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THE CESSION OF LOOISIANA TO SPAIN.

BY
WILLIAM R. SHEPHERD.

RgFRINTED FROM POLITICAL SCIENCE OUARTERLY.
Vol; XIX., No. 3.

BOS|rbN.
PUBLISHED BY €a.NN & CO.,

THE CESSION OF LOUISIANA TO SPAIN.

BY
WILLIAM R. SHEPHERD.

REPRINTED FROM POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY,
Vol. XIX., No. 3.

BOSTON.
PUBLISHED BY GINN & CO.,
1904.

C>i^. I26cr

THE CESSION OF LOUISIANA TO SPAIN.
PRESENT appreciation of the value of the Louisiana terri
tory, and the estimate put upon it by France and Spain
while they were its actual possessors, afford one of the most re
markable contrasts in history. The willingness of Spain to ex
change the tract for a petty kingdom in northern Italy, the readi
ness of Napoleon to surrender it for a quite insignificant sum of
money, and the consternation felt in the United States itself over
the gigantic landslide from beyond the Mississippi, are too well
known to need further comment. These conditions of mind will,
at any rate, bear profitable comparison with the spirit of France in
1762 when ceding Louisiana to Spain, and with the feelings of
that country in accepting it. Save as a matter of policy,' France
displayed the utmost indifference as to the fate of its American
colony. To both powers Louisiana was not merely destitute of
intrinsic value, it entailed a positive deficit.^ Its alienation would
confer an advantage upon the donor, and entail a corresponding
loss to the recipient. Ignorance, neglect and maladministration
had brought on so much expense and vexation, that France felt
inclined to relinquish the burden, although with a show of mag
nanimity that faintly concealed her actual sense of relief, while
Spain took up the unwieldy mass with a display of gratitude that
poorly masked her own chagrin. Compared with these circum
stances, the attitude of France and Spain at the opening of the
nineteenth century would seem to betoken a real reluctance in
parting with the Louisiana territory. That of the United States
in receiving it would appear one of positive eagerness.
Various considerations had induced Spain to participate in the
' See i'nfra, p. 447, et seq.
' One of the most noted of recent Spanish historians has ventured the surprising
statement that "the exploitation of the gold mines along the Mississippi brought
quite a number of colonists to Louisiana." Danvila, Historia del Reinado de
Carlos III, t. iv, p. 74. Had such mines really existed, the history of the Spaniard
in America affords some reason to believe that alacrity, and not reluctance, would
have marked the attitude of Spain in reference to accepting Louisiana from France.
439

440 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [Vol. XIX.
war that deprived her of Florida and gave her Louisiana. With
growing uneasiness the court of Madrid had watched the dimin
ution of the French power in the North American continent. It
feared that when once the colonial balance of France and England
had been destroyed, the Spanish American dominions would be
come the object of English ambition and enterprise. In this
opinion Spain was encouraged by the conduct of England her
self. The British had adhered tenaciously to their settlements
in Honduras, and had carried on a profitable contraband trade
with the Spanish colonies elsewhere. A sense of community,
also, in the affairs of the two great representatives of the Bourbon
dynasty exercised considerable influence on Charles III. The
misfortunes of his royal "brother and cousin," Louis XV, and
the skill with which the latter and his ministers utilized them in
appealing to the sentiment of dynastic affection, weaned the
Spanish king from the prudent attitude of neutrality which he
had observed during the earlier years of the war. A futile effort
to mediate on behalf of France was followed by the formation of
the third Family Compact, August 15, 1761.'
Whatever might have been the spirit of this agreement, it was
not specifically an alliance against Great Britain. That was not
concluded until February 4, 1762,^ about a month after Great
Britain, aware of the eventual purpose of the new combination
of the Bourbon courts, itself had declared war on Spain. In as
sociating himself with Louis XV on this occasion, Charles III
simply became the "cat's-paw" member of the Bourbon alliance,
precisely as the French monarch had been enacting that r6le in
his connection with Austria. Sentimental sympathy, for his
Bourbon kinsman, and the fear of British colonial designs blinded
Charles III to the actual plight of France, and to the great strength,
almost undiminished, of the English adversary. Fatuously he
assumed the task of fighting for a cause ahready lost; the act
brought in its train naught but defeat and humiliation.^
' Cantillo, Tratados, convenios y declaraciones de paz y de comercio, p. 468, et seq
" Convencion particular de alianza, ofensiva y defensiva entre las coronas de
Espafia y Francia contra la Gran Bretana." Ibid., p. 482 et seq.
^ In view of the utter overthrow of the French colonial dominion which had
been attained by the time tbe Family Compact was signed, the language of that

No. 3.] THE CESSION OF LOUISIANA TO SPAIN. 441
No sooner had Spain embarked In the war than she assumed
an active share in the negotiations, already pending, for peace.
The only section of the preliminary articles under consideration
in July, 1762, which concemed Spain, was that relating to the
proposed boundary of Canada on the south and west. By the
sixth article as then constituted, France had agreed to cede to
Great Britain the left bank of the Mississippi as far as the river
Iberville and Lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain, thus making
the Mississippi the boundary between Canada and Louisiana.'
Forthwith the Marquis of Grimaldi, the Spanish ambassador, pro
tested to the Duke of Cholseul against this virtual cession of a
part of Louisiana ^ under the guise of merely fixing the boundary
line of Canada.' Such a procedure, he argued, would give the
English an easy outlet to the Gulf of Mexico. So abhorrent was
the idea to the Spanish mind that he even expressed a doubt
whether his royal master would ever conclude peace, should the
meaning of the article be so construed. He thus Intimated that

staid document in reference to compensation for gains and losses seems almost
jocose. It says: "Their Catholic and Christian Majesties have agreed that, when
the question of peace shall have arisen at the close of the war which they may have
carried on in common, the advantages gained by one of the two powers shall com
pensate for the losses the other may have sustained." Ihid., p. 471, art. xviii.
Nor does the humorous aspect disappear in the wording of the actual treaty of
alliance between Charles and Louis, wherein it is stated that "from the day of the
date of this convention the losses and gains shall be common." Ibid., p. 483, art.
iii. The issue of the war certainly enabled Spain to fulfill her treaty obligations,
for she shared the losses and — in the minus degree — the gains! Cantillo very
properly remarks that for considerations of "mere family affection the blood and
interests of an entire people [i.e. the Spanish] were compromised in the blunders
and caprices of a foreign monarch." Ibid., p. 474.
' "La France accorde que la fleuve de Mississippi serve aux deux nations de
limites entre la Louisiane et le Canada, de manifere que la rive gauche de ce fleuve
appartienne ^ la Grande Bretagne jusqu' ^ la riviere Iberville et les lacs Maure
pas et Pontchartrain." Projet d'articles pr^liminaires arrettds (sic) entre la
France et I'Angleterre, Art. vi. Archivo General de Simancas. Estado, Legajo,
4SSI- ' Elsewhere in the preliminary articles the river and part of Mobile were in
cluded in the French cession to Great Britain.
' It must be remembered of course, that during the French occupation no defi
nite line of territorial division between Canada and Louisiana as provinces had
ever been established. Nor did the maps of the period render the task of the dip
lomats any easier.

442 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [Vol. XIX.
France was not at liberty to dispose of Louisiana without the
consent of Spain. The suggestion provoked from the Count of
Cholseul, the duke's younger brother, who was present at the
conference, the sharp rejoinder that It seemed rather odd for Spain
to lay down the law to France regarding the latter's own property,
especially since under the circumstances the English might de-
cluie altogether to entertain the proposition.' Cholseul hastened
to rebuke this youthful outburst, and answering Grimaldl's objec
tion, said that the sense In which the article was couched ought to
be clear enough to relieve the Spaniards of any such apprehension.
If that were Insufficient, the map that was to accompany the de
finitive treaty would Indicate precisely the extent of the proposed
cession. He declared that, since the river Iberville and the two
lakes were to remain in the possession of France, the further
navigation of the Mississippi by the English toward the Gulf of
Mexico would be barred at that point. At least such was the
present attitude of France on the subject. In the event of Great
Britain's being dissatisfied with the arrangement, certainly nothing
would be done, asserted Cholseul, In reference to ascertaining the
boundary between Canada and Louisiana, without a previous
agreement between the two Bourbon monarchs.^
Up to August, 1762, Grimaldi had received no precise Instruc
tions to govern his conduct in the negotiations, but his doubt in
reference to the boundary of Canada was well substantiated in
the orders that then came from Ricardo Wall, the Spanish chief
minister of state. The instructions pointed out how utterly op
posed the king of Spain was to any cession whereby the English
might get a foothold on the Gulf of Mexico, or even hope to be
able to reach that body of water. That Canada ever extended so
far to the south as the French had maintained was preposterous.
"The English on their part ought not to claim any port of Lou
isiana Itself as a boundary between that province and Canada,"
wrote Wall, "for to do this one would have to stretch Canada
southward to a point It never attained. Nor are the French free
' Simancas, Estado, Legajo, 4551. Grimaldi to Cholseul, July 20, 1762, and
to Wall, July 22 and August 19, 1762.
' Ibid. Cholseul to Grimaldi, July 21, 1762; Grimaldi to Wall, August 20,
1762.

No. 3.] THE CESSION OF LOUISIANA TO SPAIN. 443
to dispose of possessions the right to which Spain, as the legiti
mate owner, has never conceded." However, since his Majesty
had resolved to
cooperate in every way so as to secure a lasting peace, it would be
better to fix boundaries between the several possessions as they actu
ally exist, although up to the present time some of them may not have
been recognized by Spain as unquestionably parts of the royal domin
ions, Louisiana and Georgia, in particular, belonging to this class.
So far as Canada was concerned, he thought that the latitude of
the Carollnas might well serve as an approximate line of demarca
tion between the French and Spanish territories.*
Armed with these Instructions, Grimaldi notified Cholseul that
he was ready to produce legal and historical proofs whenever It
might be needful to substantiate the Spanish claim to Louisiana,^
at least so far as determining the extent to wliich the province
might be alienated to a third power. The matter of capital
importance to Spain at the existing stage of the negotiation, he

' Ibid. Wall to Grimaldi, August 2, 1762.
' "I do not believe it necessary to prove the king's right to Louisiana, but in
order that one may provide for all possible contingencies, it might be well to have
ready and at hand a memorial with the proofs of that right, such as are indicated
in the enclosed sheet — those of which all the European powers have availed them
selves to establish the legitimacy of their conquests and possessions in America.
" Memorial which proves :
" I. That the Spaniards discovered and explored all the region or coasts that
surround the Gulf of Mexico.
"2. That they have taken possession of the same, and have performed those
acts of jurisdiction and dominion whereby the European powers attest their right
to the countries of America.
" 3, That by reason of the enormous extension, Spain has not populated all
the region, in which time [sic] the French made their way to the River Mississippi
and to Louisiana.
" 4. That their settlement is not legitimate nor recognized by Spain, in proof of
which during the reigns of Philip V in Spain and of Louis XIV in France, the
French were ejected from it by armed force.
" 5. That the previous toleration by Spain neither lessens her own right, nor
gives weight to the claims of France, etc." Ibid. Grimaldi to Wall, August 20,
1762. In his fourth "proof" Grimaldi, it would seem, refers to Juchereau de
Saint Denys' exploring trip to the southwest of Louisiana in 1716. See Garri
son, Texas (American Commonwealths Series), ch. v, and Winsor, The Mississippi
Basin, 90-98, and the authorities therein cited.

444 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [Vol. XIX.
urged, was not only that the English possessions on the continent
of North America should be kept at a remote distance from the
shores of the Gulf of Mexico, but also that both banks of the Mis
sissippi for a like distance should continue to belong to France.
In the opinion of the Spanish ambassador, this would be the best
means of preventing English vessels from entering the river from
the guK itself. "So essential is this point regarded in Spain,"
concluded Grimaldi, "that until his uneasiness vanishes and his
mind is made tranquil, the king cannot lend himself to peace
according to the measure of his desires.'" In reply to this repe
tition of an earlier threat, Cholseul explained that England had
abeady declined to accept any such adjustment of the matter at
issue. Thereupon Grimaldi suggested that a neutral and desert
zone be erected between the southern boundary of Canada even
as far south as the latitude of lower Georgia on the one side, and
the remainder of Louisiana and the Spanish territories on the
other.* Such was the state of affairs on September 17, when
the Duke of Bedford, the British commissioner, became one of the
participants in the discussion.
Informed of the approaching arrival of Bedford, WaU now sent
Grimaldi a new set of Instructions. Their main purpose was to
gain, if possible, some real advantage, territorial or commercial,
which would serve either as a reimbursement for the expense of
the aid afforded to France, or as an offset to the losses Spain
might have to undergo from British conquests." Rumors of dis
aster at Havana gave a tinge of foreboding and precaution, fur-
1 Simancas, Estado, Legajo, 4531. Grimaldi to Cholseul, August 13, 1762.
' Ibid. Wall to Grimaldi, September 5, 1762, and Grimaldi to Cholseul, Sep
tember 15, 1762. "Moyens de r^gler les articles de I'Espagne avec I'Angleterre."
' "Considering that the king has performed the service of relieving the king,
his cousin, from an oppressive war, if he can obtain some compensation for the
injuries he has sustained . . . how can one believe that he would decline it?'
Ibid. WaU to Grimaldi, September 16, 1762. "Although his Majesty has not
proposed any advantages for himself, should England offer any ... it would be
foolish not to accept them, and not be the gainer by the proposals of our enemies,
securing some just indemnity for the expense and losses. To this end you have
ordered me to treat of these compensations in exchange for the restitutions that
we shall have to make." Ibid., Grimaldi to Wall, September 13, 1762. The
"restitutions" refer to the territory captured from Portugal in the region of the
Rio de la Plata.

No. 3.] THE CESSION OF LOUISIANA TO SPAIN. 445
thermore, to the Instructions. Grimaldi was bidden not to Insist
upon the Spanish claims so far as to break off the negotiations,'
and he must yield all if Havana should have fallen."
In his dealings with Cholseul and Bedford, obedient to the In
structions, Grimaldi laid all the stress possible on the benevolent
and disinterested motives of his royal master.' He asserted that
on the point of requiring Indemnification for any restitutions that
Spain might be obliged to make, his orders were absolute. At
the same time the Spanish ambassador deftly Insinuated that the
willingness of his Catholic Majesty to hasten the approach of
peace would always exercise a modifying force — "an expression
of which I availed myself," he wrote to Wall, "as an excuse In
case I were compelled to relinquish all as a prevention of rupture
in the negotiations." * Apparently the only thing that made this
threadbare diplomatic trick so successful as to disquiet even Chol
seul, was the rather unusual circumstance that the Marquis
d'Ossun, the French ambassador at Madrid, had not been able to
elicit an Inkling of Grimaldl's orders.'
At the opening conference of the commissioners of the three
powers, much to Grimaldl's consternation, th.e Duke of Bedford
submitted a new version of the sixth article of the preliminaries,
and with the character of a si-ne qua non. This provided that the
line of demarcation between Canada and Louisiana should be
traced along the Mississippi and the river IbervIUe, straight through
Lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain to the GuM of Mexico. The
navigation of the Mississippi, furthermore, from its source to its
* "Perhaps if the Duke of Bedford could be persuaded to believe that he might
be allowed to retum to London with the discomfiture of not having accomplished
anything, he might agree to yield in some respect . . . but if with all this the
outcome shoiild be naught, then bow the head and sign." Ibid., Wall to Grimaldi,
September 29, 1762.
' The possession of the stronghold of Havana, as the key to the Gulf of Mexico,
and to her colonial dominions near and around that body of water was of course
indispensable to Spain.
' Simancas, Estado, Legajo, 4551, Grimaldi to Wall, September 24, 1762.
* Ibid., September 19, 1762.
^ "Since the character of the French nation is so light and hasty, if they were
to know the actual degree to which the condescension of his Majesty extends, even
were their intentions toward us the best in the world, they wo\ild give up every
thing in one moment or another." Ibid.

446 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [Vol. XIX.
mouth was to be common to the vessels of both Great Britain
and France. When Grimaldi endeavored to give force to the
claim of Spain to Louisiana, as thereby entitling her to a voice In
the disposition of that province, Bedford remarked, rather tartly,
that although Spain did seem to claim all of America, there were
other nations In the world ownuig considerable parts of the west-
em continents, and they had strength enough as well to make
their possession valid. Louisiana, he continued excitedly, was
now held by the French; if It belonged to Spain the Intruders
should have been expelled long before. Moreover, he professed
to be astonished not so much that Spain should try to hinder
France from disposing of her own property as she saw fit, but
that the forbearance of Louis XV had lasted so long. To this
exhibition of bluster, Grimaldi replied quietly, that Spain merely
desired to 5x reasonable boundaries among the colonial posses
sions of the three powers concemed. Spain, therefore, was will
ing to relinquish her claim to Georgia, and to accept any fair
adjustment of the Florida divisional line. At this juncture Chol
seul observed that without the consent of Spain, France would
not conclude peace. "So much the worse for you," retorted
Bedford savagely, and the conference came to an abrupt close.
Later Cholseul warned Grimaldi that Spain was not in a position
to withstand the British demands, and that peace must be pro
cured at almost any cost.' Of these circumstances the Spanish
envoy was perfectly aware, and as already noted,^ his instructions
had been such as to make Cholseul's chiding advice quite super
fluous. Perceiving that Bedford was absolutely Inflexible' in his de
mands regarding the navigation of the Mississippi, Cholseul felt
obliged to contrive some means of satlsfyuig Grimaldi without
modifying the British ultimatum in any essential degree. He
confessed to Ossun that he was puzzled to know why Spain would
not accept the preliminary article as Bedford had offered It. He
' Simancas, Legajo, 4551, Grimaldi to Wall, September 19, 1762.
^ Supra, p. 445, note 1.
' "I doubt whether the universe could succeed in making him change a word;
why, I have not been able to induce him even to convert the articles he has_pro-
posed into better French!" Ibid., Cholseul to Ossun, September 20, 1762.

No. 3.] THE CESSION OF LOUISIANA TO SPAIN. 447
found nothing In It to Injure the interests or pretensions of Spain.
Unable to divine the motives of the Spanish opposition, he haz
arded the assumption that Spain objected to the danger of contra
band trade In case English vessels were allowed to enter the Mis
sissippi from the Gulf of Mexico. But according to the literal
wording of Bedford's demand, only the navigation down the river
was in question. And if It were the fear of an attack on Florida
that actuated the Spaniards, It certainly appeared easier to assail
that colony from the direction of Georgia than from that of the
Mississippi region. Impelled at length by what he believed to be
a necessity, he submitted to Bedford a new article composed in
the following form:
France consents to extend the boundaries of Canada as far as the river
Mississippi, which is to serve as a barrier and [the navigation of which]
will be common to both crowns; but it is agreed that the possession of
New Orleans shall remain with France.'
"In any case," he wrote to Ossun,
whether it be this our latest form of the article, or that of England which
is to be accepted by the two parties, the king has decided in his council
that he would order the French to evacuate the whole of Louisiana,
rather than to miss the opportunity for peace on account of the dis
cussion about a colony with which we are unable to communicate
except by sea ; which has not, and cannot have, either a port or a road
stead into which a xebec of twelve guns could enter, and which costs
France eight hundred thousand Uvres a year, without yielding a sou in
return.^
At the same time he directed Ossun to emphasize to Charles III
the Immense risk of renewing the war In case the objections of
Spain were not withdrawn. In particular, also, he must show
how willing France was to give up Louisiana altogether, and even
to cause the departure of the French colonists themselves."
' Ibid. "Art. vi; tel qu'il est propose par la France pour moyen de concili
ation." ' Ibid., September 20, 1762.
' "Repr&entez, Monsieur, la liberty oil est le Roy de ceder et mime de faire
evacuer ces possessions." Ibid., Cholseul to Ossun, September 20, 1762; Ossun
to Wall, September 27, 1762.

448 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [Vol. XIX.
Confirmation of the rumors that Havana had surrendered to
the English, together with the exhortations of Ossun, caused Wall
to notify Grimaldi that the final decision of the matters in contro
versy was to be left to France. "His Majesty has resolved to
act generously," wrote Wall, "play the part of the good thief,
and confide the final determination to the French, placing him
self thus In their hands so as to come out as well as possible, or
let theirs be the fault." '
The capitulation of Havana of course enabled Great Britain to
render the preliminary articles of peace more severe, and as Gri
maldi remarked, to "affect an Imperative tone" In most of them."
Not only was the clause In the sixth article about the navigation
of the Mississippi freed from the ambiguity in regard to the as
cent, as well as the descent, of the river," but a series of five stip
ulations was imposed, on compliance with which Havana would
be restored to Spain. One of them called for the cession to Eng
land of Porto Rico, or of all the Florida region. France was well
aware that Spain would choose the latter alternative, and sud
denly decided to relieve her ally of the necessity of surrendering
the colony in question. She had already agreed to cede to Great
Britain all of Louisiana east of the Mississippi. Now she offered
to that power the remainder of the province west of the river,
Including New Orleans and the Island on which the town was
situated — In other words, the territory comprised within the
limits of the subsequent Louisiana Purchase. The spontaneous
offer suited neither England nor Spain. The former rejected it
as an Inadequate substitute for Florida,* while the latter evinced
no sentiment of appreciation beyond the mere empty phrases of
diplomatic compliment. The Spaniards knew well enough how
slight was the importance that the French attached to Louisiana,
and hence placed a like estimate upon the sincerity of the trans-
' Simancas, Legajo, 4531, Wall to Grimaldi, September 29, 1762.
' Simancas, Estado, Legajo, 4552. Grimaldi to Wall, October 29, 1762.
' "It being understood that the navigation of the Mississippi River is to be
equally free to the subjects of Great Britain and of France in its whole breadth
and extent, from its source to the sea ... as weU as the entrance and departure
by its mouth." Cantillo, Tratados de paz, etc., p. 489. Also translated in French,
Historical Collections of Louisiana, v, p. 240. Cf. supra, pp. 446, 447.
* Cf. infra, p. 453 et seq.

No. 3.] THE CESSION OF LOUISIANA TO SPAIN. 449
action.^ Grimaldi, In fact, received orders merely to listen to
whatever might be said on the subject, but to take no further
Interest In it." On the whole, Spain felt that the greater prox
imity of Louisiana to Mexico warranted rather the sacrifice of
Florida and the retention of Louisiana In French hands."
The offer of Louisiana to England, however, proved to be the
prelude to its cession to Spain. Acting under the advice of Chol
seul * and without any diplomatic overtures whatever,' Louis XV
resolved to turn over his worthless colony, as politely as possible,
to his Spanish "brother and cousin," and his Bourbon kinsman
received It as gracefully as his conflicting emotions permitted.'
Accordingly, on November 3, 1762, the very day that the prelim
inary articles of peace were signed on behaff of the powers con
cemed, the French monarch wrote a personal letter to Charles
III, in which he announced his offer of Louisiana.' He then
bade Cholseul prepare a secret act of cession for Grimaldi to sign.
The formal proceedings of the two diplomats were simple enough.
On the same morning, before the preliminary articles had been

' "The French declare that in view of what Spain has done they will them
selves assume the indemnity that the enemy asks, but we shall do a very good
penance just the same for the ravages already suffered. I know that his Most
Christian Majesty has offered Louisiana [to Great Britain], but I am afraid that
it will not suffice. . . . We are aware that the French ministers think little of it.''
Simancas, Estado, Legajo, 4551. Wall to Grimaldi, October 23, 1762.
=> Ibid.
' Archivo Historico-Nacional, Madrid. Estado, Legajo, 3889 A. Wall to
Grimaldi, November 13, 1762.
* Cf. Gayarr^, History of Louisiana, 3d ed. ii, 129.
' Archivo Historico-Nacional, Madrid. Estado, Legajo, 3889 A. Wall to Gri
maldi, November 13, 1762.
° Cf. infra, p. 451 et seq.
^ The portion of it that relates to Louisiana is as follows: "j'ay oblige sous le
bon plaisir de V. M'^ le M'^ de Grimaldi de signer en faveur de I'Espagne la ces
sion de la Nouvelle Orleans et de la Louisianne, je I'avois offert aux Anglois ^ la
place de la floride; iis m'ont refus^, je leur aurois cdde d'autres possessions pour
eviter k I'Espagne la cession de cette colonie, mais j'ay craint que une cession dans
le golphe ne tirat trop h. consequence, je sens que la Louisianne ne dedomage que
foiblement V. M*° des pertes qu'elle a faite dans une guerre aussy courte, entre-
prise pour la France; mais en lui cedant cette colonie j'en considere moins la
valeur que le bien qu'elle pent faire k I'union de la Nation Espagnole avec la Fran-
joise; union qu'il est si necessaire d'etabUr solidement pour I'interfit de nos sujets
ainsy que de notre maison." Simancas, Estado, Legajo, 4SS2.

450 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [Vol. XIX.
signed, Cholseul called Grimaldi to his apartments and Informed
him privately that the French monarch was extremely anxious to
Indemnify his Catholic cousui of Spain for the sacrifice of Florida.
To this end, declared Cholseul, enthusiastically, his royal master
was ready to give up any part of his dominions. As a proof of
this willingness Louis XV had determined to cede Louisiana to
Spain. He had not made the offer of that province to England
more tempting by the Inclusion of St. Lucia, asserted Cholseul,
because he feared the possible consequences to both the French
and Spanish colonies of any Increase of English power In the
neighborhood of the Antilles.' But should his Bourbon relative
deem Louisiana insufficient to atone for the loss of Florida, the
French monarch would evince his gratitude and good will by the
addition of St. Lucia as well." Cholseul thereupon handed Gri
maldi the royal letter and the act of cession of Louisiana. The
Spanish ambassador signed the act tentatively, awaiting the pleas
ure of his royal master." In this letter of transmission to WaU,
however, he intimated his suspicion as to the real nature of Chol
seul's enthusiasm over the prospect of relinquishing Louisiana to
Spain, and declared that under the circumstances he thought
that the province had better stay In French hands.* The pre
liminaries of the cession to Spain having thus been concluded,
nothing further about them is mentioned in the diplomatic corre
spondence of the time.° Only the royal signatures, the one of
ratification, the other of confirmation, were formally lacking to
make the transaction complete.
' Cf. the letter of Louis XV, p. 449, note 7.
^ Archivo Historico-Nacional, Madrid. Estado, Legajo, 3889 A. Wall to Gri
maldi, November 13, 1762, citing Grimaldl's letter to him of November 3.
^ The text of the act is given in French, Historical Collections of Louisiana,
"t 235-36. It is practically a repetition of what is contained in the letter of Louis
XV, p. 449, note 7.
* Archivo Hist<5rico-Nacional, Madrid. Estado, Legajo, 3889 A. Wall to
Grimaldi, November 13, 1782, citing the latter's letter to him of November 3.
" Writing to Ossun, November 3, 1762, all that Cholseul has to say about the
cession is the following; "La lettre du Roy k sa Majesty Catholique et I'acte que
je veux de signer avec M. de Grimaldi par rapport ^ la Louisiane rempliront tout
ce que j'aurois ^ vous dire sur la matiere int&&ante, dont il s'agit. Les lumiferes
superieures et le coeur du roy d'Espagne suplieront k tout le reste." Simancas,
Estado, Legajo, 4552.

No. 3.] THE CESSION OF LOUISIANA TO SPAIN. 451
On November 10 the French ambassador at Madrid informed
Charles III of the proposed gift of Louisiana, and handed him
the letter of his Bourbon kinsman. "The reply of his Majesty, in
his first Impulse," wrote Wall to Grimaldi,
I assure you was worth any province whatever: "I say, no, no, my
cousin is losing altogether too much; I do not want him to lose anything
in addition for my sake, and would to Heaven I could do yet more for
him." '
The sentimentality was quite characteristic of Charles III at this
time, and WaU had some difficulty In persuading him to accept
the offer." On November 13, however, the Spanish kuig affixed
his signature to the act of cession, and ten days later Louis XV
confirmed the deed of gift." Not until December 2 did Charles
III send a personal acknowledgment of the favor.*
The act of France, fiirst In offering Louisiana, almost the last
vestige of her colonial dominions, to England, as a means of sav
ing Florida for Spain, and then of ceding It outright to her ally
as a partial recompense for what Spain had lost in the common
struggle, was a singular mixture of Gallic impulsiveness with
GalUc poUcy. The apparent generosity of the deed Is almost
pathetic. It would be so In fact had France really valued Lou-
' Ibid. Wall to Grimaldi, November 13, 1762.
' "This stroke of generosity is one of great policy, and we have had some trouble
to make the king accept it, and let himself be persuaded for the same political
reason that actuated its offer.'' Wall to Roda, November 16, 1762, quoted in
Danvila, Historia del Reinado de Carlos III, t. ii, p. 80. "When once the king
had overcome his first generous repugnance that his cousin should lose even a
hand's breadth of land, he at length acquiesced and ratified the cession.'' Archivo
Historico-Nacional, Madrid. Estado, Legajo, 3889 A. Wall to Grimaldi, No
vember 13, 1762.
' Text in French, Historical Collections of Louisiana, v, p. 239.
* Following is the portion that concerns Louisiana: "j'ay 6t6 charm^ que V.
M. ait saisie le moment de faire la paix, et je ne me souviendrai des pertes que par
le regret que j'auray tou jours, quelles n'ont pas 6t6 aussi utiles k la f ranee et k la
gloire de V. M., que je me I'ftois propose, en partageant ses dangers et d'avoir 6I6
oblige de c^der aux pressants instances de V. M. dans I'acceptation de la Lou
isiane! le M' D'ossun, son ambassadeur, sjait combien mon Coeur a combatu
contre la sagesse des vues politiques qui ont engage V. M. k m'en faire la cession, et
cependant sans I'espoir que j'ay de pouvoir un jour Marquer a la France les memes
sentimens je m'y serois constament refuse." Simancas, Estado, Legajo, 4552.

452 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [Vol. XIX.
isiana,' and were one able to prove the sincerity and disinterested
ness of the motives that called It forth. Rather than pathetic,
the performance was almost ludicrous in Its precipitation of what
must have been a foregone conclusion ever since the offer to Eng
land was made. Even prior to this last event France had averred
her willingness to part with Louisiana." After the English had
rejected the province, to tender it to Spain was assuredly a most
natural and logical proceeding. The precipitation, furthermore,
lay not merely in shifting the cession from one country to another,
but rather In the actual eagerness with which the French shuffled
off their ancient possession. Indeed they were actuaUy afraid
that Spain might not take Louisiana, or that Charles III might
revoke his acceptance of It." The ludicrous character of the
French share in the cession also appears in the absolute trans
parency of the economic and political motives Involved. Men of
less diplomatic discernment than those old masters of statecraft,
Wall and Grimaldi, could have fathomed them without great
effort. In view of the facts and deductions already considered, there
fore, the actual cession of Louisiana to Spain ought to occasion
jio more surprise now than It entailed diplomatic negotiation in
1762. To begin with, the French experiment at colonization In
Louisiana had been a flat failure. The province was a useless
and costly burden.* If France could only shift It from her own
' "Une colonie franjaise pleine d'avenir, vierge du fer ennemi, dernier reste
de notre empire continental d'Amerique etait c6d6e comme un troupeau." Mar
tin, Histoire de France, t. xv, p. 595.
* Cf. supra, p. 447 and note 3.
' Gayarre describes the precautions taken by the French government to ward
off this distressing possibility. He says: "When Kerlerec, the fonner governor,
sent to the French government from the Bastile a memorial showing the utility
for France to convert Louisiana in concert with Spain into a commercial depot,
in order to render the colony profitable, the minister to whom the memorial was
referred endorsed it: ' considering that there are in this memorial some details which
might point out to the Court of Madrid proximate causes of conflict with the Eng
Ush, and therefore render the cession of Louisiana less acceptable to Spain, it
seems proper that this memorial be recast so as to produce a favorable impression
upon that government.' " History of Louisiana, 3d ed., ii, p. 107.
* At the very time of the cession, d'Abbadie, the governor of Louisiana, had
notified the French government on repeated occasions that the colony was in a
"state of complete destitution,'' a veritable "chaos of iniquities," and that to re-

No. 3.] THE CESSION OF LOUISIANA TO SPAIN. 453
shoulders to those of Spain, It would be a wise stroke of economy.
Gould that be done under the guise of a magnanimous apprecia
tion of services performed, it would be still wiser as a political
move. But if the donation of Louisiana would tend to quiet the
querulous grumblings of Spain about contraband trade In the
Gulf of Mexico, and to keep that colonial beldame faithful to the
Family Compact, in case of a renewal of the contest with England
^and all of it In exchange for practically less than nothing —
that would be a masterly stroke of statesmanship Indeed.
Considered from the political standpoint, the purpose of France
in ceding Louisiana to Spain was not, as has been commonly sup
posed, to grant Spain a compensation for the loss of Florida.'
That was merely the ostensible object of the cession. Intrinsi
cally, to both France and Spain, Florida was worth nothing. As
a bar to the entrance of contraband trade into the Gulf of Mexico>
and as a station for guardacostas the port of Pensacola had been'
useful enough. But when the French had ceded to England the
river and port of Mobile, the value of Pensacola became sensibly
diminished, for the act brought with it precisely what the Span
iards desired most to avoid — the assignment to the English of a
foothold upon the Guff." Even with the retention of Pensacola
Spain could no longer maintain her jealous policy of hermetically
sealing the Guff of Mexico against the commerce of other nations,
if indeed, she ever had succeeded in enforcing It absolutely." A
more cogent reason than the bestowment of an Indemnity for the
loss of Pensacola was that of suppressing the French contraband
trade, both overland and maritime, with the Spanish colonies
aroimd the Guff, which had had New Orleans as Its centre. In
store a proper degree of order it would be necessary to employ "measures of an
extreme character." Cf. Gayarre, History of Louisiana, 3d ed., ii, 108.
' The prevalent opinion is stated for example by Martin as follows: "Par une
convention secr&te signee le mfime jour que les preUminaires le roi de France
promettait la Louisiane au roi d'Espagne pour le dedommager de la perte de la
Floride, et de I'impossibilite oii Ton etait de rendre Minorque k I'Espagne."
Histoire de France, t. xv, p. 594. The last statement is wholly a conjecture, with
out documentary foundation. Like most of his Spanish confreres, the French
wrtter interprets the cession very superficially. Cf. however the somewhat vague
opinion of Danvila, infra, p. 454, note 3. Cf. also p. 456.
' Cf. supra, p. 441 ct seq.
' Cf. the statement of Ferrer del Rio, infra, p. 454, note 3.

454 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [Vol. XIX.
this way France would dry up a source of chronic dispute with
Spain.' But the dominant purpose of France, after aU, It would
seem was to assuage the wounds and sorrows of war, and to assure
the continued subservience of her whilom ally to the French
dynastic policy."
On the part of the Spaniards the cession of Louisiana awak
ened neither surprise nor enthusiasm nor gratitude." Personal
modesty and a sense of compassion for a kinsman in distress
were commingled In the sentimental utterances of Charles III
which apparently betokened a disinclination to accept the prov
ince. It Is quite probable, however, that the king's Spanish pride
recoiled from the tacit enactment of the r61e of a suppUant to
French bounty, making him slow to accept the positive advan
tages, if any, the newly acquired American wilderness might
bring. Through an analysis of this calculation of the Spanish
monarch and his ministers one may arrive at the motives that
caused the acceptance of the cession.*
' Cf. infra, p. 156, note 4.
' A careful interpretation of the circumstances of the cession, and intensive
reading of the letter of Louis XV, are quite sufficient to establish the truth of this
assertion. For additional evidence of a documentary character, see infra, p. 456,
note 4. Danvila, it will be observed, states this view of the cession negatively
by showing what Spain should have avoided. Cf. infra, note 13.
' At this point it might be well to give the opim'ons of several of the more promi
nent Spanish historians, relative to the significance of the cession of Louisiana.
"As a compensation for the loss of Florida," remarks Lafuente, " Spain obtained
. . . what was left of Louisiana, which in fact was for Charles III a burden and a
care rather than an indemnity or a recompense." Historia de Espafia, ed. 1862,
t. X, p. 324. "The fact that Louis XV by a bit of crafty deceit forced the acqui
sition of Louisiana upon Charles III," declares Ferrer del Rio, "was far from
affording any compensation for such a loss [i.e. of Florida]. That new state not
only troubled the king with the disagreeable task of governing subjects ill-disposed
to his service, but threatened him also with the dangerous contingency of a war
with Great Britain." Historia del Reinado de Carlos III, ed. 1856, t. i, p. 377.
Danvila is the most recent and best informed of the historians who have dealt
especially with the reign of Charles III. He says: "The cession of Louisiana on
the part of France as a means of rendering our misfortunes less acute remedied
the situation and consequences of the past war in no respect. It served merely
to demonstrate . . . the necessity of modifying the course of policy, and for the
future of relying wholly upon one's own resources when about to undertake those
enterprises which every self-respecting nation is obliged to inaugurate when the
question arises of defending the integrity of one's country." Historia del Rei
nado de Carlos III, t. ii, p. 84.
* See infra, p. 456, note 4.

No. 3.] THE CESSION OF LOUISIANA TO SPAIN. 455
The disadvantages involved in the acquisition of Louisiana
were obvious enough. Neglect and misgovemment by France had
brought the province into a deplorable condition. The lack also
of any adequate system of taxation for the support of government
and the maintenance of the church made Louisiana, in the eyes
of Spain, a pauper colony, a sort of public charge that probably
could not take care of itseff financially or otherwise. It was the
first colony Spain had ever held that had not been settled origi
nally by Spaniards. A new system of colonial administration
and different social institutions would have to be superimposed
upon the French inhabitants, who probably would be disaffected
and hard to govern. Its proximity to the English colonial do
minion on the other side of the Mississippi, moreover, might en
gender friction and perhaps bring on war with Great Britain.
Nor was anything known about the nature or value of Louisiana
itseff, beyond the sparse settlements along the Mississippi; and
these were quite Insignificant. As a substitute for Florida, finally,
the odds of Intrinsic value appeared about equal.
But these drawbacks lost their Importance before the arguments
in favor of accepting and retaining Louisiana. To begin with,
the great benefits to be derived from an adherence to the Family
Compact were not perhaps quite so patent to the Spaniards as to
the French, but at all events It was not the part of wisdom to
aUenate France by a rejection of her gift.' Besides, the posses
sion of Louisiana was useful, if for no other reason than that the
Mississippi furnished an admirable line of demarcation for the
Spanish dominions In North America. Apart from this consid
eration, however, If Spain did not take the province it might fall
eventually into the power of the English." Developed under the
' "A great influence with the king has been the consideration of not losing the
effect of so fine a deed, the air of cordiality with which the two courts will appear
before the world, serving to bring together the two nations still more." Archivo
Histdrico-Nacional, Madrid. Estado, Legajo, 3889 A. Wall to Grimaldi, No
vember 13, 1762.
' "Lorsque cette malheureuse convention fut rendue publique le cabinet de
Versailles t^cha d'apaiser I'opinion, profondement blessee, en insinuant dans
ses justifications officieuses que la Louisiane etait menacee du mfime sort que le
Canada, et que I'on n'abandonnait que ce que I'on n'eflt pu garder longtemps."
Martin, Histoire de France, t. xv, p. 593.

456 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [Vol. XIX;
auspices of that mighty and enterprising people, Louisiana would
assuredly become dangerous to the peace and safety of Mexico. Even
in the hands of Spain the province was too vast In extent to serve
as a very effective barrier against English aggression. Still, on the
whole, Louisiana had better be even loosely defended by Spaniards
than suffered to become a sturdy and vigorous English colony,
with Its fortified posts well advanced toward the Mexican frontier.
All things considered, from the commercial and political point
of view furthermore, the loss of Florida had been quite a heavy
blow to Spain.' The acquisition of Pensacola, added to the ces
sion of Mobile from France and the previous possession of Jamaica,
gave the English such a hold upon the Guff of Mexico that the
Imposition of any adequate check upon their contraband trade
with the Mexican region appeared well-nigh hopeless." But if
the English had thus been admitted to the Guff it was some satis
faction at least to know that with New Orleans under Spanish
control, French smuggUng would be suppressed." Lastly, that
Louisiana possessed some natural wealth could not be doubted,
and under a wise administration Its resources could be developed,
alike to the profit of Spain and to that of Its new province.*
• Cf. supra, p. 453.
' By the acquisition of Florida "the English realized their desire of old to get
a footing on the shores of the Gulf of Mexico, so as to carry on their commerce
with New Spain, the only section of country in the western Indies free up to that
time from their illicit traffic." Ferrer del Rio, Historia del Reinado de Carlos
III, ed. 1856, t. i, p. 377. In his correspondence with Tanucci, the Neapolitan
minister of Charles III, Wall declared that, in his opinion, the real advantage
which England gained by the acquisition of Florida was nothing more than a
greater facility for navigating the Gulf of Mexico. Simancas, Estado, Legajo,
5978. Wall to Tanucci, December 14 and 28, 1762.
' Cf. infra, note 4.
* Several of the motives above discussed as actuating both France and Spain
are set forth in an official brief {extractd), prepared about 1767 for the Council
of the Indies. It states that the king of France decided to cede Louisiana, prin
cipally because he desired to "maintain the closest possible union and friendship
with Spain." Since also, the Spanish commerce with the Indies was so flourish-'
ing, he did not wish to have a settiement on the Gulf of Mexico which was likely
to carry on an illicit traffic, practically impossible to prevent, and which " contrary
to his intentions might lead eventually to unpleasant disputes. To this end he'
authorized the Duke of Cholseul to draw up an act of cession, pure and simple.-
Aware of these circumstances, his Catholic Majesty - . . was inclined to accept'
it for various considerations:

No. 3.] THE CESSION OF LOUISIANA TO SPAIN. 457
Thus having described the cession of Louisiana in 1762, and
explained the motives of France and Spain in accomplishing it,
a few words remain to be said about Its meaning for the history
of the United States. Few diplomatic transactions have exhib
ited so strange a medley of motives and emotions — at once those
of Impulsiveness, policy, reUef, reluctance and practical calcula
tion, aU of them pervaded with a tinge of Indifference and care
lessness. To the Frenchman and to the Spaniard of 1762 the
transfer of a vast and unknown tract in the wilds of North America
was, on the whole, a rather trivial performance. Had they real
ized that the Louisiana territory stretched over 900,000 square
" I. Because, by adding to his dominions of New Spain the territories which
his Most Christian Majesty had possessed between them and the River Missis
sippi, this river from its mouth to its source would serve as a fixed and definite
boundary for his royal possessions in North America.
" 2. Because, by this acquisition the French would be deprived of a point of
vantage from which they had carried on very extensive smuggling operations in
the Gulf of Mexico, and more especially along the shores of Campeachy and Hon
duras, not to mention what they were accustomed to do in the interior of the country.
" 3. Because, although granting that this new acquisition might be a" heavy bur
den upon the royal exchequer — in view of the fact that no taxation had t/een
levied there, even to the extent of tithes for the maintenance of the clergy and
worship, it being necessary to provide for it by a regular appropriation — one must
bear in mind that this appropriation would have a substantial retum from the
diminution of illicit traffic, and from the advantages that would accrue to the
king's vassals by reason of the commerce of that new dominion.
" 4. Because, were his Majesty to decline the cession, the eventual fate ... of
the colony would be doubtful; and if by any chance it might fall into the hands
of England, in time of peace it would be steadily developed and fortified in the
direction of the frontiers of our dominions, it would become widened out along
the Missouri and other rivers, the good vrill of the Indians would be won over,
evil reports would be circulated against us, and in case of an outbreak of war the
colony would be close to us and well equipped for attacks by way of the provinces
of Texas and New Mexico. It was never believed that this . . . colony would
become a bulwark for our America; the supposition has always been that should
the English intend to invade it, even if we had a large force of troops there, we
could not seriously check their movements along an extended frontier of five hun
dred leagues." The last sentence of the extracto is rather difficult to translate,
and requires a paraphrase to make its meaning reasonably clear. The text is as
follows: "Pero se consider6 que no seria lo misneo entrar de nuevo que tenerla
ocupada de antemano, y hallarse ya adelantados y fortificados & nuestras espal-
das." "But the consideration prevailed that the invasion of Louisiana, were it a
Spanish province, would be something quite different from suffering it to be de
veloped and fortified by the English at our very back." Archivo Histdrico-Na
cional, Madrid. Estado, Legajo, 3889 .\.

4S8 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [Vol XIX.
miles — an area more than four times that of France or Spain —
but little difference, probably, would have been made In the readi
ness of France to part with It, and in the comparative reluctance
of Spain to take it. Perhaps It might not be too much to say that
in the bizarre diplomacy of 1762 over the cession of Louisiana to
Spain, the fate of the United States yet unborn was decided. Had
France assigned the territory to England in that year, or If she
had retained It, the history of the period 1789-1815 justifies the
belief that the result would have been the same; the region must
have become a part of the British colonial dominion. When the
United States was In Its infancy, all conditions, geographical,
political, social and economic, pointed toward the formation of
two confederacies, one along the Atlantic seaboard, the other
along the Mississippi. For many years, if not for all time, that
river must have been at once the western boundary of the United
States, and, even had that country retained its unity, a bar to its
national development.
However unconscious and unwilling her course of action, Spain
has been the most potent external factor In the territorial expan
sion and aggrandizement of the United States. Most of the great
republic's domain was once under the Spanish sway. The ces
sion of Louisiana to Spain In 1762 was the necessary prelude to
the purchase of 1803, and the story of the West beyond the Mis
sissippi has been in the highest degree the story of our national
prosperity and power.
William R. Shepherd.

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