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ANTIETAM
AND THE MARYLAND AND VIRGINIA CAMPAIGNS
OF 1862.

m

ANTIETAM
AND THE MARYLAND AND VIRGINIA
CAMPAIGNS Of 1862

FROM THE GOVERNMENT RECORDS — UNION AND
CONFEDERATE — MOSTLY UNKNOWN AND WHICH
HAVE NOW FIRST DISCLOSED THE TRUTH
APPROVED BY THE WAR DEPARTMENT
BY
CAPTAIN ISAAC W. HEYSINGER, M.A., M.D.
OF THK MILITARY ORDER OF THE LOYAL LEGION, AND
OF THE MILITARY SERVICE INSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES, GOVERNOR'S ISLAND, N. Y.

NEW YORK
THE NEALE PUBLISHING COMPANY
1912

Copyright, 1912, by
The Neale Publishing Company

Ccli.72!

DEDICATION
TO My Comrades of the Army of the Poto
mac ; AND TO MY Comrades of our other
Armies, in the West ; To the survivors
OF the Army of Northern Virginia, whom in
IDLE hours we loved, AND IN BUSY HOURS WE
fought; to the memory of lincoln, whose
Great Heart was so borne upon; And of Mc
Clellan, WHO FELT THE SAME WEIGHT; AnD OF
Thomas Jefferson, whose brave words, "When
TWO parties make a compact, there results to
EACH A POWER OF COMPELLING THE OTHER TO EXE
CUTE IT," LED HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF HEROES
TO BATTLE AND VICTORY; To MILITARY STUDENTS,
AND Teachers of the Art of War, here and
ABROAD; To the CALM JUDGMENT OF THE AMERI
CAN People; And to Vindication of the
Truth of History, This Volume is inscribed.

CONTENTS
Chapter Page
I. Introductory — Inaccuracy of all the Cur
rent Histories  19
II. The Peninsula  26
HI. The Advent of Pope  38
IV. The Second Mianassas  50
V. Opening of the Maryland Campaign ... 55
VI. Reorganization on the March  64
VII. Lee's Lost Order  75
VIII. McCLELLAN'S Swift Advance  87
IX. Lee's Projected Turning Movement .... 90
X. The Eve of Antietam  100
XI. McClellan's Plan of Battle — Burnside . . 104
XII. Antietam — Forces Engaged  116
XIII. Marching — Fighting — Straggling — Losses . . 130
XIV. September, 18-19 — ^Ammunition  143
XV. Lee's Flight to Virginia — McClellan's Vic
tory  ISO
XVI. Shepherdstow^n — September, 20  154
XVII. Stuart's Useless Cavalry Raids — The Raids
OF Forrest — The Union Raid from Har
per's Ferry, September 14, 15, 1862 . . . .159
XVIII. McClellan's Plan to Drive Lee by a Frontal
Attack up the Valley  169
XIX. Doctored System of Supplies for McClellan's
Army  173
XX. The Great Movement on Culpeper . . . .178
XXI. Celerity of Army's Advance — Comparison
vfiTH. Other Movements  191
XXII. Longstreet Isolated — Jackson Cut Off — Lee
Bewildered — The Campaign Won — The
Armies Face to Face at Culpeper, Propor
tion 3 to I  201

8 CONTENTS
Chapter Page
XXIII. Longstreet's Battle Order— Burnside's Re
treat — Lee's Great Relief  209
XXIV. War Department Strategy, Confederate and
Union  215
XXV. McClellan's Strategy for Turning the Con
federate Positions on the Peninsula Made
Impossible by Interference From Washing
ton  221
XXVI. Position and Numbers of Confederate Forces
When McClellan Occupied the Yorktown
Front on the Peninsula  231
XXVII. The DEntACTORs of McClellan — His Friends
AND Supporters— Lincoln's Vindication of
McClellan  235
XXVIII. The Cause of McClellan's Removal ... .242
XXIX. Our Gravest Peril in the Closing Year of
the War  253
XXX. Grant's Picture of Secretary Stanton's Char
acteristics — Danger of the Reward of Mc
Clellan's Success— McClellan's Qualities
as a Commanding General  271
XXXI. Why Was McClellan Removed and Fitz John
Porter Court-Martialed ? — The Pope-Hal-
leck-Stanton Dispatches  278
XXXII. Pope's Battle and His Defeat — Second Ma
nassas  287
XXXIII. Pope's Demand Which Halleck Dared Not
Refuse — The False Dispatch of HALLECK'S
Which Brought Pope and Halleck to Com
mand at Washington  291
XXXIV. McClellan — The President — The Army of
The Potomac — Conclusion  298
XXXV. Some Notes of McClellan's Life and Per
sonality  300
NOTES  307
INDEX  311

PREFACE
This work, while in narrative form for the
public, is based entirely upon the official records of
the United States Government, Union and Con
federate ; supported, when required, by the endorse
ment of eminent officers of the United States War
Department and the Army, and by evidence taken
at the time, but not then published, before the Con
gressional Committee on the Conduct of the War;
by reports of Cabinet officers of the Government;
and by records contained in official Government
publications, as, for example. General Upton's
"Military Policy of the United States."
The facts relating to the Antietam and the Vir
ginia and Maryland campaigns of 1862 are analo
gous to those in works that treat of Napoleon, of
whom to-day no record has any value which has
not appeared until nearly forty years after Water
loo, having theretofore been hidden, suppressed, or
perverted. Since then thousands of volumes have
appeared, and are still appearing, all of which make
prior books a travesty on the truth of history. So,
9

10 PREFACE
too, with Antietam; only latter-day investigations
disclose the truth.
Popular or political histories, prejudiced or pur
posely garbled newspaper accounts, — of which I
have read and examined hundreds with the greatest
care, and compared with official data, — I have been
compelled to totally ignore, as the information was
based on unofficial data, and was practically censored
by other influences. The personal facts were doubt
less often correct, but the inferences, probably from
lack of actual knowledge or collateral circumstances
quite unknown to the narrator, or from other rea
sons, were erroneous in nearly every case, as the
subsequent records show. To quote from Max
Muller, in his "Lectures on India," before the Uni
versity of Cambridge: "It is this power of dis
covering what is really important that distinguishes
the true historian from the mere chronicler."
The principal sources from which was obtained
the material brought together in this book were, of
course, the great series of works containing the
original data, and known as the "War of the Re
bellion: Official Records of the Union and Con
federate Armies." This great work contains no
comments, connections, explanations, or criticisms,
but is confined to the literal reproduction of official
data — chronologically arranged whenever possible — ¦
under the direction of eminent army officers and
experts, detailed for that purpose, during twenty
years of study, collection, and arrangement.

PREFACE II
The first volume was issued in 1881, the last
volume in 1900, and the General Index, of 1242
pages, in 1901. The principal part of this stupen
dous work, as stated on pages xiii and xiv of the
Preface to the Index, was arranged as follows:
"Major (now Brigadier-General and Judge Ad
vocate General) George B. Davis, Judge Advocate,
United States Army, was appointed military mem
ber and president of the board thus authorized."
The work consists of 128 parts, arranged in 70
volumes, comprising an aggregate of 135,579 pages,
and a large folio atlas containing 1006 maps and
sketches, all official.
The publication was authorized under Act of
Congress in 1874. The first volume was issued
in 1 88 1, the last volume in 1900, and the general
index in 1901. The cost of publication alone has
been $2,858,514, besides the pay of army and Con
federate officers detailed or employed on this work,
and other necessary and very large expenditures.
The whole constitutes the most complete and
comprehensive record of actual war that has ever
been put forth by any government, and is a mine
which will constitute the storehouse and basis of
all authentic history of this war for all time to
come. It may be well to note here, however, that the
Supplemental Volume (li), in two parts, was not
issued until late in 1898 or in 1899. The import
ance of this note lies in the fact that a large por-

12 PREFACE
tion of this supplemental volume, relating to the
events I describe, and which should have been em
bodied in Volume xix, published in 1887, had been
hidden or suppressed, so that the records were not
available for public use until ten years or more
later, when they appear only in a supplemental
volume. This material comprises thousands of dis
patches, reports, notes, orders, and other data of
the highest importance, and all, so far as I know,
entirely new to the public, and which never has been
used in any history.
Every part, volume, and page of this great work
has been studied, selected, arranged, and annotated
in writing, in the preparation of this volume. From
these records, examined and carefully annotated, —
a work of years, — the narrative erabodied in the
following pages has been studied, compared, and
arranged. I have also cited in a number of cases the auto
graph letters of Major-General Emory Upton
which are found in the biography of that great sol
dier, by General Peter S. Michie, published by
Appleton & Co. in 1885.
General Michie, professor at the West Point
Military Academy, was graduated from that insti
tution in 1863, standing second in his class. As
signed to the engineer corps,— the highest grade,—
he was immediately made assistant, and then chief
engineer in the operations against Charleston, and

PREFACE 13
then chief engineer of the Army of the James,
where I first came to know him personally. He was
made Brigadier-General January i, 1865, in 1867
was appointed on the staff of instruction at West
Point, and in 1871 professor of natural and experi
mental philosophy. In 1871 Princeton University
gave him the degree of Ph, D., and in 1873 Dart
mouth the degree of M. A. He has served on Gov
ernment commissions in Europe, and is the author
of several important scientific works besides his
"Life of General Upton."
Major-General James H. Wilson, of the Army,
wrote a twenty-page introduction to Michie's "Life
of Upton." General Wilson was the celebrated
Western cavalry commander, in our army, of the
War. He was graduated at West Point in i860;
was assigned to the corps of topographical engi
neers ; served as chief topographical engineer of the
Port Royal Expedition, then in the Department of
the South; was an aide-de-camp to McClellan till
October, 1862, and was at the battles of South
Mountain and Antietam. He was appointed lieu
tenant-colonel of volunteers in November, 1862,
and afterwards, in our Western Army, commanded
a cavalry corps of fifteen thousand men. He was
the author of several important works, among
others his work on China, made from his own per
sonal observations, and was the co-author, with
Charles A. Dana, of the "Life of General Grant."

14 PREFACE
Of General Upton Wilson says: "I have con
stantly maintained, since the close of the War, that
at that time Upton was as good an artillery officer
as could be found in any coimtry, the equal of any
cavalry commander of his day, and, all things con
sidered, was the best commander of a division of
infantry in either the Union or Rebel army. He
was incontestably the best tactician of either army,
and this is true whether tested by battle or by the
evolutions of the drill field and parade. In the ser
vice, it is not too much to add that he could scarcely
have failed as a corps or an army commander had
it been his good fortune to be called to such rank."
In an address delivered by the Secretary of War
at the laying of the corner-stone of the Army War
College at Washington, February 21, 1903, the
Secretary spoke of General Upton in the following
terms :
"Brevet Major-General Emory Upton, colonel of
the Fourth Artillery, graduated from West Point
in the year i860, became, while almost a boy, one
of the most distinguished officers of the Civil War.
He commanded successively a battery of artillery,
a regiment of infantry, a brigade of artillery, and
a division of cavalry. Constantly in the field, he
exhibited in camp and march and in scores of
battles dauntless and brilliant courage, strict and
successful discipline, and the highest qualities of
command."

PREFACE 15
I cite the above — ^which could be greatly ampli
fied — to show that in relying, as I have done, on
the official statements and letters of General Upton,
I am supported by an authority as competent and
valid as any of those cited directly from the Offi
cial War Records, especially so since his great
work, "The Military Policy of the United States,"
from which I have freely quoted, has been officially
published by the United States, "Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1904."
Of the Battle of Antietam, which constitutes the
central axis, as it were, of the present work, and
which battle purposely was so greatly minimized
and depreciated by political officialdom at the time.
President Roosevelt more than forty years after
ward, at the dedication of the New Jersey Soldiers'
Monument on that battle-field September 17, 1903,
placed it in its full light and proper perspective in
his own vivid and incisive way :
"We meet to-day upon one of the great battle
fields of the Civil War. No other battle of the
Civil War lasting but one day shows as great a per
centage of loss as that which occurred here upon
the day on which Antietam was fought. Moreover,
in its ultimate effects this battle was of momentous
and even decisive importance.
"If the issue of Antietam had been other than it
was, it is probable that at least two great European
Powers would have recognized the independence of
the Confederacy, so that you who fought here

I 6 PREFACE
forty-one years ago have the profound satisfaction
of feeling that you played well your part in one of
those great crises big with the fate of all mankind.
"The great American Republic would have be
come a memory of derision; and the failure of the
experiment of self-government by a great people on
a great scale would have delighted the heart of
every foe of republican institutions."
It seems almost a coincidence that Napoleon, too,
subjected to similar malign influences, had to wait
for his vindication and fame till forty years after
Waterloo, which now the whole world, including
his opposing enemies, fully and grandly acclaims.
Based, as the following work is, strictly on offi
cial records, many of which were long suppressed,
I can appeal with confidence to the United States
War Department for its correctness, as has al
ready been done.
Of a somewhat similar case, in American his
tory, Parkman says: "Some of the results here
reached are of a character which I regret, since
they cannot be agreeable to persons for whom I
have a very cordial regard. The conclusions drawm
from the facts may be matter of opinion : but it will
be remembered that the facts themselves can be
overthrown only by overthrowing the evidence on
which they rest, or bringing forward counter-evi
dence of equal or greater strength; and neither
task will be found an easy one."
This work is a simple, straightforward, and dis-

PREFACE 17
passionate record of the truth, and its statistics, all
new, and its stragetical movements, which to the
civilian may appear dry reading, to the old soldiers
will be bread and meat, for they understand them
like the multiplication table, and have always longed
to learn just what they were "up against."
THE AUTHOR.

ANTIETAM
and the MARYLAND AND VIRGINIA
CAMPAIGNS OF 1862

introductory — inaccuracy of all the
current histories
In order to fully understand the Maryland cam
paign of 1862 it is necessary to consider the events
which immediately preceded, and of which this
momentous chapter in the War of the Rebellion
was the consequence.
Full significance, and the high importance of the
military operations of this epoch have never, for
many reasons, been found in the ordinary histories
of this period. There is, indeed, no campaign of
the war so little understood in its military and
national aspects as this, which had for its central
feature the battle of Antietam, but which bristles
from end to end, at every point, with questions
which never have been answered, and never could
have been answered, until the Government, with a
care and cost which must extort the heartfelt grati
tude of every patriot and soldier, has placed in our
19

20 ANTIETAM
hands the whole original record, without blot or
emendation, and without the possibility of ques
tion, and has made for us and for the historian
of the future all these events so clear and startling
that no student of war or of his country need
longer doubt or hesitate. I will endeavor to briefly
depict the facts. I cannot in this brief presentation
cite all the authorities at length by page and date, but
in a case of this kind every statement made must
be reen forced by unimpeachable original authority,
and these I have included in the text as references
in corroboration of the various facts hitherto
doubtful or ignored.
I trust that in presenting these facts entirely
without prejudice, and in vindication of historic
truth and of the noble army which did such glori
ous service in these campaigns, the writer may ask
for that consideration which long and faithful
study of the records contained in many volumes,
and a personal participation in the events them
selves, as well as a perfect familiarity from boy
hood with the whole country covered by these
operations, may appear to deserve. Forty-nine
years is full long enough to enable the calm light
of history to displace the temporary and partial
views of the great events with which I shall so
briefly undertake, in outline at least, to deal.
When General Emory Upton had written his
great work, "The Military Policy of the United
States," published by the United States Govern-

INTRODUCTORY 2i
ment, up to the campaigns of 1862 he had found
during all the preceding military operations of our
country no especial difficulty; but he now encoun
tered problems impossible of solution on any mili
tary principles. He found defeats and disasters,
movements and disco-ordinations, and a labyrinth
of incompatibilities which could not be accounted
for with the ordinary historical data at hand.
To Colonel DuPont, his classmate at West Point
and life-long friend, he writes in 1879: "To
morrow I shall finish the original draft of the cam
paign of 1862. Its volume is startling. Twice I
destroyed all that I had finished, because it fell
short of carrying conviction. . . . The Mc
Clellan question has run the manuscript up by
nearly four hundred pages. The campaign of
1862, the most critical of the war, is hardly in
shape for your painstaking revision. I fear I
have made too many quotations, and yet nothing
will be received as condemnatory of Stanton's
interference unless substantiated by documentary
proof." He continues: "The campaign of 1862
is very difficult. If I make it short, the reader may
doubt my facts and conclusions. If too long, he
may weary of the subject. If you want to know
who was the cause of a three years' war after we
created a disciplined army of six hundred thousand
men, it was Stanton. But Stanton did not create
the system — ^the system created Stanton."
In a letter to General, — afterwards President, —

22 ANTIETAM
Garfield, in 1879, he says : "When in 1862 Gen
eral McClellan, after being relieved from command,
rode the lines of his army, neither my regiment
nor myself joined in the demonstrations of affec
tion and applause which nearly everywhere greeted
his appearance. . . . The son of an Aboli
tionist, an Abolitionist myself, both as a cadet and
an officer, my sympathies were strongly on the side
of the Administration in its effort to abolish
slavery, and I could not therefore even indirectly
participate in an ovation which might be construed
as a censure on either the civil or military policy
of the Govemment. With these views you will
naturally infer that I have always been anti-
McClellan, anti-Fitz-John Porter, and such is the
fact. "Up to a few months ago, when I began our mili
tary policy during the Rebellion, I believed that
these officers, differing in policy from the Adminis
tration, had not done their whole duty to the coun
try. But in the process of this investigation I have
been compelled to change my mind. Like many
millions of our people, my opinions were vague and
shadowy; they had no foundation in fact.
"You will remember that from the nth of
March till the nth of July, 1862, we had no gen
eral-in-chief. Our armies, numbering more than
six hundred thousand men, were commanded by
the President and the Secretary of War. Could I
lay before you all the facts that have come under

INTRODUCTORY 23
my observation, I believe you would be convinced
that the causes of a four instead of a one year's
war can all be traced to this brief but disastrous
period. "It was during this time that the troops east of
the AUeghanies were divided up into six inde
pendent commands. It was during the same period
that the great army concentrated at Corinth, and
which might have made a summer excursion to
Vicksburg and Jackson, was dispersed from
Memphis to Cumberland Gap, a distance of nearly
three hundred miles. In both cases the result was
the same. The Army of the Potomac was called
back to the Potomac; the Army of the Ohio was
called back to the Ohio. It may be added, as a
further coincidence, that the commanders of the
two armies, against whose protests the division of
our forces was made, were relieved from their
command." It may be added further, that when Halleck was
brought east as general-in-chief, in July, 1862, he
came with a handicap known to Stanton, but un
known to the country, which General Pope used
against him to force the removal of McClellan,
saying, "The circumstances under which you came
to Washington and I undertook the campaign in
Virginia are well-known to one-half of Congress."
With this bomb-shell — to which I shall again
refer — in the hands of Pope and Stanton, and
ready to be exploded under him, Halleck became a

24 ANTIETAM
mere agency in carrying out the military projects
of the civilians who had so long dominated and
directed the operations of the army.
Says General Michie, the biographer of Upton:
"The great War Secretary, Stanton, a man of im
perious will, became the supreme and controlling
spirit in every military movement, and in the con
duct of military affairs, and to his interference all
our military disasters of that year may be traced."
And we shall find that these disasters did not
cease with the second Bull Run campaign, but that
Fredericksburg and ChanceUorsviUe are a part of
the same, in the midst of which McClellan's inter
regnum, enforced by the personal orders and right
eous wrath of the President, who took the bit be
tween his teeth and rose to an almost unapproach
able majesty in this great emergency, shines out
like a glorious star.
Referring to this "War Department strategy,"
as General Upton designates it, he demonstrates
that it was a clear usurpation, saying : "Neither by
the Constitution nor the laws is the Secretary of
War entitled to exercise command. Whenever he
departs from the sphere of administration to con
trol military operations he is nothing more or less
than a usurper. The Constitution, laws, decisions
of the Supreme Court, and of the Attorney-Gen
eral, nowhere give him the authority to command."
In other words, the Secretary's duties were those
of administration, and the President is made, by

INTRODUCTORY 25
the Constitution, the commander-in-chief, and the
commander-in-chief has no more power to delegate
his command than the President has to delegate his
veto. Just on the eve of McClellan's movement by
water to the Peninsula, in March, 1862, his posi
tion as general-in-chief was taken away from him,
and he commanded, henceforth, only the ground
which his army covered and only the troops which
covered it.
Says General Michie: "By thus assuming the
direction of military affairs both the Secretary and
the President became from this moment as much
responsible for whatever of disaster might befall
the army as if they had actually taken command in
the field. No sooner had the commander of the
army of the Potomac sailed for Fortress Monroe
than the disintegration of the forces which he had
relied upon for his purpose, and which had been
promised him, began to take place."

II

the peninsula

We know the result. When the Army of the
Potomac had reached the front of Richmond its
line of supply was by the York River, on the left
bank of the Chickahominy, while Richmond, the
objective, was miles away on the right bank of the
Chickahominy. This uncanny stream thus of
necessity divided our army. As soon as the James
River had become free, by the destruction of the
Merrimac, and with the ascent of our war vessels
to the Chickahominy and above, correct military-
principles required that our base should be changed
to the James.
But this was forbidden by two circumstance^
By Stanton's order of May i8 McClellan was
directed to extend his right wing so as to effect a
junction with McDowell's left wing advancing
from Falmouth, and to establish this connection as
soon as possible, by extending McClellan's right
wing to the north of Richmond; and Stanton's
orders to McDowell of June 8 directed that officer
to move his command immediately in the direction
26

THE PENINSULA 27
of Richmond, to cooperate with McClellan. Wrote
McDowell, to McClellan: "For the third time I
am ordered to join you, and this time I hope to get
through." (See War Records, vol. xi.)
But he didn't, and McDowell was tied fast, and
Stonewall Jackson was turned loose. Then came
the heroic Seven Days' battles, when McClellan,
having no hope from McDowell, but altogether
the reverse, made that remarkable change of base
to the James River, at almost precisely the spot
where Grant, two years later, did the same, after
sacrificing more men overland than his antagonist
had with which to oppose him, and finally opened
the door to Richmond and brought about the end
of the war. McClellan's plan was outlined in his
correspondence with Commodore Rodgers, — who
commanded the fleet in the James River, — under
dates June 24 and 25, and with Woodruff and
Felton, June 20. (War Records, vol. xi, part 3,
page 220.)
McClellan's plan, in brief, was to hold the Con
federate army in front of his heavy works on the
right bank of the Chickahominy and throw the bulk
of his army across to, and over, the James River,
attacking Richmond from the south and west. He
had had all the roads through this wilderness al
ready surveyed and mapped for this purpose (See
i "W. R." vol. xi; vol. xi, part i, pp. 37, 152, 264,
270, 998; part 3, pp. 24, 226, 229, 236, 246, 250,
251, 255, 256, 258, 262, 265, 272.) Confirmatory

28 ANTIETAM
of the above is the statement of Lieutenant-General
Dick Taylor (son of President Taylor), who com
manded a division in Lee's army in the battles from
Gaines' Mill to Malvern Hill, ("Destruction and
Reconstruction," page 87), "The Confederate com
manders knew no more about the topography of the
country than they did about Central Africa. . . .
McClellan was as superior to us in knowledge of
our own land as were the Germans to the French
in their late war." But the junction of Jackson
with Lee — directly due to the authorities at Wash
ington — and their combined attack on McClellan's
right, at Gaines' Mill, disarranged these plans, and
compelled him to do, in the midst of open battle,
what he had intended to do in advance by secret
movements. And now we come to the question of forces en
gaged on each side, and this question will dominate'
the entire Maryland campaign as well. It is need
less to say that the Confederate force was pur
posely minimized, and McClellan's exaggerated, in
both cases, in all the War Department figures, at
Washington. The regimental organization in both armies was
identical. The very day McClellan had landed on
the Peninsula, and when about going into a
long, exhaustive, and depleting campaign. Secretary
Stanton issued his general order of the War De
partment April 3, 1862: "The recruiting service
for volunteers will be discontinued in every State

THE PENINSULA 29
, from this date. The officers detailed on Volunteer
,;Recruiting Service will join their regiments with
out delay. . . . The public property belong
ing to Volunteer Recruiting Service will l>e sold to
the best possible advantage." (See Official Orders,
War Department, 1862.)
As stated in Lee's letter of August 16, 1862, and
Jefferson Davis's "History of the Confederacy,"
the Confederates immediately countered on this
.order, April 13, ten days afterward, by the first
general conscription of "All white men resident of
the Confederate States, between the ages of eigh
teen and thirty-five years, and to continue those al
ready in the field until three years from the date of
their enlistment." Those under eighteen and over
thirty-five were required to remain ninety days.
And as a counter to the President's War Order No.
3, of March 11, just before the Peninsula cam
paign began, relieving General McClellan from the
control of our armed forces as a whole, General
R. E. Lee, by General Orders No. 14, dated Rich
mond, March 13 (only two days afterward), was
"assigned to duty at the seat of govemment, and
was charged (directly under the President) with
the conduct of military operations in the armies of
the Confederacy."
The above general conscription alone should have
given the Confederate armies more than 800,000
men, in addition to the forces already in the field;
the entire Union armies at this time. East and

30 ANTIETAM
West, did not number, even on paper, more than
600,000 men. (See General Michie's "Biography
of Emory Upton," p. 459.) The results of this
suicidal policy at Washington, and of this magnifi
cent counter-stroke at Richmond, were soon ap
parent. In war, military principles as contrasted
with political practices will win in every case. i
It will be necessary for the purposes of this his
tory to determine the actual numbers of the oppos
ing forces during the Seven Days, as this will give
us a standard of comparison for the succeeding
campaigns. It is well known that for purposes of com
parison, the Union official figures are worthless, as
our generals were obliged to report the "rationi
strength," while the Confederate forces reported
only the "fighting strength."
The reports of a great many regimental and
other organizations engaged in the Seven Days'
battles, on both sides, give the number of their men
taken into action. These came from all parts of
each army, and are a fair index of the average-
strength, conforming also to the ratio of officers!
and the system of organization, which was alike
in both armies. The average strength of the Con
federate infantry was 542 officers and men for
each regiment. For the Union army the average
was 487 per regiment. (See vol. xi. "War
Records.") As the conscription had brought in its men

THE PENINSULA 31
freely, during the previous two and one-half months,
and recruiting had brought none at all to the Army
of the Potomac, we may be sure that if there be
any error it must be in underestimating the Con
federates. It may be well to pursue this question some
what further. In vol. xi, part 3, p. 615, W.
R., is given the "present" on June 23, 1862,
of twenty-four Virginia regiments, — which (see
Longstreet's letter on page 614, ibid.), are really
present for duty in battle, — as "7000 are at times
absent from their posts." Excluding these, the
total is 11,380; but in the letter Longstreet sums
up the whole (including officers) at 13,000. This
gives an average regimental strength of 542. As
the 6813 others are only "absent at times," the ef
fective strength in battle would be considerably
greater. On the same page the average battery
strength of thirteen batteries is given as present
for duty in battle 76 men, besides officers, per
battery. The total per battery may be put at a
minimum of 80.
Lee's published field retum for July 20, 1862,
gives as present for duty, exclusive of Jackson and
Ewell, 69,732. This includes Holmes's division;
but this division was present and engaged in the
Seven Days' battles. (See volume xi, part 2, p.
906.) Lee, in his letter to Jackson of July 27 (see
War Records, vol. xii, part 3, p. 918), gives the ef
fective strength of Jackson and Ewell at 18,000

32

ANTIETAM

men. Adding officers in the proportion of Lee*s
army — 1200 — would make this force 19,200. The
Confederate losses in the Seven Days, which are
much underestimated in the returns, since there are
large discrepancies in their own accounts (com
pare volume xi, part 2, pp. 973-984 with p. 502),
were not less than 20,077.
Aggregating these items, we have a Confederate
total taken into action in the Seven Days' battles '
of 108,899, which is less than the true aggregate.
Comparing Lee's field retum of officers present'
for duty July 20, and adding the officers of Jack-'
son and Ewell, 1200, we have a total of 5533 com
missioned officers left in Lee's army after the Seven
Days' battles.
McClellan's field return of July 10, after deduct
ing Dix's command, which had remained at Fort
Monroe and was not under McClellan's command,
gives an aggregate of 3834 commissioned officers
present for duty with McClellan's entire army after
the Seven Days.
McClellan made no complaint of his army being '
under-officered. Lee (see vol. xi. War Records, part 3, pp. 669 and
671), wrote urgently and repeatedly to the Rich
mond authorities about his shortage of officers. He
says : "The want of officers of proper rank renders
many regiments and companies inefficient ; regiments
being in some cases under the command of captains
and many companies without their proper complex

THE PENINSULA 33
ment of officers." Again, later, he writes: "I am
very anxious that the vacancies among the regi
mental officers should be filled as soon as possible,"
etc., etc.
As Lee's losses in the Seven Days' battles were
at least one-third greater than those of McClellcLn,
after making due allowance for this casualty defi
ciency of officers in Lee's army, we still see that his
force after the battles must have been decidedly in
excess of that of McClellan. So much so, in fact,
that one might suppose that the Confederate
strength in the Seven Days was really much greater
than the estimated regimental strengths would ag
gregate, since Lee had one-third more officers after
the battle than McClellan had, and was nevertheless
urging the Richmond authorities that his shortage
of officers rendered many of his organizations inef
ficient. It is needless to repeat, of course, that the system
of organization was the same in both armies.
At the end of July Lee sent to Jackson A. P.
Hill's division and two Louisiana regiments, the
latter to be brigaded with those already in Jackson's
force. These numbered altogether thirty regiments.
(See War Records, vol. xi, part 3, p. 648, and vol.
xii, part 3, p. 918.) Lee says: "These troops will
exceed 18,000 men." Adding their officers, we have
19,200 at least, and dividing by thirty we have
an aggregate regimental strength of 640 each, offi
cers and men.

34 ANTIETAM
It should be noted that the Confederates did not
multiply new regiments as we did, but kept filling up
their old regiments. Very few of the Confederate
States show regimental numbers exceeding 50 or 60.
The highest regimental number in Virginia was 61,
and this number appears in the Seven Days. So also
of Georgia and the other States. This system, of
course, added enormously to the value and efficiency
of these organizations.
Coming directly now to the numbers engaged on
each side in the Seven Days' battles, we find,
from the Confederate roster (vol. xi, part 2, pp.
483-489) that General Lee had under his direct
command, and actually engaged in these battles, 182
regiments of infantry, 11 regiments of cavalry, and
87 batteries of field artillery, — ^besides the heavy
guns in the works, — making a total battle-field
strength of 110,802, which is a minimum.
McClellan had under his comraand at the same
time 143 regiments of infantry, 6 regiments of
cavalry, and 57 batteries of artillery, making a total
battle-field strength of 81,797, which is a maximum.
The Confederates had an excess over the Array
of the Potoraac of 44 regiments of infantry, 5 regi
raents of cavalry, and 30 batteries of field artillery,
making an aggregate excess in nurabers of, at least,
29,000 men.
At the battle of Gaines' Mill, June 27, when the
combined divisions of Stonewall Jackson, Ewell,
A. P. Hill, D. H. Hill, and Longstreet, with Stuart's

THE PENINSULA 35
cavalry, made a concerted attack on three sides, the
Confederates had engaged 124 regiments of infan
try, 8 regiments of cavalry, and 27 batteries of
artillery; while the Union forces comprised only
49 regiraents of infantry, 3 regiments of cavalry,
and 21 batteries of artillery. (See casualty returns
of opposing arraies in vol. xi, W. R.)
The strength of the Confederates in this battle
was nearly in the proportion of three to one, yet
under McClellan's eye, and with Fitz-John Porter in
iraraediate coramand, our troops inflicted far greater
losses than they sustained, and at nightfall crossed
the Chickahominy with all their force intact and
ready for the battles yet to follow, which battles
concluded with that astonishing and overwhelraing
victory over all Lee's array at Malvern Hill, which
perhaps gave the highest example of what artillery
can do when properly handled, to be found in all
history, unless Antietam raay furnish another
instance. The obvious course for the Union army, now, was
to do as we did two years later, for the James and
the York rivers, the Peninsula and the .Appomattox,
were all in our possession, and the vast defensive
works in front of Petersburg and Richmond had
been as yet barely begun. (See Confederate engi
neers' reports, W. R.)
McClellan, perfectly secure in his magnificent
position at Harrison's Landing, with tidewater sup
plies open from every quarter, and with natural de-

36 ANTIETAM
fenses all around, and alraost under the shadow of
Malvern Hill, of unsavory meraory to the Con
federates, awaited support from Washington, as
Grant did two years later, to complete his work.
The editors of Upton's United States Govern
ment publication, "The Military Policy," in a note,
describe Harrison's Landing as one of the best on
the James River. It was twenty-five miles below
Richmond, with a high and open country between,
and guarded by water on both flanks and in front.
It was, in fact, imraediately across the James River
from, and less than four miles below. City Point;
whence Grant carried on his final campaign, in 1864
and 1865. In fact, McClellan occupied both sides
of the James River, as the War Records (vol. xi)
show. But other counsels prevailed.
Concerning the operations frora Harrison's Land
ing, including General Suraner's report of the cap
ture of Malvern Hill, August 5, see War Records,
vol. xi, part 3, p. 356; of McClellan's urgent ap
peals for ferry-boats to cross the Jaraes River in
force, August 3, see sarae volume and part, p. 351 ;
of Averell's cavalry action south of the James, Au
gust 9, see same volume, part 2, pp. 946-948, and D.
H. Hill's report of sarae, p. 948 ; and of other occu
pations of the southem side, pp. 949, 950. See also
Fitz-John Porter's letter to McClellan of August 5,
to push over to the Suffolk Railroad, destroying all
bridges over the Blackwater River, etc., etc.

THE PENINSULA 37
The protest of Commodore Wilkes to Secretary
of the Navy Welles, of August 5, 1862, against the
removal of the army from the front of Richmond to
Washington is an important and elaborate statement
of the facts, on the spot and at the time, and will be
found at length in the War Records, vol. xi, part 2,
pp. 356-358. He concludes: "I trust in God this
direful act will not be carried out; our noble cause
will be ruined if it is. General McClellan is con
fident as I am in the result, if left here, the capture
of the Rebel capital, and of maintaining the honor,
safety, and glory of the Union and its army."

Ill
the advent of pope
Pope had been brought to Washington and been
given coraraand of a new array, the Army of Vir
ginia, raade up of the scattered forces of Freraont,
Banks, McDowell, and the garrisons at Washing
ton, with comprehensive orders from the civilians at
Washington to "operate in such manner as, while
protecting Western Virginia and the national capital
frora danger or insult, it shall in the speediest
raanner attack and overcome the Rebel forces under
Jackson and Ewell, threaten the enemy in the direc
tion of Charlottesville, and render the most effective
aid to relieve General McClellan and capture Rich
mond." Surely it was a task worthy of those fabled an
cient heroes, and we need not wonder that General
Pope, in coraraand of this "one array," should in his
published address "To the Officers and Soldiers of
the Array of Virginia," tell them what manner of
raan he was. "Let us understand each other," he
said. "I have corae to you frora the West, where we
have always seen the backs of our eneraies; from
an army whose business it has been to seek the ad-
38

THE ADVENT OF POPE 39
versary and beat hira when he was found; whose
policy has been attack and not defense. In but one
instance has the enemy been able to place our West
ern arraies in defensive attitude. I presurae I have
been called here to pursue the same systera, and to
lead you against the eneray. It is my purpose to do
so, and that speedily. I am sure you long for an op
portunity to win the distinction you are capable of
achieving. That opportunity I shall endeavor to
give you. Meantime, I desire you to dismiss frora
your rainds certain phrases which I ara sorry to hear
so rauch in vogue among you. I hear constantly of
'taking strong positions and holding them.' of 'lines
of retreat,' and of 'bases of supplies.' Let us dis
card such ideas."
But he might have been more modest; for an
analysis of his returns frora the official War
Records, for the nine raonths up to April 8, 1862,
while in the West, when his force was 25,000 raen,
shows that his entire losses were only 1 1 raen killed
and 35 wounded; while during the so-called siege
of Corinth his entire losses aggregated only about
20 killed and 180 wounded and raissing.
Those were the trophies which he brought East,
besides HaUeck's false despatch of June 4 (which,
after the war, Pope repudiated), purporting that the
latter was pushing the enemy with all his might and
had already captured 10,000 prisoners, 15,000 stand
of arms, etc., etc., and on which report Stanton tele
graphed, "Your glorious despatch has just been re-

40 ANTIETAM
ceived, and I have sent it into every State. The
whole land will soon ring with applause at the
achievement of your gallant army and its able and
victorious comraander." And on which the Presi
dent sent his raessage, "Your despatch of to-day to
the Secretary of War received. Thanks for the
good news it brings." And on which, also, as I
shall show, later on, both Pope and Halleck came
to Washington to coraraand. Well raight General
Upton say, of Pope, that "he now labors under the
iraputation of not having understood his own plans."
(See "Military Policy.")
When this despatch was sent, as General Pope
afterward testified before the Congressional Com
mittee on the Conduct of the War, he was lying sick
in his own quarters, not four miles from Halleck,
and Halleck knew it. No wonder General Halleck,
who had been a canny lawyer in San Francisco, had
caused "that portion of the despatches and reports
concerning the operations around Corinth which
bore upon this question to be cut out of the official
books and brought with you" (as says General Pope
in his letter to Halleck of July 5, 1865), "to Wash
ington, leaving the official records mutilated and in
complete." We can see here already that Halleck
did not intend that Pope, or the Washington
authorities, should be able to prove that his glowing
despatch of June 4 was not based on any report
from Pope or frora anyone else. But Pope proved S

THE ADVENT OF POPE 41
that it was not, nevertheless, but at a time when it
was useless to the country.
These questions are all related to the Maryland
campaign, and raust be understood in order to cor
rectly understand that carapaign.
After the Seven Days' battles the armies lay con
fronting each other below Richmond. July 13
Jackson's force, with Ewell, which did not belong
to Lee's own array, had been sent up to Louisa
Court House, and to GordonsviUe — ^but still within
reach of Lee — toward the Valley, where it properly
belonged. Burnside's force was now coraing up frora North
Carolina, and Lee anxiously watched to see whether
it would come up the Jaraes River or go on to
Aquia Creek, and to Pope. In the forraer case the
Array of the Potoraac was to be reinforced and
Jackson and his other outlying troops were to be
within call frora Richraond; if the latter, then the
Array of the Potomac was to be moved, also, to
Aquia Creek and up the Rappahannock. Lee writes
Jackson, July 27: "I want Pope to be suppressed;
strike your blow, and be prepared to return to rae
when done, if necessary. I will endeavor to keep
General McClellan quiet till it is over, if rapidly
executed." For this expedition he reinforced Jackson with
A. P. Hill's division and one extra brigade, number
ing, in all, thirty-three regiments, "which will ex
ceed 18,000 men," said General Lee, giving an aver-

42 ANTIETAM
age regimental strength of about 580 officers and
raen. The bulk of Lee's army still lay in front of
McClellan. Burnside's force went in driblets to Fredericks
burg, but still Lee lingered. McClellan asked what
was to be done with the army, and urged an imme
diate reply. August 3 carae the order, which by its
very terras precluded swift and open raoveraents.
Halleck's order stated that it was deterrained to
withdraw the Army of the Potomac frora the Penin
sula to Aquia Creek, but that it was to be done in
secret. "Its real object and withdrawal should be
concealed even frora your own officers. Your
raaterial and transportation should be removed
first." The work was pushed on with the greatest ce
lerity, but it involved the removal of the sick and
stores, and of the troops by land to Fortress
Monroe. Fitz-John Porter's 5 th corps were sent ahead, and
obtained transports and sailed at once. But as the
reports show, transports were wanting at the time
for the others, due to further blundering at Wash
ington. McClellan was acused of slowness; but General
Upton has entirely vindicated him. Indeed, both
the President's order appointing Pope and HaUeck's
letter to McClellan of August 7, stated that Mc
Clellan would have command of all the forces of
both Pope and Burnside, as well as his own (see

THE ADVENT OF POPE 43
War Records, vol. xi, part 3, p. 360; vol. xii, part
3, p. 435), so that the change offered a larger in
stead of a smaller field to McClellan.
And the charge of slowness is fully refuted by
both General Pope and President Lincoln. (See
vol. xi. War Records, part 3, p. 269.) Says Presi
dent Lincoln : "We protected Washington and the
enemy concentrated on you. Had we stripped
Washington, he would have been upon us before
the troops could have been gotten to you." Page
297, Pope writes, July 4 : "If my coramand be em
barked and sent to you by Jaraes River the enemy
would be in Washington before it had half accom
plished the journey." As the distance and diffi
culties are the sarae one way as back the sarae way,
it will be seen that McClellan was twice as swift as
Pope supposed he could be; for the bulk of Pope's
array in the battles at the second Bull Run was from
the Army of the Potoraac, just returned frora Rich
mond. (See General Upton's "MUitary Policy,"
P- 370- )
As soon as McClellan started for Fort Monroe,
Lee started for the Rapidan. (See War Records,
vol. xi, part 3, pp. 634, 647, 675-6, 676, 677, 680.)
All that had been keeping Lee at Richraond was
McClellan, and, as General Upton says, "The fact
should not be overlooked that the raisguided advisers
of the President and the Confederate commander
were aiming at the same object."
Had it been even possible for McClellan to have

44 ANTIETAM
started on the 3d or 4th of August, it would have
been all the same, as General Upton demonstrates,
since Lee would have started the next day, and
would have caught Pope in a still worse position
than he subsequently did, and further from relief.
For Jackson and A. P. Hill had been sent up to
Louisa Court House some weeks before, and had
fought Pope at Cedar Mountain, away out near
Culpeper. As McClellan's army would have had to
march sixty miles to Fort Monroe, and from thirty
to fifty more at least from Aquia Creek or Fal
mouth, making ninety or one hundred in all, besides
the water transport, while Lee had at most only
seventy to march, it offered Lee a fine chance to
cut in behind Pope, drive him west to the moun
tains, and then turn on the detachments of the arriv
ing Army of the Potomac and drive them back to
Washington. The troops from the Array of the Potomac came
on as rapidly as possible. Colonel Ingalls, the chief
quartermaster, reported to General Meigs, August
15 : "Up to this moment the thing could not have
been done faster." There were delays, from
Fortress Monroe to Washington, but these were due
to Washington and not to the army. Transports
went helter-skelter, some were drafted away to New
York, and there was a great storm. McClellan had
nothing to do with all this — all he could do was to
urge and strive.
August 12 Halleck ordered Burnside, then at Fai-

THE ADVENT OF POPE 45
mouth, to divide his forces and send the bulk of
them up the river to Pope. August 13 the move
ment began, by McClellan and Burnside, and the
march of troops proceeded ; "not an hour has been
lost up to this tirae." (Colonel Ingalls.)
August 13 Lee first gave his orders to move
Longstreet's whole force, together with Hood's, to
the Rappahannock front, saying : "From every indi
cation it appears [August 14] that McClellan's
forces are being withdrawn and sent to reinforce
Pope." Lee was now turned loose, and McClellan
tied fast.
August 24 Lee reports the capture of a letter from
Pope to Halleck, dated August 20, reporting his
force for duty at 45,000, independent of Burnside,
and not including any part of the Army of the
Potomac. Meantime the movement of the latter
army by water from the Peninsula continued.
McClellan thus carae with his army directly into
the territory occupied by General Pope. In the
President's order, dated June 26. appointing Pope
to the comraand of the Array of Virginia, it was
stated that when the latter and the Array of the
Potomac were in position to communicate and di
rectly cooperate, the chief command ".shall be gov
erned, as in like cases, by the Rules and Articles of
War." August 7 HaUeck wrote McCleUan : "As I
told you when at your carap, it is ray intention that
you shall command all the troops in Virginia as soon
as we can get them together ; and with the army thus

46 ANTIETAM
concentrated I am certain that you can take Rich
mond." Halleck declared that he staked his reputa
tion on it. So the charge that McClellan was
actuated by personal motives to oppose the reraoval
is not true; for he would command a rauch larger
array, raore directly under the eyes of the nation,
and with results raore theatrically effective, by com
ing north than by remaining in the Peninsula. But
he would not be doing so much to end the war, and
this he well knew.
Halleck, afterward, in endeavoring to soothe the
ruffled feelings of General Pope, then an exile, as
he called it, in Minnesota, wrote hira October lo,
1 862 : "You coraplain that I acted unfriendly to
you in giving the command to General McClellan.
On the contrary, I advised against it. The facts do
not sustain your assertion. As General McClellan's
army arrived here by detachments, every man I
could move was, against his protest, sent to your
command. He claimed that when the two armies
began to unite, he, as ranking officer, had a right
to coraraand both. His claira was not admitted,
and he remained in coraraand only of the defenses
of Washington."
This statement contains three errors of fact:
I — McClellan did not protest against his organiza- :
tions being sent forward; he objected to sending
forward Franklin's corps in a rush without artillery,
without horses, without wagons, without supplies,
and without ammunition excepting what the men

THE ADVENT OF POPE 47
had in their cartridge-boxes. And the corps was
sent as soon as these supplies were received, even in
part. Pleasonton's cavalry was detained on the
Peninsula for want of transports, which had been
sent elsewhere by orders from Washington. 2—
McClellan did not claira the command specifically
by rank, though he was the ranking general, but
by the orders of the President and the letter of the
general-in-chief, Halleck himself. 3 — He did not
"reraain in comraand of the defenses in Washing
ton" (as Halleck stated), for he had not been given
the command of these at all. General Barnard, by
special orders of the Secretary of War, No. 190,
dated August 14, 1862, was "assigned to the com
mand of the fortifications surrounding Washing
ton." He retained this place until Septeraber i, and
only relinquished his coramand by a letter and order
September 2, after Pope's defeat.
Pope's army was defeated and flying back to
Washington. In the midst of this awful cataclysm
McClellan, whO' had seen his forces ordered away
from hira until he had only his personal staff, about
one hundred men, under his command, and had to
send out to learn the countersign, was thus addressed
by Halleck, September i : "General Pope was
ordered this morning to fall back to line of fortifi
cations, and has been moving all day in this direc
tion." But Pope was then acting under orders of
General Lee, and not of General Halleck, and the
President demanded that McClellan be sent for.

48 ANTIETAM
The whole story is told by Secretary WeUes, of
Lincoln's Cabinet, who did not especicdly love Mc
Clellan, but who did love truth and decency. I refer
to his book, "Lincoln and Seward." He says : "But
Pope was defeated, and the army, sadly demoral
ized, came retreating to the Potomac. The War
Department, and especially Stanton and HaUeck,
became greatly alarmed." A paper was brought to
Secretary Welles, in the handwriting of the Secre
tary of War, demanding McClellan's iramediate dis
missal. Four members of the Cabinet were ready
to sign it, but Seward and Welles were not, on the
ground that "the combination was improper and dis
respectful to the President, who had selected his
Cabinet to consult and advise with, not to conspire
against him."
Secretary Welles adds that he had doubted the
wisdom of recalling the Army of the Potomac from
Richraond. "The object of bringing that army
back to Washington," he says, "in order to start
anew, march overland, and regain the abandoned
position I did not understand, unless it was to get
rid of McClellan; and if that was the object, it
would have been much better to place another gen
eral at the head of the army whUe it was yet on the
James." A cabinet council was being held, September i.
Mr. Lincoln had not yet arrived when Stanton en
tered the room and said, with great excitement, that
he had just learned from General Halleck that the

THE ADVENT OF POPE 49
President had placed General McClellan in com
mand of the forces in Washington. The President
arrived; "and Stanton, with some feeling," says
Secretary Welles, "remarked that no order to that
effect had issued from the War Department. The
President calmly, with some emphasis, said the
order was his, and he would be responsible for it to
the country."
Here spoke the real Lincoln, the great Lincoln,
the Lincoln of history, and of a loving and glorify
ing country! And what a weight of suffering he
bore ! How pathetic his complaint, "I am so borne
upon." Not daring to remove McClellan from the Army
of the Potomac, as that required the direct order
of the President, it still had seemed possible to re
move the Army of the Potomac frora McClellan,
for that was a detail of the "War Departraent
strategy" which General Upton so graphically char
acterizes as being operated by the civilians in their
offices. And now this hope was gone, for Lincoln in his
majesty and power had opened wide the arras of
the "old comraander" to receive the disjecta membra
of three defeated armies, now pouring back into
Alexandria and Washington.^
^See note pp. 309-310.

IV

THE SECOND MANASSAS

Such a defeat ought not to have occurred. The
sarae critical examination of the forces at the second
Manassas as I have applied to the Seven Days'
battles will show us what forces General Pope, who
was on the defensive, had under his command on
the field of battle, and which regiments, as the
casualty reports show, all suffered actual losses in
battle, and not trifling losses either. These include
the army corps of Sigel, Banks, and McDoweU,
Re)molds's division, Heintbleman's corps, Fitz John
Porter's corps, Taylor's brigade of the sixth corps,
and Burnside's Ninth army corps. These forces ag
gregated on the field of battle 167 regiments of in
fantry, 14 of cavalry, one regiment of heavy artil
lery, and 43 batteries.
The Confederate forces opposed numbered 134/^
regiments of infantry, 14J4 regiments of cavalry,
and 61 batteries of artillery. But not all these were
actively engaged; only 120 regiments of infantry re
ported losses. The disproportion in fo-vor of Pope,
50

THE SECOND MANASSAS 51
in this battle, was almost the same as the dispropor
tion against McClellan in the Seven Days.
The crisis was now upon the country. McQellan,
by the raandate of the President, was now in cora
raand of the forces as they poured back, and of the
fortifications as they surrounded Washington; but
all the rest of the country was open to the Con
federate array.
Lincoln excused hiraself, says Secretary Welles,
for appointing McClellan to command the fortifica
tions, by saying "he was a defensive man, and could
reorganize the army better than anyone else," which
was true, for he had created it out of the ruins of
the First Bull Run and the panic of the preceding
summer. But he now cast a doubt on Welles's
memory by appointing McClellan to do the most
critical act in the whole history of the War of the
Rebellion ; that is to say, to take this "defeated and
shattered army, this retreating and demoralized
army," as the President called it, and reorganize it
indeed; but reorganize it upon the raarch, with
a victorious army sweeping across his front, — ^not
yet organized, — north to Maryland and Pennsyl
vania, not with the Confederate force merely which
had met and defeated Pope and driven him into
Washington, but with all these and more than fifty
new and fresh veteran regiments directly from Rich
mond added to the invading force. And all this
must be done inside of two weeks, for in two weeks
Lee's armies would have been in Pennsylvania and

52 ANTIETAM
marching up the Cumberland Valley, or else to York
and the Susquehanna River, as they did a year later
under almost similar circumstances, and with an
army no larger, and no better, to break in a surge,
scattered into bloody spray on the impregnable
heights of Gettysburg, "the high-water ra.ark of the
RebeUion" ; while now, with McClellan's reranants,
he was to do all this, reinforced by twenty-nine regi
ments of raw recruits, who never had seen any
enemy and never fired a shot, and with as many
other hacked-up veteran regiments left behind, with
many thousands of others also left behind, to stiU
guard "from insult" that ever-imperiled capital.
Napoleon well said that "to defend a capital
you must raake such war, and at such distance, that
the capital cannot be attacked ; if fully invested it is
already lost." But civilians do not understand these
things — they would keep out an invasion as they
would keep out a freshet in a raill-race.
General Grant, in his "Memoirs," amusingly re
lates how Mr. Lincoln, when he (Grant) was about
to take command of the armies in the spring of
1864, gave hira a plan for a campaign of his own.
"He pointed out," says Grant, "on the map two
streams which empty into the Potomac, and sug
gested that the army might be raoved on boats and
landed between the raouths of these strearas. We
would then have the Potoraac to bring our supplies,
and the tributaries would protect our flanks while
we moved out. I listened respectfuUy, but did not

THE SECOND MANASSAS 53
suggest that the same streams would protect Lee's
flanks whUe he was shutting us up."
General Grant significantly adds: "I did not
communicate ray plans to the President, nor did I
to the Secretary of War or to General Halleck."
Wasn't this splendid ? I have often envied, as it
were. Grant's magnificent opportunity, which time
and the trend of events had given him, so that he
could act according to military principles and
achieve military results in defiance of those malevo
lent civilian forces which had bound hard and fast
the military hands and feet, and crushed the mili
tary mind, and blinded the military eye, during all
those long, weary, hapless raonths while the nation
groaned in spirit and the great heart of Lincoln was
wrung with unutterable woe!
And now, for ten weeks, this great curtain of
darkness was to be lifted from the tragedy of the
spring and sumraer, and McClellan was to be sent
forward to do that work for which he was the best
fitted, — that swift raarching and fierce attack which
other interests had denied him, for alas! in those
earlier days our people at home did not know that
an army was an article of manufacture and not a
mob organized on paper. Napoleon said that it took
ten months' drill and several carapaigns to make an
army. McClellan made his in half the time. Grant
never made an array; he never had to; they were
made for him by others, as Sheridan's were. Sher-

54 ANTIETAM
man, Thoraas, Buell, Meade, and McClellan, these
raade armies, for they were all with McClellan in
1 861-1862, and they learned how to do' it under
McClellan. McClellan had learned it in Europe,
where the Government had sent him, and improved
on his teachers.

V
OPENING OF THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN.
And now the Maryland carapaign opens, and
what we have been considering will be found to be
the key to these wonderful ten weeks, commencing
in the suburbs of Washington and ending in front
of Culpeper, with Longstreet's vain orders for a
battle which was destined never to be fought, but
which, if McClellan had fought it, would have led
practically to the destruction of the Confederate
armies, to the elimination at one blow of all Vir
ginia from the Confederacy, and to the ending of
the war in 1862.
As McClellan carae in on the heels of Pope's
worst defeat, he was destined to gO' out in the face,
and on the eve, of his own greatest victory.
What was this Maryland invasion of Lee? Did
it contemplate a rapid circling around frora Point
of Rocks to Williarasport, and then back up the
Shenandoah Valley again? Who is so ignorant as
to believe that Lee did not know better ? When Lee
entered Maryland he meant business ; and what he
did in 1863 showed what he meant to do in 1862
55

56 ANTIETAM
had McClellan permitted him. But we are not with
out positive evidence that Lee's invasion was an in
vasion of Pennsylvania, and not of Maryland; and
that Maryland was crossed over simply because
Pennsylvania lay beyond Maryland.
The evidence that the invasion was of Pennsyl
vania, and not of Maryland, is conclusive; but the
same policy which sought to belittle the great work
of the Army of the Potoraac in this supreme crisis
of the nation's life ignored this evidence, thereby
belittling the Battle of Antietam and needlessly de
priving its gallant and triuraphant soldiers of their
just raced of valor and success.
Lee reported to President Davis, on Septeraber 7,
that "all divisions of the army have crossed the
Potomac, unless it be General Walker's, from whom
I have had no report since the 5 th."
But, three days before, frora his camp at Lees
burg, Va., Lee wrote Davis, Septeraber 4: "Should
the results of the expedition justify it, I propose to
enter Pennsylvania, unless you should deem it inad
visable upon political or other grounds."
On the contrary, Davis heartily approved it, and
immediately sent Lee the draft of a proclamation,
with the place for the name of the State left blank,
so as to be available in both Pennsylvania and
Maryland, and using this language: "We are v
driven to protect our own country by transferring
the seat of war to that of an enemy who pursues us
with a relentless and apparently aimless hostility;

MARYLAND CAMPAIGN 57
our fields have been laid waste, our people killed,
many homes raade desolate, and rapine and murder
have ravaged our frontiers; the sacred right of self-
defense deraands that, if such a war is to continue,
its consequences shall fall on those who persist in
their refusal to make peace. The Confederate army
therefore comes to occupy the territory of their
enemies and to raake it the theater of hostilities."
That was not Maryland, but Pennsylvania; Lee
had many troops in his own army from Maryland,
and many splendid officers.
Septeraber 9 Lee again wrote Davis, frora his
camp at Frederick, Md. : "I shall move in the direc
tion I orginally intended, toward Hagerstown and
Chambersburg." And even after the battle of Antie
tam he wrote to General Loring, commanding in the
Kanawha Valley, in Western Virginia : "Probably
a corabined movement into Pennsylvania may be
concerted." Doctor Lewis H. Steiner, a surgeon and inspector
of the United States Sanitary Commission, who
spent the whole five days of the Confederate occupa
tion of Frederick among the Rebel soldiers and of
ficers, says iri his diary, under date September 8-9 :
"Their army is plainly intended for an advance into
Pennsylvania, and they speak freely of their inten
tion to treat Pennsylvania very differently from
Maryland. I fear there will be great destruction of
property as they move forward. Many a citizen will
lose his all of this world's goods in this raid, for

58 ANTIETAM
devastation is meant to be the order or disorder of
their march when they cross the border."
When Lee's army left Frederick, Longstreet's
whole force raoved directly northwest through the
South Mountain to Hagerstown, near the Pennsyl
vania border. The array reached and held Hagers
town until the battle of South Mountain occurred
and the passes were forced (thus iraperiling Lee's
detached coraraands, across the Potomac from
Harper's Ferry), when Longstreet was suddenly
halted and brought back to Rohrersville, and then
deflected south to Antietam. The Confederate
army within the next four days bade farewell to
Pennsylvania for this year — as it did a year later —
along the sarae reach of the Potoraac River, after
the battle of Gettysburg.
Following the affair at Chantilly and McCleUan's
reorganization of the routed fragments of Pope's
array behind the defenses of Washington, of which
he had been put in comraand by the President per
sonally, as stated, the Confederate array turned its
head to the north and concentrated around Lees
burg. On the 5th, 6th and 7th of September it
forded the Potomac River near Point of Rocks,
the river being little more than knee deep.
As a personal reminiscence I raay raention that
frora the rough look-out on the summit of Mary
land Heights, opposite Harper's Ferry, which over
looked the country for many miles, for three days
we could watch the long thread unwinding across

MARYLAND CAMPAIGN 59
the river, and with glasses distinguish the guns,
wagons, even the regiraents, with their flashing
battle-flags. It was a glorious, and albeit a peaceful,
yet a terrible sight ; it was the unfolding panorama
of a great war, displayed as though it were on ex
hibition. The cavalry to which I belonged had re
treated — under orders of Halleck dated September
2, 1862 — from the Upper Shenandoah at and be
yond Winchester, and had just reached Harper's
Ferry, where, incredible as it may seera, it was sent
over to assist in garrisoning the summit of Mary
land Heights — the cavalry! with thousands of in
fantry in Harper's Ferry.
General Wool, in whose department Harper's
Ferry then was, and who, together with Stanton and
Halleck, was trying to take care of it, reports a des
patch from Colonel Miles, coraraanding at Harper's
Ferry, under date 11 a. m., September 7, stating
that Lee's army "has crossed and is stUl crossing
into Maryland, below Point of Rocks. I will send
up to the observatory to look out for dust, and I
will inform you." There was plenty of dust.
After crossing, the Confederate army moved di
rectly up to Frederick, where it concentrated,
September 9. Meantime, what was McClellan ^
doing, for he was the only one at Washington ap
parently capable of doing anything for the country?
Septemher 2, i p. m., McClellan writes the gen
eral-in-chief (and we can see what sort of a general-
in-chief Halleck was willing to be) as foUows :

6o ANTIETAM
"My Dear Halleck: My ordnance officer in
forms me that General Ripley says that he has just
received an order from the Secretary of War to ship
ever)^hing from this arsenal to New York. I had
sent to General Ripley to learn what small arms
were here, so that I might be prepared to arm
stragglers, &c. I do not think this order ought to
be carried out so proraptly. I do not despair of
saving the capital. Better destroy all there is at the
eleventh hour than to send them off now."
What had the Secretary of War to do with this
sort of work, anyhow? But Halleck replied, not
repudiating the order, but saying that "at least
50,000 or 60,000 arms will be kept, and a large
number of pieces of artillery." Doubtless, had Lee
reached as far as New York City, he would have
found it thus made impregnable; and the way for
him to reach New York City was for us to ship
Washington's defenses thither and reraove Mc
Clellan from any marching command, if not alto
gether. But Lincoln again rose in his majesty and power.
He sent for McClellan, and Secretary Seward was
present, who told the story, afterward corroborated
by WeUes and McClellan. Lincoln begged Mc
Clellan to take the army. McClellan feared the
cabal; but at length patriotism, sense of duty,
loyalty, and love for the President — whom he never
ceased to honor and believe in — ^prevailed, and he

MARYLAND CAMPAIGN 6i
took this, as it were, back-door responsibility, for
there was no official order.
Halleck's order of September 2, "Major-General
McClellan will have coramand qf the fortifications
of Washington and of all the troops for the de
fense of the capital," was issued, and you wiU find
no other official order.
Had McClellan failed, he would have been liable
to court-martial for taking "the troops for the de
fense of the capital" a hundred railes away frora the
capital. Yet that was the only way to save Penn
sylvania, to save the country, and to save the capital
itself. But, as has been said, he fought this cam
paign with a rope about his neck.
Could Lincoln have saved him? Did he save
him, afterward, when he confronted Longstreet at
Culpeper, and when to lose him cost the country
nearly everything then worth having?
HaUeck's position was officially strong. Septem
ber 3 he wrote General Pope : "Reorganization of
an array for the field will be immediately made.
TiU then, General McCleUan, as senior (he was
senior still) and as coraraanding the defenses of
Washington, must exercise general authority."
TiU then?
From September 3 to September 7 McClellan
was frequently directed as to the sending out of
various forces from Washington; sending cavalry
to Edward's Ferry; changing corps commanders;
dispatching troops, Sumner, etc. ; letting troops

62 ANTIETAM
move; moving McDowell's corps; danger of strip
ping Washington forts on the Virginia side; but
nothing at all about McClellan himself moving.
(War Records, vol. xii, part 3, pp. 787-791, 802-
810, 811-812, 812-813; vol. xix, part 2, pp. 169 to
209, and McCleUan's letter to Halleck, Sept. 8, p. 209.
Also McClellan's letter to Lincoln, frora RockviUe,
where he had just joined the array, Sept. 8, page 210.)
September 8 he seems to have gotten away entirely,
and writes to Halleck frora near Rockville : "Frank
lin has reached Muddy Branch ; Sykes, Suraner, and
Banks near here. Burnside and Hooker move to
day to Brookville, Pleasonton will advance his cav
alry to Barnesville, &c. We have cavalry at Pooles-
ville. No enemy at Edward's Ferry; I think they
are beyond the Monocacy. Couch will remain at
Offutt's until I ascertain whether there is any large
force at Dranesville, which I hope to know any
moment." McClellan was certainly in coraraand. The orders
have the genuine ring for the first time for many
weeks, and the President telegraphed hira in the
evening, "How does it look now?"
We could answer, to-day, that it looked very well,
very well indeed.
Yet all this, and all that McClellan did afterward,
was done only on the private, personal, and verbal
order of the President. Quoting frora General Up
ton, in his "Military Policy," p. 376, who cites the
"Report of the Joint Coraraittee on the Conduct of

MARYLAND CAMPAIGN 63
the War," vol. i, pp. 451-452: "To reinstate the
deposed commander was to confess that the whole
campaign was a failure; yet something had to be
done. Bragg, in the West, had begun his march to
ward the Ohio River, while Lee, with renewed con
fidence, was crossing into Maryland. For two or
three days the President consulted his advisers, but
with no satisfactory results. At last, assuming all
the responsibility, he took the general-in-chief with
him, turned his back on the War Department, and,
without disclosing his purpose, proceeded to the
house of General McClellan, where, for the raoment,
he brought the long controversy to a close by say
ing, "General, you will take command of the forces
in the field." . . . He at once, like a faithful
and subordinate soldier, crossed the Potomac to
make dispositions against attack. The raoraent he
appeared, the acclamations of the troops could be
heard for miles, throughout the whole extent of
the long columns" (p. 377).

VI
reorganization on the march
McClellan thus had three broken and disorgan
ized arraies consolidated in the field and under his
coraraand — the Array of Virginia, the Army of
North Carolina, and the Array of the Potoraac, ex
cepting the 52,000 troops still left, September 10, in
Washington for its further defense, and increased
ten days later to raore than 80,000. But these three
disorganized arraies were now being welded by Mc
Clellan, for all tirae, into that one glorious army of
the Potomac, never more to be divided — for the
shadow of Grant was already looming up, far away.
Halleck says in his report: "General McCleUan
was directed to pursue Lee with all the troops which
were not required for the defense of Washington."
This is true; but he was not so directed by Hal
leck, or by the Secretary of War, but by a greater
one, and verbally only.
As an example of this War Department strategy,
Harper's Ferry, a key-point position, was not put
under McClellan's command till September 11, —
while it was being invested, — and then only when
64

REORGANIZATION, ETC. 65
McCleUan should be able to open communication
with it. For this it was now too late, although
McClellan repeatedly attempted to do so. Prior to
this, the position was under the joint command,
apparently, of Wool and HaUeck ; and General Wool
had thus directed poor Miles on September 5 : "You
will fiot abandon Harper's Ferry without defending
it to the last extremity."
This, poor Miles — who was afterward killed in
Harper's Ferry — tried to do, for I was there. It
could have been done only by throwing his whole
force over to Maryland Heights, for Harper's Ferry
was merely the bottom of a bowl, with Maryland
Heights, Loudon Heights, and the Bolivar Virginia
Heights surrounding it on every side. Now, how
ever, on Maryland Heights already were the Con
federate divisions of McLaws and Anderson, with
sixteen brigades ; on Loudon Heights Walker's divi
sion of two brigades, and on the Virginia Heights
Stonewall Jackson's whole force, with A. P. HiU
and Ewell. Had McClellan had possession of it in
time no such nonsense would have occurred. Sup
pose Miles had used common sense, — for he was a
good regular army officer, — and had /retired to
Maryland Heights; and Harper's Ferry had been
raided — as it would have been — by Jackson, and all
its stores destroyed : where would poor Miles have
been in the coming day of judgment? So Harper's
Ferry, Maryland Heights, and Loudon Heights
were all lost before McClellan got within communi-

66 ANTIETAM
eating distance. He had absolutely no chance to
save them.
Now a word about the topography of Harper's
Ferry and its surroundings. Franklin and Couch
have been blamed for not relieving Harper's Ferry
when they were so near and were firing guns to let
the garrison know that they were so near.
This was on Sunday, September 14, the day of
the battle of South Mountain, through which moun
tain range, but further south, Crampton's Gap
passes. With Turner's Gap — where the battle of
South Mountain occurred — still in Confederate
hands and being contested for; with Longstreet
foot-free beyond it, so that any move down Pleasant
Valley would have been into a cul-de-sac; with Mc
Laws and Anderson stretched across the Valley and
with Maryland Heights already two days in their
possession, and overlooking Pleasant Valley for
, four miles, within easy cannon range ; with Loudon
Heights directly in Franklin's front across the river;
with Walker in position there already, for two days,
and with Longstreet's whole force moving down
from its position at the head of Pleasant Valley,
in Franklin's rear — it is a great mistake to suppose
that any force raarching down Pleasant Valley to
the Potoraac would reach or corae near to Harper's
Ferry. The South Mountain, coming down from
Pennsylvania, crosses the Potomac at the east of
Weverton, about four miles east of Harper's Ferry.
It reappears beyond the Potomac as a series of scat-

REORGANIZATION, ETC. 67
tered hills, called the Short Hills, which disappear
three or four railes south of the river.
The Blue Ridge, coraing up frora Virginia,
crosses the Potomac imraediately east of Harper's
Ferry and west of Pleasant Valley, across the river,
and continues on as the Maryland Heights, or Elk
Ridge, for about eight miles north of the river,
when this also disappears. It makes a sort of two-
ply parallel arrangeraent, so that a force raoving
down Pleasant VaUey — which is east of Maryland
Heights — will find itself also east of Loudon
Heights. The latter separate Harper's Ferry and
the Shenandoah river frora the north and south
line of advance of such an advancing force. You
could not even see Harper's Ferry — which lies be
hind the raountains — during all this raarch. To reach
Harper's Ferry it would be necessary to go down
the eastern side of Pleasant Valley, — which is about
two and one-half railes wide, — for there is no access
along the western side to the Potoraac, and debouche
on a shelf scooped out from the rocks, along the
river, and just wide enough for a road, the railroad,
and the canal. These triple passageways are bor
dered, along the river bank behind them, by a rocky
precipice from twenty to thirty feet high, extending
from Sandy Hook under the Maryland Heights up
to Harper's Ferry. Then by marching up this nar
row road along the river bank, and passing directly
between the lofty Maryland Heights on the northern
bank and the less lofty Loudon Heights on the

68 ANTIETAM
southem bank, you would finally come opposite
Harper's Ferry. Here a single pontoon bridge only,
under the guns on each side of the river, and hun
dreds of feet above, would have allowed you to
cross the Potomac to Harper's Ferry — if you be
haved yourself.
Between Maryland Heights and the Antietam
Creek there is nothing but almost roadless moun
tains. South of the Potomac there are no passes in
the Blue Ridge for miles, and Harper's Ferry, in
vested as it was, was as hopeless of relief from the
north or east as if it were on the planet Mars. The
miscalculation was not McClellan's — it was before
McClellan. The best maps to illustrate the topography of
Harper's Ferry and its surroundings are "Harper's
Ferry," sheet xlii, part 9, Atlas to Accorapany the
Official War Records, which also shows the preci
pice under which the only road of access passes from
Sandy Hook, under Maryland Heights, across the
river to the Ferry; No. 12, on sheet lxxxii, part
17, of said Atlas, which shows Maryland Heights,
Loudon Heights, and Bolivar Heights, with the
town of Harper's Ferry as in the bottom of a bowl,
in the middle; and the Harper's Ferry battle-field
map of the operations of this campaign, on sheet
xxix, part 6, of the sarae atlas. It will be clearly
seen that, with the Confederates within easy cannon
range on the precipitous Maryland Heights, any
force approaching from the east or the northeast

REORGANIZATION, ETC. 69
would be compeUed to advance by the flank for two
miles or more along the front of a perfectly pro
tected and strongly occupied mountain — a mountain
totally inaccessible from the east even to a climber.
Further, the advance would be in the face of heavy
guns and infantry along the southern bank and on
Loudon Heights across the river, and directly in
front at less than a mile distance. Only a narrow
roadway ran along the river from Sandy Hook, —
hemmed in by a precipice on the north, — and fully
exposed to rifle and cannon fire from the south
across the river, with a single narrow pontoon at the
Ferry as the only means of crossing the river, even
if undefended. Therefore it can plainly be seen
that the approach to Harper's Ferry was impossible
for any relieving force approaching from that direc
tion. There were two men in the opposing armies who
understood this topography; the one was General
Lee, who had occupied Harper's Ferry during the
John Brown troubles, and the other was General
McClellan, who had worked this whole ground over
when operating up the Potomac the preceding fall.
I often think, when reading current history, that
those are the only people who ever knew of that
topography, even up to this day — and they are both
dead. So the advance of McClellan continued. There
were troubles with the trains. They got balled up,
and stalled, and blockaded, as we know. But

70 ANTIETAM
General Ingalls investigated the troubles, and found
that they were all due to Pope's Army of Virginia
transportation ; the administration of the old Army
of the Potomac went on like clock-work; and when
McClellan started south at the beginning of Novem
ber the administration of all parts went on like
clock-work. He was a member of that firm which
is styled, "We know how."
As showing how the array was reorganized on
the raarch. General Crawford, writing September
8 from Rockville, Md., describes the condition of
his brigade, which had suffered severely at Cedar
Mountain. "No tirae or opportunity has been al
lowed," he says, "either to rest the men or to re
organize the corapanies and regiments, which have
lost field and staff and corapany officers, both com
missioned and non-coraraissioned, and I ara now in
coraraand of a brigade which, consisting nominally
of four regiments, numbers at this moment, in the
rank drawn up in the advance line to meet the enemy,
but six hundred and twenty-nine effective men."
In consequence, the Fifth Connecticut was de
tached by McCleUan September 9, and three new
nine-months Pennsylvania regiments, just com
pleted, were added, and in the ensuing actions these
three regiments lost 327 men.
New regiments, in like manner, were incorpo
rated with old brigades on the march in other cases ;
and General Humphreys, in his application, on

REORGANIZATION, ETC. 71
March 28, 1863, for a court of inquiry, details his
experiences with his division composed altogether
of new troops, 7000 in number. Halleck had threat
ened him with arrest, September 13, if he did not
immediately join his division. He left Washing
ton on the twelfth. He had no staff officers, one of
his brigades had no rations, all its arms were un
serviceable, and had to be exchanged en route, and
Humphreys himself forced the exchange. The divi
sion had no amraunition wagons, and no supply
train. It had only one ambulance to a regiment,
and no shelter tents. It raarched Septeraber 14,
halted by orders at Frederick, left Frederick and
raarched all day and all night and most of the fore
noon of next day, reaching the field of Antietam the
morning of Septeraber 18, the day after the princi
pal battle, after a continuous march of 23 miles.
Any one familiar with military matters and with
the state of the array on the 2d and 3rd of Septem
ber when streaming back to Washington, disorgan
ized (as President Lincoln said), with the enormous
losses of baggage and transportation of that ill-
starred campaign, will know that the array which
began fighting only ten days later, September 14,
eighty railes away frora Washington, must have been
reorganized on the raarch, if much of it was not to
fight as a mob. That army did as good work at
South Mountain and Antietam as any American
army ever did anywhere.

72 ANTIETAM
Lee's army encamped around Frederick until Sep
tember IO and II, when Jackson and A. P. HiU
marched by way of Martinsburg, Va., crossing the
Potomac near WiUiamsport, and thence down the
river to Harper's Ferry. Walker's division marched
due south frora Frederick, crossing the Potomac
near Point of Rocks and occupying Loudon Heights,
which coraraanded Harper's Ferry on the east. The
divisions of McLaws and R. H. Anderson raarched
down Pleasant VaUey to seize Maryland Heights
and prevent attack from the north, while Long-
street, Hood, and D. H. Hill moved forward di
rectly, Hill halting in Turner's Gap to prevent
pursuit and Longstreet advancing to Hagerstown.
The cavalry covered the rear. (See Dr. Steiner's
diary. )
McClellan's advance entered Frederick late in the
day of Septeraber 12 (see diary). On the 13th the
army entered, and closed up, and passed through
Frederick in pursuit, and next day was fought the
successful battle of South Mountain. Franklin had
been sent south, and the same day successfully en
gaged McLaws and forced Crampton's Gap. Mary
land Heights being already in possession of the
enemy, and Walker in front across the river, it was
impossible to drive the enemy to the Potomac, as
Longstreet had already sent a part of his force in
behind Franklin to KeedysviUe, so as to close upon
Franklin's rear should he advance further than the
eastern gaps.

REORGANIZATION, ETC. 73
The next moming, Monday, September 15, Har
per's Ferry was surrendered^
While at Frederick, on the afternoon of Septem
ber 13, an order of Lee was picked up, which de
scribed Lee's conteraplated movements. To deter
mine if the order was genuine, at 3 p. m., Septem
ber 13, McClellan imraediately directed General
Pleasonton, coraraanding the cavalry, "to ascertain
whether this order of march has thus far been fol
lowed by the eneray." (War Records, vol. xix,
part I, pp. 47, 48, 209; part 2, pp. 281-282; and
especially vol. li, part i, for McCleUan's order to
Pleasonton of Sept. 13, 3 p. m. (page 829), "Gen
eral McCleUan desires you to ascertain whether this
order of raarch has thus far been followed by the
enemy," &c. ) It was this information which de
termined his raoveraents, or rather confirraed
thera; for before he reached Frederick, and before
Lee's order was discovered, he had written
Halleck frora Clarksburg, fifteen railes southeast
of Frederick, at 10 a. m., September 12: "My
colurans are pushing on rapidly to Frederick. I
feel perfectly confident that the enemy has aban
doned Frederick, moving in two directions, viz., on
the Hagerstown and Harper's Ferry roads." This
information was precisely correct, and was to the
same effect as that embodied in Lee's orders, which
more than twenty-four hours subsequently were
picked up in Frederick and fell into McClellan's
hands. The separation and divergence of these

74 ANTIETAM
separated parts of Lee's army along lines almost at
right angles to each other constituted the entire
key to the situation ; and McClellan had this infor
raation, and frora it divined the whole campaign a
day before Lee's order was heard of; but not be
fore it was being executed in all its details.

VII

LEE S LOST ORDER

I HAVE recently been asked a curious question
by one who ought to have known better. It re
veals the existence, even at this late day, of two
theories entirely incompatible with each other. Both
originated from Washington, and both were in
tended to exploit McClellan's alleged inactivity. His
inactivity, whenever it at all existed, had, by a long
course of dominating "War Department strategy" —
as General Upton calls it — been forced upon Mc
Clellan against every fiber of his nature.
The question asked me was why, when Lee's
orders revealing his whole course, and all his plans,
had fallen into McClellan's hands he paid no atten
tion to them, instead of circuraventing thera at once
with his whole army, "as he could have done." Lee's
order was dated September 9, and was directed to
General D. H. Hill. A soldier found it wrapped
around a bunch of cigars, and it came into McClel
lan's possession late on the 13th of September.
When Hill received the order on the 9th, McCleUan,
who had just joined his army, was concentrating it
at Brookville, Middlebrook, Damestown, Seneca
75

7^ ANTIETAM
Creek, and RockviUe, near Washington. He had,
in fact, just been put in coramand, while Lee had
already cut across the Potomac directly south of
Frederick, but twenty mUes distant, and marched
on that place. McClellan did not see the order until
four days after it had been issued.
These "Special Orders, No. 191, September 9th,
1862," provided that Lee's army should resume its
march the next day (the loth), taking the Hagers
town Road from Frederick. Jackson, in the advance,
would push on ahead, turn south, cross the Poto
mac, and raarch down the Virginia side and seal
up Harper's Ferry. This was to be accoraplished by
the nth, two days before Lee's order was found.
Longstreet was tO' march to Boonsborough, on the
Hagerstown Road, and there halt. The divisions
of McLaws and Anderson, sixteen brigades, under
McLaws, were to leave the column at Middletown,
turn south, and by Friday morning (more than
twenty-four hours before Lee's order was found)
"possess hiraself of Maryland Heights." General
Walker at the sarae time was to march south, back
to the Potomac by the sarae road he had come up,
cross the river into Virginia and take possession
of Loudon Heights, on the Virginia side, just across
the Shenandoah River from Harper's Ferry.
The reserve artillery, ordnance, supply trains,
etc., were to precede D. H. Hill, whose division
would form the rear guard of the army through
the South Mountain, by Turner's Gap. Stuart's

LEE'S LOST ORDER 77
cavalry was to cover the route of the army and
bring up all stragglers.
Now we not only know from the reports of these
officers that Lee's array did so move, but from the
independent testimony of Surgeon Steiner of the
Sanitary Comraission (who was in Frederick), that
"Wednesday, Septeraber tenth, at four o'clock this
morning the Rebel army began to move from our
town, Jackson's force taking the advance. The
movement continued untU 8 o'clock p. m., occupying
sixteen hours." D. H. HiU's division could not get
away on the loth, but marched on the morning of
September 11. Friday, September 12, Stuart's
cavalry passed through Frederick, to the west, fol
lowing Lee's army. Two companies were left in the
town to observe the Union advance.
During the 12th, "cannonading was heard in the
distance." The advance Union cavalry charged
into town, and were met by a counter-charge of
Stuart's men. The latter fell back, "carrying with
them seven of our men as prisoners, and leaving
many of their own men wounded on the ground."
Then came a regiment of Ohio men, and then Burn
side's corps of the Army of the Potomac. Septem
ber 13, about nine o'clock, McClellan with his staff
rode through the town and encamped with a large
portion of his army on Dr. Steiner's own farm, west
of Frederick. The writer says: "The nature of
the camp and its arrangements prevented one form
ing any other conclusion than that it was a bivouac,

78 ANTIETAM
and only intended for temporary occupation. Some
onward movement of the army was evidently al
ready in conteraplation." Now this was not earlier
than noon, and while bivouacking here McCleUan
got hold of Lee's orders, on the 13th of September,
between that hour and 3 p. m.
If Lee's orders had been carried out before this
time, — already by two days, — ^Jackson, with his
force and Ewell's and that of A. P. Hill, was in
vesting Harper's Ferry on the southwest and
west, on the Virginia side, Walker was invest
ing it on the east, on the Virginia side, and McLaws
and Anderson had captured Maryland Heights and
were then investing it on the north and northeast.
All these events had so occurred. Jackson had
crossed the Potomac, near WiUiamsport, on the
nth, into Virginia, and had left all of Lee's army
and thirty railes of distance, and the Potomac river,
between himself and McClellan; on the night of
September 10 and the morning of the nth Walker
had crossed the Potomac at Point of Rocks, east
of the South Mountains and opposite Harper's
Ferry, into Virginia; September 11 McLaws, with
his own and Anderson's divisions, had reached and
occupied Pleasant VaUey, beyond Maryland Heights,
on the east, and between them and the South Moun
tains, and had sent Kershaw's and Barksdale's
brigades up through Solomon's Gap, on the north,
with other brigades in support, to move down the
summit of the ridge toward Harper's Ferry and

LEE'S LOST ORDER 79
carry Maryland Heights, immediately opposite and
overhanging. Another brigade, with artillery, was
sent up the South Mountain, on the east, across
Pleasant Valley, to close the gaps, and the main
force then, having invested Harper's Ferry securely,
fronted north against McClellan's approach and
guarded the eastern passes in the mountains. The
next moming, the 13th, McLaws assaulted Mary
land Heights, coraraanding Harper's Ferry, and,
as his report says, after a very sharp and spirited
engageraent, through the dense woods and over a
very broken surface, "carried the raain ridge," and
by 4 p. M. had possession of the entire heights over
looking by a thousand^ feet Pleasant Valley and
Harper's Ferry. It will therefore be seen that by
the tirae McClellan had obtained Lee's order all the
movements embraced in that order had already been
made one or raore days before, and all the results
provided for in that order had already been secured
whUe Harper's Ferry was not in McCleUan's com
mand or control. McClellan was in bivouac west
of Frederick, on the 13th, which was Saturday.
When Surgeon Steiner saw him, "in the afternoon,"
not all of McClellan's army had yet arrived. The
Twelfth corps did not pass through Frederick,
Steiner says, till Sunday morning, Septeraber 14.
General Humphreys's division did not reach Fred
erick till September 17, and on the 13th he was
still at Washington, trying to beat the authorities
into giving them muskets which could be fired.

8o ANTIETAM
So we find McClellan west of Frederick on the
afternoon of Saturday, September 13, with Lee's
orders in his possession. We can now settle the
activity question very easily. The complete invest
ment of Harper's Ferry was already accomplished.
If Maryland Heights and Loudon Heights were
held in force by the eneray, its fate was sealed. If
the garrison had abandoned the town and planted
itself on Maryland Heights, McLaws and Anderson
could not have carried these heights from the north
or from the east, the latter almost too precipitous
for nearly a thousand feet of elevation, for an un
armed raan even to climb. The former, — and the
spine of the ridge itself, — ^was open only from Solo
mon's Gap, four miles up the range to the north,
and could be held by a very moderate force for dajrs
against any enemy; could have been so held by
Miles, had he been there.
The whole question, then, tumed on whether
Miles, at Harper's Ferry, had employed decent com
mon-sense and got out of the bottom of the soup-
tureen and up on to the rim — or had not. Mc
CleUan had no notion that the War Department
strategists at Washington ( for Harper's Ferry was
then, and had been, out of McCleUan's jurisdiction)
could possibly have sent him the absurd order to
hold on to the town of Harper's Ferry, with its pots
and kettles and the old John Brown engine-house,
to the last extremity, while the only possible means
of holding anything at all lay outside the town,

LEE'S LOST ORDER 8i
across the river, and on the top of a lofty range of
mountains easily accessible to hira, but totally in
accessible, if so held, to the enemy. But Maryland
Heights had already been captured aud occupied
before McClellan reached Frederick or saw Lee's
order. Turning to the orders in Supplemental Volume
LI, of the Official Records, we find that September
1 1 McClellan ordered Burnside to push on to Fred
erick, if the enemy had marched toward Hagers
town. Sumner was ordered to Urbana, and on the
1 2th to Frederick, with Banks's corps to follow;
Franklin to Buckeystown, there to await orders to
move either on Harper's Ferry or Frederick ; Porter
to push forward with his reorganized Fifth corps;
and Couch to follow Franklin. On the night of the
i2th, at II p. M., Burnside was ordered to advance
with his whole comraand from Frederick to the
Catoctin Valley, opening the way to Pleasonton's
cavalry, which was to scout up to Pennsylvania, and
also to learn the condition of affairs at Harper's
Ferry. Pleasonton was to co-operate with Burnside
in his operation. "If the enemy has marched by the
National road the Pass must be taken ; but the at
tack upon it must only be made with a sufficiency
of troops." September 13, Sumner was ordered to
move punctually at seven next morning, ammunition
wagons to move with the troops, ambulances in rear
of all the troops, in order of corps. Franklin was
ordered at 6.30 p. m., September 13, "to move south

82 ANTIETAM
at daybreak next moming by Jefferson and Burkitts-
ville, upon the road to Rohrersville, and down into
Pleasant Valley, to seize the passes, and cut off,
destroy, or capture McLaws' command, and relieve
Colonel Miles." Couch was ordered to join Frank
lin as soon as possible.
At the same time "a division of Burnside's com
raand started several hours ago to support Pleason
ton, and the whole of Burnside's coramand, includ
ing Hooker's corps, march this evening [13th] and
early to-morrow morning, followed by . the two
corps of Sumner and Banks, and Sykes' division,
upon Boonsborough, beyond Turner's Gap, to carry
that position."
Franklin was ordered to attack "a half-hour after
you hear severe firing at the pass on the Hagerstown
pike, where the raain body wUl attack." This was
the scene of the Battle of South Mountain, on Sun
day. This latter direction, a high evidence of Mc
Clellan's sagacity and military genius, was also (as
usual) tortured against him, — and received public
credence because the public knew nothing of the
topography of the country.
Anyone who consults the map of Harper's Ferry,
sheet XLII, Atlas of Official War Records, or the
admirable official maps in the great Govemment
Atlas, of "Military Maps, Armies of the Potomac
and James" ( 1867), will see at a glance why it was
necessary for Franklin to await the attack at Tur-

LEE'S LOST ORDER 83
ner's Gap above, after he had passed RohrersviUe
and moved down Pleasant Valley, which opened, as
I have shown, not on Harper's Ferry at all, but on
the Potomac east of the raountains behind which
Harper's Ferry lay ensconced.
Lee's orders had now told McClellan what force
it was which Franklin was moving against in his
advance down Pleasant VaUey. This valley was
two miles wide, and girt on the east by the rugged
South Mountains, one thousand feet high, and on
the west by Maryland Heights, still more lofty. The
railroad from Weverton to RohrersviUe runs up
this valley now, and the traveler can enjoy the wild
and rugged scenery on each side.
McLaws and Anderson had ten brigades, com
prising forty-two veteran regiraents of infantry and
nine batteries of artiUery, of which force the six
teen regiments of McLaws had not drawn a trigger
since the Seven Days before Richmond, two and a
half months before.
Franklin's two divisions nurabered six brigades,
consisting of twenty-seven regiments of infantry
and seven batteries of artillery; and Couch, not yet
up, added three brigades, consisting of fifteen regi
ments and four batteries ; the forces would then have
been equal.
D. H. HiU's division and the Confederate cavalry
were in Turner's Gap to bar the way to the west,
and Longstreet between Turner's Gap and Boons
borough and up to Hagerstown and Pennsylvania.

84 ANTIETAM
At any time before McClellan had attacked and
held fast the enemy at Turner's Gap ( South Moun
tain) and fully occupied their attention, it was
easily possible for a Confederate force (Long-
street's) to move down Pleasant Valley from the
north, covered by D. H. Hill, and in rear of Frank
lin, shut him up in a cul-de-sac and crush him be
tween Longstreet in his rear and McLaws in his
front, each superior in force and position. It was
a neat trap. McClellan did not direct Franklin to
wait till the pass was carried, but only till the firing
became heavy. After that, McClellan intended to
take care of Hill and Longstreet hiraself, and also,
after that, if either of these had ventured down
Pleasant Valley in Franklin's rear, we would have
had a sort of four-ply arrangement, for McClellan
would have followed down and in turn shut these
forces up between Franklin now in their front and
himself in their rear.
As a matter of fact, Longstreet (see his Official
Report) did march his whole force back nearly or
quite into Turner's Gap, to D. H. HiU's support, in
the afternoon. He could just as easUy have de
flected it down behind Franklin had he not been
kept busy above, and afterward forced to retreat, —
to save himself, — ^back part way to Hagerstown,
and then to Sharpsburg for a final stand.
In fact, Lee wrote McLaws, then in Pleasant Val
ley, early on the morning of the 14th, and before he
knew that Longstreet was needed at Tumer's Gap:

LEE'S LOST ORDER 85
"General Longstreet moves down this morning to
occupy the Boonsborough Valley (which town is at
the head of Pleasant Valley), so as to protect your
flank from attacks from forces coming from Fred
erick until the operations at Harper's Ferry are
completed." But Longstreet did not occupy that
Boonsborough, or Upper Pleasant, Valley; as Ten
nyson says, "He saw the snare, and he retired."
Had Miles held Maryland Heights in force, noth
ing could have saved McLaws' whole command,
consisting of forty-two regiments and nine batteries.
They could not have reached the Potoraac, en
filaded by all the guns which would then, under
Miles, have crowned Maryland Heights for three
miles, and a strong infantry force in the only access
thereto, Solomon's Gap, the well-protected Solo
mon's Gap, and, with Franklin and Couch driving
them on. The Potomac being unfordable there by
reason of its rocky bottom, there was no possible
egress to the east; so that while Harper's Ferry
might have been gutted by Jackson at night, all its
men, all its artillery, and all its horses and wagons
and movable property would have been saved, and
the 20,000 men of McLaws and Anderson would
have been inevitably taken, while the three Fates,
Stanton, Wool, and Halleck, down at Washington
and Baltimore, sat and span. And then Miles would
have been court-martialed and shot, for abandoning

86 ANTIETAM
what he was ordered to hold "to the last extremity."
Well, he was shot, anyhow, but that was in battle,
before he surrendered.
What McClellan got out of Lee's order was no
tice that Lee had actually embarked on a side enter
prise full of peril for himself, which would require
five days to accomplish and wasn't worth a picajTine
to hira afterward ( for the prisoners he took at Har
per's Ferry were in large part short-term men, and
they were all paroled at once), excepting that it
opened a back-door road which would have enabled
him to reach McClellan's rear, and threaten or cap
ture Washington, and which McClellan himself took
care of very promptly. McClellan saw, therefore,
that this loss of five days would enable him to at
tack Lee in Maryland, instead of following and
fighting hira up through Pennsylvania, and would
preserve our own State frora the desolation and
horror of invasion, to which McClellan's subsequent
removal subjected it the next year.

VIII
m'clellan's swift advance
McClellan read Lee's order on the aftemoon
of Septeraber 13. That forenoon he had already
ordered Pleasonton and Burnside to the Catoctin
passes and the Catoctin Valley, seven miles on the
way from Frederick to Boonsborough. That same
evening and night he ordered his whole force, which
was at or nearing Frederick, forward; ordered
Franklin to Pleasant Valley, and Couch to follow,
and on the 14th, next day, fought and won the bat
tle of South Mountain and the battle of Crampton's
Gap, and forced down McLaws, Hill, and Long-
street against the Potomac, with Walker and Jack
son on the opposite side. McClellan's army now
passed through Turner's Gap on the night of the
14th and moming of the 15th, brought its trains
through the mountains, and on the i6th, in a fog,
closed up on Sharpsburg. McClellan reconnoitered
the ground, established his lines, planted his bat
teries, supplied his troops from his trains, and
opened the battle of Antietam by a fierce infantry
attack for position in the afternoon of the i6th, on
the right, and a heavy bombardment from estab-
87

88 ANTIETAM
lished positions all along the line, the same positions,
in fact, which the artillery occupied during the bat
tle of the next day. Next morning at daybreak he
attacked along his whole front, drove back Lee's
left and center, and killed, wounded, scattered, and
captured more than 25,000 of the enemy. Next
day, while Couch and Humphreys were coming up,
and while McClellan's nearly fifty heavy guns were
able only to "fire blank cartridges to draw the
enemy's fire frora the infantry," (see vol. xix,
part I, page 436), and were waiting in a feverish
suspense for the heavy ammunition which had
been ordered and sent, and should have been
there early In the raorning, but did not (for rea
sons known at Washington; see Wilson's book,
cited later) arrive till the aftemoon ; and while Lee's
broken, dispirited, and defeated men in groups and
squads, men and officers (see Lee's reports, cited
later) , were sneaking away across the river and fly
ing far, far up the Shenandoah Valley, up beyond
Winchester, many thousand of them throwing away
their shoes, as General Jones reported, lest they be
sent back into that hell again, the i8th passed. Lee
in the sUence of the night gathered his shattered and
defeated remnants about hira, and ere the raorning
star had arisen on that field the invaders found
themselves driven off Northern soU, out of Mary
land, and far away from Pennsylvania; and the
greatest battle of the war had been fought, and the
grandest victory of the war had been won. McCIel-

McCLELLAN'S SWIFT ADVANCE 89
lan, the patriot and victor, the savior of his country,
now awaited his crown of martjrrdom. All this was
within less than ten days after the time when Lin
coln ordered and McClellan took command.
And that is the story of Lee's lost order, and of
what McClellan did about it ; but not, alas ! of what
the War Department strategists did about it. That,
as Kipling says, "is another story." Meade was
pretty nearly served the same way after Gettysburg,
and Grant, also, before Vicksburg.

IX
lee's projected TURNING MOVEMENT
When Harper's Ferry had fallen, a new and most
serious problem presented itself, and one which Mc
Clellan's orders show that he very fully appreciated,
and met at once, but which the historians have
strangely overlooked. I would like to say that much
of the data relating to these events will be found
only in the Supplemental Volume li, published in
1897, 1898, and 1899, of the Official War Records,
and not at all in Volume xix, to which they properly
belong. I shall refer again to these concealments,
mutilations, or omissions, (much like those which
Pope charged on Halleck), in examining McCleUan's
subsequent advance to Culpeper; but I cannot ex
plain why they had been removed from their proper
files in the War Department, and why they were not
discovered until ten years afterward. Where, and
by whom, were they suppressed and hidden?
Why did McClellan, early on the moming of Sep
tember 15, and before Harper's Ferry had been sur
rendered, order Franklin, then in Pleasant Valley,
to "push on with your whole command to Sharps
burg," and in the evening of the same day, when the
90

LEE'S PROJECTED MOVEMENT 91
ominous silence at Harper's Ferry (see McClel
lan's Report) had told him that that place had sur
rendered, countermand this order and direct Frank
lin to "keep the enemy in your front without any
thing decisive until the Sharpsburg affair is set
tled" ? McClellan's report says : "The cessation of
the firing at Harper's Ferry indicated [on the raorn
ing of the 15th] the surrender of that place." And
at once all three roads from the Confederate rear
at Sharpsburg were opened for a great turning
movement down along the Potomac, through Vir
ginia to Harper's Ferry, and thence still down along
the Potomac, and up through Maryland, directly to
McClellan's rear, so as to plant Lee in the mountain
passes, squarely on McClellan's coraraunications,
and bar the way between the Array of the Potoraac
and Washington, with Washington at his raercy.
And this is why, Septeraber 16, when a scout
brought McClellan direct word of the surrender,
McClellan cautioned Franklin again "to watch
KnoxviUe and Berlin, so that no eneray can get in
your rear." Franklin's rear was now on the Poto
mac; he was fronting north to McClellan.
KnoxviUe and Berlin are on the great Potomac
River road, along its northern bank, which follows
the railroad and canal down across the mountains
to eastem Maryland, sending great arteries up
through the State all along its course. No enemy
could have gotten in Franklin's rear unless he had
come down the river from Harper's Ferry. Had

92 ANTIETAM
an eneray, however, gotten there, he would not only
have been in Franklin's rear, but in the rear of Mc
Clellan's whole array, with not a Union division be
tween him and Washington, and planted directly
across McClellan's communications and lines of sup
ply. With the gaps of the South Mountain then
closed by the enemy from the east in the rear of
McClellan, with Maryland Heights in possession of
the Confederates, and with a Confederate force any
where between Frederick and the mountains to hold
these gaps, McClellan's only supplies must have
come down from Harrisburg, and his retirement
north, into Pennsylvania, would have been inevita
ble, thus opening Washington and Baltimore to cap
ture, and eastem Maryland and all Virginia to per
manent Confederate occupation. These States
would both have been lost for the time at least
Nay, the Northern Central railroad, from Harris
burg to Baltimore, would have also gone in the
wreck. Stonewall Jackson's route map for the Gettysburg
campaign was prepared by that great soldier in the
following winter, 1862, and shows the topograph)
and roads of this region very well. It is sheet cxvi,
part 24, of the Atlas to the Official Records. From
KnoxviUe, just below Pleasant Valley, a splendid
paved turnpike sweeps up from the Potomac
through Petersville and Jefferson to Frederick City.
I know this road, because while Lee occupied Fred
erick myself and a comrade were sent on a cavalry

LEE'S PROJECTED MOVEMENT 93
scout to the hiUs just overlooking Frederick, and
within rifle-shot of Lee's pickets, whence, from the
gable window of a barn, we observed the whole
Confederate army spread out before us, and indeed
on the march. Had it not been that Walker's
movement from and to Point of Rocks cut us off
on the east, we could then have coraraunicated di
rectly with McClellan. We returned by night, mn-
ning the gauntlet of Walker's men, then across the
river, and reported at daybreak to Colonel Miles
what we had discovered.
From Berlin, KnoxviUe, Weverton, and Sandy
Hook, on the Potomac, fine roads also run up north
through Catoctin Valley and Pleasant Valley, to
Middletown, Burkittsville, Turner's Gap, Cramp
ton's Gap, and Rohrersville. In fact, merely re
versing the direction of the march. Walker could
have marched back toward Frederick just as he
marched down to Loudon Heights from Frederick;
McLaws and Anderson could have marched up
Pleasant Valley, or, east of the South Mountain,
up the Catoctin Valley, just as they marched south
to Maryland Heights from Frederick; and the
same route that afterward took Jackson, A. P. HiU,
Ewell, Walker, McLaws, and Anderson from Har
per's Ferry up to Shepherdstown and Antietam,
would have brought them down to and through
Harper's Ferry from the Shepherdstown Ford.
These routes were not only feasible, but they were
actually marched over by the bulk of Lee's army

94 ANTIETAM
in this carapaign, but only in the opposite direc
tion. From Boteler's Ford, below Shepherdstown, to
Harper's Ferry, by the Virginia road, is 14 miles;
from Harper's Ferry to Burkittsville, screened from
McClellan's array behind Maryland Heights, is 12
railes further; and from Burkittsville to Turner's
Gap, on McClellan's line of supply, is 10 miles more.
This raarch would have closed frora the rear every
practical pass for McClellan from the Pennsylvania
line, 40 railes above, far down into Virginia, and
McClellan would have had to force the passage
frora the west against Lee's whole army on the east,
instead of against one or two divisions. Lee's com
munications with Virginia would have been intact,
nay, even improved (since he had come up from
Leesburg), while McClellan's would have been
severed, towards the east, from below the line of
the Potomac River along the mountains nearly or
quite up to Harrisburg, Penn., a distance of 150
miles. Now, let us suppose that McClellan, without sup
plies or reconnaissance, on Monday, September 15,
had rushed his whole force forward (had it been
possible, which it was not) upon such parts of Lee's
army as had fallen back to the heights at Sharps
burg, and this part of Lee's army, comprising the
divisions of Longstreet, Hood, Jones, and D. H.
Hill, with the cavalry and reserve artillery, as a for-

LEE'S PROJECTED MOVEMENT 95
lorn hope, had withstood McClellan's attack for but a
few hours even, and then been driven in more or less
disorder across the river, which was barely knee
deep ; and suppose then that McClellan had pursued
them rapidly across the river, leaving his trains scat
tered along from Middletown, and across the moun
tains, and leaving Sharpsburg directly in his rear,
and across the Potoraac. Simultaneously with this
we may be sure that McLaws, Anderson, Walker,
Jackson, Ewell, and A. P. Hill, coraprising twenty-
two brigades, one hundred regiraents of infantry, be
sides the heavy artillery for the reduction of Har
per's Ferry, would have rapidly raarched down the
river road to KnoxviUe, Sandy Hook, and Berlin,
and thence up by a number of excellent roads to
the north, sealing the whole South Mountain range
on the east against McClellan's army. With Long-
street, Hood, D. H. Hill, Jones, and Lee's other
fragments following Jackson down to the Potomac,
and with Harper's Ferry and Maryland Heights
firmly held by the Confederates against pursuit,
what would have been the certain fate of Washing
ton, what the state of the army of the Potomac, and
what the just fate of McCleUan?
This was the great turning movement which Lee
had so successfully used on Pope a raonth
previously, and on Hooker at ChanceUorsviUe, and
again on the march to Gettysburg the next spring
and summer; but it didn't work on McCleUan; he
wasn't that kind of a commander.

96 ANTIETAM
Yet this is what we are asked to believe it was
McClellan's bounden duty to have done; and we
are told that he was slow and negligent in not
doing it.
Lee understood this problem perfectly well. He
had no reason in the world excepting this to turn
two-thirds of his army out of its way and spend
priceless days in reducing Harper's Ferry, for Har
per's Ferry would have done him no harm. It was
utterly useless for any purpose of aggression. The
next year he marched by it, on his way to Gett3rs-
burg, in disdain.
But it was necessary now for Lee to have the
river road, and Harper's Ferry barred the river
road right across its middle. Lee didn't want to
besiege and capture Harper's Ferry. He says in
his report : "It had been supposed that the advance
upon Fredericktown would lead to the evacuation
of Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry, thus opening
the line of communication through the valley. This
not having occurred, it became necessary to dislodge
the enemy from those positions before concentrating
the army west of the mountains." This line of com
munication through the valley was from east of the
mountains, not from west of them, for Shepherds
town, Sharpsburg, and WiUiamsport are the actual
gateways to the Shenandoah, which is a mere south
ern extension of the Cumberland Valley of Pennsyl
vania, and about twenty-five miles wide. Before
Antietam Lee had sent his trains across the river,

LEE'S PROJECTED MOVEMENT 97
where they would have been at hand and in proper
position for the great turning movement described,
and could have proceeded without the knowledge of
our forces, which were on the north bank of the
river and out of sight behind the mountains below
the Antietam creek.
General Wool reported to Halleck, September
5 : "Reliable persons say the Potoraac can be forded
at alraost every point."
Captain Winslow, Septeraber 24, reported that his
regiment, the Fifth New York, on Saturday, Sep
tember 20, "crossed the river in line of battle at 10
A. M., and took up position on top of bluff." (See
War Records, vol. xix, part i, p. 367.)
So we need not feel surprised that at 7.30 p. m. on
September 16, the very eve of the battle of Antie
tam, the following order was sent to Franklin:
"General McClellan directs rae to say that he still de
sires you to occupy Maryland Heights. If, however,
this should prove impracticable, he thinks you had
better leave a small force at your present position
and join him with the remainder of your com
mand." In General Franklin's official report he says:
"During the night of the i6th I received orders to
move toward KeedysviUe in the morning [the
17th], with two divisions, and to dispatch General
Couch's division to occupy Maryland Heights."
Couch's splendid veteran division, of fifteen regi-

98 ANTIETAM
ments of infantry and four batteries, remained in
Pleasant Valley facing the south, through the great
battle, and at midnight, after the battle and when
Lee, broken and shattered, had more than he could
do to even take care of himself. Couch received the
following order : "General McClellan desires you to
march with your whole command to-morrow morn
ing [September i8] in time to report with it to
Major General Franklin as soon after daylight as
you can possibly do so. Franklin is on the left of
General Sumner."
Yet this, historians tell us, was one of McClellan's
errors; although Couch's division alone stood be
tween Lee's army, McClellan's army supply, and
Washington. But even afterward McClellan kept his eye on
these open roads. September i8 he ordered
Pleasonton to scout, with his cavalry, down each side
of Elk Mountain (Maryland Heights) from
Rohrersville to the Potomac. On the 19th he or
dered Sumner to send Banks* whole corps "by way
of Rohrersville and BroAvnsville toward Harper's
Ferry, with instmctions to occupy Maryland
Heights." McClellan was then satisfied; the door had been
closed and barred, but the Washington authorities
were not, for when his chief quartermaster asked
that small supply steamers then at hand should be
sent up the canal. Quartermaster General Meigs

LEE'S PROJECTED MOVEMENT 99
(whose record it would repay anyone to look up) re
plied by "raising objections on the score of want of
protection to the canal" between Washington and
Harper's Ferry.
McClellan replied : "I do not require suggestions
of this kind. I shall be responsible that full pro
tection is afforded it."

X
THE EVE OF ANTIETAM
September i6 was a day of fog. McQeUan
writes Franklin on that day: "I think the enemy
has abandoned the position in front of us, but the
fog is so dense that I have not yet been able to
determine." To Halleck, same date: "This moming a heavy
fog has thus far prevented us from doing more than
to ascertain that some of the enemy are still there.
Do not know in what force. Will attack as soon
as situation of enemy is developed. I leam Miles
surrendered 8 a. m. yesterday, unconditionally.
Had he held the Maryland Heights he
would inevitably have been saved. The time lost
on account of the fog is being occupied in getting
up supplies, for the want of which raany of our men
are suffering."
Same date, Seth Williams writes McCleUan:
"Lieutenant Shunk has gone back to hurry up
ordnance supplies of ammunition, &c. He in
formed me that he had no supply of musket ammu
nition, but that there was plenty throughout the
various division trains."

THE EVE OF ANTIETAM loi
The afternoon of September i6 McCleUan had
completed the examination of the enemy's position
and his arrangements for battle, and his troops were
generally in their assigned position for attack at
daybreak. The Confederate line extended from a prominent
hill abutting on the Potomac, a half mile south of
Mercersville, down the line of bluffs on which
Sharpsburg stands overlooking the Antietam Valley,
which then was bent around in a sort of hook on the
enemy's right, the hook following down behind the
right bank of the Antietam Creek, but not entirely
to the river. The Confederates' only available line
of retreat was by way of Boteler's Ford, below
Shepherdstown, where the river, from the wash of
the dam above, was broad, sandy, and shallow, and
was directly in the rear of the Confederate right.
By this ford his troops coming up from Harper's
Ferry crossed the river to take their places in the
line of battle, and by it Lee's whole array retreated
the night of the i8th. The Potomac was three hun
dred yards wide and three feet deep. ( See General
Griffin's Report, War Records, vol. xix, part i, p.
350.) When Lee took position, September 15, in front
of Sharpsburg, he had with him the infantry divi
sions of Hood, Longstreet, Jones, and D. H. HiU,
with Stuart's cavalry, and nearly all his artillery,
numbering eighty regiments, with forty batteries.
Jackson and Walker came up from Harper's Ferry

102 ANTIETAM
and took position during the i6th. The divisions of
McLaws and Anderson arrived early in the morn
ing of the 17th, but A. P. Hill did not reach the
field of battle until late in the aftemoon of that day.
Hill says the head of his column arrived at 2:30,
but his brigade and regimental commanders fixed
their arrival in the presence of the enemy variously
at about 3, 3 :40, and 4. ( See reports. )
September 16 was not passed in quietness by Mc
Clellan. Lee says, in his report : "On the i6th the
artillery fire became warmer, and continued through
out the day. The enemy crossed the Antietam be
yond the reach of our batteries and menaced our
left. ... As evening approached, the enemy
opened raore vigorously with his artillery, and bore
down heavily with his infantry upon Hood, but
the attack was gallantly repelled."
McClellan's plan was, in his own words, and
which are fully corroborated by the field orders and
reports of that day, "to attack the eneray's left with
the corps of Hooker and Mansfield, supported by
Suraner's, and, if necessary, by Franklin's, and as
soon as raatters looked favorably there to raove the
corps of Burnside against the enemy's extreme
right, upon the ridge running to the south and rear
of Sharpsburg; and having carried their position,
to press along the crest toward our right, and when
ever either of these flank movements should be suc
cessful, to advance our center with all the forces
then disposable."

THE EVE OF ANTIETAM 103
At daylight, the 17th, Hooker's First corps at
tacked the Confederate left; Mansfield's Twelfth
corps was then ordered in and became engaged at
7 A. m. This was followed by Sumner's Second
corps, which became engaged at nine o'clock.
By comparing the four maps, on sheets xxviii
and xxix, part 6, Atlas to the Official War Records,
the plan and execution can be clearly understood.
The Confederate map shows the routes followed by
the troops coming up from Harper's Ferry, and also
the hooking backward of the Confederate right, op
posite what has become known as the Burnside
Bridge across the Antietam.

XI
M'CLELLAN's PLAN OF BATTLE  ^BURNSIDE I
,^' McClellan's tactical plan, in brief, was to throw
a series of very heavy attacks on the Confederate
left, extending down nearly one-half Lee's line,
and thus draw heavily from Lee's right to sustain
his overwhelmed left. When Lee's right had been
thus denuded, Burnside, on McClellan's extreme
left, and directly opposite Lee's deflected right, was
to cross the Antietara Creek, by the different fords
and by the bridge, and drive his attack along Lee's
right rear, between the Confederate line and
Boteler's Ford and the Potoraac. When Lee had
thus been cut off from his line of retreat, Fitz John
Porter's Fifth corps, supported by such parts of
Franklin's Sixth corps as were not engaged else
where, and by Pleasonton's cavalry, were to strike
the Confederate center directly in front, crossing
the Antietam in front of Sharpsburg. Pleasonton
was already across. Had these operations been
successfully carried out, Lee would have been forced
north, along the Potomac, and by way of Mercers
ville up toward Falling Waters. By Burnside's
movement, between Lee's rear sind Boteler's Ford,
104

McCLELLAN'S PLAN OF BATTLE 105
any belated troops coming up frora Harper's Ferry
would have been prevented from crossing, or even
approaching, the river. As events transpired, A. P.
HiU's division of twenty-three regiments of infan
try, — ^two having been left at Harper's Ferry, —
and seven batteries of artillery, would thus have been
cut off, for they did not reach the field till late in
the afternoon, and did not reach the ford till after
2 p. m.
Any military man will see at a glance that, even
hvithout any specific orders except to attack in force,
Burnside's duty was plain. It was not a question of
strategy or tactics; it was merely a headlong drive
across the length of the creek in front, in the brief
est time and irrespective of loss, and by every avail
able ford, road, and passage, and the fate of Lee's
army was sealed. But Burnside undertook to fight
a strategical and tactical battle, and this, under any
circumstances, was what Burnside was not capable
of doing. He sent his men in by driblets, never
went near the creek himself, never saw the ground
except from a distance, and a few Confederate rifle
men, and very few, practically without any de
fenses, picked his raen off as they maneuvered and
deployed, and halted and raarched, and counter
marched up and down in full view of the enemy,
until, counting the afternoon, when A. P. Hill, who
was not across the river then, attacked him, he lost
more than 2000 tnen. /It is a soleran fact that every
Confederate on Burnside's front bagged, that day.

io6 ANTIETAM
three, or perhaps four, of these, and then they them
selves walked off, more than half of them, when
their amraunition ran out, as the reports show.
General Hooker, in an irapassioned letter to Stan
ton, April 23, 1863, speaks of Burnside's "blunder
ing sacrifice of life at the bridge at Antietam." In
the recently published volume. Volume li of the
Official War Records (1897), we have for the first
tirae the official reports of the Confederate brigade
commanders, made at the time, and of the com
manders of all the regiments which took part in the
Confederate defense of the line of the Antietam
against Burnside's attack.
Colonel Benning's brigade, or rather two regi
ments of his brigade, — the others having on the
raorning of the 15th been sent elsewhere, — ^had
occupied the right bank of the Antietara, both above
and below the Burnside bridge, since daylight Mon
day raorning, Septeraber 15, and picketed this line
and afterward defended it against Burnside's forces.
"For a long distance below the bridge," Benning
says, "and for sorae distance above it, the ground
rose very steeply frora the creek for fifty or sixty
yards." This was on the Confederate side, where,
he says, "the face of this slope was clothed with
rather thinly scattered trees, and in one place, on the
left, it had a sort of pit, large enough to hold
twenty or thirty men. Behind the trees, at the top
of the steep slope, ran a rail fence.
"The creek was fordable everywhere above and

McCLELLAN'S PLAN OF BATTLE 107
below the bridge ; in most places was not more than
knee-deep. Pickets and skirmishers were soon
[September 15] thrown across the creek several
hundred yards to the front," and remained there
until driven back across the Antietara by Burnside's
approach. Across the creek, on Burnside's side,
about two hundred yards' distant, was a sharp ridge,
and there were good positions for cannon at from
five hundred to six hundred yards beyond the creek,
and fully comraanding the thinly wooded slope occu
pied by Benning's two regiraents, the Twentieth and
the Second Georgia. The Second Georgia was
along the slope below the bridge and the Twentieth
opposite and above the bridge. I know personally
that, when the water on the bar in the river below
Shepherdstown is not more than knee-deep, the
Antietam above its mouth is equally shallow. The
banks are not especially difficult. General Toorabs
described them as descending gently to the raargin
of the creek. Boys go bathing all along this part
of the creek in sumraer, as I know.
It was almost the keynote of McClellan's plan
that, as soon as the battle on the Union right was
under full headway, Burnside should sweep across
the shallow creek by the various fords as well as by
the bridge, driving everything out of his way, forc
ing his way behind the Confederate lines and be
tween them and the river. For this purpose he was
provided with an enormous force, far in excess of
that required to carry the passage, and with, an

io8 ANTIETAM
undue amount of artillery, rauch specially provided
and of large caliber. There was practically nothing
in his way to stop such an advance.
But no advance was raade. Time wore on until,
at 9:10, McClellan ordered Burnside to open his
attack, saying that Franklin's corps was only a mile
and a half away, and that Burnside would be sup
ported, "and, if necessary, on your own line of
attack." This raeant that Franklin's Sixth corps
would be added to Burnside's Ninth corps and to
the Kanawha division in raoving along the rear of
Lee's whole line. Benning was entirely justified in
closing his report by saying of his two regiments:
"The service they rendered was, I think, hardly to
be overestimated. If General Burnside's corps
had once got through the long gap in our line it
would have been in the rear of our whole army,
and that, anybody can see, would have been disas
trous." McClellan sent his 9:10 order to Burnside by
General Sackett, afterward Inspector-General of the
United States army, who, in a letter to McCleUan
after the war, said : "I started at once, and as fast
as my horse could carry me." He gave Burnside
the order "which," says General Sackett, "seemed
to annoy hira somewhat, as he said to me: 'Mc
CleUan appears to think I am not trjnng to carry
this bridge ; you are the third or the fourth one who
has been to me this morning with similar orders.' "
Now what were the opposing forces contesting

McCLELLAN'S PLAN OF BATTLE 109
this three-quarters of a mile stretch along the creek?
Burnside's force, consisting of the Ninth corps,
with the independent Kanawha division attached to
it, comprised twenty-nine regiments of infantry and
four companies of cavalry, with seven batteries, be
sides a battery of boat howitzers, of which artillery
one battery was of 20-pounder Parrotts, and an
other, in part at least, of the sarae heavy guns.
A few of Burnside's regiments report their num
bers in the line of battle, indicating that the average
strength was in excess of that of the army as a
whole, and more than thirty per cent, above the
average Confederate regimental strength. Every
one of Burnside's regiments showed losses in the
battle, so that there was no question of soldiership
among the men.
The troops opposing Burnside along the creek
we are now able to deterraine with accuracy, and
also their numbers and positions. A careful
examination of all the Confederate reports — regi
mental, brigade, and divisional, for all Lee's army —
shows that no other troops than those referred to
in General D. R. Jones' report had anything to do
with this line until A. P. HiU carae up late in the
afternoon and occupied the high plateau a raile in
rear of the creek. Jones' division norainally con
sisted of six brigades, with four batteries, but,
practically, nearly all of them had been taken away
from him on the i6th or earlier. Four of these
brigades composed the right of Lee's main line.

IIO ANTIETAM
and were not within reach or engaged at all in
resisting Burnside at the creek. Of the remaining
two brigades, that of Drayton, excepting the
Fiftieth Georgia during a part of the forenoon, —
as stated in the report of Jenkins' brigade. Colonel
Walker, — was with Jones' other brigades and only
Toombs' brigade was actually in action at the
bridge. Of Toombs' brigade two regiments had been de
tached the morning of the 15th to pursue the Union
cavalry to WiUiamsport and take care of the Con
federate train, and did not rejoin the army until the
afternoon of the 17th, and were then placed in the
main front line of battle in the rear of, and not
near the bridge.
Jones says that his entire six brigades on the
morning of the 17th numbered only 2430 men, but
he evidently underestimated those, for in the Con
federate report of losses they are credited with 1312,
which is far raore than fifty per cent As they took
no part in the Harper's Ferry operations, they could
not have straggled down there, and as they had had
two days' rest in position, before the battle, they
must have had their men well up.
The Second Georgia faced the Antietam to the
right of the bridge. Its coraraanding officer. Cap
tain Lewis, states that it had in line 107 men and
officers; Benning says, 97 men. The Twentieth
Georgia faced the bridge and extended to the left.
Its coramander. Colonel Cummings, says it was

McCLELLAN'S PLAN OF BATTLE iii
about 200 strong; Benning says 250. At all events,
both regiraents together did not nuraber 400.
On their right was the Fiftieth Georgia, "num
bering," as Benning says," scarcely 100 rauskets."
One company from Jenkins' brigade was also
placed one-half between the Second and Fiftieth
Georgia and the remaining half near a lower ford
beyond the Fiftieth. The only battery on this front
was Richardson's, back on the high ground far in
the rear. Longstreet sent, on request, Eubank's
battery; but, Benning says, about nine o'clock this
battery was ordered away. He also says that he
was thus left "without any artillery supports what
ever," which indicates, as does the report of
Toombs, that Richardson's battery was at least a
mile in the rear, since Eubank was halfway, Toombs
says, between Richardson and the creek. He says
that Richardson also was too far in the rear to
render efficient service against Burnside.
Summing up, then, we have a Confederate force
defending the bridge, and the ford, and the stream
on the Antietam Creek consisting of not more than
five hundred raen at the outside, coraposed of three
regiments and an extra company, with a single
battery in the rear too distant to be of much ser
vice, and another battery withdrawn early in the
day. These five hundred raen and officers, and probably
only four hundred of them, inflicted a loss on
Burnside's force of nearly two thousand men, and

112 ANTIETAM
most of this was accomplished by less than four
hundred Confederates.
It seeras actually incredible, and can only be
accounted for on the ground that Burnside had
not looked at the stream, and fought his battle
stragetically, and not as directed. General Sackett
says that he remained with Burnside to see Mc
Clellan's last order executed, and advised Burnside,
who was back with the heavy artillery, "to go down
near the bridge," and he then started to do so, but
soon returned, saying that "the bridge had been
carried and the troops were crossing over as rapidly
as possible." This was at or after i o'clock p. u.
(See Ferrero's report)
Benning says his troops were withdrawn by
reason of an enfilading fire from our batteries on
their right, and also from the exhaustion of their
amraunition. This latter is a fact, for these two
regiraents were immediately sent back to the wagons
for amraunition, as we see by the reports.
That Burnside frittered away the whole forenoon
in desultory shooting is also evidenced by the fact
that his raen were out of ammunition when the
bridge was crossed, and the Confederates had also
shot away all theirs, without actual contact. What
had 10,000 or 12,000 men to do with shooting at
400 across the creek a whole half day, with more
than forty cannon, and many of them 20-pounders,
firing at point-blank range, or enfilading these 400
Confederates behind a few fence rails in a strip of

McCLELLAN'S PLAN OF BATTLE 113
wood not one hundred feet from the "gently-rising"
bank of a creek fordable anywhere for infantry?
(See General Upton's official "Military Policy of
the U. S.," page 389. "Before being placed in com
mand of the Army of the Potomac, General Bum-
side had repeatedly informed the President and Sec
retary of War that he did not feel qualified for the
position, an opinion which the battle-field of Antie
tam had sufficiently corroborated.")
But the bridge was not necessary even for the
passage of artillery. The Kanawha division had
passed the creek in force long before the bridge
was taken. Colonel Crook reports that he had
received orders in the morning to cross the bridge
after Sturgis had taken it, but, finding that Sturgis
had not arrived, in General Crook's characteristic
way he divided his brigade and arranged his guns
to command the bridge, and got five corapanies
across the stream. "I then intended taking the
bridge," he says, "but soon after my battery opened
on the bridge General Sturgis' command crossed the
bridge." Colonel Harland, of the Eighth Con
necticut, also crossed by another ford. Colonel
Curtis, of the Fourth Rhode Island, reports that his
division, "the extreme left of the line, crossed at
a ford under fire of the enemy's skirmishers, who
were sheltered behind a stone wall ; one brigade then
moved up stream to the right, the other to the left."
Ewing's brigade "crossed the ford of the Antietam
under a shower of grape," Colonel White, of this

114 ANTIETAM
brigade, describes the operation. On the moming
of the 17th "we moved with the brigade to a ford
about one raile down the streara. While fording the
streara the enemy opened on the column with artil
lery, fortunately inflicting but little injury. After
crossing the streara we raoved up along its bank,
to the left and front of the bridge over Antietam,
to within supporting distance of General Rodman's
division. While lying in this position the enemy
shelled us severely for about two hours."
After gaining the bridge, however, about i p. M.,
there was a long delay. During this delay the
biographer of the Fifty-first Pennsylvania Regi
ment, the first to cross, says they stacked arms and
kindled fires, which the Confederate artillery ob
jected to. "Regiment^ began pouring over the
bridge after this," he says, "but like the two regi
ments that first crossed, they were all totally out
of araraunition; but after a considerable lapse of
tirae a quantity of all kinds of cartridges, both heavy
and sraall, arrived and was issued."
And during these precious but belated hours
A. P. HiU's division was tearing its heart out, seven
miles away, to reach the field and close this open
door. And he closed it. Burnside must have
thought that McClellan wanted the Antietam bridge
for a specimen. At all events, that is all that Burn
side got out of it, and he nearly lost that in the ap
proaching dusk of the evening.
With more than forty guns in position, many of

McCLELLAN'S PLAN OF BATTLE 115
them of the heaviest field calibers, fuUy command
ing the opposite creek bank and the slopes behind
at point-blank distance, or enfilading the whole
creek bank behind natural heights at from one-third
to a half-mile range, and nearer, if preferred, it
was not necessary for Burnside's infantry to have
fired a shot; they had far better protection than
their own rifles. With fixed bayonets they could
have crossed where the Kanawha division had
crossed, or anywhere else, in fact, at any time after
eight in the morning, and in ten minutes after the
line of assault had uncovered itself, and without
losing 150 men, they would have sent Toombs' 400
or 500 men whirling up the slopes. Our own
artillery would have followed across the bridge,
the slope in rear of Lee's fighting line would have
been occupied, his whole right enveloped, the
Potomac ford cut off, with A. P. Hill still ten
miles or more away, and then the Union center
would have struck Lee's salient in front of Sharps
burg, and that event would have then occurred
which McClellan had planned should occur. Our
army won a great victory, but Burnside's thousands,
with all their losses and all their gaUantry, did not
help to win it They might nearly as well have been
back in North Carolina or out in West Virginia.

XII
ANTIETAM — FORCES ENGAGED
It will be found that McClellan's plan of attack
at Antietam was closely followed by Lee at Gettys
burg, and this was the plan also foUowed by Mar
shal Oyama in his great battle of Mukden, which
ended so successfully for the Japanese.
First to assault the enemy's left with a real at
tack in heavy force, keeping up a heavy artillery fire
on the center ; then, when reinforcements have been
drawn from the eneray's opposite flank and his de
fense weakened, to throw in another heavy attack,
without regard to iramediate cost, to envelop the
enemy's right and threaten his rear and his com
munications ; and finally, by a heavy frontal attack
by the reserve in front, to crush the enemy's center.
This was carried out at Mukden ; but at Antietam
Burnside failed to realize the work he had to do,
and this prevented the frontal attack on Lee's cen
ter, by the Fifth and part of the Sixth corps and
Pleasonton's massed cavalry, already across the
Antietara. In the sarae raanner, at Gettysburg,
Early's sending off part of his force on a wild-goose
chase toward York against a mythical enemy, so
ii6

ANTIETAM— FORCES ENGAGED 117
broke up Lee's combinations that the attack on
Meade's right on the evening of July 2, after Long-
street had driven in his left, even with the aid of
part of HiU's corps in the center, failed to achieve
more than a partial success, the troops having been
put in in disconnected parts.
Lee's frontal attack at Gettysburg on the 3rd was
thereby made another partial attack, and was re
pulsed. Meade's position at Gettysburg was also
much like Lee's at Antietam, and, substituting the
Battle of South Mountain for Lee's attack in front
of Gettysburg on Reymolds on the ist, and the long
march of the Sixth corps to Gettysburg for the cor
responding march of A. P. Hill from Harper's
Ferry to Sharpsburg, the parallel becomes coraplete,
excepting that Mansfield and Sumner did make
their attack early in the morning, while Longstreet,
at Gettysburg, dawdled away most of the day in
keeping out of sight, and only attacked after the
Sixth corps had reached the field.
We now come to the question of forces engaged
at Antietam. I have cited the regiraents on both
sides at the Seven Days, and in Pope's Second
Manassas, and I will now give the sarae statistics
for Antietam. Here also McCleUan's _ force was
greatly overrated and Lee's underrated, as in the
Seven Days, while in the Pope campaign the exact
reverse was the case; and popular histories still
perpetuate the error. A simple comparison will at
once demonstrate the truth. The same armies which

ii8 ANTIETAM
fought at the Second Manassas fought also at An
tietam, and the losses at Manassas were not greatly
in excess, one with the other, on either side, the
Union losses exceeding the Confederate, as usual
when McClellan was not present.
A reference to the reports in volume xix of the
Official Records compared with volume xii, shows
that every Confederate regiraent engaged at the
Second Bull Run was engaged at Antietara, except
ing one. In addition to these Lee, at Antietam, had
received, after the Second Bull Run, forty-eight
regiraents of infantry, eighteen batteries of artil
lery, and five regiments of cavalry direct from
Richmond. These regiraents consisted of the divi
sions of McLaws, Walker, and D. H. HiU, and
Hampton's cavalry brigade, which came up after
the Pope battle was over. None of these are to be
found in the Confederate roster of the Second BuU
Run campaign, in volume xii. War Records, and
all are found at Antietam, and the reports of cas
ualties at the latter battle show that all these were
very heavily engaged against McClellan.
In McClellan's army, at Antietam, there were
twenty-nine new regiraents, mostly of new nine
months' infantry, just enlisted, and which had
never fired a gun off at an eneray, or even been
drilled or instructed. These were nearly full regi
ments. The old regiraents were sadly depleted, for
while Stanton's order of April 3, to close all the
recruiting offices and seU the furniture at auction,

ANTIETAM— FORCES ENGAGED 119
had been rescinded June 6, yet on August 4, before
recruiting officers had begun to bring in any con
siderable number of recruits, the draft for 300,000
nine months' men had been ordered, and those who
would have become recruits waited to becorae sub
stitutes with high bounties. The same order of
August 4 described the States as still deficient in
their quota of volunteers.
These twenty-nine new regiraents not only lacked
the first elements of soldiery, but raany of thera had
worthless arras. General Humphreys, referring to
one of his brigades, 3600 strong, says "all its arms
were unserviceable" ; the arras of another of his
regiments were unserviceable. There were nine
hundred stand of arms in one brigade with nipples
or hammers broken. Humphreys wouldn't move
from Washington until these worthless arms were
replaced, for there were plenty of good arms there,
by which delay he did not reach Antietam until the
day after the battle. But Colonel Gwyn, whose
regiraent, the One Hundred and Eighteenth Penn
sylvania, was so badly cut up at Shepherdstown,
reports : "Owing to the worthlessness of our pieces
[condemned Enfield], not more than fifty per cent.
of which could be discharged, the line began to
waver." The Confederates had on the battle-field of An
tietam, September 17, 1862, 179 regiraents of in
fantry, all veterans, i^V^ regiraents of cavalry, and
71 batteries of artiUery.

I20 ANTIETAM
Deducting Couch's division, absent in Pleasant
Valley, watching the Harper's Ferry outlet, and
Humphreys' division, which did not arrive till the
1 8th, McClellan had under his comraand at Antie
tam 184 regiments of infantry (including 21 of the
new regiments), 15 regiraents of cavalry, and 50
batteries of artillery. It will be seen that Lee had
21 batteries in excess of McClellan. Franklin's
Sixth Corps did not reach the battle-field until be
tween nine and eleven o'clock Wednesday, and he
had with him 27 of the above 184 infantry regi
ments and 7 of the above 50 batteries.
It may be interesting, now, to compare the regi
ments and the numbers engaged, with those at
Gettysburg a year later, when there was no object
in belittling our ovm numbers and exaggerating
those of the enemy.
The marches to these battle-fields had been nearly
the same, the marching time nearly the same, the
same country was invaded at nearly the same time
of the year, and, in each case the Confederate army
came from a great victory, the Second Manassas
and ChanceUorsviUe, and the Union army from a
great defeat. All historians concede that at Gettys
burg the opposing forces were nearly equal, with,
if an)i:hing, a slight preponderance in favor of the
Confederates. At Gettysburg Lee had i68j^ regiments of in
fantry (loj^ less than at Antietam), 26j^ regi-

ANTIETAM— FORCES ENGAGED 121
ments of cavalry (12 more than at Antietam), and
60 batteries of artillery (11 less than at Antietam).
At Gettysburg the Union army had 228 regi
ments of infantry (38 more than at Antietam),
34>^ regiments of cavalry (19^4 more than at
Antietam), and 72 batteries of artiUery (22 more
than at Antietam).
If Lee did not have his men with him at Antie
tam, it is difficult to discover where he had them.
He claims to have fought the battle of Antietam
with less than 35,000 men; but doubtless he left out
A. P. HiU's division, which came late in the after
noon, but quite in time to do a great work. And he
doubtless estimated his men after the battle. His
first army return, dated only five days after the bat
tle, and described as very imperfect, gives 36,418
officers and raen present for duty (which is several
thousand more than he claims to have had in the
battle), besides the cavalry and reserve artillery.
These nurabered 7000. Adding these and his losses,
not less than 25,000 raen, makes a total accounted
for of 68,418. To these must be added the fugi
tives from the battle-field, who never stopped after
they had "fled across the Potoraac, and whora Lee
had provost guards gathering up from the valley for
nearly a month afterward. They figure up at least
7000, as reported (see Jones' Report), making a
total taken into the battle of more than 75,000
officers and men, as battle-strength goes.
These figures correspond very closely with a total

122 ANTIETAM
independent count made while the Confederates
were marching out of Frederick, and which I have
never heretofore seen quoted. Dr. Lewis H. Steiner,
of Frederick, Md., was an inspector in the United
States Sanitary Comraission. He was at the Second
Bull Run, and Septeraber 5, when the invasion of
his home was threatened, he made his way, by per
mission, on the last railroad train which reached
Frederick, where he reraained until McClellan's
army, which he accompanied, moved out of that
city. During this interval he kept a diary, and this was
afterward published in pamphlet form in the faU
of the same year by permission of the Sanitary
Commission. It was, by the way, frora this diary
that the poet Whittier derived his material for his
poem of "Barbara Fritchie." Dr. Steiner, in his
diary, writes: "Wednesday, Septeraber 10. — At
four o'clock this raorning the Rebel army began to
move frora our town, Jackson's force taking the
advance. The raoveraent continued until 8 o'clock
p. M., occupying sixteen hours. The most liberal
calculation could not give them more than 64,000
raen. Over 3000 negroes must be included in this
nuraber. . . . Sorae of the Rebel regiments
have been reduced to 150 men; none number over
500. Their marching is very loose. They marched
by the flank through the streets of Frederick." The
description which follows shows that Dr. Steiner
gave his estimate from personal inspection, and his

ANTIETAM— FORCES ENGAGED 123
position as inspector made such estimates a prin
cipal part of his duties in the Sanitary Commission.
Dr. Steiner describes these negroes as to aU in
tents soldiers. They were clothed and fed like the
Confederate soldiers. Most of the negroes, he says,
"had arras, rifles, rauskets, sabers, bowie-knives,
dirks, etc. They were supplied, in many instances,
with knapsacks, haversacks, canteens, etc., and they
were manifestly an integral portion of the Southern
Confederacy array. They were seen riding on
horses and mules, driving wagons, riding on cais
sons, in ambulances, with the staff of generals and
promiscuously raixed up with all the Rebel horde.
The fact was patent, and rather interesting, when
considered in connection with the horror Rebels ex
press at the suggestion of black soldiers being em
ployed for national defense."
Next day, Septeraber 11, his diary contains this
entry: "General HiU's division, numbering about
8000 men, marched through the streets on their
route westward this moming; the raen marched in
better order, had better music, and were fairly
clothed and equipped." This was D. H. HiU's
division, which had just corae up from Richmond
and had not been in the Second Bull Run campaign
at all. If this force was included in his estimate
the day before, it raust have been by a subsequent
alteration in the original entry. The same is true of
Stuart's cavalry, which passed through Frederick
later, and noted in his entry of September 13.

124 ANTIETAM
In any case he could not have included General
John G. Walker's division, also fresh from Rich
mond, — ^largely by rail, as was D. H. HiU's divis
ion, — for Walker's division did not reach Frederick
at all, but was marched back to Point of Rocks and
across the Potomac to seize Loudon Heights.
As Walker's division — consisting of nine regi
ments of infantry and two batteries — is reported,
in Guild's defective estimate, with losses of 1052,
and in Lee's returns of September 22 as having
3871 present, its strength then could not have been
less than 5000. General Walker, with whom I be
carae very well acquainted after the war, told me
that it was considerably in excess of this figure.
General Upton, in his "Military Policy," p. 370,
puts Lee's array in the Second Manassas carapaign
against Pope at 60,000. As Lee had but 134^^
regiraents of infantry (only 120 of which were
actually engaged), 14J4 of cavalry (only 9J^ of
which were engaged), and 61 batteries of artUlery
(not all of which were in action), it will be seen
that Lee's regimental strength on the field aver
aged (after the Seven Days' losses) more than 400.
All the above regiments, excepting one, were pres
ent and engaged in the battle of Antietam; and in
addition there were 48 regiments of infantry — con
sisting of McLaws 's division, 16 regiments; Walk
er's division, 9 regiraents ; and D. H. HiU's division,
23 regiments — which had not fired a shot since the
Seven Days, but had been conscripted up to fuU

ANTIETAM— FORCES ENGAGED 125
strength and brought from Richmond by rail, after
Pope's campaign; 5 regiments of cavalry, Hamp
ton's brigade, which reached Manassas after the
battle; and 10 batteries of artUlery additional, be
sides 10 left at Leesburg. Lee's entire losses in the
Second Manassas carapaign were less than 9000, in
cluding killed, wounded, and missing.
The casualties in Pope's array during the same
campaign were 14,462, the excess of which of course
tended relatively to weaken McClellan during the
Antietam campaign.
The forces opposed to McClellan, in his various
battles, were so rainiraized by the authorities at
Washington — designedly — that history even to this
day has accepted these false statements as truth, and
it is only by the most painstaking and careful
analysis that an)d;hing like the exact facts can be
obtained. Fortunately for the truth of history,
however, this process of depreciation was not re
sorted to in general, — excepting in the case of Mc
Clellan, — so that we can, by taking the official army
returns from the month succeeding the first Con
federate conscription (that is to say, April, 1862)
up to the close of 1863, when the Confederate con
scription had nearly spent its force, and the process
of consolidation of two or more Confederate regi
ments, especially in the West, into a single cora
mand had become general, will accurately determine
the facts.
Commencing with the battle of Shiloh, April

126 ANTIETAM
6-7, 1862, there were in Grant's array, prior to
BueU's arrival after the first day's battle, 75 regi
raents of infantry, 5 of cavalry, and 22 batteries, a
total present for duty, officers and men, and exclu
sive of the cavalry, of 32,314, making the average
regimental strength about 400.
On the Confederate side were 74 regiments of
infantry, i regiraent of cavalry, and 18 batteries,
giving an effective total of officers and raen of
35,649, raaking an average regimental strength of
more than 480. (See War Records, vol. x, part i.)
The forces thus were almost equal, but Grant's
position on the defensive gave him some advantage.
When Buell joined Grant he brought with him 37
regiments of infantry, 2 of cavalry, and 4 batteries,
giving to Grant in the battle of AprU 7 a dispro
portion of 10 to 6. Grant was always fortunate in
having superior forces, which was the exact reverse
of McClellan's case, excepting at the great battle
of Culpeper, in November, 1862, which was never
fought, having only gone so far as Longstreet's
despairing order for battle and afterward Bum-
side's for retreat, so as to make a fresh start else
where. Fredericksburg was the next great battle succeed
ing the Antietam campaign. Lee's retum for
December 20, 1862 (see W. R., vol xxi), after the
battle, gives 180 regiments of infantry; present for
duty, officers and men, 65,970. Adding Lee's loss
in the previous battle, 5309, his infantry strength

ANTIETAM— FORCES ENGAGED 127
was 71,279 officers and raen present for duty. This
gives an average regiraental strength of 400.
At the battle of Murfreesborough, or Stone
River, December 31, 1862 -January 2, 1863, the Con
federate force numbered 98 regiments of infantry,
of which 16 had been consolidated into 8, raaking
an actual infantry force of 90 regiments. The in
fantry present for duty, including artillery, num
bered 33,475; average per regiment, 381.
The Union army in the sarae battle comprised 126
regiments of infantry, having an average strength
of 319 per regiraent.
The next iraportant battle was ChanceUorsviUe,
at the beginning of May, 1863. In this battle Lee
had 127 regiraents of infantry. The aggregate,
officers and men, present for duty April i, was
52,714. This gives an average regimental strength
of 415.
Hooker had 177 regiments of infantry which re
ported losses in this batttle.
At the battle of Gettysburg, July 1-3, 1863, Lee
had i68)4 regiraents of infantry. This was io>4
regiments fewer than he had at Antietam. The field
returns for June 10, 20, and 30 are not on file, but
by adding his losses to his present for duty on field-
returns of July 20, and 31 — we can reach an ap-
proxiraate estimate.
The retum for July 20, immediately after Lee's
broken passage into Virginia, with many of his
troops scattered, gave 37,103 infantry present for

128 ANTIETAM
duty. His losses on the field of Gettysburg (see
addenda War Record, vol. xxvn, part 2, p. 346),
exclusive of cavalry, were 20,211, making a total
of 57.314-
The next return, that of July 31, was raore com
plete, giving, inclusive of the battle losses, 58,607.
This would give an average regimental strength
of 350-
It is inconceivable that after the heavy losses at
Antietam, Fredericksburg, ChanceUorsviUe, and the
prelirainaries of Gettysburg, Lee's strength per regi
ment should have been as great as on the morning
of Antietam, before these losses occurred. It is cer
tain also that Lee's infantry strength at Gettysburg
was in excess of the figures above given.
His army was full of enthusiasm, after the vic
tories of Fredericksburg and ChanceUorsviUe, just
as the year before it was, after the victory of the
Second Manassas.
But even taking Lee's infantry strength at An
tietam at 350 per regiment, which is certainly under
rated, as it was a year earlier than Gettysburg, we
will have a total infantry alone opposed to McClel
lan at Antietam of 62,650, exclusive of cavalry and
artillery; or a grand total of at least 75,000 en
gaged. At the battle of Gettysburg Meade had 228 regi
ments of infantry, 38 more than McCleUan had at
Antietam, which will indicate that the actual average
infantry strength of McClellan's regiments at An-

ANTIETAM— FORCES ENGAGED 129
tietam was really much lower than that with which
I have credited him. Meade's field return for June
30, 1863, gives a total of infantry, officers and men,
present for duty equipped, at Gettysburg, of 76,986.
This makes an average regimental strength of 337.
It is difficult to see how McClellan, only ten days
after he took command, with constant marching and
maneuvering, and considering the state of the
debris which had flowed back to him from Pope's
defeats, could in regimental strength have averaged
much better. Whatever better it was was due alto
gether to the personality of McClellan.
In the above estimates I have dealt entirely with
the infantry, as the artillery always possessed
enough men to work the guns, while the cavalry,
by its functions, was a variable quantity, and not
estimable in the direct shock of great battles. Other
armies could be cited, but the above averages, taken
between April i, 1862, and the fall of 1863, during
which period the Confederate organization was at
its best, will give the fairest results in coraparison
with McClellan and his armies during the period of
his command.

XIII
MARCHING  FIGHTING  STRAGGLING  LOSSES
Taking the above suramaries together, it is clear
that Lee's array, when it left Frederick, September
IO, II, and 12, numbered in officers and men not
less than 75,000; and raay have nurabered con
siderably raore, if statistics of other battles besides
those of McClellan's are to be accepted as of any
value. If these raen were not at Antietara excepting
those left dead or wounded at South Mountain and
Harper's Ferry, which were relatively few, what
had becorae of thera?
Lee says they straggled. There is straggling in
all marching armies. We all know the "coffee-
boilers," and those who like to take a little rest; but
before Lee's array reached Frederick, and after it
had left Manassas, straggling was not coraplained
of by Lee, nor was Confederate straggling allowed
for by the Washington authorities in estimating the
enemy in Pope's campaign.
The Confederates must have done what no coffee-
boilers ever do — they straggled away from pro
visions and plenty back into a land of poverty and
130

MARCHING— FIGHTING— LOSSES

131

faraine. Four arraies had just marched over the
only part of Virginia which the stragglers could
reach if they had straggled hack, while right in
front, two days' march away, lay virgin Maryland
and golden Pennsylvania, right after harvest, and
with the fields rich with corn and the orchards
fiUed with fruit.
As Whittier truly says :
"Up from the meadows rich with corn,
Clear in the cold September morn,
Round about them orchards sweep,
Apple and peach tree fruited deep;
Fair as a garden of the Lord
To the eyes of the famished rebel horde.''
But Lee says they were wom out with marching.
They marched farther next year, and in a shorter
tirae, to reach Gettysburg, and in a rather worse
marching month ; but when they passed through the
villages of Franklin County, Pennsylvania, where
I was born, my friends tell rae that there were few,
if any, stragglers then ; those left behind were run
ning to catch up.
Lee's array had frora August 16 to Septeraber 17,
1862, to go frora Richmond to Antietam. Except
Jackson's force, which had a month raore to march
in, all the Confederates went to GordonsviUe by rail.
I have made careful measureraent examination
on the maps of the number of miles actually
marched by the different armies, Union and Con-

132 ANTIETAM
federate, during the above period, excluding all rail
and water transport, and I find that, taking aU the
different corps of McClellan's army, Burnside's
North Carolina and West Virginia forces, and the
different corps under Pope, the Union army
actually marched, on foot, during the same period,
more than twenty miles further than did Lee's army.
So that will not account for it. Then Lee says,
in his dispatch to Richmond, under date September
24: "The enemy has suffered from straggling as
well as ourselves (I believe to a greater extent),
but his numbers are so great he can afford it; we
cannot" (War Records, vol. xix, part 2, page 625.)
I have already shown what the relative strengths
were, and that the Confederate strength fuUy
equaled, or even exceeded, that of McClellan. There
was fearful straggling in our own army up from
Washington, as there had been in Pope's army. It
was raarching after a great defeat under Pope, and
to raeet a victorious and largely reinforced enemy,
and it included many regiments which knew noth
ing of marching or taking care of themselves. It
was being reorganized, also, the broken fragments
of three armies being consolidated into one, in ten
days, and on the march.
McClellan's circular of September 9 says : "The
general commanding entreats all general officers to
lend every effort to the eradication of the military
vice of straggling. He feels assured that their
united determination can break up the practice in a

MARCHING— FIGHTING— LOSSES 133
single week." Within that week the three battles
were all fought.
General Pope testified before the Committee on
the Conduct of the War (see Upton's "Military
Policy") : "At least one-half of this diminution
of our forces was occasioned by skulking and strag
gling frora the army. . . . Thousands of
men straggled away from their commands and were
not in any action. I had posted several regiments
in rear of the field of battle on the 29th of August,
and although many thousands of stragglers and
skulkers were arrested by thera, many others passed
around through the woods and did not rejoin their
commands during the reraainder of the carapaign."
(See Upton's U. S. Publication, "Military Policy,"
page 370.)
This was the material for which McClellan had
just seven days allowed hira to make over again,
before starting for Antietam.
Amid all the discouraging and demoralizing cir
curastances which pervaded and surrounded the
Union army, there was a single one only which
enabled that army to do its great work ; every other
factor had been part and parcel of the general dis
aster — there was but one new factor, and that was
the heart, brain, loyalty, duty, and organizing and
fighting power ofa single individual.
As Dr. Steiner says, in concluding his diary:
"On Wednesday the great Battle of Antietam was
fought, with such a display of strategy and power

134 ANTIETAM
on the part of our general, and of heroism and dar
ing from our men, that the enemy was glad to re
sign all hopes of entering Pennsylvania and to with
draw his forces across the Potomac. A great vic
tory had been gained; the enemy had been driven
from loyal soil, and McClellan had shown himself
worthy of the love (amounting alraost to adoration)
which his troops expressed on all sides."
There was indeed rauch straggling on the part
of Lee's array; but it was not untU the evening of
Septeraber 17 had closed down, and Lee's great
array was forced back, defeated, as every private
soldier in that army well knew. They knew, too,
that behind thera lay a broad river, now only knee-
deep, but which the floods usually following a great
battle might make at once impassable, as they did a
year later after Gettysburg. They now slunk away
from the shattered ranks, and fled, by ones and
twos, officers and raen, across the river and back
to Winchester — and to safety.
Where is the proof ? Lee writes, September 23,
to the Secretary of War, asking for a law to de
grade regimental and corapany officers for bad con
duct in the presence of the enemy and for leaving
their posts in time of battle. To President Davis he
writes, the sarae day, that the raain causes of his
retiring from Maryland were the casualties and
desertion and straggling connected with the hattie.
September 27 General Jones, who had been sent
to Winchester to gather in the stragglers, reported

MARCHING— FIGHTING— LOSSES 135
that he had already sent back between 5000 and
6000, besides 1200 who had thrown away their
shoes, and of these he says "the number of officers
back here was most astonishing." His efforts
created quite a stampede, he says, back to the array.
This was after Lee's returns, already cited, had been
made up.
Now these stragglers were up the Shenandoah
Valley. How did stragglers from the Bull Run,
Leesburg, or Frederick regions get across the
mountains, and fifty miles west, and why did they
go there anyway? They evidently fled up the
Shenandoah Valley after Lee had been defeated at
Sharpsburg, for they would have shown little sense
in running away if it were not clear to theraselves
that Lee was disastrously and hopelessly defeated.
Victors do not run away; it is the vanquished who
run. And so closed the full fourteen hours' battle of
Antietara, that greatest single battle of the war —
greatest in losses for the eneray and relatively in
the sraaller losses to ourselves. That was McClel
lan's way; it was because he understood artillery, -
for it will be found that in every one of McClel
lan's battles his own losses were far below those
of the enemy, not only relatively but in actual num
bers, which quite reversed the usual rule during the
war. This was largely due to McCleUan's excellent
tactics, which both Grant and Lee comraended, and
to his perfect raastery of artillery, which he loved

136 ANTIETAM
and used just as Napoleon did in his great battles.
A battery well placed had the power of a regiment,
but could only suffer the loss of a company.
In General Alexander's Confederate article in
the Century Company's "Battles and Leaders," vol.
Ill, "The Great Charge and the Artillery Fighting
at Gettysburg," he says the Confederates always
called Antietam "Artillery heU."
Major Nelson H. Davis, assistant inspector gen
eral, in whose charge the interments were, reported
about 2700 Confederate dead buried by himself
on the field of Antietam. The trophies consisted of 1 3
cannon, 39 colors, more than 15,000 stand of arms,
and more than 6000 prisoners. Hancock, in a let
ter to Adjutant-General Bowers, September 28,
1864, says : "I saw myself nine colors in the hands
of one division at Antietam."
McClellan estimates, in his letter to Halleck of
September 29, that, including South Mountain,
Crampton's Gap, Antietam, Shepherdstown, and
Confederate prisoners and deserters, the total Con
federate loss was not less than 30,000 raen. A
careful collation of the returns of the different Con
federate organizations fully supports this estimate.
The report of Medical Director Guild, in War Rec
ords, vol. xix, pt 2, pp. 810-813, is grossly def ective.
He confounds all the brigades and divisions, under
estimates Ewell's losses by raore than 300, A. P.
Hills by more than 100, and entirely omits 16 regi
ments of infantry which were in the thick of the

MARCHING— FIGHTING— LOSSES 137
fight, and all the cavalry and artillery losses. Many
of Guild's other figures show large discrepancies,
and the losses in prisoners are not included at all.
McClellan claims to have captured more than 6000
prisoners. I have examined the individual reports
of all the Union commands reporting prisoners
taken, and, omitting all duplications, I find that
there were accounted for in these few reports 5060
prisoners, while the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Twelfth
corps, and one division of the Second and one of
the Ninth, make no specific reports for prisoners
at all, although they took raany.
Correcting the Confederate casualty returns frora
the battle-field reports, their recorded losses, aU told,
so far as definitely stated, and adding a propor
tionate average for the sixteen omitted regiments,
and for the cavalry and artillery, and including the
6000 prisoners, make a conceded aggregate, by the
Confederates themselves, of between 20,000 and
21,000. Adding the 6000 or 7000 who fled up the
Valley during and on the heels of the battle and
before Lee's retreat, and the 1200 more who, Jones
says, threw away their shoes to avoid being sent
back to Lee, we have an aggregate Confederate loss
of more than 29,000. Even this is understated,
especially in the number of the dead, since these
Confederate reports include less than 2000 kiUed,
while Inspector Nelson reported burying 2700, and
stated that before Lee's flight the Confederates had
buried many of their own inside their lines. "The

138 ANTIETAM
Medical and Surgical History of the War" reports
3500 Confederates killed. These estimates of mine
of Confederate losses are based on investigations of
ray own among the confused and incomplete reports
of the different Confederate organizations which
took part in the battle. Every one of these, from
general to captain, has been carefully studied and
collated, probably for the first time. General Emory
Upton, in his "MUitary Policy of the United
States," states, on the authority of the "Medical and
Surgical History of the War of the Rebellion,"
Lee's losses at 3500 killed, 16,399 wounded, and
6000 prisoners. This is undoubtedly correct. He
says that most of these prisoners were stragglers;
but in this he is altogether mistaken. The 5060
prisoners I have taken from the reports filed were
practically battle-field prisoners, and are so noted on
ray raeraoranda, excepting some of those gathered
up by Pleasonton's cavalry. Hooker reported, at
South Mountian, 1000 prisoners taken, and Bum-
side's whole comraand, 1500. Hancock, at Antie
tara proper, 400. The Fifty-seventh New York re
ports : "We took the colors of the Twelfth Ala
bama and many prisoners. I ara unable to form any
very correct estiraate of the number of the latter,
but they considerably exceeded the number of men
in the ranks of my regiraent." This was in the
charge through the cornfield. Colonel Brooke,
Fifty-third Pennsylvania, commanding brigade, and
afterward Major-General Brooke, U. S. A., says:

MARCHING— FIGHTING— LOSSES 139
"About 200 stand of arms were captured, as also a
great number of prisoners, who were sent through
the ranks to the rear." The Sixty-sixth New York
reports : "The battalion pressed forward and com
pletely routed the enemy. It was here that we cap
tured a rebel lieutenant of the Fifth Florida regi
ment, together with his whole company and a stand
of colors." General Kimball reports: "In this
charge my command captured about 300 prisoners,
the enemy leaving on the field several stand of
colors." Colonel Wilcox reports of the Irish Brigade:
"They drove the enemy from their stronghold and
captured some 300 prisoners, including a number of
officers, among them Lieutenant-Colonel Nisbet, of
Macon, Ga., all of whom were sent to the rear."
Colonel Morris, Second Brigade, French's division :
"My brigade captured 2 stand of colors, 2 captains,
7 lieutenants, and about 400 privates. We also took
400 stand of arras. In front of the last position
held by the Fourteenth Connecticut more than 1000
of the enemy lie slain." The First Delaware re
ports : "We captured about 300 prisoners and sent
them to the rear. The comraand continued fighting
until their ammunition was expended." General
Franklin reports: "Four hundred prisoners from
17 different organizations, 700 stand of arms, one
piece of artiUery, and 3 stand of colors were cap
tured." The First Brigade of the Kanawha division sent

I40 ANTIETAM
to the rear a nuraber of prisoners fully equal to its
loss (255). Colonel Crane, coraraanding a brig
ade in Green's division, reports : "We charged them
in a heavy piece of woods, driving thera out of
it, capturing a large number of prisoners [among
them was a lieutenant-colonel and a lieutenant], and
raade terrible havoc in their ranks, covering the
ground with slain." General Hancock reports :
"Nine regiraental colors and battle flags were taken
from the eneray. . . . About 400 prisoners
were captured and 4000 rauskets collected on the
field in front of the division, and piled." And such
extracts could be multiplied. The purposed ob
scurity cast over these facts, which even misled so
profound a student as General Upton, is the excuse
for their recapitulation here.
William Bender Wilson, the War Department
telegrapher, who was present, says of this battle:
"Heroism, patriotism, and valor wrote their names
on history's page all over the sanguinary field,
which was strewn with nearly 21,000 dead and
wounded men — 3620 dead bodies and 17,365
wounded raen."
The Union losses at Antietara were 12,500, and
in all the battles. South Mountain, Crampton's Gap,
Antietam, and Shepherdstown, 15,000.
Of this aggregate of the four battles iioo were
reported as missing. As the Confederates claimed
no prisoners, except at Shepherdstown, September
20, many of these missing ones were deserters from

MARCHING— FIGHTING— LOSSES 141
the substitutes and bounty raen of the new regi
raents. Of these there were many, and in the gen
eral cleaning up after the battle — the first since
leaving Washington — all those who had disappeared
on the march or slipped away in the silence of the
night were charged up to the loss account of An
tietam. For exaraple, I find that the One Hundred and
Eighteenth Pennsylvania (the Corn Exchange Regi
raent) reported losses of 269 at the Shepherdstown
Ford, Septeraber 20, of which 105 were reported
captured or missing. But on examining the muster-
out roster of this celebrated regiment I find that the
correct total was 211, instead of 269. The cap
tured and raissing araounted to 70, instead of 105,
and of these 70 twelve had deserted before thehattie.
And of the 66 unwounded men captured, 16 de
serted when afterward returned. Doubtless in other
new regiments, in which there was no time to clean
up their rolls on the march, raany who were reported
as "missing" had disappeared before the fighting
commenced. To illustrate McCleUan's command of artillery,
it raay be interesting to corapare the losses during
the three days of the Battle of Gettysburg with those
of the one-day battle of Antietara.
At Antietara the Union losses were 2108 killed,
9549 wounded, and 753 raissing; total, 12,410. The
Confederate losses were 3500 killed, 16,399
wounded, 6000 captured; total, 25,899.

142 ANTIETAM
At Gettysburg the Union losses were 3155
killed, 14,529 wounded, and 5365 captured; total,
23,049. The Confederate losses were 2,592 killed,
12,709 wounded, and 5150 captured; total, 20,451.
See War Records, vol. xix, part i, p. 200; xxvn,
part I, p. 193; part 2, p. 346; and Upton's "MUi
tary Policy," p. 382.

XIV
SEPTEMBER 18-I9  AMMUNITION
McClellan has been censured because "he did
not attack early the next morning (the i8th) and
complete the work." This "completing the work" is
a very vague idea among civilians and new soldiers.
Meade was nearly reraoved from command by the
civilians because he did not "complete the work"
in the Gettysburg campaign. Such raen imagine
that armies can be whirled around like a club, and
that a hundred thousand men can be destroyed as
Samson destroyed the three thousand Phillistines.
And "trap" is another favorite word with the civUian
war critics. In the examination of sorae such pora
pous officer, newly drawn into the service, and whora
I recall as testifying in the winter of 1861 before
the civilian Coraraittee on the Conduct of the War,
he filled their souls with adrairation by describing
how an army should be maneuvered and fought.
There was to be no halting nor hesitation with him ;
he would hurl his army right into the face of the
enemy. But suppose, he was asked, the enemy
should appear on your flank. "Then," he replied,
"I would throw two or three divisions over there."
143

144 ANTIETAM
"And if your rear were attacked?" "Then," he
replied, "I should fling a few divisions back there."
And against anything threatening his lines of com
munication he would whirl a sufficient number of
divisions there, too, still keeping his army driving
everything before him in his front. It was meat
and drink to the civilians, and it is a pity that he
was not promoted; but he wasn't; he disappeared.
McClellan generally got out of a situation all
there was in it. The Rebels used to complain of
other Union coraraanders, and among thera some
subsequent ones in the sarae army, that "they didn't
clean up as they went, as McClellan did." It is a
curious fact that no ground that McClellan ever
fought his army over and won, — in West Virginia,
Maryland, or Virginia proper, — ever again fell into
regular Confederate occupation. And the same is
true of those greater movements which McClellan
had previously directed as general-in-chief — New
Orleans, North Carolina, Kentucky, Missouri, New
Mexico; and, had all his orders been carried out at
New Orleans by Butler, Vicksburg, Jackson,
Meridian, and all Southern Tennessee and all Mis
sissippi could be included. But that was not to be ;
the Secretary of War, an exceUent lawyer, filed a
brief and took command hiraself.
McClellan did not attack the next morning, for
the best of reasons. Not only was Couch's splendid
division absent guarding the river roads to the rear
of McClellan's anny, but he could not be withdrawn

SEPTEMBER 18-19 145
until Lee had been so paralyzed as to be incapable
of using them. At midnight, after the battle, Mc
Clellan ordered Couch's division back ; and it reached
his front after a hard raarch during the next fore
noon. Humphreys' very full division (of new
troops, it is true, but it was under Humphreys ; and
he himself bluffed the Washington authorities and
had its worthless arras replaced) reached the field
only after an all-day and all-night twenty-two mile
march, at ten o'clock on the i8th. A. P. HiU's Con
federate division was nearly fresh, and had suffered
but little loss when he drove back Burnside at
nightfall, as he reported only a loss of a thousand
out of his six brigades — less a few men left at Har
per's Ferry — after Burnside's whole corps and a
half had been forced back to the hills above the
creek. But the controlling factor was that, while Lee
had all the artillery ammunition he wanted, — all he
obtained at Harper's Ferry, a large proportion of
General Pope's, and the remainder which had come
with the new troops, half the way by train from
Richmond, — McCleUan had little ammunition at all
left, and none at all for his heavy guns, of which
he had at least seven or eight full batteries — nearly
fifty guns in all. McClellan says "a large number
of our heaviest and most efficient batteries had con
sumed aU their amraunition on the i6th and 17th,
and it was impossible to supply them until late the
following day."

146 ANTIETAM
That this stateraent is not overdrawn, we may
leam from the report of Benjamin, of Benjamin's
United States battery of 20-pound Parrotts. After
the firing on the i6th he replenished his caissons on
the raorning of the 17th, or tried to do so, for he
received only forty rounds, that being all that there
was in the Antietara supply-train. At 5 . 30 p. m.,
the 17th, he fired his last six rounds at the enemy.
After that, he says, "by order of General Bum-
side I fired blank cartridges to draw the enemy's
fire from the infantry."
McClellan was pushing the Washington authori
ties for heavy amraunition frora i o'clock p. m. on
the 17th; he was urging thera alraost constantly
from that time on : "Force some 20-pounder Par
rott amraunition through to-night, via Hagerstown
and Charaber sburg." The railroads came in with
a hearty swing; General Ripley, chief of ordnance
at Washington, joined in; Governor Curtin, our
splendid War Governor, did all that man could do ;
Watson, the Assistant Secretary of War, always
loyal and faithful, did his best; President Garrett
of the B. & O. pushed his end along with his great
est vigor; and even the Secretary of War, at mid
night of the 17th, sent word that everything must
be cleared ahead for this amraunition, the life-blood
for the palpitating heart and arteries throbbing
against the eneray at the front.
At 12.30 A. M., Septeraber 18, General Ripley,
chief of ordnance, telegraphed McClellan: "A spe-

SEPTEMBER 18-19 H7
cial train consisting of 2500 rounds of 20-pounder
araraunition left last night for Hagerstown, in
charge of Lieutenant Bradford, Ordnance Depart
ment." Field and small arm amraunition was to go
later, and it went a great deal later — late next day,
in fact. Lieutenant Colonel Rarasey, in charge of
the arsenal at Washington, sent to General Ripley,
Septeraber 18, the statement: "The shipment of the
ammunition for 20-pounders went last night by way
of Hagerstown, with Lieutenant Bradford."
So it seeras pretty well established that 2400 or
2500 rounds of 20-pounder ammunition — 60 rounds
for each gun — started to McClellan from Washing
ton by way of Baltimore, Harrisburg, and Hagers
town before midnight on the 17th of September.
What became of it? William Bender Wilson, the
special and confidential military telegrapher of the
War Department, whose services were so conspicu
ous that Pennsylvania has recently placed hira upon
her honored pension roll, — a very rare distinction, —
tells us in his little book, published in 1892, "A Few
Acts and Actors in the Tragedy of the Civil War,"
the inside history of the shipment of this vital
20-pounder amraunition. This ammunition started
from Washington before midnight on the 17th and,
with all the tracks open, with absolute right of way,
and with express speed, never reached Hagerstown
even — still a six or eight mile wagon-haul distance
from McClellan — until one o'clock on the afternoon
of the 1 8th.

148 ANTIETAM
Wilson says it was ready at the Washington
arsenal at i a. m., September i8. Both Colonel
Ramsey and General Ripley said it left the arsenal
before midnight. Wilson did all the telegraphic
work regarding this shipment, and followed its
course to Hagerstown. It is forty railes from
Washington to Baltimore. "Why," he says, "it did
not reach the Northern Central Railway at Balti
more until after seven o'clock that morning has
always been a mystery." Lieutenant Bradford was
aboard; the train consisted of an engine, tender,
and four B. & O. cars. How and where these seven
hours were passed will never be known. The train,
WUson says, left Baltimore at 7.27; was delivered to
the C. V. R. R. at Harrisburg at 10.20 a. m. The
run, eighty-four railes, was raade in two hours and
fifty-five minutes. It arrived at Chambersburg at
12, noon, and at Hagerstown at 12.42, making a
run from Harrisburg of seventy- four miles in one
hour and fifty-eight minutes. The running time was
shorter, for at two stations on the C. V. ten min
utes each were lost from hot boxes. He says that
when the train ran into the Hagerstown station "aU
the journal boxes on the four B. & O. cars were
ablaze; of this fact I was an eye-witness."
This ammunition, with the running time given'
it, should have reached Hagerstown, Mr. Wilson
says, at 7 . 20 A. m., and would then have "been of
some avail to McQeUan on that day" — Septem
ber 18.

SEPTEMBER 18-19 U9
Mr. Wilson had his theory, which he gives on
page 71 of his book, and those who care to, may see
how he accounts for that fatal seven hours' delay
which exposed McClellan, not only to attack by Lee,
but to the charge of slowness, which word (used
instead of "preparedness") acted on the people like
a red rag flashed in the face of an excited bull.

XV
LEE^S FLIGHT TO VIRGINIA  m'CLELLAN'S VICTORY
But what of this failure to attack on the i8th?
One might understand that on the i8th itself people
might say, "Why does he delay?" "Lee may attack,
himself." But after the i8th, when Lee had fled in
the night from Northern soil, with his crushed and
shattered army, why was it important that McClel
lan should have attacked on the i8th? Least of all,
why of importance to a military man? All that
could possibly have been gained by an attack was
gained; all that an attack could have accomplished
was to drive Lee across the river ; after Burnside's
failure to envelop Lee's right and cut hira off from
his ford, only a raile in his rear, and to cut off
A. P. HiU's approach, Lee could have retreated pre
cisely as he did, battle or no battle, for, as I have
quoted, the next morning, September 19th, a Union
regiment, — ^the Fourth Michigan, — ^marched across
the Potoraac by the same ford in line of battle, and
Lee's trains were already across the river, even be
fore the battle of the 17th occurred. See War
Records, vol. xix, part i, pp. 339 and 349-350.
It is true that we might have destroyed ten or a
150

LEE'S FLIGHT TO VIRGINIA 151
dozen thousand more of Lee's men, but at a cost of
ten or a dozen thousand, raore or less, of our own
men. That process of mere attrition is, however, a
sort of garae called swapping to a loss, in the garae
of checkers, which reputable players do not usually
approve of. So, in 1863, Lee lay one day also, after
the battle, in front of Gettysburg. Who now re
proaches Meade that he did not then attack? The
victory was no Ifess — it was greater, and Meade's
reputation has not been diraraed, but has, on the con
trary, been brightened thereby. Great victories
crystallize out slowly frora a great battle; at first,
soraetiraes, no one knows who has been successful.
Like a hunter, struggling body to body with a griz
zly bear, it takes sorae tirae, even when the final
blow has been given, for the grip to relax, for the
jaws to fall apart, for the muscles to unclasp, and
for the great dying hulk to fall to the ground in the
convulsion of death. But the victory is no less
great ; the result no less inevitable.
If Antietam was not a great crowning victory,
then why was Gettysburg? The forces were sub
stantially the same. At Gettysburg we were on the
defensive, and Lee attacked and failed ; at Antietam
Lee was on the defensive, and McClellan attacked
and succeeded. When it comes to losses, it is true
that at Antietam we, the attackers, only lost one-
half as many as we did at Gettysburg, while Lee,
the defender, lost from 5000 to 7000 more. At
Antietam we took six thousand prisoners from Lee.

152 ANTIETAM
At Gettysburg he took six thousand prisoners from
us. In both cases Lee lost his campaign, and was
driven back to the wasted places of Virginia; and
in both cases he was driven from Pennsylvania, for,
as I have shown, Lee's invasion of 1862 was an in
vasion of Pennsylvania just as rauch as was that
of 1863. He was broken to pieces sooner in 1862,
that was all.
It is tirae that history should clearly realize the
fact that Antietam was our greatest day of battle,
the bloodiest battle for the South and the raost glori-.
ous for the Union arras in all that wondrous four
years' war which gave to the world new examples
of patriotism and higher lessons of heroism.
During the night of the i8th Lee withdrew his
shattered and depleted remnants across the river,
and on the morning of the 19th the invasion and the
invaders had passed into history.
General Charles Griffin, commanding brigade in
MoreU's division. Fifth Corps, describes this broad
and shallow ford, on September 19, as follows:
"By direction of Major-General Porter the Fourth
Michigan was ordered to cross the river and take
some guns which our artillery fire had caused to
be abandoned. This duty was handsoraely per
formed, the regiment, about three hundred strong,
fordng the river [some three hundred yards in
width, and three feet in depth] in face of the
enemy's infantry fire." War Records, vol. xix,
part I, p. 350.

LEE'S FLIGHT TO VIRGINIA 153
General Porter, in his report (page 338), says
that parts of the One Hundred and Eighteenth
Pennsylvania and Eighteenth and Twenty-second
Massachusetts regiments volunteered and accom
panied the Fourth Michigan in the crossing and
return.

XVI
SHEPHERDSTOWN  SEPTEMBER 20
A MUCH misunderstood episode is what is com
monly called the Shepherdstown battle, on the 20th
of Septeraber. This, while popularly described as
a slaughter, was in reality a very creditable affair;
and, had it not been for the aborainable arms put
into the hands of the One Hundred and Eighteenth
Pennsylvania Regiment, and for which the Wash
ington authorities were alone responsible, would
have been considered a very successful and neces
sary reconnaissance. Many like it were subse
quently pushed across the Potomac and up the val
ley by McClellan during his occupancy of the north
bank of the river, between September 20 and Octo
ber 25, 1862.
Immediately after Lee's flight McCleUan sent
Couch up to WiUiamsport and directed Pleasonton,
with the cavalry, not to cross the Potomac "unless
you see a splendid opportunity to inflict great dam
age upon the enemy without loss to yourself." And
he was to send half his force, with two batteries,
to the Shepherdstown front, where Fitz John Porter
had advanced with the Fifth Corps, and with the
Sixth Corps in support. 154

SHEPHERDSTOWN 155
On the morning of the 20th General Sykes was
ordered to send a brigade of his regulars across the
Potomac on a reconnaisance. After coming in con
tact with the rear of the retreating enemy, he sent
back for another of his regular brigades. With this
latter brigade was. sent the old First Brigade of
MoreU's division. This First Brigade was com
posed of six veteran regiments, which, in the Seven
Days, had lost 900 men, with one of its regiments
detailed away elsewhere; and in the Pope carapaign
it had lost nearly 600 more, with another one of its
regiments detailed away. Such regiments as the
Twenty-second Massachusetts, First Michigan,
Thirteenth New York, and Second Maine speak for
themselves, and could always take care of thera
selves. But brigaded with these veterans was the
entirely new One Hundred and Eighteenth Penn
sylvania, which knew nothing of war nor of how
to take care of itself. To crown all, this regiraent
had been supplied by the War Departraent, when it
left Washington (see Colonel Gwyn's Report),
with condemned Enfield pieces, not more than fifty
per cent, of which could be discharged. A very
gallant sergeant of that regiraent told rae that they
had to beat down the hammers with a stone to make
them go off, and many of the nipples were broken
off besides. Then Colonel Prevost, the comraander,
was shot down as soon as he himself took the colors
to the front; and the whole regiment, we may know
from this circumstance alone, had become balled up.

iS6 ANTIETAM
part of it being caught by the enemy whUe still
in fours. They could neither advance nor retire,
and lingered there, irresolute and confused, while
the remainder of the brigade, under orders, safely
retired to and across the river, with a loss of less
than nine raen to a regiraent — the purpose of the
reconnaissance having been accomplished and the
question of the eneray's movement toward WiUiams
port settled. About two hundred men of the regi
ment thus left behind were gotten together and the
eneray heroically charged, but these few were soon
driven back, and then the only thing to do was to
try to escape. High rocky bluffs and lirae-kilns
were in their rear along the river, and down these
they slid and turabled, hid under the bluffs or
tried to ford the river; finally most of them got
away. The official casualty retums of all the Union
troops on both sides of the river for September 19
and 20 make the losses 363 ; the losses for the One
Hundred and Eighteenth Pennsylvania alone are
stated at 269. Colonel Gwyn in his report, dated
Septeraber 30, puts thera at 277. But an examina
tion of the muster-out — and corrected — roster of
this regiraent shows that the actual losses of the
One Hundred and Eighteenth on that day were 71
killed or died of wounds, 71 wounded and saved,
4 wounded and captured, and 63 captured un
wounded, malting a total of 209. As before stated,
some of those captured doubtless allowed them-

SHEPHERDSTOWN 157
selves to be taken, for 16 of these deserted after
they had been returned to their regiraent.
The actual losses of the Union troops across the
river on September 20 were 279, for the whole of
the eleven regiments engaged. The magnitude of
the enemy's forces which engaged these regiraents
seems startling. A. P. Hill reports that he had in
the battle itself, in the first line, the brigades of
Pender, Gregg, and Thomas, consisting of 13 regi
ments; in the second line, the brigades of Lane,
Archer, and Brockenbrough, consisting of 14 regi
ments; and (see Early's Report) in supporting line
of battle, in rear, the brigades of Early, Hays, and
Trimble, consisting of i6j^ regiments, making an
opposing total of 9 brigades, comprising 43^^ regi
ments, besides all their artillery. The commanding
officer was Stonewall Jackson.
Their losses in this little engagement were 262, a
difference, corapared with the actual Union losses,
of only 17. But they got glory out of it, for A. P.
Hill, in his report, told those at Richmond — and
those at Washington, also — that "then commenced
the most terrible slaughter that this war has yet
witnessed. The broad surface of the Potomac was
blue with the floating bodies of our foe. But few
escaped to tell the tale. By their own account they
lost 3000 men, killed and drowned, frora one brig
ade alone. Some 200 prisoners were taken. My
own loss was 30 kiUed and 231 wounded; total 261."
To which are to be added Early's losses (p. 975,

158 ANTIETAM
War Records, vol. xix, part i, page 975), making
the total, as stated, 262. It would have taken a life-
preserver to float a body in the Potomac at that
tirae, and A. P. Hill knew it, for with his foot-sore
tatterdemalions he had footed it across that river
both ways, back and forth, twice within the previous
three days. Poor McClellan! Poor Fitz John
Porter! Poor History! The tale went; all hands
were willing.

XVII
Stuart's useless cavalry raids — the raids of
FORREST  ^THE UNION RAID FROM HARPER'S
FERRY, SEPTEMBER I4-I5, 1862
Another misfortune befeU the Confederate
army a few days later. It was "Stuart's ride
around McClellan," also heralded as a great "Rebel
success." It certainly did frighten the Pennsylvania
farmers — of whom ray own folks were a part — for
the safety of Nell and Dobbin. However, Stuart
merely wore out his cavalry horses and had to re
mount his men on Pennsylvania farm-horses to es
cape — which broke down and went to pieces, as his
reports show — as soon as McClellan's great move
ment began at the end of October. This very
expedition paved the way for our own cavalry's
triumphant advance, and made Stuart's resistance
useless. The "glory," which Stuart so loved, gave
him the added theatrical eclat to "do it again" next
year, when "he rode around" Meade so far that he
lost Lee entirely, and so destroyed Lee's sole oppor
tunity for a successful invasion or of winning the
Battle of Gettysburg. Stuart did no more "riding
around" after that campaign, you may be sure. He
159

i6o ANTIETAM
was a brilliant soldier, but theatrical and boastful,
and he did not understand war in its larger aspects.
We have the type of a scientifically correct "rid
ing around," or riding through, by cavalry in the
operations of Forrest, — who was a born general, —
and of Van Dorn, when they rode around Grant
in the late fall of 1862 while Grant was moving
down to Meridian, and Jackson, and Central Mis
sissippi, to strike Vicksburg in the rear. They
reached and struck HoUy Springs, Grant's base of
supplies, destroyed it and tore up the railroads north
frora Jackson and north from Tallahatchie, and, as
Grant graphically says, December 23, 1862, "have
cut rae off from supplies, so that farther advance by
this route is perfectly impracticable. The country
does not afford supplies for troops and but a limited
supply of forage." And so Grant's great army,
then far south, was sucked back, as it were, and the
raoveraent was never undertaken again.
Or, take the cavalry expedition from Harper's
Ferry on the night of September 14 and morning
of September 15, just before the Battle of Antietam,
of which it was a part, and which it so powerfuUy
influenced. I was one of this expedition, and can
confirra Colonel Voss' unofficial report, for, by the
scattering of these teraporarily joined organizations,
after Antietam, no full report was ever sent in.
The cavalry at Harper's Ferry, on Sunday, Sep
teraber 14, demanded that they be allowed to go out,
first, to escape surrender, and second, to strike and

CAVALRY RAIDS i6i
damage the Confederates by a night attack, if pos
sible. There were about 1500 to 2000 cavalry, in
four or five different organizations — the Twelfth
lUinois cavalry. Seventh squadron Rhode Island
cavalry (to which I was attached), the First Mary
land cavalry (two organizations), and the Eighth
New York cavalry, the whole placed under com
raand of Colonel Voss, who says : "The coraraanding
officers of the several cavalry organizations held a
raeeting to discuss the feasibility of escape by cutting
their way through the eneray's lines. Present at
this raeeting were Colonel Davis, coraraanding
Eighth New York cavalry; Major Corliss, com
manding the Rhode Island Squadron; Lieutenant
Green, coraraanding detachraents frora First Mary
land cavalry; rayself, and ray second in coraraand,
Lieutenant-Colonel Hasbrouck Davis. It was unani
mously agreed that the plan was feasible, and a com
mittee was appointed to obtain the consent of Col
onel Miles, the commander of the fort. At first
he would not listen to such a proposition at all, de
nouncing it as wUd and irapracticable, iraperiling
the lives of the whole command; but he finally
yielded, and assented to the expedition."
At this time Stonewall Jackson, Ewell, and A.
P. HUl lay across the angle in rear of Harper's
Ferry, on the Virginia side, from the Potomac to
the Shenandoah ; General Walker, with his division
and his heavy guns, occupied Loudon Heights,
across the Shenandoah, looking down on Harper's

i62 ANTIETAM
Ferry, and the two divisions of McLaws and Ander
son occupied the Maryland side of the river below
Harper's Ferry, and had crowned Maryland
Heights with artillery; while two of McLaws' brig
ades, having penetrated Solomon's Gap, lay along
the northern slopes of Maryland Heights above
Harper's Ferry. During Sunday afternoon the
town was under borabardraent from all three posi
tions, and Jackson had attacked for position with
his infantry also.
The place surrendered at 8 . 30 next morning, but
without the cavalry, or their 1500 trained cavalry
horses. On Sunday, also, the battles of South
Mountain and Crarapton's Gap had been fought,
within hearing. In the night, D. H. HiU, from
the former, and Longstreet, from Boonsborough
and Hagerstown, were raoving down to Sharps
burg, and Anderson and McLaws had been driven
by Franklin down Pleasant VaUey, and were occu
pying both sides of Maryland Heights to the
Potomac. The expedition crossed the river, commencing
at 8.30 o'clock p. M., in darkness, by the single,
slight, pontoon bridge in place there, tumed up
the north bank, and almost at once climbed a very
steep log road to the summit of the mountainous
belt between Elk Ridge and the Antietam Creek.
One company turned, by raistake, to the right, and
in a few moraents came upon the eneray. The night
was very dark; the first fifteen or twenty miles was

CAVALRY RAIDS 163
through the mountains by rough mountain roads,
and not till the Antietam was nearly reached did
we emerge from this alraost impassable kind of
country. McLaws' pickets were encountered on
this mountain road, and the Confederate camp-fires
were smoldering everywhere ; but by a curious coin
cidence (see McLaws) just as the night came on
the brigades of Kershaw and Barksdale, excepting
one regiment, were withdrawn from the top and
western slopes of Maryland Heights, to form a line
of battle across Pleasant VaUey, to the east, and this
accidental evacuation left the road nearly clear for
the cavalry. At Sharpsburg we struck the raain
Boonsborough-Shepherdstown pike, along which
lay, by this time — which was after midnight —
Longstreet's just-arriving forces. At the north end
of Sharpsburg, near an old church, a strong Con
federate picket was encountered, which fired upon
the closed up head of our column — Colonel Voss
says "a sheet of flarae from at least a hundred
rifles." The coluran turned up toward Hagerstown,
and the fence-bars opening into a field on the left
of the pike were let down, beyond Sharpsburg, and
below Jones's cross-roads, and the route deflected
across country to strike the Hagerstown and
WiUiamsport road where it connects at right angles
with the WUliamsport and Greencastle road leading
up into Pennsylvania. Lee describes this action
with his advance post at Sharpsburg.
Here on the Hagerstown pike, just before we left

i64 ANTIETAM
it, occurred another coincidence. Right in front
of us, marching down from Hagerstown to Sharps
burg, Benning's brigade (see Benning's report)
was approaching; we had hardly cleared the pike
when it reached that point, and raarched by, on its
way to Sharpsburg. There it heard of the cavalry
raid, and two of its regiments were at once turned
back, without 3. halt, to pursue the cavalry and pro
tect Longstreet's threatened wagon trains. They
did not overtake the cavalry, however, which
marched raore than fifty miles that night, mostly
over abominable roads, and much of it in impene
trable darkness. But these two Confederate regi
ments, by reason of this pursuit, did not reach
Antietam till near noon on the 1 7th, were then worn
out, and could not take their place with the Second
and Twentieth Georgia in defending the Antietam
Creek and the bridge against Burnside, but were
put into the general line of battle, the Confederates
thus being able to oppose only two regiments in
stead of four against Burnside's attack.
And see also General Pendleton's report (chief
of artiUery), who passed Jones' cross-roads almost
imraediately afterward from Boonsborough to WU
liamsport, which fixes the route of the cavalry.
War Records, vol. xix, part i, pp. 829-830.
After leaving the pike, says Colonel Voss, "we
were also guided in choosing our path by the faint
glimmer of their bivouac fires." (See report of
Confederate General Pendleton, War Records, vol.

CAVALRY RAIDS 165
xix, part i, page 830, "I immediately posted guns
to the front and on the flank, sent raessengers to
General Toombs, understood to be at Sharpsburg,
for a regiment or two of infantry, set to work col
lecting a band of armed stragglers, and sent scouts
to the front") These stragglers were those who
brought the information to General Pendleton, and
through whom, in the cornfields, we had been
riding. These were ridden through headlong,
as it was now moonlight, and our columns were
closed up. We then emerged on the Hagers
town and WiUiamsport road, when a third coin
cidence occurred. Lee was sending his trains
across the river, by WiUiamsport, and Longstreet's
araraunition train had already left Hagerstown and
was pushing down toward WUliamsport, but had
not yet reached the point where we now struck the
road, in the first gray dawn of the raorning. The
rumble of many wagons carae from the right and
clouds of yellow dust were there seen rising. His
train consisted of "85 army wagons," says Colonel
Voss, "each drawn by six fine mules, and loaded
with munitions of war and provisions, and followed
by thirty or forty head of fat young steers." In
addition, many of the wagons had wounded men
piled upon their loads, 1 75 in all, I believe, who be
carae prisoners, including a brigadier-general. The
train was captured entire. Our troopers went with
it, and tumed each of the wagons to the right, at the
intersection with the Greencastle road, just below,

1 66 ANTIETAM
and took thera on a dead run up toward Pennsyl
vania while the main force reraained behind to head
off and occupy the wagon guard, said to have con
sisted of a brigade of infantry. We soon got out
of their reach, with sorae desultory firing, blew up
with their own araraunition sixteen of the wagons
which broke down in the rush, and entered Green
castle, covered with dust, and hungry, at 9 o'clock
A. M., Monday, Septeraber 15. Next day the com
raand was ordered to Antietam, and posted on the
extrerae right, below Jones' cross-roads, near the
pike. See War Records, vol. li, part i, Supple
mental, p. 851. Colonel Voss reported more than
600 prisoners taken in this operation.
Now this was a good cavalry expedition. We
saved 1500 to 2000 good cavalry horses from fall
ing into Jackson's hands, we put two Confederate
regiments out of four out of the Antietam fight,
just where they were most needed, and we captured
one-third, or even more, of Longstreet's whole am
raunition train, all his reserve amraunition, and a lot
of prisoners and beef on the hoof. This was one
of those humorous occasions concerning which the
President asked General McCleUan, October 24:
"Will you pardon me for asking what the horses
of your army have done since the battle of Antietam
that fatigues an)rthing?" He ought to have read
General Pleasonton's reports and dispatches; per
haps he had no opportunity.
It is doubtful indeed whether they ever learned

CAVALRY RAIDS 167
of this expedition at all at Washington; but Long-
street wrote, more than fifteen years after the
event : "The service you refer to was very credita
ble, and gave us much inconvenience. The coraraand
being in retreat, and in more or less apprehension
for its own safety, seems to have exercised more
than usual discretion and courage."
General John G. Walker, who was upon Long-
street's right and held the Confederate center in the
battle of Antietara, told rae, after the war, that the
loss to Longstreet was very serious, and that the
exploit itself was looked upon by the Confederates
as a most remarkable achievement. One of our
regular army officers at Vicksburg afterward told,
in my hearing, that he had chanced to be in Green
castle, Pa., on some duty at that time, and said that
"he never was so proud of American soldiers as one
morning in September, 1862, when he saw the
Union cavalry coming up out of Lee's army with
his long train of ammunition and a lot of prisoners
in their possession." When I told him that I was
one of that party, he came over and congratulated
me again and again. Alas ! he was soon afterward
himself killed, so that even he could not report it.
McCleUan alone speaks of it. In his despatch to
HaUeck, September 23, he recommended Colonel
B. F. Davis — dear old Grimes Davis — for promo
tion in the regular array, frora captain to brevet-
major, "for conspicuous conduct" on this occasion.
He received his promotion, and the next June, at

i68 ANTIETAM
Beverly Ford, says Pleasonton's report, "the brave
and accomplished Colonel B. F. Davis, while com
manding a brigade, charged at the head of his
column into the midst of the enemy and was shot
through the head." He would have reached high
rank had he survived.

XVIII
m'cLELLAn's plan to drive lee BY A FRONTAL
ATTACK UP THE VALLEY
After Lee's flight across the river, and his pre
cipitate sending back of the divisions of A. P. Hill
and Early to meet a threatened advance of Mc
CleUan's array, McClellan bent all his energies to
preparing to cross the Potoraac directly in his front
and attack Lee in the lower Shenandoah Valley.
To determine whether Lee would stand for a fight
to a finish or retire up the valley, to return when
the pressure was relieved, it was necessary to make
repeated reconnaissances in force, with bodies
strong enough to fight a battle, if necessary. To attack
Lee successfully, or to so move as to avoid the neces
sity of giving up the whole movement halfway, and
turning back to follow Lee again to Pennsylvania, it
was necessary to have either the Potoraac rise so
as to make it possible to cut him off if he crossed, or
else to cross and attack him in front, behind the
Potomac. A move by McClellan up east of the
mountains at this time would inevitably have
brought Lee north again, and with terrific conse
quences down at Washington. 169

170 ANTIETAM
This direct attack was the plan McClellan urged,
and it took all the power and influence of the Gov
ernment to force McClellan to adopt the slower and
less direct method of moving up east of the moun
tains, and so "threaten Richmond," as it was called,
nearly two hundred miles away. They offered him
the splendid bribe of a whole added army from
Washington to aid hira if he would adopt this plan.
And they did rauch raore ; they so retarded his sup
plies that he could not attack, defeat, and afterward
pursue Lee up the valley, as I shall describe. Mc
Clellan well knew — and Lee knew it as well as Mc
Clellan, for his dispatches are full of it — that as
soon as McClellan passed up east of the mountains
Jackson would cross the still shallow Potomac into
Pennsylvania, with Longstreet guarding the passes
south of the Potomac, to prevent McClellan's direct
interference. (See Lee's reports.)
No one need doubt what would have happened
then in Washington, in the North, and to McClel
lan and his army, and to himself personaUy. So
McClellan's only attack was a direct frontal attack.
provided Lee would stand and take it rather than
give up the still coraparatively rich lower Shenan
doah Valley, where his array was now feeding and
recuperating as well as getting reinforcements, for
the new conscription law, taking in all under forty-
five (instead of thirty- five), had gone into effect
just previously.
September 26 McClellan sent a cavalry recon-

McCLELLAN'S FRONTAL ATTACK 171
naissance from Shepherdstown toward Martinsburg,
and found the eneray in force two railes back of
Shepherdstown. October 2 a, reconnaissance in
force was raade to Martinsburg. The enemy were
found in force near Bunker Hill. Pleasonton, in
his report of October 14, details these actions; Lee,
October 2, gives a graphic account of this fight.
General Kiraball, with his brigade, and the Sixth
United States cavalry and two batteries, advanced
frora Harper's Ferry to Leesburg, October 3. After
the pursuit of Stuart, and the return frora his fruit
less raid, October 10, General Huraphreys, with a
force of 6000 infantry, 500 cavalry, and 6 pieces
of artillery, crossed at Shepherdstown and advanced
to Charlestown and Leetown. The Confederates
lost 24 raen in resisting this advance. At the sarae
tirae General Hancock, with the whole of his division
and 1500 raen of other divisions, and a force of
cavalry and artillery, advanced on Charlestown also,
and General McClellan accorapanied the force and
directed its operations in general. October 20 a
reconnaissance was raade by General Geary, to
Lovettsville, across from Berryville, and on the
mountain. The Confederate army had retired to
near Winchester. The fall rains were at hand, and
both armies were being refitted, as best they could,
for the next raoveraents. So the month of October
was passing away, with the Army of the Potomac
starving for supplies or fed from hand to mouth,
and clothed scarcely at all.

172 ANTIETAM
It was not tUl October i6 that Lee (see letter
to General Loring, W. R.) gave up his idea of
entering Pennsylvania if McClellan's movements
gave him the opportunity.
No army during the whole war needed supplies
raore than McClellan's array at this time, unless it
was the army of Lee, who says, in his letter to
President Davis, Septeraber 28: "History records
but few exaraples of a greater amount of labor and
fighting than has been done by this army during
the present carapaign." Of course, what was true
of Lee's array was true of McClellan's, with this
proviso, that the next raove raust be an aggressive
advance by McClellan away frora his supplies and
a defensive retirement by Lee upon his supplies.
See Grant's statement about his pursuit of Lee in
1865, chapter xxix, in this narrative.

XIX
DOCTORED SYSTEM OF SUPPLIES FOR MCCLELLANDS
ARMY
But McClellan's army on the upper Potomac was
not supplied. Lee knew this very well. Lee writes,
October i : "I think it probable that as yet Gen
eral McClellan is able only to procure supplies from
day to day." Again: "I think he is yet unable to
move, and finds difficulty in procuring provisions
from day to day." October 9 : "I do not think that
he is able to make any raove yet." October 11:
"Notwithstanding the assertions of the Northern
papers, I think this [McClellan's] array is not yet
sufficiently recuperated frora its campaign in Mary
land to make a vigorous forward raove."
The coraponents of McClellan's array had
marched and fought since spring over aU eastern
Virginia and over a large portion of North Caro
lina and Maryland. A family of school children
would want a couple of new outfits in that time. The
Curaberland Valley, Northern Central, and Balti
more and Ohio railroads delivered their trains right
into the caraps of McClellan's army, and the Chesa
peake and Ohio canal came up to its very doors.
Now the most ingenious contrivance was put
173

174 ANTIETAM
into operation, of which you may be sure that
neither President Lincoln nor Secretaries Seward
and Welles had any knowledge, whereby the whole
country would feel that McClellan's array in the
field was having supplies flooded in upon it in al
most unexampled quantities, and which yet left his
army to sit down to a veritable Barmecide feast, in
which everything was snatched away when almost
within its grasp. We need not necessarily suppose
that this was deliberately done by any high military
officers, for, as Napoleon said, "Generals are always
asking for more, and never have enough." But it
robbed McClellan's army of its supplies just the
sarae. It will be recoUected that, after President Lin
coln had, in a personal interview, September i,
directed McClellan to take charge of the fortifica
tions and troops in Washington, when Pope's
routed army was streaming back, Halleck, on be
half of the War Department, issued general orders
No. 122, dated September 2: "Major General
McClellan will have coramand of the fortifications
of Washington and of all the troops for the de
fense of the capital." This order had not been re
voked, and, indeed, so far as the public was con
cerned, was the only actual authority under which
General McClellan was doing any work at all,
either in Washington or elsewhere.
How McClellan took command in the field is
most graphically told in the Report of the Commit-

DOCTORED SYSTEM OF SUPPLIES 175
tee on the Conduct of the War (see General Up
ton's "Military Policy," p. 376). "Bragg in the
West had begun his march toward the Ohio River,
while Lee with renewed confidence was crossing
into Maryland. For two or three days the Presi
dent consulted his advisers, but with no satisfactory
result. At last, assuming aU the responsibility, he
took the general-in-chief with hira, turned his back
on the War Department, and, without disclosing
his purpose, proceeded to the home of General Mc
Clellan, where, for the moment, he brought the
long controversy to a close by saying: 'General,
you will take comraand of the forces in the field.' "
This coraraand was verbal only, and was in contra
diction of the still standing official orders of the
War Department of September 2. And the War
Department then turned its back on both the Presi
dent and General McClellan, issued no new orders,
and did not revoke or modify the previous one.
As a result, everything that went to the eighty
thousand men lying around Washington, or fear
lessly riding through its streets and suburbs, and
whatever was required for all the needs of society
and recreation, "went to McClellan's array," and
the people everywhere believed that it actually did.
It was on the principle by which the husband com
pelled his wife to take the castor-oU prescribed for
him, since they were married and were really both
the same. And that is why the Army of the Poto
mac sat down to a Barmecide feast from the 17th

176 ANTIETAM
of September to the 15th of October, and then for
the next two weeks had such a flood of clothing,
food, and supplies poured in upon its hapless head
that they could not be distributed, but were left in
great piles at the depot or on the dumps when the
army marched away from them, picking up what
they could as they passed.
The following statement from the Chief Quarter
master of the Array of the Potoraac will show the
coraparative numbers of the most essential supplies
received at the different depots of the array actually
in the field, and which could have been of any pos
sible use only to the army in the field, for two dif
ferent periods, the first up to October 1 5, from Sep
tember I, a period of forty-two days (six weeks) ;
the second from October 15 up to October 31, a
period of sixteen days (two weeks and two days) :
Aggregate, First 42 Days. Aggregate, Second 16 Days.
Coats and jackets. 17,500 Coats and jackets. 33,000
Pairs stockings.. .28,000 Pairs stockings.. .95,000
Pairs drawers  27,700 Pairs drawers  70,000
Flannel and knit Flannel and knit
shirts  27,000 shirts  36,000
Trousers  16,000 Trousers  77,500
Blankets  20 Blankets  11,000
Boots and bootees . 19,000 Boots and bootees . 77,000
Aggregate per day, 3220 Aggregate per day, 25,210
But Lee's army fared a little better. He got
5000 pairs of shoes while in Maryland; 6400 on

DOCTORED SYSTEM OF SUPPLIES 177
October 2. Jackson was getting 400 pairs per
week, and Lee 8150 pairs when McClellan moved,
while October 28, the Confederate Secretary of
War reported nearly enough clothing to supply the
army for the winter.
Colonel Ingalls, the chief quartermaster, says
of this extrerae slowness in supplying McCleUan:
"Frora this cause we were very late in receiving
clothing, and much of it arrived at Berlin too late
for issue, as the array was already on its march to
White Plains, Warrenton, etc." Fifty thousand
suits df clothing were left at Harper's Ferry, partly
on the cars and partly in store.
General Meigs stated to Halleck, October 14,
that 9254 horses had been "issued" to the Army
of the Potomac since the battles in front of Wash
ington; but the report of Quartermaster Myers,
October 31, shows that only 3813 of these came to
McClellan's own army; whUe, during the same
period 3000 had been turned over to the Quarter
master's Departraent, from that army, as worn
out; and 1500 raore were unfit and diseased.

XX

THE GREAT MOVEMENT ON CULPEPER
There is no military raoveraent in the art of war
so fraught with danger, and alraost certain disas
ter, as to endeavor to pass across the front of a
vigilant and well-coraraanded eneray, even inferior
in strength, by the flank. This is what McClellan
accomplished in this great movement on Culpeper,
in spite of all that Stonewall Jackson and Lee, with
urgent orders, and Longstreet, attempted to pre
vent. Jackson, at Winchester, in the valley, faced
McClellan's advance across his front, directly; but
the gaps in the Blue Ridge were his only line, and
McClellan, by a swift right-wheel in force, closed
them, one by one, and left Jackson helpless and
useless. As the Potomac was now, from lateness
of season, unavailable to Lee, McClellan accepted
the President's preference, to move up the east
side of the mountains, and crossed the Potomac by
pontoons, one at Berlin, just below Harper's Ferry,
and the other at Harper's Ferry itself.
The movement commenced October 26, — five
weeks after the last gun was fired at Antietam, —
by a brigade of Pleasonton's cavalry and two
178

MOVEMENT ON CULPEPER 179
divisions of Burnside's Ninth Corps crossing at
Berlin and taking the advance. Next day the other
division of Burnside's Corps and the rest of
Pleasonton's cavalry crossed, and the First and
Sixth Corps followed. The Second and Fifth
Corps crossed at Harper's Ferry, and by the 2nd
of Noveraber the entire army was across, and
started on the march. A day, in a heavy rain, was
lost in supplying the army with what it could
hastily pick up frora the supplies just arriving.
On the first of November the First Corps raoved to
Purcellsville, the Second to Woodgrove, the Fifth
to HUlsborough, and the Sixth was raarching out
frora Berlin. Pleasonton's cavalry occupied Philo-
raont and Bloorafield. The array marched along the
eastern slopes of the Blue Ridge, closing the gaps
by cavalry and infantry as it advanced. The
Twelfth Corps, with General Slocum and General
Morell, were left to guard the north bank of the
Potomac, from Harper's Ferry up to Sharpsburg
and WiUiamsport.
The raoment McCleUan started, Lee started, with
Longstreet's corps, up the VaUey through Chester
Gap to Culpeper, leaving Jackson near Winchester,
with orders, of October 28, to that officer: "Should
you find that the eneray is advancing frora the
Potomac east of those mountains, you wiU cross by
either gap that will bring you in the best position to
threaten his flank and cut off his communications."
But Jackson was not able to do either. McClellan

i8o ANTIETAM
advanced with such rapidity that Jackson was
totally unable to strike a blow at the enemy's com
munications or to penetrate the gaps, or even save
himself; so that when later on McClellan's army
had advanced to within less than six railes of Cul
peper, and was about to attack, — had begun the
attack, in fact, — and Longstreet was forced to
order battle with his own corps alone against Mc
Clellan's whole array, Jackson had been bottled up
in the Valley, and was still back at Winchester, 125
railes away frora Longstreet, by the nearest route
he could take to rejoin him.
Stonewall Jackson won many laurels, and he de
served them all; but he never won any frora Mc
CleUan. Against McDoweU, at the First BuU Run,
he won his badge of knighthood. In the Shenan
doah Valley and beyond, against raany com
manders, his array becarae known as the foot-
cavalry, and swept the valley up and down, at their
pleasure. He played with Pope as a cat plays with
raice, at Cedar Mountain and the Second Manassas,
and when ready seized and shook him out of his
skin. At Harper's Ferry against MUes — ^poor
handicapped, broken-hearted, and syndicate-sacri
ficed Miles — he counted his loot like an Eastern
potentate. At Fredericksburg, against Burnside,
he held the Confederate right, and broke and baf
fled all who tried to touch him; and at Chancel-
lorsville he was the incarnate spirit of victory
against Hooker.

MOVEMENT ON CULPEPER i8i
But when he touched McClellan the tale was dif
ferent. When he, with Lee's great army of vet
erans to aid him, struck McClellan's right at
Gaines' MUl, though outnumbered three to one,
Fitz John Porter held him at bay under McClel
lan's eye and command until the night had fallen,
and then raarched across the Chickahominy to join
the great movement already in progress to the
James, leaving far fewer dead, and no wounded,
than the Confederates left. At White Oak Swamp
McClellan so fixed it that Jackson stood gazing, and
could not attack at all; and when he could and did
attack, at Malvern Hill, he sorely wished that he
had not done so. At Antietam historians scarcely
know of his place or his deeds ; he was merely "one
of those who also fought" And when McCleUan,
on his last grand movement up east of the moun
tains made him helpless to carry out his instruc
tions to aid Longstreet's out-nurabered and out-
raaneuvered corps, or even to save himself, Mc
Clellan swiftly and securely bottled him up at Win
chester, while his own splendid army swept onward
to victory.
Lee speaks of McClellan's' moving with more
activity than usual. Colonel Ingalls says in his re
port: "The march from the Potomac at Berlin to
Warrenton, where General McClellan left the
army, was a magnificent spectacle of celerity and
skiU." The public has always believed, or has been taught

1 82 ANTIETAM
to believe, that McClellan was removed from the
comraand because he was slow. He certainly was
not slow in getting Lee out of Maryland, eighty
railes away and eight days after he was given com
raand of the army; but this march of his array from
the Potoraac to Culpeper, by way of Warrenton,
was one which has never been looked into, or com
pared, in the light of what has been called "the
deadly parallel."
On October 25 the pontoon bridge was con
structed at Berlin. At Harper's Ferry there was
one across the Potoraac and another was thrown
across the mouth of the Shenandoah, to connect.
Two of Burnside's divisions were sent over at Ber
lin, October 26. Burnside wrote McClellan a
friendly letter on the morning of October 27, pro
testing against McClellan's rush; that the passage
was already protected, and that he didn't want to
move his other division during the storm, because
the advance might be reduced by sickness by the
time its supports got up. McClellan consented.
October 28 McClellan wrote Lincoln that head
quarters were at Berlin; that Franklin's troops
were all over ; that Reynolds was massed at Berlin,
completing his supplies of clothing "to-day and
early to-morrow" ; and that McClellan was about
starting for Lovettsville.
But to learn from original sources the dis
positions and movements of the units of McClel
lan's army from this time on until, and, — at Burn-

MOVEMENT ON CULPEPER 183
side's request, — for a few days subsequent to, his
removal, volurae li of the Official Records must be
consulted. Most of these papers had been reraoved
from the files, or for some reason had disappeared, —
possibly by the means which Pope so fiercely
charged against Halleck in the West (see Chap
ter xxxv), so that nearly aU of the most important
of these papers could not be included at aU in
volume XIX, where they belonged. They were sub
sequently discovered, and have been inserted in the
Supplemental Volume, which was not published
until 1897, ten years after the publication of the
volume in which they chronologically belong. By
means of these dispatches and other papers we are
now enabled to determine precisely what McClel
lan was doing each day, where he was operating,
and what means he was eraploying to accomplish
his purposes. In fact, all the significant papers will
be found only in the Supplemental (li) Volume.
McClellan's orders to Pleasonton, of 1.30 a. m.,
Sunday, October 26, are very explicit He was to
cross the bridge at 9 a. m., — one of Burnside's
divisions to precede and another to follow him, —
and was to move the same day to Lovettsville, and
next day to Purcellsville, there to be reinforced by
Devens. He was to leave everything behind which
would impede his movements for the next three
days. Next day Sturgis with his division (of the
Ninth Corps) was ordered to move at twelve
o'clock to Lovettsville. The same day McClellan

i84 ANTIETAM
orders Franklin to send Averell with a strong cav
alry force to make a reconnaissance toward Mar
tinsburg. If Franklin finds that the enemy's in
fantry has moved toward Winchester, then Frank
lin was to move to Berlin and cross at once, "pre
pared to march next morning." October 29 Couch's
Corps moved frora Harper's Ferry around Loudon
Heights, and on the morning of October 30 Rey
nolds crossed his corps at Berlin, Meade's division
at 7.30, Rickett's at 9, and Doubleday's at 11
o'clock. October 29 Sturgis was ordered to move
at daylight next raorning to Purcellsville, to com
municate with Whipple near Hillsborough. He
was to avoid interfering with Getty and Whipple
marching on the sarae road. Getty was then, the
same day, ordered to Bolington, and from thence to
Wheatland, starting at daylight. Stoneman's cav
alry was ordered to connect with Getty.
October 30 Fitz John Porter's Fifth Corps
marched at i p. m. from Sharpsburg to Weverton,
in Pleasant Valley, on the Potomac. Same day
Franklin's Corps moved from Hagerstown by way
of KeedysviUe, to Berlin. The same day the Ninth
Corps was far in advance, with Sturgis at the inter
section of four roads near Hillsborough, and with
artillery on the flank, Getty in reserve one mile in
rear to the left, in position to support Sturgis.
Pleasonton was holding back Jackson's advance
from the valley, in Snicker's Gap. Next day, No
vember I, — on orders of the preceding day, — Rey-

MOVEMENT ON CULPEPER 185
nolds with the First Corps moved by the front,
passing Burnside by the flank, and took up posi
tion between Snickersville and Hamilton. Couch
with the Second Corps moved forward between
Woodgrove and Snickersville, and Pleasanton to
Philomont, picketing the Snickersville and Aldie
Road, and on to Upperville.
By these raaneuvers Jackson was shut off from
forcing Snicker's Gap and striking McClellan's
communications opposite Berryville and twenty
miles up from the Potoraac.
Meantime Sykes, of the Fifth Corps, on the
night of October 31 was ordered to raarch past
Humphreys' division and camp near Couch. The
order reads : "While continuing to supply youi;
comraand with what it needs, you will hold it in
readiness for active operations."
It will also be seen frora these raaneuvers, that a
great army in the presence of the enemy does not
march like a gentleraan taking a raorning walk or
a commercial traveler trying to catch a train, but
by a series of co-operative moves, like those of the
pieces of a chessboard, the combined result being
some important point in strategy which will call
"check" to the enemy in one direction, then in an
other, and finally, if properly carried out, "check
mate." Battles, in a properly conducted war, are only
accidents. In the great Uim carapaign of Napoleon,
a t3T)e of the highest war, there was no battle to

i86 ANTIETAM
be called a battle at all, yet Napoleon captured three
separate armies outnumbering his own, crushed
Austria, captured her capital, and drove away a
Russian array. Says the historian: "Fifty-four
thousand prisoners, 12,000 killed and wounded, 200
guns, 80 standards, and 5000 horses were the
trophies of the campaign." The entire French loss
was 6000 raen.
It has been seen that by reason of the woeful
deraoralization of the three corabined armies in the
Pope campaign, McClellan had to reorganize his
array on the raarch to Antietara; and so, here, he
had to supply his array on the raarch to Culpeper.
The array was now glutted. For the previous six
weeks it had been starved; for the previous six
weeks it had been naked and shoeless; now on the
march it had more clothing and shoes than it had
strength to carry or time to put on.
To Pleasonton McClellan writes on the evening
of October 31 : "Burnside will advance beyond
Reynolds on the 2nd. I think we shall continue to
advance frora to-raorrow."
November i he orders Couch with his Second
Corps to enter Snicker's Gap and attack and carry
it at once. "General F. J. Porter will follow you
with his corps." Should there be no enemy there,
he was to leave a force and push on, which he did.
General Pleasonton was at the same time ordered to
advance and seize the Manassas Gap railroad at
Springfield. November 2 the Fifth Corps passed

MOVEMENT ON CULPEPER 187
the Second Corps, General Porter asking Couch to
see that his wagons should not interfere with Por
ter's marching. On the night of November i
Averell with his cavalry was ordered to leave off
observing the Shenandoah Valley, beyond the moun
tains, and join Pleasonton by a forced march.
The concerted movements then went on to close
Ashby's Gap or fight the eneray, if he appeared
there. November 2 Hancock held Snicker's Gap,
and dispersed with his artiUery a Confederate force
of 5000 or 6000 that advanced to retake it. No
vember 3 Couch's Second and Burnside's Ninth
corps were ordered to Upperville, the entrance to
Ashby's Gap. November 4 Ashby's Gap was occu
pied in force, and held, and the cavalry was pushed
on to Piedraont. The same day the First Corps
was pushed forward to Rectortown, on the Manas
sas Gap railroad, between that point and White
Plains. Couch still held Ashby's Gap, now in rear,
with orders to be ready to march south. The same
day the Sixth Corps was ordered to UpperviUe, and
Burnside was ordered to push on next morning to
Salera, beyond the Manassas Gap raUroad.
At the same time Pleasonton was ordered to move
on wiih his cavalry toward Chester Gap and down
the road thence to Culpeper Court House. Averell
had had a heavy engageraent with Stuart, and
Pleasonton was asked to find out and report his
losses. Noveraber 5 Reynolds with his First Corps
was ordered to raove next morning as far in the

1 88 ANTIETAM
direction of Warrenton as possible, by way of
Salem, and Bayard's cavalry was sent in rear of
Warrenton. Sigel — from Washington — was now
at Thoroughfare Gap, in the BuU Run Mountains.
On the night of November 5 Pleasonton was
ordered to concentrate Averell's brigade with his
own force and move upon Little Washington and
Sperryville. Chester Gap had already heen sealed, —
the gap through which Longstreet had passed
south, — and Pleasonton's move, when supported by
infantry, would close Thornton's Gap, the last
available gap which Jackson could use down to
Swift Run Gap thirty railes behind Lee and Long-
street, who were then at Culpeper.
Noveraber 6 McClellan occupied Warrenton in
force, with the First Corps. Couch, with the Second
Corps, was ordered to follow Burnside's Ninth
Corps to Waterloo; Pleasanton to Little Washing
ton and Sperryville; and Franklin to White Plains,
with Fitz John Porter moving to the same point.
The same day Burnside was ordered to push on to
Waterloo, occupying that place by that night with at
least a division. Sigel was ordered forward from
Thoroughfare Gap to New Baltimore.
At night, Noveraber 6, Sickles was ordered to
push a portion of his force to Warrenton Junction,
frora Manassas Junction, and repair the railroad
as he advanced.
Bayard's cavalry was at the same time ordered to
turn Warrenton and reach the upper Rappahan-

MOVEMENT ON CULPEPER 189
nock, keeping in touch with Burnside on his right.
November 7 Bayard was ordered to scout the Rap
pahannock from Waterloo to the crossing of the
Orange and Alexandria railroad. Sumner was
ordered to Cedar Run, Franklin to New Baltiraore,
Reynolds in front of Warrenton, Bayard across the
Rappahannock, and Pleasonton to near Sperryville ;
general headquarters to raove next morning to
Warrenton. The Ninth Corps was directed to
Miller's Ford and Orleans, with Sturgis in front,
on the direct road to Cidpeper,- where Longstreet's
corps lay. The same date Sturgis was ordered to
Amissville and Jefferson. "The general command
ing," the order reads, "relies upon your prompt and
efficient services in this matter, as an important
movement is impending." Pleasonton at the sarae
time was notified that Sturgis was at AmissviUe,
with his other brigade and two batteries, as he was
directed to assurae coraraand of the division and
co-operate with Pleasonton, "so as to enable you to
carry out your instructions. He will send the two
regiraents at AmissviUe to Jefferson. Should you
need further assistance, send a despatch to rae [the
corps coramander] through General Stoneman at
Waterloo, who has thrown a bridge over the river
at that place."
We are now able to locate and determine the posi
tions, distances, and movements of aU the compo
nents of McClellan's army, and to determine what
McClellan's plan was with such certainty that the

I90 ANTIETAM
record will stand against any denial, even if he
himself had denied it. Comparing the above with
Longstreet's paper, cited in Chapter xxm, it will
be seen that Longstreet's proposition had been en
tirely anticipated and neutralized.
The order relieving McClellan was issued on the
5th, but was not received until late on Thursday,
November 7. Burnside asked McClellan to con
tinue in charge for a couple of days, untU he could
get his plans perfected. McClellan did so, and ar
ranged the movements so that they continued even
after McClellan had left the army, on the loth, for
Burnside did not assume active coraraand, or issue
any orders, or interfere with any raoveraents, untU
Noveraber 15. (See Halleck's report. War Records,
vol. XXI, p. 47, and Burnside's report, p. loi.)
Halleck says "General Burnside did not com
raence his moveraent from Warrenton until the
15th." Burnside says that, on receipt of a telegram
frora Halleck informing hira that the President ap
proved his plan, sent Noveraber 14, "arrangements
for a move were commenced by drawing in the
extreme right to the neighborhood of Warrenton."
The extrerae right was at that tirae in the imme
diate front of Longstreet at Culpeper Court House,
and in battle contact, so that all the movements up
to this time, November 15, were McClellan's, and
the coming battle had been already established —
"The Battle of Culpeper Court House," as it would
have been known in history.

XXI
CELERITY OF ARMY'S ADVANCE  COMPARISON WITH
OTHER MOVEMENTS
Now we are in a position to consider the question
of McCleUan's celerity or slowness, on which,
ostensibly at least, depended his retention or re
moval. This route now traversed by McClellan — for the
first tirae by any Union array — was afterward tra
versed by other arraies. For example, Meade, after
Lee had recrossed the Potomac in July, 1863,
passed up to Culpeper over the same route precisely ;
and Lee, on his great flanking movement toward
Centerville in the fall of the sarae year, did so like
wise; and Lee also, in his march to Gettysburg,
moved over pretty nearly the same route north to
the Potoraac, except that he, with Longstreet's
corps, entered the Shenandoah Valley from Upper-
vUle. The distance in an air-line from the bridges at
Harper's Ferry and Berlin, to Culpeper Court
House is sixty-five miles; by the roads one-third
more. McClellan coraraenced his crossing of the
Potomac by two pontoon bridges October 26. A
191

192 ANTIETAM
delay of a day occurred — on Burnside's protest — on
account of a severe storm and to supply his troops
with delayed clothing. On Noveraber 8 Pleasonton
was at Amissville, seven miles in front of Culpeper
Court House, with his whole division, and with his
advance near Culpeper; and, calling for the in
fantry, Sturgis's division of the Ninth Corps, with
artillery, moved up to his support and attacked the
enemy next day, November 9.
Frora the report, November 6, of Colonel Alex
ander, Lee's chief of artillery, we find: "Long-
street's corps in position about Culpeper. Large
force of enemy advancing toward the Rappahan
nock, and continued hot skirmishing of the cavalry
in front."
Frora Pleasonton's report : "Frora the 7th instant
my advance pickets were at Hazel River, within
six railes of Culpeper."
Sickles reports, Noveraber 8 : "General Bayard
occupies Rappahannock station."
Willcox, with the Ninth Corps, reports same day :
"Ferrero's brigade started across Miller's Ford at
1.40; took with him Dickenson's battery. Two
regiraents were ordered to Amissville, and then to
Jefferson. Stoneman has commenced building a
bridge at Waterloo."
Sarae date, November 8, Lee writes to Jackson,
in the valley, near Winchester: "Since my letter
to you of the 6th the eneray has occupied Warren
ton and reached Amissville from Salem, via Orleans.

CELERITY OF ARMY'S ADVANCE 193
There is said to be, in the vicinity of AmissviUe,
a large force, infantry, cavalry, and artiUery. There
is also a large force of cavalry at Jefferson, and his
cavalry last night was at Rappahannock Station.
Stuart hasfaUen back to Hazel River."
Willcox, corps commander, writes November 9:
"I have ordered General Sturgis to AmissviUe with
his other brigade and two batteries. He is directed
to assume comraand of the division and co-operate
with you, so as to enable you to carry out your
instructions." So now we have, on Noveraber 9, at least a whole
division of infantry and one of cavalry at Amiss
viUe, in front of Culpeper, with their own divisional
artillery and extra batteries, and all ready to ad
vance at once, according to instructions already
given. The remainder of the army was bivouacked
within supporting distance, the raost of it within
less than a day's marching distance, and Pleas
onton's cavalry and part of the infantry were at
Hazel River in front, and in contact with Long-
street's corps.
General Lee reports, November 10, that the
Union advanced forces were attacked by Stuart with
a brigade of cavalry and two regiments of infantry,
and driven back upon Amissville ; and that at Amiss
ville three brigades of infantry advanced upon
Stuart and drove him back.
McClellan's time consumed in reaching Amiss
viUe and the line of the Rappahannock, and pass-

194 ANTIETAM
ing it with his cavalry, and bridging it, with his in
fantry, and with his whole army prepared for bat
tle and within easy supporting distance, was from
October 26, when two divisions crossed, or Novem
ber 2, when all were across, to November 8, or
November 9 at the latest. The extreme time is
therefore thirteen days, and the actual tirae from the
completion of the crossing to the infantry occupa
tion of AmissviUe is seven days.
The raarching distance is ninety railes; air-line
distance, sixty.
Now Meade, in July, 1863, crossed by the same
bridges, with an extra one, however, at Berlin. He
raarched over the sarae roads, seized and held the
sarae passes in the sarae way, followed Longstreet
as McClellan did, and moved by Warrenton and the
mountain slope to AmissviUe and the Upper Rap
pahannock. Meade's itinerary is given in Volume xxvn of
the Official Records. The crossing commenced
July 17, the last corps, the Sixth and Eleventh,
crossing July 19. All were across July 20. July
30 the cavalry reached Amissville.
General Howard reports, July 30: "Culpeper
Court House, Brandy Station, and Stevensville be
ing occupied by the Rebel array; Longstreet's and
Stuart's cavalry are said to be there; all the fords
along the Rappahannock guarded."
Scouts were, however, out toward the Rappahan
nock, and at noon, July 30, engineers reached the

CELERITY OF ARMY'S ADVANCE 195
river and were at the station, and a point for throw
ing a bridge was being selected.
We have, therefore, the tirae for Meade's raove
raent, — from July 17 to July 30 as the extreme
time, — thirteen days, the same as McClellan; and
actual time from completion of the crossing to the
cavalry occupation of AmissviUe, and of infantry
at the Rappahannock below, ten days, which is three
days in excess of the time consumed by McClellan.
In R. H. Anderson's report of the Gettysburg
campaign he gives the itinerary of the Confederate
march from Culpeper to Shepherdstown, which is
much the same distance as McClellan and Meade
covered frora the Potoraac to Culpeper. Anderson's
was a simple march of his own division, with no
maneuvering, no presence of the enemy, and no
considerations except those of the ordinary service-
marching of a large organization. His division left
Culpeper June 17 and reached Shepherdstown June
23, too late to cross it that day. This gave the
marching time of seven days, which is precisely the
number of days occupied by McClellan in marching,
maneuvering, and fighting his entire army over sub
stantially the same ground.
General Kershaw's actual marching time frora
the Potoraac to Culpeper, on his return march from
Gettysburg, is given in his official report as seven
days, arriving July 24. This was the same tirae
for Kershaw's brigade as for McCleUan's whole
army.

196 ANTIETAM
In Lee's foot-race with Meade, in October, 1863,
for Centerville, Lee marched from Culpeper to near
Broad Run, — commencing his march October 9 and
ending his advance in the evening of October 14, —
and occupied six days. Meade's parallel movement
occupied the same time. The distance was just one-
half that from the Potomac to Culpeper.
In the Pope campaign Longstreet's force was
sent frora Richraond to GordonsviUe by rail, Au
gust 16. Longstreet thence coraraenced his infantry
moveraent against Pope. Tirae was everything to
Lee, because, while Longstreet was moving from
Richmond to Jackson's aid and against Pope, Mc
Clellan was raoving frora Richmond to Pope's aid,
and against Lee. It was a foot-race also. But
Longstreet did not reach Jackson's hard-pressed
lines until three corps of the Army of the Potomac
had by a longer foot-march reached the field — on
August 29, a period of thirteen days. Yet by the
route taken by Longstreet from GordonsviUe the
distance was ten railes shorter than that from the
Potoraac to Culpeper.
And to cite a historic example, when there was no
eneray to oppose, and beautiful broad fields and roads
to march over, in the inspiring Southern atmosphere
of December, and when in their enthusiasm it is
said that the sweet potatoes even started from the
ground — I refer to Sherraan's march from Atlanta
to the sea. Colonels Bowen and Irwin, in their
Military Biography of that splendid soldier, say:

CELERITY OF ARMY'S ADVANCE 197
"Thus, on the lOth of December, 1864, the enemy's
forces, under Hardee, were driven within the ira
mediate defenses of Savannah, and Sherraan's en
tire array, having leisurely marched over three hun
dred miles in twenty-four days with trifling oppo
sition through the whole of the eneray's country,
was massed in front of the city."
Sherman's march may have been leisurely, but a
great raany people, including Grant and Lincoln,
were "almighty anxious to know where he was at."
Had Sherman kept up the gait that McClellan did,
on the march when the latter was removed for
"slowness," Grant and Lincoln and all the rest of
us would have heard from Sherman, at Savannah,
a number of days before the loth of Deceraber;
for a little calculation will show that the Array of
the Potomac covered more ground per day than
the men whO' proudly nicknamed themselves "Sher
man's Bummers" ; of whom, for a couple of years,
I myself was one.
In the Vicksburg campaign of 1863 Sherman's
force marched on Jackson, Miss., and assaulted and
captured the place. Celerity here also was vital, in
view of separating Johnston from Pemberton. Sher
man marched from Grand Gulf (see Grant's
"Memoirs") May 6, and reached the works in
front of Jackson May 14, a period of nine days.
The marching distance was ten miles shorter than
from the Potomac to the Rappahannock, where Mc
Clellan reached the river.

198 ANTIETAM
Another historic case of rapid marching is cited
in Major Adaras' "Great Carapaigns" (frora 1796),
a work which no military student can afford to over
look. In the Friedland campaign of 1807, Benning-
sen attempted to surprise Napoleon's left (Berna-
dotte) by rapid raarching. After raarching seventy
miles in ten days, he failed in his atterapt, and
halted for the following three days on account of
fatigue and want of food. Bernadotte did not know
that such a movement was even under way.
On the pursuit of Lee's array frora Petersburg
to Appomattox, the pursuit was under full head
way on the morning of April 3, and, considering
Sheridan's move from Five Forks, earlier. The
surrender took place on the forenoon of the 9th,
giving a raarching tirae of a little less than seven
days. The distance frora Five Forks to Appomat
tox, where Sheridan passed Lee and closed on his
front, is almost precisely the distance frora Harper's
Ferry, or Berlin, to Culpeper. And yet the speed
was so great that Grant's forces had long out
marched his wagons, and even his ammunition, and
Grant, in one of his conversations with John Rus
sell Young (which Grant himself revised before
publication) said : "My pursuit of Lee was hazard
ous. I was in a position of extreme difficulty. You
see, I was raarching away frora ray supplies, while
Lee was falling back on his supplies. If Lee had
continued his flight another day I should have had
to abandon the pursuit, fall back on Danville, build

CELERITY OF ARMY'S ADVANCE 199
the raUroad, and feed ray army. So far as sup
plies were concerned, I was alraost at my last gasp
when the surrender took place." (See "Around the
World with General Grant," vol. ii, page 460.)
In Adams' "Great Carapaigns," p. 606, criticizing
the projected raarch, from Dijou to Blesme, of
Bourbaki, with an army of nearly 200,000 men, to
cut the transportations of the Gerraans, then be
sieging Paris, and with no enemy along the line,
the distance being 94 railes, he gives for this urgent
advance a raarching rate of 8J/2 miles per day. This
chapter, and also "Comraents on Bourbaki's Opera
tions," explains Grant's anxiety, in the Appomat
tox carapaign, to settle his advance there without
penetrating further southwest.
Such exaraples can be multiplied, frora the Offi
cial Records, to any extent desired. In fact, I took
the daily itinerary of a three years' regiment in the
Array of the Potomac, which entered the service
early in 1861, and added up all its marches under
different army coraraanders and divided the total for
each commander by the nuraber of days of service,
and used the official intineraries of other organiza
tions frora 1864 to the end of the war to coraplete
the record, and compared with them the correspond
ing itineraries of the troops of McClellan and other
commanders, and the results were so startling to me
that I refrain frora giving thera. Suffice it to say
that, after counting as a whole McCleUan's entire
period of command in Eastern Virginia and Mary-

200 ANTIETAM
land, — 155^ months, — and including in the count
aU his periods of rest, raarch, recuperation, organi
zation, and reorganization, his average daily army
raarch for all these raonths taken together was in
excess of that of any other army commander East
or West for equal periods. He fought more pitched
battles, won raore victories, inflicted greater losses
on the enemy, and at less cost to his own army, for
the sarae period than any other commanding gen
eral during the whole four years from April, 1861,
to the end of the war. Any one can verify these
facts who chooses to take the pains ; which, with con
siderable labor and a careful study and grouping
of the intineraries of all our arraies and all separate
parts of those arraies, I have done, frora the Official
War Records.

XXII
LONGSTREET ISOLATED  ^JACKSON CUT OFF  ^LEE
BEWILDERED  THE CAMPAIGN WON  THE
ARMIES FACE TO FACE AT CULPEPER, PROPOR
TION 3 TO I
We are now in a position to take a broad view
of the final epoch of the Maryland campaign of
1862, that is, of the moveraent from the Potomac
along the eastern base of the Blue Ridge to Sperry
ville and Culpeper, and also along the Orange and
Alexander railroad to the upper Rappahannock.
This whole moveraent forced Longstreet back to
Culpeper Court House and cut off Jackson, far be
hind at Winchester, from entering the Gaps, and
compelled him to rejoin Longstreet, if at all, by a
movement from Winchester up the Shenandoah
VaUey to Swift Run Gap, and thence back to Cul
peper, an air-line distance of 100 miles and a march
ing distance of about 125 or 130. We shall find
that at the culmination, when Longstreet issued his
order of battle on the moming of November 16,
Longstreet was at Culpeper and Jackson at Win
chester, with McCleUan's army squarely interposed
between the two, and within infantry and artillery

202 ANTIETAM
firing-contact with Longstreet. The battle had, in
fact, actually comraenced.
The forces on the opposite sides (see Volume
XXI, Official War Records) were at this moraent,
just before Burnside took active command, as fol
lows: McClellan's array consisted of 268 regiraents of
infantry, 18 regiments of cavalry, and 73 batteries
of artillery, the largest force by far which McClel
lan ever carried into battle, and which a few weeks
afterward Burnside broke and shattered to pieces
against the heights of Fredericksburg.
Against this force of McClellan's stood Long-
street's corps, including all the forces with him,
which consisted of 89 J4 regiments of infantry, 15
regiraents of cavalry, and 45 batteries, which latter
coraprised also all the reserve artillery of Lee's
army. McClellan's preponderance was in the proportion
of nearly or quite 3 to i.
Jackson's force, near Winchester, and entirely cut
off and eliminated by McClellan's swift advance,
and the holding of all the mountain passes by heavy
bodies of infantry and artillery, consisted of 91
regiraents of infantry, 3 regiraents and 2 battalions
of cavalry, and 23 batteries, coraprising about one-
half of the whole Array of Northern Virginia.
This latter, in all, counted 180 regiments of in
fantry, 19 regiments of cavalry, and 68 batteries of
artillery. For the first tirae McClellan's artUlery

LONGSTREET ISOLATED 203
exceeded all that of Lee, while previously it had
always been very much less than Lee's. The pro
portion of all McClellan's organizations, regiraents
and batteries, to aU of Lee's, including both the di
vided halves, was a little less than 2 to i.
And this was the proportion, also, when Burn
side fought the battle of Fredericksburg. At Chan
ceUorsviUe Lee had one-third less.
McClellan's advance did what had never been
done before, so far as the official records reveal,
with reference to Lee hiraself. It paralyzed and
bewildered him, and his official despatches show this
bewilderment so clearly that no araount of expla
nation can affect the facts disclosed.
Within forty-eight hours, from November 7,
Lee issued four different written orders for action
against McClellan, all incompatible with one an
other, and not one capable of being carried out, and
not one of which was even attempted to be carried
out; while the final order of battle, early on the i6th,
was issued by Longstreet alone, and was contrary
to all the other orders.
November 7 Lee wrote Stuart: "Should we be
pressed back frora here [Culpeper Court House],
my design is to retire through Madison, whUe Jack
son ascends the vaUey, so that a junction can be
made through Swift Run Gap, and we hold our
selves on the enemy's right flank if he attempts to
proceed southward."
November 8 he writes to Jackson: "It is more

204 ANTIETAM
necessary than ever that you should raove up the
valley, since Swift Run Gap is now the nearest one
open to you, unless the road through Fisher's is
practicable." November 9 he writes to Jackson : "The enemy's
object raay be to seize upon Strasburg with his raain
force, to intercept your ascent of the valley. This
would oblige you to cross into the Lost River Val
ley [into the AUeghanies], or west of it, unless you
could force a passage through the Blue Ridge ; hence
my anxiety for your safety. If you can prevent
such a movement of the enemy, and operate strongly
upon his flank and rear through the gaps of the
Blue Ridge, you would certainly, in my opinion,
effect the object you propose. A demonstration of
crossing into Maryland would serve the sarae pur
pose, and might call him back to the Potomac."
November 9, at night, he writes to Stuart : "Can
you ascertain what he is doing in your front; if he is
stationary, or what he is about? If he raoves into
the valley, I will advance Longstreet's corps to cut
off his coraraunication with the railroad."
November 10 he writes to Jackson : "As soon as
you think that your presence in that portion of the
valley will not retard or prevent the advance of the
enemy east of the Blue Ridge, I wish you to ad
vance with all celerity to unite with Longstreet's
corps." Jackson was still at the same place, however, even
a week later.

LONGSTREET ISOLATED 205
The sarae day, November 10, Lee writes the War
Department : "Should the enemy descend into the
valley. General Longstreet will attack his rear and
cut off his communications. The enemy is, appar
ently, so strong in nurabers that I think it preferable
to atterapt to baffle his designs by maneuvering
rather than to resist his advance by main force."
As a result of all these orders, and all these
maneuverings, nothing at all was done. Jackson's
half of Lee's array lay idle at Winchester, and
Longstreet's half, at Culpeper, confronted McClel
lan, who was more than three tiraes as strong as
Longstreet, and twice as strong as Lee's whole army
had it been united.
Meantime, however, the inspiring spirit of the
whole had passed away. McClellan was removed
from the coraraand and Burnside put in his stead,
and the movements instituted by McClellan and car
ried on at Burnside's request even after McClellan's
removal, had spent their force. The army and,
visibly to Lee, its cavalry, infantry, and artillery,
opposite Longstreet at Culpeper, became gradually
quiescent. Lee was more bewildered than ever.
Stuart, on the loth, was ordered to penetrate this
mysterious screen, and he drove back our advance,
but was met by the Ninth Corps and forced to retire,
and the mystery in front became deeper than ever.
During this interval Burnside had evolved his
plan : to abandon Lee and Longstreet and Jackson
to their own devices, and march, by the left flank.

2o6 ANTIETAM
thirty miles away to Falmouth. Here the river, so
little where he now was, had become a mighty
stream, with Nature's own fortifications beyond,
far stronger defenses than raan could build, — de
fenses which frowned frora their impregnable
heights over the town and over the deep and wide
Rappahannock, and confronted the heights at Fal
mouth on the northern bank, too far away from
the Confederate lines to be dangerous to the defend
ing Confederate army.
And this plan was carried by Halleck to Wash
ington on the 9th, and there the wiseacres sat in
judgraent upon it, and Burnside waited. November
13 Burnside could not wait longer, and urged Hal
leck, if possible, to send him a definite answer. And
then, Noveraber 14, HaUeck sent him an approval, in
the name of the President ; but given with such Hal-
leckian conditions that, if Burnside should succeed,
the credit would belong to Halleck, and if he should
fail the blarae would fall upon Bumside. AU the
official reports establish this.
Then on the 15th, and not till then, the new com
mander of the army waked up, and ordered the re
tireraent to Fredericksburg. An unwonted activity
prevaUed along Longstreet's front; our troops of
all arms were in raotion. The raUitary eye and mind
of Lee and Longstreet could not conceive that an
advantage such as Napoleon at Boulogne had
worked many months to achieve could be thrown
away merely to discredit its author, and the crisis

LONGSTREET ISOLATED 207
of the campaign was felt to be upon them. There
was now to be no movement to Swift Run Gap to
join Jackson and "hang on McCleUan's flank," if
he tried to move south ; there was to be no march of
Jackson up the valley to unite before the battle with
Longstreet; there was to be no falling upon Mc
Clellan's rear, to cut his communications with the
railroad; there was to be no advance of Jackson into
Maryland to call back McClellan to the Potomac.
There was to be a battle then and there, at Cul
peper Court House, on the i6th day of November,
to be known to history as the "Battle of Culpeper,"
in which McCleUan's whole army, three to one, was
to be hurled straight forward upon one-half of Lee's
army. The other half was 125 miles in the rear
across a sealed-up range of mountains, with Mc
Clellan squarely between, so that McClellan, after
Longstreet had been disposed of and his beaten
fragments pursued and scattered or destroyed by an
overwhelraing force of one-half McCleUan's army,
could with the remaining half of his raen himself
turn back through the coveted gaps south of Jack
son, close in upon him, and defeat and destroy his
other half of Lee's army, or drive it, as Lee had
said, across the western mountains into "Lost River
Valley, or west of it," and then turn to foUow up
the debris of Longstreet. Longstreet must stand
fast and fight where he was, or else lose either
Richraond, or Jackson, or both, and, in any case
his own army, as an army. At this moment Long-

2o8 ANTIETAM
street's corps lay in front of Culpeper Court House.
The Army of the Potomac stretched from Hazel
River, four miles in front of Longstreet's position
(coraraencing several miles west, with the Ninth
Corps in front of Thornton's Gap), and extending
in a continuous series of positions to the front of
Warrenton — with our left near the Rappahannock
River, at the Station. Our entire army was concen
trated — the two projecting flanks excepted, and they
connected — along an air-line of fiftten railes. Our
right covered, by a short extension, Milan's and
Swift Run Gaps, with Madison Court House mid
way, and in front, on the Rapidan. Jackson's Con
federate corps lay to the north, distant 50 railes in
an air-line, across the mountains, and by the gaps a
march of 125 miles.

XXIII
longstreet's BATTLE-ORDER  BURNSIDE's RE
TREAT — lee's great relief
So on November i6, on or before the morning
dawn, we may be sure, Longstreet issued his battle-
order for that day, to be found only in Volume
LI, part 2, pp. 645-6, Official War Records.
General Orders Headquarters First Army Corps,
No. 49. November 16, 1862.
The troops of this command will be held in readiness for
battle upon a moment's notice. Commanders will see that pro
visions, ammunition, and transportation are at hand and in
such quantities as may be wanted to meet their necessities.
The Commanding General relies upon the valor and patriotism
of these well-tried troops to sustain them in the struggles
that they may be called upon to encounter. OfEcers, be cool
and take care of your men. Soldiers, remain steady in your
ranks, take good aim, and obey the orders of your ofScers.
Observe these injunctions, and your general will be responsi
ble for the issue.
By command of Lieutenant-General Longstreet.
I find no similar order from Longstreet during the
whole course of the war ; it was like a last will and
testament 209

2IO ANTIETAM
General Pleasonton was entirely right when he
wrote back, frora Corbin's Cross-roads, to his corps
coraraander, Noveraber lo: "Jackson has no cav
alry except sorae few for scouts. Leave a strong
force to face Jackson, covering Warrenton and its
junction, with a corps of observation at Barbee's;
push your forces down to Culpeper vigorously, in
clining to the right, to take in Woodville and Madi
son. Give us ten days more of good weather and
wind up the campaign in a blaze of glory."
Yes, these were the "carrying out of his instruc
tions" in the Ninth Corps coramander's letter of
November 9; the infantry of Sturgis, and Stone
man's cavalry, and the artillery had come on, on
that sarae day, to Araissville and Jefferson ; Pleason
ton was extended away over west to Sperryville on
the foot-hills of the Blue Ridge. He was carrying
out McClellan's instructions. Poor raan ! He knew,
to his heart's sorrow, that McClellan was lost to the
array; but he did not know, he could not believe,
that everything else was for years, in that day, lost
with McClellan.
By referring to raap i, sheet lxxiv, of the atlas
accompanying the Official War Records, the posi
tions of the respective arraies can be clearly under
stood. The successive gaps in the Blue Ridge from
the Potomac to far beyond Swift Run Gap are all
laid down, and it will be seen that Snicker's, Ash
by's, Manassas, Thoroughfare, Chester, and Thorn
ton's gaps were all closed and sealed by McClellan,

LONGSTREET'S BATTLE-ORDER 211
while Longstreet, at Culpeper Court House, was
more than twenty miles southeast of the nearest of
them in the flat country between the Rapidan and
the Rappahannock. The intervening country was
covered by McClellan's army, so that for either
Longstreet or Jackson to reach the other the entire
Army of the Potomac must first have been attacked
and defeated by either half of Lee's army.
Of Pleasonton's ability to perceive and understand
a military situation I cite the following opinion
of General Sickles, in the North American Review
for March, 1891 :
"Pleasonton, chief of the cavalry corps, made his
arm superior to that of the enemy in every equal
combat. Besides, he was gifted with rare military
intuitions. He sent Buford, with our strongest cav
alry division, to Gettysburg when nobody had di
vined the place chosen by Lee to concentrate his
army for the battle. He sent Gregg to our right
to encounter Stuart and thwart his movement to our
rear; on the third day, the day of Pickett's assault,
he sent Kilpatrick on our left, where the enemy at
tempted a similar diversion, but was defeated."
Regarding McClellan's plans and operations, we
have a powerful corroboration from the principal
Confederate actor in the events described, except
that when he made his statement he was not aware
that McClellan's plans and operations, at Bumside's
request, were being fully carried out for some days
after McClellan's removal from command, no active

212 ANTIETAM
part having been taken by Bumside imtil consent
to act in another direction had been received from
Washington, November 14-15.
General Longstreet, in his article on the Battle
of Fredericksburg ("Battles and Leaders," vol. hi,
p. 84; Century Company), written long before the
publication of the Supplemental Volume li, of the
War Records, which first published the facts, cor
rectly states what McClellan — at the time of his
removal — had purposed to do. Longstreet never
knew that McClellan's plans had been already prac
tically accoraplished before Bumside took coramand,
and that the gaps which Longstreet refers to as
possibly open, were by November 9 hermetically
sealed by the Ninth Corps and all McClellan's cav
alry, under Pleasonton, down past Hazel River, and
well on to Madison Court House and beyond.
The following is the extract from Longstreet's
article above referred to :
"Burnside made a raistake frora the first. He
should have gone frora Warrenton to Chester Gap.
He raight then have held Jackson and fought me,
or have held me and fought Jackson, thus taking
us in detail. The doubt about the matter was
whether or not he could have caught me in that
trap before we could concentrate. At any rate, that
was the only move on the board that could have
benefited him at the time he was assigned to the
comraand of the Array of the Potomac. By inter
posing between the corps of Lee's army he would

LONGSTREET'S BATTLE-ORDER 213
have secured strong ground and advantage of posi
tion. "With skill equal to the occasion he should have
had success.
"This was the move about which we felt serious
apprehension, and we were occupying our minds
with plans to raeet it when the move toward Fred
ericksburg was reported. General McClellan, in his
report of August 4, 1863, speaks of this move as
that upon which he was studying when the order for
Burnside's assignment to command reached him."
There was no battle; it turned out to be a huge
but very pleasant joke on Longstreet, and he found
it out as soon as his battle-order was sent out; and
when he and Lee saw the great Army of the Poto
mac marching off as if in retreat, the snappy orders
came from Lee like whip-cracks, to McLaws, and
Ransom, and Anderson, and Pickett, and Alexan
der, who went gaily trooping away, on interior
lines, to Fredericksburg, and Jackson, with McClel
lan and all his troublesome attentions out of the
way, was making those long-legged tracks of his
up the valley, not away up to Swift Run Gap this
time, but an)rwhere, all the gaps open, to join Long-
street and have a good time. (See orders, in the
War Records, to each of the above commanders.)
McCleUan left the army. General Emory Upton,
then commanding a volunteer regiment, tells of the
army's "demonstrations and applause," and how he
and his own regiment stood, by his orders, cold and

214 ANTIETAM
silent because he was the son of an Abolitionist,
and an Abolitionist himself. But when afterward
confronted with the true facts he learned to know
McClellan ; he vindicated him ; and his later and bet
ter judgment found vent: "Twice I destroyed all
that I had finished, because it fell short of carrying
conviction. It may astonish you that I now regard
McClellan in his military character as a rauch abused
man" ; that "the differences of opinion between him
and the Administration would probably never have
arisen but for the interference of Stanton. He was
at the bottora of all the disasters of the year 1862."
(See General Michie's biography and letters of
Upton.)

XXIV
war DEPARTMENT STRATEGY, CONFEDERATE AND
UNION
To show the almost irresistible power of the
raalific civilian cabal at Washington, to which Lin
coln himself was subjected, I cite an incident show
ing General Meade's extrerae peril many months
even after the battle of Gettysburg, from which peril
Lincoln was able to save hira, and probably the
array, and the cause of the Union, only by strategy,
by fighting fire with fire. Lincoln had once half-
jestingly said: "You raust understand that I have
very little influence with this Administration" ; and
again, without any jest, had cried: "I am so borne
upon." And indeed, in the extremity of his em
barrassment, had offered to resign the Presidency
to obtain relief. The incident I quote is
taken from the authorized biography of Zachariah
Chandler, a senator who was all-powerful in the
cabal to which I refer, and the origin of which I
have referred to elsewhere in this volume.
"At the War Department Mr. Chandler was as well
known (and was reputed to be scarcely less power
ful than) as the Secretary himself." See "The
215

2x6 ANTIETAM
Detroit Post and Tribune [his own newspaper]
Biography, 1880."
"The Committee on the Conduct of the War did
not believe that the selection of General Meade for
the coramand of the Army of the Potomac was a
fortunate one. . . . It is a fact that they
recoraraended the reraoval of General Meade from
the coraraand, and the reinstateraent of Hooker.
On the 4th of March, 1864. Mr. Chandler and Mr.
Wade called upon the President, and told him that
they believed it to be their duty, impressed as they
were with the testimony the Committee had taken,
to lay a copy of it before him, and in behalf of the
army and the country demand the removal of Gen
eral Meade and the appointraent of some one more
competent to command. The President asked what
general they could recommend. They said that for
themselves they would be content with General
Hooker, believing him to be corapetent.
"They said that Congress had appointed the Com
mittee to watch the conduct of the war ; and unless
the state of things should be soon changed, it would
become their duty to make the testimony public
which they had taken, with such comments as the
circurastances of the case seemed to require." (See
Biography of Senator Chandler, page 245.)
It will be seen that this threat is alraost verbatim
the threat which Pope made to Halleck on October
30, 1862, and which was sufficiently powerful to
cause the removal of McClellan as soon as the letter

WAR DEPARTMENT STRATEGY 217
reached Washington, November 4-5, and while our
final victory was already in hand, and which re
moval gave us two more years of war besides count
less treasure and hundreds of thousands of brave
men lost. ( See statement of General Upton. )
Lincoln had yielded then, but he had had fifteen
months' experience since, and while, even now, he
was not strong enough to force the cabal, he was
strong or skillful enough to force their hand.
The Chandler biography says : "Meade was not
removed, but General Grant was, within a week,
given command as general-in-chief."
Grant was too strong for the cabal, and for Stan
ton and Halleck. Meade was safe.
It was not only in the Union army that this inter
ference of the Secretay of War appeared. In the
Confederate array it raanifested itself. It is true
in only a modified form, for it came by indirect
authority of the President, but it could not be tol
erated in any form, and it was instantly seized and
crushed and a barrier erected to make its repetition
impossible ever afterward. Well would it have
been for the cause of the Union and the success of
its armies had the like treatment been accorded a
usurping Secretary here, for license grows by what
it feeds upon, and it is but a step from the exercise
of delegated authority to the assumption of the
authority itself.
January 31, 1862, just before the depletion and
disorganization of McGellan's army began, and just

2i8 ANTIETAM
when Jefferson Davis had written, "Events havc
cast on our arras and hopes the gloomiest shadows,"
Stonewall Jackson wrote to the Secretary of War
that the Secretary's order requiring him to direct
General Loring to return with his comraand to Win
chester iramediately had been received and promptly
coraplied with. Jackson then adds: "With such
interference in my comraand I cannot expect to be
of rauch service in the field, and accordingly respect
fully request to be ordered to report for duty to the
superintendent of the Virginia Military Institute at
Lexington. Should this application not be granted,
I respectfully request that the President will accept
ray resignation frora the army."
This comraunication of Jackson's was endorsed
by General J. E. Johnston : "Respectfully forwarded
with great regret I don't know how the loss of this
officer can be supplied."
Secretary Benjarain then wrote to Johnston, stat
ing substantially the excuse raade to McClellan for
ordering away his First Corps and Blenker's divi
sion while the movement was in progress: that
Loring's command had been ordered away because
he and Davis had news of some contemplated move
ment up at Winchester by McClellan, and volun
teering, in true Stantonesque language, the opinion
that Jackson had scattered his forces "quite too far
apart for safety," but concluded by saying that these
suggestions were raerely his own opinions, "the
decision being left to yourself."

WAR DEPARTMENT STRATEGY 219
General Johnston begged Jackson to reconsider.
"Under ordinary circumstances," he said, "a due
sense of one's own dignity, as well as care for pro
fessional character and official rights, would de
mand such a course as yours; but the character of
this war, the great energy exhibited by the Govern
ment of the United States, the danger in which our
very existence as an independent people lies, requires
sacrifices from us all who have been educated as
soldiers." The Governor of Virginia wrote Jackson an im
passioned appeal. Johnston wrote the President
earnestly to prevent such a catastrophe frora oc
curring again, saying: "On a former occasion I
ventured to appeal to your Excellency against such
exercise of military coraraand by the Secretary of
War. Permit me now to suggest the separation of
the Valley District from ray comraand, on the
ground that it is necessary for the public interest
A collision of the authority of the honorable Secre
tary of War with mine might occur at a critical
moment. In such an event disaster would he in
evitable. The responsibility of the command has
been imposed upon me. Your Excellency's known
sense of justice will not hold me to that responsi
bility while the corresponding control is not in my
hands. . . . What I propose is necessary to
the safety of our troops and cause."
Jackson authorized the Governor to withdraw his
resignation, stating that his views remained un-

220 ANTIETAM
changed, and adding : "If the Secretary persists in
the ruinous policy complained of, I feel no officer
can serve his country better than by making his
strongest possible protest against it, which, in my
opinion, is done by tendering his resignation, rather
than be a willful instrument in prosecuting the war
upon a ruinous principle."
The Secretary's wings were clipped. On March
13 Executive General Orders were issued: "Gen
eral Robert E. Lee is assigned to duty at the seat
of government; and, under the direction of the
President, is charged with the conduct of military
operations in the arraies of the Confederacy."
General Huger afterward coraplained that the
Secretary of War was nothing but a clerk, so far
as troops were concerned.

XXV
M'cLELLAN'S strategy for TURNING THE CONFED
ERATE POSITIONS ON THE PENINSULA MADE
IMPOSSIBLE BY INTERFERENCE FROM WASHING
TON
This case, on a small scale, was precisely what
befell McClellan on a large scale, when Blenker's
division and then the First Army Corps were taken
away from him at a tirae when most of his army,
and the commanding general himself, had already
landed on the Peninsula and the First Corps was
absolutely necessary, and its cooperating destination
and raoveraents had been prepared and ordered.
But the stake was too great for McClellan to have
resigned ; a hundred thousand of his raen at Wash
ington and on the Peninsula, and the fate of the
nation, depended on his continuance in coraraand,
even as best he could, for the people at Washing
ton were children in the art of war.
When McClellan's army, in March, 1862, was
drawn back from the Warrenton front and rapidly
moved by water to its new base at Fort Monroe
and the Peninsula, he left more than 55,000 men,
the heavy artillery, and the works on which he had

222 ANTIETAM
expended the labor of thousands of contrabands for
months. At a council of all the corps commanders held
March 13, the Peninsula raoveraent was unani
raously recoraraended, provided the Merrimac
(Rebel ironclad) could be neutralized, which was
raost effectually done by the Monitor, which Mc
Clellan rushed forward. (See War Records.)
Heintzleman, Keyes, and McDowell agreed that,
besides the garrisoned works, a force of 25,000
would suffice to render Washington secure ; Sumner
put it at 40,000. McClellan left more than 50,000,
besides, of course, those afterward detained.
The movement comraenced. Hamilton, Fitz John
Porter, Heintzleman, Couch, the regulars and cav
alry, had landed on the Peninsula. Then, March
31, Stanton notified McClellan: "The President
directs that Blenker's division be sent forward to
Harper's Ferry, there to await orders, instead of
being sent to Fort Monroe." General Sumner
wrote, March 31, from Warrenton Junction, that
his two principal divisions had been reraoved. Then,
April 4, carae the crowning blow. "The President,
deeming the force to be left in front of Wash
ington insufficient to assure its safety, has directed
that McDowell's force [the First Corps] should be
detached from the forces operating under your im
mediate direction." Did these men know what they
were doing?
Magruder had been fortifying across the Renin-

McCLELLAN'S STRATEGY, ETC. 223
sula, on the Yorktown line, for many months, em
ploying all the negroes he could hire or impress,
from one thousand to two thousand in number.
McClellan's main raove raust be against these works,
because the Jaraes River was still in possession of
the Confederates, and the heavy forts at Yorktown,
and at Gloucester iramediately opposite, — only at
short cannon range apart, — forbade the passage
of wooden transports up the York River while
Gloucester was in possession of the eneray. (See
Magruder's elaborate dispatches in the War
Records. )
McClellan's plan was to break this blockade by
using McDowell's corps in a great turning move
ment on the north side of the York River. It was
fashionable to sneer in those days at fortifications ;
and, indeed, the only possible means of even keep
ing the public quiet after McClellan was deprived
of McDowell corps was to iterate and reiterate,—
to have the press teem with these innuendoes and
charges, — that McClellan didn't need McDowell's
corps and that Washington City needed it badly;
that McClellan lay in the mud with more than
100,000 raen in front of a line of works that even
an energetic cow could climb over in most places;
and that if he had had McDowell's corps to put into
the mud also it would have been all the sarae, or
worse. Even Grant had not yet been educated up to
the value of fortifications. August 23, 1861, he
wrote from Jefferson City, Mo. : "I am not fortify-

224 ANTIETAM
ing here at all. . . . With the picket guard
and other duty coming upon the men of this com
mand, there is but little time left for drilling. DriU
and discipline are raore necessary for the men than
fortification. Another difficulty in the way of forti
fying is that I have no engineer officer to direct it;
no time to attend to it myself, and very little dis
position to gain a 'Pillow notoriety' from a branch
of service that I have forgotten all about."
But after that period Grant learned, — at Vicks
burg, Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor, and Petersburg, —
quite a different lesson, and the branch of service
that he had forgotten all about came back to him
with a vividness that left all along the trail of his
armies fortifications of a class and scope which
America had never seen before; and he so taught
his soldiers, that the first thing they did, when in
the face of the eneray, was to take to digging with
sticks, bayonets, spoons, and tin cups.
Grant wrote to Meade, July 30, 1864: "Our
experience to-day proves that fortifications come
near holding themselves without troops. If, there
fore, the enemy should attempt to tum your posi
tion, do not hesitate to take out nearly every man
to meet such attack. . . . With a reasonable
amount of artillery and one infantryman for six
feet, I am confident either party could hold its lines
against a direct attack of the other."
July 5, 1864, General Warren proposed the with
drawal of two corps from his left, provided he could

McCLELLAN'S STRATEGY, ETC. 225
construct or have two small redoubts with a battery
and 500 men, and another along the road that would
hold 1 500 raen. He counted these 2000, with their
batteries and works for defensive purposes, as equal
there to two army corps for offensive purposes,
and added: "It gives you an idea how important
I regard the similar works now held by the eneray
in our front."
July 12, 1864, Grant writes Meade: "I would
not perrait any attack against the eneray in an in
trenched position."
July 27: "I do not want Hancock to attack in
trenched lines."
October 2, to Meade: "Intrench and hold what
you can, but raake no attack against defended forti
fications." October 24 : "Parke should be instructed that if
he finds the enemy intrenched and their works well
manned, he is not to attack, but confront him, and
be prepared to advance proraptly when he finds out
by the moveraent of the other two colurans to the
right and rear of thera that they begin to give way."
This is so accurate a description of McClellan's
proposed turning raoveraent by McDowell, while
Heintzleraan and Fitz John Porter held the front,
that it could have been incorporated verbatim in
McCleUan's report.
Grant tells Butler, October 24 : "I do not want
any attack made by you against intrenched and de^
fended positions."

226 ANTIETAM
Again : "Let it be distinctly imderstood by corps
commanders that there is to be no attack made
against defended, intrenched positions."
December 7, 1864, General Humphreys wrote
Meade that, as directed, he had withdrawn 13,300
men for a movement elsewhere, leaving "the lines
held by a miniraum force," which he described as
"total six railes of line, 4600 men."
December 8 Meade wrote Grant that he proposed
to hold all the intrenched lines of the Array of the
Potoraac "with about 11,000 men, leaving about
22,000 men and 30 guns available for any move
ment" So evident, even to the enemy, was Grant's re
vised opinion of the extreme value of fortifications,
that in 1864 Lee wrote the Secretary of War, Au
gust 22 : "I think it evident that the enemy has
abandoned the effort to drive us from our present
position by force, and that his purpose now is to
compel us to evacuate by cutting off our supplies. I
think his intention in the late demonstration north
of the James River was not only to cause the re
moval of troops from Petersburg, but also to try to
break through to Richmond."
If one will substitute York for James, and York-
town for Petersburg, he will have, exactly, Mc
Clellan's plan, just before McDowell was with
drawn. While General Grant had learned these lessons
at great expense from the Confederates, and the

McCLELLAN'S STRATEGY, ETC. 227
Administration had learned it from Grant, and the
people were left in the opinion that Grant was still
banging away and charging the works, McClellan
had learned his lessons, at a very sraall expense,
frora the Russian works in the Criraea, and the
Allied assaults and their results, where the United
States Government had sent hira during the Criraean
War for that very purpose. ( See McClellan's great
report on the Arraies of Europe, republished in
1861, which Appleton's Cyclopaedia of Araerican
Biography describes as "a model of fullness, ac
curacy, and system.")
As for our men lying in the raud and water so
long before the Rebel works, I will later on cite the
testimony of General D. H. Hill, an eye-witness,
who will tell us that the condition of the Confed
erates was so much worse, and that our own men
were so much more healthy and comfortable, that
they used to pity the poor Johnnies, as good Chris
tians ought to have done.
McCleUan's plan (see his letter of April 4, dated
at Fort Monroe, the very day McDowell's force
was taken away from hira,) was that, with one
division of the First Corps he should land on the
Severn River, up the Bay, and assault the Glouces
ter works from the rear. The fort at Gloucester
Point was on much higher ground and comraanded
the works at Yorktown at short cannon range, but
was open in the rear.
General Magruder had written of the defenses

228 ANTIETAM
at Gloucester on September 7, 1861 : "The landing
of the [Union] army in rear of Gloucester Point
can be effected easily, and without opposition, an
extensive shore and many navigable rivers affording
every opportunity."
McClellan's movement of McDowell was to be
extremely prompt; in fact, he had already tele
graphed — when he wrote McDowell, April 4 — to
Franklin and Rucker to get this division embarked
at once.
Now Magruder states, as to his own forces, in
his report of AprU 11, that "some 1500 are over
the York River, at Gloucester Point."
McClellan's next directions, April 4, to Mc
Dowell were that he should hold the other two
divisions to raove up the York River iraraedlately
upon the fall of Yorktown. The captured works
at Gloucester and the navy, under Goldsborough,
who was ready and anxious to attack, would have
silenced the Yorktown works, so that McDowell's
force could have gone up protected by the navy,
while his other division raarched up the excellent
sandy roads along the north bank of the York
River. This force, raoving to the head of York
River, would have been in rear of Magruder, who
would have had to abandon his works and retire
on Richraond or else cross the Jaraes River, — as
occurred in a like case during the Revolutionary
War, — to save themselves.
July 6, 1 78 1, CornwaUis lay with his army near

McCLELLAN'S STRATEGY, ETC. 229
Williamsburg. Lafayette and Wayne appeared on
the Peninsula, north of him, and attacked. Al
though the attack was repulsed, yet the Americans
StiU hung near the Chickahominy above him, and
Comwallis, the day after the battle of Green
Springs, retreated across the James River by boats
and abandoned the Peninsula. (See Johnston's
"Yorktown Campaign of 1781.")
McClellan would now have been at liberty to use
water transport to establish his new base at the
White House and present himself in front of Rich
mond before the bulk of General J. E. Johnston's
army, then upon the upper Rappahannock, could
have arrived there.
The effect of this movement, if earned out, is
clearly shown in Lee's letter, to General Magruder
at Yorktown, dated April 9 : "I intended to call
your attention to the possibility of the enemy's forc
ing a passage by the batteries on the York and James
rivers, below your lines at Yorktown and Williams
burg. It was not my intention to advise the aban
donment of the Williamsburg lines, even if you
should be corapelled to fall back from Yorktown,
unless the movements of the enemy by water should
place him in the rear of the former as well as the
latter position. In that event you would be com
pelled to place the Chickahominy between you and
the enemy."
He was advised to destroy the wharves on the
York and James rivers, "in the rear of your present

230 ANTIETAM
lines, as the eneray would be most likely to use them
for landing their troops."
This, of course, meant the abandonment of the
whole Peninsula and the concentration of Magruder
in front of Richmond, to defend that city alone,
no other considerable part of the Confederate army
having yet, at that tirae or for raany days after
ward, reached Richraond or Yorktown.

XXVI
POSITIONS AND NUMBERS OF CONFEDERATE FORCES
WHEN M' CLELLAN OCCUPIED THE YORKTOWN
FRONT ON THE PENINSULA
Let us try to see where Johnston's army of
Northern Virginia actually was located while Mc
Clellan's investraent of Yorktown, and the opera
tions on the Peninsula were in progress.
In the "Suraraary of Events" at the beginning
of Volume xl. Official War Records, we find:
"March 17, 1862, Erabarkation of the Array of the
Potomac commenced at Alexandria, Va." "April
2, Headquarters Army of the Potomac transferred
to vicinity of Fort Monroe." "April 12, Command
of General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army, ex
tended over the Departments of Norfolk and the
Peninsula." McClellan had sent his forces down by divisions,
as the transport service was slow.
The condition of the country roads at this time
at Warrenton, and thence to Richmond, is shown
by numberless dispatches. General G. W. Smith
reportS; March 10, from Warrenton Springs: "I
am fairly launched on a sea of mud."
231

232 ANTIETAM
McCleUan's movements were not known until
after the end of March. General Johnston on
March 27 was encamped on the Rapidan, 125 miles
in an air-line from Yorktown. Ewell's division
was on the Rappahannock, near the bridge; the
divisions of Longstreet, Jones, Early, and D. H.
Hill were near Johnston, on the Rapidan.
Lee had just ordered 10,000 men to Richmond.
Huger, south of the James, had been ordered to
Magruder, who was holding the Yorktown line, and
the Peninsula, against McClellan. By April 5
(Magruder's report on that date) McClellan's forces
had reached the Confederate works, and had begun
firing, Magruder's force was about 11,500. This
was a sraall force, relatively, but it was rauch larger,
and of better quality, than the force which defeated
Grant in his atterapt to break the merely temporary
works held largely by militia, in front of Peters
burg in June, 1864.
March 28 the divisions of Early and Toombs
were ordered South to Richraond, but did not get
away until AprU 4. Ewell was in coramand at
Williamsburg April 6; Rodes' brigade arrived
April 7, without transportation, the other regiments
reporting in the same condition. General McLaws'
command arrived about the same time and Early's
brigade April 8.
March 28 the public property was ordered from
GordonsviUe, but Lee forbade its being sent to
Richmond. March 28, also, Huger was ordered by

POSITIONS AND NUMBERS, ETC. 233
Lee to hold his few troops at Norfolk, across the
James. "The move on the Peninsula may be a
feint, and the real attack be on Norfolk."
The same date, the 28th, Lee wrote Johnston on
the Rapidan, to hold his lines there, as it would be
better to give up the Peninsula and Norfolk than
lose the Central Railroad and connection with the
valley at Staunton.
It was not until April 4 that Johnston was ordered
to raove to Richmond from the Rapidan.
Johnston wrote Lee, still from the Rapidan, April
6, that "the railroad is operating so slowly that
there is abundant time to instruct me further."
April 1 1 Magruder reported the arrival of D. H.
Hill, bringing his total force up to 20,000 men.
April 13 Hill took command at Yorktown, and
reported only sixty-five rounds of ammunition per
gun for the heavy artiUery. General Magruder had
removed five 8-inch guns to the land side of the
works, adding that "General Johnston's presence
and General Johnston's army may save us; other
wise the contest wiU be hopeless."
April 15 Hill reported that Goldsborough has
been bombarding Yorktown with two gunboats for
two days, and that he had but two guns which
could reach the gunboats; "the other shells are
w'orthless." He says, "I am rauch troubled about
the river." "If the eneray get a position in rear of
us [that is, across the York River] our raen cannot
stand to their guns on the land side. Every day is

234 ANTIETAM
a gain to the enemy." It was only on April 20
that Johnston's army had reached the Yorktown
lines. April 21 D. H. HiU wrote the War Department:
"As far as the defense of our position is concerned,
we are iraraeasurably the losers. The eneray keeps
beyond the range of our guns and pelts us all day
long. It is true that but few are killed daily, but
our raen are kept in the wet trenches and are
harassed day and night. Disease will destroy a
hundred- fold raore than the Yankee artillery. Pro
tected by these guns, however, he can retire to his
comfortable tents and fires while our poor fellows
are in the wet and cold. This is a sad but true pic
ture of our situation."

XXVII
THE DETRACTORS OF m' CLELLAN  HIS FRIENDS AND
SUPPORTERS — Lincoln's vindication of
m'clellan
Those who witnessed the scene at Warrenton,
when McClellan, stripped of all authority and or
dered to report himself at Trenton, N. J., rode
through the ranks of that magnificent and
triumphant army, as he left it, to that army's woe
and to his country's needless and irreparable loss,
will never forget it. Those who have read the de
scription of eye-witnesses wiU ever be thriUed by its
recollection; and those who have done neither, but
have traced during the Rebellion the parallel careers
of McClellan and the army he created, — for whUe
the Government furnished money and men, it was
McClellan himself who created and made the Army
of the Potoraac, — wiU know what raust have hap
pened on that wonderful occasion. I need not de
scribe it, save to quote a sentence from a private let
ter of General Hancock to his wife, on that occa
sion : "The Army are not satisfied with the change,
and consider the treatment of McClellan most un
gracious and inopportune." 235

236 ANTIETAM
It is true that there were raen in the army at one
time or another who did not like McQellan, and
who eagerly came before the civilian strategists, in
cluding the Congressional Committee on the Con
duct of the War, and testified most bitterly and
recklessly against him. But the history of the army
careers of these witnesses theraselves vindicated
McClellan raore triumphantly than the strongest
testimony from these raen could have done, if in his
favor. It was not Grant, Meade, Sherman, Sheri
dan, Thomas, Hancock, Reynolds, Couch, Slocum,
Wright, Buell, Ingalls, Williams, Hunt, Humph
reys, Warren, Pleasonton, and soldiers of this stamp
and erainence, that were to be found in the ranks
of those detractors, but raen that belonged to the
bread-and-butter brigades who sought to curry favor
with the powers that were, and who, as a reward,
lost caste, influence, and comraand. Many of those
in power at Washington who loved the prejudiced
information, despised the prejudiced informer, so
that the inexorable law of the "survival of the
fittest," long before the war ended elirainated these
men frora command more effectually than McClel
lan himself could have done, had he been all-power
ful and so disposed. You will search the records
of 1864 and 1865 in vain for the naraes of these
men; nearly all are missing, and justly so.
And that great Lincoln, not himself a soldier,
and slow to learn the principles — and never to leam
the practice^ — of the art of war, but a few months

THE DETRACTORS OF McCLELLAN 237
after McClellan's removal lived to vindicate in the
following letter McClellan's previous career and all
his teachings and practices; to legitimatize all Mc
Clellan's repudiated requests ; to confirm all his argu
ments; and to establish all that McClellan had so
vainly sought to have accepted and to disestablish
all that he had so vainly urged the authorities not
to do.
The remarkable letter, cited below, from Mr. Lin
coln to General Halleck, written Septeraber 19,
1863 (vol. XXIX, part 2, pp. 207-208), should have
a place in history alongside that other celebrated
letter he wrote to Hooker on the question of a
dictatorship, and that other noble letter in which he
declared that he would save the Union with slavery,
or he would save the Union without slavery, his
sole object being to save the Union. This letter was
written by Mr. Lincoln himself, unknown to Hal
leck or to anyone else: "Executive Mansion,
Washington, September 19, 1863.
Major-General Halleck: By General Meade's dispatch
to you of yesterday, it appears that he desires your views
and those of the Government as to whether he shall advance
upon the enemy. I am not prepared to order or even advise
an advance in this case, wherein I know so little of the par
ticulars, and wherein he, in the field, thinks the risk is so
great and the promise of advantage so small. And yet the
case presents matter for very serious consideration in an
other aspect. These two armies confront each other across
a small river, substantially midway between the two capitals,
each defending its own capital and menacing the other. Gen-

238 ANTIETAM
eral Meade estimates the enemy's infantry in front of him
at not less than 40,000. Suppose we add fifty per cent, to
this for cavalry, artillery, and extra-duty men, stretching as
far as Richmond, making the whole force of the enemy
60,000. General Meade, as shown by his returns, has with
him, and between him and Washington, of the same classes of
well men, over 90,000. Neither can bring the whole of his
men into a battle, but each can bring as large a percentage
as the other. For a battle, then, General Meade has three
men to General Lee's two. Yet, it having been determined
that choosing ground and standing on the defensive gives so
great advantage that the three cannot safely attack the two,
the three are left simply standing on the defensive also. If
the enem3r's 60,000 are sufficient to keep our 90,000 away
from Richmond, why, by the same rule, may not 40,000 of
ours keep their 60,000 away from Washington, leaving us
50,000 to put to some other use? Having practically come to
the mere defensive, it seems to be no economy at all to era
ploy twice as many men for that object as are needed. With
no object, certainly, to mislead myself, I can perceive no
fault in this statement unless we admit we are not the equal
of the enemy, man for man. I hope s^ou will consider it
To avoid misunderstanding, let me say that to attempt to
fight the enemy slowly back into his entrenchments at Rich
mond, and there to capture him, is an idea I have been trying
to repudiate for quite a year. My judgment is so clear
against it that I would scarcely allow the attempt to be
made, if the General in command should desire to make it.
My last attempt upon Richmond was to get McClellan, when
he was nearer there than the enemy was, to run in ahead
of him. Since then I have constantly desired the Army of
the Potomac to make Lee's army, and not Richmond, its
objective point. If our army cannot fall upon the enemy and
hurt him where he is, it is plain to me it can gain nothing
by attempting to follow him over a succession of intrenched
lines into a fortified city.''

THE DETRACTORS OF McCLELLAN 239
Where now was the vaunted march on Center
ville? Where the "On to Richmond" ? Where was
the great garrison of 80,000 men, besides aU the
fortifications, to guard Washington? Where now
was the condemnation of McClellan's raove to the
Peninsula, to reach the coramunications and Lee's
array by the back and side doors, and strike there
first? and where the robbing of McClellan to keep
his troops back at Washington and so render suc
cess impossible? And where was Lincoln's urging
for McClellan to raove east of the mountains and
take 40,000 from Washington's 90,000, or west of
the mountains and get 15,000?
Mr. Lincoln's reference to McClellan's run
ning into Richraond when he was nearer there, and
so getting ahead of Lee's army, refers tO' the very
part of the 1862 campaign during which McClellan
was removed, and shows that Mr. Lincoln did not
yet understand war or topography.
For McClellan to pass by his own flank across the
front of Longstreet and Jackson, to "run into Rich
mond," was the very plan eraployed by Grant the
next year, which began at the Wilderness, where
his whole front half in the advance had to be called
back, when it had gotten twenty miles ahead, to
save the rear half from total destmction, and which
ended at Cold Harbor, where the Confederates lost,
substantially, but as raany hundreds as we lost thou
sands. Mr. Lincoln never thought of Lee's suggestion

240 ANTIETAM
to Jackson, when he was in his direst strait, Novem
ber 9, 1862, to cross the Potomac, so as to draw
back McClellan's army to that river. But if Jack
son had been able to raake the movement, — which,
however, McClellan had fully provided against, —
the yell frora Washington and the North would
have hurried McClellan back, as it nearly did Grant
in August, 1864, even if at the very gates of Rich
mond, and practically "moving in"; and Mr. Lin
coln would have been the first to utter it. And so
he ought to have been. For Grant's dispatch, scare
at Washington July 26, 1864, see W. R., vol. xl,
part 3, page 484 : For removal of all Grant's heavy
guns and araraunition to be sent north, in urgent
haste, and all in our works, see from page 641 to
page 727; orders, dispatches and reports. See also
General Hunt's report, vol. xl, part i, pages 658-
660. For Lincoln's visit to meet Grant at Fortress
Monroe, part 3, page 636. Ever)d:hing on board
transports for sailing, at City Point and Broadway
Landing, July 31. Page 721. For Grant's letter to
Halleck, of August 15, 1864, "My withdrawal now
from the James River now would insure the defeat
of Sherman," vol. xlii, part 2, page 193; and Lin
coln's reply of August 17, 1864, "Hold on with a
bull-dog grip, and chew and choke as much as pos
sible," vol. xlii, part 2, page 243.
Besides, McClellan was not nearer Richmond
than Lee was, but directly the reverse, for from
Sharpsburg to Richmond is 150 miles in an air-

THE DETRACTORS OF McCLELLAN 241
line; while from Longstreet's position, near Front
Royal, with Jackson immediately behind him, is
only 105 miles. By marching routes the difference
in favor of Lee was enormously greater. Then,
Mr. Lincoln obviously believed that McClellan could
slip past a Confederate front of 60 railes, in full
view frora the mountains, "unbeknownst" to Lee;
and that the preparations for and initiation of a
great military movement does not betray itself at
once, of necessity, to the military eye and raind
of the enemy.
As a matter of fact, the day McClellan began to
move Lee began, and with Longstreet's corps passed
the southern gaps, which McClellan had not yet
reached, and was at Culpeper Court House before
McClellan was at Warrenton. Lee's mistake was
in leaving Jackson in the valley too long; he took
the chances, for military reasons, but miscalculated
McClellan's speed, and Jackson was caught, and
held fast there, in spite of all that could be done
to relieve hira or bring him to Longstreet's aid.

XXVIII
THE CAUSE OF m'CLELLAN'S REMOVAL
The question recurs: Why was McClellan re
raoved, and ordered to Trenton? As a last ditch,
many have fallen back on what is called McClellan's
attitude on the slavery question. But McClellan's
attitude was precisely that of Lincoln, but not at all
that of Stanton and some of the raembers of Con
gress with whora the Secretary of War was in close
and secret contact. And these raatters ought to be
raade clear, because they have affected the judgraent
of raUitary raen who ought to have learned better —
Grant and Upton, for example.
Early in the war — May 17, 1861 — McCleUan
wrote to Adjutant General Townsend, at Washing
ton, from his Headquarters, Department of the
Ohio, at Cincinnati, that Garrett Davis had told
him that the Union raen of Kentucky had resolved
that "we will remain in the Union by voting, if we
can; by fighting, if we must; and if we cannot hold
our own we will call on the General Govemment
to aid us." And he asked McClellan what he would
do, from Ohio, if they called upon him for assist
ance. He replied that if there were time he would
refer to General Scott for orders; if there were not
242

CAUSE OF McCLELLAN'S REMOVAL 243
time, he replied, "I would cross the Ohio with
20,000 men. If that were not enough with 30,000,
and if necessary with 40,000 ; but I would not stand
by and see the loyal Union raen of Kentucky
crushed." (Official War Records, Supplemental
Volume H, part i, pp. 381, 383.)
To Buell he wrote, while general-in-chief, No
veraber 7, 1861 : "It is absolutely necessary that we
shall hold aU the State of Kentucky. Not only that,
but that the majority of its inhabitants shall be
warmly in favor of our cause. . . . You will
please constantly bear in mind the precise issue for
which we are fighting. That issue is the preserva
tion of the Union and the restoration of the full
authority of the General Government over all por
tions of our territory. We shall most readily sup
press this rebellion, and restore the authority of the
Government, by religiously respecting the constitu
tional rights of all. I know that I express the feel
ings and opinions of the President when I say that
we are fighting only to preserve the integrity of
the Union and the constitutional authority of the
General Government
"The inhabitants of Kentucky may rely upon it
that their doraestic institutions will in no raanner be
interfered with, and that they will receive at our
hands every constitutional protection." (War
Records, vol. v, page 38.)
That this was in accordance with Mr. Lincoln's
views is deraonstrated by the fact that Kentucky

244 ANTIETAM
was excepted in the Emancipation Proclamation.
That McClellan's views of the protection of slaves
did not extend beyond the loyal boundaries is shown
by his general plan of array raoveraents throughout
the Rebel States, submitted to the Secretary of
War, for the President, February 3, 1862: "We
should then be in a condition to reduce at our leisure
all the Southem seaports, to occupy all the avenues
of comraunication; to use the great outlet of the
Mississippi; to re-establish our govemment and
arms in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas; to force
the slaves to labor for our subsistence instead of
that of the Rebels; to bid defiance to all foreign
interference." McClellan was the very first to use fugitive slaves
in a large way.
General Butler, down at Fortress Monroe, in
May, 1 86 1, was wonderfully pestered with the slave
question. On May 25 three slaves ran away from
the plantation of the coramander of the secession
forces of the district and gave themselves up to his
picket guard. Butler examined the negroes sepa
rately, and "determined for the present, and until
better advised, to avail myself of their services,"
which were much needed, and that "I would send a
receipt to Colonel Mallory that I had so taken them,
as I would for any other property of a private
citizen which the exigencies of the service seemed
to require."
General Scott and Secretary of War Cameron

CAUSE OF McCLELLAN'S REMOVAL 245
both endorsed this report as having "much to praise
and nothing to condemn. It is highly interesting
in several aspects, particularly in its relation to the
slave question."
In July Butler made a coraplaint against Colonel
Duryea, that he took nine of these escaped slaves
to Was'hington with him, against his express orders,
and after a portion of them had been detained by
Butler's provost-marshal. He wanted instructions,
but he doesn't seem to have gotten any until Mc
Clellan got to Washington, and he was not so
squeamish. General Wool was then in command
at Fort Monroe, and wrote to the Secretary of War,
September 22, 1861 : "I have called for an irame
diate report from the proper officers as to the
negroes here, in reference to General McClellan's
request, and I shall then forward as many as can
be spared."
General Wool had written, September 18: "I
would be much gratified if you would tell me what
I am to do with the negro slaves that are almost
daily arriving at this post from the interior. Ara
I to find food and shelter for the women and chil
dren, who can do nothing for themselves ?"
McClellan cried "Yes," and the Secretary of
War, Cameron, at once wrote to General Wool
from Washington: "You will, as early as prac
ticable, send to General McClellan at this place all
negro men capable of performing labor, accompanied
by their families."

246 ANTIETAM
Who is so silly as to imagine that General Mc
Clellan had teraporarily "borrowed" the women and
babies from their Rebel owners ?
September 26, 1861, McCleUan requested the
general-in-chief "to send contrabands to Harper's
Ferry to perforra the labor required, if there are
any disposable in Washington."
And McClellan saw that these men were paid
fifty cents per day and board, and that govemment
supplies were issued to feed and clothe the women
and children.
The amount of misrepresentation regarding Mc
Clellan is so great everywhere that it is alraost im
possible to run these clues out, in every case; but
whenever they are laboriously and persistently run
out, misrepresentation, false suggestion, and false
hood will be found as thick as blackberries.
McClellan's main purpose, as was Lincoln's, was
to save the Union ; others had different views and
purposes connected with conquering and subduing;
and Lincoln, tO' avoid divided counsels, was obliged
to use these factors as well, and they in tum were
constantly endeavoring to use Mr. Lincoln also.
There were two diaraetrically opposing views at
Washington, both in favor of suppressing the Re
bellion, but outside that dominating purpose one
view was to conquer the South absolutely, to rule it
as conquered territory, and to ignore State lines,
and the States themselves. This view was a real
view, and had something in its favor; but it con-

CAUSE OF McCLELLAN'S REMOVAL 247
ceded the right of secession, as well as that of con
quest, and neither Lincoln nor McCleUan accepted
this view at all. To them it was a Union of in
divisible States.
Secretary Chase expressed the radical view in his
letter to Mellen, of March 26, 1862 : "While I think
that the government, in suppression of rebellion,
in view of the destruction by suicide of the State
governraents with the actual or strongly iraplied
consent of the raajority of the citizens of the seven
Rebel States, have so far forfeited all right to be
regarded as States," etc. (see Warden's "Life
of Chase") ; and also in his conversation of Decem
ber 10, 1861, with Senator Wade and Representa
tive Ashby, Chairmen of the Territorial Coraraittees
of their respective houses, and who concurred with
Chase in his statement, that when a State govern
raent attempted to withdraw from the Union "the
State organization was forfeited, and it lapsed into
the condition of a Territory, with which we could
do as we pleased."
This was in accordance with President Johnson's
phrase, "To make treason odious," and also with the
spirit of the Reconstruction period.
But these men, even in the darkest days of the
Rebellion, did not represent the people for whom
they claimed, or, in fact, often did not even claim,
to act. They possessed speech, and they often
suborned the press, they worked in secret, and
sought by every art and device to bring the people

248 ANTIETAM
up to their plane of action. But they never suc
ceeded; the great Northern people never endorsed
thera, and the army repudiated them with indigna
tion. It was only the lamentable tragedy of Lin
coln's assassination which, even for the moraent,
swept the Araerican people off their feet, and gave
this coterie of active theorists their power success
fully to interfere. The great raass, even of the
strenuous Abolitionists, always belonged to that
class to which the poet Whittier belonged, of whom
his biographer says : "After the war was over he
would have raade the terras of settleraent liberal and
conciliatory. He was too wise and too huraane
to stir the still living erabers of passion and re
sentraent for any political end, however dear to
him." Lincoln, during the war, kept on organizing
States in the Confederate territory wherever he
could find a loyal nucleus, — in West Virginia,
Louisiana, and in Virginia, — and he represented
those more enlightened views which, after Recon
struction had demonstrated the futility, the danger,
and the unpopularity of the radical plan, were uni
versally accepted.
McClellan, in his letter of instructions to BueU,
in Kentucky, Noveraber 12, 1861, clearly put forth
his views on this subject "Bear in raind," he
said, "that we are fighting only to preserve the
Union, and to uphold the power of the General Gov
ernment. As far as military necessity will permit,

CAUSE OF McCLELLAN'S REMOVAL 249
religiously respect the constitutional rights of all.
Preserve the strictest discipline among the troops,
and while employing the utmost energy in military
movements, be careful to so treat the unarraed in
habitants as to contract, not widen, the breach exist
ing between us and the Rebels."
Since the war we have tried both plans; and I
feel satisfied that the views of Lincoln and McClel
lan will now find almost universal endorsement,
and the theory of "State suicide" almost universal
dissent. As regards eraancipation, this proclamation was
regarded by McClellan, as well as by Lincoln, as
purely a war measure, and McClellan believed that
it would prove ineffective in hostile regions wherever
our armies did not penetrate, and could not reach;
while, without it, in hostile regions where our arraies
did penetrate, the slaves were already free to aban
don their raasters, and we would protect them, —
would, as McClellan said, "force the slaves to labor
for our subsistence instead of that of the Rebels."
By ceasing to be rebels, and surrendering, in all our
territory, under McClellan's plan, they could avoid
the penalty; by ceasing to be rebels, and surrender
ing, in rebel territory, under Mr. Lincoln's plan,
they must still suffer the penalty. One plan invited
early submission ; the other, resistance to death, for
it was the slaves who supported the armies in the
field and the woraen and children at horae. One
said to the boy in the tree, "I will punish you if you

250 ANTIETAM
don't come down" ; the other, "I will punish you as
soon as you do- come down."
It is true that, alraost under any circumstances,
the systera of huraan bondage raust have received
its death-blow with the success of our arras. It was
a "peculiar institution," and was rapidly growing
out of harraony with the age, and even with the
raass of the Confederate soldiers. (See what Dr.
Steiner said of the negroes in the Confederate
ranks at Frederick, and the fact that negro soldiers
were afterward enlisted in 1865 in the Confederate
arraies.) But there was a far greater question at
issue, and one involving even eraancipation itself,
and that was the preservation of the Union ; for the
success of the Confederacy raeant not only the de
struction of our great Republic, but the failure of
eraancipation also. If we coiUd not conquer the
Rebels when they were a part of our own popula
tion, rauch less could we have found raen and raeans
to invade and conquer the South when an inde
pendent foreign country. It will be seen a little
later on into how grave peril the Union cause fell
frora political raisraanageraent, even in the very
closing raonths of the war.
No one now believes that the Eraancipation
Proclaraation legally freed any slaves, except tem
porarily by martial law. Lincoln knew that him
self, or he would not have insisted, in his confer
ence with the Rebel Commissioners at City Point
at the end of January, 1865 (see Grant's

CAUSE OF McCLELLAN'S REMOVAL 251
"Memoirs"), that they must concede the surrender
of slavery as a prerequisite to any peace. (See
Volume XLvi, part 2, p. 509, Official War Records.)
Mr. Lincoln's demands were that three things were
indispensable : "First, the restoration of a national
authority throughout all the States. Second, no
receding, by the Executive of the United States, on
the slavery question, from the position assumed
thereon by him in the late annual raessage to Con
gress and in preceding documents. Third, no ces
sation of hostilities short of an end of the war and
the disbanding of all forces hostile to the Gevorn-
ment." The first and third were, of course, subject
to acceptance or rejection; but if the second had
become a "res adjudicata" in 1862, it is difficult to
see how any amount of "receding" could put these
negroes back into slavery again in 1865.
The slaves were already free, slavery was already
abolished, if the proclamation was legally effective
when issued; and the Constitution of the United
States, and of the States theraselves, forbade already
the reduction to slavery of any legal freeman. We
all now know what freed the slaves and abolished
slavery in the United States; it was not the Proc
lamation ; it was an amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, and that was not adopted till
after the war had ended.
But there is no doubt that the Proclamation in
creased the hostility of the South, enforced, will
ingly, universal conscription, silenced the Southem

252 ANTIETAM
Unionists, and prolonged the war. Everyone agrees
to that. The sole excuse of its issuance was that
it was worth the price, especially for political effect
upon other nations, as defining the attitude of our
Government on the question of slavery in so far
as the States in rebellion were concerned. The
validity and strength of this position raay be fully
conceded. But a shorter war would have afforded
the sarae advantage, with less loss and far less risk.
But historians in general, and the public as well,
do not clearly understand what that price was, and
how we were, at last, and alraost by a rairacle, saved
from paying some such fearful price.

XXIX
OUR GRAVEST PERIL IN THE CLOSING YEAR OF
THE WAR
McClellan could have preserved the Union, en
listed horae aid in every Rebel State, ended the war,
and brought peace and fraternity in 1862, as Upton
categorically declares, and as Jefferson Davis prac
tically conceded, when he wrote on the very eve of
McClellan's spring carapaign, February 19, 1862:
"Events have cast on our arras and our hopes the
glooraiest shadows."
In July, 1861, Mr. Davis again wrote: "Every
body disappoints rae in their answers to my re
quisitions for troops, and the last hope of a large
force of militia coming to your aid seeras doomed
to add another to past disappointments." Up to this
time the Southern heart was not fully enlisted in the
cause. September 5, 1861, he wrote: "We have been
disappointed in our efforts to get arms. Lee is still
in the mountains of Virginia. My means are short
of the wants of each division of the wide frontier
I am laboring to protect One shipload of small
arms would enable rae to answer all deraands, but
253

254 ANTIETAM
vainly have I hoped and waited." The Confederate
correspondence during all this period, up to the
assuraption of generalship and command by our
new Secretary of War, and his active interference
with our arraies, betrays the hopelessness of the
Confederate cause in the East, and gives ample
intiraations of equal peril in the West.
Then McClellan's coraprehensive plan was sub
mitted (vol. V, Official Records, p. 44), describing
his proposed Peninsula carapaign and its expected
results, dated February 3, 1862, as follows: "The
second base of operations available for the Army of
the Potomac is that of the lower Chesapeake Bay,
which affords the shortest possible land route to
Richmond and strikes directly at the heart of the
enemy's power in the East.
"The roads in that region are passable at all sea
sons of the year. The country now aUuded to is
much more favorable for offensive operations than
that in front of Washington (which is very un
favorable), much more level, more cleared land,
the woods less dense, the soil more sandy, and the
spring sorae two or three weeks earlier. A move
ment in force on that line obliges the enemy to
abandon his entrenched position at Manassas in
order to hasten to cover Richraond and Norfolk.
He must do this ; for should he perrait us to occupy
Richraond, his destruction can be averted only by
entirely defeating us in battle, in which he must be
the assailant. This raoveraent, if successful, gives

OUR GRAVEST PERIL, ETC. 255
us the capital, the coraraunications, the supplies of
the Rebels, Norfolk would fall, all the waters of
the Chesapeake would be ours, all Virginia would
be in our power, and the enemy forced to abandon
Tennessee and North Carolina. The alternative pre
sented to the eneray would be to beat us in a posi
tion selected by ourselves, disperse, or pass beneath
the Caudine Forks."
This extract is a capital essay on the principles
of war. It disposes of the boastful notion that the
point of attack should have been the intrenched
armies of the enemy, and dissipated the allegation
that McClellan had sorae other dilatory scherae of
his own. Grant started in to "buck the tiger" at
the Wilderness, and expended an array and a whole
suraraer in getting to where McClellan went by
water without losing a man or a week. Grant then
spent nine months more in facing and flanking the
works at Petersburg, — and it was necessary work,
and capitally done, — but as soon as he could extend
his left far enough away from the armies in front
of Richmond and Petersburg to cut the sole line
of Confederate comraunication (as Richraond was
the sole line in 1862), lines more than sixty mUes
to the west, Petersburg fell, Richraond was aban
doned, and the whole Confederate governraent and
archives were in hopeless flight, and ended in a final
and early surrender. As I have shown elsewhere —
which is substantially the view of Napoleon — ^bat
tles in war ought to be in the nature of unpreventa-

256 ANTIETAM
ble accidents, occurring only where strategy fails
or is resisted. A perfectly conducted war would
be one of positions, coramunications, flankings, turn
ings, and the like, in which hostile armies are com
pelled tO' move thus and so under penalty of anni
hilation or surrender; in which case sensible men
who understand war, finding a battle hopeless, would
move theraselves and their raen accordingly. Bat
tles, of course, occur; so do railroad accidents and
street fights, but these are evidences of raiscal-
culation on one side, or on both.
In the fall carapaign, the so-called Bristoe cam
paign, of 1863, Meade got to CenterviUe first.
Lee was balked, and retreated without an attack.
In the Mine Run movement the conditions were
exactly reversed, and Meade retreated without an
attack. In the Pope campaign, if Pope had fallen
back to Centerville, instead of moving around, be
wildered, out among the Bull Run Mountains, Lee
would not have attacked; or, if he had, he would
have been defeated. Strategy is by far the superior
and more powerful agency of the two in wEir. It
is all a question of "Where you are at," if you have
anything available by means of which to "be at,"
when the time and opportunity arrive.
By one blow McClellan would have cleared three
States. The proof is that the same blow did the
same thing three years later ; but during those three
years — alas !
McClellan continues to tmfold his plan : "Should

OUR GRAVEST PERIL, ETC. 257
we be beaten in battle, we have a perfectly secure
retreat down the Peninsula upon Fort Monroe, with
our flank perfectly covered by the fleet During
the whole movement our left flank is covered by the
water. Our right is secure, for the reason that the
enemy is too distant to reach us in tirae. He can
only oppose us in front. We bring our fleet into
full play.
"After a successful battle our position would
be: Burnside forming our left, Norfolk held se
curely; our center connecting Burnside with Buell,
both by Raleigh and Lynchburg; Buell in eastern
Tennessee and North Alabama; Halleck at Nash
ville and Memphis. The next moveraent would be
to connect with Sherraan [not WiUiara T.J on the
left by reducing Wilmington and Charleston ; to ad
vance our center into South Carolina and Georgia;
to push Buell either toward Montgomery or to unite
with the main array in Georgia; to throw Halleck
southward to meet the naval expedition from New
Orleans. We should then be in a condition to reduce
at our leisure all the Southern seaports; to occupy
all the avenues of communication; to use the great
outlet of the Mississippi; to re-establish our Gov
ernment and arms in Arkansas, Louisiana, and
Texas; to force the slaves to labor for our sub
sistence instead of that of the Rebels; to bid defi
ance to all foreign interference."
A comprehensive plan! Was it simply ideal?
Then trace the history of the war of the Rebellion

258 ANTIETAM
from the day that McClellan stated these proposals,
and you will find that every part of his plan was not
only feasible, but that it was carried out to the letter
(by others). Not one was missed; but the time of
accomplishraent was sadly postponed. Even the re
establishraent of Southern State governraents, which
Lincoln carried out, was in the plan.
After what pain, what cost, what blood and tears
did it corae! After what heart-breakings at home
and in the field! And after what long years, stiU
hoping and praying for the day,
"When the cruel war is over."
And all the South was sprinkled with blood, and
scattered over it everywhere are the national ceme
teries of gaUant soldiers who perished that this na
tion raight live. Was the War Department strategy
worth what it cost us ? We could have had all this
salvation in 1862, almost "without money and with
out price."
It was ours to take, or to leave; and we left it.
And, after all, we won only, as it were, by a
scratch — by alraost a rairacle, in fact.
The inside history of the winter of 1864 and the
spring of 1865 has never been written, and has
never been appreciated. Our armies were melting
away. It is true that the Confederate arraies were
melting away also, but that was by the casualties of
battle, and the dead in battle are but a small portion
of those who "Live to fight another day."

OUR GRAVEST PERIL, ETC. 259
They deserted, too, but that was from starvation ;
and their armies could have even then gone where
supplies were abundant (See later on in this
chapter. )
But the time of our regiments expired, and the
men marched home, as they had a right to do. Piled
up bounties, w-hich Upton has so strenuously con
demned in his history, created a new profession;
the purlieus were drained, foreign supplies of rag
tag and bobtail were imported at great cost; skill
ful emissaries even searched the South and supplied
substitutes to fill their Northern State quotas from
the ignorant and degraded field-hands of Southem
plantations ; and the recruits were a sad lot.
Major O. C. Bosbyshell, of the Loyal Legion,
in his history of the Forty-eighth Pennsylvania
veteran regiment, describing the battle of Poplar
Spring Church, in the Petersburg front, Septeraber
29-October 2, 1864, says :
"Some of the Massachusetts regiraents in the
front line, having large nurabers of Germans in their
ranks, many of whom had not been in the country
over six weeks, and were utterly ignorant of the
English language, were thrown into great disorder
by the savage charge of the Rebel regiments. These
Germans ran pell-mell through the ranks of the sup
porting regiments. Pleasants was greatly enraged
at these fleeing soldiers as they dashed blindly to
the rear, pushing and shoving their way between
the ranks of the Forty-eighth, and with drawn sword

26o ANTIETAM
slashed to the right and left among them with the
strength of an athlete, staying the flight effectually
anywhere near his sweeping saber. Many a sore
head and stinging rib resulted from the blows well
laid on by him."
That Massachusetts should have so filled her
quotas is evidence of exhaustion of her own better
raaterial. If so patriotic a State had to resort to
such means, the other States raust have suffered
also. Perhaps I exaggerate. Read General Grant's
testiraony. He writes to Stanton as early as Sep
teraber II, 1864: "I hope it is not the intention to
postpone the draft to allow time to fill up with re
cruiting. The men we have been getting in this way
nearly all desert, and out of five reported North
as being enlisted, we don't get more than one effec
tive soldier."
At the sarae tirae Halleck wrote Grant from
Washington : "Had not the new infantry regiments
now coraing in [these were drafted, not recruited]
better be sent to City Point? Facilities for deser
tion here and with General Sheridan are so great
that we shall soon lose large nurabers."
Stanton, referring to the drafts, says, September
II, 1864, that candidates try to keep back the men
till after election, especially in Ohio, Indiana, and
Illinois. Not a regiraent, or even corapany, has
been organized in Illinois. "A special call from you
would aid the departraent in overcoming the local
inertia and personal interests that favor delay."

OUR GRAVEST PERIL, ETC. 261
Grant writes: "The enforcement of the draft
and prompt filling up of our armies will save the
shedding of blood to an iraraense degree."
September 20 he writes : "The ease with which
our men of late fall into the hands of the enemy
would indicate that they are rather willing pris
oners." January 5, 1865, Stanton wrote: "If you do
not guard against straggling and desertion you will
lose many men, as the facilities at Baltimore are
great, and the business vigorously conducted by
bounty brokers."
Sheridan writes January 6: "We have lost a
great many raen by desertion."
January 8 he writes that Grover was obliged to
lie over a day in camp; "this gives the bounty-
brokers a chance to work on the men, and I am
afraid will cause desertion."
January 10 the quartermaster wrote to Washing
ton that "Grant could not move his army if he
would, for want of forage; that the animals had
been on half rations since January 3."
Febmary 15, 1862, Halleck wrote a reraarkable
letter to Grant from which I make the following
extracts :
"In reply to your telegram in regard to the pay
ment of the troops before Richmond, I would re
mark that these troops have been paid generaUy to
a later period than those in the West and South.
Some are unpaid for seven or eight months. The

262 ANTIETAM
fault is not in the Pay Department, but a want of
money in the treasury.
"I understand that the Quartermaster's Depart
ment is already $180,000,000 in debt, and that untU
a part, at least, of this is paid it wUl be alraost im
possible to purchase and transport supplies. The
manufaicturers cannot furnish cloth, or the tailors
raake clothes, or the shoeraakers raake shoes, or the
railroads transport troops and supplies, much longer,
unless paid a part, at least, of their clairas. Some
of the Western roads cannot pay their employes
and threaten to stop running their trains if they
cannot be paid what the Govemment owes them.
Serious difficulties alsO' exist with the New York
Central, Hudson River, Harlem, and other roads.
"What is here said of the Quartermaster's De
partraent also applies tO' the Coramissary, Medical,
Ordnance, and other departments.
"If we pay the troops to the exclusion of the
other creditors of the Governraent, supplies must
stop, and our arraies raust be left without food,
clothing, or araraunition.
"What we want is some more great victories to
give more confidence in our currency and to con
vince financial men that the war is near its close.
In money matters these are the darkest days we
have yet had during the war."
During the closing month, in front of Petersburg,
President Lincoln was with Grant almost con
stantly. During this period both Admiral Porter

OUR GRAVEST PERIL, ETC. 263
and General Sherman testify to Mr. Lincoln's great
anxiety tO' have the war ended at once, if it could
possibly be done, and far preferably without serious
fighting. Says General Grant, in one of his conversations
with John Russell Young, on his Eastern tour, which
conversations Grant personaUy revised : "He was
very anxious about the war closing; was afraid we
could not stand a new campaign."
Grant hiraself says : "Rich as we were, I do not
see how we could have endured it another year,
even from a financial point of view."
Speaking of this great fear. General Grant says :
"There was no time in the war when it was more
critical than after the battle of Five Forks, when
Lee abandoned Richmond. It was President Lin
coln's aim to end the whole business there. He was
most anxious about the result. He desired to avoid
another year's fighting, fearing the country would
break down financially under the terrible strain on
its resources. I know when we raet it was a stand
ing topic of conversation. If Lee had escaped and
joined Johnston in North Carolina, or reached the
mountains, it would have imposed on us continued
armament and expense. The entire expense of the
government had reached the enormous cost of four
millions of dollars a day. It was to put an end to
this expense that Lee's capture was necessary."
He tells us by what a hair's-breadth Lee was cap
tured, how narrowly his junction was prevented,

264 ANTIETAM
either with Johnston in North Carolina, or John
ston's junction with hira in the great vaUey of
southwest Virginia, reaching down by way of
Bristol, east Tennessee, into Georgia and Ala
baraa. Grant says : "My pursuit of Lee was hazardous.
I was in a position of extrerae difficulty. You see, I
was marching away from my supplies, while Lee
was falling back on his supplies. If Lee had con
tinued his flight another day I should have had to
abandon the pursuit, fall back to Danville, build the
railroad, and feed my army. So far as supplies were
concerned, I was almost at the last gasp when the
surrender took place." (See conversations with
Grant, revised by himself, in John Russell Young's
"Around the World With General Grant," volume
II, page 460, copyright 1879.)
Had Lee known this, he could easUy have gained
another day. At Amelia Court House he lost
thirty-six hours in foraging over an exhausted
country for supplies, when his railroad trains had
by a raistake carried his own supplies to Richraond,
and left them there. He had thousands of horses
and other animals in his commissary and quarter
master's supply train, which had no supplies to haul,
and which were afterward captured or broken down
before his army reached FarmviUe. There was plenty
of such meat, to be driven on the hoof, to get his
army out of their eraergency. At Appomattox Sta
tion there arrived from L3mchburg, on the night

OUR GRAVEST PERIL, ETC. 265
before the surrender, five heavily loaded trains fiUed
with hams, cornmeal, and all sorts of foods, shoes,
and clothing. I can speak personally of this, as I sup
plied my comraand, and all the rest of us infantry
and cavalry officers did the sarae, from these trains,
after their capture on the morning of the 9th, and
the piled up food looked about as abundant when we
left it as it did when we found it We captured and
emptied these moving trains only four mUes from
Lee's advance, while he was halted at Appomattox
Court House, and only six hours before the sur
render took place.
General Grant says, and he ought to have known :
"Nor have I ever felt that the surrender at Appo
mattox was an absolute military necessity, I think
that in holding Richmond, and even in consenting
to that surrender, Lee sacrificed his judgment as a
soldier to his duty as a citizen and a leader of the
South." His love for Virginia and for his Virginia sol
diers and their farailies doubtless influenced him
greatly; but had he abandoned Virginia with his
army, even teraporarily, and joined Johnston, or
not joined Johnston, boundless supplies awaited
hira. His railroads were worthless and worn out,
but they would have been as worthless for carrying
our supplies as for carrying his; and by marching
his army to the supplies, instead of trying to haul
them to his army over railroads that couldn't haul,
he might have solved the problem and given our

266 ANTIETAM
national Govemment certainly another campaign,
another year, and perhaps more.
The official report of the Confederate Bureau
of Subsistence, dated March lo, 1865, says : "The
crops south of North Carolina, in Georgia, Alabama,
and Mississippi, were never so large." "From North
Carolina 7,500,000 bread rations, 6,000,000 meat
rations; frora Virginia, 5,000,000 bread rations,
5,500,000 meat rations; from east Tennessee and
its communications 15,000,000 bread rations,
5,000,000 raeat rations." These were all predicated
on the railroads. Beyond these, in central Alabaraa,
Mississippi, and Georgia, the supplies were illimita
ble, as the Confederates had ceased planting cotton
and gave their time to food supplies.
There was nothing at all in front to prevent
Lee or Johnston from going there; Sherraan's array
was on the Atlantic Coast; raost of Thomas' army
had just joined hira, and Grant was on the James
River. We practically had no others.
But this had not been the Confederates' only
chance, of late. When Sherman abandoned the
pursuit of Hood's array, leaving it intact, to raake
his raarch tO' the sea, it was the same array which
had just baffled Sherraan from Dalton to Atlanta,
with more than six months of continuous fighting.
Among all the fatuous things ever done by a
Confederate array, one of the worst was that of
Hood's planting himself down in front of Nash
ville, doubtless a part of some occult War Depart-

OUR GRAVEST PERIL, ETC. 267
ment strategy at Richmond, and lying there for
long weeks while all the North was open to his
invading columns. Sherman had left no army be
hind to take the place of that which he marched
across to the Atlantic; he left behind his sick,
wounded, and worn-out, whatever was not fit for
the raarch before him, and all this debris was scat
tered over thousands of square miles of territory.
Hood's was the only compact and efficient army in
the field in the West And Hood lay down before
NashvUle and waited, while Thoraas set himself to
work to make an army. With the Twenty-third
Corps as a nucleus, under Schofield, and the Fourth
Corps, under Wood, he armed and drilled all that
he could find or gather — wagoners, raechanics, any
and everybody. He gathered a bit here and a bit
there; he dragged out his convalescents and scoured
his scattered garrisons; he sent up to raiddle Mis
souri and brought down A. J. Smith and his men
(see War Records, vol. xlv, part i, pp. 31-34), and
after weeks of incessant labor he got together, De
cember 15-16, 1864, a force which attacked and
defeated Hood, and drove him south in scattered
fragments, to be reunited only months afterward in
the Carolinas.
Grant's anxiety about Hood was natural, and it
was very great But it was no part of prudence
for Thoraas to have attacked before he was fit to
attack; because, had Hood, later on, puUed up
stakes and gone to where he ought to have gone

268 ANTIETAM
in the first place, Thomas by that time had boats
and transportation enough with which to follow him
around by water, and fight him. But when Hood
first planted himself before Nashville, after driv
ing back Schofield from Franklin, there was no
concentrated force anywhere which could have inter
fered with him, and none which could have been
concentrated in time. Says General Grant, very
properly : "My objection to Sherman's plan at the
time, and my objection now, was his leaving Hood's
army in his rear. I always wanted the march to the
sea, but at the sarae tirae I wanted Hood. If Hood
had been an enterprising coramander he would have
given us a great deal of trouble. Probably he was
controlled from Richmond. As it was, he did the
very thing I wanted hira to do. If I had been in
Hood's place, I would never have gone near Nash
viUe. I would have gone to Louisville, and on north
until I came to Chicago. What was the use of his
knocking his head against the stone walls of Nash
ville? If he had gone north Thomas would never
have caught hira. We should have had to raise new
levies. I was never so anxious during the war as at
that time."
Yes, Hood could have marched through Illinois,
Indiana, and Ohio, and he, too, could have sung the
song: "Five hundred miles of latitude, five hundred to the lakes."
Or he could have crossed Ohio to Pennsylvania,

OUR GRAVEST PERIL, ETC 269
captured Pittsburg, swept West Virginia and the
Valley, threatened Washington, or even joined Lee;
or he could have done the same by marching east
from Parkersburg in West Virginia.
The "new levies" to which Grant referred, not
to speak of time, — when there was no time, — would
have been useless against Hood's veterans. What
would have been instantly wanted, and imperatively
demanded, were soldiers. And the only soldiers
avaUable, for Sherraan was buried and unheard of in
the depths of Georgia, and there were no armies to
be had elsewhere, was the Army of the Potomac,
and all of it, to meet Hood's triumphant sixty thou
sand veterans.
That meant that the spring carapaign of 1865
would have started frora Washington, where the
spring campaign of 1861 had started, and if Grant
and Lincoln and HaUeck were good judges of the
situation, it would have been very difficult to have
had it start anew and continue very vigorously, if
at all, if it had to start anew — after four years of
war — where it had started at the beginning.
The statements above raade in this chapter show
a moral exhaustion in the loyal States almost equal
to the physical exhaustion, especially in transporta
tion, of the South. Napoleon said that the moral
factor was far more important in war than brute
force, that war was essentially a moral and not a
physical problem.
The loss to Great Britain of Comwallis' eight

270 ANTIETAM
thousand at Yorktown was of trifling moment, but
seven years of war had brought an inertia in carap
and cabinet, a weariness, and a moral exhaustion
which could not be revived ; and we ourselves, after
four years, found the same difficulties, the same
moral exhaustion, the same scraping the slums for
worthless recruits, the same desertions, and the same
financial depletion and collapse, at hand.

xxx
grant's picture of SECRETARY STANTON'S CHARAC
TERISTICS  DANGER OF THE REWARD OF m'CLEL-
lan's success — m'clellan's qualities as a
commanding general I
So we see that it was not merely a matter of a few
more years of war, to secure certain personal results,
with the conclusion destined to be the same in the
end, that was involved in preventing McClellan
from finishing up the war in 1862. It was a matter
that put to deadly peril the Union, the Govemment,
republican institutions, and all that for which our
soldiers, our young men, so gladly went to fight and
so freely gave their lives. It was one of those
blunders which are said to be worse than crimes.
Said General Upton, writing in 1879 to his friend
Colonel Henry A. DuPont : "If you want to know
who was the cause of a three years' war, after we
created a disciplined army of six hundred thousand
men, it was Stanton."
Grant in his "Memoirs" clearly depicts the char
acter of the Secretary of War in such aspects as
show how he was able to accomplish so much
actual injury in so short a space of time. He depicts
271

272 ANTIETAM
him as a man of tireless energy, personally timid,
but bold in actipn and direction until caUed down
by a higher authority. Then, if he saw that his
superior "meant business" and was bound to have
things done in his own way, Stanton subsided at
once and did as. he was directed, always, however,
furtively glancing at the bone frora which he had
been driven away, and ready to seize it on the slight
est relaxation of the raaster's attention or as soon as
opportunity offered. To translate Grant's language
into the vernacular, he was frora tip to toe what is
called "a bluffer," and one who increased his power
by bullying and lacerating whenever it was safe to
do so. It is not an agreeable task to speak ill of
anyone, and Stanton had high abilities ; but he was
backed up by a secret clique of civilians, he repre
sented a powerful guild of politicians, and he felt
that he was justified in carrying out his and their
purposes at whatever cost to army, people, or coun
try, believing that the end justified the means, and
that the raeans, if boldly eraployed, were within his
corapass. Says General Grant, who alone made Stanton
bend the knee to him, and stipulated for this before
he would consent to. assurae command in the East
at all: "Mr. Stanton never questioned his own
authority to coraraand, unless resisted. He cared
nothing for the feelings of others. In fact, it seemed
to be pleasanter to him to disappoint than to gratify.
He felt no hesitation in assuming the function of

STANTON'S CHARACTERISTICS 273
the executive, or in acting without advising with
him. If his act was not sustained, he would change
it — if he saw the raatter would be followed up until
he did so." Consult Grant's "Personal Meraoirs,"
vol. II, pp. 536-537, etc.
"Mr. Lincoln," continues General Grant, "did
not require a guardian to aid hira in the fulfiUraent
of a public trust. Mr. Lincoln was not timid, and
he was willing to trust his generals in making and
executing their plans. The Secretary was very
timid, and it was irapossible for hira to avoid inter
fering with the arraies covering the capital when it
was sought to defend it by an offensive movement
against the enemy guarding the Confederate capital.
He could see our weakness, but he could not see
that the eneray was in danger. The eneray would
not have been in danger if Mr. Stanton had been in
the field."
As General Upton has so clearly shown, the Sec
retary was very much in the field ; or, rather, he
was like that other aggressive creature, who does so
much damage when he plants himself in a china-
shop, while suffering no personal danger to himself.
But the bull does his damage while ignorantly try
ing to get himself out, whereas the Secretary did
his while ignorantly trying to get deeper in.
Then, of course, there was seen looming up, be
fore these raen at Washington, the ever present
danger that what had been granted to Washington,
Jackson, Harrison, Taylor, and Pierce,— and was

274 ANTIETAM
yet to be awarded to Grant, Hayes, Garfield, and
Harrison, and, later on, Roosevelt, — raight be
granted to McClellan. A raUitary man, successful
and conspicuous, raight be chosen by the sovereign
will of the people of the whole country to be their
President; and this was soraething to be prevented
at all hazards.
But McClellan, in his place in the array, could
surely have done nothing politically to ensure this
reward at the hands of the people; none of those
other soldiers I have mentioned did so. Yet still,
if he were the really successful general I have at
terapted to describe, such danger would doubtless
exist; while on the contrary, if he were the slow,
inefficient, and useless general he was depicted to
be, then the surest way to ruin his chances of politi
cal preferment would have been to allow him to
work out his own daranation for hiraself, and re
main in comraand of that array whose soldiers wept
when he left them, and whose great officers joined
in a magnificent tribute to hira soon afterward, when
he was powerless and helpless, and which Stanton,
on hearing of it through General Carl Schurz, inves
tigated, and suppressed with a bang !
Then, was it for his slowness that he was re
raoved? If SO', his sloth raust have been recently
acquired. General Scott wrote him, July 13, 1861,
to Beverly, Va. : "The General-in-Chief and, what
is more, the Cabinet, iiicluding the President, are
charmed with your activity, valor, and consequent

STANTON'S CHARACTERISTICS 275
successes of Rich Mountain, the nth, and of Bev
erly this raorning. We do not doubt that you will
in due time sweep the Rebels frora Western Vir
ginia, but we do not mean to precipitate you, as you
are fast enough."
I think I have been able to show, when Mc
CleUan appeared slow, who it was that slowed him ;
and when he was unsuccessful, what it was that
made him so; and when he was successful, that it
was only in proportion as he could get the ropes of
interference off which were wound around him
from Washington; and that when he was free of
these he was the most successful of all our com
manding officers, the most thorough, and the most
rapid. It was for these qualities that Grant — who had
then been Major-General, Lieutenant-General, full
General, and twice President — said to John Russell
Young, when in the Straits of Malacca : "I knew
McClellan, and had great confidence in him. I
have, for that matter, never lost ray respect for
McClellan's character, nor my confidence in his
loyalty and ability. I saw in him the man who was
to pilot us through, and I wanted to be on his
staff. ... I should have liked to have joined
McClellan." McClellan, afterward describing how they carae
to miss one another, said, in his love and admira
tion for Grant : "This was his good luck ; for had
I been there I would, no doubt, have given him a

276 ANTIETAM
place on my staff, and he would probably have re
mained with rae and shared ray fate."
And Grant, as weU as McClellan and Meade, had
several close shaves of his own, and from the sarae
uncanny source.
While McClellan was in command at Camp Den
nison, in 1 86 1, there passed between him and the
War Departraent the shortest and oddest corre
spondence which I have corae across in the War
Records, and which throws a pleasing side-light on
that officer : "Cincinnati, Ohio, May 22, 1861.
Hon. Simon Cameron, Secretary of War:
Will you please authorize me to use boards to put up
places for worship at Camp Dennison? Parties furnishing
nails and labor. Geo. B. McClellan, Major-General."
War Department, May 22, 1861.
Major-General George B. McClellan, Cincinnati:
The Lord's will be done. Simon Cameron, Secretary of War.
It was for these qualities, also above narrated,
that General Long, Lee's military secretary, after
ward Brigadier-General and Chief of Artillery of
the Second Corps, Amiy of Northern Virginia, re
ports in his "Memoirs of Lee" (edited under the
supervision of General Marcus J. Wright, after
ward Agent of the United States for Collecting Con
federate Records), the following, which occurred

STANTON'S CHARACTERISTICS 277
long after the war: "One thing I remeraber hearing
hira say. He asked General Lee which, in his
opinion, was the ablest of the Union generals; to
which the latter answered, bringing his hand down
on the table with an emphatic energy, 'McCleUan,
by aU odds!'" (See page 233.)

XXXI
WHY WAS m'cLELLAN REMOVED AND FITZ JOHN
PORTER COURT-MARTIALED  THE POPE-HAL-
LECK-STANTON DISPATCHES
So the question again recurs, What was that which
we doctors call "the exciting cause" of McClellan's
removal from command on that raost unfortunate
occasion ?
We shall have to look far away for an answer
to what was then the scene of an Indian uprising,
in the wilder parts of Minnesota. We shall take up
the antecedent features of the astounding affair,
and more particularly detail in Chapter xxxiii fol
lowing just what this "exciting cause" proved to be.
It was especially important to the War Depart
ment strategists at Washington that someone at that
tirae should turn up, soraewhere far removed from
the wholesome influence of the loyal Array of the
Potomac and its comraander; and, like a gift of
Providence, carae forth the twin heroes HaUeck and
Pope. General Halleck sent to Secretary Stanton, June
4, 1862, his raade-up dispatch: 278

McCLELLAN REMOVED, ETC. 279
"Halleck's Headquarters, June 4.
Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War:
General Pope, with 40,000, is thirty iniles south of Corinth,
pushing the enemy hard. He already reports 10,000 prisoners
and deserters from the enemy, and 15,000 stand cf arms cap
tured. Thousands of the enemy are throwing away their
arms." Stanton telegraphed back :
"Your glorious dispatch has just been received, and I have
sent it into every State. The whole land will soon ring wilh
applause at the achievement of your gallant army and its
able and victorious commander."
And even the President was deceived. He tele
graphed also :
"Your dispatch of to-day to the Secretary of War re
ceived. Thanks for the good news it brings."
The fighting in the West, it is true, had been
actually done by others ; but Lyon was dead, and
Grant in disgrace, and Halleck and Pope emerged
into public view in the very nick of time. A vic
tory far beyond that of Fort Donelson, or that of
Shiloh, or of anywhere else, was made to order
and heralded abroad, for it brought thousands of
prisoners, and more to come ; and the great, tender
hearted Lincoln wanted Rebel prisoners far more
than he wanted dead Rebels.
Pope, within one week from the proclaraation
abroad' of the bogus dispatch, was rushed to Wash
ington; and within ten days more he was raade

28o ANTIETAM
coraraanding general of a new array,- — the Army of
Virginia, — with Washington as its very own, and all
the rest of Virginia as its "hinterland," or sphere
of influence. When Pope reached Washington he
must have tried to explain matters, for Stanton
telegraphed Halleck to know why he sent such a
dispatch. Halleck excused himself, like a lawyer,
by saying that he sent only the reports the generals
made to him. If anybody had lied, the inference
was, it must have been Pope.
Halleck himself was brought on next, irame
diately following Pope. He was a lawyer, a closet-
strategist, and a compiler at second-hand of books
on strategy, but one who* never manifested any
strategical skill of his own; or, if he did, feared to
use it. (See Grant, "Personal Memoirs," vol. i,
p. 578; vol. II, pp. 317, 318, 327, 337.)
Now, when General Pope carae to the Eastern
arraies every officer in those armies knew the truth
about the bogus victory, about Grant, and every
thing else, for the grapevine telegraph araong sol
diers always took care of that sort of thing.
William F. G. Shanks, in his "Personal Recollec
tions of Distinguished Generals," relates an inci
dent which could not have failed to reach the armies
in the East, for it brought Sherman and Grant to
gether for life, and Shennan was an Eastem army
officer, and one of McClellan's generals, having been
sent by the latter to coraraand in the West.
There is rauch of roraance in the story of Grant's

McCLELLAN REMOVED, ETC. 281
and Sherman's friendship. It began in 1862, and
ever afterward continued to grow in strength. When
the armies of Halleck werei lying — literally so,
indeed — before Corinth, Grant was to all appear
ance shelved in disgrace. He was second in com
mand, but to be second in coramand then was to be
the "fifth wheel to the coach." Grant was rauch
chagrined at his position, and felt in tenfold degree
each petty indignity which Halleck heaped upon
hira. One day General Sherraan, who commanded
one of the divisions of the wing under the coraraand
of General George H. Thomas, went to General
Grant's quarters and bolted with his usual abrupt
ness into Grant's tent. They didn't stand on cere
mony in the field. He found the general actually
weeping with vexation. Sherman asked the cause,
and for the first time Grant recounted the indig
nities which he had endured, the troubles he had en
countered, and the false position in which he had
been placed before the country. "The truth is,
Sherman," he said, "I am not wanted. The coun
try has no use for me, and I am about to resign and
go home."
"No, you are not," returned Sherman irapatiently;
"you are going to do nothing of the sort. The
country does need you, and you raust stay here, bear
these petty insults, and do your duty." And, the
author says, Sherraan argued Grant down, and kept
him there until Halleck's appointraent, as general-
in-chief, "left the command in the West vacant."

282 ANTIETAM
Then Grant had his chance, but neither he nor
Sherman ever forgot Halleck. Sherman, in his
"Personal Memoirs," relates this story in much the
same manner.
Pope's coming East under these circumstances
could certainly inspire no confidence in the men.
His boastful address to his Virginia army, that in
the West they had always seen the backs of their
eneraies while in the East we did the opposite — when
every officer and soldier in Virginia knew that all
the battling which Pope ever did in the West did
not equal, in actual fighting. Big Bethel or Dranes
ville — was tactless, to say no worse. His order —
promptly vetoed by the President — to remove
from their farras and horaes and send beyond our
lines all raale citizens found therein, unless they
took the oath of allegiance, was harsh, ill-tiraed, and
despotic. An iraportant fact, clearly set forth in
General Upton's "Military Policy," was that Pope
attributed to one day, in his Bull Run battle, the
events which had really occurred on another day,
and that, after assuraing coraraand on June 27 he
never went out to see his army until July 30. There
fore, in the light of the foregoing acts. Pope could
not have failed to produce an uneasiness among all
raUitary bodies, private soldiers and officers alike,
long before the Army of the Potoraac had been
ordered up from the Peninsula.
I can testify of my own knowledge to the feeling
prevalent among the troops near Washington at

McCLELLAN REMOVED, ETC. 283
the beginning of July, when General Pope conducted
a review of a few thousand men near Fort Worth,
back of Alexandria. A mere corporal in the ranks
then, I knew little of General Pope; but a jest, with
a curse, went the rounds, after that terribly hot day
of double-quicking past the grandstand (doubtless
not true, but it was in everybody's mouth) : "Oh,
Pa, twot 'em 'round again; they look so pretty."
The incident has no value as history, but it exempli
fies a popular feeling in the army at the time, long
before McClellan or his army was a possible factor
in the case.
There is nothing that sifts out a raan like sol
diering. A man can fool courts and cabinets, news
paper reporters and editors, and even the public, but
if he is a military commander he cannot fool the
intelligent and square-dealing veteran soldiers. These
men, giving up their time, their pleasures, their
business, their wives and sweethearts and families,
and throwing just so much of their actual lives away
like chaff, have offered themselves as living sacri
fices for their country, and are ready to pay the
price with life or suffering. And these men want
to feel and to know that the commander into whose
hands they are put for weal or woe is a good man,
a capable man, a powerful raan, the best that can
be obtained ; and that they are as safe in his hands
as they can be in any human hands, and that the
great cause for which they have periled life and all
that raakes life worth living is in good hands. Talk

284 ANTIETAM
about the fierce light which beats upon a throne!
It is nothing to that searching light by which among
soldiers — skilled soldiers, true soldiers, veterans —
the commander is observed, and felt; and, if worthy,
tied fast to, and lived with, and died for. When
they find one such that they can trust in implicitly,
that they can believe in absolutely and follow fear
lessly, they surrender themselves and all they have
to that commander with a joyful self-sacrifice that
makes them immortal heroes.
Of such commanders Eraerson says : "A river of
coramand runs down from the eyes of some men,
and the reason why we feel one man's presence and
not another's, is as simple as gravity; and this
natural force is no raore to be withstood than any
other natural force."
Lord Wolseley says : "This is the influence which
men, with what I raay term great electrical power
in their nature, have exercised in war. Caesar, Marl
borough, Napoleon, Sir Charles Napier, and many
others I could name possessed it largely. The cur
rent passed from them into all around, creating
great enthusiasm in all ranks far and near, and
often raaking heroes of raen whose mothers and
fathers even had never regarded them in that light.
This feeling is an addition of at least fifty per cent
of strength and energy to an array where it exists."
Bonaparte said that he often noticed the imme
diate electric effect of his arrival on the battle
field.

McCLELLAN REMOVED, ETC. 285
We all recoUect what occurred when Sheridan
reached his half -routed army in his ride from Win
chester to the battle-field of Fisher's Creek, in the
Shenandoah Valley.
On the hurried march from the Potomac 10
Gettysburg, and especially on that exceedingly long
march of the Sixth Corps, the word passed in the
night from rank to. rank, "McClellan is back again,
and in command." The whole coluran took on new
life and energy, and enthusiasm took the place of
uneasiness and despondency, as they raarched on
in anticipated triuraph, to the glory of a new An
tietam. It was not McClellan; but it was the next
best thing possible, it was one of his own chosen
three — Reynolds, Meade, and Hancock — who took
the army and saved the country.
So the poor boy-private at Antietam, with his
leg shot off at the thigh, raised hiraself on his elbow
and cried out with his dying breath, as McClellan
was riding by along the battle lines: "God bless
you. General McClellan !" And the peerless Bayard,
dying beside a tree on the fatal field of Fredericks
burg, sent this raessage: "Tell General McClellan
that ray only regret is that I do not die while under
his coraraand." So, too. General Grant said to John
Russell Young: "McClellan is to rae one of the
mysteries of the war. As a young man he was al
ways a mystery. He had the way of inspiring you
with the idea of iraraense capacity, if he would
only have a chance. Then he is a man of unusual

286 ANTIETAM
accorapllshraents — a student, and a well-read raan."
Grant thus separated this peculiar psychical power
of the coraraander frora the habits, education, and
acquireraents of the individual, while he attributed
both to McCleUan. It is frora the universal recog
nition of this controlling factor, by his old sol
diers, that even to this day they have never been
satisfied with what history professed to teach re
garding him. What General Eraory Upton discov
ered by investigation, his old soldiers found out by
personal experience; and they know, with General
Upton, that the military answer to the McClellan
problem, as so far presented in current history,
"cannot be raade to prove, and is not correct."

XXXII
pope's battle AND HIS DEFEAT  SECOND
MANASSAS
General Upton traces the Second Bull Run bat
tle with a pen of fire, and puts the blarae where it
belongs. This is what he says : "The criticisms on
the march of Franklin's corps have all been based
on the assuraption that there was a broad pike from
Alexandria to Centerville, that this highway was
aU the time open, and that nothing prevented a
junction with the hard-pressed Army of Virginia
save the indifference of the commander of the Army
of the Potomac.
"The facts as subsequently established were that,
from the afternoon of the 26th untU the afternoon
of the 28th, from 25,000 to 30,000 Confederates
were on the direct line of communication with the
Army of Virginia; that from the tirae General
Pope reached CenterviUe, on the 28th, till the even
ing of the 29th, no positive information had been
received as to his whereabouts ; that his cavalry was
so used up that not five horses per corapany could
be forced into a trot ; that he sent no dispatch to the
Governraent tUl the raorning of the 30th, and that
287

288 ANTIETAM
Franklin's corps, on the inforraation derived on the
night of the 29th, joined hira on the 30th, part of it
having marched twenty miles."
After Pope's defeated army began to. pour back
upon Washington, and after McClellan's Army of
the Potoraac had been entirely sent out to Pope,
leaving hiraself in coraraand of only his staff and
orderlies, less than one hundred men. General Upton
says that, having acted on the theory of the War
Department strategists, there were only 5989 men
left to garrison Washington, "of whom 2235 were
railitia, whose terra of service would expire before
the end of the raonth."
As regards the Array of the Potomac, in this
Pope campaign, I quote General Upton again : "The
accusation that the Army of the Potomac would not
fight, will justify the inquiry, 'What troops fought
the Second Battle of Bull Run?' The Army of Vir
ginia, as we know, consisted of the corps of Gen
eral Banks, Sigel, and McDowell. Of these General
Banks' corps took no part, being assigned to the
protection of the trains."
Sigel reported June 30 that his corps was not in
good condition, the organization not complete, and
the cavalry not more than 800 effective men and
horses. Pope had already complained of straggling, as
early as July 22. He stated afterward, of the battle
itself, that "at least one-half of this great diminu
tion of our forces was occasioned by skulking and

POPE'S BATTLE AND DEFEAT 289
straggling from the army. Thousands of men strag
gled away, and were not in any action." This corps
(Sigel's) was estimated at 9000 on the 26th of Au
gust In addition, the two divisions of King and
Ricketts nurabered 13,000; "these two divisions,"
says Upton, "about 13,000 men, and General Sigel's
corps, 9000, were all the troops belonging to the
Army of Virginia who confronted the 60,000 Con
federates on the 29th and 30th." To these are to
be added Reno's division of Burnside's corps — the
other two divisions being still opposite Fredericks
burg. The reraaining troops, says Upton, Rey
nolds, Kearny, Hooker, of Heintzleman's corps, and
Morell and Sykes, of Porter's corps, in all 20,500,
belonged to the Array of the Potomac.
Had Pope fallen back on Centerville on the 24th
or 25th, says Upton, — as Meade did in October of
1863, — Franklin and the reraaining divisions of
Burnside could have reached hira in tirae.
But, as Upton says. Pope did not understand his
own plan. He was clairaing a great victory, driving
the Rebels, and he could not understand the events
which were taking place all around him; and as
there was later on demanded someone to suffer.
Pope poured the vials of his wrath on Porter and
McClellan, and the War Department strategists
were only too glad to compound, for bringing Pope
and Halleck to Washington, by laying their failure
on the raen who really saved them. That such was

290 ANTIETAM
the case Pope, in especial, never did and never could
comprehend. Porter was court-martialed, as is well known.
The evidence was cooked. That which was incon
venient was suppressed, exculpating dispatches were
concealed, the testimony of the Confederate officers
who knew the facts on their own part was ignored,
and the victim was cashiered. But subsequently,
when the urgent necessity of convicting him to save
Pope, Halleck, and Stanton had passed, a new and
fairer tribunal, composed of Schofield, Terry, and
Getty, went over the whole case and clearly demon
strated that it was Fitz John Porter who had saved
Pope's army, instead of defeating it, who had saved
the capital, and that he deserved well of his coun
try. (See War Records, vol. xii, part 2, pp. 513-
536.) Grant, too, in his fair-mindedness and
breadth of character, promised to stand by Porter
forever, and he did so ; and his article, published
in 1883, "An Undeserved Stigma," not only vindi
cated Porter, but was the noble act of a fellow-
soldier now too great to be assailed, but who had
hiraself passed under the same harrow. Grant to
Porter :
"As long as I have a voice it shall be raised in
your support, without any reference to its effect
upon me or others." {North American Review,
December, 1885.)

XXXIII
pope's demand WHICH HALLECK DARED NOT RE
FUSE  THE FALSE DISPATCH OF HALLECK's
WHICH BROUGHT POPE AND HALLECK TO COM
MAND AT WASHINGTON
After Pope's carapaign in Virginia was over, he
was sent to Minnesota to. comraand against the sav
ages — a position of degradation, as he held it to be.
He wrote a series of reraarkable letters tO' Halleck,
commencing with one of September 30, 1862. (See
War Records, vol. xii, part 3, pp. 816-827.) He
accused HaUeck of not sustaining him against Mc
Clellan; that McClellan would never forgive Hal
leck for superseding him; that Halleck was under
"a deep personal obligation" to. Pope, and that he
could learn what it was by consulting the President,
Secretary of War, or other members of the Admin
istration; that he had besought the President, and
Halleck himself, to be allowed to go West to his old
place again; and that the journals, and merabers of
the Cabinet even, were representing that McClellan
was really commander, "while you are but a tool in
his hands." 291

292 ANTIETAM
Halleck replied, defending himself in his usual
manner by showing that whatever credit there was,
was his, and whatever blame there was belonged
to the "President and entire Cabinet."
But Pope came at him again, under date October
20: "The greatest criminal is McClellan, and ray
charge is direct and plain against hira. . Your reason
for retaining hira in command, 'the feelings of many
officers of the Potoraac Army,' is the very strongest
reason, in my view, why he should not be re
tained. . . . He [McClellan] should never
have been placed in command of anything under
such circumstances.
"I wrote you because I desire you to understand
fully my feelings, and the course of action that I
shall pursue. I had hoped that you would render
official steps unnecessary.
"Had I imagined for a moment that he would
be rewarded with his partisans for abandoning me,
and betraying his trust, and that you would, at least,
have consented to his and their advancement after
such an act, and would have failed to sustain me, or
even to do rae the barest justice, or to raake the
slightest acknowledgment in public of my services,
I would never have put foot in Virginia."
And now comes the stinger :
"Your not doing so, when the whole facts came
to be known, cannot fail to be the subject of remark,
especially so as the circumstances under which you
came to Washington and I undertook the campaign

POPE'S DEMAND, ETC. 293
in Virginia are well known to one-half of Con
gress." The italics are mine.
He adds that if Halleck cannot do justice, even in
words, to him, "No man regrets more than I do that
you occupy such a position, or would more gladly
see you out of it."
Halleck evidently considered and consulted. He
did not reply so far as publication shows, and Pope
came at hira again. This letter was dated at Saint
Paul, Minn., October 30, 1862. It should have
reached Washington Noveraber 4. The very next
day, November 5, McClellan was removed from
comraand, by the following order:
War Department, Adj. General's Office.
General Orders Washington, November 5, 1862.
No. 182.
By direction of the President of the United States, it is
ordered that Major-General McClellan be relieved from the
Command of the Army of the Potomac, and that Major-
General Burnside take the command of that army.
By order of ihe Secretary of War.
Then General Pope, and the rest, felt easier. Pope
wrote, November 20 : "I will wait the action of the
Govemment with all the patience that is in my
nature." They had not finished yet with Fitz John Porter,
and, as Pope says, "My position here is not pleasant.
My future command or place I leave to
yourself, without uneasiness, feeling assured that
you will do me justice."

294 ANTIETAM
And so the knowledge in the breast of one-half
of Congress, and in the secret files of the Comraittee
on the Conduct of the War, and in the rainds of
various others who thought it the better part of
valor to be prudent, slurabered until the war had
ended, and then, and not till then. General Pope felt
free to ask ugly questions, and to put them in print,
too, which he did. (See War Records, vol. x, part
2, pp. 635-637.) Washington, D. C,
July 3, 1865.
Major-General H. W. Halleck, U. S. A.,
Washington, D. C.
General: The war has now ended, and the events and incidents con
nected with it are passing into history. As I do not wish that
any report or misconception which has been circulated to
my prejudice, and which is susceptible of explanation, should
stand recorded against me, and as the reasons which actuated
me in preserving silence until this time no longer exist, I
desire to invite your attention to a dispatch published in the
newspapers, dated at Corinth, Miss., June 4 1862, purporting
to have been sent by you to the Secretary of War, and con
taining substantially the following words, viz. : "General
Pope is thirty miles south of Corinth, pushing the enemy
hard. He already reports 10,000 prisoners and deserters, and
15,000 stand of arms captured," etc. I do not know that
you ever sent such a dispatch; but as I do know that I never
made such a report, I infer that if you sent the dispatch in
question, you must have done so under a very great mis
apprehension. I have therefore to request that you furnish
me a copy of any report made by me upon which such a dis
patch as that in question was sent. I have full records of

POPE'S DEMAND, ETC. 295
all my letters, dispatches, and reports to you during the
operations at Corinth, and no such report is among them.
I am. General, respectfully, your obedient servant, John Pope.
But HaUeck declined to furnish Pope a copy of
such report, and said that all his papers were boxed
up for California, adding: "I never reported to
the Secretary of War dispatches received from yOu
which were not so received."
This lavvyer's letter was too much for Pope, and
he wrote Halleck, July 5, that that officer was to
pass three weeks before going to California, in New
York; that only a short time would be required to
look up this paper; that if Halleck meant to still in
sist that the dispatch was a correct transcript of any
thing that Pope had sent hira, he was "altogether
unsatisfactory," — which was certainly true, but that
was because in this case he had to be. "In short.
General, I utterly deny that the dispatch purporting
to have been sent by you to the Secretary of War
was based upon any report frora me such as is
therein stated, and I therefore call upon you to dis
avow this dispatch or to furnish me with a copy of
the report attributed to rae." He says that such a
question "in alraost any other case" could be easily
and conclusively settled by a reference to the offi
cial files, "but I have ascertained, General, that when
you left the West you ordered that portion of the
dispatches and reports concerning the operations
around Corinth, which bear upon this question, to be

296 ANTIETAM
cut out of the official books, and brought with you to
Washington, leaving the official records in Saint
Louis mutilated and incomplete."
Pope then sums up the case; says that he has all
the evidence requisite; that if Halleck would not,
or could not, clear it up, — which, of course, Pope
knew that he couldn't, and which Pope himself had
not done when it would have been of sorae use, — ^he
would feel quite different toward what one raay call
his old friend and comrade ; that Pope desired to still
maintain those relations, but  !
Halleck, however, believed that silence was
golden in this case, and no answer is recorded to
General Pope's last letter. However, the letters
answered themselves.
It is somewhat humiliating, and not creditable to
any of those concerned, to have to record these
facts ; but it is a question of either McClellan or of
his detractors, and the innocent should not in such
a case, and in so serious a case particularly, be the
one to be raade to suffer.
It is perfectly clear that General Pope, when he
wrote his letters to Halleck from Minnesota in 1862,
was thoroughly aroused. He was no hypocrite in
believing that he was a grossly abused man, and that
Halleck was responsible for it ; and that in his bogus
dispatch, mutilation of records, and other conduct
just before he left Corinth, and when he came to
Washington as General-in-Chief, Halleck had been
guilty of acts which would, if made public, forfeit

POPE'S DEMAND, ETC. 297
him his place in the army and degrade him as a
man, and he offered to Halleck in categorical terms
the alternative either to dismiss McClellan and
court-raartial and convict Fitz John Porter, or else
to be court-martialed and cashiered hiraself.
Halleck chose the former altemative, and at once,
through his co-partner Stanton, had McClellan re
moved and Fitz John Porter court-martialed, and
the court packed to cashier the latter — if not to
have him shot.

XXXIV
m'cLELLAN  the president  THE ARMY OF THE
POTOMAC  CONCLUSION
There is nothing to show that the President ever
had the slightest cognizance of the circumstances
and conditions surrounding these tragical events.
Indeed, it is certain that Lincoln not only did not
know, but never even dreamed, of cabals and ma
chinations. He was surrounded with webs and en
tanglements, and there was absolutely no one to
whom he could then turn whose words of advice,
if just and true, would not be drowned out or
silenced, and the adviser would have been destroyed
for doing his unselfish duty. McClellan himself
never believed that Lincoln was anything else than
just and friendly. In the report of his final cam
paign, dated August 4, 1863, long after his removal
frora command, he accords this just and noble
tribute to. the President :
"I cannot omit the expression of my thanks to
the President for the constant evidence given me
of his sincere personal regard, and his desire to sus
tain the military plans which my judgraent led me
to urge for adoption and execution. I cannot at-
298

McCLELLAN— THE PRESIDENT

299

tribute his failure to adopt some of these plans, and
to give that support to others which was necessary
to their success, to any want of confidence in me;
and it only reraains for rae to regret that other coun
sels came between the constitutional commander-
in-chief and the general whom he had placed at the
head of his armies — counsels which resulted in the
failure of great carapaigns.
"If the nation possesses no generals in service
competent to direct its military affairs without the
aid or supervision of politicians, the sooner it finds
them and places them in position the better it will
be for its fortunes.
"I ara devoutly grateful to God that my last cam
paign with this brave array was crowned with a vic
tory which saved the nation from the greatest peril
it had then undergone. I have not accoraplished
my purpose if, by this report, the Army of the Poto
mac is not placed high on the roll of the historic
armies of the world. Its deeds ennoble the nation
to which it belongs. Always ready for battle, al
ways firm, steadfast, and trustworthy, I never called
on it in vain ; nor will the nation ever have cause to
attribute its want of success, under myself, or under
other coraraanders, to any failure of patriotisra or
bravery in that noble body of Araerican soldiers."

xxxv
SOME NOTES OF m'cLELLAN'S LIFE AND PERSONALITY
While this work is essentially a military criticism
based on official data, much of which is new to the
public, and intended for military students and stu
dents of strategy, it may be well to append, in
the briefest form, sorae personal data relating to
General George B. McClellan hiraself. Perhaps this
can best come from a raUitary raan hiraself, one
who knew hira at West Point and during the War
with Mexico, and who has written iraportant works
on kindred subjects; and yet one who was not em
ployed in the military service during the War of the
Rebellion, having left the army six years before the
war, to engage in literary pursuits which have made
his name faraous throughout the world. I refer to
Professor and President Henry Coppee, whose
"Conquest of Spain" is a monuraental work which
could only have been accomplished by one of high
military judgraent
The remarks on the personality and history of
General McClellan I select from his biographical
notice of McCleUan in Appleton's "Cyclopsedia of
American Biography," published in 1888.
300

NOTES ON McCLELLAN'S LIFE 301
Professor Coppee entered the Military Academy
of West Point in 1841, and was graduated in 1845,
while McClellan entered the same institution in 1842,
and was graduated in 1846, so that they were asso
ciated as students for three years.
Coppee's life was fruitful, and gave him every
opportunity to measure men, and especially military
men, and their qualifications and achieveraents.
He served as an officer of artillery during the
War with Mexico, and was promoted for gallantry
at Contreras and Churubusco; he was principal as
sistant professor of geography, history, and ethics
at West Point for five years ; he resigned frora the
army in 1855, to becorae professor of English lit
erature in the University of Pennsylvania, until
1866; then president of Lehigh University, at Beth
lehem, in 1874; and was one of the Regents of the
Smithsonian Institution, at Washington. He was
twice a member of the United States Mint Assay
Commission; he was editor of the United Service
Magazine in 1864- 1866. In addition to many works
not military. Professor Coppee was the author of
"Manual of Battalion DriU," "Evolutions of the
Line," "Manual of Court-Martial," "Life and Ser
vices of General U. S. Grant," and "The Conquest
of Spain by the Arab-Moors," and translator frora
the French of "La Guerre Civile en Amerique," by
Count Paris.
Says Professor Coppee of McClellan :

302 ANTIETAM
"Born in Philadelphia, Pa., December 3, 1826;
died in Orange, N. J., October 29, 1885.
"Educated by private tutors, he spent two years
at the University of Pennsylvania, where he shared
first honors; at the age of fifteen years and six
months (while under legal age) he became by spe
cial authority a cadet at the Military Academy at
West Point July i, 1842. In his class were Gen
eral Stonewall Jackson, General Reno, and others
who subsequently becarae distinguished.
"He led his class in raatheraatics, and was gradu
ated July I, 1846. He was appointed brevet second
lieutenant in the corps of engineers (the highest
class ) , and served during the War with Mexico, in
the operations resulting in the capture of the city;
was promoted for meritorious conduct, and in 1848
was made assistant and instructor of practical engi
neering at West Point. He was engaged in the Red
River and other Government explorations, and, later,
as engineer on the Western frontiers, and in
Oregon and Washington. He was sent to Europe
during the Criraean War, on a commission to study
the organizations, arras, field and siege-works, and
operations of the different arraies, the results of
which were published in his elaborate report, "The
Arraies of Europe," and which was used in re
organizing our own armies during the War of the
Rebellion. He wrote a nuraber of other military
works of a practical character, and devised the well-

NOTES ON McCLELLAN'S LIFE 303
known McClellan saddle for cavalry, which has
come into universal military use.
"In 1857 he resigned from the array, which was
then largely unemployed, to accept the position of
chief engineer of the Illinois Central Railroad, and
became its vice-president in 1858, and in 1859 was
elected president of the Eastem Division of the St.
Louis, Missouri and Cincinnati Railroad. Imrae
diately on the breaking out of the War of the Rebel
lion he resigned, to re-enter the array, and April 23
he was appointed raajor-general of the Ohio Volun
teers, and placed in command of the Department of
the Ohio, which included the States of Ohio,
Indiana, and Illinois, with portions of Virginia and
Pennsylvania. "In a raonth he was in the field, and iraraedlately
engaged in a most successful war, which made
West Virginia a loyal State ever afterward.
"His subsequent history is a part of the history
of his country."
Of his personal qualities and characteristics. Pro
fessor Coppee has this to say :
"McClellan was about five feet eight inches in
height, firmly built, with broad shoulders ; solid and
muscular, an excellent horseman. Modest and re
tiring, he had withal a great self-respect, a gracious
dignity. His personal raagnetism has no parallel
in military history, except in that of the first Napo
leon; he was HteraUy the idol of his officers and
men. They would obey hira when all other control

304 ANTIETAM
had failed. His hold upon the people was never
relaxed. The army idolized hira, and his popularity
followed hira. In 1864 he was chosen to deliver
the oration at West Point on the occasion of the
unveiling of the monument erected to the memory
of the officers and soldiers of the regular array."
In 1864, when the very crisis of the war was upon
us, and when it was perilous "to swap horses when
crossing a streara," McClellan was raade one of the
Presidential candidates. His personality was his
only platform, and, even then, he received frora the
loyal States and the army alone a vote of 1,800,000,
against his opponent, the immortal Lincoln, who re
ceived but 2,200,000, in an undoubtedly trammeled
election. We can feel now that Lincoln's election
was necessary then; but how sad the melancholy
aftermath, and the loss of Lincoln, the Pacificator,
who never lived to be.
In 1877 McClellan was elected Governor of New
Jersey, and declined a re-election.
On his return from Europe, in 1868, he received
ovations which those who were present will never
forget. His procession through the streets of his
native city was literally bordered with tears, and
no subsequent receptions to others ever equalled or
approached that of McClellan in his own home.
We can well understand how Grant, long after the
War, said to his confidential friend and companion,
John Russell Young : "I saw in him the man who
was to pilot us through, and I wanted to be on his

NOTES ON McCLELLAN'S LIFE 305
staff. I should have liked to have joined McClel
lan," and, as McClellan pathetically said, "would
have shared my fate."
And how Robert E. Lee, after the War, when
asked his opinion of which was the ablest of the
Union generals, as narrated by his biographer and
military secretary. General A. L. Long, brought his
hand down on the table with emphatic energy, and
said, "McClellan, by aU odds !"

NOTES
Antietam. The battle of South Mountain, September 14-15,
prevented Longstreet from closing down in rear of Franklin
and Couch, in Pleasant Valley, and forced Longstreet and
D. H. Hill to turn south from Boonsborough to Sharpsburg,
and abandon invasion of Pennsylvania from Hagerstown.
See pp. IOO, IOI.
Conscription. First general Confederate conscription was
issued ten days after Stanton's order, in April, 1862, to stop all
recruiting, close the offices and sell the furniture to the best
advantage. See p. 29; also "Confederate Conscription," in
Index. Culpeper. Technique of the strategy and tactics used by
McClellan to pass by his flank across Jackson's front, and
intervene between the two halves of the Confederate army,
and strike Longstreet directly, by a frontal attack.
(All of the above only to be found in the Supplemental
Volume LI, of the Official War Records, published and issued
in 1898-1899, instead of Volume xix, which had been pub
lished in 1887.) The general movement commenced five
weeks after the last gun was fired at Antietam.
Impossibility of an earlier advance east of the Blue Ridge,
which the President insisted on. Up until the movement
commenced, or at least to October isth, the Army was living
from hand to mouth, as practically no quartermaster's stores
had been received since spring. The horses had largely de
creased since the Antietam campaign commenced. See note
"Supplies," below; Lee's statements also of how McClellan's
army was without means for a movement. Any advance of
McClellan east of the Blue Ridge would also have opened
Maryland and Pennsylvania to a fresh invasion, as Lee's
whole army was at Winchester, thirty miles from the Poto
mac, and McClellan's army would have been east of the
mountains, near Bull Run, and entirely beyond possibility of
reaching and attacking Lee's new invasion except by a long
pursuit into Pennsylvania, and an entire abandonment of our
307

3o8

NOTES

movement to Culpeper or Richmond. Lee proposed, to both
Generals Loring and Jackson, this precise movement (see
their dispatches received). November was too late for such
a general Confederate invasion, and McClellan left one whole
corps and nearly half of another on the north bank of the
Potomac to prevent even the threat of such a movement.
See pp. 176, 177; 182, 183; 182-190; 193.
Franklin and Couch at battle of Crampton's Gap and
occupation of Pleasant Valley. Franklin held these until the
night of September 16, and Couch until September 17; the
purpose to prevent a great turning movement by Lee, from
Sharpsburg across the Potomac, to Boteler's Ford; thence
down Virginia to Harper's Ferry, then across the Potomac and
down the north bank, and up east of the South Mountain,
to occupy the passes, open Washington and Baltimore to cap
ture, and compel McClellan, by want of supplies, to retire into
Pennsylvania. It was all balked by McClellan. See pp. 82-86;
90-92. Grant followed the same route in June, 1864, that McClel
lan did in June- July, 1862, from Cold Harbor (Gaines' Mill),
to Harrison's Landing.
Grant crossed there to unite with Butler's army on the south
bank of the James River. McClellan crossed the James also
in considerable force, and had there been one-half as many
Union troops then on the southern bank as Grant found there
when he reached there, the heart of the Confederacy would
have been inevitably perforated.
But Burnside's Army of North Carolina was sent, not up the
James, but up the Rappahannock to Pope ; and McClellan was
ordered to trail along after Burnside and leave Lee free to
move anywhere at will.
If President Lincoln had had the nerve or experience to
send to General McClellan, at Harrison's Landing, in July
or August, 1862, the dispatch he sent to General Grant at
City Point, just opposite, August 17, 1864 (see "War Rec
ords," Vol. XLII, Part 2, page 343), and which reads as fol
lows: "I have seen your dispatch [from Grant to HaUeck,
in reply], expressing your unwillingness to break your hold
where you are. Neither am I willing. Hold on with a bull
dog grip and chew and choke as much as possible. A. Lin
coln." How different it would have been! In 1862 it was
Pope and Halleck and Stanton who held on "with a bulldog

NOTES 309
grip," and chewed and choked, while Lincoln broke his hold,
and made McClellan, also, break his. And then !
See the protest of Commodore Wilkes, "War Records," Vol.
XI, Part 2, pp. 356-358; and see also General Upton, who,
says, "Military Policy of the United States," page 371, "The
fact should not be overlooked that the misguided advisers of
the President and the Confederate Commander were aiming
at the same object." See pp. 27, 37, 43.
McCLELLAN.^Manufactured the Army of the Potomac, and
after its disruption under Pope, in August and September,
1862, remanufactured anew, out of three disrupted armies, the
new Army of the Potomac, never to be again remade until
the war was over. Grant never made an army; they were
made for him. Sherman, Thomas, Meade, Buell and Mc
Clellan made armies, and they learned it under McClellan,
in whose army they were. Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gus
tavus Adolphus, Frederick the Great, and, above all others.
Napoleon made armies, which faculty, like that of all great
architects, is a personal endowment; and they who best made
armies also best fought them, and had the qualities which
Coppee attributes to McClellan, saying, page 303, "His per
sonal magnetism has no parallel in military history, except
in that of the first Napoleon." See pp. 53-54; 284-286;
303-305. Pope. — A curious commentary on the state of mind of
General Pope is to be found in his letter in reply to General
Halleck of October 20, 1862, "War Records," Vol xn. Part 3,
page 822. Halleck, in reply to General Pope's previous let
ter says, page 820: "The feeling of many of his officers to
ward you was such that you could not have commanded them.
No one can deny this. . . . The assignment of General
McClellan to this command, or rather his retention in it, was
not my act nor that of the War Department; it was the act of
the President alone. I did not even know of his decision on
the matter till he himself announced it to General McClellan."
To this General Pope replied: "Your reason for retaining
hira in command, 'the feeling of many officers of the Poto
mac army,' is the very strongest reason, in my view, why he
should not be retained." His view was that of the boarding-
house keeper who said "she always tried to find out what the
boarders didn't like, and then give them plenty of it."
Halleck's letter, above quoted, is a direct and categoric

3IO

NOTES

affirmation, which I have italicized, of what is stated in the
text of this book, on pages 47, 48-52, 60-62.
Steiner, Dr. — Inspector of the Sanitary Commission, a resi
dent of Frederick, Maryland, where he owned a farm. After
second Bull Run he had leave, and went to Frederick on the
last train which reached that city, remaining there as an ob
server during the entire Confederate occupation, and accom
panied McClellan's army on its campaign to Antietam. His
diary was made at the time. His important statements are
those of an expert, an official inspector of troops. See pp.
57. 77-78, 122-124, 133-134-
Supplies. — By a doctored system in the Antietam cam
paign, after the battle the people of the North were made
to believe that the Army of the Potomac was being lavishly
supplied, while it was being actually starved and nearly naked ;
while, in fact, these supplies went to the stay-at-homes in
Washington under a fiction that McClellan's army was a part
of "the defenses of the Capital," under the official order of
September 2, and ignoring the unpublished direct and per
sonal order of the President for McClellan to take command
of the army in the field. See pp. 173-177.
War Records, United States Official, Supplemental Volume
LI. Most of the actual material only is to be found in this
supplemental volume, published eleven years after volume
XIX, in which these thousands of most important papers should
have appeared their suppression. See pp. 11, 12; also "War
Records" in Index.

INDEX

Abolitionists, 22, 248.
"A Few Acts and Actors in the
Tragedy of the Civil War,"
147, 149.
Aquia creelE, 41, 42, 44.
Alexander, General, quoted, 136.
Ammunition, why McClellan did
not receive heavy artil
lery, 147-149.
Antietam, Battle of, 19, 71, 86,
87, 88, 100, 101, 102, 103,
160.
aud Gettysburg compared, 117,
151.
losses at, compared, 141-
142.
forces at, compared, 120-129,
130.
"artiUery hell," 136.
belittled, 56.
Burnside at, 105-109, 111-115,
116.
"Burnside's blundering sacri
fice of life at," 106.
errors at, 105-106, 114, 115.
comparison with forces en
gaged at ChancellorsTille,
127.
Fredericksburg, 126.
Gettysburg, 120, 121, 127,
128
Second Bull Run, 117, 118.
Seven Days' battles, 117.
Shiloh, 125, 126.
Murfreesborough, 127.
Confederate forces at, 117-120.
line at, 101.
forces engaged, 116-129.
greatest battle of war, 88, 135.
greatest day of battle, 152.
grandest victory of war, 88.
Lee force at, 101-102.
Lee's report (quoted), 102.
losses on each side, 137, 139,
140, 142.
prisoners, etc., 138-141.
McClellan's plan at, 102.
material to battle at, 133.
plan at, 116 ; closely fol
lowed by Lee at Gettys
burg, 116 ; followed by

Antieta-m — contmued.
Marshal Oyama at Muk
den, 116.
reports of Confederate com
manders at, 106-107, 109,
110, 111, 112.
Union forces at, 117-120.
weather conditions of eve of,
100 ; see Note, p. 307.
Appleton's Cyclopoedia of Ameri
can Biography, 227.
Appomattox, 198.
Union forces hold, 35.
"Armies of Europe, The," 302.
Army becomes quiescent, 205.
commanded by President and
Secretary of War, 22.
foreigners in Union, 259.
"Around the World with Grant "
198-199, 263, 264, 275,
285, 304-305.
Averell's cavalry, action of,
south of James, 86.
Baltimore's peril, 92.
"Barbara Fritchie," 122, 131.
Barnard, General, orders of Sec
retary of War to, 47.
relinquishes command, 47.
"Battles and Leaders," 136, 212-
213.
"Battle of Culpeper," 206-208.
Bayard's dying message to Mc
Clellan, 285.
Benjamin, Secretary, excuses
Cabinet interference in
army affairs, 218.
report of, 146.
Benningsen, 198.
Bernadotte, 198.
Beverly Ford, 168.
Bolivar, Virginia Heights, 65, 68.
Bounties, 259, 261.
Bradford, Lieutenant, 147, 148.
Bragg marches toward the Ohio,
63.
Bristoe, campaign of 1863, 256.
Brooke, Ma.ior-General, report of,
138-139
Brown, John, raid, 69, 80.
Buell, a pupil of McClellan, 54.

3"

312

INDEX

Bull Run, First, 51 ; see also
Manassas.
second battle of, 43.
second campaign, 24.
Burnside, General, 50, 164.
aids McClellan to retain com
mand, 190.
assumes command, 190.
driven back, 145.
given command, 205, 293.
Halleck's orders to, 45.
Lee watching, 41.
not a tactician, 105.
not qualified as general, 113.
protests against McClellan's
rush, 182.
retires to Fredericksburg, 206.
Burnside's failure to cut Lee
off, 150.
forces at Antietam, 109.
force goes to Fredericksburg,
42.
mistakes, Longstreet on, 212.
plan of campaign, 205-206.
President approves, 190.
withdrawal permits Confeder
ate Junction, 213.
Butler at New Orleans, 144.
trouble with fugitive slaves,
244.
Cabal, Chandler a. member of,
215.
civilian, at Washington, 215.
Lincoln not strong enough to
force, 217.
Stanton backed up by, 272.
Cameron, Secretary, on fugitive
slaves, 244-245.
Campaign of 1862, Stanton's in
terference in, 21, 24, 30.
Cartridges, blank, McClellan able
to flre only, 88, 146.
Cavalry, Lincoln's query to Mc
Clellan concerning, 166.
Cedar Mountain, 44, 70.
ChanceUorsvUle, 24.
Lee forces at, 203.
Confederate forces at, 127.
Union forces at, 127.
Chandler, Biography of Senator,
216, 217.
Zachariah, 215, 216, 217.
Chantilly, 58.
Chickahominy divides army, 26.
Union forces cross, 35.
City Point, 36.
"CotEee-boUers," 130, 131.
Cold Harbor, Grant at. 239.
"Comments on Bourbaki's Opera
tions," 199.

Committee on Conduct of War,
Civilian, 143, 144.
Confederate Army, cabinet in
terference in, 217, 218,
219.
leaves Pennsylvania, 58-59.
commanders ignorant of topog
raphy of country, 28.
concentrate at Frederick, 59.
conscription, 29, 30, 31, 170,
253.
engineers' reports, 35.
forces at Gaines Mill, 34-36.
at Seven Days' battles, 30-
34.
minimized, 28.
opposing Burnside at Antie
tam, 109-112.
loss at Soutli Mountain,
Crampton's Gap, Antie
tam, etc., 136-140.
offlcial report, 84.
States, regimental strength of,
33.
Congressional Committee on the
Conduct of the War, 9,
216, 236, 294
"Conquest of Spain," 300.
Conscription. See Confederate
conscription, and note, p.
307.
Coppee, Henry, 300, 301.
Corinth, dispersal of army con
centrated at, 23.
Pope's "victory" south of, 279.
siege of, 39.
Corliss, Major, 161.
CornwaUis, Lord, 228-229, 269-
270.
Couch, General, order to, 98, 154.
division, 145.
Crampton's Gap, battle of, 87,
162.
Crane, Colonel, report of, 140.
Crawford, General (quoted), 70.
Crimea, 227, 302.
Crisis, The, 51.
Crooks, General (quoted), 113.
Culpeper, 44, 45.
Great movement on, 178-190.
McClellan's disposition of units
in movement on. 182-190.
orders to Averell, 187; Bay
ard, 188-189 ; Burnside,
187, 188 ; Couch, 186, 188 ;
Franklin, 183-184, 188,
189; Getty, 184; Ninth
Corps, 189 ; Pleasonton,
183, 186, 187, 188; Por
ter, Fitz-John, 184, 188;
Reynolds, 184-185, 187-

INDEX

313

Culpeper — continued.
188, 189; Sickles, 188;
Sigel, 188 ; Sixth corps,
18 7; Stoneman , 184;
Sturgis, 183, 184, 189;
Sumner, 189 ; Sykes, 185.
reports on advance to Alex
ander, 192 ; Lee, 192, 193 ;
Pleasonton, 192 ; Sickles,
192; Willcox, 192, 193;
see Note, p. 307.
Curtin, Governor, 146.
Cyclopoedia of American Biogra
phy, 300.
DAVIS, Colonel B. F., 161, 167 ;
death of, 168.
Jefferson, approves invasion of
Pennsylvania, 56.
concedes McClellan could have
ended war, 253.
"History of the Confederacy,"
29.
Lee's report to, 56, 57.
on the hopelessness of South
ern cause, 253-254.
proclamation, 56-57.
Lieutenant-Colonel Harbroner,
161.
Major Nelson H., report of,
136.
Desertions, 260, 261, 270.
"Destruction and Reconstruction"
(quoted), 28.
"Detroit Post and Tribune Biog
raphy, The," 215-216.
Drafting, 260, 261.
DuPont, Colonel (quoted), 21-23.
Emancipation Proclamation, 243-
244, 250, 251.
a war measure, 249-250.
did not free slaves, 251.
enforced South conscription,
251.
Increased hostility of South,
251.
Its political effect upon other
nations, 252.
prolonged war, 251.
Emerson, Ralph Waldo (quoted),
284.
Equipment, damaged, 119.
Exhaustion of North and South,
269.
Fbbrbbo's report, 112.
Financial depletion, 261-262, 270.

Forrest a born general, 160.
and Van Dorn at Holly Springs,
160.
rides around Grant, 160.
Fortiflcations, Grant's respect
for renewed, 224, 225,
226.
Grant's lack of respect for, 223-
224.
Humphrey's treatment of, 226.
McClellan learns their value at
Crimea, 227.
Meade to Grant on, 226.
value of, 223.
Warren's faith in, 224, 225.
Forty-eighth Pennsylvania, his
tory of (quoted), 259.
Franklin, General, official report
of, 97, 139.
General McClellan's orders to,
97. See Note, p. 308.
Fredericksburg, 24.
battle of, 202, 203.
Burnside goes to, 42.
Confederates abandon, 72.
Confederate forces at, 126.
Union forces at, 126.
Friedland (1807) campaign, 198.
Fugitive slaves, 244, 245.
Gaines' Mill, 28.
battle of, 181.
Confederate forces at, 34-36.
Union forces at, 34-36.
Garfield, James A., 22.
Garrett, President, B. & O. R. R.,
146.
Gettysburg, battle of, 52, 58, 89,
96, 131, 134, 151, 211.
and Antietam compared, 117,
151.
forces at, compared, 120-129,
130.
losses at, compared, 141-142.
Lee's frontal attack at, 117.
Meade's peril after, 215.
Stuart destroys Lee's chances
at, 159.
campaign, Anderson, R. H., re
port of, 195.
Meade and the, 143.
Stonewall Jackson's route
map for, 92.
"God bless you. General McClel
lan," 285.
Gordonsville, 41.
Grant, General, 36 (quoted), 52-
53, 64, 89, 242.
and Sherman's friendship, ro
mance of, 280-281.

314

INDEX

Orant — contimued.
commends McClellan, 135.
compels Stanton to bend the
knee, 272.
given command, 217.
never made an army, 53.
on draft, 260, 261.
vindicates Porter, 290.
Grant's confidence iu McClelUan,
275.
final campaign, 36.
peril in pursuit of Lee, 264.
tribute to McClellan, 285.
"Great Campaigns," Adams, 198,
199.
Green, Lieutenant, 101.
Griffin, General Charles, describes
ford, 152.
report of, 101.
Guild, Medical Director, defec
tive report of, 136-137.
Gwyn, Colonel, report of, 155,
156.
Hagee, General, 220.
Hagerstown, 72.
Lee's army taken, 58.
Halleck, General, 24, 40, 48, 64,
85,
address against giving com
mand to McClellan, 46.
alarmed at Pope's defeat, 48.
carries Burnside's plan to
Washington, 206.
cause MicClellan's dismissal to
save himself, 297.
directs that McClellan shall
take charge of defenses of
Washington, 174.
equivocal message to Burnside,
206.
false dispatch, 39. See Halleck-
Pope dispatches.
letter to Grant (1862) as to
payment of troops, etc.,
261-262.
letter to Pope, 46.
letter to McClellan after Pope's
defeat, 47.
letter to McClellan, 45.
mutilates offlcial records, 40,
295-296.
on Burnside, 190.
on deserters, 260.
order for removal of army from
Peninsula, 42.
order of September 2, 61.
orders to Burnside, 44-45.
-Pope dispatches, 40, 41, 46,
90, 183, 278-286, 291-297.
letter of July 5, 1865, to, 40.

Halleck — continued.
position officially strong, 61.
stakes reputation on ability of
army to take Richmond,
46.
statement erroneous, 46-47.
threatens General Humphreys
with arrest, 71.
Hancock, General, at Snicker's
Gap, 187.
letter of, 136.
on McClellan's treatment, 235. '
report of, 140.
Harper's Ferry, 59, 72, 76, 78,
90, 91, 94, 95, 101, 103,
130, 145, 182.
cavalry expedition from, 160.
Benning's report of, 163.
Colonel Voss' report of, 160-
161, 163, 164, 165, 166.
fruits of, 166.
Lee mentions, 163.
Longstreet on, 167.
McClellan's mention of, 167.
Pendleton's report of, 164-
165, 166.
Walker, (}en. John G., on, 167.
disposition of Confederate
forces about, 161-162.
defense of, 64, 65-66.
investment of, 78, 79, 80.
McClellan's report on, 91.
surrenders, 73, 162.
topography of, 65-68, 82-83.
Harrison's Landing described, 36
McCleUan's position at, 35.
operations at, 36.
Huntbleman, 50.
Hill, A. P., 44.
drives back Burnside, 145.
D. H., on condition of Con
federate troops, 227.
on the suffering of men in
trenches, 234.
report, 36.
"History of the Confederacy," 29.
Holly Springs, Forrest and Van
Dorn at, 160.
Grant's report of raid at, 160.
Hood's fatuous Inactivity, 266-
267, 268.
opportunities, 267-269.
the menace of, 267-269.
Hooker, General, letter to Stan
ton on Burnside at Antie
tam, 106.
Humphreys, General, 171.
application for court of Inquiry,
70-71.
get's new equipment, 145.

INDEX

315

Humplireys — continued
Halleck threatens, with arrest,
71.
inadequate equipment, 71, 79.
inefficient equipment, 119.
on fortifications, 226.
"I am so borne upon," 215.
"Important movement pending,"
189.
Ingalls, Chief Quartermaster, re
port of delay in supplying
McClellan, 177.
Colonel, on McCleUan's celerity
of movement, 181.
General, 70.
General, report to General
Meigs, 44, 45.
Jackson, Stonewall, 27, 44, 302.
and Lee, junction of, 28.
brilliant exploits over Union
commanders, 180.
bottled up, 180, 241.
cut off from striking McClel
lan's communications, 184,
185.
offers his resignation from
army, 218, 219.
on cabinet Interference in con
duct of army, 218.
ordered to suppress Pope, 41-
42.
ordered to cut off McClellan's
communications, 179.
withdraws resignation from
army, 219-220.
won no laurels from McClellan,
180, 181.
James River, 41.
correct military base, 26.
Grant's change of base at, 27.
McClellan's change of base at,
27.
Johnston, J. B., begs Jackson to
reconsider his resignation,
219.
endorses Jack-son's offer of
resignation, 218.
oa cabinet interference of con
duct of war, 219.
Jones, General, 88.
report of, 121-137.
Kentucky, declaration of Union
men of, 242.
excepted from Ihnancipation
Proclamation, 243-244.
^ necessary to hold, 243.
Kimball, (Jeneral, report of, 139.

Lafayette, Marquis, 229.
"Lectures on India," Max Miiller,
10.
Lee, General Robert E., 51, 53,
145.
abandons Idea of invading
Pennsylvania, 172.
balked in campaign of 1863,
256.
bewildered, 203, 205.
captures letter from Pope to
Halleck, 45.
charged with conduct of Con
federate forces, 29.
military operations, 220.
commends McClellan, 135.
complains of shortage of offi
cers, 82-83.
crosses into Maryland, 63.
declares McClellan the ablest
Union general, 277.
greatest of Union generals,
305.
forces Pope, 47.
General Orders No. 14, 29.
had all artillery he wanted,
145.
letter of, of August 16, 29.
letter of, to General Loring,
172.
"may attack," 150.
on straggling, 132, 134.
orders Jackson to suppress
Pope, 41-42.
pursuit of, was hazardous, 264.
quoted on capture of Harper's
Ferry, 96.
retreats from Maryland, 88.
sacriflces judgment to duty,
265.
starts for Rapidan, 43.
to President Davis on needs of
army, 172.
writes to Jackson, 41.
watches Burnside s movements,
41.
Lee's army, report of supplies to,
176-177.
army encamped at Frederick,
72.
flight to Virginia, 150-152, 154.
force at Antietam, 101-102.
incompatible orders, 203, 205.
invasion of Maryland, 55.
Invasion of Pennsylvania, 56,
152.
losses at Second Manassas,
125.
lost opportunity, 264-266.
lost order, 78, 75-86, 89.

3i6

INDEX

Lee's lost orders, directions con
tained in, 76-77.
McClellan anticipates their
disclosures, 73-74.
McClellan determines If, is
genuine, 73.
McClellan's knowledge of,
too late to circumvent Con
federate movements, 78 et
seq.
success of directions contained
therein, 78-79.
order to move to Rappahan
nock, 45.
projected turning movement, its
menace to Washington, 95.
possibilities of, 98-95.
report to Jefferson Davis, 56,
57.
reports, 88.
surrender, 198, 199, 255, 265.
not a military necessity, 265-
266.
turning movement not success
ful with McClellan, 95.
used on Hooker, 95.
used on Pope, 95. ,
"Life of Chase," 147.
"Lincoln and Seward" (Welles),
48.
Lincoln, President, 22, 25, 48, 49
(quoted), 71.
assassination, 248.
begs McClellan to take the
army, 60.
desires end of war, 263.
directs McClellan to take
charge of defenses of
Washington, 174, 175.
during war organized States,
248.
enforces personal orders, 24.
excuses himself for appointing
McClellan, 51.
"has little influence with this
administration," 215.
ignorant of insufficient sup
plies, 174.
ignorant of Pope-Halleck in
trigue, 298.
letter vindicating McClellan,
237-238.
message to Halleck, 40.
offers to resign Presidency,
215.
on slavery, 242-249.
order to McClellan regarding
McDowell corps, 222.
places McClellan In command
of Washington forces, 49,
61, 68.

Lincoln — continued.
saves Meade, 215.
Lincoln's sole object to save
Union, 287.
telegraphs McClellan, 62.
to McClellan, 43.
turns his back on War De
partment, 63, 175.
vindicates McClellan, 236-238.
Longstreet anticipated and neu
tralized, 189.
battle order, 209.
gives final order of battle, 203.
halted, 58.
isolated, 201.
letter of, 31.
on Burnside's mistakes at Cul
peper, 212.
Longstreet's vain orders, 55.
Loring, General, 57.
General, letter of Lee to, 172.
Loudon Heights, 65, 67, 68, 69,
72, 76, 80, 93, 124, 161.
Louisa Courthouse, 41, 44.
Magkudee dispatches, 228.
Malvern Hill, 28.
General Sumner's report of cap
ture of, 86.
Jackson at, 181.
Lee's defeat at, 35.
Manassas, Second, 50-54, 117-118,
287-288 ; see Butt Run,.
Confederate forces at, 50, 51.
Lee's losses at, 125.
Pope's forces at, 60.
losses at, 125.
Marching distances of contending
armies in Maryland and
Virginia campaign com
pared, 131.
Martinsburg, reconnaissance to,
171.
Lee's account of, 171.
Pleasonton's report of, 171.
Maryland campaign, comparison
of forces at. 202-203.
events which led up to, 19-
21.
opens, 55.
view of flnal epoch of, 201.
Heights, 65, 67, 68, 72, 76, 78,
79, 80, 81, 83, 85, 92, 93,
95, 98, 100.
cavalry garrisons, 59.
invasion of Lee, 55.
McCleUan, General George B., 22,
23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 41, 51.
"a much abused man," 214.
accused of slowness, 42, 43,
44.

INDEX

317

McClellan — continued.
adds Instructions, 42.
and Lee move simultaneously,
241.
at Antietam awaits delayed am
munition, 88.
baffles Jackson at White Oak
Swamp, 181.
checkmates Lee, 55.
clamors for heavy ammunition,
146.
commended for activity and
valor by General Scott,
274-275.
could have ended war, 253.
could Lincoln have saved? 61.
created Army of Potomac, 235.
crosses Lee's front by the
flank, 178.
crosses Potomac, 178-179.
declared by Lee the ablest
Union general, 277.
greatest Union general, 805.
determines If Lee's lost order
Is genuine, 73.
"did not attack early enough,"
143.
did not claim command, 47.
did not protest against ad
vance of his force, 47.
directed to pursue Lee, 64.
fears cabal at Washington, 60.
PItz-John Porter's letter to,
36.
forces opposed to, minimized
at Washington, 125.
Governor of New Jersey, 304.
Grant's confldence in, 275.
tribute to, 285.
had little ammunition, 145.
had no artillery ammunition,
145.
had three disorganized armies
in field, 64.
HaUeck advises against giving
command to, 46.
Halleck's letter to, after Pope's
defeat, 47.
idol of offlcers and men, 303.
in actual command, 62.
iu charge of defenses of Wash
ington, 174.
In Mexican War, 302.
keeps Lee at Richmond, 43.
leaves army, 213.
letter of Halleck to, 45.
letter of, to Halleck, 60 ; reply
to, 60.
life and personality, 300-305.

McClellan — continued.
Lincoln begs, to take the army,
60.
refutes charge of slowness
of, 48.
main purpose to save Union,
246, 248-249.
most successful of our com
manding officers, 275.
moves Into Pope's territory, 45.
moves troops, 45.
never lost conquered territory,
144.
not actuated by personal mo
tives, 46.
not In command of defenses at
Washington, 47.
on slavery, 242.
paralyzes Lee, 203.
Pope pours his wrath on, 289.
refutes charge of slowness
of, 43.
to relieve, 38.
position of general-In-chief
taken from, 25.
President orders he be sent for,
47.
Presidential candidate, 304.
prevents Lee's great turning
movement, 82-86, 90-92.
prepares to cross Potomac and
attack Lee, 169.
placed in command of Wash
ington forces, 49, 51.
relieved of command, 190, 205,
298.
reorganizes army on the march,
186.
saving factor of a demoralized
army, 133.
saddle for cavalry, 302-303.
starts for Fort Mx)nroe, 43.
stripped of authority, 235.
studies Crimean War, 302.
superior to Jackson, 181.
to be sent forward, 53.
to command all troops in Vir
ginia, 45-46.
to coommand all forces, 42-48.
to reorganize army, 61-53, 58.
to take command of all forcei
In fleld, 63.
unable to save Harper's Ferry,
65.
understood artillery, 135-186.
Upton vindicates, 42.
uses fugitive slaves, 244-247.
vindicated by Lincoln, 286-238.
why he did not attack next
morning, 144-145.
why was he removed, 278, 297.

3i8

INDEX

McClellan's alleged inactivity, 76.
appeal for ferryboats, 36.
army, Lee on supplies of, 173.
needs of, during campaign,
172.
robbed of supplies, 174,
175.
army's applause of, 213.
average daily march greater
than any other command
er, 199-200.
caution to Franklin, 91.
celerity, 44.
in Culpeper campaign, 181.
or slowness, 191-200.
compared with Meade, 194-
195 ; Confederates, 195 ;
Kershaw (General), 195;
Lee, 196; Longstreet, 196;
Sherman's march, 197 ;
Vicksburg campaign, 197 ;
Freedland (1807) cam
paign, 198 ; Grant's pur
suit of Lee, 198-199 ; Bour
baki's operations, 199 ;
Army of Potomac regiment
itinerary, 199-200.
circular on straggling, 132-
183.
command of artillery 141.
danger of court-martial, 61.
detractors, 236.
disposition of his units in move
ment on Culpeper, 182-
190.
force exaggerated, 28.
"inactivity," 96, 274.
letter to Adjutant - General
Townsend, 242-243.
to Buell, 248, 248-249.
movements bewilder Lee, 203.
Lee's letters to Stuart con
cerning, 203-204 ; Jackson
concerning, 203-204 ; to
War Department, 205.
odd correspondence with Sec
retary Cameron, 276.
orders to Sykes, 185.
plan, 27, 28, 104-115.
a capital essay on principles
of war, 255.
for army movements through
out rebel States, 244.
of frontal attack, 169.
Washington interference in,
170.
personal qualities, 303-304.
position at Harrison's Land
ing, 35.
removal, the canse of, 242-252.

McClellan's report on armies of
Europe, 227.
on Harper's Ferry, 91.
to Halleck (September 8),
62.
success a menace to political
.ambitions of his enemies,
273, 274.
successful direction in the
South and West, 144.
tribute to Army of Potomac,
299
to Lincoln, 298-299. See
Note, p. 309.
McDoweU, 26, 27, 50.
message to McClellan, 27.
Meade, General, 54, 89, 151.
and the Gettysburg campaign,
143.
a pupil of McClellan, 54.
peril after battle of Gettys
burg, 215.
"Medical and Surgical History of
the War, The," 138.
Meigs, Quartermaster-General, 98-
99.
Meigs, General, report of, on sup
plies to McClellan, 177.
"Memoirs," Grant's, 52-53, 197,
250-251, 271, 273, 280.
of Lee," 276.
Merrimac, 26, 222.
Michie, General Peter S., 12-13,
20 (quoted), 24-25, 214.
Miles, Colonel, 59, 80, 93, 100,
161.
at Harper's Ferry, 85-86.
defense of Harper's Ferry, 65-
66.
despatch of, 59.
syndicate-sacrificed, 180.
"Military Policy of the United
States," 9, 15, 20, 36, 40,
48, 62-68, 118, 124, 133,
188, 142, 175, 282.
Mine Run movement, 256.
Monitor, 222.
Monroe, Fort, McClellan starts
for, 43.
Monroe, Portress, removal of
troops to, 42.
Moral exhaustion of the North,
269-270.
MoreU's division, losses at Seven
Days and In Pope's cam
paign, 166.
Morris, Colonel, report of, 139.
Murfreesboro, Confederate forces
engaged at, 127.
Union forces engaged at^ 127.

INDEX

319

NAPOLEON, 9, 16, 52, 53, 186, 174,
198, 255-256, 269, 284,
303.
at Boulogne, 206.
Uim, campaign of, 185-186.
Negro soldiers in Confederate
army, 123. •
Nelson, Inspector, report of, 137.
North A-merican Review, 211,
290.
North Carolina, army of, 64.
depleted of native recruits,
259-260.
"Odious, to make treason," 247.
Official Orders (quoted), 28-29.
Oyama, Marshal, 116.
Pabkman, Francis (quoted), 16.
Peninsula, army withdrawn from,
42.
campaign. Confederate artil
lery, lack of ammunition
for, 238.
Confederate defenses, weak
ness of, 233, 234.
condition of roads, 281.
Magruder on, 227-228, 229-
230.
McClellan's plan for, 227,
254-255, 256-257.
relative positions of contend
ing forces, 231-284.
strength of forces In, 232-
238.
movement begun, 222.
of troops from, 45.
unanimously recommended,
222.
Pleasonton's cavalry detained
at, 47.
Confederate army leaves, 58-59
Pennsylvania, Confederate army
leaves, 58-59.
Lee abandons idea of invading,
172.
Lee's invasion of, 56, 152.
One Hundred and Eighteenth,
154-156.
losses of, 156.
Petersburg, 232.
fall of, 255.
,^ Grant at, 255.
"Personal Memoirs," Sherman's,
282.
EecoUections of Distinguished
Generals," 280.
Pleasonton, General, 154.
on winding up campaign, 209-
210.

Pleasonton's abUity, General
Sickles on, 211.
cavalry detained at Peninsula,
47.
Pope, General, 21, 41, 44, 51,
address to the Army of Vir
ginia, 38-39.
appointed to command of Army
of Virginia, 45.
army's valuation of, 283.
attack on McClellan, 292.
at Corinth, 39.
boastful address to army, 282.
campaign, 256.
campaign. Army of Potomac in,
288, 289.
defeat, 47.
Halleck alarmed at, 48.
Stanton alarmed at, 48.
Secretary Welles on, 48.
did not understand his own
plan, 289.
exiled in Minnesota, 46.
force at Rappahannock, 45.
given command of Arm? of
Virginia, 38, 280.
-Halleck dispatches, 278-281,
294-295, 296.
army not deceived by, 280.
blames President and cabi
net, 292.
"deep personal obligation" to
Pope, 291.
excuse for, 280.
Stanton's Inquiry into, 280.
in the West, 39.
letter of July 5, 1865, to Hal
leck, 40.
losses at Second Manassas, 125.
remarkable letters to Halleck,
291-297.
repudiates Halleck's dispatch,
39.
orders to, 88.
sent to Minnesota, 291.
testifies before Congressional
Committee on Conduct of
War, 40.
threat to Halleck causes Mc
Clellan's removal, 216-217.
to McClellan, 43. See Note, p.
309.
Poplar Spring Church, battle of,
259
Porter, Fitz-John, 22, 50, 154.
at Games' Mill, 181.
court-martialed on crooked evi
dence, 290-297.
letter to McClellan, 36.
obtains transports, 42.
Pope pours his wrath on, 289.

320

INDEX

Porter, Pitti-Jolm— continued.
saved Pope and Washington,
290.
vindicated, 290.
Potomac, Army of, 31, 41, 44, 45,
49, 64.
dally Itinerary of a regiment
of, 199.
great work belittled, 56.
high on roll of historic armies,
299.
in front of Richmond, 26.
McClellan created, 235.
recall of, 48.
marches off, 213.
quartermaster's report of sup
plies to, 176 ; Meigs' re
port, 177.
second base of operations for,
254.
sent to Pope, 288.
supplies of, 186.
starving for suppUes, 171.
to be withdrawn from the Pen
insula, 42.
river. Captain Winslow reports
fording, 97.
fording the, 152-153.
General Wool reports It as
fordable, 97.
road, 91.
topography of, 92.
Preface, 9-17.
President has no power to dele
gate command, 25.
is commander-in-chief, 24-26.
Prevost, Colonel, shot, 155.
Ramsey, Colonel, 148.
Rapidan, Lee starts for, 43.
Rebel commissioners, Lincoln's
conference with, 250-251.
demands concessions of, 251.
Rebellion, divergent views as to
suppression of, 247.
Lincoln represented enlightened
views In suppression of.
248
radicals did not represent
people in suppression of,
248.
Secretary Chase's radical views
as to suppression of, 247.
Reconstruction, period of, 247,
248.
Recruiting offices closed, order
rescinding, 118-119.
service discontinued, 28-29, 31.
Report of Committee on Con
duct of War, 133, 175.

Report of Joint Committee on
the Conduct of the War,
63.
Reports, offlcial, removal of, 183.
Reorganization on the march, 64-
74.
Reynolds. 50.
Richmond, 26, 27, 30.
armies face each other below,
41.
abandoned, 255.
fall of, 27.
Ripley, General, 146, 147, 148.
order of, from Secretary of
War, 60.
Rodgers, Commodore, McClellan's
plan outlined to, 27.
Roosevelt, Theodore (quoted),
15-16.
Sackett, General, 108, 112.
Scott, General, commends Mc
Clellan for activity and
valor, 274-276.
Secretary of War as strategist,
144.
but a clerk, 220.
promises ammunition, 146.
Seven Days' battles, 27, 50, 61,
117, 124.
forces at, 30-34.
losses of MoreU's division at,
115.
Seward, Secretary, 60.
ignorant of insufficiency of sup
plies, 174.
refuses to accede to recall of
McClellan, 48.
Shepherdstown, 164
Confederate forces at, 157.
losses at, 157.
Early, report of, 157.
HIU, A. P., report of, 157.
Jackson, StonewaU, at, 157.
Union losses at, 167.
Sherman, biography of, 196-197.
"Sherman's Bummers," 197.
march to the sea, 266-267, 269.
Sheridan on desertion, 261.
Sheridan's army, 68.
ride, 285.
Shiloh, battle of, strength of Con
federate forces at, 126.
Grant's army at, 126.
Sigel, General, 50.
Sickles, General, on Pleasonton's
abiUty, 211.
Slavery, 22, 250 ; see Fiigitioe
Slaves
Slaves freed by constitutional
amendment, 251.

INDEX

321

Slaves not freed by Emancipation
Proclamation, 251.
South, Conscription in, 251 ; see
Confederate Conscription.
South Mountain, 65, 76, 92, 93,
130.
battle ot, 58, 71, 72, 76, 82, 87,
162.
topography of, 66.
Stanton, Secretary, 21, 23, 24,
25. 48, 64. 85.
alarmed at Pope's defeat, 48.
backed up by cabal, 272.
"bluffer, a," 272.
cause of continued war, 271.
demands McClellan's dismissal,
48.
Grant's character study ot, 271-
273.
interterence of, 214, 217, 273.
message to Halleck, 39-40.
message to Pope, 39-40.
on drafts and desertions, 260,
261.
on slavery, 242.
order of AprU 8, 28.
order ot May 18, 26 ; of June
8, 26.
order to McClellan regarding
Blenker's division, 222.
suppresses McClellan tribute,
274.
"State suicide," 247, 249.
Steiner, Lewis H., diary of (quot
ed), 57-58, 72, 77-78, 79,
133-134, 250. See Note, p.
310.
"Stigma, an Undeserved." 290.
Stragglers, 130, 181, 132, 133,
184, 135, 138, 140-141.
offlcers among, 134, 135.
Straggling, Pope complains of,
288-289.
Stuart destroys Lee's chances at
Gettysburg, 159.
Stuart's "ride around Meade,"
159.
McClellan," 159.
useless cavalry raids, 159-160.
Substitutes and bounties, 259.
Supreme Court, 24.
Supplies, 17.3-177. Sec also iTttm-
phreys and Note, p. 310.
Sykes' brigade, 155-156.
Tayloe, Lieutenant-General Dick,
28, 50.
Thomas, General, a pupil of Mc
Clellan, 54.
welds an army, 267.

Toombs, General, 107.
Turner's Gap, 66, 72, 76, 83, 84,
87, 93, 94.
Union forces at Gaines' Mill, 34-
36.
Seven Days' battles, 30-34.
losses at Antietam, South
Mountain, C r a m p t o n's
Gap, etc., 140.
Upton, General Emory, abilities
as an army officer, 14.
an Abolitionist, 214.
biography of, 12, 13, 30 ; see
Michie,.
misled, 140.
ou Pope, 40.
on "War Department strategy."
24.
quoted, 9, 20, 36, 48, 44, 49.
62-6.S, 75, 113, 124, 133,
138, 142, 175, 213-214,
217, 242, 253, 259, 271,
273, 282, 286, 287-288,
289 ; see MiUtary PoUcy.
vindicates McCleUan, 42, 214.
Van Doen rides around Grant,
160.
vicksburg, 89.
Virginia, Army of, 38, 64.
Pope's address to, 38-39.
Pope given command, 38. 47t.
Governor of. requests Jackson
to reconsider resignation.
219.
Military Institute, Jackson asks
to be ordered to, 218.
Wae, a perfectly conducted, 256.
Congressional Committee ou
Conduct of. Pope trstifios
before, 40.
critics, civilian, 143, 144.
debt, 262.
Department interference, 275 ;
see Stanton.
Lincoln turns his back on,
63, 175.
records suppressed and hid
den, 90.
interference of the Secretary of,
in the war, 217, 254 ; see
Stanton
strategist's, 80, 89, 278, 288,
289.
"strategy," 24, 49, 64, 7.").
21.-;, 258, 266-267, 2n,s
most critical period of, 263.

322

INDEX

War — continued.
of the Rebellion : Offlcial Rec
ords of the Union and
Confederate Armies ; see
War Becords
Order No. 3, 29.
our gravest peril in the clos
ing years of, 253.
"Records," 10, 27, 29, 30, 31,
32, 33, 35, 36, 87, 43, 62,
68, 73, 81, 82, 88, 90, 92,
97, 101, 106, 118, 126, 128,
132, 136, 142, 150, 152,
158, 164, 165, 166, 172,
183, 184, 199, 200, 202,
209, 213, 222, 223, 231,
240, 243, 251, 254, 267,
290. 291, 294. See Note,
p. 310.
"Rules and Articles of" shall
govern command, 45.
Secretary of, duties are ad
ministrative, 24.
not entitled to exercise com
mand, 24.
orders of, to General Bar
nard, 47 ; see Stanton;
see Secretary of War.
why it lasted four years, 23.
Washington, 47, 55, 58.
at Lee's mercy, 91.
force necessary to render se
cure, 222.
further blundering at, 42.
McCleUan's bars all advance
to, 98.
peril of, 92.
removal of army from Rich
mond to, Wilkes' protest
against, 37.
scare in, 240.
Waterloo, 9, 16.

Wlatson, Assistant Secretary ot
War, 146.
Wayne, General, 229.
Welles, Secretary, 51, 60.
ignorant of Insufficiency of
supplies, 174.
on recall of Army of Potomac,
48.
refuses to accede to recall of
McCleUan, 4S.
Commodore Wilkes' protest to,
37.
on Pope's defeat, 48.
White, Colonel, 112-113.
White Oak Swamp, McClellan
baffles Jackson at, 181.
Whittier, John G., 122, 131, 248.
Wilderness, Grant at, 239, 255.
Wilkes, Commodore, protest to
Secretary WeUes, 37.
Wilson. Major-General James H.,
13, 14.
WUliam Bender, 147-149.
on the Battle of Antietam, 140.
Wolseley, Lord (quoted), 284.
Wool, General, 85.
on fordability of Potomac, 97.
on fugitive slaves, 245.
order to Miles, 65.
report of, 59.
Worthless equipment, 154, 155 ;
see Humphreys.
replaced, 145.
Wright, Marcus J., 276.
XOKK River, 26.
Yorktown, 227-230.
"Campaign of 1781," 229.
Goldsborough bombards, 233.
Youug, John Russell, 263, 264,
275, 285, 304-305.

IA
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