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AN APPEAL

ON BEHALF OF THE

BEITISH SUBJECTS
RESIDING IN AND CONNECTED WITH
THE^TH^ER PLATE,
V*e-AIN5T
ANY FURTHER VIOLENT INTERVENTION

BRITISH AND FRENCH GOVERNMENTS

AFFAIRS OF THAT COUNTRY.

PRINTED BY NORRIS AND SON,
BLOMFIELD-STHEET, FINSBURY-CIItClTS.
1846.

AN APPEAL,

ETC. ETC.

The public have long been accustomed to hear
of the unsettled state of affairs in the River Plate ;
yet but very few persons have felt sufficient interest
in the matter to induce them to make themselves
thoroughly acquainted with it. Nor was this at all
to be wondered at, so long as this country abstained
from interfering in the quarrel there ; but now that
Government have shewn a disposition to take a part,
the case is changed, and it becomes the duty of
those who from their position have a voice in the
conduct of public affairs to inform themselves
correctly on the subject. Nor should this duty be
omitted on the plea that Government have better
means of information than private individuals can
have, and would not act without good grounds ;
for it is believed a very slight examination will
shew that Government are acting in this matter
under a misapprehension with reference both to the
justice of the case and the true interests of all
concerned.
a 2

Aware of the importance of brevity, we shall
with these remarks proceed at once to our narrative,
taking it up at the year 1838, from which period
dates the origin of all the recent disasters in the
River Plate. At that time General Rosas was at the
head of the government of Buenos Ayres, which is
the chief province of the Argentine Confederation,
on its south bank ; and General Oribe at the head
of that of the republic of the Uruguay, of which
Monte Video is the capital, on the north bank.
In the beginning of that year, the French com
menced their blockade of Buenos Ayres, and having
no port of their own in which to condemn or sell
their prizes, they wished to make use of Monte
Video for that and other hostile purposes against
Buenos Ayres, but General Oribe refused to join in
this attack upon the sister republic, and determined
on remaining neutral. The French agents there
upon stirred up an armed revolution against him —
he was defeated — signed a forced abdication — and
retired to Buenos Ayres.
In his stead was placed in the presidency General
Rivera, who, indebted for his elevation to the
French, repaid them by lending himself entirely to
their plans. The defeat of General Oribe had been
owing mainly to the help of a body of disaffected
Buenos Ayreans who had taken refuge in Monte
Video, and had joined Rivera and the French. By
this triple union hostilities were carried on against
Buenos Ayres with the greatest vigour — an army

was marched into her territory — and reached almost
within sight of the capital. Thus powerfully as
sailed, every one supposed she must fall, when
apparently, as by a miracle, she rallied, the inva
ders were repulsed, and ultimately defeated and
destroyed. The French, too, suddenly patched up
a peace with her, and discontinued their blockade,
which had lasted nearly three years.
It is important to remark here that the British
Government did not interfere at all in behalf of
Buenos Ayres while she was in these straits, but
left her altogether to her own resources.
The hostility of the Monte Videans against Buenos
Ayres was not at all mitigated by the loss of their
French allies. On the contrary, after a formal de
claration of war, they again invaded the Argentine
territory, where they were finally defeated in Decem
ber, 1842.
On this occasion the Buenos Ayrean forces were
commanded by the Ex-president Oribe. On his
ejection from Monte Video for his refusal to take
part against Buenos Ayres, General Rosas had in
return promised to aid him, at the first fitting op
portunity, to regain his position at Monte Video.
In the mean time he had been employing himself
in the service of Buenos Ayres.
After this victory, he in his turn marched into
the territory of the Monte Videan state, the whole
of which, in the course of time, submitted to his
authority, excepting only the city of Monte Video.

6
Not having the means of taking it by storm, he
invested it closely by land, and proposed to do the
same by sea, by the aid of the Buenos Ayres
squadron, which was placed at his disposal. But
the English and French agents, though never going
so far as openly to deny the legality of the blockade,
prevented under various pretexts its ever being put
in force.
This was the state of things in June last — Oribe
posted close outside the city of Monte Video— the
Buenos Ayres squadron in front, waiting permission
from' the English and French agents to invest it
on the sea-side, — the inside party already thinking
of making terms — when England and France inter
posed in favour of Monte Video, and commenced a
series of measures which threaten a fresh war.
It will be seen from the above that the interven
tion of the two powers does not appear to be based
upon any principle of justice. This is in favour
rather of Oribe and Buenos Ayres, because the
former is only seeking to regain his lost president
ship, and the latter merely repaying the friendship
of Oribe, and endeavouring to guard against a re
currence of the attacks of Monte Video.
Nor can we account for the intervention by any
advantages it may be expected to bring to this
country, for the only tie hitherto between us and
the River Plate has been that of commerce, the
ruin of which will be the infallible result of the
intervention if persisted in.

Still, as Government, it may be supposed, would
not have acted without good reasons, we propose
to show, that, (though no doubt with the best inten
tions,) they have acted wrong from incorrect infor
mation. One of the main inducements for their interfe
rence seems to have been an idea that Buenos
Ayres is desirous of destroying the existence of
Monte Video as an independent state. Now, the
only colour for this apprehension is the circum
stance of Oribe employing Buenos Ayrean troops
in his service. But if certain Buenos Ayreans
helped to turn him out, why should not others of
the same nation help to reinstate him? That Buenos
Ayres should wish to have a friendly neighbour in
Monte Video instead of an unfriendly one is quite
natural. The same feeling induced us to assist in
ejecting Napoleon from the throne of France, and
placing the Bourbons in his stead, only we had none
of the French on our side, whereas Oribe has more
of his countrymen for him than against him. Yet
no one would say that the independence of France
has been destroyed by our interference on that oc
casion. Moreover, both Buenos Ayres and Oribe
have constantly denied any such intention, and he
is a native of the Uruguay State, and for three
years filled the office of President of it without any
imputation upon his patriotism; indeed his jealousy
of the independence of his country, which made
him refuse to become a tool in the hands of the

8
French, was the cause of his ejection. Surely,
therefore, this fear must be allowed to be without
any rational foundation.
Even were it otherwise, it does not seem clear for
what reason we should interfere in the matter. It
can hardly be said to be the duty of this country to
adjust the relations of the different states to each
other all over the world. We do not appear always
so to. have considered it, for we allowed Santa Cruz,
when President of Bolivia, to subjugate a great
portion of the west coast of South America without
troubling ourselves at all about it. True, it has
been said we are bound by treaty to uphold the
independence of the Uruguay republic, but those
who have so stated could cite nothing in proof of
their assertion but a preliminary convention made
in 1828 between Buenos Ayres and Brazil, to which
neither England nor Monte Video were even parties,
and which is besides quite irrelevant to the ques
tion. Brazil and Buenos Ayres, who had been
fighting for the possession of the Uruguay territory,
agreed by this convention that it should belong to
neither, but should form a state by itself, and that
they would uphold its legal government against all
attacks upon it for five years, and after that time
for such further' period as should be agreed upon in
a definitive treaty of peace to be afterwards made.
As this, however, has not yet been made, and as
the first five years have long expired, the convention
may be said to be now virtually a dead letter ; but

0
if not, and if it be held still to be in force, it favours
rather than condemns the interference of Buenos
Ayres, because one of its main stipulations being
that the two contracting powers should render all
necessary assistance to the legal government of
Monte Video ; and Oribe being considered by
Buenos Ayres the legal President, the aid furnished
to him by her is obviously quite in accordance with
the spirit of the treaty.
A notion, which it is believed has made some
impression on Her Majesty's Government, is that
General Rosas has a project in his mind for exclu
ding foreigners from the River Plate, and that it is
necessary to uphold an antagonist government in
Monte Video in order to counteract it. Now the
course followed thus far by the Buenos Ayres Go
vernment with reference to foreign trade, does not
give any countenance to this fear. It is a mere
assumption destitute of any proof, and to act upon
it as if it were an ascertained fact, would be neither
just nor reasonable.
We should be quite in good time to counteract
any such intention when it took the form of action,
for not all the armies of South America could hold
out Monte Video for one day against an adequate
British naval force. There can be therefore no
wisdom in now taking measures which will involve
a great loss and expense, for the sake of guarding
against an evil which may never arise, and which may
easily and immediately be removed if it should.

10
The charge against the Buenos Ayres Govern
ment of hostility to foreign commerce has originated
mainly from certain interruptions to the local and
coasting trade, which have occurred in the course of
this war. One of the most notable was their inter
diction in January last of all trade with Corrientes
and Paraguay, so long as the former province should
remain in the hands of the persons who had re
volted against the lawful authorities. This decree
was not merely no proof of hostility to trade,
but it was, under the circumstances, in every sense
of the word, a justifiable one. Corrientes had
seized and confiscated a number of vessels belong
ing to Buenos Ayres, with their cargoes, which
were going up the river through its territory to
Paraguay. The Government of Buenos Ayres
might have retaliated by seizing the vessels of Cor
rientes, but they contented themselves with simply
forbidding all intercourse with that province so long
as the hostile party should remain in power, that
they might not by a repetition of similar acts be
enabled to furnish themselves with resources at the
expense of the citizens of Buenos Ayres. It cer
tainly is not reasonable to complain of such a decree
issued under such provocation.
All the other interruptions to trade have been in
like manner temporary — limited in extent and cir
cumstances — adapted for some special purpose — and
such as a state of war renders both justifiable and
customary; and they no more prove a hostile feeling

11
to commerce on the part of Buenos Ayres, than
does our present blockade of Buenos Ayres prove
a hostile feeling to commerce generally on the part
of England.
It would be easy to show that Buenos Ayres has
always evinced a more even and considerate regard
to the interests of trade than Monte Video. The
import duties in the former place have not varied
for the last fifteen years, being nominally 19 per
cent, on cottons, woollens, and linens, and 12 per
cent, on silks, but in reality, (owing to the moderate
system of valuing goods,) not over 16 to 17 per
cent., and 10 to 11 per cent, on the selling prices.
In Monte Video, on the contrary, the rates of duty,
which in 1839 were 19 per cent, and 10 per cent.,
were suddenly raised to 27 and 18 per cent., and
on the British Consul remonstrating against it, they
were raised again to 35 and 26 per cent , being
more than double the Buenos Ayres rates. Since
the war, they have reduced them, but there being
scarcely any business doing, the reduction has been
of little advantage.
Another striking proof has just been given of
the superior liberality of the Buenos Ayres Govern
ment over that of Monte Video, in regard to their
mode of treating the commercial interests. The
former, in order to relieve the heavy pressure upon
the merchants arising from the blockade, have re
laxed their custom-house laws, and granted new
and important facilities for the payment of the

12
duties ; whilst the latter, greedy to turn to account
a convoy offered by Her Majesty's naval forces up
the rivers, refused to allow goods to leave the har
bour with it, except on payment of a new duty of
6 per cent. Most of these goods were originally
destined for Buenos Ayres, but being forbidden
entry there by the British blockading squadron,
had no other resource but to take refuge in the har
bour of Monte Video. Thus our blockade drives
goods in there, for them to levy tribute upon. As
a tax of 20 per cent, would be as justifiable as one
of 6 per cent., it will be surprising if it be not in
creased. On goods lying in their bonded ware
houses — placed there (as the term " bonded" im
plies) on the clear understanding that they were to
be reshipped without payment of any duty— a tax
of 4 per cent, was levied. These two contemporary
incidents show how untruly Buenos Ayres has been
stated to be less favorable to commerce than her
neighbour. Pains have been taken to represent the trade of
Monte Video as of more consequence than that of
Buenos Ayres. It would be easy to bring figures
to show that this is not true, but it is not worth
while to weary our readers with them. It is suffi
cient to say, that if the trade is left to its natural
course, each port will get such portion of it as the
convenience of its situation and other local circum
stances attract to it. Nor is it of any importance
to this country which has the most, nor have we

13
any interest in depressing one or favouring the
other. To our merchants and manufacturers it is
immaterial to which they send most of their goods.
At whichever their customers prefer purchasing,
they can deliver them. It would be easy to pick
out years when, owing to the blockade of Buenos
Ayres, Monte Video w'as doing the largest business,
and, vice versa, others in which, owing to the war in
Monte Video, Buenos Ayres was. But to argue
from such figures, that the one was of more im
portance than the other, would be as silly as if,
shutting up all the doors of the Royal Exchange
but one, you were to say, that one must be the
most important door, because everybody then went
in and out by it. From the statistics of the trade,
however, one very important fact would appear,
which is, that when either Buenos Ayres or Monte
Video is shut, the amount of business done in the
port that remains open is very far short of the total
amount that is done in both ports when both are
open. So that our interest is to keep both open,
and to let the people of the country suit themselves
as to which they find it most convenient to resort to.
A great deal has been said of the importance of
the markets of Corrientes and Paraguay, and of the
hardship of their being closed to our commerce.
AVe have already shown that the closing of these
markets is only temporary, produced by the war,
and sure to end with it. It was under the present
Government of Buenos Ayres, that the communica-

14
tion with Paraguay was opened, after having been
closed by its own Government for thirty years, and
it would have remained open till this day, but for
the unjustifiable act of Corrientes above mentioned.
Violence, therefore, is not only needless for opening
the interior rivers, but will probably even defeat
our object, for they never can be permanently and
really kept open, without the good-will and consent
of the people of the countries they flow through.
As respects the supposed importance of these mar
kets, the value of the trade with Corrientes may be
estimated by the amount of its population, which
Sir W. Parish estimated at 35,000 to 40,000 in
1 836-7. Paraguay, on the principle of omne ignotum
pro magnifico, has been represented in a light alto
gether imaginative. The expectations formed of it
were much disappointed on its opening in 1842.
The people were found to be in almost the lowest
stage of mental existence. Their staple product,
the Yerba, is worthless in Europe, and the con
sumption of it is limited to a very small portion of
South America, so that it would be useless for them
to increase the growth of it, as they would find no
market for the additional quantity. The same may
be said of their tobacco, which is equally unsuitable
for the European markets. In short they have no
exports worth speaking of that would find sale in
Europe, and the idea of any large trade with them
is the merest chimera. Sir W. Parish estimates
their population at 250,000, but even if it were ten

15
times the number, their backwardness in the arts of
useful industry would make them of little import
ance to us as customers. The population of the
Argentine provinces is estimated by the same au
thority at 600,000 to 675,000, and of the single
province of Buenos Ayres alone at 180,000 to
200,000. It may be safely affirmed that one week
of its consumption of British manufactures is worth
a whole year's of that of Paraguay. There would
be no inducement therefore to sacrifice the one trade
for the other, even if we could not have them both ;
but still less is there, as with a little patience the trade
of Paraguay, such as it is, will be sure to revert to
us, without the expenditure of a single shilling.
The plea of humanity — a very popular one, and
one very likely to be abused — has been put forward
to justify this interference. Six years ago, when
the Monte Videans invaded Buenos Ayres, or even
three years ago, when the tables turned and the
Buenos Ayreans invaded Monte Video, there might
have been some humanity in interfering in an effec
tual manner, to put a stop (if possible) to this war.
But after allowing it to rage unchecked in all its
fierceness, for six years, and after waiting till it has
literally burned itself out, and is on the point of
expiring, so to speak, for want of fuel, there is cer
tainly no humanity in rekindling it. Can we re
store to life the thousands that have perished, or
blot out the atrocities that have been committed, or
replace the property that has been destroyed, or

16
undo the ruin that has been caused ? Or shall we
not rather renew and perpetuate these evils, and in
endeavouring to wrest from Oribe what it has taken
him so many years to gain, cause even still greater
ones ?
Besides, the difficulty of the task is much greater
now, than if we had interfered earlier ; then, there
was a strong party which by means of our assistance
might have made head against Oribe. But it is
now extinct — its last defeat at India Muerta in
March, 1 845, gave it the coup-de-grace. There is
not now a man in arms against him in the whole
country, excepting in the city of Monte Video.
Even there, they are destitute of provisions — am
munition — money — every thing requisite. All,
therefore, would now have to be done by our own
unassisted efforts.
That the intervention has not met with the
success which appears, without much considera
tion, to have been anticipated for it, is to be attri
buted rather to the unreasonableness of our demands,
than to obstinacy on the part of Oribe and his ally.
For the last seven years, let it be borne in mind,
this chief has devoted his life and energies to one
sole object — the re-establishment of his authority
in his native country, over which he was undeniably
the lawful ruler, when ejected by the French. At
the moment when he sees it on the point of being
realized, we, professing the strictest impartiality,
require him, not to make some slight sacrifice in

17
favor of his adversaries, but to throw away the
whole of his advantages, and to submit to terms at
our hands, which, had he been defeated and utterly
prostrate, instead of trumphantly victorious, he
might even then almost have objected to as being too
unfavourable. Our demand is nothing less than
that he should immediately evacuate the territory of
his country, leaving it in full possession of his adver
saries, to whom, after having lost the game they
had played for, we thus propose he should return
the whole of the stakes.
There may be some, perhaps, whom it will not
surprise to hear, that as the French were from the
first at the bottom of all these disasters, so they
have throughout, consistently, had a principal share
in prolonging them. In a dispatch from M. Guizot
to Count St. Aulaire, dated 21st January, 1845,*
which has been just published, the former distinctly
states, that but for the rebellious conduct of a
number of the French subjects in Monte Video,
who in defiance of the repeated orders of their
Government to lay down their arms, and abstain
from any farther part in this war, obstinately
refused to do so, the war would long ago have ter
minated. The conclusion that any fair person
would have come to on witnessing this contumacy,
would, one should think, have been to enforce the
orders of the Government, and compel these parties
* See Appendix A.

18
to observe the neutrality which was held to be their
duty. But quite the contrary to this, M. Guizot
concludes that as they will not obey their Govern
ment, their Government must obey them ; and he
decides, accordingly, to take part with them against
Oribe, as he has done,.
One of the schemes by which these Frenchmen
in Monte Video evaded the orders of their own
Government is worthy of being mentioned. On
being required by Admiral Laine to lay down their
arms, they did so as French subjects, and imme
diately took them up again as citizens of the Oriental
Republic, and have held them as such ever since.
When we see such a farcical proceeding as this not
only winked at by the French Government, but
actually rewarded with their assistance, it is difficult
to believe they were ever sincerely desirous that
their orders should be obeyed.
Neither, perhaps, would it be easy to prove to
other nations that the conduct of our own Govern
ment is altogether beyond suspicion in this respect.
The impartiality that has been professed at home
has not been put in practice at the scene of
action. Many measures which were calculated
to hasten the termination of the war — amongst
which we may particularly mention the blockade of
Monte Video — were opposed and prevented by our
officers on the station, in manifest breach of our
neutrality ; and the prolongation of the war which

Oribe is justly entitled to attribute to our own acts
and those of the French, is now assigned by us as
one of the principal grounds for our interfering to
finish it — not for, but against him.
If these circumstances have indisposed Oribe
from viewing our intervention with a favourable
eye, it can scarcely be wondered at. In whichever
direction he looks throughout the affair, he sees
nothing but foreign intermeddling. The sons of the
soil are altogether thrown into the background.
Foreigners caused the war — foreigners have carried
it on, — foreigners have ever interposed to prevent its
ending, — foreigners are in possession of his capital
city, and holding it out against the almost unanimous
consent of the natives, — and, last of all, two foreign
nations gravely come forward to blame him for the
acts of their own subjects, and to second them.
Those who complain that he has not readily con
sented to the sacrifices we have demanded of him,
can scarcely, we think, have made due allowance
for these circumstances.
The peculiar system of hostilities by which our
Government seem to expect to carry their point,
will, it is feared, be found as disastrous to third and
innocent parties, as it will be inoperative on those
against whom it is directed. For three years
Buenos Ayres withstood the blockade of the French,
and it was then only ended by their greatly modi
fying their pretensions. The power of General
Rosas was then not nearly so firmly established as
b 2

20
it is now — his enemies were far more numerous
and confident — the blockade was a new weapon of
offence to him — its weakness had not then been
proved — nor was he prepared for it as he now is.
Taking all these things into account, it may be
concluded that we have even less chance of gaining
our end by the blockade than the French had, and
that if Rosas then stood out for three years, he now
may for twice three.
We are also in a much more disadvantageous
situation for conducting it than they were. After
they had turned out Oribe from Monte Video, they
had the whole of the resources of that republic at
their disposal, both for aiding their warlike opera
tions and for refitting and provisioning their squa
dron. We, on the contrary, have not the means of
buying a single pound of fresh provisions, because
every inch of ground on both sides of the river is in
possession of Rosas and Oribe, excepting the city
of Monte Video, Colonia, and one or two other
points that we may have taken. Even these, in
stead of being a help to us, are the reverse, for they
are so closely invested by land, that they are in the
greatest straits for provisions, and the price of fresh
beef in Monte Video, which in ordinary times is
about one penny per lb., was, according to the last
advices, about two shillings, besides being very
bad, having to be brought by sea from the Brazils.
Poultry, eggs, and all other such articles were
equally dear.

21
Some reliance is apparently placed by the British
agents in the Plate on the cooperation of the people
of Corrientes, who are in revolt against the autho
rity of Buenos Ayres, and an attempt was about to
be made to effect a junction with them by means of
an expedition of our war steamers up the river
Parana. They are, however, known to be destitute
of every thing that is necessary — and should they
be induced by us to leave their shelter, and take
the field against the veteran troops of Oribe's gene
rals, it is very much to be feared that we shall have
to answer for their destruction.
Our position in the Plate therefore is this. We
have possession of the rivers — and of any point on
the coast we may choose to take. The authorities
we are in opposition to have possession of the
whole of the country — of the food — and of what is
there the most important implement of warfare —
the horses. If we take a point on the coast, we do
not get an inch of ground with it. For that, we
require troops, and above all cavalry. Our squa
dron, and the population of Monte Video and of
the other points in our possession, must live entirely
upon imported food, which we must pay for. Mean
while the troops of Oribe are living in clover — all
they are used to is beef, and they have at their dis
posal the cattle of the whole country without any
need of paying for it. Such few foreign articles as
they need they can purchase from the Brazils,
whose frontier joins theirs, and the wants of their
exchequer can at all times be readily supplied by

22
sales of cattle to the Brazilians, who are ready cus
tomers for them. Oribe is thus untouched by our
operations, and it would scarcely be an exaggera
tion to say that to blockade our own Portsmouth or
Liverpool would be almost as likely a method of
effecting what we wish as the blockades we are
instituting in the River Plate.
We have not yet adverted, except cursorily, to
the interests of the merchants and others connected
with the River Plate, but justice requires these
should not be overlooked. They complain that the
war has already been prolonged for three years by
the intermeddling of the British agents and officers.
Had strict impartiality been observed by these,
Monte Video would, upon the defeat of Rivera in
1842, have received back Oribe as President; and
many times since then the end of the strife was
seen to be at hand, if it had not been warded off
by foreign interference. So directly have our efforts
tended to prolong the war, that a bystander would
have supposed we thought our interest lay in doing
so. The result has been the loss of nearly all the
debts due in the country to the merchants, amount
ing to upwards of half a million sterling, the
destruction of a great deal of other British pro
perty, and the loss to them of three years' trade.
The more open intervention now commenced will,
instead of repairing or in any way compensating
for these losses, on the contrary prolong and extend
them. No trade of any consequence can exist in
Monte Video under such circumstances as we have

23
described, so that to the three years already lost
will be added we know not how many more. In
Buenos Ayres, also, will be repeated what has
occurred at Monte Video, but on a much larger
scale. There will be the same loss there of present
debts and of future trade. The number of British
settlers engaged in rural and other pursuits is very
large, and a continuance of the blockade will ruin
most of them and seriously injure all. It has not
been thought an exaggerated estimate to reckon the
probable loss to British subjects, from a persistance
in the late fatal measures, at more than two millions
sterling. The merchants during the trying circumstances
of the last four years were in the habit of looking
up to Her Majesty's Ministers as their best and,
indeed, their only guides in the regulation of
their operations; and relying upon their repeated
assurances in Parliament that they would not inter
fere, further than by making the offer of their
friendly mediation, they were altogether taken by
surprise by the late proceedings. Had the slightest
indication been given of any intention of adopting
violent measures, they would assuredly have at once
suspended their shipments to Buenos Ayres, and
brought their affairs generally into the very smallest
possible compass. In this way they would have
escaped any serious actual loss of property, and
would only have had to complain of the deprivation
of their trade, which, even by itself, however, would

24
have been no trifling evil. But as it is, they feel
they have been misled — not intentionally they be
lieve, but from want of due consideration — and
that they have been placed in their present un
pleasant situation by the inconsiderateness and
inconsistency of those whose high position makes
such faults extensively and fatally injurious.
Nor has any change in the position of affairs
occurred since Ministers made the declarations
referred to which can account for the change in
their conduct. Everything remains as it was, except
that the cause of our proteges having become more
helpless, the success of our interference is rendered
more hopeless. If it be said the war has now lasted
so long that it was high time we should put a stop
to it, it may be replied that it is entirely our own
fault it was not finished long ago, and that what
we are now about to do will not shorten it, but on
the contrary indefinitely prolong it.
We cannot help specially directing attention to
a few examples of the contradiction between the
declarations of Ministers and the proceedings of
their agents. Lord Aberdeen declared* that Buenos
Ayres was the lawful authority for closing the
rivers, and yet her having done so in prosecution of
her belligerent rights is one of the heaviest charges
brought against her, and a British force is, probably
at this very moment, engaged in forcing them open
* See Appendix B.

25
against the will of this same lawful authority. Sir
Robert Peel showed,* in the clearest manner, how
useless it would be for us to try to suppress the
hostilities by force, because, even if we succeeded,
the moment we turned our backs they would be
sure to commence again ; and yet we are now com
mitting this very folly which he so well exposed.
On another occasion he stated,f that Rosas had a
perfect right to institute a blockade of Monte Video,
and that this country would acknowledge it: — and
yet at the very same period of time our Minister at
Buenos Ayres was obstinately refusing to do so,
and shortly after proceeded himself to institute a
blockade of Buenos Ayres, because that Govern
ment insisted on doing what our Prime Minister
was saying they had a perfect right to do. It is
quite impossible to imagine any satisfactory solution
of these contradictions, but such serious evils will
result from a continued departure from the sound
views contained in the declarations referred to, that
it is to be hoped Ministers will not be slow in
returning to them.
If a mistake has been committed, the sooner it is
acknowledged and set right the better. It will be
much easier to do so now than a year hence, by
which time the question may become complicated in
a way very difficult to disentangle. Nor need we be
ashamed to retrace our steps, for no one will think
* See Appendix C. t Ibid.

26
of accusing us of doing so from fear. It will cost
our pride much less to acknowledge our error with
a power like Buenos Ayres than it would if it were
with France or the United States. The settlement
of the matter is an easy and simple one, if a com
mon sense view of the question be taken, devoid of
partiality and prejudice. When Mr. Ouseley left
this country, we did not know of the battle of India
Muerta which destroyed the last remnants of
Rivera's army — drove him an exile into the Brazils
— and left Oribe in undisputed possession of every
inch of the territory — the city excepted. The com
plete reinstatement of his authority over the whole
of the Uruguay Republic was not then -a, fait accom
pli, but it is now. Such an important change in
circumstances may well produce a change in our
measures, and will justify our refusing to oppose
ourselves any longer to the issue which events have
made irresistible.
If our countenance were withdrawn, the city
of Monte Video would soon follow the example of
the rest of the republic, and acknowledge the
authority of Oribe. We could easily obtain from
him satisfactory guarantees for the security of life
and property, and the whole matter would thus
be settled almost in a day. Trade would be re
sumed on both sides of the Plate, the property
of the merchants and settlers be saved, and the
cost in life and money of a long war be avoided.
The only persons who would suffer by it would

27
be those who have advanced their money for the
express purpose of keeping the losing party in
power. But they knew the risk they ran, and
stipulated for advantages proportioned to it — such
as premiums varying from 100 to 500 per cent.
and even more — in the event of success. It is
scarcely to be supposed an opportunity will be
rejected of restoring peace, merely for the purpose
of securing to these parties a favourable issue to
their speculations.
The only alternative is war; and to have any
chance of terminating it successfully, we must
send out a large expedition. The intervention
had lasted, at the date of the last advices, nearly
four months, and not the slightest progress had
been made towards the objects of it by the measures
adopted. It is now manifest to all that Oribe will
not voluntarily obey our summons to relinquish
the possession of the Uruguay territory and his
claim to the Presidentship. So far from thinking
of doing so, he has lately assembled legislative
chambers composed of the members of those in exist
ence when he was ejected. Force, therefore, is the
only means of accomplishing our object; and to make
head successfully against both Rosas and Oribe will
require, it is computed by competent persons, at
the very least 10,000 to 15,000 men— infantry and
cavalry — with everything necessary for them. The
parties whose allies we should in that case be are
destitute of almost everything, but particularly so

28
of money ; and so low is their credit, that lately,
to enable them to raise a small loan, the British
and French envoys were obliged to come forward
with a sort of guarantee for its repayment. We
shall, therefore, have to furnish not only men, but
all the funds requisite in the course of the war.
Such a war as this would probably be a novel
one in the history of the world. It would be
essentially a war of the British Government against
British subjects, for to them belongs the greater
part of the destructible property in the River
Plate ; and on them, consequently, would fall the
greater part of the ruin and havoc it would cause.
In its result it would be doubly suicidal ; for the
effect of it would be to ruin a number of our fellow-
subjects and destroy a valuable branch of trade,
and to cause us to spend a great deal of money
in doing so. The prosecution of it will bring us no
glory, and the result will probably be to reveal to
South America the secret of the means of defence
which she possesses against European aggression,
and to destroy the influence which the prestige of
our supposed power has hitherto given us. Nor
will the plea of humanity long avail us, for the na
tural course, and indeed the already published pro
gramme of our proceedings is to set at variance the
whole people of those countries, and to stir up a
civil war which must deluge them with blood. The
blockade of the French caused an amount of suffer
ing in various ways, which it is shocking to con-

29
template, and a repetition of it, after so short an
interval, through our instrumentality, will justly
make the name of European odious in the ears of
the people. The character of the parties we shall
be associated with will implicate us (as they already
have done*) in acts which we shall not be able to help
feeling as disgraceful, and whichwill probably end
in disgusting us with their alliance. The want of any
ground of complaint, on our own behalf, to justify
the war, will not be compensated by the goodness
of the cause of those whose part we shall have
espoused ; for to wrest the government of a country
from the hands of its sons, and place it in a band of
foreigners, is a proceeding very difficult to be jus
tified. In short, a war more causeless — more hope
less — more unjust, injurious, impolitic, and in
glorious, will never have been waged.
We have abstained from alluding to the system
of domestic government established at Buenos Ayres,
because we do not consider such matters to be with
in our province. Exaggerated as its. evils have
been, still it is to be feared enough remains which
is objectionable ; but we shall only make matters
worse by interfering, as was shown during the
French blockade, and will probably be shewn again
if we persist in our hostile course. In the absence
of danger or opposition the most despotic govern-
* The sacking of Colonia for instance. See also Appendix D
for the character given in the French Chamber of Peers of the
parties who now hold the reins of power in Monte Video.

30
ments relax their sternness, and it is a false sort of
humanity to goad them into severities, and then
think to excuse ourselves by crying out against
them. Could we even succeed (which is doubtful)
in overturning the present Government of Buenos
Ayres, we should have no security against a recur
rence of the same state which prepared the way for
it, and of its ending again in a similar manner.
The vicious circle ever seems to be, first licentious
ness, then anarchy, and, lastly, despotism. It is
not improbable Monte Video, also, will furnish
another example of it, if we persist and succeed in
propping up a government there, which has no ele
ments of strength in itself, no hold on the country,
and no stability except in foreign support. Our
wisest course, therefore, would seem to be to leave
all such matters entirely to the people of the coun
try to manage as they choose, limiting our inter
ference strictly to the redress of any grievances our
subjects may suffer whilst obeying the laws of the
countries they choose to reside in, and whilst ab
staining from all interference in political matters.
Should these pages tend in any degree to the
enforcement of these views, particularly with refe
rence to the matter which forms the subject of them,
their end will have been attained.

31

POSTSCRIPT.
Since the preceding pages were written, a short
paragraph has appeared in the Times of the 21st
January, giving accounts from Monte Video to the
22d November, which require some slight notice.
That port is stated to be full of shipping, from
which many perhaps will infer that business was
very active there, whereas it was just the contrary,
the town being closely invested by Oribe, and there
being no business at all doing. The unusual num
ber of vessels in the port was owing to the blockade
of Buenos Ayres, which prevented them from en
tering that port, and drove them into Monte Video.
Sometimes a heavy gale drives vessels from the
Downs into Ramsgate harbour ; yet who would cite
this as a proof of prosperity?
In this same paragraph, the old story is again
told about the advantages that will accrue from the
opening of the rivers. Persons reading these state
ments will naturally suppose that some new trade is
referred to which we have not enjoyed before.
What then will be their surprise when they are told
that these said rivers have always been open to us
(with short interruptions) as long as Buenos Ayres
itself has — that is, for the last thirty-eight years —
and that we have always had all the trade they
afford, excepting that of Paraguay, which was

32
closed by its own authorities ? This also was opened
in 1842 or 1843, but the amount of it was so
trifling that it made no perceptible difference in the
aggregate trade of the River Plate. What Para
guay may become in the course of a hundred years,
it is of course impossible to say, but to talk of it as
being at present a " rich country," in a commercial
point of view, is sheer romance. No country can
be rich in this sense without an abundance of such
products as are suited to the wants of other coun
tries, and as those countries will accept in exchange
for their own. In this sense there is perhaps scarcely
a poorer people in the world than the Paraguayans ;
which is not to be wondered at when it is considered
that for the last thirty years (with slight intervals)
they have been excluded by their own Government
from all intercourse with foreigners, and conse
quently have had no inducement to raise any thing
but what was requisite for their own simple wants.
That they possess a soil which could if properly
cultivated produce a great many things is very pro
bable, but the same thing may be said of the whole
globe. Mere soil is the cheapest ingredient, in new
and poor countries, in the production of wealth.
Capital, a thing much scarcer and of much more
difficult attainment than soil, is requisite, with a
great many other necessary accompaniments, espe
cially time. Even under all conceivable advantages,
wealth is of very slow growth, as the example of our
own colonies shews. Should our Government, con-

33
trary to our expectations, be induced to listen to
these romantic stories, and to sacrifice the actual
trade of Buenos Ayres and Monte Video for the ex
pected trade of Paraguay, it will be indeed throw
ing away the substance for the shadow. We are
the more induced to trust that such will not be the
case, as these expeditions up the rivers are diame
trically opposed to the instructions of the English
and French Governments, as will be seen by the
dispatch from M. Guizot to Baron Deffaudis, Appen
dix E. Those instructions state distinctly that the
endeavour to open the free navigation of the rivers
is only to be made in a friendly way after the other
matters have been settled ; and they particularly
dwell upon the necessity of not exciting the " na
tural uneasiness and distrust of the Argentine Go
vernment " on this subject.
In direct opposition to this the Ministers have
placed the opening of the rivers in the first part of
their plan of proceedings, and have set about it in
the most violent and offensive manner, so as to de
stroy all chance of accomplishing what was the
main object of their mission — the pacification of
the River Plate. Such being the case, we cannot
conceive these proceedings will be approved of
at home.

APPENDIX.

Extract of a Dispatch from M. Guizot to the French
Ambassador at the Court of St. James's, dated
Paris, January 2\st, 1845.
You are aware of the ferocious warfare which desolates
the left bank of La Plata. In consequence of its disputes
with the Government of the republic of Buenos Ayres, the
King's Government had allowed itself to be drawn into an
interference in the local struggles which more particularly
divide the republic of Monte Video. By the treaty of the
29th of October, 1 840, France made peace with General
Rosas ; at the same time she renounced all participation in
the internal quarrels of the country, on condition that the
independence of the republic of Monte Video should be
respected. Since that period war has continued. A former
President of the republic of Buenos Ayres has laid siege to
the city of Monte Video, which has defended itself with
obstinacy. The King's Government has often been pressed
during the last four years to interfere once more in this
contest; it has always refused to do so. Two principal
reasons have determined it to abstain — first, the right to

36
meddle, without absolute necessity, in the affairs of the two
independent states had not been acknowledged ; secondly,
there has always been, moreover, sufficient reason for be
lieving that the question would soon terminate of itself by
the close of the war.
A part of the French emigrants established at Monte
Video has thought proper to rise in insurrection against
this policy of their Government. In spite of the reiterated
warnings of their Consul, these French have taken arms
for the defence of the existing Government of that republic
against General Oribe, and have left nothing undone to
compromise the national flag in this cause, thus arrogating
to themselves the right of peace and war, which belongs to
the King alone. We have combated this claim, as it was
our duty to do. The King's Consul at Monte Video has
energetically defended the principle of the neutrality of
foreigners. The French legion, however, have not laid down their
arms, and this unexpected resolution of apart of the foreign
residents has prolonged the resistance of the city. At
present that resistance no longer appears on the point of
terminating. The state of war is maintained, and with it
all the sufferings which may result therefrom to the inte
rests of those foreigners who have remained neuter. Com
merce is interrupted by land and sea ; the city of Monte
Video has been in a state of blockade for nearly two years ;
and the country is ravaged by the excursions of the two
armies. This state of things calls for a prompt termina
tion, if we do not wish to allow the consummation of the
ruin of those French who have remained faithful to their
duty, and who urgently entreat our protection in the un
fortunate and perilous situation in which the obstinate
blindness of a part of their fellow-countrymen has so much
contributed to plunge them.

37

B.
Extract from the Speech of Lord Aberdeen.
28^ June, 1845 (Morning Chronicle). —
The EARL OF ABERDEEN said he should be most
happy to contribute, by any means in his power, to open
the navigation of the Plate, or any other river in any part
of the world, to facilitate and extend the commerce of
this country ; but it was not so easy a matter as the Peti
tioners supposed to open that which lawful authorities
had declared should be closed.
The Petitioners had spoken of a Treaty with this
country, by which they alleged they were entitled to the
navigation of the River Plate. Now Buenos Ayres was
the only organ of the combined States with which foreign
powers could deal. Some of the Provinces had revolted,
and war was now waging between them. That their Lord
ships might judge of the manner in which the Petitioners
had put forward their claims under the Treaty, he would
compare their statement with the Treaty itself.
The Petitioners alleged that by this Treaty there should
be reciprocal freedom of commerce between Great Britain
and the United Provinces, and perfect freedom and security
for British subjects there.
Now the article of the Treaty referred to was to this
effect, " That there should be between all the Territories
" of Her Britannic Majesty in Europe and the Territories
" of the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata reciprocal
" freedom of commerce; that the British should have
c 2

38
" liberty to come with their ships into all the Ports of
" the Territories aforesaid, ' into which other foreigners
" are and may be permitted to come.' " (Hear, hear,
hear !) Therefore it appeared by the article of the Treaty
that this country had only a right to claim that which was
granted to other foreigners.
The article went on to say that the inhabitants of the
two countries should enjoy perfect security for their com
merce, " subject to the laws and statutes of the two
countries respectively," so that this country was at the
mercy of a foreign state choosing to make laws restrictive
of free commerce, provided they gave us all that was en
joyed by the most favoured nations. (Hear.)
This country was now engaged in the endeavour to re
store peace in the River Plate, and he hoped that the
result would be an improvement in the present state of
things, and a great extension of our commerce in those
regions. But we should lose more than we could possibly
gain, if in dealing with these States we lost sight of the
principles of justice. (Hear, hear.) They might be unwise
in their commercial policy, and they might be following out
a system which we might think imprudent and injurious as
regarded their own interest as well as ours ; but we were
bound to respect the right of independent nations, be they
weak or be they strong.

39

Extract from the Speeches of Sm Robert Peel.
9th March, 1844 (Times).—
SIR ROBERT PEEL.— This war, it was not perhaps
known, was not a conflict so much between the Buenos
Ayreans and the Monte Videans as between party and
party : there was a powerful Buenos Ayrean party, in
fact, even in Monte Video. The war was between a
Federal party and an Unitarian party ; and mixed up with
this party hatred was a bitter personal rivalry between the
leaders — a rivalry of such extent that it was impossible
that any reconciliation between those Generals could be
hoped for. 18th May, 1844 (Times).—
In reply to the question which had been put, he was
not prepared to say that there would be any forcible
intervention on the part of England. If our rights as
a nation were violated by either party, Her Majesty's
Government were of course determined, by force if necessary,
to defend the interests of this country ; but so long as the
laws of nations were not violated, he ivas sure the House
would with him see the importance of those considerations,
which restrained any interference on the part of the
Queen's Government. No doubt England could very well
suppress the hostilities which were at present going forward,
and might for a time establish peaceful relations; but

40
what security would that furnish for a continuance of a
state of peace? How could peace be rendered permanent
unless we maintained on the spot that force by which
hostilities were in the first instance terminated ? In such
a case this country would have to take upon itself the
whole internal government of both the contending countries.
He believed that France took pretty much the same view
of the question that this country did, and that all good
offices had been offered by France with a view to the
amicable arrangement of the differences which existed ;
but France, he had no doubt, agreed with England, that
no forcible intervention ought at the present moment to
take place. Let the House only look at the consequences
of such a precedent as that of a neutral State, greatly su
perior in power, interfering forcibly in the foreign relations,
and therefore necessarily in the internal government of
another State. Such a right did not exist by the law of
nations; and if such a step were taken, other powerful
States might likewise interfere, and we should then possess
no right to remonstrate. On these grounds he must say
that he thought England ought to pause before she set any
example of interference. All he could promise, therefore,
was continued attention to the subject which the Honour
able Gentleman had brought under the consideration of
the House ; but he could not promise on the part of this
country, and he did not expect that there would be on
the part of France, any exercise of force.

14M July, 1845 (Morning Post).—
SIR ROBERT PEEL.— Any information which I can
give on the subject consistently with public interests I shall
willingly accord to the Honourable Member.

41
The state of the case is this: — Rosas, in the exercise of
his belligerent rights towards Monte Video, has a right to
institute a blockade. We were disposed to admit that
right on his part, provided the blockade was universal in
its operation ; but the French Government contested the
right, and claimed that their vessels should have exemption.
We then refused to admit the right to blockade unless it
applied to vessels of all nations.
Since that time we have reason to believe that the
French Government acquiesced in the right, and permitted
its application to French vessels ; whereupon we, providing
that it was universal, consented to recognise the belligerent
right of Rosas as far as Monte Video was concerned.
The Honourable Member also wishes to know whether
Rosas has a right to prevent the ingress of our vessels into
Paraguay. I believe that with respect to the large Rivers
Paraguay and Parana, Rosas occupies both banks and
claims the right of stopping the navigation in consequence
of his occupation of those banks.
I think that he has no right in consequence of his
blockade to prevent vessels entering the Plate, but whether
he has a right to occupy the banks I am not prepared to
say. Now the Honourable Member is aware that certain
operations are in contemplation, by which it is hoped
tranquillity will be restored ; but in case any party wishes
to have the best information respecting mercantile trans
actions, I should recommend such party to apply directly
to the Foreign Office, where the best information will at
once be given.
I give this general information in answer to the Honour- -
able Member's question; but parties immediately inte
rested had better apply directly to my noble friend the
Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

42

D.

Extract from the Speech of M. Le Cojmte de
Gabriac in the French Chamber of Peers, on
the lAth January, 1846.
The Monte Video Government does not deserve, to
speak properly, the title of a national one. This Govern
ment has sold all it could lay its hands on — the excise and
customs' duties — the buildings of the custom-house — the
old buildings of the fortifications, and portions of its
territory. It has sold even its cathedral, and the right of
navigating the River Uruguay by steam for fifteen years.
In a word, it is a Government devoid of nationality. It
is maintained by a very small number of natives, and by
that famous legion of which so much has been said. To
induce foreigners to enlist in it, they were promised lodg
ing gratis and a release from their debts. Thus this legion
of 3,600 men was — the eight-ninth parts of it a collection
of foreigners — and the ninth the scum of the natives. In
my opinion, the triumph of Monte Video would be the
greatest obstacle to the re-establishment of peace, which
only Rosas can bestow.

43

E.

Extract of a Dispatch from M. Guizot to Baron
Deffaudis, dated Paris, 22nd March, 1845.
It is expressly agreed between the two Governments
of France and England, that if it is possible to take
advantage of the new state of things which is about to
commence, for the purpose of obtaining the opening of
the tributaries of the Plata to freedom of navigation, the
representatives of the two great powers are to take this
matter in hand ; but only in case the opportunity should
offer naturally, and when the other difficulties have been
removed. It would no doubt be useful to open to
European commerce these great rivers, which penetrate
to the heart of South America^ still this is only for the
present an object of secondary inlerlsjt in comparison with
the others which are being agl||ted ' in the River Plate,
and it would be imprudent artfrg-jojiiset to augment by any
kind of exigency the natural uneasiness and distrust of
the Argentine Government.

THE END.

NOHRIS AND SON, PRINTERS, B LO M Fl EL D-8T BEET, Fl N 8 DU RY-CIRC 0 S.

3 9002