^^^^ YALE XJNIVERSnY LIBRARY AN EXAMINATION or THE CASE OF DEED SCOTT against SANDFOED, |iT tiTc Bmmt €mt sf i\i EnM BkUs', Am> A FULL AND FAIK EXPOSITION' OF THE DECISION OF THE COFI!.]^ ^ND OP THE OPINIONS OF THE - ['[ MAJORHTOF-.THE JUDGES. The duty assigned me for this evening is an examination of the case of Dred Scott against Sandford, in the Supreme Court of the United States ; and an exposition of the decision of the Court, and of the opinions of the majority of the Judges. As this duty has been assigned to me, to accomplish no par tisan or ambitious purpose, but solely for our mutual instruction and improvement, that we, thereby, may be the. better able to understand our rights and duties as citizens of this State, and of the United States, I shall discharge it with entire impar tiality and truthfulness, and make no statement, nor advance any proposition, of doubtful correctness ; and, as our object is not to acquaint ourselves with the technical and prolessional niceties of the case, hut to obtain clear and coiTect views of the real and true question which was before the Court, and de cided by it, and of the propositions advanced and sanctioned by a majority of the Judges, and which affect the rights of the several States, and of the citizens thereof, I shall pass over all the questions a^i|ing on the record, which relate to the form of the pleadings, and the manner in which the case came before the Court. The action was commenced in the Circuit Court of the United States, for the District of Missouri, to establish the freedom of Dred Scott, his wife and their two daughters, who were claimed and held by Sandford, the defendant, as slaves. The courts of the United States are not courts of general jurisdiction, having a right to hear and decide controversies of all kinds, but have jurisdiction over, and authority to hear and determine only certain specified cases, all of which are desig nated in the Constitution of the United States. Among those cases so designated, are controversies between citizens of differ ent States, It follows, as a natural and logical sequence from this constitution of the Courts of the United States, that whenever a party commences an action in one of those courts, he must show on his written pleading, that he has a right to commence his suit in that court ; or, in other words, that the conti-oversy between him and his adversary is one of those specified in the Constitu tion of the United States, which the courts thereof have a right to hear and decide. If he fails to show this, his suit is always dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Accordingly, Dred Scott, in his first written pleading, called in this case, a declara tion, stated, that he was a citizen of the State of Missouri, and Sandford, a citizen of the State of Massachusetts ; and hence the controversy, to be heard and decided, was between citizens of different States. Sandford, by his written pleas, placed his defence on two grounds : First. — He interposed what is technically called a plea in abatement to the jurisdiction of the Court, and alleged that Dred Scott was not a citizen of the State of Missouri, be cause he was, " a negro of African descent ; his ancestors were of pure African blood, and were brought into this country and sold as negro slaves," and prayed judgment, that the Court would not take further cognizance of the action. Second.^ — He interposed what is technically called a plea in bar; or, in other words, a defence on the merits ; and alleged, that Dred Scott, his wife and daughters, were his slaves. The fact stated by Sandford, in his plea in abatement, was admitted by Scott to be ti-ue — viz,, that he was, " a negro of African descent," &c. In answer to Sandford's plea iu bar on the merits, Scott re plied, and denied, that he, his wife and daughters, v,-ere slave- of Sandford, and insisted that they were fi'ee. Scott, to show that he, his wife and daughters, were free ; and Sandford, to show that they were slaves ; relied on and mutual! y admitted the following facts, (it is only necessary, however, for the present purpose, to state those which relate to Scott,) viz, : That he was formerly a slave in Missouri ; was taken by his then master to the State of HHnois, and held there in servitude nearly two years, and was from there taken to a territory of the United States west of the Mississippi river, and north of thirty- six degrees and thirty minutes of north latitude, and there held in servitude for more than a year, and then, and in the year 1838, brought back to Missouri, and there held in servitude, and sold, before this suit was commenced, to Sandford, While in the territory of the United States and in the year 1836, Scoti; was married to his wife, with the consent of liis and her then owner. The Circuit Cou^ dam'fjp.rl in ¦Fnvr>v nf Rp.ntt, on the quejatiou ofjurisdiction, and against him, on the_qn£atiQn of .hia freedom-,-' He appealed to the Supreme CouFiii JBelore thisliightinbunal, the case was twice elaborately argued. The jurisdiction of the Court depended on the question, whether Scott was a citizen of the State of Missouri ; and his freedom on the question, whether the taking of a slave by his master into a free State to reside, by the laws of which, slavery is prohibited, dissolves the relation of master and slave, and con stitutes the slave a freeman, and so fully and absolutely, that if taken back again by his master into a slave State, and there held in slavery, he can assert and maintain his freedom. The Supreme Court of the United States is composed of nine , judges. Five, are citizens of slave States, and four, of free! j States. In this case, they were divided in opinion ; aud their views of the Constitution and law, applicable to the rights of the parties, exceedingly diverse. Chief Justice Taney of Maryland, and Justices, Wayne of Georgia, Catron of Tennessee, Daniel of Yirginia, and Camp bell of Alabama, being a majority, concurred substantially in their views of the rights of the parties, and of the Constitution and law, by which those rights were to be determined. Tlie Chief Justice delivered the opinion of the Court, and in it pre sents the arguments and propositions assented to and approved by the majority. To enable us to understand and form a correct judgment of the positions advanced by the Chief Justice, we must keep in view the Constitution and law, as they were generally under stood in the country, before the decision of the case under con^ sideration. Previous to the adoption of the Federal Constitution, each of the thirteen States, then existing, was sovereign and independent. They were united by a league, called the " Confederation," but by entering into that league, they did not surrender any portion of their sovereignty. Each State had, and exercised the right of determining, who were, or who might become, citizens of it. The confederation not being a government, and only a league between sovereign States, had not, and could not have, citi zens. The /Only citizens there were, or could be, before the adoption^;^ the Federal Constitution, were citizens of the seve ral States, (fl.) Among civilized nations, and especially those who have adopted that system of law known as the English Common Law, there are two, and only two, classes of citizens. One acquire their citizenship by hixlh, and the other by law. They are generally know and distinguished by the appellatives " native" and " adopted." When the Government of the United States was established by the adoption of the Constitution, there were no persons who (a.) In most, and probably in all, of the States, at the adoption of the Federal Constitution, there were free colored persons of African descent, is-ho Trere citizens of the State, and many of whom had donjt good service in the war of the Revolu tion. The 4th article of the Confederation recognised the existence of such citizens in the several States. The language of it is: " The free inhabitants of each of these States * * * « shall be entitled to all the privileges and immnnities of free citizens in tha several States." could be citizens of it, except those who were citizens of the several States. Our Federal Goverument, as we all know, is one of special powers. It can excercise nn authority except over the sub jects especially committed to its care ; and every power not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, or pro hibited by it to the States, is reserved to the States, Tlie only provision in the Federal Constitution in regard to citi zenship), is that which authorizes Congress '" to establish an uniform rule of naturalization." Under this provision, Congress passed a law soon after the adoption of the Constitution, pre scribing the terms and manner in which any alien may become " a citizen of the United States, or any of them." The Consti tution of the United States is silent on the subject of citizenship by birth, and Congress has passed no law on that subject- Hence citizenship of the United States, by birth, rests on the general principle, that all persons, born -^vithin the limits of the United States, are citizens thereof. Ac tlipvo wp^" nrMir. cuMi tit- the adoption of the Federal Constitution, except native citizens of the several States, they became, like citizens of the United States^ ihe Uonstitution recognises the two classes of citizens above mentioned, by the provisions, that no person shall be a representative unless he has been seven years a citizen of the United States ; nor a senator, unless he has been nine years a citizen of the United States ; nor president, unless a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States at the adoption of the Constitution. Xo power was prohibited to the States re specting citizenship, except so far as the adoption of aliens wa^ concerned. Tlie States were left, and now are, sovereign in re-* spect to the citizenship of all persons except aliens. With that exception, each State may declare by law, who shall, and who shall not be citizens of it. A naturalized citizen, by residence j in a State, becomes a citizen thereof. (Gassies v. Ballon, 6 Pet. E., 762.) But each State ms.j determine by law, what rights and privileges the citizens, or any class of citizens thereof, shall have and enjoy iu it. By the Constitution of the United States, " The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States." The right, which the citizen of a State has, to resort to the Courts of the United States, is not confined to controversies between citizens 6 of different States, but extends to several other kinds of contro versies, and is an important and valuable right, (a.) Hence the power of a State to declare who shall and who shall not be a citizen thereof, has an exceedingly high value under the Consti tution of the United States, in addition to the rights and privi leges, which may be conferred by the State, and held and en joyed within it. The foregoing presents the true position of citizenship In this country, from the adoption of the Federal Constitution, to the promulgation of the opinions of the majority of the judges in this case of Dred Scott. (J.) The first, and controlling question inthe case we are consider ing was, whether Dred Scott was a citizen of the State of Mis souri. Chief Justice Taney discusses it elaborately, and states the conclusions of himself and the Justices who concurred with him, in the following words : " And upon a full and careful con sideration of the subject, the Court is of opinion, that, upon th^ facts in the plea of abatement, Dred Scott was not a citizen ori Missouri wjthin^tlie jneaping. of the Constitution -of the United States, and not entitled as such, to su^Jn its_courtsi, and conse- quently, thal-thejCScniEXourt had no_juri.sdiction.of.the.case,.- and that the judgment of that court on the plea in abatement is erroneous." (19 How, E,, 42Y.) As the State of Missouri had the sole right to determine, who should, and who should not, be citizens thereof, (other than na tu rail zed_cUi^ens_ofthe.IImted_^tate^ of whom it was not pre- ' tended Dred_Scott was one,) if the Chief Justice had .confined his inquiry to the ascertainment of the fact, whether by the constitution and laws of that State, as expounded by her courts, Dred Scott was not a citizen of Missouri, " because be was a (a.) A citizen of the United States, as such, has no right to sue ir, the United State.i CourU ; but if he is a resident of, cr identified with, any State io the Union, h.e h.^3 a right to sue in the Federal Courts, and cannot be deprived of tliat right, u.ileas he is shown to be a mere wanderer without a home. (Opinion of Tliorap- soii, .Justice, itx Rabaud vn, De Wolfe, 1 Paine C. C. R., ."iSS.) (0 ) Applications had been made occasionally, by colored men, at the Department of fctiiie, .1", Washington, for passports as American citizens to go abroad, and refused. But aa the granting or refusing of a passport determined no right, tlie action of the Department of State made no change in citizenship, under our Fe deral and State Constititions and laws, L/^negro of African descent, his ancestors of pure African blood, and brought into this country and sold as slaves," then tho opinions of himself and his concurring associates would have made no change in the powers and rights of the States in re spect to citizenship. But the Chief Justice, not only, did not. i confine himself to that inquiry, but he did not make it at all,! I He commenced his discussion of the question of jurisdiction raised by the plea in abatement, by stating, that " The question is simply this ; can a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this country and sold as slaves, become a member of the politi cal community formed and brought into existence by the Con stitution of the United States, and, as such, become entitled to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities, guaranteed by that instrument to the citizen — one of wliich rights is, the pri vilege of suing in a Court of the United States in the cases-' specified in the Constitution." After remarking, that the plea in abatement "applies to that class of persons only, whose an cestors were, negroes of the African race, and imported into this country, and sold and held as slaves," the Chief Justice proceeds and re-states the question as follows : " The only mat- ^ ter in issue before the Court, therefore, is, whether the descend ants of such slaves, when they shall be emancipated, or who are born of parents, who had become free before their birth, are citizens of a state, in the sense in which the word citizen is used in the Constitution of the United States," (19 Ho^v. E., i03,) The Chief Justice then proceeds to show, by various modes of reasoning, that free colored persons of the class mentioned belonged to a degraded race, when the Fedp.ral Constitntinn wa^-,^ ^adopted — were not a portion of the community intended to be protected by the government then instituted — and, in his own/ words, " had no rights which the white man was bound to re spect." (19 How. E., 407.) He then maintains, by like modes of reasoning, that their condition has not since been changed, and concludes, that they are not citizens of the United States, and are not, and cannot become citizens of a state, so a^ to be entitled to sue in the Courts of the United States, (a.) / %a.') This position disfranchises all colored persons of African descent and their //Ascendants, who were citizens of the several States, when the Constitution of /^the United States was adopted. This last proposition, viz., that they are not citizens of a State, and cannot become such, coming in conflict with the power reserved to the States to determine, who shall, and who shall not, be citizens thereof, the Chief Justice, speaking, as al ready mentioned, for himself and his four concurring associates, states aud maintains the proposition, " ^^'fit th'^ Cftn't^'tutiojipfj the United States, upon its adoption, took from the States all power, by any subsequent legislation, to introduce as a citizen into the political family of the United States any one, no mat ter where he was born, or what might be his character or con dition." (19 How. E., 418.) K this proposition was clothed with judicial authority, so as to have become the law of the land, the several States of the Union would be deprived by it of one of their important and valuable sovereign rights. We should not omit to notice here, that, in this case, it was not alleged, or even suggested, that there had been any legislation by the State of Missouri subsequent to the adoption of the Federal Constitution, affecting, in the least, Scott's right of citizenship ;. indeed, the proposition, in the form stated, was inapplicable to Missouri, as she did not commence her existence as a State, until more than thirty years after the Constitution was adopted. But' there had been such legislation in the State nf Tirassiiflina.qtt-i!^^ under which, colored citizens of that State had claimed, under the Constitution of the United States, their rights as citizens of one of the States of the Union, in some of the slave states, and their rights had been, in those states, not only, denied, but a fair trial of them prevented by disorderly assemblies of the people, {a.) In this connection, and before proceeding to examine and give an exposition of the opinions of the majority of the Judges on the question, whether Dred Scott, his wife and their daugh ters, were slaves, it is proper to state two principles of law, well (a.) Tiie right which a citizen of one State has in another State, rmder the Federal Constitution, came under review before Justice Washington, of the Su preme Court of the United States, in the case of Lessee of Butler us, Fansworth, (4 Wash. C. C. R., 102-3,) and Justice Washington saya, " With respect to the im munities which tbe rights of citizenship can confer, the citizen of one State is to be considered as a citizen of each and every other State in the Union." ^ established and universally adhered to by upright and enlight ened Judses. ¦'to'- First. — The decision of a court is a binding autliority only on tlie[point or proposition'! upon Avhicli the case ne- cessarilij tu7-7ied, and was decided. Seeo7id. — An opinion expressed or a proposition stated by a Judge in delivering his opinion, which is not necessarily involved in the decision of the case before the Court for judgment, is called, professionally, " oliter dictum" rendered into English, ¥ a thing said by the way," and meaning, " an opinion given in passing, andwhich, not applying judicially to the case, is not to "^e resorted to as an authority." Beside the above principles of law, there are two rules of ju dicial action, which should be stated. First. — When there are several reasons which may be assign ed for a decision, a discreet Judge will be content with giving only one of them, especially if that one is conclusive, and the other reasons involve delicate or important questions partaking of political or party strife. Second, — When an objection is made to the jnrisdic- ' tion of the Court, and the Judges decide that the Court has not jurisdiction, the case is dismissed, and the Judges do not proceed and decide the cause on its merits. To do so is obviously, and, I believe, is universally consider ed improper. In this connection, I ought also to draw your attention to the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, which give the Federal Courts their jurisdiction. By article 3, section 1, "The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and estab lish." By the same article, section 2, "The judicial power 2 10/ shall extend to, (enumerating the several cases, and among others), controversies between citizens of different States." From these provisions of the Constitution, it is obviously im material, OU a question of jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, in' what court the action is pending, whether in the Supreme or an inferior court, for the question is not, which of the courts of che United States has authority to hear and decide the given case, but whether the judicial foxoer of the United States ex tends to the case, in whatever court it may be pending. So in this case, when the Court decided, that Dred Scott was not a citizen of the State of Missouri, they decided, that this was not a case to which the judicial power of the United States extend ed, and of course, no court of the United States had jurisdiction over it. After announcing the conclusion above stated, that Scott was not a citizen of the State of Missouri, and consequently, that the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction of th.e case, and that the judgment of that court sustaining its jurisdiction, was erroneous and must be reversed, the Chief Justice speaking, let it always be remembered, for himself and his concumng associates, pro ceeds to discuss and decide the case on the merits, and deter mine whether Dred Scott was a slave ; asserting the right and duty to do so on two grounds — One, that if Scott was a slave, he was not a citizen, and for that additional reason had not a right to commence this suit in a Court of the United States — ihe other,, that the Supreme Court has aright, and it is its duty, to review the decisions of the Circuit Court, and as that Court had decided this case on the merits and adjudged that Scott was a slave, the Supreme Court ought to review that question and ascertain if it was rightly decided. The Chief Justice presented a most elaborate argument to prove that Scott was a slave, and in the course of that argument expresses several very important opinions ; and as I present thern, I will state in connection with each, what was the gene ral understanding of the country previously, on the same sub ject. rWst7—^\iQ opinion is given, that the provision in the third section of the fourth article of the Constitution of the United 11 States, respecting the territory thereof, in the following words, viz. : " The Congress shall have power to dispose of, aud make all needful rules and regulations, respecting tlie territory, or other property belonging to the United States," was oidy ap plicable to the territory owned by tho United States when the Constitution was adopted, and did not apply to any territory subsequently acquired, (19 How. E., 432, 436, 441, 442 ;) and / that over territory, acquired subsequently to the adoption of the Constitution, Congress has not_fulL_pc«f©3i-€^i46g^islat¦i©nv- (19 How. E., 447 to 450.) Previous tc the announcement of this opinion, the general, and I think it should be said, the universal understanding of the country, and of the different departments of the General Go vernment, was, that the clause in the Constitution above men tioned did apply to all the territories of the United States, whenever and however acquired, and gave Congi'ess full power to legislate concerning them, without reference to the time when the right to them was acquired. In this connection, we should recall and keep in view the fact, that Congress has exercised full power of legislation over all the territories of the United States, from the adoption of the Constitution to the present time ; andthat, too, without any re ference to the time when they were acquired. Second. — ^The opinion is given, that there is no "differenceJ between property in a slave and other property j" that each is entitled to the same protection, and stands on the same footing under our Constitution and laws. (19 How. E., 451, 452.) Before this opinion was announced, the universal understand ing of the country was, that there was a broad distinction be tween the two kinds of property In many important and marked respects, but palpably and especially in this, that while pro perty in lands and chattels was recognised throughout the whole country, and In every State of the Union, it was with equal universality acknowledged, that property in a slave was against natural right, and could only exist by positive law ; that such law could have no operation beyond the limits of the State which enacted it ; and that if the slave passed beyond those limits, he was free, with this single qualification, viz., if he 12 escaped from servitude into another State of our Union, his mas ter, under a provision of the Constitution of the United States, might reclaim him. Third. — ^The opinion is given, that the Constitution of the Uni ted States extends to the territories thereof. (19 How. E., 449, 450.) Before this opinion was announced, the underatandlng of the country, it is believed, was universal, that the Constitution of the United States was made for the States, and for them only; that it did not, and could not, by its very terms, include the territories. It was made by " The People of the United States'' " for the United States of America j" and "in order to.form a more perfect Union" between the States. All Its provisions re late to the States and citizens thereof. The territories are the property of the United States, and remain their property till they become States and are admitted Into the Union. When so admitted, they come under the Federal Constitution, and are governed and protected by it, and not till then. While the property of the United States, Congress exercises over them plenary power of legislation, not only under the clause In the Constitution, giving Congress power, to "make all needful rules and regulations, respecting the territoi-y" of the United States, but by virtue of the sovereign power, which the United States has over the territories belonging to them. This sove reign power has been freely exercised from the beginning of the government, without any regard to the provisions of the Constitution. One of many instances showing this, Is the re moval by the President of territorial judges ; while all judges, J high and low, under the Constitution, hold their offices " during good behavior." to^ Fourth. — ^The opinion is given, that Congress has not power to prohibit slavery in the territories of the United States ac quired since the adoption of the Constitution, and that the own ers of slaves have a right to take their slaves into such territo ries and hold them there in servitude, (19 How. E., 449 to 452,) and that the law of Congress, which prohibited slavery in the territories of the United States north of thirty-six degrees and 13 thirty minutes of north latitude, called the Missouri Compromise, (those territories having been acquired since the adoption of the Constitution), was unconstitutional and void, {a.) (19 How. E., 452.) Previous to the announcement of this opinion, the general understanding of the country was, that Congress had power_to prohibit slavery in all the territories of the United States, and without reference to the time when they were acquired — that the owners of slaves had not a right to take them into a terri tory of the United States, where slavery did not exist by law, and if they did, the slaves became free — and that the law, pro hibiting slavery in the territories of the United States north of thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes of north latitude, was con stitutional and valid. In this connection, and to enable us to understand fully and judge correctly of the opinion above stated, we should remem ber and keep in view, the fact, that Congress has, in nine in stances, and by as many separate laws, prohibited slavery in the tef-i'Itorles of the United States ; the first act being passed in 'August, 1Y89, and the last one In August, 1848. Four of them prohibited slavery in territory acquired since the adoption of the Constitution ; also the fact, that the Constitution of the United States contains a provision, that " No State shall pass a law im pairing the obligation of contracts." A vested right is a con tract executed ; and the courts of the United States, by a series of decisions, have established the principle, that a State cannot, either by a law of its Legislature, or a clause in its constitution, destroy or injuriously disturb a vested right, as that would Im pair the obligation of a contract. Hence, if the ownei-s of slaves may take them Into a territory of the United States and hold them there, as they may other property, that territory, when it becomes a state, cannot by a provision in its constitution, or a law of Its Legislature, put an end to slavery within it. (5.) — also (a.) Mr. Justice Catron, while concurring in this opinion, placed his own, ou rea sons different from those of his associates. (6.) 1. This shows, that " squatter or popular sovereignty," as it is called, is an illusion ; and assuming that the opinion of the five judges, viz., that slaves may be taken into the territories and held there, is law, then Mr. Buchanan's declaration 14 the fact, that if a citizen of a slave state, say of Georgia, being the ov/uer of slaves under and by virtue of the laws of that State, has a right to take them Into a territory of the United States and hold them there, while it is a territory, and after it becomes a State, he so holds them by virtue of the laws of Georgia ; and thus effect Is given to laws of that State, not only beyond the limits of the State, but in a territory of the United States, and in another State of the Union ; also, and lastly, the fact, that the law, called the " Missouri Compromise," was not only acquiesced in from Its passage In 1820, to its repeal in 1854, but was re- enacted in 1845, when Texas was admitted into the Union, (a) ¦ Fifth. — The opinion is given, that the taking of Dred Scott by his master into the State of Illinois, where slavery is for bidden by its constitution and laws, and holding him there in servitude nearly two years, did not emancipate him. Previous to the announcement of this opinion, the general, and I believe the universal, understanding of the country was, that the great and noble principle of the common law prevailed that " Kan.^as is as much a slave state as South Carolina," is strictly true — and so will every other state be a slave state, which shall be formed out of a territory into which slaves may have been taken. 2. In this connection, the startling thought arises, what will be the effect of the opinions of the majority of the judges, in connection with the clause ia the Consti tution protecting vested rights, upon the legislation of the several stijtes which have abolished slavery 1 Does not that whole body of legislation fall as unconsti tutional? And what can prevent former owners of slaves or their heirs, in the free states, from reclaiming their former slaves, and the posterity of their female slaves, and reducing them again to slavery !( (a) Tbo thirdarticleof the act, admitting Texas, is as follows: " Article III. New States of convenient size, not exceeding four in number, in addition to said State of Texas, and having sufficient population, may hereafter, by the consent of said State, be formed out of the territoty thereof, which shall be entitled to admission under the provisions of the Federal Constitudon.i^. And such States as may be formed out of that portion of said territory lyicgT(«Sa'of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north latitude, commonly called the Missouri Compromise line, shall be admitted into the Union, with or without slavery, as tho people of each state asking may desire ; and io such state or states as shall be formed out of said territory, north of said Missouri Compromise line, slavery, or involuntary servitude, (except for crime), shall be prohibited," t 15 in all the free States of this Union ; that as soon as a slave placed his foot on free soil, he became a freeman ; and that the only modification of this principle was In the provision of our , Federal Constitution, before mentioned, which entitles a master ¦ to a return of his slave, when he escapes from his service into^-^ another state. To form a correct judgment respecting the fifth opinion above stated, we must call to mind the obvious results which follow fi'om it. If an owner of slaves can take them into a free state for a temporary purpose, or residence, without thereby dissolv ing the relation of master and slave, and emancipating them. then the law of -the slave state, under and by virtue of which they are his slaves, has an operation, not only beyond the limits of that slave state, but actually in another sovereign state of the Union ; and thus compels the latter srfate to tolerate slavery within Its borders and against its will .'^ If an owner of slaves can hold them in a free state for the length of time the owner of Dred Scott held him in Illinois, without thereby emancipat ing them, there seems to be nothing to prevent an owner from taking his slaves into a free state aud holding them for any length of time and for any purpose, provided he does not in tend to become a permanent resident of the free state, and de signs at some future day to return with his slaves to the slave state from which he came, or go to some other slave state. In this way slave labor may be brought into contact and competi tion with tree labor in the free states. An owner of slaves may take a contract on a canal or railroad in a free state, and bring his slaves there to do the work. And if property In a slave stands on the same footing under the constitution and laws as property In lands and chattels, as the majority of the judges hold that it does. It would seem to follow, that a slave may be taken and held anywhere, in any state, and for any length of time, that a citizen may take and hold his carriage or his horse. After expressing the opinions above stated, and making full and elaborate arguments to sustain them, the Chief Justice states the final judgment of the Court to be ; that Dred Scott is not a citizen of the State of Missouri, " and that the Circuit { Coiift olTire" tTTTireci'StatesT^ that reason, had no jurisdiction of the case, and could give no judgment in it. Its judgment 16 for the defendant (Sandford) must consequently be reversed, and a mandate Issued, directing the suit to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction." (19 How. E., 451.) Justices, iS^elsou of jSTev/ York, and Grier of Pennsylvania, expressed no opinion on the question of jurisdiction, not con sidering it before the Court, but discussed the case ou the merits, viz., whether Dred Scott was a slave, and were of opi nion that that question should be determined by the laws of Missouri, and after a full examination of the constitution, laws and decisions of that State, came to the conclusion, that by them, Dred Scott was a slave, and they were In favor of affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court. (19 How. E., 469.) Justice 'iGrier also expressed an opinion, that the Missouri Compromise // was unconstitutional. Justices, McLean of Ohio, aud Curtis of Massachusetts, dis cussed most elaborately all the questions which arose in the cause, and took opposite views, aud expressed opposite opinions, on all of them, to the majority of the judges. Their opinions were, that Dred Scott was a citizen of the State of Missouri, and had a right to sue Sandford In the Courts of the United States; and as those Courts had jurisdiction of the cause, they were bound to examine and decide It on the merits. They ac cordingly did examine the question, whether Dred Scott was a slave, and came to the conclusion, that he was a freeman ; and as the Circuit Court had decided that Scott was a slave, they were of opinion, that for that reason thejudgment of that Court was erroneous, and ought to be reversed. The foregoing statement and exposition of the judgment of the Court and of the opinions of Chief .Justice Taney and bis four concurring associates, will enable all to form a correct judgment, whether the first question before the Court was, whether this was a case to which the judicial power of the United States extended, or, in other words, whether It was a con troversy between citizens of different states, and depended on the question whether Scott was a citizen of the State of Mis souri according to the constitution and laws thereof. If that was the fii'st question, and the Court decided, as the majority of the Judges certainly did, and pronounced the judgment of the Court to be, that Dred Scott was not a citizen of the State of Missouri, and for that reason the courts of the United States had not jurisdiction of the case and ordered It to be dismissed ; then a correct judgment can be formed, whether the Judges In the majority, having decided this was not a case to which the judicial power of the United States extended, had a right, or could, with even the appearance of judicial propriety, go far ther, and express the opinions above stated, viz. : 1. That free colored persons, whose ancestore were imported into this country and sold as slaves, " had no rights which the white man was bound to respect," and were not citizens of the United States. 2. That " the Constitution of the United States, upon its adop tion, took from the States all power by any subsequent legisla tion to introduce as a citizen into the political family of the United States any one, no matter where he was horn, or what might he his character or condition." 3. Tbat the clause in the Federal Constitution, which gives (Pongress full power of legislation over the territories of the United States, applies only to the territories, which the general government owned when the constitution was adopted, and does not apply to temtories subsequently acquired. 4. That over territories acqiilred by the general government since the adoption of the Federal Constitution, Congress has not full power of legislation. 5. That there is no difference between property in a slave and other property. 6. That the Constitution of the United States extends to the temtories thereof 7. That Congress has not power to prohibit slavery in the ter ritories acquired since the constitution was adopted. 18 8. That the owners of slaves have a right to take their slaves into territories so acquired, and hold them tliere In servitude. 9, That the act of Congress passed in 1820, prohibiting slave ry in the territories north of thirty-six degrees and thirty min utes of north latitude, was unconstitutional and void. (5. lO.^That the taking of a slave by his master Into a free state, and keeping him there In his] service for two years, does not entitle him to his freedom. : ,^. If these opinions are clothed with judicial^' authority, and for that reason are the law of the land, we cannot fail to see, that they give the country a new constitution, and a new system of law, on the subject of slavery and the government of our terri tories, and widely different from those given us by our fathers, and under which we have hitherto lived. But If they are extra judicial, mere " ol/ite/- dicta," and have no judicial authority, then a most serious question arises for the decision of the country, and upon which every citizen should be prepared to form an enlightened judgment ; and that question is, what constitutional and lawful action can be taken, to prevent these opinions from being engrafted on our Constitution and laws by judicial legisla tion. Should the Supreme Court of the United States remain organized as at present, T\'ith only nine judges, and five of them citizens of the slave states, there can scarcely remain a doubt but that, as cases arise, they will be decided in accordance with these opinions. Congress has power to reorganize that court ; and the question is, Sliall that be done, so as to give the free states a fair rf p:-escntation In that tribunal ? In favor of this measure, it Is said, that the slave states have less than half the number of free white people, and less than one-third of the amount of litigation, which the free states have; and that it Is, consequently, just and proper, that the Court should be so organized, as to give each portion of the Union an equal and fair proportion of the judges. On the other hand. It is said, re-orsianization of the Court would be a harsh and dangerous measure. Each citizen must decide for himself which is the 19 greater evil, to re-organize the Court, or allow these opinions to become parts of our constitution and laws, and give us a new constitutional and legal system on the subject of slavery and our territories, (a.) Geneva, E". Y., December 28, 1858. (o.) In February, 1847, Mr. Calhoun, then a Senator in Congress, from South Carolina, submitted to tbe Senate the following resolutions: "Jiesolved, Tbat the territories of the United States belong to the several States •composing this Union, and ai-e held by them as their joint and common property. " Resohed, Tbat Congress, aa tbe joint agent and representative of the States of the Union, has no right to make any law or do any-act whatever that shall directly, or by its effects, make any discrimination betweea the States of this Union, by which any one of them ebaU be deprived of its full and equal rights in any territory of the United States acquired or to be acquired." . "Resolved, That the enactment of any law which should directly, or by its •effects, deprive the citizens of any of the States of this Union from emigrating with their property, into any of the territories of the United Stats, would make such a