YaleUmyersit'/Librap/

39002005730933

GTON.LEAGUES

HENRY lONES FORD

George St. John Sheffield

WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES

ABRAHAM LINCOLN EDITION
VOLUME 14
THE CHRONICLES
OF AMERICA SERIES
ALLEN JOHNSON
EDITOR
GERHARD R. LOMER
CHARLES W. JEFFERYS
ASSISTANT EDITORS

WASHINGTON
AND HIS COLLEAGUES
A CHRONICLE OF THE
RISE AND FALL OF FEDERALISM
BY HENRY JONES FORD

NEW HAVEN: YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS
TORONTO: GLASGOW, BROOK & CO.
LONDON: HUMPHREY MILFORD
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
1918

Copyright, 1918, by Yale University Press

CONTENTS
I. AN IMITATION COURT Page I
IL GREAT DECISIONS " 26
IIL THE MASTER BUILDER " 64
IV. ALARUMS AND EXCURSIONS " 80
V. TRIBUTE TO THE ALGERINES " 104
VI. FRENCH DESIGNS ON AMERICA " 115
VIL A SETTLEMENT WITH ENGLAND " 147
VIII. PARTY VIOLENCE " 164
IX. THE PERSONAL RULE OF JOHN ADAMS " 195
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE ¦' 227
INDEX " 231

ILLUSTRATIONS
GEORGE WASHINGTON, SEPTEMBER. 1795
Prom the painting by Gilbert Stuart, known as
the " Gibbs-Channing Washington," in the
Metropohtan Museum of Art, New York.
This portrait was painted for Colonel Gibbs,
and passed from him to his sister, Mrs. William
F. Channing, of Providence, R. I. It was pur
chased by Mr. S. P. Avery, and loaned to
the Metropolitan Museum. Frcmtispiece
FEDERAL HALL, BROAD STREET, NEW
YORK, AT THE TIME OF WASHINGTON'S
INAUGURATION From au engraving by Amos Doolittle, after a
drawing by Peter Lacour, published in New
Haven in 1790, in the collection of the New
York Historical Society. Facing page 16
MARTHA WASHINGTON
WASHINGTON, 1796, THE "ATHENAEUM
PORTRAIT"
From the unfinishedpaintings by Gilbert Stuart,
in the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston. Loaned
by the Boston Athenaeum. •• " go
DESK USED BY WASHINGTON, AS PRESI
DENT, WHEN PHILADELPHIA WAS THE
NATIONAL CAPITAL. From a photograph
of the original in the collection of the Historical
Society of Pennsylvania.
CAMP BED USED BY WASHINGTON AT
VALLEY FORGE. From a photograph of the
original in the collection of the New York His
torical Society. " " «S

X ILLUSTRATIONS
AUTOGRAPH LETTER OF WASHINGTON
INVITING GUESTS TO DINNER, DATED
AT WEST POINT, AUGUST 16, 1779
From the original in the collection of the New
York Historical Society. Feeing page 96
GEORGE WASHINGTON, 1795
From the painting by Charles Willson Peale, in
the collection of the New York Historical Society.
This is the last portrait of Washington painted
by Peale from life, and the sittings for it were
given iu the artist's quarters, on the second
floor of the Hall of the American Philosophical
Society, Independence Square, Philadelphia. " " 108
ROBERT MORRIS. From the painting by C. W.
Peale, in the Pennsylvania Museum of the Fine
Arts, Philadelphia.
GENERAL HENRY KNOX. From the painting
by Gilbert Stuart, in the Museum of Fine Arts,
Boston. " " ISO
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, ABOUT 1792
From the painting by John Trumbull, iu the
Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York. " " ISi
THOMAS JEFFERSON
Prom a signed plaster cast of the bust by Hou
don, 1789, in the collection of the New York
Historical Society. " " 136
JOHN ADAMS
From the painting by John Trumbull, in
Memorial HaU, Harvard University, Cam
bridge, Mass. " " 196

WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
CHAPTER I
AN IMITATION COURT
Washington was glad to remain at Mount
Vernon as long as possible after he had con
sented to serve as President, enjoying the life
of a country gentleman, which was now much
more suited to his taste than official employment.
He was weary of public duties and the heavy
demands upon his time which had left him with
little leisure for his private life at home. His
correspondence during this period gives ample
evidence of his extreme reluctance to reassume
public responsibilities. To bring the matter to
its true proportions, it must be remembered that
to the view of the times the new constitution was
but the latest attempt to tinker the federal scheme,
1

2 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
and it was yet to be seen whether this endeavor
would be any more successful than previous
efforts had been. As for the title of President, it
had already been borne by a number of congres
sional politicians and had been rather tarnished
by the behavior of some of them. Washington
was not at all eager to move in the matter before
he had to, and he therefore remained on his farm
until Congress met, formally declared the result
of the election, and sent a committee to Mount
Vernon to give him official notice. It was not
until April 30, 1789, that he was formally installed
as President.
Madison and Hamilton were meanwhile going
ahead with their plans. This time was perhaps
the happiest in their lives. They had stood to
gether in years of struggle to start the movement
for a new constitution, to steer it through the
convention, and to force it on the States. Al
though the fight had been a long and a hard one,
and although they had not won all that they had
wanted, it was nevertheless a great satisfaction
that they had accomplished so much, and they
were now applying themselves with great zest to
the organization of the new government. Madi
son was a member of Congress; Hamilton lived

AN IMITATION COURT 3
near the place where Congress held its sittings
in New York and his house was a rendezvous
for the federal leaders. Thither Madison would
often go to talk over plans and prospects. A lady
who lived near by has related how she often saw
them walking and talking together, stopping some
times to have fun with a monkey skipping about in
a neighbor's yard.
At that time Madison was thirty-eight; Ham
ilton was thirty-two. They were little men, of
the quick, dapper type. Madison was five feet
six and a quarter inches tall, slim and delicate in
physique, with a pale student's face lit up by
bright hazel eyes. He was as plain as a Quaker in
his style of dress, and his hair, which was light in
color, was brushed straight back and gathered into
a small queue, tied with a plain ribbon. Hamil
ton was of about the same stature, but his figure
had wiry strength. His Scottish ancestry was
manifest in his ruddy complexion and in the
modeling of his features. He was more elegant
than Madison in his habitual attire. He had a
very erect, dignified bearing; his expression was
rather severe when his features were in repose,
but he had a smile of flashing radiance when he
was pleased and interested. Washington, who

4 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
stood over six feet two inches in his buckled shoes,
had to look down over his nose when he met the
young statesmen who had been the wheel horses
of the federal movement.
Soon after Washington arrived in New York he
sought Hamilton's aid in the management of the
national finances. There was the rock on which
the government of the Confederation had found
ered. There the most skillful pilotage was re
quired if the new government was to make a safe
voyage. Washington's first thought had been to
get Robert Morris to take charge again of the
department that he had formerly managed with
conspicuous ability, and whUe stopping in Phila
delphia on his way to New York, he had approached
Morris on the subject. Morris, who was now en
gaged in grand projects which were eventually to
bring him to a debtor's prison, declined the position
but strongly recommended Hamilton. This sug
gestion proved very acceptable to_ Washington,
who was well aware of Hamilton's capacity.
The thorny question of etiquette was the next
matter to receive Washington's attention. Per
sonally he favored the easy hospitality to which
he was accustomed in Virginia, but he knew quite
well that his own taste ought not to be decisive.

AN IMITATION COURT 5
The forms that he might adopt would become
precedents, and hence action should be taken
cautiously. Washington was a methodical man.
He had a well-balanced nature which was never
disturbed by timidity of any kind and rarely by
anxiety. His anger was strong when it was
excited, but his ordinary disposition was one
of massive equanimity. He was not imaginative,
but he took things as they came, and did what
the occasion demanded. In crises that did not
admit of deliberation, his instinctive courage
guided his behavior, but such crises belong to
mihtary experience, and in civil life careful delib
eration was his rule. It was his practice to read
important documents pen in hand to note the
points. From one of his familiar letters to General
Knox we learn that on rising in the morning he
would tum over in his mind the day's work and
would consider how to deal with it. His new
circumstances soon apprised him that the first
thing to be settled was his deportment as President.
Under any form of government the man who is
head of the state is forced, as part of his public
service, to submit to public exhibition and to be
exact in social observance; but, unless precautions
are taken, engagements will consume his time and

6 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
strength. Writing to a friend about the situation
in which he found himself, Washington declared:
"By the time I had done breakfast, and thence
till dinner, and afterwards till bed-time, I could
not get relieved from the ceremony of one visit,
before I had to attend to another. In a word, I
had no leisure to read or answer the dispatches
that were pouring in upon me from all quarters. "
The radical treatment which the situation
called for was aided by a general feeling in Con
gress that arrangements should be made for the
President different from those under the Articles of
Confederation. It had been the practice for the
President to keep open house. Of this custom
Washington remarked that it brought the office
"in perfect contempt; for the table was considered
a public one, and every person, who could get
introduced, conceived that he had a right to be
invited to it. This, although the table was always
crowded (and with mixed company, and the
President considered in no better light than as a
maitre d' hotel), was in its nature impracticable,
and as many offenses given as if no table had been
kept." It was important to settle the matter
before Mrs. Washington joined him in New York.
Inside of ten days from the time he took the oath of

AN IMITATION COURT 7
office, he therefore drafted a set of nine queries,
copies of which he sent to Jay, Madison, Hamil
ton, and John Adams, with these sensible remarks:
"Many things, which appear of little importance
in themselves and at the beginning, may have
great and durable consequences from their having
been established at the commencement of a new
general government. It will be much easier to com
mence the Administration upon a well-adjusted
system, built on tenable grounds, than to correct
errors, or alter inconveniences, after they shall
have been confirmed by habit. The President, in
all matters of business and etiquette, can have
no object but to demean himself in his public
character in such a manner as to maintain the dig
nity of his office, without subjecting himself to
the imputation of superciliousness or unnecessary
reserve. Under these impressions he asks for
your candid and undisguised opinion. "
Only the replies of Hamilton and Adams have
been preserved. Hamilton advised Washington
that while "the dignity of the office should be
supported . . . care will be necessary to avoid
extensive disgust or discontent. . . . The
notions of equality are yet, in my opinion, too
general and strong to admit of such a distance

8 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
being placed between the President and other
branches of the Government as might even be
consistent with a due proportion." Hamilton
then sketched a plan for a weekly levee: "The
President to accept no invitations, and to give
formal entertainments only twice or four times a
year, the anniversaries of important events of the
Revolution ." In addition, ' ' the President on levee
days, either by himself or some gentleman of his
household, to give informal invitations to family
dinners . . . not more than six or eight to be
invited at a time, and the matter to be confined
essentiaUy to members of the legislature and other
official characters. The President never to remain
long at table. " Hamilton observed that his views
did not correspond with those of other advisers,
but he urged the necessity of behaving so as "to
remove the idea of too immense inequality, which
I fear would excite dissatisfaction and cabal."
This was sagacious advice, and Washington
would have benefited by conforming to it more
closely than he did. The prevailing tenor of the
advice which he received is probably reflected
in the communication from Adams, who was
in favor of making the government impressive
through grand ceremonial. " Chamberlains, aides-

AN IMITATION COURT 9
de-camp, secretaries, masters of ceremonies, etc.,
will become necessary. . . . Neither dignity nor
authority can be supported in human minds,
collected into nations or any great numbers, with
out a splendor and majesty in some degree pro
portioned to them. " Adams held that in no case
would it be "proper for the President to make
any formal public entertainment," but that this
should be the function of some minister of state,
although "upon such occasions the President, in
his private character, might honor with his pres
ence. " The President might invite to his house
in small parties what official characters or citizens
of distinction he pleased, but this invitation
should always be given without formaHty. The
President should hold levees to receive "visits of
compliment," and two days a week might not be
too many for this purpose. The idea running
through Adams's advice was that in his private
character the President might live lUie any other
private gentleman of means, but that in his public
functions he should adopt a grand style. This
advice, which Washington undoubtedly received
from others as well as Adams, influenced Wash
ington's behavior, and the consequences were
exactly what HamUton had predicted. According

10 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
to Jefferson's recollection, many years afterward,
Washington told him that General Knox and
Colonel Humphreys drew up the regulations and
that some were proposed "so highly strained
that he absolutely rejected them." Jefferson
further related that, when Wasliington was
re-elected, Hamilton took the position that the
parade of the previous inauguration ought not to
be repeated, remarking that "there was too much
ceremony for the character of our government."
It is a well-known characteristic of human
nature to be touchy about such matters as these.
Popular feeling about Washington's procedure was
inflamed by reports of the grand titles which
Congress was arranging to bestow upon the
President. That matter was, in fact, considered
by the Senate on the very day of Washington's
arrival in New York and before any steps could
have been taken to ascertain his views. A joint
committee of the two houses reported against
annexing "any style or title to the respective
styles or titles of office expressed in the Con
stitution." But a group of Senators headed by
John Adams was unwilling to let the matter drop,
and another Senate committee was appointed
which recommended as a proper style of address

AN IMITATION COURT 11
"His Highness, the President of the United States
of America, and Protector of their Liberties."
WhUe the Senate debated, the House acted, address
ing the President in reply to his inaugural address
simply as "The President of the United States."
The Senate now had practically no choice but to
drop the matter, but in so doing adopted a resolu
tion that because of its desire that "a due respect
for the majesty of the people of the United States
may not be hazarded by singularity," the Senate
was still of the opinion "that it would be proper
to annex a respectable title to the office." Thus
it came about that the President of the United
States is distinguished by having no title. A
governor may be addressed as "Your Excellency,"
a judge as "Your Honor," but the chief magis
trate of the nation is simply "Mr. President. " It
was a relief to Washington when the Senate dis
continued its attempt to decorate him. He wrote
to a friend, "HappUy this matter is now done with,
I hope never to be revived."
DetaUs of the social entanglements in which
Washington was caught at the outset of his ad
ministration are generally omitted by serious
historians, but whatever iUustrates life and manners
is not insignificant, and events of this character

12 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
had, moreover, a distinct bearing on the politics of
the times. The facts indicate that Washington's
arrangements were somewhat encumbered by the
civic ambition of New York. That bustling town
of 30,000 population desired to be the capital of
the nation, and, in the splendid exertions which
it made, it went rather too far. Federal HaU, de
signed as a City Hall, was built in part for the ac
commodation of Congress, on the site in WaU Street
now in part occupied by the United States Sub-
Treasury. The plans were made by Major Pierre
Charles I'Enfant, a French engineer who had
served with distinction in the Continental Army
but whose clearest title to fame is the work which
he did in laying out the city of Washington when
it was made the national capital. Federal Hall
exceeded in dignified proportions and in artistic
design any public building then existing in America.
The painted ceilings, the crimson damask canopies
and hangings, and the handsome furniture were
considered by many political agitators to be a great
violation of republican simplicity. The architect
was first censured in the public press and then,
because of disputes, received no pay for his time
and trouble, although, had he accepted a grant of
city lots offered by the town council he would have

AN IMITATION COURT 13
received a compensation that would have turned
out to be very valuable.
Federal Hall had been completed and presented
to Congress before Washington started for New
York. The local arrangements for his reception
were upon a corresponding scale of magnificence,
but with these Washington had had nothing to do.
The barge in which he was conveyed from the
Jersey shore to New York was fifty feet long, hung
with red curtains and having an awning of satin.
It was rowed by thirteen oarsmen, in white with
blue ribbons. In the inauguration ceremonies
Washington's coach was drawn by four horses
with gay trappings and hoofs blackened and
polished. This became his usual style. He
seldom walked in the street, for he was so much a
pubhc show that that might have been attended by
annoying practical inconvenience; but when he
rode out with Mrs. Washington his carriage was
drawn by four — sometimes six — horses, with
two outriders, in livery, with powdered hair and
cockades in their hats. When he rode on horse
back, which he often did for exercise, he was
attended by outriders and accompanied by one or
more of the gentlemen of his household. Toward
the end of the year there arrived from England

14 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
the state coach which he used in formal visits to
Congress and for other ceremonious events. It
was a canary-colored chariot, decorated with
gilded nymphs and cupids, and emblazoned with
the Washington arms. His state was simplified
when he went to church, which he did regularly
every Sunday; then his coach was drawn by two
horses, with two footmen behind, and was followed
by a post-chaise carrying two gentlemen of his
household. Washington was fond of horses and
was in the habit of keeping a fine stable. The
term "muslin horses" was commonly used to
denote the care taken in grooming. The head
groom would test the work of the stable-boys by
applying a clean muslin handkerchief to the coats
of the animals, and, if any stain of dirt showed,
there was trouble. The night before the white
horses which Washington used as President were
to be taken out, their coats were covered by a paste
of whiting, and the animals were swathed in
wrappings. In the morning the paste was dry
and with rubbing gave a marble gloss to the
horses' coats. The hoofs were then blackened and
polished, and even the animals' teeth were scoured.
Such arrangements, however, were not peculiar
to Washington's stable. This was the usual way

AN IMITATION COURT 15
in which grooming for "the quality" was done in
that period.
The first house occupied by Washington was at
the corner of Pearl and Cherry streets, then a
fashionable locality. What the New York end of
the Brooklyn Bridge has left of it is now known as
Franklin Square. The house was so small that
three of his secretaries had to lodge in one room;
and Custis in his Recollections teUs how one of
them, who fancied he could write poetry, would
sometimes disturb the others by walking the floor
in his nightgown trying the rhythm of his lines by
rehearsing them with loud emphasis. About a
year later Washington removed to a larger house
on the west side of Broadway near Bowling Green.
Both buildings went down at an early date before
the continual march of improvement in New York.
In Washington's time Wall Street was superseding
Pearl Street as the principal haunt of fashion.
Here Uved Alexander Hamilton and other New
Yorkers prominent in their day; here were fashion
able boarding-houses at which lived the leading
members of Congress. When some fashionable
reception was taking place, the street was gay with
coaches and sedan-chairs, and the attire of the
people who then gathered was as brUliant as a

16 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGL^ES
flight of cockatoos. It was a period of spectacular
dress and behavior for both men and women, the
men rivaling the women in their use of lace, silk,
and satin. Dr. John Bard, the fashionable
doctor of his day, who attended Washington
through the severe illness which laid him up
for six weeks early In his administration, habitu
ally wore a cocked hat and a scarlet coat, his
hands resting upon a massive cane as he drove
about in a pony-phaeton. The scarlet waist
coat with large bright buttons which Jefferson
wore on fine occasions, when he arrived on the
scene, showed that he was not then averse to gay
raiment. Plain styles of dress were among the
many social changes ushered in by the French
Revolution and the war cycle that ensued
from it.
Titles figured considerably in colonial society,
and the Revolutionary War did not destroy the
continuity of usage. It was quite in accord with
the fashion of the times that the courtesy title of
Lady Washington was commonly employed in
talk about the President's household. Mrs.
Washington arrived in New York from Mount
Vernon on May 27, 1789. She was met by the
President with his barge on the Jersey shore.

AN IMITATION COURT 17
and as the barge passed the Battery a salute of
thirteen cannon was fired. At the landing-place
a large company was gathered, and the coach that
took her to her home was escorted with mUitary
parade. The questions of etiquette had been
settled by that time, and she performed her social
duties with the ease of a Virginia gentlewoman
always used to good society. She found them
irksome, however, as such things had long since
lost their novelty. Writing to a friend she said,
"I think I am more like a state prisoner than any
thing else. " She was then a grandmother through
her chUdren by her first husband. Although she
preferred plain attire, she Is described on one
occasion as wearing a velvet gown over a white
satin petticoat, her hair smoothed back over a
moderately high cushion. It was the fashion
of the times for the ladies to tent their hair up to
a great height. At one of Mrs. Washington's
receptions. Miss Mclvers, a New York beUe, had
such a towering coiffure that the feathers which
surmounted it brushed a lighted chandelier and
caught fire. The consequences might have been
serious had the fire spread to the pomatumed
structure below, but one of the President's aides
sprang to the rescue and smothered the burning

18 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
plumes between the palms of his hands before any
harm came to the young lady.
Every Tuesday whUe Congress was in session
Washington received visitors from three to four
o'clock. These receptions were known as his
levees. He is described as clad in black velvet;
his hair was powdered and gathered behind In a silk
bag; he wore knee and shoe buckles and yellow
gloves; he held a cocked hat with a cockade and
a black feather edging; and he carried a long sword
In a scabbard of white polished leather. As
visitors were presented to him by an aide, Wash
ington made a bow. To a candid friend who
reported to him that his bows were considered to
be too stiff, he replied: "Would it not have been
better to throw the veil of charity over them,
ascribing their stiffness to the effects of age, or to
the unskillfulness of my teacher, rather than to
pride and dignity of office, which God knows has
no charm for me?" Washington bore with
remarkable humility the criticisms of his man
ners that occasionally reached him.
On Friday evenings Mrs. Washington received,
and these affairs were known as her "drawing-
rooms." They were over by nine o'clock which
was bed-time In the Washington household; for

AN IMITATION COURT 19
Washington was an early riser, often getting up at
four in the morning to start the day's work betimes.
The " drawing-rooms " were more cheery affairs
than the levees, as Mrs. Washington had simple
unaffected manners, and the General had made
it known that on these occasions he desired to
be regarded not as the President but simply as a
private gentleman. This gave him an opportunity
such as he did not have at the levees to un
bend and to enjoy himself. Besides these receptions
a series of formal dinners was given to diplo
matic representatives, high officers of government,
and members of Congress. Senator Maclay of
Pennsylvania recorded In the diary he kept during
the First Congress that Washington would drink
wine with every one in the company, addressing
each in turn by name. Maclay thought it of suffi
cient interest to record that on one occasion a trifle
was served which had been made with rancid cream.
All the ladies watched to see what Mrs. Washington
would do with her portion; and next day there were
tittering remarks all through the fashionable part
of the town over the fact that she had martyred
herself and swallowed the dose. Incidentally
Maclay, who was in nearly everything a vehe
ment opponent of the policy of the Administration,

20 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
bore witness to Washington's perfect courtesy.
Maclay noted that in spite of his antagonistic
attitude Washington invited him to dinner and
paid him "marked attention," although "he
knows enough to satisfy him that I will not be
Senator after the 3d of March, and to the score of
his good nature must I place these attentions. "
In his relations with Congress, Washington
followed precedents derived from the English
constitutional system under which he had been
educated. No question was raised by anybody
at first as to the propriety of a course with which
the public men of the day were familiar. He
opened the session with an address to Congress
couched somewhat in the style of the speech from
the throne. At the first session there was talk of
providing some sort of throne for him; but the
proposal came to nothing. He spoke from the
Vice-President's chair, and the Representatives
went into the Senate chamber to hear him, as
the Commons proceed to the House of Lords
on such occasions. Congress, too, conformed to
English precedents by voting addresses in reply,
and then the members repaired to the President's
"audience chamber," where the presiding officers
of the two houses delivered their addresses and

AN IMITATION COURT 21
received the President's acknowledgments. These
were disagreeable duties for Washington, although
he discharged them conscientiously. Maclay has
recorded in his diary the fact that when Washing
ton made his first address to Congress he was
'agitated and embarrassed more than ever he was
by the leveled cannon or pointed musket. "
It was not until June 8 that Washington
settled these delicate affairs of official etiquette
sufficiently to enable him to attend to details of
administration. The government, although bank
rupt, was in active operation, and the several
executive departments were under secretaries
appointed by the old Congress. The distinguished
New York jurist, John Jay, now forty-four years
old, had been Secretary of Foreign Affairs since
1784. He had long possessed Washington's con
fidence, and now retained his Secretaryship until
the government was organized, whereupon he left
that post to become the first chief-justice of the i
United States. Henry Knox of Massachusetts,
aged thirty-nine, had been Secretary of War since
1785, a position to which Washington helped him.
They were old friends, for Knox had served through
the war with Washington ia special charge of
artUlery. The Postmaster-General, Ebenezer

22 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
Hazard, was not in Washington's favor. WhUe
the struggle over the adoption of the Constitution
was going on Hazard put a stop to the customary
practice by which newspaper publishers were
allowed to exchange copies by mail. Washing
ton wrote an indignant letter to John Jay about
this action which was doing mischief by "inducing
a belief that the suppression of Intelligence at that
critical juncture was a wicked trick of policy
contrived by an aristocratic junto." As soon
as Washington could move in the matter, Hazard
was superseded by Samuel Osgood, who as a mem
ber of the old Congress had served on a committee
to examine the post-office accounts. There was no
Secretary of the Treasury at that time, but the
affairs of that department were in the hands of a
board of commissioners, — this same Samuel Os
good, together with Walter Livingston and Arthur
Lee. To all these officials Washington now ap
plied for a written account of "the real situation"
of their departments.
Several months elapsed before he was in a posi
tion to make new arrangements. The salary bill
was approved September 2, 1789, and on the same
day Washington commissioned Hamilton as Secre
tary of the Treasury, — the first of the new

AN IMITATION COURT 23
appointments, although in the creative enact
ments the Treasury Department came last. Next
came Henry Knox, Secretary of War and of the
Navy, on September 12; Thomas Jefferson,
Secretary of State; and Edmund Randolph,
Attorney-General, on September 26, on which date
Osgood was also appointed. What may be
said to be Washington's Cabinet was thus estab
lished, but the term itself did not come into use
untU 1793. At the outset no more was decided
than that the new government should have ex
ecutive departments, and In superficial appearance
these were much like those of the old government.
The Constitution made no distinct provision
for a cabinet, and the only clause referring
to the subject Is the provision authorizing the
President to "require the opinion, in writing,
of the principal officer in each of the executive
departments, upon any subject relating to the
duties of their respective offices." This provision
does not contemplate a body that should be
consultative by Its normal character. The pre
vaUing opinion at the time the Constitution was
framed was that the consultative function would
be exercised by the Senate, which together with the
President would form the Administration. Upon

24 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
this ground, Mason of Virginia refused to sign
the report of the constitutional convention. It
was owing to practical experience and not to the
language of the Constitution that the President
was soon repelled from using the Senate as his
privy council and was thrown back upon the aid
of the heads of the executive departments, who
were thus drawn close to him as his Cabinet. '
The inchoate character of the Cabinet for a con
siderable period explains what might otherwise
seem to be an anomaly, — the delay of Jefferson
in occupying his post. He did not arrive until
March 21, 1790, when Washington had been iu
office nearly a year. But this situation occasioned
no remark. The notion that the heads of the
departments formed a cabinet, taking office with
the President and reflecting his personal choice as
his advisers, was not developed until long after
Washington's administration, although the Cabi
net itself, as a distinct feature of the system of
government, dates from his first term. The
importance which the Cabinet soon acquired is
' In this formative process the Postmaster-General was left outside
in Washington's time, since his functions were purely of a business
nature, not directly affected by the issues on which Washington
desired advice. The Postmaster-General did not become a member
of the Cabinet until 1829.

AN IMITATION COURT 25
evidence that, even imder a written constitution,
institutions owe more to circumstances than to
intentions. The Constitution of the United States
is no exception to the rule that the true constitu
tion of a country is the actual distribution of power,
written provisions being efficacious only in the
way and to the extent that they affect such distribu
tion in practice. Hence results may differ widely
from the expectations with which those provi
sions are introduced. A constitution is essentially
a growth and never merely a contrivance.

CHAPTER II

great DECISIONS

While Washington was bearing with mUitary
fortitude the rigors and annoyances of the imita
tion court in which he was confined, Congress
reached decisions that had a vast effect in de
termining the actual character of the govern
ment. The first business in order of course was
the raising of revenue, for the treasury was empty,
and payments of Interest due on the French
and Spanish loans were years behind. Madison
attacked this problem before Washington ar
rived in New York to take the oath of office. On
AprU 8 he introduced in the House a resolu
tion which aimed only at giving immediate effect
to a scheme of duties and Imposts that had been
approved generally by the States in 1783. On the
very next day debate upon this resolution began in
the committee of the whole, for there was then no
system of standing committees to intervene be-
26

GREAT DECISIONS 27
tween the House and its business. The debate
soon broadened out far beyond the lines of the
original scheme, and in it the student finds lucidly
presented the issues of public policy that have
accompanied tariff debates ever since.
Madison laid down the general principle that
"commerce ought to be free, and labor and indus
try left at large to find its proper object," but
suggested that it would be unwise to apply this
principle without regard to particular circum
stances. "Although Interest wUl, in general,
operate effectually to produce political good,
yet there are causes In which certain factitious
circumstances may divert it from Its natural chan
nel, or throw or retain It In an artificial one. " In
language which now reads like prophecy he referred
to cases "where cities, companies, or opulent
Individuals engross the business from others, by
having had an uninterrupted possession of it, or by
the extent of their capitals being able to destroy
a competition. " The same situation could occur
between nations, and had to be considered. There
was some truth, he also thought. In the opinion
"that each nation should have within itself the
means of defense, independent of foreign supplies, "
but he considered that this argument had been

28 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
urged beyond reason, as "there is good reason to
believe that, when it becomes necessary, we may
obtain supplies abroad as readily as any other
nation whatsoever." He Instanced as a cogent
reason in favor of protective duties that, as the
States had formerly the power of making regu
lations of trade to cherish their domestic interests,
it must be presumed that, when they put the
exercise of this power into other hands by adopting
the Constitution, "they must have done this with
the expectation that those Interests would not be
neglected" by Congress.
Actuated by such views, and doubtless also
influenced by the great need for revenue, Madison
was on the whole favorable to amendments
extending the list of dutiable articles. Though
there were conflicts between members from manu
facturing districts and those from agricultural
constituencies, and though the salt protectionists
of New York had some difficulty in carrying their
point, the contention did not follow sectional lines.
Coal was added to the list on the motion of a mem
ber from Virginia. The duties levied were, how
ever, very moderate, ranging from five to twelve
and one-half per cent, with an exception in the case
of one article that might be considered a luxury.

¦:^ -AT.-DrJTStij. ^n~X C jl''

GREAT DECISIONS 29
The bill as it passed the House discriminated
in favor of nations with which the United States
had commercial treaties. That is to say, it
favored France and Holland as against Great
Britain, which had the bulk of America's foreign
trade. Though Madison insisted on this provi
sion and was supported by a large majority of the
House, the Senate would not agree to it. During
the early sessions of Congress the Senate met
behind closed doors, a practice which it did not
abandon untU five years later. From the accounts
of the discussion preserved in Maclay's diary it
appears that there was much wrangling. Maclay
relates that on one occasion when Pennsylvania's
demands were sharply attacked, his colleague,
Robert Morris, was so incensed that Maclay
"could see his nostrils widen and his nose fiatten
like the head of a viper. " Pierce Butler of South
Carolina "flamed away and threatened a dissolu
tion of the Union, with regard to his State, as sure
as God was in the firmament. " Thus began a line
of argument that was frequently pursued there
after until it was ended by wager of battle. On
several occasions the division was so close that
Vice-President Adams gave the casting vote.
Although there was much raUing in the Senate

30 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
against imposts as a burden to the agricultural
sections, yet som^e who opposed duties In the
abstract thought of particulars that ought not to
be neglected if the principle of protection were
admitted. Duties on hemp and cotton therefore
found their way into the bill through amendments
voted by the Senate. Adjustment of the differ
ences between the two houses was hindered by
the resentment of the House at the removal of
the treaty discrimination feature, but the Senate
with characteristic address evaded the Issue by
promising to deal with it as a separate measure
and ended by thwarting the House on that
point. On the whole, in view of the sharp differences of
opialon, the action taken on the tariff was remark
ably expeditious. The bUl, which passed the
House on May 16, was passed by the Senate on
June 2, and although delay now ensued because
of the conflict over the discrimination issue, the
bill became law by the President's approval on
July 4. This prompt conclusion in spite of closely-
balanced factions becomes more intelligible when
it is observed that the rules of the Senate then
provided that, "in case of a debate becoming
tedious, four Senators may call for the question. "

GREAT DECISIONS 31
Brief as was the period of consideration as com
pared with the practice since that day, Maclay
noted indignantly that the merchants had "al
ready added the amount of the duties to the price
of their goods," so that a burden fell upon the
consumers without advantage to the Treasury.
Such consequence is evidence of defect in pro
cedure which the experience of other nations has
led them to correct, but which has continued to
increase In the United States until it has attained
monstrous proportions. Under the English bud
get system new imposts now take effect as soon
as they are proposed by the government, the
contingency of alteration In the course of en
actment being provided for by return of pay
ments made in error. The general tendency of
civilized government is now strongly In favor of
attaching the process of deliberation upon finan
cial measures to the period of their adminis
trative incubation, and of shortening the period of
formal legislative consideration.
One of the tasks of Congress in its first session
was to draught amendments to the Constitution.
The reasons for such action were stated by Madi
son to be a desire to propitiate those who desired a
bUl of rights, and an effort to secure acceptance

32 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
of the Constitution in Rhode Island and North
Carolina. Promises had been made, in the course
of the struggle for adoption, that this matter would
\ be taken up, and there was a general willingness to
proceed with it. Under the leadership of Madi
son, the House adopted seventeen amendments,
which were reduced by the Senate to twelve.
Of these, ten were eventually ratified and formed
what is commonly known as the Bill of Rights.
Apart from this matter, the session, which
lasted until September 29, was almost wholly
occupied with measures to organize the new gov
ernment. To understand the significance of the
action taken, it should be remembered that the
passions excited by the struggle over the new
Constitution were still turbulent. Fisher Ames
of Massachusetts, a member without previous
national experience, who watched the proceedings
with keen observation, early noticed the presence
of a group of objectors whose motives he regarded
as partly factious and partly temperamental. Writ
ing to a friend about the character of the House,
he remarked: "Three sorts of people are often
troublesome: the anti-federals, who alone are
weak and some of them weU disposed; the dupes
of local prejudices, who fear eastern influence.

GREAT DECISIONS 33
monopolies, and navigation acts; and lastly
the violent republicans, as they think fit to style
themselves, who are new lights in politics, who are
more solicitous to establish, or rather to expatiate
upon, some sounding principle of republicanism,
than to protect property, cement the union,
and perpetuate liberty. " The spirit of opposition
had from the first an experienced leader in Elbridge
Gerry of Massachusetts. He had seen many
years of service in the Continental Congress which
he first entered in 1776. He was a delegate to the
PhUadelphia convention, in whose sessions he
showed a contentious temper, and in the end re
fused to subscribe to the new Constitution. In
the convention debates he had strongly declared
himself "against letting the heads of the depart
ments, particularly of finance, have anything to
do with business connected with legislation."
Defeated in the convention, Gerry was now bent
upon making his ideas prevaU in the organization
of the government.
On May 19, the matter of the executive depart
ments was brought up in committee of the whole
by Boudlnot of New Jersey. At this time it was
the practice of Congress to take up matters first
in committee of the whole, and, after general

34 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
conclusions had been reached, to appoint a com
mittee to prepare and bring In a bill. A warm
discussion ensued on the question whether the
heads of the departments should be removable by
the President. Gerry, who did not take a promi
nent part in the debate, spoke with a mildness
that was In marked contrast with the excitement
shown by some of the speakers. He was in favor
of supporting the President to the utmost and of
making him as responsible as possible, but since
Congress had obviously no right to confer a power
not authorized by the Constitution, and since the
Constitution had conditioned appointments on the
consent of the Senate, It followed that removals
must be subject to the same condition. He spoke
briefly and only once, although the debate became
long and Impassioned. But he was merely reserv
ing his fire, as subsequent developments soon
showed. Without a call for the ayes and nays,
the question was decided in favor of declaring the
power of removal to be In the President. The
committee then proceeded to the consideration of
the Treasury Department. Gerry at once made a
plea for delay. "He thought they were hurrying
on business too rapidly. Gentlemen had already
committed themselves on one very important

GREAT DECISIONS 35
point." He "knew nothing of the system which
gentlemen proposed to adopt in arranging the
Treasury Department," but the fact was worth
considering that "the late Congress had, on long
experience, thought proper to organize the Trea
sury Department, In a mode different from that
now proposed. " He "would be glad to know what
the reasons were that would Induce the committee
to adopt a different system from that which had
been found most beneficial to the United States. "
What Gerry had in view was the retention of the
then existing system of Treasury management by
a Board of Commissioners. In 1781 the Con
tinental Congress had been forced to let the
Treasury pass out of Its own hands into those of a
Superintendent of Finance, through sheer inability
to get any funds unless the change was made.
Robert Morris, who held the position, had resigned
In January, 1783, because of the behavior of Con
gress, but the attitude of the army had become
so menacing that he was implored to remain in
office and attend to the arrears of military pay.
He had managed to effect a settlement, and at
length retired from office on November 1, 1784.
Congress then put the Treasury in the hands of
three commissioners appointed and supervised by

36 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
it. Gerry was now striving to continue this
arrangement with as little change as possible.
When debate was resumed the next day, Gerry
made a long, smooth speech on the many superior
advantages of the Board system. The extent
and variety of the functions of the office would be
a trial to any one man's integrity. "Admit these
innumerable opportunities for defraudiug the
revenue, without check or control, and it is next to
impossible he should remain unsullied ia reputa
tion, or Innoxious with respect to misapplying his
trust." The situation would be "very disagree
able to the person appointed, provided he Is an
honest, upright man; it will be disagreeable also to
the people of the Union, who wUl always have
reason to suspect " misconduct. " We have had a
Board of Treasury and we have had a Financier.
Have not express charges, as well as vague rumors,
been brought against him at the bar of the pubUc?
They may be unfounded, it is true; but it shows
that a man cannot serve in such a station without
exciting popular clamor. It is very well known,
I dare say, to many gentlemen in this House, that
the noise and commotion were such as obliged Con
gress once more to alter their Treasury Department,
and place it under the management of a Board of

GREAT DECISIONS 37
Commissioners." He descanted upon the perUs to
liberty involved in the course they were pursuing.
Surround the President with Ministers of State'
and "the President will be induced to place more
confidence in them than in the Senate. ... An
oligarchy wUl be confirmed upon the ruin of the
democracy; a government most hateful will
descend to our posterity and all our exertions in
the glorious cause of freedom wUl be frustrated. "
Gerry's speech as a whole was tactful and per
suasive, but he made a blunder when he appealed
to the recoUections of the old members, men who
had been in the Continental Congress, or else in
some position where they could view its springs of
action. Their recollections now came forward to
his discomfiture. "My official duty," said Wads-
worth of Connecticut, "has led me often to attend
at the Treasury of the United States, and, from
my experience, I venture to pronounce that a
Board of Treasury is the worst of all institutions.
They have doubled our national debt. " He
contrasted the order and clearness of accounts
whUe the Superintendent of Finance was in charge
with the situation since then. If the committee
had before them the transactions of the Treasury
Board, "instead of system and responsibiUty they

38 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
would find nothing but confusion and disorder,
without a possibility of checking their accounts. "
Boudlnot of New Jersey said he "would state a
circumstance which might give the committee
some small idea of what the savings under the
Superintendent were. The expenditure of hay at
a certain post was one hundred and forty tons;
such was the estimate laid before him; yet twelve
tons carried the post through the year, and the
supply was abundant, and the post was as fully
and usefully occupied as it had ever been before. "
Of course there was an outcry against the Super
intendent of Finance; "he rather wondered that
the clamor was not more loud and tremendous."
He remembered that "one hundred and forty-six
supernumerary officers were brushed off in one day,
who had long been sucking the vital blood and
spirit of the nation. Was it to be wondered at, if
this swarm should raise a buzz about him.'' " Gerry
fought on almost singlehanded, but he could not
refute the evidence that he had invited. He lost
his temper and resorted to sarcasm. If a single
head of the Treasury was so desirable, why not
"have a single legislator; one man to make all
the laws, the revenue laws particularly, because
among many there is less responsibility, system.

GREAT DECISIONS 39
and energy; consequently a numerous represen
tation in this House is an odious institution. "
The case for the Treasury Board was so hope
less that nothing more was heard of it; but the
battle over the removal question was renewed
with added violence, when the bill for establish
ing the Department of Foreign Affairs came up
for consideration. White of Virginia now led
the attack. He had been a mqmber of the Con
tinental Congress from 1786 to 1788, and a member
of the ratifying convention of his State. Although
he voted for a provisional acceptance of the
Constitution, he had supported an amendment
requiring Congress to collect direct taxes or excises
through State agency, which would have been in
effect a return to the plan of requisitions — the
bane of the Confederation. In an elaborate speech
he attacked the clause giving the President power
to remove from office, as an attempt to impart
an authority not conferred by the Constitution,
and inconsistent with the requirement that appoint
ments should be made with the advice and consent
of the Senate. The debate soon became heated.
"Let us look around at this moment," said Jack
son of Georgia, "and see the progress we are mak
ing toward venality and corruption. We already

40 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
hear the sounding title of Highness and Most Honor
able trumpeted in our ears, which, ten years since,
would have exalted a man to a station as high as
Haman's gibbet." Page of Virginia was ablaze
with indignation. "Good God!" he exclaimed.
"What, authorize in a free republic, by law, too,
by your first act, the exertion of a dangerous royal
prerogative in your Chief Magistrate!" Gerry,
in remarks whose oblique criticism upon arrange
ments at the President's house was perfectly well
understood, dwelt upon the possibiUty that the
President might be guided by some other criterion
than discharge of duty as the law directs. "Per
haps the officer is not good natured enough; he
makes an imgraceful bow, or does it left leg fore
most; this is unbecoming in a great officer at the
President's levee. Now, because he is so unfortu
nate as not to be so good a dancer as he is a worthy
officer, he must be removed." These rhetorical
flourishes, which are significant of the imdercur-
rent of sentiment, hardly do justice to the general
quality of the debate which was marked by legal
acuteness on both sides. Madison pressed home
the sensible argument that the President could
not be held to responsibility unless he could control
his subordinates. "And if it should happen that

GREAT DECISIONS 41
the officers connect themselves with the Senate,
they may mutually support each other, and for
want of efficacy reduce the power of the President
to a mere vapor; in which case, his responsibility
would be annihUated and the expectation of it
unjust. "
The debate lasted for several days, but Madison
won by a vote of 34 to 20 in committee, in favor of
retaining the clause. On second thought, how
ever, and probably after consultation with the little
group of constructive statesmen who stood behind
the scenes, he decided that it might be dangerous
to allow the President's power of removal to rest
upon a legislative grant that might be revoked.
When the report from the committee of the whole
was taken up in the House, a few days later,
Benson of New York proposed that the disputed
clause should be omitted and the language of the
biU should be worded so as to imply that the
power of removal was in the President. Madison
accepted the suggestion, and the matter was thus
settled. The point was covered by providing that
the chief clerk of the Department should take
charge "whenever the principal officer shall be
removed from office by the President." The
clause got through the Senate by the casting vote

42 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
of the Vice-President, and a simUar provision was
inserted, without further contest, in all the acts
creating the executive departments. It is rather
striking evidence of the Utopian expectations
which could then be indulged that Daniel Carroll
of Maryland was persistent in urging that the
existence of the office should be limited to a few
years, "under a hope that a time would come when
the United States would be disengaged from the
necessity of supporting a Secretary of Foreign
Affairs." Although Gerry and others expressed
sympathy with the motion it was voted down
without a division.
When the bill establishing the Treasury Depart
ment was taken up, Page of Virginia made a violent
attack upon the clause authorizing the Secretary
to "digest and report plans. " He denounced it as
"an attempt to create an undue influence" in the
House. "Nor would the mischief stop here; it
would establish a precedent which might be
extended until we admitted all the Ministers of the
government on the floor, to explain and support the
plans they have digested and reported; thus laying
the foundation for an aristocracy or a detestable
monarchy." As a matter of fact, a precedent in
favor of access to Congress already existed. The

GREAT DECISIONS 43
old Superintendent of Finance and the Board
which succeeded him had the power now proposed
for the Secretary of the Treasury. Livermore of
New Hampshire, who had been a member of the
Continental Congress, admitted this fact, but held
that such power was not dangerous at that time
since Congress then possessed both legislative
and executive authority. They could abolish his
plans and his office together, if they thought pro
per; "but we are restrained by a Senate and
by the negative of the President." Gerry de
clared his assent to the views expressed by Page.
"If the doctrine of having prime and great
ministers of state was once well established, he
did not doubt but that we should soon see them
distinguished by a green or red ribbon, or other
insignia of court favor and patronage."
The strongest argument in favor of retaining the
clause referred to was made by Fisher Ames,
who had begun to display the powers of clear state
ment and of convincing argument that soon estab
lished his supremacy in debate. He brought the
debate at once to its proper bearings by pointing
out that there were really only two matters to be
considered: whether the proposed arrangement
was useful, and whether it could be safely guarded

44 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
from abuse. "The Secretary is presumed to
acquire the best knowledge of the subject of
finance of any member of the community. Now,
if this House is to act on the best knowledge
of circumstances, it seems to follow logically
that the House must obtain the evidence from
that officer; the best way of doing this will be
publicly from the officer himself, by making it
his duty to furnish us with it. " In one of those
eloquent passages which brighten the records of
debate whenever Ames spoke at any length,
he pictured the difficulties that had to be sur
mounted. "If we consider the present situation
of our finances, owing to a variety of causes,
we shall no doubt perceive a great, although
unavoidable confusion throughout the whole
scene; it presents to the imagination a deep, dark,
and dreary chaos; impossible to be reduced to
order without the mind of the architect is clear
and capacious, and his power commensurate to the
occasion." He asked, "What improper influ
ence could a plan reported openly and officially
have on the mind of any member, more than if the
scheme and information were given privately
at the Secretary's office?" Merely to call for
information would not be advantageous to the

GREAT DECISIONS 45
House. "It will be no mark of inattention or
neglect, if he take time to consider the questions
you propound; but if you make it his duty to fur
nish you plans . . . and he neglect to perform it,
his conduct or capacity is virtually impeached.
This will be furnishing an additional check. "
Sedgwick of Massachusetts made a strong speech
to the same effect. "Make your officer respon
sible," he said with prophetic vision, "and the
presumption is, that plans and information are
properly digested; but If he can secrete himself
behind the curtain, he might create a noxious
influence, and not be answerable for the inform
ation he gives. "
The weight of the argument was heavily on the
side of the supporters of the clause, and it looked
as though the group of objectors would again be
beaten. But now a curious thing happened. Fitz-
simmons remarked that, if he understood the objec
tion made to the clause, "it was a jealousy arising
from the power given the Secretary to report
plans of revenue to the House." He suggested
that "harmony might be restored by changing
the word 'report' into 'prepare'." Fitzsimmons
was esteemed by the House because of his zealous
support of the War of Independence and also

46 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
because he stood high as a successful PhUadelphia
merchant, but he did not, however, rank as a
leader. Early in the session Ames described him
as a man who "Is supposed to understand trade,
and he assumes some weight in such matters.
He is plausible, though not over civil; is artful,
has a glaring eye, a down look, speaks low, and
with apparent candor and coolness." He was
hardly the man to guide the House on a matter
pertaining to the organization of public authority.
While the removal Issue was before the House,
Madison had been prominent in debate, and had
spoken with great power and earnestness; but up
to this time he had said nothing on the issue now
pending. He now remarked that he did not be
lieve that the danger apprehended by some really
existed, but twice In his speech he admitted that
"there is a small possibility, though it is but small,
that an officer may derive a weight from this
circumstance, and have some degree of Influence
upon the deliberations of the legislature. " In Its
practical effect the speech favored the compromise
which Fitzsimmons had just proposed; in fact,
the only opposition to the change of phrasiag
now came from a few extremists who still clamored
for the omission of the entire clause. The decisive

GREAT DECISIONS 47
effect of Madison's intervention was a natural
consequence of the leadership he had held In the
movement for the new Constitution and of his
standing as the representative of the new Adminis
tration, of his possessing Washington's confidence
and acting as his adviser. Washington, then
being without a cabinet, had turned to Madison
for help in discharging the duties of his office, and
at Washiagton's written request Madison had
drafted for him his replies to the addresses of the
House and the Senate at the opening of the session.
It was a matter of course in such circumstances
that the House accepted Fitzsimmons' amend
ment, — "by a great majority," according to the
record, — and thus the Secretary of the Treasury
was shut out of the House and was condemned to
work in the lobby.
The consequences of this decision have been so
vast that it is worth while making an inquiry
into motive, although the materials upon which
judgment must rest are scant. No one can read
the record of this discussion without noting that
Madison's approval of the original clause was luke
warm as compared with the ardor he had shown
when the question was whether Washington should
be allowed to remove his subordinates. This

48 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
contrast suggests that Madison's behavior was
affected by fear of Hamilton's influence. Would it
be prudent for him to give HamUton the advantage
of being able to appear in person before the House,
and probably to supplant Madison himself as the
spokesman of the Administration? Divergence
between the two men had already begun in details.
At the time the vote on the powers of the Secre
tary of the Treasury was taken, the tariff biU and
the tonnage bill were stUl pending, and Hamilton's
influence operated against Madison's views on
some points. Moreover, the question of the
permanent residence of the federal government
was coming forward and was apparently over
shadowing everything else In the minds of mem
bers. Ames several times in his correspondence
at this period remarks upon Madison's timidity,
which was due to his concern about Virginia State
politics. Any arrangement that might enable
Hamilton to cross swords with an opponent on
the floor of the House could not be attractive to
Madison, who was a lucid reasoner but not an
impressive speaker. Hamilton was both of these,
and he possessed an intellectual brUlIancy which
Madison lacked. Ames, who respected Madi
son's abilities and who regarded him as the leading

GREAT DECISIONS 49
member of the House, wrote that "he speaks
low, his person is little and ordinary; he speaks de
cently as to manner, and no more; his language is
very pure, perspicuous, and to the point. " Why
Fitzsimmons should be opposed to the appearance
of the Secretary in person in the House, as had been
Robert Morris's practice when he was Superintend
ent of Finance, is plain enough. Maclay's diary
has many references to Fitzsimmons 's negotiations
with members on tariff rates. It was not to the
advantage of private diplomacy to allow the
Secretary to shape and define issues on the floor
of the House. But Fitzsimmons could not have
had his way about the matter without Madison's
help. Gibbon remarks that the greatest of theological
controversies which racked the Roman Empire
and affected the peace of millions turned on the
question whether a certain word should be spelled
with one diphthong or another. A like dispropor
tion between the vastness of results and the min
uteness of verbal distinction is exhibited in this
decision by the House. The change of "report"
into "prepare" threw up a ridge In the field of
constitutional development that has affected the
trend of American politics ever since. This is the

50 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
explanation of a problem of comparative politics
that has often excited much wondering notice: why
It is that alone among modern representative
assemblies the American House of Representatives
tends to decline In prestige and authority. The
original expectation was that the House of Repre
sentatives would take a dominant position like
that of the House of Commons, but its degradation
began so soon that Fisher Ames noted it as early as
1797. Writing to HamUton he observed:
"The heads of departments are chief clerks.
Instead of being the ministry, the organs of the
executive power, and imparting a kind of momen
tum to the operation of the laws, they are pre
cluded even from communicating with the House
by reports. . . . Committees already are the
Ministers and whUe the House indulges a jeal
ousy of encroachment in its functions, which
are properly deliberative, it does not perceive
that these are impaired and nullified by the mon
opoly as well as the perversion of information
by these committees."
Justice Story, who entered Congress in 1808 as a
Jeffersonian Republican, noted the process of de
gradation, and In his Commentaries he pointed out
the cause: "The Executive is compelled to resort to

GREAT DECISIONS 51
secret and unseen influences, to private interviews
and private arrangements to accomplish its own
appropriate purposes, instead of proposing and
sustaining its own duties and measures by a bold
and manly appeal to the nation in the face of
its representatives."
The last of the organic acts of the session was
the one establishing the judiciary. The student
will be disappointed if he examines the record to
note whether there was any vision of the ascend
ancy which the judiciary was to obtain in the
development of the American constitutional sys
tem. The debates were almost wholly about
the possibilities of conflict between the state
and the federal courts. Although Maclay's diary
gives a one-sided and distorted account of the
proceedings in the Senate, the course of the debate
is clear. Ellsworth of Connecticut had principal
charge of the bUl. At the outset Lee and Gray
son of Virginia made an ineffectual effort to con
fine the original jurisdiction of the federal courts to
cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and
argued that jurisdiction over other cases involving
federal law might be conferred upon state courts.
This was a point on which there had been some
difference of opinion between Hamilton and Madi-

52 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
son. The former held that it was withia the com
petency of Congress, when instituting tribunals
inferior to the Supreme Court, to adopt the state
courts for that purpose. Madison held that
nothing less than a system of federal courts quite
distinct from the state courts would satisfy the
requirements of the Constitution. When the
biU was taken up in the House, there was along
debate over this matter. The costly duplication of
judicial establishments that has ever since existed
in the United States is certainly not necessary to
a federal system, but is an American peculiarity.
The advocates of a unified system were hampered
by the fact that this view was pressed by some in a
spirit of hostility to the Constitution. The decisive
argument was the untrustworthiness of the state
courts. Madison urged this fact with great force
and pointed out that in some of the States the
courts "are so dependent on the state legis
latures, that to make the federal laws dependent
on them, would throw us back into aU the em
barrassments which characterized our former
situation. " Such was the low repute of the state
legislatures that the only way in which this argu
ment could be met was to argue that "Congress
shaU have power, in its fuUest extent, to correct,

GREAT DECISIONS 53
reverse, or affirm, any decree of a state court."
This high assertion of federal authority was made
by Jackson of Georgia in the course of a long legal
argument. The debate did not follow sectional
lines, and in general it was not unfairly described
by Maclay as a lawyer's wrangle. The bUl was
put into shape by the Senate, and reached the
House toward the close of the session when the
struggle over the site of the national capital
was overshadowing everything else. It was so
generally believed that nothing important could
be gained by attempts at amendment that, after
an airing of opinions, the House accepted the
measure just as it had come from the Senate.

CHAPTER III

THE MASTER BUILDER

The subject of national finance had long inter
ested HamUton. His Ideas had been matured
by a dUigent and minute study of English
precedents, and now that his opportunity had
come he was ready to grasp It. Soon after he
took office, the House resolved that "an adequate
provision for the support of the public credit"
should be made, and It directed the Secretary of the
Treasury "to prepare a plan for that purpose and
to report the same to the House at its next meet
ing." This was, in effect, a postponement until
the second session of the First Congress, which
began In January, 1790. In his opening address
to Congress, Washington pointedly referred to the
public credit resolution which he had noted "with
peculiar pleasure." On the next day a letter
from Hamilton was read In the House stating that
he had prepared his plan and was ready to report
54

THE MASTER BUILDER 55
the same to the House when they should be pleased
to receive It.
This announcement brought up anew the ques
tion in what manner the Secretary should make
his report. Gerry was on his feet at once with a
motion that it should be made in writing. Boudl
not "hoped that the Secretary of the Treasury
might be permitted to make his report in person.
In order to answer such Inquiries as the members
might be disposed to make, for it was a justifiable
surmise that gentlemen would not be able clearly
to comprehend so Intricate a subject without oral
Ulustration. " The allusion to the Intricacy of the
subject had the effect of turning against the
plan of oral communication some who had favored
giving the Secretary the same direct access to
Congress that the Superintendent of Finance had
formerly enjoyed. Ames, for Instance, now de
sired that the Secretary's communications should
be in writing since "in this shape they would obtain
a degree of permanency favorable to the responsi
bility of the officer, while, at the same time, they
would be less liable to be misunderstood." Ben
son suggested that since the resolution of Congress
had directed the Secretary to make a report, it was
left to his discretion to "make it In the manner for

56 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
which he Is prepared. " Gerry adroitly countered
by saying that the resolution provided for a report.
That done, it would be time enough "to give him
the right to lay before them his explanations, if
he thinks explanations necessary." The debate
was brief and one-sided; the motion for receiving
the report in writing was adopted without a divi
sion. Five days later the written report was laid
before the House, but the Secretary was never
accorded an opportunity to offer any personal
explanations. This masterly report, which is justly regarded as
the corner-stone of American public credit, excites
the admiration of the reader by the clearness of its
analysis, the cogency of Its argument, and the
broad range of Its vision. The principles of action
that it embodied, however, were few and simple,
chief among them being exact and punctual ful
fillment of contract. "States, like individuals,
who observe their engagements, are respected and
trusted; while the reverse is the fate of those who
pursue an opposite conduct." To discharge
the principal of the public debt was of course
impracticable; nor was it desirable, as the creditors
would be well pleased to leave it at interest. In
cidentally the funding of the debt would provide

THE MASTER BUILDER 57
securities that would serve trade as a species of
currency, and would set in motion a long train of
benefits that would extend throughout the com
munity. In the funding operation the debts con
tracted by the States should be included. As to
this Hamilton remarked: "The general princi
ple of It seems to be equitable, for it seems
difficult to conceive a good reason why the ex
penses for the particular defense of a part in a
common war should not be a common charge, as
well as those incurred professedly for the gen
eral defense. The defense of each part is that
of the whole; and unless the expenditures are
brought into a common mass, the tendency must be
to add to the calamities suffered by being the most
exposed to the ravages of war and increase of
burthens. "
HamUton computed the amount of the foreign
debt, principal and arrears, at $11,710,378.62;
the domestic debt, including that of the States,
at $42,414,085.94, — a total of over fifty-four
miUions with an annual interest charge at existing
rates amounting to $4,587,444.81, — a staggering ,
total for a nation whose revenue was then insuffi
cient to meet its current expenses. Nevertheless
Hamilton refused to admit that " such a provision

58 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
would exceed the abUities of the country," but
he was "clearly of the opinion that to make it
would require the extension of taxation to a degree
and to objects which the true interest of the public
creditor forbids." He therefore favored a com
position, in arranging which there would be strict
adherence to the principle "that no change in the
rights of creditors ought to be attempted without
their voluntary consent; and that this consent
ought to be voluntary in fact as well as in name."
It followed that "every proposal of a change ought
to be in the shape of an appeal to their interests;
but not to their necessities. " Hamilton then went
into detaUs of a funding loan. In which various
options were offered to the creditors, including
land grants in part payment, and conversion In
whole or in part Into annuities, several sorts of
which were offered. He submitted estimates of
how the various plans would work out in practice,
and he concluded that the annual revenue which
would be required to enable the government to
meet its obligations under the scheme and also
to maintain Its current service would amount to
$2,239,163.09, a sum that could be readily pro
vided. There could not have been a more striking

THE MASTER BUILDER 59
contrast than there was between the humiliat
ing conditions which actually existed and the
grand results which Hamilton designed and con
fidently expected. The ardent and hopeful tone
of his plan, conceived in apparently desperate
circumstances, is very marked. He declared:
"It cannot but merit particular attention that
among ourselves the most enlightened friends
of good government are those whose expecta
tions are the highest. To justify and preserve
their confidence; to promote the increasing
respectabUity of the American name; to answer
the calls of justice; to restore landed property
to Its due value; to furnish new resources both
to agriculture and commerce; to cement more
closely the union of the States; to add to their
security against foreign attack; to establish pub
lic order on the basis of a liberal and upright
policy — these are the great and Invaluable ends
to be secured by a proper and adequate pro
vision at the present period for the support of
public credit. "
All these great objects were Indeed attained,
but Hamilton's anticipation of them was at the
time regarded as either a pretext made to cajole
Congress or else merely an ebullition from his own

60 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
sanguine nature not to be taken too seriously by
sensible people. Senator Maclay of Pennsylvania
regarded Hamilton's plans as wildly extravagant
in their conception and iaiquitous in their practical
effect. In his opinion, Hamilton had "a very boy
ish, giddy manner, and Scotch-Irish people could
weU call him a 'skite.'" Jackson of Georgia
exposed to the House the foUy of Hamilton's pro
posals by poiating out that a funded debt meant
national decay. He mentioned England as "a
melancholy Instance of the ruin attending such
engagements." To such a pitch had the "spirit
of funding and borrowing been carried ia that
country" that its national debt was now "a
burthen which the most sanguine mind can never
contemplate they will ever be reUeved from."
France also was "considerably enfeebled and
languishes under a heavy load of debt." He
argued that by funding the debt in America "the
same effect must be produced that has taken place
in other nations; it must either bring on national
bankruptcy, or annihilate her existence as an
independent empire. "
Such dismal prognostications on the very eve of
the Napoleonic era, with its tremendous revelations
of national power, were quite common at that time.

THE MASTER BUILDER 61
The long rambling debate that took place in the
House when Hamilton's report was taken up for
consideration abounds with similar instances of
shortsightedness. Many members did not scruple
to advise repudiation, in whole or in part. Liver-
more of New Hampshire admitted that the foreign
debt should be provided for, since it was "lent to
the United States in real coin, by disinterested
persons, not concerned or benefited by the revo
lution," but that the domestic debt was "for
depreciated paper, or services done at exorbitant
rates, or for goods or provisions supplied at more
than their real worth, by those who received all the
benefits arising from our change of condition."
True, Congress had pledged its faith to the redemp
tion of issues at their face value, "but this was
done on a principle of policy, in order to prevent
the rapid depreciation which was taking place."
He argued that "money lent in this depreciated
and depreciating state can hardly be said to be
lent from a spirit of patriotism; it was a mere
speculation in public securities. "
The distinction between the foreign debt and
the domestic was seized by many members as
providing a just basis for discrimination. Page of
Virginia observed that "our citizens were deeply

62 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
interested, and, I beUeve, if they were never to get
a farthing for what is owing to them for their
services, they would be well paid; they have gained
what they aimed at; they have secured their
liberties and their laws; they will be satisfied that
this House has pledged itself to pay foreigners
the generous loans they advanced to us in the day
of distress. " In the course of the debate the power
to do was so often mentioned as implying the right
to do that Ames was inoved to remark: "I have
heard that in the East Indies the stock of the
labor and the property of the empire is the pro
perty of the Prince; that it is held at his wUl and
pleasure; but this is a slavish doctrine, which I
hope we are not prepared to adopt here." As a
matter of fact, there had already been extensive
scaling of the debt, and the note emissions had
been pretty nearly wiped out. To save the public
credit from complete collapse, the Continental
Congress had entered into definite contracts under
the most solemn pledges, and it was upon this
select class of securities that it was now proposed
to start anew the process of repudiation. But
public opinion displayed itself so hostile to such
perfidy that the party of repudiation in Congress
soon dwindled to insignificance and the struggle

THE MASTER BUILDER 63
finally settled upon two issues, discrimination and
assumption. Weeks of debate ensued, and the deepest impres
sion made by a careful perusal of the record is the
inability of members to appreciate the importance
of the issues. Much of the tedious and pointless
character of their speeches may be ascribed to the
lack of the personal presence of the Secretary.
There being nothing to focus the debate and
exclude the fictitious and Irrelevant, It rambled
in any direction a speaker's fancy might suggest.
Moreover, its quality was impaired because any
consideration of motive was of the nature of talk
ing about a man behind his back and this, every
one knows, is very different from saying things to
his face. Assertions and Innuendos which would
hardly have been hazarded had HamUton been
present, or which, had they been made, would have
been forthwith met and refuted, were indulged
in without restraint. Although one of the reasons
given for requiring a written report was that the
House would be the better informed, the debate
does not indicate that the arguments by which
HamUton had vindicated his proposals had really
been apprehended.
The question whether or not any discrimination

64 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
could be made between original holders of the
public securities and those who had acquired them
by purchase was considered at length by Hamilton
in his report. The public securities had been at
such a heavy discount that now, if they were to be
met at face value, speculators would reap large
profits. Hamilton put the case of the opposition
as strongly as possible. It might be urged that it
was unreasonable "to pay twenty shillings in the
pound to one who had not given more for it than
three or four; and it is added that it would be
hard to aggravate the misfortune of the first owner,
who, probably through necessity, parted with his
property at so great a loss, by obliging him to
contribute to the profit of the person who had
speculated on his distresses. " Nevertheless, Ham
ilton submitted considerations showing that dis
crimination would be "equally unjust and
impolitic, as highly injurious even to the original
holders of public securities, as ruinous to public
credit." It Is unnecessary to repeat the lucid
argument by which Hamilton demonstrated the
soundness of his position, for security of transfer
is now well understood to be an essential element
of public credit; but the special point of interest
is that the debate simply ignored Hamilton's

THE MASTER BUILDER 65
argument and rambled along over the superficial
aspects of the case, dwelling upon the sorrows
of those who had parted with their holdings, and
exhibiting their situation as the most important
matter to be considered.
Madison was most active in making that branch
of the case the leading Issue, and in a series of
elaborate speeches which cannot now be read
without regret, he urged that the present holders
should be aUowed only the highest market price
previously recorded, and that the residue should
go to the original holders. Boudinot at once
pointed out that there was nothing on record to
show who might be an original bona fide holder.
Great quantities of the certificates of indebtedness
had, as a mere matter of convenience, been issued
to government clerks who afterwards distributed
them among those who furnished supplies to the
government or who performed services entitling
them to pay. He mentioned that he himself
appeared on the record as original holder In cases
wherein he had really acted In behalf of his neigh
bors to relieve them of the trouble of personal
appearance. Madison's proposition would there
fore invest him with a legal title to property which
really belonged to others. But this and other

66 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
evidence of the real effect of Madison's proposal
faUed to move him, further than to cause him to
declare that "aU that he wished was that the claims
of the original holders, not less than those of the
actual holders, should be fairly examined and
justly decided." Finally Benson of New York
gave him a shrewd home thrust that plainly
embarrassed him. He put the question whether,
if he had purchased a certificate from Madison,
and the Treasury withheld part of the amount for
Madison as the original holder, Madison would
keep the money ? "I ask, " said Benson, " whether
he would take advantage of the law against me,
and refuse to give me authority to take it up
in his name?" Madison evaded the query by
saying that everything would depend upon the
circumstances of any particular case, and that
circumstances were conceivable In which the
most tender conscience need not refrain from
taking the benefit of what the government had
determined. The debate on Madison's discrimination amend
ment lasted from the eleventh to the twenty-second
day of February — Washington's birthday. The
House did honor to the day when it rejected
Madison's motion by the crushing vote of 36

THE MASTER BUILDER 67
to 13. With that, his pretensions to the leader
ship of the House quite disappeared.
The assumption of state debts was the subject
of a debate in committee of the whole which lasted
from the twenty-third of February to the second
of March. New factional lines now revealed a
supposed diversity of interest of the several States.
The false notions of finance then current were
Ulustrated by an argument that was in continual
use, either on the floor or in the lobby. Members
would flgure how much their States would have to
pay as their share of the debt that would be as
sumed, and on that basis would reach conclusions
as to how their States stood to win or lose by the
transaction. By this reckoning, of course, the
great gainer would appear to be the State upon
whom the chances of war had piled the largest
debt. This calculation made Burke of South
Carolina, usually an opponent of anything coming
from Hamilton, a strong advocate of assumption.
He told the House that "if the present question
was lost, he was almost certain it would end ia her
bankruptcy, for she [South Carolina] was no more
able to grapple with her enormous debt than a boy
of twelve years of age is able to grapple with a
giant." Livermore, representing a State never

68 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
within the actual field of mUitary operations, at
once replied: "I conceive that the debt of South
Carolina, or Massachusetts, or of an individual, has
nothing to do with our deliberations. If they have
involved themselves in debt, it Is their misfortune,
and they must extricate themselves as well as
they can." On a later occasion Stone of Mary
land, another State that lay outside the track of
war, gave the leading war-debt States an admoni
tion of the kind that adds insult to injury, saying
"however inconvenient it may be to Massachusetts
or South Carolina to make a bold exertion, and
nobly bear the burthens of their present debt, I
believe in the end it would be found to conduce
greatly to their advantage." Burke made a
crushing rejoinder. "Was Maryland like South
Carolina constantly grappling with the enemy dur
ing the whole war? There is not a road in the
State but has witnessed the ravages of war; plan
tations were destroyed, and the skeletons of houses,
to this day, point out to the traveler the route
of the British army; her citizens were exposed to
every violence, their capital taken, and their
country almost overrun by the enemy; men,
women, and children murdered by the Indians and
Tories; all the personal property consumed, and

THE MASTER BUILDER 69
now is it to be wondered at that she Is not able to
make exertions equal with other States, who have
been generally in an undisturbed condition?"
The argument pressed by the advocates of
assumption was that the state debts contracted
during the Revolutionary War were for the com
mon defense, and that, unless these were assumed
by the general government, the adoption of the
new Constitution would do Injury by withdrawing
revenue resources which the States had formerly
possessed. This position at the present day seems
reasonable enough, but it is certain that at that
time people worked themselves into a genuine rage
over the matter and were able to persuade them
selves into a sincere belief that It was outrageous
the unfortunate States should expect the others
to bear their troubles, and that Hamilton was a
great rogue for proposing such a scheme. Writing
in his private diary, Maclay characterized the plan
as "a monument of political absurdity," and
he was in the habit of referring to Hamilton's
supporters as his "gladiators" and as a "corrupt
squadron. "
On the whole the records make painful reading.
The prevailing tone of public life was one of dull
and narrow provincialism, at times thickening

70 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
into stupidity, at times sharpening into spite,
although ordinarily made respectable by a serious
attitude to life and by a stolid fortitude in facing
whatever the distracted times might present. It
was the influence of a few great men that made
America a nation. If one Is not subject to the
spirit of ancestor worship that has long ruled
American history, one is bound to say that —
apart from some forceful pamphleteering of
transient purpose — the voluminous political lit
erature of the formative period displays much
pedantic erudition but has little that goes really
deep. The Federalist, the artillery of a hard
fought battle, is a striking exception. So, too, is
the series of reports by HamUton. But his plans
could not prevail by force of reason against the
general spirit of selfish particularism. Although
on March 2 a motion adverse to assumption in
committee of the whole was defeated by a vote of
28 to 22, It was then known that a majority could
not be procured for enactment, and on AprU 12
the assumption bill was defeated outright in the
House, 31 to 29. Maclay, who went over to the
House from the Senate to witness the event, gloated
over the defeat in his diary:
"Sedgwick, from Boston, pronounced a funeral

THE MASTER BUILDER 71
oration over it. He was called to order; some
confusion ensued; he took his hat and went out.
When he returned, his visage bore the visible
marks of weeping. Fitzsimmons reddened like
scarlet; his eyes were brimful. Clymer's color,
always pale, now merged to a deadly white; his lips
quivered, and his nether jaw shook with convulsive
motions; his head, neck, and breast contracted
with gesticulations resembling those of a turkey or
goose nearly strangled in the act of deglutition.
Benson bungled like a shoemaker who has lost his
end. . . . Wadsworth hid his grief under the rim
of a round hat. Boudiaot's wrinkles rose in
ridges and the angles of his mouth were depressed
and assumed a curve resembling a horse's shoe."
The defeat did not discourage Hamilton. He
had successfully handled a more difficult situation
in getting New York to ratify the Constitution,
and, resorting now to the same means he had then
employed, he used pressure of interest to move
those who could not be stirred by reason. The
intense concern felt by members in the choice
of the site of the national capital supplied him
with the leverage which he brought to bear on the
situation. Most of the members were more
stirred by that question than by any other before

72 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
Congress. It was a prominent topic in Madison's
correspondence from the time the Constitution
was adopted. Maclay's diary abounds with
references to the subject. Some of his bitterest
sentences are penned about the conduct of those
who preferred some other site to that on the
Susquehanna River which he knew to be the best
because he lived there himself. Bargaining among
the members as to the selection had been going on
almost from the first. As early as April 26, 1789,
before Washington had been installed in his office,
Maclay mentions a meeting "to concert some
measures for the removal of Congress. " There
after notices of pending deals appear frequently
In his diary. After the defeat of the assumption
bill, the diary notes the activity of Hamilton in
this matter. An entry of June 14, 1790, ascribes
to Robert Morris the statement that "HamUton
said he wanted one vote in the Senate and five in
the House of Representatives; that he was willing
and would agree to place the permanent residence
of Congress at Germantown or Falls of the Dela
ware (Trenton), if he would procure him those
votes." Although definite knowledge is un
attainable, one gets the impression, in foUowing
the devious course of these intrigues, that had

THE MASTER BUILDER 73
Pennsylvania interests been united they could
have decided the site of the national capital; but
the delegation was divided over the relative merits
of the Delaware and the Susquehanna as well as
on the question of assumption. Hamilton's efforts
in this quarter were ineffectual, and the winning
combination was finally arranged elsewhere and
otherwise by the aid of Jefferson.
Thomas Jefferson was at this time forty-seven
years old, and owing both to seniority and to the
distinguished positions he had held, he ranked as
the most Ulustrious member of the Administration.
His correspondence at this period shows that he
was fully aware of the importance of the crisis,
and he did not overrate it when he wrote to James
Monroe, June 20, 1790, that, unless the measures
of the Administration were successful, "our credit
wUl burst and vanish, and the States separate to
take care everyone of itself." In this letter
Jefferson outlined the compromise that was actu
aUy adopted by Congress. The strongest opposi
tion to the assumption bUl had come from Virginia,
although Maryland, Georgia, and New Hamp
shire also opposed it, and the Middle States were
divided. Jefferson was able to get enough South
ern votes to carry assumption in return for enough

74 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
votes from HamUton's adherents to carry the
Potomac site. An agreement was reached at a
dinner given'by Jefferson to which he invited Ham
Uton and Madison. According to this arrange
ment, the capital was to remain in PhUadelphia for
ten years and after that to be on the Potomac River
in a district ten mUes square to be selected by the
President. The residence act was approved July
16, 1790; the funding and assumption measures,
now combined in one bill, became law on Au
gust 4.
After Jefferson tumed against the Administra
tion, his participation in the passage of the
assumption bill was such an awkward circum
stance that he discredited his own intelligence
by professing that he "was most ignorantly and
innocently made to hold the candle" to Hamil
ton's "game." In reality the public service
Jefferson then performed was the most useful in all
his long and fruitful career. But for this action,
the Declaration of Independence, to the drafting of
which he owes his greatest fame, might now be
figuring among the historical documents of lost
causes, like similar elaborate statements of princi
ple made during the Commonwealth period in Eng
land. Had the national forces failed at the critical

THE MASTER BUILDER 75
period of financial organization, and the States,
bankrupt by the revolutionary struggle, been left
in the lurch, the republic would have foUowed the
usual course of disintegration displayed by feder
ations from the time of the Greek amphictyonies
down to that of the Holy Roman Empire.
The charge was made soon after HamUton's
victory that it was largely due to the influence of
speculators. The advance in the market value of
securities produced by Hamilton's measures cer
tainly gave an opportunity to speculators of which
they avaUed themselves with the unscrupulous
activity characteristic of the sordid tribe. Jeffer
son has left an account of "the base scramble."
"Couriers and relay horses by land, and swift
saUing pUot boats by sea, were flying in all direc
tions. Active partners and agents were associated
and employed in every state, town, and country
neighborhood, and this paper was bought up at
five shUlings, and even as low as two shillings in the
pound, before the holder knew that Congress had
already provided for its assumption at par. Im
mense sums were thus filched from the poor and
ignorant, and fortunes accumulated by those who
had themselves been poor enough before. "
This account is highly colored. The struggle

76 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
was too close, and the Issue was long too doubtful,
to admit of speculative preparations extending to
every "town and country neighborhood." If
speculation took place on such a large scale, it must
have been also taking risks on a large scale, for
assumption was not assured until Jefferson
himself put his shoulder to the wheel. The lack
of means for prompt diffusion of intelligence
naturally provided large opportunity for specula
tion by those in a position to keep well-informed,
and undoubtedly large profits were made; but the
circumstances were such that it seems most prob
able that profits were less than market opportu
nities would have allowed had not the issue been
so long in doubt. Nevertheless there was much
speculative activity, and the charge was soon made
that it extended into Congress. '
' This charge was put forth by John Taylor in pamphlets printed in
1793 and 1794, in which he reviewed the financial policy of the Adminis
tration and gave a list of Congressmen who had invested in the public
funds. The facts on which this charge rests have been collected and
examined by Professor Beard in his Economic Origins of Jeffersonian
Democracy. His analysis shows that out of sixty-four members of the
House, twenty-nine were security holders, and of these twenty-one
voted for and eight voted against assumption. But the facts dis
closed do not sustain his theory that the issue was essentially a con
flict between capitalism and agrarianism. The asstimption bill was
lifted to its place on the statute book through the leverage exerted by
Hamilton and Jefferson, with Washington's prestige as their fulcrum.
The characters of these three men resist schemes of classification

THE MASTER BUILDER 77
The passage of assumption was the turning point.
Other important measures foUowed, but none of
them met with difficulties which the Administra
tion could not overcome by ordinary methods of
persuasion and appeal. A national bank was
authorized by an act approved on February 25,
1791. Hamilton's famous report on manu
factures, a masterly analysis of the sources of
national wealth and of the means of improving
them, was sent to Congress on December 5, 1791.
Upon his recommendation Congress established
the mint, the only point which excited controversy
being Hamilton's proposal that the coins should be
stamped with the head of the President in whose
administration they were issued. This suggestion
was rejected on the ground that it smacked too
much of the practice of monarchies. The queer
totemistic designs of American coinage are a
consequence of this decision.
The formation of national government by
voluntary agreement is a unique event. The
according to economic interest. The principal value of analysis of
the economic elements of the struggle is to protect from undervalu
ation the motives that actuated the opposition to Hamilton's meas
ures. The historian has the advantage of a perspective denied to
participants in events, and this fact is apt to tum unduly to the
discredit of lost causes.

78 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
explanation of this peculiar result in the case of
America is the unifying influence of HamUton's
measures. They Interested In the support of the
government economic forces strong enough to
counteract the separatist tendencies that had
always before broken up states unless they were
held together by sheer might of power in their
rulers. The means employed have been cited as
evidence in support of the economic interpretation
of history now in fashion. Government, it is
true, like every other form of life, must meet the
fundamental needs of subsistence and defense,
but this truism supplies no explanation of the
particular mode of doing so that may be adopted.
Those needs account for motion but not for direc
tion. Human wIU, discernment, and purpose enter
and complicate the situation in a way that makes
theories of determinism appear absurd. No one
has ever contended that HamUton was prompted
by an economic motive In giving up his law prac
tice to accept public office. He did so against the
remonstrances of his friends, whose predictions
that what he would get out of it for himself would
be calumny, persecution, and loss of fortune, were
all fully verified; but he possessed a nature which
found its happiness in bringing high ideals to grand

THE MASTER BUILDER 79
fulfillment, and in applying his powers to that
object he let everything else go. Hamilton's
career is one of the greatest of those facts that
baffle attempts to reduce history to an exhibition
of the play of economic forces.

CHAPTER IV
ALARUMS AND EXCURSIONS
The Shakespearian stage direction which heads
this chapter appropriately describes the course
of administrative experience while Washington
was trying to get from Congress the means of
sustaining the responsibilities with which he was
charged by his office. Events did not stand still
because for a time anything like national govern
ment had ceased. Before Washington left Mount
Vernon he had been disquieted by reports of Indian
troubles in the West, and of intrigues by Great
Britain — which still retained posts that according
to the treaty of peace belonged to the United
States, — and by Spain which held the lower
Mississippi. Washington applied himself to these
matters as soon as he was well in office, but he was
much hindered in his arrangements by apathy or
iadifference in Congress. He noted in his diary
for May 1, 1790, communications made to him of a
80

ALARUMS AND EXCURSIONS 81
disposition among members of Congress "to pay
little attention to the Western country because
they were of the opinion it would soon shake off its
dependence on this, and In the meantime would be
burdensome to it. " From a letter of Gen. Rufus
Putnam, one of the organizers of the Ohio com
pany, it appears that in July, 1789, Ames of
Massachusetts put these queries to him: "Can
we retain the western country with the govern
ment of the United States? And if we can, what
use will it be to them? " Putnam wrote a labored
article to the effect that it was both feasible and
desirable to hold the West, but the character of
his arguments shows that there was then a poor
prospect of success. At that time no one could
have anticipated the Napoleonic wars which ended
all European competition for the possession of the
Mississippi valley, and, as It were, tossed that
region into the hands of the United States. There
was strong opposition in Congress to pursuing
any course that would require maintenance of an
army or navy. Some held that It was a great mis
take to have a war department, and that there
would be time enough to create one in case war
should actually arrive.
In a message to the Senate, August 7, 1789,

82 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
Washington had urged the importance of "some
uniform and effective system for the mUitia of the
United States," saying that he was "particularly
anxious" it should receive early attention. On
January 18, 1790, General Knox submitted to
Congress a plan to which there are frequent refer
ences in Washington's diary, showing the special
interest he took in the subject. The report laid
down principles which have long since been em
braced by European nations, but which have just
recently been recognized by the United States. It
asserts: "That it is the indispensable duty of every
nation to establish all necessary Institutions for its
protection and defense; that it is a capital security
to a free state for the great body of the people to
possess a competent knowledge of the mUitary art;
that every man of the proper age and abUIty of
body is firmly bound by the social compact to
perform, personally, his proportion of mUitary duty
for the defense of the State; that all men of the
legal military age should be armed, enrolled, and
held responsible for different degrees of mUitary
service." In furtherance of these principles a
scheme was submitted providing for mUitary service
by the citizens of the United States beginning at
eighteen years of age and terminating at sixty.

ALARUMS AND EXCURSIONS 83
The response of Congress was the Act of AprU
30, 1790, authorizing a mUitary establishment
"to the number of one thousand two hundred and
sixteen non-commissioned officers, privates, and
musicians," with permission to the President to
call State Militia into service if need be, "in protect
ing the inhabitants of the frontiers." Washing
ton, in noting in his diary his approval of the
act, observed that it was not "adequate to the
exigencies of the government and the protection It
is intended to afford. "
The Indian troubles In the Southwest were made
particularly serious by the ability of the head-chief
of the Creek nation, Alexander McGUlIvray,
the authentic facts of whose career might seem too
wUdly Improbable even for the uses of melodrama.
His grandmother was a full-blooded Creek of high
standing in the nation. She had a daughter by
Captain Marchand, a French officer. This daugh
ter, who is described as a bewitching beauty,
was taken to wife by Lachland McGUlIvray, a
Scotchman engaged in the Indian trade. A son
was born who, at the age of ten, was sent by his
father to Charleston to be educated, where he
remained nearly seven years receiving instruction
both in English and Latin. This son, Alexander,

84 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
was intended by his father for civUized life, and
when he was seventeen he was placed with a busi
ness house In Savannah. During the Revolution
ary War the father took the Tory side and his
property was confiscated. The son took refuge
with his Indian kinsfolk, and acquired in their
councUs an ascendancy which also extended to the
Seminole tribe. His position and influence made
his favor an important object with all powers
having American Interests. During the war the
British conferred upon him the rank and pay of a
colonel. In 1784, as the representative of the
Creek and Seminole nations, he formed a treaty
of alliance with Spain, by the terms of which he
became a Spanish commissary with the rank and
pay of a colonel.
Against the State of Georgia, the Creek nation
had grievances which McGUlIvray was able to
voice with a vigor and an eloquence that compelled
attention. It was the old story, so often repeated
in American history, of encroachments upon
Indian territory. Attempts at negotiation had
been made by the old government, and these were
now renewed by Washington with no better result.
McGUlIvray met the commissioners, but left on
finding that they had no intention of restoring the

ALARUMS AND EXCURSIONS 85
Indian lands that had been taken. A formidable
Indian war seemed imminent, but Washington,
whose own frontier experience made him well
versed in Indian affairs, judged correctly that the
way to handle the situation was to induce McGUlI
vray to come to New York, though, as he noted in
his diary, the matter must be so managed that
the "government might not appear to be an agent
in it, or suffer in its dignity if the attempt to get
him here should not succeed. " With his habitual
caution, Washington considered the point whether
he could send out an agent without consulting the
Senate on the appointment, and he instructed
General Knox "to take the opinion of the Chief
Justice of the United States and the Secretary of
the Treasury." The assurances obtained were
such that Washington selected an experienced
frontier commander. Colonel Marinus Willett of
New York, and impressed upon him the im
portance of bringing the Indian chiefs to New
York, pointing out "the arguments justifiable for
him to use to effect this, with such lures as re
spected McGUlIvray personally, and might be held
out to them. "
Colonel Willett was altogether successful, though
the inducements he offered were probably aided

86 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
by McGUlIvray 's desire to visit New York
and meet General Washington. Other chiefs
accompanied him, and on their way they received
many official attentions. An incident which
occurred at Guilford Court House, South Carolina,
displays McGUlIvray 's character in a kindly light.
A woman whose husband had been kUled by Creek
Indians and who with her children had been made
captive, visited McGUlIvray to thank him for effect
ing their release, and it was disclosed that he had
since that time been contributing to the support of
the family. At New York, the recently organized
Tammany Society turned out in costumes sup
posed to represent Indian attire and escorted the
visiting chiefs to Federal Hall. Eventually Wash
ington himself went to Federal Hall In his coach
of state and In all the trappings of official dignity,
to sign the treaty concluded with the Indians.
The treaty, which laid down the pattern subse
quently followed by the government in its dealings
with the Indians, recognized the claims of the
Creek nation to part of the territory it claimed,
and gave compensation for the part it relinquished
by an annuity of fifteen hundred dollars for the
tribe, and an annuity of one hundred dollars for
each of the principal chiefs.

ALARUMS AND EXCURSIONS 87
For his part In the transaction McGUlIvray was
commissioned an agent of the United States with
the rank of brigadier-general, a position which he
sustained with dignity. He was six feet tall, spare
in frame, erect in carriage. His eyes were large,
dark, and piercing; his forehead, wider at the top
than just above the eyes, was so high and broad
as to be almost bulging. When he was a British
colonel, he wore the uniform of that rank; when in
the Spanish service, he wore the military dress of
that country; and after Washington appointed him
a brigadier-general he sometimes wore the uniform
of the American army, but never In the presence of
Spaniards. In different parts of his dominions
he had good houses where he practised generous
hospitality. His Influence was shaken by his
various political alliances, and before he died in
1793 he had lost much of his authority.
In the course of these negotiations Washington
had an experience with the Senate which there
after affected his official behavior. The debates
of the constitutional convention indicated an ex
pectation that the Senate would act as a privy
councU to the President; and Washington —
intent above all things on doing his duty — tried
to treat it as such. In company with General

88 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
Knox he went to the Senate chamber, prepared
to explain his negotiations with the Indian
chiefs, but he forthwith experienced the truth
of the proverb that although you may lead a
horse to water you cannot make him drink. In
his diary for August 22, 1789, Maclay gave a
characteristic account of the scene. Washington
presided, taking the Vice-President's chair. "He
rose and told us bluntly that he had called on us
for our advice and consent to some propositions
respecting the treaty to be held with the Southern
Indians. Said he had brought General Knox
with him who was well acquainted with the busi
ness." A statement was read giving a schedule
of the propositions on which the advice of the
Senate was asked. Maclay relates that he called
for the reading of the treaties and other documents
referred to in the statement. "I cast an eye
at the President of the United States. I saw he
wore an aspect of stem displeasure. " There was a
manifest reluctance of the Senate to proceed with
the matter In the President's presence, and finally
a motion was made to refer the business to a com
mittee of five. A sharp debate followed in which
"the President of the United States started up in
a violent fret. 'This defeats every purpose of my

ALARUMS AND EXCURSIONS 89
coming here' were the first words that he said.
He then went on to say that he had brought his
Secretary of War with him to give any necessary
information; that the Secretary knew all about the
business, and yet he was delayed and could not
go on with the matter. " The situation evidently
became strained. Maclay relates: "A pause for
some time ensued. We waited for him to with
draw. He did so with a discontented air. "
The privy council function of the Senate was
thus in effect abolished by its own action. There
after the President had practically no choice
save to conclude matters subject to subsequent
ratification by the Senate. It soon became the
practice of the Senate to restrict the President's
power of appointment by conditioning it upon the
approval of the Senators from the State In which an
appointment was made. The clause providing for
the advice and consent of the Senate was among
the changes made In the original draft to con-
cUiate the small States, but It was not supposed
that the practical effect would be to aUow Senators
to dictate appointments. It was observed In the
Federalist that "there will be no exertion of choice
on the part of Senators." Nevertheless there was
some uneasiness on the point. In a letter of May

90 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
31, 1789, Ames remarked that "the meddliag of
the Senate in appointments is one of the least
defensible parts of the Constitution," and with
prophetic insight he foretold that "the number
of the Senators, the secrecy of their doings, would
shelter them, and a corrupt connection between
those who appoint to office and the officers them
selves would be created. "
Washington had to submit to senatorial dic
tation almost at the outset of his administration,
the Senate refusing to confirm his nomination of
Benjamin Flshbourn for the place of naval officer
at Savannah. The only detaUs to be had about
this affair are those given in a special message
of August 6, 1789, from which it appears that
Washington was not notified of the grounds of the
Senate's objection. He defended his selection on
the ground that Flshbourn had a meritorious
record as an army officer, had held distinguished
positions in the state government of Georgia
which testffied public confidence, and moreover
was actually holding, by virtue of state appoint
ment, an office similar to that to which Washington
desired to appoint him. The appointment was,
in fact, no more than the transfer to the federal
service of an official of approved administrative

ALARUMS AND EXCURSIONS 91
experience, and was of such manifest propriety
that it seems most likely that the rejection was
due to local political intrigue using the Georgia
Senators as its tool. The office went to Lachlan
Mcintosh, who was a prominent Georgia politician.
Over ten years before he had killed in a duel Button
Gwinnett, a signer of the Declaration of Indepen
dence. Gwinnett was the challenger and Mc
intosh was badly wounded in the duel, but the
affair caused a feud that long disturbed Georgia
politics, and through the agency of the Senate It
was able to reach and annoy the President of
the United States.
At the time when Washington was Inaugurated
both North CaroUna and Rhode Island were out
side the Union. The national government was
a new and doubtful enterprise, remote from and
unfamUiar to the mass of the people. To turn
their thoughts toward the new Administration it
seemed to be good policy for Washington to make
tours. The notes made by Washington in his
diary indicate that the project was his own notion,
but both Hamilton and Knox cordlaUy approved
it and Madison "saw no impropriety" in It.
Therefore, shortly after the recess of the first
session of Congress, Washington started on a

92 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
trip through the Northern States, pointedly avoid
ing Rhode Island, then a foreign country. It was
during this tour that a question of etiquette
occurred about which there was a great stir at the
time. John Hancock, then Governor of Massa
chusetts, did not call upon Washington but wrote
inviting Washington to stay at his house, and
when this invitation was declined, he wrote again
inviting the President to dinner en famille. Wash
ington again declined, and this time the faUure of
the Governor to pay his respects to the President
of the United States was the talk of the town.
Some of Hancock's aides now called with excuses
on the score of his Ulness. Washington noted
in his diary, "I informed them in expUcit terms
that I should not see the Governor unless it was
at my own lodgings. " This incident occurred on
Saturday evening, and the effect was such that
Governor Hancock called In person on Sunday.
The affair was the subject of much comment not
to Governor Hancock's advantage. Washington's
church-going habits on this trip afford no smaU
evidence of the patient consideration which he
paid to every point of duty. In New York, he
attended Episcopal church service regularly once
every Sunday. On his northern tour he went

ALARUMS AND EXCURSIONS 93
to the Episcopal church in the morning, and
then showed his respect for the dominant religious
system of New England by attending the Congre
gational church in the afternoon. His northern
tour lasted from October 15 to November 13, 1789,
and was attended by popular manifestations that
must have promoted the spread of national senti
ment. On November 21, 1789, North Carolina U
came into the Union, and Rhode Island followed
on May 29, 1790. Washington started on a tour
of the Southern States on March 21, 1791, In which
he covered more than seventeen hundred mUes
in sixty-six days, and was received with grand
demonstrations at all the towns he visited.
While he was making these tours, which in the
days before the railroad and the telegraph were
practically the only efficacious means of estabUsh
ing the new government In the thoughts and feel
ings of the people, he was much concerned about
frontier troubles, and with good reason, as he well
knew the deficiency of the means that Congress had
allowed. The tiny army of the United States
was under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel
Josiah Harmar, with the brevet rank of general.
In October, 1790, Harmar led his troops, nearly
four-fifths of which were new levies of mUitia,

94 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
against the Indians who had been disturbing the
western frontier. The expedition was a succession
of blunders and faUures which were due more to
the rude and undisciplined character of the
material that Harmar had to work with than to
his personal incapacity. Harmar did succeed
in destroying five Indian villages with their
stores of corn, but their inhabitants had warniag
enough to escape and were able to take prompt
vengeance. A detachment of troops was am
bushed and badly cut up. The design had been
to push on to the upper course of the Wabash, but
so many horses had been stolen by the Indians
that the expedition was crippled. As a result,
Harmar marched his troops back again, professing
to believe that punishment had been inflicted
upon the Indians that would be a severe lesson to
them. What really happened was that the In
dians were encouraged to think that they were
more than a match for any army which the
settlers could send against them, and before
long news came of the destruction of settlements
and the massacre of their iohabltants. "Unless,"
wrote Rufus Putnam to Washington, "Government
speedily sends a body of troops for our protection,
we are a ruined people. "

ALARUMS AND EXCURSIONS 95
Washington did what he could. He sent to
Congress Putnam's letter and other frontier
communications, but Congress, which was stub
bornly opposed to creating a national army,
replied, when the need was demonstrated, that
the militia of the several States were available.
The Government was without means of protecting
the Indians against abuse and Injustice or of pro
tecting the settlers against the savage retaliations
that naturaUy followed. The dilemma was stated
with sharp distinctness In correspondence which
passed between Washington and HamUton in AprU,
1791. Washington wrote that it was a hopeless
undertaking to keep peace on the frontier "whUst
land-jobbing and the disorderly conduct of our
borderers are suffered with impunity; and while
the States individually are omitting no occasion to
intermeddle in matters which belong to the general
Government." HamUton In reply went to the
root of the matter. "Our system is such as stUl
to leave the public peace of the Union at the
mercy of each state government. " He proceeded
to give a concrete instance: "For example, a party
comes from a county of Virginia into Pennsylvania,
and wantonly murders some friendly Indians.
The national Government, instead of havmg

96 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
power to apprehend the murderers and bring them
to justice, is obliged to make a representation
to that of Pennsylvania; that of Pennsylvania,
again, is to make a requisition of that of Virginia.
And whether the murderers shaU be brought to
justice at all must depend upon the particular
poUcy, and energy, and good disposition of two
state governments, and the efficacy of the pro
visions of their respective laws. And security of
other States and the money of all are at the dis
cretion of one. These things require a remedy;
but when that will come, God knows."
Toward the close of its last session, the First
Congress was induced to pass an act "for raising
and adding another regiment to the military
establishment of the United States and for making
further provision for the protection of the fron
tiers." The further provision authorized the
President to employ "troops enlisted under the
denomination of levies" for a term not exceeding
six months and in number not exceeding two thou
sand. The law thus made it compulsory that
the troops should move while still raw and un
trained. Congress had fixed the pay of the
privates at three dollars a month, from which
ninety cents were deducted, and it had been

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AUTOGRAPH LETTER OF WASHINGTON
INVITING GUESTS TO DINNER, DATED
AT WEST POINT, AUGUST 16, 1779.
From the original in the collection of the New
York Historical Society.

ALARUMS AND EXCURSIONS 97
necessary to scrape the streets and even the prisons
of the seaboard cities for men willing to enlist
upon such terms. Washington gave the command
to General Arthur St. Clair, whose mUitary experi
ence should have made him a capable commander,
but he was then in bad health and unable to handle
the situation under the conditions imposed upon
him. General Harmar, enlightened by his own
experience, predicted that such an army would
certainly be defeated.
The campaign was intended as an expedition
to chastise the Indians so that they would be
deterred from molesting the settlers, but it resulted
in a disaster that greatly encouraged Indian
depredations. As the army approached the In
dian towns, a body of the militia deserted, and
it was reported to St. Clair that they intended
to plunder the supplies. He sent one of his
regular regiments after them, thus reducing
his available force to about fourteen hundred
men. On November 3, 1791, this force camped
on the eastern fork of Wabash. Before daybreak
the next morning the Indians made a sudden attack,
taking the troops by surprise and throwing them
into disorder. It was the story of Braddock's
defeat over again. The troops were surrounded

98 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
by foes that they could not see and could not reach.
Indian marksmen picked off the gunners untU the
artUlery was sUenced; then the Indians rushed in
and seized the guns. In the combat there were
both conspicuous exploits of valor and disgraceful
scenes of cowardice. In that dark hour St. Clair
showed undaunted courage. He was in the front
of the fight, and several times he headed charges.
He seemed to have a charmed life, for although
eight bullets pierced his clothes, one cutting away a
lock of the thick gray hair that flowed from under
his three-cornered hat, he escaped without a
wound. Finally defeat became a rout which St.
Clair was powerless to check. Pushed aside in
the rush of fugitives, he was left In a position of
great peril. If the Indian pursuit had been per
sistent, few might have escaped, but the Indians
stopped to plunder the camp. Nevertheless six
hundred and thirty men were kiUed and over two
hundred and eighty wounded, with small loss to the
Indians. Washington's reception of the news Ulustrates
both his iron composure and the gusts of passion
under which It sometimes gave way. The detaUs
are unquestionably authentic, as they were com
municated by Washington's secretary who wit-

ALARUMS AND EXCURSIONS 99
nessed the scene. Washington was having a dinner
party when an officer arrived at the door and sent
word that he was the bearer of dispatches from the
Western army. The secretary went out to him,
but the officer said his instructions were to deliver
the dispatches to the President in person. Wash
ington then went to the officer and received the
terrible news. He returned to the table as though
nothing had happened, and everything went on as
usual. After dinner there was a reception in Mrs.
Washington's drawing-room and the President,
as was his custom, spoke courteously to every lady
in the room. By ten o'clock all the visitors had
gone and Washington began to pace the floor at
first without any change of manner, but soon he
began to show emotional excitement and he
broke out suddenly: "It's aU over! St. Clair is
defeated — routed, — the officers nearly all kiUed
— the men by wholesale, — the rout complete,
— too shocking to thiok of, — and a surprise into
the bargain!"
When near the door in his agitated march about
the room, he stopped and burst forth, "Yes, here
on this very spot I took leave of him; I wished him
success and honor; 'You have your instructions,' I
said, 'from the Secretary of War; I had a strict

100 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
eye to them, and will add one word — Beware of a
surprise! You know how the Indians fight us!'
He went off with that as my last solemn warniag
thrown Into his ears. And yet, to suffer that army
to be cut to pieces — hacked, butchered, toma
hawked — by a surprise ! O God, O God, he's
worse than a murderer! How can he answer it to
his country! The blood of the slain is upon him
— the curse of the widows and orphans — the
curse of Heaven!"
The secretary relates that this torrent of passion
burst forth in appaUing tones. The President's
frame shook. "More than once he threw his
hands up as he hurled imprecations upon St.
Clair." But at length he got his feelings under
control, and after a pause he remarked, "I wUl
hear him without prejudice. He shall have fuU
justice." St. Clair was, indeed, treated with
marked leniency. A committee of the House re
ported that the failure of the expedition could not
"be imputed to his conduct, either at any time be
fore or during the action. " St. Clair was continued
in his position as Governor of the Northwest
Territory and remained there until 1802.
Notwithstanding the dire results of relying on
casual levies. Congress was still stubbornly opposed

ALARUMS AND EXCURSIONS 101
to creating an effective force under national
control, and in this attitude to some extent
reflected even frontier sentiment. Ames in a
letter of January 13, 1792, wrote that "even the
views of the western people, whose defense has been
undertaken by government, have been unfriendly
to the Secretary of War and to the popularity
of the Government. They wish to be hired as
volunteers, at two-thirds of a dollar a day to fight
the Indians. They are averse to the regulars."
By the Act of March 5, 1792, Congress authorized
three additional regiments, with the proviso, how
ever, that they "shall be discharged as soon as
the United States shall be at peace with the Indian
tribes. " This legislation, nevertheless, was a great
practical improvement on the previous act. Gen
eral Wayne, who now took command, was fortu
nately circumstanced in that he was under no
pressure to move against the Indians. Public
opinion favored a return to negotiation, so that
he had time to get his troops under good dis-
cipliae. He did not move the main body of his
troops until the summer of 1794, and on August
20, he inflicted a smashing defeat on the Indians,
at a place known as the Fallen Timbers, followed
up the victory by punitive expeditions to the

102 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
Indian towns, and bumed their houses and crops.
The campaign was a complete success. The
Indians were so humbled by their losses that they
sued for peace, and negotiations began which were
concluded in the summer of 1795 by the treaty of
Greenville, under which the Northwestern tribes
ceded an extensive territory to the United States.
It was notorious that the trouble which the
American authorities had experienced with the
Indians, had been largely due to the activity of
British agents. In his report Wayne noted that
the destruction effected by his troops included
"the houses, stores, and property of Colonel Mc-
Kee, the British agent, and principal stimulator of
the war now existing between the United States and
the savages. " A sharp correspondence took place
between Wayne and Major William Campbell,
commandiag a British post on the Miami. Camp
beU protested against the approach of Wayne's
army, "no war existing between Great Britain and
America." Wayne assented to this statement,
and then asked what he meant "by taking post far
within the well known and acknowledged limits of
the United States." Campbell rejoiaed that he
had acted under orders and as to his right, that was
a matter which were best left to "the ambassadors

ALARUMS AND EXCURSIONS 103
of our different nations." Campbell refused to
obey Wayne's demand to withdraw, and Wayne
ignored Campbell's threat to fire if he were ap
proached too close. Wayne reported that the only
notice he took of this threat was "by immediately
setting fire to and destroying everything within
view of the fort, and even under the muzzles of the
guns." "Had Mr. Campbell carried his threats
into execution," added Wayne, "it is more than
probable he would have experienced a storm."
No colUsIon actually took place at that time but
there was created a situation which, unless it
were removed by diplomacy, must have eventually
brought on war.

CHAPTER V
TRIBUTE TO THE ALGERINES
At the time when Washington took office, the
captains and crews of two American vessels, which
had been seized by Algerlne Corsairs in 1785, stUl
remained in captivity. The Continental Congress
had made some efforts In their behalf which
were contemptuously received. The Dey of
Algiers did not wish any treaty with the United
States; but he did want $59,496.00 for the twenty-
one captives whom he then held. Farther than
that negotiation had not progressed. Agents of
the United States were advised that, if such a high
amount were paid, the Corsairs would pursue
American vessels in preference to those of any
other nation, and that the shrewd thing would be
to pretend indifference to the fate of the captives.
This advice was acted upon even to the extent of
cutting'off the supplies which had been forwarded
to the captives through the Spanish consul at
104

TRIBUTE TO THE ALGERINES 105
Algiers. The summary method which was pur
sued was that of dishonoring bills drawn by him to
cover his expenditures.
Jefferson, who while Minister to France had
been closely connected with these proceedings, was
called upon by Congress for a report upon them,
not long after he took office as Secretary of State.
This report, December 28, 1790, set forth the
fact that the Mediterranean trade, which had
employed from eighty to one hundred ships with
about twelve hundred seamen, had been almost
destroyed. In the interest of the negotiations, it
had been necessary "to suffer the captives and
their friends to believe for a while, that no atten
tion was paid to them, no notice taken of their
letters," and they were "still under this impres
sion." Jefferson contented himself with sub
mitting the facts In the case, remarking that
"upon the whole it rests with Congress to decide
between war, tribute, and ransom. If war, they
wUl consider how far our own resources shall be
called forth, and how far they will enable the
Executive to engage. In the forms of the Con
stitution, the cooperation of other Powers. If
tribute or ransom, it will rest with them to
limit and provide the amount; and with the

106 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
Executive, observing the same constitutional
forms, to make arrangements for employing it to
the best advantage. "
The problem which Jefferson thus put before
Congress was a singularly difficult one. Among
the captives was Captain Richard O'Brien, whose
ship, the Dauphin of Philadelphia, was taken
July 30, 1785. He had a ready pen and, appar
ently, had unrestricted access to the mails.
His letters were those of a shrewd observer and
depicted a situation that bristled with perplexity.
The Algerlnes had about a dozen vessels, their
armament ranging from ten to thirty-six guns,
but of these vessels only two belonged to the
Government, the others being private ventures.
Though they preyed on merchantmen, they
avoided engagements, and did not come out at all
If there were vessels cruising for them. A block
ade was effective only while it lasted. Whenever
It was raised, out came the Corsairs again. An
occasional bombardment of their port did not cow
them and had no permanent effect. A French
official described it as being "like breaking glass
windows with guineas." The Algerines made
treaties with some Powers In consideration of
tribute but refused peace to others on any terms.

TRIBUTE TO THE ALGERINES 107
as they did not desire to shut out all opportunity
for their time-honored sport of piracy.
Congress was slow to take action of any kind.
In January, 1791, Maclay noted that a committee
had decided that the Mediterranean trade could
not be preserved without an armed force to
protect it, and that a navy should be established
as soon as the Treasury was in a position to bear
the expense. Meanwhile the President began fresh
negotiations, which were attended by singular
fatality. Thomas Barclay, who had some diplo
matic experience, was commissioned to go to the
Emperor of Morocco. When Barclay reached
Gibraltar, he was taken ill, and, after being re
moved to Lisbon, he died. Admiral John Paul
Jones was then appointed special commissioner to
arrange for the ransom of the captives. As he
had then left the Russian service and was Uviag
in Paris, it was supposed that his services would
be avaUable, but he died before the commission
could reach him. The delay caused by these events
was made so much worse by the slow transmission
of intelligence that two years elapsed before a fresh
start was made by placing the conduct of matters
in the hands of Colonel David Humphreys,
then Minister to Portugal. Humphreys had gone

108 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
as far as Gibraltar on his mission when he learned
that a truce had been suddenly arranged between
Portugal and Algiers. This was alarming news,
since It meant that the Algerines could now pass
into the Atlantic from which they had been ex
cluded by Portuguese war-vessels stationed ia the
strait of Gibraltar. "I have not slept since the
receipt of the news of this the hellish plot, " wrote
Edward Church, the United States consul at
Lisbon. Church was energetic in spreading the
intelligence, which fortunately reached some Amer
ican shipmasters in time to save them. In October,
1793, as thirteen American vessels were in the port
of Lisbon afraid to venture out. Church pleaded
their case so vigorously that the Portuguese govern
ment agreed to give them an armed convoy.
Nevertheless the Algerines found plenty of game
among American ships then at sea, for they cap
tured ten vessels and added one hundred and five
more Americans to the stock of slaves in Algiers.
"They are in a distressed and naked situation,"
wrote Captain O'Brien, who had himself then been
eight years in captivity.
Humphreys made arrangements by which they
received clothing and a money allowance ranging
from twelve cents a day for a seaman up to eight

TRIBUTE TO THE ALGERINES 109
dollars a month for a captain. Nothing, however,
could be done in the way of peace negotiations.
One of Humphreys' agents reported that the Dey
could not make peace even if he really wanted to
do so. "He declared to me that his interest does
not permit him to accept your offers. Sir, even
were you to lavish mlUIons upon him, 'because,'
said he, * if I were to make peace with everybody,
what should I do with my Corsairs? What should
I do with my soldiers? They would take off my
head, for want of other prizes.'"
This was an honest disclosure of the situation.
Humphreys wrote Jefferson that "no choice is left
for the United States but to prepare a naval
force for the protection of their trade. " Captain
O'Brien wrote, "By all means urge Congress to
fit out some remarkably fast saUing cruisers, well
appointed and manned." In January, 1794,
accordingly, a committee of the House brought in a
resolution for buUding four ships of 44 guns and
two of 20 guns each. The debate began on Febru
ary 6, and for some time was altogether one-sided,
with one speaker after another opposing the
creation of a navy. Madison, as was now his habit,
had doubts as to the propriety of the measure. He
fancied that peace "might be purchased for less

no WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
money than this armament would cost." Clark
of New Jersey had "an objection to the establish
ment of a fleet, because, when once it had been
commenced, there would be no end to it. " He had
"a scheme which he judged would be less expen
sive and more effectual. This was to hire the
Portuguese to cruise against the Algerines."
Baldwin of Georgia thought that "bribery alone
could purchase security from the Algerines."
Nicholas of Virginia "feared that we were not a
match for the Algerines. "
Smith of Maryland and Fitzsimmons of Penn
sylvania championed the resolution, and Fisher
Ames made some remarks on Madison's lack of
spirit that caused Madison to deflne his position.
He proposed as a substitute for the pending meas
ure that money should "be employed in such a
manner as should be found most effectual for
obtaining a peace with the Regency of Algiers;
and failing of this, that the sum should be applied
to the end of obtaining protection from some of the
European Powers. " This motion warmed up the
debate. GUes of Virginia came to Madison's
support in a style that was not helpful. He
"considered navies altogether as very foolish
things. An immense quantity of property was

TRIBUTE TO THE ALGERINES 111
spread on the water for no purpose whatever, which
might have been employed by land to the best
purpose. " The suggestion that the United States
should be a hermit nation was an indiscreet
exposure of the logical significance of Madison's
plan, and it perhaps turned the scale in favor of
employing force.
The bill came up In the House for final passage
on March 10, 1794. Its opponents now sparred for
time, but a motion to recommit in order to give
opportunity for further consideration was defeated
by 48 to 41. GUes made a final effort, by a long
and elaborate address, in which he argued that the
effect of fitting out a navy would be to involve
the United States in war with all the European
Powers. Moreover, a navy would be dangerous
to American liberty. "A navy is the most expen
sive of all means of defense, and the tyranny of
governments consists in the expensiveness of their
machinery. " He pointed to the results of British
naval policy. "The government is not yet de
stroyed, but the people are oppressed, liberty is
banished." The French monarchy had been
ruined by its navy. He was "astonished, with
these fatal examples before our eyes, that there
should be gentlemen who would wish to enter upon

112 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
this fashionable system of politics. " In discussing
the expense of maintaining a navy, he expressed
his fear that it would eventually bring back the
miseries of feudalism.
William Smith of South Carolina made a reply
in which he defined the issue as being between
defense and tribute; but Giles had the last word.
He wanted to know whether it was maintained
that the frigates it was proposed to buUd would
"boldly march upon land and break the chains of
the prisoners?" He begged Congress not to do
what "would irritate the barbarians and furnish
additional misery to the unfortunate prisoners."
In this closing struggle over the bill Giles fought
single-handed. When he had quite finished, the
bill was passed by 50 yeas to 39 nays, a result
which showed a decided gain in strength from the
discussion. The debates in the Senate have not been pre
served, but the Senate was so evenly divided that it
took the casting vote of the Vice-President to
pass the bUl, which became law March 27, 1794.
In order to get it passed at aU, a proviso had been
tacked on that, if peace terms could be arranged,
"no farther proceeding be had under this Act."
In September, 1795, a treaty of peace with Algiers

TRIBUTE TO THE ALGERINES 113
was finally concluded, after negotiations had been
facUitated by a contingent fee of $18,000 paid to
"Bacri the Jew, who has as much art in this sort
of management as any man we ever knew," the
American agents reported. It was a keen bargain,
as Bacri had to propitiate court officials at his own
risk, and had to look for both reimbursement and
personal profit, too, out of the lump sum he was to
receive in event of his success. It can hardly be
doubted that he had the situation securely In hand
before making the bargain. The money paid in
Algiers for the ransom of the captives, for trib
ute and for presents to officials amounted to
$642,500.00. But in addition the United States
agreed to build a frigate for the Algerlne navy and
also supply naval stores, which with Incidental ex
penses brought the total cost of the peace treaty
up to $992,463.25. Moreover, the United States
agreed to pay an annual tribute of 12,000 sequins,
—about $27,500.
By the terms of the navy act, the United States
had to stop building vessels for its own protection.
Of those which had been authorized, the frigates
Constitution, United States, and Constellation were
under way and were eventually completed. The
timber, with material that had been collected for

114 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
the other vessels, was sold, except what was needed
for the frigate which was to be presented to the
Algerines, and which was to be built at Portsmouth,
N. H. The whole affair was a melancholy business
that must have occasioned Washington deep
chagrin. In his address to Congress, December
7, 1796, announcing the success of the negotiations
for effecting the release of the captives, he observed
that "to secure respect to a neutral flag requires
a naval force, organized and ready to vindicate
It from Insult or aggression. "

CHAPTER VI
FRENCH DESIGNS ON AMERICA
A FEW months before France declared war upon
England, February 1, 1793, Edmond Genet
was appointed French Minister to the United
States. He landed at Charleston, April 8, and
at once began activities so authoritative as to
amount to an erection of French sovereignty
In the United States. The subsequent faUure of
his efforts and the abrupt ending of his diplomatic
career have so reacted upon his reputation that
associations of boastful arrogance and reckless
incompetency cling to his name. This estimate
holds him too lightly and underrates the perU to
which the United States was then exposed. Genet
was no casual rhetorician raised to important
office by caprice of events, but a trained diplomat
ist of hereditary aptitude and of long experience.
His father was chief of the bureau of correspond
ence in the Department of Foreign Affairs for
115

116 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
the French monarchy, and it was as an interpreter
attached to that bureau that the son began his
career in 1775. WhUe stUl a youth, he gained
literary distinction by his translations of historical
works from Swedish into French. Genet was
successively attached to the French Embassies at
Berlin and Vienna, and in 1781 he succeeded his
father In the Department of Foreign Affairs. In
1788, he was Secretary of the French Embassy at
St. Petersburg, where his zeal for French Revolu
tionary principles so irritated the Empress Cather
ine that she characterized him as "a furious
demagogue," and In 1792 he was forced to leave
Russia. In the same year he was named Ambassa
dor to Holland, and thence was soon transferred to
the United States.
It is obvious that a man of such experience
could not be ignorant of diplomatic forms and of
international proprieties of behavior. If he pur
sued a course that has since seemed to be a marvel
of truculence, the explanation should be sought in
the circumstances of his mission more than in the
nature of his personality. When the matter is
considered from this standpoint, not only does one
find that Genet's proceedings become consistent
and intelligible, but one becomes deeply impressed

FRENCH DESIGNS ON AMERICA 117
with the magnitude of the peril then confronting
the United States. Nothing less than American
independence was at stake.
It should be borne In mind that France, in aiding
America against England, had been pursuing her
own ends. In August, 1787, the French govern
ment advised its American representative that it
had observed with indifference the movements
going on in the United States and would view the
break-up of the Confederation without regret.
"We have never pretended to make of America a
useful ally; we have had no other object than to
deprive Great Britain of that vast continent. " But,
now that war with England had broken out again,
it was worth whUe making an effort to convert
America into a useful ally. Jefferson, while
Minister to Paris, had been sympathetic with the
Revolutionary movement. In 1789, the English
Ambassador reported to his government that
Jefferson was much consulted by the leaders of the
Third Estate. On the other hand, Gouverneur
Morris, who was then living In Paris, sympathized
frankly with the King. Nevertheless he was
chosen to succeed Jefferson as the American
Minister. In notifying him of the appointment,
Washington let him know that there had been

118 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
objections. "It was urged that in France you
were considered as a favorer of the aristocracy,
and unfriendly to its Revolution. " Washington's
reminder that it was his business to promote the
interest of his own country did not have any
apparent effect on Morris's behavior. He became
the personal agent of Louis XVI, and he not only
received and disbursed large sums on the King's
account, but he also entered into plans for the
King's fiight from Paris. During the Reign of
Terror which began in 1792, he behaved with an
energy and an intrepidity honorable to him as a
man; in general, however, his course tended to
embroU and not to guard American Interests.
In the face of the European coalition against
revolutionary France, the principle of action was
that announced by Danton, — "to dare, and to
dare, and without end to dare. " Genet therefore
went on his mission to America keyed to measures
which were audacious but which can hardly be
described as reckless. By plunging heavily he
might make a big winning; If he failed, he was
hardly worse off than if he had not made the
attempt. To draw the United States Into the war
as the ally of France was only one part of his
mission. He was also planning to reestabUsh the

FRENCH DESIGNS ON AMERICA 119
French colonial empire, the loss of which was still
an unhealed wound. Canada, Louisiana, and the
Floridas were all in his mind. In Louisiana,
France regarded conditions as being so favorable
that Genet was instructed to make special efforts In
that quarter. Spain, which had entered the coali
tion against republican France, held the lower
Mississippi. Spain was therefore the common
enemy of France and of the American settlements
west of the mountains. Ought not then those
two republican interests to work together to expel
Spain and to seize Louisiana? Moreover, there
was a belief, not without grounds, that the older
States which formed the American union were
indifferent to the needs and interests of the country
west of the AUeghenies and would be more relieved
than afflicted if it should take Its destinies Into its
own hands. Such considerations animated a group
of Americans in Paris, among whose prominent
members were Thomas Paine, the pamphleteer,
Joel Barlow, the poet, and Dr. James O'FaUon, a
Revolutionary soldier now interested In Western
land speculation. AU were then ardent sym
pathizers with the French Revolution, and they
entered heartily into the design of stirring up the
Western country against Spain. The project

120 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
attracted some frontier leaders, among them
George Rogers Clark, famous for his successful
campaigns against the hostile Indians and the
British during the Revolutionary War. He was
to lead a force of Western riflemen against the
Spanish posts in Louisiana, and Genet brought with
him blank brevets of officers up to the grade of
captain for bestowal on the Indian chiefs who
would cooperate. The expenses of the expedition
wereSto be met by collections which Genet expected
to make from the treasury of the United States on
account of sums due to France.
The project of using the United States as a
French base could claim legal rights under the
treaties of 1778 between France and the United
States. There were two treaties, both concluded
on the same day. One, entitled a treaty of amity
and commerce, was a mutual conveyance of privi
leges; it provided that the ships of war of each
country should defend the vessels of the other
country against all attacks that might occur whUe
they were in company. Besides this right of con
voy, each country had the right to use the ports of
the other, either for ships of war or for privateers
and their prizes, "nor shall such prizes be arrested
or seized when they come to and enter the ports of

FRENCH DESIGNS ON AMERICA 121
either party; nor shall the searchers or other
officers of those places search the same, or make any
examination concerning the lawfulness of such
prizes, but they may hoist saU at any time, and
depart." All vessels of either country had the
right to take refuge in the ports of the other,
whether from stress of weather or pursuit of
enemies, "and they shaU be permitted to refresh
and provide themselves at reasonable rates, with
victuals and all things needful for the sustenance
of their persons or reparation of their ships, and
convenlency of their voyage; and they shaU no
ways be detained or hindered from returning out of
the said ports or roads, but may remove and depart
when and whither they please, without any let or
hindrance. " It was expressly provided that such
hospitality should not be extended to vessels of
an enemy of either country. The accompanying
instrument, entitled a treaty of alliance, was a
mutual guarantee of territorial possessions, "for
ever against all other powers." These broad
rights and privileges were supplemented by the
convention of 1788 on consular functions, which
facUitated the organization of a consular juris
diction competent to deal with cases arising from
the treaties. There was stUl due to France on

122 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
loans contracted during the Revolution a remain
der of about $2,300,000 payable by instalments,
subject to the proviso that "Congress and the
United States" had "the liberty of freeing them
selves by anticipated payments should the state of
their finances admit. " It was planned to get the
United States to reciprocate the past favors of
France by favoring her now, if not by direct pay
ments of money, at least by acceptances which
Genet could use In purchasing supplies. The
fact that whatever In the way of money or accom
modations was obtained in the United States
would be used In business in that country was
counted upon to facilitate the transaction.
These facts form the background against which
Genet's activities should be viewed. He came
with deliberate intent to rush the situation, and
armed with all needful powers for that purpose,
so far as the French government could confer them.
According to a dispatch from Morris to the State
Department, Genet "took with him three hundred
blank commissions which he is to distribute to
such as will fit out cruisers In our ports to prey on
the British commerce. "
At Charleston, Genet received an enthusiastic
reception. The Revolutionary commander. Gen-

FRENCH DESIGNS ON AMERICA 123
eral Moultrie, who was then governor of South
Carolina, entered so cordially Into Genet's plans
that in his first dispatch home. Genet was able to
say to his government that Moultrie had permitted
him to arm privateers and had assisted the various
branches of his mission in every possible way.
Such was Genet's energy that within five days
after his arrival he had opened a recruiting station
at which American seamen were taken into the
French service; he had commissioned American
vessels as French privateers; and he had turned the
French consul's office into an admiralty court for
which business was provided by the prizes that
were being brought in.
After seeing under way all matters that he could
attend to in Charleston, Genet moved on to
PhUadelphia, and received on his way thither
such greetings as to give to his journey the
character of a triumphal progress. Meanwhile,
V Ambuscade, the French frigate which had brought
Genet to Charleston, was proceeding to Phila
delphia, taking prizes on her way and sending them
to American ports. In Delaware Bay she captured
the Grange, an English merchantman lying there at
anchor, and took this vessel with her to PhUadel
phia as a prize. As Genet neared Philadelphia on

124 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
May 16, L' Ambuscade gave notice by firing three
guns, at which signal a procession was formed to
meet Genet at Gray's Ferry and escort him to his
lodgings. He found awaiting him a letter from
George Rogers Clark, which gave an account of his
plans for the invasion of Louisiana and the capture
of New Orleans, and which announced his readiness
to start if he were assisted by some frigates and
provided with three thousand pounds sterling to
meet expenses. Genet received reports from other
agents or friendly correspondents in the Spanish
territory, and so active was he in forwarding the
objects of his mission that on June 19 he was able
to write to his government, "I am provisioning
the West Indies, I excite the Canadians to break
the British yoke, I arm the Kentukols and pre
pare a naval expedition which wUl facilitate their
descent on New Orleans. "
These claims were well founded. Genet did,
in fact, make an effective start, and had he been
able to command funds he might have opened
a great chapter of history. George Rogers Clark
was the ablest and most successful commander that
the frontier had yet produced, and such was the
weakness of the Spanish defenses that had his
expedition been actually launched as planned, the

FRENCH DESIGNS ON AMERICA 125
conquest of Louisiana might indeed have been
accomplished. It was not any defect in Genet's
arrangements that frustrated his plans, but his
inability to raise money and the uncertainty of his
position as the agent of a government which was
undergoing rapid revolutionary change.
News that the French Republic had declared war
against Great Britain reached the United States
early In AprU, 1793. Washington, who was then
at Mount Vernon, wrote to Jefferson that "it
behooves the Government of this country to use
every means in its power to prevent the
citizens thereof from embroiling us with either
of those Powers, by endeavoring to maintain
a strict neutrality," and he requested that the
Secretary should "give the subject mature
consideration, that such measures as shall be
deemed most likely to effect this desirable purpose
may be adopted without delay." On arriving
at Philadelphia a few days later, Washington
was met by a distracted Cabinet. The great
difficulty was the conflict of obligations. The
United States had a treaty of alliance with France;
it had a treaty of peace with Great Britain. The
situation had become such that it could not sus
tain both relations at the same time. If the

126 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
United States remained neutral, it would have to
deny to France privileges conferred by the treaty
which had been negotiated when both countries
were at war with Great Britain. How far was that
treaty now binding? It had been made with
"the Most Christian king," whose head had been
cut off. Did not his engagements fall with his
head? That was the very position taken by the
government of the French Republic, which had
asserted the right to decide what treaties of the old
monarchy should be retained and what rejected.
As an incident of the present case, the question
was to be decided whether the ambassador of the
French Republic should be received.
Such were the issues that Washington's Adminis
tration had to face, at a time when the whole
country was thrilling with enthusiasm in behalf of
the French Republic. Chief Justice Marshall left
on record his opinion that this feeling "was
almost universal, " and that " a great majority
of the American people deemed it criminal to
remain unconcerned spectators of a conflict be
tween their ancient enemy and republican France."
Washington acted with his customary deliber
ation. On April 18, 1793, he submitted to the
members of his Cabinet thirteen questions. Jeffer-

FRENCH DESIGNS ON AMERICA 127
son, who held that the French treaty was still
operative, noted that the questions reached him
in Washington's own handwriting, " yet it was
palpable from the style, their Ingenious tissue
and suite, that they were not the President's,
that they were raised upon a prepared chain of
argument, in short, that the language was HamU
ton's and the doubts his alone. " In Jefferson's
opinion they were designed to lead "to a declar
ation of the Executive that our treaty with France
is void." Jefferson was right as to Hamilton's
authorship. At a time when Jeff-jrson had no ad
vice to give save that it would be well to consider
whether Congress ought not to be summoned,
HamUton had ready a set of interrogatories which
subjected the whole situation to close analysis.
The critical questions were these:
"Shall a proclamation issue for the purpose of
preventing interferences of the citizens of the
United States in the war between France and Great
Britain, &c.? Shall it contain a declaration of
neutrality or not? What shall It contain?
" Are the United States obliged, by good faith,
to consider the treaties heretofore made with
France as applying to the present situation of the
parties? May they either renounce them, or hold

128 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
them suspended till the government of France
shall be established? "
To the interrogatories framed by HamUton,
Washington added one which presented the point
raised by Jefferson — " Is it necessary or advisable
to call together the two Houses of Congress, with
a view to the present posture of European affairs?
If It is, what shall be the particular object of such a
caU? "
The Cabinet met on April 19. On the question
of a proclamation of neutrality Jefferson argued
that such a proclamation would be equivalent to a
declaration that the United States would not take
part in the war, and that this matter did not lie
within the power of the Executive, since it was the
province of Congress to declare war. Congress
ought therefore to be called to consider the ques
tion. Hamilton, who held that it was both the
right and the duty of the President to proclaim
neutrality, was strongly opposed to summoning
Congress. In a brief record of the proceedings he
remarked that " whether this advice proceeded from
a secret wish to involve us In a war, or from a
constitutional timidity, certain It is such a step
would have been fatal to the peace and tranquUlity
of America." The matter was finally compro-

FRENCH DESIGNS ON AMERICA 129
mised by an unanimous agreement that a pro
clamation should be issued "forbidding our citizens
taking any part in any hostilities on the seas with
or against any of the belligerent powers; and warn
ing them against carrying to any such powers any
of those articles deemed contraband, according to
the modern usage of nations; and enjoining them
from all acts and proceedings iaconsistent with the
duties of a friendly nation toward those at war."
Jefferson's scruples having been appeased by avoid
ing the use of the term "neutrality," it was now
unanimously decided that Congress should not be
caUed. It was further decided that the French
Minister should be received. Jefferson and Ran
dolph, however, were of opinion that he should
be received without conditions, whUe Hamilton,
supported by Knox, held that the Minister ought
to be apprised of the intention to reserve the
question whether the treaties were still operative,
"lest sUence on that point should occasion mis
construction. " The even division of the Cabinet
on this point was in practical effect a victory for
Jefferson. The Cabinet was unable to reach any
decision in the matter of treaty obligations.
Jefferson held that they were stUl operative;
HamUton, that they were "temporarily and

130 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
provisionally suspended." Knox sided with
Hamilton, and Randolph, although he at first
sided with Jefferson, was so shaken in his opinion
by Hamilton's argument that he asked further
time for consideration. Eventually written opin
ions were submitted by Hamilton, Jefferson, and
Randolph, confirming the views they had previ
ously expressed, and, as Knox concurred with
Hamilton, the Cabinet was still evenly divided
on that fundamental question.
The proclamation, on the lines upon which all
had agreed, was draughted by Randolph who
showed It to Jefferson In order to assure him that
"there was no such word as neutrality in It."
Jefferson, whose own account this Is, did not men
tion that he raised any objection to the wording of
the proclamation at the time, though a few months
later he referred to It In his private correspondence
as a piece of "pusillanimity," because it omitted
any expression of the affection of America for
France. The proclamation was issued on April
22, two weeks after the arrival of Genet at Charles
ton. The procedure that had been adopted at
Jefferson's instance avoided none of the difficulties
that a declaration of neutrality would have encoun
tered but rather increased them by putting the

FRENCH DESIGNS ON AMERICA 131
Government In a false position. The mere omis
sion of the term did not prevent it from being
known as a neutrality proclamation. It was at
once so designated and has always been so con
sidered. Jefferson himself, in advising the Ameri
can foreign representatives of the policy of the
Government, said that it would be "a fair neutral
ity"; and, in writing to Madison a few days after
the proclamation had been issued, he remarked,
"I fear a fair neutrality will prove a disagreeable
pUl to our friends, though necessary to keep us out
of the calamities of war. "
By its terms, however, the proclamation was
simply an admonition to American citizens to keep
out of the war, with notice that, if they got into
trouble by engaging in contraband trade, they
would not receive the protection of the United
States, and would be liable to prosecution for the
commission of acts of a nature to "violate the law
of nations." It is manifest that the question
whether or not the French treaty was stUl in oper
ation was of great practical importance. If it was
stiU In force, the treaty formed part of the law of
the land, and American citizens might plead
immunity for acts done in pursuance of its pro
visions. HamUton was for suspending the treaty

132 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
since a situation had arisen which made its pro
visions inconsistent with a policy of neutrality.
His main contention was that the obligations
Imposed by the treaty of '78 were no longer binding
on the United States, since they contemplated
only defensive war. By her declaration of war
France had taken the offensive, thereby relieving
the United States of her reciprocal obligations.
Jefferson held that the treaty was still operative,
for even if Its provisions apparently required the
United States to engage in the war, it did not
follow that such action would be an actual conse
quence. The possibility was "not yet certain
enough to authorize us in sound morality to de
clare, at this moment, the treaties nuU. "
Meanwhile Genet was left in a position in which
he had a perfect right to claim all privileges
conferred on France by the treaty. The result was
a curious chapter of diplomatic correspondence.
Genet took an attitude of indignant remonstrance
at the duplicity of the American position. Did
not the United States have a treaty with France?
By what authority then did the Administration
interfere with him in the enjoyment of his rights as
the representative of France, and interfere with
American citizens in their dealings with him?

FRENCH DESIGNS ON AMERICA 133
He shrewdly refrained from any attempt to de
fend the capture of the Grange by L' Ambuscade
in Delaware Bay. "The learned conclusions of
the Attorney-General of the United States, and
the declarations of the American Government,
have been on this subject the rule of my conduct.
I have caused the prize to be given up. " But he
stood firm on rights secured by the treaty. "As
long as the States, assembled in Congress, shall
not have determiaed that this solemn engagement
should not be performed, no one has the right to
shackle our operations, and to annul their effect,
by hindering those of our marines who may be in
the American ports, to take advantage of the
commissions which the French Government has
charged me to give to them, authorizing them to
defend themselves, and fulfill, if they find an
opportunity, all the duties of citizens against the
enemies of the State. "
This was using an argument borrowed from
Jefferson's abundant stock of constitutional limi
tations. Genet was, of course, advised of the
dissensions ia the Cabinet. He was on such con
fidential terms with Jefferson that he talked freely
about the projected raid on Louisiana. Jefferson
noted in his diary that "he communicated these

134 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
things to me, not as Secretary of State, but as Mr.
Jefferson." Jefferson told Genet that he "did
not care what Insurrections should be excited in
Louisiana," but that "enticing officers and soldiers
from Kentucky to go against Spain was really put
ting a halter about their necks, for that they would
assuredly be hung if they commenced hostilities
against a nation at peace with the United States. "
So great is the force of legal pedantry that Jefferson
was unable to agree that the President should pro
claim neutrality in clear and positive terms;
but that same pedantry was effectively employed
in covering the legal flaws of Jefferson's position
in his notes to Genet. He attenuated the treaty
obligations by strict construction and also by
reservations founded on the general principles of
international law. "By our treaties with several
of the belligerent Powers," he told Genet, "we
have established a style of peace with them. But
without appealing to treaties, we are at peace with
them all by the law of nature: for, by nature's law,
man Is at peace with man." Hence the propriety
of forbidding acts within American jurisdiction
that would cause disturbance of this peace, a point
on which he quoted copiously from Vattel. Genet
manifested some irritation at being referred to

FRENCH DESIGNS ON AMERICA 135
treatises on international law when he was resting
his case on a treaty the validity of which Jefferson
acknowledged. "Let us not lower ourselves," he
wrote, "to the level of ancient politics by diplo
matic subtleties. Let us be frank in our overtures,
in our declarations, as our two nations are In their
affections, and, by this plain and sincere conduct,
arrive at the object by the shortest way. "
Logically Jefferson's position was that of main
taining the validity of the treaty while opposing
the fiUfiUment of its obligations. At the same
time he had to carry on a correspondence with
Hammond, the British Minister, who was making
complaints of the use of American ports for French
depredations on British commerce, and to him
Jefferson pleaded entire wUlingness to discharge
in good faith the obligations of a neutral Power.
It may seem as if Jefferson was attempting the
impossible feat of trying to ride at one time two
horses going in opposite directions, but such was
his dexterity that In appearance he was largely
successful. Meanwhile he contrived to throw on
HamUton and his adherents the blame for the
feebleness and inconsistency of national policy. In
letters to his Congressional lieutenants, Monroe
in the Senate and Madison in the House, he la-

136 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
mented "the anglophobia, secret antigallomany "
that have "decided the complexion of our disposi
tions." He spoke scornfully of Randolph, whom
he regarded as so irresolute that the votes in
the Cabinet were "generally two and a half against
one and a half, " by which he meant that Hamilton
and Knox stood together against Jefferson, while
Randolph divided his influence between the two
factions. So inflamed was the state of public opinion that
a rising against the Government seemed possible.
In a letter written twenty years later, John Adams
described "the terrorism excited by Genet, in
1793, when ten thousand people in the streets of
PhUadelphia, day after day, threatened to drag
Washington out of his house, and effect a revolu
tion in the Government, or compel it to declare war
in favor of the French Revolution and against
England. " Adams related that he "judged it pru
dent and necessary to order chests of arms from the
War Office" to be brought iato his house to defend
it from attack, and he had it from "the coolest
and firmest minds" that nothing but the outbreak
of yeUow fever in PhUadelphia that summer
"could have saved the United States from a fatal
revolution of government." On the other hand.

FRENCH DESIGNS ON AMERICA 137
letters written by HamUton during the time of aU
this excitement show that he thought little of it,
although he more than anyone else was its target.
In May, 1793, he wrote that the number of persons
who went to meet Genet "would be stated high at
a hundred, " and he did not believe that a tenth
part of the city participated in the meetings and
addresses of Genet's sympathizers. "A crowd
wUl always draw a crowd, whatever be the purpose.
Curiosity wiU supply the place of attachment to, or
interest in, the object. " Washington's own letters
at this period show no trace of concern about
his personal safety though he smarted imder the
attacks on his motives. An entry of August 2,
1793, in Jefferson's private diary, forming the vol
ume since known as "The Anas," relates that at a
cabinet meeting Knox exhibited a print entitled the
funeral of George W  n, in which the President
was placed on a guillotine. "The President was
much iaflamed; got into one of those passions when
he cannot command himself; ran much on the
personal abuse which had been bestowed upon him;
defied any man on earth to produce one single act
of his since he had been in the Government which
was not done from the purest motives; that he had
never repented but once the having slipped the

138 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
moment of resigning his office, and that was every
moment since; that by God he had rather be in
his grave than in his present situation; that he had
rather be on his farm than to be made emperor of
the world; and that they were charging him with
wanting to be king; that that rascal Freneau sent
him three of his papers every day, as if he thought
he would become the distributor of his papers; that
he could see in this nothing but an impudent design
to Insult him. "
Freneau was one of Jefferson's subordinates in
the State Department, combining with his duties
there the editorship of a newspaper engaged In
spreading the calumny that the Administration was
leaning toward monarchy through the influence
of HamUton and his friends, who despised repub
licanism, hated France, and loved England. This
journalistic campaign went on under the protec
tion of Jefferson to the disturbance of an adminis
tration of which Jefferson himself formed a part.
This circumstance has given trouble to Jeffer
son's biographers, and it Is now somewhat difficult
to make those allowances to which Jefferson is en
titled from the candid historian. Such behavior
at the present day would be regarded as treacher
ous, for it is now a settled doctrine that it Is the

FRENCH DESIGNS ON AMERICA 139
duty of a member of the President's Cabinet to
give unreserved support to his policy, or to resign.
But at that period, neither in England nor in the
United States, did this view of cabinet solidarity
prevail. It was not considered against the rules
of the game for a cabinet official to use any op
portunities within reach for promoting his aims or
to boast such behavior as patriotic zeal. Jeffer
son, who wanted to resign and stayed on only at
Washington's earnest desire, certainly rendered a
service to the Administration, which was then so
unpopular that Jefferson's connection with It was
a political asset of great value.
Hamilton also made use of the services of journal
ism. When on June 29, 1793, publication began of
a series of eight articles signed "Paclficus," It was
well known that HamUton was the author. The
acute analysis and cogent reasoning of these
articles have given them classic rank as an exposi
tion of national rights and duties. Upon minds
open to reason their effect was marked. Jefferson
wrote to Madison, "For God's sake, my dear
Sir, take up your pen, select the most striking
heresies, and cut him to pieces in the face of the
public." Madison did take up his pen, but he
laid it down again without attempting to con-

140 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
trovert Hamilton's argument. The five articles
which Madison wrote over the signature "Helvi-
dlus" do not proceed farther into the subject than
a preliminary examination of executive authority.
In which he laid down principles of strict con
struction of the Constitution which have never
been adopted In practice and which are now
interesting only as specimens of dialectic subtlety.
Although as an electioneering tactician Jefferson
had superior ability, neither he nor any of his
associates was a match for Hamilton in debate.
As the issues were discussed, the Jeffersonians lost
ground, and for this they put the blame on Genet.
By July 7, Jefferson was writing to Madison that
Genet "renders my position immensely difficult,"
and thereafter in the correspondence of Jefferson,
Madison, and Monroe, Genet figures as a rash
man whose indiscretions embarrassed his friends
and impeded his own objects. This view has to a
large extent passed over into history, but when it is
considered that Genet did not come to America for
Jefferson's comfort but to accomplish certain things
for his own government, it must be owned that
he had considerable success. Although his means
were small, he managed to engage in the French
service an active American fleet including such

FRENCH DESIGNS ON AMERICA 141
vessels as Le Cassius, L'Ami de le Point d Petre,
L' Amour de la lAbertS, La Vengeance, Za Montagne,
Le Vainqueur de la Bastille, La Carmagnole, L'EspSr-
ance, Le Citoyen Genet, Sans Pareil, and Le Petit
Democrate. The last-mentioned vessel was origi
nally an English merchantman, the brig Little
Sarah, brought into PhUadelphia harbor as a
French prize. When it was learned that this vessel
had been armed and equipped for service as a
French man-of-war. Governor Mifflin of Pennsyl
vania gave orders that the vessel should be de
tained. Genet threatened forcible resistance, and
a clash might have occurred, had Jefferson not
intervened. He went to Genet's house on Sunday
to persuade him not to move the vessel until the
President could decide the case. Genet refused to
give any promise, but remarked that the vessel
would probably not be ready to depart for several
days. Jefferson thereupon exerted himself suc
cessfully to prevent the taking of any steps to
detain the vessel.
Washington, harassed and confused by the
dissensions of his Cabinet, now desired that the
advice of the justices of the Supreme Court
be taken. Hamilton was opposed to a proceeding
which iavolved prejudgment by the Court on

142 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
questions which might come before it in due course
of law, and which seemed to him also to be an
avoidance of the proper responsibility of the execu
tive. Nevertheless he took part in preparing the
case, and of the twenty-nine questions submitted
to the Supreme Court, Hamilton framed twenty-
one, Jefferson seven, and Washington himself the
last. Jefferson notified Genet of this consultation
as an additional reason for patience, "the object
of it being to obtain the best advice possible on the
sense of the laws and treaties respecting the several
cases. I am persuaded you will think the delay
well compensated." Genet did not think so, and
Le Petit DSmocrate put to sea in defiance of Ameri
can authority.
The justices declined to answer the questions,
and the Administration had to face its responsibil
ities on its own judgment of its rights and duties.
At least one member of the Administration had
clear and positive ideas on that subject. Hamilton,
who In his "Pacificus" letters had given a masterly
exposition of international obligations, now took
up the particular issues raised by Genet's claims,
which at that time were receiving ardent cham
pionship. Freneau's National Gazette held that
Genet had really acted "too tamely," had been

FRENCH DESIGNS ON AMERICA 143
"too accommodating for the peace of the United
States." HamUton now replied by a series of
articles in the Daily Advertiser over the signature
"No Jacobin," In which Genet's behavior was
reviewed. After five articles had appeared in
rapid succession, the series was abruptly termi
nated because Hamilton was taken down by the
yeUow fever.
The journalistic war was almost in the nature
of a duel between the State and the Treasury
Departments. Genet must have been amused.
Lack of funds hindered his activities more than
anything else. Jefferson had advised Washington
that, "if the Instalments falling due in this year
could be advanced v/ithout incurring more dan
ger," it would be well to make the payments, as he
"thought it very material to keep alive the friendly
sentiments of France." But this was a matter
which pertained to Hamilton's own department,
and in that field his advice controlled Washington.
Genet could do nothing in this direction, and
before the affair of Le Petit Democrate he had
ceased to expect financial aid.
Jefferson was now so angry and Indignant that
he no longer opposed the suggestions that had been
made in cabinet meetings that Genet should be

144 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
dismissed, and the note on that subject which he
drafted for transmission to the French Government
is an able document. The French Government,
with ample reason, conditioned the recall of Genet
upon the recall of Morris, who was succeeded by
James Monroe. Meanwhile Genet's situation
had become perilous through revolution at home.
On October 16, 1793, his Government issued an
order for his arrest. The United States now
became his asylum. He acquired citizenship,
married a daughter of Governor Clinton of New
York, and settled down to a useful and respected
career as a country gentleman devoted to the
improvement of agriculture. He died at his home,
Schodak, New York, in 1834, after having founded
an American family.
At the time when Genet, favored by the exasper
ated state of Western sentiment over the naviga
tion of the lower Mississippi, was promoting an
attack upon the Spanish posts, the Administra
tion had already been engaged for a long time in
efforts to secure "full enjoyment of that navi
gation, " as well as a settlement of the southwestern
boundary. In December, 1791, Washington nom
inated William Carmichael, charge d'affaires in
Spain, and William Short, then charge d'affaires

FRENCH DESIGNS ON AMERICA 145
in France, commissioners to make a treaty.
Their efforts proved unsuccessful, and in 1794
the Spanish commissioner in the United States
gave notice that they were not acceptable per
sonally, and that it "was hoped that some other
person would be appointed, with full powers,
to settle this treaty, and graced with such a
character as became the royalty to which he
was accredited." Washington then nominated
Thomas Pinckney, at that time minister In Lon
don, as minister plenipotentiary in Spain. When
Pinckney arrived on the scene he was met with
the dUatory methods then characteristic of Span
ish diplomacy, and finally he had to bring
matters to an issue by demanding his passports.
His determination so Impressed the Spanish Gov
ernment that it finally consented to a treaty,
October 27, 1795, which fixed the southern bound
ary of the United States and opened the Mississippi
River to navigation. The boundary line was to
run east along the thirty-first parallel of latitude
from the Mississippi to the Appalachicola, thence
along the latter river to its junction with the Flint,
thence to the headwaters of the St. Mary's, and
along its course to the Atlantic Ocean. The free
navigation of the Mississippi was coupled with the

146 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
privilege of depositing merchandise at New Or
leans "without paying any other duty than a fair
price for the hire of the stores. " This privilege
was to be continued after three years, or "an
equivalent establishment" on the banks of the
Mississippi was to be assigned to citizens of the
United States — a provision which was not free
from ambiguities and which furnished fresh ma
terial for controversy a few years later.

CHAPTER VII
A SETTLEMENT WITH ENGLAND
According to Jefferson, the President origi
nally took the same view of the French
treaty that he did. Jefferson relates that on
April 18, 1793, Washington spoke of having
"never had a doubt of the validity of the French
treaty," and he notes that in the cabinet dis
putes Washington was inclined to his views. As
the embarrassments of the Administration thick
ened, the President, It Is true, leaned more and
more toward Hamilton, but this inclination was
due more to necessity than to personal partiality.
The explanation stands out In Jefferson's own
account of events. Hamilton was clear, positive,
and decided as to what to do and how to do It.
Jefferson was active in finding objections but not
In finding ways and means of action. This con
trast became sharper as time went on, and, as
Washington was in a position where he had to do
147

148 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
something, he was forced to rely on Hamilton
more and more. Jefferson held that it would be
inexpedient for the general government to assume
the duty of fortifying the harbors, and that there
was no constitutional authority for establishing a
military academy. On November 28, 1793, there
was a prolonged wrangle over these issues at a
cabinet meeting, which the President ended by
saying that he would recommend the military
academy to Congress, and "let them decide for
themselves whether the Constitution authorized
it or not. " This was the last of the quarrelsome
cabinet sessions recorded by Jefferson. He vacated
the office of Secretary of State, December 31, 1793,
and thereafter the ascendancy of Hamilton in the
Cabinet was Indisputed.
An immediate effect of the change was to give
new vigor to efforts at reaching a settlement with
Great Britain. The old troubles over her reten
tion of the western posts still continued, and in
addition to them came new difficulties arising from
war measures. On January 30, 1793, Thomas
Pinckney, then American minister to Great Britain,
wrote that war was about to begin, " and although
our claim to a free intercourse is founded in reason
and our national right, yet, as we have no armed

A SETTLEMENT WITH ENGLAND 149
neutrality the members whereof this people have to
fear, they may stop our vessels bound to French
ports with provisions." What was feared soon
happened. By the French decree of 1793, the
French colonies were opened to American trade
and West Indian commerce flourished. This
was now afflicted by contraband regulations laid
down by Great Britain, under which many Ameri
can vessels were seized for carrying cargoes to
or from French ports. Although Genet's activities
and the extent to which they were indulged by
the United States did not tend to promote friendly
relations with Great Britain, yet it does not
appear that the British policy was inspired by
resentment. The regulations as defined by in
structions issued on June 8, 1793, made liable to
detention all vessels carrying "corn, flour, or
meal" to French ports, with the proviso that the
cargoes might be purchased on behalf of the
British government and the ships might then be
released with a due aUowance for freight, or they
might be allowed to dispose of their cargoes in
the ports of any country in amity with Great
Britain. Vessels attempting to enter a blockaded
port were liable to seizure and condemnation, save
that the ships of Denmark and Sweden might be

150 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
seized only if they should persist in trying to enter
after once having been turned back.
Conciliatory explanations were made by Ham
mond, the British minister, in notifying our State
Department. He pointed out that only corn and
flour were contraband, that the regulations did not
extend to other provisions, and that they secured
"to the proprietors, supposing them neutral, a full
indemnification for any loss they may possibly
sustain. " The special privilege extended to Den
mark and Sweden was attributed to treaty require
ments and therefore could not be regarded as
Invidious. In reply Jefferson at home and Pinck
ney abroad argued in behalf of the United States
for the principle that free ships make free goods,
but Great Britain would not hearken to a doctriae
that struck at the efficacy of her sea power.
Washington besought Congress to support the
efforts of the Administration by making, for the
defense of American interests, such provision as
would Inspire respect. In his address of December
3, 1793, he observed: "There is a rank due to the
United States among nations which will be with
held, if not absolutely lost, by the reputation of
weakness. If we desire to avoid Insult, we must be
able to repel it; if we desire to secure peace, one of

A SETTLEMENT WITH ENGLAND 151
the most powerful Instruments of our rising pros
perity, it must be known that we are at all times
ready for war." The answer of Congress was the
grudging consent to some naval preparations
already recounted.
After the passage of the navy bill Sedgwick of
Massachusetts endeavored to interest the House in
the general subject of military preparation. On
March 12, 1794, he Introduced resolutions for
raising fifteen additional regiments for two years,
the term to be extended for three years in case of
the outbreak of war. In advocating this measure
he spoke of the sorry experience of the country in
depending upon militia. Their " want of discipline
occasions them to commit a great waste on the
property of their fellow citizens, besides a waste of
public property." As long as we depend upon
mUItia, "European nations will not consider us as
able to retaliate and assert our rights. " Nothing
came of this sensible proposal, but Sedgwick
made an auxiliary suggestion which Congress
did adopt. He urged that the sailing of vessels
from the ports of the United States be prohibited.
An embargo would hold over foreign nations the
threat that, unless they behaved themselves,
their supplies from the United States might be

152 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
cut off. Such embargo was voted for a month
from March 26, 1794, which was subsequently
extended for another month, and the President was
authorized to lay, regulate, and revoke embargoes
during the recess of Congress. Congress regarded
the embargo policy as a cheap way out of a difficult
situation, but this method was really not only far
more costly to the nation than would have been the
straightforward course of arming for defense, but
at the same time accomplished nothing. Dayton
of New Jersey proposed to supplement the em
bargo by the sequestration of all debts due from
citizens of the United States to British subjects.
Clark of New Jersey outdid his colleague by pro
posing to prohibit all commercial intercourse
between the United States and Great Britain
untU such time as that country should surrender
the western posts and should make restitution for
all losses sustained by American citizens.
Violent speeches were made on these proposals
at the very time when the House was refusiag to
support either an army or a navy. Sedgwick intro
duced some good sense into a debate that was
alternating between blatant vaporing and legal
pedantry, by pointing out that, under the Con
stitution, the President of the United States ought

A SETTLEMENT WITH ENGLAND 153
to be allowed to have some say about the matter.
It was the function of the President to treat
with foreign powers, and yet the House was now
considering action which was in effect "prescribing
the terms of treaty, and restraining the constitu
tional power from treating on any other terms."
This argument was used effectively by a number
of speakers. It turned the main position taken by
the advocates of non-intercourse, which was that
the real objection came from the bondholders who
feared that the ensuing loss of revenue might pre
vent them from getting their interest. Such
Imputations of sordid motive became fruitless
when the issue was raised of the constitutional
authority of the President, but the advocates of
non-intercourse met this new point of view by
pointing out that the Constitution gave Congress
the right to regulate commerce. The feeling
against Great Britain was so great that the House
was bent on indulging it, and on April 25, 1794,
the non-intercourse bill was passed by a vote of
58 to 34. The Senate was so evenly divided that,
on the motion to pass the bill to its third reading,
there was a tie vote, and Vice-President Adams,
who was called upon for a casting vote, gave it
against the bill. About a month later in the House

154 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
another attempt was made to carry the policy of
non-intercourse by a joint resolution, but by this
time a reaction in favor of the Administration had
set in and the resolution received only 24 yeas to
46 nays, James Madison being among those who
stuck to the proposal to the last.
While the House was abandoning itself to reck
less mischief-making, Washington was striving to
arrange matters by negotiation. The perplexities
of his situation were great and varied. As a
military man he knew that American jurisdiction
was precarious so long as Great Britain held
the Interior. The matter had been the subject
of prolix correspondence between Jefferson and
Hammond, but the American demands that Great
Britain should surrender the frontier posts in
accordance with the treaty of peace had been met
by demands that America, In accordance with that
same treaty, should first satisfy various claims
of British subjects for restitution, Indemnity, and
relief. Tl^ regular diplomatic machinery stuck
fast at this point, both at home and abroad. In
one of his gossipy, confidential letters Fisher
Ames remarked that Hammond was a most
"petulant, Impudent" man, habitually railing
against the conduct of our government "with a

A SETTLEMENT WITH ENGLAND 155
gabble that his feelings render doubly unin
telligible. " But Pinckney, our representative In
England, was equally undiplomatic. He was
"sour and also Galilean"; although calm in man
ner, "he had prejudices, and unless a man has a
mind above them, he can do little service there."
Washington decided that It would be wise to
send a special envoy to deal with all the points at
issue. He thought first of Hamilton, but was
warned that the Senate would not ratify such an
appointment. Hamilton recommended John Jay
as "the only man In whose qualifications for
success there would be thorough confidence."
Jay was then chief -justice, but the crisis was so
dangerous as to justify Washington in calling him
even from that important post. He had match
less qualifications for the mission. He had been
minister to Spain, 1778-1782; he had been one of
the commissioners who had negotiated the treaty
of peace of 1783; he had been Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, 1784-1789; so that he had had -an experi
ence which familiarized him with every detail
of the questions at Issue. As a negotiator he had
always gained marked success by acting upon his
own principle that "a little good-natured wisdom
often does more in politics than much slippery

156 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
craft." Jay showed fine patriotism in accepting
the appointment. He remarked to his friends that
no man could frame a treaty with Great Britain
without making himself unpopular and odious,
and he accepted the mission under "a conviction
that to refuse it would be to desert my duty for
the sake of my ease and domestic concerns and
comforts." Jay was nominated as envoy extraordinary on
April 16, 1794, and, after three days of violent
debate, the appointment was confirmed by the
Senate. The event did not moderate the rage of
the House for immediate action. Some members
urged that it was indelicate for the House to be
passing reprisals at a time when the Executive was
attempting friendly negotiations; but the reply was
made that, if there was any indelicacy, it was on
the part of the Executive, inasmuch as the House
proceedings had been already begun when the
President decided to nominate an envoy extra
ordinary. WhUe Congress was fuming and wran
gling. Jay was proceeding with his difficult task.
He saUed on May 12, and on June 8 landed in Eng
land where he was hospitably received. Despite
these personal attentions, the differences to be
adjusted were so numerous and complicated that

A SETTLEMENT WITH ENGLAND 157
on the surface the situation looked almost hope
less. Conditions, however, were really more
favorable than they appeared to be. A change,
latent but influential, had taken place in the
mental attitude of the governing class ia England.
There had been a notion that American independ
ence would not last long and that the country
would eventually be restored to the British Crown.
The drift of events was rather in that direction
until HamUton's measures gave the ascendancy to
the forces making for American national develop
ment. The practical statesmanship of Great
Britain perhaps saw more clearly the significance
of what was taking place than did that of America
itself, and it was prepared to reckon with this
new condition. Moreover, the European com
motion resulting from the French Revolution had
brought to the front a new set of interests and
anxieties, for the free handling of which a settle
ment of differences with the United States might
be advantageous. The effect of such consider
ations was at least to render the situation more
manageable than might have been expected, and
Jay improved his opportunities with admirable
tact. In pursuance of his principle of bringing " good-

158 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
natured wisdom" to bear. Jay suggested to Lord
GrenvUle, the British Secretary for Foreign
Affairs, that they should dispense with written
communications, and merely meet and converse
informally "until there should appear a probability
of coming to some amicable mutual understand
ing." Even after such understanding should be
put into writing. It was not to be regarded as
official or binding, but simply as an exchange of
private memoranda. So strictly was this informal
method adhered to that the regular force of secre
taries and copyists had nothing to do with the
proceedings until the treaty was almost ready for
signing. Jay had been instructed to demand
compensation for some three thousand slaves who
had followed the British troops when they depart
ed, but Lord Grenville stood firm on the principle
that the slave, once under the British flag, became
a free man, the property rights of the former owner
thereupon becoming extinct and not forming a sub
ject for compensation. Jay, who really held the
same opinion, had to yield the point. It was
agreed that the western posts should be evacuated
by June 1, 1796, an arrangement which would
allow the British government to retain them about
two years longer. That government had already

A SETTLEMENT WITH ENGLAND 159
justified its retention of these posts by averring
that the United States had not complied with the
articles of the peace treaty relating to British
debts. Jay was not in a position to argue the
point with any force, for when he was Secretary of
Foreign Affairs he had advised Congress that
these articles "have been constantly violated on
our part by legislative acts, then and still existing
and operating"; and that Great Britain was there
fore not to blame for retaining the posts. The
British government was undoubtedly cognizant of
this report, and Jay could not make any effective
opposition to a proviso which In effect said to the
United States, "before surrendering the posts we
will wait and see whether you intend to fulffll
your agreements. " The root of the trouble —
an evU often felt and still experienced in the
United States — was defective sovereignty, an
inabUity of the whole to control the behavior of
its parts. Jay could not deny that the peace treaty
had been violated by state legislation, and only
by the humiliating means of an avowal of its im
potence could he exonerate the national government
from the Imputation of bad faith. The matter was
disposed of by provision for a joint commission to
decide upon all cases in which It was alleged that

160 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
unlawful impediments had been placed in the way
of collection of debts due British subjects, and by
the United States undertaking payment of the
awards. A similar commission was to pass upon
American claims for British violation of neutral
rights. This arrangement was a concession whose
practical value was eventually shown by the fact
that as a result American merchants received some
millions of dollars.
Jay displayed marked adroitness as a negotiator
in dealing with the Issues growing out of past differ
ences, but he made an extraordinary slip in provid
ing for commercial relations between the two
countries. In their general tenor the articles
displayed broad liberality. Between all British
dominions in Europe and the territories of the
United States there was to be "a reciprocal and
perfect liberty of commerce and navigation."
American vessels were to "be admitted and hos
pitably received" in the ports of East India,
and, although participation in the coasting trade
was prohibited, it was provided that this re
striction should not prevent ships going from one
port of discharge to another. The East Indian
trade was not, however, so important as the nearer
West Indian trade, and with respect to the latter

A SETTLEMENT WITH ENGLAND 161
the treaty provisions were narrow and exacting.
American vessels were limited to seventy tons
burden, and it was provided that "the United
States will prohibit and restrain the carrying
away of molasses, sugar, coffee, or cotton in
American vessels, either for his Majesty's Islands
or the United States, to any part of the world
except the United States, reasonable sea-stores
excepted. " Jay, in a letter to Washington, excused
his acceptance of this restraint on the ground that
"the commercial part of the treaty may be ter
minated at the expiration of two years after the
war, and in the meantime a state of things more
auspicious to negotiation will probably arise,
especially if the next session of Congress should not
interpose fresh obstacles. "
The treaty was sUent on the subject of impress
ment, but Jay's faUure on that point was just
what was to have been expected in view of the
unwiUingness of the United States to defend its
commerce. Impressment was not abandoned untU
many years afterwards, and then not through
treaty stipulation but because the United States
had a navy and could resist aggression on the seas.
In its treatment of the subject of contraband,
the treaty took positions in accord with the

162 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
international law then received, but in one respect
it made a distinct advance. Provision was made
that war between the two countries should never
become the pretext for confiscation of debts or
annulment of contracts. This position involves
the noble principle that war should never supersede
justice but should be the servant of justice. Great
practical advantage was experienced from it in the
War of 1812, when the United States was a creditor
nation. On the whole. Jay's diplomacy was as enlight
ened as it was shrewd, but at the time it exposed
him to furious denunciation which he disdained
to notice. "I had read the history of Greece,"
he wrote to a friend, "and was apprised of the
politics and proceedings of more recent date."
The phUosophic composure which he drew from his
knowledge of history enabled him to behave with
calm dignity while he was being burned in effigy,
and while mob orators were heaping insult and
calumny on his name. After a struggle that shook
the Government, the treaty was ratified by the
Senate on June 24, 1795, with the exception of the
article about the West Indian trade, an omission
to which Great Britain made no objection. The
treaty was extremely unpopular, chiefly because

A SETTLEMENT WITH ENGLAND 163
unreasonable expectations of its provisions had
been entertained. People had yet to learn that
national independence has its defects as well as its
advantages, and that the traditional intimacy
between the West Indies and America was now on
a footing of privUege and not of right. The great
benefits conferred by the treaty were therefore not
appreciated, and so violent was the fury its terms
excited that it was perhaps fortunate that Jay did
not resume his seat on the Supreme Bench. Before
his return from England and before the details of
the treaty had been made public, he had been
elected governor of New York, and to accept this
office he resigned the chief-justiceship.

CHAPTER VIII

PARTY VIOLENCE

When, In July, 1793, Jefferson notified the Presi
dent of his wish to resign from the Cabinet,
HamUton's resignation had already been before
the President for several weeks. Ever since the
removal of Congress to Philadelphia, Hamilton's
circumstances had become less and less able
to endure the strain of maintaining his official
position on a salary of $3500 a year. He had fully
experienced the truth of the warnings he had
received that. If he gave himself to the public
service, he might spend his time and substance
without receiving gratitude for his efforts or credit
for his motives. His vocation for statesmanship,
however, was too genuine and his courage too high
for such results to dishearten him. He had now
accomplished what he had set out to do in securing
the adoption of the measures which established the
new government, and he no longer regarded his
164

PARTY VIOLENCE 165
administrative position as essential to the success
of his policy. Meanwhile the need had become
urgent that he should resume the practice of his
profession to provide for his family. It was not
in his nature, however, to leave the front when a
battle was coming on, and, although he gave early
notice of his intention so that Washiagton should
have ample time to look about for his successor,
the resignation was not to become effective until
Congress had met and shown its temper. Accord
ing to Jefferson, Washington once remarked to
him that he supposed Hamilton "had fixed on the
latter part of next session to give an opportunity to
Congress to examine into his conduct. " Although
Hamilton had made up his mind to retire, he in
tended to march out with flying colors, as became
the victor on a hard-fought field. So far, he had
met and beaten all enemies who had dared to
assail his honor; he meant to beat them agaia If
they renewed the attack, and he had word that
one encounter was coming more formidable than
any before.
Hamilton's success in carrying his measures
through Congress, by sheer dexterity of manage
ment when numbers were against him, added
intense bitterness to the natural chagrin felt by

166 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
the defeated faction. Men like Jefferson and
Madison were subject to traditions of behavior
that required them to maintain a certain style of
public decorum no matter how they might rage
in private. But new men with new manners were
coming on the scene, and among them the opposi
tion to HamUton had found a new leader —
WUliam Branch Giles of Virginia. He was a
Princeton graduate of the class of 1781, had stud
ied for the bar, and had been admitted to practice
in 1786. To the full legal equipment of the period
he added an energy and an audacity that speedUy
brought him legal and political distinction. He
was active and outspoken in advocating the
adoption of the new Constitution, at a time when
popular sentiment in Virginia was strongly inclined
to be adverse. He had no hesitation about
undertaking unpopular causes, and hence British
debt cases became a marked feature of his practice.
Virginia State law had suspended the recovery of
debts due British subjects until reparation had
been made for the loss of negro slaves taken away
by the British during the war, and until the
western posts had been surrendered. But the
peace treaty of 1783 stipulated that creditors on
neither side should meet with lawful impediment

PARTY VIOLENCE 167
in the recovery of debts, and by the new Constitu
tion treaties had become part of the law of the
land. On the basis of a national jurisdiction in
conflict with the Virginia statutes, Giles acted so
energetically, that he himself related that by 1792
he had been employed in at least one hundred
British debt cases, and was "as successful in
collecting monies under judgments as is usually
the case with citizens. "
Comprehension of the true nature of the struggle
in which Giles became conspicuous must start
with the fact that the Constitution was reluctantly
accepted and with great uneasiness as to possible
consequences. In the Virginia convention of
1788, it was declared that the new Constitution
was essentially a scheme of the mUitary men to
subject the people to their rule. This argument
was not so much met as avoided by the declaration
that there could be no tyranny whUe Washington
lived. The rejoinder was obvious: what if he
should not be able to withstand military influence?
What if, in spite of him, the government should be
given a dangerous character that would develop
after he passed away? Jefferson had felt misgiv
ings on this score from the first, and Madison
experienced them as soon as differences on practical

168 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
measures arose between himself and Hamilton.
Jefferson and Madison wanted the government
to be made respectable but not strong. Hamilton
saw what they could not see — and indeed what
few at that time could see — that a government
cannot be made respectable without being made
strong. Washington was probably without any clear
views of his own on constitutional questions, and
what evidence there is on this point supports
Jefferson's claim that Washington was more dis
posed to confide in him and In Madison than in
HamUton. When Jefferson relinquished the State
Department, Washington proposed to give Madison
the post, but was told he would not think of taking
it. Washington then transferred Randolph to
the position because he could not get anybody else
of suitable capacity. Whatever Washington's
personal inclinations may have been, he was in a
position in which he had to act. Hamilton was the
only one whom he could find to show him the way,
and thus circumstances more and more compelled
Washington to accept Hamilton's guidance, whUe
at the same time it seemed increasingly clear to the
opposition that it was above all things necessary
to crush Hamilton. This state of sentiment must

PARTY VIOLENCE 169
be kept in mind in order to make inteUigible the
rabid violence of the party warfare which had long ,
been going on against HamUton, and which — now
that Jefferson had left the Cabinet — was soon
to be extended to Washington himself.
When Giles went to the front ia this war, both
Jefferson and Madison were busy behind the fir
ing line supplying munitions. GUes was elected
in 1790 to fill a vacancy caused by the death of
Theodorick Bland, and took his seat in the third
session of the First Congress. The assumption
bUl had been passed, but that was only the first of
the series of financial measures proposed by
HamUton, and GUes followed Madison's lead in
unsuccessful resistance to the excise and to the
national bank. GUes was re-elected to the Second
Congress, which opened on October 24, 1791.
In the course of this session he became the leader
of the opposition, not by supplanting Madison
but through wUliagness to take responsibUities
from which Madison, like Jefferson, shrank, because
he, too, preferred activity behind the scenes.
This situation has often occurred In parliamentary
history — a zealous party champion scouting the
scruples and restraints that hampered the official
leadership, and assuming an Independent line of

170 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
attack with the covert favor and assistance of that
leadership. In the effort to crush Hamilton a
series of raids was led by GUes, whose appetite for
fighting could never be extinguished no matter
how severe might be his defeat.
After much preliminary skirmishing which put
heavy tasks on Hamilton in the way of getting up
reports and documents, a grand attack was made
on January 23, 1793. A series of resolutions, in
drafting which Madison and Jefferson took part,
was presented, calling for minute particulars of
all loans, names of all persons to whom payments
had been made, statements of semi-monthly bal
ances between the Treasury and the Bank, and an
account of the sinking fund and of unexpended
appropriations, — all from the beginning of the
government until the end of 1792. The resolution
required Hamilton to complete and state all the
accounts of the Treasury Department up to a period
only a little over three weeks before the resolutions
were presented, and to give a detailed transcript
of particulars. But the Treasury accounts were In
such perfect order, and so great was Hamilton's
capacity for work, that the information called
for was promptly transmitted in reports dated
February 4, February 13, and February 14. At

PARTY VIOLENCE 171
the same time Hamilton hit back by observing that
the resolutions "were not moved without a pretty
copious display of the reasons on which they were
founded," which "were of a nature to excite
attention, to beget alarm, to inspire doubts."
GUes was soon able to renew the attack. Jeffer
son and Madison helped him to prepare a series
of nine resolutions which were presented on Febru
ary 27. They specifically charged Hamilton with
violation of law, neglect of duty, transgression of
the proper limits of his authority, and indecorum
in his attitude towards the House. The series
ended with a resolution that a copy should be
transmitted to the President. The proceeding
was a sort of impeachment, framed with the pur
pose not of bringing Hamilton to trial but of forc
ing him out of the Cabinet. The charges against
him were purely technical and were actuated by
malevolence. HamUton, though not allowed to
come Into the House to defend himself, neverthe
less participated in the debate indirectly by writing
the speech delivered by WUliam Smith and credited
to him in the Annals of Congress. It was so gener
ally felt in Congress that the resolutions were
founded on nothing more substantial than spite
that GUes could not hold his forces together, and

172 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
as the debate proceeded the number of his adher
ents dwindled. The House began voting at a
night session on March 1st. After the third
resolution had been defeated by a vote of 40 to 12,
an attempt was made to withdraw the others, but
such action was refused, and one by one the
remaining resolutions were defeated by increasing
numbers untU only seven voted with GUes at
the last, among them James Madison. It was a
signal triumph for HamUton. But his enemies
were not disposed to accept the decision as final,
and Jefferson thought it might be revised at the
next session.
- It was not until the Second Congress that the old
factions finally disappeared and the formation of
national parties began. The issue over the
adoption of the Constitution had produced Federal
ists and Anti-Federalists, but with its adoption
Anti-Federalism as such became a thing of the past.
Opposition to the Government had to betake itself
to the political platform provided by the successful
introduction of the new system of government, and
was obliged to distinguish itself from official
Federalism by attacking not the Constitution but
the way in which the Constitution was being
construed and applied. The suspicion, jealousy.

PARTY VIOLENCE 173
and dislike with which the new government was
regarded in many quarters were reflected from the
beginning in the behavior of Congress. There
was from the first a disposition to find fault and to
antagonize, and as time went on this disposition
was aggravated by the great scope allowed to
misunderstandiag and calumny from the lack of
direct contact between Congress and the Adminis
tration. In founding a new party, Jefferson only
organized forces that were demanding leadership.
He consolidated the existing opposition, and gave
it the name "Republican Party," implying that
its purpose was to resist the rise of monarchy and
the growth of royal prerogative ia the system of
government which was introduced by the adoption
of the Constitution. It is clear enough now that
the implication was mere calumny; the notion that
Washington was either aiming at monarchy or was
conniving at it through ignorance was a grotesque
travesty of the shameful situation that actually
existed; but fictions, pretenses, slanders, and
calumnies that would never have been allowed
utterance if the Administration and Congress had
stood face to face now had opportunity to spread
and infect public opinion. Hence the tone of ex
treme rage that dishonors the poUtical contention

174 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
of the period and the malice that stains the cor
respondence of the faction chiefs.
Although a distinct party opposition appeared
and assumed a name during the Second Congress,
it disavowed as yet any opposition to Washington
and represented its actual attempts to thwart
the measures of the Administration as efforts to
counteract Washington's evU advisers. The old
constitutional tradition that the king can do no
wrong, which still lingered in American politics,
tended to an analogous elevation of the presidential
office above the field of party strife, while leaving
the President's Cabinet advisers fully exposed to it,
just as in the case of the ministers of the Crown in
England. Allowance must be made for the effect
of this tradition when judgment is passed on the
political activities of the period. Considered with
regard to present standards of political behavior,
the course of Jefferson In fomenting opposition
to the Administration of which he was a part wears
the appearance of despicable intrigue. There was
nothing mean or low about it, however, in the
opinion of himself and his friends, and even his
enemies would have allowed it to be within the
rules of the game. Jefferson did his best to defeat
in Congress measures adopted by Washington

PARTY VIOLENCE 175
on the advice of Hamilton, and he also did his
best to undermine Washington's confidence in
HamUton. In his personal dealings with Washing
ton, Jefferson had every advantage, for he had
Washington's ear and could, more readily than
Hamilton, direct the currents of unconscious ia-
fluence that produce the wUl to believe. But
Jefferson's animosity kept tempting him to over
play his hand in a way that was fatal in the face
of an antagonist so keen and so dexterous as
Hamilton. In a letter of May 23, 1792, Jefferson presented
to Washington an elaborate indictment of Hamil
ton's policy as a justification of his own behavior
in organizing an opposition party in Congress. He
charged HamUton with subverting the character of
the Government by his financial measures, the logi
cal consequence of which would be "a change from
the present republican form of government to that
of a monarchy." Hence the need for organizing
"the Republican party who wish to preserve the
government in its present form." Washington
thought over the matter, and — according to
Jefferson — reopened the subject in a personal
interview on July 10. Being now fully apprised
of Jefferson's case, Washington himself prepared a

176 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
brief of It, divided into numbered sections, and
applied to Hamilton for a statement of his ideas
upon the "enumerated discontents," framed so
"that those ideas may be applied to the correspond
ent numbers. " The proceeding is a fine instance
of the care which Washington exercised in forming
his opinions. Of course, as soon as charges of
corruption and misdemeanor were reduced to exact
statement the matter was put just where Hamilton
wanted to get it, and in the grasp of his powerful
hands its trashy character was promptly displayed.
It is needless to go into details, now that pubhc
loans, the funding of floating Indebtedness in
excess of current iacome, and the maintenance of a
national banking system to supply machinery
of credit, are such well recognized functions that
the wonder is how any statesman could have ever
thought otherwise. Jefferson's arguments, when
read with the prepossessions of the present day,
are so apt to leave an impression of absurdity that
they constitute a troublesome episode for his
biographers. Jefferson's maneuvering utterly faUed to injure
Hamilton in Washington's esteem, but it did have
the effect of so thoroughly disgusting Washington
with public life that at one time he was determined

PARTY VIOLENCE 177
to refuse a reelection, and even went so far
as to ask Madison to prepare a valedictory address
for him. He consented to serve another term
most reluctantly, and not untU he had been be^
sought to do so by the leaders on both sides.
Jefferson was as urgent as was HamUton. While
Washington was still wavering, he received a
strong letter from Edmund Randolph that doubt
less touched his soldierly pride. The letter
closed with this sharp argument:
"You suffered yourself to yield when the voice
of your country summoned you to the Adminis
tration. Should a civil war arise, you cannot stay
at home. And how much easier wUl It be to
disperse the factions, which are rushing to this
catastrophe, than to subdue them after they shall
appear in arms? It is the Gxed opinion of the
world, that you surrender nothing Incomplete. "
An appeal of this character was the most effect
ive that could possibly be addressed to Washing
ton, but In consenting he grumbled over the
hardship of having to keep in active service at his
time of Ufe after already having served for so long
a time. He complained that his hearing was get
ting bad and that "perhaps his other faculties
might fall off and he not be sensible of it."

178 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
Acquiescence In Washington's candidacy made
it practically impossible for the Republican party
to manifest Its true strength. The compliment
of Republican support was awarded to Governor
Clinton of New York, who together with Washing
ton received all the electoral votes of Virginia,
New York, North Carolina, and Georgia. A stray
electoral vote from Pennsylvania brought Clinton's
total up to 50, whereas John Adams received 77
votes which re-elected him as vice-president.
Jefferson received only four electoral votes, aU
from Kentucky, but his poor showing in this
election was wholly due to the intricacy of the
electoral system, and his party meanwhUe de
veloped so much strength that when the Third
Congress met on December 2, 1793, the Republi
cans were strong enough to elect the speaker.
Undeterred by this circumstance, Hamilton
forced the fighting. The Jeffersonians had been
excusing the defeat they had received In attacking
HamUton in the previous Congress on the ground
that the House had acted without allowing suf
ficient time for due examination of the evidence.
This plea supplied to Hamilton an occasion for
prompt action. Exactly two weeks after the
meeting of Congress he addressed a letter to the

PARTY VIOLENCE 179
Speaker, in which he declared: "UnwUliag to leave
the matter on such a footing, I have concluded to
request of the House of Representatives, as I now
do, that a new inquiry may be, without delay, in
stituted in some mode, most effectual for an ac
curate and thorough investigation; and I will
add, that the more comprehensive it is, the more
agreeable It will be to me. "
GUes promptly took up the challenge, and
moved the appointment of a committee to examine
the state of the Treasury Department in all its
particulars. Pending action by the House, a new
complication was introduced, which, though meant
as a blow at Hamilton, resulted in a signal triumph
for him. His enemies got hold of a discharged
clerk of the Treasury Department by means of
whom they now tried to counteract the effect of
HamUton's challenge. Two days after HamUton's
letter to the Speaker, a memorial from Andrew G.
Fraunces was laid before the House making charges
which amounted to this: that there was a com
bination between HamUton and other officers of
the Treasury Department to evade payment of
warrants so that they could be bought up for
speculative purposes. Hamilton's request for an
investigation was allowed to lie on the table, but

180 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
the memorial from Fraunces was referred to a select
committee of which Giles was a member. This
circumstance turned out to be much to Hamilton's
advantage. Giles was an erect, bold, manly foe;
he could not stomach the sort of testimony upon
which depended the charges against Hamilton's
personal Integrity, and he concurred In a report on
HamUton finding that the evidence was "fully
sufficient to justify his conduct; and that in the
whole course of this transaction the Secretary and
other officers of the Treasury have acted a merito
rious part towards the public. "
Giles, while exonerating Hamilton of the charge
of dishonesty, did not desist from pressing his
motion for further investigation of the Treasury
Department. But he admitted that Imputations
upon the Secretary's integrity had been quite
removed, and he now urged that "the primary
object of the resolution is to ascertain the bound
aries of discretion and authority between the
Legislature and the Treasury Department." In
thus shifting his ground he presented a new issue
in which the House — and indeed Giles's own
party associates — took little Interest. The^fact
was that the attack on Hamilton had faUed, that
the purpose of showing him to be unworthy of

PARTY VIOLENCE 181
Washington's confidence had been abandoned as
impracticable, and that all that remained was a
proposal that the House should again engage in a
laborious investigation of the desirability of
attempting a new delimitation of the functions of
the Treasury Department and of Congress. But
this, of course, did not concern Hamilton. He
had acted under existing laws and with responsi
bilities which were defined by them. If Congress
saw fit to make new laws, the consequences would
fall upon his successor In office, not upon him since
he was about to retire. If Congress made fetters
for the Secretary, It might even be that some
member of GUes's own party would have to wear
them. Thus, however GUes's latest proposal
might be viewed, it was not attractive. Moreover,
it was presented at a time when the House had
much more urgent matters to consider. The
country was wUd with excitement over the retali
ating orders and decrees of Great Britain and
France, which subjected American interests to
injury from both sides. Giles and Page appear to
have been the only speakers on the resolution when
it was taken up for consideration on February 24,
1794, and both disclaimed any Intention of reflect
ing upon HamUton. The resolution received

182 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
decent interment by reference to a committee, with
no one objecting. The practical conclusion of the
matter was that HamUton had beaten his enemies
once more and beaten them thoroughly.
Before resigmng his office, Hamilton added stUl
another great achievement to his record of iUus
trious service in establishing public authority.
The violent agitation against the excise act pro
moted by the Jeffersonians naturally tended to
forcible resistance. One of the counts of Jeffer
son's Indictment of Hamilton's policy which had
been presented to Washington was that the excise
law was "of odious character . . . committing
the authority of the Government in parts where
resistance Is most probable and coercion least
practicable. " The parts thus referred to were the
mountains of western Pennsylvania. The popular
discontent which arose there from the imposi
tion of taxes upon their principal staple — distUled
spirits — naturally coalesced with the agita
tion carried on against Washington's neutrality
policy. At a meeting of delegates from the elec
tion districts of Allegheny county held at Pitts
burgh, resolutions were adopted attributing the
policy of the Government "to the pernicious
influence of stockholders." This was an echo of

PARTY VIOLENCE 183
Jefferson's views. But the resolutions went on to
declare: " Our minds feel this with so much
indignancy, that we are almost ready to wish
for a state of revolution and the guillotine of
France, for a short space, in order to inflict punish
ment on the miscreants that enervate and disgrace
our Government." This was an echo of the talk
in the pohtical clubs that had been formed through
out the country. The original model was appar
ently the Jacobin club of Paris. The PhUadelphia
club with which the movement started, soon after
Genet's arrival, adopted the Jacobin style of utter
ance. It declared its object to be the preser
vation of a freedom whose existence was menaced
by a "European confederacy transcendent In
power and unparalleled in iniquity," and also by
" the pride of wealth and arrogance of power"
displayed in the United States. Writing to Gov
ernor Lee of VIrgiaia, Washington said that he
considered "this insurrection as the first formidable
fruit of the Democratic Societies. "
Hamilton moved warily, doing whatever lay in
his power to smooth the practical working of the
system In the hope of "attaining the object of
the laws by means short of force. " But such was
the inflamed state of feeling in western Penn-

184 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
sylvanla that no course was acceptable short of
abandonment by the Government of efforts to en
force the internal revenue laws. During 1793, there
were several outrageous attacks on agents of the
Government, and the execution of warrants for the
arrest of rioters was refused by local authority.
People who showed a disposition to side with the
Government had their barns burned. A revenue
inspector was tarred and feathered, and was run
out of the district. The patience with which the
Government endured insults to its authority
encouraged the mob spirit. On July 16, 1794,
the house of Inspector Neville was attacked by a
mob, and, when he appealed to the local authori
ties for protection, he was notified that there was
such a general combination of the people that the
laws could not be executed. Neville, a revolution
ary veteran of tried valor, was able to obtain the
help of an officer and eleven soldiers from Fort
Pitt, but the mob was too numerous and too weU
armed to be withstood by so weak a force. After a
skirmish In which the mob fired the buildings and
the place became untenable, the troops had to
surrender. Soon after this affair, a convention of
delegates from the four western counties of Penn
sylvania was caUed to meet on August 14 to concert

PARTY VIOLENCE 185
measures for united action. Organized insurrec
tion had, in fact, begun.
"The Government," said Washington, "could
no longer remain a passive spectator of the con
tempt with which the laws were treated." But
when he called for Cabinet opinions, the old
variance at once showed itself. Randolph thought
that calm consideration of the situation "banishes
every idea of calling the militia into immediate
action." He pointed out that the disaffected region
had more than fifteen thousand white males above
the age of sixteen, and that sympathy with the in
surgents was active In "several counties In Virginia
having a strong mUltia. " There was also the risk
that the insurgents might seek British aid. In which
case a severance of the Union might result. Ran
dolph also enlarged upon the expense that would
attend military operations and questioned whether
the funds could be obtained. He advised a pro
clamation and the appointment of commissioners
to treat with the insurgents. Should such means
fall, and should it appear that the judiciary
authority was withstood, then at last military force
might be employed.
Hamilton held that "a competent force of militia
should be caUed forth and employed to suppress

186 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
the insurrection, and support the civil authority. "
It appeared to him that "the very existence of the
Government demands this course. " He urged that
the force employed ought "to be an Imposing one,
such, if practicable, as will deter from opposition,
save the effusion of the blood of the citizens, and
serve the object to be accomplished." He pro
posed a force of twelve thousand men, of whom
three thousand were to be cavalry, and he advised
that, in addition to the Pennsylvania mUitia,
New Jersey, Maryland, and Virginia should each
contribute a quota.
All the members of the Cabinet except Randolph
concurred in Hamilton's opinion. The practical
execution of the measures was entrusted to
HamUton, who acted with great sagacity. Some
appearance of timidity and inertia in Pennsylvania
state authority was indirectly but effectually coun
teracted by measures which showed that the mili
tary expedition would move even if Pennsylvania
held back. Although some troops were to gather
at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, others were to meet at
Cumberland Fort, Virginia. The business was so
shrewdly managed that Pennsylvania state author
ity fell obediently into line, and the insurgents
were so cowed by the determined action of the Gov-

PARTY VIOLENCE 187
ernment that they submitted without a struggle.
Washington thought that this event would react
upon the clubs and "effectuate their annihilation
sooner than It might otherwise have happened."
A general collapse among them certainly followed,
and they disappeared from the political scene.
It is in the nature of precaution that the more
successful It is the less necessary it appears to have
been, and thus the complete success of Hamilton's
management furnished his enemies with a new
argument against him of which they afterwards
made great use. The costly military expedition
that had no fighting to do was continually held up
to public ridicule. That the expense was trifling
in comparison with the objects achieved must
deeply impress any one who examines the records
of the times. A mistake might have been fatal
to the existence of the Government. It has
become so powerful and massive since that time,
that we can hardly realize what a rickety structure
it then was, and how readily, in less capable hands,
it might have collapsed.
Randolph, then Secretary of State, seems to
have been in a panic. Fauchet, the French
minister at that time, reported to his government
that Randolph caUed upon him and with a grief-

188 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
stricken countenance declared, "It is all over; a
civU war Is about to ravage our unhappy country. "
He represented to Fauchet that there were four
men whose talents, iafluence, and energy might
save it. "But debtors of English merchants, they
wUl be deprived of their liberty if they take the
smallest step." He wanted to know whether
Fauchet could lend "funds sufficient to shelter
them from English persecution." Fauchet's
letter was captured by the British and made
public. Randolph's explanations did not clear up
the obscurity that surrounds the affair. His
version was that the four men were flour mer
chants who were being pressed by their creditors
"and that the money was wanted only for the
purpose of paying them what was actually due to
them in virtue of existing contracts. " Even on
his own showing it was a shady transaction, and
he retired from Washington's Cabinet under a
cloud. Washington always had difficulty about the
composition of his Cabinet. A capable man had
been found to succeed Randolph as Attorney-
General in the person of WUliam Bradford, an able
Pennsylvania lawyer, but he died in 1795, and was
succeeded by Charles Lee of Virginia. When

PARTY VIOLENCE 189
Knox resigned in 1794, the vacancy was fflled
by transferring to the War Department Timothy
Pickering of Massachusetts, who had previously
served as Postmaster- General. When Hamilton
retired, January, 1795, he was succeeded by Oliver
Wolcott of Connecticut, who had been Comptrol
ler of the Treasury. After Randolph has been
discredited by the Fauchet letter, the office of Secre
tary of State went a-begging. It was offered to
WUliam Patterson of New Jersey, to Thomas John
son of Maryland, to Charles Cotesworth Pinckney
of South Caroliaa, but all these men declined.
Washington got word that Patrick Henry, the old
antagonist of the Constitution, was showing
Federalist leanings In opposition to Jefferson and
Madison, and Henry was then tendered the ap
pointment, but he too declined. Others were
approached but all refused, and meanwhile Picker
ing, though Secretary of War, also attended to the
work of the State Department. The matter was
finally settled by permanently attaching Pickering
to the State Department, whUe the vacancy thus
created at the head of the War Department was
filled by James McHenry, an appointment which
Washington himself described as "Hobson's
choice. "

190 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
HamUton, although out of the Cabinet, stUl
remained a trusted adviser, and he rendered splen
did service at a dangerous crisis. In spite of the
fact that the Jay treaty had been ratified by the
Senate in June, 1795, it was an issue in the FaU
elections that year. Jefferson held that the treaty
was an "execrable thing," an "infamous act,
which is really nothing more than a treaty of alli
ance between England and the Anglo-men of this
country against the Legislature and the people of
the United States. " GUes, who had been in close
consultation with Jefferson, moved with character
istic energy to translate Jefferson's views into
congressional action.
The Fourth Congress met on December 7, 1795,
and although a Federalist, Jonathan Dayton of
New Jersey was elected Speaker, the Republicans
were strong enough to tone down the reply to the
President's address by substituting for an expres
sion of " undiminished confidence " an acknowledg
ment of "zealous and faithful services," which
expressed "approval of his course." On March
24, 1796, the House by a vote of 62 to 37 adopted a
resolution calling upon the President to lay before
it his instructions to Jay, "together with the cor
respondence and the other documents relative to

PARTY VIOLENCE 191
said treaty." Advised by Hamilton and sus
tained by his whole Cabinet, Washington replied
on March 30, by declining to comply because
concurrence of the House was not necessary to give
validity to the treaty, and "because of the neces
sity of maintaining the boundaries fixed by the
Constitution between the different departments. "
The House retorted by a resolution declaring its
right to judge the merits of the case when appli
cation was made for an appropriation to give effect
to a treaty. Debate on this issue, which is still
an open one in our constitutional system, began
on April 14 and continued for sixteen days. Madi
son opposed the execution of the treaty, but the
principal speech was made by Giles, whose argu
ment covers twenty-eight columns in the Annals.
As the struggle proceeded, the Jeffersonians
lost ground. It became evident that weighty ele
ments of pubUc opinion were veering around to the
support of the treaty as the best arrangement
attainable in the circumstances. The balance
of strength became so close that the scales were
probably turned by a speech of wonderful power
and eloquence delivered by Fisher Ames. A deci
sion was reached on AprU 30, the test question
being on declaring the treaty "highly objection-

192 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
able." Forty-eight votes were cast on each side
and the Speaker gave his decision for the negative.
In the end, the House stood 51 to 48 in favor of
carrying the treaty into effect. Only four votes
for the treaty came from the section south of
Mason and Dixon's line.
During the agitation over the Jay treaty the
rage of party spirit turned full against Washington
himself. He was blackguarded and abused in
every possible way. He was accused of having
shown incapacity whUe General and of having
embezzled public funds while President. He was
nicknamed "the Step-Father of his country."
The imputation on his honor stung so keenly that
he declared " he would rather be in his grave than
in the Presidency, " and In private correspondence
he complained that he had been assaUed "In terms
so exaggerated and indecent as could scarcely
be applied to a Nero, a notorious defaulter, or
even to a common pickpocket." The only re
joinder which his dignity permitted him to make is
that contained in his Farewell Address, dated
September 17, 1796, in which he made a modest
estimate of his services and made a last affectionate
appeal to the people whom he had so faithfully
served.

PARTY VIOLENCE 193
The Farewell Address was not a communication
to Congress. It was issued in view of the approach
ing presidential election, to give public notice that
he declined "being considered among the number
of those out of whom a choice Is to be made. " The
usual address to Congress was delivered by
Washington on December 7, 1796, shortly after
the opening of the second session of the Fourth
Congress. The occasion was connected in the
public mind with his recent valedictory, and Con
gress was ready to vote a reply of particularly
cordial tenor. Giles stood to his guns to the last,
speaking and voting against complimentary resolu
tions. "He hoped gentlemen would compliment
the President privately, as individuals; at the same
time, he hoped such adulation would never pervade
the House." He held that "the Administration
has been neither wise nor firm, " and he acknowl
edged that he was " one of those who do not think
so much of the President as some others do. " On
this Issue Madison forsook him, and Giles was voted
down, 67 to 12. Among the eleven who stood
by Giles was a new member who made his first
appearance that session — Andrew Jackson of
Tennessee. In later years, when Giles's opinions
had been modified by experience and reflection.

194 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
he regretted his attitude towards Washington. It
is due to GUes to say that he did not stab in the
dark. He had qualities of character that under
better constitutional arrangements would have
invigorated the functions of the House as an or
gan of control, but at that time, with the separa
tion that had been introduced between the House
and the Administration, his energy was mischievous
and his intrepidity was a misfortune to himself and
to his party.
Washington's term dragged to its close like so
much slow torture. Others might resign, but he
had to stand at his post until the end, and it was a
happy day for him when he got his discharge. His
elation was so manifest that it was noticed by John
Adams. Writing to his wife about the ceremony
the day after the inauguration, Adams remarked
that Washington "seemed to me to enjoy a triumph
over me. Methought I heard him say, 'Ay! I
am fairly out, and you fairly in! See which of
us wIU be the happiest.'"

CHAPTER IX
THE PERSONAL RULE OF JOHN ADAMS
The narrow majority by which John Adams
was elected did not accurately reflect the exist
ing state of party strength. The electoral college
system, by its nature, was apt to distort the
situation. Originally the electors voted for two
persons without designating their preference for
President. There was no inconvenience on that
account whUe Washington was a candidate, since
he was the first choice of all the electors; but in
1796, with Washington out of the field, both parties
were in the dilemma that, if they voted solidly for
two candidates, the vote of the electoral college
would not determine who should be President. To
avert this situation, the adherents of a presidential
candidate would have to scatter votes meant to
have only vice-presidential significance. This
explains the wide distribution of votes that char
acterized the working of the system until it was
195

196 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
changed by the Twelfth Amendment adopted in
1804. In 1796, the electoral college gave votes to thir
teen candidates. The Federalist ticket was John
Adams and Thomas Pinckney of South Carolina.
Hamilton urged equal support of both as the surest
way to defeat Jefferson; but eighteen Adams elec
tors in New England withheld votes from Pinckney
to make sure that he should not slip in ahead of
Adams. Had they not done so, Pinckney would
have been chosen President, a possibUity which
Hamilton foresaw because of Pinckney's popu
larity in the South. New York, New Jersey, and
Delaware voted solidly for Adams and Pinckney
as Hamilton had recommended, but South Caro
lina voted solidly for both Jefferson and Pinckney,
and moreover Pinckney received scattering votes
elsewhere In the South. The action of the Adams
electors in New England defeated Pinckney, and
gave Jefferson the vice-presidency, the vote for
the leading candidates being 71 for Adams, 68 for
Jefferson, and 59 for Pinckney. The tendency of
such conditions to inspire political feuds and to
foster factional animosity is quite obvious. This
situation must be borne In mind. In order to make
intelligible the course of Adams's administration.

THE PERSONAL RULE OF JOHN ADAMS 197
Adams had an inheritance of trouble from the
same source which had plagued Washington's
administration, — the efforts of revolutionary
France to rule the United States. In selecting
Monroe to succeed Morris, Washington knew
that the former was as friendly to the French
Revolution as Morris had been opposed to it,
and hence he hoped that Monroe would be able
to impart a more friendly feeling to the relations
of the two countries. Monroe arrived in Paris
just after the fall of Robespierre. The Commit
tee of Public Safety then in possession of the
executive authority hesitated to receive him.
Momoe wrote to the President of the National
Convention then sitting, and a decree was at once
passed that the Minister of the United States
should "be introduced in the bosom of the Con
vention." Monroe presented himself on August
15, 1794, and made a glowing address. He des
canted upon the trials by which America had won
her independence and declared that "France, our
ally and friend, and who aided In the contest, has
now embarked in the same noble career." The
address was received with enthusiasm, the Presi
dent of the Convention drew Monroe to his bosom
in a fraternal embrace; and it was decreed that

198 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
"the flags of the United States of America shall be
joined to those of France, and displayed in the hall
of the sittings of the Convention, In sign of the
union and eternal fraternity of the two peoples."
In compliance with this decree Monroe soon after
presented an American flag to the Convention.
When the news of these proceedings reached the
State Department, a sharp note was sent to Monroe
"to recommend caution lest we be obliged at some
time or other to explain away or disavow an excess
of fervor, so as to reduce it down to the cool system
of neutrality. " The French Government regarded
the Jay treaty as an affront and as a violation of
our treaties with France. Many American vessels
were seized and confiscated with their cargoes, and
hundreds of American citizens were imprisoned.
Washington thought that Monroe was entirely too
submissive to such proceedings; therefore, on
August 22, 1796, Monroe was recalled and soon
after Charles Cotesworth Pinckney was appointed
in his stead.
The representation of France in the United
States had been as mutable as her politics. Fau
chet, who succeeded Genet, retired in June, 1795,
and was succeeded by Adet, who like his predeces
sors, carried on active interference with American

THE PERSONAL RULE OF JOHN ADAMS 199
politics, and even attempted to affect the presi
dential election by making public a note addressed
to the Secretary of State complaining of the be
havior of the Administration. In Adams's opinion
this note had some adverse effect In Pennsylvania
but no other serious consequences, since it was
generally resented. Meanwhile Pinckney arrived
in France in December, 1796, and the Directory
refused to receive him. He was not even per
mitted to remain in Paris; but honors were
showered upon Monroe as he took his leave. In
March, 1797, Adet withdrew, and diplomatic
relations between the two countries were entirely
suspended. By a decree made two days before
Adams took office, the Directory proclaimed as
pirates, to be treated without mercy, all Americans
found serving on board British vessels, and ordered
the seizure of all American vessels not provided
with lists of their crews in proper form. Though
made under cover of the treaty of 1778, this latter
provision ran counter to its spirit and purpose.
Captures of American ships began at once. As
Joel Barlow wrote, the decree of March 2, 1797,
"was meant to be little short of a declaration of
war. "
The curious situation which ensued from the

200 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
efforts made by Adams to deal with this emergency
cannot be understood without reference to his
personal peculiarities. He was vain, learned, and
self-sufficient, and he had the characteristic defect
of pedantry: he overrated intelligence and he un
derrated character. Hence he was inclined to re
sent Washington's eminence as being due more
to fortune than to merit, and he had for Hamilton
an active hatred compounded of wounded vanity
and a sense of positive Injury. He knew that
Hamilton thought slightingly of his political
capacity and had worked against his political
advancement, and he was too lacking In magna
nimity to do justice to Hamilton's motives. His
state of mind was well known to the Republican
leaders, who hoped to be able to use him. Jeffer
son wrote to Madison suggesting that "it would
be worthy of consideration whether it would not
be for the public good to come to a good under
standing with him as to his future elections."
Jefferson himself called on Adams and showed him
self desirous of cordial relations. Mrs. Adams
responded by expressions of pleasure at the suc
cess of Jefferson, between whom and her husband,
she said, there had never been "any public or
private animosity." Such rejoicing over the

THE PERSONAL RULE OF JOHN ADAMS 201
defeat of the Federalist candidate for Vice-Presi
dent did not promote good feeling between the
President and the Federalist leaders.
The morning before the inauguration, Adams
called on Jefferson and discussed with him the
policy to be pursued toward France. The idea
had occurred to Adams that a good impression
might be made by sending out a mission of extra
ordinary weight and dignity, and he wanted to
know whether Jefferson himself would not be
willing to head such a mission. Without checking
Adams's friendly overtures, Jefferson soon brought
him to agree that it would not be proper for the
Vice-President to accept such a post. Adams then
proposed that Madison should go. On March 6,
Jefferson reported to Adams that Madison would
not accept. Then for the first time, according
to Adams's own account, he consulted a member of
his Cabinet, supposed to be Wolcott although the
name is not mentioned.
Adams took over Washington's Cabinet as it was
finally constituted after the retirement of Jefferson
and Hamilton and the virtual expulsion of Ran
dolph. The process of change had made it entirely
Federalist in its political complexion, and entirely
devoted to Washington and HamUton in its per-

202 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
sonal sympathies. That Adams should have
adopted it as his own Cabinet has been generally
regarded as a blunder, but it was a natural step for
him to take. To get as capable men to accept
the portfolios as those then holding them would
have been difficult, so averse had prominent men
become to putting themselves In a position to be
harried by Congress, with no effective means of
explaining and justifying their conduct. Congress
then had a prestige which it does not now possess,
and its utterances then received consideration not
now accorded. Whenever presidential electors were
voted for directly by the people, the poll was small
compared with the vote for members of Congress.
Moreover, there was then a feeling that the Cabi
net should be regarded as a bureaucracy, and for a
long period this conception tended to give remark
able permanence to its composition.
When the personal attachments of the Cabinet
chiefs are considered, it Is easy to imagine the dis
may and consternation produced by the dealings
of Adams with Jefferson. By the time Adams
consulted the members of his Cabinet, they had
become suspicious of his motives and distrustful
of his character. Before long they were writing
to Washington and HamUton for advice, and were

THE PERSONAL RULE OF JOHN ADAMS 203
endeavoring to manage Adams by concerted action.
In this course they had the cordial approval of
leading Federalists, who would write privately to
members of the Cabinet and give counsel as to
procedure. Wolcott, a Federalist leader in Con
necticut, warned his son, the Secretary of the
Treasury, that Adams was "a man of great
vanity, pretty capricious, of a very moderate
share of prudence, and of far less real abilities
than he beUeves himself to possess," so that "It
will require a deal of address to render him
the service which it wiU be essential for him to
receive. "
The policy to be pursued was still unsettled when
news came of the insulting rejection of Pinckney
and the domineering attitude assumed by France.
On March 25, Adams issued a call for the meeting
of Congress on May 15, and then set about getting
the advice of his Cabinet. He presented a schedule
of interrogatories to which he asked written
answers. The attitude of the Cabinet was at first
hostUe to Adams's favorite notion of a special
mission, but as Hamilton counseled deference to
the President's views, the Cabinet finally approved
the project. Adams appointed John Marshall
of Virginia and Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts

204 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
to serve in conjunction with Pinckney, who had
taken refuge In Holland.
Strong support for the Government in taking a
firm stand against France was manifested in both
Houses of Congress. Hamilton aided Secretary
Wolcott in preparing a scheme of taxation by
which the revenue could be Increased to provide for
national defense. With the singular fatality that
characterized Federalist party behavior through
out Adams's Administration, however, all the items
proposed were abandoned except one for stamp
taxes. What had been offered as a scheme whose
particulars were justifiable by their relation to the
whole was converted into a measure which was
traditionally obnoxious in itself, and was now made
freshly odious by an appearance of discrimination
and partiality. The Federalists did Improve
their opportunity In the way of general legislation :
much needed laws were passed to stop privateer
ing, to protect the ports, and to increase the naval
armament; and Adams was placed in a much better
position to maintain neutrality than Washington
had been. Fear of another outbreak of yellow
fever accelerated the work of Congress, and the
extra session lasted only a little over three weeks.
Such was the slowness of communication in those

THE PERSONAL RULE OF JOHN ADAMS 205
days that, when Congress reassembled at the regu
lar session In November, no decisive news had
arrived of the fate of the special mission. Adams
with proper prudence thought It would be wise to
consider what should be done in case of failure.
On January 24, 1798, he addressed to the members
of his Cabinet a letter requesting their views.
No record is preserved of the replies of the Secre
taries of State and of the Treasury. Lee, the At
torney-General, recommended a declaration of
war. McHenry, the Secretary of War, offered a
series of seven propositions to be recommended to
Congress: 1. Permission to merchant ships to
arm; 2. Theconstructionof twenty sloops of war;
3. The completion of frigates already authorized;
4. Grant to the President of authority to provide
ships of the line, not exceeding ten, "by such means
as he may judge best." 5. Suspension of the
treaties with France; 6. An army of sixteen
thousand men, with provision for twenty thousand
more should occasion demand; 7. A loan and an
adequate system of taxation.
These recommendations are substantially identi
cal with those made by Hamilton In a letter to
Pickering, and the presumption is strong that
McHenry's paper is a product of Hamilton's

206 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
Influence, and that it had the concurrence of Picker
ing and Wolcott. The suggestion that the Presi
dent should be given discretionary authority in
the matter of procuring ships of the line contem
plated the possibility of obtaining them by trans
fer from England, not through formal alliance but
as an incident of a cooperation to be arranged by
negotiation, whose objects would also Include aid
in placing a loan and permission for American ships
to join British convoys. This feature of Mc
Henry's recommendations could not be carried out.
Pickering soon Informed Hamilton that the old
animosities were still so active "in some breasts"
that the plan of cooperation was Impracticable.
Meanwhile the composite mission had accom
plished nothing except to make clear the actual
character of French policy. When the envoys
arrived In France, the Directory had found in Na
poleon Bonaparte an instrument of power that was
stunning Europe by its tremendous blows. That
Instrument had not yet turned to the reorgani
zation of France herself, and at the time It served
the rapacious designs of the Directory. Europe
was looted wherever the arms of France prevailed,
and the levying of tribute both on public and on
private account was the order of the day. Talley-

THE PERSONAL RULE OF JOHN ADAMS 207
rand was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and he
treated the envoys with a mixture of menace and
cajolery. It was a part of his tactics to sever the
Republican member, Gerry, from his Federalist
coUeagues. Gerry was weak enough to be caught
by Talteyrand's snare, and he was fooUsh enough
to attribute the remonstrances of his colleagues to
vanity. "They were wounded," he wrote, "by
the manner in which they had been treated by the
Government of France, and the difference which
had been used in respect to me. " Gerry's conduct
served to weaken and delay the negotiations, but
he eventually united with his colleagues in a de
tailed report to the State Department, which was
transmitted to Congress by the President on April
3, 1798. In the original the names of the French
officials concerned were written at full length
in the Department cipher. In making a copy for
Congress, Secretary Pickering substituted for the
names the terminal letters of the alphabet, and
hence the report has passed Into history as the
X. Y. Z. dispatches.
The story, in brief, was that on arriving in Paris
the envoys called on Talleyrand, who said that he
was busy at that very time on a report to the
Directory on American affairs, and in a few days

208 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
would let them know how matters stood. A few
days later they received notice through Talley
rand's secretary that the Directory was greatly
exasperated by expressions used in President
Adams's address to Congress, that the envoys
would probably not be received until further
conference, and that persons might be appointed to
treat with them. A few more days elapsed, and
then three persons presented themselves as com
ing from Talleyrand. They were Hottinguer,
Bellamy, and Hauteval, designated as X. Y. Z. in
the communication to Congress. They said that a
friendly reception by the Directory could not be
obtained unless the United States would assist
France by a loan, and that "a sum of money was
required for the pocket of the Directory and
Ministers, which would be at the disposal of M.
Talleyrand." This "douceur to the Directory, "
amounting to approximately $240,000, was urged
with great persistence as an indispensable condi
tion of friendly relations. The envoys temporized
and pointed out that their Government would have
to be consulted on the matter of the loan. The
wariness of the envoys made Talleyrand's agents
the more insistent about getting the " douceur. " At
one of the Interviews Hottinguer exclaimed: —

THE PERSONAL RULE OF JOHN ADAMS 209
"Gentiemen, you do not speak to the point; it is
money; it is expected that you will offer money."
The envoys replied that on this point their answer
had already been given. " ' No, ' said he, 'you have
not: what is your answer?' We replied, 'It is no;
no; not a sixpence.'" This part of the envoys'
report soon received legendary embellishment, and
in innumerable stump speeches it rang out as,
"Not one cent for tribute; millions for defense!"
The publication of the X. Y. Z. dispatches
sent roUing through the country a wave of patri
otic feeling before which the Republican leaders
quaUed and which swept away many of their
foUowers. Jefferson held that the French Govern
ment ought not to be held responsible for "the
turpitude of swindlers," and he steadfastly op
posed any action looking to the use of force to
maintaia American rights. Some of the Republican
members of Congress, however, went over to the
Federalist side, and Jefferson's party was pres
ently reduced to a feeble and dispirited minority.
Loyal addresses rained upon Adams. There
appeared a new national song. Hail Columbia,
which was sung aU over the land and which was
estabUshed In lasting popularity. Among its
well-known Unes is an exulting stanza beginning:

210 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
"Behold the chief who now commands.
Once more to serve his country stands. "
This is an allusion to the fact that Washington
had left his retirement to take charge of the
national forces. The envoys had been threatened
that, unless they submitted to the French demands,
the American Republic might share the fate of the
Republic of Venice. The response of Congress
was to vote money to complete the frigates,
the United States, the Constitution, and the Con
stellation, work on which had been suspended
when the Algerlne troubles subsided; and further,
to authorize the construction or purchase of twelve
additional vessels. For the management of this
force, the Navy Department was created by the
Act of AprU 30, 1798. By an Act of May 28, the
President was authorized to raise a mUitary force
of ten thousand men, the commander of which
should have the services of "a suitable number
of major-generals. " On July 7, the treaties with
France that had so long vexed the United States
were abrogated.
The operations of the Navy Department soon
showed that American sailors were quite able and
wUling to defend the nation If they were allowed
the opportunity. In December, 1798, the Navy

THE PERSONAL RULE OF JOHN ADAMS 211
Department worked out a plan of operations in the
enemy's waters. To repress the depredations of
the French privateers in the West Indies, a squad
ron commanded by Captain John Barry was sent
to cruise to the windward of St. Kitts as far south
as Barbados, and it made numerous captures.
A squadron under Captain Thomas Truxtun
cruised in the vicinity of Porto Rico. The flag
ship was the frigate Constellation, which on Febru
ary 9, 1799, encountered the French frigate,
L'Insurgente, and made it strike its flag after an
action lasting only an hour and seventeen minutes.
The French captain fought weU, but he was put at
a disadvantage by losing his topmast at the open
ing of the engagement, so that Captain Truxtun
was able to take a raking position. The American
loss was only one kUled and three wounded, while
L'Insurgente had twenty-nine kUled and forty-one
wounded. On February 1, 1800, the Constellation
fought the heavy French frigate Vengeance from
about eight o'clock in the evening until after
midnight, when the Vengeance lay completely
sUenced and apparently helpless. But the rigging
and spars of the Constellation had been so badly cut
up that the mainmast fell, and before the wreck
could be cleared away the Vengeance was able to

212 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
make her escape. During the two years and a
half in which hostUities continued, the little navy
of the United States captured eighty-five armed
French vessels, nearly all privateers. Only one
American war vessel was taken by the enemy, and
that one had been originally a captured French
vessel. The value of the protection thus extended
to American trade is attested by the increase of
exports from $57,000,000 in 1797 to $78,665,528 in
1799. Revenue from imports increased from
$6,000,000 in 1797 to $9,080,932 in 1800.
The creation of an army, however, was attended
by personal disagreements that eventually wrecked
the Administration. Without waiting to hear from
Washington as to his views, Adams nominated him
for the command and then tried to overrule his
arrangements. The notion that Washiagton could
be hustied into a false position was a strange
blunder to be made by anyone who knew him.
He set forth his views and made his stipulations
with his customary precision, in letters to Secretary
McHenry, who had been instructed by Adams to
obtain Washington's advice as to the list of
officers. Washington recommended as major-
generals, Hamilton, C. C. Pinckney, and Knox, in
that order of rank. Adams made some demur to

THE PERSONAL RULE OF JOHN ADAMS 213
the preference shown for Hamilton, but McHenry
showed him Washington's letter and argued the
matter so persistently that Adams finally sent the
nominations to the Senate in the same order
as Washington had requested. Confirmation
promptly followed, and a few days later Adams
departed for his home at Quincy, Massachusetts,
without notice to his Cabinet. It soon appeared
that he was in the sulks. When McHenry wrote
to him about proceeding with the organization of
the army, he replied that he was willing provided
Knox's precedence was acknowledged, and he
added that the five New England States would not
patiently submit to the humUiation of having
Knox's claim disregarded.
From August 4 to October 13, wrangling over
this matter went on. The members of the Cabinet
were in a difficult position. It was their under
standing that Washington's stipulations had been
accepted, but the President now proposed a differ
ent arrangement. Pickering and McHenry wrote
to Washington explaining the situation in detail.
News of the differences between Adams and
Washington of course soon got about and caused
a great buzz in political circles. Adams became
angry over the opposition he was meeting, and on

214 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
August 29 he wrote to McHenry that "there has
been too much intrigue in this business, both with
General Washmgton and with me"; that it might
as well be understood that in any event he would
have the last say, "and I shall then determine it
exactly as I should now, Knox, Pinckney, and
Hamilton. " Washington stood firm and, on Sep
tember 25, wrote to the President demanding "that
he might know at once and precisely what he had to
expect. " In reply Adams said that he had signed
the three commissions on the same day in the hope
"that an amicable adjustment or acquiescence
might take place among the gentlemen them
selves." But should this hope be disappointed,
"and controversies shall arise, they wUl of course
be submitted to you as commander-in-chief."
Adams, of course, knew quite well that such
matters did not settle themselves, but he seems to
have imagined that all he had to do was to sit
tight and that matters would have to come his way.
The tricky and shuffiing behavior to which he
descended would be unbelievable of a man of his
standing were there not an authentic record made
by himself. The suspense finally became so intol
erable that the Cabinet acted without consulting the
President any longer on the point. The Secretary

THE PERSONAL RULE OF JOHN ADAMS 215
of War submitted to his colleagues all the cor
respondence in the case and asked their advice.
The Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, and of
the Navy made a joint reply declaring "the only
inference which we can draw from the facts before
stated, is, that the President consents to the
arrangement of rank as proposed by General
Washington," and that therefore "the Secretary
of War ought to transmit the commissions, and
inform the generals that in his opinion the rank is
definitely settled according to the original arrange
ment." This was done; but Knox declined an
appointment ranking him below Hamilton and
Pinckney. Thus, Adams despite his obstinacy,
was completely baffled, and a bitter feud between
him and his Cabinet was added to the causes now
at work to destroy the Federalist party.
The Federalist military measures were sound
and judicious, and the expense, although a subject
of bitter denunciation, was really trivial in com
parison with the national value of the enhanced
respect and consideration obtained for American
interests. But these measures were followed by
imprudent acts for regulating domestic politics.
By the Act of June 18, 1798, the period of residence
required before an alien could be admitted to

216 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
American citizenship was raised from five years to
fourteen. By the Act of June 25, 1798, the
efficacy of which was Umited to two years, the
President might send out of the country "such
aliens as he shall judge dangerous to the peace and
safety of the United States, or shall have reasonable
grounds to suspect are concerned in any treason
able or secret machinations against the govern
ment thereof. " The state of pubUc opinion might
then have sanctioned these measures had they
stood alone, but they were connected with another
which proved to be the weight that pulled them all
down. By the Act of July 14, 1798, it was made a
crime to write or publish "any false, scandalous,
and malicious " statements about the President or
either House of Congress, to bring them "into
contempt or disrepute," or to "stir up sedition
within the United States. "
There were plenty of precedents in English
history for legislation of such character. Robust
examples of It were supplied in England at that
very time. There were also strong colonial pre
cedents. According to Secretary Wolcott, the
sedition law was "merely a copy from a statute of
Virginia in October, 1776." But a revolutionary
Whig measure aimed at Tories was a very different

THE PERSONAL RULE OF JOHN ADAMS 217
thing In Its practical aspect from the same measure
used by a national party against a constitutional
opposition. Hamilton regarded such legislation
as impolitic, and, on hearing of the sedition bill,
he wrote a protesting letter, saying, "Let us not
establish tyranny. Energy is a very different thing
from violence. "
But In general the Federalist leaders were so
carried away by the excitement of the times that
they could not practice moderation. Their zeal
otry was sustained by political theories which made
no distinction between partisanship and sedition.
The constitutional function of partisanship was
discerned and stated by Burke In 1770, but his
definition of it, as a joint endeavor to promote the
national interest upon some particular principle,
was scouted at the time and was not allowed
until long after. The prevailing idea in Washing
ton's time, both in England and America, was that
partisanship was inherently pernicious and ought
to be suppressed. Washington's Farewell Address
warned the people " In the most solemn manner
against the baneful effects of the spirit of party. "
The idea then was that govemment was wholly
the affair of constituted authority, and that it was
improper for political activity to surpass the ap-

218 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
pointed bounds. Newspaper criticism and parti
san oratory were among the things in Washiagton's
mind when he censured all attempts "to direct,
control, counteract, or awe the regular deliberation
and action of the constituted authorities. " Hence
judges thought it within their province to denounce
political agitators when charging a grand jury.
Chief Justice Ellsworth, in a charge delivered in
Massachusetts, denounced "the French sys
tem-mongers, from the quintumvirate at Paris to
the Vice-President and minority in Congress, as
apostles of atheism and anarchy, bloodshed, and
plunder." In charges delivered In western
Pennsylvania, Judge Addison dealt with such sub
jects as Jealousy of Administration and Govern
ment, and the Horrors of Revolution. Washington,
then in private life, was so pleased with the series
that he sent a copy to friends for circulation.
Convictions under the sedition law were few, but
there were enough of them to cause great alarm.
A Jerseyman, who had expressed a wish that the
wad of a cannon, fired as a salute to the President,
had hit him on the rear bulge of his breeches, was
fined $100. Matthew Lyon of Vermont, whUe
canvassing for reelection to Congress, charged the
President with "unbounded thirst for ridiculous

THE PERSONAL RULE OP JOHN ADAMS 219
pomp, foolish adulation, and a selfish avarice."
This language cost him four months in jail and a
fine of $1000. But in general the law did not
repress the tendencies at which it was aimed but
merely increased them.
The Republicans, too weak to make an effective
stand in Congress, tried to interpose state author
ity. Jefferson drafted the Kentucky Resolutions,
adopted by the state legislature in November,
1798. They hold that the Constitution is a compact
to which the States are parties, and that "each
party has an equal right to judge for itself as well of
infractions as of the mode and measure of redress. "
The aUen and sedition laws were denounced, and
steps were proposed by which protesting States
"wUl concur in declaring these Acts void and of no
force, and will each take measures of its own for
providing that neither these Acts, nor any others
of the general Government, not plainly and In-
tentionaUy authorized by the Constitution, shall
be exercised within their respective territories."
The Virginia Resolutions, adopted in December,
1798, were drafted by Madison. They view "the
powers of the federal Government as resulting from
the compact to which the States are parties, " and
declare that, if those powers are exceeded, the

220 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
States "have the right and are In duty bound to
interpose." This doctrine was a vial of woe to
American politics until it was cast down and
shattered on the battlefield of civil war. It was
invented for a partisan purpose, and yet was
entirely unnecessary for that purpose.
The Federalist party as then conducted was the
exponent of a theory of government that was
everywhere decaying. The alien and sedition laws
were condemned and discarded by the forces of
national politics, and state action was as futile in
effect as it was mischievous in principle. It di
verted the issue in a way that might have ulti
mately tumed to the advantage of the Federalist
party, had it possessed the usual power of adapta
tion to circumstances. After all, there was no
reason Inherent In the nature of that party why it
should not have perpetuated its organization and
repaired its fortunes by learning how to derive
authority from public opinion. The needed trans
formation of character would have been no greater
than has often been accomplished in party history.
Indeed, there is something abnormal in the complete
prostration and eventual extinction of the Federal
ist party; and the explanation is to be found In the
extraordinary character of Adams's administration.

THE PERSONAL RULE f)F JOHN ADAMS 221
It gave such prominence and energy to individual
aims and Interests that the party was rent to pieces
by them.
In communicating the X. Y. Z. dispatches to Con
gress, Adams declared: "I wUl never send another
Minister to France without assurance that he wiU be
received, respected, and honored, as the representa
tive of a great, free, powerful, and independent
nation." But on receiving an authentic though
roundabout intimation that a new mission would
have a friendly reception, he concluded to dispense
with direct assurances, and, without consulting his
Cabinet, sent a message to the Senate on February
18, 1799, nominating Murray, then American
Minister to Holland, to be Minister to France.
This unexpected action stunned the Federalists
and delighted the Republicans as it endorsed the
position they had always taken that war talk was
foUy and that France was ready to be friendly if
America would treat her fairly. "Had the foulest
heart and the ablest head in the world," wrote
Senator Sedgwick to Hamilton, "been permitted
to select the most embarrassing and ruinous meas
ure, perhaps it would have been precisely the one
which has been adopted. " Hamilton advised that
"the measure must go into effect with the addi-

i
222 WASHINGTON AJfD HIS COLLEAGUES
tional idea of a commission of three. " The com
mittee of the Senate to whom the nomination was
referred made a call upon Adams to inquire his
reasons. According to Adams's own account,
they informed him that a commission would
be more satisfactory to the Senate and to the
public. According to Secretary Pickering, Adams
was asked to withdraw the nomination and refused,
but a few days later, on hearing that the committee
intended to report against confirmation, he sent in
a message nominating Chief Justice Ellsworth and
Patrick Henry, together with Murray, as envoys
extraordinary. The Senate, much to Adams's
satisfaction, promptly confirmed the nominations,
but this was because Hamilton's influence had
smoothed the way. Patrick Henry declined,
and Governor Davie of North Carolina was substi
tuted. By the time this mission reached France,
Napoleon Bonaparte was In power and the envoys
were able to make an acceptable settlement of
the questions at Issue between the two countries.
The event came too late to be of service to Adams
in his campaign for reelection, but it was intensely
gratifying to his self-esteem.
Some feelers were put forth to ascertain whether
Washington could not be induced to be a candidate

THE PERSONAL RUI<E OF JOHN ADAMS
again, but the Idea had hardly developed before all
hopes In that quarter were abruptly dashed by his
death on December 14, 1799, from a badly treated
attack of quinsy. Efforts to substitute some
other candidate for Adams proved unavailing, as
New England still clung to him on sectional
grounds. News of these efforts of course reached
Adams and increased his bitterness against Hamil
ton, whom he regarded as chiefly responsible for
them. Adams had a deep spite against members of
his Cabinet for the way in which they had foUed
him about HamUton's commission, but for his own
convenience in routine matters he had retained
them, although debarring them from his confidence.
In the spring of 1800 he decided to rid himself of
men whom he regarded as "Hamilton's spies."
The first to fall was McHenry, whose resignation
was demanded on May 5, 1800, after an interview
In which — according to McHenry — Adams
reproached him with having "biased General
Washington to place HamUton in his list of major-
generals before Knox." Pickering refused to
resign, and he was dismissed from office on May 12.
John Marshall became the Secretary of State, and
Samuel Dexter of Massachusetts, Secretary of
War. Wolcott retained the Treasury portfolio

224 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
untU the end of the year, when he resigned of his
own motion.
The events of the summer of 1800 completed the
ruin of the Federalist party. That Adams should
have been so indifferent to the good will of his
party at a time when he was a candidate for re
election is a remarkable circumstance. A common
report among the Federalists was that he was no
longer entirely sane. A more likely supposition
was that he was Influenced by some of the Republi
can leaders and counted on their political support.
In biographies of Gerry it is claimed that he was
able to accomplish Important results through
his influence with Adams. At any rate, Adams
gave unrestrained expression to his feelings against
Hamilton, and finally Hamilton was aroused
to action. On August 1, 1800, he wrote to Adams
demanding whether it was true that Adams had
"asserted the existence of a British faction in this
country" of which Hamilton himself was said to be
a leader. Adams did not reply. Hamilton waited
until October 1, and then wrote again, affirming
"that by whomsoever a charge of the kind men
tioned in my former letter, may, at any time,
have been made or Insinuated against me, it is
a base, wicked, and cruel calumny; destitute even

THE PERSONAL RULE OF JOHN ADAMS 225
of a plausible pretext, to excuse the folly, or mask
the depravity which must have dictated It. "
Hamilton, always sensitive to imputations upon
his honor, was not satisfied to allow the matter to
rest there. He wrote a detailed account of his
relations with Adams, Involving an examination
of Adams's public conduct and character, which he
privately circulated among leading Federalists.
It Is an able paper, fully displaying Hamilton's
power of combining force of argument with dignity
of language, but although exhibiting Adams as
unfit for his office It advised support of his candi
dacy. Burr obtained a copy and made such use of
parts of it that Hamilton himself had to publish it
mfuU. In this election the candidate associated with
Adams by the Federalists was Charles Cotesworth
Pinckney of South Carolina. Though one Adams
elector in Rhode Island cut Pinckney, he would
stUl have been elected had the electoral votes of his
own State been cast for him as they had been for
Thomas Pinckney, four years before; but South
Carolina now voted solidly for both Republican
candidates. The result of the election was a tie
between Jefferson and Burr, each receiving 73
votes, whUe Adams received 65 and Pinckney 64.
IS

226 WASHINGTON AND HIS COLLEAGUES
The election was thus thrown into the House,
where some of the Federalists entered into an
intrigue to give Burr the Presidency instead of
Jefferson, but this scheme was defeated largely
through HamUton's influence. He wrote: "If
there be a man in this world I ought to hate, it is
Jefferson. With Burr I have always been person
ally well. But the public good must be paramount
to every private consideration."
The result of the election was a terrible blow to
Adams. His vanity was so hurt that he could not
bear to be present at the installation of his suc
cessor, and after working almost to the stroke of
midnight signing appointments to office for the
defeated Federalists, he drove away from Washing
ton in the early morniag before the Inauguration
ceremonies began. Eventually he soothed his
self-esteem by associating his own trials and
misfortunes with those endured by classical heroes.
He wrote that Washington, HamUton, and Pinck
ney formed a triumvirate like that of Antony,
Octavius, and Lepidus, and "that Cicero was not
sacrificed to the vengeance of Antony more
egregiously than John Adams was to the unbridled
and unbounded ambition of Alexander Hamilton
in the American triumvirate. "

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
Abundant materials are available for the period
covered by this work. Chief among them are the
Annals of Congress, the State Papers, and the writings
of statesmen to be found in any library index under
their names. The style maintained by Washington
early became a subject of party controversy and to this
may be attributed a noticeable variation in accounts
given by difiPerent authors. For instance, Washington
Irving, who as a child witnessed the first inauguration
parade, says in his Life of Washington that the Presi
dent's coach "was drawn by a single pair of horses."
But the detailed account given in the New York Packet
of May 1, 1789, the day after the ceremony, says that
"the President joined the procession in his carriage and
four." The following authorities may be consulted
on the point:
B. J. Lossing, article in The Independent, vol. xli, April
25, 1889.
Mabtha j. Lamb, article in Magazine of American His
tory, vol. XX, December, 1888.
227

228 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
For details of official etiquette during Washington's
administration, the following may be consulted:
George Washington, Diary, from 1789 to 1791.
Edited by B. J. Lossing (1860).
William Maclay, Journal, 1789-1791 (1890).
George W. P. Custis, Memoirs of Washington (1859).
James G. Wilson, The Memorial History of New York
(1893).
Anne Hollingsworth Wharton, Martha Washington
(1897).
Works of special importance for their documentary
matter and for their exhibition of the personal aspect
of events are:
J. C. Hamilton, History of the Republic of the United
States, 7 vols. (1860).
H. S. Randall, Life of Thomas Jefferson, 3 vols. (1858).
George Gibbs, Administrations of Washington and John
Adams, 2 vols. (1846).
Some economic aspects of the struggle over^ Hamil
ton's financial measures are exhibited by:
Charles A. Beard, Economic Origins of Jeffersonian
Democracy (1915).
New light has been cast upon Genet's mission, causing
a great change in estimates of his character and activi-

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 229
ties, by materials drawn from the French archives by
Professor F. J. Turner, and presented in the following
articles: "The Origin of Genet's Projected Attack on Louisiana
and the Floridas," American Historical Review,
vol. iii.
"The Pohcy of France toward the Mississippi Valley,"
American Historical Review, vol. x.
"The Diplomatic Contest for the Mississippi Valley,"
Atlantic Monthly, vol. xciii.
Further references will be found appended to the
articles on Washington, Hamilton, Jefferson, Madison,
Jay, and John Adams in The Encyclopcedia Britannica,
11th Edition.

INDEX

Adams, John, favors making gov
ernment impressive through
ceremony, 8-9; attitude to
ward Genet affair, 136; re
elected Vice-president, 178;
elected President, 195-96; per
sonal characteristics, 200; re
lations with Jefferson, 200-01 ;
Cabinet, 201-03; defeat at
election of 1800, 226
Addison, Alexander, Judge, 218
Algiers, relations with, 104 et
seq.; treaty with, 112-13
Alien and Sedition laws, 215 et
seq.
Ames, Fisher, of Massachusetts,
32-33, 43-44, 55, 62, 81, 90,
101, 110, 154, 191
Bacri, the Jew, 113
Barclay, Thomas, 107
Baldwin, Abraham, of Georgia,
110
Barlow, Joel, 119, 199
Barry, John, Captain, 211
Beard, C. A., Economic Origins
of Jeffersonian Democracy, 76-
77
Benson, Egbert, of New York,
55, 66
Boudinot, Elias, of New Jersey,
33, 38, 55, 65-66
Bradford, William, of Rhode
Island, 188
Burke, Edanus, of South Caro
lina, 67, 68
Burr, Aaron, 226
Butler, Pierce, of South Caro
lina. 29

Cabinet, President's, a develop
ment after Washington's ad
ministration, 24-25; status of,
50
Campbell, William, Major, 102-
103
Carmichael, William, 144
Church, Edward, U. S. consul at
Lisbon, 108
Clark, Abraham, of New Jersey,
110, 152
Clark, George Rogers, 120, 124
Clinton, George, of New York,
178
Constellation, The, ship, 113, 210,
211
Constitution, The, ship, 113, 210
Constitutional amendments
adopted, 32
Daily Adveriizer, 143
Dauphin, The, ship, 106
Dayton, Jonathan, of New Jer
sey, 152, 190
Dexter, Samuel, of Massachu
setts, 223
District of Columbia, exact site
to be selected by the President,
74
Ellsworth, OUver, of Connecti
cut, 51, 218
Federal Hall, 12-13
Federalist, 70
Federalist party, 224
Finance, National, Tariff bill,
26-31; debt of United States
(1790), 57 Assumption bill, 67

231

INDEX

Finance — Continued
etseq., 169; national bank es
tabhshed, 77; mint established,
77
Pishbourn, Benjamin, 90-91
Fitzsimmons, Thomas, of Penn
sylvania, 45-46, 47, 49, 110
France, relations with United
States, 115 et seq.; treaties of
1778, 120-21; representation in
United States, 198-99; special
mission to, 201 et seq.; treaties
abrogated (1798), 210; mari
time troubles with, 210-12;
second mission to, 222
Fraunces, A. G., 179
Freneau, Philip, editor of Na
tional Gazette, 138
Genet, Edmond, appointed
French minister to United
States, 115; a trained diplomat
ist, 115-16; audacious mission,
118-22; reception in United
States, 122-24; pohcy toward
Louisiana, 124; argues for
treaty rights, 132-33; public
opinion for, 136-37; arrest by
French Government, 144; suc
cess, 140-41; United States
becomes his asylum, 144;
bibliography, 228-29
Germantown, Proposal to place
capital at, 72
Gerry, Elbridge, of Massachu
setts, 33 et seq., 55, 203, 207,
224
Giles, W. B., of Virginia, 110-12,
166 et seq., 179-81, 191, 193-
94
Grange, The, ship, 123, 133 _
Graj'son, William, of Virginia, 51
Great Britain, lays down con
traband regulations, 149-50;
retains Western posts in
America, 154, 158-59; treaty
with (1795), 158-62
Greenville, Treaty of (1795), 102
Gwinnett, Button, 91

Hail Columbia, 209-10
Hamilton, Alexander, personal
appearance, 3; aid in finance
sought by Washington, 4;
advises Washington as to
deportment, 7-8, 10; ap
pointed Secretary of Treasury,
22-23; rivalry between Madi
son and, 48; opinion as to
establishment of courts, 52;
report to Congress (1790), 54
et seq.; stand on the question
of security of transfer, 64;
interest in site for national
capital, 71-72; report on manu
factures, 77; appreciation of,
78-79; author of interrogator
ies to the cabinet (1793), 126-
128; opinion on French treaty
obligations, 131-32; stands
against Jefferson, 136; calm
ness in regard to Genet affair,
137; "Pacificus," 139; "No
Jacobin," 143; resigns as Sec
retary of Treasury (1793) , 164-
65; party warfare against, 168
et seq. ; requests a Treasury in
vestigation, 179; opinion as to
enforcing law, 185-86; remains
trusted adviser, 190-91; aids
Wolcott in preparing scheme of
taxation, 204; appointed ma
jor-general, 212-13; relations
with Adams, 224-25; bibli
ography, 228
Hammond, George, British min
ister to United States, 150,
154
Hancock, John, 92
Harmar, Josiah, Lieutenant-
Colonel, 93, 97
Hazard, Ebenezer, Postmaster-
General, 21-22
Henry, Patrick, 189
Humphreys, David, Colonel,
107-08
India> troubles in the West, 83-
87, 93-96, 97-98, 101-02

INDEX

233

Jackson, Andrew, 193
Jackson, James, of Georgia, S3,
60
Jay, John, Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, 21; appointed envoy
extraordinary to Great Bri
tain (1794), 155-56; mission
to England, 158 et seq.; elected
Governor of New York, 163
Jay treaty, terms of, 158-63;
agitation over, 190-92; French
attitude toward, 198
Jefferson, Thomas, appointed
Secretary of State, 23; attitude
on question of assumption of
state debts, 73-74; importance
of public service, 74; report on
the Algerine question, 105-06;
as mimster to Paris, 117; opin
ion on French treaty obliga
tions, 129-31, 134-37; "The
Anas," 137; disturbs the ad
ministration, 138-39; resigns
as Secretary of State (1793),
148; for the principle "free
ships, free goods," 150; op
ponent of Hamilton, 174-76;
drafts Kentucky Resolutions
(1798), 219; elected President,
225-26; bibUography, 228
Johnson, Thomas, of Maryland,
189
Jones, John Paul, Admiral, 107
Judiciary, Establishment of the,
51-53

Kentucky Resolutions, 219
Knox, Henry, Secretary of War
since 1785, 21; Secretary of
War and of the Navy, 23;
submits plan for militia, 82;
supports Hamilton in question
of treaty obligations, 129-30,
136; recommended as major-
general by Washington, 212;
question of precedence of rank,
213-14; declines appointment,
215

La Cartnagnole, ship, 141
L' Ambuscade, ship, 123-24, 133
L'Ami de la Point d ~Petre, ship,
141
La Montagne, ship, 141
L' Amour de la Liberty, ship, 141
La Vengeance, ship, 141
Le Cassius, ship, 141
Le Citoyen Genet, ship, 141
Lee, Arthur, 22
Lee, Charles, of Virginia, 188, 205
Lee, R. H., of Virginia, 51
I'Enfant, P. C, 12
Le Petit DSmocrate, ship, 141, 142,
143
L'Esperance, ship, 141
Le Vainqueur de Bastille, ship, 141
Little Sarah, ship, 141
Livermore, Samuel, of New
Hampshire, 43, 61, 67-68
Livingston, Walter, 22
Louisiana territory, 119, 124
McGillivray, Alexander, Head
chief of the Creeks, 83-87
McHenry, James, of Maryland,
189, 205, 223
Mcintosh, Lachlan, 91
Maclay, William, of Pennsylvan
ia, Diary of, 19-20, 60, 69,
70-71, 72, 88-89, 107
Madison, James, cooperates
with Hamilton in government
organization, 2; personal ap
pearance, 3; introduces scheme
for raising revenue, 26-31;
upholds President's power of
removal, 40-41; acts as ad
visor to Washington, 47; opin
ion as to system of federal
courts, 52; stand on question
of security of transfer, 65, 66-
67; opinion on creation of a
navy, 109-10; "Helvidius,"
140; attitude toward non-
intercourse, 154; drafts Vir
ginia Resolutions (1798), 219
Marshall, John, opinion on neu
trality of United States (1793),

234

INDEX

Marshall — Continued
126; appointed commissioner
to France, 203; becomes Sec
retary of State, 223
Military preparedness. Policy
of, 81-83, 96-97, 100-01, 151-
52
Monroe, James, 197-98
Morris, Gouverneur, 117-18
Morris, Robert, 4, 29, 35, 72
Moultrie, WiUiam, General, 122-
23
Murray, W. V., Minister to
HoUand, 221
Napoleon Bonaparte, 206
National Gazette, 142-43
Naval policy of the United States,
109 et seq.
Neutrality, Question of (1793),
125 et seq.
New York, desires to be capital
of nation, 12; Washington's
home in, 15
Nicholas, W. C, of Virginia, 110
Non-intercourse biU, 153-54
North Carohna admitted to the
Union (1789), 93
O'Brien Richard, Captain, 106,
108, 109
O'FaUon, James, Dr., 119
Osgood, Samuel, Postmaster-
General, 22, 23
Page, John, ot Virginia, 42, 61-62
Paine, Thomas, 119
Patterson, William, of New
Jersey, 189
Philadelphia club, 183
Pickering, Timothy of Massa
chusetts, 189, 223
Pinckney, C. C, 189, 198-99,
212-13, 225
Pinckney, Thomas, 145, 148, 150,
155, 196
President of the United States,
social position and duties.

5-10; official title, 10-11;
power of removal by, 34, 39-
42, 89
Putnam, Rufus, General 81
Randolph, Edmund, appointed
Attorney-General, 23; opinion
on question of French treaty
obligations, 129-30; divides
influence between factions in
cabinet, 136; transferred to
State Department, 168; letter
to Washington, 177; opinion
as to enforcing law, 185; ap
plies to French minister for
funds, 187-88; retires, 188
Republican party, 173
Residence act, 74
Rhode Island admitted to the
Union (1790), 93
St. Clair, Arthur, General, 97,
98, 100
Sans Pareil, ship, 141
Sedgwick, Theodore, of Massa
chusetts, 45, 151, 152
Senate, privy council function of,
87-89
Short, WiUiam, 144
Smith, Samuel, of Maryland, 110
Smith, William, of South Caro
lina, 112
Spain, Treaty with (1795),
145-46
Stone, M. J., of Maryland, 68
Story, Joseph, Justice, 50
Talleyrand, 206-09
Tariff, see Finance.
Taylor, John, 76
Treasury Department, estab
lished by Congress, 34-39;
rights and duties of Secretary
defined, 42-51 ; Secretary's
report, 55-56
Trenton, proposal to place capi
tal at, 72
Truxtun, Thomas, Captain, 211

INDEX

235

UnHfd States, The, ship, 113,
210

Virginia Resolutions, 219-20
Wadsworth, Jeremiah, of Con
necticut, 37
War Department, Opposition to,
81
Washington, George, reluctant
to reassume public responsibil
ities, 1; installed as President
(1789), 2; personal characteris
tics, 5; his magnificence, 13-
14; his levees, 18; first message
to Congress, 20-21; first cab
inet, 22-23; message to Senate
(1789), 81-82; differences with
the Senate, 87-91; tours, 91-
93; church-going habits, 92-
93; receives news of St. Clair's
defeat, 98-100; concern about
Genet affair, 137-38; opinion

as to validity ot French treaty,
147; dependence upon Hamil
ton, 147—48; address of Dec.
3, 1793, 150-51; reelected
President, 177-78; party spirit
against, 192; FareweU Adclress
(1796), 192-93; death (1799),
223; bibliography, 227-28
Washington, Martha, arrival in
New York, 16-17; her enter
tainments, 18-19
Wayne, Anthony, General, 101,
102-03
West Indies, trade with, 160-61,
162-63
Whiskey insurrection, 182 et seq.
White, Alexander, of Virginia,
39
Willett, Marinus, Colonel, 85
Wolcott, Oliver, of Connecticut,
189, 203, 223-24

"X. Y.
221

Z." dispatches, 207-09,

3 9002 00573

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in memory of "*"'
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