\2^

YALE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

No. 13

RUSSIAN LIBERATION COMMITTEE

RUSSIA AND
ENGLAND

BY

PAUL N. MILIUEOV.

173 FLEET STREET
E.C.4

fllEB lSi^:S<^PENCE NET

THE aim of the Liberation Committee
is the OTcrthrow of Bolshevism, the
restoration of order in and the regenera
tion of Russia.
If you are interested in the objects please
communicate with the Secretary, Russian
Liberation Committee, 173 Fleet Street,
London, E.C. 4.

RUSSIA

AND

ENGLAND

BY
PAUL N. MILIUKOV

RUSSIAN LIBERATION COMMITTEE
173 FLEET STREET, E.C.4

CONTENTS
PAQES
The Object of the Leaflet ..... 5-14
" Non-intervention " — a Policy, pp. 5-6.
A Prehminary Question : League of Nations, pp. 6-7.
The Sentimental Point of View, pp. 7-10.
The Legal Point of View, pp. 10-14.
The Point of Vib-w of Expediency .... 14-41
Bolshe-^ist Eussia and the World's Eevolution,
pp. 14-16.
Eussia and the Peace- of Europe, pp. 16-18.
Eussia and the Special Interests of England, pp. 18-19.
Is Eussia really a Menace to India ? pp. 19-22.
Does Eussia's Claim for an Open Sea interfere with
British Interests ? pp. 22-25.
The Eeal Danger in Asia, pp. 25-26.
The Danger of an Alternative International Grouping,
pp. 26-29. '
How to Secure the Alliance and Avoid the Secession,
pp. 29-30.
The Three " Conceivable " Policies for Eussia,
pp. 30-31.
Support to Border States, pp. 31-38.
Objections against helping Kolchak and Denikin
refuted, pp. 33-38.
Bolshevism Uncompromising and Aggressive,
pp. 38-41.
The Foueth " Conceivable " Policy . . . 41-44
Appendix  45-52
Six Points of a Sane PoUcy for Eussia. a2

The Object pf the Leaflet.
THEEE is no use concealing the fact that the mutual relations
between Eussia and England have now reached a critical
point. A radical change of policy towards Eussia has been
officially announced by the Prime Minister and by the Minister
of War for the beginning of the financial year (j.e. April 1920).
A session of the Supreme Council of the Paris Conference is to
meet some time in January 1920, in order to decide on a new
policy for Eussia. Its decision has been foreshadowed by the
exchange of opinion between M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd
George on the occasion of their London interview in December
1919. It is high time for Eussians to say what they think
of the former pohcy, now to be abandoned, and of the policy likely
to take its place henceforth. The chief arguments pro and contra
this change of pohcy, as they were summarised on the occasion
of the important debates on Eussian affairs at the House of
Commons on November 5 and November 17, 1919, must be also
re-viewed from the Eussian point of -view before the final decision
is taken by the Allied Conference.
This is the object of the follo'wing remarks. In order to make
the reader realise that there is nothing new about them, and that
the Eussian -^iew always remained the same through all the fluctua
tions of Allied pohcy towards Eussia, I publish (in an Appendix)
a memoir on the " Six Points of a Sane Policy for Eussia," which
my American friend Mr. C. had to hand over to President
Wilson as early as February 1919, -with some additional remarks,
¦written for the same friend, in October 1919.

" Non- Intervention " — a Policy ?
What is the difference between the old policy towards Eussia
and the new policy foreshadowed ?
People in this country who were dissatisfied with the old policy
of the Govemment generally answer : " There was no 'policy for
Eussia up to now ; henceforward there must, and will be one."
The Eussian answer is just the opposite.
There was a policy. It was a half-hearted, an insincere, an
ambiguous, and, in a certain sense, a provocative policy. But
there was a policy of help to Eussia, as a " former " AUy.

Note there wiU be no poUcy, if it is to be a pohcy of 3;^^*^^
vention. -Non-intervention" is a merely negato policy, a
" wSt and see '' pohcy, letting things drift their own way. It is
-iihe poUcy of " splendid isolation."
A Peeliminaey Question : League of Nations.
A preliminary question may be asked: What is the use of
talking of relations between nation to nation when a Society
of Nations " is to be reaUsed shortly ? Is not, mdeed, the League
of Nations supposed to take the place of aU balances ot
power " systems of alUances, international eqmhbnums, &c. I
I for one, cannot be accused of being the opponent of the
League of Nations.* I can have my reserves on the " Covenant,
but I always have been, and I hope shaU always remain, a strong
supporter of the idea of a League of Nations. _
Eussia, perhaps, is one of the few countries which, especially
now, would in aU sincerity prefer a larger World's Umon to any
narrower circle or group of AlUances.
Eussian " ImperiaUsm " is not aggressive. Eussia is, or
was, in possession of everything that was lacking to Germany :
an ample field for colonisation— by her own population ; the
boundless unreaUsed possibiUties of exploitkig her mternal re
sources of natural wealth; an expanding and inexhaustible
internal market for a national industry to grow on the basis of
raw materials available at home ; no overseas colonies and no
colonial poUcy at aU, a large continental aU-Eussian block,
result of a merely elemental process of expansion which, up to
quite recent times, brought Eussia into no conflict -with other
expanding national groups.
That is also why Eussia is not (and never was) a warUke
country. In the wars of her past she very often fought, not for
herself, but for other people's interests. Even in this war the
chief issue was not that between Eussia and Germany, but between
Germany on one side, France and Great Britain, the real World
Powers, on the other. Contrarily to what Bethmann-HoUweg
recently asserted, Eussian claims in the Straits are posterior to
" Jn A Handbook for Speakers on a League of Naiiona — Compiled by The League of Nations
Society, I find the following quotation from my article publislied on October 21, 1914, in the Man
chester Guardian : "The lunitation of armaments, the conclusion ofa general and obligatory treaty
, . . and, before all, a strong and efRoacious sanction to be applied in future by a legally authorised
Europe to" the attempted violations of international law — all these will be powerfully promdted
by this war. But for this there vfOali be no }Ustiflcation for the desire generaUy felt and uniTersaUy
acknowledged ia fiuasia, as well aa in England, to carry the war through to its bitter end." ¦ - -
6

the be^nning of this war and have nothing to do with its
origin. _ If the League of Nations were a reaUty, Eussia would voluntarily
join it on an equal footing with her AUies. But the point is that
no statesman in the whole world proved ready to surrender to the
League of Nations the defence of the " vital interests " of his own
country. The American entrenchment has only brought the final
blow and wound up in formulae what was the general spirit under
lying the discussions in Paris. Nobody can blame the leading
statesmen for excess of patriotic foresight. But the same Uberty
should be left to Eussian statesmen who were not present. Eussia,
the AUy, was too often treated as a defeated country, for her not
to take certain precautions before she enters the League. Mr.
Lloyd George has himself given a good example of this, whUe
presenting in his last speech on Eussia on November 17th what
was described by the Times as a " curious mixture of the League
of Nations -with the Bealpolitik." Tbe last note he struck at the
end of the year (December 18) was : " Until the League has been
founded and firmly established, until we know that the nations
of the world contribute to the work of the League, including
America, we must make our otvn country secure."
Under such conditions the question of alliances and of balances
of power cannot be dismissed. The proof is the existence of the
Franco-Anglo-American AlUance, which is now being revised for
the case of the probable absence of the United States. The
American retreat from the European continent makes the question
of continuation of the Eussian Entente and Alliance particularly
important. As the question, obviously, cannot be solved from
the point of view of the League of Nations — and as I do not think
my readers wiU accept the alternative point of view of the " Third
Internationale " started by Mr. Lenin at Zimmerwald-Kienthal
and sanctioned by the Moscow Conference of March 1919 — the
only possibility which remains is to recur to the less problematic
criteria of national feeling and national interest.

The Sentimental Point op View.
I purposely mentioned the national " feeUng " first. The
sentimental argument, of course, is not what decides in the world
of " secret diplomacy." But it often proves decisive for the
popular psychology. Sentiment to a far greater extent determines
the views of the masses, than any deeper motives for which know-

ledge and insight are necessary, thus contributmg to the most
momentous national decisions.
For the sake of argument I distinguish three sentimental
motives which brought Eussia and England closer together, and
made us feel as AlUes in the national mind. They are :
1. Common aims in going to war.
2. Common sacrifices in prosecuting the war ; and, as
their common result,
8. The so-called " obligations of honour."
I need not recall the common aims we pursued in the World
War. They were so often repeated in all war-time speeches by
the most responsible statesmen of the Allied countries. A War
of Eight, a War of Justice, a War against War, for the sanctity
of Treaties, for the safety from wanton aggression, for the
defence of small nations suffocating under Turkish and Austrian
rule. . . . People now say it was partly hypocrisy, partly self-
delusion on the part of the Liberal leaders.* But Eussian pubhc
opinion was taught to believe all that, and we preached all that,
and we looked up to the leaders of the world's Uberal opinion,
the Greys, the Asquiths, the Lloyd Georges, the Briands, the
Wilsons, for- confirmation. This was what made war popular
in Eussia, because it had heen popular. This also was what helped
the Eussian leaders to educate Eussian opinion m high standards
and pure morals of the world's democracy. Now that the rank
and file have become disappointed with the results — such people
as believed the leaders — they come up to them and ask them in
their turn whether it was hypocrisy or self-delusion. It is easy
for us to tell them that great ideals cannot be reaUsed at once,
and that, if not all, at any rate many great things have been
achieved. But it is also natural that they are not at aU satisfied
Avith things achieved outside Eussia, and they go on asking what
Russia has won in the game. Only too weU they see what Eussia
has lost : its statehood and its unity. It is then natural for them
to expect that at least the damages caused to Eussia in her struggle
for the common cause \nU be made good by the nations whom
they caUed their AlUes.
It is unfair to think that Eussia should complain about the
unachieved gains. We thought we were fighting for the common
cause. The only real gain which might be won by the common
victory— the possession of the Straits— was discredited and

Cooper Wfl^.'"''''"*^^ ''°*'"^' ^'^ "' """ ''"'' ""' ^"^ ' " ^"^^ "' ^^'^"^ Idealism, by Irene

repudiated in advance by Liberal opinion as being too selfish.
But now, seemg nothing but enormous losses, and nobody there
to repair them, Eussia makes the comparison with her sacrifices
and draws the balance. Eussia's death-roU is the heaviest of aU.
She counts : Killed .... 1,700,000
Disabled . . . 1,450,000
Wounded . . . 3,500,000
War Prisoners . . 2,500,000
Next to Eussia, France's death-roU is 1,300,000, Great Britain's
700,000, Italy's 460,000. Moreover, our sacrifices have not been
made in vain. We claim—" rightly or wrongly," a Britisher
adds — to have t-wice saved France and Italy from miUtary
disaster. We were keeping busy on our front, aU the time of the
war, from one-fourth to one-third of the whole armed forces of
the Central Empires, and we firmly believe that but for our help
the fate of the Allied countries might have been different from
what it is now. This is our second " sentimental " claim for
the continued help of our Allies.
We think the latter to be, as a result of common sacrifices
brought for achie-vdng common aims, under the " obUgations of
honour." We recollect that " honour " was the chief sentimental
reason why Great Britain went to war. Our prominent writer,
Leonid Andreyev, expressed Eussian general opinion when in
his pathetic appeal to the AlUes (" S.O.S.") he said, " that you
(the EngUshman) are the man whose word is akin to law, and
your promise is as good as performance." We felt the thrill of
moral satisfaction when we heard that view confirmed by an
EngUshman, Colonel John Ward, in his speeches in the Commons
and before the Labour Conference. " You cannot," he said,
stating his own case, " go into a coimtry and ask these men to
raUy round you and reconstruct for your own purposes in order to
assist and take off' pressure on your own shoulders, and then say,
' WeU, gentlemen, we have got peace now — there is no longer
a Westem Front. Good-bye ! We are very sorry to leave you.'
Of course, I daresay there are some who would do that, but
so far as I am concerned — the hon. member (Col. Wedgwood)
mentioned the word ' honour ' — I do not think it would be quite
honourable behaviour."
Mr. Lloyd George, in his speeches at the Guildhall annual
banquet and in the Commons (Nov. 8 and 17, 1919), spoke
also of the " obUgation of honour." But his view was that

.Great Britain has discharged it "even more honourably than any
.other AUied country."* They "enabled the ^^g^^ ^^^^^^^^
;anti-Bolshevist to protect themselves.'' They gave them the^
chance. But " it is perfectly obvious that this ^^^J^y ^v ,'
take the responsibility ot financing civil war m ^^^^s^^/^f ^f ^L
Thus, "the ObUgations of honour" are recognised at the very
moment when they are to be discarded. It were better, perhaps
not to recognise them at aU. Either there are no obUgations
of honour,'' or they cannot be " discharged ' at the rateof
£100 000 000 for 1,700,000 killed Eussian soldiers. Eussian
soldiers have not come out for World's War as mercenaries at
£59 a man's life. In Eussia that kind of limited debt
of honour wiU hardly be understood. They wiU rather
make their own the bitter remarks of the Times on the sub
ject of the Premier's speech. " It vnU be more generally under
stood in the future than in the past," the Times says, " that
instalments in EngUsh debts of honour may be terminated at
any time after she has received the whole of the consideration.
AU Eussians, anti-Bolshevists and Bolshevists, wiU appreciate
that— and wiU doubtless feel and act towards us accordingly."
Or, to state it in the words of Colonel Ward, who " has talked
to the peasants " and " met thousands of working-men at the
pubhc meetings," and " tried to get at their psychology." " They
have absolute confidence in the country that we (British) represent.
They have confidence in no other." But Colonel Ward is "certain
that if the policy of desertion is carried out, if by mere ignorant,
uninformed pubUc clamour, the Government of a great Empire
Uke this, forgetful of the future, forgetful of the difficulties that
desertion may involve— if the poUcy of desertion is adopted
now — and you make these possible friends into potential enemies,
you wiU do an injury not merely to England but to the world."
A Eussian can add nothing to these words, coming from both
wings of British public opinion. The warning — a most earnest
warning — ^is given by the British patriots themselves.

The Legal Point of View.
Bo much for the sentimental point of view. The legal point
of view is less easy to grasp by the masses. But it is even more
binding for people who abide by the sanctity of treaties and
* The Guildhall speech ; " We have sent one hundred millions worth of material and of support
in every form, and not a penny of it do I regret, in spite of the heavy burdens which are
cast upon us. It was a debt of honour and we had to discharge it. -We have given them an oppor
tunity. . . . "We cannot, of course, afEord to continue." 10

eJceerate the " scrap of paper " theory. The basic principle of
the legal obUgations of the AlUes towards Eussia is the continuity
of treaties. To state this principle in the words of a British states
man, let me quote Lord Eobert CecU's remarkable utterings in
his speech in the Commons, on May 16, 1917, while answering
Mr. PhiUp Snowden's question — Are the old treaties (concluded
with Eussia before the Eevolution) still binding on this country ?
Lord Eobert Cecil said :
WeU, sir, they are binding on this country. There is no doubt about that.
It is, of course, possible for the new Russian Government to say that it does
not wish that any particular engagement which we have undertaken on
behalf of Russia, shall be fulfilled. They can release the Allies from any
particular undertaking. But until this is done we are bound in honour to
carry out our engagements not only with Russia, but with the rest of the
Allies. I should be very sorry indeed if there was any doubt thrown by
any responsible politician in this country on that principle which I regard
as the foundation of good faith and the foundation of the possibility of
sincere dealing between one country and another.
This is positive and quite excellent. The Provisional Govern
ment has not released the AlUes from tUeir treaty obligations, as
was expUcitly stated by the Foreign Minister of this Government
before the " Council of the Eepublic " in Petrograd on the eve
of the Bolshevist overthrow. And at that very time Sir Edward
Carson once more solemnly declared in the Temps on October 26,
1917: We shall never enter into negotiations without the knowledge of our Allies,
and we shall to the letter execute our treaties with them. We not only
made common our material resources and our men ; we also made common
our honour. I add that we shall not abandon Eussia at the very hour when
the hope for liberty begins to affirm itself for her people.
Well, what remains now of these promises and of that " foun
dation of good faith " Lord Eobert Cecil spoke about ? I am
afraid, not much. Which is the exact moment when the sanctity
and the continuity of treaties lapsed ? Is this the moment of
the Bolshevist " treason," mistaken for that of the Eussian State,
whose negation Bolshevism was, or of the whole Eussian nation,
which nev«r identified itself with Bolshevist tyranny by minority ?
No, it is not. '' The proof is that AlUed missions, after having tried
in vain to apply to the Bolshevist quasi- Government the principle
of continuity, have really found the continuity of the Eussian
tradition of Statehood in the national organisations with which
they negotiated in Moscow on the subject of the reconstruction
^ "' 11 A3

of the " Eastern front " in June 1918,* and m the nuclei of thd
national armed forces under Kolchak, Denikin, Tchaikovsky and
Yudenich, with aU of whom they were fightmg the Bolshevist
"Rpfl At*ttiips
As a matter of fact there were certain treaties abandoned by
the AlUes after the loyal Eussians had stuck to them to their
own loss and detriment. In another speech, that of November 17,
1918, Lord Eobert Cecil has justly stated that " the Bolshevik
Eevolution really became effective because of the failure {oi the
Provisional Government) to give them (Eussia) peace." But
he forgot to add that this " failure " is explained by the fact that
the loyal Eussian Government was handicapped by the London
treaty, and that the idea of a separate peace has never entered
the minds of any Eussian poUtician. Eussia stood by her obU
gations at the price of her statehood and unity. Have her Allies.
done the same ?
The answer is given by the Manchester Guardian.\ No, they
have not. " The continuity of national treaty obUgations . . .
has been thrown over," the newspaper agrees, while answering
my questions. The importance of this statement is not diminished
by the remark of the Manchester Guardian that these treaties
were concluded " from Government to Government," i.e. in the
only way then and now in existence. I reminded the newspaper
that among the treaties " thrown over," " there was, one which
was not secret, and by which we felt bound in honour to stand
by each other to the end, and not to conclude a separate peace."
And I put a further question : " Whether the obligations to Eussia
are to be considered in another light than the obligations to other.
allies in the sense that henceforth they are to be disregarded and
discontinued (e.g. the treaty of 1907 which has served as a basis
for our Entente with Great Britain)." I received an evasive
answer that I " stretch the doctrine of continuing obligation
through changing Governments and wholly changed conditions
too far." This answer, though, was sUghtly modified by the
subsequent very mysterious concession : " Our real obUgations,
however contracted, we shall undoubtedly fulfil ! " I did not
ask what will be done, but what has been done with regard! to.
our legal obUgations. I can explain the obscurity of the answer
given only by the fact that the leading organ of Eadical liberaUsm
•> See thc " note verbale " handed over by Mr. Noulens in the name of the Allies to the Moscow
" National Centre " (all members of it, later on, wore shot by the BolshevikB ou 'the accusation ol
having conspired with Denikin).
t Sec the editorials published in answer to my three letters to the editor on the principle ol con
tinuity on October 26, October 31, and November 6, 1919. .---•'.- f..
12

was unable entirely to "throw over" the principle which on
i another occasion, in nearly identical expressions, it made its
own.* I find this statement in the Manchester Guardian after
the London Treaty has been violated by . . . Mr. Trotsky.
(See November 26, 1917.)
There is one treaty which is not secret and contams the obligation of
mutual loyalty as between friends which would have been sacred even if
it had not been embodied in treaty form. If Mr. Trotsky and Mr. Leniu
throw that treaty too into the dustbin, then they are as cynical as, &c.
I do not want two different measures to be appUed to Lenin
and Trotsky on the one side, and to the " Big Four " on the
other. And I am content to say that the responsible statesman
does not step into the shoes of the irresponsible journaUst. I
read in Mr. Winston Churchill's speech in the Commons on
November 5, 1919, the foUowing passage, which corroborates
my assertion : " There are stiU men in Eussia who were true to
the compact sworn between the great belligerent nations in the
Pact of London on the 4th of October 1914, by which these nations
bound themselves to make war in common, and not to make peace
except in unity." Mr. Churchill then proceeds to describe " two
careers," that of the traitor to the Alliance, Mr. Lenin, and the
faithful one. General Denikin. Lenin was sent to Eussia by
Germany, because " Eussia was to be laid low," according to
Ludendorff's avowal (ii. 509). Denikin, as Avell as Alexeiev,
Kolchak, Kornilov, on the other hand, " represented the unbroken
continuity between the position now held " by them " and the
position held by our erstwhile great ally, without whose aid we
never could have won the war." Mr. Churchill winds up with
an allusion to Mr. Asquith's recent speech :
I hope that in dividing up the honours between Lenin and Kolchak we
shall have a little greater measure of fair discrimination than is implied in
calling General Denikin an adventurer, and, no doubt, regarding Lenin and
"Trotsky as great and enlightened and progressive statesmen.
Unfortunately, here the Minister of War hits not only
Mr. Asquith, the ex-Premier, and not only organs like the
Manchester Guardian, but also Mr. Lloyd George, the present
Premier, whose way of thinking on- Eussia reminds one very
much of that of the Manchester Guardian. The recommended
" discrimination " is not being practised in Mr. Lloyd George's
* It was no pit&U of mine, to have couched niy qae^tioii nearly in the same expressions, and it
waft only later on that my attention was drawn to the quot^ition that follows.
13

speeches on Eussia. On the contrary, to him the fighting sides
in Eussia are equal, and the struggle going on now is equivalent
to "civil war" of undiscernible "factions." Helping Eussia
means, according to him, nothing but " financing the civU^war,"
and fomenting internal discord. The justification for "non
intervention " is thus won ; but the legal point of view is entirely
lost sight of.
Whatever view one adopts on Eussia, it must be made clear
that there is no alternative and no way of escape between the two
possible solutions. Either there is no legal continuity (which
may be indeed argued, on the basis of the clause known to the
International lawyer : rehus sic stantibus). Then it is quite
natural that peace is concluded without Eussia, contrarUy to the
London pact of 1914 ; that most momentous questions intimately
connected with Eussian interests are solved in her absence, &c.
The natural consequence is, that both sides are free to enter such
new obligations as they may find more conducive for them.
Or — the legal continuity exists. Then there must be an exponent
of that continuity, a juridical person who represents it. As this
can only be the Government of the loyal Eussia, this Govern
ment must be recognised, not only de facto but de jure as weU,
and every legal consequence must be drawn from the recognition.

The Point of View of Expediency.
IN this~wicked world of ours a practical poUtician, as a rule,
is not led by sentimental motives in questions of foreign
poUcy. Nor is he much concerned about legal obstacles in case
of a conflict -with national interest of his country. The point of
view which decides, although it is less often used for official
declarations and public utterances, is that of expediency. It'
remains to be seen what can be said and what is generally said
from the point of view of expediency, for or against the continua
tion of our Entente and Alliance.

Bolshevist Eussia anij the World's Eevolution.
Let us first take the selfish interest in its widest sense and
expression : the world's interest in this or that particular policy
u

towards Eussia. Eussia, which occupies one-sixth of the world's
surface, cannot, of course, be ignored by the rest of the world.
But at this • particular moment it is especially important that
Eussia should not remain a source of general conflagration and
an international menace. That Bolshevism is an international
menace is not denied — nay, it is even emphasised by the
Bolsheviks themselves. The proofs are overwhelming all over
the world.* The part of Eussia in the foreshadowed world's
revolution of the proletariat is very candidly avowed by the
Bolshe-vist leaders : this is even the chief if not the only aim of
their revolution in Eussia, which they never expected to turn
Communist and especiaUy to remain such if the world persists
in being CapitaUstic. These are Mr. Lenin's very expressions as
quoted by Mr. Eaymond Eobias, the head of the American Eed
Cross in Eussia, in his testimony before the American Senate's
Sub-committee (see the Eeport, p. 827) :
Lenin, sitting ia the Kremlin, said to me : " The Russian revolution
wiU probably faU. We have not developed far enough in the capitalist
stage, we are too primitive to realise the Socialist State. But we wUl keep
the flame of the revolution alive in Russia untU it breaks out in Europe.
. . . When you hear that the workmen's, soldiers' and peasants' Soviet is
ia command in Berlin, remember that the little man in the Kremlin told
you that a proletarian world revolution was bom.'
Since these words were uttered the danger of the " Third
Internationale " has become much more universally obvious than
it had been before the Bolshevist paradise of promises turned into
a hell in Eussia. But no consistent international policy is as yet
evolved to face the international conflagration which is left to
" burn out of itself." We Eussians think it a bad pohcy.
Many leading statesmen in the AlUed countries think the same.
But, unfortunately, the " Third Internationale " succeeded in
influencing larger circles of Labour opinion, and the defence of the
" Soviet EepubUc " — at least in the form of " non-intervention "—
has become an article of faith in many Eadical programmes, thus
making the Eussian question a plank in the platform of internal
pohcy. Colonel Ward was right in telling the London meeting of
the Labour Conference that by doing this they are injuring their
own interests and the interests of their country. But if the rank
and file of Labour are responsible for having made a good and
consistent poUcy towards Eussia impossible, their leaders are still

• I collected them in a special book on Bolshevism .-—an International Banger— its Progress througft
War and Retolution, which ia now being published by George Allen & Unwin.
16

more responsible for withholding from them the truth which they
often know better than they say, for the sake of preserving their
popularity and their hold on the masses.
Eussia and the Peace of Bueopb
Now, there is another aspect of the same question we must
touch upon. If the world in general, from the point of view of
its interest, cannot remain neutral in facing the reaUties of the
situation in Eussia, Europe has particular interest in interfering
in it. It is universally understood now, and it is even stated by
Mr. Lloyd George, that " you cannot have peace until you have
peace in Eussia." And Mr. Lloyd George was quite right in
adding : " It is not merely that there will be no peace untU peace
is estabUshed in Eussia. It means that you have got war m
half Europe, and very nearly half Asia as weU."
These views, of course, were not for the first time expressed
in the GmldhaU speech of November 8, 1919, from which I
quote them. Dr. E. I. Dillon reminds us, in his book on " The
Peace Conference," that
President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George had inaugurated their East Eui'opean
policy by publicly proclaiming that Russia was the key to the world's
situation, and that the peace would be no peace so long as her hundred and
fifty million inhabitants were left floundering in chaotic confusion, under
the upas shade of Bolshevism.
But the proposal they made to pacify Eussia was the Prinkipo
proposal. Instead of help, which, if given in time, might have
finished with the poison of Bolshevism long ago, the Eussian
question was thus taken off the order of the day, never to return.
Dr. Dillon helps us to understand the psychological reason for
that. I had interesting talks [he says] with some influential delegates on the
eve of the invitation issued to all de facto governments of Russia to fore
gather at Prinkipo for a symposium. They admitted frankly at the time
that they had no policy and were groping in the dark, and one of them held
the dogma that no light from outside was to be expected. They gave me
the impression that underlying the impending summons was the conviction
that Bolshevism, divested of its frenzied manifestations, was a rough and
ready govemment calumniously blackened by unscrupulous enemies, crimi
nal perhaps in its outbursts, but suited in its feasible aims to the peculiar
needs of a peculiar people, and therefore as worthy of being recognised as
any of the others.
That was also the psychological basis for the BulUt' negotia-
16

tions with Lenui. Since January 1919 some of the statesmen
interviewed by Dr. DiUon have learnt to know better after
they had certain Bolshevist experiences in their own countries.
In his speech of November 17, 1919, Mr. Lloyd George had to
state that " although there have been several points of view as
to the best method of deaUng with the Eussian situation, there
has only been one opinion about Bolshevism," namely that " all
have been in agreement as to their horror of both the principles
and the practice of the Bolshevist reign in Eussia. . . . The
chariot of Bolshevism is dra-wn by plunder and terror."
In spite of this strong indictment of Bolshevism, which,
unfortunately, took a whole year to materialise, the whole
psychology of the Prinkipo proposal continues unaltered. The
Prime Minister not only " still thinks peace could have been
estabUshed then (in February) if aU the parties . . . suspended
hostiUties," but he is quite ready to give the. same advice now.
In his GuildhaU speech, which was generaUy described as inau
gurating " the new Eussian pohcy," Mr. Lloyd George expressed
the hope that " the time is not distant when the Powers will be
able to renew this attempt (Prinkipo) vnth a better prospect of
success." He counts on the cooling influence of winter and . . .
defeat ? "I am hopeful," he said, " that when winter gives time
for all sections there to reflect and to reconsider the situation,
an opportunity may offer itself for the Great Powers of the world
to promote peace and concord in ihat great country." To which
General Denikin, in his last interview -with Harold Williams, gave
the dignified answer : " You may state categorically that I shall
never consent to any negotiations with the Bolshevists. What
ever happens I shall fight on, and I am sure that is Admiral
Kolchak's view too. The position is difficult now ; the Bolsheviks
are concentrating their strength against me. But even if peace
is made on aU the other fronts and the Bolsheviks throw against
me their entire force, I shall continue fighting. I cannot do
otherwise. Our success may be delayed, but we shall win in
the end, even though it be at the cost of great suffering."
The adoption of a sane policy for Eussia at the beginning of
this year would have greatly shortened the delay and would have
saved Eussia niuch suffering. The peace in Eastern Europe
might have been restored before the new year. With whom lies
the responsibihty for the delay and the suffering and the whole
unsettled conditions in Eastern Europe which menace general
peace and security ? General Denikin answers : " If I had
sufficient equipment I could have been in Moscow long ago."
17

General Yudenich repeats the same thing as regards Petrograd.
As things are, the winter comes without Moscow and Petrograd
being taken, and Mr. Lloyd George finishes the year (speech on
December 18) with the woeful exclamation : " Where is Eussia ?

Eussia and the Special Interests of England.
If the AlUed statesmen let things go and swear by the " wait-
and-see " policy, to the great detriment to the peace of the world
and of Europe particularly, does not the solution of the riddle
lie in the fact that, even at the risk of universal unrest, they do
not want to have in the East of Europe a strong and united
Eussia to deal with ?
What are, in fact, the special and lasting interests of the
AlUed Powers ? Can they be fostered or impeded by the recon
struction of their " former " Ally ? To a patriotic statesman,
under the condition of the absence of a League of Nations, the
interest of the world and of Europe may be inconclusive. What
about his, own country ?
Mr. Lloyd George gave a very undiplomatic answer to that
question. On November 17th I saw him in the House of
Commons, a living symbol of perplexity, with his characteristic
sweeping gesture of the hands, utter with great emphasis the
following sentences :
Let us reaUy face the difficulties. What is the other difficulty? . .
Denikin and Kolchak are fighting for two great main objects. The first
is the destruction of Bolshevism and the restoration of good go-Temment
in Russia. Upon that he could get unanimity amongst all the forces. But
the second is that he is fighting for a reunited Russia. WeU, it is not for
me to say whether that is a poUcy which suits the British Empire. There
was a very great statesman, a man of great imagination . . . Lord Beacons
field, who regarded a great, gigantic, colossal, gro-wing Russia rolling onwards
like a glacier towards Persia and the borders of Afghanistan and India as
the greatest menace the British Empire could be confronted with. . . .
The second (difficulty) is that one set of anti-Bolshevist forces are flghting
for consolidating, reuniting, reknitting together the old powerful Russia,
that overlay two continents ; the other great anti-Bolshe-vist forces are
fighting for local independence, for their nationality. . . . What are we to
do there ?
I have good reasons to think that Mr. Lloyd George's remarks
are not at all incidental, and that his apprehensions are shared at
least by some members of the CoaUtion giving now its support to
the Government. At any rate the same view has been more than
18

once expressed by Mr. George's great antagonist, the Times. As
early as March 3 I find in an editorial of Lord Northclille's paper
the foUowing Unes : " It is to be remembered that the doubt as
to the future developments of Eussia's pohcy throws us hack into
the Asiatic politics of the mid-nineteentlt century and makes it
doubly necessary that we should take special precautions against
danger which here would fall first upon us." " Here " means
Near Asia, as contrasted with the danger that on the Ehine could
faU first upon France. " As in Eastern Europe," the Times
article winds up, " we hope to see a harrier of free States erected,
so England, which has India to think of, wants to see a similar
harrier erected in the Middle East." This is the psychological
origin of the scheme for the " cordon sanitaire " to be drawn
between Eussia and Germany. The idea is far from being dropped
at the end of the year. On the contrary, it seems to be reviving —
at least in a mitigated form — in the sittings of" the Allied Councils
as weU as in the columns of the Times, which only recently
proposed to the Allies to force upon Kolchak and Denikin a
solution in that sense.
I shaU come back directly to the " barrier " scheme. But, so
far as the general trend of argument is considered, I must at once
state that on the basis of the " mid-nineteenth century's " policy
no standing agreement with Eussia could be brought about
except, indeed, by force. But force is lacking nowadays even for
carrying out much less momentous decisions of the Supreme
CouncU in Paris. If, indeed, we must start from the hypothesis
that " a powerful Eussia is dangerous to Great Britain," then
what is the conclusion we can come to ? Let Eussia become less
powerful ? From the point of-'view of a Eussian this is an un-
reaUsable task. People who know Eussia, like Colonel Ward,
understand that nothing can be achieved by that policy except
" making possible friends into potential enemies," and thus
" doing injury, not merely to England but to the world." The
only conclusion a Eussian could welcome would be : "As Eussia
will become strong again, whether we wish it or not, let us have
Eussia for a good friend, as she now is."

Is Eussia really a Menace to India ?
But is a strong Eussia really dangerous to Great Britain ? Is
she, moreover, " the greatest menace the British Empire could be
confronted with " ? 19 A 4

The Eussian advance in Asia, of course, is an undeniable /acf.
It is the result of the inevitable elemental process we spoke about r
a process of colonisation mostly preceding that of conquest. Sir
Harry Johnston found a very appropriate formula for this process.
" In fact," he remarked, " the Eussians, in once more aryamsmg-
Northern and Central Asia, are only repeating history." Owm^
to certain pecuUarities of Eussian colonists they easily frater
nise and amalgamate with the local' population. Mr. Albert I.
Beveridge, the author of an interesting book on " The Eussian
Advance," * teUs us of his talk with " an intelUgent Eussian
commercial man" in Vladivostok. "Yes," the flatter said,
referring to the prairies north of \1adivostok, " these fields
were aU once occupied by Chinamen ; but now, as you see, they
are as fuUy occupied by the Eussian peasant, his wife and chUdren,
as if this land had al-ways been a part of Eussia. _ That has not
been so very long ago, either. It is quite impossible to explain.
the retirement of the Chinese. There was no friction between
the people and the Eussian peasant." The author adds : " This
singular fact, which repeats itself in many different phases, is one
of the most significant truths in the pecuUar process of Eussian
expansion : never any friction between the Eussian and the
native." The Eussian " danger " for Great Britain in India, as a
hypothetical result of that elemental advance in Asia, is nothing
but a legend. In the words of Dr. Lansdell, an English traveller,
" No doubt, there were Turkestan officers — to whom war meant
medals, promotion, and money — who were quite ready to attempt
the invasion of India, or, for that matter, of Timbuctoo or any
other place, as there were Indian officers who, for similar reasons,
would invade Turkestan. But I was not led by anything I saw
or heard in Central Asia to think that there was any preparation
or desire for an invasion ; and when now and then I broached
the subject to Eussian officers, it never elicited any suspicious
remarks, or was treated otherwise than as a joke." There were
to be sure, even before Beaconsfield, recurrent fits of Eussophobia
in England, chiefly bred by Anglo-Indians ; f as there were
inflammatory Anglophobe articles, chiefly in the Moscow Gazette,
an extremely Conservative organ, in Tsarist Eussia. Under the
pressure of Eussophobe and Anglophobe elements in both
countries respectively wrong steps now and then were taken.

« New York and London, Harper & Bros., 1904.
t See the chapter on " Eussophobia— its Origin, Growth and Progress," in the book of Capt. F..
French, E.B.Q.S., The Russo-Indian Question. London: MacmiUan, 1869.
20

which, fortunately, were later regularly reconsidered and retraced.
An American Consul and a learned author of an exceUent book
'0n_ Turkestan, Mr. Eugene Schuyler, states it, so far as Great
Britain is concerned, as follows :
The attitude of England toward Russia with regard to Central Asia can
hardly be called a dignified one. There are constant questions, protests,
demands for explanations, and even threats, at least in the newspapers and
in Parliament, but nothing ever is done. Outcries were made about the
expedition to Khiva, but when the occupation had once become a, fait accompli
-the same men and the same journals said that no harm was done. Again
there were outcries and questions about the possibility of a Russian movement
on Kashgar. Kow, after Kokand is occupied, the conquest of Kashgar is
looked upon as not so alarming after all. At present there is a similar
uneasiness about Merv, and the Russophobist Party are using all their
efforts to show either that the Russians must not be allowed to take Merv,
or, it they do take it, that Herat must be occupied. In all probability Merv
wUl be occupied by the Russians, and in all probability the English
Govemment will do nothing at all. It would seem wiser and more dignified,
instead of subjecting the Russian Foreign Office to constant petty annoyances,
to aUow the Russians plainly to understand what limits they could not pass
in their onward movement. A state of mutual suspicion bodes no good to
the relations of any Governments.*
After a new crisis of opinion, which nearly brought us to war
in 1885 on the question of General Komarov's escapade at Panjdeh,
Schuyler's ad-vice was practically followed. The frontier between
Afghanistan and Eussia was finaUy delimited, thus paving the
way for a larger agreement on all pending questions in Central
Asia between Eussia and England. It seemed to be realised on
both sides that further advance was undesirable for political, as
weU as for strategical reasons. It was the opinion of the great
Duke of Wellington, that in Afghanistan, o-wing to local conditions,
" a small army would be annihilated, and a large one starved."
The same was the opinion of Lord Salisbury and Lord Kimberley,
the Secretary for India, who on the occasion of a debate in the
House of Lords, stated that " making Herat a great Indian or
British fortress . . . would involve England in great, and serious
dangers." On the other hand the famous General Skobelev is
quoted to have said that he " should not like to be commander of
an expedition to invade India."
Under such conditions our treaty of 1807 seemed to form a
sound and definite basis for a lasting co-operation in Asia. It is
* I took this quotation from a very instructive little book, which I recommend to the attention
of the readers, as it contains, up to 1885, a good dose of antidote against the outcries otpolitical
alarmists always ready to increase the number of " natural enemies," and to sow distrust and sus
picion. It is the volume of " the Imperial Parliament series " edited by Sidney Buxton, under the
title, England and Russia in Asia, by the Rt. Hon. W. E. Baxter, M.P,
21

on the British side that this treaty is left to lapse, as a consequence
of the new treaty with Persia, concluded in the absence of Eussia.
The editorial of the Manchester Guardian answering my claim for
the " continuity of our treaty obligations " objected that it meant
" the revival of the iniquitous agreement for the virtual parti
tion of Persia." I replied : " If the treaty of 1907 is looked on
as a ' partition ' of Persia,* I do not object to its being caUed
'iniquitous.' But what about the other treaty which took its
place without Eussia being consulted ? I do not think it appro
priate to speak of a ' revival ' of a treaty which, up to recently,
never ceased to exist. But how to explain and to characterise
its formal disappearance ? So far as I know there was no ' man
date ' from the League of Nations which might justify the new
change from the point of view of the Manchester Guardian." The
answer to that was — a diplomatic silence. The only answer
given by the Manchester Guardian was the same as Mr. Lloyd
George's : " At present, there is no real Eussia."

Dobs Eussia's Claim for an Open Sea interfere
WITH British Interests ?
It is particularly in the domain of the Balkan policy that the
mention of Earl Beaconsfield by Mr. George is unfortunate.
Disraeli, the symbol of British " Imperialism " in the odious
sense of the word, by destroying the Treaty of San Stefano,
really " put Britain's money on the Avrong horse," as Lord
Salisbury afterwards admitted. Far from " providing the
Sultan's dominions with a defensible frontier," as he boasted to
have done in 1878, he made the Balkans a playground for the
ambitions of Powers for decades of years to come, he destroyed
the very basis of friendship between the Serbs, the Greeks, and
the Bulgarians, and the consequences of his policy of suspicion,
coupled with ignorance of ethnography hardly surpassed by the
"Big" ones, wiU be felt long after the ratification of the new
treaty with Bulgaria. Moreover, his only aim, that of eUminating
Eussia from the Balkans, was not attained. The ' ' honest broker "
of BerUn, Prince Bismarck, took the whole profit of Beaconsfield's
pohcy for himself, and Eussia, thrown over to Germany by the
erroneous British policy, concluded the secret treaties of 1881
with Germany and Austria which were twice renewed (1884 and

* -Wliich I do not think it was.
22

1887) and which helped Germany to consohdate the basis for
her Weltpolitik of the last twenty years preceding the World's War.
Thus, partly in a direct way, partly indirectly, Beaconsfield's
pohcy is responsible for aU the unrest in Europe, foUowing the
disruption of the Treaty of San Stephano and the conclusion of
the Berlin Treaty.
Is this the policy to be imitated by the " Big Four " ? We
hope not. What lay at the bottom of the anti-Eussian pohcy
in Europe, carried by Great Britain practically since Lord
Palmerston's time? It was the suspicion of Eussian designs
in Turkey awakened by the Unkiar-Skelessi treaty between the
Porte and Eussia in 1833. What were the designs of Eussia ?
Eussia's desire was to open the Straits for Eussian trade while
reservmg the strategic defence of the Black Sea^-with the aid of
Turkey, as long as Turkey exists. Before the opening of the Suez
Canal, the DardaneUes were the great sea route to the East, and
the Powers in possession of the " freedom of the seas " looked ask
ance on possible new competitors. As long as that situation lasted,
the existence of a serious ground for conflict could not be denied.
But we have had many authoritative admissions that this
state of things has completely changed. Since the opening of
the Suez Canal in 1869 and the completion of the Salonica railway
in 1888, particularly in connection with the new railway net
bmlt in Asia Minor and Syria, with the outlets in Smyrna and
Alexandretta, Constantinople and the Straits have lost a great
deal of their former importance as the centre and the main route
of the world's commerce. Turkey has definitely proved to be the
" sick man " which the Emperor Nicholas had called her on the
eve of the Crimean War in 1853. The existence of the Turk in
Europe was recognised as an anomaly and some change in the
status of the Straits was foreshadowed long ago. The necessity
of bringing about that change appeared obvious as a result of the
speedily increasing influence of Germany in Constantinople and
,her attempt to cross the sea route by her Hamburg-Bagdad
scheme. The old bugbear of " Pan-Slav " danger had to yield
before the new Balkan tangle, on the one hand, and the much
more dangerous " Pan-Ottoman," " Pan- Islamic," and, finally,
" Pan-Turk " movement, superseding each other, but equally
adroitly exploited by the Germans, on the other. AU that helps to
explain why it proved possible on the part of the British Govern
ment, on March 4, 1915 — " provided the war is won, and provided
a number of claims made by France and England, both in the
Ottoman Empire and in other places, are satisfied " — to give its

23

"'complete consent in writing to the annexation by Eussia of the
Straits and Constantinople within the Umits indicated by Eussia.
The claims mentioned were satisfied by subsequent negotia
tions and by the agreement between Britain, France, and Eussia
as to their " zones of influence and territorial acquisitions " in
Asiatic Turkey, in the spring of 1916. The war was won. _ But
the very character of decisive victory gained by the Alhes in
connection with the disappearance of the Eussian Statehood, has
profoundly changed the whole situation. There was no more
danger of the Hamburg-Bagdad scheme, whUe, on the other hand.
Great Britain recoUected what had been said by Sir Edward Grey
in the Commons at the closing session of 1913 : "In deference
to the susceptibilities of a great section of subjects of the Crown,
our poUcy should never be one of intolerance or wanton and
unprovoked aggression against a Mussulman Power." We are
fully entitled to surmise that the poUey of the Paris Conference
towards Turkey was to a great extent guided by that consideration.
The solution was postponed by the Conference long enough to
reconsider the original scheme of the radical destruction of Turkey.
As I write these Unes, no final solution has been found, or at least
none is made known. The only light thrown by Mr. Lloyd George
on the subject, as a result of his negotiations with M. Clemenceau
in London, is that " we could not trust the same porter (of the
gates of the Straits). " It only shows how difficult it is to recur
to artificial solutions in the absence of a natural one. The natural
one, under the obtaining conditions, would be to return the capital
of Islam to its former masters, while taking necessary provisions
for the freedom of commerce in the Straits. This is also the next
best solution for Eussia, which possesses twice as many milUon
Turkish-speaking Mohammedans as the Ottoman Empire itself
(16 versus 8). Going beyond that would mean breeding new
trouble in the future. Both Eussia and Turkey would join to
oppose a complete change in the international status of the Straits
which would ignore their national interests.
At any rate, no solution should be attempted which would
deny Eussia the free passage to the open sea or endanger her
national defence. It would be equally mistaken to think that
the Eussian desire for the open sea could be satisfied, as Sir Harry
Johnston had suggested before the war, by diverting Eussia from
the Straits to the Persian Gulf and correspondingly redistributing
the " spheres of influence " in Persia.* This was practically the

• Common Sense in Foreign Policy, L. 1913, pp. 63-73.
24

¦German scheme, very often suggested by German publicists and
intended to eliminate Eussia from Germany's royal road to
Mesopotamia. The Eeal Danger in Asia.
Far from there being a danger in the Eussian advance to the
spheres of the British influence in Asia and in Eastern Europe,
the danger would Ue in the absence of Eussia from these regions.
The argument is not mine. Let me present it in the expressions
taken from a very instructive and exceedingly well informed
article in tUe Bound Table for December 1917 :*
¦What happier substitute could be found for the ancient rivalry of Russia
and Britain in Asia than that we should advance together along the same
Uberal road ? But if Russia were to break do-wn, the outlook would be
grave, unity and reconciliation would break do-wn with her ; vast regions
between the Indian frontier and Europe would return to chaos, and the
initiative there would pass iato Ottomanf hands. Wielding the weapons of
Pan-Turanianism and Pan-Islamism, according to expediency, the Committee
of Union and Progress would set religion against religion and race against
race. We know their work, for we have seen it during the war in the economic
ruin of the Ottoman Empire and the campaign of extermination waged
against its Armenian, Greek, and Arab inhabitants, f With Germany to
back them, they would extend their operations into the Russian Hinterland
and the Middle East, and the British Commonwealth would be left single-
handed to stem the devastating side of their aggression.
But even the author of this far-seeing article could not imagine
that hardly a year -will pass before the Mahommedan world would
find itself facing a new conflagration brought, not by the Pan-
Turks into Eussia, but, vice versa, by Lenin's propagandists from
Moscow into that peculiar world of Islam. The subject of the
Bolshe-vist danger to Asia is nowadays a familiar one. It is
mentioned in the House of Commons and at political gatherings,
discussed in editorials, studied by the intelligence organisations.
I may be permitted to confine myself to one single quotation from
a recent letter to the editor of the Times, published on December 22,
1919. I have every reason to think that the information here
given on the authority of a " Eussian of Tartar extraction," -with
considerable commercial interests in Moscow, and quite fresh
from Bolshe-vist Eussia, is quite genuine.
The Mussulman fraction of the " Eastern Department " of the Com
missariat for Foreign Affairs has " founded " a '' League for the Liberation
* No. 29 : Turkey, Bussia and Islam ; the concluding part under the title : '¦ The Prospects of
Turkish Irredentism."
t Eespectively German or Bolshevik. — Author's remark.
i In ttiat connection I might signalise the danger of backing the Kurds against the Armenians,
«s some British think fit to do. 25

of Islam." This League has been subsidised by the Soviet Government
to the extent of five million roubles m gold. It has been established with
the avowed and definite object of fostering and supporting seditious move
ments among the Mussulman peoples against European domination ; but
in order to conceal such subversive aims it has been given the ostentatious
title of a " League for the Protection of the Interests of the Islamic World."
The immediate work of the League -wUl consist in oral and printed propa
ganda, and in giving moral and material supportto all the existing organi
sations whjch are already pursuing the same objects. . . . The foUotdng
organisations have already reached the League :
1. The Egyptian Nationalists.
2. The Turkish Nationalists.
3. The Party of Union and Progress.
4. The Indian Nationalists.
6. The Afghan Patriots.
6. The Union of Caucasian Mussulmans (Circassians,
Daghestanians, &c.).
7. The Congress of Russian Mussulmans.
8. The League of Persian Nationalists.
The Central Executive Committee of the League (Comity Central directeur
de la Ligue Islamique Mondiale) has its headquarters at Moscow under the
direction of such well-kno-wn Mussulman leaders as Agaieff, Akchuraeff
(Akchurin), Gadjeff, Merdjimekoff, &c., who work in close co-operation -with
Karakhan, Bravin,* Voznessenski and other Bolshevists. With a -view to
extending its acti-vities over a wide area, the League has established two
sub-committees, one caUed the " Eastern Central Committee," which super
vises all organisations in Persia, Transcaucasia, Anatolia^ Turkestan, Afghanis
tan and India, and has its headquarters with the forces of Mustapha-Kemal
Pasha, and the " European Central Committee " in Berlin, which deals with
propaganda in Europe, Egypt, European Turkey, &e. The League has
decided to publish and distribute gratuitously a special periodical for purposes
of propaganda in the Persian, Arabic, Turkish and Tartar languages.
In the face of such evidence, borne out by the facts which
already occurred in all the above-mentioned countries, it is easy
to come to the conclusion which another writer to the" Times
(December 16th), Lieut.-Colonel G. Maitland Edwards, formulates.
as foUows : "An anti-Bolshevist Eussia means peace in Persia,
Afghanistan and India." A Bolshevist Eussia obviously means
trouble.

The Danger of an alternative International Grouping.
Mr. Winston ChurchiU, in concluding his speech of November 5^
m the Commons, signaUed another danger to come from the lack

the E^^aTloteiSn onSft?™ Lu**"'- ¦^.°^}' Bra^m and Voznessenski are former officials of
i-ue iiusaan iioieign omoe, very well acquamted with Asiatic problems.

26

of support to loyal Eussia. " We retain, up to the present,"
he said, " and for the months which are immediately before
us, great friendly influence upon Eussia. . . . We vnll use that
influence to prevent Eussia, as far as we can, from thro-wing
herself into German hands and making an arrangement with
Germany which, as we all know, if it became effective, would
confront our children, and possibly even ourselves, with a repeti
tion of the same evil deadly equipoise of gigantic Powers, with
the marshaUing up against us of that same formidable danger
which plunged the world in disaster in August 1914."
To avert this danger, formidable indeed, a " friendly " and
purely moral influence alone, intended to last for the few months
"immediately before us " and to be discontinued on March 31,
i.e. at the end of the financial year, is, of course, far from sufficient.
But what else is there to do ? Mr. ChurchiU is extremely per
plexed in his answer. With a touch of humorous pessimism he
tells the House : " Japan, perhaps, alone knows exactly what she
wants." It is known that Japan was the first to propose the
recognition of Kolchak. Japan is like-wise preparing to offer him
a helping hand in his hour of need. All the other Allied Powers,
Mr. ChurchiU goes on saying, are handicapped by the " last
poUtical inspirations " coming from the internationalist wing of
pubhc opinion. They are all labouring under the same internal
contradiction, paralysing any attempt at a consistent policy.
Mr. Winston Churchill gives us the best formula of that contra
diction. On the one hand, Eussia is asked " not to make friends
-with Germany and not to accept any aid from Germany, however
opportunely, tactfuUy, and effectively it may be proffered, and
however bitter their need." On the other hand, the British pohcy
is to be : " Hands off Eussia. No arms, no food, no help, no
money, no countenance, no recognition, nothing at all." These
expressions testify to a complete understanding of the cruel
dilemma now before Eussia. But even Mr. ChurchiU is powerless
to draw logical inferences from his just premisses. He knows
what are the only effective means to avert the danger. But he
does not dare to say so. He is baffled by the " last political
: inspirations." Let us now take the Eussian side. We recently read
, Mr. Harold WilUams' mterview with General Denikin at Taganrog.
' This is what the leader of the Eussian regeneration and the most
: responsible man in Eussia says on the subject : *

• The Times and The Baily Chronicle, December 19, 1919.
27

I am pro-Ally and can never be anything else. I can never make terms
with the Germans, and if ever Russians do want to associate themselves -with
Germans, they -will have to do it without me. The pro-German reactionaries
here are constantly putting pressure on me, but hitherto I have been
effectively supported in my resistance to them by the generous assistance
given to me by the personnel of the British MiHtary Mission. ... I am
deeply grateful for this assistance ; and yet, it is difficult for one to under
stand why England has not one but several poUcies on Russia. ... I could
put thousands more troops in the field, if only I had the equipment. Indeed,
if I had sufficient equipment, I could have been in Moscow long ago.
Mr. Harold Williams' personal comment is not less significant :
I cannot imagine any true Briton [he says], who, if he had been present
at that moment, would not have been deeply moved by the sight of this
I strong faithful man, grappUng with unheard of difficulties, contemplating
the possibiUty of being left in soUtude by those whom he considered his best
: friends, and yet absolutely determined to struggle on to that great achieve-
: ment for Russia which he knows is certain.
This is in a nutshell the tragedy of Eussia forsaken and left
to her own fate by the friends for whom she had made heavy
sacrifices, and yet unwilling to yield to temptation and to accept
help from the people whom she was accustomed to treat as the
bitterest enemies of herself and of the good cause she had fought
for. The clear insight of the politician and the straightforward
honesty of the soldier might easily come to a satisfactory solution.
But while the one is " baffled," the other is puzzled, and the
result is — lack of Eussian policy and a fatal procrastination.
The irony of the situation is that the responsibiUty for this lack
of policy and for this procrastination is laid on the very people
whose action is thwarted, while the accusers are the very people
who thwart the action !
At a banquet in a great university centre in Northern Britain
I was bluntly asked, as a Eussian, by a prominent writer on
international poUtics : " What can be done in order to prevent
the impending Eusso-German-Japanese aUiance ? " I was not
disagreeably surprised by the straightforwardness of the question,
which I found no difficulty in answering. " You must do just
the opposite to what you are really doing now," I answered. I
added, however, that to me the danger of such an aUiance does
not seem imminent. But it is not impossible and not entirely
excluded. If precautions are taken in time, it may not take
place at aU. The best thing would have been to include both
Eussia and Germany in the League of Nations, under the con
ditions which would secure their national existence and placate
their bitter feeling of national humiUation. Because— it is strange
28

to say and unpleasant to hear, but it is true — from a moral point
'•of view, Eussia was -treated by the victors nearly on the same
footing as Germany. She has equally resented the treatment.
" The League of the vanquished " is a current word in Southern
Eussia, testifying to the dangers of the situation.
The League of Nations might bring salvation. But, un
happily, we have seen that the ideology of the " Covenant " and
the practice of the " Big Four," are two diflerent things. The last
word on the subject is that of Mr. Lloyd George. His speech in
the Commons on December 18th is a continuous lament on
America's desertion. He avowed that while Lord E. Cecil and
-General Smuts were drawing up the Covenant, others " beUeved
that that was not the best way of doing it, but that our object
would have been done tentatively rather than written." Mr.
Lloyd George must have been among the " others."
There now remains the second best thing. Everybody must
think of their own security. Security comes first. " Until the
League has been founded and firmly established" — we have al
ready quoted Mr. Lloyd George's saying — " until we know that the
nations of the world contribute to the works of the League,
including America, we must make our own country secure."
The first important inference from this is that Great Britain
cannot undertake alone, without the United States of America,
the charge of guaranteeing France against any act of wanton
aggression. This declaration by itself is sufficient to characterise
the great change in the " Equipoise of Powers " which took place
in Europe since the draft Treaty of VersaiUes was provisionally
signed on June 28, 1919.
The question now presents itself in another form than it
might have been under the regime of the League of Nations
"firmly estabhshed." What must be done by Great Britain
and Eussia to make both countries secure ?

How TO Secure the Alliance and Avoid the Secession?
I take it as proved both by the arguments brought forward
and by the very fact of Eussia's rapprochement with Great
Britain since 1907, that there are no insurmountable obstacles
on the way to our commg to a closer agreement. Such differ
ences of interests between Eussia and England as have been
apprehended in Asia and in Turkey appear to belong to the
inistaken tradition of a wrong policy, created by overheated
29

nationaUsm and by unfounded suspicion too often used as an
instrument of aggression.
In so far as differences of national interest reaUy existed,
they dwindle down to very httle or nil in the enlarged frame of
the world's pohcy and the world's equilibrium. I'or the most
part they must be relegated to the past, never to return. If
there are exceptions to this, hkely to breed further dissensions,
they are created by the persistence of that old spirit of petty
distrust, and I must add : they are not created by Eussia.
But the absence of serious obstacles is onty a negative argu
ment. The positive must be drawn from the utility of the
Eussian rapprochement for maintaining the British security or
from the danger of the Eussian secession to another group of
Powers. As a rule, up to the present the latter was much more
generally understood than the former. I hope that the havoc
wrought in Asia during Eussia's absence will bring about a much
better understanding of the important part played by Eussia
in establishing and preserving order and settled conditions in
Asia. Now that America decides to stay at home, and Great
Britain is striving to return to her splendid isolation except
where her sea-power can reach,* Eussia's absence will be the
longer, the more bitterly resented in Europe also. Independently
of political reasons, there are very strong economical reasons
for reconstructing Eussia as soon as possible. If, then, we start
from the supposition that the Eussian reconstruction and aUiance
is worth something, while Eussian ruin and secession may be
dangerous, the question must be put and solved : how to bring
about the first and avoid the second ?

The Three " Conceivable " Policies for Eussia.
One wiU find this question answered in the appended " Six
Points of a Sane PoUcy for Eussia," a document written by
myself at the beginning of the year 1919, when it was not yet too
late to adopt the policy outlined. It was then far easier than it
is now to embark on such a pohcy. Many changes have since
taken place in the feelings as weU as in the surrounding conditions.
Procrastination and uncertainty have borne their poisonous
fruits. The question of " where is Eussia " may become

» "True to the instmot which has always saved us, we never went far from the sea"  (laughter>
;r.,??„ '"^ '"^'¦® ^'''^ *° extricate ourselves from there."— Mr. Lloyd George's sentence from his
Cjuilclnall speech. 30

better founded than it was at the moment these words were
uttered. But the substance of a sane Eussian' policy always
remains the same, and perhaps the very failure to put it into
practice may serve as a useful object lesson. There is always
the same choice as before between the three "conceivable"
poUcies. I shall once more review them shortly, and answer some
recurrent objections which, from being always repeated, have not
gained in demonstrative force but have succeeded in becoming
commonplaces — mere currency in thinking on the Eussian question.
I have said enough to make it clear that the first pohcy, that
of "non-intervention," is, as a matter of fact, based on the
Bolshevist ideology, that it is practicaUy equivalent with the
intervention on the other side and really " suicidal " for British
interests. The poUticians who defend it are regularly following
in the trail of Ijabour opinion, which in its turn is led by its
Extremist element, often without knowing it and without being
able to form an independent judgment based on impartial
evidence. A good deal of evidence pubUshed on Bolshevisin is
impartial, but as it interferes with the habits of thought estab
Ushed in concordance with the Eadical ideology, this good
e-vidence is regularly dismissed as a " pack of lies." Here the
saying may be applied : None so bUnd as they that won't see.

Support to Border States.
Another poUcy is much less ideological and much more
TeaUstic, but for this very reason still more dangerous. The
last formula of it is given in M. Clemenceau's speech on
December 23rd : "As long as Eussia remains in the state of
anarchy ... we must maintain around Eussia a wall of barbed
wire." This is the new edition of the scheme for a " cordon
"Sanitaire " to be formed by the newly created States on the Western
Eussian frontier. Of course nothing can be said against supporting
these States in their struggle against Bolshevist aggression. But
here the difficulty is that formulated by Mr. Lloyd George in the
above quotation from his speech on November 17th. The policy.
of supporting these States against the Bolsheviks evolves into a
policy of supporting their independence against Eussia, which
is equivalent to the perpetuation of 'the " German blight " of the
.Eussian dismemberment.*
* See the interesting map published in October 1918 by the National Review under the title
**' The G-erman Blight ; An Exposure of German War Aims."
31

I do not know anything more dangerous to our future relations;
than this pohcy, if its aim be the same as was Lord Beaconsfield's;
at the Berlin Congress, namely the " Balkanisation " of Eussia.
In this case Bussia is sure to be thrown into the hands of the very
first Power that proves strong and far-sighted enough not to be-
afraid of a strong and united Eussia, and which will be willing-
to give her a helping hand in restoring her unity. I do not say
anything about Poland and Finland, as the annexation of the-
first was considered a mistake — and, moreover, a sin — even by
some of our nationalistic ideologists (the "Slavophils"), while-,
the second was bound to recover its statehood. The question
of frontiers remains a cause of possible friction with Poland, as
well as the question of strategic guarantees — a cause of friction with
Finland. But apart from this, no obstacles will be put by Eussia.
to the separate existence both of Poland and Finland. The case-
is different with the other small States recently created on the-
borders of the former Eussia. Their separation from Eussia
is based on strongly— and temporarily — exaggerated national'
claims which might easily be satisfied within the limits of a large-
national autonomy. No economic foundation can be produced
to justify that separation. On the contrary : their economic-
interest is so much inteiAvoven with those of the central parts
of Eussia, that no separation is practically possible. In case of
conflict these smaU States are unable to defend themselves, while
no help can be given to them " indefinitely " by their present
protectors. It is true that in case of their justified claims being
met with refusal they will remain an eternal sore in the organism
of the Eussian State. But it is impossible to suppose that their
national and territorial claims wiU meet with a lasting refusal.
Ihere is a large scope of compromise between complete independ
ence and complete subjection. I am sure the compromise will
be sought for and easily found as soon as, on the one hand, their
hopes for the Alhed support in their claims of independence wiU
vanish, whUe, on the other hand, their fear of being simply
re-annexed to a centralised Eussia wiU pass awav. Some people^
caU a possible compromise by the term of " autonomy " some-
other prefer to speak of " federation." Even here the difference-
of opinion is not so great as it may seem as long as " federation "'
IS confounded with "confederation." The diflerence between
confederation and federation is that of the United States of
America before and after the Constitution of 1787, or that of the
former German " AlUance of the States " {Staatenbund) and the
later (smce 1871) "AUied State" of Germany (Bundesstaat).
32

'Those who strive for "federation" must accept the unity of
¦ territory, unity of citizenship, unity of central legislative assembly
: representing the people as a whole and not the separate States,
represented in an Upper House. They must also accept the
inadmissibiUty of secession : the thesis fought out by Abraham
Lincohi in the CivU War of 1860-1865. Last, but not least,'
they must admit the usual competency of the federal institutions :
unity of army and of foreign politics, a certain extent of unity
in taxation, transportation, economic and legal intercourse,
federal administration, &c. After all this is made clear and
agreed to, there wUl be not much difference left between the
seemingly divergent views. They were made to appear incom
patible chiefly by mutual fear and by ignorance of the existing
forms" of State unions.

Objections against helping Kolchak and Denikin
refuted. 5
The third policy towards Eussia is formulated by Mr. Asquith
(November 15) not as " desirable " but as " conceivable " policy,
which in his judgment is " a thoroughly bad policy," although
to a Eussian it is the only possible one. It is " to treat what
is caUed Bolshevism as an international menace, ... to ally
themselves openly with Kolchak and the other anti-Bolshevist
miUtary leaders, to support them with money, with munitions
and with men at aU cost and to the bitter end." The expressions
here used are purposely chosen to convey the impression that an
equally dangerous enterprise would be thus embarked upon as
the World's War itself. We repeatedly heard Mr. Lloyd George
emphasising the same difficulties. According to him quite a
milUon men were wanted (at the beginning of 1919) for military
success, but even then he professed to be afraid of victory, even
more than of defeat, because Eussia was something like a quick
sand, and at any rate the Eussian Eevolution reminded Mr. George
very much of the French Eevolution, with the Bolsheviks taking
the place of the Jacobins. I am afraid Mr. George was thus
" defining night by darkness." I tried to explain away that
fantastic " million " in my " six points." Considering Mr.
George's comparisons, I might repeat the old saying : " Com
parisons do ofttime great grievance." I do not know of any
' other that has done more harm than this comparison between
the Eussian and the French Eevolution. Mr. Lloyd George might.
33

recollect, that the Jacobins helped France to defend herself in
an hour of danger to her Eevolution and won in the war, whUe
the Eussian Bolsheviks were brought to power by an intense
desire for peace, they lost the war which was nearly won before ¦
their advent, and endangered the success .of everything that was
right and reaUsable in the Eussian Eevolution. He also forgets
that it is not the aristocratic emigrees who fought the Eussian
Jacobins, but whole Eussia, including workmen and peasants.
Mr. George's information on the "indifferent "population in the
rear which " want to be left " alone, is based on good but one
sided observation. The population in Eussia is as much tired
and war-weary as everywhere. But the Bolshevist regime still
succeeds in making even that worn-out population stiffen them
selves for struggle and resistance.
There are two practical considerations in Mr. George's argu
ment which cannot be so easily refuted. Great Britain cannot
help Eussia alone. And the British taxpayer cannot " inde
finitely " stand the full cost of helping loyal Eussia in a pro
tracted civil war. Both arguments would be irreproachable and
might have done with the question of Eussian help, if that help
were equivalent with a work of charity. But Colonel Ward was
right in reminding the House of Commons that British inter
vention was begun in 1918 in the AlUed interest, and Mr. ChurchUl
was also right when he made it clear that even as late as 1919,
whUe fighting for Eussia's existence, Denikin's armies con
tributed to save the small border States from the Bolshevist
invasion at the time when no armed help could be possibly
sent to Latvia or Lithuania. " Who has protected them ? "
Mr. ChurchiU asked. " It was not the League of Nations, it was
not the great Alhed Powers. . . . Kolchak and Denikm have
saved those States. . . . They have drawn off on to their fronts
three-fourths of the whole mihtary strength of the Bolshevist
Empire." Moreover, by saving the borderlands they also pre
vented the reahsation of the Bolshevist scheme to come to the
aid of the German Spartacists in the spring of 1919, and thus to
inaugurate in Berlin the World's Eevolution which they were
planning. Thus, in a sense, up to the present time the loyal
Eussians have been helping their AUies who thought the war
was over and were speedily demobihsing, to comply with the
demands of their pubhc opinion. "It is due to them alone
(Kolchak and Denikin)," Mr. ChurchiU concluded, " that you have
not been compeUed by the collapse of those smaU States, by the
spread of anarchy and rapine throughout Eastern Europe, to
34

:ma'ke good our guarantee and send not only munitions but
British troops and other assistance as well." If I am not mis
taken, this argument disposes of the objection of " costs." The
expenses were to be met anyhow, and they are still to be met if
any foreign poUcy is to be carried on at all by Great Britain.
The alternative is general disarmament. But is it possible to
speak of this when the prospects of a League of Nations are
getting gloomier from day to day, when there is a talk of " secret
Germto armies," and when the whole face of affairs in Eastern
Europe is speedily changing ? The only way to cut down and
not to increase the costs is to put an end, as soon as possible, to
the nest of European trouble in Moscow and Petrograd, and to
prevent, by timely coercion, the recrudescence of militarism in
the whole East of Europe.
There remain two more objections less serious but more
effective in public dispute, when the help to Kolchak and Deni
kin is discussed. The first is that Kolchak and Denikin are
" reactionaries," and by helping them the Allies would contri
bute to the restoration of the Tsarist Eussia.
The answer to this is, first, that Kolchak and Denikin are not
reactionaries. Their very radical and democratic promises were
often pubUshed in newspapers.* But, even were they really
reactionaries, they would not for all time to come determine
the pohcy of the Eussian State they restore. If a reactionary
poUcy is bad and dangerous, it is in the first place bad and
dangerous for Eussia herself. It is not to please the European
democracy, but to lay a firm basis for an orderly state of things
in Eussia, that Kolchak and Denikin — or their successors — ^will
stand by their Uberal or radical promises. Again, who calls
Eussian military leaders reactionaries ? In the first place, the
Bolsheviks, fpr whom everybody is a reactionary — even the
extremist Social-Democrats of the internationalist type, if they
do not belong to their own set. Secondly, the Bolsheviks are
joined by some " parlour " politicia,ns like Kerensky, whose utter
incapabUity of governing Eussia is proved by sad experience,
and who never can hope to come back to power if the recon
struction of Eussia is achieved by military effort. These people
are biding their time and, unable to fight and to win in the
struggle, they are now preparing for both issues of Bolshevist
coUapse from outside and from within. In the first case they will
* See, e.g., T!ie Times, November 19, 1919 : " A I'ree Democratic Bussia. The Aims of Kolchak
and Denikin" (a selection of messages and declarations made on different occasions by both the

35

form the opposition to the Government which will take up the
heavy burden of Eussian reconstruction. In the second case
they hope themselves to inherit the power, which, however,
they will be unable to retain for long in their weak hands, thus
menacing Eussia with some new crisis in the future. In the AlUed
countries, partly through misunderstanding, partly as a weapon
in the internal political struggle, these more moderate Eussian
Socialists are backed by their opportunist " friends," like Albert
Thomas or Arthur Henderson. By their attitude towards Kolchak
and Denikin they strengthen these friends in their policy of
" non-intervention." On this occasion a substantially Bolshevist
policy is carried on by avowedly non-Bolshevist hands, as was
also the case in revolutionary Eussia. Mr. Kerensky's friends
even tried to insinuate that " some of the Moderate Cadets," i.e.
members of the Constitutionalist Democratic Party I belong to,
share in their poUcy of neutrality between Kolchak and Lenin,
or that, if even they fight for Kolchak, they do it " reluctantly."
I can testify that, so far from this being the case, we think absten
tion from struggle and from taking sides at that darkest hour of
Eussia's existence is equivalent to treason to Eussia and to the
real Eussian democracy which fights and dies in the ranks of the
anti-Bolshevist armies and actively resists the Bolshevist regime
from inside by aU possible means. Fortunately, Mr. Kerensky's
circle does not represent even the opinion of their own party,
taken as a whole.
Another objection of the same kind against intervention is
that intervention breeds iU-feelmg against the AUies on patriotic
grounds, and helps to rally round the Bolsheviks such elements
of population as -would oppose the Bolsheviks if Eussia were
left to herself. This view is endorsed even by such prominent
politicians as Lord Eobert CecU, who on November 17, 1919,
told inthe Commons the story of a gentleman from Archangel
who said the peasants " always asked him one thing : when are
the English going ? " His informant, of course, did not plead the
" anti-foreign sentiment " or " racial animosity " ; he simply
asserted the Archangel peasants were wanting peace at any cost.
This IS quite true, and this very sentiment against protracted war
IS the same everywhere in Eussia where the population has not
yet suftered much from the Bolsheviks. But, as I have already
stated, as soon as the population learn in practice what Bolshevism
is^they turn against it, they rise and invoke every help they can
aftord to get from outside. Lord E. Cecil for his one story might
tell hundreds when people were anxiously asking : " Why are
36

the EngUsh not coming ? " He might recoUect these Unes of the
glowing appeal of our late novelist, Leonid Andreyev ('' S.O.S.' ) :
Those were incredibly beautiful fantastic days in which a gloojay>
tormented Petrograd smiled and beUeved in the EngUshman as in God ;
those were strange and happy dreams, reveries of martyr-Uke madness, when
at every sound of a shot men thought of an English gun, and ran to the Neva
to have a look, to see the English Fleet, which " h.id arrived in the night."
And the murderers trembled : it was but enough to show merely a scarecrow
of an Englishman to make all this Caindom flee in a panic.
But here another story begins, accounting for really bitter feel-
mgs bred, as Colonel Ward very well stated it, not by interven
tion but by its abrupt termination and by the Allied desertion
in the midst of the fight provoked and organised by themselves.
I cannot tell this long story here, but some day it will be told.
It begins with insurrections fomented and left without succour
promised early in 1918 in Central Eussia. The saddest chapters
in it are those of the evacuation of Odessa, and Sebastopol by the
AlUes in April 1919. The last blow will fall if help is withdrawn
at all by the AlUes on March 31, 1920. The question then will be :
" Why do the AUies abandon us ? " I am afraid that in Eussia
no satisfactory answer will be found to that question.
StiU, I must like-wise add that there is some truth in the
assertion that national feehng and patriotic impulse can be roused
by the part the foreigners played in Eussian affairs. Eussian
patriots of all parties may resent the " intervention." But under
intervention no Eussian would understand armed help given by
an aUy. By intervention he means two things. The first
is just what is freely preached by the British opponents to inter
vention, Uke, e.g., Mr. Arthur Henderson : the interference in
intemal afl'airs of Eussia. The Eussians cannot understand how
a foreigner, very insufficiently acquainted with things Eussian,
can dictate a programme of internal policy for Eussia at that
direst hour of her existence. The second form of interference
which is resented by all Eussians, including even the Bolsheviks
and, at any rate, the Bolshevist armies, is the kind of protection
and sanction given by the AlUes to the process of the Eussian
disintegration. And again, this is just what is particularly
favoured by the radical opponents to any intervention in Eussia.
They thus give a specious cover of " self-determination " principle
to a poUey which may find another— and very reaUstic — explana
tion. The situation becomes really embarrassing when this realistic
explanation for the policy of dismemberment is frankly given
by responsible statesmen like Mr. Lloyd George, or by respon-
- 37

sible journaUsts Uke Mr. Wickham Steed. The great danger of
references to Britain's " mid-nineteenth century " pohcy toward
Eussia or to Earl Beaconsfield's schemes for " pushing Eussia
back," as good examples for imitation, consists in their coinciding
with and confirming Eussian suspicions, that the reconstruction
of -a great and strong Eussia is thought by some of the AlUes to
be inconsistent with their interests. This, of course, is no basis
for a closer rapprochement.

Bolshevism Uncompromising and Aggressive.
Just as I was finishing this pamphlet (Dec. 27, 1919) a bundle of
newspapers brought news which reminded me of the last, but not
least, argument against intervention. In his speech of Nov. 17
Lord Eobert Cecil said that " General Denikin and General
Kolchak would have been far better advised if, instead of trying
to capture Moscow when they had recovered a very considerable
proportion of the richest part of Eussia, they had devoted their
time and energy to reorganising that part and establishing a
civihsed and successful government. ... If they had done that,
the moral efl'ect upon the neighbouring Bolsheviks would have
been overwhelming." On the face of it the alternative here
proposed looks very plausible. But it only shows that, even for
prominent pohticians Uke Lord Eobert " the extreme difficulty
of forming any perfectly sound conclusion " on Eussia sometimes
remains unsurmountable. To think that it would be possible
for Denikin to stop the war with the Bolsheviks and to devote
himself to introducing good government in the South of Eussia,
means simply not to reahse how aggressive Bolshevism really is.
All constructions based on the wrong supposition that Bolshevism
can be held up within its own precincts are utterly mistaken.
The opinion now is often repeated — this was also always the view
of Mr. Lloyd George— that " Bolshevism cannot be defeated by
force." WeU, Bolshevism as a system of ideas— like aU systems
of ideas— cannot indeed be defeated by force. But the Bolsheviks,
in the sense of the existing Government, can only be defeated by
force, and this is their own view of themselves. It is immaterial
whether the force comes from outside or from inside, but some
force there must be appUed. Contrary to the current opmion
in certain circles, Bolsheviks cannot evolve or peacefully yield
to some settled and civihsed Government. They openly denied
that a National Assembly could be summoned under their rule.
3S

If now and then they indulge in speaking of the possibility of
sharing the power with some internationalist Extremists outside
themsel-ves, it is only to make a show and to placate foreign
opinion. The very meaning of Bolshevism and its only raison
d'etre is to remain uncompromising. This is what gives them
the only real force they have : the force of propaganda. They
are there for the sake of propaganda : that is their only vocation.
This also explains why in Eussia they readily resort to every
kind of matter-of-fact compromise with capitalism ; namely, to
be able to live on. At the same time they are quite unable to re
nounce their doctrine and practice of the Soviet Eule by minority,
fictitiously chosen, but practically nominated by the small nuclei
of the Communist Party. They may adopt the same practice of
matter-of-fact compromise in their deahngs with foreign powers.
But the aim wiU be always the same : to secure a " breathing
space " until the world's revolution begins. In the Daily Herald
for December 27, the Czecho-Slovak Foreign Minister, Mr. Benesh,
is quoted as saying that " it has been decided by England and
France to recognise the existing conditions in Eussia and bring
about an understanding between the various Eussian parties,
provided that the Bolsheviks modify their policy." But they never
wiU do this, except for show and as a sham. In the same column
I read Mr. Trotsky's ironical reply to assertions that Bolshevism,
left to itself, -wiU die a natural death.*
Our programme is summed up in one sentence : leave us alone. If we
are as weak as we are represented in the world's press, for goodness' sake let
us die of inanition. Why waste your energies in bringing about the faU of
this So-viet regime which, accordmg to you, is perpetuaUy on the brink of
dissolution ?
They are, in fact, on the brink of dissolution. They are
reaUy dying of inanition. TUat is why they urge so insistently
upon non-intervention, try to conclude an armistice and peace
with neighbouring States and with foreign powers, asking only to
be left alone. But that is also why they gather their last forces
and make their supreme effort to liquidate their policy of exter
mination of their " internal foes " in Eussia. They want to be
left alone, to consummate their policy of terrorism and unheard-of
tyranny. Tyranny and terrorism can for a time keep up any
regime, and especiaUy so in Eussia. With much less violence
Autocracy kept in existence for centiiries. The Bolsheviks can
*'i'he quotation from the Chicago BaMp News interview between Trotsky, Don Levine, and
Oolcnel Malone. 
3»

also force their armies of conscripts to obedience. The longer
they exist the easier it is for them to do it, not on the basis of
patriotic enthusiasm on Napoleonic lines, as Mr. Lloyd George
surmised, but on the same basis on which autocracy let Eu,ssian
armies fight for every cause, little as it was understood by illiterate
masses of old. Deserters are infinitely more numerous in this
Eed Army than in pre-revolutionary ones, and the whole Army
is much more likely to collapse. But human ma.terial is as the
sand of the sea, and quite a number remain in the ranks as long
as they are fed and paid sufficiently. The only thing which at
any rate remains unattainable for that regime of violence, under
the obtaining condition of chaos, is a regular administration and
a regular budget. The State which spends without producing
cannot exist, and it cannot live infinitely on paper money. That
is why we say that the Bolshevist rule is no real state at all.
Mr. Trotsky pretends, it is true, that it was " war that has
prevented them for the last two years from estabUshing a new
system and from applying their democratic ideas." But this is
for the gallery. Mr. Lenin was much more sincere when he told
Mr. Eobins (see above) that more fundamental and less transient
reasons than war prevent the possibiUty of a Communist rule to
be inaugurated in an economically backward country Uke Eussia.
After aU Mr. Benesh may be right in asserting that Mr. Trotsky's
demand (" do away with the battle fronts, raise the blockade,
and our mihtarism wiU vanish and we shaU devote ourselves
to the establishment of a new economic order in Eussia ") is
considered by the AUies, and that the only condition put by them
is that the Bolsheviks should " modify their pohcy." This is,
of course, impossible. But what is impossible in substance may
stiU be agreed to, just as the Brest-Litovsk Treaty was agreed to,
¦with the mental reservation not to fuUil the engagement.' The
diplomatists of the old school— and there is no new school as
yet in existence— are accustomed to unreaUsable promises at a
discount. And thus Lord Eobert Cecil's advice— or the new
Prmkipo proposal, because it comes to the same thmg— may be
followed, to the great satisfaction of Mr. Leo Trotsky. Bolshevism
wiU thus be permitted to pursue its Dance of Death in Eussia, and
the world wiU find itself face to face with new object lessons
in Bolshevist propaganda of the World's Eevolution. But
there are certain things which cannot happen. The Soviet rule
cannot exist for long in Eussia. It cannot evolve and- is bound
ta be overthrown in this or that way, by force. Lackmg the
help of the AUies, this overthrow will take place under condftions

40

dif&cult - to predict. Probably they will be entirely diflerent
from such as could secure a liberal government and a Uberal
policy for Eussia. The present state of disintegration of Eussia
also cannot last. But the conditions of Eussia's reunion, which
can now be obtained by the nationalities, may prove unreaUsable,
if the Uberation of Eussia is achieved by forces of reaction (which
is not as yet the case now). Unfortunately, it is more than
probable that no effective League of Nations will be there to
prevent or to make good these untoward results. Eussia thus
¦wiU be permitted by her Allies to drift along the lines of the least
resistance to the most vital and elementary demands of hers,
which otherwise remain unsatisfied.

The Fourth "Conceivable" Policy?
(A Postscript.)
THE New Year brought extremely bad news from Southern
Eussia and Siberia. The most important centres of national
resistance to Bolshevism, such as Kolchak's and Denikin's,
appear to have at least temporarily collapsed. The non-inter
ventionists -wUl, of course, see in that fact the confirmation of
their assertion that to liberate Eussia from Bolshevism is a rather
compUcated and difficult business. The interventionists may,
however, retort that it is just the kind of policy criticised in this
leaflet which has made the task complicated and difficult. It
may, again, be argued that military considerations are not the
only ones to explain Kolchak's and Denikin's defeat, and that
their intemal policy has very much to do with this result. Some
people even may revert to Lord Eobert Cecil's mistaken alterna
tive, and try to ascribe Denikin's reverse to his failure to make
the right choice (there was no choice, in fact) between fighting
the Beds- and organising good government in his rear. After
all, the faet remains that it was the military situation which
decided matters. We had not to wait for Denikin's outspoken
complaint- about the insufficiency of military support in order to
know that defeat would be the unavoidable result of the political
vaciUation of the Allied Governments and the logical consequence
of the- " moral support " given to the Bolshevist troops hythe
triil-mph of the "Hands-off-Eussia" policy. Whatever the
41-

faults of Denikin and his Government may be, nothing has beeh
done by the AUies in order to prevent them or to paralyse their
action, and everything has been done to enhance and to accelerate
their effect on the general result.
Now that the wrong policy has borne fruit, its utmost insin
cerity becomes particularly obvious. As long as Denikin's and
Kolchak's armies were actually fighting against the common
danger to civUisation, they were left to themselves, openly criti
cised, secretly helped, with the e-vident hope that some day they
would present to the world the accomplished fact of their victory.
Their defeat leaves an enormous gap which somehow or other has
to be filled up by someone else's efforts. People began thinking,
and they have now made the discovery that Kolchak and Denikin
were doing the work of the Allies, and that their defeat is indeed
the defeat of the Allies. Therefore, even if both Kolchak and
Denikin disappear, it is recognised that their work must be done
by some one. But by whom in particular ?
At the present stage of unachieved developments and frag
mentary information, it is very difficult to guess what will be
the practical answer to that question. But as a mere observer
I must state that, as a consequence of the profound change of the
situation, a new policy is aheady being devised — a policy which
does not correspond to any of the three above-mentioned. It
can only remmd us of the fourth, which up to the present was
the most appehended and feared.
Let us first recoUect the negative premisses in favour of such
a policy. In the first place, Bolshevism must be stiU fought
agamst and crushed at any cost. There is no doubt about that.
Mr. ChurchiU's last speech in Sunderland (January 3) gives the
best summary of what has been learnt about the dangers of
Bolshevism in this country. Nor is there any question as to the
possibUity of defeating Bolshevism by the armed forces of the
AUied armies. There are no such armies to be found among the
AlUes. We have just seen the revival of the " cordon sanitaire "
scheme, under which the honour of fighting the Bolsheviks was
to be bestowed on the newly-buUt border States. But they also
want peace, and after the conclusion of the armistice with the
Bolsheviks by Esthonia other border States may foUow her lead.
Nor do the AUies seriously cherish the hope that even m case of
these States bemg wiUing to make war on the Bolsheviks-, they
might succeed in what Kolchak and Denikm have faUed. It is
dawning upon the AUies that to achieve this the border States
want much more help than ever was needed by Kolchak or Denikin.
42

As the Allied Powers are not prepared to give them that help, they
do not even much grudge their making peace with the Bolsheviks.
Do not their proteges strictly conform themselves, while doing
this, to the spirit and the letter of the Prinkipo proposal ?
WeU, then : but somebody must fight the Bolsheviks in the
interest of the Allies ! Of late attention is being drawn to the
militarist neighbours of Eussia : Japan and Germany. Hitherto
the intentions of both have been strongly suspected by the Allies.
But . . . " there is no virtue like necessity." If we are to believe
the latest news, America has already withdrawn her objections
to the Japanese taking care of Eastern Siberia. On the other
hand, symptoms are not lacking that traditional fear of Germany
is preparing to yield before maturer considerations in this country.
Since J. M. Keynes' " clever " book (" The Economic Conse
quences of the Peace ") the ice appears to be broken. We have
already had Mr. Garvin's comment on this very subject in the
Observer's editorials and Mr. Churchill's more responsible utterings,
reflecting Mr. Keynes' direct influence, in the Sunderland speech
already quoted. The last word has not yet been said. But the
general trend of public opinion is quite clear : Let the unavoidable
happen. What fates impose, that men must needs abide :
It boots not to resist both wind and tide.
A Eussian, I must say, is not in the least amused by the
prospects thus opened. The much apprehended Eusso-Japano-
German " aUiance " is one thing. As I have said, it is possible,
though not imminent. But a Japano-German protectorate over
Eussia is quite another thing. Under the condition of the
present weakening of the national resistance to Bolsheviks, it
really comes to this : protectorate, not alliance. Eussia is to
be treated, in the interests of both the Allies and Germany, not
as an Ally, but as a new colony. Mr. Keynes does not even take
any pains to conceal the crude form of economic subjection which
he advises should be applied to Eussia to remunerate Germany for
the loss of her other economic resources.
I see no possible means [he says] of repairmg this (the Russian) loss of
productJ-vity within any reasonable period of time, except through the agency
of German enterprise and organisation. It is impossible geographically,
and for many other reasons, for Englishmen, Frenchmen or Americans to
undertake it ; we have neither the incentive, nor the means for doing the
work on a sufficient scale. Germany, on the other hand, has the experience,
the incentive, and to a large extent the materials for furnishing the Russian
peasant -with the goods of which he has been starved for the past five years,
43

for reorganising the business of transport and coUection, and so for bringing
into the world's common stock, for the common advantage, the suppUes
from which we are now so disastrously cut off. It is in our interest to hasten
the day when German agents and organisers wiU be in a position to set in
train in every Russian -village the impulses of ordinary economic motive.
... If we do not allow Germany to exchange products with Russia and so
feed herself, she must inevitably compete -with us for the produce of the
New World. The more successful we are in snapping the economic relations
between Germany and Russia, the more we shall depress the level of our
own economic standards and increase the gravity of our o-wn domestic
problems. That there is a great deal of truth in all this, I have no inten
tion whatever of denying. My point is, however, that even
while admitting the unavoidable economic influence of Germany
on Eussia, it is in the interest of the Allies to see and to paralyse
its political results, equally dangerous to them and to Eussia.
To do this, the reconstruction of Eussian statehood and unity
is necessary. Whether or not at the stage we have now reached
this aim can stUl be pursued by the AlUes, is not for me to decide.
But unless it is done with the help of the Allies, it will be done
with the help of another international combination, because
even under the present state of things Eussia is not likely to be
kept for long in economic bondage. It is nowadays a difficult
task to accompUsh — even towards an actual colony.
I do not attempt to characterise the fourth " conceivable "
policy from two points of view, first mentioned in this leaflet :
moral and legal, the " obUgations of honour " and the continuity
of treaties. In Mr. Keynes' interpretation its only real sense
IS that of expediency. Mr. Keynes wants the AUies, at the
expense of Eussia, to make good the blunders of the VersaiUes
Treaty. But even from that point of view the fourth policy
wdl hardly attain its object. Practically it is the short-cut to
the very result which was the most to be dreaded, if the present
international combination is to be preserved. It is not the policy
of Great Britain and France.

44

Appendix.
Six Points of a Sane Policy for Eussia.
1. The recognition of the AU- Russian Govemment.
2. The admission of its representatives to tho Peace Conference.
3. MiUtary action against the Bolsheviks.
4. MiUtary power to restore order.
5. Liberal internal policy.
6. The re-estabUshment of Russian Unitj'.
The story of this document is described in the foUowing letter to my
American friend, Mr. C, at whose request it was -written.
Dear Mr. C. —
Thank you very much for having handed over, to President
Wilson my memoir sent to you at your request in February
1919. You now -wish me to prepare a new copy for you, and to
add a few remarks as to the difference between the policy towards
Eussia suggested by me and the actual policy carried out by the
AlUed Govemments in the interval between February and
October.* I am sorry to state that just the opposite was being
done to what I thought to be the sound basis of a sane policy
for Eussia. The complete failure of that wrong policy is now
being generaUy reaUsed, and if I am permitted to judge by the
utterings of the leading organs of public opinion in France and
Great Britain (I mean The Times and Le Temps), people begin
to learn better from their sad experience. It is high time to bring
in recollection my initial advices which, if timely agreed to,
might save Eussia a half-a-year of bitter sufferings and strengthen
very much her sympathy for the Allies. If at the eleventh hour
the pohcy for Eussia can still be reconsidered, I have no doubt
that the new line of action -will follow the path indicated by me
and by the large front of public opinion in Eussia which I claim
to represent.
Paul Miliukov.
11 Cabongfokd Road, N.W. 3,
October 17, 1919.
1. The recognition by the Allies ofthe one single lawful Govern
ment for all Bussia
is the first step and must be taken at once, before any effective miUtary help
can be given to Russia. This step wiU by itself enormously strengthen the
'^ The additional remarks to the original text are printed in the larger type of this letter.
45

sane elements in Russia in their struggle against the Bolsheviks. As it is
nothing but a " moral " support, the abstention from it--or even a procrastina
tion in resorting to it, will never be understood in Russia.
No alternative view is possible, as it has been just recognised by Mr. Lloyd
George in his speech m the House of Commons on February 12th.*
AU elements necessarj' for the recognition wanted are quite ready in
Russia. The two chief nuclei of a State organisation for the whole of Russia
are the Omsk Govemment of Admiral Kolchak and the Ekaterinodar Govem
ment of General DenUdn. All other Govemments faithful to the AlUes and
prepared to flght together for the reconstruction of the Russian unity, have
already submitted to the first two above-mentioned, f The practical re
construction of Russian unity must be left for the period of expansion of
Admiral Kolchak's and General Denikin's power over the remaining parts
of Russia,. As a matter of fact, all three pohcies : that of approaching
the Bolsheviks, withdrawing from Eussia and supporting the
anti-Bolsheviks, have been tried since February 1919, and not one
was carried out consistently! Mr. William BulUt's testimony
before the American Senate's Committee for Foreign Eolations on
September 12th revealed the true sense of the Prinkipo proposal
and the aim of Mr. BuUit's mission to Lenin (January and
February). Then, at the end of May, on the initiative of Japan,
the question of Kolchak's recognition was raised, but it was
reduced to the promise of " assisting Admiral Kolchak and his
associates with munitions, supplies and food, to establish them
selves as the Government of AU-Eussia," on certain conditions (May
26th). Kolchak's answer (June 5th) was declared by the Allies
(on June 12th) " to be, in the main, in accord with the proposals
they made to him and to contain satisfactory assurances " :
as a result, they declared to be " disposed to give . . . the
assistance mentioned." The assistance was given chiefly, if
not exclusively, by Great Britain, but the recognition was not
forthcoming up to the last successes of Denikin and Yudenich,
when recognition was urged by the Times and Le Temps. Mean
time, under the influence of the Labour propaganda against
intervention, Mr. Lloyd George unofficially declared to his
coUeagues at the Supreme Council that it was time to denounce
the Eussian " adventure." At the same time and under the

* Namely, (1) " There is no idea of recognising the Bolsheviks " ;
(2) It would be a " brutal policy " to " let the fire burn itself out," i.e. to withdraw any help
at all from the anti-Bolshevist side, and
iu *¦?? ??¦ ^^IX^ Geo^e denied he was " one day backing the anti-Bolshevist, the next day backuig
the Bolshevist," which Colonel Sn: Samuel Hoare said was his policy.
The only Ime of action lett^that of supportmg the anti-Bolshe-fiks— Mr. Lloyd George avowed
was that pursued by him. ^
™ X ®«?^ f ^ ?^ Don Cossack Government, tho Kuban Cossack Govemment, the Crimean Govern
ment, the Archangel Govemment, Ataman Dutov's Orenburg Cossack Government, &o.

46

game influence British troops withdrew from Archangel. A
new " North- Western " Government was founded under the
direct threat of a British general to withdraw the aid in case
of disobedience. Kolchak and the " AU-Eussian " Government
had not been previously consulted, and a promise was elicited
from the new Government to recognise the Esthonian indepen
dence, contrary to Kolchak's " assurances " of June 5th, declared
to be " satisfactory."
2. The admission of the legally nominated representatives of
Bussia to share in the work of the Peace Conference on an equal
footing with other great Allied Powers and to be a party to its
decisions. This is the next step which logically follows the flrst. The chief cause
for the disappointment of every Russian iowards the AlUes is that Russia
is not treated as an aUied, but as something very much Uke a. vanquished
country (see General Smuts' pamphlet on the League of Nations). The
Russian construction of facts was, and always remains, that Russia is an
AUy, that the Brest-Litovsk Treaty was not concluded by a legal power in
Eussia, but by usurpers. Russia's war against the Bolshe-viks was thus
considered to be a part of the general World's War, in which the Bolshe-viks
sided -with the enemy, being in a sense German agents and ha'ving served as
a German weapon in that devilish plot — or " ruse de guerre "¦ — of weakening
and dismembering Russia. The success of that German scheme and, as a
consequence, the loss-of Russia's statehood and national unity was considered
to be only provisory, pending the general struggle, to be made good after
the final victory of the common cause. Russia's case from this point of view
did not seem to differ substantiaUy from that of Belgium or Serbia, with
both of whom Russia had that feature in common : the continuity of struggle
in spite of the loss of territory. And, indeed, Bussia kept on continuously
fighting thB Bolshe-nks. She fought them not only on her outskirts, left
free from the Bolshevist invasion or reconquered from them, where more
or less numerous national (anti-Bolshe-vik and pro- AUy) armies were organised
for this purpose ; Russia also fought the Bolshe-viks in her interior, in every
comer of the Bolshevist territory, which was by far more difficult and
dangerous. The long story of the interminable uprisings going on all over
Bolshevist Russia can serve as a proof of this. Moreover, the AlUes had
already taken an active part in these internal struggles and upheavals.
They were always giving formal promises of assistance to all anti-Bolshevik
organisations which they thus encouraged to prolong and increase their
resistance. Eussian claims to be admitted as equals to the Peace Con
ference were not complied with. Momentous decisions, in which
Eussia was deeply concerned, were taken without consulting
Eiissian representatives. The presence in Paris of the Minister
of Foreign Affairs of the AU-Eussian Government was simply
47

ignored. The only man whose opinion was several times privately
asked was Mr. N. V. ChaUiOvsky, who was consulted not so much,
obviously, m his capacity as the head of the Archangel Govern
ment as in that of a SociaUst. The only time when the
Eussian Ambassador in Paris was caUed to defend Eussian views
before the Supreme CouncU was in the comparatively secondary
question of Bessarabia. Durmg the Peace celebrations the
Eussian army— whose death-roll in the World's War outnumbers
that of any other AUy— was absent, her services rendered to the
AUied cause seem to be forgotten, and her banners were miss
ing in the general display of colours. It is unnecessary to say
how much Eussian national feeling was hurt by aU these cruel
humiUations. 3. Military action against the Bolsheviks.
Whatever may be the results of partial miUtary efforts or local uprisings,
Russian political organisations have always looked forward to a decisive
military action on the part of the AlUes, in order to accelerate their final
Uberation from Russia's tyrants. They could not possibly expect this
action to start and to be successful as long as only the remotest border-
lands — such as Murmansk, Archangel or "Vladivostok — had been at their
disposal. But the hope for AUied help has very much increased smce
Germany's downfaU has permitted the AUied fleet to take the short cut to
the richest provinces of Russia, through the DardaneUes and the Black Sea.
After the Armistice they expected the AUied troops to come directly to
the South in order to replace the German garrisons, as it had been foreseen
by the very terms of the Armistice. At that time the AUies might have dona
that -without a shot. A screen between the Bolshe-vist Russia could be
formed, behind which a strong national army could have been buUt in some
three or four months, before the spring of 1919. If no help was given, the
Bolsheviks were sure to use their chance and to take possession of Southem
Russia, left -without defence. Even now (Febraary 1919), after these fore
bodings have proved correct and the Bolsheviks are hastUy spreading down
to the Black Sea, the Black Sea coast stUl remains the best starting poiat
for a mihtary operation on larger scale. It must be, of course, a combined
operation, starting from aU sides at the same moment chosen by miUtary
authorities : from Odessa, the Crimea, Krasnov's army on the Don, Denikin's
army on the Kuban, Admiral Kolchak's army in Siberia and perhaps also
from Esthonia -with the aid of the newly formed troops in the neighbourhood
of Petrograd. The Archangel detachment could also be given a subordinate
task. N.B. — ^The Allied help with men is now considered impossible, for the reason that this kind of
help must be effective, otiierwise it is useless. Mr. Lloyd George said in his speech referred to above :
" Before anything was ever done in regard to Bussia we asked our military advisers what it would
mean. ... If I give you the figures of what intervention meant, there is no sane man in Britain
who would advise us, after nearly flve years of war, to undertake that enterprise." I do not know
whether Colonel Boyle, a Oanadian and a Klondyke man, was among the " military advisers." But
I know from a personal talk with him on my way to England (December 1918) that he was pre
paring to give Mr. Lloyd George the figure of 1,000,000 men as necessary for a Russian expediUon.
This very figure has later on appeared in the letter of an " Englishman " in the New Statesman, accom
panied with the whole apparatus of argument used by Mr. Lloyd George. I think this is an obvious

overstatement. I can only confront it with the demands of another military expert. General Ballard
(the British military attache in Eumania, whom I saw and spoke to in Tassy, in November 1918).
Some three months ago he asked for ten times less for the opportune and speedy occupation of tha
TJkraine. I must add that at thai time we were confidently promised that help, consisting of some
six divisions to be directly sent from Salonica and from the Danube to Southem Russia.*
Mr. Lloyd George did not wish to send troops to Eussia because
he thought quite a milUon men and decades of years of struggle
were necessary for success. The French did send an expedition,
but they sent too few men. The sad story of their evacuation
of Sebastopol and Odessa is too fresh in everybody's memory to
expatiate on it. The less said on this subject the better. To
put it shortly, French military leaders in Southern Eussia occupied
themselves much more with internal poUtics than with strategic
considerations. They had been welcomed as Uberators and
friends. They Mt amidst feeUngs of mtense and universal dis
affection. It is only fair to say that after some delay miUtary assistance
was reaUy given to us by the British, in the shape of munitions,
and by the Americans, who provided for food. We are deeply
grateful for the assistance thus given without putting conditions
and without much interfering in our internal affairs. The success
of Denikin and of Yudenich t is due to a great extent to that help.
4. Military power to restore order.
As the work of Russia's reconstruction must necessarUy begin -with
restoring order in Russia, no intemal policy should be devised which could
weaken the military powers of both Admiral Kolchak and General Denikin.
I insist on this point because people here are, unhappUy, too much in
clined to brand every attempt to use miUtary force for restoring order in
Russia as being " counter-revolutionary." The Prinkipo proposal greatly
conduced to this confusion, by proclaiming the recognition of the Russian
revolution " without reservation " (i.e. including the Bolshe-viks ?) and by
having promised " in no way to aid or give countenance to any attempt at
a counter-revolution." The idea is exceUent, but if appUed to Russia it
may mean not giving the sane elements in Russia any support whatever.
Not only men Uke Kolchak and Denikin, but even the extreme SociaUst
groups (with the only exception of the Bolsheviks) have been classifled as
"counter-revolutionary " in Russia, -with the result that the term " counter
revolutionary " has here lost every poUtical meaning except that everybody
in Russia is against the Bolsheviks.
6. The liberal internal policy.
It goes -without saying that the restoration of order by a strong miUtary
* It was the " hauts comity " at Paris which caused delay in sending these troops at once, if
my information is correct.
t As a matter of fact, the help to Xudenich came too late, and this explains bis failure to take

49

hand in Russia does not exclude liberal policy as soon as order is restored. But
indeed it makes the first condition for such a poUoy possible. ^^
"Very often people in this country object to " intervention " in Russia on
the ground that intervention may pave the way for a reactionary Govern
ment. The contrary is the case. If " the fire is left to burn itself out," we
may be brought to face some spasmodic effort on the part of the suffering
population which may culminate in a reaction. On the contrary, timely help
may prevent the spasm of exasperation — a natural issue in a reckless civU
war. Thus the degree of UberaUsm of a future Russian Government to a
great extent depends on the way Russia is Uberated from the Bolshevik yoke.
I must again point out a mistake which regularly occurs, that of
considering Russian democracy to be just like that of the most advanced
democratic countries in the world, which, of course, it is not. The opposite
mistake would be to treat the Russian people as Indian tribes in the
state of revolt (this is the construction put by Mr. Lloyd George on the
Prinkipo proposal*). The middle course would be the best. We should
not be asked for a poUcy which might be suitable for a British minister
at normal times towards the British democracy, and we should not be
treated Uke the natives in the colonies.
There is no end to the demands made to Koltchak and Denikin
for their programmes of internal reforms. As the intentions of
these prominent leaders of Eussia's regeneration are thoroughly
pure and honest, they never refuse to give assurances, and their
declarations count by dozens. But I think it is a wrong way of
commending them to the favour of advanced democracy. First
of all, whatever they say, they are never beUeved by propagandists,
whose only aim in eliciting their declarations is to discredit them.
Secondly, they cannot bind by their promises all Eussian Govem
ments to come. Koltchak and Denikin work for restoring the
machinery of the State in Eussia. They cannot, and ought not
to control the free play of the State institutions. Last, but not
least, it is not for people, mostly ignorant of Eussian conditions,
to dictate to Eussian statesmen the Une of their future action.
It is particularly out of place when coming from partisans of strict
" non-intervention." Unfortunately, " non-intervention," in the
sense used by the extremists, is nothing but a means to intervene
on the other side. " Hands off Eussia " means, of course, " hands
off Lenin," the honorary president of the Society of this name.
Withdrawal of Allied troops, which is their most popular catch
word, means assistance to the " Soviet Eepublics." The most
dignified reply to the attempts at intervention into the intemal
afl'airs of Eussia is contained in the telegram from Koltchak to
the AUied powers on June 5, 1919.
* In his speech of Pebmary ho said : " When there is turbulence among tribes on the ITorth"
Westem frontier in India, they are summoned very often by our -Commissioners to see whether some
sort of order can be restored when you want to avoid a costly expedition."
50

6. The re- establishment of Bussian Unity.
One more point, of great importance if one wants to preserve the sympathy
of Russia, is not to oppose the reconsirvciion of the territorial unity of Eussia.
The struggle for Russian unity, one must confess, is the only feature of
Bolshevist tactics which appeals to every Russian, and which may account
for the kind of enthusiasm which is sometimes shown by the Bolshevist
"Red Army" and by their commanders. The Bolshe-viks know only too
weU — as every Russian knows it — that the territory which the " Soviet
RepubUc " now caU their o^^ti, cannot possibly thrive if it is deprived of
Russia's Southem granary, of her coal and iron mines, and that Russian
trade must perish if the Western harbours of the Baltic Sea are taken from
her. If the Ukraine is detached from Russia there -will be always a shortage
of food in Central and Northem Russia. They can never be fed only by their
own crops and they regularly import the surplus grain from the South. For
1917, e.g., the shortage of grain in Northem and Central Russia was 322
miUion pouds, while the surplus production in the South and in Siberia was
882 million pouds. At the same time Russia would lose 95 per cent, of her
sugar production, 90 per cent, of her production of coal, 66 to 76 per cent, of
her iron produce. The " dis-annexation " of the Baltic provinces would
deprive Russia of 30 to 40 per cent, of her exports — particularly of what she
was sending to France and to Belgium — and force her into dependence on
Germany. Up to now (Februarj') there was no doubt among the sane elements in
Russia that it was exclusively Germany which was responsible for Russia's
dismemberment, by artificiaUy fomenting national separatistic tendencies,
formerly weak or even non-existent, on Russia's outskirts. It would be more
than a disappointment to Russian public opinion to learn that the same -views
are shared by some of their AlUes. To be sure, progressive elements in Russia
do not at aU -wish to go back to the former state of Russia's centralisation,
and they are quite ready and -willing to give a large autonomy to different
regions of Russia. But they generaUy think that Russia's decisions to that
effect must origiaate in the wiU of the whole population of Russia, expressed
by her National Assembly.
After the first and foremost object, the overthrow of the
Bolsheviks, is attained, this point of Eussian unity is sure to
come to the front and to become the most important in the whole
programme of reconstruction. I once more emphasise that
Eussian pubUc opinion is united on this subject, and that from
the extreme right to the extreme left no Eussian would put himself
on the side of those who would wish to keep Eussia dismembered.
The popular use of the " self-determination " principle is fraught
with danger for the peace in Eastern Europe. The exchange of
telegrams between Koltchak and the " Big Five " is particularly
characteristic of the whole situation. The Supreme Council
demands that, "... 4. The independence of Finland and
Poland be recognised, and in the event of frontiers . . . not being
isettled by agreement, they will be referred to the arbitration of
the League of Nations. 5. That if a solution of the relations
51

between Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Caucasian and
Trans-Caucasian territories and Eussia is not speedily reached
by agreement, the settlement wiU be made in consultation and
co-operation of the League of Nations, and that untU such settle
ment is made the Government of Eussia agrees to recognise these
territories as autonomous, and to confirm the relations -^hich may
exist between their de facto Governments and the Alhed and
Associated Governments. .6. That the right of the Peace Con
ference to determine the future of the Eumanian part of Bessarabia
be recognised." One cannot help feeling that such demaMds
can only be addressed to a vanquished nation, not to an Ally.
Now here is Koltohak's well-balanced answer.
" Eussia cannot now, and cannot in future, ever be anything
but a democratic State, where all questions involving modification
of the territorial frontiers . . . must be ratified by a representative
body which is the natural expression of the people's sovereignty. . . .
The final solution of the question of delimiting the frontiers between
Eussia and Poland must ... be postponed till the meeting of
the Constituent Assembly. We are disposed at once to recognise,
the de facto Government of Finland, but the final solution of the
Finnish question must belong to the Constituent Assembly. We
are fully disposed at once to prepare for the solution of the questions
concerning the fate of the national groups in Esthonia, Latvia,
Lithuania and of the Caucasian and Trans-Caucasian countries,
and we have every reason to beUeve that a prompt settlement
will be made, seeing that the Government is assuring, as froni
the present time, the autonomy of the various nationalities. It
goes without saying that the limits and conditions of these autono
mous institutions will be settled separately as regards each of
the nationalities concerned, and in case difficulties should arise . . .
the Government is ready to have recourse to the collaboration
and to good offices of the League of Nations."
It does not depend on Russia whether or not these six points shall be
considered by the AlKe3, as a basis for a sound policy towards Bussia. But
if Russia is to recover and to become again strong — as she e-vidently -wUl— ,
she must be made to retain from her transient period of weakness, a recollection
of effective help brought to her by her AlUes. Thus— and thus only— the
tradition of sympathy to the AlUed countries wiU be kept on and strengthened,
and a steady foundation wiU be laid do-svn for Russia's international poUcy
to be carried in a spirit of lasting peace of right and justice, in the Societv of
Nations. -'

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