YALF
UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

WORKS

PRESIDENT EDWARDS.

IN TEN VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

CONTAININS,

I. IN4UIRV INTO THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
II. THE GREAT CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN DEFENDED.

NEW-YORK:
PUBLISHED BY S. CONVERSE.
1829.

CONTENTS OF VOLUME IL

L INQUIRY INTO THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

Preface PART I.

Expla-nation of Terms, S[c.
Sect, i. The Nature of the WiU
II. What determines the Will
III. The Nature of Necessity
IV. Of Natural and Moral Inability
y. Of Liberty and Moral Agency

PART II. Coi^eming the Arminia-n JVotion of L-iberty.
Sect. i. The Inconsisteace of Arminian Liberty
IL Supposed Evasions considered
III. No Event without a Cause
IV. Volition not without a Cause
v. These Evasions Impertinent
VI. Of choosing in Things Indifferent
VII. Of Liberty of Indifference
VIII. Of Liberty without Necessity
IX. Will connected with Understanding
X. Acts connected with Motives
XI. God foreknows our Volitions
XII. Foreknowledge infers Necessity
XIII. Arminian Liberty Inconsistent
PART III. Concernmg Moral Agency, l^irt-ue and Vice, Ssc.
Sect. i. God's moral excellency necessary
II. Christ's Volitions necessarily holy, &c.
III. Moral Necessity and Inability consistent
IV. Commands consistent with Moral Inability .
; V. Sincerity of Desires and Endeavours
vr. Indifference inconsistent with Virtue
VII. Arminian Notions of Moral Agency, &c. .
PART IV. On the Chief Grounds of the Reasoning qf Arminians,
Sect. i. Of the Essence of Virtue and Vice .
II. Arminian Notion of Action, false
III. Calvinism not against Common Sense

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154 166173
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186
19S
204

C0NT6NTS.
Sect. iv. Necessary Virtue agreeable to Common Sense
V. Endeavours consistent with Calvinism
VI. The charge of Stoicism, &c. answered
vii. Necessity of Divine Volition
VIII. Necessity of Divine Volition, continued
IX. Ofthe existence of Sia, &c.
X. Concerning Sin's first entrance
XI. Of God's Moral character .
XII. Supposed Tendency of Necessity
XIII. Concerning Abstruse Reasoning .
XIV. The Conclusion
XV. Appendix ....

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244
258
265272 274 280
290

IL

THE GREAT CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN
DEFENDED.

PART I. E-tddences qf Original Sinfrom Facts and Events.
GHAP. 1. The Evidence of the Doctrine from Facts.
Sect. i. All men tend to Sin and Ruin . . 309
II. Universal Sin proves a sinful propensity . 320
III. This tendency most corrupt and pernicious 327
IV. AU men sin immediately, &c. . . 332
V. All have more Sin than Virtue . . 336
VI. Men's proneness to extreme Stupidity, &c. . 343
VII. Generality of raankind wicked . . 352
VIII. Great means used to oppose wickedness . 361
IX. Several evasions considered . . 378
CHAP. II. Arguments from universal mortality . ¦ . . . 393
PART II. Proofs of the Doctrinefrom particular parts qf Scripture.
CHAP. I. Observations on the first three chapters of Genesis.
Sect. i. Concerning Adam's original Righteousness . 406
II. Death threatened to our first parents . 418
III. Adam a federal Head, &c. . . . 424
CHAP. II. Observations on Texts, chiefly ofthe Old Testament, &c. 439
I^. Observations on Texts, principally in the New Testament.
Sect. i. Observations on John iii. 6. . . . 449
II. Observations on Rom. iii. 9 — 24. . . 456
/^iT»T> ,,r ^ '"• Observations on Rom. v. 6—10., Eph. ii. 3. &c. 464
CHAP. I v.. Containing observations on Rom. v. 12, &c.
Sect. i. Remarks on Dr. Taylor's way of explaining this
Text ..... 476
II. The true scope of Rom. v. 12, &c. . . 500

PART III.
CHAP. I.
IL

Evidence qf the Doctrine from. Redemption by Christ.
Proofs from Redemption by Christ
Proof from Application of Redemption

PART IV. Containing Answers to Objections.
CHAP. I. The Objection from the nature of Sin
II. God not the Author of Sin
III. The imputation of Adam's sin stated
TV. Several other Objections answered

512
519

528 532
642 563

CAREFUL AND STRICT
ENQUIRY
INTO THE
MODERN PREVAILING NOTIONS
OF
THAT FREEDOM OF WILL,
WHICH IS SUPPOSED TO BE ESSENTIAL
TO
mORAL AGENCY,
VIRTUE AND VICE, KEWARD AND PUNISHMENT,
PRAISE AND BLAME.

ROM. IX. 16.— IT IS NOT OF HBI THAT VSriLLETH.

VOL. II.

PREFACE.

Many find much fault with calling professing Christians, that differ
one from another in some matters of opinion, by distinct -narnes ;
especially calUng them by tlie names of particular men, who have
distinguished themselves as maintainers and promoters of those opi
nions : as calling some professing Christians Arminians, from AitMi-
Nius ; others Arians, from Akitjs ; others Socinians, from Socinus,
andthe like. They think it unjust in itself; as it seems to suppose
and suggest, that the persons marked out by these names, received
those doctrines which they entertain, out of regard to, and reliance
on those men after whom they are named ; as though they rnade them
their rule ; in the same manner, as thc followers of Christ are called
Christians ; after his name, whom they regard and depend upon, as
their great Head and Rule. Whereas, this is an unjust and ground
less imputation on those that go under the forementioned denomina
tions. Thus (say they) tliere is not the least ground to suppose, that
the chief divines, who embrace the scheme of doctrine which is, by
many, called Arminianism, believe it the more, because Arminibs
believed it : and that there is no reason to think any other, than that
they sincerely and impartially study the holy scriptures, and enquire
after the mind of Christ, with as much judgment and sincerity, as any
of those that call them by these names ; that they seek after truth,
and are not careful whether they think exactly as Arminius did ; yea,
that, in some things, they actually differ from him. This practice is
also esteemed actually injurious on this account, that it is supposed
naturally to lead the multitude to imagine the difference between per
sons thus named, and others, to be greater than it is ; so great, as if
they were another species of beings. And they object against it as
arising from an uncharitable, narrow, contracted spirit ; which, they
say, commonly inclines persons to confine all that is good to them
selves and their own party, and to make a wide distinction between
themselves and others, and stigmatize those that differ from them with
odious names. They say, moreover, that the keeping up such a dis
tinction of names, has a direct tendency to uphold distance and dis
affection, and keep alive mutual hatred among Christians, who ought
all to be united in friendship and charity, though they cannot, in all
things, think alike.
I confess, these things are very plausible ; and I will not deny,
that there are some unhappy consequences of this distinction of
names, and that raen's infirmities and evil dispositions often make an
ill improvement of it. But yet, I humbly conceive, these objections
are carried far beyond reason. The generality of mankind are dis
posed enough, and a great deal too much, to uncharitableness, and to

13 PREFACE.
be censorious and bitter towards those that differ from them in reli
gious opinions : which evil temper of mind will take occasion to
exert itself from many things in themselves innocent, useful and ne
cessary. But yet there is no necessity to suppose, that our thus dis
tinguishing persons of different opinions by different names, arises
mainly ftom an uncharitable spirit. It may arise from the disposition
there is in mankind (whom God has distinguished with an ability and
inclination for speech) to improve the benefit of language, in the pro
per use and design of names, given to things of which they have often
occasion to speak, which is to enable them to express their ideas with
ease and expedition, without being encumbered with an obscure and
diificult circumlocution. And our thus distinguishing persons of dif
ferent opinions in religious matters may not imply any more, than that
there is a difference; a difference of which we find we have often oc
casion to take notice : and it is always a defect in language, in such
cases, to be obliged to make use of a description, instead ofa name.
Thus we have often occasion to speak of those who are the descen
dants of the ancient inhabitants of France, in distinction from the
descendants of the inhabitants of Spain ; and find the great conve
nience of those distinguishing words, French and Spaniards ; by
which the signification of our minds is quick and easy, and our speech
is delivered from the burden of a continual reiteration of diffuse des-
priptions, with which it must otherwise be embarrassed.
That there is occasion to speak often concerning the difference
of those, who in their general scheme of divinity agree with these
two noted men, Calvin and Akminius, is what the practice of the
latter confesses ; who are often, in their discourses and writings,
taking notice of the supposed absiird and pernicious opinions of the
former sort. And therefore the making use of different names in this
case cannot reasonably be objected against, as a thing which must
come from so bad a cause as they assign. It is easy to be accounted
for, without supposing it to arise from any other source, than the exi
gence ofthe case, whereby mankind express those things, which they
have frequent occasion to mention, by certain distinguishing names. ,
It is an effect, similar to what we see in cases innumerable, where
the cause is not at all blameworthy.
Nevertheless, at first, I had thoughts of carefully avoiding tbe
use of the appellation, Ar-miniaii, in this Treatise. But I soon found
I should be put to great difficulty by it ; and that my discourse would
be too much encumbered with circumlocution, instead of a name,
•which would better express the thing intended. And therefore I must
ask the excuse of such as are apt to be offended with, things of this
nature, that I have so freely used the term Arminian'm the following
Discourse. I profess it to be without any design to stigmatize per
sons of any sort with a name of reproach, or at all to make them ap
pear more odious. If, when I had occasion to speak of those Divines
who are commonly called by this name, I had, instead of styling them
Arminians, called them " these men,'" as Dr. Whitby does Calvinis
tic B'lvmes, it probably would not have been taken any better, or
thought to show a better temper, or more good manners. I have
done as I would be done by, in this matter. However the term Cal
vinistic is, in these days, among most, a term of greater reproach

faEFACB, l3
tJian the term Arminian ; yet I should not take it at all amiss, to be
called a Calvinist, for distinction's sake : though I utterly disclaim a
dependence on Calvin, or believing the doctrines which I hold, be^
cause he believed and taught them ; and cannot justly be charged
with believing in every thing just as he taught.
But, lest I should really be an occasion of injury to some per
sons, 1 would here give notice, that though I generally speak of that
doctrine, concerning Free-will and moral Agency, which I oppose, as
an Arminian doctrine ; yet I would not be understood as asserting j
that every Divine or Author, whom I have occasion to mention as
maintaining that doctrine, was properly an Arminian, or one of that
sort which is commonly called by that name. Some of them went
far beyond the Arminians; and 1 would by no means charge Armi
nians in general with all the corrupt doctrine, which these maintain
ed. Thus, for instance, it would be very injurious, if I should rank
Arminian Divines, in general, with such Authors as Mr. Chubb. I
doubt not, many of them have some of his doctrines in abhorrence ;
though he agrees, for the most part, with Arminians, in his notion of
the Freedom ofthe Will. And, on the other hand, though I suppose
this notion to be a leading article in the Armmiara scheme, that which,
if pursued in its consequences, will truly infer, or naturally lead to all
the rest ; yet I do not charge all that have held this doctrine, with
being Arminians. For whatever may be the consequences of the
doctrine really,-yet some that hold this doctrine, may not own nor
see these consequences ; and it would be unjust, in many instances,
to charge every Author with believing and maintaining all the real
consequences of his avowed doctrines. And I desire it may be par
ticularly noted, that though I have occasion, in the following Disr
course, often to mention the Author of the book, entitled An Essay
on the Freedom of the Will, in God and the Creature,* as holding
that notion of Freedom of Will, which I oppose ; yet I do not mean
to call him an Arminian : however, in that doctrine he agrees with
Arminians, and departs from the current and general opinion of Cal
vinists. If the Author of that Essay be the same as it is commonly
ascribed to, he doubtless was not one that ought to bear that name.
But however good a Divine he was ih many respects, yet that parti
cular Arminian doctrine which he maintained, is never the better for
being held by such an one : nor is there less need of opposing it on
that account, but rather more : as it will be likely to have the more
pernicious influence, for being taught by a Divine of his name and
character ; supposing the doctrine to be wrong, and in itself to be of
an ill tendency.
I have nothing further to say by way of preface ; but only to be
speak the Reader's candour, and calm attention to what I have writ
ten. The subject is of such importance, as to demand attention, and
the most thorough consideration. Of all kinds of knowledge that we
can ever obtain, the knowledge of God, and the knowledge of our
selves, are the most important. As religion is the great business for
which we are created, and on which our happiness depends ; and as
* TMs Essay lias been generally ascribed to Dr. Watts, and is included in his
works. W.

14 PREFACE.
religion consists in an intercourse between ourselves and our Maker ;
and so has its foundation in God's nature and ours, and in the rela
tion that God and we stand in to each other ; therefore a true know
ledge of both must be needful, in order to true religion. But the
'knowledge of ourselves consists chiefly in right apprehensions con
cerning those two chief faculties of our nature, the understanding
and mill. Both are very important : yet the science of the latter
must be confessed to be of greatest moment ; inasmuch as all virtue
and religion have their seat more immediately in the will, consisting
more especially in right acts and habits of this faculty. And the
grand question about the Freedom ofthe Will, is the main point that
belongs to the science of the Will. Therefore, I say, the importance
of this subject greatly demands the attention of Christians, and espe
cially of Divines. But as to rny manner of handling the subject, I
would be far from presuming to say, that it is such as demands the
attention of the Reader to what I have written. I am ready to own,
that in this matter I depend on the Reader's courtesy. But only thus
far I may have some colour for putting in a claim ; that if the Reader
be disposed to pass his censure on what I have written, I may be fully
and patiently heard, and well attended to, before I am condemned.
However, this is what I would humbly aslc of my Readers ; together
with the prayers of all sincere lovers of truth, that I may have much
of that spirit which Christ promised his disciples, which guides into
all truth ; and that the blessed and powerful influences of this spirit
would make truth victorious in the world.

CAREFUL AND STRICT ENaUIRY,
<^c.

PART I.
WHEREIN ARE EXPLAINED AND STATED VARIOUS TERMS AND
THINGS BELONGING TO THE SUBJECT OF THE
ENSUING DISCOURSE.

SECT. I.
Concerning the Nature of the WiU.
It may possibly be thought, that there is no great need of
going about to define or describe the Will; this word being
generally as well understood as any other words we can use to
explain it : and so perhaps it would be, had not philosophers,
metaphysicians and polemic divines brought the matter into
obscurity by the things they havc said of it. But since it is
so, I think it may be of some use, and will tend to greater
clearness in the following discourse, to say a few things con
cerning it.
And therefore I observe, that the Will (without any meta
physical refining) is, That by which the mind chooses any thing.
The faculty of the Will, is that power, or principle of mind,
by which it is capable of choosing : an act of the Will is the
same as an act of choosing or choice.
If any think it is a more perfect definition of the Will, to
say, that it is that by which the soul either chooses or refuses ;
I am content with it : though I think it enough to say, It is
that by which the soul chooses : for in every act of Will what
soever, the mind chooses one thing rather than another ; it
chooses something rather than the contrary, or father than the

16 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. PaRT I.
want or non-existence of that thing. So in every act of re
fusal, the mind chooses the absence of the thing refused ; the
positive and the negative are set before the mind for its
choice, and it chooses the negative ; and the mind's making
its choice in that case is properly the act of the Will : the
Will's determining between the two, is a voluntary determina
tion ; but that is the same thing as making a choice. So that
by whatever names we call the act of the Will, choosing, re
fusing, approving, disapproving, liking, disliking, embracing,
rejecting, determining, directing, commanding, forbidding, in
clining or being averse, being pleased or displeased with ; all
may be reduced to this of choosing. For the soul to act volun
tarily, is evermore to act electively.
Mr. Locke* says, " The Will signifies nothing but a
power or ability to prefer or choose.'" And, in the foregoing
page, he says, " The word preferring seems best to express
the act of vohtion ;" but adds, that " it does it not precisely ;
for, though a man would prefer flying to walking, yet who
can say he ever wills it ?" But the instance he mentions, does
not prove that there is any thing else in willing, but merely
preferring : for it should be considered what is the immediate
object of the Will, with respect to a man's walking, or any
other 'external action ; which is not being removed from one
place to another ; on the earth, or through the air ; these are
remoter objects of preference ; but such or such an immediate
exertion of himself. The thing next chosen, or preferred,
when a man wills to walk, is not his being removed to such a
place where he would be, but such an exertion and motion of
his legs and feet, &c. in order to it. And his willing such an
alteration in his body in the present moment, is nothing else
but his choosing or preferring such an alteration in his body
at such a moment, or his liking it better than the forbearance
of it. And God has so made and established the human na
ture, the soul being united to a body in proper state, that the
soul preferring or choosing such an immediate exertion or al
teration of the body, such an alteration instantaneously fol
lows. There is nothing else in the actions of my mind, that
I am conscious of while I walk, but only my preferring or
choosing, through successive moments, that there should be
such alterations of my external sensations and motions • toge-
ther with a concurring habitual expectation that it will 'be so •
having ever found by experience, that on such an immediate
preference, such sensations and motions do actually instanta
neously, and constantly arise. But it is not so in the catp nf
flying : though a man may be said remotely to choose or orP
fer flying : yet he does not prefer, or desire, under circum^
* Human Understanding. Edit. 7. vol. i. p. 197.

Sect. t. The Nature of the Wilt. 17
stances in view, any immediate exertion of the members of his
body in order to it ; because he has no expectation that he
should obtain the desired end by any such exertion ; and he
does not prefer, or incline to, any bodily exertion, under this
apprehended circumstance, of its being wholly in vain. So
that if we carefully distinguish the proper objects of the several
acts of the Will, it will not appear by this, and such like in
stances, that there is any difference hetween volition and^re-
ference ; or that a man's choosing, liking best, or being best
pleased with a thing, are not the same with hjs wilUng that
thing. Thus an act of the Will is commonly expressed by itsj
pleasing a man to do thus or thus ; and a man doing as he wills j
and doing as he pleases, are in common speech the samJ
thing. Mr. Locke* says, " The Will is perfectly distinguished
from Desire ; which in the very same action may have a quite
contrary tendency from that which our Wills set us upon. A
man, says he, whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to use
persuasions to another, which, at the same time I am speak
ing, I raay wish may not prevail on him. In this case, it is
plain the Will and Desire run counter." I do not suppose,
that Will and Desire are words of precisely the same signifi
cation : Will seems to be a word of a more general significa
tion, extending to things present and absent. Desire respects
something absent. I may prefer my present situation and
posture, suppose sitting still, or having my eyes open, and so
may will it. But yet I cannot think they are so entirely dis
tinct, that they can ever be properly said to run counter. A
man never, in any instance, wills any thing contrary to his de
sires, or desires any thing contrary to his Will. The fore-
mentioned instance, which Mr. Locke produces, is no proof
that he ever does. He may, on some consideration or other
will to utter speeches which have a tendency to persuade an
other, and still may desire that they may not persuade him ;
but yet his Will and Desire do not run counter at all : the
thing which he wills, the very same he desires ; and he does
not will a thing, and desire the contrary, in any particular. In
this instance, it is not carefully observed, what is the thing
willed, and what i,9 the thing desired : if it were, it would be
found, that Will and Desire do not clash in the Ifeast. The
thing willed on some consideration, is to utter such words;
and certainly, the same consideration so influences hini, that
he does not desire the contrary ; all things considered, he
chooses to utter such words, and does not desire not to utter
them. And so as to the thing which Mr. Locke speaks of as
desired, viz. That the words, tbough they tend to persuade,
* Hum. Und. vol. i. p. 205, 204.
VOL. II. ^

18 FREEDOM OP THE WILL. PaRT. I-
should not be efFectual to that end, his Will is not contrary to
this ; he does not will that they should be effectual, but rather
wills that they should not, as he desires. In order to prove
that the Will and Desire may run counter, it should be shown
that they may be contrary one to the other in the same thing,
or with respect to the very same object of Will or desire : but
here the objects are two ; and in each, taken by themselves,
.the Will and Desire agree. And it is no wonder that they
should not agree in d^erent things, though but little distin
guished in their nature. The Will may not agree with the
Will, nor Desire agree with Desire, in different things. As in
this very instance which Mr. Locke mentions, a person may,
on some consideration, desire to use persuasions, and at the
same time may desire they may not prevail ; but yet no body
will say, that Desire runs counter to Desire ; or that this proves
that Desire is perfectly a distinct thing from Desire. — The like
might be observed of the other instance Mr. Locke produces,
of a man's desiring to be eased of pain, &c.
But, not to dwell any longer on this, whether Desire and
Will, and whether Preference and Volition be precisely the
same things, I trust it will be allowed by all, that in every act
of will there is an act of choice ; that in every volition there is
apreference, or a prevailing inclination of the soul, whereby,
at that instant, it is out of a state of perfect indifference, with
respect to the direct object of the volition. So that in every
act, or going forth of the Will, there is some preponderation
of the mind, one way rather than another ; and the soul had
rather have or do one thing, than another, or than not to have
or do that thing ; and that where there is absolutely no pre
ferring or choosing, but a perfect, continuing equilibrium,
there is no volition.

SECT. II.
Concerning the Determination of the Will.
By determining the Will, if the phrase be used with any
meaning, must be intended, causing that the act of the Will
or Choice should be thus, and not otherwise : and the Will is
said to be determined, when, in consequence of some action,
or influence, its choice is directed to, and fixed upon a parti
cular object. As when we speak of the determination of mo
tion, we mean causing the motion of the body to be in such
a direction, rather thaIn another.
The Determination of the Will, supposes an effect, which
must have a cause. If the Will be determined, there is a De
terminer. This must be supposed to be intended even bv

Sect. ii. Wliat determines the Will. 19
them that say the Will determines itself. If it be so, the Will
is both Determiner and determined ; it is a cause that acts
and produces effects upon itself, and is the object of its own
influence and action.
With respect to that grand enquiry, " What determines
the Will ?" it would be very tedious and unnecessary, at pre
sent, to examine all the various opinions, which have been
advanced concerning this matter; nor is it needful that I
should enter into a particular discussion of all points debated
in disputes on that other question, " Whether the Will always
follows the last dictate of the understanding ?" It is sufficient
to my present purpose to say, It is that motive, which, as it
stands in the view of the mind, is the strongest, that determines
the Will. But it may be necessary that I should a little ex
plain my meaning.
By motive, I mean the whole of that which moves, ex
cites, or invites the mind to volition, whether that be one
thing singly, or many things conjunctly. Many particular
things may concur, and unite their strength, to induce the
rnind ; and when it is so, all together are as one complex mo
tive. And when I speak of the strongest motive, I have re
spect to the strength of the whole that operates to induce a
particular act of vohtion, whether that be the strength of one
thing alone, or of many together.
Whatever is objectively* a motive, in this sense, must be
something that is extant in the view or apprehension oftheun-
derstanding, or perceiving faculty. Nothing can induce or
invite the mind to will or act any thing, any further than it is
perceived, or is some way or other in the mind's view ; for
what is wholly unperceived and perfectly out of the mind's
view, cannot affect the mind at all. It is most evident, that
nothing is in the mind, or reaches it, or takes any hold of it,
any otherwise than as it is perceived or thought of. /
And I think it must also be allowed by all, that every thing
that is properly called a motive, excitement, or inducement to
a perceiving, willing agent, has some sort and degree of ten
dency, or advantage to move or excite the Will, previous to
the effect, or to the act of the Will excited. This previous
tendency of the motive is what I calf the strength ofthe motive.
* This appears to be the author's meaning, in order to preserve a consistency
with his professed sentiment of divine influence. He believed that a real chris
tian's mind is bom of the Spirit ; and that such a state of mind induces one choice
rather than another. But he could not raaintatn that di-ei-ne influence, which is
a sul^eetive cause of one volition rather than another, must be "in the view or
apprehension of the understanding." For " the wind bloweth where it listeth,
and thou hearest the sound thereof, but' canst not tell whence it cometh, and
whither it goeth : so ia every one that is born of the Spirit." Beside, the most
proper acceptation of the term " motive" seems to plead in favour of tiie restric
tion suggested in the text by the word "objectively ;" and the use of this dis
tinction may appear more fully hereafter. — W.

iio FBEEDOM or THE WILL. PaBT I-
That motive which has a less degree of previous advantage,
or tendency to move the will, or which appears less inviting,
as it stands in the view of the mind, is what I call a wecmer
"motive. On the contrary, that which appears most inviting,
and has, by wha't appears concerning it to the understanding
or apprehension, the greatest degree of previous tendency to
excite and induce the choice, is what I call the strongest mo-
tive. And in this sense, I suppose the Will is always deter
mined by the strongest motive.
Things that exist in the view of the mmd have their
strength, tendency, or advantage to move, or excite its Will,
from many things appertaining to the nature and circumstances
of the thing viewed, the nature and circumstances of the mind
that views, and the degree and manner of its view ; of vvhich it
would perhaps be hard to make a perfect enumeration. But
so much I think may be determined in general, without room
for controversy, that whatever is perceived or apprehended by
an intelligent and voluntary agent, which has the nature and
influence of a motive to volition or choice, is considered or
viewed as good; nor has it any tendency to engage the elec
tion of the soul in any further degree than it appears suchl
For to say otherwise, would be to say, that things that appear,
have a tendency, by the appearance they make, to engage
the mind to elect them, some other way than by their appear
ing eligible to it ; vvhich is absurd. And therefore it must be
true, in some sense, that the Will always, is, as the greatest
apparent good is. But only, for the right understanding of
this, two things must be well and distinctly observed.
1. It must be observed in what sense I use the term
" good ;" namely, as of the same import with " agreeable."
To appear good to the mind, as I use the phrase, is the same as
to appear agreeable, or seem pleasing to the mind. Certainly,
nothing appears inviting and eligible to the mind, or tending
to engage its inchnation and choice, considered as evil ox dis
agreeable / nor indeed, as indifferent, and neither agreeable
nor disagreeable. But if it tends to draw the inclination, and
move the Will, it must be under the notion of that which
suits the mind. And therefore that must have the greatest
tendency to attract and engage it, which, as it stands in tho
mind's view, suits it best, and pleases it most ; and in that
sense, is the greatest apparent good : to say otherwise, is lit
tle, if any thing, short of a direot and plain contradiction
The v^^ord » good," in this sense, includes in its significa
tion, the removal or avoiding of evil, or of that which is dis
agreeable and uneasy. It is agreeable and pleasing, to avoid
what is disagreeable and displeasing, and to have uneasiness
removed. So that here is included what Mr. Locke supposes:
determines Will. For when he speaks of " uneasiness '' as

Sect. ii. What determines the Will. M
determining the Will, he must be understood as supposing
that the end or aim which governs in the volition or act of
preference, is the avoiding or the removal of that uneasiness ;
and that is the same thing as choosing and seeking what is
more easy and agreeable.
2. When I say, that the Will is as the greatest apparent
good, or, (as I have explained it) that volition has always for
its object the thing which appears most agreeable ; it must be
carefully observed, to avoid confusion and needless objection,
that I speak of the direct and immediate object of the act oP
volition; and not some object to which the act of Will has
only an indirect and remote respect. Many acts of volition have
some remote relation to an object, that is different from the
thing most immediately willed and chosen. Thus, when a
drunkard has his liquor before him, and he has to choose whe
ther to drink it, or no ; the immediate objects, about which
his present volition is conversant, and between' which his
choice now decides, are his own acts, in drinking the liquor, or
letting it alone ; and this will certainly be done according to
what, in the present view of his mind, taken in the whole of
it, is most agreeable to him. If he chooses to drink it, and
not to let it alone ; then this action, as it stands in the view of
his mind, with all that belongs to its appearance there, is more
agreeable and pleasing than letting it alone.
But the objects to which this act of vohtion may relate
more remotely, and between which his choice may determine
more indirectly, are the present pleasure the man expects by
drinking, and the future misery which he judges will be the
consequence of it ; he may judge that this future misery,
when it comes, will be more disagreeable and unpleasant, than
refraining from drinking now would be. But these two things
are not the proper objects that the act of volition spoken of
is next conversant about. For the act of Will spoken of, is
concerning present drinking or forbearing to drink. If he wills
to drink, then drinking is the proper object of the act of his
Will ; and drinking, on some account or other, now appears
most agreeable to him, and suits him best. If he chooses to
refrain, then refraining is the immediate object of his Will,
and is most pleasing to him. If in the choice he makes in the
case, he prefers a present pleasure to a future advantage,
which he judges will be greater when it comes ; theft a lesser
present pleasure appears more agreeable to him than a greater
advantage at a distance. If on the contrary a future advan
tage is preferred, then that appears most agreeable, and suits
him best. And so still, the present volition is, as the greatest
apparent good at present is.
I have rather chosen to express myself thus, " that the
Will always is as the greatest apparent good," or " as what

22 freedom of the will. Part i.
appears most agreeable," than to say that the Will is deter-
^ mined by the greatest apparent good," or " by what seems
most agreeable ;" because an appearing most agreeable to ttie
mind, and the mind's preferring, seem scarcely distinct. It
strict propriety of speech be insisted on, it may more properly
be said, that the voluntary action, which is the immediate
consequence of the mind's choice, is determined by that which
appears most agreeable, than the choice itself; but that tJoZi-
tion itself is always determined by that in or about the mind's
view of the object, which causes it to appear most agreeable.
I say, " in or about the mind's view of the object ;" because
what has influence to render an object in view agreeable, is
not only what appears in the object viewed, but also the man
ner of the view, and the state and circumstances of the mind
that views. Particularly to enumerate all things pertaining
to the mind's view of the objects of vohtion, which have in
fluence in their appearing agreeable to the mind, would be a
matter of no small difficulty, and might require a treatise by
itself, and is not necessary to my present purpose. I shall
therefore only mention some things in general.
I. One thing that makes an object proposed to choice
agreeable, is the apparent nature and circumstances ofthe object.
And there are various things of this sort, that have influence
in rendering the object more or less agreeable ; as
I. That which appears in the object, rendering it beautiful
and pleasant, or deformed and irksome to the mind ; viewing it
as it is in itself.
2. The apparent degree of pleasure or trouble attending
the object, or the consequence of it. Such concomitants and
consequences being viewed as circumstances ofthe object, are
to be considered as belonging to it ; and as it were parts ofit,
as it stands in the mind's view a proposed object of choice.
3. The apparent state of the pleasure or trouble that ap
pears, with respect to distance of time ; being either nearer or
farther off. It is a thing in itself agreeable to the mind, to have
pleasure speedily ; and disagreeable to have it delayed : so that
if there be two equal degrees of pleasure set in the mind's
view, and all other things are equal, but one is beheld as near,
and the other afar off; the nearer will appear most agreeable
and so will be chosen. Because, though the agreeableness of
the objects be exactly equal, as viewed in themselves, yet not
as viewed in their circumstances ; one of them having the ad
ditional agreeableness of the circumstance of nearness,
II. Another thing that contributes to the agreeableness of
an object of choice, as it stands in the mind's view, is the man
ner of the view. If the object be something which appears
connected with future pleasure, not only will the degree of an

Sect. ii. What determines the Will. 23
parent pleasure have influence, but also the manner of the
view, especially in two respects.
1. With respect to the degree of assent, with which the
mind judges the pleasure to be future. Because it is more
agreeable to have a certain happiness, than an uncertain one ;
and a pleasure viewed as more probable, all other things being
equal, is more agreeable to the mind, than that which is viewed
as less probable.
2. With respect to the degree of the idea or apprehension
of the future pleasure. With regard to things which are the '
subject of our thoughts, either past, present or future, we have
much more of an idea or apprehension of some things than
others ; that is, our idea is much more clear, lively and strong.
Thus the iHf»ag wp havp nf eamgiKln thingg_l:M; jmjia^^j}^;,.^^ SCHSa-
tJQn, are usually much more lively thajB..5lQgS.jKfi-have-bv mere
imaginalion^or_byjcontemplatjo^^ My
idea ofTFiFstinTwhen 1 look upon it, is more vivid, than when
I only think ofit. Our idea of the sweet j-elish of a delicious
fruit is usually stronger when we taste it, than when we only
imagine it. And sometimes, the idea we have of things by
contemplation, are much stronger and clearer, than at other
times. Thus, a man at one time has a much stronger idea of
the pleasure which is to be enjoyed in eating some sort of food
that he loves, than at another. Now the strength of the idea
or the sense that men have of future good or evil, is one thing
that has great influence on their minds to excite volition.
When two kinds of future pleasure are presented for choice,
though both are supposed exactly equal by the judgment, and
both equally certain, yet of one the mind has a far more lively
sense, than of the other ; this last has the greatest advantage
by far to affect and attract the mind, and move the Will. It is
now more agreeable to the mind, to take the pleasure of which
it has a strong and lively sense, than that of which it has only
a faint idea. The view of the former is attended with ' the
strongest appetite, and the greatest uneasiness attends the
want of it ; and it is agreeable to the mind to have uneasiness
removed, and its appetite gratified. And if several future en
joyments are presented together, as competitors for the choice
of the mind, some of them judged to be greater, and others
less ; the mind also having a more lively idea of the good of
some, and of others a less ; and some are viewed as of greater
certainty or probability than others ; and those enjoyments that
appear most agreeable in one of these respects, appear least so
in others : in this case, all other things being equal, the agree
ableness of a proposed object of choice will be in a degree
some way compounded of the degree of good supposed by the
judgment, the degree of apparent probability or certainty of
that good, and the degree of liveliness of the idea the mind

24 freedom of the will. Part. «¦
has of that good ; because all together concur to constitute
the degree in which the object appears at present agreeable ;
and accordingly will volition be determined.
I might further observe, that the state ofthe mind which
A^iews a proposed object of choice, is another thing that contri
butes to the agreeableness or disagreeableness of that object ;
the particular temper which the mind has by nature, or that
has been introduced and established by education, example,
custom, or some other means ; or the frame or state that the
mind is in on a particular occasion. That object which appears
agreeable to one, does not so to another. And the same ob
ject does not always appear alike agreeable to the same per
son, at different times. It is most agreeable to some men, to
follow their reason ; and to others, to follow their appetites :
to some men, it is more agreeable to deny a vicious inclina
tion, that to gratify it : otliers it suits best to gratify the vilest
appetites. It is more disagreeable to some men than others,
to counter-act a former resolution. In these respects, and
many others which might be mentioned, different things will
be most agreeable to different persons ; and not only so, but
to the same persons at different times.
But possibly it is needless to mention the " state of the
mind," as a ground of the agreeableness of objects distinct
from the other two mentioned before ; viz. The apparent na
ture and circumstances of the objects viewed, and the manner
of the view. Perhaps, if we strictly consider the matter, the
different temper and state of the mind makes no alteration as
to the agreeableness of objects, any other way, than as it makes
the objects themselves appear differently beautiful or deformed,
having apparent pleasure or pain attending them ; and, as it
occasions the manner of the view to be different, causes'the idea
of beauty or deformity, pleasure or uneasiness to be more or
less lively. However, I think so much is certain, that volition, in no
one instance that can be mentioned, is otherwise than the
greatest apparent good is, in the manner which has been ex
plained. The choice of the mind never departs from that
which, at the time, and with respect to the direct and inime-
diate objects of decision, appears most agreeable and pleasing,
all things considered. If the immediate objects of the will are
a man's own actions, then those actions which appear most
agreeable to him he wills. If it be now most agreeable to
him, all things considered, to walk, then he now wills to walk.
If it be now, upon the whole of what at present appears to him",
most agreeable to speak, then he chooses to speak : if it suits
him best to keep silence, then he chooses to keep silence
There is scarcely a plainer and more universal dictate of the
sense and experience of mankind, than that, when men act vo-

Sect. II. What determines the Will. 25
luntarily, and do what they please, then they do what suits
them best, or vyhat is most agreeable to them. To say, that
they do what pleases them, but yet not what is agreeable to
them, is the same thing as to say, they do what they please,
but do not act their pleasure ; and that is to say, that they do
what they please, and yet do not what they please.
It appears from these things, that in some sense, the Will
always follows the last dictate of the understanding. But then
the understanding must be taken in a large sense, as including
the whole faculty of perception or apprehension, and not mere
ly what IS p.allf»d rfi//..gQiroJv^Hri^wj^!|7"'"lf hy t"Ee"fficRrfe of the
understanding is meant what reason 'declares to be best, or
most for the person's happiness, taking in the whole of its dura
tion, it is not true, that the Will always follows the last dictate
ofthe understanding. Such a dictate of reason is quite a dif
ferent matter from things appearing now most agreeable, all
things being put together, which pertain to the mind's present
preceptions in any respect : although that dictate of reason,
when it takes place, has concern in the compound influence
which moves the Will ; and sliould be considered in estimating
the degree of that appearance of good which the Will, always
follows ; either as having its influence added to other things,
or subducted from them. When such dictate of reason con
curs with other things, then its weight is added to them, as
put into the same scale ; but when it is against them, it is as a
weight in the opposite scale, resisting the influence of other
things : yet its resistance is often overcome by their greater
weight, and so the act of the Will is determined in opposition
toit. These things may serve, I hope, in some measure, to
illustrate and confirm th© position laid down in the beginning
of this section, viz. "That the Will is always determined by
the strongest motive," or by that view of the mind which has
the greatest degree of previous teadency to excite volition.
But whether I have been so happy as rightly to explain the
thing wherein consists the strength of motives, or not, yet my
failing in this will not overthrow the position itself; which
carries much of its own evidence with it, and is a point of
chief importance to the purpose of the ensuing discourse:
And the truth of it, I hope, will appear with great clearness,
before I have finished what I have to say on the subject of
human liberty.

VOL, II.

20 tREEDOM OF THE WILL. ^^^"^ ''

SECT. III.
Concerning ihe Meaning of the Terms Necessity, Impossibility,
InabiUty, ^c. and of Contijigence.
The words necessary, impossible, 4-c. are abundantly used
in controversies about Free- Will and Moral Agency ; arid
therefore the sense in which they are used, should be clearly
understood. Here I might say, that a thing is then said to be necessary,
when it must be, and cannot be otherwise. But this would
not properly be a definition of Necessity, any more than if I
explained the word must by the phrase, there being a Ne
cessity. "The words must^ can, and cannot, need explication
as much as the words necessary and impossible; excepting
that the former are words that in earliest life we more com
monly use.
The word necessary, as used in common speech, is a re
lative term ; and relates to some supposed opposition made to
the existence of a thing, which opposition is overcome, or
proves insufficient to hiiider or alter it. That is necessary, in
the original and proper sense of the word, which is, or will
be, notwithstanding all supposable.^opposition. To say, that a
thing is necessary, is the same thing as to say, that it is im
possible, it should not be. But the word impossible is mani
festly a relative term, and has reference to supposed power
exerted to bring a thing to pass, vvhich is insufficient for the
effect ; as the word unable is relative, and has relation to abili
ty, or endeavour, which is insufficient. Also the word irresist
ible is relative, and has always reference to resistance which
is made, or may be made, to some force or power tending to
an effect, and is insufficient to withstand the power, or hinder
the effect. The common notion of Necessity and Impossibi
lity implies something that frustrates endeavour or desire.
Here several things are to be noted.
1. Things are said to be necessary in general, which are
or will be notwithstanding any supposable opposition from
whatever quarter. But things are said to be necessary to us,
which are or will be notwithstanding all opposition supposable
,ip, the case /rom us. The same may be observed ofthe word
{possible, and other such like terms. •
2. These terms necessary, impossible, irresistible, ^c. more
especially belong to controversies about liberty and moral
agency, as used in the latter of the two senses now mention-

Sect. hi. The Nature of Necessity. 27
ed, VIZ. as necessary or impossible to us, and with relation to
any supposable opposition or endeavour of ours.
3. As the word Necessity, in its vulgar and common use,
is relative, and has always reference to some supposable insuf
ficient opposition ; so when we speak of any thing as necessary
to us, it is with relation to some supposable opposition of our
Wills, or some voluntary exertion or effort of ours to the
contrary. For we do not properly make opposition to an
event, any otherwise than as we voluntarily oppose it. Things
are said to be what must be, or necessarily are, as to us, when
they are, or will be, though we desire or endeavour the con
trary, or try to prevent or remove their existence : but such
opposition of ours always either consists in, or implies opposi
tion of our wills.
It is manifest that all such like words and phrases, as vul
garly used, are understood in this manner. A thing is said to
be necessary, when we cannot help it, let us do what we will.
So any thing is said to be impossible to us, when we would do
it, or would have it brought to pass, and endeavour it ; or at
least may be supposed to desire and seek it ; but all our de
sires and endeavours are, or would be vain. And that is said
to be irresistible, which overcomes all our opposition, resist
ance, and endeavour to the contrary. And we are said to be
unable to do a thing, when our supposable desires and endeav
ours are insufficient.
We are accustomed, in the common use of language,
thus to apply and understand these phrases : we grow up with
such a habit ; which, by the daily use of these terms from our
childhood, becomes fixed and settled ; so that the idea of a
relation to a supposed will, desire, and endeavour of ours, is
strongly connected with these terms, whenever we hear the
words used. Such ideas, and these words, are so associated,
that they unavoidably go together; one suggests the other,
and never can be easily separated as long as we live. And
though we use the words, as terms of art, in another sense,
yet, unless we are exceedingly circumspect, we shall insen
sibly slide into the vulgar use of them, and so apply the words
in a very inconsistent manner, which will deceive and confound
us in our reasonings and discourses, even when we pretend to
use them as terms of art.
4. It follows from what has been observed, that when
these terms necessary, impossible, irresistible, unable, <^c. are
used in cases wherein no insiifiicient will is supposed, or can
be supposed,~but the very nature of the supposed case itself
excludes any opposition, will or endeavour, they are then not
used in their proper signification. The reason is manifest;
in such cases we cannot use the words with reference to a sup
posable opposition, will or endeavour. And therefore if any

28 FREEDOM OP THE WILL. J'ART I-
man uses these terms in such cases, he either uses them non
sensically, or in some new sense, diverse from their original
and proper meaning. As for instance ; if any one shouia
affirm after this manner. That it is necessary for a man, or
what must be, that he should choose virtue rather than vice,
during the time that he prefers virtue to vice ; and that it is
a thing impossible and irresistible, that it should be otherwise ?
than that he should have this choice, so long as this choice
continues ; such a one would use tho ternis must, irresistible,
^c. with either perfect insignificance, or in some new sense,
diverse from their common use ; which is with reference, as
has been observed, to supposable opposition, unwillingness
and resistance ; whereas, here, the very supposition excludes
and denies any such thing : for the case supposed is that of
being willing, and choosing.
5. It appears from what has been said, that these terms
necessary, impossible, ^c. are ofteii used by philosophers and
metaphysicians in a sense quite diverge from their common and
original signification ; for they apply them to many cases in
which no opposition is supposable. Thus they use them with
respect to God's existence before the creation of the world,
when there was no other being ; with regard to many of the
dispositions and acts of the divine Being, such as his loving
himself, his loving righteousness, hating shn, &c. So they
apply them to many cases of the inclinations and actions of
created intelligent beings, wherein all opposition of the Will
is excluded in the very supposition of the case.
Metaphysical or Philosophical Necessity is nothing dif
ferent from their certainty. I speak not now of the certainty
of knowledge, but the certainty that is in things themselves,
whieh is the foundation of the certainty of the knowledge, or
that wherein lies the ground ofthe infallibihty of the proposi
tion which affirms them.
What is sometimes given as the definition of philosophi
cal Necessity, namely, " That by which a thing cannot but be,'"
or " whereby it cannot be otKerwise,"" fails of being a proper
explanation of it, on two accounts : First, the words can, or
cannot, need explanation as much as the word Necessity ; and
the former may as well be explained by the latter, as the
latter by the former. Thus, if any one asked us what we
mean, when we say, a thing cannot but be, we might explain
ourselves by saying, it must necessarily be so ; as well as ex
plain Necessity, by saying, it is that by which a thing cannot
but be. Arid Secondly, this definition is liable to the fore-
mentioned great inconvenience ; the words cannot, or unable
are properly relative, and have relation to power exerted or
that may be exerted, in order to the thing spoken of; to which

Sect. Ill, The Nature of Necessity. 29
as 1 have now observed, the word Necessity, as used by philo
sophers, has no reference.
Philosophical Necessity is really nothing else than the full
AND FIXED CONNECTION BETWEEN THE THINGS SIGNIFIED BY
THE SUBJECT AND PREDICATE OF A PROPOSITION, which affirms
something to be true. When there is such a connection, then
the thing affirmed in the proposition is necessary, in a philo
sophical sense ; whether any opposition, or contrary effort be
supposed, or no. When the subject and predicate of the pro
position, which affirms the existence of any thing, either sub
stance, quality, act, or circumstance, have a full and certain
CONNECTION, then the existence or being of that thing is said
to be necessary in a metaphysical sense. And in this sense I
use the word Necessity, in the following discourse, when I
endeavour to prove that Necessity is not inconsistent with Li
berty. The subject and predicate of a proposition, which affirms
existence of something, may have a full, fixed, and certain
connection several ways.
^ (1.) They may have a full and perfect connection in and
of themselves ; because it may imply a contradiction, or gross
absurdity, to suppose them not connected. Thus many things
are necessary in their own nature. So the eternal existence of
being generally considered, is necessary in itself; because it
would be in itself the greatest absurdity, to deny the existence
of being in general, or to say there was absolute and univer
sal nothing ; and is as it were the sum of all contradictions ;
as might be shewn, if this were a proper place for it. So God's
infinity, and other attributes are necessary. So it is necessary
in its own nature, that two and two should be four ; and it is
necessary, that all right lines drawn from the center of a circle
to the circumference should be equal. It is necessary, fit and
suitable, that men should do to others, as they would that they
should do to them. So innumerable metaphysical and mathe
matical truths are necessary in themselves : the subject and
predicate ofthe proposition which affirms them, are perfectly
connected of themselves.
(2i) The connection of the subject and predicate ofa pro
position, which affirms the existence of something, may be
fixed and made certain, because the existence of that thing is
already come to pass ; and either now is, or has been ; and so
has, as it were, made sure of existence. And therefore, the
proposition which affirms present and past existence of it, may
by this means, be made certain, and necessarily and unalter«
ably true ; the past event has fixed and decided the matter,
as to its existence ; and has made it impossible but that ex
istence should be truly predicated of it. Thus the existence
of whatever is already come to pass, is now become necessary;

ao FRfiEDOM OP THE WILL. ¦ PaRT '•
it is become.impossible it should be otherwise than true, that
such a thing has been. . . , • j
(3.) The subject and predicate of a proposition wmcn
affirms something to be, may have a real and certain connec
tion consequentially; and so the existence ofthe thing may be
consequentially necessary ; as it may be surely and firmly con-.
nected with something else, that is necessary in one of the
former respects. As it is either fully and thoroughly connected
with that which is absolutely necessary in its own nature, or.
wilh something which has already received and made sure of
existence. This Necessity lies in, or may be explained by the
connection of two or more propositions one with another. 
Things which are perfectly connected with other things that
are necessary, are necessary themselves, by a Necessity of
consequence. And here it may be observed, that all things which are
future, or which will hereafter begin to be, which can be said
to be necessary, are necessary only in this last way. Their
existence is not necessary in itself; for if so, they always
would have existed. Nor is their existence become necessary
by being already come to pass. Therefore, the only way that
any thing that is to come to pass hereafter, is or can be ner
cessary, is by a connection with something that is necessary in
its own nature, or something that already is, or has been; so
that the one being supposed, the other certainly follows.—
And this also is the only way that all things past, excepting
'those which were from eternity, could be necessary b^eace
th£y.JsomciQ,jgms ; and therefore the only way in which any
effect or event, or any thing whatsoever that ever has had, or
viiW have a beginning, has come into being necessarily, or will
lioreafter necessarily exist. And therefore this is the Neces-
¦^ity which especially belongs to controversies about the acts
of the will.
It may be of some use in these controversies, further to
observe concerning metaphysical Necessity, that (agreeable to
the distinction before observed of Necessity, as vulgarly un
derstood) things that exist may be said to be necessary, either
with a general or particular Necessity. The existence of a
thing may be said to be necessary with a general Necessity,
when, all things considered, there is a foundation for the cer-
tainty of their existence ; or when in the most general and
universal view of things, the subject and predicate of the pro
position, which affirms its existence, would appear with an
iufallible connection.
An event, or the existence of a thing, may be said to be
necessary with a. particular Necessity, when nothing that can
be taken into consideration, in or about a person, thino- or
time, alters the case at all, as to the certainty of an event or

Sect, m! The Nature of Necessity. 3l
the existence of a thing ; or can be of any Recount at all, in
determining the infallibility of the connection of the subject
and predicate in the proposition which affirms the existence of
the thing; so that it is all one, as to that person, or thing, at
least at that time, as if the existence were necessary with a
Necessity that is most universal and absolute. Thus there are
many things that happen to particular persons, in the ex
istence of which no will of theirs has any concern, at least at
that time ; which, whether they are necessary or not, with re
gard to things in general, yet are necessary to them, and with
regard to any volition of theirs at that time ; as they prevent
all acts of the will about the affair.  1 shall have occasion to
apply this observation to particular instances in the following
discourse. — Whether the same things that are necessary with
a particular Necessity, be not also necessary with a general
Necessity, may be a matter of future consideration. Let that
be as it will, it alters not the case, as to the use of this distinc
tion of the kinds of Necessity.
These things may be sufficient for the explaining of the
terms necessary and Necessity, as terms of art, and as often
used by metaphysicians, and controversial writers in divinity,
in a sense diverse from, and more extensive than their original
meaning, in common language, which was before explained.
What has been said to shew the meaning of the terms
necessary and Necessity, may be sufficient for the explaining
of the opposite terms, impossible and impossibility. For there
is no difference, but only the latter are negative," and the
former positive. Impossibility is the same as negative Neces
sity, or a Necessity that a thing should not be. And it is used
as a term of art in a like diversity from the original and vulgar
meaning, with Necessity.
The same may be observed concerning the words unable
and Inability. It has been observed, that these terms, in their
original and common use, have relation to will and endeavour,
as supposable in the case, and as insufficient for the bringing
to pass the thing willed and endeavoured. But as these terms
are often used by philosophers and divines, especially writers
on controversies about Free Will, they are used in a quite
different, and far more extensive sense, and are applied to
many cases wherein no will or endeavour for the bringing of
the thing to pass, is or can be supposed.
As the words necessary, impossible, unable, &c. are used
by polemic writers, in a sense diverse from their common sig
nification, the hke has happened to the term contingent. Any
thing is said to be contingent, or to come to pass by chance
or accident, in the original meaning of such words, when its
connection with its causes or antecedents, according to the
established course of things, is not discerned; ?ind so is what

32 FREEDOM OF TH^ WILL, PaRT I.
we have no means of foreseeing. And especially is any thing
said to be contingent, or accidental, with regard to us, when
it comes to pass without our foreknowledg®) and beside our
design and scope. ' ...
But the word contingent Js abundantly used in a very dit-
ferent sense ; not for that wliose connection with the series of
things we cannot discern, so as to foresee the event, but for
something which has absolutely no previous ground or reason,
with which its existence has any fixed and certain connection.

SECT. IV.
Of the Distinction of natural and moral Necessity, and
Inability.
That Necessity vvhich has been explained, consisting in
an infallible connection of the things signified by the subject
and predicate of a proposition, as intelligent beings are the
subjects of it, is distinguished into moral and natural Neces
sity. I shall not now stand to enquire whether this distinction
be a proper and perfect distinction ; but shall only explain how
these two sorts of Necessity are understood, as the terms are
sometimes used, and as they are used in the following dis
course. The phrase, moral Necessity, is used variously ; sometimes
it is used for a necessity of moral obligation. So we say, a
man is under Necessity, when he is under bonds of duty and
conscience, from which he cannot be discharged. Again, the
word Necessity is often used for great obligation in point of
interest. Sometimes by moral Necessity is meant that appa
rent connection of things, which is the ground of moral evi
dence ; and so is distinguished from absolute Necessity, or that
sure connection of things, that is a foundation for infallible
certainty. In this sense, moral Necessity signifies much the
same as that high degree of probability, which is ordinarily
sufficient to satisfy mankind, in their conduct and behaviour
in the world, as they would consult their own safety and inte
rest, and treat others properly as members of society. And
sometimes by moral Necessity is meant that Necessity of con
nection and consequence, which arises from such moral causes
as the strength of inclination, or motives, and the connection
which there is in many cases between these, and such certain
volitions and actions. And it is in this sense, that I use the
phrase, moral Necessity, in the following discourse.
By natured Necessity, as applied to men, I mean such
.Necessity as men are under through the force of natural

Sect. tv. Of Natural and Moral Inability. 38
causes ; as distinguished from what are called moral causes,
such as habits and dispositions of the heart, and moral motives
and inducenients. Thus men placed in certain circumstanced,
are the subjects of particular sensatioQs by Necessity : they
feel pain when their bodies are wounded ; they see the objects
presented before them in a clear light, when their eyes are
opened : so they assent to the truth of certain propositions, as
soon as the terms are understood ; as that two and two make
four, that black is not white, that two parallel lines can never
cross one another; so by a natural Necessity mens' bodies
move downwards, when there is nothing to support them.
But here several things may be noted concerning these
two kinds of Necessity.
1. Moral Necessity may be as absolute, as natural Ne
cessity. That is, the effect may be as perfectly connected
with its moral cause, as a natural necessary effect is with its
natural cause. Whether the Will in every case is necessarily
determined by the strongest motive, or whether the Will ever
makes any resistance to such a motivcj or can ever oppose the
strongest present inclination, or not ; if that matter should be
controverted, yet I suppose none will deny, but that, in some
cases, a previous bias and inclination, or the motive presented,
may be so powerful, that the act of the Will may be certainly
and indissolubly connected therewith. When motives or pre
vious bias are very strong, all will allow that there is some
difficulty in going against them. And if they were yet
stronger, the difficulty would be still greater. And therefore,
if more were still ^dded to their strength, to a certain degree,
it would make the difficulty so great, that it would be wholly
impossible to surmount it ; for this plain reason, because what
ever power men may be supposed to have to surmount
difficulties, yet that power is not infinite ; and so goes not
beyond certain limits. If a man can surmount ten degrees of
difficulty of this kind with twenty degrees of strength, because
the degrees of strength are beyond the degrees of difficulty ;
yet if the difficulty be increased to thirty, or an hundred, or
a thousand degrees, and his strength not also increased, his
strength will be wholly insufficient to surmount the difficulty.
As therefore it must be allowed, that there may be such a
thing as a sure and perfect connection between moral causes
and effects ; so this only is what I call by the name of moral
Necessity. 2. When I use this distinction of moral and natural Ne
cessity, I would not-be understood to suppose, that if any thing-
come to pass by the former kind of Necessity, the nature of
things is not concerned in it, as well as in the latter. I do not
mean to determine, that when a moral habit or motive is so
strong, that the act of the Will infallibly follows, this is not
VOL, II. ^

34 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. PART !•
owing to the nature of things. But natural and moraZ are the
terms by which these two kinds of Necessity have usually l>een
called; and they must be distinguished by some names, tor
thereis a difference between them, that is very important in
its consequences. Tliis difference, however, does not he so
much in the nature of the connection, as in the two ternis con
nected. The cause with which the effect is connected, is of a
particular kind ; viz. that which is of a moral nature ; either
some previous habitual disposition, or some motive exhibited
to the understanding. And the effect is also of a particular
kind; being likewise of a moral nature ; consistiijg in some
inchnation or volition of the soul, or voluntary action.
I suppose, that Necessity which is called raatora? in dis
tinction from moral necessity, is so called, because mere
nature as the word is vulgarly used, is concerned, without any
thing of choice. The word nature is often used in opposition
to choice ; not because nature has indeed never any hand in
our choice ; but, probably, because we first get our notion of
nature from that obvious course of events, which we observe
in many things where our choice has no concern ; and especi
ally in the material world ; which, in very many parts of it,
we easily perceive to be in a settled course ; the stated order,
and manner of succession, being very apparent. But where
we do not readily discern the rule and connection,, (though
there be a connection, according to an established law, truly
taking place) we signify the manner of event by some other
name. Even in many things which are seen in the material
and inanimate world, which do not obviously come to pass
according to any settled course, men do not call the manner of
the event by the name of nature, but by such names as acci
dent, chance, contingency, &c. So men make a distinction
between nature and choice ; as if they were completely and
universally distinct. Whereas, I suppose none will deny but
that choice, ira mawj/ cases, arises from nature, as truly as other
events. But the connection between acts of choice, and their
causes, according to established laws, is not so obvious. And
we observe that choice is, as it were, a new principle of mo
tion and action, different from that established order of things
which is most obvious, and seen especially in corporeal things.
The choice also often interposes, interrupts, and alters the
chain of events in these external objects, and causes them to
proceed otherwise than they would do, if let alone! Hence
it is spoken of as if it were a principle of motion entirely
distinct from nature, and properly set jn opposition to it.
Names being commonly given to things, according to what is
most obvious, and is suggested by what appears to the senses
without reflection and research.

Sect. iv. Of Natural and Moral Inability. 35
3. It must be observed, that in what has been explained, as
signified by the name of moral Necessity, the word Necessity is
not used according to the original design and meaning of the
word : for, as was observed before, such terms, necessary,
impossible, irresistible. Sic. in common speech, and their most
proper sense, are always relative ; having reference to some
supposable voluntary opposition or endeavour, that is insuf
ficient. But no such opposition, or contrary will and endeavour,
is supposable in the case of moral Necessity ; which is a cer
tainty of the inclination and will itself ; which does not admit
of the supposition of a will to oppose and resist it. For it is
absurd, to suppose the same individual will to oppose itself,
in its present act ; or the present choice to be opposite to, and
resisting present choice : as absurd as it is to talk of two con
trary motions, in the same moving body, at the same time. —
And therefore the very case supposed never admits of any
trial, whether an opposing or resisting will can overcome this
Necessity. What has been said of natural and moral Necessity, may
serve to explain what is intended by natural and moral Ina
bility. We are said to be naturally unable to do a thing,
when we cannot do it if we will, because what is most com
monly called nature does not allow of it, or because of some
impeding defect or obstacle that is extrinsic to the will ; either
in the faculty of understanding, constitution of body, or exter
nal objects. Moral Inability consists not in any of these .
things ; but either in the want of incliuEttion ; or the strength
of a contrary inclination ; or the want of sufficient motives
in view, to induce and excite the act of the will, or the strength
of apparent motives to the contrary. Or both these may be
resolved into one ; and it may be said in one word, that moral
Inability consists in the opposition or want of inclination. For
when a person is unable to will or choose such a thing, through
a defect of motives, or prevalence of contrary motives, it is
the same thing as his being unable through the want of an in
clination, or the prevalence of a contrary inclination, in such
circumstances, and under the influence of such views.
To give some instances of this moral Inability. — A woman
of great honour and chastity may have a moral Inability to
prostitute herself to her slave. A child of great love and duty
to his parents, may be thus unable to kill his father. A very
lascivious man, in case of certain opportunities and tempta
tions, and in the absence of such and such restraints, may be
unable to forbear gratifying his lust. A drunkard, under such
and such circumstances, may be unable to forbear taking
strong drink. A very malicious man may be unable to exert
benevolent acts to an enemy, or to desire his prosperity ; yea,
some may be so under the power of a vile disposition, that

36 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. ' PaRT I.
they may be unable to love those who are most worthy of
their esteem and affection. A strong habit of virtue, ana a
great degree of holiness, may cause a moral Inability to love
wickedness in general, and may render a man unable to taKe
complacence in wicked persons or things ; or to choose a wicK-
ed, in preference to a virtuous life. And on the other hand, a
great degree of habitual wickedness may lay a man under an
Inability to love and choose holiness ; and render hiin utterly
unable to love an infinitely holy Being, or to choose and cleave
to him as his chief good.
Here it may be of use to observe this distinction of moral
Inability, viz. of that which is general and habitual, and that
which is particular and occasional. By a general and habitual
moral Inability, I mean an Inabihty in the heart to all exercises
or acts of will of that kind, through a fixed and habitual incli
nation, or an habitual and stated defect, or want of a certain
kind of inclination. Thus a very ill-natured man may be un
able to exert such acts of benevolence, as another, who is full
of good nature, commonly exerts ; and a man whose heart is
habitually void of gratitude, may he unable to exert grateful
acts, through that stated defect of a grateful inchnation. By
particular and occasional moral Inability, I mean an Inability
of the will or heart to a particular act, through the strength or
defect of present motives, or of inducements presented to the
view ofthe understanding, on this occasion.  If it be so, that
the will is always determined by the strongest motive, then it
must always have an InabiUty, in this latter sense, to act
otherwise than it does ; it not being possible, in any case, that
the will should, at present, go against the motive which has
now, all things considered, the greatest advantage to induce
it.  The former of these kinds of moral Inabihty, is most
commonly called by the name of Inability ; because the word,
in its most proper and original signification, has respect to
some stated defect. And this especially obtains the name of
Inability also upon another account : — because, as before ob
served, the word Inability in its original and most common
use, is a relative term ; and has respect to will and endeavour,
as supposable in the case, and as insufficient to bring to pass
the thing desired and endeavoured. Now there may be more
of an appearance and shadow of this, with respect to the acts
which arise from a fixed and strong habit, than others that
arise only from transient occasions and causes. Indeed will
and endeavour against, or diverse from present acts ofthe will
are in no case supposable, whether those acts be occasional or
habitual ; for that would be to suppose the will, at present to
tbe otherwise than, at present, it is. But yet there maybe
Iwill and endeavour against future acts of the will, or volitions
Ithat are likely to take place, as viewed at a distance. It is no

Sect. iv. Of Natural and Moral Inability. 37
contradiction, to suppose thaf the acts of the will at one time,
may be against the acts of the will at another time ; and there
may be desires and endeavours to prevent or excite future
acts of the will ; but such desires and endeavours are, in
inany cases, rendered insufficient and vain, through fixedness
of habit : when the occasion returns, the strength of habit'
overcomes, and baffles all such opposition. In this respect, a
man may be in miserable slavery and bondage to a strong
habit. But it may be comparatively easy to make an altera- 1
tion with respect to such future acts, as are only occasional
and transient ; because the occasion or transient cause, if
foreseen, may often easily be prevented or avoided. On this
account, the moral Inabihty that attends fixed habits, espe
cially obtains the name of Inability. And then, as the will
may remotely and indirectly resist itself, and do it in vain, in
the case of strong habits ; so reason may resist present acts
of the will, and its resistance be insufficient : and this is more
commonly the case also, when the acts arise from strong
habit. But it must be observed concerning moral Inability, in
each kind of it, that the word Inability is used in a sense very
diverse from its original import. The word signifies only a
natural Inability, in the proper use of it ; and is applied to
such cases only wherein a present will or inclination to the
thing, with respect to which a person is said to be unable, is
supposable. It cannot be truly said, according to the ordinary
use of language, that a malicious man, let him be never so
malicious, cannot hold his hand from striking, or that he is
not able to shew his neighbour kindness ; or that a drunkard,
let his appetite be never so strong, cannot keep the cup from
his mouth. In the strictest propriety of speech, a man has a'
thing in his power, if he has it in his choice, or at his elec
tion : and a man cannot be truly said to be unable to do a
thing, when he can do it if he will. It is improperly said, that
a person cannot perform those external actions, which are de
pendent on the act of the will, and which would be easily per
formed, if the act of the will were present. And if it be im
properly said, that he cannot perform those external voluntary
actions, which depend on the will, it is in some respect more
improperly said, that he is unable to exert the acts of the will
themselves; because it is more evidently false, with respect
to these, that he cannot if he will ; for to say so, is a down
right contradiction : it is to say, he cannot will, -if he does will.
And in this case, not only is it true, that it is easy for a man to do
the thing if he will, but the very willing is the doing ; when
once he has willed, the thing is performed ; and nothing else
remains to be done. Therefore, in these things, to ascribe a
non-performance to the want of power or ability, is not just ;

38 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. PaRT I-
because the thing wanting is not a being able, but a being
willing. There are faculties of mind, and a capacity ol nature,
arid every thing else, sufficient, but a disposition : nothing is
wanting but a will. *
SECT. V.
Concerning the Notion of Liberty, and of Moral Agency.
The plain and obvious meaning of the words Freedom and
Liberty, in common speech^ is The power, opportunity, or ad
vantage that any one has, to do as he pleases. Or in other
words, his being free frpm hinderance or impediment in the
way of doing, or condii^cting in any respect as he wills.* And
the contrary to Liberty, whatever name we call that by, is a
person's being hindered or unable to conduct as he will, or be
ing necessitated to do otherwise.
If this which I have mentioned be the meaning of the
word Liberty, in the ordinary use of language ; as I trust that
none that has ever learned to talk, and is unprejudiced, will
deny ; then it will follow, that in propriety of speech, neither
Liberty, nor its contrary, can properly be ascribed to any be
ing or thing, but that which has such a faculty, power, or pro
perty, as is called will. For that vyhich is possessed of no will,
cannot have any power or opportumty of doing according to
its will, nor be necessitated to act contrary to its will, nor be
restrained from acting agreeably to it. And therefore to talk
of Liberty, or the contrary, as belonging to the very will it
self, is not to speak good sense ; if we judge of sense, and
nonsense, by the original and proper signification of words. —
For the will itself is not an Agent that has a will : the power
of choosing, itself, has not a power of choosing. That which
has the power of volition is the man, or the soul, and not the
power of volition itself. And' he that has the Liberty of doing
according to his will, is the Agent who is possessed of the will ;
and not the will which he is possessed of. We say with pro
priety, that a bird let loose has power and liberty to fly ; but
not that the bird's power of flying has a power and Liberty of
flying. To be free is the property of an agent, who is pos
sessed of powers and faculties, as much as to be cunning,
valiant, bountiful, or zealous. But these qualities are the pro
perties of persons ; and not the properties of properties.
There are two things contrary to what is called Liberty
* I say not only dmng,.hat cmductiiig ; because a voluntary forbearing to do
sitting still, keeping silence, &c. are instances of persons' conduct, about whioh
Liberty is exercised ; though they are not so properly called doing.

Sect. v. Of Liberty and Moral Agency. 39
in common speech. One is constraint; otherwise called /
force, compulsion, and coaction ; which is a person's being ne- '
cessitated to do a thing contrary to his will. The other is re- <
straint ; which is, his being hindered, and not having power
to do according to his will. But that which has no will can
not be the subject of these things. — 1 need say the less on
this head, Mr. Locke having set the same thing forth, with
so great clearness, in his Essay on the Human Understand
ing. But one thing more I would observe concerning what is
vulgarly called Liberty ; namely, that power and opportunity
for one to do and conduct as he will, or according to his
choice, is all that is meant by it ; without taking into the
meaning of the word, any thing of the cause of that choice ;
or at all considering how the person came to have such a vo
lition ; whether it was caused by some external motive, or
internal habitual bias ; whether it was determined by some
internal antecedent volition, or whether it happened without
a cause ; whether it was necessarily connected with something
foregoing, or not connected. Let the person come by his
choice any how,^ yet, if he is able, and there is nothing in the
way to hinder his pursuing and executing his will, the man is
perfectly free, according to the primary and common notion
of freedom. What has been said may be sufficient to shew what is
meant by Liberty, according to the common notions of man
kind, and in the usual and primary acceptation of the word :
but the word, as used by Arminians, Pelagians and others,
who oppose the Calvinists, has an entirely different significa
tion, — These several things belong to their notion of Liberty.
1. That it consists in a self-determining power in the will, or a
certain sovereignty the will has over itself, and its own acts,
whereby it determines its own volitions ; so as not to be
dependent in its determinations, on any cause without itself,
nor determined by any thing prior tb its own acts. 2. Indif
ference belongs to Liberty in their notion of it, or that the
mind, previous to the act of volition, be in equilibria, 3. Con-
tingence is another thing that belongs and is essential to it ;
not in the common acceptation of the word, as that has
been already explained, but as opposed to all necessity, or
any fixed and certain connection with some previous ground
or reason of its existence. They suppose the essence of
Liberty so much to consist in these things, that unless the
will of man be free in this sense, he has no real freedom,
how much soever he may be at Liberty to act according to
his will. A moral Agent is a being that is capable of those actions
that have a moral quality, and which can properiy be deno-

40 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. PART I.
minated good or evil in a moral sense, virtuous or vicious,
commendable or faulty. To moral Agency belongs a. moral
faculty, or sense of moral good and evil, or of such a thing as
desert or worthiness, of praise or blame, reward or punish
ment ; and a capacity which an Agent has of being influenced
in his actions by moral inducements or motives, exhibited to
the view of understanding and reason, to engage to a conduct
' agreeable to the moral faculty.
The sun is very excellent and beneficial in its actions
and influence on the earth, in warming and causing it to bring
forth its fruits ; but it is not a moral Agent : its action,
though good, is not virtuous or meritorious. Fire that breaks
out in- a city, and consumes great part of it, is very mis
chievous in its operation ; but is not a moral Agent : what it
does is not faulty or sinful, or deserving of any punishment.
The brute creatures' are not moral Agents : the actions of
some of them are very profitable and pleasant ; others are
very hurtful : yet seeing they have no moral faculty, or sense
of desert, and do not act from choice guided by understand
ing, 'or with a capacity of reasoning and reflecting, but only
from instinct, and are not capable of being influenced by
moral inducements, their actions are not pioperly sinful or
virtuous ; nor are they properly the subjects of any such moral
treatment for what they do, as moral Agents are for their faults
or good deeds.
Here it may be noted, that there is a circumstantial dif
ference between the moral Agency of a mler and a subject.
1 call it circumstantial, because it lies only in the difference of
moral inducenients, by which they are capable of being in
fluenced, arising from the difference of circumstances. A ruler
acting in that capacity only, is not capable of being influen
ced by a moral law, and its sanctions of threatenings and pro
mises, rewards and punishments, as the subject is ; though
both may be influenced by a knowledge of moral good and
evil. And therefore the moral Agency of the Supreme Being,
who acts only in the capacity of a ruler towards his crea
tures, and never as a subject, differs in that r^pect from the
moral Agency of created intelligent beings. , God's actions,
and particularly those which he exerts as a moral governor,
have moral qualifications, and are morally good in the highest
degree. They are most perfectly holy and righteous ; and we
must conceive of Him as influenced in the highest degree, by
that which, above all others, is properly a moral inducement ;
viz. the moral good which He sees in such and such things :
and therefore He is, in the most proper sense, a moral Agent
the source of all moral ability and Agency, the fountain and
rule of all virtue and moral good ; though by reason of his
being supreme over all, it is not possible He should be under

Sect. V. Of Liberty and Moral Agency. 41
the influence of law or command, promises or threatenings, re
wards or punishments, counsels or warnings. The essential
qualities of a moral Agent are in God, in the greatest possible
perfection ; such as understanding, to perceive the difference
between moral good and evil ; a capacity of discerning that
moral worthiness and demerit, by which some things are
praiseworthy, others deserving of blame and punishment ;
and also a capacity of choice, and choice guided by under
standing, and a power of acting according to his choice or
pleasure, and being capable of doing those things which are
in the highest sense praiseworthy. And herein does very
much consist that image of God wherein he made man, (which
we read of Gen. i. 26, 27, and chap. ix. 6.) by which God
distinguished man from the beasts, viz. in those faculties and
principles of nature, whereby He is capable of moral Agency,
Herein very much consists the natural image of God ; where
as the spiritual and moral image, wherein man was made at
first, consisted in that moral excellency with which he was
endowed.

VOL. Hi

42 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. PaRT U-

PART IL
WHEREIN IT IS CONSIDERED WHETHER THERE IS OR CAN BE
ANY SUCH SORT OF FREEDOM OF WILL, AS THAT WHEREIN
ARMINIANS PLACE THE ESSENCE OF THE LIBERTY OF ALL
MORAL AGENTS ; AND WHETHER ANY SUCH THING EVER
WAS OR CAN BE CONCEIVED OF.

SECT. I.
Shewing the manifest Inconsistence of the Arminian Notion of
Liberty of Will, consisting in the WiWs self-determining
Power.
Having taken notice of those things which may be necessary
to be observed, concerning the meaning of the principal
terms and phrases made use of in controversies concerning
human Liberty, and particularly observed what Liberty is
according to the common language and general apprehension
of mankind, and what it is as understood and maintained by
Arminians ; I proceed to consider the Arminian notion of the
Freedom of the Will, and the supposed necessity of it in
order to moral agency, or in order to any one's being capable
of virtue or vice, and properly the subject of command or
counsel, praise or blame, promises or threatenings, rewards or
punishments ; or whether that which has been described, as
the thing meant by Liberty in common speech, be not suffi
cient, and the only Liberty, which makes, or can make any
one a moral agent, and so properly the subject of these things.
In this Part, I shall consider whether any sueh thing be pos
sible or conceivable, as that Freedom of Will which Arminians
insist on ; and shall enquire, whether any such sort of Liberty
be necessary to moral agency, &c. in the next Part.
And first of all, I shall consider the notion o? a self-deter
mining Power in the will : wherein, according to the Armi
nians, does most essentially consist the Will's Freedom ; and
shall particularly enquire, whether it be not plainly absurd,
and a manifest inconsistence, to suppose that the will itself de
termines all the free acts of the will.

Sect. i. The Inconsistence of Arminian Liberty. 43
Here I shall not insist on the great impropriety of such
ways of speaking, as the Will determining itself; because
actions are to be ascribed to agents, and not properly to the
powers of agents; which improper way of speaking leads to
many mistakes, and much confusion, as Mr. Locke observes.
But Ishall suppose that the Arminians, when they speak of
the Will's determining itself, do by the Will mean the soul
willing. I shall take it for granted, that when they speak of
the Will, as the determiner, they mean the soul in the exer
cise of a power of willing, or acting voluntarily. 1 shall suppose
this to be their meaning, because nothing else can be meant,
without the grossest and plainest absurdity. In all cases when
we speak of the powers or principles of acting, or doing such
things, we mean that the agents which have these Powers of
acting, do them, in the exercise of those Powers. So when
we say, valour fights courageously, we mean the man who is
under the influence of valour fights courageously. When we
say, love seeks the object loved, we mean, the person loving
seeks that object. When we say the understanding discerns,
we mean the soul in the exercise of that faculty. So when it
is said, the will decides or determines, the meaning must
be, that the person in the exercise of a Power of willing and
choosing, or the soul acting voluntarily, determines.
Therefore, if the Will determines all its own free acts,
the soul determines them in the exercise of a Power of willing
and choosing ; or, which is the same thing, it determines them
of choice ; itdetermines its own acts, by choosing its own acts.
If the Will determines the Will, then choice orders and deter
mines the choice : and acts of choice are subject to the deci
sion, and follow the conduct of other acts of choice. And
therefore if the Will determines all its own free acts, then
every free act of choice is determined by a preceding act of
choice, choosing that act. And if that preceding act of the
Will be also a free act, then by these principles, in this act too,
the Will is self-determined : that is, this, in like manner, is an
act that the soul voluntarily chooses ; or, which is the same
thing, it is an act determined still by a preceding act of the
Will, choosing that. Which brings us directly to a contradic
tion : for it supposes an act of the Will preceding the first
act in the whole train, directing and determining the rest ; or
a free act of the Will, before the first free act of the Will.
Or else we must come at last to an act of the Will, determin
ing the consequent acts, wherein the Will is not self-deter
mined, and so is not a free act, in this notion of freedom : but
if the first act in the train, determining and fixing the rest, be
not free, none of them all can be free ; as is manifest at first
view, but shall be demonstrated presently.

44 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. PahT U.
If the Will, which we find governs the members of the
body, and determines their motions, does also govern iteelt,
and determines its own actions, it doubtless determines them
the same way, even by antecedent volitions. The Will deterr
mines which way the hands and feet shall move, by an act ot
choice : and there is no other way of the Will's determining,
directing or commanding any thing at all. Whatsoever the
Will commands, it commands by an act ofthe Will. And if
it has itself under its command, and determines itself in its
own actions, it doubtless does it the same way that it deter
mines other things which are under its comraand. So that if
the freedom of the Will consists in this, that it has itself and
its own actions under its command and direction, and its own
volitions are determined by itself, it will follow, that every free
volition arises from another antecedent volition, directing and
commanding that : and if that diVech'ra^ vohtion be also free,
in that also the Will is determined ; that is to say, that direct
ing volition is determined by another going before that ; and
so on Jtill we come to the first volition in the whole series : and
if that first volition be free, and the Will self-determined in it,
then that is determined by another vohtion preceding that.
/Which is a contradiction ; because by the supposition it can
have none before it, to direct or determine it, being the first in
the train. But if that first volition is not determined by any
preceding act of the Will, then that act is not determined by
the Will, and so is not free in the Arminian notion of freedom,
which consists in the Will's self-determination. And if that
first act of the Wiil which determines and fixes the subse
quent acts, be not free, none ofthe following acts, which are
determined by it can be free. — If we suppose there are five
acts in the train, the fifth and last determined by the fourth,
and the fourth by the third, the third by the second, and the
second by the first ; if the first is not determined by the Will,
and so not free, then none of them are truly determined by the
Will : that is, that each of them are as they are, and not other
wise, is not first owing to the Will, but to the determination
of the first in the series, which is not dependent on the Will,
and is that which the Will has no hand in determining. And
this being that which decides what the rest shall be, and
determines their existence ; therefore the first determination
of their existence is not from the Will. The case is just the
same, if instead of a chain of five acts of the Will we should
suppose a succession of ten, or an hundred, or ten thousand.
If the first act be not free, being determined by something
out of the Will, and this determines the next to be agreeable
to itself, and that the next, and so on ; none of them are free
but all originally depend on, and are determined by some cause'
out of the Will: apd so all freedom in the case is excluded

Sect. i. The Inconsistence of Arminian Liberty. 45
and no act ofthe Will can be free, according to this notion of
freedom. If we should suppose a long chain of ten thousand
links, so connected, that if the first link moves, it will move
the next, and that the next ; and so the whole chain must be
determined to motion, and in the direction of its motion, by
the motion of the first link ; and that is moved by something
else ; in this case, though all the links, but one, are moved by
other parts of the same chain ; yet it appears that the motion
of no one, nor the direction of its motion, is from any self-
moving or self-determining Power in the chain, any more than
if every link were immediately moved by something that did
not belong to the chain. — If the will be not free in the first act,
which causes the next, then neither is it free in the next, which
is caused by that first act : for though indeed the will caused
it, yet it did not cause it freely ; because the preceding act,
by which it was caused, was not free. And again, if the will
be not free in the second act, so neither can it be in the third,
which is caused by that ; because, in like manner, that third
was determined by an act of the will that was not free. And
so we may go on to the next act, and from that to the next ;
and how long soever the succession of acts is, it is all one ; if
the first on which the whole chain depends, and which deter
mines all the rest, be not a free act, the will is not free in
causing or determining any one of those acts ; because the act
by which it determines them all is not a free act ; and there
fore the will is no more free in determining them, than if it
did not cause them at all. — Thus, this Arminian notion of
Liberty of the Will, consisting in the Will's Self-determina
tion, is repugnant to itself, and shuts itself wholly out of the
world.

SECT. II.
Several supposed Ways of evading the foregoing Reasoning,
considered.
If to evade the force of what has been observed, it should
be said, that when the Arminians speak of the will determin
ing its own acts, they do not mean that the will determines
them by any preceding act, or that one act of the will deter
mines another ; but only that the faculty or power of vvill, or
the soul in the use of that power, determines its own volitions ;
and that it does it without any act going before the act deter
mined ; such an evasion would be full of the most gross
absurdity. — I confess, it is an evasion of my own inventing ;
and I do not know but I should wrong the Arminians, in sup
posing that any of them would make use of it. But it being

46 FREEDOM OF THE WILL, PaRT H.
as good a one as I can invent, I would observe upon it a few
things. ,.
First, If the power of the will determines an act ot voli
tion, or the soul in Xhe use or exercise of that power, deternames
it, that is the same thing as for the soul to determine vrolition
by an act of will. For an exercise of the power of will, and
an act of that power, are the same thing. Therefore to say,
that the power of will, or the soul in the use or exercise of
that power, determines vohtion, without an act of will precede'
ing the volition determined, is a contradiction.
Secondly, If a power of will determines the act of the
will, then a power of choosing determines it. For, as was
before observed, in every act of will, there is a choice, and a
power of willing is a power of choosing. But if a power of
choosing determines the act of volition, it determines it by
choosing it. For it is most absurd to say, that a power of
choosing determines one thing rather than another, without
choosing any thing. But if a power of choosing determines
volition by choosing it, then here is the act of volition
determined by an antecedent choice, choosing that voli
tion. Thirdly, To say, that the faculty, or the soul, determines
its own volition, but not by any act, is a contradiction. Be
cause for the soul to direct, decide, or determine any thing, is
to act ; and this is supposed : for the soul is here spoken of as
being a cause in this affair, doing something; or, which is the
same thing, exerting itself in order to an effect, which effect
is the determination of volition, or the particular kind and
manner of an act of will. But certainly, this action is not the
same with the effect, in order to the production of which it is
exerted ; but must be something prior to it.
The advocates for this notion of the freedom of the will,
speak of a certain sovereignty in the will, whereby it has power
to determine its own Volitions. And therefore the determina-
tion of volition must itself be an act of the will ; for other
wise it can be no exercise of that supposed power and sove
reignty. Again, if the will determines itself, then either the
will is active in determining its volitions, or it is not. If active,
then the determination is an act of the will ; and so there is
one act of the will determining another. But if the will is not
active in the determination, then how does it exercise any li
berty in it ? These gentlemen suppose that the thing wherein
the will exercises liberty, is in its determining its own acts.
But how can this be, if it be not active in determining ? Cer
tainly the will, or the soul cannot exercise any liberty in that
wherein it doth not act, or wherein it doth not exercise itself.
So that if either part of this dilemma be taken, this scheme of
liberty, consisting in self-determining power, is overthrown'.

Sect. ii. Supposed Evasions considered. 47
If there be an act of the will in determining all its own free
acts, then one free act of the will is determined by another ;
and so we have the absurdity of every free act, even the very
first, determined by a foregoing free act. But if there be no
act or exercise of the will in determining its own acts, then no
liberty is exercised in determining them. From whence it
follows, that no liberty consists in the will's power to deter
mine its own acts : or, which is the same thing, that there is
no such thing as liberty consisting in a self-determining power
of the will. J
If it should be said. That although it be true, if the soul
determines its own volitions, it must be active in so doing, and
the determination itself must be an act ; yet there is no need
of supposing this act to be prior to the vohtion determined ;
but the will or soul determines the act of the will in willing ;
it determines its own volition, in the very act of volition ; it
directs and limits the act of the will, causing it to be so and
not otherwise, in exerting the act, without any preceding act
to exert that. If any should say after this manner, they must
mean one of these three things : Either, (L.) That the deter
mining act, though it be before the act determined in the or
der of nature, yet is not before it in order of time. Or, (2.)
That the determining act is not before the act determined,
either in the order of time or nature, nor is truly distinct from
it ; but that the soul's determining the act of volition is the
same thing with its exerting the act of volition : the mind's ex
erting such a particular act, is its causing and determining the
act. Or, (3.) That volition has no cause, and is no effect ; but
comes into existence, with such a particular determination,
without any ground or reason of its existence and determina
tion. — I shall consider these distinctly.
(1.) If all that is meant, be, that the determining act is
not before the act determined in order of time, it will not help
the case at all, though it should be allowed. If it be before
the determined act in the order of nature, being the cause or
ground of its existence, this as much proves it to be distinct
from, and independent on it, as if it were before in the order
of time. As the cause of the particular motion of a natural
body in a certain direction, may have no distance as to time,
yet cannot be the same with the motion effected by it, but
must be as distinct from it, as any other cause, that is before
its effect in the order of time : as the architect is disfmct
from the house which he builds, or the father distinct from
the son which he begets. And if the act of the will deter
mining be distinct from the act determined, and before it in
the order of nature, then we can go back from one to another,
till we come to the first in the series, which has no act of the
will before it in the order of nature, determining it ; and con-

48 FREEDOM OF THE VVILL. PaRT II'
sequently is an act not determined by the will, and so not a free
act, in this notion of freedom. And this being the act whicft
determines all the rest, none of them are free acts. As when
there is a chain of many links, the first of which only is taken
hold of and drawn by hand ; all the rest may follovv and be
moved at the same instant, without any distance of time ; but
yet the motion of one link is before that of another in the or
der of nature ; the last is moved by the next, and that by the
next, and so till we come to the first ; which not being moved
by any other, but by something distinct from the whole chain,
this as much proves that no part is moved by any self-moving
power in the chain, as if the motion of one link followed that
of another in the order of time.
(2.) If any should say, that the determining act is not
before the determined act, either in the order of time, or of
nature, nor is distinct from it ; but that the exertion of the act
is the determination of the act ; that for the soul to exert a
particular volition, is for it to cause and determine that act of-
volition : I would on this observe, that the thing in question
seems to be forgotten, or kept out of sight, in a darkness and
unintelligibleness of speech ; unless such an objector would
mean to contradict himself. — The very act of volition itself is
doubtless a determination of mind ; i. e. it is the mind's draw
ing up a conclusion, or coming to a choice between two or
more things proposed to it. But determining among external
objects of choice, is not the same with determining the act of
choice itself, among various possible acts of choice. — The
question is. What influences, directs, or determines the mind
or will to come to such a conclusion or choice as it does 1 Or
what is the cause, ground or reason, why it concludes thus,
and not otherwise ? Now it must be answered, according to
the Arminian notion of freedom, that the will influences, or
ders and determines itself thus to act. And if it does, I say,
it must be by some antecedent act. To say, it is caused, in
fluenced and determined by something, and yet not determin
ed by any thing antecedent, either in order of time or nature,
is a contradiction. For that is what is meant by a thing's be
ing prior in the order of nature, that it is some way the cause
or reason of the thing, with respect to which it is said to be
prior. If the particular act or exertion of will, which comes into
existence, be any thing properly determined at all, then it has
some cause of existing, and of existing in such a particular
determinate manner, and not another ; some cause, whose in
fluence decides the matter : which cause is distinct from the
effect, and prior to it. But to say, that the will or mind orders
influences and determines itself to exert an act by the very ex
ertion itself, is to make the exertion both cause and effect •

.Sect. ii. Supposed Evasions considered, 49
or the exerting such an act, to be a cause of the exertion of
such an act. For the question is. What is the cause and rea
son of the soul's exerting such an act ? To which the answer
is. The soul exerts such an act, and that is the cause of it.
And so, by this, the exertion must be distinct from, and in thc
order of nature prior to itself.
(3.) If the meaning be, that the soul's exertion of such a
particular act of will, is a thing that comes to pass of itself,
without any cause ; and that there is absolutely no reason of
the soul being determined to exert such a volition, and make
such a choice, rather than another ; I say, if this be the mean
ing of Arminians, when they contend so earnestly for thc
will determining its own acts, and for liberty of will consist
ing in self-determining power ; they do nothing but confound
themselves and others with words without a meaning. In the
question. What determines the will? and in their answer, that
the will determines itself, and in all the dispute, it seems to be
taken for granted, that something determines the will ; and
the controversy on this head is not, vvhether its determination
has any cause or foundation at all ; but where the foundation
of it is, whether in the will itself, or somewhere else. But if
the thing intended be what is above-mentioned, then nothing
at all determines the will ; volition having absolutely no cause
or foundation of its existence, either within, or without. 
There is a great noise made about self-determining power, as
the source of all free acts of the will : but when the matter
comes to be explained, the meaning is, that no power at all is
the source of these acts, neither self-determining power, nor
any other, but they arise from nothing ; no cause, no power,
no influence, being at all concerned in the matter.
However, this very thing, even that the free acts of the
will are events which come to pass without a cause, is certainly
implied in the Arminian notion of hberty of will ; though it be
very inconsistent with many other things in their scheme, and
repugnant to some things implied in their notion of liberty.
Their opinion implies, that the particular determination of vo
lition is without any cause ; because they hold the free acts of
the will to be contingent events ; and contingence is essential
to freedom in their notion of it. But certainly, those things
which have a prior ground and reason of their particular exis
tence, a cause which antecedently determines them tobe, and
determines them to be just as they are, do not happen contin
gently. If something foregoing, by a c^,^l influence and
connection, determines and fixes precisely their coming to
pass, and the manner of it, then it does not remain a contin
gent thing whether they shall come to pass or no.
And because it is a question in many respects very im-
portant in this controversy, Whether the free 'trt.'s of fhf will
VOL. ir. 7

50 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. PaRT II-
are events which come to pass without a cause ? I shall be
particular in examining this point in the two following
sections. SECT. III.
Whether any Event whatsoever, and Volition in particular, can
come to pass without a Cause of its existence.
Before I enter on any argument on this subject, I would
explain how 1 would be understood, when I use the word
Cause in this discourse ; since, for want of a better word, I
shall have occasion to use it in a sense which is more exten
sive, than that in which it is sometimes used. The word is
often used in so restrained a sense as to signify only that
which has apositive efficiency or influence to prodwce a thing,
or bring it to pass. But there are many things which have no
such positive productive influence : which yet are Causes in
this respect, that they have truly the nature of a reason why
some things are, rather than others ; or why they are thus,
rather than otherwise. Thus the absence of the sun in the
night, is not the Cause of the fall of dew at that time, in the
same manner as its beams are the Cause of the ascent of
vapours in the day-time ; and its withdrawment in the winter,
is not in the same manner the Cause of the freezing of the
waters, as its approach in the spring is the cause of their
thawing. But yet the withdrawment or absence of the sun
is an antecedent, with which these effects in the, night and
winter are connected, and on which they depend ; and is one
thing that belongs to the ground and reason why they come
to pass at that time, rather than at other times ; though the
absence of the sun is nothirig positive, nor has any positive
influence. It may be further observed, that when I speak of connec
tion of Causes and Effects, I have respect to moral Causes, as
well as those which are called natural in distinction from them.
Moral Causes may be Causes in as proper a sense, as any
Causes whatsoever ; may have- as real an influence, and may
as truly be the ground and reason of an Event's coming to

Therefore I sometimes use the word Cause, in this en
quiry, to signify any antecedent, either natural or moral, posi
tive or negative, on which an Event, either a thing, or the
manner and circumstance of a thing, so depends, that it is the
ground and reason, either in whole, or in part, why it is, rather
than not ; or why it is as it is, rather than otherwise ': or in
other words, any antecedent with which a consequent Event is
so connected, thatit truly belongs to the reason why the propo-

Sect. m. No Event without a Cause. 51
sition which affirms that Event, is true ; whether it has any posi-|
tive influence, or not. And agreeably to this, I sometimes use
the word effect for the consequence of another thing, which
is perhaps rather an occasion than a Cause, most properly
speaking. I am the more careful thus to explain my meaning, that I
may cut off occasion, from any that might seek occasion to
cavil and object against some things which I may say concern
ing the dependence of all things which come to pass, on some
Cause, and their connection with their Cause.
Having thus explained what I mean by Cause,! assert
that nothing ever conies to pass without a Cause. What is
self-existent must be from eternity, and must be unchangeable :
but as to all things that begin to be, they are not self-existent,
and therefore must have some foundation of their existence
without themselves. That whatsoever begins to be, which
before was not, must have a Cause why it then begins to exist,
seems to be the first dictate of the common and natural
sense which God hath implanted in the minds of all mankind,
and the main foundation of all our reasonings about the ex
istence of things, past, present, or to come.
And this dictate of common sense equally respects sub
stances and modes, or things, and the manner and circum
stances of things. Thus, if we see a body which has hitherto
been at rest, start out of a state of rest, and begin to move,
we do as naturally and necessarily suppose there is some Cause,
or reason of this new mode of existence, as of the existence of
a body itself which had hitherto not existed. And so if a body,
which had hitherto moved in a certain direction, should sud
denly change the direction of its motion ; or if it should put
off its old figure, and take a new one ; or change its colour :
the beginning of these new modes is a new Event, and the
human mind necessarily supposes that there is some Cause or
reason of them.
If this grand principle of common sense be taken away, all
arguing from Effects to Causes ceaseth, and so all knowledge
of any existence, besides what we have by the most direct
and immediate intuition, particularly all our proof of the be
ing of God ceases : we argue His being from our own being,
and the being; of other things, which we are sensible once were
not, but have begun to be ; and from the being of the world,
with all its constituent parts, and the manner of their exist
ence ; all which we see plainly are not necessary in their own
nature, and so not self-existent, and therefore must have a
Cause. But if things, not in tiiemselves necessary, may begin
to be without a Cause, all this arguing is vain.
Indeed, I will not affirm, that there is in the nature of
things no foundation for the knowledge of the Being of God,

•52 ' FHEEDOJI OF THE WILL. I'Ail* '^'^'
without any evidence of it from his works. I do suppose
there is a great absurdity in denying Being in general, and
imagining an eternal, absolute, universal nothing : and there
fore that there would be, in the nature of things, a foundation
of intuitive evidence, that there must be an eternal, infinite,
most perfect Being ; if we had strength and comprehension of
mind sufficient, to have a clear idea of general and universal
Being. But then we should not properly come to the know
ledge of the Being of God by arguing ; our evidence would
be intuitive : we should see it, as we see. other things that are
necessary in themselves, the contraries of which are in their
own nature absurd and contradictory,; as we see that twice two
is four ; and as we see that a circle has no angles. If we had
as clear an idea of universal, infinite entity, as we have of
these other things, I suppose we should most intuitively see
the absurdity of supposing such Being not to be ; should im
mediately see there is no room for the question, vvhether it is
possible that Being, in the most general, abstracted notion of
it, should not be. But we have not that strength and extent
of mind, to know this certainly in this intuitive, independent
manner : but the way that mankind come to the knowledge of
the Being of God, is that which the apostle speaks of, Rom. i.
20. The invisible things of him, from the creation ofthe world,
are clearly seen ; being understood by the things-that are made;
even his eternal poiver and Godhead. We first ascend, and
prove a posteriori, or from effects, that there must be an eter
nal Cause ; and then secondly, prove by argumentation, not
intuition, that this Being must be necessarily existent ; and
then thirdly, from the proved necessity of his existence, we
may descend, and prove many of his perfections a priori.*
But if once this grand principle of common sense be
* To the inquirer after tmth it may here be recommended, as a matter of some
consequence, to keep in mind the precise difference between an argument a ynorj
and one o posteriori, a distinction of considerable use, as well as of long standing
among divines, metaphysicians, and logical writers. An arguraent from either of
these, when legiHmatel-y applied, niay amount to a demonstration, when used, for
instance, relatively to the being and perfections of God ; but the one should be
confined to the existence of Deity, whde the other is applicable to his perfectiaas.
By the argument a posteriori we xise fram the effect tothe cause, from' the stream
to the fountain, from what is posterior to what is prior ; in other words, from what
is contingent to what is absolute, from number to unity ; that is, frora the -numi-
festttlion of God to his existence. By the argument a priori we descend fi-njn the
cause to the efiect, from the fountain to thc stream, from what is pri&r to what
is posterior ; that is, from the necessary existence of God we safely infer certain
properties and perfections. To attempt a demonstration ofthe existence ofa first
cause, or the Being of God a priori, would be most absurd ; for it would be an at
tempt to prove a prior ground or cause of existence of a first cause ; or that there
ia some cause befpre tlie very first. The argument a primi, therefore, is not appij-
cMe to prove the divine easteiux. For this end, |he argument a posteriori alone
is legitimate ; and its conclusiveness rests on this axiom, that " there can be -no
effect wUhmt a cause."— The absurdity of denying this axiom is abundantlv Ap.
monstratcd by our author. W, "uauuy ae

Sect. III. No Event without a Cause. 53
given up, that what is not necessary in itself, must have a Cause ;
and we begin to maintain, that things which heretofore have
not been, may come into existence, and begin to be of them
selves, without any cause ; all our means of ascending in our
arguing from the creature to the Creator, and all our evidence
of the Being of God, is cut off at one blow. In this case, we
cannot prove that there is a God, either from the Being ofthe
world, and the creatures in it, or from the munner of their be
ing, their order, beauty and use. For if things may come in
to existence without any Cause at all, then they doubtless
may without any Cause answerable to the efiect. Our minds
do alike naturally suppose and determine both these things ;
namely, that what begins to be has a Cause, and also that it
has a cause proportionable to the effect. The same principle
which leads us to determine, that there cannot be any thing
coming to pass without a Cause, leads us to determine that
there cannot be more in the effect than in the cause.
Yea, if once it should be allowed, that things may come
to pass without a Cause, we should not only have no proof of
the Being of God, but we should be without evidence of the
existence of any thing whatsoever, but our own immediately
present ideas and consciousness. For we have no way to prove
any thing else, but by arguing from effects to Causes : fiom
the ideas now immediately in view, we argue other things
not immediately in view ; from sensations now excited in us,
we infer the existence of things without us, as the Causes of
these sensations ; and from the existence of these things, we
argue other things, on which they depend^ as effects on
Causes. We infer the past existence of ourselves, or any
thing else, by memory ; only as we argue, that the ideas,
which are now in our minds, are the consequences of past
ideas and sensations. We immediately perceive nothing else
but the ideas which are this moment extant in our minds.
We perceive or know other things only by means of these, as
necessarily connected with others, and dependent on them.
But if things may be without Causes, all this necessary con
nection and dependence is dissolved, and so all means of our
knowledge is gone. If there be no absurdity or difficulty in
supposing one thing to start out of non-existence into being,
of itself without a Cause ; then there is no absurdity or diffi
culty in supposing the same of milhons of milhons. For no
thing, or no difficulty multiplied, still is nothing, or no difficul
ty : nothing multiplied by nothing, does not increase the sum.
And indeed, according to the hypothesis I am opposing,
of the acts of the will coming to pass without a Cause, it is
the cajSse in fact, that millions of millions of Events are con
tinually coming into existence contingently, without any Cause
or reason why they do so, all over the world, every day and

iVi FREEDOM OF THE WILL, PaRT, H.
hour, through all ages. So it is in a constant succession, in
every moral agent. This contingency, this efficient nothing,
this effectual No Cause, is always ready at hand, to produce
this sort of effects, as long as the agent exists, and as often as
he has occasion.
If it were so, that things only of one kind, viz. acts ot the
will, seemed to come to pass of themselves; and it were an
event that was continual, and that happened in a course,
wherever were found subjects capable of such events ; this
very thing would demonstrate that there was some Cause of
them, which made such a difference between this Event and
others, and that they did not really happen contingently. For
contingence is bhnd, arid does not pick arid choose a particular
sort of Events. Nothing- has no choice. This No-Cause,
which causes no existence, cannot cause the existence which
comes to pass, to be of one particular sort only, distinguished
from all others. Thus, that only one sort of matter drops out
of the heavens, even water, and that this comes so often, so
constantly and plentifully, all over the world, in all ages,
shows that there is some Cause or Reason of the falling of
water out of the heavens ; and that something besides mere
contingence has a hand in the matter.
If we should suppose Non-entity to be about to bring
forth; and things were coming into existence, without any
Cause or Antecedent, on which the existence, or kind, or
manner of existence depends ; or which could at all determine
whether the things should be stones, or stars, or beasts, or
angels, or human bodies, or souls, or only some new motion
or figure in natural bodies, or some new sensations in animals,
or new ideas in the human understanding, or new volitions in
the will ; or any thing else of all the infinite number of pos
sibles ; then certainly it would not be expected, although many
millions of milhons of things were coming into existence in
this manner, all over the face of the earth, that they should
all be only of one particular kind, and that it should be thus
in all ages, and that this sort of existences should never fail to
come to pass where there is room for them, or a subject
capable of them, and that constantly, whenever there is occa
sion, . ¦(,,,.
If any should imagine, there is something in the sort of
Event that renders it possible for it to come into existence
without a cause, and should say, that the free acts of the will
are existences of an exceeding different nature from other
things : by reason of which they may come into existence
without any previous ground or reason of it, though other
things cannot : if they make this objection in good earnest it
would be an evidence of their strangely forgetting themselves ¦
for they would be giving an account of some ground of the ex-

Sect, ivr. Volition not without a Cause. 55
istence of a thing, when at the same time they would maintain
there is no ground of its existence. Therefore I would
observe, that the particular nature of existence, be it never so
diverse from others, can lay no foundation for that thing
coming into existence without a cause : because to suppose
this, would be to suppose the particular nature of existence to
be a thing prior to the existence, and so a thing which makes
way for existence, without a cause or reason of existence.
But that which in any respect makes way for a thing coming
into being, or for any manner or circumstance of it? first
existence, must be prior to the existence. The distinguished
nature of the effect, which is something belonging to the
effect, cannot have influence backward, to act before it is.
The peculiar nature of that thing called volition, can do
nothing, can have no influence, while it is not. And after
wards it is too late for its influence : for then the thing has
made sure of existence already, without its help.
So that it is indeed as repugnant to reason, to suppose that
an act of the will should come into existence without a cause,
as to suppose the human soul, or an angel, or the globe of the
earth, or the whole universe, should come into existence with
out a cause. And if once we allow, that such a sort of effect
as a Volition may come to pass without a Cause, how do we
know but that many other sorts of effects may do so too ? It
is not the particular kind of effect that makes the absurdity of
supposing it has being without a Cause, but something which
is common to all things that ever begin to be, viz. That they
are not self-existent, or necessary in the nature of things.

SECT. IV.
Whether Volition can arise ivithout a Cause through the
Activity ofthe Nature ofthe Soul.
The author of the Essay on the Freedom of the Will in
God and the Creatures, in answer to that objection against his
doctrine of a self-determining power in the will, (p. 68 — 69,)
That nothing is, or comes to pass, without a sufficient reason, why
it is, and why it is in this manner rather than another, allows
that it is thus in corporeal things, which are properly and phi
losophically speaking, passive being; but denies it is thus in
spirits, which are beings of an^ active nature, who have the
spring of action within themselves, and can determine themselves.
By which it is plainly supposed, that such an event as an act
of the will, may come to pass in a spirit, without a sufficient
reason why it comes^ to pass, or why it is after this manner.

56 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. PaRT «.
rather than another. But certainly this author, in this matter,
must be very unwary and inadvertent. For,
I. The objection or difficulty proposed byhim seems to
be forgotten in his answer or solution. The very difficulty, as
he himself proposes it, is this : How an event can come to pass
without a sufficient reason why it is, or why it is in this manner
rather than another? Instead of solving this difficulty, with
regard to Volition, as he proposes, he forgets himself, and an
swers another question quite diverse, viz. What is a sufficient
reason -why it is, and why it is in this manner rather than
another ? And he assigns the active being's own determination
as the Cause, and a Cause sufficient for the effect ; and leaves
all the difficulty unresolved, even. How the soul's own deter
mination, which he speaks of, came to exist, and to be what it
was, without a Cause ? The activity of the soul may enable it
to be the Cause of effects ; but it does not at all enable it to be
the subject of effects which have no Cause; which is the thing
this author supposes concerning acts of the will. Activity of
nature will no more enable a being to produce effects, and
determine the manner of their existence, within itself, without
a Cause, than out q/" itself, in some other being. But if an ac
tive being should, through its-activity, produce and determine
an effect in some external object, how absurd would it be to
say, that the effect was produced without a Cause I
2. The question is not so much. How a spirit endowed
vvith activity comes to act, as why it exerts such an act, and
not another ; or why it acts with such a particular determina
tion? If activity of nature be the Cause why a spirit (the soul
of man, for instance) acts, and does not lie still ; yet that alone
is not the Cause why its action is thus and thus limited, direct
ed and determined. Active nature is a general thing ; it is an
ability or tendency of nature to action, generally taken ; which"
may be a Cause why the soul acts as occasion or reason is
given ; but this alone cannot be a sufficient Cause why the
soul exerts such a particular act, at such a time, rather than
others. In order to this, there must be something besides a
general tendency to action ; there must also be a particular
tendency to that individual action. — If it should be asked, why,
the soul of man uses its activity in such a manner as it does ;
and it should be answered-, that the soul uses its activity thus,
rather than otherwise, because it has activity ; would such an
answer satisfy a. rational man ? Would it not rather be looked
upon as a very impertinent one ?
3. An active being can bring no effects to pass by his ac
tivity, but what are consequent upon his acting : he produces
nothing by his activity, any other way than by the exercise of
his activity, and so nothing but the fruits' of its exercise : he
brings nothing to pass by a dormant activity. But the exer-

Sect. iv. Volition not without a Cause. 57
cise of his activity is action ; and so Ijis action, or exercise of
his activity, must be prior to the effects of his activity. If an
active being produces an effect in another being, about which
his activity is conversant, the effect being the fruit of his ac
tivity, his activity must bo first exercised or exerted, and the
effect of it niust follow. So it must be, with equal reason, if
the active being is his own object, and his activity is conversant
about himself, to produce and determine some effect in him
self; still the exercise of his activity must go before the effect,
vvhich he brings to pass and determines by it. And therefore
his activity cannot be the Cause of the determination of the
first action, or exercise of activity itself, whence the effects of
activity arise; for that would imply a contradiction ; it would
be to say, the first exercise of activity is before the first exer
cise of activity, and is the Cause of it,
4, That the soul!, though an active substance, cannot
diversify its own acts, but by first acting ; or be a determining
Cause of different acts, or any different effects, sometimes of
one kind, and sometimes of another, any other way than in
consequence of its own diverse acts, is manifest by this ; that
if so, then the same Cause, the same casual Influence, without
variation in any respect, would produce different effects at dif
ferent times. For the same substance of the soul before it
acts, and the same active nature of the soul before it is exert
ed, i. e. before in the order of nature, would be the Cause of
different effects, viz. Different Volitions at different times.
But the substance of the soul before it acts, and its active na
ture before it is exerted, are the same without variation. For
it is some act that makes the first variation in the Cause, as to
any causal exertion, force or influence. But if it be so, that
the soul has no different causality, or diverse causal influence,
in producing these diverse effects ; then it is evident, that the
soul, has no influence in the diversity of the effect; and that
the difference of the effect cannot be owing to any thing in the
soul ; or which is the same thing, the soul does not determine
the diversity of the effect ; which is contrary to the supposi
tion. It is true, the substance of the soul before it acts, and
before there is any difference in that respect, may be in a
different state and circumstances : but those vwhom I oppose,
will not allow the different circumstances of the soul to be the
determining Causes of the acts of the will ; as being contrary
to their notion of self-determination.
5. Let us suppose, as these divines do, that there are no
acts of the soul, strictly speaking, but free volitions ; then it
will follow, that the soul is an active being in nothing further
than it is a voluntary or elective being ; and whenever it pro
duces effects actively, it produces effects voluntarily and elec
tively. But to produce effects thus, is the sarae thing as te
VOL.. ir. 8

5S FREEDOM OF THE WILL. PaRT If'
produce effects in consequence of, and according to its own
choice. And if so, then surely the soul does not by its ac
tivity produce all its own acts of will or choice themselves;
for this, by the supposition, is to produce all its free acts ot
choice voluntarily and electively, or in consequence of its ovvn
free -acts of choice, which brings the matter directly to the
forementioned contradiction, of a free act of choice before the
first free act of choice.— According to these gentlemen's own
notion bf action, if there arises in the mind a Volition without
a free act of the will to produce it, the mind is not the volun
tary Cause of that Vohtion ; because it does not arise from,
nor is regulated by choice or design. And therefore it can
not be, that the mind should be the active, voluntary, deter
mining Cause of the first and leading Volition that relates to
the affair, — The mind being a designing Cause, only enables
it to produce effects in consequence of its design ; it will not
enable it to be the designii^g Cause of all its own designs.
The mind being an elective iCause, will enable it to produce
effects only in consequence of its elections, and according to
them V but cannot enable it4o be the elective Cause of all its
own elections ; because that supposes an election before the
first election. So the mind being an active Cause enables it
to produce effects in consequence of its own acts, but cannot
enable it to be the determining Cause of all its own acts ; for
that is, in tbe same manner, a contradiction ; as it supposes a
determining act conversant about the first act, and prior to it,
having a causal influence on its existence, and manner of
existence. I can conceive of nothing else that can be meant by the
soul having power to cause and determine its own Volitions^
Its a being to whom God has given a power of action, but
this; that God has given power to the soul, sometimes at
least, to excite Volitions at its pleasure, or according as it
chooses. And this certainly supposes, in all such cases, a
choice preceding all Volitions which, are thus caused, even
the first of them. Which runs into the forementioned great
absurdity. Therefore the activity ofthe nature ofthe soul affords no
relief from the difficulties with which the notion of a self-de
termining power in the will is attended, nor will it help in the
- least, its absurdities and inconsistencies.

Sect. v. These Evasions Impertinon. 6f)

SECT. V.
Shewing, that if the things asserted in these Evasions should be
supposed to be true, they are altogether impertinent, and
cannot help the cause of Arminian Liberty ; and how, this
being the state of the case, Arminian Writers are obliged
to talk inconsistently.
What was last observed in the preceding section, may
shew — not only that the active nature ofthe soul cannot be a
reason why an act of the will is, or why it is in this manner
rather than another, but also — that if it could be proved, that
volitions are contingent events, their being and manner of
being not fixed or determined by any cause, or any thing ante
cedent ; it would not at all serve the purpose of Arminians,
to establish their notion of freedom, as consisting in the will's
determination of itself, which supposes every free act of the
will to be determined by some act of the will going before ;
inasmuch as for the will to determine a thing, is the same as
for the soul to determine a thing by willing ; and there is no
way that the will can determine an act of the will, than by
willing that act of the will, or, which is the same thing,
choosing it. So that here must be two acts of the will in the
case, one going before another, one conversant about the
other, and the latter the object of the former, and chosen by
the former. If the will does not cause and determine the act
by choice, it does not cause or determine it at all ; for that
which is not determined by choice, is not determined volun
tarily or willingly : and to say, that the will determines some
thing which the soul does not determine willingly, is as much
as to say, that something is done by the will, which the soul
doth not with its will.
So that if Arminian liberty of will, consisting in the will
determining its own acts, be maintained, the old absurdity and
contradiction must be maintained, that every free act of will
is caused and determined by a foregoing free act of will. —
Which doth not consist with the free acts arising without any
cause, and being so contingent, as not to be fixed by any
thing foregoing. So that this evasion must be given up, as
not at all relieving this sort of liberty, but directly destroying
it. And if it should be supposed, that the soul determines its
ovvn acts of will some other way, than by a foregoing act of
will ; still it will not help their cause. If it determines them
by an act of the understanding, or some other power, then the
will does not determine itself; and so the self-4etermining

60 FREEDOM OF THE WILL'. PaRT U.
power of the will is given up. And what liberty is there ex-
ereised, according to their own opinion of liberty, by the soul.
being determined by something besides its own, choice ? ihe
acts of the will, it is true, may be directed, and effectually de
termined and fixed ; but it is not done by the soul's own will
and pleasure : there is no exercise at all of chpice or will
in producing the effect ; and if will and choice are not exer
cised in it, how is the liberty of the will exercised in it ?
So that let Arminians twin which way they please with
their notion of liberty, consisting in the will determining its
own acts, their notion destroys itself. If they hold every free
act of will to be determined by the soul's own free choice, or
foregoing free act of will ; foregoing, either in the order of
time, or natures it imphes that gross contradiction, that the
first free act belonging to the affair, is determined by a free
act which is before it. Or if they say, that the free acts of the
will are determined by some other act of the soul, and not an
act of will or choice ; this also destroys their notion of liberty
consisting in the acts of the will being determined by the wm
itself; or if they hold that the acts of the will are determined
by notMng at all that is prior to them, but that tljey are con
tingent in that sense, that they are determined and fixed by no
cause at all ; this also destroys their notion of liberty, consist
ing in the will determining its own acts.
This being the true state of the Arminian notion of
liberty, the writers who defend it are forced into gross incon
sistencies, in what they say upon this subject. To instance in
Dr. Whitby ; he, in his discourse on the freedom of the will,*
(.opposes the opinion of the CaZutmsts, who place man's liberty
mnly in. a power of doing what he will, as that wherein they
f plainly agree with Mr. Hobbes. And yet he himself mentions
the very same notion of liberty, as the dictate of the sense and
common reason of mankind, and a rule laid down by the light
of nature : viz. that liberty is a power of acting from ourselves,
or DOING WHAT WE wiLL.t This is indeed, as he says, a
thing agreeable to the sense and common reason of mankiftd ;
and therefore it is not so much to be wondered at, that he
unawares acknowledges it against himself: for if liberty does
not consist in this, what else can be devised that it should con
sist in ? If it be said, as Dr. Whitbv elsewhere insists, that it
does not only consist in liberty of doing what we wUl, but also
a liberty of willing without necessity ; still the questipn re
turns, vyhat does that liberty of willing without necessity
consist in, but in a power of willing as we please, without be
ing impeded by a contrary necessity? or in other words, aliber-
* Jn his Book dn the five Points, Second Edit. p. 350, .351 3152
t Ibid. p. 32.5, 32P.

Sect. v. These Evasions Impertinent. 61
ty for the soul in its willing to act according to its own choice ?
Yea, this very thing the same author seems to ai!ow, and sup
pose again and again, in the use he jnakes of sayings of
the Fathers, whom he quotes as his vouchers. Thus he cites
the words of Origen, which he produces as a testimony on his
side ; * " The soul acts by her own choice, and it is free for
her to incline to whatever part she will." And those words
of Justin Martyr ;T "The doctrine of the Christians is
this, that nothing is done or suffered according to fate, but
that every man doth good or evil according to his own
FREE CHOICE." And from Eusebius, these words ; J "If fate
be established, philosophy and piety are overthrown, — All
these things depending upon the necessity introduced by the
stars, and not upon meditation and exercise proceeding from
OUR OWN FREE CHOICE." And again, the words of Macca-
rius ; II " God to preserve the liberty of man's will, suffered
their bodies to die, thatit might be in their choice' to tum
to good or evil." — " They who are acted by the Holy Spirit, are
not held under any necessity, but have liberty to turn them
selves, and DO WHAT they will in this life.''''
Thus, the doctor in effect comes into that very notion of
liberty, which the Calvinists have ; which he at the same time
condemns, as agreeing with the opinion of Mr. Hobbes, namely,
" The soul acting by its own choice, men doing good or evil accord
ing to their own free choice, their being in that exercise which
proceeds from their own free choice, having it in their choice to
turn to good or evil, and doing what they will." So that if men
exercise this liberty in the acts of the will themselves, it must
be in exerting acts of will according to their own free choice ;
or, exerting acts of will that proceed from their choice. And
if it be sp, then let every one judge whether this does not
suppose a free choice going before the free act of will, or
whether an act of choice does not go before that act of the will
which proceeds from it. And if it be thus with all free acts
of the will, then let every one judge, whether it will not fol
low that there is a free choice going before the first free act
of the will exerted in the case ! And finally, let every one
judge whether in the scheme of these writers there be any
possibility of avoiding these absurdities.
If hberty consists, as Dr. WHiTBvhimself says, ina man's
doing vjhat he will ; and a man exercises this liberty, not only
in external actions, but in the acts of the will themselves ;
then so far as liberty is exercised in the latter, it consists in
willing what he wills ; and if any say so, one of these two
things must be meant, either, 1. That a man has power to will,
* Ibid. p. 342. 1 Ibid. p. 360. j: Ibid. 363.
II In his Book on the five Points, Second Edit. p. 369, 370.

62 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. PART II.
as he does will ; because what he wills, he wills ; and therefore
power to will what he has power to will. If this be their
meaning, then all this mighty controversy about freedom of
the will and self-determining power, comes wholly to nothing;
all that is contended for being no more than this, that the mind
of man does what it does, and is the subject of what it is the
subject, or that what is, is ; wherein none has any controversy
with them. Or, 2. The meaning riiiust be, that a man has
power to will as he chooses to will : that is, he has power by
one act of choice, to choose another ; by an antecedent act of
will to choose a consequent act ; and therein to execute his
own choice. And if this be their meaning, it is nothing but
shuffling with those they dispute with, and baffling their own
reason. For still the question returns, wherein lies man's
liberty in that antecedent act of will which chose the conse
quent act. The answer according to the same principles must
be, that his liberty in this also lies in his willing as he would,
or as he chose, or agreeable to another act of choice preceding
that. And so the question returns in infinitum, and the lik^
answer must be made in infinitum : in order to support their
opinion, there must be no beginning, but free acts of will must
have been chosen by foregoing free acts of will in the soul of
every man, without beginning.

SECT. VI..
Concerning the Will determining in Things whicii are perfectly
indifferent, in the View of the Mind.
A great argument for self-determining power, is the sup
posed experience we universally have of an ability to deter
mine our Wills, in cases wherein no prevailing motive is
presented : the Will, as is supposed, has its choice to make
between two or more things, that are perfectly equal in the
view of the mind ; and the Will is apparently altogether in
different ; and yet we find no difficulty in coming to a choice ;
the Will can instantly determine itself to one, by a sovereign
power which it has over itself, without being moved by any
preponderating inducement.
Thus the fore-mentioned author of an Essay on the Free-;
dom of the Will, ^c. (p. 25, 26, 27.) supposes, " That there
are many instances, wherein the Will is determined neither by
present uneasiness, nor by the greatest apparent good, nor by
the last dictate of the understanding, nor by any thing else,
but merely by itself, as a sovereign self-determining power of
the soul ; and that the soul does not will this or that action, in
some cases, by any other influence but because it will. Thus

Sect. VI. Of choosing in Things indifferent. 63
says he, I can turn my face to the South, or the North ; I can
point with my finger upward or downward. — And thus, in
some cases, the Will determines itself in a very sovereign
manner, because it will, without a reason borrowed from the
understanding : and hereby it discovers its own perfect power
of choice, rising from within itself, and free from all influence
or restraint of any kind." And (p. 66, 70, 73, 74,) this author
very expressly supposes the Will in many cases to be deter
mined by no motive at all, and acts altogether without motive,
or ground of preference. — Here I would observe,
1. The very supposition which is here made, directly
contradicts and overthrows itself. For the thing supposed,
wherein this grand argument consists, is, that among several
things the Will actually chooses one before another, at the
same time that it is perfectly indifferent ; which is the very
same thing as to say, the mind has a preference, at the same
time that it has no preference. What is meant cannot be, that
the mind is indifferent before it comes to have a choice, or until
it has a preference ; for certainly this author did not imagine
he had a controversy with any person in supposing this. Be
sides, it appears in fact, that the thing which he supposes, is —
not that the Will chooses one thing before another, concerning
which it is indifferent before it chooses, but that the will is in
different when it chooses ; and that it being otherwise than
indifferent is not until afterwards, in consequence of its choice;
that the chosen thing appearing preferable, and more agree
able than another, arises from its choice already made. His
words are (p. 30.) " Where the objects which are proposed,
appear equally fit or good, the Will is left without a guide or
director ; and therefore must take its own choice, by its own
determination; it being properly a self-determining power.
And in such cases the will does as it were make a good to
itself by its own choice, i. e. creates its own pleasure or delight
in this self-chosen good. Even as a man by seizing upon a
spot of unoccupied land, in an uninhabited country, makes it
his own possession and property, and as such rejoices in it.
Where things were indifferent before, the will finds nothing
to make them more agreeable, considered merely in them
selves, but the pleasure it feels arising from its own choice,
and its perseverance therein. We love many things which we
have chosen, and purely because we chose them."
This is as much .as to say, that we first begin to prefer
many things, purely because we have preferred and chosen
them before. — These things must needs be spoken inconside
rately by this author. Choice or preference cannot be before
itself in the same instance, either in the order of time or
nature : It cannot be the foundation of itself, or the conse-
/]uence of itself. The very act of choosing one thing rather

64 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. PART II,
than another, is preferring that thing, and that is setting a
higher value on that thing. But that the mind sets a higher
value on one thing than another, is not, in the first place, the
fruit of its setting a higher value on that thing.
This author says, (p. 36.) " The will may be perfectly
indifferent, and yet the will may determine itself to choose one
or the other." And again, in the same page, " I am entirely
indifferent to either ; and yet my Will may determine itself
to choose." And again, " Which I shall choose must be de
termined by the mere act of my will." If the choice is deter
mined by a mere act of Will, thert the choice is determined
by a mere act of choice. And concerning tbis matter, viz.
That the act of the Will itself is determined by an act of
choice, this writer is express, (p. 72,) Speaking of the case,
where there is no superior fitness in objects presented, he has
these words : " There it must act by .its own choice, and
determine itself as it pleases," Where it is supposed that
the very determination, which is the ground and spring of the
Will's act, is an act of choice and pleasure, wherein one act is
more agreeable than another ; and this preference and superior
pleasure is the ground of all it does in the case. And if so,
the mind is not indifferent when it determines itself, but had
rather determine itself one way than ariother. And therefore
the Will does riot act at all in indifference ; not so much as in
the first step it takes. If it be possible for the understanding.
to act in indifference, yet surely the Will never does ; be
cause the Will beginning to act is the very same thing as it
beginning to choose or prefer. And if in the very first act of
the Will, the mind prefers something, then the idea of that
thing preferred, does at that time preponderate, or prevail in
the mind : or, which is the same thing, the idea of it has ,a
prevailing influence on the Will. So that this wholly destroys
the thing supposed, viz. That the mind can by a sovereign
power choose one of two or more things, which in the view of
the mind are, in every respect, perfectly equal, one of which
does not at all preponderate, nor has any prevailing influence
on the mind above another.
So that this author, in his grand aJ•g^lment for the ability
of the Will to choose one of twO or more things, concerning
« which it is perfectly indifferent, does at the same time, in
effect, deny the thing he supposes, even that the Will, in
choosing, is subject to no prevailing influence of the view of
the thing chosen. And indeed it is impossible to offer this
argument without overthrowing it ; the thing supposed in it
being that which denies itself. To suppose the Will to act at
all in a state of perfect indifference, is to assert that the mind
chooses without choosing. To say that when it is indifferent,
it can do as it pleases, is to say that it can follow its pleasure,

Sect, vi. Of choosing in things Indifferent, 65
when it has no pleasure to follow. And therefore if there be
any difficulty in the instances of two cakes, or two eggs, &c.
vvhich are exactly alike, one as good as another ; concerning
which this author supposes the mind in fact has a choice, and
so in effect supposes that it has a preference ; it as much con
cerned himself to solve the difficulty, as it does those whom
he opposes. For if these instances prove any thing to his
purpose, they prove that a man chooses without choice. And
yet this is not to his purpose ; because if this is what he
asserts, his own words are as much against hira, and does as
much contradict him, as the words ofthose he disputes against
Can do. 2. There is no great difficulty in shewing, in such in
stances as are alledged, not only that it must needs be so, that
the mind must be influenced in its choice by something that
has a pieponderating influence upon it, but also how it is so.
A little attention to our own experience, and a distinct consi
deration of the acts of our own minds, in such cases, will be
sufficient to clear up the matter.
Thus, supposing I have a chess-board before me ; and
because I am required by a superior, or desired by a friend,
or on some other consideration, I am determined to touch some
one of the spots or squares on tha board with my finger. Not
being lihiited or directed, in the first proposal, to any one io
particular ; and there being nothing in the squares, in them
selves considered, that recommends any one of all the sixty-
four, more than another ; in this case, my mind determines to
give itself up to what is vulgarly called accident,* by deter
mining to touch that square which happens to be most in
view, which my eye is especially upon at that moment, or
which happens to be then most in my mind, or which I shall
be directed to by some other such like accident. Here are
several steps of the mind proceeding (though all may be done,
as it were, in a moment) the first step is its general determina
tion that it will touch one of the squares. The next step is
another general determination to give itself up to accident, in
some certain way ; as to touch that which shall be most in the
eye or mind at that time, or to some other such like accident.
The third and last step is a particular determination to touch
a certain individual spot, even that square, which by that
sort of accident the mind has pitched upon, has actually offer
ed itself beyond others. Now it is apparent that in none of
these several steps does the m.ind proceed in absolute indif-
* I have elsewhere observed, what that is which is vulgarly cuMed accident ;
that is nothing akin to the Arminian metaphysical notion of contingence, or somo-
tliing not connected with any thing foregoing ; but that it is something thgt
comes to pass in the course of thinga, unforese'on by men, aYid not owing to their
design. VOL. II. 9

66 freedom of the will. Part il.
ference, but in each of them is influenced by a preponderat
ing inducement. So it is in the first step, the mind's general
determination to touch one of the sixty-four spots : the mind
is not absolutely indifferent whether it does so or no ; it is in
duced to it, for the sake of making some experiment, or by
the desire of a friend, or some other motive that prevails. So
it is in the second, step, the mind determining to give itself up
to accident, by touching that which shall be most in the eye,
or the idea of which shall be most prevalent in the mind, fee.
The mind is not absolutely indifferent whether it proceeds
by this rule or no ; but chooses it, because it appears at that
time a convenient and requisite expedient in order to fulfil
the general purpose. And so it is in the third and last step,
which is determining to touch that individual spot which ac
tually does prevail in the mind's view. The mind is not in
different concerning this ; but is influenced by a prevailing
inducement and reason ; which is, that this is a prosecution of
the preceding determination, which appeared requisite, and
was fixed before in the second step.
Accident will ever serve a man, without hindering a
moment in such a case. Among a number of objects in view,
one will prevail in the eye, or in idea beyond others. When
we have otir eyes open in the clear sun-shine, many objects
strike the eye at once, and innumerable images may be at
once painted in it by the rays of light ; but the attention of
the mind is not equal to several of them at once ; or if it be,
it does not continue so for any time. And so it is with respect
to the ideas of the mind in general : several ideas are not
in equal strength in the mind's view and notice at once ; or
at least, do not remain so for any sensible continuance.
There is nothing in the world more constantly varying, than
the ideas of the mind ; they do not remain precisely in the
same state for the least perceivable space of time ; as is evi
dent by this : — That all time is perceived by the mind, only
by the successive changes of its own ideas. Therefore
while the perceptions of the mind remain precisely in the
same state, there is no perceivable length of time, because
no sensible succession at all.
As the acts of the Will, in each step of the forementioned
precedure, do not come to pass without a particular cause,
but every act is owing to a pre,yailing inducement; so the
accident, as I have called it, or ithat which happens in the
unsearchable course of things, to which the mind yields it
self, and by which it is guided, is not any thing that comes
to pass without a cause. The mind in determining to be
guided by it, is not determined by something that has no
cause ; any more than if it be determined to be guided by a
lot, or the casting of a die. For though the die falling in such

Sect. vi. Of choosing of Things indifferent. 67
a manner be accidental to him that casts it, yet none will sup
pose that there is no cause why it falls as it does. The invol
untary changes in the succession of our ideas, though the cause
may not be observed, have as much a cause, as the changea
ble motions ofthe motes that fioat in the air, or the continual,
infinitely various, successive changes of the unevennesses on
the surface of the water.
There are two things especially, which are probably the
occasions of confusion in the minds of them who insist upon
it, that the will acts in a proper indifference, and without being
moved by any inducement, in its determinations in such cases
as have been mentioned.*
1. They seem to mistake the point in question, or at least
not to keep it distinctly in view. The question they dispute
about, is. Whether the mind be indifferent about the objects
presented, one of which is to be taken, touched, pointed to,
fee. as tvvo eggs, two cakes, which appear equally good.
Whereas the question to be considered, is, Whether the per
son be indifferent with respect to his own actions ; whether he
does not, on some consideration or other, prefer one act with
respect to these objects before another. The mind in its de
termination and choice, in these cases, is not most immediately
and directly conversant about the objects presented ; but the
acts to be done concerning these objects. Thc objects may
appear equal, and the mind may never properly make any
choice between them ; but the next act of the Will being about
the external actions to be performed, taking, touching, fec-
these may not appear equal, and one action may properly be
chosen before another. In each step of the mind's progress,
the determination is not about the objects, unless indirectly
and improperly, but about the actions, which it chooses for
other reasons than any preference of the objects, and for rea
sons not taken at all from the objects.
There is no necessity of supposing, that the mind does
ever at all properly choose one of the objects before another ;
either before it has taken, or afterwards. Indeed the man
chooses to take or touch one rather than another ; but not be
cause it chooses the thing taken, or touched ; but from foreign
considerations. The case may be so, that of two things offered,
a man may, for certain reasons, prefer taking that which he
undervalues, and choose to neglect that which his mind pre-
* The reader is particularly requested to give due attention to these two re
marks, especially the former, as being of the utmost importance in the controversy.
If he be pleased to examine, with this view, the most popular advocates for the
Uberty of indifference, he will find them continually confounding the objects of
choice, and the acts of choice. When they have shewn, with much plausibility,
that there is no perceivable difference, or ground of choice, in the o6;ecb, they has
tily infer the same indiflerence as applicable to the atis of choice. W.

68 FREEDOM OF THE WILL, pAHT It.
fer6. In such a case, choosing the thing taken, and choosing
to take, are diverse : and so they are in a case where the
things' presented are equal in the "mind's esteem, and neither
of them preferred. All that fact and experience makes evi
dent, is, that the mind chooses one action rather than another.
And therefore the arguments which they bring, in order to be
to their purpose, should be to prove that the mind chooses the
action in perfect indifference, with respect to that action ; and
not to prove that the mind chooses the action in perfect indif
ference with respect to the object ; which is vefy possible, and
yet the will not act at all without prevalent inducement, and
proper preponderation.
2. Another reason of confusion and difficulty in this mat
ter, seems to be, not distinguishing between a general indif
ference, or an indifference with respect to what is to be done
in a more distant and general view of it, and a particular indif
ference, or an indifference with respect to the next immediate
act, viewed with its particular and present cirqumstances. A
man may be perfectly indifferent with respect to his own
actions, in the former respect ; and yet not in the latter. Thus
in the foregoing instance of touching one of the squares of a
chess-board ; when it is first proposed that I should touch one
of them, I may be perfectly indifferent which I touch ; be
cause as yet I view the matter remotely and generally, being
but in the first step of the mind's progress in the affair. But
yet, when I am actually come to the last step, and the very
next thing to be determined is which is to be touched, having
already determined that 1 will touch that which happens to be
most in my eye or mind, and my mind being now fixed on a
particular one, the act of touching that, considered thus im
mediately, and in these particular present circumstances, is
not what my mind is absolutely indifferent about.

SECT. VH.
Concerning the notion of Liberty of Will, consisting in Indif
ference.
What has been said in the foregoing section, has a ten
dency in some measure to evince the absurdity of the opinion
of such as place Liberty in Indifference, or in that equilibrium
whereby the Will is without all antecedent bias ; that the
determination of the Will to either side may be entirely from
Itself, and that it may be owing only to its own power, and

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Sect. VII. Of Liberty of Indifference. $9
the sovereignty which it has over itself, that it goes this way
rather than that.*
But in as much as this has been of such long standing,
and has been so generally received, and so much insisted on
by Pelagians, Semi- Pelagians, Jesuits, Socinians, Arminians,
and others, it may deserve a more full consideration. And
therefore I shall now proceed to a more particular and thorough
enquiry into this notion.
Now lest some should suppose that I do not understand
those that place Liberty in Indifference, or should charge me
with misrepresenting their opinion, I would signify, that I
am sensible, there are some, who, when they talk of Liberty
of the WiU as consisting in Indifference, express themselves
as though they would not be understood to mean the In
difference of the inclination or tendency of the will, but an
Indifference of the soul's power of wilhng ; or that the Will,
with respect to its power or ability to choose, is indifferent,
can go either way indifferently, either to the right hand or
left, either act or forbear to act, one as well as the other.
This indeed seems to be a refining of some particular writers
only, and newly invented, which will by no means consist with
the manner of expression used by the defenders of Liberty
of Indifference in general. I wish such refiners would
thoroughly consider, whether they distinctly know their own
meaning, when they make a distinction between an Indiffer
ence of the soul as to its power or ability of choosing, and
the soul's Indifference as to the preference or choice itself;
and whether they do not deceive themselves in imagining that
they have any distinct meaning at afl. The indifference of
the soul as to its ability or power to will, must be the same
thing as the Indifference of the state of the power or faculty
of the Will, or the Indifference of the state which the soul
itself, which has that power or faculty, hitherto remains in,
* Dr. Whitby, and some other Arminians, make a distinction of different
kinds of freedom; one of God, and perfect spirits above; another of persons in a
state of trial. The former Dr. Whitby allows to consist with necessity ; the
latter he holds to be without necessity : and this latter he supposes to be requisite
to our being the subject of praise or dispraise, rewards or punishments, precepts
and prohibitions, promises and threats, exhortations and dehortations, and a cove
nant-treaty. And to this freedom he supposes Indifference to be requisite. In
his Discourse on the five points, (p. 299, 300) he says ; " It is a freedom (speak
ing of a freedom not only from co-action, but from necessity) requisite, as we con
ceive, to render us capalile of trial or probation, and to render our actions worthy
of praise or dispraise, and our persons of rewards or punishments." And in the
next page, speaking ofthe sarae matter, he says, " Excellent to this purpose, are
the words of Mr. Thorndake : We say not, that InSfference is requisite to <M freedom,
b-wt to the freedom of man alone in this state of travail, and profixience; the ground of
luhich is God's tender of a treaty, and conditions of peace and reconcilement to fallen
man, together with those precepts and prohibitions, those promises tend threats, those eat-
hortati<rns wind dehortatUm.s, it is enforced -with."

70 freedom of the will. Part ii.
as to the exercise of that power, in the choice it shall by and
by make. But not to insist any longer on the inexplicable abstruse-
ness of this distinction ; let what will be supposed concerning
the meaning of them that use it, thus much must at least be
intended by Arminians when they talk of Indifference as
essential to Liberty of Will, if they intend any thing, in any
respect to their purpose, viz. That it is such an Indifference as
leaves the Will not determined already ; but free from actual
possession, and vacant of predetermination, so far, that there
may be room for the exercise of the self-determining power of
the Will ; and that the Will's freedom consists in, or depends
upon this vacancy and opportunity that is left for the Will itself
to be the determiner of the act that is to be the free act.
And here I would observe in the first place, that to make
out this scheme of Liberty, the Indifference must be perfect
and absolute ; there must be a perfect freedom from all ante
cedent preponderation or inclination. Because if the Will be
already inclined, before it exerts its own sovereign power on
itself, then its inchnation is not wholly owing to itself: if
when two opposhes are proposed to the soul for its choice, the
proposal does not find the soul wholly in a state of Indiffer
ence, then it is not found in a state of Liberty for mere self-
determination. — The least degree of an antecedent bias must
be inconsistent with their notion of Liberty. For so long as
prior inclination possesses the will, and is not removed, the
former binds the latter, so that it is utterly impossible that the
Will should act otherwise than agreeably to it. Surely the
Will cannot act or choose contrary to a remaining prevailiiig
inclination of the Will. To suppose otherwise, would be the
same thing as to suppose that the Will is inclined contrary to
its present prevailing inclination, or contrary to what it is
inclined to. That which the Will prefers, to that, all things
considered, it preponderates and inclines. It is equally im
possible for the Will to choose contrary to its own remaining
and present preponderating inclination, as it is to prefer con
trary to its own present preference, or choose contrary to its
own present choice. The Will, therefore, so long as it is
under the influence of an old preponderating inclination, is not
at Liberty for a new free act ; or any, that shall now be an act
of self-determination. That which is a self-determined free
act, must be one which the will determines in the possession
and use of a pecuhar sort of Liberty ; such as consists in a
freedom from every thing, which, if it were there, would make
it impossible that the Will, at that time, should be otherwise
than that way to which it tends.*
* There is a little intricacy in this mode of expression. It may be thus illus-
ated. Suppose it were asserted, " That it is impossible for the will to be other-

Sect, viu Of Liberty of Indifference. 71
If any one should say, there is no need that the Indiffer
ence should be perfect ; but although a former inclination
still remains, yet, if it be be not very strong, possibly the
strength of the Will may oppose and overcome it : — This is
grossly absurd ; for the strength of the Will, let it be never so
great,,gives it no such sovereignty and command, as to cause
itself to prefer and not to prefer at the same time, or to choose
contrary to its own present choice.
Therefore, if there be the least degree of antecedent
preponderation of the Will, it must be perfectly abolished,
before the Will can be at liberty to determine itself the con
trary way. And if the Will determines itself the same way,
it was not a free determination, because the Will is not wholly
at Liberty in so doing ; its determination is not altogether
from itself, but it was partly determined before, in its prior
inchnation : and all the Freedom the Will exercises in the
case, is in an increase of inclination, which it gives itself,
added to what it had by a foregoing bias ; so much is from
itself, and so much is from perfect Indifference. For though
the Will had a previous tendency that way, yet as to that
additional degree of inchnation, it had no tendency. There
fore the previous tendency is of no consideration, with respect
to the act wherein the Will is free. So that it comes to the
same thing which was said at first, that as to the aCt of the
Will, wherein the Will is free, there must be perfect Indiffer
ence, ox equilibrium.
To illustrate this : suppose a sovereign self-moving power
in a natural body ; but that the body is in motion already, by
an antecedent bias ; for instance, gravitation towards the
centre of the earth ; and has one degree of motion by virtue
of that previous tendency ; but by its self-moving power it
adds one degree more to its motion, and moves so much more
swiftly towards the centre of the earth than it would do by its
gravity only : it is evident, all that is owing to a self moving
power in this case, is the additional degree of motion ; and that
the other degree which it had from gravity, is of no considerar
tion in the case ; the effect is just the same, as if tho body had
received from itself oiie degree of motion from a state of perr
feet rest. So, if we suppose a self-moving power given to the
scale of a balance, which has a weight of one degree beyond
the opposite scale ; and if we ascribe to it an ability to add to
itself another degree of force the same way, by its self-mov-
wiseat any one given time, than that way to which it tends." Such a proposi
tion one might thinlt, none who understood the terms would controvert; for it
would be to controvert this proposition, " The will is a9 its tendency." And yet,
the advocates for a self-deternuning power must assert a liberty which denies tljis
plain proposition. W.

7^ FREEDOM OF THE WILL. PaRT II.
ing- power; this is just the same thing as to ascribe to it a
power to give itself one degree of preponderation from a perfect
equilibrium ; and so much power as the scale has to give itself
an over-balance from a perfect equipoise, so much self-moving
self-preponderating power it has, and no more So that -its
free power this way is always to be measured from perfect equi
librium. ',
I need say no more to prove, that if Indifference be es
sential to Liberty, it must be perfect Indifference ; and that
so far as the Will is destitute of this, so far is it destitute of
that freedom by which it is in a capacity of being its own
determiner, without being at all passive, or subject to the
power and sway of something else in its motions and deter
minations. Having, observed these things, let us now try whether this
notion of the Liberty of Will consisting in Indifference and
equilibrium, and the Will's self-determination in such a state,
be not absurd and inconsistent.
And here I would lay down this as an axiom of undoubt
ed truth ; that every free act is done in a state of freedom, and
not only after such a state. If an act of the Will be an act
wherein the soul is free, it must be exerted in a state of free-.
dom, and in the time of freedom. It will not suffice, that the
act immediately follows a state of Liberty ; but Liberty must
yet continue, and co-exist with the act ; the soul remaining in
possession of Liberty. Because that is the notion of a free
act of the soul, even an act wherein the soul uses or exercises
Liberty. But if the soul is not, in the very time of the act,
in the possession of Liberty, it cannot at that time be in the
Mse of it.
Now the question is, whether ever the soul of man puts*-'
forth an act of Will, while it yet remains in a state of Liberty,
viz. as implying a state of Indifference ; or whether the soul
ever exerts an act of preference, while at that very time the
Will is in a perfect equilibrium, not inclining one way more
than another. The very putting of the question is sufficient
to show the absurdity of theaffirmative answer; for how ridi
culous would it be for any body to insist, that the soul chooses
one thing before another, when at the very same instan^ it
is perfectly indifferent with respect to each I This is the
same thing as to say, the soul prefers one thing to another,
at the very same time that it has no preference. — Choice and
preference can no more be in a state of Indifference, than
motion can be in a state of rest, or than the preponderation
of the scale of a balance can be in a state of equilibrium. —
Motion may be the next moment after rest ; but cannot co
exist with it, in any, everi the least part of it. So choice may
be immedig.tely after a state of Indifference, but cannot co?

Sect. vii. Of Liberty of Indifference. 73
exist with it : even the very beginning of it is not in a state
of Indifference. And therefore if this be Liberty, no act of
the Will, in any degree, is ever performed in a state of
Liberty, or in the time of Liberty. Volition and Liberty
are so far from agreeing together, and being essential one
to another, that they are contrary one to another, and
one excludes and destroys the other, as much as motion
and rest, light and darkness, or life and death. So that
the Will acts not at all, does not so much as begin to act
in the time of such Liberty : freedom has ceased to be, at
the first moment of action ; and therefore Liberty cannot
reach the action, to affect, or qualify it, or give it a deno
mination, any more than if it had ceased to be, twenty years
before the action began. The moment that Liberty ceases
to be, it ceases to be a quahficafion of any thing. If light
and darkness succeed each other instantaneously, light quali
fies nothing after it is gone out, to make any thing lightsome
or bright, at the first moment of perfect darkness, any more
than months or years after. Life denominates nothing vital,
at the first moment of perfect death. So freedom, if it con
sists in, or implies Indifference, can denominate nothing_/ree,
at the first moment of preference or preponderation. There
fore it is manifest, that no Liberty which the soul is possessed
of, or ever uses, iri any of its acts of volition, consists in Indif
ference ; and that the opinion of such as suppose, that Indif
ference belongs' to the very essence of Liberty, is to the highest
degree absurd and contradictory.
If any one should imagine, that this manner of arguing
is nothing but a' trick and delusion ; and to evade the reason
ing, should say, that the thing wherein the will exercises its
Liberty, is not in the act of choice or preponderation itself,
but in determining itself to a certain choice or preference :
that the act of the Will, wherein it is free, and uses its own
sovereignty, consists in its causing or determining the change
or transition from a state of Indifference to a certain prefer
ence or determining to give a certain turn to the balance,
which has hitherto been even ; and that the Will exerts this
act in a state of Liberty, or while thc Will yet remains in
equilibrium, and perfect master of itself. — I say, if any one
chooses to express his notion of Liberty, after this, or some
such manner, let us see if he can succeed any better than
before. What is asserted is, that the Will, while it yet remains
in perfect equilibrium, without preference, determines to
change itself from that state, and excite in itself a certain
choice or preference. Now let us see whether this does not
come to the same absurdity we had before. If it be so, that
the Will, while it yet remains perfectly indifferent, determines
Vol. n. 10

74 freedom of the will. Part ii.
to put itself out of that state, and to give itself a certain pre
ponderation ; then I would enquire, whether the soul does
not determine this of choice; or whether the Will coming to
a determination to do so, be not the same thing as the soul
coming to a choice todo so. If the soul does not determme
this of choice, or in the exercise of choice, then it does not
determine it voluntarily. And if the soul does not determine
it voluntarily, or of its own will, then in what sense does its
will determine it ? And if the will does not determine it, then
how is the Liberty of the Will exercised in the determination ?
What sort of Liberty is exercised by the soul in those deter
minations, wherein there is no exercise of choice, which are
not voluntary, and wherein the will is not concerned ? But if
it be allowed, that this determination is an act of choice, and
it be insisted on, that the soul, while it yet remains in a state of
perfect Indifference, chooses to put itself out of that state, and
to turn itself one way ; then the soul is already come to a
choice, and chooses that way. And so we have the very same
absurdity which we had before. Here is the soul in a state of
choice, and in a state of equilibrium, both at the same time :
the soul already choosing one way, while it remains in a state
of perfect Indifference, and has no choice of one way more
than the other. And indeed this manner of talking, though it
may a little hide the absurdity, in the obscurity of expression,
increases the inconsistence. To say, the free act of the will, or
the act which the will exerts in a state of freedom and Indiffe
rence, does not imply preference in it, but is what the will
does in order to cause or produce a preference, is as much as
to say, the soul chooses (for to will and to choose are the same
thing) without choice, and prefers without preference, in order
to cause or produce the beginning of a preference, or the first
choice. And that is, that the first choice is exerted without
choice, in order to produce itself!
If any, to evade these things, should own, that a state of Li
berty and a state of Indifference, are not the same, and that the
former may be without the latter ; but should say, that Indiffe
rence is still essential to freedom, as it is necessary to go imme
diately before it ; it being essential to the freedom of an act of
will that it should directly and immediately arise out of a state
of Indifference : still this will not help the cause of Arminian
Liberty, or make it consistent with itself. For if the act springs
immediately out of a state of Indifference, then it does not
arise from antecedent choice or preference. But if the act
arises directly out of a state of Indifference, without any inter
vening choice to determine it, then the act not being deter
mined by choice, is not determined by the will; the mind
exercises no free choice in the affair, and free choice and free
vyill have no hand in the determination of the act. Which is

Sect. VII. Of Liberty of Indifference. 75
entirely inconsistent with their notion of the freedom of Vo
lition, If any should suppose, that these absurdities may be
avoided, by saying, that the Liberty of the mind consists in
a power to suspend the act of the will, and so keep it in a
state of Indifference, until there has been opportunity for con
sideration ; and so shall say, that however Indifference is not
essential to Liberty in such a manner, that the mind must
make its choice in a state of Indifference, which is an incon
sistency, or that the act of will must spring immediately out
of Indifference ; yet Indifference may be essential to the
Liberty of acts of the will in this respect ; viz. That Liberty
consists in a power of the mind to forbear or suspend the act
of Volition, and keep the mind in a state of Indifference for
the present, until there has been opportunity for proper deli
beration : 1 say, if any one imagines that this helps the matter,
it is a great mistake : it reconciles no inconsistency, and
relieves no difficulty, — For here the following things must be
observed, 1, That this suspending of Vohtion, if there be properly
any such thing, is itself an act of Volition. If the mind deter
mines to suspend its act, it determines it voluntarily ; it chooses
on some consideration, to suspend it. And this choice or
determination, is an act of the will : And indeed it is supposed
to be so in the very hypothesis ; for it is supposed that the
Liberty of the will consists in its Power to do this, and that its
doing it is the very thing wherein the will exercises its Liberty.
But how can the will exercise Liberty in it, if it be not an act
of the will ? The Liberty of the will is not exercised in any
thing but what the vvill does,
2, This determining to suspend acting is not only an act
ofthe will, but it is supposed to be the only free act ofthe will ;
because it is said, that this is the thing wherein the Liberty of
the will consists — If so, then this is all the act of will that
we have to consider in this controversy. And now, the former
question returns upon us ; viz. Wherein consists the freedom
of the will in those acts wherein it is free ? And if this act of
determining a suspension be the only act in which the will is
free, then wherein consists the will's freedom with respect to
this act of suspension ? And how is Indifference essential to
this act ? The answer must be, according to what is supposed
in the evasion under consideration, that the Liberty of the
will in this act of suspension, consists in a power to suspend
even this act, until there has been opportunity for thorough
deliberation. But this will be to plunge directly into the
grossest nonsense : for it is the act of suspension itself that we
are speaking of ; and there is no room for a space of delibera
tion and suspension in order to determine whether we will

76 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. PaRT II,
suspend or no. For that supposes, that even suspension itself
may be deferred : which is absurd ; for the very deferring the de
termination of suspension, to consider whether we will suspend
or no, will be actually suspending. For during the space of sus
pension, to consider whether to suspend, the act is, ipso facto,
suspended. There is no medium between suspending to act,
and immediately acting ; and therefore no possibihty of avoid
ing either the one or the other one moment.
A«d besides, this is attended with ridiculous absurdity
another way : for now, it seems. Liberty consists wholly in the
mind, having Power to suspend its determination whether to
suspend or no ; that there may be time for consideration, whe
ther it be best to suspend. And if Liberty consists in this
only, then this is the Liberty under consideration. We have
to enquire now, how Liberty, with respect to this act of sus
pending a determination of suspension, consists in Indifference,
or how Indifference is essential to it. The answer, according
to the hypothesis we are upon, must be, that it consists in a
Power of suspending even this last-mentioned act, to have
time to consider whether to suspend that. And then the same
difficulties and enquiries return over again with respect to that;
and so on for ever. Which, if it would shew any thing, would
shew only that there is no such thing as a free act. It drives
the exercise of freedom back in infinitum ; and that is to drive -
it out of the world.
And besides all this, there is a Delusion, and a latent
gross contradiction in the affair another way ; in as much as in
explaining how, or in what respect the will is free, with regard '
to a particular act of Volition, it is said, that its Liberty con
sists in a Power to determine to suspend that act, which places
Liberty not in that act of Volition vvhich the enquiry is about,
but altogether in another antecedent act. Which contradicts
vhe thing supposed in both the question and answer. The
question is, wherein consists the mind's Liberty in any particu
lar act of Volition ? And the answer, in pretending to shew
wherein lies the mind's Liberty in that act, in effect says, it
does not lie in that act at all, but in another, viz. a Volition
to suspend that act. And therefore the answer is both contra
dictory, and altogether impertinent and beside the purpose.
For it does not shew" wherein the Liberty of the will consists
in the act in question ; instead of that, it supposes it does not
consist in that act at all, but in another distinct from it, even a
Volition to suspend that act, and take time to consider of it.
And no account is pretended to be given wherein the mind is
free with respect to that act, wherein this answer supposes the
Liberty of the mind indeed consists, viz, the act of suspension,
or of determining the suspension.

Sect, vm. Of Liberty without Necessity. 77
On the whole, it is exceeding manifest, that the Liberty of
the mind does not consist in Indifference, and that Indifference
is not essential or necessary to it, or at all belonging to it, as
the Arminians suppose ; that opinion being full of nothing but
self-contradiction.

SECT, VIII.
Concerning the supposed Liberty of the Will, as opposite to all
Necessity.
It is chiefly insisted on by Arminians, in this controversy,
as a thing most important and essential in human Liberty, that
volitions, or the acts of the will, are contingent events ; under
standing contingence as opposite, not only to constraint, but
to all Necessity. Therefore I would particularly consider this
matter. And, First, I would enquire, whether there is, or can be
any such thing, as a volition which is contingent in such a
sense, as not only to come to pass without any Necessity of
constraint or co-action, but also without a Necessity of conse
quence, or an infallible connection with any thing foregoing, —
Secondly, Whether, if it were so, this would at all help the cause
of Liberty, I, I would consider whether volition is a thing that ever
does, or can come to pass, in this manner, contingently.
And here it must be remembered, that it has been already
shewn, that nothing .can ever come to pass without a cause,
or a reason, why it exists in this manner rather than another ;
and the evidence of this has been particularly applied to the
acts of the will. Now if this be so, it will demonstrably fol
low, that the acts of the will are never contingent, or without
Necessity in the sense spoken of; in as much as those things
which have a cause, or a reason of their existence, must be con
nected with their cause. This appears by the following consi
derations, 1, For an event to have a cause and ground of its exis
tence, and yet not to be connected with its cause, is an incon
sistence. For if the event be not connected with the cause,
it is not dependent on the cause ; its existence is as it were
loose from its influence, and may attend it, or may not; it
being a mere contingence, whether it follows or attends the
influence of the cause, or not : And that is the same thing as
not to be dependent on it. And to say, the event is not de
pendent on its cause, is absurd ; it is the same thing as to say,
it is not its catise, nor the event the effect of it ; for depen
dence on the influence of a cause is the very notion of an

78 FREEDOM OF THE WILL, ^^^''^ "•
effect. If there be no such relation between one thing^ and
another, consisting in the connection and dependence ot one
thing on the influence of another, then it is certain there is no
such relation between them as is signified by the terms cause
and effect. So far as an event is dependent on a cause, and
Qonnected with it, so much causahty is there in the case, and
no more. The cause 'does, or brings to pass, no more in any
event, than is dependent on it. If we say, the connection and
dependence is not total, but partial, and that the effect,
though it has some connection and dependence, yet is not
entirely dependent on it; that is the same thing as to say,
that not all that is in the event is an effect of that cause, but
that only part of it arises from thence, and part some other
way, 2, If there are some events which are not necessarily con
nected with their causes, then it will follow, that there are
some things which come to pass without any cause, contrary
to the supposition. For if there be any event which was not
necessarily connected with the influence of the cause under
such circumstances, then it was contingent whether it would
attend or follow the influence of the cause, or no ; it might
have followed, and it might not, when the cause was the
same, its influence the same, and under the same circum
stances. And if so, why did it follow, rather than not follow ?
Of this there is no cause or reason. Therefore here is some
thing without any cause or reason why. it is, viz. the follow
ing of the effect on the influence of the cause, with which
it was not necessarily connected. If there be no necessary
connection of the effect on any thing antecedent, then we
may suppose that sometimes the event will follow the cause,
and sometimes not, when the cause is the same, and in every
respect in the same state and circumstances. And what can
be the cause and reason of this strange phenomenon, even
this diversity, that in one instance, the effect should follovv,
in another not ? It is evident by the supposition, that this is
wholly without any cause or ground. Here is something in
the present manner of the existence of things, and state of the
world, that is absolutely without a cause. Which is contrary
to the supposition, and contrary to what has been before de
monstrated. 3. To suppose there are some events which have a
cause and ground of their existence, that yet are not neces
sarily connected with their cause, is to suppose that they have
a cause which is not their cause. Thus ; if the effect be not
necessarily connected with the cause, with its influence and
influential circumstances ; then, as I observed before, it is a
thing possible and supposable, that the cause may sometimes
exert the same influence, under the same circumstances, and

Sect. viii. Of Liberty without Necessity. 79
yet the effect not follow. And if this actually happens in any
instance, this instance is a proof, in fact, that the influence
of the cause is not sufficient to produce the effect. For if it
had been sufficient, it would have done it. And yet, by the
supposition, in another instance, the same cause, with per
fectly the same influence, and when all circumstances which
have any influence, are the same, it was followed with the ef
fect. By which it is manifest, that the effect in this last
instance was not owing to the influence ofthe cause, but must
come to pass some other way. For it was proved before, that
the influence of the cause was not sufficient to produce the
effect. And if it was not sufficient to produce it, then the
production of it could not be owing to that influence, but
must be owing to something else, or owing to nothing. And
if the effect be not owing to the influence of the cause, then
it is not the cause. Which brings us to the contradiction of
a cause, and no cause, that which is the ground and reason of
the existence of a thing, and at the same time is not the
ground and reason of its existence.
If the matter be not already so plain as to render any
further reasoning upon it impertinent, I would say, that which
seems to be the cause in the supposed case, can be no cause ;
its power and influence having, on a full trial, proved insuffi
cient to produce such an effect : and if it be not sufficient to
produce it, then it does not produce it. To say other
wise, is to say, there is power to do that which there is not
power to do. If there be in a cause sufficient power exerted,
and in circumstances sufficient to produce an effect, and so
the effect be actually produced at one time ; all these things
concurring, will produce the effect at all times. And so we
may turn it the other way ; that which proves not sufficient at
one time, cannot be sufficient at another, with precisely the
same influential circumstances. And therefore if the effect
follows, it is not owing to that cause ; unless the different
time be a circumstance which has influence : but that is con
trary to the supposition ; for it is supposed that all circum
stances that have influence, are the same. And besides, this
would be to suppose the time to be the cause ; which is con
trary to the supposition of the other thing being the cause.
But if nSerely diversity of time has no influence, then it is evi
dent that it is as much of an absurdity to say, the cause was
sufficient to produce the effect at one time, and not at another ;
as to say, that it is sufficient to produce the etfect at a certain
time, and yet not sufficient to produce the same effect at the
same time.
On the whole, it is clearly manifest, that every effect has
a necessary connection with its cause, or with that which is
the true ground and reason of its existence. And, therefore.

80 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. PaRT II.
if there be no event without a cause, as was proved before,
then no event whatsoever is contingent, in the manner that
Arminians suppose the free acts of the will to be contingent.

SECT, IX.
Ofthe Connection of the Acts ofthe Will with the Dictates of
the Understanding.
It is manifest, that no Acts of the Will are contingent, in
such a sense as to be without all necessity, or so as not to be
necessary with a necessity of consequence and Connection ;
because every Act of the Will is some way connected with
the Understanding, and is as the greatest apparent good, is, in
the manner which has already been explained ; namely, that
the soul always wills or chooses that which in the present
view of the mind, considered in the whole of that view, and all
that belongs to it, appears most agreeable. Because, as was
observed before, nothing is more evident than that, when
men act voluntarily, and do what they please, then they do
what appears most agreeable to them ; and to say otherwise, '.,
would be as much as to affirm, that men do not choose what,
appears to suit them best, or what seems most pleasing to them ;
or that they do not choose what they prefer. Which brings
the matter to a contradiction.
And as it is very evident in itself, that the Acts of the
Will have some Connection with the dictates or views of the
Understanding, so this is allowed by some of the chief of the
Arminian writers ; particularly by Dr. Whitby and Dr.
Samuel Clark, Dr, Turnbull, though a great enemy to j
the doctrine of necessity, allows the same thing. In his
Christian Philosophy, (p, 196.) he with much approbation
cites another philosopher, as of the same mind, in these words : ?
" No man, (says an excellent philosopher) sets himself about
any thing, but upon some view or other, which serves him for
a reason for what he does ; and whatsoever faculties he employs,
the Understanding, with such light as it has, well or ill formedj ; .
constantly leads ; and by that light, true or false, all her opera
tive powers are directed. The Will itself, how absolute and in-
controllable soever it may be thought, never fails in its obedi
ence to the dictates ofthe Understanding. Temples have their
sacred images ; and we see what influence they have always
had over a great part of mankind ; but in truth, the ideas and
images in men's minds are the invisible powers that constantly
govern them ; and to these they all pay universally a ready sub
mission." But whether this be in a just consistence with them-

Sect, ix, WiU connected with Understandim'. 81

-a •

selves, and their own notions of liberty, I desire may now be
impartially considered.
Dr. Whitbv plainly supposes, that the Acts and Deter
minations of the Will alvyays follow the Understanding's view
of the greatest good to be obtained, or evil to be avoided ; or,
in other words, that the Determinations of the Will constantly
and infallibly follow these two things in the Understanding :
1. The degree of good to be obtained, and evil to be avoided,
proposed to the Understanding, and apprehended, viewed, and
taken notice of by it. 2. The degree of the Understanding's
apprehension of that good or evil ; which is increased by at
tention and consideration. That this is an opinion in which
he is exceeding peremptory, (as he is in every opinion which
he maintains in his controversy with the Calvinists) with dis
dain of the contrary opinion, as absurd and self-contradictory,
vvill appear by the following words, in his Discourse on tne
Five Points,*
" Now, it is certain, that what naturally makes the Under
standing to perceive, is evidence proposed, and apprehended,
considered or adverted to : for nothing else can be requisite
to make us come to the knowledge of the truth. Again,
what makes the Will cfioose, is something approved by the
Understanding ; and consequently appearing to the soul as
good. And whatsoever it refuseth, is something represented
by the Understanding, and so appearing to the Will, as evil.
Whence all that God requires of us is and can be only this ; to
refuse the evil, and choose the good. Wherefore, to say that
evidence proposed, apprehended and considered, is not suffi
cient to make the Understanding approve ; or that the greatest
good proposed, the greatest evil threatened, when equally be
lieved and reflected on, is not sufficient to engage the Will to
choose the good and refuse the evil, is in effect to say, that
which alone doth move the Will to choose or to refuse, is not
sufficient to engage it so to do ; which being contradictory to
itself, must of necessity be false. Be it then so, that we natu--
rally have an aversion to the truths proposed to us in the gosr
pel: that only can make us indisposed to attend to them, but
cannot hinder our conviction when we do apprehend them, and
attend to them, — Be it, that there is in us also a renitency to
the good we are to choose ; that only can indispose us to be
lieve it is, and to approve it as our chiefest good. Be it, that
we are prone to the evil that we should decline ; that only can
render it the more difficult for us to believe it is the worst of
evils. But yet, what we do really believe to be our chiefest
good, will still be chosen ; and what we apprehend to be the
worst of etJtZs, will, whilst we do continue under that conviction.)
.* Second Edit. p. 211, 312, 213^
Vol. II. II

82 freedom of the will. Part ij,
be refused by us. It therefore can be only requisite, in order
to these ends, that the Good Spirit should so illuminate our
Understandings, that we attending to, and considering what
lies before us, should apprehend, and be convinced of our duty;
and that the blessings of the gospel should be so propounded to
us, as that we may discern them to be our chiefest good ; and
the miseries it threateneth, so as we may be convinced that they
are the worst of evils ; that we may choose the one, and refuse
the other." Here let it be observed, how plainly and peremptorily it
is asserted, that the greatest good proposed, and the greatest evil
threatened, when equally believed and refiected on, is sufficient to
engage the Will to choose the good, and refuse the evil, and is
that alone ivhich doth move the Will to choose or to refuse ; and
that it is contradictory to itself, to suppose otherwise ; and there
fore must of necessity be false ; and then what we do really be
lieve to be our chiefest good will still be chosen, and what we ap
prehend to be the worst of evils, will, whilst we continue vnder
that conviction, be refused by us. Nothing could have been
said more to the purpose, fiilly to-signify, that the determina
tions of the Will must evermore follow the illun\ination, con
viction and notice of the Understanding, with regard to the
greatest good and evil proposed, reckoning both the degree of
good and evil understood, and the degree of Understanding,
notice and conviction of that proposed good and evil ; and that
it is thus necessarily, and can be otherwise in no instance : be
cause it is asserted, that it implies a contradiction, to suppose it
ever to be otherwise.
1 am sensible, the doctor's aim in these assertions is
against the Calvinists ; to show, in opposition to them, that
there is no need of any physical operation of the Spirit of God
on the Will, to change and determine that to a good choice,
but that God's operation and assistance is only moral, suggest
ing ideas to the Understanding; which he supposes to be
enough, if those ideas are attended to, infallibly to obtain the
end. But whatever his design was, nothing can more directly
and fully prove, that every determination of the Will, in
choosing and refusing, is necessary ; directly conirary to his
own notion of the liberty of the Will. For if the determina
tion of the Will, evermore, in this manner, follows the light,
conviction,, and view of the Understanding, concerning the
greatest good and evil, and this be that alone which moves the
Will, and it be a contradiction to suppose otherwise ; then it is
necessarily so, the Will necessarily folldws this light or vievy of
the Understanding, not only in some of its acts, but in every
act of choosing and refusing. So that the Will does not de?
termine itself, in any one of its own acts ; but every act of
choice and refusal depends on, and is necessarily connected

SlECT. IX. W^ill connected with Understafiding. 815

'£)•

with some antecedent cause ; which cause is not the Will it
self, nor any. act of its own, nor any thing pertaining to that
faculty, but something belonging to another faculty, whose acts
go before the Will, in all its acts, and govern and determine
them. Here, if it should be replied, that although it be true, that
according to the doctor, the final determination of the Will al
ways depends upon, and is infallibly connected with the Un
derstanding's conviction, and notice of the greatest good ; yet
the Acts ofthe Will are not necessary ; because that conviction
of the Understanding is first dependent on a preceding Act of
the Will, in determining to take notice ofthe evidence exhibit
ed ; by which means the mind obtains that degree of convictiori,
which is sufficient and effectual to determine the consequent
and ultimate choice ofthe Will ^ and that the Will, with regard
to that preceding act, whereby it determines whether to attend
or no, is not necessary ; and that in this, the liberty of the Will
consists, that when God holds forth sufficient objective -light,
the Will is at liberty whether to command the attention of the
mind to it or not.
Nothing can be more weak and inconsiderate than sUch
a reply as this. For that preceding Act of the Will, in deter
mining to attend and consider, still is an Act of the Will ; if the
Liberty of the Will consists in it, (as is supposed) as if it be
an Act of the Will, it is an act oi choice or refusal. And there
fore, if what the Doctor asserts be true, it is determined by
sorae antecedent light in the Understanding concerning the
greatest apparent good or evil. For he asserts, it is that light
which alone doth move the Will to choose or refuse. And there
fore the Will must be moved by that, in choosing to attend
to the objective light offered, in order to another consequent
act of choice : so that this act is no less necessary than the
other. And if we suppose another Act of the Will, still pre
ceding both these mentioned, to determine both, still that
also must be an Act of the Will, and an act of choice ; and
so must, by the sarae principles, be infallibly determined by
some certain degree of light in the Understanding concern
ing the greatest good. And let us suppose as many Acts of
the Will, one preceding another, as we please, yet are they
every one of them, necessarily determined by a certain degree
of light in the Understanding, concerning the greatest and
most eligible good in that case ; and so, not one of them free
according to Dr. Whitby's notion of freedom. ' And if it be
said, the reason why men do not attend to light held forth, is
because of ill habits contracted by evil acts committed be
fore, whereby their minds are indisposed to consider the ti'uth'
held forth to them, the difficulty is not at all avoided : still the
question returns, What determined the W^ill in those preced-

84 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. PaRT II.
ing evil acts t It must, by Di\ Whitby's principles, still be
the view of the Understanding concerning the greatest good
and evil. If this view of the Understanding be thdt alone which
doth move the Will to choose or refuse, as the Doctor asserts,
then every act of choice or refusal, from a man's first existence,
is moved and determined by this view ; and this view of the
Understanding exciting and governing the actj must be before
the act. And therefore the Will is necessarily determined, in
every one of its acts, from a man's first existence, by a cause
beside the Will, and a cause that does not proceed from, or de
pend on any act ofthe Will at all. Which at once utterly abo
lishes the Doctor's whole scheme of Liberty of Will ; and he,
at one stroke, has cut the sinews of all his arguments from the
goodness, righteousness, faithfulness and sincerity of God, in
his commands, promises, threatenings, calls, invitations, and
expostulations ; which he makes use of, under the heads of re
probation, election^ universal redemption, sufficient and effectual
grace, and the freedom of the Will of man ; and has made vairi
all his exclamatioiis against the doctrine of the Calvinists, as
charging God with manifest unrighteousness, unfaithfulness, hy
pocrisy, fallaciousness, and cruelty.
Dr. Samuel Clark, in his Demonstration of the Being
and Attributes of God,* to evade the argument to prove the
necessity of volition, from its necessary Connection with the
last dictate of thd Understanding, supposes the latter not to
be diverse from the Act of the Will itself. But if it be so,
it vvill not alter the case as to the necessity of the Act. If the
dictate of the Understanding be the very same with the de
termination of the Will, as Dr. Clark supposes, then this
determination is no fruit or effect of choice ; and if so, no li
berty of choice has any hand in it : it is necessary ; that is,
choice cannot prevent it. If the last dictate of the Understand
ing be the same With the deterinination of volition itself, then
the existence of that determination must be necessary as to vo
lition ; in. as much as volition can have no opportunity to deter
mine whether it shall exist or no, it having existence already
before volition has opportunity to determine any thing. It is
itself the very rise and existence of volition. But a thing, after
it exists, has no opportunity to determine as to its own existence {
it is too late for thati
If liberty consists in that which Arminians suppose, viz,
in the Will determining its own acts, having free opportunity
and being without all necessity ; this is the same as to say, that
liberty consists in the soul having power and opportunity to
have what determinations of the Will it pleases. And if tho
determinations of the Will, and the last dictates of the Un-
* Edit-. VI. p. 93.

Sect. ix. Will connected ivith Understanding. 85
derstanding, be the same thing, then Liberty consists in thc
mind having power and opportunity to choose its own dic
tates of Understanding. But this is absurd ; for it is to niake
the determination of choice prior to the dictate of Under
standing, and the ground of it ; which cannot consist with the
dictate of the Understanding being the determination of choice
itself. Here is no alternative, but to recur to the old absurdity
of one determination before another, and the cause of it ;
and another before, determining that ; and so on in infinitum.
If the last dictate of the Understanding be the determination
of the Will itself^ and the soul be free with regard to that
dictate, in the Arminian notion of freedom ; then the soul,
before that dictate of its Understanding exists, voluntarily
and according to its own choice determines, in every case,
what that dictate of the Understanding shall be; otherwise
that dictate^ as to the Will, is necessary ; and the acts deter
mined by it must also be necessary. So that here is a deter
mination of the mind prior to that dictate of the Understand
ing, an act of choice going before it, choosing and determin
ing what that dictate of the Understanding shall be : and this
preceding act of choice, being a free act of Will, must also be
the same with another last dictate of the Understanding : And
if the mind also be free in that dictate of Understanding, that
must be determined still by another ; and so on for ever.
Besides, if the dictate of the Understanding, and deter
mination of the Will be the same, this confounds tbe Under
standing and Will, and makes them the same. Whether
they be the same or no, I will not now dispute ; but only
would observe, that if it be so, and the Arminian notion of
liberty consists in a self-determining power in the Understand
ing, free of all necessity ; being independent, undetermined by
any thing prior to its own acts and determinations ; and the
more the Understanding is thus independent, and sovereign
over its own determinations, the more free : then the freedom
of the soul, as a moral agent, must consist in the independence
of the Understanding on any evidence or appearance of things,
or any thing whatsoever that stands forth to the view of the
mind, prior to the Understanding's determination. And what
a liberty is this 1 consisting in an ability, freedom and easiness
of judging, either according to evidence, or against it ; having
a sovereign command over itself at all times, to judge, either
agreeably or disagreeably to what is plainly exhibited to its
own view. Certainly, it is no liberty that renders persons the
proper subjects of persuasive reasoning, arguments, expostu
lations, and such like moral means and inducements. The
use of which with mankind is a main argument of the Armi
nians, to defend their notion of liberty without all necessity.

86 FREEDOM OP THE VVILL. PaRT ir.
For according to this, the more free men are, the less they are
under the governmerit of such means, less subject to the power
of evidence and reason, and more independent on their influ
ence, in their determinations.
And whether the Understanding and Will are the same
or no, as Dr. Clark seems to suppose, yet in order to main
tain the Arminian notion of hberty without necessity, the
free Will is not determined by the Understanding, nor ne
cessarily connected with the Understanding ; and the further
from such Connection, the greater the freedom. And when
the liberty is full and complete, the determinations of the Will
have no Connection at all with the dictates of the Understand
ing. And if so, in vain are all the applications to the Under
standing, in order to induce to any free virtuous act ; and so
in vain are all instructions, counsels, invitations, expostulations,
and all arguments and persuasives whatsoever : for these are
but applications to the Understanding, and a clear and lively
exhibition of the objects of choice to the mind's view. But
if, after all, the Will must be self-determined, and indepen
dent on the Understanding, to what purpose are things thus
represented to the Understanding, in order to determine the
choice 1

¦ SECT. X.
Volition necessarily connected ivith the Influence of Motives ;
with particular Observations on the great Inconsistence of
Mr. ChubVs Assertions and Reasonings, about the Free
dom of the Will.
That every act of the will has some cause, and coijse-
quently (by what has been already proved) has a necessary
connection with its cause, and so is necessary by a necessity
of connection and consequence, is evident by this, that every
act of the will whatsoever is excited by some motive : which is
manifest, because, if the mind, in willing after the manner it
does, is excited by no motive or inducement, then it has no
end which it proposes to itself, or pursues in so doing ; it aims
at nothing, and seeks nothing. And if it seeks nothing, then it
does not go after any thing, or exert any inclination or prefer
ence towards any thing. Which brings the matter to a con
tradiction ; because for the mind to will something, and for it
to go after something by an act of preference and inclination,
are the same thing.
But if every act of the will is excited by a Motive, then '
that Motive is the cause of the act. If the acts of the will are
excited by Motives, then Motives are the causes of theii*

Sect. x. Acts connected with Motives. 87
being excited ; or, which is the same thing, the cause of their
existence. And if so, the existence of the acts of the will is
properly the effect of their Motives. Motives do nothing, as
Motives or inducements, but by their influence ; and so much
as is done by their influence is the effect of them. For that is
the notion of an effect, something that is brought to pass by the
influence of something else.
And if volitions are properly the effects of their Motives,
then they are necessarily connected with their Motives, Every
effect and event being, as was proved before, necessarily con
nected with that which is the proper ground and reason of its
existence. Thus it is manifest, that volition is necessary, and is
not from any self-determining power in the will : the volition,
which is caused by previous Motive and inducement, is not
caused by the will exercising a sovereign power over itself, to
determine, cause and excite volitions in itself. This is not con
sistent with the will acting in a state of indifference and equili
brium, to determine itself to a preference ; for the way in which
Motives opiate is by biassing the will, and giving it a certain
inclination or preponderjtton one way.
Here it may be proper to observe, that Mr. Chubb, in his
Collection of Tracts on various Subjects^ has advanced a scheme
of liberty, which is greatly divided agednst itself, and thoroughly
subversive of itself; and that many ways,
T. He is abundant in asserting, that the will, in all its acts,
is influenced by motive and excitement ; and that this is the
previous ground and reason of all its acts, and that it is never
otherwise in any instance. He says, (p. 262.) " No action can
take place without some Motive to excite it," And (p. 263.)
" Volition cannot take place without some prbvious reason or
Motive to induce it." And (p. 310.) Action would not takeplace
without some reason or motive to induce it ; it being absurd to
suppose, that the active faculty would be exerted without some
PREVIOUS reason to dispose the mind to action." So (also p. 257.)
4-iid he speaks of these things, as what we may be absolutely
certain of, and vvhich are the foundation, the only foundation
we have of certainty respecting God's moral perfections.
(p. 252r-255, 261— 264.)
And yet, at the sarae time, by his scheme, the influence of
Motives upon us to excite to action, and tobe actually a ground
of volition, is consequent on the volition or choice of the mind.
For he very greatly insists upon it, that in all free actions, be
fore the mind is the subject of those volitions, which Motives
excite, it chooses to be so. It chooses, whether it will comply
with the Motive, which presents itself in view, or not ; and
when various Motives are presented, it chooses which it will
yield to, and which it will reject, (p. 256,.) " Every man has
|)ower to act, or to refrain from acting agreeably with, or con-

88 FREEDOM OP THE WILL. PaRT II.
trary to, any motive that presents." (p. 257.) " Eyery man is
at liberty to act, or refrain from acting agreeably with, or con
trary to, what each of these Motives, considered singly, would
excite hirii to. — Man has power, and is as much at liberty to
reject the Motive, that does prevail, as he has power, and is at
liberty to reject those Motives that do not." (And so p. 310,
311.) " In order to constitute a moral agent, it is necessary,
that he should have power to act, or to refrain from acting, upon
such moral Motives," as he pleases." And to the like purpose
in many other places. According to these things, the will
acts first, and chooses or refuses to comply with the Mo
tive, that is presented, before it falls under its prevailing
influence : and it is first determined by the mind's pleasure or
choice, what Motives it will be induced by, before it is induced
by them. Now, how can these things hang together ? How can the
mind first act, and by its act of volition emd choice determine,
what motives shall be the ground and reason of its volition and
choice ? For this supposes, the choice is already made, before
the Motive has its effect ; and that the volition is already exert
ed, before the Motive prevails, so as actually to be the ground
of the volition ; and make the prevailirig of the Motive the con
sequence of the volition, of which yet it is the ground. If the
mind has already chosen to comply with a Motive, and to yield
to its excitertjent, the excitement comes in too late, and is need
less afterwards. If the mind has already chosen to yield to a
Motive vyhich I'wmVes to a thing, that implies, and in fact isa
choosing of the thing invited to ; aijd the very act of choice is
befijre the influence of the Motive which induces, and is the
ground of the choice ; the son is before-hand with the father
that begets him : the choice is supposed to be the ground of
that influence of the Motive, which very influence is supposed
r to be the ground of the choice. And so vice versa, the choice
is supposed to be the consequence of the influence of the Mo^
tiye, which influence of the Motive is the consequence of that -
very choice.
' And besides, if the will acts first towards the Motive he^
fore it falls under its influence, and the prevailing of the
Motive upon it to induce it to act and choose, be the fruit and
consequence of its act and choice, then how is the Motive
" a PREVIOUS ground and reason of the act and choice, so that
in the nature of the things, vohtion cannot take place without
sonae previous reason and Motive to induce it ;" and that this
act is consequent upon, and follows the motive? Which
things Mr. Chubb often asserts, as of Certain and undoubted
truth. So that the very same Motive is both previous and cow-
sequeM, both before and after, both the ground and fruit of the
yery same thing !

Sect. x. Acts connected with Motives. 89
II. Agreeable to the forementioned inconsistent notion of
the will first acting towards the Motive, choosing whether it
will comply with it, in order to it becoming a ground of the
will's acting, before any act of vohtion can take place, Mr.
Chubb frequently calls Motives and excitements to the action
of the will, "¦ the passive ground or reason of that action."
Which is a remarkable phrase ; than which I presume there is
none more unintelligible, and void of distinct and consistent
meaning, in all the writings of Duns Scotus, or Thomas
Aquinas. When he represents the Motive volition as passive,
he must mean — passive in that affair, or passive with respect
to that action, which he speaks of; otherwise it is nothing to
the design of his argument : he must mean, (if that can be
called a meaning) that the Motive to vohtion is first acted uf)on
or towards by the volition, choosing to yield to it, making it a
ground of action, or determining to fetch its influence from
thence ; and so to make it a previous ground of its own exci
tation and existence. Which is the same absurdity, as if one
should say, that the soul of man, previous to its existence
chose by what cause it would come into existence, and acted
upon its cause, to fetch influence thence to bring it into being ;
and so its cause was a passive ground of its existence 1
Mr. Chubb very plainly supposes Motive or excitement
to be the ground of the being of volition. He speaks of it as
the ground or reason of the exertion of an act ofthe will, (p.
391, and 392.) and expressly says, that "vohtion cannot take
place without some previous ground or Motive to induce it,"
(p. 363.) And he speaks of the act as " from the Motive, and
FROM THE influence of the Motivc," (p. 352) " and from the
influence that the Motive has on the man, for the production
of an action," (p. 317.) Certainly there is no need of muhi-
plying words about this ; it is easily judged, whether Motive
can be the ground of volition taking place, so that the very
production of it is from the influence of the Motive, and yet
the Motive, before it becomes the ground of the volition, is
passive, or acted upon by the volition. But this I will say,
that a man who insists so much on clearness of meaning in
others, and is so much in blaming their confusion and incon
sistence, ought if he was able, to have explained his meaning
in this phrase of "passive ground of action," so as to shew it
not to be confused and inconsistent.
If any should suppose, that Mr. Chubb when he speaks of
Motive as a " passive ground of action," does not mean passive
with regard to that yolition which it is the ground of, but sorhe
other antecedent volition (though his purpose and argument,
and whole discourse, will by no means allow of such a suppo
sition) yet it would not help the matter in the least. For, (1.)
If we suppose an act, by which the soul chooses to yield to the
VOL. IJ. 12

90 FREEDOM OP THE WILL.^ PaKT II.
invitation of a Motive to another volition ; both these supposed
volitions are in effect the very same. A volition to yield to the
force of a Motive inviting to choose something, conies to just
the same thing as choosing the thing, which the Motive myites
to, as I observed before. So that here can be no room to help
the matter, by a distinction of two volitions. (2.) If the Motive
be passive, not with respect to the same volition, to which the
Motive excites, but to one truly distinct and prior ; yet, by Mr.
Chubb, that prior volition cannot take place without a Motive
or excitement, as a previous ground of its existence. For he in
sists, that "it is absurd to suppbse any volition should take
place without some previous Motive to induce it." So that at
last it comes to just the same absurdity : for if every volition,
must have a previous Motive, then the very first in the whole
series must be excited by a previous Motive ; and yet the Motive
to that first volition is passive ; but cannot be passive with re
gard to another antecedent volition, because, by the supposi
tion, it is the very first: therefore if it be passive with respect
to any volition, it must be so with regard to that very vohtion
of which it is the ground, and that is excited by it.
III. Though Mr, Chubb asserts, as above, that every
volition has some Motive, and that " in the nature of the thing,
no volition can take place without some Motive to induce it ;"
yet he asserts, that volition does not always follow the strong
est Motive ; or, in other words, is not governed by any superior
strength of the Motive that is followed, beyond Motives to
the contrary, previous to the volition itself. His own words,
(p, 258,) are as follow: "Though with regard to physical
causes, that which is strongest always prevails, yet it is other
wise with regard to moral causes. Of these, sometimes the
stronger, sometimes the weaker, prevails. And the ground
of this difference is evident, namely, that what we call moral
causes, strictly speaking, are no causes at all, but barely pas
sive reasons of, or excitements to the action, or to the re
fraining from acting ; which excitements we have power, or
are at liberty to comply with or reject, as I have shewed
above," And so throughout the paragraph, he, in a variety
of phrases, insists, that the will is not always determined by
the strongest Motive, unless by strongest we preposterously
mean actually prevailing in the event; which is not in the
Motive, but in the will ; but that the will is not always deter
mined by the Motive, which is strongest by any strength
previous to the volition itself. And he elsewhere abundantly
asserts, that the will is determined by no superior strength or
advantage, that Motives have, from any constitution or state of
things, or any circumstances whatsoever, previous to the
actual determination of the will. And indeed his whole dis-

Sect, x. Acts connected with Motives. 91
course on human liberty implies it, his whole scheme is found
ed upon it.
But these things cannot stand together. There is a diver
sity of strength in Motives to choice, previous to the choice
itself. Mr, Chubb himself supposes, that they do previously
invite, induce, excite and dispose the mind to action. This im
plies, that they have soraething in theraselves that is inviting, ,
some tendency to induce and dispose to volition, previous to
volition itself. And if they have in themselves this nature
and tendency, doubtless they have it in certain limited degrees,
which are capable of diversity ; and some have it in greater
degrees, others in less ; and they that have most of this ten
dency, considered with all their nature and circumstances,
previous to volition, are the strongest motives ; and those that
have least, are the weakest Motives.
Now if volition sometimes does not follow the Motive
whieh is strongest, or has most previous tendency or advantage,
all things copsidered, to induce or excite it, but follows the
weakest, or that which as it stands previously in the mind's
view, has least tendency to induce it ; herein the vvill appa
rently acts wholly without Motive, without any previous reason
to dispose the mind to it, contrary to what the same author
supposes. The act, wherein the will must proceed, without
a previous motive to induce it, is the act of preferring the
weakest motive. For how absurd is it to say, the mind sees
previous reason in the Motive, tb prefer that Motive before tlie
other ; and at the same time to suppose, that there is nothing
in the Motive, in its nature, state or any circumstances of it
whatsoever, as it stands in the previous view of the mind, that
gives it any preference ; but on the contrary, the other Motive
that stands in competition with it, in all these respects, has
most belonging to it that is inviting and moving, and has most
of a tendency to choice and preference. This is certainly as
much as to say, there is previous ground and reason in the
Motive for the act of preference, and yet no previous reason
for it. By the supposition, as to all that is in the two rival
Motives which tends to preference, previous to the act of
preference, it is not in that which is preferred, but wholly in
the other : and yet Mr, Chubb supposes, that the act of pre
ference is from previous ground and reason in the Motive which
is preferred. But are these things consistent ? Can there be
previous ground in a thing for an event that takes place,
and yet no previous tendency in it to that event ? If one thing
follows another, without any previous tendency to its foflowing,
then I should think it very plain, that it follows it without any
manner of previous reason why it should follow.
Yea, in this case, Mr, Chubb supposes, that the event
follows an antecedent, as the ground of its existence, which

02 freedom op the will. I'AKT li.
hag not only no tendency to it, but a contrary tendency. The
event is the preference, which the mirid gives to that Motive,
which is weaker, as it stands in the previous view ofthe mind;
the immediate antecedent is the view the mind has of the two
rival Motives conjunctly ; in which previous view of the mind, .
all the preferableness, or previous tendency to preference, is
supposed to be on the other side, or in the contrary Motive ;
and all the unworthiness of preference, and so previous ten
dency to comparative neglect, or undervaluing, is on that side
which is preferred : and yet in this view of the mind is sup
posed to be the previous ground or reason of this act of pre
ference, exciting it, and disposing the mind to it. Which, I
leave the reader to judge, whether it be absurd or not. If it
be not, then it is not absurd to say, that the previous tendency
of an antecedent to a consequent, is the ground and reason
why that consequent does not follow ; and the want of a pre
vious tendency to an event, yea, a tendency to the con
trary, is the true ground and reason why that event does
follow. An act of choice or preference is a comparative act,
wherein the mind acts with reference to two or more things
that are compared, and stand in competition in the mind's
view. If the mind, inthis comparative act, prefers that which
appears inferior in the comparison, then the mind herein acts
absolutely without Motive, or inducement, or any temptation
vvhatsoever. Then, if a hungry man has the offer of two
sorts of food, to both which he finds an appetite, but has a
stronger appetite to one than the other ; and there be no cir
cumstances or excitements whatsoever in the case to induce
him to take either the one or the other, but merely his appetite :
if in the choice he makes between them, he chooses that
which he has least appetite to, and refuses that to which he
has the strongest appetite, this is a choice made absolutely with
out previous Motive, Excitement, Reason, or Temptation, as
much as if he were perfectly without all appetite to either ;
because his volition in this case is a comparative act, following
a comparative view of the food which he chooses, in which
view his preference has absolutely no previous ground, yea, is
against all previous ground and motive. And if there be any
principle in man, from whence an act of choice may arise
after this manner, from the same principle volition may arise
wholly without Motive on either side. If the mind in its voli
tion can go beyond Motive, then it can go without Motive :
for when it is beyond the Motive, it is out <jf the reach of the
Motive, out of the limits of its influence, and so without Mo
tive, If so, this demonstrates the independence of volition on
Motive ; and no reason can be given for what Mr. Chubb so

Sect, x. Acts connected with Motives. 93
often asserts, even that " in the nature of things volition cannot
take place without a Motive to induce it."
If the Most High should endow a balance with agency or
activity of nature, in such a manner, that when unequal weights
are put into the scales, its agency could enable it to cause that
scale to descend, which has the least weight, and so to raise
the greater weight ; this would clearly demonstrate, that the
motion of the balance does not depend on weights in the scales ;
at least, as rauch as if the balance should move itself, when
there is no weight in either scale. And the activity of the ba
lance which is sufficient to move itself against the greater weight,
must certainly be more than sufficient to move it when there is
no weight at all,
Mr, Chubb supposes, that the will cannot stir at all with
out some Motive ; and also supposes, that if there be a Mo
tive to one thing, and none to the contrary, volition will in
fallibly follow that Motive, This is virtually to suppose an
entire dependence of the will on Motives ; if it were not
wholly dependent on them, it could surely help itself a little
without them ; or help itself a little against a Motive, without
help from the strength and weight of a contrary Motive. And
yet his supposing that the will, when it has before it various
opposite Motives, can use them as it pleases, and choose its
own influence from them, and neglect the strongest, and fol
low the weakest, supposes it to be wholly independent on
Motives. It further appears, on Mr, Chubb's hypothesis, that voli
tion must be without any previous ground in any Motive, thus :
if it be, as he supposes, that the will is not determined by any
previous superior strength of the Motive, but determines and
chooses its own Motive, then, when the rival Motives are ex
actly equal, in all respects, it may follow either ; and may in
such a case, sometimes follow one, sometimes the other.
And if so, this diversity which appears between the acts of the
will, is plainly without previous ground in either of the Mo
tives ; for all that is previously in the Motives is supposed pre
cisely and perfectly the same, without any diversity whatso
ever. Now perfect identity, as to all that is previous in the
antecedent, cannot be the ground and reason of diversity in
the consequent. Perfect identity in the ground, cannot be a
reason why it is not followed with the same consequence. And
therefore the source of this diversity of consequence must be
sought for elsewhere.
And lastly, it may be observed, that however much Mr.
Chubb insists, that no volition can take place without some
Motive to induce it, which previously disposes the mind to it ;
yet, as he also insists that the mind, without reference to any
superior strength of Motives, picks and chooses for its Motive

94 freedom op the will. Part n.
to follow ; he hiriiself herein plainly supposes, that, with regard
to the mind's preference of one Motive before another — it is
not the Motive that disposes the will, but — the will disposes it
self to follow the Motive.
IV. Mr. Chubb supposes necessity to be utterly incon
sistent with agency ; and that to suppose a being to be an
agent in that which is necessary, is a plain contradiction, p,
311, and throughout his discourses on the subject of Liberty,
he supposes, that necessity cannot consist with agency or
freedom ; and that to suppose otherwise, is to make Liberty
and Necessity, Action and Passion, the same thing. And so
he seems to suppose, that there is no action, strictly speaking,
but volition ; and that as to the effects of volition in body or
mind, in themselves considered, being necessary, they are
said to be free, only as they are the effects of an act that is not
necessary. And yet, according to him, volition itself is the effect of
volition ; yea, every act of free volition ; and therefore every
act of free volition must, by what has now been observed
from him, be necessary. That every act of free -volition is
itself the effect of volition, is abundantly supposed by him.
In p. 341, he says, "If a man is such a creature as I have
proved hira to be, that is, if he has in him a powei" of Liberty
of doing either good or evil, and either of these is the subject
of his own free choice, so that he might, if he had pleased,
have chosen and done the contrary."— — Here he supposes,
all that is good or evil in man is theLeffect of his choice ; and
so that his good or evil choice itself is the effect of his plea
sure or choice, in these words, '¦'¦ he might if he had pleased,
have CHOSEN the contrary.'''' So in p. 356, " Though it be
highly reasonable, that a man should always choose the
greater good, — yet he may, if he please, choose otherwise."
Which is the sarae thing as if he had said, he may if he chooses,
choose otherwise. And then he goes on,^" that is, he may,
if he pleases, choose what is good for himself," &c. And again
in the same page, " The will is not confined by the under
standing to any particular sort of good, whether greater
or less ; but it is at liberty to choose what kind of good it
pleases.'''' — If there be any meaning in the last words, if must
be this, that the will is at liberty to choose what kind of good
it chooses to choose^ ; supposing the act of choice itself deter
mined by an antecedent choice. The Liberty Mr. Chubb
speaks of, is not only a man's power to move his body, agree
ably to an antecedent act of choice, but to use, or exert the
faculties of his soul. Thus, (p. 379j) speaking of the faculties
of the mind, he says, "Man has power and is at liberty to
neglect these faculties, to use them aright, or to abuse them,
ag^he pleases.'''' And that he supposes an act of choice, or

Sect. x. Acts connected with Motives. 95
exercise of pleasure, properly distinct from, and antecedent
to, those acts -thus chosen, directing, commanding and pro
ducing the chosen acts, and even the acts of choice them
selves, is very plain in page 283. " He can command his ac
tions ; and herein consists his Liberty ; he can give or deny
himself that pleasure, as lie pleases. And p. 377. — If the ac
tions of men — are not the produce of a free choice, or elec
tion, but spring from a necessity of nature, — —he cannot in
reason be the object of reward or punishment on their ac
count. Whereas, if action in man, whether good or evil, is
the produce of will or free choice ; so that a man in either
case had it in his power, and was at liberty to have chosen
the contrary, he is the proper object of reward or punishment,
according as he chooses to behave himself." Here, in these
last words, he speaks of Liberty of choosing, according as he
chooses. So that the behaviour which he speaks of as subject
to his choice, is hi& choosing itself, as well as his external con
duct consequent upon it. And therefore it is evident, he means
not only external actions, but the acts of choice themselves,
when he speaks of all free actions, as the produce of free
choice. And this is abundantly evident in what he says else
where, (p. 372, 373).
Now these things imply a twofold great inconsistence.
1. To suppose, as Mr. Chubb plainly does, that every
free act of choice is commanded by, and is the produce of free
choice, is to suppose the first free act of choice belonging to
the case, yea, the first free act of choice that ever man exert
ed, to be the produce of an antecedent act of choice. But I
hope I need not labour at all to convince my readers, that it is
an absurdity to say, the vexy first act is the produce of another
act that went before it.
2. If it were both possible and real, as Mr, Chubb in
sists, that every free act of choice were the produce or the ef
fect of a free act of choice ; yet even then, according to his
principles, no one act of choice would be free, but every one
necessary ; because, every act of choice- being the effect of a
foregoing act, every act would be necessarily connected with
that foregoing cause. For Mr, Chubb himself says, (p, 389,)
"When the self-moving power is, exerted, it becoraes the ne
cessary cause of its effects," — So that his notion of a free act
that is rewardable or punishable, is a heap of contradictions.
It is a free act, and yet, by his own notion of freedom, is ne
cessary ; and therefore by him it is a contradiction, to suppose
it to be free. According to him, every free act is the produce
of a free act ; so that there must be an infinite number of free
acts in succession, without any beginning, in- an agent that has
a beginning. And therefore here is an infinite number of free
acts, every one of them free ; and yet not any one of them

96 freedom of the will. Part ii.
free, but every act in the whole infinite chain a necessary ef
fect. All the acts are rewardable or punishable, and yet the
agent cannot, in reason, be the object of reward or punish
ment, on account of any one of these actions. He is active
in them all, and passive in none ; yet active in none, but pas
sive in afl, &c.
V. Mr. Chubb most strenuously denies, that Motives are
causes of the acts of the will; or that the moving principle in
man is moved, or caused to be exerted by Motives. His words,
(p. 388 and 389,) are, " If the moving principle in man is
moved, or CAUSED TO be exerted, by something external to
man, which all Motives are, then it would not be a self-moving
principle, seeing it would be moved by a principle external to
itself. And to say, that a self-moving principle is moved, or
CAUSED to be exerted, by a cause external to itself, is ab
surd and a contradiction, &;c." — And in the next page, it is par
ticularly and largely insisted, that Motives are causes in no case,
that " they are merely passive in the production of action, and
have no causality in the production of it,-^no causality, to be the
cause of the exertion of the will.
Now I desire it may be considered, how this can possibly
consist with what he says in other places. Let it be noted
here, 1. Mr. Chubb abundantly speaks of Motives as excite
ments of the acts of the will ; and says, that Motives do excite
volition, and induce it, and that they are necessary to this end ;
that in the reason and nature of things, volition cannot take
place without motives to excite it. But now, if Motives excite
the will, they move it ; and yet he says it is absurd to say, the
will is moved by Motives. And again, if language is of any
significancy at all, if Motives excite volition, then they are the
cause of its being excited : and to cause volition to be excited,
is to cause it to be put forth or exerted. Yea, Mr. Chubb
says himself, (p. 317.) Motive is necessary to the exertion of
the active faculty. To excite, is positively to do something ;
and certauily that which does something, is the cause of the
thing done by it. To create, is to cause to be created ; to
make, is to cause to be made ; to kill, is to cause to be killed ;
to quicken, is to cause to be quickened ; and to excite, is to
cause to be excited. To excite, is to be a cause in the most
proper sense, not merely a negative occasion, but a ground of
existence by positive influence. The notion of exciting, is ex
erting influence to cause the effect to arise or come forth into
existence. 2. Mr. Chubb himself, (p. 317.) speaks of Motives as the
ground and reason of action by influence, and by prevailing
influence. Now, what can be meant by a cause, but some-

Sect. x. Acts connected with Motives. 97
thing that is the ground and reason of a thing by its influence,
an influence that is prevalent and effectual ?
3. This author not only speaks of Motives as the ground
and reason of- action, by prevailing influence ; but expressly of
their influence as prevailing for the production of an action
(p. 317.) which makes the inconsistency still more palpable'
and notorious. The production of an effect is certainly the
causing of an effect ; and productive influence is caused influence,
if any thing is ; and that which has this influence prevalently,
so as thereby to become the ground of another thing, is a cause
of that thing, if there be any such thing as a cause. This in
fluence, Mr. Chubb says. Motives have to produce an action ;
and yet he says, it is absurd and a contradiction, to say they
are causes. 4. In the same page, he once and again speaks of Motives
as disposing the Agent to action by their influence. His words
are these : " As Motive, which takes place in the understand
ing, and is the product of intelligence, is necessary to action,
that is, to the exertion of the active faculty, because that fa
culty would not be exerted without some previous reason to
DISPOSE the mind to action ; so from hence it plainly appears, ,
that when a man is said to be disposed to one action rather than
another, this properly signifies the prevailing influence that
one Motive has upon a man for the production of an action,
or for the being at rest, before all other Motives, for the produc
tion of the contrary. For as Motive is the ground and reason
of any action, so the Motive that prevails, disposes the agent to
the performance of that action."
Now, if Motives dispose the mind to action, then they
cause the mind to be disposed ; and to cause the mind to be
disposed is to cause it to be willing ; and to cause it to be
willing is to cause it to^will ; and that is the same thing as to be
the cause of an act ofthe will. And yet this sarae Mr. Chubb
holds it to be absurd, to suppose Motive to be a cause of the act
ofthe will.
And if we compare these things together, we have here
again a whole heap of inconsistences. Motives are the pre
vious ground and reason of the acts of the will ; yea, the
necessary ground and reason of their exertion, ivithout which
they ivill not be exerted, and cannot, in thenature of .things, take
place ; and they do excite these acts of the will, and do this
hy a prevailing influence ; yea, an influence which prevails for
the production of the act of the will, and for the disposing of the
mind to it: and yet it is absurd to suppose Motive to be a ca^tiLse
of an act of the will, or that a pririciple of will is moved or
caused to be exerted by it, or that it has any causality in the
¦production of it, or any causality to be the cause of the exertion
of the ivill.
vol. II. 13

98 freedom op THE WILL. PaRT 11,
A due consideration of these things which Mr. Chubb has
advanced, the strange inconsistences which his notion of Liber
ty — consisting in the will's power of self-determination void
of all necessity, united with that dictate of common sense,
that there can be no volition without a niotive — drove him
into, may be sufficient to convince us, that it is utteriy impos
sible ever to make that notion of Liberty consistent with the
influence of Motives in volition. And as it is in a manner-
self-evident, that there can be no act of will, or preference of
the mind, without some motive or inducement, something in
the mind's view vvhich it aims at, and goes after ; so it is most
manifest, that there is no such Liberty in the universe as
Arminians insist on; nor any such thing possible, or con
ceivable.

SECT. XI.
The Evidence of God's certain Foreknowledge of the Volitions
of moral Agents.
That the acts of the wills of moral Agents are not con
tingent events, in such a sense as to be without all necessity,
appears by God's certain Foreknowledge of such events.
In handhng this argument, I would in the first place
prove, that God has a certain Foreknowledge of the voIuntar|r
acts of moral Agents ; and secondly, shew the consequence,
or how it follows from hence, that the Volitions of moral
Agents are not contingent, so as to be without necessity of
connection and consequence.
First, I am to prove that God has an absolute and cer
tain Foreknowledge of the free actions of moral Agents.
One would think it wholly, needless to enter on such an
argument with any that profess themselves Christians : but so
it is: God's certain Foreknowledge of the free acts of moral
Agents is denied by some that pretend to believe the Scrip
tures to be the Word of God : and especially of late. I there
fore shall consider the evidence of such a prescience in the
Most High, as fully as the designed liinits of this essay will
admit ; supposing myself herein to have to do with such as
own the truth of the Bible.
Arg. I. My first argument shall be taken from God's
prediction of such events. Here I would, in the first place,
lay down these two things as axioms.
1, If God does not foreknow, "Re cannot foretell such
events ; that is, He cannot peremptorily and certainly foretell
them. If God has no more than an uncertain guess concern-

Sect, xi. God foreknows our Volitions. 99
ing events of this kind, then He can declare no more than an
uncertain guess. Positively to foretell, is to profess to fore
know, or declare positive Foreknowledge.
2. If God does not certainly foreknow the future Voli
tions of moral Agents, then neither can He certainly foreknow
those events which are dependent on these Volitions. The
existence of the one depending on the existence of the other,
the knowledge of the existence of the one depends on the
knowledge of the existence bf the other ; and the one cannot
be more certain than the other.
Therefore, how many, how great, and how extensive
soever the consequences of the Vohtions of moral Agents may
be ; though they should extend to an alteration of the state
of things through the universe, and should be continued in a
series of successive events to all eternity, and should in the
progress of things branch forth into an infinite number of
series, each of thera going on in an endless chain of events ;
God must be as ignorant of all these consequences, as He is
of the Volition whence they first take their rise : and the whole
state of things depending on them, how important, extensive
and vast soever, must be hid from him.
These positions being such as, I suppose, none will deny,
I now proceed to observe the following things.
1. Men's moral conduct and qualities, their virtues and
vices, their wickedness and good practice, things rewardable
and punishable, have often been foretold by God. — Pharaoh''s
moral conduct, in refusing 'to obey God's command, in letting
his people go, was foretold. God says to Moses, Exod, iii, 19,
"I am sure that the King of Egypt will not let you go,"
Here God professes not only to guess at, but to knovv
Pharaoh's future disobedience. In chap. vii. 4, God says,
" but Pharaoh shall not hearken unto you ; that I may lay
mine hand upon Egypt, &lc." And chap. ix. 30, Moses says
to Pharaoh, " as for thee, and thy servants, I know that ye will
not fear the Lord," See also chap. xi. 9. — The moral conduct
of Josiah, by name, in his zealously exerting himself to oppose
idolatry in particular acts, was foretold above three hundred
years before he was born, and the prophecy sealed by a
miracle, and renewed and confirmed by the words of a second
prophet, as what surely would not fail, (1 Kings xiii, 1 — 6, 32,)
This prophecy was also in effect a prediction of the moral
conduct of the people, in upholding their schismatical and
idolatrous worship until that time, and the idolatry of those
priests of the high places, which it is foretold Josiah should
offer upon that altar of Bethel. Micaiah foretold the foolish
and sinftil conduct of Ahab, in refusing to hearken to the
word of the Lord by him, and choosing rather to hearken to
the false prophets, in going to Ramoth-Gilead to his ruin.

100 freedom of the will. Part ii.
(1 Kings xxi. 20, — 22.) The moral conduct of if«2aeZ vvas fore
told in that cruelty he should be guilty of ; on which Hazael
says, "What, is thy servant a dog, that he should do this
thing 1" The prophet speaksof the event as what he knew, and
not what he conjectured, 2 Kings viii. 12. " I know the evil
that thou wilt do unto the children of Israel : Thoii wiU dash
their children, and rip up their women with child," The
moral conduct of Cyrus is foretold long before he had a be
ing, in his mercy to God's people, and regard to the true God,
in turning the captivity of the Jews, and promoting the build
ing of the temple, (Isai, xliv, 28, and Ixv. 13. compare ^l Chron.
xxxvi. 22, 23. and Ezra i. I, — 4.) How many instances ofthe
moral conduct of the Kings ofthe North and South, particular
instances of the wicked behaviour ofthe Kings of Syria and
Egypt, are foretold in the eleventh chapter of Daniel ? Their
corruption, violence, robbery, treachery and lies. And par
ticularly, how much is foretold of the horrid wickedness of
Antiochus Epiphanes, called there " a vile person," instead of
Epiphanes, or illustrious. In that chapter, and also in chap.
viii. ver. 9, 14, 23, to the end, are foretold his flattery, deceit
and lies, his having " his heart set to do mischief," and set
"against the holy covenant," his "destroying and treading
under foot the holy people," in a marvellous manner, his
" having indignation against the holy covenant, setting his
heart against it, and conspiring against it," his " polluting the
sanctuary of strength, treading it under foot, taking away the
daily sacrifice, and placing thr abomination that maketh de
solate ;" his great pride, "magnifying himself against God,
and uttering marvellous blasphemies against Him," until God
in indignation should destroy him. Withal, the moral con
duct of the Jeivs, on occasion of his persecution, is predicted.
It is foretold, that " he should corrupt many by flatteries,'''' (chap.
xi. 32, — 34.) But that others should behave with a glorious
constancy and fortitude, in opposition to him, (ver. 32.) And
that some good men should fall and repent, (ver. 35.) Christ
foretold Peter's sin, in denying his Lord, with its circumstances,
in a peremptory manner. And so, tnat great sin of Judas, in
betraying his master, and its dreadful and eternal punishment
in hell, was foretold in the like positive manner. Matt. xxvi.
21 — 25, and parallel places in the other Evangelists.
2. Many events have been foretold by God, which are
dependent on the moral conduct of particular persons, and
were accomplished either by their virtuous or vicious actions.
Thus, the children of Israel's going down into Egypt to dwell
there, was foretold to Abraham, (Geil. xv.) which was brought
about by the wickedness of Joseph's brethren in selling him,
and the wickedness of Joseph's mistress, and his own signal
virtue in resisting her temptation. The accomplishment of

55ECT, XI, God foreknows our Volitions. 101
the thing prefigured in Joseph's dream, depended on the same
moral conduct. Jotham's parable and prophecy, {Judges ix.
15, — 20,)was accomplished by the wicked conduct of Abime
lech, and the men of Shechem. The prophecies against the
house of Eli, (1 Sam. chap, ii, and iii.) were accomplished by
the wickedness of Doeg the Edomite, in accusing the priests ;
and the great impiety, and extreme cruelty of Saul in destroy
ing the priests at Nob. (1 Sam. xxii.) Nathan's prophecy
against David, (2 Sam. xii. 11, 12.) was fulfilled by the horrible
wickedness of Absalom, in rebelhng against his father, seek
ing his life, and lying with his concubines in the sight of the
sun. The prophecy against Solomon, (l Kings xi. 11, — 13.)
was fulfilled by Jeroboam's rebellion and usurpation, which
are spoken of as his wickedness, (2 Chron. xiii. 5, 6. compare
ver. 18.) The prophecy against Jeroboam's family, (I Kings
xiv.) was fulfilled by the conspiracy, treason, and cruel mur
ders of Baasha, (2 Kings xv. 27, (Sic.) The predictions of the
prophet Jehu against the house of Baasha, ( I Kings xvi. at the
beginning,) were fulfilled by the treason and parricide of Zimri,
(1 Kings xvi. 9,-13, 20.)
8. How often has God foretold the future moral conduct
of nations and people, of numbers, bodies, and successions of
men : with God's judicial proceedings, and many other events
consequent and dependent on their virtues and vices ; whieh
could not be foreknown, if the Volitions of men, wherein they
acted as moral Agents, had not been foreseen ? The future
cruelty of the Egyptians in oppressing Israel, and God's judg
ing and punishing them for it, was foretold long before it
came to pass, {Gen. xv. 13, 14.) The continuance of the ini
quity of the Amorites, and the increase of it until it should be
full, and they ripe for destruction, was foretold above four
hundred years before, {Gen. xv. 16. Acts vii. 6, 7.) The
prophecies of the destruction of Jerusalem j and the -land of
Judah, were absolute ; (2 Kirigs, xx. 17 — 19. chap. xxii. 15, to
the end.) It was foretold in Hezekiah's time, and was abun
dantly insisted on in the book of the prophet Isaiah, who wrote
nothing after Hezekiah's days. It was foretold in Josiah's
time, in the beginning of a great reformation, (2 Kings xxii.)
And it is manifest by innumerable things in the predictions of
the prophets, relating to this event, its time, its circumstances,
its continuance and end ; the return from the captivity, the
restoration of the teniple, city and land, &;c. I say, these
shew plainly, that the prophecies of this great event were
absolute. And yet this event was connected with, and depen
dent on two things in men's moral conduct ; first, the injurious
rapine and violence of the king of Babylon and his people, as
the efficient cause ; which God often speaks of as what he
highly resented, and would severely punish ; and secondly, the

102 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. PaRT II.
final obstinancy of the Jews. That great event is often spoken
of as suspended on this, {Jer. iv. 1. and v. 1. vii. 1. — ^7. .\i. I, —
6, xvii. 24, to the end. xxv. 1,-7. xxvi. 1,-8, 13. and xxxviii.
17, 1«.) Therefore this destruction and captivity could not be
foreknown, unless such a moral conduct of the Chaldeans and
Jews had been foreknown. And then it was foretold, th t the
people should be flnally obstinate, to the utter desolation of the
city and land. (Isai. vi. 9,-11. Jer. i. 18, 19. vii. 27,-29.
Ezek. iii. 7. and xxiv. 13, 14.)
The final obstinacy of those Jews who were left in the
land of Israel, in their idolatry and rejection of the true God,
was foretold by him, and the prediction confirmed with an oath,
{Jer. xliv. 26, 27.) And God tells the people, {Isai. xlviii. 3.
4, — 8.) that he had predicted those things which should be
consequent on their treachery and obstinacy, because he knew
they would be obstinate ; and that he had declared these
things beforehand, for their conviction of his being the only
true God, ^c.
The destruction of Babylon, with many of the circum
stances of it, was foretold, as the judgment of God for the ex
ceeding jiride and haughtiness of the heads of that monarchy,
Nebuchadnezzar and his successors, and their wickedly destroy
ing other nations, and particularly for their exalting themselves-
against the true God and his people, before any of these mo
narchs had a being ; {Isa. chap. xiii. xiv. xlvii : compare Hab-
bak. ii. 5, to the end, and Jer. chap. 1. and li.) That Babylon'i
destruction was to be " a recompence, according to the works
of their own hands," appears by Jer. xxv. 14, — The immorah^'
ty of whieh the people of Babylon, and particularly her princes
and great rfien, were guilty, that very night that the city was
destroyed, their revelling and drunkenness at Belshazzar's idol
atrous feast, was foretold, {Jer. li, 39, 57.)
The return of the Jews from the Babylonish captivity is
often very particularly foretold, with many circumstances, arid
. the promises of it are very peremptory : {Jer. xxxi, 35, — 40.
and xxxii, 6, — 15, 41, — 44. and xxxiii. 24j— 26.) And the
very time of their return was prefixed ; {Jer. xxv. 11, 12. and
xxix. 10, 11. 2 Chron, xxxvi. 21. Ezek. iv. 6. and Dan. ix. 2.)
And yet the prophecies represent their return as consequent
on their repentance. And their repentance itself is very ex
pressly aud particularly foretold, {Jer. xxix, 12, 13, 14, xxxi.
8, 9, 18,-31, xxxiii, 8, 1, 4, 5, Ezek. vi, 8, 9, 10, vii. 16. xiv.
32, 23. and xx. 43, 44.)
^ ft was foretold under the Old Testament, that the Messiah
should suffer greatly through the malice and cruelty of men ;
as is largely and fully set forth, Psal. xxii. applied to Christ
in the New Testament, {Matt, xxvii. 35, 43. Luke xxiii. 34.
.Tohn xix. 24. Heb. ii. 12.) And likewise in Psal. Ixix. which.

Sect, xi, God foreknows our Volitions. 103
it is also evident by the New Testament, is spoken of Christ ;
{John XV, 25, vii, 5, ^c, and ii, 17, Rom. xv. 3. Matt, xxvii.
34, 48, Mark xv, 23, John xix. 291) The same thing is also
foretold, Isai. Iiii, and 1. (>. and Mic. v, 1. This cruelty of
men was their sin, and what they acted as moral Agents, It
was foretold, that there should be an union of Heathen and
Jewish rulers against Christ, {Psal. ii, 1,2, compared with Acts
iv, 25, — 28,) It was foretold, that the Jews should generally
reject and despise the Messiah, Isai. xlix. 5, 6, 7. and hii.
1, — 3. Psal. xxii. 6, 7. and Ixix. 4, 8, 19, 20.) And it was
foretold, that the body of that nation should be rejected in the
Messiah's days, from being God's people, for their obstinacy
in sin ; {Isai. xlix, 4,-7, and viii, 14, 15, 16, compared with
Rom. X. 19, and /sm, Ixv, at the beginning, compared with
Rom. X, 20, 21,) It was foretold, that Christ should be re
jected by the chief priests and rulers among the Jews {Psalm
cxviii. 22. compared with Matt. xxi. 42. Acts iv. 11. 1 Pet. ii.
4' '^•)
Christ himself foretold his being delivered into the hands
of the elders, chief priests and scribes, and his being cruelly
treated by them, and condemned to death ; and that He by
them should be delivered to the Gentiles : and that He should
be mocked and scourged, and crucified, {Matt. x\'i. 21. and xx.
17, — 19. iwAeix. 22. JpAre viii. 28.) and that the people should
be concerned in and consenting to his death, {Luke xx, 13, —
18,) especially the Inhabitants of Jerusalem ; (Luke xiii. .33 —
35,) He foretold, that the disciples should all be offended be
cause of Him, that night in which he was betrayed, and should
forsake him; {Matt. xxvi. 31. John xvi. 32.) He foretold
that He should be rejected of that generation, even the body
ofthe people, and that they should continue obstinate to their
ruin; {Matt. xii. 45. xxi. 33, — 42. and xxii. 1, — 7. Luke xiii.
16, 21, 24. xvii. 25. xix. 14, 27, 41,-44, xx. 13,-18. and xxiii.
34,-39.) As it was foretold in both the Old Testament and the
New that the Jews should reject the Messiah, so it was fore
told that the Gentiles should receive Him, and so be admitted
to the privileges of God's people ; in places too many to be
now particularly mentioned. It was foretold in the Old Testa
ment, that the Jews should envy the Gentiles on this account ;
{Deut. xxxii. 21. compared with Rom. x. 19.) Christ himself
often foretold, that the Gentiles would embrace the true reli
gion, and become his followers and people ; {Matt viii. 10, 11,
12, xxi. 41,-43. and xxh. 8,-10. Luke xiii. 28. xiv. 16,-24.
and XX. 16. John x. 16.) He also foretold the Jews' envy of the
Gentiles on this occasion ; {Matt. xx. 12, — 16. Luke xv. 26, to
the end.) He foretold, that they should continue in this oppo
sition and envy, and should mainifest it in the cruel persecutions

104 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. PaRT II,
of his followers, to their utter destruction ; {Matt, xxi, 33, — 42.
xxii. 6. and xxiii. 34,-39. Luke xi. 49,-51.) The obstinacy
ofthe Jews is also foretold, {Acts xxii. 18.) Christ often fore
told the great persecutions his followers should meet with, both
from Jews and Gentiles; {Matt. x. 16,— 18, 21,22, 34,— 36,
and xxiv, 9, Mark xiii, 9, Luke x, 3, xii, 11, 49, — ^53, and xxi,
12, 16, 17, John xv, 18,-21, and xvi, 1,-^, 20,-22, 23,)
He foretold the martyrdom of particular persons ; {Matt. xx.
23. John xiii. 36. and xxi. 18, 19, 22.) He foretold the great
success of the Gospel in the city of Samaria, as near ap
proaching; which afterwards was fulfilled by the preaching
of Philip, {John iv. 35,--38.) He foretold the rising of many
deceivers after his departure, (Ma^^ xxiv. 4, 5, 11,) andthe
apostacy of many of his professed followers ; {Matt xxiv. 10,
12.) The persecutions, which the apostle Paul was to meet
with in the world, were foretold ; Acts ix, 16. xx. 23, and xxi.
11.) The apostle says to the Christian Ephesians, Acts xx.
29, 30.) " I know, that after my departure shall grievous
wolves enter in among you, not sparing the flock ; also of
your own selves shall men arise, speaking perverse things, to
draw away disciples after them." The apostle says. He knew
this: but he did not know it, if God did not know the future
actions of moral Agents.
4. Unless God foreknows the future acts of moral Agents,
all the prophecies we have in Scripture concerning the great ¦
Antichristian apostacy ; the rise, reign, wicked qualities, and
deeds of "the man of sin," and his instruments and adherents;
the extent and long continuance of his dominion, his influence
on the minds of princes and others, to corrupt them, and draw
them away to idolatry, and other foul vices ; his great and cruel
persecutions ; the behaviour of the saints under these great
temptations, &c. &c.-^I say, unless the Volitions of moral
Agents are foreseen, all these prophecies are uttered without
knowing the things foretold.
The predictions relating to this great apostacy are all of
a moral nature, relating to men's virtues and vices, and their
exercises, fruits and consequences, and events depending on
them, and are very particular; and most of them often repeat
ed, with many precise characteristics, descriptions, and limita
tions of qualities, conduct, influence, effects, extent, duration,
periods, circumstances, final issue, &c. which it would be
tedious to mention particularly. And to suppose that all these
are predicted by God, without any certain knowledge of the
future moral behaviour of free Agents, would be to the utmost
degree absurd.
5. Unless God foreknows the future acts of men's wills,
and their behaviour as moral Agents, all those great things

Sect. xi. God foreknows our Volitions. 105
which are foretold both in the Old Testament and the New,
concerning the erection, establishment and universal extent of
the Kingdom of the Messiah, were predicted and promised
while God was in ignorance whether any of these things would
come to pass or no, and did but guess at them. For that
kingdom is not of this world, it does not consist in things ex
ternal, but is within men, and consists in the dominion of
virtue in their hearts, in righteousness, and peace, and joy
in the Holy Ghost; and in these things made inanifest in
practice, to the praise and glory of God. The Messiah came
to save men from their sins, and deliver them from their spi
ritual .enemies ; that they might serve him in righteousness
and holiness before him: "he gave himself for us, thathe might
redeem us from all iniquity, and purify unto himself a peculiar
people, zealous of good works." And therefore his success
consists in gaining men's hearts to virtue, in their being made
God's willing people in the day of his power. His conquest
of his enemies consists in his victory over men's corruptions
and vices. And such a victory, and such a dominion is of
ten expressly foretold : that his kingdom shall fill the earth ;
that all people, nations and languages should serve and obey
him ; and so that all nations should go up to the mountain of
the House of the Lord, that he might teach them his ways,
and that they might walk in his paths ; and that all men
should be drawn to Christ, and the earth be full of the know
ledge of the Lord (true virtue and religion) as the waters cover
the seas ; that God's laws should be put into men's inward parts,
and written in their hearts ; and that God's people should be
all righteous, &c, &;c,
A very great part of the Old Testament prophecies is ta
ken up in such predictions as these, — And here I would ob
serve, that the prophecies of the universal prevalence of the
kingdom of the Messiah, and true religion of Jesus Christ, are
delivered in the miost peremptory manner, and confirmed by
the oath of God, Isai. xiv, 22, to the end, " Look unto me,
and be ye saved, all the ends of the earth ; for I am God,
and there is none else. I have sworn by my Self, the word is
gone out of my mouth in righteousness, and shall not return,
that unto Me every knee shall bow, and every tongue shall
swear. Surely, shall one say, in the Lord have I righteous
ness and strength : even to Him shall men come," &c. But,
here, this peremptory declaration and great oath of the Most
High, are delivered with such mighty solemnity, respecting
things which God did not know, if he did not certainly foresee
the Volitions of moral Agents.
And all the predictions of Christ and his apostles, to the like
purpose, must be without knovvledge : as those of our Saviow
comparing the kingdom of God to a graifl of iriustard-seed.
VOL. II. 14

106 FREEDOM OP THE WILL. PaRT U.
growing exceeding great from a small beginning ; and to lea
ven, hid in three measures of meal, until the whole was leaven
ed, &c. — And the prophecies in the epistles concerning the re
storation of the Jewish nation to the true church of God, and
bringing in the fulness of the Gentiles ; and the prophecies in
all the Revelation concerning the glorious change in the moral
state of the world of mankind, attending the destruction of
Antichrist, " the kingdoms of the world becoming the king
doms of our Lord and ofhis Christ ;" and its being granted to
the church to be " arrayed in that fine linen, white and clean,
which is the righteousness of saints," &c.
Corel. 1. Hence that great promise and oath of God to
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, so much celebrated in Scripture,
both in the Old Testament and the New, namely, " That in
their seed all the nations and famihes of the earth should be
blessed," must be made on uncertainties, if God does not
certainly foreknow the Volitions of moral Agents. For the
fulfilment of this promise consists in that success of Christ in
the work of redemption, and that setting up of his spiritual
kingdom over the nations of the world. Which has been spoken
of. Men are " blessed in Christ" no otherwise than as they
are brought to acknowledge Him, trust in Him, love and serve
Him, as is represented and predicted in Psal. Ixxii. 11. "All
Kings shall fall down before Him ; all nations shall serve Him."
With ver. 17. " Men shall be blessed in Him ; all nations shall
call Him blessed." This oath to Jacob and Abraham is fulfilled
in subduing men's iniquities ; as is implied in that of the pro
phet Micah, chap. vii. 19, 20.
Carol. 2. Hence also it appears, that the first gospel-
promise that ever was made to mankind, that great prediction
of the salvation of the Messiah, and his victory over Satan,^
made to our first parents, {Gen. iii. 15.) if there be no certain
prescience of the Volitions of moral Agents, must have no
Defter foundation than conjecture. For Christ's victory over
Satan consists in men's being saved from sin, and in the victory
of virtue and hohness over that vice and wickedness which,
Satan by his temptations has introduced, and wherein his king
dom consists.
6. If it be so, that God has not a prescience of the future
actions of moral Agents, it will follow, that the prophecies of
Scripture in general are without Foreknowledge. For Scrip
ture prophecies, almost all of them, if not universally, are
either predictions of the actings and behaviour of moral
Agents, or of events depending on them, or some way con
nected with them ; judicial dispensations, judgments on men
for their v^ickedness, or rewards of virtue and righteousness,
remarkable tnanife^ations of favour to the righteous, or mani
festations of sovereign raercy to sinners, forgiving their iniqui-

Sect. XI. God foreknows our Volitions. IGT
ties, and magnifying the riches of divine Grace ; or dispen
sations of Providence, in some respect or other, relating to the
conduct of the subjects of God's moral government, wisely
adapted thereto ; either providing for what should be in a
future state of things, through the Volitions and voluntary
actions of moral Agents, or consequent upon them, and regu
lated and ordered according to them. So that all events that
are foretold, are either moral events, or others which are con
nected with, and accommodated to them.
That the predictions of Scripture in general must be
without knowledge, if God does not foresee the Volitions of
men, will further appear, if it be considered, that almost all
events belonging to the future state of the world of mankind,
the changes and revolutions which come to pass in empires,
kingdoms, and nations, and all societies, depend, in ways
innumerable, on the acts of men's wills ; yea, on an innumer
able multitude of millions of Volitions. Such is the state and
course of things in the world of mankind, that one single
event, which appears in itself exceeding inconsiderable, may,
in the progress and series of things, occasion a succession of
the greatest and most important and extensive events ; causing
the state of mankind to be vastly different from what it would
otherwise have been, for all succeeding generations.
For instance, the comiiig into existence of those particular
men, who have been the great conquerors of the world, which,
under God, have had the main hand in all the consequent state
of the world, in all after-ages; such as Nebuchadnezzar,
Cyrus, Alexander, Pompey, Julius Csesar, &c. undoubtedly
depended on many milhon of acts of the will, in their parents.
And perhaps most of these Volitions depended on millions of
Volitions in their contemporaries of the same generation ; and
most of these on millions of millions of Volitions in preceding
generations. — As we go back, still the number of Volitions,
which were some way the occasion of the event, multiply as
the branches of a river, until they come at last, as it were, to
an infinite number. This wiU not seem strange to any one who
well considers the matter ; if we recollect what philosophers
tell us of the innumerable multitudes of those things which are
the principia, or stamina vita, concerned in generation ; the
animalcula in semen masculo, and the ova in the womb of the
female ; the impregnation, or animating of one of these in
distinction from all the rest, must depend on things infinitely
minute relating to the time and circumstances of the act of
the parents, the state of their bodies, &c. which must depend
on innumerable foregoing circumstances and occurrences ;
which must depend, infinite ways, on foregoing acts of their
wills; which are occasioned by innumerable things that
happen in the course of their lives, in which their own, and

tOS FREEDOM OF THE WILL. PART Ll.
their neighbour's behaviour must have a hand an infinite
number of ways. And as the Volitions of others must be so
many ways concerned in the conception and birth of such
men ; so no less, in their preservation and circumstances of
life, their particular determinations and actions, on which
the great revolutions they were the occasions of depended.
As, for instance, when the' conspirators in Persia against the
Magi were consulting about a succession to the empire, it
came into the mind of one of them to propose, that he whose
horse neighed first, when they came together the next morning,
should be king. Now, such a thing coming into his mind,
might depend on innumerable incidents, wheVein the Volitions
of mankind- have been concerned. But, in consequence of
this accident, Darius, the son of Hystaspes, was king. And
if this had not been, probably his successor would not
have been the same, and all the circumstances of the Per
sian empire might have been far otherwise : Then perhaps
Alexander might never have conquered that empire ; and then
probably the circumstances of the world in all succeeding
ages, might have been vastly otherwise. I might further
instance in many other occurrences ; such as those on which
depended Alexander's preservation in the many critical junc
tures of his life, wherein a small trifle would have turned, the
scale against him ; and the preservation and success, of the
Roman people, in the infancy of their kingdom and common'
wealth, and afterwards ; upon which all the succeeding changes
in their state, and the mighty revolutions that afterwards came
to pass in the habitable world, depended. But these hints
may be sufficient for every discerning considerate person, to
convince him that the vvhole state of the world of mankind in
all ages, and the very being of every person who has ever
hved in it, in every age, since the times of the ancient prophets,
has depended on more Volitions, or acts of the wills of men,
than there are sands on the sea-shore.
And therefore, unless God does most exactly and per
fectly foresee the future acts of men's wills, all the predic
tions which he ever uttered concerning David, Hezekiah,
Josiah, Nebuchadnezzar, Cyrus, Alexander; concerning the
four monarchies, and the revolutions in thera ; and concerning
all the wars, commotions, victories, prosperity and calamities,
of any kingdoms, nations or communities in the world, have all
been without knowledge.
So that, according to this notion, God not foreseeing the
"Volitions and free actions of men, he could foresee nothing
appertaining to the state of the world of mankind in future
ages ; not so much as the being of one person that should
Bve in it ; and could foreknow no events, but only such as he
would bring to pass Himself by the extraordinary interposi-

Sect. xi. God foreknows our Volitions. 109
tion of his immediate power ; or things which should come to
pass in the natural material world, by the laws of motion, and
course of nature, vvherein that is independent on the actions
or works of mankind : that is, as he might, like a very able
mathematician and astronomer, with great exactness calculate
the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, and the greater wheels
of the machine of the external creation.
And if we closely consider the matter, there will appear
reason to convince us, that he could not, with any absolute
certainty, foresee even these. As to the first, namely, things
done by the immediate and extraordinary interposition of God's
power, these cannot be foreseen, unless it can be foreseen
when there shall be occasion for such extraordinary interpo
sition. And that cannot be foreseen, unless the state of the
moral world can be foreseen. For whenever God thus inter
poses, it is with regard to the state of the moral world, requir
ing such divine interposition. Thus God could not certainly
foresee the universal deluge, the calhng of Abraham, the de
struction of Sodom and Gomorrah, the plagues on Egypt, and
Israel's redemption out of it, the expelling of the seven nations
of Canaan, and the bringing Israel into that land ; for these
all are represented as connected with things belonging to the
state of the moral world. Nor can God foreknow the most
proper and convenient time of the day of judgraent and gene
ral conflagration ; for that chiefly depends on the course and
state of things in the moral world.
Nor, Secondly, can we on this supposition reasonably
think, that God can certainly foresee what things shall come
to pass in the course of things, in the natural and material
world, even those which in an ordinary state of things might
be calculated by a good astronomer. For the moral world is
the end of the natural world ; and the course of things in the
former, is undoubtedly subordinate to God's designs with re
spect to the latter. Therefore he has seen cause, from regard
to the state of things in the moral world, extraordinarily to in
terpose, to interrupt, and lay an arrest on the course of things
in the natural world ; ahd unless he can foresee the Vohtions
of men, and so know something of the future state of the mo
ral world. He cannot know bul that he may still have as great
occasion to interpose in this manner, as ever he had : nor can
He foresee how, or when, He shall have occasion thus to inter
pose. Corol. 1. It appears from the things observed, that un
less God foresees the Volitions of moral Agents, that cannot
be true which is observed by the apostle James, (Acts xv. 18.)
" Known unto God are all his works from the beginning of the
world."

110 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. PaRT II,
Corol. 2. It appears, that unless God foreknows the Vo
litions of moral Agents, all the prophecies of Scripture have
no better foundation than mere conjecture ; and that, in most
instances, a conjecture which must have the utmost uncer
tainty ; depending on an innumerable multitude of Vohtions,
which are all, even to God, uncertain events : however, these
prophecies are delivered as absolute predictions, and very many
of them in the most positive manner, with asseverations ; and
some of them with the most solemn oaths,
Corol. 3, It also follows, that if this notion of God's ig
norance of future Volitions be true, in vain did Christ say,
after uttering many great and important predictions, depend
ing on men's moral actions, {Matt, xxiv, 35,) " Heayen and
earth shall pass away ; but my words shall not pass away,"
Corol. 4, From the same notion of God's ignorance, it
would follow, that in vain has he himself often spoken of the
predictions of his word, as evidences of Foreknowledge ; of
that which is his prerogative as GOD, and his pecuhar glory,
greatly distinguishing Him from all other beings, (asm Isai.
xli, 22,-26. xliii, 9, 10, xliv, 8, xiv, 21, xlvi. 10. and xlviii.
14.) '
Argum. II. If God does not foreknow the Volitions of
moral Agents, then he did not foreknow the fall of man, nor
of angels, and so could not foreknow the great things which
are consequent on these events; such as his sending his Son in
to the world to die for sinners, and all things pertaining to the
great work of redemption ; all the things which were done
for four thousand years before Christ came, to prepare the
way for it ; and the incarnation, life, death, resurrection and
ascension of Christ ; setting Him at the head of the universe
as King of heaven and earth, angels and men; and setting
up his church and kingdom in this world, and appointing Him
the Judge of the world ; and all that Satan should do in the
world in opposition to the kingdom of Christ : and the great
transactions of the day of judgment, &:c. And if God was thus
ignorant, the following Scriptures, and others like them, must
be without any meaning, or contrary to truth. (Eph. i. 4.)
" According as he hath chosen us in Him before the founda
tion of the world." (1 Pet. i. 20.) "Who verily was fore
ordained before the foundation of the world." (2 Tim. i, 9.)
" Who hath saved us, and called us with an holy calling ; not
accdrding to our works, but according to his own purpose, and
grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus before the world be
gan." So (Eph. hi, 11,) speaking of the wisdom of God in the
work of redemption, " according to the eternal purpose which
he purposed in Christ Jesus," (Tit, i, 2,) " In hope of eternal
life, which God that cannot lie, promised before the world be
gan." (Rom, viii. 29.) " Whom he did foreknow, them he also

Sect. XI. God foreknows our Volitions. Ill
did predestinate," &c. (1 Pet. i. 2.) " Elect, according to the
foreknowledge of God the Father."
If God did not foreknow the fall of man, nor the redemp
tion by Jesus Christ, nor the Volitions of man since the fall ;
then he did not foreknow the saints in any sense ; neither as
particular persons, nor as societies or nations ; either by elec
tion, or by mere foresight of their virtue or good works ; or any
foresight of any thing about them relating to their salvation ; or
any benefit they have by Christ, or any manned of concern of
theirs with a Redeemer.
, Arg. III. On the supposition of God's ignorance of the
future Volitions of free Agents, it will follow, that God must
in many cases truly repent what he has done, so as properly to
wish he had done otherwise : by reason that the event of
things, in those affairs which are most important, viz. the af
fairs of his moral kingdora, being uncertain and contingent,
often happens quite otherwise than he was before aware of.
And there would be reason to understand that, in the most
literal sense, {Gen. vi. 6.) " It repented the Lord, that he had
made man on the earth, and it grieved him at his heart," (and
1 Sam. XV. 11.) contrary to Numb, xxiii. 19. " God is not the
Son of Man, that He should repent :" and 1 Sam. xv, 15, 29.
" Also the strength of Israel will not lie, nor repent ; for He is
not a man that He should repent." Yea, from this notion it
would follow, that God is liable to repent and be grieved at
His heart, in a literal sense, continually ; and is always exposed
to an infinite number of real disappointments in governing
the world ; and to manifold, constant, great perplexity and vex
ation : but this is not very consistent with his title of " God over
all, blessed for evermore ;" which represents Him as possessed
of perfect, coristant, and uninterrupted tranquillity and felicity,
as God over the universe, and in his management of the affairs
of the world, as supreme and universal ruler. (See Rom. 1. 25.
ix. 5. 2 Cor. xi. 31. 1 Tim. vi, 15,)
Arg. IV It will also follow from this notion, that as God
is liable to be continually repenting of what he has done ; so
he must be exposed to be constantly changing his mind and
intentions, as to his future conduct ; altering his measures, re
linquishing his old designs, and forming new schemes and
projects. For his purpose-s, even as to the main parts of his
scheme, such as belong to the state of his moral kingdom,
must be always liable to be broken, through want of fore
sight ; and he must be continually putting his system to rights,
as it gets out of order, through the contingence of the actions
of moral Agents : He must be a Being, who, instead of being
absolutely immutable, must necessarily be the subject of in
finitely the most numerous acts of repentance and changes of
intention, of any being whatsoevrer ; for this plain reason, that

112 FREEDOM OP THE WILL, PaRT II.
his vastly extensive charge comprehends an infinitely greater
number of those things which are to him contingent and un
certain. In such a situation, he must have little else to do, but
to mend broken hnks as well as he can, and be rectifying his
disjointed frame and disordered movements, in the best man
ner the case will aflow. The~ Supreme Lord of all things must
needs be under great and miserable disadvantages, in govern
ing the world which he has made, and of which he has the
care, through his being utterly unable to find out things of chief
importance, which hereafter shall befafl his system ; for which,
if he did but know, he might make seasonable provision. In
many cases, there may be very great necessity that he should
make provision, in the manner of his ordering and disposing
things, for some great events which are to happen, of vast and
extensive influence and endless consequence to the universe ;
which he may see afterwards, when it is too late, and may wish
in vain that he had known before, that he might have ordered
his affairs accordingly. And it is in the power of man, on
these principles, by his devices, purposes and actions, thus to
disappoint God, break his measures, make him continually
change his mind, subject him to vexation, and bring him into
confusion. But how do these things consist with reason, or with the
word of God ? Which represents, that all God's works, all that
he has ever to do, the wliole scheme and series of his opera
tions, are from the beginning perfeetly^ in his view ; and de
clares, that whatever devices and designs are in the hearts
of men, " the counsel of the Lord shall stand, and the thoughts
of his heart to all generations," (Prov. xix. 21. Psal. xxxiii.
10, 11.) And " that which the Lord of hosts hath purposed,
none shall disannul," (Isai, xiv, 27.) And that he cannot be
frustrated in one design or thought, (Job, xiii, 2,) And " that
which God doth, it shall be for ever, that nothing can be put
to it, or taken from it," (Eccl, iii, 14,) The stability and per
petuity of God's counsels are expressly spoken of as connected
with his foreknowledge, {Isai. xlvi. 10.) " Declaring the end
from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that
are not yet done ; saying. My counsel shall stand," and I wiil
do all my pleasure." — And how are these things consistent
with what the scripture says of God's immutability, which
represents him as " without variableness, or shadow of turn
ing ;" and speaks of him, most particularly, as unchangeable
vvith regard to his purposes, {Mal. iii. 6.) " I am the Lord ;
I change not ; therefore ye sons of Jacob are not consumed,"
(Exod, iii. 14.) " I am that i am." (Job xxiii. 13, 14.) " He
is in one mind ; and who can turn him? And what his soul
desireth, even thaf he doth : for he performeth the thing that
is appointed for me."

Sect, XI, God foreknows ow Volitions. 113
Arg. V. If this notion of God's ignorance of future Voli
tions of moral Agents be thoroughly considered in its conse
quences, it will appear to follow from it that God, after he had
made the world, vvas liable to be wholly frustrated ofhis end in
the creation of it ; and so has been, in like manner, liable to
be frustrated of his end in all the great works he had wrought.
It is manifest, the moral world is the end of the natural : the
rest of the creation is but an house which God hath built, with
furniture, for moral Agents : and the good or bad state of the
moral world depends on the improvement they make of their
natural Agency, and so depends on their Volitions. And there
fore, if these cannot be foreseen by God, because they are con
tingent, and subject to no kind of necessity, then the affairs of
the moral world are liable to go wrong to any assignable de
gree ; yea, liable to be utterly ruined. As on this scheme
it may well be supposed to be Zt<era% said, when mankind,
by the abuse of their moral Agency, became very corrupt
before the flood, " that the Lord repented that he had made
man on the earth, and it grieved him at his heart ;" so,
when he made the universe, he did not know but that he might
be so disappointed in it, thaf it might grieve him at his
heart that he had made it. It actually proved, that all
mankind became sinful, and a very great part of the angels
apostatized : and how could God know before that all of
them would not! And how could God know but that all
mankind, nofwithstanding means used to reclaim them, being
still left to the freedom, of their own will, would continue in
their apostacy, and grow worse and worse, as they of the old
world before the flood did ?
According to the scheme I am endeavouring to confute,
the fall of neiSier men nor angels could be foreseen, and God
must be greatly disappointed in these events ; and so the grand
contrivance for our redemption, and destroying the works of
the devil, by the Messiah, and all the great things God has done
in the prosecution of these designs, must be only the fruits of
his own disappointment ; contrivances to mend, as well as he
could, his system, which originally was all very good, and per
fectly beautiful ; but was broken and confounded by the free
will of angels and men. And still he must be liable fo be to
tally disappointed a second time : He could not know that he
should have his desired success, in the incarnation, life, death,
resurrection,- and exaltation of his: only begotten Son, and
other great works accomplished to restore the state of things :
he could not know, after all, whether there would actually be
any tolerable measure of restoration ; for this depended on fhe
free will of man. There has been a general great apostacy of
almost all the Christian worid, to that which was worse than
heathenism ; which continued for many ageS. And how could
VOL. II, 15

114 FREEDOM OP THE WILL, PaRT ir,
God, without foreseeing men's Volitions, know whether ever
Christendom would return from this apostacy? And which
way would he foretell how soon it would begin ?. The apostle
says, it began to vvork in his time ; and how could it be known
how far it would proceed in that age ? Yea, how could it be
known that the gospel which was not effectual for the reforma
tion of the Jews, would ever be effectual for the turning of the
heathen nations from their heathen apostacy, which they had
been confirmed in for so many ages ?  i_
It is represented often in scripturCi^that God, who made
thc world for himself, and create,dJt f^ his pleasure, would in
fallibly obtain his end in-ib«-creation, and in all his works ; that
as all things are of him, so they would all be to him ; and fhat
in the final issue of things, it would appear that he is " the first,
and the last." (Rev. xxi. 6.) " And he said unto me, If is done.
I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, fhe first
and the last." But these things are not consistent with God's
liabiUty to be disappointed in all his works, nor indeed with his
failing of his end in any thing that he has undertaken.

SECT. xn.
God's certain Foreknowledge of the future volitions of moral
agents, inconsistent with such a Contingence of those voli
tions, as is without all Necessity.
Having proved thaf GOD has a certain and infallible
Prescience of the voluntary acts of moral agents, I come now,
in the second place, to shew the consequence ; how it follows
from hence, that these events are necessary, with a necessity
of connection or consequence.
The chief Arminian divines, so far as I have had oppor
tunity to observe, deny this consequence ; and affirm, that if
such Foreknowledge be allowed, it is no evidence of any Ne
cessity of the event foreknown. Now I desire, that this matter
may be particularly and thoroughly enquired into. I cannot
but thmk, that on particular and full consideration, it may be
perfectly determined, whether if be indeed so or not.
In order to a proper consideration of this matter, 1 would
observe the following things.
I. It is very evident, that with regard to a thing whose
existence is infallibly and indissolubly connected with some
thing which already hath, or has had existence, the existence
of that thing is necessary. Here may be noted the following
particulars :
1. I observed before, in explaining the nature of Necessi
ty, that in things which are past, their past existence is now

Sect. xn„ Foreknowledge infers Necessity. 115
necessary : having already made sure of existence, it is too
late for any possibility of alteration in that respect ; if is now
impossible that it should be otherwise than true, that the thing
has existed. 2. If there be any such thing as a divine Foreknowledge
of the volitions of free agents, that Foreknowledge, by the
supposition, is a thing which already has, and long ago had
"existence ; and so, now its existence is necessary ; it is now
utterly impossible fo be otherwise, than thaf this Foreknow
ledge should be or should have been.
3. It is also very manifest, that those things which are
indissolubly connected with other things that are necessary,
are themselves necessary. As that proposition whose truth
is neces.jarily connected wifh another proposition, which is
necessarily true, is itself necessarily frue. To say otherwise
would be a contradiction : it would be in effect to say, that
the connection was indissoluble, and yet was not so, but
might be broken. If that, the existence of which is indisso
lubly connected with something whose existence is now ne
cessary, is itself not necessary, then it may possibly not exist,
notwithstanding that indissoluble connection of its existence.
 Whether the absurdity be not glaring, let fhe reader judge.
4, It is no less evident, thaf if there be a full, certain, and
infallible Foreknowledge of the future existence of fhe volitions
of moral agents, then there is a certain, infalhble and indisso
luble connection between those events and that Foreknow
ledge ; and that therefore, by the preceding observations, those
events are necessary events ; being infallibly and indissolubly
connected with fhat, whose existence already is, and so is now
necessary, and cannot but have been.
To say the Foreknowledge is certain and infallible, and
yet the connection of the event with thaf foreknowledge is
dissoluble and fallible, is very absurd. To affirm if, would be
the same thing as to affirm, thaf there is no necessary connec
tion between a proposition being infallibly known fo be true,
and its being true indeed. So that it is perfectly demonstrable,
thaf if there be any infallible knowledge of future volitions,
the event is necessary ; or, in other words, thaf it is impossible
but the event should come to pass. For if it be not impossible
but thaf it may be otherwise, then it is nof impossible but
that the proposition which affirms its future conling fo pass,
may not now be frue. There is this absurdity in it, thaf it is
nof impossible, but that there now should be no truth in that
proposition, which is now infallibly known to be frue.
II. That no future event can be certainly foreknown,
whose existence i? contingent, and without all Necessity,
may be proved thus ; it is impossible for a thing to be cer
tainly known to any intellect without evidence. To suppose

116 i;SEED0M OF THE WILL, PaRT II,
Otherwise, implies a contradiction : because for a thing to be
certainly known to any understanding, is for it to be evident
to that understanding : and for a thing to be evident to any
understanding is fhe same thing, as for that understanding to
see evidence ofit ; but no understanding, created oruncreatedi
can see evidence where there is none ; for that is fhe same thing
as to see that to be,. which is not. And therefore, if there be
any truth which is absolutely without evidence, that truth is
absolutely unknowable, insomuch that it implies a contradic
tion to suppose that it is known.
But if there be any future event, whose existence is con
tingent, without all Necessity, the future existence of the
event is absolutely without evidence. If there be any evidence
of if, it must be one of these two sorts, either self-evidence or
proof; an evident thing must be either evident in itself, or evi^
dent in something else : that is, evident by connection with some
thing else. But a future thing, whose existence is without all
Necessity, can have neither of these sorts of evidence. It can
not be self-evident: for if it be, it may be now known, by what
is now to be seen in the thing itself; its present existence, or
the Necessity of its nature : but both these are contrary to the
supposition. It is supposed, both that the thing has no present
existence to be seen ; and also that it is not of such a nature
as f o be necessarily existent for the future : so that its future
existence is not self-evident. And Secondly, neither is there
any proof, or evidence in any thing else, or evidence of con
nection with something else that is evident ; for this is also con
trary to the supposition. It is supposed, that there is now
nothing existent, wifh which the future existence of fhe con
tingent event is connected. For such a connection destroys
its Contingence, and supposes necessity. Thus it is demonstra
ted, thaf there is in fhe nature of things absolutely no evidence
at all of the future existence of that event, which is contingent,
without all necessity, (if any such event there be) neither self-
evidence nor proof. And therefore the thing in reality is nof
evident ; and so cannot be seen fo be evident, or, which is fhe
same thing, cannot be known.
Let us consider this in an example. Suppose that five
thousand seven hundred and sixty years ago, there was no
Other being but the Divine Being ; and then this world, or
some particular body or spirit, all at once starts out of nothing
into being, and takes on itself a particular nature and form ;
all in absolute Contingence, without any concern of God, or
any other cause, in the matter ; without any manner of ground
or reason of its existence ; or any dependence upon, or con
nection at all with any thing foregoing : I say, thaf if this be
supposed, there was no evidence of thaf event beforehand.
There was no evidence of it to be seen in the thing itself; for

Sect. XII. Foreknowledge infers Necessity. 117
the thing itself as yet was not. And there was no evidence
of it to be seen in any thing else ; for evidence in something
else, is connection with something else : but such connection is
contrary fo the supposition. There was no evidence before,
that this thing would happen; for by the supposition, there
was no reason why it should happen, rather than something
else, or rather than nothing. And if so, then all things before
vvere exactly equal, and the same, with respect to fhat and
other possible things ; there was no preponderation, no supe
rior weight or value ; and therefore, nothing that could be of
weight or value fo determine any understanding. The thing
was absolutely without evidence, and absolutely unknowable.
An increase of understanding, or of the capacity of discern
ing, has no tendency, and makes no advance, towards discern
ing any signs or evidences of it, let it be increased never so
much ; yea, if it be increased infinitely. The increase of the
strength of sight may have a tendency to enable fo discern
the evidence which is far off, and very much hid, and deeply
involved in clouds and darkness ; but it has no tendency to
enable to discern evidence where there is none. If the sight
be infinitely strong, and the capacity of discerning infinitely
great, it will enable to see all that there is, and to see it per
fectly, and with ease ; yet it has no tendency at all to enable a
being to discern that evidence which is not ; but on the con
trary, it has a tendency to enable to discern with great certainty
that there is none.
III. To suppose the future volitions of moral agents not
to be necessary events ; or, which is the same thing, events
which it is not impossible but that they may not come to pass ;
and yet to suppose that God certainly foreknows them, and
knows all things ; is to suppose God's Knowledge to be
inconsistent with itself. For to say, that God certainly, and
without all conjecture, knows that a thing will infallibly be,
vvhich at the same time he knows to be so contingent, that it
may possibly not be, is to suppose his Knowledge inconsistent
with itself; or that one thing he knows, is utterly inconsistent
with another thing he knows. It is the same as to say, he now
knows a proposition to be of certain infallible truth, which he
knows to be of contingent uncertain truth. If a future voli
tion is so without all Necessity, that nothing hinders but it
may not be, then the proposition which asserts its future ex
istence, is so uncertain, that nothing hinders but that the
truth of it may entirely fail. And if God knows all things,
he knows this proposition to be thus uncertain. And that is
inconsistent with his knowing that it is infalhbly true : and so
inconsistent with his infallibly knowing that it is true. If the
thing be indeed contingent, God views it'so, and judges if to
foe contingent, if he views things as they are. If fhe event be

118 freedom op the will. part II,
not necessary, then it is possible it may never be : and if it
be possible it may never be, God knows if may possibly never
be ; and thaf is to know that fhe proposition, which affirms its
existence, may possibly not be true ; and that is to know that"
the truth of it is uncertain ; which surely is inconsistent with
his knowing it as a certain truth. If volitions are in themselves
contingent events, without all Necessify, then it is no argument
of perfection of Knowledge in any being to determine peremp
torily that they will be ; but on the contrary, an argument of
ignorance and mistake : because if would argue, that he sup
poses that proposition to be certain, which in its own nature,
and all things considered, is uncertain and contingent. To say,
in such a case, fhat God may have ways of knowing contingent
events which we cannot conceive of, is ridiculous ; as much so,
as to say, that God may know contradictions fo be true, for
ought we know ; or that he may know a thing to be certain,
arid at the same time know if nof to be certain, though we can
not conceive how ; because he has ways of knowing, which
we cannot comprehend.
Corol. 1. From what has been observed it is evident, that
the absolute decrees of God are no more inconsistent with hu
man liberty, on account of any Necessity of the event which
follows from such decrees, than the absolute Foreknowledge of
God. Because the connection between the event and certain
Foreknowledge, is as infallible and indissoluble, as between the
event and an absolute decree. That is, it is no more impossi
ble, that the event and decree should not agree together, than
that fhe event and absolute Knowledge should disagree. The
connection between the event and Foreknowledge is absolutely
perfect, by fhe supposition : because it is supposed, that the
certainty and infallibility of the Knowledge is absolutely per
fect. And it being so, the certainty cannot be increased ; and
therefore the connection betvveen the Knowledge and thing
known cannot be increased ; so that if a decree be added to
the Foreknowledge, if does not at all increase the connec
tion, or make it more infallible and indissoluble. If it were not
so, fhe certainty of Knowledge might be increased by the addi
tion of a decree ; which is contrary to the supposition, which
is, that the Knowledge is absolutely perfect, or perfect to the
highest possible degree.
There is as much impossibility but that the things which
are infallibly foreknown, should be, or, which is the same
thing, as great a Necessity of their future existence, as if the
event were already written down, and was known and read by
all mankind, through all preceding ages, and there was the
most indissoluble and perfect connection possible between the
writing and the thing written. In such a case, if would be as
impossible the event should fail of existence, as if it had ex-

Sect. XII. Foreknowledge infers Necessity. 119
isted alr§ady ; and a decree cannot make an event surer or
rnore necessary than this.
And therefore, if there be any such Foreknowledge, as it
has been proved there is, then Necessity of connection and
consequence is not at all inconsistent with any liberty which
man, or any other creature enjoys. And from hence it may
be inferred, that absolute decrees, which do not at all increase
the Necessity, axe not inconsistent with the liberty which man
enjoys, on any such account, as thaf they make the event
decreed necessary, and render it utterly impossible but that it
should come fo pass. Therefore, if absolute decrees are incon-
sitent with man's liberty as a moral agent, or his liberty in a
state of probation, or any liberty whatsoever that he enjoys,
it is not on account of any Necessity which absolute decrees
infer. Dr. Whitby supposes there is a great difference between
God's Foreknowledge and his decrees, with regard to Neces
sity of future events. In his Discourse on the five Points,
(p. 474, &c.) he says, " God's Prescience has no influence at
all on our actions. — Should God, says he, by immediate Reve
lation, give me the knowledge of the event of any man's state
or actions, would my knowledge of them have any influence
upon his actions ? Surely none af all. — Our knowledge doth
not affect fhe things wc know, to make them more certain, or
more future, than they woiiW be without it. Now, Foreknow
ledge in God is Knowledge. As therefore Knowledge has no
influence on things that are, so neither has Foreknowledge on
things fhat shall be. And consequently, the Foreknowledge
of any action that would be otherwise free, cannot alter or
diminish that freedom. Whereas God's decree of election is
powerful and active, and comprehends the preparation and
exhibition of such means, as shall unfrustrably produce the
end. — =Hence God's Prescience renders no actions necessary."
And to this purpose, (p. 473.) he cites Oeigen, where he says,
" God's Prescience is not the cause of things future, but their
being future is the cause of God's Prescience that they will be :"
and Le Blanc, where he says, " This is the truest resolution
of this difficulty, that Prescience is not the cause that things are
future ; but their being future is the cause they are foreseen."
In like manner, Dr. Clark, in his Demonstration of the Being
and Attributes of God, (p. 95 — 99.) And the Author of the
Freedom of Will, in God and the Creature, speaking to the
like purpose with Dr. Whitby, represents " Foreknowledge as
having no more influence on things known, to make them neces
sary, than After-knowledge," or to that purpose.
To all which I would say ; that what is said about Know
ledge, its not having influence on the thing known to make it
necessary, is nothing to the purpose, nor does if in the least

130 FREEDOM OP THE WiLL. pART 11.
affect the foregoing reasoning. Whether Prescience be the
thing that makes the event necessary or no, it alters not the
case. Infalhble Foreknowledge may prove the Necessity of
fhe event foreknown, and yet not be the thing which causes
the Necessity.* If the Foreknowledge be absolute, this proves
* This distinction is of great importance in the present controversy ; and the
want of attending to the true ground on which it stands, has been, we presume,
the principal cause of Dr. Whitby's objections, and those of most, if not al),
other Arminian writers. They seem to consider, in this argument, no other ne
cessity but the decretive, as maintained by their opponents ; and therefore inferi
that to allow any kind of necessity, is the same as to allow an infallible decree.
From this view the transition is easy to another conclusion, viz. that if any thing
is foreknown because it is decreed, every thing is foreknown on the same ground,
or for the same reason. — And then, this proving too much — the decretive appoint
ment of all the evil in the universe, which they are sure is incompatible with the
divine character, and therefore impossible — they reject the whole doctrine of ne
cessity as a ground of foreknowledge ; and suppose that, though they cannot
clearly disprove what is advanced against them, they infer that there is somehow a
sophism in the reasoning of their opponents, or sorae false principle assumed, were
they but happy enough to detect it.
But our author, in this reasoning, does not maintain, that the connection by
which every event is evidently certain, and therefore necessary, ia so because de
creed. The truth ia, that some events are foreknown to be certain because foreor
dained ; and others, because of the tendency there is in the nature of the things
themselves. — Should any, in the way of objection, assert, that the nature of things
is itself derived from the divine wiU, or decree ; we apprehend there is no evidence
to support such an assertion. For instance, ia it owing to a decree that the nature
of any created being is dependent on the first cause ' That a creature, however
exalted, is not infinite 7 That any relatim. shotild subsist between the Creator and
a creature? Or that, if equal qnaaitities be taken from equal quantities, the re
mainders wilLhe-ecitnil ? Is there any room, in thought, for a supposition of any
decree in the case ? • Nay more, does it appear possible for a decree to have made
such things otherwise ?.
Let it be observed, however, that God is the Alraighty Sovereign over nature
— not indeed so far as to alter the nature of things, which in reality is no object
of power, any more tlian to make spirit to be the same thing as matter, and vice
versa, or the working of contradictions is an object of power, but — by the position
of antecedents, and establishing premises. To illustrate this, let it be supposed,
IF God create a world, that world -mmt depend upon him, as a necessary conse
quence. To deny this, is to deny the nature and identity of things. For what is
it to create, but for an independent cause to impart, ad extra, a dependent exis
tence ? So that to deny dependence, is to deny creation. But though the conse
quence be necessary, if the antecedent be established ; yet the antecedent itself is
"not necessary, except from decree ; for there is not, 4n the nature of things, any
antecedent necessity that a world be created. That is, to suppose its non-exis
tence implies no contradiction, it being evidently the effect of sovereign pleasure.
Hence to deny the consequence, on supposition of the antecedent, is to deny the
nature of things, and to assert a contradiction, though the antecedent itself be
not necessary. And hence also, in the instance now specified among others innu
merable, the antecedent is an object of decree, but not the consequence. It is
as absurd to say, that God decreed the dependence of the world upon himself,
as it is to say, he decreed that two and two shall be equal to four, rather
than to five.
These remarks, duly considered in their just consequences, will abundantly
shew, that some things are necessary because decreed, — as the creation, the pre
servation, and the government, of the world ; the redemption, the purification,
and the salvation of the church : — and that other things — as all imperfections,
dependence, relations, and especially moral evils— come to be necessary, and so
capable of being foreknown, only by connection, or consequence. That is, if
the antecedent, whioh is under the control of the Almighty Sovereign, be. ad
mitted, the consequence follows infallibly from the nature of things. But if «««-

Sect. xu. Foreknowledge -infers Necessity. 121
the event knovvn to be necessary, or proves that it is impossible
but that fhe event should be, by some means or other, either
by a decree, or some other way, if there be any other way : be
cause, as was said before, it is absurd to say that a proposition
is known to be certainly and infalhbly true, which yet may pos
sibly prove not true.
The whole of the seeming force of this evasion lies in
this ; that, in as much as certain Foreknowledge does not
cause an event to be necessary, as a decree doOs ; therefore it
does not prove it to be necessary, as a decree does. But there
is no force in this arguing : for it is built wholly on this sup
position, that nothing can prove, or be an evidence of a thing-
being necessary, but that which has a causal influence to make
it so. But this can never be maintained. If certain Fore
knowledge of the future existence of an event be not the
thing which first makes it impossible that it should fail of exis
tence ; yet it may, and certainly does demonstrate, that it is
impossible it should fail of it, however that impossibility comes.
If Foreknowledge be not the cause, but the effect of this
impossibility, it may prove that there is such an impossibi
lity, as much as if it were the cause. It is as strong arguing
from the effect to the cause, as from the cause to the effect.
It is enough, that an existence, vvhich is infallibly foreknown,
cannot fail, whether that impossibility arises from the Fore
knowledge, or is prior to it. It is as evident as any thing can
be, that it is impossible a thing, which is infallibly known to
be true, should prove not to be true ; therefore there is a Ne
cessity that it should be otherwise ; whether the Knowledge be
the cause of this Necessity, or the Necessity fhe cause of the
Knowledge. All certain knowledge, vvhether it be Foreknowledge
or After-knowledge, or concomitant Knowledge, proves the
thing known now to be necessary, by some means or other ;
or proves that it is impossible it should now be otherwise
than true.  1 freely allow, that foreknowledge does not
prove a thing to be necessary any more than After-knowledge :
but then After-knowledge, vvhich is certain and infallible,
proves that it is now become impossible but that the proposi
tion known should be true. Certain After-knowledge proves
that it is now, by some means or other, become impossible but
that the proposition, which predicates past existence on the
event, should be true. And so does certain Foreknowledge
J Aer antecedent be • established, another consequence will follow, with equal cer
tainty, also firom the nature of things. For instance ; if Miness be given and
continued to a redeemed creature, as an antecedent ; excellence, honour, and
happiness are the necessary consequences. Bat if sin operate -without control, es
the antecedent, dishonour and misciy must be the necessary consequmc; from
the same cause. — ^W.
vou ir. 1"

12'2 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. PaBT II.
prove, that now, in the time of fhe Knowledge, it is, by some
means or other, become impossible but that the proposition,
which predicates /w^wrc existence on the event, should be true.
The necessity of the truth of the propositions, consisting in
the present impossibility of the non-existence of the event
aflirmed, in both cases, is the immediate ground of the cer
tainty ofthe Knowledge ; there can be no certainty of Know
ledge withouf it.
There must be a certainty in things themselves, before
they are certainly known, or which is the same thing, known
to be certain. For certainty of Knowledge is nothing else
but knowing or discerning the certainty there is in the things.
themselves, which are known. Therefore there must be a
certainty in things to be a ground of certainty of Knowledge,
and to render things capable of being known to be certain.
And there is nothing but the necessity of truth known, or its
being irapossible but thaf it should be true ; or in other words,
fhe firm and infallible connection between the subject and
predicate of the proposition that contains thaf truth. AH ct:-
tainty of Knowledge consists in the view of me firmness of
that connection. So God's certain Foreknowledge of the
future existence of any event, is his view of the firm and
indissoluble connection of the subject and predicate of fhe
proposition that afiirms its future existence. The subject is
that possible event ; the predicate is its future existence, but
if future existence be firmly and indissolubly connected with
thaf event, then the future existence of that event is necessary.
If God certainly knows the future existence of an event which ;
is wholly contingent, and may possibly never be, then He sees
a firm connection between a subject and predicate that are not
firmly connected ; which is a contradiction.
I allow what Dr. Whitby says to be frue, that mere
Knowledge does not affect the thing known, to make it tnore
certain or more future. But yet, I say, if supposes and proves
the thing to be already both future and certain ; i. e. neces
sarily future. Knowledge of futurity supposes futurity ; and
a certain Knowledge of futurity supposes certain futurity an
tecedent fo fhat certain Knowledge. But there is no other
certain futurity of a thing, antecedent to certainty of Know
ledge than a prior impossibility but fhat the thing should prove
true ; or which is the same thing, fhe Necessity of the event.
I would observe one thing further ; that if if be as those
I forementioned writers suppose, that God's Foreknowledge is
I not fhe cause, but the effect of the existence of fhe event
I foreknown ; this is so far from shewing fhat this Foreknow-
1 ledge doth not infer the Necessity of the existence of that
event, that if rather shews the contrary the more plainly.
Because it shews the existence of the event to be so settled

8ect, XII. Foreknowledge infers Necessity. 123
and firm, that it is as if it had already been ; in as much as
in effect it actually exists already ; its future existence has
already had actual influence and efficiency, ajid has produced an
effect, viz. Prescience : the effect exists already ; and as the
effect supposes fhe cause, and depends entirely upon it, there
fore it is as if the future event, which is fhe cause, had existed
already. The effect is firm as possible, it having already fhe
possession of existence, and has made sure of it. But the
effect cannot be more firm and stable than its cause, ground
and reason. The building cannot be firmer than the founda
tion. To illustrate this matter ; let us suppose fhe appearances
and images of things in a glass, for instance, a reflecting
telescope, fo be the real effects of heavenly bodies (at a dis
tance, and ouf of sight) which fhey resemble : if if be so then,
as these images in the telescope have had a past actual exis
tence, and it is become utterly impossible now that it should
be otherwise than that they have existed ; so they being fhe
true effects of the heavenly bodies they resemble, this proves
the existeface of those heavenly bodies to be as real, infallible,
firm and necessary, as the existence of these effects ; the one
being connected with, and wholly depending on the other. —
Now lef us suppose future existences, some way or other,
to have influence back, to produce effects beforehand, and
cause exact and perfect images of themselves in a glass, a
thousand years before they exist, yea, in all preceding ages ;
but yet that these images are real effects of these future exis
tences, perfectly dependent on, and connected with their
cause. These effects and images having already had actual
existence, render that matter of their existence perfectly firm
and stable, and utterly impossible to be otherwise : and this
proves, as in the other instance, that the existence of the
things, which are their causes, is also equally sure, firm and
necessary ; and that it is alike impossible but that fhey should
be, as if they had been already, as their effects have. And if
instead of images in a glass, we suppose the antecedent effects
to be perfect ideas of them in the Divine Mind which have
existed there from all eternity, vvhich are as properly effects,
as truly and properly connected with their cause, the case is
nof altered. Another thing which has been said by some Arminians,
to take off the force of what is urged from God's Prescience,
against the Contingence of the volitions of moral agents, is
to this purpose ; " That when we talk of Foreknowledge in
God, there is no strict propriety in our so speaking ; and that
although it be true, that there is in God the most perfect
Knowledge of all events from eternity fo eternity, yet there is
no such thing as before and after in God, but He sees all things

124 PREEDOM OP THE WILL. pAKT II-
by one perfect unchangeable view, without any succession."—
To this I answer,
1. It has been already shown, that all certain Knowledge
proves the Necessity of the truth known ; whether it be before,
after, or at the same time. — Though it be true, that there is
no succession in God's Knowledge, and the manner of his
Knowledge is to us inconceivable, yet thus much we know
concerning it, that there is no event, past, present, or to come,
that God is ever uncertain of. He never is, never was, and
never will be without infallible Knovvledge of it ; He always
sees the existence of it to be' certain and infallible. And as
he always sees things just as they are in truth ; hence there
never is in reality any thing contingent in such a sense, as
that possibly it may happen never to exist. If, strictly speak
ing, there is no Foreknowledge in God, it is because those
things which are future to us, arc as present, to God, as if
they already had existence : and that is as much as to say,
thaf future events are always in God's view as evident, clear,
sure and necessary, as if they already were. If there never
is a time wherein the existence of the event is not present
with God, then there never is a time wherein it is not as much
impossible for it to fail of existence, as if its existence were
present, and were already come to pass.
God viewing things so perfectly and unchangeably, as that
there is no succession in his ideas or judgment, does not hinder
but that there is properly now, in the mind of God, a certain
and perfect Knowledge of the moral actions of men, which to
us are an hundred years hence : yea the objection supposes
this ; and therefore it Certainly does not hinder but that, by the
foregoing arguments, it is now impossible these moral actions
should net come to pass.
We know, that God Foreknows the future voluntary ac
tions of men, in such a sense, as that he is able particularly to
foretell them and cause them to be recorded, as He often has
done; and therefore that necessary connection which there is
between God's Knowledge and the event known, as much
proves the event to be necessary beforehand, as if the Divine
Knowledge were in the same sense before the event, as the
prediction or writing is. If the Knowledge be infallible, then
the expression of it in the written prediction is infallible ; that
is, there is an infallible connection between the written predic
tion and the event. And if so, then it is impossible it should
ever be otherwise, than that the prediction and the event should
agree : and this is the same thing as to say, it is impossible but
that the event should come to pass : and this is the same as to
say that its coming to pass is necessary. So thaf it is manifest,
that there being no proper successiori in God's mind, makes no

Sect. xn. ' Foreknowledge infers Necessity. 125
alteration as to the Necessity of the existence of the events
known, ^ea,
2. This is so far from weakening the proof given of the im
possibility of future events known not coming to pass, as that
it establishes the foregoing arguments, and shews the clearness
of the evidence. For,
{\.) The very reason, why God's Knowledge is without
succession is, because it is absolutely perfect, to the highest
possible degree of clearness and certainty. All things, whether
past, present, or to come, being viewed with equal evidence
and fulness : future things being seen with as much clear
ness, as if they were present ; the view is always in absolute
perfection ; and absolute constant perfection admits of no alte
ration, and so no succession ; the actual existence of the
thing known, does not at all • increase, or add to the clear
ness or certainty of the thing known : God calls the things
that are not, as though they were ; they are all one to him as
if they had already existed. But herein consists the strength
of the demonstration before given ; that it is as impossible
they should fail of existence, as if they existed already. This
objection, instead of weakening the argument, sets it in the
strongest light ; for it supposes it to be so indeed, that the
existence of future events is in God's view so much as if it
already had been, thaf when they come actually to exist, it
makes not the least alteration or variation in his Knowledge of
them. (2.) The objection is founded on the immutability of God's
Knowledge : for it is the immutability of Knowledge that
makes it to be without succession. But this most directly and
plainly demonstrates the thing 1 insist on, viz. that it is utterly
impossible the known events should fail of existence. For if
that w^re possible, then a change in God's Knowledge and
view of things were possible. For if the known event should
not come into being, as God expected, then He would see it,
and so would change his mind, and see his former mistake ;
and thus there would Tie change and succession in his Know
ledge. But as God is immutable, and it is infinitely impossi
ble that his view should be changed ; so it is, for the same rea
son, just so impossible thaf the foreknown event should not
exist ; and that is to be impossible in the highest degree ; and
therefore the contrary is necessary. Nothing is more impossi
ble than that the immutable God should be changed, by the
succession of time ; who comprehends all things, from eternity
to eternity, in one, most perfect, and unalterable view ; so that
his whole eternal duration is vita inter minabilis, tota, simul et
perfecta possessio.
On fhe whole, I need not fear to say, thaf there is no geo
metrical theorem or proposition whatsoever, more capable of

126 PREEDOM OF THE WILL. PaRT-II.
Strict demonstration, than that God's certain Prescience of the
volitions of moral agents is inconsistent with such a Contin
gence of these events, as is without all Necessify ; and so is
inconsistent with the Arminian notion of liberty.
Corol. 2. Hence the doctrine of the Calvinists, concern
ing the absolute decrees of God, does not at all infer any more
fatality in things, than will demonstrably follow from the
doctrine of the most Arminian divines, who acknowledge
God's omniscience, and universal Prescience. Therefore all
objections fhey make against the doctrine of the Calvinists,
as implying Hobbes' doctrine of Necessity, or the stoical
doctrine of fate, lie no more against the doctrine of Calvinists,
than their own doctrine : and therefore it doth nof become those
divines to raise such an outcry against the Calvinists, on this
account. Corol. 3. Hence all arguments of Arminians, who own
God's omniscience, against the doctrine of the inabihty of
unregenerate men to perform the conditions of salvation and
the commands of God requiring spiritual duties, and against
the Calvinistic doctrine of efficacious grace ; on this ground
that those doctrines, though they do not suppose men to be
under any constraint or co-action, yet suppose them under
Necessity, must fall to the ground. And their arguments
against the Necessity of men's volitions, taken from the rea
sonableness of God's commands, promises, and threatenings,
and' the sincerity of his counsels and invitations ; and all ob
jections against any doctrines of the Calvinists as being incon
sistent with human liberty, because they infer Necessity; I
say, all fhese arguments and objections must be justly esteem
ed vain and frivolous, as coming from them ; being levelled
against their own doctrine, as well as against thaf of the Cal
vinists.* * In these two sections our author has abundantly demonstrated, that fore
knowledge infers necessity ; such a necessity as exists in the connection of a con
sequent with its antecedent ; and has represented, in various lights, how the most
contradictory and absurd conclusions follow from the opposite hypothesis. But
as his argument, strictly speaking, did not require a further explanation or distinc
tion of the principles on which it rested, which yet are important, it may not be
improper in this place briefly to enquire into the rationale of those principles ; by
which his reasoning may appear with additional evidence, and the radical princi
ples themselves confirraed by their connection with others. As these reraarks are
presented in the form of a series analytically disposed, we shall prefix to thera the
corresponding ordinal nurabers.
1. .Any land of necessity is a sufficient ground of foreknowledge, in the view
of omniscience ; but aa ia the Mnd of neceasity, or the nature of the connectim be
tween cauae and effect, so is the nofure of the foreknowledge. But thia diflierence
in the nature ofthe connection affects-r-not the certainty ofthe event, but themoiie
of causation ; or from what cause the certainty arises.
2. All necessity, or certainty of connection between antecedent and conse
quent, must arise from one of these two sources, viz. the natdre op things, or,
tne DECREE OF God. Chance is nothing ; and nothing has no properties, conse
quently has no causal influence.

Sect. xm. Arminian Liberty incmisistent, 137

SECT. XIH.

Whether we suppose the volitions of moral Agents to be con
nected with any Thing antecedent, or not, yet they must
be necessary in such a sense as to overthrow Arminian
Liberty,
Every act of the will has a cause, or it has not. If it has
a cause, then, according to what has already been demon-
3. The necessity which arises from the nature op things, is cither abso
lute or hypothetical. Absolute necessity belongs only to the first cause, or God.
He exists ABSOLUTELY ; and to suppose him not to exist, or not to have existed, is
a contradiction. For the supposition itself is made by a confessedly contingent
being ; but a contingent being necessarily irapliea an absolute being, with as much
certainty as an efiect implies a cause ; and consequently a^rsl cause.
4. The first cause excepted, every other being, or raode of being, or any event
whatever, is only of hypothetical necessity. Any event is necessary, only on
account of its relation to the first cause. This relation, or necessary connection,
between an event and the first cauae is either in the way of contrast, or in the way
of dependence. 5. There are two thinga necessarily related to the first cause by way of con
trast ; passive power, which is a natural evil — if hraited existence, dependence,
and insuiHciency, in their necessary tendency, may be so called — and sin, which is a
moral evil ; or some thing which, in point of obligation, ought not to be.
6. The other mode of necessary relation to the first cause, arising from the na
ture of things, is that of dependence. Every contingent being and event must
necessarily depend upon God, as an effect depends upon its cause. Nor is it con
ceivable without involving the grossest contradiction and absurdity, that any con
tingent being shoidd continue to exist, any more than begin to exist, independent
of the_first cause. Sublata causa, toUitur effectus, is justly entitled to be called an
aximn, in metaphysical science.
7. It vfaa before observed, that all necessity must arise either from the nature
-of thinga, or from the decree of God. What arises from the nature of thinga, as
a consequence, has for its antecedent, either an efficient or a deficient cause.
8. A DEFECT, no less than active efficiency, may be an antecedent, a.a founded
in the nature of things, firom whence a corresponding consequence must follow ;
but there is no defect in any antecedent but may be counteracted by a decree ; so
far counteracted, as that the defect shall not be an operative canse.
9. The purposes of God are a series of antecedents, from whence follow,
by the very nature of things, corresponding good consequences, and good only :
but the defect which ia inseparable from created existence, considered in itself, is
also a cause in the senae of an antecedent ; otherwise a created existence would be
as indefectible as the creating or first cause, which involves the most absurd con
sequences. 10. Defect is either natural or moral ; and each arises frora the nature of
things, as contradistinguished to decree, but in a different manner. Natu
ral DEFECT arises from the nature of things in the way of contrast to God's
natural perfections : whieh contrast forms the primary difference between creator
and creature. 11. This naturid defect ia different from defectibility ; for defectibility expresses,
in strictness, an effect not a cause ; a Uableness to defection. But the question re
turns. What renders a creature liable to defect ? To say. Its liableness to defect, or
its defectibility, assigns ho true cause ; for the question returns as "before, what
makes it liable, what makes it defectible ?

128 FREEDOM OP THE WiLt. PaRT II.
Strafed, it is not contingent, but necessary ; the effect being
necessarily dependent and consequent on its cause, let that
12. Perhaps there ia no term less exceptionable, in order to prevent circum
locution, than Passive power, to express that natural defect, which exists in a
created nature as a controst to the natural (not the moral) perfections of God.
13. Paaaivc power is as inapplicable to God, as it is applicable to a creature ;
for natural perfection is as appUcable to him, as natural imperfection is to us. 
Therefore to say, that a creature ia not the subject of passive power, is the
same aa to say, that it is perfect and indefectible in its nature as God is ;
which is the grossest "pantheism — the deification of every creature, of every atom
that exists.
14. All antecedents originate in either passive power or the di-vine decrees.
From the former proceed, according to the nature of things, all evil consequents ;
from the latter, all good.
15. Moral defect is a contrast to the moral perfections, excellence, or holi
ness of God ; and ariaes, .as a necessary consequence — not frora the divine decree as
its antecedent, but — from the hypothetical nature of things; that is, passive power,
IF not aided by a'decretive interposition, and if also united to liberty of choice in
an accountable being.
16. The re-moval of the antecedent ia the. prerogative of the supreme Lord of
nature ; but if the antecedent be not removed, that is, altered from what it was as
to its causal influence, the consequence can no more be prevented, than the nature
of things can be changed.
17. That mature of things, or that Jiecessjtt; of consequence, whereby the effect
is infallibly connected with ita cause, is nothing else but the essence o/tkuth, ema
nating from the first cause, the God of truth, or the true God.
18. We now observe, that ah event may be necessarily connected with ita
cause by a divine decree. If the divine will contemplate an end, and decree accord
ingly, it necessarily implies that the means, or the antecedents to this consequence,
are decreed. 19. Hence, an event may be necessar)/, either because virtually iZrfermmed by
the divine wW, in a series of antecedents ; or because the nature of things operates
without being affected, as to their causal influence, by decretive antecedents.
20. To suppose any sort, or any degree of defect, to be decreed, ia absurd in
different ways. It is contrary to anestabUshed axiom, that from good nothing but
good can. proceed — and it is absurd to impute that to a divine decree, which antece>
dently arises from the nature of things.
21. In reahty, divine decrees (aa before hinted) are nothing else than a
wonderful chain or series qf positimis, which are so many antecedents,' counter
acting defects arising from the hypothetical nature of things. Whemie it neces
sarily foUows, that if there were no P4 ssive power there could be no divine de
crees. For if good, and only good, arose from thenature of things ; the decree,
which has good only for its object, would be superfluous, and therefore unworthy
of divine volition.
22. Hence also, whatever event is in itself good, is an object of divine decree
in its antecedent ; and the event itself is connected with the decretive position by
the very essence of truth. But whatever is in itself evil arises from the hypotheti
cal nature of things not counteracted by decretive positions.
> 23. In God, his absolutely necessary, eternal, infinite and unchangeable na
ture, is to be regarded as an antecedent; from which all possible happiness is the
necessary consequence. . Such an antecedent is not the result of raere, arbitrary,
or decretive will, but of absolute necessity, but aU antecedents in a creature, or every
causal influence, of which good, or happiness, whether natural or moral, is the
consequence, must be the positions of decretive wiU, as the only possible mode of.
securing a good result.
24. As is the antecedent, so is the consequent ; for the connection is formed
by eternal truth. If therefore a good event, — for instance, a virtuous or holy choice
— be the consequent, the antecedent is a decretive position.
25. In reference to God, the proper and only ground ofinfallible certainty that
hia choice is goodand praiseworthy, is the goodness of his nature. Were we
to admit in thought the possibility of a defectible nature in him, in the same pro
portion must we admit a possible fa,ilure in thc goodness of his choice. And in

Sect. xm. Arminian Liberty inconsistent. 129
cause be what it will. If the cause is the will itsdf, by an
tecedent acts choosing and determining ; still the determined
caused act must be a necessary effect. The act, tliat is the
determined effect of the foregoing act which is its cause,
cannot prevent the efficiency of its cause ; but must be wholly
subject to its determination and comraand, as much as the
motions of the hands and feet. The consequent commanded
acts of the will are as passive and as necessary, with reSpect
to the antecedent determining acts, as the parts of the body
are to the volitions which determine and command them.
And therefore, if all the free acts of the will are all determined
effects determined by the will itself, that is by antecedent choice,
then they are all necessary ; they are all subject fo, and de
reference to a created being, the proper and only ground of certainty that hia choice
will be good, is the antecedent goodness of his nature or disposition. This alone
is a sufficient causal influence ; but the goodness of a creature's disposition can
be secured, as a ground of certainty, only by decretive influence of a na
ture corresponding with the nature of the effect.
26. From these principles and considerations, which can here be but briefly
stated, as necessarily connected with their legitimate consequences, we infer, that
God foresees all good, in every created being, in every mode, in every event, by
the evidence of a decretive necessity ; a necessity resulting firom actual fe-
flux, or perpetual energy, in the position of antecedents, and the essence of trtith
connecting the causal influence with the effect.
27. Prom the same principles we learn, that God foresees or foreknows all
evil — ^however blended with the good, aa the different colours in a pencil of
light are blended — in every being, and in every event where found, by that ne
ceasity which is hypothetical only; a necessity resulting from the nature of
things left to their own causal influence ; which influence, in any given circum
stances, will manifest itself either in the way of contrast, of dependence, or both
united. 28, Again : Volitions are ads of the mind, and each voluntary act is com-
poimded of a natural and moral quality. The natural quality of a voluntary act
proceeds from decretive necessity; for there is nothing in it but what is good, de
creed, and efiected by the first cause. The moral quality of a voluntary act is
either good or evil.
29. A voluntary act moraUy good, is altogether of decretive necessity, both as.
to its physical and moral quality ; and is therefore foreknown because of decretive
appointment and energy. But a voluntary act morally bad, is partly of decretiTe,
and partly of hypothetical necessity, or that of consequence.
30. The physical quality of a voluntary act moraUy bad, is of decretive
necessity, and is foreknown because foreappointed ; but the moral auALiTV of
the same act, or its badness, is foreknown only by relation, connection, or conse
quence. Thus deformity is the absence of beauty, and may be known by the
standard of beauty from which it deviates. Weakness is the absence of strength, .
and may be known by relation. A shadow is known by the interception of rays,
and may be known in the same manner. Darkness is caused by the absence of
light, and may be known by the Ught excluded.
31. How the BAD quality of a moral act may be foreknown by the evidence
of relation, will further appear from the consideration of the nature of moral evil
itself. For what is moral evil, or sin, but What ought not to be, in point of
moral obligation 7 Now for at all knowing, or foreknowing, what ought -not to be,
which is incapable of being decreed, the proper medium or evidence is the know
ledge of what ought to be.
32. If. therefore what ought to be, is known to the omniseient by constituted
relationa, or voluntary appointment ; what aught not to be, raay be kno'yn by evi
dent consequences. — W.
VOL. II. 17

130 PREEDOjr OP TSE will. I'ART ir..
cisively fixed by the fcH-egoing act, which is their cause : yea,
even the determining act itself ; for thaf must be determined
and fixed by another act preceding, if it be a free and vo
luntary act ; and so must be necessary. So fhat by this, aR ,
the free acts of the will are necessary, and cannot be free
unless fhey are necessary : because they cannot be free, ac
cording to the Arminian notion of freedom unless they are
determined by fhe will ; and this is to be determined by ante
cedent choice, which being their cause, proves them necessa
ry. And yet they say. Necessity is utterly inconsistent wifh
Liberty. So thaf, by their scheme, the acts of the will cannot
be free, unless they are necessary, and yet cannot be free if
they be necessary !
But if fhe other part of the dilemma be taken, thaf the
free acts of the will have no cause, and are connected witli
nothing whatsoever thaf goes before and determines them,.
in order to maintain their proper and absolute Contingence,,
and this should be allowed to be possible ; still it will not serve
their turn.. For if the volition come to pass by perfect Con-
tingenccr and without any cause at all, then it is certain no
act of the will, no prior act of the soul was the cause, no de
termination or choice of the soul had any hand in it. The
will, or the soul, was indeed fhe subject of what happened to
it accidentally, but was not the cause. The will is not active
in causing or determining, but purely fhe passive subject j
at least, according to their notion of action and passion. In
this case, Contingence as much prevents the determination
of the will, as a proper cause ; and as to the will, if was ne
cessary, and could be no otherwise. For to suppose that it
could have been otherwise, if the will or soul had pleased, is
to suppose that fhe act is dependent on some prior act of
choice or pleasure ; contrary fo what is now supposed ; it is
to suppose fluit it might have been otherwise, if its cause had
ordered if otherwise. But this does not agree to it having no
cause or orderer at all. That must be necessary as to the
soul, which is dependent on no free act of the soul : but that
which is without a cause, is dependent on no free act of the
soul ; because, by the supposition, it is dependent on nothing,
and is connected with nothing. In such a case, the soul is
necessarily subjected fo what accident brings to pass, from
time to time, as much as the earth, fhat is inactive, is neces
sarily subjected to what falls upon it.. But this does not con
sist with fhe Arminian notion of liberty, which is fhe will's
.power of determining itself in its own acts, and being wholly
active in if, without passiveness, and without being subject
to Necessity. — Thus, Contingence belongs to the Arminian no
tion of Liberty, and yet is inconsistent with it.

Sect. xiii. Aitainian Liberty inconsistent. 131
I would here observe, that the author of the Essay on
ihe Freedom of Will, in God and the Creature, (p. 76, 77,)
says as follows : " The word Chance always means something
done without design. Chance and design stand in direct op
position to each other : and Chance can never be properly
applied to acts of fhe will, which is the spring of all design,
and which designs to choose whatsoever it doth choose, whe
ther there be any superior fitness in the thing which it chooses,
or no ; and it designs tb determine itself to qne thing, where
two things, perfectly equal, are proposed, merely because it
will." But herein appears a very great madvertence. For
if the will be the spring of all design, as he says, then certainly
it is not always the effect of design ; and the acts of the will
themselves must sometimes come to pass, when they do not
spring from design ; and consequently come to pass by Chance,
according to his own definition of Chance. And if the will
designs to choose whatsoever it does choose, and designs to de
termine itself, as he says, then it designs to determine all its de
signs. Which carries us back from one design to a foregoing
design determining that, and to another determining that ; and
so on in infinitum. The very first design must be the effect of
foregoing design, or else it must be by Chance, in his notion
of it. Here another alternative may be proposed, relating to
the connection of the acts of the will with soraething forego
ing that is their cause, not much unlike to the other ; which is
this : either human liberty may well stand with volitions being
necessarily connected with the views of the understanding,
and so is consistent with Necessity ; or it is inconsistent with,
and contrary to such a connection and Necessity. The former
is directly subversive of the Arminian notion of liberty, con
sisting in freedom from all Necessity. And if the latter be
chosen, and it be said, that liberty is inconsistent with any such
necessary connection of volition with foregoing views of the
understanding, it consisting in freedom from any such Necessi
ty of the will as that would imply ; then the liberty.of the soul
consists, partly at least, in freedom from restraint, limitation,
and government, in its actings, by the understanding, and in
liberty and liableness to act contrary to the views and dictates
of the understanding : and consequently the more the soul has
of this disengagedness in its acting, the more liberty. Now let
it be considered to what this brings the noble principle of hu
man liberty, particidarly when it is possessed and enjoyed in its
perfection, viz. a full and perfect freedom and hableness to act
altogether af random, without the least connection with, or res*
traint or government by, any dictate of reason, or any thing
whatsoever apprehended, considered or viewed by the under-

132 PREEDOM OP THE WILL. pART II.
standing ; as being inconsistent with fhe full and perfect sover
eignty of fhe will over its own determinations. — The notion
mankind have conceived of liberty, is some dignity or privilege,
something worth claiming. But what dignity or privilege is
there in being given up to such a wild Contingence as this, to
be perfectly and constantly liable to act unreasonably, and as
much tvifhout the guidance of understanding, as if we had none,
or were as destitute of perceptiop as the smoke that is driven
by the wind !

Bec'x. I. God's moral excellency necessary. 133

PART III.
WHEREIN IS ENQUIRED, WHETHER ANY SUCH LIBERTY OF WILL
AS ARMINIANS HOLD, BE NECESSARY TO MORAL AGENCY,
VIRTUE AND VICE, PRAISE AND DISPRAISE, &c.

SECT. L
God's moral Excellency necessary, yet virtuous and.praise-
ivorthy.
Having considered the first thing proposed, relating to that
freedom of will which Arminians maintain ; namely. Whether
any such thing does, ever did, or ever can exist, I come now
to the second thing proposed to be the subject of enquiry, viz.
Whether any such kind of liberty be requisite to moral agen
cy, virtue and vice, praise and blame, reward and punish
ment, &c.
I shall begin with some consideration of the virtue and
agency of the Supreme moral Agent, and Fountain of all Agen
cy and Virtue.
Dr. WniTBY in his Discourse on the five Points, (p. 14.)
says, " If all human actions are necessary, virtue and vice must
be empty names ; we being capable of nothing that is blame^
worthy, or deserveth praise ; for who can blame a person for
doing only what he could not help, or judge that he deserveth
praise only for what he could not avoid V To the like purpose
he speaks in places innumerable ; especially in his Discourse
on the Freedom of the Will ; constantly maintaining, that a
freedom not only from coaction, but necessity, is absolutely re
quisite, in order to actions being either worthy of blame, or de
serving of praise. And to this agrees, as is well known, the
current doctrine oi Arminian writers, who, in genera], hold that
there is no virtue or vice, reward or punishment, nothing to be
commended or blamed, without this freedom. And yet Dr.
Whitby, (p. 300,) allows, that God is without this freedom ;
and Arminians, so far as I have had opportiinity to observe, ge
nerally aeknowledge, that God is necessarily holy, and his will
Tiecessarilv determined to that which is good,

134 FREEDOM 'OT THE WILL. pART III-
So that, putting these things together, the infinitely holy
God — who always used to be esteemed by God's people not
only virtuous, but a Being in whom is all possible virtue, in the
most absolute purity and perfection, brightness and amiable
ness ; fhe most perfect pattern of virtue, and from whom all
the virtue of others is but as beams from the sun ; and who has
been supposed to be, (being thus every where represented in
Scripture,) on fhe account of his virtue and holiness, infinitely
more worthy to be esteemed, loved, honoured, admired, com
mended, extolled, and praised, than any creature — ^this Being,
according to this notion of Dr, Whitby, and other Arminians,
has no virtue at all ; virtue, when ascribed to Him, is but an
empty name ; and he is deserving of no commendation or
praise ; because he is under necessity. He cannot avoid being
holy and good as he is ; therefore no thanks to him for it. It
seems the holiness, justice, faithfulness, &c. of the Most High,
must not be accounted to be of the nature of thaf which is
virtuous and praiseworthy. They will not deny, that these
things in God are good ; but then we must understand them,
that they are no more virtuous, or of the nature of any thing
commendable, than the good that is in any other being that is
not a moral agent ; as the brightness of fhe sun, and the fer
tility of fhe earth, are good, but not virtuous, because these
properties are necessary to fhese bodies, and nof the fruit of
self-determining power.
There needs no other confutation of this notion, fo Chris
tians acquainted wifh the Bible, but only stating and particu
larly representing if. To bring texts of Scripture, wherein
God is represented as in every respect in the highest manner
virtuous, and supremely praiseworthy, would be endless, and is
altogether needless to such as have been brought up in the
light of the Gospel.
It were to be wished, thaf Dr. Whitby and other divines
of the same sort had explained themselves, when they have
asserted, that that which is necessary, is not deserving of praise;
at the same time thaf fhey have owned God's perfection to be
necessary, and so in effect representing God as not deserving
praise. Certainly, if their words have any meaning at all, by
praise, they must mean the exercise or testimony of esteem,
respect,- or honourable regard. And will they then say, that
men are worthy of that esteem, respect, and honour for their
virtue, small and imperfect as it is, which yet God is not wor
thy of, for his infinite righteousness, holiness and goodness ?
If so, it must be because of some sort of peculiar Excellency
in the virtuous man, which is his prerogative, wherein he really
has the preference ; some dignity, that is entirely distinguish
ed from any Excellency or amiableness in God ; not in
dependence, but m pre-eminence; which, therefore, he does

Sect. i. God's moral Excellency necessary, ^c. 135
not receive from God, nor is God the fountain or pattern of
it; nor can God, in that respect, stand in competition with
him, as the object of honour and regard ; but man may claim
a peculiar esteem, commendation and glory, to which God
can have no pretension. Yea, God has no right, by virtue of
his necessary holiness, to intermeddle vvith that grateful respect
and praise, due fo fhe virtuous man, who chooses virtue in the
exercise of a freedom ad utrumque; any more, than a precious
stone, which cannot avoid being hard and beautiful.
And if if be so, let it be explained what that peculiar
respect is, thaf is due to the virtuous man, which differs in
nature and kind, in some way of pre-eminence, from all thaf
is due to God. What is the name or description of that pecu
har affection ? Is it esteem, love, admiration, honour, praise,
or gratitude? The Scripture every where represents God as
the highest object of all these: there we read of the soul
magnifying the Lord, of " loving Him with all the heart, with
all the soul, with all the mind, and with all the strength ;"
admiring him, and his righteous acts, or greatly regarding
them, as marvellous and wonderful; honouring, glorifying,
exalting, extolling, blessing, thanking and praising him ; giv
ing unto him all the glory of the good which is done or re
ceived, rather than unto men ; " that no flesh should glory in
his presence ; but that he should be regarded as the Being to
whom all glory is due. What then is that respect ? What
passion, affection, or exercise is it, that Arminians call praise,
diverse from all these things, which men are worthy of for
their virtue, and which God is not worthy of in any degree ?
If that necessity which attends God's moral perfections
and actions, be as inconsistent with being worthy of praise, as
a necessity of co-action ; as is plainly imphed in, or inferred
frora Dr. Whitby's discourse ; then why should we thank
God for his goodness, any more than if he were forced to be
good, or any more than we should thank one of our fellow-
creatures who did us good, not freely, and of good will, or
from any kindness of heart, but from mere compulsion, or
extrinsical necessity ? Arminians suppose that God is ne
cessarily a good ,and gracious Being ; for this they make the
ground of some of their main arguments against many doc
trines maintained by Calviriists ; they say these are certainly
false, and it is impossible they should be true, because they
are not consistent with the goodness of God. This supposes,
that it is impossible but that God should be good : for if it be
possible that He should be otherwise, then that impossibility of
the truth of these doctrines ceases, according to their own
argument. N Thaf virtue in God is not, in the most proper sense, re-
ivardable, is not for want of merit in his moral perfections and

l36 FREEDOM OP THE WILL. PaRT III,
actions, sufiicient fo deserve rewards from his creatures ; but
because He is infinitely above all capacity of receiving
any reward. He is already infinitely and unchangeably happy^
and we cannot be profitable unto him. But still he is worthy
of our supreme benevolence for his virtue: and would be
worthy of our beneficence, which is the fruit and expression
of benevolence, if our goodness could extend to Him. If God
deserves to be. thanked and praised for his goodness. He
would for the same reason, deserve that we should also requite
his kindness if that were possible. " What shall I render unto
the Lord for all his benefits ?" is the natural language of thank
fulness : and so far as in us lies, it is our duty to render again
according to benefits received. And that we might have op
portunity for so natural an expression of our gratitude fo
God as beneficence, notwithstanding his being infinitely above
our reach ; He has appointed others to be his receivers, and to
stand in his stead as the objects of our beneficence : such are
especially our indigent brethren.

SECT. II.
The acts of the Will ofthe human soul of Jesus Christ, neces
sarily holy, yet truly virtuous, praise-worthy, rewardable, ^c.
I have already considered how Dr. Whitby insists upon
it, that a freedom not only from co-action but necessity, is
requisite either to virtue or vice, praise or dispraise, reward or
punishment. He also insists on the same freedom as abso
lutely requisite to a person being the subject of a law, of
precepts, or prohibitions; in the book beJFore-mentioned, (p.
301, 314, 328, 339, 340, 341, 342, 347, 361, 373, 410.) And
of promises and threatenings, (p. 298, 301, 305, 311, 339, 340^
363.) And as requisite to a state of trial, p. 297, &c.
Now therefore, with an eye to these things, I would en
quire into the moral conduct and practices of our Lord Jesus
Christ, which he exhibited in his human nature, in his state of
humiliation. And first, I would shew, fhat bis holy behaviour
was necessary ; or that it was impossible it should be otherwise,
than that He should behave himself holily, and that he should
be perfectly holy in each individual act ofhis life. And second
ly, that his holy behaviour was properly ofthe nature oi virtue,
and was worthy of praise; and that he was the subject oilam,
precepts or commands, promises and rewards ; and that he was
in a state of trial.
I. It was impossible, that the Acts of the Will of Christ's
human soul should, in any instance, degree or circumstance, be

Sect. ii. Christ's Volitions necessarily holy, t^c. 137
otherwise than holy, and agreeable to God's nature and will.
The following things make this evident.
I. God had promised so effectually to preserve and uphold
Him by his Spirit, under all his temptations, that he could not
fail of the end for which he came into the world ; but he would
have failed, had he fallen into sin. We have such a promise,
(Isai. xliii. 1, 2, 3, 4.) " Behold my Servant, whom I uphold ;
mine Elect, in whom my soul delighteth : I have put my Spi
rit upon him : He shall bring forth judgment to the Gentiles :
He shall not cry, nor lift up, nor cause his voice to be heard in
the street. — He shall bring forth judgment unto truth. He
shall not fail, nor be discouraged, till He have set judgment in
the earth ; and the isles shall wait his lavV." This promise of
God's Spirit put upon Him, and his not crying and lifting up
his voice', <^c. relates fo the time of Christ's appearance on
earth ; as is manifest from the nature of the promise, and also
the appheation of it in the New Testament, {Matt. xii. 18.)
And the words imply a promise of his being so upheld by
God's Spirit, that he should be preserved from sin ; particularly
from pride and vainglory ; and from being overcome by any
temptations he should be under to affect the glory of this
world, the pomp of an earthly prince, or the applause and
praise of men : and that he should be so upheld, that he should
by no means fail of obtaining the end of his coming into the
world, of bringing forth judgment unto victory, and establish
ing his kingdom of grace in the earth. And in the following
verses, this promise is confirmed, wifh fhe greatest imaginable
solemnity. " Thus saith the Lord, he that created the hea
vens, and stretched them out ; He that spread forth l;he earth,
and that which cometh out of it ; He that giveth breath unto
the people upon it, and spirit to them that walk therein : I the
Lord have called thee in righteousness, and v/ill hold thine
hand ; and will keep thee, and give thee for a Covenant of the
people, for a Light of the Gentiles, to open the blind eyes, to
bring out the prisoners from the prison, and them that sit in
darkness out of the prison-house. I am Jehovah, that is my
name, &:c."
Very parallel with these promises is another {Isai. xlix. 7,
8, 9.) which also has an apparent respect to the time of Christ's
humiliation on earth. — " Thus saith the Lord, the Redeemer of
Israel, and his Holy One, to him whom man despiseth, to him
whom the nation abhorreth, to a servant of rulers ; kings shall
see and arise, princes also shall Worship ; because of the Lord
that is faithful, and the Holy One of Israel, and he shall choose ,
thee. Thus saith the Lord, in an acceptable time have I heard
thee ; in a day of salvation have I helped thee ; and I will pre-
serve thee, and give thee for a covenant of the people, to esta
blish fhe earth, &c."
VOL. ir. 18

138 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. PaRT III.
And in Isai. 1. 5 — 6. we have the Messiah expressing his
assurance that God would help him, by so opening his ear, or in
clining his heart to God's commandments that he should not be
rebeUious, but should persevere, and not apostatize, or turn his
back : thaf through God's help he should be immoveable in obe
dience, under great trials of reproach and suffering ; setting
his face like a flint: so fhat he knew he should not be ashamed^
or frustrated in his design ; and finally should be approved and
justified, as having done his work faithfully. '^ The Lord hath
opened mine ear ; so fhat 1 was nof rebellious, neither turned
away my back : I gave my back f o fhe smifers, and my cheeks
to them that plucked off the hair ; I hid not my face from
shame and spiffing. For the Lord God will help me ; there
fore shall I not be confounded : therefore have I set my face as
a flint, and I know that I shall not be ashamed. He is near
that jusfifieth me : who will contend with me ? Let us stand
together. Who is mine adversary ? Let him come near fo me.
Behold the Lord God will help me : who is he that shall con
demn' me ? Lo, they shall all wax old as a garment, fhe moflr
shall eat them up."
2. The same thing is evident from all the promises which
God made to the Messiah, of his future glory, kingdom, and
success, in his office and character of a Mediator : which glory
could nof have been obtained, if his holiness had failed, and
he had been guilty of sin. God's absolute promise makes the
tilings promised necessary and their failing fo take place ab
solutely impossible : and, in like manner, it makes those things
necessary, on which the thing promised depends, and without
which it cannot take effect. Therefore it appears thaf if was
utterly impossible that Christ's holiness should fail from such
absolute promises as these, {Psal. cx. 4.) " The Lord hath
sworn, and will not repent, thou art a priest forever, after the
order of Melchizedec." And from every other promise in that
psalm, contained in each verse of it. (And Psal. ii. 6, 7.) " I
will declare the decree : The Lord hath said unto me. Thou
art my son, this day have 1 begotten thee : Ask of me, and I
will give thee the heathen for thine inheritance, &:c." {Psah
xiv. 3, 4, &c.) " Gird thy sword on thy thigh, O most mighty,
with thy glory and thy majesty ; and in thy majesty ride pros
perously." And so every thing thaf is said from thence to the
end of the psalm. (See Isai. iii. 13 — 15. and Iiii. 10 — 12.)
And all those promises which God makes to the Messiah, of
success, dominion and glory in the character of a Redeemer^
{Isai. chap, xlix.)
3. If was often promised to the church of God of old, for
their comfort, that God would give them a righteous, sinless
Saviour. (Jer. xxiii. 5, 6.) " Behold, "the days come, saith
fhe Lord, that I wiJl raise up unto David a righteous branch ?

Sect. II, Christ's Volitions necessarily holy, i^c, 139
and a king shall reign and prosper, and shall execute judgment
and justice in the earth. In his days shall Judah be saved,
and Israel shall dwell safely. And this is the name whereby
He shall be called. The Lord our righteousness." (So Jer.
xxxiii. 15.) I will cause the branch of righteousness to grow
up unto David ; and he shall execute judgment and righteous
ness in the land." (Isai. xi. 6, 7.) " F^r unto us a child is
born ; — upon the throne of David and of his kingdom, to order
it, and to estabhsh it with judgment and justice, from hence
forth, even for ever : the zeal of the Lord of hosts will do this."
(Chap. xi. 1. &c.) " There shall come forth a rod out of the
stem of Jesse, and a branch shall grow ouf of his roots ; and
.the Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, — the spirit of
knowledge, and the fear of the Lord: — with righteousness
shall he judge fhe poor, and reprove with equity : — Righteous
ness shall be the girdle of his loins, and faithfiilness the girdle
of his reins." (Chap. lii. 13.) " My servant shall deal pru
dently." (Chap. Iiii. 9.) " Because he had done no violence,
neither was guile found in his mouth." If it be impossible
that these promises should fail, and it be easier for heaven and
earth to pass away, than for one jot or tittle of them to pass
away, then it was impossible that Christ should commit any
sin.  Christ himself signified, that it was impossible but that
the things which were spoken concerning him, should be fulfill
ed. (Luke xxiv. 44.) " That all things must be fulfilled, which
were written in the law of Moses, and in the prophets, and in
the psalms concerning me." (Matt. xxvi. 53, 54.) " But how
then shall the scripture be fulfilled, that thus it must be ?" (Mark
xiv. 49.) " But the scriptures must be fulfilled." And so the
apostle, (Acts i. 16, 17.) " This scripture must needs have been
fulfilled." 4. All the promises, which were made to fhe church of
old, of the Messiah as a future Saviour, from thaf made to our
first parents in paradise, to that which was delivered by the
prophet Malachi, shew it to be impossible that Christ should
not have persevered in perfect holiness. The ancient pre
dictions given to God's church, of the Messiah as a Saviour,
were of the nature of promises ; as is evident by the predic
tions themselves, and the manner of delivering them. But
they are expressly, and very often called promises in the New
Testament ; (as in Luke i. 54, 55, 72, 73. Acts xiii. 32, 33. Rom.
i. 1 — 3. and chap. xv. 8. Heb. vi. 13, &c.) These promises
were often made with great solemnity, and confirmed with
an oath ; as (Gen. xxii. 16, 17.) " By myself have I sworn,
saith the Lord, that in blessing, I will bless thee, and in mul
tiplying, I will multiply thy seed as the stars of heaven and
as the sand which is upon the sea-shore :  ^And in thy seed
shall all the nations of the earth be blessed." (Compare Luke

140 FREEDOM OP THE WILL, PaRT 111'
i, 72, 73. and Gal. iii. 8, 15, 16.) The Apostle in Heb. vi. 17^
18. speaking of this promise to Abraham, says, "Wherein
God willing more abundantly fo shew to the heirs of promise
the immutability of his counsel, confirmed it by an oath ; thaf
by two immdtable things, in which if was impossible for
God to lie, we might thave strong consolation,'^ In which
words, the necessity:^ of the accomplishment, or (which is the
same thing) the impossibility of fhe contrary, is fully declared.
So God confirmed the promise of the Messiah's great salva
tion, made to David, by an oath ; (Psal. Ixxxix. 3, 4.) " I
have made a covenant with my chosen, I have sworn unto
David my servant; thy seed will 1 establish forever, and
build up thy throne to all generations." There is nothing so
abundantly set forth in scripture, as sure and irrefragable, as
this promise and oath to David. (See Psalm Ixxxix. 34~-364
3 Sam. xxiii. 5. Isai. Iv. 4. Acts ii. 29, 30. and xiii. 34.) The
scripture expressly speaks of if as utterly impossible that this
promise and oath to David, concerning the everlasting domi
nion of the Messiah should fail. (Jer. xxxiii 15, &c.) " In those
days, and at that time, I will cause the Branch of Righteous
ness to grow up unto David. — For thus saith fhe Lord, David
shall never want a man to sif upon the throne of the House of
Israel." (Ver. 20, 21.) " If you can break my covenant of the
day, and my covenant of the night, and fhat there should not
be day and night in their season ; then may also my covenant
be broken with David my servant, fhat He should not have a
son to reign upon his throne." (So in ver. 25, 26.) Thus abun
dant is fhe Scripture in representing how impossible it was, that
the promises made of old concerning the great salvation and
kingdom of the Messiah should fail : which implies, that if was
impossible that this Messiah, the second Adam, the promised
seed of Abraham and of David, should fall from his integrity
as fhe first Adam did.
5. All fhe promises that were made to the Church of God
under the Old Testament, of the great enlargement of the
Church, and advancement of her glory in the days of fhe Gos
pel, after the coming of fhe Messiah ; the increase of her light,
liberty, holiness, joy, triumph over her enemies, &c. of which
so great a part of the Old Testament consists; which. are re
peated so often, are so variously exhibited, so frequently intro
duced with great pomp and solemnity, and are so abundantly
sealed with typical and symbolical representations ; I say all
these promises imply that the Messiah should perfect the work
of redemption : and this implies, thaf he should persevere.in
the work, which the Father had appointed Him, being in all
things conformed fo his Will. These promises were offen con
firmed by an oath. (See Isai. liv. 9. with the context ; chap.
Ixii. 18.) And it is represented as utterly impossible that these

Sect. ii. Christ's Volitions necessarily holy, <^c. 141
promises should fail. {Isa. xlix. I'i. with thc context, chap, liv,
10. with the context ; chap. li. 4 — 8^ chap. xl. 8. with the con
text.) And therefore it was impossible, thaf the Messiah should
fail, or commit sin.
6. It was impossible that the Messiah should fail of perse
vering in integrity and holiness, as the first Adam did, because
this would have been inconsistent with the promises, which
God made to the blessed Virgin, his mother, and to her hus
band ; implying, that he should " save his people from their
sins," that God would " give Him the throne of his Father
David," that he should " reign over the house of Jacob for
ever ;" and that " of his kingdom there shall be no end." — -
These promises were sure, and it was impossible they should fail.
And therefore the Virgin Mary, in trusting fully to them, acted
reasonably, having an immoveable foundation of her faith ; as
Elizabeth observes, (ver. 45) " And blessed is she that believeth ;
for there shall be a performance of those things, which were
told her from the Lord."
7. That it should have been possible that Christ should sin,
and so fail in the work of our redemption, does not consist
with the eternal purpose and decree of God, revealed in the
Scriptures, thaf He would provide salvation for fallen man in
and by Jesus Christ, and that salvation should be offered to sin
ners through the preaching of fhe Gospel. Thus much is im
plied in many Scriptures, (as 1 Cor. ii. 7. — Eph. i. 4. 5. and
chap. iii. 9 — 11. — 1 Pet. i. 19, 20.) Such an absolute decree
as this, Arminians allow to be signified in many texts ; their
election of nations and societies, and general election of the
Christian Church, and conditional election of particular per
sons, imply this. God could not decree before the foundation
of the world, to save all that should beUeve in and obey Christ,
unless he had absolutely decreed, that salvation should be pro
vided, and effectually wrought out by Christ. And since (as
the Arminians themselves strenuously maintain,) a decree of
God infers necessity ; hence if became necessary that Christ
should persevere and actually work out salvation for us, and that
he should not fail by the commission of sin.
8. That it should have been possible for Christ's Holiness
to fail, is not consistent with what God promised to his Son,
before all ages. For thaf salvation should be offered to men,
through Christ, and bestowed on all his faithful followers, is at
least implied in fhat certain and infaUible promise spoken of by
the apostle (Tit. i. 2.) " In hope of eternal life ; which God,
that cannot lie, promised before the world began." This does
nof seem to be controverted by Arminians.*
9. That it should be possible for Christ to fail of doing his
* See Dr. Whitet on the five Points, p. 48, 49, 50.

142 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. PaRT III,
Father's WiU, is inconsistent with the promise made to the Fa
ther by the Son, the Logos that was with fhe Father from
the beginning, before he took the human nature : as may
be seen in Psa. xl. 6 — 8, (compared with the apostle's inter
pretation, Heb. X. 5 — ^9.) " Sacrifice and offering thou didst
not desire : mine ears hast thou opened, (or bored ;) burnt-
offering and sin-offering Thou hast not required. Then said I,
Lo, 1 come ; in the volume of the book it is written of me, I
delight to do thy Will, O my God, yea, thy law is within my
heart." Where is a manifest allusion to the covenant, which
the wiUing servant, who loved his master's service, made with
his master, to be his servant for ever, on the day wherein he
had his ear bored ; which covenant was probably inserted in
the public records, caUed the Volume of the Book, by the
judges who were caUed to take cognizance of the transaction ;
{Exod. xxi.) If the Logos, who was with the Father before the
world, and who made the world, thus engaged in covenant to
do the Will of the> Father in the human nature, and fhe promise
was as it were recorded, that it might be made sure, doubtless
it was impossible fhat it should faU ; and so it was impossible
that Christ should fail of doing the WiU of the Father in the
human nature.
10. If it was possible for Christ to have failed of doing the
WiU of his Father, and so f o have failed of effectually working
out redemption for sinners, then the salvation of all the saints
who were saved from the beginning of the world fo the death
of Christ, was not built on a firm foundation. The Messiah,
and the redemption which He was to work out by his obedience
unto death, was the saving foundation of aU thaf ever were
saved. Therefore, if when the Old Testament saints had the
pardon of their sins and the favour of God promised them,
and salvation bestowed upon them, still it was possible that the
Messiah, when he came, might commit sin, then all this was on
a foundation that was not firm and stable, but liable to fail ;
something which it was possible might never be. God did, as
it were, trust to what his Son had engaged and promised to do
in future time, and depended so much upon it, that He pro
ceeded actually fo save men on the account of it, as though it
had been already done. But this trust and dependence of
God, on the supposition of Christ's being liable to fail of doing
his Will, was leaning on a staff that was weak, and might pos
sibly break. The saints of old trusted on the promises of a
future redemption fo be wrought out and completed by the
Messiah, and built their comfort upon it : Abraham saw
Christ's Day, and rejoiced ; and he and fhe other Patriarchs
died in the faith of fhe promise of it. {Heb. xi. 13.) But on
this supposition, their faith, their comfort, and their salvation,
was biiUt on a fallible foundation ; Christ was not to them " a

Sect. ii. Christ's Volitions necessarily holy, ^c. 143
tried stone, a sure foundation ;" (Isai. xxviii. 16.) David en
tirely rested on the covenant of God with him, concerning the
future glorious dominion and salvation of the Messiah ; and
said it was all his salvation, and all his desire , and comforts
himself that this covenant was an " everlasting covenant, or
dered in all things and sure," (2 Sam. xxiii. 5.) But if Christ's
virtue might fad, he was mistaken : his great comfort was not
built so sure," as he thought it was, being founded entirely
on the determinations of the Free- Will of Christ's human soul ;
which was subject to no necessity, and might be determined
either one way or the other. Also the dependence of those who
" looked for redemption in Jerusalem, and waited for the conso
lation of Israel," {Luke ii. 25 and 38.) and the confidence of
the disciples of Jesus, who forsook all and followed him, that
they might enjoy the benefits of his future kingdom, were bmlt
on a sandy foundation.
11. The man Christ Jesus, before he had finished his
course of obedience, and while in the midst of temptations
and trials, was abundant in positively predicting his own fu
ture glory in his kingdom, and the enlargement of his church,
the salvation of the Gentiles through him, &;c. and in promises
pf blessings he would bestow on his true disciples in his future
kingdom ; on which promises he required the fuU dependence
of his disciples. {John xiv.) But the disciples would have no
ground for such dependence, if Christ had been liable to fail
in his work : and Christ himself would have been guilty of
presumption, in so abounding in peremptory promises of great
things, which depended on a mere contingence ; viz. fhe de
terminations of his Free Will, consisting in a freedom ad
utrumque, fo either sin or hohness, standing in indifference,
and incident, in thousands of fiiture instances, to go either one
way or the other.
Thus it is evident, that if was impossible fhat the Acts of the
Will of the human soul of Christ should be otherwise than holy,
and conformed to the Will of the Father ; or, in other words,
they were necessarily so conformed.
I have been the longer in the proof of this matter, it be
ing a thing denied by some of the greatest Arminians, by Epis-
c<?p«Ms in particular ; and because I look upon it as a point
clearly and absolutely determining the controversy between
Calvinists and Arminians,' concerning the necessity of such a
freedom of wUl as is insisted on by the latter, in order f o moral
agency, virtue, comraand or prohibition, promise or threaten
ing, reward or punishment^ praise or dispraise, merit or demerit.
I now therefore proceed,
II. To consider whether Christ, in his holy behaviour on
earth, was not thus a moral agent, subject to commands, pro
mises, <^c.

144 FREEDOM OP THE WILL. PART HI.
Dr. Whitby very ofl;en speaks of what he calls a free
dom ad utrumlibet, without necessity, as requisite to law and
commands; and speaks of necessity as entirely inconsistent
with injunctions and prohibitions. But yet we read of Christ
being the subject of his Father's commands. {John x. 18. and
XV. 10.) And Christ tells us, that every thing that he said or
did, was in compliance with " commandments he had received
ofthe Father;" (John xii. 49, 50. and xiv. 31.) And we often
read of Christ's obedience to his Father's commands, {Rom. v.
19. Phil. ii. 18. Heb. V. 8.)
The forementioned writer represents promises offered as
motives to persons to do their duty, or a being moved and in
duced by promises, as utterly inconsistent with a state wherein
persons have not a liberty ad utrumlibet, but are necessarily
determined to one. (See particularly, p. 298, and 311.) But
the thing which this writer asserts;^ is demonstrably false if
fhe Christian religion be true. If there be any truth in
Christianity or the holy scriptures, fhe man Christ Jesus had
his WiU infallibly and unalterably determined to good, and
thaf alone ; but yet he had promises of glorious rewards made
to him, on' condition of his persevering in, and perfecting the
work which God had appointed him; {Isa. Iiii. 10, 11, 12.
Psa. ii. and cx. Isai. xhx. 7, 8, 9.) In Luke xxii. 28, 29, Christ
says fo his disciples, " Ye are fhey which have continued with
me in my temptations ; and I appoint unto you a kingdom, as
my Father hath appointed unto me." The word most properly
signifies- to appoint by covenant or proniise. The plain mean
ing of Christ's words is this : " As you have partaken of my
temptations and trials, and have been steadfast, and have
overcome ; I promise to make you partakers of my reward,
and to give you a kingdom ; as the Father has promised me a
kingdom for continuing^ steadfast and overcoming in those
trials." And the words are well explained by those in Rev.
iii. 21. " To him that overcometh, will 1 grant to sif with me
on my throne ; even as I also overcame, and am set down with
my Father in his throne." And Christ had not only promises
of glorious success and rewards made to his obedience and
sufferings, but the scriptures plainly represent him as using
these promises for motives and inducements fo obey and suf
fer ; and particularly thaf promise of a kingdom which the
Father had appointed him, or sitting wifh the Father on his
throne ; (as in Heb. xii. 1, 2.) " Lef us lay aside every weight,
and the sin which doth easily beset us, and let us run with
patience the race that is set before us, looking unto Jesus the
author and finisher of our faith ; who for the joy that was sef
before him, endured the cross, despising fhe shame, and is set
down on the right hand ofthe throne of God."

Sect. ii. Christ's Volitions necessarily lioly, ^c. 145
And how strange would it be to hear any Christian assert
that the holy and exceUent temper and behaviour of Jesus
Christ, and that obedience which he performed under such
great trials, was not virtuous or praiseworthy ; because his
Will was not free ad utrumque, to either holiness or sin, but
was unalterably determined to one ; that upon this account
there is no virtue at all in all Christ's humility, meekness,
patience, charity, forgiveness of enemies, conterapt of the
world, heavenly-raindedness, submission to the Will of God,
perfect obedience to his commands unto death, even the
death of the cross, his great compassion to fhe afflicted, his
unparalleled love to mankind, his faithfulness to God and
man under such great trials ; his praying for his enemies even
when nailing him lo the cross ; that virtue, when applied to
these things is but an empty name ; that there was no merit
in any of these things ; that is, that Christ was worthy of
nothing at all on account of them, worthy of no reward, no
praise, no honour or respect from God and man ; because his
Will was not indifferent, and free either to these things or the
contrary ; but under such a strong inclination or bias to the
fhjngs thaf were excellent, as made it impossible that he should
choose fhe contrary ; that upon this account, to use Dr.
Whitby's language, it would be sensibly unreasonable that
the human nature should be rewarded for any of fhese things.
According to this doctrine, that creature who is evidently
set forth in scripture as thefirst-born of every creature, as hav
ing in all things the pre-eminence, and as the highest of all
creatures in virtue, honour, and worthiness of esteem, praise
and glory, on account of his virtue, is less worthy of reward or
praise, than the very least of saints ; yea, no more worthy than
a clock or mere machine fhat is purely passive, and moved by
natural necessity.
If we judge by scriptural representations of things, we
have reason to suppose that Christ took on him our nature,
and dwelt with iis in this world in a suffering state, not only
fo satisfy for our sins, but that he being in our nature and
circumstances, and under our trials, might be our most fit and
proper example, leader and captain, in the exercise of glorious
and victorious virtue, and might be a visible instance of the
glorious end and reward of it ; that we might see in him the
beauty, amiableness, and true honour and glory, and exceed
ing benefit, of that virtue, which it is proper for us human be
ings to practise ; and might thereby learn, and be animated to
seek the like glory and honour, and to obtain the like glorious
reward. (See Heb. ii. 9,-14, with v. 8, 9. and xii. 1, 2, 3.
John xv. 10. Rom. viii. 17. 2 Tim. ii. 11, 12. 1 Pet. ii. 19,20.
and iv. 13.) But if there was nothing of any virtue or merit
or worthiness of any reward, glory, praise, or comlnendation at
VOL, II. 19

146 freedom of thet will. Part hi*
aU, in all that he did, hecause it was all necessary, and he could
not help it ; then how is here any thing so proper to animate
and incite us, free creatures, by patient continuance in well-do
ing, to seek for honour, glory, and virtue ?
God speaks of himself as peculiarly well pleased with
the righteousness of this distinguished servant. (Isai. xiii. 21.)
" The Lord is well pleased for his righteousness sake." The
sacrifices of old are spoken of as a sweet savour fo God, but
the obedience of Christ as far more acceptable than they.
(Psal. xl. 6, 7.) " Sacrifice and offering thou didst not desire :
Mine ear hast thou opened [as thy servant performing willing
obedience ;] burnt-offering and sin-offering hast thou not re
quired : then said 1, Lo, I come [as a servant thaf cheerfully
answers fhe caUs of his master :] I delight to do thy will, O
my God, and thy law is within mine heart." (Matt. xvu. 5.)
" This is my beloved Son, in whom 1 am weU-pleased." And
Christ feUs us expressly, that fhe Father loves him for that
wonderful instance of his obedience, his voluntary yielding
himself to death, in compliance with the Father's command,
(John X. 17, 18.) " Therefore doth my Father love me, be
cause I lay down my life : — No man taketh it from me ; but
I lay if down of myself — This commandment received 1 of my
Father." And if there was no merit in Christ's obedience unto death,
if if was not worthy of praise, and of the most glorious rewards j
the heavenly hosts were exceedingly mistaken, by the account
thaf is given of them, (iJew. v. 8— liJ.) "jThe four beasts and
the four and twenty elders fell down before the Lamb, having
every one of them harps, and golden vials full of odours : — and
they sung a new song, saying. Thou art worthy to fake the
book, land to open the seals thereof ; for thou wast slain. —
And I beheld, and I heard the voice of many angels round
about fhe throne, and the beasts, and the elders, and the num
ber of them was ten thousand times ten thousand, and thou
sands of thousands, saying with a loud voice, worthy is the
Lamb that was slain, to receive power, and riches, and wisdom^.
and strength, and honour, and glory, and blessing."
Christ speaks of fhe eternal life which he was to receive,
, as the reward of his obedience fo fhe Father's commandments.
(John xii. 49, 50.) " I have not spoken of myself ; but the Fa
ther which sent me, he gave me a commandment what I should
say, and what I should speak : and I know that his copimand-
ment is life everlastmg : whatsoever I speak therefore, even as
the Father said unto me, so I speak." — God promises fo divide
him a portion with the great, &c. for his being his righteous
servant, for his glorious virtue under such great trials and afflic
tions, (Isa. Iiii. 11, 12.) " He shall see the travail of his soul
and be satisfied : by his knowledge shall my righteous servant

Sect. ii. Christ's Volitions necessarily holy, ^-c. 147
justify many ; for he shall bear their iniquities. Therefore will
I divide him a portion with the great, and he shall divide the
spoil with the strong, because he hath poured out his soul unto
death." The scriptures represent God as rewarding hira far
above all his other servants, (Phil. ii. 7-— 9.) " He took on him
the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men :
and being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, and
became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross : where
fore God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name
above every name." (Psal. xiv. 7.) " Thou lovest righteous
ness, and hatest wickedness ; therefore God, thy God, hath
anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy feUows."
There is no room fo pretend, that the glorious benefits
bestowed in consequence of Christ's obedience, are not pro
perly of the nature of a reward. What is a reward, in the
most proper sense, but a benefit bestowed in consequence of
something morally excellent in quality or behaviour, in testi
mony of well-pleasedness in that moral excellency, and of
respect and favour on that account ? If we consider the nature
of a reward most strictly, and make the utmost of it, and add
to the things contained in this description proper merit or
worthiness, and the bestowment of the benefit in consequence ¦
of a promise ; still it wUl be found, there is nothing belonging
to it but what the scripture most expressly ascribes to fhe
glory bestowed on Christ, after his sufferings ; as appears
frora what has been already observed : there was a glorious
benefit bestowed in consequence of something morally ex
cellent, being called Righteousness and Obedience ; there was
great favour, love, and well pleasedness, for this righteousness
and obedience, in the bestower ; there was proper merit, or
Worthiness of the benefit, in fhe obedience ; it was bestowed
in fulfilment of promises, made to that obedience ; and was
bestowed therefore, or because he had performed that obedi
ence. I may add to all these things, that Jesus Christ, while here
in fhe flesh, was manifestly in a state of trial. The last Adam,
as Christ is called, (1 Cor. xv. 45. Rom. v. 14.) taking on him
the human nature, and so the form of a servant, and being
under fhe law to stand and act for us, was put into a state of
trial, as the first Adam was. — Dr. Whitby mentions these
three things as evidences of persons being in a state of trial
(on fhe Five Points, p. 289, 299.) namely, their afflictions be
ing spoken of as their trials or temptations, their being the
subjects of promises, and their being exposed to Satan's
temptations. But Christ was apparently the subject of each
of these. Concerning promises made to him, I have spoken
already. The difficulties and afflictions he met with in the
course of his obedience, are called his temptations or trials,

148 freedom of THE WILL. PaRT UI.
(Luke xxii. 28.) " Ye are they which have continued with
me in my temptations or trials." (Heb. ii. 18.) " For in fhat
he himself hath suffered, being tempted [or tried] he is able
to succour them fhat are tempted." And (chap. iv. 15.) "We
have not an high-priest, which cannot be touched with the
feeling of our infirmities ; but was in all points tempted like
as we are, yet without sin." And as to his being tempted by
Satan, it is what none will dispute.

SECT. III.
The case of such as are given up of God to Sin, and of fallen
Man in general, proves moral Necessity and Inability tobe
consistent with Blameworthiness.
Dr. Whitby asserts freedom, not only from coaction, but
necessity, to be essential to any thing deserving the name of
sin, and to an action being culpable; in these words, (Dis
course on Five Points, edit. 3. p. 348.) " If they be thus ne
cessitated, then neither their sins of omission or commission
could deserve that name : it being essential to the nature of
sin, according to St. Austin's definition, thaf it be an action
a quo liberum est abstinere. Three things seem plainly ne
cessary to make an action or omission culpable ; 1. That if be
in our power to perform or forbear it : for, as Origen, and all
fhe Fathers say, no man is blameworthy for not doing what he
could not do." And elsewhere the doctor insists, that " when
any do evil of necessity, what they do is no vice, that they are
*' guUfy of no fault,* are worthy of no blame, dispraise,! or dis-
honour,t but are unblameable."§
If these things are true, in Dr. Whitby's sense of Ne
cessity, fhey will prove all such to be blameless, who are given
up of God to sin, in what they commit after they are thus
given up  That there is such a thing as men being judicially
given up to sin, is certain, if the Scripture rightly informs tis ;
such a thing being often there spoken of : as in Psal. Ixxxi. 12.
"So I gave them up to their own hearts' lust, and they walked
in their own counsels." (Acts vii. 42.) " Then God turned,
and gave them up to worship the host of heaven." (Rom. i. 24.)
" Wherefore, God also gave them up to uncleanness, through
the lusts of their own hearts, to dishonour their own bodies
between themselves." (Ver. 26.) " For this cause God gave
them up to vile affections." (Ver. 28.) " And even as they did
* Discourse on the Five Points, p. 347, 360, 361 , 377, f 303, 326, 329, and many
Other places. 1 371, §304, 361.

Sect. hi. Moral Necessity and Inability consistent. 149
not like fo retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over
fo a reprobate mind, to do those things that are not conve
nient." It is needless to stand particularly to inquire, what God's
" giving men up to their own hearts' lusts" signifies , it is suf
ficient to observe, that hereby is certainly meant God so
ordering or disposing things, in some respect or other, either
by doing or forbearing to do, as thaf the consequence should
be men-continuing in their sins. So much as men are given up
to, so much is the consequence of their being given up, whe
ther that be less or more. If God does not order things so,
by action or permission, that sin will be the consequence, then
the event proves that they are not given up to that consequence.
If good be the consequence, instead of evil, then God's mercy
is to be acknowledged in that good ; which mercy must be
contrary to God's judgment in giving up to evil. If the event
must prove, that they are given up to evil as the consequence,
then fhe persons who are the subjects of this judgment,
must be the subjects of such an event, and so the event is ne
cessary. li not only coaction, but all necessity, will prove men
blameless, then Judas was blameless, after Christ had given
him over, and had already declared his certain damnation, and
that he should verily betray him. He vvas guilty of no sin in
betraying his Master, on this supposition ; though his so doing
is spoken of by Christ as the most aggravated sin, more
heinous than the sin of Pilate in crucifying him. And the
Jews in Egypt, in Jeremiah's time, were guilty of no sin in
their not worshipping the true God, after God had " sworn by
his great name, that his name should bene more named in the
mouth of any man of Judah, in aU the land of Egypt." (Jer.
xliv. 26.) Dr. Whitby (Disc, on Five Points, p. 302, 303) denies,
that men in this world are ever so given up by God to sin,
that their wills should be necessarily determined to evil ;
though he owns, thaf hereby it may become exceeding difficult
for men to do good, having a strong bent and powerful incli
nation to what is evil. — But if we should allow the case to be
just as he represents, the judgment of giving up to sin will no
better agree with his notions of that liberty, which is essen
tial to praise or blame, than if we should suppose it to render
the avoiding of sin impossible. \Y or ii an impossibility of avoid- '
ing sin, wholly excuses a mare; then for the same reason, its
being difficult to avoid it excuses him in part ; and this just
in proportion to the degree of difficulty. — If the influence of
moral impossibility or inabUity be the same to excuse per
sons in not doing, or not avoiding any thing, as that oi natural
inability, (which is supposed) then undoubtedly, in like man?

150 freedom of THE WILL. Part iir.
ner, moral difficulty has the same influence to excuse with
natural difficulty. But all allow, that natural impossibility
wholly excuses, and also that natural difficulty excuses in part,
and makes the act or omission less blameable in propor
tion to the difficulty. All natural difficulty, according to the
plainest dictates of the light of nature, excuses in some de
gree, so that the neglect is not so blameable as if there had
been no difficulty in the case : and so the greater the difficulty
is, still the more excusable, in proportion fo the increase of
the difficulty. And as natural impossibility wholly excuses
and excludes all blame, so the nearer fhe difficulty approaches
to impossibility, stiU the nearer a person is fo blamelessness in
proportion to that approach. And if the case oi moral impos
sibility or necessity be just the same with natural necessify or
coaction, as to its influence to excuse a neglect, then also, for
the same reason, the case of natural difficulty does not differ
in influence to excuse a neglect, from moral difficulty arising
from a strong bias or bent to evil, such as Dr. Whitby owns
in the case of those that are given up to their own hearts' lusts.
So fhat the fault of such persons must be lessened, in propor
tion to fhe difficulty and approach to impossibUity. If ten
degrees of moral difficulty make the action quite irapossible,
and so wholly excuse, then if there be nine degrees of diffi
culty, fhe person is in great part excused, and is nine degrees
in ten less blaraeworthy, than if there had been no difficulty
af all ; and he has but one degree of blameworthiness. The
reason is plain, on Arminian principles ; viz. because as diffi
culty, by antecedent bent and bias on the wiU, is increased,
liberty of indifference, and self-determination in the will, is
diminished : so rauch hindrance, impediment is there, in the
way of the will acting freely by mere self-determination. —
And if ten degrees of such hindrance take away all such
liberty, then nine degrees take away nine parts in ten, and
leave but one degree of liberty. And therefore there is but
one degree of blameableness, cceteris paribus, in the neglect ;
the man being no further blameable in what he does, or
neglects, than he has liberty in that affair ; for blame or
praise (say they) arises wholly from a good use or abuse of li
berty. From all which it follows, that a strong bent and bias one
way, and difficulty of going the contrary, never causes a per
son to be at all more exposed tp. sin, or any thing blameable :
because, as the difficulty is increased, so much the less is
required and expected. Though in one respect exposedness
to sin is increased, viz. by an increase of exposedness to the
evil action or omission ; yet it is diminished in another respect
to balance it ; namely, as the sinfulness or blameableness of
the action or omission is diminished in the same proportion,—-

Sect, hi. Moral Necessity and Inability consistent. 151
So that, on the whole, the affair, as to exposedness to guilt or
blame, is left just as it was.
To iUustrate this, let us suppose a scale of a balance to he
inteUigent, and a free agent, and indued with a self-moving
power, by virtue of which it could act and produce effects to
a certain degree, ex. gr. to move itself up or down with a
force equal fo a weight of ten pounds ; and fhat it might
therefore be required of it, in ordinary circumstances, to move
itself dov/n with that force ; for which it has power and full
liberty, and therefore would be blameworthy if it failed of it. —
But then let us suppose a weight of ten pounds to be put in
the opposite scale, which in force entirely counter-balances
its self-moving power, and so renders it impossible for it to
move down af all ; and therefore wholly excuses it from any
such motion. But if we suppose there to be only nine pounds
in the opposite scale, this renders its motion not impossible,
but yet more difficult ; so that it can now only move down
with the force of one pound : but however, this is all thaf is
required of it under these circumstances ; it is wholly excused
from nine parts of its motion : and if the scale under these
circumstances neglect to move and remain at rest, all thaf if
will be blamed for, will be its neglect of that one tenth part
of its motion ; for which it had as much liberty and advantage,
as in usual circumstances it has for the greater motion which
in such a case would be required. So that this new difficulty
does not at all increase its exposedness to any thing blame
worthy. And thus the very supposition of difficulty in the way of
a man's duty or proclivity to sin, through a being given up fo
hardness of heart, or indeed by any other means whatsoever,
is an inconsistence according to Dr. Whitby's notions of liberty,
virtue and vice, blame and praise. The avoiding of sin and
blame, and the doing of what is virtuous and praiseworthy,
must be always equally easy.
Dr. Whitby's notions of liberty, obligation, virtue, sin,
&:c. led him into another great inconsistence. He abundantly
insists thaf necessity is inconsistent with the nature of sin or
fault. He says in the forementioned treatise, (p. 14.) Who
can blame a person for doing what he could not help .^ And
(p. 15.) It being sensibly unjust, to punish any man for doing
that which was never in his power to avoid. And (p. 341.) to
confirm his opinion, he quotes one of the Fathers, saying,
Why doth God command if man hath not free will and power
to obey.'' And again, in the same and next page, Who
will not cry_ out that it is folly to command him that hath not
liberty to do what is commanded ; and that it is unjust to con
demn him that has it not in his power to do what is required ?
And (p. 373.) he cites another saying, A law is given to him

152 freedom of THE WILL. PaRT

in.

that can turn to both parts; i. e. obey or transgress it ; but no
law can be against him who is bound by nature.
And yet the same Dr. Whitby asserts, that fallen Man is
nof able to perform perfect obedience. In p. 165, he has these
words. " The nature of Adam had power to continue inno
cent and without sin ; whereas, it is certain our nature never
had." But if we have not power to continue innocent and with
out Sin, then Sin is not inconsistent with Necessity, and we
may be sinful in that which we have not power to avoid ; and
those things cannot be true which he asserts elsewhere, namely,
"That if we be necessitated, neither Sins of omission nor
commission would deserve thaf name." (p. 348.) If we have
not in our power to be innocent, then we have it not in our
power to be blameless : and if so, we are under a Necessity of
being blameworthy. And how does this consist with what he
so often asserts, thaf necessity is inconsistent with blame or
praise ? If we have it not in our power fo perform perfect obe
dience fo all the commands of God, then we are under a Neces
sity of breaking some commands in some degree ; having no
power to perform so much as is commanded. And if so, why
does he cry out ofthe unreasonableness and folly of command
ing beyond what men have power to do ?
Arminians in general are very inconsistent with them
selves, in what they say of the inability of fallen Man in this
respect. They strenuously maintain, that it would be unjust
in God to require any thing of us beyond our present power
and ability to perform ; and also hold that we are now unable
to perform perfect obedience, and that Christ died to satisfy
for the imperfections of our obedience, and has made way that
our imperfect obedience might be accepted instead of perfect :
wherein they seem insensibly to run themselves into the gross
est inconsistence. For, (as I have observed elsewhere) " they
hold that God, in mercy to mankind, has abolished thaf rigor
ous constitution or law that they were under originally, and
instead of it has introduced a more mild constitution, and put us
under a new law, which requires no more than imperfect sin
cere obedience, in compliance with our poor infirm impotent
circumstances since the fall."
Now how can these things be made consistent ? 1 would
ask, of what law are these imperfections of our obedience a
breach 1 If they are a breach of no law that we were ever
under, then they are not Sins. And if they be not Sins, what
need of Christ dying to satisfy for them ? But if they are Sins,
and the breach of some law, what law is it ? They cannot be a
breach of their new law, for thaf requires no other than im
perfect obedience, or obedience with imperfections : and
therefore to have obedience attended with imperfections, is no
breach of it ; for it is as much as it requires. And they cannot

Sect. iii. Moral Necesssity and Inability consistent. 153
be a breach of their old law : for that, they say, is entirely
abolished ; and we never were under it. — They say it would
not be just-in God to require oi us perfect obedience, because
it would not be just to require more than we can perform, or fo
punish us for failing of it. And, therefore, by their own
scheme, the imperfections, of our obedience do not deserve to
be punished. What need therefore of Christ dying to satisfy
for them ? What need of his suffering to satisfy for that which
is no fault, and in its own nature deserves no suffering ? What
need of Christ dying, to purchase that our imperfect obedi
ence should be accepted, when, according fo their scheme, it
would be unjust in itself, that any other obedience than imper
fect should be required ? What need of Christ dying to make
way for God's accepting of such obedience, as it would be
unjust in him nof to accept ? Is there any need of Christ dy
ing, to prevail with God not fo do unrighteously ? — If it be said
that Christ died to satisfy that old law for us, fhat so we might
not be under it, but that there might be room for our being un
der a more mild law ; still I would inquire, what need of Christ
dying, that we might not be under a law, which (by their prin
ciples) it would be in itself unjiist that we should be under,
whether Christ had died or no, because, in our present state, we
are not able f o keep it ?
So the Arminians are inconsistent with themselves, nof only
in what they say of the need of Christ's satisfaction to atone
for those imperfections which we cannot avoid, but also in what
they say of fhe grace of God, granted to enable men to per
form the sincere obedience of fhe new law. " I grant indeed
(says Dr. Stebbinr*) that by reason of original Sin, we are ut
terly disabled for the performance of the condition, without new
grace from God. But I say, then, that he gives such a grace to
all of us, by which the performance of the condition is truly
possible ; and upon this ground he raay, and doth most right
eously require it." If Dr. Stebbing intends to speak properly,
by grace he must mean that assistance which is of grace, or of
free favour and kindness. But yet in the same place he speaks
of it as very unreasonable, unjust, and cruel, for God to require
that as the condition of pardon, that is become impossible by
original Sin. If if be so, what grace is there in giving assist
ance and ability to perform the condition of pardon 1 Or why
is that called by the name of grace, that is an absolute debt,
which God is bound to bestow, and which it would be unjust
and cruel in Him to withhold, seeing he requires that as the con
dition of pardon, which he cannot perform without it ?
* Treatise of tho Operations of the Spirit. 2 edit. p. 112, 115
VOL. II. 20

154 FREEDOM OF THE VVILL. PaRT III,

SECT. IV.
Command and Obligation to Obedience, consistent with moral
Inability to obey.*
It being so much insisted on by Arminian writers, that ne
cessity is inconsistent with law or command, and particularly,
* The subject of " obligation to obedience," or moral oblication, though
expressed in the title of this section, is not professedly handled by our author,
either here or in any other part of the work. His professed object in this place
is to prove that obUgation to obey commands is not weakened by moral inability.
But though this conclusion is established by many considerations, yet the na
ture and grounds of obligation are not pointed out, which might afford evi
dence WHY moral oblig(dion is consistent with moral inability 1 The subject
is confessedly profound ; but, perhaps, the following series of remarks may con
tribute, in some degree, to assist our enquiries, and to bring them to a satisfac
tory conclusion.
1. Obligatian, if we regard the term, is a Vmdimg power, or an irresistible force ;
but, in reference to morality and voluntary actions, obligation is expressive of a
hypothetical iruHspensable connection between an antecedent and a consequent ; or be
tween an end proposed, and the means of obtaining it. Thus, if a moral agent
Would attain the end, he is obliged, or bound indispensably, to use the required
means. And, on the contrary, ip a moral agent adopt a different antecedent from
what is required, not only he shall not attain to the proposed consequent, but an
other consequent is to follow, indispensably connected with the antecedent actually
adopted, by a necessity of consequence. Therefore,
2. The consequent, or the end, which is proposed by the moral Governor, is
always a supposed good; for it would be unworthy of a governor wise and good
to propose any other, especially as the antecedent prescribed and required is in
dispensably connected with it. But if the connection be broken by the free
agent, by the adoption of an antecedent naturally connected with a different
consequent, he then becomes natu/raUy obliged, or forced, to sustain a propor
tionable evil.
3. In" the system of moral government, it is the prerogative of the supreme
Governor to propose the conseq-uent of the indispensable connection ; and it is the
part of the moral agent, who in the act of choice is left /ree, to choose the antece
dent, which the governor has objectively furnished, and indispensably required.
To this choice he is mordUy,- or hypothetically bound, yet is naturally free ; and if
the required choice be made, the good follows : but if not, the corresponding evil
foUows. For instance ; if the forgiveness of sin be the consequent proposed,
and repentance the antecedent required : the agent is mordly bound to repent, but
naturally free. \i, however, he break through the raoral bond, which is done by
abusing his natural freedom, or continuing his wrong choice, forgiveness does not
follow, but he stands exposed to the natural and threatened consequence of that
wrong choice, or impenitence.
4. Hence it is obvious, that in the systera of providence, and the execution
of all decretive designs, it is the prerogative of the Sovereign of the Universe to
establish the chain of all antecedents, and the consequents follow from the nature
of things : but in the system of moral government, it is equally obvious, the re
verse takes place ; for here the supreme Governor proposes, and establishes objec
tively, the chain of consequents, while the moral agent, or the obhgee, establishes
optionally the antecedents ; and as the actud choice of an antecedent is, such will
be the actual consequence. When the moral agent chooses that antecedent which
is required, or which is conformable to rectitude, the proposed consequent is ob-
ttiijied by the nature of tarings ; bnt when that which is not requh'ed, or is not

•Sect. iv. Commands consistent with moral Inability. 155
that it is absurd to suppose God, by his command, should require
that of men which they are unable to do ; not allowing, in this
conformable to rectitude, is chosen for an antecedent, the evil consequence flows
from the sarae nature of things, that is, from the essence of eternal truth.
5. Required antecedents are either a state of mind, or voluntary actions ; ac
cording as the particular consequent proposed may be. For example, if happiness
be the end, or consequent proposed, holiness, or a Iwly state of mind is the mean, or
antecedent required. If we would see tlie Lord, we must be lioly, or pure in heart,
by a new birth unto righteousness. If justifixiation be the end proposed, believing
Is a mean required. For to us nghtemmiess shall be imputed, if we believe. If a
subsequent favourable treatment of the obligee be the end proposed ; obedience, or
nonformity to rule, is the mean required.
6. When an agent is said to be obliged in or by any thing or consideration,
that thing or consideration in or by which he is obliged, is to be considered as the
consequent proposed ; and the state or act leading to it is the antecedent required.
To be obliged in conscience, in duty, in law, in honour, fyc. expresses the end to be
obtained by a certain state or conduct as the mean or antecedent required. Thus,
for instance, if conscience be satined, if duty be discharged, if law be conformed to,
or if honour be secured, the required antecedent means must be adopted, or such
acta must be perforraed.
7. If the required antecedents be not performed, it is manifest that the free
agent has voluntarily established other antecedents, and the injurious consequents
of these last flow (as before observed) frora the nature of things ; which conse
quents will be similar or dissimilar to those proposed by the supreme Governor, in
proportion as the antecedent estabUshed voluntarily by the agent, is similar or dis
similar to what was required. Hence we may see the true standard and measure
of guilt, and of the diflferent gradations of praise or blame.
8. Having considered the mature of moral obligation, let us now advert ta
tho SUBJECT of it. This enquiry has more immediately for its object the qualifica
tions of the moral agent, or those considerations whereby he stands obliged, in con
tradistinction to those beings in the universe that are not moral agents. An at
tentive and long continued investigation of the subject has taught us, that they
are included in these three particulars : (1. ) A natural capacity of moral enjoyment .
(2.) A sufficiency of suitable means. And (3.) A freedom from compulsion in the
choice of means. — Whatever being is possessed of these qualifications is morally
obUged ; for he has a suitable abiUty to estabUsh his own antecedents as reqi^ired,
in order that the proposed consequents may follow.
9. The first quaUfication is a natfrai. capacitt of moral enjoyments. This
belongs to no being that is not a free agent : but to every being who is so, it insepa
rably belongs. This, more than any superior degree of reason, 'however great,
and however forcible the influence frora that superiority) constitutes the chief and
tnost essential difference between men and brutes. That such a capacity is an in
dispensably requisite quaUfication, is clear. For free agency necessarUy impUes
a consequent moral advantage, oi; a natural good to be morally enjoyed, either
explicitly proposed by the moral Govemor, or fairly impUed in the system of moral
government ; but this could not be proposed if there were no capacity of enjoy
ment as now stated. And this consequent advantage may properly be caUed.the
perpetual enjoyment of God, the chief good ; because the chief end of all subordi
nate enjoyments, as well as of all obedience, and the sum tota! of all happiness, ig
the conscious enjoyment of divine foDour and exceUenoe.
10. The second qualification is a sufficiency of suitable means. This is indis
pensably requisite ; for to require an end while the means are out of the agent's
reach, or physically out of his power, and that under the forfeiture of the Gover
nor's displeasure, is of the very essence of injustice. But the divine Governor is
" a God of truth, and without iniquity ; just and right is he." And that these
means ought to be sufficient and suitable in their own nature to attain the end ; in
other words, that the antecedents required to be adopted by the agent, are infalli-
W»( connected with the proposed consequent, is equally plain, for the same reason
that there should be any means at all. For means in themselves insufficient and
unsuitable have no true connection with the end proposed ; even as a law in itself
bad, has raorally no obliging power. r
11. The third qualification is a freedom/hwi eomtraint (md compulsian in the

158 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. pART llL
case, for any difference between natural and moral Inability j I
would, therefore, now particularly consider this matter. — And
for greater clearness, I would distinctly lay down the following
things. I. The will itself, Imd not only those actions which are
the effects of the will, is the proper object of Precept or Com
mand. That is, such a state or a.cts of men's wills are in
many cases properly required of them by Commands ; and not
only those alterations in fhe state of their bodies or minds that
are the consequences of volition. This is most manifest ; for
it is the soul only that is properly and directly the subject of
Precepts or Commands ; that only being capable of receiving
or perceiving Commands. The motions or state ofthe body are
matter of Command, only as they are subject to the soul, and
connected with its acts. But now the soul has no other faculty
whereby it can, in the most direct and proper sense, consent,
yield to, or comply with any Command, but the faculty of the
choice of means, or in the voluntary establishment of antecedents. By " constraint"
and " compulsion," we mean a physical interference with the free agent in his act
of choice, in such a sense, as that the choice would not be the genuine effect of thc
motive; or, that the nature of the fruit should not correspond with the nature ofthe
tree ; but some extraneous force interposing would make the nature of the voli
tion to be different from the nature of the mind or disposition, whieh otherwise
would be its immediate cause.
12. Divine influence is adraitted to be requisite, in order to prepare the state
of the mind for a right choice, even as a good tree is requisite for good fruit ; but
this is no interference with the act of choice itself, nor has it the least tendency to
break the connection between motive and choice, or between the mind and its
volition. — Such influence, indeed, forms one glorious link of the decretive chain,
which the sovereign Governor has established as so many antecedents ; and aright
clioice, in a free agent thus divinely influenced, or formed anew, is the unrestrained
and unimpelled ^ect which follows by a necessi% of consequence. In otherwords,
no bad choice can possibly follow, but by a failure in the cause, the mind or disposi
tion itself. 13. On this principle it is, that the sovereign Being himself never errs in his
choice. The source from which the act of choice proceeds is perfectly good, (an
infinitely holy nature) and the connection between this cause and the eiiect, which
is a right choice, is infallibly and in the nature of things necessarily secure.
Hence it is that we never admit, or suspect, an error in his clioice, however great
his freedom ; and hence we have a firm ground of confidence, that the Judge of
the whole earth will do right. _
14. The three quaUfications mentioned belong to man asa/ree agent; but we
must not confound this idea with that of o subject of moral govemment An infant
may be the subject of government, both human and divine ; but cannot be, pro
perly speaking, a free agent. Here it follows, that the first of the quaUfications
mentioned alone is essential to constitute a subject of moroZ government, in the mosT;
extensive sense of the term, but in order to constitute that class of subjects who
are cdso free agents, the other two are essential.
15. When these three qualifications are found in any free agent, nothing mm-e
is requisite to constitute moral obligation. An end is proposed — means firmly con
nected with that end are afforded, and required to be used — these raeans are phy
sically in the power of the agent — who is also /ree from aU constraint and compul
sion in his ttiit qf choice. If these qualifications are not sufficient morally to oblige,
we are fully persuaded nothing can be sufficient. — As to the notion, that rnord
ability is necessary to constitute moral obligation, "which is maintained alike by
many Arminians and most Antinomians, (for extremes will sometimes meet) oui?
author abundantly demonstrates its futiUty and absurd contradictions. — ^W.

Sect. iv. Commands consistent with moral Inability. 157
will ; and it is by this faculty only, that the soul can directly
disobey, or refuse compliance : for the very notions of consent
ing, yielding, accepting, complying, refusing, rejecting, &;c. are,
according to the meaning of the terms, nothing but certain acts
-of the will. Obedience, in the primary nature of it, is the sub
mitting and yielding of the will of one to the will of another.
Disobedience is the not consenting, not complying of the will of
the commanded, to the manifested wiU ofthe commander. Other
acts that are not the acts of the will, as certain motions of the
body and alterations in the soul, are Obedience or Disobedi
ence only indirectly, as fhey are connected with the state or ac
tions of fhe will according to an established law of nature. So
that it is manifest, the will itself may be required : and the be
ing of a good will is the most proper, direct, and immediate
subject of Command ; and if this cannot be prescribed or re
quired by Command or Precept, nothing can ; for other things
can be required no otherwise tiian as they depend upon, and are
the fruits of a good will.
Corol. 1. If there be several acts of the will, or a series
of 'acts, one following another, and one the effect of another,
the first and determining act is properly the subject of Com
mand, and not only the consequent acts, which are dependent
upon it. Yea, this more especiaUy is that to which Command
or Precept has a proper respect ; because it is this act that deter
mines the whole affair : in this act the Obedience or Disobedi
ence lies, in a peculiar manner ; the consequent acts being all
governed and determined by it. This governing act must be
the proper object of Precept, or none.
Corol. 2. It also foUows from what has been observed, thaf
if there be any act, or exertion of the soul, prior to all free acts
of choice in the case, directing and deterraining what the acts
of the will shall be ; that act of the soul cannot properly be
subject to any Comniand or Precept, in any respect whatso
ever, either directly or indirectly, immediately or remotely.
Such acts cannot be subject to Commands directly, because
they are no acts of the will ; being by the supposition prior to
all acts of the wUl, determining and giving rise to all its acts :
they not being acts of the will, there can be in them no con
sent fo, or compliance with any Command. Neither can they
be subject to Command or Precept indirectly or remotely ; for
they are nof so much as the effects or consequences of the
wUl, being prior to all its acts. So that if there be any
Obedience in that original act of the soul, determining all vo
litions, it is an act of Obedience wherein the wiU has no con
cern at all ; it preceding every act of wiU. And therefore, if
the soul either obeys or disobeys in this act, it is wholly invo
luntarily ; there is no wiUing Obedience or rebeUion, no compli-

158 FREEDOM OP THE WILL. PaRT III.
ance or opposition of the wUl in the affair : and what sort of
Obedience or rebellion is this ?
And thus fhe Arminian notion of the freedom of the wUl
consisting in the soul's deteriiiining its own acts of will, instead
of being essential to moral agency, and to men being the sub
jects of moral governraent, is utterly inconsistent with it. For
if the soul determines all its acfs of wiU, it is therein subject fo
no Command or moral government, as has been now observed ;
because its original determining act is no act of will or choice,
it being prior, by the supposition, to every act of will. And
the soul cannot be the subject of Command in the act of the
wiU itself, which depends on the foregoing determining act and
is determined by it ; in as much as-this is necessary, being fhe
necessary consequence and effect of that prior determining
act, which is not voluntary. Nor can the man be the subject
of Command or government in his external actions ; because
these are all necessary, being the necessary^ effects of the acts
of the will themselves. So thaf mankind, according to this
scheme, are subjects of Command or moral government in no
thing at all ; and all their moral agency is entirely excluded,
and no room is left for virtue or vice in the world.
So that the Arminian scheme, and nof that of the Cal
vinists, is utterly inconsistent with moral government, and
with all use of laws, precepts, prohibitions, promises, or threat
enings. Neither is there any way whatsoever to make their
principles consist wifh these things. For if it be said, that
there is no prior determining act of the soul, preceding the acts
of the will, but that volitions are events that come to pass by
pure accident, without any determining cause, this is most pal
pably inconsistent with all use of laws and precepts; for nothing
is more plain than that laws can be of no use to direct and re
gulate perfect accident : which, by the supposition of its being
pure accident, is in no case regulated by any thing preceding ;
but happens this way or thaf, perfectly by chance, without any
cause or rule. The perfect uselessness of laws and precepts
also follows from the Arminian notion of indifference, as essen
tial to that Hberty which is requisite fo virtue or vice. For the
end of laws is to bind to one side ; and the end of Commands
is to turn the will one way : and therefore they are of no use,
unless tbey turn or bias the will that way. But if liberty consists in
indifference, then their biassing the will one way only, destroys
liberty ; as it puts the wUl out of equUibrium. So thaf fhe wiU
having a bias, through the influence of binding law laid upon
it, is not wholly left fo itself, fo determine itself which way it will,
without influence from withouf,
II. Having shewn that the will itself, especially in those
acts which are original, leading and determining in anv case,
is the proper subject of Precept and Command — and not onlv

Se^t. IV. Commands consistent with moral Inability. 159
those alterations in the body, &c. which are the effects of thc
will — 1 now proceed in the second place to observe, that the
very opposition or defect of the will itself, in its original and
determining act in the case, to a thing proposed or command
ed, or its failing of compliance, implies a moral inability to that
thing : or, in other words, whenever a Command requires a
certain state or act of fhe will, and the person commanded,
notwithstanding the Command and the circumstances under
which it is exhibited, still finds his will opposite or wanting in
that, belonging to its state or acts, which is original and deter
mining in the aff'air, that man is morally unable to obey thaf
Command. This is manifest from what was observed in the first part,
concerning fhe nature of moral inability, as distinguished from
.. natural : where it was observed, that a man may then be said
fo be morally unable fo do a thing, when he is under the influ
ence or prevalence of a contrary inclination, or has a want of
inclination, under such circumstances and views. It is also evi
dent, from what has been before proved, that the will is always,
and in every individual act, necessarUy determined by the strong
est motive* ; and so is always unable to go against the motive,
which, all things considered, has now the greatest strength and
advantage to move the will. — But not further to insist on these
things, the truth of the position now laid down, viz. that when
* Our author does not mean by " raotive," the object presented to the mind
according to its intrinsic worth ; but he takes into the account also the state of
the mind itself, in reference to that object, according to which will be the appear
ance of it. Therefore, strictly speaking, the motive, as he has intimated at the
commencement of this work, denotes the object as it stands in the -view of tlie mind.
If we do not maintain this distinction, the dispute will soon degenerate into a con
fused logomachy ; and we should be forced. In deffending this position — that the
will ia " necessarily determined by the strongest raotive" — to adopt this, the
most absurd of all conclusions, that the will of every man in the present state
always chooses what is really best, or never errs in its elections. Whereas the world
is full of errors and delusions ; things the most excellent in themselves, are com
raonly rejected, and others the most worthless are preferred. But this could not
happen, except on this principle, that the realUy-of worth differs, in those in stan
ces, from the appearance of it- In such cases, the d-^^erence is not in the object,
but in the mind, when the choice takes- place. For instance ; suppose the bless
ed God in his true character as revealed in the scriptures, the chief and an un
changeable good, be proposed to the contemplation of a wicked man, and his
will rtjects that good. Now, as the mind is incapable of rejecting a good, or of
choosing an evil, os smcA ; it is plain, that the proper and immediate cause of dif
ference between the reaUty and the appearance of good, is in the slate of the
mind. Here Uestthe essence of an erroneous choice, — the will preferring an ob
ject which 'is apparently but not really preferable. Hence it follows irrefragably,
that the state of the mind is the true and proper source of a right and wrong
choice. This is it that influences the oppearoncc of an object, so as lo stand in
the apprehension and practical judgment of the mind as worse or better than it
reaUy is. Therefore, the true state of themnd and the real state of the object of
choice, united, are the genuine parents of the objective appearance in the mind, mo
rally considered, or according to the quaUties of good and evil ; an^ this off
spring — OBJECTIVE APrEARAMCE — 13 what our author calls " the strongest mo
tive."— W,

160 FEEEDOM OP THE WILL. PaET III.
the will is opposite to, or failing of a compliance wifh a thing
in its original determination or act, if is not able to comply, ap
pears by the consideration of these two things.
1. The will in fhe time of that diverse or opposite lead
ing act or inclination, and when actually under its influences, is
not able to exert itself fo the contrary, to malie an alteration,
in order to a compliance. The inclination is unable to change
itself; and that for this plain reason, that it is unable to in
cline to change itself. Present choice cannot at present
choose to be otherwise : for thaf would be at present to choose
something .diverse from what is at present chosen. If the
will, all things now considered, inclines or chooses to go that
way, then it cannot choose, all things now considered, to go
the other way, and so cannot choose fo be made fo go the
other way. To suppose that the mind is now sincerely in
clined fo change itself to a different inchnation, is to suppose
fhe mind is now truly inclined otherwise than it is now inclined.
The will may oppose some future remote act that if is exposed
to, but not its own present act.
2. As it is impossible that the will should comply with the
thing commanded with respect to its leading act, by any act
of its own, in the time of that diverse or opposite leading and
original act, or after it has actually come uijder fhe influence
of that determining choice or inclination ; so if is impossible
it should be determined to a compliance by any foregoing act ;
for, by the very supposition, there is no foregoing act ; the
opposite or non-complying act being that act which is origi
nal and determining in the case. Therefore it must be so,
that if this first determining act be found non-complying, on
the proposal of the command, the mind is morally unable to
obey. For to suppose it to be able to obey, is to suppose it
to be able to determine and cause its first determining act to
be otherwise, and that it has power better to govern and regu
late its first governing and regulating act, which is absurd ;
for it is fo suppose a prior act of the will, determining its first
determining act ; that is, an act prior to the first, and leading
and governing the original and governing act of all ; which is
a contradiction. Here if it should be said, that although the mind has not
any ability fo will contrary to what it does will, in fhe original
and leading act of the will, because there is supposed to be
no prior act to determine and order it otherwise, and the wUl
cannot immediately change itself, because it cannot at pre
sent inchne to a change ; yet fhe mind has an ability for the
present to forbear to proceed to action, and taking time for
deliberation ; which may be an occasion of the change of the ,
inclination.

Sect. iv. Commands consistent with moral Inability. 161
I answer, (1.) In this objection, that seems to be forgot
ten which was observed before, viz. thaf the determining to
take the mafter into consideration is itself an act of the wUl :
and if this be all the act wherein the mind exercises abUity and
freedom, then this, by the supposition, must be all that can be
commanded or required by precept. And if this act be the
commanding act, then all that has been observed concerning
the commanding act of the will remains true, that the very
want of it is a moral inabUity to exert it, &e. (2.) We are
speaking concerning the first and leading act of the will about
the affair ; and if determining to deliberate, or, on the contra
ry, to proceed immediately without deliberating, be the first and
leading act; or whether it be or no, if there be another act
befoie it, which determines fhat ; or whatever be the original
and leading act ; still the foregoing proof stands good, that
the non-compliance of the leading act implies moral inabUity fo
comply. If it should be objected, that these things make all moral
inabUity equal, and suppose men morally unable to wUl other
wise fhan they actually do wUI, in all cases, and equally so in
every instance. — In answer to this objection, I desire two things
may be observed.
-First, Thaf if by being equally unable, be meant, as'
really unable ; then, so far as the inability is merely moral, it
is true ; the will, in every instance, acts by moral necessity,
and is morally unable to act otherwise, as truly and properly
in one case as another ; as, I humbly conceive, has been per
fectly and abundantly demonstrated by what has been said in
the preceding part of this essay. But yet, in some respect,
the inabUity may be said fo be greater in some instances than
others: though fhe man may be truly unable, (if moral in
abUity can truly be called inabihty,) yet he may be further
from being able fo do some things than others. As it is in
things, which men are naturaUy unable to do. A person,
whose strength is no more than sufficient to lift the weight of
one hundred poutids, is as truly and really unable to lift one
hundred and qne pounds, as ten thousand pounds ; but yet he
is further froaf being able to lift the latter weight fhan the
former; and so, according to the common use of speech, has
a greater inability for it. So it is in moral inability. A man
is truly morally unable to choose contrary fo a present inclina
tion, which in the least degree prevaUs ; or, contrary to that
motive, which, all things considered, has strength and ad
vantage ntiw to move the will, in the least degree, superior
to all other motives in view : but yet he is further from ability
to resist a very strong habit, and a violent and deeply rooted
inclinatiofl, or a motive vastly exceeding all others in strength.
And again, the Inability may, in some respects, be called
VOL. If. { 21

162 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. PaRT Iif,
greater in some instances than others, as it may be more ge-
iieral and extensive to all acts of that kind. So men may be
said to be unable in a different sense, and fo be further from
moral ability, who have that moral InabUity which is generdl
and habitual, than they who have only that InabUity which is ¦
occasional and particular.* Thus in cases of natural InabUi
ty ; he thaf is born blind may be said to be unable to see, in a
different manner, and is, in some respects, further from being
able to see, than he whose sight is hindered by a transient cloud
or mist. And besides, that which was observed in the first part of
this discourse, concerning the InabUity which attends a strong
and settled habit, should be here remembered ; viz. that a fixed
habit is attended with this peculiar moral Inabihty, by which
it is distinguished from occasional volition, namely, that endea
vours to avoid future volitions of that kind which are agree
able to such a habit, much more frequently and commonly
prove vain and insufficient. For though it is impossible there
should be any sincere endeavours against a present choice, yet
there may be against vohtions of that kind, when viewed at a
distance. A person may desire and use means to prevent fu
ture exercises of a certain inclination ; and, in order to it, may
wish the habit might be removed ; but his desires and endea
vours may be ineffectual. The man may be said in some sense
to be unable ; yea, even as the word -unable is a relative term.,
and has relation to ineffectual endeavours ; yet nof with regard
to present, but remote endeavours.
Secondly, If must be borne in mind, according to what was
observed before, thaf indeed no Inability whatsoever, which is
merely moral, is properly called by the name of Inability ; and
thaf in the, strictest propriety of speech, a man may be said
to have a thing in his power, if he has it af his election ; and
he cannot be said to be unable to do a thing, when he can,
if he now pleases, or whenever he has a proper, direct, and
ihimediate desire for it. As to those desires and endeavours
that may be against the exercises of a strong habit, with re
gard to which men may be said to be unable to avoid those
exercises, they are remote desires and endeavours in two re
spects. First, as to time ; they are never against present vo
litions, but only against volitions of such a kind, when viewed
at a distance. Secondly, as to their nature ; these opposite
desires are nof directly and properly against the habit and in
clination itself^ or fhe volitions in which it is exercised ; for
these, in theraselves considered, are agreeable ; but against
something else tha,t attends them, or is their consequence; the
opposition of the mind is levelled entirely against this ; the vo-
'* See Ihis distinction o£ morDl Jna bility explainpd in Part I. iSecf. IV,

Sect. iv. Commands consistent with moral Inability. 163
litions themselves are not at all opposed directly, and for their
own sake ; but only indirectly and remotely, on the account of
something foreign.
III. Though the opposition of the will itself, or the very
want of will to a thing commanded, implies a moral InabUity
to thaf thing; yet, if it be, as has been already shown, that the
being of a good state or act of will is a thing most properly
required by Command ; then, in some cases, such a state or act
of wUl may properly be required, which at present is nof, and
which may also be wanting after it is commanded. And there
fore those things may properly be commanded for which men
have a moral InabUity.
Such a state, or act of the will, may be required by Com
mand, as does not already exist. For if that volition only
may be commanded to be, which already is, there could be no
use of Precept : Commands in all cases would be perfectly
vain and impertinent. And not only may such, a will be re-
quured as is wanting before the Command is given, but also
such as may possibly be wanting afterwards ; such as fhe exhi
bition of the Command may not be effectual to produce or ex
cite. Otherwise, no such thing as disobedience to a proper and
lightful Command is possible in any case ; and there is no case
possible, wherein there can be a faulty disobedience. Which
Arminians cannot affirm, consistently with their principle : for
this makes Obedience to just and proper Commands always
necessary, and disobedience impossible. And so fhe Arminian
would overthrow himself, yielding the very point we are upon,
which he so strenuously denies, viz. thaf Law and Command
are consistent with necessity.
If inerely that InabUity will excuse disobedience, which
is implied in the opposition or defect of inclination, remain
ing afler the Command is exhibited, then wickedness always
carries that in it which excuses it. By how much the more
wickedness there is in a man's heart, by so much is his
inclination f o evil the stronger, and by so much fhe more, there
fore, has he of moral InabUity, to the good required. His
moral Inability consisting in the strength of his evil in
clination, is the very thing wherein his wickedness consists ;
and yet, according to Arminian principles, if must be a
thing inconsistent with wickedness; and by how much the
more he has of it, by so much is he the further from wipfced-
ness. Therefore, on the whole, it is manifest, that moral Inabi
lity alone (which consists in disinclination) never renders any
thing improperly the subject matter of Precept or Command,
and never can excuse any person in disobedience, or want of
conformity to a command.

164 freedom of the will. Part hi.
Natural Inability, arising from the want of natural capa
city, or external hindrance (which alone is properly called
Inability) without doubt wholly excuses, or makes a thing
improperly the matter of Command. If men are excused from
doing or acting any good thing, supposed to be commanded,
it must be through some defect or obstacle that is not in the
wiU itself, but either in the capacity of understanding, or body,
or outward circumstances. — Here two or three things may be
observed, 1. As to spiritual acts, or any good thing in the state or
imminent acts of the will itself, or ofthe affections, (which are
only certain modes of the exercise of the wUl) if persons are
justly excused, it must be through want of capacity in the
natural faculty or understanding. Thus the same spiritual
duties, or holy affections and exercises of heart, cannot be
required of men, as may be of angels ; the capacity of under
standing being so much inferior. So men cannot be required
to love those amiable persons, whom they have had no oppor
tunity to see, or hear of, or know in any way agreeable fo the
natural state and capacity of the human understanding. But
the insufficiency of motives will nof excuse ; unless their
being insufficient arises not from the moral state of the will or
inclination itself, but from the state of the natural understand
ing. The great kindness and generosity of another may be a
motive insufficient to excite gratitude in the person that
receives the kindness, through his vile and ungrateful temper ;
in this case, the insufficiency of the motive arises from the
state of the will or inclination of heart, and does not at all
excuse. But if this generosity is not sufficienflo excite grati
tude, being unknown, there being no means of information ade
quate fo the state and measure of the person's faculties, this in
sufficiency is attended with a natural Inability, which entirely
excuses it.
2. As to such motions of body, or exercises and alterations
of mind, which do not consist in the imminent acts or state of
the will itself — but are supposed f o be required as effects of
the will, in cases wherein there is no want of a capacity of
understanding — that Inability, and that only, excuses, which
consists in want of connection between them and the will. If
the wiU fully comphes, and the proposed effect does not prove,
according fo the laws of nature, to be connected with his vo
lition, the man is perfectly excused ; he has a natural Inability
to the thing required. For the will itself, as has been observed,
is all that can be directly and immediately required by
Command ; and other things only indirectly, as connected
with the will. If therefore, there be a full compliance of wiU,
the person has done his duty ; and if other things do not prove

Sect. iv. Commands consistent with mOral Inability. 165
to be connected with his volition, that is not criminally owing fo
him. 3. Both these kinds of natural Inability, and all Inability
that excuses, may be resolved into one thing ; namely, want
of natural capacity or strength ; either capacity of understand
ing, or external strength. For when there are external de
fects and obstacles, they would be no obstacles, were it not
for the imperfection and limitations of understanding and
strength. Corol. If things for which men have a moral Inability
may properly be the matter of Precept or Command, then they
may also of invitation and counsel. Commands and invitations
come very much to the same thing ; the difference is only cir
cumstantial ; Commands are as much a manifestation of the
will of him that speaks, as invitations, and as much testimo
nies of expectation of compliance. The difference between
them lies in nothing that touches the affair in hand. The main
difference between Command and invitation consists in thc
enforceraent of the will of him who commands or invites. In
the latter it is his kindness, the goodness from which his will
arises : in the former it is his authority. But whatever be the
ground of will in him that speaks, or the enforcement of what
he says, yet seeing neither his will nor his expectation is any
more testified in the one case than the other ; therefore, a
person being directed by invitation, is no more an evidence of
insincerity in him that directs — in manifesting either a wiU, or
expectation which he has not — than a person being known to
be morally unable to do what he is directed 6«/- command, is an
evidence of insincerity. So that all this grand objection of
Arminians against the Inability of fallen men to exert faith in
Christ, or to perform other spiritual duties, from the sincerity
of God's counsels and invitations, must be without force.*
* On the subject of Sincerity or Insincerity in prohibitions, commands, coun
sels, invitations, and the like, in cases where God' foreknows that the event will
uot take place by the compliance of the moral agent addressed, we raay remark
a few particulars in addition to our author's reasoning :
1. The sincerity of prohibitions and commands, counsels and invitations, and
the Uke, is founded — not in the event of things as good or bad, or the knowledge of
events, or the purpose that secures some, or the necessity of consequence from
which others flow, nor in the moral ability of the agent, but — in the »ery nature and
tendency of the things themselves which are prohibited, coraraanded, or proposed,
as good or cifii, either intrinsicaily, if of a moral nature, or else relatively, if of possi-
tive appointment. Therefore,
2. Whether the event be corapliance or no»-compliance, the command, or in
vitation, &c. is perfectly sincere. For, in truth, these are neither more nor less than
testi-monies respecting the goodness or badness of the things in question, in the
sense before raentioned, and the consequent obligations of the agent respecting
them, under a forfeiture either declared or impUed. Consequently,
3. Insincerity can attach to a command only on supposition that the goodness
or badness of the ment were the ground of the signified will, while at the same
time another event, diverse ffom that which actually takes place, -^as purposed by
the sa.ine will. But,

166 freedom op the will. Part hi.

SECT. V.
That Sincerity of Desires and Endeavours, which is supposed
to excuse in the Non-performance of Things in themselves
good, particularly considered.
It is much insisted on by many, that some men, though,
they are not able to perform spiritual duties, such as repent
ance of sin, love to God, a cordial acceptance of Christ as ex
hibited and offered in the gospel, &c. yet may sincerely desire
and endeavour after these things ; and therefore must be ex
cused ; it being unreasonable f o blame them for the omission
of those things, which they sincerely desire and endeavour to
do but cannot. Concerning this matter the following things
may be observed.
1. What is here supposed, is a great mistake and gross
absurdity; even that men may sincerely choose and desire
those spiritual duties of love, acceptance, choice, rejection,
&c. consisting in the exercise of the will itself, or in the dispo
sition and 'inclination ofthe heart ; and yet not be able to per
form or exert them. This is absurd, because it is absurd to
suppose that a man should directly, properly and sincerely
incline to have an inclination, which at the same time is con
trary to his inclination : for that is to suppose him not to be
inclined to that which he is inclined fo. If a man, in the state
and acts of his will and inclination, properly and directly falls
in wifh those duties, he therein performs them : for fhe duties
themselves consist in that very thing ; they consist in the state
and acts of the wUl being so formed and directed. Ifthe
4. Strictly speaking, no eeents, as such, are the objects of purpose ; but rather,
the purpose respects the good antecedents, whereby, good events, foUowing by ne
cessity of consequence, are infalhbly secured. Besides,
5. It is highly absurd, as must appear from the nature of law and obligation,
to suppose that the sincerity of legislative or inviting will should depend on the
ewcTit of compliance or non-compliance. Surely the sincerih/ ofa lawgiver is not
aflccted, whether all obey, or only some, or even none. Legislation is a testimony
with sanctions, that the thing prohibited is evil, or the thing commanded is good,
to the party. Hence,
6. The consequent, whether good or bad, is objectively establislied, or hypothe
tically proposed, by the legislator ; and the antecedent is supposed to be within
the reach, or, physicaUy considered, piaced within the power, ofthe agent. There
fore, 7. The agent's a67ise of his physical power, in reference tothe antecedent,
constitutes the criminality, and the right iise ofit constitutes the virtue of an
action. And theu alone is physical power, in fact, used aright when it is the in
strument of moral rectitude, or a right state of mind. Do raen gather grapes of
thorns, or figs of thistles ? Even so, every good tree bringeth forth, good fruit ;
but a corrupt tree bringeth forth evil fruit. A good tree (as such) cannot bring
forth evil fruit ; neither can a corrupt tree (as such) bring forth good fruit.— W.

Sect. v. Sincerity of Desires and Endeavours. 167
soul properly and sincerely falls in with a certain proposed act
of will or choice, the soul therein makes that choice its own.
Even as when a moving body falls in with a proposed direc
tion of its motion, fhat is the same thing as lo move in that
direction. 2. That which is called a desire and willingness for those
inward duties, in such as do not perform them, has respect to
these duties only indirectly and remotely, and is improperly so
caUed ; not only because (as was observed before) if respects
those good volitions only in a distant view, and with respect
to future time ; but also because evermore, nof these things
themselves, but something else fhat is foreign, is fhe object
that terminates these volitions and desires.
A drunkard who continues in his drunkenness, being
under the power of a violent appetite to strong drink, and with
ouf any love to virtue ; but being also extremely covetous and
close, and very much exercised and grieved at the diminution
of his estate, and prospect of poverty, may in a sort desire the
virtue of temperance ; and though his present will is to grafir
fy his extravagant appetite, yet he may wish he had a heart
to forbear future acts of intemperance, and forsake his ex
cesses, through an unwiUingness to part with his money : but
StiU he goes on with his drunkenness ; his wishes and endea
vours are insufficient aind ineffectual ; such a man has no
proper, direct, sincere willingnesss fo forsake this vice, and the
vicious deeds which belong to it : for he acts voluntarily in
continuing to drink to excess : his desire is very improperly
called a willingness to be temperate ; if is no frue desire of
thaf virtue ; for it is nof that virtue fhat terminates his wishes;
nor have they any direct respect at all to it. If is only the
saving of his money, or the avoiding of poverty, that termi
nates and exhausts fhe whole strength of his desire. The
virtue of temperance is regarded only very indirectly and im
properly, even as a necessary means of gratifying the vice of
covetousness. So a man of an exceedingly corrupt and wicked heart,
who has no love to God and Jesus Christ, but, on the contra
ry, being very profanely and carnally inclined, has the greatest
distaste of the things of religion, and enmity against them ;
yet being of a family, that from one generation to another,
have most of them died, in youth, of an hereditary consump
tion ; and so having little hope of living long ; and having
been instructed in the necessify of a supreme love to Christ,
and gratitude for his death and sufferings, in order to his
salvation from eternal misery ; if under these circumstances
he should, through fear of eternal torments, wish he had such
a disposition : but his profane and carnal heart remaining, he
continues stiU in his habiti^al distaste o/, and enraity fo God

168 FREEDOM 6P THE WILL. PaRT 111.
and religion, and wholly without any exercise of fhat love and
gratitude, (as doubtless the Very devils themselves, notwith
standing all fhe devUishness of their temper, would wish for
a holy heart, if b^that means they could get out of hell:) in
this case, there is no sincere "Willingness to love Christ and
choose him as his chief good : fhes^oly dispositions and ex
ercises are not at all the direct object of the wU! : they truly
share ho part of the inclination or desire of the soul ; but all is
terminated on deliverance from torment : and these graces and
pious volitions, notwithstanding this forced consent, are looked
upon as in themselves undesirable ; as when a sick man desires
a dose he greatly abhors, in order fo save his hfe. From these
things it appears,
3. That this indirect WUlingness is nof that exercise of the
will which the command requires ; but is entirely a different
one ; being a volition of a different nature, and terminated al
together on different objects ; wholly falling short of fhat virtue
of will to which the command has respect.
4. This other volition, which has only some indirect con
cern with the duty required, cannot excuse for fhe want of that
good will itself, which is commanded ; being not fhe thing
which answers and fulfils the command, and being wholly des
titute of the virtue which the command seeks.
Further fo illustrate this matter. If a child has a most
excellent father that has ever treated him with fatherly kind
ness and tenderness, and has every way, in the highest degre6,
merited his love and dutiful regard, and is withal very wealthy »
but the son is of so vile a disposition, thaf he inveterafely hates
his father ; and yet, apprehending that his hatred of him is
hke to prove his ruin, by bringing him finally to those abject
circumstances, which are exceedingly adverse to his avarice
and ambition ; he, therefore, wishes it were otherwise : but yet
remaining under the invincible power of his vUe and malig
nant disposition, he continues still in his settled hatred of his
father. Now, if such a son's indirect willingness to love and
honour his father at all acquits or excuses before God, for his
falling of actually exercising these dispositions towards him,
which God requires, it must be on one of these accounts. (1.)
Either, That it answers and fulfils fhe command. But this if
does not by the supposition ; because the thing commanded is
love and honour to his worthy parent. If the command be
proper and just, as is supposed, then if obliges fo the thing
commanded ; and so nothing else but that can answer the ob
ligation. Or, (2.) It must be, af least, because there is that vir
tue or goodness in his indirect wiUingness, thaf is equivalent to
the virtue required ; and so balances or countervails it, and
makes up for the want of it. But that also is contrary to the
supposition. The willingness the son has merely from a regard

BscT. V. Sincerity of Desires qnd Endeavours. 169
to mone]^ and honour, has no goodness in it, to countervail the
want of the pious filial respect required.
Sincerity and reality in that indirect willingness, which has
been spoken of, does not make it the better. That whjch is
real and hearty is often caUed sincere ^ whether it be in virtue
or vice. Some persons are sincerely bad ; others are sincerely
good ; and others may be sincere and hearty in things whichl
are in their own nature indifferent ; as a man may be sincerely
desu-ous of eating when he is hungry. But beiug sincere,
hearty, and in good earnest, is no vfrtue, unless it be in a thing
that is virtuous. A raan may be sincere and hearty in joining
a crew of pirates, or a gang of robbers. When the devUs cried
out, and besought Christ uot fo torment them, it was no mere
pretence ; they were very hearty in their desires not fo be tor
mented ; but this did not make their will or desire virtuous.
And if men have sincere desires, which are in their kind and
nature no better, it can be no excuse for the want of any re?
quired virtue.
And as a man's sincerity in such an indirect desire or wil
lingness to do his duty as has been mentioned, cannot excuse
for the want of performance ; so it is with Endeavours arising
from such a wUlingness. The Endeavours can ha\-e no more
goodness in them than the will of which they are the effect
and expression. And therefore, however sincere and real, and
however great a person's Endeavours are ; yea, though they
should be to the utmost of his ability : unless fhe will froni
which they proceed be truly good and virtuous, they can be of
no avail or weight whatsoever in a moral respect, That which
is nof truly virtuous is, in God's sight, good for nothing : and
so can be of no value, or influence, in his account, to make up
for any moral defect. For nothing can counterbalance evil,
but good. If evil be in one scale, and we put a great deal into
the other of smcere and earnest Desires, and many and great
Endeavours j yet, if there be no real goodness in all, there is
no weight in it ; and so it does nothing towards balancing the
real weight, which is in the opposite scale. It is only like sub
tracting a thousand noughts from before a real number, which
leaves the sum just as it was.
Indeed such Endeavours may have ^, negatively good in
fluence. Those things which have no positive virtue, have
no positive moral influence ; yet fhey may be an occasion of
persons avoiding some positive evils. As if a man were in the
wafer with a neighbour to whom he had Ul will, and who could
not swim, holding him by his hand ; this neighbour was much
in debt to him, — the man is tempted to let him sink and drown
— but refuses to comply with the temptation ; not from love
to his neighbour, but from fhe love of money, and because
by his drowning he should lose his debt ; fhat which he do§?
VOL, ir. 22

170 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. PaRT IIJ.-
ih preserving hia neighbour from drowning, is nothing good
in the sight of God : yet hereby he avoids fhe greater guilC
that would have been contracted, if he had designedly let:
his neighbettr sink and perish. But when Arminians, in
then disputes with Calvinists, insist so much on sincere De
sires and Endeavours, as \Vhat must excuse men, must he
accepted of God, &c. it is manifest they have respect to some
positive moral weight or influence of those Desires and En
deavours. Accepting, justifying, or excusing on the accpunt
of sincere Endeavours (as they are called) and men doing
what they can, &c. has relation fo some moral value, some
thing that is accepted as good, and as such, countervailing
some defect.
But there is a great and unknown deceit, arising from the
a^ibiguity of fhe phrase, sineere Endeavours. Indeed there
is a vast indistinctness and unfixedness in most, or at least
very many of the terms used to express things pertaining to
moral and spiritual matters. Whence arise innumerable mis
takes, strong prejudices, inextricable confusion, and endless
controversy. — ^The wor.d sincere is most commonly used to
signify something thaf is- good : men are habituated to un
derstand by it the same as honest and upright ; which terms
excite an idea of something good in the strictest and highest
sense ; good in the sight of Him, who sees nof only the out
ward appearance, but the heart. And, thetefore,. men think
that if a person be sincere,, he will certainly be accepted. If.
it be said that any one is sincere in his Endeavours, this sug
gests, thaf his heart is good,, that there is no defect of duty,
as to virtuous inclination; he honestly and uprightly desires
and endeavours to do as he is required ; and this leads them to
suppose, that it would be very hard and unreasonable to pu
nish him,, only because be is unsuccessful in his Endeavours,
the thing endeavoured after being beyond his power. — Whereas
it ought to be observed, fhat the word sincere has these different
significations. 1. Sincerity, as the word is sometimes used, signifies no
more than reahty of Will and Endeavour, with respect to any
thing that is professed or pretended ; without any considera
tion of the nature of the principle or aim, whence this real
Will and true Endeavour arises... If a man has some real de
sire either direct or indirect to obtain a thing, or does really
endeavour after if, he is said sincerely f o desire or endeavour,
without any consideration of the goodness of fhe principle
from vvhich he acts, or any excellency or worthiness of the end
for which he acts. Thus a man who is kind to his neighbour's
.wife who is sick and languishing, and very helpful in her case,
makes a shew of desiring and endeavouring her restoration to
health find vigour ; and not only makes such a shew, but there

Skct. v. Sincerity of Desires and Endeavours. 171
is a reality in his prefence, he does heartily and earnestly desire
to have her health restored, and uses his true and utmost En
deavours for it ; he is said sincerely to desire and endeavour
after it, because he does so truly or really ; though perhaps the
principle he acts from is no other than a vile and scandalous
passion ; having lived in adultery with her, he earnestly desires
to have her health and vigour restored, that he ma,y return to
his criminal pleasures. Or,
2. By sincerity is meant, not merely a reality of Will and
Endeavour of some sort, and from some consideration or other,
but a virtuous sincerity^ That is, that in the performance of
those particular acts thaf are the matter of virtue or duty,
there be not only the matter, but the form and essence of vir
tue, consisting in the aim thaf governs the act, and the prin
ciple exercised in it. There is not only the reality of the act,
that is, as it were, the body of fhe duty ; but also the soul,
which should properly belong fo such a body. In this sense,
a man is said to be sineere, when he acts with a pure intention ;
nof from sinister views : he nof only in reality desires and seeks
the thing to be done, or qualification to be obtained, for some
©nd or other ; but he wiUs the thing directly and properly, as
neither forced nor bribed ; the virtue of fhe thing is properly
the object of the will.
In fhe former sense, a man is said to be sincere, in op
position to a mere pretence, and shew of the particular thing
to be done or exhibited, withouf any real desire or endeavour at
all. In the latter sense, a man is said to be sincere, in opposi
tion fo that shew of virtue there is in merely doing tbe mat
ter of duty, without the reality of the virtue itself in the soul.
A man may be sincere in fhe former sense, and yet in the latter
be in the sight of God, who searches the heart, a vile hypor
crite. In fhe latter kind of sincerity, only, is there any thing truly
valuable or acceptable in the sight of God. And this is what
in scripture is called sincerity, uprightness, integrity, " truth in
the inward parts," and " being of a peffect heart." And if
there be such a sincerity, and such a degree of it as there ought
to be, and there be any thing further thaf the man is not able
to perform, or which does not prove fo be connected with his
sincere desires and endeavours, the man is wholly excused and
acquitted in the sight of God ; his will shall surely be accepted
for his deed : and such a sincere will and endeavour is aU
fhat in strictness is required of him, by any command of
God. But as to the other kind of sincerity of desires and
endeavours, having no virtue in it, (as was observed before) it
can be of no avail before God, in any case, to recommend,
satisfy, or excuse, and has no positive moral weight or influence
whatsoever.

itSj FREEDOiil OF TIKE frILL. ]PaRT III.
Corol. 1. Hence it may be inferred, that noljiing in the
reason and nature of things appears from fhe consideration of
any moral- weight in the former kind of sincerity, leading us to
suppose, that God has made any positive Promises of salvation^
or grace, or any saving assistancCj or any spiritual benefit what
soever, to any Desires, Prayers, Endeavours, Striving, or Obc
dience of those, who hitherto have no true virtue or holiness in
their hearts ; though we should suppose eUI the Sincerity, and
the utmost degree of Endeavour, that is possible fo be in a
person without holiness;
SoiMe object against God requiring, as the condition of
feaivafion, those holy exercises which are the result of a super
natural renovation ; such as a supreme respect to Christ j love
to God, loving holiness for its own sake, &c. thaf these inward
dispositions ahd exercises are above men's powerj as they are
by nature ; and therefore that we may conclude, thaf when men
are brought fo be sincere in their Endeavours, and do as well as
they caUj they are accepted ; and that this must be all that
God requires, in order to their being received as fhe objects of
his favoUrj arid iiiust be what God has appointed as the condi*
tioh of salvation. Concerning this, I would observe, fhat in
such manner of speaking as " men being accepted because
they are sincere, and do as well as they can," there is evident
ly a supposition of some virtue, some degree of that which is
truly good ; though it does not go so far as were fo be wished.
For if men do what they can, unless their so doing be from
some good firinciple, disposifioUj or exercise of heart, some
virtuous inclination or act of fhe will ; their so doing what they
can, is in some respect not a whit better than if fhey did no
thing at alL In such a case, there is no more positive moral
gdjodiiess iri a irian doing what he can, than in a windmill do
ing what if can ; because the action does no more proceed
from virtue : and there is nothing in such sincerity .ef Endea*
Vour, or doing what we can, that should render it any more a
fit recommendation to positive favour and acceptancCj or the
condition of any reward or actual benefit ^ than doing nothing }
for both fhe one and the other are alike nothing, as to any true
moral weight or value.
Corol. 2. Hence also it follows, there is nothing that appears
in the reason and nature of things, which c,an justly lead us to
determine, that God wUl certainly give the' necessary means of
salvation, or some way or other bestow true holiness and eter*
nal life on those Heathens, who are sincere, (in the sense above
explained) in their Endeavours to find ouf the will of the Deity,
and to please hinij according to their light, that they may es
cape his future displeasure and wrath, and obtain happiness in
the future state, through his favour.

iSect. VI. Indifference inconsistent with Virtue, 17;>

SECT. VI.
Liberty of Indifference, not only not necessary to Virtue, but
utterly inconsistent with it ; and all, either virtuous or vicious
Habits or Inclinations, inconsistent with Arminian Notions of
Liberty and moral Agency.
To suppose such a freedom of will as Arminians talk of
to be requisite to Virtue and Vice, is many ways contrary to
common sense*
If Indifference belong to Liberty of Will, as Arminians
suppose, and it be essential to a virtuous action, fhat if be
performed in a state of Liberty, as fhey also suppose ; it will
follow, that it is essential fo a virtuous action, that it be per
formed in a state of, Indifference : and if it be performed in a
state of Indifference, then doubtless it must be performed in
the time of Indifference. And so it will follow, thaf in order
to the virtue of an act, the heart must be indifferent in the
time of the performance of that act, and the more indifferent
and cold fhe heart is with relation to the act performed, so
much the better ; because the act is performed with so much
the greater Liberty. But is this agreeable to the light of
nature ? Is it agreeable to the notions which mankind in all
ages have of Virtue, that it lies in what is contrary to Indif
ference, even in the Tendency and Inclination of the heart to
virtuous action ; and that the stronger the Inclination, and so
the further frora Indifference, the more virtuous the heart, and
60 much the more praiseworthy the act Which proceeds from
itl if we should stippose (contrary to what has been before
demonstrated^ that there may be ari act of will in a state of
Indifference; for instance, this act, viz. The will determining
to put itself out of a state of Indifference, and to give itself
a preponderation one way : then it would follow, on Arminian
principles, that this act or determination of the wUl is that
alone wherein Virtue consists, because this only is performed
while the mind remains in a state of Indifference,' and so in a
state of Liberty ; for when once the mind is put out of its
equilibrium, it is no longer in such a state ; and therefore all
the acts, which follow afterwards, proceeding from bias, can
have the nature neither of Virtue nor Vice. Or if the thing
which the will can do, while yet in a state of Indifference, and
so of Liberty, be only to suspend acting, and determine to
take the matter into consideration ; then this determination is
thaf alone wherein Virtue consists, and not proceeding to
action after the scale is turned by consideration. So that it

174 FREEDOM OF THE WIKL. PaRT III.
will follow, from these principles, thaf whatever is done after
the mind, by any means, is once out of its equilibrium, and
arises from an Inclination, has nothing of the nature of Virtue
or Vice, and is worthy of neither blame nor praise. But
how plainly contrary is this to the universal sense of mankind,
and to the notion they have of sincerely virtuous actions ? — .
Which is, that they proceed from a heart well disposed and
well inclined ; and the stronger, the more_^a;ed! and determined,
the good disposition of the heart, the greater the sincerity of
Virtue, and so the more of its truth and reality. But if there
be any acts which are done in a state of equilibrium, or spring
immediately from perfect Indifference and coldness of heart,
they cannot arise from any good principle or disposition in
the heart ; and, consequently, according fo common sense,
have no sincere goodness in them, having no Virtue of heart
in them. To have a virtuous heart, is to have a heart fhat fa
vours Virtue, and is friendly to it, and not one perfectly cold
and indifferent about it.
And besides, the actions that are done in a state of Indif
ference, or that arise immediately out of such a state, cannot
be virtuous, because, by the supposition, fhey are not deter
mined by any preceding choice. For if there be preceding
choice, then choice intervenes between the act and the state
of Indifference ; which is contrary to the supposition of the
act arising immediately out of Indifference. But those acts
which are not determined by preceding choice, cannot be vir
tuous or vicious, by Arminian principles, because they are
not determined by the will. So that neither one way, nor the
other, can any actions be virtuous or vicious, actiording to
those principles. If the action be determined by a preceding
act of choice, it cannot be virtuous ; because the action is not
done in a state of Indifference, nor does iraraediately arise
from such a state , and so is not done in a state of Liberty. — ;
If the action be not determined by a preceding act of choice,
then it cannot be virtuous ; because then the will is not
self-determined in it. So that it is made certain that
neither Virtue nor Vice can ever find any place in the uni-,
verse I
Moreover, that it is necessary to a virtuous action that it
be performed in a state of indifference, under a notion of that
being a state of Liberty, is contrary to common sense ; as it
is a dictate, of common sense, fhat Indifference itself, in many
cases, is vicious, and so to a high degree. As if when I see
my neighbour or near friend, and one who has in the highest
degree merited of me, in extreme distress and ready to pe
rish, I find an Indifference in my heart with respect to any
thing proposed to be done, which I can easily do, for his relief
So if it should be proposed to me to blaspheme God, or kUI mv

Sect. vi. Indifference inconsistent with Virtue. 175
father, or do numberless other things which might be mention
ed, the being indifferent for a moment would be highly vicious
and vile. And it may be further observed, that to suppose this Li
berty of Indifference is essential to Virtue and Vice, destroys
the" great difference of degrees of the guUt of different crimes,
and takes away the heinousness of the most flagitious, horrid
iniquities ; such as adultery, bestiality, murder, perjury, blas
phemy, (Sic. For, according to these principles, there is no
harm at all in having the mind in a state of perfect Indifference
with respect to fhese crimes ; nay, it is absolutely necessary
in order to any Virtue in avoiding them, or vice in doing them.
But for the mind to be in a state of Indifference with respect
to them, is fo be next door to doing them : if is then infinitely
near to choosing, and so committing the fact : for equihbrium
is the next step fo a degree of preponderation ^ and one, even
the least degree of preponderation (all things considered) is
choice. And not only so, but for the will to be in a state of
perfect equilibrium with respect to such crimes, is for the
mind to be in such a state as fo be full as likely to choose
them as to refuse them, to do them as to omit them. And if
our minds must be in such a state, wherein it as near to
choosing as refusing, and wherein it must of necessity, accord
ing to fhe nature of things, be as likely to commif them as
to refrain from them ; where is the exceeding heinousness of
choosing and committing them ? If there be no harm in often
being in such a state, wherein the probability of doing and
forbearing are exactly equal, there being an equUibrium, and
no more tendency to one than the other ; then, according to
the nature and laws of such a contingence, it may be expected,
as an inevitable consequence of such a disposition of things,
that we should choose them as often as reject them : that it
should generally so fall out is necessary, as equality in fhe
effect is the natural consequence of the equal tendency of the
cause, or of the antecedent state of things from which the
effect arises. Why then should we be so exceedingly to blame,
if it does so fall out ?
If is many ways apparent, that the Arminian scheme of
Liberty is utterly inconsistent with the being of any such things
as either virtuous or vicious Habits or Dispositions. If Liberty
of Indifference be essential fo moral agency, then there can
be no Virtue in any habitual IncHnations of the heart ; which
are contrary to Indifference, and iinply in their nature fhe very
destruction and exclusion of it. They suppose nothing can be
virtuous in which no Liberty is exercised ; but how absurd
is it to talk of exercising Indifference under bias and prepon
deration !
And if self-determining power in the will be necessary to

176 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. pART I1I»
moral agency, praise, blame, &;c. then nothing done by the wilt
can be any further praiseworthy or blameworthy, than so far
as the will is moved, swayed and determined by itself, and the.
scales turned by the sovereign power the wUl has over itself.
And theriefore the wiU must not be out of its balance, prepon
deration must not be determined and efiected beforehand;
and so fhe self-determining act anticipated. Thus it appears :
another way, that habitual bias is inconsistent with that
Liberty which Arminians suppose to be necessary to Virtue or
Vice ; and so it follows that habitual bias itself cannot be either
virtuous or vicious.
The same thing follows from their doctrine concerning
the Inconsistence oi Necessity with Liberty, Praise, Dispraise,
&c. None will deny that Bias and Inclination may be so
stiong as to be invincible, and leave no possibihty of fhe wUl
determining contrary to it ; and so be attended with Neces..
sity. This Dr. Whitby allows concerning the will of God,,
Angels, and glorified Saints, with respect to good ; and the
wiU of DevUs with respect to evil. Therefore, if Necessity^
be inconsistent with Liberty, then when fixed Inclination is
to such a degree of strength, if utterly excludes all Virtue,.
Vice, Praise, or Blame. And if so, then the nearer Habits
are to this strength, the more do they impede Liberty, and
so diminish Praise and Blame. If very strong Habits destroy
Liberty, the lesser ones proportionably hinder it, according to
their degree of strength. And therefore it wUl follow, that
then is the act most virtuous or vicious, when performed with
out any Inchnation or habitual Bias af all ; because it is then
performed with most Liberty.
Every prepossessing fixed Bias on the mind brings a de
gree of moral Inability for the contrary ; because so far as the
rhind is biassed and prepossessed, so much hinderance is there
of the contrary. And therefore if moral InabUity be incoH'
sistent with moral agency, or the nature of Virtue and Vice,
then, so far as there is any such thing as evil disposition of
heart, or habitual depravity of Inclination, whether covetous«
ness, pride, malice, cruelty, or whatever else, so much the
more excusable persons are ; so much the less have thejr evil
acts of this kind the nature of Vice. And on the contrary,
whatever exceUent Dispositions and Inclinations they have, so
much are they the less virtuous.
It is evident that no habitual disposition of heart can
be in any degree virtuous or vicious; or the actions which
proceed from them at all praiseworthy or blameworthy. Be
cause, though we should suppose the Habit nof to be of such
strength as wholly to take away all moral ability and self-deter
mining power ; or may be partly from Bias, and in part from
self-determination ; yet ip this c^se, all that is frdm antecedent

Sect. vi. Indifference inconsistent with Virtue. 177
Bias must be set aside, as of no consideration ; and in estima
ting the degree of Virtue or Vice, no more must be considered
than what arises from self-determining power, without any in
fluence of that Bias, because Liberty is exercised m no more :
so thaf all that is fhe exercise of habitual Inclination is thrown
away, as not belonging to the morality of the action. By which
it appears, that no exercise of these Habits, let them be stronger
or weaker, can ever have any thing of the nature of either
Virtue or Vice.
Here if any one should say, thaf notwithstanding all these
things, there may be the nature of Virtue and Vice in the
Habits of the mind ; because these Habits may be the effects
of those acts, wherein the mind exercised Liberty ; that how
ever the forementioned reasons wUl prove that no Habits,
which are natural, or thaf are born or created with us, can be
either virtuous or vicious ; yet they will not prove this of
Habits which have been acquired and established by repeated
free acts. To such an objector 1 would say, thaf this evasion will not
at all help the matter. For if freedom of wUl be essential fo
the very nature oi Virtue and Vice, then there is no Virtue or
Vice but only in that very thing, wherein this Liberty is exer
cised. If a man in one or more things that he does, exercises
Liberty, and then by those acts is brought into such circum
stances that his Liberty ceases, and there follows a long series
of acts or events that come to pass necessarily ; those conse
quent acts are not virtuous or vicious, rewardable or punishable ;
but only the free acts that established this necessity ; for in
them alone was the man free. The following effects, that are
necessary, have no more of the nature of Virtue or Vice, than
health or sickness of body have properly fhe nature of Virtue
or Vice, being fhe effects of a course of free acts of temperance
or intemperance ; or than the good qualities of a clock are
of the nature of Virtue, which are the effects of free acts of
the artificer ; or.the goodness and sweetness of the fruits of a
garden are moral Virtues, being the effects of the free and
faithful acts of the gardener. If Liberty be absolutely requi
site to the morality of actions, and necessity wholly inconsist
ent with it, as Arminians greatly insist ; then no necessary ef
fects whatsoeverj let the cause be never so good or bad, can be
virtuous or vicious ; but the virtue or vice must be only in the
free cause. Agreeably fo this, Dr. Whitby supposes the ne
cessity that attends the good and evil Habits of the saints in
heaven and damned in hell, which are the consequence of their
free acts in their state of probation, are nof rewardable or pu
nishable. On the whole it appears, that if the notions of Arniinians
conceming liberty and moral agency be true, it will follow
VOL, II. 23

178 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. PaRT Ifl
that there is.no virtue in any such Habits or qualities as humi
hty, meekness, patience, mercy, gratitude, generosity, heaven
ly-raindedness ; nothing af all praiseworthy in loving Christ
aboy,e father and_ mother, wife and children, or our own lives ;
or in delight in hoUness, hungering and thirsting after righteous
ness, love fo enemies, universal benevolence to mankind : and
on the other hand, there is nothing at all vicious, or worthy of
dispraise, in the most sordid, beastly, malignant, devilish dis
positions ; in being ungrateful, profane, habituaUy hating God,
and things sacred and holy ; or in beirig most treacherous, en
vious, and cruel towards men. For all these things are Dispo^
sitions and Inclinations oi the heart. And in short, there is no
such thing as any virtuous or vicious quality of mind ; no such
thing as inherent virtue and holiness, or vice and sin : and the
stronger those Habits or Dispositions are, which used to be
called virtuous and vicious, the further they are from being so
indeed ; the more violent men's lusts are, the more fixed theii'
pride, envy, ingratitude, and maliciousness, still the further are
they from being blameworthy. - If there be a inan that by his
own repeated acts, or by any other means, is come to be of the
most hellish Disposition, desperately inclined to treat his neigh
bours with injuriousness, contempt, and malignity ; the further
they should be from any Disposition to be angry with him, or
in the least f o blame him. So, on the other hand, if there be a
person who is of a most excellent spirit, strongly inclining him
to the most amiable actions, admirably meek, benevolent, &;c.
so much is he further from any thing rewardable or commend
able. On which principles, the man Jesus Christ was very far from
being praiseworthy for those acts of holiness and kindness which
He performed, these propensities being strong in his heart.
And above all, the infinitely holy and gracious God is infinitely
remote from any thing commendable, his good Inclinations
being infinitely strong, and He, therefore, at the utmost pos
sible distance from being af liberty. And in all cases, the
stronger the Inclinations of any are to Virtue, and the more
they love it, fhe less virtuous, and the more they love wicked-'
ness, the less vicious they are.  Whether these things are
agreeable to Scripture, let every Christian, and every man who
has read the Bible, judge : and whether they are agreeable to
common sense, let every one judge, that has human understand
ing in exercise.
And, if we pursue these principles, we shall find that
Virtue and Vice are wholly excluded out of the world ; and
that there never was, nor ever can be any such thing as one or
the other, either in God, angels, or men. No Propensity, Dis
position, or Habit, can be virtuous or vicious, as has been
shewn; because they, so far as they take place, dejstroy the
freedora of the will, the foundation of all moral agency, and

S&CT. vu. Arminian Notions of moral Agency, <^c. 179
exclude all capacity of either Virtue or Vice. — And if Habits
and Dispositions themselves be not virtuous nor vicious, nei
ther can the exercise of fhese Dispositions be so : for the
exercise of Bias is nof the exercise of free self-determining
-will, and so there is no exercise of liberty in it. Consequent
ly, no man is virtuous or vicious, either in being well or Ul
disposed, nor in acting from a good or bad Disposition. And
whether this Bias or Disposition be habitual or not, if it ex-
-ists but a moment before the act of will which is the effect
of it, it alters not the case as to the necessity of the effect.
Or, if there be no previous Disposition at all, either habitual or
occasional, that determines the act, then it is not choice thaf
determines it ; it is, therefore, a contingence that happens fo
the man, arising from nothing in him ; and is necessary, as
to any Inclination or Choice of his ; and therefore cannot
•make him either the better or worse, any more than a tree
is better than other trees, because it oftener happens to be
lighted upon by a nightingale : or a rock more vicious than
other rocks, because rattlesnakes have happened oftener to
crawl over it. So that there is no Virtue nor Vice in good or
bad Dispositions, either fixed or transient ; nor any Virtue or
Vice In acting from any good or bad previous Inclination;
nor yet any virtue or vice in acting wholly .without any pre
vious Inclination. Where then shall we find room for Virtue
or Vice ?

SECT. VII.
Arminian Notions of moral Agency inconsistent with all Influ
ence of Motive and Inducement, in either virtuous or vicious
Actions.As Arminian notions of that liberty which is essential to
virtue or vice, are inconsistent with common sense in their
being inconsistent with all virtuous or vicious habits and dis
positions ; so they are no less inconsistent with all influence
of Motives in moral actions. — Such influence equaUy against
those notions of hberty, whether there be, previous to the act
of choice, a preponderapcy of the inclination, or a preponde-
rancy of those circumstances which have a tendency to move
the inclination. And indeed it comes to just the same thing ;
to say, the circurastances of the mind are such as tend to sway
and turn its inclination one way, is the same thing as to say,
the inclination of fhe mind, as under such circumstances, tends
that wav.

180 FREEDOia OF THE WILL. pART lit-
Or if any think it most proper to say, that Motives do
alter the inclination, and give a new bias to the mind, it will"
nof alter fhe case as to the present argument. For if Motives
operate by giving the mind an inclinatiori, then they operate
by destroying the mind's indifference, and laying it under a
bias. But to do this, is to destroy the Arminian freedom : it
IS not to leave the will to its own self-determination, but to
bring it into subjection to the powerof something extrinsic,
which operates upon it, sways and determines it, previous to
its own determination So that what is done from Motive,
cannot be either virtuous or vicious. Besides, if the acts of
the will are excited by Motives, those Motives -are the causes
of those acts of the wUl ; which makes fhe acts of the will
necessary; as effects necessarily follow the efficiency of the
cause. And if the influence and power of the Motive causes
the volition, then the influence of the Motive determines
volition, and volition does not determine itself; and so is not
free in the sense of Arminians (as has been largely shewn
already), and consequently can be neither virtuous nor vi
cious. The supposition which has already been taken notice of
as an insufficient evasion in other cases, would be, in like man
ner, impertinently alledged in this case ; namely, the suppo
sition that liberty consists in a power of suspending action for
the present, in order to deliberation. If it should be said,
Though it be frue, that the will is under a necessity of fi
nally foUowing the strongest Motive ; yet it may, for fhe
present, forbear to act upon the Motive presented, tiU there
has been opportunity thoroughly to consider it, and compare
its real weight with the merit of other Motives. I answer as
follows :
Here again if must be remembered, thaf if determining
thus to suspend and consider be the act of the will, wherein ^
alone liberty is exercised, then in this aU virtue and vice must
consist; and the acts that follow this consideration, and, are
the effects of it, being necessary, are no more virtuous or vi
cious than some good or bad events, which happen when they
are fast asleep, and are the consequences of what they did
when they were awake. Therefore, I would here observe two
things :
1. To suppose that all virtue and vice, in every case, con
sists in determining, whether to take time for consideration or
not, is not agreeable to common sense. For, according to such
a supposition, the most horrid crimes, adultery, murder, sodo
my, blasphemy, &c. do not at all consist in the horrid nature
of the things themselves, but only in the neglect of thorough
consideration before they were perpetrated, which brings their
viciousness to a small matter, and makes all crimes equal. • If

Sect. v«. A-rminian Notion^ of moral Agency, ^c. 181
it be said, that neglect of consideration, when such heinous
¦ evils are proposed to choice, is worse than in other cases : I an
swer, this is inconsistent, as it supposes, the very thing to be,
which, at the sarae time, is supposed not to be ; it supposes all
moral evil, all viciousness and heinousness, does not consist
merely in the want of consideration. It supposes some crimes
in thetmelves, in "their own nature, to be more heinous than
others, antecedent to consideration or inconsideration, which
lays fhe person under a p. evious obligation to consider in some
cases more than others.
2. If it were so, that all virtue and vice, in every case, con
sisted only in the act of the wUl whereby it determines whether
to consider or no, it would not alter the case in the least as to
the present argument. For still in this act of the will on this
determination, if is induced by some Motive, and necessarUy
follows the strongest Motive ; and so is necessarily, even in that
act wherein alone it is either virtuous or vicious.
One thing more I would observe concerning the incon
sistence of Arminian notions of moral agency with the influ
ence of Motives. — I suppose none will deny, that it is possible
for such powerful Motives to be sef before the mind, exhibited in
so strong a light, and under such advantageous circumstances,
as to beinvincible ; and such as the raind cannot but yield to.
In this case, Arminians will doubtless say, liberty is destroyed.
And if so, then if Motives are exhibit^ with half so much
power, they hinder liberty in proportion to their strength, and
go halfway towards destroying it. If a thousand degrees of
Motive abolish all liberty, then five hundred take it half away.
If one degree of fhe influence of Motive does not at all infringe
or diminish liberty, then no more do two degrees ; for nothing
doubled, is still nothing. And if two degrees do npt diminish
the will's liberty, no more do four, eight, sixteen, or six thou
sand. For nothing however multipUed comes to but nothing.
If there be nothing in the nature of motive or moral suasion,
thaf is at all opposite to liberty, then the greatest degree of it
cannot hurt liberty. But if there "be somewhat, in the. nature
of the thing, against liberty, then the least degree of it hurts
in some degree ; and consequently diminishes virtue. If invin
cible Motives to that action which is good, take away all the
freedom of the act, and so all the virtue of it ; then the more
forcible the Motives are, so much fhe wor^, so much the less
virtue ; and the weaker the Motives are, the better for the cause
of virtue ; and none is best of all.
Now let if be considered, whether these things are agree
able to common sense. If it sliould be allowed, that there are
some instances wherein fhe soul chooses without any Motive,
what virtue can there be in such a choice ? I ara sure there is
no prudence or wisdom in it. Such a choice is made for no

182 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. PaRT III.
good end ; being, made for no end at all. If it were for any
end, the view of the end would be the Motive exciting to the
act ; and if the act be for no good end, and so frora no good
aim, then there is no good intention in it ; and, therefore, ac
cording to all our natural notions of virtue, np more virtue in
it than in the motion of the smoke, which is driven to and fro
by the wind, without any aim or end in the thing moved, and
which knows not whither, nor wherefore, it is moved.
Corol. 1. By these tilings it appears that the argumenf
against the Calvinists, taken from the use of counsels, exhorta
tions, invitations, expostulations, &c. so much insisted on by
Arminians, is truly against themselves. For these things can
operate no other way to any good effect, than as in thera is
exhibited Motive and Inducement, tending to excite and de
termine the acts of the will.* But if follows, on their prin-
* The true reason why counsels, exhortations, fee. coramonly called motives,;
are consistent with the doctrine of necessity held by Calvinists, may be here no
ticed, in addition to sorae hints before given. In order to this, we must guard
against ambiguity in the word ' motive,' which at one time is intended for the ob
ject exhibited, abstractedly considered ; at another, the object concretively, as it
stands in this' view of the mind. , The opposers of that necessity for which our
author pleads, must, in order to make even a show of consistency, understand the
word ' motive' in the first of these acceptations. And if so, it is nothing marvel
lous that they should maintain the existence of a power in th^ huraan mind which -
can, on the one hand, successfully oppose the strongest possible -motive ; and on the
other, be determined by a weaker, iind even soraetimes by the weakest raotive.
For how often is the most insignificant bawble preferred to infinite excellence'!
But consistent Calvinists do not understand the term in any such raanner, but ra
ther as an effect compounded of the state of the mind and the real object. And,
seeing the object in itself considered, is not changed by mental perception, the
difference of the effect, or change of mental view, must arise from the mind itself.
-Hence one motive, in the Arminian sense, may produce, in the other acceptation of
the terra, a thousand different motives, according to the different mental states to
, which the object is presented. "¦*¦
Therefore counsels, exhortations, invitations, &c. are raost rationally em
ployed by Calvinists ; for that which determines the hiiman will to action, is the
motive as it is pere ived, or that which results from an application of the object to
the mind. According to them, without an object presented there can be no -motive,
any more than there can be a motiue without a mind to which it is presented. —
Without'evangelical truth, and an evangelical raind or disposition^ there can be no
evangelical determining raotive. Consequently, if the mind be at all roused from
ignorance and apathy, determining motives raust be produced in it by a representai
tion of objects, by counsels, exhortations, invitations, expostulations, &c. These
will succeed or tail of success, morally, according to the state of the mind. But
as the ag^t is free from co-action, constraint, and compulsion, in the act of choos
ing, the true inference is — .not that such use of the raeans is unsuitable or incon
sistent, but — that here is clearly irapUed the great necessity, the rationality, and
the perfect consistency nf prayer to the Goi! of grace, for success on the use of
means. Paul may plant, and Apollos may water, but God giveth the increase.^-
To influence the raind without moral motives, is the prerogative of God Alf hearts
are in his hand to firm them as he pKjases. If the tree be good by sovereign
iniluenee, or a new birth, the fruit of love to God and hatred to sin, holy fear, un
feigned faith, humble hope, &c. will follow, according to the objects presented. —
A crop will not follow without the union of two things, seed and suU If both be
good, the crop will be good, but not otherwise. That motive which determines
the will, cannot arise from any other cause than the object and the disposition united.
And then only can the determining motive be good, when it results from a good

Sect. vii. Arminian Notions of moral Agency, <^c. 183
ciples, that the acts of will excited by such causes, cannot
be virtuous ; because, so far as they are from these, they are
not from the will's self-determining power. Hence it wUl
follow, that it is not worth while to offer any arguments to per
suade men to any virtuous vohtion or voluntary action ; it is
in vain to set before thera the wisdom and amiableness of
ways of virtue, or the odiousness and folly of ways of vice. —
This notion of liberty and moral agency frustrates all en
deavours to draw men to virtue by instruction or persuasion,
precept or example : for though these things may induce them
to what is materially virtuous, yet at the same time they take
away the form of Virtue, because they destroy Liberty : as
they by their own power put the will out of its equUibrium,
determine and turn the scale, and take the work of self-deter
mining power out of its hands. And the clearer the instruc
tions given, the more powerful the arguraents used, and the
more moving the persuasions or examples, the more likely
they are fo frustrate their own design ; because they have so
much the greater tendency to put the will out of its balance,
to hinder its freedom of self-determination ; and so to exclude
the very form of virtue, and the essence of whatsoever is praise
worthy. So it clearly follows from these principles, thaf God has
no hand in any man's virtue, nor does at aU promote it, either
by a physical or mt)ral influence ; that notae of the moral me
thods he uses with men to promote virtue in the world have
any tendency to the attainment of that end ; that all the in
structions he has given men from the beginning of the world
to this day, by prophets or apostles, or by his Son Jesus Christ ;
that all his counsels, invitations, promises, threatenings, warn-
ings.and expostulations ; that all means he has used with men
in ordinances, or providences ; yea, all influences of his Spirit,
ordinary and extraordinary, have had no tendency at all to ex
cite any one -virtuous act of the mind, or to promote any thing
morally good and commendable in any respect. — For there is
no way that these or any other means can promote virtue, but
one of these three. Either (1.) By a physical operation on the
heart. But all effects that are wrought in men in this way, have
no virtue in tbem, by the concurring voice-of all Arminians 
Or, (3.) Morally, by exhibiting Motives to the understanding, to
excite good acts in the wUl. But it has been demonstrated,
that volitions excited by Motives, are necessary, and not ex
cited by a self-moving power ; and therefore, by their prin
ciples, there is no Virtue in them. Or, (3.) By merely giving
object applied to a good disposition, or state of mind. These things duly con
sidered, will sufficiently prove wAg Calvjnists use counsels, exhortations, ipvita-
tions, &c  W.

184 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. PaRT III.
the wUl an opportunity to determine itself concerning the ob
jects proposed, either fo choose or reject, by its own uncaused,
unmoved, uninfluenced self-determination. And if this be all,
then all those means do no more fo promote virtue than vice :
for they do nothing but give the will opportunity to deterriiine
itseli either way, either to good or bad, without laying it under
any bias to either : and so there is reaUy as much of an oppor
tunity given to determine in favour of evil as of good.
Thus that horrid blasphemous consequence wiU certainly
follow from the Arminian doctrine, which they charge on others ;
namely, that God acts an inconsistent part in using so many ,
counsels, warnings^ invitations, intreaties, &c. with sinners, to
induce them to forsake sin,-and turn to the ways of virtue ;
and that all are insincere and fallacious. It will foUow,
from their doctrine, that God does these things when he knows,
at the same time, that fhey have no manner of tendency to
promote the effect he seems to aim at ; yea, knows fhat if
they have any influence, this very influence will be inconsistent
with such an effect, and will prevent it. But what an imputa
tion of insincerity would this fix on him, who is infinitely holy
and true ! — So that theirs is the doctrine which, if pursued in
its consequences, does horribly reflect on the Most High, and
fix on him the charge of hypocrisy ; and not the doctrine of fhe
Calvirtist according fo their frequent and vehement excla*
mations and invectives.
Corol. 2. From what has been observed in this section,.
it again appears, that Arminian principles and notions, when
fairly examined and pursued in their demonstrable conse
quences, do evidently shut all virtue out of the world, and
make if impossible that there should ever be any such thing,
in any case; or that any such thing should ever be conceived
of For, by these principles, the very notion of virtue or vice
implies absurdity and contradiction. For it is absurd in itself,
and contrary to comraon sense, to suppose a virtuous act of
mind without any good intention or aim ; and, by their princi
ples, it is absurd to suppose a virtuous act with a good inten
tion or aim ; for to- act for an end, is fo act from a Motive.
So that if we rely on these principles, there can be no virtuous
act with a good design and end ; and it is self-evident, there
can be none without : consequently there can be no virtuous
act at all.
Corol. 3. It is manifest, fhat Arminian notions of moral
I agency, and the. being of a faculty of wUl, cannot consist to
gether ; and fhat if there be any such thing as either a vir-
I tuous or vicious act, it cannot be an act of the will ; no wiU
can be at all concerned in if. For that act which is performed
without inchnation, without Motive, withouf end, must be per-
^med without any concern of the will. To suppose an act

Sect. vu. Arminian Notions qf moral Agency, '^-c. 18,5
of the vvill without these, implies a contradiction. If the soul
in its act has no motive or end; then, in that act (as was ob
served before) it seeks nothing, goes after nothing, exerts na
inclination to any thing; and this implies, that in that act it
desires nothing, and chooses nothing ; so that there is no act
of choice in the case : and that is as much as to say, there is
no act of will in the case. Which very effectually shuts all
vicious and \ irtuous acts out of the universe ; in as much as,
according to this, there can be no vicious or virtuous act
wherein the will is concerned : /ind according to the plainest
di«tates.of reason, and the light (?i' noTnfffTrnm alsft-the-iJi-in-
ciples ot: Arminians themselves, there, can . lie. no—iurtuaus
or vicious 'act — wherein the will is not concerned. And
therefore thefe is no room for any virtuous or vicious acts^
-n,l]t_ — 
Corol. 4. If none ofthe moral actions of intelligent beings
are influenced by either previous Inclination or Motive, another
strange thing will follow ; and this is, that God not only cannot
foreknow any of the future moral actions of his creatures, but
he can make no conjecture, can give no probable guess con
cerning them. For, all conjecture in things of this nature,
must depend on some discerning or apprehension of these two
things, previous Disposition and Motive, which, as has been
observed, Arminian notions of moral agency, in their re*l con-
Snjouence. altogether exclude.

VOL. II. 24

IS.6 PREEDOH OF 'Hp; WIL];.. Part iv.

PART IV.
WHEREIN THE CHIEF GROUNDS* OF THE REASONINGS OF AR&tf.
NIANS, IN SUPPORT AND DEFENCE OF THE FOjtEMEN-
TlONED NOTIONS OF LIBERTY, MORAL AGENCY, &c. AND
AGAINST THE OPPOSITE DOCTRINE, ARE CONSIDERED.

SECT. I.

The Essence of the Virtue and Vice of Dispositions of the
Heart, and Acts ofthe Will, lies not in their Cause, but their
Nature.* One main foundation of the reasons which are brought to
establish fhe forementioned notions of liberty, virtue, vice,
1/
* This may appear to some to be an idaitical proposition — '• The essence of
a thing Ues in its nature ;" but it is not whoUy so, and the whole of the proposi
tion is exceedingly iraportant, on account of the negative part, or the incidental
proposition it contains, viz. The essence of virtue and vice Ues not in their cause. *
A smgle consideration raay be sufficient to shew the truth and importance of one
part of this last proposition. If the essence of virtue lay in its cause, how could
the first cause, or the uncaused nature, be virtuous ! If therefore the^rsf cause
be virtuous, or have the essence of virtue, as all theists will allow, it is plain,
that essence must Ue in the nature of that cause itself. Henee, as God is the
standard of all moral exceUence, created natures are moraUy exceUent in propor
tion as they resemble him. And as virtue is an imitable exceUence, and ae no
good reason can be assigned why the resemblance should not hold in this parti
cular, it is highly probable, a priori, that, in reference to created natures, the es
sence of their virtue lies not in its cause. To demonstrate this last, is the design
of the present section.
Again, as the essence of -virtue lies not in its cause, so neither does the es
sence of -vite lie in its ceruse. But the philosophical ground of this part of the ge
neral proposition deraands more particular attention. And as this proposition —
" the essence of vice lies not in its cause," affects the whole system of morals,
and indeed of theology, we beg leave to propose a series of remarks which, it is
hoped, wiU cast some light on the subject.
1. Causes are of two hinds, and of two only, either positive or neg(dive.
Positive causes produce positive effects, from the first cause through all secon
dary causes ; and these positive secondary causes are nothing else but so many
decretive antecedents, which act physicdly, and their consequences foUow frem
the nature of things ; even as niunber follows the repetition of units, or hoppi-
tms tmviis from tiue virtue.

Seu i. 1. Kjf tne J^ssence of Virtue and Vice. 187
&c. is a supposition, that the virtuousness of the dispositions,
or acts of the will, consists not in the nature of fhese dispo-
2. The term " cause" is appUed less properly to express a negative idea ;
for it expresses merely an antecedent of a consequent. For instance, if we say
that a man cannot read because he is blind, or cannot walk, because he has no legs,
or cannot go to heaven because he does not love God, and the like ; it is manifest
that blindness, want of legs, and want of love to God, are "causes" only as ante
cedents are causes to their consequents, without positive influence.
3. Negative causes, though they have no positive operation in producing
their consequents, are no less the ground of cerfainfi/ than those causes, properly
so called, which exist in physical operations. For the consequent follows the an
tecedent with equal certainty, whether the connection be formed by decretive
wiil and energy, as in aU positive causes, or by the nature of things only, which
is essential truth, as in all negative causes.
4. The cause of vicious acts, is a vicious disposition ; in other words, it is the
want, or the absence of a virtuous disposition. The essence of the vicious act,
however, is not in the cause, or disposition. The vice of the disposition is one
thing, and the vice of the act is another. For as the -nature of the disposition,
and the nature of the act, are different; so'the vice, or moral badness ofthe
one, is a diflerent badness from that of the other. The one and the other is a
Sad thing whatever be the cause, and irrespective of any. Hence,
5. Evil dispositions or acts should be denominated such, not frora their cause,
but from their nature. Were it otherwise, personal fault, or blarae, could never
exist ; for the vicious act would transfer the blarae to the disposition, and the dis
position to the cause of that ; whereby persons would be free from blame, and
this would attach to principles only. But to suppose a raoral agent incapable of
blaraeworthiness, which on the supposition would be the case, is a gross absur
dity. It would be to suppose an accountable being, who at the same time can
be accountable for nothing ; and it would be to impute blame to principles, or a
principle, which is incapable of moral agency.
6. The cause of virtuous ocfs, or, if we may so speak, the soil in which they
grow, is a previous incUnation or disposition to good, before any actual choice
takes place. ¦ This may be called a -virtuous inclination, or disposition. But the
original and predisposing cause of that, is divine energy, influx, or influence ;
in other words, an assimilating emanation from the holy nature and decretive will
of God. 7. Nevertheless, this is not a good, or a virtue, attributable lo man, until he
is actually possessed of it, or it becomes his, as a quality of his nature. God, the
Father of lights, from whom every good and perfect gift proceedeth, is the cause
of that virtuous disposition ; but while the virtue remained in tho cause, and not
in the man, it was no human virtue. Nor does the essence of human virtue lie in
the commumcation itself^ for this was the efiect of divine will ; but no will can
alter the nature of virtue : therefore, the essence of virtue consists not in the
cause, whether we understand by "cause," the lotH that communicates the vir
tuous disposition, or the commtmicatum itself. Consequently, the absence of virtue
is so completely confined to the disposition of the agent, and the consequent acts,
as to exclude every thing else that may be terraed its cozisc.
8. The cause of vicious acts, whatever it be, is opposite to the cause of vir
tuous acta ; for these acts have diametrically opposite effects. That vicious acts
have a cause, as weU as virtuous ones, cannot be denied by any reflecting person,
for this plain reason, that there is nothing in the universality of things, beings,
qualities, &c. but has a cause, either.positive or negative, as before explained.
Neither agency, liberty, nor any thing else, considered as an effect or a con
sequent, can exist without a cause, or antecedent. The denial of this, and
universal scepticism, are the same thing. Then all reasoning, and all common
sense, vanish. Then body and spirit, cause and effects, good and evil, &c. are
huddled up in endless confusion, without either first or last, great or small, order
or proportion. 9. The original predisposing cause of a vicious disposition, is the very oppo
site of the original, predisposing cause of a virtuous disposition. This last, it has
been shewn, is divine energy, which is a positive cause ; the other, the opposite
of this, is a negative cause. The cause of good, as before observed, is a cause

188 TREEDOM OF THE WILL. PaKT IV,
sitions, or acts of the will, but wholly in the Origin or Cause of
them : so that ifthe disposition ofthe mindyjr acts of the wiU, be
properly id called, inthe way of physical influence; but the cause of evil is caUed
" a cause" improperly, as it implies no physical influence, but onty stands as an
antecedent to a consequent ; from which however the consequent may be inferred
with as much certainty as if the influence were physical arid mechanical. Whe
ther you suppose positive quantities, or negative quantities, consequences are
equally certain, it is no less true that 5—2=3, than 3+3=6. Whether you say,
Ifthe sun werenot, it would cause darkness ; or say, ifthe sun shine, it wiUcause
light; the diflerence is onty in the nafure of the cause, as either positive or nega
tive, not in the certainty of the consequence.
10. It would be very absurd and contradictory to say that the cause of vice
is vicious. For that would be the same as to say, that a thing was before it existed.
To be vicious is to have vic£; and for this to be the cause of vice, is for it to be
the cause of itself, or self-earned, which is absurd. It is therefore impossible that
the cause of vice should be vicious ; consequently the essence of nice is no where
but in its own proper nature, to the exclusion of evei-y cause whatever. And yet,
as it is an effect, it must have a cause.
11. The principal question to be deterrained in this investigation is. What
is precisely the origmal, predisposing, negative cause of a vicious disposition ? The
answer is plain and short ; it is that property ofa creature which renders it absolute
ly dependent for its being and well-being. Or, it is that property which is the very
opposite to independence, self-sufficiency,,andimmutabiUty: and therefore is a pro
perty peculiar to a creature, and cannot belong to God.
12. Nor can thjs be said to be an actually existing property from eternity : since
it cannot belong to God, and nothing, the only alternative, has no property. It is
not therefore the Manichean eternal evil principle, if by this be meant any thing
actually existing, as coeval with a good principle. Good is a principle positively
eternal ; but what we speak of is a mere negative principle, and owes its eocistenoe as
a property to a created nature ; and were every creature annihilated, this property
would also cease to be.
13. But what shall we call this principle, property, or predisposing came of
vice 1 Shall we call it defectibility, defect, limitation, or imperfection of existence ?
Not the first : for the question would return. What makes a creature defectible ?
Not the second ; for the term is ambiguous, as there are several kinds of defect,
natural and moral, and therefore, as the word is of common use, and of frequent
occurrence, it would require perpetual explanations. Not the third, or the fourth ;
tor the same reason. A term therefore not ambiguous, and sufficiently expressive
should be employed ; as we employ technical terras to express a specific object.
For this purpose, no term, perhaps, is less exceptionable or more suitable than
TjLSSivE POWER ; for it IS free from ambiguity, and is sufficiently expressive of the
idea already explained. The idea of passieili/ is clearly implied in the name, asin
the thing ; and the term power seems preferable to property, or quality, because less
ambiguous, and yet more expressive to convey the intended idea of metaphysical
influence of cause and effect.
14. To which we may add. That " passive power" is by no means a new-
coined expression ; but has often been used to express the very idea to which it
is here applied. Thus, above a century and a half ago, that eminently pious and
profbundly learned divine, Theophilus Gale, in his "Court ofthe Gentiles," says:
" The root and origin of all creatural dependence, is the creature's/jossive jootcer and
Cod's absolute dorainion over it. — Now all limits as to nature and essence speak a
•mixture of nihility, ;)a,5sii;e ^ouier, and dependence resulting therefrom ; whence
Damascene adds, ' Movov -y,!^ ro 6im ajr«6« fra/, The deity only is impassible ;' name
ly, because exempt from nihility, passive power, and dependence. This nihility,
or nothingness of the creature, is the same with its passive power either physic or
-metaphysic, natural or obediental : whereby it is liraited, and confined to such or
such a degiee of e-ntity, existence, and operation. (Court of Gent. Part IV. b. ii. ch.
si. }4.) 15. Now that the essence of vice consisteth not in this property is plain, in
that passive power is essential to a creature, which vice neither is nor can be.
It is the soil in which vice grows, and without which it could not grow, or have
c.xistPBCe, bnt is riot itaelf-it'cions; otherwise we should be forced to seek the cause

»ECT. I. Uf the Essence of Virtue and Vice. 189
never so good, yet if the Cause of thc disposition or act be
not our virtue, there is nothing virtuous or praiseworthy in it ;
»-/
of that cause in perpetual retrogradation, and move from one difficulty to another
into endless absurdity. Ths predisposing cause of vice, therefore, is passive power,
which in itself is not vicious, or morally evil. Buc how moral evil came to exist,
and what is its true arigi'i, wiU be raore conveniently considered in a subsequent
part of this work.
16. As the essence of tho virtue and vice of lisposition.i and acts lios not in
their cause, so neither does it lie in their effects : that is, dispositions and .acts are
not to be denominated virtuous or vicious on account of their effects o. conse
quences, such as their being productive of happin'3a.^ or nii'iery. For as tho pro
perties of iny thing must be different from those of its cause, however similar, so
raust those properties differ from their effects. The immediate effect of virtue is —
not happiness to the individual, for instance, but — that the agent is approvable, or
praiseworthy. Bnt were the essence of virtue to consist in " its tendency to ulti
mate happiness," as sorae have affirraed, immediate approbation and praise could
not be safely given to any individual act or disposition, as its relation to ultiraate
happiness could not be ascertained but by the final event. Ifthe essence of the
virtue or vice were not in the act or disposition, but to be denorainated frora its ef
fects, raany other absurdities would follow. For instance,
17. On that supposition, the supreme excellence of Jehovah would not be ap
provable and -praiseworthy on its own account, or its intrinsic exceUency, but only
because of its effects and consequences. On that principle, to hate God would be
nothing bad, it would have no intrinsic deraerit ; or to love God would be nothing
good, nothing in itself praiseworthy, were it not for consequences. Which is not
only absurd, but blasphemous also and shocking.
IS. That sentiraent is evidently founded on the supposition that every thing,
property, quality and event, is the fruit of AVne -loUl; and therefore that every
thing must be equally good in Us -If, though relatively good br bad to the individual:
even as matter and motion, and their laws, are equally gopd in themselves, but not
relatively so to the individuals who sijffer from them. But this is a great mistake,
as it confounds things totally distinct in their nature, sucA as positive and nega
tive causes, natural necessity and moral certainty. Decretive positions and their
consequences are one ground of certainty ; negative causes and their consequences
are another ; therefore, from the certainty of result in the divine view we cannot
rightly infer that all results are decreed. Decretive positions comprehend neither
negative causes, nor the natuye of things. For an intelligent being to love God, is
agreeable to tho Jiafure of things ; it is what ov^ht to be independent of any decre
tive position or legal demand in reference to the case. In like manner, for an in
telligent being to hate God, is a voluntary contradiction to the nature of things-t-or
the essence of eternal truth, which is above all will, or is not founded in will— tae
well as to constituted law. Again, '
19. To deny thc " intrinsic merit and demerit of voluntary actions indepes-
dent on their consequences," as some do,* is to deny the nature of things ; and
this is nothing less than an attempt to divide eternal unity, to give the he direct
to essential truth, and to convert the first uncaused essence into contradictory coil-
tingencies. The nature of things is nothing else, radicaUy, but the nature of G()d,
which is essential truth as well as essential goodness. Decretive positions, or aa
arbitrary constitution of these things by divine will, therefore can no raore alter the
intrinsic raerit or demerit of actions, affections, habits, or characters, than divine
will can alter the character of essential truth, or choose i eai contradictions. More
over, 20. Ultimate happiness is the effect or consequence of virtue as a reward.
Now to make the merit or exceUence of virtue to depend on ultimate happiness,
while happiness is the reward of virtue, is most inconsistent ; it is to -reward for
nothing rewardable. If virtue be not of intrinsic worth, it must be a me>-'- moral no
thing as to rewardableness, and therefore ultimate happiness would be a reward
for a raere moral nothing ; that is, ha-ppiness would be no reward, which is contra
dictory. * Belsham'.? Rlements, p. 309.

i90 - PREEDOM OF THE WILL. PaRT IV.
and, on the contrary, if the wiU, in its inclinations or acts, be
never so bad, yet, unless if arises from something that is our
vice or fault, there is nothing vicious or blameworthy in it.
Hence their grand objection and pretended demonstration, or
self-evidence, against any virtue or commendableness, or vice
and blame-worthiness, of those habits or acts ofthe wUI, which
are not from some virtuous or vicious determination of the will
itself Now, if this matter be well considered, it wUl appear fo be
altogether a mistake, yea, a gross absurdity ; and that it is most
certain, that if there be any such thing as a virtuous or vicious
disposition, or volition of mind, fhe virtuousness br vicious
ness of them consists not in the Origin or Cause of these things,
but in the -Nature of them.
If the Essence of virtuousness or commendableness, and
of viciousness or fault, does not he in the Nature of the dispo
sitions or acts of mind, which are said to be our vir.tue or our
fault, but in their Cause, then it is certain it lies no where at all.
Thus, for instance, if the vice of a vicious act of wiU, lies not
in the Nature of the act, but the Cause ; so that its being of
a bad Nature will not make it at all our fault, unless it arises
from some faulty determination of ours as its Cause, or some
thing in us thaf is our fault ; then, for the same reason, neither
can the viciousness of that Cause lie in the Nature of the thing
itself, but in its Cause : that evil determination of ours is not
our fault, merely because if is of a bad Nature, unless it arises
from some Cause in us that is our fault. And when we are
come to this higher Cause, still the reason of the thing holds
good ; though this Cause be of a bad Nature, yet we are nof
at all to blame on thaf account, unless it arises from something
faulty in us. Nor yet can blameworthiness lie in the Nature of
this Cause, but in the Cause of that. And thus we must drive
faultiness back from step to step, from a lower Cause to a high
er, in infinitum : and that is thoroughly to banish it from the
21. As to vice, its consequence is punishment. If indeed this consequence
were the mere effect of arbitrary positions, or sovereign appointment ; if it were
the plan of God first to cause the existence of vice, and then to punish the subject
of it, as what the good of the whole required; there would be great plausibility
in ^he sentiraent we oppose. But the assumption itself is fundamentally errone
ous. It confounds hypothetical antecedents, as the whole of decretive plans
raay be termed, with that eternal truth which connects them with their conse
quences.. To suppose the hatred of God, for instance, to have no intri-nsic de
merit in it, or that it is bad only as dependent on its co-nsequences ; is the same as
to say, it is agreeable to the nature of things, conformable to eternal truth, that
God should be hated, and therefore that he must approve of it — only to the agent
it is attended with bad consequences. That is, on the supposition, God has ap
pointed misery as the consequent, for doing nothing that is in itself bad ; yea for
doing what is perfectly innocent, agreeable to the nature of things, conformable
to eternal truth, and acceptable to G(5d, as every thing which he appoints must
be. Whether such a sentiment be nearest a-kin to " profound philosophy,"
or to something else, let the competent reader judge. — W.

Sect. i. Of the Essence of Virtue and Vice. 191
world, and to allow it no possibility of existence any where in
the universality of things. On these principles, vice, or moral
evU, cannot consist in any thing that is an effect ; hecanse fault
does not consist in the Nature of things, but in their Cause ;
as well as because effects are necessary, being unavoidably
connected with their Cause : therefore the Cause only is to
blame. And so it follows, thaf faultiness can lie only in that
Cause which is a Cause only, and no effect of any thing. Nor
yet can it lie in this ; for then it must lie in the Nature of fhe
thing itself ; not in its being from any determination of ours,
nor any thing faulty in us which is the Causey nor indeed from
any Cause at all ; for, by the supposition, it is no effect, and
has no Cause. And thus, he thaf will maintain it is not the
Nature of habits or acts of will that makes them virtuous or
faulty, but fhe Cause, must immediately run himself out of his
own assertion ; and in maintaining it, will insensibly contradict
an.d deny it.
This is certain, that if effects are vicious and faulty, not
from their Nature or from any thing inherent in them, but
because they are from a bad Cause, if must be on account Ox
the badness of the Cause : a bad effect in the will must be bad,
because the Cause is bad, or of an evil Nature, or has badness
as a quality inherent in if : and a good effect in fhe will must
be good, by reason of the goodness of the Cause, or its being
ofa good Kind and Nature. And if this be what is meant, the
very supposition of fault and praise lying not in the Nature of
the thing, but the Cause, contradicts itself, and does at least
resolve the Essence of virtue and vice into the Nature of
things, and supposes it originally to consist in that. — And if a
caviller has a mind to run from the absurdity, by saying, " No,
the fault of the thing, which is the Cause, lies not in this fhat
the Cause itself is of an evil Nature, but thaf the Cause is evil
in thaf sense, that it is from another bad Cause." StiU the
absurdity will follow him; for, if so, then the Cause before
charged is at once acquitted, and all the blame must be laid to
the higher Cause, and must consist in thaf being evil, or of an
evil Nature. So now, we are come again to lay the blame of
the thing blameworthy fo the Nature of the tiling, and not to
the Cause. And if any is so foolish as fo go higher still, and
ascend from step to step, till ¦ he is come fo that which is the
first Cause concerned in fhe whole affair, and wUl say, all the
blame lies in that ; then at last he must be forced to own, that
the faultiness of the thing, which he supposes alone blame
worthy, lies wholly in the Nature of the thing, and not in the
Original or Cause of it ; for the supposition is, fhat it has no
Original, if is determined by no act of ours, is caused by
nothing faulty in us, being absolutely without any Cause,—

193 FREEDOM Of THE^WILL. PaRT IV.
And so the race is at an end, but the evader is taken in his
fiight. It is agreeable to the natural notions of mankind, that
moral evU, with its desert of dislike and abhorrence, and all its
other ill deservings, consists in a certain deformity in the Nature
of certain dispositions of the heart, and acts of the will ; and
not in the deformity of something . else, diverse from the very
thing itself, which deserves abhorrence, supposed to be the
Cause of it. Which wouid be absurd, because that would be
to suppose a thing that is innocent and not evil, is truly evil
and faulty, because another thing is evil. It implies a contra
diction : for it would be to suppose the very thing which is
morally evil and blameworthy, is innocent and not blame
worthy ; but that something else, which is its Cause, is only
to blame. To say, that vice does not consist in the thing
which is vicious, but in its Cause, is the same as to say,
that vice does not consist in vice, but in that which produces
it. It is true a Cause may be to blame, for being the Cause
of vice : it may be wickedness in the Cause that it produces
wickedness. But it would imply a contradiction to suppose
that these two are the same individual wickedness. The
wicked act of the Cause in producing wickedness, is one wick
edness ; and the wickedness produced, if there be any pro
duced, is another. And therefore fhe wickedness of the latter
does not lie in the former, but is distinct from it ; and the wick
edness of both hes in the evil Nature of the things vvhich are
wicked. The thing which makes sin hateful, is that by whieh if
deserves punishment ; which is but the expression of hatred. —
And that which renders virtue lovely, is that on account of
which it is fit to receive praise and reward ; which are but the
expressions of esteem and love. But thaf which makes vice
hateful, is its hateful Nature ; and thaf which renders virtue
lovely, is its amiable Nature. It is a certain beauty or defor
mity that are inherent in fhat good or evil wiU, which is the
soul oi virtue and vice (and not in the occasion of it) which is
their worthiness of esteem or disesteem, praise or dispraise,
according to the common sense of mankind. If the Cause or
occasion of the rise of an hateful disposition or act of wiU, be
also hateful ; suppose another antecedent evil will ; that is
entirely another sin, and deserves punishment by itself, under
a distinct consideration. There is worthiness of dispraise in
the Nature of an evil volition, and not wholly in some fore^
going act, which is its Cause ; otherwise the evU volition,
which is the effect, is no moral evil, any more than sickness, or
some other natural calamity, which arises from a Cause morally
evil.

S-RCT. I. Of the Essence of Virtue and Vice. 193
Thus, for instance, ingratitude is hateful and worthy oi
dispraise, according to common sense ; not because some
thing as bad, or worse than ingratitude, was the Cause that
produced it, but because it is hateful in itself, by its own
inherent deformity. So the love of virtue is amiable and
worthy of praise, not merely because something else went
before this love of virtue in our minds, which caused it to take
place there — for instance our own choice ; we chose to love
virtue, and, by some method or other, wrought ourselves into
the love of it — but because of the amiableness and condes-
cendency of such a disposition and inclination of heart. If that
was the case, that we did choose fo love virtue, and so pro
duced that love in ourselves, this choice itself could be no
otherwise amiable or praiseworthy, fhan as love to virtue, or
some other amiable inclination, was exercised and implied in
it. If that choice was amiable at all, it must be so on account
of some amiable quality in the Nature of the choice. If we
choose to love virtue, not in love to virtue, or any thing that
was good, and exercised no sort of good disposition in the choice,
the choice itself was not virtuous, nor worthy of any praise, ac
cording to common sense, because the choice was not of a
good Nature.
It may not be improper here to take notice of something
said by an author, that has lately made a mighty noise in
America. " A necessary holiness (says he*) is no holiness. —
Adam could nof be originaUy created in righteousness and
true holiness, because he must choose to be righteous, before
he could be righteous. And therefore he must exist, he must
be created, yea, he must exercise thought and reflection,
before he was righteous." There is much more to fhe same
effect, (p. 437, 438, 439, 440.) If these things are so, it will
certainly foUow, that the first choosing to be righteous is no
righteous choice ; there is no righteousness or holiness in it ;
because no choosing to be righteous goes before it. For he
plainly speaks of choosing to be righteous, as what must go be
fore righteousness ; and that which follows the choice, being
the effect of the choice, cannot be righteousness or hoUness :
for an effect is a thing necessary, and cannot prevent the in
fluence or efficacy of its Cause : and therefore is unavoid
ably dependent upon the Cause: and he says a necessary
holiness is no holiness. So that neither can a choice of righte
ousness be righteousness or hohness, nor can any thing that is
consequent on that choice, and the effect of it, be righteous
ness or holiness ; nor can any thing that is without choice, be
righteousness or holiness. So that by his scheme, aU righte
ousness and holiness is at once shut out of the world, and ilo
* Scrip. Doc. of Original Sin. p. 180, 3d. Edit. . t
VOL. II. "2^

194 i'REEDOM OF THE WILL, PaRT IV
door left open, by which it can ever possibly enter into the
world, I suppose the way that men came to entertain this ab
surd notion-^wifh respect to internal inclinations and volitions
themselves, (or notions that imply 'it,) viz. that the essence of
their moral good or evil lies not in their Nature, but their
Cause — was, that it is indeed a very plain dictate of common
sense, that it is so with respect fo all outward actions and
sensible motions of the body ; that the moral good or evil of
them does not lie at all in the motions themselves,, which,
taken by themselves, are nothing of a moral nature ; and the
Essence of aU the moral good or evU that concerns them lies
in those internal dispositions and vohtions which are the Cause
of them. Now, being always used to determine this, without
hesitation or dispute, concerning external Actions, which in
the common use of language are signified by such phrases as
men's actions or their doings ; hence, when they came to speak
of volitions, and internal exercises of their inclinations, under
the same denominations of their actions, or what they do, they
unwarUy determined the case must also be the same with these
as with external actions; not considering the vast difference in
the Nature ofthe case.
If any shall still object and say, why is it not necessary that
the cause should be considered, in order to determine whether
any thing be worthy of blame or praise ? is if agreeable to rea
son and common sense, that a man is to be praised or blamed
for that of which he is not the Cause or author?
I answer, such phrases as being the Cause, being the au
thor, and the like, are ambiguous. They are most vulgarly un
derstood for being the designing voluntary Cause, or Cause by
antecedent choice : and it is most certain, that men ate not,
in this sense, the Causes or authors of the first act of their
wills, in any case ; as certain as any thing is, or ever can be ;
for nothing can be more certain, than that a thing is not be
fore it is, nor a thing of the same kind before the first thing
of that kind ; and so no choice before the first choice. — As the
phrase, being the author, may be understood, not of being the
producer by an antecedent act of wiU; but as a person may
be said to be the author of the act of will itself, by his being
the immediate agent, or the being that is acting, or in exer
cise in that act ; if the phrase of being the author, is used to
signify this, then doubtless common sense requires men being
fhe authors of their own acts of will, in order to their being es
teemed worthy of praise or dispraise on account of them. And
common sense teaches that they must be the authors of exter
nal actions in the former sense, namely, their being the Causes
of them by an act of will or choice, in order to their being just
ly blamed or praised : but it teaches no such thing with respect

Sect. n. Of the Essence of Virtue and Vice. 195
to the acts of the will themselves— But this may appear mora
manifest by the things which will be observed in the following
section.

^ECT. 11.
The Falseness and Inconsistence of that metaphysical Notion
cf Action, and Agency, which seems to be generally enter
tained by the Defenders of the Arminian Doctrine concern
ing Liberty, moral Agency, <^c.
One thing that is made very much a ground of argument
and supposed demonstration by Arminians, in defence of the
forementioned principles, concerning moral Agency, Virtue,
Vice, &c. is their metaphysical notion of Agency and Action.
They say, unless the soul has a self-determining power, it
has no power of Action ; if its volitions be not caused by
itself, but are excited and determined by some extrinsic
cause, they cannot be the souPs own acts ; and that the soul
cannot be active, but must be wholly passive, in those effects
of which if is the subject necessarily, and not from its own free
determination. Mr. Chubb lays the foundation of his scheme of liberty
and of. his arguments to support it, very much in this position,
that man is an Agent and capable of Action. Which doubt
iess is true : but self-determination belongs to his notion of
Action, and is fhe very essence of it. Whence he infers, that
it is impossible for a man to act and be acted upon, in the
same thing, af the same time ; and that no Action can be the
effect ofthe Action of another: and he insists, that a necessary
Agent, or an Agent that is necessarily determined to act, is a
plain contradiction.*
* Were the human raind, indeed, not the subject ot either passive power,
on the one hand, as the predisposing cause of vice ; or of divine holy influence,
/ on the other, as the predisposing cause of real virtue ; and were the determining
motiae what some have represented it to be, the object it.-» J/, irrespective of tlii
changeable state of the mind perceiving it ; the objection, that " a necessary
agent is a plain contradiction," or, in other words, that man is no proper agent,
would be unanswerable. For the rank and place of man in creation, and his re
lative circumstances in the arrangement of providence, being the result of decre
tive appointment, if he himself were not liable to any change but by the same ap •
pointment, it would follow, that if the objects themselves determined him to
choose, and to choose always according to the strongest raotive, his very volitions
in the acta themselves would be necessitated decretively, to the exclusion of all hy
pothetical or moral possibility of failure ; and therefore could nevej be erroneous,
any more than the first cause could act erroneously. On such principles,^ moral
evil, vice or fault, eould have no existence. No effect could be otherwise than
good, amiable, and perfectly innocent ; a moral possibility of failnro licins; ox-

196 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. PaRT IV,
But those are a precarious sort of demonstrations, which
men build on fhe meaning thaf they arbitrarily affix fo a word ;
eluded by natural necessity. For the volition itself to be so necessitated, and not
in a moral or hypothetical manner only, is the same thing as giving it no oppor
tunity of choice or preference, or constraining it to cho'ose one way by a settled
purpose, with a natural impossibiUty of acting otherwise. But if every act of
man be thus the result of settled purpose, why should he be blamed for any one
act whatever ? He does nothing but what he is constrained, or decretively ne
cessitated to perform, the contrary being rendered naturaUy impossible ; and if
he deserves no praise, he can incur no blame, any raore than a clock tor not keep
ing time. 'Such a necessary agent would be indeed a plain contradiction. There is
much reason to apprehend that some philosophical necessarians have no better no
tion of agency than that vvhich Mr. Chubb charges, and justly charges, with " a
phiin contradiction." For those who hold the sentiment, that every act, even as
to its moral quaUty, and every event, are of decretive appointraent, in subservien
cy to ultimate good, must allow, in order to be tolerably consistent, that the su
preme Being is " the only proper agent in the universe ;* and thus reduce human
agency, and every thing else called agency in a creature, to an appointed necessai/y
choice, however odiousln its nature, mischievous in its tendency, or painful in ex
perience. Thus, according to them, God is the only proper agent in all foul crimes
and horrid blasphemies, on earth and in hell ! They have a right to define their
terms, and to say what they mean by agency in God, or in a creature, and to state
their hypothesis accordingly ; but others also have a right to deduce the genuine
consequences of that hypothesis, and to shew wherein its error Ues. — The design
of these notes is not to excite a spirit of unprofitable controversy, but to assist
the serious enquirer in detecting errors and recognizing truths of radical impor
tance in Ethics and Theology ; and, it is hoped, that to prompte these ends the
following observations raay conduce.
1. It is granted, that in reference to nofura! ocfs, the supreme Being is the
" only proper agent in the universe," as they all spring from his energy. In this
respect he is the first cause of all causes, efficiently ; and the description of the
poet is philosophically just : He
" Warms in the sun, refreshes in the breeze.
Glows in the stars, and blossoms in the trees,
Lives through all life, extends through aU extent,
Spreads undivided, operates unspent." — Pope.
2. It is also granted, that, in all acts morcily good, the created agent is the
Subject of necessity several ways. He has an active nafure from decretive neces
sity, which it is not in his power to alter. He is also, accordingly, compelled
to some act of choice, from the activity of his nature. He is, raoreover, the
siibject of physical influence of a holy and purifying nature, whereby the good-
'ness of his choice is infalUbly secured ; and without which there could be no
assignable ground of certainty that any action would be raoraUy good. There
is also a necessity of connection, arising from the nature of things, or the
essence of truth, first, between the disposition and the act, or that the act
will be of the same nature, moraUy corisidered, with the disposition from which
it proceeds ; and, secondly, between thc act and the end or consequent, which is
happiness. 3. It is raoreover allowed, that in all acts moraUy evil, the soul is passive in re
ference to that necessity of dependence which is inseparable frora a created nature,
which may be called passive power; without which the existence of moral evil
would be impossible. This necessity also arises from the nature of things, not
from decree; for no decree can alter its existence, (though it raay, and actually
does counteract it) any more than it can alter the state of a creature frpm depen
dence into independence on the first cause. A creature without passive power
involves the most palpable absurdities. For its verydefinition is " tliat property
in a creature whereby it differs essentially from the independence, self-suflicience, and
ihdefectibility of the Creator ;" and to deny it, is to suppose that a creature may
be independent, seltsuflicient, and mdefectible — that in these respects the
* Belsbam's Elements of the Philosophy of the Mind, p. 354.

Sect. it. Of the Essence, of Virtue and Vice. 197
especially when that meaning is abstruse, inconsistent, and
entirely diverse fi-om the original sense of the word in common
speech. creature and the Creator are on a par — that a necessary and a contingent
being are the same, in those very things which constitute their essential dif
ference I Were it not for this property in an agent, he could never sin; for
all his acts would be physically necessary, without any hypothetical medium, or mo
ral alternative. 4. He is a moral agent, whose volitions might havc been otherwise than they
are,i/the motives, and consequently the state ofhis mind, had been otherwise. But
to suppose that his volitions might have been otherwise than they are, the rao
tives and state of the mind being the same, would be to raake hira in his voli
tions the sport of chance, or a mere nonentity.
5. He then is a moral agent who has, in reference to volition, a moraf aZf er-
native, or a hypothetical possibiUty of a different choice. Where this alternative,
or this possibiUty, is not, there the agent (if he may be so called) is not morally
obUged, and therefore is not accountable.
6. But if so, where does the ground of such an alternative lie ? It lies in the
agent's mind or the disposition whence the volition springs, and whence its cha
racter is derived. If God influence the mind so as to raake it, in a given degree,
to reserable his own moral nature ; in that degree would the choice raade be rao
rally good. But if passive power be not counteracted by such influence, (which
being gracious, God is not bound in equity to do) in any given degree, the nature
. of things, the essence of truth, connects, in a corresponding degre«, the state of
mind with the volition. •
7. Hence it is plain thaf mora^ in^ucBce, as such, effects nothing certain; but
always requires a previous state of raind, in order to ensure a certainty of good
effect ; and that previous state of raind is effected by no other possible means
but a physical energy or agency, producing assimUation. There must be a virtu
ous raind before a virtuous choice ; the quality of the act is derived from the
agent. 8. One thing, which has been a source of much obscurity and confusion in
reference to moral agency, is the supposition that the mind is equally, free in aU re
spects, when choosing good and when choosing evil ; in other words, that the
one volition and the other become raoraUy certain, frora the same sort of necessity.
But this is, not the real case. Indeed the necessity of connection between the
previous state of the raind and the corresponding volition, is the sarae ; for it is
in each ease nothing else but the nature of things ; but f^necessifj/ which eflects
a state of mind previous to good vohtions, is as different from the otlier necessity
which effects a state of mind previous to vohtions moraUy evil, as light is from
darkness. They proceed from opposite quarters, and operate in contrary' direc
tions. A holy disposition is generated by decretive holy influence ; the other dis
position (which ought not however to be called unholy) proceeds from the hypo
thetical nature of things. Such a disposition, though not morally vicious, yet
generates vice in union with free agency.
9. It is highly worthy of remark, that though a good volition raust proceed
from a good heart, moraUy considered ; yet a bad volition does not, originally and
necessarily, proceed from a morally bad heart. The reason is, that the one state
of heart proceeds frora God, from his decretive holy will ; the other proceeds
frora passive power, which is only a natural evil, and not a.moral. Besides were
the disposition which immediately precedes a bad volition necessarily, or in every
case, evil, in a moral sense, either moral evil could have no place at aU in the
universe, no origin whatever, or else it must be the same as passive power. But
passive power is a contrast, not to the moral perfections of God, but his natural ;
and has, when alone, no moral quality. And seeing it belongs as a property to
every creature, as such, were it any thing morally evil, moral evil would be essen
tial to the very being of every creature ; which is absurd.
10. Hence it is plain, that freedora is experienced in a higher sense, or a
greater degree, in bad vohtions, than in good ones ; in such a sense, and to such
a degree, as to justify this mode of expression — that man is necessitated to good,
but free to evil. This however may need some explanatory qualification ; for

198 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. PaRT IV.
Thatthe meaning of the word Action, as Mr. Chubb and
many others use if, is utterly unintelligible and inconsistent,
is manifest, because it belongs to their notion of an Action,
that it is something wherein is no passion or passiveness ; that
is (according to their sense of passiveness) it is under the
power, influence, or Action of no cause. And this implies that
Action has no cause, and is no effect ; for to be an effect im
plies passiveness, or the being subject to the power and Action
of its cause. And yet they hold that the mind's Action is
fhe effect of its own determination, yea, fhe mind's free and
voluntary determination ; which is the same with free choice.
So that Action is the effect of something preceding, even a
preceding act of choice : and consequently, in this effect the
mind is passive, subject to fhe power and Action of the pre
ceding cause, which is the foregoing choice, and therefore can
not be active. So that here we have this contradiction, thaf
Action is always the effect of foregoing choice ,• and therefore
cannot be action ; because it is passive fo the power of that
preceding causal choice ; and fhe mind cannot be active and
he is not so necessitated to good, as not to be moraUy, or hypothetically free ;
nor so free to evil as not to be subject to a necessity of consequence. He who
octs or chooses amiss without constraint, compulsion, or interfering voluntary force
in that act, notwithstanding his passive power, is properly a. free agent ; for in the
moral quality of the act, there is properly and strictly no wiU concerned but his
own. But he who acts or chooses aright, is subject to a physical, decretive neces
sity as to his disposition, and a physical concourse of divine energy in the natu
ral act of the will. He is indeed morally free, in as much as his volition might have
been of a different, yea, of an opposite moral quality, if the state of his mind had
been difierent. Hence itis evident, that in a goodwill, choir:e, or act, man is an
agent in a less proper or secondary sense ; but in a bad wiU, choice, or act, man
is an agent, a morof agent, a. free agent, in the most proper and strict sense. And
in the production of an act morali v good two wiUs are concerned, that of
the agent, and the decretive will of God ; in that of evil, only one, the agent's
own virill.
11. If the Supreme Being is the only proper agent in the universe, either
moral agency is no proper agency ; or else, man is not a moral agent ; and if so,
he is not accountable, and has no concem in reUgion or morals. Besides, if
God be the only proper agent in the universe, how come there to exist evil deeds ?
God's agency is good, else w ^ have no evidence that he is a good being ; but there
are in the world evU deeds proceeding from et>i2 minds, which common sense and
universal consent aUow, and the nature of the thing proves, to be properly evU
ogencies ; consequently man is an ogent, a mord agent, properly so called.
12. If there be no proper agent in the universe but the Supreme Being, there
is no evil in the nature of bad vohtions, but on y in their effects- Sin, on that sup
position, is not bad in its own nature, but only injurious in its effects on the sin
ner. Sin is not to be hated, it seems, on its own account, as odious, but only
shunned as dangerous. But as this must arise, accordmg to the system of its
abettors, from a sovereign appointment, it follows, that millions of beings are by
this very appointment doomed to the greatest sufferings in the universe, for that in
which they had no proper agenci/ — no possible alternative ! Where is equity, or
benevolence? 13. The only clue out of this labyrinth, and out of many others formed by
writers on human agency, is, we are fully persuaded, a right view of passive power,
m its nature, origin, and tendency, in conjunction with a morally or hypotheticaUy
Tree cliotee, — ^W.

Sect. ii. Of the Essence of Virtue and Vice. 199
passive in fhe same thing, at the same time. Again they say,
necessify is utterly inconsistent with Action, and a necessary
Action is a contradiction ; and so their notion of Action im
plies contingence, and excludes all necessity. And therefore,
their notion of Action implies, thaf it has no necessary de
pendence on, or connection with, any thing foregoing; for
such a dependence or connection excludes contingence, and
implies necessity. And yet their notion of Action implies
necessity, and supposes that it is necessary, and cannot be
contingent. For fhey suppose, that whatever is properly call
ed Action, must be determined by the will and free choice ;
and this is as niuch as to say, thaf it must be necessary, being
dependent upon, and determined by something foregoing ;
namely, a foregoing act of choice. Again, it belongs to thejr
notion of Action, that it is the beginning of motion, or of ex
ertion of power ; but yet it is implied in their notion of Action,
that it is not the beginning of motion or exertion of power,
but is consequent and dependent on .a preceding exertion of
power, viz. the power of wUl and choice : for they say there
is no proper Action but what is freely chosen, or, which is the
same thing, determined by a foregoing act of free choice. But if
any of them shall see cause todeny this, and say they holdno such
thing as thaf every Action is chosen or determined by a fore
going choice ; but thaf the very first exertion of will only, un
determined by any preceding act, is properly called Action ;
then I say, such a man's notion of Action implies necessity ;
for what the mind is the subject of, without fhe determina
tion of its own previous choice, if is the subject of necessarUy,
as to any hand that free choice has in the affair ; and without
any ability the mind has to prevent it, by any will or election
jf its own ; because by the supposition it precludes all pre
vious acts of fhe will or choice in the case, which might pre
vent it. So thaf it is again, in this other way, implied in their
notion of act, that it is both necessary and not necessary.
Again, it belongs to their notion of an act, thaf it is no effect
of a predetermining bias or preponderation, but springs im^
mediately out of indifference ; and this implies, that it cannot
be from foregoing choice, which is foregoing preponderation ;
if if be not habitual, but occasional, yet if it causes the act,
if is truly previous, efficacious and determining. And yet, at
the same time, it is essential to their notion of the act, that it
is what the Agent is fhe Author of freely and voluntarily, and
that is, by previous choice and design.
So that, according to their notion of the act, considered
with regard to its consequences, fhese following things are
all essential to it; viz. That it should be necessary, and not
necessary ; that it should be from a cause, and no cause ; that
it should be the fruit of choice and design, and not the fruit

200 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. PaRT IV.
of choice and design ; fhat it should be the beginning of mo
tion or exertion, and yet consequent on previous exertion ;
that it should be before it is ; that it should spring immediate
ly out of indifference and equUibrium, and yet' be the effect
of preponderation ; that it should be self-originated, and also
have its original from something else ; thaf it is what the mind
causes itself, of its own will, and can produce or prevent ac
cording to its choice or pleasure, and yet what the mind has
no power to prevent, precluding all previous choice in the
affair. So that an act, according to their metaphysical notion of
it, is something of which there is no idea ; it is nothing but a
confusion of the mind, excited by words without any distinct
rneaning, and is an absolute nonentity ; and that in tvvo re
spects: (1.) There is nothing in the world that ever was, is, or
can be, to answer the things which must belong to its descrip
tion, according to what they suppose to be essential to it.
And (2.)There neither is, nor ever was, nor can be, any notion
or idea to answer the word, as they use and explain it. For
if we should suppose any such notion, it would many ways
destroy itself. But it is impossible any idea or notion should
subsist in the mind, whose very nature and essence, which
constitutes it, destroys it. — If some learned philosopher, who
had been abroad, in giving an account of the curious observa
tions he had made in his travels, should say, " He had been
in Terra del Fuega, and there had seen an animal, which he
calls by a certain name, that begat and brought forth itself,
and yet had a sire and dam distinct from itself; that it had an
appetite, aiid was hungry before it had a being ; that his
master, who led him, and governed him at his pleasure, was
always governed by him, and driven by him where he pleased ;
thaf when he moved, he always took a step before the first
step : that he went with his head first, and yet always went
fail foremost ; and this, though he had neither head nor taU :"
it would be no impudence at all, to tell such a traveller,
though a learned man, fhat he himself had no idea of such
an animal as he gave an account of, and never had, nor ever
would have.
As fhe forementioned notion of Action is very inconsist
ent, so it is wholly diverse from fhe original meaning of the
word. The more usual signification of it, in vulgar speech,
seems to be some motion or exertion of power, that is voluntary,
or fhat is the effect of the will ; and is used in fhe same sense
as doing : and most commonly if is used to signify outward Ac
tions. So thinking is often distinguished from acting ; and de
siring and willing, from doing.
Besides this more usual and proper signification of the
word Action, there are other wavs in which the word is used.

Sect.- ii. Arminiua Notion of Action, false. 201
that are less proper, which yet have place in common speech.
Oftentimes it is used to signify some motion or alteration in in
animate things, with relation to some object and effect. So the
spring of a watch is said to act upon the chain and wheels ; the
sunbeams, to act upon plants and trees ; and the fire, to act
Upon wood. Sometimes the word is used to signify motions,
alterations^ and exertions of power, which are seen in corporeal
things, considered absolutely ; especially when these motions
seem to arise from some internal cause which is hidden ; so
that they have a greater resemblance of those motions of our
bodies, which are the effects of natural volition, or invisible
exertions of will. So the fermentation of liquor, fhe opera
tions of the loadstone, and of electrical bodies, are called the
action^ of these things. And sometimes, the word action is used
to signify the exercise of thought, or of will and inchnation ; so
meditating, loving, hating, inclining, disinclining, choosing, and
refusing, may be sometimes called acting ; though more rarely
(unless it be by philosophers and metaphysicians) than in any of
the other senses.
But fhe word is never used in vulgar speech for the self-de-'
terminate exercise of the will, or an exertion of the soul that
arises without any necessary connection with any thing forego
ing. If a man does something voluntarily, or as the effect of
his choice, then in the most proper sense, and as the word is
most originally and commonly used, he is said to act ; but whe
ther that choice or volition be self-determined or no, whether
it be connected with a foregoing habitual bias, whether it be
fhe certain effect of the strongest motive, or some intrinsic
cause, never comes into consideration in the meaning of the
word. /_
And if the" viora action is arbitrarily used by some men
otherwise, to suit some scheme of metaphysics or morality, no
argument can reasonably be founded on such an use of this
term to prove any thing but their own pleasure. For divines
and philosophers strenuously to urge such arguments, as though.
they were sufficient to support and demonstrate a whole scheme
of moral philosophy and divinity, is certainly fo erect a mighty
edifice on the sand, or rather on a shadow. And though it
may now perhaps, through custom, have become natural for
them to use the word in this sense (if that may be called a
sense or meaning which is inconsistent with itself) yet this does
not prove that it is agreeable to the natural notions men have
of things, or that there can be any thing in the Creation that
should answer such a meaning. And though they appeal to
experience, yet the truth is, fhat men are so for from experiea-
cing any such thing, thaf it is impossible for them t6 have any
conception of it,
. voL.ii. 2'6

202 FKEKBOM OF THE WILL, PaRT

IV.

If it should be objected, that action and passion are doubt
less words of a contrary signification ; but to suppose fhat the
agent in. its action, is under fhe power and influence of some
thing intrinsic,- is to confound action and passion, and make
them the same thing.
I answer, that Action and Passion are doubtless, as they
are sometimes used, words of opposite signification ; but nof
as signifying opposite existences, but only opposite relations.
The words cause and effect are terms of opposite signification ;
but, nevertheless, if I assert, thaf the same thing may, at the
same time, in different respects and relations, be both cause
and effect, this will not prove that I confound the terms. The
soul may be both active and passive iri the same thing in dif
ferent respects ; active with relation to one thing, and passive
with relation, to another.* The word Passion, when set in
opposition to Action,, or rather Activeness,' is merely a relative ;;
it signifies no effect or cause, nor any proper existence ; but
is the same wifh Passiveness, or a being passive^ or a being
acted upon by some thing.. Which is a mere relation of a
thing to some power or force exerted by some cause, produc-
ing some effect in it, or upon it. And Action, when set pro
perly in opposition to Passion,, or Passiveness, is no real ex
istence ; it is not fhe same with AN Action, but is a mere re
lation :: it is the Activeness of something on another thing, be
ing the opposite relation to the other,, viz.. a relation of power,
©E force, exerted by some cause, towards another thing,
which is the subject of the effect of that power. Indeed, the
word Action is frequently used fo signify something not
merely relative, but more absolute, and a real existence; as
when we say an Action ; when the word is not used transitive
ly,, but absolutely, for some motion or exercise of body or
mind, without any relation to any object or effect : and as
used thuSj it is nof properly the opposite of Passion ; which'
ordinarily signifies nothing absolute,, but merely the relation
of being acted upon. And therefore if the word Actionhe used
in the like relative sense, then action and Passion are only
two contrary relations. And it is no absurdity to suppose,
liiat contrary relations may belong to the same thing, at the
same time,, with respect to different things.. So fo suppose
* This distinction is of considerable moment. The Soul is jiossjse, for in
stance, in reference to that necessity of dependence which is inseparable from a cre
ated nature ; and when the subject of providential energy in natural acts ; and also
when the subject of that divine influence which purifies and enables the mind, and
whereby holy effects are secured ; and in all these respects it is passive at the very
time that itis active in its choice or preference. In other words, the mind is ne-
cesmtated in some respects ; as, to exist, to think, to will, to suffer, or to enjoy ; at
the same instant that it is /ree in other respects, as, from contingence, (under
standing thereby an event without any cause) and from compulsion, or physittd
necessity in itstacts as ntoroJ. — 'W.

Sect. 11. Arminian notion of Action, false. 30S
that there are acts of the soul by which a man voluntarily
moves and acts upon objects, and produces effects, which yet
themselves are effects of something else, and wherein the
soul itself is the object of something acting upon and in
fluencing that, do not at all confound Action and Passion.
The words may nevertheless be properly of opposite significa
tion : there may be as true and real a difference between act
ing and being caused to act, though we should suppose the
soul to be both in the same vohtion, as there is between living
and being quickened,, or made to live. It is no more a contra
diction to suppose that Action may be the effect of some other
cause besides the Agent, or Being that acts, than to suppose
that life may be the effect of some other cause, besides the Be
ing that lives.
What has led men into this inconsistent notion of Action,
when applied to volition — as though it were essential to this
internal Action, that the Agent should be self determined in
it, and that the wiU should be the cause of if — was probably
this ; that according to the sense of mankind, and the common
use of language, it is so, with respect to men's external Ac
tions ; which originally, and according fo the vulgar use and
most proper sense of the word, are called Actions. Men in
thesQ. are self-directed, self-determined, and their wiUs are
the cause of fhe motions of their bodies, and external things
done ; so that unless men do them voluntarily, and of choice,
and the Action be determined by their antecedent volition,
it is no Action or Doing of theirs. Hence some metaphysicians
have been led unwarily, but exceeding absurdly, to suppose
the same concerning volition itself, that that also must be deter
mined by the will ; which is to be determined by antecedent
volition, as the motion of fhe body is ; nof considering fhe con
tradiction it implies.
But it is very evident that in the metaphysical distinction
between Action and Passion (though long since become common
and in general vogue) due care has not been taken to conform
language f o the nature of things, or to any distinct clear ideas.
As if is in innumerable other phUosophical metaphysical terms
used in these disputes ; which has occasioned inexpressible diffi
culty, contention, error and confusion.
And thus probably it came to be thought, that necessity
was inconsistent with action, as these terms are applied to
volition. First, these terms Action and Necessity are changed
from their original meaning, as signifying external voluntary
Action and Constraint, (in which meaning they are evidently
inconsistent) fo signify quite other things, viz. volition itself,
and certainty oi existence. And when the change of signifi
cation is made, care is not taken to make proper allowances
and abatements for the difference of sense ; but still the sanje

204 FREEBOM OF THE WILL. PaRT IT.
things are unwarily attributed to Action and Necessity,' in the
new meaning of fhe words, which plainly belonged to them in
their first sense; and on this ground, maxims are established
withouf any real foundation, as though they were the most cer
tain truths, and the most evident dictates of reason.
But however streniiously it is maintained, that what is
necessary cannot be properly called Action, and that a ne
cessary Action is a contradiction, yet it is probable there are
few Arminian divines, who, thoroughly tried, would sta,nd to
these principles. They will allow, that God is, in the highest
sense, an active Being, and the highest Fountain of Life and
Action ; and they would not probably deny, that what are called
God's acts of righteousness, holiness and faithfulness, are truly
and properly God's acts, and God is really a holy Agent in them;
and yet, I trust, they will not deny, that God necessarily acts
justly arid faithfully, and that it is impossible for him to act un
righteously and unholily.

SECT. HI.
The Reasons why some think it contrary to common Sense to
suppose those Things which are necessary, to be icorthy of
either Praise or Blame.
Ttis abundantly affirmed and urged by Arminian writers,
that it is contrary lo common sense, and the natural notions and
apprehensions of mankind, to suppose otherwise than that ne
cessity (making no distinction between natural and moral ne
cessity) is inconsistent with Virtue and Vice, Praise and Blame,
Reward and Punishment. And their arguments from hence
have been greatly triumphed in ; and have been not a little
perplexing to many who have been friendly to the truth, as
clearly revealed in the holy Scriptures: it has seemed to them
indeed difficult to reconcile Calvinistic doctrines with the no
tions men commonly have of justice and equity. The true
reasons of it seem to be the following :
I. It is indeed a very plain dictate of common Sense, that
natural necessity is wholly inconsistent with just Praise or
Blame. If men do things which in themselves are very good,
fit to be brought to pass, and attended with very happy effects,
properly against their wUls ; or do them from a necessity that
is without their wills, or with which their wiUs have no concern
or connection ; then it is a plain dictate of common sense,
thaf such doings are none of their virtue, nor have they, any
moral good in them ; and that the persons are not worthy
to be rewarded or praised ; or at all esteemed, honoured or
I.oved on that acrount. And on the other hand, that if, froni

Sect. hi. Calvinism not against common Sense. 205
Uke necessity, they do those things which in themselves are
very unhappy and pernicious, and do them because they
cannot help if ; the necessity is such, fhat it is all one whether
they wUl them or no ; and the reason why they are done is
from necessity only, and not from their wills : it is a very plain
dictate of common Sense that they are uot at all to blame ;
there is no vice, fault or moral evil at all in the effect done ;
nor are they who are thus necessitated in any wise worthy
to be punished, hated, or in the least disrespected on that ac-
.count. In like manner, if things in themselves good and desirable
are absolutely impossible, with a natural impossibUity, the
universal reason of mankind teaches, that this wholly and per
fectly excuses persons in their not doing them.
And it is also a plain dictate of common Sense, that if
doing things in themselves good, or avoiding things in them
selves evil, is not absolutely impossible, with such a natural
impossibility, but very rfi^cMZi, with a natural difficulty; that
is, a difficulty prior to, and not at all consisting in will and
inclination itself, and which would remain the same let the in
clination be what it will ; then a person's neglect or omission
is excused in some measure, though not wholly ; his sin is less
aggravated, than if the thing to be done were easy. And if
instead of difficulty and hinderance, there be a contrary natural
propensity in the state of things to the thing to be done or
effect to be brought to pass, abstracted from any consideration
of the inclination of the heart ; though the propensity be not
so great as to amount to a natural necessity, yet being some
approach to it, so that the doing of the good thing be very
much from this natural tendency in the state of things, and
but little from a good inclination ; then it is a dictate of com
mon Sense, that there is so much the less virtue in what is
done ; and so it is less praiseworthy and rewardable. The
reason is easy, viz. because such a natural propensity or ten
dency is an approach to natural necessity ; and the greater the
propensity, stiU so much the nearer is the approach to necessi
ty. And therefore, as natural necessity takes away or shuts out
all virtue, so this propensity approaches to an abolition of vir
tue ; that is, it diminishes it. And oo thc other hand, natural
difficulty, in the state of things, is an approach to natural im
possibility. And as the latter, when it is complete and abso
lute, ivholly takes away Blaine ; so such difficulty takes away
some Blame, or diminishes Blame, and makes the thing done to
be less worthy of punishment.
II. Men, in their first use of such phrases as these, must,
cannot, cannot help it, cannot avoid it, necessary, unable, im
possible, unavoidable, irresistible, <^c. use them to.' signify a
jt)ecessity of constraint or restraint, a natural necessity or im»

206 FREEDOM OP THE WILL. PaRT IV.
possibility ; or some necessity that the will has nothing to do
in : which may be, whether men will or no ; and which may
be supposed to be just fhe same, let men's inclinations and
desires be what they will. Such kind of terms in their original
use, I suppose among all nations, are relative ; carrying in
their signification (as was before observed) a reference or res
pect to some contrary will, desire or endeavour, which, if is
supposed, is, or may be, in the case. All men find, and be
gin to find in early childhood, fhat there are innumerable
things that cannot be done, which they desire to do; and
innumerable things, which fhey are averse fo, that must be,
they cannot avoid them, they will be, whether they choose
them or no. It is to express this necessity, which men so soon
and so often find, and which so greatly and early affects them
in innumerable cases, that such terms and phrases are first
formed; and it is to signify such a necessity, that they are
first used, and that they are most constantly used in the
common affairs of life ; and not fo signify any such metaphy
sical, speculative and abstract notion, as that connection in
the nature or course of things, which is between the subject
and predicate of a proposition, and which is the foundation
of fhe certain truth of that proposition ; fo signify which, they
who employ themselves in philosophical enquiries into the
first origin and metaj: hysical relations and dependences of
things, have borrowed these terms for want of others. But
we grow up from our cradles in the use of terms and phrases
entirely different from this, and carrying a sense exceeding di
verse from that in which thejr are commonly used in the con
troversy between Arminians and Calvinists. And it being,
as was said before, a dictate of the universal sense of man
kind, evident to us as soon as we begin to think, thaf the
necessity signified by these terms, in the sense in which we
first learn them, does excuse persons, and free them from all
Fault or Blame ; hence our ideas of excusableness or faultless-
ness is tied to these terms and phrases by a strong habit, which
is begun in childhood, as soon as we begin to speak, and grows
up with us, and is strengthened by constant use and custom,
the connection growing stronger and stronger.
The habitual connection which is in men's minds be
tween Blamelessness and those forementioned terms, must,
cannot, unable, necessary, impossible, unavoidable, ^c. becomes
very strong, because, as soon as ever men begin to use reason
and speech, they have occasion to excuse themselves from
the natural necessify signified by these terms, in numerous
instances. — / cannot do it— -I could not help it. — And all man
kind have constant and daily occasion to use such phrases in
this sense, to excuse themselves and others, in almost all the
concerns of hfe, with respect to disappointments, and things

S^ECT. III. Calvinism not against common Sense. 207
that happen, which concern and affect ourselves and others,
thaf are hurtful, or disagreeable to us or them, or things desi
rable, that we or others fail to obtain.
That our being accustomed to an union of different ideas
from early chUdhood, makes the habitual connection exceed
ing strong, as though such connection were owing to. nature^
is raanifest in innumerable instances. It is altogether by
such an habitual connection of ideas that men judge of the
bigness or distance of the objects of sight from their appear
ance. Thus it is owing to such a connection early established,
and growing up with a person, that he judges a mountain,
which he sees at fen miles distance, to be bigger than his
nose, or further off than the end of it. Having been used so
long to join a considerable distance and magnitude with such
an appearance, men imagine it is by a dictate of natural sense :
whereas, it would be quite otherwise with one that had his
eyes newly opened, who had been born blind : he would have
the same visible appearance, bnt natural sense would dictate
no such thing concerning the magnitude or distanee of what
appeared. III. When men, after fhey had been so habituated to
connect ideas of Innocency or Blamelessness with such terms,
that fhe union seems fo be the effect of mere nature, come
to hear the same term^ used, and learn to use them in the
forementioned new and metaphysical sense, to signify quite
another sort of necessity, which has no such kind of relation
to a contrary supposable wUl and endeavour j fhe notion of
plain and manifest Blamelessness, by this means, is, by a
strong prejudice, insensibly and unwarily transferred to a case
to which if by no means belongs : the change of the use of the
terms to a signification which is very diverse not being takeii'
notice of or adverted to. And there are several reasons why
it is not.^ 1. The terms, as used by philosophers, are not very dis
tinct and cigar in their meaning : few use them in a fixed de
terminate sense. On the contrary, their meaning is very
vague and confused, which commonly happens to the words
used to signify things inteUectual and moral, and to express
what Mr. Locke calls mixt modes. If men had a clear and
distinct understanding of what is intended by these metaphy-
fflcal terms,^ they would be able more easily to compare them
with their original and common Sense ; and so would not be
easily led into delusion by words of this sort.
2.^ The change of fhe signification of terms is the more
insensible, because the things signified,^ though indeed *ery
different^ yet do in some generals agree. In necessity, that
which is vulgarly so called, there is a strong connection be
tween the thing said to be necessary, and something- antece-

208 FREEnoli OF the will. Part iv.
dent to if, in fhe order of nature ; so there is also a philosophi
cal necessity. And though in both kinds of necessity, the
connection cannot be called by that name, with relation to an
opposite wUl or endeavour to which it is superior ; which is
the case in vulgar necessity ; yet in both the connection
is prior fo will and endeavour, and so, in some respect,
superior. In both kinds of necessity, there is a foundation
for some certainty of the proposition that affirms the event. — ¦¦
The terms used being the same, and the things signified agree
ing in these and some other general circumstances, and the
expressions as used by philosophers being not well defined,
and so of obscure and loose signification ; hence persons are
not aware of the great difference ; the notions of innocence
or faultiness which were so strongly associated with them, and
were strictly united in their minds ever since they can remem
ber, remain united with them stUl, as if the union were alto
gether natural and,necessary ; and they that go about to make
a separation, seem to them to do great violence even to nature
itself. IV. Another reason why it appears difficult to reconcUe it
with reason that men should be blamed for that which is ne
cessary with a moral necessity (which, as was observed before,
is a species of philosophical necessity) is, that for want of due
consideration, raen inwardly entertain that apprehension, that
this necessity may be against men's wUls and sincere endea
vours. They go away wifh thaf notion, that men may truly
wUI, and wish and strive that it may be otherwise, but that in
vincible necessity stands in the way. And many think thus
concerning themselves : some wicked men think they wish that
they were good, and that they loved God and holiness : but yet
do not find that their wishes produce the effect. — The reasons
why men think thus, are as follow :
I. They find what may be called an indirect willingness
to have a better wiU, in the manner before observed. For if
is impossible and a contradiction to suppose the will to be
directly and- properly against itself. And they do not consider
that this indirect willingness is entirely a different thing from
properly wUling what is the duty and virtue required ; and
that there is no virtue in that sort of willingness which they
haye. They do not consider that the volitions which a
wicked man may have, that he loved God, are no acts of the
will at all against the moral evil of not loving God ; but only
some disagreeable consequences. But the making of the
requisite distinction requires more care of reflection and
thought than most men are used to. And men, through a pre
judice in their own favour, are disposed to think well of their
own desires and dispositions, and to accotmt them good and

Bect. hi. Calvinism not agaiast common Sense. 209
virtuous, though their respect to virtue be only indirect and re
mote, and that it is nothing at all virtuous that truly excites or
terminates their inclinations.
3. Another thing that insensibly leads and beguiles men
into a supposition that this moral necessity or impossibility is,
or raay be against men's wills and true endeavours, is the deri
vation of the terms often used to express it. Such words for
instance, as unable, unavoidable, impossible, irresistible ; which
carry a plain reference to a supposable power exerted, endea
vours used, resistance made, in opposition to the necessity ;
aild the persons that hear them not considering nor suspecting
but that they are used in their proper sense : that sense being
therefore understood, there does naturally, and as it were ne
cessarily arise in their minds a supposition, that it may be s»
indeed, that true desires and endeavours may take place, but
that invincible necessity stands in the way and renders them
vain and to no effect.
V. Another thing which makes persons raore ready to
suppose it to be contrary to reason, that men should be ex
posed to the punishments threatened to mu for doing those
things which are morally necessary, or not doing those things
which are morally impossible, is, that imagination strengthens
the argument, and adds greatly to fhe power and influence of
the seeming reasons against if, from the greatness of that
punishment. To allow that they raay be justly exposed to a
small punishment, would not be so difficult. Whereas, if there
were any good reason in the case, if it were truly a dictate of
reason, that such necessity was inconsistent with faultiness or
just punishment, the demonstration would be equally certain
wifh respect to a small punishment, or any punishment at all,
as a very great one : but it is not equally easy to fhe imagina
tion. They fhat argue against the justice of damning raen for
those things that are thus necessary, seem to make their argu
ment the stronger, by setting forth the greatness of the punish
ment in strong expressions : — " That a man should be cast into
eternal burnings, that he should be made fo fry in hell to all
eternity for those things which he. had no power to avoid,
and was under a fatal, unfrustrable, invincible necessity of do>'
ing, <Sic."

VOL. II. 27

2^10 FREEDOM OP THE WILC PaKT IV..-

SECT. IV.
It is agreeable to common Sense, and the natural Notions of
Mankind, to suppose moral Necessity to be consistent with
Praise and Blame, Reward and Punishment,
Whether the reasons that have been given, why it ap
pears difficult to some persons fo reconcile with common
Sense the praising or blaming, rewarding or punishing those
things which are morally necessary, are thought satisfactory
or nof } yet it most evidently appears by the following things,
that if this matter be rightly understood, setting aside all
delusion arising from the impropriety and ambiguity of terms,
( this is not at all inconsistent with fhe natural apprehensions
of mankind, and that sense of things which is found every
where in the common people ; who are furthest from having
their thoughts perverted from their natural channel by metar
physical and philosophical subtUties ; but, on the contrary, alto
gether agreeaJble to, and the very voice and dictate of this na
tural and vulgar Sense..
I. This wUl appear, if we consider what the vulgar No
tion of blameworthiness isj The idea which the common
people, through aU ages and nations, have of faultiness, I sup
pose to be plainly this ; a person being or doing wrong, with
his own will and pleasure ; containing fhese two things ; 1.
IKs doing wrong, when he does as he pleases. 2. His pleasure-
being wrong. Or, in other words, perhaps more intelligibly
expressing their Notion ;. a person having his heart wrong, and^
doing wrong from his heart. And tbis is the sum total of fhe
matter. The common people do not ascend up in their reflections
and abstractions fo the metaphysical sources, relations and de
pendencies of things, in order to forra their Notion of faultiness:
or blaraeworthiness. They do not wait till they have decided
fey their refinings what first determines the will, whether it be
determined by something extrinsic or intrinsic ; whether voli
tion determines volition, or whether the understanding deter
mines the will ; whether there be any such thing as metaphysi
cians raean by contingence (if they have any meaning ;) whe-
^er there be a sort of a strange unaccountable sovereignty in
the will, in the exercise of which, by its own sovereign acts, it
brings to pass all its own sovereign acts. They do nof take
any part of their Notion of fault or blarae from the resolution
?»f any such questions. If this wete tbe case, there are multi-

Sect. iv. Necessary Virtue agreeable to Common Sense. 211
tudes, yea the far greater part of mankind, nine hundred and
ninety-nine out of a thousand, would live and die without
liaving any such Notion as that of fault ever entering into
their heads, or without so much as once having any concep
tion that any body was to be either blamed or commended for
aliy thing. If this were the case, it would be a long time
before raen came to have such Notions. Whereas it is mani
fest, they are in fact some of the first Notions that appear in
children ; who discover, as soon as fhey can think, or speak, or
act at all as rational creatures, a Sense of desert. And certainly,
in forming their Notion of it, they raake no use of raetaphysics.
AU the ground they go upon consists in these two things ; ex
perience, and a natural sensation of a certain fitness or agreea-
lileness which there is in uniting such raoral evU as is above
<iescribed, viz. a being or doing wrong with the will, and resent
ment in others, and pain inflicted on the person in whora this
«ioral evU is. Which natural Sense is what we call by the narae
of conscience. Itis true, the common people and children, in their Notion
oi any faulty act or deed of any person, do suppose thaf it is
the person's own act and deed. But this is all that belongs fo
what they understand by a thing being a person's own deed or
action ; even that it is something done by him of choice. That
sorae exercise or motion should begin of itself, does not belong
lo their Notion of an action or doing, li so, it would belong
to their Notion of it thaf if is the cause of its own beginning :
and thaf is as rauch as fo say, that it is before it begins to be.
Nor is their Notion of an action some motion or exercise, that
begins accidentally withouf any cause or reason ; for that is
contrary to one of the prirae dictates of comraon Sense, name
ly, that every thing that begins to be, has some cause or reasoa
why it is.
The common people, in their Notion of a faulty or praise
worthy work done by any one, do -suppose, fhat the man does
it in the exercise of liberty. But then their Notion of hberty
is only a person having an opportunity of doing as he pleases.
They have no Notion of liberty consisting in the will first
acting, and so causing its own acts ; determining, and so
causing its own determinations ; or choosing, and so caus
ing its own choice. Such a Notion of liberty is what none
have, but those that have darkened their own minds with con
fused metaphysical speculation, and abstruse and ambiguous
terms. If a man is nof restrained from acting as his will deter
mines, or constrained fo act otherwise ; then he has liberty,
according ffo comraon Notions of Kberty, without, taking int»
the idea that grand contradiction of all, the deferrainations of a
man's free will being the effects of the determinations of his
free will. — Nor have men commonly any Notion of freedom

212 EREEDOM OF THE WILL. pART IV.
consisting ia indifference. For if so, then if would be agreea
ble to their Notion, fhat the greater indifference men act with,
the more freedom they act with ; whereas, the reverse is true.
He that in acting proceeds with the fullest inclination, does
what he does with the greater freedom, according to comraon
Sense. And so far is it from being agreeable to common Sense
that such Kberty as consists in indifference is requisite to praise
or blame, that, on fhe contrary, the dictate of every man's na
tural sense through the world is, that the further he is from be
ing indifferent in his acting gpod or evil, and the more he does
either with full and strong inclination, the more is he esteemed
or abhorred, comraended or conderaned.
II. If it were inconsistent with the common Sense of
mankind, that men' should be either blamed or condemned in
any volitions, in ease of moral necessity or impossibility ;
then it would surely also be agreeable to the same Sense
and reason of mankind, that the nearer the case approaches
to such a moral necessity or impossibility- — either through a
strong antecedent moral propensity, on the one hand,* or a
great antecedent opposition and difficulty, on the other — the
nearer does it approach fo a person being neither blameable
nor commendable ; so that acts exerted with such preceding
propensity, would be worthy of proportionably less praise ; and
when emitted, the act being attended with such difficulty,
the omission would be worthy of the less blame. It is so, as
was observed before, with natural necessity and impossibility,
propensity and difficulty : as if is a plain dictate of the sense
of all mankind, thaf natural necessity and impossibility take
away all blame and praise ; arid therefore, that the nearer the
approach is to these, through previous propensity or diffi
culty, so praise and blame are proportionably diminished.
And if if were as much a dictate of common Sense thaf
moral necessity of doing, or impossibility of avoiding, takes
away all praise and blame, as that natural necessity or im
possibility does; then by a "perfect parity of. reason, it would
fee as much the dictate of common Sense, that an approach
•f, moral necessify of doing, or impossibility of avoiding,
diminishes praise and blarae, as that an approach to natural
necessity and impossibility does so. It is equally the voice
ef common Sense, that persons are excusable in part, in neg
lecting things difficult against their wills, as that they are excu
sable wholly in neglecting things impossible against their wills<
And if it raade no difference, whether the impossibility were
natural and against the will, or moral, lying in the will, with
regard to excusableness ; so neither would it make any dif-
* It is here argued, on supposition that not all propensity implies moral nc
fcssitv, but only some very high degree ; whieh non^ will deny.

S:ScT. IV. Necessary Virtue agreeable to common Sense. 313
ference, whether the difficulty, or approach to necessity be na
tural against the wiU, or moral, lying in the propensity of the
wHl. But it is apparent that the reverse of these things is true.
If there be an approach fo a moral necessity in a man's exer
tion of good acts of will, they being the exercise of a strong
propensity to good and a very powerful love to virtue ; it is
so far from being the dictate of common Sense that he is less
virtuous, and the less to be esteemed, loved and praised,
that it is agreeable to the natural Notions of all mankind, that
he is so much the better raan, worthy of greater respect, arid
higher coraraendation. And the stronger the inclination is,
and the nearer it approaches to necessity . in that respect ;
or to irapossibility of neglecting fhe virtuous act, or of doing
a vicious one ; still the raore virtuous, and worthy of higher
coraraendation. And, on thc other hand, if a raan exerts evil
acts of mind ; as, for instance, acts of pride or malice from a
rooted and strong habit or principle of haughtiness and mali
ciousness, and a violent propensity of heart to such acts ; ac
cording to the natural Sense of men he is so far from being the
less hateful and blameable on that account, that he is so much
the more worthy to be detested and condemned by all that obi
serve him,
Moreover, it is raanifest that it is no part of the Notion
which mankind coramonly have ofa blameable or praiseworthy
act of the wUl, that it is an act which is not determined by an
antecedent bias or motive, but by the sovereign power of the
wUl itself; because, if so, the greater hand such causes have
in determining any acts of the will, so much the less virtuous
or vicious would they be accounted ; and the less hand, the
more virtuous or vicious. Whereas, the reverse is true : raen
do not think a good act to be the less praiseworthy for the agent
being much determined in it by a good inclination or a good
motive, but the more. And if good inclination, or motive,
has but little influence in determining the agent, they do not
think his act so much the more virtuous, but the less. And
so concerning evil acts, which are determined by evil motives
or inclinations. Yea, if it be supposed that good or evil dispositions are
implanted in the hearts of men by nature itself (which, it is
eertain, is vulgarly supposed in innumerable cases) yet it is
not commonly supposed that men are worthy of no praise or
dispraise for such dispositions ; although what is natural is
undoubtedly necessary, nature being prior to all acts of the
wiU whatsoever. Thus, for instance, if a raan appears to
be of a very haughty or malicious disposition, and is sup
posed to be so by his natural teraper, it is no vulgar Notion,
no dictate of the common Sense and apprehension of raen, that

214 FREEDOM OP THE WILL. PaRT IV.
sucli dispositions are no vices or moral evils, or thaf such per
sons are not worthy of disesteem, or odium and dishonour ;
or that the proud or malicious acts which flow from such
natural dispositions are worthy of no resentment. Yea, such
vile natural dispositions, and the strength of them, will com
monly be mentioned rather as an aggravation ofthe wicked
acts that come fi-ora such a fountain, than an extenuation
of thera. It being natural for men fo act thus, is often ob
served by men in the height of their indignation : they will
say, "It is his very nature: he is of a vUe natural temper;
it is as natural to him to act so, as it is to breathe ; he cannot
help serving the devil, &c." But it is not thus with regard
to hurtful mischievous things, that any are the subjects or
occasions of, by natural necessity, against their inclinations.
In such a case, the necessity, by the common voice of man
kind, wiU be spoken of as a fuU excuse. — Thus it is very plain,
that common Sense makes a vast difference between these two
kinds of necessity, as to the judgment it makes of their in
fluence on the moral quality and desert of men's actions.
And these dictates are so natural and necessary, that it may
be very much doubted whether the Arminians themselves have
ever got rid of them ; yea, their greatest doctors, fhat have
gone furthest in defence of their metaphysical Notions of liber
ty, and have brought their arguments to their greatest strength,
and as they suppose to a demonstration, against fhe consis
tence of virtue and vice with any necessity : it is to be ques
tioned whether there is so much as one of them, but that, if he
sufl'ered very rauch from the injurious acts of a raan, under the
power of an invincible haughtiness and malignancy of temper,
would not, frora the forementioned natural sense of raind, resent
it far otherwise than if as great sufferings carae upon him from
the wind thaf blows, and the fire that burns by natural necessify ;
and otherwise than he would, if he suffered as much from the
conduct of a man perfectly delirious ; yea, though he first
brought his distraction upon hira some way by his own fault.
Some seem to disdain the distinction that we make be
tween natural and moral necessity, as though it were altogether
impertinent in this controversy : " fhat which is necessary,
say they, is necessary ; it is that which must be, and cannot
be prevented. And that' which is impossible, is impossible,
and cannot be done : and, therefore, none can be to blame for
not doing it." And such comparisons are made use of, as the
commanding of a man to walk who has lost his legs, and con
demning him and punishing him for not obeying; inviting. and
caUing upon a raan, who is shut up in a strong prison, fo come
forth, &c. But, in these things Arminians are very unreason
able. Let comraon sense deterraine whether there be not a
great difference between those two cases ; the one, that of a

Sect. iv. Necessary Virtue agreeable to common Sense. 215!;
man who has offended his prince, and is cast into prison ; and
after he has lain there awhUe, the king comes to him, calls
him fo come forth ; and tells him, that if he will do so, and
wUl fall down before him and humbly beg his pardon, he shall
be forgiven, and sef at liberty, and also be greatly enriched,
and advanced fo honour : fhe prisoner heartily repents of the
folly and wickedness of his oft'ence against his prince, is
thoroughly disposed to abase himself, and accept of the king's
offer ; but is confined by strong walls, with gates of brass and
bars of iron. The other case is, that of a raan who is of a
very unreasonable spirit, of a haughty, ungrateful, wilful dis
position ; and moreover, has been brougnt up in traitorous
principles ; and has his heart possessed with an extreme and
inveterate enraity to his lawful sovereign ; and for his rebellion
is cast into prison, and lies long there, loaded with heavy
chains, and in miserable circumstances. At length fhe com
passionate prince comes to the prison, orders his chains to be
knocked off, and his prison doors to be set wide open ; calls
to him, and tells him, if he wUl come forth to him, and fall
down before hira, acknowledge that he has treated hira un
worthily, and ask his forgiveness ; he shall be forgiven, sef at
liberty, and set in a place of great dignify and profit in his
court. But he is so stout and fuU of haughty malignity, that
he cannot be willing to accept fhe offer : his roofed strong
pride and malice have perfect power over him, and as it were
bind him, by binding his heart : the opposition of his heart has
the raastery over him, having an influence on his mind far su
perior to the king's grace and condescension and to all his
kind offers and promises. Now is it agreeable to common
sense fo assert and stand to it, that there is no difference be
tween these two cases as to any worthiness of blame in the
prisoners ; because, forsooth, there is a necessity in both, and
the required act in each case is impossible ? It is true, a man's
evil dispositions may be as strong and iraraoveable as fhe bars
of a castle. But who cannot see, fhat when a man, in the lat
ter case, is said to be unable to obey the command, the expres
sion is used improperly, and not in the sense it has originally
and in common speech ? and thaf it may properly be said to
be in the rebel's />owcr fo come out of prison, seeing he can
easily do it if he pleases ; though by reason of his vile temper of
heart, which is fixed and rooted, it is impossible thaf it should
please him ?
Upon the whole, I presurae there is no person of good un
derstanding who impartially considers these things, but will
allow, that it is not evident, frora the dictates of common sense
or natural notions, fhat moral necessity is inconsistent with
praise and blame. And, therefore, if fhe Arminians would-

sio FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 1 ART lf«
prove any such inconsistency, it must be by some philosophical
and metaphysical arguraents, and not common sense.
There is a grand Ulusion in the pretended demonstration
of Arwimiflrts frora coraraon sense. The main strength of aU
these demonstra.tions lies in that prejudice, that arises through
the insensible change of the use and meaning of such terms as
liberty, able, unable, necessary, impossible, unavoidable, invinci
ble, action, ^c. from their original and vulgar sense, fo a meta
physical sense, entirely diverse ; and the strong connection of
the ideas of blamelessness, &c. with some of these terms, by
a habit contracted and established, while these ^terms were
used in their first raeaning. This prejudice and delusion are
the foundation of all those positions they lay down as maxims,
by which most of the scriptures they alledge in this controversy
are interpreted, and on which all their pompous demonstrations
from scripture and reason depend. From this secret delusion
and prejudice they have almost all their advantages : it is the
strength of their bulwarks, and the edge of their weapons.
And this is the main ground of aU the right they have to treat
their neighbours in so assuraing a manner, and to insult others,
perhaps as wise and good as themselves, as " weak bigots,
men that dwell in fhe dark caves of superstition, perversely set,
obstinately shutting their eyes against the noon-day light, ene
mies to common sense, maintaining fhe first-born of absurdi
ties, &c. &c." But perhaps an impartial consideration of the
things which have been observed in the preceding parts of this
enquiry, may enable the lovers of truth better to judge whose
doctrine is indeed absurd, abstruse, self -contradictory, and in
consistent with common sense, and many ways repugnant to the
universal dictates of the reason of mankind.
Corol. From the things which have been observed it will
follow, that if is agreeable to common Sense to suppose thaf
the glorified saints have not their freedora af all diminished in
any respect ; and that'God himself has the highest possible free
dom, according to the true and proper meaning of the term ;
and that he is, in fhe highest possible respect, an agent, and ac
tive in the exercise of his infinite holiness ; though he acts
therein, in the highest^ degree, necessarily : and his actions of
this kind are in the highest, most absolutely perfect manner vir
tuous and praiseworthy ; and are sd for thaf very reason, be^
cause they are most perfectly necessary.

Sect. v. Endeavours consistent ivith Calvinism. Slf

SECT. V.
Objections, that this Scheme of Necessity renders all Means and
Endeavours for avoiding Sin, or obtaining Virtue and Ha-
piness, vain, and to no Purpose ; and that it makes Men no
more than mere Machines in Affairs of Morality and Reli
gion, answered.
Arminians say. If sin and virtue come to pass by a ne
cessify consisting in a sure connection of causes and effects, an
tecedents and consequents, if can never be worth while to
use any Means or Endeavours to obtain the one and avoid
the other ; seeing no endeavours can alter the futurity of the
event, which is become necessary by a connection already esta
blished. But I desire that this mafter raay be fully considered ; and
that if raay be exarained with a thorough strictness, whether it
wiU follow that Endeavours and Means, in order fo avoid or ob
tain any future thing, raust be more in vain, on the suppo
sition of such a connection of antecedents and consequents,
than if the contrary be supposed.
For endeavours fo be in vain, is for them not to be suc-
cessfiil ; that is to say, for them not eventuaUy to be the
Means of the thing aimed af, which cannot be but in one of
these two ways ; either, first. That although the Means are
used, yet the event aimed at does not follow ; or, secondly. If
fhe event does follow, it is not because of fhe Means, or from
any connection or dependence of the event on the Means, the
event would have come to pass as well without the Means as
with them. If either of these two things are the case, then
the Means are not properly successful, and are truly in vain.
The success or non-success of Means, in order to an effect, or
their being in vain or not in vain, consists in those Means being
connected, or not connected, with fhe effect, in such a manner
as this, viz. Thaf fhe effect is with the Means, and not without
them ; or, thaf the being of the effect is, on the one hand, con
nected with Means, and the want of the effect, on the other
hand, is connected with the want of the Means. If there be
such a connection as this between Means and end, the Means
are not in vain : the more there is of such a connection, the
fiirther they are from being in vain ; and the less of such a con
nection, the more they are in vain.
Now, therefore, the question to be answered — in order to
determine, whether it foUows from this doctrine of the neces
sary connection between foregoing things, and consequent ones,
X'OL. II. 28

218 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. ParT Vf.
that means used in order to any effect are more in vain than
they would be otherwise — is, whethei- it follows from if, that
there is less of the forementioned connection between means
and effect ; fhat is, whether on the supposUion of there being
a real and true connection between antecedent things and con
sequent ones, there must be less of a connection between Means
and effect, than on the supposition of there being no fixed con
nection between antecedent things and consequent ones : and
the very stating of this question is sufficient to answer it. It
must appear to every one that will open his eyes, that this
question cannot be affirmed withouf the grossest absurdity and
inconsistence. Means are foregoing things, and effects are fol
lowing things : And if there were no connection between fore
going things and following ones, there could be no connection
between raeans and end ; and so all means would be wholly
vain and fruitless. For it is only by virtue of some connection
that they become successful : It is some connection observed,
or revealed, or otherwise known, between antecedent things
and foUowipg ones, that directs in the choice of means. And
if there were^ no such thing as an established connection, there
could be no choice as to means ; one thing would have no
more tendency to an effect than another ; there would be no
such thing as tendency in the case. All those things, which,
are successful means of other things, do therein prove con
nected antecedents of them : and therefore fo assert fhat a
fixed connection between antecedents and consequents makes
means vain and useless, or stands in the way fo hinder fhe
connection between means and end, is just so ridiculous as to
say, that a connection between antecedents and consequents
stands in the way to hinder a connection between antecedents
and consequents. Nor. can any supposed connection of the successiori or
train of antecedents and consequents frora the very beginning
of all things, fhe connection being made already sure and
necessary, either by established laws of nature, or by these
together with a decree of sovereign imraediate interpositions
of divine power on such and such occasions, or any other
way (if any other there be ;) I say, no such necessary con
nection of a series of antecedents and consequents can in the
least fend to hinder, but that the means we use may belong to
the series ; and so may be some of those antecedents which
are connected with the consequents we aira at, in the estab
lished course of things. Endeavours which we use, are things
that exist ; and, therefore, they belong to the general chain of
events ; all the parts of which chain are supposed to be con
nected : and so Endeavours are supposed to be connected
with some effects, or some consequent things or other. And
certainly this does not hinder but that fhe events they are

Sect. v. Endeavours consistent with Calvinism. 219
connected with may be those which we aim at, and which
we choose, because we judge them most likely to have a con
nection with those events, from the established order and
course of things which we observe, or from something in divine
Revelation. Let us suppose a real and sure connection between a
man having his eyes open in the clear daylight, with good or
gans of sight, and seeing ; so that seeing is connected with liis
opening his eyes, and not seeing with his not opening his eyes ;
and also the like connection between such a raan attempting
to open his eyes, and his actually doing it : the supposed
established connection between these antecedents and conse
quents, let the connection be never so sure and necessary,
certainly does not prove that if is in vain, for a man in such
circumstances to attempt to open his eyes, in order to seeing :
his aiming at fhat event, and the use of the Means, being the
effect of his will, does not break the connection or hinder the
success. So fhat the objection we are upon does not lie against the
doctrine of the necessity of events by a certainty of connec
tion and consequence : On fhe contrary, it is truly forcible
against the Arminian doctrine of contingence and self-deter
mination, which is inconsistent with &uch a connection. If
there be no connection between those events wherein virtue
and vice consists, and any thing antecedent : then, there is no
connection between these events and any Means or Endeavours
used in order to them : and if so, then those raeans raust be in
vain. The less there is of connection between foregoing
things and following ones, so much the less there is between
Means and end. Endeavours and success ; and in the sarae
proportion are Means and Endeavours ineffectual and in
vain. It wiU follow from Arminian principles, that there is no
degree of connection befweeti virtue or vice, and any fore
going event or thing: or, in other words, that the determina
tion of the existence of virtue or vice does not in the least
depend on the influence of any thing thaf comes to pass
antecedently, as its cause, Means, or ground ; because, so
far as it is so, it is not from self-determination : and, there
fore, so far there is nothing of the nature of virtue or vice.
And so it foUows, fhat virtue and vice are not at all, in any de
gree, dependent upon, or connected with, any foregoing event
or existence, as its cause, ground, or Means. And if so, then
all foregoing Means must be totally in vain.
Hence it follows,* fhat there cannot, in any consistence
with the Arminian scheme, be any reasonable ground of so
much as a conjecture concerning the consequence of any
Means and Endeavours, in order to • escaping vice or obtain-

220 FREEDOM OP THE WILL. pAKT 1%.,
ing virtue, or any choice or preference of Means, as having a
greater probability of success by some than others ; either
from any natural connection or dependence of the end on
the Means, or through any divine constitution or revealed
way of God bestowing or bringing to pass fhese things, in
consequence of any Means, Endeavours, Prayers or Deeds.
Coiyectures, in this latter case, depend on a supposition that
Gpd himself is the giver, or determining Cause of fhe events
sought : but if they depend on self-determination, then God
is not the determining or disposing Author of them : and if
these things are not of his disposal, then no conjecture can be
made from any revelation he has given, concerning any method
of his disposal of them.
Yea, on these principles, if will not only follow thaf men
cannot have any reasonable ground of judgment or conjecture
that their means and Endeavours to obtain virtue or avoid vice
will be successful, but they may be sure they will not'; they
may be certain that they wUl be in vain ; and that if ever the
thing which they seek comes to pass, it wUl nof be at all owing.
to fhe Means they use. For Means and Endeavours can have
no effect af all, in order to obtain the end, but in one of these
two ways: either (I.) Through a natural tendency and influ
ence to prepare and dispose the mind more to virtuous acts,
either by causing the disposition of the heart to be more in
favour of such acts, or by bringing the mind more info the
view of powerful motives and inducements : or, (2.) By put
ting persons more in the way of God's bestowment of the
benefit. But neither of these can be the case. Not the latter;
for, as has been just now observed, if does not consist with the
Arminian notion of self-determination, which they suppose
essential to virtue,, that God should be the Bestower, or
(which is the same thing) the deterraining, disposing Author
of Virtue. Not the former ; for natural influence and ten
dency suppose causality, connecti&n,.and necessity of event,
,wbich are inconsistent with Arminian liberty. A tendency
of Means, by biassing the heart in favour of virtue, or by bring
ing the will under fhe influence and power of motives^in its de
terminations, are both inconsistent with Arminian liberty of will
consisting in indiflerence, and sovereign self-determination, as
has been largely demonstrated.
But for fhe more full removal of this prejudice against the
doctrine of necessity, which has been maintained, as though it
tencied to encourage a total neglect of aU Endeavours as vain ;
the following things may be considered.
The question is nof. Whether men may not thus improve
this doctrine : we know fhat many true and wholesome doc
trines are abused : but, whether the doctrine gives any just
occasion for such an improvement ; or whether, on the suppo-

i3ECT. v. Endeavours consistent with Calvinism. 221
sition of the truth of the doctrine, such a use of if would not
be unreasonable ? If any shall affirm, that it would not, but
that the very nature of the doctrine is such as gives just occa
sion for it, it must be on this supposition ; namely, that such an
invariable necessity of all things already settled, raust render
the interposition of all Means, Endeavours, Conclusions or
Actions of ours, in order to the obtaining any future end what
soever, perfectly insignificant ; because they cannot in the
least alter or vary fhe course and series of things, in any event
or circurastance ; all being already fixed unalterably by ne
cessify: and thaf therefore it is folly for men fo use any
Means for emy end ; but their wisdom to save themselves
the trouble of Endeavours, and take their ease. No person
can draw such an inference fi-ora this doctrine, and come to
such a conclusion withouf contradicting himself, and going
counter to the very principles he pretends fo act upon : for he
comes to a conclusion, and takes a course in order to an end,
even his ease, or saving himself from trouble ; he seeks sorae
thing future, and uses Means in order to a future thing, even
in his drawing up that conclusion, thaf he will seek nothing
and use no Means in order fo any thing in fiiture ; he seeks
his fiiture ease, and fhe benefit and comfort of indolence. If
prior necessity that determines all things, makes vain all
actions or conclusions of ours in order to any thing future ;
then it makes vain all conclusions and conduct of ours in or
der to our future ease. The measure of our ease, with the
time, manner, and every circurastance of it, is already fixed
by all-deferraining necessity as much as any thing else. ~TT~
he says within himself, " What future happiness or raisery I
shall have, is already in effect determined by the necessary
course and connection of things ; therefore I wUl save myself
the trouble of labour and dihgence, which cannot add to my
determined degree of happiness, or dirainish ray misery ; but
wUl take my ease, and will enjoy the corafort of sloth and neg
ligence." Such a man contradicts himself: he says, the mea
sure of his future happiness and misery is already fixed, and he
will nof try to dirainish the one nor add to the other : but
yet, in his very conclusion, he contradicts this ; for he takes
up this conclusion, to add to his future happiness, by the ease
and comfort of his negligence ; and fo diminish his future trou
ble and misery, by saving himself the trouble of using Means
and taking Pains.
Therefore persons cannot reasonably make this ira
proveraent of the doctrine of necessity, that they will go into
a voluntary neghgence of Means for their own happiness. —
For the principles they must go upon, in order to this, are
inconsistent with their making any improveraent at aU of the
doctrine : for to make some improvement of it is to be influ-

222 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. ParT IV.
enced by it, to come to some voluntary conclusion, in regard
to their own eonduct, with some view or aim : but this, as
has been shown, is inconsistent with the principles they pre
tend to act upon. In short, fhe principles are such as can
not be acted upon at aU, or in any respect, consistently. And,
therefore, in every pretence of acting upon them, or mak
ing any improvement at all of them, there is a self-contradic
tion. As to that Objection against the doctrine, which I have
endeavoured to prove, that it makes men no more than mere
Slachines; I would say, that nofwithstanding this doctrine,
^--"slan is entirely, perfectly, and unspeakably different from a
mere Machine, in that he has reason and understanding, with
a faculty of wiU, and so is capabJe of volition and choice ; in
that his will is guided by the dictates or views of his under
standing ; and in that his external actions and behaviour, and
in many respects also his thoughts, and the exercises of his
mind, are subject to his will ; so thaf he has liberty to act
according to his choice, and do what he pleases ; and by Means
of these things, is capable of moral habits and moral acts,
such inclinations and actions as, according to the comraon sense
of mankind, are worthy of praise, esteem, love and reward ; or
on the contrary, of disesteem, detestation, indignation and pu
nishment. In fhese things is all the dift'erence from mere Machines,
as fo liberty and agency, that would be any perfection, dignity
or privUege in any respect : all fhe difference that can be
desired, and all that can be conceived of; and indeed all that
the pretensions of the Arminians theinselves corae to, as they
are forced often fo explain theraselves ; though their explica
tions overthrow and abolish the things asserted, and pretended
tp be explained. For they are forced to explain a self-deter
mining power of wUl by a power in the soul to determine as
it chooses or wills ; which comes to no raore fhan this, that a
man has a power of choosing, and in raany instances, can do
as he chooses. Which is quite a different thing from that con
tradiction, his having power of choosing his first act of choice
in the case.
Or, if their scheme make any other difference than this
between Men and Machines, it is for the worse : it is so far
from supposing Men to have a dignity and privUege above
Machines, fh-at it makes the manner of their being determined
still more unhappy. Whereas, Machines are guided by an in
telligent cause, by the skilful hand of the workman or owner ;
the will of Man is left to the guidance of nothing but absolute
blind contingence !

Sect. vr. The charge of Stoicism, <^c. answered. 223

SECT.-VL
Conceming that Objection against the Doctrine which has been
maintained, that it agrees with the Stoical Doctrine of Fate,
and the opinions of Mr. Hobbes.
When Calvinists oppose the Arminian notion of the free
dom of wiU and contingence of volition, and insist that there
are no acts of the will, nor any other events whatsoever, but
what are attended with sorae kind of necessity ; their opposers
exclaim against them, as agreeing with the ancient Stoicks in
their doctrine of Fate, and with Mr. Hobbes in his opinion of
Necessity* If would not be worth whUe to take notice of so imperti
nent an Objection had it not been urged by some of the chief
Arminian writers. — There were raany important truths main
tained by the ancient Greek and Roman phUosophers, and es
peciaUy fhe Stoicks, that are never the worse for being held by
them. The Stoic phUosophers, by the general agreeraent of
Christian divines, and even Arminian divines, were the great
est, wisest, and most virtuous of all fhe heathen phUosophers ;
and, in their doctrine and practice, came the nearest fo Chris
tianity of any of their sects. How frequently are the say
ings of these phUosophers, in raany of the writings and ser
mons, even of Arminian divines produced, not as arguments
for the falseness of the doctrines which fhey delivered, but
as a confirmation of some of the greatest truths of the Chris
tian Religion, relating to the Unity and Perfections of the
Godhead, a future state, the duty and happiness of mankind,
&:c. and how the light of nature and reason, in the wisest
and best of the Heathen, harmonized with, and confirms the
Gospel of Jesus Christ.
And it is very reraarkable, concerning Dr. Whitby, that
although he alledges fhe agreement of the Stoicks with us,
wherein he supposes they raaintained the like doctrine, as an
arguraent against the truth of ours ; yet this very Dr. Whitby
alledges the agreement of the Stoicks with the Arminians,
wherein he supposes they taught the same doctrine with
them, as an argument for the truth of their doctrine.* So
that, when the Stoicks agree with them, it is a confirmation
of their doctrine, and a confutation of ours, as shewing that
our opinions are contrary to the natural sense and common
* WhUby oil the Five Points, Edit. 3. p. 335,326, 337.

224 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. PaRT IV.
. reason of mankind : nevertheless, when the Stoicks agree with
us, it argues no such thing in our favour ; but, on fhe contrary,
is a great argument against us, and shews our doctrine to be
heathenish I
It is observed by some Calvinistic writers, that the Armi
nians symbolize with the Stoicks, in some of those doctrines
wherein they are opposed by the Calvinists ; particularly in
their denying an original, innate, total corruption and depravity
of heart ; and in what they held of man's ability to make
himself truly virtuous and conformed to God ; and in some
other doctrines.
It may be further observed, fh-at certainly if is no better
Objection against our doctrine, that it agrees, in some respects,
with the doctrine of the ancient Stoic philosophers ; than it is
against theirs, wherein they differ fi-om us, that if agrees in
sorae respects wifh the opinion of the very worst of fhe hea
then philosophers, the followers of Epicurus, that father of
atheisra and licentiousness, and with the doctrine of fhe
Sadducees and Jesuits.
I am not much concerned to know precisely what the
ancient Stoic philosophers held concerning Fate, in order to
determine what is truth ; as though it were a sure way to be
in the right, to take good heed to differ from them. It seems
thaf they differed among themselves ; and probably fhe doc
trine of Fate, as maintained by most of them, was, in some
respects, erroneous. But whatever their doctrine was, if any
of thera held such a Fate, as is repugnant to any liberty, con
sisting in our doing as we please, I utterly deny such a Fate.
If fhey held any such Fate as is not consistent with the
common and universal notions fhat mankind have of Uberty,
activity, moral agency, virtue and vice ; I disclaim any such
thing, and think I have demonstrated, that the scheme I
maintain is no such scheme. If the Stoicks, by Fate, meant
any thing of such a nature, as can be supposed to stand in the
way of advantage and of benefit in use of means and endea
vours, or would make if less worth while for men to desire,
and seek after any thing wherein their virtue and happiness
consists ; 1 hold no doctrine thaf is clogged with any such in
convenience, any more than any other scheme whatsoever ;
and by no means so much as the Arminian scheme of con
tingence ; as has been shewn. If they held any such doc
trine of universal fatality, as is inconsistent wifh any kind of
liberty, that is or can be any perfection, dignity, privilege or
benefit, or any thing desirable, in any respect, for any intel
ligent creature, or indeed wifh any liberty thaf is possible or
conceivable; I embrace no suchv doctrine. If they held any
such doctrine of Fafe, as is inconsistent with the world being'
in all things subject to the disposal of an intelligent, wise

Sect. vii. Concerning the Necessity, ^c. 226
agent, that presides — not as the soul of the world, but — as
the Sovereign Lord of the Universe, governing all things by
proper wUl, choice and design, in the exercise of fhe most
perfect liberty conceivable, without subjection to any con
straint, or being properly under fhe power or influence of any
thing before^ a,bove or without himself; I wholly renounce
any such doctrine.
As to Mr. Hobbes maintaining the same doctrine concern
ing necessify, I confess if happens I never read Mr. Hobbes.
Let his opinion be what it will, we need not reject all truth
which is demonstrated by clear evidence, merely because it
was once held by some bad man. This great truth, "fhat
Jesus is the Son of God," was not spoUed because it was once
and again proclaimed with a loud voice by the devil. If truth
is so defiled, because it is spoken by the mouth, or written by
the pen of sorae ill rainded, raischievous man, that it must
never be received, we shall never know, when we hold any
ef the most precious and evident fruths by a sure tenure. And
if Mr. Hobbes has made a bad use of this truth, that is to be
lamented : but the truth is nof to be thought worthy of rejec
tion on that accourit. It is common for the corrupt hearts of
evil men to abuse fhe best things to vile purposes.
t might also take notice of its having been observed,
that the Arminians agree with Mr. Hobbes* in many more
things than the Calvinists. As, in what he is said to hold con
cerning original sin, in denying the necessify of supernatural
illumination, in denying infused grace, in denying the doc-i
trine of justification by faith alone ; and other things.

SECT. VII.
Concerning the Necessity of the Divine Will.
Some may possibly object against what has been supposed
of fhe absurdity and inconsistence of a self-determining power
in fhe wUl, and the impossibility of its being otherwise than
that the wiU should be determined in every case by some
motive, and by a motive which (as it stands in the view ofthe
understanding) is of superior strength to any appearing on the
other side ; that if these things are true, if will follow that
riot only the will of created minds, but fhe wUl of God Him
self is necessary in all its determinations. Concerning which,
the Author of the Essay on the Freedom of Will in God and
in the Creature, (pag. 85, 86.) says: " What strange doctrine
is this, contrary fb all our ideas of the dominion of God? does
*Dr. GaL, in his Answer to Dr. Whiibt, Vol, III. h J§3, %C.
VOL. ii. 29 %

326 FREEDOM OP THE WILL. PaRT IV,
it not destroy the glory of his liberty of choice, and fake away
from the Creator and Governor and Benefactor of the world,.
thaf most free and Sovereign Agent, all the glory of this sort
of freedom? does it not seem to make hun a kind of mecha
nical medium of fate, and iritroduce Mr. Hobbes's doctrine
of fatality and Necessity into all things that God hath to do;
with? Does it not seem to represent the blessed God as a
Being of vast understanding, as weU as power and efficiency,
but stUl to leave him withouf a will to choose among all the ob-^
jects within his view ? In short, it seems to make the blessed
God a sort of Almighty Minister of Fate, under its universal
and supreme influence ; as if was the professed sentiment of
some of the ancients, thaf Fate was above the gods.
This is declaiming rather than arguing, and an applica
tion to men's imaginations and prejudices rather fhan to mere
reason. I would now calmly endeavour to consider whether
there be any reason in this frightful representation. But be
fore I enter upon a particular consideration of fhe matter, I
would observe, that it is reasonable to suppose it should
be much more difficult to express or conceive things accord
ing fo exact metaphysical truth, relating to the nature and
manner ofthe existence of things in the Divine Understanding:
and WiU, and the operation of fhese faculties (if I may so cal!
thera) ofthe Divine Mind, than in the human mind; which is
infinitely raore within our view, more proportionate fo the
measure of our comprehension, and more commensurate to
the use and import of human speech. Language is indeed
very deficient, in regard of terms to express precise truth con
cerning our own minds^ and their faculties and operations.
Words were first formed to express external things ; and those
that are applied to express things internal and spiritual, are
almost all borrowed, and used in a sort of figurative sense.
Whence they are, most of thein, attended with a great deal
of ambiguity and unfixedness in their signification, occasioning
innumerable doubts, difficulties, and confusions, in enquiries
and controversies about things of this nature. But language
is much less adapted fo express things existing in fhe mind of
tbe incomprehensible Deity, precisely as they are.
We find a great deal of difficulty in conceiving exactly
of the nafure of our own souls. And notwithstanding aU the
progress which has been made in past ages and the present in
this kind of knowledge, whereby our metaphysics, as it relates
to these things, is brought to greater perfection than once it
was ; yet here is slHl work enough left for future enquiries and
researches, and room for progress stiU to be made for many
ages and generations. But we had need to be infinitely able
metaphysicians to conceive with clearness, according to strict,
proper,^ind perfect truth, concerning the nature of the Divine

-Sect. vii. Concerning the Necessity, ^c. 227
Essence, and the raodes of action and operation in the powers
of the Divine Mind,
And it may be noted particularly, that though we are
obliged to conceive of some things in God as consequent and
dependent on others, and of some things pertaining to the
Divine Nature and WUl as the foundation of others, and so
before others in the order of nature : as, we must conceive of
the knowledge and holiness of God as prior, in the order of
nature, to his happiness ; the perfection of his understanding,
as the foundation of his wise purposes and decrees ; the holi
ness of his nature, as the cause and reason of his holy determi
nations. And yet, when we speak of cause and effect, antece
dent and consequent, fundamental and dependent, determining
and determined; in the first Being, who.is self-existent, indepen-
dent, of perfect and absolute simplicity and immutability, and
the first cause of all things ; doubtless there raust be less pro
priety in such representations fhan when we speak of derived
dependent beings, who are compounded and liable fo perpetual
mutation and succession.
Having premised this, I proceed to observe concerning the
forementioned Author's exclamation about the necessary De
termination of God^s Will in all things, by what he sees to be
fittest and best.
That all fhe seeming force of such objections and excla
mations must arise from an imagination, thaf there is some
sort of privilege or dignity in being withouf such a moral
Necessity as will make if impossible to do any other than
always jchoose what is wisest and best ; as though there were
some disadvantage, meanness and subjection, in such a Neces
sity; a thing by which the will was confined, kept under,
and held in servitude by something which, as it were, main
tained a strong and invincible power and dominion over it, by
bonds that held hira fast, and from which he could, by no
means, deliver hiraself. Whereas, this raust be all mere
imagination and delusion. It is no disadvantage or dishonour
to a being, necessarily to act in the raost excellent and happy
manner, from the necessary perfection of his own nature.
This argues no imperfection, inferiority, or dependence, nor
any want of dignity, privilege, or ascendency.* It is nof in-
* " It might have been objected, with more plausibleness, that the Supreme
Cause cannot be free, because he must needs do always what is beet in the whole.
But this would not at all serve Spjjioja'* purpose ; for this is a neeessity, not of
nature and of fate, but of fitness and wisdom ; a necessity consistent with the
greatest freedora and most perfect choice. For the only foundation of this ne
cessity is such an unalterable rectitude of will and perfection of wisdom, as
makes it impossible ibr a wise being to act foohshly." Clark's Demonstration of
the Being and Attributes of God." Edit. 6. p. 64.
" Though God is a most perfect free Agent, yet he cannot but do always
what is best and wisest in the whole. The reason is evident ; because perfect
v.'isdom and goodness are as steady and certain principles of action, as Necessity

.328 freedom of t'se wiLt. Part iv.
consistent with the absolute and most perfect sovereignty of
God. The sovereignty of God is his abUity and authority fo
itself ; and an infinitely wise and good Being, indued with tho most perfect liber
ty, can no more choose to act in contradiction to wisdom and goodness, than a
necessary agent can act contrary to the Necessity by which it is acted ,- it being
as great an absurdity and impossibility in choice, for Infinite Wisdom to choose to
act unwisely, or Infinite Goodness to choose what is not good, as it would be in
nature, for absolute Necessity to fail of producing its necessary eflect. There
was, indeed, no Necessity in nature, that God should at first create such beings
as he has created, or indeed any being at all ; because he is, in Himself, infinitely
happy and all-suificient. There was, also, no Necessity in nature, that he should
preserve and continue things in being after they were created ; because he
Would be self-sufficient without their continuance, as he was before their crea
tion. But it was fit, and wise, and good, that Infinite Wisdom should manifest,
and Infinite Goodness communicate itself ; and therefore it was necessary, in the
sense of Necessity I am now speaking of, that things should be made at such a
lime, and continued so long, and indeed with various perfections in such degrees,
as Infinite Wisdom and Goodness saw it wisest and best that they should." Ibid.
p. 112, 113.
" It is not a fault, but a perfection of our nature, to desire, will, and act, ac.^ '
cording to the last result of a fair examination. — This is so far from being a re
straint or diminution of freedom, that it is the very improvement and benefit of it :
it is not an abridgment, it is the end and use of our liberty ; and the further we
are removed from such a determination; the nearer we are to misery and slavery.
A perfect indifference in the mind, not determinable by its last judgment, of the
good or evil thatis thought to attend its choice, would be so far ftom being an ad
vantage and excellency of any intellectual nature, that it would be as great ari
imperfection, as the want of indifTerency to act, or not to act, till determined by
the will, would be an imperfection on the other side.— It is as much a perfection,
that desire or the power of preferring should be determined by good, as that the
power of acting should be determined by the will : and the eertainer such deter
mination is, the greater the perfection. Nay, were we determined by any thing
but the last result of our own minds, judging of the good or evil of any action,
we were not free. This very end of our freedom being, that we might attain the
good we choose ; and, therefore, every man is brought under a Necessity by his
constitution, as an intelligent being, to be determined in willing by his own
thought and judgment, what is best for him to do ; else he would be under the
determination of sorae other than hiraself, which is want of liberty. And to deny
that a man's will, in every determination, follows his own judgraent, is to say, that
a man wills and acts for an end that he would not have, at the same time that he
wills and acts for it. For if he prefers it in his present thoughts before any other,
it is plain he then thinks better of it, and would have it before any other ; unless
he can haye, and not have it ; will, and not will it, at the sanie time ; a contra
diction too manifest to be admitted. — If we look upon those superior beings above
us, who enjoy perfect happiness, we shall have reason to judge, that they are raore
steadily determined in their choice of good than we ; and yet we have no reason
to think they are less happy, or less free, than we are. And if it were fit for such
poor finite creatures as we are, to pronounce what Infinite Wisdom and Goodness
could do, I think we might say, that God himself cannot choose what is npt 'good.
The freedom ofthe JUmighty hinders not his being determined by what is ftest.— Biit t6
give a right view of this mistaken part of liberty, let me ask. Would any one be
a changeUng, because he is less determined by wise determination than a wise
man ? Is it worth the name of freedom, to be at liberty to play the fool, and
draw shame and misery upon a raan's self? If to break loose from the conduct
of reason, and to want that restraint of examination and judgment that keeps
us from doing er choosing the worse, be liberty, true liberty, mad men and fools
are the only free men. Yet, I think, no body would choose to be mad, for the
sake of such hberty, but he that is mad already." Locke's Hum. Und. Vol. I.
Edit. 7. p. 215, 216.
" This Being, having all things always necessarily in view, must always, and
eternally will, according to his infinite comprehension of thihgs ; that is, must wiU
all things that are wisest and best to be done. There is no getting free of this cop-

Sect. vii. Necessity of divine Volition. 220
do whatever pleases him ; whereby " he doth according fo
his wiU in the armies of heaven, and amongst the inhabitants
of the earth, and none can stay his hand, or say unto him,
what dost thou ?" — The following things belong to the sove
reignty of God; viz. (1.) Supreme, Universal, and Infinite
Power; whereby he is able fo do what he pleases, without
controul, without any confinement of that power, without any
subjection, in the least measure, to any other power ; and so
without any hindrance or restraint, that it should be eitiier im
possible or at all difficult for him to accomplish his WiU ; and
without any dependence of his power on any other power, from
whence it should be derived or of which it should stand in
any need ; so far from this, that all other power is derived from
him, and is absolutely dependent on him. (2.) That He has
supreme authority ; absolute and most perfect right to do what
he wills, without subjection to any superior authority, or any
derivation of authority from any other, or limitation by any
distinct independent authority, either superior, equal, or infe
rior; he being the head of all dominion, and fountain of all
authority ; and also without restraint by any obligation, imply
ing either subjection, derivation, or dependence, or proper limi
tation. (3.) That his Will is supreme, underived, and inde
pendent oh' any thing without Hiraself; being in every thing
determined by his own counsel, having no other rule but his
own wisdom ; his wUl not being subject to, or restrained by the
will of any other, and other wills being perfectly subject to his.
(4.) That his Wisdom, which determines his will, is supreme,
perfect, underived, self-sufficient, and independent ; so that it
may be said, as in Isai. xl. 14. " With whom took He counsel 1
And who instructed Him and taught Him in the path of judg
ment, and taught Him knowledge, and showed him the way of

sequence. If it can will at all, it must will this way. To be capable of know
ing, and not capable of willing, is not to be understood. And to be capable of
willing otherwise than what is wisest and best, contradicts that knowledge which
is infinite. Infinite Knowledge must direct the will without error. Here then is
fhe origin of moral JTecessity ; and that is, really, of freedom — Perhaps it may be
said, when the Divine Will is determined, from the consideration of the eternal
aptitudes of things, it is as necessarily determined, as if it were physically im
pelled, if that were possible. But it is unskilfulness to suppose this an objection.
The great principle is once established, viz. That the Divine Will is determined
by the eternal reason and aptitudes of things, instead of being physically impel
led ; and after that, the more strong and necessary this determination is, tho
raore perfect the Deity must be allowed to be : it is this that makes him an amiar
ble and adorable Being, whose Will and Power are constantly, immutablv deter
mined, by the consideration of what is wisest and best ; instead of a surd Being,
with power, without discerning and reason. Jt is the beauty of this Jfecessity, that
itis strmg as fat'e itself,- with all the advaniageof reason and goodness. — It is strange
to see men contend, that the Deity is not free, because he is necessarily rational,
immutably good and wise ; when a man is allowed still the perfecter being, the
more fixedly and constantly his will is determined by reason and truth." — Enqni^
ry into the J^ature of the Human Saul. Edit. 3. Vol. II. p. 403, 404.

§30 FREEDOM OF THE WILLi -PaRT IV.
understanding ?" There is no other Divine Sovereignty but
this : and this is properly absolute sovereignty ; no other is
desirable ; nor would any other be honourable or happy *
and indeed there is no other conceivable or possible. If is
the glory and greatness of the Divine Sovereign, fhat his
Will is deterrained by his own infinite, all-sufficient wisdoln
in every thing ; and is in nothing at all directed either by infe
rior wisdom, or by no wisdom ; whereby it would become
senseless arbitrariness, determining and acting without reason,
design, or end.
If God's Will is steadily and surely determined in every
thing by supreme wisdom, then it is in every thing neces
sarily determined to that which is most wise, and certainly,
it would be a disadvantage and indignity to be otherwise ;
for if the Divine Will was not necessarily determined to what
in every case is wisest and best, if must be subject to some
degree of undesigning contingence ; and so in the same de
gree liable to evil. /"To suppose the Divine WiU liable to be
carried hither and thither at random, by the uncertain wind of
blind contingence which is guided by no wisdom, no motive,
no intelligent dictate whatsoever, (if any such thing were
possible) would certainly argue a great degree of imperfec
tion and meanness, infinitely unworthy' of fhe Deity. If it
be a disadvantage for the Divine WiU to be attended with this
moral Necessity, then the more free from it, and the more
left at random, the greater dignity and advantage. And con
sequently, to be perfectly free from the direction of understand
ing, and universally and entirely left to senseless unmeaning
contingence, to act absolutely at random, would be the supreme
glory 1
If no more argues any dependence of God's WUI, that
his supremely wise volition is necessary, than if argues a depen
dence of his being, that his existence is necessary. If it be
something too low for the Supreme Being to have his Will de
termined by moral Necessity, so as necessarily, in every case,
to will in fhe highest degree holily and happily ; then why is
it not also something too low for him to have his existence,
and the infinite perfection of his nature, and his infinite happi
ness determined by Necessity ? It is no more fo God's disho
nour to be necessarily wise than to be necessarily holy. And
if neither of them be to his dishonour, then it is not to his dis
honour necessarily fo act holily and wisely. And if it be not
dishonourable to be necessarily holy and wise, in the highest
possible degree, no more is it mean and dishonourable, neces:
sarily to act holy and wisely in the highest possible degree ; or
which is fhe same thing, to do fhat, in every case, whi6h above
all other things is wisest and best.

Sect. vu. Necessity of divine Volition. 33T
The reason why it is not dishonom-able to be necessarily
most holy is, because holiness in itself is an exceUent and ho
nourable thing. For the sarae reason it is no dishonour fo be
necessarily most wise, and in every case to act raost wisely, or
do fhe thing which is the wisest of all : for wisdora is also in it
self excellent' and honourable.
The forementioned Author of the Essay on the Freedom of
Will, ^c. as has been observed, represents that doctrine of the
Divine Will being in every thing necessarily deterrained by su
perior fitness, as making the blessed God a kind of Almighty
Minister and mechanical mediura of fate : he insists,(p. 93, 94,)
that this moral Necessity and impossibility is in effect the same
thing with physical and natural Necessity and impossibility r
and says, (p. 54, 55.) "The scheme which determines the
wiU always and certainly by the understanding, and the under
standing by the appearance of~ things, seems to take away the
true nature of vice and virtue. For fhe sublimest of virtues,
and the vilest of vices, seem rather to be raatters of fate and
Necessity, flowing naturally and necessarily frora the existence,
the circurastances, and present situation of persons and things ;
for this existence and situation necessarily raakes such an ap
pearance to the mind ; from this appearance flows a necessary
perception and judgraent concerning these things ; this judg
ment necessarily determines the wiU : and thus, by this chain
of necessary causes, virtue and vice would lose their nature, and
become natural ideas and necessary things, instead of moral and
free actions."
And yet this same Author allows, (p. 30, 31.) That a
perfectly wise being will constantly and certainly choose what
is raost fit; and says, (p. 102,103.) "I grant, and always
have granted, that wheresoever there is such antecedent supe
rior fitness of things, Godacts according to it,; so as never to
contradict it ;' and, particularly, in all his judicial proceedings
as a governor, and Distributer of rewards and punishments."
Yea, he says expressly, (p. 42.) " That it is not possible for
God to act otherwise, than according to this fitness and good
ness in things."
So that according to this Author, putting these several
passages of his Essay together, there is no virtue,- nor any
thing of a moral nature, in the most sublime and glorious acts
and exercises of God's holiness, justice, and faithfulness ;
and he never does any thing which is in itself supremely
worthy, and above all other things fit and exceUent, but only
as a kind of mechanical medium of fate ; and in what he does
as the Judge and moral Govemor of the world, he exercises
no moral excellency ; exercising no freedora in these things,
because he acts by raoral Necessity, which is, in effect, the
same with physical or Natural Necessity; and therefore he

232 FREEDOM ep THE WILL. PaRT IV.
only acts by an Hobbistical fatality; "as a Being indeed of
vast understanding, as well as power and efficiency (as he said
before) but without a will to choose, being a kind of Almighty
Minister of fafe, acting under its supreme influence." For he
allows, that in all these things God's will is , determined
constantly and certainly by a superior fitness, and that it is
not possible for him to act otherwise. And if these things
are so, what glory or praise belongs to God for doing holily
and justly, or taking the raost fit, holy, wise and exceUent
course, in any one instance ? Whereas, according to the scrip
tures, and also the coraraon sense of mankind, it does not in
the least derogate from the honour of any being, that through
the raoral perfection of his nature, he necessarily acts with su
preme wisdom and holiness ; but on fhe contrary his praise is
the greater : herein consists the height of his glory.
The same author, (p. 56,) supposes, that herein appears
the exceUent " character of a wise and good man, that though
he can choose contrary to the fitness of things, yet he does not,
but suffers himself to' be directed by fitness ;" and that, in
this conduct, "he imitates the blessed God." And yet he
supposes it is contrariwise with the blessed God : nof that he
suffers himself to be directed by fitness, when " he can choose,
contrary to the fitness of things ;" but that " he cannot choose
contrary to the fitness of things,''^ as he says, p. 42, " That it
is riot possible for God to act otherwise fhan according fo this
fitness, where there is any fitness or goodness in things." Yea,
he supposes (p. 31.) That if a raan " were perfectly wise and
good, he could not do otherwise than be constantly and cer
tainly deterrained by the fitness of things."
One thing raore I would observe, before I conclude this
section ; and that is, that if it derogate nothing from the
glory of God, to be necessarily determined by superior fit
ness in some things, then neither does if to be thus deterriiined
in all things; from any thing in the nature of such Necessity,'
as at all detracting from God's freedom, independence, abso
lute supremacy, or any dignity or glory of his nature, state
or manner of acting; or as implying any infirmity, .restraint or
subjection. And if the thing be such as well consists with
God's glory, and has nothing tending at all to detract frora it ;
then we need not be afraid of ascribing it fo God in too raany
things, lest thereby we should detract from God's glory too
much.

Sect. vni. Necessity of Divine Volition, continued. 23S

SECT. vm.
Some further Objections against the moral Necessity of God's
Volitions considered.
The author last cited, as has been observed, owns that
God, being perfectly wise, wUl constantly and certainly
choose what appears most fit, where there is a superior fit
ness and goodness in things ; and that it is not possible for
him to do otherwise. So that it is, in effect, confessed thaf in
those things where there is any real preferableness, it is no dis
honour,, nothing in any respect unvvorthy of God, for him to
act from Necessity ; notwithstanding all that can be objected
from the agreement of such a Necessity with the fate of the
Stoicks, and the Necessity raaintained by Mr. Hobbes. From
which it will follow, that if in all the different things among
which God chooses, there were evermore a superior fitness or
preferableness on one side, then it would be no dishonour, or
any thing unbecoming, for God's will to be necessarily deter
mined in every thing. And if this be allowed, it is giving up
entirely the argument from the unsuitableness of such a Ne
cessity to fhe liberty, supremacy, independence, and glory of
the Divine Being ; and resting the whole weight of the affair
on the decision of another point wholly diverse ; viz. Whethei-
it be so indeed, that in all the various possible things, objects
of his choice, there is not evermore a preferableness in one
thing above another. This is denied by this author ; who sup
poses that, in many instances between two or more possible
things which come within the view ofthe Divine Mind, there is
a perfect indifference and equahty, as to fitness or tendency, to
attain any good end which God can have in view, or to answer
any of his designs. Now, therefore, 1 would consider whether
this be evident.
The arguments brought fo prove this, are of tvvo kinds.
(1.) It is urged, that, in many instances, we must suppose there
is absolutely no difference between various possible objects of
choice, which God has in view : and (2.) that the difference be
tween many things is so inconsiderable, or of such a nature,
thaf it would be unreasonable to suppose it to be of any conse
quence ; or fo suppose that any of God's wise designs would
not be answered in one way as well as the other.
. Therefore, I. The first thing fo be considered is, whether there are
any instances wherein there is a perfect likeness, and absolutely
no difference, between different objects of choice that are pro
posed to fhe Divine Understanding ?
voit. H. 30

234 freedom of the will. Part iv.
And here, in fhe first place, if may be worthy to be con
sidered, whether the contradiction there is in the terms of the
question proposed, does not give reason to suspect, that there
is an inconsistence in fhe thing supposed. If is inquired whe
ther different objects of choice may not be absolutely without
difference? If they are absolutely without difference, then
how are they different objects of choice ? If there be abso
lutely no difference, in any respect, then there is no variety or
distinction : for distinction is only by some difference. And if
there be no variety among proposed objects of choice, then
there is no opportunity for variety of choice, or difference of
determination. For that determination of a thing, which is nof
different in any respect, is not a different determination, but
the same. That this is no quibble may appear more fully in a
ghort time.
The arguments, to prove that the Most High, in some
instances, chooses to do one thing rather than another,
where the things themselves are perfectly without difference,
are two. I. Thaf fhe various parts of infinite time and space, ab
solutely considered, are perfectly alike, and do nof differ af all
one from another : and that therefore, when God determined
to create the world in such a part of infinite duration and
space, rather than others, he determined and preferred among
various objects, between which there was no preferableness,
and absolutely no difference.
Answ. This objection supposes an infinite length of time
before fhe world was created, distinguished by successive parts,
properly and truly so ; or a succession of limited and unmea-
surable periods of time, following one another, in an infinitely
long series : which must needs be a groundless imagination.
The eternal duration which was before the world, being only
the eternity of God's existence ; which is nothing else but his im
mediate, perfect, and invariable possession of the whole of his
unlimited life, together and at once ; Vitai interminabilis, tota,
mmul et perfecta possessio. Which is so generally aUowed that
I need not stand to demonstrate it.*

* " If all created beings were taken away, all possibility of any mutation or
succeesion, of one thing to another, would appear to be also removed. Abstract
succession in eternity is scarce to be understood. What is it that succeeds ?
One minute to another, perhaps, velut unda supervenit u-nddm. But when we ima
gine this, we fancy that the minutes arfe things separately existing. This is the
common notion ; and yet it is a manifest prejudice. Time is notfing but the ex
istence of created successive beings, and eternity the necessary existence of the
Deity. — Therefore, if this necessary Being hath no change or succession in his na
ture, his existence must, of course, be unsuccessive. We seem to commit a dou
ble oversight in this case ; first, we find succession in the necessary nature and
existence of the Deity himself: which is wrong, if the reasoning above be con
clusive. And then we ascribe this succession to eternity, considered abstractedly
from the Eternal Being ; and suppose it, one knows not what, a thing subsisting

^ECT, VIU. Necessity of Divine Volition, continued, 235
So this objection supposes an extent of space beyond the
limits of the creation, of an infinite length, breadth, and depth,
truly and properly distinguished into different measurable parts,
limited at certain stages, one beyond another, in an infinite se
ries. Which notion of absolute and infinite space is doubtless
as unreasonable as fhat now mentioned, of absolute and infinite
^Juration. It is as improper to iraagine that the immensity and
omnipresence of God is distinguished by a series of miles and
leagues, one beyond another, as that the infinite duration of
God is distinguished by months and years, one after another.
A diversity and order of distinct parts, limited by certain periods,
is as conceivable, and does as naturally obtrude itself on our
imagination, in one case as fhe other ; and there is equal rea
son in^each case to suppose that our imagination deceives us.
It is equaUy iraproper to talk of months and years of the Di
vine Existence, as of square miles of Deify : and we equally
deceive ourselves, when we talk of the world being differently
fixed with respect fo either of these sorts of measures. I think
we know not what we mean, if we say, the world raight have
been differently placed from what it is, in the broad expanse
of infinity ; or, that it raight have been differently fixed in the
long line of eternity : and all arguments and objections, which
are built on the imaginations we are apt to have of infinite ex
tension or duration, are buUdings founded on shadows, or cas
tles in the air.
2. The second argument, fo prove that the Most High
wills one thing rather than another, without any superior fit
ness or preferableness in fhe thing preferred, is God's actu-
ally placing in different parts of the world, particles, or atoms
of matter, that are perfectly equal and alike. The fore-
mentioned author says, (p. 78, &c.) " If one would descend to
the minute specific particles, of which different bodies are com
posed, we should see abundant reason fo believe, fhat there are
thousands of such little particles, or atoms of matter, which
are perfectly equal and alike, and could give no distinct defer-
by itself, and flowing, one minute after another. This is the work of pure ima
gination, and contrary to the reality of things. Hence the common metaphorical
expressions ; Time runs apace, let us lay hold on the present minute, and the like.
.The philosophers themselves mislead us by their illustration. They compare
' eternity to the motion of a point running on for ever, and making a traceless in
finite line. Here the point is supposed a thing actually subsisting, representing
the present minute ; and then they ascribe motion or succession to it : that is,
they ascribe inotion to a raere nonentity, to illustrate to us a successive eternity,
Hiade up of finite successive pUrts. — If once we allow an all-perfect mind, which
hath an eternal, immutable, and infinite comprehension of^all things, always
(and allow it we must) the distinction of past and future vanishes with re
spect to such a mind. — In a word, if we proceed step by step, as above,
the eternity or existence of the Deity will appear to be VitK interminabilis,
tota, simul el perfecta possessio ; how much soever this may have been a para.
dox hitherto." Enquiry into the J^ature of the Htm<m Said. Vol. ii. 409, 410,
411. Edit. 3.

230 FilEEUOM OF THE WILL. pART iV.-
mination to the WUl of God, where to place them," He there
- instances in particles of water, of which there are such ini-
mense numbers, which compose the rivers and oceans of this
world ; and the infinite myriads of the luminous and fiery par
ticles, which compose the body of the Sun ; so many, that it
would be very unreasonable to suppose no two of them should
be exactly equal and alike,
Ansto. (1.) To this I answer : that as we must suppose
matter fo be infinitely divisible, it is very unlikely, that any two
of all these particles are exactly equal and alike ; so unlikely,
that it is a thousand to one, yea, an infinite number to one, but
if is otherwise : and thaf although we should aUow a great simi
larity between the different particles of water and fire, as to
their general nature and figure ; and however small we sup
pose those particles to be, it is infinitely unlikely that any
two of them should be exactly equal in dimensions and quan
tity of mafter. — If we should suppose a great many globes of
the same nature with the globe of the earth, it would be yery
strange, if there were any two of them that had exactly the
same number of particles of dust and water in them. But
infinitely less strange, than that two particles of light should
have just the same quantify of raatter. For a particle of light,
according to the doctrine of the infinite divisibihty of matter,
is composed of infinitely more assignable parts fhan there
are particles of dust and water in the globe of the earth.
And as it is infinitely unlikely, that any two of these parti
cles should be equal ; so it is, that they should be alike in other
respects : to instance in the configuration of their surfaces. If
there were very many globes of the nature of the eaith, it
would be very unlikely fhat any two should have exactly the
sarae nuraber of particles of dust, wafer, and stone, in their
surfaces, and all posited exactly alike, one with respect to
another, without any difference, in any part discernible either
by the naked eye or microscope ; but infinitely less strange,
than that two particles of light should be perfectly of the
sarae figure. For there are infinitely more assignable real
parts on the surface of a particle of light, than there are
particles of dust, wafer, and stone, on the surface of fhe ter
restrial Globe.
Answ. (2.) But then, supposing that there are two parti
cles, or atoms of matter, perfectly equal and alike, which God
has placed in different parts of the creation ; as I will not deny
if to be possible for God to make two bodies perfectly alike,
and put them in different places ; yet it will not follow, that
two different or distinct acts or effects of the Divine Power
have exactly the same fitness for the same ends. For these
two different bodies are nof different or distinct, in any other
respects than those wherein they differ : they are two in no>

Sect. vm. Necessity of divine Volition, continued. - 23'?
other respects than those wherein there is a difference. If
they are perfectly equal and alike in themselves, then fhey can
be distinguished, or be distinct, only in those things which
are called circumstances ; as place, time, rest, motion, or some
other present or past circurastances or relations. For it is dif
ference only that constitutes distinction. If God raakes two
bodies, in themselves every way equal and alike, and agreeing
perfectly in all other, circumstances and relations, but only
their place ; then in this only is there any distinction or dupli
city. The figure is the same, the raeasure is the sarae, the
solidify and resistance are fhe same, and every thing the same,
but only the place. Therefore what the WiU of God deter
mines is this, that there should be the sarae figure, the same
extension, the same resistance, &c. in two diflerent places.
And for this determination he has sorae reason. There is sorae
end, for which such a deterraination and act has a peculiar
fitness, above all other acts. Here is no one thing deterrained
without an end, and no one thing without a fitness for that
end, superior fo any thing else. If it be the pleasure of God
to cause fhe sarae resistance, and the sarae figure, to be in two
different places and situations, we can no more justly argue
from it, that here must be some determination or act of God's
will that is wholly withouf motive or end, than we can argue,
than whenever in any case it is a man's will to speak the same
words or make the same sounds af two different tiraes ; there
must be some deterraination or act of his will, without any
motive or end. The difference of place, in the former case,
proves no more than fhe difference of time does in the other.
If any one should say, wifh regard to fhe former case, that
there must be soraething determined without an end, viz.
that of those two similar bodies, this in particular should be
made in this place, and the other in the other, and should
enquire, why the Creator did not make thera in a transposi
tion, when both are alike, and each would equally have suited
either place ? The enquiry supposes soraething fhat is not
true ; namely, fhat the two bodies differ and are distinct in other
respects besides their place. So thaf with this distinction in
herent in them, they might, in their first creation, have been
transposed, and each might have begun its existence in the
place of the other.
Lef us, for clearness sake, suppose, that God had, at fhe
beginning, made two globes, each of an inch diameter, both
perfect spheres, and perfectly solid, without pores, and per
fectly alike in every respect, and placed thera near one to
another, one towards the right hand, and the other towards
the left, without any difference as fo tirae, motion or rest, past
or present, or any circumstance, but only their place ; and the
qeustion should be asked, why God in their creation placed

238 - FREEDOM OF THE WILL. ParT IV .
them so ? Why thaf which is made on the right hand, was
not made on the left, and vice versa ? Let it be well consider
ed, whether there be any sense in such a question ; and whether
the enquiry does nof suppose something false and absurd.
Lef it be considered, what the Creator must have done other
wise than he did, what different act of will or power he must
have exerted, in order to fhe thing proposed. All that could
have been done, would have been to have made two spheres,
perfectly alike, in liie same places where he has made them,
without any diffisrence of fhe things made, either in them
selves or in any circumstance ; so that the whole effect would
have been without any difference, and, therefore, just the
sarae. By the supposition, the two spheres are different in no
other respect but their place ; and therefore in other respects,
they are fhe same. Each has the same roundness ; it is not a
distinct rotundity, in any other respect but its situation.
There are, also, fhe same dimensions, differing in nothing but
their place. And so of their resistance, and every thing else
that belongs to them.
Here, if any chooses to say, " thaf there is a difference
in another respect viz. that they are not Numerically the
same: thaf if is thus with all the qualities thaf belong to
them: that if is confessed they are in some respects the
same ; that is, they are both exactly alike ; but yet numeri
cally they differ. Thus the roundness of one is not the same
numerical, individual roundness with fhat of the other." Let
this be supposed ; then the question about fhe determination
of fhe Divine Will in the affair, is, why did God will, that this
individual roundness should be af the right hand, and the
other individual roundness at fhe left ? why did nof he raake
them in a contrary position ? Let any rational person consider,
whether such questions be not words withouf a meaning ; as
much as if God should see fif for some ends, to cause the same
sounds fo be repeated, or made at two different times: the
Sounds being perfectly the same in every other respect, but
only one was a minute after the other ; and if should be asked
upon it, why God caused these sounds, numericaUy different,
to succeed one the other in such a manner? Why he did
not make that individual sound, which was in the first minute,
to be in the second ? And the individual sound of the last
minute to be in fhe first : which enquiries would be even ri
diculous ; as I think every person must see, in the case pro
posed of two sounds, being only the same repeated, absolutely
without any difference, but that one circumstance of time.
If the Most High sees if will answer some good end, that the
same sound be made thunder at two distinct times, and there
fore wUls fhat it should be so, must it needs therefore be,
that herein there is some act of God's will without any mo-

Sect viii. Necessity of divine Volition, continued. 239
tive or end ? God saw fit often, at distant times, and on diffe
rent occasions, to say the very same words fo Moses ; namely,
those, / am Jehovah. And would if not be unreasonable to
infer as a certain consequence frora this, that here must be
some act or acts of the Divine WiU, in deterraining and dis
posing the words exactly ahke, af different tiraes, wholly
without aim or inducement ? But it would be no more unrea
sonable them lo say, that there must be an act of God without
any inducement, if he sees it best, and, for some reasons,
determines that there shall be the same resistance, the same
dimensions, and fhe same figure, in several distinct places.
If in the instance of fhe two spheres, perfectly alike, it
be supposed possible that God might have raade them in a
contrary position ; that which is made at the right hand, being
made at the left; then I ask. Whether it is not evidently
equaUy possible, if God had made but one of them, and that
in the place of the right hand globe, that he might have
made that numericaUy different from what if is and numeri
cally different from whathe did make it; though perfectly alike,
and in the sarae place ; and af the same time, and in every
respect, in the same circumstances and relations? Namely,
Whether he might not have made it numerically the same
with that which he has now made at the left hand ; and so
have left that which is now created af the right hand, in a
state of non-existence ? And, if so, whether if would not have
been possible fo have made one in that place, perfectly like
these, and yet numerically differing from both ? And let it
be considered, whether, from this notion of a numerical differ
ence in bodies perfectly equal and alike, which numerical dif
ference is something inherent in fhe bodies themselves, and
diverse from the difference of place or time, or any circum
stance whatsoever ; it will not follow, that there is an infinite
number of numerically different possible bodies, perfectly alike,
among which God chooses, by a self-determining power, when
he goes about to create bodies.
Therefore lef us put the case thus : Supposing that God,
in the beginning, had created but one perfectly solid sphere,
in a certain place, and it should be enquired. Why God
created fhat individual sphere, in that place, af fhat time ? —
And why he did nof create another sphere perfectly like it, but
numerically different, in the same place, af the same time ? —
Or why he chose to bring into being there, that very body, ra
ther than any of fhe infinite number of other bodies, perfectly
like if ; either of which he could have made there as well,
and would have answered his end as well ? Why he caused
to exist at that place and time, that individual roundness, ra
ther than any other of the infinite number of individual ro
tundities just like it ? Why that individual resistance, rather

240 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. pART IV.
than any other of the infinite number of possible resistances
just like if ? And it riiight as reasonably be asked. Why, when
God first caused if to thunder, he caused that individual sound
then fo be made, and not another just like it ? Why did he make
choice of this very sound, and reject all the infinite number
of other possible sounds just like it, but numerically differing
from it, and aU differing one from another ? I think every
body must be sensible of the absurdity and nonsense of what
is supposed in such enquiries. And; if we calmly attend f o the
matter, we shall be convinced that all such kind of objections
as I ara answering, are founded on nothing but fhe iraperfec-
tion of our raanner of conceiving things, and the obscureness
of language, and great want of clearness and precision in the
signification of terras.
If any should find fault with this reasoning, that if is
going a great length into metaphysical niceties and subtilties ;
I answer, the objection to which they are a reply is a meta
physical subfilty, and must be treated according to the nature
of it.*
II. Another thing alledged is, fhat innumerable things which
are determined by the Divine WiU, and chosen and done by
God rather than others, differ from those that are not chosen
in so inconsiderable a manner, that it would be unreasonable
to suppose the difference to be of any consequence, or that
there is any superior fitness or goodness, that God can have
respect to in the determination.
To which I answer, it is impossible for us fo determine,
with any certainty or evidence, fhat because the difference
is very small, and appears to us of no consideration, therefore
there is absolutely no superior goodness, and no valuable end,
which can be proposed by the Creator and Governor of the
world, in ordering such a difference. The forementioned au
thor mentions many instances. One is, there being one atom
in the whole universe, more or less. But 1 think it would
be unreasonable to suppose fhat God made one atom in vain,
or without any end or motive. He made not one atom but
what was a work of his Almighty Power, as much as fhe whole
globe of the earth, and requires as much of a constant exer
tion of Almighty Power to uphold it ; and was made and is
upheld with understanding and design, as much as if no other
had been made but thaf. And if would be as unreasonable
to suppose, that he made it without any thing really aimed
af in so doing, as much as to suppose, that he made the planet
Jupiter without aim or design.
* " For raen to have recourse to subtihties in raising difficulties, and then
complain, that they should be taken off" by minutely examining these subtilitiea,
i? a strange liind of procedure." Jfature of the Human SoiH, Vol, II, p. 331,

Sect. viii. Necessity of divine Volition, continued. 241
It is possible that the most minute effects of the Creator's
power, the smallest assignable difference between the things
vvhich God has made, may be attended, in the whole series
of events, and the whole compass and extent of their influ
ence, with very great and important consequences. If the
laws of raotion and gravitation, laid down by Sir Isaac New
ton, hold universally, there is not one atom, nor the least assign
able part of an atom, but what has influence every moraent
throughout the whole raaterial universe, fo cause every part to
be otherwise than it would be if it were not for that parti
cular corporeal existence. And however the effect is insen
sible for the present, yet it may, in length of tirae, become great
and important. To illustrate this, let us suppose two bodies moving the
same way, in straight lines, perfectly parallel one fo another ;
but to be diverted from this parallel course, and drawn one
from another, as much as might be by the attraction of an
atom, at the distance of one of the furthest of the fixed stars
from the earth ; these bodies being turned out of the lines of
their parallel raotion, will, by degrees, get further and further
distant, one from fhe other ; and though the distance may be
imperceptible for a long time, yet af length it may become very
great. So the revolution of a planet round the sun being re
tarded or accelerated, and fhe orbit of its revolution made
greater or less, and more or less elliptical, and so its periodical
time longer or shorter, no more than may be by the influence
ofthe least atom, might, in length of time, perform a whole re
volution sooner or later fhan otherwise it would have done ;
Which might raake a vast alteration with regard to millions of
important events. So the influence of fhe least particle may,
for ought we know, have such effect on something in the con
stitution of some human body, as to cause another thought f o
arise in the mind at a certain tirae, than otherwise would have
been ; which, in length of time, (yea, and that not very great
might occasion a vast alteration through the whole world of
mankind. And so innumerable other ways might be mention
ed, wherein the least assignable alteration may possibly be at
tended with great consequences.*
Another argument, which the fore-mentioned author brings
against a necessary determination of the Divine Will by a
superior fitness, is, that such doctrine derogates from the free-
7iess of God's grace and goodness, in choosing the objects of
his favour and bounty, and from the obligation upon men to
thankfulness ior special benefits, (p. 89, &c.) In answer to
this objection, I would observe,
* On this subject see Doddridoe's Works, Vol. iv. p. 391, and the note there
by the Editor.
vox,. It 3-1

242 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. pART rV,
1. That it derogates no more from the goodness of God,
to suppose the exercise of fhe benevolence of his nature fo
be determined by wisdom, than fo suppose if determined by
chance, and thaf his favours are bestowed altogether af ran
dom, his will being determined by nothing but perfect acci
dent, without any end or design vvhatsoever ; which must be
fhe case, as has been demonstrated, if Volition be not de
termined by a prevailing motive. That which is owing to
perfect contingence, wherein neither previous inducement, nor
antecedent choice has any hand, is not owing more to good
ness or benevolence, than that which is owing fo fhe influence
of a wise end.
2. It is acknowledged, that if the motive fhat determines
the wiU of God in fhe choice of the objects of his favours,
be any moral quality in fhe object, recommending that object
to his benevolence above others, his choosing that object is not
so great a manifestation ofthe freeness and sovereignty of his
grace, as if it were otherwise. But there is no necessify for
supposing this, in order fo our supposing that he has some wise
end in view, in determining to bestow his favours on one per
son rather than another. We are fo distinguish between the
inerit of the object of God's favour, or a moral qualification of
the object attracting that favour and recommending lo it, and
the natural fitness of such a determination of the act of God's
goodness, to answer some wise design of his own, some end in
the view of God's omniscience. — If is God's own act, that is
the proper and immediate object of his Volition.
3. I suppose thaf none will deny, but that, in some in
stances, God acts from wise design in determining the parti
cular subjects of his favours : none will say, I presume, fhat
when God distinguishes by his bounty particular societies or
persons, He never, in any instance, exercises any wisdom in
so doing, aiming at some happy consequence. And, if if be
not denied to be so in some instances, then I would enquire,
whether, in these instances, God's goodness is less manifested,
than in those wherein God has no aira or end at all ? And
whether the subjects have less cause of thankfulness ? And
if so, who shall be thankful for the bestowraent of distinguish
ing mercy, with that enhancing circumstance of the distinction
being made without an end 1 How shall it be known when
God is influenced by some wise aim, and when not ? It is very
manifest, with respect fo fhe apostle Paul, that God had wise
ends in choosing him fo be a christian and an apostle, who had
been a persecutor, &c. The apostle himself mentions one end.
(1 Tim. i. 15, 16.) " Christ Jesus came into the world fo save
sinners, of whom I am chief Howbeit, for this cause I obtained
mercy, that in me first, Jesus Christ might shew forth all long-
suffering, for a pattern to them who should hereafter believe on

JsECT. viti. Necessity of divine Volition, continued. 243
him to life everlasting." But yet the apostle never looked on
if as a diminution of the freedora and riches of divine grace in
his election, which he so often and so greatly raagnifies.. This
brings rae to observe,
4. Our supposing such a moral necessity in the acts of
God's will, as has been spoken of, is so far from necessarily
derogating fi-om the riches of God's grace to such as are the
chosen objects of his favour, that, in many instances, this
moral necessity may arise from goodness, and from the great
degree of it, God raay choose this object rather than another,
as having a superior fitness to answer fhe ends, designs and
inclinations of his goodness ; being raore sinful, and so more
miserable and necessitous than others ; the inclinations of infi
nite mercy and benevolence may be more gratified, and fhe
gracious design of God in sending his Son into the world may
be more abundantly answered, in fhe exercises of mercy to
wards such an object, rather than another.
One thing raore I would observe, before I finish what I
have to say on fhe head of fhe Necessity of the acts of God's
will ; and that is, that something much more like a servile
subjection of the Divine Being to fatal Necessity will follow
from Arminian principles, than from the doctrines which they
oppose. For they (at least most of them) suppose, with re
spect to all events that happen in fhe moral world, depending
on fhe Volitions of moral agents, which are fhe most impor
tant events of the universe, to which all others are subordi
nate : I say, they suppose, with respect to these, that God has
a certain foreknowledge of them, antecedent, to any purposes
or decrees of his about them. And if so, they have a fixed
certain futurity, prior to any designs or volitions of his, and
independent on them, and to which his volitions must be
subject, as he would wisely accommodate his affairs to this
fixed futurity of the state of things in the moral world. So
that here, instead of a moral necessity of God's Will, arising
from, or consisting in, the infinite perfection and blessedness
of the Divine Being, we have a fixed unalterable slate of
things, properly distinct from the perfect nature of the Divine
Mind, and the state of the Divine Will and Design, and en
tirely independent on these things, and which they have no
hand in, because they are prior to thera ; and to which God's
Will is truly subject, being obliged to conforra or accommo
date himself to it, in all his purposes and decrees, and in every
thing he does in his disposals and government of the world :
fhe moral world being fhe end of the natural ; so that all is in
vain that is not accommodated to that state of the moral
world, which consists in, or depends upon, the acts and state
of the wiUs of moral agents, which had a fixed futurifion from
eternity. Such a subjection to necessity as this, would truly

'244 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. pART 1\,
argue an inferiority and servitude, that would be unworthy of
the Supreme Being ; and is much more agreeable to the no
tion which many of the heathen had of fate, as above the
gods, than that moral necessity of fitness and wisdom which
has been spoken of; and is truly repugnant to the absolute
sovereignty of God, and inconsistent with the supremacy of
his will ; and really subjects the will of the Most High to the
wiU of his creatures, and brings him into dependence upon

SECT. IX.
Coneerning that Objection against the Doctrine which has been
maintained, that it makes God the Author of Sin.
It is urged by Arminians, that the doctrine of the neces
sity of men's volitions, or their necessary connection with an
tecedent events and circumstances; makes the first cause, and
supreme orderer of all things, the author of sin ; in that he
has so constituted the state and course of things, that sinful
volitions becorae necessary, in consequence of his disposal.
Dr. Whitby, in his Discourse on the Freedora of the Will,*
cites one of the ancients, as on his side, declaring that this
opinion of the necessity of the will " absolves sinners, as do
ing nothing of their own accord which was evil, and would
cast all the blame of all the wickedness committed in fhe
world upon God, and upon his providence, if that were admit
ted by the asserters of this fate ; whether he himself did ne
cessitate them to do fhese things, or ordered matters so that
they should be constrained to do them by some other cause."
And the doctor says, in another place,t " In the nafure of fhe
thing, and in the opinion of philosophers, causa deficiens, in re
bus necessariis, ad causam per se efficientem reducenda est. In
things necessary, the deficient cause must be feduced to the
efficient. And in this case the reason is evident ; because the
not doing what is required, or not avoiding what is forbidden,
being a defect, raust follow from the position of the necessary
cause of that deficiency." — Concerning this, I would observe
the following things.
I. If there be any difficulty in this matter, it is nothing pe
culiar to this scheme ; it is no difficulty or disadvantage wherein
it is distinguished from the scheme of Arminians ; and, there
fore, not reasonably objected by them.
* On the Five Points, p. 3B1. t Hid. p. 486-

Sect. ix. Of the Existence of Sin, ^c. Mii
Dr. Whitby supposes, that if sin necessarily foUows from
God withholdmg assistance, or if that assistance be not given
which is absolutely necessary to the avoiding of evil ; then, in
the nature of the thing, God raust be as properly the author
of fhat evU, as if he were the efficient cause of it. From
whence, according to what he himself says of the devUs and
daraned spirits, God riiust be the proper author of their per
fect unrestrained wickedness : he must be the efficient cause of
the great pride ofthe devils, and of their perfect malignity against
God, Christ, his saints, and all that is good, and of the insatia
ble cruelty of their disposition. For he allows, that God has
so forsaken them, and does so withhold his assistance from them,
that they are incapacitated from doing good, and determined
only fo evU.* Our doctrine, in its consequence, raakes God
the author of raen's sin in this world, no raore, and in no other
sense, fhan his doctrine, in its consequence, makes God the au
thor of the hellish pride and malice of the devils. And doubt
less the latter is as odious an effect as the forraer.
Again, if it wUl follow at all that God is the author of
sin, from what has been supposed of a sure and infaUible con
nection between antecedents and consequents, it w'lll follow
because of this, viz. that for God to be the author or orderer of
those things which he knows beforehand, will infallibly be at
tended wifh such a consequence, is the sarae thing, in effect, as
for him to be the author of that consequence. But if this be
so, this is a difficulty which equally attends the doctrine of Ar
minians themselves ; at least of those of thera who allow God's
certain foreknowledge of all events. For, on fhe supposition
of such a foreknowledge, this is the case with respect fo every
sin that is committed : God knew that if he ordered and
brought to pass such and such events, such sins would infallibly
follow. As for instance, God certainly foreknew, long before
Judas was born, that if he ordered things so, thaf there should
be such a man born, af such a time, and at such a place, and
that his life should be preserved, and that he should, in divine
providence, be led into acquaintance with Jesus ,• and that his
heart should be so influenced by God's Spirit or Providence as
to be inclined fo be a follower of Christ ; and that he should
be one of those twelve, which should be chosen constantly fo
attend him as his family ; and that his health should be pre
served, so that he should go up to Jerusalem at the last passo
ver in Christ's life ; and if should be so ordered, thaf Judas
should see Christ's kind treatment of the woraan which anoint
ed him at Bethany, and have that reproof from Christ which he
had at that time, and see and hear other things which excited
his enmity against his Master, and other circumstances should
* On the Five Pointe, p. 302, 305.

246 FREEDOM OF THE WILL; PaRT IV,
be ordered as they were ordered ; it would most certainly and
infallibly follow, that Judas would betray his Lord, and would
soon after hang himself, and die impenitent, and be sent to hell
for his horrid wickedness.
Therefore, this supposed difficulty ought not tobe brought
as an objection against the scheme which has been maintained,
as disagreeing with the Arminian scheme, seeing it is no diffi-'
culty owing to such a disagreement ; but a difficulty wherein
the Arminians share with us. That must be unreasonably
made an objection against our differing from them, which we
should nof escape or avoid at all. by agreeing with them. — And
therefore I would observe, 
II. They who object, that this doctrine makes God fhe
Author of Sin, ought distinctly fo explain what they mean by
that phrase, The Author of Sin. I know fhe phrase, as it is
commonly used, signifies something very Ul. If hy the Author
of Sin, be meant the Sinner, the Agent, or Actor of Sin, or
the Doer of a wicked thing ; so it would be a reproach and
blasphemy, to suppose God to be the Author of Sin. In this
sense, 1 utterly deny God to be the Author of Sin ; rejecting
such an imputation on the Most High, as what is infinitely to
be abhorred ; and deny any such thing fo be the consequence
of what I have laid down. But if, by the Author of Sin, is
meant the permitter, or not a hinderer of Sin ; and, at fhe
same time, a disposer of the state of events, in such a manner,
for wise, holy, and most excellent ends and. purposes, that
Sin, if it be permitted or not hindered, wiU most certainly
and infallibly follow : I say, if this be all thaf is meant, by
being fhe Author of Sin, I do nof deny thaf God is the Author
of Sin, (though I dislike and reject the phrase, as that which
by use and custom is apt to carry another sense) it is no re
proach for the Most High to be thus the Author of Sin. This
is not f o be the Actor of Sin, but on the contrary, cf holiness.
What God doth herein, is holy ; and a glorious exercise of
the infinite excellency of his nature. And I do nof deny,
that God being thus the Author of Sin, follows from what
I have laid down ; and, I assert, thaf it equally follows from
the doctrine which is maintained by raost of the Arminian di
vines. That it is most certainly so, that God is in such a manner
the Disposer and Orderer of Sin, is evident, if any credit is
to be given fo the Scripture ; as well as because it is impossi
ble, in the nature of things, to be otherwise. In such a
mariner God ordered the obstinacy of Pharaoh, in his refiising
to obey God's Commands fo lef the people go. (Exod. iv. 21.)
" r wiU harden his heart, and he shall not let the people go." —
(Chap. vii. 2 — 5.) " Aaron thy brother shall speak unto Pha
raoh, that he send the children of Israel out of his land. —

Sect. ix. Of the existence of Sin, df-c. 247
And I will harden Pharaoh's heart, and multiply my signs and
my wonders in fhe land of Egypt. But Pharaoh shall not
hearken unto you ; fhat I may lay my hand upon Egypt, by
great judgments, &;c." (Chap. ix. 12.) " And the Lord hard
ened the heart of Pharaoh, and he hearkened not unto them,
as the Lord had spoken unto Moses." (Chap. x. 1, 2.) " And
fhe Lord said unto Moses, Go in unto Pharaoh ; for I have
hardened his heart, and the heart of his serv.infs, that I raight
show these ray signs before hira, and that thou raayst tell it
in the ears of thy son, and thy son's son, what things I have
wrought in Egypt, and my signs which I have done amongst
them, thaf ye may knovv that I am the Lord." (Chap. xiv. 4.)
" And I will harden Pharaoh's heart, that he shall follow after
theiri : and I wiU be honoured upon Pharaoh, and upon all his
Host." (Ver. 8.) " And fhe Lord hardened the heart of Pha
raoh King of Egypt, and he pursued after the children of
Israel." And it is certain, that in such a manner God, for wise
and good ends, ordered that event, Joseph being sold into
Egypt, by his brethren. (Gen. xiv. 5.) " Now, therefore, be
nof grieved, nor angry with yourselves, that ye sold me hither ;
for God did send me before you fo preserve life." (Ver. 7, 8.)
" God did send me before you fo preserve a posterity in the
earth, and fo save your lives by a great deUverance : so that
now it was not you that sent me hither, but God." (Psal. cvii.
17.) " He sent a man before them, even Joseph, who was
sold for a servant." It is certain that thus God ordered the
Sin and Folly of Sihon King of the Amorites, in refusing to
let fhe people of Israel pass by hira peaceably. (Deut. u. 30.)
"But Sihon King of Heshbon would not let us pass by him ;
for fhe Lord thy God hardened his spirit, and made his heart
obstinate, fhat he might deliver him into thine hand." It is
certain that God thus ordered fhe Sin and Folly of the Kings
of Canaan, that they attempted not to make peace with Israel,
but with a stupid boldness and obstinacy, set themselves
violently to oppose them and their God. (Josh. xi. 20.) " For
if was of the Lord, to harden their hearts that they should
corae against Israel in battle, that he might destroy them
utterly, and that they might have no favour ; but thaf he
might destroy them, as the Lord commanded Moses." It is
evident that thus God ordered the treacherous rebellion of
Zedekiah against the King of Babylon. (Jer. Iii. 3.; " For
through the anger of the Ldrd it came to pass in Jerusalem,
and Judah, until he had cast them out frora his presence, that
Zedekiah rebeUed against the King of Babylon. (So 2 Kings
xxiv. 20.) And it is exceeding raanifest, that God thus order
ed fhe rapine and unrighteous ravages of Nebuchadnezzar, in
spoiling and ruining fhe nations round about. (Jer. xxv. 9.)
" Behold, I wiU send and take all the famihes of the north,

348 FREEDOM OP THE WILL. PaRT IV.
saith the Lord, and Nebuchadnezzar my servant, and wUl
bring them against this land, and against all the nations round
about; and will utterly destroy them, and make them an
astonishment, and an hissing, and perpetual desolations." —
(Chap. xhii. 10, 11.) " I vviU send and take Nebuchadnezzar the
king of Babylon, my servant : and I will set his throne upon
these stones thaf I have hid, and he shall spread his royal pavi
lion over ihem. And when he cometh, he shall smite the land
of Egypt, and deliver such as are for death to death, and such
as are for captivity to captivity, and such as are for the sword
to fhe sword." Thus God represents himself as sending for
Nebuchadnezzar, and taking hira and his arraies, arid bringing
him against the nations which were to be destroyed by him,
to thaf very end, that he might utterly destroy them, and
make them desolate ; and as appointing the work that he
should do so particularly, that the very persons were desig
nated that he should kUI with the sword ; and those that should
be killed With famine and pestilence, and those that should be
carried into captivity ; and that in doing all these things he
should act as his servant ; by which less cannot be intended,
than thaf he should serve his purposes and designs. And in
Jer. xxvii. 4 — 6. God declares, how he would cause him thus
to serve his designs, viz. by bringing this to pa«s in his sove
reign disposals, as the great Possessor and Governor of the
Universe thaf disposes all things just as pleases him. " Thus
saith the Lord of Hosts, the God of Israel ; 1 have made the
earth, fhe man and the beast that are upon the ground, by my
great power, and my stretched out arm, and have given it
unto whom it seemed meet unto me ; and now I have given all
these lands into the hands of Nebuchadnezzar my sekv4NT,
and the beasts of the field have I given also to serve him." —
Ahd Nebuchadnezzar is spoken of as doing these things, by
having his arms strengthened by God, and having God's sword
put into his hands, for this end. (Ezek. xxx. 24, 25, 26.) Yea,
God 'speaks of his terribly ravaging and wasting the nations,
and cruelly destroying aU sorts, without distinction of sex or
age, as the weapon in God's hand, and the instrument of his
indignation, which God makes use of to fulfil his own purposes,
and execute his own vengeance. (Jer. li. 20. &:c.) " Thou
art my battle axe, and weapons of war. For with thee I will
break in pieces the nations, and with thee 1 will destroy king
doms, and with thee I will break in pieces the horse and his
rider, and with thee I wUl break in pieces the chariot and his
rider ; with thee also will I break in pieces raan and woman ;
and with thee I will break in pieces old and young ; and with
thee wiU I break in pieces the young raan and fhe maid, &c."
ilis represented, thatthe designs oi Nebuchadnezzar and those
that destroyed Jerusalem, never could have been accomplish-

^ECT. IX. Of the Existence of Sin, <^c. *249
ed, had not God determined them. (Lam. iii. 37.) " Who is
he that saith, and if cometh to pass, and fhe Lord commandeth
it not'?" And yet the king of Babylon thus destroying the
nations, and especially the Jews, is spoken of as his great
wickedness, for which God finally destroyed him. Isa. xiv.
4 — 6, 12. Hab. ii. 5 — 12, and Jer. chap. 1. and li.) It is raost
raanifest that God, to serve his own designs, providentially
ordered Shimei's cursing of David. (2 Sam. xvi. 10, 11.)
" The Lord hath said unto him, curse David. — Let him curse,
for fhe Lord hath bidden him."
It is certain fhat God thus for excellent, holy, gracious
ends, ordered the fact which they coraraitted, who were
concerned in Christ's death ; and that therein they did but
fulfil God's designs; as I trust no Christian wUl deny it
was the design of God, thaf Christ should be crucified, and
that for this end he carae info the world. It is very manifest
by many scriptures, that the whole affair of Christ's crucifixion,
with its circumstances, and the treachery of Judas that
made way for if, was ordered in God's Providence, in pursu
ance of his purpose ; notwithstanding the violence that is used
with those plain scriptures, to obscure and pervert the sense
of thera, (Acts ii. 23.) "Hira being delivered, by the
deterrainate counsel and foreknowledge of God* ye have
taken, and wifh wicked hands have crucified and slain." Luke
xxii. 21, 22t. " But behold the hand of him thaf befrayeth
me, is with me on the table : and truly fhe Son of Man goeth,
as it was determined." (Acts iv. 27, 28.) " For of a truth,
against the holy child Jesus, whom thou hast anointed, both
Herod, and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles, and the people
of Israel were gathered together, for to do whatsoever thy hand
and thy counsel determined before to be done," (Acts iii. 17,
18.) "And now, brethren, 1 wot fhat through ignorance
ye did if, as did also your rulers; but these things, which
Ood before had shewed by the mouth of all his prophets, fhat
Christ should suffer he had so fulfiUed." So that what
these murderers of Christ did, is spoken of as what God
brought to pass or ordered, and that by which he fulfiUed his
own word.
* " Groti-as, as well as Beza, observes, iwgo-yvurii must here signify decree ;
and Eisner has shewn that it has that signification in approved Greek writers.
And it is certain snJorot signifies one given up into the hands of an enemy :" 
Dodd in Loc.
¦f" As this passage is not Uable to the ambiguities which some have apprehend
ed in .Sets ii. 23. and iv. 28, (which yet seem on the whole to be parallel to it, in their
most natural construction) I look upon it as an evident proof, that these things
are, in the language of scripture, said to be determined or decreed (or exactly
bounded and marked out by God, as the word «g'f« most naturally signifies) wHch
he sees in fact will happen, io consequence of ms volitions, without any necessita
ting agency ; as well as those events of which he is properly the author." Dowk
in Loc. VOL. n. 33

•450 S^EEEOM OF THE WILL. . PaRT IV,
Jn Rev. xvii. 17. " The agreeing of fhe kings of fhe earth
|o give their kingdom to the beast ;" though it was a very
wjcked thing in them, is spoken of as " fulfilling God's wiU,"
and what "God had put into their hearts to do." If is mani
fest, that God sometimes permits sin fo be committed, and at
the same time orders things so, that if he permits the fact, it
will come to pass, because on sorae accounts he sees it needful
and of importance fhat it should come to pass. (Matt, xviii.
7.) " if must needs be that offences come ; buf vyoe to that
man by whom the offence cometh. (With 1 Cor. xi, ip.) " For
there must also be heresies among you, thaf fhey which are ap
proved may be raade raanifest araong you."
Thus it is certain and demonstrable, fron} the holy Scripr
fures, as well as the nature of things, and the principles of
Arminians, tha;t God perpiifs sin ; and af fhe same time so
orders things in his P.rovidpnce,"that it certainly and infallibly
wiU come to pass, in consequence ofhis permission. 1 proceed
to observe in the next place,
III. Thaf there is a great difference between God being
concerned thus, by his permission, in an event and act, which
jn the inherent subject and agent of it, is sin, (though the
event wi|l certainly follow on his permission) and his being
concerned in it hy producing if and exerting the act of sin ; or
between his being the orderer of its certain existence by not
hindering it, under certain circumstances, and his being the
proper actor or author of it, by a positive agenpy or efficiency,
And this, notwithstanding what Dr. Whitbv offers ?ibout a say,
ing of philosophers, that causa deficiens, in rebus necessariis, ad
eausam per ^e efficientem reducenda est. As there is a vast dif
ference between the sun being the caiise of the lightsomeness
and vvarrath of the atmosphere, and the brightness of gold and
diamonds, by its presence apd positive influence ; and its ber
ing the occasion of darkness and frost, in the night, by its mo
tion whereby it descends below fhe horizon. The motion of
the sun is the occasion of the latter kind of events ; but it is
nof tbe proper cause, efficient or producer of them ; though
they are necessqirily consequent on that raotion, under such cir-r
cumstances : no more is any action of the Divine Being the
Cause of the evil of men's wills. If the sun were the proper
cause oi cold and darkness, it would be the fountain of these
things, as it is the fountain of light and heat : and then some-<
thing might be argued from the nature of cold and darkness,
to a likeness of nature in the sun ; and if might be justly in
ferred, thaf fhe sun itself is dark and cold, and that his beams
are black and frosty. But from its being the cause no other';
wise than by its dep?irture, no such thing c^n be inferred, but
the contrary ; it may justly be argued, thaf the sun is a bright
gpd het body, if cold and darkness are found to be the conscs

SEct. IX. Of the Existence of ^in, <fc. 251
quence of its withdraWraent ; and the more constantly arid he-
cessarily these effects are connected with, and confined to its
absence, the more strongly does it argue the sun fo be fhe foun
tain of light and heat. So, inasrauch as sin is not the fruit of
any positive agency or influence of fhe Mdsf High, buf on fhe
contrary, arises frora fhe withholding of his action and energy, "
and; under certain circumstances, necessarily follows on fhe
Want of his influence ; this is ho argument fhat he is sinful, or
his operation evil, or has any thing of the nature of evil ; but,
on the contrary, that he, and his agency, are altogether good
and holy, and that he is the fountain of all holiness. If
would be strarige arguing indeed, because men never corarait
sin, but only when God leaves thera to themselves, arid ne
cessarily sin when he does so, and therefore their sin is not
from themselves, but from God ; and so, thaf God must be
a sinful being : as strange as it Would be to argue, because
it is always dark when the sun is gone, and never dafk Wheri
the sun is present, that therefore all darkness is from the stm,
and that his disk and beams must needs be black.
IV. It properly belongs to the supreme a^d absolute gover
nor of the Universe, to order all important everits within his do
minion by his wisdora : but the events in the moral world are_
of the most important kind ; such as the raoral actions of intel
ligent creatures, and their Consequences.
These events wUl be ordered by something. They wilf
either be disposed by wisdom, or they wUl be disposed by
chance ; thaf is, they will be disposed by blind and uridesign-
ing causes, if that were possible, and could be called a dispo
sal. Is it not better that the good and evil which happen iri
God's world should be ordered, regulated, bounded, and de
terrained by the good pleasure of an infinitely wise Being, Who'
perfectly compreherids Within his understanding and constant
view, the universality of things, in afl their ex:tent and dnrationv
and sees aU the influence 6f every event, with respect to every
individual thing and circurastance throughout the grand sys
tera, and the Whole of the eternal series of consequences ; than
to leave these things to fall out by chance, and to be dcfermi-
ried by those causes which have no understanding or aim 1
Doubtless, in fhese iraportant events, there is a better and aL
Worse, as to the time, subject, place, manner, and circftmstances'
of their coming td pass, with' regard to their influence on the-
state and course of things. And if there be, it is cerfairily'
best that they should be determined fo that time, place, &c.
which is best. And therefore it is in its own nature 'fit, that
wisdom, and nof charice, should order these things. So that it
belongs to the Being who is the possessor of infinite wisdom^
and is the creator and owner of the whole system of created
existences, and has the care of all ; I say, it belongs to higi, to

2^ FREEDOM OP THE WILL. PaKT IV-
take care of tWs matter ; and he would not do what is proper
for him, if he should neglect it. And if is so far fi-om being
unholy in him to undertake this affair, that if would rather
have been unholy to neglect if ; as it would have been a ne
glecting what fitly appertains to him ; and so it would have
been a very unfit and unsuitable neglect.
Therefore the sovereignty of God doubtless extends to
this mafter : especiaUy considering, thaf if God should leave
men's vohtions and all moral events to the determination and
disposition of blind unmeaning causes, or they should be left
to happen perfectly without a cause ; this would be no more
consistent with liberty, in any notion of it, and particularly
not in the Arminian notion of it, than if these events were
subject to the disposal of divine providence, and the wUl of
man were determined by circumstances which are ordered and
disposed by Divine Wisdom ; as appears by what has been
akeady observed. But it is evident, that such a providential
disposing, and determining of men's moral actions, though it
infers a moral necessity of thos& actions, yet it does not in the
least infringe the real liberty of mankind ; the only liberty fhat
common sense teaches fo be necessary to moral agency,
whicln as has been demonstrated, is not inconsistent with such
necessity. On the whole it is manifest that God may be, in the man
ner which has been described, the Orderer and Disposer of
that event, which, in the inherent subject and agent, is moral
Evil ; and yet His so doing may be no moral Evil, He may
will the disposal of such an event, and its coming to pass for
good .ends, and his will nof be an immoral or sinfiil will,, but
a perfect, holy will. And he may actually, in his Providence,
so dispose and permit things, that the event may be cer
tainly and infaUibly connected with such disposal and per
mission, and his act therein not be an immoral or unholy, but
a perfectly holy act. Sin may be an evil thing, and yet fhat
there should be such a disposal and permission, as that it
should come to pass, may be a good thing. This is no con
tradiction or inconsistence. Joseph''s brethren selling him into
Egypt,, consider it only as it was acted by them and with re
spect to their views and aims which were evil, was a very bad
tiding ; but it was a good thing, as it vvas an event of God's or
dering, and considered with respect to his views and airas
which^were good, (Gen. 1. 20.) " As for you, ye thought Evil
against nae ; but God meant if unto Good." So the crucifixion
of Christ, if we consider only those things which belong to fhe
event as if proceeded from his murderers, and are comprehend
ed within the compass of the affair considered as their act,
their principles, dispositions, views, and aims ; so it vvas one of
the most heinous things that ever was done i in many respect^

Sect. ix". Of the Existence of Sin, 4-c. 253
thc most horrid of all acts : but consider it, as it was willed
and ordered of God, in the extent of his designs and views, it
was fhe most admirable and glorious of all events ; and God
wUling the event was the most holy volition of God, that ever
was made known fo men ; and God's act in ordering it, was a
divine act, which, above aU others, manifests the moral excel
lency of fhe Divine Being.
The consideration of these things may help us to a suffi
cient answer fo the cavils of Arminians concerning what has
been supposed by many Calvinists, of a distinction between a
secret and revealed Will of God, and their diversify one from
the other ; supposing that the Calvinists herein ascribe incon
sistent WiUs to the Most High : which is without any founda
tion. God's secret and revealed Will, or, in other words, his
disposing and preceptive Will may be diverse, and exercised in
dissimilar acts, fhe one in disapproving and opposing, the other
in willing and determining, without any inconsistence. Be
cause, although these dissimilar exercises of the Divine Will
may, in some respects, relate to the same things, yet, in strict
ness, they have different and contrary objects, the one evil and
the other good. Thus, for instance, the crucifixion of Christ
was a thing contrary to the revealed or preceptive Will of God ;
because, as it was viewed and done by his malignant murder
ers, if was a thing infinitely contrary to the holy nature of God,
and so necessarily contrary to the holy inclination of his heart
revealed in his law. Yet this does not at all hinder but that
the crucifixion of Christ, considered with all those glorious
consequences which were within the view of the Divine Om
niscience, might be indeed, and therefore might appear fo
God to be, a glorious event ; and consequently be agreeable to
his WiU, though this WUl may be S3cret, i. e. not revealed in
God's law. And thus considered, the crucifixion of Christ was
not evU, but good. If fhe secret exercises of God's Will were
of a kind that is dissimilar, and contrary to his revealed Will,
respecting the same, or like objects ; if the objects of both
were good, or both evil ; then, indeed, to ascribe contrary
kinds of volition or inclination to God, respecting these ob
jects, would be fo ascribe an inconsistent Will to God : buf to
ascribe fo Him different and opposite exercises of heart, re
specting different objects, and objects contrary one to another,
is so far from supposing God's Will to be inconsistent with it
self, that if cannot be supposed consistent with itself any other
way. For any Being to have a WiU of choice respecting good,
and, at the same time, a WUl of rejection and refusal respect
ing evil, is to be very consistent : but the contrary, viz. to have
the same WUl towards fhese contrary objects, and to choose
and love both good and evil at the same time, is to be very in
consistent.

254 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. PaRT IV.
There is no inconsistence in supposing that God may
hate a thing as it is in itself, and considered simply as evil,
and yet thaf it may be his Will it should come to pass, consi
dering all consequences. I believe there is no person of good
understanding who will venture to say, he is eertain that it is
impossible it should be best, taking in tlie whole compass and
extent of existence, and all consequences in the endless series
of events, fhat there should be such a thing as moral evil in fhe
world.* And if so, it vviU certainly follow, that an infinitely
wise Being, who always chooses what is best, must choose?
that there should be such a thing. And if so, then such a
choice is not an evil, but a wise and holy choice. And if so,
then fhat providence which is agreeable to such a choice, is a
wise and holy providence. Men do will sin as sin, and so
are the authors and actors of it : they love it as sin, and for
evil ends and purposes. God does not vvill sin as sin, or for
the sake of any thing evil j. though it be his pleasure so tc
* Here are \*orthy to be oliserved some passages of a late noted writer of
oar nation, that nobody who is acquainted with him will suspect to be very favour
able to Calvinism. " It is difficult," says he, " to handle the necessity of evil in" such
a manner as not to stumble on such as are nqt above being alarmed at propositions
which have an uncommon sound. But if philosophers will but reflect csJmly on
the matter, they will find that consistently with the unlimited power of the su
preme cause, it may be said, tliat in the best ordered system emls must have
place." — Tumbidl's Principles of morid Philosophy, (p. 327, 328.) He is ther&
speaking of moral evils, as may be seen.
Again- the sarae author, in his second Vol. entitled Christian PhUosophy, p; SB,
has these words : " If the author and governor of all things be infinitely perfect,-
then whatever is, is right; of all possible systems he hath chosen the best : and,
consequently, there is no absolute evil in the universe. — This being the case, all the
Seeming imperfections or evUs in it are such only in a|7a)-KnJ view ; and witli respect
to the whole system, they are goods.
Ibid. p. 37. " 'Whence then conrus evU ? is the question that hath, in all ages,.
been reckoned the Gordian knot in philosophy. And indeed, if we own the ex.-
iStence of evil in the world in an td)solute sense, we diametrically contradict what
hath been just now proved of God. For if there be any evU in the system, that
is not good with respect to the whole, then is the whole not good, but evil ; or, at
best, very imperfect :' and an author must be as his wm-kmaiiship is ; as is the
efifect, such IS the cause. But the solution of this- difiiculty is at hand ; That
there is no evil in the universe. What ! Are there no pains, no imperfections ?.^
Is there no misery, no vice in the world ? or are not these evils ? EvUs indeed they
are : that is, those of one sort are hurtful, and those of the other sort are equally
Imrtfiil and abominable : but they are not evil or nuschievous witli respect to the
johole. Ibid. p. 42. " But he is, at the same time, said to create evil, darkness, con
fusion ; a'nd Vet to do no evil, but to be the author of good' only. He is called the
" Father of lights," the author of " every perfect and good gift, with whom there
is no variableness nor shadow of turning," who " tempteth no man," but " giveth-
to all raen liberally, and upbraideth not." And yet by the prophet (Isa. xiv. 7.)
he is introduced saying of himself, "I form light and create darkness ; I make
peace, and create evil : I the Lord, do all these things;" What i6 the meaning,
the plain language of all this, but that the Lord' delighteth in goodness, and (as
the scripture speaks), evil is " )iis strange work ?" He intends and pursues the'
universal good of his creation : and the evil which happens is not permitted for its-
own sake, or through any pleasure in evil, but beonuse it is requisite to the grealeif
gopd piWsued."

Sect, ix. Of the Existence of Sin, <^c. 255
order things that, he permitting, sin will come to pass ; for the
sake of the great good that by his disposal shall be the con
sequence. His wiUing to order things so thaf evil should come
to pass for the sake of fhe contrary good, is no argument
that he does not hate evU as evil : and if so, then it is no rea
son why he may not reasonably forbid evU as evU, and punish
it as such. The Arminians themselves must be obliged, whether they
wUl or no, to allow a distinction of God's WiU, amounting to
just the same thing that Calvinists intend by their distinction
of a secret und revealed Will. They must allow a distinction
of those things which God thinks best should be, considering
all circumstances and consequences, and so are agreeable to
his disposing WiU, and those things which he loves, and are
agreeable to his nature, in themselves considered. Who is
there that wUl dare to say that fhe hellish pride, malice and
cruelty of devUs are agreeable to God, and what he likes and
approves ? And yet, I trust, there is no Christian divine but
will allow, that it is agreeable to God's Will so to order and
dispose things concerning them, so to leave thera to them
selves, and give them up to their own wickedness, that this per
fect wickedness should be a necessary consequence. Doctor
Whitby's words plainly suppose and allow it.* These follow
ing things may be laid down as raaxims of plain truth and in
disputable evidence,
1. That God is a perfectly happy Being, in the raost ab
solute and highest sense possible.
2. That it will follow frora hence, thaf God is free from
every thing that is contrary to happiness ; and so, thaf in strict
propriety of speech, there is.no such thing as any pain, grief,
or trouble in God.
3. When any intelligent being is really crossed and disap
pointed, and things are contrary to what he truly desires, he is
the less pleased, or has less pleasure, his pleasure and happiness
are diminished, and he suffers what isdisagreeable to hira, or is
the subject of something that is of a nature contrary to joy
and happiness, even pain and grief t
From this lasl axiom, it follows, that if no distinction is
to be admitted between God's hatred of sin, and his Will with
respect to the event and the existence of sin, as the aU-wise
Determiner of all events, under the view of all consequences
through the whole compass and series of things ; I say, then
* Whitby on the Five Points, Edit. 2. 300, 305, 300.
t Certainly it is not less absurd and unreasonable to talk of God's Will and
Pesires being truly and properly crossed, without his suffering any uneasiness, or
any thing grievous or disagreeable, than it is talk of soraething that may be called
^ revealed Will, which may, in some respect, be different from a, secret purpose^
^yhjch purpose may be fulfilled, when the other is opposed,

256 FREEDOM OP THE WILL. PaRT IV.
if certainly follows, fhat the coming to pass of every individual
act of sin is truly, all things considered, contrary to his Will,
and that his WUl is really crossed in it ; and this in proportion
as He hates it. And as God's hatred of sin is infinite, by rea
son of the infinite contrariety of his Holy Nafure to sin ; so
his Will is infinitely crossed in every act of sin that happens.
Which is as much as to say. He endures that which is infinite
ly disagreeable to hira, by raeans of every act of sin that He
sees coraraitted. And, therefore, as appears by the preceding
positions. He endures truly and really infinite grief or pain
frdm every sin. And so He must be infinitely crossed, and
suffer infinite pain, every day, in millions of millions of in
stances : He raust continually be the subject of an immense
number oireal, and truly infinitely great crosses and vexations.
Which would be to make him infinitely the most miserable of
all Beings. If any objector should say ; all thaf these things amount
to, is, that God may do evil that good may come ; which is just
ly esteemed immoral and sinful in men ; and therefore may be
justly esteemed inconsistent with the moral perfections of God.
I answer, that for God to dispose and permit evil in the man
ner that has been spoken of, is not fo do evil fhat good may
come ; for it is not to do evil at all. — In order to a thing being
morally evil, there must be one of these things belonging to it,
either it must be a thing unfit and unsuitable in its own nature ;
or it must have a bad tendency ; or if must proceed frora an
evil disposition, and be done for an evil end. But neither of
these things can be attributed to God's ordering and permitting
such events as the immoral acts of creatures for good ends.
(1.) It is not unfit in its own nuture,that He should do so. For
it is in its own nature fit, that infinite wisdom, and not blind
chance, should dispose moral good and evil in the world. And
it is_^*, that fhe Being who has infinite wisdom, and is the Maker,
Owner, and Supreme Governor ofthe World, should fake care
of that matter. And, therefore, there is no unfitness, or unsuit
ableness in his doing it. If may be unfit, and so immoral, for
any other beings to go about fo order this affair ; because they
are not possessed of a wisdom that in any manner fits them
for it ; and, in other respects, they are nof fit fo be trusted with-
this affair ; nor does it belong to them, they not being the own
ers and lords of the universe.
We need not be afraid to affirm, fhat if a wise and good
man knew with absolute certainty it would be best, all things
considered, that there should be such a thing as moral evil in
the world, if would nof be contrary to his wisdom and good
ness for him to choose thaf it should be so. If is no evil de
sire to desire good, and to desire that which, all things con
sidered, is best. And jt is no unwise choice to choose that

Sect, ix. Of the Existence of Sin, <^c, Q57
that should be, which it is best should be ; and to choose the
existence of that thing concerning which this is known, viz.
that it is best it should be, and so is known in the whole to be
most worthy to be chosen. On the contrary, it would be a
plain defect in wisdom and goodness, for him nof to choose it.
And the reason why he might nof order it, if he were able,
would not be because he might nof desire if, but only the
ordering of thaf raatter does nof belong fo hira. But it is no
harra for Him who is, by right, and in the greatest propriety,
the Supreme Ordeeer of all things, to order every thing in such
a manner, as if would be a point of wisdora in Hira to choose
that they should be ordered. If it would be a plain defect of
wisdom and goodness in a being, not fo choose that thaf should
be, which He certainly knows it would, all things considered,
be best should be (as was but now observed) then it must be
impossible for a Being who has no defect of wisdom and good
ness, to do otherwise than choose it should be ; and that for
this very reason, because He is perfectly wise and good. And
if it be agreeable f o perfect wisdom and goodness for him t©
choose that it should be, and the ordering of all things su
premely and perfectly belongs to him, it must be agreeable to
infinite wisdom and goodness to order fhat it should be. If
the choice is good, fhe ordering and disposing things according
fo fhat choice must also be good. It can be no harra in one
to whom it belongs " to do his WUl in the arraies of heaven,
and amongst the inhabitants of fhe earth," to execute a good
volition. If this WiU be good, and the object of his Will be,
^11 things considered, good and best, then fhe choosing or wiU
ing it is not willing evil that good may come. And if so, then
his ordering accordingly to that WiU, is not doing evil, that good
may come.
2. It is not of a bad tendency, ior the Supreme Being thus
to order and permit that moral evU to be, which it is best
should come to pass. For thaf it is of good tendency, is fhe
very thing supposed in the point now in question. — Christ's
Crucifixion, though a most horrid fact in them that perpetra
ted it, was of a most glorious tendency as permitted and order
ed of God.
3. Nor is there any need of supposing it proceeii* from any
evil disposition or aim ; ior by the supposition, what is aimed
at is good, and good is the actual issue, in the final result of
things.* * From tbe whole strain of our authoi's defence ofhis principles, in reference
to the existence of sin in the universe, though there are many exceUent remarks
interspersed, and sound reasoning as far as his data would admit, yet he is evi
dently embarrassed ; makes concessions which his general principles of moral
necessity did' not require, and shelters himself under covers that afford him in re-
. ality ne efiectual protection. To say, that the existence of sin is only a commm
dij^xilt-y, which bek>ngs to every hypothesis — ^thst though God is thei taithor of siir,
VOL. H. 33

2p8 FREEDOM OF *HE WILL. PART TV.
SECT. X,
Conceming Sin's first Entrance into the World.
The things which have already been offered, may serve
to obviate or clear many of the objections which might be
in some sense, yethe is not the agent, therefore the phrase should be disliked and
rejected, that though God wills the event of sin, yet he wills it not as an evil, but
for excellent ends — that the events of moral evils are disposed by toisdom— ^that
God may be the orderer and disposer of moral evil, wliich in the agent is infinitely
evil, bnt in the orderer of it no evU at all— that in order to a thing being morally
evil, it must be unfit and -unmitable, or of a bad tendency, or frora an evil disposition';
but that in willing the event of sin neither can be attributed to God — that if a wise
and good man knew, with absolute certainty, that it would be best, all things consi
dered, there should be moral evil, he might choose that it should be so — that the
reason why he might not order it, if he wer« able, would not be because he might
not desire, but only the ordering of that matter does not belong to hira — and that
in the language of Turkbull, " there is no evU in the universe, — no absolute evil ;
sins are evils only in a partial -view, but with respect to the whole systera they are
not evil or mischievous, \mt. goods, &c." to say these things and more of a similar
cast, is not calculated to satisfy a mind that wants the best evidence which tlie
nature of the case will admit ; and we strongly suspect, from his manner of writ
ing, that oor author's own mind was not satisfied with the solution which he has
attempted. In former notes we have had occasion only to explain principles adopted,
or to point out others either more evident or raore radical, on which those of the
author were founded, or with which they stood inseparaUy connected. But at the
close of the present section we feel ourselves obliged to attempt, at least, the ree-
tifijiation of ms principles ; or, perhaps more properly, to point out other principles
vhich we conceive are at-tended with no auch embarrassment, are exposed to no
sel&contradiction, and which represent the great Supremo in a much more amia
ble light, "rtie task is indeed a-rduous; but fet it not be thought impossible, nor
let the imperfection of language be confounded with the inadeqiiacy of principles.
And while we solicit the candour of the reader — wherehy he will be prepared to
makesuchallowanceB as the nature of the subject requires, be prevented firom
drawing hasty conclusions of the impracticability of bringing the subject of enquiry
to a eatisfactoiy issue, or of presumption in atterapting it — we no less demand a
Strictness of examination. The real enquirer after truth, the christian divine, and
the moral philosopher, should be solicitous, not to have the " last word " in con
troversy, but to make all possible advances in ascertaining th&.genuine grounds of
acknowledged truths, in discovering radical principles, and in ascertaining theit
just bearings and tendencies;
1. The true point of enquiry is — not whether they he moral evil, or whether
God be just ? but — how the actual existence of sin, or raoral evil, in Uie universe,
is to be reconoiled with the moral perfections and character of God ? Thereiof e,the
thing wanted is a middle term, or argumentative medium, whra-eby it may-be shewn,
that this proposition is tme, -viz. There is no waJ inconsistence between the existence
ef sin and the moral perfections of God.
2. 'We raay therefore consider the following propositions as first principles :
AXIOMS.
I, TTieredbes exist nt the universe moraPevil.
11. God is infinitely free from injustice, nnholincss, and all imperfections,-.-
H4nce, COROLLAEY.
There is no reat inconsistence between the existence of moral evil and the mo
ral perfections of God.
3.^ Now the quSstion retUms. What is the best evidence that there ia no such
iirS^Jffistency ? TfttJse'wbo are satisfied with these pldin propositions, the axioms

Sect. x. Conceming Sin''s first Entrcuict. tip9
raised concerning sin's first coming into the world ; as though
it would foUow from the doctrine maintained, that God must
and corollary, may have the evidence of faith, that there is no inconsistence be
tween the subject and predicate ofthe laat proposition. They may know so rauch
of God as to be assured that the existence of sin in the world is no impeachment
«f the moral character of the Most High. For such evidence it behoves us to be
thankful. MilUons are now in heaven, who enjoyed no other evidence while on
earth than that of faith. But this is no sufficient reason why those who have op>
portunity should make no fiirther enquiries into the subject. Some, indeed, sup
pose that no rational emdence is in the present state attainable by man. But why
any should so conclude it is difficult to say, except it be, that they wish to raake
their own minds the standard of all others, or their own attainments the ne plus \Mra
of moral philosophy. Such persons are not Ukely to acknowledge or perceive the
real evidence on supposition that it is laid before them, as their minds wiU be
strongly prejudiced against aU reasoning on the subject.
4. One tiling however is incontrovertible, as necessarily connected with the
axioms, that the existence of mural evil, and the spotless and infinitely excellent
moral character of God are perfectly consistent ; and therefore there must be some-
inhere 'good evidence ofit. And anollier thing is equally plain, that the brighter the
evidence we have of the truth ef the proposition wmch asserts the consistency of
the two axioms, the more will be our acquaintance with God's real character, and
the real nature of sin, which all must aUow to be advantageous. To which we
may add ; tlmt increased evidence of such a proposition is far fiom being injurious,
may be further inferted frora this coruodcK'tion, thai the higher any beings arise in
honness eind happiness, the more dear will be that evidence to their view.
5. The terms of the question are so plain, and so generally understood, that
it is scarcely necessary to notice them ; we may however briefly observe, that
moral evil is what stands in direct opposition to the moral character of God ; and
that this latter "inclades unicersal rectitude or holing and ferfect benevolenee.
Therefore, roSTDLATE.
Whatever is perfectly consistent with universal rectitude^ and perfect bene
volence, is consistent with the moral perfectiens of God. The reader n-ill ob
serve that what is asserted of rectitude and benevcHence is di£ferent; the one b
said to be unioersal and the other perfea only. Every attribute of Jehovah is in it-
self bofli perfect and universal ; but not relatively so. Thus his rectitude is
ioth perfect in itself, and universal with respect to its object; but his benevolence
however infinitely perfec^ is restricted as to its objects, both in extent and in de
gree. And this restriction is necessary two ways :
6. First, the objects of benevolence, at least in this world, compose a sys
tem ; and every system, whether notaral or raoral, impUes a suioriitnation and
comporotire superiorits ef parts 5 therefore the very idea of a systematic whole im
pUes a restnetion of benevolence as to extent and degree.
7. SeconiBj, the exercise of benevolence is an exercise of wifl ; and the ex
erdse of wiU unpUes ifitiersiti/ of objects, and a preference of some rather than
others to occupy the more excellent parts of the whole system ; so that perfect
¦universaUty or a strict equaUty of benevolence, without a ^tinguishing prefer^
ence is necessarily excluded by the very nature of benevolence m exercise.
8 Divine benevolenee, therefore, admits of gradations, from the smaUest de
cree conceivable to the utmost extent of the system ; while rectitude admits of
So such degree. Were we to attempt an iUustration of so abstract a subject by
mental im^es, we might say, that reclitode in its exercise towards the creatures,
mav be compared to a plain surface as widely extended as the umverse, of infi-
nitelv perfect poKsh, ind withont a flaw m any part. Hence, m its exercise, it is
¦wimersd as its objects ; and can no more admit of degrees, than a perfect poUsh
¦caa admit of flaws. On the contrary, benevolence may be compared to a cone, in
«n inverted form, the vertex of which is in contact with a pomt of that plane, and
¦which, from the least possible degree, is capable of nsmg^ severe^ nleasure.
in its exercise towards the universe, to such a height, as fliat the base ei it mg^
he, or may not be, of equal extent with the plane below. ^ .
9. S^om iust views of benevolence we may infer, that ite Menase is purdy
ftee,«nd aadwewedby the creature ; being the feat of wiD, choice, aad sove-

*260 PRfcEfidM Of THE WILL. ^\H1 IV.
be the author of the first sin, through his so disposing things,
that it should necessarily follow from his permission, that the
reign pleasure. The absence of it, with respect to creatures, impUes no flaw in
perfect rectitude. Every degree of benevolence, from the least to the greatest,
must be altogether optional. Perfect rectitude, with respect to created beings
and each individual creature, may subsist, without any more benevolence than
what is necessarily included in mere existence.
10. ThisTieing the case, the state of the universe in reference to perfect
Rectitude, and irrespective of benevolence, may be further compared to a balance
in perfect equihbrium. The least weight of benevolence makes it preponderate,
proportionally, in favour of virtue and happiness ;, but without which weight nei
ther coiHd take place.
11. But, according to what has been said in a former note, eveiy created be
ing is the subject of possiwe power; which, with respect to its influence on the
creature, is, in some respect, the opposite of benevolence. In some, not in aU
respects. Benevolenee is an exercise of will, and implies an agent ; but passive
power is a qualifrjf or principle inseparable frora every creature, and from the uni
verse at large. In reference to a former illustration, this mgty- b&eorapi!^ t®-
another cone exactly opposite, the vertex of vihis^, from below, meets that of
the other in the same plane. The,, iateHnediate point, and indeed every point in
the sarae plane, may repissent the perfect rectitude of God towards every indi
vidual ; the inverted cone above, divine benevolence ; the cone below, passive
jjower,"with its base necessarily e^ual to the whole plane, as it respects the created
universe. 12. Hence we may say that the neutral state of any being is placed in the
plane ; his degree of influence from passive power, the predisposing cause of
vice, is represented by a corresponding given part of the cone below ; and his
degree of predisposition to virtue from divine benevolence, is j-epresented by a
corresponding given part of the cone above. Or, to change the comparison, if a
perfectly poised balance be made to represent perfect rectitude, then we may sup
pose weights at each end in all possible proportions, from the smallest to the
greatest. Passive power not being the effect of will, but of the relative nature
of things, and inseparably connected with one end of the balance, it is evident,
that it can be counteracted in its tendency only by the weight of benevolence, or
sovereign pleasure. Therefore, whoever on earth or in heaven, rises to, and is
confirmed m virtue, his attainment must be the effect of mere benevolence. And
whoever on earth or in, hell, falls into, and is confirmed in vice, his deterio
ration must be the effect of passive power, as the predisposing cause of vice,
which nothing in the universe can counteract but sovereign, free, unmerited, be
nevolence. 13. Consequently, all the good and happiness in the universe is the effect of
benevolence, or sovereign pleasure, and exists above the plane of perfect recti
tude ; but all the evil aud misery in the world is the efifect of passive power, in
'Union with free agency, and exists below the plane of rectifnide. The one gene
rates virtue, and raises to happiness and heaven ; the pther generates vice, and
sinks to misery and hell.
14. Every thing in the universe planned, decreed, and effected by Jehovah,
is a structure of benevolence. All He effects is good, and only good. The evU
that exists is not his work. Benevolence has decreed an endless chain of anJece-
rfenJs, including the natural and moral worlds ; and the consequents, peculiar to
them result therefrom with infallible certainty. But other antecedents, in tJiis
world and in hell, are constantly interposed by free agents under the influence of
passive power, whose consequences also foUow with equal infallible certainty.
To the eye of created intelligence these counter positions, and opposite con-
sequents appear blended in an inextricable manner, like the diflerent rays of light
iri the same pencil, different gases in a given space, and diflTerent subtle fluids in
the sarae body. But to the eye of oraniscience they appear perfectly distinct, in
then proper nature, in aU thsir directions and bearings, in all their tendencies and
effects. IS. Instead, therefore, of saying, '• There is uo evil in the universe," we
;ihouId say, " There is much evil in the universe ; there is much on earth, and
more in hell ; but none of God's appointment. It is demonstrable, that passive

Sect. x. Conceming Sin's first Entrance. 261
sinful act should be committed, &c. I need not, therefore,
stand to repeat what has been said already, about such a ne-
power can no more be an object of appointment, than the most direct contradic
tions ; and yet it is equally demonstrable that such a principle is the, inseparable
concomitant of every creature It is of prior consideration to moralagency ; for
whatever is a property of a created nature as such, is of prior consideration to the
agency of that creature. Consequently it is a property neither divinely appointed,
nor yet a moral evil.
16. Liberty, in one sense, bears the same relation to good and evil, as recti
tude does to benevolence and passive power. Liberty in itself is equally a me
dium between good and evil, as rectitude is between benevolence and passive
power ; and the medium is of a nature perfectly distinct from both extremes. To
which we may add, that Liberty united to, or under the influence of sovereign
benevolence, generates virtue ; but Liberty united to, or under the influence of
passive power, generates vice.
17. From the premises it may be seen, that the existence of all evil, and es-
pecieilly moral evU, in the universe, is not inconsistent with the raoral perfections
of God. It is evident also that in no sense whatever, except by a total misapplica
tion of terms, can God be said to be " the author of sin." Nor can it be said that
God " wills the event of sin ;" but the contrary is plain, that he does not will it,
cither in a decretive, a legislative, or any other sense.
18. The great source of confusion into which raany authors have plunged
themselves, is, that they draw too hasty an inference in attempting to make not
hindering an event to be ultiraately the same as wUling it. Upon their data, indeed,
it may be true, while they regard every event alike to be the effect of divine
energy, and even the worst, in order to answer a good end. And this will al
ways be the case, for self-consistency requires it, until we see and acknowledge
a metaphysical negative cause of moral evil, and an eternal nature of things antece
dent to all will, with their infallible eflects, when not counteracted by sovereign
benevolence. 19. Let us now view the subject in the Ught of terms a Utile different. Much
error often arises through the defect of language ; and where there is danger of
misapprehension, it may be of use to change expressions. Hereby a diflicult sub
ject may be taken By different handles, or a reader raay apprehend it by one han
dle, which he could not by another. Let us then substitute the word Equity instead
of Rectitude, and undeserved favour instead of benevolence.
POSTULATE.
Whatever is perfectly consistent vvith equity is also perfectly consistent with
the morai character of God.
20. Whatever is the pure effect of equity and the nature of things, or essential
truth, united, cannot be inconsistent with the moral perfections of God , the ex
istence of moral evil in the universe is the pure effect of these : therefore the
existence of moral evil in the universe cannot be inconsistent with the moral
perfections of God.
21. The onty ground of hesitation here is. How moral evil is the effect of
equity and the nature of ihings .' Liberty itself is a natural good, and therefore
is the fruit of divine favour ; and the mere exercise of liberty must be a-icrlbed to
the same cause. But he who is hypothetically free to good, must be in like man
ner free to evil For this hypothetical freedom either to good or to evil is what
constitutes the morality of his acts of choice. Take away this hypothetical free
dora, and you take away the essence of moral agency It is plain, then, that to
possess this freedom and consequent raoral agency, is not inconsistent wilb the
equity, rectitude, or moral perfections of God. Yet it is demonstrable that free
dom cannot be influenced in its choice, so as to constitute it virtuous or vicious,
holy or sinful, morally right or wrong, good or evil, bu! from two causes radi
cally ; divine favour and passive power. If the agent be under the influence of
divine favour, a happy result, in the same proportion, is secured by the same es
sential truth as renders the choice of the great i am infallibly good ; which no
one will say is inconsistent with the divine perfections. For though favour raises
the agent oiooe' what rigid or pure equity can do, there is no inconsistence between
them, any more than between paying a just debt and bestowing also a free gift

?i6'2 PllKEDOIfl OF THE WILL. I'ART IV.
cessity not proving God to be the Author of Sin, in any ill
sense, or in any such sense as to infringe any liberty of man,
concerned in his moral agency, or capacity of blame, guilt, and
punishment.
in addition. But if the agent be not under the influence of undeserved favour,
the only allernative is,tbat he must necessarily be under the influence of passive
power. And as nothing can possibly secure a happy result but undeserved favour,
or benevolent influence, a negative cause becomes an infallible ground of cer
tainty of an opposite result. Again,
22. When God gii'es to creatures whiit is their due, he deals with thera in
equity ; but when God gives them less grace than Is actually sufficient to secure
from sin, or will in fact do so, he gives thera Iheir due. Were it otherwise, it
would be impossible for any to sin. If to give them so rauch favour or benevo
lent influence as would actuaUy preserve them from sin, vvere their due, it is plain
that the God of equity would give them their due, and preserve them from sin
accordingly. But tbe fact is widely otherwise. They are not all preserved from
sin, though all might be, through the interposition of sovereign favour ; therefore
it is not their due, or equity does not require it.
S3. If it be said. It is owiug to their own fault ; it is very true. But bow
came any creatures to he faulty f God raade angels and men upright ; and he has
always dealt with every creature, however debased by sin, in equity. He has
also given to every creature, capable of sinning, Uberty unconstrained. Ho of
ten influences the disposition by benevolence ; and the goodness of God, by
Srovidential and gracious dispensations, leadeth to repentance But never has
e dealt with any unjustly, or given them less than their due Not a fallen spi
rit, however deeply sunk, can verify such a charge. Assuredly, they have
destroyed themselves : but in God is the only help. A principle of which God is
not the author, as before explained, in union with the abuse of their liberty,
satisfactorily accounts for the fact. Our evil is of ourselves ; but all our good
is from God.
- 24. From what has been said we may safely draw this inference, that the
existence of raoral evil in the universe is not inconsistent with the moral perfec
tions of God. And the proposition ivould be equally tiue had the proportion of
moral evil been greater Ihail it is But some will continue to cavil, il is proba
ble, because every objection is not professedly answered ; and some difficulties, or
divine arcana, will always I'emain. They will still be asking, why benevolence is
not more universal, and thereby raoral evil altogtther prevented ? Why the cone
(to which benevolence has been compared) is not a cylinder, whose base is com
mensurate vvith the plane of creatural existence, and whose top rises ud ir\fini-
tum ? They might as well enquire, Why is not every atom a sun ? Why not
every drop an ocean .' Why not every moment an age ? Why not evei-y worm
an angel ? Why not thc solar system as large as all material systems united I
Why the number of angiels and men not a thousand times greater .' And to com
plete the absurdity of demanding evidence for every thing, as an objection
against demonstrable truth, Why is not any given part on the surface of a cone,
a fcylinder, or a globe, not iu the centre .* To all such inquiries — and if advanced
as objections, impertinent enquiries — it is sufficient to reply, Infinite Wisdom has
planned a universe, in which divine benevolence appears wonderfully conspicu
ous; and even the evils — whether natural or inoral, which are intermixed, and
which in their origin are equally remote from divine causation and from chance
. — ^are overruled, to answer purposes the most benevolent and the most wonder
fully sublime. COROLLARIES.
1. The only possible way of avoiding the raost ruinous consequences — mo
ra! evil and misery — is to direct the will, through the instrumentality of its free
dom, to a state of union to God, submission to his vrill, and an imitation of his
moral perfections, according to his most raetviful appointment.
2. To creatures fallSn below the line of rectitude, and yet the subjects of
hope, prayer to God for grace, undeserved favour, or benevolent influence, is an
exercise the most becoming, a duty the most necessary and iraportant, and apri-
vilege of the first magnitude.— VV.

Sec5. X. Concerning Sin's first ^Entrance. 363
But should it nevertheless be said, that if God, when he
had made man, might so order his circumstances, that from
these, together with his withholding further assistance and Di
vine Influence, his Sin would infallibly follow, why raight nof
God as well have first made man with a fixed prevaUing princi
ple of Sin in his heart ?
I answer, 1. It was meet, if Sin did come into existence
and appear in the world, if should arise from the imperfection
which properly belongs to a creature, as such, and should
appear so to do, that if might appear not fo be from God as
the efficient or fountain. But this could not have been, if raan
had been made at ffrst with Sin in his heart ; nor unless the
abiding principle and habit of Sin were first introduced by an
evil act of the creature. If Sin had not arisen from the im
perfection of fhe creature, it would not have been so visible,
that it did not arise from God as the positive cause and real
source of it. — But if would require roora that cannot be here
allowed, fully to consider all the difficulties which have been
started coneerning the first entrance of Sin info the world.—
And therefore,
3. I would observe, thaf objections against the doctrine
that has been laid down in opposition to the Arminian notion
of liberty, from fhese difficulties, are altogether impertinent ;
because no additional diflSculty is incurred, by adhering to a
scheme in this manner differing from theirs, and none would
be removed or avoided, by agreeing with, and raaintaining
theirs. Nothing that the Arminians say about the contin
gence or self-deterraining power of raan's will, can serve fo
explain, with less difficulty, how the first sinful volition of
mankind could fake place, and man be justly charged with the
blame of if. To say, the will was self-determined, or deter
mined by free choice, in that sinfiil volition — which is to say,
that the first sinful volition was determined by a foregoing sin
ful volition — is no solution of the difficulty. It is an odd way
of solving difficulties, to advance greater, in order to it. To
say, two and two make nine ; or, that a chUd begat his father,
solves no difficulty : no raore does it to say, the first sinful act
of choice was before the first sinful act of choice, and chose
and determined it, and brought it to pass. Nor is it any bet
ter solution to say, the first sinful volition chose, determined,
and produced itself; whieh is to say, it was before it was.
Nor wiU it go any further towards helping us over fhe diffi
culty to say, the first sinful volition arose accidentally, without
any cause at all ; any more than it will solve that difficult
question, How the world could be made out of nothing ? to
say, if came into being out of nothing, without any cause ; as
has been already observed. And if we should allow that the
first evU volition should arise by perfect accident, without

264 FftEECOM O'F THE WILL. ParT IV.
any cause ; it would reUeve no difficulty, about God laying
the blame of it to raan. For how was man to blame for per
fect accident which had no cause, and which, therefore, he
was not the cause of, any more than if it came by some exter
nal cause ? — Such kind of solutions are no better than if some
person, going about to solve sorae of the strange mathemati
cal paradoxes about infinitely great and small quantities — as,
that some infinitely great quantities are infinitely greater fhan
some other infinitely great quantities ; and also that some in
finitely sraall quantities are infinitely less than others, which
yet are infinitely little — should say, that raankind have been
under a mistake, in supposing a greater quantity to exceed a
smaUer; and thaf a hundred, multiplied by fen, makes but a
single unit.*
* On the subject of the origin of moral evil, our author is more concise than
usual. His design, in this very short section, is merely to shew, that the difficul
ties which have been started, concerning the first entrance of sin into the world,
are such as cannot be discussed in «. smaU compass ; and, that the Arminian
cause gains nothing by urging thera. That cause has been sufficiently examined
in several parts of this Enquiry ; but the true and precise origin of moral evil, re
quires further notice. It is indeed of infinitely greater importance to be ac
quainted with that celestial art, and that sacred influence, whereby we may
emerge from the gulf of sin to holiness and heaven, than to be accurately versed
in the science of its origination. And so it is far more iraportant to see objects,
and improve sight, than to be able to demonstrate the theory of vision ; to reco
ver health, and to use it aright, than to have skill to ascertain the cause and the
symptom of disease ; to contribute vigorously in extinguishing a fire that
threatens to destroy our dwelUngs and ourselves, than to know the author of the
calamity ; to participate the effects of varied seasons, than to understand, astro
nomically, the precise reason of those variations. The mariner may navigate
without knowing why his needle points to the north ; and the celestial bodies in
the solar system were as equally regular in their motions before Sir Isaac Newton
had existence, as they have been since he has ascertained those laws and propor
tions according to which they raove. And yet the science of optics is not use
less, the healing art is not to be despised, to discover an incendiary is desirable,
and never is that philosopher, who attempts to ascertain the causes of naturtd
phenomena, held up as blaraeworthy. In like manner, though millions are
delivered from the influence of sin, and raised to the most exalted eminence of
happiness, who never knew, or even sought to know, scientifically, the origina
tion of sin ; this is no good reason that such knowledge is useless, or even un
important. As we do not wish to swell these notes unnecessarily, we beg leave
to refer to what we have said elsewhere on the subject, particularly in notes on
the former part of this Treatise, on Dr. Doddridge's Lectures, and on a Sermon,
concerning " Predestination to Life," second edition, in connection with what
we now add. (See Doddr. Works, vol. iv. p. 333, &c. vol. v. p. 208, &c.
JVotes.) — As the basis of our present demonstration, we begin with proposing a
few axioms. AXIOMS.
1. No eflect can exist without an adequate cause. On tliis truth are founded
all reasonings and all metaphysical evidence.
2. Sin is an eflect and has a cause. On this truth are founded all moral
means and all religious principles.
3. The origin of raoral evil cannot be moral evil ; or, the cause of sin can
not be sin itself. Except we adrait this, the sarae thing raay be and not be, at
the sarae time, and in the same respect — the sarae thing may be sin and no sin —
cause and no cause — or, contrary to the first axiom, a contingent event may be
fhe cJiusB of itself, or may exist without an adequate cause.

SjsoT. XJ. Of God's moral Character. 'iti;")

SECT. XI.
Of a supposed Inconsistence between these Principles and God's
moral Character.
The things which have been already observed, may bc
sufficient to answer most of the objections, and sUence the
4. Thereis no positive cause but what is ultimately from God. If otherwise,
something positive may begin to be without a positive cause ; or, something may
exist without an adequate cause ; "which is the same as an effect to exist ivithout
a cause, contrary to the first axiom.
5. There may be a negative metaphysical cause, where there is no decretive
divine operation to effect it. Were there no negative metaphysical causes, such
ideas as absence, ignorance, folly, weakness, and the like, could have no meta
physical effects, contrary to universal experience. And we must renounce all
ideas of congruity to suppose that such things are the mere effects of divine de
cree and operation.
Having premised these positions as axioms not to be disputed, we proceed
to make a few observations, which, though equally true, may not be equally ob
vious. 6. The origin of raoral evil cannot be one principle. For were it one, it must
be either a positive or negative cause. If positive, it would be ultimately from
God, but this would exclude a moral alternative, the very essence of moral agency,
and consequently be incompatible with the existence of moral evil. But if a ne
gative cause, it must ultimately be referred to the prime negative cause, which
can be no other than passive power, as before explained ; which is nothing in
dependent of positive existence ; and consequently can have no effect but in
umon with positive existence.
7. It remains, then, that the origin of moral evil is a compound of two causes
at least. Yet not more than two ; because, as we shall see, these are sufficient,
and more would be superfluous in order to produce the efl[ect.
8i Now the question remains, Wliat are these compounded principles ? Arc
they two positive causes, two negatives, or one of each ? They cannot be two
positive causes ; for then they might be ultimately reduced to one, the first cause ;
as before proved, gr. 4, 6. Nor can they be two negative ones ; for ultimately
there is but one cause properly negative. Consequently,
9. The first entrance of^sin into the world, or the true and precise origin of moral
evil, may be foimd in two causes united : the one positive and the other negative.
But neither of Which is morally good or morally evil ; if the cause were morally
good, the effect c)()uld not be morally bad ; and if morally evil, it would be con
trary to the third\ axiom, and to common sense. These two causes are, first.
Liberty, a cause nhturaUy good ; secondly, passive power, a cause naturally evil. —
And these two causes are as necessary for the production of moral evil, a.^ two
parents for the production ofa human being according to the laws of nature.
9. Dr. Clarke, whose brief account has been more impUcitly admitted than
any other, says, that raoral evil " arises wholly frora the ABtrsE of Liberty ; which
God gave to his creatures for other purposes, and which it was reasonable and fit to
give them for the perfection and order of the whole creation, only they, contrary
to God's intention and command, have abused what was necessary for the perfec
tion of the whole, to the corruption and depravation of themselves," This extract
from Dr. Clarke (in his Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, p.
113, 5tb edit.) has been advanced by celebrated writers, as "containing all that
can be advanced with certainty" on the subject. But surely those minds must be
easily satisfied who.canbe satisfied with such evidence. Dr. Clarke allows and
proves, that Uberty is a perfection rather than an evil. How came it then to ;>ro-
dute evil? He answers, " This arises wholly from the o5use of liberty." But
what is the cause of this effect called " the abuse of Uberty ?" This in fact' is tho
vot,, II. 34

266 FEEEDOM or THii WILL. PaRT IV.
great exclamations of Arminians against tho Calvinists, from
the supposed inconsistence of Calvinistic principles with the
whole ofthe difiiculty) and yet he leaves it untouched. The free agent /oits in thc
exercise of liberty ; this failure is an effect ; but there is no effect without a cause ;
therefore this failure must have a cause ; and this cause (not the abuse of Uberty)
must bring us to the origtn of moral evil.
10. What Dr. Clarke has lefl untouched mayyetbe ascertained. We think
it has been fairly e.xcluded, by what has been already advanced, from every thing
except Liberty and Passive Power. Therefore, the abuse of liberty can arise onbj
trom its associate. But Aoao can this operate as a cause of the abuse of liberty ?
In order to answer this question, we must recollect what liberty itself is, viz. a
natural power or instrument of the mind, capable of producing moral effects. —
Not a, self-determining power, which would be contrary to the first axiom ; and which
our author has abundantly demonstrated to be full of contradictions, and an ut
ter impossibility. It must then bc determined by motives. But motives, as before
shown (m a former note) are the objects of choice in union with the state of the
mind, as a compound efiect. Now the cau-ie why the real good, suppose the chief
good, which is absolutely unchangeable, is not chosen, and an inferior good ap
pears at the instant of choice preferable, and is in fact preferred, must arise from
that part of the motive which is the state of the mind.
11. Now there aro only two states of the mind conceivable whereby liberty
can be influenced ; tho one a state naturaUy evil ; the other a state moially good.
Were we to say that the state was morally evil at the first entrance of sin, wo
should contradict the third axiom. And were we to say that the cause was only
naturally good, wo should contradict the yirst axiom. Therefore the cause of the
abuse of liberty is a state naturally evil. No other cause can possibly be assigned,
without involving a contradiction. But what is a state naturally evil, and without
any mixture of moral evil ? It can be no other but a state under the influence of
what we caU passive power.
12. Let us view the subject in another light. Perfect liberty, in reference to
virtue and vice, the scale of merit and demerit, and its attendant degrees of hap
piness or misery, is a medium, standing between all extremes — ^between virtue
and vice, merit and deraerit, happiness and misery. If we regard divine rectitude
or equity according to a former simUe, in reference to the moral system, as an
universal plane, Uberty may be said to coincide with it. And being a natural per
fection, or, when exerted, a good which has a positive cause, it is the effect of be
nevolent energy. If the mind be under unmerited, sovereign, benevolent influ
ence, its liberty attaches itself to real good ; then the agent rises on the scale of
excellence, and therefore of happiness. But if the mind be under passive influ
ence, or the infiuence of passive power, (a depraved nature and confirmed vicious
habits being now out of the question) its liberty attaches itself to apparent good,
in opposition to real; then vice is generated, the agent sinks on the scale of dete
rioration, and consequently of misery.
13. It appears, then, that the will, in the exercise of its freedom, when pro
ducing moral effects, is the instrument of the disposition ; and that the character
of the effect bears an infallible and exact proportion to that of the predisposing
cause. Yet the will in the exercise of choice is so free, that all constraint, coac
tion, and irapulse, are entirely excluded frora that wliich constitutes the morality
of the act. Here lies the essence of moral agency ; and the ground of account-
ableness. The agent has a -moral alterative ; if he be differently minded he
may choose otherwise than he actually does. If under benevolent influence he
wiU, in proportion, infaUibly choose aright ; if under equitable, passive influence,
the opporent good will not be the reoZ one, and consequently the choice will be
morally bad. Means, objects perfectly suitable and sufficient, are exhibited to
view ; but these of themselves would never determine the will, otherwise tho
same effect would always follow the same means. Temptations also are pre
sented ; these in like manner of themselves never determine the will, otherwise
temptation and sin would be infalhbly connected. Then the holy Jesus could not
have withstood the numerous and powerful solicitations of the tempter. But
why did he withstand all ? Because objects of temptation did not constitute
the whole of motives ; because objects operate according to the state of tho
nrind ; and becanse in hirn benevolent influence counteracted passive power

Sect. xi. Of God's inoral Character. ^G"*
moral perfections of God, as exercised in his government of
mankind. . The consistence of such a doctrine of necessity as
has been maintained, with the fitness and reasonableness of
Hence, when the prince of this world came, he found nothing in him ; and
hence he rose to the greatest height of glory, having " a name above every
name." 14. There is no end of objections and cavils, however demonstrative the
proof; for such there have been against all the first principles of reUgion — the be
ing of God — a revelation of his will to the human race — the doctrine of a future
state, &c. Sc. Some may say. Why should sin be made to originate in these two
things, liberty and passive power ? We answer, It has been deraonstrated, that
all metaphysical, positive and negative, causation, in reference to raoral evil, is
reducible to these two ; and therefore they might as vfell ask. Why one and one
make two, rather than any other number ?
15. Others may say, Why not proceed from Gorf nfone ? They might as well
ask. Why is not the sun the cause of darkness ? Love, the cause of enmity ?
Wisdora, the cause of folly ? Happiness, the cause of misery ? Order, the cause
of confusion ? But the cjfect, it may be said, is the same. VVe reply, the assig
nation of a cause, whether true or false, does not alter the nature of phenomena.
It would be, indeed, a strange phenomenon, hitherto unknown, and unknowable,
for an hypothesis, however demonstrable, to alter the Tuifure of the things in ques
tion. The effects are the same. Very true. But the question is not about the ef
fects ; the enquiry is about the t-rue cause of those effects, in opposition to false
philosophy. The e^ecJ of raoral evil is misery, or deserved suffering. Now does
it make no difference, in justifying the ways of God to men, whether a rational,
iraraortal being suffer deservedly or undeservedly 1 To suffer for moral evil, is to
suffer deservedly ; but were sin and suffering from God alone, or the effect of con
stituted laws, this could not be the case. To say, that this partial suffering may
be ultiraately counterbalanced by a restoration, is begging the question, that theru
wiU be a restoration. And if there were, what is it better than an apology for
past injustice ? To suffer undeservedly, is to suffer unjustly ; and to punish at all
is an act of injustice, if undeserved, as well as to punish for ever.
16. It may be again asked. What advantage is there in fixing on this origin
of moral evil, rather than another ? We reply by putting another question. Why
should we put up with a false cause assigned for any thing ? Surely, phenoraena
more interesting, more alarming in their nature; and raore awful in their conse
quences, than moral evils, cannot arrest human observation. And it would be
passing strange to suppose, that the ascertaining of their true cause and origin is
not an important part of philosophy, and deserving of the closest investigation.
What can be raore dishonourable to the moral character of Deity, than to make
sin originate in his will alone .' Or, if this be its origin, how preposterous to call
it moral evil, as distinguished from natural ? How cruel and unjust, beyond pre
cedent, to punish it ; and how absurd the idea of threatening punishment for what
was irreversibly appointed.
17. Some may say. Why may we not be satisfied with the idea ofpermissi/m ?
If properly understood, we acknowledge that this goes a considerable way. But
we suspect, few seem acquainted with the fuU implication of the term. Godper-
inits. True ; if by it wo mean he does not hinder. The free agent acts araiss when
he is not hindered. This only shews, that God might hinder if he pleased ; but it
assigns no cause v hy the agent acts amiss. Permilling, or not hindering, implies
a cause distinct from divine causation. And the question returns, what is the
cause of sin taking plate when not hindered ? In vain do we fix on chance, or a
self-determining power ; these explain nothing, and in fact are nothing, as our
author has demonstrated various ways. In vain do we say, sin arises from the
abuse of liberty. For the question recurs, What is the cause of that abuse ? If
this be not explained, nothing is effected. In vain shaU we say. It proceeds from
the cause of causes. For that cause is good only. Frora such a cause only good can
proceed ; and to ascribe sin to this cause is as proper as to say that moral evil is a
good thing, and ought to be rewarded rather than punished. If this be not a rc-
provable mode of calling " pvil good, and good evil," (Isai. v- 20.) we know not
tvhaf is.

:<J68 J'hEEDOM OF THE WILL. pART IV/
God's commands, promises and threatenings, rewards and
punishments, has been particularly considered. The cavils
of our opponents, as though our doctrine of necessity made
God the author of sin, have been answered ; and also theiv
objections against these principles, as inconsistent with God's
sincerity, in his counsels, invitations, and persuasions, has been
already obviated, in what has been observed respecting fhe
consistence of what Calvinists suppose, concerning the secret
and revealed will of God. By that it appears, there is no
repugnance in supposing it may be the secret wUl of God, fhat
his ordination and permission of events should be such, that
it shall be a certain consequence, that a thing never wUl corae
to pass ; which yet itis man's duty to do, and so God's precep
tive will, that he should do ; and this is the same thing as to
say, God may sincerely command and require him to do it.
And if he may be sincere in coramanding him, he may, for
the sarae reason, be sincere in counseUing, inviting and using
persuasions with him to do it. Counsels and invitations are
manifestations of God's preceptive will, or of what God loves,
and what is in itself, and as man's act, agreeable fo his heart ;
and not of his disposing will, and what he chooses as a part of
his own infinite scheme of things. It has been particularly
shewn, Part III. Sect. IV. that such a necessity as has been
maintained, is not inconsistent with the propriety and fitness of
divine commands ; and for the same reason, nof inconsistent
with the sincerity of invitations and counsels, in fhe Corollary
af fhe end of that Section. Yea, it hath been shewn, Part III.
Sect. VII. Corol. 1. that this objection oi Arminians, concerning
fhe sincerity and use of divine exhortations, invitations and
counsels, is demonstrably against themselves.
Notwithstanding, I would further observe, that the diffi
culty of reconciling the sincerity of counsels, invitations and
persuasions with such an antecedent known fixedness of aU
events as has been supposed, is not peculiar to this scheme,
COROLLARIES.
18. Those who renounce the idea of passive power, as before explained, and
its influence on the mind of a free agent, as a negative metaphysical cause ; can
never find the true, philosophical cause of vice and sin, and consequently of de
served suffering. As soon might they ascertain the laws of the planetary motions,
while rejecting the principle of gravitation. If it be asked, Wat is the link of
connection between this principle and the event ? We reply. Essential truth, the
same truth as connects 2-)-2=4, or 2 — 1=1.
19. Those who renounce a sovereign, benevolent, physical, holy influence on
the mind can never find the true, philosophical origin of virtue and hoUness, and
consequently happiness.
20. From the premises we infer, that tlie highest wisdom, the be$t interest,
and the greatest honour of a rational and accountable being, is to employ his li
berty, and all his powers, in the way of absolute submission tothe divine will ; in
supreme affection, fear and love, to the infinite raajesty and self-existent, excel
lence of God ; and inl the way of humble and diligent obedience, according to the
manifestation whiQh God has made of himself. — W.

Sect. xi. Of God's moral Character. 269
as distinguished from that of the generality of Arminians, which
acknowledge the absolute foreknowledge of God : and there
fore, it would be unreasonably brought as an objection against
my differing from them. The main seeming difficulty in the
case is this : that God, in counseUing, inviting and persuading,
malies a shew of aiming at, seeking and using endeavours for
the thing exhorted and persuaded to ; whereas, it is impossi
ble- for any inteUigent being truly to seek, or use endeavours
for a thing, which he af the same time knows, raost perfectly,
will not come f o pass ; and that it is absurd to suppose he makes
the obtaining of a thing his end, in his calls and counsels, which
he, af the sarae tirae, infallibly knows will not be obtained by
these raeans. Now, if God knows this, in the utmost certain
ty and perfection, the way by which he comes by this know
ledge makes no difference. If he knows it is by the necessity
which he sees in things, or by some other means ; it alters nof
the case. But it is in effect aUowed by Arminians themselves,
thaf God's inviting and persuading men to do things, which he,
at the same time, certainly knows will not be done, is no evi
dence of insincerity ; because fhey allow, fhat God has a cer
tain foreknowledge of all sinful actions and omissions. And as
this is implicitly aUowed by most Arminians, so all that pretend
to own the scriptures to be the word of God, raust be constrain
ed to allow it.- —God coraraanded and counselled Pharaoh to
lef his people go, and used arguraents and persuasions fo in
duce him to it ; he laid before him arguments takeiv from his
infinite greatness and almighty power, {Exod. vii. 16.) and
forewarned him of the fatal consequences of his refusal from
time to tirae ; {chap. vin. I, 2, 20, 21. chap. ix. 1, — 5. 13, — 17.
and X. 3, 6.) He coraraanded Moses, and the elders of Israel,
to go and beseech Pharaoh to let the people go ; and at the
same tirae told them, he knew surely that he would not cora
ply with it. (Exod. in. 18, 19.) " And thou shalt corae, thou
and fhe elders of Israel, unto the king of Egypt, and you shall
say unto hira ; the Lord God of fhe Hebrews hath raet with
us ; and now let us go, we beseech thee, three days' journey
into the wilderness, that we raay sacrifice unto the Lord our
God :" and, " I am sure, fhat fhe king of Egypt will not let you
go." So our blessed Saviour, the evening wherein he was be
trayed, knew thaf Peter would shamefully deny hira before
fhe morning : for he declares if to him wifh asseverations, to
shew the certainty of if ; and tells the disciples, thaf all of them
should be offended because of hira that night ; {Matt. xxvi. 31 ,
— 35. John xin. 38. Luke xxii. 31, — 34. John xvi. 32.) And yet
if was their duty to avoid these things ; fhey were very sinful
things, which God had forbidden, and which it was their duty
to watch and pray against ; and fhey were obliged to do so
from the counsels and persuasions Christ used with them, at

270 FREEDOM OP THE V.ILL, PaRTI\.
that very time, so to do; {Matt, sjtvi. 41.) "Watch and
pray, that ye enter not into temptation." So that what
ever difficulty there can be in this raatter, it can be no ob
jection against any principles which have been maintained
in opposition to the principles of Arminians; nor does it any
more concern me fo remove the. difficulty, than it does them, or
indeed all, that call themselves Christians, and acknowledge
the divine authority of the scriptures. — Nevertheless, this mat
ter may ' possibly (God aUowing) be more particularly and
largely considered in some future discourse on the doctrine of
predestination.* But I would here observe, that however the defenders of
that notion of liberty which I have opposed, exclaim against
the doctrine of Calvinists, as tending to bring men into doubts
concerning the moral perfections of God : it is their scheme,
and not the scheme of Calvinists, thaf indeed is justly charge
able with this. For it is one of their most fundamental points,
that a freedom of will consisting in self-determination, without
all necessity, is essential to moral agency. This is the same
thing as to say, that such a determination of the wiU, without
all necessify, must be in all intelhgent beings, in those things,
wherein they are moral agents, or in their moral acts : and from
this it will follow, that God's will is not necessarily determined,
' in any thing he does, as a moral agent, or in any of his acts
that are of a moral nature : So that in ail things wherein he
acts holilf/, justly and truly, he does not act necessarily; or
his will is not necessarily determined to act holily and justly;
because, if it were necessarUy determined, he would not be a
moral agent in thus acting: his will would be attended with
necessity ; which, they say, is mconsisfent with moral agency :
" He can act no otherwise ; he is at no hberty in the affair ;- he
is determined by unavoidable invincible necessity : therefore
such agency is no moral agency ; yea, no agency at all, pro
perly speaking : a necessary agent is no agent : he being pas
sive, and subject fo necessity, what he does is no act of his, but
an effect ofa necessity prior to any act of his." This is agree
able to their manner of arguing. Now then, what is become
of all our proof of the moral perfections of God ? How can
we prove, that God certainly will, in any one instance, do that
which is just and holy; seeing his will is determined in the
matter by no necessity ? We have no other way of proving
that any thing certainly wiU be, but only by fhe necessity of
the event. Where we can see no necessity, but that the thing
may be, or raay not be, there we are unavoidably left at a loss.
* It does notappear that the author did any thing morc towards accomplish
ing this design, than to pen some thoughts, probably with a view to an elaborate
treatise, which are included in his Miscellaneous I^emarks and Observations.
— W^

Sect. xi. Of God's moral Cliaracter. 271
We have no other way properly and truly to demonstrate thc
moral perfections of God, but the way that Mr. Chubb proves
them, (p. 252, 261 — ^263, of his Tracts,) viz. that God must,
necessarily, perfectly know, what is most worthy and valuable
in itself, which, in the nature of things, is best and fittest to be
done. And, as this is most ehgible in itself, he, being omnis
cient, must see it to be so ; and being both omniscient and
self-sufficient, cannot have any temptation to reject it; and
so must necessarily wiU that which is best. And thus, by
this necessity of the determination of God's will to what
is good and best, we demonstrably establish God's moral char
acter. Corol. From what has been observed, it appears, thaf most
of the arguments from scripture which Arminians make use
of to support their scheme, are no other than begging the ques
tion. For in these fhey deterraine in the first place, that with
out such a freedom of will as fhey hold, men cannot be proper
moral agents, nor fhe subjects of command, counsel, persuasion,
invitation, promises, threatenings, expostulations, rewards and
punishments ; and that without such freedom it is to no purpose
for men to take any care, or use any diligence, endeavours or
means, in order to their avoiding sin, or becoming holy, escap
ing punishment, or obtaining happiness : and having supposed
these things, which are grand things in question in the debate,
then they heap up scriptures, containing commands, counsels,
calls, warnings, persuasions, expostulations, promises and threat
enings ; as doubtless they may find enough such ; (the bible
being confessedly full of them, from fhe beginning fo the end)
and then fhey glory, how full fhe scripture is on their side, how
many more texts there are that evidently favour their scheme,
than such as seem to favour the contrary. But let them first
make manifest the things in question, which they suppose and
take for granted, and shew thera to be consistent with thera
selves ; and produce clear evidence of their truth ; and fhey
have gained their point, as all will confess, without bringing one
scripture. For none denies, fhat there are coraraands, counsels,
promises, threatenings, &c, in fhe bible. But unless fhey do
these things, their multiplying such texts of scripture is insigni
ficant and vain.
It raay fiirther be observed, that such scriptures as they
bring, are really against thera, and nof for them. As it has
been demonstrated, thaf it is tneir scheme, and not ours, is in
consistent with the use of motives and persuasives, or any moral
means whatsoever, fo induce men fo the practice of virtue, or
abstaining from wickedness. Their principles, and not ours,
are repugnant to moral agency, and inconsistent with moral
government, with law or precept, wifh the nature of virtue or

272 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. PaRT IV.
vice, reward or punishment, and wifh every thing whatsoever
of a raoral nafure, either on fhe part ofthe moral governor, or
in the state, actions or conduct of the subject.

SECT. XII.
Ofa supposed Tendency of these Principles to Atheism and
Licentiousness.
li any object against what has been maintained, thaf it
tends to Atheism ; I know not on what grounds such an ob
jection can be raised, unless it be, fh-at some Atheists haye
held a doctrine of necessity which fhey suppose to be like this.
Buf if if be so, I am persuaded the Arminians would not look
upon it just that their notion of freedom and contingence
should be charged with a tendency to aU- the errors that ever
any embraced, who have held such opinions. The Stoick
phUosophers, whom the Calvinists are charged with agreeing
wifh, were no Atheists, but the greatest Theists, and nearest
akin to Christians in their opinions concerning fhe unify and
fhe perfections of the Godhead, of all the heathen philoso
phers. And Epicurus, fhat chief father of Atheism, maintain
ed no such doctrine of necessity, but was the greatest main
tainor of contingence.
The doctrine of necessify, which supposes a necessary con
nection of all events, on some antecedent ground and reason
of their existence, is the only mediura we have to prove fhe
being of God. And the contrary doctrine of contingence,
even as maintained by Arminians (which certainly implies or
infers, that events may corae into existence, or begin fo be,
without dependence on any thing foregoing, as their cause,
ground or reason) fakes away all proof of the being of God ;
which proof is summarUy expressed by the apostle, in Rom. i.
20. And this is a tendency fo Atheism with a witness. So that,
indeed, it is the doctrine of Arminians, and not of the Calvin
ists, that is justly charged wifh a tendency fo Atheism ; it being
built on a foundation that is the utter subversion of every de
monstrative argument for the proof of a Deity ; as has been
shewn. Part II. Sect. III.
And whereas it has often been said, that the Calvinistic
doctrine of necessify saps fhe foundations of all religion and
virtue, and fends fo fhe greatest licentiousness of practice :
this objection is built on the pretence, that our doctrine ren
ders vain all means and endeavours, in order fo be virtuous
and religious. Which pretence has been already particularly
considered in the fifth Section of this Part ; where it has been
demonstrated, that this doctrine has no such tendency ; but

Sect. xn. Supposed tendency of Necessity. 273
that such a tendency is truly fo be charged on the contrary
doctrine : inasmuch as the notion of contingence which their
doctrine implies in its certain consequences, overthrows all
connection in every degree, between endeavour and event,
means and end.
And besides, if many other things, which have been ob
served to belong fo fhe Arminian doctrine, or fo be plain con
sequences of it, be considered, there will appear just reason
fo suppose, thaf if is that which raust rather fend fo licentious
ness. Their doctrine excuses all evil inclinations, which men
find to be natural ; because, in such inclinations, fhey are not
self-determined, as such inclinations are not owing fo any
choice or determination of their own wills. Which leads men
wholly to justify themselves in all their wicked actions, so far as
natural inclination has had a hand in determining their wills to
the commission of them. Yea, these notions, which suppose
moral necessity and inabUity to be inconsistent with blame or
moral obligation, wUl directly lead men fo justify the vilest acts
and practices, from the strength of their wicked inclinations
of all sorts ; strong inclinations inducing a moral necessity j
yea, to excuse every degree of evil inclinotlon, ao far as this
has evidently prevailed, and been fhe thing which has deter
mined their wills: because, so far as antecedent inclination de
termined the wiU, so far the wiU was withouf liberty of indif
ference and self-determination. Which, at last, wUl come to
this, that men will justify themselves in all the wickedness they
commit. It has been observed already, thaf this scheme of
things exceedingly diminishes fhe guilt of sin, and the diffe
rence between fhe greatest and smallest offences ;* and if it
be pursued in its real consequences, if leaves room for no sucli
thing as either virtue or vice, blame or praise, in the worW.
tAnd again, how naturally does this notion of fhe sovereign
self-defermiiiing power of the wUl, in all things vurtuous qr vi
cious, and whatsoever deserves either reward or punishnient,
tend to encourage men to put off the work pf religion and vir
tue, and turning from sin to God ; since they have a sovereign
power to determine themselves, just when they please ; or jf not,
they are wholly excusable in going on in sin, because of their
inabUity to do any of her.
If it should be said, that the tendency of this doctrine of
necessity fo licentiousness appears, by fhe iraproveraent many
af this day actually make of if, to justify themselves in their
dissolute courses ; I will nof deny thaf some raen do unrea
sonably abuse this doctrine, as they do many other things
* Part III. Sect. VI.
t Part III. Sect. VI. Ibid. Sect. VII. Part IV. Sect. I. Part III. Sect. III.
Corol. 1. after the first head.
VOL. II. 35

374 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. PaET IV.
which are true and exceUent in their own nature ; but I deny,
thaf this proves fhe doctrine itself has any tendency to hcen-
tiousness./! think the tendency of doctrines, by what now
appears ih the world, and in our nation in particular, may much
more justly be argued from fhe general effect which has been
seen to attend fhe prevailing of the principles of Arminians,
and the contrary principles ; as both have had their turn of
general prevalence in our nation. If it be indeed, as is pre
tended, that Calvinistic doctrines undermine the very founda
tion of all religion and raorality, and enervate and disannul all
rational motives to holy and virtuous practice ; and that the
contrary doctrines give the inducements to virtue and goodness
their proper force, and exhibit religion in a rational light, tend
ing to recoramend it to the reason of mankind, and enforce if
in a manner thatis agreeable to their natural notions of things:
I say, if if be thus, it is remarkable, that virtue and religious
practice should prevail most, when the former doctrines, so in
consistent with it,.prevailed almost universally : and that ever
since fhe latter doctrines, so happily agreeing with it, and of
so proper and excellent a tendency fo promote it, have been
gradually prevEiiling, vice^profaneness, luxury and wickedness
of all sorts, and contempt of all religion, and of every kind of
seriousness and strictness of conversation, should proportiona
bly prevail ; and that these things fhould thus accompany one
another, and rise and prevail one with another, now for a whole
age together 1 If is reraarkable, fhat this happy remedy (dis
covered by the free enquiries, and superior sense and wisdom
of this age) against fhe pernicious effects of Calvinism, so in
consistent with religion, and tending so much to banish all
virtue from the earth, should, on so long a trial, be attended
with no good effect ; buf thaf the consequence should be fhe
reverse of amendraent; that in proportion as fhe reraedy
takes place, and is thoroughly applied, so the disease should
prevail ; and fhe very sarae dismal effect take place, to the
highest degree, which Calvinistic doctrines are supposed to
have so great a tendency to ; even the banishing of religion
and virtue, and the prevailing of unbounded licentiousness of
manners ! If these things are truly so, they are very remarka*
ble, and matter of very curious spnculation,

s ECT. XIII. Supposed tendency of N^sessity. 174

SECT. XIH.
Conceming that Objection against the Reasoning, by which the
Calvinistic doctrine is supposed, that it is metaphysical and
abstruse. It has often been objected against the defenders of Cal
vinistic principles, that in their reasonings they run into nice
scholastic distinctions, and abstruse metaphysical subtUties,
and set these in opposition to common sense. And it is pos
sible, that after the former manner, it may be alledged against
fhe Reasoning by which I have endeavoured to confute the
Arminian scheme of liberty and moral agency, fhat it is very
abstracted and metaphysical. Concerning this, I would observe
the following things :
1. If that be made an objection against the foregoing rea
soning, that it is metaphysical, or may properly be reduced
to the science of metaphysics, it is a very impertinent objec
tion ; whether it be so or no, is not worthy of any dispute or
controversy. If the reasoning be good, it is as frivolous to
enquire what science it is properly reduced fo, as what lan
guage it is delivered in : and for a man to go about fo confute
fhe arguments of his opponent, by telling him, his arguments
are metaphysical, would be as weak as to tell him, his argu
ments could not be substantial, because they were written
in French or Latin. The question is not, whether what ia said
be metaphysics, physics, logic, or mafheraafics, Latin, French,
English, or Mohawk ? But whether the Reasoning be good,
and the arguments truly conclusive ? The foregoing arguments
are no more metaphysical, than those which we use against the
Papists, to disprove their doctrine of transubstantiation ; alledg
ing it is inconsistent with the notion of corporeal identity, that
it should be in ten thousand places af the same tirae. If is by
metaphysical arguments only we are able to prove, that the ra
tional soul is nof corporeal, that lead or sand cannot think ; thaf
thoughts are nof square or round, or do nof weigh a pound.
The arguraents by which we prove fhe being of God, if handled
closely and distinctly, so as to shew their clear and demonstra
tive evidence, must be metaphysically treated. If is by meta
physics only that we can demonstrate, thaf God is not limited
to a place, or is not mutable ; that he is not ignorant, or forget
ful ; that it is impossible for hira to he, or be unjust ; and that
there is one God only, and nof hundreds or thousands. And,
indeed, we have no strict deraonstration of any thing, ex
cepting mathematical truths, but by metaphysics. We caa
have no proof that is properly demonstrative of any one

'i76 PREEDOlit OF THE WILL. PaRT IV.
proposition, relating to the being and nafure of God, his crea
tion of the world, the dependence of all things on him, the
nature of bodies or spirits, the nature of our own souls, or
any of the great truths of morality and natural religion, buf
What is metaphysical. I am willing my arguments should be
brought to the fest of the strictest and justest reason, and
thaf a clear, distinct, and determinate raeaning of the terms
I use, should be insisted on ; but let nof the whole be re
jected, as if all were confuted, by fixing on it the epithet me
taphysical. II. If the reasoning which has been made use of, be in
some sense metaphysical, it will not follow thaf therefore it
must need be abstruse, uninfeUigible, and akin to the jargon
6f the schools. I hurably conceive the foregoing reasoning,
at least to those things which are raost material belonging fo
il< depends on no abstruse definitions, or distinctions, or terms
withouf a meaning, or of very ambiguous and undetermined
signification, or any points of such abstraction and subfilty, as
tends to involve the attentive understanding in clouds and
darkness/There is no high degree of refinement and ab
struse speculation in determining thaf a thing is not before it is,
and so cannot be the cause of itself; or that the first act
of fr6e choice, has not another act of free choice going be
fore that to excite or direct it ; or in determining thaf no
choice is made while the mind remains in a state of absolute
indifference ; that preference and equilibrium never co-exist ;
and thaf therefore no choice is made in a state of liberty, con
sisting in indifference : and thaf so far as fhe will is deter
mined by motives, exhibiting and operating previous to fhe
act of the will, so far it is not determined by fhe act of the
will itself; that nothing can begin to be, which before was not,
without a cause, or sorae antecedent ground or reason, why
it then begins to be ; thaf effects depend on their causes, and
are connected with them ; that virtue is not the worse, nor
sin fhe better, for the strength of inclination, with which it is
practised, and the difficulty which thence arises of doing other
wise ; that when it is already infallibly known that the thing
will be, it is nof contingent whether it wUl ever be or no ; or
that it can be truly said, notwithstanding, that it is not neces
sary it should be, but it either may be, or may not be. And fhe
like might be observed of many other things which belong to
fhe foregoing reasoning.
If any shaU stiU stand to if, that the foregoing reasoning
is nothing but mere metaphysical sophistry : and that if must
be so, that the seeming force of the arguments all depends
en some faUacy, and whUe that is hid in the obscurity, which
always attend* a great degree of metaphysical abstraction and
refinement ; and shaU be ready to say, " Here is indeed some-

Sect. xiu. Concerning the abstruse Reasoning. 277
thing tends to confound the mind, but not to satisfy it : for
who can ever be truly satisfied in it, that men are fitly blamed
or comraended, punished or rewarded for those' volitions
which are not from themselves, and of whose existence fhey'
are not the causes. Men may refine, as much as they please,
and advance the abstract notions, and make out a thousand
seeming contradictions, to puzzle our understandings ; yet
there can be no satisfaction in such doctrine as this : the na
tural sense of the mind of man will always resist it.* I hura
bly conceive, that such an objector, if he has capacity, and
humility, and calmness of spirit sufficient, impartially and
thoroughly to examine himself, will find that he knows not
really what he would be at ; and indeed, his difficulty is no
thing but a raere prejudice, from an inadvertent customary
* A certain noted author of the present age says, the arguments for necessi
ty are nothing but quibbling, or logomachy, using words without a meaning, or begging
the question. — I do not know what kind of necessity any authors to whom he raay
h'dve reference, are advocates for ; or whether they have managed their arguraents
weU or ill. As to the arguments I have made use of, if they are quibbles they may
be shewn to be so : such knots are capable of being untied, and the trick and
cheat may be detected and plainly laid open. If this be fairly done, with respect
to the grounds and reasons 1 have relied upon, I shall have just occasion, for the
future, to be silent, if not to be ashamed of my argumentations. I am willing my
proofs should be thoroughly examined ; and if there be nothing but begging the
question, or mere logomachy, or dispute of words, let it be made raanifest, and
shewn liow the seeming strength of the argument depends on my using words with
out a meaning, or arises from the ambiguity of terms, or my making use of words
in an indeterminate and unsteady manner ; and that the weight of my reasons
rest mainly on such a foundation : and then I shall either be ready to retract what
I have urged, and thank the man that has done the kind part, or shall be justly ex
posed for my obstinacy.
The same author is abundant in appealing, in this affair, from what he calls
logomachy and sophistry, to experience. — A person can experience only what passes
in his own mind. But yet, as we may \t/el\ suppose, that all men have the sarae
human faculties ; so a man may well argue from his own experience to that of
others, in things that shew the nature of these faculties, and the manner of their
operation. But then one has as good a right to alledge his experience as another.
As to my own experience, I find, that in innumerable things I can do as I will ;
that the motions of my body,inmany respects, instantaneously follow the acts of
my will concerning those motions ; and that my will has some command of my
thoughts ; and that the acts of my will are my own, i. e. that they are acts of my
will, the vohtions of my own mind ; or, in other words, that what I will, I will ;
which, I presume, is the sum of what others experience in this aflfair. But as to
finding, by experience, that my will is originally deterrained by itself ; or that, my
wiil first choosing what volition there shall be, the chosen volition accordingly
foUows ; and that this is the first rise of the deterraination of my will in any afiair ;
or that any volition arises in my mind contingently ; I declare, I know nothing in
myself, by experience, of this nature , and nothing that ever I experienced, carries
the least appearance or shadow of any such thing, or gives me any more reason to
suppose or suspect any such thing, than to suppose-that my volitions existed twen
ty years before they existed. It is true, I find myself possessed of rdy volitions
before I can see the effectual power of any cause to produce them, for the power
and efficaoy of the cause is not seen but by the effect, and this, for ought I know,
may make some imagine that volition has no cause, or that it prodoces itself. But
I have no more reason from hence to deterrauie any such thing, than I have to de
termine that I gave myself my own being, or that I came into being accidentally
without a cause, because I first foimd myself possessed of being before I had
fenowtedge of aeause of iny being.

378 FREEDOM OP THE WILL. pART IV,
use of words", in a meaning that is not clearly understood, nor
carefully reflected upon. Let the objector reflect again, if he
has candour and patience enough, and does not scorn to be at
fhe trouble of close attention in the affair. — He would have a
man's volition be from himself. Let it be from himself most
primarily and originally of any way conceivable ; that is, from
his own choice ; how wiU that help the matter as to his being
justly blamed or praised, unless that choice itself be blarae
worthy or praiseworthy f And how is the choice itself (an ill
choice, for instance) blameworthy according to these princi
ples, uuless that be from himself too, in the same manner ;
that is, from his own choice ? But the original and first de-
term nin^. choice in the affair is not from his choice : his choice
is not the cause of it. And if it be from himself some other
way, and not from his choice, surely that will not help fhe
matter. If it be not from himself of choice, then it is not
from himself yo!untariiy : and it' so, he is surely no more to
blame, then if it were not from himself at all. It is vanity to
pretend it is a sufficient answer to this fo say, that it is nothing
but metaphysical refinement and subtUity, and so attended
wifh obscurity and uncertainty.
If it be the natural sense of our minds fhat what is blame
worthy in a man must be from himself, then it doubtless is
also, that it must be from something bad in himself, a bad
choice, or bad disposition. But then our natural sense is, that
this bad choice or disposition is evil in itself, and the man
blaraeworthy for it on its own account, without taking into our
notion of its blaraeworthiness, another bad choice, or disposi
tion going before this, from whence this arises : for that it is
ridiculous absurdity, running us into an immediate contradic
tion, which our natural sense of blameworthiness has nothing
fo do with, and never comes into the mind, nor is supposed
in the judgment we naturally make of the affair. As was
deraonstrated before, natural sense does not place the moral
evU of volitions and dispositions in the cause of them, but the
nature of them. An evU thing being from a man, or from
something antecedent in him_, is not essential to the original
notion we have of blameworthiness : but it is its being the
choice of the heart ; as appears by this, that if a thing be
from us, and not from our choice, it has not the nature of
biaiiie worthiness (iriji desert, according to our natural sense. —
When a thing is from a man, in that sense, that it is from his
will or choice, he is to blame for it, because his wiil is m it :
so far as the will ism it, blame is in it, and no further. Neither
do we go any lurther in our notion of blame to enquire whether
the bad will be prom a bad will : there is no consideration of
fhe original of thaf bad will ; because, according fo our natu
ral apprehension, blame originally consists in it. Therefore a

Sect. xtii. Concerning the abstruse Reasoning. 27U
thing being from a man, is a secondaiy consideration in the
notion of blame or iU desert. Because those things, in our
external actions, are most properly said fo he from us, which
are from our choice ; and no other external actions, but those
that are from us in this sense, have the nature of blame ; and
they indeed, not so properly because they are froin us, as be
cause we are in them, i. e. our wills are in them ; noi so much
because they are frora some property of ours, as because they
are our -properties..
However,' aU those external actions being truly /rom us,
as their cause ; and we being so used, in ordinary speech, and
in the comraon affairs of life, to speak of men's actions and
conduct which we see, and which affect human society, as de
serving ill or well, as worthy of blame or praise ; hence it is
come to pass, that philosophers have incautiously taken all
their measures of good and evil, praise and blame, from the
dictates of comraon sense, above these overt acts of raen ; to
the running of every thing into the most lamentable and dread
ful confusion. And, therefore, 1 observe,
III. It is so far from being true (whatever may be pre
tended) that fhe proof of the doctrine which has been main
tained, depends on certain abstruse, unintelligible, metaphysi
cal terms and notions ; and that the Arminian scheme, without
needing such clouds and darkness for its defence, is supported
by the plain dictates of comraon sense ; that the very reverse
is most certainly true, and that to a great degree. It is fact,
that they, and not we, have confounded things with meta
physical, unintelligible notions and phrases, and have drawn
them from fhe light of plain truth into the gross darkness of
abstruse metaphysical propositions, and words without a
meaning. Their pretended demonstrations depend very much
on such unintelligible, metaphysical phrases, as self-determi
nation and sovereignty of the will ; and the metaphysical sense
they put on such terras as necessity, contingency, action, agency,
Szc. quite diverse frora their raeaning as used in common
speech ; and which, as they use them, arp without any con
sistent meaning, or any manner of distinct consistent ideas ;
as far frora it as any of the abstruse terms and perplexed
phrases of the peripatetic philosophers, or the most unintelli
gible jargon of the schools, or the cant of the wildest fana
tics. Yea, we raay be bold to say, these metaphysical terms,
on which they build so much, are what they use without know
ing what they mean themselves ; they are pure metaphysical
sounds, without any ideas whatsoever in their minds to answer
thera ; inasmuch as it has been demonstrated, that there can
not be any notion in the raind consistent with these expres
sions, as fhey pretend to explain them ; because their ex
planations destroy themselves. No such notions as imply

280 FREESOM or THE WILL. iPART

IV.

self-contradiction, and self-abolition and this a great many
ways, can subsist in the mind ; as there can be no idea of a
whole which is less than any of its parts, or of solid extension
without dimensions, or of an efiect which is before its cause.—
Arminians iraprove these terras, as terms of art, and in their
metaphysical meaning, to advance and establish those things
which are contrary to coraraon sense, in a high degree. Thus,
instead of the plain vulgar notion of liberty, which aU man
kind, in every part of the face of the earth, and in all ages,
have; consisting in opportunity to do as one pleases; they
have introduced a new strange liberty, consisting in indiffe
rence, contingence, and self determination ; by which they
involve themselves and others in great obscurity, and mani
fold gross inconsistence. So, instead of placing virtue and
vice, as comraon sense places thera very much, in fixed bias
and inclination, and greater virtue and vice in stronger and
more established inclination ; these, through their refinings
and abstruse notions, suppose a liberty consisting in indiffe
rence, to be essential to all virtue and vice. So they have
reasoned themselves, not by metaphysical distinctions, but
metaphysical confusion, into many principles about moral
agency, blame, praise, reward, and punishment, which are,
as has been shewn, exceeding contrary to the comraon sense
of raankind ; and perhaps to their own sense, which governs
them in common life.

SECT. XIV.
The Conclusion.
Whether fhe things which have been alledged, are lia
ble to any tolerable answer in the way of calm, intelligible
and strict reasoning, I must leave others to judge : but I am
sensible they are liable to one sort of answer. It is not un
likely thaf some, who value themselves on fhe supposed ra
tional and generous principles of the modern fashionable di
vinity, will have their indignation and disdain raised at the
sight of this discourse, and on perceiving what things are
pretended to be proved in it. And if they think it worthy of
being read, or of so much notice as fo say rauch about if,
they may probably renew fhe usual exclamations, with addi
tional vehemence and contempt, about the fate ofthe heathen,
Hobbes' Necessity, and making men mere machines ; accu-
tnulafing the terrible epithets oi fatal, unfrustrable, inevitable,
irresistible, &:c. and it may be, with addition of horrid and

Sect. xiv. Conclusion. 2j»i
blasphemous ; and perhaps much skill may be used to set forth
things which haye been sajd, in colours which shall be shock
ing to the imaginations, aiid moving to the passions 6f those,
who have either too little papacity or too much confidence of
the opinions they have imbibed, and contempt of the contra
ry, to try the matter by any serious and circumspect exami
nation.* Or difficulties may be stated and insisted on, whieh
do not belong to the controversy ; because, lef them be more
or less real, and hard to be resolved, they are not what are
owing to any thing distinguishing of this scheme from that
of the Arminians, and would not be removed nor diminished
by renouncing the former, and adhering to the latter. Or some
particular things may be picked out which they raay think will
sound harshest in fhe ears of the generality ; and these raay
be glossed and descanted on wifh fart and contemptuous words ;
and from thence, the whole discourse may be treated vS^ith tri
umph and insult.
It is easy to see how fhe decision of most of the points
in controversy between Calvinists and Arminians, depends
on the determination of this grand article concerning the Free
dom of the Will requisite to moral agency ; and that by clear
ing and establishing the Calvinistic doctrine in this point, the
chief arguments are obviated by which Arminian doctrines
in general are supported, and the contrary doctrines demon
stratively confirmed. Hereby it becomes manifest, thaf God's
moral government over mankind, his treating them as moral
agents, making them fhe objects of his commands, counsels,
calls, warnings, expostulations, promises, threatenings, rewards
and punishments, is not inconsistent with a determining dispo
sal of all events, of every kind, throughout the universe, in
his Providence; either by positiye efficiency or permission.
Indeed such an universal determining Providence, infers some
kind of necessity of all events, such a necessity as implies an
infallible previous fixedness of the futurity of fhe event:
but no other necessity of moral events, or volitions of intelli
gent agents, is needful in order to this, than moral necessity ;
* A writer of the present age, whom I'have several times had occasion to
mention, speaks onoe and again of those who hold the doctrine of M'ecessity as
scarcely worthy of the name of philosophers. I do not know whether he has re
spect to any particular notion of necessity that some may have maintained ; aind, if
so, what doctrine of necessity it is thathe means. VlTiether I ara worthy of the
name of a philosopher or not would hea question Uttie to the present purpose.
If any, and ever so many, should deny it, I should not think it worth whde to en
ter into a dispute on that question : though, at the same tirae, I might expect sorae
better answer should be given tothe arguments brought for the truth of the doc
trine I maintain ; and I might further reasonably desire, that it might be consider
ed whether it does not becorae those who are truly worthy of the narae of philoso
phers to be sensible that there is a difference between argument and contempt ; yea,
and a difference between the conteraptibleness of the person that argues and the
inconclusiveUesa of the arguments he offers.
VOL, II. 36

282 IfBEEDOM OF THfi -iriLL. PaRT IV,
which does as much ascertain fhe futurity of fhe event, as any
other necessity. But, as has been demonstrated, such a neces
sity is not at all repugnant fo moral agency, and a reasonable
use of commands, caUs, rewards, punishments, &c. Yea, not
only are objections of this kind against the doctrine of an uni
versal determining Providence, removed by what has been said,
buf the truth of such a doctrine is demonstrated. As if has
been demonstrated, that the futurity of all future events is es
tablished by previous necessity, either natural or moral ; so it
is manifest, that the sovereign Creator and Disposer of fhe
world has ordered this necessify, by ordering his own conduct,
either in designedly acting, or forbearing to act. For, as the
being of the world is from God, so fhe circumstances in which
it had its being at first, both negative and positive, must be
ordered by him, in one of fhese ways ; and all fhe necessary
consequences of fhese circumstances, must be ordered by him.
And God's active and positive interpositions, after the vvorld
Was created, and the consequences of these interpositions ;
also every instance of his forbearing fo interpose, and the
sure consequences of this forbearance, must all be determined
according to his pleasure. And therefore every event, which
is the consequence of any thing whatsoever, or that is connect
ed with any foregoing thing or circurastances, either positive
or negative, as the ground or reason of its existence, must be
ordered of God ; either by a designing efficiency and interpo
sition, or a designed forbearing to operate or interpose. But,
as has been proved, all events whatsoever are necessarily con
nected wifh something foregoing, either positive or negative,
which is the ground of its existence. If follows, therefore, fhat
the whole series of events is thus connected with soraething in
the state of things either positive or negative, which is origi-
nal in fhe series ; i. e. soraething which is connected with no
thing preceding fhat, but God's own imraediate conduct, either
/his acting or forbearing to act. Frora whence it follows, that
as God designedly orders his own conduct, and its connected
consequences, if raust necessarily be, that he designedly orders
all things. The things which have been said, obviate sorae of the
chief objections of Arminians against the Calvinistic doctrine
of the total depravity and corruption of man's nature, whereby
his heart is wholly under fhe power of sin, and he is utterly un
able, withouf fhe interposition of sovereign grace, savingly fo
love God, belieye in Christ, or do any thing that is truly good
and acceptable in God's sight. For the raain objection against
this doctrine, fhat it is inconsistent with the freedora of man's
will, consisting in indifference and self-deterraining power ; be
cause if supposes raan fo be under a necessity of sinning, and
that God requires things of him, in order to his avoiding eter-

Sect. xiv. The Conclusion. ' 283
nal damnation, which he is unable to do ; and thaf this doctrine
is wholly inconsistent with fhe sincerity of counsels, invitations,
&c. Now, this doctrine supposes no other necessity of sinning,
than a moral necessity ; which, as has been shewn, does nof at
all excuse sin ; and supposes no other inability to obey any com
mand, or perform any duty even fhe raost spiritual and exalted,
buf a moral inability, which, as has been proved, does not
excuse persons in fhe non-performance of any good thing, or
make them not to be the proper objects of coraraands, coun
sels and invitations. And, raoreover, it has been shewn, fhat
there is not, and never can be, either in existence, or so much
as in idea, any such freedom of will, consisting in indifference
and self-determination, for fhe sake of which, this doctrine of
original sin is cast out ; and that no such freedom is neces
sary, in order fo fhe nature of sin, and a just desert of punish
ment. The things, which have been observed, do also take off
the main objections of Arminians against the doctrine of
efficacious grace ; and, at the same time, prove the grace of
God in a sinner's conversion (if there be any grace or divine
influence in the affair) to be efficacious, yea, and irresistible
too, if by irresistible is meant, that which is attended wifh a
moral necessity, which it is impossible should ever be vio
lated by any resistance. The main objection of Arminians
against this doctrine is, thaf it is inconsistent wifh their self-
deterraining freedom of will; and that it is repugnant fo the
nature of virtue, that it should be wrought in the heart by fhe
determining efficacy and power of another, instead of its be
ing owing fo a self-moving power ; that, in that case, the good
which is wrought, would not be our virtue, but rather God's
virtue ; because not the person in whom if is wrought is the de
termining author of it, but God fhat wrought if m him. But
the things which are the foundation of fhese objections, have
been considered ; and it has been demonstrated, thaf the liberty
of moral agents does not consist in self-determining power ;,ana
thaf there is no need of any such liberty, in order to fhe nature
of virtue ; nor does it af all hinder but that the state or act of
the will may be the virtue of the subject, though it be not from
self-determination, but the determination of an intrinsic cause ;
even so as fo cause the event to be morally necessary to fhe
subject of it. — And as if has been proved, that nothing in the
state or acts of fhe will of man is contingent ; but that, on fhe
contrary, every event of this kind is necessary, by a moral ne
cessity ; and has also been now demonstrated, that the doctrine
of an universal determining providence, foUows from thaf doc
trine of necessify, which was proved before : and so that God
does decisively in his providence, order all the volitions of mo
ral agents, either by positive infiuence or permission : and it

:iS-i BRBEDOJt OP THE WILL. PaBT 1\. |J ,
being allowed, on all hands, that what God does in the affair
of man's virtuous volitions, whether it be more or less, is by
some positive influence, and not by mere permission, as in the
aftair of a sinful volition : if we put these things together, it will
follow, tliat God's assistance or influence must be determining
and decisive, or must be attended n ith a moral necessity of
the event ; and so that God gives virtue, holiness and conversion
to sinners, by an influence which determines the effect, in such
a manner, thaf flie effect will infallibly follow by a moral neces
sity : which is what Calvinists mean by efficacious and irresis
tible grace.
The things which have been said, do likewise answer thc
chief objections against the doctrine of God's iniircrsal and
absolute decree, and afford infallible proof of this doctrine ;
and of the doctrine of absolute, eternal, personal election in
particular. The raain objections against these doctrines are,
thaf they infer a necessity ofthe volitions of moral agents, and
of fhe future raoral state and acts of men ; and so are nof con
sistent with those eternal rewards and punishments, which are
connected with conversion and irapenitence : nor can be made
to agree with the reasonableness and sincerity of the precepts,
calls, counsels, warnings and expostulations of the word of
God ; or with the various methods and means of grace, which
God uses with sinners to bring them to repentance ; and the
whole of that moral government, which God exercises towards
mankind : and that they infer an inconsistence between the
sem-'-t and revealed will of God ; and make God the author of
sin. But all these things have been obviated in the preced
ing discourse. And the certain truth of fhese doctrines, con
cerning God's eternal purposes, will follow from what was just
now observed concerning God's universal providence ; how it
infallibly follows from what has been proved, that God orders
all events, and the volitions of moral agents amongst others,
by such a decisive disposal, that the events are infallibly con
nected with his disposal. For if God disposes all events, so
that fhe infallible existence of fhe events is decided by his
providence, then, doubtless, he thus orders and decides things
knowingly, and on design. God does not do what he does, nor
order what he orders, accidentally and unawares ; either with
out or beside his intention. And if there be a foregoing de
sign of doing and ordering as he does, this is the same with a
purpose or decree. And as it has been shewn, that nothing is
new to God, in any respect, buf all things are perfectly and
equally in his view from eternity ; hence it will follow, that his
designs or purposes are not things formed anew, founded on
any nevy vievvs or appearances, but are all eternal purposes.
And as it has been now shewn, how the doctrine of determin
ing efficacious grace certainly foUows from things proved in

Sect. xiv. The Conclusion, 285
j.the foregoing discourse; hence will necessarily foUow the
doctrine of particular, eternal, absolute election. For if men
are made true saints no otherwise than as God raakes thera so
and distinguishes thera frora others, by his efficacious power
and influence, that decides and fixes the event ; and God thus
makes some saints, and not otheis, on design or purpose, and
(as has been now observed) no designs of God are new ; it
foUows, that God thus distinguished from others, all that ever
become true saints, by his eternal design or decree. I might
also shew, how God's certain foreknowledge must suppose an
absolute decree, and how such a decree can be proved to a
deraonstration from it: but that this discourse raay not be
lengthened out too much, that raust be oraitted for the pre
sent.* From fhese things if wUl inevitably follow, that however
Christ in some sense may be said to die for all, and to redeem
all visible Christians, yea, the whole world by his death ; yet
there must be something particular in fhe design of his death,
with respect to such as he intended should actually be saved
thereby. As appears by what has been now shown, God has
the actual salvation or redemption of a certain number in bis
proper absolute design, and of a certain number only ; and
therefore such a design only can be prosecuted in any thing
God does, in order to the salvation of men. God pursues a
proper design of the salvation of the elect in giving Christ to
die, and prosecutes such a design with respect to no other,
most strictly speaking ; for it is impossible that God should
prosecute any other design than only such as he has : he cer
tainly does not, in the highest propriety and strictness of
speech, pursue a design that he has not And indeed, such a
particularity and limitation of rederaption will as infallibly fol
low from the doctrine of God's foreknowledge, as frora that of
the decree. For it is impossible, in strictness of speech, thaf
God should prosecute a design, or aim at a thing, which he at
the same time most perfectly knows wUl not be accoraplished,
as thaf he should use endeavours for that which is beside his
decreet * Certain foreknowledge does iraply some necessity. But our author is not
sufficiently guarded, or else not sufficiently expUcit, when he says, that foreknow
ledge must suppose an absolute decree. For certainty or hypothetical necessity,
may arise from the nature of things, and frora negative causes, as well as from a de
cree. If, indeed, .the reraark be liraited to the subject iraraediately preceding it is
an iraportant truth. — W.
t The terms design and endeavours are not sufficiently discriminating. It is
here supposed that it is unworthy of God to use endeavours which are beside his de
cree, or to prosecute a design which he knows wiU not be accomplished. Is it not
a matter of plain fact that he uses endeavoui-s whioh are beside his decree, and
prosecutes a. design -which he knows wiU not be accoraplished, through the whole
system of legislation and government ? Is it not the very design of legislation and
government to prevent crimes as well as to punish them, and to-prortiote obedience

286 FREiTDOM OP THE WfLL. PaRT

l\.

By the things which have been proved, are obviated some
of the main objections against the doctrine of the infallible
and necessary perseverance of saints, and some of the main
foundations of this doctrine are established. The main pre
judices of Arminians against this doctrine seem to be these ;
they suppose such a necessary infallible perseverance to be
repugnant to the freedom of the will ; that if must be owing
to raan's own self deterraining power he first becomes virtuous
and holy : and so, in like manner, it raust be left a thing con
tingent, fo be deterrained by the same freedom of wUl, whether
he will persevere in virtue and holiness ; and that otherwise
his continuing stedfast in faith and obedience would not be
his virtue, or at all praiseworthy and rewardable ; nor could
his perseverance be properly the matter of divine commands,
counsels and promises, nor his apostacy be properly threaten
ed, and men warned against it. Whereas, we find all these
things in scripture : there we find stedfastness and persever
ance in true Christianity, represented as the virtue of the
saints, spoken of as praiseworthy in them, and glorious rewards
proraised to it ; and also find, that God raakes it the subject
of his commands, counsels and promises ; and fhe contrary, of
threatenings and warnings. But fhe foundation of these ob
jections has been reraoved, by shewing thaf raoral necessity
and infallible certainty of events is nof inconsistent with fhese
things ; and that, as to freedora of will lying in the power of
the will to deterraine itself, there neither is any such thing, nor
is there any need of it, in order to virtue, reward, commands,
counsels, &c.
And as the doctrines of efficacious grace and absolute
election do certainly follow from the things proved in the pre- ¦
ceding discourse ; so some of the main foundations of fhe
doctrine of perseverance are thereby established. If fhe
beginning of true faith and holiness, and a man becoming a
true saint at first, does not depend on fhe self-determining
power of the will, but on the determining efficacious grace of
God ; it may well be argued, fhat it is also wifh respect to
men being continued saints, or persevering in faith and holi
ness. The conversion of a sinner being nof owing fo a man's
self-determination, but to God's deterraination, and eternal
election, which is absolute, and depending on the sovereign
will of God, and not on the free will of raan ; as is evident
from what has been said : and it being very evident frora the
and conformity to law ? Legislative design, therefore, is not accomplished in the
coinmission of criraes, otherwise the legislator, as such, could not find fauU for
breach of law. Our Lord used endeavours with the inhabitants of Jerusalem, &c.
beside his decree, yet with perfect propriety. If we keep in mind that the divine
-will subsists under two relations, according to the two-fold state of man, who is
at once a subject of decree and a subject of government, W6 shtJl see the propri
ety of calling it decretive and rectwoi,— W^

Sect., XIV. The Conclusion. 281'
scriptures, that fhe eternal election of saints to faith and holi
ness, is also an election of them to eternal salvation : hence
their appointment fo salvation must also be absolute, and nof
depending on their contingent, self-determining will. Frora all
which it follows, that it is absolutely fixed in God's decree, that
all true saints shaU persevere to actual eternal salvation.
But I raust leave all these things to fhe consideration of the
impartial reader ; and when he has raaturely weighed them, I
would propose it fo his consideration, whether many of the first
reformers, and others thaf succeeded them, whom God in their
day made the chief pillars of his church, and the greatest in
struments of their deliverance frora error and darkness, and of
the support of the cause of piety araong them, have not been
injured, in the contempt with which they have been tieated by
many late writers, for their teaching and raaintaining such doc
trines as are commonly called Calvinistic, Indeed, some of
these new writers,af f he same time that they have represented the
doctrines of these ancient and eminent divines as in fhe highest
degree fidiculous, and contrary ¦ to comraon sense, in an osten
tation of a very generous charity, have allowed thaf they were
honest well-meaning men ; yea, it may be some of them, as
though it were in great condescension and compassion to them,
have allowed, that they did pretty well for the day in which they
lived, and considering the great disadvantages they laboured
under ; when, at fhe sarae time, their manner of speaking has
naturally and plainly suggested to the minds of their readers,
fhat they were persons, who — through the lowness of their ge
nius, and fhe greatness of fhe bigotry with which their minds
were shackled, and their thoughts confined, living in the gloomy
caves of superstition — fondly erabraced, and demurely and zea
lously taught the most absurd, silly, and monstrous opinions,
worthy of the greatest contempt of gentlemen possessed of
that noble and generous freedom of thought, which happily
prevails in this age of light and enquiry. When, indeed, such
is the case that we might, if so disposed, speak as big words as
they, and on far better grounds. And really all the Arminians
on earth raight be challeng-d without arrogance or vanity, fo
make fhese principles of theirs, wherein they mainly differ from
their fathers, whora they so rauch despise, consistent with com
mon sense ; yea, and perhaps to produce any doctrine ever em
braced by the blindest bigot of the church of Rome, or the
most ignorant Mussulman, or extravagant enthusiast, thaf
might be reduced to more demonstrable inconsistencies, and
repugnancies fo coraraon sense, and to theraselves ; though
their inconsistencies indeed raay not lie so deep, or be so artfully
veUed by a deceitful ambiguity of words, and an indeterminate
signification of phrases. I will not deny, that these gentle
men, many of them, are men of great abilities, and have

SBd FREEDOM OP THE WILL. PaRT IV.
been helped fo higher attainments in philosophy, than those
ancient divines, and have done great service to the Church of,
God in some respects : buf I hurably conceive, that their differ
ing from their fathers, with such magisterial assurance, in these
points in divinity, must be owing to some other cause fhan su
perior wisdom.
It raay also be worthy of consideration, whether the great
alteration which has beeft made in the state of things in our na
tion, and some other parts of the Protestant world, in this and
the past age, by exploding so generally Calvinistic doctrines — an
alteration so often spoken of as worthy to be greatly rejoiced
in by the friends of truth, learning, and virtue, as an instance of
the great increase of light in the Christian Church — be indeed
a happy change, owing fo any such cause as an increase of true
knowledge and understanding in the things of religion ; or
whether there is not reason fo fear, thaf if may be owing fo some
worse cause.
And I desire it may be considered, whether fhe boldness
of sorae writers raay not deserve to be reflected on, who have
not scrupled to say, that if these and those things are true
(which yet appear to be fhe deraonstrable dictates of reason,
as well as fhe certain dictates of the mouth of fhe Most High).
then God is unjust, and cruel, and guilty of manifest deceit
and double deahng, and the like. Yea, sorae have gone so
far as confidently to assert, that if any book which pretends
to be Scripture, teaches such doctrines, that alone is sufficient
warrant for mankind fo reject it, as what cannot be the word of
God. Some, who have not gone so far, have said, thaf if the
Scripture seems to teach any such doctrines, so contrary to
reason, we are obliged to find out some other interpretation
of those texts, where such doctrines seem to be exhibited.
Others express themselves yet more modestly ; they express
a fenderiiess and rehgious fear, lest they should receive and
teach any thing that should seem to reflect on God's moral
character, or be a disparagement to his methods of administra
tion, in his moral government ;. and therefore express them
selve as nof daring to embrace some doctrines, though they
seera to be delivered in Scripture, according to fhe more
obvious and natural construction of the words. Buf indeed it
would shew a truer modesty and humility, if they would more
entirely rely on God's wisdom and discernment, who knows
infinitely better than we what is agreeable to bis owh perfec
tions, and never intended to leave these matters to the decision
of the wisdora and discernraent of raen ; but by his own unerr
ing instruction, to determine for us what the truth is ; knowing
how little our judgment is to be depended on, and how ex
tremely prone vain and blind men are to err in such matters.

Sect. xiv. The Conclusion. 289
The truth of the case is, that if the Scripture plainly
taught fhe opposite doctrines to those that are so much stum
bled- at, viz. fhe Arminian doctrine of free will, and others de
pending thereon, it would be the greatest of all difficulties
that attend the Scriptures, incomparably greater than its con
taining any, even fhe most mysterious of those doctrines of the
first reformers, which our late freethinkers have so superciliously
exploded. Indeed, it is a glorious argument of the divinity of
fhe holy Scriptures, that fhey teach such doctrines, which in one
age and another, through the blindness of men's minds, and
strong prejudices of their hearts are rejected, as most absurd and
unreasonable, by the wise and great raen of the world ; which
yet, when they are most carefuUy and strictly examined, appear
to be exactly agreeable to the most demonstrable, certain, and
natural dictates of reason. By such things it appears, that
" fhe foolishness of God is wiser than men." (I . Cor. i. 19, 20.)
" For if is written, I wUl destroy the wisdom of the wise ; I will
bring fo nothing the understanding of fhe prudent. Where is
the wise ! Where is the scribe ! Where is fhe dispufer of this
world I Hath not God raade foolish the wisdom of this world ?
And as if was in time past, so probably it will be in time to come,
as it is also written, (ver; 27 — 29.) " But God hath chosen fhe
foolish things of the world, fo confound fhe wise : and God
hath chosen fhe weak things of the world, to confound fhe
things that are mighty: and base things of the world, and
things which are despised, hath God chosen : yea, and things
which are nof, fo bring to nought things fhat are ; that no flesh
should glory in his presence," Amen.

VOL. n.

37

290 FREEDOM OP THE WILL. pART IV.
APPENDIX. SECT. XV.
Containing Remarks on " Essays on the Principles of Morali
ty and Natural Religion," in a letter to a Minister of th c
Church of Scotland.*
REV. SIR,
The intimations you have given me of the use which has
by some been made of what I have written on the Freedom
of the Will, &c. to vindicate what is said on the subject of lib
erty and necessity, by fhe Author of " Essays on the Principles
of Morality and Natural Religion," has occasioned my read
ing this Author's Essay on that subject with particular care and
attention. And I think it must be evident to every one, that
has read both his Essay and ray Enquiry,. that our scheraes are
exceedingly different from each other. The wide difference
appears particularly in the following things.
This author supposes, thaf such a necessify fakes place
with respect to all men's actions as is inconsistent with liberty ,t
and plainly denies fhat men have any liberty in acting. Thus
(p. 168.) after he had been speaking of the necessity of our
determinations, as connected with motives, he concludes with
saying, "In short, if motives are not under our power or direc
tion, which is confessedly fhe fact, we can af bottom have no
LIBERTY." Whereas, I have abundantly expressed it as my
mind, fhat man, in his moral actions, has true liberty ; and fhat
the moral necessify which universally takes place, is nof in the
least inconsistent with any thing that is properly called liberty,
and with the utmost liberty fhat can be desired, or thaf can
possibly exist or be conceived of
I find thaf sorae are apt to think, that in fhat kind of mo
ral necessity of men's volitions, which I suppose to be univer
sal, af least some degree of liberty is denied ; that though it be
true I allow a sort of liberty, yet those who maintain a self-de •
termining power in the will, and a liberty of contingence and
indifference, hold an higher sort of freedom than I do : but I
think this is certainly a grea t mistake.
*The ' Essays" to which this Appendix relates, were the production of
liord Kames.
tP. 160, 161, 164, 165, and many other places.

Sest. XV. Append I.'.. 291
Liberty, as I have explained it, is the power, opportunity,
fyr advantage that any one has to do as he pleases, or conducting
Mmself IN ANY respect according to his pleasure; without
considering how his pleasure comes to be as it is. It is
demonstrable, and I think has been demonstrated, that no
necessity of men's volitions that I maintain is inconsistent
with this liberty : and 1 think it is impossible for any one fo
rise higher in his conceptions of liberty than this : If any
imagine they desire, and that they conceive of a higher and
greater liberty than this, they are deceived, and delude them
selves with confused ambiguous words instead of ideas. If any
one should here say, " Yes, I conceive of a freedom above and
beyond the liberty a man has of conducting himself in any re
spect as he pleases, viz. a liberty of choosing as he pleases."
Such an one if he reflected, would either blush or laugh at his
own proposal. For is not choosing as he pleases, conducting
himself in some respect according to his pleasure, and
still without determining how he CEime by thaf pleasure ? If
he says, " Yes 1 came by that pleasure by my own choice."
If he be a man of common sense, by this time he wUl see his
own absurdity : for he must needs see that his notion or con
ception even of this hberty, does not contain any judgment
or conception how he comes by thaf choice, which first de
termines his pleasure, or which originally fixed his own will
respecting the affair. Or if any shall say, " That a man ex
ercises liberty in this, even in determining his own choice,
but not as he pleases, or not in consequence of any choice,
preference, or inclination of his ovvn, but by a determination
arising contingently ouf of a state of absolute indifference ;"
this is not rising higher in his conception of liberty : as such
a determination of the wiU would not be a voluntary determi
nation of it. Surely he tliat places liberty in a power of doing
^something not according to his own choice, or from his choice,
has nof a higher notion of it than he thaf places it in doing
as he pleases, or acting from his own election. If there were
a power in the mind to determine itself, but not by its choice
or according fo its pleasure, what advantage, would it give ?
and what liberty worth contending for would be exercised
in it ? Therefore no Arminian, Pelagian, or Epicurean, can
rise higher in his conceptions of liberty, than the notion of it
which I have explained ; which notion is perfectly consistent
with the whole of that necessity of men's actions which I
suppose takes place. And I scruple not to say, if is beyond
all their wits to invent a higher notion, or form a higher im-
ag:ination of liberty ; let them talk of sovereignty of the will,
self-determining power, self-motion, self-direction, arbitrary
decision, liberty, ad utrumvis, power of choosing diffferently in
given cases. 4<". as long as they will. It is apparent that these

292 PEEEBOM OP THE WILL. PaRT IV.
men in their strenuous dispute about these things, aim at fhey
know nof what, fighting for soraething they have no concep
tion of, substituting a number of confused unmeaning words,
rasfead of things and instead of thoughts. They may be chal
lenged clearly fo explain what they would have ; but they never
can answer the challenge.
The author of the Essays, through his whole Essay on
Liberty and Necessity, goes on the supposition, that in order
fo fhe being of real liberty, a man must have a freedom that
is opposed to moral necessity: and yet he supposes, (p. 175,)
that " such a liberty must signify a power in the mind of acting
without and against motives, a power of acting without any
view, purpose or design, and even of acting in contradiction to
our own desires and aversions, and to all our principles of ac
tions ; and is an absurdity altogether inconsistent with a ratiorial
nature." Now who ever iraagined such a liberty as this, a
higher sort or .degree of freedom fhan a liberty of following
one's own views and purposes, and acting agreeably to his own
inclinations and passions ? Who wiU ever reasonably suppose,
that a liberty which is an absurdity altogether inconsistent with
a rational nafure, is above that which is consistent with fhe
nature of a rational, inteUigent, designing agent ?
The Author of the Essays seem to suppose such a ne
cessity fo take place, as is inconsistent with some supposable
Power of Arbitrary Choice,* or that there is sorae liberty
conceivable, whereby men's own actions might be more pro
perly IN THEIR PowER,t and by which events might be more
dependent on ourselves :% contrary to what I suppose to be
evident- in my Inquiry. What way can be imagined of our
actions being more in our power from ourselves, or dependent
on ourselves, than their being froni our power to fulfil our own
choice, to act from our own inclination, pursue our own views,
and execute our own designs ? Certainly to be able to act thus,
is as properly having our actions in our power and dependent
on ourselves, as a being liable to be the subject of acts and
events contingently and fortuitously, without desire, view, pur
pose or design, or any principle of action within ourselves ; as
we must be, accordihg to this Author's own declared sense,
if our actions are performed with that liberty thaf is opposed to
raoral necessity.
This author seems every where fo suppose, that neces
sify, most properly so called, attends all men's actions ; and
that the terms necessary, unavoidable,impossible, &c. are equal
ly applicable to the case of moral and natural necessity. In
p. 173, he says. The idea of necessary and unavoidable equally
agrees, both to moral and physical necessity. And in p. 184,
* P. 169. t P. 191, 195, 197, 206. J P. WS.

Sect. xv. Appendix. 393
All things that fall out in the natural and moral world are alike
necessary. P. 174, This inclination and choice is unavoidable,
caused or occasioned by the prevailing motive. In this lies the
necessity of our actions, that in such circumstances it was impos
sible we could act othenvise. He often expresses himself in like
Jnanner elsewhere, speaking in strong terms of men's actions
as unavoidable, what they cannot forbear, having no power
over their own actions, the order of them being unalterably
fixed and inseparably linked together, &c.*
On fhe contrary, I have largely declared, that the connec
tion between antecedent things and consequent ones which
takes place with regard to the acts of men's wiUs, which is
called moral necessity, is called by the name of Necessity im
properly ; and that all such terms as must, cannot, impossible,
unable, irresistible, unavoidable, invincible, &c. when applied
here, are not applied in their proper signification, and are
either used nonsensically and with perfect insignificance, or in
a sense quite diverse from their original and proper meaning
and their use in coraraon speech : and that such a necessity as
attends the acts of raen's wUl is more properly called certainty
than necessity ; if being no other than the certain connection
between the subject and predicate of the proposition which
affirms their existence.
Agreeably to what is observed in my Inquiry, I think it is
evidently owing to a strong prejudice, arising from an insen
sible- habitual perversion and misapplication of such like terms
as necessary, impossible, unable, uriavoidable, invincible, &c.
that they are ready to think, that to suppose a certain .connec
tion of raen's volitions without any foregoing motives or incli
nations, or any preceding moral influence whatsoever, is truly
and properly to suppose a strong irrefragable chain of causes"
and effects, as stands in the way of, and makes utterly vain,
opposite desires and endeavours, like immovable and imjiene-
trable mountains of brass; andirapedes our liberty hke waUs of
adamant, gates of brass, and bars of iron : whereas, all such
representations suggest ideas as far from the truth as the east
is from the west. Nothing thaf I maintain, supposes fhat men
are af all hindered by any fatal necessity, from doing, and even
wUling and choosing as they please, with full freedom ; yea,
with the highest degree of liberty that ever was thought of, or
thaf ever could possibly enfer info the heart of any man to con
ceive. I know it is in vain to endeavour to make sorae persons
beheve this, or af least fully and steadily to believe it : for if
it be deraonstrated to them, still the old prejudice remains,
which has been long fixed by fhe use of the terms necessary,
must, cannot, impossible, &c. the association with these terms of
* P. 180, 188, 193, 194, 195, 197, 198, 199, 205, 2Q6.

'294 FREEDOM OP THE WILL. PaRT IV.
certain ideas inconsistent with liberty, is nof broken ; and the
judgment is powerfully warped by it ; as a thing that has been
long bent and grown stiff, if if be straitened, will return to its
former curvity again and again.
The author of the Essays most manifestly supposes, that
if men had the truth concerning the real necessity of all their
actions clearly in view, they would not appear to themselves
or one another, as at all praiseworthy or cUlpable, or under
any moral obligation, or accountable for their actions :* which
supposes, that men are nof to be blamed or praised for any of
their actions, and are not under any obligations nor are truly
accountable for any thing fhey do, by reason of this necessity ;
which is very contrary to what I have endeavoured to prove
throughout the third part of my Inquiry. I hurably conceive
it is there shown, that this is so far from the truth, that fhe
moral necessity of men's actions which truly fake place is re
quisite to the being of virtue and vice, or any thing praise
worthy or culpable^ that the liberty of indifference and con
tingence, which is advanced in opposition to that necessity, is
inconsistent with the being of these ; as it would suppose tbat
men are not determined in what they do by any virtuous or
vicious principles, nor act frora any motives, intentions or aims
whatsoever ; or have any end, either good or bad, in acting. —
And is it not reraarkable fhat this author should suppose, that
in order to men's actions truly having any desert, fhey must be
performed without any view, purpose, design, or desire or any
principle of action, or any thing agreeable to a rational nature ?
As it will appear that he does, if we compare p. 306, 207, wifh
p. 175. The author of the Essays supposes, that God has deeply
implanted in raan's nafure a strong and invincible apprehen
sion, or feeling, as he calls it, of a liberty and contingence of
his own actions, opposite fo that necessify which truly attends
them ; and which in truth does nof agree with real fact,t is
not agreeable to strict philosophic fruth,]: is contradictory to
fhe truth of things,§ and whicii truth confradicts||, nof tallying
with the real plan :ir and that therefore such feelings are deceit-
fiil,** and are in reality of the delusive kind.tt He speaks of
them as a wise delusion,J| as nice artificial feelings, merely
that conscience may have a commanding power :§§ meaning
plainly, that these feehngs are a cunning artifice of the author
of Nature, to make men believe they are free when they are
not. nil He supposes that by these feelings fhe moral world
has a disguised appearance,1[ir &c. He supposes that all self-
approbation, and all remorse of conscience, all commenda-
* P. 207, 209, and other places.
fP. 200. iP. 152. § P. 183. IIP. 186. IT P 205. ** P. 203, 204, 211.
ft P. 183. tl P. 209. §§ P. 211. IIII P. 153. HIT P. 214.

Sect. xy. : ¦ Appendix. 295
tion or condemnation of ourselves or others, all sense of de
sert, and all that is connected with this way of thinking, all
fhe ideas which at present are suggested by the words ought,
should, arise from this delusion, and would entirely vanish with
out it*. AU which is very contrary to what I have abundantly in
sisted on and endeavoured to demonstrate in my Inquiry ;
where I have largely shewn that it is agreeable to fhe natural
sense of mankind, thaf fhe moral necessity or certainty fhat
attends men's actions, is consistent with praise and blame, re
ward and punishment :t and fhat it is agieeable to our na
tural notions that moral evil, with its desert of dislike and ab
horrence, and all its other ill deservings, consists in a certain
deformity in the nature of the dispositions and acts of the heart,
and not in fhe evil of something else, diverse from fhese suppo
sed fo be their cause or occasion.|
1 might well ask here, whether any one is to be found in
the world of mankind, who is conscious fo a sense or feeling
naturally and deeply rooted in bis mind, fhat in order to a
man's performing any action that is praiseworthy or blame
worthy, he must exercise a liberty that implies and signifies a
power of acting without any raotive, view, design, desire, or
principle of action ? For such a liberty, this author supposes,
fhat raust be which is opposed to moral necessity, as I have
already observed. Supposing a man should actually do good,
independent of desire, aim, inducement, principle or end,, is it
a dictate of invincible natural sense, that his act is more meri
torious or praiseworthy, than if he had performed it for some
good end, and had been governed in it by good principles and
¦motives ? and so I might ask, on the contrary, with respect fo
evil actions. §
The author of the Essays supposes fhat the liberty with
out necessify of which we have a natural feeling, implies con
tingence: and, speaking of this contingence, he soraetiraes
calls if by the narae of chance. And it is evident, that his no
tion of it, or rather what he says about it, implies things hap
pening loosely, fortuitously, by accident, and without a cause.^
Now I conceive the slightest reflection may be sufficient fo
satisfy any one, that such a contingence of raen's actions, ac
cording to our natural sense, is so far frora being essential to
the morality or merit ofthose actions, fhat it would destroy if;
and that on the contrary, fhe dependence of our actions on
such causes, as inward inclinations, incitements and ends, is
essential to the being, of it. Natural sense teaches men, when
* P. 160, 194, 199, 205, 206, 207, 209. f Inquiry Part IV. Sect. 4.throughout.
X Idem, Part IV. Sect. 1. throughout.
§ See this matter illustrated in my Inquiry, Part IV. Sect. 4. || P. 156—159
177, 178, 181, 183—185.

296 FREEDOM OP THE WILL. '^fc PaRT IV.
they see any thing done by others of a good or evil tendency,
to inquire what their. mJeM^ioM was ; what principles and views
fhey were moved by, in order to judge how far they are to be
justified or condemned : and nof fo determine, that, in order fo
their being approved or blamed af all, the action must be per
formed altogether fortuitously, proceeding from nothing, aris
ing from no cause. Concerning this matter, I have fully express
ed my mind in fhe Inquiry.
If fhe liberty of which we have a natural sense as ne
cessary to desert, consists in the mind's self-determination,
withouf being determined by previous inclination or motive,
then indifference is essential fo it, yea absolute indifference ;
as is observed in my Inquiry. Buf men naturally have no
notion of any such liberty as this, as essential to the morality
or demerit of their actions ; buf, on the contrary, such a li
berty, if if were possible, would be inconsistent with our na
tural notions of desert, as is largely shown in fhe Inquiry.*
If if be agreeable to natural sense that men must be indif
ferent in determining their own actions; then, according to
the same, the raore they are determined by inclination, either
good or bad, the less they have of desert : the more good ac
tions are performed from good disposition, the less praise
worthy ; and fhe more evil deeds are from evU dispositions,
the less culpable ; and, in general the more men's actions are
from their hearts, the less fhey are fo be comraended or con
demned: which all must know is very contrary to natural
sense. Moral necessity is owing fo fhe power and government of
the inclination of the heart, either habitual or occasional, ex
cited by motive : buf according to natural and coraraon sense,
the more a man does anything with full inclination of heart,
the more is to be charged to his account for his condemnation
if if be an ill action, and the more to be ascribed to him for his
praise if if be good.
If fhe mind were deterrained to evU actions by contin
gence, frora a state of indifference, then either there would be
no fault in thera, or else the fault would be in being so perfect
ly indifferent, that fhe raind was equally liable to be a bad or
good deterraination. And if this indifference be liberty, then
the very essence of the blarae or fault would lie in the liberty
itself, or the wickedness would, primarUy and summarily, lie
in being a free agent. If there were no fault in being in
different, then there could be no fault in the determina
tion being agreeable to such a state of indifference : that is,
there could be no fault found, fhat opposite determinations ac
tually happen to fake place indifferently, sometimes good and
sometimes bad, as contingence governs and decides. And if
* Especially in Partm. Sect. 6 and 7.

Sect. XV. ¦^ ;J^ : Appendi.v. 397
it be a fault to be indifferent to good and evil, then such indif
ference is no indifference to good and evil, but is a determina
tion to evU, or to a fault ; and such an indifferent disposition
would be an evil disposition, tendency, or determination of
mind. So inconsistent are these notions of liberty, as essential
to praise or blame.
The author of the Essays supposes men's natural delu
sive sense of a liberty of contingence to be, in truth, the foun
dation of all the labour, care and industry of mankind ;* and
that if men's " practical ideas had been formed on fhe plan of
universal necessity, the ignava ratio, the inactive doctrine of
the Stoics, would have followed, and that there would have
been no Room for forethought about futurity, or any sort of in
dustry and care :t" plainly iraplying, that in this case, raen
would see and know fhat all their industry and care signified
nothing, was in vain, and to no purpose, or of no benefit;
events being fixed in an irrefragable chain, and not at all de
pending on their care and endeavour ; as he explains hiraself
particularly, in the instance of raen's use of raeans to prolong
life :X nof only very contrary to what I largely raaintain in my
Enquiry, § but also very inconsistently with his own seherae, in
what he supposes of the ends for which God has so deeply ira-
planted this deceitful feeling in man's nature ; in which he man
ifestly supposes men's care and industry nof to be in vain and
of no benefit, but of great use, yea of absolute necessity, in or
der to their obtaining the most important ends and necessary
purposes of huraan life, and fo fulfil the ends of action fo the
BEST advantage; as he largely declares.|| Now, how shaU
these things be reconciled 1 That if raen had a clear view of
real truth, fhey would see that there was no room for their care
and industry, because they would see it f o be in vain and of no
benefit ; and yet fhat God, by having a clear view of real truth,
sees their being excited to care and industry will be of excellent
use to raankind and greatly for the benefit of the world, yea ab
solutely necessary in order to it : and that therefore the great
wisdom and goodness of God to men appears, in artfully con
triving fo put them on care and industry for their good, which
good could not be obtained without them ; and yet both these
things are maintained af once, and in fhe same sentences and
words by this author. The very reason he gives, why God has put
this deceitful feehng into raen, contradicts and destroys itself;
that God in his great goodness to raen gave them such a de
ceitful feeling, because it was very useful and necessary for
them, and greatly for their benefit, or excites thera to care and
* P. 184. fP. 189. t P- 184, 185. § EspeciaUy Part IV. Sect. 5. |[ P. 188
— 192. and in many other places,
voL.n. 38

298. freedom op the will, 'i''*,^^ Part iv.
industry for their own good, which care and industry is useful
and necessary to fhat end ; and yet fhe very thing for which, as a
reason, this great benefit ofcare and industry is given, is God's de
ceiving men in this very point in making them think their care and
industry to be of great benefit to them, when indeed if is of none
at all ; and if fhey saw the real truth, they would see all their
endeavours to be wholly useless, that there was no room for
them, and thatthe event does not at all depend upon them.*
And besides, what this author says plainly implies (as
appears by what has been already observed,) that it is ne
cessary raen should be deceived, by being made to believe
thaf future events are contingent, and their own future actions
free, with such a freedom as signifies that their actions are not
the fr-uit of their own desires or designs, but altogether contin
gent, fortuitous, and without a cause. Buf how should a notion
of liberty consisting in accident or loose chance, encourage
care and industry ? I should think it would rather entirely dis
courage every thing of this nature. For surely if our actions
do not depend on our desires and designs, then they do not de
pend on our endeavours flowing frora our desires and designs.
This Author himself seems fo suppose, fhat if men had, indeed.
Such a liberty of contingence, it would render all endeavours to
determine or move men's future volitions in vain : he says that
in this case, to exhort, to instruct, to promise, or to threaten,
would be fo no purpose.t Why ? Because (as he hiraself
gives fhe reason), " then our will would be capricious and arbi
trary, and we should be thrown loose altogether, and our arbi
trary power could do us good or ill only by accident." But if
such a loose fortuitous state would render vain others' endea
vours upon us, for the sarae reason would if make useless our
endeavours on ourselves : for events that are truly contingent
and accidental, and altogether loose from, and independent of,
aU foregoing causes, are independent on every foregoing cause
within ourselves, as well as in others.
I suppose that it is so far frora being true, that our minds
are naturally possessed with a notion of such liberty as this so
strongly that it is impossible to root it out, thaf indeed raen
have no such notion of liberty at all, and fhat it is utterly ira
possible, by any raeans whatsoever to iraplant or introduce such
a notion into the mind. As ho such notions as imply self-
contradiction and self-abohtion can subsist in the mind, as I
have shewn in ray Inquiry ; I think a raature sensible consi
deration of fhe matter is sufficient to satisfy any one, that even
the greatest and most learned advocates theraselves for liberty
of indifference and selfdetermination have no such notion ;
and thaf indeed fhey mean something wholly inconsistent with
* P, 188, 189, &c. t P. 178, 213, 214.

Sect. xv. Appendix. 299
and directly subversive of, what they strenuously affirm and
earnestly contend for. By a man naving a power of deter
mining his own will, they plainly raean a power of determining
his will as he pleases, or as he chooses ; which supposes thaf
the mind has a choice, prior to its going about to confirm any
action or determination to it. And if they mean that they
determine even the original or prirae choice by their own 'plea
sure or choice, as the thing that causes and directs it ; I scruple
nof most boldly to affirm, that they speak fhey know not what,
and that of which they have no manner of idea ; because no
such contradictory notion can come into, or have a moraent's
subsistence in the raind of any raan living, as an original or
first choice being caused or brought info being, by choice.
After all, they say, fhey have no higher or other conception of
liberty, than that vulgar notion of it, which I contend for, viz.
a man's having power or opportunity to do as he chooses : or
if fhey had a notion that every act of choice was determined
by choice, yet if would destroy their notion of the contingence
of choice ; for then no one act of choice would arise contin
gently, or from a state of indifference, but every individual
act, in all the series, would arise from foregoing bias or prefe
rence, and from a cause predetermining and fixing its exist
ence, which introduces at once such a chain of causes and ef
fects, each preceding link decisively fixing fhe foUowing, as
they would by all means avoid.
And such kind of delusion and self-contradiction as this,
does not arise in men's minds by nature : it is not owing to any
natural feeling which God has strongly fixed in the mind and
nature of raan ; buf to false philosophy, and strong prejudice,
from a deceitful abuse of words. It is artificial ; nof in the
sense of the Author of the Essays, supposing it to be a deceit
ful artifice of God ; but artificial as opposed to. natural, and as
owing to an artificial deceitful manageraent of terras, fo darken
and confound the raind. Men have no such thing when they
first begin to exercise reason ; but raust have a great deal of
time to bUnd themselves with metaphysical confusion, before
they can embrace and rest in such definitions of liberty as are
given, and imagine they understand them.
On the whole I humbly conceive, that whosoever wiU
give himself the trouble of weighing what I have offered to
consideration in my Inquiry, must be sensible that such a
moral necessity of raen's actions as I raaintain, is not af
all inconsistent with any liberty fhat any creature has, or
can have, as a free, accountable, moral agent, and subject
of moral governraent ; and fhat this moral necessity is so far
from being inconsistent wifh praise and blame and the be
nefit and use of men's own care and labour, that, on fhe
contrary, it implies the very ground and reason why men's

300 freedom op the will. Part iv,
actions are to be ascribed to them as their own, in such a
manner as fo infer desert, praise, and blame, approbation
and remorse of conscience, reward and punishment ; and that
it establishes the moral system of the universe and God's
moral government in every respect, with fhe proper use of mo
tives, exhortations, coraraands, counsels, promises, and threat
enings ; and the use and benefit of endeavours, care and indus
try. There is therefore no need that the strict philosophic
truth should be a.t all concealed ; nor is there any danger in
contemplation and profound discovery in these things. So far
from this, fhat fhe truth in this matter is of vast importance,
and extremely needful to be known ; and fhe more clearly and
perfectly the real fact is known, and the more constantly it is
in view, fhe better. More particularly, that the clear and full
knowledge of that which is the true system of the universe in
these respects, would greatly establish the doctrines which
teach the frue Christian scheme of Divine administration in the
city of God, and the gospel of Jesus Christ in its most impor
tant articles. Indeed fhese things never can be well estab
lished, and fhe opposite errors — so subversive of fhe whole
gospel, which af this day so greatly and generally prevail — be
well confuted, or the arguments by which they are maintained
answered, fill these points are settled. While this is not done,
it is to rae beyond doubt, that the friends of those great gospel
truths will but poorly raaintain their controversy with fhe adver
saries of those fruths ; they will be obliged often to shuffle, hide,
and turn their backs ; and the latter will have a strong fort
frora whence fhey never can be driven, and weapons to use
from which those whom fhey oppose will find no shield to screen
themselves : and fhey will always puzzle, confound, and keep
under the friends of sound doctrine, and glory and vaunt them
selves in their advantage over them ; and carry their affairs
wifh a high hand, as they have done already for a long time
past. I conclude, Sir, with asking your pardon for troubling you
with so much in vindication of myself from the imputation of
advancing a scheme of necessify, like that of the author of the
Essays on the principles of Morality and Natural Religion.
Considering that what I have said is nof only in vindication of
myself, but as I think, one of the most important articles of
moral philosophy and religion ; I trust in what I know of your
candour fhat you will excuse
Your obliged friend and brother,
J. EDWARDS.
Stockbridge, July 35th, 1757.

the
GREAT CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE
OF
ORIGINAL SIN
DEFENDED ;
EVIDENCES OF ITS TRUTH
PRODUCED,
ARGUMENTS TO THE CONTRARY ANSWERED.
CONTAINING, IN PARTICULAK,
A REPLY TO THE OBJECTIONS
OB
DR. JOHN TAYLOR,
IN HIS BOOK, KNTITLKD
^*THE SCRIPTXJRE-DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN PROPOSED TO
FREE AND CANDID EXAMINATION, &c."

Matt. ix. 13. They that be whole, need not a Physician ; but they that are sick.
— Et haec non tantum ad Peccatores referenda est ; quia in omnibus Maledictionibue primi Honunis^
omnes ejus Generationes conveniunt. — R. Sal. Jarchi.
Propter Concupiscentiam, innatnm Cordi humano, dicitur, In Iniquitate genitus sura ; atque Sensu
est quod a Nativitate implantatum Cordi sit humano •7e£zerAarafl^,Figmentum malum.
Aben-Eira.
— Ad Mores Natura recurrit
Damnatoa, fixa et mutari nescia.<—
— Dociles imitandis
TurpibuB et pravis omnes sumus.— Jw.

ADVERTISEMENT,
CONTAINING A
BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THIS BOOK AND ITS AUTHOR,
BY THE FIRST EDITOR.

The Reverend Author of the following' piece was removed by
death before its publication. But ere his decease, the copy was finish
ed and brought to the press ; and a number of sheets passed his own
review. They who were acquainted with the author or know his just
character, and have any taste for the serious theme, will want nothing
to be said in recommendation of the ensuing tract, but only that Mr.
Edwards wrote it.
Several valuable pieces on this subject have lately been publish
ed upon the same side of the question. But he had no notice of so
much as the very first of them, till he had wholly concluded what he
had in view : nor has it been thought that any thing already printed
should supersede this work ; being designed on a more extensive plan
— comprising a variety of arguments and answers to many objections
that fell not in the way of the other worthy writers — and the whole
done with a care of familiar method and language as well as clear
reasoning, accommodated very much to common capacities. It must
be a sensible pleasure to every friend of truth, that so masterly a hand
undertook a reply to Dr. Taylok ; notwithstanding the various an
swers already given him both at home and abroad.
Since it it has been thought unfit that this posthumous book
should go unattended with a respectful memorial of the author, it is
hoped the reader will candidly accept the following :*
As he lived cheerfully resigned in all things to the will of Hea
ven, so he died, or rather, as the Scripture emphatically expresses it
in relation to the saint in Christ Jesus, he fell asleep without the
least appearance of pain and with great calra of mind. Indeed when
he first perceived the symptoms upon him to be mortal, he is said to
have been a little perplexed for a while about the meaning of this
mysterious conduct of Providence, in calling him out fi-om his belov
ed privacy to a public scene of action and influence ; and then so
suddenly, just upon his entrance into it, translating him from thence,
in such a way, by mortality ! However, he quickly got believing and
composing views ofthe wisdom and goodness of God in this surpris
ing event : and readily yielded to the Sovereign Disposal of Heaven,
with the most placid submission. Amidst the joy of faith, he de
parted this world to go and see Jesus whom his soul loved ; to be
with him, to behold his glory, and rejoice in his kingdom.
* As we have given a full Memoir in the first volume, those particulars which
were contained in this brief account, and which are more fully and accurately nar
rated there, are omitted in order to avoid needless repetitions.

304 ADVERTISEMfeNT.
In person he was tall of stature, and ofa slender make. There
was something extremely delicate in his constitution ; which always
obliged him to observe the exactest rules of temperance, and every
method of cautious and prudent living. By such means he was helped
to go through incessant labours, and to bear up under much study,
which, Solomon observes, is a weariness to tiie flesh. Perhaps never
was a man more constantly retued li-oni the world ; giving himself to
reading and contemplation. And a wonuer it was that hts feeble.
frame could subsist under such fatigues, daily repeated and so long
continued. Vet upon occasion of some remark upon it by a friend,
which was only a few months before his death, he told him, •¦ He
did not find but he was then as well able to bear the closest study as
he was thirty years before ; and could go through the exercises ofthe
pulpit with as little weariness or difiiculty." In his youth he ap
peared healthy and with a good degree of vivacity ; but was never
robust. In middle life he appeared very much emaciated (1 had almost
said mortified] by severe studies, and intense applications of thought.
Hence his voice was a little languid, and too low for a large assem
bly ; though much relieved and advantaged by a proper emphasis,
just cadence, well-placed pauses, and great distinctness in pronuncia
tion. He had a piercing eye, the truest index of the mind. His aspect
and mien had a mixture of severity and pleasantry. He had a natu
ral turn for gravity and sedateness ; ever contemplative ; and in con
versation usually reserved, but always observant of a genuine deco
rum in his deportment ; free from sullen, supercilious and contemp
tuous airs, and without any appeal ance of ostentation, levity, or
Tanity. As to imagination, he had enough of it for a great and good
man ; but the gaieties of a luxuriant fancy, so captivating to many,
were what he neither aiFected himself, nor was much delighted with
in others. He had a natural steadiness of temper and fortitude of
mind ; which being sanctified by the Spirit of God, was ever of vast
advantage to him. to carry him through difficult services, and support
him under trying aftlictions in the course of his life. Personal inju
ries : e bore with a becoming meekness and patience, and a disposi
tion to forgiveness. The humility, modesty, and serenity of his. be
haviour, much endeared him to his acquaintance ; and made liim ap
pear amiable in the eyes of such as had the privilege of conversing
with him. He waa a true and faithful friend ; and shewed much of
a disinter€sted benevolence to his neighbour. The several relations
sustained by him he adorned with an exemplary conduct ; and was
soUcitous to fill every station with its proper duty. He kept up an
extensive correspondence with ministers and others in various parts ;
and his letters always contained some significant and valuable com
munications. In his private walk as a chri-stian, he appeared an ex
ample of truly rational, consistent, unilbrm religion and virtue ; a
shining instance ofthe power and efficacy of that holy faith to which
he was so firmly attached, and of which he was so strenuous a de-
defender. He exhibited much of spirituality and a heavenly bent of
soul. In him one saw the loveliest appearance, a rare assemblage
of christian graces united with the richest gills, and mutually sub<
serving and recommending one another.

AUVERTI5EMEM. 305
As a scholar, his intellectual furniture exceeded what is common,
considering the disadvantages we labour under in this remote corner
ofthe world. He very early discovered a genius above the ordinary
size : which gradually ripened and expanded by daily exertion and
application. He was remarkable for the penetration and extent of
his understanding, for his powers of criticism and accurate distinction,
quickness of thought, solidity of judgment, and force of reasoning :
which made him an acute and strong disputant. By nature he was
formed for a logician and a metaphysician ; but by speculation, ob
servation, and converse, greatly improved. He had a good insight
into the whole circle of liberal arts and sciences; po.ssessed a very
valuable stock of classic learning, philosophy, mathematics, history,
chronology, &c. By the blessing of God on his indefatigable
studiousness, to the last he was constantly treasuring up useful
knowledge, both human and divine.
Thus he appears uncommonly accomplished for the arduous
and momentous province to which he was finally called. And had
heaven indulged us with the continuance of his precious life, we
have reason to think he would have graced his new station, and been
a signal blessing to the college, and therein extensively «erved his
generation, accordingto the vvill of God.
After all, it must be owned, divinity was his favourite study ;
and the ministry his most delightful employment. Among the lumi
naries ofthe church in these American regions, he was justly reputed
a star of the first magnitude ; thoroughly versed in all the branches^
of theology, didactic, polemic, casuistic, experimental, and prac
tical. In point of divine knowledge and skill, he had few equals,
and perhaps no superior, at least in these parts. On the maturest
examination of the different schemes of principles obtaining in the
world, and on comparing them with the sacred scriptures, the ora
cles of God and the great standard of truth, he was a Protestant and
a Calvinist in judgment ; adhering to the main articles ofthe re
formed religion with an unshaken firmness and with a fervent zeal,
but tempered with charity and candour, and governed by discretion.
He seemed as little as most men under the bias of education or the
influence of bigotry. As to practical and vital Christianity, no man
appeared to have a better acquaintance with its nature and impor
tance ; or to understand true religion, and feel its power, more than
he ; which made him an excellently fit guide to inquiring souls, and
qualified him to guard them against all false religion. His internal
sense of the intercourse between God and souls being brought by
him to the severe test of reason and revelation, preserved him both
in sentiment and conduct, from the least tincture of enthusiasm.
The accomplished divine enters deep into his character.
As a preacher, he was judicious, solid, and instructive. • Seldom
wag he known to bring controversy into the pulpit : or to handle
any subject in the nicer modes and forms of scholastic dissertation.
His sermons in general seemed to vary exceedingly from his con
troversial compositions. In his preaching, usually, all was plain,
familiar, sententious, practical ; and very distant from any affectation
of appearing the great man, or displaying his extraordinary abilities
voTy. II. 39

306 ADVEBTISEStE'arit'.
as a scholar. But still he ever preserved the character of a skilful
and thorough divine. The common themes of his ministry were the
most weighty and profitable ; and especially, the great truths of the
gospel of Christ in which he himself lived by faith. His method in
preaching was, first to apply to the understanding and judgment, la
bouring to enlighten and convince them ; and then to persuade the
will, engage the affections, and excite the active powers of the soul.
His language was with propriety and purity, but with a noble negli
gence ; nothing ornamented. Florid diction was not the beauty he
preferred. His talents were of a superior kind. He regarded
thoughts, rather than words. Precision of sentiment and clearness
of expression are the principal characteristics of his pulpit style.
Neither quick nor slow of speech, there was a certain pathos in his
utterance, and such skill of address, as seldom failed to draw the at
tention, warm the hearts, and stimulate the consciences of the audit
ory. He studied to shew himself approved unto God, a workman
that needed not to be ashamed, rightly dividing the word of truth.
And he was one who gave himself to prayer, as well as to the minis
try of the word. Agreeably it pleased God to put great honour up
on him, by crowning his labours with surprising successes, in the
conversion of sinners, andthe edification of saints, to the advancement
of the kingdom and glory of God our Saviour Jesus Christ.
As a writer, Mr. Edwards distinguished himself in controversy,
to which he was called on a variety of occasions. Here the superi
ority of his genius eminently appeared. He knew to arrange his
ideas in an exact method ; and close application of mind, with the un-
, common strength of his intellectual powers, enabled him in a man
ner to exhaust every subject he took under consideration. He deli-
gently employed the latter part of his life in defending Christianity,
both in its doctrinal and practical views, against the errors of the
times. Besides his excellent- writings in behalf of the power of god
liness, which some years ago happily prevailed in many parts of the
British America, he made a noble stand against enthusiasm and false
religion, when it threatened to spread, by his incomparable treatise
upon religious affections. And more lately in opposition to Pelagian,
Arminian, and other false principles, he published a very elaborate
Treatise upon the Liberty ofthe human Will. A volume that has procu
red him the elogy of eminent divines abroad. Several professors of di
vinity in the Dutch universities very lately sent him their thanks, for
the assistance he had given them in their enquiry into some contro
verted points ; having carried his own further than any author they
had ever seen. And now this volume of his, on the great Christian
doctrine of original sin, is presented to public view ; which, though
studiously adapted to lower capacities, yet carries in it the evident
traces of hia.great genius, and seems with superior force of argument
to have entirely baffled the opponent.
His writings will perpetuate his memory and make his name
blossom in the dust. The blessing of heaven attending the perusal
of them, will make them effiectually conducive to the glory of .God,
and the good of souls ; which will brighten the author's crown and
add to his joy, in the day of future retribution.

THE AUTHOR'S PREFACJ:.

The following Discourse is intended, not merely as an answer
to any particular beak written against the doctrine of Original Sin,
but as a general defence of that great important doctrine. Never
theless, I have in this defence taken notice of the main things said
against this doctrine by such of the more noted opposers of it as I
have had opportunity to read ; particularly those two late writers,
Dr. Turnbull and Dr. Taylor, of Norwich ; but especially the lat
ter, in what he has published in those two books ofhis, the first entitled,
TheTScripture Doctrine of Original Sin proposed to free and candid
Examination ; the other, his Key to the ApostoUc Writings, with a
Paraphrase and Notes oil the Epistle to the Romans. I have close
ly attended to Dr. Taylor's Piece on Original Sin in all its parts,
and have endeavoured that no one thing there said, of any conse
quence in this controversy, should pass unnoticed, or that any thing
which has the appearance of an argument, in opposition to this doc
trine, should be left unanswered. I look on the doctrine as of great
importance, which every body will doubtless own it is, if it be true.
For^if the case be *uch indeed, that all mankind are by naturein a
state of total ruin, both with respect to thc moral evil of which they
are the subjects, and the afflictive evil to which they are exposed, the
one as tbe consequence and punishment of the other ; then doubt
less, the great salvation by Christ stands in direct relation to this
ruin, as the remedy to the disease ; and the whole Gospel, ot doc
trine of salvation, must suppose it ; and all real belief, or true notion
of that gospel, must be built upon it. Therefore as I think the liioc-
trine is most certainly both true and important, I hope my attempt
ing a vindication of it will be candidly interpreted ; and that what I
have done towards its defence will be impartially considered by all
that will give themselves the trouble to read the ensuing discourse :
in which it is designed to examine every thing material throughout
the doctor's whole book, and many things in that other book, con
taining his Key and Exposition on Romans ; as also many things
written in opposition to this doctrine by some other modern authors.
Moreover, my discourse being not only intended for an answer to Dr.
Taylor, and other opposers of the doctrine of original sin, but for
a general defence of that doctrine ; producing the evidence of th©
truth of the doctrine, as well as answering objections made against it,
I hope this attempt of mine will not be thought needless, nor be al
together useless, notwithstanding other publications on the subject.
I would also hope that the extensivenesa of the plan of the fol
lowing treatise will excuse the length of it: And that when it is con
sidered how much was absolutely requisite to the full executing of a
design formed on such a plan ; how much has been written ag-aiws?

308 PUEPACE.
the doctrine of original sin, and with what plausibility ; how strong
the prejudices of many are in favour of what is said in opposition to
this doctrine — and that it cannot be expected any thing short of a
full consideration of almost every argument advanced by the main
opposers, especially by this late and specious writer, Dr. Taylor,
will, satisfy many readers — how much must unavoidably be said in
order to a full handling of the arguments in defence oi the doctrine ;
and how important the doctrine must be, if true ; I trust the length
of the following discourse will not be thought to exceed what the
ease really required. However this must be left to the judgment of
the intelligent and candid reader.
Stockbridge, May 26, 1757.
JVofe; — When the page is referred to in this manner, p. 40, p. 50, without
mentioning the book, thereby is to be understood such a page in Dr. Ta*lor's
Scripture-Doctrine of Original Sin. S. intends the Supplement. When the word
Key is used to signify the book referred to, thereby is to be understood Dr. Tay
lor's Ka/ to the Apostolic Writings. This mark [S] with figures or a number an
nexed, signifies such a section or paragraph in his Key. When after mentioning
Preface to Par. on Epist. Romans, there is subjoined p, 145, 47, or the like, thereby
is intended page and paragraph, page 145, paragraph 47. The letter T. alone,
is used to signify Dr. Taylor's name, and no other.

THE

GREAT CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE

Of*

ORIGINAL SIN DEFENDED.

PART I.
WHEREIN AKE CONSIDERED SOME EVIDENCES OF ORIGINAL SIN
FROM FACTS AND EVENTS, AS FOUNI^d)bY OBSERVATION
AND EXPERIENCE, TOGETHER WITH REPRESENTATIONS
AND TESTIMONIES OF HOLY SCRIPTURE, AND THE CON
FESSION AND ASSERTION OF OPPOSERS.

CHAP, I.
The Evidence of Original Sinfrom what appears in Fact of the
Sinfulness of Mankind.
SECT, I.
AM Mankind constantly, in all Ages, without Fail in any one In
stance, run into that moral Evil, which is in effect their own
utter and eternal Perdition in a total privation of GOD's
Favour, and suffering of his Vengeance and Wrath.
By Original Sin as the phrase has been most commonly,used
by divines, is meant the innate sinful depravity of theheark
But yet when the doctrine of original sin is spoken of,4t-is
-Vulgarly understood in that latitude, w-hich includes not only
the depravity of nature, but the imputation of Adam's first sin ;
or, in other vi^ords, the liableness or exposedness of Adam's I
posterity, in the divine judgment, to partake of the punishment
bf that sin. So far as I know, most of those who have held

310 ¦ X**^^ ORieiSAL S11S-. Ri. Ch. I

I

one of these, ha,ve maintained the other ; and most of those
who have opposed one, have opposed the other : both are op
posed by the,^Author chiefly attended to in the following dis
course, in his booITagri inst original sin : And it may perhaps ap
pear in our future consideration of the subject, that they are
closely connected ; that the arguments which prove the one es
tablish the other, and that there are no more difficulties attend
ing the allowing of one, than the other.
1 shall in the first place, consider this doctrine more espe
cially with regard to the corruption of nature ; and as we treat
of this the other will naturally come into consideration, in the
prosecution of the discourse, as connected with it. As all moral
qualities, all principles either of virtue or vice, lie in the dispo
sition of the heart, 1 shall consider whether we have any evi
dence that the heart of man is naturally of a corrupt and evil
disposition. This is strenuously denied by many late writers
who are enemies to the doctrine of original sin ; and particular
ly by Dr. Taylor.
The way we come by the idea of any such thing as dispo
sition or tendency is by observing what is constant or general
in event ; especially under a great variety of circumstances ;
and above all, when the effect or event continues the same
through great and various opposition, much and manifold force
and means used to the contrary not prevailing to hinder the
efiect. 1 do not know that such, a prevalence of effects is de
nied to be an evidence of prevailing tendency in causes and
agents ; or that it is expressly denied by the opposers of the
doctrine of original sin, that if, in the course of events, it uni
versally or generally proves that mankind are actually corrupt,
this would be an evidence of a prior corrupt propensity in the
world of mankind ; whatever may be said by some, which, if
taken with its plain consequences, may seem to imply a denial
of this ; which may be considered afterwards. But by many
the fact is denied ; that is, it is denied, that corruption and
moral evil are commonly prevalent in the world : on the con
trary, it is insisted on, that good preponderates, and that virtue
has the ascendant.
To this purpose, Dr, Turnbull says,* " With regard to
the prevalence of vice in the world, men are apt to let their
imagination run out upon all the robberies, piracies, murders,
perjuries, frauds, massacres, assassinations they have either
heard of, or read in history ; thence concluding all mankind to
be very wicked. As if a court of justice were a proper place
to make an estimate of the morals of mankind, or an hospital
of the healthfuJness of a chmate. But ought they not to con
sider that the number of honest citizens and farmers far sur-
* Moral Philos. p. 289, 890.

Sect. i. All Men tend to Sin and Ruin. 311
passes that of all sorts of criminals in any state, and that the
innocent and kind actions of even criminals themselves surpass
their crimes in numbers ; that it is the rarity of crimes in com
parison of innocent or good actions, which engages our atten
tion to them and makes them to be recorded in history, while
honest, generous domestic actions are overlooked only because
they are so common ? as one great danger, or one month's
sickness shall become a frequently repeated story during a
long life of health and safety. — Let not the vices of mankind
be multiplied or magnified. Let us make a fair estimate of
human hfe, and set over against the shocking, the astonishing
instances of barbarity and wickedness that have been perpe
trated in any age, not only the exceeding generous and brave
actions with which history shines, but the prevaihng innocency,
good-nature, industry, felicity, and cheerfulness of the greater
part of mankind at all times ; and we shall not find reason to
cry out, as objectors against Providence Jo on this occasion,
that all men are vastly corrupt and that there is hardly any
such thing as virtue in the world. Upon a fair computation
the fact does indeed come out, that very great villanies have
been very uncommon in all ages and looked upon as mon
strous ; so general is the sense and esteem of virtue." — It
seems to be with a like view that Dr. Taylor says, " We must
not take the measure of our health and enjoyments from a lar
zar-house, nor of our understanding from Bedlam, nor of our
morals from a jail." (p. 77. S.)
With respect to the propriety and pertinence of such a
representation of things, and its force as to the consequence
designed, I hope we shall be better able to judge, and in some
measure to determine whether the natural disposition of the
hearts of mankind be corrupt or not, when the things which
follow have been considered. But for the greater clearness,
it may be proper here to premise one consideration that is of
great importance in this controversy, and is very much over
looked by the opposers of the doctrine of original sin in their
disputing against it.
That' it is to be looked upon as the true tendency of the
innate disposition of man's heart, which appears to be its ten
dency, when we consider things as they are in themselves, or
in their own nature, without the interposition of divine grace. —
Thus, that state of man's nature, that disposition of the mind,
is to be looked upon as evil and pernicious, which, as it is in
itself, tends to extremely pernicious consequences, and would
certainly end therein, were it not that the free mercy and
kindness of God interposes to prevent that issue. It would
bo very strange if any should argue that there is no evil ten
dency in the case, because the mere favour and compassion of
the Most High may step in and oppose the tendency and pre-

312 0RI6INAL SIN. 1*, I, Ch. I,
vent the sad effect. Particularly, if there be any thing in th&
nature of man whereby he has an universal unfailing tendency
to that moral evil which," according to the real nature and true
demerit of things as they are in themselves, implies his utter
ruin, that must be looked upon as an evil tendency or propen
sity ; however divine grace may interpose to save him from
deserved ruin, and to over-rule things to an issue contrary to
that which they tend to of themselves, Grace is sovereign,
exercised according to the good pleasure of God, bringing
good out of evil. The effect of it belongs not to the nature of
things themselves, that otherwise have an ill tendency, any
more than the remedy belongs to the disease ; but is something
altogether independent on it, introduced to oppose the natural
tendency, and reverse the course of things. But the event to
which things tend, according to their own demerit, and accord
ing to divine justice, is the event to which they tend in their
own nature ; as Dr. T.'s own words fully imply {Pref to. Par.
on Rom. p. 131.) " God alone (says he) can declare whether he
will pardon or punish the ungodliness and unrighteousness of
mankind, which is in its own nature punishable," Nothing
is more precisely according to the truth of things than divine
justice : it weighs things in an even balance ; it views and es
timates things no otherwise than they are truly in their own
nature. Therefore undoubtedly that which implies a tendency
to ruin, according to the estimate of divine justice, does in
deed imply such a tendency in its own nature.
And then it must be remembered, that it is a moral depra
vity we are speaking of; and therefore when we are consider
ing whether such depravity do not appear by a tendency to a
bad effect or issue, it is a moral tendency to such an issue that
is the thing to be taken into the account, A moral tendency
or influence is by desert. Then may it be said man's nature or
state is attended with a pernicious or destructive tendency in
a moral sense, when it tends to that which deserves misery and
destruction. And therefore it equally shews the moral depra
vity of the nature of mankind in their present state, whether
that nature be universally attended with an effectual tendency
to destructive vengeance actually executed, or to the'ir deserving
misery and ruin, or their just exposedness to destruction, how
ever that fatal consequence may be prevented by grace, or
whatever the actual event be.
One thing more is to be observed here, that the topic
mainly insisted on by the opposers of the doctrine of original
sin, is the justice of God ; both in their objections against the
imputation of Adam's sin, and also against its being-so ordered,
that men should come into the world with a corrupt and ruined
nature, without having merited the displeasure of their Creator
by any personal fault. But the latter is not repugnant to God's

T''

Sect, t. All Men tend to Sia and Ruijt. 3113
I justice, if men aftually are born into the world with a tendency
to sin, and to misery~and'ruin for their sin, which actually wifl
be the consequence unless mere grace steps in and prevents it.
If this be allowed, the argument from justice is given up : for
it is to suppose, that their liableness to misery and ruin comes
in a way of justice ; otherwise there would be no need of the
interposition of divine grace to save them. Justice alone
would be sufficient security, if exercised, without grace. It is
all one in this dispute about what is just and righteous, whether
men are born in a miserable state by a tendency to ruin which
actually follows, and that justly ; or whether they are born in
such a state as tends to a desert of ruin, which might justly
follow, and would actually follow did not grace prevent. For
the controversy is not what grace will do, but what justice
might do.
I have been the more particular on this head, because it
enervates many of the reasonings and conclusions by which Dr.
T. makes out his scheme ; in which he argues from that state
which mankind are in by divine grace, yea, which he himself
supposes to be by divine grace ; and yet not making any al
lowance for this, he from hence draws conclusions against what
others suppose of the deplorable and ruined state mankind are
in by the fall,* Some of his arguments and conclusions to
* He often speaks of death and affliction as coming on Adam's posterity in
consequence of his sin ; and in p. 30, 31. and many other places, he supposes that
these things come in consequence of his sin, not as a punishment or a calamity,
but aa a benefit. But in p. 23. he supposes, those things would be a great calamity
and misery, if it were not for the resurrection ; which resurrection he there, anti
in the following pages, and in many other places, speaks of as being by Christ ;
and often speaks of it as being by the grace of God in Christ.
P. 63, 64. Speaking of our being subjected to sorrow, labour, and death, in
consequence of .^darn's sin, he represents these as evils that are reversed mni.
tumed into advantages, and from which we are delivered through grace in Christ.
And p. 65, 66, 67. he speaks of God thus turning death into an advantage through
grace in Christ, as what vindicates the justice of God in bringing death by Adam.
P. 153, 156. One thing he alleges against this proposition of the Assembly
of Divines — That we are by nature bond-slaves to Satan.^TAa< God hath been pro
viding, from the begin-ning of the world to this day, various means and dispensaHmis,
to preserve and rescue mankind from the devil.
P. 1*8, 169, 170 In answer to that objection against his doctrine That we
«ire in worse circumstances than Adam, he alleges the happy circumstances we arc
under by the provision and means furnished through free grace in Christ.
P. 228. In answering that argument against his doctrine — That there is a
law in our members, bringing ua into captivity to the law of sin and death, Rom.
vii. — He allows, that the case of those who are under a law threatening death for
every sin (which law he elsewhere says, shews us the naturid and proper demerit of
sin, and is perfectly consorumi to everlasting truth and righteousness) must be quite de
plorable if they have no relief from the -mercy of the lawgiveir.
p. 90 — 93. S. In opposition to what is supposed of the miserable state man
kind are brought into by Adam's sin, he alleges, Ths noble desigta of love, tnanifest-
edby adoanc'mg a new and happy dispensation, founded on the obedience and righteous
ness of the Son of God; and that, -aUhough.hy Adam we are subjected to dea.th»
VOL. n. 40

314 OEIGItfAL SIN, P- !• Gfl, I,
this effect, in order to be made good, must depend on such a
supposition as this:— that God's dispensations of grace are
rectifications or amendments of his foregoing constitutions and
proceedings, which were merely legal; as though the dis
pensations of grace, which succeed those of mere law, im
plied an acknowledgment that the preceding legal constitu
tion would be unjust if left as it was, or at least very hard
deahng with mankind ; and that the other were of the na
ture of a satisfaction to his creatures for former injuries, or
hard treatment. So that, put together the injury with the
satisfaction, the legal and injurious dispensation taken with
the following good dispensation, which our author calls
grace, and the unfairness or improper severity of the former
amended by the goodness of the latter, both together made up
one righteous dispensation.
The reader is desired to bear in mind what I have said
concerning the interposition of divine grace not altering the
nature of things as they are in themselves. Accordingly,
when I speak of such and such an evil tendency oi things be
longing to the present nature and state of mankind, under
stand me to mean their tendency as they are in themselves,
abstracted from any consideration of that remedy the sove
reign and infinite grace of God has provided. — ^Having pre
mised these things, I now assert, that mankind are all natu
rally in such a state, as is attended, without fail, with this con
sequence or issue ; that they universai,i.y run themselves
INTO THAT WHICH IS, IN EFFECT, THEIH OWN UTTER ETERNAI,
PERDITION, as being fiinally accursed of God and the subject
of his remediless wrath through sin. — From which I infer,
yet in this dispensation a resurrection is provided ; and that Adam's posterity are
under a mild dispensation of Grace, &c.
P. X18. 8. He vindicates God's dealings with Mam, in placing him at first
under the ngour'of law, transgress and die, (which, as he expresses it, loasputting
Ms happiness on a foot extremely dangerous) by saying, that as God had before deter
mined in his own breast, so he immediately established his covenant upon a quite Afferent
hettom, namely, upon grace.
P. 128, 123, S. Against what R. R. says. That God forsook man when he
&11, and that mankind after Adam's sin were born without the divine favour, &c.
he alleges, among other things, Christ's coming to be the propitiation for the sins of
the whole world — .Snd the riches of God's mercy in giving the promise of aRedeemer
to destroy the works of the devil — Thai he caught his sinning faUing creature m tht
arms of Ma grace.
In his note on Bom. y. 20. p. 297, 298. he says as follows : " The law I conceive,
is not a dispensation suitable to the infirmity of the human nature in our present
state ; or it doth not seem congruous to the goodness of God, to afibrd us no
other way of salvation but by a law, which, if we once transgress, we are ruined
forever. For who then from the beginning of the world could be saved? And
therefore it seems to me,- that the law was not absolutely intended to be a rule
for obtaining life, even to Adam in paradise : Grace was the dispensation God in
tended mankind should be under; and therefore Christ was fore-ordained before
the foundation of the world." — There itre various other passages in this author's
Wrifnrgs of tbe filse ftind.

SiiCT. 1, ATI Men tend to Sin and Ruin. 3-15
that the natural state of the mind of man, is attended with'-
a propensity of nature, which is prevalent and effectual, to such
an issue ; and that therefore their nature is corrupt and deprav
ed with a moral depravity that amounts to and implies their
utter undoing.
Here I would first consider the truth of the proposition ;
and then would shew the certainty of the consequences which
I infer from it. If both can be clearly and certainly proved,
then 1 trust none will deny but that the doctrine of original
depravity is evident, and so the falseness of Dr, T.'s scheme
demonstrated; the greatest part of whose book called the
Scripture Doctrine of Original Sin, &c, is against the doc
trine of innate depravity. In p, 107, S, he speaks of the con
veyance of a corrupt and sinful nature to Adam's posterity as
the grand point to be proved by the maintainers of the doctrine
of original sin.
In order to demonstrate what is asserted in the proposi
tion laid down, there is need only that these two things
should be made manifest : one is this fact, that all mankind
come into the world in such a state as without fail comes to
this issue, namely, the universal commission of sin ; or that
every one who comes to act in the world as a moral agent, ie,
in a greater or less degree, guilty of sin. The other is, that all
sin deserves and exposes to utter and eternal destruction under
God's wrath and curse ; and would end in it, were it not for
the interposition of divine grace to prevent the effect. Both
which can be abundantly demonstrated to be agreeable to the
word of God, and to Dr, T.'s own doctrine.
That every one of mankind, at least such as a;re capable
of acting as moral agents, are guilty of sin (not now taking il
for granted that they come guilty into the world) is most clear
ly and abundantly evident fi-om the holy scriptures : 1 Kings
viii, 46, If any man sin against thee ; for there is no man that
sinneth not. Eccl, vii, 20. Thereis not a just man upon earth
that doeth good and sinneth not. Job, ix, 2, 3, / know it is so of
a truth, (i. e. as Bildad had just before said, that God would
not cast away a perfect man, &c,) but how should man be just
with God." If he will contend with him, he cannot answer him
one of a thousand. To the like purpose, Psal. cxliii, 2, Enter
not into judgment with thy servant ; for in thy sight shall no
man living be justified. So the words of the apostle (in which
he has apparent reference to those of the Psalmist,) Rom, iii.
19, 20. " That every mouth may be stopped, and all the
world become guilty before God. Therefore by the deeds
of the law there shall no flesh be justified in his sight : for by
the law is the knowle^fe^jf . sin. So, Gal. ii, 16, 1 John i, 7 —
10, " If we walk in the light, the blood of Christ cleanseth
us from all sio. If we say that we have no sin, w© deceive oiir-

;{lt) ORieiNAL SlK. P- I" Ch. j.
selves, and thc truth is not in us. If we confess our sins, he
is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from
all unrighteousness. If we say that we have not sinned, we
make him a liar, and his word is not in us," In this, and in
numerable other places, confession and repentance of sin are
spoken of as duties proper for all ; as also prayer to God
for pardon of sin : also forgiveness ofthose that injure us, from
that motive, that we hope to be forgiven of God. Unitersal
guilt of sin inight also be demonstrated from the appoint
ment, and the declared use and end of the ancient sacrifices ;
and also from the ransom which every one that was nupbered
in Israel was directed to pay, to make atonement for his soul,
{Exod. xxx. 11 — 16.) All are represented, not only as bemg
sinful, but as having great and manifold iniquity. {Job. ix, 2,
3, Jam. iii, 1,2,)
There are many scriptures which both declare the univer
sal sinfulness of mankind, and also that all sin deserves and
justly exposes to everlasting destruction, under the wrath and
curse of God ; and so demonstrate both parts of the proposi
tion I have laid down. To which purpose that passage in
Gal. iii. 10, is exceeding full : For as many as are of the works
pfihe law are underthe curse; for itis written, cursed is every
ene that continueth not in all things which are written in the
book of the law, to do them. How manifestly is it implied in
the apostle's meaning here, that there is no man but what
fails in some instances of doing all things that are written in
the book of the law, and therefore as many as have their de
pendence on their fulfilling the law, are under that curse which
is pronounced on them that fail of it ? And hence the apostle
infers in the next verse, that no man is justified by the law in the
sight of God : as he had said before in the preceding chapter,
ver. 16, By the works of the law shall no flesh be justified.
The apostle shews us he understands, that by this place which
he cites from Deuteronomy, the scripture hath concluded, or shut
up all under sin. (Gal. iii. 22.) So that here we are plainly
taught, both that every one of mankind is a sinner, and that
every sinner is under the curse of God,
To the like purpose is Rom. iv, 14. also 2 Cor. iii, 6, 7, 9.
where the law is called the letter thdt kills, the ministration of
death, and the ministration of condemnation. The wrath, con
demnation, and death, which is threatened in the law to all its
transgressors, is final perdition, the second death, eternal ruin ;
as is very plain, and indeed is confessed. And this punishment
which the law threatens for every sin is a fust punishment ;
being what every sin truly deserves ; God's law being a righteous
law, and the sentence of it a righteous sentence.
All these thing* are what jy^r. Taylor himself conf(?8ses

Sect. r. All Men tend to Sin and Ruin. 317
and asserts. He says that the law of God requires perfect
obedience. {Note on Rom. vii. 6. p. 308.) " God can never
require imperfect obedience, or by his holy law allow us to be
guilty of any one sin how small soever. And if the law, as a
rule of duty, were in any respect abolished, then we might
in some respects transgress the law and yet not be guilty of
sin. The moral law, or law of nature, is the truth, everlasting,
unchangeable ; and therefore, as such, can never be abrogated.
On the contrary, our Lord Jesus Christ has promulgated it
anew under the gospel, fuller and clearer than it was in the
mosaical constitution, or any where else : — having added to its
precepts the sanction of his own divine authority," And many
things which he says imply that all mankind do in some degree
transgress the law. In p. 228. speaking of what may be
gathered from Rom. vii. and viii. he says, " We are very apt in
a world full of temptation, to be deceived and drawn into
sin by bodily appetites, &c. And the case of those who are
under a law threatening death to every sin must be quite
deplorable, if they have no relief from the mercy of the law
giver." But. this is very fully declared in what he says in his note
on Rom. v. 20. p. 297. His words are as foUovifs ; " Indeed
as a rule of action prescribing our duty, it (the law) always was
and always must be a rule ordained for obtaining life ; but not
as a rule of justification, not as it subjects to death for every
transgression. For if it could in its utmost rigour have given
us life, then as the apostle argues, it would have been against
the promises of God. For if there had been a law in the strict
and rigorous sense of law, which could have made us live,
verily justification should have been by the law. But he sup
poses no such law was ever given : and therefore there is need
and room enough for the promises of gra'ce : or as he argues.
Gal. ii. 21. it would have frustrated or rendered useless the grace
of God. For if justification came by the law, then truly Christ
is dead in vain, then he oied to accomphsh what was, or might
HAVE been effected by law itself without his death. Certainly
the law was not brought in among the Jeivs to be a rule of jus
tification, or to recover them out of a state of death and to
procure hfe by their sinless obedience to it : For in this, as well
as in another respect, it was weak ; not in itself, but through
the weakness of our flesh, Rom. viii. 3. The law, I conceive,
is not a dispensation suitable to the infirmity ofthe human nature
in our present state ; or it doth not seem congruous to the
goodness of God to afford us no other way of salvation but by
LAW ; WHICH IF WE ONCE TRANSGRESS, WE ARE RUINED FOR
EVER. For WHO then, from the BEGINNING OF THE WORLD,
COULD BE SAVED ?" How clcar and express are these things,

318 ORIGINAL SIN*. P. I- Cft. I,
that no one of mankind, from the beginning of the world, can
ever be justified by law, because every one transgresses it 1*
And here also we see, Dr, T, declares, that by the law
men are sentenced to everlasting ruin ior one transgression.
To the like purpose he often expresses himself So p, 207.
"The law requireth the most extensive obedience, discover-
.ng sin in all its branches, — It gives sin a deadly force, sub
jecting every transgression to the penalty of death ; and yet
supplieth neither help nor 'hope to the sinner, bnt leaving him
under the power of sin and sentence of death," In p. 213, he
speaks of the law as extending to lust and irregular desires, and
to every branch and principle of sin ; and even to its latent
principles and minutest branches; again {Note on Rom. vii.
6. p. 308.) to every sin how small soever. And when he speaks
of the law subjecting every transgression to the penalty of
death, he means eternal death, as he from time to time explains
the matter. In p. 212. he speaks of the law in the condemn
ing power of it, as binding us in everlasting chains. In p. 120.
S. he says, that death which is the wages of sin, is the second
death; and this p. 78. he explains of ^na? perdiiiow. In his
Key, p. 107, § 296, he says, " The curse of the law subjected
men for every transgression to eternal death." So in Note on
Rom. V. 20. p. 291. " The law of Moses subjected those who
were under it to death, meaning by death, eternal death." These
are his words.
He also supposes that this sentence of the law, thus sub
jecting men for every, even the least sin, and every minutest
branch and latent principle of sin to so dreadful a punishment,
is just and righteous, agreeable to truth and the nature of
things, or to the natural and proper demerits of sin. In this
he is very full. Thus in p, 186. P, " It was sin (says he)
which subjected us to death by the law, justly threatening
sin with death. Which law was given us, that sin might ap
pear ; might be «et forth in its proper colours ; when we
saw it subjected us to death by a law perfectly holy, just,
and GOOD ; that sin by the commandment, by the law, might
be represented what it really is, an exceeding great and
deadly evil. So in note on Rom. v. 20. p. 299. " The law or
ministration of death, as it subjects to death for every trans
gression, is still of use to shew the natural and proper
demerit op sin." Ibid. p. 292. " The language of the law,
dying thou shalt die, is to be understood of the demerit oi the
transgression, that which it deserves." Ibid. p. 298. " The
? I am sensible these things are quite inconsistent with what he says else
where, of sufficient power in aU mankind constantly to do the whole duty which God re
quires of them, without a necessity of breaking God's law in any degree, (p. 63 —
68. S.) But I hope the reader wiU not thinH me accountable for feis incongisten-
cif&.

SacT. I. All Men tend to Sfin and Ruin. 319
law was added, saith Mr. Locke, on the place because the
Israelites, the posterity of Abraham, were transgressors as
well as other men, to show them their sins, and the punish
ment and death which in strict justice they incurred by
them. And this appears to be a true comment on Rom. vii.
13. — Sin, by virtue of the law, subjected you to death for this
end, that sin, working death in us, by that which is holy,
just, and good, perfectly consonant to everlasting truth
AND righteousness. — Consequently every sin is in strict jus
tice deserving of wrath and punishment ; and the law in its
rigour was given to the Jews to set home this awful truth
upon their consciences, to show them the evil and pernicious
nature of sin ; and that being conscious they had broke
the law of God, this might convince them of the great need
they had of the favour of the lawgiver, and oblige them by
faith in his goodness, to fly to his mercy for pardon and salva
tion." If the law be holy, just, and good, a constitution perfectly
agreeable to God's holiness, justice, and goodness ; then he
might have put it exactly in execution, agreeably to all these
his perfections. Our author himself says, p. 133. S. " How
that constitution, which establishes a law, the~ making of which
is inconsistent with the justice and goodness of God, and the
executing of it inconsistent with his holiness, can a be righte
ous constitution, I confess is quite beyond my comprehen
sion. Now the reader is left to judge whether it be not most
plainly and fully agreeable to Dr. T.'s own doctrine, that there
never was any one person from the beginning of the world
who came to act in the world as a moral agent, and that it is
not to be hoped there ever will be any, but what is a sinner or
transgressor of the law of God ; and that therefore this proves
to be the issue and event of things, with respect to all man
kind in all ages, that by the natural and proper demerit of
their own sinfiilness, and in the judgment of the law of God,
which is perfectly consonant to truth and exhibits things in
their true colours, they are the proper subjects of the curse
of God, eternal death, and everlasting ruin ; which must be
the actual consequence, unless the grace or favour of the law
giver interpose, and mercy prevail for their pardon and salva
tion. The reader has seen also how agreeable this is to the
doctrine of the holy scripture. If so, and if the interposition
of divine grace alters not the nature of things as they are in
themselves, and that it does not in the least affect the state of
the controversy we are upon — concerning the true nature and
tendency of the state in which mankind come into the world —
whether grace prevents the fatal effect or no ; I trust none will
deny that the proposition laid down isfully proved, us agree.-

320 ftRi*tx\t Six. P. r. Ca. 1.
able to the word of God, and Dr. T.'s own words ; viz. That
mankind are all naturally in such a state as is attended, with
out fjiil, with this consequence or issue, that they uniyersaUy
are the subjects of that guilt mui sinfulness, irliich is, in efect,
their utter and eternal min, being cast wholly out of the
favour of God, and subjected to his everlasting wrath and
curse.

SECT. 11,
It follows from the proposition jtroved in the foregoing Section.
that all Mankind are under the influence of a prevailing
effectual Teridencu in their Natttre to that sin tmd Wick
edness, which implies their utte-r and eternal Ruin.
The proposition laid down being proved, the conscipienre
ofit remains to bo made out, viz. That the mind of man has a
neiturtd tendency or propensity to that event which has been
shewn universally and infallibly to take place ; and that this is
a corrupt or depraved propensity, — I shall here consider th©
former part of this consequence, namely. Whether such an
universal, constant, infallible event is truly a proof of any ten
dency or propensity to tliat event ; leaving the <(v7 and cortt^t
nature of such a propensity to be considered afterwards.
If any should say Ihey do not think that its being a thing
universal and infiillible in event that mankind commit some
sin, is a proof of a prevailing tendency to sin ; because they do
good, and perhaps more good than evil : let them remember
that the question at present is not, How much sin there is a
tendency to ; but, whether tliere be a prevailing propensity to
that issue which it is allowed all men do actually come to
that all fail of keeping the law perfectly — whether there be not
a tendency to such imperfection of obedience as always with
out fail comes to pas.s ; to that degree of sinfulness, at least,
which all fall into; and so to that utter ruin which that sin
fulness implies and infers. Whether an efiectual propensity to
tbis be worth the name of depravity, because of the good that
may be supposed to balance it, shall be considered by and by.
If all mankind, in all nations and ages, were at least one day
in their lives deprived of the use of their reason, and raving
mad ; or that all, even every individual person, once cut
their own throats, or put out their own eyes ; it might be an
evidence of some tendency in the nature or natural state of
mankind to such an event ; though they inight exercise reason
many more daAs than they wore distracted, and were kind to
and tender of themselves oftener than they mortally and cruel-
Iv wounded themselves.

Sect, II. Universal Sin proves a Sinful propensity. 321
To determine whether the unfailing constancy of the
above-named event be an evidence of tendency, let it be con
sidered, What can be meant by tendency, but a prevailing
liableness or exposedness to such or such an event ? Wherein
consists the notion of any such thing, but some stated pre
valence or preponderation in the nature or state of causes or
occasions, that is followed by, and so proves lo bc effectual
to, a stated prevalence or commonness of any particular kind
of effect ? Or something in the permanent state of things,
concerned in bringing a certain sort of event to pass, which
is a foundation for the constancy or strongly prevailing proba
bility of such an event? If wc mean this by tendency, (and
I know not what else can be meant by it, but this or something
like,) then it is inanifest, that where we see a stated preva
lence of any effect there is a tendency to that effect in ths
nature and state of its causes. A common and steady effect
shews that there is somewhere a preponderation, a prevailing
exposedness or liableness in the state of things, to what comes
so steadily to pass. The natural dictate of reason shews, that
where there is an effect there is a cause, and a cause sufficient
for the effect ; because if it were not sufiicient, it would not be
efFectual ; and that therefore, where there is a stated preva
lence of the effect, there is a stated prevalence in the cause.
A steady effect argues a steady cause. We obtain a notion of
tendency, no other way than by observation : And we can
observe nothing but events: And it is the commonness or con
stancy of events that gives us a notion of tendency in all cases.
Thus we judge of tendencies in the natural world. Thus we
judge of the tendencies or propensities of nature in minerals,
vegetables, animals, rational and irrational creatures. A notion
of a stated tendency or fixed propensity, is not obtained by
observing only a single event. A stated preponderation in tho
cause or occasion, is argued only by a stated prevalence of the
effect. If a die be once thrown and it falls on a particular
side, we do not argue from hence, that thai side is the heaviest ;
but if it be thrown without skill or care many thousands or
millions of times, and it constantly falls on the same side, wc
have not the least doubt in our minds but that there is some
thing of propensity in the case, by superior weight of that side,
or, in some other respect. How ridiculous would ho make
himself, who should earnestly dispute against any tendency in
the state of things to cold in the winter or heat in the summer;
or should stand to it, that although it often happened that
water quenched fire, yet there was no tendency in it to such an
effect ?
In the case we are upon, human nature, as existing in
such an immense diversity of persons and circumstances and
never failing^in any one instance, of coming to that^ issue —
VOL. n. 41

322 obiginal sin. P, i. Ch. i
that sinfulness, which implies extreme misery and eternal
ruin-— is as the die often cast. For it alters not the case in the
least as to the evidence of tendency, whether the subject of
the constant event be an individual, or a nature and kind.
Thus, if there be a succession of trees of the same sort, pro
ceeding one from another from the beginning of the world,
growing in all countries, soils, arid climates, all bearing ill
fruit ; it as much proves the nature and tendency of the kind,
as if it were only one individual tree that had remained from
the beginning of the world, often transplanted into different
soils, and had continued to bear only bad fruit. So, if there
were a particular family, which, from generation to generation,
and through every remove to innumerable different countries
and places of abode, all died of a consumption, or all run dis
tracted, or all murdered themselves, it would be as much an
evidence of the tendency of something in the nature or con
stitution of that race, as it would be of the tendency of some
thing in the nature or state of an individual, if some one per
son had lived all that time, and some remarkable event had
often appeared in him, which he had been the agent or subject
of from year to year and from age to age, continually and with
out fail.* Thus a propensity attending the present nature or natural
state of mankind, eternally to ruin themselves by sin, may cer
tainly be inferred frorn apparent ahd acknowledged fact, —
And I would now observe further, that not only does this fol
low from facts acknowledged by Dr, T. but the things he asserts
and the expressions which he uses, plainly imply that all man
kind have such a propensity ; yea, one of the highest kind, a
propensity that is invincible, or a tendency which really amounts
to a fixed, constant, unfailing necessity. There is a plain con
fession of a propensity or proneness to sin, p, 143, — " Man
who drinketh in iniquity like water; who is attended with
so many sensual appetites, and so apt to indulge them, — "
And again, p. 228, " We are very apt, in a world full
* Here may be observed the weakness of that objection made against the
validity of the argument for a fixed propensity to sin from the constancy and uni
versaUty of the event, that Adam sinned in one instance without a fixed propen
sity. Without doubt a single event is an evidence that there was some cause or oc
casion of that event : But the thing we are speaking of, is a fixed cause : Propen
sity is a stated continued thing. We justly agree, that a stated effect must have a
stoted cause, and truly observe, that we obtain the notion of tendency or stated pre
ponderation in causes, no other way than by observing a stated prevalence of a
particular kind of eflect. But who ever argues a fixed propensity from a single
event ? And it is not strange arguing, that because an event which once comes
to pass does not prove any stated tendency, therefore the unfailing constancy of
an event is an evidence ofno such thing ? But because Dr. T. makes so much of
this objection from Adam sinning without a propensity, 1 shall hereafter consider
it more particularly, in the beginning of the 9th section of this chapter ; where
win also be considered what is objected from the fall of the angels.

Sect, 11, Universal Sin proves a Sinful propensity. 323
of temptation, to be deceived and drawn into sin by bodi
ly appetites," — If we are very apt or prone to be drawn
into sin by bodily appetites and sinfully to indulge them, and
very apt or prone to yield to temptation to sin, then we are
prone to sin ; for to yield to temptation to sin is sinful. — In
the same page he shews, that on this account and its con
sequences, the case of those who are under a law threatening
death for every sin must be quite deplorable, if they have no re
lief from the mercy of the lawgiver. Which implies that their
case is hopeless as to any escape from death, the punishment
of sin, by any other means than God's mercy. And that im
plies such an aptness to yield to temptation as renders hope
less that any of mankind should wholly avoid it. But he
speaks of it elsewhere, over and over, as truly impossible, or
what cannot be; as in the words before cited in the last section
from his note on Rom. v, 20, where he repeatedly speaks of
the law, which subjects us to death for every transgression, as
what cannot give life ; and states, that if God offered us no
other way of salvation, no man from the beginning of the world
COULD be saved. In the same place he cites with approbation
Mr, Locke's words, in which, speaking of the Israelites, he
says, " All endeavours after righteousness was lost labour,
since any one slip forfeited life, and it was impossible for
them to expect ought but death." Our author speaks of it as
impossible for the law requiring sinless obedience to give
life, not that the law was weak in itself, but through the weakness
of our flesh. Therefore he says he conceives the law not to be
a dispens.ation suitable to the infirmity of the human nature in
its present state. These things amount to a full confession,
that tbe proneness in men to sin and to a demerit of and just
exposedness to eternal ruin, is universally invincible ; or
which is the same thing, amounts to invincible necessity;
which surely is the highest kind of tendency or propensity :
And that not the less, for his laying this propensity to our in
firmity or weakness, which may seem to intimate some de
fect, rather than any thing positive : And it is agreeable to
the sentiments of the best divines, that all sin originally comes
from a defective or private cause. But sin does not cease
to be sin justly exposing to eternal ruin (as implied in Dr, T,'s
own words) for arising from infirmity or defect ; nor does an
invincible propensity to sin cease to be a propensity to such
demerit of eternal ruin, because the proneness arises from such
a cause. It is manifest, that this tendency which has been proved,
does not exist in any particular external circumstances that
perspns are in peculiarly influencing their minds ; but is inher
ent, and is seated in that nature which is common to all man
kind, which they carry with them wherever they go, and still

334 0EI61NAL SlK. P, I. Ch, 1.
remains the same however circumstances may differ. For it
is implied in what has been proved and shewn to be confessed,
that the same event comes to pass in all circumstances. In
God's sight no tnan living can be justified; but all are sinners,
and exposed to condemnation. This is true of persons of all
constitutions, capacities, conditions, manners, opinions and
educations ; in all countries, climates, nations and ages ; and
through all the mighty changes and revolutions which have
come to pass in the habitable world.
We have the same evidence that the propensity in tliis case
lies in the nature of the subject — and does not aiise from any
particular circumstances — as we have in any case whatsoever ;
which is only by the effects appearing to be the same in all
changes of time and place, and under all varieties of circum
stances. It is in this way only we judge that any propensities
•which we observe in mankind, are seated in their »ature in all
otlier cases. It is thus we judge of the mutual propensity be
twixt the sexes, or of the dispositions which are exercised in
any of the natural passions or appetites, that they truly belong
to the nature of man ; because they are observed in mankind in
general through all countries, nations and ages, and in all con
ditions. If any should say. Though it be evident that there is a
tendency in the state of tilings to this general event — that all
mankind should fail of perfect obedience, and should sin, and
incur a demerit of eternal ruin ; and also that this tendency
does not lie in any distinguishing circumstances of any parti
cular people, person or age — yet it may not lie in man's nature,
but in the general constitution and frame of this world. Though
the nature of man may be good, without any evil propensity
inherent in it; yet the nature and universal state of this world
may be full of so many and strong temptations and of such
powerful influence on such a creature as man, dwelling in so
infirm a body, &c. that the result of the whole may be a strong
and infallible tendency in such a state of things, to the sin and
eternal ruin of every one of mankind.
To this I would reply, that such an evasion will not at all
avail to the purpose of those whom I oppose in this controversy.
It alters not the case as to this question. Whether man, in his
present state, is depraved and ruined by propensities to sin. If
any creature be of such a nature that it proves evil in its proper
place, or in the situation which God has assigned it in the uni
verse, it is of an evil nature. That part of the system is not
good, which is not good in its place in the system ; and those
inherent qualities of that part of the system which are not good,
but corrupt, in that place are justly looked upon as evil inher
ent qualities. That propensity is truly esteemed to belong to
the nature of any being, or to be inherent in it, that is the ne-

Sect. n. Universal Sin proves a Sinful propensity. 325
cessary consequencie of its nature, considered together with its
proper situation in the universal system of existence ; whether
that propensity be good or bad. It is the nature of a stone to
be heavy ; but yet if it were placed, as it might be, at a distance
from this world, it would have no such quality. But being a
stone is of such a nature, that it will have this quality or tenden
cy in its proper place in this world, where God has made it, it
it is properly looked upon as a propensity belonging to its nature.
And if it be a good propensity here in its proper place, then it
is a good quality of its nature ; but if it be contrariwise, it is
an evil natural quality. So, if mankind are of such a nature
that they have an universal effectual tendency to sin and ruin in
this world, where God has made and placed them, this isto be
looked upon as a pernicious tendency belonging to their nature.
There is perhaps scarce any such thing, in beings not indepen
dent and self-existent, as any power or tendency but what has
some dependence on other beings, with which they stand con
nected in the universal system of existence. Propensities are
no propensities any otherwise than as taken with their objects.
Thus it is with the tendencies observed in natural bodies, such
as gravity, magnetism, electricity, &c. And thus it is with the
propensities observed in the various kinds of animals : and thus
it is with most of the propensities in created spirits.
It may further be observed, that it is exactly the same
thing as to the controversy concerning an agreeableness with
God's moral perfections of such a disposal of things — that man
should come into the world in a depraved and ruined state by
a propensity to sin and ruin — whether God has so ordered it,
that this propensity should lie in his nature considered alone, or
with relation to its situation in the universe, and its connection
with other parts of the system to which the Creator has united
it ; which is as much of God's ordering as man's nature itself,
most simply considered.
Dr. T. (p. 188, 189.) speakingof the attempt of some to
solve the difficulty of God being the author of our nature and
yet that our nature is polluted, by supposing that God makes
the soul pure, but unites it to a polluted body, (or a body so
made as tends to pollute the soul ;) he cries out of it as weak
and insufficient, and too gross to be admitted : For, says he,
Who infused the soul into the body ? And if it is polluted by
being infused into the body. Who is the author and cause of its
pollution ? And who created the body, <^c. — But is not the case
just the same, as to those who suppose that God made the soul
pure, and places it in a polluted world, or a world tending by
its natural state in which it is made to pollute the soul, or to
have such an influence upon it that it shall without fail be
polluted with sin and eternally ruined ? Here may not I also
cry out, on as good grounds as Dr. T. — Who placed the soul

326 original sin, P. i. Ch, i.
here in this world ? And if the world be polluted, or so con
stituted as naturally and infallibly to pollute the soul with sin,
Who is the cause of this pollution ? And, who created the
world ?
Though in the place now cited, Dr, T, so insists upon it,
that God must be answerable for the pollution of the soul,
if he has infused or put rhe soul into a body that tends to pol
lute it : yet this is the ver. thing which he himself supposes
to be fact, with respect to the soul being created by God,
in such d body, and in such a world ; where he says, " We are
apt, in a world full of temptation, to be drawn into sin by
bodily appetites." And if so, according to his way of reason
ing, God must be the author and cause of this aptness to be
drawn into sin. Again, p. 143. we have these words, " Who
drinketh in iniquity like water ? Who is attended with so many
sensual appetites, and so apt to indulge them ?"¦ In these words
our author in effect says the individual things that he exclaims
against as so gross, viz. — The tendency of the body, as God has
made it, to pollute the soul which he has infused into it. These
sensual appetites which incline the soul or make it apt to a
sinful indulgence, are either from the body which God hath
made, or otherwise a proneness to sinful indulgence is immedi
ately and originally seated in the soul itself, which will not mend
the matter. I would lastly observe, that our author insists upon it, p.
42, S, that this lower world, in its present state, " Is as it was,
when, upon a review, God pronounced it and all its furniture,
very good. And that the present form and furniture of the
earth is full of God's riches, mercy, and goodness, and of the
most evident tokens of his love and bounty to the inhabitants,"
If so, there can be no room for evading the evidences from
facts of the universal infallible tendency of man's nature to sin
and eternal perdition ; since, on the supposition, the tendency
to this issue does not lie in the general constitution and frame
of this world, which God hath made to be the habitation of
mankind.

Sect. hi. This Tendency most corrupt and pernicious. 327

SECT. Ill,
That propensity which has been proved to be in the Nature
of all Mankind, must be a very evil, depraved, and per
nicious Propensity ; making it manifest, that the Soul of
Man as it is by Nature, is in a corrupt, fallen, and
ruined State ; which is the other Part of the Conse- j
quence drawn from the Proposition laid down in the first '
Section.
The question to be considered in order to determine
whether man's nature be depraved and ruined, is not, Whether
he is inclined to perform as many good deeds as bad ones ?
But to which of these two he preponderates in the frame of his
heart and the state of his nature, a state of innocence and
righteousness, and favour with God ; or a state of sin, guilti
ness, and abhorrence in the sight of God ? — Persevering sinless
righteousness, or else the guilt of sin, is the alternative on the
decision of which depends — according to the nature and truth
of things, as they are in themselves, and according to the rule
of right and of perfect justice — man being approved and ac
cepted of his Maker and eternally blessed as good ; or his be
ing rejected and cursed as bad. And therefore the determina
tion of the tendency of man's heart and nature, with respect
to these terms, is that which is to be looked at, in order to de
termine whether his nature is good or evil, pure or corrupt,
sound or ruined. If such be man's nature and the state ofhis
heart, that he has an infallibly effectual propensity to the lat
ter of those terms ; then it is wholly impertinent to talk of the
innocent and kind actions, even of criminals themselves, sur
passing their crimes in numbers, and of the prevailing innocence,
good nature, industry, felicity, and cheerfulness of the greater
part of mankind. Let never so many thousands or millions of
acts of honesty, good nature, &c, be supposed ; yet, by the
supposition, there is an unfaihng propensity to such moral evil
as in its dreadful consequences infinitely outweighs all effects
or consequences of any supposed good. Surely that tendency
which in effect is an infallible tendency to eternal destruction,
is an infinitely dreadful and pernicious tendency : And that
nature and frame of mind which implies such a tendency,
must be an infinitely dreadful and pernicious frame of mind.
It would be much more absurd to suppose, that such a state of
nature is not bad, under a notion of men doing more honest and
kind things than evil ones ; than to say the state of that ship
is good for crossing the Atlantic Ocean, though such as cannot
hold together through the voyage, but will infallibly founder

328 original sisf. P. i. Ch. i,
and sink, under a notion that it may probably go great part of
the way before it sinks, or that it will proceed and sail above
water more hours than it will be m sinking : Or, to pronounce
that road a good road to go to such a place, the greater part
of which is plain and safe, though some parts of it are danger
ous and certainly fatal to them that travel in it ; or to call that
a good propensity, which is an inflexible inclination to travel in
such a way,
A propensity to that sin which brings God's eternal wrath
and curse (which has been proved to belong to the nature of
man) is evil, not only as it is calamitous and sorrowful, ending
in great natural evil; but as it is odious and detestable; for
by the supposition, it tends to that moral evil by which the
subject becomes odious in the sight of God, and liable as such,
to be condemned, and utterly rejected, and cursed by him.
This also makes it evident, that the state which it has been
proved mankind are in is a corrupt state in a moral sense, that
it is inconsistent with the fulfilment of the law of God, which is
the rule of moral rectitude and goodness. That tendency
which is opposite to what the moral law requires, and prone to
that which the moral law utterly forbids and eternally condemns,
is doubtless a corrupt tendency, in a moral sense.
So that this depravity is both odious, and also pernicious,
-fatal and destructive, in the highest sense ; as inevitably tending
to that which implies man's eternal ruin. It shews that man,
as he is by nature, is in a deplorable state, in the highest sense.
And this proves that men do not come into the world perfectly
innocent in the sight of God, and without any just exposedness
to his displeasure. For the being by nature in a lost and ruined
slate, in the highest sense, is not consistent with being by nature
in a state of favour with God,
But if any should still insist on a notion of men's good
deeds exceeding their bad ones, and that, seeing the good more
than countervails the evil, they cannot be properly denomina
ted evil ; all persons and things being most properly denomi
nated from that which prevails and has the ascendant in them;
I would say further. That if there is in man's nature a tenden
cy to guilt and ill desert in a vast overbalance to virtue and
merit; or a propensity to sin, the demerit of which is so great,
that the value and merit of all the virtuous acts that ever he per
forms are as nothing to it ; then truly the nature of man may be
said to be corrupt and evil.
That this is the true case, may be demonstrated by what
is evident of the infinite heinousness of sin against God, from
the nature of things. The heinousness of this must rise in
some proportion to the obligation we are under to regard the
Divine Being; and that must be in some proportion to his
worthiness of regard; which doubtless is infinitely beyond

Sect. III. This tendency most corrupt and pernicious. 329
the worthiness of any of our fellow-creatures. But the merit
of our respect or obedience to God is not infinite. The merit
of respect to any being does not increase, but is rather dimi
nished, in proportion to the obligations we are under in strict
justice to pay him that respect. There is no great merit in
paying a debt we owe, and by the highest possible obligations
in strict justice are obliged to pay; but there is great demerit
in refusing to pay it. That on such accounts as these, there
is an infinite demerit in all sin against God, which must there
fore inimensely outweigh all the merit whioh can be supposed
to be in our virtue, I think is capable of full demonstration ;
and that the futility of the objections which some have made
against the argument might most plainly be demonstrated.
But I shall omit a particular consideration of the evidence of
this matter from the nature of things, as I study brevity, and
lest any should cry out, metaphysics! as the manner of some
is, when any argument is handled against a tenet they are
fond of with a close and exact consideration of the nature of
things. And this is not so necessary in the present case, in as
much as the point asserted — that he wbo commits any one sin
has guilt and ill desert so great, that the value and merit of all
the good which it is possible he should do in his own life is
as nothing to it — is not only evident by metaphysics, but is
plainly demonstrated by what has been shewn to he fact, with
respect to God's own constitutions and dispensations towards
mankind. Thus, whatever acts of virtue and obedience a man
performs, yet if he trespasses in one point, is guilty of any, the
least sin, he — according to the law of God, and so according
to the exact truth of things and the proper demerit of sin —
is exposed to be wholly cast out of favour with God and sub
jected to his curse, to be utterly and eternally destroyed. This
has been proved ; and shown to be the doctrine which Dr. T.
abundantly teaches.
But how can it be agreeable to the nature of things and
exactly consonant to everlasting truth and righteousness, thus
to deal with a creature for the least sinful act, though he
should perform ever so many thousands of honest and virtuous
acts, to countervail the evil of that sin 1 Or how can it be
agreeable to the exact truth and real demerit of things, thus
wholly to cast off the deficient creature without any regard to
the merit of all his good deeds, unless that be in truth the
case, that the value and merit of all those good actions bear
no proportion to the heinousness of the least sin? If it were
not so, one would think that however the offending person
might have some proper punishment, yet seeing there is so
much virtue to lay in the balance against the guilt, it would
be agreeable to the nature of things that he should find some
favour, and not be altogether rejected and made the subject
VOL. II. 42

330 OIHGIN AI. SIN. P, i.Ch, I.
of perfect and eternal destruction ; and thus no account at all
be made of all his virtue, so much so as to procure him the
least relief or hope. How can such a constitution represent
sin in its proper colours, and according to its true nature and
desert, (as Dr. T. says it does) unless this be its true nature,
that it is so bad, that even in the least instance it perfectly
swallows up all the value of the sinner's supposed good deeds,
let them be ever so many. So that tbis matter is not left to
our metaphysics or philosophy ; the great lawgiver and infal
lible judge of the universe has clearly decided it in the revela
tion he has made of what is agreeable to exact truth, justice,
and the nature of things, in his revealed law or rule of righte
ousness. He that in any respect or degree is a transgressor of God's
law, is a wicked man, yea, wholly wicked in the eye of the
law ; all his goodness being esteemed nothing, having no ac
count made of it, when taken together with his wickedness.
And therefore, without any regard to his righteousness, he is,
by the sentence of the law, and so by the voice of truth and
justice, to be treated as worthy to be rejected, abhorred, and
cursed for ever ; and must be so, unless grace interpose to co
ver his transgression. But men are really in themselves what
they are in the eye of the law, and by the voice of strict equity
and justice ; however they may be looked upon and treated
by infinite and unmerited mercy.
So that on the whole it appears all mankind have an infal
libly effectual propensity to that moral evil, which infinitely
outweighs the value of all the good that can be in them ;
and have such a disposition of heart, that the certain conse
quence of it is their being, in the eye of perfect truth and
righteousness, wicked men. And I leave all to judge, whe
ther such a disposition be not in the eye of truth a depraved
disposition ?
Agreeable to these things, the scripture represents all
mankind not only as having guilt, but immense guilt, which
they caa have no merit or worthiness to countervail. Such is
the representation we have in Matt, xviii. 21. to the end, —
There, on Peter's enquiring. How often his brother should tres
pass against him and he forgive him, whether until seven times ?
Christ replies, I say not unto thee, until seven times, but until
seventy times seven ; apparently meaning, that he should es
teem no number of offences too many, and no degree of in
jury it is possible our neighbour should be guilty of towards us,
too great to be forgiven. For which this reason is given in the
parable following, that if ever we obtain forgiveness and fa
vour with God, he must pardon that guilt and injury towards
his majesty which is immensely greater than the greatest inju
ries that ever men are guilty of one towards another ; yea.

Sect. ih. 27ms Tendency most corrupt and. peimicious. 331
than the sum of all their injuries put together, let them be ever
so many, and ever so great ; so that the latter would be but
as an hundred pence to ten thousand talents, which immense
debt we owe to God and have nothing to pay ; which implies,
that we have no merit to countervail any part of our guilt. —
And this must be, because if all that may be called virtue in
us be compared with our ill desert, it is in the sight of God
as nothing to it. The parable is not to represent Peter's case
in particular, but that of all that who then were, or ever
should be, Christ's disciples ; as appears by the conclusion of
the discourse, (ver. 35.) So likewise shall my heavenly Father
^'^1 \f y^ from your hearts forgive not every one his brother
iheir trespasses.
Therefore how absurd must it be for christians to object
against the depravity of man's nature, a greater number of in
nocent and kind actions than of crimes ; and to talk of a pre
vailing innocency, good nature, industry, and cheerfulness of
the greater part of mankind ? Infinitely more absurd than it
would be to insist, that the domestic of a prince was not a bad
servant, because though sometimes he contemned and affront
ed his master to a great degree, yet he did not spit in his master's
face so ofteii as he performed acts of service. More absurd
than it would be to affirm, that his spouse was a good wife to
him, because, although she committed adultery, and that with
the slaves and scoundrels sometimes, yet she did not do this so
often as she did the duties of a wife. These notions would be
absurd, because the crimes are too heinous to be atoned for by
many honest actions of the servant or spouse of the prince ;
there being a vast disproportion between the merit ofthe one
and the ill desert of the other : But infinitely less than that be
tween the demerit of our offences against God, and the value of
our acts of obedience.
Thus I have gone through with my first argument ; having
shewn the evidence of the truth of the proposition laid down at
first, and proved its consequence. But there are many other
things that manifest a very corrupt tendency or disposition in
man's nature in his present state, which I shall take notice of in
the following sections.

i'S2 ojRmiNAL siiv. P-1. Ch. i.

SECT. IV.
The depravity of Nature appears by a Propensity in all to Sin
immediately, as soon as they are capable of it, arid to Sin
continually and progressively ; and also by the Remains of
Sin in the best of Men.
The great depravity of man's nature appears, not only in
that they universally commit sin who spend any long time in
the world ; but in that men are naturally so prone to sin, that
none ever fail of immediately transgressing God's law, and so
of bringing infinite guilt on themselves, and exposing them
selves to eternal perdition, as soon as they are capable ofit.
The scriptures are so very express upon it, that all man
kind, all flesh, all the world, every man living, are guilty of
sin ; that it must at least be understood, every one capable of
active duty to God or of sin against him. There are multi
tudes in the world who have but very lately begun to exert
their faculties as moral agents ; and so have but just entered
on their state of trial as acting for themselves : many thousands
constantly, who have not lived one month, or week, or day,
since they have arrived at any period that can be assigned (for
the conimencement of their agency) from their birth to twenty
years of age. Now — if there be not a strong propensity in
men's nature to sin, that should, as it vvere, hurry them on to
speedy transgression, and if they have no guilt prgvious •totheir
personal sinning — what should hinder, bunhat there might
always be a great numb. r, who have hitherto kept themselves
free from sin, and have perfectly obeyed God's law, and so . are
righteous in his sight, with the righteousness of the law ? And
who, if they should be called out of the world without any long
er trial, as great numbers die at all periods of life, would be
justified by the deeds ofthe law ? And how then can it be true,
that in God's sight no man Uving can be justifled, that no man
can be just with God, and that by the deeds of thc law no flesh
can be justified, because by the law is the knowledge of sin ?
And what should hinder but that there may alivays be many in
the world — who are capable subjects of instruction and coun
sel, and of prayer to God — for whom the calls of God's word
to repentance, to seek pardon through the blood of Christ, and
to forgive others their injuries because they need that God should
forgive them, would not be proper ; and for whom the Lord's
prayer is not suitable, whefein Christ directs all his followers to
pray that God would forgive their sins, as they forgive those
that trespass against them ?

Sect. iv. All men Sin immediately, ^c. 333
If there are any in the world — though but lately be
come capable of acting for themselves as subjects of God's
law — who are perfectly free from sin ; such are most likely to
be found among the children of christian parents, who give
them the most pious education and set them the best exam
ples. And therefore such would never be so likely to be found
in any part or age of the world, as in the primitive christian
church, in the first age of Christianity, (the age of the Church's
greatest purity) so long after Christianity had been established
that there had been time for great numbers of children to be
born, and educated by those primitive christians. It was in that
age, and in such a part of that age, that the apostle John wrote
. his first epistle to the christians. But if there was then a num
ber of them come to understanding who were perfectiy free
from sin, why should he write as he does ? 1 John i. 8, 9, 10,
If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth
is not in us. If we confess our sins, he is faithful and just to for
give us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness. If we
say that we have not sinned, we make him a liar, and the truth
is not in ws.*
Again, the reality and greatness ofthe depravity of man's
nature appears in this. That he has a prevailing propensity to
be continually sinning against God. What has been observed
above will clearly prove this. That same disposition of nature
which is an effectual propensity to immediate sin, amounts to a
propensity to continual sin. For a being prone to continual sin
ning is nothing but a proneness to immediate sin continued.
Such appears to be the tendency of nature to sin, that as soon
as ever man is capable, it causes him immediately to sin, with.
* If any should object, that this is an overstraining of things ; and that it sup
poses a greater niceness and exactness than is observed in scripture representa
tions to infer frora these expressions, that all men sin immedia.'ely as soon as ever
they are capable of it. To this I would say, that I think the arguments used are
truly solid, and do really and justly conclude, either that men are born guilty,
and so are chargeable with sin before they come to act for themselves, or else
commit sin immediately, without the least time intervening, after they are capa
ble of understanding their obligations to God, and reflecting on themselves ; and
that the scripture clearly determines there is not one suchperson in the world, free
from sin. But whether this be straining things to too great an exactness or not ;
yet I suppose none that do not entirely set aside the sense of such scriptures as
have been mentioned, and deny those propositions which Dr. T. himself allows
to be contained in some of them, will deny they prove, that no considerable time
passes alter men are capable of acting for themselves, as thi subjects of God's
law, before they are guilty of sin ; because if the time were considerable, it
would be great enough to deserve to be taken notice of, as an exception to such
universal propositions as, in thy sight shall no num. living be justified, &c. And
if this be allowed, that men are so prone to sin that in fact all mankind do
sin, as it were, immediately, after they come to be capa.ble of it, or fail not to sin
ao soon that no considerable time passes before they run into transgression against
God; it does not rauch alter the caseas to the present argument. Ifthe time
of freedom from sin be so small as not to be worthy of notice in the fore-
mentioned universal propositions of scripture, it is also so small as not to be
worthy of notice in ^he present argument.

334 - tTRiGiNAL siKf. P. I, Ch, i
out suffering any considerable time to pass without sin. And
therefore, if the same propensity be continued undiminished,
there will be an equal tendency to immediate sinning again,
without any considerable time passing. And so the same will
always be a disposition still immediately to sin, with as little
time passing without sin afterwards as at first. The only rea
son that can be given why sinning must be immediate at first,
is that the disposition is so great, that it will not suffer any con
siderable time to pass without sin : and therefore, the same
disposition being continued in equal degree, without some new
restraint or contrary tendency, it will still equally tend to the
same eff'ect. And though it is true, the propensity may be di
minished or have restraints laid upon it, by the gracious dispo
sals of providence or the merciful influences of God's spirit ;
yet this is not owing to nature. That strong propensity of na
ture by which men are so prone to immediate sinning at first,
has no tendency in itself to a diminution ; but rather to an in
crease; as the continued exercise of an evil disposition in
repeated actual sins, tends to strengthen it more and more :
agreeable to that observation of Dr, T.'s, p, 228. " We are apt
to be drawn into sin by bodily appetites, and when once we
are under the government of these appetites, it is at least ex
ceeding difficult, if not impracticable, to recover ourselves by
the mere force of reason." The increase of strength of dis
position in such a case is as in a falling body, the strength of
its tendency to descend is continually increased, so long as its
motion is continued. Not only a constant commission of sin,
but a constant increase in the habits and practice of wicked
ness, is the true tendency of man's depraved nature, if unre
strained by divine grace ; as the true tendency of the nature
of an heavy body, if obstacles are removed, is not only to fall
with a continual motion, but with a constantly increasing mo
tion. And we see that increasing iniquity is actually the con
sequence of natural depravity in most men, notwithstanding
all the restraints they have. Dispositions to evil are common
ly much stronger in adult persons, than in children when they
first begin to act in the world as rational creatures.
If sin be such a thing as Dr. T. himself represents it, p.
69. " a thing of an odious and destructive nature, the corrup
tion and ruin of our nature, and infinitely hateful to God;
then such a propensity to continual and increasing sin must be
a very evil disposition. And if we may judge of the perni-
ciousness of an inchnation of nature, by the evil of the effect
it naturally tends to, the propensity of man's nature must be
evil indeed : For the soul being immortal, as Dr. T. acknow
ledges, p. 94. /S, it will follow from what has been observed
above, that man has a natural disposition, to one of these two
things ; either to an increase of wickedness without end, or till

SfiCT, IV. Atl men Sin immediately, ^c. 335
wickedness comes to be so great, that the capacity of his na
ture will not allow it to be greater. This being what his wick
edness vvill come to by its natural tendency, if divine grace
does not prevent, it may as truly be said to be the effect which
man's natural corruption tends to, as that an acorn in a proper
soil truly tends by its nature to become a great tree.
Again, That sin which is remaining in the hearts of the
best men on earth, makes it evident that man's nature is cor
rupt as he comes into the world. A remaining depravity of
heart in the greatest saints may be argued from the sins of most
ofthose who are set forth in scripture as the most eminent in
stances and examples of virtue and piety : and is also manifest
from this, that the scripture represents all God's children aS
standing in need of chastisement. Heb, xii, 6, 7, 8, For whom
the Lord loveth he chasteneth ; atul scourgeth every son whom
he receiveth. — What son is he, whom the Father chasteneth not ?
If ye are without chastisement, then are ye bastards, and not
sons. But this is directly and fully asserted in some places ;
as in Eccles, vii, 20, There is not a just man upon earth, that
doeth good and sinneth not. Which is as much as to say, there
is no man upon earth that is so just, as to have attained to such
a degree of righteousness as not to commit any sin. Yea, the
apostle James speaks of all christians as often sinning, or com
mitting many sins ; even in that primitive age of the christian
church, an age distinguished from all others by eminent attain
ments in holiness ; Jam. iii. 2. In many things we all offend.
And that there is pollution in the hearts of all antecedent to all
means for purification, is very plainly declared in Prov. xx. 9,
Who can say, I have made my heart clean, I am pure from my
sin? According to Dr, T, men come into the world wholly free ,
from sinful propensities. And if so, it appears from what has
been already said, there would be nothing to hinder — but that
many, without being better thaln they are by nature, might per
fectly avoid the commission of sin. But much more might this
be the case with men after they had, by care, diligence, and good
practice, attained those positive habits of virtue whereby they
are at a much greater distance from sin than they were na
turally — :which this writer supposes to be the case with many
good men. But since the scripture teaches us that the best
men in the world do often commit sin, and have remaining poi-*
lution of heart, this makes it abundantly evident that men, when
they are no otherwise than they were by nature, without any
of those virtuous attainments, have a sinful depravity ; yea, must
have great corruption of nature.

336 ORIGINAL SIN. P. I, Ch, I.

SECT. V.
The depravity of Nature appears, in that the general consequence
of the State and Tendency of Man's Nature is a much
greater degree of Sin, than Righteousness ; not only with
" respect to value and demerit, but matter and quantity.
I have before shewn that there is a propensity in man's
nature to that sin, wh^h in heinousness and ill desert immense
ly outweighs all the value and merit of any supposed good that
may be in him, or that he can do, I now proceed to say fur
ther, that such is man's nature in his present state, that it tends
to this lamentable effect, that there should at all times, through
the course of his life, be at least much more sm than righteous
ness ; not only as to weight and value, but as to matter and
measure; more disagreement of heart and practice from the law
of God. and from the law of nature and reason, than agreement
and conformity. The law of God is the rule of right, as Dr. T.
often calls it. It is the measure of virtue and sin : so much
agreement as there is with this rule, so much is there of recti
tude, righteousness, or true virtue, and no more ; and so much
disagreement as there is with this rule, so much sin is there.
Having premised this, the following things may be here ob
served,
, I. The degree of disagreement from this rule of right is to
'be determined, not only by the degree of distance from it in ex
cess but also in defect ; or in other words, not only in positive
transgression, or doing what 'is forbidden, but also in withholding
what is required. The divine Lawgiver does as much prohibit
the one as the other, and does as much charge the latter as a
sinful breach of his law, exposing to his eternal wrath and
curse, as the former. Thus at the day of judgment, as de
scribed, Matth. xxv. The wicked are condemned as cursedto
everlasting flre, for their sin in defect and omission ; I was an
hungered, and ye gave me no meat, ^c. And the case is thus,
not only when the defect is in word or behaviour, but in the
inward temper and exercise of the mind, I Cor, xvi, 22. If
imy man love not the Lord Jesus Christ, let him^e jinathema ^
Maranat/iaT Dr. T. speaking ofthe sentence and punishment
of the wicked, {Matth. xxv. 41 , 46.)says, p. 159, " It was ma
nifestly for WANT of benevolence, love, and compassion to
their fellow-creatures, that they were condemned," And
elsewhere, as was observed before, he says, that the law of
God extends to the latent principles of sin to forbid them, and
to condemn to eternal destruction for them. And if so, it
doubtless also extends to the inward principles of holiness, to

Sect, v. All have more Sin than Virtue. 337
require them, and in like manner to condemn them for the want
of them. II. The sum of our duty to God required in his law, is
LOVE ; taking love in a large sense, for the true regard of our
hearts to God, implying esteem, honour, benevolence, grati
tude, complacence, &;c. This is not only very plain by the
scripture, but it is evident in itself The sum of what the law
of God requires, is doubtless obedience to that law : No law
can require more than that it be obeyed. But it is manifest,
that obedience is nothing, any otherwise than as a testimony
of the respect of our hearts to God : Without the heart, man's
external acts are no more than the motions of the limbs of a
wooden image : have no more of the nature of either sin oi-
righteousness. It must therefore needs be, that love to God,
the respect of the heart, must be the sum of the duty required
in his law,
III, It therefore appears from the premises, that whoso
ever withholds more of that love or respect of heart from
God which his law requires, than he affords, has more sin
than righteousness. Not only he that has less divine love than
passions and affections which are opposite; but also he that
does not love God half so much as he ought or has reason to
do, has justly more wrong than right imputed to him, accord
ing to the law of God and the law of reason; he has more
irregularity than rectitude, with regard to the law of love.
The sinful disrespect of his heart towards God is greater than
his respect to him.
But what considerate person is there, even aniong the
more virtuous part of mankind, but would be ashamed to say
and profess befoie God or men, that he loves God half so
much as he ought to do ; or that he exercises one half of that
esteem, honour and gratitude towards God, which would be
altogether becoming him ; considering what God is, and what
great manifestations he has made ofhis transcendent excellency
and goodness, and what benefits he receives from him ? And
if few or none of the best of men can with reason and truth
make even such a profession, how far from it must the gene-
rahty of mankind be ?
I The chief and most fundamental of all the commands of
Ithe moral law requires us to love the Lord our God with all our
1 hearts, aud with all our souls, with all our strength, and all our
' Tmnd : that is plainly, with all that is within us, or to the utmost
<apacity of ^Qjir nature, God is in himself worthy of infinitely
greater love than aiiy creature can exercise towards him;
love equal to his perfections, which are infinite, God loves
himself with no greater love than he is worthy of, when he
loves hijmself .infinitely ; but we can give to God no more than
we have. Therefore if we give him so much, if we love him to
VOL. H, 43

338 OBIGINAL SIN. P- i. Ch. I,
the utmost extent ofthe faculties of our nature, we are excused.
But when what is proposed is only that we should love him
as much as our capacity wiU allow, all excuse of want of capa
city ceases, and obligation takes hold of us ; and we are doubt
less obliged to love God to the utmost oi what '\s possible for us,
with such faculties and such opportunities and advanta,ges to
know God, as we have. And it is evidently implied in this
great commandment ofthe law, that our love to God should be
so great, as to have the most absolute possession of all the soul,
and the perfect government of all the principles and springs of
action that are in our nature.
Though it is not easy precisely to fix the limits of man!s
capacity as to love to God ; yet in general we may determine,
that his capacity of love is co-extended with his capacity of
knowledge : The exercise of the understanding opens the
way for the exercise of the other faculty. Now, though we
cannot have any proper positive understanding of God's infi
nite excellency ; yet the capacity of the human understanding
is very great, and may be extended far. It is needless to
dispute how far man's knowledge may be said to be strictly
comprehensive of things that are very great, as of the extent
of the expanse of the heavens, &:c. The word comprehensive
seems to be ambiguous. But doubtless we are capable of
some proper positive understanding of the greatness of these
things, in comparison of other things that we know. We
are capable of some clear understanding of the greatness or
considerableness of a whole nation ; or of the whole world of
mankind, as vastly exceeding that of a particular person or
family. We can positively understand, that the whole globe
of the earth is vastly greater than a particular hill or moun
tain. And can have some good positive apprehension of the
starry heavens, as so greatly exceeding the globe of the earth
that the latter is as it were nothing to it. So the human faculties
are capable of a real and clear understanding of the greatness,
glory, and goodness of God, and of our dependence upon him,
from the manifestations which God has made of himself to
mankind, as being beyond all expression above that of the
most excellent human friend or earthly object. And so we
are capable of esteem and love to God, which shall be pro
portionable, much exceeding that which we have to any crea
ture. '¦ *
These things may help us to form some judgment, how
vastly the generality of mankind fall below their duty, with
respect to love to God ; yea, how far they are from coming
half-way to that height of love which is agreeable to the rule
of right. Surely if our esteem of God, desires after him, and
delight in "him, were such as become us, considering the things
forementioned, they would exceed our regard to other things

Sect. v. All Men have more Sin than Virtue. 339
as the heavens are high above the earth, and would swallow up
all other affections hke a deluge. But how far, how exceed
ing far, are the generality ofthe world from any appearance of
being influenced and governed by such a degree of divine love
as this I
If we consider the love of God with respect to one ex
ercise of it, gratitude, how far indeed do the generality of
mankind come short of the rule of right and reason in this ! —
If we consider how various, innumerable, and vast the benefits
we receive from God, how infinitely great and wonderful that
grace which is revealed and offered to them who live under
the gospel — in that eternal salvation which is procured by God
giving his only begotten Son to die for sinners — and also how
unworthy we are all, deserving (as Dr. T. confesses) eternal
perdition under God's wrath and curse — how great is the gra
titude that would become us, who are the subjects of so many
and great benefits. What grace is this towards poor sinful
lost mankind, set before us in so affecting a manner, as in the
extreme sufferings of the Son of God ; who was carried through
those pains by a love stronger than death, a love that conquer
ed those mighty agonies, a love whose length and breadth,
and depth and height, passes knowledge ? But oh ! what
poor returns ! How little the gratitude ! How low, how
cold and inconstant the affection in the best, compared
with the obligation ! And what then shall be said of the
gratitude of the generality ? Or rather, who can express the
ingratitude ?
If the greater part of them who are called christians, were
no enemies to Christ in heart and practice, were not governed
by principles opposite to him and his gospel, but had some
real love and gratitude ; yet if their love falls vastly short of
the obligation, or occasion given, they are guilty of shameful
and odious ingratitude. As when a man has been the subject
of some instance of transcendent generosity, whereby he has
been relieved from the most extreme calamity, and brought
into very opulent, honourable and happy circumstances by a
benefactor of excellent character ; and yet expresses no more
gratitude on such an occasion than would be requisite for
some kindness comparatively infinitely small, he may justly fall
under the imputation of vile unthankfulness, and of much
more ingratitude than gratitude ; though he may haye no ill
will to his benefactor ; or no positive affection of mind con
trary to thankfulness and benevolence. What is odious in him
is his defect, whereby befalls so vastly below his duty.
Dr. Turnbull abundantly insists, that the forces of the
affections naturally in man are well proportioned ; and often
puts a question to this purpose— How man's nature could
have been better constituted in this respect ? How the affc.c-

340 OBlGlSAL SIN. P. 1. Ch. I,
tions of his heart could have been better proportioned ? I will
now mention one instance out of many that might be mention
ed. Man, if his heart were not depraved, might have had a
disposition to gratitude to God for his goodness, in proportion
to his disposition to anger towards men for their injuries. When
I say in proportion, 1 mean considering the greatness and
number of favours and injuries, and the degree in which the
one and the other are unmerited, and the benefit received by
the former, and the damage sustained by the latter. Is there
not an apparent and vast difference and inequality in the dis
positions to these two kinds of affection, in the generality of
both old and young, adult persons and little children ? How
ready is resentment for injuries received from men ? And how
easily is it raised in most, at least to an equality with the de
sert ? And is it so with respect to gratitude for benefits re
ceived from God, in any degree of comparison ? Dr. Turn-
bull pleads for the natural disposition to anger for injuries, as
being good and useful. But sufely gratitude to God, if we
were inclined to it, would be at least as good and useful as the
other. How far the generality of mankind are from their duty,
with respect to love to God, will further appear, if we consi
der, that we are obliged not only to love him with a love of
gratitude for benefits received ; but true love to God prima
rily consists in a supreme regard to him for what he is in
himself. The tendency of true virtue is to treat every thing
as it is, and according to its nature. And if we regard the
Most High according to the infinite dignity and glory of his
nature, we shall esteem and love him with all our heart and
soul, and to the utmost of the capacity of our nature, on this
account ; and not primarily because he has promoted our in
terest. If God be infinitely excellent in himself, then he is
infinitely lovely on that account ; or in other words, infinitely
"Worthy to be loved. And doubtless, if he be worthy to be
loved for this, then he ought to be loved for it. And it is
manifest, there can be no t-nte love to him, if he be not
loved for What he is ih himself. For if we love him not for
hisMjwn sake but for something else, then our love is not ter
minated on him., but on something else, as its ultimate ob
ject. That is no true value for infinite worth; which implies
no value for that worthiness in itself considered, but only on
thc account of something foreign. Our esteem of God is fun
damentally defective, if it be not primarily for the excellency
of his nature, which is the foundation of all that is valuable in
him in any respect. If we love not God because he is what he
is, but only because he 'is proflttMe to us, in truth we love him
npt at all : If we seem to love him, our love is not to him, but
to Softiething else.

Sect, v. All have more Sin than Virtue. 341
And now I must leave it to every one to judge for himself,
from his own opportunities of observation and information con
cerning mankind, how little there is of this disinterested love to
God, this pure divine affection, in the world. How very little
indeed in comparison of other affections altogether diverse,
which perpetually urge, actuate and govern mankind, and keep
the world, through all nations and ages, in a continual agita
tion and commotion ! This is an evidence of an horrid con
tempt of God. It would justly be esteemed a great instance
of disrespect and contempt of a prince, if one of his subjects
when he came into his house, should set him below his meanest
slave. But in setting the infinite Jehovah below earthly objects
and enjoyments, men degrade him below those things, between
which and him there is an infinitely greater distance, than be
tween the highest earthly potentate andthe most abject of mor
tals. Such a conduct as the generality of men are guilty of towards
God, continually and through all ages, in innumerable respects,
would be accounted the most vile contemptuous treatment of
a fellow-creature of distinguished dignity. Particularly men's
treatment of the offers God makes of himself to them as their
friend, their father, their God, and everlasting portion ; their
treatment of the exhibitions he has made of his unmeasurable
love and the boundless riches of his grace in Christ, attended
with earnest repeated calls, counsels, expostulations, and in
treaties : as also of the most dreadful threatenings of his eter
nal displeasure and vengeance.
Before I finish this section, it may be proper to say some
thing in rqyply to an objection some may be ready to make
against the force of this argument — that men do not come
half-way to that degree of love to God, which becomes them
and is their duty. The objection is this : That the argument
seems to prove too much, in that it will prove, that even good
men themselves have more sin than holiness ; which also has
been supposed. But if this were true it would follow, that
sin is the prevalent principle even in good men, and that it is
the principle which has the predominancy in the heart and
practice of the truly pious ; which is plainly contrary to the
word of God.
I answer, If it be indeed so, that there is more sin, con
sisting in defect of required holiness, than there is of hohness
in good men in this world ; yet it will not follow that sin has
the chief government of their heart and practice, for two
reasons. 1. They may love God more than other things, and yet
there may not be so much love, as there is want of due love ;
or in other words, they may love God more than the world,
and therefore the love of God may be predominant, and yet
may not love God near half so much as they ought to do.

342 ORIGINAL SIN. P. I. Ch. i.
This need not be esteemed a paradox : A person may love a
father, or some great friend and benefactor, of a very excel
lent character, more than some other object, a thousand times
less worthy of his esteem and affection, and yet love him ten
times less than he ought ; and so be chargeable, all things
considered, with a deficiency in respect and gratitude that is
very unbecoming and hateful. If love to God prevails above
the love of other things, then virtue will prevail above evil
affections, or positive principles of sin ; by which principles it
is, that sin has a positive power and influence. For evil affec
tions radically consist in inordinate love to other ihings be
sides God : And therefore, virtue prevailing beyond these,
will have the governing influence. The predominance of the
love of God in the hearts of good men, is more from the na
ture of the object loved, and the nature ofthe principle of true
love, than the degree of the principle. The object is one of
supreme loveliness ; immensely above all other objects in
worthiness of regard ; and it is by such a transcendent excel
lency, that he is God and worthy to be regarded and adored
as God : And he that truly loves God, loves him as God. True
love acknowledges him to be divinely and supremely excel
lent ; and must arise from some knowledge, sense, and convic
tion of his worthiness of supreme respect : And though the
s!?nse and view of it may be very imperfect, and the love thaf
arises from it in like manner imperfect ; yet if there be any re
alising view of such divine excellency, it must cause the heart
to respect God above all.
2. Another reason why a principle of holiness^ maintains
the dominion in the hearts of good men, is the nature of the
covenant of grace, and the promises of that covenant, on
which true Christian virtue relies, and which engage God's
strength and assistance to be on its side, and to help it against
its enemy, that it may not be overcome. The just live by faith.
Holiness in the Christian or his spiritual life, is maintained as
it has respect by faith to its author and finisher, and derives
strength and efficacy from the divine fountain, and by this
means overcomes. For, as the apostle says, This is the victory
that overcomes the world, even our faith. It is our faith in him
who has promised never to leave nor forsake his people ; not
to forsake the work of his own hands, nor suffer his people to
be tempted above their ability ; that his grace shall be sufficient
for them, his strength be made perfect in weakness ; and that
where he has begun a good work he will carry it on to the day
of Christ.

Sect. vi. JJfen's proneness to extreme Stupidity, ^c, 343

SECT, VL
The Corruption of Man's Nature appears by its Tendency, in
its present State, to an extreme Degree of Folly and Stu
pidity in Matters of Religion.
It appears that man's nature is greatly depraved, by an ap
parent proneness to an exceeding stupidity and sottishness in
those things wherein his duty and main interest are chiefly con
cerned, I shall instance in two things, viz. men's proneness to
idolatry ; and a general great disregard of eternal things, in
them who live under the light of the gospel.
It is manifest, in the flrst instance, that man's nature in its
present state is attended with a great propensity to forsake the
acknowledgment and worship of the true God, and to fall into
the most stupid idolatry. This has been sufficiently proved
by known fact, on abundant trial : Insomuch as the world of
mankind in general (excepting one small people, miraculously
delivered and preserved) through all nations, in all parts of the
world, ages after ages, continued without the knowledge and
worship of the true God and overwhelmed in gross idolatry,
without the least appearance or prospect of its recovering itself
from so great blindness or returning from its brutish principles
and customs, till delivered by divine grace.
In order to the most just arguing from fact, concerning the
tendency of man's nature, as that is in itself, it should be en
quired what the event has been, where nature has been left to
itself, to operate according to its own tendency, with least op
position made to it by any thing supernatural ; rather than in
exempt places, where the infinite power and grace of God have
interposed, and extraordinary means have been used to stem the
current, and bring men to true religion and virtue. As to the
means by which God's people of old, in the line of Abraham,
were delivered and preserved from idolatry, they were miracu
lous and of mere grace. Notwithstanding which, they were of
ten relapsing into the notions and ways of the heathen ; and
when they had backslidden, never were recovered but by divine
gracious interposition. And as to the means by which many
Gentile nations have been delivered since the days of the gos
pel, they are such as have been wholly owing to the most won
derful, miraculous, and infinite grace, God was under no obli
gation to bestow on the heathen world greater advantages than
they had in the ages of their gross darkness ; as appears by the
fact, that God actually did not, for so long a time, bestow great
er advantages.

344 ON ORIGINAL SIN. P, I, Ch, I.
Dr, T. himself observes, {Key p, 1.) That in about four
hundred years after the flood, the generality of mankind were
fallen into idolatry. And thus it was every where through the
world, excepting among that people that was saved and pre
served by a constant series of miracles, through a variety of
countries, nations, and climates, great enough, — and through
successive changes, revolutions, and ages, numerous enough to
be a sufficient trial of what mankind are prone to, if there be
any such thing as a sufficient trial.
That men should forsake the true God for idols is an evi
dence ofthe most astonishing folly and stupidity, by God's own
testimony, Jer, ii. 12, 13, Be astonished, O ye heavens, at this,
and be ye horribly afraid, be ye very desolate, saith the Lord :
For my people have committed two evils ; they have forsaken
me, the fountain of living waters, and have hewed out to them
selves cisterns, broken cisterns, that can hold no water. And
that mankind in general did thus, so soon after the flood, was
from the evil propensity of their hearts, and because they did not
like to retain God in their knowledge : as is evident by Rom.
i, 28. And the Universality of the effect shews that the cause
was universal, and not any thing belonging to the particular
circumstances of one, or only some nations or ages, but some
thing belonging to that nature which is common to all nations
and which remains the same through all ages. And what
other cause could this great effect possibly arise from, but a de
praved disposition, natural to all mankind ? It could not arise
from want ofa sufficient capacity or means of knowledge. This
is in effect confessed on all hands Dr. Turnbull {Chris. Phil,
p, 21.) says : " The existence of one infinitely powerful, wise,
and good mind, the Author, Creator, Upholder, and Governor
of all things, is a truth that lies plain and obvious to all that will
but think." And (ibid. p. 245 :) " Moral knowledge, which is
the most important of all knowledge, may easily be acquired by
all men." And again, (ibid, p, 292,) Every man by himself,
if he would duly employ his mind in the contemplation of the
works of God about him or in the examination ofhis own frame,
might make very great progress in the knowledge ofthe wisdom
and goodness of God. This all meh, generally speaking, might
do, with very little assistance ; for they have all sufficient abili
ties for thus employing their minds, and have all sufficient time
for it," Mr, Locke says, {Hum. Und. p. iv. chap. iv. p, 242.
edit. 11.) "Our own existence and the sensible parts ofthe
universe, offer the proofs of a Deity so clearly and cogently to
our thoughts, that I deem it impossible for a considerate man to
-withstand them. For I judge it as certain and clear a truth as
can any where be delivered, that the invisible things of God are
clearly seen from the creation of the world, being understood by

Sect. vr. Men's proneness to extreme Stupidity, ^c. 345
the things that are made, even his eternal power and godhead."
And Dr, T, himself, (in p, 78,) says, " The light given to all
ages and nations of the world, is sufficient for the knowledge
and practice of their duty." And (p. 111,112,) citing those
words of the apostle, Rom. ii. 14, 15, he says, "This clearly
supposes that the Gentiles, who were then in the world, might
have done the things contained in the law by nature, or their
natural power." And in one of the next sentences he says,
"The apostle, in Rom. i, 19,20, 21, affirms that the Gentiles
had light sufficient to have seen God's eternal power and god
head in the works of creation ; and that the reason why they
did not glorify him as God, was because they became vain in
their imaginations, and had darkened their foolish heart ; so
that they were without excuse. And in his paraphrase on those
verses in the 1st of Rom. he speaks of the very heathens that
were without a written revelation, as having that clear and evi
dent discovery of God's being and perfections that they are in
excusable in not glorifying him suitably to his excellent nature,
and as the author of their being and enjoyments." And (p. 146.
S.) he says, " God affords every man sufficient light to know his
duty." If all ages and nations of the world have sufficient light
for the knowledge of God and their duty to him, then even such
nations and ages, in which the most brutish ignorance and bar
barity prevailed, had sufficient light, if they had but a disposi
tion to improve it ; and then much more those of the heathen
which were more knowing and polished, and in ages wherein
arts and learning had made greatest advances. But even in
such nations and ages there was no advance made towards true
religion; as Dr, Winder observes, {Hist, of Knowl. vol, ii.
p. 336.) in the following words : — The pagan religion degen
erated into greater absurdity the further it proceeded ; and it
prevailed in all its height of absurdity when the Pagan nations
were polished to the height. Though they set out with the ta
lents of reason, and had solid foundations of information to
build upon, it in fact proved that with all their strengthened
faculties and growing powers of reason, the edifice of religion
rose in the most absurd deformities and disproportions, and
gradually went on in the most irrational, disproportioned, in
congruous systems, of which the most easy dictates of reason
would have demonstrated the absurdity. They were contrary
to all just calculations in moral mathematics. " He observes,
" that their grossest abominations first began in Egypt, where
was an ostentation of the greatest progress in learning and
science : And they never renounced clearly any of their abom
inations, or openly returned to the worship of the one true God,
the Creator of all things, and to the original, genuine senti
ments of the highest and most venerable antiquity. The Pagan
VOL. II. 44

346 ON ORIGINAL SIN, P. I. Ch. X.
religion continued in this deep state of corruption to the last.
The Pagan philosophers, and inquisitive men, made great im
provements in many sciences, and even in morality itself; yet
the inveterate absurdities of Pagan idolatry remained with
out remedy. Every temple smoked with incense to the sun
and moon, and other inanimate material luminaries, and
earthly elements, to Jupiter, Juno, Mais, and Venus, &c,
&:c. the patrons and examples of almost every vice. He
catombs bled on the altars of a thousand Gods, as mad
superstition inspired. And this was not the disgrace of
our ignorant untaught northern countries only ; but even at
Athens itself the infamy reigned, and circulated through all
Greece, and finally prevailed, amidst all their learning and
politeness, under the Ptolemys in Egypt, and the Ccesars at
Rome. Now if the knowledge of the pagan world in religion
proceeded no further than this ; if they retained all their
deities, even the most absurd of them all their deified beasts,
and deified men, even to the last breatli of pagan power : We
may justly ascribe the great improvements in the world on
the subject of religion to divine revelation, either vouchsafed
in the beginning when this knowledge was competently clear
and copious ; or at the death of paganism, when this light
shone forth in its consummate lustre at the coming of
Christ." Dr, T, often speaks of the idolatry of the heathen world
as great wickedness, in which they were wholly inexcusable ;
and yet often speaks of their case as remediless, and of them
as being dead in sin and unable to recover themselves. If so,
and yet according to his own doctrine, every age, every na
tion, and every man, had sufficient light afforded to know God
and their whole duty to him ; then their inability to deliver
themselves must be a moral inability, consisting in a desperate
depravity and most evil disposition of heart.
And if there had not been sufficient trial of the propensity
of the hearts of mankind, through all those ages that passed
from Abraham to Christ, the trial has been continued down to
this day in all those vast regions of the face of the earth that
have remained without any effects of the Hght of the gospel ;
and the dismal effect continues every where unvaried. How
was it with that multitude of nations inhabiting South and
North America ? What appeaiance was there when the Eu
ropeans first came hither, of their being recovered, or recover
ing, in any degree, from the grossest ignorance, delusion, and
most stupid paganism ? And how is it at this day in those parts
of Africa and Asia into which the light of the gospel has not
penetrated ?
This strong and universally prevalent disposition of man
kind to idolatry, of which there has been such great trial and

Sect, VI, Melt's proneness to extreme Stupidity, c^c. 347
so notorious and vast proof, in fact, is a most glaring evidence
of the exceeding depravity ofthe human nature ; as it is a pro
pensity in the utmost degree contrary to the highest end, the
main business, and chief happiness of mankind — consisting in
the knowledge, service, and enjoyment of the living God, the
Creator and ^Governor of the world — in the highest degree
contrary to that for which mainly God gave mankind more un
derstanding than the beasts of the earth, and made them wiser
than the fowls of heaven ; which was, that they might be capa
ble of the knowledge of God. It is also in the highest degree
contrary to the first and greatest commandment of the moral
law, That we should have no other Gods before Jehovah, and
that we should love and adore him with all our heart, soul,
mind, and strength. The scriptures are abundant in repre
senting the idolatry of the heathen world as their exceeding
wickedness and their most brutish stupidity. They who wor
ship and trust in idols are said themselves to be like the lifeless
statues they worship, like mere senseless stocks and stones. —
(Psalm cxv, 4 — 8, and cxxxv. 15 — 18.)
A second instance of the natural stupidity of mankind is
that great disregard of their own eternal interest, which appears
so remarkably, so generally among them who live under the
gospel. Mr, Locke observes, {Hum. Und. vol. i. p. 207.) " Were
the will determined by the views of good, as it appears in con
templation greater or less to the understanding, it could never
get loose from the infinite eternal joys of heaven, once pro
posed and considered as possible ; the eternal condition of a
future state infinitely outweighing the expectation of riches or
honour, or any other worldly pleasure which vve can propose
to ourselves ; though we should grant these the more probable
to be obtained." Again, (p. 228, 229.) " He that will not bo
so far a rational creature as to reflect seriously upon infinite
happiness and misery, must needs condemn himself, as not
making that use of his understanding he should. The rewards
and punishments of another life, which the Almighty has
established as the enforcements of his laws, are of weight
enough to determine the choice against whatsoever pleasure
or pain this life can shew. When the eternal state is consider
ed but in its bare possibility, which nobody can make any
doubt of, he that will allow exquisite and endless happiness to
be but the possible consequence of a good hfe here, and the
contrary state the possible reward of a bad one, must own him
self to judge very much amiss, if he does not conclude that a
virtuous life with the certain expectation of everlasting bliss,
which may come, is to be preferred to a vicious one, with the
fear of that dreadful state of misery which it is very possible
may overtake the guilty, or at least the terrible uncertain hope

348 ORIGINAL SIN, P. I. Ch. I.
of annihilation. This is evidently so ; though the virtuous
life here hcCd nothing but pain, and the vicious continual plea
sure; which yet isfor the most part quite otherwise, and wick
ed men have not much the odds to brag of, even in their pre
sent possession : Nay, all things rightly considered, have I
think even the worst part here. But when infinite happiness
is put in one scale against infinite misery in the other ; if the
worst that comes to the pious man, if he mistakes, be the best
that the wicked man can attain to, if he be in the right; who
can, without madness, run the venture? Who in his wits
would choose to come within a possibility of infinite misery ?
which if he miss, there is yet nothing to be got by that ha
zard : Whereas, on the other side, the sober man ventures no
thing, against infinite happiness to be got, if his expectation
comes to pass."
That disposition of mind which is a propensity to act con
trary to reason, is a depraved disposition. It is not, because
the faculty of reason which God has given to mankind is not
sufficient fully to discover to them, that forty, sixty, or an hun
dred years, is as nothing in comparison of eternity — ^infinitely
less than a second of time to an hundred years — that the great
est worldly prosperity is not treated with the most perfect dis
regard, in all cases where there is any degree of competition of
earthly things, with salvation from exquisite, eternal misery,
and the enjoyment of everlasting glory and felicity. But is it
a matter of controversy, whether men in general shew a strong
disposition to act far otherwise, from their infancy till death
sensibly approaches ? In things that concern their temporal
interest, they easily discern the difference between things of a
long and short continuance. It is no hard matter to convince
men of the difference between being admitted to the accom
modations and entertainments of a convenient, beautiful, well-
furnished habitation, and to partake of the provisions and pro
duce of a plentiful estate for a day, or a night ; and having all
given them and settled upon them as their own, to possess as
long as they live, and to be theirs and their heirs for ever.
There would be no need of preaching sermons, and spending
strength and life to convince them of the difference. Men
know how to adjust things in their dealings and contracts one
with another, according to the length of time in which any
thing agreed for is to be used or enjoyed. In temporal affairs,
they are sensible that it concerns them to provide for future
time as well as for the present. Thus common prudence teach
es them to take care in summer to lay up for winter ; yea, to
provide a fund, or an estate, whence they may be supplied for
a long time to come. And not only so, but they are forward
to spend and be spent, in order to provide for their children
after they are dead ; though it be quite uncertain, who shall

Sect, vi. Men's proneness to extreme Stupidity, <^c. 349
enjoy what they lay up, after they have left the world. And
if their children should have the comfort of it as they desire,
they will not partake with them in that comfort, or have any
portion in any thing under the sun. In things which relate to
men's temporal interest, they seem very sensible of the uncer
tainty of life, especially of the lives of others ; and to make
answerable provision for the security of their worldly interest,
that no considerable part of it may rest only on so uncertairi a
foundation, as the hfe of a neighbour or friend Common dis
cretion leads them to take good care that their outward pos
sessions be well secured by a good and firm title. In worldly
concerns, men discern their opportunities, and are careful to
improve them before they are past. The husbandman is care
ful to plough his ground and sow his seed in the proper season;
otherwise he knows he cannot expect a crop : And when the
harvest is come, he will not sleep away the time ; for he knows
if he does so the crop will soon be lost. How careful and eagle-
eyed is the merchant to improve opportunities to enrich him
self? How apt are men to be alarmed at the appearance of
danger to their worldly estate, or any thing that remarkably
threatens great damage to their outward interest? And how
will they bestir themselves in such a case, if possible to avoid
the threatened calamity ? In things purely secular, and not
of a moral or spiritual nature, they easily receive conviction
by past experience, when any thing, on repeated trial, proves
unprofitable or prejudicial ; and are ready to take warning by
what they have found themselves, and also by the experience
of their neighbours and forefathers.
But if we consider how men generally conduct themselves
in things on which their well-being infinitely more depends,
how vast is the diversity '( In these things how cold, lifeless,
and dilatory ? With what difficulty are a few, out of multi
tudes, - excited to any tolerable degree of care and diligence,
by the innumerable means used in order to make them wise
for themselves ? And when some vigilance and activity is ex
cited, how apt is it to die away, like a mere force against a
natural tendency ? What need of a constant repetition
of admonitions and counsels to keep the heart from fall
ing asleep ? How many objections are made ? How are
difficulties magnified ? And how soon is the mind dis
couraged ? How many arguments, often renewed, variously
and elaborately enforced, do men stand in need of, to con
vince them of things that are almost self-evident ? As that
things which are eternal are infinitely more important than
things temporal, and the like. And after all, how very few
are convinced effectually, or in such a manner as to induce
them to a practical preference of eternal things 1 How sense
less are men of the necessity of improving their time, as to their

350 ORIGINAL SIN, P. I, Ch, I
spiritual interest, and their welfare in another world ? Though
it be an endless futurity, and though it be their own personal,
infinitely important good, that is to be cared for. Though
men are so Sensible of the uncertainty of their neighbours'
lives; when any considerable part of their own estates depends
on the continuance of them ; how stupidly senseless do they
seem to be of the uncertainty of their own lives, when their
preservation from immensely great, remediless, and endless
misery, is risked by a present delay, through a dependence on
future opportunity ? What a dreadful venture will men careless
ly and boldly run, repeat and multiply, with regard to their
eternal salvation ; who yet are very careful to have every thing
in a deed or bond, firm and without a flaw ? How negligent are
they of their special advantages and opportunities for their
soul's good ? How hardly awakened by the most evident and
imminent dangers, threatening eternal destruction, yea, though
put in mind of them, and much pains taken to point them forth,
shew them plainly, and fully to represent them, if possible to
engage their attention ? How are they like the horse that bold
ly rushes into the battle ? How hardly are men convinced by
their own frequent and abundant experience, of the unsatisfac
tory nature of earthly things, and the instability of their own
hearts in their good frames and intentions ? And how hardly
convinced by their own observation, and the experience of all
past generations, of the uncertainty of life and its enjoyments?
Psal. xlix, 11, &c. Their inward thought is, that their houses
shall continue for ever. — Nevertheless, man being in honour,
abideth not ; he is like tlie beasts that perish. This their way
is their folly ; yet their posterity approve their sayings. Like
sheep are they laid in the grave.
In these things, men who are prudent for their temporal
interest act as if they were bereft of reason : They have eyes,
and see not; ears, and hear not ; neither do they understand r
They are like the horse and mule, that have no understanding.
— Jer. viii. 7. The stork in the heaven knoweth her appointed
times ; and the turtle, and the crane, and the swallow, observe
the time of their coming : But my people know not the judgment
of the Lord.
These things are often mentioned in scripture as eviden
ces of extreme folly and stupidity, wherein men act as great
enemies to themselves, as though they loved their own ruin ;
Prov. viii. 37. Laying wait for their own blood, Prov. i. 18.
And how can these things be accounted for' but by supposing
a most wretched depravity of nature? Why otherwise should
not men be as wise for themselves in spiritual and eternal things
as in temporal ? All christians will confess, that man's faculty
of reason was given him chiefly to enable him to understand
the former, wherein his main interest and true happiness con-

Sect. vi. Men's proneness to extreme Stupidity, ^c. 351
sists. This faculty would therefore undoubtedly be every way as
fit for understanding them as the latter, if not depraved. The
reason why these are understood, and not the other, is not that
such things as have been mentioned belonging to men's spirit
ual and eternal interest, are more obscure and abstruse in their
own nature. For instance, the difference between long and
short, the need of providing for futurity, the importance of im
proving proper opportunities, and of having good security and
a sure foundation in affairs wherein our interest is greatly con
cerned, &c. these things are as plain in themselves in religious,
as in other matters. And we have far greater means to assist
us to be wise for ourselves in eternal, than in temporal things.
We have the abundant instruction of perfect and infinite wis
dom itself, to lead and conduct us in the paths of righteousness,
so that we may not err. And the reasons of things are most
clearly, variously and abundantly set before us ia the word of
God ; which is adapted to the faculties of mankind, tending
greatly to enlighten and convince the mind : Whereas, we have
no such excellent and perfect rules to instruct and direct us in
things pertaining to our temporal interest, nor any thing to be
compared to it. 
If any should say. It is true, if men gave full credit to
what they are told concerning eternal things, and these appear
ed to them as real and certain things, it would be an evidence
of a sort of madness in them, that they shew no greater
regard to them in practice : But there is reason to think, this
is not the case ; the things of another world being unseen,
appear to men as things of a very doubtful nature, and attend
ed with great uncertainty. — In answer, I would observe,
agreeable to what has been cited from Mr. Locke, though
eternal thihgs were considered in their bare possibility, if men
acted rationally, they would infinitely outweigh all temporal
things in their influence on their hearts. And I would also
observe, that to suppose eternal things not to be fully believed,
at least by them«who enjoy the light of the gospel, does not
weaken, but rather strengthen the argument for the depravity
of nature. For the eternal world being what God had chiefly
in view in the creation of men, this world was made wholly
subordinate to the other, man's state here being only a state
of probation, preparation, and progression, with respect to the
future state. Eternal things are in effect their all, their whole
concern ; to understand and know which it chiefly was, that
they had understanding- given them ; therefore we may un
doubtedly conclude, that if men have not respect to them as
real and certain things, it cannot be for want of sufficient
evidence of their truth : But it must be from a dreadful
stupidity of mind, occasioning a sottish insensibility of their
truth and importance, when manifested by the clearest evi
dence.

352 ORIGINAL SIN*. P. !¦ Ch. I.

SECT. vn.
That Man's Nature is corrupt, appears, in that by far the
greater Part of Mankind, in all Ages, have been wicked
Men.The depravity of man's nature appears, not only in its
propensity to sin in some degree, which renders a man an evil
or wicked man in the eye of the law, and strict justice, as was
before shewn ; but it is so corrupt, that its depravity either
shews that men are, or tends to make them to be, of such an
evil character as shall denominate them wicked men, accord
ing to the tenor of the covenant of grace.
This may be argued from several things which have been
already observed : As from a tendency to continual sin ; a
tendency to much greater degrees of sin than righteousness,
and from the general extreme stupidity of mankind. But yet
the present state of man's nature, as implying or tending to a
wicked character, may deserve to bc more particularly consi
dered and directly proved. And in general, this appears, in
that there have been so very few in the world, from age to age,
ever since the world has stood, that have been of any other
character. It is abundantly evident in scripture, and is what I sup
pose none that call themselves christians will deny, that the
whole world is divided into good and bad, and that all mankind
at the day of judgment will either be approved as righteous or
condemned as wicked : either glorified as children of the king
dom, or cast into a furnace of fire as children of the wicked
one. I need not stand to shew what things belong to the cha
racter of such as shall hereafter be accepted as righteous, ac
cording to the word of God, It may be sufficient for my pre
sent purpose to observe what Dr, T. himself speaks of as be
longing essentially to the character of such. In p, 203. he
says, " This is infallibly the character of true christians, and
what is essential to such, that they have really mortified the
flesh with its lusts ; — they are dead to sin, and live no longer
therein ; the old man is crucified, and the body of sin destroy
ed : They yield themselves to God, as those that are alive
from the dead, and their members as instruments of righteous
ness to God and as servants of righteousness to holiness," —
There is more to the like purpose in the two next pages. In p.
228. he says, " Whatsoever is evil and corrupt in us we ought
to condemn ; not so, as it shall still remain in us, that we
may alvVays be condemning it, but that we may speedily re-

Sect. vn. Generality of mankind wicked. 353
form, and be effectually delivered from it ; otherwise certain
ly we do not come up to the character of the true disciples of
Christ." In p. 248. he says, " Unless God's favour be preferred
before all other enjoyments whatsoever, unless there be a de
light in the worship of God, and in converse with him, unless
every appetite be brought into subjection to reason and truth,
and unless there be a kind and benevolent disposition towards
our fellow-creatures, how can the miiid be fit to dwell with
God in his house and family, to do him service in his king
dom, and to promote the happiness of any part of his crea
tion." — And in his Key, § 286, p, 101, 102, &c, shewing there
what it is to be a true christian, he says among other things,
" That he is one who has such a sense and persuasion of the
love of God in Christ, that he devotes his life to the honour
and service of God, in hope of eternal glory. And that to
the character of a true christian it is absolutely necessary,
that he diligently study the things that are freely given him
of God, viz. his election, regeneration, &c, that he may gain
a just knowledge of those inestimable privileges, may taste
that the Lord is gracious, and rejoice in the gospel salvation
as his greatest happiness and glory. It is necessary that he
work these blessings on his heart, till they become a vital
principle, producing in him the love of God, engaging him to
all cheerful obedience to his will, giving him a proper dignity
and elevation of soul, raising him above the best and worst of
this world, carrying his heart into heaven, and fixing his affec
tions and regards upon his everlasting inheritance, and the crown
of glory laid up for him there. — Thus he is armed against all
the temptations and trials resulting from any pleasure or pain,
hopes or fears, gain or loss, in the present world. None of
these things move him from a faithful discharge of any part ofhis
duty, or from a firm attachment to truth and righteousness ;
neither counts he his very life dear to him, that he may do the
will of God, and finish his course with joy. In a sense of the
love of God in Christ, he maintains daily communion with God
by reading and meditating on his word. In a sense of his own
infirmity and the readiness of the divine favour to succour him,
he daily addresses the throne of grace for the renewal of spiritu
al strength, in assurance of obtaining it through the one Media
tor Christ Jesus, Inlightened and directed by the heavenly
doctrine of the gospel, &c,*
Now I leave every one that has any degree of impartiali
ty to judge, whether there be not sufficient grounds to think
that it is but a very, small part indeed of the many myri-
* What Dr. Tornbcli. says of the character of a good man, is also worthv
to be observed, Chris. PhU. p. 86, 258, 259, 288, 375, 376, 409, 410.
VOL. H. 45

354 ORIGIHAL SfiS'. P. !• Ch, 1,
ads and milhons which overspread this globe, who are of a cha
racter that in any wise answers these descriptions. However
Dr, T. insists, that all nations, and every man on the face of
the earth, have light and means sufficient lo do the whole will
of God, even they that live in the grossest darkness of paga
nism. Dr. T. in answer to arguments of this kind, very imperti
nently from time to time objects, that we are no judges of the
viciousness of men's characters, nor are able to decide in what
degree they are virtuous or vicious. As though we could have
no good grounds to judge, that any thing appertaining to the
qualities or properties of the mind, which is invisible, is general
or prevailing among a multitude or collective body, unless we
can determine how it is with each individual. I think I have
sufficient reason from what I know and have heard of the
American Indians to judge, that there are not many good phi
losophers among them ; though the thoughts of their hearts,
and the ideas and knowledge they have in their minds, are
things invisible ; and though I have never seen so much as a
thousandth part of the Indians; and with respect to most of
them, should not be able to pronounce preremptorily concern
ing any one, that he was not very knowing in the nature of
things, if all should singly pass before me. And Dr. T. him
self seems to be sensible of the falseness of his own conclusions
that he so often urges against others ; if we may judge by his
practice, and the liberties he takes in judging of a multitude
himself He, it seems, is sensible that a man may have good
grounds to judge that wickedness of character is general in a
collective body ; because he openly does it himself. {Key, p.
102.) After declaring the things which belong to the charac
ter ofa true Christian, he judges ofthe generality of Christians,
that they have cast off these things, that they are a people that
do err in their hearts, and have not known God's ways, p. 259,
he judges, that the generality of Christians are the most wicked
of all mankind, when he thinks it will throw some disgrace
on the opinion of such as he opposes. The like we have
from time to time in other places, (as p. 168, p. 258, Key, p,
127, 128.)
But if men are not sufficient judges whether there are
few of the world of mankind but what are wicked, yet doubt
less God is sufficient, and his judgment, often declared in his
word, determines the matter. Matt. vii. 13, 14. Enter ye in
at the strait gate : For wide is the gate, and broad is the way
that leadeth to destruction, and many there be that go in thereat:
Because strait is the gate, and narrow is the way that leadeth to
life, and few there be that find it. It is manifest, that here
Christ is not only describing the state of things as it was at that
day, and does not mention the comparative smaUness of the

¦Sect. vit. Generality of mankind, wicked. 555
number of them that are saved as a consequence ofthe pecuhar
perverseness of that people and of that generation ; but as a
consequence of the general circumstances of the way to life
and the way to destruction, the broadness of the one and the
narrown'ess of the other. In the straitness of the gate, &c, I
suppose none will deny that Christ has respect to the strict
ness of those rules, which he had insisted on in the preceding
sermon, and which render the way to life very difficult. But
certainly these amiable rules would not be difficult, were they
not contrary to the natural inclinations of men's hearts ; and
they would not be contrary to those inclinations, were these
not depraved. Consequently the wideness of the gate, and
broadness of the way, that leads to destruction, in consequence
of which many go in thereat, must imply the agreeableness
of this way to men's natural inclinations. The hke reason is
given by Christ, why few are saved, Luke xiii. 23, 24. Theu
said one unto him. Lord, are there few saved ? And he said
unto them. Strive to enter in at the strait gate : For many I say
unto you, shall seek to enter i-n, a-nd shall not be able. That there
are generally but few good men in the world, even among them
who have the most distinguishing and glorious advantages for
it, is evident by that saying of our Lord, Many are called, but
few are chosen. And if there are but few among these, how
•few, how very few indeed, must persons of this character be,
compared with the whole world of mankind ? The exceeding
smaUness of the number of the saints, compared with the whole
world, appears by the representations often made of them as
distinguished from the world ; in which they are spoken of as
called and chosen out of the world, redeemed from the earth,
redeemed from among men ; as being those that are of God,
while the whole world lieth in wickedness, and the like.
And if we look into the Old Testament, we shall find the
same testimony given, Prov, xx, 6. Most men will proclaim
every man his own goodness: But a faithful man who can flnd?
By the faithful man, as the phrase is used in scripture, is intend
ed much the same as a sincere, upright, or truly good man ; as
in Psal. xii. 1, and xxxi. 23. andci.6. and other places. Again,
Eccl. vii. 25 — ^29. / applied mine heart to know, and to search,
and to flnd out wisdom, and the reason of things, and to know
the wickedness of folly, even of foolishness and madness : And
I find more bitter than death, the woman whose heart is snares,
i^c. Behold, this have I found, saith the preacher, counting
one by one, to find out the account, which yet my soul seeketh, but
I find not : One man among a thousand have I found : but a
woman among all these have I not found. Lo, this only have I
found, that God made man upright ; but they have sought out
many inventions. Solomon here signifies, that when he .set

Job ORIGINAL siy, y. t. Ch. i
himself diligently to find out the account or proportion of
true wisdom, or thorough uprightness ainong men, the result
was, that he found it tobe but as one to a thousand, &c. Dr.
T. on this place, p, 184, says, " The wise man in the context,
is inquiring into the corruption and depravity of mankind, of
the men and women that lived in his time." As though
what he said represented nothing of the state of things in the
world in general, but only in his time. But does Dr. T. or any
body else, suppose this only to be the design of that book, to re
present the vanity and evil of the world in that time, and to
shew that all was vanity and vexation of spirit in Solotnon^s
day? That day truly, we have reason to think, was a day of
the greatest smiles of heaven on that nation that ever had been
on any nation from the foundation of the world. Not only
does the subject and argument of the whole book shew it to be
otherwise ; but also the declared design of the book in the first
chapter; where the world is represented as very much the
same, as to its vanity and evil, from age to age. It makes lit
tle or no progress, after all its revolutions and restless motions,
labours and pursuits ; like the sea, that has all the rivers con
stantly emptying themselves into it, from age to age, and yet is
never the fuller. As to that place, Prov. xx. 6. A faithful mcvi who
can flnd." there is no more reason to suppose that the wise man
has respect only to his time in these words, than in those imme
diately preceding. Counsel in the heart of a man is like deep
waters ; but a man of understanding will draw it out. Or in
the words next following. The just man walketh in his integri
ty : His children are blessed after him. Or in any other pro
verb in the whole book. And if it were so that Solomon in these
things meant only to describe his own times, it would not at all
weaken the argument. For, if we observe the history ofthe Old
Testament, there is reason to think there never was any time
from Joshua to the captivity, wherein wickedness was more re
strained, and virtue and religion more encouraged and promo
ted, than in David's and Solomon's times. And if there was
so little true piety in that nation, the only people of God under
heaven, even in their best times, what may we suppose con
cerning the world in general, (ake one time with another ?
Notwithstanding what some authors advance concerning
the prevalence of virtue, honesty, good neighbourhood, chear-
fulness, &c, in the world ; Solomon, whom we may justly esteem
as wise and just an observer of human nature and the state of
the world of mankind as most in these days (besides. Christians
ought to remember, that he wrote by divine inspiration) —
judged the world to be so fiill of wickedness, that it was better
never to be born, than to be born to live only in such a world.
Eccl. iv. 1 — 3. So I retumed and considered all the oppressions
that are imder the sun ; and behold, the tears of such as

I'
Sect. VII. Generality of Manldnd,wicked. 357
were oppressed, and they had no comforter: And on the side of
their oppressors there was power ; but they had no comforter.
Wherefore, I praised the dead, which were already dead, more
than the living, which are yet alive. Yea, better is he than both
they, which hath not yet been ; who hath not seen the evil
work that is done under the sun. Surely it will not be
said that Solomon has only respect to his time here too, when
he speaks of the oppressions of them that were in power ; since
he himself, and others appointed by him, and wholly under his
controul, were the men that were in power in that land, and in
almost all the neighbouring countries.
The same inspired writer says, Eccles. ix. 3. The heart of
the sons of men is full of evil; and madness is in their heart
while they live ; and after that they go to the dead. If these
general expressions are to be understood only of some, and
those the smaller part, when in general truth, honesty, good
nature, &c. govern the world, why are such general expressions
from time to time used ? Why does not this wise and noble
prince express himself in a more generous and benevolent
strain, and say, wisdom is in the hearts of the sons of men while
they live, &c. — instead of leaving in his writings so many sly,
ill natured suggestions, which pour such contempt on human
nature, and tend so much to excite mutual jealousy and male
volence to taint the minds of mankind through all generations
after him ?
If we consider the various successive parts and periods of
the duration of the world, it will, if possible, be yet more evi
dent, that by far the greater part of mankind have in all ages
been of a wicked character. The short accounts we have of
Adam and his family are such as lead us to suppose that the
greater part of his posterity in his hfe-time, yea, in the former
part of his life, were wicked. It appears, that his eldest son,
Cain was a very wicked man who slew his righteous brother
Abel. And Adam hved an hundred and thirty years before
Seth was born : And by that time we may suppose, his poste
rity began to be considerably numerous : When he was born,
his mother called his name Seth ;for God, said she, hath ap
pointed me another seed instead of Abel : which naturally
suggests this to our thoughts ; that of all her seed then exist
ing, none were of any such note for religion or virtue, as that
their parents could have any great comfort in them, or expec
tation from them on that account. And if by the brief history
we have, it looks as if- however there might be some inter
vals of a revival of religion, yet — in the general, mankind
grew more and more corrupt till the flood. It is signified, that
when men began to multiply on the face of the earth, wickedness
prevailed exceedingly. Gen, vi. 1, &c. And that before God
jappeared to Noah, to command him to build the ark, one hun-

358 ORIGINAL SIN, P. I. Ch. I.
dred and twenty years before the flood, the world had long con
tinued obstinate in great and general wickedness, and the dis
ease was become inveterate. The expressions (ver. 3, 5, 6,) sug
gest as much : — And the Lord said, my spirit shall not always
strive with man. — And God saw that the wickedness of man was
great on the earth, and that every imagination of the thought of
his heart was evil, only evil continually/ and it repented the
Lord that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him at
his heart. And by that time,all flesh had corrupted his way upon
the earth, (v, 12.) And as Dr, T. himself observes, (p, 122,)
" Mankind were universally debauched into lust, sensuahty, ra
pine, and injustice,"
And with respect to the period after the flood, to the calhng
oi Abraham; Dr, T. says, as already observed, that in about
four hundred years after the flood, the generality of mankind
were fallen into idolatry ; which was before afl they were dead
who came out ofthe ark. And it cannot be thought the world
went suddenly into that general and extreme degree of corrup
tion, but that they had been gradually growing more and more
corrupt ; though it is true, it must be by very swift degrees —
however soon we may suppose they began — to get to that pass
in one age.
And as to the period from the calling oi Abraham to the co
ming of Christ, Dr. T, justly observes as follows : {Key, p,
133,) " If we reckon from the call oi Abraham to the coming of
Christ, the Jewish dispensation continued one thousand nine
hundred and twenty-one years ; during which period, the other
families and nations of the earth not only lay out of God's pe
culiar kingdom, but also lived in idolatry, great ignorance, and
wickedness," And with regard to the Israelites, it is evident
that wickedness was the generally prevailing character among
them, from age to age. If we consider how it was with Jacob's
family, the behaviour ol Reuben with his father's concubine, the
behaviour of Judah with Tamar, the conduct of Jacob's sons
towards the Shechemites, and the behaviour of Joseph's ten
brethren in their cruel treatment of him ; we cannot think that
the character of true piety belonged to many df them, according
to Dr, T's. own notion of such a character ; though it be true,
they might afterwards repeat. And with respect to the time the
children of Israel were in Egypt; the scripture, speaking of
them in general, or as a collective body, often represents them
as complying with the abominable idolatries of the coun
try.* And as to that generation which went out of Egypt
and wandered in the wilderness, they are abundantly represen
ted as extremely and almost universally wicked, perverse, and
children of divine wrath. And after Joshua's death, the scrip-
* Levit. xvii. 7. Josh. v. J), and xxiv. 14, Ezek. xx. 7. 8. ajid xxiii. 3.

Sect. Vii, Generality of Mankind, wicked. 359
tare is very express, that wickedness was the prevailing charac
ter in the nation, from age to age. So it was till Samuel's
time, (1 Sam, viii, 7, 8,) They have rejected me, that I should
not reign over them ; accordingto all their works which they
have done, since the day that I brought them out of Egypt, unto
this day. Yea, so it was till Jeremiah's and Ezekiel's time,
(Jer. xxxii, 30, 31.) For the children o/" Israel andthe children
o/" Judah, have only done evil before me from their youth ; for the
children q/" Israel have on\y provoked me to anger with the work
of their hands, saith the Lord : For this city hath been to me a
provocation of mine anger, and of my fury, from the day they
built it even unto this day. (Compare chap, v, 21, 23. and
chap. vii. 25, 26, 27.) So Ezek, ii, 3, 4. / send thee to the chil
dren of Israei, to a rebellious nation that hath rebelled against me,
they and their fathers have transgressed against me e'vcn unto this
very day : For they are impudent children, and stiff-hearted.
And it appears by the discourse of Stephen, (Acts vii.) that this
was generally the case with that nation, from their first rise,
even to the days ofthe apostles. After tbis summary rehearsal
ofthe instances of their perverseness from the very time of their
selling Joseph into Egypt, he concludes, (ver, 51 — 53,) Te
stiff-necked, and uncircumcised in heart and ears, ye do always
resist the Holy Ghost. As your Fathers did, so do ye. Which
ofthe Prophets have not your fathers persecuted ! And they
have slain them which shewed before of the coming of that just
One, of whom ye have been now the betrayers arid murderers :
Who have received the law by the disposition of angels, and have
not kept it.
Thus it appears that wickedness was the generally prevail
ing character in all nations, till Christ came. And so also it ap
pears to have been since his coming to this day. So in the age
of apostles. There was a great number of persons of a truly
pious character in the latter part of the apostolic age, when
multitudes of converts had been made, and Christianity was as
yet in its primitive purity ; but what says the apostle John of
the church of God at that time, as compared with the rest of
the world ? (1 John v. 19.) We know that we are of God,
and the whole world lieth in wickedness. And after that
Christianity came to prevail to that degree, that christians had
the upper hand in nations and civil communities, still the great
er part of mankind remained in their old heathen state; which
Dr. T. speaks of as a state of great ignorance and wickedness.
And besides, this is noted in all ecclesiastical history, that as the
christians gained in power and secular advantages, true piety
declined, and corruption and wickedness prevaileo among them.
And as to the state ofthe christian world since Christianity began
to be established by human laws, wickedness for the most part
has greatly prevailed ; as is very notorious, and is imphed in

360 OHKSINAL SIN, P. I, Ch. I.
what Dr. T, himself says : In giving an account how the doc
trine of original sin came to prevail among christians, he ob
serves, (p, 167, S.) " That the christian religion was very early
and grievously corrupted, by dreaming, ignorant, superstitious
monks." In p, 259, he says, " The generality of christians
have embraced this persuasion concerning original sin ; and the
consequence has been, that the generality of christians have
been the most wicked, lewd, bloody, and treacherous of all man
kind," Thus a view of the several successive periods ofthe past du
ration of the world, from the beginning to this day, shews that
wickedness has ever been exceeding prevalent, and has had
vastly the superiority in the world. And Dr, T, himself in effect
owns, that it has been so ever since Adam first turned into the
way of transgression, " It is certain (says he, p, 168,) the mor
al circumstances of mankind, since the time Adam first turned
into the way of transgression, have been very different from a
state of innocence. So far as we can judge from history, or
what we know at present, the greatest part of mankind have
been, and still are very corrupt ; though not equally so in every
age and place." And lower in the same page, he speaks of
Adam's posterity, as having sunk themselves into the most la
mentable degrees of ignorance, superstition, idolatry, injustice,
debauchery, ^c.
These things clearly determine the point concerning the ten
dency of man's nature to wickedness, if we may be allowed to
proceed according to such rules and methods of reasoning as
are never denied or doubted to be good and sure, in experi
mental philosophy :* or may reason from experience and facts,
in that manner which common sense leads all mankind to
in other cases. If experience and trial will evince any thing at all
concerning the natural disposition of the human heart, one
would think the experience of so many ages as have elapsed
since the beginning ofthe world, and the trial made by hundreds
of different nations together for so long a time, should be suffi
cient to convince all, that wickedness is agreeable to the nature
of mankind in its present state.
Here, to strengthen the argument, if there were any need
of it, I might observe not only the extent and generality oi the
prevalence of wickedness in the world, but the height to which
it has risen and the degree in which it has reigned. Among in
numerable things which confirm this, I shall now only observe,
The degree in which mankind have from age to age been hurtful
one to another. Many kinds of brute animals are esteemed
very noxious and destructive, many of them very fierce, vora-
* Dr. Turnbull, though so great an enemy to the doctrine of the depravity
of nature, yet greatly insists upon it, that the experimental method of reasoning
ought to be adopted in moral matters and things pertaining to the human natate ;
and should chiefly be relied upon in moral ae well as natural philosophy. See
Introiw). to Xor. Phil.

Sect, vm. Generality of mankind, wicked. 361
cious, and many very poisonous, and the destroying of them
has always been looked upon as a public benefit : But have not
mankind been a thousand times as hurtful and destructive as
any one of them, yea, as all the noxious beasts, birds, fishes,
and reptiles in the earth, air, and water, put together, at least
of all kinds of animals that are visible ? And no creature can
be found any where so destructive of its own kind as man is.
All others, for the most part, are harmless and peaceable with
regard to their own species. Where one wolf is destroyed by
another wolf, one viper by another, probably a thousand men
are destroyed by those of their own species. Well therefore
might our blessed Lord say, when sending forth his disciples
. into the world, (Matth, x, 16, 17.) Behold I send you forth as
sheep in the midst of wolves ; — but, beware of men. Why do
I say wolves? I send you forth into the wide vvorld of men,
that are far more hurtful and pernicious, and of whom you had
much more need to beware, than of wolves.
It would be strange indeed, that this should be the state of
mankind, 'Aistinguished by reason for that very end that they
might be capable of religion, which summarily consists in
love, if men, as they come into the world, are in their nature inno
cent and harmless, undepraved, and perfectly free from all evil
propensities.

SECT, VIII.
The native depravity of Mankind appears, in tliat there has been
so little.good effect of so manifold and great means, used to
promote Virtue in the world.
The evidence of the native corruption of mankind appears
much more glaring, when it is considered that the world has
been so generally, so constantly, and so exceedingly corrupt,
notwithstanding the various, great, and continual means, that
have been used to restrain men from sin, and promote virtue
and true religion among them.
Dr, T, supposes, that sorrow and death, which came on
mankind in consequence of Adam's sin, was brought on them
in great favour ; as a benevolent father exercising a wholesome
discipline towards his children ; to restrain them from sin by
increasing the vanity of all earthly things to abate their force
to tempt and delude; to induce them to be moderate in grati
fying the appetites ofthe body; to mortify pride and ambition;
and that men might always have before their eyes a striking de
monstration that sin is irfinitely Jiateful to God, by a sight of
that than which nothing is more proper to give them tlie utmost
abhorrence of iniquity, and to fix in their minds a sense ofthe
VOL. ir. 46

3§2 cmieiNAL SIN. P- 1 Ch, i>
dreadful consequences of sin, ^«. ^c And in general, that
they do not come as punishments, but purely as means to keep
men from vice and to make them better.— If it be so, surely
they are great means. Here is a mighty alteration : mankind,
once so easy and happy, healthful, vigorous, and beautiful,
rich in all the pleasant and abundant blessings of paradise, now
turned out, destitute, weak, and decaying, into a wide barren
world, yielding briars and thorns, instead of the delightful
growth and sweet fruit of the garden of Eden, to wear out life
in sorrow and toil, on the ground cursed for his sake ; and at
last, either through long and lingering decay, or severe pain
and acute disease, to expire and turn to putrefaction and dust. ¦
If these are only used as medicines, to prevent and to cure the ,
diseases of the mind, they are sharp medicines indeed ; espe
cially death ; which, to use Hezekiah's representation, is as it
were breaking all his bones. And one would think,- should be
very effectual, if the subject had no depravity-— no evil and
contrary bias to resist and hinder a proper efiect — especially
in the old world, when the first occasion df this terrible altera
tion, this severity of means, was fresh in memory, Adam
continued alive near two thirds of the time before the flood ;
so that a very great part of those who were alive till the flood
might have opportunity of seeing and conversing with him,
and hearing from his mouth not only an account of his fall, and
the introduction of the awful consequences of it, but also of
his first finding himself in existence in the new-created world, of
the creation of Eve, and what passed between him and his
Creator in paradise.
But what was the success of these great means, to restrain
men from sin and to induce them to virtue ? Did they prove
sufficient ? — instead of this the world soon grew exceeding cor
rupt ; till, to use our author's own words, mankind were univer
saUy debauched into lust, sensuality, rapine, and injustice.
Then God used further means: He sent iVoa/j, a preacher
of righteousness to warn the world of the universal destruction
which would come upon them by a flood of waters, if they
went on in sin. This warning he delivered with circumstances
tending to strike their minds and command their attention.
He immediately went about building that vast structure, the
ark, in which he must employ a great number of hands, and
probably spent afl he had in the world to save himself and his
family. And under these uncommon means God waited upon
them one hundred and twenty years. — But all to no effect. The
whole world, for ought appears, continued obstinate, and ab
solutely incorrigible: So that nothing remained to be done
with them, but utterly to destroy the inhabitants of the earth ;
and to begin anew world from that single family who had dis
tinguished themselves by their virtue, that from them might be

Sect, vm. Great Means used to oppose Wickedness. 363
propagated a new and purer race. Accordingly, this was
done : And the inhabitants of this new world, Noah's posteri •
ty, had these new and extraordinary means to restrain sin and
excite to virtue, in addition to the toil, sorrow, and common
mortality, which the world had been subjected to before, in
consequence of Adam's sin : viz. that God had newly testified
his dreadful displeasure for sin, in destroying the many millions
of mankind, all at one blow, old and young, men, woinen, and
children, without pity on any for all the dismal shrieks and
cries with which the world was filled. They themselves, the
remaining family, were wonderfully distinguished by God's
preserving goodness, that they might be a holy seed, being de
livered from the corrupting examples of the old world ; and be
ing all the offspring of a living parent, whose pious instructions
and counsels they had, to enforce these things upon them, to
prevent sin, and engage them to their duty. These inhabi
tants of the new earth must, for a long time, have before their
eyes many evident and striking effects of that universal destruc
tion, to be a continual affecting admonition to them. And
.besides all this, God now shortened the life of man to about
one half of what it used to be. The shortening man^s life.
Dr. T. says, (p. 68.) " Was that the wild range of ambition
and lust might be brought into narrower bounds, and have less
opportunity of domg mischief; and that death, being still
nearer to our view, might be a more powerful motive to regard
less the things of a transitory world, and to attend more to the
rules of truth and wisdom,"
And now let us observe the consequence. — These new
and extraordinary means, in addition to the former, were so
far from proving sufficient, that the new world degenerated
and became corrupt by such swift degrees, that as Dr. T. ob
serves, mankind in general were sunk into idolatry, in about
four hundred years after the flood, and so in about fifty years
after Noah's death they became so wicked and brutish, as to
forsake the true God, and turn to the worship of inanimate
creatures. When things were come to this dreadful pass, God was
pleased, for a remedy, to introduce a new and wonderful dis
pensation — separating a particular family and people from all
the rest of the world by a series of the most astonishing mira
cles, done in the open view of the world ; and fixing their dwel
ling as it were in the midst of the earth, between Asia, Europe
and Africa, and in the midst of those nations which were most
considerable for power, knowledge, and arts — that might, in
an extraordinary manner, dwell among that people, in visible
tokens of his presence. There he manifested himself, and
thence to the world, by a course of miraculous operations and
effects, for many ages ; that the people might be holy to God

3i)4 ORIGINAL SIN. P. I. Ch, I.
as a kingdom of priests, and mi^t stand as a city on a hill, to
be a light to the world. He also gradually shortened raan's
life, till it was brought to about one-twelfth part of what it used
to be before the flood ; and so, according to Dr. T, greatly
diminishing his temptations to sin, and increasing his excite
ments to holiness. — And now let us consider what the success
of these means was, both as to the Gentile world, and the
nation of Israel.
Dr, T, justly observes, {Key, p. 24. § 75.) "The Jewish
dispensation had respect to the nations of the world, to spread
the knowledge and obedience of God in the earth ; and was
established for the benefit of all mankind," — But how unsuc
cessful were these means, and all other means used with the
Heathen nations, so long as this dispensation lasted 1 Abraham
was a person noted in all the principal nations then in the
world ; as in Egypt, and the eastern monarchies, God made
his name famous by his wonderful, distinguishing dispensations
towards him, particularly by so miraculously subduing, before
him and his trained servants, those armies of the four eastern
kings. This great work of the most high God, possessor of
heaven and earth, was greatly noticed by Melchizedeck ; and
one would think should have been sufficient to awaken the
attention of all the nations in that part of the world, and to
lead them to the knowledge and worship of the only true God ;
especially if considered in conjunction with that miraculous and
most terrible destruction of Sodom and all the cities of the
plain for their wickedness, with Lot's miraculous deliverance :
facts which doubtless in their day were much famed abroad in
the world. But there is not the least appearance, in any ac
counts we have, of any considerable good effect. On the con
trary, those nations which were most in the way of observing
and being affected with these things, even the nations of Canaan,
grew worse and worse, till their iniquity came to the full, in
Joshua^s time. And the posterity of Lot, that saint so won
derfully distinguished, soon became some of the most gross
idolaters ; as they appear to have been in Moses's time, (See
Num, xxv.) Yea, and the far greater part even of Abraham''s
posterity, the children of Ishmael, Ziman, Joksham, Medan, Mi
dian, Ishbak and Shuah, and Esau, soon forgot the true God,
and fell off to heathenism.
Great things were done in the sight of the nations, tend
ing to awaken them and lead them to the knowledge and obe
dience of the true God, in Jacob's and Joseph's time ; in that
God did miracuously, by the hand of Joseph, preserve from
perishing by famine as it were the whole world ; as appears by
Gen. xli, 56, 57, Agreeably to which, the name that Pharaoh
gave to Joseph, Zaphnath-Paaneah, as is said, in the Egyptian
language signifies saviour of the world.. But there does not

Sect. viii. Great Means used to oppose Wickedness. 865
appear to have been any go^ abiding effect of this ; no, not
so ranch as among the Egyptians, the chief of all the heathen
nations at that day, who had these great works of Jehovah in
their most immediate view. On the contrary, they grew worse
and worse, and seemed to be far more gross in their idolatries
and ignorance of the true God, and every way more wicked and
ripe for ruin, when Moses was sent to Pharaoh, than they were
in Joseph's time.
After this, in Moses and Joshua's time, the great God was
pleased to manifest himself in a series of the most astonishing
miracles for about fifty years together, wrought in the most
public manner in Egypt, in the wilderness, and in Canaan, in
the view as it were of the whole world ; miracles by which the
world was shaken, the whole frame of the visible creation,
earth, seas, and rivers, the atmosphere, the clouds, sun., moon,
and stars were affected ; miracles greatly tending to convince
the nations of the world of the vanity of their false gods,
shewing Jehovah to be infinitely above them in the thing
wherein they dealt most proudly, and exhibiting God's awful
displeasure at the wickedness of the heathen world. And
these things are expressly spoken of as one end of these great
miracles. (Exod. ix. 14. Numb. xiv. 21. Josh. iv. 23, 24.)
However, no reformation followed, but by the scripture-account,
the nations which had them most in view, were dreadfiilly hard
ened, stupidly refusing all conviction and reformation, and ob
stinately went on in opposition to the Uving God, to their own
destruction. After this, God from time to time very publicly manifest
ed himself to the nations of the world, by wonderful works
wrought in the time of the Judges, of a like tendency with
those already mentioned. Particularly in so miraculously de
stroying, by the hand of Gideon, almost the whole of that vast
army of the Midianites, Amalekites, and all the children of the
east, consisting of about 135,000 men. (Judg. vii. 12. and viii.
10.) But no reformation followed this, or the other great works
of God, wrought in the times of Deborah and Barak, Jeptha
and Sampson. After these things God used new, and in some respects
much greater means with the heathen world, to bring them to
the knowledge and service of the true God, in the days of
David and Solomon. He raised up David, a man after his
own heart, a most fervent worshipper of the true God and
zealous hater of idols, and subdued before him almost all the
nations between Egypt and Euphrates ; often miraculously
assisting him in his battles with his enemies. And he con
firmed Solomon his son in the full and quiet possession of that
great empire fdr about forty years : and made him the
wisest, richest, most magnificent, and every way the greatest

366 original sin. P, i, Ch. i.
monarch that ever had been in the world ; and by far the most
famous and of greatest name among the nations ; especially
for his wisdom, and things concerning the name of his God;
particularly the temple he built, which was exceeding magnifi
cent, that it might be of fame and glory throughout all lands ;
1 Chron. xxii. 5. And we are told that there came of all peo
ple to hear the wisdom of Solomon, from all kings of the earth.
(1 Kings iv. 34. and x. 24.) And the scripture informs us that
these great things were done, that the nations in far countries
might hear of God's great name, and of his out-stretched arm;
that all the people of the earth might fear him, as well as his
people Israel : And that all the people of the earth might know
that the Lord was God, and that there was none else. (1 Kings
viii. 41 — ili, 60.) But still there is no appearance of any con
siderable abiding effect, with regard to any one heathen na
tion. After this, before the captivhy in Babylon, many great
things were done in the sight ofthe Gentile nations, very much
tending to enlighten, affect and persuade them. As God des
troying the army of the Ethiopians of a thousand thousand, be
fore Asa ; Elijah's and Elisha's miracles ; especially Elijah mi
raculously confounding Baal's prophets and worshippers ; Elisha
healing Naaman, the king of Syria's prime minister and the
miraculous victories obtained, through Elisha's prayers, over the
Syrians, Moabites, and Edomites; the miraculous destruction
ofthe vast united army of the children of Moab, Ammon, and
Edom, at Jehoshaphat's^prayer. (2 Chron. xx.) Jonah's preach
ing at Nineveh, together with the miracle of his deliverance
from the whale's belly,; which was published, and well attested,
as a sign to confirm his preaching : But more especially that
great work of God, in destroying Sennacherib's army by an an
gel, for his contempt of the God of Israel, as if he had been no
more than the gods ofthe heathen.
When all these things proved ineffectual, God took a new
method with the heathen world, and used, in some respects,
much greater means to convince and reclaim them, than ever
before. In the first place, his people, the Jews, were removed
to Babylon, the head and heart of the heathen world {Chaldea
having been very much the fountain of idolatry) to carry thith
er the revelations which God had made of himself, contained
in the sacred writings ; and there to bear their testimony against
idolatry ; as some of them, particularly Daniel, Shadrach, Me-
shack, and Abed-nego, did in a very open manner before the
king and the greatest men ofthe empire, with such circumstan
ces as made their testimony very famous in the world. And God
confirmed it with great miracles ; which were published through
the empire by order of its monarch, as the mighty works ofthe
God of Israel, shewing him to be above all gods : Daniel, that

Sect. viu. Great Means used to oppose Wickedness. 367
great prophet, at the same time being exalted to be governor
of all the wise men of Babylon, and one of the chief officers of
Nebuchadnezzar's court.
After this, God raised up Cyrus to destroy Babylon, for
its obstinate contempt of the true God and injuriousness to
wards his people ; according to the prophecies of Jsaiah,
speaking of him by name, instructing him concerning the na
ture and dominion of the true God, (Isai, xiv,) Which pro
phecies were probably shewn to him, whereby he was induced
to publish his testimony concerning the God of Israel, as the
God. (Ezra, i, 2, 3,) Daniel, about the same time, being ad
vanced to be prime minister of state in the new empire erected
under Darius, did in that place appear openly as a worshipper
of the God of Israel, and him alone ; God confirming his testi
mony for him, before the king and all the grandees of his king
dom, by preserving him in the den of lions ; whereby Darius
was induced to publish to all people, nations, and languages,
that dwell in all the earth, his testimony that that the God of
Israel was the living God, and steadfast for ever, &.c.
When after the destruction of Babylon, some of the Jews
returned to their own land, multitudes never returned, but
were dispersed abroad through many parts of the vast Persian
empire ; as appears by the book of Esther. And many of
them afterwards, as good histories inform us, were removed
into the more western parts of the world ; and so were dis
persed as it were all over the heathen world; having the holy
scriptures with them, and synagogues every where for the
worship of the true God. And so it continued to be to the
days of Christ and his apostles ; as appears by the Acts of the
Apostles. Thus that light, which God had given them, was
carried abroad into all parts of the world : So that now they
had far greater advantages to come to the knowledge of the
truth in matters of religion, if they had been disposed to improve
their advantages.
And besides all these things, from about Cyrus's time,
learning and philosophy increased, and was carried to a great
height, God raised up a number of men of prodigious genius,
to instruct others, and improve their reason and understand
ing, in the nature of things : And philosophic knowledge
having gone on to increase for several ages, seemed to be got
to its height before Christ came, or about that time.
And now let it be considered what was the effect of all
these things. — Instead of a reformation, or any appearance or
-ptospect of it, the heathen world in general rather grew worse.
As Dr, WiNDAB observes, " The inveterate absurdities of pagan
idolatry continued without remedy, and increased as arts and
learning increased ; and paganism prevailed in all its height of
absurdity, when pagan nations were polished to the height.

368 ORIGINAL SIN. P. 1. Ch. I.
and in the most polite cities and countries ; and thus continued
to the last breath of pagan power." And so it was with re
spect to wickedness in general, as well as idolatry ; as appears
by what the apostle Paul observes in Rom, i, — Dr. T. speak
ing of the time when the gospel-scheme was introduced, {Key,,
§289,). says, "The moral and religious state ofthe heathen
was very deplorable, being generally sunk into great ignorance,
gross idolatry, and abominable vice," Abominable vices pre
vailed, not only among the common people, but even among
their philosophers themselves, yea, some of the chief of them,
and of greatest genius ; so Dr. T, himself observes, as to that
detestable vice of sodomy, which they commonly and openly
allowed and practised without shame, (See Dr, T,'s note on
Rom, 1, 27,)
Having thus considered the state of the heathen world,
with regard to the effect of means used for its reformation
during the Jewish dispensation, from the first foundation of it
in Abraham's time ; let us now consider how it was with that
people themselves, who were distinguished with the peculiar
privileges of that dispensation. The means used with the
heathen nations were great ; but they were small if compared
with those used with the Israelites. The advantages by which'
that people were distinguished are represented in scripture
as vastly above all parallel, in passages which Dr, T, takes
notice of {Key, § 54.) And he reckons these privileges
among those which he calls antecedent blessings, consisting in
motives to virtue and obedience ; and says, {Key, § 66,)
" That this was the very end and design of the dispensation of
God's extraordinary favours to the Jews, viz. to engage them
to duty and obedience, or that it was a scheme for promoting
virtue, is clear beyond dispute, from every part of the old tes
tament." Nevertheless, the generality of that people, through
all the successive periods of that dispensation, were men of a
wicked character. But it will be more abundantly manifest
how strong the natural bias to iniquity appeared to be among
that people, by considering more particularly their condition
from time to time.
Notwithstanding the great things God had done in the
times of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, to separate them and
their posterity from the idolatrous world, that they migbt be a
holy people to himself; yet in about two hundred years after
Jiacoft's death, and in less than one hundred and fifty years after
the death of Joseph, and while some were alive who had seen
Joseph, the people had in a great measure lost the true religion,
and were apace conforming to the heathen world. For a reme
dy, and the more effectually to alienate them from idols and
engage them to the God of their fathers, God appeared, in
order to bring them out from among the Egyptians and sepa-

Sect. viii. Great means medio oppose Wickedness. 369
rate them from the heathen world, and to reveal himself in
his glory and majesty, in so affecting and astonishing a manner
as tended most deeply and durably to impress their minds ;
that they might never forsake him any more. But so perverse
were they, that they murmured even in the midst of the mira
cles that God wrought for them in Egypt, and murmured at
the Red Sea, in a few days after God had brought them out
with such a mighty hand. When he had led them through the
sea, they sang his praise, but soon forgot his works. Before
they got to Mount Sinai, they openly manifested their perverse
ness from time to time ; so that God says of them, Exod, xvi,
28, How long refuse ye to keep my commandments and my
laws ? Afterwards they murmured again at Rephidim.
In about two months after they came out of Egypt, they
came to Mount Sinai; where God entered into a most solemn
covenant with the people, that they should be an holy people
nnto him, with such astonishing manifestations of his power,
raajesty, and holiness, as were altogether unparalleled. God
puts the people in mind, (Deut. iv, 32 — 34,) For ask now of
the days tliat are past, which were before thee, since the day that
God created man upon the earth; and ask from one side ^hea
ven unto the other, whether there has been any such thing as this
great thing is, or hath been heard, like it. Did ever people hear
the voice of God speaking out of the midst of the fire, as thou
hast heard, and live ? Or hath God assayed to take him a nation
from the midst of another nation, ^c. ? And these great things
were in order to impress their rainds with such a conviction and
sense of divine truth, and their obligations, that they might
never forget thera ; as God says, (Exod. xix, 9,) Lo, I come
unto thee in a thick cloud, that the people may hear when I speak
with thee, and believe thee for ever. But what was the effect of
all ? It was not more than two or three months, before that peo
ple, under that very raountain, returned to their old Egyptian
idolatry, and were singing and dancing before a golden calf^
which they had set up to worship.' And after awful manifesta
tions of God's displeasure for that sin, and so much done to
bring them to repentance and confirm them in obedience, it
was but a few months before they came to that violence of spir
it, in open rebellion against Grod, that with the utmost vehe^
mence they declared their resolution to follow God no longer,
but to make them a captain to return into Egypt. And thus
they went on in perverse opposition to the Most High, from
time to tirae, repeating their open acts of rebellion, in the raidst
of continued astonishing miracles till that generation was de
stroyed. And though the following generation seems to have
been the best that ever was in Israel, yet notwithstanding
their good example, and notwithstanding all the wonders of
God's power and love to that people in Joshua's time, how soon
VOL. XI. 47

S7G ORIGINAL SIN. P" !• Ck. I.
did that people degenerate, and begin to forsake God, and join
with the heathen in their idolatries, till God by severe means,
and by sending prophets and judges, extraordinarily influenced
from above, reclaimed them? But when they were brought to
some reformation by such means, they soon fell away again in
to the practice of idolatry ; and so from one age to another ; and
nothing proved effectual for any abiding reformation.
After things had gone on thus for several hundred years,
God used new methods with his people, in two respects ; First,^
he raised up a great prophet, under whom a number of young
men were trained up in schools, that from among them there
might be a constant succession of great prophets in Israel, oi
such as God should choose ; which seems to have been coritm-
ned for more than five hundred years. Secondly, God raised
up a great king, David, one erainent for wisdom, piety, and for
titude, to subdue all their heathen neighbours, who used to
be such a snare to them ; and to confirra, adorn, and per
fect the institutions of his public worship ; and by him to re
veal more fully the great salvation and future glorious king
dom of the Messiah. And after him was raised up his son^
Solomon^ the wisest emd greatest prince that ever was on earth, .
more fully to settle and establish those thuigs which his Father
David had begun concerning the public worship of God in Isrctel,
and to build a glorious temple for the honour of Jehovah and
the institutions ofhis worship, and to instruct the neighbour na
tions in true wisdom and religion. But what was the success
of these new and extraordinary means ? If we take Dr. T. for
our expositer of scripture, the nation must be extremely corrupt
in David's tirae ; for he supposes he has respect to his own
times in those words, Psal. xiv, 3, 3, The Lord looked down
from heaven, to see if there were any that did understand, and
seek God; they are all gone aside : they are together become
filthy ; there is none that doeth good ; no, not one. But, wheth
er Dr. T. be in the right in this or not, yet if we consider what
appeared in Israel in Absalom''s and Sheba''s rebellion, we shall
not see cause to think, that the greater part of the nation at
that day were men of true wisdom and piety. As to Solotnon's
time, Dr, T. supposes, as has been already observed, that Solo
mon speaks of his own times, when he says, he had found but
one in a thousand that was a thoroughly upright man.
However, it appears, that all those great means used to pro
mote and establish virtue and true religion, in Samuel's, Da,.
vid's, and Solomon's times, were so far from having any gene
ral abiding good effect in Israel, that Solomon himself, with
all his wisdom, and notwithstanding the unparalleled favours of
God to him, had his mind corrupted so as openly to tolerate
idolatry in the land, and greatly to provoke God against him.
And as soon as he was dead, ten tribes of the twelve forsook the

Sect. vm. Great Means used to »ppbse VVickedness. 'Sfl
true worship of God, and instead of it, openly established the
like idolatry that the people fell into at mount Sinai, when they
made the golden calf; and continued finally obstinate in this
apostacy, notwithstanding all means that could be used with
thera by the prophets whom God sent, one after another, to re
prove, counsel, and warn them, for about two hundred and fifty
years ; especially those two great prophets, Elijah and Elisha.
Oi all the kings that reigned over thera, there was not so much
as one but what was of a wicked character. And at last their
case seemed utterly desperate ; so that nothing remained to be
done with them, but to remove them out of God's sight. Thus
the scripture represents the matter, 2 Kings xvii.
And as to the other two tribes ; though their kings were al
ways of the family of David, and they were favoured in many
respects far beyond their brethren, yet they were generally ex
ceeding corrupt. Their kings were, most of them, wicked
men, and their other magistrates, and priests and people, were
generally agreed in the corruption. Thus the matter is repre
sented in the scripture history, and the books of the prophets.
And when they had seen how God had cast off the
ten tribes, instead of taking warning, they raade themselves
vastly more vile than ever the others had done. 2 Kings xvii.
18, 19. Ezek. xvi. 46, 47, 51. God indeed waited longer upon
them, for his servant David's sake, and for Jerusalem's sake,
that he had chosen ; and used more extraordinary means with
thera ; especially by those great prophets, Isaiah and Jere
miah, but to no effect : So that, at last, as the prophets repre
sent the matter, they were like a body universally and despe
rately diseased and corrupted, that would admit of no cure,
the whole head sick, and the whole heart faint, &c.
Things being come to that pass, God took this method
with thera ; he utterly destroyed their city and land, and the
temple which he had araong thera, raade thorough work in
purging the land' of them ; as when a raan empties a dish,
wipes it, and turns it upside down : or when a vessel is cast into
a fierce fire, till its filthiness is thoroughly burnt out. (2 Kings
xxi. 13. Ezek. chap, xxiv.) They were carried into captivity
and there left, tiU that wicked generation was dead and those
old rebels were purged out ; that afterwards the land might be
resettled with a more pure generation.
After the return frbm the captivity, and God had built
the Jewish church again in their own land, by a series of won
derful providences; yet they corrupted themselves again to
so great a degree, that the transgressors were come to the full
again in the days of Antiochus Epiphanes; as the matter is
represented in the prophecy of Daniel. (Dan, viii. 23.) And
then God made them the subjects of a dispensation, little, if
any thing, less terrible, than that which had been in Nebuchad^

37^i oHiGiNAfc- s^^¦. P< I. Ch. I..
nc2«ar''s days. And after God had again delivered them, and
restored the state of religion among them, by the instrumentali
ty of the Maccabees, they degenerated again : So that when
Christ came, they were arrived to that extreme degree of
corruption which is represented in the accounts given by the
Evangelists. It may be observed here in general, that the Jews, though
so vastly distinguished with advantages, means, and motives
to holiness, yet are represented, frora time to time, as more
wicked in the sight of God, than the very worst ofthe heathen.
As, of old, God sware by his life that the wickedness of So
dom was small corapared with that of the Jews; (Ezek. xvi.
47, 48, &c. also chap. v. 5 — 10.) So Christ, speaking of the
Jews in his tirae, represents thera as having rauch greater guilt
tlian the inhabitants of Tyre and Sydon, or even Sodom and
Gomorrah. But we are now come to the time when the grandest scene
was displayed that ever was opened on earth. After all other
schemes had been so long and so thoroughly tried, and had so
greatly failed of success, both among Jews and Gentiles ; that
wonderful dispensation was at length introduced — the greatest
scheme for suppressing and restraining iniquity among man
kind, that ever infinite wisdom and mercy contrived— even the
glorious gospel of Jesus Christ. , " A new dispensation of
grace was erected (to use Dr. T's, own words, p. 239, 240) for
the raore certain and effectual sanctification of raankind into
the image of God ; delivering them from the sin and wickedness
into which they might fall, or were already fallen ; to redeera
thera from all iniquity, and bring them to the knowledge and
obedience of God," In whatever high and exalted terms the
scripture speaks of the means and motives which the Jews en
joyed of old ; yet their privileges are represented as having
no glory, in comparison of the advantages of the gospel. Dr.
T,'s words (p. 233,) are worthy to be here repeated. " Even
the heathen (says he) knew God, and might have glorified him
as God ; but under the glorious light of the gospel, we have
very clear ideas of the divine perfections, and particularly of
the love of God as our Father, and as the God and Father of
our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. We see our duty in the
utmost extent, and the most cogent reasons to perform it :
We have eternity opened to us, even an endless state of
honour and felicity, the reward of virtuous actions ; and the
Spirit of God promised for our direction and assistance. And
all this may and ought to be applied to the purifying of our
minds and the perfecting of holiness. And to these happy
advantages we are born ; for which we" are bound for ever to
praise and magnify the rich grace of God in the Redeemer."

Sect, vui. Great means used to oppose Wickedness. 373
And he elsewhere says,* " The gospel constitution is a scheme
the most perfect and effectual for restoring true religion, and
proraoting virtue apd happiness, that ever the world has yet
seen," Andt admirably adapted to enlighten our minds and
sanctify our hearts. AndX never were motives so divine and
powerful proposed, to induce us to the practice of all virtue and
goodness. And yet even these means have been ineffectual upOn the
far greater part of them with whom they have been used ; of
the many that have been called few have been chosen.
As to the Jews, God's ancient people, with whora they
were used in the first place, and used long by Christ and his
apostles, the generality of them rejected Christ and his gospel
with extrerae pertinacity of spirit. They not only went on still
in that career of corruption which had been increasing from
the time of the Maccabees ; but Christ's coming, his doctrine and
miracles, the preaching of his followers, and the glorious things
that attended the same, were the occasion, through their per
verse misimprovement, of an infinite increase of their wick
edness. They crucified the Lord of Glory with the utmost
raalice and cruelty, and persecuted his followers ; they pleased
not God, and were contrary to all raen ; they went on to grow
worse and worse, till they filled up the measure of their sin, and
wrath carae upon them to the uttermost ; and they were de
stroyed and cast out of God's sight, with unspeakably greater
tokens ofthe divine abhorrence and indignation, than in the days
of Nebuchadnezzar. The greater part of the whole nation
were slain, and the rest were scattered abroad through the earth
in the raost abject and forlorn circumstances. And in the same
spirit of unbelief and malice against Christ and the Gospel, and
in their miserable dispersed circumstances, do they remain to
this day. And as to the gentile nations, though there was a glorious
success of the gospel amongst them in the apostles' days ; yet
probably not one in ten of those that had the gospel preached
to thera erabraced it. The powers ofthe world were set against
it, and persecuted it with insatiable malignity. And among
the professors of Christianity, there presently appeared in raany
a disposition to abuse the gospel to the service of pride and li
centiousness. The apostles foretold a grand apostacy of the
christian world which should continue many ages ; and obser
ved, that there appeared a disposition to such an apostacy
among professing christians, even in that day. (2 Thess. ii. 7.)
The greater part of the ages now elapsed, have been spent in
that grand and general apostacy, under which the christian
world, as it is called, has been transformed into what has been
¦^ Key, § 167. t -Vote o» Rom. i. 16. t Pref to Par. mi Rom. p. 145, 47.

374 oiiieiNAL SIN. P- !• Ch. i*
vastly more dishonourable and hateful to God, and repugnant
to true vntue, than the state of the heathen worid before ; Which
is agreeable to the prophetical descriptions given of it by the
Holy Spirit.
In these latter ages ofthe christian church, God has raised
up a number of great and good raen to bear testimony against
the corruptions of the Church of Rome, and by their means in
troduced that light into the world, by which, in a short tirae,
at least one third part of Europe was delivered from the raore
gross enormities of Antichrist ; Which was attended at first
with a great reformation as to vital and practical religion. But
how is the gold become dim ! To what a pass are things come
in protestant countries at this day, and in our nation in particu
lar ! To what a prodigious height has a deluge of infidelity,
profaneness, luxury, debauchery, and wickedness of every kind,
arisen ! The poor savage Americans are raere babes, if I raay
so speak, as to proficiency in wickedness, in comparison of mul
titudes in the christian world, Dr, T, hiraself, as before observ
ed, represents, that the generality of christians have been the
most wicked, lewd, bloody, and treacherous of all mankind ; and
{Key, § 388,) that " The wickedness of the christian world rend
ers it so much like the heathen, that the good^ effects of our
change to Christianity are but little seen."
With respect to the dreadful corruption of the present day,
it is to be considered, besides the advantages already men
tioned, that great advances in learning and philosophic know
ledge have been made in the present and past century : afford
ing great advantage for a proper and enlarged exercise of our
rational powers, arid for our seeing the bright raanifestation of
God's perfections in his works. And it is to be observed, that
the ineans and inducements to virtue which this age enjoys,
are in addition to most of those which were mentioned before,
as given of old ; ahd among other things, in addition to the
shortening of man's life to 70 or 80 years, from near a thousand.
And, with regard to this, I would observe, that as the case now
stands in christendora, take one with another ofthose who ever
come to years of discretion, their life is not more than forty or
forty-five years ; which is but about the twentieth part of what
it once was : And not so much in great cities, places where
profaneness, sensuality, and debauchery, commonly prevail to
the greatest degree.
Dr. T. (Key, § I.) truly observes, That God has from the
beginning exercised wonderful and infinite wisdorii in the
methods he has, from age to age, raade use of to oppose vice,
cure corruption, and proraote virtue in the world ; and intro
duced several schemes to that end. It is indeed remarkable, ,
how many schemes and methods were tried of old, both before
and after the flood ; how many were used in the times of the

Sect, VIII. Great means used to oppose Wickedness. 375
old testament, both with jews and heathens, and how ineffec
tual all these ancient methods proved, for 4000 years together,
till God introduced that grand dispensation, for redeeming men
from all iniquity, and purifying them to himself, a people zea
lous of good works ; which the scripture represents as the sub
ject of the admiration of angels. But even this has now so
long proved ineffectual, with respect to the generahty, that Dr,
T. thinks there is need of a new dispensation ; the present light
of the.gospel being insuffi,cient for the full reformation of the
Christian world, by reason of its corruptions : (Note on Rora.
i. 27.) — And yet all these things, according to him, without
any natural bias to the contrary ; no stream of natural incli
nation or propensity at all, to oppose inducements to good
ness ; no native opposition of heart, to withstand those gra
cious raeans which God has ever used with" mankind, frora
the beginning of the world to this day ; any more than there
was in the heart of Adam the moment God created him in
perfect innocence.
Surely Dr, T,'b scheme is attended with strange para
doxes. And that his mysterious tenets may appear in a true
light, it raust be observed that — at the sarae time he supposes
these means, even the very greatest and best of thera, to have
proved so ineffectual, that help from thera, as to any general
reformation, is to be despaired of — that he maintains all man
kind, even the heathen in all parts of the world, yea, every
single person in it, (which must include every Indian in Ame-
ca, before the Europeans came hither ; and every inhabitant
of the unknown parts of Africa and Terra Australis) has abi
lity, light, and means sufficient to do their whole duty ; yea,
many passages in his writings plainly suppose, to perform per
fect obedience to God's law, without the least degree of vice
or iniquity.*
But 1 raust not orait to observe, that Dr. T. supposes, the
reason why the gospel-dispensation has been so ineffectual, is,
that it has been greatly misunderstood and perverted. In his
Key, (§389,) he says, "Wrong representations of the scheme
of the gospel have greatly obscured the glory of divine grace,
and contributed rauch to the corruption of its professors.—
Such doctrines have been alraost universally taught and re
ceived, as quite subvert it. Mistaken notions about nature,
grace, election and reprobation, justification, regeneration, re..
demption, calling, adoption, ^c, have quite taken away the
very ground of the Christian life,"
But how came the gospel to be so universally andiexceed-
ingly misunderstood ? Is^ it because it is in itself so very dark
and unintelligible, and not adapted to the apprehensioh of the
* See p. 259, 63, 64, 72. S.

376 oaiGiNAL SIN. P. I. Ch. i.
human faculties ? If so, how is the possession of such an ob
scure and unintelligible thing, so glorious an advantage? — Or
is it because of the native blindness, corruption, and supersti
tion of raankind? But this is giving up the thing in question,
and allowing a great depravity of nature. Dr. T-. speaks of
the gospel as far otherwise than dark and unintelligible ; he
represents it as exhibiting the clearest and raost glorious light,
calculated to deliver the world frora darkness, and to bring
them into marvellous light. He speaks of the light which the
Jews had under the Mosaic dispensation, as vastly exceeding
the light of nature . which the heathen enjoyed ; and yet he
supposes, that even the latter was so clear, as to be sufficient
to lead men to the knowledge of God and their whole duty to
him. He speaks of the light ofthe gospel as vastly exceeding
the light of the Old Testament ; and says of the apostle Paul
in particular, " That he wrote with great perspicuity ; that he
takes great care to explain every part of his subject ; that he
has left no part of it unexplained and unguarded ; and that
never was an author raore exact and cautious in this,"* Is it
not strange, therefore, that the Christian world, without any
native depravity, should be so blind in the raidst of such glar
ing light, as to be all, or the generality, agreed, frora age to
age, so essentially to misunderstand that which is raade so very
plain ?
Dr. T. says (p. 167. S.) " It is my persuasion, that the
Christian religion was very early and grievously corrupted by
dreaming, ignorant, superstitious monks, too conceited to be
satisfied with the plain gospel ; and has long remained in that
deplorable state." — But how carae the whole Christian world,
without any blinding depravity, to hearken to these ignorant,
foolish raen, rather than unto wiser and better teachers ?
Especially, when the latter had plain gospel on their side, and
the doctrines of the other were (as our author supposes) so
very contrary not only to the plain gospel, but to men's
reason and common sense ? Or were all the teachers of the
Christian church nothing but a parcel of ignorant dreamers ?
If so, this is very strange indeed, unless raankind naturally
love darkness, rather than light; seeing in all parts of the
Christian world there was a great multitude in the work of the
ministry, who had the gospel in their hands, and whose whole
business it was to study and teach it ; and therefore had in
finitely greater advantages to become truly wise, than the hea
then philosophers. But if, by ' some strange and inconceiva
ble means, notwithstanding all these glorious advantages,
all the teachers of the christian church through the world,
without any native evil propensity, very early became silly
- Pref. to Par. on Korti. p. 146, 48..

Sect, viii, Grreat Means used to oppose Wickedness. 377
dreamers — and also in their dreaming, generally stumbled on
the same individual monstrous opinions, and so the world might
be bhnded for a while — ^yet, why did they not hearken to that
wise and great man, Pelagius, and others like him, when he
plainly held forth the truth to the christian world ? Especially
seeing his instructions were so agreeable to the plain doctrines,
and the bright and clear light of the gospel of Christ, and also
so agreeable to the plainest dictates of the common sense and
understanding of all raankind ; but the other so repugnant to
it, that (according to our author) if they were true, it would
prove understanding to be no understanding, and the word of
God to be no rule of truth, nor at all to be relied upon, and God
to be a Being worthy ofno regard !
Besides, if the inefficacy of the gospel to restrain sin and
proraote virtue be owing to the general prijvalence of these
doctrines, which are supposed to be so absurd and contrary to
the gospel, here is this further to be accounted for ; naraely,
Why, since there has been so great an increase of light in reli
gious matters (as must be supposed on Dr. T.'s scheme) in this
and the last age, and these monstrous doctrines of original
sin, election, reprobation, justification, regeneration, &c. have
been so much exploded, especially in our nation, there has been
no reforraation attending this great advanceraent of light and
truth : But on the contrary, vice, and every thing opposite to
practical Christianity, has gone on to increase with such a pro
digious celerity as to become like an overflowing deluge ; threat
ening, unless God mercifully interposes, speedily to swallow up
all that is virtuous and praiseworthy.
Many other things might have been mentioned under this
head — the means which raankind have had to restrain vice and
promote virtue — such as wickedness being many ways contrary
to men's teraporal interest and corafort, and their having con
tinually before their eyes so raany instances of persons made
miserable by their vices; the restraints of human laws, without
which men cannot live in society ; the judgments of God
brought on men for their wickedness with which history abounds,
and the providential rewards of virtue ; and innumerable
particular raeans that God has used from age to age to curb
the wickedness of mankind, which I have omitted. But there
would be no end of a particular enumeration of such things.
They that will not be convinced by the instances which have
been mentioned, probably would not be convinced, if the
world had stood a thousand times so long, and we had the
raost authentic and certain accounts of means having been
used from the beginning, in a thousand times greater variety ;
and new dispensations had been introduced, after others
had been tried in vain, ever so often, and still to little effect.
He that will not be convinced by a thousand good witness^
VOL. IT. 48

378 ORIGINAL SIN.

Ch. U

es, it is not likely that he would be convinced by a thousand
thousand, . ,
The proofs that have been extant in the worid, trom toal
and fact, of the depravity of man's nature, are inexpressible,
and as it were infinite, beyond the representation of all simili
tude. If there were a piece of ground which abounded with
briars and thorns, or some poisonous plant, and all mankind
had used their endeavours, for a thousand years together, to
• suppress that evil growth — and to bring that ground by manure
and cultivation, planting and sowing, to produce better fruit,
all in vain ; it would still be over-run with the sarae noxious
growth — it would not be a proof that such a produce was
agreeable to the nature of that soil, in any wise to be cora
pared to that which is given in divine providence, that wick
edness is a produce agreeable to the nature of the field of the
world of mankind. For the means used with it have been va
rious, great and wonderful, contrived by the unsearchable and
boundless wisdom of God ; medicines procured with infinite
expense, exhibited with a vast apparatus ; a marvellous succes
sion of dispensations, introduced one after another, displaying
an incomprehensible length and breadth, depth and height, of
divine wisdom, love and power, and every perfection of the
godhead, to the eternal admiration of principalities and powers
in heavenly places^

SECT. IX.
Several Evasions ofthe argumentsfor the Depravity of Nature
from Trial and Events considered.
Evasion I. Dr. T. says, (p. 231, 232.) "^dawi's natuiev
it is allowed, was very far from being sinful ; yet he sinned.
And therefore, the common doctrine of Original Sin is no
more necessary to account for the sin that has been or is in the
world, than it is to account for Adam's sin."* Again, (p. 52 —
54. S. &c.) " If we allow mankind to be as wicked as R. R.
has represented them to be ; and suppose that there is not one
upon earth that is truly righteous and without sin^ and that
some are very enormous sinners, yet it will not thence follow
that they are naturally corrupt. — For, if sinful action infers a
nature originally corrupt, then, whereas Adam (according to
them that hold the doctrine of Original Sin) committed the
most heinous and aggravated sin that ever was coraraitted in
the world ; for, according to thera, he had greater light than
any other man in the world, tb know his duty, and greater
* Belsham.

^ ECT. IX. sneral EcasioHS considered. 379
power than any other man to fulfil it- and was under greater
obligations than any otlier man to obedience -. he sinned when
he knew he was the representative of millions, and that the
happy or miserable state of all mankind depended on liis con
duct ; which never was, nor can be, the ease of any other man
ia the world: — ^Then, I say, it will follow, that A« nature was
originaUy -corrupt, ire, — Thus their argument from the wicked
ness of mankind, to prove a sinliil and cornipt nature, must in
evitably and irrecoverably fall to the ground. — Which will ap
pear more abondantly, if we take in the case of the angels, who
in nombers sinned and kept not tteir first ^;tate, though created
with a natare superior to Adam's.'' Again, (p. 145 S.) '•'When
h is inquired, how it comes to pass that our appetites and pas-
."^ons are now so irregoiar and strong, as that not one person
has resisted them, so as to keep himself pure and innocent? If
this be the case, if such as make the inqnirr will tell the world
how it came to pas that Adtai's applies and passions were
so irF^alar and strong that he did not reast them so as to keep
himself pore and innocent, when npcm their principles he was
&r more able to have redsted them ; I also will tell them how
it comes to pass that his posterity does not resist them. Sin
doth not alter its nature by its being general ; and therefiire
how far soever it spreads, it must come upon all just as it came
upon Adamf'''
These things are delivered with much assurance. Bnt is
there any reason in such a way of talking? One thing imphed
in it, and tbe main thing, if any at all to the purpose, is, that
because an effect being general does not alter the tuxlvre ofthe
efect, therefore nothing more can be argued concerning the
cause from iis happening constantly, and in the most steady
Bianner, than from its happening but once. But how contrary
is this w reason ? Suppose a person, through the deceitfiil
persuasions of a pretended friend, once tak^ a poisonous
draught of liquor to which he had before no inclination ; but
after he has once taken ofit, he is observed to act as one that
has an insatiable, incurable thirst after more of the same, in his
constant practice, obstiiiately continued in as long as he lives,
against all posible arguments and endeavours used to dissuade
him from it. And suppose we should from hence argue a fixed
inclination, and b^pn to snq>ect that this is the nature and
opraution of the poisoxL, to produce such an inclination, or that
this strong propensity is some way the consequence of the first
draught. In such a case, could it be said with good reason,
that a fixed propensity can no more be argued from his conse
quent constant practice than from his first draught ? Or, sup-
ipose a yooDg man, soberly inclined, enticed by wicked com-
panicHis, should drink to exces, until he had got a habit of
excessive diinkiDg, and =hould come under the power of a

380 ORIGINAL SIN, P. I. C'll. I.
greedy appetite after strong drink, so that drunkenness should
become a common and constant practice with him : And
Suppose an observer, arguing from this general practice, should
say, " It must needs be that this young man has a fixed incli
nation to that sin ; otherwise, how should it come to pass that
he should make such a trade of it ?" And another, ridicuhng
the weakness of his arguing, should reply, " Do you tell me
how it came to pass, that he was guilty of that sin the first
time, without a fixed inclination, and I will tell you how he is
guilty of it so generally without a fixed inclination. Sin does
not alter its nature by being general: And therefore, how
common soever it becomes, it raust corae at all times by the
same means that it came at first." I leave it to every one to
judge, who would be chargeable with weak arguing in such a
case. It is true there is no effect without sorae cause, ground,
or reason of that effect, and some cause answerable to the
effect. But certainly it will not follow that a transient effect
requires a permanent cause or a fixed propensity. An effect
happening once, though great, yea, though it may come
to pass on the same occasion in many subjects at the same
time, will not prove any fixed propensity or permanent influ
ence. It is true, it proves an influence great and extensive,
answerable to the effect, once exerted, or once effectual ; but
it proves nothing in the cause j^:re<i or constant. If a particular
tree, or a great number of trees standing together, have blasted
fruit on their branches at a particular season — or ifthe fruit be
very much blasted, and entirely spoiled — it is evident that
something was the occasion of such an effect at that time ; but
this alone does not prove the nature of the tree to be bad.
But if it be observed, that those trees, and all other trees of
the kind, wherever planted, and in all soils, countries, climates,
and seasons, and however cultivated and managed, still bear ill
fruit, from year to year, and in all ages, it is a good evidence
of the evil nature of the tree. And if the fruit, at all these
times, and in all these cases, be very bad, it proves the nature
of the tree to be very bad. If we argue in like manner from
what appears araong raen, it is easy to determine whether the
universal sinfulness of mankind — all sinning immediately, as
soon as capable of it, and continually, and generally being of a
wicked character, at all times, in aU ages, in all places, and
under all possible circumstances, against means and raotives
inexpressibly manifold and great and in the utmost conceiva
ble variety — be from a permanent internal great cause,
Ifthe voice of common sense were heard, there would be
no occasion for labour in multiplying arguments to shew that
one act does not prove a fixed inclination ; but that constant
pursuit does. We see that, in fact, it is agreeable to the rea-

Sect, ix. Several Evasions considered, 381
son of all mankind, to argue fixed principles, tempers, and pre
vailing inclinations, from repeated and continued actions —
though the actions are voluntary, and performed of choice —
and thus to judge of the tempers and inclinations of persons,
ages, sexes, tribes, and nations. But is it the manner of men
to conclude, that whatever they see others once do, they have
a fixed abiding inclination to do ? Yea, there may be several
acts seen, and yet not be taken as good evidence of an estab
lished propensity ; even though that one act, or those several
acts, are followed by such constant practice as afterwards
evidences fixed disposition. As for example; there may be
several instances ofa man drinking some spirituous liquor, and
those instances be no sign of a fixed inclination to that liquor :
But these acts may be introductory to a settled habit or pro
pensity, which may be raade very manifest afterwards by con
stant practice.
From these things it is plain, that what is alleged concern
ing the first sin of Adam, and of the angels, without a previous
fixed disposition to sin, cannot in the least weaken the argu
ments brought to prove a fixed propensity to sin in mankind,
in their present state. From the permanence ofthe cause has
been argued the permanence of the effect. And that the per
manent cause consists in an internal fixed propensity, and not
in any particular external circumstances, has been argued frora
the effects being the sarae, through a vast variety and change
of circumstances. But the first acts of sin in Adam or the an
gels, considered in themselves, were not permanent, continued
effects. And though a great number of the angels sinned, and
the effect on that account was the greater and more extensive ;
yet this extent of the effect is a very different thing from that
permanence, or settled continuance of effect, which is supposed
to shew a permanent cause or fixed propensity. Neither was
there any trial of a vast variety of circumstances attending a
permanent effect, to shew the fixed cause to be internal, con
sisting in a settled disposition of nature, in the instances ob
jected. And however great the sin of Adam, or of the angels
was, and however great the means, motives, and obligations
were against which they sinned — and whatever may be thence
argued concerning the transient cause, occasion, or temptation,
as being very subtle, remarkably tending to deceive and se
duce, &c, — yet it argues nothing of any settled disposition, or
flxed cause, either great or small ; the effect both in the angels
and our first parents, being in itself transient, and, for ought
appears, happening in each of them under one system or coin
cidence of influential circumstances,*
* See vol. I. p. 398. note.

382 oBiGiNAL SIN. P- '• Ch, u
The geneial continued wickedness of mankind, against
such raeans and motives, proves each of these things, viz. that
the cause '\s fixed, and that the fixed cause is internal in man's
nature, and also that it '\s \ery powerful. It proves that the
cause is fixed, because the effect is so abiding, through so
many changes. It proves that the fixed cause is internal,
because the circumstances are so various — including a variety
of means and motives — and they are such circumstances as
cannot possibly cause the effect, being most opposite to it in
their tendency. And it proves the greatness of the internal
cause ; or that the propensity is powerful ; because the means
which have opposed its influence have been so great, and yet
have been statedly overcome.
But here I may observe, by the way, that with regard to
the motives and obligations against which our first father sinned,
it is not reasonably alleged, that he sinned when he knew his
sin would have destructive consequences to all his posterity,
and might in process of time pave the whole globe with skulls,
^c. It is evident, by the plain account the scripture gives us
of the temptation which prevailed with our first parents to
commit that sin, that it was so contrived by the subtlety ofthe
terapter, as first to blind and deceive them as to that matter,
and to make thera believe that their disobedience should be
followed with no destruction or calamity at all to themselves,
(and therefore not to their posterity) but on the contrary, with a
great increase and advancement of dignity and happiness.
Evasion II. Let the wickedness ofthe world be ever so
general and great, there is no necessity of supposing any de
pravity of nature to be the cause : man's own free-unll is cause
sufficient. Let mankind be more or less corrupt, they make
theraselves corrupt by their own free choice. This Dr. T.
abundantly insists upon, in rnany parts ofhis book,*
But I would ask, how it comes to pass that raankind so
universally agree in this evil exercise of their free-will ? If their
wills are in the first place as free to good as to evil, what is it
to be ascribed to, that the world of mankind, consisting of so
many millions, in so many successive generations, without con
sultation, all agree to excercise their freedom in favour of evil ?
If there be no natural tendency or preponderation in the case,
then there is as good a chance for the will being determined to
good as to evil. If the cause be indifferent, why is not the
effect in sorae raeasure indifferent? Ifthe balance be no
heavier at one end than the other, why does it perpetually pre
ponderate one way ? How comes it to pass, that the free will of
mankind has been determined to evil, in hke manner before the
flood, and after the flood ; under the law and under the gospel t
*Page 357,258, 53, 63, S. and many other places.

Sect. ix. Several Evasions considered. 383
among both Jews and Gentiles, under the Old Testament ; and
since then, among Christians, Jews, Mahometans ; among pa
pists and protestants ; in those nations where civility, politeness,
arts, and learning most prevail, and among the Negroes, and
Hottentots in Africa, the Tartars in Asia, and Indians in Amer
ica, towards both the poles, and on every side of the globe ; in
greatest cities and obscurest villages ; in palaces and in huts,
wigwams and cells under ground ? Is it enough to reply. It hap
pens so, that me;n every where, and at all times, choose thus to
determine their own wills, and so to make themselves sinful, as
soon as ever they are capableofit, and sin constantly as long as
they live, and universally to choose never to come up half way
to their duty ?
A steady effect requires a steady cause ; but free-will, with
out any previous propensity to influence its determinations, is
no permanent cause ; nothing can be conceived of farther from
it : For the very notion of fieedbra of will, consisting in self-de
terraining power, implies contingence ; and if the will is perfect
ly free frora any government of previous inclination, its freedom
raust imply the most absolute and perfect contingence : And
surely nothing can be conceived of more unfixed than that.
The notion of liberty of will, in this sense, implies perfect free
dora from every thing that should previously fix, bind or deter
mine it ; that it may be left to be fixed and determined wholly
by itself: Therefore its determinations must be previously al
together unfixed. And can that which is so unfixed, so contin
gent, be a cause sufficient to account for an effect in such a
manner, and to such a degree, permanent, fixed, and constant ?
When we see any person going on in a certain course with
great constancy, against all manner of means to dissuade him,
do we judge this to be no argument of a fixed disposition of
mind, because, being free, he may determine to do so, if he will,
without any such disposition? Or if we see anation, or people,
that differ greatly from other nations in such and such instances
oftheir constant conduct — as though their tempers and inclina
tions were very diverse — and any should say, we cannot judge at
all ofthe teraper or disposition of people by any thing observa
ble in their constant practice or behaviour, because they have
all free-will, and therefore raay all choose to act so, if they
please, without any thing in their temper or inclination to bias
them. Would such an account of such effects be satisfying to
the reason of mankind ? But infinitely further would it be from
satisfying a considerate mind, to account for the constant and
universal sinfulness of mankind by saying that their will is free,
and therefore all may, if they please, make themselves wicked:
They are free when they first begin to act as moral agents and
therefore all may, if they please, begin to sin as soon as they be
gin to act : They are free as long as they continue to act in the

384 ORIGINAL SIN, P. I. Ch. I.
world, and therefore theymay all commit sin continually, if they
will : Men of all nations are free, and therefore all nations may
act alike in these respects, if they please, though some do not
know how other nations do act. Men of high and low condition,
learned and ignorant, are free, and therefore they may agree in
acting wickedly, if they please, though they do not consult
together. Men in all ages are free, and therefore men in one age
may all agree with men in every other age in wickedness, if they
please, though they do not know how men in other ages have
acted, &c. Let every one judge whether such an account of
things can satisfy reason,
Evasion-'lII, It is said by raany opposers of the doctrine
of original sin, that the corruption of mankind may be owing,
not to a depraved natuie, but to bad example. And I think we
must understand Dr, T. as having respect to the powerful influ
ence of bad instruction and example, when he says, (p. 118,)
" The gentiles in their heathen state, when incorporated into
the body of the gentile world, were without strength, unable
to help or recover themselves," And in several other places to
the like purpose. If there was no depravity of nature, what
else could there be but bad instruction and example, to hinder
the heathen wbrld, as a collected body, (for as such Dr. T.
speaks of them, as may be seen p, 117, 118,) from emerging out
of their corruption on the rise of each new generation ? As to
their bad instruction, our author insists upon it, that the hea
then, notwithstanding all their disadvantages, had sufficient
light to know God, and do thefr whole duty. Therefore it
must be chiefly bad example, according to him, that rendered
their case helpless.
Now concerning this way of accounting for the corrup
tion of the world by the influence of bad example, I would
observe, I . It is accounting for the thing by the thing itself. It
is accounting for the corruption ofthe world by the corruption
of the worid. For, that bad examples are general all over the
world to be followed by others, and have been so from the
beginning, is only an instance, or rather a description of that
corruption of the world which is to be accounted for. If man
kind are naturally no more inclined to evil than good, then
how corae there to be so many more bad examples than good
ones, in all ages ? And if there are not, how come the bad
examples that are set to be so much raore followed than the
good ? If the propensity of man's nature be not to evil, how
comes the current of general exaraple, every where, and at
afl times, to be so rauch to evil ? And when opposition has
been raade by good exaraples, how coraes it to pass that it has
had so little effect to stem the stream of general wicked
practice ?

Sect, ix. Several Evasions considered. 385
1 think from the brief account the scripture gives us of
the behaviour of our first parents, and of the expressions of
their faith and hope in God's revealed mercy, we have reason
to suppose, that before ever they had any children they re
pented, were pardoned, and became truly pious. So that
God planted the world at first with a noble vine ; and at the
beginning of their generations he set the stream of example
the right way. And we see that children are more apt to follow
the example of their parents than of any others ; especially
in early youth, their forming time, when those habits are gene
rally contracted which abide by them all their days. Besides,
Adam's children had no other examples to follow but those of
their parents. How therefore came the stream so soon to turn
and to proceed the contrary way with so violent a current ?
When mankind became so universally and desperately corrupt
as not to be fit to live on earth any longer, and the world was
every where full of bad examples, God destroyed them all at
once — except righteous Noah and his faraily — in order to re
move those bad examples, and that the world might be planted
again with good example, and the stream again turned the
right way. How therefore came it to pass, that Noah's pos
terity did not follow his good example, especially when they
had such extraordinary things to enforce it, but so generally,
even in his life-time, becarae exceeding corrupt ? One would
think the first generation at least, while all lived together as
one family, under Noah, their venerable father, raight have
followed his good exaraple. And if they had done so, then,
when the earth came to be divided m P cleg's tirae, the heads
of the several farailies would have set out their particular colo
nies with good examples, and the stream would have been
turned the right way in all the various divisions, colonies, and
nations of the world. But we see in fact, that in about fifty
years after Noah's death the world in general was overrun
with dreadful corruption ; so that all virtue and goodness was
like soon to perish from among mankind, unless something ex>
traordinary should be done to prevent it.
Then, for a remedy, God separated Abraham and his
family from all the rest of the world, that they might be de
livered from the influence of bad example, and that in his
posterity he might have an holy seed, Thus God again
planted a noble vine ; Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob being emi
nently pious. But how soon did their posterity degenerate,
till true religion was hke to be swaflowed up ? We see how
desperately, and almost universally corrupt they were, when
God brought them out of Egypt, and led them in the wilder
ness. Then God was pleased, before he planted his people in
Canaan, to destroy that perverse generation in the wilder-
vol. n. 49

386 ORIGINAL SIN. ?• I- Ch, I.
ness, that he might plant them there a noble vine, wholly a right
seed, and set them out with good exaraple, in the land where
they were to have their settled abode. Jer. ii. 21. It is evident
that the generation which came with Joshua into Canaan was
an excellent generation, by innumerable things said of thera.*
But how soon did that people, nevertheless, become the degen
erate plant ofa strange vine ?
And when the nation had a long time proved desperately
and incurably corrupt, God destroyed them, and sent them in
to captivity — till the old rebels were dead and purged out, in
order to deliver their children from their evil example. And
when the foflowing generation was purified as in a fiirnace, God
planted them again, in the land oi Israel, a noble vine, and set
them out with good example ; which yet was not followed by
their posterity.
When again the corruption was become inveterate, the
christian church was planted ; and a glorious out-pouring ofthe
Spirit of God caused true virtue and piety to be exemplified far
beyond what ever had been on earth before ; and thus the
christian church was planted a noble vine. But that primitive
good example has not prevailed to cause virtue to be generally
and steadfastly maintained in the christian world. To how
great a degree it has been otherwise, has already been observed.
After raany ages of general and dreadful apostacy, God
was pleased to erect the protestant church, as separated from
the raore corrupt part of Christendom ; and true piety flourish
ed in it very much at first ; God planted it a noble vine : But
notwithstanding the good examples of the first reformers, what
a melancholy pass is the protestant world come to at this day ?
When England grew very corrupt, God brought over a
number of pious persons, and planted them in New England,
and this land was planted with a noble vine. But how is the
gold become dim I How greatly have we forsaken the pious
examples of our fathers ! -
So prone have mankind always proved themselves to de
generacy and backsliding, that it shew% plainly their natural
propensity. And when good has revived and been promoted
among raen, it has been by some divine interposition oppos
ing the natural current; the fruit of some extraordinary means.
And the efficacy of such means has soon been overcome by
constant natural bias, the effect of good example presently
lost, and evil has regained the dominion. Like a heavy body,
which may by some great power be caused to ascend, against
its nature, a little while, but soon goes back again towards the
center, to which it naturally and constantly tends.
* See Jer. ii. 2, 3. Psal. Ixyiii. 14. Josh. xxii. 2. and xxiii. 8. Deut. iv. 3. 4.
Hos. xi. 1. and ix. 10. Judgrii. 7, 17, 22. and many other places.

Sect. ix. Several Evasions considered. 387
So that evil exaraple wiU in no wise account for the cor
ruption of raankind, without supposing a natural proneness to
sin. The tendency of example alone will not account for ge
neral wicked practice, as consequent on good example. And
if the influence of bad example is a reason of some of the wick
edness, that alone will not account for raen becoming worse
than the exaraple set, degenerating raore and raore, and grow
ing worse and worse, which has been their manner,
2, There has been given to the world an example of vir
tue, which, were it not for a dreadful depravity of nature,
would have influence on them who live under the gospel, far
beyond all other examples ; that is, the example of Jesus
Christ, God, who knew the huraan nature, and how apt men are
to be influenced by example, has raade answerable provision.
His infinite wisdora has contrived that we should have set
before us the raost araiable and perfect exaraple, in such cir
curastances as should have the greatest tendency to influence
all the principles of man's nature but his corruption. Men
are apt to be moved by the example of others like themselves,
or in their own nature : therefore this example was given in
our nature. Men are ready to follow the example of the^ea<
and honourable ; and this — though that of one in our nature,
yet — was the example of one infinitely higher and raore honour
able than kings or angels, A people are apl to foUow the
example of their prince. This is the example of that glorious
person, who stands in a peculiar relation to Christians as their
Lord and King, the suprerae head of the church; and not
only so, but the King of kings, supreme head of the universe,
and head over all things to the church. Children are apt to
follow the example of their parents ; this is the example of
the author of otn being, and of our holy and happy being ;
the Creator of the world and everlasting Father of the uni
verse. Men are very apt to follow the example of their
friends : The example of Christ is that of one who is infinitely
our greatest friend, standing in the raost endearing relations
of brother. Redeemer, spiritual head and husband ; whose
grace and love expressed to us, transcends aU other love emd
friendship, as much as heaven is higher than the earth. The
virtues and acts of his example were exhibited to us in the
raost endearing and engaging circumstances that can possibly
be conceived of. — His obedience and submission to God, his
humility, meekness, patience, charity, self-denial, &;c. being
exercised and expressed in a work of infinite grace, love, con
descension, and beneficence to us — and had all their highest
expressions in his laying down his life, and meekly, patiently,
and cheerfully undergoing unutterable suffering for our eternal
salvation. Men are peculiarly apt to follow the example of

388 6aieiiNAL sin. ' P- i- Ch, i,
those from whora they have great benefits : But it is utterly
impossible to conceive of greater benefits, that we could have
by the virtues of any person, than we have by the virtuous
acts of Christ ; we, who depend upon being thereby saved
from eternal destruction, and brought to inconceivablej im
mortal glory at God's right hand. Surely if it were not for an
extreme corruption of the human heart, such an example would
have that strong influence on it, which would as it were swal
low up the power of all the evil and hateful examples of a ge
neration of vipers,
3. The influence of bad example, without corruption of
nature, will not account for children universally committing
sin as soon as capable of it ; which I think, is a fact that has
been made evident by the scripture. It will not account for it
in the children of eminently pious parents ; the first example
set in their view being very good ; which was especially the
case of many children in Christian families in the apostolic
days, when the apostle John supposes that every individual
person had sin to repent of, and confers to God.
4, What Dr. T. supposes to have been fact, with respect
to a great part of mankind— the state of the heathen world,
which he supposes, considered as a collective body, was help
less, dead in sin, and unable to recover itself — cannot consis
tently be accounted for from the influence of bad example.
Not evil example alone, no, nor as united with evil instruction,
can be supposed a sufficient reason why every new generation
that arose among them, should not be able to emerge from the
idolatry and wickedness of their ancestors, in any consistence
with his scheme. The ill example of ancestors could have no
power to oblige them to sin, any other way than as a strong
temptation. But Dr. T. himself says, (p. 72. S.) " To sup
pose men's temptations to be superior to their powers, will im
peach the goodness and justice of God, who appoints every
man's trial." And as to bad instructions, as he supposes that
they all, yea every individual person, had light sufficient to
know God, and do their whole duty. And if each one could
do this for himself, then surely they might all be agreed in it
through the power of free-will, as well as the whole world be
agreed in corruption by the same power.
Evasion IV, Some modern opposers of the doctrine of
original sin, thus account for the general prevalence of wick
edness, viz, that in the course of nature our senses grow up
first, and the aniraal passions get the start of reason. So Dr.
Turnbull,* "Sensitive objects first affect us, and inasmuch
as reason is a principle which, in the nature of things, must
« See Mor. PhU. p. 279, and Chris. PhU. p. 274.

Sect. ix. Several Evasions considered. 389
be advanced to strength and vigour by gradual cultivationj
and these objects are continually assailing and soliciting Us ;
so unless a very happy education prevents, our sensitive appe
tites raust have becorae very strong, before reason can have
force enough to call thera to an account, and assume authority
over them." From hence Dr. Turnbull supposes it comes
to pass,* " That though some few may, through the influence
of virtuous example, be said to be sanctified frora the womb,
so liberal, so generous, so virtuous, so truly noble is their cast
of mind ; yet generally speaking, the whole world lieth in such
wickedness, that, with respect to the far greater part of man
kind, the study of virtue is beginning to reform, and is a severe
StrUggleagainstbadhabits early contracted, and deeply rooted ; it
is therefore putting off an old invetelate corrupt nature, and put
ting on a new form and temper ; it is moulding ourselves anew ;
it is being born again, and becoming as children. — And how
few are there in the world who escape its poflutions, so as not
to be early in that class, or to be among the righteous that
need no repentance ?"
Dr. Taylor, though not so exphcit, seems to hint at the
sarae thing, (p. 192.) " It is by slow degrees that children
corae to the use of understanding ; the animal passions being
for some years the governing part of their constitution. And
therefore, though they may be froward and apt to displease us,
yet how far this is sin in them, we are not capable of judging.
But it may suffice to say, that it is the will of God that children
should have appetites and passions to regulate and restrain, that
he hath given parents instructions and commands to discipline
and inform their minds, that if parents first learned true wisdora
for theraselves, and then endeavoured to bring up their children
in the way of virtue, there would be less wickedness in the
vvorld." Concerning these things I would observe, that such a
scheme is attended with the very same difficulties which they
who advance it would avoid by it ; liable to the same objec
tions which they make against God's ordering it so, that men
should be brought into being with a prevailing propensity to
sin. For this scheme supposes, the Author of Nature has so
ordered things, that men should come into being as raoral
agents, that is, should first have existence in a state and capa
city of moral agency, under a prevailing propensity to sin.
For that strength which sensitive appetites and animal passions
come to by their habitual exercise, before persons come to the
exercise of their rational powers, amounts to a strong propen
sity to sin, when they first come to the exercise of those ra
tional powers, by the supposition : Because this is given as a
* Chris. Phil p. 282, 283',

390 ORIGINAL SIN. P. I. Ch, I.
reason why the scale is turned for sin, and why, generally speak
ing, the whole world lies in wickedness, and the study of virtue
is a severe struggle against bad habits early contracted, and
deeply rooted. These deeply rooted habits must imply a tend
ency to sin ; otherwise they could not account for that which
they are brought to account for, naraely, prevailing wickedness
in the world : For that cause cannot account for an effect,
which is supposed to have no tendency to that effect. And
this tendency which is supposed, is altogether equivalent to a
natured tendency, being as necessary to the subject. For it is
supposed to be brought on the person who is the subject of it,
when he has no power to oppose it; the habit, as Dr Turn-
bull says, becoming very strong, before reason can have force
enough to call the passions to account, or assume authority
over them. And it is supposed, that this necessity, by which
men become subject to this propensity to sin, is from the order
ing and disposal of the Author of Nature ; and therefore must
be as rauch from his hand, and as much without the hand of
the person himself, as if he were first brought into being with
such a propensity. Moreover, it is supposed that the effect is
truly wickedness. For it is alledged as a cause why the whole
world lies in wickedness, and why all but a very few are first in
the class of the wicked, and not among the righteous that need
no repentance. If they need repentance, what they are guilty
of is truly and properly wickedness, or moral evil ; for certain
ly men need no repentance for that which is no sin, or blaraea-
ble evil. If, as a consequence of this propensity, the world
lies in wickedness and the far greater part are of a wicked
character, without doubt the far greater part go to eternal
perdition ; For death does not pick and choose, only for men
ofa righteous character. And certainly that is an evil, corrupt
state of things, which naturally tends to, and issues in this consO'
quence, that as it were the whole world lies and lives in wicked
ness, dies in wickedness, and perishes eternally. And this, by the
supposition, is a state of things wholly ordered by the Author
of Nature, before mankind are capable of having any hand
in the affair. And is this any relief to the difficulties
which these writers object against the doctrine of natural de
pravity ?
And I might here also observe, that this way of account
ing for the wickedness of the world amounts to just the sarae
thing with that solution of raan's depravity, raentioned before,
against which Dr. T. cries out, as too gross to be admitted,
(p. 188, 189.) viz. God creating the soul pure, and putting it
into such a body as naturally tends to pollute it. For this
scheme supposes, that God creates the soul pure, and puts it
into a body, and into such a slate in that body, that the natural

Sect, ix. Several Evasions considered. ' 391
consequence is a strong propensity to sin, as soon as the soul is
capable of sinning.
Dr. Turnbull seems to suppose, that the matter could
not have been ordered otherwise, consistent with the nature
of things, than that animal passions should be so aforehand
with reason, as that the consequence should be that which has
l^een mentioned ; because reason is a faculty of such a nature,
that it can have strength and vigour no otherwise than by ex
ercise and culture,* But can there be any force in this ? Is
there any thing, in nature to make it impossible, but that the
superior principles of man's nature should be so proportioned
to the inferior, as to prevent such a dreadful consequence as
the moral and natural ruin, and eternal perdition of the far
greater part of raankind ? Could not those superior principles
be in much greater strength at first, and yet be capable of
endless improvement ? And what should hinder its being so
ordered by the Creator, that they should iraprove by vastly
swifter degrees than they do ? If we are christians, we must
be forced to allow it to he possible in the nature of things, that
the principles of human nature should be so balanced, that
the consequence should be no propensity to sin, in the very
beginning of a capacity for moral agency ; because we must
own, that it was so in fact in Adam, when first created, and
also in the man Christ Jesus ; though the faculties of the latter
were such as grew by culture and improvement, so that he in
creased in wisdom as he grew in stafure.
Evasion V. Seeing men in this world are in a state of
trial, it is fit that their virtue should meet with trials, and con
sequently that it should have opposition and temptation to
overcome ; not only from without, but from within, in the
animal passions and appetites ; that by the conflict and victory
our virtue may be refined and established.t Agreeably to
this Dr. T. (p. 253.) says, " Without a right use and applica
tion of our powers, were they naturally ever so perfect, we
could not be judged fit to enter into the kingdom of God. —
This gives a good reason why we are now in a state of trial
and temptation, viz. to prove and discipline our minds, to
season our virtue, and to fit us for the kingdom of God ; for
which, in the judgment of infinite wisdom, we cannot be qua
lified but by overcoming our present temptations," And,
(p, 78, S,) " We are.upon trial, and it is the will of our Father
that our constitution should be attended with various passions
and appetites, as well as our outward condition with various
temptations." He says the like in several other places. To
the sarae purpose very often Dr, Turnbull, particularly Chris.
Phil. p. 310. " What raerit (says he) except from combat ?
¦^ Mor. Phil. p. 311. t Belsham.

392 osiGiNAL feiN. P. I. Ch. r.
What virtue without the encounter of such eneraies, such
temptations as arise both frora within and frora abroad ? To
be virtuous, is to prefer the pleasures of virtue to those which
come into competition with it, and vice holds forth to tempt
us ; and to dare to adhere to truth and goodness, whatever
pains and hardships it raay cost. There must therefore, in
order to the formation and trial, in order to the very being pf
virtue, be pleasures of a certain kind to make temptations to
vice," In reply to these things I would say, either the state of
temptation, which is supposed to be ordered for men's trial,
amounts on the whole to a prevailing tendency to that state of
general wickedness and ruin which has been proved to take
place, or it does not. If it does not amount to a tendency to
such an effect, then how does it account for it ? When it is
inquired by what cause such an effect should come to pass, is
it not absurd to allege aeause which is owned at the same time
to have no tendency to such an effect ? Which is as much as
to confess, that it will not account for it, I think it has been
demonstrated, that this effect must be owing to some prevail
ing tendency, — But if the other part of the dilemma be taken,
and it be said, that this state of things does imply a prevailing
tendency to that effect which has been proved, viz. that all
mankind, without one exception, sin against God, to their own
deserved eternal ruin — and not only'so, but sin thus immedi
ately, as soon as capable of it, and continually, have raore sin
than virtue, and have guilt that infinitely outweighs the value
of all the goodness any ever have, and that the generality of
the world in all ages are extremely stupid and foolish, of a
wicked character, and actually perish for ever — then I say, if
the state of teraptation implies a natural tendency to such an
effect as this, it is a very evil, corrupt, and dreadful state of
things, as has been already largely shewn.
Besides, such a state has a tendency to defeat its own
supposed end, which is to refine, ripen, and perfect virtue,
and so to fit men for the greater eternal happiness and glory :
Whereas, the effect it tends to is the reverse of this, viz. gene
ral, eternal infamy and ruin, in all generations. It is supposed,
that men's virtue must have passions and appetites to struggle
with, in order to have the glory and reward of victory :
but the consequence is, a prevailing, continual, and generally
effectual tendency— not to men's victory over evil appetites
and passions, and the glorious reward of that victory, but — to
the victory of evil appetites and lusts over men, utterly and
eternally destroying them. If a trial of virtue be requisite, yet
the question is. Whence coraes so general a failing in the
trial, if there be no depravity of nature ? If conflict and war
be necessary, whence the necessity that there should be more

Chap, ii. Several Evasions considered. 393
cowards than good soldiers ? and whence is it necessary that
the whole world as it were should lie in wickedness, and die in
cowardice ?
1 raight also here observe, that Dr. Turnbull is not very
consistent in supposing that combat with temptation is re
quisite to the very being of virtue. For I think it clearly followe
from his own notion of virtue, that it must have a being prior
to any virtuous or praiseworthy combat with temptation. For
by his principles, all virtue lies in good affection, and no
actions can be virtuous but what proceed from good affection,*
Therefore, surely the combat itself can have no virtue in it,
unless it proceeds from virtuous affection : And therefore
virtue must have an existence before .the combat, and be the
cause of it.

CHAP, II.
Universal Mortality proves Original Sin; particularly the Death
of Infants, with its various Circumstances,
The universal reign of death over persons of all ages indis
criminately, with the awful circurastances and attendants of
death, prove that raen come sinful into the world. — It is need
less here particularly to inquire. Whether God has not a sove
reign right to set bounds to the lives of his own creatures, be
they sinful or not ; and as he gives life, so to take it away when
he pleases ? Or how far God has a right to bring extrerae
suffering and calamity on any innocent moral agent? For
death, with the pains and agonies with which it is usually
brought on, is not merely a limiting of existence, but is a most
terrible calamity : and to such a creature as man — capable of
conceiving of immortality, made with an earnest desire after it,
capable of foresight and reflection on approaching death, and
having an extreme dread of it — is a calamity above all others
terrible, I say, it is needless elaborately to consider, whether
God may not, consistent with his perfections^by absolute sover
eignty, bring so great a calamity on mankind when perfectly
innocent. It is sufficient, if we have good evidence from scrip
ture, that it is not agreeable to God's manner of dealing with
mankind so to do.
It is manifest, that mankind were not originally subject
ed to this calaraity : God brought it on them afterwards, on
occasion of man's sin, when manifesting his great displeasure,
and by a sentence pronounced by him as a judge ; which Dr.
T. often confesses. Sin entered into the worid, as the apostle
* CAm. PH. p. lis, 114, ll.";.
VOL. II. 50

394 OKIGISAL SIN, P. I-
says, and death by sin. Which certamly leads us fo suppose,
that this affair was ordered, not merely by the sovereignty of a
creator, but by the righteousness of a judge. And the scripture
every where speaks of all great afflictions and calaraities which
God in his providence brings on mankind, as testimonies ofhis
displeasure for sin, in the subjects of those calamities ; except
ing those sufferings which are to atone for the sins of others.
He ever taught his people to look on such calamities as his rod,
the rod ofhis anger, his frowns, the hidings ofhis face in dis
pleasure. Hence such calamities are in scripture so often call
ed by the name oi judgments, being what God brings on men
as a judge, executing a righteous sentence for transgression.
Yea, they are often called by the name of wrath, especially
calamities consisting or issuing in death.* And hence also is
that which Dr. T. would have us take so much notice of, that
sometimes, in the scripture, calamity and suffering is called by
such names as sin, iniquity, being guilty, &c, which is evident
ly by a metonyray of the cause for the effect. It is not likely
that, in the language used of old among God's people, calarai
ty or suffering woiild have beeri called by the names of sin and
guilt, if it had been so far from having any connection with sin,
that even death itself, which is always spoken of as the most
terrible of calaraities, is not so rauch as any sign of the sinful
ness of the subject, or any testimony of God's displeasure for
his guilt, as Dr. T, supposes.
Death is spoken of in scripture as the chief of calamities,
the most extreme and terrible of all natural evils in this world.
Deadly destruction is spoken of as the most terrible destruc
tion. (1 Sam. V. II.) Deadly sorrow, as the most extreme
sorrow, (Isai, xvii, 11, Matt, xxvi. 38.) And deadly enemies,
as the most bitter and terrible enemies, (Psal, xvii, 9,) The
extremity of Christ's sufferings is represented by his suffering
unto death. (Phil, ii. 8, and other places,) Hence the great
est testimonies of God's anger for the sins of men in this world,
have been by inflicting death ; as on the sinners of the old
world ; on the inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah ; on Onan,
Pharaoh, and the Egyptians; on Nadab and Abihu, Corah
and his corapany, and the rest of the rebels in the wilderness ;
on the wicked inhabitants of Canaan ; on Hophni and Phine-
has, Ananias and Sapphira, and the unbelieving Jews, upon
whora wrath carae to the uttermost, in the time of the last de
struction of Jerusalem. This calamity is often spoken of as in
a peculiar manner the fruit of guilt, Exod. xxviii. 43, That
they bear not iniquity and die, Levit, xxii, 9, Lest they bear
* See Levit. x. 6. Numh. i. 53. and xviii. 5. Josh. ix. 20. 2 Chron. xxiv.
18. and xix. 2, 10. and xxviii. 13. and xxxii. 25. Ezra vii. 23. Neh. xiii. 18.
Zech. vu. 12. and many other places.

Chap, h. Argument from universal Mortality. 39S
sin for it and die, (So Num. xviii. 22. compared with Levit.
X, 1, 2,) The very light of nature, or tradition from ancient^
revelation, led the heathen to conceive of death as in a pe
culiar manner an evidence of divine vengeance. Thus we
have an account, (Acts xxviii. 4.) That when the barbarians
saw the venemous beast hang on Paul's hand, they said among
themselves, no doubt this man is a murderer, whom though he
hath escaped the seas, yet vengeance sufFereth not to
LIVE. Calaraities very small in comparison of the universal
temporal destruction of mankind by death, are spoken of as
manifest indications of God's great displeasure for the sinful
ness of the subject ; such as the destruction of particular
cities, countries, or numbers of men, by war or pestilence,
Deut, xxix, 24, All nations sliall say. Wherefore hath the
Lord done. thus unto this lands' what meaneth the heat of this
great anger ? (Compare Deut xxxii, 30. 1 Kings ix. 8. and Jer,
xxii, 8, 9,) These calamities, thus spoken of as plain testimo
nies of God's great anger, consisted only in hastening on that
death, which otherwise, by God's disposal, would most cer
tainly have come in a short tirae. Now to take off thirty or
forty years frora seventy or eighty, (supposing it tobe so much,
one with another, in the time of these extraordinary judgments)
is but a small matter, in comparison of God first making man
mortal, cutting off his hope of immortality, subjecting him to
inevitable death, which his nature so exceedingly dreads ; and
afterwards shortening his life further, by cutting off more than
eight hundred years of it: so bringing it to be less than a
twelfth part of what it was in the first ages of the world. Be
sides that innumerable multitudes in the common course of
things, without any extraordinary judgment, die in youth, in
childhood, and infancy. Therefore how inconsiderable a
thing is the additional or hastened destruction, that is some
times brought on a particular city or country by war, com
pared with that universal havock which death makes of the
whole human race, from generation to generation, without
distinction of sex, age, quality, or condition ; with all the in
finitely various dismal circumstances, torments, and agonies,
which attend the death of old and young, adult persons and
little infants ? If those particular and comparatively trivial ca
lamities, extending perhaps not to more than the thousandth
part of one generation, are clear evidences of God's great
anger; certainly this universal destruction — by which the
whole world, in all generations, is swallowed up as by a
flood that nothing can resist — must be a most glaring raani
festation of God's anger for the sinfulness of mankind. Yea,
the scripture is express, that it is so: (Psal. xc. 3, &c.)
"Thou turnest man to destruction, and sayest, return, ye

396 ORIGIJSTAt SIN. P. i.
children of men, — Thou carriest them away as with a flood :
^^hey are as a sleep: In the raorning they are like grass, which
groweth up : in the morning it flourisheth and groweth up ; in
the evening it is cut down and withereth. For we are con
sumed by thine anger, and by thy wrath are we troubled.
Thou hast set our iniquities before thee, our secret sins in the
light of thy countenance. For all our days are passed away
in thy wrath : We spend our years as a tale that is told. The
days of our years are threescore years and ten : And if by rea
son of strength they be fourscore years, yet is their strength
labour and sorrow, for it is soon cut off, and we fly away.
Who knoweth the power of thine anger ? According to thy
fear, so is thy wrath. So teach us to number our days that we
may apply our hearts .unto wisdom." How plain and full is
this testimony, that the general mortality of raankind is an
evidence of God's anger for the sin of those who are the sub
jects of such a dispensation?
Abimelech speaks of it as what he had reason to conclude
frora God's nature and perfection, that he would not slay a
righteous nation. Gen. xx. 4. By righteous evidently raeaning
innocent. And if so, much less will God slay a righteous world-
— consisting of so raany nations, repeating the great slaughter
in every generation — or subject the whole world of mankind
to death, when they are considered as innocent, as Dr. T. sup
poses. We have from time to time in scripture such phrases
as — worthy of death, and guilty of death : But certainly the
righteous Judge of all the earth will not bring death ori thou
sands of raillions, not only that are not worthy of death, but are
worthy of no punishment at all.
Dr. T, from time to time speaks of affliction and death as
a great beneflt, as they increase the vanity of all earthly things,
and tend to excite sober reflections, and to induce us to be
moderate in gratifying the appetites of the bo'dy, and to mortify
pride and ambition, &c,* To this I would say,
I, It is not denied but God may. see it needfiil for man
kind in their present state, that they should be mortal, and
subject to outward afflictions, to restrain their lusts, mortify
their pride, &c. But then is it not an evidence of man's
depravity, that it is so ? Is it not an evidence of distemper of
mind, yea, strong disease, when man stands in need of such
sharp medicines, such severe and terrible means to restrain
his lusts, keep down his pride, and to make him willing and
obedient to God ? It raust be owing to a corrupt and ungrate
ful heart, if the riches of divine bounty in bestowing life and
prosperity, things comfortable and pleasant, will not engage
the heart to God and virtue, love and obedience. Whereas
* p. 21,67, and other places,

Chap. 11. Argument from universal Mortality. 397
he must always have the rod held over liim," be often chastised,
and held under the apprehensions of death, to keep him from
running wild in pride, conterapt and rebellion; ungratefully
using the blessings dealt forth from God's hand, in sinning
against him, and serving his enemies. If man has no natural
disingenuity of heart, it must be a mysterious thing indeed,
that the sweet blessings of God's bounty have not as powerful
an influence to restrain him from sinning against God, as
terrible afflictions If any thing can be a proof of a perverse
and vile disposition, this must be aproof of it, that men should
be most apt to forget and despise God, when his providence
is most kind ; and that they should need to have God chastis
ing them with great severity, and even killing them, to keep
them in order. If we were as much disposed to gratitude to
God for his benefits, as we are to anger at our fellow-creatures
for injuries, as we raust be (so far as I can see) if we are not
of a depraved heart; then the sweetness of divine bounty,
and the height of every enjoyment pleasing to innocent human
nature, would be as powerful incentives to a proper regard
for God — tending as much to promote religion and virtue —
as to have the vvorld filled with calamities, and to have God
(to use the language of Hezekiah, Isaiah xxxviii, 13, describing
death and its agonies) as a lion, breaking all our bones, and from
day even to night, making an end of us.
Dr, T. himself, (p. 252.) says, " That our first parents be
fore the fall were placed in a condition proper to engage their
gratitude, love, and obedience." Which is as much as to say,
a condition proper to engage them to the exercise and prac
tice of all religion. And if the paradisaical state was proper
to engage to all religion and duty, and men still come into the
world with hearts as good as the two first of the species, why
is it not proper to engage them to it still ? What need of so
vastly changing man's state, depriving him of all those bless
ings, and instead of thera allotting to him a world full of briers
and thorns, affliction, calamity, and death, to engage him to
it ? The taking away of life, and all those pleasant enjoyments
man had at first, by a permanent constitution, would be no
stated benefit to raankind, unless there was in them a stated
disposition to abuse such blessings. The taking of them away
is supposed to be a benefit, under the notion of their tending
to lead men to sin : But they would have no such t< ndency, at
least in a stated manner, unless there was in men a flxed ten
dency to make that unreasonable misimprovement of them.
Such a temper of mind as amounts to a disposition to make
such a misimproveraent of blessings, is often spoken of in
scripture, as raost astonishingly vile and perverse. So con
cerning Israel abusing the blessings of Canaan, that land flow
ing with railk and honey ; their ingratitude in it is spoken of

398 - ¦' original sin. P. i.
by the prophets, as enough to astonish all heaven and earth,
and as more than brutish stupidity and vileness. Jer, ii, 7,
I brought them into a plentiful country, to eat the fruit thereof,
and the goodness thereof. But when ye entered, ye defied my
land, ^c. See the following verses, especially verse 12, Be
astonished, O ye heavens, at this. So Isai, i, 2 — 4, Hear, O
heavens, and give ear, O earth ; I have nourished and brought up
children, and they have rebelled against me. The ox knoweth
his owner, and, ihe ass his master's crib ; but my people doth not
know, Israel doth not consider. Ah, sinful nation! a people
laden with iniquity, a seed of evil-doers, children that are corrup
ters: (Conipare Deut, xxxii, 6 — 19.) If to be disposed thus
to abuse the blessings of so fruitful and pleasant a land as
Canaan, showed so great depravity, surely it would be an evi
dence of a corruption no less astonishing, to be inclined to abuse
the blessings of Eden, and the garden of God.
2. If death be brought on mankind only as a benefit, and
in that raanner which Dr, T, mentions, — to mortify Or raode
rate their carnal appetites and affections, wean thera frora the
world, excite them to sober reflections, and lead them to the
fear and obedience of God, &c. — is it not strange that it should
fall so heavily on infants, who are not capable of making any
such improvement ofit ; so that many raore of mankind suffer
death in infancy, than in any other equal part of the age of
man ? Our author sometimes hints, that the death of infants
may be for the correction and punishment of parents. But
hath God any need of such methods to add to parents' afflic
tions ? Are there not other ways for increasing their trouble,
without destroying the lives of such multitudes of those who
are perfectly innocent, and who, on the supposition, have in no
respect any sin belonging to them ? On whora death comes
at an age, when not only the subjects are not capable of re
flection, or riiaking any iraprovement of it, either in suffering,
or the expectation of it : but also at an age, when parents
and friends — who alone can improve, and whom Dr, T. sup
poses alone to be punished by it — suffer least by being be
reaved of thera ; though the infants theraselves soraetimes suffer
to great extremity ? ,
3. To suppose, as Dr, T, does, that death is brought on
mankind in consequence of Adam's sin, not at all as a calamity,
but only as a favour and benefit, is contrary to the gospel ;
which teaches, that when Christ, as the second Adam, comes
to remove and destroy that death which came by the first
Adam, he finds it not as a friend, but an enemy, 1 Cor, xv, 22.
For as in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive;
(with ver. 25, and 26.) For he must reign, till he hath put all
enemies under his feet. The last EN EM Y that shall be destroy
ed, is DEATH.

Chap, II, Argument from universal Mortality. 399
Dr, T, urges, that the afflictions to which mankind are
subjected, and particularly their common mortality, are repre
sented in scripture as the chastisements of our heavenly Father ;
and therefore are designed for our spiritual good, and conse
quently are not of the nature of punishments. (So in p. 68, 69,
38, 39, S.)
Though I think the thing asserted far from being true,
viz, that the scripture represents the afflictions of mankind in
general, and particularly their common mortality, as the chas
tisement of an heavenly Father ; yet it is needless to stand to
dispute that matter. For if it be so, it will be no argument
that the afflictions and death of mankind are not evidences of
their sinfulness. Those would be strange chastisements from
the hand of a wise and good Father, which are wholly for no
thing ; especially sucb severe chastisements, as to break the
child's bones, when at the same time the father does not sup
pose any guilt, fault, or offence, in any respect, belonging to
the child ; but it is chastised in this terrible manner only for
fear that it will be faulty hereafter. I say, these would be a
strange sort of chastisements ; yea, though he should be able
to make it up to the child afterwards. Dr. T. speaks of repre
sentations made by the whole current of scripture ; I am cer
tain it is not agreeable to the current of scripture to represent
divine fatherly chastisements after this manner. It is true, the
scripture supposes such chastenings to be the fruit of God's
goodness ; yet at the same time it evermore represents them as
being for the sin oi the subject, and as evidences ofthe divine
displeasure for. its sinfulness. Thus the apostle (1 Cor. xi. 30
— 32.) speaks of God's chastening his people by mortal sick
ness, for their good, that they might not be condemned with the
world, and yet signifies that it was for their sin ; for this cause
many are weak and sickly among you, and many sleep : that is,
for the profaneness and sinfiil disorder before mentioned. So
Elihu, (Job xxxiii. 10, &c.) speaks of the same chastening by
sickness, as for men's good ; to withdraw man from his sinful
purpose, and to hide pride from man, and keep back his soul from
the pit ; that therefore God chastens man with pain on his bed,
and the multitude of his bones with strong pain. But these
chastenings are for his sins, as appears by what follows ; (ver,
28.) Where it is observed, that when God by this means has
brought men to repent, and humbly confess their sins, he de
livers them. Again, the same Elihu, speaking of the unfailing
love of God to the righteous, even when he chastens them, and
tliey are bound in fetters andholdenin cords of affliction, (Chap.
xxxvi. 7, &c.) yet speaksof these chastenings as being for their
SINS, (ver, 9,) Then he sheweth them their work, and their
transgressions that they have exceeded. So David, (Psal. xxx.-—)
speaks of God's chastening by some afflictions, as being for his

400 ORIGINAL SIN. P. I.
good, and issuing joyfully ; and yet being the fruit of God's
anger for his sfti, (ver. 5, j God's ANGER endureth but for
a moment, &c, (compare Psal. cxix, 67, 71, 75.) God's fa
therly chastisements are spoken of as being for sin, (2 Sam.
vii, 14, 15.) / will be his father, and he shall be my son. If
he commit iniquity, / will chasten him with the rod of men, and
icith the stripes of the children of men; but my mercy shall
not depart away from him. So the prophet Jeremiah speaks
of the great affliction that God's people suffered in the time
of the captivity, as being i for their good. (Lam. iii. 25, &c,)
But yet these chastisements are spoken of as being for theii'
SIN, (see especially ver, 39, 40,) So Christ says. Rev, iii, 19,
As many as I love, I rebuke and chasten. But the words fol
lowing shew, that these chastenings frora love are for sin that
should be repented of: Be zealous therefore, and repent. And
though Christ tells us they are blessed that are persecuted
for righteousness' sake, and have reason to rejoice and be ex
ceeding glad ; yet even the persecutions of God's people, as
ordered in divine Providence, are spoken bf as divine chas
tenings for sin, like the just corrections of a father when the
children deserve them, Heb, xii. The apostle there speaking
to the Christians concerning the persecutions which they suf^
fered, calls their sufferings by the name of divine rebukes ;
which implies testifying against a fault : And that they may
not be discouraged, puts them in mind, that whom the Lord
loves he chastens, and scourgeth every son that he receiveth. It
is also very plain, that the persecutions of God's people, as
they are from the disposing hand of God, are chastisements for
SIN.* If divine chastisements in general are certain evidences
that the subjects are not wholly without sin some way belonging
to them, then in a peculiar manner is death so ; for these rea
sons : (I.) Because slaying, or delivering to death, is often spo
ken of as, in general, a more awful thing than the chastise
ments which are endured in this life. Thus, Psal. cxviii. 17,
18. / shall not die, but live, and declare the works of the Lord.
The Lord hath chastened me sore; but he hath not given me
over unto death. So the Psalmist, (Psal. Ixxxviii, 15.) setting
forth the extremity of his affliction, represents it as what was
next to death, / am aflHicted, and ready to die — while I suffer
thy terrors, 1 am distracted. (See 1 Sara, xx, 3,) And so God's
tenderness towards persons under chastisement, is, from time
to time, set forth, that he did not proceed so far as to make
* See 1 Pet. iv. 17, 18, compared with Prov. ix. 31. See also Psal. Ixix.
4 — 9.

UBAP, n. Argument from Umversal Mortality, 401
an end of them by death.* God's people often pray, when
under great affliction, that God would not proceed to this
as the greatest extremity, Psal, xiii, 3, Consider, and hear
me, O Lord, my God ; lighten mine eyes, lest I sleep the sleep
ofdeatht Especially may death be looked upon as the most extreme
of all temporal sufferings, when attended with such dreadful
circumstances and extreme pains, as those with which provi
dence sometimes brings it on infants ; as on the children that
were offered up to Moloch and some other idols, who were
tormented to death in burning brass. Dr. T. says, (p. 83,
128. S.) " The Lord of all Being can never want time, and
place, and power, to compensate abundantly any sufferings in
fants now undergo in subserviency to his good providence,"
But there are no bounds to such a licence, in evading evidences
from fact. It might as well be said, that there is not and can
not be any such thing as evidence, frora events of God's displea
sure ; which is most contrary to the whole current of scripture,
as may appear in part from what has been observed. This
gentleraan raight as well go further still, and say, that God
may cast guiltless persons into hell-fire, to remain there in the
most unutterable torraents for ages of ages, (which bear no
greater proportion to eternity than a quarter of an hour) and if
he does so, it is no evidence of God's displeasure ; because he
can never want tirae, place, and power, abundantly to corapen-
sate their sufferings afterwards. If it be so, it is not to the
purpose, as long as the scripture so abundantly teaches us to
look on great calaraities and sufferings which God brings on
men, especially death, as raarks of his displeasure for sin, and
for sin belonging to them who suffer.
(2.) Another thing — which may well lead us to suppose
death, in a peculiar raanner, above other temporal sufferings,
to be intended as a testimony of God's displeasure for sin — is
that death is attended with that awful appearance, that gloomy
and terrible aspect, which naturally suggests to our minds
God's awful displeasure. Of this Dr, T, himself takes parti
cular notice, when (p, 69,) speaking of death ; " Herein (says
he) have we before our eyes a striking demonstration, that sin
is infinitely hateful to God, and the corruption and ruin of our
nature. Nothing is more proper than such a sight to give us
the utmost abhorrence of all iniquity, &c," Now, if death be
no testimony of God's displeasure for sin — no evidence that the
subject is looked upon by him who inflicts it, as any other
than perfectly innocent, free from all imputation of guilt, and
* As in Psal. Ixxviii. 38, 39, Psal. ciii. 9, with ver. 14, 15, Psal. xx.^. 2,3, 9,
and Job xxxiii. 22 — ^24.
fSo Job x. 9. Psal. vi 1 — 5. Ixxxviii. 9, 10, 11. and cxliii. 7,
VOL. IL 51

402 ORIGINAL SIN. r. I.
treated only as an object of favour — is it not strange, that Qod
should annex to it such affecting appearances ofhis hatred and
anger for sin, more than to other chastisements ? Which yet
the scripture teaches us are always for sin. These gloomy and
striking manifestations of Ged's hatred of sin attending death,
are equivalent to the awful frowns of God attending the stroke
ofhis hand. If we should see a wise and just father chastising
his child, mixing terrible frowns with severe strokes, we should
justly argue, that the father considered his child as having in
him something displeasing, and that he did not thus treat his
child only under a notion oi mortifying him, and preventing his
being faulty hereafter, and making it up to him afterwards, when
he had been perfectly innocent, and without fault, either of ac
tion or disposition.
We raay well argue from these things, that infants are not
sinless, but are by nature children of wrath, seeing this terri
ble evil comes so heavily on mankind at this early period.
But, besides the raortality of infants in general, there are
some particular cases of their death attended with circum
stances, which, in a peculiar manner, give evidence of their
sinfulness, and of their just exposedness to divine wrath.
Particularly, The destroying of the infants in Sodom and the neighbour
ing cities, raay be pleaded in evidence ; for these cities, de
stroyed in so miraculoiis and awful a manner, are set forth
^s a signal example of God's dreadful vengeance for sin.
{Jude, ver. 7.) God did not reprove, but manifestly counte
nanced Abraham, when he said with respect to the destruction
of Sodom, (Gen. xviii. 23,25.) Wilt thou destroy the righteous
with the wicked.'' — That be far from thee to do after this man
ner, to slay the righteous with the wicked, andthat the righteous
should be as the wicked, that be far from thee. Shall not the
Judge of all the earth do right ? Abraham's words imply that
God would not destroy the innocent with the guilty. "We may
well understand innocent as included in the word righteous,
according to the language usual in scripture, in speaking of
such cases of judgment and punishment.* Eliphaz says. Job
iv. 7. Who ever perished, being innocent ? or where were the
RIGHTEOUS cut off? We see what great care God took that
Xioi should not be involved in that destruction. He was mira
culously rescued by angels, sent on purpose ; who laid hold
on hira, brought hira, set hira without the gates of the city,
and told hira that they could do nothing till he was out of the
way. {Gen. xix. 22.) And not only was he thus miraculously
delivered, but his two wicked daughters for his sake. The
*Gen. II. 4. Exod. xxiii, 7. Deut, xxv. 1. 2 Sam. iv. 11. 2 Chron.
vi. 93. and Prov. xviii. 5.

Chap, ii. Argument from universal Mortality. 403
whole affair, both the destruction and the rescue, was rairacu
lous; and God could as easily have delivered the infants
which were in those cities. And if they had been without
sin, their* perfect innocency, one should think, would have
pleaded much more strongly for them, than those lewd wo
men's relation to Lot pleaded for them. When in such a case,
we must suppose these infants much further from deserving to
be involved in that destruction, than even Lot himself To
say, that God could make it up to those infants in another
world, must be an insufficient reply. ; For so he.could as 'easily
have made it up to Lot, or to ten or flfty righteous, if they had
been destroyed in the same fire. Nevertheless, it is plainly
signified, that this would not have been agreeable to the wise
and holy proceedings of the Judge of all the earth.
Since God declared, that if there had been found but ten
righteous in Sodom, he would have spared the whole city for
their sakes, may we not well suppose, if infants are perfectly
innocent, that he would have spared the old world, in which
there were, without doubt, raany hundred thousand infants,
and in general, one in every family, whose perfect innocence
pleaded for its preservation ? Especially when such vast ca.re
was taken to save Noah and his family, (some of whom, one
at least, seem to have been none of the best) that they might
not be involved in that destruction. If the perfect sinlessness
of infants had been a notion entertained among the people of
God in the ages next following the flood — handed down frora
Noah and his children, who well knew that vast multitudes of
infants perished in the flood— is it likely that Eliphaz, who
lived within a few generations of Shem and Noah, would have
said to Job, (Job iv. 7.) Who ever perished, being innocent?
and when were the righteous cut off? Especially, since in the
same discourse (chap. v. 1.) he appeals to the tradition of the
ancients for a confirmation of this very point, (also in chap,
XV. 7 — 10 and xxii. 15, 16.) and he mentions the destruction of
the wicked by the flood, as an instance of that perishing of
the wicked which he supposes to be peculiar to them, for
Job's conviction ; in which the wicked were cut down out of
time-, their foundation being overflown with a flood. Where it
is also observable, that he speaks of such an untimeliness of
death as they suffered by the flood, as one evidence of guilt ; as
he also does, chap. xv. 32, 33, It shall be accomplished bejfore
his time ; and his branch shall not be green. But those who
were destroyed by the flood iri infancy, above all the rest, were
cut down out of time ; when instead of living above nine hun
dred years, according to the common period of raan's life at
that time, many were cut down before they were one year
old. When God executed vengeance on the ancient inhabitants

404 okigikal 5IN, P. I-
of Canaan, he not only did not spare their cities and families
for the sake of their infants, nor took care that they should not
be involved in the destruction ; but he often repeated his
express commands, that their infants should not be spared',
but should be utteriy destroyed, without any pity ; while
Rahab the harlot (who had been far from innocence, thoygh she
expressed her faith in entertaining, and safely dismissing the
spies) was preserved, and all her friends for her sake. And
when God executed his wrath on the Egyptians by slaying
their first born — though the children of Israel, who were most
of them wicked men, as was before shewn, were wonderfully
spared by the destroying angel, yet — the Egyptian infants
were not spared. They not only were not rescued by the
angel, and no miracle wrought to save them (as was observed
in the case of the infants of Sodom) but the angel destroyed
them by his own immediate hand, and a rairacle was wrought
to kill them.
Not to be particular concerning the command by Moses,
respecting the destruction of the infants of the Midianites ;
(Numb. xxxi. 17.) And that given to Saul to destroy all the in
fants of the AmaZetees ; (1 Sam. XV. 3.) and what is said con- *
cerning Edom, (Psal. cxxxvii. 9.) Happy shall he be that taketh
and dasheth thy little ones against the stones ; 1 proceed to_take
notice of something reraarkable concerning the destruction of
Jerusalem, represented in Ezek, ix, when coraraand was given
to destroy the inhabitants, ver. 1 — 8, And this reason is given
for it, that their iniquity required it, and it was a just recom
pence oftheir sin, (ver. 9, 10.) God, at the same time was raost
particular and exact in his care, that such as had proved by
their behaviour, (hat they were not partakers in the aboraina-
tions of the city, should by no means be involved in the slaugh
ter. Coramand was given to the angel to go through the city,
and set a mark upon their foreheads, and the destroying angel
had a strict charge not to come near any man on whom was the
mark ; yet the infants were not marked, nor a word said of
Sparing thera : On the contrary, infants were expressly men
tioned as those that should be utterly destroyed, without pity,
(ver. 5,6.) Go through the city and smite : Let not your eye
spare, neither have ye pity. Slay utterly old and young, both
maids and little children ; But come not near any man upon
whom is the mark.
And if any should suspect that such instances as these were
peculiar to a more severe dispensation, under the Old Testa
ment, let us consider a reraarkable instance in the days ofthe
glorious gospel of the grace of God ; even the last destruction
oi Jerusalem. This was far more terrible, and with greater tes
timonies of God's wrath and indignation, than the destruction
of Sodom, or oi Jerusalem in Nebuchadnezzar's time, or any

Chap. n. Argument from universal Morality. 405
thing that ever had happened to any city or people from the begin
ning ofthe world to that time. (Agreeable to Matt, xxiv, 21,
and Luke xxi, 23, 23,) At that time particular care was taken
to distinguish and to deliver God's people ; as foretold Dan.
xh, 1, And we have in the New Testament a particular ac
count ofthe care Christ took for the preservation ofhis followers :
He gave them a sign by which they might know when the de
solation of the city was nigh, that they who were in Jerusalem
might flee to the mountains and escape. And, as history relates,
the Christians followed the directions given, and escaped to a
place in the mountains called Pella, and were preserved. Yet
no care was taken to preserve the infants ofthe city, in general ;
but according to the predictions of that event, they were in
volved with others in that great destruction. So heavily did
the calamity fall upon them, that those words were verified,
Luke xxiii, 29, Behold the days are coming in which they shall
say. Blessed are the barren, and the womb that never bare, and
the paps which never gave suck : And that prophecy in Deut.
xxxii. 21 — ^25. which has undoubtedly a special respect to this
very time, and is so applied by the best commentators ;^/tf)iZZ
provoke them to jealousy, with those that are not a people : For
a flre is kindled in mine anger, — and it shall burn to the lowest
hell. I will heap mischiefs upon them : I will spend mine ar
rows upon them. They shall be burnt with hunger, and devour
ed wjth buming heat, and bitter destruction. The sword with
out, and terror within, shall destroy both the young man, and the
virgin, the suckling also, with the man of grey hairs. And by
the history of that destruction it appears, that then was a re
markable fulfilment of Deut. xxviii. 53 — 57. concerning parents
eating their children in the siege, — and the tender and delicate
woman eating her new-born child. And here it must be remem
bered, that these very destructions of that city and land are
spoken of as clear evidences of God's wrath, to all nations who
shall behold them. And if so, they were evidences of God's
wrath towards infants ; who, equally with the rest, were the
subject of the destruction. If a particular kind or rank of per
sons, which made a very considerable part of the inhabitants,
were from time to time partakers of the overthrow, without any
distinction made in divine Providence, and yet this was no evi
dence at all of God's displeasure with any of them ; then being
the subjects of such a calamity could not be an evidence of
God's wrath against any of the inhabitants, to the reason of all
nations, or any nation, or so much as one person.

406 ORIGINAL SIN. P. JI. Ch. I.

PART II.
CONTAINING OBSERVATIONS ON PARTICULAR PARTS OF THE
HOLY SCRIPTURE, WHICH PROVE THE DOCTRINE OF ORIGI
NAL SIN.

CHAPTER L

Observations relating to Things contained in the three first
Chapters of Genesis, with Reference to the Doctrine of
Original Sin.
SECT. I.
Concerning Original Righteousness; and whether our first
Parents were created with Righteousness, or moral Recti
tude of heart ?
The doctrine of Original Righteousness, or the creation
of our first parents with holy principles and dispositions, has a
close connection, in several respects, with the doctrine of
original sin. Dr. T. was sensible of this ; and accordingly he
strenuously opposes this doctrine, in his book against original
sin. And therefore in handling the subject, I would in the
first place, reraove this author's main objection against this
doctrine, and then shew how it may be inferred from the
account which Moses gives us in the three first chapters of
Genesis. ''
Dr. T.'s grand objection against this doctrine, which he
abundantly insists on, is this : That it is utterly inconsistent
with the nature of virtue, that it should be concreated with
any person ; because, if so, it must be by an act of God's abso
lute power, without our knowledge or concurrence ; and that
moral virtue, in its very nature, implieth the choice and consent
of the moral agent, without which it cannot be virtue and holi-

Sect, i. Concerning Adam's original Righteousness. 407
ness : That a necessary holiness is no holiness. So p. 180, ¦
where he observes, " That Adam must exist, he must be
created, yea he raust exercise thought and reflection, before
he was righteous," (See also p, 250, 251.) In p, 161, S, he
says, " To say that God not only endowed Adam with a capa
city of being righteous, but moreover that righteousness and
true holiness were created with him, or wrought into his na
ture, at the same time he was made, is to affirm a contradic
tion, or what is inconsistent with the very nature of righteous
ness." And in like manner Dr. Turnbull in many places
insists upon it, that it is necessary to the very being of virtue,
th at it be owing to our own choice and diligent culture.
With respect to this 1 would observe, that it consists in a
notion of virtue quite inconsistent with the nature of things,
and the common notions of mankind ; and also inconsistent
with Dr. T.'s own notions of virtue. Therefore, if to affirm
that to be virtue or holiness, which is not the fruit of preceding
thought, reflection, and choice, is to affirm a contradiction, I
shall shew plainly, that for him to affirm otherwise, is a con
tradiction to himself
In the first place, I think it a contradiction to the nature
of things, as judged of by the common sense of mankind.
It is agreeable to the sense of men, in all nations and ages,
not only that the fruit or effect of a good choice is virtuous, but
that the good choice itself from whence that effect proceeds,
is so ; yea, also the antecedent good disposition, temper, or
affection of mind, from whence proceeds that good choice,
is virtuous. This is the general notion — not that principles
derive their goodness frora actions, but — that actions derive
their goodness from the principles whence they proceed ; so
that the act of choosing what is good is no further virtuous,
than it proceeds from a good principle, or virtuous disposition
of mind.* Which supposes that a virtuous disposition of mind
may be before a virtuous act of choice ; and that, therefore,
it is not necessary there should first be thought, reflection, and
choice, before there can be any virtuous disposition. If the
choice be first, before the existence of a good disposition of
heart, what is the character of that choice ? There can ac
cording to our natural notions, be no virtue in a choice which
proceeds frora no virtuous principle, but from mere self-love,
ambition, or some animal appetites ; therefore, a virtuous
temper of mind may be before a good act of choice, as a tiee^
may be before the fruit, and the fountain before the stream
which proceeds from it.
The following things, in Mr, Hutcheson's inquiry con-
cerning moral good and evil, are evidently agreeable to the
nature of things, and the voice of human sense and reason,
rSec II. p. 132, 133.) " Every action which we apprehend

408 original sin, P. "' Ch. i.
as either morally good or evil, is always supposed to plow from
some affections towards sensitive natures. And whatever we
call virtue or vice, is either some such affection, or some ac
tion CONSEQUENT UPON IT. — All the actious counted religious
in any country, are supposed by those who count them so^ to
flow from some affections towards the Deity : And whatever
we call social virtue, we still suppose to flow from affections
towards our fellow creatures, — Prudence, if itis only eraployed
in promoting private interest, is never imagined to be a virtue."
In these things Dr. Turnbull expressly agrees with Mr.
Hutcheson, his admired author,*
If a virtuous disposition or affection is before its acts,
then they are before those virtuous acts of choice which pro
ceed from it. Therefore there is no necessity that all virtu
ous dispositions or affections should be the effect of choice :
And so, no such supposed necessity can be a good objection
against such a disposition being natural, or from a kind of in
stinct, implanted in the mind in its creation. Agreeably to
this Mr. Hutcheson says, {Ibid, sect. III. p, 196, 197.) " 1
know not for what reason some will not allow that to be virtue,
which flows from instinct or passions. But how do they help
themselves ? They say, virtue arises from reason. What is
reason, but the sagacity we have in prosecuting any end ?
The ultimate end proposed by common moralists, is the hap
piness of the agent himself And this certainly he is determi-.
ned to pursue from instinct. Now raay not another instinct to-
. wards the public, or the good of others, be as proper a princi
ple of virtue as the instinct towards private happiness ? If it be
said, that actions from instinct are not the effect of prudence
and choice, this objection will hold full as strongly against the
actions which flow from self-love."
And if we consider what Dr, T. declares, as his own no
tion of the essence of virtue, and which he so confidently and
often affirms, that it should follow choice, and proceed frora
it, we shall find it is no less repugnant to that sentiraent, than
it is to the nature of things and the general notions of man
kind. For it is his notion, as well as Mr. Hutcheson's, that
the essence of virtue lies in good affection, and particularly in
benevolence or love : As he very fully declares in these words
in his Key,t " That the word that signifies goodness and raercy
should also signify moral rectitude in general, will not seem
strange, if we consider that love is the fulfilling of the law.
Goodness, according to the sense of scripture, and the nature
of things, includes all morcd rectitude ; which, I reckon, may
every part of it, where it is true and genuine, be resolved into
* Mor. Phil. p. 118— lis. p. 142. et alibi passim, t Marginal Note annexed
)o§36g. r _ e

Sect, I. Concerning Adam's original Righteousness. 409
this single principle." If it be so indeed, then certainly no act
whatsoever can have moral rectitude, but what proceeds from
this principle. And consequently no act of volition or choice
can have any moral rectitude, that takes place before this prin
ciple exists. And yet he most confidently affirms, that thought,
reflection, and choice must go before virtue, and that all virtue
or righteousness must be the fruit of preceding choice. This
brings his scheme to an evident contradiction. For no act of
choice can be virtuous but what proceeds from a principle of
benevolence or love ; for he insists that all genuine moral rec
titude, in every part of it, is resolved into this single principle.
And yet the principle of benevolence itself, cannot be virtuous
unless it proceeds from choice ; for he affirms, that nothing can
have the nature of virtue but what comes from choice. So that
virtuous love, as the principle of all virtue, must go before vir
tuous choice, and be the principle or spring of it ; and yet vir
tuous choice raust go before virtuous benevolence, and be the
spring of that. If a virtuous act of choice goes before a prin
ciple of benevolence, and produces it, then this virtuous act is
soraething distinct frora that principle which follows it and is
its effect. So that here is at least one part of virtue, yea the
spring and source of all virtue, viz. a virtuous choice, that can
not be resolved into that single principle oilove.
Here also it is worthy to be observed, that Dr. T.
(p. 128.) says, the cause of every effect is alone chargeable
with the effect it produceth or which proceedeth from it :
And so he argues, that if the effect be bad, the cause alone
is sinful. According to which reasoning, when the effect
is good, the cause alone is righteous or virtuous. To the cause
is to be ascribed all the praise of the good effect it produc
eth. And by the same reasoning it will follow, that if, as
Dr, Taylor says, Adara raust choose to be righteous before
he was righteous, and if it be essential to the nature of righte
ousness or moral rectitude that it be the effect of choice, and
hence a principle of benevolence cannot have moral rectitude,
unless it proceeds from choice ; then not to the principle of be
nevolence, which is the effect, but to the foregoing choice alone
is to be ascribed all the virtue or righteousness that is in the
case. And so, instead of all raoral rectitude in every part ofit,
being resolved into that single principle of benevolence, no
moral rectitude, in any part of it, is to be resolved into that
principle : But all is to be resolved into the foregoing choice,
which is the cause.
But yet it follows from these inconsistent principles, that
there is no moral rectitude or virtue in that first act pf choice,
that is the cause of all consequent virtue. This follows two
ways ; 1. Because every part of virtue lies in the benevolent
principle, which is the effect; and therefore no part ofit can lie
VOL. H. 52

410 ORIGINAL SIN. P. 11, Ch. I.
in-the cause, 2. The choice of virtue, as to the first act at least,
can have no virtue or righteousness at all ; because it does not
proceed from any foregoing choice. For Dr. T. insists, that a
man raust first have reflection and choice, before he can have
righteousness ; and that it is essential to holiness that it pro
ceed from choice. So that the first choice frora which holiness
proceeds can have no virtue at all, because, by the supposition,
it does not proceed from choice, being the first choice. Hence,
if it be essential to holiness that it proceeds from choice, it must
proceed from an unholy choice ; unless the first holy choice can
be before itself
And with respect to Adam, let us consider how, upon Dr.
T.'s principles, it was possible he ever should have any such
thing as righteousness, by any means at all. In the state where
in God created him, he could have no such thing as love to
God, or any benevolence in his heart. For if so, there would
have been original righteousness ; there would have been ge
nuine moral rectitude ; nothing would have been wanting : For.
our author says. True genuine moral rectitude, in every part of
it, is to be resolved into this single principle. But if he were
wholly without any such thing as love to God or any virtuous
love, how should he come by virtue ? The answer doubtless
will be, by act of choice : He must first choose to be virtuous.
But what if he did choose to be virtuous ? It could not be frora
love to God, or any virtuous principle, that he chose it ; for, by
the supposition, he has no such principle in his heart. And if
he chooses it without such a principle, still, according to this
author, there is no virtue in his choice ; for all virtue, he says, is
to be resolved into that single principle of love. Or will he say,
there may be produced in the heart a virtuous benevolence by
an act or acts of choice that are not virtuous ? But this does
not consist with what he implicitly asserts, that to the cause
alone is to be ascribed what is in the effect. So that there is
no way that can possibly be devised, in consistence with Dr.
T.'s scheme, in which Adam ever could have any righteous
ness, or could either obtain any principle of virtue, or perform
any one virtuous act.
These confused inconsistent assertions concerning virtue
and moral rectitude, arise, from the absurd notions in vogue,
concerning freedom of will, as if it consisted in the will's self-
determining power, supposed to be necessary to moral agency,
virtue and vice. The absurdities of which, with the grounds of
these errors, and what the truth is respecting these matters,
with its evidences, I have, according to my ability, fully and
largely considered in my " Inquiry" on that subject; to which
I must refer the reader who desires fiirther satisfaction, and is
wiUing to give himself the trouble of reading that discourse.*
* See the first part of this volume.

Sect. I, Concerning Adam's original Righteousness, tU
Having considered this great argument and pretended de
monstration of Dr. T. against original righteousness ; I proceed
to the proofs ofthe doctrine. And, in the first place, I would
consider, whether there be not evidence of it in the three first
chapters of Genesis : Or whether the history there delivered
does not lead us to suppose that onr first parents were created
in a state of moral rectitude and holiness.
I. This history leads us to suppose that Adam's sin with
relation to the forbidden fruit was the flrst sin he committed.
Which could not have been, had he not always, till then, been
perfectly righteous, righteous from the first moment of his ex
istence ; and consequently, created or brought into existence
righteous. In a inoral agent, subject to moral obligations, it is
the same thing to be perfectly innocent, as to be perfectly righ
teous- It must be the same, because there can no more be any
medium between sin and righteousness, or between being right
and being wrong, in a moral sense, than there can be a medium
between straight and crooked, in a natural sense. Adara was
brought into existence capable of acting imraediately as a
moral agent ; and therefore he was immediately under a rule of
right action. He was obliged as soon as he existed to act aright.
And if he was obliged to act aright as soon as he existed, he
was obliged even then to be inclined to act right. Dr. T. says,
(p. 166. S.) "Adam could not sih without a s'minl inclination:*"
and just for the sarne reason, he could not do aright without
an inclination to right action. And as he was obliged to act
rightly from the first moment of his existence, and did so, till he
sinned in reference to the forbidden fruit, he must have had a
disposition of heart to do rightly the first moment of his exist
ence ; and that is the same as to be created or brought into ex
istence with an inclination to right action, or, which is the same
thing, a virtuous and holy disposition of heart.
Here it will be in vain to say, " It is true, that it was Adam's
duty to have a good disposition or inclination, as soon as it was
possible to be obtained, in the nature of things ; but as it could
not be without time to establish such a habit, which requkes
antecedent thought, reflection, and repeated right action ;
therefore all that Adam could be obliged to, in the first place,
was to reflect, and consider things in a right manner, and ap
ply himself to right' action, in order to obtain a right disposi
tion :" for this supposes, that even the reflection and considera
tion to which he was obliged, was right action. Surely he was
obliged to it no otherwise than as a thing that was right: And
therefore he raust have an inclination to this right action imme-
* This is doubtless tme: For although there was no natural sinful inclination
in. Adam, yet an inclination to that sin of eating the forbidden fruit, was begotten
in him by the delusion and error he was led into ; and this inclination to eat the
forbidden fruit, must precede his actual eating.

412 ORIGINAL SIN. P, II. Ch, 1.
diately, before he could perform those first right actions. And
as the inclination to them should be right, the principle, or dis
position from which he perforraed even those actions, raust be
good : Otherwise the actions would not be right in the sight of
hira who looks at the heart; nor would they answer his obliga
tions, if he had done them for some sinister end, and not from
a regard to God and his duty. Therefore there must have been
a regard to God and his duty implanted in hira at his first ex
istence : Otherwise it is certain, he would have done nothing
frora a regard to God and his duty ; no, not so rauch as to re
flect and consider, and try to obtain such a disposition. The
very supposition of a disposition to right action being first ob
tained by repeated right action, is grossly inconsistent with itself:
For it supposes a course of right action before there is a dis
position to perform any right action.
These are no invented quibbles or sophisms. If God ex
pected from Adam any obedience or duty to hira at all, when
he first made hira — whether it was in reflecting, considering,
or jany way exerting his faculties — then he was expected imrae
diately to exercise love to God. For how could it be expected
that Adam should have a strict and perfect regard to God's
commands and authority, and his duty to him, when he had no
love nor regard to him in his heart, nor could it be expected
he should have any ? If Adam from the beginning did his duty
to God, and had more respect to the will of his Creator than
to other things, and as much respect to him as he ought to
have ; then from the beginning he had a supreme and perfect
respect and love to God : And if so, he was created with such
a principle. There is no avoiding the consequence. Not only
external duties, but internal ones, such as sumraarily consist in
love, must be immediately required of Adam, as soon as he
existed, if any duty at all was required. For it is most appa
rently absurd, to talk of a spiritual being, with the faculties of
understanding and will, being required to perform external
duties, without internal, Dr, T, himself observes, that love is
the fulfilling of the law, and that all moral rectitude, even every
part of it, must be resolved into that single principle. Therefore,
if any morally right act at all, reflection, consideration, or any
thing else, was required of Adara immediately on his first ex
istence, and was performed as required ; then he must, the first
moment of his existence, have his heart possessed of that prin
ciple of divine love which implies the whole of moral rectitude
in every part ofit, according to our author's own doctrine ; and
so the whole of moral rectitude or righteousness must begin
with his existence : Which is the thing taught in the doctrine of
original righteousness.
Let us consider how it could be otherwise than that Adam
was always, in every moment of his existence, obliged to ex-

Sect, I. Conceming Adam's o-riginal Righteousness. 413
ercise such respect of heart towards every object, as was agree
able to the apparent merit of that object. For instance, would
it not at any time have become Adam, on the exhibition of
God's infinite goodness to him, to have exercised answerable
gratitude ; and would not the contrary have been unbecoming
and odious ? And if something had been presented to Adam's
view transcendently amiable in itself, for instance, the glo
rious perfection of the divine nature, would it not have be
come hira to love, relish, and delight in it? Would not such
an object have merited this ? And if the view of an object so
amiable in itself did not affect his mind with complacence,
would it not, according to the plain dictates of our understand
ing, have shewn an unbecoming temper of mind ? Time, by
culture, to form and establish a good disposition, would not
have taken off the odiousness of the teraper. And if there had
been never so rauch tirae, I do not see how it could be expect
ed he should improve it aright in order to obtain a good dispo
sition, if he had not already some good disposition to engage
him to it.
That belonging to the will, and disposition of the heart,
which is in itself either odious or amiable, unbecoming or
decent, always would have been Adam's virtue or sin, in any
moraent of his existence ; if there be any such thing as virtue
jr vice ; by which terms nothing can be meant, but something
in our moral disposition and behaviour which is becoming or
unbecoming, amiable or odious.
Human natui:e raust be created with some dispositions ;
a disposition to relish some things as good and amiable, and
to be averse to other things as odious and disagreeable : Other
wise it must be without any such thing as inclination or will ;
perfectly indifferent, without preference, without choice, or
aversion, towards any thing as agreeable or disagreeable. But
if it "had any concreated dispositions at all, they raust be either
right or wrong, either agreeable or disagreeable to the nature
of things. If man had at first the highest rehsh of things ex
cellent and beautiful, a disposition to have the quickest and
highest delight in those things which were most worthy of it,
then, his dispositions were raorally right and amiable, and never
can be excellent in a higher sense. But if he had a disposition
to love most those things that were inferior and less worthy,
then his dispositions were vicious. And it is evident there can
be no mediura between these.
II. This notion of Adam being created without a prin
ciple of holiness in his heart, taken with the rest of Dr. T.'s
scheme, is inconsistent with what the history in the begin
ning of Genesis leads us to suppose of the great favours and
imiles of heaven, which Adara enjoyed while he remained in
nnocency. The Mosaic account suggests to us that till Adam

1:14 ORIGINAL SIN. P. II. Ch. I.
sinned he was happy in circumstances, surrounded with tes
timonies and fruits of God's favour. This is implicitly owned
by Dr. T. when he says, (p. 252.) "That in the dispensation
our first parents were under before the fall, they were placed
in a condition proper to engage their gratitude, love, and obe
dience." But it will follow on our author's principles, that
Adam, while in innocency, was placed in far worse circum
stances than he was in afler his disobedience, and infinitely
worse than his posterity are in ; under unspeakably greater
disadvantages for avoiding sin, and the performance of duty.
For by this doctrine, Adam's posterity come into the world
with their hearts as free from any propensity to sin as he, and
he was made as destitute of any propensity to righteousness
as they : And yet God, in favour to them, does great things
to restrain them from sin and excite thera to virtue, which he
never did for Adara in innocency,' but laid him, in the highest
degree, under contrary disadvantages. God, as an instance
of his great favour and fatherly love to man since the fall,
has denied him the ease and pleasures of paradise, which gra
tified and allured his senses and bodily appetites ; that he
might diminish hi.s temptations to sin. And as a stiff greater
means to restrain from sin and promote virtue, has subjected
him to labour, toil, and sorrow in the world : And not only so,
but as a means to promote his spiritual and eternal good far
beyond this, has doomed him to death. When all this was
found insufficient, he, in further prosecution of the designs
of his love, shortened men's lives exceedingly, made them
twelve or thirteen times shorter than in the first ages. And
yet this, with all the innumerable calamities which God, in
great favour to mankind, has brought on the world — whereby
their temptations are so vastly cut short, and the inducements
to virtue heaped one upon another to so great a degree — have
proved insufficient, now for so many thousand years together,
to restrain from wickedness in any considerable degree ;. while
innocent human nature, all along, comes into the world with
the same purity and harmless dispositions that orir first parents
had in paradise. What vast disadvantages indeed then must
Adam and Eve be in, who had no more in their nature to keep
them from sin, or incline them to virtue, than their posterity,
and yet were without all those additional and extraordinary
means I They were not only without such exceeding great
means as we now have, when our lives are raade so very short,
but had vastly less advantages than their antediluvian posterity,
who to prevent their being wicked, and to make them good,
had so niuch labour and toil, sweat and sorrow, briars and
thorns, with a body gradually decaying and returning to the
dust. Our first parents had the extreme disadvantage of being
placed amongst many and exceeding great temptations — not

Sect. i. ¦ Concerning Adam's original Righteousness. 4l5
only without toil or sorrow, pain or disease, to humble and
mortify them, and a sentence of death to wean them from the
vvorld, but — in the midst ofthe most exquisite and alluring sen
sitive delights ; the reverse in every respect, and the highest
degree, of that most gracious state of requisite means and great
advantages, which mankind now enjoy ! If mankind now
under these vast restraints and great advantages, are not re
strained from general, and as it were universal wickedness, how
could it be expected that Adam and Eve, created with no
better hearts than m,en bring into the world now, and destitute
of all these advantages, and in the midst of all contrary disad
vantages should escape it ?
These things are not agreeable to Moses's account. That
represents a happy state of peculiar favours and blessings be
fore the fall, eind the curse coming afterwards ; but according
to this scheme, the curse was before the fall, and the great favours
and testimonies of love followed the apostacy. And the curse
before the fall must be a. curse with a witness, being to so high
a degree the reverse of such means, means so necessary for such
a creature as innocent man, and in all their multitude and ful
ness proving too little. Paradise therefore must be a mere de
lusion I There was indeed a great shew of favour in placing
raan in the midst of such delights. But this delightful garden,
it seems, with all its beauty and sweetness, was in its real ten
dency worse than the apples of Sodbm. It was but a mere bait,
(God forbid the blasphemy) the more effectually enticing by its
beauty and deliciousness to Adam's eternal ruin. Which
might be the more expected to be fatal to him, seeing he was
the first man, having no capacity superior to his posterity, and
wholly without the advantage oftheir observations, experiences,
and improvements, 1 proceed now to take notice of an additional proof of the
doctrine we are upon, from another part of the holy scripture.
A very clear text for original right oushess, we have in Eccles.
vii. 29. Lo, this only have I found, that God made man up
right ; but they have sought oui many inventions.
it is an observation ofno weight which Dr. T. makes on this
text, that the word man is commonly used to signify mankind
in general, or mankind collectively taken. It is true it often
signifies the species of mankind ; but then it is used to signify
the species with regard to its duration and succession irom its
beginning, as well as with regard to its extent. The EngHsh
word mankind is used to signify the species : But what then ?
Would it be an improper way of speaking to say, that when
God first made mankind he placed them in a pleasant paradise,
(meaning in their first parents) but now they live in the midst of
briars and thorns ? And it is certain that to speak thus of God
making mankind — his giving the species an existence in their

416 ORIGINAL SIN, P. II. Ch. I.
first parents, at the creation — is agreeable to the scripture use
of such an expression. As in Deut. iv, 32, Since the day that
God CREATED MAN upou the earth. Job xx, 4. Knowest thou
not this of old, since man was placed upon the earth. Isai. xiv.
12. I have made the earth and created man upon it : I, even
my hands, have stretched out the heavens. Jer. xxvii. 5. /have
MADE the earth, the man and the beast that are upon the ground,
by my great power. All these texts speak of God making man,
signifying the species of mankind ; and yet they all plainly have
respect to God making man at first, when he made the earth and
stretched out the heavens. In all these places the same word,
Adam, is used as in Ecclesiastes ; and in the last of them, used
with (he emphaticum) the emphatic sign, as here ; though Dr. T,
omits it, when he tells us he gives us a catalogue of all the
places in scripture where the word is used. And it argues
nothing to the doctor's purpose that the pronoun they is used ; —
they have sought out many inventions. This is properly ap
phed to the species, which God made at first upright ; the species
begun with more than one, and continued in a multitude. As
Christ speaks of the two sexes, in the relation of man and wife,
continued in successive generations ; Mat, xix, 4, He that
MADE them in the beginning, made them male and female; hav
ing reference to Adam and Eve,
No less impertinent, and also very unfair, is his criticism
on the word (tif i) translated upright. Because the word sorae
tiraes signifies right, he would frora thence infer, that it does
not properly signify moral rectitude, even when used to express
the character of moral agents. He might as well insist that
the English word upright, sometimes, and in its raost original
raeaning, signifies right up, or in an erect posture, therefore it
does not properly signify any moral character, when applied to
moral agents. And indeed less unreasonably ; for it is known
that in the Hebrew language, in a peculiar manner, most words
used to signify raoral and spiritual things, are taken frora ex
ternal and natural objects. The word {-wi Jashar) is used, as
apphed to moral agents, or to the words and actionsof such, (if
I have not mis-reckoned*) about an hundred and ten times in
scripture ; and about an hundred of thera, without all dispute,
to signify virtue, or raoral rectitude, (though Dr, T. is pleased
to say, the word does not generally signify a raoral character)
and for the most part it signifies true virtue, or virtue in such a
sense, as distinguishes it frora afl false appearances of virtue, or
what is only virtue in some respects, but not truly so in the
sight of God, It is used at least eighty times in this sense :
And scarce any word can be found in the Hebrew language
raore significant of this. It is thus used constantly in Solomon's
* Mak'm^ use of B-uxtorfs Concordance, which, according to the author'*
professed design, directs to all the places where the word is used.

Sect, i. Concerning Adam's original Righteousness. 417
writings, (where it is often found) when used to express a cha
racter or property of moral agents. And it is beyond all con
troversy, that he uses it in this place, (the viith of Eccles.) to
signify moral rectitude, or a character of real virtue and inte
grity. For the wise man is speaking of persons with respect to
their moral character, inquiring into the corruption and depra
vity of raankind, (as is confessed p. 184.) and he here declares,
he had not found more than one among a thousand of the right
stamp, truly and. thoroughly virtuous and upright : Which ap
peared a strange thing I But in this text he clears God, and
lays the blame on man : Man was not made thus at first. He
was made of the right stamp, altogether good in his kind, (as
all other things were) truly and thoroughly virtuous as he ought
to be ; but they fiave sought out many inventions. Which last
expression signifies things sinful, or morally evil ; fas is confess
ed, p. 185.) And this expression, used to signify those moral
evils he found in man, which he sets in opposition to the up
rightness man was made in, shews, that by uprightness he raeans
the raost true and sincere goodness. The word rendered inven
tions, raost naturally and aptly signifies the subtile devices and
crooked deceitful ways of hypocrites, wherein they are of a
character contrary to men of simplicity and godly sincerity ;
who, though wise in that which is good, are simple concerning
evil. Thus the same wise raan, in Prov. xii. 2. sets a truly good
man in opposition to a man of wicked devices, whom God will
condemn. Solomon had occasion to observe many who put on
an artful disguise and fair shew of goodness ; but on searching
thoroughly, he found very few truly upright. As he says, Prov.
XX. 6. Most men will -proclaim every one his own goodness :
•But a faithful man who can find ? So that it is exceeding plain
that by uprightness, in this place, {Eccles. vii.) Solomon means
true moral goodness.
What our author urges concerning many inventions, where
as Adam's eating of the forbidden fruit was but one invention,
is of as little weight as the rest of what he says on this text.
For the many lusts and corruptions of mankind, appearing in
innumerable ways of sinning, are all the consequence of that
sin. The great corruption men are fallen into by the origi
nal apostacy, appears in the multitude of the wicked ways to
which they are inclined. And therefore these are properly
mentioned as the fruits and evidences of the greatness of that
apostacy and corruption.

VOL, II.

r^H

lis ORIGINAL 311^;. P- II- Cl-

SECT. II.

Conceming the Kind of Death threatened to our first ParentSi
if they should eat of -the forbidden Fruit.
Dr. T, in his observations on the three first chapters of
Genesis, says, (p, 7,) "The threatening to man in case of
transgression was, that hc should surely die, — Death is the
losing of life. Death is opposed to life, and must be under
stood according to the nature of that.life, to which it is oppos
ed, Now the death here threatened can, with any certainty,
be opposed only to the life God gave Adam, when he created
-him, (ver. 7.) Any thing besides this must be pure cOnjectiire,
without solid foundation."
To this I would say : it is true. Death is opposed to life,
and mmt be understood according to ihe nature of that life, to
which it is opposed. But does it therefore follow that nothing .
can be meant by it but the loss of life ? Misery is opposed. to
happiness, and sorrow is in scripture often opposed to joy ;
but can we conclude from thence, that nothing is meant in
scripture by sorrow, but the Zoss q/'^/oy.*' Or that there is no
more in misery than the loss or absence of happiness ? And
if the death threatened to Adam can, with certainty, "be op
posed only to the life given to Adam, when God created him ;
I think a state of perfect, perpetual, and hopeless raisery is
properly opposed to that, state Adam was in when God created
him. For I suppose it will not be denied, that the life
Adam had was truly a happy life ; happy in perfect innocency,
in the favour of his Maker, surrounded with the happy fruits
and testimonies of his love. And I think it has been proved,
that he also was happy in a state of perfect righteousness.
Nothing is more manifest, than that it is agreeable to a. very
common acceptation of the word life, in scripture, that it be
understood as signifying a state of excellent and happy exis
tence. Now that which is most opposite to that life and state
inwhich Adam was created, is a state of total, confirmed Wick-
jedness, and perfect hopeless misery, under the diyine displea
sure and curse ; not excluding temporal death, or the destruc
tion of the body, as an introduction to it, ¦ ..
Besides, that which is much more evident than any thing
Dr, T. says on this head, is, that the death which was to come
on Adam as the punishment of his disobedience, was opposed to
that life which he would have had as the reward ofhis obedience
IB case he had not sinned. Obedience and disobedience are con-

Sect, n. Death threatened to our flrst Parents. 419
traries ; the threatenings and promises which are sanctions of
a law are set in direct opposition ; and the promises, rewards
and threatened punishments, are most properly taken as each
other's opposites. But none will deny that the life which would
have been Adam's reward, if he had persisted in obedience, was
eternal life. Afid therefore we argue justly that the death
which stands opposed to that life, (Dr, T, himself being judge,
p, 120. S.) is manifestly eternal death, a death widely different
from the death we now die — to use his own words. If Adam,
for his persevering obedience was to have had everlasting life
and happiness, in perfect holiness, union with his Maker, and
enjoyment of his favour ; and this was the life which was to be
confirmed by the tree of hfe ; then, doubtless, the death threat
ened in case of disobedience, which stands in direct opposition
to this, was an exposure to everlasting wickedness and misery,
in separation from God, and in enduring his wrath.
When God first made mankind, and made known to them
the methods of his moral government towards them, in the re
velation he made of himself to the natural head of the whole
species— and letting him know that obedience to him was ex
pected, and in enforcing his duty with the sanction of a threaten
ed punishment, called by the name oi death- — we may with the
greatest reason suppose, in such a case, that by death was meant
the most proper punishment ofthe sin of mankind, and which
he speaks of under that name throughout the scripture, as the
proper wages of sin ; and this was always, from the beginning,
understood tobe so in the church of God. It would be strange
indeed if it should be otherwise. It would have been strange,
if, when the law of God was first given, and enforced by the
threatening of a punishment, nothing at all had been raentioned
of that grea* punishment ever spoken of under the name of
death — in the revelations which he has given to mankind from
age to age — as the proper punishment of the sin of mankind. —
And it would be no less strange, if when the punishment which
was mentioned and threatened on that occasion was called by
the same name, even death, yei we must not understand it to
mean the same thing, but something infinitely diverse, and in
finitely more inconsiderable.
But now let us consider what that death is, which the scrip
ture ever speaks of as the proper wages of sin, and is spoken of
as such by God's saints in all ages of the church. I will begin
with the New Testament. When the apostle Paul says,
(Rom. vi. 23.) The wages of sin is death. Dr. T. tells us, (p.
120, S.) that this means eternal death, the second death, a death
widely different from the death we now die. The same apostle
speaks of death as the proper punishment due for sin, Rom. vii.
5. and chap. viii. 13. 2 Cor, iii, 7. 1 Cor. xv. 56. In all which
places, Dr. T. himself supposes the apostle to intend eternal

420 ORIGINAL- SIN, P. U. Ch. I.
death,* And when the apostle James speaks of death, as the
proper reward, fruit, and end of sin, (Jam, i. 15.) Sin, when it
is flnished, bringeth forth death ; it is manifest, that our author
supposes eternal destruction to be meant.t And the apostle
John, agreeably to Dr, T.'s sense, speaks ofthe second death as
that which sin unrepented of will bring all men to at last. Rev,
ii, 11 XX, 6, 14. and xxi, 8. In the same sense the apostle John
uses the word in his 1st epistle chap, iii, 14. We know that we
have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren. He
that hateth his brother abideth in death. In the same manner
Christ used the word from time to tirae, when he was on earth,
and spake concerning the punishraent of sin. John v. 24, He
that heareth my word and believeth, <^c. hath everlasting life ;
and shall not come into condemnation ; but is passed from death
to life. Where according to Dr, T,'s own way of arguing, it
cannot be the death we now die that Christ speaks of, but eter
nal death, because it is set in opposition to everlasting life,
John vi, 50, This is the bread which cometh down from heaven,
that a man may eat thereof and not die. chap. viii. 51. Verily,
verily, I say unio you, ifa man keep my saying he shall never see
DEATH. Chap, xi, 26, And whosoever liveth and believeth in me
shall never die. In which places it is plain Christ does not
mean that believers shall never see temporal death. (See alsp
Matt, X, 28, and.Luke x, 28.) In like manner the word was com
monly used by the prophets of old, when they spake of death as
the proper end and recompence of sin. So abundantly by
the prophet Ezekiel. Ezek, iii. 18, When I say unto the
wicked man thou shalt surely die. In the original it is, Dying
thou shalt die: The same form of expression which God
used in the threatening to Adam. We have the same words
again, chap, xxxiii. 18. — In chap, xviii. 4, it is said. The soul
that sinneth, it shall die.| And that temporal death is not
meant in these places is plain, because it is promised most
absolutely, that the righteous shall not die the death spoken
of Chap, xviii, 21, He shall surely live, he shall not die,
(So verse 9, 17, 19, and 22, and chap, iii, 21,) And it is evi
dent the prophet Jeremiah uses the word in the same sense,
Jer, xxxi. 30, Every one shall die /or his own iniquity. And
the same death is spoken of by the prophet Isaiah, Isai, xi, 4,
With the breath of his lips shall he slay the wicked. (See also
chap. Ixvi. 16. with ver, 24,) Solomon, who we must suppose
* See p. 78. note on Rom. vii. 5, and note on ver. 6. Note on Rom. v. 20.
Note on Rom. vii. 8.
j By comparing what he says, p. 126, with what he often says of that death
and destruction which is the demerit and end of personal sin, which he says is the
second death or eternal destruction.
* To the Hke purpose are chap. iii. 19, 20, and xviii. 4, 9, 13, 17—21, 24, 26,
"^s, chap, xxiui. 8,9. 12— 14,19. > . > »

Sect. ii. Death threatened to our flrst Parents. 421
was thoroughly acquainted with the sense in which the word
was used by the wise, and by the ancients, continually speaks
oi death as the proper fruit, issue, and recompense of sin, using
the word only in this sense. Prov. xi. 19. As righteounesi
tendeth to life, so he that pursueth evil pursueth it to his own
death.* He cannot mean temporal death, for he often speaks
of it as a punishment of the wicked, wherein the righteous
shafl certainly be distinguished from them : As in Prov. xii.
28. In the way of righteousness is life, and in the path-way
thereof is no death. (So in chap. x. 2, xi. 4. xiii. 14. xiv.
27, and many other places.) But we find this same wise man
observes, that as to temporal death, and temporal events in
general, there is no distinction, but that they happen alike to
good and bad. (Eccl. ii. 4 — 16. viii. 14. and ix. 2, 3.) His
words are remarkable in Eccl. vii. 15. There is a just man that
perisheth in his righteousness ; and there is a wicked man that
prolongeth his life,in his wickedness. So we find, David in the
book of Psalms uses the word death in the same sense, when
he speaks of it as the proper wages and issue of sin. Psalm
xxxiv, 21, Evil 'shall slay the wicked. He speaks of it as a '
certain thing, Psal. cxxxix. 19. Surely thou wilt slay the
wicked, O God. And he speaks of it as a thing wherein the
wicked are distinguished from the righteous. Psal. Ixix. 28.
Let them be blotted out ofthe book of the living, and not be writ
ten with the righteous. — And thus we find the word death used
in the Pentateuch, where we have the account of the threa
tening of death to Adam. When, in these books, it is spoken
of as the proper fruit and appointed reward of sin, it is to be
understood oi eternal death. Thus, Deut. xxx. 15. See, I have
set before thee this day life and good, and death and evil.
Ver. 19, / call heaven and earth to record this day against yon,
that t have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing.
The life that is spoken of here is doubtless the same that is
spoken of in Levit, xviii, 5, Ye shall therefore keep my statutes
and my judgments, which if a man do, he shall live in them.
This the apostle understands of eternal life ; as is plain by
Rom, X. 5, and Gal, iii, 12, But that the death threatened for
sin in the law of Moses meant eternal death, is what Dr, T.
abundantly declares So in his note on Rom, v, 20, (Par, p.
291,) " Such a constitution the law of Moses was,subjecting those
who were under it to death for every transgression : Meaning by
death eternal death," These are his words. The like he
asserts in many other places. When it is said, in the place
now mentioned, / have set before thee life and death, bless
ing and cursing, without doubt, the same blessing and cursing
* See chap. v. S, 6, 23, vii. 27, viii. 36, 'a. 18. x. 21, xi. 19. xiv. 12. xv. 10.
s™i. 21, xix. 16, !1, and xxiii. 13, 14.

422 original si\. P. u. Ch. i,
^-irieant which God had already set before them^with such
solemnity, in the 27th and 28th chapters ; where we have the
sum of the curses in thosfe last words of the 27th chapter.
Cursed is every one which confl,rmeth not all the ivords of this
law to do them. Which the apostle speaks of as a threatening
oi eternal death ; and with him Dr. T. himself* In this sense
also Job and his friends spake of death, as the wages and end
of sin, who lived before any written revelation, and had their
religion and their phraseology about religion, from the an
cients. If any should insist upon it as an objection— against sup-.
posing that death was intended to signify eternal death in the
threatening to Adam — that this use of the word is figurative ;
I reply, that though this should be allowed, yet it is by no
means so figurative as many other phrases used in the history
contained in these three chapters : As when it is said, God
said, Let there be light ; God said. Lei there be a flr-mament,
&:c. as though God spake such words with a voice. So when
it is said, God called the light day ; God called the flrmament
heaven, &c. God rested on the seventh day ; as though he had
been weary, and then rested. And when itis said. They heard
the voice of God walking ; as though the deity had feet, and
took steps on the ground. Dr. T. supposes, that when it is
said of Adam and Eve, Their eyes were opened and they saw
that they were naked ; by the word naked is meant a state of
guilt. (P. 12.) Which sense of the word, naked, is much
further from the common Mse oi the word, than the supposed
sense of the word death. So this author supposes the pro
mise concerning the seed ofthe woman bruising the serpent's
head, while. the serpent should bruise his heel, is to be understood
of the Messiah destroying the power and sovereignty ofthe devil,
and receiving some slight hurt from him. (P. 15, 16.) Which
makes the sentence full of figures. And why might not God
deliver threatenings to our first parents in figurative expressions,
as well as promises ?
But indeed, there is no necessity of supposing the word
death, or the Hebrew word so translated, if used in the man
ner that has been supposed, to have been figurative at all. It
does not appear but that this word, in its true and proper
meaning, raight signify perfect misery, and sensible destruc
tion ; though the word was also applied to signify soraething
raore external and visible. There are raany words in our lan
guage, such as heart, sense, view, discovery, conception, light,
and raany others, which are applied to signify external things ;
as that muscular part of the body called heart; external
feeling called sewse; the sight of the bodily eye called mew;
" Note on Rom. v. 35. Par. p. 291—299,

;Skct. II. Death threatened to our first Parenis. 423
•the finding of a thing by itsbeing uncovered, called discovery ;
the Iirst beginning of the foetus in the womb, called conception :
and the rays of the sun, caUed light. Yet these words do as
truly and properly signify other things of a more spiritual tn^er-
nal nature ; such as the disposition, affection, perception, and
thought of the mind, and manifestation and evidence to the
soul". Common use, which governs the propriety of language,
makes the latter things to be as much signified by those words,
in their proper meaning, as the former. It is especially com
mon in the Hebrew, and 1 suppose other oriental languages,
that the same word that signifies soniething external, does no
less properly and usually signify something more spiritual. So
the Hebrew wo'rds used for breath, ha\e such a double signifi
cation ; (riDtfj) Neshama signifies both breath and the soul; and
the latter as commonly as the former : (nn) Ruach is used for
breath or wind, but yet more commonly signifies spirit, {vbi)
Nephesh is used for breath, but yet more commonly signifies
soul. So the Word (33S or fc'?) Lebh, heart, no less properly sig
nifies the soul, especially with regard to the will and affections,
than that part of the Dody so Called. The word (aiW) Shalom,
which we render peace, no less properly signifies prosperity
and happiness, than mutual agreement. The word translated
life, signifies the natural life of the body, and also the perfect
and happy 'state of sensible active being ; and the latter as
properly as the lormer. So the word death, signifies destruc
tion, as to outward sensibility, activity, and enjoyment : But it
has raost evidently another signification, which in the Hebrew
tongue, is no less proper, viz. perfect, sensible, hopeless ruin and
misery. It is therefore wholly without reason urged, that death pro
perly signifies only the loss'oi this present lile ; and that there
fore nothing else was meant by that death which was threaten
ed for eating the forbidden fruit. Nor does it at all appear but
that Adam — ^who, from what God said concerning the seed of
the woman, could understand that relief v/as promised as to
the death which was threatened, as Dr. T. himself supposes —
understood the death which was threatened, in the more impor
tant sense. Especially seeing temporal death, considered ori
ginally and in itself, is evermore, excepting as changed by di
vine grace, an entrance into that dismal state of misery which
is shadowed forth by the awful circumstances of this death ; cir
cumstances naturally suggesting to the mind the most dreadful
state of hopeless, sensible ruin.
As to the objection, that the phrase. Dying thou shalt
die, is several times used in the books of Moses to signify
temporal death, it can be of no force. For it has been shewn
already, that the same phrase is sometimes used in scripture
tip signify eier??«Z death, in instances muclj more parallel with

424 ORIGINAL SIN. , P, II, Ch, i,.
this. But indeed nothing can be certainly argued concerning
the nature of the thing intended, frora its being expressed in
such a manner. For it is evident, that such repetitions of a
word in the Hebrew language, are no more than an emphasis
upon a word in the more modern languages, to signify the
great degree of a thing, the iraportance or certainty of it, &c.
When we would signify and irapress these, we commonly
put an emphasis on our words. Instead of this, the Hebrews,
when they would express a thing strongly, repeated or doubled
the word, the more to impress the mind of the hearer ; as
may be plain to every one in the least conversant with the
Hebrew bible. The repetition in the threatening to Adam,
therefore, only implies the solemnity and importance of the
threateijing. But God may denounce either eternal or tem
poral death with peremptoriness and solemnity, and nothing
can certainly be inferred concerning the nature of the thing
threatened because it is threatened with emphasis, more than
this, that the threatening is much to be regarded. Though it
be true, that it raight in an especial raanner be expected that
a threatening of eternal death would be denounced with great
eraphasis, such a threatening being infinitely important, and to
be regarded above all others.

SECT. HI.
Wherein it is inquired, whether there be any thing in the His
tory of the three first Chapters of Genesis which should
lead us to suppose that God, in his Constitution with Adam
dealt with Mankind in general,- as included in their first
Father, and that ihe Threatening of Death, in Case he
should eat the forbidden Fruit, hdd respect not only to him,
but his Posterity ?
Dr. T. rehearsing that threatening to Adam, Thou shalt
surely die, and giving us his paraphrase of it, (p, 7, 8,) con
cludes thus : " Observe, here is not one word relating to
Adam's posterity." But it may be observed, in opposition to
this, that there is scarcely one word that we have an account
of, which God ever said to Adara or Eve, but what does-^mani-
festly include their posterity in the meaning and design of it.
There is as much of a word said about Adam's posterity in
that threatening, as there is in those words of God to Adam
ahd Eve, Gen. i. 28. Be fruitful, and multiply, and repleriish
the earth, and sUbdue it ; and as much in events, to lead^ us to
suppose Adam's posterity to be included. There is as much
of a word of his posterity in that threatening, as in those
words, (ver. 29.) Behold, I have given ybu ever-yherb bearing

Sec t. in. Adam a federal Head, ijc. 425
seed, — and every tree in which is the fruit of a tree yielding-
seed, &c. Even when God was about to create Adam, what
he said on that occasion had not respect only to Adam, but to
his posterity. Gen. i. 26. Let us make man in our image, and
let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, &,c. And, what
is raore reraarkable, there is as much of a word said about
Adam's posterity in the threatening of death, as there is in
that sentence, (Gen. iii. 19,) Unto dust shalt thou retum.
Which Dr. T. himself supposes to be a sentence pronounced
for the execution of that very threatening, Thou shalt surely
die. This sentence he himself also often speaks of as includ
ing Adam's posterity: And, what is much more remarkable
still, is a sentence which Dr. T. hiraself often speaks of, as
including his posterity, as a sentence of condemnation, as a
JUDICIAL sentence, and a sentence which God pronounced
with regard to Adam's posterity, acting the part of a
JUDGE, and as such condemning them to temporal death. —
Though he is therein utterly inconsistent with himself, inas
much as he af the same time abundantly insists, that death is
not brought on Adara's posterity in consequence of his sin, at
all as a punishment ; but merely by the gracious disposal of a
father, bestowing a benefit of the highest nature upon him,*
But I shall shew that I do not in any of these things falsely
charge or misrepresent Dr, T, — He speaks of the sentence in
chap, iii, 19, as pronounced in pursuance of the threatening
in the fiirmer chapter, in these words, (p, 17, 18.) " The sen
tence upon the man, ver. 17, 18, 19. first affects the earth up
on which he was to subsist : The ground should be incumbered
with many noxious weeds, and the tillage of it more toilsome :
Which would oblige the man to procure a sustenance by hard
labour, till he should die, and drop into the ground from
whence he was taken. Thus death entered by sin into the
world, and man became raortal,t According to the threat
ening IN the former chapter." Now, if mankind became
mortal, and must die, according to the threatening in the for
mer chapter, then doubtless the threatening in the forraer
chapter. Thou shalt die, had respect not only to Adam but
to mankind, and included Adara's posterity. Yea, and Dr. T.
is express in it, and very often so, that the sentence concerning
dropping into the ground, or returning to the dust, did include
Adam's posterity. So, p, 20, speaking there of that sentence,
" Observe (says he) that we their posterity are in fact subjected
to the same affliction and mortality, here by sentence infficted
upon our first parents, — P. 42, Note, " But yet men through
* Page 27. S.
fThe subsequent part ofthe quotation the reader will not meet with in the
third edition of Dr. T. but in the second of 1741.
VOL, H, 54

420 oiiiGiNAti SIN, P- ". Ch. i.
that long tract were ^11 suVjiBCt to death, therefore they must
be included in the sentence," The same he affirms in innu
merable other places, some of which I shall have occasion to
raention presently.
The sentence which is founded on the threatening, and
(as Dr. T. says) according to the threatening, extends to as many
as were included in the threatening, and to no more. If the
sentence be upon a collective subject, indefinitely, the greatest
part of which were not included in the threatening nor were ever
threatened at all, then certainly this sentence is not accw-ding
to the threatening, nor built upon it. If the sentence be accord
ing to the threatening, then we may justly explain thc threat
ening by the sentence. And if we find the sentence spoken to
the same person to whom the threatening was spoken, and
spoken in the second person singular in like raanner with the
threatening, founded on t\}e threatening, and according fo it ;
and if vke find the sentence includes Adam's posterity, then
we raay certainly infer, that sp did the.threatening. And hence,
that both the threatening and sentence were delivered to Adam
as the public head and representative of his posterity.
And we may also further infer from it, in another respect,
directly contrary to Dr, T,'s doctrine, that the sentence which
included Adam's posterity was to death, as cy^nishment to that
posterity, as well as to Adam liimself For a sentence pro
nounced in execution of a threatening, is for a punishraent.
Threatenings are of punishments. Neither God nor man are
wont to threaten others with /auoMrs and benefits.
But lest any of this author's admirers should stand to it
that it may very properly be said, God threatened mankind with
bestowing great kindness upon them, I would observe, that Dr,
T. himself often speaks of this sentence as pronounced by God
on all mankind, as condemning them ; as a sentence of condim-
nation judicially pronounced, or a sentence which God pro
nounced on all mankind acting as their judge, and in a judi
cial proceeding. This he affirms in multitudes of places. In
p. 20. speaking of this sentence, which he there says subjects
us, Adam's and Eve's posterity, to affliction and raortality, he
calls it a judicial act of condemnation, " The judicial act of
condemnation (says he) clearly implies, a taking hira to pieces,
and returning him to the ground from whence he was taken."
And p, 28, 29. (Note.) " In aU the scripture from one end to
the other^ there is recorded but one judgment to condemnation,
which carae upon all men, and that is. Gen. iii. 17 — 19. " Dust
thou art," &c. P. 40, speaking of the same, he says, " All
men are brought under condemnation." In p, 27, 28, " By
judgment, judgment to condemnation, it appeareth evidently to
me, he {Paul) means the being adjudged to the forementioned
death ; he means the sentence of death, of a general mortality,

*5ect. hi, Adam a federal Head, ^-c. .12'/
pronounced upon mankind in consequence of Adam's first trans
gression. And the condemnation inflicted by the judgment of
God, answereth to, and is in effect the same thing with, being
dead." P, 30, " The many, that is mankind, were subject to
death by the judicial act of God," P. 31. " Being made sin
ners, may very well signify, being adjudged, or condemned to
death, — For the Hebrew word, ^c. signifies to make one a sin
ner by a judicial sentence, or to condemn." — P, 178, Par, on
Rom, V, 19, Upon the account of one inan's disobedience,
mankind were judicially constituted sinners ; that is, subjected
to death by the sentence of God the Judge."- And there are
many other places where he repeats the same thing. And it is
pretty remarkable, that (page 48, 49,) immediately after citing
Prov. xvii, 15, He that justfieth the wicked, and he that condem
neth the just, are both an cAomination to the Lord — ahd iVhen
he is careful in citing these words to put us in mind, that it is
meant of a judicial act— yet, in the very next words, he sup
poses that God hilnself does so, since he constantly supposes
that Adam's posterity, whora God condemns, are innocent. His
words are these, " Fi-om all this it followeth, that as the judg
ment that passed upon all raen to condemnation, is death's
coming upon all men, by the judicial act of God, upon occasion
of Adam's transgression : So," <Sz:c, — And it is very remarka
ble, that* (p. 3, 4, 7, S.) he insists, " That in scripture no ac
tion is said to be imputed, reckoned, or accounted to any per
son for righteousness or condemnation, but the proper act and
deed, of that person," — And yet he thus continually affirms,
that all mankind are made sinners by a judicial act of God
the Judge, even to condemnation, and judicially constituted sin
ners, and so subjected to a juditial sentence of condemnation,
on occasion of Adam's sin ; and all according to the threatening
denounced to Adam, Thou shalt surely die : Though he sup
poses Adara's posterity were not included in the threatening,
and are looked upon as perfectly innocent, and treated vvholly
as such, I am sensible Dr, T. does not run into all this incon
sistence only through oversight and blundering ; but that he is
driven to it, to make out his matters in his evasion of that no
ted paragraph in the fifth chapter of Romans ; especially those
three sentences ; (yer, 16,) The judgment was by orle to con
demnation, (ver, 18i) By the offerice of orie, judgmimt came
upon all men to condemnation : arid (ver. 19.) By oiie man's
disobedience many were made sinners. And I am also sensible
of what he offers to salve the inconvenience, viz. " That ifthe
threatening had immediately been executed on Adam, he would
have had no posterity ; and that so far the possible existence
of Adam'g pdsterity fell under the threatening of the law,
and into the hands of the judge, to b i disposed of as he should

+28 OBIGI-VAL SI.V. P- "• ^"' ^¦
think fit : And that this is the ground of the judgment to con
demnation coming upon afl men,*" But this is trifling to a
great degree : For,
1, Suffering death, and failing of possible existence, are
entirely different things. If there had never been any such
thing as sin committed, there would have been infinite numbers
of possible bemgs, which would have failed of existence by
God's appointment. God has appointed (if the phrase be al
lowable) not to bring into existence numberless possible
worlds, each replenished withinnumerable possible inhabitants.
But is this equivalent to God's appointing them all to suffer
death ?
2. Our author represents, that by Adam's sin, the possible
existence of his posterity fell into the hands ofthe Judge, to be
disposed of as he should think ft. But there was no need of
any sin of Adam, or of any body else, in order to their being
brought into God's hands, in this respect. The future possible
existence of all created beings is in God's hands, antecedently
to the existence of any sin. And therefore infinite numbers of
possible beings, without any relation to Adam, or any other
sinning being, fail of their possible existence. And if Adam had
never sinned, yet it would be unreasonable to suppose, but that
innumerable multitudes of his possible posterity would have
failed of existence by God's disposal. For will any ;be so un
reasonable as to imagine, that God would and must have
brought into existence as many of his posterity as it was possi
ble should be, if he had not sinned ? Or, that then it would not
have been possible, that any other persons of his posterity should
ever have existed, than those individual persons who now ac
tually suffer death, and retum to the dust ?
3. We have many accounts in scripture, which imply the
actual failing ofthe possible existence of innumerable multitudes
of Adam's posterity, yea, of raany raore than ever come into
existence. As, of the possible posterity of Abel, the possible
posterity of all them that were destroyed by the flood, and the
possible posterity of the innumerable multitudes which we read
of in scripture destroyed by sword, pestilence, &c. And if
the threatening to Adam reached his posterity in no other res
pect than this, that they were liable to be deprived by it of their
possible existence, then these instances are much more properly
a fulfilment of that threatening, than the suffering of dfeath by
such as actually come into existence; and so is that which is
most properly the judgment to condemnation executed by the
sentence ofthe Judge, proceeding on the ground of that threat
ening. But where do we ever find this so represented iri scrip
ture ? We read of multitudes cut off for their personal sins, vvho
* Page 96, 90, 91. S.

Sect. hi. Adam a federal Head, <^-c. 429
thereby failed.of their possible posterity. And these are men
tioned as God's judgriients on them, and effects of God's con
denmation of them : But when are they ever spoken of as God
judicially proceeding against, and condemning their possible
posterity ?
4. Dr. T. in what he says concerning this matter, speaks
of the threatening of the law delivered to Adam, which the pos
sible existence of his. posterity fell under, as the ground of the
judgment io condemnation coming upon all men. But herein he
is exceeding inconsistent with himself: For he affirms in a place
forecited, that the scripture never speaks of any sentence of con
demnation coming upon all men, but that sentence in the third
of Genesis, concerning manturning to dust. But according to
him, the threatening of the law delivered to Adam could not
be the ground of that sentence ; for he greatly insists upon it,
that that law was entirely abrogated before that sentence was
pronounced, had no existence to have any such influence as
might procure a sentence of death ; and therefore this sentence
was introduced entirely on another footing, a new dispensation
of grace. The reader may see this matter strenuously urged,
and particularly argued by him, p. 113 — 120. S. So that this
sentence could not, according to him, have the threatening of
that law for its ground, as he supposes ; for it never stood upon
that ground. I]t could not be called a judgment of condemna
tion under any such view ; for it could not be viewed in circum
stances where it never existed.
5. If, as our author supposes, the sentence of death on
all men coraes under the notion of a judgraent to condem
nation by this means, viz. that the threatening to Adam was in
some respect the ground of it ; then it also comes under the
notion of a punishment : For threatenings annexed to breaches
of laws, are to punishments ; and a judgraent of condemna
tion to the thing threatened, must be to punishment ; and
the thing condemned to must have as much the notion of a
punishment, as the sentence has the notion of a judgraent to
condemnation. But this Dr, T, wholly denies: He denies
that death comes as any punishment at all ; but insists that
it comes only as a favour and benefit, and a fruit of fatherly
love to Adam's posterity, respected not as guilty, but wholly
innocent. So that his scheme will not admit of its coming
under the notion of a sentence to condemnation in any respect
whatsoever. Our author's supposition, that the possible ex
istence of Adam's posterity comes under the threatening of
the law, and into the hands of the judge, and is the ground of
the condemnation of all men to death, implies, that death by
this sentence is appointed to mankind as an evil, at least
negatively so ; as it is a privation of good : For he manifestly
speaks of a non-existence as a negative evil. But herein he is

130 okigikal sin, P. n, Ch. i.
inconsistent with hiniself : For he continually insists that man
kind are subjected to death only as a beneflt, as has been be
fore shewn. According to him, death is not appointed to raan
kind, as a negative evil, as any cessation of existence, or even
diminution of good ; but on the contrary, as a means of a more
happy existence, and a great increase of good.
So that this evasion of Dr. T. is so far from helping the
matter, that it increases and multiplies the inconsistence. And
that the laW, with the threatening of death annexed, was given
to Adam as the head of mankind, and to his posterity as in
cluded in him, not only follows from some of our author's own
assertions — and the plain full declarations of the apostle in the
fifth of Romans, which drove Dr. T- into such gross inconsist
encies — but the account given in the three first chapters of
Genesis directly and inevitably leads us to' such a conclusion.
Though the sentence. Gen. iii. 19. Unto 'dust thou shalt
return, he not of equal extent with the threatening in the
foregoing chapter, or an execution of the main curse of the
law therein denounced — for that it should have been so would
have been inconsistent with the intimations of mercy just before
given — yet' it is plain, this sentence is in pursuance of that
threatening, being to something that was included in it. The
words of the sentence were delivered to the same person with
the words of the threatening, and in the same manner, in like
singular terms, and as rauch without any express raention of
his posterity. Yet it manifestly appears by the consequence,
as well as all circumstances, that his posterity were included in
the words of the sentence ; as is confessed on all hands. And
as the words were apparently delivered in the form of the sen
tence of a judge, condemning for something that he was dis
pleased with, and ought to be condemned, viz. sin ; and as the
sentence to him and his posterity was but one, dooming to the
same suffering, under the same circumstances, both the one
and the other sentenced in the same words, spoken but once,
and immediately to but one person, we hence justly infer, that
it was the same thing to both ; and not as Dr, T, suggests,
(p, 67,) a sentence to a proper punishment to Adara, but a
mere promise of favour to his posterity.
Indeed, sometimes our author seeras to suppose, that
God meant the thing denounced in this sentence, as a favour
both to Adam and his posterity.* But to his posterity, or
mankind in general, who are the main subject, he ever insists,
that it was purely intended as a favour. And therefore, One
would have thought, the sentence should have been delivered
with manifestations and appearances of favour, and not of
anger. How could Adara understand it as a promise of great
¦" Page 2S, i5. 46. 5.

Sect, ih, Adam a federal Head, <^c. 131
favour, considering the manner and circumstances of the de
nunciation ? How could he think, that God would go about
to delude him, by clothing himself with garments of ven
geance, using words of displeasure and rebuke, setting forth
the heinousness of his crime, attended with cherubims and a
flaming sword ; when all that he meant was only higher tes
timonies of favour than he had before in a state of innocence,
and to manifest fatherly love and kindness, in proniises of
great blessings? If this was the case, God's words to Adam
must be understood thus : " Because thou hast done so wick
edly, hast hearkened unto the voice of thy wife, and hast eaten
of the tree of which I commanded thee, saying, thou shalt not
eat of it ; therefore I will be more kind to thee than I was in
thy state of innocence, and do now appoint for thee the fol
lowing great favours : Cursed be the ground for thy sake," &c.
And thus Adam must understand what was said, unless any
will say (and God forbid that any should be so blasphemous)
that God clothed himself with appearances of displeasure,
to deceive Adam, and make him believe the contrary of what
he intended, and lead him to expect a dismal train of evils on
his posterity, contrary to all reason and justice, implying the
most horribly unrighteous treatment of millions of perfectly in
nocent creatures. It is certain, there is not the least appear
ance in what God said, or the manner of it, as Moses gives us
tbe account, of any other, than that God was now testifying
displeasure, condemning the subject of the sentence he was
pronouncing, as juatfy exposed to punishment for sin, and for
that sin which he mentions.
When God was pronouncing this sentence, Adam doubt
less understood that God had respect to his posterity, as well
as himself; though God spake wholly in the second person
singular, Because thou hast eaten, — rin sorrow th&u shalt eat, —
Unto the dust shalt thou return. But he had as much reason
to understand God as having respect to his posterity, when he
directed his speech to hira in like manner in the threatening,
thou shalt surely die. The sentence plainly refers to the
threatening and results from it. The threatening says. If
thou eat, thou shalt die : The sentence says. Because thou hast
eaten, thou shalt die. And Moses, who wrote the account,
had no reason to doubt but that the affair would be thus un
derstood by his readers ; for such a way of speaking was well
understood in those days : The history he gives us of the ori
gin of things abounds with it. Such a manner of speaking to
the heads of the race, having respect to the progeny, is not
only used in almost every thing that God said to Adam and
Eve, but even in what he said to the very birds andflshes. Gen.
i, 22, And also in what he said afterwards to Noah, Gen, ix,
to. Shenai Mam and Jaj^eth, and Canaan, Gen. ix, 25 — 27.

432 ORIGINAL SIN. P. U. Cu. I.
So in promises made to Abraham, God directed his speech to
him, and spake in the sepond person singular, flora tirae to
time, but meant chiefly his posterity : To thee will I give this
land. In thee shall all the families ofthe earth be blessed, &c.
&c. And in what is said of Ishmael, as of his person, but
meant chiefly of his posterity. Gen, xvi, 12, and xvii, 20, Thus
in what Isaac said to Esau and Jacob in his blessing he spake
to them in the second person singular ; but meant chiefly their
posterity. And so for the most part in the proraises raade to
Isaac and J acob ; and in Jacob blessing Ephraira and Manasseh,
and his twelve sons.
But I shall take notice of one or two things further, shew
ing that Adam's posterity were included in God's establishment
with him, and the threatening, denounced for his sin ; and that
the calamities which come upon them in consequence ofhis sin,
are brought on them as punishments.
This is evident from the curse on the ground ; which if it
be any curse at all, comes equally on Adara's posterity with
himself And it it be a curse, then a'gainst whomsoever it is
designed, and on whomsoever it terminates, it comes as a pu
nishment, and not as a blessing, so far as it coraes in consequence
of that sentence,
Dr, T, (p, 19,) says, " A curse is pronounced upon the
ground, but no curse upon the woman and the man." And (p.
45, 46, S,) he insists, that the ground only was cursed, and not
the man : as though a curse could terminate on lifeless sense
less earth ! To understand this curse otherwise than as ter
minating upon man through the ground, would be as senseless
as to suppose the meaning to be. The ground shall be punished
and shall be miserable for thy sake. Our author interprets the
curse on the ground, of its being incumbered with noxious
weeds : But would these weeds have been any curse on the
ground if there had been no inhabitants, or if the inhabitants
had been of such a nature, that these weeds should not have
been noxious, but useful to thera ? It is said, Deut, xxviii,. 17,
Cursed shall be thy basket and thy store ; And would he not
be thought to talk very ridiculously, who should say, ' Here is a
curse upon the basket ; but not.a word of any curse upon the
owner : And therefore we have no reason at all to look upon
it as any punishment upon him, or any testiraony of God's dis
pleasure towards him,' How plain is it, that when lifeless
things not capable either of benefit or suffering, are said to be
cursed or blessed with regard to sensible beings — who use or
possess these things, or have connection with them — the mean
ing must be, that these sensi6Ze beings are cursed or blessed in
the other, or with respect to them I In Exod. xxiii. 25. it is said.
He shall bless thy bread and thy water. And I suppose never
any body yet proceeded to such a degree of subtility in distin-

Sect. iu. Adam a federal Head, <^-c. 433
guishing, as to say, ' Here is a blessing on the bread and the
water, which went into the possessor's mouth, but no blessing
on him.' To make such a distinction with regard to the curse
God pronounced on the ground, would in some respects be more
unreasonable ; because God is express in explaining the matter,
declaring that it was for man's sake, expressly referring this
curse to him, as being for the sake of his guilt; and as consist
ing in the sorrow and suffering he should have from it. In sor
row shalt thou eat of it. — Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth
to thee. So that God's own words tell us where the curse
terminates. The words are parallel with those in Deut. xxviii.
16. but only more plain and explicit, Cursed shalt thou be in
the fleld, or in the ground.
If this part of the sentence was pronounced under no no
tion of any curse or punishnient at all upon raankind, but, on
the contrary, as making an alteration forthe better, as to them—~
that instead of the sweet, but tempting, pernicious fruit of para
dise, it might produce wholesome fruits, more for the health of
the soul ; that it might bring forth thorns and thistles, as excel
lent medicines, to prevent or cure moral distempers, diseases
which would issue in eternal death — then it was a blessing on
the ground, and not a curse ; and it might more properly have
been said, ' blessed shall the ground be for thy sake — I will
raake a happy change in it, that it raay be a habitation more fit
for a creature so infirm, and so apt to be overcome with tempt-r
ation, as thou art.'
The event makes it evident, that in pronouncing this
curse, God had as much respect to Adam's posterity, as to
himself And so it was understood by his pious posterity before
the ffood ; as appears by what Lamech, the father of Noah, says,
Gen. V. 29. And he called his name Noah ; saying, this same
shall comfort us concerning our work, and the toil of our hands,
BECAUSE OP THE GROUND WHICH THE LORD HATH CURSED.
Another thing which argues that Adam's posterity were
included in the threatening of death — and that our first parents
understood, when fallen, that the tempter, in persuading
thera to eat the forbidden fruit, had aimed at the punishment
and ruin of both them and their posterity, and had procured
it — is Adam immediately giving his wife that new name. Eve
or Life, on the promise or intiraation of the disappointment
and overthrow of the tehipter in that matter, by her seed.
This Adam understood to be by his procuring life ; not only
for themselves, but for raany of their posterity, and thereby
delivering thera frora that death and ruin which the serpent
had brought upon them. Those that should be thus deli
vered, and obtain life, Adara calls the living. And because
he observed by what God had said, that deliverance, or life,
was to be by the seed of the woman, he therefore remarks
Vol. II, 53

434 ORifiiNAL SIN. P. II. Ch. i.
that she is tlte mother of cdl Uving, and thereupon giyes her a
new name, mn life. Gen iii. 20.
There is a great deal of evidence that this is the occasion
of Adam giving his wife her new name. This was her new
honour, and the greatest honour, at least in her present state,
tliat the Redeemer was to be of her seed. New names were
wont to be given for soraething that was the person's peculiar
honour. So it was with regard to the new names of Abraham,
Sarah, and Israel. Dr. T. himself observes,* that they who
are saved by Christ, are called, (oi ^mrss 2 Cor. iv. 11.) the living
or they that live. Thus we find in the Old Testament, the
righteous are called by the name of the living, Psal, Ixix. 28.
Let them be blotted out ofthe book of the living, and not be writ
ten with the righteous. If what Adam meant by her being the
mother of cdl living, was only her being the mother of mankind ;
and gave her the name life upon that account ; it were much
the raost likely that he would have given her this name at
first ; when God first united them, under that blessing, befruit-
fvd and multiply, and when he had a prospect of her being the
mother of raankind in a state of immortality, living indeed,
living and never dying. But that Adam should at that time
give her only the name of {twk) Isha, and then immediately
on that melancholy change, by their coming under the sentence
of death, with all their posterity — having now a new awful
prospect of her being the mother of nothing but a dying race,
all from generation to generation turning to dust, through her
folly — he should change her name into life, calling her now the
mother of all living, is (on that supposition) perfectly unac
countable. Besides it is manifest, that it was not her being
the raother of all mankind — or her relation as a mother to her
posterity — ^but the quality of those of whora she was to be the
raother, Adara had in view, in giving his wife this new name ;
^s appears by the name itself, which signifies life. And if it
had been only a natural and mortal life he had in view, this
wasi nothing to distinguish her posterity frora the brutes ; for
the very sarae name of living ones, or living things, is given
from time to time to them.] Besides, if by life the quality oi
her posterity was not meant, there was nothing in it to dig.
tinguish her frora Adara ; for thus she was no raore the raother
of all living, than he was the father of all living ; and she could
no raore properly be called by the name of life on any such
account, than he : But names are given for distinction. Doubt
less Adam took notice of something distinguishing concerning
her, that occasioned his giving her this new name. And I
¦* Note annexed to § 287.
t Ab in Gen. i. 21, 24, 28. -Chap. ii. 19. Chap. w. 19. vii. 23. and viii,. 1 .
uiwl iBSny other places m thc bibles

S-ECT, UI, Adam a federal Head, ^c. 436
think it is exceeding natural to suppose, that as Adam had
given her the first name frora the manner of her creation, so he
gave her the new name from redemption, and as it were new
creation, through a Redeemer of her seed. And it is equally
probable that he should give her this name frora that which
coraforted him, with respect to the curse that God had pro
nounced on him and the earth, as Lamech named Noah, Gen.
V, 29. Saying, this same shall comfort us concerning our work,
and toil of our hands, because of ihe ground which the Lord hath
cursed. Accordingly he gave her this new name, not at her
first creation, but immediately after the promise of a Redeemer.
<See Gen. iii. 15—20.)
Now as to the consequence which I infer ftom Adam
giving his wife this name, on the intimation which God had
given — that Satan should by her seed be overthrown and dis
appointed, as to his malicious design in tempting the woman —
it is, that great nurabers of raankind should be saved, whom
he calls the living ; they should be saved from the effects of
this malicious design of the old serpent, and frora that ruin
which he had brought upon thera by tempting their first
parents to sin ; and so the serpent would be, with respect to
them, disappointed and overthrown in his design. But how is
any death, or indeed any calamity at all, brought upon their
posterity by Satan's raalice in that teraptation, if instead of
that, ail the consequent deatfi and sorrow was the fruit of
God's fatherly love? an instance of his free and sovereign
favour ? And if multitudes of Eve's posterity are saved from
either spiritual or temporal death by a Redeemer, one of her
seed, how is that any disappointment of Satan's design in
tempting our first parents ? How came he to have any such
thing in view as the death of Adam's and Eve's posterity, by
terapting thera to sin, or any expectation that their death would
be the consequence, unless he knew that they were included in
the THREATENING. Sorae have objected against his posterity being included
in the threatening delivered to Adam, that the threatening itself
was inconsistent with his having any posterity : It being that he
should die on the day that he sinned. To this I answer, that the
threatening was not inconsistent with his having posterity, on
two accounts :
I. Those words. In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt
surely die, according to the use of such like expressions araong
th^ Hebrews, do not signify immediate death, or that the ex
ecution shall be within twenty-four hours from the corarais
sion of the fact ; nor did God by those words limit himself
as to the time of executing the threatened punishment ; but
?hat was still left to God's pleasure. Such a phrase, accord-

436 eiijGijrAL sfN. P- ". Ch. i,
ing to the idiom of the Hebrew tongue, signifies no more than
these two things :
1, A real connection between the sin and the punishment,
^o Ezek, xxxiii, 12^ 13, The righteousness of the righteous
shall not deliver him in the day of his transgression. As
for the wickedness of the wicked he shall not fall thereby in the
DAY that he lumeth from his wickedness. Neither shall the
righteous be able to live in the day that he sinneth : But
for his iniquity that he hath committed, he shall die for it.
Here it is said, that in the day he sinneth, he shall not be able
to livcj but he shall die ; not signifying the tirae when death
shall be executed upon hira, but the connection between his
sin and death ; such a connection as in our present coraraon
use of language is signified by the adverb of time, when ; as if
one should say, " According to the laws of our nation, so long
as a man behaves himself as a good subject, he may live; but
when he turns rebel, he must die :" Not signifying the hour,
day, or month in which he must be executed, but only the con
nection between his crime and death,
2, Another thing which seeras to be signified by such an
expression, is, that Adara should be exposed to death by one
transgression, without waiting to try hira the second tirae. If
he eat of that tree, he should immediately fall under con
demnation, though afterwards he might abstain ever so strict
ly. In this respect the words are much of the same force
with those words of Solomon to Shimei; I Kings, ii. 37. For it
shall be that on the day that thou goest out, and passest over
the brook Kidron, thou shall know for certain, that thou
SHALT SURELY DIE. Not meaning, that he should certainly be
executed on that day, but that he should be assuredly liable
to death for the first offence," and that he should not have
another trial to see whether he would go over the brook Kidron
a second time. — Besides,
II. If the words had implied that Adam should die that
Very day (within twenty four or twelve hours) or that moment
in which he transgressed, yet it will by no means follow, that
God obliged hiraself to execute the punishment in its utmost
extent on that day. The sentence was in great part executed
immediately ; he then died spiritually ; he lost his innocence
and original righteousness, and the favour of God ; a dismal
alteration was made in his soul, by the loss of that holy divine
principle which was in the highest sense the life of the soul.
In this he was truly ruined and undone t/iat very day ; be
coming corrupt, miserable, and helpless. And I think it has
been shewn that such a spiritual death was one great thing
implied in the threatening. And the alteration then made in
his body and external state was the beginning of temporal-
death- Grievous external calamity is tailed by the name of ,

Sbct. hi. Adam a federal Head, <^c. 437
death in scripture Exod. x. 17. — Intreat the Lord that he may
take away this death. Not only was Adam's soul ruined that
day, but his body was ruined ; it lost its beauty and vigour, and
became a poor, dull, decaying, dying thing.
And besides all this, Adam was that day undone in a
more dreadful sense ; he immediately fell under the curse of
the law, and condemnation to eternal perdition. In the
language of scripture, he is dead, that is, in a state of con
demnation to death; even as our author often explains this
language in his exposition upon Romans. In scripture-
language, he that 'believes in Christ immediately receives
life. He passes at that time from death to life, and thence
forward (to use the apostle John's phrase) " has eternal life
abiding in hira." But yet, he does not then receive eternal
life in its highest corapletion ; he has but the beginning of it ;
and receives it in a vastly greater degree at death. The proper
time for the complete fulness, is not till the day of judgment.
When the angels sinned, their punishment was immediately
executed in a degree ; but their full punishment is not till the
end of the world. And there is nothing in God's threatening to
Adam that bound him to execute his full punishment at once ;
nor any thing which determines that he should have no posteri
ty. The constitution which God established and declared, de
termined, that IP he sinned, and had posterity, he and they
should die. But there was no constitution determining the
actual being of his posterity in this case ; what posterity he
should have, how raany, or whether any at all. All these things
God had reserved in his own power : The law and its sanction
interpieddled not with the matter.
It maybe proper in this place also to take some notice of
that objection of Dr. T. against Adam being supposed to be a
federal head for his posterity, that it gives him greater honour
than Christ, as it supposes that all his posterity would have had
eternal life by his obedience, if he had stood ; and so a greater
number would have had the benefit of his obedience, than are
saved by Christ.* — I think, a very little consideration is suffi
cient to shew that there is no weight in this objection. For the
benefit of Christ's raerit raay nevertheless be vastly beyond that
which would have been by the obedience of Adara. For those
that are saved by Christ, are not merely advanced to happiness
by his merits, but saved from the infinitely dreadful effects of
Adam's sin, and many from immense guilt, pollution, and mise
ry, by personal sins. They are also brought to a holy and a
happy state through infinite obstacles ; and exalted to a far
greater, degree of dignity, felicity, and glory, than would have
been due for Adam's obedience ; for aught I know, many thou
sand times so great. And there is enough in the gpspel-dis-
+ Page 120, &c. S.

438 original sit. P- n- Ch. i.
pensation, clearly to manifest the sufficiency of Christ's merits
for such effects in all mankind. And how great the number will
be, that shall actually he the subjects of them, or how great a
proportion of the whole race, considering the vast success of the
gospel that shall be in that future, extraordinary, and glorious
season, often spoken of, none can tell. And the honour of these
two federal heads arises not so much frora what was pro
posed to each for his trial, as frora their success, and the good
actually obtained ; and also the raanner of obtaining. Christ
obtains the benefits men have through hira by proper merit of
condignity, and a true purchase by an equivalent ; which would
not have been the case with Adam if he had obeyed,
I have now particularly considered this account which
Moses gives us, in the beginning ofthe bible, of our first parents,
and God's dealings with them; the constitution he established
with them, their transgression, and what followed. And on the
whole, if we consider the manner in which God apparently
speaks to Adam from time to time ; and particularly if we con
sider how plainly and undeniably his posterity are included in
the sentence of death pronounced on him after his fall, founded
on the foregoing threatening ; and consider the curse denounc-
on the ground for his sake, for his sorrow, and that of his pos
terity ; and also consider, what is evidently the occasion of his
giving his wife the new name of Eve, and his meaning in it —
and withal consider apparent fact in constant and universal
events, with relation to the state of our first parents, and their
posterity from that time forward, through all ages ofthe world
•^I cannot but think it must appear to every impartial person,
that Moses's account does, with sufficient evidence, lead all
raankind, to whora his account is communicated, to understand,
that God, in his constitution with Adam, dealt with him as a
public person — as the head ofthe human species — -and had res
pect to his posterity, as included in him. And it must appear
that this history is given by divine direction, m the beginning
of the first written revelation, in order to exhibit to our view the
origin of the present sinful, miserable state of mankind, that
we raight see what that was which first gave occasion for all
those consequent wonderful dispensations of divine raercy and
grace towards mankind, which are the great subject of the
scriptures, both ofthe Old and New Testaraent ; and that these
things a,re not obscurely and doubtfully pointed forth, but deli
vered in a plain account of things, which, easily and naturally
exhibits thera to our understandings.

Chap, u. Texts, chiefly from the Old Testament, <^c. 439

CHAP, II.
Observations on other Parts of the holy Scriptures, chiefly in the
Old Testament, that prove the doctrine of Original Sin.
Original depravity may well be argued, from wicked
ness being often spoken of in scripture as a thing belonging to
the race of mankind, and as if it were a property of the species.
So in Psal xiv. 2, 3, The Lord looked down from heaven upon
the CHILDREN OF MEN, to See if there were any that did under
stand and seek God. They are all gone aside ; they are alto
gether become filthy : There is none that doeth good ; no, not one.
The like we have again, Psal, Iiii, 2, 3, — Dr, T, says, (p, 104,
105.) "The holy Spirit does not mean this of every indivi
dual ; because in the very same psalm, he speaks of some that
were righteous, ver. 5. God is in the generation of the righteous."
But how little is this observation to the purpose ? For who ever
supposed, that no unrighteous men were ever changed by
divine grace, and afterwards made righteous ? The psalmist is
speaking of what men are as they are the children ofmen,horn
of the corrupt human race ; and not as born of God, whereby
they come to be the children of God, and of the generation of
the righteous. The apostle Paul cites this place in Rom, iii,
10 — 12. to prove the universal corruption of mankind ; but yet
in the same chapter he supposes the same persons spoken of as
wicked may become righteous, through the righteousness and
grace of God.
Wickedness is spoken of in other places in the book of
psalms, as a thing that belongs to men, as of the human race,
as sons of men,. Thus, in Psal. iv. 2, O ye sons of men, how
long will ye tum my glory into shame ? How long will ye love
vanity? &ic. Psal, Ivii, 4, / lie among them that are set on
fire, even the sons of men, whose teeth are spears and arrows,
and their tongue a sharp sword. Psal, Ivhi, 1,2, Do ye indeed
speak righteousness, O congregation ? Do ye judge uprightly,
O ye sons of men ? Yea, in heart ye work wickedness ; ye
weigh out the violence of your hands in the earth. Our author
mentioning these places, says, (p. 105, note,) " There was a
strong party in Israel disaffected to David's person and govern
ment, and sometimes he chooseth to denote them by the sons
or children of men," But it would have been worth his while
to have inquired. Why the psalmist should choose to denote the
worst raen in Israel by this narae? Why he should choose
thus to disgrace mankind, as ifthe compellation of sons of men
most properly belonged to such as were of the vilest character,
jind as if all the sons of men, even every one of them, were of

440 original sin, P, II.
such a character, and none of them did good ; no, not one ? Is
it not strange that the righteous should not be thought worthy
to be called sons of men, and ranked with that noble race of
beings, who are born into the world wholly right and innocent I
It is a good, easy, and natural reason, why he chooseth to call
the wicked sons of men, as a proper name for them, That by
being of the sons of men, or of the corrupt, ruined race of
mankind, they come by their depravity. And the psalmist
himself leads us to this very reason, Psal. Iviii. Do ye judge
uprightly, O ye sons op men ? yea, in heart ye work wicked
ness, ye weigh oui the violence of your hands. The wicked are
ESTRANGED FROM THE WOMB, iSic. Of which I shall spcak more
by and by.
Agreeable to these places is Prov, xxi. 8, The way of man
is froward and strange ; but as for the pure, his work is right.
He that is perverse in his walk is here called by the name of
man, as distinguished from the pure : which I think is abso
lutely unaccountable, if all mankind by nature are pure and
perfectly innocent, and all such as are froward and strange
in their ways, therein depart from the native purity of all
mankind. The words naturally lead us to suppose the con
trary ; that depravity and perverseness properly belong to man
kind as they are naturally, and that a being raade pure, is by
an after-work, by which sorae are delivered from native pollu
tion, and distinguished from mankind in general : Which is
perfectly agreeable to the representation in Rev. xiv, 4, where
we have an account of a number that were not defiled, but were
pure, and followed ihe Lamb ; of whora it is said. These were
REDEEMED FROM AMONG MEN.
To these things agree Jer. xvii. 5, 9. In ver. 5, it is said.
Cursed is he that trusteth in man. And in ver. 9. this reason
is given, The heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately
wicked ; who can know it ? What heart is this so wicked and
deceitful ? Why, evidently the heart of him, who, it was said
before, we must not trust ; and that is man. It alters not the
case as to the present arguraent, whether the deceitfulness . of
the heart here spoken of be its deceitfulness to the man him
self, or to others. So Eccl. ix. 3. Madness is in the heart of
the SONS of MEN, while they live. And those words of Christ to
Peter, Matth. xvi. 23, Get thee behind me, Satan — For thou
savourest not the things that be of God, but the things that be of
MEN, Signifying plainly, that to be carnal and vain, and op
posite to what is spiritual and divine, is what properly belongs
to men in their present state. The same thing is supposed in
that of the apostle, 1 Cor. iii. 3, For ye are yet carnal. For
whereas there is among you envying and strife, are ye not carnal,
and walk as men ? And that in Hos, vi, 7. But they like men
have transgressed the covenant. To these places may be added

Chap, ii. Texts chiefly ofthe Old Testament, ^c. 44I
Matth, vii, 11, i/" ye being evil, know how to give good gifts.
Jam, iv, 5, Do ye think that the scripture saith in vain, the spirit
that DWELLETH IN US, LUSTETH TO ENVY ?  1 Pct. iv, 2, That
he no longer should live the rest of his time in the lusts of men,
but to the will of God — Yet above all, that in Job xv, 16, How
much more abominable andfllthy is man who drinketh iniquity
LIKE WATER? Of which morc presently.
Now what account can be given of these things on Dr.
T.'s seherae? How strange is it, that we should have such
descriptions, all over the bible, of man, and the sons op men !
Why should raan be so continually spoken of as evil, carnal,
perverse, deceitful, and desperately wicked, if all men are by
nature as perfuctly innocent, and free from any propensity to
.evil, as Adam was the first raoraent ,of his creation, all made
right, as our author would have us understand, Eccl. vii. 29 ?
Why on the contrary, is it not said, at least as often, and with
.equal reason, that the heart of man is right and pure ; that the
way of man is'innocent and holy ; and that he who savours true
virtue and wisdom, savours the things that be of men ? Yea, and
why raight it not as well have been said, the Lord looked down
from heaven on the sons of men, to see if there were any that did
understand, and did seek after God ; and they were all right,
altogether pure, thera was none inclined to do wickedness, no, not
one ? Of the hke iraport with the texts raentioned are those
which represent wickedness as what properly belongs to the
WORLD ; and that they who are otherwise are saved from the
world, and called out of it. As John vii. 7. The world cannot
hate you ; but me it hateth ; because I testify of it, ihat the
works thereof are evil. Chap. viii. 23. Ye are of this world : /
am not of this world. Chap. xiv. 17. The spirit of truth, whom
the world cannot receive : because it seeth him not, neither
knoweth him: But ye know him. Chap. xv. 18, 19. If the
world hate you, ye know that it hated me before it hated you.
If ye were of the world, the world would love its own: But
because -ye (ire not of the world, but I have chosen you out ofthe
world, therefore ihe world hateth you. Rev. xiv. 3, 4. These
are they which were redeemed from the earth, — redeemed
from among mem John xvii. 9. Ipray not for the world, but
for them ivhich thou hast given me. ver. 14. / have given them
thy word; and the world hath hated them, because they are not
of the WORLD, even as I am not of the world. 1 John iii. 13.
Marvel not, my brethren, if the world hate you. Chap. iv. 5.
They are of the world, therefore speak they of the world, and
the world AearefA them. Chap. v. 19. We are of God, and the
whole WORLD lieth in wickedness. It is evident that in these
places by the world is meant the worid of mankind; not the
Vop. II. •'i6

442 ORIGINAL .SIN, P. ".
habitation, but the inhabitants : For it is the world spoken of as
loving, hating, doing evil works, speaking, hearing, &c.
The same thing is shewn, when wickedness is often
spoken of as being man's own, in contradistinction frora virtue
and holiness. So men's lusts are often called their own hearths
lusts, and their practising wickedness is called walking in their
OWN ways, walking in their own counsels, in the imagination
of their own heart, and in the sight of their own eyes, accord
ing to their own devices, &c. These things denote wicked
ness to be a quality belonging properly to the character and
nature of mankind in their present state : As, when Christ
would represent that lying is remarkably the character and the
very nature of the devil in his present state, he expresses it
thus, John viii, 44, When he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his
OWN : For he is a liar, and the father ofit.
And that wickedness belongs to the very nature of raen in
their present state, may be argued frora those places which
speak of raankind as being wicked in their childhood, or from
their childhood. So Prov, xxii. 15. Foolishness is bound in the
heart ofa child ; but the rod of correction shall drive it far from
him. Nothing is raore raanifest, than that the wise raan in this
book continually uses the word folly, or foolishness, for wicked
ness ; and that this is what he means in this place, the words
themselves explain. For the rod of correction is proper to
drive away no other foolishness, but that which is of a moral
nature. The word rendered bound, signifies (as observed in
Pool's Synopsis,) a close and firm union. The same word is
used in Chap, vi, 21. Bind them continually upon thine heart.
And Chap. vii. 3. Bind them upon thy flngers, write them upon
the table of thine heart.* The same verb is used, 1 Sam.
xviii. 1. The soul of Jonathan was knit, or bound to the soul
of David, and Jonathan loved him as his own soul. — But how
coraes wickedness to be so firmly bound, and strongly fixed, in
the hearts of children, if it be not there naturally ? Tbey have
had no time firmly to fix habits of sin, by long custom in actual
wickedness, as those who have lived many years in the world.
The same thing is signified in that noted place. Gen. viii.
21. For the imagination of man's heart is evi, trom his youth.
It alters not the case, whether it be translated /or or though the
iraagination of man's heart is evil from his youth, as Dr. T.
would have it. The word translated youth, signifi; s the whole
of the former part of the age of man, which commences frora
the begimiirof of life. The word in its derivation has reference
to the birth or beginning of existence. It comes from (lyj) a
word to shake off, as a tree shakes off its ripe fruit, or a plant its
* To the hke purpose is Chap. iii. 3. and Deut. xi. 18. wherethis word is used

Chap. ii. Texts chiefly ofthe Old Testament, <^c. 443
seed ; the birth of children being commonly represented by a
tree yielding fruit, or a plant yielding seed. So that the word
here translated youth, comprehends not only what we in English
most commonly call the time of youth, but also childhood and
infancy, and is very often used to signify these latter.*
Dr. T. says, (p. 124. note,) that he " conceives, from the
youth, is a phrase signifying the greatness or long duration of
a thing." But if by long duration he means any thing else
than what is literally expressed, viz. from the beginning of life,
he has no reason to conceive so ; neither has what he offers so
much as the shadow of a reason for his conception. There is
no appearance in the words of the two or three texts he men
tions, of their meaning any thing else than what is most literally
signified. And it is certain, that what he suggests is not the
ordinary import of such a phrase among the Hebrews ; but that
thereby is meant from thebeginning, or the early time of life, or
existence; as may be seen in the places following, where the
same word in the Hebrew is used as in the eighth of Genesis.
1 Sam. xii. 2. I am old and grey-headed — and I have walked
before you from my childhood until this day. Psal. Ixxi. 5, 6,
2 hou art my trust from my youth : By thee have I been hold
en up from the womb. Thou art he that took me of my mother's
bowels, (ver. 1 7, 18.) O God, thou hast taught me from my
youth ; and hitherto have I declared thy wondrous works: Now
also, when I am old and grey-headed, forsake me not. Psal.
• cxxix. 1, 2. Many a time have they afflicted me prom my youth,
Tnay Israel now say : Many a time have they afflicted me from
MY YOUTH ; yet have they not prevailed against me. Isa. xlvii.
12. Stand now with the multitude of thy sorceries, wherein thou
hast laboured from thy youth. (So also ver. 15.) 2 Sam.
xix. 7. That will be worse unio thee, than all the evil that
befell thee from thy youth until now. Jer. iii. 24, 25. Shame
hath devoured the labour of our fathers, from our youth. — We
have sinned against the Lord our God from our youth, even
to this day.]
And it is observed, that according to the manner of the
Hebrew language, when it is said, such a thing has been from
youth, or the first part of existence, the phrase is to be under
stood as including that fir.st time of existence. So, Josh. vi. 21.
They utterly destroyed all from the young to the old, (so in the
* A word ofthe same root is used to signify a youngs chUd, or a little child, in
the following places : 1 Sam.i. 24, 25, 27. 1 Kings iii. 7. ahd xi. 17. 2 Kmgs ii. 23.
Job xxxiii. 25. Prov. xxii. 6. xxiii. 13. and xxix. 21 Isai. x. 19. xi. 6. and bev. 20.
Hos. xi. 1. The same word is used to signify an infant, in Exod. ii. 6. and x. 9.
Jad. xiii. 5, 7, 8, 24, 1 Sam. i. 22. and iv. 21. 2 Kings v. 14. leai. vii. 16. and viii. 4.
t So Gen. xlvi. 34. Job xxxi. 18. Jer. xxxii. 30. and xlviii. 11. Ezek. iv. 14.
Zech. xiii. 5.

444 ORIGINAL SIN. P. H-
Hebrew) i, e, including both, (So Gen. xix. 4. and Esther
iii. 13.) And as mankind are represented in scripture as being bf
a wicked heart from their youth, so in other places they are
spoken of as being thus from the womb. Psal. Iviii. 3. The
wicked are estranged from the womb : They go astray as soon
as they be bom, speaking lies. It is observable that the psalm
ist mentions this as what belongs to the wicked, as the sons of
MEN :' For, these are the preceding words ; " Do ye judge up'
rightly, O ye sons of men? — Yea, in heart ye work wicked
ness."* Then it follows, the wicked are estranged from the
womb, &c. The next verse is^ their poison is like the poison of
a serpent. Serpents are poisonous as soon as they come into
the world ; they derive a poisonous nature by their generation.
Dr. T. (p. 134,' 135.) says, " It is evident that this is a scriptural
figurative way of aggravating wickedness on the one hand, and
of signifying early and settled habits of virtue on the other^
to speak of it as being from the womb." And as a probable
instance of the latter, he cites that in Isai. xlix, 1, The Lord
hath called me from the womb ; from the bowels of my mother hath
he made mention of my name. But I apprehend, that in order
to seeing this to be either evident or probable, a man must have
eyes peculiarly affected, I humbly conceive that such phrases
as that in the 49th of Isaiah, of God's calling the pro
phet _^ro»i the womb, are evidently not of the import which he
siipposes : but mean truly from the beginning of existence,.
and are manifestly of like signification with that which is said
of the prophet Jeremiah, Jer, i, 5, Before I formed thee in the
belly, I knew thee : Before thou earnest oui of ihe womb, I sanc
tified thee, and ordained thee a prophet unto the nations. Which
surely means something else besides a high degree of virtue ;
It plainly signifies that he was, from his first existence, set
apart by God for a prophet. And it would be as unreasonable ,
to understand it otherwise, as to suppose the angel meant any
other than that Samson was set apart to be a Nazarite frora the
beginning of his life, when he says to his mother, Behold, thou
shalt conceive and bear a son ; And now drink, no wine nor strong
drink, ^c. For the child shall be a Nazarite to God, from the
WOMB, to the day of his death. By these instances it is plain,
that the phrase, from the womb, as the other, from the youth,
as used in scripture, properly signifies from the beginning of
life. Very reraarkable is that place. Job xv. 14—16- What is
mm, that be should be clean ? And he that is born of a woman,
that he should be righteous ? Behold, he putteth no trust in
* A phrase of the like import with that in Gen. viii. Bl. The imagination, or,
as It might have been rendered, the operation of his heart is evil.

Chap, II. Texts chiefly of the Old Testament, ^c. 445
his saints ; yea, the heavens are not clean in his sight : How
much more abominable and filthy is man, which drinketh ini
quity like water ? And no less reraarkable is our author's rae
thod of managing it. The 16th verse expresses an exceeding
degree of wickedness, in as plain and emphatical terms,
alraost, as can be invented ; every word representing this in
the "strongest raanner : How much more abominable anafilthy is
man, that drinketh iniquity like water ? I cannot now recollect
where we have a sentence equal to it in the whole bible, for
an emphatical, lively^ and strong representation of great wick
edness of heart. Any one of the words, as such words are
used in scripture^ would represent great wickedness : If it had
been only said. How much more abominable is man ? Or, How
much more filthy is man ? Or, Man that drinketh iniquity.
But all these are accumulated with the addition of — like
water, — the further to represent the boldness or greediness of
men in wickedness. Though iniquity be the most deadly
poison, yet men drink it as boldly as they drink water, are as
familiar with it as with their common drink, and drink it with
like greediness as he that is thirsty drinks water. That bold
ness and eagerness in persecuting the saints, by which the
great degree of the depravity of raan's heart often appears, is
thus represented, Psal. xiv, 4, Have the workers of iniquity no
knowledge who eat up my people as they eat bread ? And the
greatest eagerness of thirst is represented by thirsting as an
aniraal thirsts after water, Psal. xiii, L
Now let us see the soft, easy, light manner, in which Dr,
T, treats this place, (p, 143,) " How much more abominable
and filthy is man, in comparison of the divine purity,
who drinketh iniquity like water ? who is attended with so
raany sensual appetites and so apt to indulge them. You see
the argument,"' man in his present weak and fleshly state can
not be clean before God, Why so ? Because he is conceived
and born in sih, by reason of Adam's sin ? No such thing.
But because, if the purest creatures are not pure in compari
son of God, much less a being subject to so many infirmities
as a mortal raan. Which*is a demonstration to rae, not
only that Job and his friends did not intend to establish the
doctrine we are now examining, but that they were wholly
strangers to it." Thus he endeavours to reconcile this text
with his doctrine of the perfect native innocence of mankind ;
in which we have a notable specimen of his demonstrations, as
well as of that great impartiality and fairness in examining
and expounding the scripture, of which he so often raakes a
profession !
In this place we are not only told how wicked man's heart
is, but also how raen corae by such wickedness ; even by be
ing of the race of mankind, by ordinary generation : What is

46 ORIGINAL SIN. ; P. H.
man that he should be clean ? and he that is born of a woman,
that he should be righteous ? Our author (p, 141, 142.) repre
sents man being born of a woman, as a periphrasis to signify
man ; and that there is no design in the words to give a rea
son why man is not clean and righteous. But the case is most
evidently otherwise, if we may interpret the book of Job by
itself It is raost plain that man's being bom of a woman is
given as a reason of his not being clean ; chapter xiv, 4, Who
can bring a clean thing out of an unclean ? Job is speaking there
expressly of man's being born of a woman, as appears in ver, 1.
And here how plain is it, that this is given as a reason of man's
not being clean ? Concerning this Dr. T. says, That this has no
respect to any moral uncleanness, but only common frailty , ^c.
But how evidently is this also otherwise ? when that unclean
ness which a man has by being born of a woman, is expressly
explained of unrighteousness, in the next chapter at the 14th
verse. What is man that he should be clean ? and he that is
born of a woman that he should be righteous ? Also in chap.
xxv. 4. How then can man be justified with God ? And how can
he be clean that is bom of a woman ? It is a raoral cleanness
Bildad is speaking bf, which a raan needs in order to his being
justified — His design is to convince Job of his moral impurity,
and- frora thence of God's righteousness in his severe judg
raents upon hira ; and not of his natural frailty. ¦
And without doubt, David has respect to this way of
derived wickedness of heart, when he says, Psal. li. 5. Be
hold, I was shapen in iniquity, and. in sin did my mother con
ceive me. It alters not the case as to the arguraent we are
upon, whether the word (mpdh') conceive me signifies to con
ceive, or to nurse; which latter our author takes so much
pains to prove : For when he has done all, he speaks of it as a
just translation of the words to render thera thus, I was born m
in iniquity, and in sin did mu mother nurse me. (p, 135,) If
it is owned that man is born in sin, it is not worth the while
to dispute, whether it is expressly asserted that he is con
ceived in sin. But Dr, T, after his manner, insists, that such
expressions as being born in sin-^^eing transgressors from the
womb, and the like, are only phrases figuratively to denote
aggravation, and a high degree of wickedness. But the con
trary has been already demonstrated, from many plain scrip
ture instances. Nor is one instance produced, in which there
is any evidence that such a phrase is used in such a manner.
A poetical sentence out of Virgil's Mneid has here been pro
duced, and made much of by some, as paraUel with this, in
what Dido says to JEneas, in these hnes :
Nec tibi diva parens, generis nec Dardanusrauctor,
Perfide :• Sed duris genuit te cautibus horrens
Caucasus, hyrcanseque admdrOnt ubera tygres.

Chap, ii. Texts chiefiy of the Old Testament, 4-c. 447
In which she tells Mneas, that not a goddess was his mother,
nor Anchises his father; but that he had been brought forth
by a horrid rocky raountain, and nursed at the dugs of tigers,
to represent the greatness of his cruelty to her. But how
unlike and unparallel is this ? Nothing could be more natural,
than for a woman overpowered with the passion of love, and
distracted with raging jealousy and disappointment, thinking
herself treated with brutish perfidy and cruelty, by a lover
whose highest fame had been his being the son of a goddess,
to aggravate his inhumanity and hard-heartedness with this,
that his behaviour was not worthy the son of a goddess, nor
becoming one whose father was an illustrious prince : And that
he acted more as if he had been brought forth by hard unre
lenting rocks, and had sucked the dugs of tigers. But what
is there in the case of David parallel, or at all in like manner
leading him to speak of himself as born in sin, in any such
figurative sense 1 He is not speaking hiraself, nor any one
speaking to hira, of any excellent and divine father and rao
ther, of whom he was born : Nor is there any appearance of
his aggravating his sin, by its being unworthy of his high birth.
There is nothing else visible in David's case, to lead hira to
take notice of his being bom in sin, but only his having such
experience of the continuance and power of indwelling sin,
after so long a time, and so many and great means to engage
hira to holiness : which shewed that sin was inbred, and in his
very nature.
Dr. T. often objects to these and other texts, brought by
divines tb prove original sin, that there is no raention raade in
thera of Adam, nor of his sin. He cries out, Here is not the
least mention or intimation of Adam, or any ill effects of his sin
upon. us. — Here is_not one word, nor the least hint of Adara, or
any consequences of his sin, &c, &c,* He says,t " If Job and
his friends had known and believed the doctrine of a corrupt
nature, derived from Adam's sin only, they ought in reason
and truth to have given this as the true and only reason of the
human imperfection and uncleanness they mention," But
these objections and exclanfations are made no less iraper-
nently than frequently. It is no more a proof that corruption
of nature did not come by Adam's sin, because many times
ivhen it is mentioned, his sin is not expressly mentioned as the
cause of it ; than that death did not come by Adam's sin, as
Dr. T, says it did. For though death, as incident to mankind,
is mentioned so often in the Old Testament, and by our
Saviour in his discourses, yet Adam's sin is not once expressly
mentioned, after the three first chapters of Genesis, any
* Page 5, 64, 96, 97, 98, 108, 108, 112, 118, 120, 122,127, 128, 136, 142,
143, 149, 152, ISS, 229. ]U^.

448 ORIGINAL oIN. P. H.
where in all the Old Testament or the four EvangeUsts, as the
occasion of it.
What christian has there ever been, that believed the
moral corruption of human nature, who ever doubted that it
came in the way of which the apostle speaks, when he says,
"By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sirt?"
Nor indeed have they any raore reason to doubt of it, than to
doubt of the whole history of our first parents, because Adam's
narae is so rarely raentioned on any occasion in scripture, after
that ffrst account of him, and Eve's never at all ; and because
we have no more any express mention of the particular raan
ner in which raankind were first brought into being, either
with respect to the creation of Adara or Eve, It is sufficient,
that the abiding, most visible effects of these things reraain
in the view of raankind in all ages, and are often spoken of
in scripture ; aud that the particular raanner of their being in
troduced is once plainly set forth in the beginning of the
Bible, in that history which gives us an account of the origin
of all things. And doubtless it was expected by the great au
thor of the bible, that the account in the three first chapters
of Genesis should be taken as a plain account of the introduc
tion of both natural and raoral evil into the world. The bistou
ry of Adara's sin, with its circumstances, God's threatening,
the sentence pronounced upon him after his transgression and
the immediaje consequences, consisting in so vast an alteration
in his state — and the state of the world, with respect to all his
posterity — most directly and sufficiently lead us to understand
the rise of calamity, sin and death, in this sinful, miserable
world. It is fit we all should know, that it does not become us to
tell the Most High, how often he shall particularly explain and
give the reason of any doctrine which he teaches, in order to
our believing what he says. If he has at all given us evidence
that it is a doctrine agreeable to his mind^ it becomes us to re-
eeive it with full credit and submission ; and not sullenly to re
ject it, because our notions and humours are not suited in the
manner, and number of times, of his particularly explaining it.
How often is pardon of sins promised in the Old Testaraent to
repenting and returning sinners ? How raany hundred tiraes is
God's special favour tliere proraised to the sincerely righteous,
without any express raention of these benefits being through
Christ ? Would it therefore becorae us to say, that inasrauch
as our dependence on Christ for these benefits is a doctrine^
whieh, if true, is of such injportance, God ought expressly to
have mentioned Christ's merits as the reason and ground of
the benefits, if he knew they were the ground of thera ; and
should have plainly declared it sooner, and more frequently, if
ever he expected we should believe him when he did tell us of

Skct, i. Proofs from John iii. 6. <^c. 449
it ?rjriHow oft is veugeanco and misery threatened in the Old
Testament to the wicked, without any clear and express signi
fication of any such thing intended, as that everiasting fire,
where there is wailing and gnashing of teeth, in another world,
which Christ so often speaks of as the punishment appointed
for all the wicked ? Would it now become a christian to object
and say, that if God really rasant any such thing, he ought in
reason and truth to have declared it plainly and fully ; and not
to have been so silent about a matter of such vast importance
to all mankind, for four thousand years together ?

CHAP. III.
Observations on various other Places of Scripture, principally of
the New Testament, proving the Doctrine of Original Sin.
SECT. I.
Observations on John iii. 6. in Connection with some other Pas
sages in the New Testament.
Those words of Christ, giving a reason to Nicodemus,
why we must be born again, John iii. 6. That which is born of
the fiesh, is fiesh, and ihat which is born of the spirit is spirit,
have not without good reason been produced by divines, as
a proof of the doctrine of original sin : supposing that by
fiesh here is meant the human nature in a debased and corrupt
state. Yet Dr. T. (p. 144.) thus explains these words, " that
which is born of the flesh is flesh; that which is born by na
tural descent and propagation, is a man consisting of body and
soul, or the mere constitution and powers of a man in their
natural state." But the constant use of these terms, ^esA and
spirit, in other parts of the New Testament, when thus set
in opposition, and the latter said to be produced by the spirit
of God, as here — and when expressive of the same thing
which Christ is here speaking of to Nicodemus, viz. the requi
site qualifications to salvation — will fully vindicate fhe sense
of our divines. Thus in the 7th and 8th chapters of Romans,
where these terras ^esA and spirit, {(fag^ and -avsuiut are abimdant
ly repeated, and set in opposition, as here. So chap. vii. 14.
The law is («vsu(/,arix@-) spiritual, but I am (tfapxix®-) carnal, sold
under sin. He cannot only mean, ' I am a man consisting of
body and soul, and having thepowers of a man.' Ver. 18. /
know that in me, that is, in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing.
He does not raean to condemn his frarae, as consisting of body
Vor....T.i. 57

450 ORIGINAL SIN. P- "• Cn. III.

%

and soul ; and to assert, that in his human constitution, with the
powers of a man, dwells no good thing. And when he says in
the la t verse of the chapter, with themi I myself serve the
law of God, but with the flesh, the law of sin ; he cannot mean,
' / myself serve the law of God; but with my innocent human
constitution, as having the powers of a man, I serve the law of
sin.' And when he says in the next words, the beginning of
-the 8th chapter, there is no condemnation io them, — that walk
not after the flesh, but after the spirit; and ver. 4. The righte
ousness ofthe law is fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh ;
he cannot mean, ' there is no condemnation to them that walk
not according to thepowers ofa man,'' &c. And when he says,
(ver. 5, and 6,) They that are after the flesh, do mind the
things ofthe flesh : and to be carnally minded is death ; he does
not intend, ' they that are according to the human constitution,
and the powers of a man, do mind the things of the human con
stitution and powers ; and to mind these is death,' And when
he says, (ver, 7, and 8,) The carnal (or fleshly) mind is enmity
mgainst God, and is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed
can be: so that ihey that are in the flesh, cannot please God;
he cannot raean, that to raind the things which are agreeable
to ' the powers and constitution of a man,' who as our author
says, is constituted or raade right, is enmity against God ; and
that a mind which is agreeable to this right human constitution,
as God hath made it, is not subject to the law of God, nor in
deed can be ; and that they who are according to such a consti
tution cannot please God,' Andwhenit itis6aid,(ver, 9,) Yeare
not in the flesh, but in thespirit,the apostle cannot mean, ' ye are not
in the human nature, as constituted of body and soul, and with the
powersof a man.' It is most manifest, that by the flesh here the
apostle raeans a nature that is corrupt, of an evil tendency, and
directly opposite to the law and holy nature of God ; so that to
walk according to it, and to have a mind so conforraed, is to
be an utter enemy to God and his law ; in a state of perfect
inconsistence with subjection to God, and of being pleasing to
him ; and in a sure and infallible tendency to death and utter
destruction. And it is plain, that here by walking after, or
¦according to the flesh, is meant the same thing as walking ac
cording to a corrupt and sinful nature ; and to walk according
to the spirit, is to walk according to a holy and divine nature
I or principle ; And to be carnally minded, is the same as being
viciously and corruptly minded ; and to be spiritually minded,
is to be ofa virtuous and holy disposition.
When Christ says, John iii. 6. That which is bom of the
FLESH is flesh, he represents the flesh not merely as a quality :
for it would be incongruous to speak of a quality as a thing born.
Therefore man, as in his whole nature corrupt, is called flesh ;
which is agreeable to other scripture representations, where
he corrupt nature is called the old man, the body of sin, and

Sect, i. Proofs from John iii. 6, ^c. 451
the body of death. Agreeable to this are those representations
in the 7th and 8th chapters of Romans. There, flesh is figura
tively represented as a person, according to the apostle's
manner. This is observed by Mr. Locke, and after him by
Dr. T. who takes notice that the apostle, in the 6th and 7th
of Romans, represents sin as a person ; and that he figuratively
distinguishes in himself two persons, speaking of flesh as his
person. For I know ihat in mb, that is in my flesh, dwelleth
no good thing. And it may be observed, that in the 8th chap
ter he still continues this representation, speaking of the flesh
as a person. Accordingly, in the 6th and 7th verses, he speaks
oithe mind ofthe flesh, ((p^ovijjxa <sa^x<^,) and ofthe mind of the
spirit, {tpgovriiui jsrtsufAar©',) as if the flesh and spirit were two
opposite persons, each having a mind contrary to that of the
other. Dr. T, interprets this mind of the flesh, and mind of
the spirit, as though the flesh and the spirit were the different
objects, about which the mind is conversant. But this is plain
ly beside the apostle's meaning ; who speaks of the flesh and
spirit as the subjects in which the mind is ; and in a sense the
agents, but not the objects about which it acts. We have the
sarae phrase again, ver, 27. He that searcheth the hearts,
knoweth what is the mind of the spirit, ((pgovjifjia avtuftaTi^.)
The raind of the spiritual nature in the saints is the sarae with
the raind of the spirit of God himself, who imparts and ac
tuates that spiritual nature ; and here the spirit is the subject
and agent, but not the object. The sarae apostle, in a sirailar
manner, uses the word, {vxs,) mind. Col. ii. 18. Vainly puffed
up by Ais fleshy mind, (airo tx vo@^ r-itg rfa^x®' avTs,) by the mind
<f his flesh. And this agent so often called flesh, represented
by the apostle as altogether evil, without any good thing
dwelling in it, or belonging to it— ryea perfectly contrary to
God and his law, and tending only to death and ruin, and di
rectly opposite to the spirit — is what Christ speaks of to Ni
codemus as born in the first birth, and furnishing a reason
why there is a necessity ofa new birth, in prder to a better pro^
duction. One thing is particularly observable in that discourse of
the apostle — in which he so often uses the term j^e«A, as oppo
site to spirit — that he expressly calls it sinful flesh, Rom. viii, 3,
It is manifest, that hy sinful flesh he" raeans the sarae thing with
that flesh spoken of in all the context ; And that when it is said,
Christ was made in the hkeness of sinful fleshy the expression is
equipollent with those that speak of Christ as made sin, and
made a curse for us.
Flesh and spirit are opposed to one anothesr in Gal. v, in
the same manner as in the Sth of Romans. And there assu
redly, by flesh cannot be meant only the human nature of body
sand soul or the mere constitution and powers ofa man, as in it?

452 ORIGINAL SIN, P. II. Ch. Ill,
natural state, innocent and right. In the 16th ver, the Apostle
says, Walk in the spirit, and ye shall not fulfil the lusts of the
FLESH : the^^esA is something of an evil inclination, desire, or
lust. But this is more strongly signified in the next words ;
J^or the flesh lusteth against the spirit and the spirit against
the FLESH ; and these are contrary the one to the other. What
could haye been said more plainly, to shew that what the apostle
means hy flesh, is something very evil in its nature, and an
irreconcilable enemy to all goodness ? And it may be observed
that in these words and those that follow, the apostle still
figuratively represents the flesh as a person or agent, desiring,
acting, having lusts, and performing works. And by works of
the flesh, and fruits of the spirit, which are opposed to each
other, (from ver, 19, to the end) are plainly meant the same as
works of a sinful nature, and fruits of a holy renewed nature,
"Now the works ofthe flesh are inanifest, which are these:
Adultery, fornication, uncleanness,lasciviousness,idolatry, witch
craft, hatred, variance, wrath, strife, seditions, heresies, &c,-But
the fruit of the spirit is love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentle
ness, good ness," &c. The apostle by^esAdoesnot mean anything
that is innocent and good in itself, which only needs to be re
strained and kept in proper bounds ; but something altogether
evil, which is to be destroyed, 1 Cor, v. 5. To deliver such an
one to satan, for the destruction of the flesh. We must
have no mercy on it ; we cannot be too cruel to it ; it must even
be crucified. Gal v, 24, They that are Christ's have crucified
the FLESH with the affections and lusts.
The apostle John — the same apostle that writes the account
of what Christ said to Nicodemus^ — by the spirit raeans the
sarae thing as a new, divine, and holy nature, exerting itself in a
principle of divine love, which is the sum of aH christian holi
ness. 1 John iii. 23, 24. " And that we should love one another,
as he gave us commandment; and he that keepeth his com
raandraents dwelleth in him, and he in him : And hereby we
know that he abideth in us, by the spirit that he hath given us.
Chap, iv, 12, 13, If we love one another, God dwelleth in us^*
and his love is perfected in us : Hereby know we that we dwell
in him, because he hath given us of his spirit." The spiritual
principle in us being as it were a communication of the Spirit
of God to us.
And as by {-avsunoi) spirit, is meant a holy nature, so by the
epithet (irveufAaTix®-) spiritual, is meant the sarae as truly virtu
ous and holy. Gal, vi, 1, " Ye that are spiritual, restore such an
one in the spirit of meekness," The apostle refers to what he
had just said at the end of the foregoing chapter, where he had
mentioned meekness as a fruit of the spirit. And so by carnal
OT fleshly, (tfajxix®-) is meant the same as sinful, Rom. vii. 14,

Sect. i. Proofs from John iii. 6. ^c. 453
"The law is spiritual, (i. e. holy) but I am carnal, sold under
sin." And it is evident that by flesh, as the word is used in the
New Testaraent, and opposed to spirit, when speaking of the
qualifications for eternal salvation, is meant — not only what is
now vulgarly called the sins of the flesh, consist'mg in inordinate
appetites of the body, and their indulgence ; but — the whole
body of sin, implying those lusts that are mqst subtle, and
farthest from any relation to the body ; such as pride, malice,
envy, &c. When the works of the flesh are enumerated. Gal.
V. 19 — 21. they are vices of the latter kind chiefly that are
mentioned ; idolatry, witchcraft, hatred, variance, emulations,
wrath, strife, seditions, heresies, envyings. So, pride of heart is
a^ effect or operation of the^e«A. Col. ii. 18. Vainly puffed
-Ap by his fleshly mind : In the Greek, (as before ob.served) by
the mind of the flesh. So, pride, envying, strife, and division,
are spoken of as works of the flesh, 1 Cor. iii. 3, 4. " For ye are
yet carnal (rfajxixoi, fleshly.) For whereas there is envying, and
strife, and division, are ye not carnal, and walk as men ? For
vvhile one saith, I am of Paul, and another, I am of Apollos, are
ye not carnal?" Such kind of lusts do not depend on the body,
or external senses ; for the devil himself lias them in the highest
degree, who has not, nor ever had, any body or external senses
to gratify. Here, if it should be inquired, how corruption or depravity
in general, or the nature of man as corrupt and sinful, came to
be called ^esA ; and not only that corruption which consists in
inordinate bodily appetites ? I think what the apostle says in
the last cited place. Are ye not carnal, and walk as men?
leads us to the true reason. It is because a corrupt and sinful
nature is what properly belongs to mankind, .or the race of
Adara, as they are in theraselves, and as they are by nature.^
The word^esA is often used in both the Old and the New Tes
tament to signify mankind in their present state. To enumer
ate all the places would be very tedious : I shall therefore only
inention a few in the New Testament, Matt, xxiv, 22. " Ex
cept those days should be shortened, no flesh should be saved."
Luke iii. 6. " All flesh shall see the salvation of God." John
xvii, 2. " Thou hast given hira power over all flesh.* Man's
nature, being left io itself, forsaken of the Spirit of God, as it
was when man fell, and consequently forsaken of divine and
holy principles, of itself became exceeding corrupt, utterly de
praved and ruined : And so the word^esA, which signifies man,
came to be used to signify man as he is in hiraself, in his natu
ral State, debased, corrupt, and ruined. On the other hand, the
word spirit came to be used to signify a divine and holy prin-
- See also Actsii. 17. Rom. iii. 20. 1 Cor. i. 29. Gal.ii. lfi.

454 ORIGINAL SIK. P. "• Ch. Ill,
ciple, or new nature ; because that is not of man, but of God,
by the indwelling and vital influence ofhis spirit. And thus to
be corrupt, and to be carnal, or fleshly, and to walk as men, are
the sarae thing. And so in other parts of scripture, to savour
the things that be of man, and to savour things which are corrupt,
are the same ; and sons of men, and wicked men, also are the
same, as observed before. And on the other hand, to savour
the things that be of God, and to receive the things of the Spirit
of God, are phrases that signify as rauch as relishing and era-
bracing true holiness or divine virtue.
All these things confirm what we have supposed to be
Christ's meaning in saying, " That which is born of the flesh, is
flesh ; and that which is born of the spirit, is spirit." His speech
implies, that what is born in the first birth of man, is nothing
but man as he is of himself, without any thing divine in him ;
depraved, debased, sinful, ruined man, utterly unfit to enter
into the kingdom of God, and incapable of the spiritual di
vine happiness of that kingdora. But that which is born in
the new birth, of the Spirit of God, is a spiritual principle, a
holy and divine nature, meet for the heavenly kingdom. It is
no sraall confirmation of this being the true meaning, that the
words understood in this sense contain the proper and true rea
son, why a man must be born again, in order to enter into the.
kingdom of God ; the reason given every where in other parts
of scripture for the necessity ofa renovation, a change of mind,
a new heart, &c. in order to salvation : To give a reason of
which to Nicodemus, is plainly Christ's design in the words which
have been insisted on.  Before I proceed, I would observe
one thing as a corollary from what has been said.
Corol. If by flesh and spirit, vvhen spoken of in the New
Testaraent, and opposed to each other in discourses on the
necessary qualification for salvation, we are to understand
what has been now supposed, it will not only follow, that raen
by nature are corrupt, but wholly corrupt, without any good
thing. If by flesh is meant man's nature, as he receives it in
his first birth, then therein dwelleth no good thing ; as appears
by Rora. vii. 18. It is wholly opposite to God, and to subject
tion to his law, as appears by Rom. viii. 7, 8, It is directly
contrary to true holiness, and wholly opposes it, as appears by
Gal. V. 17. So long as men are in their natural state, they not
only have no good thing, but it is impossible they should have
or do any good thing ; as appears by Rom. viii, 8. There is
nothing in their nature, as they have it by the first birth,
whence should arise any true subjection to God; as appears
by Rom. viii. 7, If there were any thing truly good in the flesh,
or in man's nature, or natural disposition, under a moral view,
then it should only be amended ; but the scripture represents
as though we were to be enemies to it, and were to seek no»

Sbct, i. Proofs from John iii, 6. ^c. 455
thing short of its entire destruction, as before observed. And
elsewhere the apostle directs not to the amending of the old
man, but putting it off, and putting on the new man : and seeks
not to have the body of death made better, but to be delivered
from it ; and says, that if any man be in Christ, he is a new
creature (which doubtless means the same as a man new born,)
old things are (not amended but) passed away, and all things
are become new.
But this will be further evident, if we particularly consi
der the apostle's discourse in 1 Cor. the latter part of the se
cond chapter and the beginning of the third. There the
apostle speaks of the natural man and the spiritual man :
where natural and spiritual are opposed just in the same man
ner, as carnal and spiritual often are. In chap. ii. 14, 15, he
says, " the natural man receiveth not the things of the spirit of
God : For they are foolishness unto him ; neither can he know
them, because they are spiritually discerned. But he that is
spiritual judgeth all things." And not only does the apostle
here oppose natrual and spiritual, just as he elsewhere does
carnal and spiritual, but his following discourse evidently
shews that he means the very same distinction, the same two
distinct and opposite things. For immediately on his thus
speaking of the difference betwen the natnral and the spiritual
raan he says, " And I, brethren, could not speak unto you as
linto spiritual, but as unto carnal." Referring manifestly to
what he had been saying in the immediately preceding discourse,
about spiritual and natural men, and evidently using the word
carnal as synonyraous with natural. By which it is put out of
all reasonable dispute, that the apostle by natural men raeans
the sarae as men in that carnal, sinful state, that they are in by
their first birth ; — notwithstanding all the glosses and criticisms,
by which modern writers have endeavoured to palm upon us
another sense of this phrase ; and so to deprive us of the clear
instruction the apostle gives in that I4th verse, concerning the
sinful miserable state of raan by nature. Dr. T. says, by
4/uxi'<(^, is meant the animal man, the man who maketh sense
and appetite the law of his action. If he aims to limit the
meaning of the word to external sense and bodily appetite,
his meaning is certainly not the apostle's. For the apostle in
his sense includes the more spiritual vices of envy, strife,
&c. as appears by the four first verses of the next chapter ;
where, as I have observed, he substitutes the word carnal in
the place of vj/uj^ix®'. So the apostle Jude uses the word in like
manner, opposing it to spiritual, or having the spirit, ver. 19.
" These are they that separate themselves, sensual, (^ux^oi) not
having the spirit." The vices he had been just speaking of,
were chiefly of the raore spiritual kind. ver. 16. " These are
murmurers, complainers, walking after their own lusts ; and their

456 ORIGINAL SIN. P. II. Ch. III.
mouth speaking great swelling words, having men's persons in
admiration, because of advantage." The vices mentioned are
much of the same kind with those of the Corinthians, for
which he calls them carnal; envy, strife, divisions, saying, /
am of Paul, and / of Apollos ; and being puffed up for one
against another. We have the same word again. Jam. iii. 14,
15. " If ye have bitter envying and strife, glory not, and lie
not against the truth : This wisdom descendeth pot from above,
but is earthly, sensual, (^l^ux"")) and devilish ;" where also the
vices the apostle speaks of are of the more spiritual kind.
So that on the whole, there is sufficient reason to under
stand the apostle, when he speaks of the natural man, in 1 Cor.
ii. 14. as meaning man in his native corrupt state. And his
words represent him as totally corrupt, wholly a stranger and
enemy to true virtue or holiness, and things appertaining to it,
which it appears are commonly intended in the New Testa
ment by things spiritual, and are doubtless here meant by
things of the spirit of God. These words also represent, that
it is impossible man should be otherwise, while in his natural
state. The expressions are very strong : The natural man
receiveth not the things of the spirit of God, is not susceptible
of things of that kind, neither can he know them, can have no
true sense or relish of them, or notion of their real nature and
true excellency ; because they are spiritually discerned ; they
are not discerned by means of any principle in nature, but alto
gether by a principle that is divine, something introduced by
the grace of God's holy spirit, which is above all that is natu
ral. The words are in a considerable degree parallel with
those of our Saviour, John xiv, 16, 17, " He shall give you the
spirit of truth, whora the world cannot receive, because it seeth
hira not, neither knoweth hira : But ye h.now hira ; for he dwell
eth with you, and shall be in you,"

SECT. IL
Observations on Rom. iii. 9 — ^24.
If the scriptures represent all mankind as wicked in their
first state, before they are made partakers of the benefits of
Christ's redemption, then tbey are wicked by nature : For
doubtless men's first state is their native state, or that in which
they come into the world. But the scriptures do thus represent
all mankind. Before I mention particular texts to this purpose, I would
observe that it alters not the case as to the argument in hand,
whether we suppose these texts speak directly of infants, or
only of such as understand something of their duty and state.

Sect, ii. Proofs from Rom. iii, 9, 24, 457
For if all mankind, as soon as ever they are capable of reflect
ing, and knowing their own moral state, find theraselves wicked,
this proves that they are wicked by nature ; either born so, or
born with an infallible disposition to be wicked as soon as pos
sible, if there be any difference between these ; and either of
thera will prove raen to be born exceedingly depraved. I havc
before proved, that a native propensity to sin certainly follows
from many things said of mankind in the scripture ; but
what I intend now, is' to prove by direct scriptuie-testimony,
that all mankind, in their first state, are really of a wicked
character. To this purpose, exceeding full, express, and abundant is
that passage of the apostle, in Rom. iii, 9 — 24, which I shall set
down at large, distinguishing the universal terms which are
here so often repeated, by a distinct character. The apostle
having in the first chapter (ver. 16, 17,J laid down his proposi
tion, that none can be saved in any other way than through the
righteousness of God, by faith in Jesus Christ, he proceeds to
prove this point, by shewing particularly that all are in them
selves wicked, and without any righteousness of their own.
First, he insists on the wickedness of the Gentiles, in the first
chapter ; next, on the wickedness of the Jews, in the second
chapter. And then, in this place, he comes to sura up the
raatter, and draw the conclusion in the words following:
" What then, are we better than they ? No, in no wise ; for
we have before proved both Jews and Gentiles, that they are
ALL under sin : As it is written, there is none righteous, no,
NOT ONE ; there is none that understandeth ; there is none
that seeketh after God ; they are all gone out of the way ;
they are together become unprofitable ; there is none that
doeth good, no, not one. Their throat is an open sepulchre ;
with their tongues they have used deceit ; the poison of asps
is under their lips ; whose mouth is full of cursing and bitter
ness ; their feet are swift to shed blood ; destruction and misery
are in their ways, and the way of peace they have not known i
there is no fear of God before their eyes. Now we know, that
whatsoever things the law saith, it sayeth to them that are
under the law, that every mouth may be stopped, and all
THE world raay become guilty before God, Therefore by
the deeds of the law, there shall no flesh be justified in his
sight ; for by the law is the knowledge of sin. But now the
righteousness of God without the law, is manifest, being witr
nessed by the law and the prophets ; even the righteousness
of God, which is by faith of Jesus Christ, unto all, and upon
ALL thera that believe ; for there is no difference. For all
have sinned, and come short of the glory of God. Being jus
tified freely by his §race, through the redemption wjiich is irj
Jesus Christ,"
VOL. II. 5^

458 original sin, P. n- Ch. hi.
Here the thing which I would prove, viz. tha4 mankind in
their first state, before they are interested in the benefits of
Christ's rederaption, are universally wicked, is declared with
the utmost possible fulness and precision. So that if here this
matter be not set forth plainly, expressly, and fully, it raust be
because no words can do it, and it is not in the power of lan
guage, or any manner of terms and phrases, however contrived
and heaped up one upoii another, determinately to signify any
such thing.
Dr. T. to take off the force of the whole, would have u
to understand, (p. 104 — 107,) that these passages quoted from
the Psalms, and other parts of the Old Testaraent, do not
speak of all mankind, nor of all the Jews ; but only of them of
whom they were true. He observes, there were raany that were
innocent and righteous ; though there were also raany, a strong
party, that were wicked, corrupt, &c, of whora these texts were
to be understood. Concerning which I would observe the fol
lowing things :
1, According to this, the universality oi the terms in these
places which the apostle cites from the Old Testament, to
prove that all the world, both Jews and Gentiles, are under sin,
is nothing to his purpose. The apostle uses universal terms in
his proposition and in his conclusion, that all are under sin..
that EVERY MOUTH is stoppcd, ALL THE WORLD guilty, — that by
the deeds ofthe law no flesh can be justified. And he chooses
out a nuraber of universal sayings or clauses out of the Old
Testament, to confirra this universality; as. There is none
righteous; no, not one: They are all gone out of the way;
there is none that understandeth, <^c. But yet the universal
terms found in them have no reference to any such universality,
either in the collective or personal sense ; no universality of
the nations of the world, or of particular persons in those na
tions, or in any one nation in the world : " But only of those
of whom they are true .'" That is, there is none of them righte
ous, oi whom it is true, that they are not righteous ; no, not
one ; there is none that understandeth, of whora it is true, that
they understand not : they are all gone out ofthe way, of whom
it is true, that they are gone out of the way, &c. Or these ex
pressions are to be understood concerning that strong party in
Israel, in David's and Solomon's days, and in the prophets'
days ; they are to be understood of them universally. And what
is that to the apostle's purpose ? How does such an universality
of wickedness— that all were wicked in Israel, who were wicked ;
or, that there was a particular evil party, all of which were
wicked — confirm that universality which the apostle would
prove, viz. That all Jews and Gentiles, and the whole world,
were wicked, and every mouth stopped, and that n0 fiesh conld
beji|s^ifi«d by their owjEi righteousness. ' .

Sect, ii, froojsfrom nom. iii, 9 — .24. 459
Here nothing can be said to abate the nonsense, but this,
that the apostle would convince the Jews that they were
capable of being wicked, as well as other nations ; and to prove
it, he raentions sorae texts which shew that there was a wicked
party in Israel a thousand years ago. And as to the uni
versal terms which happened to be in these texts, the apostle
had no respect to them ; but his reciting them is as it were
accidental, they happened to be in some texts which speak of
an evil party in Israel, and the apostle cites them as they are,
not because they are any more to his purpose for the universal
terras which happen to be in them. But let the reader look
on the words of the apostle, and observe the violence of such
a supposition. Particularly let the words of the 9th and 10th
verses, and tlfeir connection, be observed. — All are under sin :
As it is written, there is none righteous : no, not one. How
plain is it, that the apostle cites that latter universal clause out
of the 14th Psalm, to confirm the preceding universal words of
his own proposition ? And yet it will follow from what Dr. T.
supposes, that the universality of the terms in the last words,
there is none righteous ; no, not one, hath no relation at all to
that universality he speaks of in the preceding clause, to which
they are joined, all are under sin: and is no more a confirma
tion of it, than if the words were thus, ' There are some or
there are many in Israel, that are not righteous.'
2, To suppose the apostle's design in citing these pas
sages was only to prove to the Jews, that of old there was. a
considerable number of their nation that were wicked men,
is to suppose hira to have gone about to prove what none of the
Jews denied, or made the least doubt of; even the Pharisees,
the raost self-righteous sect of thera, who went furthest in
glorying in the distinction of their nation from other nations
as a holy people, knew it, and owned it ; they openly confess
ed that their forefathers killed the prophets. Mat, xxiii, 29 —
31. And if the apostle's design had been only to refresh their
memories, to put them in mind of the ancient wickedness
of their nation, to lead to reflection on themselves as guilty of
the like wickedness, (as Stephen does. Acts vii.) what need
had he to go so far about to prove this — gathering up many
sentences here and there which prove, that their scriptures
speak of some as wicked men — and then to prove that the
wicked men spoken of must be Jews, by this argument, that what
things soever the law saith, it saith to them that are under the
law, or that whatsoever the books of the Old Testament said,
it must be understood of that people who had the Old Testa
ment ? What need had the apostle of such an ambages as
this, to prove to the Jews that there had been many of their
nation in past ages, which were wicked men ; when the Old
Testament was full of passages that asserted this expressly, not

460 original sin, P, n, Ch, nu
only of a strong party, but of the nation in general ? How
much more would it have been to such a purpose, to have put
them in mind of the wickedness of the people in general in
worshipping the -golden calf: of the unbelief, murmuring,
and perverseness of the whole congregation in the wilderness,
for forty years, as Stephen does ? Which things he had no
heed to prove to be spoken of their nation, by any such in
direct argument as this, " Whatsoever things the law saith, it
saith to them that are under the law."
3, It would have been impertinent to the apostle's pur
pose, even as our author understands his purpose, for hira to
have gone about to convince the Jews, that there had been a
strongparty of bad raen in the time oi David and Solomon, and
the prophets. For Dr, T, supposes, the apostle's aim is to
prove the great corruption of both'/etcs and Gentiles when
Christ came into the world,*
. In order the more fully to evade the clear and abundant
testimonies to the doctrine of Original Sin, contained in this
part of the holy scripture, our author says, the apostle is here
speaking of bodies of people, of Jews and Gentiles in a collec
tive sense, as two great bodies into which raankind are divid
ed ; speaking of them in their collective capacity, and not with
respect to particular persons ; that the apostle's design is to
prove, that neiiher of these two great bodies, in their collec
tive sense, can be justified by law, because both were corrupt ;
and so that no more is implied, than thatthe generality of both
were wicked,t On this I observe,
(1.) That this supposed sense disagrees extremely with
the terms and language which the apostle here makes use of
For according to this, we must understand either.
First, That the apostle means no universality at all, but
only the far greater part. But if the words which the apostle
uses do not most fully and determinately signify an univer
saUty, no words ever used in the bible are sufficient to do it.
I might challenge any man to produce any one paragraph in
the scripture, from the beginning to the end, where there is
such a repetition and accumulation of terms, so strongly and
emphatically and carefully, to express the most perfect and
absolute universality ; or any place to be compared to it.
What instance is there in the scripture, or indeed in any other
writing, when the meaning is only the much greater part,
where this meaning is signified in such a manner, They are
mil, — They are all, — They are all, — together, — every one,-^all
the world; joined to multiphed negative terms, to shew the
universality to be without exception ; saying. There is no
,, * See Key, § 307, 310. f Pa^e 102, 104. 117, 119, 120. and note On Rom.
Ili. lO— 19.

BacT, tl, Proo/s /rom Uo»i. iii. 9 — ^24. 461'
fiesh, — there is none,— 'there is none, — there is none,—^there is
none, four times over; besides the addition of No, not one, —
no, not one,— ^once and again ! — Or,
Secondly. If any universality at all be allowed, it is only
of the collective bodies spoken of; and these collective bodies
but two, as Dr. T. reckons them^ viz. the Jewish nation, and
the Gentile world ; supposing the apostle is here representing
each of these parts of mankind as being wicked. But is this
the way of men using language, when speaking of but two
things, to express themselves in such universal terms, when
they raean no more than that the thing affirraed is predicated
of both of thera ? If a man speaking of his two feet as both
. lame, should say, AZZ my feet are lame^—They are cdl lame — All
together are become weak — None of my feet are strong^-None
of them are sound — No, not one ; would not he be thought to
be lame in his understanding, as well as his feet ? When the
apostle says. That every mouth may be stopped, must we sup-
' pose, that he speaks only of these two great collective bodies,
figuratively ascribing to each of them a mouth, and raeans that
these two raonths are stopped ! Besides, according to our au
thor's own interpretation, the universal terras used in these texts,
cited from the Old Testament, have no respect to those two
great collective bodies, nor indeed to either of them ; but to
some in Israel, a particular disaffected party in that one nation,
which was made up of wicked men. So that his interpretation
is every way absurd and inconsistent,
(2,) If the apostle is speaking only of the wickedness or
giiilt of great collective bodies, then it will follow, that also
the justification he here treats of, is no other than the justifica
tion of such collective bodies. For they are the same of whora
he speaks as guilty and wicked, and who cannot he justified
by the works of the law, by reason of their being wicked.
Otherwise his arguraent is wholly disannulled. If the guilt
he speaks of be only of collective bodies, then what he argues
frora that guilt must be only, that collective bodies cannot be
justified by the works of the law, having no respect to the
justification of particular persons. And indeed this is Dr. T.'s
declared opinion. He supposes the apostle here, and in other
parts of this epistle, is speaking of men's justification con
sidered only as in their collective capacity.* But the con
trary is most raanifest. The 26th and 28th verses of this
third chapter, cannot, without the utraost violence, be under
stood otherwise than of the justification of particular persons.
" That he raight be just, and the justifier of him that believeth
in Jesus, — Therefore we conclude tha,t a man is justified by
faith, without the deeds of the law." So chap, iv, 5, " But to him-
* See note on Bom. iii. 10—19. Chap, v, 11. and Chap. ix. 30, 31.

462 ORIGINAL SIN, P, H, Ch. Ill,
that worketh not, but believeth on him that jusfifieth the ungod
ly, his faith is counted for righteousness." And what the apos
tle cites in the 6th, 7th and Sth verses from the book of Psalras
evidently shews, that he is speaking of the justification of
particular persons. " Even as David also describeth the bless
edness oithe man unto whora God imputeth righteousness with
out works, saying. Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiv
en, and whose sins are covered." David says these things in
the 32d Psalm, with a special respect to his own particular case ;
there expressing the great distress he was in while under a sense
of personal sin and guilt, and the great joy he had when God
forgave him.
And what can be plainer, than in the paragraph we have
been upon, (Rom, iii, 20,) it is the justification oi particular
persons of which the apostle speaks, " Therefore by the deeds
of the law there shall no flesh be justified in his sight." He
refers to Psal. cxliii, 2. " Enter not into judgraent with thy
servant ; for in thy sight shall no man living be justified," Here
the Psalmist is not speaking of the justification of a nation, as
a collective body, or of one of the two parts of the world, but
of a particular man. And it is further raanifest, that the apos
tle is here speaking of personal justification, inasmuch as this
place is evidently parallel with Gal, iii, 10, 11, "For as raany
as are of the works of the law, are under the curse : For it is
written. Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things
that are written in the book of the law to do them. But that
no man is justified by the works of the law, is evident ; for the
just shall live by faith," It is plain, that this place is parallel
with that in the 3d of Romans, not only as the thing asserted is
the same, and the argument by which it is proved — ^that all are
guilty, and exposed to condemnation by the law, — But the
same saying of the Old Testament is cited. (Gal. ii, 16.)
Many other things demonstrate, that the apostle is speaking of
the sarae justification in both places, which I omit for brevity's
sake. And besides all these things, our author's interpretation
makes the apostle's argument wholly void another way. The
apostle is speaking of a certain subject which cannot be justifi
ed by the works of the law ; and his arguraent is, that the
same subject is guilty, and is condemned by the law. If he
means that one subject, suppose a collective body or bodies,
cannot be justified by the law, because another subject, ano
ther collective body, is conderaned by the law, it is plain, the
argument would be quite vain and irapertinent. Yet thus the
argument must stand according to Dr, T,'s interpretation.
The collective bodies which he supposes are spoken of as
wicked, and conderaned by the law, considered as in their
collective capacity, are those two, the Jewish hation, and the

Sect. II. Proofs from Rom. iii, 9 — ^24. 4fj3
heathen world. But the collective body which he supposes
the apostle speaks of as justified without the deeds of the law,
is neither of these, but the christian church, or body of be
lievers ; which is a new collective body, a new creature, and
a new raan, (according to our author's understanding of such
phrases) which never had any existence before it was justified,
and therefore never was wicked or condemned, unless it was
with regard to the individuals of which it was constituted;
and it does not appear, according to our author's scheme, that
these individuals had before been generally wicked For ac
cording to him, there was a number both among the Jews and
GentUes, that were righteous before. And how does it ap
pear, but that the comparatively few Jews and GentUes, of
which this new-created collective body was constituted, were
ch iefly of the best of each ?
So that in every view, this author's way of explaining the
passage appears vain and absurd. And so clearly and fully has
the apostle expressed himself, that it is doubtless impossible
to invent any other sense to put upon his words, than that
which will imply that all mankind, even every individual of the
whole race, but their Redeeraer hiraself, are in their first origi
nal state corrupt and wicked.
Before I leave this passage, (Rora, iii. 9 — 24.) it may be
proper to observe, that it not only is a most clear and fiill
testimony to the native depravity of mankind, but also plainly
declares that natural depravity to be total and exceeding
great. It is the apostle's manifest design in these citations
from the Old Testaraent, to shew these three tilings, 1,
That all mankind are by nature corrupt. 2. That every one
is cdtogether corrupt, and as it were depraved in every part,
3, That they are in every part corrupt in an exceeding degree.
With respect to the second of these, it is plain the apostle
puts together those particular passages of the Old Testament,
wherein most of those merabers of the body are raentioned,
that are the soul's chief instruraents or organs • of external
action. The hands (implicitly) in those expressions. They are
together become unprofitable. There is none that doeth good.
The throat, tongue, lips, and mouth, the organs of speech, in
those words ; " Their throat is an open sepulchre : With their
tongues they have used deceit : The poison of asps is under
their lips ; whose mouth is full of cursing and bitterness."
The feet in those words, ver. 15, " Their feet are swift to shed
blood," These things together signify, that man is as it were
all over corrupt in every part. And not only is the total cor
ruption thus intimated by enumerating the several parts, but
also by denying all good ; any true understanding or spiritual
knowledge, any virtuous action, or so much as a truly virtuous
desire, or seeking after God, " There is none that understand-'

464 OBlftlBTAL SIS. P. II, Ch. III.
eth ; There is none that seeketh after God : There is none that
doeth good ; The way of peace have they not known." And
in general by denying all true piety or religion in men in their
first state, ver, 18. "There is no /ear of God before their
eyes."-^The expressions also are evidently chosen to denote
a raost extreme and desperate wickedness of heart. An ex
ceeding depravity is ascribed to every part : To the throat,
the scent of an open sepulchre ; to the tongue and lips, deceit,
and the poison of asps ; to the mouth, cursing and bitterness ;
of their feet it is said, they are swift to -shed blood : And with
regard to the whole man it is said, destruction and misery are
in their ways. The representation is very strong of each of
these things, viz. That all mankind are corrupt ; that every
one is wholly and altogether corrupt ; and also extremely and
desperately corrupt. And it is plain, it is not accidental that
we have here such a collection of such strong expressions, so
emphatically signifying these things ; but that they are chosen
of the apostle on design, as being directly and fully to his
purpose ; which purpose appears in all his discourse in the
whole of this chapter, and indeed from the beginning of the
epistle.

SECT, III,
Observations on Rom. v, 6 — 10, and Eph. ii, 3, with the Con
text, and Rom. vii.
Another passage of this apostle, which shews that all who
are raade partakers of the benefits of Christ's rederaption are
in their first state wicked, desperately wicked, is Rora. v.
6t— lo, " For when we were yet without strength, in due time
Christ died for the ungodly. For scarcely for a righteous man
will one die; yet peradventure for a good man, some would
even dare to die. But God comraendeth his love towards us,
in that while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us. Much
more then, being now justified by his blood, we shall be saved
from wrath through him. For if while we were enemies, we
were reconciled to God throiigh the death of his Son ; much
more, being reconciled, we shall be saved by his life, "-<-Here
all for whoni Christ died, and who are saved by him, are spoken
of as being in their first state sinners, ungodly, enemies to God,
exposed to divine wrath, and without strength, without ability
to help theraselves, or deliver their souls from this miserable
state, Dr, T, says, the apostle here speaks of the Gentiles only
in their heathen state, in contradistinction to the Jews ; and
*hat not of particular persons among the heathen Gentiles, ov

SijcT, III. Proofs from Rom. v. 6—10, 4^c, 405
as to the state they were in personally; but only of the Gen
tiles collectively taken, or of the miserable state of that great
collective body, the heathen world : And that these appella
tions, sinners. Ungodly, enemies, &.c. were names by which the
apostles in their writings were wont to signify and distinguish
the heathen world in opposition to the Jews ; and that in this
sense these appellations are to be taken in their epistles, and
in this place in particular.* And it is observable, that this way
of interpreting these phrases in the apostolic writings is be
come fashionable with raaliy late writers ; whereby they not
only evade several clear testimonies of the doctrine of original
sin, but make void great pari of the New Testament ; on which
account it deserves the more particular consideration.
It is allowed to have been long common and customary
among the Jews, especially the sect of the Pharisees, in their
pride and confidence in their privileges as the peculiar people
of God, to exalt theraselves exceedingly above other nations,
and greatly to despise the Gentiles, calling thera by such
naraes as sinners, enemies, dogs, &c. Themselves they ac
counted, in general (excepting the publicans, and the notori
ously profligate) as the friends, the specia\ favourites and child
ren of God ; because they were the children of Abrahara, were
circuracised, and had the law of Moses as their peculiar pri
vilege, and as a wall of partition between thera and the Gen
tiles. But it is very reraarkable, that a christian divine, who has
stiidied the New Testaraent, and the epistle to the Romans in
particular, so diligently as Dr, T, has done, should so strongly
imagine that the apostles of Jesus Christ countenance and
cherish these self-exalting, uncharitable dispositions and no
tions of the Jews which gave rise to such a custom, so far as
to fall in with that custom, and adopt that language of their
pride and conterapt ; and especially that the apostle Paul
should do it. It is a ijnost unreasonable iraagination on many
accounts. 1, The whole gospel dispensation is calculated entirely to
overthrow and abolish every thing to which this self-distin
guishing, self-exalting language of the Jews was owing, —
It was calculated wholly to exclude such boasting, and to
destroy the pride and self-righteousness which were the causes
of it. It was calculated to abolish the enmity, and break
down the partition wall between Jews and Gentiles, and of
twain to make one new man, so making peace : to destroy all
dispositions in nations and particular persons to despise one
another, or to say one to another, " stand by thyself, come not
near to me ; for I am holier than thou ;" and to establish the
* Page 114—120. See also Dr. T.'s Paraph, and notes on tJie plaire.
•VOL. II. 59

466 ORIGINAL SIN. P. If. Cm, HI.
contrary principles of humility, mutual esteem, honour and
love, and universal union, in the most firm and perfect man
ner. 2. Christ, when on earth, set himself, through the whole
course of his ministry, to militate against this pharasaical spi
rit, practice, and language of the Jews, by which they showed
so much conterapt of the Gentiles, Publicans, and such as
were openly lewd and vicious, and thus exalted theraselves
above them ; calling them sinners and enemies, and themselves
holy,' and God's children : not allowing the Gentile to be their
neighbour, &c. He condemned the Pharisees for not esteeming
themselves sinners as well as the Publicans ; trusting in them
selves that they were righteous, and despising others. He
militated against these things in his own treatment of some
Gentiles, Pubhcans, and others, whom they called sinners, and
in what he said on those occasions.*
He opposed these notions and manners of the Jews in his
parables,t and in his instructions to his disciples how to treat
the unbelieving JewsJ ; and in what he says to Nicodeinus
about the necessity of a new birth, even for the Jews, as v^ell
as the unclean Gentiles with regard to their proselyteisin, which
sorae of the Jews looked upon as a new birth. And in opposi
tion to their notions of their being the children of God, be
cause the children of Abraham, but the Gentiles by nature sin
ners and children of wrath, he tells thera that even they were
children of the devil §.
3. Though we should suppose the apostles not to have
been thoroughly brought off from such notions, manners, and
language of the Jews, till after Christ's ascension ; yet after the
pouring out of the spirit on the day of Pentecost, or at least
after the calling of the Gentiles, begun in the conversion of
Cornelius, they were fully instructed in this matter, and effectu
ally taught no longer to call the Gentiles unclean, as a note of
distinction frora the Jews, Acts x. 28, which was before any of
the apostolic epistles were written.
* Matth. viii. 5—13. Chap. ix. 9—13. Chap. xi. 19—24. Chap. xv. 21—
28. Luke vii. 37. to the end. Chap. xvii. 12 — 19. Chap. xix. 1 — 10. John iv.
9. &c. ver. 39, &c. Corapare Luke x. 29, &c.
t Matth. xxi. 28—32. Chap, xxii. 1—10. Luke xiv. 16—24. Compare
Luke xiii. 28, 29, 30.
t Matt. X. 14, 15. § John viii. 33,  44.
It may also be observed, that John the Baptist greatly contradicted the Jews'
opinion of themselves, as being a holy people and accepted of God, because they
were the children of Abraham — and on .that account better than the Heathen
whora they called sinners, enemies, unclean, &c. — in baptizing the Jews as a pol-
Med people, and sinners, as the Jews used to baptize proselytes from among the
Heathen; calUng them to repentance as sinners, saying, " Think not to say with-
ih yourselves, We have Abraham tb our father; for I say unto you, that Godis
able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraliam ;" and teaching the Phar
isees, that instead of their being a holy generation, and children of God, as they
a^ed tjlerosehe*, they were a genetatiim, of tipers.

Sect. iii. Proofs from Rom. v. 6 — 10, ^c. 467
4. Of all the apostles, none were more perfectly instruct
ed in this matter than Paul, and none so abundant in instruct
ing others in it, as this great apostle of the Gentiles. None of
the apostles had so much occasion to exert themselves against
the foreraentioned notions and language of the Jews, in oppo
sition to Jewish teachers and judaizing Christians who strove
to keep up the separation wall between Jews and Gentiles, and
to exalt the forraer and set at nought the latter.
5. This apostle, in his epistle to the Roraans, above all his
other writings, exerts hiraself in a raost elaborate raanner, and
with his utraost skill and power, to bring the Jewish Christians
off from every thing of this kind. He endeavours by all
means that there might no longer be in thera any reraains
of these old notions in which they had been educated, of such
a great distinction between Jews and Gentiles as were express
ed in the naraes they used to distinguish them by ; the Jews,
holy children of Abraham, friends and children of God; but
the Gentiles, sinners, unclean, enemies, and the like. He makes
it alraost his whole business, from the beginning of the epistle,
Rora. V. 6, ^c. to convince thera that there was no ground for
any such distinction, and to prove that in coraraon, both Jews
and Gentiles, all were desperately wicked, and none righteous,
no not one. He tells them, chap. iii. 9. that the Jews were by
no means better than the Gentiles ; and (in what follows in
that chapter) that there was no difference between Jews and
Gentiles ; and represents all as without strength, or any suffi
ciency of their own in the affair of justification and rederap
tion. And in the continuation of the same discourse, in the
4th chapter, he teaches that all who were justified by Christ
were in themselves ungodly ; and that being the children of
Abraham vvas not peculiar to the Jews. In this 5th chap, still
in continuation of the same discourse — on the same subject and
argument of justification through Christ, and by faith in him —
he speaks of Christ dying for the ungodly and sinners ; and
those who were without strength or sufficiency for their own
salvation, as he had done all along before. But now, it seeras,
the apostle by sinners and ungodly, raust not be understood ac
cording as he used these words before ; but raust be supposed
to mean only the Gentiles as distinguished from the Jews ; adop
ting the language of those self-righteous, self-exalting, disdain
ful Judaizing teachers, whom he was with all his might oppos
ing : countenancing the very same thing in them, which he had
been from the beginning of the epistle discountenancing, and
endeavouring to discourage, and utterly to abohsh, with all his
art and strength.
One reason why the Jews looked on themselves better than
the Gentiles, and called themselves holy, and the Gentiles
sinners, was, that they had the law of Moses. They made

468 Original sin- P. n. Cii. iiti
their boast of the law. But the apostle shews theinj that this
was so far from making them better, that it condemned theiQi
and was ari occasion of their being sinners in a higher degreej
and more aggravated manner, and more effectually and dread"
fiilly dead in sin*.
It cannot be justly objected here, that this apostle did
in fact use this language, and call the Gentiles sinners in con»
tradistinction to the Jews, in what he said to Peter, Gal, ii.
16, 16. " We who are Jews by nature, and not sinners oi the
Gentiles, knowing that a man is not justified by the works of
the law, but by faith in Jesus Christ." It is true that the apostle
here refers to this distinction, as what was usually made by
the self-righteous Jews., betvveen themselves and the Gentiles ;
but not in such a manner as to adopt or favour it ; but on the
contrary, so as plainly to shew his disapprobation of it ; q. d.
' Though we were born Jews, and by nature are of that people
which are wont to make their boast of the law, expecting to
be justified by it, and trust in themselves that they are righ
teous, despising others, calling the Gentiles sinners, in dis
tinction from themselves ; yet We being now instructed in the
gospel of Christ, know better ; we now know that a raan is not
justified by the works of the law ; that we are all justified on
ly by faith in Christ, in whora there is no difference, no dis
tinction of Greek or Gentile, and Jew, but all are one in
Christ Jesus.' And this is the very thing he there speaks of,
which he blamed Peter for ; that by his withdrawing and se
parating himself from the Gentiles, refusing to eat with thera;
&c, he had countenanced . this self exalting, self-distinguish
ing, separating spirit and custom of the Jews, whereby they
treated the Gentiles as in a distinguishing manner sinners
and unclean, and not fit to come near thera who were a holy
people. 6. The very words of the apostle in this place shew plain
ly, that he uses the term sinners, not as signifying Gentiles, in
opposition to Jews, but as denoting the morally evil, in opposi
tion to such as are righteous or good. This latter distinctifiBi
between sinners and righteous is here expressed in plain
terms. " Scarcely for a righteous man will one die ; yet per
adventure for a good man some would even dare to die ; but
God commended his love towards us, in that while we were
yet sinners, Christ died for us." By righteous men are doubt
less meant the same that are meant by such a phrase through
out this apostle's writings, throughout the New Testaraent,
and throughout the Bible. Will any one pretend, that by the
righteous man, for whom men would scarcely die, and by the
good man, for whom perhaps some might even, dare to die, is
* Sae Chap, vii. 1 — 13. agrfceably to those words of Christ, John v. 45.

Sect. hi. Proofs from Rom. v. 6 — 10, ^c, 469
meant a Jew? Dr, T, himself does not explain it so, in his ex*
position of this epistle ; and therefore is not very consistent
with himself, in supposing that in the other part of the dis
tinction the apostle means Gentiles, as distinguished from the
Jews, The apostle himseff had been labouring abundantly
in the preceding part of the epistle, to prove that the Jews
were sinners in opposition to righteous ; that all had sinned,
that all were under sin, and therefore could not be justified,
could not be accepted as righteous, by their own righteous
ness, 7. Another thing which makes it evident that the apostle,
when he speaks in this place of the sinners and enemies for
whom Christ died, does not mean only the Gentiles, is, that he
includes himself among them, saying, while we were sinners,
and when we were enemies.
Our author from time to time says, the apostle, though he
speaks only of the Gentiles in their heathen state, yet puts him
self with them, because he was the apostle of the Gentiles.
But this is very unreasonable. There is no raore sense in it,
than there would be in a father ranking himself among his
children, when speaking to his children of the benefits they
have by being begotten by himself; and saying, We chil'
dren. Or in a physician ranking himself with his patients,
when talking to them of their diseases and cure ; saying. We
sick folks. Paul being the apostle of the Gentiles to save
thera from their heathenism, is so far from being a reason for
him to reckon himself among the heathen, that on the con
trary, it is the very thing that would render it in a pecu
liar manner unnatural and absurd for him so to do. Because,
as the apostle of the Gentiles, he appears as their healer and
deliverer from heathenism ; and therefore in that capacity, in
a pecuhar manner, appears in his distinction from the heathen,
and in opposition to the state of heathenism. For it is by the
most opposite qualities only, that he is fitted to be an apostle
of the heathen, and recoverer from heathenism. As the clear
light of the sun is what makes it a proper restorative from
darkness ; and therefore, the sun being spoken of as such a
remedy, none would suppose to be a good reason why it should
be ranked among dark things. Besides, the apostle, in this
epistle, expressly ranks himself with the Jews, when he speaks
of them as distinguished from the Gentiles ; as in Chap, iii. 9,
What then ? are we better than they ? That is, are we Jews
better than the Gentiles ?
It cannot justly be alleged in opposition to this, that the
apostle Peter puts himself with the heathen, 1 Pet. iv, 3, "For
the time past of our life raay suffice us to have wrought the will
of the Gentiles ; when we walked in lasciviousness, lusts, excess
of wine, revellings, banquetings, and abominable idolatries.''

470 ORIGINAL SIN. P. II, Ch, III.
For the apostle Peter (who by the way was not an apostle of the
Gentiles) here does not speak of himself as one of the heathen,
but as one of the church of Christ in general, made up of those
who had been Jews, proselytes, and heathens, who were now
all one body, of which body he was a meraber. It is this
society therefore, and not the Gentiles, that he refers to in the
pronoun us. He is speaking of the wickedness that the mem
bers of this body or society had lived in before their conver
sion ; not that every member had hved in all those vices here
mentioned, but some in one, others in another. Yery parallel
is the passage with that of the apostle Paul to Titus, Chap.
iii, 3, " For we ourselves also (i, e, we of the christian church)
were sometimes foolish, disobedient, deceived, serving divers
lusts and pleasures, (some, one lust and pleasure, others an
other) living in malice, envy, hateful and hating one another,"
&c. There is nothing in this but what is very natural. That
tbe apostle spealung to the christian church, and of that
church, confessing its former sins, should speak of himself
as one of that society, and yet mention sorae sins that he per
sonally had not been guilty of, and among others, heathenish
idolatry, is quite a different thing from what it would have
been for the apostle, expressly distinguishing those of the chris
tians which had been heathen, from those which had been Jews,
to have ranked himself with the former, though he was truly of
the latter. If a minister in some congregation in England, speaking
in a sermon of the sins of the nation, being himself of the na
tion, should say, ' We have greatly corrupted ourselves, and
provoked God by our deism, blasphemy, profane swearing, las
civiousness, venality,' &c. speaking in the first person plural,
though he himself never had been a deist, and perhaps none of
his hearers, and they might also have been generally free from
other sins he mentioned ; yet there would be nothing unnatu
ral in his thus expressing himself But it would be quite a
different thing, if one part of the British dominions, suppose
our king's American dominions, had universally apostatized
from Christianity to deism, and had long been in such a state,
and if one who had been born and brought up in England
araong christians, the country being universally christian, should
be sent among thera to shew thera the folly and great evil of
deism, and convert them to Christianity ; and this missionary,
when making a distinction between English christians, and
these deists, should rank himself the latter, and say, we Araeri
can deists, WE foolish blind infidels, &c. This indeed would be
very unnatural and absurd.
Another passage of the apostle, to the like purpose with
that which we have been considering in the 5th of Romans,
is that in Eph, ii, 3. — " And were by nature children of wrath,

Sect. iii. Proofs from Rom. v. 6 — 10, &c. 471
even as others." This remains a plain testimony to the doc
trine of original sin, as held by those who used to be called
orthodox christians, after all the pains and art used to torture
and pervert it. This doctrine is here not only plainly and ful
ly taught, but abundantly so, if we take the words with the
context; where christians are once and again represented as
being, in their first state, dead in sin, and as quickened and
raised up, from such a state of death, in a most marvellous dis
play of free rich grace and love, and exceeding greatness of
God's power, &-c.
With respect to those words (¦*i|*sv Tsxva (purfsi ojyijg,) We were
by nature children of wrath. Dr. T. says, (p. 112 — 114.) " The
apostle means no more by this, than truly or really children of
wraih ; using a metaphorical expression, borrowed from the
word that is used to signify a true and genuine child of a fami
ly, in. distinction from one that ia a child only by adoption."
In which it is owned, that the proper sense of the phrase is,
being a child by nature, in the same sense as a child by birth
or natural generation : but only he supposes that here the
word is used metaphorically. The instance he produces as pa
rallel, to confirm his supposed metaphorical sense of the
phrase as meaning only truly, really, or properly children of
wrath, viz. the apostle Paul's calling Timothy his own son in the
faith, {yrnidm tsxvov) is so far from confirming his sense, that it
is rather directly against it. For doubtless the apostle uses the
word here {yvriim) in its original signification, meaning his
begotten son ; yv-ndt^ being the adjective from yov*], offspring, or
the verb, /swaw, to beget ; as much as to say, Timothy my begot
ten son in the faith. For as there are two ways of being begot
ten, one natural, and the other spiritual ; the first generation,
and regeneration ; so the apostle expressly signifies which of
these he raeans in this place, Timothy my begotten son in the
FAITH, in the same manner as he says to the Corinthians, 1 Cor,
iv. 15. " In Christ Jesus I have begotten you through the gos
pel." To say, the apostle uses the word, ipuirsi, in Eph, h, 3
only as signifying real, true, and proper, is a most arbitrary in
terprctation, halving nothing to warrant it in the whole bible
The word ipufis is no where used in this sense in the New Tes
tara ent,* Another thing which our author alleges to evade the force
of this, is, that the word rendered nature sometimes signifies
habit contracted by custom, or an acquired nature. But this is
not its proper meaning. And it is plain, the word in its cora
raon use, in the New Testament, signifies what we properly
* The following are all the other places, where the word is used, Rom. i. 26.
and ii. 14. and ver. 27. and xi. 21. and ver. 24. thrice in that verse, 1 Cor. xi. 14
Gal. ii, 15. andiv. 8. Jam. iii. 7. twice in that verse, and 2 Pet. i, 4.

4T2 ORIGINAL SIN, P. II. Ch. iu.
express in English by the word nature. There is but one
place where there can be the least pretext for supposing it to
be used otherwise ; and that is 1 Cbr. xi. 14. Doth not even
nature itself teach you, that if a man have long hair, it is a shame
unto him? And even here there is, I think, no manner of
reason for understanding nature otherwise than in the proper
sense. The emphasis used (aurv) '/\ (putfis,) nature itself, shews
that the apostle does not mean custom, but nature in the proper
sense. It is true, it was long custom which made having the
head covered a token of subjection, and a feminine appear
ance ; as it is custom that makes any outward action or word a
sign or signification of any thing. But nature itself, nature in
its proper sense, teaches, that it is a shame for a man tp appear
with the established sign ofthe female sex, and with significa
tions of inferiority, &:c. As nature itself shews it to be a fehame
for a father to bow down or kneel to his own child or servant,
Or for men to bow to an idol, because bowing down is by cus
tom an established token or sign of subjection and submissioil;
Such a sight therefore would be unnatural, shocking to a man's
very nature. So nature would teach, that it is a shame for a
woman to use such and such lascivious words or gestures^
though it be a custora that establishes the unclean signification
ofthose gestures and sounds.
It is particularly unnatural and unreasonable to understand
the phrase, (rsxva (puirsi,) in this place, any otherwise than in
the proper sense, on the following accounts. 1. It may be
observed, that both the words texvb and iputfiff, in their original
signification, have reference to birth or generation. So the
word ^utfiff, from ipuu, which signifies to beget or bring forth
young, or to bud forth, as a plant that brings forth young buds
and branches. And so the word texvov comes from tixtw, which
signifies to bring forth children.— ^2, As though the apostle took
care by the word used here to signify what we are by birth,
be changes the word he used before for children. In the pre
ceding verse he used uioi, speaking of the children of disobe
dience ; but here rsma, which is a word derived, as observed,
from rwTw to bring forth a child, and more properly signifies a
begotten or born child. — 3, It is natural to suppose that the
apostle here speaks in opposition to the pride of some, especi
ally the Jews, (for the church in Ephesus was mady up partly
of Jews, as well as the church in Rome) who exalted themselves
in the privileges they had by birth, because they were born the
children of Abraham, and were Jews by nature, ipufa Ix^aioi,
as the phrase is. Gal, ii, 15, In opposition to this proud con
ceit, he teaches the Jews, that notwithstanding this they were
by nature children of wrath, even as others, i. e, as well as the
Gentiles, which the Jews had been taught to look upon as
sinners, and out of favour with God by nature, aud born chih

Sect. hi. Proofs from Rom. v. 6. — 10, ^c. 473
dren of wrath. — 4. It is more plain that the apostle uses the
word nature in its proper sense here, because he sets what they
were by nature, in opposition to what they are by grace. In
this verse the apostle shews what they are by nature, viz.
children of wrath ; and in the following verses he shews how
very different their state is by grace ; saying, ver. 5. By grace
ye are saved ; repeating it again ver. 8, By grace ye are saved.
But if by being children of wrath by nature, were raeant no
more than only their being really and truly children of wrath,
as Dr, T, supposes, there would be no opposition in the signifi
cation of these phrases ; for in this sense they were by nature
in a state of salvation, as ranch as by nature children of wrath ;
for they were trul-y, really, and properly in a state of .salva
tion. If we take these words with the context, the whole abun
dantly proves that by nature we are totally corrupt, without
any good thing in us. For if we allow the plain scope of the
place, without attempting to hide it by doing extreme violence
to the apostle's words, the design here is strongly to establish
this point ; That what christians have that is good in thera, or
in their state, is in no part ofit naturally in themselves or from
theraselves, but is wholly from divine grace, all the gift of God
and Ais workmanship, the efiect of his power, his free and won
derful love. None oi onr good works are primarily frora ourselves,
but with respect to thera all, we are God's workmanship, created
unto good works, as it were out of nothing. Not so much as faith
itself, the first principle of good works in christians, is of them
selves, but thatis the gift of God. Therefore the apostle compares
the work of God in forming christians to true virtue and holiness,
not only to a new creation, but a resurrection, or raising frora the
dead. ver. 1. "You hath he quickened, who were dead in trespass
es andsins." And again, ver. 5. "Even when we were deadinsins,
hath quickened us together with Christ ." In speaking of Chris
tians being quickened with Christ, the apostle has reference to
what he had said before, in the latter part of the foregoing chap.
of God manifesting the exceeding greatness of his power towards
Christian converts in their conversion, agreeable to the operation
of his mighty power When he raised Christ from tlie dead. So
that it is plain by every thing in this discourse, the apostle
would signify, that by nature we -have no goodness ; but are as
destitute of it as a dead corpse is of life. And that all good
ness, all good works, and faith the principle of all, are perfect
ly the gift of God's grace, and the work of his great, almighty,
and exceeding excellent power, I think, there can be need of
nothing but reading the chapter and minding what is read, to
convince all who have common understanding of this ; what
ever any of the most subtle critics have done, or ever can do,
yoL. II. 60

474 ORIGINAL SlJf. P. II. Ch, hi.
to twist, rack, perplex, and pervert the words and phrases here
used, Dr, T, here again insists, that the apostle speaks only of
the gentiles in their heathen state, when he speaks of those
that were dead in sin, and by nature children of wrath ; and
that though he seems to include himself among those, saying,
WE were by nature children of wrath, we were dead in sins ;
yet he only puts himself among them because he was the apos
tle of the Gentiles. The gross absurdity of this may appear
from what was said before. But besides the things which have
been already observed, there are some things which make it pe
culiarly unreasonable to understand it so here. It is true, the
greater part of the church of Ephesus had been heathens, and
therefore the apostle often has reference to their heathen state,
in this epistle. But the words in this chap, ii, 3, plainly shew,
that he raeans himself and other Jews in distinction from the
Gentiles; ior the distinction is fully expressed. After he had
told the Ephesians, who had been generally heathen, that they
had been dead in sin, and had walked according to the course
of this worid, &c. (ver, 1 and 2,) he makes a distinction, and
says, " among whom we also had our conversation," &c, " and
were by nature children of wrath, even as others." Here first
he changes the person ; whereas before he had spoken in the
second person, " ye were dead — ye in time past walked," &c.
now he changes style, and uses the first person in a most ma
nifest distinction, among whom we also, that is, we Jews, as
well as ye Gentiles : not only changing the person, but adding
a particle of distinction also ; which would be nonsense, if he
meant the same without distinction. And besides all this,
more fully to express the distinction the apostle further adds a
pronoun of distinction ; " we also, even as others," or we as
well as others : Most evidently having respect to the notion
so generally entertained by the Jews, of their being much bet
ter than the Gentiles, in being Jews by nature, children of
Abraham, and children of God ; when they supposed the
Gentiles to be utterly cast off, as born aliens, and by nature
children of wrath : In opposition to this, the apostle says,
'We Jews, after all our glorying in our distinction, were by na
ture children of wrath, as well as the resi of the world.' And
a yet further evidence that the apostle here means to include
the Jews, and even hiraself, is the universal terra he uses.
Among whom also we all had our conversation, &c. Though
wickedness was supposed by the Jews to be the course of this
world, as to the generality of mankind, yet they supposed
themselves an exempt people, at least the Pharisees, and the
devout observers of the law of Moses and traditions of the el
ders ; whatever might be thought of publicans and harlots.
But in opposition to this, the apostle asserts that they all were

Sect. m. Proofs from Rom. v. 6—10, ^-c. 475
no better by nature than others, but were to be reckoned
among the children of disobedience, and children of wrath.
Besides, if the apostle chooses to put^ himself among the
Gentiles, because he was the apostle of the Gentiles, I would
ask, why does he not do so in the llth verse of the same chap
ter, where he speaks of the gentile state expressly ? Remem
ber that YE being in time past Gentiles in the flesh. Why does
he here make a distinction between the Gentiles and himself?
Why did he not say, Let ms remember, that we being in time
past Gentiles ? And why does the same apostle, even universally,
make the same distinction, speaking either in the second or
tliird person, and never in the first, where he expressly speaks
of the gentilisra of those to whom he wrote, or of whom he
speaks, with reference to their distinction from the Jews ? So
every where in this same epistle ; as in chap, i. 12, 13, where
the distinction is made just in the sarae manner as here, by the
change of the person, and by the distinguishing particle also :
That WE should be to the praise of his glory who flrst trusted in
Christ, (the first believers in Christ being of the Jews, before
the Gentiles were called) in whom ye also trusted, after that
ye heard ihe word of truth, ihe gospel of your salvation. And
in all the following part of this second chapter, as ver, 11, 17,
19, and 22, in which last verse the sarae distinguishing oarticle
again is used ; In whom ye also are builded togetherfor an
habitation of God through the spirit*
Though I ara far from thinking our author's exposition of
the viith chap, of Romans to be in any wise agreeable to the
true sense of the apostle, yet it is needless here to stand par
ticularly to examine it ; because the doctrine of original sin
may be argued not the less strongly, though we should allow
the thing wherein he mainly differs from such as he opposes in
his interpretation, viz. That the apostle does not speak in his
own name, or to represent the state of a true Christian, but as
representing the state of the Jews under the law. For even
on this supposition, the drift of the place will prove, that every
-one who is under the law, and with equal reason every one of
raankind, is carnal, sold under sin, in his first state, and till de
livered by Christ, For it is plain, that the apostle's design is to
shew the insufficiency of the law to give life to any one whatso
ever. This appears by what he says when he comes to draw
his conclusion, in the continuation of this discourse ; chap. viii.
3. t For what the law could not do in ihat it was weakthrough
* See also the following chapters, chap. iii.t6. and iv. 17. And not only in this
epistle, but constantly in other epistles ; as Rom. i. 12, 13, chap. xi. 13, 14, 17,18,
19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 30, 31i chap. xv. IS, 16. 1 Gov. xii. 2 Ga:l. iv. 8.
Col i. 27. chap. ii. 13. 1 Thess. i. 5, 6, 9. chap. ii. 13, 14, 15, 16.
1 Dr. T. hiraself reckons this a part of the same diScourae or 'paragraph, in
the division he makes of the epistle, in bis paraphrase, and nofes upon it.

476 oftiGiNAL SIN. P. II. Ch, iv.
theflesh : God sending his own son, &c. Our author supposes
what is here spoken of, viz. " that the law cannot give life be
cause it is weak through the flesh," is true with respect to every
one of mankind*. And when the apostle gives this reason, in that
it is weak through the flesh, it is plain that by the flesh, which
here he opposes to the spirit, he means the sarae thing which
in the preceding part of the same discourse, in the foregoing
chapter, he had called by the name flesh, ver. 5, 14, 18. and
the law ofthe members, ver. 23. and ihe body of death, ver. 24.
This is what, through this chapter, he insists on as the grand
hindrance why the law could not give life ; just as he does in
his conclusion, chap viii. 3. Which, in his last place is given
as a reason why the law cannot give life to any of mankind.
And it being the same reason oi the same thing, spoken of in
the same discourse, in the former part of it — this last place be
ing the conclusion, of which that former part is the premises —
and inasmuch as the reason there given is being in the flesh,
and being carnal, sold under sin : Therefore, taking the whole
of the apostle's discourse, this is justly understood to be a rea
son why the law cannot give life to any oi mankind ; and con
sequently, that all mankind are in theflesh and are carnal, sold
under sin, and so remain till delivered by Christ : And conse
quently, all mankind in their first original state are very sinful ;
which wfes the thing to be proved.

CHAP. IV.
Containing Observations on Rom. v. 12. to the End.
SECT. I.
Remarks on Dr. T.'s way of explaining this Text.
The following things are worthy of notice, concerning our
author's exposition of this remarkable passage.
I. He greatly insists, that by death in this place no more is
meant, than that death which we all die, when this present life
is extinguished and the body returns to the dust. That no
more is raeant in the 12, 14, 15, and 17th verses (P. 27.) he de
clares a,s evidently, clearly, and infallibly so, because the apos
tle is still discoursing on the same subject; plainly implying,
that infallibly the apostle means no more by death, throughout
this paragraph on the subject. But as infallible as this is, if we
* See note on Rom. v. 20.

Sect. i. Remarks on Rom. v. 12, <^c. 477
believe what Dr. T. says elsewhere, it must needs be otherwise :
for, (p. 120. S.) speaking of those words in Rom. vi. 23. TAe
wages of sin is death, but the gift of God is eternal life,
through Jesus Christ our Lord, he says, " Death in this place
is widely different from the death we now die ; as it stands there
opposed to eternal life, which is the gift of God through Jesus
Christ, it manifestly signifies eternal death, the second death, or
that death which they shall hereafter die, who live after the flesh."
But the death, (in the conclusion of the paragraph we are upon)
that comes by Adam and the hfe that comes by Christ, (in the last
verse of the chapter,) is opposed to eternal hfe just in the same
raanner as in the last verse of the next chapter : " That as sin
has reigned unto death, even so might grace reign through righte
ousness unto eternal life, by Jesus Christ our Lord." So that
by our author's own arguraent, death in <Ais place also, is man
ifestly widely different from the death we now die, as it stands
here opposed to eternal life through Jesus Christ ; and signifies
eternal death, the second death. And yet this is a part of the
same discourse, begun in the 12th verse ; as reckoned by Dr.
T. hiraself in his division of paragraphs, in his paraphrase and
notes on the epistle. So that if we follow him, and admit
his reasonings in the various parts of his book, here is manifest
proof against infallible evidence 1 So that it is true, the apostle
throughout this whole passage on the same subject, by death,
evidently, clearly, and infaUibly means no more than ihat death
we now die, when ihis life is extinguished ; and yet by death,
in some part of this passage, is meant something widely different
from the death we now die — manifestly eternal death, the second
death. But had our author been more consistent with himself, in
laying it down as certain and infallible, that because the apos
tle has a special respect to temporal death in the 14th verse
" Death reigned from Adam to Moses," therefore he means no
raore in the several consequent parts of this passage, yet he is
doubtless too confident and positive in this matter. This is
no more evident, clear, and infallible, than that Christ meant
by perishing — in Luke xiii. 5. when he says, " I tell you. Nay,
but except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish" — no more
than such a temporal death as came on those who died by the
fall of the tower of Siloam, spoken of in the preceding words
of the same speech ; and no more infallible, than that by life,
Christ raeans no more than this temporal life, in each part of
that one sentence — Matth. x. 39. " He that findeth his life shall
lose it ; and he that loseth his life for my sake shall find ii" — be
cause in the first part of each clause he has respect especially
to temporal life :*
* There are many places parallel with these, as John xi. 25, 26. " I am the
resurrection, and the life : He that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall

478 omGiKAL SIN. p. II. Ch. hi.
The truth of the case, with respect to what the apostle
here intends by the word death, is this, viz. The whole of that
death which he, and the scripture every where, speaks of as
the proper wages and punishraent of sin, including death
temporal, spiritual, and eternal ; though in some parts of this
discourse he has a more special respect to one part of this
whole, in others to another, as his argument leads him ; with
out any more variation than is quite coraraon in the same dis
course. That life which the scripture speaks of as the reward
of righteousness, is a whole containing several parts, viz. The
life of the body, union of soul and body, and the most perfect
sensibility, activity, and felicity of both, which is the chief thing.
In like manner the death which the scripture speaks of as the
punishnient of sin, is a whole including the death of the body
and the death of the soul, and the eternal, sensible, perfect
destruction and misery of both. It is this latter whole that the
apostle speaks of by the name of death in this discourse, in
Rom, V, though in sorae sentences he has a more special respect
to one part, in others to another : And this, without changing
the signification of the word. For having respect to several
things included in the extensive signification of the word, is
not the same thing as using the word in several distinct signifi
cations. As for instance, the appellative, man, or the proper
name of any particular man is the narae of a whole, including
the different parts of soul and body. And if any one in speak
ing of James or John, should say, he was a wise man, and a
beautiful man; in the forraer part of the sentence, respect
would be had more especially to his soul, in the latter to his
body, in the word man : But yet without any proper change of
the signification of the name to distinct senses. In John xxi,
7. it is said, Peter was naked, and in the following part of the
same story it is said, Peier was grieved. In the former propo
sition, respect is had especially to his body, in the latter to his
soul : But yet here is no proper change of the meaning of the
name, Peter. And as to the apostle's use of the word death in
the passage now under consideration, on the supposition that
he in general means the whole of that death which is the wages
of sin, there is nothing but what is perfectly natural in sup-
he live ; And whosoever liveth, and believeth in me, shall never die." Here both
the words, life and death, are used with this variation ; / am the resv/rrection and
the life, meaning spiritual and eternal life : He that believeth inme, though he were
dead, having respect to temporal death, -yet shall he live, with respect to spiritual
life, and the restoration ofthe life of the body. ,9.nd whosoever liveth and believeth in
me, shall never die, meaning a spiritual and eternal death. So in John vi. 49, 50.
Your fathers did eat -manna in the JVilaerness, and aie dead, having respect chiefly to
temporal death. This is the bread which cometh down from heaven, that a -inan -may
eat thereof, and not die, i. e. by the loss of spiritual life, and by eternal death. (See
also ver. 58.) And in the next verse, If an-y man eai of this bread, he shall live for ever,
have eternal life. So ver. 54. See another like instance, John v. 34r— 29.

Sect. i. Remarks on JJo»n, v, 12, ^c, 479
posing that — in order to evince that death, the proper punish
ment of sin, comes on all mankind in consequence of Adam's
sin — he should take notice of that part of this punishment
which is visible in this world, and which every body therefore
sees does in fact corae on all mankind, (as in ver. 14.) And is
it not equally natural from thence to infer, that all mankind
are exposed to the whole of that death which is the proper
punishment of sin, whereof temporal death is a part, and a
visible iraage of the whole, and (unless changed by divine grace)
an introduction to the principal, and infinitely the most dread
ful part ?
II, Dr, T,'s explanation of this passage makes wholly in
significant those first words. By one man sin entered into the
world, and leaves this proposition without any sense at all.
The apostle had been largely and elaborately representing h w
the whole world was full of sin, both among Jews and Gentiles,
and all exposed to death and condemnation. It is plain that
in these words he would tell us how this came to pass, naraely,
that the sorrowful event came by one man, even the first man.
That the world was full of sin, and full of death, were two
great and notorious facts, deeply affecting the interests of
mankind ; and they seemed very wonderful facts, drawing the
attention of the more thinking part of raankind every where,
who often asked this question. Whence comes evil, raoral and
natural evil ? It is manifest the apostle here means to tell us,
how these came into the world, and came to prevail in it as
they do. But all that is meant, according to Dr. T.'s interpre
tation, is " He begun transgression."* As if all that the
apostle meant was to tell us who happened to sin first ;
not how such a malady came upon the world, or how any
one in the world, besides Adam himself, came by such a dis
temper. The words of the apostle. By one man sin entered
into the world, and death by sin, shew the design to be,
to tell us how these evils came, as affecting the state of the
world; and not only as reaching one man in the world.
If this were not plain enough in itself, the words immediately
following demonstrate it ; " And so death passed upon all men,
for that all have sinned." By sin being in the world, the apos
tle does not mean being in the world only in that one instance
oi Adara's first transgression, but being abroad in the world,
araong the inhabitants of the earth, in a wide extent, and con
tinued series of wickedness ; as is plain in the first words of
the next verse. For until the law, sin was in the world.
And therefore when he gives us an account how it came to
be in the world, or, which is the same thiAg, how it entered
into the world, he does not raean only coming in one in
stance. * Page 56.

480 ORIGINAL SIN. P. H. Ch. IV.
If the case were as Dr. T. represents, that the sin of
Adara, either in its pollution or punishment, reached none but
himself, any more than the sin of any other man, it would be
no more proper to say that by one man sin entered into the
world, than if — were it inquired how mankind carae into
America, and there had anciently been a ship of the Pheni-
cians wrecked at sea, and a single man of the crew was driven
on this continent, and here died as soon as he reached the
shore — ^it should be said. By that one man mankind came into
America. Besides, it is not true that by one man, or by Adam, sin
entered into the world, in Dr. T.'s sense : For it was not he
but Eve, that began transgression. By one man Dr. T. under
stands Adam as the figure of Christ. And it is plain that it
was for Ais transgression, and not Eve's, that the sentence of
death was pronounced on mankind after the fall. Gen. iii. 19.
It appears unreasonable to suppose the apostle means to include
Eve when he speaks of Adam ; for he lays great stress on it,
that it was by one, repeating it several times.
Ill, In like manner this author brings to nothing the sense
of the causal particles, in such phrases as these, so often re
peated, " Death by sin, ver. 12. If through the offence of one
many be dead, ver. 15. By one that sinned — judgment was by
one to condemnation, ver. 16. By one man's offence, death
reigned By one, ver. 17. By the offence of one, judgment came
upon all, &.C. ver. 18, By one man's disobedience," ver, 19,
These causal particles, so variously repeated, unless we make
mere nonsense of the discourse, signify some connection and
dependence, by some sort of influence of that sin of one man,
or some tendency to that effect which is so often said to come
BY it. But according to Dr. T, there can be no real depen
dence or influence in the case, of any sort whatsoever. There
is no connection by any natural influence of that one act to
make all mankind mortal. Our author does not pretend to
account for this effect in any such manner, but in another raost
diverse, viz. A gracious act of God, laying mankind under af
fliction, toil, and death, from special favour and kindness.
Nor can there be any dependence of this effect on that trans
gression of Adam, by any moral influence, as deserving such
a consequence, or exposing to it on any moral account : For
he supposes that mankind are not in this way exposed to the
least degree of evil. Nor has this effect any Ze^aZ dependence
on that sin, or any connection by virtue of any antecedent
constitution which God had established with Adam : For he
insists, that in thM threatening. In the day thou eatest thou
shalt die, there is not a word said of his posterity ; (p, 8,) And
death on mankind according to him, cannot corae by virtue
of that legal constitution with Adara ; because the sentence

Sect. i. Remarks on Rom. v. 12, ^c. 481
by which it came was after the annulling and abolishing that
constitution; (p. 113. S.) And it is manifest that this con
sequence cannot be through any kind of tendency of that sin
to such an effect ; because the effect comes only as a benefit,
and is the fruit of mere favour : But sin has no tendency, either
natural or moral, to beneflts, and divine favours. And thus
that sin of Adam could neither be the efficient cause, nor the
procMrin^ cause ; neither the natural, moral, nor legal caase;
nor an exciting and moving cause, any more than Adam's eat
ing of any other tree of the garden. And the only real rela
tion that the effect can have to that Sin, is a relation as to time,
viz. that it is after it. And when the matter is closely examin
ed, the whole amounts to no more than this, that God is pleased,
of his mere good will and pleasure, to bestow a greater fa
vour upon us ^han he did upon Adam in innocency, after that
sin of his eating the forbidden fruit ; which sin we are no more
concerned in, than in the sin ofthe king of Pegu, or the emperor
of China. IV. It is altogetlier inconsistent with the apostle's scope,
and the import of what he says, to suppose that the death of
which he here speaks as coming on mankind by Adam's sin,
comes not as apunishment, but only as a favour. It quite makes
void the opposition in which the apostle sets the consequences
of Adam's sin, and the consequences of the grace and righte
ousness of Christ. They are set in opposition to each other,
as opposite effects, arising from opposite causes, throughout
the paragraph : One, as the just consequence of an offence ; the
other, a free gift, ver. 15 — 18. Whereas, according to this
scheme, there is. no such opposition in the case ; both are bene
fits, and both are free gifts. A very wholesome medicine to
save from perishing, ordered by a kind father, or a shield to
preserve frora an eneray, bestowed by a friend, is as much a
free gift as pleasant food. The death that comes by Adam, is
set in opposition to the life and happiness that comes by Christ,
as being the fruit oi sin, and judgment for sin : when the latter
is the fruit oi divine grace,\er. 15, 17, 20, 21. Whereas, accord
ing to our author, both came by.grace. Death comes on man
kind by the free kindness and love of God, much more truly
and properly than by Adam's sin. Dr, T. speaks of it as
coming by occasion of Adam's sin : But, as I have observed,
it is an occasion without any influence. Yet the proper cause
is God's grace. So that the true cause is wholly good. Which,
by the way, is directly repugnant to the apostle's doctrine in
Rora, vii, 13, " Was then that which is good, made death unto
me ? God forbid. But sin, that it might appear sin, working
death in rae by that which is good." Where the apostle ut
terly rejects any such suggestion, as though that which is good
were the proper canse of death ; and signifies that fin is tlv-
VOL. TI. 61

482 ORIGIUAL SIN. p. II. <--«• IV'
proper cause, and that which is good, only the occasion. But
according to this author, the reverse is true : That which is good
in the highest sense, even the love of God, and a divine gracious
constitution, is the proper cause oi death, and sin only the occa
sion. But to return, it is plain that death by Adara, and life and
happiness by Christ, are here set in opposition ; the latter being
spoken of as good, the other as evil ; one as the effect of righte
ousness, the other of an offence ; one of the fruit of obedience,
the other of disobedience ; one as the fruit of God's favour, in
consequence of what was pleasing and acceptable to him, but
the other the fruit of Ais displeasure, in consequence of what
was displeasing arid hateful to him ; the latter coming by justi-
flcation, the former by the condemnation of the subject. But
according to the scheme of our author, there can be no oppo
sition in any of these respects : The death here spoken of
neither comes as an evil, nor from an evil cause, neither an evil
efficient cause, or procuring cause, nor at all as any testimony
of God's displeasure to the subject, but as properly the eflect
of his favour, no less than that which is spoken of as coming
by Christ ; yea, as much as an act of justification of the
subject ; as he understands and explains the word justification ;
for both are by a grant of favour, and are instances of mercy
and goodness. And he abundantly insists upon it, that " any
grant of favour, any instance of mercy and goodness, whereby
God dehvers and exempts from any kind of danger, suffering,
or calamity, or confers any favour, blessing, or privilege,
is called justification in the scripture-sense and use of the
word,"* Moreover our author makes void the grand and funda
mental opposition— to illustrate which is the chief scope of
this whole passage — between the flrst and second Adam; in
the death that comes by one, and the life and happiness by the
other. For, according to his doctrine, both come by Christ the
second Adam; both by his grace, righteousness, and obe
dience : The death to which God sentenced mankind (Gen,
iii, 19,) being a great deal more properly and truly by Christ,
than by Adam, For, according to him, that sentence was not
pronounced on the basis of the covenant with Adam ; because
that was abrogated, and entirely set aside, as he largely in
sists for raany pages together, (p, 113 — 120, S,) "This cove
nant with Adara was disannulled imraediately after Adam sin
ned. Even before God passed sentence upon Adam, grace
was introduced," " The death that mankind are the subjects
of now, stands under the covenant of grace," — In the counsel
* Key, § 374, where it is to be observed, that he himself pnts the word ant in
capital letters. The same thing in substance is often asserted elsewhere. And
this indeed is hie main point in what he calls the true gospel-scherne.

Sect. I. Remarks on Rom. v. 12, ^c. 483
and appointment of God, it stood in this very light, even before
the sentence of death was pronounced upon Adam : and con
sequently, death is no proper and legal punishment of sin."
And he often insists, that it comes only as a favour and benefit ;
and standing, as he says, under the covenant of grace, which
is by Christ, therefore is truly one of the benefits of the new
covenant, which comes by Christ, the second Adam. For he
himself is decided, to use his own words.* " That all the grace
of the gospel is dispensed to us, in, by, or through the son of
God." " Nothing is clearer (says he t) from the whole current
of scripture, than that all the mercy and love of God, and all
the blessings of the gospel, from first to last, are in, by, and
THROUGH Christ, and particularly by his blood, by the redemp
tion that is in him. This can bear no dispute among Chris
tians." What then becomes of all this discourse of the apos
tle's, about the great difference and opposition between Adam
and Christ ; as death is by one, and eternal life and happiness
by the other ? This grand distinction between the two Adaras,
it seems, and the other instances of opposition and difference
here insisted on — as between the effects of sin and righteous
ness, the consequences of obedience and disobedience, of the
offence and the free gift, judgment and grace, condemnation
and justiflcation — all come to nothing. And this whole dis
course of the apostle, wherein he seems to labour much, as if
it were to set forth some very grand and most important dis
tinction and Opposition in the state of things, as derived from
the twp great heads of raankind, proves nothing but a multi
tude of words without meaning, or rather a heap of inconsis
tencies. V. Our author's own doctrine entirely makes void what he
supposes to be the apostle's argument in the 13th and 14th ver
ses, in these words ; " For until the law, sin was in the world :
but sin is not imputed where there is no law. Nevertheless
death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over them that had
not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression."
What he supposes the apostle would prove here, is, that the
mortality of mankind comes only by Adam's sin, and not by
men's personal sins, because there was no law threatening death
to Adam's posterity ior personal sins, before the law of Moses;
but death, or the mortality of Adam's posterity, took place
many ages before the law was given ; therefore death could
not be by any law threatening death for personal sins, and con
sequently could be by nothing but Adam's sinj. On this X
would observe,
1. That which he supposes the apostle to take for a truth
* Key, chap. viii. title, p. 44. t Key, § 145.
J Page 40, 41, 42, 57. and often elsewhere.

484 dBitsi-NAL SIN. P. "• Ch. jv.
in this argument, viz. That there was no law of God in being,
by which men were exposed to death for personal sin, during
the time from Adam to -Moses, is neither true, nor agreeable to
this apostle's own doctrine.
First, The assertion is not true. For the law of nature,
written in raen's hearts, was then in being, and was a law by
which raen were exposed to death for personal sin. That there
was a divine establishment, fixing the death and destruction of
the sinner as the consequence of personal sin, which was well
known before the giving of the law by Moses, is plain by many
passages in the book of Job, as fully and clearly implying a
connection between such sin and such a punishment, as any
passage in the law of Moses: Such as that in Job xxiv. 19.
" Drought and heat consume the sijow-waters ; so doth the
grave them that have sinned," (Compare ver. 20 and 24.)
Also chap, xxxvi. 6. " He preserveth not the life of the wick
ed. Chap. xxi. 29 — 32. Have ye not asked them that go by
the way ? and do ye not know their tokens ? That the wicked
is reserved to the day of destruction ; they shall be brought
forth to the day of wrath. Ver. 32. He shall be brought to
the grave,*" Secondly, To suppose that there is.no law in being by
which men are exposed to death for personal sins, when a re
vealed -law of God is not in being, is contrary to our apostle's
owK dortriwe in this epistle. Rom. ii. 12, 14, 15. For as many
as have sinned without law, (i. e. the revealed law) shall perish
without law. But how they can be exposed to die and perish,
who have not the law of Moses, nor any revealed law, the
apostle shews us in the 14th and i5th verses ; viz. In that they
have the law of nature, by which they fall under sentence to
this punishment. "i^ortiiAew iAe Gentiles, wAicA have not the
law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these having
not the law, are a law to themselves; which shew the work of
the law written in their hearts ; their conscience also bearing
witness." Their conscience not only bore witness to the duty
prescribed by this law, but also to the punishment before spoken
of, as that which they who sinned without law were liable
to suffer, viz. that they should, perish. In which the apostle is
yet raore express, chap. i. 32. speaking more especially of the
heathen, " Who knowing the judgment of God, that they
which commit such things are worthy of death," Dr. T. often
calls the law the rule of right ; and this rule of right sentenced
those sinners to death who who were not under the law of
Moses, according to this author's own paraphrase of this verse,
* See also Job iv. 7, 8, 9. Chap. xv. 17—35. Chap, xviii. 5—21. xix. 29. and
??¦ . .u ''""j^^"'- 23—29. Chap. xxi. 16.— 18. 20—26. xxii. 13—20. and xxvii.
11. tothe end. Chap. xxxi. 3, 23. xxxiii. 18, 22, 23, 24, 28, 30. xxxiv. 11. 21—
2fi. XXXVU. 12, 18, 19, 20. and xxxviii. 13.

Sect. i. Remarks on Rom. v. 12, <^c. 485
in these words, " The heathen were not ignorant of the rule of
iight, which God has implanted in the human nature ; and
which shews that they which commit such crimes are deserv
ing of death." And he himself supposes Abraham, who lived
between Adam and Moses, to be under law, by which he would
have been exposed to punishment without hope, were it not for
the promise of grace. — (Paraph, on Rom. iv. 15.)
So that in our author's way of explaining the passage be
fore us, the grand argument which the apostle msists upon here
to prove his main point, viz. that death does not come by men's
personal sins, but by Adam's sin, because it came before the
law was given that threatened death for personal sin ; 1 say,
this argument which Dr. T. supposes so clear and strong,* is
brought to nothing more than a mere shadow without sub
stance ; the very foundation of the argument having no truth.
To say there was no such law actually expressed in any stand
ing revelation, would be mere trifling. For it no more appears,
that God would not bring temporal death for personal sins
without a standing revealed law threatening it, than that he
would not bring eternal death before there was a revealed law
threatening that: Which yet wicked men that lived in Noah's
time were exposed to, as appears by 1 Pet. iii. 19, 20. and
which Dr T. supposes all mankind are exposed to by their
personal sins ; and he himself says,1 " Sin in its own unalter
able nature leads to death." Yea, it might be argued with
as much strength of reason, that God could bring on men no
punishment at all ior any sin that was committed from Adam
to Moses, because there was no standing revealed law then
extant threatening any punishment. It may here be properly
observed, that our author supposes the, shortening of man's
days, and hastening of death, entered into the world by ihe sin
of the Antediluvians, in the same sense as death and mortality
entered into the world by Adam's sin,| But where was
there any standing revealed law for that, though the event
was so universal ? If God might bring this on all mankind, on
occasion of other men's sins, for which they deserved nothing,
without a revealed law, what could there be to hinder God
bringing death on men for their personal sins, for which their
own consciences tell them they deserve death without a re
vealed law?
2, If from Adam to Moses there had been no law in be
ing of any kind, revealed or natural, by which men could be
properly exposed to temporal death for personal sin, yet the
mention of Moses's law would have been wholly impertinent,
apd of no signification in the argument, according to our au
thor. He supposes that what the apostle would prove is,
* Page 117, S. t Page 77, 78. J Page 68.

486 ORIGINAL SIN, P. H- Ch, IV.
that temporal death comes by Adam ; and not by any law
threatening such a punishment for personal sin ; because this
death prevailed before the law of Moses was in being, which
is the only law threatening death for personal sin. And yet
he hunself supposes, that the law of Moses, when it was in
feeiw^, threatened no such death for personal sin. For he abun
dantly asserts, that the death which the law of Moses threaten
ed for personal sin, vvas eternal death, as has been already
noted : And he says in express terms, that eternal death is of a
nature widely different from the death we now die ;* as was also
observed before.
How impertinently therefore does Dr, T, make an inspir
ed writer argue, when, according to him, the apostle would
prove, that ihis kind of death did not come by any law
threatening this kind of death, because it came before the ex
istence of a law threatening another kind of death, of a nature
widely different ? How is it to the apostle's purpose, to fix on
that period, the time of giving Moses's law, as if that had been
the period wherein men began to be threatened with this
punishment for their personal sins, when in truth it was no such
thing ? And therefore it was no more to his purpose to fix on
that period, from Adam to Moses, than from Adam to David,
or any other period whatsoever. Dr. T. holds, that even now,
since the law of Moses has been given, the mortality of man
kind, or the death we now die, does not come by that law ;
but that it always comes only by Adam.] And if it never
comes by that law, we may be sure it never was threatened in
that law.
3. If we should allow the argument in Dr, T,'s sense of
it, to prove that death does not come by personal sin, yet it
will be wholly without force to prove the raain point, even
that it must come by Adam's sin : For it might come by God's
sovereign and gracious pleasure ; as innumerable other di
vine benefits do. If it be ordered, agreeable to our author's
supposition, not as a punishment, nor as a calamity, but only as
a favour, what necessity of any settled constitution, or reveal
ed sentence, in order to bestow smcA a favour, more than other
favours ; and particularly raore than that great benefit, which
he said entered into the world by the sin of the Antediluvians,
the shortening men's lives so much after the flood ? Thus the
apostle's arguing, by Dr. T.'s explanation of it, is turned into
mere trifling, a vain and impertinent use of words, without any
real force or significance,
VI, Tbe apostle here speaks of that great benefit which
we have by Christ, as the antitype of Adam, under the notion
* Page 120 S. He says to the like purpose in his note on Rom. v. 17.
tThis is plain by whathe says, p. 38,40,53, 117. S.

Segt. I. Remarks on Rom. v, 12, ^-c. 487
of a fruit of grace. 1 do not mean only that super-abounding
of grace, wherein the benefit we have by Christ goes beyond
the damage sustained by Adam ; but that benefit, with regard
to which Adam was the flgure of him that was to come, and
which is as it were the counterpart of the suffering by Adara
and which repairs the loss we have by him. This is here spo
ken of as the fruit of the free grace of God; (as appears by
ver, 15 — 18, 20, 21,) which according to our author, is (he
restoring of mankind to that life which they lost in Adam :
And he hunself supposes this restoration of life by Christ to be
what grace does for us, and calls it the free gift of God, and
the grace and favour of the lawgiver.* And speaking of this
restoration, be breaks out in admiration of the unspeakable
riches of this grace.]
But it follows frora his doctrine, that there is no grace at
all in this benefit, and it is no more than a mere act oi justice,
being only a removing of what mankind suffer, being innocent.
Death, as it commonly comes on mankind, and even on in
fants, (as has been observed) is an extreme positive calamity ;
to bring which on the perfectly innocent, unremedied, and
without any thing to countervail it, we are sufficiently taught,
is not consistent with the Righteousness of the Judge of all the
earth. What grace therefore, worthy of being so celebrated,
would there be in affording remedy and relief, after there had
been brought on innocent mankind that which is (as Dr, T,
hiraself represents)^ the dreadful and universal destruction of
their nature ; being a striking demonstration how infinitely
hateful sin is to God ! What grace in delivering from such
shocking ruin, them who did not deserve the least calamity I
Our author says, " We could not justly lose communion with
God by Adam's sin,"§ If so, then we could not justly lose
our lives, and be annihilated, after a course of extreme pains
and agonies of body and mind, without any restoration ; which
would be an eternal loss of communion with God, and all other
good, besides the positive suffering. The apostle, through
out this passage, represents the death which is the consequence
of Adam's transgression, as coming in away oi judgment and
condemnation for sin ; but deliverence and life through Christ,
as by ^race, and the free gift of God, Whereas, on the con
trary, by Dr. T,'s scheme, the death that comes by Adam,
comes by ^r(a!ce,^eai^race; it being a great benefit, ordered
in fatherly love and kindness, and on the basis of a covenant of
grace : But in the deliverence and restoration by Christ there
is no grace at all. So things are turned topsyturvy, the apos
tle's scope and scheme entirely inverted and confounded,
* Page 39, 70, 148. 27. S. See also contents of this paragraph in Rom. v. in
his notes on the epistle, and his note on ver. 15, 16, 17.
t Page 119. S. t Page 69. § Page 148.

488 ORIGINAL SIN. P, ". Ch, IV.
VII, Dr, T, explains the words, judgment, condemnation,
justification and righteousness, as used in this place, in a very
unreasonable manner. SiAwrt^^S i.>^^\A*. o»>v
I will first consider the^fCTW-fie-P^^^Tqiion the two for
mer, judgment and condemnation. He often calls this con
demnation a judicial act, and a sentence of condemnation. But,
according to his scheme, it is a judicial sentence of condem
nation passed upon thera who are perfectly innocent — and
viewed by the judge, even in passing the conderanatory sen
tence, as having no guilt of sin, or any fault at all chargeable
upon them — and a judicial proceeding, passing sentence ar
bitrarily, without any law or rule of right before established.
For there was^no preceding law threatening death, that he or
any one else ever pretended to have been established, but on
ly this. In ihe day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die.
And concerning this he insists, that there is not a word said in
it of Adara's posterity. So that the condemnation spoken of,
is a sentence of condemnation to death, for, or in consequence
of the sin of Adam, without any law by which that sin could be
imputed to bring any such consequence ; contrary to the apos
tle's plain scope. ' And not only so, but, over and above all this,
itis a judicial sentence of condemnation to that which is no ca
lamity, nor is considered as such in the sentence ; but a con
demnation to a great favour !
The apostle uses the words judgment and condemnation
in other places ; they are no strange and unusual terms with
him : But never are they used by him in this sense, or any
like it ; nor are they ever used thus any where else in the New
Testament. This apostle, in this epistle to the Romans often
speaks of condemnation, using the sarae or similar terms and
phrases as here, but never in the abovesaid sense.* This will
be plain to every one who casts his eye on those places. And
if we look into the former part of this chapter, the apostle's
discourse raakes it evident, that he is speaking of a conderana-
tion, which is no testiraony of favour to the innocent ; but of
God's displeasure towards those to whom he is not reconciled,
but looks on as offenders and enemies, and holds as the objects
of his wrath, from which we are delivered by Christ. (See ver.
6—11.) And even viewing this discourse itself in the very para
graph we are upon, if we may judge any thing by language,
there is every thing to lead us to suppose, that the apostle
uses words here, as he does elsewhere, properly, and as im
plying a supposition of sin, chargeable on the subject, and
* See Chap. ii. 1, 2, 3. six times in these verses ; also ver. 12 and 27. and
chap. iii. 7. chap. viii. 1 and 3. chap. xiv. 3, 4. and ver. 10, 13, 22, and 23.

Sect, t. Remarks on Rom. v. IS, ^c. 489
exposing to punishment. He speaks of condemnation as what
comes by sin, a condemnation to death, which seems to be a
most terrible evil, and capital punishraent, even in what is
temporal and visible; and this in .the way oi judgment and
execution of justice, in opposition to grace or favour, and gift
or a benefit coming by favour. And sin, ofience, transgres
sion and disobedience are, over and over again, spoken of as
the ground of the condemnation, and of the capital suffering,
for ten verses successively ; that is, in every verse in the whole
paragraph. The words, justification and righteousness, are explained
by Dr. T. in a manner no less unreasonable. He understands
justification, in ver. 18. and righteousness, in ver, 19, in such a,
sense, as to suppose they belong to all, and are actually to be
applied to all mankind, good and bad, believers and unbelievers;
to the worst enemies of God, remaining such, as well as his
peculiar favorites, and many that never had any sin imputed to
them ; meaning thereby no raore than what is fulfilled in an
universal resurrection from the dead, at the last day,* Now
this is a most arbitrary, forced sense. Though these terms are
used all over the New Testament, yet nothing like such an use
of thein is to be found in any one instance. The words justi
fy, justification, and righteousness, as from God to men, are
never used but to signify a privilege belonging only to some,
and that which is peculiar to distinguished favourites. This
apostle in particular, above all the other writers of the New
Testament, abounds in the use of these terms ; so that we have
all imaginable opportunity to understand his language, and
know the sense in which he uses these words : But he never
elsewhere uses them in the sense supposed here, nor is there any
pretence that he does. Above all, this apostle abounds in the
use of these terms in this epistle. Justification* is the subject
he had been upon through all the preceding part of the epistle.
It was the grand subject of all the foregoing chapters, and the
preceding part of this chapter, where these terras are continu
ally repeated. And the word justification is constantly used
to signify something peculiar to believers who had been sinners;
implying some reconciliation and forgiveness of sin, and special
privilege in nearness to God, above the rest of the world. Yea,
the word is constantly used thus, according to Dr. T.'s own
explanations in his paraphrase and notes on this epistle. And
there is not the least reason to suppose but that he is still
speaking of the same justification, which he had dwelt upon
from the beginiiing to this place. He speaks oi justification
and righteousness here, just in the same manner as he had
done in the preceding part of the epistle. He had all along
* So pases47,49,60,BI,62,andoth«rplaces.
Vol. ti. 62

490 ORIGINAL SIN, P. 11, Ch. IV.
spoken of justification as standing in relation to sin, disobedi
ence to God, and offence against hira, and so he does here.
He had before been speaking of justification through free
grace, and so he does here. He before had been speaking of
justification through righteousness, as in Christ Jesus, and so he
does here.
And if we look into the former part of this very chap
ter, we shall find justification spoken of just in the same sense
as in the rest of the epistle ; which is also supposed by our
aiithor in his exposition. It is still justification by faith, justi'
fication of them who had been sinners, justification attended
with reconciliation, justification peculiar to them who had the
love of God shed abroad in their hearts. The apostle's forego
ing discourse on justification by grace through faith — and what
he had so greatly insisted on as the evidence of the truth of
this doctrine, even the universal sinfulness of mankind in their
original state — is plainly what introduces this discourse in the
latter part of this 5th chapter ; where he shews how all man
kind came to be sinful and miserable, and so to need this grace
of God, and righteousness of Christ. And therefore we can
not, without the most absurd violence, suppose any other than
that he is still speaking of the same justification.
And as to the universal expression used in the 18th verse, by
the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men to
justification of life ; it is needless here to go into the controver
sy between the remonstrants and anti-remonstrants, concerning
universal redemption, and their different interpretations of this
place. If we take the words even as the Arminians do ; yet, in
their sense of them, the free gift comes on all men to justifica
tion only conditionally, i, e, provided we believe, repent, &c.
But in our author's sense, it actually coraes on all, whether they
believe and repent, or not : which certainly cannot be inferred
from the universal expression, as here used. Dr. T. himself
supposes the main design of the apostle in this universal phrase,
all men, is to signify that the benefits of Christ shall come on
Gentiles as well as Jews*. And he supposes that the Many and
the All, here signify the same ; but it is quite ceriain, that all
the benefits here spoken of, which the apostle says are to the
many, does not actually come upon all niankind ; as particular
ly the abounding of graces ver. 15. " The grace of God,
and the gift by grace, hath abounded unto the many," (ei6«s
iToXXiiff,) This abounding of grace our author explains thus ; "a rich
overplus of grace, in erecting a new dispensation, furnished
with a glorious fund of light, means, and motives." (p. 44.)

epistle.

I
* Page 80, 61. See also contents of this paragraph, in his notes en the
tie. '

Shot, i. Remarks on Rom. v, 12, ^c. 491
But will any pretend, that all mankind have actually been par
takers of this new fund of light, &c. ? How were the raany mil
lions of Indians, on the Araerican side of the globe, partakers
of it, before the Europeans came hither ? Yea, Dr. T. himself
supposes, than it is only free for all that are willing to accept
of it. * The agreement between Adara as the type or figure of
him that was to come, and Christ as the anti-type, appears full
and clear, if we suppose that all who are in christ (to use
the common scripture phrase) have the benefit of his obedi
ence even as all who are in adam have the sorrowful fruit of
his disobedience. The scripture speaks of believers as the seed
or posterity of Christ. (Gal. ui. 29.) They are in Christ by
grace, as Adam's posterity are in him by nature. See also
1 Cor. XV. 45—49. The spiritual seed are those which this
apostle often represents as Christ's body : And the 64 -mWot
here spoken of as maJe righteous by Christ's obedience, are
doubtless the same with the 61 aoXXoi which he speaks of in chap.
xii. 5. We, being many, are one body ; or, we, the many,
01 cfoXXoi iv (fufiM s(t{j,sv. And again, 1 Cor. x. 17. ^v iTufia 01 woXXoi
stffAEv. And the sarae which the apostle had spoken of in the
preceding chapter. (Rom. iv, 18, compared with Gen, xv, 5,)
Dr, T, insists rauch on 1 Cor, xv. 21, 22. "For since by
man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the
dead : for as in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be raade
alive ;" to confirm his suppositions, that the apostle in the .5th
of Romans, speaking of the death and condemnation which
come by Adam, has respect only to the death we all die when
this life ends': And that by the justification and life which corae
by Christ, he has respect only to the general resurrection at the
last day. But it is observable that his argument is wholly built
on these two suppositions, viz. First, that the resurrection
meant by the apostle, 1 Cor, xv, is the resurrection of all man
kind, both just and unjust. Secondly, That the opposite conse
quences of Adam's sin and Christ's obedience, in Rom, v. are
the very sarae, neither more nor less, than are spoken of there.
But there are no grounds for supposing either of these things to
be true. 1. There is no evidence that the resurrection there spoken
of relates both to the just and unjust ; but abundant evi
dence of the contrary. The resurrection of the wicked is
seldom raentioned in the New Testament, and rarely included
in the meaning of the word ; it being esteemed not worthy
to be called a rising to life, being only for a great increase of
the misery and darkness of eternal death : And therefore by
the resurrection is most commonly meant a rising to life and
\ * Notes on the epistle, page 2S4.

492 GRieiNAL SIN. p. II. Ch. n.
happiness*. The saints are called the children of ihe resur
rection, as Dr. T. observes in his note on Rom. viii. 11. And
it is exceeding evident, that it is the resurrection to life and
happiness which the apostle is speaking of in 1 Cor. xv. 21,
22. As appears by each of the three foregoing verses. Ver. 18.
Then they which are fallen asleep in christ (i. e. the saints)
are perished. Ver. 19. If in this life only we (christians or
apostles) have hope in Christ, (and have no resurrection and
eternal life to hope for) we are of all men most miserable. Ver.
20. But now is Christ risen from the dead, and is become the
FIRST FRUITS of them that slept. He is the forerunner and
first fruits only jvith respect to thera that are his ; who are to"
follow him, and partake with him in the glory and happiness
of his resurrection : But he is not the first fruits of them that
shall come forth to the resurrection of damnation. It also ap
pears by the verse immediately following, ver. 23. " But every
man in his own order ; Christ the first fruits, and afterward
they that are Christ's at his coming." The sarae is plain
by what is said in verse 29—32. and by all that is said
from the 35th verse to the end of the chapter, for twenty-
three verses together : It there expressly appears, that the
apostle is speaking only of arising to glory, with a glorious
body, as the little grain that is sown, being quickened, rises
a beautiful flourishing plant. He there speaks of the different
degrees of glory among them that shall rise, and compares
it to the different degres of glory among the celestial lumi
naries. The resurrection he treats of is expressly, being
raised in incorruption, in glory, in power, with a spiritual body,
having the image of the second man, the spiritual and heavenly
Adam : a resurrection wherein this corruptible shall put on in-
eorruption, and ihis mortal put on immortality, and death be
swallowed up in victory, and the saints gloriously triumph over
that last enemy. Dr. T. hiraself says what is in eflect own
ing that the resurrection here spoken of is only of the righ
teous ; for it is expressly a resurrection ev aSavatfia. and a(p^a^a'ia,
(ver. 53, and 42.) But Dr. T. says, " These are never attributed
to the wicked in scripture."! So that when the apostle says
here. As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive ;
it is as much as if he had said. As in Adam we all die, and our
bodies are sown in corruption, in dishonour, and in .weakness ;
so in Christ we all (we christians, whom 1 have been all along-
speaking of) sAaZZ be raised in power, glory, and incorruption,
spiritual and heavenly, conformed to the second Adam. " For
as we have borne the image of the earthly, we shall also bear
* As may bo observed in Matt, xxii. 80. Luke xx. 85, 86. John vi. 99, 40, 54,
PhiUp. iij. 11. and other places.
t Note on Bom. viii. 37.

Sect. i. Remarks on Rom. v. 12, ^c. 493
the image of the heavenly," ver. 49. Which clearly explains
and determines his meaning in ver. 21, 22.
2. There is no evidence that the benefit by the second
Adam, spoken of in Rom. v. is the very same (containing nei
ther more nor less) as the resurrection spoken of in I Cor. xv.
It is no evidence of it, that the benefit is opposed to the death
that comes by the first Adam, in like manner in both places.
The resurrection to eternal life, though it be not the whole
of that salvation and happiness which comes by the second
Adara, yet is it that wherein this salvation is principally ob
tained. The time of the saints' glorious resurrection is often
spoken of as the proper time of their salvation, The day of their
redemption, the time of their adoption, glory, and recompense.*
All that happiness which is given before, is only a prelibation
and earnest of their great reward. Well therefore raay that
consuraraate salvation bestowed on thera, be set in opposition
to the death and ruin which comes by the first Adam, in like
raanner as the whole of their salvation is opposed to the
sarae in Rora. v. Dr. T. himself observes,! " That the revival
and resurrection of the body, is frequently put for our advance
ment to eternal hfe." It being the highest part, it is often put
for the whole.
This notion, as if the justification, righteousness, and life,
spoken of in Rom. v. implied the resurrection to damnation,
is not only without ground from scripture, but contrary to
reason. For those things are there spoken of as great bene
fits, by the gift and free grace of God : But this is the con
trary, in the highest degree possible ; the most consummate
calamity. To obviate this, our author supposes the resurrec
tion of all to be a great benefit in itself, though turned into a
calamity by the sin and folly of obstinate sinners, who abuse
God's goodness. But the far greater part of mankind, since
Adam, have never had opportunity to abuse this goodness, it
having never been made known to them. Men cannot abuse
a kindness which they never had either in possession, pro-
raise, offer, or sorae intimation : But a resurrection is made
known only by divine revelation ; which few comparatively
have enjoyed. So that as to such wicked men as die in lands
of darkness, if their resurrection comes at all by Christ, it
comes from hira, and to them, only as a curse, and not a bles
sing ; for it never comes to thera at all by any conveyance,
grant, promise, or offer, or any thing by which they can claim it,
or know any thing ofit, till it comes as an infinite calamity, past
all remedy. * As in Luke liv. 14. and xxi. 28. Bora. viii. 23. Eph. iv. 30. Colos. iii. 4. 2
Thes. '\. 7. STirn. iv. 8. 1 Pet. i. 13. and v. 4. 1 .lohn iii. 2. and other place?.
+ Note on Rom. viii. 11.

494 ORIGIHAL SIS. p. II. Ch. iv.
VIII. In a peculiar manner is there an unreasonable
violence used in our author's explanation of the words sinners
and sinned, in the paragraph before us. He says, " These
words. By one man's disobedience many were made sinners,
mean neither more nor less, than that by one man's disobedi
ence, the many were made subject to death, by the judicial act
of God."* And he says in the same place, " By death, most
certainly is meant no other than the death and mortality com
mon to all mankind." And these words, ver. 12, For that all
have sinned, he thus explains, " All men became sinners, as
all " mankind are brought into a state of sufiering,"! Here I
observe, 1, The main thing by which he justifies such inter
pretations is, that sin, in various instances, is used for suffering,
in the Old Testament.J To which I reply ; though it be true
that the original word (ttan) signifies both sin, and a sin-offering
— and though this, and some other Hebrew words which signi
fy sin, iniquity, and wickedness, are sometimes put for the ef
fect or punishment of iniquhy, by a metonyray of the cause
for the effect — yet it does not appear, that these words are ever
used for suffering, where that suffering is not a punishment, or
a fruit of God's anger for sin. And therefore none of the in
stances he mentions corae up to his purpose. When Lot is
commanded to leave Sodom, that he might not be consumed
in the iniquity of the city, meaning in that fire which was the
effect and punishment of the iniquity of the city ; this is quite
another thing, than if that fire came on the city in general, as
no punishment at all, nor as any fruit of a charge of iniquity,
but as a token of God's /auoMr to the inhabitants. For accord
ing to Dr, T. the death of mankind is introduced only as a
beneflt, irom a covenant of grace. And especially is this quite
another thing than if, in the expression used, the iniquity had
been ascribed to Lot ; and God, instead of saying. Lest thou
be consuraed in the iniquity of the city, had said, Lest thou be
consumed in thine iniquity, or. Lest thou sin, or be made a sin^-
ner. Whereas the expression is such, as expressly removes the
iniquity spoken of from Lot, and fixes it on the city. The
place cited by our author in Jer, li, is exactly parallel. And as
to what Abimelech says to Abraham, " What have I offended
thee, that thou hast brought on me, and on my kingdom, a great
sin ?" It is manifest, Abimelech was afraid that God was angry,
for what he had done to Sarah ; or, would have been angry
with him, if he had done what he was about to do, as imputing
sin to him for it. Which is a quite different thing from calling
some calamity, sin, under no notion of its being any punish
ment of sin, nor in the least degree from God's displeasure,
* Page 30. , t Page 34, and elsewhere. J Page 34.

Sect,i. Remarks on Rom. \.l^, ^, 495
And so with regard to every place our author cites in the mar
gin, it is plain that what is raeant in each of them is the
punishment of sin, and not some suffering which is no punish
ment at all. And as to the instances he mentions in his Sup
plement, (p. 8.) the two that look most favourable to his design
are those in Gen. xxxi. 39, and 2 Kings vii, 9, With respect
to the forraer, where Jacob says, that which was born of beasts,
(manu ojm, / bear the loss of it.) Di. T, is pleased to translate
it, / was the sinner ; but properly rendered, it is, / expiated it ;
the verb in Pihel, proper signifying to expiate ; and the plain
raeaning is, 1 bore the blame of it, and was obliged to pay for it^
as being supposed to be lost through my fault or neglect :
Which is a quite difterent thing from suffering without any sup
position of fault. And as to the latter place, where the lepers
say, this day is a day of good tidings, and we hold our peace :
If we tarry till moming some mischief will befall us : In the
Hebrew it is {\\)y umc) iniquity will flnd us, that is, some
punishment of our fault will come upon us. Elsewhere such
phrases are used, as your iniquity will flnd you out, and the
like. But certainly this is a different thing from suffering
without fault, or supposition of fault. And it does not appear,
that the verb in Hiphil, (j'lfin) rendered to condemn, is ever
put for condemn, in any other sense than for sin, or guilt,, or
supposed guilt belonging to the subject condemned. This
wprd is used in the participle of Hiphil, to signify condemn
ing, in Prov. xvii, 15. " He that justifieth the wicked, and he
that condemneth the just, even both are an abomination to the
Lord." This Dr. T. observes, as if it were to his purpose,
when he is endeavouring to shew, that in this place (Rom. v.)
the apostle speaks of God himself as condemning the just, or
perfectly innocent, in a parallel signification of terms. Nor is
any instance produced, wherein the verb siw, which is used by
the apostle when he says all have sinned, is any where used in
our author's sense, for being brought into a state of sufferings
and that not as a punishnient for sin, or as any thing arising
frora God's displeasure ; much less for being the subject of
what coraes only as the fruit of divine love, and as a benefit of
the HIGHEST NATURE.* Not cau any thing like this sense of the-
verb be found in the whole bible.
2. If there had been any thing like such an use of the
words sin and sinner, as our author supposes, in the Old Testa
ment, it is evident that such an use of them is quite alien from
the language ofthe New Testament. Where can an instance.
be produced of any thing like it, in any one place, besides
what is pretended in this? and particularly in any of this
apostle's writings ? We have enough of his writings by which
* Page 87. 8.

496 ORIGINAL SIN, P. "• CS, IV,
to learn his way of speaking about sin, condemnation, punish-
meet, death, and suffering. He wrote rauch more of the New-
Testament than any other person. He very often has occasion
to speak of condemnation : but where does he express it by
such a phrase as being made sinners ? Especially how far is he
elsewhere from using such a phrase, to signify being condemn
ed without guilt, or any imputation or supposition of guilt ?
Vastly more still is it remote from his language, so to use the
verb sin, and to say, raan sinneth, or Aas sinned, though here
by meaning nothing more or less than thathe, by a judicial act,
is condemned, according to a dispensation of grace, to receive
a great favour ! He abundantly uses the words sin and sinner;
his writings are full of such terms ; but where else does he
use them in such a sense ? He has much occasion in his epis
tles to speak of death, temporal and eternal ; to speak of suf
fering oi all kinds, in this World, and the world to come : But
where does he call these things sin? or denominate innocent
raen sinners, meaning, that they are brought into a state of suf
fering? If the apostle, because he was a Jew, was so addict
ed to the Hebrew idiora as thus in one paragraph to repeat this
particular Hebraism, which, at most is comparatively rare even
in the Old Testament ; is it not strange, that never any thing
like it should appear any where else in his writings ? and espe
cially, that he should never fall into such a way of speaking in
his epistle to the Hebrews, written to Jews only, who were most
used to the Hebrew idiom ? And why does Christ never nse
such language in any of his speeches, though he was born and
brought up among Jews, and delivered alraost all his speeches
to Jews only ? And why do none of the other New Testaraent
writers ever use it, who were all born and educated Jews, (ex
cepting perhaps Luke) and some of thera wrote especially for
the benefit of the Jews?
It is worthy to be observed what liberty is taken and bold
ness is used with this apostle. Such words as aii.agro'K®-', aixag-
ravu, xpif),a, xaTctxpif^a, ^ixaiou, Jixaiwtfis, are aliundantly used by him
elsewhere in this and other epistles, when speaking, as here, of
Christ's redemption and atonement, the general sinfiilness of
mankind, the condemnation of sinners, the justification by Christ,
death as the consequence of sin, and restoration to life by- Christ ;
yet no where are any of these words used, but in a sense very
remote from what is supposed by Dr. T! however, in this place,
it seeras, these terms must have a distinguished singular sense
annexed to them I A new language must jlje', coined for the
apostle, to which he is evidently quite unused, for the sake of
evading this clear, precise, and abundant testiraony of his, to
the doctrine of original sin. ' • '
3, To put such a sense on the word sin, in this place, is
not only to make the apostle greatly disagree with himself in

Sect, i. Remarks on Rom. v. 12, ^-f 497
the language he uses every where else, but also in this very
passage. He often here uses the word sin, and other words
plainly of the same import, such as transgression, disobedience,
offence. Nothing can be more evident, than that theSe are
used as several naines of the same thing ; for they are used
interchangeably, and put one for another, And these words
are used no less than seventeen times in this one paragraph.
Perhaps we shall find no place in the whole bible, in whicii
the word, sin, and other words plainly synonomous, are used
so often in so little compass. And in all these instances, in the
proper sense, as signifying moral evil, and even so understood
by Dr. T. himself (as appears by his own exposition) but only .
jn these two places (ver, 12, 19.) where, in the midst of all, to
evade a clear evidence of the doctrin? of original sin, another
meaning raust be found out, and it must be supposed that the
apostle uses the -word in a sense entirely different, signifying
something that neither .imjpZies nor supposes any moral evil at all
in the subject.
Here it is very reniarkable, how the gentleman who so
greatly insisted upon it, that the word, death, must needs be
understood in the same sense throughout this paragraph ; yea,
that it is evidently, clearly, and infallibly, so, inasmuch as the
apostle is still discoursing on the same subject ; yet can, with
out the least difficulty, suppose the word sin, to bg used so
differently in the very same passage, wherein the apostle is
discoursing on the same thing. Let us take that one instance
in ver, 12, " Wherefore as by one maij sin entered into the world,
and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, for that all
have sinned." Here, by sin, implied in the word sinned, in
the end of the sentence, our author understands something
perfectly and altogether diverse from what is meant by the
word sin, twice in the former part of the same sentence, of
which this latter part is the explication. And a sense entirely
different from the use of the word twice in the next sentence,
wherein the apostle is still most plainly discoursing on the same
subject, as is not denied. And so our author himself under
stands ver, 14, Afterwards (ver, 19,) the apostle uses the word,
sinners, which our author supposes to be in a somewhat differ
ent sense still, So that here is the utmost violence of the kind
that can be conceived of, to make out a scheme against the plain
est evidence, in changing the meaning of a word backward and
forward, in one paragraph, all about one thing, and in differ
ent parts of the same sentence, occurring in quick repetitions,
, with a variety of other synonymous words to fix its signification.
To which we raay add, the continued use of the word in all
the preceding and subsequent parts of this epistle ; in none
of which places is it pretended, but that the word is used in tlje
VOL, II. ^^

<I98 ORIGINAL SIN, P, II, Ch, IV.
proper sense, by our author in his paraphrase and notes on the
whole epistle*.
But indeed we need go no further than ver. 12. What the
apostle means by sin, in the latter part of the verse, is evident,
by comparing it with the former part ; the last clause being
exegetical of the first. " Wherefore, as by one man sin enter
ed into the world, and death by sin ; and so death passed up
on all men, for that (or, unto which) all have sinned," Here
sin and death are so spoken of in the former and in the latter
part that the same things are clearly meant by the terms in
both parts. Besides, to interpret sinning, here, by falling un
der the suffering of death, is yet the more violent arid unreason
able, because the apostle in this very place once and again dis-
tingifishes between sin and death ; plainly speaking of one as
the effect, and the other the cause. So in the 21st verse, that
as SIN hath reigned unto death ; and in the 12th verse, sin en
tered into the world, and death by sin. And this plain dis
tinction holds through all the discourse, as between death and
the offence, ver. 15 and ver. 17, and between the offence and
condemnation, ver. 18.
4. Though we should orait the consideration of the manner
in which the apostle uses the words, sin, sinned, <^c. in othei:
places, and in other parts of this discourse, yet Dr, T.'s inter
pretation of them would be very absurd.
The case stands thus : According to Ais exposition, we are
said to have^sinned by an active verb, as though we had active
ly sinned ; yet this is not Spoken truly and properiy, but it is put
figuratively for our becoming sinners passively, oiir being made
or constituted sinners. Yet again, not that we do truly be
come sinners passively, or are really made sinners, by any thing
that God does ; this also is only a figurative or tropical repre
sentation ; and the meaning is only, we are condemned, arid
treated as if we were sinners. Not indeed that we are prop
erly condemned, for God never truly condemns the innocent ;
But this is only a figurative representation of the thing. It is
but as it were condemning ; because il is appointing to death,
a terrible evil, as if it were a punishment. But then, in reality,
here is no appointment to a terrible evil, or any evil at all ; btit
* Agreeably to his manner, our author^ in explaining the 7th chap, of Ko-
mans, understands the pronoun / or me, used by the "apostle in that one continu
ed discourse, in no less than six different senses. He takes jt in the 1st ver. to
signify the apostle Paul himself. In the 8, 9, 10, and llth verses, for the people
of the Jpws, through all ages; both before and after'Moses, especially the carnal
uiigodly part of them. In the 13th ver. for an objecting Jew, entering into a dia
logue with the apostle. In the 15, 16, 17th, 20th, and latter part of the 25th ver.
itis understood in two different senses, for two I's in the same person; one a
inan's reason ; and the other, his passions and carnal appetites. And the 7th and
former part of the last verse; foif us Christians in general ; or, for all that enjoy
the word of God, the law and the gospel : And these different senses, the most of
them strangely intermixed and interchanged backwards and forwards.

iSJECT. 1, nemaries on nom. v. 12, df-c. 499
truly to a, beneflt, a great benefit : And so in representing death
asj a punishment, another figure is used, and an exceeding bold
pn^ ; for, as we are appointed to it, it is so far from being an
evil or punishment, that it is really a favour, and that of the
highest nature, appointed by mere grace and love, though it
seems to be a calamity.
Thus we have tropes and figures multiplied, one upon
another ; and all in that one word, sinned ; according to the
manner, as it is supposed, in which the apostle uses it. We
have a flgurative representation, not of a reality, but a figu
rative representation. Neither is this a representation of a
reality, but of another thing that still is but a figurative repre^
sentation of something else : Yea, even this something else is
still but a figure, and one that is very harsh and far-fetched.
So that here we have a figure, to represent a figure, even
a figure, of a figure, representing some very remote fig
ure, which most obscurely represents the thing intended ; if
the raost terrible evil can indeed be said of all to represent
the contrary good of the highest kind. And now, what cannot
be made of any place of scripture, in such a way as this ? And
is there any hope of ever deciding any controversy by the
scripture, in the way of using such a licence in order to force
it to a compliance with our own schemes ? If the apostle in
deed uses language after so strange a manner in this place, it is
perhaps such an instance, as not only there is not the like in all
the bible besides, but perhaps in no writing whatsoever. And
this, not in any parabolical, visionary, or prophetic descrip
tion, in which difficult and obscure representations are wont
to be made ; nor in a dramatic or poetical representation, in
which a great license is often taken, and bold figures are com
monly to be expected. But it is in a famihar letter, wherein
the apostle is delivering gospel-instruction, as a minister of the
New Testament ; and wherein, as he professes, he delivers
divine truth without the vail of ancient figures and similitudes,
and uses great plainness of speech. And in a discourse that
is wholly didactic, narrative, and argumentative ; evidently
setting hiraself to explain the doctrine he is upon, in the rea
son and nature of it, with a great variety of expressions, turn
ing it as it were on every side, to make his meaning plain,
and to fix in his readers the exact notion of what he intends.
Dr. T. hiraself observes,* " This apostle takes great care to
guard and explain every part of his subject : And I may ven
ture to say, he has left no part ofit unexplained or unguarded.
Never was an author more exact and cautious in this than he.
Sometimes he writes notes on a sentence liable to exception,
and wanting explanation." Now I think, this care and ex-
"5 Pref. to paraph, on Bom. p. 146, 4S.

500 ORIGINAL Slisr. P. II. Ch, iv
actness ofthe apostle no where appears more than in the place
we are upon. Nay, I scarcely know another instance equal to
this, of the apostle's care to be well understood, by being very
particular, explicit, and precise, setting the matter forth in every
light, going over and over again with his doctrine, clearly to
exhibit, and fully to settle and determine the thing at which
he aims.

SECT. H.
Some Observations on the Connections, Scope, and Sense of thiS
remarkable Paragraph, Rom. v, l2, ^c. With some Re->
flections on the Evidence which we here have of the Doctrine
of Original Sin.
The connection of this remarkable paragraph with the
foregoing discourse in this epistle, is not obscure ahd difficult,
nor to be sought for at a distance. It may be plainly seen,
only by a general glance ori what goes before, from the begin
ning of the epistle ; And irideed what is said immediately be^
fore in the same chapter, leads directly to it. The apostle
in the preceding part of this epistle had largely treated of the
sinfulness and misery of all mankind, Jews as well as Gentiles,
He had particularly spoken of the depravity and ruin of man
kind in their natural state, in the foregoing part of this chapter ;
representing them as being sinners, ungodly enemies, exposed
to divine wraih, and without strength. This naturally leads
him to observe, how this so great and deplorable an event came
to pass ; how this universal sin and ruin came into the world.
And with regard to the Jews in particular, though they Inight
allow the doctrine of original sin in profession, they were
strongly prejudiced against what was implied in it, or evidently
followed from it, with regard to themselves. In this respect
they were prejudiced against the doctrine of universal sinful
ness, and exposedness to wrath by nature, looking on them
selves as by nature holy, and favourites of God, because they
were the children of Abraham ; and with them the apostle had
laboured most in the foregoing pcut of the epistle, to convince
them of their being by nature as sinful, and as much the chil
dren of wrath, as the Gentiles : It was therefore exceeding
proper, and what the apostle's design most naturally led him to,
that they should take off their eyes from their father Abraham,
their father in distinction from other nations, and direct them
lo their father Adam, who was the common father of inankind,
equally of Jews and Gentiles, And when he had entered on
this doctrine of the derivation of sin and death to all mankind
from Adam, no wonder if he thought it needful to be somewhat

Sect, ii. The true Scope of Rom. v. 12. ^-c. 50l
particular in it, seeing he wrote to Jews and Gentiles ; the
former which had been brought up under the prejudices of a
proud opinion of themselves, as a holy people by nature, and
the latter had been educated in total ignorance.
Again, the apostle had, from the beginning of the epistle,
been endeavouring to evince the absolute o'epc ndence of all
mankind on the free grace of God for salvation, and the great
ness of this grace ; and particularly in the former part of this
chapter. The greatness of this grace he shews especially by
two things. (1.) The universal corruption and misery of man
kind ; as in all the foregoing chapters, and in several preceding
verses of this chapter, (ver. 6 — 10.) (2.) The greatness ofthe
benefits which believers receive, and the greatness of the
glory for which they hope. So especially in ver. I — 5, and
llth of this chapter. And here, ver. 12. to the end, he still
pursues the same design of magnifying the grace of God, in
the favour, life, and happiness which believers in Christ re
ceive ; speaking here of the grace of God, ihe gift by grace,
the abounding of grace, and the reign of grace. And he still
sets forth the freedom and riches of grace by the same two ar
guraents, viz. The universal sinfulness and ruin of mankind,
all having sinned, all teing naturally exposed to death, judg
raent and conderan ation ; and the exceeding greatness of the
benefit received being far greater than the misery which
comes by the first Adam, and abounding beyond it. And it
is by no means consistent with the apostle's scope, to suppose,
that the benefit which we have by Christ, as the antitype of
Adam, here mainly insisted on, is without any grace at all,
being only a restoration to life of such as never deserved
death. Another thing observable in the apostle's grand scope
from the beginning of the epistle, is, that he endeavours to
shew the greatness and absoluteness of dependence on the re
demption and righteousness of Christ, for justification and life,
that he raight magnify and exalt the Redeemer ; in which de
sign his whole heart was swallowed up, and may be looked
upon as the main design of the whole epistle. And this is
what he had been upon in the preceding part of this chapter,
inferring it from the same argument, even the utter sinfulness
and ruin of all men. And he is evidently still on the same
thing from the 12th verse to the end ; speaking of the sanie
justification and righteousness which he had dwelt on before,
and not another totally diverse. No wonder, when the apos
tle is treating so fully and largely of our restoration, righteous
ness, and life by Christ, that he is led by it to consider our
fall, sin, death, and ruin by Adam ; and to observe wherein
these two opposite heads of mankind agree, and wherein they
differ, in the manner of conveyance of opposite influences and
communications from each.

502 ORIGINAL SIN, P, II, Ch. iV.
Thus, if the place be understood, as it is used to be under
stood by orthodox divines, the whole stands in a natural, easy^
and clear connection with the preceding part of the chapter,
and all the former part of the epistle ; and in a plain agree-^
ment with the express design of all that the apostle had been
saying; and also in connection with the words last before
spoken, as introduced by the two immediately preceding
verses, where he is speaking of our justification, reconcilia
tion, and salvation by Christ ; which leads the apostle direct
ly to observe, how, on the contrary, we have sin and death by
Adam. Taking this discourse of the apostle in its true aijd
plain sense, there is no need of great extent of learning, or
depth of criticism, to find out the connection. But if it be
understood in Dr. T.'s sense, the plain scope and connection
are wholly lost, and there was truly need of skill in criticism,
and the art oi discerning, beyond or at least different from that
of former divines, and a faculty of seeing what other men's
sight could not reach, in order to find out the connection.
What has been already observed, may suffice to shew the
apostle's general scope in this place. But yet there seeras to
be some other things to which he alludes in several expressions.
As particularly, the Jews had a very superstitious and extra:
vagant notion of their law, delivered by Moses ; as if it were
the prime, grand, and indeed only rule of God's proceeding
with mankind as their judge, both in their justification and
condemnation, or from whence all, both sin and righteousness,
was imputed ; and had no consideration of the law of nature,
written in the hearts of the Gentiles, and of all mankind.
Herein they ascribed infinitely too rauch to their particular law,
beyond the true design of it. They made their boast of the
law ; as if their being distinguished from all other nations by
tbat great privilege, the giving of ike law, sufficiently made
them a holy people, and God's children. This notion of theirs
the apostle evidently refers to, chap, ii, 13, 17 — 19. and indeed
through that whole chapter. They looked on the law of Moses
as intended to be the only rule and means of justification ; and
as such, trusted in the works of the law, especially circumci
sion; which appears by the third chapter. But as for the
Gentiles, they looked on them as by nature sinners, and chil
dren of wrath ; because born of uncircumcised parents, and
aliens Icom their law, and who themselves did not know,
profess and submit to the law of Moses, becorae proselytes,
iand receive circumcision. What they esteemed the sum of
their wickedness and condemnation, was, that they did not
turn Jews, and act as Jews*, To this notion the apostle has a
* Here are worthy to be observed the things which Dr. T. himself says to the
»ame purpoSftKej, § 302, 303. and Preface to Par., on JEpist. to Eora. p. 144, 43.

Sect. ii. The true Scope of Rom. v. 12, ^c, 503
plain respect, and endeavours to convince them of its false
ness, in chap. ii. 12 — 16. And he has a manifest regard again
to the same thing here. (Chap, v, 12 — 14,) Which may lead
us the more clearly to see the true sense of these verses ;
about the sense of which is the main controversy, and the
meaning of which being determined, it will settle the mean
ing of every other controverted expression through the whole
discourse. Dr. T, misrepresents the apostle's argument in these
verses ; which, as has been demonstrated, is in his sense alto
gether vain and impertinent, He supposes, the thing which
the apostle mainly intends to prove, is, that death or mortality
does not corae on raankind by personal sin ; and that he would
prove it by this medium, that death reigned when there was no
law in being which threatened personal sin with death, It is
acknowledged that this is imphed, even that death came into
the world by Adam's sin : Yet this is not the main thing the
apostle designs to prove. But his main point evidently is,
that sin and guilt, and just exposedness to death and -ruin, came
into fhe world by Adam's sin ; as righteousness, justification,
and a title to eternal life come by Christ, Which point he
confirms by this • consideration, that from the very time when
'Adara sinned, sin, guilt, and desert of ruin became universal
¦ in the world, longi before the law given by Moses to the Jewish
nation had any being.
The apostle's remark, that sin entered into the world by
one man, who was the father of the whole human race, was an
observation which afforded proper instruction for the Jews, who
looked on themselves as an holy people, because they had the
law of Moses, and were the children of Abraham, an holy
father ; while they looked on other nations as by nature un
holy and sinners, because they were not Abraham's children.
He leads them up to a higher ancestor than this patriarch,
even to Adam, who being equally the father of Jews and
Gentiles^ both alike come from a sinful father ; from whom
guilt and pollution were derived alike to all mankind. And
this the apostle proves by an argument, which of all that could
possibly be invented, tended the most briefly and directly to
convince the Jews; even by this reflection, that death had
corae equally' on all mankind from Adam's time, and that the
i posterity of Abraham wene equally subject to it with the rest of
the world. This was apparent in fact, a thing they all knew.
And the Jews had always been taught that deatA (which began
in the destruction of the body, and of this present life) was the
¦ proper punishment of sin. This they were taught in Moses's
histol-y of Adam, and God's first threatening of punishment
for sin, and by the constant doctrine of the law and the pro
phets ; as already bbserved.

504 ORIGINAL SIN. P. Tl. Ch, iV.
And the apostle's observation — that sin was in the world
long before the law was given, and was as universal in the world
from the times of Adam, as it had been among the heathen
since the law of Moses— shewed plainly, that the Jews were
quite mistaken in their notion of their particular law ; and that
the law which is the original and universal rule of righteousness
and judgment for all mankind, was another law, of far more
ancient date, even the law of nature. This began as early as
the human nature began, and vvas established with the first
father of mankind, and in him with the whole race, The
positive precept of abstaining from the forbidden fruit was
given for the trial of his compliance with this law of nature ;
of which the main rule is supreme regard to God and his will.
And the apostle proves that it must be thus, because if the
law of Moses had been the highest rule of judgnjent, and if
there had not been a superior, prior, divine rule established,
raankind in general would not have been judged and con
demned as sinners, before that was given, (for " sin is not ira-
puted when there is no law")as it is apparent in fact they were,
because death reigned before that time, even frorii the time of
Adam, It may be observed that the apostle both in this epistle,
and in that to the Galatians, endeavours to convince the Jews
of these two things, in opposition to the notions and prejudices
they had entertained concerning «Aeir law. (I.) That it never
was intended to be the covenant, or method by which they
should actually he justifled. (2.) That it was not the highest and
universal rule or law, by which mankind in general, and parti
cularly the heathen world, were condemned. And he proves
both by similar arguments. He proves that the law of Moses
was not the covenant by which any of mankind were to obtain
justiflcation, because that covenant was of older date, being
expressly established in the time of Abraham, and Abraham
himself was justifled by it. This argument the apostle parti-.
cularly handles in the third chap, of Galatians, particularly in
ver. 17 — 19. and especially in Rom. iv. 13 — 15.- He proves
also that the law of Moses was not the prime rule of judgment,
by which mankind in general, and particularly the heathen
world, were condemned. And this he proves also the same
way, viz. by shewing this to be of older date than that law, and
that it was established with Adam. Now these things tended
to lead the Jews to right notions of their law, not as the intend
ed method of justiflcation, nor as the original and universal
rule of condemnation, but something superadded to both ; super-.
added to the latter, to illustrate and confirm it, that the offence
might abound : and superadded to the former, to be as a school
master, to prepare men for its benefits, and to magnify divine
grace in it, that this might much more abound.

OECT, ir. The true Scope of Rom. v. 12, ^c. 505
The chief occasion of obscurity and difficulty, attending
the scope and connection of the various clauses of this dis
course, particularly in the 13th and I4th verses, is, that there
are two things (although closely connected) which the apostle
has in view at once. He would illustrate the grand point he had
been upon frora the beginning, even justification through Christ's
righteousness alone, by shewing how we are originally in a sinful
miserable state, how we derive this sin and misery from Adam,
and how we are delivered and justified by Christ as a second
Adam, At the same time he would confute those foolish and
corrupt notions of the Jews, about their nation, and their law,
which were very inconsistent with these doctrines. And he here
endeavours to establish, at once, these two things in opposition
to those Jewish notions,
(I,) That it is our natural relation to Adam, and not to
Abraham, which determines our native moral state ; and that,
therefore, being natural children of Abraham, will not raake
us by nature holy in the sight of God, since we are the natural
seed of sinful Adara, Nor does the Gentiles being not descend
ed frora Abraham, denominated them sinners, any more than
the Jews, seeing both alike are descended from Adam,
(2.) That the law of Moses is not the prirae and general law
and rule of judgment for raankind, to condemn thera, and de-
norainate thera sinners ; but that the state they are in with re
gard to a higher, more ancient and universal law, determines
them in general to be sinners in^the sight of God, and liable to
be condemned as such. Which observation is, in many respects,
to the apostle's purpose ; particularly in this respect, that if the
Jews were convinced, that the law, which was the prime rule
of condemnation, was given to all, was common to all mankind,
and that all fell under condemnation through the violation of
that law by the common father of all, both Jews and Gentiles,
then they would be led more easily and naturally to believe,
that the method oi justification, which God had established,
also extended equally to all mankind : And that the Messiah,
by whom we have this justification, is appointed, as Adam was
for a common head to all, both Jews and Gentiles — The apos»
tie aiming to confute the Jewish notion, is the principal occa
sion of those words in the( 13th verse, " for until the law, sin
was in the world ; but sin is not imputed, when there is np
law," As to the import of that expression, even over ihem that
had not sinned after the similititde of Adam's transgression,
not only is the thing signified, in Dr. T.'s sense of it, not true ;
or if it had been true, would have been impertinent, as has
been shewn : But his interpretation is, otherwise, very much
strained and unnatural. According to him, " by sinning after
the similitude of Adam's transgression," is not meant any simi-
voL, II. 64

506 OBIGINAL SIN, P. II. Ch. IV.
litude ofthe act of sinning, nor of the command sinned against,
nor properly any circumstance of the sin; but only the simi
litude of a cfrcumstance of the command, viz. the threatening.
with which it is attended. A far-fetched thing truly, to be
called a similitude of sinning ! Besides, this expression in
such a meaning, is only a needless, impertinent, and awkward
repetition of the same thing, which it is supposed the apostle
had observed in the foregoing verse, even after he had pro
ceeded another step in the series of his discourse. As thus,
in the foregoing verse the apostle had plainly laid down his
argument, (as our author understands it) by which he would
prove, that death did not come by personal sin, viz. because
death reigned before any law, threatening death for personal
sin, was in being : so that the sin then committed was against
no law, threatening death for personal sin. Having laid this
down, the apostle leaves this" part of his argument, and pro-
eeeds another step, nevertheless death reigned from Adam to
Moses : And then returns, in a strange unnatural irianner, and
repeats that arguraent or assertion again, but only more ob
scurely than before, in these words, even over them that had
not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression ; i, e.
over them that had not sinned against a law threatening death
for personal sin. Which is just the same thing as ifthe apostle
had said, " they that sinned before the law, did not sin against
all law threatening death for personal sin ; for there was no
such law for any to sin against at that time : Nevertheless
death reigned at that time, even over such as did not sin against
a law threatening death for personal sin." Which latter clause
adds nothing to the premises, and tends nothing to illustrate
what was said before, but rather to obscure and darken it.
The particle (mi) even, when prefixed in this manner, is used
to signify something additional, some advance in the sense or
argument ; implying that the words following express some
thing more, or express the same thing more fully, plainly, or
forcibly. But to unite two clauses by such a particle, in such
a manner, when there is nothing besides a flat repetition, with
no superadded sense or force, but rather a greater uncer
tainty and obscurity, would be very unusual, and indeed very
absurd, I can see no reason why we should be dissatisfied with
that explanation of this clause, which has more commonly
been given, viz. That by them who have not sinned after the
similitude of Adam's transgression, are meant infants; who,
though they have indeed sinned in Adam, yet never sinned as
Adam did, by actually transgressing in their own persons;
unless it be, that this interpretation is too old, and too common.
It was well understood by those to whom tbe apostle wrote,
that vast numbers had died in infancy, within that period of

Sect. ii. The true Scope of Rom. v, 12, &e. 597
which he speaks, particularly in the tirae of the deluge. And
it would be strange, that the apostle should not have the case
of such infants in his raind ; even supposing his scope were
what our author supposes, and he had only intended to prove
that death did not come on mankind for their personal sin.
How directly would it have served the purpose of proving this,
to have mentioned so great a part of mankind who are subject
to death, and who, all know, never committed any sin in their
own persons ? How much more plain and easy the proof of the
point by that, than to go round about, as Dr, T, supposes, and
bring in a thing so dark and uncertain as this, that God never
would bring death on all mankind for personal sin, (^though
they had personal sin) without an express revealed constitution ;
and then to observe, that there was no revealed constitution of
this nature from Adam to Moses, — which also seems to be an
assertion without any plam evidence — and then to infer, that
it must needs be so, that it could come only on occasion of
Adam's sin, though not for his sin, or as any punishment of it ;
which inference also is very dark and unintelligible.
If the apostle in this place meant those who never sinned
by their personal act, it is not strange that he should express
this by their not sinning after the similitude of Adam's trans
gression. We read of two ways of men being like Adam, or
in which a similitude to him is ascribed to men : One is, being
begotten or born in his image or likeness. Gen, v. 3, Another
is, transgressing God's Covenant or law, like him, Hos. vi. 7.
They like Adam, (so, in the Heb. and Vulg. Lot.) have trans
gressed the covenant. Infants have the former similitude, but
not the latter. And it was very natural, when the apostle
would infer that infants become sinners by that one act and
offence of Adam, to observe, that they had not renewed the
act of sin themselves, by any second instance of a like sort.
And such might be the state of language among Jews and Chris
tians at that day, that the apostle might have no phrase more
aptly to express this meaning. The manner in which the epi
thets, personal and actual, are used and applied now in this
case, is probably of later date, and more modern use.
And the apostle having the case of infants in view, in this
expression, makes it more to his purpose to mention death
reigning before the law of Moses was given. For the Jews
looked on all nations besides themselves as sinners, by virtue
of their law ; being made so especially by the law of circum
cision, given first to Abraham, and completed by Moses, making
the want of circumcision a legal pollution, utterly disqualifying
for the privileges of the sanctuary. This law, the Jews sup
posed, made the very infants of the Gentiles to be sinners, pol
luted and hatefiil to God ; they being uncircumcised, and born
of uncircumcised parents. But the apostle proves against these

50S biiifiiNAL SIN. P. II. Ch. iV<
riotidns of the Jews, that the nations of the world do not be
come sinners by nature, and sinners from infancy, by virtue of
^Aeir law, in this manner, but by Adara's sin : Inasrauch as
infants were treated as sinners long before the law of circura
cision was given, as well as before they had coraraitted actual
sin. What has been said, may, as I humbly conceive, lead us
to that which is the true scope and sense of the apostle in these
three verses ; which I will endeavour more briefly to represent
in the following ^arapAra^e,.
12. Wherefore, "The things which I have largely
as by one man sin en- insisted on, viz. -the evil that is in the
tered into the world, world, the general wickednessi guilt and
and death by sin; ruin of mankind, and the opposite good,
and so death passed even justification and life, as only by
npon oilmen, for that Christ, lead me to observe the likeness of
iftZZ have sinned. the manner in which they are each of
them introduced. For it Was by one man
that the general corruption and guilt
which I have spoken of, came into the
world, and condemnation and death by
sin : And this dreadful punishraent and
ruin came on all mankind by the great law
of works, originally established with man
kind in their first father, and by his one
offence, or breach of that law ; «ZZ thereby
becoming sinners in God's sight, and ex
posed to final destruction.
13. For until the " It is manifest that it was in this
law sin was in ihe way the world became sinful and guilty ;
world : But sin is and not in that way which the Jews sup-
- not imputed when pose, viz. That their law, given by Moses
there is no laiv, is the grand universal rule of righteous
ness and judgment for mankind, and that
it is by being Gentiles, uncircumcised,
and aliens from that law, that the na
tions of the world are constituted sinners,
and unclean. For before the law of Moses
was given, mankind were all looked up
on by the great Judge as sinners, by
corruption and guilt derived from Adam's
violation of the original law of works;
which shews, that the original universal
rule of righteousness is not the law of
Moses ; for if so, there would have been
no sin imputed before that was given ;
because sin is not imputed, when there
fe no law.

Sect. ii. The true Scope of Rom. v. 12, ^c. 500
" But that at that time sin was im- 14; Neveriheless,
puted, and men were by their judge death reigned from
reckoned as sinners, through guilt and Adam to MoSes,
corruption derived from Adam, and con- even over them ihat
demned for sin to death, the proper had not sinned af-
punishment of sin, we have a plain proof ter the similitude of
in that it appears in fact, all mankind, Adam's transgres-
during that whole time which preceded sion.
the law of Moses, were subjected to that
temporal death, which is the visible in
troduction and image of that utter
destruction which sin deserves, not ex
cepting even infants, who could be sin
ners no other way than by virtue of
Adam's transgression, having never in
their own persons actually sinned as
Adam did ; nor could at that time be
made polluted by the law of Moses, as
being uncircumcised, or born of uncir
cumcised parents."
Now, by way of reflection on the whole, I would observej
that though there are two or three expressions in this para*
graph, Rom. v. 12, &c. the design of which is attended with
some difficulty and obscurity, as particularly iir the 13th and
Llth verses, yet the scope and sense of the discourse in general
is not obscure, but on the contrary very clear and manifest ;
and so is the particular doctrine mainly taught in it. The
apostle sets himself with great care to make it plain, and pre
cisely to fix and settle the point he is upon. And the discourse
is so framed, that one part of it greatly clears and fixes the
meaning of other parts ; and the whole is determined by the
clear connection it stands in with other parts of the epistle and
by the manifest drift of all the preceding part of it.
The doctrine of original sin is not only here taught, but
most plainly, exphcitly, and abundantly taught. This doctrine
is asserted, expressly or impliedly, in almost every verse, and
in some of the verses several times. It is fully implied in that
first expression in the 12th ver. By one man sin entered into
the world. The passage implies, that sin became universal in
the world ; as the apostle had before largely shewn it was •
and not raerely (which would be a trifling observation) that one'
raan, who was made first, sinned first, before other men sinned -
or, that it did not so happen that many men began to sin just •
together at the same moment. The latter part of the verse
and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, for that
(or, if you will, unio which) all have sinned, shews that in the
eye of the Judge of the worid, in Adam's first sin all sinned ;
not only in .?ome .sort, but all sinned .so as fo be exposed to that

510 ORKJINAL SIN. P. II, Ch. IV.
death, and final destruction, which is the proper wages of sin.
The same doctrine is taught again twice over in the 14th verse.
It is there observed, as a proof of this doctrine, that death
rmgned over them which had not sinned after the similitfude of
Adam's transgression, i. e. by their personal act ; and therefore
coiild be exposed to death, only by driving guilt and pollution i-
from Adam, in consequence of his sin. And it is taught again
in those words, who is the figure of him that was io come. The
resemblance lies very much in this circumstance, viz. our de
riving sin, guilt, and punishment by Adam's sin, as we do righ
teousness, justification, and the reward of life by Christ's obe
dience ; for so the apostle explains himself The same doctrine
is expressly taught again, ver. 15. Through the offence of one,
many be dead. And again twice in the I6th verse, it was by one
that sinned : i. e. It was by Adam, that guilt and punishraent
(before spoken of) came on mankind : And in these words,
judgment was by one to condemnation. It is again plainly and
fully laid down in the 17th verse, by one man's offence death
reigned by one. So again in the 18th verse, By the offence of
one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation. Again
very plainly in the 19th verse, " By one man's disobedience,
many were made sinners."
Here is every thing to determine and fix the meaning of
all the important terms used ; As, the abundant use of them
in all parts of the New Testament ; and especially in this apos
tle's writings, which make up a very great part of the New
Testament ; and his repeated use of them in this epistle in
particular ; and in the former part of this very chapter ; and also
the light that one sentence in this paragraph casts on another,
which fully settles their meaning : As, with respect to the
words justification,righteousness, and condemnation'; and above
all, in regard of the word sin, which is the most important of
all, with relation to the doctrine and controversy we are upon.
Besides the constant use of this term every where else through
the New Testament, through the epistles of this apostle, this
epistle in particular, and even the former part of this chapter,"
it is often repeated in this very paragraph, and evidently used
in the very sense that is denied to belong to it in the end of
ver. 12. and ver. 19. though owned every where else. And its
meaning is fully deterrained by the apostle varying the term ;
using together with it, to signify the same thing, such a variety
of other synonymous words, such as offence, transgression, dis
obedience. And further, to put the matter out of all contro
versy, it is particularly, expressly, and repeatedly distinguish
ed from that which our opposers would explain, it by, viz.
condemnation and death. And what is meant by sin entering
into the world, in ver. 12, is determined by a like phrase of
sin being in the world, in the next verse. — And that by the

iSECT. II. The true Scope of Rom. x.Vi, ^c. 511
offence of one, so often spoken of here, as bringing death and
condemnation on all, the apostle means the sin of one, de
rived in its guilt and pollution to mankind in general (over and
above all that has. been already observed) is determined by
those words in the conclusion of this discourse, ver. ^0. " More
over, the law entered, that the offence might abound : But where
sin abounded, grace did much more abound." These words
plainly show, that the offence spoken of so often, the offence
of one raan, becarae the sin oi all. For when he says, TAe law
entered, that the offence might abound, his raeaning cannot be,
that the offence of Adara, raerely as Ais personally, should
abound ; but, as it exists in its derived guilt, corrupt influence,
and evil fruits, in the sin of raankind in general, even as a tree
in its root and branches.*
What further confirms the certainty of the proof oi o-rigi
nal sin, which this place affords, is this, that the utmost art
cannot pervert it to another sense. What a variety of the most
artful methods have been used by the ei, emies of this doctrine,
to wrest and darken this paragraph of holy writ, which stands
so rauch in their way ; as it were, to force the bible to speak a
language agreeable to their mind ! How have expressions
been strained, words and phrases racked ! What strange
figures of speech have been invented, and with violent hands
thrust into the apostle's mouth ; and then with a bold counte
nance and magisterial airs obtruded on the world, as from him !
But blessed be God, we have his words as he delivered them,
and the rest of the same epistle, and his other writings to com
pare with thera ; by which his meaning stands in too strong and
glaring a light to be hid by any of the artificial mists which
they labour to throw upon it.
It is really no less than abusing the scripture and its read
ers, to represent this paragraph as the most obscure oi all the
places of scripture, that speak of the consequences of Adam's
sin ; and to treat it as if there was need first to consider other
places as more plain. Whereas, it is most manifestly a place
in which these things are declared, the most plainly, parti
cularly, precisely, and of set purpose, by that great apostle,
who has raost fully explained to us those doctrines in general,
which relate to the redemption by Christ, and the sin and mi
sery we are redeeraed from. And it must be now left to the
* The offence, according to Dr. T.'s explanation, does not abound by the laie
at all really and truly, in any sense ; neither the sin, nor the punishment. For he
says, " The meaning is not, that men should be made more wicked ; but, that
men should be liable to death for every transgression." But after all, they are
liable to no more deaths, nor to any worse deaths, if they are not more sinful :
For they were to have punishments according to their desert before. Such
as died, and went into another world before the law of Moses was given,
¦were punished acpording to their deserts; and the law, when il came, threatened
no more.

512 - ORIGINAL siiv, P. lit. Ch, i.
reader's judgment, whether the christian church has not pro
ceeded reasonably, in looking on this as a place of scripture
raost clearly and fully treating of these things, and in using its
determinate sense as a help to settle the meaning of raany
other passages of sacred writ.
As this place in general is Very full and plain, so the doc
trine of the corruption of nature, as derived from Adam, and
also the imputation of his first sin, are both clearly taught in it.
The imputation of Adam's one transgression, is indeed most
directly and frequently asserted. We are here assured, that
by one man's sin, death passed on all ; all being adjudged to
this punishment, as having sinned (so it is implied) in that one
man's sin. And it is repeated, over and over, that all are con
demned, many are dead, many made sinners, <fcc. by one man's
offence, by the disobedience of one, and by one offence. Arid
the doctrine of original depravity is also here taught, when the
apostle says. By one man sin entered into the world; having a
plain respect (as hath been shewn) to that universal corrup
tion and wickedness, as well as guilt, of which he had before
largely treated.

PART III,
THE EVIDENCE GIVEN US RELATIVE TO THE DOCTRINE OF ORI,
GINAL SIN, IN WHAT THE SCRIPTURES REVEAL, CONCERN--
ING THE REDEMPTION BY CHRIST.

CHAPTER I.

TAe Evidence of Original Sin, from the Nature of Redemp
tion, in the Procurement of it.
According to Dr. T.'s scheme, a very great part of man
kind are the subjects of Christ's redemption^ who live and die
perfectly innocent, who never have had, and never will have
any sin charged to their account, and never are exposed to
any punishment whatsoever, viz. all that die in infancy. They
are tlie subjects of Christ's redemption, as he redeems them
from death, or as they by his righteousness have justification.

GatAp, I, Proof from Redemption by Clirist. 513
and by his obedience are made righteous, in the resurrection of
the body, in the sense of Rom, v, 17, 19, And all mankind
are thus the subjects of Christ's redemption, while they are
perfectly guiltless, and exposed to no punishment, as by Christ
they are entitled to a resurrection. Though, with respect to
such persons as have sinned, he allows it is in some sort by
Christ and his death, that they are saved from sin, and the
punishment of it.
Now let us see whether such a scheme well consists with
the scripture-account of the redemption by Jesus Christ,
I, The representations of the redemption by Christ, every
where in scripture, lead us to suppose, that aZZ whom he carae
to redeera are sinners ; that his salvation, as to the terra from
which (or the evil to be redeemed frora) in all, is sin, and the
deserved punishment of sin. It is natural to suppose, that when
he had his name Jesus, or Saviour, given him by God's special
and iramediate appointment, the salvation meant by that name
should be his salvation in general ; and not only a part of his
salvation, and with regard only to some of thera whora he
carae to save. But this narae was given hira to signify Ais sav
ing his people from their sins. Mat. i. 21. And the great
doctrine of Christ's salvation is, that Ae came into the ivorld to
save sinners, 1 Tira. i. 15, And that Christ hath once suffer
ed, the just for the unjust, 1 Pet, iii, 18, In this was manifest
ed the love of God towards us, (towards such in general as
have the benefit of God's love in giving Christ) that God sent
his only begotten son into the world, that we might live through
him. Herein is love, ihat he sent his son to be the propitiation
for our sins, 1 John iv, 9, 10, Many other texts might be
mentioned, which seera evidently to suppose, that all who are
redeeraed by Christ, are saved from sin. We are led by what
Christ himself said, to suppose, that if any are not sinners, they
have no need of hira as a Redeemer, any raore than a raan in
health of a physician, Mark ii, 17, And that, in order to our
being the proper subjects of the mercy of God through Christ,
we must first be in a state of sin, is iraplied in Gal. iii, 22. "But
the scripture hath concluded all under sin, that the promise by
faith of Jesus Christ might be given to them that believe," To
the same effect is Rora. xi, 32.
These things are greatly confirmed by the scripture-doc
trine of sacrifices. It is abundantly plain, both frora the Old
and New Testaraent, that these were types of Christ's death,
and were for sin, and supposed sin in those for whora they
were offered. The apostle supposes, that in order to any hav
ing the benefit of *Ae eternal inheritance by Christ there must
of necessity be the death Of the testator ; and gives that reason
for it, that without shedding of blood there is no remission, Heb,
ix. 15, &c. And Christ himself, in representing the benefit of
VOL. II. 65

514 oftiGiNAL SIN, Part in.
his blood, in the institution of the Lord's supper, under the
notion of the blood of a testament, calls it. The blood of the
New Testament shed for the remission of sins. Matt, xxvi, 28.
But according to the scheme of our author, many have the
eternal inheritance by the death of the testator, who never had
any need of remission,
II. The scripture represents the redemption by Christ,
as a redemption from deserved destruction ; and that, not mere
ly as it respects some particulars, but as the fruit of God's love
to mankind. John iii. 16. " God so loved the world, that he gave
his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should
not perish, but have everlasting life ;" iraplying, that other
wise they raust perish, or be destroyed. But what necessity
of this, if they did not deserve to be destroyed ? Now, that
the destruction here spoken of, is deserved destruction, is ma
nifest, because it is there corapared to the perishing of such of
the children of Israel as died by the bite of the fiery serpents,
which God in his wrath, for their rebellion, sent araongst them.
And the same thing clearly appears by the last verse of the
same chapter, " He that believeth on the Son, hath everlasting
life ; and he that believeth not the Son, shall not see hfe, but
the wrath of God abideth on him," or, is left remaining on
him : Implying, that all in general are found under the wrath
of God, and that they only of all mankind who are interested
in Christ, have this wrath removed, and eternal life bestowed;
the rest are left with the wrath of God still remaining on them.
The sarae is clearly illustrated and confirraed by John v.24:.
" He that believeth, hath everlasting life, and shall not come
into condemnation, but is passed from death to life." In being
passed from death to life is implied, that before they were all
in a state of death ; and they are spoken of as being so by a
sentence of condemnation ; and if it be a just condemnation, it
is a deserved conderanation.
HI. It will follow on Dr. T.'s scheme, that Christ's re
demption, with regard to a great part of them who are the sub
jects of it, is not only a redemption from no sin, but from no
calamity, and so from no evil of any kind. For as to death
which infants are redeeraed frora, they never were subjected
to it as a calamity, but purely as a benefit. It carae by no
threatening or curse denounced upon or through Adam ; the
covenant with him being utterly abolished, as to all its force
and power on raankind (according to our author) before the
sentence of raortality. Therefore trouble and death could
be appointed to innocent mankind no other way than on ac-
count of another covenant, the covenant of grace ; and in this
channel they come only as favours, not as evils. Therefore
they could need no remedy, for they had no disease. Even
death itself, which it is supposed Christ saves them from, is

I

Chap, i. Proof from Redemption by Christ. 515
only a medicine ; and one of the greatest of benefits. It is
ridiculous to talk of person's needing a medicine, or a physi
cian to save them frora an excellent medicine ; or of a remedy
froni a happy remedy ! If it be said, though death be a benefit,
et it is so because Christ cAan^es it, and turns it into a benefit,
y procuring a resurrection : I would ask, what can be meant
by turning or changing 'it into a benefit, when it never was other
wise, nor could ever justly be otherwise ? Infants could not
at all be brought under death as a calamity ; for they never
deserved it. And it would be only an abuse (be it far frora us,
to ascribe such a thing to God) in any being, to offer any poor
sufferers, a Redeemer from a calamity which Ae had brought
upon them, without the least desert of it on their part.
But it is plain, that mortality was not at first brought on
mankind as a blessing, by the covenant of grace through Christ ;
and that Christ and grace do not bring mankind under death,
but find them under it, 2 Cor, v, 14, " We thus judge, that
if one died for all, then were all dead." Luke xix, 10. " The
son of man is corae to seek and save that which was lost."
The grace which appears in providing a deliverer from any
state, supposes the subject to be in that state prior to his deli
verance. In our author's seherae, there never could be any
sentence of death or condemnation, that requires a Saviour
frora it ; because the very sentence itself, according to the true
meaning of it, imphes and raakes sure all that good, which is
requisite to abolish and make void the seeming evil to the
innocent subject. So that the sentence itself is in effect
the deliverer ; and there is no need of another to deliver from
that sentence. Dr. T, insists upon it, that " nothing coraes up
on us in consequence of Adam's sin, .in any sense, kind, or
DEGREE, inconsistent with the original blessing pronounced on
Adam at his creation ; and nothing but what is perfectly con
sistent with God's blessing, love and goodness, declared to
Adam as soon as he carae out of his Maker's hands,"* If the
case be so, it is certain there is no evil or calamity at all for
Christ to redeera us frora ; unless things agreeable to the divine
goodness, love and blessing, are things frora which we need re-
deraption,t IV, It will follow, on our author's principles, not only
with respect to infants, but even adult persons, that rederap
tion 'is needless, and Christ is dead in vain. Not only is there
no need of Christ's redemption in order to deliverance from
any consequences of Adara's sin, but also in order to periect
* Page 88, 89, S.
t In this inferential short reply, our author is not quite so guarded as usual.
It seems applicable only to infants ; since adults have actual or personal sin and
gwlt from which to be redeeraed. But what immediately follows anticipates the
objection, — W.

516 oaiGiSAL SIN. Part iii,
freedora from personcd sin, and all its evil consequences, Eor
God hasmade other sufficient, provision for that, viz, a sufficient
power and, ability, in all mankind, to do all their duty, and
wholly to avoid sin Yea, he insists upon it, that " when raen
have not sufficient power to do their duty, they have no duty
to do. We may safely and assuredly conclude, (says he) that
mankind in all parts of the world have sufficient power to do
the duty which God requires of them ; and that he requires of
them NO MORE than they have sufficient powers to do.* And
in another, place,t "God has given powers equal to the duty
which he expects." And he expresses a great dislike at R. R's
supposing, that our propensities to evil, and temptations, are
too strong to be effectually and constantly resisted ; or
that we are unavoidably sinful in a degree ; that our appetites
and passions will be breaking out, notwithstanding our ever
lasting watchfulness."! These things fully imply, that raen
have in their own natural ability sufficient means to avoid sin,
and to be perfectly free from it ; and so, frora all the bad con
sequences of it. And if the raeans are sufficient, then there is
no need of more; and therefore there is no need of Christ
dying, in order to it. What Dr, T, says, (p, 72, S,) fully ira-
plies, that it would be unjust in God to give mankind being in
such circumstances, as that they would be raore likely to sin,
so as to be exposed to final misery than otherwise. Hence
then, without Christ and his redemption, and without any
grace at all, mere justice raakes sufficient provision for our
being free frora sin and raisery, by our own power.§
If all mankind, in all parts of the world, have such suf
ficient power to do their whole duty, without being sinful in
any degree, then they have sufficient power to obtain righ
teousness by the law : and then, according to the apostle Paul.
Christ is dead in vain. Gal. ii. 21. "If righteousness come by
law, then Christ is dead in vain ;" — Sm vojuix, without the article,
by law, or the rule of right action, as our author explains the
phrase,|| And according to the sense in which he explains
this very place, " it would have frustrated, or rendered useless
the grace of God, if Christ died to accomplish what was or
MIGHT have been effected by law itself, without his death,"Tr
So that it most clearly follows from his own doctrine, that
Christ is dead in vain, and the grace of God is useless. The
same apostle says, if there had been a law which could have
given life, verily righteousness should have been by the law. Gal.
* Page ill, 63, 64. S. ] Page 67. S. J Page 68. S.
I Here also, our author -mW be thought not quite accurate, in the inference
he draws against Dr. T. for the " sufficient power," for which Dr. T. pleads, re
lates only to the prevention of sin, but not to its remission, or the removal of its
0ects. But this also will soon be answered. — W.
I! Pref. to Par. on Rom. p. 143, 38. H Note on Eom. v. 80. p. 297.

Chap,, i. Proof from Redemption by Christ. 517
iii, 21. i, e, (still according to Dr. T.'s own sense) if there was
a law, that man, in his present state, had sufficient power per
fectly to fulfil. For Dr. T, supposes the reason why the law
could not give life, to be " not because it was weak in itself,
but through the weakness of our flesh, and the infirmity ofthe
human naturein the present state."* But he says, "We are
under a mild dispensation of grace, making allowance for
our infirmities."t By our inflrmities, we may upon good grounds
suppose he raeans that infirmity of huraan nature, which he
gives as the reason why the law cannot give life. But what
grace is there in raaking that allowance for our infirmities,
which justice itself (according to his doctrine) most absolutely
requires, as he supposes divine justice exactly proportions our
duty to our ability ?
Agaui, if it be said, that although Christ's redemption
was not necessary to preserve men from beginning to sin, and
getting into a course of sin, because they have sufficient power
in theraselves to avoid it ; yet it may be necessary to deliver
men, after they have by their own folly brought theraselves
under the dominion of evil appetites and passions,^ I answer,
if it be so, that raen need deliverance from those habits and
passions, which are become too strong for them, yet that de
liverance, on our author's principles, would be no salvation
from sin. For, the exercise of passions which are too strong
for us, and which we cannot overcome, is necessary ; And he ¦
strongly urges, that a necessary evil can be no moral evil.
It is true, it is the effect of evil, as it is the effect of a bad
practice, while the man had power to have avoided- it. But
then according to Dr, T, that evil cause alone is sin ; for he
says expressly, " the cause oi every effect is alone chargea
ble with the effect it produceth, or which proceedeth from it."§
And as to that sin which was the cause, the man needed no
Saviour from ihat, having had sufficient power in himself to
have avoided it. So that it follows, by our author's scheme,
that none oi mankind, neither infants nor adult persons, neither
the more nor less vicious, neither Jews nor Gentiles, neither
Heathens nor Christians, ever did or ever could stand in any
need of a Saviour ; and that, with respect to all, the truth is,
Christ is dead in vain.
If any should say, although all raankind in all ages have
sufficient ability to do their whole duty, and so may by their
own power enjoy perfect freedom frora sin, yet God foresaw
that they woidd sin, and that after they had sinned, they would
need Christ's death, I answer, it is plain, by what the apostle
» Note on Rom. v. 20. p. 297. ] Page 92. S.
I See p. 228. and also what he says of the helpless state of the heathen, in
paraph, and notes on Rom. vii, and beginning of chap. viii. § Page 128v

518 ORIGINAL SIS. Part ui.
says in those places which were just now mentioned, (Gal. ii.
21. and iii. 21.) that God would have esteemed it needless to
give his Son to die for men, unless there had been a prior im-
possibihty of their having righteousness by any law ; and that,
if there had been a law which could have giveri life, this other
way by the death of Christ would not have been provided.
And this appears to be agreeable to our author's own sense of
things, by his words which have been cited, wherein he says,
" It would have prostrated or rendered useless the grace of
God, if Christ died to accomplish what was or might have
BEEN effected by law itself, without his death."
V, It will follow on Dr, T,'s scheme, not only that Christ's
rederaption is needless for saving frora sin, or its consequences,
but also that it does no good that way, has no tendency to any
diminution of sin in the world. For as to any infusion oi virtue
or holiness into the heart, by divine power through Christ or his
rederaption, it is altogether inconsistent with this author's no
tions. With him, inwrought virtue, if there were any such
thing, would be no virtue ; not being the effect of our own will,
choice, and design, but only of a sovereign act of God's pow
er*. And therefore, all that Christ does to increase virtue, is
only increasing our talents, our light, advantages, raeans and
raotives ; as he often explains the raatter t. But sin is not at
all diminished. For he says, our duty must be -measured by our
talents ; as, a child that has less talents, has less duty ; and
therefore must be no more exposed to commit sin, than he that
has greater talents ; because he that has greater talents, has
more duty required, in exact proportion J. If so he that haa
but one talent, has as much advantage to perform that one de
gree of duty which is required of him, as he that has flve tal-
Jents, to perform his/ve degrees of duty, and is no more expos
ed to fail of it. And that man's guilt, who sins against great
er advantages, raeans, and motives, is greater in proportion
to his talents §, And therefore it will follow, on Dr, T,'s prin
ciples, that men stand no better chance, have no more eligible
or valuable probability of freedom from sin and punishraent, or
of contracting but little guilt, or of performing required duty,
with thc great advantages and talents iraplied in Christ's
redemption, than without them ; when all things are cora-
puted, and put into the biilances together, the nurabers, de
grees, and aggravations of sin exposed to, degrees of duty
required, &.c. So that men have no redemption from sin, and
no new means of perforraing duty, that are valuable or worth
any thing at all. And thus the great redemption by Christ in
.every respect comes to nothing, with regard both to infants
and adult persons,
* See p. 180, 245, 250. f In p. 44, 50, and innumerable other places.
i See page 334, 61, 64—72. S. § See Paraph, Roija, ii, 0. also on ver. 12.

Chap. II. Proof from Redemption' by Christ. 519

CHAP. II.
TAe Evidence of the Doctrine of Original Sin from what the
Scripture teaches of ihe Application of Redemption.
The truth of the doctrine of original sin is very clearly -
manifest from what the scripture says of that change of state,
which it represents as necessary to an actual interest in the spir
itual and eternal blessings of the Redeemer's kingdom.
In order to this, it speaks of it as absolutely necessary for
every one, that he be regenerated, or born again. John iii. 3.
" Verily, verily, I say unto thee, except a man {ysvvri^ri m/u.^sv,)
he begotten again, or born again, he cannot see the kingdora of
God." Dr. T. though he will not allow that this signifies any
change from a state oi natural propensity to sin, yet supposes that
the new birth here spoken of, means a man's being brought to
" a divine life, in a right use and application of the natural pow
ers, in a life of true holiness* :" And that it is the attainment of
those habits of virtue and religion, which gives us the real cha
racter of true christians, and the children of God ;] and that it
is putting on the new nature of right action.f
But in order to proceed in the most sure and safe manner
in understanding what is meant in scripture by being born again,
and so in the inferences we draw from what is said ofthe ne
cessity of it, let us compare scripture with scripture, and con
sider what other terms or phrases are used, where respect is evi
dently had to the same change. And here I would observe the
following things.
I. If we compare one scripture with another, it will be
sufficiently manifest, that by regeneration, or being begotten or
bom again, the same change in the state of the mind is signi
fied with that which the scripture speaks of as effected in true
REPENTANCE and CONVERSION. I put repentance and conver
sion together, because the scripture puts them together. Acts
iii. 19. and because they plainly signify much the same thing.
The word {iJ-sravoia) repentance signifies a change of the mind ;
as the word conversion, means a change or turning from sin to
God. And that this is the same change with that which is call
ed regeneration, (excepting that this latter term especially sig
nifies the change, as the mind is passive in it) the following
things may shew.
In the change which the raind undergoes in repentance and
conversion, is attained that character of true christians which is
* Page 144. t Page 246, 248. i Page 231.

.V20 OKioiSAL SIK. Part hi.
necessary to the eternal privileges of such. Acts iii. 19.
" repent ye therefore, and be converted, that your sins may be
blotted out, when the times of refreshing shall come from the
presence of the Lord." — And thus it is in regeneration ; ns is
evident from what Christ says to Nicodemus, and as is allowed
by Dr. T,
The change of the raind in repentance is that in which
saving faith is attained, Mark i, 15, " The kingdom of God is
at hand, repent ye, and beUeve the gospel," And so it is in be
ing born again, or born of God ; as appears by John i. 12, 13.
" But as many as received him . to them he ggve power to become
the sons of God, even to thein that bclicvr on his name, which
were bom not of blood, &c, but of God," — Just as Christ says
concerning coiwersion, Matth. xviii, 3. " Verily, verily, I say
unto you, Except ye be converted and become as little children,
ye shall not enter the kingdom of heaven :" So does ho
say concerning being born again, in what he spalce to Nicode
mus, By the change men undergo in conversion^ they become
as little children : which appears in the place last cited : And
so they do hy regeneration. (I Pet. i. 23. and H. 2.) "Being
born again. —Wherefore, as new-born babes, desire," &c. It
is no objection, that the disciples to whom Christ spake in
Matth, xviii. 3. were converted dlready : This makes it not less
proper for Christ to declare the necessity of conversion to
them, leaving it with them to try themselves, and to make
sure their conversion : In like manner as he declared to them the
necessity of repentance, in Luke xiii. 3,5. " Except ye repent, ye
shall all likewise perish."
The change effected by repentance is expressed and exhib
ited by baptism. Hence it is called the baptism of repentance.
(Matth, iii, 11. Luke iii. 3, Acts xiii. 24, and xix, 4.) And so is
regeneration, or being born again, expressed by baptism ; as is
evident by such representations of regeneration as those, John
iii. 5, " Except a man be born of water, nnd of tho spirit," —
Tit. iii. 5. " He saved us by the washing of regeneration, — Many
other things might be observed, to shew that the change men
pass under in their repentance and conversion, is the same with
that of which they are the subjects in regeneration — But these
observations may be sufficient.
II, The change which a man undergoes when born again,
and in his repentance and conversion, is the same that thc scrip-
ture calls the circumcision of the heart. — This may easily
appear by considering, that as regeneration is that in which arc
attained the habits of true v'trtuc and holiness, ns has been shewn,
and as is confessed ; so is circumcision of heart. Deut, xxx, 6,
" And the Lord thy God will circumcise thine heart, and the
heart of thy seed, to love the Lord thy God with all thine heart,
and with all thv soul."

Chap. ii. Proofs from Application of Redemption, -"i^l
Regeneration is that whereby men come to have the
character of true christians ; as is evident, and as is confessed ;
and so is circuracision of heart ; for by this men become Jews
inwardly, or Jews in the spiritual and christian sense, (and that
is the same as being true christians) as of old, proselytes were
made Jews by circumcision of the flesh. Rom. ii. 28, 29. " For
he is not a Jew, which is one outwardly ; neither is that c'lr-
cumcision which is outward in the flesh : But he is a Jew, which
is one inwardly ; and circumcision is that of the heart, in the
spirit and not in the letter, whose praise is not of men, but of
God." That circuracision ofthe heart is the same with conversion
or turning from sin to God, is evident by Jer. iv. 1 — 4 " If thou
wilt return, O Israel, return unto -me. Circumcise your
selves to the Lord, and put away the foreskins of your
heart." And Deut. x. 16. " Circumcise therefore the foreskin
of your heart, and be no more stiffnecked." Circumcision of
the heart is the same change of the heart that men experience
in repentance; as is evident by Levit. xxvi. 41. "If their mh-
circumcised hearts be humbled, and they accept the punishment
of their iniquity."
The change effected in regeneration, repentance, and con
version, is signified by baptism, as has been shewn ; and so is
circumcision of the heart signified by the same thing. None
will deny that it was this internal circumcision, which of old
was signified by external circumcision ; nor will any deny,
now under the New Testament, that inward and spiritual bap
tism, or the cleansing of the heart, is signified by external
washing or baptism. But spiritual circumcision and spiritual
baptism are the same thing ; both being " putting off the body
of the sins of the flesh;" as is very plain by Colos. ii. II — 13.
" In whom also ye are circumcised, with the circumcision made
without hands, in putting off the body of the sins of the flesh,
by the circumcision of Christ, buried with him in baptism,
wherein also ye are risen with him," &c.
Ill, This inward change, called regeneration and circum
cision of the heart, which is wrought in repentance and conver
sion, is the same with that spiritual resurrection so often
spoken of, and represented as a dying unto sin, and a living
unto righteousness. — This appears with great plainness in that
last cited place. Col, ii. " In whom also ye are circumcised,
with the circuracision raade without hands, — buried with him
in baptisra, wherein also ye are risen with him, through the
faith of the operation of God, &c. And you, being dead hi
your sins, and the uncircumcision of your flesh, hath he quick
ened together with him; having forgiven you all trespasses."
VOL II. 66

522 oEittiNAL SIN. Part hi.
The same appears by Rom. vi. 3—5. " Know ye not, that
so many of us as were baptized into Jesus Christ, were baptised
into his death ? Therefore we are buried with him by baptism
into death ; that like as Christ was raised up from the dead by
the glory of the Father, even so we also should walk in newness
of- life," &c. ver. 11. Likewise reckon ye also yourselves to be
dead unto sin, but alive unio God, through Jesus Christ our
Lord." In which place also it is evident, and by the whole
context, that this spiritual resurrection is that change in which
persons are brought to habits of holiness and to the divine life,
by which Dr. T. describes the thing obtained in being born
again. That a spiritual resurrection to a new, divine life, should
be called a being bom again, is agreeable to the language of
scripture. So those words in the iid Psalm, " Thou art my Son,
this day have I begotten thee," are applied to Christ's resurrec
tion. Acts xiii, 33, So in Col, i, 18, Christ is called theflrst born
Jrom the dead ; and in Rev. i, 5, TAe flrst begotten of the
dead. The saints in their conversion or spiritual resurrection,
are risen with Christ, and are begotten and born with him.
1 Pet, i, 3, "Who hath begotten us again to a lively hopCj
by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, to an inher
itance incorruptible," This inheritance is the same thing with
that KINGDOM of heaven which men obtain by being bom
again, according to Christ's words to Nicodemus ; and that
same "inheritance of thera that are sanctified," spoken of as
what is obtained in true conversion. Acts xxvi, 18, " To turn
them (pr convert thera) from darkness to light, and from the
power of Satan unto God, that they may receive forgiveness of
sin, and inheritance among them that are sanctified, through
-faith that is in me," Dr. T.'s own words, in his note on Rom.
i. 4, speaking of that place in the iid Psalm, are very worthy
to be here recited. He observes how this is applied to Christ's
¦resurrection and exaltation, in the New Testament, and then
has this remark, ' note, begetting is conferring a new and happy
state : A son is a person put into it. Agreeably to this, good -
men are said to be the sons of God, as they are the sons of
the resurrection to eternal life, which is represented as a
•KaKiyysvsgici, a being begotten, or born again, regenerated.'
So that I think it is abundantly plain, that the spiritual resur
rection spoken of in scripture, by which the saints are brought
to a new divine life, is the same with that being bom again,
which Christ says is necessary for every one, in order to his
seeing the kingdom of God.
IV. This change, of which men are the subjects when
they are born again and circumcised in heart, when they re
pent, and are converted, and spiritually raised from the dead,
i% the ^ame qhaiage which is meant when the scripture

Chap. tr. Proof from Application of Redemption, 523
speaks of making the heart and spirit new, or giving a new
heart and spirit.
It is almost needless to observe, how evidently this is
spoken of as necessary to salvation, and as the change in which
are attained the habits of true virtue and holiness, and the
character of a true saint ; as has been observed of rege
neration, conversion, ^c. and how apparent it is, that the change
is the same. Thus repentance (f^sravoia) ihe diange of ihe mind,
is the same as being changed to a new mind, or a new heart
and spirit. Conversion is the turning of the heart ; which is
the same thing as changing it so, that there shall be another
heart, or a new heart, or a new spirit. To be born again is to
be born anew ; which implies a becoming new, and is repre
sented as becoming new bom babes. But none supposes it is
the body that is immediately and properly new, but the mind,
heart, or spirit. And so a spiritual resurrection ia the resurrec
tion of the spirit, or rising to begin a new existence and life, as
to the mind, heart, or spirit. So that all these phrases imply
having a new heart, and being renewed in the spirit, according
to their plain signification.
When Nicoderaus expressed his wonder at Christ declar
ing it necessary that a man should be bom again in order
to see the kingdora of God, or enjoy the privileges of the
kingdora of the Messiah, Christ says to him, " Art thou a mas
ter of Israel, and knowest not these things ?" i. e. ' Art thou one
who is set to teach others the things written in the law and
the prophets, and knowest not a doctrine so plainly taught in
your scriptures, that such a change is necessary to a partaking
of the blessings of the Messiah's kingdom ?" But what can
Christ refer to, unless such prophecies as that in Ezek, xxxvi,
25 — ^27 1 Where God, by the prophet, speaking of the days
of the Messiah's kragdom, says, " Then will 1 sprinkle clean
water upon you, and ye shall be clean, — A new heart also
will I give you, and a new spirit will I put within you — and
I will put ray spirit within you," Here God speaks of having
a new heart and spirit, by being washed with water ; and
receiving tAe Spirit of God as the qualification of God's peo
ple, that shall enjoy the privileges of the Messiah's kingdom.
How rauch is this like the doctrine of Christ to Nicodemus, of
being " born again of water, and of the spirit V We have
another hke prophecy in Ezek. xi, 19,— Add to this, that rege
neration, or a being born again, and the renewing (or making
new) bythe Holy Ghost, are spoken of as the same thing, Tit,
iii, 5, " By the washing of regeneration and renewing of the
Holv Ghost," , . , . .
"V. It is abundantly manifest, that being born again, spi
ritually rising from the dead to newness of life, receiving a
new heart, and being renewed in the spirit ofthe mmd, are the

.524 OKioliSAL siv. Pari' iii.
same thing with that which is called " putting off the old man,
and putting on the new man."
The expressions are equivalent ; and the representations
are plainly of the same thing. When Christ speaks of being
born again, two births are supposed : a first and a second, an
old birth and a new one : And the thing born is Called man. —
So what is born in the first birth is the old man : and what is
brought forth in the second birth, is the new man. That which
is born in the first birth (says Christ) is flesh : It is the carnal
man, wherein we have borne the image of the earthly Adam,
whom the apostle calls the flrst man. That which is born
in the new birth, is spirit, or the spiritual and heavenly man :
Wherein we proceed from Christ the second man, the new man,
who is made a quickening spirit, and is the Lord from heaven,
and the Head of the new creation. — In the new birth, men are
represented as becoming new-born babes, which is the sarae
thing as becoming new men.
And how apparently is what the scripture says of the spi
ritual resurrection of the Christian convert equivalent and of
the very same import with putting off the old man, and put
ting on the new man ? So in Roin, vi. the convert is repre
sented as dying and being buried wiih Christ; which is ex
plained in the 6th verse, by this, that the old man is crucified,
that the body of sin might be destroyed." And in the 4th verse,
converts in this change are spoken of as " rising t6 newness of
life." Are not these things plain enough ? The apostle in effect^
tells us, that when he speaks of spiritual death and resurrec
tion, he means the same thing as " crucifying and burying the
old man, and rising as a new man."
And it is most apparent, that spiritual cucumcision, and
spiritual baptism, and the spiritual resurrection, are all the same
with " putting off the old man and putting on the new man."
This appears by Colos. ii. 11, 12. " In whom also ye are circum
cised with the circumcision made without hands, in putting off
the body of the sins of the flesh by the circumcision of Christ,
buried with him in baptism ; wherein also ye are risen with him."
Here it is manifest that the spiritual circumcision, baptism,
and resurrection, all signify that change wherein men " put off
the body ofthe sins ofthe flesh." But that is the same things in
this apostle 'slanguage, as " putting off' the old man ;" as appears
by Rom. vi. 6. "Our old man is crucified that the body of sin may
be destroyed." And that putting off the old man is the same
with putting off the body- of sin, appears further by Ephes. iv.
22—24. and Colos. iii. 8—10. As Dr. T. confesses, that to
be born again, " is that wherein are obtained the habits of vir
tue, religion, and true holiness ;" so how evidently is the same
thing predicated of that change, which is called " putting off the
old man, and putting on the new man ?" Eph. iv. 22—24. " That

L/'hap, ii. Proof from Application of Redemption. 525
ye put off the old man, which is corrupt, &c, and put on the
new man, which after God is created in righteousness and true
holiness." And it is most plain, that this putting off the old man, &c.
is the very same thing with making the heart and spirit new.
It is apparent in itself; tlie spirit is called the man, in the lan
guage of the apostle : .it is called the inward man, and the hid
den man. (Rom. vii. 22. 2 Cor. iv. l(i. 1 Pet. iii. 4.) And there
fore, putting off' the old man, is the same thing with the remov
al of the old heart ; and the putting on of the new man, is the
receiving of" a new heart, and a new spirit." Yea, putting on
the neiv ma« is expressly spokenof as the same thing with receiv
ing " a new spirit, or being renewed in spirit, Eph. iv. 22 — 24.
" That ye put off the old man — and be renewed in the spirit of
your mind, and that ye put on the new man."
From these things it appears how unreasonable, and con
trary to the utmost degree of scriptural evidence, is Dr. T.'s
way of explaining the old man, and the new man,* as though
thereby was meant nothing personaZ ; but that by the old man
was meant the heathen state, and by the new man, the Chris
tian dispensation, or state of professing Christians, or the whole
collective body of professors of Christianity, made up of Jews
and Gentiles ; when all the colour he has for it is, that the apos
tle once calls the Christian church a new man. (Eph. ii. 15.) It
is very true, in the scriptures often, both in the Old Testament
and the New, collective bodies, nations, peoples, and cities, are
figuratively represented by persons : particularly the church of
Christ is represented as one holy person, and has the same ap
pellatives as a particular saint or befiever ; and so is called a
" child, a son of God," (Exod. iv. 22. Gal. iv. 1, 2.) " a servant
of God," (Isai. xli. 8, 9. and xliv. 1.) "The daughter of God,
and spouse of Christ," (Psal. xiv. 10, 13, 14. Rev. xix. 7.) Never-'
theless, would it be reasonable to argue, that such appellations
as a " servant of God, a child of God," &c. are always or com
monly to be taken as signifying only the church oi God in
general, or great collective bodies ; and not to be understood
in a personal sense ? But certainly this would not be more un
reasonable than to urge, that by the old and the new man as the
phrases are raostly used in scripture, is to be understood nothing
but the great collective bodies of Pagans and of Christians, or
the heathen and the christian world, as to their outward profes
sion, and the dispensation they are under. It might have been
proper, in this case, to have considered the unreasonableness
of that practice which nur author charges on others, and finds
so much fault with in them,t ' That they content themselves
with a few scraps of scripture, which, though wrong understood,
* Page. 149—1 53.— S. f Page 224.

526 0RI6INAL SIN. ?ART

IU.

they make the test of truth and the ground of their principles,
in contradiction to the whole tenor of revelation."
VI. I observe once more, it is very apparent, that " being-
born again," and spiritually raised frora death to a state'of new
existence and life, having a " new heart created in us, being re
newed in the spirit of our mind," and being the subjects of that
change by which we " put off the old raan and put on the new
raan," is the sarae thing with that which in scripture is called
being created anew, or made new creatures.
Here, to pass over many other evidences which raight be
mentioned, I would only observe that the representations are
exactly equivalent. These several phrases naturally and most
plainly signify the same effect. In the first birth or generation,
we are created or brought into existence ; it is then the whole
man first receives being : The soul is then formed, and then our
bodies are " fearfully and wonderfully made, being curiously
wrought by our Creator." So that a new-born child is a new
creature. So, when a man is born again, he is created again ;
in that new birth, there is a new creation ; and therein he be
coraes as a new born babe, or a new creature. So, in a resur
rection, there is a new creation. When a raan is dead, that
which was made in the first creation is destroyed : When that
which was dead is raised to life, the mighty power of the Author
of life is exerted the second tirae, and the subject restored to
a new existence and a new life, as by a new creation. So giving
a new heart is called creating a clean heart, Psal. li. 10.
Where the word translated create, is the sarae that is used in the
first verse in Genesis. And when we read in scripture of the
new creature, the creature that is called new is man ; and there
fore the phrase, new man, is evidently equipollent with nei«
creature ; and putting off the old man, and putting on the new
man, is spoken of expressly as brought to pass by a work of
creation. Col. iii. 9, 10. " Ye have put off the old man — and
have put on the new raan, which is renewed in knowledge,
after the image of him that created him." So Eph, iv. 22 — ^24.
" That ye put off the old raan, which is corrupt, &:c, and be re
newed in the spirit of your mind, and that ye put on the new
raan, which after Gnd is created in righteousness and true
holiness." These things absolutely fix the meaning of 2 Cor.
V. 17. " If any man be in Christ, he is a new creature : Old
things are passed away ; behold, all things are becorae new."
On the whole, the following reflections may be made :
1. That it is a truth of the utraost certainty, with respect
to every man born of the race of Adam by ordinary genera
tion, ihat unless he be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of
God. This is true not only of the heathen, but of thera that
are born of the professing people of God, as Nicoderaus, and
the Jews, and every raan born of the flesh. This is most man-

Chap, ii. Proofs from Application of Redemption. 527
ifest by Christ's discourse in John iii, 3—11, So it is plain
by 2 Cor, v. 17, " That every raan who is in Christ, is a new
CREATURE," 2, It appears frora this, together with what has been prov
ed above, that it is most raost certain with respect to every
one of the human race, that he can never have any interest in
Christ, or see the kingdora of God, unless he be the subject
of thaf CHANGE in the teraper and disposition of his heart,
which is raade in repentance and conversion, circuracision of
heart, spiritual baptism, dying to sin, and rising to a new and
holy life ; and unless he has the old heart taken away, and a
new heart and spirit given, and puts off the old man, and puts
on the new man, and old things are passed away, and all things
made new.
3. From what is plainly implied in these things, and frora
what the scripture raost clearly teaches of the nature of thera,
it is certain, that every man is born into the world in a state of
moral pollution. For spiritual baptism is a cleansing from
raoral filthiness, (Ezek. xxxvi. 25, compared with Acts ii, 16,
and John iii, 5,) So the washing of regeneration, or the new
birth, is a change frora a state of wickedness, (Tit, iii, 3 — 5,)
Men are spoken of as purified in their regeneration, (1 Pet, i,
22, 23, See also 1 John ii, 29, and iii. 1, 3.) And it appears
that every raan in his first or natural state is a sinner ; for oth
erwise he would then need no repentance nor conversion, no
turning frora sin to God. And it appears that every man in his
original state has a heart of stone ; for thus the scripture calls
that old heart, which is taken away, when a new heart, and
NEW spirit is given. (Ezek. ix. 19. and xxxvi. 26.) And it
appears that man's nature, as in his native state, is corrupt ac
cording to the deceitful lusts, and of its own motion exerts it
self in nothing but wicked deeds. For thus the scripture char
acterises the OLD MAN, which is put off when men are renewed
in the spirit of their minds, and put on the new man. (Eph.
iv. 22 — ^24. Col, iii, 8 — 10.) In a word it appears that man's
nature, as in its native state, is a body of sin which must be de
stroyed, raust die, be buried, and never rise more. For thus
the OLD MAN is represented, which is crucifled, when raen
are the subjects of a spiritual resurrection. Rom. vi.
4 — 6, Such a nature, such a body of sin as this, is put off
in the spiritual renovation, wherein we put on the new man,
and are the subjects of the spiritual circumcision. Eph. iv.
21—23. It must now be left with the reader to judge for himself,
whether what the scripture teaches of the application of
Christ's redemption, and the change of state and nature neces
sary to true and final happiness, does not afford clear and abun
dant evidence to the truth of the doctrine of original sin.

528 ORIGINAL SIN. PaRT IV.

PART IV.

CONTAINING ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS.

CHAP. I.

Conceming the Objection, That to suppose Men born in
SIN, without iheir Choice, or any previous Act of their
own, is to suppose what is inconsistent with ihe Nature
of Sin.
Some of the objections made against the doctrine of ori
ginal sin, which have reference to particular arguments used in
defence of it, have been already considered in the handling of
those arguments. What I shall therefore now consider, are
such objections as I have not yet had occasion to notice.
There is no argument Dr. T, insists raore upon, than that
which is taken from the Arminian and Pelagian notion of free
dom of will, consisting in the will's self-determination, as ne
cessary to the being of moral good or evil. He often urges,
that if we corae into the world infected with sinful and deprav
ed dispositions, then sin must be natural to us ; and if natural^
then necessary ; and if necessary, then no sin, nor any thing we
are blameable for, or that can in any respect be our fault, being
what we ' cannot help : And he urges, that sin raust proceed
from our own choice, &c.*
Here I would observe in general; that the foreraentioned
notion of freedom of will as essential to moral agency, and
necessary to the very existence of virtue and sin, seeras to be
a grand favourite point with Pelagians and Arminians, and all
divines of such characters, in their controversies with the
orthodox. There is no one thing raore fundamental in their
schemes of religion : On the deterraination of this one leading
point depends the issue of almost all controversies we have
with such divines. Nevertheless, it seems a needless task for
me particularly to consider that raatter in this place ; having
already largely discussed it, with all the main grounds of this
* Page 125, 128—130, 186—188, 190, 200, 245, 246, 253, 258. 63, 64, 161,
S. and other places.

Chap. i. 'The Objection from the ISature of Sin. 529
notion, and the arguments used to defend it, in a late book on
this subject, to which I ask leave to refer the reader.* It is*
yery necessary, that the raodern prevailing doctrine concerne
ing this point should be well understood, and therefore
thoroughly considered and examined : For without it there is
no hope of putting an end to the controversy about original sin,
and innumerable other controversies that subsist about many
of the main points of religion. I stand ready to confess to the
forementioned raodern divines, if they can raaintain their pe
culiar notion of freedom consisting in the self determining
power of the will, as necessary to moral agency, and can tho-*
roughly establish it in opposition to the arguments lying against
it, then they have an irapregnable castle, to which they raay
repair, and remain invincible, in all the controversies they have
with the reformed divines concerning original sin, the sove
reignty of grace, election, redemption, conversion, the efficacious
operation of the Holy Spirit, the nature of saving faith, perse
verance of the saints, and other principles of the like kind.
However, at the same tirae, I think this will be as strong a for
tress for the Deists, in common with them ; as the great
doctrines subverted by their notion oi freedom, are so plainly
and abundantly taught in the scripture. But I am under no
apprehensions of any danger which the cause of Christianity
or the religion of the reforraed is in, frora any possibility of that
notion being ever established, or of its being ever evinced that
there is not proper, perfect, and raanifold demonstration lying
against it. But as I said, it would be needless for rae to enter
into a particular disquisition of this point here ; frora which I
shall easily be excused by any reader who is willing to give him
self the trouble of consulting what I have already written. And
as to others, probably they will scarce be at the pains of read
ing the present discourse ; or at least would not, if it should be
enlarged by a full consideration of that controversy.
I. shall at this tirae therefore only take notice of some gross
inconsistencies that Dr. T. has been guilty of, in his handling
this objection against the doctrine of original sin. In places
which have been cited, he says, that " sin must proceed from
our own choice :" And that " if it does not, it being necessary
to us, it cannot be sin, it cannot be our fault, or what we are to
blarae for : And therefore all our sins must be chargeable on
our choice, which is the cause of sin :" For he says, " the cause
of every effect is alone chargeable with the effect it produceth,
and which proceedeth frora it."t Now here are iraplied several
gross contradictions. He greatly insists, that nothing can be
sinful, or have the nature of sin, but what proceeds from our
* In vol I. of tMs edition. t Pa^e 13S.
vOj^. n. 67

530 original sin. Part iv.
choice. Nevertheless he says, « Not the effect, but the cause
alone is chargeable with blame." Therefore the choice, which
is the cause, is alone blameable, or has the nature of sin ; and
not the effect of that choice. Thus nothing can be sinful, but
the effect of choice : and yet the effect of choice never can be
sinful, but only the cause, which alone is chargeable with all the
blarae. Again, the choice from which sin proceeds, is itself sinful..
Not only is this implied in his saying, " The cause alone is
chargeable with all the blame ;" but be expressly speaks of the
choice as faulty,* and calls that choice wicked, frora which
depravity and corruption proceeds.] Now if the choice itself
be sin, and there be no sin but what proceeds from a sinful
choice, then the sinful choice raust proceed frora another an
tecedent choice ; it must be chosen by a foregoing act of willr
determining itself to that sinful choice, that so it may have
that which he speaks of as absolutely essential to the nature
of sin namely, that it proceeds from our choice, and does not
happen to us necessarily. But if the sinful choice itself pro
ceeds frora a foregoing choice, then also that foregoing choice
must be sinful ; it being the cause of sin, and so alone charge
able with the blame. Yet if that foregoing choice be sinful,
then neither must that happen to us necessarily, but rauSt
likewise proceed from choice, another act of choice preceding
that : For we must reraeraber, that " Nothing is sinfiil but
what proceeds from our choice" And then for the sarae rea
son, even this prior choice last raentioned raust also be sinful,
being chargeable with all the blame of that consequent evil
choice which was its effect. And so we must go back till we
come to the very flrst volition, the prime or original act of
choice in the whole chain. And tAis, to be sure, must be a sin
ful choice, because this is the origin or primitive cause of all
the train of evils which follow ; and according to our author,
must therefore be " alone chargeable with all the blame :" And
yet sodt is, according to hira this "cannot be sinful," because
it does not " proceed frora our own choice," or any foregoing
act of our will ; it being, by the supposition, the very flrst act
of will in the case. And therefore it raust be necessary, as to
us, having no choice of ours to be the cause -of it.
In p. 232. he says, " Adam's sin was frora his own disobedi
ent will ; and so must every man's sin, and all the sin in the
world be, as well as his." By this it seems, he must have a
" disobedient will" before he sins ; for the cause must be be
fore the effect : And yet that disobedient will itself is sinful;
otherwise it could not be called disobedient. But the question
is, How do men corae by the disobedient will, this cause of all
* Pi^e 190. t Page 200. See aljo p. 216-.

UHAP. I, 'i'Ae Objection from the Natare of Sin. 531
the sin in the world ? It raust not come necessarily, without
men's choice ; for if so, it is not sin, nor is there any disobedi
ence in it. Therefore that disobedient will raust also come from
a disobedient will; and so on, in infinitum. Otherwise it must
be supposed that there is some sin in the world which does not
eorae from a disobedient will : contrary to our author's dogma
tical assertions.
In p. 166. S. he says, " Adam could not sin without a sinful
inclination." Here he calls that inclination itself sinful, which
is the principle from whence sinful acts proceed ; as elsewhere
he speaks of the disobedient will frora whence all sin coraes :
And he allows*, that " the law reaches to all the ^"^ latent prin
ciples of sin ;" meaning plainly, that it forbids and threatens
punishment for those latent principles. Now these latent prin
ciples of sin, these sinful inclinations, without whioh, according
to our author, there can be no sinful act, cannot all proceed
frora a sirful choice; because that would imply great contra
diction. For, by the supposition, they are the principles from
whence a sinful choice comes, and whence all sinful acts of
will proceed ; and there can be no sinful act without thera.
So that the first latent principles and inclinations frora whence
all sinful acts proceed, are sinful ;¦ and yet they are not sinful,
because they do not proceed frora a wicked choice, without
which, according to hira, " nothing can be sinful."
Dr. T. speaking of that proposition of the assembly of di
vines, wherein they assert that man is by nature utterly corrupt,
&c. t thinks hiraself well warranted by the supposed great evi
dence of these his contradictory notions to say, " Therefore sin
is not natural to us ; and therefore 1 shall not scruple to say,
this proposition in the assembly of divines is false," But it
may be worthy of consideration whether it would not have
greatly become him, before he had clothed himself with so
rauch assurance, and proceeded, on the foundation of these
his notions, so magisterially to charge the AsscmftZy's proposition
with falsehood, to have taken care that his own propositions,
which he has set in opposition to thera, should be a little raore
consistent ; that he raight not have contradicted himself, while
contradicting them ; lest some irapartial judges, observing hig
inconsistence, should think they had warrant to declare with
equal assurance, that " they should not scruple to say. Dr. T.'s
doctrine is false."
* Contents of Rom. chap. vii. in Notes on the epistle. t P»6* ^^^-

oRioi.vAL siKV Part iv.

CHAP. II.

Conceming the Objections against the Doctrine of native Cor-
ruption, that to suppose Men receive their first Existence
in Sin, is to make him who is the Author of their Being,
the Author of their Depravity.
One argument against a supposed native, sinful depravity,
which Dr. T. greatly insists upon, is, " that this does in effect
charge him, who is the author of our nature, who formed us in
the womb, with being the author of a sinful corruption of na
ture ; and that it is highly injurious to the God' of our nature,
whose hands have formed and fashioned us, to believe our
nature to be originally corrupted, and tJiat in the worst sense
of corruption.*" With respect to this, I would observe in the first place,
that this writer, in handling this grand objection, supposes
something to belong to the doctrine objected against, as main
tained by the divines whora he is opposing, which does nqt
belong to it, nor follow from it. As particularly, he supposes
the doctrine of original sin to imply, that nature raust be cor
rupted by some positive infiuence ; " something, by some means
or other, infused into the human nature ; some quality or other,-
not frora the choice of our rainds, but like a taint, tincture, or
infection, altering the natural constitution, faculties, and dis
positions of our souls.t That sin and evil dispositions are
I3IPLANTED in the foetus in the worab.f" Whereas truly our
doctrine neither implies nor infers any such thing. In order
to account for a sinful corruption of nature, yea, a total native
depravity of the heart of man, there is not the least need of
supposing any evil quality infused, implanted, or wrought into
the nature of man, by any positive cause or influence whatso
ever, either from God, or the creature ; or of supposing that
man is conceived and born with a fountain of evil in his heart,
such as is any thing properly positive^ I think a little atten
tion to the nature of things will be sufficient to satisfy any
impartial considerate inquirer, that the absence of positive
good principles, and so the withholding of a special divine in
fluence to impart and maintain those good principles — leaving
the common natural principles of selflove, natural appetite,
&c, to themselves, without the government of superior divine
principles — will certainly be followed with the corruption ; yea,
the total corruption of the heart, without occasion for any
* Page 137, 1S7— 189, 256, 258,'260. 143. S. and other places.
i Patre 187. +;page 146. 148, 149. S, and the like in many other places.

Chap, ii, God not the Author of Sin. 333
positive influence at all : And that it was thus in fact that cor
ruption of nature carae on Adam, imraediately on his fall, and
coraes on all his posterity, as sinning in him, and falling with
him.* * The sentiment contained in this paragraph, and illustrated in the following
part of thia chapter, is of the utmost importance, in order not only to remove Pe
lagian prejudices, and the cavils of modern philosophers, but also to give a just
and consistent view of the nature and cause of ein ; the cause of all sin, in gene
ral, and orignal sin in particular. Our author's explanation, which immediately
follows, both in the text and in the note, is ingenious, and in some respects quite
satisfactory. But a brief representation of the same result in another way, may
demand some attention.
I. It is probably more philosophical, as well as more intelligible, in describ
ing the two kinds of principles, as the author calls them, possessed by Adam, to
say, that the inferior ones were, Those faculties in man which constituted
HIM A MORAL AGENT ; rather than calling them " the principles of mere human
nature." The superior ones are very accurately described ; but instead of calling
them " supernatural principles ;" they may more properly be termed, divine bene
volent, SOVEREION INFLUENCE, SUPERADDED TO THOSE FACULTIES WHICH CONSTI
TUTED ADAM A MORAL AGENT. This representation leads to the essential rela
tions that subsist between God and his creature man. " Mere human nature,"
and " supernatural principles" convey no distinctive character of relation. " Facul
ties which constitute a moral Eigent," express the ground of relation between
equity in God and accovmtableness in man ; and " benevolent influences," express
the ground of relation between sooereignty in God and passiveness in man.
2. That Adam had such (jualilications or faculties as rendered him a moral
agent, independently of his spiritual knowledge, righteousness, hoUness, dominion,
honour and glory — in. other words, his divine light, holy hfe, and supreme love to
God — is self-evident. For after he had lost these excellencies, he was confessedly
no less a moral agent, and accountable to his divine Govemor and Judge for his
temper, thoughts, desires, words and works, than he was before he lost them.
3. The philosophical cause, or the true origin of Adam's defection was hia
liberty in union with his passive power. For an explanation of these terms, and
the proof of the proposition just laid down, we must refer the reader to our notes
on the first volume of this work, where the subject is professedly discussed.
4. The true and ultimate cause ofthe first sin of Adam, of all his subsequent
sins, and those of his posterity, whether infants or adults, is not essentially dif
ferent. If the principles, as our author calls them, or the faculties and qualifica
tions which constitute moral agency and accountability, be left to themselves —
whereby they become influenced by passive power, not counteracted by sovereign,
benevolent, or holy divine influence — the efiect will be the same, though attended
with difierent circumstances.
5. When the cause of Adam's integrity, perfection, spirituality, and happi
ness, or his paradisical hfe, was no longer operative for his preservation, defection
ensued ; which consisted in the loss of the chief good, together with that disor
der, confusion, and a conscious exposedness to a continuance in that state,
whereby happiness was necessarily exchanged for a restless uneasiness called
misery. 6. This was the case of Adam in hia own person. But our author, in the next
chapter, excellently shows, that Adam and all hia posterity were atrictly one.
This union we may call a systematic whole. For raankind, or the whole race of
man, has a constituted connection no less than a seed with its plant ; for instance,
the acorn with the oak-plant, and that with its future branches. We justly called
it the same tree from the time it was planted to its utmost longevity, though some
of its branches came into existence a hundred years or more after the first shoot.
This union of Adam with his posterity, is no less a constituted union, than that
which connects the solar system ; or any other inferior systematic whole, as an
animal body, which is regarded as one from its birth till its death. For instance,
nothing but a constitution founded in the sovereign pleasure of God, caused the
body of Methuselah to be the sanm, or regarded as the same, when in infancy, and
above nine hundred years after. The parts of his body, at least most of them,
were as difierent in old age, compared with his infancy, as any of his posterity are

534 ORIGINAL SIN. pART IV.
(The case with man was plainly this : When God made raan
at first be implanted in him two kinds of principles. There
different from Adam. In each case aUke, the appointment of God in fojrming a
course of nature, or his operations according to a constituted plan, could make the
body of Methuselah to be the same body from the first to the last ; and the pos-
terity of Adam the same with himself
7. In every vital system there is a. vital part, and in every other system, as auch,
one part is more essential than another. Adam was the -mlal part of the system of
mankind. The root ofthe tree, the foundation of the building, the mainspring of
the raachine, the sun of the system. We his posterity are but so many members of
a body, and are all dependent on him as on our head or heart ; but not so on one
another. There may be the amputation of a limb, while the other lirabs are not
injured ; but ifthe head or heart be deprived of life, all the members are deprived
at the sarae time. A branch of a tree may be lopped off without injury to the
other part ; but ifthe root, the vitnl part, be aflected, all the branches are also af
fected as the necessary consequence. A dead root and a living tree are incompa
tible ; though a dead branch and a Uving branch of the same tree are not A watch
ia a systera founded on principles of mechanism, the index may be mutilated, or
the cog of a wheel may be broken or detached, without affecting the more essen
tial parts ; but if the mainspring be broken, the whole system, as to its design
ed use, is destroyed. A building ia a system ; a slate or a chimney raay be
blown down without affecting the foundation, but if the whole foundation be
underrained, the whole fabric must fall to ruin. The solar system might sub-
siat, for ought that appears to the contrary, though a comet, a satelUte, or a
planet, were annihilated ; but if the sun were annihilated, ruin and confusion must
ensue. 8. Whatever Adam lost by transgression, he could have no claim either in
equity or by promise, that is, he could have no claim at all for a restoration of it.
And what he could have no claim for himself, could not be claimable by or for his
posterity, j^ny more than a branch or a raeraber could obtain life, when the root
of that branch or the head of that member had ceaspd t. live ; or any more than
the subordinate parts of any sys' tm when the radical, vital, fundamental, and
essential parts had failed.
9. What Adam lost was the divine life, and the happiness impUed in it, as a
favour granted on n condition. Observing this condition, he was to have it con
tinued ; but on breaking the condition it waa to be forfeited. Adam may be
corapared to a lord in waiting, who should have free access to every, room in the
king's palace, one excepted. By abstaining from this intrusion he should have
his honour and dignity preserved, and confirmed to his heirs forever ; but by
offending as to the condition prescribed, he raust sink to the rank of a com
mon subject, stripped of all his former dignity. How absurd would it be for
the heirs of such a lord to step forward and claim what he had forfeited ! —
Equally absurd is it to say, that Adam's poaterity are no suflerers by his trans
gression. 10. If we would form accurate notions of Adam's transgression, original sin,
and the imputation of guilt, it will be of the utmost importance to consider the
divine law, by which is the knowledge of sin, under a two-fold consideration. —
As a rule requiring conformity and obedience in every period of our existence, or
the measure of moral obligation ; and as a covenant, the condition of which waa
perfect conformitv and obedience, under a forfeiture of a special favour. The law
as a ride may be trarisgreaaed times and methods innumerable ; but as a covenant
it could be transgreaaed only once. For the very first offence was a breach of the
condition, and a forfeiture of that favour which depended on the performance of
that condition. It is possible for the transgressor of the law aa a n4e to become
through grace a perfect character, and therefore perfectly conformable to that I'avir.
But to be perfectly conformable to the required condition, once broken, is impos
sible ; as impossible as to recall tune once past, or to make transgression to be no
transgression. 11. Our author very justly remarks, that " there is not the least need of sup
posing any evil quaUty infused, implanted, or wrought into the nature of man, by
any positive cauae or influence whataoever, either from God or the creature ; or
of supposing that man is conceived and born with a fovntmn of mJ in his heart.

Chap. ii. - God not the Author of Sin. S35
was an inferior kind, which may be called natural, being the
principles of mere human nature; such as self-love, with
such as is any thing properly podtive." But however just this remark, there is
reason to fear that many beside Dr. Taylor have imbibed a notion of original ain
considerably different frora what is here asserted. It is not improbable that the
terms by which the evil has been coraraonly exprcsaed without a due examina
tion of the idea intended, have had no sraall influence to effect this. The fre
quent use of such analogical and allusive terms as pollution, defilement, corrup
tion, contamination, and the like, seems to intimate something positive ; as these
expressions in their original meaning convey an idea of sofnething superadded to
the subject. Whereas other terms, though equally analogical and iulusive, im
ply no such thing ; auch as disorder, discord, conf-usion, and the like. We do not
mean to condemn the use of the former, or to recommend the latter to their ex
clusion, but only design to caution from a wrong inference from a frequent use of
thera. 12. On the subject of the imputation of Adam's ofience to his posterity, our
author, in the next chapter, has treated very ably and fully. But we may here ob
serve, that it is of the greatest importance to have just views of what is caUed
original guUt. It is to be feared that many form very confused notions of the sub
ject, when it is said, " we are all guilty when born," or " we are all guilty of Adam's
transgression," or " the gialt of Adam's offence is ours." Though we conceive
these and similar propositions to be expressive of an iraportant truth, yet we are
no less liable to be led astray from the true idea referred to by these expressions,
than by otheis eraployed to represent moral depravity.
13. It may contribute to a clearness of conception on the subject, if we keep
in mind that Adam was guilty by his first offence, under a two-fold consideration.
He was guilty of a breach of law considered as a rule of rectitude, and of the
same law as a covenant enjoining the observance of a special duty, which was the
avowed and express condition of it. The performance of the condition was to
secure not merely moral purity and innocence, but also the favour, or gracious be
nefit, which he possessed on the footing of a sovereign grant. This was his
federal privilege. Now by the transgression of the law, considered as a covenant,
this favour was forfeited ; and for God to treat him as one deprived of this favour,
is the same thing as to treat him'as guilty. For how could he be treated other
wise, when the very condition on which he retained the favour was broken.
14. Whatever Adam possessed beyond those considerations which constituted
him a moral agent, was the fruit of sovereign benevolence. Hence arises the pro
priety of regarding the possession of his privilege, on the observance of a specifi
ed condition, under the term covenant. For if Adam possessed sorae spirit%uil
principles, or benevolent influences, as a person possesses immunities and privileges
by charter for himself and his heirs ; and if these chartered benefits be retained
on conditimi, of not oflending in a specified manner; it follows, that a privation of
sueh benefits belongs as much to the heirs as to the individual oflending. But if
they are treated for breach of such covenant, or charter held on condition, as per
sons included in the forfeiture, it is manifest they are regarded so far guilty, or
-aorthy to suffer such loss.
15. From these considerations it follows, that Adara's breach of law as a nde,
which brought gwlt upon hira as an individual, is n it the guilt imputable to his pos
terity. During his long life, no doubt he waa guilty of innumerable offencea after
the first transgression, but not one of these is imputed to us ; the reason is, that
after he broke the condition of the charter, he stood upon the bare ground of
personal moral obligation. But personal guilt, on such ground, cannot in equity
be transferred from »ne to another. The sins of the father, whether the first father
or any other, considered merely as a personal deviation from rectitude, or a breach
of moral obUgation, cannot be imputed to the children.
16. What Adam therefore suffered for breach of covenant, was a privation
of chartered benefits. The unavoidable effect of this waa death ; a privation of
spiritual Ufe — which continued is death eternal — and a privation of that protection
and care which would have preserved from temporal death. There seems little
room to doubt, that even the corporeal or elementary part of Adam, underwent
a great change by the faU. However, having forfeited his charter of preservation

5^6 ORIGINAI, ^IN. ?ART IV.
those natural appetites and passions, which belong to the nature
of man, in which his love to his own liberty, honour, and
pleasure, were exercised: These, when alone, and left to
theraselves, are what the scriptures soraetiraes call flesh.
Besides these, there were superior principles, that were spiri
tual, holy, and divine, suraraarily comprehended in divine love ;
wherein consisted the spiritual image of God, and man's right
eousness and true holiness ; whicii are called in scripture the
divine nature. These principles may, in some sense, be called
supERNATUKAL,* being (however concrealud ui cuniiale^-j^et)
such as are above those pfirreipiesu-that— are-essentially implied
in, or necessarily: resulting fr"m^ ar^d '"Repacahly connected
with, mere human nature ; and being such as iraraediately de-
by transgreasion, he and all his posterity became exposed to the natural operations
of this world and its elements. Matter and motion, in animals and vegetables,
in the natural state of things, ensure a dissolution.
17. Much has been said by sorae divines about the probabihty of Adam, had
he kept the condition, being promoted to some situation still raore exalted. But
there is reason to suspect, that such a sentiment proceeds on the supposition of
Adam possessing a less exalted situation than he really did possess. The idea
s^ems to be founded on a probable promotion for continued obedience. But what
could be a greater reward than a continuance of his chartered privUeges 1 And
what a greater loss than their forfeiture ?
18. It would not be difficult to demonstrate, were not this note too far ex
tended to admit of it, that Adam, dealt with on the ground of strict equity, would
have been not less liable to defection than his posterity are, when they begin to
exercise moral agency. Therefore the objection against the constitution of
Adam and hia posterity being regarded as one, is deprived of all force. For what
ever creature, in whatever world, were dealt with in strict eqmty, without '5 eneuo-
lent influence to counteract passive power, he would have no advantage against a
liability to defection above the race of man after the faU. The only diflerence is,
that Adam once actually possessed an exalted privilege, and fell from it. And if his
posterity, rendered so far guilty aa to be deprived of chartered benefits with him,
cannot be raised to happinesa from their fallen state without the exercise of bene
volent sovei-eign influence in the plan of salvation ; it should be recollected, that Adam
himself could not have nudntained his standing hut by the same benevolent sovereign
influence, though exercised in a different way.
COROLLARY.
19. Hence thepropriefi/ and the true ground ofthe well known distinction ofa
believer in the second Adam not being under the law, (i. e. the condemnation of
the law) as a covenant, though under the law as a rttle. It is found, as to its true
reason, in the state of Adam, as above explained. — W.
* To prevent all cavils, the reader is desired particularly to observe in what
sense I here use the words natural and supernatural : — Not as epithets of distinc
tion between that which is concreated or connate, and that which ia extraordina
rily introduced afterwards, besides the first state of things, or the order established
originally, beginning when man's nature began ; but as distinguishing betweeu
what belongs to, or flows from, that nature which man has, merely as man, and
those things which are above this, by which one is denominated, not only a man,
but a truly virtuous, holy, and spiritual man ; which, though they began in .ddam as
soon as huraanity began, and are necessary to the perfection and weU-being of the
huraan nature, yet are not essential to .the constitution of it, or necessary to its ber
ing : Inasrauch as one may have every thing needful to his being man, exclusively
of them. If in thus using the words natural and supernatural, I use them in an un
comraon sense, it is not from any affectation of singularity, but for want of other
fernjs more aptly to express my iijeaning.

Chap. II. Godnot the Author of Sin. 537
pennon raan's union nnH fprrimnninn with Gpd, or divine com
munications and influences of God's spirit :* Which though
withdraw»B,_iind man's nature forsaken of ITiese principles,
human natare- would be human nature at.ill ;!!fflan's n.ature, as
such, being ««uiiiii.-withoui these divine principles, which the
scripture sometimes calls spirtt, in contradistinction to flesh.
Tliese superior principles were given to possess the throne,
and maintain an absolute dorainion in the heart; the other to
be wholly subordinate and subservient. And while things con
tinued thus, all was in excellent order, peace, and beautiful
harraony, and in a proper and perfect state. These divine
prijiciples thus reigning, were the dignity, life, happiness, and
glory of man's nature. When man sinned and broke God's
covenant, and fell under his curse, these superior principles
left his heart : For indeed God then left him ; that coraraunion
with God on which these principles depended, entirely
ceased; the Holy Spirit, that divine inhabitant, forsook the
house. Because it would have been utteriy improper in itself,
and inconsistent with the constitution God had established, that
he should still raaintain coramunion with man, and continue by
his friendly, gracious, vital influences, to dwell with hira and
in hira, after he was becorae a rebel, and had incurred God's
wrath and curse. Therefore iraraediately the superior divine
principles wholly ceased ; so light ceases in a roora when the
candle is withdrawn ; and thus man was left in a state of dark
ness, woeful corruption and ruin ; nothing but flesh without
spirit. The inferior principles of self-love and natural appe-
tite which~were given only to serve, being alone, and lett to
theraselves, oj course became reigning principles; haviiigTio !
superior, principles to regulate or control them, they became i
absolute masters of the hpart_ Thp. imnnpflintt. nr.r..;oq,,on^.p
of which was a fated catastrophe, a t.iirnino; of all things upside
down, and the succession of a state of the most ndimia ani^
dreadful contusion. Man iraraediately set up himself, and the
objects of hiy private affections and appetites, as suprwne ;
and so they took the place of tion. These inTeribr princi-
ples are hkej^re m a nouse; Wlliuh we say is a good servant,
but a bad raaster ; very useful while kept in its place, but if
left to take possession of the whole house, soon brings all to
destruction. Man's love to his own honour, separate interests,
and private pleasure, which before was wholly subordinate unto
love to God and regard to his authority and glory, now dis
poses and irapels hira to pursue those objects, without regard
to God's honour, or law ; because there is no true regard to
these divine things left in him. In consequence of which, he
seeks those objects as much when against God's honour and
law, as when agreeable to thera. God still continuing strictly
to require supreme regard to hiraself, and forbidding all undue
VOL. II. 68

338 uRioiNAL SIN, Part iv.
gratifications of these inferior passions— but only in perfect
subordination tdf the ends, and agreeableness to the rules and
limits, which his holiness, honour, and law prescribe — Whence
immediately arises enmity in the heart, now wholly under the
ipower of self-love ; and nothing but war ensues, in a constant
course, against God. As when a subject has once renounced
his lawful sovereign, and set up a pretender in his stead, a
state of enmity and war against his rightful king necessarily
ensues. It were easy to shew, how every lust, and depraved
disposition of man's heart, would naturally arise from this pri
vative original, if here were room for it. Thus it is easy to give
an account, how total corruption of heart should follow on
man's eating the forbidden fruit, though that was but one act
of sin, without God putting any evil into his heart, or implant
ing any bad principle, or infusing any corrupt taint, and so be
coming the author of depravity. Only God's withdrawing, as
it was highly proper and necessary that he should, frora rebel-
raan, and his natural principles being left to themselves, is suffi
cient to account for his becoming entirely corrupt, and bent on
sinning against God,
And as Adam's nature becarae corrupt, without God's
implanting or infusing of any evil thing into it ; so does the
nature of his Posterity. God dealing with Adam as the head
of his posterity, (as has been shewn) and treating them as one,
he deals with his posterity as having all sinned in him. And
therefore, as God withdrew spiritual communion, and his vital
gracious influence from the comraon head, so he withholds the
sarae frora all the members, as they come into existence;
whereby they come into the world mere flesh, and entirely un
der the governraent of natural and inferior principles ; and so
become wholly corrupt, as Adam did.
Now for God so far to have the disposal of this affair, as
tp withhold those influences without which nature will be cor
rupt, is not to be the author of sin. But concerning this, I
must refer the reader to what I have said of it in m.y discourse
on the Freedom of the Will.* Though besides what I have
there said, I may here observe, that if for God so far to order
and dispose the being of sin, as to permit it, by withholding
the gracious influences necessary to prevent it, is for him to be
the author of sin, then some things which Dr, T, himself lays
down, will equally be attended with this very consequence.
For, frora tirae to time, he speaks of God giving men up to the
vilest lusts and affections, by permitting, or leaving them,t
Now ifthe continuance of sin, and its increase and prevalence,
may be in consequence of God's disposal in withholding need^
* Part iv. § 9.
+ Key, § 388, Note: and Par. on Rom. i. 24, 36.

Chap, ii, God not the Author of Sin. 539
ful grace, without God being the author of that continuance
and prevalence of sin ; then, by parity of reason, may the be
ing of sin in the race of Adara, be in consequence of God's
disposal by his withholding that grace which is needful to pre
vent it, without his being the author of si?).
If here it should be said, that God is not the author of sin,
in giving up to sin those who have already made themselves
sinful, because when men have once made themselves sinful,
their continuing so, and sin prevailing in them, and becoraing
more and more habitual, will follow in a course of nature ; I
answer, let that be remembered which this writer so greatly
urges, in opposition to them who suppose original corruption
coraes in a course of nature, viz. That the course of nature is
nothing without God. He utterly rejects the notion of the
" course of nature's being a proper active cause, which will
work, and go on by itself, -without God, ii he lets or permits
it."* But affirras, " That the course of nature, separate from
the agency of God, is no cause or nothing ; and that the course
of nature should continue itself, or go on to operate by itself,
any more than at first produce itself is absolutely impossible."
These strong expressions are his. Therefore, to explain the
continuance of the habits of sin in the same person, when once
introduced, yea, to explain the very being of any such habits,
in consequence of repeated acts, our author must have re
course to those same principles which he rejects as absurd to
the utmost degree, when alleged to. explain the corruption of
nature in the posterity of Adam." For, that habits, either good
or bad, should continue after being once established, or that
habits should be settled and have existence in consequence of
repeated acts, can be owing only to a course of nature, and
those laws of nature which God has established.
That the posterity of Adam should be born without holi
ness, and so with a depraved nature, comes to pass as rauch by
the established course of nature, as the continuance of a corrupt
disposition in a particular person, after he once has it ; or as
rauch as Adara's continuing unholy and corrupt, after he had
once lost his holiness. For Adam's posterity are frora him,
and as Lt were in him, and belonging to him, according to an
established course of nature, as much as the branches of a tree
are, accordihg to a course of nature, from the tree, in the tree,
and belonging to the tree; or (to make use of the comparison
_ which Dr, T. himself chooses frora tirae to tirae, as proper to
illustrate the matter*) just as the acorn is derived from the oak.
And I think, the acorn is as much derived frora the oak, ac
cording to the course, of nature, as the buds and branches. It
is true, that God, by his own alraighty power, creates the soul
* Page 134. S. .See also with what Vehemence this is urged in p. 137. S.
1 Page 146, 187.

540 , OKIGINAL SIN, PaET IV.
of the infant ; and it is also true, as Dr. T. often insists, that
God, by his immediate power, forms and fashions the body of ¦
the infant in the womb ; yet he does both according to that
course of nature, which he has been pleased to establish. The
course of nature is demonstrated by late improvements in phi
losophy, to be indeed what our author himself says it is, viz.
Nothing but the estabhshed order of the agency and Operation
of the author of nature. And though there be the immediate
agency of God in bringing the soul into existence in genera
tion, yet it is done according to the method and order established
by the author of nature, as much as his producing the bud, or
the acorn of the oak ; and as much as his continuing a partic
ular person in being, after he once has existence, God's irame
diate agency in bringing the soul of a child into being, is as
much according to an established order, as is his imraediate
agency in any of the works of nature whatsoever. It is agree
able to the established order of nature, that the good qualities
wanting in the tree, should also be wanting in the branches and
fruit. It is agreeable to the order of nature, that when a par-
I ticular person is without good raoral qualities in his heart, he
should continue without thera till sorae new cause or efficiency
produces them. And it is as much agreeable to an established
course and order of nature, that since Adam, the head of man
kind, the root of that great tree with raany branches springing
f frora it, was deprived of original righteousness, the branches
[ should corae forth without it. Or if any dislike the word nature,
as used in this last case, and instead of it choose to call it a
constitution, or established order of successive events, the alter
ation of the narae will not in the least alter the state of the
present arguraent. Where the narae, nature, is allowed with
out dispute, no raore is raeant than an established method and
order of events, settled and limited by divine wisdom.
If any should object to this, that if the want of original
righteousness be thus according to an established course of na
ture, then why are not principles of holiness, when restored
by divine grdce, also communicated to posterity ? I answer.
The divine laws and establishments of the author of nature,
are precisely settled by him as he pleaseth, and limited by his
wisdom, Grace is introduced araong the race of raan by a
new establishment; not on the ground of God's original estab
lishraent, as the head of the natural world and author of the
first creation ; but by a constitution of a vastly higher kind ;•
wherein Christ is raade the root of the tree whose branches
are his spiritual seed, and he is the head of the new creation ;
of which I need not stand now to speak particularly.
But here I desire it raay be noted, that I do not suppose
the natural depravity of the posterity of Adara is owing to the
course of nature only ; it is also owing to the "ust judgment of

Chap, ii, God not the Author of. Sin. 541
God, But yet I think, it is as truly and in the same raanner
owing to the course of nature, that Adara's posterity corae in
to the world without original righteousness, as that Adam him
self continued without it, after he had once lost it. That Ad
am continued destitute of holiness when he had lost it, and
would always have so continued, had it not been restored by a
Redeemer, was not only a natural consequence, according to
the course of things established by God as the author of nature ;
but it was also a pened consequence, or a punishraent of his
sin, God, in righteous judgment, continued to absent hiraself
from Adara after he became a rebel ; and withheld from him
now those influences of the Holy Spirit which he before had.
And just thus I suppose it to be with every natural branch of
mankind : All are looked upon as sinning in and with their
coraraon root; and God righteously withholds special influ
ences and spiritual communications from ail, for this sin. But
of the raanner and order of these things, more may be said in
the next chapter.
On the whole, this grand objection against the doctrine
of men being born corrupt, that it makes him who gave us our
being, to be the cause of the being of corruption, can have no
more force in it, than a like argument has to prove, that if
men by a course of na,ture continue wicked, or remain without
goodness, after they have by vicious acts contracted vicious
habits, and so made theraselves wicked, it raakes him, who is
the cause of their continuance in being, and ihe cause of the
CONTINUANCE of the course of nature, to be the cause of their
CONTINUED wickedness. Dr, T, says,* " God would not make
any thing that is hateful to him ; because, by the very terras,
he would hate to make such a thing," But if this be good
arguing in the case to which it is applied, may I not as well
say, God would not continue a thing in being that is hateful
to him ; because, by the very terras, he would hate to continue
such a thing in being? I think the very terras do as rauch
(and no raore) infer one of these propositions, as the other.
In like raanner the rest that he says on that head raay be
shewn to be unreasonable, by only substituting the word con
tinue, in the place of make and propagate. I raay fairly imitate
his way of reasoning thus : To say God continues us accord
ing to his own original decree, or law of continuation, which
obliges him to continue us in a manner he abhors, is really to
make bad worse : For it is supposing him to be defective in
wisdom, or by his own decree or law to lay such a constraint
upon his own actions, that he cannot do what he' would, but is
continually doing what he would not, what he hates to do, and
what he condemns in us ; viz, continuing us sinful when he
* Page 136. S.

542 ORIGINAL SIN. ParT IV.
conderans us for continuing ourselves sinful," If the reasoning
be weak in the one case, it is ho less so in the other.
If any shall still insist, that there is a difference between
God so disposing things, as that depravity of heart shall be
continued, according to the settled course of nature, in the sarae
person, who has by his own fault introduced it ; and his so dis
posing as that men, according to a course of nature, should be
bom with depravity, in consequence of Adam's introducing
of sin, by his act which he had no concern in, and cannot be
justly charged with : On this I would observe, that it is quite
going off the objection which we have been upon, frora God's
agency, and flying to another. It is then no longer insisted
on, that simply for hira, frora whose agency the course of
nature and our existence derive, so to dispose things as that
we should have existence in a corrupt state, is for him to be
the author of sin : But the plea now advanced is, that it is not
proper and just for such an agent so to dispose, in this case, and
only in consequence of Adam's sin ; it not being just to charge
Adara's sin to his posterity. And this matter shall be particu
larly considered in answer to the next objection ; to which I
now proceed.

CHAP. Ill,
That great Objection against the imputation of Adam's sin to his
Posterity, considered, that such imputation is unjust and
unreasonable, inasmuch as Adam and his Posterity are not
one and the same. With a brief Reflection subjoined of what
some have supposed, of God imputing the Guilt of Adam's
Sin to his Posterity, but in an infinitely less Degree, than
to Adam himself.
That we may proceed with the greater clearness in con
sidering the main objections against supposing the guilt of
Adara's sin tb be imputed to his posterity ; I would premise some
observations with a view to the right stating of the doctrine j
and then shew its reasonableness, in opposition to the great
clamour raised against it on this head,
I think it would go far towards directing us to the more
clear conception and right statement of this affaif, were we
steadily to bear this in mind: That God, in every step of bis-
proceeding with Adara, in relation to the covenant or constitu-
tion established with hira, looked on his posterity-as being one
with him. And though he dealt raore iraraediately with Adam,
it yet was as the head of the whole body, and the root of the
whole tree ; and in his proceedings with hira, he dealt with

Chap, III, The imputation of Adam's Sin stated. 543
all the branches, as if they had been then existing in their
root. • From which it will follow, that both guilt, or exposedness
to punishment, and also depravity of heart, came upon Adam's
posterity just as they carae upon him, as much as if he and
they had all co-existed, hke a tree with many branches ; allow
ing only for the difference necessarily resulting from the place
Adam stood in, as head or root of the whole. Otherwise, it
is as if, in every step of proceeding, every alteration in the root
had been attended at the same instant with tne sarae altera
tions throughout the whole tree, in each individual branch.
I think this will naturally follow on the supposition of there
being a constituted oneness or identity of Adara and his posterity
in this afl'air.
Therefore I am humbly of opinion, that if any have sup
posed the children of Adam to corae into the world with a
double guilt, one the guilt of Adara's sin, another the guilt
arising from their having a corrupt heart, they have not so well
conceived of the matter. The guilt a man has upon his soul
at first existence, is one and simple, viz. the guilt of the original
apostacy, the guilt of the sin by which the species first re
belled against God. This, and the guilt arising from the de
praved disposition of the heart, are not to be looked upon as
two things, distinctly imputed and charged upon men in the
sight of God. Indeed the guilt that arises from the corrup
tion of the heartj as it remains a confirmed principle and ap'
pears in its consequent operations, is a distinct and additional
guilt : But the guilt arising from the first existing of a depraved
disposition in Adam's posterity, I apprehend, is not distinct
from their guilt of Adam's first sin. For so it was not in Adam
himself The first evil disposition or inchnation of Adara to
sin, was not properly distinct frora his first act of sin, but was
included in it. The external act he committed was no other
wise his, than as his heart was in it, or as that action proceed
ed frora the wicked inclination of his heart. Nor was the guilt
he had double, as for two distinct sins : One, the wickedness
of his will in that affair ; another, the wickedness of the exter
nal act, caused by it. His guilt was all truly from the act of
his inward raan ; exclusive of which the raotions of his body
were no raore than the motions of any lifeless instrument.
His sin consisted in wickedness of heart, fully sufficient for,f
' and entirely araounting to, all that appeared in the act he com
mitted. The depraved disposition of Adam's heart is to be con
sidered two ways. (1.) As the flrst rising of an evil inchna-
. tion in his heart, exerted in his fust act of sin, and the ground
of the complete transgression. (2.) An evil disposition of
heart continuing afterwards, as a confirmed principle that came

544 OEIGINAL SIN, Part iv,
by God's forsaking of hira; which was a punishment oi hia
first transgression. This confirraed corruption, by its re
maining and continued operation, brought additional guilt on
his soul. In like manner, depravity of heart is to be considered two
ways in Adam's. posterity. Theflrst existing oi a corrupt dis
position, is not to be looked upon as sin distinct from their
participation of Adara's first sin. It is as it were the extended
pollution of that sin through the whole tree, by virtue of the
constituted union of the branches with the root ; or the inher
ence of the sin of that head of the species in the members,
in their consent and concurrence with the head in that first act.
But the depravity of nature remaining as an established princi
ple in a child of Adam, and as exhibited in after-operations, is
a consequence and punishment of the first apostacy thus partici
pated, and brings new guilt. Theflrst being of an evil dispo
sition in a child of Adam, whereby he is disposed to approve
the sin of his first father, so far as to imply a full and per
fect consent of heart to it, I think, is not to be looked upon
as a consequence of the imputation of that first sin, any more
than the full consent of Adam's own heart in the act of sinning;
which was not consequent on the imputation, but rather prior
to it in the order of nature. Indeed the derivation ofthe evil
disposition to Adani 's posterity, or rather, the co-existence of
the evil disposition implied in Adara's first rebellion, in the
root and branches, is a consequence of the union that the wise
Author of the world has established between Adara and his
posterity ; but not properly a consequence oi the imputation of
his sin ; nay, is rather antecedent to it, as it was in Adam him
self. The first depravity of heart, and the imputation of that
sin, are both the consequences of that established union ; but
yet in such order, that the evil disposition is first, and the
charge of guilt consequent, as it was in the case of Adara him
self* * My meaning in the whole of what has been here said, may be illustrated
thus : Let us suppose that Adam and all his posterity had co-existed, and that his
posterity had been, through a law of nature estabUshed by the Creator, united to
him, something as the branches of a tree are united to the root, or the members of
the body to the head, so as to constitute as it were one complex person, or one mo
ral whole : So that by the law of union there should have been a communion and
co-exMf ence in acts and affections ; all jointly participating, and all concurring, as
one whole, in the disposition and action of the head : as we see in the body natural,
the whole body is affected as the head is affected ; and the whole body concurs
when the head acts. Now in this case, all the branches of mankind, by the con
stitution pf nature and law of union, would have been affected just as Adam, their
common root, was affected. When the Heart of the root, by a full disposition,
committed the first sin, the hearts of all the branches would have concurred ; and
when the root, in consequence of this, became guilty, so would all the branches ;
and when the root, as a punishment of the sin committed, was forsaken ot God, in
like manner would it have fared with all the branches ; and when the root, in con
sequence of this, was confirmed in permanent depravity, the case would have been

Chap, hi. The Imputctidon of Adam's Sin stated. 545
The first existence of an evil disposition, amounting to a
full consent to Adam's sin, no raore infers God being the
the same with all the branchea ; and as new guilt on the aoul of Adam would have
been consequent on this, so alao would it have been with hia moral branches. And
thua all things, with relation to evil disposition, guilt, pollution and depravity,
would exist, in the same order and dependence, in each branch, as in the root.
Now, difference of the time of existence does not at all hinder things succeeding in
the same order, any more than diffeience oi place in a co-existence of time.
Here may be observed, as in several respects to the present purpose, some
things that are said by Stapferus, an erainent divine of Zu-rich, in Switzerland, in
his Theologia Polemica, pubUshed about fourteen years ago ; — in JEnglish as follows.
" Seeing all Adara's posterity are derived from their first parent, as their root, thc
whole of the human kind, wjth its root, may be considered aa constituting but one
whole, or one mass ; so as not to be properly distinct from its root ; the posterity not
dtjfering from it, any otherwise than the brsinches from the tree. From which it
easily appears, how that when the root sinned, all that which is derived frqm it, and
with it constitutes but one whole, may be looked upon as also sinning ; seeing it
is not distinct from the root, but one with it." — Tom. i. Cap. 3. § 856. 57.
" It is objected against the imputation of Adara's sin, that we never com
mitted the same sin with Adam, neither in number nor in kind. I anawer, we
should distinguish here between the physical act itself which Adam coraraitted,
and the -mor^ity of the action and consent to it. If we have respect only to the
external act, to be sure it must be confessed that Adam's posterity did not put
forth their hands to the forbidden fruit : In which sense, that act of transgression
and that faU of Adam cannot be physically one with the sin of his posterity. But
if we consider the morality of the action, and lyhat consent there is to it, it is alto
gether to be raaintained, that his posterity committed the same sin, both in num
ber and in kind, inasmuch as they are to be looked upon as consenting to it. For
where there is consent fo a sin, there the same sin is committed. Seeing there
fore that Adam with all his posterity constitute but one moral person, and are
upited in the same covenant, and are transgressors of the same law, they are
also to be looked upon as having, in a raoral estimation, committed the same
transgression of the law, both in number and in kind. Therefore this reasoning
avails, nothing against the righteous imputation of the sin of Adam to all man
kind, or to the whole moral person that is consenting to it. And for the reason
mentioned, we may rather argue thus. The ain of the posterity, on account of
their consent, and the moral view in which they are to be taken, is the same with
the sin of Adara, not only in kind, but in number ; therefore the ain of Adam is
rightfully imputed to his posterity." — Id. Tom. iv. cap. 16. § 60, 61.
The iraputation of Adam's first sin consists in nothing else than this, that his
posterity are viewed as in the same place with their father, and are like him. But
seeing, agreeable to what we have already proved, God might, according to his
own righteous judgment, which wa^ founded on his raost righteous law, give
Adam a posterity that were like himself; and indeed it could not be otherwise, ac
cording to the very laws of nature ; therefore he might also in righteous judg
ment imput^ Adam's sin to them, inasmuch as to give Adam a posterity Kfe him
self, and to impute his sin to thera is one and the same thing. And therefore if
the forijaer be not contrary to the divine perfections, so neither is the latter. Our
adversaries contend wijth us chiefly on tMs account, that according to our doctrine
of original sin, auch nn impKb^ion of the first aip is maintained, whereby God,
without any regard to universal native corruption, esteems all Adam's posterity as
giiUty, and holds them as Uable to condemnation, purely on account of that sinful
act pf their first parent i so that they without any respect had to their own sin, and
so, as inngeent in' themselves, are destined to eternal punjahment— I have there-
fojre ever been careful to ahew, that they do injurimsly suppose those things to be
separated'm our doctrine which are by no -means to be separated. The whole of the
controversy thpy haye with us about this raatter, evxdently arises from this, that
they suppose the mediate and the immediate imputation are distinguished one from
the other, not only in the manner of conception, but in reaUty. And so indeed
they consider imputation only as immediate and abstractedly from the mediate;
when yet our divines suppose, that neither ought to be considered separately {torn
the other. Therefore I chcse not to use any such distinction, or to suppose any ¦
VOL, If. 69

546 ORIGINAL SIN. PaRT IV.
author of that evil disposition in the child, than in the father. —
The first arising or existing of that evil disposition in the heart
of Adara was by God's permission ; who could have prevented
it, if he had pleased, by giving such influences of his spirit,
as would have been absolutely effectual to hinder it ; which
it is plain in fact he did withhold : And whatever mystery may
be supposed in the affair, yet no christian will presume to say,
it was not in perfect consistence with God's holiness and
righteousness, notwithstanding Adam had been guilty of no
offence before. So root and branches being one, according to
God's wise constitution, the case in fact is, that by virtue of
this oneness answerable changes or effects through all the
branches co-exist with the changes in the root : consequently
an evil disposition exists in the hearts of Adam's posterity,
equivalent to that which was exerted in his own heart when he
eat the forbidden fruit. Which God has no hand in any other
wise, than in not exerting such an influence as might be effec
tual to prevent it ; as appears by what was observed in the for
mer chapter,* But now the grand objection is against the reasonableness
of such a constitution, by which Adam and his posterity should
be looked upon as one, and dealt with accordingly, in an affair
of such infinite consequence ; so that if Adara sinned, they
must necessarily be made sinners by his disobedience, and
come into existence with the same depravity of disposition, and
be looked upon and treated as though they were partakers
with him in his act of sin, I have not room here to rehearse
all Dr, T.'s vehement exclamations against the reasonableness
and justice of this. The reader raay at his leisure consult his
book, and see thera in the places referred to below.t What
ever black colours and frightful representation are employed
on this occasion, all may be summed up in this, That Adam and
his posterity are not one, but entirely distinct agents. But with
respect to this mighty outcry made against the reasonableness
of any such constitution, by which God is supposed to treat
such thing, in what I have said on the subject ; but only have endeavoured to ex
plain the thing itself, and to reconcile it with the divine attributes. And therefore
I have every where conjoined both these conceptions conceming the iraputation of
the first sin as inseparable ; and judged, that one ought never to be considered
without the other. — While I have been writing this note, I consulted all the sys
tems of divinity, which I have by me, that I might see what was the true and
genuine opinion of our chief divines in this affair ; and I found they were of the
same mind with me ; inamely, that these two kinds of imputation are by no means
to be separated, or to be considered abstractedly one from the other, but that one
does involve the other." — He there particularly cites those two famous reformed
divines, Vitringa and Lampius. — Tom. iv. Cap. 17. § 78.
* See also Vol. I. p. 249, note, 5 8. &c. 278, 5 12, &c. 393, § 9,&c. 398, S 17
&c. 533, § 7, &c.
t Page 13, 150, 151, 156, 361. 108, 109, 111, S.

Chap. hi. The Imputation of Adam's sin stated. 547
Adam and his posterity as one, I would make the following ob
servations. I. It signifies nothing to e-xclaim against plain /ac*. Such
is the factj the raost evident and acknowledged fact, with
respect to the state of all raankind, without exception of one
individual araong all the natural descendants of Adara, as
makes it apparent, that God actually deals with Adam and his
posterity as one, in reference to his apostacy, and its infinitely
terrible consequences. It has been demonstrated, and shewn
to be in effect plainly acknowledged, that every individual
of raankind comes into the world in such circumstances, as
that there is no hope or possibility of any other than their vio
lating God's holy law, (if they ever live to act at all as moral
agents) and being thereby justly exposed to eternal ruin.*
And God either thus deals with mankind, because he looks
upon them as one with their first father and so treats them as
sinful and guilty by his apostacy; or (which will not mend the
matter) he, without viewing them as at all concerned in that
affair, but as in every respect perfectly innocent, subjects them
nevertheless to this infinitely dreadful calamity. Adam by his
sin was exposed to the calamities and sorrows of this life, to
temporal death and eternal ruin ; as is confessed. And it is
also in effect confessed, that all his posterity come. into the
world in such a state, as that the certain consequence is their
being exposed, and justly so, to the sorrows of this life, to tem
poral death and eternal ruin, unless saved by grace. So that
we see, God in fact deals with them together, or as one. If
God orders the consequences of Adara's sin, with regard to his
posterity's welfare — even in those things which are raost
iraportant, and which in the highest degree concern theii'
eternal interest — to be the same with the consequences to
Adara himself, then he treats Adam and his posterity as one
in that affair. Hence, however the matter be attended with
difficulty, fact obliges us to get over it, either by finding out
some solution, or by shutting our mouths, and acknowledging
the weakness and scantiness of our understandings ; as we
must in other innumerable cases, where apparent and undeni
able fact, in God's works of creation and providence, is
attended with events and circumstances, the manner and
reason of which are difficult to our understandings. — But to
proceed. II. We will consider the difficulties themselves, insisted on
in the objections of our opposers. They may be reduced to
these two : First, That such a constitution is injurious to Adam's
posterity. Secondly, That it is altogether improper, as it im-
* Part I, Chap. I. the three fivst sections,

548 ORIGINAL SIN. Part iv.
plies_^feeAood, viewing ahd treating those as one, which indeed
are not one, but entirely distinct.
First difficulty. That appointing Adam to stand, in this
great affair, as the moral hec^ of his posterity, and so treating
them as one with him, as standing or falling with him, is injuri
ous to them. To which I answer, it is demonstrably otherwise ;
that such a constitution was so far from being injurious to
Adara's posterity, any more than if every one had been ap
pointed to stand for hiraself personally, that it was, in itself con
sidered, attended with a more ehgible probability of a happy
issue than the latter would have been ; And so is a constitution
that truly expresses the goodness oi its Author. For,
I. It is reasonable to suppose, that Adam was as likely,
on account of his capacity and natural talents, to perSevere in
obedience, as his posterity, (taking one with another) if they
had all been put on the trial singly for theraselves. And sup
posing that there was a constituted union or oneness of hira
and his posterity, and that he stood as a public person or com
raon head, all by this constitution would have been as sure to
partake ofthe benefit ofhis obedience, as of the ill consequence
ofhis disobedience, in case ofhis fall,
2, There was a greater tendency to a happy issue in such
-an appointraent, than if every one had been appointed to
stand for hiraself; especially on two accounts, (1,) That
Adam had stronger motives to wdtchfidness than his ptjsterity
would have had ; in that not only his own eternal welfare lay at
stake, but also that of all his posterity: (2) Adam was in a
state of coraplete nianhood when his trial began. It was a
constitution very agreeable to the goodness of God, considering
the state of mankind, which was to be propagated in the way
of generation, that \k\e\r first father should be appointed to
stand for all. For by reason ofthe manner oftheir coming into
existence in a state of infancy, and their coming so gradually
to mature state, and so reraaining for a great while in a state of
childhood and comparative imperfection, after they -were be
come moral agents, they would be less fit to stand for them
selves, than their first father to stand for them.
If any raan, notwithstanding these things, shall say that
for his own part, if the affair had been proposed to him, he
should have chosen to have had his eternal interest trusted in
his own hands : It is sufficient to answer, that no man's vain
opinion of himself, as more fit to be trusted than others, alters
the true nature and tendency of things, as they demonstrably
are in themselves. Nor is it a just objection, that this ¦Consti
tution has in event proved for the hurt of mankind. For
it does not follow, that no advantage was given for a happy
event in such an establishraent, because it was not such as to
make it utterly impossible there should be any other event.

UHAP. HI. Tlie Imputation of Adam's Sin stated. .549
3. The goodness of God in such a constitution with Adam
appears in this : That if there had been no sovereign gracious
establishment -at ail, but God had proceeded only on Sie basis
of mere justice, and had gone no further than this required,
he might have demanded of Adam and all his posterity, that
they should perform perfect perpetual obedience, without ever
failing in the least instance, on pain of eternal death ; and
might have made this demand without the pro-mise of any
positive reward for their obedience. For perfect obedience
is a debt, that every one .owes to his Creator ; and therefore
is what his Creator was not obliged to pay him for. None is
obliged to pay his debtor for discharging his just debt. — But
such was evidently the constitution with Adam, that an eter
nal happy life was to be the consequence of his preserving fidel
ity, to all such as were included within that constitution (of
which the tree of life was a sign) as well as eternal death to
be the consequence of his disobedience. — I corae now to con
sider the
Second difficulty. — It being thus manifest that this con
stitution, by which Adam and his posterity are dealt with as
one, is not unreasonable on account of its bemg injurious and
hurtful to the interest of mankind, the only thing remaining in
the objection against such a constitution is the impropriety of
it, as implying falsehood, and contradiction to the true jpature
of things ; as hereby they are viewed and treated as one, who
are not one, but wholly distinct ; and no arbitraiy constitu
tion can ever make that to be true, which in itself considered
is not true.
This objection, however specious, is really founded on a
false hypothesis, and wrong notion of what we call sameness or
oneness, among created things ; and the seeming force of the
objection arises frora ignorance or inconsideration of the de
gree, in which created identity or oneness with past existence,
in general, depends on the sovereign constitution and law of
the supreme Author and Disposer of the universe.
Some things are entirely distinct, and very diverse, which
yet are so united by the established law of the Creator, that by
virtue of that establishment, they are in a sense one. Thus a
tree, grown great, and a hundred years old, is one plant with |
the little sprout, that first came out of the ground frora whence |
it grew, and has been continued in constant succession ; ;
though it is now so exceeding diverse, many thousand tiraes \
bigger, and of a very different forra and perhaps not one atom \
the very same : Yet God, according to an established law of
nature, has in a constant succession communicated to it many
bf the same qualities, and most important properties, as if it
were <me. It has been his pleasure to constitute an union in
these respects, and for these purposes, naturally leading us to

550 0RI615JAL siisr. Part Lv.
, to look upon all as one. — So the body of man at forty years of
age, is one with the infant-body which first carae into the world,
frora whence it grew ; though now constituted of different sub
stance, and thegreater part of the substance probably chang
ed scores (if not hundreds) qf times : And though it be now
in so raany respects exceeding diverse, yet God, according to
the course of nature which he has been pleased to establish,
has caused that in a certain raethod it should coraraunicate
with that infantile body, in the same life, the same senses, the
same features, and many the same q^ialities, and in union with ,
the sarae soul ; and so, with regard to these purposes, it is dealt
with by him as one body. Again the body and soul of a raan
are one, in a very different manner, and for different purposes.
Considered in theraselves, they are exceeding different beings,
of a nature as diverse as can be conceived ; and yet, by a very
\ peculiar divine constitution, or law of nature, which God has
Ibeen pleased to establish, they are strongly united, and becorae
towe, in raost important respects ; a wonderful mutual commu
nication is established ; so that both become different parts of
me same man. But the union and mutual communication they
I&ye, has existence, and is entirely regulated and limited, ac
ceding to the sovereign pleasure of God, and the constitution
h^' has been pleased to establish,
¦; And if we come even to the personal identity of created
intelligent beings, though this be not allowed to consist wholly
in what Mr, Locke supposes, i, e. Same consciousness ; yet I
think it cannot be denied, that this is one thing essential to
it. But it is evident, that the communication or continuance
of the same consciousness and memory to any subject, through
successive parts of duration, depends wholly on a divine es
tablishment. There would be no necessity that the remera
brance and ideas of what is past should continue to exist, but
by an arbitrary constitution of the Creator, — If any should
here insist that there is no need of having recourse to any
such constitution, in order to account for the continuance of
the same consciousness ; and should say, that the very nature
of the soul is such as will sufficiently account for it, its ideas
and consciousness being retained, according to the course of
nature : Then let it be remembered, who it is that gives the
soul this nature ; and let.^pt be remembered, which Dr, T,
says of the course of nature, before observed ; denying, that
" the course of nature is a proper active cause, which will work
and go on by itself without God, if he lets and perraits it;"
saying, " that the course of nature, separate frora the agency of
God, is no cause, or nothing ; and affirraing, that " it is abso
lutely impossible, the course of nature should continue itself, or
go on to operate by itself, any more than produce itself;* and
" Page 134. .'i.

Chap, hi. The Imputation of Adam's Sin stated. 551
that God, the original of all being, is the only cause of all natu
ral effects,*" Here is worthy also to be observed, what Dr,
Turnbull says of the laws of nature, as cited frora Sir Isaac
Newton,! " It is the will of the mind that is the flrst cause,
that gives subsistence and efficacy to all those laws, who is the
efficient cause that produces the phaenomena, which appear in
analogy, harmony and agreement, according to these laws."
And, " the same principles must take place in things pertaining
to moral, as well as natural philosophy,^"
From these things it will clearly follow, that identity of
consciousness depends wholly on a law of nature ; and so, on
the sovereign will and agency of God, And therefore, that
personal identity, and so the derivation of the pollution and
guilt of past sins in the sarae person, depends on an arbitrary
divine constitniion ; and this, even though we should allow the
same consciousness not to be the only thing which constitutes
oneness of person, but should, besides that, suppose sameness
of substance requisite. For, if same consciousness be one
thing^necessary to personal identity, and this depends on God's
sovereign constitution, it will still follow, that personal identity
depends on God.'s sovereign constitution.
And with respect to the identity of created substance
itself, in the different raoraents of its duration, I think we shall
greatly mistake, if we imagine it to be like that absolute, inde
pendent identity of the first beino, whereby he is the same
yesterday, to-day, and for ever. Nay, on the contrary, it raay
be demonstrated, that even this oneness of created substance
existing at diflerent times, is a merely dependeni identity ; de
pendent on the pleasure and sovereign constitution of him who
worketh all in all. This will follow from what is generally
allowed, and is certainly true, that God not only created all
things, and gave them being at first, but continually preserves
them, and upholds them in being. This being a matter of con
siderable iraportance, it may be worthy here to be considered
with a little attention. Let us inquire therefore, in the first
place, whether it be not evident, that God does continually, by
his immediate power, uphold every created substance in being ;
and then let us see the consequence.
That God does, by his immediate power, uphold every
created substance in being, will be raanifest, if we consider
that their present existence is a dependent existence, and
therefore is an effect and raust have some cause ; and the cause
must be one of these two ; either the antecedent existence of
the same substance, or else the power of the Creator. But it
cannot be the antecedent existence of the same substance. For
instance, the existence of the body of the moon, at this present
^ Page 140, S. t Mor. Phil, p. 7. t Ibid. p. 9.

552 oiiioiNAL sin. Part iv.
raoraent cannot be the ^ecf of its existence at the last foregor
ing raoment. For not only was what existed the last moraent,
no active cause, but wholly a passive thing ; but this also is to
be considered, that no cause can produce effects in a time and
place in which itself is nat. It is plain, nothing can exert itself,
or operate, when and where it is not existing. But the moon's
past existence was neither wAere nor when its present existence
is. In point of time, what is past entirely ceases when present
existence begins ; otherwise 'it would not be past. The past
moment has ceased, andis gone when the present moment takes
place; and no more co-exists with it, than any other raoraent
that had ceased twenty years ago. Nor could the past existence
of the particles of this moving body produce effects in any other
place, than where it then was. But its existence at the present
moment, in every point of it, is in a different ^/ace frora where
its existence was at the last preceding raoraent. Frora these
things I suppose it will certainly follow, that the present
existence, either of this, or any other created substance, cannot
be an effect of its past existence. The existences (fp to
speak) of an effect, or thing dependent, in different parts
of space or duration, though ever so near^. one to another,
do not at all co-exist one with the other ; and therefore are
as truly different effects, as if those parts of space and dura
tion were ever so far asunder. And the prior existence can
no raore be the proper cause of the new existence, in the next
moment, or next part of space, than if it had been in an age
before, or at a thousand miles distance, without any exis
tence to fili up the intermediate tirae or space. Therefore the
ex;istence of created substances, in each successive moment,
must be the effect of the immediate agency, will, and power of
GOD. If any shall insist upon it, that their present existence is
the effect or consequence of past existence, according to the
nature of things ; that the established course of nature is suf
ficient to continue existence once given ; I allow it. But then
it should be remembered, what nature is in created things; '
and what the established course oi nature is ; that, as has been
observed already, it is nothing, separate from the agency of
God ; and that, as Dr, T, says, god, the original of dll being,
is the ONLY cause of all natural effects. A father, according
to the course of nature, begets a child ; an oak, according
to the course of nature, produces an acorn, or a bud ; so ac
cording, to the course of nature, the forraer existence of the
trunk of the tree is followed by its new or present existence.
In the one case, and the other, the new effect is consequent
on tbe former, only by the established laws and settled course
of nature ; which is allowed to be nothing but the continued
immediate efficiency of god, according to a constitution that

Chap. hi. The Impulai'ion of Adam'^s Shi stated. 553
he has been pleased to establish. Therefore, according to
what our author urges ; as the child and the acorn which come
into existence according to tli-e course of nature, in conse
quence of the prior existence and state of the parent and the
oak, are tmly immediately created by God; so must the ex
istence of each created person and thing, at each moraent,
be from the immediate continued creation of God. It will
certainly follow from these things, that God's preserving^ of
created things in being, is perfectly equivalent to a continued
creation, or to his creating those things out of nothing at each
moment of their existence. If the continued existence of
created things be wholly dependent on God's preservation,
then those things would drop into nothing, upon the ceasing
of the present raoment, without a new exertion of the divine
power to cause them to exist in the following moment.* If
* The Christian Observek,. (Vol. V. p. 177.) in reviewing a sermon enti
tled, " Predestination to Life," remarks : " It may be allowed (though even this
is not to us in the sense formerly explained, a self-evident proposition) that al!
created nature, as such, tends to nihiUty. Since it sprung out of nothing, only
through the intervention of Almighty Power, it must certainly relapse into no
thing when the intervening power is removed. Since it became something only
during the pleasure of another, it will cease to be something when left to itself.
But it is not so apparent, why that wliich never subsisted but. in a state of virtue
and purity, should of itself have a tendency to subsist in any other state ; or
why, when left to itself, if it continue at all, it should not continue in that state
in which it was left." — But, in p. 186, he retracts what he first said, in the follow
ing very singular note : "The preceding sheet was printed off before we perceived
that we had expressed ourselves at p. 177, col. 2. in language which may be con
strued into an admission of the truth of the doctrine maintained by Dr. Williams ,
as it respects the necessary tendency of all created nature to nihility. In a popular
sense, indeed, it may perhaps be said (though the proposition will be found ' to
fill the ear rather than the mind') that what sprung out of nothing at the pleasure
of another, must again become nothing when left to itself ; and, for the sake of
shortening the discussion, we were willing to concede thus much. We must at
the same time confess that we da not quite u-nderstand the position, that created be
ings tendifo nihility -, and we leave it to our readers to judge whether there be much
more meaning in saying that "what is tends nof to ie,"J than in saying "that what
is not tends fo 6c;" or, in other words, whether a tendency to annihilation in that
which exists, be at all more conceivable, than a tendency to become existeitt in that
whicheiJsfs iwt."
How far the writer had any good reason for retracting what he first asserted,
and thereby opposing the sentiments, not only of the author he reviews, but of
nearly all the divines that ever have written upon providence, let the reader judge
by a careful perusal of this chapter. We are not ignorant of what Bishop Bur
net says on this head, (Art. 1. p. 30. 3d Ed.) but are well satisfied his notion is
as incapable of being supported by sound reason, as it was novel ; and as little
calculated to support the cause ot piety as any one opinion he advances, in his un
decisive and latitudinarian exposition 'of the Thirty-nine Articles. (See parti
cularly Art. ix. on Original Sin.) For what can be a more heterodox opinioii,
or more full of horrid impiety, if traced to its just consequences, than the senti
ment advanced by that Bishop, and by the eHiusTi an OnsEiivEKi though we
are far from supposing that either the one or the other foresaw those consequen
ces. The best excuse we can form for this writer is, that " he does not quite under
stand the position" against which he writes. This record, we believe, m true; and
is equally applicable to several other positions in that article. But then the puhlic
expects from a Re-viewer a comprehensive acquaintance with the subject which ho
VOL. II. ' 70

5^ ORIGINAL SIN. pART IV,
there be any who own that God preserves things in being, and
yet hold that they would continue in being without any fur
ther help from him, after they once have existence ; I think,
it is hard to know what they mean. To what purpose can it
be, to talk of God preserving things in being, when there
is no need oi his preserving them? Or to talk of their being
dependent on God for continued existence, when they would
of"^ themselves continue to exist, without his help; nay, though
he should wholly withdraw his sustaining power and influence ?
It will follow from vvhat has been observed, that God's
upholding of created substance, or causing of its existence in
each successive moment, is altogether equivalent to an imme
diate production out of nothing, at each moment. Because its
existence at this moraent is not raerely in part frora God, but
wholly frora hira ; and not in any part, or degree, frora its ante
cedent existence. For, to suppose that its antecedent existence
concurs with God in efficiency, to produce some part of the
effect, is attended with all the very sarae absurdities, which
have been shewn to attend the supposition of its producing it
wholly. Therefore the antecedent existence is nothing, as to
any proper influence or assistance in the affair: And conse
quently God produces the effect as rauch frora nothing, as if
there had been nothing before. So that this effect differs not
at all from the first creation, but only circumstantially ; as, in
first creation there had been no such act and effect of God's
criticises, instead of " a wood of words" and inconclusive declamations. How
ever, he seems to be notoriously deficient in comprehending the true state of the
question. A great part of that long article consists in proving what was not denied,
and in disproving what was never asserted ; with a goodly portion of contradictory
propositions. We might have expected, that an author who studiously shwns the intricacies of
a subject which will, in his apprehension, " descend to posterity with all its difii
culties on its head" — a subject, the depth of which " the sounding line of meta
physics will never fathom" — would have kept himself more free from embarrass
ments and self-contradictions. And it was also to be expected frora one who pro
fesses to advocate the cause of piety and practical religion, that he should keep
aloof from the horrible sentiment suggested by Burnet, in opposition to the almost
unanimous verdict of all the pious and learned divines that ever lived. We almost
shudder to draw the inference demonstrably impUed in the sentiment — That the
world would continue in being, were there no God to uphold it ! When we say, that this
is the just inference drawn from the sentiraent held by the Christian OeserveIi,
we mean, by the individual Reviewer in question, whose critique disgraces that
excellent work.
Aware, perhaps, that the author whose works we now publish was of the same
way of thinking; or at least, that his works have the same tendency with what he
opposes,lie observes : " We are apt to think that the metaphysicsJcast which the
celebrated Mr. Kdwards gave to his writings in.divinity, has to a certain degree
produced an imfavourable efiect on the minds of his followera." It would have
been extremelj; difiicnlt for this writer to point out any preacher who came closer
to men's consciences, or any writer who more eiFectually promotes the interest of
genuine, hurable, holy, practical rehgion, than President Edvvards ; and the editors
pf his works are fully conscious, that what they pubUsh tends, in the most direct man
ner, -when duly considered and understood, to essential truth — to God; of whom,
md thrmigh wmn, amd to whom are all things : to whom be glory for ever, .Mrnen, W.

Chap, in. The Imputation of Adam's sin stated. 555
power before ; whereas his giving existence afterwards,/oZZott)s
preceding acts and effects of the same kind, in an established
order. Now, in the next place, let us see how the consequence
of these things is to my present purpose. If the existence
of' created substance, in each successive moraent, be wholly
the effect of God's imraediate power in that moment, with
out any dependence on prior existence, as rauch as the first
creation out of nothing, then what exists at this moment,
by this power, is a new effect ; and simply and absolutely con
sidered, not the sarae with any past existence, though it be
like it and follows it according to a certain established rae
thod.* And there is no identity or oneness in the case, but
* When I suppose, that an effect which is produced every raoment by a new
action or exertion of power, raust be a new effect in each moment, and not abso
lutely and numerically the sarae with that which existed in preceding raoraents,
what I intend may be iUustrated by this exaraple. The lucid colour or brightness
of the moon, as we look steadfastly upon it, seems to be a permanent thing, as
though it were perfectly the sarae brightness continued. But indeed it is an ef
fect produced every moraent. It ceases, and is renewed, in each successive point
of tirae ; and so becomes altogether a new effect at each instant ; and no one
thing that belongs to it is numerically the same that existed in the preceding mo
ment. The rays of the sun, impressed on that body, and reflected from it, which
cause the efiect, are none of them the same : The impression made in each rao
ment on our sensory, is by the stroke of neio rays : And the sensation excited by
the stroke is a new effect, an effect of a ncto impulse. Therefore the brightness
or lucid whiteness of this body is no more numerically the same thing with that
which existed'in the preceding moment, than the sound of the wind that blows now
js individually the same with the sound of the wind that blew just before ; which,
though it be like it, is not the same, any raore than the agitated air, that raakes
the sound, is the same ; or than the water flowing in a river, that now passes by,
is individually the sarae with that which passed a little before. And if it be thus
with the brightness or colour of the moon, so it must be with ita solidity, and every
thing elae belonging to its substance, if all be, each moment, aa much the immedi
ate effect of a new exertion or appUcation of power.
The raatter may perhaps be in some respects stiU more clearly iUustrated
thus. — The images of things in a glass, as we keep our eye upon them, seem to
remain precisely the same, with a continuing perfect identity. But it ia known
to be otherwiae. Philosophers well know, that these images are constantly re
newed, by the impression and reflection of neio raya of Ught ; so that the image im-
preaaed by the former rays is constantly vanishing, and a new image impressed
by neio rays every moment, both on the glass and on the eye The iraage con
stantly renewed, by new successive rays, is no raore numerically the same, than if
it were by some artiat put on anew with a pencil, and the colours constantly van-
iahing as fast as put on. And the new images being put on immediately or instant
ly, do not make them the same, any more than if it were done with the jintermisr
sion of an hour or a day. The iraage that exists this raoment, is not at all derived
frora the image that existed the last preceding raoraent : for, if the succession of
new rays be intercepted by something interposed between the object and the "glass,
the image immediately ceases ; the past existence of the image has no infiuence to
uphold it, so much as for one moment. Which shews, that the image is altogether
new-made every moment; and strictly speaking, is in no part numerically the
same with that which existed the moraent preceding. And truly so the raatter
niust be with the bodies theraselves, as well as their images. They also cannot be
the sarae, with an absolute identity, but must be wholly renewed every moment,
if the case be as has been proved^ that their present existence is not, atrictly speak
ing, at all the effect of their past existence ; but is wholly, every instant, the
effect of a new agency, or exertion of the powerful cause of their existence. If
so, the existence caused is every instant a new effect, whether the cause be light
or immediate divine power, or whatever it be.

,r>5(j eiiSGiKAL SIS. Part n,
what depends on the arbitrary constitution of the Creator;
who by his wise sovereign establishment so unites these suc
cessive new effects, that he treats them as one, by communi
cating to them like properties, relations, and circumstances ;
and so leads us to regard and treat them as one. When
1 call this an arbitrary constitution, I mean that it is a con
stitution which depends on nothing but the divine will; which
divine will depends on nothing but the divine wisdom. In
this sense, the whole cottrse of nature, with all that belongs to
it, all its laws and methods, constancy and regularity, continu
ance, and proceeding, is an arbitrary constitution. In this
sense* the continuance of the very being of the world and all
its parts, as well as the manner of continued being, depends
entirely on an arbitrary constitution. For it does not at all necessa
rily follow, that because there was sound, or light, or colour, or
resistance, or gravity, or thought, or consciousness, or any other
dependent thing the last moment, that therefore there shajl be
the like at the next. All dependent existence whatsoever is in
a constant flux, ever passing and returning ; renewed every
moment, as the colours of bodies are every moment renewed
by the light that shines upon them ; and all is constantly pro
ceeding from GOD, as light from the sun. In him ive live, and
move, and have our being.
Thus it appears, if we consider matters strictly, there is
no such thing as any identity or oneness in created objects,
existing at different times, but what depends on God's sove
reign constitution. And so it appears, that the objection we
are upon, made against a supposed divine constitution where
by Adam and his posterity are viewed and treated as one, in the
manner and for the purposes supposed — as if it were not con
sistent with truth, because no constitution can make those to
be one, which are not one — is built on a false hypothesis : For
it appears that a divine constitution is what makes truth, in af
fairs of this nature. The objection supposes, there is a one
ness in created beings, whence qualities and relations are deriv
ed down from past existence, distinct from, and prior to any
oneness that can be supposed to be founded on divine consti
tution. Which is demonstrably false ; and sufficiently appears
so from things conceded by the adversaries themselves ; And
therefore the objection wholly falls to the ground.
There are various kinds of identity and oneness found
among created things, by which they become one in different
manners, respects and degrees, and to various purposes ; several
of which differences have been observed ; and every kind is
ordered, regulated and limited, in every respect, by divine con
stitution. Some things, existing in different times and places,
are treated by their Creator as one in one respect, and others in
another ; some are united for this communication, and others

Chap, hi. The Imputation of Adam's sin stated. 557
for that ; but all according to the sovereign pleasure of the
fountain of all being and operation.
It appears, particularly, from what has been said, that all
oneness, by virtue whereof pollution and guilt frora past wick
edness are derived, depends entirely on a divine establishment.
It is this, and this only, that must account for guilt and an evil
taint on any individual soul, in consequence of a crime com
mitted twenty or forty years ago, remaining still, and even to
the end of the world and for ever. It is this that must account
for the continuance of any such thing, and where, as conscious
ness of acts that are past ; and for the continuance of all hab
its, either good or bad : And on this depends every thing that
can belong to personal identity. And all communications, de
rivations, or continuation of qualities, properties, or relations,
natural or moral, from what is past, as if the subject were one,
depends on no other foundation.
And I am persuaded that no solid reason can be given, why
God — who constitutes all other created union or oneness ac
cording to his pleasure, and for what purposes, communications,
and effects he pleases — may not establish a constitution where
by the natural posterity of Adara, proceeding from him, much
as the buds and branches frora the stock or root of a tree, should
be treated as one with hira, for the derivation, either of righte
ousness and comraunion in rewards, or of the loss of righteous
ness, and consequent corruption and guilt*,
* I appeal to such as are not wont to content themselves with judging by a su-
perficial appearance and view of things, but are habituated to examine things
strictly and closely, that they may judge righteous judgment, whether on supposi
tion that aU mankind had co-existed, in the manner mentioned before, any good rea
son can be given, why their Creator might not, if he had pleased, have establish
ed such an «nion between Adara and the rest of mankind, as was in that case sup
posed. Particularly, if it had been the case, that Adam's posterity had actually,
according to the law of nature, some how grown out of him, and yet remained con-
tiguausa.nd UteraUy umted to him, as the branches to a tree, or the members of the
body to the head ; and had aU, before the fall, existed together at the same time,
though in different places, as the head and raerabers are in different places : In this
case, who can deterraine that the author of nature might not, if^ it had pleased
him, have established such an union between the root and branches of this
complex being, as that all should constitute one moral whole ; so that by the law
of union, there should be a communion in each -moral alteration, and that the heart
of every branch should at the same moment participate with the heart ofthe roof, be
conformed to it and concurring with it in all its affections and acts, and so jointly
partaking, in its state, as a part ofthe same thing ? Why might not God, if he had
pleased, have fixed such a kind of union as this, an union of the various parts of
such a moral wliole, as well as many other unions, which he has actually fixed, ac
cording to his sovereign pleasure ? And if he might, by his sovereign consti
tution, have estabUshed such an union of the various branches of mankind,
when existing in different places, I do not see why he might not also do the sarae,
though they exist in different ti-mes. I know not why succession, or diversity of
ti-me, should make any such constituted union more unreasonable, than diversity
of place. The only reason why diversity of time can seem to make it unreasonable,
is that difference of time shews there is no absolute identity ofthe things existing
in those difierent times : But it shews this, I think, not at all more than the differ
ence of the place of existence.

558 oUitiiNAL SIS, Part iv.
As I said before, all oneness in created things, whence
qualities and relations are derived, depends on a divine con
stitution that is arbitrary in every other respect, excepting
that it is regulated by divine wisdom. The wisdom which is
exercised in these constitutions appears in these two things,—
First, in a beautiful analogy and harmony with other laws or
constitutions, especially relating to the same subject ; and se-
, condly, in the good ends obtained, or useful consequences of
such a constitution. If therefore there be any objection still
lying against this constitution with Adam and his posterity, it
must be, that it is not sufficiently wise in these respects. But
what extreme arrogance would it be in us, to take upon us to
act as judges of the beauty and wisdom of the laws and
established constitutions of the suprerae Lord and Creator of
the universe ? And not only so, but if this constitution in par
ticular be well considered, its wisdom, in the two forementioned
respects, raay easily be made evident. There is an appareht
raanifold analogy to other constitutions and laws, established
and raaintained through the whole system of vital nature in
this lower world ; all parts of which, in all successions, are de
rived frora the first of the kind, as frora their root or founfain ;
each deriving frora thence all properties and qualities, that are
proper to the nature and capacity of the species ; no deriva
tive having any one perfection unless it be what is raerely cir-
curastantial, but what was in its primitive. And that Adam's
posterity should be without that original righteousness whicii
Adam had lost, is also analogous to other laws and establish
ments relating to the nature of mankind ; according to which,
Adara's posterity have no one perfection of nature, in any kind,
superior to what was in him, when the human race began to
be propagated from hira.
And as such a constitution was fit and wise in other res
pects, so it was in this that follows. Seeing the divine consti
tution concerning the manner of mankind coming into exist
ence, was such as did so naturally unite them, and make
thera in so many respects one, naturally leading them to a close
union in society, and manifold intercourse, and mutual de
pendence — things were wisely so established that all should
naturally be in one and the same moral state ; and not in
such exceeding different states, as that some should be per
fectly innocent and holy, but others corrupt and wicked ; some
needing a Saviour, but others needing none ; some in a con
firraed state of perfect happiness, but others in a state of
public conderanation to perfect and eternal misery ; sorae
justly exposed to great calaraities in this world, but others by
their innocence raised above all suffering. Such a vast diver
sity of state would by' raeans have agreed with the natural
and necessary constitution and unavoidable situation and cir-

Chap, hi. The Imputation of Adam's sin slated. 659
cumstances of the world of mankind ; " all made of one blood
to dwell on all the face of the earth," to be united and blended
in society, and to partake together in the natural and comraon
goods and evils of this lower world.
Dr. T. urges* that sorrow and sharae are only for personal
sin; and it has often been urged, that repentance can be for
no other sin. To which I would say, that the use of words
is very arbitrary : But that men's hearts should be deeply af
fected with grief and humiliation before God, for the pollution
and guilt which they bring into the world with them, I think is
not in the least unreasonable. Nor is it a thing strange and un
heard of, that men should be ashamed of things done by others,
in whom they are nearly concerned. 1 am sure it is not un
scriptural; especially when they are justly looked upon in the
sight of God, who sees the disposition of their hearts, as fully
consenting ahd concurring.
From what has been observed it raay appear there is no
sure ground to conclude, that it raust be an absurd and impos
sible thing for the race of mankind truly to partake of the sin
of the first apostacy, so as that this, in reality and propriety,
shall become their sin ; by virtue of a real union between
the root and branches of mankind (truly and properly avail
ing to such a consequence) established by the author of the
whole system of the universe ; to whose establishments are
owing all propriety and reality of union, in any part of that
system ; and by virtue of the full consent of the hearts of Adam's
posterity to that first apostacy. And therefore the sin of the
apostacy is not theirs, merely because God imputes it to them ;
but it is truly and properly theirs, and on that ground God im
putes it to them.
By reason of the established union between Adam and
his posterity, the case is far otherwise between him and them,
than it is between distinct parts or individuals of Adara's race
betwixt whom is no such constituted union : As between
children and other ancestors. Concerning whora is apparently
to be understood that place, Ezek, xvui, 1 — ^20t where God re
proves the Jews for the use they raade of that proverb, " The
fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set
on edge ;" and tells thera, that hereafter they shall no raore
have occasion to use this proverb ; and that if a son sees the
wickedness of his /a^Aer, and sincerely disapproves it and avoids
it, and he himself is righteous, " he shall not die for the iniquity
ofhis father ; that all souls, both the soul ofthe father and the
son are his, and that therefore the son shall not bear the iniquity
of his father, nor the father bear the iniquity of the son ; but
the soul that sinneth, it shall die ; that the righteousness of the
* Page 14. t Ivhich Dr. T. alledges, p. 10, 11 S.

660 ORIGINAL HIN, PaRT IV-
lighteous shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked
shall be upon hira," The thing denied, is communion in the
guilt and punishment of the sins of others, that are distinct
parts of Adam's race ; and expressly in that case, where there
is no consent and concurrence, but a sincere disapprobation of
the wickedness of ancestors. It is declared that children who
are adult and come to act for theraselves, who are righteous,
and do not approve of, but sincerely conderan the wickedness
of then: fathers, shall not be punished for their disapproved
and avoided iniquities. The occasion of what is here said, as
well as the design and plain sense, shews, that nothing is in
tended in the least degree inconsistent with what has been sup
posed concerning Adam's posterity sinning and falling in his
apostacy. The occasion is, the people's raurmuring at God's
methods under the Mosaic dispensation ; agreeable to that in
Levit, xxvi, 39, " And they that are left of you shall pine away
in their iniquity in their enemies' land, and also in the iniquities
of their fathers shall they pine away with them :" and other
parallel places, rfespecting external judgments, which were the
punishments most plainly threatened, and chiefly insisted on,
under that dispensation (which was, as it were, an external and
carnal covenant) and particularly the people suffering such
terrible judgments in Ezekiel's time, for the sins of Manasseh j
according to what God says by Jeremiah, (Jer. xv. 4.) and
agreeable to what is said in that confession. Lam. v. 7. " Our
fathers have sinned and are not, and we have borne their ini
quities !"
In what is said here, there is a special respect to the
gospel-dispensation ; as is greatly confirmed by comparing this
place with Jer. xxxi, 29 — ^31. Under which dispensation, the
righteousness of God's dealings with raankind would be raore
fully manifested, in the clear revelation then to be raade of the
method of God's judgment, by which the^^naZ state of wicked
men is determined ; which is not according to the behaviour of
their particular ancestors ; but every one is dealt with according
to the sin of his own wicked heart, or sinful nature and prac
tice. The affair oi derivation ofthe natural corruption of man
kind in general, and of their consent to, and participation of,
the primitive and common apostacy, is not in the least inter
meddled with, by any thing meant in the true scope and design
of this place in Ezekiel.
On the Vvhole, if any do not like the philosophy, or the
metaphysics (as some perhaps raay choose to call it) raade use
of in the foregoing reasonings ; yet I cannot doubt, but that a
proper consideration of what is apparent and undeniable in
fact, with respect to the dependence ofthe state and course of
things in the universe on the sovereign constitutions of the
supreme Author and Lord of all — who "gives account to none

Chap, n I, The Imputation of Adam's sin stated. 561
of any of his matters, and whose ways are past finding out" —
will be sufiicient, with persons of comraon raodesty and sobriety,
to stop their raonths frora raaking pereraptory decisions against
the justice of God, respecting what is so plainly and fully taught
in his holy word, concerning the derivation of depravity and
guilt from Adam to his posterity.
This is enough, one would think, for ever to silence such
bold expressions as these — " If this be just, — if the scriptures
teach such doctrine, &c, then the scriptures are of no use — un
derstanding is no understanding, — and, what a God mus tAe be,
that can thus curse innocent creatures ! — Is this thy God, O
Christian .'" — &c. &:c.
It raay not be iraproper here to add something (by way of
supplement to this chapter, in which we have had occasion to
say so rauch about the imputation of Adara's sin) concerning
the opinions of two divines, of no inconsiderable note araong
the dissenters in England, relating to a partial imputation of
Adam's first sin.
One of thera supposes, that this sin, though truly imputed
to INFANTS, SO that thereby they are exposed to a proper
-punishment, yet is not imputed to them in such a degree, as
that upon this account they should be liable to eternal punish
ment, as Adam himself was, but only to temporal death, or
annihilation ; Adara hiraself, the iramediate actor, being raade
infinitely wiore guilty by it, than his posterity. On which I
would observe ; that to suppose God imputes not all the guilt
of Adam's sin, but only some little part of it, relieves nothing
but one's imagination. ~ To think of poor little infants bearing
such torments for Adam's sin as they soraetiraes do in this
world, and these torments ending in death and annihilation,
raay sit easier on the imagination, than to conceive of their
suffering eternal misery for it. But it does not at all relieve
one's reason. There is no rule of reason that can be supposed
to lie against imputing a sin in the whole of it, which was cora
raitted by one, to another who did not personally corarait it,
but what will also he against its being so iraputed and punished
in part. For all the reasons (if there be any) Ue against the
imputation ; not the quantity or degree of what is imputed. If
there be any rule of reason, that is strong and good, lying
against a proper derivation or coraraunication of guilt from
one that acted, to another that did not act ; then it lies against
all that is of this nature. The force of the reasons brought
against iraputing Adam's sin to his posterity (if there be any
force in them) lies in this. That Adam and his posterity are not
one. But this lies as properiy against charging a part of the
guilt as the whole. For Adam's posterity, by not being the
fame with him, had no more hand in a to«ie of what was done
than the whole. They were as absolutely free from being
VOL, II. '*¦

S&i omoiNAL SIN. Part. IV
concerned in that act partly, as they were wholly. And there
is no reason to be brought, why one man's sin cannot be justly
reckoned to another's account, who was not then in beingi in
the whole of it ; but what will as properly lie against its being
reckoned to him in any part, so as that he should be subject to
any condemnation or punishment on that account. If those
reasons are good, all the difference is this ; that to bring a great
punishraent on infants for Adam's sin, is a great aet of injustice,
and to bring a comparatively smaller punishment is a smaller
act of injustice ; but not, that this is not as truly and demonstra
bly an act of injustice as-the other.
To illustrate this by an instance soraething parallel. It is
used as an argument why I may not exact from one of ray
neighbours what was due to me from another, thaVhe and my
debtor are not ihe same ; and that their concerns, interests and
properties are entirely distinct. Now if this argument be good,
it lies as truly against my demanding from him a part of the
debt as the whole. Indeed it is a greater act of injustice for
me to take from hira the whole of it, than a part ; but not more
truly and certainly an act of injustice.
The other divine thinks there is truly an imputation of
Adara's sin, so that infants cannot be looked upon as innocent
creatures ; yet seeras to think it " not agreeable to the perfec
tions of God," to make the state of infants in another world
worse than a state of non-existence. But this to me appears
plainly a giving up of that grand point of imjiutation, both in
whole and in part. For it supposes it to be not right for God to
bring any evil on a child of Adam, which is innocent as to per
sonal sin, without paying for it, or balancing it with good ; so
that still the state of the child shall be as good as could be de
manded in justice, in case of mere innocence. Which plainly
supposes, that the child is not exposed to any proper punish
ment at all, or is not at all in debt to divine justice, on account
of Adam's sin. For if the child were truly in debt, then surely
justice might take something from him, without paying for it, or
without ^i«iM^ that which raakes its state as good, as raere inno
cence could in justice require, ^If he owes the suffering of
some punishment, then there is no need that justice should re
quite the infant for suffering that punishment ; or make up for
It, by conferring some good that shall countervail it, and in ef
fect remove and disannul it ; so that, on the whole, good and
evil shall be at even balance, yea, so that the scale of good shall
preponderate. If it is unjust in a judge, to order any quantity
of money to be taken from another, without paying hira again,
and fully making it up to him, it must be because he had justly
forfeited none at all.
It seems to me pretty raanifest, that none can, in good con
sistence with themselves, own a real imputation of the guilt of

Chap, IV, Other Objections answered. 563
Adam's first sin to his posterity, without owning that they are
justly treated as sinners, truly guilty, and children of wrath, on
that account ; nor unless they allow a just imputation of the
whole of the evil of that transgression ; at least all that per
tains to the essence of that act, as a full and complete violation
ofthe covenant which God had established ; even as much as if
each one of mankind had the like covenant established with him
singly, and had by the like direct and full act of rebellion, vio
lated it for himself

CHAP, IV.
"Wherein several other Objections are considered.
DR.. T, objects against Adara's posterity being supposed
to corae into the world /under a forfeiture of God's blessing,
and subject to his curse through his sin, — That at the res
toration of the world after the flood, God pronounced equi
valent or greater blessings on Noah and his sons, than lie
did on Adam at his creation, when he said, "be fruitful and
multiply and replenish the earth, and have dominion over the
fish of the sea," &c.* — To this I answer in the following re
raarks, 1, As it has been already shewn, that in the threatening
denounced for Adara's sin, there was nothing which appears
inconsistent with the continuance of this present life for a sea
son, or with propagating his kind ; so for the like reason, there
appears nothing in that threatening, upon the supposition that
it reached Adam's posterity, inconsistent with enjoying the
teraporal blessings of the present life, as long as this is con
tinued ; even those teraporal blessings which God pronounced
on Adara at his first creation. For it must be observed, that
the blessings which God pronounced on Adara when he created
him, and before the trial of his obedience, were not the sarae
with the blessings which were suspended on his obedience. The
blessings thus suspended, were the blessings of eternal life;
which, if he had maintained his integrity through his trial,
would have been pronounced upon hira afterwards ; when God
as his judge should have given him his reward, God might
indeed, if he had pleased, immediately have deprived him of
life, and of all temporal blessings given him before. But those
blessings pronounced on him beforehand, were not the things
for the obtaining of which his trial was appointed. These were
reserved till the issue of his trial should be seen, and then to hc
* See page 82, &c. .S.

564 oniGiNAL SIN. Part iv.
pronounced in the blessed sentence, which would have been
passed upon him by his judge, when God carae to decree to
hira his reward for his approved fidehty. The pronouncing
of these latter blessings on a degenerate race, that had fallen
under the threatening denounced, would indeed (without a re
deraption; have been inconsistent with the, constitution which
had been established. But giving them the former kind of bles
sings, which were not the things suspended on the trial, or de
pendent on his fidelity (and these to be continued for a season)
was not at all inconsistent therewith.
2, It is no more an evidence of Adara's posterity being
not included in the threatening denounced for his eating the
forbidden fruit, that. they still have the temporal blessings of
fruitfulness, and a dorainion over the creatures continued to
thera, than it is an evidence of Adara being not included in that
threatening himself, that he had these blessings continued to him,
was fruitful, and had dominion over the creatures after his fall,
equally with his posterity,
3, There is good evidence that the benedictions God pro
nounced on Noah and his posterity, were granted on a new
foundation; a dispensation diverse from any grant, proraise,
or revelation which God gave to Adara, antecedently to his
fall ; even on the foundation of the covenant of grace establish
ed in Christ Jesus ; a dispensation, the design of which is to
deliver raen from the curse that came upon them by Adam's
sin, and to bring them to greater blessing than ever he had, —
These blessings were pronounced on Noah and his seed, on
the same foundation whereon afterwards the blessing was pro
nounced on Abraham and his seed, which included both spiri
tual and temporal benefits, — Noah had his narae prophetically
given hira by his father Lamech, because by him and his seed
deliverance should be obtained from the curse which came by
Adara's fall. Gen, v, 29, " And he called his name Noah (i, e.
Rest) saying. This same shall corafort us concerning our work,
and toil of our hands, because of the ground which the Lord
hath cursed," Pursuant to the scope and intent of this pro
phecy (which indeed seeras to respect the sarae thing with the
prophecy in Gen, iii. 15.) are the blessings pronounced on Noah
after the flood. There is this evidence of these blessings be
ing conveyed through the channel of the covenant of grace,
and by the redemption through Jesus Christ, that they were
obtained by sacrifice ; or were bestowed as the effect of God's
favour to mankind, which was in consequence of " smelling a
sweet savour" in the sacrifice which Noah offered. And it is
very evident by the epistle to the Hebrews, that the ancient
sacrifices never obtained the favour of God, but only by virtue
of the relation they had to the sacrifice of Christ. — Now that
Noah and his faraily had been so wonderfully saved from the

»-^HAP. IV, Other Objections answered. 565
wrath of God, which had destroyed the rest of the world, and
the world was as it were restored from a ruined state, there
was a proper occasion to point to the great salvation to come
by Christ : As it was a coraraon thing for God, on occasion
of sorae great temporal salvation of his people, or restoration
from a low and miserable state, to renew the intimations of
the great spiritual restoration of the world by Christ's Re
demption.* God deals vvith the generality of mankind in their
present state, far differently, on occasion of the redemption
by Jesus Christ, from what he otherwise would do : For, be
ing capable subjects of saving raercy, they have a day of
patience and grace, and innuraerable temporal blessings be
stowed on thera ; which, as the Apostle signifies (Acts xiv, 17,)
are testiraonies of God's reconcileableness to sinful raen, to put
them upon seeking after God.
But beside the sense in which the posterity of Noah in
general partake of these blessings of dominion over the crea
tures, Szc. Noah himself^ and all such of his posterity as have
obtained like precious faith with that exercised by hira in offer
ing his sacrifice, which raade it a sweet savour, and by which it
procured these blessings, have dominion over the creatures,
through Christ, in a more excellent sense than Adam in inno
cency ; as they are " raade kings and priests unto God, and
reign with Christ," and " all things are theirs," by a covenant
of Grace, They partake with Christ in that " dorainion over
the beasts of the earth, the fowls of the air, and fishes of the
sea," spoken of in the 8th Psaira ; which is by the Apostle in
terpreted of Christ's dorainion over the world, (I Cor, .w, 27,
and Heb, ii, 7,) And the time is coming, when the greater part
of the posterity of Noah, and each of his sons, shall partake
of this more honourable and excellent dominion over the crea
tures, through hira " in whom all the families of the earth shall
be blessed." Neither is there any need of supposing that these
blessings have their raost coraplete accoraplishment, till many
ages after they were granted, any more than the blessing on Ja-
phet, expressed in those words, " God shall enlarge Japhet, and
he sliall dwell in the tents of Shem."
But that Noah's posterity have such blessings given them
through the great Redeemer, who suspends and removes the
curse which came through Adara's sin, surely is no arguraent,
that they originally, as in their natural state, are not under
the curse. That raen have blessings through grace, is no evi
dence of their being not justly exposed to the curse by nature;
- but it rather argues the contrary. For if they did not deserve
the curse, they would not depend on grace and redemption for
* It may be noted, that Dr. T. liimself signifies it as hii muid, tliat these
blessings on Noah were on account of the covenant of grace, p. 84, 90, 91,
93, S.

566 OEIGINAL SIN. PaRT IV,
the removal of it, and for bringing thera into a state of favour
with God.
Another objection, which our author strenuously urges
against the doctrine of original sin, is, that it disparages the di
vine goodness in giving us our being : which we ought to re
ceive with thankmlness, as a great gift of God's beneficence,
and look upon as the first, original and fundaraental fruit of the
divine liberality.*
To this I answer in the following observations :
I. This argument is built on the supposed truth of a thing
in dispute ; and so is a begging of the question. It is built on
this supposition, that we are not properly looked upon as one
with our flrst father, in the state wherein God at first created
him, and in his fall from that state. If we are so, it becomes
the whole race to acknowledge God's great goodness to them,
in the state wherein raankind was made at flrst ; in the happy
state they were then in, and the fair opportunity they then had
of obtaining confirmed and eternal happiness ; and to acknow
ledge it as an aggravation of their apostacy ; and to humble
themselves, that they were so ungrateful as to rebel against
their good Creator, Certainly we may all do this with as
much reason, as the people of Israel in Dajniel's and Neherai
ah's times, who did with thankfulness acknowledge God's great
goodness to their fathers, many ages before ; and in their con
fessions they bewailed, and took shame to themselves, for the
sins committed by their fathers, notwithstanding such great
goodness, (See the 9th chapter of Daniel, and the ixtb of
Nehemiah,) 2, If Dr, T, would imply in his objection, that it doth not
consist with the goodness of God, to give mankind being in a
state of misery, whatever was done before by Adam, whether
he sinned or did not sin, I reply, if it be justly so ordered,
that there should be a posterity of Adam which must be looked
upon as one with him ; then it is no more contrary to God's
attribute of goodness to give being to his posterity in a state
of punishment, than to continue the being of the same wicked
and guilty person, who has made himself guilty, in a state of
punishment. The giving of being, and the continuing of be
ing, are both alike the work of God's power and will, and
both are alike fundamental to all blessings of man's present
and future existence. And if it be said, it cannot be justly
so ordered, that there should be a posterity of Adam which
should be looked upon as one with him, thig is begging the
question, 3. If our author would have us to suppose that it is con
trary to the attribute of goodness for God, in any case, by an
immediate aet of his power, to cause existence, and to cause
* Page 25G, 357, 260, 71—74. S.

Chap. iv. Other Objections answered. 567
new existence, which shall be an exceeding miserable exist
ence, by reason of exposedness to eternal ruin ; then his
own scheme must be supposed contrary to the attribute of
God's goodness : For he supposes, that God will raise raulti
tudes frora the dead at the last day (which will be giving new
existence to their bodies, and to bocUly life and sense) in order
only to their suffering eternal destruction.
4. Notwithstanding we are so sinful and miserable as we
are by nature, yet we may have great reason to bless God, that
he has given us our being under so glorious a dispensation of
grace through Jesus Christ ; by which we have a happy oppor
tunity to be delivered from this sin and misery, and to obtain
unspeakable eternal happiness. And because through our own
wicked inclinations, we are disposed so to neglect and abuse this
mercy, as to fail of final benefit by it, this is no reason why we
ought not to be thankful for it, even according to our author's
own sentiments. What (says he*) if the whole world lies in
wickedness, and few therefore shall be saved ? Have raen no
reason to be thankful, because they are wicked and ungrateful,
and abuse their being and God's bounty ? Suppose our own evil
inclinations do withhold us, viz. frora seeking after happiness,
of which under the light of the gospel we are placed within
the nearer and easier reach ; " suppose the whole Christian
world should lie in wickedness, and but few Christians should
be saved, is it therefore certainly true, that we cannot reasona
bly thank God for the gospel ?" Well, and though the evil in
clinations, which hinder our seejdng and obtaining happiness
by so glorious an advantage, are what we are born with, yet if
those inclinations are our fault or sin, that alters not the case ;
and to say they are not our sin, is still begging the question.
Yea, it will follow frora several things asserted by our author,
that notwithstanding raen are born in such circumstances as
that they are under a very great improbability of ever becoraing
righteous, yet they raay have reason to be thankful for their be
ing. Thus particularly, Dr. T. asserts, that all men have rea
son of thankfulness for their being ; and yet he supposes that
the heathen world, taken as a collective body, were dead in
sin, and could not deliver or help themselves, and therefore stood
in necessity of the Christian dispensation. And not only so,
but he supposes that the Christian world is now at length
brought to the like deplorable and helpless circurastances, and
needs a new dispensation for its relief According to these
things, the world in general, not only forraerly but even at this
day, are dead in sin, and helpless as to their salvation ; and
therefore the generality of thera that are born into it, are
much raore likely to perish, than otherwise, till the new dis
pensation comes: And yet he supposes we all have reason
to be thankful for our being. Yea, further still, I think ac-
* Page 72, 73. S.

568 ORIGINAL SIN. pART IV-
cording to our author's doctrine, men may have great reason
to be thankful to God for bringing thera into a state, which
yet, as the case is, is attended with misery, as its certain con
sequence. As with respect to God's raising the wicked to
life at the last day ; which he supposes, is in itself a great
benefit, procured by Christ, and the wonderful grace of God
through him : And if it be the fruit of God's wonderful grace,
surely raen ought to be thankflil for that grace, and praise God
for it. Our doctrine of original sin, therefore, no more dispa
rages God's goodness in raan's forraation in the worab, than
his doctrine disparages God's goodness in their resurrection
from the grave.
Another argument, which Dr. T, makes use of, against
the doctrine of original sin, is what the scripture reveals of the
process of the day oi judgment ; which represents the judge as
dealing with raen singly and separately, rendering to every
raan according to his deeds, and according to the iraprovement
he has made of the particular powers and talents God has giv
en him personally *,
But this objection will vanish, if we consider what is the
end or design of that pubhc judgment. Now this will not be,
that God raay find out what raen are, or what punishraent or,
reward is proper for them, or in order to the passing of a right
judgment of these things within himself, which is the end of
human trials ; but it is to raanifest what men are to their own
consciences, and to the world. As the day of judgment is
called " the day of the revelation of the righteous judgment
of God ;" in order to this God will make use of evidences or
proofs. But the proper evidences of the wickedness of men's
hearts (the true seat of all wickedness) both as to corruption of
nature, and additional pollution and guilt, are men's works.
The special end of God's public judgment will be, to
make a proper, perfect, open distinction araong raen, rightly to
state and manifest their difference one frora another, in order
to that separation and difference in the eternal retribution that
is to follow : and this difference will be raade to appear by their
personal works.
There are two things with regard to which raen will be
tried, and openly distinguished by the perfect judgraent of
God at the last day ; according to the twofold real distinction
subsisting among mankind : viz. (I) The difference of state ;
that primary and grand distinction, whereby all raankind are
divided into two sorts, therighteous and the wicked, (2,) That
secondary distinction, whereby both sorts differ from others in
the same general state, in degrees of additional fruits of righte
ousness and wickedness. Now the Judge, in order to manifest
both these, will judge raen according to their personal works.
But to inquire at the day of judgment, whether Adara sinned or
* Page 65, 66, 111, S.

Chap. XV. Other Objections answered. 569
no, or whether men are to be looked upon as one with him,
and so partakers in his sin, is what in no respect tends to mani
fest either of these distinctions.
1. The first thing to be manifested, will be the state that
each man is in, with respect to the grand distinction of the
whole world of mankind into righteous and wicked; or, in
nietaphorical language, loheat and tares ; or, the children ofthe
kingdom oi Christ, and the children ofthe wicked one; the lat
ter, the head of the apostacy ; but the forraer, the head of the
restoration and recovery. The Judge, in raanifesting this, will
prove men's hearts by their works, in such as have had oppor
tunity to perform any works in the body. The evil works of
the children of the wicked, one will be the proper manifestation
and evidence or proof of whatever belongs to the general
state of such ; and particularly they will prove that they
belong to the kingdom of the great deceiver, and lieajd of the
apostacy, as they will demonstrate the exceeding corruption of
their nature, and full consent of their hearts to the common
apostacy ; and also that their hearts never relinquished the
apostacy, by a cordial adherence to Christ, the great restorer.
The Judge will also make use of the ^ood works oithe righte
ous to shew their interest in the rederaption of Christ ; as there
by will be manifested the sincerity of their hearts in their ac
ceptance of, and adherence to the Redeeraer and his righteous
ness. And in thus proving the state of men's hearts by their
actions, the circumstances of those actions must necessarily
come into consideration, to raanifest the true quality of their
actions ; as, each one's talents, opportunities, advantages, light,
motives, <^c.
2. The other thing to be raanifested, will be that secondary
distinction, wherein particular persons, both righteous and
wicked, differ frora one another in the degree of secondary
good or evil ; the degree of evil fruit, which is additional to
the guilt and corruption of the whole body of apostates and
enemies ; and the degree of personal goodness and good fruit,
whicii is a secondary goodness, with respect to the righteous
ness and merits of Christ, which belong to all by that sincere
faith manifested in all. Of this also each one's works, with their
circumstances, opportunities, talents, &c. will be the proper
evidence. As to the nature and aggravations of the general aposta
cy by Adam's sin, and also the nature and sufficiency of the
redemption by Jesus Christ, the great restorer, though both
these will have vast influence on the eternal state which men
shall be adjudged to, yet neither of thera will properly, belong
to the trial men will be the subjects of at that .day, in order
to the manifestation of their state, wherein they are distinguish
ed one from another. They will belong to the business of that
VOL, II. 72

570 ORIGINAL SIN. PaRT IV.
day no otherwise, than the manifestation of the great truths of
religion in general ; as the nature and perfections of God, the
dependence of mankind on God, as their creator and preserver,
&c. Such truths as these will also have great influence on
the eternal state to which men will then be adjudged, as they
aggravate the guilt of raan's wickedness, and raust be consi
dered in order to a due estiraate of Christ's righteousness,
and men's personal virtue ; yet being of general and equal
concernment, will not properly belong to the trial of particular
persons. Another thing urged by our author particularly against
the imputation of Adam's sin, is this : " Though, in scripture,
action is frequently said to be imputed, reckoned, accounted to
a person, it is no other than his own act and deed,"* In tbe
sarae place he cites a nuraber of places of scripture where
these words are used, which he says are all that he can find in
the bible. But we are no way concerned with this arguraent at pre
sent, any further than it relates to iraputation of sin, or sinful
action. Therefore all that is in the arguraent which relates
to the present purpose, is this : That the word is so often ap
plied in scripture to signify God's imputing of personal sin,
but never once to his iraputing of Adara's sin, — So often! —
How often ? — But twice. There are but two of all those places
which he reckons up, that have any reference to God imput
ing sin to any person, where there is any evidence that only
personal sin is raeant; (Levit, xvii, 3, 4, and 2 Tim, iv. 16.)
All therefore that the argument comes to, is this : Tbat the
word impute, is applied twice in scripture to the case of God
iraputing sin, and neither of those tiraes to signify the imput
ing of Adam's sin, but both tiraes it has reference to personal
sin ; therefore Adam's sin is not iraputed to his posterity.—
And this is to be noted, that one of these two places, even that
in Levit, xvii, 3, 4, does not speak of iraputing the act com
mitted, but another not coramitted. The words are, " What
man soever there be of the house of Israel, that killeth an ox
or lamb or goat in the carap, or that killeth it out of the camp,
and bringeth it not unto the door of the tabernacle of the con
gregation, to offer an offering unto the Lord, before the taber
nacle of the Lord, blood shall be imputed unto that man ; he
hath shed blood :. that man shall be cut off from among his
people," i. e. plainly, murder shall be imputed to hira : He
shall be put to death for it, and therein punished with the same
severity as if he had slain a man. It is plain by Isai. Ixvi. 3.
that, in some cases, shedding the blood of beasts in an unlaw
ful manner, wjis imputed to them as if they slew a man.
*r^ge3,&cv 105. S.

Chap. iv. Other Objections answered. 571
fi.^ But whether it be so or not, although in both these places
me word impute be applied to personal sin, and to the very
act or although this could be said of all the places which our
author reckons up ; yet that the word impute is never ex
pressly applied to Adam's sin, does no more argue that it is
not imputed to his posterity, than it argues that pride, unbe-
Uet, lying, thefl;, oppression, persecution, fornication, adultery,
sodomy, perjury, idolatry, and innumerable other particular
moral evils are never imputed to the persons that coraraitted
thera, or ra whora they are ; because the word impute, though
so often used in scripture, is never applied to any of these kinds
of wickedness. I know not what can be said here, except one of these
two things: That though these sins are not expressly said to
be imputed, yet other words aie used that do as plainly and
certainly imply that they are iraputed, as if it were said so
expressly. Very well, and so I say with respect to the iraputa
tion of Adam's sin. The thing raeant by the word impute, may
be as plainly and certainly expressed by using other words, as
if that word were expressly used ; and more certainly, because
the words used instead of it, raay amount to an explanation of
this word. And this, I think, is the very case here. Though
the word impute is not used with respect to Adara's sin, yet
it is said, cdl have sinned ; which, respecting infants, can be
true only of their sinning by his sin. And, it is said, " by his
disobedience raany were made sinners ;" and, "judgment and
condemnation carae upon all by that sin ;" and that by this
means death, the wages of sin, passed on all men, &,c. Which
phrases amount to full and precise explanations of the word
impute; and therefore do raore certainly determine the point
really insisted on.
Or perhaps it will be said, with respect to those personal
sins before-mentioned, pride, unbelief, &c. it is no arguraent
they are not imputed to those who are .guilty of them, that the
very word impute, is not applied to thera ; for the word itself
is rarely used ; not one tirae in a hundred, and perhaps five
hundred, of those wherein the thing raeant is plainly implied,
or may be certainly inferred. Well, and the same also raay be
applied likewise, with respect to Adara's sin.
It is probable Dr. T. intends an argument against original
sin, by that which he says in opposition to what R. R. suggests
of " children discovering the principles of iniquity, and seeds
of sin, before they are capable of moral action,"* viz. That
" little children are made patterns of humihty, meekness and
innocence." (Matth. xviii. 3. 1 Cor. xiv. 20. and Psal. cxxxi,
2.) * Page 77,78, ». •¦

.572 ORIGINAL SIN, pART IV.
But when the utmost is made of this, th6re can be no
shadow of reason to understand more by these texts, than that
little children are recoraraended as patterns in regard of a
negative virtue, innocence with respect to the exercises and
fruits of sin, harralessness as to the hurtful effects of it ; and
that image oi meekness and humility arising from this, in con
junction with a natural tenderness of mind, fear, self-diffi
dence, yieldableness, and confidence in parents and others
older than themselves. And so they are recommended as
patterns of virtue no more than doves, which are an harmless
sort of creatures, and have an image of the virtues of meek
ness and love. Even according to Dr. T.'s own doctrine, ho
more can be made of it than this : For his scheme will not ad
mit of any such thing as positive virtue, or virtuous disposition
in infants ; he insisting (as was observed before) that virtue must
he the fruit of thought and reflection. But there can be no
thought and reflection that produces positive virtue in chil
dren not yet capable of moral action ; and it is such children
he speaks of. And that little children have a negative virtue
or innocence, in relation to the positive acts and hurtful effects
of vice, is no argument that they have not a corrupt nature
within them : For let their nature be ever so corrupt, yet surely
it is no wonder that they be not guilty of positive wicked ac
tion, before they are capable of any moral action at all. A
young vipier has a malignant nature, though incapable of doing
a malignant action, and at present appearing a harraless creature.
Another objection, which Dr. T. and some others offer
against this doctrine, is, " That it pours contempt upon the hu
man nature."*
But their declaiming on this topic is like addressing the
affections and conceits of children, rather than rational arguing
with men. It seems this doctrine is not complaisant enough,
I art! sensible it is not suited to the taste of sorae, who are so
very delicate (to say no worse) that they can bear nothing but
compliment and flattery. No conterapt is by this doctrine cast
¦upon the noble faculties and capacities of raan's nature, or
the exalted business, and divine and immortal happiness of
Virhich he is made capable. And as to speaking ill of man's
present moral state, 1 presume it will not be denied, that shame
belongs to them who are truly sinful ; and to suppose that
this is not the native character of mankind, is still but meanly
begging the question. If we, as We come into the world, are
truly siiiful, and consequently miserable, he acts but a friendly
part to us, who endeavours fully to discover and manifest
our disease. Whcfeas, on the contrary, he acts an unfriendly
part, who to his utmost hides it from us ; and so, in effect, does
I- Page 74, 75. S.

ChaIp. IV. Other Objections considered. 573
what in hira lies to prevent our seeking a reraedy frora that,
which if not remedied in time, must bring us finally to shame
and everlasting contempt, and end in perfect and remediless de
struction hereafter.
Another objection, which some have made against this
doctrine, much hke the former, is, that it tends to " beget in us
an ill opinion of our fellow-creatures, and so to promote ill-
nature and mutual hatred.
To which I would say, if it.be truly so, that we all come
sinful into the world, then our heartily acknowledging it tends
to promote humility : But our disowning that sin and guilt
which truly belongs to us, and endeavouring to persuade our
selves that we are vastly better than in truth we are, tends
to a foolish self-exaltation and pride. And it is manifest, by
reason, experience, and the word of God, that pride is the
chief source of all the contention, mutual hatred, and ill-will
which are so prevalent in the world ; and that nothing so effec
tually promotes the contrary tempers and deportments, as
humility. This doctrine teaches us to think no worse of others
than of ourselves : It teaches us that we are all, as we are
by nature, companions in a miserable helpless condition ;
which under a revelation ofthe divine raercy, tends to promote
mutual compassion. And nothing has a greater tendency to
promote those amiable dispositions of raercy, forbearance,
long-suffering, gentleness and forgiveness, than a sense of our
own extrerae unworthiness and raisery, and the infinite need
we have ofthe divine pity, forbearance and forgiveness, together
with a hope of obtaining mercy. If the doctrine which teaches
that mankind are corrupt by nature, tends to promote ill-will,
why should not Dr. T.'s doctrine tend to it as much ? For he
teaches us, that the generality of mankind are very wicked,
having made themselves so by their own free choice, without
any necessity : which is a way of becoming wicked, that ren
ders men truly worthy of resentraent ; but the other, not at all,
even according to his own doctrine.
Another exclamation against this doctrine is, that it tends
to " hinder corafort and joy, and to promote raelancholy and
gloorainess of mind,"*
To which I shall briefly say, doubtless, supposing men
are really become sinful, and so exposed to the displeasure
of God, by whatever means, if they once come to have their
eyes opened, and are not very stupid, the reflection on their
case will tend to make thera sorrowful ; and it is fit it should.
Men with whora this is the case may well be filled with sorrow,
till they are sincerely willing to forsake their sins, and turn to
God, But there is nothing in this doctrine that in the least
* Page 231, and other some places.

574 ORIGINAL SIN, PaRT IV.
stands inthe way of corafort and exceeding joy, to such as find
in their hearts a sincere willingness wholly to forsake all sin,
and give their hearts and whole selves to Christ, and coraply
with the gospel-raethod of salvation by him.
Another thing objected is, that to make men believe that
wickedness belongs to their very nature, tends to encourage
thera in siw, and plainly to lead thera to all manner of iniquity ;
because they are taught that sin is natural, and therefore ne
cessary and unavoidable.'"'
But if this doctrine, which teaches that sin is natural to
US, does also at the same time teach us, that it is never
the better, or less to be condemned, for its being natural, then it
does not at all encourage sin, any raore than Dr, T,'s doc
trine encourages wickedness when it is become inveterate ;
who teaches that such as by custom have contracted strong
habits of sin, are unable to help themselves,t And is it reason
able to represent it a^ encouraging a man in boldly neglecting
and wilfully continuing in his disease, without seeking a cure, to
tell hira of his disease, to shew hira that it is real and very fatal,
and what he can never cure himself of ; yet withal directing
hira to a great Physician, who is sufficient for his restora.tion ?
But for a raore particular answer to what is objected against
the doctrine of our natural impotence and inability, as being an
encourageraent to go on in sin, and a discourageraent to the
use of all means for our help, I must for brevity refer the rea
der to what has been largely written on this head in ray dis
course on the Freedom of the Will,
Our author is pleased to advance another notion, among
others, by way of objection against the doctrine of original sin :
That if this doctrine be true, it would be unlawful to beget chil
dren. He says,t " If natural generation be the raeans of una
voidably conveying all sin and wickedness into the world, it
must itself be a sinful and unlawful thing," Now, if there be
any force of argument here, it lies in this proposition, whatso
ever is a means or occasion of the certain infallible existence of
sin and wickedness, must itself be sinful. But I imagine Dr, T.
had not thoroughly weighed this proposition, nor considered
where it would carry him. For, God continuing in being the
devil, and others that are finally given up to wickedness, will
be attended, most certainly and infalHbly, with an eternal se
ries of the raost hateful and horrid wickedness. But will any
be guilty of such vile blasphemy, as to say, therefore God's
upholding of them in being is itself a sinful thing ? In the
same place our author says, " so far as we are generated in sin,
* Page 139, and 259.
t See his exposition on Rom. vii. p. 205 — 220.. But especially in his para
phrase and notes on the epistle.
t Page 145.

Chap, iv. Other Objections answered. 575
it must be a sin to generate." But there is no appearance of
evidence in that position, any more than in this : " So far as
any is upheld in existence in sin, it is a sin to uphold thera in
existence." Yea, if there were any reason in the case, it would
be strongest in the latter position : For parents, as Dr; T, hira
self observes, are not the authors of the beginning of existence :
Whereas, God is truly the author of the continuance of exist
ence. As it is the known will of God, to continue Satan and
millions of others in being, though the raost sure consequence
is the continuance of a vast infernal world, full of everlasting
hellish wickedness : so it is part of the revealed will of God,
that this world of mankind should be continued, and the spe
cies propagated, for his own wise and holy purposes ; which wiU
is complied with by the parents joined in lawful marriage.
Their children, though they come into the world in sin, yet are
capable subjects of eternal holiness and happiness : Which in
finite benefits for their children, parents have great reason to
expect, in the way of giving up their children to God in faith,
through a Redeemer, and bringing them up in the nurture and
admonition of the Lord, I think this may be answer enough
to such a cavil.
Another objection is. That the doctrine of original sin is
no oftener and no raore plainly spoken of in scripture ; it be
ing, if true, a very iraportant doctrine, Dr, T, in raany parts
of his book suggests to his readers, that there are very few texts
in the whole bible, wherein there is the least appearance of their
teaching any such doctrine.
Of this I took notice before, but would here say further :
That the reader who has perused the preceding defence of this
doctrine, raust now be left to judge for hiraself, whether there
be any ground for such an allegation ; whether there be not
texts in sufficient nuraber, both in the Old Testaraent and New,
that exhibit undeniable evidence of this great article of chris
tian divinity ; and whether it be not a doctrine taught in the
scripture with great plainness. I think there are few, if any,
doctrines of revelation, taught more plainly and expressly. In
deed it is taught in an explicit raanner raore in the New Testa
ment than in the Old. Which is not to be wondered at ; it be
ing thus with respect to all the most important doctrines of re
vealed religion.
But if it had been so, that this doctrine were but rarely
, taught in scripture '; yet if we find that it is indeed declared to
us by God, if held forth to us by any word of his ; then what
belongs to us, is to beheve his word, and receive the doctrine
which he teaches us ; and not to prescribe to him how often he
shall speak of it, and to insist upon knowing what reasons he
has for speaking of it no oftener, before we will receive what
he teaches us ; or to pretend that he should give us an account

376 ORIGINAL SIN. Part iv.
why he did not speak of so plainly as we think he ought to
have done, sooner than hedid. In this way of proceeding, if
it be reasonable, the Sadducees of old, who denied any resur
rection or future - state, raight have maintained their cause
against Christ, when he blamed thera for not knowing the scrip-
¦ tures, nor thepower of God ; and for not understanding by the
scripture, that there would be a resurrection to spiritual enjoy
ment, and not to animal life and sensual gratifications ; and
they might have insisted, that these doctrines, if true, were
very important, and therefore ought to have been spoken of in
the scriptures oftener and more explicitly, and not that the
church of God should be left, till that time, with only a few
obscure intimations of that which so infinitely concerned them.
And they might with disdain have rejected Christ's argument,
by way of inference from God calling hims( If in the books of
Moses, the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. For answer
they raight have said, that Moses was sent on purpose to teach
the people the mind and will of God ; and therefore, if these
doctrines were true, he ought in reason and in truth to have
taught thern plainly and frequently, and not have left the people
to spell out so important a doctrine only from God's saying
that he was the God of Abrahara, &c.
One great end of the scripture is, to teach the world what
manner of being God is ; about which the world, without reve
lation, has been so woefiilly in the dark: And that God is an
infinite being, is a doctrine of great iraportance, and a doctrine
sufficiently taught in the scripture. But yet it appears to rae,
this doctrine is not taught there, in any measure, with such ex-
plicitness and precision, as the doctrine of original sin : and the
Socinians, who denied God's oranipresence and oraniscience,
had as much roora left them for cavil, as the Pelagians who
,deny original sin.
Dr. T. particularly urges, that Christ says not one word of
this doctrine throughout the four gospels ; which doctrine, if
true, being so important, and what so nearly concerned the
great work of redemption, which he came to work out (as is sup
posed) one would think, "it should have been emphatically^ spo
ken of in every page of the gospels."*
In reply to this it may be observed, that by the account
given in the four gospels, Christ was continually saying those
things which plainly implied, that all raen in their original state
are sinful and miserable. As when he declared, that " they
which are whole need not a physician, but they which are sick;"t
That " he carae to seek and to save that which was lost,"| That
it was necessary for all to be born again, and to he converted,
and that otherwise they could not enter into the kingdom of
' Page 942, 243. +Matt. ix. 12. f Matt, .xviii. 11. Luke xix. 10.

Chap, iv. Other Objections ansivered. 5/7
heaven f*— and that all were sinners, as well as those whose
blood Pilate mingled with their sacrifices, ^c. and that every
one who did not repent, shouldperish;]— Withal directing every
one to pray to God ior forgiveness of sin ;j — Using our necessi
ty of forgiveness from God, as an argument with all to forgive
the injuries of their neighbours ;§ — Teaching that earthly jaa-
rents, though kind to their children, are in themselves evil,\\  And
signifying that things carnal and corrupt are properly the things
of men ,-ir — Warning his disciples rather to beware of men, than
of wild beasts ;** — Often representing the world as evil, as wick
ed in its works, at enmity with truth and holiness, and hating
him;]] — Yea, and teaching plainly, that all raen are extreraely
and inexpressibly sinful, owing ten thousand talents to their di
vine creditor.JI
And whether Christ did not plainly teach Nicodemus the
doctrine of original total depravity, when he came to hira to
know what his doctrine was, raust be left to the reader to
judge, frora what has been already observed on John iii. 1 — II.
And besides, Christ ui the course of his preaching took the
most proper raethod to convince men of the corruption of their
nature, and to give them an effectual and practical knowledge
of it, in application to themselves in particular, by teaching
and urging the holy and strict law of God, in its extent and
spirituality and dreadful threatenings : Which, above all things,
tends to search the hearts of raen, and to teach thera their in
bred exceeding depravity ; not raerely as a matter of specula
tion, but by proper conviction of conscience : which is the only
knowledge of original sin, that can avail to prepare the mind
for receiving Christ's rederaption ; as a raan's sense of his
own sickness prepares hira to apply in good earnest to the
physician. And as to Christ being no raore frequent and particular
in raentioning and inculcating this point in a doctrinal raanner,
it is probable one reason to be given for it, is the sarae that is
to be given for his speaking no oftener of God's creating of
the world: Which, though so iraportant a doctrine, is scarce
ever spoken of in any of Christ's discourses ; and no wonder,
seeing this was a raatter which the Jews, to whora he confined
his personal rainistry, had all been instructed in frora their
forefathers, and never was called in question araong them.
And there is a great deal of reason, from the ancient Jewish
writers, to suppose, that the doctrine of original sin had ever
been allowed in the open profession of that people :§§ though
* Matt, xviii. 3. f Luke xiii. 1 — 5. j: Matt. vi. 12. Luke xi. 4.
§ Matt. vi. 14, 15. and xviii. 35. || Matt. vii. 11. IT Matt. xvi. 23,
** Matt. X. 16, 17. ft John vii. 7. and viii. 23. and xiv. 17. andxv. 18, 19.
« Matt, xviii. 21. to the end.
§§ What is found in the more ancient of the Jewish rabbis, who have written
VOL. Hi "^^

578 OBifliNAL SIN. Part iv.
they were generally, in that corrupt time, very far from a
practical conviction of it ; and many notions were then preva-
since the coming of Christ, is an argument of this. Many things of this sort are
taken notice of by Stapferus, m his Theologia Polemicahetore mentioned. Some of
these things, which are there cited by him in Latin, I shall here faithfully give m
English, for the sake of the English reader.
"—So Manasseh, concerning Human Frailty, pag. 129.— Gen. vin. 21. 'I will
not any raore curse the earth for man's sake ; for the appetite of man is evil from
his youth ;' that is, from the time when he comes forth from his mother's tvomb.
For at the same time that he sucks the breast, he follows his l-ust ; and while he is
yet an infant, he is under the dominion of anger, envy, hatred and other vices to
which that tender age is obnoxious." — 'Prov. xxii. 15. Solomon says, 'Foolish
ness is bound to the mind of a child.' Conceming which place R. Levi Ben Ger-
som observes thus, " Foolishness as it were grows to him in his vei'y beginning."
Conceming this sin, which is common and original to all men, David said, Psal.
li. 5. " Behold I was begotten in iniquity, and in sin did my mother warm me."
Upon which place Eben-Ezra says thus : " Behold, because of the concupiscence
which is innate in the heart of man, it is said, I am begotten in iniquity. And the
sense is, that there is implanted in the heart of man, jetzer hjtrang, an evil fig
ment, from his nativity."
And Manasseh Ben Israel, de Fragil. pag. 3. " ' Behold, I was formed in ini
quity, and in sin hath my mother warmed me.' . But whether this be understood
conceming the common mother, which was Eve, or whether Davidspake only of
his own raother, he would signify, that sin is as it were natural and inseparable in
this life. For it is to be observed, that Eve conceived after the transgression was
committed : and as many as were begotten afterwards, were not brought forth in
a conformity to the rule of right reason, but in conformity to disorderly and lust
ful aifections." He adds, " One of the wise men of the Jews, namely, K. Aha,
rightly observed, David would signify that it is impossible, even for pious men
who excel in virtue, never to commit any sin." ' Job also asserts the sarae thing
with David, chap. xiv. 4. saying. Who will give a clean thing for an unclean ?
Tmly not one.' Concerning which words Aben-Ezra says thus : " The sense is
the same with that, Iwas begotten in iniquity, because raan is made outof an un
clean thing." Stapferus, Theolog. Polera. tom. iii. p. 36, 37.
Id. Ibid. p. 132, &c. So Sal. Jarchi ad Gemaram, Cod. Schabbath, foi. 142. p. 2.
" And this is not ordy to be referred to sinners,- because all the posterity of the
flrst man are In hke manner suhjeoted to all the curses pronounced on him." And
Manasseh Ben Israel, in his preface to Human Fraiuy, says, " I had a mind ta
shew by what means it came to pass, that when the first father of all had lost his -
righteousness, his posterity are begotten liable to the same punishment with hira."
And Munsterus on the gospel of Matthew cites the foUowing words, from the book
called The Bundle of Myrrh : " The blessed Lord said to the^«t man, when he
cursed him, ' Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee ; and thou shalt eat
the herb of the field.' The thing which he means is, that because of his sin aU
who should descend from him, shovud be wicked and perverse, Uke thoms and thistles,
according to that word of the Lord speaking to the prophet : Thoms and irrita-
tors are with thee, and thou dwellest among scorpions. And all this is from the
serpent, who was the devil, Sammael, who emitted a mortiferous and corruptive
poison into Eve, and becarae the cause of death to Adam himself, when he eat
the fruit." Remarkable is the place quoted in Joseph de Voisin, against Martm
Kaymund, p. 471. of Master Menachem Rakanatensis, sect. Bereschit, from Mi-
drasch Tehillim ; which is cited by Hoornbekius, against the Je s, iii these words :
"It is no wonder, that the sin of Adara and Eve is written and sealed with the
king's ring, and to be propagated to all following generations ; because on the Say
that Adam was created all things were finished ; so that he stood forth the per
fection and completion of the whole workmanship of the world ; So wben Ae sin
ned, the whole world sinned ; whose sin we bear and sufier. But the matter is
not thus with respect to the sins of his posterity.*'— Thus far Stapferus.
Besides these, as Ainsworth on Gen. vui. 21. observes, "In Bereshith
Rabba, a Hebrew commentary on this place, a rabbin is said to be ask
ed, When is the evil imagination put into -man ? And he answered, From the
hmtrthtike is.f!imcd.-' And in Pool's Synopsis itis added, from Grotius, "So

Chap. iv. Other objectibns answerfd. o1%
lent, especially among the Pharisees, which were indeed
inconsistent with it. And though on account of these preju-
Rabbi Salomon interprets Gen. viii. 21. The imagination of man's heart is evUfrom
his youth, of its being evil from the time that he is taken out of his mother'* bow
els." Aben-Ezra thus interprets Psal. h. 5. " I was shapen in iniquity, and in
sin did my mother conceive me ; that evil concupiscence ia implanted in the heart
from childhood, as if he were /ormed in it ; and by my mother, he understands Eve,
who did not bear children till she had smned. And so Kafvenaki says, " Hovi?
shall 1 avoid sinning ? My original is corrupt, and frora thence are those sins." So
Manasseh Ben Israel, from this place (Psal. h. 5.) concludes that not only David,
but all raankind, ever since sin was introduced into the world, do sin from their
original. To this purpose is the answer of Rabbi Hakkadosch which there is an
account of in the Talmud. From what time does concupiscence nde over man ^ From
the very moment of his first formaHon, or from his nativity 1 Ans. From his formatimi."
— ^Pool's Synops. in Loc.
On these things I observe, there is the greatest reason to suppose, that these
old Rabbis of the Jewish nation, who gave such heed to the tradition of the elders,
would never have received tbis doctrine of original sin, had it not been delivered
down to them from their forefathers. For it is a doctrine very disagreeable to
those practical principles and notions, wherein the religion of the unbelieving
Jews raost fundamentaUy differs from the reh^on raaintained among Christians ;
particularly their notion oi justification by their own righteousness, and privUeges
as the chUdren of Abraham, &c. without standing in need of any satisfaction, by
the sufierings of the Messiah. On which account the raodern Jews do now um-
I versally reject the doctrine of original sin, and corruption of natm'e ; as Stapfems
I observes. And it is not at aU likely, that the ancient Jews, if no such doctrine
Ihad been received by tradition from the fathers, woidd have taken it up from the
Ic/trwtians, whom they had in such great contempt and enmity ; especially as it is
X doctrine so pecuharly agreeable to the Christian notion of the spiritual salvation
if Jesus, and so contrary to their carnal notions of the Messiah, and of his sal-
'ation and kingdom, and so contrary to their opinion of themselves ; and a doc-
rine which men in general are so apt to be prejudiced against. And besides,
hese Rabbis do expressly refer to the opinion of their /ore/atAers ; as R. Manasseh
lays, " according to the opinion of the ancie-ixts, none are subject to death, but
hose which have sinned : for .where there is no sin, there is no death," Stapfcr,
Tom. iii. p. 37, 38.
But we have more direct evidence, that the doctrine of original sin was truly
la received doctrine among the ancient Jews, even before the coming of Christ.
[This appears by ancient Jewish writings, which were written before Christ ; as,
in the apocryph, 2 Esdras iii. 21 : " For the first Adam, bearing a vidcked heart,
I transgressed, and was overcome : and so be all they that are bom of him. Thus
Un/irmiti/ was made permanent ; and the law also in the heart of the people, with
Ithe malignity of the root ; so that the good depart away, and the evU abode stUl."
t— 2 Esdras iv. 30. For the grain of evil seed hath been sown in the heart of Adam
Ifrom the beginning ; and how rauch ungodliness hath it brought up unto this
(Ume? And how much shall it yet bring forth, tiU the time of threshing shaU
tome ?" And chap . vii. 46. "It had been better not to have given the earth
junto Adam ; or else, when it was ^ven him, to have restrained him from sinning j
for what profit is it, for raen now in this present tirae, to live in heaviness, and af
ter death, to look for punishment? O thou Adam, what hast thou done ! For
Ihouffh it was thou that sinned, thou art not fallen alone, but we aU that come of thee."
knd we read, Eccles. xxv. 24 " Of the woman came the beginning of sin, and
mrough her we aU die."
I As this doctrine of original corruption was constantly maintained in the church
Jf God frora the beginning ; so from thence, in all probabihty, as well as from the ¦
evidence of it in universal experience it was, that the wiser heathens maintained
fthe Uke doctrine Particularly Plato, that great philosopher, so distinguished for
/his veneration of ancient traditions, and diligent enquiries after them. Gale in
(his Court of the GentUeSj observes as foUows: "Plato says (Gorg. foi. 493.) I
I have heard from the vidse men, that we are now dead, and that the body is but our
I sepulchre.' And in his Timaeus Locrus (foi. 103.) he says, ' The cause of vitiosity
\isfrom our parents, and first principles, rather than from ourselves. So that we

580 ORIGINAL SIN. PaHT IVj
dices they raight need to have this doctrine explained and ap
plied to thera^ yet it is well known, by all acquainted with their
bibles, that Christ, for wise reasons, spake raore sparingly and
obscurely of several of the raost important doctrines of revealed
religion, relating to the necessity, grounds, nature, and way of
his redemption, and the method of the justification of sinners,
while he lived here in the flesh ; and left these doctrines to be
more plainly and fully opened and inculcated by the Holy Spi
rit, after his ascension.
But if after all, Christ did not speak of this" doctrine often
enough to suit Dr, T, he might be asked, Why he supposes
Christ did no oftener and no raore plainly teach some of his
Dr, T,'s doctrines, which he so much insists on ? As, that tera
poral death coraes on all mankind by Adam ; and that it comes
on thera by him, not as a punishment or calamity, but as a
^reat favour, being made a rich benefit, and a fruit of God's
abundant grace, by Christ's redemption, who came into the
world as a second Adam for this end. Surely if this were so,
it was of vast importance that it should be known to the church
of God in all ages, who saw death reigning over infants, as
well as others. If infants were indeed perfectly innocent, was
it not needful that the design of that which y^.as such a melan
choly and awful dispensation towards so many millions of inno
cent creatures, should be known, in order to prevent the worst
thoughts of God frora arising in the rainds of the constant spec
tators of so mysterious and gloomy a dispensation ? Buf why
then such a total silence about it for four thousand years toge
ther, and not one word of it in all the old testament ; nor one
word of it in all Xhe four gospels ; and indeed not one word of
it in the whole bible, but only as forced and wrung out by Dr.
T.'s arts of criticism and deduction, against the plainest and
strongest evidence !
never relinquish those actions, which lead us to follow these primitive blemishes
of our first parents.' Plato mentions the corruptions of tbe will, and seems to '
disown &ny free will to true good; albeit he allows, some suifuia, or natural disposi
tions, to civil good, in some great heroes. Socrates asserted the coiTuption of
human nature, or xctunv i/u^unv — Grotius affirms, that the philosophers acknow
ledged, it was con-natural to men, to sin.
Seneca (Benef 5. 14.) says, " Wickedness has not its first beginning in
wicked practice ; though by that it is first exercised and made raanifest." And
Plutarch (de sera vindicta) says, " Man does not first become wicked, when he
first manifests himself so : but he hath wickedness from the beginning ; and he
shows it as soon as he finds opportunity and abihty. As men rightly judge, that
the sting is not first ingendered in scorpions when they strike, or the poison in
vipers when they bite." — Pool's Synops. on Gen. viii. 21.
To which raay be subjoined what Juvenal says,
— M mores natura recurrit
. Damnatos fixa et mutarinescia.
\. Englished thus, in prose ;
^ Nfi,tare, a thing fixed and not knowing how fo change, returns to its
TOcked manner.s, — Watts, Ruin and Recovery.

Chap. iv. Other Objections answered. 581
As to the arguments made use of by many late writers,
frora the universal moral sense, and the reasons they offer frora
experience, and observation of the nature of raankind, to shew
that we are bom into the world with principles of virtue ; with
a natural prevaihng relish, approbation, and love of righteous
ness, truth, and goodness, and of whatever tends to the public
welfare ; with a prevailing natXiral disposition to dislike, to re
sent and conderan what is selfish, unjust, and immoral ; and a
native bent in mankind to rautual benevolence, tender compas
sion, &c. those who have had such objections against the doc
trine of original sin thrown in their way, and desire to see them
particularly considered, I ask leave to refer them to a Treatise
on the Nature of true Virtue, lying by rae prepared for the
press, which raay ere long be exhibited to public view.

CONCLUSION.

/

On the whole I observe, there are some other things, be
sides arguments, in Dr. T.'s book, which are calculated to in
fluence the rainds, and bias the judgment of sorae sorts of
readers. Here, not to insist on the profession he makes in
many places, of sincerity, humility, meekness, modesty, charity,
&c. in searching after truth ; and freely proposing his thoughts,
with the reasons of them, to others ;* nor on his magisterial
assurance, appearing on many occasions, and the high contempt
he soraetimes expresses of the opinions and arguments of very
excellent divines and fathers in the church of God, who have
thought differently from himt — both of which, it is not unlikely,
may have a degree of influence on sorae of his readers — I
would take some notice of another thing observable in the
writings of Dr. T. and many of the late opposers of the more
peculiar doctrines of Christianity, tending (especially with
juvenile and unwary readers) not a little to abate the force, and
prevent the due effect of the clearest scripture-evidence in favour
of those important doctrines ; and particularly to make void the
arguments taken from the writings ofthe Apostle Paul, in which
those doctrines are more plainly and fully revealed than in any
other part of the bible. What I mean is this : These gentle
men express a high opinion of this apostle, and that very justly,
for his eminent genius, his admirable sagacity, strong powers of
X^reasoning, acquired learning, &c. They speak of him as a
\vriter of raasterly address, of extensive reach, and deep de-
si^:^, every where in his epistles, alraost in every word he says.

ee his Preface, and p. 6,237, 265, 267, 175. S.
t Page Ilo, 125, 150, 151, 159, 161, 183, 188, 77. S,

582 ORIGINAL SIN. Part iv.
This looks exceedingly specious : it carries a plausible appear
ance of christian zeal and attachment to the holy scriptures, to
bear such a testimony of high veneration for that great apostle,
who was not only the principal instrument of propagating Chris
tianity, but with his own hand wrote so considerable a part of
the new testament. And I am far from determining, with res
pect at least to some of these writers, that they are not sincere
in their declarations ; or that all is mere artifice, only to raake
way for the reception of their own peculiar sentlraents. How
ever, it tends greatly to subserve such a purpose ; as much as if
it were designedly contrived, with the utmost subtilty, for that
end. Hereby their incautious readers are prepared the more
easily to be drawn into a belief that they, and others in their
way of thinking, have not Hghtly understood many of those
things in this apostle's writings, which before seemed very plain
to them. Thus they are prepared, by a prepossession in jfauoMr
of these new writers, to entertain a favourable thought of the
interpretations put by them upon the words and phrases of this
apostle ; and to adrait in raany passages a meaning which be
fore lay entirely out of sight ; quite foreign to all that in the
view ofa common reader seeras to be their obvious sense ; arid
most reraote frora the expositions agreed in by those who used
to be esteeraed the greatest divines, and best commentators.
As to this apostle, being a man of no vulgar understanding, it
is nothing strange if his meaning lies very deep ; and no won
der then, if the superficial observation of vulgar christians, or
indeed of the herd of comraon divines, such as the JVestmin-
sier Assembly, &g. falls vastly short of the apostle's reach,
and frequently does not enter into the true spirit and design of
his epistles. They must understand, that the first' reformers,
and indeed preachers and expositors in general^ for fifteen or
sixteen hundred years past, were too unlearned and short-sight
ed, to be capable of penetrating into the sense, or fit to make
comments on the writings of so great a raan as this apostle ;
or else had dwelt in a cave of bigotry and superstitiop too
gloomy to allow them to use their own understandings with
freedom, in reading the scripture. But, at the same time, it
must be understood, that there is risen up now at length, in
this happy age of light and liberty, a set of men of a more free
and generous turn of mind, of a more inquisitive genius, and of
better discernment. By such insinuations, they seek advantage
to their cause ; and thus the most unreasonable and extrava
gant interpretations of sc/ipture are palliated and recommend
ed : So that if the siraple reader is not very much on his guard,
if he does not clearly see with his own eyes, or has too rauch
indolence, or too little leisure, thoroughly to examine for him
self, he is in danger of being imposed on with delijsive appear
ances.

Chap. iv. The Conclusion. 583
But I hurably conceive that their interpretations — particu
larly of the Apostle Paul's writings, though in some things
ingenious — are in raany things extreraely absurd, and demon
strably disagreeable, in the highest degree, to his real design,
to the language he comraonly uses, and to the doctrines current
ly taught in his epistles. Their criticisms, when examined,
appear fa,r raore subtile than solid ; and it seems as it nothing
can possibly be strong enough, nothing perspicuous enough, in
any composure whatever, to stand before such liberties as these
writers indulge. The plainest and raost nervous discourse is
analysed and criticized, till it either dissolves into nothing, or
becomes a thing of little significance. The holy scripture is
subtilized into a raere mist ; or raade to evaporate into a thin
cleud, that easily puts on any shape, and is moved in any direc
tion, with a puff of wind, just as the raanager pleases. It is
not in the nature and power of language, to afford sufficient
defence against such an art, so abused ; as, I iraagine, a due
consideration of some things I have had occasion in the
preceding discourse to observe, may abundantly convince

^^^t

3ut this, with the rest of what I have offered On the subject
/ must be left with every candid reader's judgment ; and the
success oi the whole must now be left with God, who knows
what is agreeable to his own mind, and is able to raake his
own truths prevail ; however mysterious they may seem to the
poor, partial, narrow, and extremely imperfect views of raor-
taJs, while looking through a cloudy and delusory mediura ;
and however disagreeable they raay be to the innumerable pre
judices of raen's hearts:- — And who has promised, that the
gospel of Christ, such as is really his, shall finally be victo
rious ; and has assured us, that the word which goes out of his
mouth, "shall not return to hira void, but shall accomplish that
which he pleaseth, and shall prosper in the thing whereto he
sends it." — Let God arise and plead his own cause, and glorify
is own great narae. Amen.

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