YALE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY This book was digitized by Microsoft Corporation in cooperation with Yale University Library, 2008. You may not reproduce this digitized copy ofthe book for any purpose other than for scholarship, research, educational, or, in limited quantity, personal use. You may not distribute or provide access to this digitized copy (or modified or partial versions of it) for commercial purposes. zzJg? ^Ig :%AH.Rltdii- mulating wealth naturally engender, was further favored in Ohio by the circum stances of her settlement and geography. Along four hundred and thirty-six miles of her border lay slave States. Prom these many of her pioneers had come; many more traced with Kentuckians and West Virginians th$ir common lineage back to the eastern slope of the ancient Dominion. In time of -war the most effect ive support to the exposed settlements of the infant State had come from their generous and warlike neighbors across the Ohio. In the long peace that followed, the heartiest friendships and warmest social attachments naturally went out to those who had been proved in the hour of trial. If her churches on every hill side taught a religion which found no actual warrant in the Bible for the system of human slavery, they at least had no difficulty in believing that the powers that be are ordained of God, and by consequence in enforcing a toleration which proved quite as acceptable across the Border as the most exhaustive Scriptural exegesis. North of the National Boad, which ^for many years was_the_ Mason and Dixon's line of Ohio •politics, different views prevailed; and the people, tracing their ancestry to Puritan rather than Virginia stpqk.. cherished different feelings; but the southern half of the State, being more populous., and more influ- ential, lonff controlleiLtlia.fllflldJim&jai^^ o£j-_i&?£Qyj_rnment , and the legislation. In the Presidential contest of 1848, the electoral vote of -the State was thus thrown for Lewis Cass. In 1852, it was in like manner given to Franklin Pierce. But by this time a change had begun. In the very heart of the conservative " feehng ofthe State, one of the foremost lawyers ofthe city..of.C_nfliiuiati..had for years been keeping u^^n^ntislajvery^j^tetuon. He had found a few, like- minded with himself, but Society and the Church had combined to frown him down.iijjgtill, so single-minded and sincere was he. that, though the most ambi- t- tious of men, he resolutely faced._t.hp, popular current, shut his eves to all' hope of political advancement, and daily labored at the task of resisting the preten - sions of Slavery, giving legal .protection to the friendless and helpless negroes. and diffusing an Abolition, apptiment, g.mong the conservative men ofthe Border, and the influential classes of the great city of the State, whose prosperity was supposed _to depend upon herjntimatje rgjatjona and imrnensR tradn with the slave-holdin g regions-toJ.hje^aiLth-Q£.h er. To this task he brought some peculiar Yot.. 1—9. 18 Ohio in the War. qualifications. Profoundly ignorant of men, he was, nevertheless, profoundly versed in the knowledge of Man. The baldest charlatan might deceive him into trusting his personal worth; but the acutest reasoner could not mislead him in determining the general drift of popular sentiment, and the political tendencies of the times. Conscious of abilities that might place him in the front rank of our Statesmen, his sagacity, not less than his conscience, taught him to take Time for his ally; and lightly regarding the odium of his present work, to look confidingly to the larger promises of the Future. Loving per sonal popularity, he was entirely destitute of the qualifications for attaining it. Really warm-hearted and singularly tenacious in his attachments, he was perpet ually regarded as utterly selfish and without capacity for friendship; so that his defects, no less than his merits, shut him up to a course which could hope for personal triumph only in the triumph of great principles. He was gifted by nature with a massive and cogent eloquence, little likely to sway the immediate passions of the populace, but sure to infiltrate the judgment and conscience of the controlling classes in the community. His energy was tireless, and his will absolutely inflexible'?'-"' Under such leadership, ably seconded by the faithful and true old man who so long stood in Ohio the champion of Abolition, pure and simple, and the peculiar representative ofthe Beserve, a new element sprang up in Ohio politics. It cast a handful of votes for Birney for the Presidency; had risen to propor tions which made it a respectable element in political calculations when it cast, what was thought to be, the vote of the balance of power for Van Buren; and had reached the height of its- unpopularity with the old ruling class ofthe State when, in 1852, refusing to sustain General Seott on account of the "anti-agita tion " and "finality of the slavery question " features in his platform, it persisted in again giving the votes of its balance of power to John P. Hale, and thus permitting the triumph of Franklin Pierce. But before another Presidential election the shrewd calculations of the sagacious leader of this outcast among parties had been realized. Holding, as has been seen, the balance of power, and subordinating all minor questions to what they regarded as the absorbing issue of slavery or antislavery, they had already, with a handful of votes, controlled a great election, and sent this Abolition leader to the United States Senate. A greater triumph now awaited him. As dexterous in managing parties as he was blind in managing men, he placed such stress upon the new organization which had risen upon the ruins ofthe old Whig party, that, detesting his principles and distrusting himself, they were, nevertheless, forced to secure the votes without which the election were lost in advance, by placing his name at the head of their ticket, and beariDg the odious Abolitionist in triumph into the chair of the Chief Executive of the State. The impulse thus given was never wholly lost ; for though the people were by no means as radical as their Governor, they gave at the next Presi- / dential election a handsome majority to Fremont, and a year later again elected their Abolition leader. * Whether it was through a far-seeing anticipation of what was to grow out Condition of the State. 10 of this antislavory struggle, or whether it was only a result of the sagacious forecast which in mpst things distinguished his administration, Governor Chase early began to attempt an effective organization of the militia. In this, as in his political views, he was in advance of his times. In every State west of the Alleghanies the militia had fallen into undisguised contempt. The old-fash ioned militia musters had been given up ; tho subject had been abandoned as fit only to bo the fertile theme for the ridicule of rising writers and witty stump orators. The cannon issued by the Government were left for the uses of polit ical parties on the occasion of mass meetings or victories at the polls. The small arms were scattered, rusty, and become worthless. In Chicago a novel drill had been an inducement for the organization of the Ellsworth Zouaves ; aud here and there through the West the young men of a city kept up a mil itary company; but these were the exceptions. Popular prejudice against doing military duty was insurmountsible, and no name for these exceptional organizations so struck the popular fancy as that of "the Cornstalk Militia." Governor Chase at once essayed the formation of similarly uniformed and' equipped militia companies at all leading points throughout the State, with a provisional organization into regiments and brigades. At first the popu lar ridicule only was excited; by-and-by attention to the subject was' slowly aroused. Some legislative support was secured, a newarsenal was established; an issue of new arms was obtained from the General Government; and an approximation was at last made to a military peace establishment. Such was the interest finally excited that at one time a convention of .nearly two hundred officers assembled at Columbus to consult as to the best means of developing and fostering the militia system; and the next year, before going out of offipe, Governor Chase had the satisfaction of reviewing, at Dayton, nearly thirty companies, assembled from different parts of the State — every one of which was soon to participate in. the war that was then so near and so litt-le antici pated. His successor continued the general policy thus inaugurated, urged, the Legislature to pay the militia for the time spent in drill, and enforced the necessity of expanding the system. Comparatively little was accomplished, and yet the organization of Ohio militia was far superior to that existing in any of the States to the westward. All of them combined did not possess so krgo a militia force as the First Ohio Regiment, then under the command of Colonel King, of Dayton. Thus, materially prosperous and politically progressive, yet with much of the leaven of her ancient Conservatism still lingering, and with the closest affiliations of friendship and trade with the slave-holding States of the Ohio and Mississippi Valleys, but with the germs of a preparation .for hostilities, and such a nucleus of militia as might serve , to protect the border from immediate ravages, Ohio entered upon the year that was to witness the paralysis of her industry and trade, the sundering of her old friendships, her political revolu tion, and the devotion of her .entire .energies tp the business of war. 20 Ohio in the War. CHAPTEK III. INITIAL WAR LEGISLATION -THE STRUGGLE AND SURRENDER OF PARTY, THE legislative and executive departments of the State Government, upon which were precipitated the weightiest burdens of the war, had been chosen as representatives rather of the average antislavery progress of the Whig party, than of the more advanced positions to whieh ex-Governor Chase had been committing his supporters. Great pains were taken to welcome the Legislatures of Kentucky and Tennessee on their visit to Columbus, and to convince them of the warm friendship borne them, not less by the Government- than by the people of the State. Union-saving speeches and resolutions marked the popular current ; and, as had long been usual, the Union-saving temper- went largely toward the surrender to the South of everything save the abso lutely vital points in controversy. The Governor, in his inaugural address, while firmly insisting upon hostility to the extension of slavery, had also advo cated the colonization of the blacks in Central or South America, and faithful- obedience to what were regarded as our constitutional obligations to the slave- holding States. A leading member of the party in the Senate* had introduced a bill to prevent by heavy penalties the organization or the giving of any aid to parties like John Brown's, and it had come within three votes of a passage. More striking proof of the conciliatory disposition with which the Legisla-1 ture was animated was to be given. The constitutional amendment carried through Congress by Thomas Corwin, and submitted to the Legislatures of the several States for ratification, provided that hereafter no amendment or other change in the powers of Government should be permitted, whereby the National- authorities should be enabled to interfere with slavery within its present limits. Before the beginning of actual hostilities in Charleston Harbor, it was apparent that, carrying the effort for conciliation to the furthest extreme, the heavy Ee publican majority in the Legislature meant to give the sanction of Ohio to this irreversible guarantee to slavery in the fundamental law of the land. Before its place on the Senate calendar was reached, however, came the bombardment of Sumter, the surrender, and the call of the President to protect the capital from the danger of sudden capture by tho conspirators. On the 15th of April *Hon. R..D. Harrison, afterward elected from the Seventh District, to succeed ex-Governor Corwin in Congress. Initial War Legislation. 21 Columbus was wild with the excitement of the call to arms. On the 16th the feeling was even more intense ; troops were arriving, the telegraphs and mails were burdened with exhortations to the Legislature to grant money and men to any extent; the very air came laden with the clamor of war and of the swift, hot haste of the people to plunge into it. On the 17th, while every pulse around them was at fever-heat, the Senators of Ohio, as a last effort, passed the Corwin constitutional amendment, only eight members out of the whole Senate opposing it.* But this was the last effort at conciliation. Thenceforward the State strove to conquer rather than to compromise. Already, on the 16th of April, within less than twenty -four hours after the President's call for troops had been re ceived, the Senate had matured, carried through the several readings, and passed a bill appropriating one million of dollars for placing the State upon a war- footing, and for assisting the General Government in meeting the shock of the rebellion.f The debate which preceded the rapid passage of this bill illustrated the melting away of party lines under the white heat of patriotism. Senator Orr, the Democratic representative ofthe Crawford County Senatorial District, ' was opposed to the war, and even to the purposes of the bill, but he should vote for it as the best means of testifying his hostility to secession.' Judge Thomas M. Key, of Cincinnati, the ablest Democrat in the Senate, followed.]; He, too, was in favor of the bill. ' Yot he felt it in his soul to be an unwarranted declara tion of war against seven sister States. He entered his solemn protest against the line of action announced by the Executive. It was an usurpation by a President, in whom and in whose advisers he had no confidence ; it was the be ginning of a military despotism. He firmly believed it to be the desire of the Administration to drive off the border States, and permanently sever the Union. But he was opposed to secession, and in this contest he could do no otherwise than stand by the stars and stripes.' Next came Mr. Moore, of Butler County, conspicuous as the most conservative of those reckoned at all with the Bepubli- *The eight who had the foresight to perceive that the 17th of April, 1861, was not a time to be striving to add security to slavery were, Messrs. Buck, Cox, Garfield, Glass, Monroe, Morse, Parrish, and Smith. tSome days earlier a bill had been introduced appropriating a hundred thousand dollars for war purposes. On a hint from the Executive that perhaps other and more important measures might be needed, action was delayed. Then the million war bill was introduced, in response to a message from Governor Dennison, announcing the call from Washington, maintaining the necessity for defending the integrity of the Union, and concluding as follows: " But as the contest may grow to greater dimensions than is now anticipated, I deem it my duty to recommend to the General Assembly of this State to make provisions proportionate to its means to assist the National authorities in restoring the integrity and strength of the Union, in all its amplitude, as the only means of preserving the rights of all the States, and insuring the permanent peace and prosperity of the -whole country. I earnestly recommend, also, that an appropriation of not less than four hundred and fifty thousand dollars be immediately made for the purchase of arms and equipments for the use of the volunteer militia of the State. I need not remind you of the pressing exigency for the prompt organization and arming of the mili tary force of the State." i % Subsequently Colonel and Judge Advocate on McClellan's staff. 22 Ohio in the War. can parfy in the Senate; in fact as almost the ideal ofthe old " Silver-Gray Whig."* Hitherto he had voted consistently against all military bills, and hud even avowed his readiness to surrender the Southern forts rather than bring on a collision. 'Now he felt called upon to do the most painful duty of his life But there was only one course left. He had no words of bitterness for party with which to mar the solemnity of the hour. This only he had to say : Ho could do nothing else than stand-by the grand old flag ofthe country, and stand by it to the end. He should vote for the bill.' Thus, to recur to the figure already used, did the iron rules of party disci pline and prejudice, melting beneath the white heat of patriotism, still mark in broken outline the old divisions beneath and through which the molten current* freely mingled. The bill passed by an almost unanimous vote ; one Senator only, Mr. Newman, of Scioto County, voting against it.f In the House, however, party opposition gave way more slowly. That same afternoon the bill went over from the Senate, and an effort was made to Suspend the rules, so as to put it upon its passage. The Democrats demanded , time for consultation. Mr. Wm. B. Woods J (ex-Speaker and Democratic leader) gave notice that it could not be unanimously passed without time were given. For one, he wanted to hear from his constituents. Mr. Geo. W. Andrews,|[ of Auglaize County, denounced the excitement on the subject of war, here and over the country, as crazy fanaticism. Mr. Devore, of Brown County, 'regarded the interests of the country, south ofthe Ohio Biver as well as north of it. The dispatches about the danger to Washington were preposterous, and were mostly manufactured for evil purposes.' Mr. Jessup, of Hamilton County, gave notice that if the majority wanted his vote they must wait for it. And so, the Eepub licans agreeing to delay in the hope of securing harmony, the bill went over, after two ineffectual efforts to suspend the rules.§ The next day, the Democrats having in the meantime spent three hours ifi excited debate in caucus, the effort to suspend the rules again failed. But the leaders earnestly assured the House that with another day's delay there was a strong probability of the unanimous passage of the bill. A dispatch had al ready been received from Scioto County, denouncing Senator Newman for his vote against it in the Senate, and it was said that his son was enlisted in one of the companies then on the way to Columbus. Mr. Hutcheson, of Madison County, an extreme States'-Rights Democrat, and almost a secessionist^ spoke handsomely in favor of the bill, and drew out hearty applause from House and * Subsequently Colonel of one of the hundred days' regiments. t Under the terrible pressure of public condemnation, especially in his own district, Mr. Newman shortly afterward asked leave to change his vote. t Subsequently Colonel of a three years' regiment, and Brevet Major-General of Vol unteers. J Subsequently Colonel of the Fifteenth Ohio in the fhrte months' service, and Lieutenai* Colonel, until after the Clarksville'snrrender, of the Seventy-Fourth Ohio. I In these efforts twenty-five Democrats voted against suspending the ruies, fourteen voted with the Republicans for suspension, and eight were absent when the roll was called. The Struggle and Surrender of Party. 23 galleries. But delay was still insisted upon, and so the bill went over to the third day from the date of its introduction. Then all were ready. Ex-Spoaker Woods led off in a stirring lit'tle speech, declaring his intention 'to stand by the Government in peace or in war, right or wrong.' Mr. Wm. J. Flagg, of Hamilton County, followed. ' He was glad that delay had produced unanimity. But ho had been of the number that had favored instant action. Ho had done so because Jefferson Davis had shown no hesitation in suspending the rules, and marching through first, second, and third readings without waiting to hear from his constituents. He had ever advocated peace, but it was always peace for the Union. Now he was ready for peace for the Union, or war for it, love for it, hatred for it, everything for it." Mr. An drews, of Auglaize County, had less to say of the crazy fanaticism of the ex citement. ' The act of South Carolina toward the Democrats of the North was a erime for which the English language could find no description. It had for ever severed the last tie that bound them together.' Amid such displays of feeling on the part of the Opposition, the bill finally went through, on the 18th of April, by an unanimous vote ; ninety-nine in its favor. It appropriated half a million dollars for the pm'Pose of carrying into effect any requisition of the President to protect the National Government ; four hundred and fifty thousand dollars for the purchase of arms and equipments for the militia of the State ; and the remaining fifty thousand as an extraordinary contingent fund for the Governor. The Commissioners of the Sinking Fund were authorized to borrow the money, at six per cent, interest, and to issue cer tificates therefor which should be free from State taxation. ,» Meantime the Senate, under the leadership of Mr. Garfield, had matured and passed a bill defining and providing punishment for the crime of treason against tho State of Ohio. It declared any resident of the State who gave aid and comfort to the enemies of the United States guilty of treason against the State, to be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary at hard labor for life.* With the passage of these bills all semblance of party opposition to neces sary war measures disappeared from the proceedings of the Legislature. Mr. Vallandigham visited the capital and earnestly remonstrated with the Demo- cra.ts for giving their sanction to the war; but the patriotic enthusiasm of the crisis could not be controlled by party discipline. Under the leadership of ex- Speaker Woods, a bill passed exempting the property of volunteers from exe cution for debt during their service. Then, as within a few days it became evident that far more troops were pressing for acceptance than were-needed to fill the President's call for thirteen regiments, the Legislature acceded to the sagacious suggestion of the Governor that they should be retained for the serv ice of the State. The bill authorized the acceptance of ten additional regi ments, provided five hundred thousand dollars for their payment, and a million and a half more to be used in case of invasion of the State, or the appearance of danger of invasion. Other measures were adopted looking to the danger of *This bill was understood at the time to be specially aimed at Mr. Vallandigham. 24 Ohio in the War. shipments of arms through Ohio to the South ; organizing the militia of the State; providing suitable officers for duty on tho staff of the Governor; requir ing contracts for subsistence of the volunteers to be let to the lowest bidder ; authorizing the appointment of additional general officers. No little hostility toward some members of Governor Dennison's staff was exhibited, but with the Governor himself the relations of the Legislature were entirely harmonious. In concert with him the war legislation was completed; and when, within a month after the first note of alarm from Washington the General Assembly adjourned, the State was, for the first time in its history, on a war footing. Before the adjournment the acting Speaker had resigned to take a command in one of the regiments starting for Washington ; two leading Senators had been appointed Brigadier-Generals ; and large numbers of the other member^ had, in one capacity or another, entered the service. It was the first of the war Legislatures. It met the first shock ; under the sudden pressure matured the first military laws. It labored under difficulties inseparable from so unexpected a plunge into duties so novel. But it may now be safely said that in patriotism, iu zeal and ability, it was second to neither of its successors, and that in the exu berance of patriotic sentiment which wiped out party lines and united all iu common efforts to meet the sudden danger, it surpassed them both. Dennison's War Administration. 25 CHAPTER IV. THE OPENING ACTS OF DENNISON'S WAR ADMINISTRATION. ALTHOUGH the country had been greatly excited by the acts of seces sion by several States, the seizure of forts, and the defiance of the General Government, there still lingered in the minds of the most a trust that in some way the matter would be adjusted, and bloodshed would be avoided. There was much war talk on the part of the young and excitable, but the influ ential men and the masses were slow to believe in the possibility of war. Yet the portents still grew darker and darker at the South. " Then a fierce, sudden flash across the rugged blackness broke, And with a voice that shook the land the guns of Sumter spoke ; And wheresoe'er the summons came, there rose an angry din, As when, upon a rocky coast, a stormy tide sets in."* Before the bombardment had ended twenty full companies were offered to the Governor of Ohio for immediate service. With the news of the surrender, and the call of the President for volunteers, the excitement became fervidly intense. Militia officers telegraphed their readiness for orders. The President of Kenyon College tendered his service in any capacity, and began by enlisting in the ranks.f The Cleveland Grays, the Rover Guards, the Columbus Videttes, the State Fencibles, the Governor's Guards, the Dayton Light Guards, the Guthrio Grays — the best known and best drilled militia companies in the State — held meetings, unanimously voted to place themselves at the disposal of the Government, and telegraphed to Columbus for orders. Portsmouth announced ¦ a company ready to march. Chillicothe asked if she should send a company that day. Circleville telegraphed, offering one or more companies, announcing that they had two thousand dollars raised to equip them. Xenia asked leave to raise a battery of artillery and a company of infantry. Canton sent up an officer, beg ging the acceptance of two companies. Lebanon wanted two companies accepted. Springfield wanted the same. Lancaster started a company to Columbus. Cin- * " War Poems," by E. J. Cutler : Little, Brown & Co. 1867. tThree months, indeed, before the fase, the one near Cincinnati, thf n^" "°" Co lumbus, were controlled by the United States authorities. On Governor Den nison fell the selection and management of other camps throughout the State, of which the following are the principal ones established during his admin istration : Camp Jackson Columbus.. Camp Putnam at Marietta. Camp Harrison .! near Cincinnati. Camp Wool at Athens. Camp Taylor at Cleveland. Camp Jefferson at Bellair. Camp Goddard at Zanesville. Camp Scdtt at Portland. Camp Anderson at Lancaster. Until the United States undertook the task of subsisting and supplying sol diers as soon as they were recruited, these were supplied by the State Quarter master. Of the magnitude of the other interests intrusted to this officer during Governor Dennison's administration, some idea may be formed from statements like these : The number of rifles purchased on State account for the use of infantry was eleven thousand nine hundred. The number of carbines and revolvers for cavalry was one thousand eight hundred and eighty-five. The number of six-pounder bronze field guns was forty-one. A laboratory was established at Columbus for the supply of ammunition, which the United States arsenals, before there was time for a vast enlargement of their capacities, were unable to furnish. From this laboratory two million five hundred and five thousand seven hundred and eighty musket and pistol cartridges were supplied ; with sixteen thousand five hundred and thirty-seven cartridges, fixed shot, canister, and spherical case for artillery. 60 Ohio in the War. In the absence of a sufficient supply of rifles, the. old muskets wore rifled, Miles Greenwood, of Cincinnati, taking the contract. The " Greenwood rifle" thus manufactured became quite popular, being held by the troops the equal of the Enfield in precision and range, and more destructive, inasmuch as it carried a heavier weight of metal. During Dennison's administration twenty-five thousand three hundred and twenty-four of these smooth-bore muskets were thus changed, at a cost of one dollar and a quarter per gun. The State had under its control, at the outbreak of the war, thirty-three smooth-bore six-pounders. Twenty-seven of these were likewise rifled and made equal to the best rifled guns. Twelve additional batteries were contracted for — the guns for which Miles Greenwood had already begun casting. The office received from the Government and issued to troops fifty-eight thousand five hundred and sixty-six rifles and muskets. . It expended in the purchase of uniforms $1,117,349 35. Of none of the vast quantity of clothing thus bought were complaints ever made, except in the case of a few regiments, which in the first rush and at a time when the goods to make regulation uniforms were not in the country, received a pretty bad sample of shoddy... We have seen that the operations of the Commissary Department were the first to arouse the clamor which continued till near its close to pursue our first War Administration. At the end of the year, however, the Commissary-Gen eral was able to report that, in issuing nearly three-quarters of a million rations the State had paid only thirteen and one-quarter cents per ration; and that in commuting four hundred and eleven thousand seven hundred and ten rations,* in the haste of the first organization, before it was possible to issue rations, and when it was unavoidable that the troops should either be quartered at hotels or otherwise boarded, the State had paid only an average of about forty-four and one-half cents per ration. Large as this last sum seemed it was small com pared with that allowed by the United States Army Begulations, under which a soldier so stationed as to have no opportunity of messing, was allowed to commute at the rate of seventy -five cents per day — the highest sum paid in the State anywhere in the greatest pressure of troops just after the April call. The whole sum of expenditures by the State for subsistence of soldiers was $488,858 71. For all these operations large sums of money were required. It was held1 by the Auditorf that of the three millions appropriated by the Legislature for war purposes, only half a million was available in direct aid of the United States. This was soon exhausted. Presently, however, under the effective '"Commuting rations" is to pay money for the subsistence of soldiers instead of issuing to them rations in kind. The ration, as used in the above, means a supply of previsions for one man for one day. tR. W. Tayler, an exceedingly scrupulous and exact financial officer, who has since been made one of the Comptrollers of the United States Treasury, to succeed Elisha Whittlesey. Progress and Close of Dennison's Administration. 61 financial management of Secretary Chase, the Government was able to refund the sums thus advanced. Here a new difficulty arose. The Auditor decided — and in this he was sustained by the Attorney-General — that these refunded moneys could afford the Governor no relief, since, if they once entered the treasury, they could not again be used in aid of the United States — the full appropriation of a half million dollars for that purpose having already been used. Technically there was no doub£ that this was correct. Governor Dennison at once determined to evade this technicality and em ploy the money. Accordingly, instead of permitting it to be refunded to the State Treasury through the ordinary channels, he caused it to be collected from the Government by his personal agents, when he proceeded again to use it for the various military purposes for which it was needed. As it was again, after a time refunded, he again collected it by his personal agents, and continued to employ it so long as was needful. In this way it was eventually reported that he had kept out of the State Treasury the sum of $1,077,600. For every dollar he presented satisfactory accounts and vouchers to the Legislature. The use of this money was a bold measure, but it was vindicated by the law of public necessity, and it never cast a shadow upon the integrity of the Governor who retained it, or of the officers through whom he disbursed it. i During the fall and early winter of 1861, a cry of suffering came from the Ohio troops among the Alleghany Mountains in West Virginia. Sanitary and Christian Commissions were not then prepared to respond to such calls, and the Governor had no resource, save an appeal to the liberality of the people. In October he accordingly issued a proclamation calling upon the people for con tributions of clothing, and particularly of blankets. Within a few weeks nearly eight thousand blankets and coverlets had been sent in, besides nearly ten thousand pairs of woolen socks, and proportionate quantities of other articles. The suffering in the mountains however proved to have been much exaggerated, and only a small part of the articles thus contributed . was sent there. Some were used in hospitals, others were issued to troops in Kentucky, and a con siderable quantity remained on hands for the next year's uses. The annual nominating convention of his party had been held during the height of Governor Dennison's unpopularity. Most of the party leaders were already aware of the injustice with which he had been treated, and a strong disposition was felt to renominate him in spite of the odium that would thus be attached to their ticket. But reasoning as politicians will, that the party could n ot afford such a risk, and being moreover anxious to draw off the war wi n g of the Democratic party, they passed Governor Dennison by with a compli- mentary_resg!uti,oq, indorsing -his,, administration, and bestowed their nomina tion upon David Tod, of the Beserve. a patriotic and prominent Democratic "¦leadex Governor Dennison betrayed no unseemly mortification at the result, and gave his cordial efforts to aid in the success of the ticket. In his final message 62 Ohio in the War. he recited the efforts made to place the State on a war footing and to furnish all the troops called for, with scarcely a reference to the misrepresentation with which he had been pursued. The facts were his conclusive vindication. As a bank man, he protested against the policy of Secretary Chase for the destruction of State banks and the establishment ofthe National Bank system.* As a somewhat conservative Eepublican he deplored any proclamation of im mediate emancipation, as a measure which would insure the extermination of the negro race. He favored confiscation of Eebel property, and advocated the establishment of a negro colony in Central America. "I do not doubt," he con cluded in a manly strain, "that errors have occurred in conducting my civil and military administration ; but I am solaced by the reflection that no motive has ever influenced me which did not spring from an earnest desire to promote the interests of my fellow-citizens, and preserve the honor of the State and the integrity of the Nation. . . I felt that I would be recreant to the duties en trusted to me, if I failed to exert all my powers and employ all the instrumen talities at my command, to support the Government in its efforts to suppress the insurrection and maintain its constitutional authority." For this singleness of aim and purity of purpose, as well as for marked sagacity and ability in the discharge of his public duties, his fellow-citizens have long since given him credit. It was his misfortune that the first Columbus, November 7, 1862. j IAeutenant-CoUmel E. W. Hollingsworth, Nineteenth Regiment 0. V. I., Columbia, Kentucky : Dear Sir: — Your letter of the 1st inst., by Lieutenant Case, is before me. I am surprised, Colonel, that you should be so short-sighted as not to second my efforts in filling up your regi ment. To save the existence of your regiment, and thereby the official existence of yourself, I appointed Lieutenant Case as Second-Lieutenant, upon condition that he recruit thirty men for your regiment, and take them with him. He could much more easily have earned a position for himself by recruiting for a new regiment, but my fear that the gallant old Nineteenth might be attached to some other old regiment, and thereby strike from the rolls its brave officers, induced me to urge him to recruit for it. Notwithstanding the bad taste of your letter, I have ordered Lieutenant Case to return to you again, and ask of you that you either assign him to duty or give him up his men, that he may find a place in some other old regiment, the officers of which may be able to appreciate that the Secretary of War will not keep regiments in the field simply to make place for officers. Respectfully yours, DAVID TOD, Governor. The State of Ohio, Executive Department, 1 Columbus, November 27, 1862. j Colonel J. G. Hawkins, Thirteenth Regiment O. V. I., Silver Springs, Tennessee: Sir: — Deeply as I regret to differ with you, I can not comply with your wishes as to Lieu tenant Charles Crawford. To preserve the existence of your regiment, as I supposed, I offered this young man the po sition of Second-Lieutenant, upon the express condition that he recruit a given number of men within a time specified. In thus doing I supposed that I was laboring for the interests of your regiment, and therein for the best interests of the Government. Lieutenant Crawford more than performed his part of the agreement — he recruited fifty-two men— -and you must not interfere with its performance on my part. Very respectfully yours, DAVID TOD, Governor. 76 Ohio in the War. In spite of these difficulties considerable numbers for the old regiments ivere secured by the persistent efforts of the Governor, whose sagacity was no- ivhere more conspicuous than in perceiving this to be the essential necessity of the recruiting service. By the end of the year it was estimated that, of the troops raised in various ways throughout the State during the last eight months, about twenty -four thousand had gone to fill the wasted ranks at the front. A final opportunity to break away from the volunteering system was lost. When the orders of the Secretary of War for a draft were issued, many locali ties seemed disposed to slacken their efforts and await it. Thereupon, on the 5th of August, the Governor addressed the military committees, by means of a cir- cular published in the newspapers: "The recent order of the Secretary of War in relation to drafting may cause diversity of opinion and action among you. Hence I deem it proper to urge that you proceed in your efforts to complete the regiments heretofore called for, and fill up those already in the field, as though the recent order had not been promulgated ; and it is hoped that the generous and liberal offers now being made all over the State, in the shape of bounties to recruits, will not be withdrawn or interfered with. It is believed that with continued vigorous efforts the regiments may be filled up by the fifteenth." And then, as the Government found it necessary to make still further post ponements of the draft, the Governor again (1st September) addressed the mili tary committees : "For the new regiments there are wanted about two thousand men, and for the old regi ments about twenty-one thousand men, or, in all, about twenty-three thousand. Can this force be raised by voluntary enlistment, and thereby save the trouble, expense, and vexation of resort ing to drafting in Ohio? It is believed that it can be. More than twice that number has been raised within the past few weeks ; and surely, the gallant men of Ohio are not weary in their good work."For the original prejudice against the draft as a systematic and permanent mode of sustaining the army, Governor Tod was not responsible. But it is thus seen how he fell in with and finally led the opposition to it. After all, the draft came. It was postponed to the 15th of September. The- number then deficient was twenty thousand four hundred and twenty-seven; and it was further postponed to the 1st of October. On the 1st of September only thirteen counties had filled their quotas. On the 1st of October only thir teen more had escaped the draft, and it was finally ordered for twelve thousand two hundred and fifty-one. The Secretary of War appointed six Provost-Mar shals: Charles F. Wilstach of Cincinnati, Wells A. Hutchins of Portsmouth, M. G. Mitchell of Piqua, Henry C. Noble of Columbus, Charles T. Sherman=of Mansfield, and J. L. Weatherby of Cleveland. The State was divided into six districts and assigned to these gentlemen, under whose supervision the draft proceeded — each community striving by high and higher bounties, and by every form of individual effort, continued to the last moment, to escape. The counties that filled their quotas before the draft was ordered, and those that filled them after its first postponement, with the number of enrolled militia and the whole number of volunteers furnished in each, from the outbreak of the Tod's Administration. 77 war up to the 1st of October, 1862, together with the number then drafted, may be found set forth in the following table : COUNTIES. Number of Enrollment. Number of Volunteers to the lat September. Kumber ordered to be drafted Number of Volunteers and correc tions to 1st October. Numberdrafted. Adams Allen Ashland Ashtabula ... Athens Auglaize Belmont Brown Butler Carroll ...... ChampaignClark Clermont ... Clinton Columbiana Coshocton... Crawford ... Cuyahoga...Darke Defiance Delaware .... Erie Fairfield .... Fayette Franklin .... Fulton Gallia Geauga Greene Guernsey.... Hamilton... Hancock Hardin Harrison .... Henry Highland.... Hocking Holmes Huron Jackson Jefferson Knox Lake Lawrence ... Licking Logan Lorain Lucas Madison Mahoning ... Marion Medina Meigs Mercer ., Miami Monroe Montgomery Morgan Morrow 3,920 3,792 4,0335,9454,297 3,2825,973 5,127 6,5442,615 4,112 4.838 6,1913,910 5,7384,2994,524 14,360 4,913 2,535 4,430 4,223 4,878 3,2437,8412,792 3,832 2,7115,099 3,961 39,926 4,156 3,077 3,2771,559 4,7552,935 3,522 5,318 3,221 '4,379 4,981 2,579 4,062 6,5953,924 . 5,496 .5,918 2,909 4,8953,213 3,858 4,736 2,5305,8144,4898,959 3,872 3,530 1,4281,411 1,3222,1291,9631,102 2,2171,753 2,759 850 1,4931,869 2,295 1,4241,8301,4901,161 4,874 1,503 813 1,724 1,532 1,8881,278 3,105 931 1,288 983 1,889 1,445 14,795 1,260 1,197 1,098 704 1,711 1,195 962 1,9141,058 1,8561,630 945 1,852 2,2081,635 1,7042,143 1,095 1,501 929 1,112 1,716 814 2,1201,694 2,822 1,3091,179 137105289 238 210 172294 "l89 152 75 177139 465227 642869 458 202 46 157 6018 31 185 244100150138 1,175 404 35 215 78 185 447 202 230 361 88 '430"493 225 71 457 356431 177198 205 100 755237232 164 139 86 146 4671 165 '"64 212102 201 41 256 2962 569141 39 15 943539 371 9035 42 25 138 1,529 2755 10 24 4 41 153172 "'59 29 '"69 "206 419 4380 116 48 177 5 341 399365 29 78 Ohio in the War. counties. Number of Enrollment. Number of Volunteers to the 1 st September. Number ordered to be drafted. Number Volunteers and correc tions to 1st October. Number drafted. Muskingum Noble Ottaw.w Paulding Perry Pickaway — Pike Portage Preble Putnam Richland Ross Sandusky — Scioto Seneca.-. Shelby Stark Summit Trumbull....Tuscarawas .. Union Van Wi-rt.... Vinton Warren Washington Wayne Williams Wood Wyandot Total 7,020 3,617 1,5871,0253,104 4,2942,3534,4203,5752,4595,870 5,8534,3874,797 5,497 2,602 7,9105,0765,9975,7573,059 2,1722,4465,3526.0S9 5,7863,175 3,699 3,322 425,147 2,314 961 575 458 1,1451,9331,0601,261 1,307 S69 1,9702,687 1,403 2,116 2,001 990 2,477* 1,622 1,9371,739 1,161 685 1,002 1,842 2,2431,847 975 1,4871,304 151,301 489483 58 96 15 20,427 182145 21 52 307 339 37 "44 503 190 313 124 37 87 114 39 75 377 150 227 351 163 94 188 190 63 127 52 11 41 686 145 541 411 55 356 461 218 243 564 140 424 62 9 53 182 31 151 298 246 52 193 86 107 467 98 369 295 71 224 12 9,508 12,251 Three hundred and fifty-nine of those thus drafted were released on the ground of belonging to churches conscientiously opposed to fighting, as follows: Ashland 8 Belmont 2 Clinton 9 Columbiana 3 Crawford 7 Darke 18 Defiance 11 Delaware 1 Erie 2 Fulton 5 Gallia 4 Greene 7 Hancock 3 Total Henry 1 Holmes 72 Jackson 1 Knox 9 Licking 2 Mahoning 12 Marion 2 Medina 3 Monroe 12 Mercer 6 Montgomery 78 Morgan 7 Morrow 1 Muskingum 3 Perry 2 Putnam 8 Richland 1 Sandusky 1 Stark 16 Summit 3 Tuscarawas 11 Van Wert 1 Warren 4 Wayne 20 Williams 2 .359 Opposed from the outset as something discreditable, the draft naturally failed to accomplish all that its advocates had expected. Of the twelve thou sand to be drafted, about four thousand eight hundred either in person or by substitute volunteered after the draft; two thousand nine hundred were for various reasons discharged; one thousand nine hundred ran away, and the old Tod's Administration. 79 regiments received only the beggarly re-enforcement of two thousand four hun dred. How these were distributed may be seen in part from the following: AT CAMP CLEVELAND. November 20, 1862, to the 6th Regiment 0. V. Cavalry 69 men. " 20, " " 38th " " Infantry 83 " " 20, " " 41st " " " 11 " " 20, " " 42d ' " " " 23 " " 20, " " 72d " " " .' 44 " Total 230 AT CAMP DENNISON. November 19, 1862, to the 25th Regiment O. V. Infantry 15 men. " 19, " " 30th " " " 12 " " 17, " " 36th " " " 32 " " 19, " " 62d " " -" 30 " " 19, " " 69th " " " 11 " " 19, " " 70th " " " 2 " 19, " " . 77th " " " 60 " Total 162 AT CAMP MANSFIELD. November 11, 1862, to the 16th Regiment O. V. Infantry 90 men. " 12, " " 19th " " " 91 " " 13, " " 20th " " " 116 " " 13, " " 21st " " " 54 " December 9, " " 27th " " " : 9 " November 11, " " 37th " " " 56 " " 13, " " 41st " " " 26 " 13, " " 42d " " " 47 " " 13, " " 43d " " " v 50 " 13, " " 46th " " " 25 " 11, " " 49th " " " ...: 77 " " 13, " " 51st " " " 17 " " 14, " " 56th " " " 65 " " 13, " " 57th " " " 129 " " 13, " " 64th " " " 93 " " 12, " " 76th " " '• 80 " " 12, " " 82d " " " 53 " f, Total 1,078 AT CAMP ZANESVILLE. November 11, 1862, to the. 2d Regiment O. V- Infantry. 19 men. " 10, " " 43d ' " " 55 " " 11, " " 46th " " " V 3 " " 10, " " 51st " " " 34 " « 10, " " 65th " ',' " 44 " " 6, " " 76th " " " 130 " " 11, " " 78th " " " 16 " 10, " " 80th " " " 25 " Total 326 The deficiencies from runaway drafted men were soon more than made up by voluntary enlistments, so that at the end of the year ihe Governor was able 80 Ohio in the War. to report the State ahead of all calls upon her, and his Adjutant-General to reckon up the sum of Ohio's contributions to the war at one hundred and sev enty-thousand one hundred and twenty-one men— not counting the first three months' men who had re-enlisted, the recruits for the regular army, or those found in the naval service, or in organizations credited to other States. In so far as the appointment of nevv officers for these troops fell upon him, Governor Tod acted upon excellent principles. As far as possible he sought to secure for the leading officers men already in the service, whose conduct had shown them worthy of promotion. Thus the Colonels of a number of new reg iments were chosen as follows : 45th Regiment, Colonel Runkle, late Lieutenant-Colonel 13th O. V. I. 52d " " D. McCook, late Captain on General Staff. 79th " " Kennett, late Lieutenant-Colonel 27th O. V. I. 83d " " Moore, late Captain 5th O. V. I. 91st " " Turley, late Lieutenant-Colonel 22d and 81st O. V. L 92d " " Van Vorhes, late Quartermaster 18th O. V. I. 94th •' " Frizell, late Lieutenant-Colonel 11th O. V. I. 98th "" " Webster, late Lieutenant-Colonel 25th O. V. I. 99th " " Langworthy, late Captain 49th O. V. I. 100th " " Groom, late Major 84th O. V. I. 103d " " Casement, late Major 7th O. V. I. 105th " " Hall, late Lieutenant-Colonel 24th O. V. I. 106th " " Tafel, late Captain 9th O. V. I. 108th " " Limberg, late Captain in Kentucky Regiment. 110th " " Keifer, late Lieutenant-Colonel 3d O. V. I. 111th " " Bond, late Lieutenant-Colonel 67th O. V. I. 115th " " Lucy, late Captain 32d O. V. I. 113th " " Washburn, late Captain 25th O. V. I. 118th " " Mott, late Captain 31st O. V. I. 120th " " French, late Lieutenant-Colonel 65th O. V. I. 121st " " Reed, late Brigadier-General of Militia. 123d " " Wilson, late Lieutenant-Colonel 15th O. V. I. 124th " " Payne, late Captain in Illinois Regiment. 125th " " Opdycke, late Captain 41st O. V. I. 126th " " Smith, late Captain 6th U. S. I., and Colonel 1st O. V. I. So far as possible the Governor assiduously sought to secure men for the lower offices in the same way. Many obstacles, however, were encountered,. from the unwillingness of the War Department to grant furloughs to good offi cers in the midst of active campaigns, merely that they might go home on ro- cruiting duty. Of course the majority of the appointments had to be taken from civil life. In the selection of these Governor Tod relied largely upon the recommendations of the county military committees. He was quite as success-. ful as could have been anticipated; and the troops of the State thus continued to be, in the main, well-officered. During the progress of these efforts to fill up the army, difficulties were from time to time thrown in the way by persons hostile to the war. The most conspicuous perhaps of these was Dr. Edson B. Olds of Lancaster, a Democratic' politician of some local prominence. His speeches were considered by Gover- Tod's Administration. 81 nor Tod as calculated to discourage enlistments so seriously that he recom mended the Washington authorities to arrest him, under the provisions of the proclamation suspending the writ of habeas corpus. Dr. Olds was accordingly arrested on the evening of the 12th of August by a couple of United States officers. Some resistance was attempted by one or more members ofthe family, but it proved trifling, and the prisoner was conveyed with little difficulty out of town, and sent forward to Port Lafayette, where the "United States authorities continued to hold him for many months. Arrests of some other parties of less prominence followed. In all, eleven were made — only two of which were on the Governor's recommendation. He likewise felt constrained, in one instance, to interfere with the organiza tion of a military force. About the time Cincinnati was threatened by the Eebel columns operating in Kentucky, a Democratic meeting was held in Butler County, in which it was resolved to form a regiment to oppose the threatened invasion of the State. Doubting, as it would seem, the entire good faith of this procedure, and unwilling, at any rate, to permit the efforts of his officers at re cruiting to be embarrassed by such anomalous organizations, G°vemor Tod addressed a letter to Eobert Christy, Esq., of Hamilton, whom the meeting had appointed to take charge of the movement, "Whether it was intended," he said in this letter, "by this proceeding to interfere with the voluntary enlistments now being made all over the State, in response to the President's recent calls for troops, is now immaterial. Believing such to be the effect, I feel it my im perative duty to direct that you, and all associated with you in the effort to raise said regiment, at once desist. It is hoped that you and your associates will give cheerful'obedience to this order, and join all loyal citizens of the State in their efforts to suppress the unholy rebellion in the manner designated by the National authorities." » The state of affairs in which orders like this are necessary, and in which arrests of respectable men for interfering with the operations of the Govern ment become common, may generally be taken as betokening a popular reac tion. It was more marked now than had been expected. The war presented, East and West, but a gloomjT prospect. The peninsu lar campaign had ended in failure. The Army of Northern Virginia, which next essayed an advance toward Eiehmond, had been hurled back in disorder to the defenses of Washington. The successful Eebel army had invaded Mary land, and had only been checked, not beaten, at Antietam. The opening of the Mississippi had met with sudden check at Vicksburg. The great army that had pressed the Eebel column from Kentucky to North Alabama came hurrying back to defend the Ohio border. Cincinnati and Louisville were threatened. Along the whole Western Virginia and Kentucky border alarms about intend ing invasion were frequent; and, in the midst of this gloomy outlook, the President had declared his purpose to abolish slavery throughout the Eebel States (with the exception of some inconsiderable localities), by prpclamation, as a war measure. We have seen how nobly, through all discouragements, the people labored at Vol. I.— 6. 82 Ohio in the War. the good work of filling up the army. But the drain of men, the absence of large numbers of Eepublican voters in the field, the initial unpopularity of the Emancipation Proclamation, the embittered feelings aroused by the arrests, and tho general gloom that grew out of the military situation, secured the reaction. The State whieh, a year before, had elected Tod Governor by a majority of fifty. five thousand, now went Democratic by a majority of five thousand five hun dred and seventy-seven. Out of nineteen Eepresentatives in Congress barely ' five Eepublicans were elected. There might have been some legitimate ground for fears that Governor Tod, as an old Democrat, long trusted in the councils of the party and likely, from all past associations and prejudices, to revolt from the Proclamation of Emancipation, would now be drawn by this triumph of his old friends to renew his connection with them. But his patriotism was made of sterner stuff; the motives which had led him to abandon party for country at the outbreak of the war were now only strengthened. He made no allusion, in his annual message, to the Emancipation Proclamation ; but he dwelt upon the necessity of sustain ing the war, urged the lack of provocation for the rebellion of the insurgent States, and fully indorsed the obnoxious arrests. He recommended better pro visions for soldiers' families, efficient militia organization, and the support of a military school. For the rest, he proposed to provide against another defeat at the polls by enacting that the soldiers of the State should not be longer disfran chised while fighting the battles of the Country. Siege of Cincinnati. 83 CHAPTER VIII. THE SIEGE OT CINCINNATI. IN the early days of 1862 a new name was growing at once into popular fayor and popular fear among the prudent Eebels of the Kentucky bor der. It was first heard of in the achievement of carrying off the^ artil lery belonging to the Lexington company of the Kentucky State Guard into the Confederate service. Gradually it came to be coupled with daring " scouts," by little squads of the Eebel cavalry, within our contemplative picket lines along Green Eiver ; with sudden dashes, like the burning of the Bacon Creek Bridge, * whieh the lack of enterprise,' or even of ordinary vigilance on the part of some of our commanders permitted ; with unexpected swoops upon iso lated supply -trains or droves of army cattle ; with saucy messages about an intention to burn the Yankees out of Woddsonville the next week, and the like. Then came dashes within our lines about Nashville, night attacks, audacious captures of whole squads of guards within sight of the camps and within half a mile of division head-quarters, the seizure of Gallatin, adroit' impositions upon telegraph operators, which secured whatever news about the National armies was passing over the wires? Then, after Mitchel had swept down into North- * As the burning of this Bacon Creek Bridge was once the subject of newspaper controversy, and as it is not elsewhere spoken of in this work, it may be interesting here to show what view the Rebels themselves took of it. Colonel Ba,sil W. Duke, Morgan's secondin command through out the war, in his " History of Morgan's Cavalry," pp. 106, 107, says : "This bridge had been destroyed at the time our forces fell back from Woodsonville. It was a small structure and easily replaced, but its reparation was necessary to the use of the road. The National army then lay encamped between Bacon and Nolin Greeks, the advance about three miles from Bacon Creek, the outposts scarcely half a mile from the bridge. A few days' labor served to erect the wood work of the bridge, and it was ready to receive the iron rails, when Morgan asked leave to destroy it. ' It was granted, and he started from Bowling Green on the same night with his entire command, for he believed that he would find the bridge strongly guarded, and would have to fight for it. . . . Pressing on vigorously, he reached the bridge, . . . and to his surprise and satisfaction found it without a, guard, that which protected the workmen during the day having been withdrawn at night. The bridge was set on fire, and in three hours thoroughly destroyed, no interruption to the work being attempted by the enemy. The damage inflicted was trifling, and the delay occasioned of little consequence. The benefit derived from it by Morgan was twofold : it increased the hardihood of his men in that species of service, and gave himself still greater confidence in his own tactics." 84 Ohio in the War. ern Alabama, followed incursions upon his rear, cotton-burning exploits under the very noses of his guards, open pillage of citizens who had been encouraged by the advance of the National armies to express their loyalty.* These acts covered a wide range of country, and followed each other in quick succession, but they were all traced to John Morgan's Kentucky cavalry ; and such were their frequency and daring, that by midsummer of 1862 Morgan and his men occupied almost as much of the popular attention in Kentucky and along tho border as Beauregard or Lee. The leader of this band was a native of Huntsville, Alabama, but from early boyhood a resident of Kentucky. He had grown up to the free and easy life of a slaveholding farmer's son, in the heart of the "Blue Grass country," near Lexington ; had become a volunteer for the Mexican war at the age of nineteen, and had risen to a First-Lieutenancy; had passed through his share of personal encounters and "affairs of honor " about Lexington — not without wounds — and had finally married and settled down as a manufacturer and spec ulator. He had lived freely, gambled freely, shared in all the dissipations of the time and place, and still had retained the early vigor of a powerful consti tution, and a strong hold upon the confidence of the hot-blooded young men of Lexington. These followed him to the war. They were horsemen by instinct, accustomed to a dare-devil life, capable of doing their own thinking in emer gencies without waiting for orders, and in all respects the best material for an independent band of partisan rangers the country had produced. They were allied by family connections with many of the leading people of the " Blue Grass " region ; and it could not but result that when they ap peared in Kentucky — whatever army might be near — they found themselves among friends. /» The people of Ohio had hardly recovered from the spasmodic effort to raiso regiments in a day for a second defense of the capital, into which they had been thrown by the call of the Government in its alarm at Stonewall Jackson's rush through the valley. They were now, rather languidly, turning to the effort of filling the new and unexpected call for seventy-four thousand three years' men. Few had as yet been raised. Here and there through the State were the nuclei of forming regiments, and there were a few arms, but there was no ade quate protection for the Border, and none dreamed that any was necessary, Beauregard had evacuated Corinth; Memphis had fallen; Buell was moving eastward toward Chattanooga ; the troops lately commanded by Mitchel held Tennessee and Northern Alabama ; Kentucky was mainly in the. hands of her Home-Guards, and, under the supervision of a State military board, was raising volunteers for the National army. * " The command encamped that night in a loyal neighborhood, and, mindful always of a decorous respect for the opinions of other people, Colonel Morgan made all ofhis men 'play Union.' They were consequently treated with distinguished consideration, and some were (tar nished with fresh horses, for which they gave their kind friends orders (on the disbursing officers at Nashville) for their back pay. . . . Over one store the stars and stripes were floating re- Fplendent. The men were so much pleased with this evidence of patriotism that they would pat- ronize no other store in the place!" Basil W. Duke's History of Morgan's Cavalry, pp. 158-9. , Siege of Cincinnati. 85 Suddenly, while the newspapers were still trying to explain McClellan's change of base, and clamoring against Buell's slow advances on Chattanooga, without a word of warning or explanation, came the startling news that John Morgan was in Kentucky 1 The dispatches of Friday afternoon, the 11th of July, announced that he had fallen upon the little post of Tompkinsville, and killed or captured the entire garrison. By evening it was known that the pris oners were paroled ; that Morgan had advanced unopposed to Glasgow; that he had issued a proclamation calling upon the Kentuckians to rise ; that the author ities deemed it unsafe to attempt sending through trains from Louisville to Nashville. By Saturday afternoon he was reported marching on Lexington, and General Boyle, the commandant in Kentucky, was telegraphing vigorously to Mayor Hatch, at Cincinnati, for militia to be sent in that direction. A public meeting was at once called, and by nine o'clock that evening a concourse of several thousand citizens had gathered in the Fifth Street market- space. Meantime more and more urgency for aid had been expressed in suc cessive dispatches from General Boyle. In one he fixed Morgan's force at two thousand eight hundred ; in» another he said that Morgan, with one thousand five hundred, had burned Perryville, and was marching on Danville; again, that the forces at his command were needed to defend Louisville, and that Cin cinnati must defend Lexington ! Some of these dispatches were read at the public meeting, and speeches were made by the Mayor, Judge Saffin, and others. Finally a committee was appointed,* headed by ex-Senator Geo. E. Pugh, to take such measures for organized effort as might be possible or necessary. Before the committee could organize came word that Governor Tod had ordered down such convalescent soldiers as could be gathered at Camp Dennison and Camp Chase, and had sent a thousand stand of arms. A little after midnight two hundred men belonging to the Fifty-Second Ohio arrived. On Sunday morning the city was thoroughly alarmed. The streets were thronged at an early hour, and by nine o'clock another large meeting had gath- dred in the Fifth Street market-space. Speeches were made by ex-Senator Pugh, Thos. J. Gallagher, and Benj. Eggleston. It was announced that a bat talion made up of the police force would be sent to Lexington in the evening. Arrangements were made to organize volunteer companies Charles F. Wilstach and Eli C. Baldwin were authorized to procure rations for volunteers. The City Council met, resolved that it would pay any bills incurred by the commit tee appointed at the public meeting, and appropriated five thousand dollars for immediate wants. Eleven hundred men — parts of the Eighty-Fifth and Eighty- Sixth Ohio from Camp Chase — arrived in the afternoon and went directly on to Lexington. The police force, under Colonel Dudley, their chief, and. an artil lery company, with a single piece, under Captain Wm. Glass, of the City Fire Department, also took the special train for Lexington in the evening. Similar scenes were witnessed across the river, at Covington, during the same period. While the troops were mustering, and the excited people were volunteering, it * Consisting of Mayor Hatch, Geo. E. Pugh, Joshua Bates, Thos. J. Gallagher, Miles Green wood, J. W. Hartwell, Peter Gibson, Bellamy Storer, David Gibson, and J. B. Stallo. 86 Ohio in the War. was discovered that a brother of John Morgan was a guest at one of the prin cipal hotels. He made no concealment of his relationship, or of his sympathy with the Eebel cause, but produced a pass from General Boyle. He was detained. Monday brought no further news of Morgan, and the alarm began to abate. Kentuckians expressed the belief that he only meant to attract attention by feints on Lexington and Frankfort, while he should make his way to Bourbon county, and destroy the long Townsend viaduct near Paris, which might cripple the railroad for weeks. The Secretary of War gave permission to use some cannon which Miles Greenwood had been casting for the Government, and Gov ernor Morton furnished ammunition for them.* The tone of the press may be inferred from the advice ofthe Gazette that the "bands sent out to pursue Mor gan " should take few prisoners — " the fewer the better." " They are not worthy of being treated as soldiers," it continued; "they are freebooters, thieves, and murderers, and should be dealt with accordingly." For a day or two there followed a state of uncertainty as to Morgan's whereabouts, or the real nature of the danger. In answer to an application for artillery, the Secretary of War telegraphed that Morgan was retreating. Pres ently came dispatches from Kentucky that he was still advancing. Governor Dennison visited Cincinnati at the request of Governor Tod, consulted with the " Committee of Public Safety," and passed on to Frankfort to look after the squads of Ohio troops that had been hastily forwarded to the points of danger. The disorderly elements of the city took advantage of the absence of so large a portion of the police force at Lexington. Troubles broke out between the Irish and negroes, in which the former were the aggressors; houses were fired, and for a little time there were apprehensions of a serious riot. Several hundred leading property-holders met in alarm at the Merchant's Exchange, and took measures for organizing a force of one thousand citizens for special service the ensuing night. For a day or two the excitement was kept up, but there were few additional outbreaks. While Cincinnati was thus in confusion, and troops were hurrying to the defense of the threatened points, John Morgan was losing no time in idle de bates. He had left Knoxville, East Tennessee, on the morning of the 4th of July; on the morning of the 9th he had fallen upon the garrison at Tompkins- ville; before one o'clock the next morning he had possession of Glasgow; by the 11th he had possession of Lebanon. On the Sunday (13th) on which, Cincinnati had been so thoroughly aroused, he entered Harrodsburg. Then, feigning on Frankfort, he made haste toward Lexington, striving to delay re-enforcements by sending out parties to burn bridges, and hoping to find the town an easy capture. Monday morning he was within fifteen miles of Frankfort; before * The Columbus authorities were asked for ammunition, and sent word that it would be fur nished only on the requisition of a United States officer commanding a post. The Indianapolis authorities furnished it on the order of the Mayor ; and the newspapers commented with some severity on what they called "the difference between the red-tapeism of Columbus, and the man ner of doing business at Indianapolis." Siege of Cincinnati. 87 nightfall he was at Versailles — having marched between three' and four hundred miles in eight days. Moving thence to Midway, between Frankfort and Lexington, he surprised the telegraph operator, secured his office in good order, took off the dispatches that were flying back and forth; possessed himself of the plans and prepara tions of the Union officers !at Frankfort, Lexington, Louisville, and Cincinnati; and audaciously sent dispatches in the name of the Midway operator, assuring the Lexington authorities that Morgan was then driving in the pickets at Frank fort ! Then he hastened to Georgetown-^ — twelve miles from Lexington, eighteen from Frankfort, and within easy striking distance of any point in the Blue Grass region. Here, with the Union commanders completely mystified as to his whereabouts and purposes, he coolly halted fol* a couple of days and rested his horses. Then, giving up all thought of attacking Lexington, as he found how strongly it was garrisoned, he decided — as his second in command naively tells us*— "to make a dash at Cynthiana, on the Kentucky Central Eailroad, hoping to induce the impression that he was aiming' at Cincinnati, and at the same time thoroughly bewilder the officer in command at Lexington regarding his real intentions." Thither, therefore, he went; and to some purpose. The town was garrisoned by a few hundred Kentucky cavalry, and some home- guards, with Captain Glass's firemen's artillery company from Cincinnati — in all perhaps five hundred men. These were routed after some sharp fighting at the bridge and in the streets ; the gun was captured, and four hundred and twenty prisoners were taken ; besides abundance of stores, arms, and two or three hundred horses. At one1 o'clock he' was off for Paris, which Sent out a deputation of citizens to meet him and surrender. By this time the forces that had been gathering at Lexington had moved out against him with nearly double his strength ;f but the next morning he left Paris unmolested ; and marching through Winchester, Eiehmond, Crab Orchard, and Somerset, crossed the Cum berland again at his leisure. He started with nine hundred men, and returned with one thousand two hundred— having captured and paroled nearly as many, and having destroyed all the Government arms and stores in seventeen towns. Meanwhile the partially -lulled excitement in Cincinnati had risen again. A great meeting had been held in Court Street market-space, at which Judge Hugh J. Jewett.who had been the Democratic candidate for Governor, made an earnest appeal for rapid enlistments, to redeem the pledge of the Governor to assist Kentucky, and to prevent Morgan from recruiting a large army in that State. Quartermaster-GeneralWright had followed in a situilar strain. The City Council, to silence doubts oh the part of sbine, had taken the oath of alle giance as a body. The Chamber of Commerce had memoralized the Council to make an appropriation for bounties to volunteers ; Colonel Burbank had been * Basile W. Duke's History of Morgan's Cavalry, p. 199. The foregoing statements of Mor gan's movements are derived from the same source. t Under General Green Clay Smith. 88 Ohio in the War. appointed Military Governor ofthe city,* and there had been rumors of martial law and a provost- marshal. The popular ferment largely took the shape of clamor for bounties as a means of stimulating volunteers. The newspapers called on the Governor to "take the responsibility," and offer twenty -five dol lars bounty for every recruit. Public-spirited citizens made contributions for such a purpose — Mr. J. Cleves Short a thousand dollars, Messrs. Tyler, David son & Co. one thousand two hundred, Mr. Kugler two thousand five hundred, Mr. Jacob Elsas five hundred. . Two regiments for service in emergencies were hastily formed, which were known as the Cincinnati Eeserves. Yet, withal, the alarm never reached the height of the excitement on Sun day, the 13th of July, when Morgan was first reported marching on Lexington. The papers said they should not be surprised any morning to see his cavalry on the hills opposite Cincinnati ; but the people seemed to entertain less apprehen sion. They were soon to have greater occasion for fear. For the invasion of Morgan was only a forerunner. It had served to illus trate to the Eebel commanders the ease with which their armies could be planted in Kentucky, and had set before them a tempting vision of the rich supplies of the ,: Blue Grass." July and August passed in comparative gloom. McClellan was recalled from the Peninsula. Pope was driven back from the Eapidan, and after a be wildering series of confused and bloody engagements, was forced to seek, refuge under the defenses at Washington. In the South-west our armies seemed tor pid, and the enemy was advancing. In the department in which Ohio was specially interested there were grave delays in the long-awaited movement on Chattanooga, and finally it appeared that Bragg had arrived there before Buell. Presently vague rumors of a new invasion began to be whispered, and at last while Bragg and Buell warily watched each the other's maneuvers, Kirby Smith, who had been posted at Knoxville, broke camp and marched straight for the heart of Kentucky with twelve thousand men and thirty or forty pieces of artillery.f With the first rumors of danger, Indiana and Ohio had both made strenuous exertions to throw forward the new levies, and Indiana in particular had hastily put into the field in Kentucky a large number of perfectly raw troops, fresh from the camps at which they had been recruited. Through Big Creek and Eogers's Gaps Kirby Smith moved without moles tation; passed the National forces at Cumberland Gap without waiting to attempt a reduction of the place, and absolutely pushed on into Kentucky un opposed, till within fifteen miles of Eiehmond and less than three times that distance from Lexington itself, he fell upon a Kentucky regiment of cavalry under Colonel Metcalf and scattered it in a single charge. The routed cavalry- *This was done in response to a dispatch requesting it from Mayor Hatch, Captain J. H. Dickerson (then Post-Quartermaster, U. S. A.), and Joshua H. Bates, Chairman of the Com mittee of Public Safety. tThis statement of Smith's strength follows the account of Colonel Basil W. Duke, Histoiy Morgan's Cavalry, p. 235. He says Smith had in East Tennessee about twenty thousand, a*| that he left eight thousand in front of Cumberland Gap. Siege of Cincinnati. 89 men bore back to Eiehmond and Lexington the first authentic news of the Eebel advance. The new troops were hastily pushed forward, in utter igno rance of the strength of the enemy, and apparently without any well-defined plans ; and so, as the victorious invaders came up toward Eiehmond, they found this force opposing them. Smith seems scarcely to have halted, even to con centrate his command, but precipitating the advance of his column upon the raw line that confronted him, scattered it again at a charge.* General Manson, who commanded the National troops, had been caught before getting his men well in hand. A little farther back, he essayed the formation of another line, and the check of the rout: but while the broken line was steadying, Smith again came charging up, and the disorderly retreat was speedily -renewed. A third and more determined stand was made, almost in tho suburbs of the town, and some hard fighting ensued; but the undisciplined and ill-handled troops were no match for their enthusiastic assailants, and when they were this time driven, the rout became complete.f • The cavalry fell upon the fugitives, whole regiments were captured and instantly paroled ; those that escajied fled through fields and by-ways, and soon poured into Lexington with the story of the disaster. Thither now went hurrying General H. G. Wright, the commander of the department. A glance at the condition of such troops as this battle of Eieh mond had left him, showed that an effort to hold Lexington would be hopeless. Before Kirby Smith could get up he evacuated the place, and was falling back in all haste on Louisville, while the railroad company was hurrying its stock toward the Cincinnati end of the road ; the banks were sending off their specie ; Union men were fleeing, and the predominant Eebel element was throwing off all disguise. , On the 1st of September General Kirby Smith entered Lexington in tri umph. Two days later he dispatched Heath with five or six thousand men against Covington and Cincinnati ; the next day he was joined by John Morgan, who had moved through Glasgow (and Danville; and the overjoyed people of the city thronged the streets and shouted from every door and window their welcome to the invaders.J A few days later Buell was at Nashville. Bragg was moving into Kentucky, and the "race for Louisville," as it has sometimes been called, was begun. So swift was the Eebel rush upon Kentucky and the Ohio Border ; so sudden the revolution in the aspect of the war in the South-west. We have told the simple story of the Eebel progress. It would need more *29th August, 1862. ¦ t General William Nelson arrived in time to command at this last struggle, and to exert all his influence in striving to check the rout. He subsequently claimed that the battle was brought on by disobedience to orders on the part of General Manson, and that his instructions, if obeyed, vrould have secured such a disposition of the troops as would have kept the Rebels from crossing the Kentucky River. He was himself wounded. But one Ohio regiment was in the action, the Ninety-Fifth. Its share may be found more fully described in Vol. II, pp. 527-28. X Duke's History Morgan's Cavalry, pp. 233-34. Pollard says the bells of the city were rung, and every possible manifestation of joy was made. 90 Ohio in the War. vivid colore to give an adequate picture of the state into which Cincinnati and the surrounding country were thereby thrown. News of the disaster at Eiehmond was not received in Cincinnati till a late hour Saturday night* It produced great excitement, but the full extent of its consequences was not realized. There were soldiers in plenty to drive back the invaders, it was argued, only a few experienced officers were needed. The San itary Commission hastened its shipments of stores toward the battle-field, and the State authorities began preparations for sending relief to the wounded: while the newspapers gave vent to the general dissatisfaction in severe criti cisms on the management of the battle, and in wonders as to what Buell could be doing. Thus Sunday passed. Monday afternoon rumors began to fly about that the troops were in no condition to make any sufficient opposition — that Lexington and Frankfort might have to be abandoned. Great crowds flocked about the newspaper offices and army head-quarters to ask the particulars, but all still thought that in any event there were plenty of troops between the in vaders and themselves. By dusk it was known that instead of falling back on Cincinnati the troops were retreating through Frankfort to Louisville — that between Kirby Smith's flushed regiments and the banks and warehouses of the Queen City stood no obstacle more formidable than a few unmanned siege guns back of Covington, and the easily -crossed Ohio Eiver. The shock was profound. But none thought of anything save to seek what might be the most efficient means of defense. The City Council at once met in extra session — pledged the faith of the city to meet any expenses the military authorities might require in the emergency; authorized the Mayor to suspend all business, and summon every man, alien or citizen, who lived under the protection of the Government, to unite in military organizations for its de fense; assured the General commanding the department f of their, entire confi dence, and requested him to call for men and means to any extent desired, no limit being proposed save the entire capacity of the community. While the municipal authorities were thus tendering the whole resources of a city of a quarter of a million people, the Commander of the Department was sending them a General. Lewis Wallace was a dashing young officer of volunteers, who had been among the first from Indiana to enter the field at tho outbreak of the war, and had risen to the highest promotion then attainable in the army. He was notably quick to take responsibilities, full of energy and enthusiasm, abundantly confident in his own resources, capable of bold plans. When the first indications of danger in Kentucky appeared he had waived his rank and led one of the raw regiments from his State into the field. Then, after being for a short time in charge of the troops about Lexington, he had, on being relieved by General Nelson, returned to Cincinnati. Here the Commander of the Department seized upon him for service in the sudden emergency, sum moned him first to Lexington for consultation; then, when himself hastening to Louisville, ordered Wallace back to Cincinnati, to assume command and defend the town with its Kentucky suburbs. Ho arrived at nine o'clock in the evening. *30th August. 1 Major-General Horatio G. Wright. Siege of Cincinnati. 91 The Mayor waited upon him at once with notice of the action of the City Council. The Mayors of Newport and Covington soon came hurrying over. The few army officers on duty in the three towns also reported; and a few hours were spent in consultation. Then, at two o'clock, the decisive step was taken. A proclamation of mar tial law was sent to the newspapers. Next morning the citizens read at their breakfast-tables — before yet any one knew that the Eebels were advancing on Cincinnati, two days in fact before the advance began — that all business must be suspended at nine o'clock, that they must assemble within an hour thereafter and await orders for work; that the ferry-boats should cease plying, save under military direction; that for the present the city police should enforce martial law; that in all this the principle to be adopted was: " Citizens for labor, sol diers for battle." It was the boldest, and most vigorous order in the history of Cincinnati or of the war along the Border.* "If the enemy should not come after all this fuss," said one ofthe General's friends, "you will be ruined." '.'Very well," was the reply, "but they will come, or, if they do not, it will be because this same fuss has caused them to think better of it." f The city took courage from the bold course of its General; instead of a panic there was universal congratulation. "From the appearance of our streets," said one of the newspapers the next day, in describing the operations of martial law, "a stranger would imagine that some popular holiday was being celebrated. Indeed, were the millennium suddenly inaugurated, the populace could hardly seem better pleased." All cheerfully obeyed the order, though there was not military force enough present to have enforced it along a single street. Every business house was closed; in the unexpectedly scrupulous obedience to the *The following is the text of this remarkable order, which practically saved Cincinnati: "The undersigned, by order of Major-General Wright, assumes command of Cincinnati, Covington, and Newport. "It is but fair to inform the citizens that an active, daring, and powerful enemy threatens them with every consequence of war; yet the cities must be defended, and their inhabitants must assist in the preparations. Patriotism, duty, honor, self-preservation, call them to the labor, and it must be performed equally by all classes. " First. All business must be suspended. At nine o'clock to-day every business house must be closed. " Second. Under the direction of their Mayor, the citizens must, within an hour after the suspension of business (ten o'clock. A. M.), assemble in their convenient public places ready for orders. As soon as possible they will then be assigned to their work. This labor ought to be that of love, and the undersigned trusts and believes that it will be so ; anyhow, it must be done. The willing shall be properly credited, the unwilling promptly visited. " The principle adopted is : Citizens for the labor, soldiers for the battle. " Martial law is hereby proclaimed in the three cities, but until they can be relieved by the military, the injunction of this proclamation will be executed by the police. "The ferry-boats will cease plying the river after four o'clock, A. M., until further orders. "LEWIS WALLACE, "Major-General Commanding." t"The Siege of Cincinnati," hy Thomas Buchanan Read, in Atlantic Monthly, No. 64, Feb ruary, 1863. Mr. Read served during the siege on General Wallace's staff. 92 Ohio in the War. letter of the proclamation, even the street-cars stopped running, and the teach ers, closing their schools, reported for duty. But few hacks or wagons were to be seen save those on Government service. Working parties of citizens had been ordered to report to Colonel J. V. Guthrie; companies of citizen-soldiery to Major Malcom McDowell. Meetings assembled in every ward; great numbers of military organizations were formed; by noon thousands of citizens in fully. organized companies were industriously drilling. Meanwhile, back of Newport and Covington, breastworks, rifle-pits, and redoubts had been hastily- traced, guns had been mounted, pickets thrown out. Toward evening a sound of ham- mers and saws arose from the landing; by daybreak a pontoon bridge stretched from Cincinnati to Covington, and wagons loaded with lumber for barracks and material for fortifications were passing over. In such spirit did Cincinnati herself confront the sudden danger. Not less vigorous was the action of the Governor. While Wallace was writing his proclamation of martial law and ordering the suspension of business, Tod was hurrying down to the scene of danger for consultation. Presently he was tele graphing from Cincinnati to his Adjutant-General to send whatever troops wevo accessible without a moment's delay. "Do not wait," he added, "to have them mustered or paid — that can be done here — they should be armed and furnished ammunition." To his Quartermaster he telegraphed: "Send five thousand stand -of arms for the militia of this city, with fifty rounds of ammunition. Send also forty rounds for fifteen hundred guns (sixty-nine caliber)." To the people along the border through the press and the military committees he said: "Our southern border is threatened with invasion. I have therefore to recommend that all the loyal men of your counties at once form themselves into military companies and regiments to beat back the enemy at any and all points he may attempt to invade our State. Gather up all the arms in the county, and furnish yourselves with ammunition for the same. The service will be of but a few days' duration. The soil of Ohio must not be invaded by the enemies of our glorious Government." To Secretary Stanton he telegraphed that he had no doubt a large Eebel force was moving against Cincinnati, but it would be successfully met. The commander at Camp Dennison he directed to guard the(track of the Little Mi ami Eailroad against apprehended dangers, as far up as Xenia. The rural districts were meanwhile hastening to the rescue. Early in the day — within an hour or two after the arrival of the Cincinnati papers with news of the danger — Preble and Butler counties telegraphed offers of large number! of men. Warren, Greene, Franklin, and half a score of others, rapidly fol lowed. Before night the Governor had sent a general answer in this proclamation: "Cincinnajti, September 2, 1862. "In response to several communications tendering companies and squads of men for the protection of Cincinnati, I announce that all such bodies of men who are armed will be received. They will repair at once to Cincinnati, and report to General Lew. Wallace, who will complete their further Organization. None but armed men will he received, and such only until the 5th instant. Railroad companies will pass all such bodies of men at the expense of the State. It>> not desired that any troops residing in any of the river counties leave their counties. All such are requested to organize and remain for the protection of their own counties. "DAVID TOD, Governor." mm 1*11 S Siege of Cincinnati. 93 Before daybreak the advance of the men that were thenceforward to be known in the history of the State as the " Squirrel Hunters," were filing through the streets. Next morning, throughout the interior, church and fire-bells rang; mounted men galloped through neighborhoods to spread the alarm ; there was a hasty cleaning of rifles, and molding of bullets, and filling of powder-horns, and mustering at the villages ; and every city-bound train ran burdened with the gathering host. While these preparations were in progress perhaps Cincinnati might have been taken by a vigorous dash of Kirby Smith's entire force, and held long enough for pillage. But the inaction for a day or two at Lexington was fatal to such hopes. Within two days after the proclamation of martial law the city was safe beyond peradventure. Then, as men saw the vast preparations for an enemy that had not come, they began, not unnaturally, to wonder if the need for such measures had been imperative. A few business men complained. Some Germans began tearing up a street railroad track, in revenge for the invidious distinction which, in spite ofthe danger, had adjudged the street cars indispensable, but not the lager- beer shops. The schools had unintentionally been closed by the operation of the first sweeping proclamation, and fresh orders had to be issued to open them ; bake-shops had been closed, and the people seemed in danger of getting no bread; the drug-stores had been closed, and the sick could get no medicines. Such oversights were speedily corrected, but they left irritation.* The Evening Times newspaper, giving voice to a sentiment that undoubtedly began to find expression among some classes, published a communication whj.ch pronounced the whole movement " a big scare," and ridiculed the efforts to place the city in a posture of defense.f To at least a slight extent the Commander of the Department would seem * The following order, issued by the Mayor, with the sanction of General Wallace, obviated the. difficulties involved in the literal suspension of all business in a great city : " 1st. The banks and bankers of this city will be permitted to open their offices from one to two P. M. ~) "2d. Bakers are allowed to pursue their business. "3d. Physicians are allowed to attend their patients. " 4th. Employees of newspapers are allowed to pursue their business. " 5th. Funerals are permitted, but only mourners are allowed to leave the city. " 6th. All coffee-houses and places where intoxicating liquors are sold are to be closed and kept closed. "7th. Eating and drinking houses are to close and keep closed. "8th. All places of amusement are to close and keep closed. 9th, All drug-stores and apothecaries are permitted to keep open and do their ordinary business. "GEORGE HATCH, " Mayor of Cincinnati." t Within an hour or two after this publication, General Wallace suppressed the Times; for this article, as was generally supposed, although it was subsequently stated that the offensive matter was an editorial reviewing the military management on the Potomac. The zealous loy alty of the paper had always been so marked that General Wallace was soon made to feel the popular conviction of his having made a grave mistake, and the next day the Times was per mitted to appear again as usual. ,« 94 Ohio in the War. to have entertained the same opinion. After two days of martial law and mus- tering for the defense of the city, he directed, on his return from Louisvill^a •relaxation of the stringency of the first orders, and notified Governor Tod that no more men from the interior were wanted. The next day he relieved General Wallace of the command in Cincinnati, and sent him across the river to take charge of the defenses ; permitted the resumption of all business save liquor- selling, only requiring that it should be suspended each afternoon at four o'clock, and that the evenings should be spent in drill ; systematized the drain upon the city for labor on the fortifications, by directing that requisitions be made each evening for the number to be employed the next day, and that these be eqnitav bly apportioned among the several wards* The day before the issue of this order had witnessed the most picturesque and inspiring sight ever seen in Cincinnati. From morning till night the streets resounded with the tramp of armed men marching to the defense of the city. From every quarter of the State they came, in every form of organization, with every species of arms. The " Squirrel Hunters," in their homespun, with pow der-horn and buckskin pouch; half-organized regiments, some in uniform and some without it, some having waited long enough to draw their equipments and some having marched without them; cavalry and infantry; all poured out from the railroad depots and down toward the pontoon bridge. The ladies of the city furnished provisions by the wagon-load ; the Fifth Street market- house was converted into a vast free eating saloon for the Squirrel Hunters; halls and warehouses were used as barracks. On the 4th of September Governor Tod was able to telegraph General Wright : " I have now sent you for Kentucky twenty regiments. I have twenty- one more in process of organization, two of which I will send you this week, five or six next week, and the rest the week after, ... I have no means of knowing what number of gallant men responded to my call (on the militia) for the protection of Cincinnati, but presume they now count by thousands." And the next day he was forced to check the movement." * This order, which was hailed by the business community as sensible and timely, and which certainly gave great mitigation to the embarrassments caused by the suspension of business, vas as follows: ^ " Head-Qtjabteks, Department of the Ohmm " Cincinnati, September 6, 1862.J "GENEKAIiOaDJBBNO.il. "The resumption of all lawful business in the city of Cincinnati, except the sale of liquor, w hereby authorized until the hour of four o'clock, P. M., daily. "All dr nggists, manufacturers of breadstuff's, provision dealers^ railroad, express, and transfer companies, persons connected with the public press, and all persons doing business for the Gov ernment, will be allowed to pursue their vocations without interruption. "By command of Major-General Wbight.- "N. H. McLEAN, "AssistaniiAdjutant General and Chief of Staff. Siege of Cincinnati. 95 " Columbus, September 5, 1862. "To the Press: " The response to my proclamation asking volunteers for the protection of Cincinnati was most noble and generous. All may feel proud of the gallantry of the people of Ohio. No more volunteers are required for the protection of Cincinnati. Those now there may be expected home in a few days. I advise, that the military organizations throughout the State, formed within the past few days, be kept up, and that the members meet at least once a week for drill. Re cruiting for the old regiments is progressing quite satisfactorily, and with continued effort there is reason to believe that the requisite number may te obtained by the 15th instant. For the want of proper accommodations at this point, recruiting officers are directed to report their men to the camp nearest their locality, where they will remain until provision can be 'made for their removal. Commanding officers of the several camps will see that every facility is given neces sary for the comfort of these recruits. "DAVID TOD, Governor." The exertions at Cincinnati, however, were not abated. Judge Dickson, a well-known lawyer of the city, of Badical Republican politics, organized a negro brigade for labor on the fortifications, which did excellent and zealous service. Full details of white citizens, three thousand per day — judges, law yers, and clerks, merchant-prince and day-laborer, artist and artisan, side by side — were also kept at work with the spade, and to all payment at the rate of a dollar per day was promised. The militia organizations were kept up, " regi ments of the reserve " were formed, and drilling went on vigorously. The Squirrel Hunters were entertained in rough but hearty fashion, and the ladies continued to furnish bountiful supplies of provisions. Across the river regular engineers had done their best to give shape to the hasty fortifications. The trenches were manned every night, and after an im perfect fashion a little scouting went on in the front. General Wallace was vigilant and active, and there was no longer a possibility that the force under Kirby Smith could take the city. At last this force began to move up as if actually intending attack. One or two little skirmishes occurred, and the commander of the Department, de ceived into believing that now was the hour of his greatest peril, appealed has tily to Governor Tod for more militia. The Governor's response was prompt : " Columbus, September 10, 1862. "To the Press oe Cleveland: "to the several military committees of northern OHIO. "By telegram from Major-General Wright, Commander-in-Chief of Western forces, re ceived at two o'clock this morning, I am directed to send all armed men that can be raised im mediately to Cincinnati. You will at once exert yourselves to execute this order. The men should be armed, each, furnished with a blanket, and at least two days' rations. " Railroad companies are requested to furnish transportation of troops to the exclusion of all other business. "DAVID TOD, Governor." The excitement in the city once more sprang up. Every disposition was made for defense and the attack was hourly expected. The newspapers of Sep tember 11th announced that before they were distributed the sound of artillery might' be heard on the heights of "Covington; assured readers ofthe safety of the city, and exhorted all to "keep cool." Business was again suspended, and 96 Ohio in the War. the milita companies were under arms. The intrenchments back of Covington were filled; and, lest a sudden concentration might break through the lines at some spot and leave the city at the mercy of the assailants, the roads leading to it were g#arded, and only those provided with passes could travel to or fro, while the river was filled with gunboats, improvised from the steamers at the wharves But the expected attack did not come. As we now know, Kirby Smith had never been ordered to attack, but only to demonstrate; and about this very time the advance of Buell seemed to Bragg so menacing that he made haste to order Smith back to his support. General Wallace gradually pushed out his advance a little and the Bebel pickets fell back. By the 11th all felt that the danger was over. On the 12th Smith's hasty retreat was discovered. On the 13th Gov ernor-Tod checked the movement ofthe Squirrel Hunters, announced the safety of Cincinnati, and expressed his congratulations.* On this bright Saturday afternoon the " Regiments of the Reserve" came marching across the pontoon bridge, with their dashing commander at the head of the column. Joyfully these young professional and business men traced thejr way through Front, Broadway, and Fourth Streets to the points where they were relieved from the restraints of military service, and permitted to seek the pleasures and rest of, home! An examination ofthe dockets and day -hooks of that eventful fortnight, will show that the citizens of Cincinnati were absent from their usual avocations ; but Monday, the 15th, brought again to the count ing-rooms and work-shops the busy hum of labor. * "Columbus, September 13, 1862, eight o'clock A. SI, "To the Press op Cleveland: "Copy of dispatch this moment received from Major-General Wright at Cincinnati: 'The enemy is retreating. Until we know more of his intention and position do not send any more citizen troops to this city. (Signed) H. G. Wright, Major-General.' In pursuance of this order all volunteers en route for Cincinnati will return to their respective homes. Those now at Cin cinnati may be expected home so soon as transportation can be secured. The generous response from all parts of the State to the recent call, has won additional renown for the people of Ohio. The news which reached Cincinnati, that the patriotic men all over the State were rushing to its defense, saved our soil from invasion, and hence all good citizens will feel grateful to the patriotic men who promptly offered their assistance. It is hoped that no further call for minute-men will be necessary; but should I be disappointed in this, it is gratifying to know that the call will be again cheerfully and gallantly responded to. Railroad companies will pass all volunteers to their homes, at the expense of the State. The Captains of each squad, or company, are requested to give certificates of transportation to the superintendents or conductors of the railroads over which they may pass. I avail myself of this opportunity to renew the request heretofore made, that the several military volunteer organiza t ions, formed within- the past few days, be maintained, meeting for drill as often as once a week at least. I have further to request, that the command ers of said squads or companies report by letter to the Adjutant-General, the strength of their respective commands. "DAVID TOD, Governor." "Columbus, September 13, 1862. "To Hon. E. M. Stanton, Sec'y. of War, Washington, D. C. : "The minute-men or Squirrel Hunters responded gloriously to the call for the defense of Cincinnati. Thousands reached the city, and thousands more were en route for it. The enemy having retreated, all have been ordered back. This uprising of the people is the cause of tbe retreat. You should acknowledge publicly this gallant conduct. Please order Quartermaster Burr to pay all transportation bills, upon my approval. "DAVID TOD, Governor. THE SQUIRREL HUNTER KIRBY SMITH S RAID. Siege of Cincinnati. 97 General Wallace took his leave of the city he had so efficiently served in a graceful, and manly address : "To the People of Cincinnati, Newport, and Covington: — For tho present, at least, the enemy have fallen back, and your cities are safe. It is the time for acknowledgments, I beg leave to make you mine. When I assumed command there was nothing to defend you with, except a few half-finished works, and some dismounted guns; yet I was confident. The energies of a great city are boundless; they have only to be aroused, united and directed. You were appealed to. The answer will never be forgotten. "Paris may have seen something like it in her revolutionary days, but the cities of America never did. Be proud that you have given them an example so splendid. The most commercial of people, you submitted to a total suspension of business, and without a murmur adopted my principle: ' Citizens for labor, soldiers for battle.' "In coming time strangers, viewing the works on the hills of Newport and Covington, will ask, 'Who built these intrenchments?' You can answer, 'We built them.' If they ask, 'Who guarded them?' you can reply, 'We helped in thousands.' - If they inquire the result, your an swer will be, ' The enemy came and looked at them, and stole away in the night.' "You have won much honor; keep your organizations ready to win more. Hereafter be always prepared to defend yourselves. "LEWIS WALLACE, "Major-General Commanding." He had done some things not wholly wise, and had brought upon the people much inconvenience not wholly necessary. But these were the. inevitable neces sities of the haste, the lack of preparation, and the pressure of the emergency. He took grave responsibilities; adopted a vigorous ' and needful policy; was prompt and peremptory when these qualities were the only salvation of the city. He will be held therefor in grateful remembrance so long as Cincinnati continues to cherish the memory of those who do her service. As the regiments from the city were relieved from duty, so the Squirrel Hunters were disbanded and sought the routes of travel homeward, carrying with them the hearty thanks of a grateful populace.* While the attack was expected, there were many in Cincinnati who thought that the enemy might really be amusing the force on the front while preparing to cross the river at Maysville, above, and so swoop down on the city on the undefended side. To the extent of making a raid into Ohio at least, such an intention was actually entertained, and was subsequently undertaken by Col onel Basil W. Duke, of John Morgan's command, who was left to occupy the forces near Cincinnati as long as possible after Kirby Smith's withdrawal. He went so far as to enter Augusta, on the river above Cincinnati, where he was encountered by a determined party of home-guards, and given so bloody a re ception that after a desperate little street fight he was glad to abandon his *The Legislature at its next session adopted the following resolution.: "Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the State of Ohio, That the Governor be and he is hereby authorized and directed to appropriate out of his contingent fund, a sufficient sum to jjay for printing and lithographing discharges for the patriotic men of the State, who re sponded to the call of the Governor, and went to the southern border to repel the invader, and who will be known in history as the Squirrel Hunters. "JAMES R. HUBBELL, " Speaker of the House of Representatives. "P. HITCHCOCK, Columbus, March 11, 1863. "President pro tern of the Senate." Vol. I.— 7. 98 Ohio in the War. movement, and fall back in haste to Falmouth, and thence, soon after, toward the rest of the retreating forces. ~Work on the fortificatipns was prudently continued, and some little time passed before the city lapsed into its accustomed ways; but the "Siege of Cin cinnati" was over. The enemy was before it about eight days — at no time twelve thousand strong. The following summary of persons in charge of some of the various duties connected with the sudden organization for the defense of the city may hero be given : STAFF OF MAJOR-GENERAL LEWIS WALLACE. Chief of Staff. , Colonel J. C. Elston, jr. Chief of Artillery Major C. M. Willard. Aid-de-Camps : Captains James M. Ross, A. J. Ware, jr., James F. Troth, A. G. Sloo, G. P, Edgar, E. T. WaUace. Volunteer Aid-de-Camps : Colonel J. V. Guthrie ; Lieutenant-Colonel G. W. Neff; Majoni Malcom McDowell, E. B. Dennison; Captains James Thompson, A. S. Burt, Thomas Buchanan Read, S. C. Erwin, J. J. Henderson, J. C. Belman. NEGRO BRIGADE — CAMP SHALER. Commander Judge Dickson. Commissary Hugh McBirney. Quartermaster - J. S. Hill. , it FATIGUE FORCES. , jjj; In Charge Colonel J. V. Guthrie. Commissary Captain Williamson. . Quartermaster Captain George B. Cassilly. ''" Camp Mitchel, under Captain Titus. ft.'J " Anderson, under Captain Storms. " Sharer, (back of Newport) under Major Winters. RIVER DEFENSE. In Charge R. M. Corwine. Aid Wm. Wiswell, jr. Men in Millcreek, Green, Storrs, Delhi, Whitewater, Miami, Columbia, Spencer, and An derson Townships, subject to orders of above. COLLECTION OF PROVISIONS. Committee appointed by General Wallace: Wm. Chidsey, T. F. Rogers, T. Horton, T. F. Shaw, and A. D. Rogers. IN COMMAND OF dNCINlfATI. v Military Commander Lieut. Col. S. Burbank, U. S. A. Aid John D. Caldwell. Provost-Marshal A. E.Jones. EMPLOYMENT OF LABORERS FOR FORTIFICATIONS. Hon. A. F. Perry, assisted by Hon. Benjamin Eggleston, Charles Thomas, and Thomas Gilpin. ; About the same time and throughout the autumn, there was much alarm along the West Virginia and the upper part ofthe Kentucky border. Governor Tod was energetic in sending troops to the exposed points, and in enforcing upon all officers the duty of preventing invasion. "Stand firm," he telegraphed to one Captain commanding a post; "if you fall I will escort your remains home." At one time the danger from Guyandotte seemed imminent; but in spite of sad reverses and barbarities in West Virginia it passed away. Arrest and Trial of Vallandigham. 99 CHAPTER IX. THE ARREST AND TRIAL OF VALLANDIGHAM. FROM the outbreak ofthe war, two Representatives in Congress from Ohio were the most conspicuous leaders of the Opposition to Mr. Lin coln's Administration, and to the policy of the party in power. Both were able and outspoken. O ne, a gentleman by birth and by education, maintained a relentless h os- tility to the prosecution of the war ; but, withal, he brought to his discussions of the subject such enlarged views, and so accustomed himsfijf tn thp. mndfira- tion of language habitual with fair-minded men, who, penetrated with strong convictions themselves, respect the strength of opposite convictions in others. that he was generally popular even among his poljy'ffll antap-nniBta To the other life had been, a rougher struggle,, find. tbp-rp- waH, P1flrfi"vftl'j^' HnmAtlnng in tfrp. t.p.Yt.nre nf f.he man's mind that inched him to the rancor and virulence of the most intemperate partisanship. He cherished a, honndlpss am bition, n.nH it, was nr?t, move h;s natural fondness for producing BfdQB&tJjflinS and saying things that should attract attention, than a shrewd calculation of. the value of extravagance in times of high excitement as a means of retaining party favor, that led to the peculiarly aggressive and defiant nature of his 6pposition to the war. We must not fail to add that he was sincere in his position ; that all his past political course, and the prejudices of his whole life, combined with the natural vehemence of his character to piake a zealot of .hjrn, in his advocacy of peace by comxtcflumise. He had been in Congress for six years, but at the election in 1862. in spi te ) of the general triumph of his party, he had been defeated hy p anIHiAT .in t.hp i field. From the last session of the Congress to which he had been elected he returned, therefore, in the spring of 1863. a soured politician out of place, w hom jt betiooved to be all the more vehement lest he should be gradually forgotten. The first ardor with which the people of Ohio had rushed into the war seemed to have passed away. The pressure of its burdens displeased some ; the gloomy prbspects in the field discouraged many more. The armies of the South-west were still foiled before Vicksburg; Eosecrans had lain ih seeming exhaustion ever since his victory at Stone Biver ; the Bebel invasion of Mary land had been followed by the slaughter about Fredericksburg', and new threats 100 Ohio in the War. of an advance into Pennsylvania. Their success at the late election had greatly encouraged those Democrats who opposed the war, and as a now draft began to be talked about, there was much popular ferment, with some hints of resist ance. Mr. Vallandigham naturally became the spokesman for the irritated and disaffected people. He expressed himself with great boldness of utterance, de nounced the war, denounced the draft, stirred up the people with violent talk, and particularly excited them and himself over alleged efforts on the part ofthe military authorities to interfere with freedom of speech and of the press, which he conjured them to defend under any circumstances and at all hazard! Possibly with some reference to Mr. Vallandigham, certainly with direct reference to the state of public feeling whieh he was helping to bring about, and to the acts that were growing out of it, the new Commander of the Department finally felt constrained to issue an order that was to bo a noted one in the his tory of the State. This commander was Major-General Ambrose E. Burnside, an officer of distinguished personal gallantry, of the most loyal devotion to the cause of the country, of great zeal, not always according to knowledge, and of very moderate intellectual capacity. He was fresh from the field of a great disaster incurred under his management; and this fact helped to increase the bitterness with whieh his efforts to subdue the sympathizers with the South were received. His " General Order ]STo. 38," some results of which we are now to trace, was understood at the time to have the approval of the State and Na tional authorities. It was as follows : "Head-Quarters, Department of the Ohio, -i " Cincinnati, April 13, 1863. / " General Orders, No. 38. "The Commanding General publishes, for the information of all concerned, that hereafter all persons found within our lines who commit acts for the benefit of the enemies of our country, will be tried as spies or traitors, and, if convicted, will suffer death. This order includes the following class of persons : "Carriers of secret mails. " Writers of letters sent by secret mails. "Secret recruiting officers within the lines. " Persons who have entered into an agreement to pass our lines for the purpose of joining the enemy. " Persons found concealed within our lines belonging to the service of the enemy, and, in fact, all persons found improperly within our lines, who could give private information to the enemy. " All persons within our lines who harbor, protect, conceal, feed, clothe, or in any way aid the enemies of our country. "The habit of declaring sympathies for the enemy will not be allowed in this Department. Persons committing such offenses will be at once arrested, with a view to being tried as above stated, or sent beyond our lines into the lines of their friends. "It must be distinctly understood that treason, expressed or implied, 'will not be tolerated in this Department. " All officers and soldiers are strictly charged with the execution of this order. " By command of Major-General Burnside. "LEWIS RICHMOND, "Assistant Adjutant-General "Official: D. R. Larned, Captain and Assistant Adjutant-General." The publication of this order was the signal for a stream of invective from Arrest and Trial of Vallandigham., 101 the bolder of the exponents ofthe Peace Democratic'feeling, in the press and on the stump. Mr. Vallandigham was, of course, bitter and outspoken. Some of his more intemperate remarks were reported to General Burnside. Regarding them as a soldier, and with the tendency to magnify his office common to all pro fessions, the General resolved, on the repetition of the offense, to arrest this leader of the discontented party and bring him to triaL Presently Mr. Vallan digham was announced to speak at Mount Vernon, in Knox County, to a Dem ocratic mass meeting. A couple of military officers were at once ordered to re pair thither, and, without attracting attention to their presence, to observe what was said. The meeting was on Friday, the 1st of May. On the ensuing Monday, after hearing the reports of the officers, General Burnside gave orders for Cap tain Hutton, of his staff, with a company of the One Hundred and Fifteenth Ohio, to proceed to Mr. Vallandigham's residence in Dayton, arrest him as qui etly as possible, and to return to Cincinnati by special train before daylight the next morning. Everything had been managed with great caution thus far, but on attempting to make the arrest, Captain Hutton foun'd the popular agitator apparently suspicious of his impending fate. When, approaching Mr. Vallan digham's door after midnight, he aroused the inmates and explained his errand, he was refused admission, while the object of his visit, thrusting his head from the second story bed-chamber window, shouted, " Asa, Asa, Asa." Signals, sup posed to bo in answer to this call, were heard, and presently the fire-bells ofthe city began ringing. Fearing an attempt at rescue, the officer waited no longer to parley, but, battering in the front door, he entered the house with ^his sol diers, forced two other doors which Mr. Vallandigham had fastened in his way, and finally made. the arrest. Then, returning to the railroad depot, he departed with his prisoner in the special train before the crowds gathering in answer to the signals were large enough to make any resistance. The unusual circumstances of the. arrest were of themselves, eno.ugh_.tp pro- duce great excitement in a community so evenly divided in political sentiment. and with such bitterness_of ISglSJain^.nS.M?^. -^e ¦ ais *n ^at of Davton. It was believed by many &t the time that secret societies, formed for purposes hostile to the Government, had also much to do in fomenting the agitation. The streets were crowded all day with the friends and adherents of Mr. Vallandigham; liquor seemed to flow among them freely and without price; and the tone of the crowds was very bitter and vindictive. In the afternoon the journal formerly edited by Mr. Vallandigham, the Dayton Empire, appeared witb the following inflammatory article : "The cowardly, scoundrelly Abolitionists of this town have at last succeeded in having Hon orable C. L. Vallandigham kidnapped. About three o'clock this morning, when the city was quiet in slumber, one hundred and fifty soldiers, acting under orders from General Burnside, ar rived here on a special train from Cincinnati, and, like thieves in the night, surrounded Mr. Val landigham's dwelling, beat down the doors, and dragged him from his family. The frantic cries of a wife, by this dastardly act almost made a maniac; the piteous tears and pleadings of a lit tle child for the safety of its father, were all disregarded, as a savage would disregard the cries of a helpless infant he was about to brain. All forms and manner of civil law were disregarded. 102 Ohio in the War. Overpowered by one hundred and fifty soldiers, and with pickets thrown out, so as to prevent any alarm being giving to his friends, they tore him forcibly from his home and family, and inarched with all possible speed to a special train in waiting, and before it was known to any1 of his friends they were off like cowardly scoundrels, fearing, as they had reason to, the vengeance of an outrafed people. " Mr. Vallandigham, nor his friends, would have offered no resistance to his arrest by due process of law. He had told them, time and again, that if he was guilty of treason under the Constitution, he was at all times ready to be tried by that instrument. But they have disregarded law, and all usage of law, in this arrest. No charges were preferred ; he was not told for what crime he was dragged, in the dead hour of night, from his family and his friends. He was sim ply informed that Burnside had ordered it. Does Burnside, or any other man, hold the life and liberty of this people in his hands ? Are we no longer freemen, but vassals and serfs of a mili tary despotism? These are questions that will now be decided. If the spirit of the men who purchased our freedom through the fiery ordeal of the Revolution still lives in the heart of the people, as we believe it does, then all will yet be well, for it will hurl defiance to military des potism, and rescue through blood and carnage, if it must be, our endangered liberties. Cowards are not deserving of liberty, brave men can not be enslaved. In our opinion the time is near at at hand, much nearer than unthinking men suppose, when it will be decided whether we are to remain free, or bare our necks to the despot's heel. The contest will be a fearful one. It will involve the loss of many lives, and immense destruction of property. Men in affluence to-day will be beggars to-morrow ; there will be more orphans and widows, tears and moans, and suf fering. But the men who love liberty will emulate the spirit and daring of the immortal heroes of the Revolution, and make the willing sacrifice. Let cowards, and all who are willing to be slaves, seek safety in flight. Let them east aside the Constitution, and never again look with pride upon the glorious folds of that starry banner of freedom ; it can awake no glorious feeling of emotion within their craven hearts. The men who feel that ' resistance to tyrants is obedi ence to God,' are men for the times; and, regardless of every consideration, will, in the spirit of the immortal Patrick Henry, exclaim, 'Give me liberty or give me death.' " The kidnapping of Mr. Vallandigham interests every lover of freedom in the land. It was against these illegal and arbitrary arrests that the voice of a mighty people was heard in thunder tones at the fall elections. That voice carried terror and dismay to the hearts of the des pots at Washington. It opened the prison bars of the bastiles, and gave liberty to hundreds of outraged men, who had been imprisoned merely for opinion's sake. Has that warning lesson been so soon forgotten by the despots at Washington, and their satraps and minions throughout the country ? Must they have a more severe and emphatic lesson taught them? It would seem so. They have taken the initiative, and upon them and their tools in this city and elsewhere' must rest the fearful responsibility of what follows. " We know the men who have been mainly instrumental in having this hellish outrage per petrated ; and, by the Eternal, they will yet rue the day they let their party malice lead them as accomplices into the scheme of depriving, by force, as loyal a citizen as they dare be of his lib erty. It has come to a pretty pass, when the liberty of Democrats in this city and county and district is in the hands, and subject to the caprice of such a petty upstart as Provost-Martial Ed. Parrott. Abolition leaders of this town, having some influence with Burnside, have worked out the kidnapping of Mr. Vallandigham. He has not been arrested for any offense against the laws of his country, for he has committed none. Personal and party malice is at the bottom of it. all. It is a direct blow at the Democratic party, and the personal liberty of every member of that organization. Will they quietly submit to it? That'eTthe question to be settled now. Is safety to be coveted more than freedom? Is property, or even life, more to be prized than lib erty? Had the heroes of the Revolution so believed and acted, we, their children, never would have enjoyed the priceless boon of freedom ; and perhaps it would have been called to feel and mourn over its loss. If justice is still abroad in this unhappy country, if truth and right is still powerful to combat error and wrong, there is a terrible retribution in store, not far distant, for the guilty scoundrels who, possessed of 'a little brief authority,' are seeking to crush out the last vestige of American liberty." This, of course, tended to aggravate the mob spirit that had already dis- Arrest and Trial of Vallandigham. 103 played itself in numerous personal assaults. About dark a swivel was fired in front of the Empire office, around which a crowd soon gathered. They pres ently moved across the street to the office of the Eepublican newspaper, the Dayton Journal, and began assailing it with siones and occasional pistol shots. Then a rush was made, the doors were burst open, whatever was easily accessible was destroyed, and finally the building was set on fire in sev eral different places. The flames spread to neighboring houses, and threatened for a time to end in a terrible conflagration. The fire companies found their hose cut in dozens of places, and their engines unmanageable, while others were held back by force by the rioters, so that the Journal office and several adjacent buildings were completely destroyed before anything could be done. The next day General Burnside promptly proclaimed martial law in Mont gomery. County, and sent up Major Keith, ofthe One Hundred and Seventeenth Ohio, to act as Provost-Martial, with an ample military force to back him. No further disturbances were attempted. From his confinement in Cincinnati, Mr. Vallandigham, the next day, issued the following address to the Democracy of Ohio : "I am here in a military bastile,* for no other offense than my political opinions, and the defense of them and of the rights of the people, and of your constitutional liberties. Speeches made in the hearing of thousands of you, in denunciation of the usurpations of power, infrac tions of the Constitution and laws, and of military despotism, were the causes of my arrest and imprisonment. I am a Democrat; for Constitution, for law, for the Union, for liberty; this is my only crime. For no disobedience to the Constitution, for no violation of law, for no word, sign, or gesture of sympathy with the men ofthe South, who are for disunion and Southern independence, but in obedience to their demand, as well as the demand of Northern abolition disunionists and traitors, I am here in bonds to-day ; but "'Time, at last, sets all things even.' " Meanwhile, Democrats of Ohio,. of the North-west, of the United States, be firm, be true to your principles, to the Constitution, to the Union, and all will vet be well. As for myself, I adhere to every principle, and will make good, through imprisonment and life itself, every pledge and declaration which I have ever made, uttered, or maintained from the beginning. To you, to the whole people, to time, I again appeal. Stand firm. Falter not an instant ! "C. L. VALLANDIGHAM." A Military Commission, of which General E. B. Potter was President, was then in session in Cincinnati, under General Burnside's orders. Before this Mr. Vallandigham was brought to trial on the day after the arrest, on the following charge and specifications : " Charge. — Publicly expressing, in violation of General Orders No. 38, from Head-quarters Department of the Ohio, sympathy for those in arms against the Government of the United States, and declaring disloyal sentiments and opinions, with the object and purpose of weakening the power of the Government in its efforts to suppress an unlawful rebellion. "Specification. — In this, that the said Clement L. Vallandigham. a citizen of the State of Ohio, on or about the 1st day of May, 1863, at Mount Vernon, Knox County, Ohio, did publicly * At first Mr. Vallandigham was confined in the military prison on Columbia Street, but it was soon seen that there was no danger of attempted rescue, and the military bastile in which he was then immured was the Burnet House. 104 Ohio in the War. address a large meeting of citizens, and did utter sentiments in words, or in effect, as follows, de claring the present war ' a wicked, cruel, and unnecessary war ; ' ' a war not being waged W (he preservation of the Union; ' 'a war for the purpose of crushing out liberty and erecting a despot ism;' 'a war for the freedom of the blacks aud the enslavement of the whites;' stating 'that if the AdminJItration had so wished, the war could have been honorably terminated months ago;' that 'peace might have been honorably obtained by listening to the proposed intermediation of France;' that 'propositions by which the Northern States could be won back and the South guaranteed their- rights under the Constitution, had been rejected the day before the late battle of Fredericksburg, by Lincoln and his minions,' meaning thereby the President of the United States, and those under him in authority ; charging ' that the Government of the United States was about to appoint military marshals in every district, to restrain the people of their liberties, to deprive them of their rights and privileges ; * characterizing General Orders No. 38, from Head-quarters Department of the Ohio, as 'abase usurpation of arbitrary authority,' inviting his hearers to resist the same, by saying, 'the sooner the people inform the minions of usurped power that they will not submit to such restrictions upon their liberties, the better;' declaring 'that he was at all times, and upon all occasions, resolved to do what he could to defeat the at tempts now being made to build up a monarchy upon the ruins of our free government;' as serting 'that he firmly believed, as he said six months ago, that the men in power are attempting to establish » despotism in this country, more cruel and more oppressive than ever existed before.' " All of which opinions and sentiments he well knew did aid, comfort, and encourage those in arms against the Government, and could but induce in his hearers a distrust of their own Government, sympathy for those in artns against it, and a disposition to resist the laws of the land." The prisoner was attended by eminent counsel, Hon. Geo. E. Pugh, Hon. Geo. H. Pendleton, and others, but he preferred to submit no defense to a tri bunal which he declared to have no right to try him, and contented himself with a cross-examination of the few witnesses summoned. The specifications were clearly sustained, save that, in order to avoid the delay involved in sum- , moning Mr. Fernando Wood, of NewYork, by whom Mr. Vallandigham wished to prove the nature of the propositions for peace which he had charged Mr. Lincoln with refusing, this item was abandoned. The testimony of one ofthe witnesses set forth the intemperate language in some detail, as follows : ["The witness stated that, in order to give his remarks in the order in which they were made, he would refresh his memory from manuscript notes made on the occasion. These the witness produced and held in his hands.] "The speaker commenced by referring to the canopy under which he was speaking— the stand being covered by an American flag— 'the flag which,' he said, 'had been rendered sacred by Democratic Presidents — the flag under the Constitution.' " After finishing his exordium, he spoke of the designs of those in power being to erect a despotism; that 'it was not their intention to effect a restoration of the Union ; that previous, to the bloody battle of Fredericksburg an attempt was made to stay this wicked, cruel, and unneces sary war.' That the war could have been ended in February last. That, a day or two before the battle of Fredericksburg, a proposition had been made for the readmission of Southern Sena tors into the United States Congress, and that the refusal was still in existence over the Presi dent's own signature, which would be made public as soon as the ban of secrecy enjoined by the President was removed. That the Union could have been saved, if the plan proposed by the speaker had been adopted; that the Union could have been saved upon the basis of reconstruc tion ; but that it would have ended in the exile or death of those who advocated a continuation of the war; that 'Forney, who was a well-known correspondent of the Philadelphia Press, had said that some of our public men (and he, Forney, had no right to speak for any others than those connected with the Administration), rather than bring hack some of the seceded States, would Arrest and Trial of Vallandigham. 105 submit to a permanent separation of the Union.' He stated that ' France, a nation that had al ways shown herself to be a Mend of our Government, had proposed to act as u, mediator;' but 'that her proposition, which, if accepted, might have brought about an honorable peace, was in solently rejected.' It may have been ' instantly rejected ;' that ' the people had been deceived as to the objects of the war from the beginning;1 that 'it was a war for the liberation of the blacks and the enslavement of the whites.- We had been told that it would be terminated in three months — then in nine months, and again in a year — but that there was still no prospect of its being ended. That Richmond was still in the hands of the enemy ; that Charleston was theirs, and Vicksburg was theirs ; that the Mississippi was not opened, and would not be so long as there was cotton on its banks to be stolen, or so long as there were any contractors or officers to enrich.' I do not remember which word, contractors or officers, he used. He stated tbat a Southern paper had denounced himself and Cox, and the ' Peace Democrats,' as having ' done more to prevent the establishment of a Southern Confederacy than a thousand Sewards.' That 'they proposed to operate through the masses of the people, in both sections, who were in favor of the Union.' He said that 'it was the purpose or desire of the Administration to suppress or prevent such meetings as the one he was addressing.' That ' military marshals were about to be appointed in every district, who would act for the plirpose of restricting the liberties of the peo ple;' but that ' he was a freeman ;' that he ' did not ask David Tod, or Abraham Lincoln, or Am brose E. Burnside for his right to speak as he had done, and was doing. That his authority for so doing was higher than General Orders No. 38 — it was General Orders No. 1 — the Constitution. That General Orders No; 38 was a base usurpation of .arbitrary power ; that he had the most supreme contempt for such power. He despised it, spit upon it; he trampled it under his feet.' That only a few days before, a man had been dragged down from his home in Butler County, by an outrageous usurpation of power, and tried for an offense not known to our laws, by a self-con stituted court-martial — tried without a jury, which is guaranteed to every one; that, he had been fined and imprisoned. That two men had been brought over from Kentucky, and tried, contrary to express laws for the trial of treason, and were now under the sentence of death. That an order had just been issued in Indiana, denying to persons the right to canvass or discuss military pol icy, and that, if it was submitted to, would be followed up by a similar order in Ohio. That he was resolved never to submit to an order of a military dictator, prohibiting the free discussion of either civil or military authority. 'The sooner that the people inform the minions of this usurped power that they would not submit to such restrictions upon their liberties, the better.' ' Should we cringe and power before such, authority?' Th,at 'we claimed the right to criticise the acts of our military servants in power ' That there never was a tyrant in any age who op pressed the people further than he thought they would submit to or endure. That in days of Democratic authority, Tom Corwin had, in face of Congress, hoped that our brave volunteers in Mexico ' might be welcomed with bloody hands to hospitable graves,' but that he had not been interfered with. It was never before thought necessary to appoint a captain of cavalry as pro vost-marshal, as was now the case in Indianapolis, or military dictators, as were now exercising authority ih Cincinnati and Columbus. He closed by warning the people not to be deceived. That 'an attempt would shortly be made to enforce the conscription act;' that 'they should reinember that this was not a war for the preservation of the Union;' that 'it was a wicked Abolition war, and that if those in authority were allowed to accomplish their purposes, the peo ple would be deprived of their liberties, and a monarchy established ; but that, as for him, he was resolved that he would never be a priest to minister upon the altar upon which his country was being sacrificed.' " The prisoner, in the cross-examination, brought out the facts that, notwith standing his violent language, he had cautiously added that tho remedy for these evils was at the ballot-box and in the courts; that he had denounced the cheers for Jefferson Davis which some of his remarks had evoked; that he had. professed his firm adherence to the Union, his desire to try by compromise to restore it as the, fathers made it, and his determination not to take any part, in agreeing to its dissolution. These extenuating circumstances he proposed to 106 Ohio in the War. prove a so by other witnesses, but the Judge-Advocate admitted them all with- out further testimony. When the trial was begun, Mr. Vallandigham refused to enter any plea, de nying the jurisdiction of the Court. At the close of the evidence he simply read to the Court this protest, with which he submitted the case : "Arrested without due 'process of law,' without warrant from any judicial officer, and no* in a military prison, I have been served with a ' charge and specifications,' as in a court-martial or military commission. " I am not in either 'the land or naval forces of the United States, nor in the militia in the actual service of the United States,' and therefore am not triable for any cause, by any such court, but am subject, by the express terms of the Constitution, to arrest only by due process of law, judicial warrant, regularly issued upon affidavit, and by some officer or court of competent jurisdiction for the trial of citizens, and am now entitled to be tried on an indictment or present ment of a grand jury of such court, to speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the State of Ohio, to be confronted with witnesses against me, to have compulsory process for witnesses in my behalf, the assistance of counsel for my defense, and evidence and argument according to the common laws and the ways of judicial courts. " And all these I here demand as my right as a citizen of the United States, and under the Constitution of the United States. " But the alleged ' ofl'ense' is not known to the Constitution of the United States, nor to any law thereof. It is words spoken to the people of Ohio in an open and public political meeting, lawfully and peaceably assembled, under the Constitution and upon full notice. It is words of criticism of the public policy of the public servants of the people, by which policy it was alleged that the welfare of the country was not promoted. It was an appeal to the people to change that policy, not by force, but by free elections and the ballot-box. It is not pretended that I counseled disobedience to the Constitution, or resistance to laws and lawful authority. I never have. Beyond this protest I have nothing further to submit. "C. L. VALLANDIGHAM." The Judge-Advocate replied that ho had nothing to say as to the jurisdic tion of the Court — that question having been decided by the authority conven ing it ; and that as to counsel and witnesses, the prisoner had been enabled to have any witnesses he wished summoned, and had three counsel of his own choice in an adjacent room, whom he had not chosen, for reasons unknown, to bring into the Court. And so, after a two days' trial, the ease was left to the Court. Eight days later the findings were approved by the General Commanding, and published in general orders. Mr. Vallandigham was found guilty of the charge and specifi cations (with the exception of the words, " That propositions by which the Northern States could be won back, and the South guaranteed their rights under the Constitution, had been rejected the day before the late battle of Fredericks burg, by Lincoln and his minions," meaning thereby the President ofthe United States, and those under him in authorit}', and the words, "asserting that he firmly believed, as he asserted six months ago, that the men in power are at tempting to establish a despotism in this country, more cruel and more oppres sive than ever existed before"), and was sentenced to close confinement in some United States fort during the continuance ofthe war. General Burnside named Fort Warren in Boston harbor, as the place of confinement; and forwarded the proceedings in the case to the President. Arrest and Trial of Vallandigham. 107 There was a general fear that the result of the trial would be to exalt Mr. Vallandigham in public estimation as a martyr to the cause of free speech. On this account the entire proceedings had been generally disapproved at the East- and even among the supporters of the Government within the State were very many who regretted that any notice whatever had been taken of the Mount Vernon speech. Now that the thing was done, it was held that the least objec tionable course out of the difficulty would be to send Mr. Vallandigham through the lines to the South, there to remain "among his friends," as the newspapers phrased it, till the end of the war. To this view the President acceded. He accordingly ordered General Burnside to send Mr. Vallandigham under secure guard to the head-quarters of General Eosecrans, to be put by him beyond the military lines. Ih case of his return he was to be arrested and punished in accordance with the original sentence. This order was promptly obeyed ; and under a flag of truce, Mr. Vallandigham was sent over into the Eebel lines in Tennessee. We shall have occasion in reciting the events speedily following in the State's history to see what course he took, and what was the final result of all these proceedings upon the popular action in favor of the prosecution of the war. Two days after the close of Mr. Vallandigham's trial before the Military Commission, Hon. George E. Pugh, of his counsel, applied to Judge Leavitt of the United States Circuit Court for a writ of habeas corpus. The application was ably argued — by Mr. Pugh for the prisoner, and bAjMr. Aaron F^Perry, . and the United States District-Attorney. {Mr. Flamen BalLJn behalf of General Burnside. The Clerk had been directed to notify General Burnside of the application and ofthe day on which it would be heard. He appeared, not only by counsel, but in the following personal statement, which was presented for him by the District- Attorney : "If I were to indulge in wholesale criticisms of the policy of the Government, it would de moralize the army under my command, and every friend of his country would call me a traitor. If the officers or soldiers were to indulge in such criticism, it would weaken the army to the ex tent of their influence ; and if this criticism were universal in the army, it would cause it to be broken to pieces, the Government to be divided, our homes to be invaded, and anarchy to reign. My duty to my Government forbids me to indulge in such criticisms; officers and soldiers are not allowed so to indulge, and this course will be sustained by all honest men. " Now, I will go further. We are in a state of civil war. One of the States of this depart ment is at this moment invaded, and three others have been threatened I command the depart ment, and it is my duty to my country, and to this army, to keep it in the best possible condition; to see that it is fed, clad, armed, and, as far as possible, to see that it is encouraged. If it is my duty and the duty of the troops to avoid saying any thing that would weaken the army, by pre venting a sipgle recruit from joining the ranks, by bringing the laws of Congress into disrepute, or by causing dissatisfaction in the ranks, it is equally the duty of every citizen in the depart ment to avoid the same evil. If it is my duty to prevent the propagation of this evil in the army, or in a portion of my department, it is equally my duty in all portions of it ; and it is my duty to use all the force in my power to stop it. " If I were to find a, man from the enemy's country distributing in my camps speeches of 108 Ohio in the War. their public men that tended to demoralize the troops or to destroy their confidence in the consti tuted authorities of the Government, I would have him tried, and hung if found guilty, and all the rules of modern warfare would sustain me. Why should such speeches from our own public men be allowed? '' The press and public men, in a great emergency like the present, should avoid the use of party epithets and bitter invectives, and discourage the organization of secret political societies, which are always undignified and disgraceful to a free people, but now they are absolutely wrong and injurious ; they create dissensions and discord, which just now amount to treason. The simple names ' Patriot' and 'Traitor' are comprehensive enough. "As I before said, we are in a state of civil war, and an emergency is upon us which re quires the operations of some power that moves more quickly than the civil. "There never was a war carried on successfully without the exercise of that power. "It is said that the speeches which are condemned have been made in the presence of large bodies of citizens, who, if they thought them wrong, would have then and there condemned them. That is no argument. These citizens do not realize the effect upon the army of our coun try, who are its defenders. They have never been in the field ; never faced the enemies of their country ; never undergone the privations of our soldiers in the field ; and, besides, they have been in the habit of hearing their public men speak, and, as a general thing, approving of what thev say ; therefore, the greater responsibility rests upon the public men and upon the public press, and it behooves them to be careful as to what they say. They must not use license and plead that they are exercising liberty. In this department it can not be done. I shall use all the power I have to break down such license, ana I am sure I will be sustained in this course by all honest men. At all events, I will have the consciousness, before God, of having done my duty to my country, and when I am swerved from the performance of that duty by any pressure, public or private, or by any prejudice, I will no longer be a man or a patriot. " I again assert, that every power I possess on earth, or that is given me from above, will be used in defense of my Government, on all occasions, at all times, and in all places within this department. There is no party — no community — no State Government — no State Legislative body — no corporation or body of men that have the power to inaugurate a war policy that has the validity of law and power, but the constituted authorities of the Government of the United States; and I am determined to support their policy. If the people do not approve that policy, they can change the constitutional authorities of that Government, at the proper time and by the proper method. Let them freely discuss the policy in a proper tone ; but my duty requires me to stop license and intemperate discussion, which tends to weaken the authority of the Govern ment and army : whilst the latter is in the presence of the enemy, it is cowardly to so weaken it. This license could not be used in our camps — the man would be torn in pieces who would attempt it. There is no fear of the people losing their liberties ; we all know that to be the cry of dema gogues, and none but the ignorant will listen to it : all intelligent men know that our people are too far advanced in the scale of religion, civilization, education, and freedom, to allow any power on earth to interfere with their liberties ; but this same advancement in these great characteris tics of our people teaches them to make all necessary sacrifices for their country when an emer gency requires. They will support the constituted authorities of the Government, whether they agree with them or not. Indeed, the army itself is a part of the people, and is so thoroughly educated in the love of civil liberty, which is the best guarantee for the permanence of our republican institutions, that it would itself be the first to oppose any attempt to continue the exercise of military authority after the establishment of peace by the overthrow of the rebeU ion. No man on earth can lead our citizen -soldiery to the establishment of a military despot ism, and no man living would have the folly to attempt it. To do so would be to seal bis own doom. On this point there can be no ground for apprehension on the part of the people. "It is said that we can have peace if we lay down our arms. All sensible men know this to be untrue. Were it so, ought we to be so cowardly as to lay them down until the authority of the Government is acknowledged? " I beg to call upon the fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, sons, daughters, relatives, friends, and neighbors of the soldiers in the field to aid me in stopping this license and intemperate dis cussion, which is discouraging our armies, weakening the hands of the Government, and thereby strengthening the enemy. If we use our honest efforts, God will bless us with a glorious peal* Arrrest and Trial of Vallandigham. 109 and a united country. Men of every shade of opinion have the same vital interests in the sup pression of this rebellion; for, should we fail in the task, the dread horrors of a ruined, and dis tracted nation will fall alike on all, whether patriots or traitors. "These are substantially my reasons for issuing 'General Order No. 38;' my reasons for the determination to enforce it, and also my reasons for the arrest of Hon. C. L. Vallandigham for a supposed violation of that order, for which he has been tried. The result of that trial is now in my hands. " In enforcing this order I can be unanimously sustained by the people, or I can be opposed by factious,bad men. In the former event, quietness will prevail ; in the latter event, the re sponsibility and retribution will attach to the men who resist the authority, and the neighbor hoods that allow it. "All of which is respectfully submitted. "A. E. BURNSIDE, Major-General, "Commanding Department of the Ohio." Mr. Pugh complained that this was in effect a return to the writ, avowing the facts detailed in the petition therefor; and that yet, without having the body of the petitioner in court, or without any order compelling General Burn side to stay the execution of sentence, he was required to proceed with his duties as an advocate. The habeas corpus, he maintained, was a writ of right, under which, whenever it ajtpeared on affidavit, that the prisoner was unlaw fully imprisoned the Court had.no choice, no latitude, no right even of post ponement. After fortifying this position, asserting that the only question was whether upon the allegations of the petition, Mr. Vallandigham was lawfully or unlawfully imprisoned, and, quoting the preamble and enacting clause of the Constitution, he continued : " There can be no Union except as intended by that compact. The people have not agreed to any other; and without their consent, it is impossible that any other should be legitimately established. The justice to be administered in this court, and in all other tribunals, military and civil, must be such as the Constitution requires. Domestic tranquillity is a condition greatly to be envied ; but it must be secured by observing the Constitution in letter and in spirit. Gen eral Burnside admonishes us of a certain ' quietness' which might prevail as the consequence of enforcing his military order : I answer him that quietness attained by fhe sacrifice of our ances tral rights, by the destruction of our constitutional privileges, is worse than the worst degree of confusion and violence. Touch not the liberty of the citizen ; and we. in Ohio, at least, will be unanimous. We may not concur as to the causes which induced so mighty a rebellion; we may ) differ as to the best methods of subduing or of mitigating it: we may quarrel as partisans, or even as factioiiiats ; but we will, nevertheless, with one accord, sustain the General in the dark- ) est hour of his despondency,^ W^l?-? jl\j,V,jfliB;,p£ trinmph— Mljfrin him hv nnr mnnol. by ' all our means. an^,,.^, necessary a tjthe expense of qur.li^es. But we can not give him our lib- ,. erties. Tbat sacrifice would be of no advantage to him : and it would render us and our pos terity forever miserable. It is not necessary to the common defense ; it would not — it can not— promote the common welfare." He quoted the clause of the Constitution prohibiting Congress from passing any law abridging freedom of speech, or the right of peaceable assembly, to protest against grievances, and continued : "General Burnside holds an office created by act of Congress alone — an office which Congress may, at any time, abolish. His title, his rank, his emoluments, his distinction above his fellow-citizens, are all derived from that source. I take it to be absolutely certain, therefore, that he can make ho 'law' which Congress could not make. He can not abridge the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people to assemble and to consider of their grievances. 110 Ohio in the War. And yet, sir, of what does he accuse Mr. Vallandigham? Let the specification of Captain Cutts answer: Of having addressed a public assembly of the electors of Ohio, at Mount Vernon, in Knox County, on the first day of this month. Nothing more ; nothing whatsoever. It was nn assembly of the people to deliberate upon their grievances, and to advise with each other in what way those grievances could be redressed. Into that forum — the holiest of holies in our political system— has General Burnside intruded his military dictation. Need I say more? What avails a right of the people to assemble, or to consult of their public affairs, if, when assembled, and that peaceably, they have no freedom of speech ? " He pointed out the difference between General Burnside's relation to the President as his military Commander-in-Chief, bringing him under the Articles of War, which forbid disrespectful language of his superior officers, and that of Mr. Vallandigham, as simply a citizen. He answered the complaint as to the effect of Mr. Vallandigham's language on the people, by saying in effect that the people must do their own thinking after their own fashion, and with such aid in the way of speeches as they should choose for themselves ; and the complaint as to the effect upon the soldiers, thus: "O! — but the effect on the soldiers. Well, sir, let us inquire into that. The soldiers have been citizens ; they have been in the habit of attending public meetings, and of listen- in" to public speakers. They are not children, but grown men — stalwart, sensible, and gallant men — with their hearts in the right place, and with arms ready to strike whenever and wherever the cause of their country demands. The General assures us of more, even than this: 'No man on earth,' 'he says, 'can lead our citizen-soldiery to the establishment of a military despotism.' And are these the men to be discouraged, and, especially, to feel weary in heart or limb —unable to cope with an enemy in the field because Mr. Vallandig ham or any other public speaker, may have said something, at Mount Vernon or elsewhere, with which they do not agree? The soldiers have not chosen me for their eulogist; but I will say, of my own accord, that they are no such tender plants as General Burnside imagines. They know exactly, for what they went into the field ; they are not alarmed, nor dissatisfied, nor dis couraged, because their fellow-citizens, at home, attend public meetings, and listen to public speeches, as heretofore; they have no serious misgivings as to the estimation in which they are holden by the people of the Northern and North-western States, without any distinction of sects, parties, or factions. ^ "Let the officers, and especially those of highest degree, observe their military duties; let them see to it, as General Burnside has well said, and as, I doubt not, he has well done, so far a-i his authority extends, that tbe soldiers are ' fed, clad, and armed,' and ' kept in the best possible condition' for service. Allow them to vote as they please ; allow them to read whatever news papers they like; cease any attempt to use them for a partisan advantage: I do not accuse Gen eral Burnside of this — but others, and too many, have been guilty of the grossest tyranny in regard to it. Protect the soldier against the greed of jobbers and knavish contractors — against dealer) in shoddy, in rotten leather, in Belgian muskets, in filthy bread and meat — against all the hide ous cormorants which darken the sky and overshadow the land in times of military prepara tion. Let the party in administration discharge these duties; and my word for it, sir, that the volunteers from Ohio, from Indiana, from Illinois, from every other State, will do and dare »s much, at least, as the best and bravest soldiers in the world can accomplish." Eeviewing the several specifications in the arraignment of Mr. Vallandig ham before the Military Commission, he sought to show how none of the words quoted, even in the disjointed, unconnected shape in which thej' were given, passed the lawful latitude of free discussion ; asked how mere words could, in General Burnside's language, "amount to" treason ; and discussed at considera- Arrest and Trial of Vallandigham. Ill ble length the question of constructive treason, and arrayed a formidable pre sentment of authorities on the subject, concluding: "But, sir, what become of our safeguards — what avails the experience of seven hundred years — where is that Constitution which declares itself to be the supreme law of the land — if a Major-General commanding the Department of the Ohio, or any other officer, civil or military, can create and multiply definitions of treason at his pleasure? The ancient Ruminalis put forth new leaves when all men supposed it to be dying ; whether the tree of American liberty will be able to supply the place of that splendid foliage which has been stripped from its branches, and scattered beneath our feet, by this rude blast of arbitrary and unlimited authority, is a question hereafter to be determined. That question does not concern my distinguished client any more than it concerns every other citizen. The partisans in power to-day will be the partisans in op position to-morrow ; then military command will be shifted from those who oppress to those who have been oppressed ; and so, with the mutations of political fortune, must the personal rights and rights of property, and even the lives, of all be in constant hazard. I pray that my learned friends upon the other side will consider this in time ; that they will use their influence not only with the defendant, but with those to whom at present he is amenable, to revoke — ere it be too late — the dreadful fiat of tyranny, of hopeless confusion, of ultimate anarchy, which has been sounded in our midst." Then, saying that the argument for the prisoner might well be here con cluded, he nevertheless, under his instruction, must proceed to present the head ings of another article of the Constitution ; that guaranteeing the right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures, and forbidding the issue of warrants but upon probable cause, supported bj' oath or affirmation. Arraying the authorities on this subject, and enumerating the requisites for arrest and trial, he then concluded : " And yet, sir, to that we have come — in the first century of our Republic, with a written Constitution less than eighty years old, in a country professing to be civilized, intelligent, refined, and (strangest of all) to be free 1 It is our case— if your Honor please — your own case and mine ; and not merely the case of Clement L. Vallandigham. He is the victim to-day ; but there will be, and must be, other victims to-morrow. What rights have we, or what security for any right, under such a system as this ? • "'Every minist'ring spy That will accuse and swear, is lord of you, Of me, of all our fortunes and our lives. Our looks are call'd to question, and our words, How innocent soever, are made crimes ; We shall not shortly dare to tell our dreams, Or think, but 't will be treason.' " And the excuse for it, as given by General Burnside, is that a rebellion exists in Tennessee, in Arkansas, in Louisiana, in Mississippi, in Alabama, in other States a thou.sand miles distant from us, Does any rebellion exist here? President Lincoln, by his proclamation of January 1, 1863, has undertaken to ' designate ' the States, and even 'parts ' of States, at present in rebell ion ; but I do not find the State of Ohio, nor the county of Montgomery, nor the city of Dayton so designated. How can the Rebels, in addition to disclaiming their own rights under the Con stitution of tbe United States, also forfeit the rights of my client? I ask General Burnside, or his counsel, to answer me that question ;, because, until it has been answered, and answered sat isfactorily, there can be no excuse, no apology, hot the least degree of palliation,, for such extra ordinary proceedings as have been avowed here, and vainly attempted to be justified. " You have presided in this court almost thirty years ; and, during that time, have heard and determined a vast number and variety of important controversies. But never, as I venture to affirm, have you been called to the discharge of a greater duty than upon this occasion. I had supposed, in the simplicity of my heart and understanding, that all the propositions for which I 112 Ohio in the War. have contended were too firmly established in America, as well as in England, to be disturbed or even doubted. It seems otherwise; and, therefore, at unusual length, and without as lucid an order and as close an argument as I could wish, have I descanted upon the mighty themes of contest, in all past ages, between the supporters of arbitrary power and the defenders of popular rights. I pray that you will command the body of my client to be brought before you, in this court of civil judicature, and in the open light of day ; to the end that he may be informed here of what he is accused, and may be tried on that accusation, whatever it be, in due form of law. Let us know the worst any man has to allege against him ; and then let him stand before a jury of his countrymen, in the face of all accusers, for deliverance, or, if guilty, for condemnation. , " I ask this, sir, in the interest of that Constitution which has been violated by his arrest and imprisonment — in the interest of that Union, the fortunes of which now depend on the arbitrament of the sword — in the interest of that army which we have sent into the field to maintain our cause — in the interest of peace at home, and of unanimity in waging a battle so bloody and so hazardous — in the interest of liberty, of justice, of ordinary fairness between man and man. " I have tried to say what ought to be said, and no more, in vindication of the rights of the petitioner. God help me if I have said anything which ought to have been omitted, or omitted anything which ought to have been said ! " Mr. Peny began his reply as follows : "May it please the Court: When General Burnside requested me to assist the District Attorney on this occasion, he forebore to give me any instructions, except to present such consid erations to the judgment of the court as should seem to me right and proper. I have a distinct impression that he has no preference that the questions here presented should be heard before any other jurisdiction or tribunal rather than this ; and tbat he wishes his proceedings to be here discussed by his counsel, chiefly on the broad basis of their merits; that they should be made to rest on the solid ground of the performance of a high and urgent public duty. The main argu ment which I shall present to the court will, therefore, be founded on the obligations, duties, and responsibilities of General Burnside as a Major-General in command of an army of the United States, in the field of military operations, for the purposes of war, and in the presence of the enemy. I shall not place it on any ground of apology, excuse, or palliation, but strictly and confidently on the ground of doing what he had a lawful, constitutional right to do ; and on the ground of performing a duty imposed upon him as one of the necessities of his official position. I shall make no plea of an exigency in which laws are suspended, and the Constitution forgot ten, but shall claim that the Constitution is equal to the emergency, and has adequately provided for it ; that the act complained of here is an act fully warranted by law, and authorized by the Constitution. I shall support this claim by references to more than one opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, and to other authorities.1' After dwelling upon some defects in the application for the writ, and ridi culing its rhetorical features, he laid down the principle that the habeas corpus could not meddle with arrests legally made, and that arrests under the laws of war were legal as well as those" under the ordinary forms. Without relying upon the President's Proclamation -of 24th September, 1862, suspending the writ and delaririg martial law, he proceeded to maintain that, with the privilege of the writ admitted to be still in full force, the application should not be granted: " I claim, then, that the facts before this court show that the arrest of Clement L. Vallan digham, by Ambrose E. Burnside, a Major-General in the United States service, commanding a the Department of the Ohio, was a legal and justifiable arrest. For the facts showing its legality I rely — 1 . On the petition and affidavit of the prisoner ; 2. On facts of current public history of which the Court is bound to take judicial cognizance. Among the facts of public history I need . recall but few. Unfortunately, the country is involved in dangers so many and so critical, tbat its people neither do nor can divert their thoughts to other topics." Arrest and Trial of Vallandigham. 113 "The power and wants of the insurrection are not all nor chiefly military. It needs not only food, clothing, arms, medicine, but it needs hope and sympathy. It needs moral aid to sus tain it against reactionary tendencies. It needs argument to represent its origin and claims to respect favorably before the world. It needs information concerning the strength, disposition, and movements of government force. It needs help to paralyze and divide opinions among those who sustain the government, and needs help to hinder and embarrass its councils. It needs that troops should be withheld from government, and its financial credit shaken. It needs that gov ernment should lack confidence in itself, and become discouraged. It needs that an opinion should prevail in the world that the government is incapable of success, and .unworthy of sym pathy. Who can help it in either particular I have named, can help it as effectually as by bear ing arms for it. Wherever in the United States a wish is entertained to give such help, and such wish is carried to its appropriate act, there is the place of the insurrection. Since all these helps combine to make up the strength of the insurrection, war is necessarily made upon them all, when made upon the insurrection. Since each one of the insurrectionary forces holds in check or neutralizes a corresponding government force, and since government is in such extremity as not 6afely to allow any part of its forces to withdraw from the struggle, it has no recourse but to strike at whatever part of the insurrection it shall find exposed. All this is implied in war, and in this war with especial cogency. 'If war be actually levied — that is, if a body of men be actu ally assembled for the purpose of effecting by force a treasonable purpose — all those who per form any part, however minute, or however remote from the scene of action, and who are actu ally leagued in the general conspiracy, are to be considered as traitors.' 4 Cranch, 126." Eulogizing the Generals in command (Burnside and Cox), he then'asked: "Why are these men here? Have they, at any time since the war begun, sought any other but the place of danger ? They are here ; they are sent here for war : to lay the same military hand upon this insurrection, wherever they can find it, in small force or large force, before them or behind them, which they have laid upon it elsewhere. They are not here to cry peace, when there is no peace ; not here to trifle with danger, or be trifled with by it. They are patriot Gen erals, commanding forces in the field in the presence of the enemy, constrained by their love of country, and in the fear of God only, to strike. Are they to fold their arms and sleep while the incitements to insurrection multiply around them, and until words shall find their way to appro priate acts ? Are they to wait until the wires shall be cut, railroad tracks torn up, and this great base of supplies, this great thoroughfare for the transit of troops, this great center and focus of conflicting elements, is in a blaze, before they can act ? Must they wait until apprehended mis chief shall become irremediable before they can attempt a remedy ? Jefferson Davis would •nswer, 'Yes!' Traitors and abettors of treason would everywhere answer, 'Yes!' I seem to hear a solemn accord of voices rising from the graves of the founders of the Constitution saying, 'No ! ' And I seem to hear the response of loyal and true friends of liberty everywhere swelling to a multitudinous and imperative ' Amen 1' " " I understood the learned counsel to intimate that Government would receive the unani mous support of the people of Ohio, if it would do nothing which displeased any of them. ' Touch not the liberty of the citizen, and we, in Ohio, at least, will be unanimous.' May it please your Honor, the liberty of the citizen is touched when he is compelled, either by a sense of duty or by conscription, to enter the army. The liberty of the citizen is touched when he is forbidden to pass the lines' of any encampment. The'liberty of the citizen is touched when he is forbidden to sell arms and munitions of war, or to carry information to the enemy. Learned counsel is under a mistake. We, in Ohio, could not be unanimous in leaving such liberties untouched. The liberty to stay at home from war is at least as sacred as the liberty to make popular ha rangues. But since all these liberties are assailed by war, they must be defended by war. We, in Ohio, never could be unanimous in approving the action of a government which should force one portion of the population to enter the army, and allow another portion of it to discourage, de moralize, and weaken that army. Unanimity, on such conditions, is impossible. But this sug gestion of unanimity is not quite new. The zeal of the advocate, the charming voice, the stir ring elocution with which it is now reproduced, do all that is possible to redeem it from its early associations. But we can not forget that the same thing has played a conspicuous part in the his- V0L. L— 8. 114 Ohio in the War. tory of the last few years. At the last presidential election it happened, as it had on all preceding similar occasions, that a majority of lawful votes, constitutionally cast, elected a President of the United States, and placed the federal administration in the hands of persons agreeing in opinion, or appearing, to agree with that majority. It happened, as it had ordinarily happened before, that the minority did not agree with the majority, either as to principles or as to the men selected. It claimed to believe the majority in the wrong, and no minority could find provocation or excuse for being in the minority, unless it did believe the majority in the wrong. It is not now necessary to inquire which were right in their preferences and opinions. The minority were fatally wrong in this, that they refused the arbitrament provided in the Constitution for the settlement of 8uch controversies. The new Administration must yield, because the minority found itself unwilling to yield. The old Constitution must be changed by new conditions, or run the risk of overthrow. In other words, it must be overthrown in its most vital principles, by compelling a majority to accept terms from a minority, accompanied by threats of war, or it might be nominally kept alive by consenting to abdicate its functions. All that the secession leaders proposed was, that they should be allowed to administer the Government when elected, and, also, when not elected. They were willing to respect the constitutional rights of elections, provided it should be conceded that if they were beaten they should go on with public affairs the same as if they had been elected. They were willing to take the responsibility of judging what they would like to do, and all they asked was the liberty to do it. 'Touch not our liberties, and we can be unanimous! ' The same old fallacy reappears in every phase of the insurrection ; sometimes with and sometimes without disguise. Neither change of wigs, nor change of clothing, nor presence nor absence of burnt cork, can hide its well-known gait and physiognomy. The insurrection will support the Gov ernment, provided the Government will support the insurrection ; but the Government must con sent to abdicate its functions, and permit others to judge what ought to be done, before it can be supported. One of its favorite disguises is to desire to support the Government, provided it were in proper hands ; but to be unable to support it in its present hands. The proper hands, and the only proper hands for Government to be in, are the hands in which the Constitution places it. If the whole country should believe any particular hands to be the most suitable, those hands would be chosen. He who can riot support the Government on the terms pointed out in the Con stitution, by recognizing as the proper hands for its administration the hands in which the law places it, is not a friend, but an enemy of the Constitution. What he means by liberty is not that qualified liberty in which all may share, but a selfish, tyrannical, irresponsible liberty to have his own way, without reference to the wishes or convenience of others. This notion of selfish and irresponsible liberty is an unfailing test and earmark ofthe insurrection.. Whatever other ap pearances it may put on, it can always be known and identified by this. No darknesf can con ceal, no dazzling light transform it. Wherever it may be found, there is insurrection, in spirit at least, and according to different grades of courage, in action also. This kind of liberty can not live at the same time with the liberty which our Constitution was ordained to secure. Gov ernment must lay hands upon it or die. Dangerous as its hostility may be, its embrace would be more fatal. Its hostility may, in time; destroy the Government, but any government" consent ing to make terms with it is already dead." He noticed the claim that Mr. Vallandigham's violent language and ap for resistance pointed only to resistance at the ballot-box and in the courts. Beading the specifications, he continued: " It appears from this that he publicly addressed a large meeting; of citizens. He was not expressing in secresy and seclusion his private feelings or misgivings, but seeking publicity and influence. The occasion and circumstances show the purpose to have been to produce an effect on the public mind, to mold public feeling, to shape public action. In what direction ? The charfp says, by expressing his sympathies for those in arms against the Government of the United States, by declaring disloyal sentiments and opinions. He declared the war to be wicked and cruel, and unnecessary, and a war not waged for the preservation of the Union : a war for crushing out lib erty and erecting a despotism. What is this but saying that.those who fight against the United States are in the right, and that it would be cowardly and dishonorable not to fight against the United States ? In what more plain or cogent language could he urge his audience themselva Arrest and Trial of Vallandigham. 116 to take up arms against their Government ? If those who heard him could not be incited to fight against a Government by persuading them it was making an unjust and cruel war to crush out liberty, how else could he expect to incite them ? If he did not hope to persuade them to join their sympathies and efforts with the enemies of the United States, by convincing them that these enemies are in the right, fighting and suffering to prevent the overthrow of liberty, Btanding up against wickedness and cruelty, what must he have thought of his au'dience ? What else but the legitimate result of his ai-gument can we impute fairly as the object of his hopes ? To whatever extent they belieVe him, they must be poor, dumb dogs not to rally, and rally at once, for: the overthrow of their own Government, and for the support of those who make war upon it. But he did not leave it to be inferred. He declared it to be a war for the enslavement of the whites and the freedom of the blades. Which of the two was, in his opinion, the greater outrage, he does not appear to have stated. It is one of the Unmistakable marks' of insurrection, by which it can always be identified, that its declarations for' liberty are for a selfish and brutal liberty, which in cludes the liberty of injuring or disregarding others. If his white audience were not willing to be enslaved, that is to say, not willing to endure the last and most degrading outrage possible to be inflicted on human nature, they must, so far as they believed him, resist their own Govern ment. If he himself believed what be said, he must take up arms to resist the Government, pr stahd a confessed poltroon. A public man, who believes that his Government is guilty of the crimes he imputed, and will not take up arms against it, is guilty of unspeakable baseness. If his audience believed what he told them, they must have looked upon advice not to take up arms as insincere qr contemptible. No public, man, no private man, can make such charges and de cently claim not to mean war. All insurrections have their pretexts. The man who furnishes these is more guilty than the man who believes them and acts on them. If the statements of Vallandigham were true, the pretexts were ample, not merely as pretexts, but as justification of insurrection. They were more : they were incitements which it would be disgraceful to resist, and which human nature generally has no power to resist. Tbe place where such things are done is the place of insurrection, or there is not and can not be a place of insurrection anywhere. If these laboratories of treason are to be kept in full blast, they will manufacture traitors faster than our armies can kill them. This cruel process finds no. shelter under the plea of political discussion. Whatever might be said about ballots and elections, the legal inference is that it is intended to produce the results which would naturally flow from it. If the President, with all the army and navy, and his 'minions./ is at work' to overthrow liberty and enslave the whites, every good man must fear to see that army victorious, and ' hail its disasters with joy. Every good man must strike to save himself from slavery now while he can. The 'elections are far off, and may be too late. It can not be claimed that the motive was to influence elections, because the argument does not fit that motive. It fits to insurrection, and that only. He pronounced General Orders No. 38 to be a base usurpation, and invited his hearers to resist it. How resist it? How could they resist it, unless by doing what the order forbade to be done? " What was there to be complained of except by persons wishing to do, or to haye done by others, the acts by that order prohibited? He invited tp resist the order. The order thus to be resisted prohibited the following acts, viz.: Acts for the benefit of the enemies of our country, such as carrying of secret mails ; writing letters sent by secret mails ; secret recruiting of sol diers for the enemy inside our lines ; entering into agreements to pass our ' lines for the purpose . of joining the enemy ; the being concealed within our lines while in the service of the enemy ; being improperly within our lines by persons who could give private information to the enemy ; the harboring, protecting, concealing, feeding, clothing, or in any way aiding the enemies of our country; the habit of declaring. sympathies for the enemy ; treason. These are the things pro hibited in Order No. 38, which Mr,, Vallandigham invited Iiis au'dience to resist. ' 'The sooner,' he told them, ' the people inform the .minions of usurped power that they will not submit to such restrictions on their liberties, the better.' The 'minions' here referred to were the commanding General of the Department and others'charged with official duties under their own Government. The 'liberties ' not allowed to be restricted were liberties to aid the enemies' of the United States. He declared his own purpose to do what he could to, defeat the attempt now being made f o build up a monarchy upon the ruins' of our free Government. The resistance could mean nothing but re sistance to his own Government, which he had before declared to be making attempts to enslave the whites. These appeals to that large public meeting are charged to have been made 'for the 116 Ohio in the War. purpose qf weakening the power of his own Government in its efforts to suppress an unlawful rebeUion,' all of which opinions and sentiments 'he well knew did aid, comfort, and encourage those in omij against the Government, and could but induce in his hearers a distrust of their own Government, and symp^hy for those in arms against it, and a disposition to resist the laws of the land.' Not one syllable of all this is denied, and yet the arrest is complained of as unconstitutional." He denied the claim that the laws of war could only apply to military men, and that, under them, only those in the military service could be arrestod ; showed how fatal to all war-making power would be such an admission, and that even Eebels in arms, not being in the military service of the Government could not be arrested; drew the distinction between military and martial law, and arrayed the authorities thereon ; dwelt particularly on the opinion of tho Supreme Court in cases growing out of the Dorr rebellion, concluding this branch of his argument as follows : "May it please your Honor ! I have pursued this branch of the argument at some length. If the view of the Constitution here presented be, as it appears to me, well grounded. in reason, and sustained by authority, the main proposition on which the petitioner rests his application ia overthrown, and, with it, the claim to a writ of habeas corpus. "I did not understand counsel to argue that, in the case of Vallandigham, there were cir cumstances to render this arrest illegal or unnecessary, provided such arrests can in any case be justified. I did distinctly understand him to disclaim the idea that the Constitution permits a military arrest to be made, under any circumstances, of a person not engaged in the military or naval service of .the United States, nor in the militia of any State called into actual service ; and to rest his case on that broad denial. The whole petition is framed on this idea, for none of the charges are denied. "Upon first impression, your Honor may have inclined to the belief that petitioner had as sumed an unnecessary burden, and might have more easily made a case by putting General Burnside to show the propriety of this arrest ; admitting the general right to make such arrest as were indicated by the necessities of the service, but denying any ground for this arrest. But yonr Honor will find that no mistake has been made by learned counsel on the other side, in this particular. The circumstances shown justify the arrest, if any arrest of the kind can be justi fied. If General Burnside might have arrested him for making the speech face to face with his soldiers, the distance from them at which it was uttered can make little difference. He might make it in camp ; and unless he could be arrested, there would be no way to prevent it. The right of publication, of sending by mail and telegraph, are of the same grade with freedom of speech. If utterance of the speech could not be checked, its transmission by mail and telegraph could not be. And I so understand the argument of the counsel of Vallandigham. It appears to claim, and go the whole length of claiming that it can do the army no harm to read such ad dresses ; nor, of course, to hear them. It is necessary the argument should not stop short of that in order to meet the question, and it does not. Yet this is not the whole extent to which it must go to avail the petitioner. It must go to the extent of showing that this Court is authorized to determine that such addresses may be heard by the army, the opinion of the commanding Gen eral to the contrary notwithstanding. It goes and must go the extent of transferring all responsi bility for what is called the -morale and discipline of the army from its commanding General to this Court. It is not certain that if these addresses shall persuade nobody, their authors will be disap pointed? It is not certain that any soldier persuaded to believe that his Government is striving to overthrow liberty, and for that purpose is waging a wicked and cruel war, can no longer, in good conscience, remain in the service? The argument leads to one of two conclusions. We are to be persuaded by the men who make the speeches, that the speeches will not produce the effect they intend — a persuasion in which their acts contradict their words — or we are to consent to the demoralization of the army. The Constitution authorizes and even requires the army to be formed, but at that stage of the transaction interposes an imperative prohibition against the usosl means of making it effective. " It is said, however, that the charges against Vallandigham are triable in the civil tribe- Arrest and Trial of Vallandigham. 117 nals. So are a large proportion of all the charges which can be brought against any one engaged in an insurrection. No Rebel soldier has been captured in this war, no guerrilla, who was not triable in the civil tribunals. The argument in this, as in other particulars, necessarily denies the applicability of the laws of war to a state of war." Then, after maintaining the irrelevancy of much of Mr. Pugh's argument to the case in hand, he concluded : " May it please your Honor I I must bring this argument to a close. Are we in a state of war or not? Did the Constitution, when it authorized war to be made, without limitations, mean war, or something else ? The judicial tribunals provided for in the Constitution, throughout twelve States of the Union, have been utterly overthrown. In several other States they are maintaining a feeble and uncertain hold of their jurisdiction. None of them can now secure to parties on trial the testimony from large portions of the country, to which they are entitled by the Constitution and laws. The records of none of them can be used in the districts dominated by the insurrection. They are all struck at by this insurrection. Counsel tells us that, except the Union provided for in the Constitution, there is no legal Union. Yet that Union is, tempo rarily I hope, but for the present, suspended and annulled. This Court can have no existence except under that Union, and that Union now, in the judgment of those who have been intrusted by the Constitution with the duty of preserving it, depends upon the success of its armies. The civil administration can no longer preserve it. "The courts which yet hold their places, with or without military support, may perform most useful functions. Their jurisdiction and labors were never more wanted than now. But they were not intended to command armies. When Generals and armies were sent here, they were sent to make war according to the laws of war. I have no authority from General Burnside to inquire, and I have hesitated to inquire, but, after all, will venture to inquire, whether an in terference by this Court with the duties of military command must not tend to disturb that harr- mony between different branches of government, which, at this time, is most especially to be desired? " Counsel expresses much fear of the loss of liberty, through the influence of military as cendency. Are we, on that account, to so tie the hands of our Generals, as to assure the over throw of the Constitution by its enemies ? I do not share that fear. It has been the fashion of society in many countries to be divided into grades, and topped out with a single ruling family. In such societies the laws and habits of the people correspond with its social organization. The two elements of power — intelligence and wealth — are carefully secured in the same hands with politi cal power. It has happened in a number of instances, that a successful General gained power enough to push the monarch from his throne and seat himself there. In such instances the change was chiefly personal. Little change was necessary in the social organization, laws, or habits. It has also happened that democracies or republics, which have, by a long course of corruption, lost the love and practice of virtue, have been held in order by a strong military hand. But in this country no man can gain by military success a dangerous ascendency, because the change would require to be preceded by a change in the whole body of laws, in the habits, opinions, and social organization. History furnishes no example of a successful usurpation under similar circumstances, and reason assures me it would prove impossible. Our society has no ele ment on which usurpation could be founded. My sleep is undisturbed, and my heart quite fear less in that direction. I do not fear that we shall lose our respect for the laws of peace by respecting the laws of war ; nor our love for the Constitution by the sacrifices we make to uphold it. I do not fear any loss of democratic sympathies by the brotherhood of camps. I do not fear any loss of the love of peace by the snfferin3gs of war. I am not zealous to preserve, to the ut most punctilio, any civil right at the risk of losing all, when all civil rights are in danger of overthrow. The question of civil liberty is no longer within the arbitrament of our civil tri bunals. It has been taken up to a higher court, and is now pending before the God of Battles. May he not turn away from the sons whose fathers he favored! As he filled and strengthened the hearts of the founders of our liberty, so may he fill and strengthen ours with great con stancy ! Now, while awaiting the call of the terrible docket, while drum-beats roll from the At lantic Ocean to the Rocky Mountains, while the clear sound of bugles reaches far over our once 118' Ohio in the War. peaceful hills and valleys; now, when the hour of doom is about to strike, let us lose all sense of individual danger; let us lay upon a common altar all private griefs, all personal ambitions; let us unite in upholding the army, that it may have strength to rescue from unlawful violence, and restore to^us the body of the American Union — E Plu-ribus Union! Above all, O Almighty God! if it shall please thee to subject us to still more and harder trials ; if it be thy will that we pass further down into the darkness of disorder, yet may some little memory of our fathers move thee to a touch of pity! Spare us from that last human degradation! Save! O save us from the lit tleness to be jealous of our defenders !" A briefer argument was made by District-Attorney Ball, and Mr. Pugh rejoined. The decision of Judge Leavitt was awaited with much interest hy all classes. He took the case briefly under advisement, and finally denied the writ — giving an opinion, which we quote in full : "This case is before the Court on the petition of Clement L. Vallandigham, a citizen of Ohio, alleging that he was unlawfully arrested, at his home in Dayton, in this State, on the night of the 5th of May, instant, by a detachment of soldiers of the army of the United States, acting under the orders of Ambrose E. Burnside, a Major-General in the army of the United States, and brought against his will, to the city of Cincinnati, where he has been subject to a trial before a military commission, and is still detained in custody, and restrained of his liberty. The petitioner also avers that he is not in the land or naval service of the United States, and has not been called into active service in the militia of any State ; and that his arrest, detention and trial, as set forth in his petition, are illegal, and in violation of the Constitution of the United States. The prayer is that a writ of habeas corpus may issue, requiring General Burnside to produce the body of the petitioner before this Court, with the cause of his caption and detention. . Accompanying the pe tition is a statement of the charges and specifications on which he alleges he was tried before the Military Commission. For the purposes of this decision it is not necessary to notice these charges specially, but it may be stated in brief that they impute to the prisoner the utterance of sundry disloyal opinions and statements in a public speech, at the town of Mt. Vernon, in the State of Ohio, on the 1st of May, instant, with the knowledge 'that they did aid and jcomfort and encour age those in arms against the Government, and could but induce, in his hearers, a distrust in their own Government, and sympathy for those in arms against it, and a disposition lo resist the laws of the land.' The petitioner does not state what the judgment of the Military Commission is, nor is the Court informed whether he. has been condemned or acquitted on the charges exhib ited against him. " It is proper to remark here, that, on the presentation of the petition, the Court stated, to the counsel of Mr. Vallandigham, that, according to the usage of the Court, as well as of other courts of high authority, the writ was not grantable of course, and would only be allowed on a sufficient showing that it ought to issue. The Court is entirely satisfied of the correctness of the course thus indicated. The subject was fully examined by the learned Justice Swayne, when present, the presiding Judge of this Court, on a petition for habeas corpus, presented at the last October term ; a case to which further reference will be made. I shall now only note the au thorities on this point, which seem to be entirely conclusive. " In case Ex parte Watkins (3 Peters, 193), which was an application to the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus, Chief-Jnstice Marshall entertained no doubt as to the power of the court to issue the writ, and stated that the only question was whether it was a case in wbich the power ought to be exercised. He says, in reference to that case, 'the cause of imprisonment is shown as fully by the petitioner as could appear on the return of the writ ; consequently, the writ ought not to be awarded, if the court is satisfied the prisoner would be remanded to prison.' The same principle is clearly and ably stated by Chief- Justice Shaw, in the case Ex parle Sims, before the Supreme Court of Massachusetts. (7 Cushing's Rep. 285). See, also, Hurd on hd. corpus, 223, et seq. " I have no doubt of the power of this Court to issue the writ applied for. It is clearly con ferred by the fourteenth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789; but the ruling of this Courtin Arrest and Trial of Vallandigham. 119 > the case just referred to, and the authorities just cited, justify the refusal of the writ, if satisfied the petitioner would not be discharged upon a hearing after its return. The Court, therefore, di rected General Burnside to be notified of the pendency of the petition, to the end that he might appear, by counsel, or otherwise, to oppose the granting of the writ. "That distinguished General has accordingly presented a respectful communication to the Court, stating, generally and . argumentatively, the reasons of the arrest of Mr. Vallandigham, and has also authorized able counsel to represent him in resistance of the application for the writ. And the case has been argued at great length, and with great arbility, on the motion for its allowance. " It is proper to remark, further, that when the petition was presented, the Court made a dis tinct reference to the decision of this Court in the case of Bethuel Rupert, at October term, 1862, before noticed, as an authoritative precedent for its action on this application. On full reflection, I do not see how it is possible for me, sitting alone in the Circuit Court, to ignore the decision, made upon full consideration by Justice Swayne, with the concurrence of myself, and whieh, aa referable to all cases involving the same principle, must be regarded as the law of this Court un til reversed by a higher court. The case of Rupert was substantially the same as that of the present petitioner. He set out in his petition, what he alleged to he an unlawful arrest by the order of a military officer, on a charge imputing to him acts of disloyalty to the Government, and sympathy with the rebellion against it, and an unlawful detention and imprisonment as the result of such order. The application, however, in the case of Rupert differed from the one now before the Court, in this, that affidavits were exhibited tending to disprove the charge of disloyal conduct imputed to him; and also in this, that there was no pretense or showing by Rupert that there had been any investigation or trial by any court of the charges against him. " The petition in this case is addressed to the judges of the Circuit Court, and not to a single judge of that Court. It occurs, from the absence of Mr. Justice Swayne, that the District Judge is now holding the Circuit Court, as he is authorized to do by law. But thus sitting, would it not be in violation of all settled rules of judicial practice, as well as of courtesy, for the District Judge to reverse a decision of fhe Circuit Court, made when both judges were on the bench? It is well known tbat the District Judge, though authorized to sit with the Circuit Judge in the Circuit Court, does not occupy the same official position, and that the latter judge, when present, is ex. .officio, the, presiding judge. It. is. obvious that confusion and uncertainty, which would greatly impair the respect due to the adjudications, of the Circuit Courts of the United States, would result from the assumption of such an exercise of power by the District Judge. It would not only be disrespectful to the superior judge, but would evince in the District Judge an utter want of appreciation of his true, offipial connection with the Circuit Court. ."Now, in passing upon the application of Rupert, Mr. Justice Swayne, in an opinion of some length, though not written, distinctly held that this Court would not grant the writ of habeas cor pus, when it appeared that the detention or imprisonment was under military authority. It is true, that Rupert was a man in humble position, unknown beyond the narrow circle in which he moved ; while the present petitioner has a wide-spread fame as a prominent politician arid states man. But no one will insist that there should be any difference in the principles applicable to the two cases. If any distinction were allowable, it would be against him of admitted intelli gence and distinguished talents. "I might, with entire confidence, place .the grounds, of action I propose in the present case upon the decision, Qf the learned judge, in that just .referred , to. Even if I entertained doubts of the soundness of his,, views, I see no principle upon which I could be justified in treating the decision as void .of authority. . But the counsel of Mr. Vallandigham was not restricted in the argument of this motion to this point, but was allowed the widest latitude in the discussion of the principles involved. It seemed due to him that the Court should hear what could be urged. against the legality of the arrest, and in favor of the interposition of the Court in behalf of the petitioner, i And I have been greatly interested in the forcible argument which has, been sub mitted, though unable to concur, with the speaker in all his conclusions. "Ifit were my desire to do so, I ha.yenotnow the physical strength to notice or discuss at length the grounds on which the learned counsel has attempted to prove the illegality of General Burn side's order for the arrest of Mr. Vallandigham, and the duty of the Court to grant the writ ap- plid for. The basis of the whole argument rests on the assumption that Mr. Vallandigham, not 120 Ohio in the War. t being in the military or naval service of the Government, and not, therefore, subject to the Rules and Articles of War, was not liable to arrest under or by military power. And the various pro visions of the Constitution, intended to guard the citizen against unlawful arrests and imprison ments, have been cited and urged upon the attention of the Court as having a direct bearing on the point. It is hardly necessary to quote these excellent guarantees of the rights and liberties of an American citizen, as they are familiar to every reader of the Constitution. And it may be conceded that if, by a just construction of the constitutional powers of the Government, in the solemn emergency now existing, they are applicable to and must control the question of the legality of the arrest of the petitioner, it can not be sustained, for the obvious reason that no warrant was issued ' upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,' as is required in ordinary arrests for alleged crimes. But are there not other considerations of a controlling character applicable to the question? Is not the Court imperatively bound to regard the present state of the country, and, in the light which it throws upon the subject, to decide upon the expe diency of interfering with the exercise of the military power as invoked in the pending applica tion ? The Court can not shut its eyes to the grave fact that war exists, involving the most im minent public danger, and threatening the subversion and destruction of the Constitution itself. In my judgment, when the life of the Republic is imperiled, he mistakes his duty and obligation as a patriot who is not willing to concede to the Constitution such a capacity of adaptation to cir cumstances as may be necessary to meet a great emergency, and save the nation from hopeless ruin. Self-preservation is a paramount law, which a nation, as well as an individual, may find it necessary to invoke. Nothing is hazarded in saying that the great and far-seeing men who framed the Constitution of the United States supposed they were laying the foundation of our National Government on an immovable basis. They did not contemplate the existence of the state of things with which tbe nation is now unhappily confronted, the heavy pressure of which is felt by every true patriot. They did not recognize the right of secession by one State, or any number of States, for the obvious reason that it would have been in direct conflict with the purpose in view in the adoption of the Constitution, and an incorporation of an element in the frame of the Government which would inevitably result in its destruction. In their glowing- visions of futurity there was no foreshadowing of a period when the people of a large geograph ical section would be guilty of the madness and the crime of arraying themselves in rebellion against a Government under whose mild and benignant sway there was so much of hope and promise for the coming ages. We need not be surprised, therefore, that, in the organic law which they gave us, they made.no specific provision for such a lamentable occurrence. They did, how ever, distinctly contemplate the possibility of foreign war, and vested in Congress the power to declare its existence, and 'to raise and support armies,' and 'provide and maintain a navy.' They also made provision for the suppression of insurrection and rebellion. They were aware that the grant, of these powers implied all other powers necessary to give them full effect. They also declared that the President of the United States ' shall be Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy and of the militia of the several States when called into actual service,' and they placed upon him the solemn obligation 'to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.' In refer ence to a local rebellion, in which the laws of the Union were obstructed, the act of the 28th of February, 1795 'was passed, providing, in substance, that whenever, in any State, tbe civil author ities of the Union were unable to enforce the laws, the President shall be empowered to call out such military force as might be necessary for the emergency. Fortunately for the country, this law was in force when several States of the Union repudiated their allegiance to the National Government, and placed themselves in armed rebellion against it. It was sufficiently compre: hensive in its terms to meet such an occurrence, although it was not a case within the contempla tion of Congress when the law was enacted. It was under this statute that the President issued his proclamation of the 15th of April, 1861. From that time the country has been in a state of war, the history and progress of which are familiar to all. More than two years have elapsed, during which- the treasure of the nation has been lavishly contributed, and blood has freely flowed, and this formidable rebellion is not yet subdued. The energies of the loyal people of the Union are to be put to further trials, and, in all probability, the enemy is yet to be en countered on many a bloody field. " It is not to be disguised, then, that our country is in imminent peril, and that the crisis de mands of every American citizen a hearty support of all proper means for the restoration of the Arrest and Trial of Vallandigham. 121 Union and the return of an honorable peace. . Those placed by the people at the head of the Government, it may well be presumed, are earnestly and sincerely devoted to its preservation and perpetuity. The President may hot be the man of our choioe, and the measures of his Ad ministration may not be such as all can fully approve. But these are minor considerations, and can absolve no man from the paramount obligation of lending his aid for the salvation of his country. All should feel that no evil they can be called on to endure, as the result of war, is comparable with the subversion of our chosen Government, and the horrors which must follow from such a catastrophe. " I have referred thus briefly to the present crisis of the country as having a bearing on the question before the Court. It is clearly not a time when any one connected with the judicial de partment of the Government should Sallow himself, except from the most stringent obligations of duty, to embarrass or thwart the Executive in his efforts to deliver the country from the dangers which press so heavily upon it. Now, the question which I am called upon to decide is, whether General Burnside, as an agent of the executive department of the Government, has transgressed his authority in ordering the arrest of Mr. Vallandigham. If the theory'of his counsel is sus tainable, that there can be.no legal arrest except hy warrant, based on an affidavit of probable cause, the conclusion would be clear that the arrest was illegal. But I do not think I am bound to regard the inquiry as occupying this narrow base. General Burnside, by the order of the President, has been designated and appointed to take the military supervision of the Depart ment of the Ohio, composed of the States of Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan. The precise extent of his authority, in this responsible position, is not known to the Court. It may, however, be properly assumed, as a fair presumption, that the President has clothed him with all the powers necessary to the efficient discharge of his duties in the station to which he has been called. He is the representative and agent of the President within the limits of his De partment. In time of war the President is not above the Constitution, but derives his power ex pressly from the provision of that instrument, declaring that he shall be Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy. The Constitution does not specify the powers he may rightfully exercise in this character, nor are they defined by legislation. No one denies, however, that the Presi dent, in this character, is invested with very high powers, which it is well known have been called into exercise on various occasions during the present rebellion. A memorable instance is seen in. the emancipation proclamation, issued by the President as Commander-in-Chief, and which he justifies as a military necessity. It is, perhaps, not easy to define what acts are prop erly within this designation, but they must, undoubtedly, be limited to such as are necessary to the protection and preservation of the Government and' the Constitution, which the President has sworn to support and defend. And in deciding what he may rightfully do under this power, where there is ho express legislative declaration, the President is guided solely by his own judg ment and discretion, and is only amenable for an abuse of his authority by impeachment, prosecuted according to the requirements of the Constitution. The occasion which justifies the exercise of this power exists only from the necessity of the case ; and when the necessity exists there is a clear justification of the act. " If this view of the power of the President is correct, it undoubtedly implies the right to arrest persons who, by their mischievous acts of disloyalty, impede or endanger the military ope rations of the Government. And, if the necessity exists, I see no reason why the power does not attach to the officer or General in command of a military department. The only reason why the appointment is made is, that the President can not discharge the duties in person. He, there<- fore constitutes an agent to represent him, clothed with the necessary power for the efficient su pervision of the military interests of the Government throughout the Department. And it is not necessary that martial law should be proclaimed or exist, to enable the General in command to perform the duties assigned to him. Martial law is well defined by an able jurist to be 'the will of a military commander, operating, without any restraint save his judgment, upon the lives, upon the persons, upon the entire social and individual condition of all over whom this law extends.' It can not be claimed that this law was in operation in General Burnside's Depart ment when Mr. Vallandigham was arrested. Nor is it necessary that it should have been in force to justify the arrest ; the power is vested by virtue of the authority conferred by the appoint ment of the President. Under that appointment General Burnside assumed command of this Department. That he was a man eminently fitted for the position there is no room for a doubt. 122 Ohio in the War. He had achieved, during his brief military career, a national reputation as a wise, discreet, pat riotic, and brave General. He not only enjoyed the confidence and respect of the President and Secretary of War, but of the whole country. He has nobly laid his party preferences and pre dilections upon the altar of his country, and consecrated Iiis life to her service. It was known that the widely-extended Department, with the military supervision of which he was charged, was one of great importance, and demanded great vigilance and ability in the administration of its military concerns. Kentucky was a border State, in wbich there was a large element of disaf fection toward the National Government, and sympathy with those in rebellion against it. For midable invasions have been attempted, and are now threatened. Four of the States have a river border, and are in perpetual danger of invasion. The enforcement of the late conscription law- was foreseen as a positive necessity. In Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois a class of mischievous poli ticians had succeeded in poisoning the minds of a portion of the community witb the rankest feelings of disloyalty. Artful men, disguising their latent treason under hollow pretensions of devotion to the Union, were striving to disseminate their pestilent heresies among the masses of the people. The evil was one of alarming magnitude, and threatened seriously to impede the military operations of the Government, and greatly to protract the suppression of the rebellion. General Burnside was not slow to perceive the dangerous consequences of these disloyal efforts, and resolved, if possible, to suppress them. In the exercise of his discretion be issned the order — No. 38 — which has been brought to the notice of the Court. I shall not comment on that order, or say anything more in vindication of its expediency. I refer to it only because General Burnside, in his manly and patriotic communication to the Court, has stated fully his motives and reasons for issuing it ; and also that it was for its supposed violation that he ordered the ar rest of Mr. Vallandigham. He has done this under his responsibility as the commanding Gen eral of this Department, and in accordance with what he supposed to be the power vested in him by the appointment of the President. It was virtually the act of the Executive Department un der the power vested in the President by the Constitution ; and I am unable to perceive on what principle a judicial tribunal can be invoked to annul or reverse it. In the judgment of the com manding General, the emergency required it, and whether he acted wisely or discreetly is not properly a subject for judicial review. "It is worthy of remark here that this arrest was not made by General Burnside under any claim or pretension that he had authority to dispose of or punish tbe party arrested, according to his own will, without trial and proof of the facts alleged as the ground for the arrest, but with a view to an investigation by a Military Court or Commission. Such an investigation has taken place, the result of which has not been made known to this Court. Whether the Military Com mission for the trial of the charges against Mr. Vallandigham was legally constituted and had jurisdiction of the case, is not a question before this Court. There is clearly no authority in this Court on the pending motion, to revise or reverse the proceedings of the Military Commission, if they were before the Court. The sole question is, whether the arrest was legal ; and, as before remarked, its legality depends on the necessity which existed for making it ; and of that neces sity, for the reason stated, this Court can not judicially determine. General Burnside is unques tionably amenable to the executive department for his conduct. If he has acted arbitrarily and upon insufficient reasons, it is within the power, and would be the duty of the President, not only to annul his acts, but to visit bim with decisive marks of disapprobation. To the President, as commander-in-chief of the army, he must answer for his official conduct. But, under our Con stitution, which studiously seeks to keep the executive, legislative, and judicial departments of the Government from all interference and conflict with each other, it wOuld be an unwarrantable exercise of the judicial power to decide that a co-ordinate branch of the Government, acting under its high responsibilities, had violated the Constitution, in its letter or its spirit, by author izing the arrest in question. Especially in these troublous times, when the national life is in peril, and when union and harmony among the different branches of the Government are so impera tively demanded, such interference would find no excuse or vindication. Each department of the Government must, to some extent, act on a presumption that a co-ordinate branch knows its powers and duties, and will not transcend them. If the .doctrine is to obtain, that every one charged with, and guilty of, acte of mischievous disloyalty, not within the scope of criminal laws of the land, in custody under the military authority, is to be set free by courts or judges on habeascor- pus, and that there is no power by which he may be temporarily placed where he can not perpetrate Arrest and Trial of Vallandigham. 123 mischief, it requires no argument to prove that the most alarming conflicts must follow, and the action of the Government be most seriously impaired. I dare not, in my judicial position, as sume the fearful responsibility implied in the sanction of such a doctrine. "And here, without subjecting myself to the charge of trenching upon the domain of polit ical discussion, I may be indulged in the remark, that there is too much of the pestilential leaven of disloyalty in the community. There is a class of men in the loyal States who seem to have no jnst appreciation of the deep criminality of those who are in arms, avowedly for the overthrow of the Government, and the establishment of a Southern Confederacy. They have not, I fear, risen to any right estimate of their duties and obligations, as American citizens, to a Government which has strewn its blessings with a profuse hand, and is felt only in the benefits it bestows. I may venture the assertion that the page of history will be searched in vain for an example of a rebellion so wholly destitute of excuse or vindication, and so dark with crime, as that which our bleeding country is now called upon to confront, and for the suppression of which all her ener gies are demanded. Ita cause is to be found in the unhallowed ambition of political aspirants and agitators, who boldly avow as their aim, not the, establishment of a government for the better security of human rights, but one in which all political power is to be concentrated in an odious and despotic oligarchy. It is, indeed, consolatory to know that in most sections of the North those who sympathize with the rebellion are not so numerous or formidable as the apprehensions of some would seem to indicate. It may be assumed, I trust, that in most of the Northern States reliable and unswerving patriotism is the rule, and disloyalty and treason the exception. But there should he no division of sentiment upon this momentous question. Men should know, and lay the truth to heart, that there is a course of conduct not involving overt treason, or any offense technically defined by statute, and not, therefore, subject to punishment as such, which, never theless, implies moral guilt and gross offense against their country. Those who live under the protection and enjoy the blessings of our benignant. Government, must learn that they, can not stab its vitals with impunity. If they cherish hatred and hostility to it, and desire its subver sion, let them withdraw from its jurisdiction, and -seek the fellowship and protection of those with whom they are in sympathy. If they remain mith us, while they are not of us, they must be subject to such a, course of dealing as the great law of self-preservation prescribes and will enforce. And let them not complain, if the stringent doctrine of military necessity should find them to be the legitimate subjects of its action. I have no fears that the recognition of this doc trine will lead to an arbitrary invasion of the personal security or personal liberty of the citizen. It is rare, indeed, that a charge of disloyalty will be made upon insufficient grounds. But if there should be an occasional mistake, such an occurrence is Jiot to be put in competition with the preservation of the life of the nation. And I confess I am but little moved by the eloquent appeals of those who, while they indignantly denounce violations of personal liberty, look with no horror upon a despotism as unmitigated as the world has ever witnessed. " But I can not pursue this subject further. I have been compelled by circumstances to pre sent my views in the briefest way. I am aware there are points made by the learned counsel representing Mr. Vallandigham, to which I have not adverted. I have had neither time nor strength for a more elaborate consideration ofthe questions involved in this application. For the reasons which I have attempted to set forth, I am led clearly to the conclusion that I can not ju- dically pronounce the order of General Burnside for the arrest of Mr. Vallandigham as a nul lity, and must, therefore, hold that no sufficient ground has been exhibited for granting the writ applied for. In reaching this result, I have not found it necessary to refer to the authorities which have been cited, and which are not controverted, for the obvious reason that they do not apply to the theory of this case, as understood and affirmed by the Court. And I may properly add here, that I am fortified in my conclusion by the fact, just brought to my notice, that the Legislature of Ohio, at its last session, has passed two statutes, in which the validity and legality of arrests in tins State under military authority are distinctly sanctioned. This is a clear indi cation of the opinion of that body, that the rights and liberties of the people are not put in jeopardy by the exercise of the power in question, and is, moreover, a concession that the pres ent state of the country requires and justifies is exercise. It is an intimation that the people of our patriotic State will sanction such a construction of the Constitution as, without a clear viola tion of its letter, will adapt it to the existing emergency. "There is one other consideration to which I may, perhaps, properly refer, not as a, reason t 124 Ohio in the War. for refusing the writ applied for, but for the purpose of saying that, if granted, there is no prob ability that it would be available in relieving Mr. Vallandingham from his present position. It is, at least, morally certain, it would not be obeyed. And I confess I am somewhat reluctant to authorize a process, knowing it would not be respected, and that the Court is powerless to enforce obedience. Yet, if satisfied there were sufficient grounds for the allowance of the writ, the con sideration to which I have adverted would not be conclusive against it. " For these reasons I am constrained to refuse the writ." * The Democratic party assailed this judicial decision with unwonted bitter ness; and the correctness of parts of the opinion was doubted by many earnest supporters of the Government. It stood however as the law of the land ; and under its influence the utterance of the sentiments to which Mr. Vallandigham had given so free expression, became much more guarded. A strong popular reaction set in in favor of the Government, and the soldiers had thenceforward less reason to complain of the "fire in the rear." Since the war a subject similar in some of its features has been brought before the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of the Indiana Con spirators. The decision was adverse to some of the positions assumed by Judge Leavitt; and, freed from technical terms, was substantially that, in States not in rebellion, where the civil courts were in session and the territory was not the actual theater of war, such cases should be tried, not before military commis sions, but in the ordinary tribunals, and with the accustomed forms of law. * The above opinion, and the extracts from the speeches and other documents, have all been carefully revised by their respective authors. We are indebted to the courtesy of Mr. R. W. Car roll, whose publishing house brought them out in book form, for permission to use them here. Armed Resistance to the Authorities. 125 CHAPTER X. ARMED RESISTANCES THE AUTHORITIES. THE excited feeling among the Peace Democrats, of which Mr. Vallandig- ham's inflammatory speech at Mount Vernon was an exponent, continued for some months." One outbreak that threatened for a little time to prove serious had occurred in Noble County, before his arrest. Two occurred after ward; one, that in Dayton, growing immediately from it; the other arising in Holmes County out of resistance to the, enrollment for a draft. None of these were so serious or so wide-spread as the similar movements about the same time, in Indiana on the West, or in Pennsylvania and New York on the East; but they nevertheless rose to the importance of organized and armed efforts to resist the authorities; and no regard for the fair'fame of the State should now lead to their concealment. It was near the middle of March, 1863, that what the newspapers of the day called "the speck of war in Noble County "made its appearance. This county, in the south-eastern part of the State near the Virginia line, is rough, hilly, and sparsely peopled — in great part by an uneducated community of Vir ginia and Kentucky origin. Peace Democracy was the general jiolitical faith at that time, and the citizens had, been not a little excited by seditious teach ings, by their hostility to a draft, and by the indications that the fortune of war was going steadily against the Government. Mr. Flamen Ball, then the United States District-Attorney for Southern Ohio, came into possession in February, of a letter written by F. W. Brown, a school-teacher in the village of Hoskinsville, Noble County, to Wesley McFar- ren, a private soldier of company G, Seventy -Eighth Ohio Infantry, denouncing the Administration, expressing opposition to the "war, and urging McFarren to desert. The soldier did desert, and found harbor and concealment near Hos kinsville. A Deputy United States Marshal and a corporal's guard from the One Hundred and Fifteenth Ohio, were thereupon dispatched from Cincinnati to arrest the deserter and the instigator of desertion. This force presently re turned with the report that, at Hoskinsville, they had found the men they sought under the protection of nearly a hundred citizens, armed with shot guns, rifles, and muskets, and regularly organized and officered. The Captain pleasantly 126 Ohio in the War. proposed to the Deputy United States Marshal and squad, that they surrender and be paroled as prisoners of the Southern Confederacy! On the 16th of March an order was thereupon issued by the post command ant at Cincinnati* to Captain L. T. Hake, to report with companies B and H, One Hundred and Fifteenth Ohio, with ten days' rations and fort}' rounds of ammunition, to United States Marshal A. C. Sands, to serve as his posse in making arrests in Noble County. On the evening of the 18th they reached Cambridge, the seat of justice of the adjoining county, where they received all possible aid and information from the inhabitants. Leaving the railroad, they now marched across the country to Hoskinsville. On the way word was re ceived that the people were still in arms, and were determined to continue their resistance to the officers. But, on their arrival on the afternoon of the 20th, they found no force to meet them. The men had secreted thelnselves in tho woods, and only a few frightened women and children were to be found. The business of searching for and arresting the parties concerned in the previous resistance to the Deputy Marshal was then begun, on the strength of an affida vit, before United States Commissioner Halliday, by Moses D. Hardy, giving names of some of them, as follows : "William McCune, James McCune, Joseph McCune, Mahlon Belford, Absalom Willey, Wil liam Willey, Curtis Willey, Wesley Willey, Asher Willey, Milton Willey, Edmund G. Brown, William Campbell, Henry Campbell, William Pitcher, Joshua Pitcher, Joseph Pitcher, Andrew Coyle, John Coyle, Thomas Racey, John Racey, George A. Racey, Peter Racey, William Cain, Samuel Cain, Abel Cain, A. G. Stoneking, Samuel McFarren, Richard McFarren, Joel McFar- ren, David McFarren, Lewis Fisher, Milvin M. Fisher, James McKee, Benton McKee, William Archer, James Harkens, George Ziler, Peter Rodgers, William Lowe, Andrew Lowe, Samuel Marquis, Arthur Marquis, John Marquis, M. Norwood, Robert Bogg6, 'Elisha Fogle, Abner Davis, William Davis, Taylor Burns, John Manifold, George Manifold, Henry Engle, Joshua Hillyer, Benton Thorle, Richard Burlingame, George Willey, H. 'Jones, Joseph Jones, Gordon Westcoll, G. E. Gaddis, William Engle, Jacob Trimble, Charles Brown, Andrew J. Brown, William Barnhouse.'' The expedition remained, making arrests and searching for the guilty par ties through the 20th, 21st, and 22d. It then marched to Sharon, then to Cald well, the county seat, and thence to Point Pleasant — halting for the night and making arrests at each place. After thus marching over nearly the entire dis trict in which the disaffection had been fomented, the command returned with its prisoners to Cambridge, where they were welcomed at a public bangjiet. Messrs. F. Clatworthy and E. Henderson acted as aids to the Marshal throughout. Subsequently the following prisoners, thus arrested, were brought before the United States Court in Cincinnati, Judges Swayne and Leavitt presiding: "Andrew Coyle, George Willey, Henry Engle, Lewis Fisher, Charles Brown, Andrew Brown, William Barnhouse, Gordon Westcoll, William Engle, Jacob Trimble, Samuel Marquis, William McCune, Joseph McCune, James McCune, Joshua Hillyer, Benton Thorle, Richard Burlingaifle, Samuel Cain, John Racey, William Norwood, Robert Boggs, Richard McFarren, Thomas Bacey, George A. Racey, William Campbell, Henry Campbell, Harrison Jones, Joel McFarren, G E. Gaddis, William Lowe, John Willey, James McKee, James Harkens, Mahlon Belford, Samuel McFarren.'' s Then Lieutenant-Colonel Eastman. Armed Resistance to the Authorities. 127 These were arraigned on indictment for obstructing process, and those of them named below plead guilty, and were fined and imprisoned: "Samuel McGennis, Benton Thorle, William McCune, John Willey, James Harkins, William Lowe, Joel McFarren, Lewis Fisher, Mahlon Belford." In the cases of Samuel McFarren, John Wesley McFarren, Curtis Willey, John .Bacey, Alexander McBride, Benton McKee, Tertullus W. Brown, Andrew Coyle, Peter Bacey, and James McKee, indictments for conspiracy were found ; and Samuel McFarren, John Racey, and Andrew Coyle, were convicted, sen tenced, and fined five hundred dollars each. T. W. Brown made his escape, as did many others implicated, a number of them going to the territories. The Noble County Eepublican (newspaper) stated that, at a meeting held by the men engaged in the protection of the deserter, resolutions had been passed, declaring, 1st, that they were in favor of the Union as it was, and the Constitution as it is; 2d, that they would oppose all arbitrary arrests on the part of the Government; 3d, opposition to the enforcement of the conscription act ; 4th, recommending the raising of money, by contribution, for the purchase of arms tb enable them successfully to resist a draft, should another be ordered ; 5th, the assassination of an obnoxious person. How these brave words ended has been told. Quiet was restored in the county, and the healthy influence of the punishments inflicted was soon mani fest in the tone of the community. , In speaking of Mr. Vallandigham's arrest, we have already mentioned the disturbances and incendiarism follQwing i^, which led to the proclamation of martial law in Montfri^iTiRry Pnnnt.y The only remaining; outbreak of importance was one in resistance to the enrollment for a draft in Holmes County, on the south-westerr^yerge.of the Western Reserve, in the following June. On the 5th, while the enrolling officer, Mr. E. W. Robinson of Loudonville, was proceeding with his duty, he was attacked by some of the excited populace. Some stones were thrown, and he was told that if he ever returned on such work his life would be in danger. He reported the facts to Captain J. L. Drake, ProvQst-Marshal of the district, who promptly arrested four of the ringleaders. The alarm however spread quickly, and before he had conveyed them to prison he was encountered near the village of Napoleon, by a force reported at the time to number sixty or seventy men, armed with rifles and revolvers. They demanded the immediate release of the prisoners, and he was forced to comply. Then they proceeded to revile him as a secessionist himself, declared that he should never again visit their township in his officials capacity, and even levelled their guns upon him, ordering him to kn,eel in the road and take the oath of allegiance ! . Finally, however, with renewed warnings never to return, they suffered him to depart. These occurrences were reported to Colonel Parrott, then the Provost-Mar shal General of the State, and to Brigadier-General Mason, in command at Columbus. Colonel Wallace, of the Fifteenth Ohio, was ordered to tho scene 128 Ohio in the War. of disturbance, with a force made up of scraps of commands found at Camp Chase— a part of the Third Ohio, the Governor's Guards, Sharp-Shooters from Camp Dennison, twenty Squirrel Hunters from Wooster, and a section of Cap- tain Neil's Battery — in all about four hundred and twenty men. It was re ported that they would find the malcontents in a regular fortified camp, with pickets, intrenchments, and cannon. Governor Tod, anxious that bloodshed should be avoided if possible, prepared the following judicious proclamation: "Columbus, O., 16th June, 1863. "To the men who are now assembled in Holmes County for the purpose of using armed force in resisting the execution of the laws of the National Government: " I have heard with pain and deep mortification of your unlawful assemblage, and as Gov ernor of the State to which you owe allegiance, and as the friend of law and order, as well as the friend of yourselves and your families, I call upon you at once to disperse and return to your quiet homes. This order must be immediately complied with, or the consequences to yourselves will be destructive in the extreme. The Government, both of the State and Nation, must and shall be maintained. Do not indulge the belief for a moment that there is not a power at hand to compel obedience to what I now require of you. Time can not be given you for schemes or machinations of any kind whatever. I have felt it my duty to give you this timely warning; and having done my duty, I sincerely hope you will do yours. "DAVID TOD, Governor." This, General Mason was requested to have sent forward under a flag of truce, before firing upon any party he might meet. If the party should then offer to disperse he asked that they might be permitted to do so. If they re fused, he continued, with the indiscreet language that sometimes got the better of him, "then show them no quarter whatever."* On the morning of the 17th Colonel Wajlaoe landed with his command at Lake Station, on tho Pittsburg, Fort Wayne, and Chicago Railroad, twelve miles from Napoleon, where the malcontent camp was said to be located. Marching in that direction, he came upon the pickets about three miles south-east of the village, and drove them in. Then, throwing out skirmishers to the front, he advanced. A number of men stationed behind a rude stone breastwork de livered a single volley as the skirmishers approached, and then fled to the woods. The command pursued, taking two or three prisoners, and wounding two.f No organized force, however, was encountered after the first volley from behind the stone breastwork. Squads of men scouted through the hills, under the guidance of Union men of the neighborhood, and brought in six prisoners before evening. Meantime leading Peace Democrats were striving to have all thought of resistance abandoned ; and one of the rescued prisoners, J visiting the neighbor ing village of Williamsburg that night to ask re-enforcements, met with a very cold reception. Finally a committee of both parties was appointed to visit the camp and endeavor to adjust the difficulty. Hon. D. P. Leadbetter, ex-sheriff John French, Llewellyn Allison, and Colonel D. French represented the Demo crats, and Robert Long and Colonel Baker the Unionists. *Ex. Doc. 1863, part I, p. 297. t George Butler and Brown, both shot through the thigh. t Wm. Greiner. Armed Resistance to the Authorities. 129 On the morning of the 18th they waited upon Colonel Wallace, and finally agreed to visit the insurgents and try to secure the surrender of the prisoners. The Democratic members spent the day in visits to different squads of those in arms; and by evening returned with the promise that; the next day, such men as were wanted would be delivered. Next morning Mr. Leadbetter and Colonel French appeared with the four rescued prisoners, William Greiner, Jacob Stuber, Simeon Snow, and Peter Stuber. Tney promised to deliver the ringleaders in the rescue, Lorenzo Blanchard, Peter Kaufman, James Still, William H. Dyal, Emanuel Bach, Godfrey Steiner, and Henderson, and with this under standing Colonel Wallace returned with his command to Columbus. It was reported in the newspapers at the time,, and generally believed, that over a thousand men had been in the insurgent camp the previous Sunday, either as combatants or as auditors to the inflammatory speeches that were then made. A considerable store of cooked provisions was found in houses in tho neighborhood. They had four little howitzers; and, on Colonel French's admis sion, there were nine hundred men fully armed. With the subsidence of this difficulty, the violent passions that had been engendered were turned into a new channel. The great Vallandigham and Brough political campaign absorbed the energies of all: and its result was such as to end all efforts at resistance to the authorities. Vol. L— 9. 130 Ohio in the War. CHAPTER XI. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD. WE have seen that before the outbreak of the war Governor Chase had sought to revive the despised militia system of Ohio; that the few militia companies thus kept up were seized upon, when the guns of Sumter rang across the Land, for organizing the first regiments hurried to the field ; that thenceforward, in the stern presence of a war that called for volunteers by the hundred thousand, militia and musters fell into utter neglect. But the alarm along the border in the fall of 1862, and particularly the siege of Cincinnati, served to illustrate the mistake thus made. The State, while crowd ing brigades of her sons to the front armed and equipped for battle, was bare and defenseless at home. A handful of bold riders could throw a great city into a panic; a regiment or two could convulse the State, ring alarm bells through out her limits, and summon the crude, unorganized swarms of Squirrel Hunters to ready but unsatisfactory service in her defense. The lesson was not lost upon the people; and their representatives in the State Legislature — assembling a few months later in adjourned session — were made to understand that a satisfactory organization of the militia of the State, and the complete arming and^equipment of a sufficient number of them for im mediate service in such sudden emergencies, were popular demands. Governor Tod fully appreciated the general feeling, as well as the palpable necessity which suggested it. In his message to the Legislature, at the opening of the session of 1863, he said : " The necessity of a thorough organization of the militia of the State, must now be apparent to all, and your attention is earnestly invited to the subject. A plan, embracing my views and opinions on this important subject, will be presented for the consideration of the military com mittee of the House in a few days. I have given the matter much consideration, and hope that my labors may prove of service to tbe committee.'' Throughout the session the committees continued to labor upon the subject. At last, after considerable partisan opposition, and only in the last hours of the session, a bill was passed "to organize and discipline the militia of Ohio." It was the basis of the organization that afterward enabled Governor Brough, at scarcely two days' notice, to throw to the front at the critical hour of the East ern campaign, the magnificent re-enforcement of forty thousand Ohio National Guards. National Guard. 13i The bill kept in view throughout two objects : First, it was to secure the enrollment, organization, and, as far as might be, the drill of the entire military strength of the State, including every able-bodied man between the ages of eighteen and forty-five; and, second, it was to provide for a force of volunteers raised from this militia, who should be armed, uniformed, and equipped, and Bhould be instantly available at any sudden call for the defense of the State. These distinct classes were to be designated respectively the Ohio Militia and the Ohio Volunteer Militia. It was accordingly provided that the assessors should make an enrollment, and return the same to the county auditor, and proper penalties were imposed for any efforts to deceive the assessors or defeat the enrollment. The township trustees were to hear applications for exemption, divide their localities into company districts, and order elections for company officers, the returns of which should be made to the county sheriffs. The sheriffs should then organize the companies into regiments and order the election of regimental officers ; and the Governor was empowered to consolidate these regiments, or order the organiza tion of new ones, as the good of the service should seem to require — while regi mental officers could do the same as to companies. Thus the "Ohio Militia" was to be made up. The "Ohio Volunteer Militia" was to be composed of such companies or batteries as the Governor should choose to accept; it was to be fully armed and equipped, and its members were to provide themselves with United States regu lation uniforms; it was to muster on the last Saturday of each September, at the same time with the militia, and was, beside, to have not less than two addi tional musters each year; it was to be subject to the first call in case of invasion or of riot; it was to unite with the officers of the militia in the last two of the eight days' encampment for "officers' muster" for which the act provided. The volunteer companies were to draw two hundred dollars per year from the State military fund (batteries at the rate of one hundred dollars for every two guns), for the care of arms and incidental expenses ; their members were to be held for five years, and at the end of that time they were to be exempt from further military duty of any kind in time of peace. The bill was long and complicated; it was incumbered with much machin ery for Courts of Inquiry, fines, elections of company, regimental, and even bri gade commanders, traAsportation to officers' musters, payment of encampment expenses, and all manner of minutiae; but the above were its essential features. In organizing the militia under this law Governor Tod derived invaluable aid from his Adjutant-General. This officer* had been a devoted militia-man in the old peaceful times. His little field-service had not been brilliant, and, indeed, was then resting under weighty, though unjust, censure. But he was earnest, laborious, possessed of considerable system, familiar with the wants of the mili tia service, and capable of infinite attention to small things — peculiarly quali fied, in fact, for the onerous task to which he was now called. * General Charles W. Hill. 132 Ohio in the War. He at once undertook the enforcement of the new law. At the outset it was found to be so cumbrous that the newspapers would not print it; and so complicated that, even after it was circulated in pamphlet form, those who had most intrest in it could scarcely understand its provisions. At last the Adju tant-General had resort to public meetings. He itinerated in the interest ofthe militia system through the State, held meetings and made speeches at Marietta, Dayton, Cleveland, Wooster, Mansfield, Norwalk, Elyria, Newark, Zanesville, Lebanon,. Cincinnati, Portsmouth, Ironton, Gallipoiis, Pomeroy, London, Dela ware, Urbana, Piqua, and Toledo. The Quartermaster-General assisted him at some of these places, and made speeches alone at some others. Finally addi tional meetings were held on the 6th and 7th of July, 1863, in Cincinnati. There was trouble in procuring arms, and some slowness among the people in aiding to get the system into operation, but by the end of the first week in July tho returns of company elections were beginning to come in. Then came the Morgan raid, suspending all work of this kind, and plung ing the State once more into the spasmodic effort of unorganized masses to op pose on the instant an organized and swiftly-moving foe. The exhaustion which followed, and the necessary attention to ordinary business which had been neglected during the invasion, wrought still further delay. Then scarcely any arms could be secured for cavalry or artillery. Uni forms were, however, obtained at less than Government rates,* and the organ izing companies took prompt advantage of this excellent arrangement. To the encampments and officers' musters the Adjutant-General was par ticularly attentive. He succeeded in getting grounds, fuel, water, and the like necessaries free of expense to the State, by convincing the towns at which en campments were to be held of the business advantages that would thus accrue He had competent and experienced officers assigned to each, and at three he himself assumed personal command. The militia officers and the volunteer companies were kept at drill during the time prescribed by law, and the organ ization was thus given shape and cohesion. As the result of these labors, he was able at the end of the year to report an organized militia of one hundred and sixty-seven thousand five hundred and seventy -two men, and a volunteer militia, equipped and available for duty at any hour's call, forty -three thousand nine hundred and thirty strong.f Governor Tod justly reported in his last message that the services of the Adjutant-General in this work could not be too highly commended. We shall have occasion to see how, within a few months, it was to prove a thing of Na tional significance; and we can not better conclude this too brief account of a great task well accomplished, than in the words of pregnant advice which Gen- * Fatigue suit, cap, lined blouse, and trowsers, at seven dollars and twenty-one cents; and rail-dress suit, with hat trimmed, at twelve dollars and seventy-two cents. t Of these, thirty-one thousand nine hundred and fifty-three were uniformed before the 1st of November, 1863, and thirty-two thousand one hundred and thirty-five had been in attendance at the fall encampments. They had voluntarily expended, for uniforms and other articles of outfit, up to that time, three hundred and thirty-foifr thousand two hundred and four dollars and National Guard 133 eral Hill gave, in turning over the subject to his successor. a wider application than he then imagined : They were to have "Keeping in mind the probabilities, or even possibilities, of having to call the troops for service before midsummer, it is recommended that all of the preparations be made early, and that the encampments commence in time to be completed by the first week in July. Every or ganization will thus be brought into good working order, and ready for efficient service. If the State is menaced, or a raid or invasion comes, its ability to; put any requisite number of effective troops in the right positions at once, will be a mere question of railroad transportation, and' if the year brings no such occasion for service, there will be the satisfaction of knowing that the State is ready.'' eighty-two cents. The, Adjutant-General does not report the distribution of these volunteers among the several counties, but he gives the following enrollment of the militia in each county : COUNTIES. Adams Allen Ashland .... Ashtabula.. Athens Auglaize.... Belmont .... BroWn Butler .-.. Carroll ChampaignClark Clermont ... Clinton ColumbianaCoshocton...Crawford ... Cuyahoga... Darke Defiance Delaware ... Erie Fairfield .... Fayette Franklin ... Fulton....:.. Gallia Geauga Greene : Guernsey.... Hamilton...Hancock Hardin Harrison .... Henry........Highland...Hocking Holmes Huron Jackson Jefferson.....Enox Lake ..... — Lawrence ... Licking Number ¦ , of , . . Enrollment. , 3,336 3,356 3,0494,2312,5742,644 4,0953,861 5,993 2,1263,7694,1024,416 2,991 4,605 3,100 3,122 11,188 4,552 . 1,802 2,929 3,556 4,432 2,426 6,9042,563 . 2,9492,205 : 3,728 2,982 41,960 3,098 2,9743,0921,4723,6872,584 2,549 5,0382,4533,9053,381 2,373 2,965 5,009 COUNTIES. Logan Lorain Lucas Madison Mahoning ... Marion Medina Meigs , Mercer ., Miami Monroe-....,.Montgomery Morgan Morrow MuskingumNoble Ottaway Paulding.....Perry Pickaway .... Pike Portage Preble Putnam Richland Ross Sandusky .... Scioto Seneca Shelby ....... ., Stark.. Summit Trumbull Tuscarawas .. Union .'. - Van Wert.... Vinton Warren WashingtonWayne.. 'Williams Wood Wyandot Total Number of Enrollm't. 3,518 4,015 5,339 1,8943,574 2,8782,9173,9911,730 4,48-5 2,9597,4303,1572,8915,583 2,830 1,1 S3 788 2,289 3,561 1,572 3,7783,573 1,7513,88Q4,620 3,296 3,116 3,808 2,711 6,482 '3,643 4,425 4,042 2,631 1,516 1,7233,872 4,829 '5,140 2,6592,713 2,841 345,593 134 Ohio in the War. CHAPTER XII. THE MORGAN RAID THROUGH OHIO. LITTLE progress had been made in the organization of the State Militia, when, in July, 1863, there came another sudden and pressing demand for it. Eosecrans lay at Stone River menacing Bragg at Tullahoma. Burnside was at Cincinnati organizing a force for the redemption of East Tennessee, which was already moved well down toward the confines of that land of stead fast but sore-tried loyalty. Bragg felt himself unable to confront Eosecrans; Buckner had in East Tennessee an inadequate force to confront Burnside. But the communications of both Eosecrans and Burnside ran through Kentucky, covered mostly by the troops (numbering perhaps ten thousand in all) under General Judah. If these communications could bo threatened, this last force would at least be kept from re-enforcing Eosecrans or Burnside, and the advance of one or both of these officers might be delayed. So reasoned Bragg, as, with anxious forebodings, he looked about the lowering horizon for aid in his ex tremity. He had an officer who carried the reasoning to a bolder conclusion. If, after a raid through Kentucky, which should endanger the communications and fully occupy General Judah, he could cross the Border, and carry terror to the peaceful homes of Indiana and Ohio, he might create such a panic as should delay the new troops about to be sent to Eosecrans, and derange the plans of the campaign. There was no adequate force, he argued, in Indiana or Ohio to oppose him; he could brush aside the local militia like house-flies, and outride any cavalry that should be sent in pursuit; while in his career he would in evitably draw the whole Union force in Kentucky after him, thus diminishing the pressure upon Bragg and delaying the attack upon East Tennessee. This was John Morgan's plan. Bragg did not approve it. He ordered Morgan to make a raid into Ken tucky; gave him carte blanche to go wherever he chose in that State; and par ticularly urged upon him to attempt the capture of Louisville; but forbade the crossing of the Ohio. Then he turned to the perils with which Bosecrana's masterly strategy was environing him. Morgan prepared at once to execute his orders ; but at the same time he Morgan Haid. 135 gave confidential information to Basil W. Duke, his next in command of his intention to disregard Bragg's prohibition. Ho even went further. Weeks before his movement began he sent men to examine the fords of the upper Ohio — that at Buffington Island among them — and expressed an intention to re- cross in that vicinity, unless Lee's movements in Pennsylvania should make it advisable to continue his march on Northern soil, until he thus joined the army of Northern Virginia.* Here then was a man who knew precisely what he wanted to do. He arranged a plan, far-reaching, comprehensive, and perhaps the boldest that the cavalry service of the war disclosed ; and before the immensely superior forces which he evaded could comprehend what he was about, he had half executed it. On the 2d of July he began to cross the Cumberland at Burkesville and Turkey-Neck Bend, almost in the face of Judah's cavalry, which, lying twelve miles away at Marrowbone, trusted to the swollen river as sufficient to render the crossing impracticable. The mistake was fatal. Before Judah moved down to resist, two regiments and portions of others were across. With these Morgan attacked, drove the cavalry into its camp at Marrowbone, and was then checked by the artillery. But his crossing was thus secured, and long before Judah could get his forces gathered together Morgan was half way to Columbia. He had two thousand four hundred and sixty men all' told. Before him lay three States, Kentucky, Indiana, Ohio, which he meant to traverse ; one filled with hostile troops, the Others with a hostile and swarming population. *The above statement differs widely from the common understanding of Morgan's movement into Indiana and Ohio as a last desperate resort, never originally contemplated,, and finally adopted only because the Union cavalry was so close upon him that he could do nothing else. Rut to one who remembers what Morgan had already done in the way of evading pursuers, and " recalls the fact that when he reached the Ohio, the pursuing cavalry was full forty miles behind him, this wfll seem inherently improbable. Partly for this reason, partly because of corrobo rating circumstances, and partly because of the general candor and seeming trustworthiness of his account, I have preferred to follow fhe statements of Basil W. Dnke. In his "History of Morgan's Cavalry" (pp. 409, 410, 411), he gives* substantially the above version of the conference, between Bragg and Morgan, and of the lafttgr's avowed determination to disobey Bragg's order against crossing the Ohio; and (p. 429) thus scouts the theory that the raid north of fhe river was an afterthought, and an expedient to which Morgan's desperate condition drove him: "It has been frequently surmised in the North that Morgan crossed the Ohio River to escape from Hobson. Of all the many wild and utterly absurd ideas which have prevailed regarding the late war, this is perhaps the most preposterous. . , . Hobson was from twenty-four to thirty-six hours behind us-r-he was at any rate a good fifty miles in our rear, and could learn our track only by following it closely. General Morgan, if anxious to escape Hobson, and actuated by no other motive, would have turned at Bardstpwn and gone out of Kentucky through the western part of the State, where he would have encountered no hostile force that he eould not have easily repulsed. It was not too late to pursue the same general route when we were at Garnettsville. . . . Tp rush across the .Ohio River as a means of escape would have been the choice of an idiot. . . . That military men' in the North should have entertained this opinion, proves only that in armies so vast there must necessarily be many men of very small capacity. General Morgan certainly believed that he could, with energy and care, preserve his men from capture after crossing the Ohio, but he no more believed that it would be safer, after having gained the northern side of the river, than he believed it was safer in Kentucky than south of the Cumberland." 136 Ohio in the War. The next day, at the crossing of Green Eiver, he came upon Colonel Moore with a Michigan regiment, whom he vainly summoned to surrender and vainly strove to dislodge. The fight was severe for the little time it lasted; and Mor gan, who had no time to spare, drew off, found another crossing, and pushed on through Campbellsville to Lebanon. Here came the last opportunity to stop him. Three regiments held the position, but two of them were at some little distance from the town. Palling upon the one in the town he overwhelmed it before the others could get up, left them hopelessly ih his rear, and double- quicked his prisoners eight miles northward to Springfield before he could stop long enough to parole them* Then turning north-westward, with his foes far behind him, he marched straight for Brandenburg, on the Ohio Eiver some s'ixty miles below Louisville. A couple of companies were sent forward to cap ture boats for the crossing; others were detached to cross below and effects diversion; and still others were sent toward Crab Orchard to distract the atten tion ofthe Union commanders. He tapped the telegraph wires, thereby finding that he was expected at Louisville and that the force there was too strong for him ; captured a train from Nashville within thirty miles of Louisville; picked up squads of prisoners here and there, and paroled them. By ten o'clock on the morning ofthe 8th his horsemen stood on the banks ofthe Ohio. They had crossed Kentucky in five days. When the advance companies, sent forward to secure boats, entered Bran denburg, they took care to make as little confusion as possible. ¦¦ Presently the Henderson and Louisville packet, the J. J. MeCoombs; came steaming up the river, and landed as usual at the wharfboat. As it made fast its lines, thirty or forty of "Morgan's men" quietly walked on board and took possession. Soon afterward the Alice Dean, a fine boat running in the Memphis and Cincin nati trade, came around the bend. As she gave no sign of landing, they steamed out to meet her, and before captain or crew could comprehend the' matter, the Alice Dean was likewise transferred to the Confederate service. When Morgan rode into town, a few hours later, the boats were ready for his crossing. > Indiana had just driven out a previous invader — Captain Hines, of Mor gan's command, who, with a small force, had crossed over "to stir up the Cop perheads," as the Eebel accounts pleasantly express it. Finding the country too hot for him, he had retired, after doing considerable damage; and in Bran denburg he was now awaiting his chief. Preparations were at once made for crossing over. But the men crowding down incautiously to the river bank, revealed their presence to the militia on the Indiana side, whom Captain Hines's recent performance had made unwont- edly watchful. They at once opened a sharp fusillade across the stream with musketry and with an old cannon, which they had mounted on wagon wheels. Morgan speedily silenced this fire by bringing up;his Parrott rifles; then hastily dismounted two of his regiments and sent them across. The militia retreated.. * Some horrible barbarities to one or two of these prisoners were charged against him in tbe newspapers of the day. WPWtiM fift 1 ¦ . HI 11 Meantime the excitement and apprehension in all the towns and villages within thirty or forty miles of Morgan's line of march was unprecedented in the history of the State. Thrifty farmers drove off their horses and cattle to the woods. Thrifty housewives buried their silver spoons. At least one terri fied matron, in a pleasant inland town forty miles from the Eebel route, in her husband's absence, resolved to protect the family carriage-horse at all hazards, aud knowing no safer plan, led him into the house and stabled him in the par lor, locking and bolting doors and windows, whence the noise of his dismal tramping on the resounding floor sounded, through the live-long night, like dis-. tant peals of artillery, and kept half the citizens awake and watching for Mor gan's entrance. There was, indeed, sufficient cause for considering property insecure any where within reach of the invaders.. Horses and food, of course, they took wherever and whenever they wanted them; our own raiding parties generally ~ Squads of Morgan's men passed from Lockland, through Sharpsburg and Montgomery, and even so close to the city as Duck Creek, two miles from the corporation line, stealing all the fine horses they could lay their hands upon. t Preble County, in the front here, as at the siege of Cincinnati, had sent down a company or two the night before. 144 Ohio in the War. did the same. But the mania for plunder which befel this command and made its lino of march look like a procession of peddlers, was something beyond all ordinary cavalry plundering. We need look for no other or stronger words, in describing it, than the second in command has himself chosen to use. "Tho disposition for wholesale plunder," ho frankly admits, "exceeded anything that any of us had ever seen before. The men seemed actuated by a desire to pay off, in the enemy's country, all scores that the Union army had chalked up iu the South. The great cause for apprehension, which our situation might have inspired, seemed only to make them reckless. Calico was the staple article of appropriation. Each man (who could get one) tied a bolt of it to his saddle, only to throw it away and get a fresh one at the first opportunity. They did not pillage with any sort of method or reason ; it seemed to be a mania, sense less and purposeless, One man carried a bird-cage, with three canaries in it, for two days. Another rode with a chafing-dish, which looked like a small me tallic coffin, on the pommel of his saddle till an officer forced him to throw it away. Although the weather was intensely warm, another slung seven pairs of skates around his neck, and chuckled over the acquisition. I saw very few ar ticles of real value taken ; they pillaged like boys robbing an orchard. I would not have believed that such a passion could have been developed so ludicrously among any body of civilized men. At Piketon, Ohio, some days later, one man broke through the guard posted at a store, rushed in, trembling with excitement and avarice, and filled his pockets with horn buttons. They would, with few ex ceptions, throw away their plunder after a while, like children tired oftheir toys."* Some movements of our own were, after their different fashion, scarcely less ridiculous. Some militia from Camp Dennison, for example, marched after Morgan till near Batavia, when they gravely halted and, began felling- trees across the road to — check him in case he should decide to come back over the route he had just traveled ! A worthy militia officer telegraphed to Governor' Tod Morgan's exact position, and assured him that the Eebel forces numbered precisely four thousand seven hundred and fifty men ! Burnside himself tele graphed that it was now definitely ascertained that Morgan had about four thousand men. At Chillicothe they mistook some oftheir own militia for Eebel scouts and, by way of protection, burned a bridge across a stream always ford- able. Governor Tod felt sure that only the heavy concentration of militia at Camp Chase had kept Morgan from seizing Columbus and plundering the State treasury. Several days after the bulk of the invading force had been captured, the Governor gravely wrote to a militia officer at Cleveland, whom he was ex horting to renewed vigilance, " I announce to you that Morgan may yet reach the lake shore ! " f But if there was an error in the zeal displayed, it was on the safe side. Over fifty thousand Ohio militia actually took the field against the sore-pressed, fleeing band.J Not half of them, however, at any time got within three-score miles of Morgan. * Duke's History of Morgan's Cavalry, pp. 436, 437! t Ex. Doc., 1863, part I, p. 230. X Adjutant-General's Report for 1863, p. 82. Morgan Raid. 145 That officer was meantime intent neither upon the lake shore nor yet upon the treasury vaults at Columbus, but, entirely satisfied with the commotion he had created, was doing his best to get out of tbe State. He came very near doing it. On the morning of the 14th of July ho was stopping to feed his horses in sight of Camp Dennison. That evening he encamped at Williamsburg, twenty- eight miles east of Cincinnati. Then marching through Washington C. H., Piketon (with Colonel Eichard Morgan going through Georgetown), Jackson, Vinton, Berlin, Pomeroy, and Chester, he reached the ford at Buffington Island on the evening of the 18th. But for his luckless delay for a few hours at Ches ter, it would seem that he might have escaped. Until he reached Pomeroy he encountered comparatively little resistance. At Camp Dennison there was a little skirmish, in which a Eebel Lieutenant and several privates were captured ; but Lieutenant-Colonel Neff, the commandant, wisely limited his efforts to the protection of the bridge and camjo. A train of the Little Miami Eoad was thrown off the track. At Berlin there was a skir mish with the militia under Colonel Eunkle. Small militia skirmishes wero constantly occurring, the citizen -soldiery hanging on the flanks ofthe flying in vaders, wounding two or three men every day, and occasionally killing one. At last the daring little column approached its goal. All the troops in Ken tucky had been evaded and left behind. All the militia in Indiana had been dashed aside or outstripped. The fifty thousand militia in Ohio had failed to turn it from its predetermined path. Within precisely fifteen days from the morning it had crossed the Cumberland— nine days from its crossing into Indi ana — it stood once more on the banks of the Ohio. A few hours more of day light and it, would be safely across in the midst again of ,a population to which it might look for sympathy, if not for aid. But the circle of the hunt was narrowing. Judah, with his fresh cavalry, was up, and was marching out from the river against Morgan. Hobson was hard on his rear. Colonel Eunkle, commanding a division of militia, was north of him. And at last the local militia in advance of him were beginning to fell trees and tear up bridges to obstruct his progress. Near Pomeroy they made a stand. For four or five miles his road ran through a ravine, with occasional in tersections from hill roads. At all these cross-roads he found the militia posted; and from the hills above him they made his passage through the ravine a per fect running of the gauntlet. On front, flank, and rear the militia pressed; and, as Morgan's first subordinate ruefully expresses it, "closed eagerly upon our track." In such plight he passed through the ravine, and, shaking clear of his pursuers for a little, pressed on to Chester, where he arrived about one o'clock in the afternoon.* t Here he made the first serious military mistake that had marked his course on Northern soil. He was within a few hours' ride of the ford at which he hoped to cross ; and the skirmishing about Pomeroy should have given him am- * 18th July. Vol. I.— 10. 146 Ohio in the War. pie admonition of the necessity for haste. But he had been advancing through the ravine at a gallop. He halted now to breathe his horses, and to hunt a guide. The hour and a half thus lost went far toward deciding his fate. Whjpn his column was well closed up and his guide was found, he moved forward. It was eight o'clock before he reached Portland, the little village on the bank of the Ohio nearly opposite Buffington Island. Night had fallen— a " ni.n-ht of solid darkness," as the Eebel officers declared. The entrance to tho ford was guarded by a little earthwork, manned by only two or three hundred infantry. This alone stood between him and an easy passage to Virginia. But his evil genius was upon him. He had lost an hour and a half at Chester in the afternoon — the most precious hour and a half since his horse's feet touched Northern soil ; and he now decided to waste the night. In the hurried council with his exhausted officers it was admitted on all hands that Judah had arrived — that some of his troops had probably given force to the skirmishing near Pomeroy — that they would certainly be at Buffington by morning, and that gunboats would accompany them.* But his men \yere in bad condition, and he feared to trust them in a night attack upon a fortified position which he had not reconnoitered. The fear was fatal. Even yet, b}r abandoning his wagon-train and his wounded, he might have reached unguarded fords a little higher up. This, too, was mentioned by his officers. He would save all, he promptly replied, or lose all together. And so he gave mortgages to fate. By morning Judah was up. At daybreak Duke advanced with a couple of Eebel regiments to storm the earthwork, but found it abandoned. He was rap idly proceeding to make the dispositions for crossing when Judah's advance struck him. At first he repulsed it and took a number of prisoners,"!" the Ad jutant-General of Judah's staff among them. Morgan then ordered him to hold the force on his front in check. He was not able to return to his com mand till it had been broken and thrown into full retreat before an impetuous charge of Judah's cavalry, headed by Lieutenant O'Neil, of the Fifth Indiana. He succeeded in rallying them and re-forming his lino. But now, advancing up the Chester and Pomeroy road, came the gallant cavalry that over three States had been galloping on their track — the three thousand of Hobson 's com mand — who for now two weeks had been only a day, a forenoon, an hour be hind them. As Hobson's guidons fluttered out in the little valley by the river bank where they fought, every man of that band that had so long defied a hundred thousand knew that the contest was over. They were almost out of ammuni tion, exhausted, and scarcely two thousand strong; against them were Hob- son's three thousand and Judah's still larger force. To complete the overwhelm ing odds that, in spite oftheir efforts, had at last been concentrated upon thom, the tin-clad gunboats steamed up and opened fire. Morgan comprehended the situation as fast as the hard-riding troopers, * Duke's History Morgan's Cav., p. 4-47. t Forty or fifty, lie claims. Morgan Raid. 147 who, still clinging to their bolts of calico, were already beginning to gallop toward the rear. He at "once essayed to extricate his trains, and then to with draw his regiments by column of fours from right of companies, keeping up, meanwhile, as sturdy resistance as he might. For some distance the with drawal was made in tolerable order ; then, under a charge of a Michigan cav alry regiment, everything was broken, and the retreat became a rout. Morgan, with not quite twelve hundred men, escaped. His brother, with Colonels Duke, Ward, Huffman, and about seven hundred men, were taken prisoners. This was the battle of Buffington Island. It was brief and decisive. But for his two grave mistakes of the night before, Morgan might have avoided it • and escaped. Yet it can not be said that he yielded to the blow that insured his fate without spirited resistance, and a courage and tenacity worthy of a better cause. Our superiority in forces was overwhelming and our loss trifling.* ' The prisoners were at once sent down the river to Cincinnati, on the trans ports whieh had brought up some of their pursuers, in charge of Captain Day, of General Judah's staff, f of whose " manly and soldierly courtesy " they made grateful mention, albeit not much given to praising the treatment they received at the North. The troops, with little rest, pushed on after Morgan and the fugitive twelve hundred. And now began the dreariest experience ofthe Eebel chief. Twenty miles above Buffington'he struck the river again, got three hundred of his command across, and was himself midway in the stream, when the approaching gunboats checked tbe passage. Eeturn'ing to the nine hundred still on the Ohio side, he once more renewed the hurried flight. His men were worn down and exhausted by long-continued and enormous work ; they were demoralized by pillage, dis couraged by the shattering of their command, weakened most of ali by their loss of faith in themselves and their commander, surrounded by a multitude of foes, harassed on every hand, intercepted at every loophole of escape, hunted like game night and day, driven hither and thither in their vain efforts to double on their remorseless pursuers. It was the early type and token of the similar fate, under pursuit of wbich the great army of the Confederacy was to fade out; and no other words are needed to finish the story we have now to tell than those with which the historian of the Army of the Potomac dccribes the tragic flight to Appomattox C. H. : "Dark divisions, sinking in the woods for a few hours' repose, would hear suddenly the boom of hostile guns and the clatter of the troops of the ubiquitous cavalry, and tbey had to be up and hasten off. Thus pressed on all sides, driven like sheep before prowling * Among the few killed, however, was Major Daniel McCook, a patriotic old man, for whose ' fate there was very general regret. He was not in the service, but had accompanied the cavalry as a volunteer. He was accorded a military funeral at Cincinnati, which .was largely attended. He was the father of Robert L., Alexander M., and George W. McCook, besides several other sons, nearly all of whom, with notable unanimity, had been in the service from the outbreak of the war, and most of whom had risen to high rank. t Afterward on the staff of Governor Cox, at Columbus. 148 Ohio in the War. wolves, amid hunger, fatigue, and sleeplessness, continuing day after day, they fared toward the rising sun: " ' Such resting found the soles of unblest feet !»» Yet, to the very last, the energy this daring cavalryman displayed was such as to extort our admiration. From the jaws of disaster he drew out the rem nants of his command at Buffington. When foiled in the attempted crossing above, he headed for the Muskingum. Foiled here by the militia under Eunkle, he doubled on his track and turned again toward Blennerhassett Island. The clouds of dust that marked his track betrayed the movement, and on three sides tho pursuers closed in upon him. While they slept, in peaceful expectation of receiving his surrender in the morning, he stole out along a hillside that had been thought impassable — his men walking in single file and leading their horses ; and by midnight be was out of the toils and once more marching hard to outstrip his pursuers. At last he found an unguarded crossing of the Mus kingum, at Eaglesport, above McConnellsville, and then, with an open country before him, struck out once more for the Ohio. This time Governor Tod's sagacity was vindicated. He urged the shipment of troops by rail to Bcllaire, near Wheeling, and by great good fortune, Major Way, of the Ninth Michigan Cavalry, received the orders. Presently this officer was on the scent. "Morgan is making for Hammondsville," he telegraphed General Burnside on the 25th, "and will attempt to cross the Ohio Eiver at Wellsville. I have my section of battery, and shall follow him closely." He kept his word and gave the finishing stroke. " Morgan was attacked with the remnant of his command, at eight o'clock this morning," announced General Burnside on the next day (26th July) "at Salineville, by Major Way, who, after a severe fight routed the enemy, killed about thirty, wounded some fifty, and took some two hundred prisoners." Six hours later the long race ended: "I captured John Morgan to-day at two o'clock, P. M.," telegraphed Major Eue of the Ninth Kentucky Cavalry on the evening of the 26th, "taking three hun dred and thirty-six prisoners, four hundred horses, and arms." Salineville is in Columbiana County, but a few miles below the most north erly point of the State touched by the Ohio Eiver, and between Steubenville and Wellsville, nearly two-thirds the way up the eastern border of the State. Over such distances had Morgan passed after the disaster at Buffington, which all had supposed certain to end his career; and so near had he still corneto making his escape from the State, with the handful he was still able to keep together. The circumstances of the final surrender were peculiar, and subsequently led to an unpleasant dispute. Morgan was being guided to the Pennsylvania line by a Mr. Burbeck, who had gone out with a small squad of volunteers against him, but with -whom, according to Morgan's statement, an arrangement had been made 'that, on condition that he would disturb no property in the aSwinton's History Army Potomac, p. 614. Morgan Raid. 149 county, he was to be safely conducted out of it. Seeing, by the clouds of dust on a road parallel with the one he was on, that a cavalry force was rapidly gaining his front, and that thus his escape was definitely cut off, he undertook to make a virtue of his necessity, and try to gain terms by volunteering sur render to his guide. Burbeck eagerly swallowed the bait, and accepted the surrender upon condition that officers and men were to be immediately jmroled. In a few minutes Major Eue was upon them. He doubted the propriety of such a surrender, and referred the case to General Shackleford (second in command in Hobson's column) who at once disapproved and refused to recognize it. Morgan thereupon appealed to Governor Tod, as Commander-in-Chief of the Ohio militia, claiming to have surrendered upon terms to one of his sub ordinates, and calling upon him to maintain the honor of his officer thus pledged. Governor Tod took a little time to examine the case, stud on the 1st of August responded: "I find the facts substantially as follows : A private citizen of New Lisbon, by the name of Burbeck, went out with some fifteen or sixteen others to meet your forces, in advance of a volunteer organized military body from the same place under the command of Captain Curry. Said Burbeck is not and never was a militia officer in the service of this State. He was captured by j'ou and traveled with you some considerable distance before your surrender. Upon his discovering the regular military forces of the United States to be in your advance in line of battle, you surrendered to said Burbeck, then your prisoner. Whether you supposed him to be a Captain in the militia service or not is entirely immaterial." The officers of Morgan's command — -not so much perhaps because of the alleged lack of other secure accommodations as through a desire to gratify the popular feeling that they should be treated rather as horse-thieves than as sol diers, and with a wish also to retaliate in kind for the close confinement to whieh the officers of Colonel Straight's raiding party were then subjected in Eebel prisons — were immured in the cells of the Ohio Penitentiary* They have since made bitter complaints of this indignity, as well as of the treatment there received, thereby only illustrating the different feelings with which men guard Andersonvilles and Salisburies, from those with which they themselves regard, from the inside, places much less objectionable. After some months of confinement, Morgan himself and six other prisoners made their escape, on the night of the 27th of November, by cutting through the stone floors of their cells with knives carried off from the prison table, till they reached the air-chamber 'below ; tunneling from that under the walls of the building into the outer yard, and climbing the wall that surrounds the grounds by the aid of ropes made from their bed-clothes. The State authorities were very much mortified at the escape, and ordered an investigation. It was thus disclosed that the neglect which enabled the prisoners to prosecute the * The official dispatches requesting the use of the penitentiary for this purpose indicate that it was to General Halleck that Morgan and his officers were indebted for the*" practice of this method of treating prisoners of war. 150 Ohio in the War. tedious task of cutting through the stone floors undiscovered, had its origin in vthe coarse-minded suggestion of one of the directors of the penitentiary that the daily sweeping ofthe cells might be dispensed with, and " the d d Rebels made* to sweep their own cells." This poor effort to treat the prisoners of war worse than he treated the convicts, enabled them to cover up their work and conceal it from any inspection of cells that was made. It was officially re ported that misunderstandings between the military authorities in Columbus and the civil authorities of the penitentiary led to the escape. Morgan quietly took the Little Miami train for Cincinnati on the night of his escape, leaped off it a little outside the city, made his way across the river, and was straightway concealed and forwarded toward the Confederate lines by his Kentucky friends. He lived to lead one more raid into the heart of his fa vorite " Blue Grass," to witness the decline of his popularity, to be harassed by officers in Eiehmond who did not understand him, and by difficulties in his com mand, and finally to fall, while fleeing through a kitchen garden, in a morning- skirmish in an obscure little village in East Tennessee. He left a name second only to those of Forrest and Stuart among the cavalrymen of the Confederacy, and a character which, amid much to be condemned, was not without traces of a noble nature. The number of Ohio militia called into service during the Morgan raid has already been roughly stated at fifty thousand. The Adjutant-General, in his next annual report, gave the following tabular statement of the number from each count}-, and the amount paid for their services: Athens. ....... Adams Butler Belmont Clarke Clinton Clermont — Champaign. Delaware Franklin — Fayette Fairfield Gallia Greene Guernsey-.-.Hamilton ... Highland .... Hocking — Jackson Montgomery No. of Compa nies. No. of Men on duty. 20 1,967 4 340 14 1,202 6 378 27 2,697 25 7 1,980 507 2 1 49 2025 3,9521,5302,094 27 2,032 16 4 1,135 323 15 1,461 2315 5 1,898 1,307 510 1 60 Amount paid. $11,671 74 1,171 44 3,220 73 816 86 7,947 71 5,282 64 1,328 51 214 41 45 26 10,441 59 7,083 39 5,091 39 17,408 50 3,780 06 1,147 82 8,001 00 6,858 17 4,554 82 2,294 92 102 35 COUNTIES Jefferson Lawrence Licking .^ Madison Monroe Meigs Morgan Muskingum Noble Pickaway Perry Pike Ross Scioto Vinton AVashington Knox Warren Total amounts No. of Compa nies. 58 1 16 28 1728 2 18 25 11 9 48 7 13 32 1 10 587 No. of Men on duty. 511572109 1,4782,4491,661 2,409 150 1,741 1,980 911 782 4,180 639 1,059 2,542 807 49,357 Amount paid. $939 10 2,783 01 482 15 4,643 24 11,256 26 11,108 52 10,834 61 1,161 71 5,620 61 9,627 68 4,665 07 3,254 51 22,816 18 3,537 43 5,298 81 13,092 09 77 60 2,657 58 $212,318 97 To this an explanation was added : " Many companies that responded promptly and performed efficient service for from one to Mohgan Raid. 151 five days, have returned muster-rolls and declined payment for the service rendered in defense of their own homes j still others have never made out rolls for pay, generously donating their services to the State. The entire militia force of Harrison County, through Mr. Shotwell, Secre tary of the Military Committee, unanimously declined payment for the very important service they rendered. There are, however, rolls outstanding that have been returned on account of some defects. I have information of about seventy additional companies that have reported for pay, most of which will be ultimately paid ; tbey will increase the number paid to upward of fifty- five thousand men, and add twenty thousand dollars to the sum total." The Governor stated some of tho expenses of tho raid as follows : Pay proper of militia $250,000 Damage by the ehemy 495,000 Damage by our troops '. 152,000 $897,000 This was exclusive of the heavy expense of subsisting aud transporting the militia. He maintained that there was wisdom in the very heavy concentration of this force at Camp Chase to protect the Capital, but at an early period in the raid, two days after Morgan's entry upon Ohio soil, he announced to the men there assembled that they were not needed, and dismissed one-half of them, chosen by lot, to their homes. Four days later, on receipt of news of the ac tion at Buffington Island^ he discharged all the rest from the camp. Nearly all in South-western Ohio were also discharged early in the progress of the raid. Two days before the battle at Buffington Island he issued a circular to tho Military Committees of the several counties through which Morgan passed, asking full reports of the losses, public and private, from the i*aid, and the names • of the individual sufferers. These amounts were afterward made the subject of a claim on the General Government for reclamation. After Morgan's sur render, the Governor issued an address to the people of tho State, reciting the main facts of the invasion, and congratulating them upon "the capture and de struction of one of the most formidable cavalry forces of , the EebelS; a force that had been a terror to the friends of the Union in Tennessee and Kentucky for about two years." It should not be forgotten, in contrasting the numbers of the Ohio militia thus called out with their performance, that they were only being organized when the call was made upon them ; that they were utterly without drill, and that many of them even took the field before their officers had been commis sioned. In 1864 the Legislature ordered the appointment of a Board of Commis sioners to examine and pass upon the claims for damages to property during the Morgan raid. Messrs. Albert McVeigh, Geo. W. Barker, and Henry S. Bab bitt, who were appointed the commissioners, passed over the route of the raid, and had public hearings of the claims at each point. They reduced them largely in most cases, and classified them into damages done by the Eebels, by United States troops, and by State militia respectively. A summary of their report sets forth the results of their investigation in tabular form, as follows: 152 Ohio in the War. s~ -»-> SA, -0 -Q CQCO 53 II) I-H Grj* S =*1 f~ K .O l5" O -w s -C? p Gi ^ e - Pq ^3 K « FS: f^ <=* =¦ *¦» S ¦*f ZZ .*>> .1^ I ^ S* £.* ¦~ Cn CO , S OO o '-e ^ "8 'S g s=i o ^ £ w 'S °0 5° « ^ g ^ m « t, g - In H ¦ss S o iS . ^s ^^-^ . CD qT3 "~ JJ «1 §:s.f53HI if? °p S3 f« ?:2 C3 S^ | -. =^3 3D3— , t.-^ O &P 33 35 =5 . gg8ggSgSS333SgggSS3SgSSS8388S iC ¦— ' CO i-- NWNi* t. ."I *". ¦<• 1— 1 8 8 Number of Claims. sssss ;SSSggggg8g88gSgggg8 ggS8S8g8SSSS8Sgg88ggg O — >!¦ M N O O "O >T N -.CM— I t- r~6- ggSSSSSSSSggggeq_Vl-„OOlNt--(ON*aO 01IDiOTP«e*0 3'.-,tCONi-'- 0 = 00 3C5c¦i o 0 o = 23 =<= = 000=00 A oJB -0O-»^! SSgg ;"QOri«o /ji-ooiojt-NoeifONOOiingi — — n r ¦noor^oo -- rtt»c -HNCnh Ct-~sC"fi iQN 00 sss •SOMQOOt^OOO 1-OOOtNCTiOOOCOO -ccc^oun^eoofo rTeT 1= s ;¦ "^ T 11 O O N rt L- 1- N -J IB t|i -« 3ji ~00 nr ^(Nt-cOOOM^^-TrKTJ^^t^iO^i _ - z.- — -i-.~«O^C-!f(0 — t— c - . ( -^ ;S 3: pj i; «j -± r-ONinnsi^-M^ ;gg Hnc^wflch-aotto^Nni Vallandigham Campaign. 153 CHAPTEE XIII. THE VALLANDIGHAM CAMPAIGN. THE early summer of 1863 was the dead-point of danger in the war. "We have been seeing how arbitrary arrests, popular disaffection, resist ance to the draft, and an audacious invasion were features of its his tory within the limits of Ohio. Elsewhere the gloom was far greater. The worse than failure at Chancellorsville was followed by the transfer of Lee's en tire army to the soil of Pennsylvania. The long labors before Vicksburg had not yet been rewarded with success, and fresh disasters at Galveston aud else where had combined to deepen the general gloom. It was in the midst of this feeling that General Burnside, by his arrest of Mr. Vallandigham, lifted that politician into the position of a representative man, and, in making him the martyr of his party, made him also its leader. He had scarcely reached the Confederate lines until the Eebel newspapers were emphasizing the fact that he could only be received as a prisoner — as one emi nently deserving kindness and consideration, but none the less a prisoner; that it would be the height of folly for him to think of remaining. in the Confeder acy ; that his true base of ojterations was Canada, and his true mission to be come the candidate of his party for the Governorship of Ohio.* The idea which would thus appear to have been suggested at the South was soon found to have taken firm hold upon the minds of the masses in the Democratic party. Its leaders regarded such a policy as" unwise, in the ex treme, and would greatly have preferred the nomination xi of a moderate war Democrat, like „B;jiglhll-jri1.,Jg.^ett-their former candidate. But the masses were dissatisfied — sore about the draft, inflamed with anger at the treatment of the man who had most boldly championed their views, and absorbed to such a de gree in these personal grievances as to consider their redress a question of more importance than the prosecution of the war or the preservation of the Nation. As the time for the convention approached, the tide of opinion set in stronger and stronger for Vallandigham, until it soon became a popular furor. For days before the date for the assemblage Cqlumbus was crowded .with dele- gations from the rural districts, whose intensity of feeling and bitterness of expression found no parallel in any previous.. political .excitemeiit in i.h,ejgtate. * For -the earliest expressions of these views the curious reader is referred to the first num bers of the Chattanooga Rebel issued after .news of the arrival of Mr. Vallandigham within General Bragg's lines had been received. 151 Ohio ix the War. They denounced, especially, General Burnside's "Order No. 38," declared it an insufferable tyranny, proclaimed their intention of violating it on all oc casions, and defiantly threatened resistance to attempted arrests. Governor Tod, General Burnside, and Secretary Stanton were the subjects of peculiarly virulent attack. Mr. Vallandigham was the suffering champion of their cause, whose wrongs were to be redressed, whose election as Governor was to be made the fitting rebuke to his persecutors. His absence made no difference. When elected he could easily gain access to the Border; and then, where was the General, or even higher official, who would dare to keep the chosen Governor of this great State in exile beyond its limits? Only let that be attempted, and the Lieutenant-Governor elect would lead an army of a hundred thousand Democrats to the Border to bring him home in triumph ! The talk of the masses thus developed a deliberate purpose to provoke the gravest issues, and a readiness to embroil the State in civil war. They had re solved on resistance to arrests, resistance as far as might be to the draft and to the war, and they were reckless as to consequences. The leaders vainly tried to stem the current. As a last resort they strove to bring forward General McClellan, who was still a citizen of Ohio, as a can didate for the Governorship, but he refused the use of his name. "When the convention assembled an immense crowd took possession, overslaughed the del egates, elected as permanent chairman a man M'ho was not a delegate at all* and clamored for the nomination of Vallandigham by acclamation. The most ofthe members fell completely in with the current; a few war Democrats made sturdy resistance for a little, demanded a call of the delegates by coun- ties, and cast their votes for Judge Jewett. But the pressure was overwhelm- ing. Jewett's own county presently hisisted upon_withdrawing hjs name, and, amid a wild saturnalia of cheering, and embracing, and all manner of extrava gant demonstrations of delight^ the convict of General Burnside's Military Commission was nominated by acclamation as the candidate of this great party fnr^t.he offi^p nf GnYfH'Pnr of Ohio. A strenuous struggle was made for a resolution in favor of peace in the platform, but the most shouted: "Vallandigham is platform enough ; " and so the leaders were left to fit thejr declaratiorL,of principles to their candidate with what skill they might, while the great cjowd^hjingwith^delight on the address of ex-Senator Pugh, who, having been Mr. Vallandigham's legal repre- sen tati ve i n the trials, jvas naturally called out to speak for him now. It was known that through the morning Mr. Pugh had been urging moderation ; but by this time the air of the convention had infected him. His violent, inflam matory address completely carried away his hearers ; and, in the whirlwind of enthusiasm which he evoked, he was nominated by acclamation for Lieutenant- Governor, in spite of his protests and refusal. Some passages of this remark able speech (as reported in the newspapers of the day) were as follows : "The Democracy did not bring the war about — it was by the acts of the Administration in power. No one but the abject slave of the Administration would say that this controversy could * Ex-Governor Medill. Vallandigham Campaign. 155 not have been settled on honorable terms of peace. He could not, and he did not state this as a matter of opinion, but as a fact. The Administration had been warned and implored not to launch the country into a civil war. The inevitable result was predicted, and he now called it to its account. If the Government should demand untold treasures to suppress the rebellion it should have them; it should have all its wants under the Constitution. If then the Administra tion did not succeed, its folly would be apparent, and the judgment of God and history would be against it. "He would utter no word and commit no act that could be construed as an excuse for its failure. Having all the constitutional power, if it succeeded and preserved the Union, it would have credit, but if it failed, it should not put on him or his any excuse for the failure. If these gentlemen declare martial law, and if the security of himself, his wife, and his children, and his property, was to be subject to the whim of General Burnside, or any other General, the time for them and him had arrived to call a convention, whieh should never adjourn until it had achieved the liberty of the people. He scorned 'Order 38.' He trampled under foot the order of every military officer outraging the laws; and if his fellow-citizens were such abject slaves as to hold their liberty and right of free speech subject to the dictation of any military man, whether Gen eral, Colonel, Corporal, or private, they deserved to be slaves. He had already said that his friend, their nominee for Governor, had dared to express his opinions, and for so doing he had been banished. He (Pugh) might not have agreed with all Vallandigham had said, but he in sisted upon his right to express his opinions, and he exhorted them to postpone every other ques tion to the great question of the vindication of our liberties. "He would exhort Mr. Lincoln on the question of war when he (Pugh) had the liberty to discuss war or peace. He would express his opinions under the rights guaranteed -him by the Constitution, even at the hazard of his life. He begged the Democracy to think of this; not to go home and think of crops and workshops, and put it off. It ought to fill their hearts every hour; it ought to be their business from now until the second Tuesday of October. "What was their property worth to them — what the safety of their wives and children, and every thing dear to them, if they were liable at the dead hour of the night to have their doors broken open and to be dragged, from the presence of wife and children, to a mock tribunal and tried? Don't cheer and repent to-morrow. It was easy for them to cheer without responsibility. Say what you mean and stick to it. Let each man take counsel of his own heart, and then come to the resolution that this thing must be stopped peaceably if possible, but stopped -ib must be. If you do that it will be stopped. Do n't talk about it ; do it and maintain it at all hazards. " Somebody must meet the issue. If I, God help me, I will meet it. I am out of political life, and will accept no office; but claim my rights as a private citizen, guaranteed to me by the Constitution. If we had an honest man as Governor my rights and liberties could have been pre served. That creature who has licked the dust off the feet of the Administration is less than the dust in the balance. We have no Governor. We have a being, and he has the audacity to say, and has said to my faee, after this war is over he will come back into the Democratic party, and put such men as Vallandigham and Olds to the wall. I told him if he showed his face in a Democratic convention I would move to suspend all business until he was expelled. I can par don an honest man who might have been misled, but the man who not only sold himself, but sold the birthright of Democracy, his crime is infamous. If General Burnside should arrest me to morrow, will yOu act? (Cheers, and 'yes.') Then your liberties will be safe. I have considered that possibly you might not act; but, whether you will act or not, if it be at the cost of my life, I intend to maintain my rights as a freeman. Our fellow-citizen, for expressing his opinions, was seized between night and morning by an overpowering force of soldiers and dragged from Day ton to Cincinnati to be imprisoned. The judicial officer, knowing his duty, refused to interfere from personal cowardice, and he trampled the Constitution under his feet. Judge Leavitt's name will be handed down to posterity with' scorn and shame. I tell you nothing less than the safety and necessity of my family brought me here. Life is no longer tolerable under the despotism that exists. I would rather be led to the altar than submit to ' Order 38.' The question is, will you submit to it ? If, after a fair and honest appeal, a majority of the people decide to submit, then I counsel you to sell your goods and chattels and emigrate to some other country, where you can find freedom. I say, like Patrick Henry, 'If this be treason make the most of it.' Now, my friends, I think I have violated 'Order 38' enough. 156 Ohio in the War. "I knew perfectly well when Lincoln changed the sentence of Vallandigham, that the Ee publicans would say it was done at Vallandigham's request. While on the gunboat with Pen dleton, Dr. Fries, Mr. Ware, and Mr. McLean, I asked Mr. Vallandigham: 'Has the President given you a choice?' He replied that he had not. I asked him : 'If he gave you a choice whieh would you take?' and his answer was, 'I would go to Fort Warren a thousand times rather than go South and be placed in the hands of the Rebels.' He authorized me to say this. If General Burnside has spies here and should lead me out between a file of soldiers, I have given you my opinions. Free speech is the only security for our freedom, and we must assent to this right. If I suffer I shall only consider that I have gone in the way of a true patriot; I shall look to the Democracy in prosperous times for a vindication in this hour of trial. I will not desert my prin ciples, and if I suffer they will say at least that that man was ever true to the principles he pro fessed. Do not adjourn, I beg of you, until, in the name of the one hundred and eighty thousand Democrats of Ohio, you have demanded of Abraham Lincoln the restoration of Vallandigham to his home. " We will not talk of war, or peace, or rebellion, until our honored citizen has been restored to us. If you make that your platform you will be victorious. If not, I counsel you to seek a home where liberty exists." This convention was held on the 11th of June. At that time Mr. Vallan digham was still within the Confederate lines, and it is not known that his friends had received any communications from him since the party under a flag of truce from General Eosecrans had carried him over.* The convention ap pointed a committee to urge upon the President the duty of giving him permis sion to return. A similar appeal from New Tork Democrats had, a little before, drawn from Mr. Lincoln an elaborate vindication of his policy of arbitrary ar rests. He therefore replied now to the Ohio committee with more brevity. Their address and his reply are subjoined : " Washington City, June 26, 1863. " To His Excellency, the President of the United States : "The undersigned having been appointed a committee, under the authority of the resolutions of the State convention held at the city of Columbus, Ohio, on the 11th instant, to commuuicate with you on the subject of the arrest and banishment of Clement L. Vallandigham, most respect fully submit the following as the resolutions of that convention, bearing upon the subject of this communication, and ask of your Excellency their earnest consideration. And they deem it proper to state that the convention was one in which all parts of the State were represented, and one of the most respectable as to numbers and character, one of the most earnest and sincere in support of the Constitution and the Union ever held in that State. " Resolved, 1. That the will of the people is the foundation of all free government ; that to give effect to this will, free thought, free speech, and a free press are indispensable. Without free discussion there is no certainty of sound judgment ; without sound judgment there can be no wise government. " Resolved, 2. That it is an inherent and constitutional right of the people to discuss all meas ures of their Government, and to approve or disapprove, as to their best judgment, seems right. They have a like right to propose and advocate that policy which, in their judgment, is best, and to argue and vote against whatever policy seems to them to violate the Constitution, to impair their liberties, or to be detrimental to their welfare. " Resolved, 3. That these, and all other rights guaranteed to them by their Constitution, are their rights in time of war as well as in the time of peace, and of far more value and necessity in war than peace ; for in time of peace liberty, security, and property are seldom endangered ; in war they are ever in peril. " Resolved, 4. That we now say to all whom it may concern, not by way of threat, but calmly/ *A report, however, was in circulation at the convention, that his wife had received letters from him, saying he would soon be home again. Vallandigham Campaign. 157 and firmly, that we will not surrender these rights, nor submit to their forcible violation. We will obey the laws ourselves, and all others must obey them. "Resolved, 11. Thaf Ohio will adhere to the Constitution and the Union as the best, and it may be the last, hope of popular freedom, and lor all wrongs which may have been committed, or evils which may exist, will seek redress under the Constitution, and within the Union, by the peaceful but powerful agency of the suffrages of the people. " Resolved, 14. That we will earnestly support every constitutional measure tending to pre serve the Union of the States. No men have a greater interest in its preservation than we have, none desire more; there are none who will make greater sacrifices or endure more than we will to accomplish that end. We are, as we ever have been, the devoted friends of the Constitution and the Union, and we have no sympathy with the enemies of either. " Resolved, 15. That the arrest, imprisonment, pretended trial, and actual banishment of Clem ent L. Vallandigham, a citizen of the State of Ohio, not belonging to the land or naval forces of the United States, nor to the militia in actual service, by alleged military authority, for no other pretended crimes than that of uttering words of legitimate criticism upon the conduct of the Administration in power, and of appealing to the ballot-box for a change of policy — (said arrest and military trial taking place where the courts of law are open and unobstructed, and for no act done within the sphere of active military operations in carrying on the war) — we regard as a palpable violation of the following provisions of the Constitution of the United States : " 1. ' Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.' " 2. 'The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.' "3. 'No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia when in actual service in time of war or public .danger.' " 4. ' In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed ; which district shall have been previously ascertained by law.' "And we furthermore denounce said arrest, trial, and banishment, as a direct insult offered to the sovereignty of the people of Ohio, by whose organic law it is declared that no person shall be transported out of the State for any offense committed within the same. "Resolved, 16. That C. L. Vallandigham was, at the time of his arrest, a prominent candidate for nomination by the Democratic party of Ohio for the office of Governor of the State ; that the Democratic party was fully competent to decide whether he is a fit man for that nomination, and that the attempt to deprive them of that right, by his arrest and banishment, was an unmerited imputation upon their intelligence and loyalty, as well as a violation ofthe Constitution. "Resolved, 17. That we respectfully, but most earnestly, call upon the President of the United States to restore C. L. Vallandigham to his home in Ohio, and that a committee of one from each Congressional District of Oliio, to be selected by the presiding officer of this convention, is hereby appointed to present this application to the President. "The undersigned, in the discharge of the duty assigned them, do not think it necessary to reiterate the facts connected with the arrest, trial, and banishment of Mr. Vallandigham ; they are well known to the President and are of public history ; nor to enlarge upon the positions taken by the convention, nor to recapitulate the constitutional provisions which it is belteved have been contravened ; they have been stated at length, and with clearness, in the resolutions which have been recited. The undersigned content themselves with a brief reference to other suggestions pertinent to the subject. t " They do not call upon your Excellency as suppliants, praying the revocation of the order banishing Mr. Vallandigham, as a favor, but by the authority of a convention representing a majority of the citizens of the State of Ohio, they respectfully ask it as a right due to an Amer ican citizen, in whose personal injury the sovereignty and dignity of the people of Ohio, as a free State, has been offended. 158 Ohio in the War. "And this duty they perform the more cordially from the consideration that at a time of great national emergency, pregnant with dangers lo our Federal Union, it is all-important that the true friends of the Constitution and the Union, however they may differ as to the mode of ad ministering the Government, and the measures most likely to be successful in the maintenance of the Constitution and the restoration of the Union, should not be thrown into conflict with each other. " The arrest, unusual trial, and banishment of Mr. Vallandigham have created wide-spre.id and alarming disaffection among the people of the State; not only endangering the harmony of the friends of the Constitution and the Union, and tending to disturb the peace and tranquillity of the State, but also impairing that confidence in the fidelity of your Administration to thegreat landmarks of free government essential to a peaceful and successful enforcement of the laws of Ohio. "You are reported to have used, in a public communication on this subject, the following language : " 'It gave me pain when I learned that Mr. Vallandigham had been arrested ; that is, I was pained that there should have seemed to be a necessity for arresting him, and that it will afford me great pleasure to discharge him so soon as I can by any means believe the public safety will not suffer by it.' "The undersigned assure your Excellency, from our personal knowledge of the feelings of the people of Ohio, that the public safety will be far more endangered by continuing Mr. Val landigham in exile than by releasing him. It may be true that persons differing from him in political views may be found in Ohio and elsewhere who will express a different opinion; but they are certainly mistaken. " Mr. Vallandigham may differ with the President, and even with some of his own political party, as to the true and most effectual means of maintaining the Constitution and restoring the Union; but this difference of opinion does not prove him to be unfaithful to his duties as an American citizen. If a man devotedly attached to the Constitution and the Union conscientiously believes that, from the inherent nature of the Federal compact, the war, in the present condition of things in this country, can not be used as a means of restoring the Union ; or that a war to subjugate a part of the States, or a war to revolutionize the social system in a part of the States, could not restore, but would inevitably result in the final destruction of both the Constitution and the Union, is he not to be allowed the right of an American citizen to appeal to the judg ment of the people for a change of policy by the constitutional remedy of the ballot-box? "During the war with Mexico many of the political opponents of the Administration then in power thought it their duty to oppose and denounce the war, and to urge before the people of the country that it was unjust, and prosecuted for unholy purposes. With equal reason it might have been said of them that their discussions before the people were calculated to discourage enlistments, ' to prevent the raising of troops,' and to induce desertions from the army ; and leave the Government without an adequate military force to carry on the war. "If the freedom of speech and of the press are to be suspended in time of war, then the es sential element of popular government to effect a change of policy in the constitutional mode is at an end. The freedom of speech and of the press is indispensable, and necessarily incident to the n.iture of popular government itself. If any inconvenience or evils arise from its exercise, they are unavoidable. " On this .subject you are reported to have said further: " ' It is asserted, in substance, that Mr. Vallandigham was, by a military commander, seized and tried, ' for no other reason than words addressed to a public meeting, in criticism of the course of the Administration, and in condemnation of the military order of the General.' Now, if there be no mistake about this, if there was no other reason for the arrest, then I concede that the arrest was wrong. But the arrest, I understand, was made for a very different reason. Mr. Valiandigham avows his hostility to the war on the part of the Union, and his arrest was made because he was laboring with some eflect to prevent the raising of troops, to encourage desertions from the army, and to leave the rebellion without an adequate military force to suppress it. He was arrested, not because he was damaging the political prospects of the Administration, or the personal interests of the Commanding General, but because he was damaging the army, upon the existence and vigor of which the life of the Nation depends. He was warring upon the Vallandigham Campaign. 159 military, and this gave the military constitutional jurisdiction to lay hands upon him. If Mr. Vallandigham was not damaging the military power of the country, then his arrest was made on mistake of facts, which I would be glad to correct on reasonable. satisfactory evidence.' " In answer to this, permit us to say — First : That neither the charge, nor the specifications in support of the charge on whioh Mr. Vallandigham was tried, impute to him the act of either laboring to prevent the raising of troops or to encourage desertions from the army. Secondly: No. evidence on the trial was offered with a view to support, or even tended to support, any such charge. In what instance, and by what act, did he either discourage enlistments or encourage desertions from the army ? Who is the man who was discouraged from enlisting ? and who en couraged to desert by any act of Mr. Vallandigham ? If it be assumed that, perchance, some person might have been discouraged from enlisting, or that some person might have been encouraged to desert, on account of hearing Mr. Vallandigham's views as to the policy of the war as a means of restoring the Union, would that have laid the foundation for his conviction and banishment? If so, upon the same grounds, every political opponent of the Mexican war might have been convicted and^ banished from the country. "When gentlemen of high standing and extensive influence, including your Excellency, opposed, in the discussions before the people, the policy of the Mexican war, were they ' war ring upon the military?' and did this 'give the military constitutional jurisdiction to lay hands upon' them? And, finally, the charge of the specifications upon which Mr. Vallandigham was tried entitled him to a trial before the civil tribunals, according to the express provisions of the late acts of Congress, approved by yourself, July 17, 1862, and March 3, 1863, which were man ifestly designed to supersede all necessity or pretext for arbitrary military arrests. "The undersigned are unable to agree with you in the opinion you have expressed, that the Constitution is different in time of insurrection or invasion from what it is in time of peace and public security. The Constitution provides for no limitation upon or exceptions to the guarantees of personal liberty, except as to the writ of habeas cm-pus. Has tbe President, at the time of invasion or insurrection, the right to engraft limitations or exceptions upon these con stitutional guarantees whenever, in his judgment, the public safety requires it? " True ii is, the article of the Constitution which defines the various powers delegated to Congress declares that ' the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless where, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety ma'y require it.' But this qualifica tion or limitation upon this restriction upon the powers of Congress has no reference to or con nection with the other constitutional guarantees of personal.liberty. Expunge from the Consti tution this limitation upon the powers of Congress to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, and yet the other guarantees of personal liberty would remain unchanged. "Although a man might not have a constitutional right to have an immediate investiga-' tion made as to the legality of his arrest, upon habeas corpus, yet ' his right to a speedy and pub lic trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been com mitted,' will not be altered; neither will his right to the exemption from 'cruel and unusual punishments ; ' nor his right to be secure in his person^houses, papers, and effects, against un reasonable seizures and searches ; nor his right not to be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor his right not to be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous offense, unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury be in anywise changed. " And certainly the restriction upon the power of Congress to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, in time of insurrection or invasion, could not affect the guarantee that the freedom of speech and of the press shall not be abridged. It is sometimes urged that the proceedings in the civil tribunals are too tardy and ineffective for cases arising in times of insurrection or inva sion. It is a full reply to this to say that arrests by civil process may be equally as expeditious and effective as arrests by military orders. " True, a summary trial and punishment are not allowed in the civil courts. But if the ! offender be under arrest and imprisoned, and not entitled to a discharge on writ of habeas corpus, > before trial, what more can be required for the purpose ofthe Government? The idea that all * the constitutional guarantees bf personal liberty are suspended, throughout the country, at a time of insurrection or invasion in any part of it, places us upon a sea of uncertainly, and subjects I the life, liberty, and property of every citizen to the mere will of a military commander, or what I he might say that he considers the public safety requires. Does your Excellency .wish to have » 160 Ohio in the War. it understood that you hold that the rights of every man throughout this vast country are sub ject to be annulled whenever you may say that you consider tbe public safety requires it in time of invasion or insurrection? " Yon are further reported as having said that the constitutional guarantees of personal lib erty have,' no application to the present case we have in hand, because the arrests complained of were not made for treason ; that is, not for the treason defined in the Constitution, and upon the conviction of which the punishment is death; nor yet were they made to hold persons to answer for capital or otherwise infamous crimes ; nor were the proceedings following, in any constitu tional or legal sense, criminal prosecutions. The arrests were made on totally different ground', and the proceedings following accorded with tbe grounds of the arrests,' etc. "The conclusion to be drawn from this position of your Excellency is, that where a man is liable to ' a criminal prosecution,' or is charged with a crime known to the laws of tbe land, he is clothed with all the constitutional guarantees for his safety and security from wrong and injus tice ; but that where he is not liable to ' a criminal prosecution,' or charged with any crime known to the laws, if the President or any military commander shall say that he considers tbat the pub lic safety requires it, this man may be put outside of the pale of the constitutional guarantees, and arrested without charge of crime, imprisoned without knowing what for, and any length of time, or be tried before a court-martial, and sentenced to any kind ,of punishment unknown to the laws of the land, wbich the President or military commander may deem proper to impose. "Did the Constitution intend to'throw the shield of its securities around the man liable to be charged with treason as defined by it, and yet leave the man not liable to any such char-ge un protected by the safeguard of personal liberty and personal security ? Can a man not in the mil itary or naval service, nor within tbe field of the operations of the army, be arrested and impris oned without any law of the land to authorize it ? Can a man thus, in civil life, be punished without any law defining the offense and prescribing the punishment? If the President or a cohrt-martial may prescribe one kind of punishment unauthorized by law, why not any other kind? Banishment is an unusual punishment, and unknown to our laws. If the President has the right to prescribe the punishment of banishment, why not that of death and confiscation of property? If the President has the right to change the punishment prescribed by the court-mar tial, from imprisonment to banishment, why not from imprisonment to torture upon the rack, or execution tipon the gibbet? " If an indefinable kind of constructive treason is to be introduced and engrafted upon the Constitution, unknown to tbe laws of the land and subject to the will of the President whenever an insurrection or invasion shall occur in any part of this vast country, what safety or security will be left for the liberties of the people? "The constructive treasons that gave the friends of freedom so many years of toil and trouble in England, were inconsiderable compared to this. The precedents which you make will become a part of the Constitution for your successors, if sanctioned and acquiesced in by the people" now. " The people of Ohio are willing to co-operate zealously witb you in every effort warranted by the Constitution to restore the Union of the States, but they can not consent to abandon those fundamental principles of civil liberty which are essential to their existence as a free people. " In their name we ask that, by a revocation ofthe order of his banishment, Mr. Vallandigham may be restored to the enjoyment of those rights of which they believe he has been unconstitu tionally deprived. " We have tbe honor to be, respectfully, yours, etc., " M. BIRCHARD, Chairman, 19th District. " David A. Houk, Secretary, 3d District. " George Bliss, 14lh District. George S. Converse, " T. W. Bartley, 8th " Warren P. Noble, "W.J.Gordon, 18th " George H. Pendleton, " John O'Neill, 13th " W. A. Hutchins, " C. A. White, 6th " Abner L. Backus, "W. D. Finck, 12th " J. F. McKinney, " Alexander Long, 2d " F. C. Le Blond, "J.W.White, 16th " Louis Schaefer, "Jas. R. Morris, loth " 7th District. 9th tt 1st tt 11th tl 10th tt 5th it 5th U 17th fi Vallandigham Campaign. 161 KEPLY OF THE PRESIDENT. I "Washington, D. C, June 29, 1863. "Gentlemen: The resolutions ofthe Ohio Democratic State Convention, which you present me, together with your introductory and closing remarks, being in position and argument mainly the same as the resolutions of the Democratic meeting at Albany, New York, I refer you to my response to the latter as meeting most of the points in the former. This response you evidently used in preparing your remarks, and I desire no more than that it be used with accuracy. In a single reading of your remarks, I only discovered one inaccuracy in matter which I suppose you took from that paper. It is where you say, 'the undersigned are unable to agree with you in the opinion you have expressed, that the Constitution is different in time of insurrection or invasion from what it is in time of peace and public security.' "A recurrence to the paper wijl show you that I have not expressed the opinion you suppose. I expressed tbe opinion that the Constitution is different in its application in cases of rebellion or invasion, involving the public safety from what it is in times of profound peace and public secu rity ; and this opinion I adhere to, simply because by the Constitution itself, things may be done in the one case which may not be done in the other. • "I dislike to waste a word on a merely personal point, but I must respectfully assure you that you will find yousr.selves at fault, should you ever seek for evidence to prove your assumption that I ' opposed in discussions before the people the policy of the Mexican War.' "You say, 'Expunge from the Constitution this limitation upon the power of Congress to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, and yet the other guarantees of personal liberty would remain unchanged.' Doubtless if this clause of the Constitution, improperly called as I think a limita tion upon the power of Congress were expunged, the other guarantees would remain the same; but the question is not how those guarantees would stand with that clause out ofthe Constitution, but how they stand with that clause remaining in it, in case of rebellion or invasion, involving the public safety. If the liberty could be indulged of expunging that clause, letter and spirit, I really think the constitutional argument would be with you. " My general view on this question was stated in the Albany response, and hence I do not state it now. I only add that, as seems to me, the.benefit of the writ of habeas corpus is the great means through which the guarantees of personal liberty are conserved and made available in the last resort; and corroborative of this view, is the fact that Vallandigham in the very case in ques tion, under the advice of able lawyers, saw not where else to go, but to tbe habeas corpus. But by the Constitution the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus itself may be suspended when in cases of rebellion and invasion the public safety may require it. "You ask in substance whether I really claim that I may override all the guaranteed rights of individuals, on the plea of conserving the public safety — when I may choose to say the public safety requires it. This question, divested of the phraseology calculated to represent me as strug gling for an arbitrary personal prerogative, is either simply a question who shall decide, or an affirmation that nobody shall decide, what public safety does require in cases of rebellion or in vasion. The Constitntion contemplates the question as likely to occur for decision, but it does not expressly declare who is lo decide it. By necessary implication, when rebellion or invasion comes, the decision is to be made from time to time; and I think the man whom, for the time the people have, under the Constitution made the Commander-in-Chief of their army and navy, is the man who holds the power and bears the responsibility of making it. If he uses the power justly, tha same people will probably justify him; if he abuses it, he is in their hands, to be dealt with by the modes they have reserved to themselves in the Constitution. "The earnestness with which you insist tljat persons can only in times of rebellion be law fully dealt with,, in accordance with the rules for criminal trials and punishments in times of peace, induces me to add a word to what I have said on that point in the Albany response. You claim that men may, if they choose, embarrass those whose duty it is to combat a giant rebellion and then be dealt witlronly in turn as if there was no rebellion. The Constitution itself rejects this view. Tbe military arrests and detentions which have been made, including those of Mr. Vallandigham, which are not different in principle .from the others, have been for prevention and not for punishment — as injunctions to stay injury — as proceedings to keep the peace, and hence, like proceedings in such cases and for like reasons, they haye been accompanied with indictments, or trials by juries, nor, in a single case, by any punishment whatever beyond what is purely Vol. 1.— 11. 162 Ohio in the War incidental to the prevention. The original sentence of imprisonment in Mr. Vallandigham's case was to prevent injury to the military service only, and the modification of it was made as a less disagreeable mode to him of securing the same prevention. "I am unable to perceive an insult to Ohio in the case of Mr. Vallandigham. Quite surely nothing of this sort was or is intended. I was wholly unaware that Mr. Vallandigham was at the time of his arrest, a candidate for the Democratic nomination for Governor, until so informed bv your reading to me the resolutions of the Convention. I am grateful to the State of Ohio for many things, especially for the brave soldiers and officers she has given in the present National trial to the armies of the Union. "You claim, as I understand, that, according to my own position in the Albany response, Mr. Vallandigham should be released ; and this because, as you claim, he has not damaged tbe mili tary service, by discouraging enlistments, encouraging desertions, or otherwise ; and that, if he had, he should have been turned over to the civil authorities under the recent acts of Congress. I certainly do not know that Mr. Vallandigham has specifically and by direct language advised against enlistments, and in favor of desertion and resistance to drafting. We all know that com binations, armed in some instances, to resist tbe arrest of deserters, began several months ago ; that more recently the like has appeared in resistance to the enrollment preparatory to a draft; and that quite a number of assassinations have occurred from the same animus. These had to be met by military force, and this again has led to bloodshed and death. And now, under a sense of responsibility more weighty and enduring than any which is merely official, I solemnly declare my belief that this hindrance of the military, including maiming and murder, is due to the course in which Mr. Vallandigham has been engaged in a greater degree than to any other cause, and is due to him personally in a greater degree than to any other one man-. These things have been notorious, known to all, and of course known to Mr. Vallandigham. Perhaps I would not be wrong to say they originated with his special friends and adherents. With perfect knowledge of them be has frequently, if not constantly, made speeches in Congress and before popular assemblies, and if it can be shown that with these things staring him in the face, he has ever uttered a word of rebuke or counsel against them, it will be a fact greatly in his favor with me, and one of which, as yet, I am totally ignorant. When it is known that the whole burden of his speeches has been to stir up men against the prosecution of the war, and that in the midst of resistance to it, he has not been known in any instance to counsel against such resistance, it is next to impossible to repel the inference that he has counseled directly in favor of it. With all this before their eyes, the convention you represent have nominated Mr. Vallandigham for Gov ernor of Ohio, and both they and yon have declared the purpose to sustain the National Union by all constitutional means. But of course they and you, in common, reserve to yourselves to decide what are constitutional means ; and, unlike tbe Albany meeting, you omit to state or inti mate that in your opinion an army is a constitutional means of saving the Union against rebell ion, or even to intimate that you are conscious of an existing rebellion being in progress, with the avowed object of destroying that very Union. At the same time your nominee for Governor, in whose behalf you appeal, is known to you and to the world to declare against the use of an army to suppress the rebellion. Your own attitude, therefore, encourages desertion, resistance to the draft, and the like, because it teaches those who incline to desert and escape the draft to believe it is your purpose to protect them, and to hope that you will become strong enough to do so. After a personal intercourse with you, gentlemen of the Union look upon it in this light. It is a substantial hope, and, by consequence, a real strength to the enemy. It is a false hope, and one which you would willingly dispel. I will make the way exceedingly easy. I send you dupli cates of this letter in order that you, or a majority of you, may, if you choose, indorse your names upon one of them, and return it thus indorsed to me, with the understanding that those signing are thereby committed to the following propositions, and to nothing else : "1. That there is now a rebellion in the United States, the object and tendency of which is to destroy the National Union ; and that, in your opinion, an army and navy are constitution*! means for suppressing that rebellion. "2. That no one of you will do anything which, in his own judgment, will tend to hinder the increase or favor the decrease, or lessen the efficiency of the army and navy while engaged in the -effort to suppress the rebellion ; and, "3. That each of you will, in his sphere, do all he can to have the officers, soldiers, and sei- Vallandigham Campaign. 163 men of the army and navy, while engaged in the effort to suppress the rebellion, paid, fed, clad, and otherwise well provided and supported. "And with the further understanding that upon receiving the letter and names thus indorsed, I will cause them to be published, which publication shall be, within itself, a revocation of the order in relation to Mr. Vallandigham. "It will not escape observation that I consent to the release of Mr. Vallandigham upon terms not embracing any pledge from him or from others as to what he will or will not do. I do this because he is not present to speak for himself, or to authorize others to speak for him, and hence, I shall expect, that on returning he would not put himself practically in antagonism with the position of his friends. But I do it chiefly because I thereby prevail on other influen tial gentlemen of Ohio to so define their position as to be of immense value to the army — thus more than compensating for the consequences of any mistake in allowing Mr. Vallandigham to return, so tbat, on the whole, the public safety would not have suffered by it. Still, in regard to Mr. Vallandigham and all others, I must hereafter, as heretofore, do so much as the public serv ice may seem to require. " I have the honor to be respectfully yours, etc., A. LINCOLN." The Committee responded to this proposition in another long argument, closing as follows : i "The people of Ohio were not, so deeply moved by the action of the President, merely because they were concerned for the personal safety or convenience of Mr. Vallandigham, but because tbey saw in his arrest aud banishment an attack upon their own personal rights ; and they attach value to his discharge chiefly as it will indicate an abandonment of the claim to the power of such arrest and banishment. ' However just the undersigned might regard the prin ciples contained in the several propositions submitted by the President, or how much soever they might, under other circumstances, feel inclined to indorse the sentiments contained therein, yet they .assure him they have not been authorized to enter into any bargains, terms, contracts, or conditions with the President of the United States to procure the release of Mr. Vallandigham. "The opinions of the undersigned touching the questions involved in these propositions are well known, have been many times publicly expressed, and are sufficiently manifested in the resolutions of the convention which they represent, and they can not suppose that the President expects that they will seek the discharge of Mr. Vallandigham by a pledge, implying not only an imputation upon their own sincerity and fidelity as citizens of the United States ; and also carry ing with it by implication a concession of the legality of his arrest, trial, and banishment, against which they and the convention they represent, have solemnly protested. And while they have asked the revocation of the order of banishment, not as a favor, but as a right, due to the people of Ohio, and with a view to avoid the possibility of conflict or disturbance of the public tran quillity ; they do not do this, nor does Mr. Vallandigham desire it, at any sacrifice of their dignity and self-respect. "The idea that such a pledge as that asked from th^ undersigned would secure the public safety sufficiently to compensate for any mistake of the President in discharging Mr. Vallandig ham, is, in their opinion, a. mere evasion of the grave questions involved in this discussion and of a direct answer to their demand. And this is made especially apparent by the fact that this pledge is asked in a, communication which concludes with an intimation of a disposition on the part of the President to repeat the acts complained of. "The undersigned, therefore, having fully discharged the duty enjoined upon them, leave the responsibility with the President. The effort of the President to commit these gentlemen to the support ofthe army and tho war thus failed. It was well understood that this happened, not entirely because they disliked his "evasion of the grave questions involved" in the treatment of Mr. Vallandigham, but also and mainly because of the fact that, in the temper then prevalent in their party, they were unwilling to give any countenance to the war. 164 Ohio in the War. Mr. Vallandigham passed through the Confederacy, from Chattanooga to Eiehmond, and thence to Wilmington. Here he took passage ou a blockade- runner, which, escaping capture, landed him safely at the British port of Nas sau, whence he made his way under the British flag to Canada, taking up his quarters on the Canada side at the Niagara Falls. He arrived at Niagara on the 15th of July, and on the same day issued the following address, accepting the nomination which had been conferred upon him while he was in the Confederacy : "Niagara Falls, Canada West, July 15, 1863. " Arrested and confined for three weeks in the United States, a prisoner of state ; banished thence to the Confederate States, and there held as an alien enemy and prisoner of war, though on parol, fairly and honorably dealt with and given leave to depart, an act possible only by run ning tbe blockade at the hazard of being fired upon by ships flying the flag of my own countrv, I found myself first a freeman when on British soil. And to-day, under the protection of the British flag, I am here to enjoy and in part to exercise the privileges and rights which usurpers insolently deny me at home. The shallow contrivance of the weak despots at Washington and their advisers has been defeated. Nay, it has been turned against them, and I, who for two years was maligned as in secret league with the Confederates, having refused when in their midst, under circumstances the most favorable, either to identify myself with their cause, or even so much as to remain, preferring rather exile in a foreign land, return now with allegiance to my own State and Government unbroken in word, thought, or deed, and with every declaration and pledge to you while at home, and before I was stolen away, made good in spirit and to the very letter. " Six weeks ago, when just going into banishment because an audacious but most cowardly des potism caused it, I addressed you as a fellow-citizen. To-day, and from the very place then selected by me, but after wearisome and most perilous journeyings for more than four thousand miles by land and upon sea, still in exile, though almost in sight of my native State, I greet you as your representative. Grateful, certainly I am, for the confidence in my integrity and patriotism, im plied by the unanimous nomination as candidate for Governor of Ohio, which yon gave me while I was yet in the Confederate States. It was not misplaced ; it shall never be abused. But this is the last of all considerations in times like these. I ask no personal sympathy for tbe personal wrong. No ; it is the cause of constitutional liberty and private right cruelly outraged beyond example on a free country, by the President and his servants, which gives public significance to the action of your convention. Yours was, indeed, an act of justice to a citizen who, for his devo tion to tbe rights of the States and the liberties of the people, had been marked for destruction by the hand of arbitrary power. But it was much more. It was an example of courage worthy of the heroic ages of the world ; and it was a spectacle and a rebuke to the usurping tyrants who, having broken up the Union, would now strike down the Constitution, subvert your present Gov ernment, and establish a formal and proclaimed despotism in its stead. You are the restorers and defenders of constitutional liberty, and by that proud title history will salute yon. " I congratulate you upon your nominations. They whom you have placed upon the ticket with me are gentlemen of character, ability, integrity, and tried fidelity to the Constitution, the Union, and to liberty. Their moral and political coura,ge, a quality always rare, and now the most valuable of public virtues, is beyond question. Every way, all these were nominations fit to be made. And even jealousy, I am sure, will now be hushed, if I especially rejoice with yon in the nomination of Mr. Pugh as your candidate for Lieutenant-Governor and President of the Senate. A scholar and a gentleman, a soldier ina foreign war, and always a patriot ; eminent as a lawyer, and distinguished as an orator and a statesman, I hail his acceptance as an omen of the return of the better and more virtuous days of the Republic. ' I indorse your noble platform ; elegant in style, admirable in sentiment. You present the true issue, and commit yourselves to the great mission just now of the Democratic party— to restore and make sure first the rights and liberties declared yours by your Constitutions. It is in vain Vallandigham Campaign. 165 to invite the States and people of the South to return to a Union without a Constitution, and dis honored and polluted by repeated and most aggravated exactions of tyrannic powers. It is base in yourselves, and treasonable to your posterity, to surrender these liberties and rights to the creatures whom your own breath created and can destroy. "Shall there be free speech, u. free press, peaceable assemblages of the people, and a free ballot any longer in Ohio? Shall the people hereafter, as hitherto, have the right to discuss and condemn the principles and' policy of the party — the ministry — the men who for the time con duct the Government ? To demand of their public servants a reckoning of their stewardship, and to place other men and another party in power at their supreme will and pleasure? Shall Order 38 or the Constitution be the supreme law of the land ? And shall the citizen any more be arrested by an armed soldiery at midnight, dragged from wife and child at home to a military prison ; thence to a mock military trial ; thence condemned and then banished as a felon for the exercise ofhis rights? This is the issue, and nobly you have met it. It is the very question of free, popular government itself. It is the whole question : upon the one side liberty, upon the other despotism. The President, as the recognized head of his party, accepts the issue. What ever he wills, that is law. Constitutions, State and Federal, are nothing; acts of legislation nothing ; the judiciary less than nothing. In time of war there is but one will supreme — his will ; but one law — military necessity — and he the sole judge. Military orders supersede the Constitution, and military commissions usurp the place of the ordinary courts of justice in the land. Nor are these mere idle claims. For two years and more', by arms, they have been enforced. It was tbe mission of the weak but presumptuous Burnside — a name infamous for ever in the ears of all lovers of constitutional liberty — to try the experiment in Ohio, aided by a judge whom I name not, because he has brought foul dishonor upon the judiciary of my country. In your hands now, men of Ohio, is the final issue of the experiment. The party of the Admin istration have accepted it. By pledging support to the President they have justified his outrages upon liberty and the Constitution, and whoever gives his vote to the candidates of that party, commits himself to every act of violence and wrong on the part of the Administration which he upholds ; and thus, by the law of retaliation, which is the law of might, would forfeit his own right to liberty, personal and political, whensoever other men and another party shall hold the power. Much more do the candidates themselves. Suffer them not, I entreat you, to evade the issue ; and by the judgment of the people we will abide. "And now, finally, let me ask, what is the pretext for all the monstrous acts and claims of arbitrary power, which you have so nobly denounced? 'Military necessity?' But if indeed all these be demanded by military necessity, then, believe me, your liberties are gone, and tyranny is perpetual. For if this civil war is to terminate only by the subjugation or submission of the South to force and arms, the infant of to-day will not live to see the end of it. No, in another way only can it be brought to a close. Traveling a thousand miles and more, through nearly one-half of the Confederate States, and sojourning for a time at widely different points, I met not one man, woman, or child who was not resolved to perish rather than yield to the pressure of ,arms, even in the most desperate extremity. And whatever may and must be the varying. fortune of the war, in all which I recognize the band of Providence pointing visibly to the ulti mate issue of this great trial of the States and people of America ; they are better prepared now every way to make good their inexorable purpose than at any period since the beginning of the struggle. These may, indeed, be unwelcome truths, but they are addressed only to candid and honest men. Neither, however, let me add, did I meet any one, whatever his opinions or his station, political or private, who did not declare his readiness, whenthe war shall have ceased, and invading armies been withdrawn, to consider and discuss the question of re-union. And who shall doubt the issue of the argument? I return, therefore, with my opinions and convictions as to war or peace, and my faith as to final results from sound policy and wise statesmanship, not only unchanged but confirmed and strengthened. And may the God of heaven and earth so rule the hearts and minds of Americans everywhere that with a Constitution maintained, a Union restored, and liberty henceforth made secure, a grander and nobler destiny shall yet be ours tha:i that even which blessed our fathers in the first two ages of the republic. "C. L. VALLANDIGHAM." 166 Ohio in the War. We have had occasion to notice that Governor Tod's faithful, zealous, and generally able administration was occasionally marred by foibles, and once or twice by serious mistakes. People laughed at some of his exaggerated and undignified expressions — as when he announced to the Secretary of War that it was well he did not know who was withholding certain supplies from the now troops, since, if he did, he "would whip the fellow, though he were as strong as Samson" — and it is always more unfortunate to an aspirant for public favor to become ridiculous than to make even serious blunders. But there was also a disposition to charge upon him responsibility for some needless expenses, some unfounded alarms, some unwise vigor in the business of arrests. The dissatis faction was not general, nor was it very well founded ; but it was sufficient to break the force of what might otherwise have proved a spontaneous movement for his renomination. As the determination of the Democratic masses to nominate Mr. Vallandig ham became evident, a growing sentiment began to appear in favor of casting aside all personal considerations, and nominating the strongest candidate who could be found, to head the Union ticket. It appeared that Governor Tod was not generally held to be that man ; and it was thought questionable whether, even if his ability were conceded, he would, under the peculiar circumstances, be the most available candidate. These considerations were having some weight, though Governor Tod still seemed to have the best prospects; when the managers of the two leading Eepublican newspapers of Cincinnati, apparently by a preconcerted plan, united in giving special prominence to a new candidate. John Brough had in times past been one of the most honored names among the Ohio Democracy. The man had been founder and editor of their great party organ, the Cincinnati Enquirer;* had achieved a remarkable financial repu tation as Auditor of State; bad been tendered foreign missions, and even a place in the cabinet of a Democratic President. He was reckoned one of their best stump speakers. He had been out of politics and engaged in managing rail ways for nearly fifteen years, so that his fame had become almost traditional, and his name called up associations with great campaigns and great leaders jvhom the party had canonized. He now appeared, almost unheralded, at Marietta, the home of his boy hood, to address an assemblage bf supporters of the war. The Cincinnati news papers two days later — on the very day on which they published the report of the Vallandigham Convention — spread his speech in full before their readers, not forgetting to suggest that the great Democrat who now gave such hearty support to the Government in its trials would be an excellent man to put up against the " Blue-light Convention and its convict candidate." f The speech was an admirable popular effort, and its instant effect was to make Mr. Brough * The paper had been in existence long before, but under Mr. Brough's proprietorship its name was changed to that which it has ever since borne, and such other changes were made as would seem to warrant the treatment of him as its founder. tThis was the phrase with which Hon. E. D. Mansfield headed an article in the Gazette od the nomination of Mr. Vallandigham. Vallandigham Campaign. 167 the most popular man in the State. The next day the Cincinnati 'Eepublican papers openly came out in advocacy of his nomination; the feeling spread like wild-ui*e, and when, in the next week, the Union Convention assembled at Co lumbus, it was seen from the outset that Mr. Brough had a majority of tho delegates. Governor Tod's friends, however, gave him an earnest support. The ballot stood, for Brough, two hundred and twenty -six; for Tod, one hundred and eighty-three and half. The Governor behaved handsomely. He addressed the convention, giving a frank expression of his natural disappointment, and assur ances of his intention, nevertheless, to do all in his power for the success of the ticket. The, enthusiasm of the convention was greatly excited by the address from the soldiers of the Army of the Cumberland, presented by Governor Dennison. This document, which had no small influence, both upon tho nominations and in the- subsequent canvass, was as follows : "Tetone, Tekbt., June 9th. " Gentlemen : You have been selected by the representatives of a very large number ofthe soldiers of Ohio, now serving with the Army of the Cumberland, to attend the Union Conven tion, called to assemble at Columbus on the 17th inst., for the nomination of Governor and other State officers. "We sincerely hope that neither the convention nor the people of Ohio, will deem this action of her citizen-soldiery as formed upon any mere desire to participate, even in the remotest degree, in party or political strifes at home, but solely from a most earnest wish that civil, State, and .political action may be so conducted as to contribute to the great objeet which" all true patriots, whether citizens or soldiers, must have at heart, the maintainance of tbe Government and the restoration of the Union. With parties, as such, we have long since ceased to sympathize, and to day the Army of the Cumberland has but this platform of political principles : ' An unlimited use of all the energies and all the resources of the Government for the prosecution of the war until the rebellion is subjugated and the Union restored.' Though formerly divided by all the party dis tinctions of their time, we are to-day a ' band of brothers,' standing firmly and unitedly upon this broad platform. We ask of each other no reason why we are so united, but we gratefully accept the fa.ct and let that suffice. We do not discuss whether slavery be right or wrong ; whether the slaveholder or abolitionist is the primary cause of the rebellion ; it is enough for us tbat the rebellion now exists, and that we are bound by the heritage of the past, and the hope of the future, to put it down. We did not refuse to sustain the Government before the Administration inaugurated the policy of emancipation. We will npt desert it now that it has. m The efficiency and continued harmony of your army depend, in a great measure, upon the State ..Government at homil It has pleased that Government to give us, while yet in the field, a voice at the polls. While eminent. civilians at home will doubtless be proposed to the convention as candidates for the gubernatorial chair, from whom a choice might be made that would command our cordial support ; still, if *uch choice can not be made with harmony, we beg to suggest the propriety of selection being made from among the many eminent public men Ohio now has in tbe field. Such a candidate, while being thoroughly acquainted with every want of the soldier, would, at the same time, possess equal ability to administer the domestic affairs of the State. For such a can didate we can safely pledge the undivided support of Ohio's one hu/ndred thousand soldiers. "Once more we call upon our friends at home to. stand firmly by the Government and its army. Mistakes in policy, if any such occur, are but the straw and foam that whirl and disap pear on the broad river of nationality, sweeping on majestically and undisturbed beneath them. , Under this Administration the American Union is to fall ingloriously, or be so firmly re-estab lished that the world in arms can not shake it henceforth, ahd none but traitors can withhold their support. Whatever will aid in crushing traitors is orthodox with us, regardless of what old political text-books say. We ask you to unite on our simple platform. 168 Ohio in the War. " The shifting scenes of National life are now changing with electric swiftness ; old ideas, theories, and prejudices are being hurried into their graves. With the stern realities of the liv ing present we must grapple boldly and act earnestly, or history will write over our National tomb that we of the North were unequal to the hour in which we lived. Let us labor on, then, patiently and zealously, each in his separate sphere of action— you as citizens surrounded by the blessings and the quiet of home, striving against traitors there— we fighting less dangerous foes on the fields which lie between them and the homes we love so well. Over these fields of carnage now we hope, by the blessing of God, to re-establish our noble form of American nationality, that shall yet bless the world as no government before has done. This, with you, we hope to enjoy wheu we have laid aside the character of soldiers and entered again the walks of peaceful life. " With highest regard, gentlemen, we have the honor to remain, " Very respectfully, your obedient servants, "GEO. P. ESTE, Colonel 14th O. V. I. "F. VAN DEB VEER, Colonel 15th O. V. I. " DURBIN WARD, Lieutenant-Colonel 17th 0. V. I. "To Hon. Wm. Dennison, Brigadier-General J. D. Cox, Judge Stanley Matthews, Colonel John M. Connell, Colonel James H. Godman."i The following declaration of principles, reported by Senator Wade, was adopted by acclamation : "Resolved, That the calamities of the present rebellion have been brought upon this Nation by the infamous doctrines of nullification and secession, promulgated by Calhoun and denounced by General Jackson in 1832, and reiterated by the convention held in the city of Columbus on the 11th instant.. We denounce them as incompatible with the unity, integrity, power, and glory of the American Republic. " Resolved^ That the war must go on with the utmost vigor, till the authority of the National Government is re-established and the old flag floats again securely and triumphantly over every State and Territory of the Union. "Resolved, That in the present exigencies of the Republic we lay aside personal preferences and prejudices, and henceforth, till the war is ended, will draw no party line, but the great line between those who sustain the Government and those who oppose it ; between those who rejoice in the triumph of our arms and those who rejoice in the triumph of the enemy. " Resolved, That immortal honor and gratitude are due to our brave and patriotic soldiers in the field, and everlasting shame and disgrace to any citizen or party who withholds it ; that, sym pathizing with the army in its hardships, and proud of its gallantry, the lovers of tbe Union will stand by it, and will remember, aid, and support those who are disabled, and the families of those wbo fall fighting for their country. " Resolved-, That confiding in the honesty, patriotism, and good sense of the President, we pledge to him our support of his earnest efforts to put down the rebellion. "Resolved, That the present Governor, David Tod, is an honest, able public servant, and tbat his official conduct deserves and receives the approbation of all loyal people. Mr. Brough signified his acceptance of the nomination, whieh he continued to protest was unexpected and undesired, in the following letter: * "Cleveland, Ohio, July 27, 1863. "Gentlemen: On my return home last evening I found your favor of 17th instant, an nouncing my nomination, by the Union Convention, as a candidate for Governor of Ohio. "You are fully aware, gentlemen, that this nomination has been made, not only without my solicitation, but against my personal wishes. The circumstances attending it, and the manner of its presentation, scarcely admit of discussion as to the course to be adopted. Personal considera tions must yield to the duty which every man owes to the State ; and therefore, while appreciating alike the honors and responsibilities of the position, I assume the standard you present to me, and, to the utmost of my ability, will bear it through the contest, whether to victory or defeat, those who have chosen me must determine. Vallandigham Campaign. 169 "I accept and fully approve the resolutions of the convention accompanying your note. My own position has been So clearly defined that I consider it unnecessary to restate it on this occasion. I have but one object in accepting the position your constituents have assigned me — and that is to aid you and them in sustaining the Government in the "great work of suppressing this most wicked rebellion, and restoring our country to its former unity and glory. ." Very truly yours, , JOHN BROUGH. " Messrs. Wm. Dennison, Pres't, John D. Caldwell, Sec'y, Union Convention of Ohio. " The campaign which ensued will long be remembered in Ohio as one ofthe most exciting ever known in her history. The meetings of both parties were unusually large — those of the Democrats being especially noticeable for unpre cedented numbers and enthusiasm. The ablest speakers on both sides traversed the State; and the newspapers gave almost as much space to tho canvass as to the great victories in the field, which soon came to inspire tho party of the Gov ernment. The tone of the Democrats, in spite of this revolution in the prospects of the war, was one of unabated defiance, and they proclaimed, on all hands, their determination to form an army to conduct Mr. Vallandigham home in case they should elect him. To the last they appeared confident of success, and the vote showed that they polled their full strength. On the other side a fuller vote was brought out than ever before at a gubernatorial election. Mr. Chase, then Secretary of the Treasury, set the example of "going home to vote"-^making for that purpose his first visit to Ohio since the outbreak of»the-war. Large numbers of clerks from the departments in Washington imitated his course, as did thousands of citizens scattered east and west through other States, on business or pleasure. The result was as signal as the struggle had been conspicuous. One hun dred thousand was the majority by which the people of Ohio put the seal of their condemnation on the course which Mr. Vallandigham had chosen to pur sue, and renewed their vows to continue the war, through good fortune or ill, to the end of the utter defeat of the rebellion. Mr. Brough's majority on the home vote was sixty-one thousand nine hun dred and twenty. Ofthe votes ofthe soldiers, forty-one thousand four hundred p and sixty-seven were cast for him, and only two thousand two hundred and eighty-eight for Mr. Vallandigham,* Brough's aggregate majority was thus swelled to one hundred and one thousand and ninety-nine, in a total vote of four hundred and seventy-six thousand two hundred and twenty-three. But Mr. Vallandigham had received the startling number of one hundred and eighty-seven thousand five hundred and sixty-two votes. In the election, one year before, the Democrats had carried the State — the soldiers not being per mitted to vote — by a majority of five thousand five hundred and seventy-seven. The change, in majorities, therefore, on the home vote alone was sixty-seven thousand four hundred and ninety-seven; while, including the soldiers' vote, it *Even this the soldiers spoke of as falling many thousands below the majority they would have given had tlie election come before the battle of Chickamauga. Great numbers of men who would have voted for Brough were left upon that unfortunate field — to linger out the war in Bebel prisons, or to be thenceforth reported " dead on the field of glory." 170 Ohio in the War. swelled to the enormous number of one hundred and seven thousand five hun. dred and seventy-six. The general feeling of triumph found expression in the editorial of tho Cincinnati Gazette the morning after the election — which may be taken as a fair indication of the temper of the times, and with which we may fitly close this condensation of the salient features of a great historical campaign : " VICTORY ! — NEMESIS ! " Thank God ! The good name of our State is once more free from stain 1 It was a disgrace to Ohio, loyal mother of us all, that such a man as Clement L. Vallandigham should be nomi nated by any considerable party of her citizens for any respectable position in the State; but right nobly has the disgrace been wiped out. Our people forgot party when patriotism was in volved ; and from the river to the lakes their condemnation of traitors and sympathizers with traitors has sounded out in tones so clear, so loud, that through the whole limits of this Nation, Rebel or Loyal, none can fail to hear. " If Ohio furnished the most conspicuous and persistent minion of the great rebellion, Ohio, too, has magnificently repudiated her recreant, banished sonl No, exiled citizen, not son! Thank God ! he is no son of Ohio, whom her people have loathingly spurned from his crouching position beyond the border. "Beneath our office windows the people of Cincinnati are thronging the public space in a wild exuberance of ecstatic joy they have not shown since the first proud victories of tbe war stirred the great heart of tbe Nation to its profoundest depths; and the name of the candidate whose high honor it has been to become the symbol of a State's loyalty is ringing in exultant shouts from square to square. " ' Count every ballot a bullet fairly aimed at the heart of the rebellion,' said the great min ister of finance yesterday.* They are counting the bullets thus truly aimed ! In the morning the State will count from our bulletins as the city counts to-night ; and as the reckoning is footed up, there will come a gush of joy, and of pride that overtops the joy. " It is no great victory that prompts this thanksgiving of the Commonwealth. It is simply the redemption of our fair fame! It is what we all knew the noble State must do, but what it thrills us to find she has done so superbly. " The estimates we thought the wildest are far outstripped. The State Central Committee talked of thirty-two thousand majority on the home vote. It will be fifty thousand ! At Colum bus they say it is more likely to be seventy -five thousand! And this is without our soldiers! Wait till their voice comes in, and the thunders of our home guns will be penny fire-crackers beside tbe reverberating roar of their artillery. " From acrossrthe water the echoes will soon come sounding back. There is an end of hopes for a desertion of their Government by the people; an end of hopes for a division at the North ; an end of expectations of peace save through the red gates of a war that knows no close but the close of Jhe rebellion it means to crush. "So much for the victory ! And now for the retributive justice it compels I "It has been no ordinary contest concerning disputed questions of politics. It was a grave attempt by certain leading men, enjoying the privileges of citizens of Ohio, to establish treason to tbe Government under the forms of law — to place the State in direct hostility to the General Government. For that crime, and for all the consequences that crime would have en tailed, had it been as successful as they strove to make it, we hold these men responsible now and through all their lives. For this sin there' is no forgiveness. " Political opponents from whom we differ we can yet esteem^ hut men who sought to dis grace the Nation by base submission to its enemies, or to dishonor the State by placing it with the traitors against the Government — why should they be less infamous evermore than the Tories and Cowboys of our earlier and less dangerous times of trial? "The prime mover in all the conspiracy is Clement L. Vallandigham. Let him px=s! Con victed by two courts, banished by the Chief Magistrate of the Nation, an appellant from that tribunal to tbe bar of his State, and by her cast off with an ignominy none other of her citizens $ This phrase had occurred in a speech by Secretary Chase on the election. Vallandigham Campaign. 171 ever received — branded traitor by the rulers, sealed traitor by the people — let him wander, out cast that he is, with the mark of Cain upon his brow, through lands where distance and obscurity may diminish, till the grave shall swallow, his infamy. "Ohio has had sons whom she delighted to honor; men crowned with her Senatorial bays, or chosen to stand and speak for her among the Representatives of the Nation. How had this foul rottenness festered in the State, that it could reach these men and blight them forever? In a moment of crp.zy delirium they permitted vexation at private grievances, or groveling fealty to party machinery by which they hoped to rise, or unmanly fear of party drill to conquer their consciences and their honor ; and to the horror of all who took honest pride in their fair names, they fell to be the seconds and adherents of the malevolent outcast. It is a hard fate for men who might have had large futures before them ; but stern justice demands that henceforth, to each one who loves the honor of his State, their names — they rise to all lips, we need not call them over — be held infamous for evermore. " There can be, there must be no escapei They will seek to evade the responsibility for their bold, bad attempt ; will shuffle, and equivocate, and deny ; but it must not be. As they have sowed, so must they reap. For the deceived masses there may be many excuses ; for the deceiving leaders none. To have been a Tory in the Revolution will seem a light thing in the years that come, beside having been a Vallandigham leader in the Great Rebellion." 172 Ohio in the War. CHAPTEE XIV. THE CLOSING FEATUKES OF TOD'S ADMINISTEATION. rflHEOTJGHOUT his term of service Governor Tod was zealous, watch- I ful, and pains-taking to a degree not common among officials of any grade. -"- After his defeat in the effort for renomination these qualities were more conspicuous than ever. None could fail to see that he was wounded by the treatment he had received ; but none could fail also to see that his efforts to serve faithfully the people who had elected him continued unabated till the last hour of his official career. We have already passed in review most of the events which make the period of his administration memorable in our history. It remains to speak of his continued efforts for recruiting the army ; of his continued care of tbe wounded; ofhis relations with the officers in the field; ofhis efforts for the protection of the border from minor raids ; of the discharges to the Squirrel Hunters, aud the re- enlistment of the veterans. The large numbers of men put into the field in 1862 left comparatively lit tle work to be done in the way of raising troops in Ohio in 1863. Throughout the year fifteen thousand and sixty new men were enlisted who, according to the Governor's calculation, i-aised the entire number furnished by the State to two hundred thousand six hundred and seventy-one. Of these a few were for missing companies in infantry regiments sent to the field before their numbers were completed, and a few for missing battalions in cavalry regiments in the field. A couple of six months' regiments were raised under the unwise call of the Government for such troops in June. A couple of heavy artillery regi ments were raised — one of them having for a nucleus a regiment of infantry already in the service; and -one or two new batteries of light artillery were formed. A regiment or two for service in guarding prisoners, and a negro reg iment completed the list of new organizations. Several that had been per mitted to enter the service as coming from other States, in the great rush for acceptance in 1861, were reclaimed. The rest of the recruiting, conducted by tho aid of the military committees * but mainly under the authority of United 'The services of these military committees throughout the war were most valuable, and were entirely gratuitous. They were originally appointed by Governor Dennison, and contin- Closing Features of Tod's Administration. 173 States officers, was for the old regiments, and under the stimulus of a desire to avoid the draft The grand total of these various efforts we have already given. But the grand feature of the enlistments for 1863 was one with which, from the nature of the case, the State authorities could have little to do. The Ohio ued by his successors, wife a few occasional changes caused by deaths or disabilities. The names of their members deserve an honorable record; and their organization at the close of 1863 gives about as fair a statement of the general working force as is attainable. We present the list, therefore, as it stood at that date : ' ADAMS. E. P. Evans, Ch'n. G. W. McKee. J. fti. Hook, Soc'y. T.J. Milieu. H. Sprowl. ALLEN. T. Cunningham, Ch. Shelby Taylor, Sec'y. A. N. Smith. leu ist li S. Pillars. Joseph W. Hunt. ASHLAND. L. J. Sprengle, Sec'y. William Osborn. W. H. IT. Potter, John D. Jones. B. 1). Frew. W. A. Boiler. C. C. Wick. ASHTABULA. Abner Kellogg. John A. Prentice. Edwin B. Williams. Ed ward A.Wright. J. D. Ensign, Sec'y. attti-ns. M. H.Greene, Ch'n. Hon. J. W. Bayard. H. S. Brown. Hon. L. L.Smith. S. W. Pickering, Sec'y. Capt. J. M. Dana. E. JH. Monro. W. B. Golden. AUGLAIZE. B.A.Wendlon,Ch'n. Col. John Walknp. John G. Bennett. David Simpson. William Bush. S. B.A y res. John Keller, Sec'y. BELMONT. D. D. T. Cowen, Ch'n. John Lippencott. Alex. Brannum, St. Clair Kelly. Lewis Boyer. William Smith. Hon. Wm. Keunon. BROWN. G. W.Kins:, Chairm'n Jacob Herinann. E. Blair. S. Hemphill. J. P. Biehn, Sec'y. BUTLER. N.C. McFarland, Ch. Alex. F. Hume. Israel Williams, Sec'y. Henry Bfmrdsley. J. 3d. Minikin. CARROLL. George Hardesty. William Doford. George Beatty. EdAvin Forrell. 0. A. Shober, Sec'y. CHAMPAIGN. , Wm. MaD.mald, Ch'n John H.Bryan. Thomas Chance. Isaac Johnson. R. C. Fulton, Sec'y, CLARK. JohnB. Jlagau, Ch'n. Alex. Waddle. Samuel E. Sturrcll. D. A. Harrison, Sec'y, Charles M. Clark. William S. Mcranda. Kreider Mower. v CLERMONT. Philip ii. Swing, Ch'n. B. W. Clark. John Goodwin. Dr. Cyrus Gaskins. Dr. John P. Emrie. B. B. Harlan. Ch'n. William C. Jfifo.. C. M. Bosworth. William JB. Fisher. A. W; Miller. J. Q. Smith. COLUMBIANA. Hon.L. W.Poncr. John Voglesong. .I.J. Boouc. Josiah Thompson. Juseph G. Laycock. COSHOCTON. Dr. A. L. Cuss, Ch'n. Houston Hay. Capt. E. Shail'i-r. Col. J. Irvine, Sec'y. Seth McOlain. Hon. John Johnson. CRAWFORD . T. J. Orr, Chairman. Jacob Scroggs. George Quinby, Sec'y. 11. C. Carhart. W. W. Bagley. CUYAHOGA. W.B. Castle, Ch'n. William Biugham. F. Nicola. E. Hossenmuellor. Col. George B. Senter. Stillman Witt. . 31. Banow, Sec'7- William Edwards. William F. Cary. DARKE. Daniel K. Davis. Capt. Charles Calkins. Capt. B.B. Allen. W.M. 'Wilson, Sec'y. DEFIANCE. Jonas Colby, Ch'n. John I'mw. S. A. Strong. John Paul. J. P. Buffington, Sec'y. DEU WAR B. Hon. T.W.Powell, CE. Robert McKinney. Charles Sherman. jHmes W. Stark. John W. Ladd. B. C. Waters. George F. Stayman. Hugh Cole. Burton Moore. ERIE. Hon. J. M. Boot, Ch. Henry C. Bush. Walter F. Stone. Capt. Thomas Fernald. Charles Bosford. FAIBt'IlBI/D. M. A. Daugherty, Ch. A. Syfert. - John Beber. P. B. Ewing. John li. McNeil, Sec'y. FAYETTE. Hon. J. Pursell, Ch'n. Peter Wendel. II. B. Maynard, Sec'y. Gilbert Terrill. James M. Edwards. FRANKLIN. John Miller, Ch'n, David Taylor. L. W. Babbitt. Peter Ambo's. John Field. FULTON . N. Merrill, chairm'n. Octavius Waters. D. W.'l-I. Howard. U. B. Verity. Sec'y. Joel Brigham. William Sutton. GALLIA. Joseph Bradbury. James Harper. Amos Kepley. Robert Biack. Wm. Nash, Sec'y. GEAUGA. Hon. D-.Woodbury, Ch. Erastus Spencer. Chester Palmer. Hon. P.Hitchcock,Sec. David Bobinson. GREENE. ' B. Nesbitt, Chairman. Capt. A. McDowell. E. H. Manger. Horace Bn-lsford. Joseph Wilson. GUERNSEY. Hon.C.J.Albright.Ch Joseph D. Taylor. Thomas 01 Ihani. Isaac Morton. Joseph Ferrell. HAMILTON. Gen. J. H. Bates, Ch. H«n. N.W. Thomas. Col. A. E. Jones. W. W. Lodwick. Jobn W. Ellis Francis Weisnewski. W. H.Davis, Sec'y. Thomas Sherlock. EH Muclimore. Amzi Magill. HAKCOOK. Edson Goit, Ch'n. J. F. Perky. Henry Brown, Sec'y. J. S. Patterson. J. B Rothschild. HARDIN. Henry Harris. B-iu. B. Brunson. II u;li Lot S" 11. B. L. Chase-. David Goodin. C. H. Gatch, Sec'y. HARRISON. . 0. Slemmons, Ch'n. James M. Paul. John Jamison. Harrison— Continued. Charles Warfell. S. B Shotwell, Sec'y. HENRY. E. Sheffield, Chairm'n. Cyrus Howard. Achilles Smith. James Durban. L. H. Bigelow, Sec'y. HIGHLAND. Dr. Wm. Smith, Ch'n. Dr. Enos Holmes. James H. Thompson. Col. Jacob Hyer. HOCKING. James B. Grozan, Ch. Alex. White. C. W. James. Capt. G. M. Webb. HOLM KB. ¦ Col. A. Baker, Ch'n, Dr. John G. Biugham. John Corbus. B. C. Brown, Sec'y. Trayer Anderson. John W. Vorhes. HURON. C. L. Boalt, Esa-, Ch. John Dewey. George G. Baker. Jehu Gardiner. J. M. Farr. C. A. Preston, Sec'y. JACKSON. Davis Mackley, Ch'n. Joshua E. Ferrell. George W. Johnson. James Tripp. J. E. Jones. John M. Martin. JEFFERSON. Col. G.W. McCook, Ch. R. (J. Hoffman. Joseph Means. Charles Mather. Beatty McFarlane. KNOX. . James Blake. C. H. Scribuer. T. P. Frederick. Adam Weaver. S. L. Taylor. Sherman Pyle, Sec'y. LAKE. Hon. S. S. Osborn, Ch. C. C. Jennings. Chas. D. Adams, Sec'y. Sellick Warren. D. B. Page. LAWRENCE. John Campbell. Hon. H. S. Neal, Benj.F.Ctfry. Ralph Leet. Thomas McCarthy. Wm. W. Kirker. John Merrill. LICKING. Joseph White. Col. Andrew Legg. Michael Morath. Dr. J.N. Wilson. Noah Wilkins. LOGAN. I. S. Gardner, Ch. John Underwood. log as— Continued. B. E. Bunklo. J. B. McLauhlin, Sec'y. Jobn Emery. Isaac Smith. LORAIN. H. E. Mussey, Ch'n. G. G. Washburn. R. A. How. Conrad Reid. J. H. Dickson. LUCAS. Gen. John E. Hunt.Ch. John J. M;iu<>r. George W. Reynolds. Capt. lt. Waite, Sec'y. Peter Lent. James W. Brigham. Peleg T. Clarke. MADISON. Thomas P. Jones, Ch. Gabriel Prugh. Benj. F. Clark, Scc'y. Oliver P. Crabb. Robert Armstrong. MAHONING. Hosea Hoover. Fred. W. Whitslar. John M. Edwards. C. Fitch Kirtland. F. 0. Arms MARION. John Merrill, Ch'n. Ainus H. King. Ira Ohler, SeeTy. Adam A ult. B. W. Davis. MEDINA. Hon. H. G. Blake. Ch. William Shakespear. N. H. Bostwick. Asaph Severance, jr. Ephraim Briggs. MEIGS. Hiram G. Daniel, Ch. David B. Jacobs. JH. B. Smirh, Sec'y. Nicholas Stanberry. Ed. Tiffany. MERCER. Dr. J. Tayler, Ch'n Wm.O., A. Munsel. Oliver Ellis, Sec'y. William Dickman. Adam Jewitt. an AMI. Hon.M.G.Mitchell.Ch. Dr. Harrison. Eobert L. Douglass. Charles Morris. William W. Crane. John Wiffgiu. James M. Bowe. MONROE. Hon. Wm. F. Hunter. Hon. J. A. Davenport. John Kerr, Esq. Stephen S. Ford. J . M. Kirkbride, Sec'y. MONTGOMERY. Hon. D. A. Haynes. James Turner. T. A. Philips. Geo. Startsman. Henry Fowler. B. W. Steele, Sec'y. 174 Ohio in the War. regiments in the field had dwindled from a thousand to an average of from two to four hundred each. They had been decimated in battle, had languished in hospitals, had borne the manifold sufferings of the camp and the march, had gone through a Red Sea of troubles, and even yet were far from the sight of the promised land. They had left families, unprotected, behind them; they felt that others at home should be in the rai^ks beside them; they saw as jet little reward for all their toils, privations, and wounds. With such a past and such prospects to contemplate, they heard the demand of the Generals for more troops. Their own terms of enlistment were expiring; long before the great campaign to which they were then looking forward should be ended many of them would have the right to turn their faces homewa»d. But, with a patriotism to which the history of the war furnishes no equal dis play, they turned from this alluring prospect, resolved that the vacant places by the loved firesides should remain vacant still, perhaps for the war, perhaps for ever, and pledged themselves to the Government once more as its soldiers to the end. Over twenty thousand vetei-ans, the thin remnants of nearly eighty reg iments of Ohio soldiers, re-enlisted for the war within a few weeks after the subject was first proposed to them. It was the most inspiring act since the uprising after Sumter. The Sixty-Sixth was the first of these regiments to return to the State after its re-enlistment, on the veteran furlough of thirty days, by which the Govern ment wisely marked its gratitude for their unexampled fidelity. It reached Military Committees for 1863 — Continued.. MORGAN. Gen. Jas. Cornelius. John B. Stone. Enoch Dye. Hon. W. P. Sprague. Hon. J. M. Gaylord. Joshua Davis. F. W. Wood. MORROW. A. R. Dunn, Ch'n. J. G. Miles. Wm. Chase. Bertrand Andrews. Dr. J. M. Briggs, Sec, MUSKINGUM. Hon. T. J. Maginnis. Valentine Best. Maj. B. W. P. Muse. D. McCarty. Perry Wiles. NOBLE. - J. Belford. John M. Bound. B. F. Spriggs. Wm. Fraser. John W. Tipton. OTTAWA. James Lattimore. Dr. W. W. Stedman. Cyrus WiUiams. IraDutcher, Sec'y. John Ryder. Aug. W. Lucky. PAULDING. F. T. Mellingcr, Ch'n. Isaiah Richards. S. B. Brown, Sec'y. John W. Ayres. Samuel Forder. PERRY. Col.N.B.Colborn. Ch. £. Rose. perry— Co niimtod. T. Selby. William Spencer. J. L. Sheridan, Sec'y. PICKAWAY. Geo. W. Gregg, Ch'n. James Reber. Joseph P. Smith. Isaac N. Ross. Nelson J. Turney. P.O. Smith, Sec'y. PIKE. Andrew Gilgore, Ch'n, PORTAGE. S. E. M. Kneeland. Alphonso Hart. Col. H. L. Carter. Philo B. Conant. S. D. Harris, jr., Sec. PREBLE. G. W. Thompson, Ch. Robert Miller. L. C. Abbott. PUTNAM. James L. Olney. John Dixon. Thos. J. Butler. John B. Fruckly. Jacob Shaff. _ ri en LAND. James Purdy, Ch'n. Thomas Mickey. Henry C. Hedges. B. S. Bunyan. A. B. Beverstock. H. P. Davis, Esq. ROSS. John Hough, Ch'n. AddiBon Pearson. Wm. T. McClintick. ross — Continued. Job E. Stevenson. Jobn 11. Allston. M. B. Bartlett. D. A. Schutte, Sec'y. SANDUSKY. Dr. L. Q. Rawson, Ch. James Justice. Oliver Mclntyre. Isaac Knapp. C. 0. Tillotson, Sec'y. SCIOTO. A. W. Buskirk. Samuel Maekh»n. Martin B. Gillret. John P. Torry, Sec'y. BENECA. J. M. Naylor, Ch'n. G. M. Ogden. Charles Foster. John T. Huss. Michael Sullivan. SHELBY. J. Cummins, Ch'n. John F. Fraser. Chas. W. Wells. J. S. Couklin. J. J. Elliott, Sec'y. G. BI. Russell. STARK. Hon. J. W. Under hill, Ch'n. John ''. Mnng. G. G. B. Greenwood. Anson Pease. S. Moi by. H. Knoblock. Jus. S. Kelly. D. B. Wyant. John F. Reynolds. John P. Rix. H. 8. Martin. SUMMIT. Col.L. P. Buckley.Ch, Henry McKinney. Heury Baldwin. Wm. 0. Sackett. Archibald shields. TRUMBULL. G. T. Townsend, Ch'n, JohnM. Stull. John R. Woods. Jacob \V. Pattengill. G. F. Townsend, Sec, TUSCARAWAS. John Sargent, Ch'n. John II. Barnhill. JohnHildt.Clark 11. Robinson. K. Burnett. UNION. P. B. Cole, Ch'n. J. A. Henderson, Sec. J. R. Smith. A. F. Wilkins. Joseph Newlove. VAN WERT. E. P. Edson, Ch'n. A. McGavren. Robert Conn, jr. James Webster. Wm. Patterson, Sec'y. VINTON. Francis Shades, Ch'n. Isaac Brown. Charles Brown. E. P. Ambrose. J. S. Hawk, Sec'y. WARREN. B. W. Gilchrist, Ch'n, Wm. H. Clement. Thomas Allen. w a rren— Continued. Dr. J. Scott. J. S. Bee.se. J. S. Totter, Sec'y- WASHINGTON. Col.W. R. Putnam, Cii. George W. Baker. S. T. Cooke. Mark Greene. John Newton. WAYXE. Dr. L. Firestone, Ch. J. H. Buniganlner. David Bobiusun. Robert Donclly. R. B. Stibbs. Constant Lake Aug. McDuhuld. WILLIAMS. S. E. Blakslee, Ch'o. James Bell. A. M. Pratt. J. N. How. J. Pollett. J. Touse, Sec'v. woon. Dr. H. A. Hamilton Chairman. Jus. W. Boss. E. Graham. George Lackey. Col. J. T. Norton. WYANDOT. J. Y. Bobcrte.Ch'D. S. H. Hunt. J. D. Sears. S. H. White. T. E. Grisoll, Sec'y. Closing Features of Tod's Administration. 175 Columbus on the 26th of December, 1863, The Twenty -Ninth soon followod, and after it in rapid succession came a stream of them — the Tvvelfth7the Four teenth, tho Seventeenth, the^Nineteenth, the Twenty -Third, the Twenty-Seventh, the Thirty First, the Thirty-Sixth, the Thirty-Eighth, the Thirty -Ninth, the Forty-Third, the Forty-Fourth, the Fifty -First, and all the rest of tho noble list. The Twenty-Third, Colonel E. B.'Hayes, was the first in which re-enlist ments had begun.— the work being fairly commenced in its ranks in October. The Thirty-Ninth, Colonel B. F. Noyes, furnished a larger number of veterans than any other regiment from the State. The number from each, as well as from several organizations credited to other States, but wholly or in part raised in,Ohio, may be found set forth in the following table :* INFANTRY. ' No. Regiment. 1st.; , 2d...4th.. 5th. . 7th..8th.. 9th.. 10th.11th. . 12th. 13th.. 14th..15th. . 17th .. 18th . 19th . 20th... 21st..'.22d... 23d.... 24th.. 25th..26th.. 27th.. No. Men. 3 33 47 127 20 6 34 70 204181 322302366 62 312 306275 31 257 65 203187 437 No. Begimunt. 28th 29th ' . 30th 31st 32d 33d 34th 35th: 36th 37th 38th 39th 40th 41st 42d 43d 44th 45th 46th 47th 48th 49th 51st 52d No. Men. 62 269301277304 229312 3S 364218360534179211 2 436453 2 288233254314260 4 No. Begiment. 53d. 54th 55th 56th57th 58th. 59th61st. 62d.. 63d. . 64th65th66th67th68th 69th70th71st. 72d..73d. 74th 75th76th. 77th No. Men. 380 153310280213109 1 243292 455 226171 269246300348332313261247321 66 252304 No. Begiment. 78th 80th.. 81st... 82d. ....... 90th.... 95th 104th ....... 110th 113th 2dBat.V.R.C.18th Indiana.. 52d " 57th 10th Tenn 14ih Kentucky 1st West Va... 4th5th " 9th 11th " 66th Ilinois.... No. Men. 303245136291 1 211 4 1 11 2 18 1 4 87 126 58 2 92 CAVALRY. No. Regiment. 1 No. Mon. No. Regiment. No. Men. No. Regiment. No". Men. No. Regiment. ' No Men. 285358 307205127 6th 264 44 81 1 62 4th Pa. Cav ... llth ' " 2nd Ind. Cav„ llth 9th Ills. Cav.J. 3 36 34 1 5th Iowa Cav.. IstW.V.Cav.. 2d " 5th " 7th " " 1 2d 11th 'M'Lauglin'sSq 5th Indp. Batt. Merrill's H'se. 29 3d 333 4th 3 5th 51 *Adjjutant-General's Report for 1864. 176 Ohio in the War. artillery. ?\o. Regiment. No. Men. >o. Regiment. N31. Men. No. Regiment. No. Men. No. Roginient. No. Men. l3t — Liillt 515 4th Ind't Batt. 26 lOthlnd't Batt. 34 25th Ind't Batt 109 1st — Heavv 17 5th 9 12th " 33 1st Kv. Bait... 17 1st — Mounted... 115 6th 66 14th " 77 1st Mo. L. A... 1 1st Ind'pt Bat... 17 7th 22 15th " 10 IstW.Va.L.A 14 2d " .. 31 8th 24 16th 80 1st Pa. L. A.... 9 3d " .. 46 9th 41 17th 1 Total number 20,708. Thej- rekindled the fires of a glowing patriotism throughout the State. They fanned the work of recruiting to a flame. Thoy shamed out the sullen spirit of opposition to the losses and inconveniences ofthe war which had culmi nated in the Vallandigham movement. They secured the devotion anew of the State, and all that it contained, to the great struggle. And for themselves, they found how warm was the popular gratitude, how tender the care for the soldier, how lavish the generous regards of those from whose homes they had been beating back the horrors of war. They were the honored guests of the State, were feasted at every table, were toasted at every assemblage, were pointed out to the little children wherever, they passed as the men who were saving the Nation, were showered with the smiles of beauty and the blessings of ago. It has been said that one negro regiment was raised in 1863. More ought to have been secured ; let it never be said that it was the fault of the colored men themselves that they were not. At the first call for troops in 1861, Governor Dennison was asked if he would accept negro volunteers. In deference to a sentiment then almost uni versal, not less than to the explicit regulations of the Government, he replied that he could not. When the Emancipation Proclamation changed the status of negroes so completely, and the Government began to accept their services, they resumed their applications to the State authorities. Governor Tod still discouraged them. He had previously committed himself, in repelling the importunities of their leaders, to the theory that it would be contrary to our laws, and without warrant either in their spirit or letter, to accept them, even under calls for militia. He now did all ho could to transfer such as wished to enlist to the Massachusetts regiments. The Adjutant-General, in his report for 1863, professed his inability to say why Massachusetts should be permitted to make Ohio a recruiting-ground for filling her quotas. If he had looked into the correspondence which the Gov ernor gave to the public in connection with his message, he would have found out. As early as May llth the Governor said, in a letter to Hon. Wm. Porter, Millon, Ohio : " I do not propose to raise any colored troops. Those now being recruited in this State are recruited by authority from Governor Andrew, of Massachusetts." * - • Ex. Doc, 1863. Part I, p. 270. Closing Scenes of Toes Administration. 177 A few days later he wrote to John M. Langston : "As it was uncertain what number of colored men could be promptly raised in Ohio, I have advised, and still do advise, that those disposed to enter the service promptly join the Massachusetts regiments. . . . Having requested the Governor of Massa chusetts to organize the colored men from Ohio into separate companies, so far as practicable, and also to keep me fully iidvisod of the names, age, and place of residence of each, Ohio will have the full benefit of all enlistments from the State, and the recruits themselves the benefit of the State associations to the same extent nearly as if organized into a State regiment." * And to persons proposing to recruit said companies he wrote that all commissions would be issued by the Governor of Massachusetts. In this course he had the sanction if not the original suggestion of the Secretary of War. Afterward his applica tions for authority to raise an Ohio regiment were for some time refused, but finally he secured it, and the One Hundred and Twenty-Seventh was the quick result. Unfortunately it was numbered as the Fifth United States Colored. The result of all this was that Ohio received credit for little over a third of her colored citizens who volunteered for the war. To the end Governor Tod continued to add to the weight of the debt the State owes him for his zealous care of her wounded. Immediately after Stone Eiver .he sent Surgeon-General Smith to the battle field with forty surgeons and nurses. That very efficient officer had learned by past experience the necessity for a longer period of additional aid to the sur geons in the field than had been customary after great battles, and accordingly he now took none who were not able to remain in the hospitals for at least a month's service. Such. of the wounded as could be properly transported were sent home on the steamer Emerald, which was chartered for this pui'pose by the Governor, and was sent out under the care of Dr. E. N. Barr, as Medical Director, and Mr. Octavius Waters, as commander. Large expenditures were thus incurred, but the grateful thanks of many rescued soldiers who had been ready to perish were the more than sufficient return. Soon after General Grant, by the brilliant campaign below Vicksburg, had gained the rear of the besieged city, another hospital steamer, the St., Cloud, was sent by the Ohio authorities to gather up the wounded who had been left along the line of the rapid march. As in all previous cases, the Cincinnati Sanitary Commission and the Columbus Ladies' Aid Society gave liberal assist ance in furnishing the boat with supplies. It went under the care of Mr. Waters, as commander, and Dr. A. Dunlap, of Springfield, as Medical Director. At the mouth of the Yazoo they were met by an order from General Grant that "none ofthe sick and wounded should betaken from Vicksburg by hospital boats from any of the States, for the reason that the United States had sufficient means of transporting their wounded in their own boats as fast as it could be done with safety." Eeturning thus disappointed, they found an opportunity to do good service by carrying timely re-enforcements to repel an attack on the * Ex. Doe., 1863. Part I, p. 271. "Vol. I. — 12. 178 Ohio in the War. the colored troops at Milliken's Bend, in progress as they arrived. At Memphis they were again met by an order from the Secretary of War forbidding tho further removal of the sick and wounded to their respeative States. Defeated in the^objects of their mission they could only distribute their supplies and return with a few wounded officers. With this, Governor Tod's effort with hospital boats ended. When the battle of Gettysburg came to break the gloom which, toward the middle of 1863, was settling upon the country, the Governor promptly ten dered to the Surgeon -General ofthe United States medical assistance to any extent, but it was declined, with the assurance that the Government had made full provision for the comfort of the wounded in all respects. The'State Surgeon- General subsequently saw occasion to express his regret that he had not taken the want for granted, accepted the numerous offers from the best physicians of the State, and taken a corps of them directly to the battle-field. Some agents were, however, sent to look after the Gettysburg wounded; and the efficient State Agent at Washington labored zealously for the welfare of all of them who came within his reach. The State Agency system at the various points of most importance was kept up with excellent results. The Governor now also kept the Eev. E. A. Howbert — an Ohio clergyman who, throughout his administration, was employed in work for the soldiers — travel ing through the Eastern armies (as well as once or twice through the Army of the Cumberland), reporting to him the condition of Ohio soldiers, informing him of the special wants in each locality and of cases of neglect, and thus enabling him to give proper direction to the efforts of the various organizations furnish ing volunteer aid to the men in the field. In a hundred other ways the Governor manifested the same watchful care for the wounded, which really forms the most beautiful feature of his work, and his highest claim to the gratitude of the State. He urged and urged again upon the Secretary of War the speedy discharge to their homes of men no longer fit for duty. He insisted that the paroled Ohio prisoners at Annapolis, whose distressful condition awakened the sympathies of all, should be speedily sent to Ohio hospitals, as near as possible to their respective homes. Wherever it seemed at all possible he urged also the removal of Ohio patients in other hos pitals throughout the country, either to their homes or to hospitals within the State. In certain cases he insisted upon changes of Medical Directors, as when* he declared that, from sources entitled to his fullest confidence, he was assured that Dr. Irwin, then director at Memphis, was not fit for his place. Often he wrote letters in behalf of distressed parents to surgeons in distant hospitals asking for whatever was needed for private soldiers, facts of their last illness, removal of their remains, and the like. Again and again he was forced to refuse patriotic ladies, and even school-girls, permission to enter the army lines as hospital nurses ; but he took care to soften the disappointment as much as possible. From scores of such letters this one must suffice: * Ex. Doc, 1863. Part I, p. 142. Closing Features of Tod's Administration. 179 " Columbus, January 24, 1863. " Miss Rosella Rice, Perryville, Ohio : "Dear Girl: Your kind and benevolent letter of the 19th instant, asking a passport for a friend to visit her gallant boy at Bowling Green hospital, is before me, and it causes me great pain to be compelled to say that I can not comply with your generous request. Our brave army near Nashville is suffering for the want of food, and the entire army under General Rosecrans is in peril for the want of re-enforcements. This state of things made it the imperative duty of General Rosecrans to forbid all travel of civilians over the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, and my painful duty to carry out his orders to that effect. Your pleading letter came near swerv ing me from my duty, and yet I am glad that I possess the official firmness to deny you. " Very afiectionately yours, DAVID TOD, Governor." What he could and what he could not do to further their wishes he wrote owr and over, with like care and tenderness, to anxious wives and mothers and Bisters all through the State;- and wherever the authority of the Governor of Ohio could, within his knowledge, help to smooth the pillow of a sick or wounded soldier ofthe State, the effort was made. He was heartily sustained and assisted throughout in this good work by Surgeon-General Smith, a man whose tender care and sympathy will long be gratefully remembered by the soldiers he served so well. Governor Tod did not escape without some difficulties with the officers in the field. Indeed, such is the anomalous position of these officers, indebted to the Governor for their commissions, and looking to him for promotion,* yet owing him no obedience, that difficulties could scarcely be avoided. He wrote tartly to Colonel Casement that he learned with surprise of the Colonel's course in disregarding his action under an order exempting certain privates from punish ment for absence without leave, and that he must insist on prompt compliance and no controversy .f Colonel Hildebrand having expressed dissatisfaction with the promotion of a Sergeant, the Governor told him the circumstances com manded a more respectful tone, and then patiently explained.J He had Cap tain Leggett dismissed the service for writing what he styled a foolish and inflammatory letter which appeared in the newspapers, but asked his re-instate- ment after he had explained that it appeared in a garbled form, and was not intended for publication || He utterly refused to acknowledge Colonel Anson McCook's claim that no one but the commander of the regiment should have anything to do with the appointments in it.§ To Colonel Lane's claim of a similar nature he offered a similar response.** Nearly all these differences with officers rose out of the vexed question of promotions. On this subject he adopted no fixed rule. Sometimes he promoted in accordance with rank, sometimes against it ; sometimes in accordance with the wishes of the Colonel, sometimes against him. Hs successor, adopting a uniform rule, was to find it almost equally productive of embarrassments. The transportation of soldiers over the railroads of the State, on fur lough, sick-leave, and the like, grew to be an important feature of the State work. It was committed to the Quartermaster-General, who. finally made an * Up only, of course, to the g'rade of Colonel. t Ex. Doc, 1863, part I, p. 163. X Ibid., p. 165. 1| Ibid., p. 171. § Hud., p. 173. ** Ibid., p. 177. 380 Ohio in the War. arrangement with the several companies for transportation at the uniform rate of one and a half cents per mile. Tickets were at first given to the railroad agents, to be issued to those entitled to them. Afterward, when this was ffound to involve some practical difficulties, the charge of these tickets was committed to the State agents, and ultimately the sale of tickets on credit to soldiers was reduced to as narrow limits as possible. Some three thousand dollars were reported by the Quartermaster-General as probably lost in this w;1y — a sum altogether insignificant when compared with the great convenience and saving to needy soldiers. The militia transported to the musters in 1863 were carried at the same reduced rates, the railroad companies generally giving a cheerful acquiescence to the view that it was their duty thus to make sacrifices for the common cause as well as others — the more, inasmuch as their property was peculiarly exposed to the hazards of war from which the soldiers protected them, and as their business was also measurably augmented by the lower rates. The manufacture of ammunition at the State arsenal was continued up to August, 1863. when, owing to difficulties in getting supplies of powder from the Ordnance Department at Washington, it was abandoned. Under a resolution of the Legislature, discharges in due form were fur nished to the " Squirrel Hunters " who, in the preceding year, had rushed to the defense of Cincinnati. The numbers sent from each county thus came to be ascertained with at least an approximate degree of accuracy. They are set forth in the following table : COUNTIES. Number. COUNTIES. Number. COUNTIES. Number. COUNTIES. Number 250163104366 160 1.326 '116 14 201 459 442607337 31 454 6658 25 244 1,093 199 675 3 504 170 55 203 45 295 200 256 129 561 404 178295 197149 80 103 92 425266 3217 150261372258 50 137 Allen Franklin 1S4 84 Shelby W Mahoning 333 Guernsey Hamilton Summit Trumbull HI Ml Carroll 8fl Champaign Clark j Montgomery... Van Wert 95 Hocking 4,36 Muskingum ... 285 30 Pike . . 72 35 Preble Erie 1,5,766 Faii-field Mr. Edson B. Olds, whose arrest for speeches calculated to discourage enlist ments in the first year of Tod's administration has been mentioned, had been released. He now procured a warrant for the arrest of Governor Tod, on the charge of kidnapping, under an old State law. His movements were adroitly timed so as to carry the Governor to the Fairfield Cojirt just after its adjourn ment, and thus secure his incarceration, for a few days, at least. But Judge. Gholson of the Superior Court promptly issued a writ of habeas corpus, and tbe Closing Features of Tod's Administration. 181 Governor was finally permitted to give bail for his appearance at the next term of the court. The main object of the arrest — the hope to retaliate for Old's im prisonment in kind and humiliate the Governor, was thus defeated, and the whole movement finally came to nothing. . Hon. E. D. Mansfield, the Commissioner of Statistics, reported at the close of 1863 that out of five hundred and fifty-four thousand three hundred and fifty-seven able-bodied men, whom his calculations upon the census returns showed to be embraced in the population of the State, one hundred and forty thousand were then absent in the service, of had died or been disabled in it; leaving the great reserve of four hundred and fourteen thousand three hundred and fifty-seven from which re-enforcements could yet be drawn. Two-thirds of the able-bodied men ofthe State were thus left at home to carry on her agri culture, manufactures, and commerce, in spite of all the pressure of the war. "Ohio," he exclaimed, "if we consider the progress of machinery, has no longer any thing to fear from the reduction of her industry." He further deduced, from the election returns, the conclusion that the State, in spite of all losses, had thirty thousand more able-bodied men in the autumn of 1863 than in the autumn of 1860; and that the loss of able-bodied men in the State, traceable to the war, had as yet only amounted to twelve thousand seven hundred and eighty. In such condition the State found herself at the close of her second war administration. Governor Tod conducted his closing work, with dignity and continued zeal ; made provisions for burial places for Ohio soldiers ; watched to the last over the safety of the Border; took vigorous measures to repel the danger that once threatened from piratical incursions organized in Canadian waters; and took especial pains to leave the organization ofthe militia in a satisfactory shape. In his last message he tersely recited the work the State had done, urged an increased tax levy for the relief of the families of soldiers, and advised an increase in the salary to be paid his successor, commensurate with the labors and expenses of the position. He laid down his office, perhaps not quite so popular as when he had entered upon its duties, yet with a better title to popularity. It was indeed easy to ridicule some of his peculiarities. He was a trifle pompous in his style — some what sophomoric, not to say egotistic, in habitually referring to the soldiers as "my gallant boys" — given to puerile exaggerations, as when he declared that the people were determined to "put down the accursed rebellion, whether that take seven days or seven hundred years."* He made some mistakes of undue vigor, and some of his operations entailed expenses not wholly necessary. But he was zealous, industrious, specially watchful for the welfare of the troops, faithful in season and out of season. He was at the head of the State in the darkest hours through which she passed. He left her affairs in good order, her contributions to the Nation fully made up, her duties to her soldier sons jealously watched, aad her honor untarnished. *Ex. Doc., 1853, part I, p.' 166. 182 Ohio in the War, CHAPTER XV. THE OPENING OF BROUGH'S ADMINISTRATION— HIS CARE FOE THE SOLDIERS, AND THE STRIFES TO AVHICH IT LED. ON" the llth of January, 1864, John Brough became Governor of Ohio. He brought to the office a larger reputation for ability than either of his predecessors during the war. He came in on the topmost wave of an unparalleled popular enthusiasm, backed by such a majority as no Governor of the State had ever before received, sustained by a public confidence that hesi tated at no demand, and was ready for any sacrifice for the war. In his inaugural address he gracefully recognized the true significance of his wonderful triumph. "It was no mere party triumph," he said, "no individ- ual success. No mere partisan effort could have achieve^ such a victory; no man in the State isjrorthy^jrfj^ ovation:" " It was." he continued, "a spontaneous declaration of the intense loyalty of our people to their Government — beariftg with it the stern commandment that every energy of their Sta.te and every exertion of its rulers shall be given to the restoration of that Government to its original unity and power. It not only relieves us of all .mere partisan trammels and affinities, but it commands us that, for the time being, these shall be laid aside until the great purpose is accomplished of restoring our country to a position in which partisan contests may be indulged without involving our nationality, and party yictories be won without their possible results giving encouragement to. Bebels in a^-ms against the supremacy ofthe Constitution and laws of the land. In that spirit I accept the iate declaration of our common constituency, and humbly thank them that in this particular they have made my path easy and straight before me." Toward the close of his inaugural he gave voice to another lesson of the great campaign which had ended in his triumph. " We want peace," ho said — "the North as well as the South — but we have not passed the terrible ordeal of the last three years to make or accept peace upon any other than honorable terms. "VVe can not negotiate with Eebels in arms, or admit of anything from them but unconditional surrender and submission. . . . The past has its punishments that may be mitigated or forgiven, but the future must have full and ample security. . . . There are but two ways in which tho restoration of peace and the Union is to be accomplished: first, the unconditional surrender Opening of Brougifs Administration. 183 of the leaders and the abandonment of the rebellion ; or, second, the continued progress and conquests of ou-r arms until the military power of the Confederacy ib broken and the heart of the rebellion crushed." In such spirit and with graceful reference to his predecessor,* he entered upon the duties in which he was to make the last great offering to the cause. The only recommendation to the Legislature which Governor Brough felt called upon to make in his inaugural, was one which was to prove a conspicu ous feature of his administration. He insisted that tho tax for the aid of sol diers' families was not half large enough. He objected to Governor Tod's rec ommendation that it be doubled, that even this increase would be too small to do justice either to the people or the soldiers; and urged that the work was a debt due the soldier, and should not be left to private contributions. To the arguments in favor of leaving this relief to charitable efforts, he made, at somo length, this reply : "1. That if the State acknowledges this obligation to the family of the absent soldier, she should meet it as a compensation for his services, and in a manner fully equal to the necessities of the case. "2, Private contribution is not equitable in its character, and can not be adjusted to the prop erty and interests that are protected by our armies. The generous will give beyond their actual abilities, while the parsimonious, or the opponent of the war, will withhold from pecuniary or unpatriotic considerations. Taxation alone will equalize this burden, and impose it, where it should rest, upon the property protected by the services that the revenue is intended to compen sate. .If the additional levy increases the taxation of" generous contributors, it relieves them from a larger amount of private bounty, and imposes it upon the non-contributors, where it should fall. Even when the State assumes the entire support of soldiers' families, there will be scope enough for private contributions to alleviate the privations and sufferings of sick, disabled, and wounded men in hospitals and at home. ''3. The form of private charity is not always acceptable to its recipients, and especially the class to whom this ia applicable. Much suffering and privation will be endured before pride will suffer application to private charity, where there is a consciousness that meritorious services of the absent provider should promptly call the State to the protection and support of his de pendent family. We should divest this fund of the appellation of charity. It is not such, in any application of the term. It is an honest debt, and an imperative duty, that we owe the inen who are serving us in positions of labor and danger. They save us from invasion — from the destructive ravages of war. within our borders. While they press the conquests of our arms for the restoration of our Government, they protect our property and our lives ; they are the con servators of all the prosperity that surrounds us. They do not perform this service for the small compensation allowed them by the Government. They are actuated by a higher and a nobler motive ; and while they incur privations, danger, and death for the common cause, the State should not only protect their families from want, but make the act one of right and justful compensation, instead of burdening it with the offensive appellation of charity. Neither should it be governed by the rigid economy of mere subsistence. It should be at least such plenty and comfort as the stalwart arm of the natural provider would furnish them, if he were at home to do it, instead of laboring in our service, to ward calamity from our hearthstones. "In my judgment three mills on the dollar is the least sum at which this tax should be * "His arduous labors have contributed in no small degree to the gratifying results presented to you ; and it is a pleasing reflection that the people of the State will be able to follow him into his present retirement from executive duties with the grateful plaudit of ' well done, good and faithful servant.' It will be an abiding pleasure to me if, at the end of my own brief service, I shall be able to attain alike his usefulness and his reward." 184 Ohio in the War. fixed, and I would prefer to see it four mills. The patriotic people of the State will cheerfully pay it, and justify you for imposing it. The act should also require county commissioners to collect reports of disbursements from township and ward trustees, and communicate their aggre gates annually to the Auditor of State." # The Legislature, accepting these views, yet fearful of such heavy taxation as they proposed, passed a bill levying a tax of two mills on the dollar, giving county commissioners power to add another mill, and city councils authority to add half a mill more. Township and county officers were charged with tbo proper distribution of the fund, but in case of their failure or misconduct, the Governor was authorized to interfere. •As soon as this measure became a law, the Governor gave earnest attention to its enforcement. He presently found a tendency to obstruct its operations, in regions where the political belief of the majority had suffered defeat in the de feat of Mr. Vallandigham. Township officers neglected, or openly refused to do their duty. Thereupon Governor Brough appealed to the military committees: " Executive Department, Columbus, April 5, 1864. "TO THE MttlTABY COMMITTEES OF THE STATE OF OHIO : "Gentlemen: I send you, herewith, a copy of the act passed by the recent General Assem bly, 'for the relief of the families of soldiers and marines in the State and United States service, and of those who have died or been disabled in such service.' I especially call your attention to the eighth section of the law, and on behalf of our soldiers and their families earnestly ask your co-operation in giving it efficiency. "There are almost daily complaints to this department, that township officers in certain localities are indisposed to administer this fund in the manner evidently designed by the General Assembly. Women complain of being rudely treated — of being compelled to travel long dis tances to get signatures of officers, and then being allowed very small amounts, of being almost insultingly catechised as to their means of support, and divers other hindrances and oppressions. I have been unwilling to believe that men, trusted of their fellow-citizens, would or could make of their offices a means of oppression upon the weak and helpless families of the brave men who are fighting our battles, and keeping the tide of rebellion from our borders; but inquiries made of military committees have brought replies even worse than the original complaints. lam mortified that these things are so; but while this evil spirit works with those who set party spirit above patriotism, and political resentment above the obligations of public duty, the friends ofthe country and its brave defenders must contribute a portion of their time and trouble to aid in th» enforcement of the provision made by the law to remedy these evils. Except through occasional correspondence, I can not be advised of these cases where the law is wrested to private purposes, and its operations hindered and embarrassed. I request you, therefore, to eo-operate with me in this particular. Where township officers do not faithfully administer the law, I hope you will at once present the facts to your county commissioners. If they neglect or refuse to act, please notify this department, and at the same time indicate good and loyal men who will undertake the performance of the duty. Be assured of prompt and decisive action in this quarter ; and in cases where you report to me specific facts, 1 will put them in such attitude that the people of the State shall see and know the means resorted to for the purpose of injuring the cause of the country and its soldiers at the same time. I do not doubt your cordial sympathy with me in this work; for it is a duty we all owe, while our soldiers protect us abroad, to look to the support and com fort of their loved ones at home. "The act is unusually clear and explicit in its provisions. If, however, controversies arise as to its intent and meaning, I hope you will freely state them, and, as far as I can do so, I will aid in solving them. The law was enacted in a spirit of liberality and justice, and it should be so administered. It does not dole out a charity, but awards what is justly due to its citizens who have voluntarily left their peaceful avocations to protect the State, and aid in crushing au unholy rebellion against the peace and unity of the Nation. "Very respectfully, JOHN BROUGH." Opening or Brough's Administration. 185 This appeal he supplemented with the utmost personal watchfulness. In some cases he found that boards of township trustees, composed of partisans of Mr. Vallandigham, had actually set asido this money from its legitimate use, and added it to their bridge funds! Wherever he had occasion to suspect unfaithful ness, he summarily dispossessed these officers of their power. As the year passed away he found his fund exhausted, and the winter bringing prospect of suffering. To meet the want, he made an official appeal for private con tributions: " Executive Department, Columbus, November 14, 1864. "To the Military Committees: "The chilling blasts give token of approaching winter. How are the families of our brave soldiers prepared to meet it, and pass through its trials ? The long-continued campaigns — the almost constant moving of troops, has rendered difficult, and in some cases impracticable, the punctual payment of the men. They have not been able, therefore, to remit as much as usual to their families. In the meantime, the prices of food, clothing, and particularly fuel, have largely advanced, and many families will want the means of comfort and sustenance unless our people are liberal of their gifts. " We must not weary in well-doing. How much of our prosperity and security we owe to our army in the field can easily be understood and appreciated by every citizen of the State. I do not ask charity for the families of these men, I ask open manifestations of gratitude for their labors and sacrifices, and a liberal recognition of the obligations we are under to them. The general sentiment of the men is, we want less in the field and more at home. The State agencies have done a great work this year for our men, as the forthcoming reports will show you. Now that the winter is upon us, while we do not neglect the sanitary work in the field, let us direct a larger portion of our energies to the wants of the families in our midst. Thursday, the 24th instant, we will devote as a day of thanksgiving and prayer to Almighty God for His mercies and blessings. We will be strengthened and made fervent by so doing. Let us thereupon devote Saturday, the 26th, as a day of feasting and jubilee to the soldiers' families. "In cities and towns fuel is a most important item. Call upon farmers and friends to come in with their wagons loaded with wood, and let them make it heaping- measure. Of their abund ant crops of potatoes, apples, grains, and vegetables, let them make liberal contributions. Do not confine this to county seats; but let the same be done, in all the towns of the county where there are families needing aid. The committee can readily organize a small body of respectable citi zens at each point, who will attend to receiving and distributing all such contributions. I need not go into the details. ' Start the noble work in your county, and hundreds of willing hands will be put forth to aid you. "Clothing is much needed among these families, 'especially in towns and cities. Almost every family can contribute something in this particular ; but wealthy men can contribute money, either to buy clothing or to purchase fabrics which thousands of our countrywomen, with busy fingers, will fashion into garments for the needy. "The appeal is to all our people. Do not be backward or hesitating on this day of jubilee. Have no fears that too much will be contributed. There is more necessity than ever before. The large number of men furnished this year; the putting forth of the National Guard, and the advance in the prices of the necessaries of life, have all drawn heavily on the relief fund. In many counties it has been anticipated and exhausted. You are not likely to exceed the actual wants of the soldiers' families ; but even if you should contribute somewhat to their comfort, or even luxury, it will be a very small equivalent for the protection you have received, and the pros perity you have enjoyed. "I respectfully urge the committees to give this matter special and immediate attention. Give full notice of the movement. Let the call upon the people be widely circulated. Give a few days to perfecting the arrangement. The time is small compared with that expended for us by the men at the front. ¦ See that the relief contributed is extended to its object; and thus we will make this a day that will gladden the hearts of wives and kindred at home, and strengthen the arms, and reanimate the courage of husbands, fathers, and brothers, in the field. It is a noble work, let it be well done. Very respectfully, JOHN BROUGH." 186 Ohio in the War. While thus giving unusual attention to the wants of the soldiers' families, he continued the work, so well begun by his predecessors, of watching, through the various military agencies of the State, over the troops from Ohio in every field. /The Legislature, on his suggestion, increased the number of these agen cies to twelve. As far as possible the men selected for each were peculiarly adapted to the work;* the system of their operations was carefully revised ; and something of the same close management, industry, and economy were infused into the business for which the Governor had been noted, in past times, in his railroad operations. Of the results attained in these agencies a fair idea may be derived from the report of the most important of them, that at Wash ington, where to be an Ohioan came to be regarded among the soldiers as a dis tinction, insuring kindly treatment and watchful care in all emergencies. The materiaf portions of this report for the year 1864 are as follows : " The Agency has furnished during the year five hundred and ninety-three thousand eight hundred and eighty-seven miles of transportation to individual enlisted men from Ohio, amount ing to eight thousand six hundred and fifty-six dollars and fifty-six cents, on which there was a saving to them of two thousand six hundred and forty-four dollars and forty-two cents; which sum amounts to more than your agent has charged to the expense account of your Agency. " The Agency has collected at the Paymaster-General's Department, for individual Ohio sol diers discharged the service, something over one hundred thousand dollars. It has collected from the different departments, and remitted to soldiers' families and citizens of Ohio, free of cost, some one hundred and fiftv thousand dollars. It may not be out of place here to note one spe cial case. A claim of the Franklin County, Ohio, Infirmary on the Government for two thou sand five hundred and sixty-six dollars had been repeatedly rejected (although it had all the influ ence that gentlemen in high official positions could give it), or payment refused for a greater sum than nine hundred and odd dollars. The full amount was obtained, thus saving to that charita ble institution an important fund. " It has attended to the wants and furnished gratuitous information to at least six thousand correspondents. " It has given counsel and relief to . over ten thousand Ohio soldiers who have called at ite office. "It has visited, or caused to be visited (for the purpose of relief ), in the hospitals of Wash ington, Alexandria, Baltimore, and Annapolis, many thousand sick and wounded soldiers of the State. During the spring, summer, and autumn of the past year it has had its relief agenta in the armies of the 'Potomac' and 'James,' who have rendered essential services, not only to the soldiers of Ohio, but to those of other States. "It has received and distributed among the sick and wounded men of Ohio, in the field and hospitals, seven hundred and fifty packages of sanitary stores, the most of which were sent by the patriotic and self-sacrificing ladies of Ohio. "On the arrival of the National Guards (Ohio 'one hundred days men') in Washington, your agent addressed to each of the commanding officers a letter, of which the following is a copy: * The assignment was as follows : Washington Jas. C. Wetmore. New Orleans Lorin R. Brownell. Louisville Vesalius Horr. Columbus Jas. E. Lewis. Nashville D. R. Taylor. Cincinnati D. K. Cady. Chattanooga Royal Taylor. Cleveland Clark Warren. St. Louis Weston Flint. Crestline W. W. Bagley. Memphis F. W. Bingham. Gallipolis R. L. Stewart. Of these the Cleveland, Crestline, and Gallipolis agents were paid each five hundred and fifty dollars per annum ; the New Orleans, Memphis, Nashville, and Chattanooga agents, one thousand five hundred dollars per annum, and all the rest cme thousand two hundred dollars each. Opening of Brough's Administration. 187 " 'Ohio State Military Agency, Washington, D. C, May, 1864. " ' To Colonel commanding Regiment Ohio N. G.: "'Sik: It would afford me pleasure, as far as I am able, to answer the call of your Surgeon in charge, approved by yourself, for sanitary stores, for use of the sick in your regimental hospital. " 'I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, (Signed) " 'JAMES C. WETMORE, O. S. M. Agent.' " The severe epidemic that prevailed in many of those regiments during their short term of service called largely for relief, and which your Excellency's foresight, and the generous contri butions of the 'Ladies' Aid Societies' of our State, enabled your agent to respond to the many draughts made upon him for such assistance. "The amount disbursed for the relief of sick, wounded, and unfortunate Ohio Boldiers, since your Excellency placed a fund in the hands of your agent (March 1, 1864), has been seven thou sand one hundred and fifteen dollars and twenty-seven cents, which amount went directly for the benefit of our soldiers, except a small amount for labor. The agents, whose names have been reported to you at different times, are Ohio gentlemen who kindly volunteered their services free of charge. "It has obtained from the Secretary of War, Adjutant-General, Surgeon-General, and Com missary-General of prisoners important orders affecting the interests and welfare of Ohio soldiers." 3 I An example of the special results attained after great battles may be found in the operations of the Ohio Agency after the battles of the Wilderness. One of the persons sent down to Fredericksburg with stores for the wounded, Mr. John Hopley, made a report, of which this is the substance : "There are, I judge, over five thousand wounded at Fredericksburg. They are not lying in the streets, so that our patrol can not pass, as was reported, but nearly every house contains wounded men. All of the public and very many of the private buildings, especially the large ones, are crowded from basement to attic. In the way of comforts and supplies a gradual improvement is daily evident, but everything is still very difficult to get. For some days the commonest necessaries were wanting, and a vast amount of increased suffering was in conse quence added to the terrible aggregate of human agony everywhere patent. For many days even after my arrival, which was a week after the sick and wounded had been sent there, there was no regularity in the feeding of the wounded, and scarcely anything for them but plain hard tack and coffee, and poor at that. There were no beds, and frequently no blankets, for upon the set ting in of hot weather the men had thrown them away, and thousands were lying upon the bare floor. For many nights there were no lights in many of the hospitals, and the sufferers had to lie and groan in torture through the terrible darkness, with no possibility of being relieved. The first fearful duty of the morning would be to distinguish the sleeping from those forever.at rest. One surgeon to over two hundred men would be a fair estimate. Under these circumstances what attention can our brave citizens obtain who have arrived at that terrible crisis in their career when bleeding and dying for us is no longer a rhetorical ornament? Their wounds are often undressed for days, and when at length dressed, then not by professional hands or with the requisite appliances, for on Wednesday I heard a hospital surgeon say there was not a pound of simple cerate in the city. As an instance of what I have said, a brave Ohio boy, to whom I took a tin cup of beef soup,- and who declared he was only slightly wounded — having an arm broken by a round shot which had also carried away a finger — said he had to go two squares to get some one to pour cold water upon his arm, which had not been dressed since the previous morning, being then four P. M. Opposite to our State agency rooms is a house filled with wounded, many of whom having thrown away their blankets, were lying on the bare floor ; some without arms, some without a leg, and others more fearfully and fatally wounded. These, for twenty-four hours had no food but what the Ohio Agency supplied, and for many long, weary hours, loaded with pain, not a surgeon could be spared to attend to them. When it is remem bered that our effective army must be supplied at all hazards, that two weeks ago we did not pos sess Fredericksburg, and that the collection of the wounded there has been sudden and unex pected, it can not be laid to the charge of the powers that be, that these sad things are constantly occurring, while it can be said that at least a slight improvement is daily perceptible. 188 Ohio in the War. "Upon my arrival I found several gentlemen already sent forward by Mr. Wetmore, to whom I was instructed to report, and who had already been for many days actively at work dis tributing- such supplies as had been forwarded. The Sanitary and Christian Commissions were also making themselves beneficially felt; but the feeling prevailed tbat the former was not doing as mueh-as the latter nor coming up to the expectations of those who supposed themselves capa ble of judging. Possibly the demand upon the Sanitary Commission was so very great that it was kept constantly drained, but it was very difficult to get anything from it. As an instance coming under my own experience, I took up for Mrs. Swishelm, who was in charge of the Theater Hos pital, a requisition for six crutches, three shirts, three pairs of drawers, and three bottles of brandy, or some other stimulant. I took the requisition at her request, and stated that she had almost the entire charge of a hospital in which were very many legless and armless sufferers, and upon the requisition all I could get was a single bottle of sherry wine. Again, its men came fre quently to our State agency rooms and were freely supplied with many things, and instead ofthe Sanitary Commission supplying us, we, in many cases, supplied them. Considering the amount of funds the State of Ohio, through her sanitary fairs, has poured into the treasury of the Sani tary Commission, I think it was a part of the duty of the Sanitary Commission to put themselves in communication with the Ohio State Agency and offer to supply whatever stores might be needed; but nothing of the kind was done. I think the State of Ohio had a right to expect this, and that there was a neglect of duty somewhere that it was not done. It is but my own opin ion, and your Excellency may think otherwise. It further seemed to me that the sanitary people had, with their greatness and extended resources, so entangled themselves with routine formali ties and red tape that they were unable to be as promptly and effectively useful as the less liber ally endowed Christian Commission. "I am proud of our own State Agency. Through the promptness of Mr. Wetmore, and the activity of the gentlemen he had sent there, the State of Ohio has been effectively and benefi cially felt ; but I fear not so much among the brave citizens of our own State as they had a right to expect. Our gallant Buckeyes are scattered through the city in many houses widely sepa rated, and they are often surrounded with citizens from other States which have no Soldiers' Aid Agencies established there. Under these circumstances it is impossible to discriminate, and cruel to do so. The wounded man from Illinois or New York is, when before us, as much entitled to our sympathy, and to whatever comforts we may have to dispense, as our own brave Buckeyes; and we can not, while administering to the wounded of Ohio those comforts and luxuries the liberality of her citizens have provided, refuse to other, and perhaps more severely wounded citizens around us, that alleviation of their sufferings which it may be in our power to bestow. Thus I found the Ohio Relief Association constantly betrayed by the circumstances surrounding us into being a Relief Association for the wounded of the whole Union. This is neither fair to the Ohio boys who need Ohio's fostering care, nor to the citizens of Ohio at home who have determined that the citizens in the field should be well cared for, and yet, as I experienced the situation of affairs, it could not be amended." And, to conclude this imperfect exhibit of the workings of the State Agency system, we may add the substance of the Eeport for the Nashville Agency: " Number transportation tickets sold 3,132 Amount of money receivable for same $4,647 29 Amount of money collected on soldiers' account $24,528 70 "There have been a large number of soldiers assisted in collecting their pay, whose names do not appear on my books. The actual number of persons assisted in various ways can not be given, but that the number is large there can be no doubt. The expenses of this office (exclusive of agents' salary, as established by law) are eleven hundred and fifty-four dollars and ninety-two cents. "The present system of furnishing our discharged anO. furloughed soldiers transportation is not equaled, I think, by any State represented in this department. It often occurs that there is such a call for transportation at the Government office at this place, that men are compelled to await their turn one or two days ; but by taking the State tickets they are relieved from any delay or extra expense. "Since May 1st I have kept a full record of Ohio soldiers admitted to hospitals at and near Opening of Brough's Administration. 189 this place. This has proved very useful in furnishing friends a ready reference, and of great assistance to me in answering numerous letters of inquiry. From such record I find that the following changes have taken place since May 1st, as follows, viz.: "Number of Ohio soldiers admitted, including those in hospital May lst...v 10,970 Number transferred North 4,429 Number returned to duty 1,765 Number discharged 32 Number furloughed 1,397 Number died ? 277 "The move made by Governor Brough and yourself to have a portion of the donations from the generous people of Ohio sent, through you, to the State Military Agents, to be distributed by them directly to Ohio soldiers, has met with the hearty approval of our soldiery, and if the sat isfaction manifested by them is a fair index, the scheme has proved a success. Since June 3d I have received sanitary goods, etc.: "From yourself... 200 pkgs. From Cincinnati Br. U. S. Sanitary Commission, as per your order 15 " From Milford Center Aid Society 4 " From Unionville Aid Society 1 " From unknown sources 2 " "Total number packages 222 "Of which the following 'disposition has been made: "Forwarded to Agency at Chattanooga 68 pkgs. Delivered to U- S. Christian Commission as per your request 5 " Distributed from this office and to hospitals 109 " Remaining on hand 40 " "Total number packages..... 222 CONTENTS OF PACKAGES. Opened for Distribution. Shirts 549 Drawers prs. 191 Stockings prs. 245 Pants .' prs. 11 Coats 22 Handkerchiefs 625 Towels_ 263 Arm-slings Housewives 54 Slippers 39 Quilts 10 Sheets 24 Distrib uted. 4841S9 243 3 22 450 212 24 39 3 24 On Iliii.d 65 2 2 175 51 21 30 Opened for Distribution. Pillows and Pads 1025 Pillow-cases 207 Rolls Bandages 1339 Pkgs. Rags 1648 Pkgs. Lint 20 Bottles Cordial 325 Can Fruit 275 Pkgs. Dried Fruit 69 Pounds Apples 1318 Pkgs. Herbs 33 Can Butter 1 Distrib uted. 902 207 11391348 17 304 262 60 1318 13 1 On Hand. 123 200300 3 21 13 20 "Owing to the difficulty in obtaining transportation during the past few weeks, I have been compelled to retain quite an amount of goods intended for the agency at Chattanooga. Although the distribution of goods- adds largely to the duties of this office, we have the satisfaction of knowing that much distress is relieved, the popularity of our State increased, and that our extra labor is appreciated by the soldiers. "Upon entering this office Governor Brough placed at my disposal a special fund for reliev ing extreme cases pf necessity, for which no other provision was made. From this, and funds £ent me by benevolent persons, I have been enabled to relieve many of the most distressing cases imaginable." 190 Ohio in the War. It may have been observed that the State Agency system, under tho increased vigor infused into its workings by Governor Brough, opened the way to com plications with the Sanitary and Christian Commissions. These organization not uunaturally sought that the contributions for the soldiers should pass through their hands. The State authorities preferred to have the control. Clashings arose; and, in one or two cases, open and very unpleasant controversies. In his message in January, 1865, the Governor condensed his reasons for turning the stream of good works for the soldiers as far as possible into the channel of the State Agencies: "There are many benefits attending this system, which should not be disregarded. " 1. It is decidedly the most economical way of aggregating and distributing the contribu tions of our people, and expending the means appropriated by the State for this purpose. "2. It renders certain the distribution of all supplies to the objects and purposai for which they are intended. There is hardly a possibility for misappropriation. There is no machinery about it to be kept lubricated, and no class of middle men to levy toll upon it. "3. By proper care and management it is made more prompt and energetic than any other mode; and, by being more systematic, will be more general and appropriate in its relief. "4. It fosters and gratifies the State pride of our soldiers. It comes nearer to the feeling of home. An Ohio soldier regards an Ohio Agency as a place he has a right to enter and expect a welcome. If he' is in want, there is no system of orders or requisitions for him to go through — no prying and unpleasant catechism for him to submit to. The supplies furnished by his State and his people are there ; and he feels that he is no object of charity when he partakes of them. His remembrances of home are freshened — his attachment lo his State is quickened and increased — and he goes away feeling that he is not neglected or forgotten — that the cause of the country is still worth upholding, and the dear old State still worth defending from the encroachments of the Rebel adversary. And this is doubly the case when the agent passes almost daily through his hospital — bends over the bed on which he is stretched with sickness or wounds — inquires kindly into his wants, and ministers unto them from the benefactions of his people, and the liberality of his State. Surely that spirit is worth cherishing and preserving. "While I do not seek to limit the contributions of our people through other channels, I invoke their attention to their own agencies, and their active co-operation in the labors of the opening year. If earnest, benevolent citizens will organize a central association here, I will be glad to work with them. If our aid societies are satisfied with the present system of working through the Quartermaster's Department, we will continue it, in the hope it will be much enlarged — that our supplies will be increased — and our soldiers comforted and strengthened under the perils and sufferings they are called to endure." And in a letter of instructions to his agent at Louisville, in reference to the claims of the Sanitary Commission,' the Governor entered somewhat more into detail : "The point submitted in yours of the 3d inst., is somewhat difficult and complicated. We desire, as far as practicable, to work in harmony with the Sanitary Commission; but there are circumstances to be taken, into account which we can not disregard. "1. Many of our aid societies have adopted tne principle that their labors and collections shall be devoted to Ohio men first, until tbey are fully cared for. Where they so direct, accom panying their contributions, their requests must be complied with. "2. Many of these societies desire that their aid shall be State aid, and administered as such. Whether rightfully or wrongfully, they have more confidence that supplies through this channel will more certainly reach and benefit the object of their care and bounty. "3. It they desired their contributions to go through a common stock, either of the Sanitary, or any other association, they could so send them, without cost of transportation to the State, or trouble to the agents, and at the same time, deprive the State and the aid societies of any State credit in providing or disbursing them. Opening of Broughs Administration. 191 "4. Many soldiers feel that the relief associations are charities, but that State aid is a right which they may claim without any delicacy. This is acknowledged on the part of many of our people, and the principle is worthy of encouragement. " The main cause of trouble with the Sanitary Commission, which is now alienating the gen erous people of this State from it, is that it will not permit any other exertion ; will not allow any rivalry in the good work ; demands a monopoly of all the donations of the people, and the dis tribution of them without any check or investigation. Its publications declare that the people of Ohio have constituted the Commission the 'sole almoners of their bounty' — the people say they have done no such thing. " The State officers and agents have no desire to monopolize relief, or to break down or drive the Sanitary Commission from the field. We are willing to work • alongside of them, to do all the good we can ; to aid them when short of supplies ; to give them full credit for what aid they may render us, but we can not put our contributions for Ohio men into their general pot, and then receive it, or a fraction of it, back, on orders, as Sanitary stores. " Such a demand, on their part, is unreasonable, and is made in a spirit of superiority anfl monopoly. Our position is a clearly proper and defensible one ; and we shall steadily hold it. We would avoid conflict — we desire to work in harmony. ' " Our people have given hundreds of thousands of dollars to the Commission, let that be administered for the purpose of its donation. What these same people give to the State authori ties, will he distributed under State authority, for the benefit of Ohio men. We will do this in N the spirit of kindness and co-operation. If the Commission is not satisfied, and chooses to cut off supplies from Ohio men, because the State desires to aid them, let that position be assumed and made known. The State and its people will be found equal' to the emergency. We do not desire to invite or provoke such a result, but we will not shrink from it if forced upon us as a retaliation for attempting to preserve the character and identity of the State in the care of its soldiers. " Your duty, therefore, in this matter, while a delicate, is a firm one. "Avoid controversy and strife; but minister to those under your care the comforts that are sent to them. When our people or myself desire to use the Sanitary or any other commission to do the work of your agency, you will be regularly notified. Until then, pursue the straight line of duty, kindly but firmly. If a room is found necessary for your supplies, get it as economically as you can. If you find help necessary in the Tyork of receiving and distributing, more than you , have, you- are authorized to employ it. But in all assume no prerogative, and gwe no unneces sary offense. Work in harmony as long as it is possible to do so, making all proper concessions, but not yielding the great principle that the State will look after her sons, without accepting the dictation or patronage of any institution." The most serious difficulty, however, was that in which the State agent became involved with the Sanitary Commission at Washington. The trouble here was primarily about a contract made by the Commission with the Balti more and £)hio, and connecting roads, by which all soldiers for Northern Ohio were forced to go over these roads, and thus to make long and expensive detours from their direct routes home. As a practical railroad man, Governor Brough saw at once the injustice andthe motives of this arrangement. As soon as com plaints began to reach him, he directed the State agent to take entire charge, thenceforth, of the supply of transportation to Ohio soldiers going home. Against this the Sanitary Commission protested. The feeling grew bitter, and Borne things that had been better unsaid, crept into the newspapers. In how temperate and wise a spirit of moderation Governor Brough him self viewed the controvei-sy may be seen in his own hand-writing, in a letter preserved among the State archives for the year 1864. "I am afraid," he wrote to his agent, " that you have a little too much personal feeling in regard 192 Ohio in tpie War. to the Sanitary trouble. Public servants must remember that great public inter ests must not be affected by personal wishes or feelings. The interests of others are involved in this matter. We have soldiers to be fed and cared for. In this work the Sanitary Commission is doing well." And to this he added these golden words of advice: "In everything that affects the interest of out- soldiers we must conciliate where necessary; we must heal and not widen breaches; we must crucify personal feelings; we must bear injuries as they como rather than resent them when no good will follow. In this case, as in all others, we must not provoke a conflict, and if it must come, let us be suro that we are in the right. We must not weaken confidence in an institution that is doing good, even though it commit some errors."* But, with all his moderation, he was immovable in his resistance to what he regarded as the encroachments of the Sanitary Commission. He would not place the State machinery for tho relief of her soldiers in its hands. He would not withdraw his agents ; would not give them the money and stores from the State; would not yield his personal responsibility for the soldiers sent out by his constituents. In the case of the railroad imbroglio at Washington he finally ended the controversy as follows : s " Executive Department, Columbus, January 20, 1864. " Fbed. N. Knapp, Esq., Associate Secretary Sanitary Commission, Washington City, D. ft.- "SrB: Your communication of December 23, addressed to Governor Tod, has come to my hands. Of the accompanying correspondence I had been in possession for some weeks. My personal knowledge of this ticket department covered much more than the topics of this contro versy. I do not propose to follow the intricacies of the controversy itself, but to deal as briefly as possible with the facts. " 1. I concede to the Sanitary Commission all tbey claim as to the motives which actuated their principal officers in this arrangement for soldiers' transportation. I cheerfully acknowl edge their great^bors and usefulness in the work of ministering to the comforts of soldiers. I impeach them with no frauds or attempts at fraud. Yet they are but men, and may err in judg ment, even where motives are pure. " 2, I hold they did err in judgment first, when in organizing this plan they gave a monop olizing control to one line of road out of Washington and its connections; and second, when a controversy arises they at once adopt the independent ticket office of that road as a part of their own organization, and defend it with great zeal against all charges. This ticket office is not under your control. It is the office of the Baltimore anil Ohio Road; the agent is appointed by them, reports to them, is paid by them, and, of course, works for them. He is independent of you, and you can not know what he does only as he sees fit to disclose to you.' He has injured you, and he can continue to do so. He is an agent to be watched, and not to be implicitly trusted. " 3. The argument that is made by Mr. Abbott to you in favor of giving a monopoly in this transportation to the Baltimore and Ohio Road is unsound in this, that that' road makes a ter mination and connections at Wheeling that disables it from accommodating many Western sol diers in direct routes of travel to their homes. Their ticket agent will always send over his whole line, while many a soldier would be facilitated in getting to Pittsburg. Let me illustrate: I have known soldiers for Fort Wayne, and parts west of it, sent, via Wheeling, Columbus, and Indi anapolis. Look over the map for the detour. I know of three soldiers going to Winchester, Ran dolph County, Indiana, sent on tickets to Indianapolis, Indiana, seventy-five miles west of their destination, with no further transportation; for, iioni that point I passed them home. Soldiers from Northern Ohio have been sent to Wheeling, thence back to Wellsville, and thence to Cleve- * Letter to'James C. Wetmore, February, 1864. Letter Books Brough's Administration, State Archives. Opening of Brough's Administration. 193 land and Toledo. All these should have had transportation to Pittsburg, whence they had straight roads home, All these things are within my personal knowledge. Granted there was trouble in getting the Northern Central Road into the arrangement. They did come into it for Northern Pennsylvania soldiers, for Ohio soldiers at Governor Tod's request, and would, with a fair distribution of business, have done it with you. Mr. Abbott's argument shows that he was as willing to get rid of them, upon a slight refusal, as he was anxious to give a monopoly to the Baltimore and Ohio Road. I do not attribute to him any bad motive in doing so, but the fact is none the less fixed. " 5. Here, therefore, is the root of the evil. Mr. Abbott did not understand all the ramifi cations of these routes of communication. He did not foresee that in a great work of this kind he must have not only immediate but remote lines open to him. He did not comprehend the fact that Pittsburg was a more important distributive point for Northern and Central Ohio than Wheeling. He was not versed in the sympathies of trunk lines and their connections. He wanted to do with one party only. Granted that orders have been given to send soldiers by the direct routes. The ticket agent interprets that for himself, and acts for the interests of his em ployers. You can not know his transgressions ; you can not control his acts ; you can do noth ing but implicitly take his statements, and become at once his shield and defense. Hence what was intended for a good thing for soldiers has, by a mistake in the beginning, and interested management on the part of railroad agents vested with its monopoly, become a source of strife, and, in some cases, of small wrongs and oppression. Monopolies always produce such results. " 6. It was partially in view of this that Governor Tod organized his system of furnishing half-fare transportation to Ohio soldiers, and intrusted his tickets to his own-agent. He could not have them sold at that office, and his agent bore many complaints before he gave a public caution to Ohio men. "7. A strict construction of M. Wetmore's card, I admit, implies a censure upon the Sani tary Coinmission. If I had written it I would have embraced the ticket agency alone. And yet, as the beginning of the trouble is in your granted monopoly (which was an error of judg ment and not of intention), you should not blame him for his course in not more strictly defining the line of responsibility. "8. I attach very little importance to the case of McDonald, except as to its having been the initial point of this controversy. Mr. Wetmore has affidavits of other cases. Still others have been matters of complaint here in Ohio, and others, and more flagrant ones, have come under my own personal observation in Ohio and Indiana. Because you are ignorant of any other than the case of McDonald, if for 'nothing else, I acquit the sanitary committee, as a body, of any knowl edge or complicity in this thing, except the great mistake in the beginning. " 9. The controversy has been a very unpleasant one. I would regret it were it not that I see that good will come from it. The officers of this State do not desire any collision with the Sanitary Commission. We would much rather co-operate with them ; but when we know that they have, however honestly, made a mistake, we shall not hesitate to protect our soldiers from the results of it ; and especially will we not permit them to grant as a monopoly the whole mat ter of transportation from Washington when, through our own agents, we can do better for our soldiers. " 10. No further good can come from a prolongation of this controversy. I respectfully sug gest that the sanitary committee not only send all Ohio soldiers to the Ohio quarters for trans portation, but protect them from being seized at the ticket office on their grounds ; and that, on the other hand, Mr. Wetmore withdraw his card, and co-operate in works of kindness with you. So shall both State and Sanitary Commission work together harmoniously for a common purpose, the protection of the interests of the soldiers. " Very respectfully, JOHN BROUGH." The Commission was unable to deal with these trenchant statements, but it never regarded the Governor afterward with a kindly eye. With its Western Branch, however, his relations were generally cordial, as they were also with the Christian Commission everywhere. The State Quartermaster was directed to take charge of all contributions Vol. 1.— 13. 194 Ohio in the War. which the people might prefer to send to the soldiers directly through the medium of the State Agencies. The supplies thus forwarded were liberal, and it was believed that they were distributed to the soldiers for whom they were intended with more accuracy, promptness, and economy than could havo been secured in any other way. How conciliatory in wish, yet firm in action, Governor Brough was as to his relations to" outside organizations for relieving the soldiers, we have been seeing. It remains to observe that his patience gave way, and his strong passions were inflamed to the utmost at any maltreatment of Ohio soldiers in hospitals. Other errors he could regard with charity; but this was a crime for which he could scarcely find words to express his feelings, or hot, vigorous action prompt enough to satisfy his demands. He kept a watchful eye upon .all the hospitals where any considerable num bers of Ohio troops were congregated. The least abuse of which he heard was made matter of instant complaint. If the Surgeon in charge neglected it, ho appealed forthwith to the Medical Director. If this officer made the slightest delay in administering the proper correction, he went straight to the Surgeon- General. Such, from the outset, was the weight of his influence with the Sec retary of War that no officer about that Department dared stand in the way of Brough's denunciation. It was known that the honesty and judgment of his statements were not to be impugned, and that His persistency in hunting down offenders was remorseless. Into the details of his dealings with hospital authorities we can not enter. But the cases of the Camp Dennison and Madison Hospitals may serve as illus trations. Through the autumn of 1864 complaints as to the food of patients at Camp Dennison were rife — particularly complaints as to the food of convalescents. To these the Governor promptly called the attention of Surgeon Tripler, the Medical Director at Cincinnati. That officer sent up Surgeon Stanton, a cou.sin to the Secretary of War, to make an investigation, the report of which was duly forwarded to Governor Brough. The two letters from him thus evoked do, perhaps, some injustice, or, at least, express a possibly harsh judgment. But as instances ofthe rough, sturdy way in which he stood up for his wounded men, like a bear for its wounded cubs, of the pitiless severity with which he cut through all excuses for mistreatment ofthe soldiers, and of his utter indifference to mere considerations of social and official standing in the persons whom ho attacked, they are unique. No soldier will read them without fresh feelings of gratitude to the strong champion who thus espoused his cause against all comers: "Executive Department, Columbus, November 29, 1864 "Surgeon C. S. Tripijbk, Medical Director, Pincinnati, Ohio: "Sib: Absence in part, and in part other, objects, have prevented an earlier response to your favor of September 26th, inclosing report of Surgeon Stanton, touching the complaints of bad treatment of our men at Camp Dennison. "Upon a careful reading of the report of Surgeon Stanton, I was forcibly struck with th« fact that, while he admitted that insufficient and deteriorated food was furnished the men, and the Opening of Brough's Administration. 195 hospital fund largely reduced without providing an equivalent to the sick aud wounded, he was utterly unable to discover by what process this was accomplished, or upon whom the responsi bility of this state of things should rest. Whether this defect of vision was personal or official — artificial or real — I had not then any means of determining: but I have always entertained the opinion that an honest public servant rarely finds a dishonest effect without being able to trace it to the proper cause. I was very far from being satisfied with the superficial and gingerly report of Surgeon Stanton. The reports to me of the gross wrongs perpetrated on sick and wounded soldiers at Camp Dennison had become a serious matter. I had several times pressed you for an investigation. You finally send me a report which admits all that has been charged; measurably evades the point of liability, rather seeking to cover up than expose; presents facts that tell an open story of wrong, if not of fraud; and glosses all over with glittering generalities and specious phrases without vigor or honesty of purpose. Still no remedy was proposed ; no change of offi cials recommended ; no remedy for the wrongs or sufferings of our men pointed out ; but the scarred and wounded veterans of a score of battle-fields were coolly sacrificed to the esprit de corps of the medical profession. I felt that your blood would be stirred by this thing; that your repu tation, if nothing else, would spur you to a further investigation of this wrong, and an applica tion^ a remedy. I waited sometime patiently for such a demonstration, but it came not. I then instituted inquiries on my own account. By whom , and in what manner, lam prepared, on a proper occasion, to disclose. It must be sufficient for the present purpose to state that I offi cially indorse the parties making it, as capable, truthful, and honest men. No information of theirs comes from hospital patients — but from undoubtedly reliable sources. "The three following points are clearly established: "1. That the quantity of the food provided for the convalescent soldier in this hospital for the past six months, has been entirely inadequate. " 2. The quality of an important article — coffee — has been deteriorated. "3. The variety which is designed to be furnished to the sick under the name of delicacies, has been deficient. "4. The question of the capacity or honesty of the Surgeon-in-chief is left to conjecture; from the facts, charity pointing to the former in the absence of the actual and positive proofs as to the latter. " I am willing to accept the first part of the suggestion myself; but unwilling that it shall any longer work injury and wrong to our soldiers. "During all this time it i^ shown, as by Surgeon Stanton, that full rations have been drawn, and a good quality of articles furnished; but the men have not reaped the benefit; and the sick and" wounded have languished for the delicacies which the hospital fund should have furnished. " In relation to the article of coffee it is found : " 1. That instead of the issue of the original berry parched, to be ground in the hospital kitchens, a large coffee-mill has been procured, and the coffee drawn from the Post Commissary has been ground in the large mill, and issued in that form. "2. The cooks have been instructed to save their coffee grounds after boiling, dry them,; and then return them to the issuing clerk of the hospital. " As a matter of course the coffee is a miserable slop. "4. The question naturally occurs, ' Do the dried coffee grounds after being returned to the issuing clerk get mixed with a portion of good coffee, and find ita way to the soldier's table a second time?' Perhaps Dr. Stanton could have determined this, if he had drank. » cup of the 'miserable slop' with which our soldiers are regaled. The smallness of the hospital fund is a matter of surprise. Dr. Stanton admits this himself. He can not imagine the reason. I am not willing to suggest it. The prior history of the hospital proves that, under former management, this fund was not only ample to supply the men with extras and delicacies, but a surplus of several thousand dollars was paid over to other hospitals in 1863. "I trouble you merely with the points, not copying the very interesting detail with which they are illustrated. There is enough of this in all conscience. If we grow indignant over the starvation and inhuman treatment of our soldiers in Rebel prisons, what emotion will our people manifest when they find the same thing in their own hospitals,' even though it occur only from the incapacity of those who should be stewards of our bounty? "I learn from the public papers, that the Surgeon in charge at Camp Dennison has been 196 Ohio in the War. relieved there and ordered to Evansville. From other sources I am advised that efforts are being made to get that order reversed, and continue the present order of things. To the latter, you may be assured, I shall not consent ; on the other hand, while I am not only willing but deter mined to be rid of him in Ohio hospitals, I have strong scruples about having him imposed upon the hospitals of other States. My own judgment is, that his want of capacity, exemplified in this case,.disqualifies him for any similar position. Be this as it may, I now insist upon his imme diate removal from Camp Dennison ; and if you feel any hesitancy about assuming this responsi bility, I am ready at any moment to forward a copy of this communication, with the report on which it is predicated, to the War Department. If the removal is not promptly made, I shall ask it direct of the Surgeon-General. " I am aware that I have not kept strictly within regulations by instituting an investigation into a hospital under your control. I have explained that I waited one month after Dr. Stanton's report for you to move in the matter. It did not seem possible that you would rest in Bilence over that document. You did not act. From that report, if from nothing else,. I knew tbe wrong existed. You did not apply the remedy. I could not see our men suffer, and daily read their appeals for relief. I sympathized with them if their military guardians did not. Thus you have my reasons for my action. I regard them as sufficient, and am confident the War De partment will so consider them. " I will relieve you from any indignation by making the confession to the Department myself. I have tried to keep within regulations and to co-operate with you. I regret any collision; but I can not hear complaints from our men without investigating them; and where I find wrongs I am always restless until I find a remedy. Very respectfully, "JOHN BROUGH, Governor of Ohio."* This very naturally drew out a reply from Surgeon Tripler — the nature of wbich may be gathered from the Governor's response : " Executive Department, Columbus, December 7, 1864. "Surgeon C. S. Tripler, Medical Director, Cincinnati, Ohio: "Sir : I acknowledge your favor of the 3d instant. As I have assurance therein that Surgeon Varian has been relieved from Camp Dennison, my object is accomplished, and, though my time does not admit of extended correspondence on the subject, I owe it perhaps in justice to you to notice a few points. "1. I have heretofore done full justice to your official conduct as director in the department, and the general "promptitude of your action. It was on this account that I was so greatly sur prised at what I took to be your acquiescence in the state of things at that camp after the report of Surgeon Stanton. " I supposed you would regard that report as I did — as an evidence that an immediate change was required there. I read your letter accompanying that report hastily, and did not then recog nize, what now appears to me, that you considered it a sufficient explanation, not requiring any immediate action. "The papers came to me as I was leaving to go East. Had I supposed it possible that yon regarded the investigation as satisfactory, I would have advised you that it was not so to me, and required prompt action. Such an idea never occurred to me, and I daily expected to hear that Surgeon Varian was removed. " 2. I do not comprehend the reason for the delay on the ground that Surgeon Varian was detailed by your superiors, and not under your immediate control, A report from you as to his incapacity in the position he filled would have brought a change at any moment. My experience is that the department looks to the care of our men, and not to places for incompetent officers over them. " 3. My course is, where I find a wrong to institute a remedy, and I will not allow any man living to stand in the way of it. I may sometimes act impulsively, but I have not done so in this case. I waited a full month, during which time the wrong prevailed, and no movement of » visible character was made until I took the matter in charge. " 4. I nave no disposition to do injustice to Surgeon Stanton. I have read his report again, and •Brough's Letter Books for 1864. State Archives. Opening of Brough's Administration. 197 I can not take baok a word by which I have characterized it. He found a grave wrong to our men at camp. He could have acquired the details, and the requisite remedy. He lacked either the capacity or disposition to do so — am willing to admit the latter. He could have ascertained the details fully as well as others did it after him. He took the case as made by Surgeon Va rian and there rested it. His sympathies stopped there. What were the wrongs of a lot of sick and wounded men to him, compared with the reputation and place of the man through w.hose incapacity these wrongs were inflicted ! " Did he inspect the insufficiency of food and its results? He could have tasted, analyzed the miserable slops called coffee; he could have ascertained that coffee grounds were dried and sent back to the post commissary ; he could have ascertained that food was deteriorated, and that it was distributed without regard to the ability Of the men to consume it. " All these things were subject to his knowledge; but he "passes them by, and ' draws on his imagination for his facts,' undertaking to speculate about what he could have demonstrated in an hour. This is why I denominated it a 'gingerly report.' If not dessigned, it was calculated to ' screen the officer through whose ' incapacity' these things existed. Surgeon Stanton may be an honest and good officer. I do not seek to controvert your opinions' on this point, but he does not conduct investigations to my satisfaction. I desire a little more earnest and thorough inquiry into matters connected with this hospital. "5, It is proper to say that in the facts communicated to me, no one is based on the state ments of the patients in hospitals. I am glad you realize the position of these men. I do the same. I do not want to wrong surgeons, but I will not screen them, nor any other class of officers, either from charges or complaints; many of the latter are fictitious, some of them exaggerated; but all of them, or nearly so, merit investigation, beyond the statements ofthe surgeon in charge, and outside of his influence. " I hope we understand our relative positions. I do not feel that I have misjudged or wronged you in this matter, but that you have done injustice to yourself. I desire to co-operate cordially with you. All I have said or done in this case has been directly with yourself, except the investigation I directed when I found you had determined to rest tbe matter upon the report of Surgeon Stanton. The complaints of men come direct to me. I can not pass them by, es pecially after this experience. If they can be investigated through your department, I much prefer that course; but I can not abide superficial examinations that stand self-condemned on their face, nor permit incompetent officers to remain in charge for months after they should be dismissed. I can only assure you that my personal feelings toward yourself are as kindly as ever; my severity of speech is not intended to wound but to aid as a corrective in past or future wrongs to our men. " Very truly yours, JOHN BROUGH."* These Camp Dennison troubles had scarcely been settled till complaints be gan to grow more uniform and continuous concerning the bad food, at the hos pital in Madison, Indiana, where a large number of Ohio patients were collected. The Ohio Agent at Louisville reported these complaints, and from many other sources the Governor satisfied himself of their justice. As in other cases he fol lowed the hesitation of the medical authorities to administer the correctives which he demanded, with swift, strong action on his own account. On the same day he forwarded orders to bis agent and notification to the Medical Director, as follows : ¦• '> . ¦,.. "Executive Department, Columbus, January 5, 1865. "Captain V. Horr^, Agent, Louisville, Kentucky: "Sir: You will please call on Assistant-Surgeon-General Wood, or the Medical Director of your department, and respectfully request that na more transfers of Ohio men be made to the hospitals at Madison, Indiana, while it is under the charge of Surgeon Grant. Send them any where else but there. The treatment at that place is inhuman and villainous. I have appealed to the Medical Director of this department for a change, but no movement is made, I ask, there- * Brough's Letter Books for 1864. State Archives. 198 Ohio in the War. fore, that our men be protected from any further injustice and barbarity. You may furnish a copy of this letter. Very respectfully, JOHN BROUGH." "Executive Department, Columbus, January 5, 1865. " Surgeon C. S. Tripler, Medical Director, Cincinnati, Ohio : "Sir: I am under obligations for the transfer of one hundred Ohio men from that pest-house called a hospital at Madison, to points where, I hope, they will be properly fed and decently treated. "I respectfully request that the rest of the Ohio soldiers at that point be transferred at the earliest possible moment, and that no more Ohio soldiers be sent to that hospital while it is under the control of Surgeon Grant. If your own reputation as Medical Director of this department does not require a change in the management of that hospital, my duty as Governor of the Stale is to protect our soldiers, as far as practicable, from the brutal treatment they have received there. If I can not accomplish this through your department, I must attempt it elsewhere. I regret much to be compelled to assume this position. "It is three weeks since I called your attention to this matter. The complaints accumu late on me every day — and I know them to be well founded. I can not permit the wrong to con tinue, if I can possibly reach it. If I have failed through you, where I have desired to work in harmony, I must try it otherwise, even if it be against your views and wishes. " Very respectfully, JOHN BROUGH." The storm thus raised about the ears of the authorities soon produced a change. An investigation ordered by Governor Morton, of Indiana, resulted in a report that the food furnished had been insufficient and of inferior quality, but that it was now greatly improved. The surgeon in charge resigned. But the Medical Director sought to break the force of the charges, whereupon the Governor responded with a terse exhibit of the process of "medical investiga tions into alleged mismanagement of hospitals." " Coitlmbus, January 14, 1865. " .Surgeon C. S. Tripler, Cincinnati, Ohio : " Sir : I have the honor to acknowledge your favor of the 9th instant. I do not propose to review its suggestions in regard to Madison Hospital, as I am advised by Surgeon Wood tliat Surgeon Grant has resigned, to take effect 31st instant. In this act Surgeon Grant has been wiser than his friends. Notwithstanding the whitewashing of a Government inspection, he knows that the special inspection made by Governor Morton, in response to the demands of the Madison people, more than confirmed the report made to me, and that his dismissal was a matter of cer tainty. His departure from the scene of his petty tyranny and abuse of brave men will unloase tongues that have been tied by fear of hiin ; and if you will take the trouble, next month, to go beyond head-quarters into the wards, you will find that the actions of Governor Morton and myself have been more than justifiable. "I am very well satisfied that Surgeon Grant has voluntarily retired. What is past can not be recalled. The present and future only can be improved. If abuses can be remedied without unnecessary publicity, perhaps it is as well — for if the wrongs done at that hospital were dis closed to the public, it would shake their confidence in our whole hospital management. As it is, there is enough promulgated to severely damage the reputation of officers to whom that man agement is intrusted. " I know nothing of the inspector sent to Madison. He may merit all the encomiums you bestow upon him, but you will allow me, in kindness, to make some suggestions in regard to these inspections : " 1. Inspectors are generally in full sympathy with surgeons in charge. Both classes adopt the theory that men in hospitals are a set of grumblers and fault-finders, whose complaints are to be disregarded. " This assumption has done infinite wrong, and in many cases covered gross frauds. As a general thing, the assumption is false and wicked. " 2. The inspection rarely goes beyond head-quarters. Full of this false theory, he takes the statements of the surgeon in charge, as he eats his dinner, and justifies it by his theory as he Opening of Brough's Administration. 199 praises the wines. If he does go beyond, it is after he has received his impressions from the head. " The assistants understand the bonds of sympathy — they know they are at the mercy of both parties, and they close their lips or evasively approve. "3." The abused private is not consulted in the matter; or if called up, it is in the presence of interested superiors, who, he knows, will punish him, or 'send him to the front, if he died by the way.' He is, of course, silent. "4. Upon this character of investigation, the inspector goes forth and makes his report. " The sore is healed over — the wrong goes on, and our men are further mistreated and abused. I speak of that which I know." I have narrowly watched this thing, and the cases at Den nison and Madison fully justify my position. It is in full proof that at the latter place the cor respondence of the men was interrupted, their letters opened and read, and the writers punished for daring to complain. I do not say there were no false charges made, and that there are no grumblers. I know that to be so; but it is not a safe theory upon which to judge all complaints. " When a whole hospital complains, there is some cause for it. As Medical Director you are the umpire. As such you should receive all the facts and judge of them fairly. The Gov ernment and the men alike look to you for this course. " I do not intend to impeach your motives or your official coursl, but I want to show you that in the large majority of cases, when you hear the inspector, take all he says for granted, and close the case upon his report, you are acting exparte, for you have only the statement of the surgeon in charge, be he incompetent or corrupt.' If you follow this course, if you hold all the presump tions in favor of the surgeon and against the men, if you encourage the theory that all com plaints are false, because a few are so, if you investigate in the interests of the surgeon instead of against him, you will fail in the great commission that is given to you, and very soon forfeit the high reputation you brought into this department. The sympathies of the Western authori ties are with the men who have fought their battles. " While we are ready to approve all good and competent surgeons in charge of our hospitals, we do not approve them until we know their worth. We are jealous of them, until they have won our confidence, and we have no mercy for either the incompetent or corrupt. Our men are objects of our care, and we will not see them wronged. In this we want your sympathy and your aid. We want you to realize our position and work with us. In a word, we ask you to join us in the adjuration to 'doubt all things, prove all things, and hold fast to things which are good,' I have no other purpose myself, no enemies to punish, no surgeons to promote. I want the right for my soldiers, and that I will contend for against all opposition. "Very truly yours, JOHN BROUGH."* That this was all just we can not affirm. That it was error on the safe side, if at all, is patent; and the soldiers, who rarely heard of these efforts dur ing his life, and will see his strong words in their favor now for the first time, as they find them here copied from the archives of the State, will, learn at last to appreciate the warmth of the zeal in their service which he never cared to trumpet to the world, and which he, nevertheless, made so searching and so effectual for good. ' In his dealings with other hospitals, Governor Brough generally kept two main points in view. He strove to have Ohio soldiers transferred, as rapidly as possible to hospitals within the State. And, when Ohio soldiers in transitu needed medical assistance, he demanded such arrangements as would insure it without the tedious delay sometimes involved in awaiting an order from a med ical director. * Justice to Surgeon Tripler requires it to be added that he denied the charge of insufficient food furnished to convalescents, and attributed it to the craving appetite always felt by that elass of patients, which wise physicians, in hospitals or in family practice, were always compelled to restrain — to the great dissatisfaction of the patients themselves. 200 Ohio in the War. CHAPTER XVL THE LAST RECRUITING— ITS PROGRESS AND PERILS. WE have seen in the previous administration the beginnings of the vicious system by which the work of recruiting was poisoned — the system which, when the genuine impulse of volunteering had measurably disappeared, sought by bribery, in the shape of bounties, to secure a sickly counterfeit of it, rather than resort to the honest and impai'tial draft. We have now to see how the work thus grew more and more difficult, and the drafts it had been sought to shun grew nevertheless the more frequent, till the clear vision ofthe Governor of the State was able to perceive nothing less than ruin in the near future. The re-enlistment of the veterans, and the recruiting near the close of Gov ernor Tod's administration, left the State ahead of her quotas underallt.be calls. But in February, 1864, came a fresh call from the President, under which the quota of Ohio was fifty-one thousand four hundred and sixty -five men. In March came another call, adding twenty thousand five hundred and ninety -five to the quota ; in July, another adding fifty thousand seven hundred and ninety- two more ; and in December another, under which the final quota of the State was twenty-six thousand and twenty -seven. The method pursued in raising these required troops was uniform — save in its progressive tendency from bad to worse. Very much against the wishes of Governor Brough, there was left no plan save to offer high and higher bounties. Government, State, county, township bounties, hundreds piled on fresh hundreds of dollars, till.it had come to such a pass that a community often paid in one form or another near a thousand dollars for every soldier it presented to the mustering officers, and double as much for every one it succeeded in getting into the wasted ranks at the front. Saying nothing of the desertion, the bounty- jumping, the substitute brokerage thus stimulated, we have only to add thatiall this extravagance failed in its main purpose — it too rarely got the respective localities "out of the draft." Out of the four calls made upon Brough's admin istration, which we have enumerated, the second was made before the preceding one had been filled, and for three of them, as many as several drafts were ordered. It was found that the State had not received proper credits for her previous contributions, and a reduction of over twenty thousand was secured in the assigned quotas. Even with this aid seven thousand seven hundred and eleven men had to be drafted in May, out of whom the Government — so ineffectual had the whole system become — received one thousand four hundred and twenty-one Progress of Recruiting. 201 soldiers, and commutation money for the rest. In September a draft for nine thousand and six was ordered, under which, thanks to the excess of credits in patriotic localities that had already more than filled their quotas, the State obtained a small credit to carry over to the final call. Under this also a little drafting was done in backward localities. Eleven new regiments were organized in 1864, running from the One Hun dred and Seventy-Third to, the One Hundred and Eighty-Third, and some fifteen companies were divided among others ; while a considerable number of the old l'egiments, being wasted below the minimum allowed by the department, were either consolidated or reduced to battalions. Early in 1865, under the inspiring aspect of affairs, the new regiments required were rapidly raised and sent to the field; the One Hundred and Eighty-Fourth as soon as the 22d of February, and the last of them, the One Hundred and Ninety:Seventh by the 15th of April. Officers for the new regiments were sought almost exclusively from the meritorious officers of Ohio troops then at the front — two years' active service being held an indispensable prerequisite. How well or ill each county in the State stood at the close may be gathered from the following table. Here may be seen what counties lagged behind, what ones resorted to the draft, what ones kept up the patriotic impulse to the last and stood ahead of all their quotas, when Appomattox C. H. ended the struggle and sounded the recall : COUNTIES. o p. §¦£& ti : d Ul5* ao COUNTIES. copCD 1 fejBI 2.5aP. : a- : -< IE B.-JJ: ** e 3d UCO a lfl\217248 3213 1911158 428329492 -167 221)385332206 259 271 479669 455 137 299 207366 127 f>79 ,174 -265 145 414 236 2.143 277199279 63 311 136 197 429 119 214 359 1139 238437 98 202233 294 194 161 371296 462 159 166 370323 199 250 171 434 407 384 91 294174 311 133 432 129170 123 3S6227 1,869 242 174 230 63 293 112 127420 99 138 20S102 220392 35 10 133212233 327 195170 389310454 164 185 370 329 206250 183 435 420 408 94 . 297 174 348 134 441 131 ^(179 '143 386 235 2,043 259 195 237 63 313 137 127420 112193 215102 232399 28 5 15 296 301 267 257300 87 165 538 . 134 4402(11598258 186 561276 102 74 193 326 95 264246 ¦147 2S9 357294233 377 221 408 363 271380 202 113145 266361 327 216 204 231 281285 260 234274 82 136 305 122 429 153 534225 153 280203 36 16 159 s 296 63 214246 127 242330265 223 346 183 373 316 221 252 196107 90 248240279 169 1B7 210 3 56 1 . 30 71 30 19 7- 105 10 3233 1216 52 1822 7 45 234 290266 -235 304 89 137335 141 436263544 257 1S6 292219 41 18 ¦ 177 320 70 259246 132 309339272233359 196 378316265252213 114 125 250371232 170 183 226 42 3 7 4 2 1 33 1 9 19 44 2Tl 19 1l 39 u Butler 38 3 41 15 3 Clark Montgomery ... 67 9 8344 249 4743 Muskingum .,.. 20 17 1 13 24 3 3 61 Perry 2 Erie 32 13 1 71 929 15 Fayette 7 5 67 97 10 13 13 23 IS 43 86 2 28 1 95 18 4 4225 Fulton 11 18 8 179 1721 7 25 Stark... 44 Tuscarawas .... ..._„ 17 7 35 2 131 3 1 1 ' 16 15 25 Van Wert 10 20 70 97, 19| 144! 96 ' 6 33 Washington.... 13 5 9 45 4u IS Lake .^ 5 12 7 26,022 21,868 1,415 23,263 S3 2,827 1 202 Ohio in the War. On the 23d of August, 1864, the people of the State were startled by a proclamation appealing to them not to offer organized resistance to the draft then impending. The language of the Governor was conciliator}-, and he made few disclosures as to any secret knowledge of the danger which he professed to apprehend. After reciting the facts connected with the order for a draft, ho mentioned a fear of organized opposition to it, explained the punishments for conspiracy- against the Government, and continued : "Most earnestly do I appeal to the people of the State not to engage in this forcible resist ance to the laws, which evil counsellors and bad men are leading them. It can not, and will not, succeed. Its triumph, if it achieve any, must be of a mere temporary character. The Govern ment is not weak. It is strong and powerful. It can not, and it will not, permit an armed insurrection to impeach its strength, or impair its power, while contending with the Southern rebellion. I do not say this to you in any spirit of intimidation, or in any threatening tone. I speak it to you as a warning, and with an imploring voice to hear and heed it. I know what the determination of your Government is, and I fully comprehend the power at hand to enforce it. "AVhat can you, who contemplate armed resistance, reasonably expect to gain by such a movement? You can not effectually or permanently prevent the enforcement of the laws. You can not in anywise improve your own condition in the present, and must seriously injure it in the future. Judicious and conservative men, who look to the supremacy of Government for the pro tection and safety of their persons and property, will not sympathize or co-operate with yon. You may commit crime; you may shed blood; you may destroy property; you may spread ruin and devastation over some localities of the State; you may give aid and comfort for a season to the Rebels already in arms against the country; you may transfer, for a brief time, tlie horrors of war from the fields of the South to those of the State of Ohio; you may paralyze prosperity, and create consternation and alarm among our people. This is a bare possibility, but it is all you can hope to accomplish; for you have looked upon the progress of our present struggle to little purpose, if you have not learned the great recuperative power, and the deep earnestness of the country in this contest. The final result will not be doubtful; the disaster to you will be complete, and the penalty will equal the enormity of the crime. "From the commencement of this rebellion the State of Ohio has maintained a firm and inflexible position which can not now be abandoned. In this internal danger that now threatens us, I call upon all good citizens to assert and maintain the supremacy -of the Constitution and laws of the land. These constitute the great elements of our strength as a nation, and they arc the bulwarks of our people. Hold in subjection by persuasion and peaceable means, if you can, all attempts at civil insurrection, or armed resistance to the laws. Failing in this, there is another duty as citizens from which we may not shrink, and to which I earnestly hope we may not be enforced. To those who threaten us with this evil, I say, we do not use any threats in return — there is no desire to provoke passion; or create further irritation. Such men are earnestly and solemnly invoked to abandon their evil purposes; but at the same time they are warned that this invocation is not prompted by any apprehension of the weakness of the Government, or the success of the attempts to destroy it. I would avert, by all proper means, the occurrence of civil war in the State; but if it must come, the consequences be with those who precipitate it upon us. "JOHN BROUGH." We now know that it was the discovery of the "Order of American Knights" or "Sons of Liberty," and the knowledge of the extent of their plans, which prompted these precautions. His Private Secretary* has since explained the circumstances: "Governor Brough received his first intimation of what was being done by that secret organization in the State of Ohio from Major-General Eosecrans, whose watchfulness was very extraordinary. The * Hon. Wm. Henry Smith, subsequently Secretary of State. ' The extract above .given is from a private letter to the author. Progress of Recruiting. 203 Governor then employed secret agents, who penetrated the most hidden recesses of the order, and ascertained all that was going on. One of his agents was a short-hand writer, who took reports of the most remarkable declarations made at their meetings. This same officer aided in distributing the arms to the mem- ,bers — which was done by moonlight — in the country. The Governor was so vigilant — sitting up all night, often for several nights in succession, to receive reports from his agenis — that he was able to foil their treasonable schemes without bloodshed.'" Por bloodshed seems to have been really intended. They met in secret for drill, armed' themselves as well as they could, boasted of their strength, and openly threatened that the second draft of 1864 should not take place. But before the draft came on, the regiments of the National Guard (whose history we have next to trace) were pouring back into the State. "I claim very little credit for my own counsels," said the Governor modestly in his annual message some months afterward, "but as regiment after regiment was discharged from the camps, and went to their homes, with arms in their hands and well-known loyalty in their hearts, the wave of rebellion very rapidly subsided; and the conspirators who had been the boldest in their demonstrations of resistance to the laws, were among the first to hurry substitutes into the ranks of the. army, or relieve the State of their presence, in order to avoid the service they had openly threatened could not be imposed. The draft went forward promptly, and in the most peaceable manner. The persecution and abuse of Union citi zens ceased at once. Law and order were again in the ascendant; and no doubt or fear was entertained as to the perfect ability of the State- to maintain them. And yet no force was used; no considerable body of men kopt under arms in military array — no parade or exhibition of armed forces. But there spread all over our territory a consciousness that the State was prepared for any emer gency ; that its protectors were ready at a moment's warning, and could be implicitly relied upon ; and that the first movement toward forcible resist ance of tho laws would be speedily crushed, entailing its consequences upon those who might inaugurate it. It was a peaceful triumph, achieved by the inherent power of a State, in its least pretentious manifestation; and its result and consequences were of a thousand times more value than, the expenditure the organization and support of the National Guard have imposed upon the people." Sundry facts as to this organization were given by the Adjutant-General in Lis report : "One of the most noticeable features of the rebellion during the year, iu Ohio, which neces sarily engaged a large share of the attention of this department, was the existence throughout the State of a formidable secret organization, known as "The Order of American Knights." The origin of this society is directly traceable to the rebellion, of which it has been at all times an auxil iary. Early in the year the Governor organized a system of espionage upon certain suspicious movements of well-known Rebel sympathizers in the State. Through the instrumentality of detectives, and other means not necessary to enumerate, the entire workings of the order, their objects, principles, and strength were ascertained. By comparing the information thus obtained with what had been learned of the order by the military authorities in Missouri, Indiana, and 204 Ohio in the War. other Western States, it was clearly demonstrated that there existed in the State of Ohio a secret, treasonable organization, numbering from eighty thousand to one hundred and ten thousand mem bers, bound together by oaths, which they professed to hold paramount to their allegiance to their State and country. This organization was to a considerable extent armed, drilled, and supplied with ammunition. It had a quasi military organization, and a system of signals by which large numbers might be called together at the very shortest notice. The written principles of the order recognize and defend the institution of slavery, and its twin abomination, the right of secession. These doctrines were sugar-coated by fallacious arguments and nicely-rounded periods, to tickle the ears of the groundlings, and entice the unsuspecting neophyte to advance to the higher degrees, where all disguise was thrown aside, and the knife was whetted and the gun shotted, to take the life of any man who dared stand up for the cause of the country. "The purposes and operations of the order were fully known early in the summer, and ample steps were taken to meet any overt act of violence with such a power as would crush it out at once and forever. The programme of the uprising last contemplated embraced the destruction of the railroads and telegraph lines, and the sudden movement of a force to this city; the seizure of the State and United States arsenals here ; the release of the Rebel prisoners at Camp Chase, who were to be armed by the arms captured here. The column, thus re-enforced, was to co-operate with John Morgan, or some other Rebel commander, who was expected to demonstrate at some point on the border, more probably in Kentucky. The time fixed for the commencement of this grand movement was the 16th day of August last. This date was learned from several sources, and from lodges in different parts of this and other States. It was also known to the Rebel prisoners at Camp Chase, and of course they were on the qui vive for their expected deliverance. "The real causes of the failure of this movement are known to be the increased vigilance of our military authorities in strengthening the prison and arsenal guards, in arresting the leading conspirators in the several States, and the seizure of large quantities of arms known to belong to the organization." Serious as this hidden danger would now seem to have been, there was an open one, connected with the work of recruiting the army, which threatened far more alarming consequences. It was no less than the demoralization ofthe peo ple and the bankruptcy of the country, by the fast-growing evils of the ruinous bounty system. The machinery itself was imperfect — cumbrous in detail, and open to abuses. "There is more or less corruption in at least one-half the subordinate provost-marshalships of the State," wrote Brough in a confidential letter to the Provost-Marshal-General. Men furnished substitutes who were ineligible. Substitutes deserted by the hundred, and enlisted again for fresh and higher bounties. The business of substitute brokerage came to be almost a respect able way of making a fortune. "While the army was thus cheated, the people were impoverished in their efforts to buy soldiers. No Government in the world, in the whole history of war, ever had an army raised at such cost as were the recruits of 1864. No Government in the world could ever long endure such a financial strain.. All the bounties, it is true, did not come from the National or State Treasuries but where they were made up by local efforts, the communities in question were thus weakened by tbe drain, and rendered less capable of bearing the heavy taxation. One way "or another, by public or pri vate extravagance in purchasing military duty, the money of the country was being swept into the vortex, credit was being exhausted, debts were accumu lating, and sagacious men came to dread bulletins from the treasury far more than those from the army. Difficulties of Recruiting. 205 Prom the outset Governor Brough protested against any delays in the draft, having for their object the extension of opportunities for piling up bounties in the hope of getting soldiers. As early as March 14, we find him writing in this vigorous strain to the Secretary of War:* "Columbus, March 14, 1864. " Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War, Washington City, D. C. : "Silt: In your general remark to the Senate, lhat State executives were pressing the exten sion of bounties I hope you made a mental reservation in favor of your servant. I have favored the draft steadily from the day the proclamation ordering it on the 10th was issued. The result of this last postponement has fulfilled my prediction to the President. ' "Recruiting has virtually stopped. The bounties even will not tempt, and the local authori ties and citizens having the fear of the draft removed, are making no further effort to fill quotas. They regard the postponement of the draft as indefinite, both because of the recruiting and because, as they say, 'Ohio is so near being out she will not be drafted, even if a draft is ordered.' We shall do very little more in this State until our people realize that a draft will be had on a fixed day, and that promise must be kept. "I favor a draft for another consideration. I regard our financial position as rapidly becom ing the most critical one connected with the war. With every man we put into the army, costing us over three hundred dollars, we are amassing a debt and corresponding taxation, that will soon force us to resort to the same means as the Confederacy to get rid of it, except that in our case such a measure will be our destruction. If the call is to be filled, let us have the draft on the 1st of April. Yours, very truly, "JOHN BROUGH." In other and equally vigorous communications he had even earlier placed himself vpon the record, in earnest opposition to the whole bounty system as then administered. "We have seen that no man outdid him — no man indeed came near equaling him in the extent of his claims for the families of soldiers, but he did not regard the wasteful bounties to the men as the proper method of supplying -the wants of the families they left behind. To Congress he appealed for the aid which. Congress alone could give, in at least modifying a system against which no one State could make effectual opposition. His two letters to the Chairman of the Military Committee of the House of Eepresentatives were regarded at the time as the ablest presentment of the case which reached that body from any quarter. "With them we may fitly close this account of the re cruiting in the last years of the war, and the evils and dangers that beset it : "Coluicbus, February 6, 1865. "Hon. R. C. Schenck, House of Representatives, Washington City, D. C. : "Snt: The local bounty system is ruining the armies and the Government. The present system of allotting quotas and filling them is weakening if not actually destroying the confidence of the people, and with it onr political ability to sustain the Government. It has run into cor ruptions, or rather created them, of the most serious and alarming character all over the State. This is a general statement I know ; but details are plenty enough to make a respectable-sized volume. The temptation to the subordinate under slender pay is great, while the controlling and examining power is too remote. A deputy prcvost-marshal or a surgeon can only be re moved by an order from Washington. He may have influences enough to hold himself in position for months over the head and even against the recommendations of the State Provost-Marshal, who perhaps has not strictly legal evidence, but yet information of such a character as to satisfy him that the man should be removed. Why not regard them as civil officers to be removed when the public service required? Why hold them under the military rule, to be reached only by charges, arrests, and court-martial investigations? Why should they not be responsible to the * Brough's private Letter Books, State Archives, War Department Letters, 1864, p. 33. 206 Ohio in the War. State provost-marshals, and they in turn to tbe Provost Marshal-General? What is the neces sity of all the red-tape that now exists? But a more pertinent and practical inquiry comes up: why not change the whole programme of assigning quotas and filling them? Why not under a call for troops, assign to each State its quota of the call, and leave the assignment of local credits and quotas, and the raising of the men to the State authorities under Government inspection and muster? It can be done for less than half the expense of the present system, and would com mand the confidence of the people much more than the present system. " We are daily overwhelmed by delegations and letters from all parts of the State in regard to local quotas, and representations of errors and injustices. We have no information and of course can not give any ; we can only refer to the Assistant Provost Marshal-General. His an swer is that he has no knowledge of details. The quotas of congressional districts are given to him from Washington, and the rule fixed by which to distribute below thai. Men go away dissatisfied — in many cases despondent, in some bitter opponents of the whole Government ma chinery. It needs simplification, and it can be simplified. It is necessary to bring it nearer to the people, where they can know its workings and hold some one responsible for it. I give you merely a general idea. The details may be a little troublesome, but they can be readily worked out. It would not strike out the provost-marshal's department, but simply relieve it of its tedious and cnmbrous details, dividing them round among the respective States. Under it I think we could control and restrain much of the fraud and corruption that is now prevailing, and unless checked will effectually break down the power of the Government to replenish its armies. I can say to you confidentially, that of the thirty thousand men raised, credited, and mustered in Ohio during the last call, over ten thousand failed to reach the front. This appears here of record. Pennsylvania shows a worse result. About one thousand one hundred men Lave been forwarded to Camp Chase under the present call, and of these two hundred and sixty-three were on the lists last night as 'absent without leave,' and this although the money brought here with them is taken from them on arrival. Still they have been mustered and credited, and fill so much of the 'quota,' though not of the army. "The State swarms with bounty-brokers, bounty-jumpers, and mercenaries of every descrip tion. Men take contracts to fill 'quotas' as they would to furnish hay or wood. They take the largest share to themselves, and frequently the recruit deserts because he says he has been swindled in his bounty. Patriotism and love of the cause are supplanted to a, large degree, as a motive of filling our armies by the mercenary spirit of making money out of the operation. In our own State I am alarmed at the enormous debts we are creating and piling upon weak localities. I have not the data to fix it, but I am satisfied it now exceeds six millions of dollars. There a a pay day for it all, either in crushing taxation or dishonor. " In addition to this apprehension is the painful conviction that it does not give us men to fill our wasting ranks — it does not add to our power to crush the rebellion and end the war. Instead of that it is constantly weakening us, both in a military and financial sense. We are drifting upon the breakers! We are going to ruin ! I have been trying to persuade our legisla tors to provide a State bounty, merely duplicating the bounty of the Government, and prohibit all loeal bounties or debt on taxation for them. But the answer is, 'other States will not do it,' and we must keep up in the general scramble. I do not know that we can get co-operation, but I would have some faith in doing so if the States had control of filling their own quotas, and were required to produce men for them. Perhaps we might fail, but we would remedy one class of evils and have a chance for the other. "A recent convention of Adjutant-Generals at this city brought here some experienced and able men. Upon this point of States filling their quotas, there was a full debate and a perfect unanimity of opinion. Is anything practicable in the waning hours of this session of Congress, or will we necessarily go on under the present system through another year? If so, I can only deplore it. I am full of anxiety upon this subject.' I would almost try to break the chains that bind me here, and go to Washington if I were convinced I could do any good thereby. Unless we can change, our policy I have painful forebodings of the future. We have strength enougli, but we are throwing it away; we are weakening our armies by every call and draft, instead of strengthening them ; we are piling up enormous debts and taxations upon our people ; we are impairing the confidence of the thinking and earnest portion of our people, and pampering the desires of the weak and profligate; we are making a traffic of the holiest duty we owe to the Difficulties of Recruiting. 207 country, and procrastinating a struggle that we have the power to speedily terminate, if our means were less popularly and more earnestly directed. "I have written more than I intended, and you will patiently read. I hope I am wrong in my forebodings. I will be gratified to find myself so. I do not profess to be wiser than other men. In this particular I would be almost glad to find myself a fool. It has been a subject of much examination and reflection. I can see its remedy only in the wisdom of Congress — I can not add to that, but I can not refrain from making some suggestions for your consideration in this private way. "Very truly yours, JOHN BROUGH." "Columbus, February 9, 1865. " Hon. R. C. Schenck, House of Representatives, Washington City, D. C. : "Sir: After so long a communication only three days ago, I will no doubt be considered obtrusive in again reviewing the subject ; but anxiety grows upon me every day, and I cannot forbear every exertion to remedy the evils that beset us. "Present indications are that we will not enlist over ten thousand men out of a quota of twenty-six thousand ; of whom fully twenty-five per cent, will fail to reach the service. The argument is constantly repeated, that one State can not inaugurate a reform where other States refuse to co-operate. This sentiment pervades and influences alike legislators and people. The overweening anxiety is to fill the quotas — get the credits, no matter what the material, or how the army is affected. I feel the force of all phis, yet I see its consequences not only in my own State but elsewhere. "It seems to me there must be and is a controlling .power somewhere. All admit that the bownty is the source of the evil. But it is said that having inaugurated the system we can not get rid of it; that it has passed beyond our control, and we must patiently await the ruin that is rapidly working out. I will not discuss this latter proposition. I simply do not believe it. If we have the moral courage we can control the evil, provided we concentrate our energies and our strength. "The bounty system began with the General Government — that Government must assume the initiative in restraining it. To that end I suggest that Congress should enact : 1. That no bounty or payment shall be given or made by any locality or community to any man for entering the service, except such bounty as may be provided by his State, which shall not exceed the amount paid by the Government for a like term of service. 2. That the price of a substitute shall be fixed at double the amount of the Government bounty, and no higher sum shall be paid or received. 3. That no soldier shall enlist as substitute out of his own State, and on his offering to do so, shall be returned to his State for punishment. " These enactments will cut present evils up by the roots, and I fail to see any new ones they can breed. Why is it not in the power of the present Congress to enact them ? Do not answer that concentration of action can not be had. We must have it. No measure is before that body of such vital moment as this. We are at the turning point of our destiny, militarily and financially. The next campaign settles the impending controversy for good or for evil. "But I will not argue it. 1 make the suggestion and it is the only one I can make that seems to give promise of good results. 1 hope it will commend itself to your own good judg ment, and that you will lend it all your valuable aid. "I have not written to any of our delegation but yourself. I would like you to show my notes to General Garfield, if it is consistent with your views. I need not repeat that I am deeply -solicitous on the subject. I may write a 'note to our senators to-night, but I can not go into the matter as fully as I have done to you. Very truly yours, JOHN BROUGH." The next campaign did "settle the impending controversy." The sagacity of Brough was not at fault — we are next indeed to see how in other ways and with potent weight his policy was to aid in settling it. But the evils to which his forebodings so gloomily turned were not averted. The frightful expenses of an army of a million men, raised with such waste, to confront -the remnant of the hundred thousand that was left to uphold the Rebel banner, still press down the country. Por many weary years to come they must continue to press, unless, alas! relief be sought in National dishonor. 208 Ohio in the War. CHAPTER XVII. THE HUNDRED DAYS' MEN. THE summer of 1863 had been marked in Ohio by unusual turbulence and by invasion. The arrests, the trial of Vallandigham, and his sub sequent defiant candidacy for the Governorship, the organized efforts to resist the draft, the dangers along the whole southern border, and the invasion by John Morgan, had combined to make the year memorable in our local annals. As the season for military operations in 1864 approached, Governor Brough dis played special anxiety to be prepared for similar dangers. Toward the close of February he discussed with ex-Governor Dennison the plan of having a few regiments of the volunteer militia of the State called into active service for duty along the southern border; and, at his request, Governor Dennison visited Washington to urge this policy upon the Secretary of War. Mr. Stanton doubted the immediate necessity, and for various reasons, specially including the jealousy of other States, which it would arouse, discouraged the proposition. On the 15th of March Governor Brough addressed the Secretary at some length, renewing his proposition, and strenuously urging its necessity. "Pass ing events in Ohio and in Canada," he wrote, "point to a pressing danger of raids upon us from that quarter; while our southern frontier, including that of Indiana, is undoubtedly to be the object of an assault by Morgan and his forces, as soon as their preparations are completed." The true way, he argued, to pre vent such raids, as well as the only economical way, was to have a force of drilled' men on the frontier. A knowledge that the State was prepared to receive him would be the surest way to prevent Morgan from coming, and he insisted that he ouglit therefore to have authority to call out two to four regiments. But the view which other States would take of such a measure, still seemed sufficient reason for delay.* Meantime all saw the critical point of the war to be approaching. The Nation had enormous armies in the field, but they were larger on the pay-rolls' than in the list of men present for duty at the front. • A General had been pro moted to the chief command whose avowed policy for conquering the rebellion was the lavish use of overwhelmingly superior forces. The Government stand- * Brough's private Letter Books, State Archives, War Department Letters, pp. 36-37. Hundred Days' Men. 209 ing aghast at the frightful expenses into whioh the bounty system and this pol icy of demanding untold numbers bad plunged it, held success in the impending campaign to be indispensable — it could not, as was declared, bear up under such a drain for another year. Because, therefore, success then was held to be vitally necessary, and because the General in command would only promise a prospect of success, on condition that he should have treble or quadruple the number of soldiers his antagonist could muster, it became an object of the utmost solicitude that every veteran in the forts about Washington, or the block-houses along the railroads, should be added to the ranks then about to plunge into the blind, bloody wrest ling of the Wilderness. But neither forts nor railroads could be left exposed. John Brough was the first to comprehend the situation and divine its wants. He was led, likewise, to it by a continuation of his recent effort. He had sought the protection of his State by placing its militia in the field in such numbers that an invader would keep away. He now sought a similar but larger end, the protection of the Capital and the whole territory of the North, by keeping the enemy so busy on their own soil that they would have no opportunity for incur sions Northward. Under his suggestions the State miliiiia law had been care fully revised and improved, and the militia force which Governor Tod had left was in excellent condition. He conceived, therefore, the idea of calling out this militia to hold the forts and railroads, while Grant should throw his whole strength upon the Bebel army, crush it, and end the war. Within a hundred days — such was then the understanding of the Bebel peril, and such was un doubtedly a correct apprehension of the possibilities which a Frederick or Napo leon might have grasped — the struggle should be over. For the lass great effort that should end the contest, therefore, he rightly held that Ohio would make any sacrifice, and that the sister States to the westward could be induced to unite with her. 'Accordingly, on his suggestion, a meeting of the Governors of Ohio, Indi ana, Illinois,' Wisconsin, and Iowa was held at Washington. Governor Brough stated his ability to furnish thirty thousand men. Governors Morton and Yates believed they could each add twenty thousand. There was some difference as to the time for which the offer could be made, but the term of one hundred days was finally agreed upon ; and under Governor Brough's direction the fol lowing proposition was prepared : "Wab Department, Washington City, April 21, 1864. " To the President as the United States: ' "I. The Governors of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin offer to the President infantry troops for the approaching campaign, as follows : Ohio. : 30,000 Indiana 20,000 Illinois 20,000 Iowa..!: 10,000 Wisconsin.... * S 5,000 "II. The term of service to be one hundred days, reckoning, from the date of muster into the service of the United States, unless sooner discharged. "III. The troops to be mustered into the service of the United States by regiments, when Vol. I.— 14. 210 Ohio in the War. the regiments are filled up, according to regulations, to the minimum strength — the regiments to be organized according to the regulations of the War Department ; the whole number to be fur nished within twenty days from date of notice of the acceptance of this proposition. "IV. The troops to be clothed, armed, equipped, subsisted, transported, and paid as other United Sjates infantry volunteers, and to serve in fortifications, or wherever their services may be required, within or without their respective States. "V. No bounty to be paid the troops, nor the services charged or credited on any draft. "VI. The draft for three years' service to go on in any State or district where the quota is not filled up ; but if any officer or soldier in this special service should be drafted, he shall be credited for the service rendered. "JOHN BROUGH, Governor of Ohio. "O. P. MORTON, Governor of Indiana. "RICHARD YATES, Governor of Illinois. "W. M. STONE, Governor of Iowa." All believed that this would insure the speedy success of Grant's campaign. The President, taking the same hopeful view, accepted the proposition two days after it was presented. On that eventful Saturday afternoon the Adjutant-General of Ohio was startled with this dispatch : i " Washington, April 23, 1S64. " B. R. Cowen, Adjutant- General : "Thirty thousand volunteer militia are called from Ohio, the larger portion to ser vice out of the State. Troops to be mustered into service of United States for one hundred days, unless sooner discharged ; to be mustered in by regiments, of not less than the minimum strength, and organized according to laws of War Department. "They will be clothed, armed, equipped, transported, and paid by the Government, and to serve on fortifications, or wherever services may be required. Not over five thousand to be detailed for home service ; no bounty to be paid or credit on any draft. The draft to go on in deficient localities, but if any officer or soldier in die Rpecial service is drafted, he will be cred ited for the service rendered. Time is of the utmost importance. It is thought here, that if substitutes are allowed, the list of exemptions may .be largely reduced ; say, confining it to tele graph operators, railroad engineers, officers and foremen in shops, and mechanics actually employed on Government or State work for miltary service. This is left to your discretion. Set the machinery at work immediately. Please acknowledge receipt by telegraph. "JOHN BROUGH." The Adjutant-General of Ohio was a man who had been trained to matters of detail, and had long displayed a special aptitude for such executive work. He thoroughly understood all the minutiae of the militia system. He was sin gularly accurate and comprehensive in his grasp of details ; was incapable of being confused by any sudden pressure of business; was not liable to lose bis judgment or his coolness under the bewildering rush of exciting matters; not to be discouraged by difficulties, not to be swerved from his straight path hy any representation of hardships or clamor for exemptions — an officer of clear, strong common sense. Governor Brough well knew the man upon whom his unexpected dispatch was to throw this sudden weight, and he assured the Secretary of War that, by the time he could get back to Columbus, he should find the great movement well begun. He was not disappointed. The announcement was received at Columbus on Saturday afternoon. There were no adequate means of reaching the people before Monday morning. } Hundred Days' Men. 211 Meantime the necessary orders were made, and such preparations as foresight could suggest, were devised. The gapers of Monday morning, throughout tho State, contained the following: "General Head-Quarters State op Ohio, ^ "Adjxfjcant-Generai's Office, Columbus, April 25, " General Orders No. 12. "The regiments, battalions, and independent companies of infantry of the National Guard of Ohio are hereby called into active service for the term of one hundred days, unless sooner discharged. They will be clothed, armed, equipped, transported, and paid by the United States Government. "These organizations will rendezvous at the most eligible places in their respective counties (the place to be fixed by the commanding officer, and to be on a line of railroad if practicable), on Monday, May 2, 1864, and report by telegraph, at four o'clock P. M. of the same day, the number present for duty. . "The alacrity with which all calls for the military forces of the State have been heretofore met, furnishes the surest guaranty that the National Guard will be prompt to assemble at the appointed time. Our armies in the field are marshaling for a decisive blow, and the citizen-sol-. diery will share the glory of the crowning victories of the campaign, by relieving our veteran regiments from post and garrison-duty, to allow them to engage in the more arduous labors of the field. By order of the Governor : "B, R. CO WEN, Adjutant-General, Ohio." At the same time an order was promulgated, making the exemptions which the Governor had suggested. And now came the tremendous pressure which, for a little tjme, the Adju tant-General had to bear alone. A week had been given preparatory to the rendezvous. Through this time protests, appeals for exemption, warnings of danger to the State, financially and politically, poured in. General Cowen bore stoutly up against them all, refused every appeal for exemption that did not come under the terms of his order, referred applications for discharge to the regimental commanders, assured every objector that the call was necessary, that it would be enforced at all hazards, and that the State Administration was ready to accept all responsibilities. Throughout the State arose a sudden, excited, sometimes angry buzz. The men who composed the volunteer militia companies (now known as the National Guard) were among the most substantial and patriotic citizens of the State. They were in the midst of the opening business or labors of the season. To almost every man it came as a personal sacrifice to be made for a necessity not very clearly understood. Some prominent Union leaders discouraged the movement ; all saw that it would prove a repetition of the wasteful folly of the early calls for three months' and six months' troops (who had just come to be useful when their term of service had expired), unless, indeed, the crisis were such that/ this sudden re-enforcement would insure the striking of the final blow. The day came for the mustering of the regiments at their respective rendez vous. A cold rain prevailed throughout the State. Many had predicted that the movement would be a failure ; it now seemed as if it must be. But by four o'clock in the afternoon commanders of regiments began to report by telegraph. At seven in the evening the Adjutant:General telegraphed the Secretary of 212 Ohio in the War. "War: "More than thirty thousand National Guards are now in camp and ready for muster." At half-past seven the reports showed thirty-eight thousand men in camp, and clamorous to be sent forward. Considering the exhaustion, the previous discouragements, the period in the war, it was the grandest uprisiug of soldiers, the most inspiring rush of armed men from every village and ham let and walk of life that the whole great struggle displayed. Governor Brough gave fitting expression to the general feeling of admira tion which the stirring spectacle evoked, in an address, the next day issued : " Executive Department, Columbus, May 3, 1864. " To the National Guard of Ohio : "The Commander-in-Chief cordially and earnestly thanks you for your noble response on yesterday to the call made for the relief of our army, and the salvation of the country. This manifestation of loyalty and patriotism is alike honorable to yourselves and your noble State. In the history of this great struggle it will constitute a page that you and your descendants may .hereafter contemplate with perfect satisfaction. "The duty to which you will be assigned, though comparatively a, minor one, will be none the less beneficial to the cause of the country. While you hold fortifications, and lines of army communications, you will release veteran soldiers, and allow them to strengthen the great army that is marshaling for the mightiest contest of the war. In this you will contribute your full measure to the final result we all so confidently anticipate, aud so much desire — the end of the rebellion, and the restoration of peace and unity in the land. " There is no present imminent danger that calls you from your peaceful avocations. But, it is necessary that we enter upon the spring campaign with a force that will enable us to strike rapid aqd effective blows when the conflict opens. Though we have met with a few reverses this spring, the general military situation is everywhere hopeful, and those in command of your armies were never more confident. But we can hot permit this war, in its present proportions, to linger through another year. It is laying a burden upon us which, by vigorous and united exertion, we must arrest. It is true economy, as well as the dictate of humanity, to call to the termination of this contest a force that will be sufficient for the purpose. Time, treasure, and blood will alike be saved in augmenting our forces, and making the contest short and decisive. The hope of the Rebel leaders is in the procrastination of the war. In this a political party in the North sympathizes with them, and is laboring, by the same means to secure a political triumph at the expense of the unity and future prosperity- of the Nation. The first we must subdue with our arms within the hundred days, and then we can turn upon the other and win over it a more peaceful, but not less glorious victory. "I am not ignorant of the sacrifices this call imposes upon you, nor of the unequal manner in which it imposes the burdens of the war. You must reflect, however, that hitherto we have experienced comparatively little of the inconveniences and depression consequent upon a state of war. If a part of these come home to us now, we can well afford to meet, for so short a time, the tax imposed upon us, especially when the sacrifice gives promise of materially hasten ing the close of the contest. The burden must necessarily be unequal, for the Union men of this country must work out its salvation. The disloyal element is not to be relied upon either to encourage our armies, or to aid in the crushing of the rebellion. You are, in this particular, not tmlike your ancestors who achieved the independence of your country against a foreign enemy on the one hand, and the tories of the revolution on the other. " Remember then, that like unto those who wrought out your nationality, through adversity that you have not yet experienced, the greater the sacrifice the higher the honor of those who are called to preserve it. " Fully comprehending the effects of this call upon the industrial interests of the State, I would not have made it, had I not been fully impressed with the necessity of an increase of our forces, as the most effective means of hastening the close of the contest and the advent of peace. I have done what I conscientiously believed to be my duty in the present position of affairs, and you have responded in a manner that challenges my admiration, and will command the gratitude of the country. Hundred Days' Men. 213 "Go forth, then, soldiers of the National Guard, to the fulfillment of the duty assigned to yon. I have entire confidence that you will meet all its requirements with fidelity and honor. The prayers of the people of the State will follow you; and may your return be as glorious as your going forth is noble and patriotic. JOHN BROUGH." Then followed the difficult work of consolidation. Since the oria-inal organization of the volunteer militia, thousands of its members had entered the National service, and every regiment was thus reduced below the minimum. The principle adopted was to break up the smaller companies and divide the mon among the others in such proportions as were needed. Army officers of experience were called in to aid in this delicate duty ; Colonel W, P. Eichard son at Camp Chase, General A. M. McCook at Camp Dennison, and Colonel Aquila Wiley at Camp Cleveland. On these, and on all others, the Governor now pressed again and again the importance of haste. "Nothing," as an eye-witness wrote, "was neglected. There was no detail so small that it did not receive the personal attention ofthe Governor. He had an eye on every officer and kept him to his work/ There were men selfish and unpatriotic enough at this time to seek to create disturb ance by filling the minds of the men with fear that they were being entrapped only to be offered up as a sacrifice to the Moloch of war. To a Major of a regi ment that refused to be mustered, he telegraphed: 'The Guard will bo promptly mustered out at the end of the hundred days. The faith of the Government and the State are both pledged to this. The regiment can serve in the State if it wants to do so. We want a regiment at Camp Chase to guard Bebel prisoners and patrol Columbus. No other regiment wants to do it. Men who refuse to muster will be held to this service. The muster into the United States service is a mere form to make the payment from the Government instead of the State. Advise me if this is satisfactory.' This regiment was mustered within a few hours, and asked to be allowed to go out of the State. Delay in the organiza tion of regiments was not tolerated. To Colonel Jackson, of the Ninth, he tel egraphed: 'Your regiment was reported ready yesterday. President Jewett says no requisition has yet been made for transportation. The War Depart ment is thundering at me for these troops every hour. No trivial cause for delay must be suffered to intervene. Jewett says he can have a train this afternoon if immediate notice is given. Why can not this be done? Timo is precious. Make every liour coun.t.' To Major-General McCook, at Camp Den nison, he telegraphed nearly the same. Mustering officers and quartermasters were kept driving, and, with a few exceptions, they were willing to do all in their power, and the importance of this energy and haste will be more appre ciated when it is remembered that at this time Ohio was the only State furnish ing militia to take the place of veterans." * The War Department was amazed and caught napping. It had no expecta tion of such a response, and was unprepared with mustering officers. But for this — so tremendous was the energy with which the work was driven forward — * From a newspaper sketch ofi the raising of the Hundred Days' Men, written by Hon. Wm, Henry Smith. 214 Ohio in the War. the whole force might, have been on its way to the field soveral days sooner. As it was, within two weeks, over thirty thousand men, fully armed and equipped were put into the service. Within a single week after the assemblage, it was found tbat there were several thousands more in camp than the Government had agreed to accept, and Governor Brough was telegraphing : " E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C: "I have five or six regiments organized and iu camp more than my quota. Will you take them or must I disband them? If you take them where shall they be assigned? Answer early as they are crowding me. JOHN BROUGH." On the same day the Secretary of War replied as follows: "I will accept all the troops you can raise. The other States will be deficient and behind time. We want every mail now. . . . Let us have all your regiments within the next week. They may decide the war. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War." t Before this indeed, the Secretary, finding with what implicit confidence he might call upon Ohio in hours of need, had telegraphed : "Washington, D. C, May 5, 1864. "Governor Brough: General Sigel's advance has exposed the Baltimore and Ohio Bail- road, and a guerrilla force of about a hundred have seriously injured the shops and several engines at Piedmont. Mr. Garrett says that a regiment of your men will, if promptly for warded, prevent any further injury. "EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War." "Washington, D. G, May 5, 1864. " Governor Brough : If you have any regiments organized, please forward them immedi ately to Wheeling and Cumberland. The Rebels, in small squads, are already on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and unless driven off may do considerable damage. Sigel has moved his force down the Valley, and is too far off to do any good. " EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War." "Washington, D. C, May 13, 1864. " Governor Brough : Official ^dispatches have been received from the Army of the Poto mac. A general attack was made by General Grant at four and a half o'clock A. M. yesterday, followed by the most brilliant results. At eight o'clock Hancock had taken four thousand pris oners, including Major-General Edward Johnson and several Brigadiers, and between thirty and forty cannon. Now is the time to put in your men. " EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War." In answer to the first of these dispatches the first of the National Guard regiments left on the 5th of May, three days after reporting in camp. The last one was ready to leave on the 16th. Within that time forty-one minimum reg- ments and one battalion of seven companies, in all thirty-five thousand nine hundred and eighty-two men, had, as the Adjutant-General, with justifiable pride, recited in his report, "been consolidated, organized, mustered, clothed, armed, equipped, and turned over to the United States military authorities for transportation and assignment." Two days later Governor Brough bad the pleasure of sending this cautions recital : " Columbus, May 18, 1864. "E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C: " Ohio has sent regiments as follows : Four to Baltimore, Maryland, two to Cumberland, thirteen to Washington, and the fourteenth will leave to-night; three to Parkersburg, four to Hundred Days' Men. 215 Charleston, three to New Creek, three to Harper's Ferry. Has stationed one at Gallipolis, two at Camp Dennison, two at Camp Chase, two regiments and a battalion of seven companies at Johnson's Island ; being forty regiments and one battalion, comprising an aggregate of thirty- four thousand men. This work has been completed in sixteen days. "JOHN BROUGH." But before Mr. Stanton received this, he had already made haste to express his gratitude. "The Department and the Nation are indebted to you," he tele graphed, "more than I can tell, for your prompt and energetic action at this crisis." The provision that members of the National Guard in active service should not be exempt from the draft then pending, was obviously calculated to create a feeling that they were being unjustly dealt with. Governor Brough sought a change in this respect, which should cause the burdens of the draft to fall upon the opponents of the war, the great class which had thus far evaded military duty, and was now peacefully at home, while the more patriotic had been sud denly carried by thousands to the front. He regarded the National Guard movement as having pretty well sifted out the young Union men liable to mili tary duty, and he wanted the draft, therefore, at this opportune moment, to fall upon the communities at home, where the Peace men were now largely in the majority. His efforts failed, but he persisted— the correspondence shows with what results: "Columbus, May 4, 1864. "E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C: "The National Guard of Ohio have fully resp'onded to my call. They do not want to be credited on the quota, and they want the draft to go forward, but they ask to be exempt from it, that the draft may fall upon the stay-at-home men. That is, if the name of a man is drawn who belongs to the National Guard, it be laid aside the same as an enlisted volunteer, and another name be drawn. For many reasons, I recommend this, if it can properly be done. It will increase rather than decrease our military strength, and somewhat equalize the burdens of service. Our Guard ie composed exclusively of Union men. JOHN BROUGH." "Columbus, May 4, 1864. " E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War, Washington, D. Ct "Your dispatch received. I will crowd the force by all practicable means. Carefully con sider and grant, if possible, my request to exempt the National Guard from the -present draft making it fall on the 'shirks.' There is great future value in this movement. "JOHN BROUGH." Washington Ciiy, May 4, 1864. "His Excellency John Brough, Governor of Ohio: "After much consideration of your suggestion in regard to the draft, it seems to me impos sible for the Department to conform to your wishes, for the following, among other reasons: "1. Any change in the terms agreed upon between the Governors and the President in one instance, would form certain occasion for an infinite number of changes that would be applied for by others, and would lead either to great discontent at their being refused, or to serious injury to the service by adopting them. " 2. The terms of the arrangement were called for by the Committee on Finance, and formed the basis of their recommendations for the appropriation. In their view, and in the view of General Grant, it was deemed an indispensable condition that the special volunteers should in no wise interfere with the operation of the law for drafting. A change now made in the particular you mention, would be charged immediately as a breach of faith on the part of the Executive with Congress, and might lead to very serious complications. "E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War." 216 Ohio in the "War. "General Head-Quarters, State of Ohio, ¦> "Adjutant-General's Office, Columbus, May 5, 1864./ "Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C: "My request was to exempt the members of the National Guard, actually in service, from operations of the present draft to fill Ohio's quota on the last call, but not to extend to any draft on any future call. No other State tendering militia can object to this, as their quotas are all full ; neither does it break any faith with Congress, as it does not change the position of the State as to filling her quota by draft. I propose that the draft shall go on, and the quota filled thereby, but simply to limit its operations to men who have not enlisted or responded to- the call for the National Guard. Thus I put you thirty thousand National Guards into the hundred days' ser vice, and by draft fill my quota of ninety-two hundred from other citizens of the State. I do not reduce you a man in the service, but add to it in the number of men who may be drafted from the Guard. I do not ask any credit for the Guard on quotas, nor any exemption for it on future calls, if any are made. Is not this reasonable and just? I know it will be acceptable to oar people. JOHN BROUGH." "Columbus, July 5, 1864. "Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C: "Sir: I respectfully urge that in the pending call for additional men, the principles be established : "1. That at the expiration of the notice of fifty days, any balance of the quota of any State that may be deficient, shall be drafted from the population of the State that may not be, at the time, in the service of the United States. "2. That thisbeconstruedtoembra.ee the one hundred days' men ofthe several States furnishing them, and that if any such men be drafted, the name of such man be set aside, and another name be drawn to fill the place. "3. That this rule be observed only while the hundred days' men are in service, and for fifty days thereafter; and after the expiration of such time, this class of men to become liable to other and future calls, as other citizens of the State. "4. I submit to you the expediency of providing that if hundred days' men shall volunteer under the first call, they be allowed to join such regiments as they may elect, and be credited with such time as they may have served under the hundred day call, not exceeding fifty days. "I do not press this point beyond your own convictions as to its policy and propriety. The three first propositions, however, I do urge as a matter of justice to the men who have so promptly come forward in the hundred day service, and as a fair and equitable distribution of the burdens of the war among those who have heretofore avoided them. I do not see any legal difficulty in exempting from the first call and draft men who are actually in service at the time, however proximate their term of service, especially if they become liable to a future call after that serviee has expired. The principle seems to me just and equitable, and I urge its adoption. "Very respectfully, JOHN BROUGH." Subsequently, however, under an opinion from Solicitor Whiting, of the "War Department, all men actually in the service of the United States — no mat ter for what term of service — -at the time of the draft, were held to be exempt from its operations. But no credit was ever given the State on subsequent quotas for this magnificent and instant re-enforcement of the National armies on the sudden call. Of the whole volunteer militia of the State but one company absolutely refused to obey the order calling it out. Under the authority of the Governor, this case was dealt with as follows : "General Head-Quarters, State of Ohio, i "Adjutant-General's Office, Columbus, May 26, 1864. J "Special Orders, No. 314. "Company B, Captain Wendell Mischler, Fortieth Battalion, National Guard, is hereby dishonorably dismissed from the service of the State of Ohio, with forfeiture of all pay and allow- Hundred Days' Men. 217 ances, or having refused to come to the relief of the Government, under the recent call of the President for one hundred days' troops. "The National Guard of Ohio, by its promptness in responding to said call, has won an immortality of honor, and justice to it demands that all recusants should be promptly punished, and the Guard relieved from the odium of so disgraceful a course of action. "To the honor of the Guard, it is announced that the above company was the only one among the forty-two regiments sent to the field that lacked faith in the honor of their State and adopted country, and refused to fly to the relief when the fate of the country was trembling in the balance. , "They can return to their homes and say to their friends and neighbors that they have regarded their country and its safety as secondary to their own personal ease and security; and that in the hour of most imminent peril to that Government which had received and protected them when aliens, they basely .betrayed their trust, and refused to follow their gallant comrades to the field of honor and of danger. "No member of said company will be allowed to enlist in any other company of the National Guard, under any circumstances whatever, as men who wish to be 'soldiers in peace and citizens in war,' will not be allowed to disgrace the Guard, or peril the State and Nation by their pres ence and example. "By order of the Governor: B. R. COWEN, Adjutant-General of Ohio." The sudden summons of the National Guard to active service was specially likely to lead to suffering among the families thus left, at a week's warning, unprovided for. Profoundly alive to this aspect of the movement, Governor Brough lost no time in appealing to the citizens at home for aid 3 fc " Executive Department, Columbus, May 9, 1864 "To the Military Committees and the People of the State:' "The departure of the National Guard from the State, in the service of the country, will necessarily work much individual hardship. In many cases in each county, families of laboring men, dependent c-n the daily labor of the head, will be left almost wholly unprovided for. The compensation of the soldier will not enable him to provide for the daily wants of his family. We who remain at home, protected by the patriotism and sacrifices of these noble men, must not per mit their families to suffer. The prompt response of the Guard to the call has reflected honor upon the State. We must not sully it by neglecting the wants of those our gallant troops leave behind. No such stain must rest upon the fair character .of our people. "As organized, is ever better than individual action, I suggest to the people of the several counties that they promptly raise, by voluntary contribution, a sufficient sum to meet the proba ble wants of the families of the Guards, who may require aid, and place the same in the hands of the military committee of the county, for appropriation and distribution. The committee can des ignate one or two good men in each township who will cheerfully incur the trouble and labor of pass ing upon all cases in their townships, and of drawing and paying such appropriation as may be made to them. Citizens, let this fund be ample. Let those whom God has blessed with abundance con tribute to it freely. It is not a charity to which you may give grudgingly. It is payment of only part of the debt we all owe the brave men who have responded to the call of the country, and whose action is warding off from us deadly perils, and saving us from much more serious sacri fices. What is all your wealth to you if your Government be subverted? What the value of your stores if your public credit or finances be ruined, or Rebel armies invade and traverse your State? Be liberal and generous then in this emergency. Let no mother, wife, or child of the noble Guard want the comforts of life during the hundred days; and let these noble men feel on their return that the people ofthe State appreciated, and have, to some extent, relieved the sacri fices they so promptly made in the hour of the country's need. " As these families do not come within the means provided by the Relief Law, we must look to voluntary contributions to provide for them. In aid of these, I feel authorized to appropriate the sum of five thousaiid dollars- from the Military Contingent Fund. This sum will be appor tioned among the several counties in proportion to the number of the Guard drawn from each, and the chairman of the military committee early notified of the amount subject to his order. 218 Ohio in the War. "In many cases men have left crops partly planted, and fields sown, that in dne time must be harvested or lost. In each township and county there should be at once associations of men at home who will resolve, that, to the extent of their ability, they will look to these things. It is not only the dictate of patriotism, but of good citizenship, that we make an extra exertion to save the grops to the country, and the accruing value to the owners, who, instead of looking to seed-time and harvest, are defending us from invasion and destruction. Men of the cities and towns, when the harvest is ready for the reaper, give a few days of your time, and go forth by the dozens and fifties to the work. The labor may be severe, but the sacrifice will be small, and the reflection of the good you have done will more than compensate you for it all. " In this contest for the supremacy of our Government, and the salvation of our country, Ohio occupies a proud position. Her standard must not be lowered; rather let us advance it to the front. No brighter glory can be reflected on it than will result from a prompt and generous support to the families of the Guard. Let us all to the work. " Very respectfully, JOHN BROUGH." A few days afterward, changing his views as to the proper interpretation of the law providing relief for soldiers' families, the Governor addressed a sep arate appeal to the military committees of the several counties : " Executive Department, Columbus, May 16, 1864. "To the Military Committees: "Upon more careful examination of the provisions of the Relief Law, I feel constrained to change my former position as to the right of families of the National Guard to its benefits. They have the same rights as families of other soldiers in the service. Still, our people should bear in mind that with the large addition thus made to the dependent families of soldiers, this fund will now be severely burdened. The taxation was made on the basis of our quotas under the calk We have now added over thirty thousand men ; and to that extent have increased the number of families that will require aid. Therefore, it is necessary that we should add to the fund, by vol untary contribution, to the extent, at least, of this increase of its liability. You should see that your county commissioners levy the discretionary tax for this year ; or, at least have a clear record of a refusal to do so. "Some complaints in regard to the action of trustees in the distribution of this fund, are an swered in this form : "1. It is asked, Where the absent soldier owns a house and lot, or a small tract of land on which his family resides, is the family thereby debarred from relief? Certainly not; unless the property, independent of furnishing a home for the family, is productive of the means of support ing it. Unproductive property may be an incumbrance, in the way of taxes and other expense?. Sensible and well-meaning men should not have any trouble in deciding questions of this kind. A helpless family may not be able to work ground, even to the partial extent of a livelihood. The simple question with practical men should be: Does the famUy, considering all its circum stances, its capability to produce, its ordinary industry and economy, need aid to live comfortar bly ? If so, the aid should be extended. It is mortifying to add, that in a few cases trustees are represented as deciding that where the family held a small homestead, entirely unproductive, it was not entitled to relief until the property be sold, and its proceeds consumed. Such a position is at variance alike with the provisions of the law, and the dictates of humanity. " 2. It is asked whether the family of a deceased soldier in receipt of a Government pension is entitled to relief? The answer depends upon the circumstances, sensibly viewed. Is the pen sion, considering the size and helplessness of the family, sufficient for its support? If not, relief should be extended from the fund, and the amount of the pension is to be taken into the account when equalizing the fund in the township. "Other questions that may arise should be settled, not by the strict rules of legal refinement, but upon the principles of practical common sense. The trust should be liberally and honestly construed. There is no requirement to practice a niggardly economy, but to fairly distribute the fund in the spirit of justice and humanity, and accomplish with it the greatest amount of good. "In cases where the military committees feel warranted in doing so, they can relieve them selves of some labor and responsibility, and probably secure a- more equitable distribution, by Hundred Days' Men. 219 apportioning the voluntary contributions among the townships, upon the basis adopted by the county commissioners, and handing the amounts to the township trustees, to be paid out in the Barne manner, and as a part of the relief fund. "Please have this circular published in your county. "Very respectfully, JOHN BROUGH." The service of the National Guard did not accomplish the result that had been expected with such confidence, alike by National and State authorities. It did relieve the men whom Grant wanted from forts and railroads, but with these < re-enforcements he did not win the great victory that had been expected ; the war was not ended within the hundred days ; and, in a certain sense, therefore, the great movement was a failure. In another and larger sense it was not. In accordance with the prophetic declaration of her first war Governor, Ohio still led throughout the war. She was incomparably ahead of all the States that had united with her in the offer of hundred days' men to the Government, alike in the numbers that she furnished and in the promptness with' which they were forwarded. Even Indiana, usually so near the front, fell far behind her now. The Ohio National Guard regiments guarded the Baltimore and Ohio Eailroad from the river to the sea-board; they manned the forts at Baltimore, and filled the fortifications around Washington. Theyiiberated the garrisons over this great extent of territory, and thus swelled Grant's army with thirty thousand veterans. They grew restive under mere guard-duty, and finally begged that they too might go to the front.* Nearly all of them were under fire; and none brought discredit upon the Commonwealth that sent them forth. Into the details of their service we can not enter here. Elsewhere f we have sought to tell the story of each ; it is enough here to add that their numbers, promptness, and uniform bearing drew forth, not only such eulogies as we have already quoted, but this, at the close of their service, from Mr. Lincoln himself: "Executive Mansion, Washington City,") September 10, 1864. ) "The term of one hundred days, for which the National Guard of Ohio volunteered having expired, the President directs an official acknowledgment oftheir patriotism and valuable service during the recent campaign. The term of service of their enlistment was short, but distinguished by memorable events in the Valley of the Shenandoah, on the Peninsula, in the operations of the James River, around Petersburg and Richmond, in the battle of Monocacy, in the intrenchments of Washington, and in other important service. The National Guard of Ohio performed with alacrity the duty of patriotic vulumeers, for which they are entitled, :md are hereby tendered, through the Governor of their State, the National thanks. "The Secretary of War is directed to transmit a copy of this order to the Governor of Ohio, and to cause a certificate of their honorable service to be delivered to the officers and soldiers of the Ohio National Guard, who recently served in the military force of the United States as vol unteers for one hundred days. [Signed] "ABRAHAM LINCOLN." In calling out the National Guard Governor Brough assumed a res2)onsi- bility and ran a risk, from whicli all but the boldest would have shrunk back. *The One Hundred and Thirty-Second, Colonel Haines, of Logan County, was the first to apk to be sent to the front. Several others speedily followed. t Volume II, Sketches National Guard Re,giments. 220 Ohio in the War. It did not accomplish all the good he hoped, and it may have helped to swell the unpopularity whicb we are next to see growing at home and in the army against him. But it was through no fault of his that Grant was foiled in the Wilderness, and faced with Lee's steady front at every bloody step of his painful progress toward Eiehmond. Brough had done what be could to "organize victory;" he had kept tbe State, whose honor he so jealously guarded, far in advance of all her sisters, and had displayed an energy and devotion beyond all praise. Others of his actions may have produced more lasting good, but none displayed more consummate ability, and none reflected brighter honor upon the State. Brough's Troubles with Officers. 221 CHAPTEE XVIII. BROUGH'S TROUBLES WITH OFFICERS, AND HIS FAILURE TO BE RENOMINATED. THE anomalous position of regimental officers — owing their commissions to the Governor of their State, but owing him no obedience — looking to him for ijromotions, but looking elsewhere for the orders under which promotions must be won — has already been described. It insured difficulty between the Governor and his officers, no matter what policy of promotion he might adopt. Governor Tod had preferred to get on without a policy. At onetime he would promote according to ra,nk, at another time in spite of rank ; now he would give the ranking Sergeant the vacant Second-Lieutenancy; again he would jump a Captain over the heads of all. superiors to the vacant Lieuten ant-Colonelcy ; to-day he would be governed by the recommendations of the Colonel; to-morrow by the recommendations of military committees or personal acquaintances; the next day by the apparent sentiment ofthe regiment; the next by the requirements of rank. That this was unwise is not here, argued. Perhaps it was well thus to set tle each case as it arose, upon such varying considerations as should seem to suggest the need of a peculiar treatment ; certainly it resulted in less difficulty than a contrary course was to bring on. But Governor Brough was a man of severe methods. He must work on clearly-defined rules, or he could work with no satisfaction. > One of his earliest efforts, therefore, was to secure a system of promotions. He saw the evils resulting from promotion on the recommendation of the com manding officer, the openings it gave for tyranny and for favoritism, the abso lute mastery ofthe fortunes of subordinates it secured to the Colonel. Looking to the regulations and the orders of the War Department, he saw a way pro vided for driving out incompetent officers, and where they were not incompe tent, he conceived it unjust to ignore their rank in making promotions to fill vacancies. It was a cardinal theory with him to bear only his legitimate respon sibilities, and to compel all others^ to do as much. He was unwilling to assume the responsibility of punishing inefficient officers in the field; that was made the duty of those who were conversant with tho facts, and were therefore able to resort to the remedy in the regulations. He would, therefore, promote 222 Ohio in the War. according to rank, save in cases where known intemperance would make this course one of immediate danger to the command, and would put upon tho reg iment itself the task of ridding its roster of men who proved unfit, and who stood jn the way of the promotion of others. Acting on such views he" early promulgated his noted " General Order No. 5," the fertile source of many of the troubles which embittered his administra tion, and turned the officers of the army against him : "General Head-Quarters, State op Ohio, l " Adjutant-General's Office, Columbus, February 6, 1864. / "General Orders No. 5. " Hereafter, all vacancies in established regiments, battalions, or independent companies will be filled by promotion according to seniority in the regiment, battalion, or independent company, except in cases of intemperance. " Existing orders from the War Department afford the necessary facilities for ridding the service of incompetent or inefficient officers, by ordering them before an examining board, which will relieve the Governor from the disagreeable necessity of deciding the merits of an officer ou the mere opinion of the regimental or other commander. " Section ten of an act of Congress, approved July 22, 1861 (General Orders No. 49, series of 1861), provides as follows: " ' That the General commanding a separate Department or detached army, is hereby author ized to appoint a military board or commission of not less than three nor more than five officers, whose duty it shall be to examine the capacity, qualifications, propriety of conduct and efficiency of any commissioned officer of volunteers within his Department or army, who may be reported to the board or commission, and upon such report, if adverse to such officer, and if approved by the President of the United States, the commission of such officer shall be vacated ; Provided, always, that no officer shall be eligible to sit on such board or commission whose rank or pro motion would in any way be affected by its proceedings, and two members, at least, if practicable, shall be of equal rank of the officer being examined.' " No officer shall be deprived of his right to promotion on the mere expression of his com manding officer that he is not competent to discharge the duties of the position to which his seni ority entitles him. " In the case of promotions of sergeants the same rule will govern, and for this reason : com manding officers of regiments and other organizations will give careful attention to the appoint ment of non-commissioned officers, that none but competent, proper, and efficient men Bhall be brought into the line of promotion. " Officers who seek to be detailed on duty which detaches them from their commands, will be considered out of the line qf promotion during their continuance on such detached service. No tice of such detail must be furnished this department, and also notice of the time they are returned to theii* commands. " Commanding officers must promptly deliver all commissions to the parties for whom they are intended. By order : " B. R. COWEN, Adjutant-General of Ohio." Abstract' theory would pronounce this rule perfect; practical results might give a different verdict. The leading officers claimed tbat Governor Brough did not always act on his own regulation, and they were opposed to it at any rato from the start, for very obvious reasons. Their power to promote or retard promotions was measurably taken away ; and it was from this an easy step to open hostility against the man who had done it. Then Governor Brough himself was led, by the logic of his position, into becoming more and m<#e the chanipion of the private soldier as against the officer, and of the subordinate officer as against his superiors. That a strong sense of justice to the weak Brough's Troubles with Officers. 223 inspired this is plain; that it proved sometimes subversive of all commonly- accepted rules of subordination and military etiquette can not be denied. Disputes with the officers in the field Eoon sprang up. For a time these were kept within bounds, but as the officers began to feel more and more out raged, they threw off the tone of deference to the Governor. He, on the other hand, treated. them as he would his railroad operatives; held them to the samo rigid performance of duty; rebuked with as little search for soft phrases when he thought they were neglecting their work. Thus, by and by, a state of affairs sprang up whioh led to the most acrimonious correspondence, to the dis missal of officers for disrespect to the Governor, and to a combination of officers against Brough's renomination. To such a pass did things come that, on a reference by the Governor to the Colonel of a regiment of a complaint which a soldier of the regiment had chosen to send to the Governor, this extraordinary interchange of indorsements on 'the soldier's letter could ensue : "Head-Quarters Second Brigade, Third Division Fourth A. C.,\ "New Market, March 25, 1865. } "Respectfully returned. This communication to the Governor is a studied assault on my character as an officer, and should not have received the official attention of the Commander-in- Chief of the military of Ohio. It certainly will receive no attention from me until it shall have gone to the Governor through the soldier's commanding officer. This private channel of slan dering military officers, has been too freely used, and has certainly received tacit sanction at the Capital. As inattention to a soldier's wants and rights by an officer is among the gravest of offenses, so is such a charge, when not well founded, a low slander. " If his Excellency desires to know the history of this case, it will afford me pleasure to give it, but his request must in no way indorse the grave charges of wanton cruelty against me. "Very respectfully, your obedient servant, "H. K. McCONNELL, Colonel Seventy-First Ohio Infantry." Executive Department, Columbus, April 13, 1865. "Returned to Colonel McConnell as unofficer-like and insolent. It is alike the prerogative and the duty of the Commander-in-Chief to hear and investigate the complaints of the humblest private against the acts of his commanding officer. He does not acknowledge any regulation requiring a private to ask permission of the officer, of whose injustice he complains, to graciously permit him to forward his petition. In every case of this kind the officer has been first called upon for a statement of facts or explanation of the case, and the officer who throws himself upon his dignity, and talks of slander and defamation, naturally provokes the suspicion that he has no better explanation or defense. Colonel McConnell can act his own pleasure in regard to farther report in this case. He can have no mitigation of the terms in which it was originally called for. In the mean time, he can rest assured that this department will receive the complaint, and redress, as far as practicable, the grievances of the soldiers of the State, as it will protect itself from the insolence of officers who do not comprehend the courtesies and duties of their positions. "By order of the Governor. SIDNEY D. MAXWELL, "A. D. G, etc., to Governor Brough.'' 3 Long before this, a gallant officer, soon to lay down his life for the cause, had been betrayed by the feeling which was already spreading among men of his rank against the Governor, into a letter which drew out this response: " Executive Department, Columbus, March 8, 1864. "Colonel Daniel McCook, Fifty-Second Regiment 0. V. I., McAffee Church, Georgia: "Sir: When the Colonel of the Fifty-Second Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry clothes his communications in language becoming 'an officer and a gentleman,' they will be courteously 224 Ohio in the War. responded to. How true his allegations may be as to the Provost-Marshal, I have not taken tho trouble to inquire; but as to this department, both directly and inferentially, they are alike insulting and unfounded. As I can not present as disrespectful a. communication as this to the Provost-Marshal, I leave Colonel McCook to r«dress his own grievances, until he appreciates a more courteous and respectful manner in seeking it through this department. "Very respectfully, JOHN BROUGH." While thus addressing officers who treated him with disrespect, he was remorsdessly hunting down others whom he believed to be shirks, in a in an ner which these letters that follow may illustrate: "Executive Department, Columbus, July 21, 1864. "Major W. G. Neilson, Annapolis, Maryland: "Sir: I am surprised to learn to-day that you left the regiment on the second day of May, and have not been with it since; that a part of the time you have been sick, but the greater portion you have been managing to keep on detached service out of the field. I do not know how much of this is true, but so long an absence from the regiment requires an explanation. I have no fancy for officers who play off from their regiments, and I have therefore written the War Department requesting that your case be investigated. "The regiment requires its officers; if you can not serve in your line of duty, you should not prevent another from doing so. Yours truly, JOHN BROUGH." "Executive Department, Columbus, August 5, 1861. " Major W. G. Neilson, Twenty-Seventh Regiment U. S. Colored Troops, Elmira, New York : "Dear Sir: I have yours of the 3d instant. I gave you reports that reached me, and of the truth of which I had no knowledge, while I have not charged you with any improper con duct or shirking from duty (though others have done so), and do not make any such charges now. I am still impressed with the fact that in the critical condition of your regiment you should not have laid sixty days inactive without at least some effort to relieve it, or some communica tion with this department. It is very certain that your prestige with the regiment is gone. I will have it full to the maximum in fifteen days, and it needs officers badly. As you admit you can not return to it, the question is with yourself whether you will deprive it of an officer, and remain a drone in the service. "Very respectfully, JOHN BROUGH, Governor of Ohio." The Governor was no less outspoken in defense of officers whom he believed to be doing their duty, and against whom prejudicial efforts were making at head-quarters or in the department. Of his representations on this class of subjects, the letter below may serve as a sample, while it also illustrates his views of the strong practice at elections which the times would warrant: " Executive Department, Columbus, October 14, 1864. " Major-General Hooker, Commanding Department, Cincinnati : "Sir: I am informed that Colonel Greene, in charge of draft rendezvous here, is asking that Major Skiles, Eighty-Eighth Regiment O. V. I., in charge of Tod BarrackB here, be relieved and superseded. I have not had any conversation with Colonel Greene myself, but my information comes from responsible parties. Major Skiles is one of the very best officers we have in service here. His offense, I am informed, is that he acted as marshal of a Union torch light procession here on Saturday night, and on election day refused to allow Mr. Congressman Cox to go within the barracks to electioneer among the soldiers, where the poll was opened. On the one hand, it is said that Colonel Greene is a sympathizer with General McClellan; of this I have no evidence. On the other hand, an army officer states his position to be that he holds it improper for an army officer, either regular or volunteer, to take any part in elections beyond his vote. On whichever, ground it is placed is to me immaterial. Major Skiles has done his duty as an officer, and I hold he is doing it as a citizen, and in both he is sustaining the Government and aiding to crush the rebellion. I therefore respectfully protest against hu being superseded therefor. Very respectfully, JOHN BROUGH. Brought Troubles with Officers. 225 We have spoken of the charge by the officers that Governor Brough did not uniformly adhere to his own rule about promotions, as laid down in " Order No. 5." They pointed to a class of cases like that of Captain Mayer as proof: " Executive Department, Columbus, November 17, 1864. "Brigadier-General J. P. Hatch, Jacksonville, Florida: "Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge your favor of the 26th instant. While I have great respect for your opinions, I think I have fully examined and understand the troubles in the One Hundred and Seventh Regiment. CaPtain Mayer is, in my judgment, so intimately connected with them that his promotion to the command would be a step I can not consent to take. I frankly told him so when he called on me, some months since ; and I further said, what I now repeat, that I would hail his resignation as a token of future promise and usefulness of the regiment. I have seriously thought of asking his removal by the. War Department, but have heretofore forborpe, what, upon less provocation, I .shall hereafter do. During my absenoe the Adjutant-General sent him a commission as Major, which I directed should be revoked. " In the hope of promoting the efficiency of the regiment, I have to-day appointed Captain J. S. Cooper Lieutenant-Colonel, and sent him to the regiment. He is a good officer and known to the command. He is conversant with the troubles in the regiment, and I .trust he will be able, by a conciliatory but firm course, to remedy them. I shall not permit Captain Mayer to embarrass him for an hour after that fact comes to my knowledge. I have no personal feeling in the matter; my only object is to promote the harmony and efficiency of the regiment. "Very respectfully, JOHN BROUGH." The letter-books of Brough's administration, in the State archives (from which the documents here are taken), swarm, with similar evidences of his activity, his remorseless pursuit of men whose conduct he thought unsatisfac tory, his habitual disregard of the dignity of officers, his championship of the private soldiers, his watchfulness for those he suspected to be shirks. Thus, within two or three weeks after his inauguration, we find him addressing the Secretary of War* concerning Colonel De Haas, of the Seventy-Seventh Ohio : " The fact is presented that during twenty-one months' service of said regiment, since Colonel Mason took command. Colonel De Haas has been with it but one hundred and sixty-one days, and those were during the time it was not en gaged in field service. He has been in action witb it but once, and that but two hours ; and my information is (from other sources than Colonel Mason) that his record on that occasion is anything else than honorable. . . . On seven days' furlough he has been absent six months. . . . The regiment should not be sent back under this officer. . . . He stands in the way of the promotion of officers who have shared the privations of the regiment. If the power were mine I would find a way to right this wrong." A few days later, f we find him writing to Colonel J. A. Lucy, of the One Hundred and Fifteenth Ohio: "You will save yourself and youi\officers some trouble and improve the morale of your regiment by refraining from sending me the proceedings of indignation meetings on the subject of promotions. If an error is committed by this department it does not require the machinery of a national convention to have it corrected ! " Some soldiers in the Second Ohio Heavy Artillery complained that they had been treated with unjust cruelty by some of the officers. Brough straight en 25th January, 1864. t February 11, 1864. - Vol. I.— 15. 226 Ohio in the War. way wrote to General Steedman, in whose command the regiment was, asking that the complaints be quietly investigated. He defended " Order No. 5 " against all complaints, and wanted it adopted as the jule also in the promotions beyond the rank of Colonel. " Let me illus trate," he said, in the course of a long letter about affairs in Sherman's army. "The nomination of Colonel Harker to a Brigadier-Generalship has cost us four of tbe best Colonels in the army. He was No. 16 in the rank of Ohio Colonels ; and, of the fifteen ranking him, twelve at least were as meritorious as himself. Two of these have resigned and been discharged the service hon orably. Two more have resignations pending." In this matter he had been opposed by Senator John Sherman, between whom and himself strife as to promotions seems to have been common. On another occasion, Brough having recommended Colonels Yan Derveer and Gibson for Brigadier-Generalships, Sherman wrote to him, asking that he would with draw these recommendations, for the purpose of insuring the promotion of Colonel Stanley. Brough replied : " I respectfully protest against the injustice of overslaughing his (Stanley's) ranking officers, who are his equals in merit." In the re-enlistment of the veterans, Puller's well-known brigade was credited to Tennessee instead of Ohio, to the great astonishment of the officers, as well as of the Governor. Colonel Edw. F. Noyes, of the Thirty-Ninth, and other officers concerned, wrote earnestly to the Governor on the subject, pro testing against the change. He seems finally to have been convinced that Ful ler himself was to blame for,it, and that the new muster-rolls had been pur posely made to show that the enlistment took place in Tennessee (which was technically true), for the purpose of compelling Ohio to raise more troops. Brough thereupon writes to Judge Spaulding at Washington, complaining of Fuller's action, and adding : " I submit whether these facts constitute a good reason for his promotion to a Brigadier-Generalship." * Thus, on all hands, Brough's brusque ways with the officers, and his utter indifference to their feelings when he felt they were in the wrong, were raising up enemies for him, whose enmity was to prove potential. A case was yet to come which should attract more general attention, and seem to the army to involve some elements of persistent injustice. On this the feeling against him concentrated. It was a much-disputed case, but the facta generally agreed upon were about these : In accordance with a policy whieh we have seen to be somewhat common with him, Governor Tod had given a commission to Sergeant John M. Wood ruff, of the One Hundred and Eleventh, on condition that he should recruit thirty men for the regiment, and take them back with him to the field. Two days after Governor Brough's inauguration Woodruff reported at Colnmhus, gave proofs of having the men, and received the commission in due form. When, however, he presented himself in the field to Colonel J. B. Bond, the commandant of the regiment, that officer took his commission, but refused to * A movement for which was then on foot. The rolls were finally changed, and the regi ments thus restored to Ohio. Brough's Troubles with Officers. 227 muster him into the service, for the reasons, as subsequently appeared, (1), that Woodruff had been commissioned without any recommendation from the regi ment, not having been even sent home to recruit, but to conduct drafted men back to the regiment; (2), that some of the men whom he claimed as recruits, entitling him to the commission, had not been recruited by him; and (3), that he merited no promotion by behavior either in the regiment or at home. Governor Brough did not learn for some months that his commission to Woodruff was being ignored. The news then came in a letter of complaint from Woodruff himself, dated 22d May, 1864. He thereupon asked Colonel Bond to report the reasons for preventing his muster. To this the only response received was as follows : " Head-Quarters One Hundred and Eleventh O. V. L, 1 Near Acworth, Georgia, June 9, 1864. j " Respectfully returned to the Adjutant-General of Ohio, a report having been made in the case to the department. (Signed) "JOHN R. BOND, Colonel One Hundred and Eleventh O. V. I." This Brough construed as referring to a report sent to the War Depart ment, and as, therefore, intimating that the matter was one with which the Governor of Ohio had nothing to do, 'and on which the Colonel did not pro pose to be catechised. Meantime Woodruff had been severely wounded and crippled for life, and the Governor had issued to him, in acknowledgment of his gallantry, a commission as First-Lieutenant. He now at once forwarded to the Secretary of War Woodruff's letter, the inquiry of tho Adjutant-General, and Bond's reply — making no recommendation, but calling the Secretary's at tention to the language of Bond's reply, and stating that he had failed to report as requested. The Secretary of War had a profound admiration for Governor Brough, as had also the President. They held him the ablest of the Governors, relied im plicitly upon him, and about this time were specially grateful to him for the splendid keeping of his promise of hundred-days' men. The result could, of course, be foreseen. A special order was promptly issued, "dishonorably dis missing Colonel Bond from the service for refusing to recognize the commis sions of the Governor of Ohio." A copy of this order was sent to Brough, but no other correspondence was had on the subject. Subsequently Colonel Bond explained that the report referred to in his offensive indorsement above qu6ted was in reality one which he had previously sent to the Governor on this case, which had never been received. Supposing that before his reply could reach Columbus this report must come to hand, and that, therefore, his indorsement would be understood, and a longer explanation needless, he sent it as quoted, being the more disposed to be very brief where he could, because they were then in the midst of the Atlanta campaign and on the march. He had many warm friends in Toledo, who interested themselves in his case, and made efforts, both at Columbus and Washington, to have, him reinstated. To this end a special order was finally procured from General Halleck, directing him, as an indispensable preliminary, to make a satisfactory 228 Ohio in the War. apology to Governor Brough. On this document, when received, Brough placed the following indorsement: "Executive Department, Columbus, November 12, 1864. " The within is, probably, a technical fulfillment of the order of the Secretary of War, but, in my judgment, it is deficient in the elements of repentance and frankness. It does not meet the fact that Colonel Bond had determined, from favoritism to others and personal repugnance, that Woodruff should not be mustered. " The record shows that after a personal interview with the Adjutant-General of Ohio, in August, he went to his regiment and reported that the commission would be revoked, and mus tered another man over him, thus filling the only vacancy in the regiment. " The Adjutant-General says he made no such communication. The averment that Wood ruff had not recruited his men is a pretext. He produced evidence of that fact when the com mission was issued. Captain Beal's statement that he recruited the men is not justified. "In my judgment the good of the regiment and of the service require that Colonel Bond should be relieved from his command, for these reasons : " 1. This is his second offense of this character. In 1862 Governor Tod was compelled to procure a special order of the War Department to muster a Lieutenant and Adjutant. The offense was passed over. " 2. He has passed a large portion of his time away from his regiment. He has been twice arrested for gross intemperance, and was six months absent from the regiment at home under ene of these arrests. Both arrests were released without trial, under promise of reformation. " 3. He has been, and is now, in political sentiment, opposed to the head of the Govern ment, and, consequently, its policy in the prosecution of the war ; and in this particular is very obnoxious to a large majority of his command. " He appeals to have the stigma of a dismissal removed. While I respectfully, but ear nestly, protest against his being assigned to command again, I have no objections, if the De partment sanctions such a course, to a reinstation, accompanied by an immediate resignation. I leave this for the Secretary to determine. I am convinced the service would be benefited by the retiracy in one form or the other. JOHN BROUGH, Governor of Ohio." Some, at least, of the charges thus made could probably have been sus tained ; but there was a good deal of sympathy with Bond, especially among the officers ofthe army. He was said to be brave, and a good fighting Colonel, and to such a man they held that much ought to be pardoned. The matter got into the newspapers ; several of the most influential journals of the State attacked Brough's course in the case, as exhibiting a petty spirit of personal revenge and an unwillingness to drop his cause of quarrel after the most sat isfactory apologies. The latent hostility to the Governor, which his previous treatment of many others had aroused, now broke out openly, and he speedily became intensely unpopular, -with n. large portion of the officers, at least, of that army which, a year before, had given him forty-one thousand votes, to only two thousand against him. We can now see that much of this feeling was unwarranted. Among the confidential letters in the State Archives, for the term of Brough's administra tion, is one on this subject, touchingly expressing bis appeal to the safe judg ment of time, whieh may be properly made public. It is addressed to Colonel W. H. Drew, then the acting military agent of the State at Chattanooga. This gentleman seems to have expressed fears as to the effect which the feeling aroused by the Bond case would have on the Governor's political prospects. Be replied on the 20th of February, 1865, explaining tbe facts at some length, and concluding in this wise and temperate strain : Brough's Failure to be Renominated. 229 "This is a simple history of the affair. I had no personal feeling in it — never saw Colonel Bond until he fir^t called on me — never had any controversy with him until it grew out of this affair. I treated him and his counsel with uniform courtesy and kindness ; heard them patiently, and assured them I had no offended dignity to avenge and propitiate.' My only object was the good of the service, and to prevent the return to it of an officer who I conscientiously believed should not be there. I understand the case is now under review at Washington. I can not tell what may be its result, but I am satisfied I have done nothing but my duty in regard to it. " Personally, I am very indifferent as to political consequences to myself on account of this, or any other of my public acts. The most earnest desire I have is to be permitted to retire from a position I did not seek, and really involuntarily assumed. I am equally indifferent as to who may be my successor, though I confess to some anxiety that he shall be one who will make it a cardinal principle not to put in the military service, or continue there, officers who disqualify themselves by intemperate habits or immoral conduct. "Now for the moral of this long story. You, as well as myself, have an important duty to perform toward our men who can not help themselves. To do this successfully, we must some times crucify our feelings and our animosities. We may think wrong is being done — that friends are being injured — that improper means are being used to forward ambitious purposes. But we must pass this all by in the present. Time and truth will set all things right. To hasten this end we must avoid controversies with those who have power that they can use, either to favor or injure the success of our labors. Your relation to the commander is such that you should be extremely cautious as to your feelings and utterance where third parties are concerned. If he looks to high political position you need not become his partisan, but you should not become his opponent, nor make him yours in such form as to impair your usefulness to the men under your charge. Avoid harsh expressions, avoid controversies, avoid even allusion to an irritating sub ject. While I personally appreciate and prize your friendship for and confidence in me, I would not for a moment you should weaken your own position or usefulness by assuming my defense against. any charges or imputations. Living or dead, I have no fears of any assaults that may be made upon my public acts. I know they have all been dictated by honest motives. They may be marked by errors, but not by weakness or dishonesty. And so time and truth will provp them. " This is a miserable scrawl, but I have not time to re-write. Accept in a purely confiden tial character, and believe me Very truly yours, "JOHN BROUGH." Other causes combined to increase the unpopularity which originated in the army. The Governor was rough, harsh, and implacable with men who were guilty of little offenses. His honesty was fierce and a^gressive^and^ it_ led ^ him to denounce many men for practices which the most considered quite in tbe lino of official precedents._He utterly scorned the arts^^^opojji^ity^ a ndn refused t0 court the "local £rcat men" of Columbus.._an.d ot.hfir Ttfl/if.iV.aJ c^ffltW ffl thp State. His manners were often offensive, an^^h^ ^ersona^habjf^^J^ some nespects at least, if not in^aU with which he was freely^ch^arg^tJESxajapt cor rect. Besides all this, the call on the National Guard had leftMisomet soreness in the minds of many people whom it inconvenienced. He still had hosts of friends throughout the State; men who could overlook all minor considerations in their admiration for bis splendid ability, and their gratitude for the incorruptible honesty, the economy, and the wonderful and wise zeal that had marked his service of tbe State. These urged him to be a candidate for renomination. For a time he held the question under advisement, declaring that he would consider it only in the light of what would be best for the Union party. Then he wrote to all who addressed him on the subject, that while he believed he might secure a nomination, he was unwilling to struggle 230 Ohio in the War. for it; that it would be better for the party to have a candidate who would arouse less personal hostility, and that he would not enter the contest. And finally he addressed this frank and characteristic communication to the press: "Columbus, June 15, 1865. " To the People of Ohio : " I accepted the nomination of the Union party for Governor of Ohio two years ago with unfeigned reluctance. I did not seek or desire it, and I only accepted from considerations of public duty, which, in view of the state of the country, it clearly imposed upon me. I came into office with the firm determination that if the military power of the rebellion should be broken and the war closed during the first term of my administration — which I confidently anticipated — under no circumstances would I be a candidate for re-election. This determination I freely com municated to my friends. During the past spring, under pressing importunities from nearly every section of the State, I allowed this position to be modified to this extent, that while I would not seek the nomination, and did not desire it, yet if it was conferred with a reasonable degree of unanimity and good feeling, I would not decline it. I however reserved to myself the privilege of following my original purpose, and withdrawing my name from the canvass whenever, in my judgment, the same should become requisite to the harmony of the convention and the success of its nominations. " Many prominent men of the Union organization will bear me witness that I have frequently urged upon them the conflicts that would arise from my renomination. In times like those through which we have passed in the last four years, no man who filled the position, and honestly and conscientiously discharged the duties of the office of Governor of Ohio, could hope to escape censure and opposition, or fail to destroy what politicians term his ' availability ' as a candidate for re-election. Such was the case with two of my predecessors, who were earnest, good men. I could not, and did not, hope to avoid the same result; and therefore I made the reservation, and based it upon my own judgment of passing events. Even if I desired the position, I owe the people of the State too much to embarrass their future action for the gratification of my own ambition. As I have no political desires, either present or future, the path of duty becomes not only plain, but personally pleasant. "After a careful survey of all the surroundings, I am entirely satisfied that the sanie con siderations of duty that pressed upon me the acceptance of a nomination two years ago, as impe riously require that I should decline it at the present time'. Under this conviction, I respectfully but unconditionally withdrew my name from the convention and the canvass. " I am aware that by this decision I do violence to the wishes and" feelings of a host of friends, whose good opinions I cherish. But they must pardon me. I have no sentiment of doubt or distrust, either of their friendship or good judgment ; but I see my own course so clearly that I may not turn aside from it. " Of course I have no personal regrets or disappointments. On the contrary, I am highly gratified that I can honorably retire. I doubt very much whether my health — much impaired by close confinement to official duties — would sustain me through a vigorous campaign; while increasing years, and the arduous labor of a long life in public positions, strongly invite me to retirement and repose during the few years that may yet remain to me. " To the people of the State, who have so nobly sustained me, I owe a lasting debt of grati tude. I have served them, during the trying periods of my administration, to the best of my ability. I know that I have done it conscientiously and honestly. I look back upon my record with but a single regret, and that is, that I have not been able to make it more effective in the cause of the State and Nation. Very respectfully, "JOHN BROUGH." Close of Brough's Administration. 231 CHAPTER XIX. CLOSE OF BROUGH'S ADMINISTRATION. TO the illustrations of Governor Brough's activity for the army, for tho soldiers in the hospitals, for recruiting, and for the advancement of Grant's campaign, it is fitting lo add here some indications of the in fluence he exerted upon the Union party. Early in 1864 he openly committed himself to the renomination of Mr. Lincoln for the Presidency. He seized the opportunity, however, of a malignant attack upon Secretary Chase, which that gentleman had some apparently substantial reasons for supposing to have been made with the connivance of the President, to address him his congratulations on the triumphant manner in which he had passed the investigation that ensued. In reply to Mr. Chase's acknowledgment of this letter he wrote again, striving to soften the asperities between Mr. Chase and Mr. Lincoln, and to convince him of the hopelessness of any effort to defeat Mr. Lincoln : "June 1,1865. "Hon. S. P. Chase, Washington City, D. C. " My Dear Sib : An unusual pressure of business engagements has prevented an earlier acknowledgment of your esteemed favor of the 19th instant. I confess I feel highly gratified, not only that you found some benefit, however slight, in the suggestions I had the honor of making to you, but that you appreciate and so kindly credit me with the motives that prompted them. Not the least of these, let me now assure you, was the cordial personal friendship which I have ever entertained for you ; a sentiment I have cherished from the first day of our acquaint ance, and which no difference of opinion in public matters has ever interfered with. I confess to you I had other motives: — the condition of tbe country, the value and importance of your serv ices in the Treasury, the disaster that would follow a breach in the public councils and your retiracy, the shock to our whole system of credit and finance — but I felt that all these were reconcilable with the personal desire I had for the preservation of your own high character and reputation. I was satisfied then, and am now, that your best vindication, and your highest meed of honor, would be found in remaining at your post, and demanding through your friends in Con gress a full investigation of the charges made against you. I urged that course on the Ohio del egation, and they pledged themselves to it. The result has justified you nobly before the country. It has sustained you, and sustained your friends. You stand better before the Nation to-day than if Blair had not afforded you the opportunity for so triumphant a vindication. I know this result has been reached at a terrible cost of personal feeling to yourself — but these things are ever so. It is the penalty men pay in this age for inflexibly holding and pursuing a course dictated by honor and integrity. It is said that every worldly affliction has its consola tion. Yours must be that your personal suffering is immensely less than would have been the consciousness that you merited the reproaches cast upou you, and that your friends could not suc cessfully vindicate your official conduct. I am more than gratified if I contributed to a result 232 Ohio in the War. that I am satisfied has alike enured to your benefit and the protection of the Nation from a serious disaster. "While I have no palliation for the course of Blair, you must allow me to say, in all kindness, that I think you in error in attributing any portion of his malignaty to the promptings or even the knovjjedge of the President. I think Mr. Lincoln erred in his original promise to reinstate Blair in the army. Having given that pledge, his innate honesty of character prompted him to keep it. I think that at the last moment he saw that error more clearly than he did the means of correcting it. But I am most certain that it was no part of his purpose to prompt or even to jus tify Blair's hostility to you. The whole affair has been an unfortunate one. I do not feel willing to discuss it; but while, with my knowledge of all the facts, I concede that a little sterner course on the part of the President would have produced better results. I do not find in them any evi dence of falsity or hostility on his part toward you personally or officially. I admit that I have been anxious to find this so— but I do not think that my judgment has been colored by my desires in this particular. " While I would have preferred not to have opened the political campaign at so early a day, I accept the nomination of Mr. Lincoln as one that I think would have been made as certainly sixty or ninety days hence. It is to an unusual extent an impulse of the popular mind, and nothing but a great disaster to our cause would have changed it. I do not regard it as a measure of hostility to you or any other of the distinguished men whose names were connected with the canvass. It grows ont of the circumstances, and, perhaps, the necessities of the case. It is the point upon which the public anxiety, for a favorable result to our great struggle, has concentrated as promising more of harmony and unity of action than any other. After much reflection, I am inclined to accept it as the best practicable result we could attain. "I do not sympathize in your 'apprehensions as to the result. I have no reasonable doubt as to the election of Mr. Lincoln— that is, if the Union party of the country can elect any man of undoubted Union sentiments and policy. That which would defeat him, would defeat any other man on the same platform ; that is, disaster to our cause in the field. We must achieve success with our arms; we must .see the 'beginning of the end' of this rebellion during this year; we must defeat the Fabian policy of the Rebels by bold and vigorous progress — or he who foretells adverse political results, will not be entitled to the reputation of a prophet. But with military success comes political triumph; and I think I see more certain indications of that now than at any former period of the war. There may be, and there will be, some dissenters from this nom ination; some will find one cause in the past, and others an apprehension in the future. But I am impressed with the peculiarity of this contest. While there is an anxious and earnest desire to terminate this great struggle, there is an equal purpose to terminate it rightfully, and a fixed determination to lay aside all prejudices, and sacrifice for the present all preferences and wishes, to accomplish the great end. The nearer we approach this end through the successes of our arms, and the firmness and energy of our Government, the more irresistible will the popular tide be come — and all opposition will be swept away by it. You may see this indicated by the late con vention at Cleveland. There are leading politicians enough who do not prefer Mr. Lincoln— but they did not cast their,fortunes with that manifestation of opposition to him. They realize the political 'situation,' and stand back. They see the risiug of the tide and wait to calculate its altitude. They know that the success of our cause by the military arm leaves no room to doubt the political result. I do not care to contemplate the other side of the picture ; but this convic tion impresses itself upon my mind, that if disaster does come in the field, Ind we can not breast it under Mr. Lincoln, we should be as badly, if not worse, defeated under any other political leader. I crave your pardon for the infliction of this terribly long epistle. I did notv contemplate the half of it when I took up my pen. It is my honest view from my own stand-point; whether correct or judicious, you can determine. It is hastily written, without choosing phrases, and is given as friend to friend in our friendly relations. I have only to repeat that though we may differ on these points, it is my earnest desire that these relations may not thereby be disturbed. " Very truly yours, JOHN BROUGH." Later in the Presidential campaign there we're grave apprehensions, among some, of Mr. Lincoln's success, and at the time there were reports of a move- Close of Brough's Administration. 233 ment designed to force him off the Eepublican ticket. Possibly with reference to this, the following letter was sent to Mr. Theodore Tilton : "Columbus, September 5, 1864. "Theodobe Tilton, Esq., Editor Independent, New York: "Sib: I have the note under date of 3d instant of Messrs. Grealey, Godwin, and yourself. I answer your interrogatories : "1. I not only regard the election of Mr. Lincoln as a probability, but I am satisfied that unity and co-operation in the Union element can easily make it a certainty. "2. At this time I have no doubt of the result in the State of Ohio. "3. Under these convictions I answer your three interrogatories very decidedly in the neg ative. Very respectfully, JOHN BROUGH." The unpublished letters of the Governor abound in evidences of his con tinued and constant activity for the service of the State. In February, 1864, he writes to the Secretary of War concerning the appointment of an officer from New Hampshire as Provost-Marshal for Ohio, after the resignation of Provost-Marshal Parrott : " Is Ohio so poor in men and material that it is necessary to import upon her? I have now four crippled Colonels who can not for some time go back to the field (either of whom is abundantly' competent for this place), and all desiring some position of useful ness, but they find themselves some morning turned out to shift for themselves. Are our veterans to be made to know that their toils and dangers go for nothing? Is the Colonel who left his leg at Mission Bidge,* or he who came from Binggold covered with wounds, to be told that a place he could fill in Ohio is reserved for some sound Colonel from New Hampshire ? Have we done anything to merit this slight? Bespectfully, but firmly, I protest against this wrong to the State and its band of war-worn veteran officers." In January, 1864, he writes to the Secretary of War, calling his attention to the exposed condition of the Border, and asking for artillery, owed by the Government under old militia laws. Stanton at first objected; but Brough per sisted until his efforts resulted in the equipment of four complete batteries, which, during the hundred days' movement, did good service. He remonstrated against the injustice which kept between twenty and thirty independent batteries in the field from Ohio, and asked a regimental organization for them, that their officers might have some chance of promo tion. "I more than ask," he said in a letter to the Secretary of War, in Febru ary, 1864, "I urge that at .least two regiments of artillery be created from Ohio batteries now in service. They are, all re-enlisting— must they go back as independent batteries only?" He felt the passions, of his kind at witnessing the horrible condition of some of the starved Union prisoners, on their return from Southern confinement. A relative of General Cass, of Michigan, and a personal friend of his own, wrote to him about this time, asking his influence to secure the release on parole of a Bebel General, then confined at Detroit, that he might remain with friends * Understood to refer to Colonel Wiley, Forty -First Ohio. 234 Ohio in the War. there who would entertain him, and be responsible for his conduct. This is Brough's reply: "Executive Depabtment, Columbus, May 23, 1864. "General John E. Hunt, Detroit, Michigan: "Sie: I have your favor of the 19th instant. All prisoners of war. civil and military, are nnder the sole charge of Colonel William Hoffman, Commissary-General of Prisoners, Washing ton City. I can not interfere with them if I would, and I can not give an order to any to com municate with them without his permission. "I am glad it is so. Some four weeks ago I saw, at Baltimore, the arrival of a vessel loaded with our prisoners from Belle Isle, who, in the very refinement of barbarism, had been reduced by starvation to mere skeletons, for no other purpose than to incapacitate them for further service in the Union armies. Over one-third of these men were too far gone to be resuscitated, and died within forty-eight hours after arrival. While I would not retaliate on Rebel prisoners by prac ticing like means, I confess, General, I have very little sympathy with, or desire to parole or release from confinement, men who have been upholding a rebellion that has deluged the land with sorrow and blood — and whose leaders have resorted to cruelty and barbarism in the treat ment of prisoners more infernal than any ever practiced by savages. The higher the rank and social position of men, the less are they entitled to sympathy. They sinned against light and knowledge. Therefore I am glad their fate is not in my keeping, lest, under such provocation, I should not be over merciful. " I return letter as requested, "Very respectfully, JOHN BROUGH." Some lawyers, understood then to be sympathizers with the rebellion, wrote him a letter urging with pertinacity, but without much courtesy, his duty to help to get some claims of clients allowed at Washington. He replied: "Executive Depabtment, Columbus, May 26, 1864. " C. & C, Attorneys, Athens, Ohio : "Gentlemen: I have been honored with two epistles from your firm. The inclosures in your first communication I forwarded to the War Department. Your second note I shall send after them, giving you an introduction to the Secretary. "I duly appreciate the lecture you so emphatically read to me as to my duty to my constit uents, but I fail to see any obligation to become the agent of 'attorneys' to press their claims upon the departments, especially when those 'attorneys' are blessed with a manner of communi cation so much more emphatic and persuasive than my own. Your clients undoubtedly com mitted their interests to your hands in consideration of your business energy, and your influence with the departments at Washington ; and it would be improper for me to rob you of the honors of success, by any interference on my part. On the other hand, while I am ever ready to respond to the appeals of my constituents, I do not recognize the right of 'attorneys' to command my services for their own benefit, especially when in so doing they berate and denounce the Govern ment which it is alike my pleasure and my duty to support. "Very respectfully, JOHN BBOUGH." In marked contrast was the cordial letter — to select one out of many — which he wrote in November to Samuel Pike, of Washington C. H., sympa thizing with his fatherly solicitude for the special exchange of his son, but add ing that, heartily as he wished he could help him, he felt bound to oppose all special exchanges, for the reason that they tended to render more hopeless the case of those still kept in Southern prisons, and to postpone still further the day of their deliverance. While the struggle lasted, Governor Brough was second to no Statesman of tho Nation in the clearness of vision with which he perceived the popular demand, or in the zeal with which, amid all discouragements, he enforced the Close of Brough's Administration. 235 necessity for the steady prosecution of the war to the ends of human freedom and National supremacy. In the height of the personal vexations we have shown as surrounding him, he closed his message to the Legislature with these b'rave words : "Instead of voting this war 'a failure,' and commanding a 'cessation of hostilities,' the peo ple have declared it a success thus far in its progress, and required its continuance until the rebellion is suppressed, and their Government restored to its original power and usefulness. They have counted its cost and measured its sacrifices ; they have voted to themselves heavy tax ation, and if necessity requires it, more calls upon them to fill up the ranks of their armies ; they have left their authorities no discretion; have forbidden them to take any backward step, but to press onward with energy and vigor, calling for and using all the resources of the Nation until the Rebel power is broken, and the peace and unity of the country is restored. They have gone further, and declared with clear and unmistakable emphasis that with the conquest of this rebell ion must perish its most potent element, as well as one of its exciting causes ; arid that when peace sheds its blessings again upon our people this shall be, what God and our fathers designed it — A LAND OP HUMAN EBEEDOM. " From the commencement of this great contest the State of Ohio has occupied no doubtful or hesitating position. Our people have assumed their burdens with alacrity, and borne them with cheerfulness. They have responded with promptitude to every call that has been made upon them ; and without passing the bounds of becoming modesty, they may point with emotions of pride to the record which her sons have made for the State in the council and in the field. Ohio officers have commanded with distinction and honor in nearly every department of the service ; and Ohio soldiers have battled with exalted courage and patriotism upon nearly every field of the war, and marched over portions of every State that the treasonable leaders took into rebellion. At all times and at all places they have nobly done their duty; achieving for themselves and reflecting upon their State the highest honor. True, there have been grievous sacrifices ; there has been mourning at many hearth-stones ; and we have often been called upon to pause in our exultation over the noble conduct of our living heroevs, to lament our heroes dead; but even the eye bedimmed with tears has caught a glance of the future, and the stricken heart has found con solation in the assurance that all these sacrifices will be hallowed in the triumph of freedom, and the coming greatness and glory of our country. The commandment of the people is to you and to me, in our allotted spheres, to move onward to the accomplishment of this great end ; and to contribute all of ability and usefulness we possess to the consummation of that grand triumph in which not only we ourselveis but the friends of free government throughout the world will rejoice.'' When at last the tidings from Appomattox C- H. flashed across the Land, and the rapidly following reduction of the army that was no longer needed began, Secretary Stanton found nowhere more efficient aid in hurrying the sol diers back to their peaceful avocations than in the Executive of Ohio, on whom he had so often relied. The tables elsewhere given* may show the rapidity with which the work was done, but they can not exhibit the fervid energy with which the Governor pressed it at every point; the persistency with which he assailed the paymasters and mustering officers, forcing them to work harder than they were accustomed, and greatly arousing their indignation thereby ; the vehemence with which he strove to prevent the addition of unnecessary expenses for a single day to the enormous debt under which the Nation was staggering. At the same time he hastened temporary provision for a home for disabled soldiers.-)- These were services that gained him no credit then ; we owe them at least the reward of grateful remembrance now. •Vol. II, p. 7. t Charles Anderson became Governor of Ohio before these arrangements for the Soldiers' 236 Ohio in the War. The simple words with which the Governor had concluded his address to tbe people of the State, declining tbe canvass for renomination, were soon to receive a sad significance. " I doubt very much," he then wrote, " whether my health-a-much impaired by close confinement to official duties — would sustain me through a vigorous campaign, while increasing years and the arduous labor of a long life in public positions, strongly invite me to retirement and repose during the few years that may yet remain to me." But the Government had other purposes. Secretary Stanton wished to retire at the close of the war, and it was arranged that tho man whom of all others he and Mr. Lincoln held fittest for tbe place should succeed him. Gov ernor Brough was expected to assume charge of the War Department at least at the close of bis term as Governor, if not at an earlier date. Neither his own longings for a few years' retirement and repose, nor Mr. Lincoln's wish that his services should be transferred to the National arena, were to be gratified. In the midst of his labors his health began to give way. The store of strength ou which he had been drawing so profusely, was even lower than he thought when, with some natural forebodings, he doubted whether it would bo sufficient to carry him through the labors of an active canvass of the State. Through the closing work, connected with the disbandment of the army, he labored more unremittingly than ever, often spending the whole night at his desk, in his efforts to hasten the reduction of expenses. No human svstem could endure this strain. Early in June, while his health was broken down by harassing labor, and before he seemed to have recovered from the 6hock and anxiety consequent upon the assassination of Mr. Lincoln, he stepped upon a stone in such a way as to bruise the foot and give a severe sprain to the ankle. His great weight and the soreness of this foot compelled him for days to lean heavily upon his cane, and in the diseased and impoverished condition of his blood, inflammation in the hand was thus brought on. In both foot and hand gangrene set in, and for two months his sufferings were continuous and acute. The liveliest alarm was man ifested by tho Government at his condition. The Secretary of War sent out the army Surgeon most conversant with such cases, to remain in constant attend ance upon him, in conjunction with the Surgeon -General of the State. Daily dispatches as to his condition were required to be forwarded to the Government. Every care which family affection or professional skill could suggest was given, but it all proved vain. He was literally worn out in the public service, and his system had no powers of recuperation. After incredible sufferings he at length passed into a state of insensibility, from whicb he was never in this life aroused. He died at bis residence in Cleveland, on the afternoon ofthe 29th of August, about half a year before the expiration of his term of office, and some weeks heforo the election of his successor. Home were finished. He placed it nnder the charge of five trustees, Surgeon-General R. N. Barr ; Hon. Lewis B. Gunckle, of Dayton ; Hon. Jas. C. Hall, of Toledo ; Stillman Witt, Esq., of Cleveland ; and Hon. Chas. F. Wilstach, of Cincinnati. It was first located at the old Tripler Hospital, near Columbus. Close of Brough's Administration. 237 Ofthe administration thus brought to an untimely close it maybe said that it was at once the most vigorous and the most unpopular, as well as perhaps tho most able with which Ohio was honored throughout the war. It grappled with no such sudden rush of momentous and new questions as did Dennison's ; it passed through no such gloomy periods of depression as did Tod's. T\"ith fewer necessities therefor, it created more dissatisfaction than did either. Governor Brough was impetuous, strong-willed, indifferent to personal considerations, often regardless of men's feelings, always disposed to try them by a standard of integrity to which the world is not accustomed. His administration was constantly embroiled — now with the Sanitary Commission — then with tho offi cers in the field- — again with the surgeons. But every struggle was begun and ended in the interest of the private soldiers as against the tyranny or neglect of their superiors; in the interest of subordinate officers as against those who sought to keep them down ; in the interest of the men who fought as against those who shirked; in the interest of the maimed as against the sound; in the interest oftheir families as against all other expenditures. Never was a Knight of the old Chivalry more unselfishly loyal to the defense of the defenseless. We write no apology for his errors, attempt no concealment of his vices. We have no sympathy with the false charity that would belie history in order to hide them. They were such that, proud as is the heritage of fame he has left us, no parent in the State eaft point to John Brough as an example for his boy. But they rarely injured the public service ; and tbey scarcely mar the picture he has left us of statesmanlike ability and of patriotic devotion ; of an integrity like that of Cato, and an industry without a parallel. 238 Ohio in the War. CHAPTER XX MILITARY LEGISLATION OF THE STATE. WITH the death of Governor Brough properly ends our account of the War Administrations of Ohio. What followed was merely the resump tion, with a rapidity that approached the marvellous, of their civil duties by the returning soldiers. After the initial war legislation ofthe Legislature at the session of 1860-61, we have taken little pains thus far to trace the additional acts by which the spirit of the people was mirrored in their laws. We may here, therefore, fitly present a summary ofthe legislation on military matters at succeeding sessions through out the war : ' LEGISLATION OF 1862. Dr. Scott, member from Warren County, introduced into the House in January, 1862, a bill for the relief of soldiers families. The bill provided for a levy of three-fourths of one mill on the dollar valuation on the grand list of the taxable property of the State. The revenue so raised was to be disbursed, without compensation by the commissioners of the several counties of the State, to the families of all volunteers enlisted in the service of the United States from this State. [A similar bill was introduced by Mr. Ready in 1863, and passed, providing for a levy of one mill on the dollar — to be disbursed in the same manner.] Several bills of a local nature were passed at the session of 1862, authorizing the county com missioners of several of the counties to transfer moneys from certain county funds to the relief fund for soldiers families. Mr. Sayler, member from Hamilton County, introduced in the House in January, 1862, a bill to enable the volunteers of Ohio, when in the military service of the State or of the United States, to exercise the right of suffrage, and designating the manner in which, where, and by whom, such elections should be conducted. The bill was referred to a select committee, who re ported it back without recommendation. A bill upon the same subject was introduced into the Senate by Mr. Gunckle, Senator from the Montgomery District, which was passed by the Senate, and transmitted to the House for its action, where, after its second reading, it was referred to a select committee, who reported it back without recommendation, when the House ordered it to be laid on the table. No further action was had upon this bill at that session. At the second session in 1863, Mr. Odlin, member from Montgomery County, reported from a select committee of the House an amended bill, which provided that whenever any of the qualified voters of this State shall be in the actual military service of this State or of the United States, they may, upon the usual days for holding county, state, congressional, and presidential elections, exercise the right of suffrage at any place where there shali be twenty such voters, M fully as if present at their usual places of election. The remaining sections of the bill provide Military Legislation of the State. 239 the manner in which and by whom such elections shall be conducted; requiring the return of the poll-books used and ballots voted at such election to the proper county and State officers. This bill (House Amendments to S. B., No. 143) was passed by the House, and the amendments were agreed to by the Senate. Mr. Stiver, member from Preble County, introduced into the House a bill to prohibit per sons in this State from trafficking with persons engaged in armed hostility to the Government of the United States. The penalty for violation of the provisions of this act was imprisonment in the penitentiary. The bill passed both branches of the General Assembly. Mr. Flagg, member from Hamilton County, introduced into the House in April, 1862, a bill authorizing the Governor to contribute out of his contingent fund to the Cincinnati branch of the United States Sanitary Commission, such sums of money as in his discretion he might deem proper, to be applied to the relief of the wounded and sick soldiers of the State of Ohio. The bill passed both branches of the General Assembly. A bill reported from the Senate Judiciary Committee was passed by both branches of the General Assembly in January, 1862, exempting from execution the property of all persons mus tered into the service of the United States, so long as they continued in such service, and two months after muster out. This law was amendatory of the act of May, 1861. Mr. McVeigh, Senator from the Fairfield District, introduced into the Senate a bill supple mentary to the act of April, 1861, to provide for the defense of the~ State, and for the support of the Federal Government against rebellion, and making appropriations for the payment of claims for the purchase of arms and equipments for the militia of the State; also troops of the United States where such purchases were made under the authority of the Governor, and creating a board of commissioners for the examination and adjustment of claims against the State arising out of military transactions. The Auditor of State, Secretary of State, and Attorney-General, constituted the board. The bill was passed by both branches of the General Assembly, 1862. Mr. Hitchcock, from a select committe of the Senate, reported a bill providing for the ap pointment by the Governor of pay agents, whose duty it was to visit the volunteers from Ohio in the service of the United States, and obtain from them allotments of pay and remittances of money for the benefit of their families or friends. All moneys received by such agents was to be paid into the State Treasury. The bill was passed by both branches of the General Assembly, in 1862, and was found, for a year or two, to give tolerable satisfaction by its workings. Mr. Eggleston, Senator from Hamilton County, introduced into the Senate a bill appropri ating three thousand dollars to aid the Cincinnati branch of the United Sanitary Commission, in promptly and efficiently giving relief to such wounded and sick Ohio soldiers in the service of the United States as might be brought to that point for care. The bill passed both branches of the General Assembly in 1862. A joint resolution was passed in January, 1862, tendering thanks to General Thomas and Colonels Garfield and McCook, and men of their commands, for the victory achieved by them in Kentucky over the enemies of the Union. A joint resolution was passed in February, 1862, tendering thanks to General Grant and Flag-Officer Foote, and men of their commands, for the courage, gallantry, and enterprise ex hibited in the bombardment and capture of Fort Henry ; also for capture of Fort Donelson. A joint resolution was passed in February, 1862, tendering thanks to General Burnside and Commander Goldsborough, and men of their commands, for the victories achieved in North Carolina. A joint resolution was passed in March, 1862, tendering thanks to Brigadier-General Cur tis, Brigadier-General Sigel, and Colonels Asboth, Davis, and Carr, and men oftheir commands, for the victory achieved over the Rebel forces under Van Dorn, Price, and McCulloch, at Pea Ridge, in the Ozark Mountains of Arkansas. A joint resolution was passed in March, 1862, declaring that the Government could make no peace save on the basis of an unconditional submission to the supremacy of the Constitution and the laws ; that the future peace and permanency of the Government, as well as the best 240 Ohio in the War. interests of humanity, demanded the speedy trial and summary execution of all the leading conspirators ; and that, in the name of the people of Ohio, the Legislature protested asgainst anv peace, save upon this basis. A joint resolution was passed in April, 1862, tendering thanks to Brigadier-General Shields and officers and men of his command for their gallant conduct in the victory achieved at Winchester, Virginia. LEGISLATION OF 1863. Mr. Krum, from a select committee of the House, reported a bill to provide for bounty paid to Ohio volunteers who enlisted and were mustered into the service of the United States, under the calls of the President issued on the second day of July and on the fourth day of August, AVD. 1862, and creating the County Commissioners of the several counties of this State a County Board, whose duty it shall be to ascertain and make recorcfof the amount of such bounty paid, or agreed to be paid, to volunteers in their respective counties, and the manner in which such bounty was paid, or agreed to be paid ; and authorizing the county commissioners to assess a tax upon the taxable property entered upon the grand tax duplicate of their respective counties for the pay ment of such claims. The bill passed both branches of the General Assembly. Mr. McVeigh, Senator from the Fairfield District, introduced a bill to provide more effect ually for the defense of the State against invasion. This bill authorized the Governor, in case of invasion of the State, or danger thereof, to call into active service the militia of the State, or such numbers as, in his opinion, might be necessary to defend the State and repel such invasion, and making an appropriation of five hundred thousand dollars for the payment of the necessary expenses that may be incurred by the Governor in calling out the militia of the State for any of the objects provided for in this act, and empowering the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund to borrow such sum on the faith and credit of the State, and to issue certificates to the parties loan ing the State the said sum, bearing six per cent, interest, payable semi-annually, exempt from taxation under the authority of this State. This passed both branches of the General Assembly. Mr. Sinnet, Senator from the Licking District, introduced a bill empowering the Governor to appoint such number of military claim agents as the good of the service might require, whose duty it was to investigate, give advice, and take such other action as would enable dis charged Ohio soldiers speedily to obtain, free of charge, the money due them from the General Government for military service. This passed both branches of the General Assembly. A joint resolution was passed in January, 1863, tendering thanks to Major-General Rose crans, staff, officers, and men under their command, for the achievement of the victory at Mur- freesboro', Tennessee. A joint resolution was passed in January, tendering thanks to Major-General Benjamin F. Butler for his distinguished services to the country during the rebellion. A joint resolution, passed in February, 1863, tendering thanks to the Eighty-Third, Ninety- Sixth, and Seventy-Sixth Ohio Regiments, and the Seventeenth Ohio Battery, for gallantry and good conduct at the capture of Arkansas Post. A joint resolution, passed in March, 1863, tendering thanks to patriotic citizen-soldiers of the State — the " Squirrel Hunters " — for their gallant conduct in repairing to points of danger on the border to defend the State from the threatened invasion of the Rebel hordes under the command of Kirby Smith. A joint resolution, passed in March, tendering thanks to Major-General Lew. Wallace, for the promptness, energy, and skill exhibited by him in organizing, planning the defense, and exe cuting the movements of soldiers and citizens under his command at Cincinnati, at the time of the threatened invasion of Ohio by the forces under Kirby Smith. A joint resolution, passed in March, authorizing the Governor to procure lithographed dis charges for the " Squirrel Hunters." A joint resolution, passed in March, tendering thanks to Captain Abner Read, commander of United States gunboat "New London," for his patriotism, gallantry, and distinguished serv ices against the enemies of his country. Military Legislation of the State. 241 [Captain Read captured fourteen, and aided in the capture of nine more vessels of the enemy, and also captured two Rebel forts, Wood and Pike.] The trustees of Green Lawn Cemetery, which is located near Columbus, Ohio, having pre sented a lot in their Cemetery grounds for the burial of Union soldiers who died in the camps in the vicinity of Columbus, the General Assembly, by joint resolution, authorized the Governor to contribute a sum not exceeding five hundred dollars out of his military contingent fund for the removal of the dead bodies of those brave men, and their proper interment iu the grounds thus given for this purpo.se. LEGISLATION OF 1864. Mr. Odlin, member from Montgomery County, introduced into the House, in March, 1864, a bill to enable the qualified voters of any city in this State, who may be in the military service of this State or of the United States, to exercise the right of suffrage when absent in such service of the United States or of this State, on the days provided by law for electing the municipal officers thereof, the same as if present at their respective places of voting in said cities. The elections under this act were to be conducted in the same manner as provided iii the act of April, 1863. The bill passed both branches of the General Assembly. Mr. Odlin, from the House Committee on Finance, reported a bill to provide more effectually for the defense of the State against invasion. This bill authorizes the procurement of arms, field batteries, equipments, camp equipage, subsistence, munitions of war, and all other means and appliances as may be necessary to provide the State against invasion, riot, insurrection, or ganger thereof, and making an appropriation of one million dollars to pay the expenses incurrred by the Governor under authority of this act. The bill passed both branches of the General Assem bly. Under it four batteries were equipped. Mr. Gunckle, Senator from the Montgomery District, introduced into the Senate, in Febru ary, 1864, a bill to provide relief for the families of soldiers and marines. The act authorizes a levy of two mills on the dollar valuation of the grand list of taxable property of the State, and in counties where the State levy shall be insufficient, grants the board of county commissioners power to levy and assess an additional amount, not exceeding one mill on the dollar valuation on * the grand list of taxable property of such county ; also city councils the power to levy and assess an additional amount, not'exceeding one-half mill on the dollar valuation of the grand list of taxable property of such city, for the purpose of affording the relief contemplated by this act. The benefits of this act extend to the families of colored soldiers and marines actually in the service of the United States, or who have died or been disabled therein. In cases of refusal or neglect of township and county officers to discharge the duties required by this act, the Governor was empowered to appoint suitable persons, citizens of such counties, to perform said duties. , * , Mr. Stevenson, Senator from the Ross District, introduced a bill to authorize county commis sioners, trustees of townships, and city councils to levy a tax for the payment of bounties to vol unteers, and to refund subscriptions made for that purpose. The act authorizes the commissioners of the several counties, the city council of the several cities, and the trustees of each township in this State (if they deem the same expedient), in 1864, to levy a tax upon the taxable property within their respective jurisdictions for the purpose of raising a fund to pay bounties to volun teers, and fixing the amount of bounty to be paid each volunteer at one hundred dollars. In order to anticipate the proceeds of the tax authorized by this law, the county commis sioners, township trustees, and city councils were allowed to borrow moneys or transfer money from certain other funds in the county, township, or city treasuries. This act also authorizes the payment of bounty to each veteran volunteer not having previ ously received a local bounty. Said bounty not to exceed one hundred dollars. This act also authorizes, upon proper evidence shown to the county commissioners, township trustees, or president of the proper city council, the payment of all moneys advanced by indi viduals for the purposes named in this act. Mr. Sinnet, a Senator from the Licking District, introduced into, the Senate, in February, 1863, a bill to organize and discipline the militia of the State. This bill was passed by both branches of the General Assembly. See ante, Chap. " Organization of the National Guard." Vol. I.— 16. 242 Ohio in the War. Colonel John M. Connell, Senator from the Fairfield District, introduced, in March, 1861, a bill for the same purpose, and repealing the act of 1863. It differed therefrom mainly in being better arranged and more clearly expressed, in changing the name " Volunteer Ohio State Mili tia " to " National Guard," in giving a more satisfactory system of exemptions, in abandoning the effort to keep up an official organization of the common militia until it shall be called out, and in perfecting the organization and arrangements for drilling the National Guard. The Adjutant- General, in his report for 1864, stated that the original draft for this bill was prepared by Hon. Len. A. Harris, then Mayor of Cincinnati. On the passage of the bill four Senators voted in the negative : Messrs. Converse, Lang, O'Connor, and Willett, all Democrats. Mr. Lang moved to amend the title as follows : " A bill establishing an expensive and oppressive standing army in the State of Ohio, and to tramp out of existence the few last vestiges of civil liberty still remaining with lhe people." The same Senators who voted negatively on the passage of the bill, voted affirmatively on the motion of Mr. Lang to amend the title. An act was passed in March, 1864, authorizing and requiring theGovernor to appoint a coin- mission of three persons, whose duty it was to examine claims growing out of the Morgan raid. The commissioners were required to appoint times and places for the examination of claims within the counties through which said raid passed, and to give notice by publication in a news paper. The commissioners had power to call and examine witnesses. All claims examined by the commissioners to be reported to the Governor, separated into the following classes: 1. Claims for property taken, destroyed, or injured by the Rebels.* 2. Claims for property taken, destroyed, or injured by the Union forces under command of United States officers. 3. Claims for property taken, destroyed, or injured by Union forces not under the command of United States officers, with a statement showing specifically in each case under what circum stances, and by what authority such property was so taken, injured, or destroyed.* An act was passed in February, 1864, to prevent enlistments of residents of this Slate, by unauthorized persons, in or for military organizations of other States, and to punish any citizen of the State who, by offers of bounties or otherwise, should attempt to induce such enlistments. An act was passed in March, 1864, to establish in the office of the Adjutant-General a bureau of military statistics, for the purpose of perpetuating the names and memories of the gallant anil patriotic men of this State who volunteered as privates in the service of the United States, which was to be done by preserving lists of their names, and sketches of the organizations to which they belonged.t An act was passed in March, 1864, for the relief of debtors in the military service of the United States, providing that any party in a suit against whom judgment had been entered with out defense made, while the said party was in the service, should have the privilege of re-opening judgment or order in his case at any time within one year after his discharge, for presentation of his defense. LEGISLATION OF 1865. An act was pas.sed in February, 1865, creating a bureau of soldiers' claims, and providing for the appointment by the Governor of a commissioner, whose duty it shall be to furnish and (jive all necessary instructions, information, and advice, free of charge, to the soldiers and marines of Ohio, or their heirs or legal representatives, respecting any claims which may be dne them from this State or the United States. X * The results of the investigation under this law have been given, ante, Chap. "The Morgan Raid." t Repeated efforts were subsequently made to secure an appropriation for publishing this matter, but it would have made a cart-load of volumes, and the Legislature always refused. J An attempt to make this bureau amount to something led to serious complications with the State Military Agent at Washington. Military Legislation of the State. 243 A supplementary act to tlie aet of Maroh, 1864, enabling qualified voters of cities, etc., who may be in the military service of the State, or of this United States, to exercise the right of suf frage, was passed March 31, 1865. It gave the privilege of voting for all township officers save assessors, and adapted other provisions of the existing law to correspond with this. A relief bill for the families of soldiers and marines in the State and United States service was passed in April, 1865, providing for a State levy of two mills on the dollar valuation of the grand list of taxable property of the State, and should the fund so raised be insufficient, author izing the county commissioners to make an additional levy of two mills, and city councils an additional levy of one mill. An act was passed in April, 1865, for the relief of discharged soldiers and marines, being merely a modification of the State Agency system for their benefit. An act supplementary to an act entitled "an act to provide a board of commissioners to examine certain military claims,'' and making an appropriation for their payment, was passed in April, 1865. It gave system to previous legislative action looking to the payment of the irregular claims arising out of the necessity for haste and vigor in the early part of Governor Dennison's military administration. A considerable number of new amendments to the National Guard law were passed. An act to provide bounty for veteran volunteers, who had. not previously received local bounty, was passed in April, 1865, authorizing the trustees of the several townships of this State to issue to each re-enlisted veteran volunteer a bond for the sum of one hundred dollars, bearing six per cent, interest, redeemable at the pleasure of the trustees, one year after the date thereof. An act was passed in April, 1865, to authorize the trustees of townships, councils of cities, and commissioners of counties in this State, to levy a tax to refund money borrowed or pledged for local bounties. Bounty under this act limited to one hundred dollars. A bill was introduced into the Senate in March, 1865, to establish a soldiers' home. The home so established to be maintained at the expense of the State, for the care and support of such soldiers of the State as have' been disabled in the war. The bill provided for the purchase of Ohio White Sulphur Springs Farm and buildings, at a cost not to exceed fifty thousand dollars. For the management and control of said home the Governor was authorized to appoint six trustees, who shall hold their office for one, two, and three years. Their successors for three years each. The board of trustees were empowered to appoint a superintendent and other necessary officers for the home. The home to be governed by such rules and regulations as shall be made by the board, and approved by the Governor. The board shall admit as many disabled soldiers as the home will comfortably contain, having due reference to a just and equitable distribution of the benefits thereof to the several counties of the State. All soldiers admitted to the home were required to transfer to the board all incomes which they are entitled to receive from the State, United States, or other sources, except the amount of two dollars per month. The board was authorized to receive and accept in trust for said home any donations of land, money, or other property, and to hold or dispose of the same for the benefit of the home, as they deemed most advisable. The commissioners of the several counties of the State were authorized and required to appropriate out of the fund raised for the relief of soldiers' families, a sufficient amount to sup port indigent and disabled soldiers within their respective counties, until sueh dependent soldiers shall be transferred to the home established by this act. Fifty thousand dollars were to be appropriated for the purpose of carrying out the pro visions of this act. The bill did not pass. The General Assembly of 1866 passed a law establishing a home, which is now in successful operation near Dayton. At the session of the General Assembly in 1867 a memorial from Major-General Eaton and 244 Ohio in the War. others, was presented to the Senate, asking an appropriation by the State to aid in erecting a monument to the memory of Major-General James B. McPherson, at Clyde, Ohio. The memorial was referred to a select committee of one — General Warner, Senator from the Licking District — who, in his report upon the prayer of the memorialists, recommended the adoption of the following joint resolution :x " Resolved, by the General Assembly of the State qf Ohio, That the sum of five thousand dollars is hereby directed to be appropriated out of any funds in the treasury, not otherwise appro priated, to aid in the erection of a monument at Clyde, Ohio, to the memory of Major-General James B. McPherson.'' The resolution was adopted by the Senate by a strict party vote, every Democrat voting against it. The resolution was then transmitted to the House, by which body it was indefinitely post poned. Ohio Surgeons in the War. 245 CHAPTER XXI. OHIO SURGEONS IN THE WAR. "VTOTHING in the general management of Ohio military affairs through- \ out the war did more to raise the character of the State than the care -*- ' with which medical officers were selected, and the unusually high class of officers thus obtained. Among the many excellent acts for which ex-Governor Dennison has never received proper credit, was his determination, in the very climax of the confu sion that followed the first call to arms, that no Ohio regiment should enter the field without a surgeon whom the best judgment of the profession in the State would pronounce fitted for the place. It was the time of crudities in every branch of military organization — when troops were electing "their officers, and regiments were demanding thirty wagons each for transportation, and recruits were receiving quarters at first-class hotels at Government expense. To have perceived, in the midst of this rawness and ignorance, the necessity for rigid examinations of medical officers was a piece of sagacity that was to inure to the benefit of every soldier sent out, and to secure for the State pre-eminence in tho surgical and medical history of the war. Within a few days after the organization of troops began, Governor Denni son appointed George C. Blackman, M. D., of Cincinnati; J. W. Hamilton, M. D., of Columbus ; and L. M. Whiting, M. D., of Canton, a board to examine all applicants for appointments as surgeons or assistant-surgeons for Ohio regi ments. No one was to be eligible who had not been regularly educated, had not been a practitioner in good standing for ten years, and could not pass a rigid examination before this board ; while for even the assistant-surgeons, five years of previous practice were required. The system thus begun was kept up through the succeeding administra tions. As the "business of the war became more systematized, tbe State Surgeon- General assumed charge of such matters, and saw to it that the standard required by the examining board should be raised rather than lowered. During the summer of 1861, Drs. Blackman and Whiting retired, and S. M. Smith, M. D., and William M. Awl, M. D., of Columbus, took their places. These gentle men discharged the delicate duties of the- board throughout the administration of Governor Dennison. Governor Tod, on his entrance into office, appointed C. 246 Ohio in the War. C. Cook, if. D., of Youngstown ; John W. Eussell, M. D., of Mount Vernon ; and John A. Murphy, M. D., of Cincinnati. Afterward, on the death of Dr. Cook, Gustav. C. E. Weber, M. D., of Cleveland, took his place Through the administration of Governor Brough these gentlemen were retained ; but during the absence of Dr. Weber in Europe, and the illness of Dr. Murphj-, Drs. S. M. Smith and Starling Loving, of Columbus, acted in their places. Before theso gentlemen — all commanding the confidence of the profession throughout tho State — every surgeon or assistant-surgeon for an Ohio regiment was compelled to pass. The examination was exhaustive, and moral habits in the appli cant, temperance, and fair standing in the profession, were required as rigor ously as satisfactory answers to the professional questions.* When, having appointed General McClellan in the hope of having him as military adviser, Governor Dennison asked of him who should be made Sur geon-General, a prompt recommendation was given to George H. Shumard, of Cincinnati, and an appointment was as promptly made. The profession, par ticularly in Cincinnati, manifested some astonishment, and began to inquire who Dr. Shumard was. Presently it came to be known that he was really a repu table physician, though long absent from Cincinnati, engaged in geological surveys in Texas when the war broke out, and for years previously a resident of Arkansas. He had avowed his Union sentiments in spite of the terriblo pressure of public opinion against him, and when he was finally forced to flee, General McClellan, in introducing him to Governor Dennison's attention, had spoken of him as "the last Union man of Arkansas." These facts tended to mollify the first harsh judgment of the profession ; but they never quite recon ciled themselves to his appointment as Surgeon-General of Ohio'; and he was never popular. He nevertheless did some valuable, though fragmentary service. Tho troops first hurried into the field were ignorant of everything necessary to com fort or health in camp life ; the camps were filthy, the hospitals crowded, ill- ventilated, and worse attended, the medical supplies insufficient. To the correc tion of these evils Dr. Shumard addressed himself with industry and zeal. He visited the camps of the State troops, helped to organize their medical depart ments, and did what in him lay to inaugurate system in medical matters. But he was made to feel so keenly the opinion of the profession that he was an interloper, enjoying undeserved promotion over Ohio physicians, that he was very glad to embrace the opportunity of entering the United States service as a brigade surgeon. He was succeeded by William L. McMillen, M. D., of Columbus, who had enjoyed opportunities of becoming familiar with army surgery in Bussian hos- * The following is a summary of medical officers appointed, resigned, promoted, dismi»sed, and deceased during the rebellion : "Appointed — Surgeons, 287; Assistant-Surgeons, 694. Resigned — Surgeons, 122; Assist ant-Surgeons, 171. Promotions — Assistant-Surgeons to Surgeons, 165 ; Surgeons and Assistant* to Surgeons and Assistants U. S. V., 45. Dismissed — Surgeons, 2; Assistant-Surgeons, 12. Deceased — Surgeons, 18; Assistant-Surgeons, 24." Ohio Surgeons in the War. 247 pitals during the Crimean war. Ho served as Surgeon- General during the few remaining months of Governor Dennison's administration. Governor Tod appointed Gustav. C. E. Weber, M. D., Professor of Surgery in the Cleveland Medical College, as Surgeon-General on his staff. This gentle man was of German birth and education, and was a physician of high repute in Cleveland and throughout the State. He began the system of hospital boats, of which we have already had occasion to speak at length ; visited the field of Pittsburg Landing and labored, faithfully among the wounded, till he was himself prostrated by disease ; visited hospitals where Ohio soldiers were congregated elsewhere, and particularly those in Washington; had repeated con ferences with the Surgeon-General of the United States army and co-operated zealously with him in promoting tbe good of the service ; perfected the system of examination for applicants for appointment as regimental surgeons, and made it moro stringent and systematic. When Dr. Weber's health gave way he was succeeded by Samuel M. Smith, M. D., Professor of Theory arid Practice of Medicine in Starling Medical Col lege, and long a well-known and highly esteemed practitioner in Columbus. Dr. Smith had completed his medical studies in Paris, and had long been recog nized as one -of the foremost men in the profession in the State. He continued the system of hospital boats, and gave the closest personal attention to its work ings. He was a man of peculiarly warm temperament, and his whole heart was in the work to which he now devoted himself. He made repeated personal visits to the great battle-fields ; was always prepared to forward corps of select surgeons and nurses wherever needed; was active in seeking occasions for ren dering aid to the medical officers in the field, and watchful as to the conduct of those whom he sent out. He maintained the high standard of appointments to the medical service. When Governor Brough entered upon the duties of his office he selected his personal friend, B. N. Barr, Professor of Anatomy in the Medical College of Cleveland, and a man of excellent standing in the profession, as his Surgeon- General. There was now less necessity for attention to the wants of the troops in the field, or special efforts to render assistance after great battles, since the more perfect organization of the medical strength of the army and the opera tions of the Sanitary and Christian Commissions left less for the medical authorities of the several Stages to do. The Government now had its own hospital boats, hospital cars, and abundant medical supplies; while, for special wants, the thorough organization of the charitable commissions might be safely trusted. Dr. Barr's duties were, therefore, more closely confined to the routine of office work than had been those of his predecessors. It is high praise to say that he kept up the standard they had fixed. Under the administrations of these several gentlemen the State expended, on her own account, in bringing home her wounded or in sending additional surgeons and supplies to them on the battle-fields where they fell, nearly two hundred thousand dollars. Professor J. ,H. Salisbury, of Cleveland, under an appointment from Gov- 248 Ohio in the War. ernor Tod, visited a number of hospitals in the different theaters of military operations, looking after the condition of the Ohio sick and wounded, and making known their wants. He gave, however, the larger share of his time to experiments and investigations bearing on the great epidemics that invade the army, and specially on chronic diarrhea, malarial fevers, and camp measles, as well as on the army ration as largely entering into the causation of many army diseases. He made meritorious experiments looking to the proof of tho theory that some of these diseases have a cryptogamic origin, and presented an elab orate report, which was given to the profession as an appendix in successive reports of the several Surgeon -Generals. Besides the regimental surgeons,* who embraced a representation of the best professional talent ofthe State, a number ofthe leading physicians entered the United States service as " United States Volunteer Surgeons," with the rank of Major, or as assistants, with the rank of First-Lieutenant, after an exhaustive examination under authority of the Secretary of War, before n board of regular army surgeons at Washington.-)" They were assigned to duty as surgeons in charge of hospitals, division or corps surgeons, and in more than one instance as medical director's of great, departments. One of these, Dr. Wm. H. Mussey, of Cincinnati, was subsequently pro moted to be one of the small board of medical inspectors, who stood next to * Whose names appear, together with the important facts of their military history, in the rosters of their respective regiments, in Vol. II. t SURGEONS OF VOLUNTEERS, WITH RANK. RANK. NAME. DATE of com. BORN. 1 RESIDENCE. 1 REMARKS. J\s. D. Robinson Aug.Sejpt.Oct. Dec. April Not. Fet>. MarchMay July Not. Jan. May June Not. 3, 1861 5, " 5, " 5, " 4, " 4, " io! " 24, " 21, " 24, " 4. 1862 4, " 11, " 7, " 7, " 19, 18T3 19, " 26, " 27, " 9, " 20, " 19, 1864 is, ¦' 30, " 311, " 3CI, H 25, " 25, '" Ireland . Ohio Cincinnati....Cincinnati.... Division Surgeon. Ass't Med. Dir. Dept. Cumberland. Do Do N.J,Ireland . M;iss N.Y N.HTt Cincinnati....Cincinnati....Cincinnati....Cincinnati.... Colnmbus Superintendent Hospitals, Louisville. Do _ D. W. 11 tRTSHORN .... Geo. C. Blackman ... Do Division Snrgeon. [Insp's of Army. Do Do J Corps Medical Director. Do Rufus H. Johnston. EnglandOhioIreland . Cincinnati.... Hospital Surgeon, Nashville. Division Surgeon. Med. Director, Department Kentucky. Med. Purveyor and Sure, in charge, Cum berland Hospital, Nashville. Do Do. . Portsmouth . Do Clarke McDermott. Howard Culeertson Jno. M. Robinson.... Do Do EnglandOhio Delaware Corps Medical Director. Hospital Surgeon. Hospital Snrgeon. , Div. and Post Med. Dir., Murfreesboro . Do Do Ohio CircJeville.... Do Do Elhobe Y. Chase.... a . g. swartzweldeb Robert Fletcher.... Do _ Division Surgeon. Medical Purveyor, Army Cumberland. Hospital Surgeon. Division Surgeon. Division Surgeon. Do England Cincinnati.... Do Do - Ohio Do N. T Do Do Do Do _ Do _ 31. C. Woodworth ... N.Y. , Ohio.,. N. S... Ohio Cincinnati.... Hospital Surgeon. Division Snrgeon. Hospital Surgeon, Cincinnati. 1st Lientennut Do. ASS'T SURGEONS. M. K* Moxi.ey Nov. Feb.Sept. Nov. Jau. April Inly 7, 1ST.! 19, l*i3 19, " 9, " 7. " «, 1STH s, " 21), " Do. * Do. Germ'iiy Cincinnati.... Hospital Surgeon. Do. Hf.net M. Kirk Samuel Kitchen Do. Do. Canada . Ireland . Youngs* town. Do. Do. Ohio . , Cincinnati.... Division Medical Director. Ohio Surgeons in the "War. ' 249 the Surgeon -General and his Assistant as the ranking officers of tho medical Bervico in the army. In this capacity he proved singularly industrious in his search for mismanagement or abuses, and unshrinking, to a degree rarely wit nessed, in exposing them and applying the necessary correctives. He was spe cially watchful as to the character of the medicines and supplies furnished the hospitals, the rations issued to soldiers in the field, and the quality of clothing furnished to the troops. On the battle-fields his authority was interposed to save the -wounded from unscrupulous operators. In all respects, he was an un tiring and faithful public servant. Dr. Wm. Clendenin, of the same corps, aside from his professional serv ices, was esteemed for the thorough system of registration of sick and wounded which he introduced, first into some hospitals under his own care, and after ward into the entire medical service of the army. Under the old regulations it was impossible to trace, from the hospital records, the successive stages of any particular case, where the patient had either been transferred to another hos pital or granted a furlough. Under the system introduced by Clendenin's blanks the hospitals of the entire service could be explored, the case could be followed anywhere, its ultimate result was always discoverable, and the entire multiform experience of the war thus became available for the instruction and advancement of the profession. Dr. Clendenin filled various posts of enlarged usefulness, and finally became Assistant Medical Director of the Army of the Cumberland. His chief, the honored director in this army through a large part of its bloody experience (Dr. Glover Perrin), though an old officer of the regular army, may, nevertheless, be properly reclaimed by his native State in a recoi-d like this. In establishing the chain of hospitals from Louisville to Kenesaw, and in organizing the medical and surgical work after the great bat tles that mark this historic route, he did a work second to none in importance, and ever worthy to be gratefully cherished, not only by his State, but the Na tion whose soldiers he served and saved. Another of the brigade surgeons, Dr. Fletcher, rose to distinction in the same field, as Medical Purveyor at Nashville for the great armies that, step by step, won Stone Eiver and Chickamauga, Mission Eidge, and Atlanta, and swept thence to the sea and back through the Carolinas. He was pronounced by the Surgeon-General among the best, if not the best, of the purveyors in the service, and the grateful testimony of Eosecrans, Thomas, and Sherman more than confirms the encomium. Dr. McDermott of Dayton did a similar work as Medical Purveyor at Murfreesbpro' for a time, and afterward took charge of the noted Cumberland hospital at Nashville, the largest in the department. Dr. A. J. Phelps, at first a regimental surgeon, and then "surgeon of volunteers," became Medical Director of one ofthe army corps under Thomas, and afterward Medical Director of the Department of Kentucky. Dr. Francis Salter passed through the same promotions and became the chief medical officer ofthe cavalry ofthe whole army. Dr. W. W. Holmes became Medical Director in the command of General Cox, and gave up his life in the service. Dr. Nor man Gay of Columbus became a Corps Medical Director. 250 Ohio in the War. The high standing which these examples may illustrate, extended through out the long rolls of regimental surgeons as well. They can appear on the rolls only in connection with their respective regiments ; but they were constantly called to other and important fields of duty. Thus Dr. James, of the Fourth Ohio Cavalry, became the chief medical officer of the entire cavalry of the army, and held this place till the end of his service — making his administration notable for improvements in the ambulance system specially adapted to the peculiar wants of the cavalry service, a new form of haversack for cavalry use, and other reforms. Dr. Muscroft of the Tenth Ohio became a division surgeon, and performed a great variety of service on army boards, medical inspections, and the like. Dr. Brelsford of Bellbrook had charge of the important hospitals at Cumberland. The list might be indefinitely extended. They made large and valuable contributions to the Army Museum of Surgery and Surgical and Medical Pathology at Washington ; in reports and office labors thejr did their full share toward the advancement of the profession which the war brought about ; most of all, with a faithfulness more nearly uniform than could reasona- " bly have been expected, they devoted themselves to the relief of those ready to perish on the ghastly battle-fields, and in the more ghastly hospitals that over half the continent marked the last sacrifices of the loyal people for the life of the Nation. In this work some of them fell on the battle-fields, more breathed their last in the hospitals, where they had so often ministered to the wants of others,* more still carried back to civil life constitutions broken down by the exposures they had courted in the service of our braves. * DEATHS OF MEDICAL OFFICERS DURING THE REBELLION. Surgeon AsB't Surg. Surgeon Ass't Surg . Surgeon .. A 3333ft Surg.. Surgeon Abb t Surg .. Surgeon Ass't Surg.. Snrgeon Ass't Surg .. SurgeonAss't Surg ... Surgeon Ass't Surg ... SurgeonAss't Surg ... Surgeon ... R. B. McMeans H. H. McAbee James Davenport W. W. Holmes Henry Spcllman J. H. Biteman John G. Purple William Y. Dean G. S. Guthrie „ Johu A. Soliday Francis D. Morris , John N. Minor W. W. Bridge Greenleaf C. Norton J. K. Lewis „ A. J. Rosa Samuel Mathers N. H. Fisher John P. Haggett William D. Carlin „ Bruno Laukriet.. WiUiam S. Moore Muses B. HaincB B. Vi. Steele _ Charles li. Pierce Robert P. Muenschor Pardon Cook L. C. Brown A. Longwell Alfred Taylor F. W. Marseilles G. W. Sayres , F. M. Andrews Charles A. Hartman D. H. Silver A. R. Gilkey Thomas J. Shannon Martin Doty Z. Northway „ R. H. Tullius James W. Thompson „ WilUam F. Brown REQIMENT. 3.11thUth 12th15th 1'Jth 20th 25th 32d32d 3.ith42d4l'.th 46th 48th5231 53d 5t'3th57th57th 58th61st Kith 74th 76thWth 77th (¦5th(Wth -'.'111 "Mil 102d lit!. I 107th 111th 116th116th 174th 6th 7th 10th 136th 0. O. V. I... 0. T. C. N. G.'. Oct. 30, Sept. — , Mar. 29, April 28, Sept. 25, May 13, Sept. 17, Feb. 20, Mar. 26, Sept. 23, Dec. 13, Aug. 6, Aug. 10, Oct. II, Feb. 20. May 23, Jan. 25, April 30, Dec. 26, Oct. 27, July 3, ISrt5 18112 1S64 1811518114 18..2 186-1 18112 I81H 1865 1862 .I)3U Oct.Sept.Nov.Mar. M ay May Sept.Oct.May JuneJuneOct. Dec. Nov.Sept. Not. June 29, 1863 2, 1S6: 23, 1.M3 — , 1882 18, I-.;. 23, 1863 1, 1864 9, " 9, 1863 27, 1864 4, 1863 19,1864 10,10, 25", Killed by railroad accident. Died of disease contracted in service. Died of consumption. Died at EvaiiBvilie, Indiana. Died in Texas. Died of disease contracted in service. Died of disease contracted in Bervico. Died at Chattanooga. Died at Goldsboro', North Carolina. Died at Hamilton, Ohio. Died at Marietta, Georgia. Died at Lookout Mountain. Died at Seminary Hospital, Columbus, 0. Died at Memphis, Tennessee. Killed at Gettysburg. Died at Vicksburg, Mississippi. Died at Camp Chase, Ohio. Drowned in Ohio River. Died at Chattanooga. Died at home. Died at Atlanta. Killed at the battle of Fredericklburg. Died at Knoxville, Tennessee. Died at Winchester, Virginia. Killed in battle Died at home. Died at Ripley, Ohio. Died at home. Relief Work; Aid Societies, Etc. 251 In all this it can at least be claimed that Ohio stood second to no State in the Union. Certainly, in the care with which hor medical officers were selected, and in their uniformly high professional character, she was in advance of tho most; and in the early period in the war at which the rigid system of examina tions before appointment was instituted, she was in advance of all. CHAPTER XXII. THE RELIEF WORK; AID SOCIETIES, ETC. OF the position of the great State throughout the war, of its support of the National armies, of its support of the National purpose, of its official care for its stricken ones, we have now some hope of having spoken — if not satisfactorily, at least suggestively. But of that great popular movement which made care for the soldiers and their families the business of life for our tenderest and best at home while the war lasted, no man may speak. Charity is not puffed up, Charity vaunteth not itself; and the myriad works of love and kindness to which the best of both sexes and all ages devoted them selves, fell like the gentle dew and like it disappeared — leaving no sign and having a memory only in the immortality of their beneficent results. In closing, therefore, this sketch of the home history of the State during the war, with a reference to the unofficial efforts of the whole people in behalf of their soldiers, we may gather up some records of their organized action through the medium of Aid Societies, and Sanitary Commissions, and Christian Com missions, and Soldiers' Fairs; some names of the fortunate ones whose privilege it was to work as the almoners of the people's bounty; some traces of the more public demonstrations. But the real history of the work will never be written, never can be written, perhaps never ought to be written. Wht? shall intrude to measure the love of the Mothers, and Sisters, and Wives, at home for the Soldiers in the field ? — who shall chronicle the prayers and the labors to shield them from death and disease? — who shall speak worthily of that religious fervor which counted loss, and suffering, and life as nothing, so that by any means God's work might be done in the battle for Liberty and Eight? Some of the mere tangible results, the organizations and visible work and dollars and cents of the great movement, that gathered into one common effort as they had never been gathered before, all the elements of a vast community, we may here set down ; and, with that, rest. 252 Ohio in the War. The largest and most noted organization in Ohio for the relief of soldiers was, of course, the "Cincinnati Branch of the United States Sanitary Commis sion." This body throughout its history pursued a policy little calculated to advance its own fame — admirably adapted to advance the interests of the sol diers for whom it labored. It had but one salaried officer, and it gave him but a meager support for the devotion of his whole time. It spent no large funds in preserving statistics, and multiplying reports of its good works. It entered into no elaborate scientific investigations concerning theories as to the best san itary conditions for large armies. It left no bulky volumes of tracts, discus sions, statistics, eulogies, and defenses. Indeed, it scarcely left a report that might satifactorily exhibit the barest outline of its work. But it collected and used great sums of money and supplies for the soldiers. First of any consider able bodies in the United States it sent relief to battle-fields on a scale com mensurate with the wants of the wounded. It was the first to equip hospital boats, and it led in the patient faithful work among the armies, particularly in the West, throughout the war. Its guardianship of the funds committed to its care was held a sacred trust for the relief of needy soldiers ; the incidental expenses were kept down to the lowest possible figure, and were all defrayed out of the interest on moneys in its hands before they were needed in the field, so that every dollar that was committed to it went at some time or other directly to a soldier, in some needed form. In short, it was business skill and Christian integrity in charge of the people's contributions for their men in the ranks. In some of these features it differed from other organizations of the Sani tary Commission. We mean here to utter no word in condemnation of the policy which they thought it wisest to pursue; we only speak of these features as peculiar and noteworthy. And with this introduction we can give no fitter record of a great work, faithfully done and modestly told, than in a synopsis of the operations of the Cincinnati Branch of the Sanitary Commission, under stood to have been prepared under the eye of its executive officers : * "Soon after the surrender of Fort Sumter, the President and Secretary of War were induced by certain gentlemen to issue an order authorizing them and their associates to co-operate with the Government in the relief of sick and wounded soldiers, and to prosecute such inquiries of a sanitary character as might further the same end. Under this authority these parties organized the United States Sanitary Commission, and have since elected to that body a few others not origin ally acting with them. They also construed their powers as enabling them to create a class of associate members, several hundred in number, residing, respectively, in almost every loyal State and Territory. The duties of these associates, and the extent to which they share the power com mitted to the original members, have never been precisely defined. "Appointments were made as early as May, 1861, of several such associate members, resident at Cincinnati; but no organization of a Branch Commission was effected until the succeeding fall. "Through the instrumentality of Dr. W. H. Mussey, the use of the United States Marine Hospital, an unfurnished building, originally intended for Western boatmen, was procured from Secretary Chase, a board of ladies and gentlemen organized for its management, and the house furnished by the donations of citizens, and opened for the reception of sick and wounded soldiers in May, 1861. This institution was carried on without cost to the Government, all necessary * From the History of the Great Western Sanitary Fair (C. F. Vent & Co., Cincinnati), pp. xxiii to xxx. Relief Work; Aid Societies, Etc. 253 services of surgeons and nurses, and all supplies, having been provided gratuitously until August, 1861, when the success of the enterprise induced the Government to adopt it, and it was taken charge of by the Medical Director of the Department.® "The Western Secretary of the" Sanitary Commission having given notice to the associate members resident in Cincinnati of their appointment, the Cincinnati Branch was formally organized at a meeting at the residence of Dr.,W. H. Mussey, November 27. 1861. Robert W. Burnet was elected President, George Hoadly Vice-President, Charles R. Fosdick Corresponding Secretary, B. P. Baker Recording Secretary, and Henry Pearce Treasurer. " The body thus created was left almost wholly without instructions or specification of powers. It had no other charge than to do the best it could with what it could get. It was permitted to work out its own fate by the light of the patriotism and intelligence of its mejmbers. If any authority was claimed over it, or power to direct or limit its action, it was not known to the members for nearly two years from the date of its organization. "The steps actually taken were, however, from time to time, communicated to the United States Sanitary Commission at Washington, and by them approved. Delegates more than once attended the sessions of that body, and were permitted to participate in its action. The Branch were requested to print, as one of the series (No. 44) of the publications of the Commission, their report of their doings to date of March 1, 1862, and two thousand five hundred copies of the edition were sent to Washington for distribution from that point. "Previous to the organization of this Branch, an address had been issued by the United States Sanitary Commission to the loyal women of America, in which the name of Dr. Mu?sey was mentioned as a proper party to whom supplies might be sent. A small stock had been received by him, which was transferred to the Branch, and circulars were at once prepared. and issued, appealing for the means of such useful action as might seem open. A Central Ladies' Soidiers' Aid Society for Cincinnati and vicinity was organized,! and the co-operation of more than forty societies of ladies in Hamilton County thus secured. This Society, it is proper to add, continued its beneficial connection with the Branch in vigorous activity, furnishing large quantities of supplies of every description, for nearly two years, and until the dispiriting effect of the change hereafter to be noticed, in the relations of the Branch to the work of distribution, paralyzed its efforts, and resulted, finally, in a practical transfer of the labors of the ladies to other fields of no less patriotic service: "The camps and hospitals near Cincinnati were subjected to inspection, and all necessary relief was furnished. Concert of action was established with the Volunteer Aid Committee, appointed at a public meeting of citizens in October, 1861, of whom Messrs. C. F. Wilstach, E. C. Baldwin, and M. E. Reeves were elected members of the Branch. Their rooms, kindly fur nished, free of expense, by the School Board, became its office and depot, and finally, in the spring of 1862, a complete transfer was made of all the stock in the hands of that Committee to the Cincinnati Branch, and the former body was merged in this. "Under the stimulus of constant appeals to the public, and by the wise use of the means received, .the confidence of the community having been gained, large quantities of hospital and camp supplies, and some money, were received, and the members entered with zeal upon the duty of distribution. The force which the United States Sanitary Commission then had in the West consisted of the Western Secretary and a few inspectors, who were engaged in traveling from camp to camp, without any fixed head-quarters. That body was not prepared and did not profess to undertake this duty. " A serious question soon presented itself to the mind of every active member of the Branch — whether to prosecute the work of distribution mainly through paid agents, or by means of volun tary service. At times there have been differences of opinion upon the subject, and some of the members have had occasion, with enlarged experience, to revise their views. The result of this experience is to confirm the judgment that the use of paid agents by such an organization, in such a crisis, is, except to a limited extent, inexpedient. It has been clearly proved that volun- * Mrs. Cadwell became its matron. Her name is a sacred one with thousands of soldiers throughout the West. t Of which Mrs. George Carlisle was President, and Mrs. Judge Hoadly Secretary. All its members were devoted workers. 254 Ohio in the War. tary service can be had to a sufficient extent, and such service connects the army and the people by a constantly renewing chain of gratuitous, valuable, and tender labors, which many who can not serve in the field esteem it a privilege to be permitted to perform in the sick-room and the hospital. "Tljp members of this Branch felt at liberty to pledge publicly, in their appeals for contribu tions, that the work of distribution should be done under their personal supervision, subject, of course, to the control of the proper medical officers of the army; and, until late in the autumn of 1862, they faithfully kept this pledge, and were able to effect, as they all believe, a maximum of benefit with a minimum of complaint. Fault-finding never cea.ses while the seasons change; but the finding of fault with the gratuitous services of men well known in a community has no power to injure. "While their labors were prosecuted under this plan, nearly every member of the Branch was brought into personal contact with the work of distribution. They were present on the battle field of Shiloh. They were first at Perryville and Fort Donelson, at which point they inaugurated the system of hospital steamers. They called to their aid successfully the services of the most eminent surgeons and physicians, and the first citizens of Cincinnati. They gained the confidence of the Legislature of Ohio, which made them an appropriation of three thousand dollars, and of the City Council of Cincinnati, who paid them in like manner the sum of two thousand dollars, and of the Secretary of War and Quartermaster-General, who placed at their control, at Govern ment. expense, a steamer, which for months navigated the Western waters in the transportation of supplies and of the sick and wounded. They fitted out, in whole or part, thirty-two such steamers, some running under their own management, others under that of the Governor of Ohio, the Mayor of Cincinnati, the United States Sanitary Commission, and the War Department. "The relief furnished at Fort Donelson by this Branch constituted a marked, and at the same time, novel instance of their mode of management, which may properly receive more specific men tion here, as it elicited high praise from the Western Secretary and the compliment of a vote of encouragement from the United States Sanitary Commission. In this case a handsome sum was at once raised by subscription among the citizens, and the steamer 'Allen Collier' was chartered, loaded with hospital supplies and medicines, placed under the charge of five members of the Branch, with ten volunteer surgeons and thirty-six nurses, and dispatched to the Cumberland River. Al Louisville the Western Secretary accepted an invitation to join the party. It was also found practicable to accommodate on board one delegate from the Columbus, and another from the Indianapolis Branch Commission, with a further stock of supplies from the latter. Th* steamer reached Donelson in advance of any other relief agency. Great destitution was found to exist — on the field no chloroform at all, and but little morphia, and on the floating hospital 'Fanny Bullitt,' occupied by three hundred wounded, only two ounces of cerate, no meat for soup, no wood for cooking, and the only bread, hard bread — not a spoon or a candlestick. The suffer ing was corresponding. Happily the ' Collier ' bore an ample stock, and witli other parties on a like errand, who soon arrived, the surgeon's task was speedily made lighter, and his patients gained in comfort. The. 'Collier' returned after a. short delay, bringing a load of wounded to occupy hospitals at Cincinnati, which this Branch had meanwhile, under the authority of General Halleck, and with the aid of that efficient and able officer, Dr. John Moore, then Post-Surgeon at Cincinnati, procured and furnished. "This was but the beginning of very arduous and extensive services personally and gratuit ously rendered by members of this Branch. They traveled thousands of miles on hospital steamers on their errands of mercy, and spent weeks and months in laborious service on battle fields and in camps and hospitals. They aided the Government in the establishment of eight hospitals in Cincinnati and Covington, and suggested and assisted the work of preparing Camp Dennison, seventeen miles distant, as a general hospital, for the reception of thousands of patient9. They bought furniture, became responsible for rent and the pay of nunses, provided material for the supply table, hired physicians, and in numberless ways secured that full and careful attention to the care and comfort of the soldier, which, from inexperience, want of means, or the fear of responsibility, would otherwise, during the first and second years of the war, have been wanting. "During the period to which allusion has been made, the United States Sanitary Commissioii had few resources, and those mostly employed in proper service at the East, where the members principally reside. This Branch was called on to aid that body, and to the extent of its means, Relief "Work; Aid Societies, Etc, 255 responded. At one time (early in 1862) it was supposed impossible to sustain that organization, except by a monthly contribution from each of the several branches, continued for six months; and this Branch was assessed to pay to that end the sum of two hundred and fifty dollars per month for the time specified, which call was met by an advance of the entire sum required, viz. : two thousand three hundred and seventy-five dollars. This sum, small as it now seems in com parison with the enormous contributions of a later date, was then considered no mean subsidy by either of the parties to it. "In May, 1862, the Soldiers' Home of the branch was established, an institution which, since its opening, has entertained with a degree of comfort scarcely surpassed by the best hotels of the city, over eighty thousand soldiers — furnishing them three hundred and seventy-two thousand meals. It has recently been furnished with one hundred new iron bedsteads at a cost of five hundred dollars. The establishment and maintenance of the Home the members of the Cincin nati Branch look upon as one of their most valuable works, second in importance only to the relief furnished by the ' sanitary steamers ¦ dispatched promptly to the battle-fields, with surgeons, nurses, and stores, and with beds to bring away the wounded and the sick, and they may, per haps, be permitted with some pride' to point to these two important systems of relief inaugurated by them. The necessity for the last-mentioned method of relief has nearly passed away; we hope it may soon pass away entirely, never to return. The Home long stood, under the efficient superintendence of G. W. D. Andrews, offering food and rest to the hungry and way-worn sol dier, and reminding us of the kind hearts and loyal hands whose patriotic contributions and patient toil, supplementing the aid furnished by the Government through the quartermaster and commissary departments of the army, enabled them to establish it. To this aid of a generous and benign Government, dispensed with kindness and alacrity by the officers who have been at the heads of these departments in this city, this institution is indebted, in great measure, for its existence and usefulness. " The importance of perpetuating the names of all soldiers whose lives had been or might be sacrificed in the defense of our Government, being an anxious concern of many of the members of our Commission, and regarded by them as of so much importance, they early resolved that, so far as they could control this matter, not only should this be done, but that their last resting-place should be in our beautiful city of the dead, Spring Grove Cemetery. An early interview was had with the trustees, who promptly responded to the wishes of the Commission, and gratuitously donated for that purpose a conspicuous lotfnear the charming lake, of a circular shape, and in size sufficient to contain three hundred bodies. In addition thereto, this generous association have interred, free of expense for interment, aU the soldiers buried there. This lot having be come occupied, the Commission arranged for another of similar size -and shape near by, for the sum of fifteen hundred dollars. The subject of the payment of the same having been presented to the Legislature of Ohio, the members unanimously agreed that, as a large proportion of those who were to occupy this ground as their last home were the sons of Ohio, it was the proper duty of the State to contribute thereto. In accordance therewith, an appropriation of three thousand dollars was made for the purpose,'subject to the approval of his Excellency, Governor Tod. A third circle, of the same size and shape, adjacent to the others, was therefore secured at the same price. The propriety of this expenditure was approved of by the Governor, after a careful ex amination of the ground and its value. Two of these lots have been filled, and the third is in readiness for occupancy, should it become necessary. A record is carefully made on the books of the cemetery, of the name, age, company, and regiment of each soldier interred there, that relatives, friends, and strangers m&y know, in all time to come, that we, for whom their lives were given, were not unmindful of the sacrifice they had made, and that we properly appreciate the obligations we are under to them for their efforts in aiding to secure to us and future genera tions the blessings of a redeemed and regenerated country. "In view of the work of this Branch from the commencement, we can not but express our heartfelt gratitude to that kind Providence which has so signally blessed its efforts, and made the Commission instrumental in the distribution of the large amount of donations whieh have been poured into their hands by full and free hearts, for the benefit of sufferers who are bravely defending our country and our homes. " It will be seen that one and a half per cent, on the cash receipts, from the commencement, will cover all expenses for clerk-hire, labor, freight, drayage, and other incidental matters ; and 256 Ohio in the War. this comparative small expense„is, in great measure, owing to the extreme liberality wkjeh should here be gratefully acknowledged, of the free use of the telegraph wires, and the free car riage of hundreds of tons of stores by the several express companies, railroads, and steamboats.* " With all this liberality our supplies would long since have been exhausted bv the con stantly-increasing requirements of our soldiers, had not the sagacity and enterprise of a num ber of energetic and patriotic gentlemen suggested the idea of and inaugurated the Great West ern Sanitary Fair of this city, the wonderful result of which realized (to the Commission) over a quarter of a million dollars. R. W. BURNET, President. " Geo. Hoadly, Larz Anderson, Vice-Presidents. "J. J. Bboadwell, Recording Secretary. " R. W. Bcbnet, Thomas G. Odiokne, Cttawt.ts F. Whstach, Executive Committee. "Geo. K. Shoenberger, A. Aub, M. Bailey, Eli C. Baldwin, Joshua H. Bates, E. S. Brooks, A. E. Chamberlain, Rev. B. W. Chidlaw, Charles E. Cist, C. G. Comegys, M. D. ; Geo. F. Davis, Charles R. Fosdick, L. B. Harrison, James M. Johnston, B. F. Baker, David Judkins, M. D.; Edward Mead, M. D. ; George Mendenhall, M. D. ; W. H. Mussey, M. D.; Henry Pearce, Elliott H. Pendleton, Chas. Thomas, Mark E. Reeves, E. Y. Robbins, all of Cincin nati ; Charles Butler, of Franklin ; James McDaniel, J. D. Phillips, R. W. Steele, of Day ton ; David S. Brooks, of Zanesville. J. B. Heich, General Secretary." To this sketch it need only be added that the Cincinnati Branch ofthe San itary Commission continued to devote its moneys sacredly to the precise pur pose for which they were contributed. At the close ofthe war many thousands of dollars were in its treasury. These it kept invested in United States bonds, using the interest and drawing on the principal from time to time as it was needed for the relief of destitute soldiers, and specially for their transportation to their homes, in cases where other provision was not made for them. Three years after the close of the war it still had a remnant of the sacred sum, and was still charging itself as carefully as ever with its disbursement. Incomparably the greatest and most efficient organization of this kind for the aid of soldiers, outside of the leading city of the State, was that first •The following statement shows fully the receipts and disbursements of money from the treasury to August 11, 1864. A detailed account of the Tariety of stores and supplies which has passed through the storeroom of the Branch would corer mauy pages. The value can not be accurately estimated, but the donations alone exceed ono million of doUars. RECEIPTS. 1'rom the State of Ohio (part of $3,000 appropriated) $1,000 00 " city of Cincinnati — donation 2,000 00 " citizens of Cincinnati — donations 33,265 73 " citizens of other parts of Ohio „ „ 14,423 43 *' sale of unconsumed rations at Soldiers' Home 2,175 52 " Sanitary Fair (per committee) _ „ 235, 406 62 *' citizens of California, through the United States Sanitary Commission 15,000 (0 41 interest and premium on securities 5,655 00 Total „ _ _.....S313,926 30 DISBUBSEHEXTS. f For purchase of medicines SI, 412 37 " three sets of hospital-car trucks 3,10S 00 *' expenses at rooms (for salaries of clerks, porters, laborers, freights on receipts, shipments, etc.) lfi.402 IS " Ladies' Central Soldiers Aid Society „ 3,101 65 " charter of hospital steamboats 13,272 31 " disbursements on account of Soldiers' Home :. 5,502 49 *• supplies for distribution to hospitals, camps, etc 14*1,215 40 " remittance to United States Sanitary Commission „ 2,003 75 Balance on hand, eighty five-twenty bonds „ ™ $30,000 00 Thirty-eight one-year certificates „ 37,184 45 Cash in bank „ „ 5,720 70 122,805 15 Total _ J313.926 30 After this date the receipts were mainly from the interest on the investments in United States Relief Wokic; Aid Societies, Etc. 257 ktiown as the "Soldiers' Aid Society of Northern Ohio," and afterward as the Cleveland Branch of the Sanitary Commission. Indeed it may be questioned if, considering its location and opportunities, it was not the first in efficiency in the West. On another account it deserves honorable distinction and a cheerful award of pre-eminence. It was the first general organization in the United States for the relief of soldiers in this war. The "Woman's Central Association of New York," which has been generally regarded the first, was organized on the 25th of April, 1861. The Cleveland association was organized on the 20th of April, 1861, five days earlier than that in New York, and only five days after the first call for troops. For the quick charity of her generous women let Cleveland bear the palm she fairl}7 merits, and Ohio — proud in so many great achievements— be proud also of this. Of the spirit with which the women of Cleveland entered upon the work bonds. The following summary was afterward published of aggregate receipts of Sanitary stores from December 1, 1861, to March 28, 1865, by the Cincinnnati Branch : Arm-BlingB, 3068. Alum, pulv. 3 pounds. Arrow Boot, 3 pounds. Ale, 10 bis., 14 hlf, bis., J2kgs., 2,592 bottles. Apples .green, 1547 bus. Apple Butter, 34 bia., „4S hlf. bis.; 115 kegs, 9 boxes, llti (.this ami jars, Agricultural Imple ments, 25. Artichokes, 1 bushel. Blankets, 5,976. Bod ticks, 9,10f>. Bed Gqwns, 369. Boots and Shoes, 1,265 pairs. Bags, 99 j. Busters, 61. Bedste'ds, Cots, etc. 732. Iron Bedsteads, 100- Bed Pans, 244. Bowls, drinking, 3019. Brushes, 305. Beets, 91 bush. Beans, 35M bush. Buttpr, 10, 233 pounds. Broad, 2,043 loave3. Barley, Pearl.2,690 lbs. Buckets, 300. Bowls, wash, 516. Beef, dried, 11, 051K lbs. Blacking, 15 boxes. Brooms, 83. Blackberry Boot, 137 pounds. Blackberry Syrup, 7 bis., 4 hlf. bis, and-13 Beef, Extract of, 6 c'ns. Comforts, 13,^92; •Cushions, 21,953. Coats, 2,914. Crutches, 1,250. Combs 7,830. Carrots, i% buph. Cnbbage,green,6hhds, 11 bis., 181 bush., and 522 lieatlB. Gaudies, IIS pounds. Crackers, 137,488 lbs. Codfish, 5.400. Cups and Saucers, 270. Canteens, 28. . Cinnamon, 25 pounds. Coroa, 407 pounds. Chocolate, 312 pounds. Coffins, 72. Chambers, 344. Colonno, 77 bottles and 1 gallon. Chairs, .'id. Colfafl, 1,133 pounds. Chickens, dressed and live, 2,659. Citric Acid, 20 bottles. Corq-meal, 10,653 lbs. Coffee Mugs. 402. Cbeese, l,6uti pounds. ' Corn, parched, 503 lbs Corn, dried, 783>£ lbs. CigarB, 3 boxes. Candlesticks, 72. Cakes, 2,639 pounds. Corn Starch, 7,177 lbs. Collars, 53, Coffeepots, 87. Condensed Milk,61,761. Cranberries, "fresh, 1 barrel. Catsup, 3 bis., 4 hlf. bri., 3 kegs, 9 jugs. 1,181 bottles. Cabbage iu curry, 176 bis. and 336 hlf. bis Checker Board, 31> Current Wine, 2 kegs and 1 jug. Compound Tincture of Gentian, 10 gallons. Drawers, 47,312 pairs. Dressing-gowns, 3^9. Dried Fruits, 250,743 'pounds. Dishes, 90. Dippers, 49. Desks, 3. Drinking tubes, TOtf. Dandelion Boot, 2 lbs. Eggs, 15,319 dozen. Eggrkeaters, 4.. Envelopes 73,800. Eye-shades, 1,949. ITruits, 75,079 cans and ¦ jars.- Flour, 2 bis. Fish, whiter 7 bis. and 1 ke«. Flaxseed, £09 pounds. Faucets, 24. Fans, 10,214. Feeders, 180. Flat-irons, 6. Finger-stalls, 626. Foot- warmers, 6. Farina, 13,139 pounds. Fruit Saucers, 2>'8. Funnels, 2. Fly-brushes, 171. Flannel, 1,466 yards. Groceries, Sundries, 2,- 700 pounds. GreeuCorn, 3 sacks. Groats, 100 pounds. Gastriuns, 3 pouuda. Grapes, 130 boxes aud 2 ' half boxes. Gmger, dry , 2,239 pkgs. and 4 cans. Ginger, Essence of Ja- maca, 16 bottles. Gooseberries, ripe, -6 bushels, Graters, 23. , Garden Seeds, 20 boxes. Gridirons, 4, Hospital Car-trucka, sets. Handkerchiefs, 64,345, Hats and Caps, 1,156. Housewives, %f-~i. Hams, 686. Hayersapks, 13. Hops, 561>£ pounds. Herbs, 55^ pounds and 227 packages. Hatchets, 16. Herrings, 22 boxbs. Hominy, 1,955 pounds. Honey, 9cans2bottles. Havelocks, 319. Horseradish, 1 keg, I sack, 63 jars, 228 bot tles. Head Covers, 13. Ice, 81 tons. Ice-cream Freezers, 2, Ink. 432 bottles. Knives and j?orkB,l,2CiB Kettles, 13. Lard Oil, 2 kegs and 1 can. Lanterns, 128.' Lumber, 14,500 feet. Lemons, 131 boxes and S3 dozen. Liquorice, 6 pounds. Lemon, extract of, 120 jars. Lemon Syrup 141 bot tles. Liuseed Oil, 1 keg. Lobsters, 26 cans. Lard, 41 pounds. Lad'^8,2 Lead Pencils, 209 doz. Meats, 4,165. Mittens, 11,174 pairs. McLean^ Pills, 6 bra. MinerM Plants,250bxs. Milk, 129 gallons. Mattresses, 472. Melions, 7-. . Mustard, ground, WA pounds, 102 bottles, and 898 boxes. Mops, 78. Macaroni, 3 boxes. Mo1asses,4hlf. bis. and 8 legs, 15 cans, 15jugs, 15 bottles, and 78 gal lons. Mugs, 200'. Mosquito Bars, 1,758. Mess Pans, 2S. Mutton Tai low, 123 c'ns and 5>£ pounds. Mustard Seed, 21 lbs Neck-ties, 914. Napkins, 1,359. Nuts, Hickory, 19 bush, Nuts, Walnuts, 6 bush Nails, 1,350 pounds. Night-caps, 153. Nutmegs, 13 pounds. Needles, 7,000. Oat-meal, 495 pounds. Oranges, 23>£ boxes. Oyt.tei'8, ] ,310 cans. Oakum, 6 packages. Onions, 10, 90S bushels. Pillows, 26,234. 'Pillow-cases, 71,671. Pants, 2,993 pairs. . Pin-cushions, 6,963. Pig's Feet, 29 kegs. Pepper, ground, '60M lbs. and 1,58," papers. Parsnips, 17M bushels. Pretzels, 282. ¦ Prunes 280 pounds. Porter. 36 dozen. Pen-holders, S-k dozen Pins, 15 packs. Ptfpperfi, 6 bottles and 6 jars. Potatoes, 29,592 buBh, Pearlies, ripe, ?A bush Pie Plant, 56 pounds. , Pepper-sauce, 113 bot tles.. Puzzles, 7. Pickles, 911 bis., 355 hlf. bis., 501 kegs, fi firkins, 14 crocks, 77 bottles, 752 cans and jars. Portable Lemonade, 300 cans. Paper, Writing, 288 rme Rice. 921 pounds. Rflisins, 19 bnxes. ( litt&s, Lint, and Band ages, 55,018 pounds. Shawls, 54. Spit-cups, 1.125. Slippers, 6,590pairs. Sheets, 37,777. ' ' Socks, 50,774 pairs. Shirts, 104,199. Strainers, 20. Slippery-elm Flour, 2 packages. Shoulders. Pork, 556 pounds. Strawberries, 21 boxes. Sardines, 23 boxes. Sausages, 375 pounds. Spittons, 292. ( StTaw, 79 bales. Sponges. 15packages. Scissors, 24 pairs. Stretchers, 16. Stone Jugs, 612. =. Soap, 3,689>i pounds. 1,017 cakes, 16S bars and' 6 boxes. Sago, 1,032 pounds. Spoons, Table and Tea, 2,028. Sugar. 5,797^ pounds. Shovels, 6. Spices, fi boxes,67 pack ages, and 15 pounds. Skimmers, 14. Suspender.'j. 547 pairs. Halt, 404 pounds and 2 barrels. Sticking s,alve, G boxes and 11 rolls , Saucepans, 60. Sour-krout, 1,174 hi* 193 hlf. bis., 17 kegs, and 5 jars. Stareh, 7J32 pounds. Solitaire Boards, 25. Steel pens, 5 gross. Towels, 62,126. Tin Cups, 21,3-11. Tincture of Blackb'ry Bopt, 5 gallons. Turnips, 99 bushels. Tainnnnds, 6 jars. Thumb-stalls, 22. Tin Plates, 1,062.' .'lip ware, assorted, 2 boxes. Tongues, dried, 717. Toast, dry, 2fi bis. and 1,680 pounds. Tumblers 762. Tea, 1,570>£ pounds. Tables, 34. Tea Pots, 53. • .Tapioca, 76 pounds. .T6bacco, 3,0SS papers, 8M boxes, 1,051 lbs., and 3. barrels, Ttnva^Pal-'nt,!.^ lbs. Tomatoes, ripe,3M hush Turkeys,live and dr'sd, 29. TomatopB, canned, 2,- 765 pounds. d-imsls, 125. Vests, 538. -Vermicelli, 70 pounds. Vinegar, 19bls.. 3 kegs, 4 jugs, and 10 bottles. White-wash brushes, 24. Wines, Liquors, and ' Cordials, 28,269 bot- > ties. Wash-start ds, 100. White Lead, 1 keg. "Whisky, 10 gallons. Yeast Powders, 20 lbs. Yeast Cakes, 28 lbs, Yeast, 7 sacks. Vol. I.— 17. 258 Ohio in the War. that was to be so long, so sad, and so honorable, no better illustration can be given than this extract from the (unpublished) "History of the Cleveland Branch Sanitary Commission," by Miss Mary Clark Bray ton : " Two days later (April 23, 1861), while busy but unskillful hands were plying the sad task of bandage-rolling, a gentleman from the camp of instruction just opened near the city begged to interrupt. Mounting the platform, he announced that one thousand men, from towns adjoin ing, were at that moment marching into camp, and that, expecting (with the pardonable igno rance of our citizen -soldiery at that early day) to be fully equipped on reaching this rendezvous, many had brought no blankets, and had now the prospect of passing a sharp April night uncov ered on the ground. This unexpected occasion for benevolence was eagerly seized. Two ladies hastened to engage carriages; others rapidly districted the city. In a few minutes eight hacks were at the door, two young ladies in each, their course marked out, and they dispatched to rep resent to the matrons of the towns this desperate case. At three o'clock this novel expedition set off; all the afternoon the carriages rolled rapidly through the streets ; bright faces glowed with excitement ; grave eyes gave back an answering gleam of generous sympathy. A word of explanation sufficed to bring out delicate rose blankets, chintz quilts, thick counterpanes, and by nightfall seven hundred and twenty-nine blankets were carried into camp. " Next morning the work was resumed, and beforA another night every volunteer in Camp Taylor had been provided for. " While yet this ' blanket raid ' was going on the ladies at the meeting, startled by sound of fife and drum, hurried to the door just in time to see a company of recruits, mostly farmer lads, march down the street toward the new camp. These had 'left the plow in the furrow,' and, imagining that the enlistment-roll would transform them at once into TJncle Sam's blue-coaled soldier-boys, they had marched away in the clothes that they were wearing when the call first reached them. Before they turned the corner motherly watchfulness had discovered that some had no coats, that others wore their linen blouses, and that the clothing of all was insufficient for the exposure of the scarcely-inclosed camp. On this discovery the bandage meeting broke up, and the ladies hurried home to gather up the clothing of their own boys for the comfort of these yonng patriots. Two carriages heaped with half-worn clothing drove into camp at sundown." Of the results to which this spirit ultimately led, the barest outlines may be read in these suggestive figures : Estimated value of stores disbursed $1,000,000 00 Total cash disbursed to November, 1867 $162,956 09 Number registered at Soldiers' Home -. 56,645 Number lodgings given at Soldiers' Home 30,000 Number meals given at Soldiers' Home 112,000 Number of soldiers supplied with employment 206 Number of claims received at the Free Agency 1,900 Receipts (net) of Cleveland sanitary fair $78,000 Number of Aid Societies enrolled as branches 525 Office of the Society still open (November, 1867) for settlement of remaining claims— about three hundred. And ofthe general history of their work we can give no better outline than in this summary by one of the members : " The officers, at organization, were : Mrs. B. Bouse, President ; Mrs. John Shelley, Mrs. Wm. Melhinch, Vice Presidents ; Mary Clark Brayton, Secretary ; Ellen F. Terry, Treasurer. "Np changes occurred, except the resignation of Mrs. Shelley, on removal from the city in 1863, when Mrs. Lewis Burton was elected to her place. She soon resigned and Mrs. J. A. Har ris was chosen to succeed her. The list as given below best expresses the working force of the .society throughout its whole existence : " Mrs. B. Bouse, President ; Mrs. Wm. Melhinch, Mrs. J, A. Harris, Vice Presidents ; Maiy Clark Brayton, Secretary ; Ellen F. Terry, Treasurer ; Carrie P. Younglove, Document Clerk. Relief Work; Aid Societies, Etc. 259 " The society was the outgrowth tff an earnest purpose to do with a might whatsoever a woman's hand should find to do. In the eagerness to work, no form of constitution or by-laws was ever thought or spoken of. Beyond a membership fee of twenty-five cents monthly, and a verbal pledge to work while the war should last, no form of association was ever adopted ; no written word held the society together even to its latest day. , "The entire business of influencing, receiving, and disbursing money and stores — the prac tical details of invoicing, shipping, and purchasing — were done by the officers of the- society. There was no finance, advisory, or auditing committee of gentlemen, as was usual elsewhere in such institutions. The services of officers and managers were entirely gratuitous, no salary was ever asked or received by any one of them. Several of the officers made repeated trips to the front; to head-quarters Sanitary Commission at Louisville and Washington; to hospitals of Wheeling, Louisville, Nashville, and minor points; to the battle-fields of Pittsburg Landing, Penyville, Stone River, and Chattanooga. These trips were undertaken with a view to stimu late the benevolence of the people of Northern Ohio, by informing them of the real needs ofthe sick and wounded. The officers were happily able to bear their own charges, and not one cent was ever drawn from the treasury of the society for traveling or other expenses. "The teritory from which supplies were drawn was extremely limited, being embraced in eighteen counties in the north-eastern part of Ohio. - A few towns in Southern Michigan and North-western Pennsylvania were, during the first years, tributary to the Cleveland Society, but later these were naturally withdrawn and associated with the agencies established at Detroit and Pittsburg. Meadville, Pennsylvania, was the only considerable town outside of the State of Ohio that remained to the end a branch of the Cleveland Commission. The north-western part of Ohio having more direct railroad communication with Cincinnati, sent its gifts generally to that supply center. Columbus had its own agency.* The geographical position of Cleveland limited the territory influenced by its society, since it could not be expected that towns in the central part of the State would send their stores northward, knowing they would be at once reshipped south toward the army. The small field was carefully and thoroughly cultivated, and from it a. con stituency was built up of branch societies numbering, at the close of the war, five hundred and twenty-five. * Tho officers of this Columbus society were : "Dr. W. M. Awl, President; Dr. J. B. Thompson, Vice-President ; John W. Andrews, Secretary ; Prof. T. G. Wormly, Treasurer ; Dr. J. B. Thompson, Peter Ambos, and F. C. Sessions, Executive Committee. Mr. Andrews, though continuing a zealous worker wiien in the city, was compelled to resign the secretaryship, when F. C. Sessions took his place. The society was organized in tbe summer of 1861. A brief out line of its workings is furnished in the following extract from a letter from one of its members : *' The Soldier's Home was started at the depot, April 22, 1862, under the charge of Isaac Daiton. A two-story build ing, twenty-four by sixty, near the depot, was commenced in the spring of IStiS, and occupied in October following, erected by Columbus Branch of the United States Sanitary Commission, at a cost of about two thousand three hun dred dollars. It was finished so as to appear as home-like, comfortable, and attractive as possible to the soldiers. It was plastered and painted, and we were often told by the soldiers that it was the most attractive Home that they had ever visited in any place. Soon after we erected an addition, twenty-six by eighty feet, at a cost of about two thou sand dollars, making the whole building twenty-four hy one hundred an I forty. Afterward another small building waB erected, eleven by twenty-five. The whole cost about five thousand dollars. It was furnished mostly by the cit izens of Columbus. T. E. Botsford and Isaac Daiton were superintendents. Mr. Daiton was superintendent from the first, and proved a faithful and self-sacrificing officer. The Barne could be said of Mr. Botsford. It waa their duty to care for the sick and wounded, to furnish soldiers with meals and lodging, to assist them to and from the depot, one or both to be present at the arrival arid departure of every train, procuring transportation, and in every way assisting the soldiers who came to the city on business, or were on their way to and from the front. Ono hundred and thirty-six thousand meals were furnished, and about fifty thousand with beds. Several of the members of our Com mission visited the battle-fields to take supplies to out sick and wounded, and assist in various ways, as their services Mere needed. Dr. S. M. Smith, Dr. Loving, and F. C. Sessions at different times, the latter spending most of his time without pay for nearly two years, visiting Kentucky, Fort Donelson, Pittsburg Landing, Murfreesboro', Nash ville, Antietam, Fremont's and Grant's armies on the Potomac several times. "Tho Ladies' Aid Society was indefatigable and self-sacrificing in their labors in providing clothing and delica cies for the sick and wounded, and sending them to tho hospitals by som ¦ member of the Commission, or as they might learn where they were most needed, without reference to what State the soldiers were from. The amount sent M valued by those most familiar with its work at about severity-five thousand dollars. It is difficult to sinsle out any lo name as most active in the work during the war, when so many were bo faithful, but I will venture to name Mrs. Governor Dennison, who waB the first President, and Mrs. W. E. Ide, w ho succeeded Mrs. Dennison, and acted until nearly the close of the war, and by whose sympathy and enthusiasm others were aroused to duty. ,A1bo Mrs. S.J. Haver, Mrs. George Heyl, Mrs. Lewis Heyl, Miss M. L. Swayne, Mrs. S. M. Smith, Miss Pamclia Sullivant, Mrs. H. C. Noble, Mrs. Harvey Coit, Mrs. Alex. Housten, Mrs. Joseph Geiger, Mrs. Isaac Castor,Mrs. James Beobe, Mrs. John 8. Hall, Mrs. Wm. G. Deshler, Mrs. Walter Brown, Mrs. E. T. Morgan, Mrs. Sessions, and Mrs. John W. Andrews were among its officers and active members. "Our Sanitary Commission visited the camps and hospitals in the city and vicinity, and suggested Buch changes In Bewerage, food, and location as they deemed best. Wo employed a police force at the depot, to see that the soldiers were not swindled." 260 Ohio in the War. "It is believed that no other arm of the Sanitary Commission had so intimate communica tion with its tributary societies, or drew from so small a district such large results. The stores contributed run very close to the receipts of Cincinnati and Chicago, and in some leading arti cles outrun their tables. No attempt was ever made to divert contributions out of the direct channel*oward the army. Towns were always advised to send to the sanitary agency nearest the point of demand. State lines were ever scrupulously ignored ; the only passport to aid was the suffering need of a Union soldier, without a question whether his enlistment roll was signed in Maine or Minnesota. " It is believed tbat the Aid Societies of Northern Ohio were a power for loyalty. The work at first undertaken for sweet charity only, soon became an exponent of political sentiment. The 'Peace' or 'Union' proclivities of a man was surely indicated by his generosity and good will toward ' the Sanitary,' or his open or covert attacks upon it. The Union sentiment of a town was sure to crystallize around its Aid Society. The hands of Union men at home were as certainly held up by this Httle band of workers in every town and village, as were the hearts of the sol diers in the field cheered and strengthened by knowledge of the agencies employed at home for their comfort. This was sharply brought out in the Brough-Vallandigham campaign. Thou sands of loyal documents were scattered both at home and in the army by the Aid Societies ; mass conventions and Union leagues recognized the power and value of these organizations, and showed their appreciation by liberal contributions to them. "For the first six or eight months the Cleveland society had a hard struggle for life. So much desultory work was done by the people directly to their friends in the army that it was only by much persistence that sanitary labors were centralized. The society does not claim to have engrossed all the relief work of its territory, but to have gathered it into form, and have given it wise direction and made it more effective. " The supply work was strictly confined to issues of hospital stores, except during the sum mers of 1863 and 1864, when the campaign against scurvy began, and the Sanitary Commission called upon its branches to furnish the regiments in the field the vegetables that became the ounce of prevention which proverbially outweighs even the pound of cure. Through these sea sons four and five car-loads of vegetables per week, on an average, were sent down to the army from the Cleveland rooms, exclusive of the usual shipments of hospital stores in the same direction. " The stores disbursed were the clothing, bedding, surgeons' supplies, light groceries, stimu lants, dairy stores, fruits, vegetables, and articles of hospital furniture, common to all sanitary supply stations. The estimated value of stores disbursed is over one million of dollars. "A great deal was done in Northern Ohio in sending boxes to individuals in the army; pro visions, Christmas and thanksgiving boxes to camps, presentations of socks and mittens to regi ments marching away; sending messengers loaded with good things down to the front. (See I Samuel, xviii : 17, 18.) This outside work enters into no records of sanitary effort, bnt it is cer tain that the Aid Societies were the ' head centers ' of all communication between the home and the army, and that their being kept in so healthy and vigorous condition gave an impetus to all such work, whether done strictly within their limits or not. "The agencies used for stimulating supplies were the frequent issues of circulars, containing appeals and instructions ; publications in newspapers ; the circulation of sanitary documents from the General Commission (about seventy thousand copies) ; the employment of canvassers among farmers in the home-field ; and constant personal correspondence with the officers of branch societies. As a ready means of communicating with branches, a small printing office was added to the rooms, and it3 frequent bulletins sensibly increased the receipts' by giving prompt information of the ever varying demand ; while the cheering letters that we received from the army were thus made to stimulate and strengthen the hands of many who waited only to he directed and encouraged. For more than two years the ladies of the Cleveland Society were allowed a space in the Cleveland Leader of two columns weekly. This was devoted to the inter ests of sanitary work, and was edited at the aid rooms. "After the establishment of head-quarters of Sanitary Commission at Louisville, moat of the shipments went down from Cleveland by car-load, in locked cars, to the Ohio Eiver; thence transferred to steamers and shipped to Louisville, there to be forwarded to the army at the dw- cretion of Dr. S. S. Newberry, General Secretary for the West. The books of the society, how- Relief Work; Aid Societies, Etc. 261 ever, show that so early as the close of the year 1862 its stores had reached fifty-seven camps, regimental hospitals, and recruiting stations; forty. general and post hospitals; eighteen estab lished or temporary depots of the Sanitary Commission, besides supplies to floating hospitals and Btoreboats. These issues had been made to points inTVIaryland, Virginia, Ohio, Kentucky, Ten nessee, Illinois, Missouri, and'Kansas, besides small supplies to the army of the Potomac. " The money shown »in the summary of operations was obtained by contributions and by entertainments given under management of the society. It also includes ten thousand dollars given by California, a part of the one hundred thousand dollars divided among the Western branches of the Sanitary Commission in the winter of 1862-3, and money received at various times from the General Commission for purchase of vegetables, krout, etc., in the war against scurvy. Personal solicitation of money by the officers of the Cleveland Society was scrupulously avoided, and never resorted to save in raising means for building a Soldiers' Home, in August and September, 1863, when one thousand seven hundred dollars were obtained from citizens of Cleveland for that specific object. " The Cleveland Soldiers' Home was built upon land adjoining the Union Depot. It was sustained and conducted by the Aid Society, and large additions were subsequently made for the entertainment of returning regiments. The records of this Home show : "Number registered.... • 56,645 Number of lodgings given 30,000 Number of meals given • 112,000 "No Government support was received, and no rations drawn from the commissary stores, as was usual in institutions of this kind; Below is a short report which illustrates the character of the Home: " It ia scarcely a year since the building now used as our Soldiers' Home was opened, and as its walls rose many had been the doubts expressed of its usefulness. Time has proved us not unwise in thus extending our means for entertaining the sick and friendless soldier while passing through our city. The number of men admitted into the Home in the laBt six months* is greater than the whole number previously receiving our care since the opening of tho war. The Home was soon found too Bmall, and in August last repairs and additions were made. The house, now two hundred feet long, with sixty beds, two small wards for the very sick, reading room, bathing room, and good dining and kitchen arrangements, is but barely sufficient to receive those who have a right to claim its shelter. " The Home stands near the Union Depot, and each railroad train that enters our city, day or night, brings its freight of worn and weary travelers to its door. The sick, wounded, or destitute discharged man, who can no longer draw help from the Government— the soldier on his sick furlough, or painfully bearing homeward his honorable wounds— the released prisoner or the homeless refugee, all have in their need of kindness and aid, a passport to this way-side inn, where a hospitable welcome, good cheer, and a comfortable bed are freely given in the name of the Sanitary Commission. "Afew hours generally finds the soldier on his way again, rested and refreshed; but there are often caseB of severe and lingering illness to'watch and tend, and seven times within the period embraced in this report has the angel of death thrown the shadow of his sable wing across the threshold of our Home. " We have often begged for the Home the notice and the charities of our friends, and no one enters its doors with out acknowledging its claims upon the benevolent ; yet its good Samaritan work can never be fully known to any but a constant visitor. Though conducted on an average of only twelve cents to each meal and lodging, the expenses of so large a household are a seriou s draft upon our treasury, and we gratefully acknowledge all gifts of money, provisions, and coal; also the gratuitous medical and surgical attendance, and medicines and dressings furnished. Several of our Branch Societies have sent bread, cake; apple-butter, poultry, apples, and spring vegetables to the Home, and one small township has lately given one hundred pounds of butter. The amount due for milk left daily during the month of December was given as a * Christmas present,' and many similar tokens havo come from those who sympathize with its charitable mission. " We again beg from the abundance of our citizens and friends in the country anything that will furnish the tables and make the soldier feel that the ' Home ' to which he is directed is not unworthy of its name. All who are interested in learning moro of its objects and management are cordially invited to visit it when in the city, and we hope that in the coming year our Hume may find many new friends." " In the autumn of 1863 the Cleveland Society, catching the enthusiasm and the spirit of sanitary fairs, from a visit to the fair of Chicago, resolved to launch its own little boat upon the the wave of prosperity, and projected a fair, which opened February 22, 1864, running sixteen days, with net results of seventy-eight thousand dollars ; a brilliant success for Cleveland. The fair, though not as large as many others, was considered extremely attractive. It was held in a building erected for the purpose on the public square, and on an area of sixty-four thousand square feet. The structure was in form of a Greek cross, the four arms being respectively, a bazaar, bright and bewildering in its,gay ornamentation and profusion of costly, ingenious, fan ciful, and useful wares ; a mechanics' or power hall, filled with inventions of machinery or fab rics of, thqjr manufacture; a vast dining-hall, where scores of pretty girls, in bewitching 262 Ohio in the War. cap and coquettish apron, served the visitors to a 'feast of fat things;' a grand audience room, with 6eats for three thousand persons, where evening entertainments of varied character were given. The central building — forming a junction of all these halls — was an octagon, seventy-six feet in diameter, rising in a dome, and inclosing the Perry Statue. This building was decorated as a Floral Hall, and was the crowning beauty and attraction of the fair — a marvel of taste and skill, where ' well-skilled art, taking its text from nature, formed grottoes that might, have been fairy homes bowers fit for the garden of a king — cascades, rocky hillsides, and tangled copses that vie with nature itself.' In connection with the fair th^re was also a museum of heaped-up wonders, and a picture gallery, where the art treasures loaned by citizens, or given by artists, were exhibited. "The unexpectedly successful results of the Sanitary Fair placed the Cleveland Society in a state of financial security to the end of its existence. Its plans were enlarged, and were thor oughly carried out. Until the close of the war money was freely used in purchasing vegetables, and material for hospital clothing, and in sustaining the branch societies, by furnishing to them material to make up for the hospitals. When the close of hostilities diminished the work of the supply department, and regiments began to return, the Soldiers' Home was much enlarged, and a cordial welcome was extended to every returning regiment or squad. Day after day, and night after night, the long dining tables were spread with an abundance of home dainties, such as the soldier had long been a stranger to. The ladies of the Society were always at the Home to wel come the regiments, and to serve at the tables. " After the troops were disbanded, an employment agency was opened, and continued for eight months. , " Out of four hundred and eleven applicants two hundred and six were supplied with situa tions. A considerable number failed to report a second time, and were discharged from the books, bo that only ninety-seven remained unsupplied with business. Most of these were disabled men, unfit for any duty, and these were admitted into the Home, or became regular pensioners of the Society in their own homes. "The Society could not consider its duties over till the last soldier had been supplied. The following bulletin shows how the supply department was kept up for months after the war closed: "'Soldiers' Aid Sogiett or Northern Ohio, * "'Central Office. No. S9 Bake. Street, Cleveland, July 10, 1S65.J " ' Deae Madam : We are convinced that the closing of your Society is premature, and it is certain that for Tfisn months longer your work should continue. Will you not at once call together your faithful members and reorganise} " ' Until you can raise means to purchase material we will continue to furnish cut garments as heretofore, and would b?g you to have theBe made and returned as soon as possible. " ' Our returned Boldiers, without money, and with clothing worn and travel-stained, are daily besieging our doon for articles of comfort, whicb we, fob lack of youb help, have uot to give them ! These men, now disowned by Government, are properly our care until they assume their citizen's duties, and can provide themselves with citizen's dress. " * We are daily purchasing and giving out cotton socks, suspenders, combs, soap, writing material, etc. We ask your help in supplying 6hirts, drawers, towels, and handkerchiefs. You have"nobly foUowed our soldiers into camp and field with your gifts — do not let them ask in vain when they return to this land of plenty. "' It is no time to stop now, and it will bring discredit upon all that has been done should we close our doors In the face of any deuiand. One day in our rooms would satisfy auy one that Sanitary work is by no means over. Let ns go on until we can all close, knowing that our work has been well and thoroughly done. " ' .Send for a package of garments to make up. MAKT C. BRAXTON, Secretary.' " In October, 1865, when the Ohio State Soldiers' Home was opened, the Cleveland society appropriated from the treasury five thousand dollars to support that institution until the State appropriation should be received. " On January 1, 1865, a free claim agency was established under the auspices of the Cleve land society. This agency has received about nineteen hundred claims, and in November, 1867, was still open for prosecution of the unsettled claims. It ceased to take new claims January 1, 1867. The claim agency was under the immediate supervision of the Secretary and Treasurer of the society, who employed clerical assistance in the business." To these outline sketches of the work accomplished, at the two great dis tributing centers of the relief associations of the State, may here be fitly added a synopsis, prepared by a member, of the facts in the history of the Ohio Be lief Association at Washington, of some of the operations of which we have, in preceding chapters, had occasion to make mention : Relief Work; Aid Societies, Etc. 263 " Early in June, 1862, it was found necessary to establish a large number of hospitals in and near Washington, D. C, for the care and shelter .of the numerous sick and wounded soldiers who required attention. The Government at this time was, in a great measure, without suitable buildings and necessary supplies for them. In the. emergency, churches were seized by military authority and occupied, and medical officers placed in charge of them. Some of these latter took delight in showing their ' little brief authority,' by snubbing individual visitors who called to see that our suffering soldiers were made as comfortable as possible. On the 12th of June a number of ladies and gentlemen from Ohio, temporarily residing in Washington, met at the residence of A. M. Gangewer, No. 537 H street, and organized the ' Ohio Relief Association,' by electing Hon. S. T. Worcester President, Major G. P. Williamson Vice-President, David Rees Treasurer, and A. M. Gangewer Secretary. Committees were appointed to visit the various hos pitals and report the names and condition of Ohio soldiers in them, with the companies and regiments to which they belonged, in order that a record might be made of them, their friends advised of their condition, and their wants supplied, so far as the means of the society would enable them to supply them. As there were nearly fifty hospitals established in and. near the city, it will be readily seen that the work to be done was one of some magnitude. Weekly meetings were held at No. 537 H street, ' Ohio Head-quarters,' to hear reports of committees and devise means to relieve the wants of the suffering soldiers. A committee of three (Messrs. U. H. Hutchins,. John R. French, and D. Rees) was appointed to solicit funds and procure del icacies for the soldiers. Governors Dennison ,. and Tod, and the Senators and members of Con gress from Ohio gave the society their confidence and favor. From this time until near the close of the war these weekly meetings were kept up, and much good was done in an unobtrusive way to our disabled soldiers. " In April, 1863, Mrs. S. T. Worcester wrote as follows to the Norwalk Reflector respecting the operations of the association : " ' The operations of this association are well known to me, having been an attendant upon their weekly meetings during the past winter ; and I take this opportunity to ask "the friends of the sick soldier, especially those who havo Bons, brothers, cousins, or acquaintances in Eastern Virginia, to send money or hospital stores to it. Its committees go to the bedside of every sick Ohio soldier within their reach, converse freely with them,.ascertain in what manner they can assist them, and then do the best possible thing for them. Government allows the association the use of an ambulance, two mules, and a driver, so that they are able to reach the hospitals within seven miles of the city. Jn many cases these sick men need something that can be better purchased iu Washington than sent from hero. Such, for instance, as apples, oranges, lemons, wine', a baker's biscuit, a custard (for which eggs, milk, and sugar must be bought), newspapers, both English and German, a Testament, a hymn-book, a towel of their ovm, a piece of soap, strawberries in their season, etc. The visits of these ladies and gentlemen, from their own State, with their little comforts, the men tell me, do litem more good than medicine. Let me mention a single case from fifty which I could enumerate. Last week I received a letter from a young German, to whose wants I attended while in Washington. In it he says : ' I suppose my poor heart would have bursted if it had not been for the German hymn-book you gave mc. There I found iny hopes when near, dying. 1 shall take good care of it in remembrance of you, and try to keep its words holy. It used to be hard for me to shed tears, but since I have been sick it has often been the case.' For this young man I provided while I staid in Washington, and Mrs. Gangewer attended to him afterward. He is now fast recovering. He had lost all his clothing, had not a cent of money, and had a ' cry ' every day because ' no one from Ohio came to see him.' The German hymn-book (Lutheran") alluded to came from the Belgian legation, and was sent, with many other publications in the same language, to us for distribution. " ' I can testify to the excellent character of the ladies and gentlemen of the Ohio Belief Association. I know what they receive goeB directly to the sick soldier, and is the answer to his own requestB. All the other loyal States, except tne border States, have similar organizations. Each looks after its own men tenderly.' " The names of those who were most active in the association were Messrs. J. C. Wetmore, D. Rees, Rev. B. F. Morris, G. P. Williamson, J. Van Offenbacher, W. G. Finney, J. R. French, J. W. Dwyer, Henry Beard, L. H. Ranney, C. S. Mattoon, L. A. Lyons, J. C. Winn, U. H. Hutchins, J. C. Brand, J. W. Schuckers, J. D. Patton, J. R. Dodge, J. H. Wilkinson, D. Chambers, L. D. Reynolds, J. R. Fitch, O. B, Olmstead, and a few ladies — Mrs. D. Rees, Mrs. A. M. Gangewer, ,Mrs. Gunckel, Mrs. Staats, Miss Maggie Rees, Miss Sue Helmick, Miss J. H. Gangewer, Miss Julia Baldwin, and others. Quite a number of ladies in Ohio co-operated with the society in furthering its objects, among the more prominent of whom were Mrs. T. L. Jew ett, of Steubenville ; Mrs. Annie P. Trimble, of Chillicothe ; Mrs. J. R. Osborn, of Toledo ; Mrs. S. T. Worcester, of Norwalk, and various ladies connected with local ladies' soldiers' aid societies in Ohio, all of whom contributed generously to sustain its operations. " In December, 1862, the Secretary of the association, A. M. Gangewer, published the fol lowing statement of the articles distributed by the society to that date, viz. ; 11 ' Clothing, Etc.— 195 wool shirts, 131 wool drawers, 405 prs wool socks, 1,054 prs cotton socks, 700 prs cotton drawers. 264 Ohio in tpte War. 1,147 cotton shirts, 45 coats, 65 prs pantB, 117 prs slippers, 47 prs shoes, 16 vests, 43 hats, 36 caps, 31 dreestog-gounds, 1,357 handkerchiefs, 1,401 towels, 36 prs susp.nders, huir-brusheB, looking-glasses, combs, fans, pins, needles, thread, pin cushions, tobacco, letter-paper, envelopes, books, magazines, newspapers, etc. " 'Bepding, Etc.— 116 sheets, lt5 pillows, 253 pillow-cases, 59 bedticks, 155 blankets, 37 quilts and comforts. " ' Sanitary Stobes, Etc.— 397 cans fruit, 997 bottles wines and cordials, 14 bottles shrub, 64 bottles brandy, 2 jars l33'<-f essence, 5 jars pickles, 15 jars apple-butter, 1 keg do., 1 tub kale slau, 2 boxes onions, 209 cans jellies, 2 brls toast bread, 4 brfc green apples, 53 sacks, 7 bushels, and 5 boxes dried fruit, corn starch, grapes, lemons, dried beef, hooey tea, sago, dried corn, cornmeal, crackers, cheese, peppers, 4 tubs butter, farina, sugar, hams, tomatoes, p.'ach-butter oysters, chickens, lint, bandages, pads, soap, crutches, 18 rocking-chairs, etc. " * Cooking Utensils, Etc.— 2 coffee boilers, 3 tin pans, 30 knives and forks, 24 table-spoons, 50 tin oups, 24 plates cooking lamps, cups and saucers, etc. " ' The nnmber of names of Ohio soldiers entered on the register as visited by their committees, is 3,7(36, but tho wants of a much larger number have been supplied whose names have not been reported, and the urgent needs ot many soldiers from other States have been met, when made known to their visiting committees. "'Tho amount of money collected, principally from Ohio residents in this city, was $1,296 67; amount expelled SI. -'to 92, leaving in the hands of the treasurer $05 75.' "About this time a committee was appointed to represent to the State authorities the necessity of having an agent in Washington, to especially look after sick soldiers who are unable to reach home without assistance, and to see that they obtain their pay promptly. The Association recom mended the appointment of Mr. J. C. Wetmore, who had been active and untiring in his efforts to aid our weak and suffering soldiers. Newspaper representations having inforced the 6ame policy, he was accordingly appointed. "The Association did not confine its operations lo Washington, but sent visitors to hospitals at Fredericksburg, Alexandria, and camps in Virginia; to Baltimore, Annapolis, and Frederick, Maryland, and to Gettysburg. "On the 24th of. February, 1863, a special meeting was held to present a service of silver to Mrs. A. M. Gangewer, for her exertions in behalf of the soldiers. The meeting was attended hy Hon. S. P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury; Judge Johnson of Cincinnati, and a crowd of Ohio people then in Washington. "On the 5th of August, 1863, the Association rented a room near the City Hall for a store room. By this time the Government was enabled to supply the wants of the inmates of the hos pitals, which were generally efficiently managed ; but still there were occasional isolated cases of suffering which needed attention, and rt-lief was freely bestowed. Those who are acquainted with the operations of the society know well that it has done a work of which none who partici pated in it need be ashamed. Governor Brough made appeals to the people of Ohio to support ii, and its work was constantly performed in harmony with the State Agency system." The general work in the more active ofthe home organizations through the State may be best illustrated, on a large scale, by this graphic picture of the Cleveland Aid Rooms, from the forthcoming history of that association, by Miss Mary Clark Brayton : " At eight o'clock, or even earlier, the rooms are open for the business of the day. The boxes unloaded from the dray upon the sidewalk are trundled through the wide doors, and the lids skillfully removed by the porter, or energetically pried off by some impatient member ofthe unpacking committee, whose duties now begin. " Cautiously she peeps under the layers, not without fear that some mischievous cork, false to its trust, may have spread liquid ruin among the soft folds. Shirts, drawers, and gowns, aa they are drawn forth, are duly counted, examined, and noted. If zealous haste has dispatched litem minus a button or a string, the deficiency is supplied by some careful matron who sits near. The garment is then thrown with the others upon a high counter, behind which is enthroned a third committee woman with stencil-plate and brush. The labels and mottoes that she may find nestling in the pocket of a dressing-gown, or hidden in the soldier's thread-case are not removed, but steadily she works there, affixing the indelible stamp, ' Soldiers' Aid Society of Northern Ohio,' and each article passes from her hand into its appointed place in one or another of tho great hinged receiving cases that form a row down the long wall. " Books and pamphlets, too, are stamped and piled upon their allotted shelf, where sonic soldier from the city camps may often be seen turning over their leaves, with free permission to choose. " Bags of dried fruit are tumbled in a heap upon tbe scales Bottles aud jars, as they appear, Relief Work; Aid Societies, Etc. 265 are closely inspected ; . the sound to be carefully repacked in saw-dust, and the defective cemented anew, or, if too far gone for that, they are set aside for the ' Home,' the city hospital, or the sick soldier not many squares off. " At a table in the center of the room a bandage machine is whirling under a hand grown dexterous by much practice in these sad days; and at the old-linen box stands an embodiment of patience, vainly toiling to bring order out of the ever-uprising mass. " Just behind is the busy packing committee, upon whose skillfulness rests the good name of the society with the army. Bending over their work, they fold and smooth and crowd down each article with its kind, until there is space only for the invoice sheet at top, and the box awaits the porter's hammer and its tally number before being consigned to the store-house. " The long table at the end of the room is occupied by the work committee. Here bed- sacks and sheets are torn off with an electrifying report, and two pairs of savage shears are cut ting their vigorous way through a bolt of army-blue flannel. The cut garments, rolled and ticketed, are stowed away in the great work-box till given out to ladies of the city, or sent in packages to bridge over a financial gap in some country Aid Society. " Two or three ladies, delegates from neighboring branches, are narrowly watching this busy scene, while receiving from highest official sources suggestions and sympathy, if need be, aud under the same hospitable guidance are making a tour of inspection through the room and into the little office in the rear, which is separated from the main apartment only by a glazed partition. Here some tokens of femininity have crept in, despite the evident determination to give it a severe business air. A modest carpet covers the floor ; the big box of documents in the corner, cunningly cushioned, takes ambitious rank as a sofa; some kind body has sent in a rocking- chair ; occasionally a bouquet graces the table ; two or three pictures have found their way upon the walls, among railroad time-tables and shipping guides. But the latest war bulletin hangs with them there, and all these amenities fail to disguise the character of the room, or to draw attention from the duties of the hour. " Here at her desk sits one whom fate and the responsibilities of office have called to ' carry the bag,' and to make the, neatest of figures in the largest of ledgers. There stands another, knitting her brows over the complications of a country invoice or a 'short shipping bill.'. A third is perpetually flitting between the entry desk in tbe main room and the bright-eyed girls who are folding circulars at the office table ; and* a fourth drops her plethoric file of ' letters unan swered ' to read proof for the printer's boy waiting at her elbow, or to note down for future use the sanitary news as it falls fresh from the lips of an agent who has called in en route from the 'front,' to give a cordial hand to the ladies." In October, 1863, the patriotic citizens of Chicago held a great fair, an ex pansion of the comnion church festivals given by ladies in the interest of the Sanitary Commission. As the reports of its success came to attract attention, the gentlemen of the Sanitary Commission and the National Union Association iti Cincinnati began to discuss the policy of undertaking a similar enterprise on a larger scale. Por some days the matter was confined to private discus sions. Meantime, as happened so often through the war, a woman stepped for ward to lead in the movement for good works for the soldiers. On the after noon of the 31st of October this communication, the first public appeal for a Sanitary Fair in Cincinnati, appeared in the Evening Times: " Editob T^mes : I wish to call the attention- of the patriotic ladies of Cincinnati to the fair that is now progressing in Chicago for the benefit of the soldiers, and which is realizing a handsome sum of money. Taking into consideration the fact that the winter is fast approach ing, and that the soldiers will stand in need of much assistance, would it not be well for our Cin cinnati ladies to get aroused up in the same cause, and in the same way ? We should not let Chicago, or any other place, be in advance of us in our efforts. I know we have ladies here who are devoted friends of the soldiers, and now is the time for them to be up and doing. Please call public attention to this subject, and oblige. A LADY." 266 Ohio in the War. This appeal* was copied in the morning papers, but no public action was taken till, on November 7th, in response to an article on the subject in the Gazette, "Who speaks for Cincinnati?" Mr. Jno. D. Caldwell inserted in the papers a call for a meeting of the executive and finance committees of the National Union Association, " to initiate movements toward a grand fair in Cin cinnati, in aid of the cause of families of Union soldiers." At this meeting a committee of public-spirited citizens was appointed to hold a conference with committees of existing organizations on the llth of November. Circulars and public notices followed ; the attention of the entire community was arrested ; the enterprise rapidly took shape; Mr. Edgar Conkling reported a plan of oper ations involving an undertaking incomparably more extensive than any previ ous one in the same direction; and presently the whole city was alivo with tho enthusiasm of a common generous effort. Those who best know the usually staid and undemonstrative Queen City unite in the testimony that she was never before so stirred through all the strata of her society, never before so warm and glowing for any cause or on any occasion. Churches, citizens' asso ciations, business men, mechanics took hold of the work. Committees were appointed, embracing the leading men and the best workers in every walk of life throughout the city; meetings of ladies were held ; circulars were distrib uted ; public appeals filled the newspapers. General Eosecrans, then fresh from the Tullahoma and Chickamauga campaigns, and the more popular in the city of his residence in proportion to his loss of favor with the War Department, was made President of the fair, and his name evoked fresh enthusiasm for tho effort. On the 25th of November the organization had been completed, and the following general address to the public was issued : "This fair, in aid of the Cincinnati Branch of the United States Sanitary Commission, will be opened, with appropriate ceremonies, on Monday, the 21st day of December next, and con tinue through the holidays. Arrangements have been made on an extensive scale for collecting and disposing of every article of a salable nature that may be contributed. Nothing will be amiss that can aid the Sanitary Commission, either in funds or in any of the stores so well known to be wanted in the camp and hospital. " This branch of the Sanitary Commission extends relief throughout the armies ofthe Union operating in the West and South-west. It supplies, without distinction, all who are in those armies, no matter whence they come. Therefore, the far East and the Central States will see and feel, as well as the West, the grand object to be accomplished by this fair, and may well join and share with us in this grateful effort, before the rigors of winter beset them, to provide for the wants and cheer the hearts of their sons wbo are with ours in these fields. Each congregation or society, of whatever name, in all the loyal States, is invited to elect » lady delegate or corres ponding member, who will be registered as such, and, if an active contributor, will be entitled to a handsomely-engraved certificate, commemorative of the occasion, bearing her name and residence. " Contributions from far and wide will be thankfully received ; contributions in money ; con tributions of every production of the farmers, manufacturers, machinists, mechanics, merchants, clothiers, jewelers, milliners, gardeners ; contributions of music, decorations, fruits, floweif, and refreshments ; contributions or loans for exhibition in the fine arts and sciences ; relics, memo- * Written by Mrs. Dr. Mendenhall, who afterward became the ladies' Vice-President of the fair. Relief Work; Aid Societies, Etc. 267 rials, and curiosities of every sort ; contributions of lectures, concerts, and dramatic or other ben efits • and, to give efficiency to all, a general contribution of the influence of the press in fur thering our efforts. Every offering, in short, which can add beauty, interest, or profit, to any department of the fair, or be used as material in the work of the Sanitary Commission will be acceptable. In order, moreover, that nothing, however small, which even our youth can con tribute, may be lost to the general offering, it is requested that directors and teachers of schools, public and private, everywhere, invite their pupils to prepare articles of their own handiwork, which will form a special department of the fair. And, above all, we invoke the aid and influ ence of the women of the land, as individuals, in their home and social circles, and as classes, in their churches, aid societies, and other organizations. " The whole arrangements of the fair have been assigned to committees on finance, buildings, machinery and mechanical exhibitions, public conveyances and transportation, merchandise and donations, refreshments, art ball, gallery of paintings, music and decorations, floricultural exhi bitions, relics, curiosities and war memorials, lectures, concerts, and benefits, each having duties corresponding to their titles. The character ofthe parties comprising these committees is suffi cient evidence of their ability to provide extraordinary attractions and accommodations for our visitors and patrons, no matter how large their number. " One of the chief attractions of the fair will consist of an immense bazaar, four hundred feet long by sixty feet wide, under charge of the ladies, and devoted to the sale of fancy and useful merchandise. Similar buildings, for use as refreshment hall and exhibition and saleroom of heavier articles of merchandise, machinery, etc. " Mozart Hall and its anterooms have been secured for the purposes of lectures, concerts, exhibitions, etc " The most liberal terms that could be desired are proffered to our transportation committee by all the express, railroad, and steamboat lines centering at this city. " The dining hall will be in charge of a committee of ladies, and will be able to accommo date, in space and variety, all who may come. " A plan is under consideration for the publication of a complete history of the fair, from its inception to its close. This is intended to embrace a list of the officers, committees, managers, and corresponding members, the name of every contributor, a list of the articles donated, and such other matters of interest as may occur, and will serve to give permanency in history to this evidence that the people of the Union never forget their brave defenders. " All contributions of money should be remitted to Robert W. Burnet, Esq., Treasurer. All the express, railroad, and steamboat lines centering in this city have offered to carry freight for the fair fbee op charge. Heavy goods should be sent by railroad; light and valuable pack ages by express. All articles should be carefully packed, and marked 'Sanitary Fair, Cincin nati, Ohio.' " When articles are donated a list of the articles, their estimated value, and the donor's name and residence, should be sent by mail to John D. Caldwell, Corresponding Secretary, to whom all correspondence may be addressed. Articles for exhibition should be accompanied by directions for their return, similarly addressed. " Special information as to any department may be obtained by addressing the chairman of the proper committee, whose name appears in the annexed list. " No further appeal is needed ; all hearts will feel and respond to this call. Let no one sup pose that enough is or ever will be done in this direction. The Cincinnati Branch of the Sani tary Commission has distributed to tbe army nearly nine hundred thousand dollars' worth of supplies generously furnished; but it has never yet reached the maximum of demands upon it. " Present movements indicate a winter campaign of unusual activity and hardship. Let every one do his part, that there may be no want or suffering among our brave soldiers. " Major-General W. S. ROSECRANS, President* " John D. Caldwell, Corresponding Secretary." * The organization of the working force of the fair -w as large and complicated. We append the names of the lead ing officers, and of the chairmen of committees : OFFICERS. Mnjor-General Bosecrans, President; Mayor L. A. Harris, First Vice-President; Mrs. Dr. G. Mendenhall, Second Vice-President ; B. W. Burnet, Treasurer ; Joseph C. Butleb, Assistant Treasurer ; John D. Caldwell, Cor responding Secretary, 268 Ohio in the War. The committees and the whole community now prossod forward their labors, and for the time the "cause of sweet charity" for the soldiers was the engross ing subject of all thought. Qn the morning of the 21st of December the fair was opened with an address from General Eosecrans at Mozart Hall. That evening the various halls were crowded with a curious and liberal throng; and for weeks thereafter there followed such a lavish expenditure of money as the city had never before dreamed of. The great salesroom of the ladies — the " Bazaar " — was in a building specially erected for the purpose'on the Fifth Street Market-Space, four hundred feet long and sixty feet broad. On the Sixth Street Market-Space was another building of the same dimensions — "Produce Hall" — used for the display of agricultural productions. In Mozart Hall were the relics, war memorials, art gallery, etc. Greenwood Hall was devoted to the horticultural department; and the Palace Garden was made a refreshment hall. To describe the display in these various departments were an endless task. The bewildering exhibition in the Ladies' Bazaar was, of course, the center of attraction, and its appearance was the result of a degree of faithful and varied labor on the part of thousands of ladies not easily . expressed. Froift every quarter came the gifts that filled the attractive tables — from aged fingers which could scarcely direct the needle, but must needs make something for the fair that was to help the grandson soldier — from children eager to do something for the cause to which their fathers were offering their lives — from the wealthiest and most- fashionable — from the humblest poverty-stricken homes that were still not too poor to help the soldiers — from even the Lunatic Asylums and the Home of the Friendless. Ladies presided behind the counters, fair prices were charged, and the sales were enormous.* In the other halls were collected such displays as the city had never before HONORARY OFFICERS. His Excellency Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States ; Hon. Hannibal Hahlin, Vice-President; the Honorable the Governors of the Loyal States. EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE. Gentlemen.— Edgar Conklin, Chairman ; David T. Woodrow, Charles Reakirt, Benjamin Bruce, Charles F. Wilstach, L. C. Hopkins, James Daiton, Charles E. Cist. Ladies — Mrs. S. B. Williams, Mrs. W. F. Nelson, Mrs. R. M. W. Taylor, Mrs. Robert Hosea, Mrs. Joseph Tilney, Mrs. Joseph Guild, Mrs. C. W. Starbuck, Mrs. John Kebler, Mrs. Dr. C. A. Schneider. COMMITTEES. Circulars and Printing.— John D. Caldwell, Chairman. Finalise.— S. S. Davis, Chairman. BuUdings.— Philip Hinkle, Chairman. Merchandise and Donations.— W. T. Perkins, Chairman. Country Produce. — Adolph Wood, Chairman. Ma chinery and Mechanical Exhibitions.— IS. M. Shield, Chairman. On Agricultural Machinery. — J. M. McCullough, Chair man. Refreshments.—}. W. Garrison, Chairman. Art Ball, Gallery of Paintings, Music, and Decorations— Wm. Wiswcll, Chairman. War Memorials, Belies, and Curiosities. — George Graham, Chairman. Circulars and Correspondence.— 'Bev. E. T. Collins, Chairman. War Memorials.— Colonel A. W. Gilbert, Chairman. Coins and Autographs.— T. 0. Day, Chairman. Iiorlicultural and Pomological Department. — Gentlemen : D. B. Pierson, Chairman ; Ladies : Mrs. W. S. Groesbeck, Chair man. Fruits and Flowers.— Hib. D. T. Woodrow, Chairman. Christmas Tree*.— Miss Rebecca Groesbeck, Chairman. Refreshments.— zMra. W. H. Dominick, Chairman. Evergreen Decorations— -Mrs. Wm. Proctor, Chairman. Telegraph and Posl-OJ/ioe.— Miss. E. C. Smith, Chairman. Lectures, Concerts, Dramatic, and other Entertainments.- W '. C. Peters, Chair man. Lectures.— S. S. Smith, Chairman. Concerts.— S. Davis, jr., Chairman. Dramatic and Operatui Entertainments- W. Clough, Chairman. School Exhibitions.— M. Glenn, Chairman. On Tableaux.— J. B. Enneking, Chairman, Halls ana Theaters.— J,. C. Hopkins, Chairman. Military Organizations.— J . J. Dobmeyer, Chairman. Orchestral Music— Carl Barns, Chairman. Vocal Music. — V. Williams, Chairman. Public Conveyance and Transportation.— Hush McBirney. Chairman. Employees. — Jamea H. Walker, Chairman. Children's Department. — Lyman Harding, Chairman. * L. C. Hopkins, the well-known dry goods merchant, was the Superintendent of the Bazaar- Relief Work.; Aid Societies, Etc 269 gathered— an accumulation of autographs immense and unique; a vast number of relics and mementos of the war; cabinets of shells and scientific specimens; a gallery of paintings that included some works of European masters, and a fine representation of American, and particularly of Western artists; "a glimpse of Fairy Land " in the luxuriant profusion ofthe Horticultural Department; machinery, agricultural implements — something to interest and attract from evory walk of life. The great Mozart Hall was night after night filled with audiences that oongregated to hear readings from Jas. B. Murdoch or Buchanan Eead, or lectures from others who patriotically gave their services to the cause; and the refreshment saloon was filled with the first ladies" of the city, who served like waiters in some mammoth restaurant. The net result of all this labor and display was the payment of $235,406 to the Cincinnati Branch of the Sanitary Commission* The indirect result was the quickening of the sympathies of a vast community for the soldiers, a warmer. flame of loyalty throughout the State, invigoration in the purpose that upheld the war, and an example that was to stir up Philadelphia, New Tork, Pittsburg, and St. Louis, to yet more splendid exhibitions of the munificent generosity of the people. The suggestion of these fairs' came from Chicago. Cincinnati showed the Nation what a large plan and liberal purpose could make out of them,-]- and may well cherish her record in this particular as one of the brightest pages in her history through the war. In the story of noble deeds at home, whieh we must now end, we have reserved the noblest feature for the last. From the outbreak of the war till the hour of its.close, the hands of the Government aud ofthe army were held up by the warm hearty zeal of the churches and the clergy. They led in the demand for the -maintenance of the National supremacy. They inspired the moral purpose of the war and made it a thing of more than territorial signifi cance. They furnished the nucleus for home organizations for the relief of the soldiers. They followed with their ministrations to the camps and the battle fields. They pierced the disguises of the false pretense of Humanity and Christianity that clamored for peace without Liberty and Union. The sun did stand on the mountains of Gilboa at their prayer— the most excitable and unstable people cf tho Anglo-S;ixon race were held true to a fixed purpose, through rivers of blood, and mourning by every hearth-stone, and the countless cost of a four years' fearful struggle, till tho battle between Freedom and Slavery should be manfully fought out. Among the. earliest volunteers were clergymen: The pulpits ofthe various *The outlay for expenses amounted to eight and )one-fifth per cent, on this amount, which added thereto gives the gross receipts. tThe receipts of the Cincinnati Fair were larger in proportion to population than those held in any other cities, excepting Pittshurg and St. Louis, which, coming later, had the advantage and stimulus of the experience and success elsewhere. The net result of the series of Sanitary Fairs which this in Cincinnati fairly opened, was over four million dollars, given in aid of sol diers and their families. , 270 Ohio in the War. churches became the foremost stimulants to recruiting. As early as the 3d of June, 1861, the association of Evangelical ministers of Cincinnati adopted a deliverance,* whereof these sentences should not pass out of men's memories in the State they inspired : " Deeply grateful to Almighty God, our Heavenly Father, for his past mercies to this Nation and particularly noting at this time His gracious goodness in leading our fathers to establish and preserve for us a Constitutional Government unequalled among the governments of the earth in guarding the rights and promoting the entire welfare of a great people — we, the Evangelical ministry of Cincinnati, have been lead by a constrained sense of accountability to Him, the author of all our good, and by unfeigned love for our country, to adopt the following statement: "We are compelled to regard the rebellion which now afflicts our land and jeopardizes some of the most precious hopes of mankind, as to the result of a long-contemplated and wide-spread conspiracy against the principles of liberty, justice, mercy, and righteousness proclaimed in the Word of^God, sustained by our Constitutional Government, and lying at the foundation of all public and private welfare. In the present conflict, therefore, our Government stands before us as representing the cause of God and man against a rebellion threatening the Nation with ruin, in order to perpetuate and spread a system of unrighteous oppression. In this emergency, as min isters of God, we can not hesitate to support, by every legitimate method, the Government in maintaining its authority unimpaired throughout the whole country, and over this whole people." The sentiments thus expressed were echoed by almost every religious body throughout the State. Among others, was this declaration from the venerable Bishop Mcllvaine} in the Protestant Episcopal Convention at Cleveland, in June, 1861 : "Our duty in this emergency is bravely, earnestly, to sustain our Govern ment in its administration in the use of all lawful means to preserve the integrity of the Union." Not less emphatic and early were the expressions of Archbishop Purcell, who caused the American flag to be raised over the Cathedral at Cin cinnati, and the churches in every part ofhis diocese, and whose great influence in the Eoman Catholic Church was thrown throughout in favor of the Govern ment in this holy war. As the struggle, progressed, the efforts for the relief of soldiers clustered around the prayer-meetings, Sunday-school associations, and ladies' mite socie ties of the church congregations throughout the State. To trace the history of these societies here would be impossible;;— they were in every village and hamlet— but the good works they wrought are faithfully set down in the record of Him who reivardeth openly. As the Sanitary Commission grew up, the stream of church contributions was turned into this channel. After a time the good men who had followed the army with the Bible and the sermon felt the need of an organization for specific religious effort for the soldiers, combined with relief labor, and the Christian Commission began its noble work.f * Reported by a committee consisting of Granville Moody, H. M. Storrs, C. B. Boynton, E. T. Eobinson, and Joseph White. f In the last annual report of this Commission the following list of the Ohio membership is given : *¦ CINCINNATI BRANCH UNITED STATES CHRISTIAN COMMISSION. A. E. Chamberlain-, President; H. Thane Miller, Vice-President; Eev. J. F. Maelay, Secretary; Ber. B. W. Cni:sLA\v, General Agent. 0'<'iiii:tt£e— William T. Perkins, Thomas F. Shaw, George H. Warner, E. Sargent, W. W. Scarborough, Hon. Relief Work; Aid Societies, Etc 271 The reports give the cash receipts of the branches in Ohio as : Cincinnati Branch up to 1864 $70,493 Cincinnati Branch up to 1865. 38,396 Cleveland Branch— total 8,144 Total $117,033 Besides, stores were received in Cincinnati amounting in value to the splendid sum of two hundred and eighty-nine thousand six hundred and two dollars, and publications for distribution among the soldiers, valued at three thousand and twenty -four dollars. In Cleveland the gifts of stores amounted to five thousand five hundred dollars, and of publications to twelve hundred dollars* Some further facts as to the operations of this unobtrusive but most effi cient* organization may be presented in the condensed closing report of the Cincinnati Branch: .. i " From the 1st of January, 1865, the date of the last annual report, until the office was closed, about the middle of August, the work of the Cincinnati Branch continued to prosper. It was understood, soon after the fall of Richmond, that the business of the Commission would be closed up as speedily as possible. Notwithstanding a public statement to this effect, the people of Ohio continued to furnish the means necessary to carry on our operations creditably and suc cessfully, until supplies were no longer needed. Some of the most prominent items of receipts and distributions are given in the following table : Number of boxes, etc., of stores sent to the field, or distributed at Home, exclusive of those sent to, or received from the Central pr Branch offices '. 3,446 Number of boxes, etc., of publications Bent to the field, or distributed at Home, exclusive of those sent to, or received from Central or Branch offices ,. ,.... 161 Number of boxes of stores donated directly to this Branch .33 -..'... 3,114 Number of boxes of publications donated directly to this Branch 27 Estimated value of these donated stores : $289,602 74 Estimated valuo.of these donated publications $3,024 00 Number of copies of Scriptures, or portions of them distributed 9,940 Number of hymn and psalm-hooks 55,091 Number of soldiers' and sailors' knapsack books, in paper or flexible covers 458,033 Number of bound volumes of library and other books 8,678 Number of magazines and pamphlets „ „ „ 18,117 Aggregate number of weekly and monthly religious newspapers 803,236 Number of pages .of tracts 101,658 "In making up this final statement of our Branch of the United States Christian Commis sion, it is due the generous people who have so freely contributed to sustain it, to make a grateful acknowledgment of their untiring liberality. From the opening of the office, at No. 51 Vine Street, until it was closed, an uninterrupted stream of money and stores poured in upon us from the patriotic men and women of the West, and especially of the State of Ohio. Soldiers' Aid Bellamy Storer, Phillip Phillips, T. G. Odiorne, B. Homans, jr., Georse P. Davis, Wm. J. Breed, Eli Johnson, Benja min Frankland, H. Wilson Brown, Thomaa Frankland, J. M. Johnston, Hugh Stewart, M. B. Hagans, Matthew Addy, R. A. Holden. Gambiee— Rev. Archibald M. Morrison. ' ' CLEVELAND COMMITTEE UNITED STATES CHRISTIAN COMMISSION. Executive Committee— Hon. Stillman Witt, President; Joseph Perkins, Vim-President ; 1. F. Mellen, Sec retary; S. H. Mather, Treasurer; George Myoatt, Receiver of Supplies; Hon. William Castle, Kov. T. II. Hawks, D. D.; T. P. Handy, Dr. H. K. Cushins, Key. J. SI. Hoyt, Daniel P. Eels, Horace Banton. Committee— Hon. William A. Otis, Eev. Samuel Wolcott, D. D.; Eev. Dr. W. H. Goodrich, Ansel Roberts, J. E. Ingersoll, Eev. J. Montieth, jr.; Rev. S. B. Page, George W. Whitucy, Hon. John A. Foote, Rev. Charles Hammer, Dr. Alleyne Bllynard, Jay Odell, Hon. J. P. Bishop',' Rev. WiUiam A. Hogc, Dr. Eilward Taylor, Rev. C. Eutenick, E. E. Perkins, J. H. Dewitt, Rev. J. A. Thome, Rev. Moses Hill, Eev. Bishop C. Kingsley. NORTH-WESTERN BRANCH UNITED STATES CHRISTIAN COMMISSION, TOLEDO. W. Bakeb, President; Eev. C. T. Wales, Recording Secretary; Eev. H. W. Piekson, D. T., Corresponding Sec retary ; D. B. Smith, Treasurer. * The Toledo collections seem, in the reports of the Christian Commission, to have gone to swell the sums credited to Chieago. 272 Ohio in the War. Societies and Ladies' Christian Commissions, by scores and hundreds, kept us supplied wilh the means to minister largely to the comfort and temporal wants of our noble boys in bluel We held no large sum of money in our treasury, believing that Providence would furnish us the means to do our work. God honored the faith of his servants — since, although our funds were often low we never were without the means to meet our obligations. "The removal of Rev. E. P. Sipith, the efficient and successful Field Agent of our depart ment, to the Eastern work, was felt to be a severe loss. From the beginning he had superin tended the work in the West with a sagacity, discrimination and zeal' worthy .of the highest praise. His self-denying labors, amid suffering and personal dangers, in behalf of his country in all the dark days and months of the great rebellion, "should endear him to the hearts of his countrymen., ¦"%¦ "His place at Nashville was well filled by Mr. T. R. Ewing, an earnest Christian gentleman and a most genial, kind-hearted man and efficient administrator. Mrs. E. P. Smith remained in charge of the 'home' at Nashville, performing a service for" which few women coiild have been found equally qualified, with a cheerfulness and hearty enthusiasm worthy of alir" honor. Hun dreds and thousands of sohners, who have been in the hospitals of Nashville, will remember Mrs. Smith to their dying "day. Not a few will join in gratitude with aii Illinois soldier who said to the.friend at his cot, taking his dying message, 'Tell Mrs. Smith I shall thank her in heaveii for the ice.' "The transfer of Rev. J. F. Loyd to the Louisville agency was an important and satisfactory change. Under his wise and faithful administration,' and by the transfer of General Sherman to Louisville, this became one of our most interesting fields. We believe that the Christian Com mission has had few workers more reliable, faithful, and competent than Mr. Leyd. The statis tical tables published in this report will exhibit the receipts and expenditures of the year. During the last year of our work our financial records were kept by Mr. W. J. Breed, of the Commission, who rendered thus, gratuitously, a service of great magnitude and importance, in addition to his very liberal cash contribi^ons. "A. E. Chamberlain & Co., have given lis office and store-room without charge. ,!;'; ^ "Our President, Mr. Chamberlain, continued to serve the cause with unaplted Z$jT afld suc cess until the last. For more than two years all his time was consecrated to his suffering country. By public addresses, all over Ohio, he aroused the zeal of others, and contributed more largely than any other person to make the Christian Commission the people's favorite channel of com munication with the army. In this work of appeal to the. people at home, 3We have, also, been very largely aided by services most cheerfully and efficiently tendered by Hon. Bellamy Storer and Rev. B. W. Chidlaw. ThUTvolume which records , .Une' closing labors, pf so beneficent an institution would be incomplete and unsatisfactory tfit aid not make special mention of these noble men, whoj^ndered such unselfish and signal|piviee to the best Government God evergavo to man, in the d&rkest hour of its whole history." JOHN F. MARLAY, Secretary." ¦'! • W' l,'":$k With this we close. No effort has been made to presenPin detail Jap great . •' "*z - > recruiting service, not less than to the demoralization of the trOops already rajsed. The whole burden ofthe complaint — for lack of proper food, insufficient arms, tents, ilothing, everything — was laid upon Governor Dennison. General McClellan lever uttered a word to relieve him of this obloquy, though the entire matter vas all the time entirely in his own hands ! Much of the complaint was unjust aid unreasonable ; but it would at least have been considerate, as well as a del- ltyte courtesy to the man who had first appointed him, to have simply borne hy own burdens. One of General McClellan's earliest actions as department commander was to xater into negotiation with General Buckner, then Inspector-General of Ken- •} 280 Ohio in the wak. tucky, on the subject of the "neutrality" of that State. He went so far as to agree that " the territory of Kentucky should be respected on the part of the United States, even though the Southern States should occupy it," only exact ing a promise that, in this last case, Kentucky should try to drive them out, and, in«ievent of her failure, McClellan should then have permission to do it, on condition of straightway retiring again to the north side of the Ohio Eiver* * General McClellan having subsequently disputed General Buekner's statements concerning this agreement, and the matter having formed the subject of some acrimonious political discus sion, I subjoin the correspondence of different parties concerned, throwing light upon it. Gen eral McClellan's denial is first given : " Grafton, Virginia, June 26, 1861. " Captain W. Wilson, United States Navy : " My interview with General Buckner was personal, not official. It was solicited by him more than once. I made no stipulation on the part of the General Government, and regarded his voluntary promise to drive out the Confederate troops as the only result of the interview. His letter gives his own views, not mine. G. B. McCLELLAN." " Head-Quarters Kentucky State Guard, | Louisville, June 10, 1861. " Sis : On the 8th instant, at Cincinnati, Ohio, I entered into an arrangement with Major- General George B. McClellan, commander of the United States troops in the States north of the Ohio River, to the following effect : " The authorities of the State of Kentucky are to protect the United States property within the limits of the State, to enforce the laws of the United States in accordance with the interpreta tions of the United States Courts, as far as those laws may be applicable to Kentucky, and to enforce, with all the power of the State, our obligations of neutrality as against the Southern States, as long as the position we have assumed shall be respected by the United States. " General McClellan stipulates that the territory of Kentucky shall be respected on the part of the United States, even though the Southern States should occupy it ; but in the latter case he will call upon the authorities of Kentucky to remove the Southern forces from our territory. Should Kentucky fail to accomplish this object in a reasonable time, General McClellan claims the right of occupancy given the Southern forces. I have stipulated, in that case, to advise him of the inability of Kentucky to comply with her obligations, and to invite him to dislodge the Southern forces. He stipulates that, if successful in so doing, he will withdraw his forces from the territory of the State as soon as the Southern forces shall be removed. " This, he assures me, is the policy he will adopt toward Kentucky. " Should the Administration hereafter adopt a different policy, he is to .give me timely notice of the fact. " The well-known character of General McClellan is a sufficient guarantee for the fulfillment of every stipulation on his part. " I am, Sir, very respectfully, " Your obedient servant, "S. B. BUCKNER, Inspector-General." " Cincinnati, June 7, 1861. " To Hon. J. J. Crittenden, Frankfort, Kentucky : " The papers of this morning state that General Prentiss, commander United States forces at Cairo, has sent troops across the Ohio River into Kentucky. I have no official notice of such f movement ; but I at once telegraphed General Prentiss for the facts, and stated to him that if th' report were true, I disapproved his course, and ordered him to make no more such movement without my sanction previously obtained. GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General." ; " Cincinnati, June 11, 1861. '" Governor B. Magoffin : j " I have received information that Tennessee troops are under orders to occupy Island N^i six miles below Cairo. In accordance with my understanding with General Buckner I call y°n I I i George B. McClellan. 281 And General Buckner was good enough to assure Governor Magoffin that " the well-known character of General McClellan is a sufficient guarantee for the ful fillment of every stipulation on his part." It is not known that there was any Government sanction for this extraordinary action ; but, so anomalous and un settled were the times, it was never noticed, and soon, of course, became a dead . letter. \\ Meanwhile a few regiments of Ohio State troops had been hurried across the West Virginia border; they had been followed by Indiana re-enforce ments, under General Thomas A. Morris, to whom General McClellan addressed aVsagacious and comprehensive letter of instructions ; and proclamations had been issued to the soldiers on taking the field, and to the West Virginians on ' entering their territory. This last assured the people that there would be no interference with their slaves; that, on the contrary, "we will, with an iron hand, crush any attempt at insurrection on their part." The equipment of troops\was hastened ; most of all, efforts were made to secure adequate trans portation, by which, at that early period, was meant not less than fifteen to eighteen wagons for a regiment.* At last, on the 20th of June, 1861, General McClellan himself started for the field. The army now under the command of General iMcClellan at Grafton and Clarksburg, West Virginia, was about eighteen thousand strong. The Eebel force, under. General Garnett, probably reached six thousand — fifteen hundred, under Colonel Pegram, in fortifications at Eich Mountain, the remaining forty- five hundred, under Garnett himself, in a fortified camp on Laurel Hill. The troops were equally raw on either side, and whatever advantage there was from the, sympathy of the inhabitants inured to the benefit of the National forces. The plan for the campaign, as elaborated during the few days spent by General McClellan at Grafton, was simple. Colonel Pegram's force at Eich Mountain was a mere outpost, protecting Garnett's flank and rear. If that could be suddenly overpowered, the victors would be planted upon Pegram's line of retreat. He was, therefore, to be amused by the demonstrations of a considerable force in his front while the outpost was being carried. Then, from.front and rear, a simultaneous advance upon him was to end in his surren der of his whole command. To General Morris, with a force little if any supe rior to Garnett's, was assigned the task of moving upon his front and keeping him occupied on Laurel Hill, while General McClellan himself, at the head of the bulk of the army, was to move' hastily from Clarksburg across the country you to prevent this step. Do you regard the islands in the Mississippi River above the Tennes see line as within your jurisdiction ? and if so, what ones? "Respectfully, GEO. B. McCLELLAN, " Major-General United States Army." " Frankfort, June 11, 1861. " General Geo. B. McClellan, Cincinnati, Ohio : " General Buckner has gone to Padueah and Columbus ; has orders to carry out his under standing with you ; am investigating the questions of jurisdiction over the islands to which you allude; will answer further probably to-morrow. , B. MAGOFFIN." *Some of the troops moving on Philippi complained bitterly of having only twelve I 282 Ohio in the War. to Rich Mountain, capture Pegram, and reach Garnett's rear. McClellan's march was about four times as long as that of Morris. The latter officer made his movement on the night the order was received, reaching Laurel Hill a little after daybreak on the morning of the 7th of July. General McClellan, however, found difficulties in getting up supplies— so early did this chronic complaint make its appearance — and was not ready for decisive movements at Eich Mountain until the 10th. General Eosecrans, com manding one of his brigades, then asked permission to make a detour and attack Pegram in the rear, to which General McClellan assented. Bosecrar.8 fought and drove the enemy, bitterly complaining that McClellan utterly failed to second him by an attack in front. McClellan explains that he meant to do this — next morning ! and that he was prevented from doing it then, up to the time when the news of Eosecrans's success arrived, by accidents to the artillery * Pegram, however, beaten by Eosecrans, and with McClellan in his front, was compelled to take to the mountains, where, in a day or two, he surrendered the shattered remnants of his command. Garnett, hearing of this disaster, retreated, and McClellan having failed to move promptly forward in his rear,f the bulk of the Eebel army escaped in a demoralized condition, and with the loss of hag- gage and artillery — the latter secured by Morris's pursuit and engagement with the rear-guard. Of this brief little campaign, afterward so loudly lauded and so little under stood, it may be said that the conception was excellent and the execution indif ferent. It was undertaken without orders from Washington and carried forward solely on the General's own responsibility. Up to the time when, having ordered Morris to Garnett's front at Laurel Hill, General McClellan put him self at the head of the main column, moving against Pegram, and so to Gar nett's rear, he had controlled the various movements with good judgment. Once, however, in the field in person, he delayed needlessly, lost the advantage of a surprise, handled his force irresolutely and without nerve. In the excite ment over Rosecrans's victory he seems to have forgotten that, in his original plan, this had been but a preliminary movement, and failed to move rapidly forward upon Garnett's rear. He thus lost the ultimate object of the whole campaign, in failing to secure the surrender of the main Eebel force. He had still seen no actual fighting, having at no time during the movement been so near troops in action as when, from his head-quarters tent, he listened to the sound of Eosecrans's guns, three miles away. * Rep. Com. Con. War, series of 1865, Vol. I. Rosecrans's Campaigns, p. 6. McClellan's Report, preliminary chapter. — It is even true that McClellan, instead of attacking when he heard the sound of Rosecrans's guns, fearing, on account of the Rebel cheers, for the safety of his own camp, sent back orders to arm the teamsters, so as to be prepared for any emergency ! Yet the force then about him (aside from Rosecrans's brigade) was more than double Pegram's entire command. t It was not till the second day after Rich Mountain that McClellan reached Beverly. Gar nett indeed supposed him to be there, and did not retreat that way ; but had McClellan moved only a few miles toward him, he would have shut up the St. George Road, and prevented the possibility of retreat in any direction. George B. McClellan. 283 But Fortune, whom most soldiers at first find veiy like a step-mother in her regards, seemed determined to exhaust all means of forcing greatness upon this favorite young son. Four months ago a retired Captain, three months ago an officer of Ohio militia, he was already commander of a great department and the popular hero of a successful campaign. The Country, recovering from the stupefaction of Bull Eun, read with delight the story of the marches and skir mishes that had liberated West Virginia. The newspapers, quick to furnish what was pleasing, dilated on the glories of the achievement, and compared it to Napoleon's liberation of Italy. General Scott, broken down under the failure before Washington, telegraphed General McClellan to come on and take com mand of the Potomac army, and tho people hailed him as a victor, come from the mountains, to secure, by another campaign not less brief, results as much more brilliant as the field was more extensive. Never was a General more completely master of the situation. The Gov ernment received him with unlimited confidence, and practically gave him unlimited power. The people, humiliated and chastened by Bull Eun, hastened to support and re-enforce the new General. The soldiers, led to look upon him as a veritable "organizer of victory," became his enthusiastic champions. Arms, artillery, ammunition, horses, supplies were demanded for the reorgan izing army on a scale rarely witnessed in the history of modern war, but there was no question of anything — it was McClellan who asked it. From every State the stream of new regiments set steadily to Washington, for McClellan had said that his army must be quadrupled. When he took the command, he found the remnants of McDowell's Bull Eun army, fifty thousand infantry, one thousand cavalry, and less than a thou sand artillery with thirty guns. These men were dispirited by defeat and bad management. . Their commissariat and quartermasters' arrangements 'were defective, and the vicious system of electing their own officers had effectually prevented any respectable discipline. McClellan at once addressed himself to the work of reorganization with a skill to be expected from one who had, under Government support, made the organization of armies a special study, and with a vigor which deserves the highest praise. A Provost-Marshal speedily thinned the streets of the stragglers and deserters, who were still retailing their stories of how they had performed prodigies of valor till the "Black Horse Cavalry" swept down at the very moment a "masked battery" had opened and was cut ting them to pieces. A Board weeded out the incompetent officers. Thorough inspections, drill, and reviews reduced the regiments to discipline. An accomplished tactician (General Casey) was assigned to the task of brigading the new troops as they came in. As they began to acquire some skill in the evolutions, and the qualifications of their commanders began to be ascer tained, the brigades were formed into divisions. A skillful artillerist (General Barry) was instructed to form an artillery establishment for the army, and a body of trained officers of the regular service were assigned to duty under him. Field batteries, composed of guns of uniform caliber, were assigned to divisions, in the proportion of at least five pieces to 284 Ohio in the War. each two thousand men; an artillery reserve of a hundred guns and a siege- train of nearly a hundred more were equipped, and careful instruction in their duties, both by text-books and practice, was given the artillerists of each division.* Into the hands of a no less skillful "specialist," Major (subsequently Major- General) Barnard, of the Engineers, was given the task of placing Washington in a condition of defense. The works on the Virginia side were strengthened and connected, and fortifications soon began to crown the heights to the north ward, till a chain of earthworks, professedly modeled on the lines of Torres Vedras,f encircled the Capital with a sweep of forts on every eminence, and infantry parapets spanning every valley for a circumference of thirty -three miles. In like manner the Quartermaster's and Commissariat Departments were reorganized, competent Ordnance officers were appointed; the whole business of the army was systematized. In all this it is true that the plans were not of General McClellan's origina tion. General Barry submitted a memorandum of the principles on which the artillery should be organized; General Barnard traced the fortifications; Gen eral McDowell had left a nucleus of fifty thousand men, properly brigaded and divisioned; General Casey took charge of the new levies of infantry, and Gen eral Stoneman of those of cavalry. Nor were the plans new plans ; the work was but to follow the beaten path which the best armies of Europe had trodden for a hundred years. But it was McClellan who enforced the necessity for this work, and selected these men for their respective duties; who procured for them the materials they demanded; who supervised their operations, and after due investigation, gave to all the sanction of his authority. Of high credit for all this, no fair criticism can deprive General McClellan. It was not great work, stamping its author as a man of the highest genius, hut it was congenial work, exactly in the line of his studies, leading him over pre cisely the ground, in the whole scope of the Art of War, with which he was most familiar, and he did it faithfully, wisely, and well. "If other Generals, the successors of McClellan, were able to achieve more decisive results than he, it was in no small degree because they had the perfect instrument he had fash ioned to work withal." J But now the army had grown to triple its original size. Three months had been consumed in giving it form and consistency; while, meantime, a foe every way its inferior held it close under the fortifications of the besieged Capital. The people had by no sign or word diminished the fullness of the trust in which, with touching patience, they awaited their General's own time for using this trenchant blade. The very abandon of their confidence increased the weight under which it placed the trusted General. But already had begun the development of that strange perversity of vision •Report Engineer and Artillery Operations Army Potomac,^. 106. t Barnard's Report, p. 12. JSwinton's History Army of Potomac, p. 61. George B. McClellan. 285 which was to prove among tho foremost causes for the downfall of the popular idol; that worse than near-sightedness which not only diminished tenfold what ever obstacles were at a distance or in other departments, but no less exaggerated such as were near at hand. As early as the 4th of August General McClellan had, in an elaborate memorandum, assured the President that no large additions to the troops in Missouri were needed, that twenty thousand would form an amply strong column for Kentucky and Tennessee, and that for his own army he would need two hundred and seventy -three thousand men! Toward the close of October, having then an army of one hundred and sixty-eight thousand, he informed the Secretary of War that he considered at least two hundred and eight thousand requisite to enable him to advance I And his reason for demand ing this colossal army was, that "the enemy have a force on the Potomac not less than one hundred and fifty thousand strong, well-drilled and equipped, ably commanded, and strongly intrenched!" Outside the head-quarters few then believed the enemy's force to be more than half this number; we now know from General Jos. E. Johnston's official report, and from the actual consolidated mOrning returns of his army, that the entire Eebel strength in Northern Vir ginia" on 31st of October, 1861, was sixty-six thousand two hundred and forty- three, of which only forty-four thousand one hundred and thirty-one were present for duty. General McClellan, while ciphering his own army down to its lowest point, depreciating its arms, and complaining of its rawness, had mag nified the raw levies of the enemy nearly fourfold, and had ascribed to them an equipment and discipline which, according to the confessions of their own commanders, they neither had then, nor ever subsequently acquired! But he still thought he might move by the 25th of November. Meantime, as vague hints of these strange conceptions of the enemy's force, and these enormous demands percolated official circles, a feeling of uneasiness began to appear. The Eebel columns, in a spirit of taunting braggadocio, had been advanced till their flags could be seen from the President's windows. Eebel batteries lined the Potomac till, with an enormous army lying idly about it, and a sufficient navy within call, the Capital of the Nation was actually blockaded. - Foreign nations construed the endurance of these things as signs of conscious weakness; and statesmen regarded the danger of European inter vention, or at least of European recognition of the Southern Confederacy, as imminent. A strange affair happened at Ball's Bluff, on the Upper Potomac, not indeed by General McClellan's direct orders, but certainly with his implied sanction, in which there was a sad waste of life, without appreciable object, and under the grossest mismanagement; and the fall in it of a highly-esteemed Senator of the United States intensified the public horror at the details. But when men asked why our immense force did not remedy some of these things, they were pointed, for answer, to the glittering staff surrounding the handsome young Napoleon, as he swept down the Avenue and across the Long Bridge to some new review, to the sight of which, as to a holiday parade, the wives and daughters of Congressmen had been invited. Still, though the whispers swelled to muttering, there was little open dis- 286 Ohio in the War. content, and when, at the close of October, the President was called to appoint a successor to General Scott, he was subsequently able to say, "neither in council nor country was there, so far as I know, any difference of opinion as to the proper person to bo selected."* It was indeed known, even then, to a few, that the retiring chieftain had bitterly complained of lack of respect and even of actual insubordination on the part of General McClellan ; but Scott was old and testy, and little importance was attached to these complaints.f By the middle of November, however, the patience of the public became pretty thoroughly wearied, and frequent demands were made as to why nothing could be done with the grand Army of the Potomac. But there had now sprung up about the General commanding a knot of parasites and flatterers, who deemed such inquiries from those whose sons and brothers constituted this army a great impertinence. The General was maturing his plans; they would in due time be found to cover every point and satisfy every expectation; and till he chose, in his own good time, to develop them in action, it only became the public to be thankful for his genius and to admire such fruits of it as were already apparent. Talk like this from the head-quarters was taken up and amplified by the newspapers, and for months the public heard little but eulogies upon the matchless General and his mysterious plans; glowing descriptions of his martial appearanco on a review; and sanguine accounts of the havoc ho would work upon the Eebel hordes, when once his strategy dictated the time for placing himself at the head of his heroic battalions and leading them to glory. Meanwhile, sword presentations, addresses of admiring delegations, and the like filled up the time, and still the Army of the Potomac lay motionless before Washington, while Eebel guns by river and by land still besieged it. It would seem — so absolute was the deference with our young favorite of Fortune yet commanded — that even now the President failed to require of him his reasons for continued inaction. He himself informs us| that, "had the discipline, organization, and equipment of the army been as complete, at the close of the fall as was necessary, the unprecedented condition of the roads and Virginia soil would have delayed an advance till February." Here, again, we have the strange visual defect. The unprecedented condition of the roads con sisted in this, as described by a Southern annalist: "A long, lingering Indian summer, with roads more hard and skies more beautiful than Virginia had seen for many a year, invited the enemy (i. e., the United States forces), to advance. Ho steadily refused the invitation to a general action; the advance of our lines to Munson's Hill was tolerated, and opportunities were sought in vain by the Confederates, in heavy skirmishing, to engage the lines of the two armies. The young Napoleon was twitted as a dastard in the Southern newspapers." || With an army nearly four times the size of that which confronted it, the * President's Annual Message, December, 1861. tThe letter on which these statements are based was written by General Scott before his resignation, and was read by Mr. Thaddeus Stevens, in the course of debate in the House of Representatives, nearly two years later. X McClellan's Report, Government edition, p. 35. | Pollard's History, Vol. I, p. 184. George B. McClellan. 287 daily increasing demand of the public, who, after all, controlled the war, for a movement that should at least clear away the Eebels from the front of the Capital, was reasonable. As General-in-Chief, McClellan naturally desired that the movements of the Potomac army should be simultaneous with tho&e of the Western armies, whose "total unpreparedness" he makes a plea for still further delay. But a special movement upon Manassas would not have interfered with such subsequent co-operation, while its moral effect would have been invaluable. Here was the grave error General McClellan now committed. Accepting the confidence with which he had been received as an unreserved tribute to his merits he forgot that the stress under which he was placing popular expecta tion must within a reasonable time be relieved; that he could not be forever taken upon trust, while, in the absence of actual performance, he called for such supplies as were unheard of in this country, and almost unparalleled among the most warlike nations of Europe. But to the complaints which indignant Con gressmen soon began to make, the only reply from head -quarters came from the glittering young staff-officers, who roundly denounced the interference of civilians and especially of politicians, in military affairs, which they could not "be expected to understand. The winter passed in profound inactivity. General letters of instruction were addressed to the commanders of the various departments, all good, and in one case (that of the letter to General Butler, giving directions for the move ment against New Orleans), exceptionally clear-sighted and explicit. No new operations, however, were planned ; the General-in-Chief seemed satisfied either with countermanding or permitting the completion of the operations already in progress. • The stress of the public demand, that sometEing should be shown in return for the vast resources bestowed upon the commander of the Army of the Poto mac, became greater; the danger of foreign recognition was now known to be imminent; and Mr. Lincoln grew very uneasy. "If General McClellan does not want to use the Army of the Potomac," he said, quaintly and almost patheti cally, to some officers with whom he was consulting, "I should like very much to borrow it of him;" and, "if something is not done soon, the bottom will be out of the whole affair."* Just at this time McClellan became ill; and, in his distress, the President, failing several times to secure interviews with his Gen eral-in-Chief, sent for other officers, and sought, by their aid, to find out how "something could be done." Before the last of these consultations, General McClellan recovered. He scarcely concealed his chagrin at what had been going on, and with great reluctance imparted even to the President, the pur poses he had been nourishing so long. These, it proved, were to transfer the army by water to the Lower Chesapeake, and move thence from some such base as Urbana on the Rappahannock, against Richmond, leaving at Washington only a sufficient body of the newest troops to garrison the forts. But, on the 13th of January, before the President, members of the Cabinet, * McDowell's Memorandum of Interviews with President Lincoln. Swinton's History Army Potomac, p. 80. 288 Ohio in the War. and army officers, whom the President had called in consultation, General McClellan, after evading a direct answer to the question what he intended to do with the army, had finally protested against developing his plans, unless under peremptory orders, but had given assurance that he had a time fixed for beginning operations. Two weeks later, the President having received no further information, had lost all patience and issued a peremptory order, fixing a date, about a month in advance, for the movement of all the armies of the United States. After this, McClellan came forward with his plan for taking sail to Fortress Monroe. There was manifestly not time to accomplish this and be ready for offensive operations within the time already fixed by the President. Partly for this reason, partly also, without doubt, because of a sincere conviction of the injudicious nature of the plan, Mr. Lincoln promptly disapproved it, and ordered instead a turning movement against Manassas. McClellan, instead of obeying, inquired if this order was final, or if he might present his objections to it in writing. Leave was granted, his objections were set forth, and finally, less because the President was convinced than be- . cause he feared that he could look for no hearty execution of any other plan, he yielded to McClellan's urgency, and ordered the water transportation to be pre pared for the execution of McClellan's plan, requiring, however, that it should be approved by his corps commanders, that the Eebel blockade of the Potomac should be broken, and that an ample force should be left for the security of Washington. While these preparations were in progress, the enemy quietly evacuated Manassas, in pursuance of measures begun three weeks before, for moving nearer their base of supplies. The troops of the grand Armyof the Potomao were now marched out, over the roads which up to this time had been gazetted as "impassable," and then, there being nothing for them to do, were marched back again. The movement intensified the popular discontent, and led to innu merable pasquinades. At last the preparations for the long-expected movement were complete. Eighteen thousand men only were left in garrison at Washington, but General McClellan reckoned, as also available for its defense,! the thirty -five thousand in the Shenandoah Valley, and those at Warrenton and Manassas. One hundred and twenty-one thousand (besides Blenker's division, withdrawn at the start, and McDowell's corps, subsequently withheld), were left for the movement from Fortress Monroe. The temper of the Administration, by this time, may be inferred from the closing sentence of an order from the Secretary of War : " Move the remainder of the force down the Potomac, choosing a new base at Fortress Monroe, or any where between here and there, or at all events, move such remainder of the army at once in pursuit of the enemy by some route!"* Under such pressure, the movement finally began. By the 2d of April — eight months after receiving the command — -General McClellan was at Fortress Monroe, ready to begin his campaign. He had, in the meantime, possessed the unlimited confidence of the * McClellan's Report, Government edition, p. 60. George B. McClellan. 289 Government and the country, and had measurably lost that of both; he had received the baton of General-in-Chief, and had lost it again; had at first been so absolute that not even the President thought of inquiring as to his plans; and had at last been fairly ordered out of Washington in words that, scarcely veiled in polite phraseology, meant "go anywhere, move anywhere you please, only let us have an end of excuses — do something." He still possessed, how ever, in a remarkable degree, the admiration of his untried soldiers. General McClellan's original plan had been to land at Urbana on the Rap pahannock, and move thence on Richmond. The retreat of Johnston from Manassas, placing the Eebel army behind the line of the Eappahannock, had prevented this. He had then proposed to move up the James. The presence of the dreaded Eebel iron -clad Merrimac prevented this. And so it was now determined to move up the York River. The second day's march brought the army to a halt! It was discovered that the Rebels had" earthworks at Yorktown as well as at Manassas. These works were manned by General Magruder, (an officer who in the old army had ranked chiefly as a coxcomb), with a force, in all, of not quite eleven thousand men.* Here, at the very outset of his campaign, where if ever vigor and dash were required, that the objective might be reached before the enemy had time to concentrate his troops on the new line of operations, General McClellan's evil genius overcame him. All his troops not yet having arrived, he only had about' five times as large an army as that which confronted him, and so he deliberately sat down to besiege them! His information, he said, "placed Gen eral Magruder's command at from fifteen thousand to twenty thousand men, independently of General Huger's force at Norfolk, estimated at about fifteen thousand menlf Huger's real force at Norfolk is now known to have been eight thousand, so that the whole force possible to be combined against General McClellan at Yorktown was nineteen thousand, instead of the thirty -five thou sand which he thus estimates. It was the painful story of "one hundred and fifty thousand behind the intrenchments of Manassas" over again. Then General Johnston had arrived with part of the Manassas army, and he felt sure that he "should have the whole force of the enemy, not less than one hundred thousand," on his hands! "In consequence ofthe loss of Blenker's division and McDowell's corps," his force was already "possibly less than that of the enemy." J And one of his corps Generals confidentially wrote, with his approval, that "the line in front of us is one of the strongest ever opposed to an invading force in any country." || In point of fact, General Johnstbn had then brought down no re-enforcements at all, had only come to inspect the defenses, * This seems to be the largest number that any of the authorities will allow. It is proper, however, to say that Pollard (Southern History of the War, p. 293) says that Magruder had only seven thousand five Hundred. Magruder himself reports his strength, exclusive of the garrisons at Gloucester Point and elsewhere, at five thousand. t McClellan's Report, Government edition, p. 74. ' X McClellan's Report, Government edition, p. 79. || Ibid, p. 81. Vol. I.— 19. 290 Ohio in the War. had pronounced them faulty in construction, and untenable, (in which opinion he was fully sustained by General Robert E. Lee, then chief-of-staff to Mr. Davis), and had therefore strongly recommended the entire evacuation of the Peninsula* * That the Rebel works at Yorktown could and should have been taken by assault, without one day's delay, is therefore a verdict which no informed mili tary- critic, in the light of facts now known, will presume to question. But while- nothing can excuse the General, who, at the outset of a great campaign, planned by himself, suffers a force only one-tenth as great as his own to para lyze his army and destroy his plans, there are still some circumstances which tend to place General McClellan's conduct in a more favorable light. He had desireS to turn Yorktown by a movement on Gloucester, but the navy was unwilling to undertake its share of such an enterprise, and McDowell's corps, to which he had assigned the task, failed to reach him. His mind, always mor bid on the subject of the numbers of his army, was thus greatly depressed ; he never formed new plans with rapidity, and his old ones for the disposition of his troops were thus shattered. And to this it should be added, that the opinion of his engineer was decidedly against assault.f It may further be remarked, that while nothing can excuse General McClel lan's failure to use tho abundant forces he had, in sweeping over Yorktown and on up the peninsula, there is likewise no sufficient excuse for the vexations to which the Administration now subjected him. He had been given the command of Fortress Monroe and the forces there, that he might thus control his own base of operations. Alarmed at finding how nearly he had stripped Washington of effective troops, and fearing a similar performance at Fortress Monroe, this com mand was taken from him, almost before he had begun to exercise it — a humilia tion, under all the circumstances, which it was unwise to inflict upon a General left at the head of an army. If he could not be trusted with the troops at his own base, he could not be trusted with troops anywhere, and the Administra tion should have promptly superseded him. Equally unwise was the withdrawal *The above facts have been repeatedly stated by both the Confederate Generals named. They may he found as given by General Johnston to the author, in Swinton's History Army Potomac, pp. 102, 103. 1 1 make no account whatever of the two excuses urged by General McClellan himself in his report, and continued, in the form of charges, against the Administration, with such perti nacity by his friends ; viz., that there had been just ground to expect the co-operation of the navy, and that there was just cause of complaint for the withholding of McDowell's corps. It was General McClellan's business, before he set out on a campaign to which the Govern ment had been steadily opposed from the beginning, and which was only tolerated in deference to his persistent advocacy of it, and virtual unwillingness to undertake any other, to know whether or not he could count on the support of the navy. His Council of Corps Commanders had made this a peremptory sine qua non, (McClellan's Report, p. 60), and he had given the President assurance that the conditions imposed by that Council had been complied with. The disposition made of McDowell's corps by Mr. Lincoln was, of course, unmilitary, and the consequent disappointment great, but the force left General McClellan was still overwhelm ingly superior to that of the enemy, or to any force which, for the next three weeks, the enemy could, by any possibility, have concentrated against him. And, furthermore, eleven thousand of McDowell's corps did reach him before he left Yorktown. George B. McClellan. 291 of McDowell's corps. It was not needed for the defense of Washington ; and although it was true that McClellan still had an ample force for his work, yet he had been fairly led to rely upon more, and should not have been dis appointed. The siege went on — to the infinite mortification of the President, who wrote, " the country will not fail to note, is noting now, that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated."* > But the General's requisitions were all promptly filled ; an enormous siege-train, comprising one and two hundred-pounder rifled guns, was gathered about the handful of Rebels under Magruder; rope mantlets were constructed in New York for the batteries ; shells were forwarded,' charged with Greek fire ; the whole army was delayed from the 4th of April to the 4th of May; ahd then- let poor General Barry, of the artillery, finish the story: "It will always be a source of great professional disappointment to me, that the enemy, by his pre mature abandonment of his defensive line, deprived the artillery of the Army of the Potomac of the opportunity of exhibiting the superior power and effi ciency of the unusually heavy metal used in this siege !"f That was all ! The enemy had waited till the siege-train was ready to open, and then had quietly retreated, leaving their empty works and the heavy guns (taken from the Nor folk Navy-yard) which they had been unable to carry with them. Sumner's corps was at once pushed forward in pursuit. Resistance might well be expegted, for the existence of considerable defensive works at Williams burg, twelve miles up the peninsula from Yorktown, was well known at head- quarters.J If the pursuit was of any use at all, it was likely to reach the trains near this point; and, with fortifications ready to his hand, the Rebel com mander would be sure to make a stand till his trains were saved. But, either these considerations did not occur to General McClellan, or the disappointment of the unexpected retreat had so destroyed his poise of mind that he was inca pable of perceiving the import of such facts, or he did not consider that, a battle being imminent, his presence was necessary. In any event this was what he did : Remaining at Yorktown to superin tend the starting of Franklin's division, which he had decided to send up the York River on transports, he permitted the eager troops to push forward, with out reconnoissance, upon the batteries of Williamsburg. What followed may be easily inferred. The cavalry advance had warned General Johnston ofthe pur suit, and he had hastily sent back Longstreet to man the deserted works. Be fore our ¦ infantry arrived, night had fallen, a heavy rain came on, the troops bivouacked in confusion in the woods. Next morning Hooker found himself, with his division, confronting the Rebel intrenchments. He immediately cleared his front and opened fire with a couple of batteries. Longstreet responded by a series of efforts to turn his flank. Hooker was left completely * McClellan's Report, Government edition, p. 84. t Engineer and Artillery Operations Army Potomac : Barry's Report, p. 134. t Ibid, Barnard's Report, p. 63. 292 Ohio in the War. unsupported, suffered heavily, and about four o'clock was running out of ammu nition, when the opportune arrival of Kearney enabled him to re-form his lines and maintain his position. Meantime, about noon, Hancock's brigade, almost by accident, as it would seem, stumbled into the extreme flank of the enemy's works (whieh had been neglected in the heat of the contest with Hooker), and thus held a position commanding his flank and rear. But, instead of being re- enforced, he was now ordered to fall back. Night came on again, the wet and hungry troops threw themselves on the ground, and the battle was over. Next morning it was found that Longstreet, having secured the desired delay, had continued the retreat. Hooker had lost two thousand men in a needless conflict, which he was left to bear alone, while thirty thousand soldiers were within sound ofhis firing and almost within sight ofhis colors; and the General of the army was twelve miles in the rear, supervising the departure of transports. There was now open to General McClellan the- route which he had pre viously characterized as "promising the most brilliant results." The enemy had destroyed the Merrimac, on the evacuation of Yorktown, and there was no longer anything to prevent a combined land and naval advance up the James River, which, in ten days, as it would now seem, might have planted the Na tional flag on the Confederate capitol at Richmond. But, whether through the same disturbance of mind that led to loading transports instead of supervising the advance of the army upon fortified positions, or whether the General's attention had become so morbidly fixed upon the possibility of still having McDowell's corps march overland to re-enforce him, that he could see nothing else, it is certain that no further thought was given to the James, and the move ment of troops up the York Kiver went deliberately on. By the 16th of May, twelve days after the evacuation of Yorktown, the head of navigation on the Pamunkey Eiver (a continuation of the York) had been reached; and in two weeks more the troops had crossed the intervening twenty or thirty miles, and reached the Chickahominy. These movements were greatly hindered by the difficult nature of the roads. But while admitting this as sufficient explanation of much of the delay, we can not omit to add that General McClellan had him self foreclosed the admission of such excuses in his behalf at as early a day as the 3d of February, when, in the course of a communication protesting against having to execute Mr. Lincoln's order to move against Manassas, and setting forth the superior advantages of his own plan, he had particularly urged that, on the Peninsula, "the roads are passable at all seasons of the year."* By this time, however, owing to the delays which had filled up the season from the 17th of March to the 30th of May in moving the Srrmy from Washing ton to the Chickahominy, the enemy bad been given ample time to concentrate his forces. So consummate a strategist as General Jos. E. Johnston was not likely to leave unimproved so signal an advantage. The interval was employed in gathering the whole army of Northern Virginia, as well as that of the Peninsula, into the defenses of Eiehmond, with the passage and enforcement of * McClellan's Report, Government edition, p. 47. George B. McClellan. 293 the conscription bill, and with the most vigorous and successful efforts to put the army in thorough fighting trim. So now, when at last the army of the Poto mac began really to confront the enemy it was to encounter, the mind of its com mander was already weighed down again by the chronic fear of numerical inferi ority. Even from Williamsburg, whence he had exultantly telegraphed that he "was pursuing" hard, and should push the enemy to the wall," he had, within a day or two, written that, if not re-enforced, he would be " obliged to fight nearly double his numbers, strongly, intrenched." Four days later he assured tho President that he would have to attack an intrenched foe, " much larger, per haps double his number's." He did not think "it would be at all possible" for him " to bring more than seventy thousand men upon the field of battle." Yet at this time his own reports show his strength to have been one hundred and twenty-six thousand three hundred and eighty -seven, of whom he had given eleven thousand leave of absence ; but, deducting all absentees, sick, deserters, and men under arrest, he had actually present for duty,, one hundred and four , thousand six hundred and ten. But so strenuous were his representations, and so continuous his calls for re-enforcements, that, on the afternoon of the 18th of May, twenty -four hours before the army reached the Chickahominy, the President ordered the portion of McDowell's corps, which had still been withheld, to march overland to join him. Six days later — that is to say, four days after McClellan's arrival at tho Chickahominy — he was notified that McDowell must be again withheld, Stone wall Jackson having broken loose in the Valley. Thenceforward General McClellan understood that whatever he did at Eiehmond he must do with the forces he had ; and he was further notified by the weary and alarmed President that " the time is near when you must either attack Eiehmond or give up the job and come to the defense of Washington." There is no need here to add anything to the disputes of which this dispo sition of McDowell's corps has been the prolific theme. Two points, however, are worthy of notice. There was no wisdom in the President's use of McDow ell ; in so far McClellan was right. The corps was sent on a fool's errand (a "stern-chase " after Stonewall Jackson), at a time and by a route that rendered success physically impossible. But McClellan was not forced (as he claims in his report), by the promise of this corps, and by the subsequent uncertainty concerning it, to attack Eiehmond from the north, instead of seeking the line of the James. Eight days before he learned that McDowell was ordered to him, at Eoper's Church, on the llth of May, the decision was made not to move to the James^ but to continue on the Williamsburg Eoad to Eiehmond.* * Furthermore, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, he subse quently stated that " the navy was not at that time in a condition to make the James River per fectly sure "for our supplies. I remember that the idea of moving on the James River was seriously discussed at that time. But the conclusion was arrived at that, under the circumstances then existing, the route actually followed was the best." So" that General McClellan became en tangled in the swamps of the Chickahominy, not because he expected re-enforcements to reach him . there from Fredericksburg, but because he had previously decided that, under the circumstances, that was the best route. 294 Ohio in the War. Replying to the President's remark that he must soon attack Eiehmond or • come to the defense of Washington, General McClellan telegraphed (25th May) that "the time is very near .when I shall attack Eiehmond." The next day he "hoped soon to be within shelling distance." And later in the day: " We are quietly closing in upon the enemy, preparatory to the last struggle." Yet all this time, and for five days longer, he allowed his army to lie along the Chickahominy, one-third on the Eiehmond side, the remainder on the northern side, with bridges only for the one wing, and with a march of near twenty miles to be made by the remainder of the army before, in case of attack, the bridges could be reached over which to re-enforce it. The position was most unfortunate — necessary, possibly, for a day or two; but all the more potent, therefore, as a reason for hastening such operations as should reunite the army, now perilously divided in the face ofthe " enemy of double its numbers." General Johnston perceived the exposure, and instantly gave orders to profit by it. A heavy storm the same night swelled the Chickahominy, flood ing the lowlands ; and. while it rendered the attack more difficult, it likewise increased the danger of the isolated wing and the difficulties in the way of re- enforcing it. By ten o'clock Johnston struck the front of Casey's division, and speedily crumbled it up. The troops were rallied at General Couch's position at Seven Pines. Presently this division was likewise repulsed and broken in two ; and Kearney, advancing on the left, was hurled back into the swamp. The whole corps seemed about to be annihilated, when the fortune of the day was changed by the entrance of a column from the north side of the Chicka hominy. Sumner, with the soldierly instinct that led him toward the sound of a battle, had called out his troops as soon as the firing began ; and when he learned that re-enforcements were needed, not daring to delay by marching to the bridges in rear of the imperiled corps, adventured across the swollen stream on an imperfect bridge, which he had himself been building, that was all afloat, and swung taut against the ropes which tied it to stumps on the bank, and alone prevented it from floating off. By great good fortune it bore the corps across ; a few hours later it was impassable. This, then, was the column that saved the day. General Johnston was wounded; his forces retreated before Sumner's splendid charge; and, in the opinion of many of the best officers of the army, this defeat of Fair Oaks, thus suddenly converted into a victory, might have been followed by a successful advance of the army of the Potomac into Eiehmond.* But, only too well con- *William Henry Hurlbert, a partisan of McClellan's, then in Richmond, says of the effect of this defeat in the Rebel capital: "The roads into Richmond were literally crowded with stragglers, some throwing away their guns, some breaking them on the trees — all with the same story, that their regiments had been cut to pieces, that the Yankees were swarming on the Chick ahominy like bees, and fighting like devils. In two days of the succeeding week the Provost- marshal's guard collected between four thousand and five thousand stragglers, and sent them into camp. What had become of the command no one knew." If to these five thousand stragglers be added the seven thousand Rebel loss in the battle, we have an aggregate of twelve thousand taken out of a force which at best did not yet exceed sixty-five thousand around Richmond. Under the circumstances would not McClellan's one hundred thousand have had a fair chance for van quishing the remainder ? George B. McClellan. 295 SOME OF THE ROUTES TO, AND BATTLE-FIELDS AROUND, RICHMOND. George B. McClellan. 297 tent at having so narrowly escaped the destruction of one-third of his army, General McClellan recalled Sumner from the pursuit, when within four miles of Eiehmond, and sent his troops to resume their old positions. He was not on the field during the'fighting, and his only share in bringing about the barren victory consisted in directing Sumner to cross, after that old hero had for hours been awaiting such orders. And now began a change, of ill-omen to the procrastinating General On tho Chickahominy, and to the brave army he was keeping out of action. General Johnston, who had hitherto controlled the Eebel movements around Eiehmond, had never been a favorite with their Government, and his representations ofthe necessity of concentration to oppose McClellan's advance had fallen upon unwill ing ears. At the very time when this latter officer was telegraphing, from day to day, that the enemy was double his numbers, that enemy was vainly striving to secure re-enforcements from the Valley of Virginia and from the sea-coast, that should bring his numbers up to even two-thirds of those of his assailant. But it was now seen that General Johnston's wound wajs likely to keep him long out of the field, and Mr. Davis was nowise loth to improve the opportunity by filling his place with his own Chief-of-Staff and particular favorite, General Eobert E. Lee. The change was fatal to McClellan. For, such was General Lee's influence with his Government, that the troops for which his predecessor had vainly applied, were freely given him, and the long-talked -of Eebel con centration about Eiehmond really began. The army of Beauregard was broken up and transferred to Lee ; troops were brought /in from other points on the sea-coast ; the conscription, now beginning to work effectively, was made to yield its best fruits to the Eiehmond army. Worst of all, General Lee took measures for the secret and sjpeedy return of Stonewall Jackson's tried troops from the Valley. Thus the danger which McClellan had discounted, to borrow a figure from the stock-brokers, so long in advance, was now actually upon him. There was yet time to escape it ; but the crisis, which from the moment of his landing on the Peninsula, had demanded speedy and vigorous movements, now more than ever, and more imperatively, demanded them. But a strange stupor seemed to settle down upon his army. Its perilous position, astride the Chickahominy, with the boggy lowlands intervening to retard the movements of either wing to the support of the other, was continued, and the line was even extended ; while no effort was made to secure the base of supplies, which lay almost as accessible to Lee's army as to his own. And here, in this anomalous position, he contin ued building bridges and constructing great lines of fortifications, as if, with the Rebel army daily swelling before him, he meant to enter upon another siege. And yet it would seem that he was fully sensible of the dangers of his position and the necessity of assuming the offensive. On the 2d of June, two days after the battle of Fair Oaks, he telegraphed that he hoped almost imme diately " to cross the right," which still lay north of the Chickahominy, and thus reunite his army. On the 4th, as if expecting an immediate battle, he 298 Ohio in the War. begged to know what re-enforcements he could receive "within the next three days." On the 7th: "I shall be in perfect readiness to move forward and take Richmond the moment McCall reaches here, and the ground will admit the pas sage of artillery." On the 10th: "I shall attack as soon as the weather and ground will permit. * * I wish to be distinctly understood, that whenever the weather permits I shall attack with whatever force I may have.'' On the 12th General McCall arrived, and on the 14th McClellan telegraphed, "weather now very favorable." These were the conditions that were to place him in "perfect readiness to move forward and take Eiehmond," but now "the indica tions are, from our balloon reconnoissances and from all other sources, that the enemy are intrenching, daily increasing in numbers, and determined to fight desperately." That was all ! No word of moving forward and taking Eieh mond, (although on the 18th he did say "a general engagement may take place any hour"); but, six days later, on the 20th, this: "I would be glad to have permission to lay before your Excellency, by letter or telegraph, my views as to the present state of military affairs throughout the whole country. In the meantime I would be pleased to learn the disposition, as to numbers and posi tion, of the troops not under my command, in Virginia and elsewhere." This remarkable proposition, that the General of an invading army, in a perilous posi tion, with one wing isolated from the rest of the army, with a daily increasing enemy, and the necessity of doing something hourly more and - more urgent, should stop to furnish his government a volunteer essay on the general aspects of a war that covered half a continent ; meantime requesting, as preparatory thereto, a detailed statement of the positions and numbers of all the troops in the country, seemed, for a time, to exhaust his energies. It was not till five days later — eleven days after he was ';in perfect readiness to take Eiehmond" — that, on the 25th, " an advance of our picket-line of the left was ordered, prepara tory to a general forward movement." Precisely three hours later, "several contrabands came in," giving such information that the General abandoning, it would seem, all thought of his "forward movement," telegraphed, "I shall have to contend against vastly superior odds; but this army will do all in the power of men to — hold their position and repulse any attack ! "* It is the strangest, and, were it not so tragic, it would be the most ludicrous chapter of the whole sad story. One day just about to advance and take Eieh mond; the next just ready to move; the next likely to have a battle any hour; the next desirous of furnishing the Government his views on the war at large ; the next heroically resolved to — hold his position and repulse any attack. The perpetually recurring mystery is how the Government persuaded itself to leave such Unreadiness and "Uncertainty incarnate in command of its finest army. Even at this late day it was still possible to move successfully against Eieh mond, or at least to deliver general battle in front of Eiehmond, with fair pros pects of success, and with elaborate fortifications for refuge in case of defeat. Forty-eight hours afterward it was too late. *McQellan's Report, Government edition, pages 113 to 121. George B. McClellan. 299 For now General Lee had gathered his forces, had recalled Jackson, was ready for the onset. A preliminary cavalry raid bad circled the Army of the Potomac, shown him how exposed was McClellan's base, and laid bare the danger of the isolated right wing, which still held the north bank of the Chickahominy. Leaving, therefore, Magruder with twenty-five thousand men to occupy the bulk of McClellan 'e army on the south side of the Chickahominy, facing Eiehmond, Lee massed the remainder of his forces,* and, moving away to the north-westward from Eiehmond, crossed the Chickahominy at Meadow ' Bridge with his advance, then, turning down the north side of the stream, confronted Fitz John Porter's isolated corps. A sharp fight ensued, in which Porter held his ground and inflicted severe punishment upon the enemy. Jack son had not yet arrived, but it was known that another day must bring him within co-operating distance of the rest of Lee's army. General McClellan was promptly advised of the appearance of the Eebel column that afternoon on his isolated right. N6w, therefore, having, by a month's delay astride the Chickahominy, lost the initiative, it behooved him forthwith to decide where and how he would meet the attack which the enemy was about to deliver. He had on that day present for duty one hundred and fifteen thousand one hundred and two men.f His antagonist had an aggregate of about ninety-five thousand ; but General McClellan believed him to have one hundred and eighty thousand.' Acting under this belief, it would seem that the moment he found himself about to be attacked he resolved to retreat. He had definitely rejected the idea of adopting the James Eiver route, two months before, at Boper's Church, and, indeed, even before that, at Williamsburg. Knowing for weeks that he had no longer a hope of being joined by McDowell's corps, marching overland, he was free, if he had now seen occasion to revise that previous judgment, to transfer his base to the James Eiver. But, having adhered to his position on the Chickahominy, and continued his promises to take Eiehmond from that point, up to the hour of Lee's appearance on his right, he now, within a few hours, decided to abandon his base and accumulation of supplies and retreat to the James Eiver. For, Porter's affair with the advanc ing Eebels having first developed Lee's design on the afternoon of the 26th, before the morning of the 27th Porter's baggage and the great siege-train had been moved to the south side of the Chickahominy, orders had been sent to the White House to move off what supplies could be saved and to burn the rest, and the water transportation had been, ordered around to the James. It can not be disguised that, under the circumstances, this decision was as unwise as it was hasty. If General McClellan had determined at last to adopt the James Eiver route, he should have done so before the attack of the enemy converted his movement into a retreat. That attack, rightly considered, might * About seventy thousand men, including Jackson's corps, which joined him the next day, tis appears from their official reports. t The official records of the Adjutant-General's office in the War Department show the fol lowing figures for the Army of the Potomac on June 26, 1862: Present for duty, 115,102; on special duty, sick, etc., 12,225 ; absent, 29,511. Total aggregate McClellan's army, 156,838. 300 Ohio in the War. have proved the very opportunity for decisive battle under favorable circum stances, for which he had been seeking. Hastily withdrawing Porter on the night of the 26th, it was possible for him to haye hurled his united army upon the fragment of the enemy's force that now alone intervened between him and the Eebel capital.* This would have conformed to one of the elementary prin ciples of war; it would have been — the enemy having divided his force — to beat him in detail. Or, if he had believed that the main army still lay between him and Eiehmond, he could have manned the defensive works — the very emergency for which, as he often said, he had constructed them — and could then have massed the bulk of his army on the north side of the Chickahominy, at Porter's position, and there delivered decisive battle. Or, finally, if either of these operations seemed to him too daring, he might still have withdrawn Porter's corps, and at once started for the James Eiver with his entire force, thus avoid ing that evil fate by which, on the next day, he left this devoted body of twenty- seven thousand men to bear up against the attack of Lee's massed arm}-. But General McClellan either really believed himself confronted by an army of one hundred and eighty thousand men, notwithstanding his certainty of "taking Eiehmond" a week ago; or, under the alarm created by suddenly finding himself attacked instead of the attacker, he lost that well-poised bal ance of mind essential to the decision of purely military questions. One way or the other it came about that, after all his intrenching, he now left a single corps without intrenchments to fight the bulk of the Eebel army on the north side of the Chickahominy before he began his retreat. He did, indeed, ask the Generals on the south side if they could spare any troops for Porter's relief; but, as is usual, (and following the example which McClellan himself, on a larger scale, had set them), each General magnified his own dangers and held on to his troops. For there was opposed to these Generals, on the south side of the Chickahominy, the same skillful braggart, who had ¦succeeded with eleven thousand men in stopping the whole National army before his lines at York- town. Adopting the same tactics, marching his few regiments to and fro, keep ing up a tremendous cannonade and dreadful pother, he convinced not only the Corps Generals but even McClellan himself, that a mighty force was about to be hurled against their intrenched lines. With twenty -five thousand men he thus actually held seventy -five thousand National soldiers inside their works ; while across the river their brethren, only twenty-seven thousand strong, were fight- ing'the decisive battle that had been so long expected, without intrenchmente, *The Rebel commander subsequently said: "I considered the .situation of our army as extremely critical and perilous. The larger part of it was on the opposite side of the Chicka- nominy, the bridges had been all destroyed, but one was rebuilt, and there were but twenty-five thousand men between McClellan's army of one hundred thousand and Richmond. Had McClel lan massed his whole force in column, and advanced it against any point of our line of battle, as was done at Austerlitz, under similar circumstances, though the head of his column would have suffered greatly, its momentum would have insured him success and the occupation of our works about Richmond. His failure to do so is the best evidence that our wise commander fully under stood the character of his opponent." — Magruder. Official Reports Army Northern Virginia- Rebel Government edition, vol. I, pp. 191, 192. George B. McClellan. 301 and against nearly treble their numbers. It is difficult to conceive of any theory of military science on which such generalship could be justified. The battle of Gaines's Mill, thus fought, was necessarily a defeat. Porter did his best, and sacrificed near ten 'thousand men ; but when night fell, his routed columns, having left their dead and wounded with much of their artil lery on the field, were huddling about the bridge that led to the main army on the south side, and were only saved from total destruction by the arrival of a couple of brigades from Sumner's corps, and by the friendly darkness, under whose cover they crossed the bridge and destroyed it behind them. It remained to seek the James Eiver. General Lee was still uncertain what course McClellan would pursue, and lost the next day moving on the. late base of supplies. While he looked upon the smouldering piles of flour and meat, that told him of the abandonment, the trains and material of the army were already swiftly moving among the silent woods, far on their way to the James. At this moment, with Porter's loss of ten thousand men, by a needless battle still staring him in the face, General McClellan brought himself to say to the Secretary of War: "I have lost this battle because my force was too small. Had I ten thousand fresh troops to use to-morrow, I could take Eiehmond. I know that a few thousand more men would have changed this battle from a defeat to a victory. If, at this instant, I could dispose of ten thousand fresh men, I could gain the victory to-morrow. If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any other persons in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army."* Of the tone of such language to his superior we say nothing. But what could present a stranger picture of a mind chaotic, revengeful, and without dis tinct ideas? He believes the enemy to be one hundred and eighty thousand •strong; yet, with ten thousand fresh men (j.. e., if he 3etood now precisely where he stood twenty -four hours ago), he could take Eiehmond,! With ten thousand fresh troops he could to-morrow win the victory — speaking as if fresh battles were still in his mind, when, in fact, his retreat was in progress ! Beginning his movement in such temper, it is not strange that we find him still, with persistent ill-luck, contriving, through the rest of the movement, to be in the last places a Commanding General would be expected to occupy; until one of his corps commanders was warranted in testifying before the Committee on the Conduct of the War : " We fought the troops according to our own ideas. We helped each other. If anybody asked for re-enforcements, I sent them. If I wanted re-enforcements I sent to others. *• * * * * He (McClellan) was the most extraordinary man I ever saw. I do not see how any man could leave so much to others, and be so confident that everything would go just right. "f * McClellan's Report, Government edition, p. 132. t General Heintzleman's Testimony, Rep. Com. Con. War, series of 1863, vol. I, pp. 358, 359. It should be added, in justice to General McClellan, that he had found grave fault with one por tion of General Heintzleman's conduct during the retreat — a fact which may unconsciously have given a tinge to the above evidence. 302 Ohio in the War. Tet things did, after a fashion, " go right." The vast baggage-train coiled its way through the woods till it emerged upon the James in safely. Lee was delayed a day by his doubt as to where McClellan had gone, and by the skillful manner in which the old front on the south of the Chickahominy was kept tip till the last moment, On the 29th he fell, with Magruder's corps, on Sumner, who guarded the rear at Savage's Station, but was held at bay till dark. By daylight the advance of the army with the artillery was emerging upon the James, and Sumner was safe through the White Oak Swamp. Of McClellan himself we catch but a passing glimpse. He gave careful and well-considered orders to Sumner, Heintzleman, and Franklin, for guarding the passage through the White Oak Swamp, and the road leading down from the Eiehmond side upon the route of the army beyond the swamp, and then rode off to the front of the column to see to the trains and select other positions for defense. . The intersection of these roads was the key to the whole retreat. If the enemy secured it, he had planted himself upon the rear of one-half the retreat ing army and isolated it from the rest. If he failed to secure it, the change of base was accomplished. McClellan's fortunate dispositions, and the splendid tenacity of the troops held the ground, and made the battle of New Market Cross Eoads a success. Stonewall Jackson, pursuing through the swamp, was stopped at the bridge by General Franklin and held powerless. Longstreet swept down from the open country toward Eiehmond, but, within a mile of the point where his junction with Jackson was to be effected, Sumner and Heintzle man held him. The attack was furiously delivered, but every assault was repulsed till night again closed the scene. There were no orders to retreat; the rest of Lee's army was rapidly advancing; by morning the whole of it would be upon them. McClellan was off at James Eiver ; before there could be time to communicate with him the opportunity would be lost. Thus reasoning, General Franklin abandoned his hold on the swamp bridge, on Stonewall Jack son's front, and, under cover of the darkness, rapidly retreated without orders. Discovering this, Sumner and Heintzlenian hastily abandoned their positions and likewise retreated. They thus saved the army. At daybreak Lee's whole army stood on the battle-field of the previous evening, but its opportunity Of dividing or attacking in flank the retreating column was gone. Continuing the pursuit, however, General Lee, in a few hours, overtook his antagonist, only to find him securely posted on Malvern Hill. This point General McClellan had selected during the progress of the fight of the day before at New Market Cross Eoads ; it com manded the entire region along the James, and was' admirably adapted to the most liberal use of artillery. "Under any circumstances the National army must have received attack here with advantage, but the superiority of the position was greatly enhanced by the confused, blundering, and isolated assaults made by Lee's successive corps as they arrived. The repulse was finally complete, and the pursuer recoiled with heavy loss from the last stand of the retreating army. The retreat was ended, and " this army saved." If, by an infirmity of purpose and a timidity of execution amounting to George B. McClellan. 303 crimes, General McClellan had frittered away his opportunities, from the time he had landed his invading army on the Peninsula up to the time when he was thus driven from his fortifications on the Chickahominy, it was now equally true that he had skillfully extricated this army from the thick-gathering dan gers that did so beset it, and had foiled a victorious enemy, who already regarded his destruction as assured. He owed much of this to the nature of the country, which protected his flanks, concealed his movements, and delayed the pursuit; much he owed to the splendid tenacity with which his corps commanders guarded his rear; and for the actual control of the fighting he can claim less credit than ever attached before to General commanding such an army in such a plight. But, if his absence in the rear, selecting lines of retreat and points for defense, was without precedent, it may be said that the work- which he thus chose to do was admirably well-done; and if his Generals were forced to fight through the day on the orders of the morning alone, and thenceforward by hap-hazard and without unity of action, it so fell out that this plan of conducting battles under such circumstances proved successful; and in War, Success is the absolute test. The movement by the Peninsula against Eiehmond was palpably ended. General McClellan indeed clung to the idea that he might still be re-enforced and permitted to renew his attempt; and he had conceived the bold and saga cious plan of crossing to the south side of the James and moving against Eiehmond by the way of Petersburg.* But there were no re-enforcements for him; his campaign was regarded as an utter failure; he had lost the confidence of the Government f and measurably of the country; there was a general shock at the sight of an invading army, of which such hopes had been entertained, fleeing for seven days before an enemy not even then believed to be his equal in numbers. Furthermore, General Lee, having as it seemed, effectually disposed of the immediate danger to Eiehmond, had already detached Jackson, with large re-enforcements, to renew his operations in the Valley; and the alarm which that brilliant officer speedily succeeded in renewing, added to the pre vious considerations, decided the Government to recall McClellan's army in all haste to be united with the forces in front of Washington. There was some thing piteous in the tone of McClellan's remonstrances and petitions to remain; but; in the existing temper of the Government, they only served to confirm the impression that he would be insubordinate, if he dared. Then followed a painful delay. The first order for the withdrawal was sent on 30th July. It was not till 15th August that General McClellan was able to telegraph that his advance was started; and not itntil 241^h August that, preceding the bulk of his command, he was able personally to report * Precisely the plan to which General Grant found himself ultimately forced. t There is sufficient evidence for the assertion that, at this time, the Government suffered under the greatest apprehensions that McClellan might yet surrender his entire army! This may also help to explain the subsequent reluctance tp explain plans to him, or even, when he was ordered to send back his sick, to disclose to him the real intention of withdrawing the army, which prompted that order. 304 Ohio in the War. for orders at Aquia Creek. The interval had been occupied with blunders aDd delays about transportation, and with a telegraphic correspondence with Gen eral Halleck (now made General-in-Chief) which, on the part of the latter grew daily more and more curt ^.nd peremptory as the delays continued. It is doubtless true that the Quartermasters insisted upon their inability to move the army back faster than they did; but it is equally true that, if McClellan's heart had been in the matter, he could have controlled Quartermasters and their transportation, and if he did not fully satisfy the unreasonable expecta tions that were entertained, could at least have lessened the delay. As it was, so thoroughly was the patience of the Government exhausted that, on his arrival at Alexandria his troops were taken from him, and his own peti tions for active service, or at least for permission to be present with his men, could gain no audience. But affairs now reached a very critical posture. Lee had thrown his whole force to the support of Jackson ; Pope's army, confronting it, had come back in a jumble ; the divisions of the Army of the Potomac began to re-enforce him only as he neared the fatal ground of Manassas. McClellan was accused — with questionable cause— of delaying these re-enforcements, through a malicious desire to "leave Pope to get out of his scrape," as he was unfortunate enough to ex press himself in a dispatch to tho President; and this only tended to increase the acerbity of his relations to the War Department and the General-in-Chief. Presently, however, Pope's army came streaming back, broken up and demoralized by much fighting and some bad handling. The enemy was at the gates. In this crisis, whatever it thought of him as a General, the Administra tion was glad to use McClellan as an organizer. Furthermore, it was believed that there was no other name that still had such magic for the rank and file of the Army of the Potomac. And so it proved. Taking up the demoralized fragments of two armies, as they poured back from the second Bull Eun, Gen eral McClellan moved them across the Potomac and out on the Seventh Street and Tenallytown Eoads, a compact, orderly organization, ready for fresh con flicts, and actually in better fighting trim than they had been for months. Still he moved slowly, less than six miles a day ; primarily, doubtless, because of his inherently cautious and circumspect nature, but likewise, it must be remembered, under perpetual injunctions to caution from the General-in- Chief. Lee had crossed the Upper Potomac into Maryland. Covering Wash ington and Baltimore, McClellan felt his way forward to meet him ; till on the 13th of September, -at Frederick City, by great good.fortune, there fell into his hands an order issued by Lee on the 9th, fully detailing the movements then in execution. Thus informed of his adversary's designs, McClellan threw forward his army toward the passes of the South Mountain, threatening the isolated corps with which Lee was trying to reduce Harper's Ferry. A brilliant action here, handsomely managed by McClellan, carried the pass, but too late to succor the small force at the Ferry. Lee, with a master-hand, now began to gather together his scattered forces, and, flushed with the victory at Harper's Ferry, they opposed their front to the pursuing army along the bank of Antietam Creek. George B. McClellan. 305 McClellan came in sight of their ostentatiously displayed lines on the after noon of the day following the action at South Mountain, and spent the remain ing hours of daylight in reconnoissances. The next day was similarly occupied ; a delay precious to Lee, for before its close his scattered divisions all arrived, (save the two at Harper's Ferry), and stood contact again to face their old antag onist. Late in the afternoon Hooker was thrown across the creek to turn Lee's left, but no decisive result followed, save the consequent premature revelation of McClellan's plan, for which Lee through the night quietly prepared. Next morning Hooker opened the battle, advancing against Lee's left. At first successful, he was subsequently repulsed, as the inaction along the rest of the line showed Lee that he could transfer fresh troops to the left with impunity. Hooker was wounded and carried off the field ; and as brave old Sumner came up with his corps he " found that Hooker's corps had been dispersed and routed, and saw nothing of the corps at all."* Pushing forward he too became hotly engaged and soon had occasion to regret that "General McClellan should send these troops into action in driblets," and to find that "at the points of attack the enemy was superior."! With varying fortunes, however, he at last succeeded, with heavy losses, in pushing back the Eebel left till he had almost reached their center. Ee-enforcing again from the rest of the idle line, Lee was about to throw fresh battalions upon Sumner's exhausted front when another "driblet" arrived, in the form of Franklin's corps. Sumner might then have advanced again, but four out of the six corps of the army "were now drawn into this seething vortex of the fight " on the enemy's loft ; and he, not unwisely, judged it inexpedient, three of them being already much shattered, to expose the whole right of the army to destruction, by crippling the fourth, while still uncertain as to the plans or possibilities on other parts of the field. He accordingly con tented himself with holding his ground. It was now one o'clock, and as yet nothing had been done elsewhere. McClellan indeed was not ignorant that, through this inaction, Lee was being enabled to, mass his forces to resist the attack on his left'; and as early as eight o'clock in the morning he had ordered Burnside to take the bridge over the Antietam Creek, on the enemy's extreme right, and advance against him. But Burnside, though directly under McClellan's eye, was permitted to consume the time in frivolous skirmishing, till it was now one o'clock, and the whole action on the enemy's left was over, before he carried the bridge. Two hours more delay here ensued, when, advancing up the hill, he swept the enemy's right from its crest. At nine o'clock in the morning, when Sumner was charging the enemy's left, this success would have gained the day, but now at three, Sumner, with four corps under him, lay exhausted, and the two Eebel divisions from Har per's Ferry were just arriving upon the field. This last re-enforcement settled the question. Burnside was driven back to the bridge by night-fall, and the action was over. McClellan had lost twelve thousand five hundred men. Lee's loss reached eight thousand. * General Sumner's evidence, Rep. Com. Con, War;, series of 1863, Vol. I, p. 368. tlbid. • Vot,. I.— 20. 306 Ohio in the War. The next day General McClellan did not feel able to renew the attack, but he proposed to do so, if his re-enforeements (to the number of fourteen thousand, then marching from Washington), should arrive on the day following. But by that time Lee, having kept up a bold front during the day on Antietam Creek, was safely across the Potomac and back into Virginia again, with all his trains and material. This was the first and only battle of importance in which, during his whole career, General McClellan commanded in person. Viewing it in the light of facts now known it is easy to see its mistakes. It was on the 13th that, by the singular good fortune of capturing Lee's field order to his Corps Generals, General McClellan was put in possession of all his adversary's positions and plans. . It was quite possible for him, acting with the dash which such knowl edge warranted^ and which Stonewall Jackson again and again exhibited, to have carried the South Mountain pass that evening, when it could have been dono almost without resistance, and to have thrown himself upon the rear of McLaws's Eebel division then beleaguering Harper's Ferry. This would have enabled him to beat Lee's scattered troops in detail. But, passing this by, when the armies fairly met at Antietam he had double the numbers that his weak ened antagonist was able to muster. We now know, from Eebel official reports, that Lee's whole force barely reached forty thousand ; that of McClellan was over eighty thousand. Yet, holding his force feebly, he delivered isolated attacks, from hour to hour, on different parts of the field, enabling the wary enemy so to muster his thin battalions, as at each point of attack to oppose to the onset a stronger force. The tactical management of the battle thus admits of no defense. Of the failure to renew the attack on the next day more may be said. General McClellan did not know how completely the enemy was exhausted by lack of supplies, straggling, and actual loss in battle. He only knew that in front of him still stood that indomitable line against which, the day before, he had vainly sacrificed twelve thousand men ; that his Corps Generals felt their commands unfit for immediate renewal of the attack ; that a few hours would bring him fourteen thousand fresh men ; that he held in his hands the safety of the capital, and, under continual monitions of caution from the General-in- Chief, alone stood between the enemy and the defenseless North. He might indeed have reflected that this enemy must be exhausted; that he lay in a dan gerous position, with his back to a large river, and at an immense distance from his base of supplies. But, remembering what he did, and the difficulties that beset him, we may well conclude that if his conduct was not that of a great General, it was still in that safe line by which a prudent General seeks to guard the interests committed to his keeping. General McClellan, however, had largely contributed to such a state of feel ing between himself and the Adminstration that he could expect no lenient judgment on mistakes or delays. He had claimed Antietam as a great victory. The Government, therefore, demanded that he should promptly follow it up. George B. McClellan. 307 Instead, it saw the beaten enemy quietly extricate himself from his perilous position, 'and, in the face of the victorious army, march unmolested away. Then it demanded prompt pursuit. Instead, General McClellan telegraphed for shoes and blankets. The Government thought the Crisis demanded some sacri fice, even to the extent of calling upon the troops for such hard service as the enemy was performing. If the shoeless Eebels could beat a great army and invade Maryland, it was even willing that our troops should, shoeless, drive them back. Not so General McClellan. His methodical genius would permit no such irregularities ; and strong in the recollection that, after trying to dis place him, the Government had beeft forced to recall him, and, doubtless, de termined as well to teach the Government something of his importance and power, he suffered -the splendid fall weather to go by, while, for over a whole month, he lay on the Potomac, reorganizing and reclothing his army. At last he moved, but he had already presumed too far ; and, on the 5th of November, 1862, when his advance-guard was about reaching the new positions which General Lee had assumed, the outraged Government relieved him of his command, and thus put an end to his military career in its service. He contin ued to hold his commission for two years longer, until after his defeat for the Presidency, but he was never put on duty, and, for the most part, he lived in retiracy with his family in New Jersey. Thus passes from the field a General in whose favor Fortune seemed at first to have exhausted her resources. He was still popular with his army, for whose comfort he sedulously exerted himself, and for whose good-will he skillfully strove. That he had disappointed public expectation was not wonderful, for, greatly through the folly of his own friends, public expectation had been raised to dizzy heights, which genius of the first, order could scarcely have reached. In, that he had disappointed the Government he was more blameworthy. If ho had been willing to place himself at the outset on the footing of a trained the orist, confessedly ignorant of the practice of war, many of his mistakes might have been forgiven. But it was precisely here that the complaint rested. Ig noring all the national considerations which constrained action; narrowing his vision till he saw for his whole duty the task of building up on the banks of the Potomac a colossal army, which should equal, in all the perfection of dis cipline and equipment, the finest of those he had seen in Europe, he then arro gated to himself the privileges of an acknowledged Expert in a recOndite Sci ence; claimed the exclusive power of planning and deciding, while the sorely - beset Government must, in blind faith, await his own good time for defeating the enemy; and encouraged the talk of the brainless upstarts around him, who declaimed against the impertinent interference of mere civilians — the Com mander-in-Chief, to-wit, and his constitutional advisers. When, after all this, it was found that his Generalship exhausted itself in preparations, that in the field he handled his great forces irresolutely, and, perpetually debating between brilliant, alternatives, perpetually suffered each to escape him, the disappoint ment was as great as the promises had been high. It was, perhaps, more his 308 Ohio in the War. misfortune than his fault that thenceforward (to repeat what we have already said at the outset of this sketch) he was forever judged, and severely judged, by the false standard which his friends had set up. Worse than all, when it happened that his military career was about to become one of the vexed points in a Presidential canvass, he brought himself to disingenuous subterfuges and adroit after-thoughts, by which he sought tn shift the blame of his errors upon other shoulders.* Still these circumstances, which so powerfully affected the immediate judg ment of his countrymen, will not entirely control the place in history to which a calm review of his career must assign him. He never made good his claim to the character of a great General. His conduct showed no flashes of genius, and never exhibited that inspiration of battle which, in the moment of action, lights up the minds of truly warlike men. He was singularly deficient in that species of executive capacity which controls the tactics of an army in the face of an enemy, and he never gave evidence ofhis ability to handle skillfully even fifty thousand men in battle. But he thoroughly understood the theory of war, and especially the organization of armies. " Too military to be warlike,1, there was much in his conduct to suggest a comparison to that Grand Duke Constantine, of Eussia, who had so perfected the drill and equipment of the army that, in his love for its splendid appearance, he protested against war, because it would ruin his soldiers. In the field his professional and tech nical knowledge overburdened him till he was incapable of skillfully using it; in the solitude of his head-quarters, and freed from his absorbing attention to personal considerations, it made him an excellent strategist. It was his misfortune that he overrated his own capacity, and set himself tasks to which he was unequal. But he was always able to oppose a front of opposition to tho enemy, and to maintain the morale ofhis army. Twice he was fortunate enough to have a field for the display of his peculiar abilities ; and on those occasions, once in the restoration of confidence after Bull Eun and the organization of the army, and again in the reorganization of the demoralized fragments that drifted back in disorder from the second Bull Eun, he so served the imperiled Country that his name must forever find a place in the list of those' who have helped to save the Eepublic. From the date of General McClellan's first taking the field in West Vir ginia, he had been accompanied by a staff officer from Cincinnati, who was a sagacious politician, and quick to perceive those currents of popular fawr along which politicians may guide their barks to official harbors. The whirlwind of popular applause had no sooner set in around the " Young Napoleon " from West Virginia than this astute officerf recognized his opportunity. Thenceforward it was sedulously cared for that in whatever McClellan said or did, his sayings and actions should be so shaped as not to unfit him for the candidacy of the * Throughout the labored self-vindication, misnamed " Report." t Who has the credit of the revision of the most and the authorship of the most important of McClellan's proclamations and other papers having political bearings. , George B. McClellan. 309 party with which he affiliated — the party opposed to tho Administration whose officer he was — in the next Presidential election. The policy was shrewdly planned and carried out. Had military success re-enforced it, its author might have seen it successful. But when the Democratic party assembled in convention at Chicago, they were compelled by the pressure of their peace wing to resolve that the War for the Union was a failure. Upon this platform, and that of his own military failure, they placed General McClellan. The combination defeated him in ad vance. He still polled a respectable vote in each of the States, but he only carried three of them, Kentucky, New Jersey, and Delaware. The heat of the canvass, and his anomalous position as a Soldier on a Peace Platform, opposing the cause which the Country regarded as peculiarly the cause ofhis fellow-soldiers, led to his being assailed with unusual and often with unjust bitterness. Now that political passions have cooled, there are few who will not regret that the loyalty, and even the personal courage of General McClellan were once slanderously called in question. Eesigning his commission as a Major-General in the regular army, after his popular defeat, General McClellan sailed for Europe, where he remained in retirement with his family till long after the close of the war. In person General McClellan is below the middle height, compact and muscular, with unusually large chest, and well-shaped head. His features are regular, and, in conversation, light up with a pleasing smile. His manners are singularly charming and graceful ; and the magnetism of his personal presence and his gracious ways is always sure to fill his private life with friends, as it bound to him the officers and soldiers of the army of the Potomac, with an affectionate regard which no subsequent commander was able to inspire. William S. Rosecrans. 311 MAJOR-GENERAL WILLIAM S. ROSECRANS. TH E greatest of modern strategists never rose beyond the rank of a Briga dier-General. Napoleon was once on the point of making him a Marshal of France ; he repeatedly rendered such services as, in the case of his compeers, were wont to command high praise and the largest promotion ; but, do what he would, General Jomini could never "get on." His hot temper and his open contempt for the blunders, or the foibles of his superiors, for ever barred his promotion and embittered his daily life, till at last, insulted in Gene ral Orders, he revenged himself by going over to the enemy. When Ohio was called on for her men best fitted for the instant emergencies of a sudden war, two were at once presented. At a stroke of the pen, one was made a Major-General, the other a Brigadier in the Eegular Army ; through the one, when he had retired to civil life, had been a simple Captain, and the other but a First Lieutenant. Yet the Army vindicated the wisdom of both promo tions. Both came to fill large space in the attention of the Nation, and the records ofthe war ; both wielded great armies and fought great battles ; but both passed frdm a brief season of the highest favor with the Government, and with those who controlled the business of the war, by steady progression, from cool ness X-o open hostility, and both were stranded long before the peaceful port was reached. If we have found "the one so far blinded by his resentments and his ambi tion as to suffer himself to be affiliated (at least) with friends of the enemy, it will now be our pleasanter task to trace the career of that other, hot-tempered and indiscreet as Jomini himself, who yet permitted no recollection of private wrongs to warp his discharge of public duty ; wh© through many discourage ments and buffets of fortune bore bravely up and made a good fight; who was, throughout the war, as unwise for himself as he was wise in controlling the interests of the Country, committed to, his care; and of whom at last it must be said that for his Country's sake he made greater sacrifices than his haughty temper could brook to make for his own, and, faithful ever to his Comrades and the Cause, was ever his own worst enemy. William Starke Eosecrans* was born in Kingston Township, Delaware Count}'', Ohio, 6th September, 1819. His parents were Crandall Eosecrans. whose ancestors came from Amsterdam, and Jemima Hopkins, of the family of * The name is Dutch, and signifies " a wreath of roses." 312 Ohio in the War. that Timothy Hopkins, whose name has passed into history as one ofthe signers of the Declaration of Independence. His father was a native of Wyoming Val ley, Pennsylvania, who had emigrated to Ohio in 1808. His mother was reared in the same beautiful valley, and was a daughter of a soldier of the Eevolution. Young Eosecrans was a close student, and at fifteen was master of all that the schools of his native place could teach. He already evinced the strong religious tendency which has continued to characterize him through life, and was noted, among all the boys of his neighborhood, for his disposition to study the Bible, and to engage preachers and others on religious topics. Not less characteristic is another glimpse that we get of his boy life. His proficiency in such mathematical and scientific studies as he had been able to pursue, led him to look longingly upon the treasures of a West Point education. Consulting no one, not even his father, he wrote directly to Hon. Joel.E. Poinsett, Secretary of War under President Van Buren, asking for an appointment as Cadet. It was not strange that such an application failed to receive an instant response; hut young Eosecrans thought it was, and presently applied to his father for some plan to re-enforce his request. A petition for the cadetship was prepared and largely signed, and, as he was depositing the bulky document in the post- office, he received the letter informing him of his appointment. At West Point Cadet Eosecrans was known as a hard student, something of a recluse and a religious enthusiast. His class — that of 1842— numbered fifty -six, and among them the reader of the histories of those times will not fail to recognise such names as James Longstreet, Earl Van Dorn, Jobn Pope, Abner Doubleday, Lafayette McLaws, E. H. Anderson, Mansfield Lovell, G. W. Smith, John Newton, and George Bains. Among these men Cadet Eosecrans stood third in mathematics and fifth in general merit, while Poj)e was seventeenth, Doubleday twenty-fourth, and Longstreet fifty -fourth. Entering the elite of the Eegular Army, the Engineer Corps, as a Brevet Second Lieutenant, young Eosecrans was now, at the age of twenty -two, ordered to duty at Fortress Monroe, under Colonel De Bussey. A year later he was returned to West Point as Assistant Professor of Engineering, and about this time was married to Miss Hegeman, only daughter of Adrian Hegeman, then a well-known lawyer of New York. From 1843 to 1847 Lieutenant Eosecrans was kept at West Point ; first, as we have seen, as Assistant Professor of Engineering, then as Assistant Professor of Natural and Experimental Philosophy; then, again, in charge ofthe depart ment of Practical Engineering, and finally as Post Quartermaster. In 1847 he was ordered to Newport, Ehode Island, where- he took charge of the fortifica tions, and the reconstruction at Fort Adams of a large permanent wharf. He was thus continued on engineering duty till, in 1852, we find him in charge of the survey of New Bedford and Providence harbors and Taunton river, under the Act of Congress requiring their improvement. In April, 1853, the Secretary of the Navy having asked for the services of a competent Engineer from the War Department, Lieutenant Eosecrans, now promoted to a First Lieutenancy, was ordered to report to him for duty, and was assigned to service, under the William S. Rosecrans. 313 \ Bureau of Docks and Yards, as Constructing Engineer at the Washington Navy Yard. He continued on service 'here until November, 1853, when his health broke down. Lieutenant Eosecrans was now thirty-four years of age ; ho was an ackowl- edged master in the profession of Engineering, and had given, in its practice, eleven of the best years of his life to the Government without yet having reached the dignity of a Captain's commission, or the meager emoluments of a Captain's salary. In the army, where, " few dying and none resigning," pro motion in peaceful times seemed hopelessly remote, he could see nothing more brilliant in the future, and was already growing discouraged, when his illness now gave additional force to these considerations and determined him to tender his resignation. The Secretary of War, (Jefferson Davis), expressed his unwill ingness to lose so valuable an officer from the service, and proposed, instead, to give him a year's leave of absence, with the understanding that if he should then insist upon it, he would be permitted to resign. In April, 1854, his resig nation was accordingly accepted, General Totten, the Chief of Engineers, for warding the acceptance accompanied with a complimentary letter, referring to the "services rendered the Government by Lieutenant Eosecrans," and his ^'regret that the country was about to lose so able and valuable an officer." The next seven, years were to Lieutenant Eosecrans years of more varied than profitable activity. At first we find him in a modest office in Cincinnati, on the door of which appearedNthe inscription, " William S. Eosecrans, Consult ing Engineer and Architect." Next, a little more than a year later, he figures as Superintendent, and then as President of the Cannel Coal Company, striving, by locks and dams, on the little Coal Eiver in West Virginia, to secure slack-water navigation there, and thus make available the vast wealth that lay emboweled in the banks of that stream. From this position he passed to a somewhat similar one, that~ seemed to offer larger returns, in charge of the interests of the Cincinnati Coal Oil Company. :In all these positions he displayed such ability as to command the confi dence of capitalists; yet, after all, his ventures ended in pecuniary failures. His restless mind was constantly bent on making improvements and substituting better methods ; his ingenuity left everywhere its traces in new inventions, and others have since largely profited by his researches and experiments; but it is possible that the stockholders in his Companies might have received better divi dends if he had been content to plod steadily in the old paths. It is only the usual fate of inventors to hew out the new roads by which others and not them selves may advance to fortune. And so, in the Spring of 1861, we find the future General, now in his forty- second year, not very much better situated than when, seven years before, he had resigned his First Lieutenancy; but matured, broadened, in the prime of vigorous manhood, become a man of affairs, and possessing, both by virtue of his professional abilities and of his religious affiliations, marked influence in the great city which he had made his home. For it is now the time to observe 314 Ohio in the War. that Eosecrans was a devout Eoman Catholic, implicitly believing in the infal libility of his Church, and reverently striving to conform his life to her pre cepts. His brother was Bishop of the Diocese, and his own relations to the Church were such that his example was likely to have large weight with the great mass of voters in the city of Cincinnati, whom that Church held within her folds, and who might be said, by virtue of the balance of power which they often possessed, to control the attitude of the city toward the Government and toward the war. In the first frenzy of the rush to. arms after the attack on Fort Sumter, these considerations seem to have had no weight; but we shall have occasion to see how signally, in more than one critical period, they enabled the Eoman Catholic General more effectively to serve the country to whose service he had again devoted himself. From the moment that the war had declared itself, Eosecrans gave thought and time to no other subject. The city, it was supposed, might be in some danger from a sudden rush over the border, and citizens hastened to enroll themselves as Home Guards, Eosecrans's military education at once came into play, and he gave himself up to the task of organizing and drilling these Home Guards, till, on the 19th of April, General McClellan, just appointed Major- General of Ohio Militia, requested him to act as Engineer on his Staff, and to select a site for a camp of instruction for the volunteers now pouring in. He selected the little stretch of level land, walled in by surrounding hills, a few miles out of Cincinnati, which has since been known as Camp Dennison ;* and, for the next three weeks, he was here occupied by General McClellan in encamp ing and caring for the inchoate regiments as they arrived. Governor Dennison next claimed his services, sending him first to Phila delphia to look after arms, next to Washington to make such representations to the Government as would secure proper clothing and equipment for Ohio troops, and particularly for the extra regiments, mustered into the State service, but not coming into the quota of Ohio under the first call for troops. On these missions he was fully successful, and, by June 9th, he returned to Cincinnati to find himself commissioned Chief Engineer for the State, under a special law. A day or two later he was made Colonel of the Twenty-Third Ohio, and assigned to the command of Camp Chase, at Columbus. Four days afterward the com mission as Brigadier-General in the United States army, which had been issued to him on 16th of May,f (on the recommendation of General Scott, backed hy such names as those of Secretary Chase and his old chief, General Totten, ofthe Engineers), reached him, and, almost immediately afterward, General McClellan summoned him to active service in West Virginia. Of the mode in which the General entered upon his new duties we catch * This selection was made with reference to the fears, then prevalent, of " sudden descent upon Cincinnati. It was thought especially desirable, in view of the doubtful position of Ken tucky, to keep whatever available troops the State might have within call. The name was chosen by General McClellan, in compliment to Governor Dennison, by whom he had just been appointed. t Two days after McClellan's appointment to a Major-Generalship of Regulars. William S. Rosecrans. 315 many pleasant little pictures like this one, from the pen of an eye-witness at Parkersburg : " Our General is an incessant worker. He is in his saddle almost constantly. He has not had a full night's sleep since he has been in -Virginia, and he takes his meals as often on horseback as at his table. His geniality and affability endear him to all who come in contact with him; and his soldiers recognize in him a competent commander." These soldiers were those of the Seventeenth and Nineteenth Ohio, and Eighth and Tonth Indiana — the first troops whom General Eosecrans ever com manded in the field. Within two weeks after he assumed command, they had fought a battle under him and won the victory that decided the first campaign of the war. Moving as the advance of McClellan's column, Eosecrans's brigade had been brought to a halt before the intrenched position on the western slope of Eich Mountain, held by Colonel Pegram as defense for the flank and rear of the main Eebel force under General Garnett, then lying at Laurel Hill. Within an hour or two the restless General had gained an idea ofthe enemy's position — " his right covered by an almost impenetrable laurel thicket, his left resting high up on the spur ofthe mountain, and his front defended by a log breastwork and abatis "-^-and had heard of a loyal guide who could tell how to turn it. He reported the facts to an officer of McClellan's staff, but no notice was taken of the communication, and the next day an extended reconnoissance was ordered which only developed the strength of the position more fully. General ^McClellan, as it appears, had now decided upon an assault on the front of the enemy's works, and had, in fact, assigned to Eosecrans's brigade the advance in the movement, when that officer, having found his loyal guide, took him to McClellan. "Now, General," said he,* "if you will allow me to take my brigade, I will, by a night-march, surprise the enemy at the gap, gain posses sion of it, and thus hold his only line of retreat. You can then take him on the front. If he give way we shall have him ; if he fight obstinately, I will leave a portion of my force at the gap, and, with the remainder, fall upon his rear." General McClellan, " after an hour's deliberation, assented;" it being finally agreed that Eosecrans should enter the forest at daylight, and report progress by couriers as he advanced, and that the sound of his firing should be the signal for McClellan's attack in front. A drenching rain-storm poured down upon the raw troops as they entered the forest, and it was found necessary to deflect the line of march, far to the right, to avoid discovery by the enemy. Marching with the awkwardness of perfectly raw troops, and under peculiarly dispiriting circumstances, it was one o'clock before the columb reached the crest ; and, about half-past two, when, after another toilsome march through the woods and a hasty reconnoissance, the brigade came out upon the enemy's line. The last courier had been sent at eleven, with the message that the growing difficulty of communication would prevent another dispatch until something decisive bad occurred. * The details of this interview are given in Rosecrans's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Report, series 1865, Vol. Ill, p. 2. 316 Ohio in the War. Forming his line as hastily as the rawness of the troops and the repeated misconceptions of orders by some of the equally raw Colonels would permit — the enemy meanwhile keeping up a sharp musketry fire and a fusilade from two pieces of artillery — General Eosecrans, comprehending that, with troops who had never before been under fire, instant action was the only safe course, ordered a charge, and, at the head ofthe Thirteenth Indiana, led it in person. The one or two volleys previously fired had shaken the Eebel line, and, as the attacking brigade now leaped the log breastworks with a ringing cheer, the enemy broke and fled, abandoning the two pieces of artillery. The excited troops rushed pell-mell after them through the woods, and the next two hours were consumed in getting our men together again. Meantime there had been no attack in the front. General McClellan had stated to General Eosecrans that the enemy was from five to six thousand strong.* The little brigade, thus le/t isolated and unsupported, lay between this force and one of unknown size at the town of Beverly, on the other slopo of the mountain. The situation appeared critical, and the main column, still lying on the enemy's front, seemed to have abandoned them ; but they biv ouacked in good order, turned out half a dozen times through the night on false alarms caused by indiscriminate picket firing, and in the morning marched down on the camp to find that part of the enemy had escaped to the mountains and the rest had hoisted the white flag. Those who escaped, finding themselves hemmed in on the mountains, soon sent in their surrender. Garnett, at Laurel Hill, perceiving his line of retreat imperilled, hastily retreated, and the cam paign was ended. General Eosecrans's conduct in this affair merited the praise which it instantly and everywhere received. The plan, as has been seen, was entirely his own ; and though it was his first action, as well as the first for the troops he commanded, his conduct showed a thorough comprehension of the true method of handling raw volunteers, not less than that disposition to "go wherever he asked his soldiers to go," which always made him a favorite with the men in the ranks. But he already exhibited symptoms of the personal imprudence which was to form so signal a feature in his character, by casual hints as to his dis satisfaction with thd conduct of his superior officer — a dissatisfaction which he afterward expressed officially, by complaining that " General McClellan, con trary to agreement and military prudence, did not attack" the enemy in front.f We shall soon see how this began to affect his subsequent career. The affair of Eich Mountain — it scarcely deserves the name of a battle, for our loss was but twelve killed and forty-nine wounded, and the enemy left hut twenty wounded on the field — raised Eosecrans from the head of a brigade to the command ofthe department. The force at his disposal, with which to retain and secure the fruits of the Eich Mountain victory, was but eleven thousand * Rosecrans's testimony Rep. Com. Con. War, series 1865, Vol. in, p. 5. t MS. sketch of military career, furnished in obedience to War Department Circular, and on file in Adjutant-General's office. William S. Rosecrans. 317 men ; for it was ono of that peculiar combination of circumstances which tended to deepen the hprror of the first Bull Eun, that the disaster befell us just as the time of service of most of our troops was expiring. The very train which bore General McClellan out of the Department, on his way to Washington, took out of it also the first of a long succession of three-months' regiments, embracing almost the entire army that had won the campaign just ended. Thanks how ever, to the forecast of Governor Dennison, of Ohio, a few more regiments of raw troops were hastily forwarded to General Eosecrans. They were not sent a day too soon, for now it became known that, lying on the defensive in front of Washington, the enemy had resolved to wrest the west ern portion of the State, that had become the battle-field of the war, from the hands of the invader ; and that there had been delegated to this task the officer of largest reputation within the Confederate army. Presently General Eobert E. Lee appeared in front of the works which Eosecrans had already erected at Cheat Mountain pass, and proposed an exchange of prisoners. . , At the outset the " Dutch General," as the Eebel newspapers were con temptuously naming him, seized the advantage which he did not once fail to the end to retain. " I can not exchange prisoners as you propose. You ask me for the men captured here, hardy mountaineers, familiar with every pass and bridle path, who would at once go to re-enforce your army operating against me. You propose to give me, in return, men captured at Bull Eun, who know nothing of service here, and whom I should have, at any rate, to send East to their old commands. I can not consent. But if you can remedy this inequality, I shall be very glad to make an exchange. "* But the presence of the Virginia officer, who had stood so high in the esti mation of General Scott, and had been popularly regarded as the ablest officer in the old army, created general alarm. The Unionists of West Virginia were profoundly disturbed ; the Secessionists exulted in the thought that they should speedily gain- the control ; and friendly warnings from Washington began to admonish General Eosecrans of the widely-prevailing fear that he was about to be outgeneraled. "Don't you think Lee likely to prove a troublesome antag onist?" asked one about this time at. the General's head-quarters. "Not at all," was Eosecrans's reply ; " I know all about Lee. He will make a splendid plan of a campaign ; but I '11 fight the campaign before he gets through with plan ning it."f The General's confidence was not unsustained by rapidly -foil owing events. General Lee brought to bear upon his front at Cheat Mountain a force of six teen thousand men, to meet which General Eeynolds, the officer in immediate command, had less than half as large a number. Meantime General Cox, to * Report Com. Con. War, series of 1865, Vol. Ill, Rosecrans's testimony, page 13. 1 1 was myself present at this conversation. It is a curious confirmation of this estimate to find the Rebel annalist Pollard (vol. I, p. 177) recording the failure of Lee's plan of campaign, and then adding : " General Lee's plan, finished drawings of which were sent to the War Depart ment at Richmond, was said to have been one of the best laid plans that ever illustrated tbe consummation of the rules of strategy, or ever went awry on account of practical failures in its execution.'' 318 Ohio in the War. whom had been confided the task of holding the Kanawha Valley, found him self about to be overwhelmed by tbe co-operation of the columns of Wise and Floyd, the former holding his front, the latter advancing so as to menace his communications, and having already overwhelmed and scattered to the four winds*" a considerable outpost, under Colonel Tyler, at Cross Lanes. General Eosecrans promptly met the emergency. Calling in outposts and detachments everywhere, he did what he could to strengthen General Eeynolds; and then, trusting to that officer's sagacity not less than to his admirably forti fied position, he left him to cope with Lee's threatened attack, collected such raw regiments as were within his reach, and, at the head of a column of seven and a half regiments, three of which had just received their arms, marched southward from the line of the North-Western Virginia road toward tho Kanawha, to the relief of General Cox. By the 10th September he had reached Somerville, a few miles from the Gauley,* where he was duly informed by the frightened citizens and scouts that Floyd lay a few miles ahead of him, intrenched near Cross Lanes, with a force of from fifteen to twenty thousand men. "We can not stop to count numbers," was his remark to the staff; "we must fight and whip him, or pass him to join Cox." The column pressed onward. By two o'clock, after a march of sixteen miles that day, the advance brigade engaged the enemy's outposts. Now it so happened that, in the scarcity of experienced officers, this brigade had been intrusted to a newly-made Brig adier, recommended not only by the warm indorsement of General McClellan,f but by that lion's skin, so often used in the early days of the war to cover the ass's shoulders, " service in Mexico." The Brigadier had the misfortune of always seeing causes for staying out of reach of the enemy when he was sober, and of being too drunk to understand his surroundings whenever he was likely to have to fight. The Eebel outpost having retreated, this obfuscated officer conceived the idea that he had won a great victory, and plunged ahead pell-mell with his brigade through the woods, contrary to his explicit orders, and without even a line of skirmishers deployed to the front, till suddenly they found them selves before a formidable earth-work which barred further progress, and in a moment were exposed to a withering fire from seven or eight pieces of artillery and the musketry of Floyd's whole command, at a distance of scarcely more than fifty yards. The General commanding had now either to order up re-enforcements for this attack upon a fortified position, concerning every detail of which he was in absolute ignorance, or withdraw the young troops, under the enemy's fire, at the imminent risk of creating a stampede. He ordered up the re-enforcements, hastened in person to form the line as well under cover ofthe woods as possible, and then sought, by various demonstrations, to discover a weak point in the enemy's position. The troops thus placed kept up a tremendous fusilade against the earth-works, which had no particular effect except to cause the enemy to lie close, although it did not prevent a tolerably rapid and skillful return-fire * One of the streams which, by their junction, form the Kanawha. t First official dispatch concerning affair at Carrick's Ford. William S. Rosecrans. 319 from musketry and artillery. It was soon found that the Eebel intrenchments stretched across a bend in the Gauley, with both flanks protected by the pre cipitous banks of that stream, here rising to a perpendicular height of from four to five hundred feet, while at his rear was Carnifex Ferry, the only point at which, for a distance of twenty-five miles, a passage could be effected. Arrange ments were therefore begun for an assault, but night fell upon the combatants before they were completed. Anticipating a sortie during the night, General Eosecrans drew his command back through the woods, from the immediate front of the enemy's works, to some cleared fields, where they were bivouacked in line of battle, with skirmishers well to the front. In the confusion two of the raw regiments in the woods mistook each other for the enemy, and inter changed several volleys before the sad mistake was discovered. Through the night the rumbling of artillery was heard, and by daylight it was discovered that the enemy was gone. He had crossed the ferry, and destroyed' the boat behind him. This action, in which we lost about one hundred and twenty, killed and wounded, was neither so well judged nor so well delivered as the first in which General Eosecrans had commanded. The advance was intrusted to an incom petent, of whom some little previous knowledge might have taught him to beware.* The subsequent movements were too vigorous for a reconnoissance and too feeble for an attack ; and at least one good opportunity for an assault, that on the enemy's right, was overcautiously delayed till darkness prevented its execution. On the other hand, it must be remembered that the movement had been seriously imperiled by the blunders of the Brigadier' commanding the advance, and that the troops were thus thrown into a confusion which, under the circumstances, it took long to rectify. But Floyd, who really had only seven teen hundred and forty men,f,was frightened into retreating; the chance for cutting off Cox was prevented. Wise, thus left alone, speedily retreated from Cox's front; and so the substantial fruits of victory remained with General Eosecrans, although tactically the affair could not be called by so brilliant a name. Meantime the sagacity of his judgment concerning affairs at Cheat Mount ain had been vindicated. Lee had made a partial attack and hadbeen repulsed; his able strategic plan for a combined movement that was to maneuver the Na tional commander out of his intrenchments had failed through want of cohe- • sion in the different parts ; and, abandoning the effort, Lee had hastily marched southward, apparently with a view of concentrating Floyd's and Wise's com mands with his own, and overwhelming Eosecrans. He soon had Floyd's army, and, at the head of twenty thousand men, awaited Eosecrans's advance at Mount Sewell. Uniting with Cox, General Eosecrans was now able to muster only about * And whom he still failed to expose, till further blunders had entailed greater losses. It is scarcely necessary to explain that the officer here referred to is Henry W. Benham, subse quently dismissed from the volunteer service. t Pollard's Southern History of the War, Vol. I, p. 171. 320 Ohio in the War. ten thousand * but he nevertheless pressed hard on the enemy's front, till a ter rible storm intercepted his communications, and he judged it prudent to retire to the junction of the Gauley and New Eivers. f One more act closes the West Virginia campaign. General Lee now pro posed to cut off Eosecrans's communications by throwing a column to his rear on the Kanawha, and then to attack him with superior forces, simultaneously in front and r"ear. Knowing the country better than Lee, General Eosecrans argued that such a column could only come out over Cotton Mountain, striking the river opposite the mouth of the Gauley, where his rear-guard was placed ; and he forthwith took measures to surround instead of being surrounded. Stationing a small force, sufficient to delay the enemy at least twenty -four hours, at a gap through which Lee's main column must advance, he awaited tho appearance of Floyd on Cotton Mountain with the column that was to cut his communications. He had so arranged it that General Benham, with one brig ade, was to cross the Kanawha secretly, six miles below, and by a sudden march throw himself upon Floyd's rear; while General Schenck was to cross above, at a hastily improvised ferry, and General Cox, from the mouth of the Gauley, was to attack in front. A heavj- rain destroyed the ferry above, but General Schenck crossed promptly at the mouth of the Gauley. All worked well till it was discovered that General Benham, passing from the extreme of rashness to the extreme of either negligence or timidity, wasted his time and opportunity in needless halts, till the enemy was gone. The obedience of his instructions by this incompetent could scarcely have failed to result in the cap ture of Floyd's whole force. General Lee was now recalled and sent to the coast; the Eebel forces were all retired, and General Eosecrans was enabled to put his troops in winter- quarters, with scarcely a Eebel bayonet to be found in the Department of West Virginia. No further comment on the campaign is needed than that which the enemy himself supplied. The Eebel annalist, Pollard, says: J "The campaign, * * * after its plain failure, * * * was virtually abandoned by the Govern ment. Eosecrans was esteemed at the South one ofthe best Generals the North had in the field. He was declared by military critics, who could not be accused of partiality, to have clearly outgeneraled Lee, who made it the entire object of his campaign to ' surround the Dutch General ; ' and his popular manners and amiable deportment toward our prisoners, on more than one occasion, pro cured him the respect of his enemy." The Ohio Legislature, by unanimous vote, thanked General Eosecrans and his army for their achievements; and, so satisfactory was the General's civil admin istration to the people of West Virginia, that the Legislature of that State, hy *He himself places his force at eight thousand five hundred " effectives." Rep. Com. Con. War, series of 1865, Vol. Ill, Rosecrans's testimony, p. 10. tit subsequently appeared that he had not retired a day too soon. Lee had arranged for a combined movement on his front and rear, and it was actually to have been executed the night before Rosecrans fell back ; but some delay in the starting of the flanking column led Lee to postpone the movement till the ifext night. The next night Rosecrans was gone. JVol.1, pp. 175, 179. William S. Rosecrans. 321 unanimous vote, passed a similar resolution of thanks for his conduct of civil as well as of military affairs. He sought, during a visit to Washington, to procure leave lo mass his troops and throw thom suddenly upon Winchester ; but he already found that his free criticisms of the Gcneral-in-Chiof had borne their natural fruits, and he was condomned to see the task which he sought commit ted to his own troops under other leadership. In April, 1862, under the press ure which demanded of Mr. Lincoln that John C. Fremont should • nOt be banished the public service for declaring the principles .of the Emancipation Proclamation earlier than himself, General Eosecrans was relieved to make room for Fremont, and ordered to Washington. Then followed some work in the immediate service of the Secretary of War— hunting up Blenker's division, •vyhich had incomprehensibly disappeared, consulting with General Banks as to the amazing blunders by which Stonewall Jackson was permitted to paralyze throe armies in the Valley, and at the same time threaten Washington, laying plans before the War Department, and the like. By the middle of May he was ordered to General Halleck, before Corinth. For a General who has commanded a department and planned his own campaigns, to bo reduced not merely to the position of a subordinate, but to that of a subordinate's subordinate, as General Eosecrans now was by his assignment to the command of some divisions in General Pope's column, consti tuting the left wing of Halleck's army, is never a grateful change ; but the General bore it handsomely ; was alert enough to be among the very first in discovering the evacuation of Corinth and getting off troops in pursuit; kept his place in the advance till the enemy were found in new positions; held this fropt till ordered back to assume command of the Army of Mississippi on the departure of General Pope for the East. The departure of General Halleck, a little earlier, to assume the position of General-in-Chief at Washington, left General Grant in chief command at the South-West, and thus, for the first time, brought General Eosecrans into relations with that officer, whose subsequent ill-will was to prove so baleful. Mr. Jefferson Davis, about the same time, in a fit of passion, displaced General Beauregard from the command of the opposing forces, to make room for his subordinate, General Braxton Bragg. The change was to prove an auspi cious one. Whether it was through his own engrossment with the civil cares of his grea,t department, or through the chilling influence of General Tlalleck's excess of caution, General Grant suffered the Eebels quietly to recuperate from the demoralization into which they had been thrown by the retreat from Corinth, the fall of Memphis, New Orleans, and Natchez, and in their own good time to assume the offensive. On the 10th -of September General Sterling Price, with a force of about twelve thousand, marching northward, took Jacinto, and moved upon Iuka, a point on the railroad between Tuscumbia and Memphis. Eosecrans, sending out a reconnoissance, under Colonel (since General) Mower* determined that Iuka was Vol. I.— 21. 322 Ohio in thi: War. occupied in force, and so advised General Grant. Meantime it had been ascer tained that Earl Van Dorn, with another Eebel column, was rapidly advancing in the direction of Corinth. By rapid movements there was time to concentrate and overwhelm Price before Van Dorn's arrival, and on this course Grant at once resolved. On the recommendation of Eosecrans, he determined to attack Price at Iuka. with General Ord's command, moving eastward upon him from the direction of Memphis, while Eoseerans, coming up from his camps below Corinth, should seize his lines of retreat. Ord was able to muster about six thousand five hundred, Eosecrans nearly nine thousand. Price, with his twelve thousand, might be expected to defeat either of these forces alone; the only salvation for either seemed to be in a nearly simultaneous attack. On the evening ofthe 18th Eosecrans's column was concentrated at Jacinto. nearly south of Iuka. Ord lay on the railroad to Memphis, seven and a half miles west of Iuka, and Grant was with him. Eosecrans dispatched a courior, informing Grant of his position, saying that he should move in the morning at three, and hoped to reach Iuka not later than four in the afternoon, and adding that he should send couriers from points every two or three miles along the route. But General Grant, resting, as it would seem, on the single idea that Eosecrans's troops had not all reached Jacinto till nine o'clock at night, ordered Ord next morning to delay his attack. Again, at four o'clock in the afternoon, the very hour fixed by Eosecrans for his arrival, Grant again cautioned Ord against attack, but directed him to move forward to within four miles of Iuka, and there await the sound of Eosecrans's guns from the opposite side. Now it eo happened that the wind was blowing fresh in the face of Eosecrans's column. It might have been remembered that this would prevent the guns from being heard, but it was not. Finally, at five, the advance of Ord's command reported a dense smoke seen rising from Iuka. Even this, coupled with Eosecrans's dis patch announcing that he should be on hand at four, was not enough to arouse either Grant or Ord himself, and the column lay idly watching the smoke, and listening for the sounds that the wind was blowing away from them* Meantime Eosecrans had kept his promise. Within ten minutes of the time he had fixed, his skirmishers were driving in the enemy's pickets; and a few moments later Price opened upon him with grape and canister. He list ened in vain for the guns from the opposite side, and soon had the mortification to see Eebel troops marching from that direction to co-operate in a charge upon his weak and exposed lines. Till dark the battle raged. At sunset a heavy assault on Eosecrans's right was made. It was repulsed, and a heavier one %came. Half an hour's conflict ensued; the Eebel line at last drifted back in disorder, and the soldiers discovered, in the moment of success, that they had fired their last cartridge. Bivouacking his men in line of battle, Eosecrans now sent a last message to General Grant, reciting the events of the afternoon, saying he was fighting superior forces unsupported, and begging that Qrd might be hurried up. Then, making his dispositions to seize some adjacent heights at daybreak for his artil- *For all above statements concerning Grant's orders, see Ord's Official Report. William S. Rosecrans. 323 ' lery, and replenishing his ammunition, he had the men called at three o'clock, and at daylight was moving. But meantime Price had learned of the prox imity of Ord's column, and had hastily evacuated. General' Eosecrans pushed the pursuit as far as was prudent ; -then, under orders, hastened back to Corinth. The enemy's loss in this engagement was ono thousand and seventy-eight, prisoners, dead, and wounded, left on the field, with three hundred and fifty more wounded estimated to have been carried away. Our loss was seven hun dred and eighty-two killed, wounded, and missing. General Eosecrans's con duct was energetic, courageous, and hopeful. General Grant said, in his official dispatch : " I can not speak too highly of the energy and skill displayed by General Eosecrans in the attack." General Grant's own course might be crit icised as unduly cautious. Eosecrans's dispatch, naming his hour for attack, the smoke from his guns, and the adverse wind, plainly explaining the failure to hear the sound of firing, might have been sufficient warrant for moving Ord's column. But it is to be said that Ord's command was the weaker of the two, that it therefore behooved to take special care not to suffer it to be overwhelmed by engaging too soon, and that Eosecrans's distance, the night before, from the field of battle — nineteen miles — might well be held a sufficient cause for Grant's doubt about his getting up in time for action that day. Of course, however, Eosecrans could not omit the opportunity to do him self an injury, and so, even in his official report to General Grant, he curtly expressed his disappointment at Ord's failure, and elsewhere was even more explicit. But, at Washington, the McClellan opposition being neutralized by that officer's own failure, he was now rising rapidly in the favor of the War Depart ment, and events in the near future were to give him still further advancement. The day after Iuka he received notice of his appointment as Major-General of Volunteers, and General Grant assigned him to the command of the District of Corinth. Twelve days after the battle of Iuka * Eosecrans became convinced that Van Dorn's column, moving northward, had been re-enforced by Price's defeated army, and by the commands of Lovell and Villepigue, and was likely either to attack or pass him within a day or two. He had already been vigorously engaged in fortifying an inner line, which he claims to have urged upon Gene ral Grant all through the summer, and which he now pressed forward by organ izing from the slaves of the neighborhood a strong force of negro engineers, the first used in the war. Meantime his cavalry had been everywhere. His hope was that Van Dorn and Price, dreading the fortifications of Corinth, would pass him to attack Jackson or Bolivar, in which case he would have an opportunity to fall upon their rear. • But on the 2d September his vigilance in reconnoitering was rewarded with the conviction that they were about to attempt the recapture of Corinth, and his dispositions were accordingly made, so as to be ready to repel * That is, 2d September, 1862. 324 Ohio in the War. an attack from any direction. His force was fifteen thousand seven hundred infantry and artillery, and two thousand five hundred cavalry. His estimate of the combined strength of the enemy was thirty-five thousand, in which ho subsequently felt himself fully warranted by the fact that he had taken pris oners from fifty-three regiments of Eebel infantry, eighteen of cavalry, and sixteen batteries. By nine o'clock on the morning of 3d September the enemy began to press his advance. His orders were to "hold positions pretty firmly to develop the enemy's force." General Davies, under these orders, held a slight hill on which he was posted with such tenacity as to concentrate the Eebel attack, induce him to send for re-enforcements, and to cause the contest here to develop almost into the proportions of a battle. But by one o'clock he had fallen back. The enemy now renewed the vigor of their attack. Eosecrans gradually withdrew his line till it rested on the intrenchments, and meantime swung Hamilton's division in across the Columbus Eailroad on the enemy's flank. This began sensibly to diminish the fierceness of the assault in front, and darkness now closed opera tions for the day. Eosecrans spent the night re-forming the lines on his batteries, so as to bring the enemy's next attack within converging artillery fire, reassuring the men, end giving detailed instructions to his division commanders. It was three o'clock before his work was done. The feeling in Corinth, under the retreat of the army into the town, was a nervous one; but, as an eye-witness described it, "Eosecrans was in magnificent humor. He encouraged the lads by quoting Barkis, assuring them that 'things is workin'-." Before daybreak the Ohio Brigade heard the enemy placing a battery in front, not over six hundred yards from Fort Eobinett. "Let 'em plant it," said Eosecrans* The officers, and through them the men, were inspired with his confidence. Not all could sco how well the preparations for resisting the attack promised; but those who saw no meaning in the massing of artillery for raking fires from right and left into charging columns, could interpret more readily the meaning of the glad smilo on their General's face, better than re-enforcements to the beleaguered and bleed ing but courageous garrison. Before daylight the Eebel battery planted so near Fort Eobinett opened; hut it was speedily silenced, and by seven o'clock all was quiet again. Eose crans improved the lull to gallop along the lines, and encourage the men. But by nine the crackling of the skirmishers' fire gave warning of a hostile advance, and presently the Ecbcl columns, emerging from tho woods, swept grandly up to the National lines. The batteries poured in their double charges; the crash ing volleys of musketry told of sturdy resistance; but, "riddled and scattered, * From the graphic account of the battle furnished the Cincinnati Commercial hy W. D. Bickham, Esq., Rebellion Record, Vol. I, Doc, p. 501. The account adds: "Captain Williams opened ar daylight his thirty-pounder Parrotts in Fort Williams, on the battery Which the enemy had so slyly posted in darkness, and in about three minutes it was silenced. This was why Gen eral Rosecrans had said ' Let 'em plant it.' The enemy dragged off two pieces, but were unablo to take the other. Part of the Sixty-Third Ohio and a squad of the First United States Artilleiy went out and brought the deserted gun within our lines." William S. Rosecrans. 325 the ragged hoad of Price's storming columns advanced" — breaking the thin National line, and pushing on to the center of the town. Of what followed Eosecrans himself, in his report, modestly says only this: that ho had the personal mortification of witnessing the untoward and untimely stampede. But it lives in the memory of every soldier who fought that day, how his General plunged into the thickest of the conflict, fought like a private soldier, dealt sturdy blows with the flat of his sabre on runaways, and fairly drove them to stand. Then came a quick rally which his magnificent bearing inspired, a storm of grape from the batteries tore its way through the Eebel ranks, re-enforcements which Eosecrans sent flying up, gave impetus to tho National advance, and the charging column -was speedily swept back outside the intrenchments. Let us hear again from the contemporaneous description of this battle, the splendid story of the charge and the repulse. "A prodigious mass, with gleaming bayonets, suddenly loomed out, dark and threatening, on the east of the railroad, moving sternly up the Bolivar road in column by divis ions. Directly it opened out in the shape of a monstrous wedge, and drove forward impetuously toward the heart of Corinth. Hideous gaps were rent in it, but those massive lines were closed almost as soon as they were torn open. Our shells swept through the mass with awful effect, but the brave Eebels pressed onward inflexibly. Directly the wedge opened and spread out magnifi cently, right and left, like great wings, seeming to swoop over the whole field before them. But there was a fearful march in front. A broad, turfy glacis, sloping upward at an angle of thirty degrees, to a crest fringed with determined, disciplined soldiers, and clad with terrible batteries, frowned upon them. There were a few obstructions — fallen timber — which disordered their lines a little. But every break was instantly welded. Our whole line opened fire; but the enemy bent their necks downward and marched steadily to death, with their faces averted, like men striving to protect themselves 'against a driving storm of hail. At last they reached the crest of the hill, and General Davies's division began to fall back in disorder. General Eosecrans, who had been watching the conflict with eagle eye, and who is described as having expressed his delight at the trap into which Price was blindly plunging, discovered the break, and dashed to the front, inflamed with indignation. He rallied tho men, by his splendid example, in the thickest of the fight. The men, brave when bravely led, fought again."* But before that wild charge was repelled, General Eose crans's own head-quarters were captured! Seven corpses, wearing Eebel gray, were found lying in his door-yard when tho line fell back. Meanwhile, not less violent had been the charge led by Van Dorn. It swopt up in four columns, under storms of grape and canister, to within fifty yards of Fort Eobinett, when the Ohio Brigade f delivered a murderous volley, before which it reeled and retreated. Again they advanced, steadier, swifter .than before, till they were pouring over the edge of the very ditch around the * Rebellion Record, Vol. I, Doc, p. 501. t Composed ofthe Tweiity-Seventh, Thirty-Ninth, Forty-Third, and Sixty-Third Ohio, com manded by Colonel Fuller. 326 Ohio in the War. fort, when this deadly musketry fire of the Ohio Brigade broke their formation. A moment later, and, at the word, the Twenty-Seventh Ohio and Eleventh Missouri sprang over the intrenchments, charged the disordered foe, and drove them again to the woods. The battle was over. fourteen hundred and twenty-three Eebel dead were left upon tho field. Thej7 lay at Eosecrans's head-quarters — within the forts — on the parapets — in the ditches, in short, everywhere over the field. With these Van Dorn and Price left twenty-two hundred and sixty weight prisoners, fourteen stand of colors, two pieces of artillery, thirty-three hundred stand of small arms, forty- five thousand rounds of ammunition. On the National side three hundred and fifteen were killed, eighteen hundred and twelve wounded, and two hundred and thirty-two prisoners and missing. Yet the contest was eighteen thousand against thirty -five thousand. It has been well said that such fighting was Homeric. To the losing side the magnitude of the defeat may be estimated from the words ofthe Eebel annalist, who describes it as "the great disaster which was to react on other theaters of the war. and cast the long shadow of misfortune upon the country of the West."*- Knowing the exhausted condition of his troops and their inferior numbers, the General, as prudent amid the delirium of victory as he was heroic tinder the crush of disaster, cautiously felt the retiring foe with his skirmishers. Then, convinced that the defeat was assured, he ordered pursuit. Soldierly McPher son arrived, in the nick of time, with five fresh regiments, and was given tho advance. The enemy tried to delay pursuit by a flag of truce with a burial party. It was ordered to stand aside. Van Dorn was informed that his old class-mate knew the rules of war well enough to bury the dead on the field he had won, and the column pressed onward in pursuit. Bridges were destroyed; the pursuers rebuilt them. The enemy had eighteen regiments of cavalry; the four National regiments everywhere drove them. Eations were hurried for ward; for three days the troops that had fought through the preceding two pushed on, capturing deserters and stragglers, forcing the enemy's baggage- train to abandon half its loads, occasionally engaging the enemy's rear-guard, till, on midnight of 7th of October, Eosecrans proudly exclaimed that "Missis sippi is in our hands." At this inauspicious moment he was notified by General Grant that no aid could be sent; that he did not regard the column strong enough for pursuit. Eosecrans, of course, remonstrated. His long dispatch closed : "I beseech you to bend everything to push them while they are broken, weary, hungry, and ill- supplied. Draw everything from Memphis to help move on Holly Springs. Let us concentrate * * * and we can make a triumph of our start." In reply, Grant ordered him to stop the pursuit and return to Corinth. Eosecrans promptly obeyed, but, true to his argumentative and indiscreet nature, added that he most deeply dissented from the policy. And now began to bo seen the first developments of a feeling that, growing with age, was to draw after it an expanding train of evil. There is some rea- •Pollard's Southern History, Vol. I, p. 516. William S. Rosecrans. 327 son to believe that Grant had been nettled at the complaints, partly official from Eosecrans himself, far more unofficial from thoughtless staff-officers who "knew all their General knew,"* about the failure to support him at Iuka. The order to stop the pursuit renewed this indiscreet chatter, and whispering tongues were soon poisoning truth, by the reports they made at Grant's head quarters. Grant congratulated the army on its victory in General Orders, but, passing by tne brilliant battle at Corinth with a single clause, devoted the most of the order to extravagant praise of Hurlbut, for the brief onslaught he had made upon the enemy during their retreat, f There was subsequently an effort at explaining away misunderstandings; both Grant and Eosecrans professed them selves satisfied, and they parted promising friendly intercourse in the future;! but it is doubtful if the scars were ever fully effaced from the memory of either, till later events came to brand them deeper and broader with both. But in the War Department, where Grant's hostility, even if existing and exerted, could as yet avail little, the star of Eosecrans was now rapidly rising to its zenith. Nine days after his return to Corinth he was ordered to Cincin nati, where fresh orders instructed him to relieve General Buell and assume command of the great but demoralized army, which, retiring steadily through the early fall, to keep pace with Bragg's advance into Kentucky, had fallen from North Alabama to the Ohio Eiver. The Country and the Army, remem bering Jiis heroism and his victories, gave implicit confidence to the new Gen eral commanding; and he entered upon the duty of pushing back the war from his native State, and holding the center of that great line which stretched from the Potomac to the Arkansas, under outward auspices the most cheering. But he found the troops dispirited, discipline lax, unsoldierly complaints gen eral. Winter was approaching; the railroad lines were a wreck, and even if the army had been pushed forward through the country which Bragg had . exhausted, it would have been impossible to supply it. In the midst of the first comprehension of these unexpected difficulties came an order from the General-in-Chief at Washington, to undertake a march after Bragg, to East Tennessee, a distance of two hundred and forty miles, at a time when the army had transportation enough to supply it less than fifty miles from its depots, while the cavalry was utterly unable, over even so short a route, to protect the trains. Briefly replying that su,ch a march was impossible, Eose crans hastened the work pf supply and reorganization, and at the earliest moment concentrated his troops at Nashville. Here speedily came Bragg with his army from the mountains, thus vindicating the judgment of Eosecrans in refusing to be drawn after him into an impracticable country. Yet, already irritated at the ignoring of his first order, and the subsequent vindication of such policy, Halleck soon fpund fresh cause of complaint. Before the first train could get through from Louisville to Nashville, over the destroyed * Bickham's Rosecrans's Campaign with the Army^f the Cumberland, p. 145. t Grant and his Campaigns, p. 131. - X Rep. Com. Con. War, series of 1865. Rosecrans's Testimony, p. 56. 328 Ohio in the War. railroad, and before it had been possiblo to accumulate five days' supplies for the army at Nashville, the Gcneral-in-Chiof again urgently demanded a forward movement; and Eosecrans having again represented its impossibility, as well as the needlessness of marching into a rohgh country to meet Bragg, when Bra™ was already coming far away from his base of supplies to meet him, General Halleck once more required the movement, "for urgent political reasons," and significantly added that " he had been requested by the President to designate a successor for General Eosecrans." * The reply to this was manly and testy, as might have been expected: "My appointment to the command having been made without any solicitation from me or my friends, if the President continues to have confidence in the propriety of the selection, ho must permit mc to uso my judgment and be responsible for the results; but if be ontertains doubts ho ought at once to appoint a commander in whom he can confide, for the good of the service and of the country." f This seemed to be sufficient, and Eosecrans was molested no furthei. He bent every energy toward hurrying forward supplies, kept his cavalry vigor ously at work, handling them so skillfully that they were generally successful, and soon became animated with the prestige of victory; skirmished all along his lino of outposts with the enemy. Bragg having persisted in robbing pris oners of their overcoats and blankets, and having on one or two occasions taken unwarrantable advantage of flags of truce, Eosecrans, after energetic remonstrances, finally notified him that — "I shall not, therefore, be able to hold any further official intercourse with you. Indeed, you render it impracticable, because I can not trust your messengers, or the statements made by them of occurrences patent as the sun. No flag will, therefore, be received from you excepting one conveying reparation for your outrages." J Within less than a month after the re-opening of the railroad between Lou isville and Nashville, a sufficient store of supplies had been accumulated at the latter place to warrant the undertaking'of an offensive campaign, with it as the immediate base. Meantime the enemy had been skillfully led to believe that the army would be able to accomplish nothing during the winter; and resting secure in this belief, he had sent away a large force to operate in Kentucky, and another of cavalry to harass Grant in West Tennessee. Now, therefore, had come the fitting moment for the attack. It was two months, lacking one day, since Eosecrans had assumed command of the army. He had found it so weak ened that, as shown by the rolls in the office of the Adjutant-General, thero were absent thirty-two thousand nine hundred and sixty-six men, whom the Government and the country supposed to be in the ranks. || Even now he was only able to muster an effective offensive force of forty-six thousand nine hnn- dred and ten men of all arms. On the 26th December, 1862, the advance upon Mnrfreesboro', where Bragg sRep. Com. Con. War, series of 1865, Vol. III. Rosecrans's Testimony, p. 25. t Ibid. X Rosecrans's Campaign with the Army of the Cumberland, by W. D. Bickham, p. 105. I Of whom six thousand four hundred and eighty-four were desei-ters, through the demorali zation consequent upon Buell's retreat. William S. Rosecrans. 329 had thrown up slight intrenchments and gone into wintor-quai'tors, began. Already men not unskilled in war, and not wishing defeat to the National army, were predicting it. For Eosecrans, with the lamentable ignorance of human nature whieh we havo before had occasion to notice, had confided the command of the two wings of his army to two soldiers scarcely equal to the command of divisions.* Moving his troops in three columns, and handling them skillfully, the General was soon ablo to develop the Eebel positions. Hardee he found holding the enemy's left, in intrenchments west of Murfreesboro' and north of Stone Eiver. Bragg himself was in the town with Polk, and the right was held by Breckinridge, who lay behind Stone Eiver, and not far from the most avail able fords. Their outposts contested the advance stubbornly, and on the 29th there was sharp skirmishing all along tho line, but particularly on Hardee's front. That evening, however, found the lino well up, and its left in sight of Murfreesboro'. At nine o'clock the corps commanders assembled, and tho General explained to them his plan for the ensuing day. McCook, on his right, (opjjosito Hardee) was to hold the enemy; ThOmas, in the center, was to push straight to the river; while Crittenden, on the left, crossing the river at the fords, was to take Breckin ridge in flank and rear, when Thomas, now up to the river, was to assail him at the same time in front. With this preponderance of force there could be no doubt of Breckinridge's defeat. Then the left and center, (Crittenden and Thomas), sweeping through Murfreesboro', were to fall upon the rear of Hardee and whatever forces might be united with him against McCook. Manifestly this plan pivoted on one single point: Could McCook hold the right while center and left were thus hurled upon tho enemy's rear? The General asked him: "You know the ground — you have fought over its difficulties. Can you hold your present position for three hours?" "Yes; I think I can." Thereupon ho was admonished that his present formation ofhis line was faulty; that his extreme right was too much in the air, and therefore in imminent danger of being turned. Great fires were to be built along three or four times the extent of his line, to lead the enemy to the belief that he was ma.ssing troops there. And so the corps comnianders rode back to their places. f Early next morning Crittenden began his movement against the enemy's flank and rear. But, away off to the right, the enemy had been quicker, and before Crittenden's men had moved to the fords, already the mass of the Eebel army was advancing in columns of assault upon McCook. That officer had failed to correct the faulty formation of his line — indeed, considered that "a better disposition of his troops, under the circumstances, could not be made." J ¦The result was inevitable. * Excepting when under the eye of .a superior officer, who could do their thinking for them. t Rosecrans's Official Report Stone River, Gov't. Edition. In opposition to all this, however, Shank's "Personal Recollections of Distinguished Generals," (Harper & Bros., 1866, pp. 148, 149), says: "The official reports tell very elaborately of a grand plan, but that plan was arranged after the battle was finished. The soldiers fought the battle on our part, not the Gen eral commanding." No evidence, however, is given for so grave a statement. X McCook's Official Report of action of right wing in battle of Stone River. 330 Ohio in the War. Presently a tide of fugitives began to sweep back out of the cedars on tho right. " McCook's corps was beaten ; " "Sill was killed;" "two batteries were captured;" "the Eebel cavalry was charging the rear." Close upon their track came a staff-officer from McCook, confirming the evil news, but giving no par ticulars. " Tell General McCook to contest every inch of the ground," exclaimed Eosecrans; "if he holds them it will all work right." But he did not hold them. The tide of disaster swept on ; it was soon seen that McCook's corps was coming back bodily ; that the battlo was spreading to the center. And yet the attack had lasted less than an hour.; it was scarcely half an hour since Crittenden's advance had begun to cross the river for the movement in flank and rear. McCook was not checking the enemy " three hours," nor one, nor a moment. The instant of attack had been the instant when his ill-formed line began to crumble. It was now, therefore, fallen upon the General commanding to decide at once whether to abandon- the attack on the left, and narrow his efforts to a struggle for the safety of his own army, or whether he could still trust this routed corps, of which parts might retain their solidity, till he could attack the enemy's rear, according to the original plan. The last course was already perilous in the extreme ; half an hour later it was impossible. Yet it must have been with a pang that the General sent orders withdrawing Crittenden's advance, and forwarding re-enforcements instead into the cedar brakes on the right. Thenceforward it was technically a defensive battle. " The history ofthe combat in those dark cedars will never be known. No man could see even the whole of his own regiment, and no one will ever be able to tell who they were that fought bravest, or they who proved recreant to their trust. It was left to Sheridan to stay the successful onset of the foe. Never did a man labor more faithfully than he to perform his task, and never was leader seconded by more gallant soldiers. . His division formed a pivot on which the broken right wing turned in its flight, and its perilous condition can easily be imagined, when the flight of Davis's division left it without any protection from the triumphant enemy, who now swarmed upon its front and right flank; but it fought until one-fourth its number lay upon the field, and till all ita brigade commanders were gone."* As Sheridan came out of the cedars, with his riddled but still compact division, he rode up to Eosecrans, pointing to his men : " Here is all that is left of us, General. Our cartridge-boxes are empty, and so are our guns." Meantime Eosecrans had been busy re-forming the line, grouping batteries on the crest of the knoll near the turnpike, once or twice heading charges to repel advancing Eebel columns. With the lines re-formed, the rest of the battle was simple. By eleven o'clock the rout of McCook's corps was over, the new formation was complete, and a lull had come. Then followed assault after assault, mainly upon the left. All were handsomely repulsed ; and in all the •From the admirable account of the battle furnished by Mr. W. S. Furay to the Cincinnati Gazette. William S. Rosecrans. 331 William S. Rosecrans. 333 presenco of Eosecrans himself was tho inspiring feature. Garesche's head was blown from his body as he galloped by the side of the General* in one of these movements. Eiehmond and Porter, of the staff, were shot. Kirby was shot. Two or three orderlies were shot; and nearly a dozen ofthe staff lost their horses. To every remonstrance about this personal exposure, the General only replied: "This battle must be won." When Garesche fell, his most intimate and trusted friend, the General made no sign. But, a moment later, he thun dered up to a regiment and ordered it to charge. So, with unretrieved disaster in the morning, and with handsome defense through the afternoon, the day ebbed out with the ebbing fire. Twenty-eight pieces of artillery had been lost; seven thousand men lay dead and wounded on the field. The General galloped back and selected ground, a few miles in tho rear, to which, in case of necessity, the retreat could be conducted; then ' returned to his corps commanders, and, with few orders, simply said : " Gentle men, we fight it out here." The rear was swarming with the enemy's cavalry ; communication with Nashville was nearly or quite cut off; in front lay an army that had already driven ono wing in confusion, broken up the whole plan of battle, and thrown the attacking column into an attitude purely defensive. But, " Gentlemen, we fight it 'out here." " Most men in that army were whipped," it was afterward well said, "excepting the General who com manded it." The next day passed quietly, till, in the afternoon, the enemy made one or two partial demonstrations, which were easily repulsed. , It began to be seen that, in spite of his seeming success, Bragg had been severely punished. The next forenoon likewise passed inactively; but in the afternoon tho enemy con centrated his strength for a final effort. Eosecrans, finding his position appar ently secure, had extended his left across Stone Eiver, at the point where he had originally intended that his main attack on the enemy's flank and rear should begin. On this isolated forcef tho enemy now poured down, driving it in hot haste back across the river again, and crossing himself in pursuit. But here he came under the fire of a great collection of batteries skillfully placed on the north bank. The slaughter was terrible ; and, as a couple of brigades advanced upon him, the enemy in turn fled in confusion. His loss in less than forty minutes was two thousand men. Excepting Malvern Hill, it was, per haps, the handsomest artillery fight of the war. This was the last sullen effort of the. enemy, and ended the battle of Stone Eiver. Next day, under cover of heavy rains, and a vigorous maintenance of skirmishing on the front, Bragg was in full retreat. No pursuit was attempted. The battlo thus inauspiciously begun and happily ended, electrified the Nation. At the capital, men waited, day by day, during the continuance of the fighting, for dispatches from Eosecrans, as if he held in his hands the fate of the Government. General Halleck, lately so dissatisfied, and about, "at the President's request," to name General Eosecrans's successor, could scarcely say * To whom he was Chief of Staff. . t Van Cleve's division. 334 Ohio in the War. too much. " The victory was well earned, and one of the most brilliant of tho war. You and your brave army have won the gratitude of your countiy and the admiration of the world. The field of Murfreesboro' is mado historical, and future ^fenerations will point out the place where so many heroes fell gloriously in defense of the Constitution and the Union. All honor to the Army of tho Cumberland ! Thanks to the living, and tears for the lamented dead ! " Scarcely less enthusiastic was the President : " God bless you, and all with you ! Please tender to all, and accept for yourself, the Nation's gratitude for your and theic skill, endurance, and dauntless courage." The Country re-echoed the words. Admiring journals dwelt upon the details of the General's personal movements through the battle. . Men compared him to that Marshal of France to whom, when Napoleon had said: "I. give you sixty thousand soldiers," and he had replied: "Sire, Your Majesty mistakes ; I have but forty thousand," the great Master of War rejoined : " No, sir, I do not mistake ; I count you for twenty thousand." Yet now, on a calm review of all the facts, it must be confessed that tho battle is open to criticisms. It was a fatal mistake to intrust a forlorn hope (such as Eosecrans proposed to make the right while he pushed the left and center upon the enemy's flank and rear) to an' officer like McCook. Most of all was it a mistake to do this in an army which then numbered among its Gen erals, George H. Thomas and Philip H. Sheridan. The man that could do this was hopelessly ignorant of human nature ; hopelessly deficient in that foremost quality of a General which teaches how to select the right men for the right places. Had the original plan not been ruined at the outset by this blunder, it would have been exposed to similar danger further on, from its counterpart, for Crittenden, though abler than McCook, was still unfit for such responsible positions. Furthermore, in a case like this, where everything depended upon this right wing, while he was convinced that its position was faulty, and knew that the enemy was massed upon it, the General commanding was not absolved from responsibility by a simple statement that, as his corps General* "knew tho ground best, he must leave it to his judgment." f But when the diaster had enveloped half the army, and from that time to the end, Eosecrans was magnificent. Eising superior to the disaster that, in a moment, had annihilated his carefully -prepared plans, he grasped in his single hands the fortunes of the day. He stemmed the tide of retreat, hurried brig ades and divisions to the points of danger, massed the artillery, handled bis troops as Morphy might his chess-men, infused into them his own dauntless spirit, and out of defeat itself fashioned the weapons of victory. As at Eich Mountain, Iuka, Corinth, it was his personal presence that magnetized his plans into success. •Throughout the above, the Generals of the center and wings have, for the sake of conve nience been designated as corps Generals, though in reality they held no such rank. Eosecrans himself was, as yet, only a corps General, and his army was known at the War Department a" the Fourteenth Corps. t Rosecrans's own explanation in his official report. William S. Rosecrans. 335 Of his forty-six thousand mon, Eosecrans lost fifteen hundred and thirty- throe killed, and seven thousand two hundred and forty-five wounded, besides nearly three thousand prisoners. In other words, his killed and wounded alone constituted one-fifth of his entire command. He took prisoners from one hun dred and thirty-two regiments of Eebel infantry. On this basis he estimated the strength of his antagonist at sixty -two thousand five hundred and twenty, which was unquestionably an exaggeration. Bragg, in his official repOrt, said he had but thirty-five thousand men in the field when the battle commenced. Out of these he admits a loss of nine thousand killed and wounded and one thousand prisoners;, but he consoled himself and the Eebel Government by estimating Eosecrans's loss at twenty -four thousand killed and wounded. And now there followed the most unfortunate six months of Eosecrans's career. He kept up a series of skirmishes and affairs of more or less import ance with isolated bodies of the enemy ; sent General Carter on a raid into East Tennessee; resisted raids upon his communications by Forrest and Morgan; sent Jeff. C. Davis and Sherida'n on movements to the southward against small Eebel forces; engaged Morgan, Van Dorn, and others, at points near Murfrees boro' ; dispatched Colonel Straight, with eighteen hundred cavalry to the rear of Bragg's army; to cut the Eebel railroad communications and destroy their depots of supplies. Most of these movements were successes; the last, by unskillfulness, resulted in the capture of the entire command. But these were trifling matters. General Eosecrans had a great army, which had won a great victory. He was expected to improve it. The winter was given him to recruit and reorganize. With spring came an impatience for his advance, which every delay intensified, till at last the dissatisfaction of the Government culminated in such orders as it never in any other case brought itself to address to a General to whose hands it still intrusted an army. From 4th January to 23d June, 1863, the army lay at Murfreesboro'. In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, General Eose crans explains this delay by the weakness of his cavalry force, the scarcity of forage, the nature of the roads, and the policy of holding Bragg on his front rather than driving him out of Tennessee, only that he might unite with Jos. B. Johnston and fall upon Grant, who was still ineffectually struggling before Vicksburg. In his sketch of his military career, officially furnished to the War Department * he says : " The detachment of General Burnside's troops to Vicks burg, the uncertainty of the issue of our operations there, and the necessity of 'nursing' — so to speak — General Bragg on my front, to keep him from retiring behind the mountain and the Tennessee, whence he could and would have been obliged to send heavy fe-enforcements to Johnston, delayed the advance of my army until the 23d of June, when, the circumstances at Vicksburg . and the arrival of all our cavalry horses warranting it, we began the campaign." And in his correspondence with the General-in-Chief, he said that to fight in •Manuscript on file in rolls of Adjutant-GeneraVs office at Washington. 336 Ohio in the War. Tennessee while Grant was about fighting at Vicksburg, would violate one of the fundamental maxims of war, the proper application of which -would "for bid this Nation from engaging all its forces in the great West at the same timo, so as to leave it without a single reserve to 6tem tho current of possible disaster."* Some of these considerations are of undoubted weight; but on the whole they wall hardly seem now to havo afforded sufficient cause for the delay. In point of fact, Bragg profited by it to detach a considerable portion ofhis troops to the Eebel lines of the South-West, the very result which Eosecrans imagined himself to be hindering.f There are no traces of complaint from Grant him self on the subject, but his friends were not silent; and there is some reason to think that their importunity served still further to exasperate the already dis satisfied feelings of the General-in-Chief. Presently there sprang up an extraordinary state of affairs between that officii- and General Eosecrans. The latter asked for cavalry. General Halleck replied as if ho thought it a complaint. Eosecrans telegraphed the Secretary of War. In reply came fresh hints from Halleck about tho tendency of his subordinate to complain ofhis means instead of using them. Eosecrans begged for revolving rifles, adding almost piteously: "Don't be weary at my impor tunity. No economy can compare with that of furnishing revolving arms ; no mode of recruiting will so promptly and efficaciously strengthen us.I" But the Prussian war not yet having been fought, the practical Goneral-in-Chief con sidered such applications the extravagant whims of a dreaming theorist. The dispatches for " cavalry," " cavalry," "cavalry," continued. On 20th March General Eosecrans said : " Duty compels me to recall the attention ofthe War Department to the necessity of more cavalry here. Let it be clearly under stood that the enemy have five to our one, and can, therefore, command the resources of the country and the services of the inhabitants." Ou 29th March again: "General Eousseau would undertake to raise eight or ten thousand mounted infantry. I think the time very propitious." On 24th April, still the same: " Cavalry horses are indispensable to our success here. This has been stated and reiterated to tho Department; but horses have not been obtained." Again, on 10th May, in reply to a letter of General Halleck, proving to him that he had cavalry enough : " Wc have at no time been able to turn out moro than five thousand for actual duty. I am not mistaken in saying that this great army would gain more from ten thousand effective cavalry than from twenty thousand infantry." On 26th July: "I have sent General Eousseau to Wash ington, directed to lay before you his plan for obtaining from the disciplined troops recently mustered out in the East, such a mounted force as would enable us to command the country south of us." || This last application ended the list. General Eousseau returned, telling Eosecrans that he " was satisfied his official destruction was but a question of time and opportunity ; the will to accomplish * Rf p. Com. Con. War, series 1865, Vol. HI, Rosecrans's Campaigns, p. 41. t Pollard's Southern History, Vol. Ill, p. 114. t Rep. Com. Con. War, ubi supra, p. 38. H Ibid., pp. 37, 38, 39, 40, and 41. William S. Rosecrans. 337 it existed, and there was no use to hope for any assistance from the War De partment." The Secretary of War had "even gone so far as to say that he would be damned if he would give Eosecrans another man."* For, meantime, the high spirit and utter lack -of caution in personal mat ters which so distinguished General Eosecrans had led to two other breaches with the Department. Either of them would have served to make his position as a successful General, vigorously prosecuting a triumphant campaign, suf ficiently unpleasant. As a delaying General, furnishing excuses for not under taking the campaign on which the Government, with all its power, was urging him, they were enough to work his ruin. Yet who can check a thrill of honest pride as he reads that an Ohio General, in such a plight, had still sturdy man hood enough left to send a dispatch like this to the all-powerful General-in- Chief: " Murfreesboro', 6th Mafrch, 1863. ".General: Yours ofthe 1st instant, announcing the offer of a vacant Major- Generalship in the regular army to the General in the field "\frho first wins an important and decisive victory, is at hand. As an officer and a citizen I feel degraded at such an auctioneering of honors. Have we a General who would fight for his own personal benefit when he would not for honor and his country ? He would come by his commission basely in that case, and deserve to be despised by men of honor. But are all the brave and honorable Generals on an equality as to chances ? If not, it is unjust to those who probably deserve most. " W. S. Eosecrans, Major-General. " To Major-General H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief." Under the merited sting of this incautious but unanswerable rebuke, Gen eral Halleck renewed his complaints, found fault with Eosecrans's reports, and his failures to report, and even criticised the expenses of his telegraphing ! At last Eosecrans, chafing under one of these dispatches, with absolutely character istic lack of prudence, was stung into saying : " That I am very careful to inform the Department of my successes, and of all captures from the enemy, is not true, as the records of our office will show ; that I have failed to inform the Government of my defeats and losses is equally untrue, both in letter and in spirit. I regard the statement of these two propositions of the War Department as a profound, grievous, cruel, and ungenerous official and personal wrong." Was it wonderful now— human nature being, after all, only human nature — that Eosecrans's " official destruction was but a question of time and oppor tunity?" At last,")" thirteen days after everyone of his corps and division Generals had in writing expressed his opposition to an effort to advance, General Eose crans began his movement. Bragg lay heavily intrenched at Tullahoma, with advance positions at Shelbyville and Wartrace. By a series of combined move ments which even General Halleck was forced officially to pronounce "admira ble," \ Bragg's attention was completely taken up by Gordon Granger's dashing * Rep. Com. Con; War, ubi supra. 1 24th June, 1863. X Halleck's Official Report. Report Sec. War, First Sess. Thirty-Eighth Congress. Vol. I.— 22. 338 Ohio in the War. advance on Shelby ville, while the bulk of the army, hastily moving far to tho enemy's right, seized the mountain gaps which covered his flank. Bragg per ceived, too late, the extent of his loss, and made baste to expedite his retreat. Eosecrans pushed forward for a similar flanking movement on Tullahoma, but Bragg, foreseeing that Eosecrans's success would cut off his hope of retreat, made haste to get out of Tullahoma while he could, and precipitately retired behind the Tennessee Eiver. Success had again justified General Eosecrans; but, brilliant as were these operations, they lacked the element of bloodshed which goes so far toward fixing the popular standard of appreciation. The very day on which he had begun the campaign had unfortunately proved the beginning of an unprecedented rain-storm which lasted for seventeen successive days. Through this the cam paign was carried on; but for the delays whieh it compelled, Tullahoma would have been turned so speedily that Bragg would have found himself forced to battle on disadvantageous ground, and the history of the war in the South^West might have been changed. As it was, Eosecrans was fully warranted in his proud summing up: "Thus ended a nine days' campaign which drove the enemy from two fortified positions, and gave us possession of Middle Tennessee, conducted in one of the most extraordinary rains ever known in Tennessee at that period of the year, over a soil that became almost a quicksand. These results were far more successful than was anticipated, and could only have been obtained by a surprise as to the direction and force of our movements."* Eis total loss was five hundred and sixty. He took sixteen hundred and thirty -four prisoners, six pieces of artillery, and large quantities of stores. General Eosecrans at once set about repairing the railroads in his rear, and hurrying forward supplies. By 25th of July the first supply train was pushed through to the Tennessee Eiver. But already "the General-in-Chief began to manifest great impatience at the delay in the movement forward to Chatta nooga." So Eosecrans mildly states it. The nature of these manifestations may be inferred from the correspondence. On 3d July General Halleck tele graphed positive orders to advance at once, and report daily the movement of each corps until the Tennessee Eiver was crossed ! Eosecrans, in astonishment, replied that he was trying to prepare for crossing, and inquired if this order was intended to take away his discretion as to the time and manner of moving his troops. Halleck's response was such as was never given under similar cir cumstances to any other General during the war: "The orders for the advance of your army, and that its progress be reported daily, are peremptory ! " The War Department has not favored us with General Eosecrans's reply to this extra ordinary order, but we are not without the means for determining its nature. He stated his plans,f showed the necessity of deceiving the enemy as to the intended point for crossing the Tennessee, insisted on not moving till he was ready, and requested that, in the event of the disapproval of these, views, he * Rosecrans's Official Report Tullahoma Campaign. t Rosecrans's MS. Sketch "of his Military Career, furnished under orders of War Depart- mBnt, in files of the Adjutant-General's office. William S. Rosecrans. 339 should be relieved from the command of the army! This seems to have freed him from further molestation; but it needed no prophetic sagacity now to see that only "time and opportunity" were waited for at the War Department. It was on 5th August that General Halleck telegraphed his peremptory orders to move, and received in reply the tender of the command. General Eosecrans quietly waited till the dispositions along his extended line were com pleted, till stores were accumulated, and the corn had ripened so that h.is horses could be made to live off the country. On the 15th he was ready. The problem now before General Eosecrans was to cross the Tennessee Eiver and gain possession of Chattanooga, the key to the entire mountain ranges of Eastern Tennessee and Northern Georgia, in the face of an enemy of equal strength, whose business it was to Oppose him. Two courses were open. Forc ing a passage over the river above Chattanooga, he might have essayed a direct attack upon the town. If not repulsed in the dangerous preliminary move ments, he would still have had upon his hands a' siege not less formidable than that of Vicksburg, with difficulties incomparably greater in supplying his army. But, if this plan was not adopted, it then behooved him to convince the enemy that he had adopted it; while, crossing below, he hastened southward over the ruggedest roads, to seize the mountain gaps whence he could debouch upon the enemy's" line of supplies. More briefly, he could either attempt to fight the enemy out of Chattanooga, or to flank him out. He chose the latter. By the 28th the singular activity of the National forces along a front of a. hundred and fifty miles had blinded and bewildered Bragg as to his antago nist's actual intentions. Four brigades" suddenly began demonstrating furiously against his lines above Chattanooga, and the plan was thought to be revealed! Eosecrans must be about attempting to force a passage there, and straightway began a concentration to oppose him. Meantime, bridges having been secretly prepared were hastily thrown across, thirty miles further down the river at different points, and before Bragg bad finished preparing to resist a crossing above, Eosecrans, handling with rare skill his various corps and divisions, had securely planted his army south of the Tennessee, and, cutting completely loose from his base of supplies, was already pushing southward, his flank next the enemy being admirably protected by impassable mountains. For Bragg, but one thing was left. As he had been forced out of Shelby- ville, out of Wartrace, out of Tullahoma, precisely so had the same stress been placed. upon him by the same hand in his still stronger position; and in all haste he evacuated Chattanooga, leaving it to the nearest corps of Eosecrans's army to march quietly in and take possession. The very ease of this occupa tion was to prove its strongest element of clanger. For men, seeing the objective point of the campaign in our hands, forgot the columns toiling thrQugh moun tains away to the southward, whose presence there alone compelled the Eebel evacuation. But for- them the isolated troops at Chattanooga would have been overwhelmed. Thenceforward there was need of still greater Generalship to reunite the scattered corps. They could not return by the way they had gone, for the moment they began such a movement Bragg, holding the shorter 340 Ohio in the War. line, and already re-enforced by Longstreet's veteran corps of the Army of Northern Virginia, could sweep back over the route of his late retreat. Plainly they must pass through the gaps, and place themselves between Bragg and Chattanooga, before the stronghold — beyond a mere tentative possession — could be within our grasp. And so it came about that a battle — the bloody one of Chickamauga — was fought to enable our army to concentrate in the position which one of its corps had already occupied for days without firing a shot. Unfortunately the concentration was not speedy enough. Indeed, there are i-ome plausible reasons for believing that Eosecrans was for a few days deceived by his easy success into a belief that Bragg was still in full retreat. Certainly the General-in-Chief and the War Department did all they could to encourage such an idea; and even after Eosecrans, (every nerve tense with the struggle to concentrate his corps), was striving to prepare for the onset of the re-enforced Eebel army, General Halleck informed him of reports that Bragg's army was re-enforcing Lee, and pleasantly added that, after he had occupied Daiton it would be decided whether he should move still further'southward! But now Bragg had gathered in every available re-enforcement; Longstreet from the East, Buckner from Knoxville, Walker from the army of Jos. E. John ston, militia from Georgia,* and, waiting near Lafayette, hoped to receive the isolated corps of Eosecrans's army as they debouched through the gaps, aDd annihilate them in detail. For a day or two it looked as if he would be suc cessful ; Eebel critics insist that he might have been, and he himself seems dis posed to blame his subordinates. One way or another, however, he failed. Eosecrans gathered together his army, repelling whatever assaults sought to hinder the concentration, yielding part of the line of the Chickamauga, and marching one of the corps all through the night before the battle. On 19th September Bragg made his onset — with certainly not less than seventy thou sand men. Eosecrans had fifty-five thousand. Bragg's plan was to turn his antagonist's left, and thus clear the way into Chattanooga. But, most fortunately, the left was held by George H. Thomas. Shortly after the attack began, Eosecrans, divining the danger, strengthened Thomas's corps with one or two divisions. Disaster overtook us at first, artil lery was lost, and .ground yielded, but Thomas re-formed and advanced his lines, regained all that had been lost, sustained every shock of the enemy, and at night held Lis positions firmly. Meanwhile the contest on other parls of our line had been less severe, and had ended decidedly to our advantage. But it was seen that we were outnumbered, and as they came to think how every brigade in the whole army, two only excepted, had been drawn into the fight, the soldiers began to realize the dispiriting nature of the situation. Through the night the last of Longstreet's corps came up, led by himself, and Bragg prepared for a more vigorous onset on the National left. Eosecrans trans ferred another division (Negley's) to Thomas, and placed two more in reserve, to be hurried to Thomas's aid if needed. At daybreakf he galloped along the * Raising Rragg's force, according to Rosecrans's estimate, to ninety-two thousand men. t 20th September. 1863. William S. Rosecrans. 341 CHICKAMAUCA AND CHATTANOOGA. William S. Rosecrans. 343 front, to find McCook's line, as usual, ill-formed, and also to learn that Negley had not yet been forwarded to Thomas. The errors were corrected as well as possible; but long before Thomas's needed re-enforcements had come, the battle was raging on his front and flank. Profoundly conscious of the danger, Eosecrans sought to render still further aid, and ordered over Van Cleve's division from the right, directing the several division commanders and the^corps General to close up the line on the left. In the heat of the battle, which by this time was broken out along the right also, one of these division commanders* misunderstood his orders; and, though he has subsequently stated that he knew the consequences of his action must be fatal, he chose to consider himself bound by the order to break the line pf battle and march to the rear of another division. Longstreet per ceived the gap and hurled Hood into it. The battle on the right was lost. The whole wing crumbled; the enemy poured forward, and all that was left of McCook's corps, a broken rabble, streamed back to Chattanooga. General Eosecrans himself was caught in this rout and borne along, vainly striving to stem its tide. Finally, conceiving that if the wing least pressed was thus destroyed, Thomas, upon whom he knew the main efforts of the enemy were concentrated, could not hold out beyond nightfall, he hastened to Chatta nooga to make dispositions for the retreat and defense, which he already regarded as inevitable. Meantime his chief of staff, General Garfield, was sent to Thomas to convey to him information of what had happened and of the plans for the future. This ended Eosecrans's connection with the battle of Chickamauga. The troops under Thomas stood their ground superbly, and their defense saved the routed right from destruction. When they fell back, Eosecrans had perfected his dispositions at Chattanooga, and Bragg found that, beyond possession of the battle field, his victory had gained him nothing. He confessed to a loss of two-fifths of his army ! Eosecrans's loss in killed and wounded was ten thousand nine hundred and six, somewhat less than that of Bragg, though his loss in prisoners was greater. The battle of Chickamauga was the "opportunity" for which, according to Eousseau, the War Department had been waiting, and Eosecrans was removed from the comm1 and as soon thereafter as circumstances permitted. The Country seemed to acquiesce in this displacement of a popular favorite. Journals in the interest of the War Department circulated atrocious calumnies concerning him, whieh for a time found ready believers. He was a drunkard. He was a con firmed opium-eater. He had been on the point of surrendering his army at Chattanooga. He was worse "stampeded" during the battle than the worst of his troops. He was not under fire, or near enough the battle to have any intel ligible idea about it. Even the Secretary of War so far forgot himself, and out raged all decency, as to speak of the hero of Iuka, Corinth, and Stone Eiver, as a coward ! In short, " The painful warrior, famoused for fight, After a thousand victories, once foiled, Is from the books of honor razed quite, And all the rest forgot for which he toiled."t • Thomas J. Wood of Kentucky. t Shakspeare's Sonnets, XXV. 344 Ohio in the War. Impartial criticism can not indeed wholly acquit General Eosecrans of blame for Chickamauga. The idle clamor of the War Department about his fighting the battle at all, when he had possession of Chattanooga without it, may be passed by as the talk of those who know nothing of what they discuss. But it is not so clear that it was impossible to concentrate the army one or two days earlier in time to assume strong defensive positions. With a competent commander for his right wing — and after Stone Eiver it was criminal to retain McCook — his orders for re-enfQrcing Thomas on the night of the 19th might have been executed before ten o'clock of the 20th, and the dangerous closing up on the left under fire, in the midst of which the disaster occurred, might have been avoided. The fatal order to Wood might have been more explicitly worded. It was curious wrong- headedness to misconstrue it, but there was left the possibility of misconstruction. And finally, the man who saved Stone Eiver might have done something to check the retreat of the broken right, and rally it on new positions for freBh defense, but for the error of judgment which led to the conclusion that all was lost because one wing was sacrificed. It is not always given to men to come up to their highest capacities. At Corinth and at Stone Eiver Eosecrans had risen superior to disasters, that, as it seemed, must overwhelm him. It must he regretfully set down that at Chickamauga he did not. Yet, what a good General in the midst of sore difficulties might do, he did. He saved the army, gained the objective point of his campaign, and held the gates through which it was fated that other leaders should conduct the swelling hosts that were soon to debouch upon Georgia and the vitals of the Confederacy^ When the order relieving him came, he never uttered a murmur. Turning over the command to his most trusted and loved General,* he dictated a touching and manly farewell; and, before his army knew that it was to lose him, he was on his way, under orders, to his home in Cincinnati. It was just a year since he had assumed command of the Department. For tbe next three months General Eosecrans remained quietly in Cincin nati; serving as President ofthe great Sanitary Fair, and in every way striving to cast his influence on the side of the soldiers and of the Government. The value of this influence, particularly among the Eoman Catholic voters of Cincin nati, was incalculable. The people of his native State had never sympathized in the hue and cry raised against him, because after so many victories he had lost a battle; and the public journals continued to demand his restoration to command, with such persistency that he was finallyf ordered to relieve General Schofield in command ofthe Department of Missouri. He found that State harassed by the worst evils of civil war. The militia in the north-western counties, though nominally raised to preserve order in the community, was more than suspected of active sympathy with the rebellion. Murders and robberies were of constant occurrence; no man knew whether to * George H. Thomas, between whom and Rosecrans the relations were always of the most cordial and confidential nature. t 28th January, 1864. William S. Rosecrans. 345 trust his neighbor, and the whole country was in confusion; while, to add to the general alarm, the secessionists were all confident that Price would speedily invade the State. His attention being attracted to the large shipments of arms into North-Western Missouri", General Eosecrans began, through his secret ser vice, to explore the machinations ofthe secessionists, and was speedily convinced that they were well organized in a secret "Order of American Knights," which promised to be dangerous. The matter was thoroughly investigated, a large mass of testimony was taken, going to show a design to invade Missouri, Ohio, and Pennsylvania simultaneously, and efforts were made to warn and arouse the Government. But Eosecrans was in no better favor at Washington; and Grant, with whom the old affairs at Iuka and Corinth were scarcely forgotten, was now Lieutenant-General. When Eosecrans sent a staff-officer to Washington to rep resent his need for more troops, the officer was arrested. When he sent the President word of his discoveries concerning the secret society, and asked leave to send on an officer to explain them, he was told to write out and send by mail whatever he might have to communicate. General Grant, caused an officer to make an inspection of affairs in the department, who reported that Eosecrans already had far more troops than he needed. And so matters drifted on till, with the State stripped of nearly all troops save her own uncertain militia, the long- expected invasion came. Price entered South-Eastern Missouri, and the guerrillas, Eebel-sympa- thizing militia, and secession outlaws over the whole State suddenly broke out into more daring outrages. Securing A. J. Smith's command, which happened to be passmg Cairo at the time, prevailing upon some Illinois hundred-days' men to come over to St. Louis and help defend the city, although their time of service had expired, and concentrating his troops on his main depots, General Eosecrans strove to preserve the points of importance while he developed the strength and intentions of the enemy. Then followed a curious medley of isolated engagements, attacks, pursuits, retreats, marches, and counter-marches. Price, with a mounted command, came within striking distance of St. Louis ; then beginning to comprehend the nature of the combinations against him, speedily retired. By this time Mower and Pleasanton had come to Eosecrans's relief. There was some marching at cross-purposes in attempting to come up with Price, and one or two oppor tunities to strike him were lost, but he was severely punished at the Big Blue, at the-Marais-des-Cygnes, the Little Osage, and Newtonia, and so driven, shat tered, reduced one-half in numbers, and with the loss of nearly all his materiel, into Arkansas again. General Eosecrans estimates Price's force in this campaign at from fifteen to twenty -six thousand. He took from him ten guns; two thousand prisoners, many small arms, and most of his baggage-train. He remained himself in St. Louis, at one time the point of greatest danger, and the place from whicb, as it seemed, he could best overlook the confused and desultory struggle.* The cam- * General Grant, in his official report, censured Rosecrans's conduct of this campaign very 346 Ohio in the War. paign over, General Eosecrans hastened to forward such of his troops as were no longer needed, to re-enforce General Sherman at Atlanta. In the preservation of order at the State election which now ensued, and in his general management of the political interests of his department, Eose crans so acted as to receive the general, though qualified, approval ofthe "Rad icals," and to confirm the reputation he had early acquired in West Virginia for sagacity and fair-mindedness in civil affairs. He had been appointed to the command in Missouri in opposition to the personal hostility of the General-in-Chief, and of most of those who conducted the business of the war — a hostility largely incurred, as we have sought to show in the preceding pages, by indiscretions and hot-tempered sayings of his own. A political necessity had dictated his restoration; the necessity was thought to be over; the number of his enemies at the head of affairs was increased by the promotion of General Grant. He was relieved of his com mand, without explanation or warning, on 9th December, 1864, and so took his final leave of active service. He made no public complaints, and was more than ever scrupulous that his influence among the Eoman Catholics should hind them more firmly to the cause of the Government. At the close of the war, having been left by General Grant without assign ment to duty, he applied for a year's leave of absence, during which he visited the silver mines of Nevada, and made scientific observations as to the richness of the mineral deposits in that and our other Western Territories. At the end of his leave he tendered the resignation of his high rank in the regular army, which was promptly accepted, and he was thus left, at the age of forty-eight, to begin the world anew, and almost at the bottom of the ladder again. The officer thus ungraciously suffered to retire from the service he adorned, must forever stand one of the central figures in the histoiy of the War for the Union. He can not be placed in that small category of commanders who were always successful ; but who of our Generals can ? Few of his battles or cam paigns are entirely free from criticism, for "whoever has committed no faults has not made war." But as a strategist he stands among the foremost, if not himself the foremost, of all our Generals. In West Virginia he outmaneuvered Lee. At Corinth he beguiled Van Dorn and Price to destruction. In his Tul lahoma and Chattanooga campaigns his skillfully -combined movements devel oped the highest strategic ability, and set the model, which was afterward followed with varying success, in the famed advance on Atlanta. But responsi bility weighed upon him and made him sometimes hesitating. For, as a great writer has said, " war is so anxious and complex a business that against every vigorous movement heaps of reasons can forever be found; and if a man is so cold a lover of battle as to have no stronger guide than the poor balance of the severely, saying it showed " to how little purpose a superior force might be used," and that " there was no reason why he should not have concentrated his forces and beaten Price before the latter reached Pilot Knob.'' He forgot that this concentration would, even if possible, hare left the other portions of the State exposed to the risings to which the oath-bound Rebels of the secret societies stood pledged. William 'S. Rosecrans. 347 arguments and countor-arguments, his mind will oscillate or even revolve, making no movement straightforward." Eosecrans's mind did not revolve, but more than once it oscillated painfully back and forth, when he should have been on the verge of action. When he did move his tactical ability shone as conspicuously as his strategy. He handled troops with rare facility and judg ment under the stress of battle. More than all, there came upon him in the hour of conflict the inspiration of war, so that men were magnetized by his presence into heroes. Stone Eiver under Eosecrans, and Cedar Creek under Sheridan, are the sole examples in the war of defeats converted into victories by the re-enforcement of a single man. He was singularly nervous, but in battle this quality was generally developed in a nervous exaltation which seemed to clear his faculties and intensify his vigor. Once, perhaps,* it led to an opposite result.f * At Chickamauga. t Some personal characteristics of General Rosecrans are happily described by Mr. Bickham in the following extracts from the " Campaign with the Fourteenth Army Corps : " " Industry was one of the most valuable qualities of General Rosecrans. Labor was a con stitutional necessity with him. And he enjoyed a fine faculty for the disposition of military business — a faculty which rapidly improved with experience. He neither spared himself nor his subordinates. He insisted upon being surrounded by active rapid workers. He liked ' sandy fellows,' because they were so 'quick and sharp.' He rarely found staff-officers who could endure with him. Ambition prompted all of them to remain steadfastly with him until nature would sustain no more. Often they confessed, with some exhibition of selfish reluctance, that he was endowed with extraordinary vital force, and a persistency which defied fatigue. Those who served upon' his staff in Western Virginia or Mississippi predicted a severe future. They were not deceived. He was habitually prepared for labor in quarters at ten o'clock in the morn ing. On Sundays and Wednesdays he rose early and attended mass. He never retired before two o'clock in the morning, very often not until four, and sometimes not until broad daylight. He often mounted in the afternoons and rode out to inspect or review the troops. It was not extraordinary that his Aids sometimes dropped asleep in their chairs, while he was writing vehemently or glancing eagerly over his maps, which he studied almost incessantly. Sometimes he glanced at his ' youngsters ' compassionately, and pinching their ears or rubbing their heads paternally until he roused them, would send them to bed. * * * t » " During the few days he remained at Bowling Green, he reviewed most of the divisions which had reached that vicinity. Night labors compensated for hours thus stolen from his maps, reports, and schemes for the improvement of the army. At the reviews the satisfaction of the troops with the change of commanders was manifested by their enthusiastic reception of him. The manner of his inspections at once engendered a cordiality toward him which prom ised happy results. The soldiers were satisfied that their commander took an interest in their welfare — a moralizing agency which no capable General of volunteers can safely neglect. He examined the equipments of the men with exacting scrutiny. No trifling minutia? escaped him. Everything to which the soldier was entitled was important. A private without his canteen instantly evoked a volley' of searching inquiries. 'Where is your canteen?' 'How did you lose it ?— when?— where?' 'Why don't you get another?' To others, 'You need shoes, and you a knapsack.\. Soldiers thus addressed were apt to. reply frankly, sometimes a whole com pany laughing at the novelty of such keen inquisition. 'Can't get shoes,' said one; 'required a canteen and couldn't get it,' rejoined another. 'Why?' quoth the General. 'Go to your Cap tain and demand what you need ! Go to him every day till you get it. Bore him for it ! Bore him in his quarters ! Bore him at meal-time ! Bore him in bed ! Bore him ; bore him ; bore him ! Do n't let him rest ! ' And to Captains, ' You bore your Colonels ; let Colonels bore their Brigadiers ; Brigadiers bore their division Generals ; division commanders bore their corps com manders, and let them bore me. I'll see, then, if you do n't get what you want. Bore, bore, bore ! until you get everything you are entitled to ; ' and so on through an entire division. 348 Ohio in the War. His fatal defect as a General was his lack of knowledge of human nature. Whatever he himself did was well done. When he came to intrust work to others he had no faculty of seeing, as by intuition, whom to trust and whom to avoid. And sometimes, when repeated failures had taught him the worthless ness of trusted subordinates, his kindness of heart withheld him from the action which duty demanded. It may well be believed that thus there came upon him that excessive devotion of his own time to minute details, which was sometimes instrumental in causing delay. Added to this was that uncontrollable spirit which, ready to sacrifice everything for the Cause, would yet refuse to brook a single slight from a superior. With his inferiors he was uniformly kind and " ' That's the talk, boys,' quoth a brawny fellow. ' He'll do,' said another ; and the soldiers returned to their camp-fires and talked about ' Rosy,' just as those who knew him best in Missis sippi had talked. " The confidence which such deportment inspired was pregnant with future good. And it was soon observed that he was careful to acknowledge a private's salute — a trifling act of good breeding and military etiquette, costing nothing, but too frequently neglected by officers who have much rank and little generous sympathy with soldiers who win them glory. This is a wise ' regulation,' but it reaches far deeper than mere discipline. " Shortly after head-quarters were established at Bowling Green Major-General George H. Thomas reported himself. The military family of the commanding General quickly recognized the real Chief of Staff. It had been observed that General Rosecrans did not ' consult ' habit ually upon the principles and policy of the campaign with other commanding officers. The keen eyes of those familiar with his customs, however, discovered an unusual degree of respect and confidence exhibited toward General Thomas. Confidential interviews with him were fre quent and protracted. It soon got to be understood in the camps that ' Pap ' Thomas was chief counsellor at head-quarters, and confidence in ' Rosy ' grew apace. $ « » • * * * * « » " Riding along the highway, he was careful to observe the configuration of the country and its military characteristics, requiring the inscription upon the note-book of his topographical engineer of intersecting roads, as often as such roads rambled off into the forests along the line of march. Habitually cheerful in a remarkable degree, on such expeditions the mercury of his spirits rises into playfulness, which develops itself in merry familiar quips and jests with his subordinates, and none laugh more pleasantly than he. Fine scenery excites his poetic tempera ment, and he dwells eloquently upon the picturesqueness of nature, exhibiting at once the keenest appreciation of the ' kind mother of us all,' and the niceties of landscape art. But the grandeur of nature more frequently carries his mind into the realms of religion, when he is wont to burst into adoration of his Maker, or launch into vehement and impatient rebuke of scoffers. All of nature to him is admonition of God. Such is his abhorrence of infidelity that he would banish his best-loved officers from his military household should any presume to intrude it upon him. He is wont to say he has no security for the morality of any man who refuses to recognize the Supreme Being. Religion is his favorite theme, and Roman Catholicism to him is infallible. In his general discussions of religion he betrays surprising acquaintance with the multifarious theolcgies which have vexed the world, and condemns them all as corruptions of the true doc trines of the Mother Church. His social conversations of this character are seldom indulged with his cherished guest, Rev. Father Traeey, with whom he is always en rapport, but he is ever ready to wage controversy with any other disputant. But argument with him on his faith had as well be ended with the beginning, save for the interest with which he invests his subject, and the ingenious skill with whicb he supports it. Ambling along the highway in a day's journey, unless some single theme of business absorbs him, he will range through science, art, and litera ture with happy freedom and ability. You do not listen long before you are persuaded that you hear one who aspires ambitiously beyond the mere soldier. The originality and shrewdness of his criticisms, the comprehensiveness of his generalizations, and his erudition, assures you that you talk with no ordinary man.'' William S. Rosecrans. 349 considerate; to those above him he was always punctilious, often testy, and at times deplorably indiscreet. No such correspondence as his with General Hal leck, which in the preceding pages we have sought to trace, can be elsewhere found throughout the history of the war. While he was in command at St. Louis he arrested a Consul,* and when ordered by Secretary Stanton to release him, peremptorily refused. He afterward said that he would have been relieved rather than obey that order. This sturdy honesty, whieh led him to take upon himself the weightiest responsibilities, and incur the gravest displeasure rather than do that which, in his conviction, would prove injurious to the Cause, was at once one ofthe most striking features of his character, and one of the potent reasons for his constant embarrassments. The enemies whom he thus made dealt him their fatal blow at the unkind- est moment. Eosecrans had never been more active, more enterprising, more skillful than after Chickamauga. His plans for an advance were matured, the preliminary steps were all taken, the troops for which he had so long begged had nearly reached him. In a few days more the glory of Lookout Mountain and Mission Eidge might have been his. But the fields he had sown it was left for others to reap; from the coigne of vantage he had won it was left for others, with larger armies and the unquestioning support of the Government, to swoop down on Georgia and march to the Sea. In his enforced retirement it may be. his proudest boast that ho word or action of his — however deeply he writhed beneath his treatment — tended to injure the cause of the country; so that now, in spite of all the exceptions we have made, he must forever shine in our history as a brave, able, and devoted Soldier of the Eepublic. General Eosecrans is nearly six feet high, compact, with little waste flesh, nervous and active in all his movements, from the dictation of a dispatch to the tearing and chewing of his inseparable companion, his cigar. His brow is ample; the eyes are penetrating and restless; the face is masked with well- trimmed beard ; but the mouth, with its curious smile, half of pleasure, half of some exquisite nervous feeling, which might be intense pain, is the feature which will linger longest in the mind of a casual visitor. He is easy of access," utterly destitute of pretense, and thoroughly democratic in his ways. With his staff his manner was familiar and almost paternal ; with private soldiers always kindly. In the field he was capable of immense labor; he seemed never to grow weary, and never to need sleep. Few officers have been more popular with their commands, or have inspired more confidence in the rank and file. *'For being concerned in the Order of American Knights. • Note. — The account of the fatal order at Chickamauga, in the preceding sketch, follows General Rosecrans's own statements. The subject h^s been much disputed, and General Thomas J. Wood, the division commander in que,stion, has been permitted by the War department to file a reply to Rosecrans's official report. Since the preceding pages were stereotyped, some of Gen eral Wood's friends have complained that they do him injustice. After a careful review of the subject, I can not convince myself that the words in the text require any modification. General Wood certainly did misunderstand the order. Its language was: "The General commanding directs that you close up on Reynolds as fast as possible and support him." Now, it happened 350 Ohio in the War. i that Brannan's division lay between Wood's and Reynolds's — though Rosecrans had just been in formed that it did not, and on that information wrote. To execute the order literally was impos sible. General Wood might "support" Reynolds, but he could not "close up upon" him without crowding Brannan out of line. When the letter of an order, therefore, was impossible, would not any fair mode of interpretation require that its spirit should be looked at? And, to a division commander in that wing — knowing the peril in which Thomas was placed, and the ten dency of all the morning's effort to withdraw troops for his support and steadily close up the remaining troops on the left toward him — ought there to have been one moment's question as to the real meaning of an order to close up on somebody on the left? Here the case might rest ; but the indiscretion of General Wood's friends in their discussion of a matter for which they ought to seek a speedy forgetfulness, warrants a further step. Even if literal execution of the order had been possible, obedience to it approached crimi nality. It is a well-settled principle of military law that a subordinate has the right to disobey an order manifestly given under a misapprehension of facts, and sure to be disastrous in its con sequences. To do so involves a grave responsibility, and (should an error of judgment be made in the matter) a grave personal risk. But there is another and graver responsibility — the ruin of an army, the loss of a cause. Between these responsibilities, on that fateful morning, Gen eral Wood made his choice. Whatever may be his present feelings about it, he may be sure that his children, thirty years hence, will not point with pride to the fact that, in such a case, their father chose the risk for the army rather than the risk for himself. I append extracts giving the pith of the various official statements of the case. , General Halleck's annual report, in reciting the facts, says: *' when, according to General Rosecrans's order, General Wood, overlooking the order to close up on Beynolds, supposed he was to support him by withdrawing from the front and passing in the rear of General BraoQan." General Rosecrans's report says: " A message from General Thom.-vs soon followed that he was heavily pressed. Captain Kellogg, A. D. 0„ the bearer, informing me at the same timo that General Brannan was out of line, and General Reynolds's right was exposed. Orders were dispatched to General Wood to close up on Beynolds, and word was sent to General Thomas that he ehonld be supported, even if it should take the whole corps of Crittenden and McCook. . . . General Wood, over looking the direction to ' close up' on General Reynolds, supposed he was to support him by withdrawing from the line and passing to the rear of Geueral Brannan, who, it appears, was not ont of line, but was in echelon, and slightly in rear of Keynolds's right. By this unfortunate mistake a gap was opened in the line of battle, of which the enemy took instant advantage." General Wood's '" note," filed with Rosecrans's official report, says : "A few minutes, perhaps five, before eleven o'clock, A. M., on the 20th, I received the following order : '* * Head-Quarters, D.C, September 30—10:45. "'Brigadier-General Wood, Commanding Division, etc..- " * The General commanding directs that you close up on Reynolds as fast as possible, and support him. " ' Respectfully, etc., FRANK J. BOSD, Major and A. D. 0.' " This order was addressed as follows : " ' 10:45 A. M. Gallop. Brigadier-General WOOD, Commanding Division." " At the time it was received there was a division (Brannan's) in line between my division and General Reynolds'*. I was immediately in rear of the center of my division at the time. I immediately dispatched my staff officers to tbe brigade commanders, directing them to move by the left, crossing in the rear of General Brannan's division to closo op and support General Reynolds ; and as the order was peremptory', I directed the movement to be made on the dooble- ' quick. It was commenced immediately. " As there was a division between General Reynolds's and mine, it was absolutely physically impossible for me to obey the order by any other movement than the one I made." To this it may be added that General Rosecrans afterward said substantially that he had once found General Wood giving a liberal interpretation to an order, when literal obedience would have been better ; and now a strained literal obedience, when he must have seen that it would be disastrous. The order in question was the only one from head-quarters through the battle not written by General Garfield, the Chief of Staff. I have preferred, also, to let the figures stand as given in the text, setting forth the numbers of the opposing armies at Chickamauga. In justice to Rosecrans, however, I should add that his Chief of Staff says there were not over forty-two thousand five hundred men on our side in the fight. And finally, minute verbal criticism may object to the sentence which speaks of the whole right wing as crumbling, inasmuch as one division did splendidly maintain its coherence. Never theless, the slatement is correct as to the Wing, and besides, that division was thenoeforward able to exert no influence on the fortunes of the day. Its course is described elsewhere, in the sketch of its distinguished commander, General Sheridan. Ulysses S. Grant. 351 GENERAL ULYSSES S. GRANT. THAT the son of a Tanner, poor, unpretending, without influential friends until his performance had won them, ill-used to the world and its ways, should rise— not suddenly, in that first blind worship of helpless ignorance which made any one who understood regimental tactics illustrious in advance for what he was going to do, not at all for what he had done — but slowly, grade by grade, through -all tho vicissitudes of constant service and mingled blunders and success ; till, at the end of a four years' war, he stood at the head of our armies, crowned by popular acclaim our greatest Soldier, is a satisfactory answer to criticism and a sufficient vindication of greatness. Suc cess succeeds. . We may reason on the man's career. We may prove that at few stages has he shown personal evidences of marked ability. We may demonstrate his mis takes. We may swell the praises of his subordinates. But after all, the career stands — wonderful, unique, worthy of the study we now invite to it, so long as the Nation honors her benefactors, or the State cherishes the good fame of the sons who have contributed most to do her honor. Hiram Ulysses Grant, since called, Ulysses Simpson Grant, was born on the 27th of April, 1822, in a little, one-story house on the banks of the Ohio, at the village of Point Pleasant, in Clermont County. His parents were poor, respect able young laborers, who had been married only ten months before. His father when a boy, had been brought with the family from Pennsylvania to Colum biana County, near the Western Eeserve. Five years later, then an orphan of eleven, he was apprenticed to a tanner. During the war of 1812 he went with his mother to Maysville, Kentucky. At its close, in his 21st year, he returned to the Eeserve and established a tannery of his own at Eavenna, After five years' experiment he went' back, still poor, to the Ohio Eiver. Here he met with and married Miss Hannah Simpson. The mother of the future General belonged to the same walks of life with the father. She was a native of Mont gomery County, Pennsylvania,' and had come West with her father's family only three years before.* * Those curious in such matters have traced back the lineage of General Grant, on the fath er's side, to Matthew Grant, one of the Scotch emigrants, by the "Mary and John," to Dorches ter, Massachusetts, in 1630. Among the collateral branches they have also found connections of Hon. Columbus Delano and General Don Carlos Buell, the one related by blood tn Genera] 352 Ohio in the War. A year after the birth of their first son the young couple removed to the next county eastward, and settled at Georgetown. They continued poor — so poor that all thought of education for their boy, beyond the "quarter in winter time'^ at the village school, was out of the question. The lad showed spirit and good sense, but this seems to have suggested nothing more to the struggling pair than what an excellent tanner he would make. "Ulysses was industrious in his studies," so writes his father,* "but at that time I had little means and needed his assistance; so that, except the three winter months, he had but little chance for school after he was about eleven." Before this, indeed, the boy had begun to show the pluck and obstinacy there were in him. "I had left a three years' old colt in the stable," — it is again his father who tells usf — "and was to be gone all day. I had had the colt but a few days and it had never been worked. Ulysses, then not quite seven years old, got him out, geared, and hitched him to a sled, led and drove him to the woods, loaded up his sled with bark, chips, and such wood as he could put on, mounted tbe load and, with a single line, drove home." The passion for horses, which no cares or honors have been able to eradicate, seems, in fact, to have been the most prominent feature of the boy's life ; for his father, striving to re call his memories of those young days, immediately afterward| gives us another anecdote of the same nature: "I wanted Ulysses to go about three miles and back on an errand for me one day, before I could start on a trip which was to take the whole day. He wanted to ride a pacing horse I had, but as I was going to ride this myself on his return, I told him he must take the colt. 'Well,' said he, 'if I do I will break him to pace.' In about an hour back he came, and he really had the young horse in a beautiful pace." Already, with an old head on his young shoulders, the lad assumed responsi bilities as naturally as a man. His schoolmates tell us that, though never obtrusive, he insensibly came to be the leader in their games, and to direct their schoolboy exploits. So, too, when one of these schoolmates tries to remember what he can recall as the most striking thing about Grant's boyhood, he gives us this: || "At the age of twelve he aspired to the management of his father's draught team, and was intrusted with it for the purpose of hauling some heavy hewed logs. Several men with handspikes were to load them up for him. He came with his team and found the logs but not the men. Observing a fallen tree with a gradual upward slope he unhitched his horses, attached them to one of the hewed logs, drew it horizontally to the tree, and then drew one end of it up the inclined trunk higher than the wagon-truck, and so as to project a few Grant's great-grandmother, the other to his grandfather's first wife. The following they give as General Grant's direct line of descent from the Matthew Grant of the "Mary and John:" 1. Matthew and Priscilla Grant. 2. Samuel and Mary Grant; born Porter. 3. Samuel and Grace Grant; born Miner. 4. Noah and Martha Grant; born Huntingdon. 5. Noah and Susannah Grant; born Delano. 6. Noah and Rachel Grant; born Kellery. 7. Jesse Boot and Hannah Grant; born Simpson. 8. Ulysses S. Grant. •Private letters from Jesse R. Grant, furnishing details for this sketch. tlbid. Jlbid. 1 Letter of Hon. J. N. Morris, to the National Intelligencer, March 22, 1864. Ulysses S. Grant. 353 feet over it. So he continued to do until he had brought several to this position. Next he backed the wagon under the projecting ends; and finally, one by one, hitched and drew the logs lengthwise across the fallen trunk on to his wagon, hitched up again, and returned with his load to his astonished father."* Such glimpses we get of the sturdy, active, self-reliant boy who was now fast growing up to^the life of a tanner; with some knowledge of reading and writing, a little arithmetic, and not much else in the way of education, save that which came from the great school in which his most valuable lessons have been learned, the school of self-supporting experience. His parents were still in very limited circumstances; children came as they come to poor families generally, there were five more mouths to feed and bodies to clothe." The eldest had now spent six years laboring with his father; he was almost arrived at man's estate. We may well believe that his good mother a grave, matronly, judicious woman, whose character seems in many ways impressed upon her distinguished son, did not fail tp encourage the boy's desire for something better. But what should he do? Colleges were out of the question ; high-schools could scarcely be thought of. It was an era of bankruptcy and general financial distress. The future seemed to offer no encouragement. Something of a politician and a worker, it was natural that Jesse Grant should think of political relief. He wrote to Senator Morris concerning West Point The Senator replied that he had no appointment, but that Hon. Thomas L. Hamer (the representative of the district, a leading Dem- crat and a noted stump orator ,of those days) had. Curiously enough it happened that Mr. Hamer had appointed a young man named Bailey, who failed to pass the examination for admittance.! The failure of Cadet Bailey made the vacancy for Ulysses Grant; and he was appointed.! In his eighteenth year, then, on the 1st of July, 1839, we find Grant fairly embarked at West Point He had a hundred classmates at the outset — not one, it is said, with preparation as deficient as his for the academic course. But be fore the four years were ended only thirty-nine were left out of the hundred to graduate ; and Grant had worked his way well up toward the middle of this smaller number in the grade of his attainments. Among these men were Wm. B. Franklin, who bore off the honors of the class. ; Eosewell S. Eipley, late of the Eebel army; John J. Peck, Jos. j. .Eeynolds, and C. C. Augur, three woll- *The following story we find in a popular Boy's Biography of Grant. His father has given us a confirmation of it : " The absence of fear was always a characteristic of Ulysses. When two years of age, while Mr. Grant was carrying Ulysses in his arms on a public occasion through the village, a young man wished to try the effect of a pistol report on the child. Mr. Grant consented, saying, 'The child has never seen a pistol or gun in his life.' The baby hand was put on the lock and pressed quietly there till it snapped, and off went the charge with » loud report. Ulysses scarcely Btirred; but in a moment pushed away the pistol, saying, 'Fick it again.' fick it again!' . A by stander remarked: 'That boy will make a general; for he neither winked nor dodged.'" tThe examination which Bailey could not pass, and which seems tohave been regarded with some apprehension by Grant, included simply reading, spelling, writing, and arithmetic to deci mal fractions. X Letter of J. N. Morris to National Intelligencer. Vol. 1—23; 354 Ohio in the War. known Union Major-Gen orals; Franklin Gardner, who surrendered Port Hud son; Frederick Steele; and Eufus Ingalls. Among the thirty-nine Grant was graded the twenty-first. !No one dreamed of his ever being a General. He had good j-sense, was quiet, industrious, rather popular with those who knew him, and withal a little old-fashioned and peculiar, as was natural to a boy ofhis antecedents. A schoolmate* says of him : "I remember him as a plain, common- sense, straightforward youth; quiet, rather ofthe old-head-on-the-young-shoul- der order; shunning notoriety; quite contented while others were grumbling; taking to his military duties in a very business-like manner; not a prominent man in the corps, but respected by all and very popular with his friends, nis soubriquet of 'Uncle Sam'f was given him there, where every good fellow has a nickname, from these very qualities; indeed, he was a very uncle-like sort of youth. He was then and always an excellent horseman; and his picture rises before me as I write, in the old torn coat, obsolescent leather gig-top, loose rid ing pantaloons with spurs buckled over them; going with his clanging saber to the drill-hall. He exhibited but little enthusiasm in anything; his best stand ing was in the mathematical branches and their application to tactics and mili tary engineering." So the uncle-like youth got on ; in quiet, jog-trot fashion, making no show, certainly indulging no sentiment, but plodding on in his own matter-of-fact way. And, in reality, he did plod to some purpose; for that a boy who had lived to his eighteenth year in a tannery, with no education beyond " reading, writ ing, and arithmetic in decimal fractions," should learn enough in four years to stand even twenty -first in a class that had traversed the West Point course, was in itself much. His standing was of course too low for anything but the Infantry, and so he was assigned as brevet Second Lieutenant to the Fourth, then stationed at Jef ferson Barracks, St. Louis. His residence here lasted a year, in tho usual dull routine of army life, but with one episode that was to have its infln- " ence on his future career. Among his classmates had been one Frederick T. Dent,J of St. Louis, like him not standing very high in the class, and like him assigned to the Fourth Infantry. It was natural that Dent shotild take him tc visit his family; not very natural, one would say, that Grant should fall in love. But he did. Five years later, on his return from Mexico, he married Miss Dent — the gentle woman who has since been at his side through good and through evil repute. But service in the regular army makes small allowance for the exigencies * Professor Coppee — Grant and his Campaigns, page 22. tThere seems to have been some curious blundering about a name that was, one day, to r?te so high. As his father explains it, he was originally named Hiram Ulysses, the last name being a favorite with his grandmother. His Cadet warrant, however, was made out for Ulysses Sidney. He quietly took the name and bore it through West Point. Then, in honor of his mother, he finally changed Sidney to Simpson. } Still in the Fourth Infantry where he has risen to Major; also Brevet Brigadier and serv ing on Grant's staff. Ulysses S. Grant. 355 of courtships. Within a year Grant was sent away from St. Louis, with his regiment, to Natchitoches, Louisiana; thence^ a" year later, to the Mexican frontier; then, as the war broke out, across the Eio Grande with Zachary Tay lor's famous army of occupation. Meantime, after two years' waiting, he had become a Second-Lieutenant and, by special permission, had been allowed to remain in the Fourth Infantry with his brother-in-law that was to be, instead of being transferred to the Seventh, for which his appointment was originally made out. With his regiment he participated in the opening contests at Palo Alto and Eesaca de la Palma — his first sight of real war; and some months later he passed through the bloodier engagement of Monterey. The regiment was now withdrawn to General Scott's column before Vera Cruz ; and presently Grant was made the regimental quartermaster. Apparently there was no thought that the man had better material in him than was needed for managing wagon-trains. But he had no idea of devoting himself to the trains when a battle was going on ; and so we find that at every engagement he joined his regiment and shared its exposure. At Molino del Eey he won praise and a brevet. At Chapultepec " ho behaved with distinguished gallantry," as the official report of the commanding officer of his regiment testified; wbile the brigade commander added, "I must not omit to call attention to Lieutenant Grant, Fourth Infantry, who acquitted himself most nobly upon several occasions under my own observation;" and General Worth himself felt warranted in expressing his obligations to " Lieutenants Lendrum and Grant, Fourth Infantry, especially." So much of the future General-in-Chief can be seen through the nebulous atmosphere of official reports during the Mexican war— no more. Doubtless he behaved as hundreds of others did — no better — no worse. But he had still made no impression on the men who concerned themselves with the rising officers of the army; no one thought of a brilliant future for him; and he con tinued to be the quartermaster of his regiment — first in New York, then on the Northern frontier. At last he rose to the command of his company, and about the same time he was married. His command was kept for a season at Detroit; then at Sackett's Harbor. Thus, in quiet garrison -duty, three years of married life went by. Then ho was ordered to Oregon, where he saw a little Indian fighting. Two years passed on the Pacific coast. The idleness of army life, absence from his family, and the swarming temptations of the early times in California and Oregon, began to tell upon our sober-sided, uncle-like youth. His passion for horses did not, in the least, diminish. • Billiards were always fasci nating. Presently less desirable sources of exhilaration began to exert their power. The sudden reception of an order assigning him to a command far in tho interior of Oregon, broke the current on which our Captain was embarked. It seemed to indicate indefinite separation from his family; it promised no distinc tion, and certainly no pleasure. He wisely decided that it was time to rejoin 356 Ohio in the War. his wife; resigned his commission just eleven years and one month after enter ing the service;* and went home to try his fortune in civil life.f He first established himself near the home of his wife's relatives in Rt. Loui^County, Missouri, as a farmer. In this he failed. He tried to sell wood, and failed again. In his matter-of fact way he went to work with his own hands to earn bread for his family. Au old comrade at West Point says : " I vis ited St. Louis at this time, and remember with pleasure that Grant, in his farmer rig, whip in hand, came to see me at the hotel where were also Joseph J. Eey nolds, Don Carlos Buell, and Major Chapman ofthe cavalry. "J And it is pleas ant to find him adding : " If Grant had ever used spirits, as is not unlikely, I distinctly remember that, upon the proposal being made to drink, Grant said : 'I will go in and look at you for I never drink anything;' and the other officers, who saw him frequently, afterward told me that he drank nothing but water." But proper conduct alone will not earn bread. Farming and wood- selling having proved failures he moved into the city. But in all that great, bustling center of activity whither, as to the coming metropolis ofthe continent, adventurous young men were thronging from every quarter ofthe over-crowded East to seek their fortunes, there seemed nothing at which Captain Grant could succeed. He tried auctioneering. He applied to the city authorities for a posi tion as engineer, which they "respectfully declined." He attempted something in the real-estate agency way. He tried that most unpleasant of callings, collecting money for creditors who had no time to pursue their small debtors with personal duns. All this time he lived almost from hand to mouth. He was too poor to rent an office ; but he found a fat, good-natured young lawyer, named Hillyer, whose office was not overcrowded with clients, and who will ingly gave him desk room. Ajtd so ho worried through till 1859. Meantime the canny Scot nature had shown itself in his industrious father. The old gentleman had prospered bf.avely in tanning, and had become the owner of a harness and leather store, with means to enlarge his business if he chose. He was beginning a branch of his establishment at Galena, Illinois, in which a younger son was to be a partner. Ulysses had shown so little capacity for "getting on," and withal seemed so deprived of the energy that had been noticed in him during his boyish days by the idleness of army life, that it became necessary to do something for him. Mr. Grant thought the boy ought to know something about the leather trade, if he knew anything at all in a business way, and so he had him remove to Galena to act as a sort of assistant * On July 31, 1854. 1 1 have preferred, in the foregoing paragraph, to follow the account sanctioned by Grant's family and friends of the way in which he came to leave the service. But I am reminded of that wise maxim of Lessing's: "It is a duty, if one undertake to teach the truth, to teach the whole of it or none at all." It would be dishonest in one professing to trace the development of Grant's character and the events of his life, to suppress allusion to the dissipated habits into which, at this stage in his career, be had unfortunately fallen. The belief has been current through the West (and there are somo reasons for crediting it) that his resignation was prompted by the significant warning which the Department, because of these habits, now fell bound to give him. X Professor Coppee — Grant and his Campaigns, page 26. Ulysses S. Grant. 357 manager in the house of Grant & Son. Citizens knew little of the elder brother at the new leather store. But the few that came to be intimate with him, in the two years that intervened before the outbreak of the war, while una ble, as all had been before, to discern any signs of coming greatness beneath his almost stolid exterior, had not failed to observe the good judgment and strong common sense, which commended him as an eminently safe man. Who ever knew him well, liked him. Not many thought him much of a business man ; but it was a strong point that he was not above his business. He put on no airs ; assumed nothing in consequence of his connection with that aristocratic affair, the regular army ; was not disposed to boast over his exploits in Mexico, He lived modestly, and seemed to be at last getting his head above water. Such was the retired army Captain on the 12th of April, 1861. After a hard struggle he seemed to have gained a footing ; there stretched before him a quiet, unostentatious life — rising to a partnership, selling good leather for good prices, and gaining in the end a modest competence, which, in Galena, would be ample for a respected and comfortable old age. The next day all was changed. With the firing on Sumter his Destiny came to him. Up to this time Grant had been a decided Democrat. He disliked the Eepublican movement, sympathized with the South in its recital of grievances, detested the Abolitionists. But he had the soldierly instinct which was wanting to so many of his old comrades. When the flag he had sworn to maintain was assailed, he knew no. question of polities. " He laid down the paper containing the account ofthe bombardment"— so writes an admiring intimate in the family — "walked around the counter and drew on his coat, saying, 'I am for the war to put down this wicked Eebellion. The Government educated me for the army and, though I served faithfully through one war, I feel still a little in debt for my education, and am ready to discharge the obligation.'"* He threw himself at once into the recruiting work which swept over the North ; drilled the company first raised in Galena, and went with them to the State capital. In that hour of sudden need men that knew how to drill com panies, and understood the organization of a regiment, were god-sends to the officials who had so long helped the popular prejudice against musters and the "cornstalk militia." It was no sooner discovered, at Springfield, that Captain Grant had actually been at West Point, and had besides seen real fighting in Mex ico, than the Governor determined to secure so valuable an aid. Forthwith he was made Adjutant-General for the State, and was set to work at mustering in troops. The confusion was intolerable; at first the rather slow Adjutant-General made little more headway in it than had the civilians. Perhaps, after all, he was not highly fitted for office work. Once or twice it was hinted that he might take a regiment, if he chose, and go into the field. But the plan ot electing officers dis gusted him. He would not command, as soldiers, men who were his constitu ents. In June he was absent for a short time on a visit to his father at Cincin- *A lady friend of the Grants, in the Portage County Democrat, March 30, 1864. 358 Ohio in the War. nati. By this time regimental elections were abandoned, and, daring his ah sence, Governor Yates appointed Grant Colonel of the Twenty-First. The regiment was to serve only three months. Pleased at having an educated soldier for Colonel the men re-enlisted for three years, and speedily became noted for their drill and discipline. Presently there was an alarm about Quincy, and Colonel Grant marched his regiment thither, a distance of one hundred and twenty miles. Then came orders to defend railroad lines in Northern Missouri, which brought him into the vicinity of other regiments. The civilian Colonels who outranked him shrank from giving orders to a veritable West Pointer, and so he became commander of the brigade.* * A "Staff Officer" gives currency to a story of these early campaigning days. It was while Grant was leading a small column after Jeff. Thompson : " Lieutenant Wickfield, of an Indiana cavalry regiment, commanded the advance guard, consisting of eighty mounted men. About noon he came up to a small farm-house, from the out ward appearance of which he judged that there might be something fit to ea,t inside. He halted his company, dismounted, and with two Second-Lieutenants entered the dwelling. He knew that Grant's incipient fame had already gone out through all that country, and it occurred to him that by representing himself to be the General he might obtain the best the house afforded. So, assuming a very imperative demeanor, he accosted the inmates of the house, and told them he must have something for himself and staff to eat. They desired to know who he was, and lie told them that he was Brigadier-General Grant. At the sound of that name they flew aronnd wilh alarming alacrity and served up about all they had in the house, taking great pains all the while to make loud professions of loyalty. The Lieutenants ate as much as they could of the not over- sumptuous meal, but which was, nevertheless, good for that country, and demanded what was to pay. 'Nothing.' And they went on their way rejoicing. " In the meantime General Grant, who had halted his army a few miles further back for a brief resting spell, came in sight of, and was rather favorably impressed with, tlie appearance of this same house. Riding up to the fence in front of the door, he desired to know if they would cook him a meal. "'No,' said a female in a gruff voice; 'General Grant and his staff have just been here and eaten everything in the house except one pumpkin -pie.' "'Humph,' murmured Grant; 'what is your name?' "'Selvidge,' replied the woman. "Casting a half dollar in at the door he asked if she would keep that pie till he sent an officer for it; to which she replied that she would. "That evening, after the camping-ground had been selected, the various regiments were noti fied that there would be a grand parade at half-past six for orders. Officers would see that their men all turned out, etc. In five minutes the camp was in a perfect uproar and filled with all sorts of rumors. Some thought the enemy were upon them, it being so unusual to have parades when on a march. At half past six the parade was formed, ten columns deep, and nearly a quar ter of a mile in length. After the usual routine of ceremonies the acting assistant Adjutant-Gen eral read the following order: "'HeAD-QTTAKTEKS AbSIY IK THE FlEUD. '"Special Order No.— . " ' Lieutenant Wickfield of the Indiana Cavalry, having on this day eaten everything in Mrs. Selvidge's house, at the crossing of the Ironton and Pocahontas and Black River and Cape Girardeau Roads, except one pumpkin pie, Lieutenant Wickfield is hereby ordered to return with an escort of one hundred cavalry and eat that pie also. " 'U. S. Geant, Brigadier-General Commanding.' "Grant's orders were law, and no soldier ever attempted to evade them. At seven o clock the Lieutenant filed out of camp with his hundred men, amid the cheers of the entire army. The escort concurred in stating that he devoured the whole of the pie, and seemed to relish it. Ulysses S. Grant. 359 Generals were needed and, since Grant was doing well as acting Briga dier,, his appointment to the grade was naturally suggested. On the 9th tof August the commission was issued, though it was made to bear date from the 17th of May. True to his old middle-ground he held about the middle place in the list of thirty-four appointments to General rank that day made. Neither to General Scott, however, nor to any of the others who were searching th.e ranks of the old army for promising young men with whom to fill its higher places, did his name once occur. McClellan was thought of; Eosecrans, Fre mont, McDowell,, Halleck were all thought of; but no one ever suggested that Grant was worthy of more than a place among the politicians who were cari-y- ing off the Brigadier-Generalships of Volunteers. In fact some of his old com rades were even' surprised at his attaining that measure of success. But his time was coming. The new General was ordered down to Cairo, and given command of the small district around the confluence of the Ohio and Mississippi, then known as the District of South-Bastern Missouri. Troops were pouring down the Illinois Central Eailroad from. all parts of the State, and the General soon found himself with an ample command. Those were the days of tho McClellan and Buckner neutrality* While the Xentuckians were amusing McClellan, their friends were seizing Hickman, Columbus, and Bowling Green. They were just about to plant themselves at Padueah (on the Ohio Eiver at the mouth of the Tennessee), a strongly secession town, the possession of which would have enabled them to command the navigation of the Tennessee and the lower Ohio. General Grant comprehended the position and acted promptly-^ The people of Padueah were hourly expecting the arrival of a Eebe^. force when, on the morning of the 6th of September, they awoke to find the town in possession of a brigade of Grant's troops under Chas. F. Smith. Soon after he. seized Smithland, ten miles further up, at the entrance of the Cumberland, and thus held the mouths of the streams which led to the center of the extended line the Eebels were forming. In these operations Grant showed promptness and good sense; but he gave also the first display of another quality, little suspected as yet, which was to prove one of the most important elements of his future success. He selected the right man for the work, Chas. F. Smith was the beau ideal of a soldier, and men of the old army held him its ablest and most accomplished officer. It was an army tradition that he had incurred the hot displeasure of General Scott, who never forgot nor forgave. But for this, many thought, he might have had the place to which young McClellan was so unexpectedly raised. With Smith at Padueah the Tennessee was safe. But the ways of the rigid old disciplinarian were not the ways of the fresh volunteers, and soon a clamerous storm against him began to blow abput headquarters. The newspapers scolded; their columns teemed with communications from indignant soldiers; politicians took hold of it, and the sins of- Padueah Smith were canvassed at the Capitol. But Grant knew his man, and never faltered in his support. By-and-by came Fort Donelson ; and *See ante— Life of McClellan. 360 Ohio in the War. the vision of the white-haired old hero, bare headed, leading tho wild charge over the outer intrenchments, shamed into silence the grumblers and the slan derers Price was advancing into Missouri. Jeff. Thompson was already roaming, apparently at will, through the State. The Eebel garrison at Columbus was believed to be re-enforcing Price, and it seemed probable, at any rate, that it would interfere with a small column sent out by Grant in pursuit of Thompson. Fremont, now in command of the department, accordingly ordered Grant to make a demonstration against Columbus. Grant at once sent word to Smith, at Padueah, of his intentions, and requested that a co-operating movement from that point be made against the rear of Columbus. At the same time he ordered come changes in the movement of the forces in pursuit of Jeff. Thompson, that might tend to confuse the enemy as to the real nature ofthe operations in hand. Then, embarking a force of three thousand men* on steamboats, he proceeded down the Mississippi to a point nine miles below Cairo (not quite half way to Co lumbus), where he rounded to, and tied up for the night on the Kentucky shore. Up to this point it would seem that General Grant had formed no decided plan for a demonstration against the enemy. News received here after midnight, he tells us,f determined him to attack — not Columbus — but the out-lying post at Belmont, directly across the river from Columbus, and under its guns. Th news which decided this unexpected movement was brought by a "reliable Union man" to his small force at Charleston, and thence forwarded to him by special messenger. It was to the effect that the garrison at Columbus had been crossing troops into Missouri at Belmont, for the purpose of pursuing hnd falling upon the rear of the column which Grant had sent after Jeff. Thomp son. It does not appear that he had any expectation of pursuing the pur suers. He only decided to attack vigor ously whatever forces he might find at Belmont, "knowing tUat in case of re pulse we could re-embark without diffi culty.!" It is earfy enough now to see that such a movement could have but one ter mination. The troops landed on the Mississippi shore, just as near Belmont as the steamboats dare approach — for fear of the Columbus batteries. They * The exact number was three thousand one hundred and fourteen — Grant's Official Report, Belmont. tlbid. J Ibid. BATTLE OF BELMONT. Ulysses S. Grant. 361 marched by the flank, with skirmishers well in advance, about a mile down the river, and then formed in line of battle; where, presently, they encountered tho enemy advanced a mile or more above his camp. The troops, to nearly all of whom it was their first battle, behaved handsomely. They were opposed by three Eebel regiments, nearly or quite equal in numbers to their own force; but they steadily advanced their line, 'drove the Eebels into the tangled timber abattis in front of their camp, through which they finally charged, sweeping • everything before them, and driving the Eebels (now a.ugmented by Pillow's recently arrived re-enforcements) over the bank down to their transports. Grant, meanwhile, had freely exposed himself to all the dangers of the con flict, his. horse had been shot under him, and the soldiers, seeing him ever in advance, were inspired with confidence. But, though it was the first battle in which he had ever held a command (for he did not even have charge of his own company in any of his engagements in Mexico), he remained cool enough in the midst of the enthusiasm, to comprehend the necessity of instant retreat. Already the heavy, Eebel artillery, from the opposite bank, was trained upon them. Pillow had brought over three fresh regiments only in time to be caught in the impetuous charge of the Illinoisians and Iowans, but now they were re-form ing under the bank, and General Polk himself was crossing with two regiments more. It was not evident that General Grant yet knew that three more regiments were crossing above to intercept his return to his transports; but enough was seen to convince him that not a moment must be lost in getting out of his cap tured camp. Everything was hastily fired, the Eebel artillery was dragged off, and the column started up the river for its boats. And now there suddenly, rose in their path the apparition of a fresh foe. The Eebel column designed to cut them off from their transports had gained its position. Four pieces of the captured artillery were abandoned; and with the others the line charged again, successfully cutting its way through till it reached the steamers. One regiment, however was missing. It had gone too farfrom the river bank on the return, had missed the intercepting Eebels, and was now groping its way at random down to the river. Meantime the Eebels had formed again on the bank, and opened fire on the crowded jam of National soldiers on the transports. The gunboats came to their relief, and presently their shells began to fall not only among the Eebels, but into the ranks of the missing regiment. It hastened down to the river, coming out through a little depression, below where the Eebels were engaged, and embarking there under cover of the gunboats, as soon as a transport could be dropped down to take them off. tIn such guise — with Eebel shot still whistling through their helpless mass, with the wounded crowded confusedly among the throng, with their dead and a hundred and twenty-five wounded left in the hands of the exultant Eebels, as well as with the loss of a hundred more taken prisoners — did Grant and his men steam slowly up the river to the point from which they started. General Grant frankly told the story of the day in his official report, but claimed that he had prevented the Columbus garrison from re-enforcing Price, or sending out an expedition to cut off the column moving against Jeff. Thomp- 362 Ohio in the War. son. An impartial judgment can not confirm these claims. Three' hours after the battle of Belmont the Columbus garrison was ¦ as free to re-enforce Price as it had been three days before. What the Eebels knew was that a small 'force, making a sudden descent upon an out-lying camp, had been able to burn the tents and blankets, and carry off a couple of guns before being driven back to its boats, and forced, in its haste, to leave its dead, wounded, and prisoners behind it. Such performance was not likely to so terrify them that, under the possibility of a similar attack, they would fail to re-enforce Price if they chose. Whether any more important results could have been- obtained from the "demonstration against Columbus," which Fremont had ordered, may be ques tioned. But it is clear that the same results could have been secured by an operation (especially in conjunction with Smith's Padueah column) against, tho rear of Columbus, without the necessity of an enforced retreat under fire; with out leaving dead and wounded in the enemy's hands; and without definitely as suring the enemy, in advance, that nothing more than a sudden, inconsequential dash was intended, by delivering the attack on a spot that was, by ho possi bility, tenable for the attacking party.* Yet the action at Belmont, unfortunate as it seemed, and depressing as were its immediate effects upon the public mind, did good. It showed the raw soldiers what war was; it gave them unbounded confidence in their capacity to take care of themselves against anything like even numbers ; and it taught them that their General was ready to go wherever he asked them to go. To the General himself it revealed the mettle ofthe blade he was 'privileged to wield, as well as the nature of his work, thus far known only in theory. More than all, it re vealed to those controlling the business of this war a General, cool and brave in action, and skillful enough if he led his troops into tight places to get them out again without serious loss.f Furthermore it showed to the country one General, in the midst of the prevailing inaction, who believed that war meant fighting — not everlasting preparations and proclamations. So that, while with the un thinking, Belmont was set down as a failure and its General as little better, and while the General himself, and the staff that surrounded him, grew restive and e " The same results could have been secured." That is to say, the enemy could have been ' kept busy for a little while, and made to believe that there was danger of serious attaok. Keeping him busy to whatever extent it might be carried, to that extent diminished ' the danger to the column pursuing Jeff. Thompson, or the probability of re-enforcements being sent to Price — the professed objects of the movement. And just so far as th.9 movement lqoked like a serious one did it answer the purposes of the demonstration JTremont desired. But no Bebel General thereabouts was fool enough to suppose that the descent upon a palpably untenable position like Belmont, could be anything more than a frivolous demonstration— a sudden dash- having no element of a serious movement against Columbus, about it.. They were simply warned to draw in their troops to the fortifications, and run no risks of such attacks again— that was all. TFor, notwithstanding the unfavorable circumstances, Grant had the pleasure of knowing that the enemy's loss was heavier than his own. They took ninety-nine able-bodied prisoners; lie carried off one hundred and seventy-five; their entire loss-Mulled, wounded, and missing— was six hundred and thirty-two (according to Pollard) ; his was four hundred and eighty-five. They lost their tents, blankets, and two pieces of artillery; he none. Ulysses S. Grant. 363 soured with tho lack of popular appreciation of their work, they had made firm, friends they litle dreamed of, whose friendship was to prove potential. Through the whole summer, and fall, and winter of 1861, our military leaders, stupefied. by Bull Eun, lay idle or consumed their resources in frivolous recomioissances and expeditions that came to nothing. Meanwhile tbe Eebels had made the best use oftheir opportunities. By the 1st of January, 1862, their lahoriously-strengtened line stretched from Columbus, on the Mississippi, west ward through Missouri to the plains; eastward through strong posts on the Ten nessee and Cumberland Eivers to Bowling Green in Kentucky, thence to Cum berland Gap ; and so connected with the head and front of their force in Virginia. Their garrisons at the important points were considerable, their advantage of rapid communication by railroads on interior lines was well used, and their fortifications were represented to be scientific and formidable. The true vital points were tersely indicated by General Buell: "I think it is not extravagant to say that the great power of the Eebellion in the West is arranged on a front, the flanks of which are Columbus and Bowling Green, and the center' about where the railroad between those points crosses the Tennessee and Cumberland Eivers."* Unfortunately the system of parceling out the country by State lines, to find places for as many independent Generals as possible, still prevailed. One-half this formidable line was confronted by the left of General Halleck's forces; the rest of it by General Buell. With a single commander it might easily have been broken almost before it was formed; with the two it was the 1st of February, 18,62, before any practical effort to break it was commenced. ,, -General Buell had proposed to General Halleck an advance up the Ten nessee and Cumberland Eivers by a combined land and naval force, with co operative, simultaneous movements threatening Bowling Green and Columbus. f general Halleck regretted that his important operations in Southern Missouri would prevent him from giving any assistance to such a plan. But shortly afterward he gave orders, in tbe most inclement season of the year, for a gen eral reconnoissance (as it would seem) through and around South-Western Ken tucky. The roads were very muddy, and the whole alluvial bottom-land through which the columns moved was sticky mire. General Grant sent one column down the river, from Cairo, toward Columbus, which wandered about through the mud,, bivouacked in the mud, and returned to fill the hospitals; having at no time gone nearer than tq the distance of a mile from the defenses of Columbus. General C. F. Smith, meanwhile, with his force from Padueah, per formed a somewhat similar task a few miles further east. At its close, however, he undertook a reconnoissance on his own accoitnt, the results of which were far-reaching.. Encountering one of the new gunboats on the Tennessee, he went on hoard and ran up toward. Fort Henry. He approached near enough to draw the fire of the fort, and to get a rough idea of its defensive capacity. He hast ened to present his report to General Grant, in vhich he urged that a sudden « •General Buell to General Halleck— Official dispatch, January 3, 1862. tlbid. 364 Ohio in the War. movement upon the fort could hardly fail to result in its surrender. Grant forwarded the report to Halleck as early as the 24th of January. Halleck made no reply. Four days later Grant and Admiral Foote, commanding1 the gunboat flotilla, urged it upon his attention. The next day Grant renewed his importunities, and on the afternoon of the next he received permission to try. So much had General Halleck to do with the grand conception of breaking the enemy's center, on which his fame has subsequently rested. Don Carlos Buell' was the first to make official suggestion of the plan ;* Chas. F. Smith was the first to show how practical it was; and Grant richly deserves the honor of having at once comprehended the opportunity, and persisted in applications till he finally secured leave to embrace it. On the morning of February 2d, Admiral Foote started with his gunboats, General Grant following with the divisions of McClernand and Chas. F. Smith, about fifteen thousand strong, on steam transports. Next morning the gunboats were only a few miles below the fort. Here, however, they suffered three days to pass, partly waiting for the troops, partly fishing up torpedoes. At last on the 6th, everything being ready, General Grant was to invest the fort on the land side, while Admiral Foote was to open the attack. Meanwhile General Tilghman, the Eebel commander, had gained a thorough knowledge of the situation. The fort was indifferently planned and worse situ ated; high lands on the opposite side, on which Grant was moving a couple of brigades, completely commanded it; the high water uplifted the gunboats so that they could pour their fire aknost horizontally into its midst. He had two thousand six hundred and ten men of all armsjf he knew that he was threat ened by a large land force (which he only estimated at three thousand too many) as well as by the gunboats; and he considered successful defense impractica ble. He determined, therefore, early in the morning to order a retreat of the main body of his troops, across the narrow neck of land between the two rivers, to Fort Donelson, retaining only the artillerists to work the heavy guns in the fort, and so to keep up a show of resistance while the retreat was being made good. And to aid this movement, in case of discovery, he ordered a small portion ofthe Donelson garrison to move half-way across and await events. In the light of these facts it is veiy easy to see that Grant should have has tened up his overwhelmingly superior numbers in time to cut off escape.' But the woods were miry and the country was unknown, while ignorance of the enemy's force or intentions counseled the greatest caution. Admiral Foote steamed up, opened the fight half an hour after the time agreed upon with Grant, knocked the fort to pieces, and received the surrender of the General and his little band of artillerists in an hour and a half. An hour later Grant got up, but the escaped garrison was already far on its way to Fort Donelson. Preparations for attacking Fort Donelson were at once begun. .Six days after the surrender of Fort Henry, Chas. F. Smith and McClernand were on the * Unless, indeed, the prior claim of Fremont be admitted. t General Tilghman's Official Report, Spec. Com. Rep. on Recent Military Disasters at Forts Henry and Donelson, published by authority, Conf. Congress, page 184. Ulysses S. Grant. 365 march across. Our forces had, meantime, been ordered up the Cumber land river from Cairo, to be landed as noar Donelson as circumstances would permit, and to unite with Smith and McClernand. The gunboats hastened down the Tennessee, mado such slight repairs of damages aa were possible,, and steamed up the Cumberland to within a few miles of Donelson. But Grant, conscious of having lost time before Fort Henry, and now determined not to give the navy another opportunity to snatch a victory from his grasp, i began ' operations without waiting for the gunboats, or for the re-enforcements that were to, accompany them. The fort now to be assailed was the last defense to the "center of the line" whieh Buell had proposed to break. It alone stood between the gunboats and Nashville. Its fall would inevitably drag down Bowling Green with it; while it would also remove the last serious obstacle to a movement for the taking of Memphis in the rear. So much was known to Grant; but beyond this it does not appear that, at head-quarters, ideas concerning the nature and importance of the work to be undertaken prevailed, more definite than the utterly vague notions which were floating through the country. The whole region was an unknown land since the Eebel occupation. The chatterers who labored at the voluntary task of finding excuses for alkdolays, had found a fresh Manassas at every earthwork between the mountains and the plain; while no words but Gibraltars ofthe West could serve to describe the tremendously-fortified posi tions of Bowling Green and Columbus. The reaction from this folly may pos sibly have carried the Generals, as it did the people, a little toward the other extreme. But we now know that, in the language of Albert Sidney Johnston, ""VYe (the Eebels) decided that we must fight for Nashville at Fort Donelson." The Bowling .Green garrison was accordingly weakened to re-enforce Donelson, while General Buell's magnificent army in Kentucky was being held back by a paltry force of ten thousand men.* Meanwhile, at Fort Donelson, had been accumulated a garrison which General Johnston supposed to number sixteen thousand; which Chief- Engineer Gilmer— apparently the only man making any report about the surrender who seemed willing to tell the simple truth — fixed at "fifteen thousand effectives ;" which General Pillow pronounces to have been less than thirteen thousand, and which General Floyd seems in clined to rate still lower. f This garrison received no very large re-enforcements in. the persons of its Generals. On learning of Tilgbman's surrender at Fort Henry, the Eebels hastily sent General Pillow to take command. Three days later General Buckner reported to General Pillow. A few hours afterward Gen eral John B. Floyd arrived and assumed command. "¦ General Pillow, not a high authority on fortifications since the date of his en gineering exploits in Mexico, considered the works strong and defensible. Nobody else, before or since, has been known to entertain sO high an opinion of them. Up to the night before the appearance of Grant's troops the outer line was unfin- * Sidney Johnston's letter to Jefferson Davis, March 17, 1862. Published by Conf. Gov't, in Rep. Com. on Surrender of Forts Henry and Donelson. t Official Report Surrender Fort Donelson. 366 Ohio in the War. V ished. It ran, zig-zag, through the medley of knolls and ravines, covered with a dense forest, that, lay back of the river, and followed, at great length, the line of the hills. Heights farther to the rear, however, commanded it, and the works themselves were slight. But the water battery was strong and well-finished, and it had a splendid range down the river. The two divisions with which Grant was advancing to the attack, could not have numbered over fifteen thousand. With their advantage of fortifica tions and knowledge of the country, the enemy ought to have routed him in confusion (and might even have aspired to the recapture of Fort Henry) before the gunboats and re-enforcements could have arrived. But the' panic-stricken infantry that had run away from Fort Henry without firing a gun, had infnsed their own terror into the rest of the garrison. General Pillow, indeed, tells us that on his arrival (three days before the attack) he "found deep gloom hang ing over the command, and the troops greatly depressed and demoralized by the surrender of Fort Henry."* On Wednesday morningf Grant marched from Fort Henry. By twelve o'clock his column had crossed the strip of land intervening between the' two rivers, and was driving in the Eebel pickets. With astounding lack of enter prise the garrison quietly allowed itself to be invested by an assailant no stronger than itself. Nothing but light skirmishing interfered with the progress of the investment, and the little force bivouacked in line of battle around the fort. Thursday morning the Eebels opened with artillery. General Grant, it would seem, had intended no attack, owing to the absence of the gunboats and infantry reinforcements,! but under the sting of this fire, he was drawn into something more than the " extension of the investment on the flanks of the enemy " of which he speaks in his report. An advance upon the enemy's left (up the river) developed into an action, which the Eebels dignify by the name of the "Battle of the Trenches," in which they claim to have repulsed their assailants, and wen a clear advantage. Grant's troops were really compelled to fall back from one or two positions they had taken, in some disorder, and with considerable loss. Meantime the weather changed from the balmy breezes ot spring to sleet, cold rain, and finally to snow ; the troops were without blankets, without rations, and without shelter. Furthermore, they began to comprehend that they were fronting intrenchments manned by a force as strong as their own; and the arrival of the gunboats came to be a matter of much anxiety. In such plight they passed the weary watches of Thursday night. By Friday morning Grant considered the situation really critical, and hastily dispatched a messenger to General Lew. Wallace to bring up the garri son he had left at Fort Henry. A little later, however, the gunboats came in sight. Even then Grant did not feel himself equal to the assault, and the army lay still, awaiting the result of the gunboat attack. Admiral Foote steamed gallantly up, and speedily silenced several of the enemy's guns. But his vessels had been shattered at Fort Henry, and the Eebel artillery practice soon began s General Pillow's Official Report. 1 12th February, 1862. X Grant's Official Report. Ulysses S. Grant. 367 to tell upon them. In ten minutes more he would havo boen able to pass the fort and take it in reverse, when a shot cut the rudder-chains of one of his boats, his flagship had her pilot's wheel shot away, and he himself was wounded. The other two iron-clads were, moreover, seriously damaged, and thus, with two vessels helplessly drifting, and the others injured, he was forced to give the order for retiring. To the watching young General on the bank, this came with the weight of a disaster that enforced a change of all his plans. He at once decided* to make no further direct attempts upon the fort, but to complete his investment, fortify his line, get more men to hold it,f and await the return of the gunboats. Meantime, in the Eebel councils reigned strange confusion. They believed themselves surrounded by "an immense force" — not a regiment less than fifty- two would General Pillow admit — and visions of batteries above the fort on the river that should cut off their communication with Nashville and their supplies began to float before them. Floyd dwelt upon the immense resources against which they were battling; beside the gunboats there was "a land force drawn from an army of two hundred thousand men, all so stationed as to be easily con centrated on the banks of the Cumberland in a week I " " With aless force than fifty thousand men Fort Donelson was untenable," and even that garrison "must be sustained by twenty thousand at Clarksville and twenty-five thousand at Nashville!"! And thus, while Grant was abandoning the idea of attack, and men tally tracing lines of fortification that should protect him till relief had come, Floyd and Pillow, taking numbers from their imaginations, and counsels from some quality that looks strikingly like cowardice, were devising means of escape from a struggle tbey had given up in advance. It was tp Buckner, it would seem, that they owed tne plan finally adopted. A sortie -was to be made on the portion of the National line farthest up the river toward Nashville, and if possible it was to be rolled back upon the center, where Buckner was then to strike it. If they should succeed in shattering the National column, well; if not, they might hope, at least, so to break the lines as to make their escape. So they have since explained their plans. A more probable explanation appears to he that, after their first emotion of unmanly terror, they were shamed by Buck ner into the opposite extreme, and came to think that they might really break thp National lines and drive Grant off. Stimulated by such hopes, they moved out, under Pillow, early on Saturday morning — while Grant was off on a gun boat consulting with Foote; — and commenced an attack. Catching our pickets napping, they pushed vigorously forward, drove two of McClernand's brigades in confusion, and started a panic, that came near spreading to the whole division. Finally new lines were formed, and the attack was temporarily checked. Meanwhile, Buckner had found it impossible to do anything with his * Grant's Official Report. tAlthough the large re-enforcements that followed the gunboats up the river had now reached him. X Floyd's and Pillow's Official Reports. 368 Ohio in the War. timid troops; the first heavy fire they encountered drove them to cover, and their General was forced to employ "persuasions" instead of commands, in his efforts to bring them once more to the work. At last they advanced, just as Pilltfw was again forcing back McCIernand's line; the two Eebel columns met; the National forces were hurled clear back from their positions on the right; a mounted officer galloped among the troops scattered to the rear, shouting, "We are eut to pieces ! " In fact, the panic seemed on the point of sweeping away the army, when General L. Wallace's division, not yet heavily engaged, came up in fine order and checked the retreat. What followed was curiously confused. Pillow returned to the fort, and tel egraphed to Nashville, " on the honor of a soldier," that he bad won a brilliant victory. Part of his troops seem to have been retired; the rest took no advant age of the disorder into which their success had thrown the ranks of their antagonists. At this critical moment the inspiration of Grant's imperturbable coolness came upon him. His right was in disorder, amounting almost to rout, but Charles F. Smith's division, on his left, was unharmed. The enemy had palpably withdrawn their forces from that part of their line to aid in Pillow's attack. "Then charge it!"* Leaving the soldierly Smith to his work, he rode over to the shattered right, and ordered General Lew. Wallace to advance. By five o'clock that officer bad handsomely regained all that McClernand had lost. Meantime, down the river on the left, the old soldier to whom had been com mitted the crowning trust, was marshaling his column. His skillful dispositions, heroic bearing, superb presence, all inflamed the enthusiasm of his command, which, as soon as the word was given, rushed up the hill with bayonets set and the wildest cheering. In front is the color -bearer of the advance brigade: hy his side rides the General. The Eebel artillery riddles the advance, and it wavers. Smith urges it on, and leads the way ; the line straightens, charges, pours over the abattis, climbs the embankments, rushes into the outerwork; and almost before its defenders are out of the way, the batteries are whirled up and are opening upon the lower interior fortifications. Darkness ends the struggle, but white-haired old Charles F. Smith has insured the fall of Fort Donelson. Within the fort the position is comprehended clearly enough. General Buckner tells his superiors that, with Smith inside his intrenchments, an attack is sure to be made, and that he can not hold out half an hour. Pillow talks of his having at least, by his own brilliant victory, cut open a way out of the fort, and the command is actually mustered to retreat, when, to his amazement, he learns that the National troops arc in the way, pressing even more closely than before his victorious battle was fought- Scouts are sent out to see if they can march by the river bank, directly up along the brink ofthe river. They report the route open, but waist deep in mire and water. Boats are sought for, on which * "I remember an anecdote which General Grant told me about Donelson — that at a certain period of the battle he saw that either side was ready to give way, if the other showed a bold front, and he determined to do that very thing, to advance on the enemy, when, as he prognosti cated, the enemy surrendered." Sherman's Letter to the United Service Magazine on Pittsburg Landing. Ulysses S. Grant. 369 to cross to the other bank of tho river and so escape ; but these havo been sent to Nashville and are not yet returned. So passes the night with Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner. The two ranking officers dread the Yankees to such extent that they declare they must be permitted, personally, to escape. Buckner reminds them that a General has no right to desert his men. But they have made up their minds that in no event will they fall into the hands .of the Yankees — if they can help it. And so Buckner assumes the command, and sends a flag of truce. Floyd seizes on the steamboats, when they return about daylight, and makes off, with such of his own brigade as he can hurriedly embark. Long before this the redoubtable Pillow has made his way across the fiver, "in a small hand-flat" — let us be true to history, for has not Pillow himself recorded it for our benefit — "in a small hand-flat, about four feet wide by twelve long. . Myself and staff then made our way to Clarksville by land."* General.. Buckner solicited an armistice, and the appointment of commis sioners to agsee upon terms of capitulation. General Grant's reply struck the key-note of popular feeling, and has become historic: "No terms, other than an unconditional and immediate surrender can "be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works." Buckner had been at West Point with Grant. He was there a showy, chivalrous Kentuckian. Grant was the son of a tanner, poor and not graceful. That this poor schoolmate of his would be flattered by his offer of "capitulation" he did not doubt. His amazement at the matter-of-fact response stung him into boyish folly. "Notwithstanding the brilliant success of the Confederate arms on yesterday," he was "compelled to accept the ungenerous and unchivalrous terms." And so Grant's army marched in.f Up to this time Grant had secured little popular "recognition. The battle at Belmont had been counted a disaster. Fort Henry had been taken without him; and he1 had even failed to get up in time to intercept the runaway garri son. But Fort Donelson was the first great, decisive success of the war. Its results were the capture of Nashville and the speedily following fall of Mem phis. Moreover, the army of prisoners was something hitherto unknown in wars on the Continent. The General who had accomplished these things at * Pillow's Answer to Interrogatories of Conf. Sec. War. tGeneral Grant reported a capture of twelve to fifteen thousand prisoners. This number was exaggerated ; but the Rebels went to the other extreme. Pollard sets down the exact number of prisoners taken as five thousand and seventy-nine. He omits, however, in his list all the wounded left on the field, and at least two regiments — known to number a thousand men. On the other hand Floyd carried off between fifteen hundred and two thousand, including the strag glers who subsequently joined him. Wounded, to the number of eleven hundred and thirty-four, had been sent to Nashville, and the dead must have swelled this to nearly two thousand. Deduct these and the two thousand carried away by Floyd from the fifteen thousand originally present, and we have about eleven thousand well and wounded left for Grant. No accurate lists are known to have been made out. Some forty pieces of artillery were captured, with large store of muskets, horses, mules, etc. breneral Grant's estimate of his own losses was twelve hundred killed, wounded, and missing, which subsequently proved to be far below the real number. Vol. I.— 24. 370 Ohio in the War. once became the popular idol. A Major-Generalship was bestowed upon him and his command was extended. People dwelt admiringly on his curt answer to Ijjickner. His accidental initials were turned to new use, and our uncle-like youth, whom his schoolmates had called Uncle Sam, was now denominated Unconditional Surrender Grant. The newspapers gave the new Secretary of War some credit for the victory, whereupon he announced* that "We owe our recent victories to the Spirit of the Lord, that moved our soldiers to dash into battle, and filled the hearts of our enemies with terror and dismav. What, under the blessing of Providence, I conceive to be the true organization of vic tory and military combination to end this war, was declared in few words by General Grant's message to General Buckner, 'I propose to move immediately on your works.' " Furthermore, with these popular approvals, and this evidence of the admiration of his official chief, Grant obtained another advantage. He acquired the firm, admiring friendship of the strong-willed and influential mem ber of Congress from Galena, whieh was henceforth, in more than one emer gency, to prove his protection. It was General Grant's high, good fortune to be thus at the head of a movement, whose material and moral results were alike inspiring to the Nation. He did his duty in it simply, courageously, and well. But if we look for signal displays of special military ability in the operations, we shall have to read the story over again under the spell of the enthusiasm it first aroused. There was praiseworthy energy in the prompt movement from Fort Henry; there was high courage in undertaking the investment with only fifteen thousand men; but, yet, these were qualities which many, undistinguished men are constantly exhibiting. One striking circumstance brings into bold relief one of Grant's strongest men tal points. He secured Fort Donelson when, after the rout of his right wing, he- ordered Chas. F. Smith, with the left, to charge the enemy's works. He selected the right man, and in the midst of disaster he chose the right moment. Then followed an interval of civil administration. While Grant was be coming the popular hero, he suddenly fell into disgrace at head-quarters. After Donelson, he went up to Nashville with a division; taking troops out ofhis own district without cause, and intruding upon the independent department of Gen eral Buell, whom, by his recent promotion, he outranked. The last was a breach of military etiquette, the other spmething more. General Halleck further com plained of Grant's failure to make satisfactory reports of the state of his com mand, and of a prevailing disposition, as he construed it, to act independently. The result was, that after Grant had issued some orders to the people of Tennes see, forbidding the Eebel officers to exercise any official functions, and directing the conduct of his troops in enforcing martial law over West Tennessee, he found himself— just when the expedition up the Tennessee Eiver came to be organized — suddenly ordered to head-quarters at Fort Henry, and forbidden to take the field. The hero of Fort Donelson, Chas. F. Smith, a subordinate of Grant's from the outset, was assigned to the command of the troops, and Grant •Secretary Stanton's Letter to NewYork Tribune, February, 1862. Ulysses S. Grant. 371 became little better than an Adjutant-General. Stung to the quick, he sent an indignant letter to Halleck, protesting against the injustice, complaining bitterly of anonymous letters attacking him, and finally asking to be relieved of com mand! Explanations however ensued, and ten days after the issue of the order to quit the field he was again ordered into it. The interval however was not unfruitful. The Tennessee Eiver Expedition • had been organized ; great fleets of steamboats had swept up the stream, crowded with the troops of six divisions and sixty regiments. Sherman had been sent to cut one of the railroads leading into Corinth, and had failed. Lew. Wallace Bent to cut another, had succeeded, but in a few days the damages were repaired. Then the army had been debarked, by an almost fatal error of judgment, at Pittsburg Landing, on the South side of the river, and within easy striking dis tance of the enemy's concentration of forces at Corinth. * ' On Grant's arrival he found the army scattered through the woods about tho Landing, like a huge militia encampment, preparatory to the annual mus ter-day; or like a great Maying party, camping out for a pic-nic. Troops es tablished themselves here and there, it would seem, almost as the spots happened to strike the fancy of the Colonels; there was no definite front; no relation of one part of the army to another, such as would go to make up a satisfactory defensive line. The several brigades of a division were not even encamped together. One of General Sherman's own brigades lay more than two miles from *Subsequent events (even if abstract military principles were not sufficient) having seemed to most men to condemn tbe location of the army on that side the river, while awaiting Buell's arrival, General W. T. Sherman has volunteered a defense of General Grant in the premises. Having first justified the landing on the south side and consequent exposure to an enemy believed to be largely superior, with a swollen river in the rear between the army and the one that was to re-enforce it, on the absurd ground that " it was not then a question of military skill and strat egy, but of courage and pluck ; that it was necessary that a combat, fierce and bitter, to test the manhood of the two armies should come off, and that was as good a place as any ; " he continues, after the pattern of the famous cracked kettle defense : First, the kettle was not returned to the lender cracked. Second, it was cracked when it was borrowed. First, General Grant was not wrong in locating the troops on the enemy's side of the river. Second, he didn't locate them there at all. "The battle-field was chosen by that veteran soldier, Major-General Chas. F. Smith. If there were any error in putting that army on that side the Tennessee, exposed to the superior force of the enemy also assembling at Corinth, the mistake was not General Grant's." These statements of fact have been questioned by officers of equal rank and ability. General Grant has himself added nothing to the controversy, nor is he likely to do so. He has long ago outlived, (if indeed he were ever subject to) the foolish vanity of thinking it necessary to prove that he never made a mistake, in order to vindicate his title to greatness Of the general issue thus raised, however, one thing ought to be said. It is ungenerous, and likely to be unfair, after public odium has attached to a transaction, to shift it to a dead man's shoulders. Chas. F. Smith can not appear to tell us under what stress of orders he was acting, and the General of the schools, who from his head-quarters in St. Louis was then controlling the campaign, is not the man to tell for him. Furthermore, Smith, prostrated by disease incurred at Fort Donelson, was capable of giving active direction to affairs for but a few days subsequent to the arrival at Pittsburg Landing, and soon after he was stretched on his death-bed. Moreover, Grant himself, restored to command, was on the spot weeks before the battle. If he had regarded the position faulty, he was bound to rectify it. If, absorbed in the duties of the head-quarters bix miles below, he intrusted such duties in the field to the responsible General there, that Gen eral has now no right to shield himself from criticism, just or unjust, behind a hero's corpse. 372 Ohio in the War. the rest of his troops, with two other independent divisions thrust in between. The ground was well adapted for defensive works, yet not a rifle-pit was dug, nor even the simplest breastwork of rails and earth thrown together. Slash ings of timbers could have been made before every camp; yet not a hatchet was raised to prepare an abattis. Three miles in advance ran a stream which might •well have been used as a defensive line ; yet even its crossings were not watched. And still the enemy was known to be but a little more than a dozen miles distant and was believed to be in superior force. However the dispute ought to be decided as to the responsibility for such errors at the outset, there can be no question as to the responsibility for their continuance. To his honor, be it said General Grant has never sought to evade it. Let us gratefully add, that in all his varied career he has never repeated such blunders. The army thus confronting the enemy had been originally expected to ac complish more. General Halleck's first instructions were to occupy Florence, and destroy the railroad connections between Johnston's.army, retreating from Nash ville, and that of Beauregard, so soon to retreat from Memphis. Corinth, Jackson, and Humboldt were the railroad points he hoped to strike.* We have seen that the first movements in this direction under Sherman and Wallace were abortive. Then came the surprise of finding Corinth occupied and fortified, "with twenty thousand men under Beauregard," telegraphed General Halleck; and "Smith not strong enough to attack." Next came a determination to "land at Savannah and establish a depot."f Then, as Johnston fell back from Murfreesboro, Hal leck, estopped before Corinth, and finding it impossible to prevent the junction of Johnston and Beauregard, arranged with Buell to gain the co-operation ofthe Army of the Ohio. While preparing to move in accordance with this arrange ment, Buell signified his approval of Halleck's dispositions, thus: "The estab lishment of your force on this side of the river, as high up as possible, is evi dently judicious."! 'But what must his astonishment have been on learning, a week later, that the column he was already toiling overland, to join, was planted on the opposite side of a swollen river, and almost under the fortifications ofthe concentrating foe! He refused to believe it, and telegraphed to Gen. Halleck for information. What we have now to add would seem incredible, were not the official dispatches on file. Whether General Halleck himself knew that his army was thus scattered on the south bank, with the river in its rear and the foe in its front, does not certainly appear; but it does appear that if he did know, he did not, in reply to this dispatch, notify General Buell of it.|] That officer moved on * "Available force gone up the Tennessee to destroy connections at Corinth, Jackson and Humboldt. ... It is of vital importance to separate them (Beauregard's troops) from John ston's army. Come over to Savannah or Florence and we can do it." Halleck's dispatch to Buell, 1th March, 1862. t " Florence was the point originally designated, but on account of enemy's forces at Corinth and Humboldt, it is deemed best to land at Savannah and establish a depot." Halleck to Buell, 10th March, 1862. J Buell to Halleck, 10th March, 1862 ; reply to dispatch just quoted. | Buell's dispatch, 18th March, 1862, said, " I understand that General Grant is on the east (north) side of the river ; is it not so ? " Halleck's reply " did not inform him to the contrary. Ulysses S. Grant. 373 as rapidly as the roads and bridgeless streams would permit, but in no special haste, ignorant of any cause for special haste; actually requested by General Halleck to halt at Waynesboro, thirty miles short of the junction with Grant till he (Halleck) could get ready to run up from St. Louis ; not even notified bv Grant of the true condition of affairs ; and finally — strangest of all — he was informed by Grant, as late as the Saturday night before the direful Sunday of Pittsburg Landing, that it was unnecessary to hasten his march I * So absolute was the surprise of that fateful attack. Meantime the golden opportunity had been lost. When the army under Chas. F. Smith began moving up the Tennessee, Corinth (next to Florence — if not before it — the great objective point) could have been seized by a handful of troops. When the army was blindly striking at railroads, right and left, Corinth was still feebly garrisoned. Beauregard admits that it was only on the 2d of March that he began the effort to concentrate there. As late as March 6th, Gen eral Halleck himself, repeating the news sent "down the Tennessee," placed the force at Corinth at only twenty thousand; whereas the army he had sent against it could even then muster almost double that number. But the chances were flitting fast, As early as 25th of February General Sidney Johnston had declared, in a private letter to Mr. Davis, his determination to abandon Middle Tennessee, and move toward Corinth, to co-operate or unite with Beauregard. Buell moved from Nashville on the 15th of March, to form a junction with Hal leck's forces (under Grant) ; but, three days afterward, Sidney Johnston was able to write Mr. Davis again, "the passage is almost completed, and the head of my column is already with General Bragg at Corinth." He adds, with a satisfac tion warranted by the apparent success of his grand strategy, "the movement was deemed too hazardous, by the most experienced members of my staff, but the object warranted the risk. The difficulty of effecting a junction is not wholly overcome, but it approaches completion. Day after to-morrow, unless the enemy intercepts me, my force will be with Bragg." f The " enemy "did not " intercept him." The junction was completed ; fresh re-enforcements arrived from Louisiana and other States; the rest of Beauregard's spare forces had been called in — alto gether not less than forty thousand effective troops were mustered within less than a day's march of our scattered, undefended, unguarded camps on the Tennessee. Moreover there was an end to the management of Floyds and -Pillows and Tilghmans in the Eebel army. The ablest soldier then, or ever espousing their cause, had assumed the command in the field. He had patiently borne the popi ular clamor that followed his abandonment of Bowling Green; had made no * Buell to Editor U. S. Service Magazine, January 19th, 1865. Halleck proposed to leave St. Louis, April 7th. The battle began on the 6th. Buell's words about Grant's communication, are: 'The day before his arrival at Savannah, General Nelson, who commanded my leading division, advised General Grant, by courier, of his approach, and was informed in reply, that it was unnecessary to hasten his march, as he could not, at any rate, cross the river before the following' ¦Tuesday." It will be seen hereafter in these pages (Life of General Ammen) that another officer of Buell's army received from Grant more striking statements to the same effect. t Sidney Johnston to Jeff. Davis, March 18, 1862. (Private letter communicated to Confed erate Congress.) 374 Ohio in the War. answer to the storm that beat upon him when his subordinates sacrificed Fort Donelson. Now, at last, his army was in hand; the unsuspecting antagonist lay before him inviting the blow; and on the third of April he announced to the "Soldiers of the Army of the Mississippi," that he "had put them in motion to offer battle to the invaders of their country," and to "fight for all worth living or dying for." One more opportunity was left for that torpid antagonist. The hand of God interfered to work delay. Johnston moved from Corinth by noon of April 3d; hut the,heavens opened and deluged the swampy country over which he had to pass. Less than seventeen miles of marching would bring him upon our camps; he did not accomplish the distance till the afternoon ofthe 5th. One whole day was spent with an army of forty thousand men, floundering through woods within the line - our pickets should have occupied. Even yet it was not too late. There, through that long afternoon and evening, lay the Eebel army, almost within gunshot of the camps it was to attack. If the camps were without pickets, and the army without Generals, it would seem, at least, that the men could scarcely be with out ears. And yet day darkened into night without alarm; the commanding General quietly returned to his head-quarters in Savannah; the army sank into slumber; the enemy in silent bivouac on its front actually listened to its drums, and was guided by its "taps" and "reveille." "The total absence of cavalry pickets from General Grant's army," writes an officer of Beauregard's staff,* " was a matter of perfect amazement. There were absolutely none on Grant's left, where Breckinridge's division was meeting him, so that we were able to come up within hearing of their drums entirely unperceived. The Southern' Generals always kept cavalry pickets out for miles, even when no enemy was supposed to be within a day's march of them. The infantry pickets of Grant's forces were not above three-fourths of a mile from his advance camps, and they were too few to make any resistance." And yet there had been enough to alarm any but the blindly self-confident. On Friday a reconnoissance, a few miles out from camp, had developed a Eebel battery in position, and had led to a sharp skirmish. On Saturday there had been more or less picket firing; more than one Colonel had felt it incumbent upon him to give emphatic warning of the signs of the enemy's presence in force, which he could perceive on his front. They were treated as alarmists, whose freshness from civil life and ignorance ofthe noble art of war must excuse their nervous apprehensions ! Saturday evening, as he passed down to his head-quar ters at Savannah, General Grant stopped at Crump's Landing to see General Lew. Wallace. There were some indications of possible attack, he thought; but if it were really intended, it would probably fall there, and not at Pittsburg ' Landing. And so we drifted into the assault. Next morning it came. By daylight the Eebel divisions were in motion. ' The shots of our pickets had scarcely been noticed, till such of them as were not captured rushed into camp. Almost simultaneously crashed the first volley of • "An Impressed New Yorker's Thirteen Months in the Rebel Army." The author of this work is Geo. M. Stevenson, son of Rev. Dr. Stevenson of the American Tract Society. Ulysses S. Grant. 375 the advancing foe on Prentiss's front. A little later they struck Sherman. Each hastened to form line of battle. The latter was successful, and for some little time held his ground. Prentiss was scarcely so fortunate. Meanwhile the two divisions had no connection ; the enemy found the gap, and the flank of each was turned. Sherman's left broke in disorder ; the confusion was spreading to his right when the whole line fell back. Away to the left the enemy found another gap, for Prentiss had as little connection with Sherman's solitary brigade on the extreme left as he had with the other brigades of that officer on the extreme right. He was flanked there also ; three sides were enfolded ; he fell back, fight ing bravely enough against the inevitable, and was at length compelled to sur render such fragments of his force as still retained their coherency. The enemy rushing in on his left flank had struck the right of Sherman's isolated brigade, and it, likewise under the same stress, was hurled backward. Never was there a battle where everything had been so skillfully arranged to court such sudden disaster. The roar of the onslaught startled Grant from his peaceful Sunday morning slumbers, down the river at Savannah. He hurried.up, on the first steam boat he could obtain, to find Prentiss practically disappeared from the contest ; Sherman's division in confusion ; McClernand's, which had hastened to support it, crippled, and but Hurlbut and W. H. L. Wallace left to save the day. He strove to make the troops contest the ground more obstinately, hurried forward sup plies of cartridges, and for a time did little more. He was facing his superiors in the art of war, and, as he first felt the weight of their skillful combinations and resistless assaults, we may well believe that for a moment there came over the mind of our Infantry Captain and Galena leather-dealer— now returned to his old profession to rival his old masters — a wish that the confidence born of Port Donelson had not carried him so far. But he allowed no signs of distrust to escape him. There seemed little that he could do, but he could at least keep up his courage. The troops were beaten back from place to place, with an ever narrowing front, and a steadily swelling stream of deserters to the rear. The bluff was alive with them. Miles down the stream they made their hurried way in scores and hundreds. Still the army of forty thousand, surprised, broken in fragments, driven piecemeal, dwindled to scarcely more than half its number, kept up a good fight. Never did Generals strive more bravely in the field to redeem their irredeemable blunders in the council. By half-past, four in the afternoon there remained for them scarcely more than half a mile of ground to stand on. Eebel shells were dropping among the skulkers on the Landing. A staff officer was killed, almost at Grant's side, on the bluff. The tremendous roar to the left, momentarily nearer and nearer, told of an effort to cut him off from the river and from retreat. Grant sat on his horse, quiet, thoughtful, almost' stolid. Said one to him, "Does not the prospect begin to look gloomy ?" " Not at all," was the quiet reply. " They can't force our lines around these batteries to-night — it is too late. Delay counts everything with us. To-morrow we shall attack them, with fresh troops and drive them, of course. "* I was myself a listener to -this conversation, and from it I date, in my own case at least, the beginnings of any belief in Grant's greatness. 376 Ohio in the War. .For Buell had already arrived in person ; the advance of the Army of the Ohio was at Savannah ; before daybreak almost the whole column would be up. There was no consultation between the independent commanders now on the field. Grant explained to Buell the position ; Sherman furnished him with a little map of the roads, and, by common consent, it was understood that Buell was to advance at daybreak with his fresh troops on the left, where his fore most division had already done some fighting. Grant gathered together what he could of his army and prepared to advance on the right. PITTSBURC LANDING AND SURROUNDINGS. A. Positions of Major-General Grant's forces on the morning of April 6th. B. Positions of Gl-ant, with tho divisions of Nelson and Crittenden, oa the evening of April 6th. 0. Positions of Grant and Buell on tjhe morning of April 7th. n. Positions of Grant and Buell on tho evening of April 7th. B. Eeserve of Artillery. The next day brought success. The Army of the Ohio extended its front over three-fourths of the battle-field; Grant's shattered troops were barely able Ulysses S. Grant. 377 to keep up the line on the other fourth ; but there were enough — the day was won. The troops were too much exhausted for pursuit, and halting in the camps from which they had been driven the day before, were content to call it a victory. Not to be outdone, Beauregard (in command since Sidney John ston's death in the first day's battle) telegraphed to Eiehmond that he had won a great and glorious victory; and Mr. Davis went so far as to communicate the glad tidings to the Confederate Congress in a special message. The losses were about equal. Beauregard reported his at ten thousand six. hundred and ninety-nine killed, wounded, and missing. Grant estimated his at five thousand killed and woundea, while two thousand two hundred prisoners were known to be taken with Prentiss. The incomplete reports of the subor dinates, however, subsequently showed a loss often thousand six hundred killed and wounded. Altogether our loss must have been fifteen thousand, and Beau regard's could not havo fallen many hundreds below the same figure. On the first day the contending forces were about equal. On the second Beauregard was largely outnumbered. Of General Grant's conduct during this battle nothing can be said but praise; of his conduct before it little but blame. Flushed with Donelson, and seeming to despise his antagonist, he neglected almost every precaution and violated almost every rule of his profession. Believing the enemy to be largely superior in numbers, he lay, awaiting Buell's army, in a position inherently false and dangerous.* The order of his encampments was worse even than the position. "With. an enemy in front," says Montecuculli, "an army should always encamp in order of battle." It is Napoleon himself who tells us that "encampments of the same army should always be formed so as to protect each other;" and again, that "it should be laid down as a principle never to leave intervals by which the enemy can penetrate between corps." The neglect to fortify is palliated by the popular dislike then existing to the spade as a weapon. But officers who had studied war. and knew its requirements could scarcely have forgotten the spirit, even if they had failed to recall the words of the great Master of War, when he declared that, in the presence of an enemy, "it is necessary to intrench every night, and occupy a good defensive position." The neglect of pickets and out-posts approached criminality. That an enemy, forty thousand strong, only eighteen miles distant at the outset, and hourly approaching, could spend three days preparing to attack and in leisurely selecting its positions, without discovery by the antagonist General, will seem to the next generation preposterous and incredible. When the storm which he thus invited had burst, when he found how disaster was enveloping his army, and saw divisions melt ing bodily out of his grasp, Grant rose to the height of a hero. More than that, he rose (and for the first time on that movement) to the height of a General. "For it is the first qualification of a General-in-chief," says Napoleon again, "to have a cool head." The man who amid the disasters of that day could calmly * Napoleon laid it down as a maxim of war, that "when the conquest of a country is under taken by two or three armies, having separate lines until they arrive at a point fixed upon for their concentration, the union of these different corps should never take place near the enemy." 378 Ohio in the War. reason out the certainty of success to-morrow, gave proof, in spite Qf.blundeiB that under most managements would have cashiered him, ofhis capacity to lead the hosts of Freedom in greater struggles yet to come. The battle of Pittsburg Landing added to Grant's reputation at the East and increased his already rapidly rising popularity. In the West% where it was better understood, where the ghastly losses were felt and the causes were known ,it was held to be sufficient reason for his removal from command. The (qrover- nors of several Western States requested his removal on the grounds of inca pacity and alleged intoxication. The fearful foss of life was charged directly to his negligence, and exaggerated stories of his habits were widely circulated. Even the gross slander, that explained the disasters of the first day's battle by the allegation of Grant's absence for hours in a state of intoxication at Savan nah, found ready believers. In the midst of all this, General Halleck hurried from. St. Louis to take personal control, and thus illustrate to the Nation what one, who had gained such brilliant victories from his remote head-quarters, could accomplish when once his martial tread shook the actual field. One of his earliest deeds was to deprive Grant of all command. But Halleck had been lawyer quite as much as soldier; and his explanation to the victim, of the high honor he did him in thus beheading him, was a masterpiece of. lawyer -liko strategy. General Grant was the second in command; therefore it was necessary that he should have no command. For, in the event, which his constant exposure made hourly imnji- nent, of the General-in-chief 's being killed or disabled, it was necessary that the next in rank should be ready on the instant, and disengaged from other duties. " The General studied a long while over that stroke, and seemed mightily. pleased at the shape he gave it," said an admiring staff officer. Grant tried hard to believe in the theory, but his sturdy common sense was too much for it. Indeed; there were times_during that weary two,, months' "siege" of Corinth wh.en those who entered his tent found him almost,. in tears — contemplating, once it is said, the tender of his resignation as a, means of escape from a position which he, felt to be humiliating, In these dark days he had a constant friend in General Sherman — a fact not without itSj.influence in the later career of both. Halleck's summons to the East as General-in-chief, not long after the evacuation of Corinth, left Grant again in active command. For a time there was little to do. The campaign that,, opening so bravely amid winter snows around Donelson and .Henry, had swept the Eebels from Bowling .Green to Corinth, from Columbus to Vicksburg, frittered itself away tiy.gariy summer, in inconsequential pursuits and final stagnation- The enemy had, time to recoyer from blows that had well-nigh proved mortal, to concentrate his scattered forces, and to resume the offensive. For this it is not pjain that. Grant should be held in any sense responsible. He had always advocated vigorous action, to the extent indeed of taking too little rather than too much time for preparation. Through all the amazing delays at Corinth he had urged advance, and it niay Ulysses S. Grant. 379 well be believed that his natural bent was not changed when power was at last lodged again in his hands. The limits of Ms command naturally placed before him the task of opening the Mississippi. It was not till 27th of November that he was able to set about it. This interval of six months after the fall of Corinth, was spent in civil administration, and in a couple of battles directed by Grant and fought by Eosecrans. At first Grant established his head-quarters at Memphis. Presently it was discovered that the resident families of Eebel officers were constantly furnishing them news of the movements and numbers of troops. To prevent this, such families were peremptorily ordered beyond the lines. Subsequently the order was so far modified as to permit those to remain who chose to give their word of honor not to communicate with the Eebel army. An order hold ing the communities which sustained guerrilla bands pecuniarily liable for their outrages, struck at the root of the system. A disloyal newspaper was sumr marily suppressed. Efforts were made to keep back the swarm of unprincipled speculators who hastened South, loaded with specie, to cross the lines and trade with the Eebels. The runaway slaves who crowded his camps were organized into companies and made to earn a living by being set to work picking cotton. The army was rigorously forbidden to interfere with the natural workings of the slavery question. Slaves were neither to be enticed away from their mas ters nor returned to them. A regiment that had been guilty of pillaging to a disgraceful extent, found itself charged with the value of its robberies when the paymaster came around. The Jews, as a class, were arraigned for "violating every regulation of trade established," and were ordered out of the department on twenty-four hours' notice, not to return under penalty of imprisonment. Some of these orders were perhaps indiscreet; the most were well-judged and ha.d a happy effect. Grant's strong common sense was conspicuous through the various work; but the chaotic condition of civil affairs in the conquered territory, and the confusion of trade regulations under conflicting authorities rendered it impossible that the labors of any one sHould be satisfactory or complete. The midsummer repose was broken by the advance of the columns which the Eebels had been given time to re-assemble. Van Dora and Price were the leaders. The designs were uncertain ; but the first demonstration was an effort to break the line between Memphis and Corinth. Grant drew back his isolated garrisons before the advance, and suffered Price to take quiet possession of Iuka. Then, learning that Van Dorn could not eome up for four or five days, he sud denly concentrated upon Price. Ord, with six thousand five hundred men, was to come in from the north; Eosecrans, with nine thousand, from the direction of Jacinto. Grant remained with Ord's column, which was to attack as soon as Eosecrans could get up on the opposite side.1 Unfortunately a strong wind was blowing directly against this advance, and the sound of Eosecrans's cannonade was not heard. Grant, resting on the idea that as his march was a long one, he, could hardly be expected so soon, held Ord back, and thus Eosecrans was left to fight the battle alone. Next morning Price, discovering his danger, had re-- 380 Ohio in the War. treated, and the chance of closing with a consolidated force of near sixteen thousand upon Price's twelve thousand, and crushing it, was lost. Van Dorn next advanced upon Corinth. Grant entrusted its defense to Eosecrans, and disposed his remaining forces with a view to protect other points if the movement on Corinth should prove only a feint. Eoseorans was attacked with a desperation that made Corinth one of the hardest fought battles of the war. The close of the second day saw Van Dorn with his combined forces in full flight. Grant had already forwarded fresh troops to Eosecrans for the pur suit; he now threw in Ord upon the flank ofthe beaten enemy and inflicted still further punishment. The brief little campaign was admirably managed. The pursuit might have been more energetically pushed, but there were reasons for delay that may leave Grant free from blame. The battle of Corinth was fought on the 4th of October. It was nearly two months later before Grant again advanced. The enemy was now posted on the Tallahatchie, to the south-west of Grand Junction and Corinth, where he covered Vicksburg and Jackson. Grant himself moved down on his front, while ho sent a small force from Helena, striking eastward across the country, to demonstrate upon his rear and cut off his supplies. So marked was the effect of this demon stration that the enemy hastily abandoned the line of the Tallahatchie, and fell back upon the Yallabusha. Grant pressed steadily down into the interior, leav ing in his trail a long train of posts to be garrisoned, the loss of any one of which would inevitably throw him back upon his base. It was a hazardous experiment, but one that promised brilliant results if successful. Whether this movement had originally been designed as one against Vicks burg does not appear; but about this time General Halleck sent orders from Washington that a direct expedition against Vicksburg should be started. Gen eral Sherman was at once sent back to Memphis to organize it, with orders to "proceed to the reduction of Vicksburg." The garrison, it was hoped, would be found weak ; and Grant's advance was relied on to keep the Eebel army, then on the Yallabusha, too fully occupied to relieve it. Such were the plans when a single stroke disarranged them all; and left, in place of the victory that had been hoped, a barren record of retreat for one column and a bloody repulse for the other. Grant had made Holly Springs the" immediate base of supplies for his. advance, and had left it under the com mand of Colonel Murphy, with .a garrison of a thousand men. Supplies and transportation had been accumulated here to the value of over four millions of dollars. The Eebel cavalry were suddenly discovered dashing past Grant's column, with evident design to cut his communication. In alarm for his sup plies ho sent word to Murphy of the impending danger, and hurried four regi ments back to re-enforce him. The regiments were delayed; Murphy proved himself an imbecile; the post was surrendered without firing a shot; Van Dorn destroyed everything in hot haste, and pushed on to other posts in quest of further work. It was the defeat of the whole movement. Grant moved back, and the enemy was left to devote his attention undisturbed to Vicksburg. Sherman, unfortunately, started the day after this disaster, and before he had Ulysses S. .Grant. 381 heard of it. He reached the northern defenses of Vicksburg, made a gallant and bloody assault, was repulsed with heavy loss, and was forced to abandon his effort. And so, by the opening of 1863, Grant found himself fairly confronted with the problem of Vicksburg. His most trusted Lieutenant had essayed it and failed. He had himself essayed a co-operative movement and failed. The Administration said: "Take Vicksburg." The people grew restive under the delay in fulfilling the order. To their minds the Great Eiver was the symbol of the Union. Till every obstruction to its peaceful flow was burst off, they could see no hopeful issue to the conflict. About this time, too, the whole horizon was dark. The partisans of McClellan waged fierce war upon the Government that had removed their favorite ; his enemies shrank appalled, as by their own handi work, from the ghastly slaughter of our bravest which his incompetent successor had wrought on the heights of Fredericksburg. The capture of New Orleans had led to none of the expected results. Operations on the sea-coast were frivo lous and inconsequential. At a great cost the old Army of the Ohio had, before Nashville, maintained its ground, without the ability to advance. From the sea to the river our armies seemed paralyzed. The opponents of the war at the North, encouraged by these indications, ventured upon an opener course. Their able representatives in Congress pointed to the failures of two bloody years as proof that the seceded States could never be subdued; demanded a cessation of hostilities; declared that continuance of the struggle would insure the eternal separation of the South. Their eloquent spokesman warned the Government that, in such case, the North-West would go with the South. If war could not open the Father of Waters, the men who dwelt on its tributaries and about its sources would make peace to accomplish the end. "There is not one drop of rain that falls over the whole vast expanse of the North-West," he exclaimed with threatening emphasis, and with the instant applause of his great party, "that does not find its home in the bosom of the Gulf. * We must and we will follow jjt, with travel and trade, not by treaty but by right; freely, peaceably, and without restriction or tribute, under the same Government and flag."* , Unmoved by the clamor' that thus agitated the public mind and gave fever ish .interest to his operations; unmoved likewise by the signs of his own growing unpopularity, the stories about his habits, the comments on his Mississippi failure, . the censures of his negligence in leaving Holly Springs with defense so inade quately prpportionedto the importance of the post— moved by none of these things from his equable calm, Grant, still with the fullest support ofthe Govern ment, began his study of the Vicksburg problem. It was evident that the conditions were different from those under which the other strongholds along the Mississippi had been successively secured. The naval, farce had in every case proved insufficient to reduce the 'Eebel. batteries which, blocked the navigation, so long as their garrisons were free from menace "Vallandigham's Speech on Wright's Resolutions, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., Jan., 1863. 382 Ohio in the War. by a superior land column. But the moment that an army in the interior endangered the communications of the garrison, the post had fallen. With the establishment of Grant's forces at Fort Donelson, Columbus had been abandoned. With Pope's appearance below it, Island No. 10 had been abandoned. With the evacuation of Corinth came the evacuation of Fort Pillow, and the resulting fall of Memphis. With the occupation of Jackson, whieh Grant had essayed, might have come Sherman's occupation of Vicksburg. But Grant had failed to keep open his communications on his march toward Jackson; and whether he might have done better again or not, he abandoned the effort, and committed himself to the radically false movement* of passing directly down the river. He was not long indeed in discovering the error ; but the steps could not well be retraced. Thenceforward his mind was wholly turned upon efforts to find some way of vaulting from the river in the front, to the hills in the rear of Vicksburg. And here it was that the peculiar difficulties of the problem were encountered. This city of Vicksburg is situated at the eastern end of a great bend of the Misssisippi, and on its eastern bank. Its high bluffs render direct assault from the front an impracticable thing. It is now to be seen that a movement from the east bank of the Mississippi above it, around to its rear, was likewise an impracticable thing. A few miles above Vicksburg the Yazoo river empties into the Mississippi, on the eastern side. The hills which skirt Vicksburg extend northward, forming a good defensive line up to Haines's Bluff on the Yazoo, twelve miles from its confluence with the Mississippi. In front of these hills lay swamps, dense woods, and an old bed of the Yazoo — an uncertain region, neither land nor water, but presenting the obstacles of both, and admirably improved by the Eebel commander. The batteries at Haines's Bluff effectually closed the Yazoo to our gunboats: the defensive line thence to Vicksburg, just described, barred an advance by the land forces. This then was the problem : How should the army be planted in the rear of Vicksburg and supplied? The route overland, via Holly Springs, having been definitely abandoned, but two possible lines of supply seemed left. If the Yazoo could be used, the army might reach the rear of Vicksburg from the north side. If the Mississippi could be used, it might reach the rear from the south side. But we have seen that the Yazoo was closed by the batteries of Haines's Bluff, the Mississippi by the batteries Of Vicksburg itself. Months were spent in efforts to evade first the one and-then the other. All were futile ; and failure after failure served at once to strengthen the opposition at the North, to embarrass the Government, and to discourage the army. * High authorities will condemn this censure. But I find myself fortified in it, not merely by the abstract principles of war, but by the openly expressed conviction of so eminent a soldier and so distinguished a friend of Grant's as General Sherman. In his speech, July 20th, 1865, at a banquet given in his honor, at St. Louis, General Sherman, after referring to the canals and the " drowning on the levee like mnskrats," said : " All that time the true movement was the on,gi- nal movement, and everything approximating it came nearer the truth. But we could not make a retrograde movement. Why ? Because you people of the North were too noisy. We could not take any step backward, and for that reason we were forced to run the batteries at Vicksburg. Ulysses S. Grant. 383 The first project was to open the Mississippi by cutting a canal (scarcely a mile in length), directly across the neck of land around which the river bends, to wash the bluffs of the threatened city. This would have opened a line of supply to « GEN. GRANT — »- ADMIRAL. PORTER GEN. BLAIR VICKS3URC AND SURROUNDINGS. the southward — even if the channel had not been permanently changed — and would thus have enabled Grant to move from the south side to the rear of Vicks burg. The work was energetically prosecuted, but before the canal was deep enough, the rising river swept in t$ie dam at its upper end, flooded the camps and drove off the workmen. Even then the undertaking might have been a success ; but the upper end of the canal had been located exactly at a powerful eddy in the river, which effectually prevented the current from entering it. And— as if the planners had predestinated failure — even if the canal had been 384 Ohio in the War. made navigable, it must have been useless, for it entered the Mississippi again directly under heavy batteries of the enemy. The river rose none too soon to prevent further waste of time on a scheme like this. Still seeking a route down the river by which he might supply his army below, Grant next bethought him of the chain of lakes and ponds and stagnant bayous through the swamps of Louisiana, connecting Lake Providence (lying only a mile west of the Mississippi) with the Tensas Eiver, which, through the Eed, leads again into the Mississippi far below Natchez. Chimerical, indeed, must have been the visions of relief from the remorseless conditions ofhis prob lem that were swarming before the mind of the puzzled General, when the project of opening and defending a line like this, through the enemy's country, was seriously entertained. But a canal from the Mississippi into Lake Provi dence was begun, and for a time the troops were kept busy with the spade upon it. Scarcely less unpromising was another wild effort, the last of the schemes for evading Vicksburg and still descending the Mississippi. Near Milliken's Bend are certain Louisiana bayous, sluggish wastes of water in that "half-made land," which, during the spring freshets, swell into navigable streams. By one tortuous connection and another, through cypress swamps innumerable, it was just possible that a shallop could be floated along these bayous, at flood time, till it should strike the Tensas, and thus again reach the Mississippi, through the Eed, half way down to New Orleans. Along this circuitous route an effort was actually made to dredge a channel. Presently the river fell, the bayous shrank again into scum-covered ponds, the connections with each other stiffened into mud, and, mayhap, before the season ended, cotton stalks were growing along the track the dredge boats had marked. With this ended the series of efforts to evade the Vicksburg batteries, and still find a line for supplies down the river. Meantime more promising plans were projected. We have seen that if the waters of the Yazoo could be reached, that stream would furnish a line, by the aid of which the army might safely essay from the northward a movement to the rear of the defenses of its long-coveted prize. The mouth of the Yazoo Deing closed by these defenses themselves, it became necessary to seek some other and unknown way of bursting into that river. Far up the Mississippi — well-nigh to Memphis itself — lies one of those anomalous sheets of water that line the banks of the Great Eiver, — tributaries in its weakness, parasites in its strength. This connects with a little lake, this again with the head-waters of one of the branches of the Tallahatchie, and through it with the Yazoo, Such is the route which now came to be known to the baffled, struggling army, as the Yazoo Pass. An expedition was formed to enter it, and after incredible labor, navigating those dark, interminably winding aisles of cypress, the Tallahatchie was fairly reached, early in March. "But," to take General Grant's own explanation, "while my forces were opening one end of the pass the enemy was diligently closing the other." Just as the leaders of the expedition imagined that they were about to reach the goal of all their labors (the Yazoo) and sweep Ulysses S. Grant. 385 down from the rear upon the batteries of Haines's Bluff, they were suddenly stopped by a fort the Eebels had been busily building at the junction of the Tallahatchie with the Yazoo. It proved too strong for the gunboats; the high water prevented the land forces from co-operating in an attack; and so, by 21st March, the movement that had come so near success was abandoned, and tho expedition returned. But there yet remained a roundabout road to tho Yazoo, — so obscure that perhaps the Eebels had not obstructed it. Parallel with the Tallahatchie, and like it, emptying into the Yazoo, but nearer the Mississippi, with a more slug gish current, a shallower channel and more confusedly winding course, ran the Big Sunflower.- It tqo could be reached, through lakes and bayous and ponds, from Yazoo Pass. Into this the gunboats now adventured. The trees from either bank interlaced their branches above; cypress trees rose in the very midst of the channel ; here and there a, sturdy cypress stood fair in the path the ' boats must take; logs and brush floated idly on the surface of the dark lagoons. "Every foot of our way," wrote an officer, " was cut and torn through a dense forest never before traversed by steamers." Delays were necessary, arising mainly from the utter ignorance of steamboatmen and all others as to the nature of the waters thus to be navigated. The enemy discovered the movement and prepared to check it; and so, when almost ready to emerge into the Yazoo, this last of the failures returned. Throe, months had now been consumed, and the army that had been expected to storm Vicksburg still lay on the Louisiana shore, with the Missis sippi river between it and its goal. It was in good health, for at that season the evils of the climate and of the swamp are not felt; but to the excited appre hensions of the people at home, who knew their sons to be aimlessly crowded on levees or wading through dark morasses, to no successful end, the condition ofthe troops became a matter of keenest apprehension. Meantime, all that the country knew was that effort after effort had failed; that now seven distinct and successive undertakings against Vicksburg, six of them under General Grant's sole direction, had fallen impotent, and had only aroused the mirth of the enemy, who jeered at the Yankee ditch-diggers. One by one, those wise men of the East, who had followed the rising star from Fort Donelson, fell off. Long since it had been possible to number, with few figures, Grant's friends at the West. "There was a time," said Mr. Lincoln, "when I stood almost alone in supporting him." The clamor .for., his removal swelled. Even that sturdiest of champions for a friend's cause, the Congressman from Grant's own district, who had already tilted many a parliamentary joust in his favor, grew luke warm. Slanders revived. " The army was being ruined," said the coarsest and most reckless of the newspapers, " in mud-turtle expeditions, under the leader ship of a drunkard, whose confidential adviser was a lunatic." It was the crisis of Grant's career. One thing, one only, stood between him and a removal, which would have consigned him to the purgatory of broken-down Generals, with a record that, in the light of this final failure, would have been read as one of unbroken blunders and disasters, relieved only by a victory that another had Vol. I— 25. 386 Ohio in the War. won for him at Donelson. The confidence of Abraham Lincoln, though sadly shaken, did not yet give way; he would "let Grant try once more." And it is to be specially noted that, in so resolving, he resolved likewise that the General thus' favored should be supplied with every re-enforcement and appliance for which he asked. With such hard fortune as befell other Generals in similar straits, Grant must inevitably have gone down like them. But while McClellan, in the midst of the like futile attempts against a Eebel stronghold, clamoring for ro-enforcements, was denied. — while Eosecrans, piteously begging for troops, was told to cease his importunity and use what he had — Grant, in greater disfavor now than either, was still supported with generous and unstinting hand. What ever he sought, that he straightway received. The endangered General himself bore stoutly up. Through nil this flounder ing for a plan of operations, one feature of his character shines clear — he did not see how to take Vicksburg; but without discouragement, or despondency at failures that would have broken down most men, with unabated hope, indeed^ he resolutely continued to face the problem. "All this while," says General Sherman, "the true movement was the origi nal movement," — that is, the march from Memphis via Holly Springs upon Jackson— and in this verdict that eminent General unquestionably follows the teachings of sound military science. That, at the time, he urged upon General Grant a return to Memphis to undertake the campaign over again on some such route is well understood ;* that Grant was for a time impressed by the-suggeBtion seems probable. But our " uncle-like youth " had been growing. Eepeated failures had cleared his vision and inflamed his resolution; till now, determined not to go back, he had wrought himself up to the point of an undertaking, obvious enough to have been talked over among the privates by their camp- fires, but so hazardous that not the boldest General in all that brave army would have dared it. He decided to march his troops southward on the Louisi ana side, to trust for supplies to steamboats that might run the gauntlet of the Vicksburg batteries, to cross the Mississippi below the last post in the chain of defenses, and then, staking everything upon tbe die, and trusting to the fortune of the cast, to cut loose from supplies, and strike for Vicksburg or ruin. More over, there was that in the mind of this most audacious of Generals that never permitted him to doubt of success, or to admit, in this wildest flight, the most prudent and judicious precautions. In the last days of March, the troops moved across the little peninsula opposite Vicksburg, and came out on the Mississippi below New Carthage. Gun boats and transports next ran past the batteries,^a fearful ordeal, from which they emerged, battered, shattered, some in flames, while others had gone down beneath the pitiless rain of shells. Then, with gunboats leading the way, and * General Sherman, in his St. Louis speech, referring to an incorrect version of the above statement, emphatically denied having protested against Grant's final movement. " I never pro tested against anything," he said. But he did not deny that, after Grant's movements had actually begun, he submitted in writing his reasons for believing that his own policy, as indicated above, would be better. Portions of this memorandum may be found in the (following) sketch of Sherman's life. Ulysses S. Grant. 387 transports bearing down store of provisions, the army marched on, till it camo opposite the last Rebel fort, that at Grand Gulf. Here the gunboats were expected to reduce the hostile works, but they failed. Grant then hastened twelve miles further down ; the gunboats and transports followed. The movement had now consumed a month ; and the Eebels were still incredulous or blind as to its real purpose. For Sherman had been left above, with his corps; and, when Grant was ready to cross to the eastern side of tho river and at last launch his army upon the enemy's rear, he had skillfully arranged that Sherman should be making a feint of attacking them in force above. And so it came about that, while, on the first of May, Pemberton was watching Sherman, at Haines's Bluff, Grant was fairly across, far below the city, and moving rapidly in the rear of Grand Gulf. From this moment there was in the mind of the great strategist, now at the head, of all the Confederate armies in the West, no doubt of the course to be pursued. Comprehending instantly the menace,, recognizing that the fat£ of Vicksburg was now to be settled by the fate of this army that was so suddenly rushing without a base into the enemy's country, General Jos. E. Johnston ordered Pemberton out, of Vicksburg, to concentrate everything, fall upon Grant and crush him. But not less clear was the vision of the General with whom Johnston was contending. From the hour that he set foot on tbe east side of the Mississippi, below Vicksburg, he persistently addressed himself to one clearly defined, distinct object, from which no raids upon his rear, no question of com- , munications, no dubious maneuvers of the enemy were to swerve him. Herein : lay the great Generalship of his movement. He at last knew precisely what he wanted. Interposing between Pemberton's forces near Vicksburg, and any troops to the eastward which Johnston might collect for the emergency, he struck straight along the most eligible route for the rear of Vicksburg, whence bursting off instantaneously, by attack in reverse, the fortifications on the Yazoo, he might open communication with the fleet, and sit down at his leisure to the siege. Accordingly, no sooner had the advance corps landed on the east side of the river and drawn four days' rations than it was pushed out on the road to Port Gibson — a point, the possession of which necessarily menaced the Rebel fortifi cations at Grand - Gulf. The garrison here understood well enough the nature of such movement, and four miles in front of Port Gibson strove desper ately to check the advance. The battle raged along the narrow ridge on which ran the road of the National army throughout the day, and cost a thousand of Grant's troops. But the. end was inevitable; the Rebels were defeated and forced back toward their fortifications. Grant pushed instantly on, and the Grand Gulf garrison found itself on the point of being cut off from Vicksburg. In all haste, therefore, it evacuated and fled, leaving Grant to move up the trans ports from Bruinsburg, and make his temporary base of stfpplies at the point he had originally selected. A little above Grand Gulf, the Big Black, after flowing a few miles to the rear of Vicksburg, and thence almost parallel with the Mississippi southward, 388 Ohio in the War. empties into the Great River. Crossing it at the bridge which the Grand Gulf garrison took, there lay before the army a straight road, only twenty miles long, directly to Vicksburg. But it was no part of Grant's plan to' move square in the teeth ofhis foe. Yet he sent a column along this road to pursue the flying gar rison, and thus creating the impression that the whole National army was rushing straight upon him, held Pemberton near Vicksburg. Then, pushing his army along the eastern bank of the Big Black, he protected by that stream his left flank, while he hastened to plant himself upon the line by which Johnston and Pemberton communicated — the short forty -five mile railroad connecting Vicks burg with Jackson, the capital of the State. Assured by this skillful interpo sition of the Big Black, of hia safety from Pemberton, he even stretched his right, under McPherson, miles away to the eastward, to strike Jackson itself, destroy the Eebel stores, and discover what force Johnston might be gathering for Pemberton's relief. Meantime it was the fate of that able but unfortunate commander to be cursed with subordinates who fancied they knew more than their chief. Troops for the emergency were collecting at Jackson. He had already ordered Pem berton to concentrate against Grant; now, on his arrival at Jackson, he found Grant pushing by long strides against the railroad, midway between Jackson and Vicksburg, while Pemberton, conceiving it to be his duty in any event to cover Vicksburg, lay near it on the railroad. Johnston saw at once the false position of his forces, scattered on either side of Grant's column and sure to he beaten in detail; and he peremptorily ordered Pemberton to move north-east ward, crossing in advance of Grant's front, and so reaching Jackson. Had that brave but brainless General known only enough to obey his superiors, the issue might have been different. But he could not conceive of anything that could absolve him from the duty of standing by the earthworks of his cherished forti fication ; and so he took it upon himself to disobey Johnston's order. Not merely this; so bent was he upon helping his adversary that, remembering the rule in the books about striking an enemy's line of communications, and utterly failing to comprehend the essence of Grant's movement, which was an abandonment of all lines of communication, he actually marched southward, big with the mighty purpose of preventing Grant from drawing supplies from Grand Gulf. Meanwhile, Grant, hearing of Johnston's attempted concentration at Jack son, bent eastward the lines of Sherman and McClernand also, so that suddenly the whole' army thus concentrated, burst upon Johnston's feeble force. That commander, disobeyed by his subordinate on whose troops he had. confidently counted for such an emergency, did the best he could; but in two hours his hand ful was driven from Jackson, and the accumulated stores were in flames. Then, having thus cleared away obstructions in the rear, turning sharp to the west ward, Grant had before him — Vicksburg! To this stage had he reached in two short weeks! For, crossing the Missis sippi on the first, he was now, on the fifteenth, marching straight from Jackson upon the doomed city. All too late, Pemberton discovered' his blunder. Pour days before his mighty resolve to throw Grant back by cutting his communica- Ulysses S. Grant. 389 tions, Grant had sent word that "he would .communicate no more with Grand Gulf." Now, therefore, Pemberton finding that, in utter contempt of his threats, Grant was almost upon his flank, came hastening back with intent to march north eastward in the direction of Johnston's original order. But while he had been marching and countermarching, Grant with single purpose, had been driving straight to his goal. So then, when Pemberton, coming up from his futile raid against an abandoned line, reached in his northward march the Jackson and Vicksburg railroad, he was struck by Grant's columns hastening westward. It was too late to think of concentrating now with Johnston ; for his life and the life of his army he was forced to fight on the ground where he stood. Thus came about the battle of Champion Hills, at which the doom of Vicksburg was sealed. Pemberton's position was naturally strong and he had twenty -five thousand men to defend it. * Grant's heads of columns only were up ; one entire corps — that of Sherman, was still near Jackson. By eleven o'clock Hovey's division of McClernand's corps was fiercely engaged. Once it was repulsed; but Grant has tened to put in a division from McPherson's corps to strengthen it. Meantime Logan was sent far to the right to feel the enemy's flank. He found the road on which he moved suddenly bend down so as to bring him fairly upon the enemy's rear. Hovey was being once more repulsed, in spite of supports, when Pemberton discovered this new source of danger and hastily drew off. Then Hovey and the rest pressed forward; Logan's flanking column joined in; the retreat of the Eeheis became a rout ; one whole division was cut off from their army, and the rest were driven to the Big Black — almost within hearing of the bells of Vicksburg — before nightfall. Here came the last flickering effort of .the bewildered and blindly struggling Eebel commander. Crossing most of his troops, he left on the east side enough to hold the strong work defending the approaches to the river, while on the heights of the western bank he posted his artillery. Here, next morning, the advance corps of Grant's army, after some skirmishing, made an impetuous charge. The demoralized Eebel force broke at once. Pemberton vainly strove to rally them. Threats, persuasion, force were all in vain ; disordered, terror- stricken, a mob, not an army, they poured back to Vicksburg. f There were still left them a few hours in which to escape, for Grant was delayed half a day bridging the Big Black. Johnston's peremptory order once more came to save them, but not even as by fire was this Pemberton to be saved. He could still see nothing but Vi'cksburg, and while he debated with his officers about Johnston's strange order to evacuate and hasten north-eastward, Grant's columns came sweeping up in rapid deployment, around the city, and thenceforward there was no evacuation for the caged army. It was only the 18th of May; the movement had begun on the 1st. Into such brief limits was crowded the most brilliant cam- *Some Rebel authorities say only seventeen thousand five hundred. if Eighteen guns were captured here and fifteen hundred prisoners. Grant's total loss was but two hundred and seventy-one. At Champion Hills, however, the'day before, he lost two thousand four hundred and fifty -seven. The Rebel loss in killed and wounded was nearly as great; while it was swelled by two thousand prisoners, fifteen guns, and the death of Lloyd Tilghman, of Fort Henry memory. 390 Ohio in the War. paign of the General whose star, bursting at last from all clouds and conceal ment, soared thenceforward steadily to the zenith. ILpre Grant might well have rested, for his right bad already carried the Yazoo, and communications with the fleet were once more restored, and the issue of a siege could not be doubted. But as Johnston was known to be in the rear with a force which he would doubtless strive to increase for the purpose of rais ing the siege, and as the Eebel garrison was known to be greatly demoralized, it was thought best to try the effect of an immediate assault. Accordingly the day after the investment, this was ordered, but resulted only in carrying the lines forward upon the very verge of the enemy's works. Two days later, after ample preparations, agi-and simultaneous assault along' the whole line was made. Twenty-five hundred men were lost in the attempt, and Grant then concluded, to use his own words, "that the enemy's position was too strong, both naturally and artificially, to be taken in that way." Then followed the regular details of a siege. The utmost activity was main tained; Grant himself exercised the closest supervision of all the bombardments, mines, parallels, and siege approaches. By and by Johnston was reported to he moving upon him. Straightway Sherman was detached to face the new danger. "The Eebels," wrote Grant, referring to the intercepted letters on which he based this movement, "seem to put a great deal of faith in the Lord and Joe Johnston ; but you must whip Johnston at least fifteen miles from here." With all his efforts Johnston was too late. By the 7th of July, as he finally wrote Pemberton, he would be able to make an effective diversion. But Pem berton never received the letter; it went, like so many more, to swell the well- grounded confidence of the taciturn commander who now pressed his lines hard against every point of the beleaguered defenses. The garrison had long been on half rations; hope was exhausted; on the 3d of July Pemberton sought to "capitulate" on termswhich "commissioners" might arrange. Grant knew his advantages and replied that commissioners were useless, since he had no terms but unconditional surrender to offer. Still he was willing to have an interview on the subject. Pemberton gladly assented. They met between the lines under a clump of trees, at a spot since marked by a monument. Pemberton insisted upon commissioners. Grant, between the puffs of his cigar, replied that it was impossible. They sat down on the grass — tens of thousands of eager troops from the lines on either hand devouring their every movement — and talked it over. Pemberton still stood out for better terms. Perhaps, as the Eebel com mander has since hinted, some trace of the melo-dramatic tinged Grant's wish that the next day, the Fourth of July, should witness the surrender which ho knew to be inevitable. At any rate, that night he receded from his demand of unconditional surrender, agreed to parole the entire Eebel army, and permit it to carry off such provisions as it wanted. Pemberton still higgled, with skill commonly attributed in his section only to Yankee bargainers, and on the morn ing of the Fourth he gained the further jirivilege of marching out with colors and arms, and stacking them in front of his limits. This done the conqueror rode in. McPherson and Logan were by his side; a division of the army that Ulysses S. Grant. 391 had followed him from his movement on Jackson six months before, through all the buffets "and reverses that fortune had given him, up to this crowning moment, followed him now. As he rode, the "uncle-like youth " placidly smoked his ' cigar ! This .triumphant ending of the six .months' efforts against Vicksburg was slightly marred, in the popular estimation, by undue lenity. It was generally believed that the paroles of an army of thirty-seven thousand men were not likely to be too scrupulously regarded in such straits as those upon which the Confed eracy was now fallen, and Grant was blamed for not having sent his prisoners to the .North. In reply, it was said that, under all the circumstances, this was impossible. But the subject never affected the instant outburst of enthusiasm that bore Grant to the first rank among all the Generals in the service of the country. From the day that Vicksburg fell, he was, in the eyes ofthe men who made up the army, and of the men who sustained it, the central figure of the war. President Lincoln addressed him a characteristic letter — "in grateful acknowledgment for, the almost inestimable service you have done the countiy. I wish," he continued, "to say a word further. When you first reached the vicinity of Vicksburg, I thought you should do what you finally did — march the troops across the neck, run the batteries with the transports, and thus go below, and I never had any faith, except a general hope that you knew better than I, that the Yazoo Pass expedition and the like could succeed. When you got below, find took Port Gibson, Grand Gulf and vicinity, I thought you should go down the river and join General Banks; and when you turned northward, east of, the Big Black, I feared it was a mistake. I now wish to make a personal acknowl edgment that you were right and I was wrong." Barely as such words have reached a General from the head of a great Government, it has been more rarely still that the high honor they confer has been so meekly borne. While the army was .wild, while the North, was ringing bells and building bonfires, while the politicians were nominating him for the Presidency, and the President was thus wreathing his name with the praises of the Nation, General Grant, scarcely pausing to look at his conquest, was hastening to make head against Johnston's army in his rear. Sherman's division, was not even allowed to enter the city before which it had so long suffered and fought. While the streets of Vicksburg resounded with the shouts of such troops as had entered, it was toiling far to the eastward again, to press Johnston into position at Jackson, and soon there after to force him to retreat. At the same time General Frank J. Herron was sent to capture Yazoo City; that handsomely accomplished, he was ordered to re-enforce Sherman. Throughout those operations, thus happily ended, three great traits of character shone conspicuously. Grant rarely mistook his men, or failed to choose for every task* leaders amply qualified to execute it. He was uniformly calm and sensible, even in his moods of most audacious undertaking. And his deterrnination;td conquer, at whatever cost, was invincible — not to be daunted by any risk, not to be turned back by any slaughter. 392 Ohio in the War. There followed an interval of comparative leisure, extending to the middle of October. Expeditions were sent to prevent the passage of supplies from the Trans-Mississippi to Johnston ; re-enforcements were dispatched to Banks and Schofield; civil affairs were measurably adjusted in the conquered territory and along the Great Eiver that at last "went unvexed to the sea." Grant care fully regulated the issue of rations to the destitute inhabitants and to the swarm ing contrabands. He opposed the policy, enunciated in the expression attributed to Secretary Chase, that " trade follows the flag," declaring that any trade what ever with the rebellious States was equivalent to a weakening of the National * -r-r forces thirty-three and a third per cent. He observed the extortions practiced hy the greedy steamboat men who first followed the re-opened river, regulated the fares they were permitted to charge soldiers ; and ordered that, if a private soldier chose to travel as a cabin passenger, and had the money to pay for the privilege, no boat officer should have the power to hinder him. For the first time since the outbreak of the war he saw his wife. She now visited him at his head-quarters. The good woman's uneasiness about a liveli hood for the future, from the man who had been forced to peddle wood through the streets of St. Louis to earn a living for her, were at last at an end ; for hav ing resigned his place many years ago, in the regular army, he was now re-appointed. But what a leap was there! He had resigned a Captaincy with the pay of an ordinary clerk ; he was appointed to a Major-Generalship with a salary for life larger than that of a cabinet officer or of the Chief-Justice of the United States! Soon after, he 'was entertained at a costly banquet given to him in Memphis. The honors and attentions' showered upon him wrought no change. He was the same quiet, undemonstrative, plain^looking, plain- spoken man that had been at his wit's ends, digging ditches through weary months of vain experiment above Vicksburg. Some one sought to draw out his political opinions. He had none, he said. He didn't understand politics. But there was one subject he did understand, and, if they chose, was ready enough to discuss. He thought he knew all about the right way for tanning leather! In September he went to New Orleans, for a little rest. General Banks had a grand review in his honor. Grant was given a very fiery horse to ride. Even in the review he proved unmanageable, and the guest, unable to control his steed, went thundering along the lines as if he rode a break-neck race. The attendant Generals and their staffs did their best to keep up, and the horses all became wild with the excitement. As Grant turned back to the city, the sudden shriek of a locomotive startled his horse ; it plunged against a carriage that was meet ing him, and threw Grant heavily to the ground. He was carried insensible to an adjacent house; his hip was paralyzed; and for a time it seemed that he was permanently disabled. More than two months passed before he could walk without the aid of a crutch. While Grant was resting after the completion of his task, Eosecrans had been busied with his. Sweeping down from Murfreesboro', with the movemenfs of a consummate strategist, he had maneuvered Bragg beyond the Tennessee ; then, gathering all his resources, with muscles tense and every nerve on the Ulysses S. Grant. 393 rack, he had leaped to clutch the end of his campaign — the Hawk's Nest* that looks down to Georgia and the Sea. At the cost of a bloody battle he had won it, and Cha,ttanooga was ours. But the conquest cost the conqueror his command. Startled1 by their loss the Eebels hastened to concentrate upon the devoted army that, perching there among the mountain fastnesses, held firm in its bloody grasp the key to all their land. It was well-high too late when the War De partment perceived the danger to be real. Then, detaching from the Potomac a column under Hooker, it ordered Sherman across from the Mississippi, and made haste to concentrate the great armies ofthe West upon the spot whence it saw that, henceforth, the West must be defended and the South subdued. Inasmuch as it had decided to remove Eosecrans, there was but one man left to command these converging columns. The hero of Vicksburg was spontaneously suggested. On his arrival, under orders, at Indianapolis, he was met by the Secretary of War in person, and was given command of the whole country between the Mississippi and the Alleghanies. At last, then, victory was indeed organizing. Eosecrans bad been left with the dejdeted Army of the Cumber land, with restricted command, and no possibility of re-enforcements, to take the strategic point and hold it against Bragg and Longstreet. It was the rare good fortune of his successor that, thanks partly to the awakened apprehen sions of the Government, but more to its present unlimited confidence in the man, he was able to bring to the continuation of this same work the colossal re-enforcement of two armies. On the 23d of October, 1863, General Grant arrived at Chattanooga. He found the men on half rations and likely, within a week or two, to be starved out. But he found, also, the plans elaborated by which they could be relieved the proper officers apprised oftheir nature, and the troops in position to execute them. Furthermore, he found the plans elaborated. for the army's resuming the offensive. With his usual good sense he at once adopted these arrangements of his predecessor, and, with larger forces and unquestioning support from the Government, proceeded to their execution. We may now, therefore, look back to the weeks intervening between the disastrous day of Chickamauga and Grant's appointment to his new command, to trace the origin and development of the brief but brilliant campaign that was to carry our sturdy hero one step higher, and bring him the ortly promotion that remained for him to win. When, crushed beneath the Eebel concentration which the War Department had refused to believe possible, Eosecrans drew back his shattered columns to Chattanooga, that astute strategist realized, more fully, perhaps, than when a wing of his army first entered it, that there was the top and crown of bis rounded campaign — not to be lost under any circumstances — not to be yielded to any superiority of attack. Knowing how largely he was outnumbered he first sought to form a defensive line, sufficiently concentrated to defy the enemy in any strength. To "this end he abandoned- Lookout Mountain and his line of *the Indian word Chattanooga means "Hawk's Nest." 394 Ohio in the War. supplies south of the Tennessee, trusting that the re-enforcements, at last so vigorously forwarded after the battle was over, might arrive in time to re-open the line before its loss should be seriously felt. Meanwhile steamboats were building at Bridgeport for supplies, and bridge materials were earnestly sought. Now the position in which the army that bad wrested Chattanooga from the enemy stood, was this: Lying on the south side of the Tennessee, .closely shut up within its fortifications, it was forced to bring its supplies far over rough mountain i-oads to the northwai*d. In front of it lay its victorious enemy, looking down into its camps from the fastnesses of Mission Eidge, with out lying divisions down the river to its right, holding the point of Lookout Moun tain which abuts on the river, and the ferries below it. But to the left, above Chattanooga, it was possible for a force operating from the north side of the stream to cross to the rear of the enemy, who there bent his flank down around the beleaguered garrison. Likewise to the right, below Chattanooga, it was possible again for a force, operating from the north side of the river, to plant itself on the enemy's flank. For the river bends southward below the city, and then returns, making a huge TJ, with the curved end toward the south. Now against this curved end abuts Lookout Mountain. But beyond this, along the returning side of the U, runs Lookout Valley. The force holding Chattanooga, by passing to the north side of the river, behind the city, and marching across the little peninsula inclosed within the two sides of the U, would strike the river again below and beyond Lookout, and, by gaining a passage there, would find itself directly on the flank of the troops that held Lookout Mountain. Moreover, it would still be practically nearer to its main body than would any force which the enemy could then send to attack it. For, from Lookout, no artillery could be moved to this lower point, save by a long march twenty-six miles to the southward, to the nearest practicable gap. But from Chattanooga there was only the short march, on the north side, across the little peninsula. Thus, when this ferry on the further side of the peninsula was once gained, its possession was secure; for if it were disputed the army from Chattanooga could concentrate there in two hours, the enemy scarcely in two days. If we have at all succeeded in explaining these peculiar topographical fea tures, we have made the plans of General Eosecrans clear. As soon as Hooker's re-enforcements began to approach, they were ordered to Bridgeport, the place where the railroad strikes the Tennessee, and the nearest point on the river in our possession. Hooker was to cross here; troops from Chattanooga were sud denly to seize the ferry on the lower side of the peninsula we have described, leading into Lookout Valley ; Hooker was then to sweep up'to it along the south side road from Bridgeport, and the direct line of supplies would be once more opened ; while the enemy's flank down the river would be compromised. , Then another force was to be crossed above Chattanooga, at the point already men tioned, and planted upon the other flank. Further than this it does not appear that the plans of Eosecrans had taken consistent shape; when, on the very day of his return from the final reconnois sance of the ferry, by which ho meant tO open communication with Hooker, Ulysses S. Grant. 395 then about ready to march, he found orders relieving him from command of tho army. * Four days later General Grant arrived. He found these elements of a campaign ready to his hand, and competent subordinates to explain them. In three days, in precise conformity to Eosecrans's arrangements, he had Hooker orossing at Bridgeport. Meantime General W. ¥. Smith, one of the officers to whom Eosecrans had developed the plans, was sent down the river with a small force, in pontoon boats, to float silently past the enemy at Lookout, and seize the ferry at Lookout Valley. No sooner had they landed and driven off the Eebel pickets, than they were re-enforced by a column that had been marched across the peninsula. It only remained to fortify and await Hooker's advance. That officer pushed vigorously forward, suffering a terrible night attack from the now thoroughly aroused enemy; but repulsing it and effecting the connection on the 2-9th of October. Supplies could then come forward freely, by rail to Bridgeport, thence by river to tbe posts in Lookout Valley; and thence it was but a two hours' march, over the pontoon bridge and across the peninsula, to Chattanooga. Favored as he had been by great re-enforcements and wise dispositions for the execution of a skillful plan, there was now reserved for Grant a crowning piece of good fortune. The Eebel commander, seeing that it was no longer possible to starve out the army in Chattanooga, and little dreaming that his * The above account differs widely from those currently received, which attribute to Rose crans the intention of abandoning Chattanooga, and to Grant the elaboration of the brilliant campaign that raised the siege after his arrival on the spot. But Grant's fame is too solidly established to need such poor inventions for building it up by detraction of others. General Eosecrans, in testimony under oath before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, specifically stated that he had formed these plans, had made reconnoissances preliminary to carrying them out, and had explained them (fifteen days, in fact, before his removal) to Generals Thomas and Garfield, and, some time later, to General William F. Smith. Grant afterward acknowledged, in terms, his indebtedness to General William P. Smith for the crossing below Chattanooga, and the connection with Hooker; and Sherman took pains to emphasize his obligations to Smith for aid in all the details of the crossing above. Inthe course of bis testimony, just referred to, General Rosecrans said :¦" As early as the 4th of October, I called the attention of Generals Thomas and Garfield to the map of Chattanooga and vicinity, and, pointing out to them the positions, stating that, as soon as I could possibly get the bridge materials for that purpose, I would take possession of Lookout Valley (the point on the south side, reached by the march across the peninsula) and fortify it, thus completely cover ing the road from there to Bridgeport To effect this General Hooker was directed to concentrate his troops at Stevenson and Bridgeport, and advised that, as soon as his train should arrive, or enough of it to subsist his army, ten or twelve miles from his depot, he would he directed to move into Lookout Valley On the 19th I directed General William F. Smith to reconnoiter the shore above Chattanooga, with a view to that very movement on the enemy's right flank which was afterward made by General Sherman." These words of Rosecrans, it will be seen, are the only direct evidence I have cited to show who planned the Chattanooga and Mission Ridge campaign. No other evidence will be needed till it can be established, first, that General Rosecrans is at once knave and fool enough to be guilty of the perjury, with circumstance of falsely swearing to these statements, and naming the Gen erals who must know them to be true or false; and second, that these Generals, all honorable and highly esteemed gentlemen and' soldiers, are guilty of silently suffering themselves to be thus quoted, in matters of high moment, as authorities for statements which they know to be untrue. 396 Ohio in the War. own mountain-girt eyrie could be assailed, bethought him of the plan of crush ing Burnside's weak column in East Tennessee, which should have been sent months ago, to Rosecrans. General Longstreet, with his tried division of incomparable soldiers from the Army of Northern Virginia, was accordingly detached to East Tennessee. It was Grant's opportunity. He was already re-enforced by Hooker; Sherman, with the Army of the Mississippi, was march ing to join him ; and thus, while the force that held Chattanooga was being well-nigh trebled, its unwary antagonist was being weakened by almost one- half of his fighting capacity. Manifestly, Sherman's arrival must be the signal for attack. The outlines of the plan were already drawn. Hooker lay below menacing the enemy's flank on Lookout. Thomas, in Chattanooga, faced his center. It remained to put in Sherman on the upper flank; and the means for doing this secretly, from the north bank of the river, had already been devised by Smith, in the reconnoissance on which Rosecrans had sent him. On Sher man's arrival, Smith, at once, became his guide. It was only left to deceive the enemy as to the destination of this new army, now marching in from the westward. A happy accident directed one of its divisions to Hooker ; behind this, and unknown to the enemy, the rest of the army passed to the north side, behind Chattanooga and up to the points already selected for its reerossing to the eastward of the enemy's strongest position on Mission Ridge. Thus positioned, the troops awaited the signal of the quiet soldier now limping about the streets of Chattanooga on his crutch. They were seventy-five thousand strong; their recently weakened antagonist could only muster forty thousand. Grant had been impatient to attack from the moment he had heard of the detachment of Longstreet's corps ; the importunities of the War Depart ment concerning the danger to Burnside made him more eager; and he had once resolved not to wait for the arrival of Sherman. In that case he would have been carrying out Rosecrans's plan with Rosecrans's means. But fortune meant better for him. Now, on the evening of the 23d, Sherman's army lay con cealed above Chattanooga, on the north bank, and ready for the crossing. There fore, it was time that the movement should begin by attracting the enemy's atten tion somewhere else. Thomas was accordingly moved out on the center — that superb soldier so handling the finely-tempered force that had won its way from Stone River to the ground it stood on, that the enemy, looking down from the heights of Mission Eidge, thought it was a grand review, till, with compact lines, the column suddenly swept out upon his pickets and on over his advance posts, and crowned the "review" with the capture of Orchard Knob. The new positions were at once intrenched and strengthened with heavy artillery. Six hours later Sherman's men were crossing. By daylight a column, eight thousand strong, stood ready for the march on Mission Eidge; by noon tho bridges were all built, and the whole Army of the Mississippi was crowding across; by half-past three the north end of Mission Eidge had been carried, and, in strongly intrenched positions, Sherman awaited the hour for pressing hard upon the enemy at this vital point, while, by sweeping down the river from Ulysses S. Grant. . 397 the newly-gained heights, communication was opened again on the south side with the army in Chattanooga. Simultaneous with these operations were those grander ones down the river, which, through all our history, are to be known as Hooker's battle above the clouds. While the enemy, suddenly called off from contemplating the capture on his center, in which Thomas's grand review had ended, was now striving to make head against the new danger up the river,. whore Sherman was pushing into the very fastness of his strength, and while Grant knew, by the necessity of his weakened ranks, that his forces below on Lookout could not be large, Hooker was ordered to advance and take it. He charged up the slopes ofthe mountain, carried the works, took two thousand prisoners, and, emerging on the side of Lookout up the river, kindled his camp-fires at night in safety among the clouds, in full view of the patient commander in Chattanooga, who now saw his several lines converging to their focus, and his preparations complete. Next morning* Sherman and Hooker both advanced — the latter carrying every thing before him as he marched down Lookout and across the interven ing valley, toward Mission Eidge ; while Sherman moved vigorously from the heights of that Eidge next the river, across some intervening depressions, till Bragg, concentrating upon his front, held him stoutly at bay, and for a brief time drove one or two of his divisions. In thus strengthening his exposed flank the Eebel commander had weakened his center. Now, therefore, was the op portune moment. Hooker, delayed for a time by the stream that runs through the valley between Lookout and Mission Eidge, was now advancing again. Thomas lay ready. Grant, watching the panorama from Orchard Knob, gave the signal. Six guns, fired at intervals of two seconds, from head-quarters, sounded the order to charge along the lines. In an instant the old Army of the Cumberland was up, Hooker was up, the last reserves were up, every man that could bear a musket was thrown forward. The plain was swept; the rifle-pits were carried. And then the spectator on Orchard Knob saw that the troops no longer waited for his orders. They were climbing the mountain. " They dash out a little way and then slacken; they creep up, hand over hand, loading and firing, and wavering and halting, from the first line of works to the second ; they burst into a charge, with a cheer, and go over it. Sheets of flame baptize them; plunging shot tear away comrades on right and left; it is no longer shoulder to shoulder; it is God for us all. Under tree trunks, among rocks, stumbling over the dead, struggling with the living, facing the steady fire of eight thousand infantry, poured down upon their heads as if it were the old historic curse frOm heaven, they wrestle with the Eidge. Ten, fifteen, twenty minutes go by like a reluctant century. The hill sways up like a wall before them, at an angle of forty -five degrees; but our brave mountaineers are clam bering steadily on. They seem to be spurning the dull earth under their feet, and going up to do Homeric battle with the greater gods. If you look you shall see, too, that these thirteen thousand are not a rushing herd of human creatures; that along the Gothic roof of the Eidge a row of inverted Vs is "Wednesday, 25th November. 398 Ohio in the War. sldwly moving itp, almost in line. At the angles is something that glitters like a wing — the regimental flag — and glancing along the front you count fifteen of those colors that were borne at Pea Eidge, waved at Pittsburg Landing, glori fied* at Stone Eiver, riddled at Chickamauga. Up move the banners, now flat tering like a wounded bfrd, now faltering, now sinking out of sight. Three times the flag of one regiment goes down. You know why. Just there lie three dead color-sergeants. But the flag, thank God! is immortal, and up it comes again, and the Vs move on. The sun is not more than a hand's breadth from the edge of tbe mountain ; its level rays bridge the valley from Chattanooga to the Eidge with beams of gold; it shines in the Eebel faces; it brings out the National blue; it touches up the flags. Oh, for the voice that could bid that sun to stand still. Swarms of bullets sweep the hill; you can count twenty-eight bullets in one little tree. The Eebels tumble rocks upon the rising line; they light the fuzes aud roll shells down the steep; they load the guns with handfuls of cartridges in their haste. Just as the sun, weary of the scene, was sinking out of sight, the advance surged over the crest, with magnificent hursts all along the line, exactly as you have seen the crested waves leap up at the breakwater. In a minute, those flags fluttered along the fringe where fifty Eebel guns were kenneled. What colors were first upon the mountain battlement one dare not try to say; bright honor itself might be proud to bear, nay, to follow the hind most. Foot by foot they had fought up the steep, slippery with much blood; let them go to glory together!"* At the same time Hooker was charging through the Eossville Gap, on the enemy's left flank. The battle was over; the Rebels retreated in wild disorder. Bragg himself narrowly escaped capture. The Hawk's Nest was secure, and the army stood ready to be launched on At lanta and the sea. First, however, Burnside was to be saved, and Sherman was hastily detached to that end; while a brief pursuit harassed the enemy to Tunnel Hill. Grant modestly announced his success. Quartermaster General Meigs sent an elaborate dispatch, describing it, in which he declared that "perhaps not so well-directed, well-ordered a battle had taken place during the war;" and the fame of the General now rose to its culmination, while with the War Depart ment, with the President, and with the people, his word became law. The Leg islature of his native State voted him its thanks. That of the Empire State followed its example. Congress voted him a gold medal, bearing his laurel- wreathed profile and the image of Fame, with the scroll of his victories. Pres ents were showered upon him. Honorary memberships in societies of all sorts were conferred. And most significant of all, his sturdy friend, Mr.Washburnc, now introduced his resolution reviving, for Grant's sake, the grade of Lieutenant- General, never filled in our armies save by Washington and" (with brevet appoint ment only) by Winfield Scott. While it was pending, Grant visited different points of his Department, received the banquet and municipal honors of the city in which he had hauled wood to the kitchen-doors of its citizens, for a livelihood, and so passed away the winter. Men talked to him about the rrcs- * From the stirring account of the battle written by B. F. Taylor, Esq., an eye-witness. Ulysses S. Grant. 399 idency, for it was now within a few months of the time for a nomination, and groat journals, discerning that he was the most popular man on the continent, were urging his name. Grant's common sense and caution stood him in good stead; His Commander-in-Chief was a candidate for re-election ; and besides, as we may well believe, he could see that just then his greatest glory was to be won in the field. So, when approached on tho subject, he replied that there was but one political office that he desired — after the war was over he wanted to be elected Mayor of Galena. If successful, he meant to see to it that the sidewalk between his house and the depot was put in better order! On the 2d of March, 1864, the leather-dealer of Galena, who had raised a company and marched with it to the State capital to gain an entry into the ser vice, became Lieutenant-General of the United States Army. He repaired at once to Washington, to accept the position and study its requirements. The diners at:the fashionable hotel scarcely noticed the quiet, rather rough-looking little man, who, with an air of embarrassment, came down the private stair case, leading a little boy, and was shown to a seat at the head of one of tho cross:tables. But presently a. buzz ran along the great dining-hall, fair ladies turned with feminine impetuosity to gaze at the man who had taken Vicksburg, and scaled Missionary Eidge ; the inevitable Congressman sprang to his feet to an nounce that "We have the honor of being in the presence of Lieutenant-General Ulysses S. Grant ;" and the fashionable proprieties were startled by three cheers that rang from end to end of the hotel, while the mob of Washington greatness and beauty bore down upon the General's devoted hand. In the evening our quiet officer thought it his duty to pay his respects to the President, who had just placed him at the head of the army, and so he went up to the levee. He met Abraham Lincoln for the first time in his life. But there was little oppor tunity for acquaintance. The mob again besieged the conqueror from the West, and the evening was devoted to hero-worship, in its coarser forms of staring and crowding and forcing on exhibition. The next day, in the presence of the Cabi net and the retiring General-in-Chief, he received his commission, with the gentle admonition that, with the high honor devolved a corresponding responsibility, and a few days later a Presidential order gave him the actual control over the armies which his rank implied. The man into whose hands were thus committed the issues of the war was now in his forty -third year. His rapid rise had in no wise changed his appear ance or bearing, tie was still the Same taciturn, undemonstrative, unpreten tious person, in well-worn uniform, with perpetual cigar, and withal not a little embarrassed by the attentions of' the fine people with whom he now found him self surrounded. Experience had taught him much in the details of his profes sion. There was no chance for another Belmont in his career, no possibility of another Pittsburg Landing. But this experience had not altered the essential characteristics of the man's mental organization. There were no flights of genius about him; no strokes of brilliant generalship; there were "the genius of common sense " and an unconquerable pertinacity. 400 Ohio in the War. The position, as the Lieutenant-General saw it, was this : At the North was a great people, weary, perhaps, of reverses and delays, but not yet touched by the exhaustion of war. Its resources, instead of being drained, were, in fact scarcely comprehended. Its spirit was invincible ; the troops it could command were innumerable. Against it stood up a brave, skillful antagonist, driven to the last straits, with limited resources and inferior numerical strength. The General shall himself tell us jvhat resolution the sight inspired : "I, therefore determined first to use the greatest number of troops practicable against the enemy ; second to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until, by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left to him."* That strategy of the campaigns that followed is not far to seek. There it is, in its author's own words: "To hammer continuously, till by mere attrition, there should be nothing left to him." In the light of that sentence we may follow with a quicker pen all that follows. - By the rule of hammering continuously, which the Lieutenant-General thus prescribed for the conduct of pur armies, strategic points lost a large share of their importance. Armies, not strongholds, now became our objectives. The purpose in view was to kill off or capture the Eebel soldiery — not specifically to conquer the Eebel territory. Two Eebel armies thus became the objectives of the great Eastern and Western campaigns — those under General Eobert E. Lee and Gen eral Joseph E. Johnston. The latter Grant committed to his trusted associate and friend, General Sherman, whom he raised to the chief command between tbe mountains and the Mississippi. For himself he set the task of crushing the great, often-tried and fire-refined army of Northern Virginia. For the work he was able to concentrate a column of one hundred and thirty thousand, against the fifty -two thousand six hundred and twenty -six j men, of all arms, whom General Lee was able to muster. But, besides this overwhelming prepondeiv ance, he was also able to dispose a column of thirty thousand on the James to menace the flank of Eiehmond, and another of seventeen thousand for co-ope rative movements in the Shenandoah and Kanawha Valleys. Plainly he was able, as he was sometimes credited with saying, to change off man for man with his antagonist, and still come out, by long odds, victor in the end. Two months of preparation intervened. Sherman was visited; particular instructions were dispatched to Banks, now engaged in the ill-starred Eed Eiver expedition, and to other outlying commanders. Then Grant returned to the Army of the Potomac, and addressed himself to his task. On the 2d of May, 1864, the long-expected order was issued. Within twenty-four hours the army was crossing the Eapidan. Below it lay Lee, not unmindful of its movements. Grant's hope was to turn the Eebel right beyond the Wilderness, then throw his army between Lee and Eiehmond. To the Wil derness itself, that dark, tangled "region of gloom and the shadow of death, * Grant's first Annual Report as Lieutenant-General. t The exact figure shown by the consolidated morning returns of Lee'B army for the 1st of May, 1864. Ulysses S. Grant. 401 he trusted for protection of his own flank, and concealment of his purpose, till his success should disclose it. But, for the first time in his career, since his dis asters at Pittsburg Landing, he was matched against a first-class General.* Scarcely had his movement begun till his experienced adversary had detected and prepared to neutralize it.. ' And so it came about that while Grant was marching through the Wilderness, with eyes and thoughts only for that which should befal him when he had emerged from it, he was suddenly struck fair on the flank by Lee's veteran divisions. At first he refused to believe that it was more than a light reconnoitering party of the enemy, to be hastily brushed aside hy and by. The fierceness of the confused grapple in the dark woods taught him better, and he made all haste to call up the detached corps from their loose marching order, lest; before he could concentrate, his army should be fairly cut in two by this terrible flank attack. The battle raged thenceforward with musketry alone — a huge " bushwhacking" Indian fight, with varying suc cess, but perfectly indecisive issue, till nightfall. It was not at all what he had hoped when he moved across the Rapidan; but, undismayed by the failure of his purpose, he issued his simple order of battle for the morrow, to " attack- along the line at five o'clock." But once more Lee was quicker. At daybreak his massed troops fell upon Hancock, and only the accidental wounding of Longstreet, the Rebel General in charge of the attack, would seem to have saved the army from serious disaster. As it was, the day wore on with the'rattle of musketry in the gloomy woods, where no man could see the battle, and with confused struggles by troops that had lost all formation in the tangled thickets. Grant seated himself on the grass, under the trees, a little to the rear, smoked hiscjgar, and awaited the issue. "It has been my experience," he said, "that though the Southerners fight desperately, at first, yet when we hang on for a day or two we whip them awfully." f Fresh onslaught, however, broke out along his lines, while his orders for preparing for another attack were being delivered. Lee had again precipitated his gray masses through the obscure woods, upon our exposed lines. The fight, raged till dark; then, exhausted with their blind and fruitless wrestling, the antagonists each withdrew a little, and waited to see what the other would do. The Army of the Potomac, accustomed to fall back when failure to accom plish its intent was palpable, awaited the order to return across the Rapidan. But it was now commanded by the man who, amid the disasters of Pittsburg Landing, calmly reasoned out the certain success of the morrow. As he found that Leo's attack upon his flank had ended through exhaustion, he silently drew out his troops and — renewed his march toward Richmond ! This opening slaughter certainly displayed no brilliant generalship. It was the blind collision of brute masses in the midst of dense > thickets. It cost us twenty thousand soldiers — the enemy scarcely ten thousand. But our army Johnston indeed sought to make head against him at. Vicksburg, but was without troops, and utterly disobeyed by his subordinates. t Swinton's Decisive Battles of the War, p. 380. Vol. I.— 2ti. 402 Ohio in the War. i marched onward. It was to hammer continuously — had not the Lieutenant- General declared it? pn the night of the 9th of May the advance of the Army of the Potomac silently moved out from the Wilderness, and marched rapidly toward Spottsyl vania Court House. The troops were somewhat entangled on the narrow roads, and several hours were thus lost. When, at last, Spottsylvania was approached a seething fire of musketry burst out upon the column, and told that again Lee had divined the movement. Only his advance was yet up, and a vigorous attack might have gained the point; but one untoward event and another hin dered; Lee gained time to form his lines, and when, on the morning ofthe 10th, Grant renewed his assault, he was everywhere met by a compact, well-ordered resistance. Hancock was sent across the River Po, to the north-west of Lee's position, without any very distinctly defined object. Presently he was ordered back to aid in an assault. In retiring his troops were vehemently assailed, tho woods behind him were fired, and, after appalling suffering and heavy loss, his corps rejoined the army. Meanwhile there had been two successive assaults upon a hill crowned by the enemy's works, and approachable onlyrthrough a thicket of dead cedars. The failures taught no lesson ; with the re-enforcement of Hancock's corps two more charges were made upon the same position ; five or six thousand men were lost, and, at last, the effort was abandoned. All this was hammering continuously, but the process was proving fatal to the hammer. At daybreak on the 12th a better devised attack began. A point in Lee's center was selected as likely to be more easily carried. The troops, unable to see it after they entered the woods, were guided to it by the compass. A bril liant charge carried a salient of the Eebel work; an effort to penetrate further met a bloody repulse ; the troops, however, kept the salient, and there, heavily re-enforced, barely held up against Lee's tremendous efforts to regain it. An effort was, thereupon, made to break another point in Lee's line, which it was supposed must be weakened by his concentration to regain the salient. The supposition proved erroneous, and another bloody repulse followed. Then ensued fresh struggles around the salient, till at night the Bebel dead were act ually piled in veritable heaps on the slopes of the intrenchments. Eight thou sand more were added to the frightful lists of the National lost. It was the day before these bloody repulses that Grant had sent his roseate- dispatch to the Secretary of War, announcing that the result, up to this time, was much in his favor, that he believed the enemy's loss to be greater than his own, and that he "proposed to fight it out on this line if it took all summer. Only, indeed, on this groundless opinion that the enemy was losing as nnrch as himself, can we comprehend Grant's persistent attacks fair on the front of a position he could so easily have turned. Man for man he was willing to kill off, till the list on the Eebel side should be exhausted. No higher generalship con trolled the contests around Spottsylvania. Seven days more of blind attacks or essays to attack followed. Everywhere the attacking column — mayhap marched wearily for miles along the extended front, to catch the enemy unawares — was met by the vigilant antagonist with ample force. The troops were worn out. At last, Ulysses S. Grant. 403 on tho night of the 20th, fairly baffled, Grant drew back once more, and, in secret silence, renewed the march past Lee toward Eiehmond. Since crossing the Rapidan he had lost, in his hammering, forty thousand soldiers — four-fifths as many as the entire army which, at the outset, confronted him! The difference between the generalship which only proposes to hammer continuously and that which seeks to accomplish ends, with all the saving of life that may result from the most skillful applications of military science, could find no more impressive illustration. Lee — on the offensive quite as much thus far as Grant — lost through this series of battles less than half as many ! Already Grant's army of one hundred and thirty thousand going out to do battle against fifty thousand, was calling lustily for re-enforcements ! Meanwhile Grant had signalized his assumption of personal command at the East, by the opportune display of one of his strong points. At Mission Eidge he had noticed a fiery little division General. He remembered the man ; and now Philip H. Sheridan was placed at the head of the cavalry, and sent sweeping around Lee's rear to Eiehmond. The expedition took much spoil and brought back much information. At the same time Butler had been demon strating against Eiehmond along the James. That he accomplished little was mainly due to the orders under which he acted. The movement away from Spottsylvania was hazardous; but it was skill fully accomplished; and the army, once more with a clear road before it, struck out Eichmondwards. Not less active, however, was its wary antagonist. The columns headed for the North Anna; on the morning of the 23d they ap proached it, only to behold, on the opposite side, the advance of Lee's army ready to receive them. A passage was forced; there was some heavy fighting by detached corps; in the end the army found itself pushed out southward, from the river on each wing, with Lee clinging firmly to it in the center, and thus ready to cut the column in two, and beat it in detail. Discovering his dangerous predicament Grant drew carefully back again, abandoned the route upon which he had essayed to enter, and turned the heads of his corps away toward the Pamunkey. The army was skillfully handled on the route; it reached the Pa munkey and crossed it in safety, connecting thus with its new base of supplies from the Chesapeake;* and then the march turned toward the Chickahominy. But once more Lee, having the shorter route, was found in advance, planted across the paths by which the army moved. His real positions were skillfully masked; but at last he was found near Cold Harbor, covering the approaches to the Chickahominy. It was the old battle-field of Gaines's Mills, whence McClel lan's retreat to the James began ; but with this difference,-that Lee now occupied McClellan's, and Grant, Lee's old ground. Preliminary contests for position, on June 1st, cost two thousand men. On the 3rd Grant decided upon attack, not upon any special point, but along the whole line. It was executed at daybreak next morning, and resulted in * A striking .feature of Grant's overland march was that the peculiar topography of the coun try enabled him to dispense with long supply trains. Each new movement brought him toa new river which floated his supplies. 404 Ohio in the War. bloody failure. The men swept up to the works, found them impregnable (save at one point where a footing was actually gained in the intrenchments, but, being utterly unsupported, was lost again), then sullenly fell back, and, thenceforth, refused to advance — having no further faith in orders to pour out their blood for nothing. Tbe battle scarcely lasted a quarter of an hour; it cost eleven thousand men ! Wben an order was sent to each corps commander to renew the assault, independently of any other part of the line, it was duly delivered, and the men, from one end of the line to the other, simply refused to stir! There were brains in those ranks ; and they did not reckon self-murder to be the best method of making war. A few days of fruitless siege operations followed; then came a total change in all the plans of the campaign. Up to this point Grant, starting with one hundred and thirty thousand men, had lost the appalling number of sixty thousand in a month's campaign. The losses inflicted on his adversary scarcely reached twenty thousand. If the object of the campaign had been to reach the positions on which, at its end, the army stood, one-half the loss might have been saved. For it is to be observed that tbe heavy casualties occurred in the hopeless, direct assaults on the enemy's fortified positions, after the failure of which they were, in each case, success fully flanked. But if the object had been to wear out the Eebel army by the "attrition of continuous hammering," it was most unfortunate that the process should be so managed as to cost us three to the enemy's one. And in these words there seems to be summed up all the criticism the campaign requires. But we have now to see that, after such ghastly experience, the mind of tho General who conducted' this campaign, far from depression, was actually rising to the height of a moral courage, capable of steps most distasteful to the Gov ernment whose favor had made him, and to whose favor, after this costly expe rience, he still looked for support. General Grant determined to abandon the overland route against Eiehmond* to abandon the work of furnishing direct cover to Washington by his army, and, marching away from the Eebel intrench ments at Cold Harbor, to plant himself on the south side of the James Eiver. Lee's army ceased to be his objective; he now made it — Eiehmond. Warren was instructed to seize certain crossings of the Chickahominy, spread his front to cover all the roads by which Lee could attack the retiring army, and create the impression that he was about to assume a vigorous offen sive. The plan was admirably carried out; the army crossed the James undis turbed, and Lee, when he discovered the movement, retired into Richmond. But there had been one or two unfortunate delays in a plan, the success of which depended upon its celerity. For General Grant was now resolved to cap ture Petersburg, to the south of Eiehmond, by the very suddenness with which he ajiproached it, while Lee was in doubt as to his plans. This done, the Eebel capital was untenable. But he had intrusted the whole work to W. F. Smith, and, with singular lack of precaution, bad even failed to inform the advance ot *The line on which he had proposed to fight it out if it took all summer. Ulysses S. Grant. 405 the Army of the Potomac of his plans. Smith advanced from Butler's position on the Jamos, reconnoitered the defenses of " Petersburg, and finally carried the outer works, when, at nightfall, further operations were most unfortunately sus pended, although the moon shone brightly, and energy was never more needed, In spite of the delays Hancock was across the James that day, in ample time to have re-enforced Smith, when Petersburg must havo fallen without a struggle. But till late in-the afternoon he Was kept idly awaiting rations at the river-bank, and was not even told what weighty matters were in hand a few miles out on his front. When at last he was moved up the opportunity was not yet quite lost, for an assault by moonlight was practicable. But the auspicious moment was soon gone. Lee's advance, marching all night, reached Petersburg in time to confront the old antagonists from behind its formidable earthworks at day break; and the Cockade City, instead of being carried with a rush in an even ing's attack, was to be, for a twelvemonth, the impassable barrier on which the great armies of the Lieiitenant-General were to wear themselves away. Grant himself was now up. In his vexation he cast the blame for the fail-, ure to take the city upon W. F. Smith,* and ordered an instant assault. It failed: Repeated efforts were made to find some weak spot in Lee's close-jointed armor. 3 All failed. The army was swung southward, away to its left, to cut one of the railroads supplying Petersburg. This, too, failed. Then at last, when two weeks of such efforts had cost Grant fifteen thousand more men, and had gained for him absolutely nothing, he sat down to that nondescript thing which was called a siege. Widely different, indeed, were the conditions here, from those which had^ from the outset, insured his success at Vicksburg. There the enemy was completely cut off from any communications; the fleet thundered on the front, the army on the rear; and surrender was only a question of rations and physical endurance. Here Lee was in no sense under siege, save in name. To his rear stretched four great lines of road, securely connecting him with all that was left of the Confederacy. By his side lay Eiehmond, protected by his position. His front was covered with fortifications which Grant's engineers pronounced too formidable for assault; he so guarded his flanks that all attacks were repulsed at heavy cost to the assailants. Realizing that»his hopes of speedy results in the campaign, undertaken with such superb forces, and prosecuted with such, fearful loss— a loss already swelling to seventy-five thousand^men — were all blasted, Grant began a series of fortifiqations to match those of his enemy. These completed, a mine was extended Under one of the enemy's forts, the explosion of which should prepare the way for a grand assault. Then a force was detached to the north side of the' James, which, demonstrating against Eiehmond, drew away from Peters burg to the immediate defense of the imperiled capital a heavy portion of Lee's army.-)- Thus the most favorable conditions for the explosion of the mine and assault were happily secui'ed. Unfortunately, however, instead of the be.«t, it Baldy" Smith — the same who had 'figured so prominently in the movements at Cliatla- nooga and Mission Ridge. tFive out of Lee's eight divisions. 406 Ohio in the War. actually turned out that the very poorest troops in the army were selected for the assault. Burnside's corps — the worst in the army— having been ordered to furnish tbe assaulting column, it was reported to General Grant that the negro division was fhe best in the corps. Grant, however, refused to permit it to make the assault ; the choice between the other divisions was made by lot; the assault was, of course, badlj- made, and inefficiently supported. Miserable con fusion and slaughter followed, ending in total repulse. The loss was over four thousand. General Grant was not on the ground at "this miserable affair," as he has himself justly styled it, nor was the officer whom he retained as the titu lar commander of the Army of the Potomac ; and the military court of inquiry subsequently pronounced as one of the potent causes of failure. " the want of a competent common head at the scene of the assault to direct affairs as occur rences should demand."* Meantime, Lee, as soon as the failure of Grant's initial attacks on the lines of Petersburg, and the beginning of elaborate fortifications, had assured him of the comparative safety of his positions, detached Early with a considerable force to menace the National capital. In this operation the sagacious Eebel com mander relied upon a double reason, which seemed to render certain the aban donment of Grant's efforts against him. He remembered how fears for the safety of Washington had so often paralyzed the aggressive operations of the Army of the Potomac, and reckoned on similar results now from the similar causes. But, furthermore, he was convinced that his present antagonist was a General who relied for success solely on overwhelming superiority of numbers — an opinion that the events of the campaign were, by no means, ill-calculated to produce. Now he was well assured that menace to tbe capital would immedi ately call forth from the Washington authorities orders for the return of at least a part of Grant's army. With such a reduction of strength he believed that it would not accord with Grant's theory of superior numbers to continue the efforts against Petersburg, f But our quiet General was to surprise Lee, as he had surprised so many others, by the exhibition of qualities for which no one had given him credit. He, indeed, detached a corps to defend the cajiital, and deflected another to the same end, which was on its way to him from New Orleans; but he never relaxed his grip on the positions which menaced Eiehmond. The agitation at Wash ington was extreme, and, indeed, the peril was for a few hours imminent. Under former managements, the Army of the Potomac would have come streaming back; there was the more reason to expect it now, since, when Grant crossed the James in disregard of the well-known views of the Administration, as to the necessity of covering Washington, it was with tbe implied pledge that he would keep the enemy too busy at home to leave them the opportunity for adventures north of the Potomac. Through such action the capital was now on the verge of capture; could he fail to bend every energy to its relief? But there was that s' Rep. Com. Con. War. Second Series, Vol. I, page 215. . t The latter motive for the movement against Washington was assigned by Lee's staff officeis Swinton's History Army of the Potomac, p. 528. Ulysses S. Grant. 407 ff >r C «• £.§ ag § g g i 2,°ta « ** rt H *d *d ?d S* o o o rf B 00 (D « p sr tr 2, ^ a a — - ft & s ® 5 3 tr sj 3 » J> CD - S 3 mH pi cO>zo-IXm•n r * * 1 | I ° ? 3om3 m z H H OHXPI P PI o' o' o' S" a o a a tr tr » p ffl 10 33+ e^ S» "^ ™ O S ¦ ao ° E sr s- © ^ ® B 3^, *2 S"l>J R o p - u31 " 5 IT'S ' : f Ulysses S. Grant. 409 in the amazing calm of Grant's intellect which enabled him to perceive that where he stood, not where the capital stood, was the vital point to be held at any sacrifice of Government favor or Northern territory. Fortunately, the Eebel commander of the column moving against Washing ton was without enterprise, and while he stood hesitating before earthworks* manned by a corporal's guard, the re-enforcements arrived, the capital was safe, and Grant was left to pursue his policy. What ensued along the Potomac need not here be further traced, save to add that Grant displayed again his hap* piness of selection, in giving Philip H. Sheridan charge of all matters in that direction. He was a young man, in years and in experience, for such a place ; but the campaign that followed far more than vindicated the choice. Thenceforward, through the summer and fall of 1864, Grant was left undis turbed, to work out, with ample support cf every kind, whatever results against the enemy's position the resources of his skill and daring might accomplish. First of all came, on the 12th of August, an effort against Eiehmond, in the way of a surprise, from the north bank of the James. It reached the enemy's works, vainly assailed them, and after four days of fruitless effort to find a weak place, returned, with a loss of fifteen hundred men. But now Lee had moved considerable re-enforcements to the north side of the James, to meet this attack. Grant, therefore, judged it an opportune time to strike at one of the railroad connections of Petersburg, while the bulk of Lee's forces were at the extreme opposite end of his extended lines. Warren's corps was accordingly launched'from the left upon the Weldon Eailroad, which, after a sharp action, it succeeded in seizing. Lee made desperate efforts to re- grain it, and in one of these some blundering of the subordinate Generals'led to false positions of Warren's force, and to the capture of twenty -five hundred of them. Ee-enforcements came up in time and the railroad was firmly held. After some further efforts, Lee was forced to submit to lose this important line of communication. But he had again exacted a heavy price. The losses of Warren's corps in these movements amounted to four thousand four hundred and fifty -five. Hancock, having returned from the north side of the James, was now ordered out on the left, in rear of Warren, to another point on the Weldon Eailroad, four miles further south. Here he was engaged in destroying the track, when he was heavily attacked. The assaults were repulsed until nightfall, when Han cock withdrew, not at all satisfied at the failure to re-enforce him. This' affair cost twenty-four hundred men, and accomplished only trivial results. \"z A month's rest for the army followed, varied only by the fierce picket-f ght- ingand artillery practice at such points as that much dreaded, one which the soldiers, half in jest half in earnest, named Fort Hell. Late in September, act ing on the general theory that by attacking at the extremities he should greatly weaken and harass Lee's thin lines, General Grant began simultaneous move- ments'north of the James, threatening Eiehmond, and on the extreme left, to the south of Petersburg. Butler's movements on the James were successful, and the position which he gained at Chapin's Farm proved of high value. On the 410 Ohio in the War. south two corps of infantry, with a cavalry force, pushed out on the left sus taining pretty heavy resistance, but securing their positions. No considerable gains, however, resulted, and the cost was over twenty-five hundred men. Another month of preparation ensued; then another effort on the left -was made — the object this time being to seize the South-Side Eailroad. The opera tions were complicated and confused; the enemy struck between two corps, shattering the flank of each; and finally the troops returned to the intrench- itoeuts, having little or nothing but the losses to show for their fighting. With a few further slight movements to the left, and with some demonstrations by the cavalry, the active work of the army for the season ended. In this campaign the Army of the Potomac alone had lost eighty-eight thousand three hundred and eighty -seven men!* Of the Army of the James we have not as precise returns; but tbe aggregate losses of the two ai-e known to have been largely -above a hundred thousand — more than double the entire strength at the outset of the army they were to annihilate. The movements about Petersburg were always accompanied by heavy losses; they were invari ably made in such a way that the enemy was able to strike the exposed flank of the moving column, and their only appreciable gain was the jjrolonged exten sion of our lines, not around, but awaj- from, the "besieged" city. Grant's oper ations here will not compare in boldness with those happier strokes of daring by which he planted himself in the rear of Vicksburg. The terrible punishment he had received on the overland march seemed to have made him timid about cutting loose from his base; and besides he had now the capital to observe, as well as the enemy. Across the mountains, his friend and subordinate, in similar check before a fortified city, had swung far to the southward, planted his army squarely upon the connecting lines of railroad, and thus taken .Atlanta. But Grant had grown cautious of positions and lavish of lives. The time had now come when influences from without were to reach what Grant's own continuous hammering had failed to accomplish. If the campaign to which he had given his personal attention had been less successful than he hoped and the country had a right to expect, those other movements which he had discussed in outline with his subordinates, and which he had intrusted to theirtexecution, began to converge in their influence upon the hapless little body of brave men in the trenches of Petersburg. Sheridan had cleared the valley, put an -end to fears for the capital or the North, and swept through the enemy's country, destroying his means of communication and his stores. The last port of tire Confederacy had been closed by the capture of Fort Fisher. The power of the rebellion in the West had been annihilated before Nashville. And now, fluttering across half the continent, came the banners of the victorious army of Sherman on Lee's line of retreat. Against this converging circle of a million soldiers stood the armies of Lee and Joseph E. Johnston, the one numbering barely fifty thousand, the other scarcely half so many. The people of the South had lost faith in the rebellion, * Grant and his Campaign^, p. 399. Ulysses S. Grant. 41] the armies were not re-enforced, desertion depleted thom far faster than the "continuous hammering.'' Their commissariat was so wretchedly managed that the few troops remaining were not half supplied; in fact, seven pounds of flour and a pound and three-quarters of meat formed the week's ration for Lee's own soldiers through the winter. The depression of the people reacted on the army, and completed the work its privations and thinned ranks had begun, so that the effective force of Lee's troops was less than (in the times of their old vigor) their number would have indicated. In silence, not perhaps unmingled with dread, they awaited the movements of the quiet, thoughtful soldier, who sat in his log cabin at City Point, and studied the positions of the forces. At last that soldier determined upon' his course. Sherman must be left to manage Johnston, with whom it was now known that Lee was anxious to form a junction. For himself, he reserved the work he had essayed on the. banks of the Eapidan a year ago, that of crushing the Army of Northern Virginia. To that end he once more ordered one of the old movements on the left ; this time with larger forces and without the diversion north of the Potomac. The verge ofhis swinging column was formed by Sheridan's cavalry, which was to cut loose as soon as the movement was developed, and strike for the old goal, the South-Side Eailroad. While these preparations were in progress Lee, already striving under an offensive mask to prepare the way for an evacuation, attacked Grant's lines' on the right. His troops failed to fight with their old spirit; the attack, after some initial successes, was repulsed, and some two thousand prisoners were lost. Grant followed up this success by precipitating his movement on the left. Moving with the column himself, he became more and more impressed with the signs of Eebel weakness, and at nightfall he dispatched to Sheridan word that he " now felt like ending the matter, if it were possible to do so, before going back." Sheridan's orders to strike for the railroads were accordingly withdrawn, and he was directed to push to the right and rear of the enemy. To the sorely-beset Eebel commander the only hope was to break this encir cling line. He struck first at Warren, then at Sheridan. Each bore up against the fury of the attack; but for Sheridan, who lay isolated at Dinwiddie Court- House; the keenest apprehensions were felt. Grant made every effort to get Warren's corps moved out to him, but the unexpected lack of bridges on the road prevented. Next morning it was found that, Sheridan's front was clear again, Lee having drawn back to Five Forks. Thither Sheridan followed, Warren now joining, and coming under his orders. The battle that ensued, brilliantly managed by Sheridan, with happy use of cavalry to aid the opera tions of the infantry, resulted in the breaking up of the entire force which Lee, had here massed on his right— the painful collection of all the available material he could strip from his extended lines of works. Fragments of these troops fled westward, a few rejoined the main body, over five thousand laid down their arms, Lee was left with the thin lines stretched from Hatcher's Eun to the Appomattox, "the men scarcely close enough together for sentinels." To such straits was the great Army of Northern Virginia fallen. But it was not yet without sparks of its ancient fire. 412 Ohio in the War. The next day,* indeed within a few hours after the issue of Five Forks Grant ordered an assault of the Eebel intrenchments, preluded by a fierce bom bardment through the whole night. The attack swept the weak lines of the enemy from the outer works, and to the eye of the experienced Eebel com mander it was plain that the end had come. At eleven o'clock he announced to Mr. Davis his intention of evacuating Eiehmond and Petersburg. But even yet he was able to maintain stout resistance, and, indeed, to make one last offensive sally. This over he drew back his few wearied, half-starved troops, and under cover of the darkness, moved away rapidly to the south-westward! Only twenty -five thousand were left of them ; by daybreak, under his skillful man agement, these were sixteen miles away from Petersburg. He was still. hopeful; he looked to a junction with Johnston, to unlimited opportunities for falling upon Grant's detached corps far away from their supplies ; to all the myriad chances of war that may come to the General who takes heart of hope even in the gloomiest conditions. But the times of his good fortune were past, and fate now dealt him her unkindest blow. Thirty-eight miles down his road of retreat lay Amelia Court-House, whither he had ordered supplies from Danville. The blundering officials in Eiehmond ordered the cars forward for their own escape; the stupid train-men never thought that they should first unload the supphes, and so the food for the retreating army was lost at Eiehmond. The last hope here vanished. The army had to be delayed to forage. Grant was pushing the pursuit with a tremendous energy proportioned to the magnitude of the game he had now in hand. Sheridan soon struck the baggage trains, next he dashed in upon a train bearing painfully collected supplies for the famished troops; at last he planted himself squarely across Lee's path, burled back his desperate effort to cut through, and was just ready to charge down upon the sorrowful remnants of the great army, when a white flag appeared. Hostilities were ended. Before this, indeed, Grant had addressed Lee a note asking, to prevent the useless effusion of more blood, the surrender of the Eebel army. Lee had replied, doubting if he were yet forced to this, but hinting a willingness to treat for the surrender of all the troops of the Confederacy, the manifest object being to gain terms for all that could not be demanded for these poor fragments alone, which he was now leading. Grant declined to entertain such propositions, wisely perhaps, and drove on the pursuit. Then came the inevitable, and when next Lee discussed the subject of surrender, it was at a deal-table in an humble dwelling in Appomattox Court-House, with the remorseless Chieftain whose continuous hammering had at last worn him out, seated opposite, to name at pleasure what terms he would. In this supreme moment of his life Grant, cool and quiet as ever, generously sought to break the fall of the antagonist he had such weighty reason for respecting, and his conduct throughout was delicate and magnanimous. The Eebel soldiers were paroled, officers were allowed to retain their side-arms and private horses, all were to return to their homes, "not to be disturbed by United States authorities so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they reside." The last condition was afterward to prove * Sunday morning, April 2, 1865. Ulysses S. Grant. 413 embarrassing to the Government, and it would have been wiser in Grant to have avoided passing beyond tho strictest line pf his military powers. But in the rejoicings that followed the matter was for a time almost wholly overlooked. A few days' later Grant's most trusted friend became involved in grave troubles, arising out of efforts to discharge duties never committed to his care The Government felt outraged, a conspicuous Cabinet officer* went so far as to declare that the least punishment Sherman deserved was dismissal from the army, and there was danger that the hero of the South-West would retire from the service in disgrace with the Administration. Grant stood up stoutly for his friend, and went personally to present the Government's disapproval of his negotiations and ease his fall. ,. Then came reviews, presentations, felicitations innumerable. Whichever way Grant turned the grateful people overwhelmed him with their honors. Visits to the leading cities he could not escape. . Each strove to out-do the other in the warmth of the reception it extended. Banquets, levees, speech-making were forced xtpon him. He went to his late home at Galena, and the half-wild populace escorted him along the "mended pavement" to his old house, so reno vated that he could scarcely recognize it. In the city in whieh he had been a wood-peddler he was received with such warmth of honors as no President since Washington could have commanded. More substantial tokens of approval fol lowed. An elegant residence in, Philadelphia, and another in Washington were presented him. Finally, Congress created the grade of full General — till now unknown in pur army — for his benefit; and the tanner's son stood decorated with a rank higher than that bestowed upon the Father of his Country. At this giddy height we leave him. It is for the future to show whether its glories intoxicate or its perils bewilder. We close as we began. Such a career laughs at criticism, and defies depre ciation. Success succeeds. But when the philosophic historian comes to analyze the strange features of our great war, no anomaly will be more puzzling than Grant. He will find him guilty of errors and disasters that would have set aside any other General in disgrace. He will follow him through a tale of futile efforts and heroic deviso- ments, pf inexcusable slaughter to no purpose, commingled with happy triumphs at little cost. He will marvel at the amazing mental equipose of the man, cast down by no disaster, elated by no success. He will admire his strong good sense, his instinctive reading of men's characters as of an open page, his tremendous unconquerable will. He will find him not brilliant in conception, though sound in judgment; not fertile in expedients, but steadfast in execution; terrible in a determination that was stopped by no question of cost; stolid as to slaughter or famine or fire, so they led to his goal.. Yet he will look in vain for such charac teristics as should account for his being first in a Nation of soldiers; and will not fail to observe the comparative poverty of his intellect and his acquirements. Seeking still for the causes of his rise, he' will record the firm friendships that *Hon. Hugh McCulloch, Secretary of the Treasury. 414 Ohio in the War. were so helpful ; will allow for the unexampled profusion in which soldiers and munitions were always furnished at his qall ; will observe how willingness to fight while others were fortifying, first gavo him power; how remoteness from the Administration long preserved him from interruptions ; how he came upon the broader stage only when it was made easier for his tread by the failures of his predecessors and the prestige of his own victories, and how both combined to make him absolute. But after all these considerations he will fail to find the veritable secret of this wonderful success; and will' at last be forced to set it down that Fortune — that happy explainer of mysteries inexplicable — did from the outset so attend him, that in spite of popular disapproval and protracted fail ure, through clouds and rough weather, he was still mysteriously held up and borne forward, so that at the end he was able to rest in the highest professional promotion, "in peace after so many troubles, in honor after so much obloquy." In private life, Grant's manners are as unpretending as his person: He re ceives attentions with embarrassment, and is best pleased with simple ways and ' little ostentation. He would scarcely be held a good conversationalist, and yet, on topics that interest him or have come within the range of his observation, he converses clearly and well. His friendships are strong ; so also are his preju dices, though he rarely seems to bear malice. Even after the bitter relations had sprung up between himself and General Butler, he asked Butler to a social partj- at his house, and seemed a little surprised at the indignant refusal of his invitation. In his military judgments he is generally generous. He is, indeed, rarely willing to acknowledge that he has started on a wrong course; and he rarely forgives those who, in failing to execute impossible plans, have shown their impossibility. But he is singularly free from envy or jealousy. He has himself done the most toward raising those who now come nearest rivaling him in reputation. On political matters he is ignorant and careless. He has his full share of the regular army feeling, which holds it a matter of professional etiquette to despise the politicians. Before the war his sympathies were strongly Southern. The leading officers of his staff were Illinois Democrats. Since the war his feelings have been intensely loyal, but at the same time conservative. His in fluence has been effectively given for the fireservation of strong military rule at the South. With the advanced positions of the Eadieal Eepublican party he has little sympathy. He was fervidly hostile to the French effort at Imperial ism in Mexico, and he would have hailed armed intervention in behalf of the struggling, Juarists. His passion for fast horses and for billiards survives the war. Smoking he will never give up. From other stimulants he does not always abstain so rig orously as in the days of his poverty in St. Louis. Through the war he deserved great praise for his entire freedom from all schemes for personal advancement. Wisely or unwisely, on good plans or had plans, he kept steadily at work for the Cause; if honors came they were grate fully accepted; but the idea seems never to have occurred to him to go out or Ulysses S. Grant. 415 the way to seek them. Since the war he has been a focus for the attention of politicians. As early as the middle of 1866, his father had written, in a letter given to the newspapers : * " The most ultra Radicals, the worst Copperheads, the desperate Rebels, and the true , Union men, all say : Give us Grant, we want no other platform than that he has written with his sword. You know enough about Ulysses to know that to accept the Presidency would be to him a sacrifice of feeling and personal interest. He could not well stand the trial of being a candi date for public favor; and 'his present position is every way a much better one than that of Pres ident. But if there should seem to be the same necessity for it two years hence as now, I expect he will yield." Substantially the same statement has been made by the General himself, in reply to the inquiries of partisans. * Letter to E. A. Collins (by him published), Covington, Kentucky, 10th of July, 1866. Note. — Since these pages were stereotyped General Grant has become a very prominent candidate for the Presidency— being mainly urged by the conservative wing of the Republican party; and has been made Secretary of War, ad interim, succeeding Mr. Stanton, who was removed by the President. William T. Sherman. 417 LIEUTENANT-GENERAL WM. TECUMSEH SHERMAN. '1 it"!" AM gratified at your purpose to prepare a record of Ohio's contri butions to the war. The work, however, will necessarily be so extended that my own place in it must be very brief. Whatever facts you need about me can be readily gleaned from Colonel Bowman's book." So writes — in a letter now lying before us — the man who conquered Atlanta, and marched down to the sea. We do not agree with him. That would be a very ill-proportioned account of Ohio's contributions to the war which should allow Mm small space. Whatever may be thought of many parts of his varied career there can be no dispute as to the place to which it led. He rightfully divides with Grant the honor of pre-eminence among all the brilliant commanders whom the war educated for the country's service. Tho State that takes pride in having given birth to both, does well to reckon them foremost on the long roll of her Generals. Unlike his great associate, General Sherman comes of a family in which culture and social position have been a birthright for many generations. In 1634 three Shermans, two brothers and a cousin, emigrated froih E,ssex County, in England, to the infant colony of Massachusetts Bay. One of these, the Honorable Samuel Sherman, settled in Connecticut, where the family remained and prospered, until, in 1815, the death of the great-grandson of the emigrant, ajudge of one of the Connecticut courts, compelled his widow to seek a cheaper living and better chances for her boys in the West. Here one of her sons rose in the practice of the law, till, eight years after their arrival,* he became one of the Judges of the Supreme Court. But he married young,f had a family of eleven children, and spent hiss income in their support. In 1829 he died very suddenly of cholera. Of two out of the eleven children thus left without support in the house of a bereaved widow at Lancaster, the world has since heard something. The eighth of them, then a lad of six or seven, was John Sherman, since Eepresen tative and Senator in Congress, and the sixth, then nine years of age, a bright- eyed, red-haired, play-loving urchin, was William Tecumseh Sherman. The future General was born in Lancaster, on the 8th of February, 1820. The family names had been pretty well exhausted in furnishing forth the five who had preceded him, and there was great perplexity in seeking a name at *That is, in 1823. tin his twenty-second year. YolT I.— 27. 418 Ohio in the War: once suitable and new, for the infant. The father finally decided it. He wanted one boy trained for the army; he had himself seen and admired Tecumseh, and among military names none was then held in such special esteem about Lancas ter as that of this renowned Indian chieftain (slain in battle but a short time before), whose kindness had more than once, within the knowledge of the pio neers of that vicinity, saved the shedding of innocent blood * "Up to the death of his father, Tecumseh Sherman led the pleasant life of an active, mischievous warm-tempered boy, surrounded by affectionate brothers and sisters, and watched over by a good mother.f He was now to experience the change by which his subsequent life was moulded. The members of the bar at Lancaster knew very well that Judge Sherman had left no adequate provision for his large family, and it was agreed among them that some of the children should be educated and supported by the legal brethren of the deceased parent. In accordance with this arrangement Hon. Thomas Ewing, then in the prime of his reputation as a great lawyer and statesman, decided to adopt one of the boys. "I must have the smartest of them," so the stories of the timesj tell us that Mr. Ewing said to the widow; and on the same authority we have it that, after some consultation between the mother and the eldest sister, "Cuuip," at that important period of his life at play in a neighboring sandbank, was selected. The next seven years passed in school-boy life in Lancaster. Young Sher man was fairly adopted into the Ewing family, and he soon made his way to all their hearts. He was sent to the English department of the village academy, where he stood well in his classes, and came to be called a promising boy. "There was nothing specially remarkable about bim, "so writes his foster-father, Mr. Ewing,|| "excepting that I never knew so young a boy who would do an errand so correctly and promptly as he did." And again: "He was transpa rently honest, faithful, and reliable. Studious and correct in his habits, his progress in education was steady and substantial." And so the boy reached his seventeenth year. Mr. Ewing now had a vacancy at West Point in his gift, and he bestowed it upon the child of his eld friend. Young Sherman was admitted to the academy in June, 1836, and, with the exception of a two-months' furlough in the summer of 1838, which he spent in a visit to his home at Lancaster, he remained there continuously until his graduation, in June, 1840. Starting with a good preliminary education, he had maintained a fair, though not first-class, standing to the close. Mr. Ewing desired that he should graduate in the Engineer Corps. This, as he himself wrote some months before, he was unable to do, but his rank was such as to entitle him to enter the artillery. He was sixth in his class. Six forms below a This is understood to be the explanation given by Hon. Thomas Ewing. Headley'p Sher man, pp. 17, 18. t Miss Mary Hoyt, to whom Judge Sherman was married in 1810, is spoken of as an intelli gent, exemplary woman, a, member of the Presbyterian Church, and an affectionate wife ano mother. JHeadley's Sherman, p. 24. II Ibid, p. 25. William T. Sherman. 419 him stood George H. Thomas; next below Thomas was E. S. Ewell; and among other names borne on the roll of that class of 1840, with which the country has since become familiar, were Stewart Van Vliet, Bushrod E. Johnson, George W. Getty, William Hays, and Thomas Jordan. The pleasautest glimpses we get of these four years of cadet life, are in the letters of the future Lieutenant-General to the fair companion and playmate of his Lancaster home, the daughter of Mr. Ewing, for whom he had already formed a strong attachment. These letters are sprightly, vivacious, and a trifle eccentric — not at all unlike, in style, those graver epistles, which, at a later period-, were to draw from the uncomplimentary Secretary of War the compli ment that " Sherman wrote as well as -he fought." As might readily be sus pected, Cadet Sherman was not much of a " society man." " We have two or three dancing parties each week," he writes in one letter, " at which the gray bobtail is a sufficient recommendation for an introduction to any one. You can well conceive how the cadets have always had the reputation, and have still, here in the East, Of being great gallants and ladies' men. God only knows how I will sustain that reputation." The army, as he grew ready to enter it, seemed very inviting. About a year before his graduation he wrote of himself in this characteristic vein : " Bill is very much elated at the idea of getting free of West Point next June. He does not intend remaining in the army more than one year, then to resign and study law, probably. No doubt you admire his choice; but tp speak plainly and candidly, I would rather be a blacksmith. Indeed, the nearer we come to that dreadful epoch, graduation-day, the higher opinion I conceive of the duties and life of an officer of the United States army, and the more confirmed in the wish of spending my life in the service of my country. Think of that!" Nurtured in the Presbyterian teachings of his mother till his tenth year; then kept under the influence of Mr. Ewing's Eoman Catholic family, he hadgrown, after such changes, a little restive under pro tracted religious exercises : .' The church bugle has just blown, and in a moment I must put on my side-arms and march to church, to listen to a two hours' sermon, with its twenty divisions ahd twenty-one subdivisions; .... but I believe it is a general fact that what people are compelled to do they dislike." Then, as, in later life, practical matters and details were especially to his taste: "The last encampment, taken all in all, I think was the most pleasant one I have ever spent, even to me, who did not participate in the dances and balls given every week by the' different classes; besides the duties were of altogether a different nature from any of the previous ones, such as acting as officers upon guard and at artillery drills, practising at target-firing with long twenty -fours and thirty -twos, mortars, howitzers, etc., as also cavalry exercise, which has been introduced this year." He w*as not slow in taking to the knack of command : " As to lording it over the plebs, to wbich you referred, I had only ohe, whom I made, of course, 'tend to a pleb's duty, such as bringing water, policing the tent, cleaning my gun and accouterments, and the like, and repaid in the usual and cheap coin — advice ; and since we have commenced studying, I make him bone, and explain to him the difficult parts of Algebra and tho 420 Ohio in the War. French Grammar, since he is a good one and fine fellow; but should he not carry himself straight, I should have him found in January, and sent off, that being the usual way in such cases, and then take his bed, table, and chair, to pay for*the Christmas spree." Imagine how greedily these details of her heart's hero were devoured by the fair Miss Ellen, in whose eyes West Point, with all its advantages, could scarcely be good enough for the wonderful lad. He did not fail to show his confiding playmate that he had come to the dignity of doing his own thinking. How amusingly characteristic is it to find this unfledged stripling of West Point rebuking, with the solemn graviiy of one who had fathomed the whole case, the course of the Whig party, of which his foster-father was then a conspicuous leader, and the confidence with which he predicts its defeat in the famous Harrison campaign. "You, no doubt, are not only firmly impressed, but absolutely certain that General Harrison will be our next President. For my part, though, of course, but a ' superficial observer,' I do not think there is the least hope of such a change, since his friends have thought proper to envelop his name with log-cabins, gingerbread, hard-cider, and such humbugging, the sole object of which plainly is to deceive and mislead his ignorant and prejudiced, though honest, fellow-citizens; whilst his qualifica tions, his honesty, his merits, and services, are merely alluded tO ! " More laugh able still is the solemn air with which the precocious youth discusses, and patronizingly, yet with due caution and reserve, approves the qualifications of the Board of Visitors at the annual examination: "There is but little doubt of its being nearly as well selected as circumstances would admit of. Party seems to have had no influence whatever, and, for my part, I am very glad of it. I hope that our army, navy, or the Military Academy, may never be affected by the party rancor which has for some time past, and does now, so materially injure other institutions ! " The grammar may be a little halting, but is it not plain that here is a youth little likely to be ever much retarded by any doubts as to the wisdom of his own opinions, or as to his ample facilities for forming correct judgments? Nor was he at all disposed to hide his academic standing under a bushel : " I presume you have seen the register of cadets for the last year," he writes to Miss Ellen, " and remarked that I still maintain a good stand in my class; and if it were not for that column of demerits it would be still better, for they are combined with proficiency in study to make out the standing in general merit. In fact, this year as well as the last, in studies alone, 1 have. been among the stars." And here, to close these extracts, is a glimpse of the young cadet's ideas for his future, as graduation-day approached: "I fear I have a difficult part to act for the next three years, because I am almost confi dent that your father's wishes and intentions will clash with my inclinations. In the first place, I think he wishes me to strive and graduate in the Engineer Corps. This I can't do. Next to resign and become a civil engineer. . • ¦ Whilst I propose and intend to go into the infantry, be stationed in the Far West, out of the reach of what is termed civilization, and there remain as long as possible." * *Sherman and his Campaigns (Bowman and Irwin), pp. 11, 12, 13. William T. Sherman. 421 The assignment of the Brevet Second-Lieutenant was not quite in accord ance with these anticipations of the Cadet. He was not, indeed, able to enter the engineers, but his standing fully warranted admission to the artillery, and the influence of his guardian was such that, in those days of slow promotion, he rose, in a little over a year, to the rank of First-Lieutenant. Until March, 1842, he served in Florida, mostly on garrison-duty, although he participated in several expeditions against the Seminoles. Even thus early he developed some signs of the theory of war which he has since made so famous. He would have no truces or parleys with the Indians; he would exterminate all who resisted and drive from the country all who submitted; and so would end the war in a single campaign* He easily fell, for a little while, into the languid life of the region. Writ ing from Fort Pierce, in East Florida, in 1841, he says: "Books we have few; but it is no use — we can not read any but the lightest trash; and even the newspapers, which you would suppose we would devour, require a greater effort of mind to search than we possess. We attribute it to the climate, and bring up these lazy native Minorcans as examples, and are satisfied. Yet, of course, we must do something, however little. . . . The Major and I have a parcel of chickens in which we have, by competition, taken enough interest to take up a few minutes of the day; besides, I have a little fawn to play with, and crows, a crane, etc., and if you were to enter my room you would doubt whether it was the abode of man or beasts. In one corner is a hen, setting; in another some crows, roosted on bushes; the other is a little bed of bushes for the little fawn; whilst in the fourth is my bucket, wash basin, glass, etc. So you see it is three to one." . So, again, he gives us this pleasant picture: "I've got more pets now than any bachelor in the country — innumerable chickens, tame pigeons, white rabbits, and a full-blooded Indian pony — rather small matters for a man to deal with, you doubtless think, but it is far better to spend time in trifles, such as these, than in drinking or gambling." He still clung to his fancy for life on the Western frontier: "We hear that the new Secretary of War intends proposing to the next Congress to raise two rifle regiments for the Western service. As you are at Washington I presume you can learn whether it is so or not, for I should like to go in such a regiment, if stationed in the far West; not that I am in the least displeased with my present berth, but when the regiment goes North it will -in all likelihood be sta tioned in the vicinity of some city, from which God spare me." Already he prided himself on his downright way of saying things. "If you have any regard for my feelings," he exclaims in one of his Florida letters, "don't say the word 'insinuation' again. You may abuse me as much as you please; but I'd prefer, of the two, to be accused of telling a direct falsehood than stating anything evasively or underhand; and if I have ever been guilty of such a thing it was unintentionally." The Florida life ended in March, 1842, when Lieutenant Sherman's com- Sherman and his Campaigns (Bowman and Irwin), p. 14. 422 Ohio in the War. pany was removed to Fort Morgan, at the entrance to Mobile Bay. In midsum mer of the same year it was brought still nearer the detested " fashionables," being transferred to Fort Moultrie, in Charleston Harbor, where the time passed in an agreeable round of hunting, fishing, and enjoyment of the hospitalities of the aristocratic Charlestonians, to whose selectest society the uniform of the army or navy was always an open sesame. His heart, however, resisted all the fascinations to which it was here exposed; and, true to his early attach ment, he procured, in the fall of 1843, a four months' furlough for a visit to the family of his guardian, during which he became formally engaged to Miss Ellen Ewing. He was next assigned to duty on a board of officers, appointed to examine the claims of Georgia and Alabama militia for horses lost in the Seminole War. Meanwhile the restless young officer was busy studying the country, from a professional stand-point. Nothing could more strikingly exhibit the foundations of that wonderful knowledge of the topography and resources of the South which was afterward to prove so valuable, than this scrap of a letter to Phile mon Ewing, written while on duty with the Board of Claims: "Every day I feel more and more the need of an atlas, such as your father has at home; and as the knowledge of geography, in its minutest details, is essential to a true mili tary education, the idle time necessarily spent here might be properly devoted to it. I wish, therefore, you would procure for me the best geography and atlas (not school) extant." Presently we find him reaching out after other matters. " Since my return," he writes from Fort Moultrie, after the adjournment of the Board, "I have not been running about in the city or the island, as hereto fore, but have endeavored to interest myself in Blackstone. I have read all four volumes, Starkie on Evidence, and other books, semi-legal and semi-histor ical, and would be obliged if you would give me a list of such books as you were required to read, not including your local or State law. I intend to read the second and third volumes of Blackstone again; also Kent's Commentaries, which seem, as far as I am capable of judging, to be the basis ofthe common law practice. This course of study I have adopted from feeling the want of it in the duties to which I was lately assigned. . . . I have no idea of making the law a profession ; but as an officer of the army it is my duty and interest to be prepared for any situation that fortune or luck may offer. It is for this alone that I prepare, and not for professional practice."* He was indeed to prove, in his after life-, that he was incapable of successful "professional prac tice." Then followed the usual routine of army life — detached service for a little time at the Augusta Arsenal, court-martial service at Wilmington, and finally, when the Mexican war broke out, recruiting service at Pittsburg. At last his repeated requests for active service received the attention of the War Depart ment, but it did not appear that the impression he had made upon those con trolling the army was strong enough to secure an order to the seat of war. He was, however, sent around the Cape, and up the west coast of South America, * Sherman and his Campaigns, pp. 14, 15, 16, 17, 18. William T. Sherman. 423 to California, where presently he became aid-de-camp to General Persifer F. Smith, and by-and-by Acting Assistant Adjutant-General to Stephen W. Kear ney. He saw no active service whatever, but he discharged the clerical duties of his position with such promptness and accuracy as to secure the favorable notice of his superiors. In 1850 he returned to "the States," and on 1st May his long engagement was closed by his marriage to Miss Ellen Ewing, at the residence of her father, then Secretary of the Interior. Among the guests who graced the wedding were Daniel Webster, Henry Clay, and Zachary Taylor. He was soon sent to garrison-duty at Jefferson barracks, Missouri, and shortly afterward, with the brevet of Captain "for meritorious services in California during the war with Mexico," was made Commissary, and sent, first to St. Louis, and then to New Orleans. Captain Sherman had thus been in the army thirteen years, and in all that time had seen no fighting save some paltry Indian skirmishes in Florida. Pro motion seemed slow; he now had a wife to support; his commissary's expe rience had thrown him among business men, and had given them an idea of his capacity. He was offered, by a St. Louis house, a position in San Francisco, to manage a branch bank which they were about to establish there. He at once accepted the offer; on the 6th of September, 1853, resigned his commission, and before the end of the year was established in San Francisco, with the expecta tion of making his home for life on the Pacific coast. From 1853 to 1857 our retired artillery captain remained in business in San Francisco, struggling hard to make a success out of his new way of life. He rose into some esteem among the Californians, and attained the empty dig nity of a Major-General of the California militia.* He was not esteemed a great financier, and some of his ways of doing thjngs exhibited more strongly the straightforward bluntness of the camps than the finesse of a dextrous finan cier. But his business integrity was unquestioned. At last, however, it became necessary to give up his banking experiment. Toward the close of 1857 he essayed a similar business in New York ; but next spring he decided that it was time to try something else. The young Ewings, his brothers-in-law, were now establishing themselves in Kansas, and Sherman was very glad to fall back on his old Fort Moultrie law-reading, and interest himself in their professional practice. For two years he strove to be a lawyerf — with indifferent success, if tho reminiscences of the Leavenworth newspapers may be trusted. While the Ewings did the pleadings and the outside work, the restless, nervous, eccentric office-partner did well-enough. If he was not particularly valuable, he at least did no harm. Citizens knew little of him, and while his brothers-in-law rapidly rose to stand among the foremost leaders in the law and the politics of the young State, Sherman gained no influence and had no prominence. At last the *MS. Mem. Military Career, furnished by Sherman tp War Dep't, and on file among rolls of Adjutant-General's office. tlbid. 424 Ohio in the War. play came to an end. "It happened one day"— so a Leavenworth newspaper tells us — "that Sherman was compelled to appear before the Probate Judge, Gardjier, we believe. The other partners were busy ; and so Sherman, with his authorities and his case all mapped out, proceeded to court. He returned in a rage, two hours after. Something had gone wrong. He had been pettifogged out of the case by a sharp, petty attorney opposed to him, in a way which was disgusting to his intellect and his convictions. His amour-propre was hurt, and he declared that he would have nothing to do with the law in Kansas. That afternoon the business ,was closed, partnership dissolved, and in a very short time Sherman was on his way to a more congenial clime and occupation."* Doubtless disgust with the unpleasant details of legal practice in a frontier town had much to do with the sudden abandonment of the law; but it is -not improbable that his decision was hastened by a flattering offer which reached him at this opportune season. Louisiana was establishing a "State Seminary of Learning and Military Academy." The professed object of the institution was to train up the youth of the State to the knowledge of arms, so that, in the event of negro insurrections, or of trouble from the Indians on the border, an instructed body of officers might be ready at once to place the community in a position of defense. Sherman had been stationed at New Orleans during a part of his army life, and nearly his whole term of service had been passed in the South. His political opinions were known to be strongly Southern; he was regarded as decidedly pro-slavery; and it was quite natural, therefore, that, in casting about for a Superintendent for their new institution, the authorities should think of him. He was tendered the position of Superintendent, and Professor of Engineering, Architecture, and Drawing, with an annual salary of five thou sand dollars. He promptly accepted, and remained at this post through the remainder of 1859 and until 18th January, 1861. A lurking suspicion of inse curity, however, accompanied .him. The air was already alive with the portents of civil strife. Strong as were Captain Sherman's sympathies with the slave holders in their opposition to the abolition excitement, it would seem that from the outset he had foreseen the possibility of their reaching a point to which he would not accompany them. In the midst of this uncertainty he decided it best not to remove his family to Louisiana. As the excitement increased, every effort was made to win the able Super intendent. He was found strikingly efficient in the duties to which they had called him, and his adhesion to their cause was, therefore, all the more desired. But he met all arguments in favor of armed resistance to any decision of the National authorities with the unwavering dictum, that it was the duty of a sol dier to fight for, never against, the flag and the government to which he had sworn allegiance. * Leavenworth Conservative. On the same authority we have this : " Prior to entering upon the practice of law in Leavenworth he lived for some time at Topeka, upon a farm of one hundred and sixty acres, which we believe he still owns. His neighbors tell of his abrupt manner, reserved yet forcible speech and character." And it also tells us that " an outlying part of our city plat is marked on the maps as 'Sherman's Addition.'" William T. Sherman. 425 The progress of events cut short the debate. The South rang with prepara tions to secede from the Union, to the chief executive office of which Abraham Lincoln was about to be admitted. Captain Sherman's course was clear and unshrinking. No patriot — most of all, no Ohioan — can read his letter of resig nation without a thrill of honest pride in his sturdy manhood and faithful loyalty : "To the Governor of the State of Louisiana:. " Sra — As 1 occupy a quasi military position under this State, I deem it proper to acquaint you that I accepted such a position when Louisiana was a State in the Union, and when the motto of the Seminary, inserted in marble over the main door, was : 'By the liberality of the General Government of the United States ; The Union — Esto Perpetua.' "Recent events foreshadow a great change, and it becomes all men to choose. If Louisiana withdraws from the Federal Union, I prefer to maintain my allegiance to the old Constitution as long as a fragment of it survives, and my longer stay here would be wrong in every sense of the word I beg you to take immediate steps to relieve me as Superintendent the moment the State determines to secede ; for on no earthly account will I do any act or think any thought hostile to or in defiance of the old Government of the United States." Captain Sherman at once returned to St. Louis, and, entering into street- railroad speculations in that city, presently became President of the Fifth-street line. In this position the war found him. He was now in his forty-second year. Thus far his career in life had scarcely been what one who should reckon his original promise, and the special social and political influences that were always combined "in his favor, would have expected. His thirteen years of army life had brought no distinction. McClellan, Fremont, Halleck, Hooker, Eosecrans, and a score of the other young retired officers of the army, were re membered as brilliant soldiers, according to the standard of those old army days. Sherman had left no name. The eight years of civil life that followed had added little to his fortune and nothing to his fame. He was a tolerable bank agent and unpractical lawyer. But the heart of the man was sound to the core; and his impulsive abandpnment of his position in Louisiana did more than all his life thus far to fix him in men's minds. He was soon to enter a wider career, but the days of his success were still distant, and a severe probation yet awaited him. About tbe time of Mr. Lincoln's inauguration the President of the Fifth- street Eailroad went to Washington. His younger brother, Hon. John Sher man, had just been elected to represent their native State in the United States Senate, and this, coupled with his prominence in the Speakership contest, some years before, betokened an influence that might be beneficial. Captain Sher man was ready for almost anything. He talked freely, drew largely on his observations in the South, assured the Eepublicans they would have war, and a bloody war, went to Mr. Lincoln to try and impress him with the danger, and to volunteer his services in any capacity. "We shall not need many men like you," said the hopeful patriot; "the affair will soon blow over." But the Cap tain's social position, as the son-in-law of so distinguished a statesman and 426 Ohio in the War. lawyer as Mr. Ewing, and the brother of a Senator, secured him some consider ation. He applied for the chief clerkship in the War Department . and his influence, political and military, was such as to secure strong backing; but the place was given to another. Then, when Jos. E. Johnston resigned the Quar termaster-Generalship to enter his career in the Eebel army, Captain Sherman sought this vacancy, but failed again.* When the call for seventy -five thousand volunteers for three months was issued, our confident Captain at once denonnced it as unwise. He was told that if he would go home to Ohio he could probably get the command of ono of the regiments; but he would have nothing to do with such folly. "You might us well attempt to put out the flames of a burning house with a squirt-gun." "You are sleeping on a volcano." "You want to organize the whole military power of the North at once for a desperate struggle." "You don't know any thing about this people. Why, if we should have a reverse beyond the Po tomac, the very women of this city would cut the throats of our wounded with case-knives." f Such were the energetic sayings with which he won, for a time, the character of an alarmist. At last, disgusted with his failure to impress his ideas upon the authorities, or to secure a satisfactory position, he went back to his street railroad in St. Louis. But his thoughtful brother did not neglect his interests. Presently it was decided to add eleven regiments to the regular army. Application was at once made for a position for Captain Sherman in this new force, and so vigorously and influentially was the case presented, that early in June the Senator tele graphed him to return to Washington, and shortly after his arrival he was commissioned Colonel of the Thirteenth (new) Eegulai" Infantry. Officers at all instructed in the minutiae of military matters were just then greatly needed to aid in reducing the shapeless masses of militia to consistency, and the new Colonel was ordered at once to report for duty at General Scott's head-quarters. A few days later, Scott sent him out to take command of a fort. Here he remained till McDowell's movement on Manassas was organized, when his West Point education secured him the command of a brigade. The ensuing battle of Bull Eun was Colonel Sherman's first engagement. His behavior was cooler than they would have imagined who should judge only from his nervous excitability of character. Coming into the action about. half- past twelve, he found the enemy retreating, and advanced for over a mile with his brigade in line of battle. Then, as the fire became severe, he protected them a little along the line of a sunken road, till ordered to move them up to the attack. One regiment after another was then put in by itself, only to be driven back in disorder. The brigade was beaten in detail, but not without considerable loss. Presently the panic began, and Sherman's command yielded to its full force. He himself reported their retreat as "disorderly in the extreme." But his own conduct had been such as to mark him out as ono of * Sherman and his Campaigns, p. 24. t This last remark was made to Murat Halstead, Esq., the editor of the Cincinnati Com mercial. William T. Sherman. 427 the raw officers, essaying war for the first time, who might yet come to some thing. Such was the impression of the Ohio Congressmen ; and, at the suggestion of his brother, they united in a request for his appointment to the rank of Brigadier-General. On the 3d of August the commission was issued.* | The new General was unpopular. He had curtly and nervously told the truth about the panic in his own command as well as among the rest of the runaways. Never at all bashful about expressing his opinions, the prevailing excitement gave him unusual freedom of utterance; and he now criticised blunders with the absolutism of a professor and the zeal of a novice. But his political in fluence shielded him from danger. ( About the middle of August General Eobert Anderson, given command of the Department of Kentucky' for his defense of Fort Sumter, asked for Sher man, Burnside, Thomas, and Buell, to serve under him; and toward the last of the month Sherman was sent. According to his testimony to the Committee on the Conduct of the War, he " expressed to General Anderson and to the Presi dent that he did not wish to be placed in any conspicuous position, but would attempt any amount of work."j- Presently, on Anderson's retiring because of ill health, Sherman rose by seniority to the control of the Department— much against his own wishes, if we may trust the1 same testimony ; for he tells us that he "remonstrated against being placed in chief command, and, consider ing the President pledged not to put him in any prominent command, urged it with earnestness. "J For a course so unusual in a man so ambitious, General Sherman has assigned no reasons. We may well believO, however, that he real ized his limited knowledge of practical war, and sagaciously dreaded becoming prominent before he had time to learn in the school of experience. '* Paint me as I am,'' was the stern command of a historic Soldier, to the artist who sketched his portrait; "put in every scar and wrinkle." The great soldier, whose career we now trace, to be truly great, should emulate the wis dom of the Lord Protector. In that case we should have none of the disin genuous subterfuges with which it has been sought to gloze over Sherman's utter failure in 'Kentucky. He was inexperienced in war. He was profoundly alive to the terrible earnestness of the South. In the fervor of his intelligent opposition to the "sixty-days" nonsense, he went, like most incautious men of high nervous organ izations, to the opposite extreme:|| To his excited vision, the South was a giant armed cap-a-pie; the North, a stolid mass, trusting to raw militia for the conduct of a gigantic war. No story of Southern resources or reckoning of Eebel armies was too gross for his belief; no depreciation of his personal command could *Like many others issued about this^period, it was dated back to 17th May. t Report of 1867, Vol. I, p. 4. 4 Ibid. II And from this, in spite of the lessons of the war, he never recovered. As late as 25th October, 1864, after the fall of Atlanta, after Grant had pushed Lee into Petersburg, and had written that the Rebels were then robbing the cradle and the grave to keep up their armies, and when he himself was about to launch his army through Georgia to the sea, he wrote to the Sec retary of War (Final Report Com. Con. War, Vol. I, p. 240) that "the contest was but fairly begun." 428 Ohio in the War. come up to his own conviction of its unfitness to cope with the tremendous powers ofhis antagonist. General Buckner had led into Kentucky a Eebel force numbering barely four thousand, had with this paltry detachment menaced Louisville, and had finally established himself in fortifications at Bowling Green. By the 15th of October he was able to increase his strength to twelve thousand. At this average it remained till months after Sherman's departure from Kentucky.* But long before this, Sherman had at Camp Nevin, facing Buckner, three brigades of four full regiments each, besides a column of nine thousand at Camp Dick Eobinson under General Thomas, and seatterf 1 forces in Louisville and along the line of the railroad! Yet, with such resources, he declared Louisville itself to be in danger, burdened the telegraph with petitions for re-enforcement to save him from being driven across the Ohio, and at one time actually proposed that the troops facing Buckner should burn their bag gage and retreat on Louisville. Excited by these visions of danger, and worn out with the labor of his Department, his nervousness increased upon him. He talked extravagantly, and made little secret of his fears. Eye-witnesses spoke of him as a man haggard with work, and yet so excited that he '¦' scarcely knew what he was about."f Arrangements were already in progress for raising the force in Kentucky to an army of sixty or seventy thousand strong, but Sherman's exaggerated dis patches had caused some apprehension as to the wisdom of entrusting so great a column to such a commander. Accordingly, when the Secretary of War. in a tour of inspection westward, about this time, reached Louisville, he asked General Sherman what his views really were as to the wants of his Department. "How many men do you need?" "Two hundred thousand!" was the prompt and emphatic reply.J To us, contemplating this strange answer in the light of Sid- s Pollard says: "In spite of the victory at Belmont, our situation in Kentucky was one of extreme weakness, and entirely at the mercy of the enemy, if he had not been imposed upon by false representations of the number of our forces at Bowling Green. About the middle of Sep tember General Buckner advanced with a, small force of about four thousand men, which was increased by 15th October to twelve thousand; and though other accessions of force were received, it continued at about the same strength till the end of November. The enemy's force was then reported to the War Department at fifty thousand." Sidney Johnston's Letter to Jeff. Davis, after the surrender of Fort Donelson, gives the same figures. TMr. F. B. Plympton, one of the editors of the Cincinnati Commercial, had an amus ing experience with General Sherman during the height of his alarm about the Rebel strength and purpose. He waited on the General to inform him that he had come down to write what was to be told about the army. The General, who was at a small railroad station near Muldraughs Hill, broke out into the most violent and extravagant abuse, cursing and swearing like a madman. Presently he commenced oharging up and down the platform, his saber rattling along behind him. Every time he passed Mr. Plympton he discharged, at him a volley of fresh oaths, each winding up with tbe renewed order to get back to Louisville on the first train if he had any regard for his personal safety. Plympton bore the matter philosophically. Sherman continued prancing up and down the platform, gesticulating, swearing, and working himself into a very ecstasy of rage. All of a sudden he stopped opposite Plympton: "If you want to get a real good dinner, the very best that can be had anywhere about here, just step over to that house which you see yonder!" This was said in the kindest and most friendly manner possible. Then, with a return to the old tone: "But be d d sure you take that first train back to Louisville. tin this statement I follow the narrative of Adjutant-General Thomas, who was present at William T. Sherman. 429 ney Johnston's declaration that his force at Bowling Green numbered twelve thousand, and of his naive statement to Mr. Davis that he "magnified his forces to the enemy, but disclosed his true strength to the department,"* it is only doubtful whether Sherman's opinion should furnish cause more for amazement or for amusement. But to the Secretary of War and the Adjutant-General it was a very sober subject. Here was an untried commander, nervous, palpably under high excitement, having, according to concurrent testimony, only a small force opposed to him, but declaring that he needed two hundred thousand men straightway, when the entire available force then in camps at the North did not muster half so many. Either those controlling the business of the war were grossly mistaken in their comprehension of the requirements, or General Sherman was. The result was natural. General Sherman was relieved from command and sent to Benton Barracks, Missouri, to drill raw recruits. In this humble sphere he was kept at work until the spring of 1862; while the re-en forcements that had been designed for him were confided to the leadership of his successor. A force at no time so great as two hundred thousand was sub sequently found, under such efficient handling as General Sherman himself largely aided to give it, sufficient to drive the enemy to the Gulf. Meantime, with the rawness of our early essays at the management of a war, Adjutant-General Thomas had rushed into print with his sensationally- written report, embracing, among many other secrets, an account ofthe strange demand which had preceded Sherman's sudden removal. The country was indignant. Presently a leading journal of Cincinnati,! in solemn seriousness, on authority that it believed to be unquestionable, and with a kindly desire to do justice to Sherman, by enabling the country to understand the causes of his strange action, came to the rescue with an editorial explanation ofthe mystery. In the light of subsequent history it becomes pleasant reading: "The painful intelligence reaches us in such form that we are not at liberty to discredit it, that General W. T. Sherman, late commander of the Department of the Cumberland, is insane ! It appears that he was at times, when commanding in Kentucky,- stark mad. We learn that he at one time telegraphed to the War Department three times in one day for permission to evac uate Kentucky and retreat into Indiana. He also, on several occasions, frightened the leading Union men of Louisville almost out of their wits by the most astounding representations of the overwhelming force of Buckner, and the assertion that Louisville could not he defended.. The retreat from Cumberland Gap was one of his mad freaks. When relieved from the command in Kentucky he was sent to Missouri and placed at the head of a brigade at Sedalia, where the the interview, A biography of General Sherman, prepared under Iiis eye, has Rince explained that he said: "Sixty thousand to drive the enemy out of Kentucky, two hundred thousand to finish the war in this section." But inasmuch as sixty thousand would have been a very absurd number to insist upon for driving out Buckner's twelve thousand at Bowling Green and the small force under Zollicoffer, which Thomas's little column subsequently defeated so handsomely at Mill Springs, the explanation (which at any rate looks strikingly like an after-thought) does not greatly mend the matter. See post, Life of Buell. * Letter of General Sidney Johnston to President Davis, 18th March, 1862 — furnished Con federate Congress, and published in Report Spec. Com. on Causes of Disasters at Forts Henry and Donelson, pp. 171, 172. t Cincinnati Daily Commercial, December, 1861. 430 Ohio in the War. shocking fact that he was a madman was developed, by orders that his subordinates knew to be preposterous, and refused to obey. He has, of course, been relieved altogether from command. The harsh criticisms which have been lavished upon this gentleman, provoked by his strange conduct, will now give way to feelings of the deepest sympathy for him in his great calamity. It seems providential that the country has not to mourn the loss of an army through the loss of the mind of a General into whose hands were committed the vast responsibilities of the command in Kentucky."* The country at once accepted the explanation ; and though General Sher man's relatives promptly contradicted it,f his actual insanity was doubted by few, save the army officers who surrounded him, till, in the spring of 1862, General Halleck decided to try him on more active duty than Benton Barracks afforded. When Grant went up to Fort Donelson it was important that there should be an instructed officer at Padueah to supervise the forwarding of troops and supplies. With this task Sherman was intrusted. J All winter he had been restless and chafing; his boundless activity now found scope, and he proved so energetic and useful that Halleck, who had known him in California, and, besides, had a strong penchant for West Pointers, determined to try him further. The-expedition up the Tennessee was soon on foot, and Sherman was assigned to the command of a division in it. He was boiling over with energy, and his wide theoretical acquaintance with military matters was soon found to be re-en forced by a remarkable capacity for learning from every day's experience. In short, he so handled his troops that in a little time Chas. F. Smith, having ho other West Pointer (save Hurlbut, who need scarcely be counted) among his Di vision Generals, came to rely chiefly on Sherman, and to give him the lead. On *The facts on which this noted article was based were furnished by Mr. Henri Villard, a well-known and trustworthy journalist, connected with the Eastern press, and also with the Commercial. He considered them of so much importance that he made a trip from Louisville to Cincinnati expressly to communicate them in person. He added that George D. Prentice, Hon. James Guthrie, Hon. James Speed, and other prominent Unionists of Louisville, had been tele graphing to the War Department concerning the danger, before the removal of General Sher man. Mr. Halstead accepted the statement thus fortified by direct and circumstantial testimony as conclusive. It seemed to him a kindness to General Sherman that the country should be enabled to know the real secret of his strange sayings and doings, as well as the enormous dan ger from which it has just escaped, in- having so important a command controlled by a6tark, raving madman. When General Sherman first saw the article he was at Lancaster, on a visit to his family. He laid down the paper, and, in his quick, nervous way, exclaimed : " Well, now, I should n't be surprised if they would fasten that on me. It 's the hardest tiling in the world for a man to prove himself sane, especially when many people think his ideas wild." His family and friends, who were greatly enraged, at once attributed the statement to General McClellan. !No amount of reasoning on the_part of Mr. Halstead could convince them that the General then at the head of the army had nothing to do with the origin of the Commercial's article. Some other facts (known or suspected, doubtless, by Sherman's family) will serve to show the basis for their suspicions. Colonel Thomas SI. Key, the well-known Judge-Advocate and confidential ad viser on General McClellan's staff, was actually sent to see Sherman's condition. > He returned with the report that, so far as he could judge, Sherman was not sufficiently master of his judgment to be intrusted with the command of an army and a great department. It may not be improper to add that Colonel Key long continued to entertain the same opinion, and that very many gentle men who had seen much of Sherman during his stay at Louisville agreed with him. t First contradicted by P. B. Ewing. in Cincinnati Commercial, 12th December, 1861. X February 17, 1862. William T. Sherman. 431 Grant's arrival to take command in Smith's place, he found Sherman in the advance at the fateful encampment at Pittsburg Landing. When Grant, a raw, uninformed boy, entered West Point, Sherman was in his last, year there, was well known and highly ranked. Subsequent acquaintance had led Grant to keep up the old West Point estimate of his capacity, and so ho too came to repose a large share of confidence in the ardent, energetic, hopeful Division General on the front line. The Eebels advanced, undiscovered, from Corinth on Thursday, 3d April. All day Friday they marched, or floundered, through the rain-storm ; all, day Saturday they were in motion on Sherman's front. But, though there had been a cavalry skirmish or two, the army lay down to rest on Saturday night with out a conception of the enemy that was then lying silent in tbe woods at its picket-line, and listening to its tattoo. General Sherman was approached by one or two uneasy officers, who reported what they thought signs of an impend ing attack, but he was incredulous,* and took no special precautions. On Sun day morning the storm burst. With three of his brigades, Hildebrand's, Buckland's, and McDowell's (posted in the order we have named them, Hildebrand having the left), Sherman held the right of the irregular, ill-defined line. His remaining brigade he had suffered to remain encamped miles away, on the extreme left of the National army, and with this there was no possibility of his holding any communication. At the first sound of attack Sherman was prompt in ordering out his command, sending for aid, and notifying the other division commanders that the enemy was upon him in force. The enemy, however, made that announcement before him. Sherman's left soon broke, in confusion, under the vmexpected onset. Waterhouse's battery was lost. The' flank was threatened, and presently the whole line fell back to a new position. It was hardly taken till another battery was lost. The flank was again exposed, and the division — now reduced to the fragments of two brigades — again fell back, seeking a position where it could support McClernand's right. Here Sherman held his ground till some time in the afternoon, when he was once more pressed back. This time he selected a line covering the Snake Creek bridge, by which Lew. Wallace was expected to * Much has been written, pro and con, on the question .whether or not tbe National army was surprised at Pittsburg Landing. Between Lieutenant-Governor Stanton, of Ohio, and General Sherman, an especially acrimonious discussion sprang up, which General Sherman's father-in- law afterward continued with all his lawyer-like ability. There is no need to add to the dispute, and General Sherman's relatives do him no kindness in keeping it up. I do not cite authorities to sustain the view given in the text, because I should as soon think of citing authorities to prove the ftict that General McDowell retreated from the first Bull Run. But, to show that General Sherman himself did not always express the views advanced by and for him in this discussion, I way mention that, after the battle, in conversation with General R. W. Johnston, of Buell's army, whom he was entertaining in his tent, he said: "I had no idea of being attacked — did not believe it was a serious attack even after the firing began, till I saw the masses of their infantry bursting out of those woods down there just in front of us." The Adjutant-General on General Johnston's staff, Lieutenant (Rev.) W. C. Turner (ofthe N. S. Presbyterian Church), was present- with his chief at this conversation, has a distinct recollection of it, and certifies to the accuracy of the above statement. 432 Ohio in the War. arrive, and here the shattered remnants of his division bivouacked in line of battle, while Buell's fresh army was marching in to re-form and extend the front. On the next day Sherman gathered together what fragments of his reg iments he could, and pressed hard upon the enemy, but his force was reduced to such an extent that it no longer formed a considerable element in the contest. Throughout tbe battle, but specially on the first day, General Sherman ex posed himself recklessly, and set the example — then much needed— of the closest supervision by officers of their commands in action. His conduct did much to check the unseemly panic, and his unyielding tenacity went largely to pre vent an abandonment of the field under the shock of the first disaster, and to brace up the faltering purpose of officers and men through all the misfortunes of that gloomy day. He was slightly wounded in the hand, and before the action ended three horses had been shot under him. So much was his gallant conduct in the field considered to have aided in the final success, that General Halleck reported it to the Government as the unanimous opinion of the officers concerned, that "General Sherman saved the fortunes of the day on the 6th and contributed largely to the glorious victory of the 7th." He accordingly recommended his promotion to a Major-Generalship of Volunteers, and the com mission was speedily issued. For most of the blunders of Pittsburg Landing Sherman could not have been held responsible, had he not chosen to make himself so. He was only a subordinate officer, greatly trusted indeed by his chief, but at no time in com mand of the camp, He should certainly have kept his division together; and it must over seem inconceivable to those not actual witnesses to the fact, that an officer, with military education, and professing to understand war and war's con ditions, should have lain for weeks in the vicinity of an enemy he believed to outnumber him, without a spadeful of earth thrown up for defense, without even an obstruction of fallen timber, and, finally, without pickets a mile beyond his own tent! These, however, were matters which the commanding General should have enjoined.* But, with that disposition — born of the morbid vanity, which we shall more than once observe in his future career — to accept unneces sary responsibilities, and to deny that he has ever made a blunder, General Sher man has since chosen to vindicate the management of affairs before the battle.f His true friends can not but regret so unwise a step ; and no degree of admira tion for the brilliant genius which he subsequently displayed, can blind impar tial observers to the criminal foolhardiness and blundering whieh made the first day of Pittsburg Landing a slaughter, and well-nigh an irreparable calamity. "It was necessary that a combat, fierce and bitter, to test the manhood of the two armies, should come off, and that was as good a place as any. It was riot then a question of military skill and strategy, but of courage and pluck. When the military student of another generation comes to read such words from the man who took Atlanta, in apology for neglect of pickets, lack of any regu- * For a fuller statement of the amazing carelessness and neglect at Pittsburg Landing, prior to the battle, see ante, Life of Grant. t In his letter to U. S. Service Magazine on Pittsburg Landing, and in earlier publications. William T. Sherman. 433 lar formation of line, and absence of the slightest defensive works, against a foe supposed to be superior, he will find it as difficult to believe that the Lieutenant- General Sherman of history wrote the excuse as that he was guilty of the blunders. Under General Halleck's personal management the army now passed from the extreme of rashness and neglect to the extreme of timid overcaution. It advanced upon Corinth at a snail's pace, stopping to construct long lines of for tifications after every trivial movement, till the whole distance between Corinth and the Landing became an interminable succession of redoubts and rifle-pits. General Sherman, fully awakened from the contempt of the enemy which can alone explain the neglect to prepare for him before the fatal Sunday morning of the attack, was now fully ready to second all the cautious devices of the new commander. General Halleck's high opinion of his conduct in the battle natu rally led to his giving him an important position, and it so fell out that on the right, to which Sherman was thus assigned, occurred the only skirmishes of im portance that marred the peaceful monotony of the methodical advance.* These were two in number. In each General Sherman's dispositions were excellent, and his success complete. The first was to drive the enemy from Eussell's House, and the high hill on which it stood, about a mile and a quarter from the outer intrenchments at Corinth. For this purpose Sherman sent General Mor gan L. Smith's brigade directly against the position, while, on either hand, another brigade threatened the flank. A few shots from Smith's batteries drove the enemy, and Sherman hastened to fortify the hill thus won. His entire loss was only ten killed and thirty-one wounded. Ten days later Halleck ordered another advance, to drive the Eebels from a ridge on Sherman's new front, and to demonstrate against Corinth. Sherman promptly formed a line of his own division (now reduced to three brigades) and of another brigade summoned from the reserve. The troops advanced silently and with great caution. The. artillery demolished a house from which the enemy's sharpshooters had given annoyance; then, at the signal of a single shot, the whole line dashed across the intervening space, carried the ground, and with trifling loss established them selves, under cover of a dense wood, within thirteen hundred yards of the enemy's main fortifications. The Eebels presently rallied and essayed a coun ter-attack, but they were repulsed by tbe picket-line — which, thanks to the lessons of Pittsburg Landing, was now amply strong and well-placed. Two days later the enemy evacuated Corinth. By seven o'clock in the morning Sherman was in the town with the bulk of his division. So marked was tbe improvement already made in the important matter of. watching the enemy! Throughout these siege-operations, as the commanding General chose to style them, General Sherman, though in a purely subordinate position, was active, cautious and energetic, and his services were highly appreciated by "Of course the reader will understand that General Pope's battle of Farmington, on the extreme left, is not included in this remark. It is swelled far beyond the importance of a mere Bkirniish. Vol. I.— 28. 434 Ohio in the War. Halleck. But it is more important to observe that, although Grant was in a state of quasi disgrace, Sherman kept up his old cordial relations with him, and was at pains to express his sympathy. He was not to wait long for his reward. But the rawness of our rapidly-learning General was still aB apparent as the absolute confidence with which he volunteered opinions outside of his own sphere. One can scarcely read now, without a smile, the language in which he chose to announce the result. " The evacuation of Corinth," he declares, . . . " was a clear back-down from the high and arrogant tone heretofore assumed by the Eebels. . . . It is a victory as brilliant and important as any recorded in history." This is not the language of a great General, or even of a military student — it is the bombast of a college sophomore. School-boy exaggeration, indeed, rarely makes itself so absurd as to style such performance as that at Corinth a victory as brilliant as any recorded in history. It was a victory without fighting, in which over a hundred thousand men spent two months in driving forty-seven thousand out of works which Sherman himself pronounced "poor and indifferent!* But it may be readily inferred that such extravagan cies of laudation were expected to be highly gratifying to the hero of this great victory, the redoubtable General-in-Command. who was soon to rise to still higher rank, to the country's injury. Sherman was now ordered westward along the Memphis and Charleston Eailroad; and after Halleck's transfer as General-in-Chief to Washington, Grant, on resuming command, at once sent him to Memphis to take charge of the dis trict. Here he spent (with unimportant exceptions) the remainder of 1862, engrossed in the civil duties of his command. He adopted vigorous' measures of retaliation for guerrilla outrages, and for firing on steamboats; kept a vigilant watch on the spies with whom Memphis swarmed, and did his best to prevent any trade beyond the lines, particularly in cotton. Most of these measures originated with Grant, but Sherman threw great energy into their execution. The Government countermanded his orders about cotton, to his great chagrin. In the fall he aided Grant's advance against the line of the Tallahatchie by-co operative movements on flank and rear, which were well-timed and entirely successful. Then, under Grant's orders, he prepared his expedition " to proceed to Vicksburg and reduce it,"j- whilo Grant himself was advancing upon the ene my's main force via Holly Springs. Most unfortunately Sherman was not advised of the disaster at Holly Springs, which ended Grant's movement; and the very next day he started, in the full confidence that he should find but an easy task before him at the front of Vicksburg, while Grant was thundering on its rear. His fall and winter's campaign upon the traders had greatly embittered him, and his orders^ 0D setting out, were mainly directed against them. No citizens were, on any pre- * Sherman's Official Report. Advance on Corinth. I have followed above the Rebel official statement of their strength. The estimate made by our own officers was some eighteen thousand more. t The language of Grant's order. William T. Sherman. 435 text, or for any purpose, to accompany the expedition. If any cotton was by. any body put on board the transports, it was to be confiscated. If any mem bers of the press were found they were to be treated as spies. If any other citizens were found they were to be conscripted into the army, or forced to work without pay as deck-hands on the transports.* The fretful and arbitrary tone of these orders made an unfavorable impression at the time; and after the expe dition was over, led' to the bitter taunt that as the General had directed his thoughts mainly to warfare upon our own citizens, so he was more successful in that than in his efforts against the enemy. The sneer was unjust, but be had given occasion for itf On arriving before "NHcpsburg, on Christmas-Eve, Sherman first proceeded to break up the Vicksburg and Texas Eailroad ; then moved on transports up the old mouth of the YazOo, and by noon of the 27th had his whole command of four divisions, and forty-two thousand men,f disembarked on its south side, near the mouth of Chickasaw Bayou, the boggy stream permeating the swamp th'ence down to Vicksburg, which rendered the approach to the flank of the enemy's works so difficult. Above its eastern bank frowned the Eebel fortifica tions. It was his first effort at directing more than a single division in action; but Sherman's dispositions soon showed that in the last year he had been rapidly learning his business. He at first decided to move three of his divisions up the bayou by various routes, under cover ofthe swamp on the side farthest from the enemy, to the points where he proposed to deliver the attack, while a single division should move in the same direction on the enemy's side of the bayou. The heads of columns soon drove in the enemy's pickets, and found ground of the utmost difficulty before them. Steele, who was moving on the enemy's side of the bayou, presently reported that his path led along a corduroy causeway, raked by both enfilading and cross-fire from the enemy's batteries ; and Sherman decided to withdraw him to the other side. Meantime, the othOr three divisions had, with many difficulties, toiled through the swamp till they had reached the points at which it was proposed to cross. In front of them was the uncertain bayou, with its boggy banks; above that rose the high bluffs, marked from base to summit with the enemy's rifle-pits and parapets; while along the base of the bluff ran an excellent road, by which the Eebels could rapidly concentrate at any threatened point: Their force, though considerably increased during the delay in Sherman's movements after his arrival, was still greatly inferior; but it occupied a position well-nigh impregnable. This position, however, Sherman now decided to assault. Morgan's division, re-enforced by Blair's and Thayer's brigades, was" to attack on the left; while A. J. Smith, farther up the bayou, with more difficult ground before him, was to secure a lodgment with two divisions on the steep bluff that here rose from the bank, and prevent the enemy from concentrating on Morgan. * Sherman and his Campaigns, pp. 80, 81. tA. J. Smith's, Morgan L. Smith's, and George W. Morgan's divisions, numbered, in the aggregate, thirty thousand and sixty-eight. Frederick Steele's numbered twelve thousand three hundred and ten. 436 Ohio in the War Of Smith's assault the Eebel report briefly tells the story: "When within four hundred yards our infantry opened— the enemy coming to within one hun dred and fifty yards of my lines. Here our fire was so terrible that they broke but in a few minutes rallied again, sending a force to my left, to turn my left flank. This was soon met and handsomely repulsed. The force in my front was also repulsed. Our fire was so severe that the enemy laid down to receive it. Seeing their confusion the Twenty-Sixth Louisiana, and a part of the Sev enteenth, were marched on the field, and under their cover, twenty-one commis sioned officers and three hundred and eleven privates, with four colors, and five hundred stand of arms, were captured. The eriemyjeft in great confusion, leaving their dead on the field."* ~f * Meantime, on the right, two companies had been sent over in advance tq dig away a path in the steep bluff, so that the coliimn could ascend. They rushed gallantly across, and, under cover of the bank, commenced digging — so close to the enemy that the Eebels above reached down their muskets, firing vertically at them from the top of the same bank. But the movement had been too much delayed ; Morgan was already repulsed before this, column was ready to cross, and Sherman ordered an abandonment of the effort. The brave fellows under the bayou bluff were accordingly withdrawn, at nightfall, under cover of the darkness. Less than an hour's fighting had settled the matter. General Sherman now realized — at the fruitless cost of nineteen hundred and twenty -nine sol diers (against a Eebel loss of two hundred and nine) — that the position was impregnable. Unwilling, however, to confess the total failure of his expedi tion, he cast about for some further means, of at least planting his army in a position to menace the Eebel fortifications. With this view he proposed to Admiral Porter, commanding the accompanying gunboat fleet, to cover the landing of a force of ten thousand picked troops up the Yazoo, at the point where the extremity of the Eebel line touched that stream. While thjs body should essay to turn the line here, he would occupy the enemy's attention at the old points. * Then, the works being turned, he would hasten up with the rest of his army. The troops were sent, but on the first night Admiral Porter found the fog too dense to move; on the second he found the moonlight almost as. bright as day, and, therefore, decided the effort too hazardous. Thus baffled again, there-was nothing left for Sherman but to withdraw — the ground on which he was encamped being swampy, and liable to overflow after any heavy rain, while behind him there were only more 'swamps and the rising Mississippi, and in front the triumphant enemy. He accordingly decided to move up the river to Milliken's Bend. Tho Administration had not yet fully returned to the confidence in Sher man which he had lost in Kentucky, and at this juncture it decided that for the effort down the Mississippi a more capable commander was required. The Pres ident accordingly selected John A. McClernand, by whom Sherman was met as^he reached the mouth of the Yazoo again. *Official Report of Rebel General S. D. Lee. William T. Sherman. 437 » The failure before Vicksburg was harshly judged by the public, and Sher man remained unpopular and distrusted. Yet it is now evident, as Grant him self soon after cheerfully testified, that Sherman had done all that was possible. His only error — if there was error at all — consisted in "making an attack on impregnable positions. Yet his orders, binding him up to the "reduction of' Yicksburg," could hardly have been considered satisfied without an effort against the enemy- On the arrival at Milliken's Bend Sherman issued a farewell order to the army, of which McClernand now assumed command. It was not difficult to see that he was chagrined. "A new commander," he said, " is now here to lead you. He is chosen by the President of the United States, who .... has the undoubted right to select his own agents."* Sherman was now reduced to the command of two divisions. With these he accompanied the rest of the army which he had lately commanded, on McClernand's expedition up the Arkansas Eiver to Arkansas Post. In the investment he was given the advance. He promptly passed around the rear of the fort, and rested his right on the river above it. As soon as the gunboats opened fire Sherman opened also, and after about fifteen minutes' bombardment, to which he received no reply from the enemy, he gave the signal for assault. The troops dashed forward gallantly, but were speedily entangled in the rough ground and obstructions on the enemy's front. They maintained their position and advanced slowly, till the enemy, overpowered by the gunboat fire, raised the white flag. In this affair Sherman lost seventy-nine killed apd four hundred and forty wounded. McClernand officially spoke of him as " exhibiting his usual activity and enterprise." Grant himself having now gone down the river, that remarkable series of devices was begun, by which it was sought to evade the difficulties of tho Vicksburg problem. Sherman had no special share in any of them save tho effort to burst into the Yazoo by means of the Sunflower, and the bayous through which that stream has its uncertain connection with the Mississippi. In this he was ordered to accompany the gunboats, and seize some point on the Yazoo from which operations could be directed against Haines's Bluff. He set out at once with a single regiment and a detachment of pioneers, leaving the rest of his troops to follow. They aided the gunboats to open the bayous, followed in transports as long as transports found the route practicable, then changed to coal-barges, and were drawn along by a little steam-tug, marched wherever the "boggy roads were not completely overflowed, and finally, the gunboats, being hemmed in by fallen timber, and attacked by the enemy with infantry and artillery, made forced marches through the swamps — in one case even groping their uncertain way by candle-light through a canebrake — and finally got up just in time to save Admiral Porter from being surrounded. The energy with which the troops were pushed forward was admirable; and Porter cheer fully testified that' "no other General could have done better or as well as He went on, however, to cover up this feeling by urging cheerful obedience to McClernand, and saying there was glory enough in store for all. 438 Ohio in the War. * Sherman." But the movement was abandoned when almost within sight of the Yazoo. < Meanwhile the puzzled General who directed these various operations was at his wits' end ; and numerous were the discussions as to what could be done to plant the army in striking distance of the long-sought stronghold. In these. Admiral Porter and General Sherman were his most frequent and confidential counselors. Finally General Sherman submitted his written plan, a couple of weeks before Grant's final policy of running the batteries and marching up from the south was adopted. He regarded the army as already far in advance ofthe other grand armies, would make sundry movements in Arkansas, and then would "move the maiD army back to the Tallahatchie, secure and re-open the road back to Memphis," and adopt "the line ofthe Yallabusha as the base from which to operate against the points where the Mississippi Central crosses Big Black above Canton, and lastly where the Vicksburg and Jackson Eailroad crosses the same river. The capture of Vicksburg would result." And finally he " would leave in this vicinity (i. e., on the river in front of or near Vicks burg) a force not to exceed ten thousand men, with only enough steamboats to transport them to any desired point* In effect, he would have returned the army to Memphis and started over again on substantially the same route which Grant had attempted before, and from which the Holly Springs- disaster had thrown him back. That this was sound strategy can not be doubted; that it was a bold proposition, coining from a General already sufficiently unpopular at the North, and to one already maturing a totally different plan, need hardly be enforced. All this while the people regarded Sherman with distrust, tempered with dislike. He was looked upon as an unlucky if not an incapable commander; his brusque expressions of enmity to the party that controlled the Government were quoted to his disadvantage;! his talk against anti-slavery men and meas ures gave deep offense; and in some quarters slanderous doubts were even hinted as to his fidelity to the cause — mainly originating in his warm expres sions of regard for old friends then in the Confederate service. His warfare with the newspaper press, into which he had himself at the outset infused a needless bitterness, raised up enemies for him where he should have had the warmest of friends, and led to the most unfavorable constructions of every thing in which he was concerned. But the confidence and friendship of Grant were unshaken. Sherman was now assigned the left of the army in the movements by which Grant finally proposed to vault to the rear of Vicksburg. He was left behind when the rest of the army moved down to Bruinsburg ; and when the *13herman and his Campaigns, pp. 129, 130. tOne of the strangest of these expressions was made during the advance on Corinth. Sherman and a brother officer .of equal rank were being introduced. " I am very glad to meet you," said the other General; "I know Senator Sherman very well, and I believe he is your brother.'' "Yes," replied Sherman, ."I have a brother who is one of the d d Abolitionists that have been getting up this war." Of course the reader will understand that I print this statement only on the direct personal authority of the General to whom the remark was made. William T. Sherman. 439 crossing was to be effected he was ordered to make a feint above Vicksburg (on the batteries at Haines's Bluff), to prevent the enemy from suspecting the real nature of the movement below or concentrating to oppose it. "I hate to ask you to do it," said Grant, " because the fervor of the North will accuse you of being rebellious again."* The time, however, was at last approaching when the fervor of the North was likely to assume a different direction in Sherman's behalf. He ran up to Haines's Bluff, disembarked under cover of a heavy gun boat fire, and so demonstrated as to keep the enemy in momentary anticipation of an attack, till there was reason to suppose that the crisis below was passed. The whole operation was skillfully and handsomely performed. Then hastening after Grant, with his command he crossed the Mississippi below, and caught up with the army on the evening of the 8th of May, just in time to participate in the general advance already ordered. In this, Sherman (with McClernand) hugged close the eastern bank of the Big Black, while McPherson was pushed far out \o the eastward, to strike Jackson, forty-seven miles due east from Vicksburg. Then, as McPherson seemed likely to encounter unexpected resist ance, Sherman and McClernand were ordered over to his aid. They moved rapidly arid in concert ; and, with McClernand lying in reserve in the vicinity, Sherman moved forward and attacked the enemy on the Mississippi Springs Eoad, while McPherson, further to the southward, was engaging the bulk of his forces on the road to Canton. Some sharp skirmishing resulted ; then a reg iment, sent out to feel one of the enemy's flanks, reported the works there de serted. The troops were at once led into Jackson by that route, and the enemy fled northward. Sherman took two hundred and fifty prisoners, eighteen guns, and much ammunition and public stores. While now McClernand and the other forces turned their faces west ward, aud had straight before them their goal, the doomed city of Vicks burg, Sherman was left to destroy railroads, arsenals, and other public property. A church and some private buildings were despoiled in the confusion, but without Sherman's sanction. From the field of Champion Hills Grant sent back a message for Sherman to hasten forward, but the advance swept everything before it, till the Big Black was reached. Here Sherman crossed with a pontoon train, and pushing rapidly forward on the right, interposed between the enemy's posts on the Yazoo and the defenses of Vicksburg. From that moment the whole operation was a success, and the fall of Vicks ¬burg but a question of time. The Haines's Bluff defenses were hastily evacuated, ^herman opened communications with the fleet, and the army was again supplied with rations. The next day Sherman participated in the assault. Several of his regi ments gained the exterior slope of the enemy's works, but they were unable to advance further, and, under cover of the darkness, they were drawn back a little. Two days later another assault along the whole line was ordered. Sher man's corps, with its storming parties marching by the flank, succeeded again m planting colors at various points on the outer slope of the parapet. Word * Sherman's speech at the St. Louis banquet in his honor. 440 Ohio in the War. being brought that McClernand had effected a lodgment within the works opposite his part of the line, Sherman ordered another assault, which only led to the planting of more colors on the outer parapets, and the burrowing beside them of more men in the earth, to protect themselves from' the terrific fire of the garrison. Under cover of night they were again withdrawn — Grant hav ing by this time reached the wise conclusion that the works were too strong for direct assault. Sherman then settled down to the prosecution of his share in the siege. By the 25th June the works were so strengthened that smaller numbers served for the investment, and Sherman was accordingly detached, with some what increased command to watch Johnston, who had now gathered together a small force, and was maneuvering for the relief of the beleaguered city. "You must whip Johnston at least fifteen miles from here," wrote Grant. Hardly had Vicksburg surrendered, when, under Grant's orders, Sherman advanced against Johnston, pushing him back toward Jackson. The weather was in tensely hot, the roads were very dusty, and the troops were not even per mitted before starting on their toilsome march, to enter the stronghold they had aided to conquer. " Though personal curiosity," writes Sherman to his friend, Admiral Porter, "would tempt me to go and see the frowning batte ries and sunken pits that have defied us so long, and sent to their silent graves so many of our early comrades in this entei-prise, I feel that other tanks lie before me, and time must not be lost. Without casting anchor, and in spite of the heat and dust and the drouth, I must again into the bowels of the land, to make the conquest of Vicksburg fulfill all the conditions it should in the progress of this war." On 9th July Sherman appeared before Jackson, and by the 12th had all his troops up and in position, and was skirmishing vigorously. His ammunition was delayed, and while he was waiting for it Johnston destroyTed his stores and retreated. Our loss was about a thousand. Johnston's was about six hundred killed and wounded, and seven hundred and sixty-four prisoners. The retreat ing force was harassed for some distance, all the railroads centering in Jackson were broken up, and then Sherman, leaving a garrison in the town, drew hack to the line of the Big Black. Grant fitly summed up Sherman's handsome conduct in this campaign: " His demonstration at Haines's Bluff in April, to hold the enemy about Vicks burg, while the army was securing a foothold east of the Mississippi ; his raP'^ marches to join the army afterward; his management at Jackson in the first attack; his almost unequaled march from Jackson to Bridgeport and passage of the Black Eiver, .... attest his great merit as a soldier."* The period of comparative leisure that followed enabled General Sherman ,to attend to some minor duties. A very pleasing evidence of his admiration for spirited 'behavior, and his sympathy for the friendless, was exhibited in a letter to the Secretary of War : " I take the liberty of. asking that something he 9 Grant's Official Report, Vicksburg. William T. Sherman. 4A1 done for a young lad named Orion P. Howe, of Waukegan, Illinois. He is too young for West Point, but would be the very thing for a midshipman. When the assault at Vicksburg was at its height, on the 19th of May, and I was on foot near the road which formed the line of attack, this young lad came up to me wounded and bleeding, with a good healthy boy's cry: 'General Sherman, send some cartridges to Colonel Walmbourg; the men are all out.' 'What is the matter, my boy?' 'They shot me in the leg, but I can go to the hospital; send the cartridges right away.' Even where we stood the shot fell thick, and I told him to go to the rear at once, I would attend to the cartridges; and off he limped. Just before he disappeared over tho hill, he turned and called as loud as he could : ' Caliber fifty-four.' . . . What arrested my attention then was, and what renews my memory of the fact now is, that one so young, carry ^ ing a musket-ball wound through his leg, should have found his way to me on that fatal spot, and delivered his message,1 not forgetting the very important part, even, of the caliber of the musket, which, you know, is an unusual one. I'll warrant that the boy has in him the elements of a man, and I commend him to the Government as one worthy the fostering care of some one of its National institutions." A few days after this letter was written, General Sherman received a com mission as Brigadier-General in the -regular army. He was not mistaken in attributing his promotion to the friendly influence of Grant, to whom he wrote: "lvalue the commission far less than the fact that it will associate my name with yours and McPherson's, in opening the Mississippi. . . I beg to assure you of my deep personal attachment, and to express the hope that the cbances of war will leave me to serve near and under you till the dawn of that peace for which we are contending." It was not unnatural — most "men having a good deal of human nature in them" — that such deferential language to his supe rior officer should increase the good opinion entertained of Sherman at head quarters. His restless mind was never satisfied with the mere details of the business pressing upon it. Through the summer he addressed, the Governor of Ohio, urging a new plan of recruiting. With rare foresight he struck at the inherent vice of the existing system, in expressing his " earnest hope that the strength of our people will not again be wasted by the organization of new regiments, while we have in the field skeleton regiments, with officers, non-commissioned officers and men, who only need numbers to make a magnificent army. . . The mass of men called for should all be privates, and sent so as to make every reg iment in the field equal to one thousand men. . . Ohio has in the field one hun dred and twenty-six regiments, whose officers now are qualified, and the men of which would give tone and character to the new recruits. To fill these regi ments will require fifty thousand recruits. . . I therefore hope and pray that you will use your influence against any more new regiments, and consolidation of old ones, but fill up all the old ones to a full standard." No wiser policy of recruiting was presented to the Government through the war. Fortunate, 442 Ohio in the War. indeed would it have been for the country had this recommendation of General Sherman's been adopted. In such discussions of the general war policy, in elaborate letters urging these views, in the miscellaneous work ofthe corps, and in a visit from his wife and family that was to have a very sad ending, the summer passed away. At last the Government awoke to the critical position, of Eosecrans. While Grant's great army was dping nothing to engage the enemy in the West while the army of the Potomac was equally inactive at the East, Eosecrans with inadequate force, was penetrating to the vital and jealously -guarded strong hold of Chattanooga. Unable to make head against Grant, Johnston's forces were at liberty to hasten against Eosecrans; not occupied in Virginia, Lee was at liberty to send Longstreet to help check the perilous advance ofthe venture some "Dutch General." Finally, on the 13th of September, orders were sent to Sherman to forward all availablo forces to Corinth and Tuscumbia, to. co-op erate with Eosecrans. For some reason that has never been explained, Sherman did nothing * At last, on the 22d, Grant telegraphed, requiring one division for Eosecrans's aid to be forthwith forwarded to Memphis. Two days later he was ordered to follow with his whole corps. It was not till the 27th that he was able to proeure steamboat transportation, and even then the delays were so great that the corps did not all arrive at Memphis until October 4th. Thence the troops were to march eastwardly along the line ofthe Memphis and Charleston Eailroad, which connects Memphis and Chattanooga. While supervising the preparations for this march, Sherman was bowed down by the burden of a great grief. His own touching words to the com manding officer of his old regiment shall tell the sad story : " I can not sleep to-night, till I record an expression of the deep feelings of my heart to you, and to the officers and soldiers of the battalion, for their kind behavior to my poor child. .... Consistent with a sense of duty to my profession and office, I could not leave my post, and so I sent for my family to come to me in that fatal climate, and in that sickly period of the year; and behold the result ! The child that bore my name, and in whose future I reposed with more confidence than I did in my own plans of life, now floats a mere corpse, seeking a grave in a distant land, with a weeping mother, brother, and sisters clustered about him. . . . But my poor Willy was, or thought he was, a Sergeant of the Thirteenth. I have seen his eye brighten and his heart beat as he beheld the battalion under arms, and a-sked me if they were not real soldiers. Child as he was, he had the enthusiasm, the pure love of truth, honor, and love of country, which should animate all soldiers. God only knows why he should die thus young. . . Please convey to the battalion my heartfelt thanks, and assure each and all that if, in after yeajs, they call on me or mine, and mention that they were of the Thirteenth Eegu- lars when poor Willy was a Sergeant, they will have a key to the affections of my family that will open all it has — that we will share with them our last blanket, our last crust." Unfortunately General Sherman decided to repair the Memphis and Charleston Eailroad as he advanced eastwardly along it, in the direction of Eosecrans's position. It would seem that he still had no adequate conception of the peril at Chattanooga, or that he did not conceive himself bound to *"For some reason that has never been explained." That is, unless the explanation in- Gen eral Halleck's Annual Report to the Secretary of War (Ex. Doc, Vol. V, 1863-4) be considered sufficient. He says: "The dispatches of the 13th to Grant and Sherman did not reach them William T. Sherman. 443 strenuous efforts for relief. It was the llth of October before he left Memphis to obey the order first issued, 13th of September. At Collierville his train plunged fairly into a fight raging about the station. The Eebel General Chal mers, with three thousand cavalry, was attacking it. Sherman's body-guard, under his own eye, rushed to the rescue, and the assailants were driven off. The next day he reachecl Corinth, and pushed on his advance to Iuka. Building railroads instead of marching to the relief of the beleaguered army in Chatta nooga, it was not until the 27th of October that he left Iuka, under orders has tily sent by courier across the country from Grant, to drop all railroad work, and hurry his army forward as fast as their legs could carry them. It was now forty-four days since the first issue of the order for the march, and the troops had yet accomplished scarcely one-third of the distance between Memjjhis and Chattanooga. In eighteen days more General Sherman rode into Chattanooga, and reported to Grant for orders. There had been some sharp skirmishing with the Eebel cavalry that hung upon the front and flanks, and much trouble in crossing streams from the destruction of bridges and lack of pontoons. The delays in the early part of this march have been sharply criticised in some quarters, and it must be confessed that it did not exhibit the celerity tbat a full appreciation of the crisis and a cordial desire to relieve Eosecrans would , have dictated.* But it is to be remembered that General Sherman's whole career has sufficiently shown that lack of energy was never one of his failings; that the difficulties of the march were considerable; that it was well managed throughout, and that the latter part of it was so rapid and skillful as to merit the highest praise. Genera] Grant had been on the point of making the attack without Sher man — so great was his anxiety to dislodge the enemy from Mission Eidge and Lookout Mountain, and to dispatch a force to raise the siege of Knoxville. He now explained his plans to Sherman, who at once sprang into a skiff, rowed him- until some days after iheir dates." " Some days" is a phrase that seems scarcely to cover a delay of nine days; nor does it seem probable that nine days could be spent in forwarding a dis patch from Memphis (to which point Halleck had telegraphic communication) over the short river stretch to Vicksburg. As this matter has given rise to a good deal of dispute, I subjoin Halleck's order: "HEAD-QUARTEBS 03? THE AuMY, 1 " Washington, D. C, 13th September, 1863. J "Major-General Grant, or Major-General Sherman, Vicksburg: "It is quile possible that Bragg and Johnston will move through Northern Alabama to the Tennessee River, to turn General Rosecrans's right, and cut off his communications. All of General Grants available forces should be sent to Memphis, thence to Corinth and Tuscumbia, to co-operate with Rosecrans, should the Rebels attempt that movement. "H. W..HAHH5CK, General-in-Chief." * Colonel Bowman, after saying that at Memphis Sherman received Halleck's order to march, and to report to Rosecrans,' adds: "He was substantially to follow the railway eastwardly, repairing it as he moved, looking to his own lines for supplies." General Halleck, however, makes no mention of such orders, and the tone of his report indicates great anxiety for haste in the movement. No apprehension about supplies at the end of the mareh need have been enter- tamed, for the railroad was unobstructed as far as Bridgeport, -and, as was afterward proved, was capable of supplyihg far larger armies than were now dependent upon it. 444 Ohio in the War. self down to Bridgeport, where his columns were arriving, and hastened them forward. When they reached the ground the other troops were all in position the jpontoons were ready, and the movement was at once begin. Sherman passed behind Chattanooga on the north side, having been compelled in the haste to leave one division with Hooker, below, moved down to the river secretly on the night of the 23d, by daylight on the 21th had two divisions across and rifle-pits dug to protect them, and by one o'clock was ready with his whole force for the advance,. Moving up in echelon, with skirmishers well to the front they reached the base of the ridge in safety, completely protected from the enemy's observation by the mist and fog. The heads of columns were fairly on the top before the enemy discovered the movement and opened with artillery. Nothing, however, but some exchanges of artillery-firing" and skirmishing occurred through the afternoon, and daring the night the positions were for tified. In front of Sherman now lay a crest of the Mission Eidge, wooded on the eastern side, partially cleared on the western, and occupied by the enemy. Beyond this was a higher eminence, whence the enemy's artillery played over the whole field in dispute. By daylight Sherman was out, trying to gain an .idea of the. position, and by sunrise he had his troops in motion. General Coree was to attack from the center, Morgan L. Smith on the left, and Colonel Loomis on the right. Corse met heavy resistance, and made little progress. About teu o'clock he was severely wounded and carried from the field, while Colonel Walcutt succeeded to the command. Smith fared better on the left, and Loomis got far enough on the right to effect a serious diversion in favor of the center column of attack. But the day was clear, and across the heights long columns of the enemy could be seen streaming toward the point of the ridge where Sherman's attack was progressing. Unsuspicious of the danger that lay threatening his center and left, the enemy was concentrating on his right to overpower Sher man. The case looked critical. Ee-enforcements were thrown forward to aid Walcutt in the center ; but tho crest where he fought was narrow, and already thronged' with troops. The new arrivals were thus crowded over to the west 'side of the ridge, which, as has been seen, was cleared of timber. Here they soon became exposed to a terrific fire, and were presently hurled back in much disorder. But the key -point on the crest was held. At last the white fringe of smoke that rose from Thomas's line, told that r the attack on the center had begun. Thenceforward Bragg found enough to do without further concentration on Sherman. Darkness soon closed thecarnagp; and after nightfall Sherman had the satisfaction of learning that, though he had not gained the objective point of his assault, and had indeed been terribly pun ished in holding his positions, he had so weakened the enemy's lines on the center that magnificent victory had come with the setting sun. His was not the most brilliant, but it was far from being the least useful part in the great battle. He pushed forward his reserve in the pursuit, captured some stores and artillery, then turned to the eastward to make room for Hooker's column, which contin- William T. Sherman. 445 ned the pursuit, while Sherman broke up the communications between Bragg and Longstreet. Then, Grant having been dissatisfied with the reception by another officer ofhis order to march to Knoxville to Burnside's relief, fell back on Sherman, on whose zeal and energy he knew he could safely reckon. Wearied as the men were with tho hurried march to Chattanooga, and the bloody battle that had immediately followed* Sherman at once put them in motion, and had them re-enforced by Gordon Granger's command. On the 29th of November, in intensely cold weather, the movement began. By 3d December Sherman com municated with Burnside; by the 5th the heads of columns, after much delay from difficulty in crossing streams, met within striking distance of Knoxville. But hore a messenger arrived announcing that Longstreet, warned by their advance, was already in full retreat. The column then turned southward, and in leisurely marches returned to the Hiawassee Valley, Sherman himself keep ing on the alert for possibilities of striking Longstreet, and once or t\vice diverting portions of his force in ineffectual attempts to capture wagon-trains Or detachments. The troops who had now been in constant motion from the time they left their camps on tho Big Black, near Vicksburg, required rest. The indefat igable commander, however^ seemed to need none, and he at once set out for Memphis and Vicksburg, to inspect the department which had been assigned to him while he was on the march to Chattanooga. Some three weeks were given to this work, and, meanwhile, an important expedition was organizing. Of the spirit in whftsh, through these busy weeks, the General issued instructions as to their civil duties, to his subordinates, this, from his letter to the commanding officer at Huntsville, must serve as an illustration : . " If the people of Huntsville think differently let them persist in war three years longer, and they will not be consulted. Three years ago, by a little reflection and patience, they could have had a hundred years of peace and prosperity, but they preferred war. Very well. Last year they could have saved their slaves, but now it is too late; all the power of earth can not restore to them their slaves any more than their dead grandfathers. Next year their lands will be taken — for in war we can take them, and rightfully, too — and in another year they may beg in vain for their lives. A people who will persevere in war beyond a certain limit ought to know the consequences. Many, many people, with less pertinacity than the South, have' been wiped out of national existence." By the 3d of February Sherman was ready for his new movement. It seemed to him that the free navigation of the Mississippi Eiver could be best guarded by destroying the lines of railroad by which tho Eebels were able to approach it at any point, at will, and then by the establishment of small posts in the interior to keep the guerrillas away from the banks. With this view, he proposed to mOve out with a strong column due east from The losses of Sherman's corps in the battle and brief pursuit, were two hundred and fifty- eight killed, twelve hundred and fifty-seven'wounded, and two hundred and eleven missing. 446 „ Ohio in the War. m Vicksburg across the State of Mississippi to the important railroad center of Meridian, where a cavalry force, moving from Memphis out to and down the Mobile and Ohio Eailroad, should meet him. General William Sooy Smith was assigned to this latter duty. Sherman himself took the field with the Vicksburg column, composed of two divisions from McPherson's corps, and two from Hurlbut's, with Colonel Winslow's brigade of cavalry. With this formidable force he plunged into the country, and disappeared from the public eye. The novelty and mystery of the movement piqued curiosity and great exjiectations were cherished as to the results at which Sherman .was supposed to be aiming. When, after a month's absence, the missing army eifaerged again, having simply, in the words of its, leader, accomplished "a big raid," there was general disappointment. The expedition had, however cut the enemy's communications at Meridian, destroyed long stretches of 'the railroads, depots, arsenals, public stores, and spread among the people of Mississippi a general sense of danger, and of the weakness of their cause. More might, perhaps, have been accomplished but for the failure of the Mem phis cavalry column to join the expedition at Meridian.* Meanwhile, it was noteworthy that throughout the great march the General had handled his army with as much ease as if it were but a regiment, and had learned the art of subsisting an army in the enemy's country without a base and without a supply-train. Thus far we have traced the progress of General Sherman, through many checkered scenes, to the point from which his successful career begins. Hitherto he has been mainly in subordinate positions, and his few independent commands have not enlarged his fame. His career in Kentucky was a failure. With tbe same harsh judgment which the Government repeatedly visited upon others in similar plight, he would never again have been assigned to active service. If to an j- extent he was responsible for the neglect before the. battle of Pittsburg Landing, his conduct there was worse than a failure. His first assault on Vicks burg failed. And his Meridian expedition was not at the time accounted a success. In subordinate positions, and mainly under the command of Grant, he had achieved great credit, and the army and the public alike recognized in him a competent corps General. With the most, this was believed to be the height of his capacity. It is to the rare sagacity of General Grant in judging men that the countiy owes the- brilliant and eventful career we have now to trace. Between these two the friendship that began almost at the outbreak of the war, cemented as it was in many an hour of danger and on many a hard-fought field, had grown more intimate and confidential. When now, Grant was raised to the Lieutenant-Generalship, in the fullness ofhis heart he sat down and wrote a letter to "Dear Sherman," giving him the news, and adding: "I want to ex press my thanks to you and McPherson, as the men to whom, above all others, I feel indebted for whatever I have had of success. How far your advice and *For the causes of this failure see post, Life of William Sooy Smith. William T. Sherman. 447 assistance have been of help to me, you know. How far your execution of whatever has been given you to do entitles you to the reward I am receiving, you can not know as well as I." Warm, generous words, honorable alike to the writer afid the one addressed ! But the reply is something more. It was irraceful that General Sherman should say: "You do yourself injustice and us too much honor in assigning to us too large a share of the merits which have led to your high advancement. . . . You are now Washington's . . suc cessor, and occupy a position of almost dangerous elevation ; but if you can continue, as heretofore, to be yourself, simple, honest, and unpretending, you will enjoy through life the respect and love of friends, and the homage of mill- ions'of human beings that will, award you a large share in securing to them and their descendants a government of law and stability." And it was frank to add: "My only point of doubt was in your knowledge of grand strategy and of books of science and history; but I confess your common sense seems to have supplied all these." So, too, it was natural that he should urge Grant to "come West; take to yourself the whole Mississippi Valley. Let us make it dead sure— and I tell you the Atlantic slopes and Pacific shores will follow its destiny. . . . Here lies the seat of coming empire, and from the West, when our task is done we will make shqrt work of Charleston and Eiehmond,- and the impoverished coast of the Atlantic." But it touched the limits of extrava gant admiration, and was hardly free from a suspicion of flattery, to speak of Grant to his face as "Washington's legitimate successor,'' and to say, "I believe you are as brave, patriotic, and just, as the great prototype Washington — as unselfi.sh, kind-hearted, and honest, as a man should be." * <• Two days after this letter was sent, Sherman was appointed to the chief command between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi Eiver! He was summoned to meet Grant at Nashville, and he traveled as far north with him as Cincinnati. In that visit the plans were first outlined, the comple tion of which ended the war. Later, General Grant sent him a map, on which were traced the lines the several armies were to take. Tbe bare possibility of some inquisitive postmaster having opened the package in which this was sent, threw Sherman's suspicious mind into a fever of apprehension. f Finally Grant wrote, under date 4th April, disclosing his complete programme. This was Sherman's share: "You I propose to move against Johnston's army, to break it up, and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflict ing all the damage you can against their war resources. I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but simply to lay down the work it is desirable to have done, and leave you free to execute in your own way. Submit to me, however, as early as you can, your plan of operations." Sherman responded promptly: "lam pushing stores to the front with all possible dis patch. ... It will take us all of April to get in all our furloughed vet- * Rep; Com. Gon. War. Series of 1866, Vdl. I, pp. 14, 15. T Ibid, p. 25. "I "will cause inquiries to be made," writes Sherman, "lest the map has been seen by some eye intelligent enough to read the meaning of the blue and red lines. We can not he too careful in these matters." 448 Ohio in the War. erans, . . and to collect provisions and cattle to the line of the Tennes see. . . At the signal, to be given by you, Schofield will . . drop down to Hi- awassee, and march on Johnston's right. . . Thomas will aim to have forty- five thousand men of all arms, and move straight on Johnston, wherever he may be, and fighting him continuously, persistently, and to tbe best advantage. McPherson will have full thirty thousand of the best men in America. He will cross the Tennessee at Decatur, march toward Eome, and feel for Thomas. Should Johnston fall behind the Chattahoochie I would feign to the right but pass to the left, and act on Atlanta, or on its eastern communications, according to developed facts. This is about as far ahead_as I feel disposed to look."* Such then, was the campaign which our nervous, energetic General, now at last in independent command, and with ample force, proposed to himself. He would act first against Johnston ; then against Atlanta, or its. communications. For the work he had three armies, numbering, in the aggregate, a hundred thousand men.f He had, moreover, three Generals — a consideration of no less weighty import. If Grant could trace his success to Sherman and McPherson, Sherman might now well fortify his hopes for the campaign by remembering that he was privileged to command George H. Thomas, James B. McPherson, and J. M. Schofield, J with the long list of brave officers, educated to war in the war, comprised within the army of each. * Ibid, pp. .26, 27, 28. t The exact number was: Thomas's Army of the Cumberland, sixty thousand seven hundred and seventy-three ; McPherson's Army of the Tennessee, twenty-four thou.sand four hundred and six^-five; Schofield's Army of the Ohio, thirteen thousand five hundred and fifty-nine; total ninety-eight thousand seven hundred and ninety-seven ; with the splendid artillery equipment of two hundred and fi fty-four guns. The organization of these armies was as follows : AEMY OP THE CUMBERLAND (THOMAS). D. S. Stanley's division. Fourth Corps — 0. O. Howard, - ¦{ John Newton's division. Thomas J. Woods's division. Jeff. C. Davis's division. Fourteenth Corps — John M. Palmer, - -J R- W. Johnson's divison. A. Baird's division. A. S. Williams's division. Twentieth Corps — Joseph Hooker, - •! John W. Geary's division. {{ Daniel Butterfield's division. ABMT OF THE TENNESSEE (lIi'PHERSON). IP. J. Osterhaus's division. Harrow's division. (" T. E. G. Ransom's division. Sixteenth Corps — George M. Dodge, -j John M. Corse's division. (. T. W. Sweeney's division. Seventeenth Corps-Frank P. Blair, Jr., { ^J^KW!^ ARMY.OF THE OHIO (SCHOFIELD). t> * tiu- j n ( M. S. Hascall's division. Twenty-Third Corps, - - - - { J. D. Cox's division. X The whole force had been reorganized, and from the assignment of corps commanders down, the President had given Sherman his choice in everything. William T. Sherman. 449 Against him stood the ablest commander remaining to the Confederacy, an accomplished and experienced soldier. But it was General Johnston's misfor tune to be in ill favor at Eiehmond. He had but forty-five thousand men of all arms, with some possible recruits, in the doubtful shape of Georgia militia, with out transportation, and cowed by the successive disasters which (under Bragg) had hurled them back from Nashville to Murfreesboro, to Tullahoma, to Chatta nooga, to Mission Eidge, and to Daiton. With this force, Mr. Davis was demanding that he should undertake an offensive campagn against the hundred thousand men that lay clustered about the fastnesses of Chattanooga. While they debated it, Sherman's last preparations were completed. Grant had first fixed the 25th of April for the simultaneous movement of the several grand armies; then, as he found the Army of the Potomac still unready, the 27th; then 1st May, and finally 5th May. On the 4th he sent the final order; on the 5th the campaign against Johnston and Atlanta opened. Sherman hoped to force Johnston to speedy and decisive battle; * Johnston, with the cautious wisdom that distinguished him, saw at once that, with his weak forces, his policy was to act on the defensive, draw Sherman away from his base, weaken his army at every step for guards for his attenuated line of sup plies, and so finally bring on the decisive battle on something more nearly approaching equal terms. But he was nevertheless prepared to make his defensive campaign an obstinate one. His main defenses, in his present posi tion, were along the 'Eocky Face Eidge, a short distance north of Daiton; at Tunnel Hill and Buzzard's Boost Gaps. Here the heights were crowned with artillery, the approaches were obstructed with abattis, and, to complete the work, these were finally flooded by the aid of dams on the adjacent streams. Not pro posing to sacrifice his soldiers against this impregnable position, General Sher man made it his' aim to maneuver Johnston into open ground, and then suddenly bring him to battlo. To this end he sent Thomas to make a strong feint directly against the works, while McPherson, marching from his position on the west around Johnston, should silently sieze the Snake Gap, and throw himself upon the railroad below him at Eesaea, thus forcing him out of his craggy fastness to fight for his line of supplies. Thomas carried out his part of the plan admira bly, and made so formidable a demonstration that he fairly forced himself into the gap on Johnston's front. Meantime McPherson hastened around on his western detour, only to find that Johnston had seen through the whole plan from the outset, and had effectually guarded against it. In ample time he had dis patched troops to Eesaea, and McPherson reported that he "found tho place too strong to be taken by assault." And besides, so complete were Johnston's pre parations, that he had not only fortified Eesaea, but had so strengthened his tenure of the line of railway to Daiton, above, that McPherson found it impos sible to burst in upon it anywhere. Yet more, he had cut roads through the rough country so as to be able, by a sudden march, to pounce down from Daiton upon the. flank of any adventurous force here seeking to molest his rear. Thus * "I hope the enemy will fight at Daiton," said Sherman in letter of instructions to McPher son, 5th May.— Rep. Com. Con. War. ' Series of 1866 Vol. I, p. 51. V->l. I— 29. 450 Ohio in the War. endangered, McPherson thought it necessary for his own safety to draw back and fortify at Snake Gap; and so the first step in the campaign ended in failure. The cause will readily suggest itself to every one. The whole movement turned upon the success at Eesaea. The attack at Buzzard's Boost was only a feint. But the feint was committed to Thomas, with an army of sixty thousand- the real movement to McPherson, with an army of twenty-five thousand, which proved, in the judgment of its skillful commander, too weak to attack, or even to hold its ground and run the risk of being attacked. But Sherman, with a fertility of resource that was admirable, was ready at once for the contingency although, as he said, "somewhat disappointed at the result." He at once pre pared to make the attack at Eesaea with almost his entire force, leaving only a single corps to keep up the feint at Buzzard's Boost. So ended the first stage of the campaign. But Johnston was again to offer a skillful parry. No sooner had Sherman's movement commenced than, divining its object, his antagonist began to move to meet it. On the 13th Sherman's army began to arrive before Eesaea. On the 13th Johnston abandoned Daiton, and marched down to Eesaea, leaving the corps Sherman had left keeping up the feint, to march quietly after him. Next morning when Sherman arrived, he perceived at a glance that he was foiled again. This time, however, he determined to fight; while, at the same time, he should again essay cutting Johnston's line of supplies. From Eesaea southward the Oostenaula interposed its waters between Sherman and the railroad to Atlanta. Laying a pontoon bridge across this stream, a few miles below Eesaea, Sherman crossed here a single division. Behind this, and much further down, he sent Garrard's cavalry division to cut the railroad far to the south ward. Then, placing Thomas in the center, McPherson on the right, and Scho field on the left, he made a fierce attack upon the intrenchments of Eesaea. Thomas and Schofield found the obstructions too great, and gained little or nothing. McPherson fared better, and succeeded in securing ground whence his batteries swept the Eebel positions. Meantime, hearing of the pontoon bridge across the river a little way below him, and of the threat there made on his rear, Johnston dispatched Hood to guard against this new danger. But before he could accomplish anything Sherman was swinging his whole right across the bridge. This settled the matter. Johnston at once evacuated Eesaea, and retreated southward, burning the bridges behind him. Thus ended the second stage of the campaign. It cost between four and five thousand men, while the Eebel loss was proportionately far less, on account of their intrenchments, and the result was finally obtained, not by sanguinary fighting, but by the bloodless flanking operations below the town. Sherman was again disappointed in seeking to force Johnston's forty -five thousand to pitched battle with his hundred thousand — he must find his battle-field yet further from his base. Pursuit was promptly begun. McPherson had a skirmish at Calhoun; there was a brisker little engagement at Adairsville; and finally Johnston was William T. Sherman. 451 •J.LOVEJOY SHERMAN'S ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. William T. Sherman. 453 found intrenched at Cassville, a point on the railroad about midway between Chattanooga and Atlanta. The Eebel army was now re-enforced by a fresh division of Polk's corps, making it a little stronger than at the outset of the campaign; and an attack was ordered on Sherman's advancing columns. But the orders were misunderstood; nothing was done, and Sherman soon had his artillery favorably posted, and playing upon the intrenchments. Hood and Polk, at nightfall, waited upon Johnston and urged a retreat, insisting that the National artillery made their positions untenable. The Eebel commander dis sented from thoir views; but'the representations of his two best officers had so strong an influence upon him that, against his better judgment, he finally con sented. Next morning Sherman found his antagonist gone. So ended one more stage in the campaign. Already far down into the enemy's country, beyond what, six months before, had seemed the utmost capacity of the Government to supply the army, Sherman did not hesitate. Thus far he had wonderfully preserved the thread of railroad by which his supplies passed through the hostile regions of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Northern Georgia, to reach him; and, emboldened by his suc cess, and fertile in expedients, he at once resolved on yet more hazardous ven tures. He was greatly disappointed in being unable to bring Johnston to 'decisive battle, and he knew full well the aim of "that astute commander," as he often styled him, in drawing him yet further and further from his, base of supplies. But.re- enforcements continued to reach him, and with bold hearts his troops once more turned their faces southward. Sherman's thorough study of the topographical features of the country led him to tho belief that Johnston's next stand would be in the strong natural position of Allatoona Pass, a point he had no desire to attack. Loading his wagons, therefore, with food and powder he made a long stride away from his railroad — marching far to the south-westward of Johnston's supposed position, and hoping to sieze Dallas, toward the west and rear of Allatoona Pass. But "the astute commander" saw through Sherman's efforts to mask his real pur pose; and when the heads of columns appeared near Dallas they found John ston behind formidable intrenchments, ready to receive them. Here, in the vicinity of New Hope Church, Hooker, who led the advance of Thomas's army, had a fierce engagement as he came up on the 25th of May ; and for the next three days there was skirmishing, sometimes swelling into heavy fighting, all along the lines. On the 27th Sherman ordered an assault, which cost some three thousand men, while the enemy lost only four hundred and fifty, and held his ground. The next day, however, Johnston fell upon McPherson's army, but found it already behind good breastworks, and received an equally bloody repulse. Thus, for ten days, stood the two skillful antagonists, fairly matched, facing each other with thrust and parry. But Sherman was not so to be balked. To flank again to the westward would throw him, as he thought, too far from the railroad, with which it was vital to maintain his connection. He therefore gradually extended his lines to the eastward, Johnston' closely watching and following every move. Throwing his cavalry out; he succeeded in siezing Alia- 454 Ohio in the War. toona Pass, and Acworth, on the railroad; then, establishing himself there, he began to accumulate supplies and prepare for a desperate grapple with the enemy, who, still resolutely confronting him, now lay a little further down on the railroad at Marietta. Between the hostile armies interposed a mountain spur — henceforth as bloody and ill-omened a name in our history as Freder icksburg — the heights of Kenesaw. They were held by the enemy. Within the next five days Sherman had the railroad repaired to his very camps, had abundant supplies, and was ready for a fresh movement. Weary of perpetual flanking, which seemed only to result in driving the enemy to stronger positions, and knowing very well what his antagonist hoped in thus. drawing him on, he now determined to abandon his effort to bring on a battle on equal ground, and to attack Johnston just where Johnston had prepared for attack. Yet the results of his reconnoissances might well have given him pause. Directly in front loomed Kenesaw, bristling with batteries, scarred with in trenchments and abattis. To the west, securely covering the flank, was Lost Mountain; thrust forward between the two was Pine Hill. But, with his quick eye for detecting the salient points of a position, Sherman saw that this line was too much extended for Johnston's weak force, and trusting to the chances that might result from carrying the weaker of the heights, he proceeded to attack. From the 9th of June, on which the advance was made, till the 3d of July, Sherman lay beating away his strength against those rock-bound barriers. He soon, indeed, forced Johnston off Lost Mountain and Pine Hill; but in so doing he only .strengthened his position. Emboldened, however, by these successes, as it would seem, and doubtless remembering the scaling of Mission Eidge, at which all the world wondered, he now brought himself, well knowing the dan ger, to order an attack on Kenesaw itself. Ample time was given for prepara tion. Finally, on the 27th, the batteries swept the mountain side with a fearful storm of shell; and at last two armies, Thomas's and McPherson's, rushed to the assault. They wTere completely and bloodily repiulsed ; the position was im pregnable. " Failure it was, and for it I assume the entire responsibility," said Sherman, manfully. It would have been better for his fame if he had there rested. But, as has already been seen, it was a characteristic of this gifted commander's mind to be unwilling ever to acknowledge an error;* and so he must needs prove that the failure was advantageous: "I claim that it produced good fruits, as it demonstrated to General Johnston that I would assault, and that boldly. Novel reason for battle — to make the enenrf understand his intentions! Asa mistake, the first in a brilliant and highly successful campaign,! it would have • So warm an admirer of General Sherman, and so acute a military critic as Mr. Swinton, has here been forced to substantially the same observation: "The other alternative (from assault), lhat of flanking," he says, " would, if now adopted, suggest the query why it had not been chosen before, with saving of time and troops. Accordingly, Sherman felt authorized to make one grand assault." — Decisive Battles of the War, p. 403. t Or, at most, the second, if taking the bulk of the army for a feint at Resaca he reckoned the first. William T. Sherman. 455 been cordially pardoned. Who ever thought the less for it of that Frederick who wrote, "I have lost a great battle, and solely by my own fault?" But as a wise movement, neither the Government nor the Country was disposed to accept it. Presently, General Sherman thought it necessary to argue the point: "The assault " he writes to the Chief of Staff at Washington, "was no mistake. I had to do it. The enemy and our own army and officers had settled down into the conviction that the assault of lines formed no part of my game, and the moment the enemy was found behind anything like a parapet, why, everybody . would deploy, throw up coun ter- works, and take it easy, leaving it to the 'obi man' to turn the position."* There is more of it in this and many other letters, but this is enough. Proud as he was of his army, he was yet ready to slander it in seeking defense for his course. Under his management, forsooth, its discipline had fallen so low that it had to be slaughtered in order to fit it for fighting ! And yet, a few days later, we find him apologetically explaining to General Grant that his army had "lost nothing 'in morale in the assault,"f — not because the assault had tended to improve the morale, as ho has just been argu ing, but because he prevented its injurious effects by speedily following it up with other movements. Here, indeed, was his great merit. Unshaken by misfortune, he rose above it to fresh brilliancy. Instantly recognizing, with that swift perception that had so often stood him in good stead, the utter impossibility of seeking by further efforts to drive Johnston out of Kenesaw, he once more launched out his flanking column far to the south-westward. Straightway, in the darkness of a single night, Kenesaw fell without a blow ! Johnston first halted at Smyrna Church, then, as Sherman's quick -maneu vers threw him out of this position, fell back beyond the Chattahoochie. Sher man pushed forward, and lo! in sight rose the spires of Atlanta! But between him and them lay the network of defenses, drawn and held by a skillful General, whose parapets were for many weary days to keep the army at bay. Johnston now considered that the long-awaited favorable moment had come for decisive battle. "He had compelled the powerful antagonist, who mus tered more than two soldiers to his one, to spend seventy -two days in marching a hundred miles; he had lured him on to attack fortified positions, and, as he believed, had inflicted great loss. As the line lengthened, he knew that the assailant must weaken his forces at. the front to protect it, and be reckoned on this as a cause of still greater depletion in the hostile ranks. Meanwhile his own were strengthened. Whereas he had begun the campaign with scarcely forty-five thousand men, yet now, notwithstanding the natural losses of so active a series of operations, his reinforcements had raised his strength to fifty- one thousand.! Believing, therefore, that he at last approached terms of equal- *Eep. Com. Con. War. Series of 1866, Vol. I, p. 114. t Ibid, p. 122. X Johnston's entire losses in the campaign, thus far, were ten thousand killed and wounded, and four thousand seven hundred from other causes. He had inflicted much greater loss upon Sherman. He estimates it at five times his own. 456 Ohio in the War. ity with his antagonist, he prepared such measures as seemed to promise decisive victory. Sherman, remembering his plan for demonstrating on the east side of Atlanta or its communications, as announced to Grant at tbe outset, had already crossed the Chattahoochie to the eastward ofthe railroad and city; but between him and Atlanta there still lay the swampy banks of Peachtree Creek. On the further side of this stream Johnston prepared his first works. He proposed that Sherman should be permitted to cross; that then, sallying from his works he would fall upon the adventurous army and essay to drive it back in confusion into the stream. Failing in this, his next plan would be to draw off to the South and East, deserting these works, and leaving Sherman to march fair upon Atlanta. Then, issuing from his new positions, he would fall upon the flank of Sherman's passing column, break it if possjble, and beat the fragments in detail. Such was the reception preparing for our army, when the Eebels, them selves dealing the weightiest blows to their own cause, came to our aid. "Such a mysterious blow to the Confederacy," says an able military critic,* "was that by which General Johnston was removed from its Western army, when he was most needful for its salvation ; kept from its command till an intervening General had ruined and disintegrated it, and then gravely restored to the leadership of its pitiful fragments." There was left to oppose Sherman's advance, General J. B. Hood! It was- a sorry contrast. The one, warlike by instinct, trained to military methods, and educated by long experience, was now the most brilliant soldier in the armies ofhis country. The other was a brave, rash, inconsiderate fighter — noth ing more. Conscious, as it would seem, of his unfitness for the task to which the blind passions of the Confederate President had assigned him, he appealed to his late chief for assistance. Johnston explained all his plans, and Hood adopting them, at once proceeded to essay their execution. So it happened that, when Sherman, advancing across the Peachtree Creek, was coming out upon the firm ground, whence he hoped to march on Atlanta, he was suddenly struck with tremendous force at an unfortunate gap be tween Schofield and Thomas. Pushing his advantage, Dravely but not skillfully, General Hood strove to carry out Johnston's plan, and drive the disordered columns into the stream. But a part of the line had been protected by hastily- erected breastworks of rails; here the onset was handsomely resisted, the other corps rallied and were re-eoforced, and, in the end, Hood was driven back to his intrenchments, with a loss, as Sherman estimated it, of well-nigh five thousand men. Sherman's own loss was but one thousand seven hundred and thirty-three. Foiled at the outset, Hood next faithfully strove to carry out Johnston's second plan. In the night he abandoned his Peachtree lines and drew down to his fortifications east of Atlanta. Next morning, Sherman was astonished to find that the works whence had flamed forth such fierce attack, were deserted. In the first surprise, and with his natural swiftness of reasoning, he leaped to the conclusion that Atlanta itself must be evacuated; and straightway he put 5 Swinton's Decisive Eatlles of the War, p. 405. William T. Sherman. 457 his columns in motion to occupy the city. It was nearly noon* when Hood, lying in wait, conceived the opportune moment to have come. Issuing, then, from his works, far to the rear of Sherman's advance, he fell upon his flank, where McPherson's army was marching. The attack was irresistible; the col umn broken and in some disorder, was pushed back, some batteries were cap tured, McPherson himself — weightiest loss of all — was killed. But Sherman, never long disconcerted by anything, quickly disposed his greatly superior force, hurried up Schofield, and at last, after a terrible struggle, continuing from noon till night, beat Hood back. The battle cost Sherman three thousand seven hun dred and twenty-two men ; he, estimated Hood's loss at eight thousand, which was doubtless something of an exaggeration. Hood now drew back into the works immediately around the city ; Sherman dispatched cavalry to attempt cutting the Eebel communications; then at last,f convinced that there was no hope on the dast side of Atlanta, swung over to the west. But Hood, discerning the movement, marched. as promptly, and the next day struck the National lines in what Sherman himself called a " magnificent assault." But it was timed a little too late. No sooner had Sherman's troops been halted than their very first moments, had been given to throwing up rapid breastworks. Behind these, therefore, they met Hood's onset. It was fiercely made, and for four hours continued, with a final result of six hundred lost to Sherman, and, as he estimated, not less than five thousand to Hood. The desperate struggles of the army that stood savagely at bay in Atlanta here ended for a little — apparently through sheer exhaustion. Sherman com pleted his works, planted batteries, shelled the town (frequently setting it on fire), and gradua.lly extended his lines around to the southward, toward the rail-, road hy which Hood drew the bulk ofhis supplies. Schofield was ordered to attempt breaking through the enemy's southern lines, but the effort failed. There followed a period of bombardments, of skirmishing along the line, of simultaneous extensions of works on either hand. It was now the middle of August. For a month Sherman had lain baffled in sight ,of Atlanta. His army was reduced; periods of enlistment were fast expiring; new levies of enormous magnitude began to be contemplated with alarm at the North. To what end, they asked, all this waste of blood and treasure? We gain barren lines of railroad by strategic marches, but the fight ing is against us, the Eebel army confronts us, and in the West, as at the East, the fortifications ofthe city we have spent a whole campaign in trying to reduce still defy us. , The old distrust of Sherman was not yet fully allayed, and even his warmest admirers grew uneasy. At last the great convention of the anti-war party assembled at Chicago. In the height of their opposition to the prosecution of hostilities, they pointed to Sherman's foiled armies before Atlanta, and proclaimed that the war for the restoration of the Union was a failure. But, on the very day before that resolution passed, there began an eventful movement, which, a month afterward, those political managers would have * On 22d July, 1864. t July 27th. 458 Ohio in the War. given untold sums to have foreseen. General Sherman had sent Kilpatrick to make a serious break on the railroads south of Atlanta — taking advantage of the o/pportune absence of Hood's cavalry on a similar errand northward. But Kilpatrick was not satisfactorily successful. Meantime it would seem that Sherman himself had grown uneasy at the protracted contest, and would will ingly have stayed his hand. He east longing looks to Mobile and its rivers for help. He sent dispatepes to know if Mobile were likely to fall* and said that if it were he would quietly await the event. He dwelt upon the danger to his communications, the peril of carrying his flanking operations further. Across the mountains, his great friend, the General-in-Chief, lay before another beleaguered city in similar perplexity. There no device was practiced save a steady extension of the lines. But at last, having fully counted the cost, Sher man took his resolution. Filling his wagons with supplies, and cutting loose from his base, he swung around to the south-westward with the bulk of his army. He first struck the West Point Eailroad, broke and thoroughly destroyed it for many miles; and then, while the Chicago Convention is pi'oclaiming the war a failure, pushes straight eastward, for the only remaining railroad con necting Atlanta with the Confederacy. He strikes it near Jonesboro', finds a considerable portion of Hood's army here, fights and repulses them, interposes between them and Atlanta, and proceeds with a vigorous destruction of the track. Hood now needs no strategist to tell him the effect of that repulse. That night* dull reverberations at the north, in the direction of Atlanta, arouse the sleepers. It is the end of the long campaign. Hood is evacuating the city, out of which he has been maneuvered. The exultation of the army was tempered by the remembrance of the graves that lined the railroad back to Chattanooga, and of the fresh perils that came with the victory. But the rejoicing of the country knew no hounds. General Grant fired a shotted salute from every battery bearing on the enemy about Eiehmond in honor of the great achievement of his friend. The Presi dent ordered a salute of a hundred guns from each leading city and military post in the country; and in special executive order tendered to General Sher man the thanks of the Nation for " the distinguished ability, perseverance, and courage displayed in the campaign." Bells rang, flags were hung out, bonfires were burnt in the leading cities. From the day that the capture of Atlanta was announced, the party that had resolved that the war was a failure was defeated. The Presidential contest was settled when Sherman cut loose from his base. The name and praise of Sherman were in every mouth. From positive unpopularity, or cold and questioning respect, he suddenly found him self burdened by the heartfelt homage of an impulsive and grateful people. The popular verdict indeed made amends to Sherman for previous coldness by fervid excess of praise. Of the remarkable campaign thus happily ended, it must be said that its main object was, after ali, unattained. General Slier- man had sought to bring the Eebel army to decisive battle at Daiton ; he had * September 1, 1864. The campaign began 5th May, and thus lasted about four months. William T. Sherman. 459 sought it at every stage of his advance ; but the army had at last escaped him, shattered, indeed, but still an effective organization, with all its trains and war materiel intact. He had neither crushed it nor signally defeated it. But, viewed simply as an operation for conquering territory, the entire campaign was mas terly. Each feature, its tactics, its logistics, its strategy, was equally admirable. Blunders there undoubtedly were. Need we recall again that wise saying of Marshal Turenne's, '¦ Whoever has committed no faults has not made war." But, as a whole, the campaign will long be studied as a brilliant exemplification of sound military principles skillfully put in practice. Two features in it will always attract special attention : the marvelous manner in which, by judicious accumulations of supplies at various secondary bases along the route, thoroughly protected by strong garrisons and fortifications, the army was kept constantly supplied, in spite of raids to the rear, the hostility of the inhabitants, and the inevitable exposure of so unprecedentedly long a line ; and the no less marvel ous manner in which, moving great armies over great spaces, in the face of a wary antagonist, General Sherman handled them as deftly and as precisely as he might thp pieces on a chess-board. But the fall of Atlanta brought to General Sherman new perplexities. He had advanced beyond it a little, had found the enemy opposing a strong front in well-chosen defensive positions, and had felt unable to attack. He dared not prolong his line another score of miles; already he was sure that Hood's forces, if reasonably well-handled, were strong enough to break it and throw him back upon Chattanooga ; at the farthest he could only hope, by the vigorous use of his army, to defend the railroad which supplied him, and main tain himself at the end of it. To what purpose? He perplexedly considered the question, as, he lay listening to the thunders of Northern applause, sending home the thousands of troops whose time of service had expired, and refitting the remainder. Meantime it was easy to see how success had elated the man, and increased the natural absolutism of all his mental processes. Before Atlanta, indeed, there had thus been bred a habit of command that did not always stop within legiti mate limits. Opposed from the outset to the enlistment of negro troops, he had chosen, in a letter to the head-quarters of the army, to denounce the law of Congress for sending recruiting-agents for them into the Eebel States as the height of folly, and to declare that he would not permit its enforcement within nis command.* Even less objectionable services were .barely tolerated : " The Sanitary and Christian Commissions," he declared, " are enough to eradicate all trace of Christianity from our minds, much less a set of unscrupulous State agents in search of recruits." When the agent of Massachusetts applied for a pass to the army, in accordance with the law, he gave him one instead into The exact language was: "I must express my opinion that it is the height of folly. I can hot permit it here. I will not have a set of fellows hanging about on any such pretences." Report Com. Con. War. -Series of 1866, Vol. I, p. 123. T Ibid. 460 Ohio in the War. the Eebel lines, and pleasantly advised him to open recruiting-offices in Mobile Montgomery, Savannah, and similar Eebel posts; while to help the matter he adde,fi that "civilian agents about an army were a nuisance," — a proposition of more palpable truth than politeness, and not exactly sufficient to overturn a law of Congress.* The Governor of Minnesota wished to send a military commissioner to look after the sick and wounded from his State — a species of generous care for their soldiers practiced by the Governments of -most of the States throughout the war, and often attended with the happiest results. General Sherman perempto rily refused to give him a pass, on the ground that it would be loading down the cars with passengers, and excluding provisions for the soldiers !f To such lengths had his imperious temper, and his hostility to State or civilian agencies carried him. On another point his views were more alarming. Expressing his regret that Governor Bramlette, of Kentucky, had not felt warranted by law to carry out his extraordinary recommendation for "arresting every fellow hang ing about the towns, villages, and cross-roads, who had no honest calling," he declared that, "in our country personal liberty has been so well secured that public safety is lost sight of in our laws and constitutions; and the fact is we are thrown back a hundred years in civilization, law, and everything else, and will go right straight to anarchy and the devil if somebody doesn't arrest our downward progress. We, the military, must do it, and we have right and law on our side." J This, in a letter of instructions to a military commander, as late as June, 1864, in defense of the policy of arresting by wholesale, without warrant or process, unaccused persons throughout an entire State, not openly in rebellion, because their occupations did not seem satisfactory to the petty officers in command at the various posts! It will not now seem wonderful that after still other brilliant successes in the field had still further elated our General, he should carry his disposition to absorb all power into his own hands to an extent that, for a little time, proved alarming alike to the Government and to the whole country. He was not, indeed, backward at any time in traveling to the verge of his own sphere, to volunteer opinions, advice, or protest. The promotion by the President of General Osterhaus to a Major-Generalship displeased him, and he straightway telegraphed the Department: "I wish to put on record this, my emphatic opinion, that it is an act of injustice to officers who stand by their posts in the day of danger to neglect them and advance such as General Hovey and General Osterhaus, who left us in the midst of bullets to go to the rear in * Sherman and his Campaigns, pp. 236, 237. .t Rep. Com. Con. War. Series of 1866, Vol. I, pp. 146, 147. The language is: "It seems that Dr. Luke Miller, a commissioner of your State, has been denied a pass on the military rail road below Nashville, for the purpose of ministering to the wants of the sick and wounded sol diers of your State here at the front. You will be amazed when on this simple statement I must accuse you of heartless cruelty to your constituents, but such is the fact. You would take the very bread and meat out of your soldiers' mouths,' . . . would load down our ears with trav elers, and limit our ability to feed our horses, and transport the powder and ball necessary to carry on this war." X Letter of instructions to General Burbridge. Sherman and his Campaigns, p. 233. William T. Sherman. 461 search of personal advancement." In the midst of his perplexity before Atlanta, iust after his failures* on the eastern side, and while he was hesitating about swinging to the south-westward, he found time to volunteer General Canby advice as to the best way of taking Mobile,* and Admiral Farragut suggestions as to the stationing of his fleet, but they do not seem to have been followed. While at bay before Dallas, he telegraphed that he thought Grant, by the move on Hanover C. H., which he regarded specially admirable, could force Lete to attack him in position or to move away toward Gordonsville or Lynchburg, f but Lee failed to perceive the necessity. In the same temper we now find him sending messages through his lines to Governor Brown, of Georgia, and to Alexander H. Stephens, telling them on what terms they could have peace, and how Georgia might escape being ravaged by his army. The Government had little fault to find with tbe substance of these communications; but it was a startling symptom that a military officer, having certain specific military duties to perform, should, .without authority, enter into peace negotiations with prominent civil officials of the Eebel Govern ment; and even trustful Mr. Lincoln — a little alarmed as it would seem — pro posed to himself a visit to General Sherman's head-quarters to look into the matter. J Yet it is noteworthy that in all this the intention seems always good. The General gradually assumed more and more authority to interfere iu all sorts of matters, but a word from the Government was always sufficient to check him, and he generally made full and frank reports of his exceptional doings. - Meanwhile he had grown to be, the idol of his troops. Their faith in Sher man was bOundless; their zeal for him flaming. Like McClellan, he had skill fully cultivated this feeling, though he displayed far more art in concealing His arts of popularity. He was always jealous of their privileges. He took great pains to keep them abundantly supplied. The whistle of the provision-train's locomotive in their works, almost before they had finished the skirmish that secured them, was a perpetual reminder of the care of their General. He was 'never laggard in extolling their exploits. Even when, in congratulatory orders, he said, "The crossing of the Chattahoochee was most handsomely executed by us, and will be studied as an example in the art of war,"|| the troops, overlook ing the egotism for the sake of the praise, were in raptures over the eulogium which the fortunate "us" enabled them to share. Nor was he less careful of his officers. To the shirks he was remorselessly severe; and sometimes he took an inexplicable dislike to a good officer, as when, preferring the mediocre Howard 'to Hooker for the command of a force less than twenty -five thousand strong, he said of the latter that he "was not qualified for or suited to it," and that he might leave if he wanted to — he was "not indis- * "I would advise that a single gunboat lie above Pilot Cove, and prevent supplies going to Fort Morgan. To reduce Mobile, I would pass a force up the Tensas and across to Old Fort Stod dard." Dispatch of 17th August to Canby. Rep. Com. Con. War, ubi supra, p. 175. t Ibid, p. 77. I Rep. Com. Con. War. Series of 1866, Vol. I, p. 197. Sherman and his Campai,gns, p. B12- II Order on fall of Atlanta. 462 Ohio in the War. pensable to success."* But, save in a very few such instances, he was kind and almost paternal in his regard for the welfare of the officers who deserved well. In mentioning to one of his army commanders, that in a division just sent him was a certain brigade, he took pains to say that it was commanded "by Charles E. Woods, whom you will find a magnificent officer." His letter on the death of McPherson was as touching and tender as a woman's. When Palmer became involved in a question of rank with Schofield, Sherman decided against him. Subsequently be beard that Palmer felt aggrieved and was about to resio-n. Writing at length to him at once he begged him to reconsider this determina tion : "Your future is too valuable to be staked on a mistake. If you want to resign, wait a few days and allege some other reason — one that will stand the test of time. Do not disregard the friendly advice of such men as General Thomas and myself, for you can not misconstrue our friendly feelings toward you."-}- He feared that a corps general was prejudiced against one of his division commanders ; and, in the midst of the fighting, he stopped to write a letter to General Logan about it. " I have noticed for some time a growing dis satisfaction on the part of General Dodge with General Sweeney. It may be personal. See that General Dodge prefers specific charges and specifications; and you, as the army commander, must be the judge of the sufficiency of the charges. . . . You can see how cruel it would be to a brave and sensitive gentleman and officer to be arrested and sent to the rear at this time. I fear that General Sweeney will feel that even I am influenced against him . . . but it is not so. "J By such kindness, care, and watchful justice, was it that personal bickerings and jealousies were wonderfully removed, so that the army with which General Sherman was now to essay undertakings not less remarka ble than his late ones, became the most brotherly, the most soldierly, the most harmonious that ever marched on the continent. When Sherman was forecasting the hazards of the movements by which Atlanta fell, he dwelt especially on the danger of being permanently cut off from the base which he was temporarily to abandon. "If I should be," he telegraphs to the Chief-of-Staff at Washington, "look out for me about St. Marks, Florida, or Savannah, Georgia. "|| To the authorities at Washington, this doubtless seemed chimerical enough, but Sherman kept revolving the idea. He was not yet, however, cut off from his base. Then came the dangers to his line, and the uncertainty about Mobile, to which, as we have seen, he had often longingly looked. Under these new impulses, before he had entered Atlanta, he had tele graphed to Washington his plans for the next campaign : " Canby should now proceed with all energy to get Montgomery, and the reach of the Alabama Eiver above Selma ; that, when I know he can move on Columbus, Georgia, I move on La Grange and West Point, keeping to the east of the Chattahoochie ; that we form a junction, repair roads to Montgomery, open up the Appalachicola sRep. Com. Con. War, ubi supra, p. 142. tlbid, p. 155. J Rep. Com. Con. War. Series of 1866, Vol. I, pp. 139, 140: || Ibid, p. 167. Dispatch of date 13th August, 1864. William T. Sherman. 463 and Chattahoochie Eivers to Columbus, and move from it as a base, straight on Macon. This campaign can be made in tho winter."* And, in the same dis patch, he added, as if it were an element of this plan : " I propose to move all the inhabitants of Atlanta, sending those committed to our cause to the rear, and the Eebel families to the front, ... so that we will have tho entire use of the railroad back, and also such corn and forage as may be /reached by our troops. If the people raise a howl against my barbarity and cruelty, I will answer that war is war, and not popularity seeking." This last determination he executed to the letter. A small portion of the inhabitants were sent northward. Four hundred and forty-six families, embrac ing over two thousand souls, were sent south — being permitted to take an aver age of not three hundred and fifty pounds of personal effects of all kinds to each person. We have told this story in few and simple- words ; but the sufferings it entailed could scarcely be described in a volume. The Mayor of Atlanta in one touching paragraph, gave a faint shadowing of the story : " It involves in the . aggregate consequences appalling and heapt-rending. Many poor women are in an advanced state of pregnancy; others now have young children, and their husbands, are either in the army, prisoners, or dead. Some say, 'I have such an one sick at home; who will wait on them when I am gone?' Others' say, 'What are we to do? We have no houses to go to and no means to buy, build, or rent any — no parents, friends, or relatives to go to.' The country south of this is already crowded -with refugees, and withovit houses to accommodate the people; and . . many are now starving in churches and other out-buildings. This being so, how is it possible for the people here (mostly women and children) to find any shelter? and how can they live through the winter in the woods — no shelter nor subsistence, in the midst of strangers who know them not, and with out the power to assist them if they were willing to do so?" General Sherman's reply to this touching appeal was one of the happiest and most convincing specimens of the ad captandum argument that has ever been offered: "I give full credit," he said, "to your statements ofthe distress that will be occasioned, and yet shall not revoke my order, simply because my orders are not designed to meet the humanities ofthe case, but tO prepare for the future struggles in which millions, yea, hundreds of millions of good people outside of Atlanta have a deep interest. . . . The use of Atlanta for warlike purposes is inconsistent with its character as a home for families. ... I can not dis cuss this subject with you fairly, because I can not impart to you what I propose to do, but I assert that my military plans make it necessary for the inhabitants , , ,togoaway. . . . You can not qualify war in harsher terms than I will. War is cruelty, and you can not refine it; and those who brought war on our country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can pour out. . . . You might as well appeal against the thunder-storm as against these terrible hardships of war. . . . But . . when peace comes you may call upon me * Report Com. Con. War. Series of 1866, Vol. I, p. 190. Dispatch of date 4th September, from Lovejoy 's, sent' in cipher. 464 Ohio in the War. for anything. Then will I share with you the last cracker, and watch with you to shield your home and families against danger from every quarter. Now you must go and take with you the old and feeble; feed and nurse them, and build for them in. more quiet places proper habitations to shield them against the weather, until the mad passions of men cool down, and allow the Union and peace once more to settle on your old homes at Atlanta." The trenchant statement, of which we have here condensed the outlines was at once accepted as ample excuse for the sufferings inflicted on the people of Atlanta. It was accepted, indeed, for far more. The Administration party reprinted it as a campaign document, considered to condense and elucidate the heart and substance of the struggle; the Secretary of War brought himself to unaccustomed words of eulogy after its perusal; the newspaper press reproduced it with rapturous comments, and the people considered it at once the end of argument,' and the evidence of a breadth of ability they had never before sus pected in its author. Now that the passions of the war have cooled down, we can scarcely contemplate it with the same feelings. General Sherman could not explain to the Mayor of Atlanta his reasons for the measure, and therefore his declaration that his plans made it necessary was sufficient. But we now have (in the dispatch above quoted) his own statement of what made it necessary. It was that he might "have the entire use of the railroad back, as also such corn and forage as might be reached by the troops." General Sherman was at the head of an army of a hundred thousand men. Here was a community of women and children, the " feeble folk" who could not follow or precede Hood's retreat, two thousand in number, with, as the Mayor assured him, a "respectable number" who could subsist for several months without assistance, and another "respecta ble number " who would not need assistance at any time. General Sherman had already contemplated cutting loose from this base altogether; his present plan was to unite with another force, with Mobile as a base ^ and it will scarcely be thought that the selling of supplies for a month or two to such portion of these two thousand women and children as might need them, would have in terfered with either of these plans. Furthermore, with that looseness of expression which may often be noticed in General Sherman's resort to the pen as a weapon, he committed himself to a barbarism which no officer in the army would be quicker to repel than himself. The cruelty of war can be refined, and the army holds no greater stickler for its refinements than General Sherman. How long was it till he was declaring (substantially) that if the truce which he had made with General Johnston, though disapproved, and to be void in a few hours, should be violated by one hour by United States troops, he himself would unite with the Eebel General to punish the violators? It was presently to appear that neither Atlanta nor the railroad that sup plied it were longer of any importance in the great game that Sherman played. Finding that Mobile was not to be counted on, he cast about for some new plan of campaign, and presently fell again upon his old idea of "turning up" "at St. Marks, Florida, or Savannah, Georgia." As early as September 20th he had his plans somewhat elaborated. Not yet, however, had he. reached the pitch of William T. Sherman. 465 audacious daring that the subsequent march down to the noa required. Ho still looked to co-operating movements for assistance. If Grant would take Wilming ton, and then "fix'adayto be in Savannah," he "would not hesitate to cross the State of Georgia with sixty thousand men," assured that "where a million of people find subsistence my (his) army won't starve." Till Savannah fell, he thought it would be enough for him "to keep Hood employed, and put the army in fine order for a march on Augusta, Columbus, and Charleston."* But now an unexpected counselor was to aid in the decision. This was none other than Hood himself; who, under the spur of Mr. Davis's visit to the West to inspirO new life into the drooping affairs ofthe Confederacy, determined upon an aggressive campaign, which, cutting Sherman's line of supplies, should throw him back to the Tennessee, only to find his, antagonist ahead of him, once moro in possession of the fertile country about Murfreesboro' and Nashville. The moment this project was fairly disclosed, Sherman's inspiration came to him. " If Hood will go to Tennessee," he exclaimed, " I will furnish him rations for the trip." He at once decided on detaching Thomas to take care of Hood, and marching through to the Atlantic with the rest of the army. He under stood precisely what he was doing. " The movement," he writes, "is not purely military or strategic, but it will illustrate the vulnerability of the South." And now ensued a month of measureless activity. Hood threw himself upon the railroad, was repulsed, then moved off in directions for a time uncer tain and to the highest degree mystifying. Troops were marched hither and thither to guard against him. Sherman himself flew back and forth ; the tele graph was burdened with messages to his Generals; couriers were kept con stantly on the run. Hood might venture to the Tennessee, so Sherman finally assured Thomas, but he did not believe he would cross it. As soon as he found* tbe army sweeping southward from Atlanta, he would be compelled to turn and follow it.f But "having alternatives, I can take so eccentric a course that no General can guess at my objective. "J Ever}' preparation was accordingly hastened for marching southward as fast as Hood was going northward. Thomas was strengthened and fully in structed; supplies were accumulated; the army was re-organized and re-enforced til!, without Thomas, it numbered sixty-six thousand; Atlanta and the railroad hack to Daiton were destroyed; last messages were sent and instructions re ceived; the telegraph connecting the head-quarters with the North was cut; and on the 12th of November the army, to which all eyes had so long turned, disap peared from the Northern gaze. || , The Government and the public alike resorted to the Eiehmond newspapers for accounts of Sherman. The people of the North were as much puzzled as the Eebels themselves, to decide where he was going. Charleston, Mobile,1 9Eep. Com. Con. War. Series of 1866, Vol. 1, p. 200. Letter to Grant of date 20th Sep tember, 1864. tEep. Com. Con. War. Series of 1866, Vol. I, pp. 213, 226. i Ibid, p. 235. II Instead of the rather stilted designation of " armies," the two organizations remaining in Vol L— 30. 466 Ohio in the War. Savannah. St. Marks, were all canvassed; while others, remembering the Meri dian raid, predicted that before long he would be heard of again at Atlanta. For a time it was believed that his cavalry must be almost destroyed. Every day's issue of the Eiehmond papers contained fresh accounts of how Wheeler Sherman's force after the withdrawal of Thomas were now entitled respectively the right and left wings. The following was their organization : EIGHT WING— MAJOR-GENERAL HOWARD. (Divisions of Brigadier-General Charles R. Wood. Brigadier-General William B. Hazen. Brigadier-General John E. Smith. Brigadier-General John M. Corse. ci ii. .-i -»r • /-i » i -ci 1 f Divisions of Maior-General Jobn A. Mower. Seventeenth Corps-Major-Gen'alErank I Brigadier-General M. D. Leggett. r. mair, jr. [ Brigadier-General Giles A. Smith. LEFT WING— MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. SLOCUM. „ ., „ t, i -»r • n f Divisions of Brigadier-General William P. Carlin. Fourteenth Corps-Brevet Majm-Gen- I Brigadier-General James D. Morgan. eral Jeff. C. Davis. | Brigadier-General A. Baird. , m *¦ n. r* t> • j- n „i a f Divisions of Brigadier-General Norman J. Jackson. T^6 w- £ CorPs-BrlSadier-General A- J Briladier-General John W. Geary. ., b. Williams. ^ Brigadier-General William T. Ward. /'" Besides, there were two brigades of cavalry under General Kilpatrick. A popular biographer of Sherman preserves the following fugitive sketch of his appearance at the outset of the Atlanta and Savannah campaign : " While I was watching to-day the end less line of troops shifting by, an officer with a modest escort rode np to the fence near which I was standing, and dismounted. He was rather tall and slender, and his quick movements denoted good muscle added to absolute leanness — not thinness. His uniform was neither new nor old, but bordering on a hazy mellowness of gloss, while the elbows and knees were a little accented from the continuous agitation of those joints. " The face was one I should never rest upon in a crowd, simply because, to my eye, there was nothing remarkable in it save the nose, which organ was high, thin, and planted with a curve as vehement as the curl of a Malay cutlass. The face and neck were rough and covered with red dish hair, the eye light in color and animated ; but, though restless and bounding like a ball from one object to another, neither piercing nor brilliant ; the mouth well-closed but common, the ears large, the hands and feet long and thin, the gait a little rolling, but firm and active. In dress and manner there was not the slightest trace of pretension. He spoke rapidly, and gen erally with an inquisitive smile. To thus ensemble I must add a hat which was the reverse of dignified or distinguished — a simple felt affair, with a round crown and drooping brim — and you have as fair a description of General Sherman's externals as I can pen. " Seating himself on a stick of cordwood hard by the fence, he drew a bit of pencil from his pocket, and spreading a piece of note paper on his knee, he wrote with great rapidity. Long col umns of troops lined the road a few yards in his front, and beyond the road, massed in a series of spreading green fields, a whole division of infantry was waiting to take up the line of march, the blue ranks clear cut against the verdant background. Those who were near their General looked at him curiously ; for in so vast an army the soldier sees his Commander-in-Chief but seldom. Page after page was filled by the General's nimble pencil, and dispatched. "For half an hour I watched him, and, though I looked for and expected to find them, no symptoms could I detect that the mind of the great leader was taxed by tbe infinite cares of a terribly hazardous military coup de main. Apparently it did not lay upon his mind the weight of a feather. A mail arrived. He tore open the papers and glanced over them hastily, then ¦chatted with some general officers near him, then rode off with characteristic suddenness, but with fresh and smiling countenance, filing down the road beside many thousand men, whose lives were in his keeping. William T. Sherman. 467 had cut Kilpatrick to pieces. But presently it was observed that after each annihilation, Kilpatrick kept getting into new fights on advanced positions, and the apprehensions were dispelled. Ofthe great bulk ofthe army nothing could be heard. At first, the Eebel papers predicted that it could not cross the Ocmulgee without hard fighting. Then for weeks they told of its being baffled at every point in attempting to cross the Oconee. Finally, they admitted that it had crossed the Oconee, but were perfectly sure that the success would be fatal, since now it was securely shut up between the Oconee and the Ogee chee. As to its ultimate destination, their notions were vague and contradic tory. But their accounts were absolutely all that the country could get from tho lost army, and were eagerly sought. Energetic agents were kept in the works before Eiehmond to get papers through the lines; and whatever they contained about Sherman was forthwith telegraphed bodily East and West. In this uncertainty with which General Sherman wonderfully shrouded his movements, even from the Eebel cavalry that hung upon his flanks, and which the confusion of the Eiehmond newspapers fairly represented, lay his safety. He had only sixty-five thousand men. Had they but known, or been able to form, from his course, any reasonable guess as to his destination, the Eebels might have concentrated thirty thousand to oppose him. With an enemy thirty thousand strong on his front, he could not have spread out his columns over a breadth of thirty miles, to gather in the supplies of the country ; and as he was forced to concentrate, he would have found it impossible to feed. The march through Georgia was possible, only because General Sherman so bewil dered his antagonists that they were looking for him at once at Augusta, and Macon, and Milledgeville, at Charleston and Savannah ; and the force that should have been consolidated to resist his march was scattered in garrisons for each threatened town, and utterly paralyzed. And so it came about that, moving out from the smoking ruins of Atlanta, General Sherman marched over three hundred miles in twenty-four days, and deployed his forces before Savannah without having had a battle by the way, or even a' vigorous skirmish (save with the cavalry), with a loss (including the storming of a fort at the end of his march) of only five hundred and sixty-seven all told, of whom but sixty -three were killed and two hundred and forty-five wounded. Marching his columns first on Milledgeville, he nevertheless kept the garrison of Macon in daily expectation of attack, sending the cavalry far to his right to threaten it, and actually bringing on a cavalry fight at its outer defenses. Thus Milledgeville fell. Then, marching for Millen, where he hoped to liberate large numbers of Union prisoners, he yet kept Augusta in a panic, sending the cavalry to threaten in that direction. In this Kilpatrick had a Slight misadventure, and the prisoners were removed from Millen before Sher man could arrive. But the success of the march was now assured; the last river was passed, and before the army lay the easy slope down to Savannah and the sea. To the very last, the mystification was kept up, and demonstrations at Sister's Ferry kept the Charlestonians uneasy till the troops were actually deploying before Savannah. 468 Ohio in the War. 14 20 ¦¦¦"'-> Ac- ! nT.wiN ->» y, 1 The army fared superbly. Sherman, indeed, had declared, months before that where a million of inhabitants found subsistence, his army could not starv^; but even he had no conception of the ease with which the question of supplies would adjust itself. The foraging parties provided hams, chickens, turkeys, sweet-potatoes, sorghum, and the like, in abundance; and in some of the corps the rations with which the scanty wagon-trains were loaded at Atlanta were hauled through to the sea almost unbroken. The collection of these sup plies was not always performed without excess. Fillage and spoliation follow naturally in the path of loose impress ments by irresponsible parties, and no effort seems to have been made to re press irregularities. But the worst did not come till the Georgia campaign was over. One other stain rests upon the fair record of the march. Thousands of negroes accompanied the column, by the express permission of General Sherman.. Once or twice great crowds of these un fortunate creatures were driven back from the bridges, when the army was crossing rivers, and, the bridges being taken up as soon as the army had cross ed, were left to the cruelty of the Eebel cavalry and of the enraged masters whom they had been encouraged to de sert. General Jeff. C. Davis seems to have been. prominent in this barbarism, but it called forth no rebuke from Gen eral Sherman himself. Throughout the march, Sherman was in constant communication, with all the corps, and with the cavalry. He gener ally accompanied the corps engaged in destroying the railroads, and he person ally saw to it that this destruction was accomplished in the most thorough man ner. When Savannah was reached, he Sherman's march to the sea. sought instantly to open communication with the fleet. Fort McAllister stood in the way. It was nearly sunset; but a vessel was seen in the distance ; and just as she began signalling to know if McAllister had fallen, so that she could safely approach, Sherman gave the order to Hazen to storm. In less than half an hour the flags of Hazen's com mand were floating from the fort; and Sherman, after hasty congratulations on the gallant deed, was in a skiff, recklessly pulling over the torpedoes toward the vessel. William T. Sherman. 469 He soon had Savannah almost entirely invested. One road of exit to Hardee's garrison of fifteen thousand men was left, for reasons never fully explained. It was considered unsafe to isolate a force to guard it; and yet Sherman thought he "could command it." He began preparing for a siege, and about the time his heavy guns wero in position Hardee evacuated, leaving all his artillery and about twenty-five thousand bales of cotton ; but carrying off his army safe. It wasou the morning of 21st of December. Sherman himself was absent, but two days later he returned, and telegraphed to Mr. Lincoln, "I beg to present you. as a Christmas gift, the city of Savannah, with one hundred and fifty heavy guns, and plenty of ammunition, and also about twenty -five thousand bales of cotton." Once more the North rekindled its bonfires. In this steady-marching suc cess of Confederate disasters, in this "tramp, tramp, tramp," that winter or rotigh weather could not delay, of the sixty thousand that had bisected the Confederacy, they read the approaching doom of the Eebel cause. Grant still lay baffled by the skill of the wise soldier who defended Eiehmond ; but already in imagination, "while the doomed Confederate army, compassed in fatal toils, looked southerly for an outlet of escape," the people heard — to use the words of an elegant writer — "rolling across the plains ofthe Carolinas, beating nearer and nearer, the drums of Champion Hills and Pittsburg Landing."* Other plans for this still victorious army engrossed for a time the mind of the Lieutenant-General. He congratulated its leader most heartily, wanted his views, and subscribed himself "more than ever, if possible, Your Friend. "f But still he wanted the army transferred at once by water io Eiehmond. " Un less you see objections to this plsin, which I can not see," he wrote as early as 6th December, " use every vessel going to you for the purpose of transporta tion. "J General Sherman promptly began preparations to obey this order ; at the same time expressing some doubts as to whether it would not be better to "punish South Carolina as she deserves." "I do sincerely believe," he wrote, a few days later, "that the whole United States, North and South, would rejoice to have this army turned loose on South Carolina, to devastate that State in the manner we have done in Georgia. "|| General Grant presently fell in with this view, and before transportation had been accumulated for removing the army by sea, General Sherman was ordered to march northward through the interior, all details being left to his own judgment. This decision reached him a day or two after his entry into Savannah. Three weeks were spent in prepa ration ; on 15th of January, 1865, the movement began. Meantime, the restless temper of the General on whom the cares of this still moro dangerous movement might be supposed to press with sufficient weight, kept him busy with essays in fresh fields of responsibility. Some' citizen wrote, asking his advice on the question of reorganization. He had the .wis- *Swinton's Twelve Decisive Battles of the War. t Grant's letter to Sherman 18th Dec, 1864, Rep. Com Con. War, ubi supra, p. 287. t Ibid, p. 279. || Ibid, p. 284. 470 Ohio in the War. dom to say that he had nothing to do with it, but not the wisdom to stop with that. Instead, he went on at length to elaborate his views on a subject already engaging the full powers of the best statesmen of the country, trained to politi cal problems, and not otherwise employed: " Georgia is not out of the Union," he declared with some emphasis. "My opinion is that no negotiations are necessary, nor commissioners, nor conventions, nor anything of the kind. Whenever the people of Georgia quit rebelling against their Government, and elect members of Congress and Senators, and these go and take their seats, then the State of Georgia will have resumed her functions in the Union." Light, indeed, must the crime of the rebellion have seemed in the eyes of the man who could in such haste propose to restore Eebels to the balance of power in Congress. Abundant must have been the confidence in his own judgment, on any and all subjects, that could induce the general of a great army, on the eve of most dangerous movements, to obtrude an opinion — tossed off in a leisure half hour like a family letter — on the gravest of political problems — unfamiliar to him, but already being studied in the minutest details by the first jurists and statesmen of the nation.* He next essayed a solution of the negro problem — setting apart for the exclusive use of the negroes in the vicinity, the Sea Islands of South Carolina and Georgia, and the rice swamps of the adjacent mainland, each family to have a forty-acre tract, to which a military officer was to give a possessory title! It was the most remarkable assumption of power outside his sphere which Gen eral Sherman had yet attempted; and the fact that the order was shown to the Secretary of War before its issue constitutes no excuse for the interminable difficulties to which it led, — difficulties alike for the poor blacks whom it pro posed to befriend, and for the Government whose functions it usurped. The operations of the Treasury Department did not suit him. He thought it "ought not to bother itself with the captures of war,"f — in effect that what ever Government property the military captured it should retain under its exclusive control. An English Consul sought to protect the cotton claims of some English subjects. The General astonished him by the notification that in no event would he "treat an English subject with more favor than one of our own deluded citizens," and that " it would afford him great pleasure to conduct his army to Nassau and wipe out that nest of pirates." J He reverted once more to his chronic rabies, the newspaper subject, solemnly adjudicated that two newspapers were enough for Savannah, and no more should be published; ordered that these be held to the strictest accountability "for any libellous pub lication, mischievous matter, premature news, exaggerated statements, or any comment whatever upon the acts of the constituted authorities — even for such articles, though copied from other papers." || It is with pleasure that we turn from these performances, in which much * This letter was shown to Secretary Stanton, who was then on a visit to Savannah. His only reply was that, like all the General's letters, it was sufficiently emphatic and not likely to be misunderstood. Sherman and his campaigns, pp. 324, 325. t Sherman and his Campaigns, p. 326. X Ibid, p. 326. || Ibid, p. 321. William T. Sherman. 471 good sense is so mingled with eccentric extravagances and ill-considered judg ments, to the brighter story of the march through the Carolinas.* When, gathering in hand his various divisions from Savannah and Beaufort the Sea Islands, the ferries, and the- important roads in the interior, General * A pen-picture of General Sherman at Savannah, by Rev. Mr. Alvord, has been much admired by his friends, and may, prove interesting to those who would study his characteristics more in detail. The following extracts embrace its substance: " Tall, lithe, almost delicately formed. If at ease stoops slightly ; when excited, erect and commanding. Face stern, savage almost ; yet smiling as a boy'B when pleased. Every move ment, both of mind and body, quick and nervous. A brilliant talker, announcing his plans, but concealing his real intention. A graceful easy rider. When leading a column looking as if born only to command. Approachable at times, almost to a fault, again not to be approached at all. "I saw him in a grand review at Savannah. His position was in front of the Exchange on Bay street. The Twelfth Corps was to pass before him ; he rode rapidly to the spot, almost alone, leaped from his horse, stepped to the bit and examined it a moment, patted the animal on the cheek, then adjusted his glove, looked around with au uneasy air as if in want of some thing to do; catching in his eye the group of officers on the balcony he bowed, and commenced a familiar conversation, quite unconscious of observation by the surrounding and excited crowds. Presently music sounded at the head of the approaching corps. Quick as thought he vaulted to the saddle and was in position. There was peculiar grace in the gesture of arm and head which did not weary, as for an hour he returned the salutes of every grade of officers. Rev erence was added as the regimental flags were lowered before him. The more blackened and torn and riddled with shot they were, the higher the General's hat was raised and the lower his' head was bent in recognition of the honored colors. Every soldier, as he marched past, showed that he loved his commander. He evidently loved his soldiers. "I saw him in his princely head-quarters at Charles Green's on New Year's Day. Many were congratulating him. He was easy, affable, magnificent. Presently an officer with hurried step entered the circle and handed bim a sealed packet. He tore it open instantly) but did not cease talking. Read it, still talking as he read. Commodore Porter had dispatched a steamer, announcing the defeat at Fort Fisher. "'Butler's defeated!' he exclaimed, his eye gleaming as it lifted from the paper. ' Fizzle — great fizzle!' nervously, 'knew 'twould be so. I shall' have to go up there and do that job — eat 'em up as I go and take 'em back side.' Thus the fiery heart exploded, true to loyalty and country. "I entered the rear parlor and sat down at the glowing grate. He came, and leaning his elbow upon the marble mantel, said: 'My army, sir, is not demoralized — has improved on the march — Christian army I've got — soldiers are Christians, if anybody is — noble fellows — God will take care of them — war improves character. My army, sir, is growing better all the while.' "I expressed satisfaction at having such testimony, and the group of officers who stood around could not suppress a smile at the General's earnest Christian eulogium, "Such is W. T. Sherman. A genius, with greatness grim and terrible, yet simple and unaffected as a child. The thunderbolt or sunbeam, as circumstances call him out. "On the march from Atlanta his order was ' No plunder by the individual soldier; ' but his daily inquiry as he rode among them would be, 'Well, .boys, how do you get' along? like to see soldiers enterprising; ought to live well, hoy's ; you know I don't carry any thing in my haver sack, so don't fail to have a chicken leg for me when I come along ; must live well, boys, on such a march as this.' The boys always took the hint. The chicken leg was ready for the Genera], and there were very few courts-martial between Atlanta and Savannah to punish men for living as best they could. "When McAllister fell, he stood with his staff and Howard by his side, awaiting the assaulting column. 'They are repulsed,' he exclaimed, as the smoke of bursting torpedoes enveloped the troops; 'must try something else.' It was a moment of agony. The strong heart did not quail ! A distant shout was heard. Again raising his glass the colors of each of the three 472 Ohio in the War. Sherman now launched his columns northward, the strategic problem presented to himself and to that "astute Eebel commander"* who (soon to be restored to the fragments of the army ho had been forced to leave before Atlanta), strove to withstand him, was the same. General Sherman sought to secure a junction with Grant and to prevent Johnston's junction with Lee. General Johnston sought to secure a junction with Lee and to prevent Sherman's junction witli Grant. Neither sought decisive battle with his immediate antagonist, for the eyes of each were fixed upon what, might befall after the desired junction should be secured. But the game was an unequal one, and it needed no far-seeiug vis ion to perceive the end. Sherman had sixty thousand. Johnston had twenty -five thousand.f Or, if we look beyond these single combatants, Lee had but fifty thousand; and Lee and Johnston stood for the Confederacy. Against and around brigades were seen planting themselves simultaneously on the parapet. 'The fort is ours,' said he, calmly. He could not restrain his tears. ' It's my old division,' he added, ' I knew they'd do it.' "'How long, General,' said a Southron, 'do you think this war will last, we hear the North ern people are nearly exhausted?' 'Well, well,' said he, 'about six or seven years of this kind of war, then twenty or twenty-five of guerrilla, until you are all killed off-, then we will begin anew.' " A wealthy planter appealing to his pity, ' Yes, yes,' said be, ' war is a bad thing very bad, cruel institution — very cruel ; but you brought it on yourselves, and you are only getting a taste of it.' "The English ex-consul asked him for protection and a pass on the ground of his neutrality and that of his country. ' Don't talk to me,' said Sherman, ' of your neutrality, my soldiers have seen on a hundred battle-fields the shot and shell of England with your Queen's mark upon them all, and they never can forget it. Don't tell me you couldn't leave before I came ; you could send out your cotton to pay Confederate bonds and bring cannon in return — don't tell me you couldn't get away yourself.' " The consul stood abashed, and awkwardly bowed himself from his presence. "Such is his treatment of Rebels. He receives no apology nor has any circumlocution. He strikes with his battalions ; he strikes with every word he utters, whether from pen or lips. The secessionists of Georgia and South Carolina believe he'll do what he threatens. -» "Said the Rebel Colonel who had placed the torpedoes in the Savannah River when ordered to take them up, 'No! I'll be d — d if I do any such drudgery.' "'Then you'll hang to-morrow morning ; leave me,' said the stem commander. The torpedoes were removed. "In this way, by his words, his manner, his personal presence, his threats with their. literal execution, and the swift and utter destruction in the track of his army on their late march, he has struck terror to all hearts. Though thoroughly secretive, he is strangely frank. "'Give me your pass, General?' said I, 'I'll meet you again on your march.' 'You don't know where I'm going,' said he, with emphasis. 'I think I do, General, if I can catch you.' ' Where f 'At Charleston.' 'I'm not going to Charleston.'. ' Then, at ATilmington.' 'I'm not going to Wilmington.' 'I'll see you, I think, in Richmond.' 'I'm not going to Richmond. You don't know where I'm going. Howard don't know.' But he gave me the pass; I, at least, know where he was not going." * Sherman's own phrase in describing Johnston. t Sherman, indeed, estimated the force opposed to him at a much higher figure, — at one time reckoning it at not less than "forty-five thousand effectives." (Rep. Com. Con. War. Series of 1867. Vol. I, p. 346.) But the honesty of General Johnston's official statements has never been ques tioned, and he says that he had (besides militia and other dead-weights who deserted him long before he had any chance to use them) not over twenty-five thousand effective strength. Sec, also, Swinton, Hist. Army Potomac, p. 567. William T. Sherman. 473 t»CAMDEN IJfcOLUMBiV. \ .RALESGH ,1 N A BENTON vg' J-'-il AVEK'YJB0^^^1WARIIAW /.V • ' ":r />/ /^CLINTON FAYETTEVILLE^ -,^*+*7->''r \ ' ¦¦ — ' ,' ¦'/ ^^"love's/Sr...-^ !CHAM^ /ft < ..-• / i- / i A .-.'fijOSSNECK V ">''\ 7a / VV '¦¦¦¦""C7>Q n // » !\CHERAW \ ^"V-*- I >:*TLO RENSE N Ft.FISHE V •MANCHESTER rWATEREEJUMC. "Kkingsville T. PULASKI ,15™ Corps. .,.1.,.,_,.17™ „ 14™ „ 20™ „ h.*+h--hCAVALRV CAMPAIGN OF THE CAROLINAS. / William T. Sherman. 475 them rose, with fateful gleam, the bayonets of the converging ranks of a million soldiers. At the outset of his movement, Sherman experienced no difficulty save that from the roads. The remnants of Hood's army— making their way eastward, over the route of the march from Atlanta to the sea, that region where now, as the expressive phrase of the soldiers had it, a crow could not make the jour ney without carrying a haversack, — experienced fatal delays. Meantime, the other Eebel forces were scattered, guarding points supposed to be in danger. Johnston had not yet assumed command, and there was no unity of action. Sherman made feints toward Charleston, on his right, and Hardee lay waiting for him!; and sent his cavalry towai'd Augusta, on his left, and the Georgia mili tia stayed there. On his front were left only Wheeler's and Wade Hampton's cavalry, — a force to be brushed aside by his army like house-flies. Presently, his columns appeared, unresisted, before Columbia. The capital fell without a blow, while the h/ulk of the army that should have defended it had been sol emnly guarding the ruins of Charleston. Suddenly, Hardee discovered that while he was thus lying idle at the useless sea-port, the State was being ravaged from end to end, his own flank was turned, and, unless he made haste to rescue himself from his false position, his army would be as effectually eliminated from the campaign as if it were thrown beyond the Alleghanies. Already, Sher man's position barred his march toward the point of danger — he was forced to retreat on a line far to the eastward. E