YALE
UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

GERMANY AND ITS EVOLUTION
IN MODERN TIMES

GERMANY AND ITS EVOLUTION
IN MODERN TIMES

BY

HENRI LIGHTENBERGER
Mattre de Con/erences & la Sorbonne

TRANSLATED PROM THE FKMNCH BY
A. M. LUDOVICI

NEW YORK
HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY
1913

PRINTED BY
HAZELL, WATSON AND VINBy, LD.,
LONDON AND AYLESBURY,
ENGLAND.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION
Religious and scientific mental outlook — The development of
rationalism — Modern antagonism between rehgion and science
— Repugnance of Germany to radical solutions . xiii-xxv

BOOK I
ECONOMIC EVOLUTION
CHAPTER I
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SYSTEM OF
CAPITALISTIC ENTERPRISE
Beginnings of the capitahstic system in Germany — The ideal of
sustenance — Development of free enterprise — Economic emanci
pation of Prussia after Jena .... pp. 3-7
Stages in the development of capitalism — Germany at the be
ginning of the century — Period between 1800 and 1848 —
Economic stride after 1848 — Speculative madness after 1870
— The triumphs of German industry at the end of the
century ........ pp. 7-17
CHAPTER II
THE EFFECTS OF THE SYSTEM OF ENTERPRISE
UPON THE OLD FORMS OF INDUSTRY
I. Domestic industry — Disappearance of domestic work among
the peasantry — The domestic industry of the country districts
— The great domestic industries of the towns . pp. 18-22
II. The trades — Their ancient organisation — Gradual dissolution of

vi CONTENTS
the guild system — The craftsman's work menaced by the com
petition of great industries — Economic and social decadence of
the artisan class ...... pp. 22-27
CHAPTER III
THE EFFECT OF CAPITALISTIC ENTERPRISE
UPON AGRICULTURE
Agrarian evolution — Increase of production during the century—
The law of the concentration of capital not applicable to
agriculture — Substitution of private exploitation for collec
tive exploitation — Liquidation of feudal property — Its results
for the large landowners and for the peasantry — Evolution
of customs in the rural class .... pp. 28-36
The Agrarian crisis — Its causes : competition of new countries,
the debt on landed property — Its effects on the nobility and
the peasantry — Diminution of the importance of agriculture
in the life of the nation ..... pp. 36-47

CHAPTER IV
SOCIAL EVOLUTION
Social effects of the system of enterprise — The old classes : the
nobihty, the middle class, the people — The modern classes :
the aristocracy of enterprise and the army of labour — Forma
tion and evolution of the proletariat in Germany pp. 48-57
General results of the economic evolution — The good and evil of
the system of enterprise — Signs of a reaction against the
system of unrestricted competition . . . pp. 57-61
BOOK II
POLITICAL EVOLUTION
CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM OF GERMAN LIBERTY AND
UNITY
I. Weakness of Germany at the beginning of the century — Absence
of unity and liberal institutions . . . pp. 65-72
II. Austria — Metternich's policy of stability — Austria hostile to
the movement toward unity and Liberalism . pp. 72-76

CONTENTS vii
III. Prussia — Prussian power — Sympathy of Prussia with the desire
for unity — The Prussian monarchy and Liberal aspirations : <
its evolution towards a constitutional system — Reforms of Stein '
and Hardenberg — The divided state of Germany . pp. 76-85

CHAPTER II
THE IDEALISTIC STRUGGLE FOR LIBERTY
AND UNITY
I. The beginnings of Liberalism — Its original idealistic character —
The " organic " evolution of pohtical institutions in Prussia — -
The " inorganic " character of the political evolution of the
southern states of Germany .... pp. 86-101
II. The evolution of Liberalism — Nationalistic tendencies — Radical
tendencies ...... pp. 101-104
III. The Revolution of 1848-49 — Its explosion in Germany — The
Parhament of Frankfort — Its impotence against the German
princes — The futility of its efforts to realise German unity —
The reasons for this failure .... pp. 105-113

CHAPTER III
THE FOUNDATION OF GERMAN UNITY
I. The new turn of mind — The development of the realistic and
positive spirit — Bismarck the typical representative of the
realistic era : his will to power ; his intellectual lucidity ; his
nervous sensitiveness ..... pp. 114-120
II. The reahsation of German unity — The conquest of Germany
by Prussia — The Zollverein — Failure of the Union — The
reaction in Germany and in Prussia — -The restoration of
Prussian power — The struggle for supremacy with Austria :
Sadowa — The war of 1 870 : its causes ; responsibility for it
of France and Germany respectively — The restoration of the
German Empire  pp. 120-137

CHAPTER IV
THE GERMAN EMPIRE AND HER
FOREIGN POLICY
I. European policy of Germany — Its pacific tendencies — The
necessity for developing the power of Germany — France and

viii CONTENTS
Germany after 1870 — The German army — Germany's alliances
— Armed peace ...... pp. 138-148
II. Universal pohcy — " Greater Germany " — Germans outside Ger
many — German interests abroad — Constitution of » colonial
empire ....... pp. 149-157
III. German imperialism — Nationalism and imperialism — The con
flicting interests of agriculture and industry in Germany —
, The Government as arbitrator . . \ pp. 157-165
''* " >'¦"'- ' «"<«. „,*!,„,; **
&..- ,., , '*r->.:-"'.v,. CHAPTER V "V**<*f*!.i
THE GERMAN EMPIRE AND HER
HOME POLICY
I. The internal hfe of Germany — Increasingly realistic conception
of the idea of party : conflict of principles changed to conflict
of classes and interests .... pp. 166-169
II. The Sociahst Party — Utopian Socialism — Evolution towards
an increasingly practical activity — Revolutionaries and re
formers — Syndicalism .... pp. 169-175
III. The Liberal Party — Its idealistic beginnings — It becomes the
middle-class party — Evolution of the National Liberal Party : it
becomes the political organ of the great industries pp. 175-179
IV. The Conservative Party — Its behef in authority and its par
ticularism — Positive ambitions of the Conservatives — Their
reconciliation with Bismarck — They constitute themselves the
defenders of agricultural interests : the Bund der Land-
wirte  pp. 179-184
V. The Cathohc Centre Party. . . . pp. 184-185
VI. General results of the evolution of parties — Decadence of
parliamentary life — Disappearance of all political idealism —
The parties and the Emperor . . . pp. 186-190
CHAPTER VI
MODERN POLITICAL IDEALISM
I. Education pohcy — Gradual secularisation of pubhc instruction 
Nevertheless, the Church keeps some influence over teaching 
Increasingly realistic and democratic character of modern
teaching .  pp. 191-199
II. Social policy — Social associations and protection of workmen
— Intervention of the German State in the social question 
Social policy of Bismarck : the social insurance laws — Acces
sion of William II : era of reforms and subsequently of
reaction — Renewal of social idealism in the Germany of
to-day  pp. 199-210

CONTENTS ix

BOOK III
THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGIOUS AND
PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT
CHAPTER I
THE RENAISSANCE OF CATHOLICISM IN GERMANY AT
THE BEGINNING OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
I. The development of scientific rationalism transforms the " re
ligion " of the modern man . . . pp. 213-214
II. The dechne and revival of Roman Catholicism at the beginning
of the nineteenth century — Reformed Catholicism — Apparent
dechne of Roman Catholicism — Reaction towards positive forms
in religion — The alliance between the Throne and the Altar
against the Revolution — The struggle for Catholic ''"liberty"
— The dechne of reformed Catholicism — The romanticist move
ment favours the progress of Catholicism among the elite —
Progress of Catholicism in the lowest layers of the nation ;
the Catholic associations .... pp. 214-236

CHAPTER II
THE PROGRESS OF CATHOLICISM DURING THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY
I. The triumph of Roman Catholicism over reformed Catholicism
— Hermesianism — The " German Catholic " movement — The
" Old Catholics "  pp. 237-240
II. Conflicts between the Church and the State — The gradual
emancipation of Catholicism during the first sixty-five years
of the nineteenth century — The conflict between the power
of the Pope and the new German Empire — The Kulturkampf
— The reconcihation between the Centre and the Government —
The Centre as a government party — William Tl. and Catho
licism — " Political " and " idealistic " Catholicism pp. 240-250

x CONTENTS
CHAPTER III
THE PROTESTANT SPIRIT
I. Fundamental tendencies of Protestantism — Cathohc " semi-
rationalism " and Protestant " irrationalism " — Protestantism
proclaims the independence of reason and faith — It tends to
conciliate science and rehgion — Definition of the domains of
rehgion, metaphysics, and morality . . pp. 251-258
II. Protestant mysticism — The mystic element in the religion of
Luther — Pietism : its fundamental characteristics — Its evolu
tion in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries — The
awakening — Modern and contemporary pietism pp. 259-268
III. Protestant subjectivism — Gradual crumbling away of dogma ;
radical subjectivism of Schleiermacher — Gradual ehmination
of the historical elements from Christianity ; the rationalism of
the eighteenth century — the mythical interpretation of the Bible
stories — Rehgion stripped of its absolute character pp. 268-279
IV. Attempts to reconcile science and religion — The rationalism
of the eighteenth century — The idealism of the nineteenth
century — Kantianism ; modern evolution of idealis tic philo
sophy — Contemporary Protestant idealism . pp. 279-290
CHAPTER IV
THE PROTESTANT CHURCH
I. Protestant orthodoxy — Restoration of the idea of orthodoxy —
Orthodoxy and pietism in the nineteenth century — Conflict
between the " positive " tendency and the " negative " ten
dency  pp. 291-297
II. The Protestant Church — The idea of a Church in the Middle
Ages — Protestantism replaces the institution of an ecclesi
astical hierarchy by the notion of universal priesthood — The
Protestant Church under the rule of the State — Necessary
rupture between Church and State — The official Church and
the Free Churches — Divorce between the official Church
and the Protestant spirit — Antagonism between Protestant
subjectivism and the idea of a Church . . pp. 297-312
CHAPTER V
FREE THOUGHT
I. Materialism — Its diffusion in the nineteenth century — The
causes of its progress — The real discredit of materialism among
the cultured minority .... pp. 313-323

CONTENTS xi
II. Positivism — It springs up in opposition to metaphysical dog
matism — Its diffusion in the nineteenth century pp. 323-328
III. Pessimism — Formation of the doctrine of pessimism — Its
diffusion in the second half of the century — Reaction against
pessimism ..... pp. 328-334
IV. Naturalism — The Nihihsm of Nietzsche — The transvaluation
of all values and Dionysianism— Nietzsche is one of the
typical representatives of the modern mind pp. 334-342
V. Contemporary tendencies — The hatred encountered by Nietz-
schean Radicalism in Germany — Contemporary aspirations to
a new classicism; the "return to Goethe " . pp. 342-347

BOOK IV
EVOLUTION IN ART
CHAPTER I
THE VALUE OF ART
I. The cult of art — Classic conception of art ; the neo-Hellenism
of Goethe — The glorification of art among the romanticists —
Diffusion of the cult of art in the nineteenth century pp. 351-362
II. Reaction against the cult of art— Art and culture considered as
the products of industry — Progress of utihtarian realism — Art
subordinated to science — Art in the service of life — Democratic
art — The desire of the people for art . . pp. 362-378
CHAPTER II
ROMANTICISM, REALISM, AND IMPRESSIONISM
I. Romanticism — At first a continuation of classicism — Its charac
teristics: Subjectivism — Lyricism — Evolution of romanticism
towards a national and popular art . . pp. 379-392
II. Realism — Dissolution of romanticism — Diffusion of realistic
tendencies  pp. 392-396
III. Impressionism — Gradual refinement of nervous sensitiveness
in the nineteenth century — Development of impressionism in
music — Impressionism in painting and poetry — Impressionism
and " decadence "  pp. 397-406

xii CONTENTS
CHAPTER III
SYNTHETIC ART
I. The synthetic work of art in the domain of poetry and music —
Correspondence of sensations — Wagner's musical drama —
Criticism of Wagnerism .... pp. 407-414
II. The synthetic work of art in the domain of the plastic arts —
Search for a new style — Period of imitating the old styles
— The tendencies of contemporary art industries pp. 414-419
CONCLUSION
Will to power and solidarity — The development of German power
— The instinct for order and discipline — Change from a com
bative to a solidaristic idea of life . . . pp. 420-430
Index  pp. 431-440

INTRODUCTION
The great fact which strikes us when we compare
the present day with the ages that have preceded it
is the enormous growth in human power which took
place during the course of the last century. It is
possible to have some doubts about the " progress "
of humanity, in the sense that it is very far from
certain that the man of to-day is happier, wiser, or
even in a safer position than he was formerly. On
the other hand, it is perfectly clear that the sum-
total of human power in the face of nature has
increased enormously. The conquest and subjuga
tion of elemental forces by the intelligence of man
made a tremendous stride during the nineteenth
century. Man no longer regards the Universe in
the same way or with the same feelings as he once
did. Even his mental outlook has been profoundly
modified, and, to use an expression which is con
tinually recurring in the works of German critics,
it has developed in the direction of " subjectivity."
The Middle Ages were filled above all with a deep
sense of our helplessness in the face of forces far more
powerful than ourselves. If we examine the state
of mind which prevailed, even towards the beginning
of the fifteenth century, we find that the most funda-'
mental difference between ourselves and the men of
that period was the fact that they had no conception

xiv INTRODUCTION
of causality. We live under the firm conviction
that every circumstance, without exception, can be
explained as the effect of one or more causes. We ad
mit the existence of an inexorable bond of causation
between all phenomena — a rule which admits of no
exceptions ; and we force ourselves throughout the
whole range of our experience to grasp clearly the
chain of cause and effect. Even when we cannot
find this relation, we are convinced that it exists
and that greater scientific knowledge would enable
us to discover it. It is this fundamental conviction
which was above all lacking in the man of the Middle
Ages. His knowledge of the outside world was still
very limited in range, and, unlike his modern brother,
he had not got at his disposal an enormous number
of systematised experiences, which had been classi
fied and organised. His intelligence in the presence
of every fact and event did not imperatively demand
a causal explanation. In order to get his bearings
and to find his way in the midst of the chaos of
phenomena, he was content at every turn to reason
by analogies which were more or less haphazard and
superficial, and not to pursue a course of rigorous
induction. It is not surprising, therefore, that in
addition to a very restricted group of phenomena,
in which experience had taught him to trace a
certain regularity, he gladly postulated the existence
in our very midst of a far vaster realm of miracles,
which was independent of natural laws, and which,
at any moment could break the normal chain of
events. Nor is it surprising, either, that, in the
absence of firmly established positive science, and
by reason of the insignificant sum of experience that
can be acquired by a single individual, the tradi
tional wisdom bequeathed from the past should have

INTRODUCTION xv
exercised powerful authority over him. Indeed, there
is nothing astonishing in the fact that a religion
founded on a belief in miracles and based on the
authority of long tradition should have dominated
the spirits and imposed itself with irresistible force
upon men's intelligence as well as their will.
How different is the mental attitude of the modern
man! Whilst the intellect of the Middle Ages bowed
willingly before the authority of tradition, and saw
miracles in everything, and the hidden, arbitrary,
mysterious influence of superior powers in the world
of phenomena, modern thought becomes ever more
resolutely self-reliant. The intellectual horizon of
mankind spreads to vast distances ; the sum-total
of human experience, classified and docketed, grows
greater every day. Science and the scientific in
stinct developed along parallel lines. Belief in the
absolute determinism of phenomena has slowly taken
the place of faith in the supernatural ; rigorous
inductive reasoning has supplanted reasoning by
analogy. At the same time, there has sprung up,
chiefly during the last three centuries, a wider and
more complete knowledge of the universe based upon
reason and experiment. Through the great dis
coveries of Simon Stevin, Galileo, Newton, Descartes,
Leibnitz, Euler, d' Alembert, and Laplace, mathe
matics and mechanics were placed upon a firm basis
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Towards the end of the eighteenth century the
empirical sciences in their turn leave the stage of
blind groping. Lavoisier inaugurated the era of
modern chemistry, Galvani and Volta that of elec
tricity. And during the nineteenth century a vast
conception of the mechanistic unity of the world was

xvi INTRODUCTION
gradually elaborated. Human intelligence learnt to
consider all the physical forces of nature in turn —
mechanical processes, heat, light, sound, and elec
tricity — as so many different expressions for one and
the same fundamental power which manifests itself in
every natural phenomenon, but remains unchanged
in essence. It thus proved the unity of the forces of
nature, and established the fact that everywhere
and in every shape force obeys a fundamental cosmic
law — the law of the conservation of energy and of
the constancy of force and matter in the universe.
Pushing its conquests yet further afield, it attempted
at last to extend these laws to organic nature. In
one of the simple, elementary substances — carbon-
it unveiled the marvellous material which determines
the formation of an infinite variety of organic bodies,
and which, consequently, represents the chemical
basis of life (Haeckel) ; it finds in the simple, solitary
cell, the elementary organism which by successive
combinations gives birth to all the tissues com
posing vegetable or animal organisms. With the
theory of evolution, prophetically foreshadowed by
Goethe at the end of the eighteenth century and
scientifically formulated in 1859 by Darwin, it ex
tended the mechanistic theory to the realm of
biology and proclaimed that the universe as a
whole was nothing more than an eternal evolution
of matter.
But reason did not rest satisfied with postulating
an explanation of the universe based upon the prin
ciple of causality ; it was not content with theory
alone — it became practical, it acted, it created. In
proportion as it acquired a sounder knowledge of the
laws which govern phenomena, it learnt to subdue
the forces of nature, to train them and make them

INTRODUCTION xvii
work for its own profit. At the same time as it
founded science, it also instituted a rational method
of dealing with technical processes.
These, in the old days, were essentially empirical.
The artisan knew, through having learnt it from his
predecessors, how to set about obtaining a given
result or product. His master had transmitted to
him, through the channel of practical work, the
knowledge gained by experience and the various
processes by means of which a certain article was
produced. And, in his ignorance of the laws of
nature, he applied these formulae without knowing,
as a rule, how or why they gave the desired results.
Sometimes a lucky fluke provided him with a clue
to a new process by which he could gain his end with
greater speed and certainty, and in such a case he
enriched by some new rule the technical code, which
he bequeathed to the generation to follow. But
this code still remained a collection of empirical
formulae fortuitously discovered and not a well-co
ordinated body of reasoned and scientifically correct
knowledge. Now the distinguishing feature of modern technical
processes is precisely the gradual substitution of
rational knowledge for empiricism and of scientific
methods for traditional formulas. Thus scientific
knowledge has, as its corollary, a profound modi
fication of all technical processes, which gradually
assume an entirely new complexion. What is the
goal towards which natural science is tending ? It
is essentially directed towards reducing differences
of quality to difference of quantity, towards finding a
mathematical formula for giving an adequate ex
planation of some natural fact, and finally towards
bringing down all the phenomena of organic life to
b

xviii INTRODUCTION
the increasingly complex movements of primordial
elements, which, in essence, are the same as those
which constitute inorganic bodies. Similarly, modern
technical processes in all their various forms —
mechanics, thermophysics, chemistry, electricity, etc.
¦ — tend everywhere to eliminate living agents and to
substitute dead elements in their stead ; to replace,
for instance, human or animal motive power by
steam or electricity, workers made of flesh and bone
by instruments of iron and steel and by machinery ;
natural organic products such as wood, vegetable
colours, and manure, by artificial inorganic products
like coal and iron, aniline dyes, and chemical manures.
Thus technical processes become ever more exact,
impersonal and independent of time and space ; they
no longer depend upon capacity, whether natural
or acquired — manual dexterity, keensightedness,
hearing, taste, or smell — among various classes of
men ; they operate with the rigorous, impartial, un
swerving accuracy of a machine ; they are not obliged
to submit to conditions of time and place, to which
the natural growth of animal or vegetable organisms
is subject, but produce the results they wish to
obtain by means of an artificial combination of
elements and forces which are always at their dis
posal. They are no longer more or less delicate
arts, whose secrets it would be possible to lose, but
definite acquisitions, for all time and all nations, of
the knowledge common to all mankind.
Thus the development of science and of technical
processes based upon reason increased the power of
man and his dominion over nature to inordinate
proportions. And under these circumstances we
also find a profound change in his entire attitude
towards life and the world.

INTRODUCTION xix
In the Middle Ages, as we saw, man felt himself
essentially a dependent creature. In all the depart
ments of his material or spiritual life he obeyed
either God or tradition. In the domain of religion,
the Bible or the Church gave him for all great
metaphysical problems a definite and complete
solution inspired by God Himself, which he was ex
pected to accept without reservation or discussion.
Morality was imposed upon him as a divine ordinance
which he should humbly obey. The organisation of
society, founded upon ancient tradition, was also
invested with a semi-sacred character. In all the
important acts of his life, man obeyed a command
given by a power whose will was infinitely above
his own, and to whom a humble and resigned sub-
missiveness was the only possible attitude.
Now, it is precisely this submissive attitude towards
an outside authority which is modified as man
gains consciousness of his own power. For centuries
Christianity provided men of the western world with
a cosmology — an explanation of historic evolution, an
interpretation of the meaning of life and a rule of
conduct ; for centuries they had inscribed Faith at
the head of their Table of Values. But as rational
knowledge grew, together with the power of organi
sation which such knowledge confers, man learned
self-confidence. Science now rose up as a rival to
Faith. Proud of her magnificent victories, Reason
aspired to usurp the place of Religion in all depart
ments of human life. She in her turn raised her
eyes towards the first place upon the Table of Values.
Since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the
rationalistic movement has resulted in gigantic
synthetic constructions, such as the systems of Des
cartes, Spinoza, and Leibnitz, in which Reason,

xx INTRODUCTION
elevated to the tribunal of the supreme judge of truth,
sets herself the task of constructing, by the light of
her own illumination alone, and independent of all
authority, of all tradition and all revelation, an order
of the Universe. At the beginning of the modern
era, German thought, in the persons of Kant and
Fichte, announced, with no uncertain voice, the great
principle of Free Will. This disturbed the connection
which was hitherto regarded as existing between
religion and morality. The old order of ethics, which
attributed the principles of morality to the Divine
Will and curbed the human will by the ordinances of
God, was, for Kant, a heteronomous morality, founded
upon the principle of authority, which he repulsed
with all the force at his command. In maintaining
that " Pure Will," or will determined by pure Reason,
and swayed exclusively by the law she lays down for
herself, is the principle of all true morality, and by
proclaiming that there is no authority in the world
which can command human Liberty, that man is his
own lawgiver, and that in obeying the moral law it
is the voice of his own Reason to which he listens,
Kant accomplished, in the domain of ethics, a task
which in its bearings was truly colossal and in
augurated a new era in the history of moral con
sciousness. Through him the human race became
definitely conscious of its autonomy.
The idea of human autonomy was from that time
forward proclaimed with ever-increasing strength.
Humanity learned to believe ever more and more
firmly that the thinking and active " subject " re
cognises no power above himself before whom he
should bow. The modern man has a growing con
viction that he should not obey, but command and
organise. He resolutely faces the problem of the

INTRODUCTION xxi
rational exploitation of the universe, and he labours
at the scientific organisation of life in all its aspects
— moral, economic, social, and political.
In its most extreme and paradoxical form, the
subjectivism of our day proclaims with Nietzsche
that " God is dead," denies not only the transcen
dental deity of the theologian, but also the immanent
God of the metaphysician, urges mankind to remain
': faithful to this world," to put resolutely aside
all interest in a Beyond, and to understand that he
should be a " creator of values," that outside himself
there is no " objective " truth, morality, or meta
physics to which he should submit, but that in all
independence he should be a law unto himself.
There is nothing in the world but centres of force in
a state of perpetual evolution and of unceasing
action and reaction upon each other. The Will to
Power, to ever-increasing power, which subjects
to its dominion an ever greater sum of energy, is
the fundamental fact of the life of the universe.
The severance from the point of view prevalent in the
Middle Ages is complete. Then we had the believer
who felt himself surrounded by mystery and miracle,
and submitted meekly to the authority of tradition,
whether religious, moral, or scientific. To-day we
find the stern Titan, who no longer recognises any
law or any master above him, but sees in the cease
less Will to Power, the eternal destiny of man,
mankind, and the whole world.
When I contrast the old belief in authority with
modern subjectivism, I do not wish in any way to
assert that either of these two conceptions of life is
intrinsically superior to the other, or that one of
them should necessarily supplant the other, or that
history shows us a progressive evolution, continuous

xxii INTRODUCTION
though indefinite, towards rationalistic subjectivism.
All that I wish to say is this — that mankind during
modern times, and especially during the nineteenth
century, has felt within himself the tremendous
growth of the belief in the organising power of the
human intellect and will, that he has applied his
energy with remarkable intensity to the conquest of
" power," whether scientific or technical, economic
or political, and that the effort to inaugurate the
universal rule of scientific and free reason is, per
haps, the greatest fact of the nineteenth century.
But it is also true that the " religious " instinct,
which made the spirits of the Middle Ages bow before
the mystery of God, which led them to reverence in
tradition the manifestation of the Divine Will, which
impelled them to adoration and submission to a
universal order — in short, to an attitude, not of com
mand, but of reverent humility before the riddle of
the world — this instinct has not, even in our days,
ceased from making its voice heard. The modern
man works with all his might to conquer the world
through intelligence and conscious will. And he has
pride in his strength. But he also retains a con
sciousness of the strict limitation of his power over
matter. He still reveres the terrible and infinite
powers which close about him and upon which he
feels his dependence. And, especially in Germany,
he willingly esteems and respects, in addition to the
rules of conduct dictated by reason, that unconscious
wisdom which finds expression in great religious,
moral, political, and social traditions.
The history of Germany in the nineteenth century
is therefore doubly interesting. Of all the nations
of Europe, the German people is one of those among
whom scientific reason and organising will have dis-

INTRODUCTION xxiii
played the most extraordinary prowess and modern
subjectivism has blossomed most luxuriantly. But
it is also one among whom the " religious " spirit,
respect for tradition and authority, has retained
the greatest strength. German thought has been a
powerful helper in the development of the positive
sciences and in the elaboration of a rational explana
tion of the universe. German force has organised
itself in a manner as methodical as it is formidable ;
it has clung with incomparable energy to the con
quest of power, both economic and political ; and
it has made Germany, together with England and
the United States, one of the most expansive nations
of the world. German Reason, therefore, has proved
herself a force of the first magnitude and a peerless
instrument of power. But she has not posed as an
absolute and intolerant sovereign, and has always
sought to work as amiably as possible with the
forces of the past. She has endeavoured, in the
realm of religion, to make a compromise with tradi
tional beliefs, to " fulfil " Christianity rather than
fight it to the death. And in the domain of politics,
instead of founding a uniformly rationalistic state,
she has displayed great consideration for tradition,
has shown a respect for monarchical authority, and
has been careful not to violate vested interests, or
to precipitate too hurriedly the evolutionary process
which bears modern nations towards democracy.
Does this constitute a strength or a weakness ?
This is indeed a question. Some will admire the
continuity of the political and religious evolution of
Germany ; they will regard it as a priceless advan
tage for a nation not to have made a clean slate of
the past ; they will consider it probable that she will
continue to develop along the same lines, without

xxiv INTRODUCTION
any violent shakes or blows, seeking and finding, in
the means between the two extremes of democracy
and Socialism, or feudalism and clericalism, a formula
acceptable to the great majority. Others, on the
contrary, will think that the Germany of to-day —
a military and feudalistic state, an empire with a
sternly realistic outlook, thirsting for power and
wealth, and disdainful of all democratic and humani
tarian idealism — is an anachronism in modern Europe,
and cannot fail — perhaps in the near future — to
undergo grave, and maybe violent, transformations.
I, for my part, have no pretensions to giving an
original verdict on questions so hotly disputed.
Without pretending that it is possible in a matter
of this kind to attain complete objectivity, I shall
at least try to describe as impartially as I can, and
with the least possible obtrusion of my own personal
feelings, a collection of phenomena which are of
extraordinary interest to us. For some time past
German science has, in numerous works by single
individuals and several collaborators, taken upon
itself the task of making up the balance-sheet of the
last century. Some of these works — from which I
shall quote in particular Lamprecht's admirable
History of Germany — are of the highest importance.
I thought it would be interesting to present to the
French public, in as simple a shape as possible, some
of the general results of this vast field of inquiry.1
1 The most important are : Das XIX Jahrhundert in Deutsch-
lands Entwicklung, hg. v. P. Schlenther, Berlin, Bondi, 1898, ss. ;
Die Allgemeinen Grundlagen der Kultur der Qegenwart, hg. v. P.
Hinneberg, Berlin u. Leipzig, Teubner, 1906, ss. ; Am Ende des
Jahrhunderts, Berlin, Cronbach, 1898, ss. ; Das Deutsche Jahr
hundert in Einzelschriften, hg. v. G. Stockhausen, Berlin, Schneider
1901 ; H. St. Chamberlain, Die Grundlagen des XIX Jahrhunderts',
Miinchen, Bruckmann, 1889. It seemed to me, moreover, impos
sible, without making my book too heavy, to give either a biblio-

INTRODUCTION xxv
By very reason of the profound differences which at
present separate France from the Germany of to-day,
it would be useful for us to force ourselves to form,
without passion, a clear image and a general idea
which shall be as precise as possible of the tendencies
of that nation. My only object, in this study, is to
trace the bold outlines of this picture as faithfully
and sincerely as I can.
graphy of the works I have consulted, or to quote, in any detail,
the authors to whom I refer. Among the works from which I
have derived most profit, I must mention in the foremost place
the three volumes which Lamprecht published as supplements to
his History of Germany under the title of Zur jiingsten deutschen
Vergangenheit (Freiburg, 1902-1904), then the German works of
Sombart, Ziegler, Treitschke, E. Marcks, Lenz, Zwiedineck-Siiden-
horst, F. Mehring, Paulsen, Trceltsch, Nippold, Briick, Windelband,
Ueberweg-Heinze, Kiilpe, R. M. Meyer, Bartels, Gurlitt, Muther,
Meier-Graefe, Riemann, etc., and finally the French works by
Andler, Basch, Denis, Goyau, Levy Bruhl, Albert Levy, Matter,
Milhaud, Pariset, Rouge, etc. It goes without saying that I
might enlarge this list considerably. But I do not see what use
such a, catalogue would be to the French reader. I merely wish
to point out that the ideas I develop in this volume are not my
own exclusive property. This essay, I repeat, has no other object
than that of giving a summary of the researches lately made on
the subject of the culture of modern Germany by historians with
out whom my book would never have been written.

BOOK I
ECONOMIC EVOLUTION

CHAPTER I
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SYSTEM OF CAPITALISTIC
ENTERPRISE
The great fact which dominates the economic and
social history of Germany, as well as that of the
whole of Europe, during the nineteenth century, is
the growth of capitalism, or, to use a term more
generally favoured by German political economists,
the system of "enterprise" (Unternehmung).
Former ages never felt to the same extent as the
nineteenth century that greed for unlimited gain
which is characteristic of the modern speculator
of every category. In the pre-capitalistic era, each
individual, from the lowe^tTtcTErie^ighest in the social
scale, aimed only at earning enough to ensure him the
means of sustenance (Nahrung). and a mode of life in
keeping with .the customs of his class. This was the
ideal of the country gentleman, of the Junker,1 who,
as a rule, did not aim at that intensive cultivation
of his property which would make it yield the abso
lute maximum of production, but only asked from
his lands sufficient maintenance for his rank, the right
of living like a lord on his estate for part of the
year, of hunting in the autumn, paying a visit to the
capital of the kingdom or province during the bad
1 The landed proprietor, whose class is the dominating one in
Prussia. It is from this class that all officers and higher officials
are drawn. — Te. 3

4 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
season, and providing a dowry for his daughters and
supplementing the income of a son in the army. The
ideal of the artisan and of the " master " was a
similar one. He expected his trade to support him,
together with his family and the journeymen and
apprentices, who lived under his roof and formed
part of his household. He never dreamt of extending
his output indefinitely, but only aspired to the life
of a self-supporting producer, who faithfully satisfied
the ordinary demands of a very limited number of
clients, whom no man had the right to lure away from
him. And, like the craftsman, the tradesman had
no other object than that of earning a livelihood
by disposing of his goods among a more or less re
stricted circle of customers with whose tastes and
traditional needs he was familiar.
Under these conditions, the general tendency of the
age was to protect the position which a man had won,
or inherited, against the results of unrestricted compe
tition and the encroachments of neighbours, who were
either too greedy or too enterprising. The landed pro
prietor was bound not to allow his lands to lie fallow,
or to reduce the number of his tenures or the sum-
total of the peasant families for whom he provided a
livelihood on his estate ; he was even liable to help
them in time of difficulty. In return, he was certain
of always having at his disposal, through the institu
tion of serfdom and forced labour, the service which
was necessary for the cultivation of his property.
In a similar way, the artisans were protected by their
guilds, which, although they were fast dying out,
still existed in rough outline at the beginning of the
nineteenth century. These guilds had the effect of
creating, in every town, a sort of monopoly, based
either upon law or upon usage, in favour of the

CAPITALISTIC ENTERPRISE 5
" masters " of the various trades, and of limiting the
competition between the masters themselves in such
a way as to prevent the appropriation of raw material
and labour by a few individuals and to hinder the
diversion of custom.
This idea of a " competency " gradually gave way
to that of " free enterprise." From the end of the
eighteenth century protestations resounded on every
side against the barriers which barred the path to
private initiative. The old organisation of the rural
community, which, by the partition of an estate and
the inextricable mingling of the allotments, made all
the inhabitants of a village dependent upon each
other and forced them to cultivate their land accord
ing to a traditional plan laid down by the elders
of the place for use throughout the entire area of
cultivation, was set aside. The people rebelled
against the feudal system of a landed aristocracy,
which placed the peasant in a position of absolute
subjection to his lord and denied him the oppor
tunity of ever winning economic independence.
They complained of the countless obstacles placed
by the guilds in the way of the natural growth of
industry and commerce ; but, above all, they pro
tested against the tutelary administration of the
enlightened despotism, which, in the eighteenth
century, reserved for itself all initiative in economic
matters and regulated, down to the smallest detail,
the life and productive powers of the nation. The
physiocrats in France, and Adam Smith in England,
proclaimed the blessings of laisser-faire, and a similar
spirit inspired William of Humboldt, in his celebrated
pamphlet on the " Limits of State Interference "
(1795), to raise an energetic protest against a bureau
cratic system which made man into a machine, cast

6 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
officials in the moulds of slavery, and stifled all inde
pendent action in the masses.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, after
the annihilation of Prussia at Jena, these ideas
tended to gain the upper hand among the patriots,
who set themselves the task of raising their native
land from the dust. In their opinion, the weakness
of Prussia relative to the French Empire was due
to the fact that, whilst in France the Revolution had
roused the whole nation to take a share in public
life, enlightened despotism and the feudal system
had crushed out every trace of spontaneity in Prussia.
They accordingly set themselves the task of awaken
ing the national conscience, of breathing life into
the sluggish mass which constituted the Prussian
State, and of transforming it into an organism
in which every limb was alive and co-operated
freely in the work of the whole system. ThgjL
persuaded^ the king to carry out from abov&-lhe_
Resxilutipn which the French people ^accomplished
from below.
It was imperative for the nation to be set free
from feudal and administrative tutelage. Absolute
rule, which was incapable, on its own resources, of
making good the evils caused by the war, or of pro
viding any effective relief for the various grievances
of private individuals, abdicated its economic pre
rogatives and decided to " suppress every obstacle
which had hitherto been able to prevent any indi
vidual from attaining that degree of prosperity to
which his powers entitled him to raise himself." In
every department of the administration, Stein en
deavoured to introduce the principle of autonomy.
Stein, and afterwards Hardenberg, attempted to
raise the condition of the rural population by abolish-

CAPITALISTIC ENTERPRISE 7
ing serfdom, allowing the redemption of forced
labour, setting the tenant free from his lord's estate,
and the peasant from the village community, and
by favouring the formation of a class of independent
peasantry who possessed their own land. In the
towns they enfranchised the Third Estate by pro
claiming the freedom of industry and commerce,
destroying the guild system, and granting parochial
self-government on a liberal scale. In spite of the
resistance of the feudal party, which succeeded for
many years in preventing this agrarian reform from
being carried into execution, and, in the final liquida
tion of the feudal system, managed to secure enor
mous material advantages, the old order crumbled
away after a hopeless defeat. The State renounced
the right of directing the economic life of the
nation. On a large number of cardinal points it
left a clear field for private initiative, and unchained
the spirit of enterprise, whose ambition had till then
been thwarted by the feudal system and the guilds.
The era of unrestricted competition was inaugurated.
A new class of speculators now sprang into existence
and grew rapidly, at first among the landed pro
prietors, and afterwards among the industrial and
trading classes as well. They were men in whom
the spirit of enterprise had become incarnate, and
who were actuated only by the desire to develop
their economic power indefinitely. It is this class
which from that moment took the lead in the eco
nomic movement ; and in a very short time unre
stricted competition, by utilising for its own ends the
marvellous progress in science and technical processes,
which we have just sketched, succeeded in overturn
ing and transforming with incredible rapidity the
manner of life of the whole nation.

8 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
Let us trace the principal phases of its evolution
during the course of the nineteenth century.
At the beginning of the century, Germany was a
rather poor agricultural country, but little developed
from the economic point of view. It is estimated
that the Empire itself had at that time a population
only of about 25 millions, of whom three-quarters,
at least, lived in the country, and two-thirds were
engaged in agricultural pursuits. There was very
little industry and commerce. Means of communica
tion were few and bad : Prussia in 1816 possessed
only 523 miles of high-roads, and they were execrable ;
the post was slow, inconvenient, and costly. More
over, the Treaties of Vienna sanctioned the political
and economic partition of Germany. As soon as
peace was declared, thirty-eight lines of customs
frontiers paralysed all internal commerce, and, to use
List's well-known description, produced " much the
same result as if one decided to bind up the various
members of the human body in order to prevent the
blood from circulating from one to the other."
Every industrial impulse was, consequently, for the
time being, impossible. Moreover, the economic life
of the nation was still somewhat primitive. The line
of demarcation between agricultural and industrial
pursuits remained very indistinct. The peasant still
fashioned a large number of the utensils, clothes, and
articles of all kinds which he required; and, con
versely, many artisans and journeymen had, in
addition to their trade, a little corner of ground
which they cultivated themselves. Agriculture alone
had been developed, and was even in a prosperous
condition. Important demands for agricultural pro
ducts arose in England owing to the growth of
industry and the increase of urban centres ; while

CAPITALISTIC ENTERPRISE 9
Holland and the Scandinavian countries also became
importers of corn. Now Germany at that time hap
pened to be in a position to export part of her agri
cultural products, and was consequently able to sell
a fairly large quantity of them, especially corn,
abroad. This favourable state of things gave the
landowners the opportunity of improving their
methods of culture ; agricultural processes were
perfected under the able guidance of Thaer, and the
price of land went up. At that moment, for various
reasons, a number of important towns sprang into
existence in the north of Germany, in consequence
of which the spirit of enterprise awoke, and we find
the growth of fairly active speculation in agri
cultural land.
Throughout the first half of the century this state
of things changed very little, but it is possible to
trace the birth of circumstances which a little later
on were to bring about the economic awakening of
Germany. The first factor was the population,
which, in consequence of the agricultural prosperity,
increased by leaps and bounds : between 1816 and
1845 the number of inhabitants rose from 25 millions
to 34| — that is to say, an increase of 38*7 per cent. —
the highest that was ever reached during the century.
Secondly, the establishment of the Zollverein during
the 'thirties had the result of creating in Germany
a territory of 8,253 square miles which was free
from all internal customs and contained a popula
tion of at least 25 million inhabitants. The rhythm
of exchange began to grow more rapid and the
means of communication more frequent. New roads
were made, and under the energetic sway of Nagler,
the Postmaster-General, the postal service became
quicker and more reliable. In 1835 the first rail-

10 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
way line in Germany was built between Nuremberg
and Fiirth, and at the end of ten years— in 1845—
there was a network of 2,131 kilometres of railroad.
At the same time, the first and still feeble indications
of the new spirit of enterprise made their appearance
in the domain of industry. The great mining in
dustry gradually freed itself from the old forms which
fettered its flight, and every day saw the growth of
its own importance. In connection with certain
branches of the textile industry, and especially in
the spinning and weaving of cotton, factories grew
more numerous and tended to monopolise the entire
production. But, generally speaking, the period
between 1820 and 1850 did not produce any decisive
economic progress. About 1820, agriculture even
underwent a crisis which lasted nearly ten years, and
made itself felt by a depression in land values and
numerous bankruptcies. German industry also found
great difficulty in struggling against the crushing
competition of England, which, in default of suffi
ciently high protective tariffs, inundated Germany
with cheap goods. Thus the country went through
a period of difficulty and discomfort, and complaints
were everywhere rife about want of money and hard
times. But directly after the great crisis of 1848 every
thing changed. As the scale of commerce for several
years turned in favour of Germany, money began
once more to flow in and accumulate there. The
price of agricultural products, and consequently the
value of land, showed a steady rise. The triumph
of reactionary principles, moreover, seemed to herald
a period of internal peace. The whole country, sick
of political struggles and the fruitless agitations they
involved, flung itself from that moment with re-

CAPITALISTIC ENTERPRISE 11
doubled energy upon the conquest of material pros
perity and wealth. The spirit of enterprise and
the love of speculation were not confined, as they
had been at the beginning of the century, to a small
fraction of the public, but invaded the lowest layers
of the nation, and once for all took possession of the
business world. During the twenty years which
separated the crisis of 1848-49 from the Franco-
German War, modern capitalistic Germany was
formed. We now find a great increase in credit
banks, such as the Bank fiir Handel und Industrie
zu Darmstadt (founded in 1853) and other similar
institutions whose business consisted in collecting the
financial means necessary for the organisation of
great industrial speculations or means of transport,
and of thus stimulating to the highest possible pitch
the spirit of enterprise which gave them birth and
which kept them alive. Joint-stock companies,
which, in a sense, make speculation democratic and
associate the most modest resources with great
capitalistic enterprises, sprang from the earth on
every side and multiplied with extraordinary rapidity.
It is estimated that in Germany, between 1853 and
1857, the issue of shares in new banks alone amounted
to 200 million thalers, and railway shares to 140
million thalers, whilst a similar increase was shown
in issues of a different nature, such as railway or
industrial bonds, shares in insurance companies,
mining ventures, steam navigation, machinery, sugar
refineries, cotton mills, etc. The years inaugurating
the second half of the century formed the first lap
in the marvellous economic development which was
to place Germany at the head of the industrial nations
of Europe. It was during this period that the net
work of great railways joining the principal towns

12 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
of Germany to each other and the outlying districts
to the centre was built. At the same time, mining
and weaving industries assumed a definitely modern
complexion, whilst in the domain of agriculture,
scientific processes of cultivation were every day
more widely employed.
The four years following the war of 1870 are
known in the economic history of Germany by the
name of Grunderjdhre. The fructifying rain of
wealth due to the millions of the war indemnity
produced a luxuriant and disordered crop of capital
istic enterprises. A veritable debauch of speculation
filled Germany. The economic phenomena which
had followed the crisis of 1848 appeared once more,
but exaggerated beyond all bounds. There was a
formidable inundation of economic activity in all
quarters and a headlong rush for fortune. It is
sufficient to quote one figure to illustrate the extra
ordinary intensity of this movement. The twenty
years between 1851 and 1871 (first half) had seen
the birth of 205 joint-stock companies with a capital
of 2,404 millions of marks. The four years between
1870 (second half) and 1874 witnessed the sprouting
of 857 with a capital of 3,306 millions of marks. As
is only to be expected, a reverberating crash was the
result of this orgy of speculation.
After this violent crisis of growth, the economic
development of Germany assumed a more normal
pace, and during the last thirty years she has made
giant strides along the path of progress. It is true
that German agriculture is in the toils of serious
difficulties. In spite of the remarkable technical pro
gress made during the second half of the century, it
entered upon a critical period, which came slowly into
existence, manifested itself clearly about 1875, and

CAPITALISTIC ENTERPRISE 13
has not even yet passed away. But in the domains
where the spirit of capitalistic enterprise is most
conspicuous, such as banking, transport, industry,
and commerce, German industry has accomplished
marvels. The great law of the " concentration of
capital," in virtue of which modern enterprise tends
to accumulate capital in ever greater masses, to in
crease indefinitely the dimensions of factories, mills,
and institutions of all kinds, to collect ever-growing
armies of workers in them, and to produce ever more
and more enormous bulks of merchandise, is proved
in the case of Germany in the most astounding
manner. During a relatively short lapse of time,
one can trace the extraordinary development in that
country of credit banks,1 of means of communication
1 A few figures will illustrate better than any theoretic explana
tions the progress achieved by Germany in the organisation of
credit and the tendency towards concentration in financial matters.
In 1846 there were, in Prussia, 1,100 persons engaged in finance
and in the employment of 442 establishments, which gives a pro
portion of 658 employees to 442 employers. In 1895 there were
17,896 persons employed in 2,763 establishments, which gives
15,133 employees to 2,763 employers, or an average of about 6
men to each master. The first great credit banks in Germany,
the Darmstadter Bank and the Diskontogesellschaft, were founded,
the former in 1853 with a capital of 6'8 millions of marks, the
latter in 1856 with a capital of 37'2 millions of marks. At the
beginning of the twentieth century, the principal German bank,
the Deutsche Bank, was carrying on business with a capital of
257 millions of marks (including the reserve funds) ; and the seven
largest credit banks possessed, in 1905, in subscribed and reserve
capital, a, total of nearly 1,400 millions of marks. The average
daily circulation of bank-notes increased from 120 milhons of marks
about 1850 to 1,316 milhons of marks in 1900 and 1,485 milhons
in 1905. The circulation of bills in the Konigliche Bank of Berhn
in 1820 was about 1J millions of marks ; the total sum of bills
discounted at the Reichsbank reached, in 1905, nearly 9,000 millions
of marks. In the principal banks of the Empire, the annual average
of the sum-total of discounted bills reached 5'26 thousand milhons
of marks per annum from 1876-80, 20'4 thousand milhons of marks
from 1896-1900, and 28'6 from 1901-1905. At the same time, the

14 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
and transport business, railway, river, and sea
traffic, postal, telegraphic, and telephonic1 services,
total annual amount of the transfer operations in deposit accounts
rose from 3,500 milhons of marks in 1875 (Preussische Bank and
Hamburger Bank) to 164,000 millions of marks in 1900 in the
Reichsbank and 222,000 millions in 1905, whilst the sum-total of
settlements carried out by the agency of the Clearing Houses,
founded by the Reichsbank, rose from 12 '1 thousand millions of
marks in 1884 to 29'5 thousand milhons in 1900 and 37'6 thousand
milhons in 1905. (The majority of the figures I give have been
either supphed or verified by the Board of Financial Investigation
of the Credit Lyonnais, to whom I take this opportunity of ex
pressing my gratitude for their courtesy.)
1 Let me once more quote some typical figures. The network
of roads in Germany increased from 30,000 kil. in 1857 to 96,000
kil. in 1900 ; the railroads from 469 kil. in 1840 to 54,164 kil. in
1905; her revenues are over 500,000 millions of marks; her
maritime fleet rose from a tonnage of 500,000 about 1850 to 2
million tons in 1900 and Z\ million in 1905 ; she has thus become
the second maritime power of the world, with a fleet inferior only
to the English Navy. At the same time, there is a noticeable in
crease in the size and power of vehicles and in the number of
passengers and amount of goods they transport. Large four-horse
waggons used to carry at most 5 or 6 tons of merchandise ;
when the railways were first opened, an engine drew 40 waggons
of 2 tons apiece — that is to say, 80 tons — -whilst at the present
moment it draws 100 waggons of 10 tons — that is to say, 1,000 tons.
The large boats which bear the traffic of the Rhine carried 400 tons
in 1840, 800 in 1880, 2,000 in 1900. The average tonnage of the
ships in the Port of Hamburg rose from 187 tons between 1841 and
1845 to 1,233 for the year 1900 ; the steamship Wilhelm II. alone is
a vessel of 19,500 tons — that is to say, half the tonnage of the whole
fleet of Hamburg about 1840, which consisted of 211 ships with a
tonnage of 39,670 ; the engines of the Great Eastern about 1850
rose to 3,000 horse-power, whilst those of the large steamers of
to-day reach 40,000 h.p. The circulation of travellers and goods
has increased in similar proportions. In 1834 the stage-coach
service carried about 1 million passengers ; in 1905 it carried
over 3 millions by road; but to this number we must add
the 1,000 million passengers who travelled by rail in 1905, besides
the 761J millions of townspeople who used the tramways and
those who patronised the 15,410 cabs on the streets of the towns
(1899). It is estimated that in 1846 there were, within the con
fines of the Zollverein, 38,349 horses in use for the transport of
passengers and goods whose total power was computed at 130

CAPITALISTIC ENTERPRISE 15
and large industries of every description. The total
annual production of the mining and metal industries
in Germany, which about 1800 represented a gross
value estimated at about 25 millions of marks,
reached in 1900 a value of about 4,000 millions of
marks.1 Chemical industry, which was still insignifi-
millions of kilometric tons ; the power in use in 1900 on the net
work of railways is estimated at about 37,000 millions of kilo-
metric tons, which is equivalent to the work done by about 11
milhon horses. The traffio in the Port of Hamburg, which in 1831
amounted to a tonnage of 232,000, rose to 8 milhon tons in 1900
and 9J milhon tons in 1905; for the aggregate of German ports,
it has increased from 6,228,000 tons in 1873 to 18 million tons in
1900 and 22 '4 milhon tons in 1905. Comparative statistics of the
river and canal traffic show an enormous increase during the last
quarter of the century : it is reckoned that the total traffic of the
five principal ports (Duisburg, Ruhrort, Mannheim, Berhn, Magde
burg) rose from 7,761,000 tons in 1882 to 28,813,000 tons in la03,
whilst at the same time the import and export trade in the Rhine
ports rose from 6,400,000 to 36,100,000 tons. Lastly, correspon
dence has developed to colossal proportions. Whilst about 1851 the
average was about 3 letters a head, it is estimated that every
German received on an average 5857 letters or cards in 1900 and
72 '26 in 1904. The total number of postal packages of all kinds
has reached nearly 7,000 milhons a year. In 1850, 35,000 tele
graphic messages were sent, in 1904, 46 milhons; and the telephone,
which in 1881 served 7 localities with 1,504 call offices, served,
in 1904, 22,792 localities with 515,300 pubhc and private call
offices. 1 The progress lately achieved by the mining and metal in
dustries will be realised from the following figures. In 1880 the
output of coal was about 50 milhon tons and of cast iron 2 "7
million tons. In 1905 the figures are respectively 121 milhon tons
and almost 11 milhon tons. As a producer of iron and steel, Ger
many since 1903 has outstripped England and is second only to the
United States. Motor-power has increased in similar porportions.
About 1840 there were barely 500 motors in the whole territory
of the Zollverein; in 1873 the sum-total of motor-power already
exceeded a milhon horse-power; in 1895 it reached 3'4 milhon, and
it is estimated that since that time it has increased again by yO
or 100 per cent. Mulhall has made a calculation of the total
power (human, animal, or mechanical) in use in Germany, and
taking as his unit the force necessary to raise a weight ot 1 ton

16 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
cant towards the middle of the century, increased
rapidly, especially during the last twenty years of
the nineteenth century, and actually produced an
output the total value of which was estimated at
1,250 millions of marks in 1905. Electrical industry,
the latest result of the great creative impulses due to
the spirit of capitalistic enterprise, increased with
extraordinary rapidity after 1880 and especially
after 1895, triumphantly surmounted a formidable
crisis during the opening years of the twentieth
century, and carries on its work to-day with a capital
of nearly 625 millions of marks, and represents, if we
include the capital involved in electric installations,
a gross value of about 2,500 millions of marks. Thus,
at the beginning of the twentieth century, German
industry has risen to an unprecedented degree of
power and prosperity, of which those who are engaged
in it are justifiably proud. Animated by an extra
ordinary creative activity, it increases its enterprises
with a rapidity and a boldness which baffle the
imagination. The years between 1895 and 1899
especially formed a period of peculiarly great economic
activity. During these five years, the net sum-total
of stocks issued exceeded 10,000 millions of marks, of
which over 1,250 millions consisted of bank shares,
and over 2,250 millions of industrial stock. And if the
first years of the twentieth century were inaugurated
by a fairly serious crisis, the business market shows
clear signs to-day of complete recovery. Whereas in
1900 the sum-total of stocks issued (in shares, bonds,
and loans) was estimated at 1,500 millions of marks ;
in 1905 it was over 3,000 millions.
On the whole, therefore, the result of the last few
to a height of 1 foot, he has estimated that in 1840 there were
310 units of power per head, in 1860, 415, and in 1895 about 900.

CAPITALISTIC ENTERPRISE 17
years has been a brilliant triumph for German in
dustry and commerce. Fifteen years ago Germany
ranked fourth among the commercial powers, and
gave precedence to England, France, and the United
States. To-day, whilst France has sunk from the
second to the fourth place, Germany, outstripping
both France and the United States, has won the
second place. The sum-total of her commerce rose,
in 1905, to 12*7 thousand millions of marks, of which
seven consisted of imports and 5*7 thousand millions
of exports.1 She is even threatening the traditional
commercial supremacy of England. The gross value
of her industrial productions is estimated, according
to American statistics, at over 2,900 millions of
dollars, which is 650 millions above that of France
(2,245 millions) and inferior only to that of England
(4,100 millions) and the United States (7,000 millions).
1 The corresponding figures are : England 19'3, the United
States 11 '8, and France 7 '6 thousand millions of marks.

CHAPTER II
the effects of the system of enterprise
upon the old forms of industry

After having described the system of capitalistic
enterprise, and depicted its chief manifestations, we
must now consider how it has modified the old forms
of economic activity, domestic industry, the crafts
man's work, and agricultural life.
The importance from the earliest times until quite
recently of home industries among rural populations
is well known. Until about the middle of the last
century, the German peasant differed very little from
his prototype of ancient days, who, with the help of
his household, was almost entirely self-supporting.
Even when the nineteenth century was in full swing,
the German peasant did not limit himself to pro
ducing the simple necessities of life, but, in addition,
utilised his leisure moments to fashion for himself
the various things he required. He was his own
baker and his own butcher. He used to spin and
weave the wool or the flax required for his clothes
and linen. He was able to build and repair his own
house with its wooden framework, its loam-coated
walls, and its thatched roof, and was enough of a
blacksmith and wheelwright, if occasion demanded, to
make and keep in repair his agricultural implements
18

EFFECTS UPON INDUSTRY 19
and carts of all kinds. When he was not in a position
to make what he wanted himself, he had recourse to
the help of workmen and tradespeople — the tailor,
the cobbler, the carpenter — whom he generally had
to work under his own supervision in his own house.
Only in very exceptional circumstances was he
obliged to turn to outside aid and buy in the market
or the town articles or provisions which he was
unable to produce by his own industry. Generally
speaking, the peasant was still able to supply himself
with all the essentials he required, and he was almost
entirely independent of the fluctuation of prices or
the working of the law of supply and demand.
During the second half of the century, this
patriarchal state of things underwent a rapid modifi
cation. Workers confined themselves more and more
exclusively to one speciality and produced this, no
longer merely for their own use, but for the market,
and with the proceeds bought the various neces
sities of life. Political economists quote as a typical
example the case of the peasant woman of Hagsfeld,
in the province of Baden, who declared she no longer
even had the time to do the family washing herself at
home, but sent it to the steam-laundry at Karlsruhe.
It is true that every German housewife has not yet
come to such a pass, and in many of the rural dis
tricts, both urban and rural, domestic work is held in
high esteem. Nevertheless, it plays, on the whole, an
ever smaller part in the economic life of the middle-
classes and peasantry. If industry on a large scale
has reached ever-increasing dimensions, and if the
proportion of the population engaged in industrial
pursuits has grown enormously during the course of
the last century, one of the chief reasons for this
development is to be found precisely in the dis-

20 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
appearance of domestic work. Articles once made in
leisure hours round the family hearth are to-day
manufactured wholesale by specialists. Consequently,
the apparently prodigious growth of industry can be
at least partially explained by the gradual specialisa
tion of economic activity. The peasant confined
himself more and more rigorously to purely agri
cultural pursuits ; he gave up home industry and
supplied his wants in this sphere, by means of an
ever-increasing class of industrial craftsmen who had
nothing whatever to do with agriculture.
Where home industry still survived, it completely
changed in character, owing to a series of consecutive
transformations. The peasant who used to employ
the leisure moments which his work in the fields
allowed him, in the exercise of some supplementary
trade worked for himself and not with the object
of selling his goods to the general public. Little by
little, however, we find him labouring with an eye
to the market. He joined some friends in working
a mine ; he became a weaver or a worker in metal or
wood. He thus turned into an industrial worker on
a small scale and circulated his wares by means of
pedlars. Then his condition changed ; from being an
independent craftsman he gradually sank to a posi
tion of dependence upon the big town merchant from
whom he received his raw material and the implements
necessary for his work. He thus, in fact, became
simply the paid servant of a master, who found it
profitable to allow his employees to work at home
instead of collecting them into shops and factories.
The craftsman, moreover, was at first protected to a
certain extent by the State, which subjected the
employers to the minutest regulations of an officious
fiscal legislation, exercised a strict supervision over

EFFECTS UPON INDUSTRY 21
them, and prevented them from sweating their under
lings. This form of home industry was fairly
flourishing at the beginning of the nineteenth century.
In the mountainous and barren districts of Central
Germany, and especially in Silesia, the Erzgebirge,
the Frankenwald, the Hartz Mountains, and West
phalia, a large part of the population was engaged
in the textile industry. But this form of home
industry was also condemned to disappear before the
progress of industry on a large scale. It was im
possible for the single craftsman who carried on his
trade by hand to compete with mechanical work
produced by the help of machinery and by workers
collected in a factory. In order to meet this crush
ing competition, the contractors, who gradually
freed themselves from State supervision, had no
alternative but to reduce the salaries of their
work-people, whom they thereby condemned to the
direst poverty and sometimes even to the horrors
of starvation. Every one has heard of the terrible
straits to which the Silesian workers found them
selves reduced during the 'forties, and their sufferings
and revolts have been immortalised by Gerhard
Hauptmann in his famous play The Weavers. The
final result was almost always the disappearance of
home industry. In every case where it had once
existed — in the mining and textile industries and in
various minor branches of the metal industry — whole
sale manufacture, concentrated in a mill or factory,
gained the upper hand once for all.
Whilst home industry thus died out more and
more completely in the rural districts, we find it, on
the other hand, reviving under a new form in the
large towns, such as Berlin and Stettin, Frankfort,
Nuremberg and Stuttgart, Munich and Barmen-

22 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
Elberfeld. In these places, during the second half
of the century, a flourishing industry sprang up for
the production of clothes and linen. These industries
are now concentrated in the hands of a few great
firms, who employ a large number of hands working
either at home or in small workshops under the
supervision of sub-contractors. But we all know the
price paid for this prosperity and the ludicrous
salaries which the large manufacturers and their
middlemen can impose upon the unfortunate men
and women whom they sweat and condemn only too
often to poverty or prostitution. Home work, which
is so difficult to supervise or regulate, thus entails
the most glaring abuses, and its history in every
country is, without a doubt, one of the most shocking
chapters in the evolution of capitalism.

II
Just as the growth of capitalism proved fatal
to home industry, it also completely destroyed the
" trades " guilds.
The old-fashioned " master " was a sort of manu
facturer on a small scale, who combined in his own
person the functions of capitalist, employer, qualified
craftsman, and tradesman. He was an independent
producer, who worked on his own account, together
with the members of his family and a few journey
men and apprentices, who formed part of his house
hold. Under these conditions his ambition could
not soar very high. He did not aspire to extend his
sphere of action indefinitely or to exploit his under
lings unduly. Moreover, the guild system, which still
survived in rough outline at the beginning of the
nineteenth century, would not have allowed him to

EFFECTS UPON INDUSTRY 23
develop his business beyond certain limits. This
system had the effect, in short, of securing to each
master a sphere of activity in which he was scarcely
troubled at all by outside competition, but which,
on the other hand, he himself could not extend. By
establishing in every town a sort of monopoly in
favour of the masters, by limiting the number of
masters in each district, by forbidding the cornering
of raw material, by defining the number of journey
men and apprentices which each master might
employ, and by punishing the diversion of custom,
it protected the " master " against the competition
of outside rivals or of his fellow guildsmen in the
same town, whilst at the same time it prevented him
from raising himself above a very modest pinnacle of
prosperity. The guild system, which was fast falling into decay
at the beginning of the century, disappeared com
pletely about the middle of the nineteenth century.
The first crisis took place during the 'forties. The
old regulations gradually fell to pieces. Complaints
grew louder on every side : the apprentices and
journeymen rebelled against the guild rules, and the
limits assigned to each guild in the division of labour
were no longer regarded ; everywhere privateers
(Bonhasen) sprang into existence, and were, as a
rule, not prosecuted. In vain did the labour parlia
ment which met at Frankfort in 1848, side by side
with the national parliament (middle of July to
middle of August 1848), protest at its first session
against industrial freedom — in vain did it demand
the restoration of the guild regulations of the Middle
Ages. The tide which was hurrying the whole epoch
towards a system of unrestricted competition could
not be stemmed. The old order crumbled away in

24 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
spite of the fruitless efforts of legislators to save it.
The whole of the labouring class, the whole of that
lower middle class, which had been so modest, hard
working, thrifty, and respectful of tradition, saw the
customs of centuries swept away, and was violently
shaken by a crisis which attacked the very founda
tions of its existence. The masters, the most am
bitious and the most easy-going alike, tried harder
every day to free themselves from the guild regula
tions. They accepted the system of competition,
increased the number of their apprentices and
journeymen, introduced division of labour, created
specialisation, and organised their system of employ
ment to the best advantage without regard for old
customs. In short, they became small contractors,
made a position for themselves in the new order of
society, and succeeded, thanks to their activity and
business instinct, in maintaining their economic
activity. Those of a less energetic frame of mind
clung to the old routine, and were hurried more or
less speedily to final disaster, in the midst of fruitless
lamentations over the bad times, the decay of the
old customs and ancient privileges. Many lost
heart, gave up business, and became petty officials,
or found employment on the railways or in some
industrial or commercial enterprise. Others, more
particularly in Swabia and the Palatinate, emigrated
in large numbers, and went to seek their fortunes
beyond the seas, especially in South and South- West
America. And lastly, many who were less enter
prising, were content to leave town for the country,
where, in spite of the jeers of their urban brethren,
they ended by taking root and making a suitable
position for themselves. The artisan and craftsman
class, transformed in this way by the influence of the

EFFECTS UPON INDUSTRY 25
spirit of enterprise, roughly maintained its position
for a quarter of a century longer.
Nevertheless, about 1880 there began to be dis
cerned the indications of a fresh crisis, which was
more terrible and severe than the first, and threatened
to deprive workers once for all of the last vestiges
of economic independence. This crisis was not, like
the first one, caused by the entrance of new psychic
elements into the working class — it was due to the
crushing competition which the single worker in
every branch of economic activity had to meet on
the part of colossal industrial enterprises.
In short, wholesale production, concentrated in a
factory or a mill, established its superiority more
and more firmly every day, and steadily gained
ground. In every domain and every branch of
human industry, the small producer and the inde
pendent craftsman found themselves gradually wiped
out by the very force of circumstances. The retreat
from the old position was manifested everywhere,
not only in the large and small towns, but even in
the country, where the peasant grew more and more
accustomed to buying cheap ready-made articles
supplied him by large firms. Every profession found
itself faced by a similar menace. The progress of
colossal industries was not equally swift in every
department : it was rather more rapid in the clothing
industry, for example, and in furniture ; somewhat
slower in food stuffs and the building trade. But
there is nothing to show that this process will end
before it has secured the triumph of capitalism at
every point.
Practically speaking, craftsmen belonging to nearly
every kind of trade — carpenters, cobblers, tailors,
masons, thatchers, etc. — had already fallen under the

26 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
more or less disguised dominion of some capitalistic
contractor, and were thus really in a position quite
as dependent as that of the factory hand, although
nominally they were still free. Thus builders were
dependent on the contractor who could provide them
with work, carpenters were at the mercy of the
furniture dealer, who bought the articles they made
at a low price, and tailors depended upon the clothier
who gave them orders. In the most favourable
circumstances, the worker could become a capitalist
on a small scale — a sort of cross between the old
master and the wholesale manufacturer ; he could
still earn an honest livelihood as a baker, a butcher,
a bespoke tailor, a locksmith, a cabinet-maker, etc.
But he always ended by having to face the competi
tion of large industries. Sometimes these entirely
monopolised the production of an article and only
left repairs to craftsmen (as in the bootmaking trade).
Sometimes they produced nearly every article and
only left to the craftsmen installations, alterations,
and repairs (the locksmith's trade). Sometimes they
monopolised the production of certain articles in
such a way that they were made partly in the factory
and partly in the shop or by hand (joinery). Lastly,
they sometimes appropriated to themselves the
fabrication of a small number of special articles and
allowed the old arrangements to continue more or
less as before (butchers and bakers).
On the whole, the class of independent craftsmen
was rapidly dying out. It is true that according to
statistics there was still an aggregate of about two
million craftsmen. It is also true that there was even
an absolute increase in their number ; thus, between
1834 and 1895 the number of craftsmen in Prussia
showed an increase of nearly 450,000. But the

EFFECTS UPON INDUSTRY 27
number of craftsmen in proportion to the total popula
tion seems to have diminished a little — in Prussia it
dropped, during the period above mentioned, from
4'1 per cent, to 3*7 per cent. ; whilst in social im
portance the working class fell much lower than
statistics can show. The craftsman, who was once a
free agent, was now only free in name, and his con
dition, except in rare cases, differed very little from
that of the ordinary member of the masses.

CHAPTER III
THE EFFECT OF CAPITALISTIC ENTERPRISE
UPON AGRICULTURE
The effect which the rise of the spirit of enterprise
had upon the development of German agriculture is
far less striking than that produced in the domain
of industry during the same lapse of time. It has
even been pointed out that, superficially, Germany,
judging from the distribution of agrarian property,
changed very little during the last century. About
1800 there existed, and still exist to this day, dis
tricts where large estates predominated (the country
east of the Elbe), others where there were large num
bers of peasant proprietors (Schleswig, Hanover,
Westphalia, Brunswick), and yet others where
moderate-sized and small estates were the rule (the
region south-west of the valley of the Rhine). More
over, the most varied types of undertakings subsisted
peacefully side by side, without any particular
one showing signs of definitely gaining the upper-
hand in the near future. But it was none the less
certain that German agriculture had undergone a
series of fundamental internal transformations, of
which I will endeavour to trace the principal features.
In the first place, agricultural products had in
creased enormously. This result was due chiefly to
the fact that the surface of the ground had been more
28

EFFECTS UPON AGRICULTURE 29
fully utilised since the development of husbandry,
which had considerably reduced pasture and fallow
land. In this connection, it is estimated that the
ground occupied by fields and gardens was a quarter,
perhaps even a third, as much again as it was during
the previous century. This, however, was due
principally to the perfection reached in technical
processes. Scientific knowledge about the conditions
necessary for the growth of vegetable produce, and
especially the great discoveries of Liebig in the
domain of agricultural chemistry, had the result of
substituting rational methods for the old rules-of-
thumb. The old plan of triennial distribution gave
way to that of the rotation of crops, which in its turn
was supplanted by the system of intensive cultiva
tion through the aid of chemical manures. The old
primitive instruments used by the peasants in the
Middle Ages were gradually replaced by complicated
agricultural machines of all kinds — steam ploughs
and engines for sowing, weeding, and thrashing —
whose numbers multiplied particularly rapidly after
about 1880. The culture of paying crops was
developed at the expense of those which were less
remunerative. Side by side with agricultural con
cerns, factories sprang up, where the products of
the soil underwent a transformation into industrial
commodities : the beetroot grower, for instance, be
came a sugar-refiner as well, the potato planter a
distiller. The methods of afforestation and the rear
ing of cattle were gradually brought to perfection,
and the results obtained became every day more
fruitful. The output per acre continued to increase.
The number of head of cattle of all kinds grew to
considerable proportions, the stock was improved,
and the average weight of the animals went up. In

30 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
short, it is estimated that the sum-total of agricul
tural production has increased at least two, if not
threefold, during the last hundred years. As, more
over, the number of rural labourers has not multiplied
in similar proportions, it seems evident that, owing
to the progress made in technical processes, the pro
ductivity of agricultural labour has increased enor
mously during the last century. It is not possible,
however, yet to decide to what extent it has done
so, or whether at the present time this capacity for
production is tending to increase or diminish, and
whether, therefore, the working of the law of the
gradual exhaustion of the soil is making itself felt
in Germany or not.
But if, both in agriculture and industry, we find
that progress has been based upon the employment
of more rational technical processes, their respective
modes of development are nevertheless exceedingly
different. Whilst in industry, as we have pointed
out, capital became concentrated in ever more colossal
enterprises, this law did not make its action felt in
the domain of agriculture, where we do not find that
large enterprises tend to expand indefinitely. On
the contrary, they seldom reach more than modest
dimensions, and cultivated properties of over 2,500
acres are the rarest exceptions. Neither do we
observe that small or moderate-sized concerns are
fatally inferior to the large ones. Not only do the
former survive, but a diminution — very slight, it is
true — in large properties may even be discerned.
Moreover, we do not see in agricultural enterprises
that tendency towards specialisation which is so
characteristic of industry. On the contrary, it would
seem that to-day a greater variety of produce is
obtained by any one concern than was the case a

EFFECTS UPON AGRICULTURE 31
hundred years ago. It is impossible to hold the
theory that the capitalist who works a large estate
can produce more cheaply than the ordinary culti
vator, and that wholesale production is consequently
an economic necessity in agriculture. It is, there
fore, incorrect to say that just as small industries
are stifled by large ones, the peasant, finding it im
possible to struggle against the competition of great
landed proprietors, is hastening to irretrievable
disaster. Nevertheless, the new spirit shows itself in agri
cultural life as well, by a series of characteristic
symptoms. The most important of these is the revolution which
took place during the first half of the nineteenth
century in the management of agrarian property, by
which private cultivation was substituted for col
lective cultivation.
About 1800 a country village was still a sort of
collectivist settlement. Each peasant or member of
the community was given a Hufe, or privilege of
having a share in the general possessions of the village,
such as cultivated land, rivers and ponds, roads and
lanes, meadow-lands and forests. By virtue of this
principle, every member of the association had the
right to possess property enough to employ his own
activity and to draw from it the products necessary
for the sustenance of himself and his family. The
Hufe thus included : a farm and its appurtenances,
which was the private property of the peasant ; the
rightof using the unapportioned part of thecommonty,
or Allmende, as it was called ; and lastly a certain
amount of arable land. But this arable land was
never leased to one man alone. At the time when
the village was founded, the total area of arable

32 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
land (Flur) had been divided up into a certain
number of sections — thirty to forty — each containing
ground of about the same quality ; and in each
of these sections every peasant family had been
allotted a Morgen or J och — that is to say, as much
land as a yoke of oxen could plough in one morning.
Under these circumstances, and in spite of the modifi
cations which had taken place, the arable land
belonging to a village was still, at the beginning of
the nineteenth century, divided into hundreds, and
sometimes thousands, of allotments, and each peasant
owned a large number of these plots scattered over
the whole territory of the village. Now, this parti
tion of arable land (Gemengelage) necessarily resulted
in a collective system of cultivation. As the allot
ments were all mixed up together, and an owner had
no means of access to his property except through
his neighbour's field, the entire area of cultivation
was worked according to a plan laid down by the
elders of the village. By the law of Flurzwang each
peasant was bound to grow a particular plant in a
given piece of land, and to begin to till the ground
or to gather in the harvest at fixed dates. In short,
his right to possess the land he cultivated was defined
by a series of exceedingly strict obligations which
prevented him from organising the culture of his
property as he liked, and subjected him, on a large
number of points, to the decisions of the whole
community. Nevertheless, the peasant, in the course of cen
turies, nearly always fell into economic or social
dependence upon the overlord or large landowner.
This dependence was represented, at the beginning
of the nineteenth century, by two kinds of obliga
tions. The peasant paid rent, either in money or

EFFECTS UPON AGRICULTURE 33
in kind, to the overlord, in his capacity as master of
the soil (Grundherr). In districts where this was the
only imposition, nothing was altered in the typical
organisation of the village which has already been
described. Secondly, the peasant was bound to give
his lord, in his capacity as owner of the domain,
gratuitous labour for the cultivation of his private
property (Frondienst). In such cases, the overlord
was the owner of pieces of land scattered about in
the midst of those belonging to his peasants or
tenants, who were bound to cultivate, in addition to
their own fields, the plots belonging to the lord.
Agricultural labour was managed, through the whole
area of cultivation, by the head of the rural com
munity — the Schulze — who was the lord's agent. The
rights which the tenant had over his land were
consequently quite precarious, and the overlord
practically considered himself the co-proprietor of all
rural holdings. Though he no longer had the power
of appropriating the land of the peasants to his own
use, nor of allowing his fields to lie fallow, he still,
at least, possessed the right of replacing one tenant
by another, and consequently of turning a peasant
out of his holding, of transferring him to another
holding which was either better or worse than the
old one, or even of reducing him to the position of a
day labourer. Bound by the system of forced labour,
chained to the soil by the prohibition to leave his
lord's territory without the consent of his master,
without any right of appeal against the arbitrary
will of the overlord and his agents, the peasant, under
these circumstances, was nothing more than a hard-
worked beast of burden, who would have made good
his escape if he had not been bound to the land by
the ties of serfdom.
3

34 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
Now the liquidation of feudal property took place
throughout Germany during the first half of the
nineteenth century. The process varied in rapidity
and thoroughness in different districts. It began, as
a rule, during the first few years of the century, only
to be completed after the revolution of 1848 under
the pressure of new economic and social conditions.1
But everywhere it had the definite result of emanci
pating the peasant from the control of the overlord,
or of the rural community, and making him the
absolute and independent owner of his own property.
Let us examine a little more closely the consequences
of this change for the landlord and the peasant.
As far as the large landowner was concerned, the
transition from the old order of things to the new
was carried out without much difficulty. The owner
of ancestral estates had long before 1800 become a
commercial man who ran his estate by means of the
unpaid work provided by forced labour. It is true
that the agrarian reforms deprived him of gratuitous
labour. But, in the first place, he received a large
compensation in kind, either in land or in money
paid for the redemption of taxes, forced labour and
liabilities, in consideration of which he consented to
give to the peasants the liberty of which he had
formerly deprived them without indemnity. Secondly,
he was not slow to discover that free labour, on the
whole, was a good exchange for the old forced labour
he had had the right to demand from his tenants.
1 In Prussia there were four distinct stages in this process of
liquidation : First, Stein's edict of October 7, 1807, abolishing
serfdom ; second, Hardenberg's Regulirungsedikt and Landea-
kulturedikt of September 14, 1811 ; third, the Gemeinheitsteilunga-
ordnung of July 7, 1821 ; and fourth, the edict of March 2, 1850,
which once more set in motion the reforms which had been stopped
by the opposition of those whom they hit.

EFFECTS UPON AGRICULTURE 35
It is true that he had to pay for it, which he had not
done before. But, on the other hand, he got more
profitable work ; as early as 1809 Thaer calculated
that two free labourers did as much work as three
forced ones. Moreover, once their wages were paid,
the master was free from all responsibility towards
them, and did not have to trouble his head about
procuring them a livelihood. So that, under the
new system, it was possible for him, when work was
pressing, to hire a whole army of labourers, whom
he could dismiss at a moment's notice without having
to consider what would become of them when he
no longer required their services.
The liquidation of feudal estates under these cir
cumstances only had the result of developing among
the landowners a class of capitalistic contractors.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, a land
owner did not regard his property merely from the
point of view of the profit he could derive from it.
He saw in it the hereditary cradle of his race and
the basis of his social power, as well as the source
of his competency. His primary object was to get
from the land the products necessary for the susten
ance of himself, his family, and his tenants ; only
after this had been secured did he aim at a surplus
destined for sale and to bring in money. Now every
thing changed. In the first place, the large land
owner is not necessarily of noble birth. Whilst
at the end of the eighteenth century no burgess
was allowed to possess titled property, it is an
ascertained fact that about 1800, in the eastern pro
vinces of Prussia alone, 7,086 estates out of 11,065
belonged to commoners who could only have acquired
them by the payment of money. In the second
place, the landed proprietor, when he lost his

36 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
seigniorial rights, ceased to have any jurisdiction
over his people, and, consequently, found himself in
the same position with regard to the labourers he
hired as the manufacturer was in respect to his
workmen. The natural tie which once united the
overlord to his property was thus considerably
weakened. The modern landlord came to regard his
estate more and more as a source of revenue, as
capital which should be rationally exploited and the
highest possible rate of interest secured — property
which could be leased to a farmer in order to avoid
the trouble of personal administration, or sold to
a new owner as soon as a favourable opportunity
occurred. If, in spite of all, the remembrance of the
old order has survived even in our own day ; if a
few old titled estates are still managed as they were
in patriarchal times, and if in many cases the change
to capitalism has been far from complete, many
landowners, on the other hand, have become true
business men, who have deposit accounts at the
Reichsbank, keep their books as accurately as a
trading firm, and administer their domains accord
ing to the principles of a rational utilitarianism which
is utterly devoid of all sentiment.
As far as the peasant was concerned, agrarian reform
meant emancipation either from the dominion of the
overlord or from that of the village community. On
the one hand, the tenant became, on the payment of
rent, the owner of his own farm and free to dispose
of his property and his person as he pleased ; whilst
the peasant, on the other, was liberated from his
obligations to the village community. The All-
menden were divided among those who had a clajm
to them ; the rights of usage were redeemed ; the
Gemengelage was abolished by consolidating the

EFFECTS UPON AGRICULTURE 37
various allotments belonging to one owner into the
property of a single tenant or into a small number
of fair-sized plots. Thus we find the revival of the
primitive system of a class of peasant proprietors
free from all seigniorial or municipal control, at
liberty to manage as they please and on their own
responsibility the property which they possess in
their own persons and share with no one. What is
the result of this transformation for the rural popu
lation ?
The individualisation of property has, without a
doubt, been a good thing for the intelligent and in
dustrious peasant. It has allowed him to free him
self from routine, to get the best he can out of his
property, to derive advantage from the progress of
technical science in agriculture — in short, to become
a contractor on a small scale. And as the redemption
of rights of usage put him in possession of a little
capital, he found himself able to make some necessary
improvements in his land. The bound made by
German agriculture during the nineteenth century,
the large increase in the output of the soil, and the
rapid growth of population prove that the liquida
tion of feudal property really provided the means of
progress for at least one section of the peasant class.
For others, on the contrary, it was practically disas
trous. The small tenant, who was only allotted a
little bit of land not large enough to provide him
with a Hvelihood, and the incapable or unlucky peasant
who did not succeed in managing his property well,
found themselves much worse off. The destruction
of the strong tie which once bound the inhabitants
oi a village to each other, or the tenants to their
landlords, had the effect of exposing every day to
the most rigorous consequences of the law of com-

38 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
petition a number of poor people for whom it was
impossible to be self-supporting by their own unaided
efforts. It is true that the peasant, unlike the small shop
keeper or industrial worker, did not toil merely with
the object of selling his goods, but to a large extent
with a view to his own needs. He thus to some
degree escaped the most disastrous results of capita
listic competition. In fact, in theory there is no
reason why a peasant family which once lived on its
own property and produced all it required should
not still be self-supporting to-day. If it works for
its own requirements, and not to produce an article
destined for sale, obviously it can be independent
of the current price of corn, and has nothing to fear
from the competition of a better equipped producer
or a more clever husbandman, for the simple reason
that it does not compete with any one. But all this
changes from the moment the peasant requires
money, and is consequently obliged to sell all or part
of his harvest. If he is ill equipped or unskilful, and
if in consequence his work is not highly productive,
he must of necessity come to a point when he can
no longer produce enough to earn the sum of money
he requires ; or, with the same result to himself, he
will be obliged to sell his goods at a price which,
whilst it is still sufficiently remunerative to his rivals,
means ruination to him. Now the peasant, under
present conditions, must have money. Even if he
could succeed in producing all he consumes, as he
did in the good old days, and even assuming that he
could keep himself out of debt, a capitalistic State
takes good care to put him under an obligation,
without his permission, by forcing him to take his
share in the public expensja~ Taxation is the factor

EFFECTS UPON AGRICULTURE 39
that spells ruination to the peasant. Willy-nilly, he
must work for the market ; he must make good the
inferiority of his primitive equipment and his super
annuated methods of culture by exceedingly heavy
toil. Whilst he is exceedingly hard upon himself, he
exploits unmercifully those whom he employs on his
small estate — his wife and children, his man-servant,
his maid-servant, and his day labourers. In spite of
all, he only keeps his head above water with diffi
culty ; he is at the mercy of the slightest accident, a
bad harvest, or an illness. Despite the most desperate
efforts, the moment irrevocably arrives when the
unfortunate man is obliged to mortgage his estates.
This is the prelude to the inevitable catastrophe,
because, in addition to his old difficulties, he is now
obliged to pay the interest on his debts : before he
can sit down to table himself he must satisfy his
creditors. It is true he no longer, as he once did,
runs the risk of being turned out of his property by
fraud or violence ; but he has not gained much by
the change, for from the day that he becomes in
solvent he has his land taken away from him as
before — and, moreover, under the full sanction of the
law, which is a very poor consolation. The rural
populations, who used to live without moving for
centuries, now find themselves rudely uprooted and
dispersed. Numberless tenants evicted from their
little bit of land, and peasants ruined and bankrupt,
are obliged either to emigrate or to go to the towns,
where they swell the ever-increasing army of un
skilled industrial labourers.
The condition of rural workers is even worse — the
owners of diminutive holdings, small farmers and
cotters, or simple day labourers— who try to make
a living by their toil. The chief cause of their hard-

40 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
ships is that the large landowner who gives them
work does not need their services all through the
year, but only during the agricultural seasons, which
have been very much curtailed by the use of
machinery. It is to his interest, therefore, to en
courage a large number of labourers during a short
space of time when a maximum of work is done, and
to dismiss most of them immediately afterwards.
Consequently these unfortunate people have alternate
periods of killing work — fifteen to eighteen hours a
day in the height of the season — and enforced leisure.
Settled workers have not even the hope of seeing an
improvement in their lot. For they are exposed to
the ruinous competition of swarms of casual labourers,
chiefly foreigners — either Poles or Russians — who con
gregate in every district where there is work, and
are eagerly welcomed by the landowners, as these
unfortunate people are docile and incapable of re
sistance, content with ludicrously low wages, and go
away as soon as they are no longer required.
The individualisation of property has not only had
the most serious consequences for the material con
dition of the rural populations, but it has also had a
profound effect even upon the mind of the peasant.
Once upon a time, a very strong tie bound a peasant
family to the property handed down for cultivation
from father to son. The family seemed to feel a
common obligation to devote their labour and care
to this property. According to the district, the land
either remained undivided among all those who had
a claim to it and cultivated it in common, or else
it passed into the hands of a privileged heir (either
the eldest or the youngest son), who became the head
of the family and generally kept his brothers and
sisters in his service. The men and maid-servants

EFFECTS UPON AGRICULTURE 41
were not treated as hirelings, but as members of the
family, and also, to a certain extent, shared in this
devotion to the land. Now all this has changed.
The peasant family is disintegrating, and an eye to
the main chance has taken the place of the instinct
of solidarity. The younger brothers, instead of re
maining on the family property, go out to seek their
fortunes in the industrial world or else emigrate.
In fact, statistics for the years between 1882 and
1895, alone, show a decrease of about 500,000 under
the heading of " members of the family engaged in
agricultural pursuits " (382,872 in 1895 compared
with 866,413 in 1882)— a deficit which was partly
made good by an increase in domestic servants, both
male and female, whose number grew from 1,589,088
to 1,718,885. The peasant proprietor thus became
a contractor, who tried to get as much as possible
out of his workmen, whilst the servants, on their
side, aimed at obtaining the best possible terms from
their masters. Now, the general growth in these in
dividualistic tendencies was a grave menace to the
existence of peasant proprietors. It either resulted
in the infinite partition of land, under a system by
which it was divided among all the heirs, or else in
debt, in the cases where one heir inherited the whole
property and found himself obliged to pay a money
compensation to the rest.
We thus witness in the domain of agriculture also
a conspicuous development in the spirit of enter
prise. The type known as the business man gradu
ally grows more and more common among the class
of large landowners, peasants, and farmers. But
whilst the commercial speculator found his business
extraordinarily prosperous, especially at the end of
the last century, the agriculturist, on the contrary,

42 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
has been struggling for over thirty years in the toils
of a formidable crisis, the end of which is apparently
not yet in sight. The question is, how did this
crisis arise ?
The period between the 'thirties and 1870 was one
of remarkable prosperity for German agriculture.
About 1800 Germany was in a position not only to
feed her own people, but also to sell her surplus pro
duce abroad. But the growth of population was so
rapid and the consumption of food-stuffs developed
to such colossal proportions that, in spite of the
increased power of production due to the progress
made in the technical processes of agriculture,
Germany soon ceased to be able to satisfy the needs
of her own market herself. Towards the middle of
the century, her import of rye began to exceed her
export, until, about 1880, in consequence of the
growth in her imports, Germany not only found
herself dependent upon the foreigner for cereals of all
kinds — wheat, barley, and oats — but was also obliged
to import domestic animals of every sort — sheep,
cows, and horses. This, obviously, created a condi
tion of things favourable to agriculture. And,
indeed, from about 1830 onwards, agriculture enjoyed
over forty years of prosperity, during which it is
reckoned there was a general rise in all agricultural
produce varying from 60 per cent, in corn to 148
per cent, in beef. This rise naturally entailed a
corresponding increase in the value of land. It is
estimated that farms more than doubled in value,
whilst the price of land was three or even four times
as great as it had been.
From about 1880 this state of things began to
change. Germany — and for the matter of that the
whole of Western Europe, as is well known — began to

EFFECTS UPON AGRICULTURE 43
feel the effects of the competition of new countries
which produced corn in large quantities at a low
price — countries like Russia, Roumania, the United
States, India, Uruguay, and Argentina. In conse
quence of the growth of international intercourse and
the gradual diminution in the cost of transport by
rail -and sea, corn could be sold in the German market
at ever lower prices. A period of depression there
fore set in ; between 1896 and 1900 prices fell,
according to the different kinds of corn, 13| to 23|
per cent, as compared with the rates between 1876
and 1880. This was accompanied by a correspond
ing depression in the value of farms and land.
Now, this lowering in market value and prices had
most terrible results for the German agriculturist,
especially by reason of the debt with which landed
property was weighed down in consequence of it.
Mortgages, indeed, increased in enormous proportions
during the course of the century. Proprietors bor
rowed money in order to carry out improvements
calculated to increase the output of the land ; or
heirs, if they wished to keep their property whole,
were obliged to compensate their co-inheritors by a
sum of money. Or else speculators, expecting a rise
in the market, calculated that in the long run they
would profit more by working heavily mortgaged
estates, of which they could obtain possession by the
outlay of a small initial capital. In short, for a host
of reasons, landed proprietors found their debts
growing without limit. In Prussia alone, between
1883 and 1896, this increase reached a total of nearly
2,500 millions of marks. It is obvious that to the
owner of a heavily mortgaged estate a decrease of
income quickly causes inconvenience, and means
complete ruin as soon as the returns from his land are

44 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
less than the interest he is obliged to pay his creditors
every year.
Thus the competition of new countries and the
indebtedness of landed property produced an agri
cultural crisis which was further aggravated by other
minor circumstances, and especially the difficulty
experienced by large landowners in securing the
necessary labour. This crisis was rendered some
what less severe by a series of measures tending either
to raise the price of agricultural produce or to give
assistance to the agriculturist : the protectionist
policy inaugurated in 1879 by Bismarck, for instance ;
the lowering of railway rates in favour of the home
producer, which enabled him to meet foreign com
petition more successfully ; the improvement of
education in agricultural matters, and the organisa
tion of a system of credit in that department. But
even to-day the crisis cannot be regarded as ended.
German agriculture maintains its existence by means
of protective tariffs and thanks to the solicitude of
the Government for the interests of the landed
nobility and the rural classes. It is very far indeed
from following in the ambitious footsteps of German
commerce, and political economists are reduced to
expressing the hope that the gradual " industrialisa
tion " of agriculture may perhaps, in the future,
succeed in imparting fresh vigour to it.
In the meantime, it is certain that agriculture has
lost much of its importance in the life of the nation.
About 1830 it is estimated that four-fifths of the
population was engaged in agricultural pursuits.
About 1860 the proportion was only three-fifths ; in
1882 it was very little more than two-fifths (42 \ per
cent.) ; and in 1895 it falls below this figure (35*7 per
cent.). Whilst agriculture is obliged, owing to the

EFFECTS UPON AGRICULTURE 45
lack of labour, to employ every year, during the busy
season, bands of foreign workers, chiefly of Polish
extraction, to supply the deficiency of German
labour, the percentage of the population living by
industry and commerce daily increases. In Prussia,
for the year 1843, it was 25-3 per cent., for 1895 nearly
50 per cent. This figure is greater for the whole of
Germany, and has reached 50 6 per cent. Before
our eyes a large proportion of the rural population
is emigrating to the towns or abroad, and Germany
is becoming an industrial country. Lamprecht
quotes statistics which show that about 1900 the
annual agricultural produce was worth 6,000 millions
of marks, whilst small and large industries produced
twice that amount ; and that the revenue derived from
agricultural enterprises reached 3,000 millions, whilst
that drawn from industry and commerce was 13,500
millions. An investigation into the balance of trade proves,
in a striking manner, the change which has taken
place in this respect. It is a well-known fact that
since between 1885 and 1888 the imports of Germany
have exceeded her exports, and to such an extent
that in 1900 her imports reached 5,833 millions of
marks, whilst her exports only reached 4,555 millions,
thus showing an excess in the imports of 1,278
millions of marks. Now, what do these figures
prove ? First of all, that Germany is to-day an
industrial country, no longer living on the produce of
her own soil, but on the industry of her inhabitants.
Political economists have calculated that if Germany
wished to produce from her own soil the food-stuffs
and raw material necessary for her own consumption
and her own industry, she would require a territory
at least twice or three times as large as that of the

46 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
present Empire, and this exclusive of tropical pro
ducts, such as spices, coffee, and cotton, which her
geographical position prevents her from growing. It
is thus obvious that the present population of the
German Empire could not exist if it were not in a
position to procure an enormous quantity of foreign
goods, the production of which would require an
extent of territory which Germany does not possess.
How does she secure this ? In the first place, by
exchanging one product for another, either by selling
abroad in her turn certain products of her own soil,
and above all the articles manufactured by her in
dustry. Secondly, by making good the difference
between her expenditure and her income by the help
of two main sources of revenue — that provided by
her maritime commerce and that by capital invested
abroad. The estimate for 1899 of the profits realised
by German maritime transport is about 250 millions
of marks, whilst the revenue derived during the same
year from capital invested abroad was valued at
1,000 millions of marks. These two sums together
reach a total which almost covers the deficit of 1,278
millions of marks shown by the balance of trade
during 1900. The extraordinary rapidity with which
the change was accomplished is proved by the fact
that as late as 1880 the balance of trade showed a
credit of 86 millions of marks, whilst in 1888 it
showed a debit of only 67 millions, which reached
1,278 millions in 1900 and rose in 1905 to 1,253
millions. It is thus quite clear that the population of Ger
many cannot exist on the produce of her own soil
alone. It lives by industry, maritime commerce,
and acquired wealth. An agricultural country at
the beginning of the last century, Germany is on the

EFFECTS UPON AGRICULTURE 47
way to becoming a colossal industrial and capital
istic state. And this transformation has not been
realised without inspiring many Germans with feel
ings of regret and anxiety. They are asking them
selves whether the change from a rural to an urban
manner of life, from labour on the land to industrial
toil, will not entail disastrous consequences for the
physical and moral well-being of the race. And they
perceive a possible, if not an actual, danger in the
fact that Germany is growing less and less able to
nourish her own population, and finds herself obliged
to rely ever more completely for her livelihood on
her external trade, and consequently upon foreign
purchases.

CHAPTER IV
SOCIAL EVOLUTION
The system of enterprise has not only considerably
modified the condition of production — it has also
fundamentally changed the social structure of the
nation. At the beginning of the nineteenth century there
were, roughly speaking, three distinct classes in Ger
many- — the " nobility," including in addition to
the aristocracy proper, the old patrician families of
the free towns ; a rather vague " intermediate "
class, consisting, on the one hand, of the cultured
ilite of the nation, and, on the other, Of everybody
who possessed a moderate competency, high and
petty officials, manufacturers and merchants — in
short, the greater part of what is to-day called the
middle class ; and, lastly, the " people " formed by
the artisans, the rural populations, and the prole
tariat which was coming into existence at that
time. Until about the middle of the century, the
line of demarcation between the various types was
exceedingly faint. On the one hand between the
wealthy member of the upper middle class and the
noble, and on the other between the member of
the lower middle class and the labourer, the difference
was practically indistinguishable. The capitalistic
middle class did not yet exist as an order of society.
The proletariat was regarded as a collection of the
48

SOCIAL EVOLUTION 49
unclassed remnants of society, and it was considered
the business of the Government gradually to include
it in the other social categories and thus to put
a stop to the multiplication of its members.
In the second half of the century, with the rise of
capitalistic enterprise, this state of things changed
rapidly. On the one side, we see a huge army of
labour coming into existence, in which social outcasts
of every description are found shoulder to shoulder
with craftsmen in domestic industry, the majority of
skilled artisans ruined by the competition of the
large manufacturers, the bulk of agricultural labourers
and evicted peasants. And at the other extremity
of the social ladder there sprang up a class of " con
tractors," into which everybody who in one way
or another had some interest in capitalistic enterprise
congregated, from the old landed proprietors be
longing to the ancient nobility, or the kings of
commerce and finance, down to workmen who had
grown wealthy, small merchants, and the managers
of large industrial firms.
The proletariat — that is to say, the class of people
who, according to Sombart's definition, only make
a livelihood by earning a salary paid in money, are
engaged for a particular job, and can be dismissed
on the shortest notice, or even summarily — was not
numerous until about 1850. It is true that from the
end of the eighteenth century there existed a labour
ing class living in a state of dependence upon capital
istic enterprise. It is, no doubt, also true that this
class increased slowly between 1820 and 1840 in
proportion to the development of enterprise in
Germany. But it did not yet show any marked
features, and there was scarcely any clear line of
demarcation discernible between the common work-
4

50 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
man and the artisan or petty tenant. It was only
during the 'fifties and 'sixties, when the old forms
of industry underwent a violent crisis, that the
German proletariat, which from that day forward
never ceased to multiply, really came into existence.
And this phase of its evolution seems also to have
been its most painful one. The terrible uncertainty
of life for the proletariat is well known ; the absolute
dependence of its members upon the employer, who
can at any moment deprive them of their work and re
duce them to want ; the dangers they run on account
of the crisis in supply and demand to which industry
is periodically subjected ; the ever-increasing difficulty
for the workman to raise himself to the position
of a master ; the degradation of labour due to the
development of machinery, which has made man
merely an appendage to the machine, and thus con
demns him to a stupefying toil from which he can
derive no satisfaction. We all know the terrible
drama of proletarian pauperism : the shameless ex
ploitation not of the workman alone, but of his wife
and family ; the indefinite extension of the working
day, the overcrowding in unhealthy surroundings,
the starvation wages, the crises of unemployment,
which reduce whole districts to despair. Germany
has not been more successful in escaping these evils
than any other industrial nation. The most that
can be said is that she has perhaps suffered less in
proportion than England, because the rise of capi
talism came later in Germany, and the abuses of
the new system met, as soon as they appeared, with
a more determined opposition on the part of the
public conscience.
At all events, it is certain that " class feeling "
developed fairly rapidly in the German working man.

SOCIAL EVOLUTION 51
During the last thirty years of the nineteenth cen
tury, the proletariat increased l in numbers, and at
the same time organised itself into a political
party. Worked out in the brains of philosophers,
who dreamed of turning to the advantage of society
as a whole the discoveries of inventors, and who saw
in the community of wealth, or in the nationalisation
of the means of production, the only cure for the ills
of the people, the Socialistic ideal gradually became
the popular ideal. At the same time, the instinctive
chaotic revolt of labour against oppression and
poverty gave place to the methodical organisation
of the proletarian forces in their struggle against
capitalism. Fichte and Hegel, and afterwards Feuer-
bach and Young Germany, Moses Hess and Karl
Griin, and finally Marx and Engels, gradually dc
veloped the materialistic theory of history and the
doctrine of collectivism. From the beginning of
1848, the Communistic Federation, which combined
the popular and the intellectual elements of the new
party, launched forth its celebrated Manifesto, which
formulated in all its essential features the programme
of Socialism and urged the proletariat of every
country to combine for the class struggle. In 1863,
under the leadership of Lassalle, the General Associa~
tion of German Workmen was founded, which con
centrated the forces of the labouring class into a
party which was independent of the progressive
section of the middle classes. From that moment,
the Socialist Party, which was at first split up for
some years into " Lassallians " and " Internationals,"
but was unified in 1875 at the Congress of Gotha
1 Sombart calculated that in 1895 the proletariat consisted of
about 35 millions — that is to say, about 67£ per cent, of the whole
population of the Empire.

52 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
under the title of German SociaUst Labour Party,
made uninterrupted progress. In 1871 it secured
113,000 votes in the Reichstag elections ; in 1881,
312,000 ; in 1890, 1,427,000 ; in 1896, 2,107,000 ; and
almost 3,200,000 in 1907 : ; and it now has a larger
number of constituents than any other party. It is
true that these do not consist entirely of orthodox
Socialists, but also include a large number of mal
contents of all kinds, who, by voting for the Socialist
candidate, merely wish to register, in the most
emphatic manner possible, their disapproval of the
actual state of affairs ; but it is none the less certain
that the party as a whole is composed of the prole
tariat themselves, and that this class, concentrated
in a large party, subjected to a severe discipline and
animated by a strong esprit de corps, forms an im
posing bulk which grows every day more conscious
of its own power.
For a long time the labour movement in Germany
was chiefly political. Unlike its brethren in Eng
land, the country of powerful trade unions and
prosperous co-operative societies, the German prole
tariat was rather slow to form any organisation in
the economic field. Nevertheless, it has to-day made
a great advance in this domain also. Outside the
Socialist Democratic Party, but sharing its ideas,
strong unions have sprung up, whose influence has
grown considerably, especially during the last ten
years, and whose actions are generally in unison with
those of the Socialist Party. No doubt non-Socialist
unions also exist. The Hirsch-Duncker Professional
Associations, founded in 1868 by the Progressive
Party, and the Christian syndicates inaugurated a
few years ago by the Catholic Centre Party, do not
* The number in 1912 was estimated at 3,800,000. — Tb.

SOCIAL EVOLUTION 53
place themselves upon the basis of class antagonism,
but, on the contrary, assert the unity of interests
between the employer and the employed, or recognise
the equal rights and duties of capital and labour re
spectively. But these associations have not anything
like the importance of the Free Syndicates,1 which,
even if they are neutral in theory and exact no pro
fession of political faith from their members, are in
reality composed of a huge majority of Socialists.
Under these circumstances, in spite of the inevitable
hitches and temporary rivalry between " politicians "
and " syndicalists," the unions nearly always work
in harmony with the Socialist Democratic Party.
Now, these unions, which were founded with the
object of protecting the professional interests of the
working man, have given proofs of great vitality,
more especially during the last few years. Menaced
in their very existence by powerful employers'
syndicates in Germany, they have not only resisted
disorganisation, but have even imbibed fresh force
from the attacks levelled against them. Their papers
announce with pride that the lock-outs decreed by
the employers' syndicates in response to strikes have
at present only had the effect of strengthening the
solidarity of labour and attracting fresh recruits to
the armies of Trade Unionism.
With the organisation of a large political party
divided into strong associations of the various trades,
the proletariat of Germany is fighting energetically
to win a more tolerable existence for itself. And
apparently these efforts have not been altogether
1 Statistics show that towards the end of 1895 the Hirsch-
Duncker Associations numbered 120,000 members, the Christian
Syndicates 250,000, and the small group of Independent Syndicates
75,000 ; whilst the Free Syndicates had over 1,300,000 members.

54 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
fruitless. Pessimism with regard to social matters
seems to have made way for an at least comparatively
optimistic frame of mind. The Socialists are march
ing forward full of confidence to the conquest of
political and economic power. They also look more
and more for the realisation of their hopes, not to
some great social upheaval, but to a slow process of
pacific evolution which will transform the capital
istic order of society from within. The gloomy
resignation of early days has given place to a pug
nacious spirit. A very pronounced desire for culture
and art has been added to an interest in the mere
material necessities of life. A number of political
economists, moreover, regard the economic future
of the country with less suspicion. They quote with
satisfaction the general rise in the revenues, a slight
relative decrease in numbers in the poorest class, the
rise of wages, the improvement in the conditions of
life among the people,1 and the diminution of emi
gration.2 They draw attention to the increased
security given to the working classes by insurance
against accidents, invalidity, old age, and illness.3
1 Statistics show that during the last thirty years of the nine
teenth century, the consumption of cotton, per head of the popu
lation, was trebled, whilst the consumption of beer, corn, meat,
eggs, and milk almost doubled. This improvement, certainly to a
large extent, benefited the working classes. Statisticians also
note, to the credit of the proletariat in Germany, that during the
same period the consumption of alcohol and tobacco remained
almost stationary.
2 The number of emigrants, which between 1881 and 1885
reached an average of 170,000 persons per annum, fell to 22,000
in 1900 and rose to only 28,000 in 1905.
3 Insurance against accident is enjoyed by nearly 19J milhon
workmen, and the insurance companies paid claims amounting to
126-7 milhons of marks during 1904. Insurance against invalidity
and old age paid, in the same year, claims amounting to 150 millions
of marks, and during the total thirteen years that it has been in

SOCIAL EVOLUTION 55
They point out that among the bulk of the prole
tariat there are signs of a growing tendency to
differentiate, and that above the mass of incapable,
unfortunate, or fallen members of society and the
crowd of " unskilled " labourers, a body of " skilled "
artisans is coming into existence whose standard of
life is improving every day. All these symptoms
seem calculated to inspire the hope that the terrible
problem created by the colossal growth of the prole
tariat will find a solution by means of pacific evolution
instead of violent upheavals.
At the same time as the system of capitalistic
enterprise created at the foot of the social ladder
the great class of the proletariat, it also profoundly
modified the upper and intermediate sections of
German society.
Generally speaking, modern social evolution tends
to substitute, for the old categories founded on differ
ences of social function, new subdivisions based
simply upon differences of income. It wipes out or
modifies the differences between the countryman and
the townsman, between the peasant, the tradesman,
and the industrial worker, who are on the same level
of material wealth. For those who roughly enjoy
the same competency, it creates more or less uniform
habits and conditions of life. And if, among the
innumerable social types which constitute the upper
and middle classes — small contractors and small town
and country tradesmen, the head employees of large
concerns of all kinds, the late survivals of the old
middle class, the cultured minority engaged in the
liberal professions, officials and officers, the aristo-
working, almost 855'6 milhons of marks. In 1903 the insurance
against illness dealt with almost 11 million cases, and the claims
paid during that year amounted to over 213 millions.

56 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
cracy of commerce or of birth — there are certainly
profound distinctions, the difference is much more
one of income than of special occupation or the
observance of certain traditional manners and cus
toms. 1 There is also noticeable, on the other hand, a
drastic destruction of recognised tables of values.
In the place of the old aristocracies of birth and of
culture, there has sprung up a commercial and in
dustrial aristocracy whose fundamental criterion for
distinguishing rank and merit is a capacity for busi
ness and for success. It is unnecessary to remark
that this evolution is very far from having reached
its highest development and that the majority of the
old groupings still subsist more or less intact in the
very midst of modern society. This accounts for the
fact that people of the middle class who are engaged
in the " liberal professions," especially the clergy,
schoolmasters and professors, the members of the
Civil Service, or officers in the army, have scarcely
been touched by the spirit of enterprise. Neverthe
less, this new spirit is gradually insinuating itself
into almost every department of life, and is little by
little dissolving the ancient hierarchies. Even the
aristocracy, who, on principle, declared that it was
impossible for them, without demeaning themselves,
to take part in modern economic life, the commerical
character of which was repugnant to them, have not
escaped the contagion. And, as a matter of fact, the
nobility, in their capacity as landed proprietors, have
also been caught in the wheel of the capitalistic
system. And in their case this has happened under
unfavourable conditions, because agricultural enter
prise gives returns which are, as a matter of fact,
far inferior to those provided by industrial or com-

SOCIAL EVOLUTION 57
mercial speculations. So much is this the case, that
some thinkers have wondered whether the economic
basis upon which the power of the nobility is
founded in these days is solid enough to allow of
their maintaining their preponderating political
influence and their social prestige much longer.
At all events, the new commercial aristocracy is
growing every day more strong and self-confident
by the side of the aristocracy of birth. After
having for a long time — until about the 'eighties
— tried as far as possible to ape the old nobility
and to adopt their customs and way of life, they
seem at present to aim more at asserting their
own independence and maintaining their own indi
viduality. They are in the midst of a process of
forming themselves into a separate caste, with their
own special characteristics and ranks, and owning
allegiance to a small oligarchical coterie engaged in
high finance.
We have now seen pretty clearly the general re
sults of that tremendous rush for economic power
which was characteristic of the nineteenth century.
By utilising and exploiting the marvellous discoveries
of science and the improvements in technical pro
cesses, by working without ceasing to progress in
scientific knowledge in order to create new sources
of profit, the spirit of enterprise introduced an
organised method into the rational exploitation of
the forces of nature, of the wealth of the land, and of
human labour. And it has reached these prodigious
results by the proclamation of the principle of un
restricted competition and the right of every man
to develop as he pleases his various faculties and his
capacity for work, and by destroying the traditional

58 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
institutions which were opposed to the free expansion
of individual energy, which curbed unbridled and
insatiable ambition and assigned to each man a
clearly circumscribed sphere of action from which it
was almost impossible for him to escape. The result
attained is certainly wonderful. The nineteenth
century produced an enormous increase in the
power of man over matter, and it succeeded in achiev
ing a gradual " rationalisation " of life. It developed
the production of material wealth to colossal pro
portions. It solved the problem of making Germany
capable of providing a tolerable livelihood for 60
million souls, whilst at the beginning of the century
only 25 million could live on the same extent of
territory, and that under conditions certainly far
harder than they are to-day. It transformed a poor
agricultural country into a formidable factory pro
vided with the most perfect industrial and com
mercial equipment, living on the industry of its
workers and on the income from its acquired wealth.
Germans are proud, and justly proud, of the capacity
for application, for energetic perseverance, for scien
tific rectitude, for order, and above all for discipline,
which have allowed them to take, in the general
unloosing of competition, one of the foremost places
among the industrial nations of the modern world.
But they also acknowledge that this tremendous
upheaval has not taken place without bringing many
an evil in its train. They are filled with anxiety at
the thought that Germany is no longer in a position
to feed her people with the produce of her own soil,
and ask themselves whether the gradual industrialisa
tion of national life will not produce lamentable
results from the point of view of the physical and
moral balance of the race. They are depressed at

SOCIAL EVOLUTION 59
the sight of the constant increase in the pace of life,
and the ever swifter and more rapid motion which
hurries men and things onward and envelopes in its
vortex all that has . anything to do with the system
of enterprise. They deplore the insecurity of life to
which the system of unrestricted competition, with
its anarchical method of production, its periodical
crises, and its perpetual instability, has exposed all
who are engaged in it, whether they belong to the
proletariat or the capitalist class, whether they are
masters, employees, or ordinary workers. They
draw attention to the fact that man ends by
becoming a slave to the things he creates. Modern
industry and commerce impose on the consumer a
limited number of products which tyrannically beg
his favour. And so well does it succeed, that all
variety in private life is clearly dying out and
making way for an ever-increasing uniformity of
requirements, which are satisfied, and at the same
time determined, by wholesale production. In
short, many Germans feel very little" edified by
the results which the great principle of the sub
stitution of quantity for quality has given with
regard to the development of the race. They con
template without enthusiasm the artificial man of
to-day, their contemporary townspeople, the off
spring of the asphalt of large cities, with no direct
contact with Nature, without traditions and without
a past, without any real personality — an abstract
type, middling and mediocre, the product of present-
day urban civilisation. And they ask themselves,
not without some feeling of trepidation, whither this
evolution is tending. Will it end in a violent catas
trophe, or in slow decay, till the advent of those
" last men " — a vast host of sand fleas, over-cautious

60 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
and over-cautioned creatures, without hopes and
without ideals, which the ardent imagination of
Nietzsche foresaw ?
If, in spite of all this, they are on the whole con
fident in the future, it is because they expect, in
one shape or another, a fundamental transformation
in the system of capitalistic enterprise. And it is
not Socialists alone who hope either for the advent of
collectivism by means of revolution or for the gradual
peaceful " socialisation " of the country. Men who
absolutely repudiate all upheavals, and who frankly
admire the economic and political achievements of
the last century, are also of the opinion that the era
of unrestricted competition is drawing to its close.
Lamprecht, for instance, far removed as he is from
believing in the social cataclysm predicted by ortho
dox Marxism, is none the less certain that a profound
change is slowly preparing itself. The fact that a
new order of things is imminent seems proved to him
by a host of signs — such, for instance, as the develop
ment of associations of credit and of production, the
growing extension in State enterprises, the increase
of trade unions on the one hand and of employers'
syndicates on the other, the development of co
operative societies, and, also, the spread among the
working and thinking classes of social doctrines which
grow more practical and less Utopian every day, the
incessant progress of insurance, both public and pri
vate, and the great measures for the protection of
labour carried out by the State. All these symptoms
seem to indicate that the principle of free enterprise
is being gradually discredited on all sides, that there
is a growing tendency to limit competition, and
that Germany is slowly advancing towards a less
anarchical method of production and a system which

SOCIAL EVOLUTION 61
will give more individual security. Free enterprise
and unrestricted competition are thus being gradually
supplanted by a system of organised enterprise and
of regulated and restricted competition (Gebundene
Unternehmung) which will give more permanence and
stability to the social hierarchy, organise a new
aristocracy of labour and commerce, and also secure
for the proletarian masses a less precarious and more
humane manner of life. It is on the advent of this
era of economic and social solidarity that the picked
intellects of Germany seem to build their hopes to
day.

BOOK II
POLITICAL EVOLUTION

63

CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM OF GERMAN LIBERTY AND UNITY

The rise of the system of free enterprise, which
during the course of the nineteenth century resulted
in such an astonishing intensification of human labour
and in such a marvellous development of economic
activity, could not fail also to have a decisive influence
upon the political evolution of Germany.
Free enterprise, which tends towards unlimited •
economic expansion, has, as its first logical corollary,
a desire for the attainment of political power. Its
fundamental principle is quantitative production, it
creates ever more enormous bulks of merchandise,
and thus tends to accumulate stocks of goods which
are larger than the requirements of the consumer's
immediate demand. It consequently finds itself
driven to seek every conceivable means of circulating
its goods, it is obliged to extend its field of operation
as much as possible, and after consolidating its
natural economic domain— Germany itself — to seek
outlets for its produce in foreign lands, and to demand
free trade everywhere and liberty of access to all
the markets of the world. In short, it aims at en
larging its sphere of influence indefinitely, and in
order the better to secure its supremacy and defend
itself against foreign competition, it is irresistibly
5 65

66 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
impelled to build its economic power upon a founda
tion of political strength.
Thus German policy during the nineteenth century
aimed at unity and imperialism and endeavoured to
win political solidarity, to restore the Empire and
then develop a system which would result in union.
But it did not rest content with this. It gradually
came to consider the German Empire, founded
on the victories of 1866 and 1870, as the solid
kernel of a far more extensive Pan-Germanic " Im
perium." This Greater Germany embraces the entire
sphere of German interests throughout the world.
It includes not only the home territory, but the
countries in which the German element plays a
more or less leading part— as it does in Austria, the
Baltic provinces of Russia, Switzerland, Holland,
and Flemish Belgium. It extends to the German
colonies, which emigrants have planted all over the
world, and binds together all the material and spiritual
interests of Germany in the four quarters of the
globe. Germany thus grew accustomed to extend
ing her gaze far beyond her own political frontiers,
and from a national State she became an expansive
State. She grew familiar with the idea of imperialism,
which considers a nation something more than an
ethnical entity tied down to a limited area, and re
gards it as a ceaselessly active force which is ever striv
ing to extend its sphere of influence and struggling
without relaxation throughout the whole world and
in every corner of the globe against the energies of
rival peoples whose powers of expansion form a
barrier to its own might. Germany thus found her
self dragged into building a fleet and becoming a
maritime Power ; she founded a colonial empire and
took an ever more energetic share in the world's

PROBLEM OF LIBERTY AND UNITY 67
politics. And accordingly she ranks to-day, together
with England and the United States, as one of the
most resolutely " expansive " nations of the modern
world. At the same time as Germany was carrying out the
process of her unification and organisation against
the foreigner, she was also transforming her own
institutions. This internal evolution also took the
form Of a struggle for power between rival parties,
each of which aspired to take that share of influence
in the national organisation to which might gave it
right. And during the course of the nineteenth cen
tury this conflict assumed an ever more realistic and
practical character. If the parties were, as a matter
of fact, in the beginning founded upon distinctions
of principle, they tended gradually to change into
social groups, and ended by really becoming associa
tions based upon interest. At the beginning of the
nineteenth century men fought for the principle of
authority or for the religion of liberty. At the be
ginning of the twentieth century we find the repre
sentatives of agriculture, industry, and commerce,
workers and Catholics, forming powerful societies, in
which they eagerly discuss their business, and in the
last resort submit their disputes to the arbitration
of the monarch, who, standing outside and above
every party, is the representative of the interests of
the nation as a whole.
The history of the foreign policy of Germany shows
us the efforts she made to raise herself to the highest
pinnacle of power in Europe and the world. Her
internal history shows us the gradual rise of the
middle classes and the proletariat to power, the con
flict of German democracy with the ruler by divine
right and the governing class, which alone possessed

68 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
any real authority in the eighteenth century, and
the evolution which little by little transformed politi
cal institutions and substituted for the benevolent
despotism of the era of enlightenment a system
which, though strictly monarchical, was also consti
tutional. In politics too, therefore, the growth of the spirit
of enterprise had the result of letting loose the will
to power both among peoples and parties. It created
a sort of potential state of war among rival nations
and rival parties. But in the domain of politics, as
well as in the sphere of economics, modern Germany
hopes for a modification in this respect. Side by
side with the realistic struggle for power and material
wealth she sees the development of a new idealistic
spirit striving for education and high culture and an
equitable solution of the social problem. And she
does not despair, after having passed through the
storms of the nineteenth century, of attaining a
more stable equilibrium, founded upon the conscious
ness of solidarity and resulting in a happy com
promise between the principle of authority and that
of freedom, between monarchy and democracy.
If we cast a glance at the political condition of
Germany about 1815, just after the Treaties of
Vienna, we shall find that at that time she possessed
neither unity nor liberty.
Let us take the question of unity first. The Holy
Roman Empire had already for a long time dragged
out a purely nominal existence, and when in 1806 it
fell to bits beneath the blows of Napoleon, when the
Emperor Francis voluntarily abdicated an absolutely
illusory sovereignty and declared the imperial office
extinct and obsolete, public opinion accepted without

PROBLEM OF LIBERTY AND UNITY 69
much concern the final fall of the glorious Empire of the
Ottos and the Hohenstaufen. The " Mainz Gazette "
restricted itself to observing, without any particular
display of emotion, " that Germany was no more."
And, indeed, why should it have been upset ? For a
very long time " Germany " had ceased to exist in
fact, and the feudal tie which bound the princes to
the Emperor had lost all meaning. The imperial
authority no longer exercised any appreciable influ
ence on the internal life of the various states, which
were governed and administered by sovereign princes
and their tools — officials of every rank. It also showed
itself incapable of securing the safety of Germany
against outside aggression, or of creating and main
taining an army able to protect the frontiers of the
Empire efficiently. And at the utmost it was re
garded as a protector which was at the same time a
source of danger for the small states who were not
able to defend themselves. It sheltered them
against the lusts of their neighbours, and restricted,
to a certain extent at least in their favour, the
struggle for existence which could not fail to make
itself felt among the German princes. In short, the
Empire had long lost all organic unity, and the life
had gone out of the central body. Germany was
broken up into a number of independent states,
jealous of their own sovereignty, devoid of all feeling
of national unity, and each one animated by the most
cynical and ferocious spirit of selfish particularism.
The official fall of the Empire in 1806 only gave a
public sanction to a state of things which had long
been in existence.
The War of Independence, which put an end to the
Napoleonic rule in Germany, did not revive either in
name or in essence that Empire whose restoration

70 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
patriots and romanticists so passionately desired. It
is true that the Act of Federation, dated June 8,
1815, and added to the final Act of the Congress
of Vienna, founded a German Confederation. The
thirty-seven sovereign states and free towns of Ger
many were united in order to secure the internal and
external safety of the country as well as the indepen
dence and inviolability of the signatory states.
But no one exactly knew what was meant by " Ger
many." Was it a political, a geographical, or an
ethnical body ? It was impossible to say. Kliiber,
the great authority on federation, maintained that,
properly speaking, the German Confederation pos
sessed no territory at all. At all events, it had no
Emperor or even a recognised head. All the efforts
made by diplomacy to group the small states round
the two great German powers — Austria and Prussia —
had failed. The princes kept their full sovereign
powers. They undertook, it is true, not to make
war among themselves and to bring their disputes
before the Diet, and they promised, in the case of a
federal war, not to enter into any negotiations with
the enemy without the consent of their brother
princes. But, on the other hand, they reserved to
themselves the right of concluding private treaties
with princes outside the Confederation. Germany,
without a sovereign, without a parliament, without
any supreme tribunal, possessed only one central
body in the shape of a diet, which met at Frankfort
under the auspices of Austria, and enjoyed, in theory,
fairly extensive political powers, but was in practice
condemned to the most complete impotence. A mere
congress of ambassadors, without any real authority,
and completely out of touch with the nation, this
diet was bound to inaction, because every important

PROBLEM OF LIBERTY AND UNITY 71
decision had to be passed by a majority of two-thirds,
or even unanimously, and also because it possessed
no efficient means for securing the execution of its
decrees or of forcing the compliance of a rebellious
member of the Confederation.
And just as Germany possessed no real unity, so
also was she deprived of liberal institutions of any
kind. All effective control was concentrated en
tirely in the hands of the princes and the officials
who acted as the instruments of their power. As
for the nation itself, it was kept entirely isolated
from politics and had to obey the laws passed by
the rulers without having any recognised means
for making its wishes known or respected. The
" patriots," who ever since the negotiations at the
Congress of Vienna, had endeavoured without success
to create in Germany a strong and respected central
power, had also tried to secure the participation of
the people in the affairs of their country. Baron von
Stein had proposed the institution, in addition to
the central executive body, of a Reichstag, which
would have enjoyed fairly extensive legislative powers
and would have served as a Court of Arbitration
between the various states of the Confederation or
between the princes and their diets. But all the
measures which aimed at limiting the absolute power
of the princes were rejected. The declaration of the
rights of German citizenship which Stein would have
liked to introduce into the Federal Constitution was
finally reduced to a few very general stipulations
regarding the civil rights which the members of any
one state in the Confederation should enjoy in the
others. No political rights were secured for the
German citizen ; article 13 only contained the assur
ance that " diets should be held in the various federal

72 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
states." With the exception of this exceedingly
vague and ill-defined promise, there was nothing to
show that the princes felt disposed to grant their
subjects any greater share of self-government than
they had done in the past.

II
If the Act of Federation, therefore, disappointed
the hopes of the patriots who dreamt of a free united
Germany, this was due to the circumstance that such
dreams were for the moment impossible to realise.
The failure of the schemes for unification in 1815 can
be imputed neither to the ill-will nor the incapacity
of the negotiators at the Congress of Vienna. It was
the inevitable result of a state of things against which
the desires of the patriots could avail nothing. Ger
many remained, in fact, essentially particularistic
at heart. The princes did not want a unity which
might possibly compromise their own sovereign
power, and as Prussia and Austria continued to
balance each other, neither country was strong
enough to impose her hegemony upon the rest of
Germany. Let us examine this situation a little
more closely.
In the first place, Austria was just as resolutely
opposed to the nationalist as she was to the demo
cratic movement. The Emperor Francis and his
Chancellor, Metternich, regarded all aspirations for
unity and liberty as legacies from the French Revolu
tion, and opposed them might and main. Upheld
by an aristocracy who saw in an unlimited monarchy
the surest guarantee of social order, and seconded
by an aristocratic bureaucracy which confined itself

PROBLEM OF LIBERTY AND UNITY 73
to preparing and carrying into execution the decrees
of the sovereign without displaying any will or free
activity of its own, the Emperor enjoyed absolute
power, which he exercised through the agency of the
favourite councillors by whom he was surrounded
and the heads of the various departments of the
Civil Service. And he utilised this power to fight
the " revolutionary " spirit in every shape and form.
He himself declared that his Empire was an old
house which would crumble to bits if people tried
to repair it. He knew that Austria already possessed
all she was able to hold, that any change would only
be for the worse, and that her power was more
apparent than real ; and he considered that under
these circumstances the system best calculated to
ensure her existence was absolute immobility. He
consequently carried out with unflagging pertinacity
" the policy of stability " of which Metternich had
made himself the recognised champion in Europe.
Thus the policy of Austria always aimed at sup
pressing everywhere any attempt made to modify
the existing state of affairs in Europe, created by
treaties, and towards maintaining the status quo. In
France she backed the Bourbons both against
Bonapartist intrigues and democratic agitation. In
Italy she endeavoured to perpetuate her own
supremacy, and with this object in view she encour
aged the state of strife and servitude which was such
a heavy weight round the neck of that unfortunate
country, and even countenanced despots as contemp
tible as the scandalous but " legitimate " Kings of
Naples. In Spain she opposed the efforts of the
Liberals to re-establish the constitutional government
which had been abolished by a brutal coup d'etat.
And in the East she defended the integrity of the

74 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
Ottoman Empire both against Russian lust of con
quest and against Greek revolt.
Similarly in Germany she looked with the most
profound suspicion upon all aspirations for unity.
The Austrian Empire is a heterogeneous aggregate of
incongruous elements — Germans, Czechs, Magyars,
Croats, Serbs, Ruthenians, Roumanians, and Italians
— who are only bound together by a common bond of
loyalty to the Crown. Her sovereign, consequently,
can have no national policy — he can only have a
dynastic policy. He does not feel that he is the
representative of one nation or of one race ; his
only object is to enlarge his domain in every direc
tion — in Germany, in Poland, in the Valley of the
Danube, and in Italy. He was, therefore, of neces
sity hostile to any exaltation of national feeling,
which, in his territory, could only prove a source of
conflict and a menace of dissolution. He did not
trouble his head about a German Imperial Crown
which might, on occasion, become an inconvenient
burden. And, under these circumstances, he had
no wish, either, to see the formation, between the
various German states, of any efficient and genuine
federal bond. He was suspicious of Prussia and
afraid of the ambition and patriotic enthusiasm
which she displayed so brilliantly in 1813. He had
a presentiment that this alert and essentially German
power would have an ever-growing influence in the
bosom of a strongly organised German confedera
tion, and he consequently also refrained from seek
ing too great an intimacy with this disquieting rival,
but tried to isolate her from the rest of Germany
by carefully nursing the distrust which prevailed in
the petty states with regard to the House of Hohen-
zollern. And, moreover, he tried to drag her into

PROBLEM OF LIBERTY AND UNITY 75
the wake of Austrian policy. In short, his whole
scheme was systematically aimed at encouraging all
the centrifugal forces in Germany. At the Congress
of Vienna, Austria came to the assistance of the
particularistic selfishness of the princes, which re
sulted in the failure of the projects for unity pro
pounded by Prussian patriots and statesmen. Once
peace was concluded, she raised obstacles in the way
of every effort at drawing the federal bonds more
closely together, she paralysed the action of the Diet
of Frankfort, she encouraged particularism every
where, and did all in her power to thwart the efforts
of Prussia to form the centre of a group of petty
states. And just as the Austrian Government looked with
no friendly eye upon any manifestation of national
feeling in Germany, so also it showed itself intract
ably hostile to all liberal aspirations. It gave to
Article 13 of the Act of Federation an interpretation
which deprived it of all meaning. Instead of regard
ing it as a promise to establish constitutional govern
ment and a system of national representation, it
read it as signifying that the princes would have
carried out the requirements of the article, if they
preserved or restored in their respective states the
diets of the old system. This was the interpretation
of the article which prevailed in the various states
of Austria, in which it consequently remained a
dead letter and the old absolutism flourished in all
its integrity. And just as Austria eluded the estab
lishment of constitutional government in her own
domains, she also endeavoured to prevent its instal
lation elsewhere. In Prussia Metternich by his
diplomacy opposed the liberal tendencies which
made their appearance among the King's councillors ;

76 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
he did everything in his power to dissuade the King
from granting his subjects the Constitution he had
promised, and thus contributed largely towards post
poning, until the eve of the Revolution of 1848,
the establishment of constitutional government in
Prussia. In the same way he encouraged the
constitutional princes of Southern Germany in their
various plots for carrying out a coup d'etat, and,
moreover, extended the protection of Austria to
the worst despots of Germany — the Princes of
Hesse, the Elector of Brunswick, and the
King of Hanover. In short, the Austrian Govern
ment instituted itself the spiritual gaoler of Germany.
It stifled in Austria itself all desire for free thought
by organising in intellectual matters an oppressive
and officious police system which prevented any
criticism of the acts of the Government, superin
tended all meetings, eavesdropped at every con
versation, carried on a rigorous censorship of all
books and papers, and paralysed all higher culture
for years. And it tried to extend this system of
repression and forced silence to Germany, and thus
appeared in the guise of the instigator of every severe
measure directed against university students or
" demagogues " and of every reactionary attempt to
gag the press and limit free thought.

Ill
Prussia, although she too was a particularistic
state and subjected to an absolute monarchy, presents
in many respects a very distinct contrast to Austria.
Compared with Austria— a country that had grown
senile, and whose real strength by no means corre
sponded with her external authority— Prussia stands

PROBLEM OF LIBERTY AND UNITY 77
out as an organised and disciplined force of the fore
most rank, with a " will to power " of remarkable
energy and exceptional vitality. She was guided to
her destiny by a dynasty of monarchs inspired by
a high sense of duty, solicitous, above all, for the
good of the State, living for their sovereign mission
alone and for the greatness of their kingdom. Her
nobility, bound to the monarch by ties of the most
ardent loyalty, formed a military caste, in which the
virtues of the warrior were transmitted from father
to son. She possessed an honest and well-informed,
though occasionally rough and pedantic, Civil Service,
strictly disciplined, but at the same time capable
of initiative, heartily devoted to the King, but free
from all servility and capable of defending, even
against the monarch himself, what it considered to
be the interests of the State. Her national army, in
a high state of efficiency, full of confidence and en
thusiasm, had proved its mettle during the War of
Independence, and her hardworking and thrifty
population, filled with an instinct for obedience, was
sincerely attached to its princes and respectful of the
established order. Such were the chief elements
which constituted the power of Prussia. By the side
of an effete and sensual Austria, mad on pleasure and
demoralised by a degrading despotism, by the side
of the petty German states, in which a high scientific
and literary culture sometimes flourished, but where
the more manly virtues which go to making a useful
citizen had small scope for development, Prussia,
robust and pugnacious, seemed like a rough and
stern school of discipline and self-sacrifice and of
patient and determined energy.
It is true that the policy of Prussia was founded
upon a vigorous national egoism. Prussian particu-

78 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
larism, which was extraordinarily well developed
and full of vitality, had not the smallest intention
of sacrificing or subordinating the private interests
of her own kingdom to those of Germany as a
whole. But as, in addition to this, the Hohen-
zollern dynasty was an exclusively German power,
there were no essential differences between the in
terests of Prussia and those of Germany, and the
former was consequently, in distinction to Austria,
favourably disposed to the development of national
unity. Of course she would not have pushed her
disinterestedness to such lengths as to risk com
promising her independence as a great sovereign
power. As an open rival of the Hapsburgs, she
would never have consented to abdicate in favour
of Austrian hegemony, nor did she wish to have laws
dictated to her by a confederation dominated by
Austria. But on condition of being given her
legitimate share of influence in any such confedera
tion, she was ready to support the formation of an
effective central power, and was anxious that Ger
man unity should not remain an empty phrase.
The patriots who strove for unity founded their
strongest hopes, during the War of Independence,
upon Prussia. And the Prussian Government on its
side felt a certain sympathy for the Pan-German
aspirations of the patriots. Not that it ever dreamt,
at the time of the Congress of Vienna, of putting
into practice any drastic policy of unification.
Leading statesmen like Hardenberg and Humboldt
sincerely believed, on the contrary, that the partition
into independent states which counterbalanced one
another was not in itself an evil, and made Germany
more capable of becoming the central nation of a
Europe founded upon the principle of the balance

PROBLEM OF LIBERTY AND UNITY 79
of power. But at the same time they admitted the
necessity for a certain unity. They disapproved of
the shameless particularism of the princes, and when
the negotiations on the German Constitution were
being carried on at Vienna they pronounced them
selves in favour of Baron von Stein's schemes of
unification. They publicly declared that " the King
considered it his duty as a sovereign to make his
subjects join a federation by means of which they
would form part of one German nation." They did
all they could to consolidate the power of the new
confederation and to set up a constitution which
should exercise an effective control over the separatist
tendencies and the scandalous selfishness of the petty
princes. And even if their efforts came to nothing
before the open opposition of the princes and the
covert antagonism of Austria, they at least, by their
attitude, conveyed the impression that Prussia under
stood the German patriots' ambition for unity and
sincerely desired to bring about their triumph in a
more or less near future.
Similarly, Prussia also showed herself, at least in
a certain sense and to some degree, favourable to
the liberal aspirations which began to make their
appearance about the same time.
We know the general conception which German
historians have of the evolution of their country in
the direction of political freedom. They describe
the Germans as a people who, ever since the time of
Tacitus, had been essentially military and at every
moment in their history had felt the need of having
a chief or king. But monarchy as they understood
it was very far removed from despotism. The
sovereign, it is true, was heard and respected, as was
only right in the case of a leader in war, but he

80 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
possessed no arbitrary power. His position was only
upheld and ratified by the tacit or open consent of
the nation in arms. The German, therefore, had
an instinctive tendency to reconcile the principle of
authority with that of the free initiative of the sub
ject. He was full of respect for the social order
established by tradition, and animated by the sincerest
feeling of loyalty to the Crown. Till the very height
of the nineteenth century he preserved his tradi
tional devotion to the nobility. He remained
attached to the past, felt no desire to free himself
from the established order of things or to break with
the traditions in which he saw a guarantee for the
safety of the State and for the orderly progress of
civilisation. But he also wished to safeguard his
own individual liberty. He wanted every man, in
his own limited sphere, to have the right and to feel
it his duty to make a free use of his own spontaneous
activity. He thus aimed at reconciling obedience
with independence, discipline with free initiative.
He did not claim equality for all, as he was quite
ready to admit that the sphere of autonomy should
not be the same for every citizen. But neither did
he admit the principle of despotism, as each individual
was encouraged to give free exercise to his power in
the realm assigned to him, and public opinion did
not willingly tolerate any interference on the part
of an outside authority in this specially reserved
domain. From the political point of view, therefore, the natural
inclination of the German was not for the republican
form of government, which suppressed the personality
of the king and thus decapitated the national army
by depriving it of its head. Neither did he demand
a parliamentary system and the rule by charter and

PROBLEM OF LIBERTY AND UNITY 81
law, under which all real power is placed in the
hands of deputies elected by the nation, and the
king finds his authority either altogether destroyed
or else irreparably reduced. The system to which
he gave his entire sympathies was a constitutional
monarchy under which authority is wielded by virtue
of the agreement between the will of the king and
the will of the people.
Now the transformation of the old absolute
monarchy into constitutional government was carried
out " organically " in Prussia, and was accomplished
side by side with the development of the political
education of the people. In proportion as individuals
or social groups felt the need of self-government
awake in their breasts and the ability to guide their
own destinies, they were called upon to play an in
creasingly active part in the life of the nation.
Immediately after the defeat at Jena, Prussian
statesmen had the insight to perceive the funda
mental reason for the disaster which had overtaken
their country. They realised that Prussia had come
to grief under her old system, because the enlightened
despotism of the eighteenth century had ended by
stifling all spontaneity, because the serf bound to the
soil, the merchant tied to his trade and shut up in
his own town, and the noble concerned only with
the interests of his order, had lost all idea of national
unity and had dissociated themselves entirely from
the commonwealth. They grasped the necessity of
liberating the nation, step by step, from this bureau
cratic system, which, in the words of Humboldt,
" made a machine of man," stifled in the people the
capacity of acting on their own initiative, and caused
the physical and intellectual downfall of the State.
They saw that the regeneration of the country de-
6

82 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
manded, as an essential condition, the reorganisation
of society, and that it was necessary to substitute
for the old Prussia conquered at Jena a new Prussia
upheld, as revolutionary France had been upheld,
by the free, self-conscious will of every citizen ; and
that, in order to regain her rank among the nations
of Europe, Prussia was bound to undergo, without
violence, without bloodshed, or any brutal rupture
with the past, a transformation similar to that which
France had accomplished during the storms of the
Revolution. The reforms of Stein and Hardenberg began this
great work of social education. By freeing the rural
population from serfdom and paving the way for the
institution of a class of .independent peasant pro
prietors, by suppressing the guilds ancT inaugurating
the era of the. complete freedom of industry, the
Prussian ministers emancipated the country from
the -tutelage to which she had been subjected. And
at the same time as Stein led the people to freedom
of labour he also aimed at making them accustomed
to self-government. He considered that the time
was ripe for the nation to be entrusted with parochial
and local administration. With this object in view,
he gave the towns a fair share of municipal self-
government and endeavoured to free the rural com
munities from the exclusive rule of the aristocracy.
From the top to the bottom of the social ladder it
was his object to organise a system of co-operation
between the Government and the people. In the
district, the province, and the kingdom, he proposed
to establish, in addition to the representatives of
royal authority, a number of elective diets in
which the aspirations of the people would find free
expression, and by means of which they could

PROBLEM OF LIBERTY AND UNITY 83
discuss all matters of local, provincial, or national
interest. It is possible to have some doubts about the actual
result of Stein's work, and to ask to what extent
he really succeeded in liberating the people and in
putting an end to the omnipotence of the aristocracy
and the officious interference of the bureaucrats. It
is possible to cast aspersions upon the efficiency of
this sytsem of self-government which he tried to
introduce into Prussia, and to maintain that it
proved incapable of shattering the aristocratic
oligarchy, whose rule still really kept the majority
of the nation in a state of servitude. At all events,
it is certain that this great minister, who was at
once a feudalist and a democrat, filled with a pro
found respect for the royal authority and the tradi
tional order of society, hostile to the constitutional
government and the centralised administration of
revolutionary or imperial France, but convinced of
the necessity of supplanting enlightened despotism
and feudal tyranny by an ever more comprehensive
system of popular self-government, was a true repre
sentative of that conservative but not reactionary
spirit which inspired a large number of Prussian
statesmen during the nineteenth century. German
public opinion is inspired by a feeling of gratitude to
Stein and Hardenberg for having put the feudalistic
past into liquidation and for having laid the founda
tions of a new society built on a basis of a wide
parochial and urban self-government, ruled from
above by the firm and undisputed authority of the
sovereign and defended against all aggression by a
national army recruited on the principle of com
pulsory military service for all.

84 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
Thus at the beginning of the nineteenth century
Germany was still hopelessly divided. On the one
side Austria was trying to preserve her traditional
hegemony and to draw the German princes into the
orbit of her own policy. Prussia, on the other hand,
without yet aiming at supplanting Austria, was,
nevertheless, filled with the ambition to increase her
sphere of influence as much as possible. Between
the rival aspirations of these two great powers, the
German princes manoeuvred to the best of their
ability to safeguard their own independence. Their
sovereignty was, as a rule, purely illusory, owing to the
fact that it was based upon no real power and was
quite unable to make itself respected outside its own
borders. Nevertheless the princes exercised a more
or less unlimited authority over their own subjects.
Some used their power well and for the benefit of their
country. Some even showed themselves disposed
to grant their subjects a more or less liberal constitu
tion and parliamentary institutions. Others, on the
contrary, were merely arrogant and hated despots —
malignant tyrants who squeezed their subjects shame
lessly and ruined the country by crippling it beneath
a crushing system of taxation, ridiculous puppets
foolishly infatuated by their fictitious majesty and
giving themselves airs utterly out of keeping with
their real power.
But they were one and all filled with the desire
of carrying out a strictly particularistic policy. They
all knew, in fact, that national unity could only be
established at their expense, and that the creation of
a strong central power in Germany must necessarily
level a blow at their precarious sovereignty. They
accordingly opposed the movement towards unifi
cation with might and main. They were instinctively

PROBLEM OF LIBERTY AND UNITY 85
suspicious of Prussia, whose strength they feared
and whose ambitions they guessed. They aimed,
therefore, at balancing the two great powers who
were fighting for the hegemony of Germany against
each other, and thus hoped to stop all innovations
which might strike at their own precious indepen
dence. How, under these unfavourable conditions, was the
national organisation of Germany, which had only
been sketched in rough outline by the diplomatists
at the Congress of Vienna, to be carried out ?

CHAPTER II
THE IDEALISTIC STRUGGLE FOR LIBERTY AND
UNITY

During the first half of the nineteenth century the
struggle for German unity formed part of the fight
for political liberty, and was of a highly idealistic
nature. The parties which came into being at that
time fought less for the conquest of power or for the
realisation of practical reforms of a definite character
than for the triumph of a moral doctrine — a sort of
political religion. The apostles of liberty and unity
seem generally to have been idealists who, in the
presence of the worn-out powers of absolute monarchy
and of feudal or clerical reaction, put forward the
fundamental claims of modern subjectivism — the
right of the nation to self-government and her demand
to be consulted upon public matters. They were
not so much party men with a definite programme
in their hands aiming at securing certain practical
reforms, as men of thought who brought forward a
certain ideal, and relied, for the triumph of their
cause, upon that irresistible power of persuasion
which a truth once proclaimed has upon the minds
of men. And they dreamt of founding the liberty
and unity of Germany upon the omnipotence of the
idea. 86

STRUGGLE FOR LIBERTY AND UNITY 87
When about the beginning of the nineteenth cen
tury, soon after the disaster at Jena, aspirations for
unity began to make their appearance in Germany,
they showed themselves first among the intellectual
minority of the nation, and were closely associated
with literary and philosophical considerations.
Fichte was the characteristic representative of the
first believers in unity. The German nationality,
according to him, consisted of all who used the
German language and shared in the philosophic,
literary, and religious culture belonging to the
German-speaking countries. And to this linguistic
and literary test he added a metaphysical and moral
criterion, and defined the Germans as the " primitive
people," who4>elieved in 4he liberty, the indefinite
improvement, and the eternal progress of the human
race, in distinction to " foreign nations," who imagine
themselves subjected, and who really are subjected,
to universal determinism, who regard liberty as an
illusion, and see everywhere nothing but an inexorable
and unchanging necessity. In Fichte's eyes, therefore,
German unity was essentially a moral unity. Mere
political unity seemed to him useless, and he regarded
the division of Germany into independent states as a
guarantee of liberty, and would have considered the
absorption of the various states by any one of them
and the establishment of a German monarchy as a
calamity. German unity, he thought, could only be
secured by the growth of freedom. Only when the
dream of liberty had been gradually realised in the
breasts of the various German states, could a German
commonwealth come spontaneously into being, un
shackled by any hereditary ruler or sovereign dynasty ;
and this was the living embodiment of the rational
istic State such as Fichte conceived of it, forming in

88 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
the very centre of Europe a formidable but peace
ful power, able not only to make itself respected by
its neighbours, but also capable of imposing peace
upon the rest of the world.
We thus see how Utopian and how far removed
from hard historical reality were the political con
victions of the author of the Discourses to the German
People. And the most different minds shared with
him this enthusiasm for the great German nation
and divine liberty. Among them were men of action
like Blucher and Gneisenau, Stein and Scharnhorst,
who fought above all to deliver Germany from the
yoke of France, but also believed, with Gneisenau,
that " the triple supremacy of the army, the consti
tution, and science " was the country's best defence.
Others, like Gorres, were romanticists, who wedded
in their minds dreams of the future of Germany
with memories of the past of the Teutonic peoples
and longed for the advent of a new Germany which
should be a restoration of the glorious Empire of the
Ottos. In the Rhein Mercury they preached the
adoption of compulsory service for all and the
abolition of all internal customs, or revived Dante's
Monarchia, believing that they could reform the
institutions of the nineteenth by the help of those
of the thirteenth century. Then came the political
dilettantes, the crowd of publicists, who enlarged upon
the restoration of the German Empire and tried to
discover a practical means of reconciling the ambi
tions of Prussia and Austria, or proposed, like Pro
fessor Lips, to allow the various German princes in
succession to occupy the imperial throne for a period
of five years ! The believers in unity and liberty
did not yet form a regular party. The cultured
middle classes of that period, inexperienced as they

STRUGGLE FOR LIBERTY AND UNITY 89
were in politics, saw no difficulty in reconciling their
old particularistic customs with vague dreams of the
restoration of the Empire or political emancipation.
And they piled up, in newspapers and pamphlets,
the most fantastic arguments about the measures
which should be taken, without having the faintest
notion of how difficult it was to put into practice the
ideal of a free united Germany, which it was so easy
to imagine in the abstract.
Just after 1815, during the first days of the German
Confederation, democratic tendencies and ideas of
unity began to shape and assert themselves with
greater clearness and persistence. The aspirations
of the " patriots " spread more and more among
university students belonging to the Allgemeine
Deutsche Burschenschaft, among the middle classes
and the labouring population of the west and south,
and the intellectual elite of the whole country.
The reconstruction of Germany at the Congress of
Vienna had profoundly disillusioned the whole nation,
and public opinion naturally placed the responsi
bility for the bankruptcy of all the hopes aroused by
the War of Independence upon the shoulders of the
rulers. From that moment the Liberals fell gradu^
ally into the habit of contrasting the people with the
Governments in order to exalt the one and decry
the other. The people had taken up arms to deliver
Germany trampled underfoot by the foreign tyrant.
The armies of Napoleon had been put to flight by
the whole nation in arms — the line regiments, the
Landwehr, and above all the volunteers — who rose up
as one man to free the country from oppression.
And behold ! as soon as the victory was won, Courts
and Cabinets prevented the nation from enjoying
the fruits of its labours. The diplomatists had

90 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
failed to bring the work of freedom to a satisfactory
conclusion. They had left Alsace in the hands of
France, who in the past had torn it away from the
German Empire, to whose security it was indispen
sable ; and they had shown themselves incapable of
organising the material and moral unity which the
nation demanded. The princes had selfishly pre
vented the formation of a powerful German con
federation, and one and all had thus given proof of
inefficiency and ill-will.
The Liberals did not realise that their reasoning
rested in the last instance upon an illusion.
In the first place, they never imagined that in
giving to the " people " the credit for the victories
of 1813 they were the dupes of a romantic mirage.
The War of Independence had not in any respect been
a spontaneous popular outburst. On the contrary, it
had been prepared with consummate care a long time
beforehand by excellent organisers, and the victories
had been won, not by the volunteers, who always
played an insignificant part, but by the regular
troops levied and drilled by Scharnhorst and his
colleagues. As Treitschke points out, it was an
error and an injustice to glorify the work of the
i people exclusively and pretend to despise the direct
agents of freedom — the generals, diplomatists, states
men, administrators, and nobles who had made the
preparations for the war and directed its course. It
was also a mistake to make the governments alone
responsible for the check given to the hopes for unifi
cation. The spirit of particularism, local selfishness,
the hatred between neighbours, were not invented by
the Cabinets. It was untrue to say that there was
a conflict at this time between the will of the people
demanding unity and the will of the princes, who

STRUGGLE FOR LIBERTY AND UNITY 91
thrust it from them out of a selfish desire to preserve
their own sovereignty. As a matter of fact, it was
the soul of Germany itself which was divided be
tween the desire for unity and the accustomed
practice of particularism. A national parliament
would in all probability have proved just as inca
pable of bringing about the unification of Germany
as the Congress of diplomatists had been.
But public opinion did not give this verdict. It
found it more convenient to cast the blame upon
the various governments instead of saying med culpd
on its own part as well. And thus there grew up an
antagonism which was destined to last for a long
time between the adherents of Liberalism and unity
and the governments. The Liberals grew more and
more inclined to regard the heads of the states as selfish
tyrants, who were both inefficient and ill-disposed.
They longed for the moment when, in the words of
Dahlmann, " the lamp of good constitutions should
be lighted, before which the smoky torches of Cabinets
would grow pale." They gave vent to their dis
content and made professions of their democratic
creed in bombastic and barren manifestations like
the Wartburg and Hambach Festivals. The govern
ments, on their side, haunted by the spectre of
revolution, grew frightened without reason ; they took
inoffensive idealists for dangerous agitators, and
tried to dam the democratic flood which was hurry
ing along the whole of the modern world in its eddies.
They imagined they were preserving the public
peace by muzzling the press, gagging the universities,
persecuting students and thinkers, and pursuing the
" demagogues " with a brutality as hateful as it
was foolish.
The conflict between Liberalism and absolutism

92 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
presents rather different features in Prussia on the
one hand and the South German states on the other.
Prussia was, and has remained, essentially an abso
lute monarchy. Her kings, Frederick William III.
and Frederick William IV. possessed the most lofty
idea of their sovereign rights, and were resolutely
decided not to relinquish any tittle of them.
Frederick William IV. especially was par excellence
the monarch by divine right. He really believed
himself the medium through which God made known
his wishes to the people, and he therefore listened
to the voice of divine inspiration in his own heart,
and would have thought himself lacking in his first
duty if he had given way before the advice of his
councillors, or above all had hearkened to the wish of
the people when any great decision had to be made.
Abdication on his part would have been treason
against the nation, as it would have deprived it of
the divine help it required. It was not only the
right, but the duty of the king to exercise the
sovereign powers which had been placed in his
hands. And, consequently, Frederick William IV.
ruled his councillors and ministers with a high hand.
He regarded them as subalterns, who have no business
to possess a will of their own or to carry out their
own designs, but are merely the weapons for the
accomplishment of the royal desires. He treated
them as servants, whom he employed as long as he
pleased, and could dismiss without the smallest
scruple when they no longer served his purpose, as
they were merely human instruments and adjuncts
of the one, indivisible, everlasting, and divine will
of the sovereign.
And the people of every rank and station were
still profoundly impregnated with the belief in

STRUGGLE FOR LIBERTY AND UNITY 93
monarchy. This faith existed in the breasts of the
princes of the blood— as for instance in Prince William,
who expressed his opinions with the greatest freedom
even when they conflicted with those of the Em
peror, but gave way without a murmur as soon as
the monarch had spoken. It existed among the
officials, who felt they were simply the instruments
of the royal will ; they stated their opinions in all
sincerity without fear of displeasing the King, al
though they felt bound to serve their master in all
circumstances, even if he decided against their con
victions and obliged them to act in a manner of
which they did not approve. They did not think
they had the right of leaving the service of the
King without his consent ; they did not even allow
themselves to bring pressure to bear upon his decisions
by threatening to resign ; as loyalty demanded of
them, even if they were beaten, to retain office if
the King desired it. Like the ministers, the nobility
had preserved its loyalty to the Crown intact, it
remained faithful to the House of Hohenzollern, and
served it faithfully either with the sword or in the
royal councils. Among the people, also, the attach
ment to the dynasty was full of vitality ; they ful
filled their duties to the State not in any spirit of
utilitarian selfishness or out of any respect for
authority in the abstract, but by virtue of a profound
instinct, which made them see in the King the in
carnation of the national will.
It is clear that under these circumstances no one
dreamt of introducing into Prussia the system of
parliamentary government as we understand it. The
King of Prussia was absolutely determined to keep
the whole of his power intact without surrendering
the minutest portion of it to the hands of a parlia-

94 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
ment. And the patriots, too, had not the smallest
intention of weakening the monarchy. When Stein
proposed the establishment of a State diet in addi
tion to the central government, he had no idea of
creating a new power in rivalry to the King ; he
merely wished that the nation should be associated
with the free decisions of the central power. The
King, in any case, remained as much the absolute
master of the diet as he had been of his ministers.
He continued with his sovereign powers unimpaired to
have the last word on every important question ;
he confined himself to taking counsel with the diet,
and remained free to follow the advice of his ministers
or not. Regarded from this point of view, the estab
lishment of a constitution and representative in
stitutions did not appear to the King and his ministers
in the light of a revolutionary measure. There was
no question of limiting the authority of the King or
6i creating, as a counter-weight to the royal preroga
tive, the rival power of an elective assembly. It was
not even a question of bringing into existence some
thing entirely new. The future was to spring from
the womb of the past. The provincial diets, which
the Prussian Government proposed to convoke, were
to be the lineal descendants of the old provincial
assemblies, which had once been conquered by the
King and reduced to impotence. And the general
Landtag of Prussia was on its side to arise out of the
provincial diets. The deputies were not to be
" elected by the people," but were to be the dele
gates of their peers, of their " wards," of the nobility
and landed proprietors, the townspeople and the
peasantry. But if the proposed Landtag in no way resembled
the typical English or French parliament, the for-

STRUGGLE FOR LIBERTY AND UNITY 95
mulating of a constitution and the convoking of that
Landtag were none the less a concession to Liberal
opinion and to the political aspirations of the educated
middle classes. The King and many of his coun
cillors, moreover, were sincerely desirous of con
necting the people with the deliberations which con
cerned the general interests of the whole nation.
They felt that the people had attained its majority,
and that it was not possible to keep it in leading-
strings for ever. This sentiment was very clearly
and precisely defined in the minds of statesmen,
such as Hardenberg, Humboldt, and Schcen, and the
King himself was not opposed to them. He was in
spired by no feelings of systematic ill-will against the
meeting of the Landtag, though the realisation of the
scheme gave rise to very great difficulties. In the
first place, it was no easy task to convoke the pro
vincial diets, which were to serve as the basis of the
future Landtag. And it was still more difficult to
found a Landtag which would not prove a Prussian
Parliament and a rival to royal authority, but would
remain a purely advisory body, whose decisions the
King was in no sense bound to ratify, and which he
was not even expected to summon at any regular
intervals. Consequently delays arose in the organisation
of representative institutions, which irritated and
estranged public opinion. Ever since May 22,
1815, the King of Prussia had been making solemn
promises to give a written constitution to his king
dom and to convoke the national diet. More than
twenty years passed by before this promise was ful
filled. Frederick William III., after having sum
moned and dissolved one after the other four com
missions, which had been charged with drawing up

96 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
the plan of the constitution, gave up the idea of
organising a national representative assembly and
confined himself to creating provincial diets in each
of the eight provinces of his kingdom. And matters
did not advance more rapidly under his successor.
Once again preliminaries dragged on for years with
out resulting in any solution. And when, in February
1847, the King suddenly decided to issue a patent
grouping the provincial diets into one common diet
or Vereinigter Landtag, the concession came too late.
Liberal opinion was no longer content to have an
assembly whose powers were purely advisory except
on the question of loans, and which, on all save
financial matters, was bound to hold its discussions
in two separate wards, and had not even secured the
promise of being periodically united in one body.
During the long period of fruitless waiting, the
Prussian Liberals, especially before 1840, gave proofs
of untiring patience. Out of loyalty to the dynasty,
and also inspired by a very comprehensible prudence
— as Prussian authorities had a heavy hand — they
avoided all loud agitation and took care not to indulge
in any manoeuvre which could possibly be regarded
as forcing the hand of the King. No struggle took
place between absolutism and the democratic party.
The royal authority was exercised without meeting
with any organised opposition. Only in every direc
tion, especially after 1840, signs were multiplied which
showed that the cultured and industrial middle
classes were aspiring more and more to have a say
and to make their influence felt in public affairs.
The situation in Southern Germany was very
different. The middle states — Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and the
Grand Duchy of Baden — had adopted constitutional

STRUGGLE FOR LIBERTY AND UNITY 97
government very early. There were various reasons
which combined to make the governments of these
countries favourable to the establishment of repre
sentative institutions. In the first place, the territory
of these states had grown to such an extent during
the Napoleonic era that the national diets neces
sarily seemed to present to the governments a con
venient method for creating a bond of unity between
the old parties and the lands recently annexed.
Moreover, these three states, by the very fact of their
sudden expansion, and also because they had been
subjected more profoundly than other parts of Ger
many to French influence, had been led into making
a sudden break with the feudalistic past. The Grand
Duke Charles Frederick and his successor, the Grand
Duke Charles of Baden, the Bavarian Minister,
Montgelas, and King Frederick I. of Wurtemberg,
had abolished, not without brutality in some cases,
the majority of the privileges of the nobility and the
clergy, and had aimed at making the principle of
equal rights for all before the law, and the duty of
every man to contribute to State expenses, supreme.
And in this task of social transformation they felt
themselves forced to rely upon public opinion. Lastly,
diets and constitutional government appeared to
the various sovereigns in the light of a possible prop
to particularistic sentiments, as a means of distracting
the public mind from the dangerous chimera of
unity, and as a last defence against the desire for
unification on the part of the Confederation. Under
these circumstances, when in 1815 the princes found
themselves menaced by the Confederation with the
danger of being forced into convoking a diet and
drawing up a constitution, they hastened to be the
first in the field and to promise on their own initiative
7

98 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
to give their subjects free institutions. Thus con
stitutional government was established in the south
of Germany much earlier than in Prussia. And from
that moment Prussia was regarded by the Liberals
as the home of reaction, as a country which was
behind the times, and the classic territory of lordlings
and dragooning.
German historians, as a rule, have a low opinion of
these southern states, which boasted of having set an
example of Liberalism to the rest of Germany. They
consider that their political development, to use
a hackneyed expression, was "inorganic." Their
institutions were not, as in the case of Prussia, the
natural, spontaneous, and necessary result of the
national growth. In fact, all the middle states of the
South had come under the influence of France, both
during the Napoleonic era and later — more especially
in 1830. Some, like Bavaria, had purely and simply
aped the institutions and administration of France.
Others — that is to say, nearly all the states which had
a constitution and representative government before
1848 — had felt the same influence more indirectly, but
none the less surely. The characteristic they all had
in common was the fact that they were governed not
by their own native institutions, but by a system
imported from abroad.
Now in states like England, whose growth has been
" organic," public safety has as its basis and guarantee
the regular working of the fundamental institutions
of the nation, the administration by rural, urban, and
provincial councils. The line of demarcation between
the royal authority and that of the people, between
the functions of the central Government and that
of the autonomous local administrations, has been
settled by practice and by virtue of the experience of

STRUGGLE FOR LIBERTY AND UNITY 99
long periods. In "inorganic" states, on the con
trary, these relations, instead of being regulated by
elastic living customs and by an unwritten law,
come under the jurisdiction of a legal compact and a
code of judicial obligations on the part of the monarch
towards the State. The free sovereign will of the
prince is obliged to bow before the decrees of strict
rule and imperative law. A sheet of paper, to use
the well-known words of Frederick William IV., is
placed between the King and his people. Thus a
system of mutual confidence between a prince and
his subjects gives place to a dry and barren legal
formality. The principalities of Southern Germany are " in
organic " states of precisely this type. The middle
class, which formed the Liberal or Radical parties in
them, was not an active living body endowed with
organising powers which it wished to make supreme.
It merely saw salvation in some abstract theory of a
constitutional state, and in a number of political
formulas borrowed from abroad, which did not
adequately reflect a real condition of things. Its
leaders were doctrinaires mounted on the hobby
horse of constitutional dogmatism, living in a very
narrow sphere, and devoid of all experiences or breadth
of view. Quite incapable of formulating a practical
programme to serve as a basis for the public life of
that " Great Germany " of which they dreamt, they
drew up beautiful plans in abstracto for a future which
could never be realised in practice, and showed them
selves clumsy in carrying out reforms that were
actually possible. And these idealists, wedded to
their belief in abstract ideas, these theorists in love
with barren legal formalities, made grave mistakes in
their estimate of the forces which were making them-

100 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
selves felt in the political evolution of Germany. They
remained cosmopolitan until after 1830, whilst the
country was developing more and more in the direc
tion of nationalism. They were hostile to standing
armies, which they regarded as the mainstays of
despotism and schools of servitude, whilst Prussia
was destined to found her greatness precisely on her
military prowess, and Germany was to grow more
and more accustomed to looking upon the national
army as the great training school of civic unity and
morality. They hated the hereditary nobility, whose
ruin and extinction they prayed for at a time when
the aristocracy had just played a leading and glorious
part in the War of Independence, and was to keep for
some time longer, especially in Prussia, a position
of the highest importance in the life of the nation.
They often professed a pedantically narrow rationalism
and despised " the barbarism of the Middle Ages "
at a moment when the romantic spirit had everywhere
awakened the love of the nation's past and a religious
revival was making itself felt in the breasts of Pro
testants and Catholics alike.
Nevertheless, we may perhaps be allowed not to
accept without some reservations the harsh judg
ment which the historical school usually passes upon
Liberalism. It is true that the Liberals did not foresee
the turn events were to take. With rare excep
tions, they neither guessed, desired, nor prepared for
the conquest of Germany by Prussia and the rise of
German imperialism in the second half of the century.
As advocates of peace and cosmopolitans, as supporters
of friendship between France and Germany, and dis
approving of the fratricidal struggle between nations
for political power, they misread the signs of the
times. They were wrong in saying with Heine that

STRUGGLE FOR LIBERTY AND UNITY 101
" in Europe there were no longer any nations, but only
parties " ; they were wrong in prophesying the advent
of a great German revolution which should sweep
away kings and aristocracies and in dreaming of
securing for Germany a supremacy which should be
chiefly spiritual. But their idealistic efforts in the
cause of democracy, as we shall see later on, were not
devoid of influence upon the course of events. And
if a united empire is not the final goal of Germany's
ambition, if it proves to have been only a transitory
stage in her evolution, and if she ever revives her
humanitarian dreams of the beginning of the nine
teenth century, it is not unlikely that the Liberals,
in spite of their mistakes and their narrowness, will
one day be recognised as the first champions in Ger
many of a better future, of an era of peace and good
will, in which the bloody strife of nations shall give
way to a universal desire for progress and happiness.
II
Nevertheless, about 1840 a split took place in the
ranks of the Liberal Party.
On the one side the section which believed in
nationalism and unity, with which Liberalism had
from the first been associated, forced itself to the
front for various reasons. This was due in the first
place to the accession of Frederick William IV., who
by his grandiloquent rhetoric fanned into a blaze the
flame of national sentiment and the romantic cult of
the past of the Teutons. At the same time, the war
like ambitions which showed themselves in France in
1840, when she found herself, by the London Con
vention, excluded from the concert of Europe and
rudely checkmated in her designs on Egypt, provoked

102 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
an extraordinary outburst of patriotism throughout
the whole of Germany. In the first moment of
anger and vexation France had rashly declared her
self ready to resume the struggle against the Holy
Alliance. French publicists denounced the treaties
of 1815, demanded the left bank of the Rhine, and
threatened Europe in arms to play " the terrible
game of revolution " against her. Germany, who
was living in the most profound peace, and had
no idea of picking a quarrel with France, suddenly
saw rising before her eyes the menace of a war which
,, she had done nothing to provoke. She was angry at
' the idea that France should put forward the preten-
; sion of finding compensation on the Rhine for her
disappointment over her Egyptian policy. The pas
sions of 1813 blazed forth more fiercely than before.
Journalists and poets, writers and soldiers, fulminated
-against the immorality of France, preached a war
without quarter against the sinning nation, and
demanded the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine. Con
vinced that the hereditary foe was preparing to re
open the everlasting conflict for the possession of the
Rhine, the Germans were fired afresh with aspirations
for unity. They felt the necessity for combining to
resist aggression and to win back the imperial lands
which still remained in the hands of France.
• Liberalism, which had before been cosmopolitan
and sincerely sympathetic with France, became from
that moment strictly nationalistic. In vain did Heine
protest against the outburst of Chauvinism, which
he regarded as a foolish return to the spirit of the
past. He grew angry with the " phrase-mongering
patriotism " of poets, who enlisted their Muse in the
service of the good cause and degraded her into a
cantiniere of liberty or the washerwoman of Christian

STRUGGLE FOR LIBERTY AND UNITY 103
Teutonism. In the figure of Atta Troll, the dancing
bear, he caricatured the new type of the convinced
democratic patriot, the nationalistic and religious
acrobat. He asserted his inviolable attachment to
France and combated with all his passionate ardour
the spirit of imperialism, greedy for war and conquest,
which he saw appearing among his countrymen. It
was of no use. He remained an isolated figure. On
the whole, Liberalism developed along the lines of a
decided imperialism, which longed ever more pas
sionately for the unity and strength of Germany*
The " Liberal " became the " National Liberal."
At the same time, the advanced wing of the party
progressed to a more absolute form of Radicalism.
During the 'thirties democratic aspirations demanded
little more than the establishment of a constitutional
monarchy. After 1840 they more frequently aimed at
uncompromising republicanism. In Prussia the policy
of drastic repression and clumsy reaction inaugurated
by Frederick William IV., after a short period of
liberal ambitions, profoundly irritated public opinion.
The strict measures taken against the press and
against political poets, the pedantic despotism with
which the Minister Eichhorn weighed down the
universities and scholastic establishments, the merci
less severity with which every democratic manifesta
tion was suppressed, made the Government more
and more unpopular. Liberal opinion showed itself
particularly hostile even to the person of the King,
whom it regarded, not without reason, as responsible
for the absolutist, feudalistic, and revivalist reaction
which was again let loose in Prussia. Anti-religious
and anti-monarchical Radicalism, as it was preached by
Strauss, the Bauer brothers, Arnold Ruge, Karl Marx,
and Feuerbach, gained ground every day. At the same

104 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
time, a band of political poets like Hoffmann von
Fallersleben, Dingelstedt, Freiligrath, Meissner, Karl
Beck, Gottfried Kinkel, and others passionately
espoused the cause of the people and of liberty and
hurled inflammatory appeals across Germany. The
hostility against the King rose to such a pitch that
when Tschech attempted to assassinate Frederick
William IV. public opinion was inclined to excuse the
murderer, whilst some even went so far as to write
lofty apologies for regicide.
Whilst in Prussia the opposition to the King in
creased in violence every day, in the constitutional
states of the South also the conflict between the
democratic chambers and the reactionary ministers
grew ever more acute. In the province of Baden
especially the struggle against the Government became
resolute. In addition to the constitutional Liberals
like Welcker, Bassermann, and Karl Mathy, there
rose up a Radical Party under the leadership of
Hecker, Struve, and Itzstein, who preached the estab
lishment of a pure democracy, for which the country
was far from ripe. This party tried to make the
electors suspicious of the moderation of the con
stitutionalists, and by an inflammatory propaganda
kept alive a dangerous spirit of discontent among the
masses. When the February Revolution broke out
in Paris, Germany also was in a state of seething
ferment. Liberals of all shades, believers in unity
or constitutionalists, Radicals or Socialists, were all
agreed that the existing state of things in Germany
could not continue, and that profound reforms were
necessary in order to give the country the unity and
liberty of which it stood so sorely in need.

STRUGGLE FOR LIBERTY AND UNITY 105
III
The Revolution of 1848 in France was immediately
followed in Germany by a general conflagration. In
the space of a few weeks a good third of the country
was plunged into a sort of anarchy, which was, how
ever, of a fairly pacific nature, as, in view of the
unanimity of the movement, the authorities scarcely
made any attempt at resistance.
The princes got frightened and gave way. The
King of Wurtemberg, the Grand Dukes of Baden and
Hesse, and the Senate of Frankfort hastened to decree
the liberty of the press. The Diet of Frankfort lost
its head, decided upon a revision of the Act of Federa
tion " on really national lines," and invited the govern
ments to send delegates to discuss this revision. Dis
orders broke out in Munich, resulting on March 20 in
the abdication of King Ludwig I. and the accession
to power of Maximilian II. and a Liberal Cabinet.
In Vienna the Revolution broke out on May 13, and
swept away the system of Metternich ; Hungary and
Italy rose at the same moment. In Berlin the rum
blings of insurrection were heard in the streets on
March 18, and on the 19th the retreat of the troops
put the King and the capital in the hands of the
insurgents. Everywhere absolutism was foundering.
At the head of the movement marched the educated
middle classes — professors, writers, lawyers, doctors,
merchants, and industrialists — demanding unity and
liberty. Their fundamental claims were the con
vocation of a national parliament, the liberty of the
press, the institution of trial by jury, and the sub
stitution of the nation in arms for a standing army.
In the very ranks of this great Liberal Party there
were, moreover, sections which were more or less

106 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
advanced, the more moderate ones counting on the
help of the established authorities— the kings and
princes— to bring the reforms to a satisfactory conclu
sion ; others, more radical, insisting upon the estab
lishment of a republic and the abolition of rank and
royalty. Behind the middle classes the masses of the
people rose up, demanding, in addition to political
reforms, social changes, which were to bring universal
happiness ; equality for all, the abolition of the
privileges of the large landed proprietors in the
country districts, the reform of the industrial system
in the towns, the protection of the artisan against the
competition of the factory owner, and of the factory
hand against the exploitation of his employer.
All this revolutionary movement resulted in the
meeting of the Parliament of Frankfort, whose
convocation was demanded and its organisation pre
pared by the people themselves and the men in
whom they trusted. The governments, reduced to
impotence, did not direct the movement ; but they
countenanced the meeting of the Parliament, sanc
tioned the elections, and allowed representatives
chosen by universal suffrage to come together in
order to discuss the general interests of the country
and offer their assistance to the princes who had
been swamped in the floods of revolution. In a
moment German Liberalism had become a power,
and found itself in a position to carry its pro
gramme into practice. The result of the attempt
is well known. It ended in the complete confusion
of the Liberals. On May 18, 1848, the Parliament
met at Frankfort. At the beginning of June 1849
the remnants of the Rumpfparlament of Stuttgart
melted away after having at their last meeting at the
Marquardt Hotel launched forth a call to insur-

STRUGGLE FOR LIBERTY AND UNITY 107
rection. And as soon as the autumn came the forces
of reaction once more triumphed throughout Ger
many. What were the meaning and scope of this
crisis ?
In the first place, what did the Liberal middle
classes want ?
Firstly, it is clear that they did not want to take
the government of the country directly into their
own hands. The extreme Radicals had understood
perfectly well that if the people wanted to secure
power, it was necessary for them to lay hands on
the instruments of authority — the Civil Service and
the army. Consequently, after the preliminary
meeting at Heidelberg, the Radicals of Baden de
manded the proclamation of a republic. And at the
preliminary meeting of the Vorparlament at Frank
fort, Struve proposed the abolition of monarchy in
all the German states and the substitution of freely
elected parliaments, each of which should nominate
its own president. Germany was to become a
federation modelled on the United States. In the
meantime, whilst the transformation was being pre
pared, the national Parliament was to declare itself
permanent and take the executive power into its
own hands. But the Radicals were in a minority,
both in the Parliament and in the country. Parlia
ment defeated their revolutionary proposals by over
whelming majorities. And when they wanted to
make an appeal to arms, it soon became apparent
that they were few in numbers and that their ill-
disciplined bands, badly organised and still more
badly conducted, were no match for the regular
forces. The democratic revolution was vanquished
by force of arms in Berlin, Vienna, Hungary, the
province of Baden, and Dresden. The little group of

108 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
German republicans, unable to draw into their
ranks the bulk of the moderate Liberal Party, and
ill-supported, on the other hand, by the mass of
the people, who had no discipline and no cohesion,
finally proved too weak to seize power and create a
new political and social organisation in Germany.
Consequently the Liberal majority, both in Parlia
ment and in the country, remained royalist. It did
not wish to strip the sovereigns of their power, and
had no intention of taking their place, but aimed
simply at putting them under the control of a
constitutional and parliamentary system. Now the
princes represented the only effective and organised
force remaining in Germany. It is true their power
had been weakened and shaken by the disturbances
of March 1848. But it still existed. And it rested
upon a double foundation, one which was both moral
and material. On the one hand, in spite of every
thing the sentiment of loyalty to the Crown still
remained alive in the hearts of a considerable fraction
of the people, and German public opinion would have
been loth to see the old reigning houses swept away
by the revolutionary whirlwind. On the other
hand, the princes still had in their own hands the
instruments of power, which formed the chief advan
tage they possessed ; the army and the Civil Service
almost everywhere remained resolutely loyal. Thus
they had at their command, in order to make them
selves obeyed, the civil and military machinery of
the State, which they could set in motion whenever
they pleased.
But the Parliament, which had been born from the
will of the people, had, for its part, a purely moral
influence. Its strength consisted in the weakness of
the governments. The more the authority of the

STRUGGLE FOR LIBERTY AND UNITY 109
princes was lessened by the disorders, the more did
the machinery of the State become useless owing to
the confusion in the streets, and the more also did
the power of Parliament seem something positive
and real. But apart from its moral credit, Parlia
ment had no weapon at its disposal to secure the
execution of its wishes. It was free to decree its
own sovereignty, to appoint a Chancellor of the
Empire, to form its ministries, to pass laws, and to
promulgate a constitution. But for its decisions to
be carried into effect, it was necessary for them to be
accepted by the governments, failing which they
remained a dead-letter and purely Platonic mani
festations. The sovereign Parliament could, to give
a concrete example, decree that the federal troops
should wear a red, black, and gold cockade ; its
Minister of War could give an order that on August 6,
1848, there should be a grand parade of all the im
perial forces, who were to give three cheers for the
Chancellor of the Empire — the supreme head of the
whole imperial army. But it had no means of
forcing the obedience of the Emperor of Austria, the
King of Prussia, the King of Bavaria, and the Elector
of Hanover ; and these princes, for their part, paid
no heed to its decisions, and thus publicly proved
the weakness of that central authority, which had
not the power necessary to make itself respected.
Under these circumstances, only one alternative
remained open to Parliament, if it wished to attain
any practical results ; and this was to come to an
understanding with the governments.
Parliament made an attempt to do this. Guided
by a sure political instinct, it knew that German
unity was the one goal to be attained, and that the
process of unification could be carried out only by

110 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
means of Prussia. It therefore decided to offer most
solemnly, in the name of the whole German people,
the Imperial Crown to Frederick William IV. We
know the ill-success with which this attempt was
met. For a variety of reasons — dislike of accepting
from plebeian hands a " Crown of the stones of
barricades," antipathy for the democratic constitu
tion, which would have to be accepted at the same
time as the imperial sceptre, scruples about profiting
by the embarrassment of Austria to turn her out of
Germany, fear of the war into which the acceptance
of empire might lead Prussia — Frederick William
refused the Crown which was offered to him. The
verdict of history upon the act is faltering. Some
see in his refusal an inevitable necessity. They admit
that the King of Prussia could not have held his
throne as a gift from an assembly which had no
regular mandate, and that if he had accepted it he
would have been involved in an adventure in which
he might have risked his crown and perhaps the
future of Germany. Others, on the contrary, are of
the opinion that owing to absolutist prejudices he
prevented German unity, created by the free vote
of a national parliament, from becoming a reality.
They maintain that if the King had taken into his
hands the sceptre held out to him, German unity
would have come peacefully into existence on a
grander and more magnificent scale than ever before.
But, whether we put the blame on the shoulders of
the Parliament or of the King, the fact remains that
the co-operation required between the National
Assembly and the Prussian Crown could not be
secured, and this meant the inevitable failure of the
whole policy of the Parliament.
It must be added that if this check was perhaps

STRUGGLE FOR LIBERTY AND UNITY 111
largely due to the mistakes of individuals, it also
arose to a great extent out of far more general causes.
The Parliament failed, in the first instance, because
it was intrinsically impossible to find a solution
which could reconcile the conflicting interests in
volved. On nearly every fundamental question
German public opinion was, as a matter of fact, hope
lessly" divided. What with believers in unity and
particularists, Conservatives, Liberals, and Radicals,
the partisans of a " Great Germany," including
Austria, and the upholders of a " Little Germany,"
excluding her from the Empire, it was extremely
difficult to come to any understanding. The result
was that precisely the most important decrees of the
Parliament were passed by bare majorities. When,
for example, Parliament, after having previously
come to a contrary decision, decided at the third
reading on March 27, 1849, by a majority of four
votes, that there should be an hereditary Emperor
of Germany, and on March 28 nominated the King
of Prussia to this dignity by 290 votes to 248, it is
clear that the moral weight of such a decree was very
small, and that there was little chance of its imposing
itself finally upon German public opinion.
But the most fundamental reason for the failure
of the Parliament, and the one which German his
torians are generally agreed in advancing, must be
looked for in the character of the men who found
themselves at the head of the movement. Many of
the leaders of German Liberalism were apparently
men of thought, who aimed with ardent enthusiasm
at the realisation of a theoretical ideal, rather than
political minds endeavouring to reach the practical
attainment of a definite object. And this fact is
easily explained if we examine the general evolution

112 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
of the middle classes in Germany. During the first
half of the century it was the intellectual minds, the
men of high culture, and especially the university
professors, who held the most important position
and played the chief part. The middle class was
still essentially a cultured Mite. The capitalist
middle class and the aristocracy of enterprise were
only in the course of formation and still took but a
small share in public life. Now the German thinker
of that period was fundamentally an idealist. He
believed in the omnipotence of the idea, which, once
it had been grasped, is bound to be realised by virtue
of the irresistible immanent power of expansion
possessed by truth. He consequently regarded the
foundation of German unity as a theoretical problem,
the solution of which was to be found in beautiful
academic discussions. He did not clearly realise that
this question was above all made up of a conflict of
forces, and could only be solved by an appeal to force
— " by fire and steel," to use Bismarck's expression.
This idealistic temperament, prevalent among a large
number of the members, provides an explanation of
some of the mistakes with which the Parliament has
often been reproached, such as the abstract and
doctrinaire character of its debates, the facility with
which it believed that a division was quite capable
of solving every difficulty and settling all disputes,
the rashness with which it passed measures on
principle, without thinking whether their practical
realisation was possible. The Parliament of Frank
fort sought with a touching sincerity and ardour,
with a profoundly impressive good faith, for a
scheme of German unity, and it believed that the
moment it had hit upon a plan, unity would at once
be realised. This was a dangerous illusion. The

STRUGGLE FOR LIBERTY AND UNITY 113
historians of to-day try to render justice to the
generous effort — which was perhaps less barren than
it was long thought to be — of these idealists. They
allow that they too helped in the building of the
edifice of German unity, and give them a share in
the homage they pay to the real architects of that
unity. But they confess that these idealists must
inevitably have succumbed to circumstances. It
required men of exceedingly strong wills to bring to
a successful issue the arduous task of calling the
German Empire back to life.

CHAPTER III
THE FOUNDATION OF GERMAN UNITY

The Revolution of 1848-49 marks a decisive crisis
in the evolution of Germany. It would be correct
to define its essential character by saying that Ger
many from that moment passed from an idealistic
to an ever more definitely realistic and practical
conception of political problems.
This transition becomes quite clear if we examine
the evolution of the middle classes. And, indeed,
towards the middle of the century there was a rapid
development in its ranks of the instinct of capital
istic enterprise, of the desire for wealth and for
power in general. We have already discussed the
material manifestations which bear witness to this
rise of capitalism during the 'fifties. But this change
in the general direction of men's minds is not to be
discerned only in the economic life of the nation — it
also made itself felt in the domain of political events.
The most vital element in the middle classes was, at
the beginning of the century, the intellectual ilite,
who aspired, not to material power, but to scientific
and artistic culture, and who consequently had aims
which were above all spiritual. This cultured middle
114

FOUNDATION OF UNITY 115
class now began to be ousted and gradually degraded
to the second rank by the new aristocracy of enter
prise. The representatives of capitalism — the large
manufacturers and merchants — began to play an
increasingly important part in public life. Their
social influence began to predominate, and they re
joiced in an ever higher consideration. And from
that moment their mental outlook also began to
take the lead. Now this aristocracy of enterprise
was very clearly differentiated from the old intel
lectual ilite. It did not aim at culture, or, to be
more exact, it did not regard scientific culture as an
end in itself, but simply as an instrument of power.
It aspired, on the contrary, to wealth and authority.
It had no desire for spiritual, disinterested, or general
aims, but only followed positive, concrete, and
tangible interests. It no longer allowed itself to be
guided in its actions by general theories or abstract
principles, but aimed at bounding its ambitions by
its power, and making an exact calculation of the
forces it had at its disposal and the opposition it
was likely to encounter, so as to adjust the means
to the ends it had in view. From that time forward
business men were destined to rise to an ever higher
position among the middle classes of Germany.
Their realistic ambitions and concrete desires gradu
ally took the place of the idealism of the men of
thought, who, until the meeting of the Frankfort
Parliament, had guided the destinies of the Liberal
Party. But it is not only in the middle classes that we
find this change from idealism to realism, which
was the natural result of the spread of the spirit
of enterprise. It was also to be discovered among
the nobility and the leading statesmen. Here

116 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
it is true, the sense of reality had never lost
ground, for it existed, without doubt, among the
country squires, in whose ranks, as we have already
seen, the first representatives of the spirit of capital
istic enterprise in Germany were to be found ; and
it also existed in the minds of the statesmen who
paved the way for the War of Independence, and
among the administrators who, when peace was
established, gradually raised the edifice of Prussian
greatness, reorganised the finances and the army,
and brought the work of the Zollverein to a satis
factory conclusion. But there were also indications
of a certain liberal idealism among men like Stein
and Humboldt. And in others, more particularly in
the case of the advisers of Frederick William IV., this
was allied to a more or less strong dose of romantic
conviction. And the Conservatives of this type — the
champions of the divine right of kings and dynasties,
who abhorred the Revolution with all their might,
dreamt of restoring the Christian State and the
hierarchy of the Middle Ages, were filled with a pious
reverence for the Holy Alliance, and could conceive
of no German Empire of which the House of Austria
was not the head — were idealists quite as doctrinaire
as the enthusiasts of constitutional Liberalism, or of
the republican ideal, could be.
It is possible to measure the progress made in the
direction of realism if we contrast with these roman
ticists the statesman whose giant figure dominates
the whole of the second half of the century, and whose
entrance into public life dates precisely from the days
of the Revolution of 1848 — I mean Prince Bismarck.
Bismarck was, it is true, the highest product of
feudalism. Uniting in his single personality the
proud and pugnacious arrogance of the Brandenburg

FOUNDATION OF UNITY 117
squire with the commercial spirit and business ex
perience of the Pomeranian noble, imbued with the
doctrines of the historical school and with romanti
cism, fashioned in the school of Hugo and of Heeren,
Savigny, and Hoffmann, he shared from the bottom
of his soul in the great prejudices of his caste. He
was a fervent upholder of monarchy by right divine,
a mystic whose piety was deeply sincere, and a
hearty convert, after a youth of infidelity, to the
religion of the Gospels. Like a good romanticist, he
was in love with the " real people ! " — that intangible
multitude of souls that " draws from the sense of
tradition the power which leads it to its predestined
goal " ; while he also believed that the sovereign
alone, by means of the grace vouchsafed him from
on high, was able to read the soul of the nation, to
decipher its will, and guide it to the destiny appointed
by Providence. He hated and despised revolutionary
forces — the undisciplined mob which rose against
legitimate authority, and the workman who in
dulged in the desire to think and to reason. He
hurled his thunderbolts against the spirit of impiety
and demoralisation, which had sprung up throughout
the urban civilisation of the modern world. But,
above all, he could not find any sarcasm sufficiently
strong for the middle-class man and the thinker who
made clumsy attempts to gain power, for members
of Parliament who aspired to regulate the sovereignty
of the people, for the constitutionalists who granted
to incompetent deliberative assemblies — those gro
tesque caricatures of the national will — the sacred and
divine right of legislation. He detested from the
bottom of his heart those arrogant idealists who
placed their foolish overweening faith in abstract
reason and its artificial creations.

118 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
But this feudalist, this romanticist, this " red re
actionary," who bewitched and at the same time dis
turbed Frederick William IV., possessed to a supreme
degree the essential characteristics of the modern
mind : the will to power, intellectual lucidity, and
intensity of nervous energy.
He desired with an incredibly violent passion
power for himself, for his party, for his country, and
for his race. And this without any shadow of
sentimentality, but by virtue of the most elementary
of instincts, which was the mainspring of his whole
being — an instinct which proclaimed itself openly and
was not ashamed. He possessed to a most extra
ordinary degree the love of power, and revelled in
exercising and spreading his own influence and that
of his country. And he was constantly putting into
practice this " combative " idea of existence, with
out remorse and without scruple, without pity for
the feeble or generosity for the vanquished, an inde
fatigable fighter, ever ready to guide his people in
their hard ascent to power. He has been accused
of cynicism, he has been reproached with putting
into practice the principle that " might is right."
It would be more just to say that in the case of
Bismarck — as indeed is true, more generally speak
ing, of the conscience of the whole of Germany — it is
a mistake to try to establish between might and right
the antagonism which the judicial mind of France is
quite ready to admit. In his eyes there was no right
without might or might without right. He saw in
the insatiable thirst for power no cynical usurpation
of the seat of justice by brute force, but the primordial
duty and the sacred mission of strong men and
healthy nations.
This will of iron was backed by a marvellous

FOUNDATION OF UNITY 119
ability for summing up reality with absolute exacti
tude, for understanding men and things, and un
ravelling the mesh of events. It has been truly
remarked of Bismarck that his peculiar genius did
not consist so much in the capacity for conceiving
vast designs and preparing for some distant future,
as in the marvellous dexterity with which he was
able at any given moment to extract the best pos
sible results from the present. He is said to have
had no greater joy than in visualising every day and
every hour, as news poured in, the ever-changing
image of the state of the world at the time, and in
constantly discovering by an infallible instinct the
action that was required and the attitude which it
was necessary to assume in order to advance his
designs. Thus he lived always in the present, which
by a genial effort of the imagination he embraced
whole ; he gave himself up to the task of the
day without bothering overmuch about distant con
tingencies. And to this rare gift of being able to
reflect with clearness and fidelity the multitudinous
and diverse changes of everyday actual reality, he
added the subtle power of divining the current of public
opinion, the meaning of imponderabilia, in such a
way that almost up to the last he was able to guess
the essential tendencies of contemporary evolution
and adapt his policy to the profoundest needs of his
time. A realist by the possession of a will directed to
wards the conquest of material power, wealth, and
supremacy, as also by the clear lucidity of his intel
ligence and the infinite resources of his co-ordinating
faculties, Bismarck, on account of the complexity
of his psychic organism and the exceptional intensity
of his nervous energy, was also the legitimate son

120 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
of the new age which was being inaugurated. One
has only an incomplete idea of Bismarck if one
imagines that he was a sort of robust and healthy
giant, a soldier of genius, a voracious eater and
drinker, mad on hunting and violent riding, open
air and country life, and finding in the primeval
vigour of his constitution the strength to bear the
crushing burden of public life. One must also take
into account that an existence so active and full as
his presupposed the possession of a nervous system
which was both marvellously sensitive and marvel
lously hard. And, as a matter of fact, Bismarck
had a highly nervous temperament, which sometimes
vibrated to distraction, and was subject to strange
disorders, which seemed to be the physical mani
festation of psychic upheavals and disturbances.
But in spite of everything he was strong enough to
keep his balance and to endure without irreparable
damage the incredible expenditure of nervous energy
in which he indulged. But the sort of internal
vibration which constantly animated him betrayed
the accelerated speed and the terrible tension under
which his sensitive, and at the same time powerful,
organism worked.
With the rise of the realistic spirit in politics, a
new phase in the evolution of Germany began.
II
In the first act of the political drama, the great
struggle for German unity, with all its various
vicissitudes, takes place. And since the beginning of
the century this struggle had changed very much in
character, The aspirations for unity arose, at first, out of the

FOUNDATION OF UNITY 121
feeling of solidarity between the Teutonic nations
who spoke the same language and had the same
culture, as distinguished from the foreigner, and
tended to create between these nations a moral rather
than a material tie. Those who believed in unity
thought that the federation of the German states
would be the result of the reasoning will of the whole
nation, which would gradually triumph over the par-
ticularist egoism of the princes. Without sacrificing
the autonomy of the various divisions of Germany,
it would secure the realisation of a union which was
not only demanded by the national conscience, but
was also as necessary for the external safety as for the
economic development of the country. We have
already seen how this desire for unity almost attained
its object on the day on which the Parliament of
Frankfort offered the imperial crown, in the name
of the German people, to the King of Prussia, and
how the refusal of Frederick William IV. caused the
miscarriage of this brilliant hope.
From that time forward the problem of unity
gradually assumed a different aspect. Instead of
being an idealistic impulse towards national solidarity,
it became above all a question of dynamics.
The system of German states contained in Prussia
and Austria two rival centres of attraction, which
mutually neutralised and cancelled each other. This
rivalry, whether it was open or covert, paralysed the
powers of the Teutonic body politic and encouraged
the centrifugal and particularist tendencies of the
minor states. For unity to be established it was
necessary for this dualism to be stopped and for
Prussia, the most vigorous state of Germany, gradually
to increase her power, affirm her superiority, drive
her irreconcilable rival, Austria, out of the Empire,

122 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
and group all the other German states around her,
either by force or by the prestige of victory. The
history of this slow conquest by Prussia is sufficiently
well known for me to confine myself to giving a rough
sketch of its most important phases.
The first step towards the practical realisation of
unity was the establishment of the Zollverein. Prus
sian statesmen deserve credit for having understood
the vital necessity for modern industry to have a
wide market at its disposal, and this at a time when
Austria had not yet realised that fact. Moreover,
they were clear-sighted enough to see the political
advantage Prussia would derive from drawing closer
the economic ties with the other German states, even
at the price of certain material sacrifices. And in the
end they succeeded in this difficult enterprise, in spite
of the obstacles which stood in their path. They baffled
the hostility of Austria, who scented in this move
ment towards unity a revolutionary manifestation,
and a dangerous manoeuvre on the part of Prussia
for extending her sphere of influence. They suc
ceeded in calming the particularist suspicions of the
minor states, who saw a slight to their sovereignty
in the interference of Prussia in their administration
and finance. They resisted the blundering impatience
of certain over-hasty partisans of unity, like List,
who would have liked to see the economic unification
of Germany proclaimed at one stroke by a decree of
the diet, instead of proceeding gradually by succes
sive stages. They triumphed over all these difficul
ties by the firmness of a persevering and loyal policy,
pursued methodically, without haste, brutality, or
weakness. Their action was, moreover, seconded by the
natural play of economic laws. Prussia, which was

FOUNDATION OF UNITY 123
the only large state in Germany, was the one power
in a position to secure the prosperity of industry on
a large scale, which must of necessity have been
confined and hampered in the minor states. Con
sequently, a customs union with Prussia was so
clearly to the advantage of the latter, that in the
long run there was no alternative but to resign them
selves to it. The customs duties, moreover, con
stituted a financial resource of the first importance ;
so much so that for the states whose finances were in
low water, the prospect of an immediate and certain
increase of revenue was one of the most enticing
baits. Lastly, tariff walls and rights of transit might
prove exceedingly efficacious weapons against ob
stinate hostility, and Prussia did not hesitate to use
them on occasion to bring some recalcitrant neigh
bour to repentance. During the 'thirties a customs
union including the greater part of Germany — only
Hanover and a few petty North German states re
mained outside the Zollverein — was definitely estab
lished under the hegemony of Prussia. The economic
results of this arrangement were immediately notice
able everywhere. And soon the Zollverein, founded
on the solid basis of material interests, became a
definite institution, capable of defying all assaults
and of victoriously weathering the storms of the
revolutionary period of 1848-1849.
As soon as she had been placed at the head of
the German Customs Union, Prussia immediately en
deavoured, in the spring of 1849, after the refusal of
King Frederick William IV. to accept the Imperial
Crown offered him by the Parliament of Frankfort,
to realise the political unity of Germany by means
of diplomacy.
On the advice of his friend General von Radowitz,

124 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
the King of Prussia tried to create within the Con
federation, and with the consent of Austria, a smaller
" union " which was to come into being through the
voluntary adherence of the petty states. This was
a strangely complicated scheme, in which there was a
curious admixture of the enthusiasm for unity of
1848, Prussian aspirations to the hegemony of Ger
many, and fidelity to the traditional policy of friend
ship with Austria. It was foredoomed to failure
— in the first place because the desire for unity,
weakened by the check with which the Frankfort
Parliament had met, had not sufficient strength to
demand the sacrifices required from the particularist
egoism of the minor states ; secondly and chiefly
because Austria, in proportion as she regained the
power which had been shattered by the revolutionary
crisis, showed herself more clearly hostile to a pro
gramme which would destroy her influence in Ger
many. The weakness and indecision of Frederick
William IV. in this difficult position almost brought
about a catastrophe. After having in the first place
grouped around him a certain number of petty states,
he did not know how to anticipate defection on the
part of his allies by the use of force, he could not make
up his mind to beat a retreat in time, nor had he the
courage to accept an open conflict with Austria under
the disadvantageous circumstances in which he was
placed. This diplomatic campaign, foolishly under
taken, and then conducted without spirit and energy,
finally ended in the disastrous reverse of Olmutz.
Prussia, isolated and ill-prepared for war, found herself
constrained to give way all along the line and to sub
mit to the humiliating terms which victorious Austria
imposed upon her.
During the years that followed Prussia retired into

FOUNDATION OF UNITY 125
herself, and gathered together her forces for the great
struggle which had become inevitable, and which
was to decide to whom the hegemony of Germany
was to belong.
First, the Prussian Government re-established its
authority at home by means of the reaction, which
immediately after the crisis of 1848 began to set in
throughout Germany and the whole of Europe. And
it regained its position all the more surely inasmuch
as it used its victory with comparative moderation.
In Austria, Schwarzenberg and his successors re
turned to the most superannuated forms of absolutism.
They cancelled all constitutional guarantees and
established a centralised bureaucratic and clerical
system which ruffled the most elementary instincts of
the modern conscience. And they thus condemned
themselves to a reign of systematic suppression,
levelling despotism and brutal violence. In the minor
German states the princes, who had recovered from
the revolutionary scare, wreaked their vengeance on
their foes at home by a series of petty persecutions,
without seeing that they were thereby destroying in
the hearts of their subjects the last vestiges of that
devotion to the dynasties which had hitherto been
their chief instrument of power. It is true that in
Prussia also the forces of reaction triumphed. The
officials of all kinds were subjected to a stricter disci
pline, and found themselves reduced to the alternative
either of resigning or of becoming the docile weapons
of the central power. The right of forming societies
was practically restricted to those who were friendly
to the Government. The press was sedulously gagged
and reduced to impotence. The all-powerful police
force made its heavy fist felt everywhere, and all too
complacent tribunals sanctioned, by audacious inter-

126 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
pretations of the law, the most arbitrary actions on
the part of the central power. But the feudalistic
and revivalist Right, nevertheless, did not succeed in
destroying the parliamentary institutions which had
been accepted by the Government, nor in restoring the
edifice of social privilege, nor in founding that Chris
tian state of which romanticists dreamt.
On the day following that on which the King of
Prussia, thanks to the support of the army, dissolved
the National Assembly elected after the March Re
volution, and thus re-established by force of arms
the sovereign authority which he had at one moment
seemed on the point of abdicating, he promulgated a
written constitution almost identical with the one he
had presented only a short time previously to the
National Assembly, and containing the fundamental
clauses of the Belgian Constitution. This consti
tution satisfied, at least in theory, the chief demands
of the Liberal Party ; it officially proclaimed the
liberty of the subject and civil equality, and instituted
a representative system in addition to the royal
authority. In short, to the great disgust of the
extreme feudalists, it put an end, once for all, to the
reign of autocracy, and organised the co-operation
of the Crown and the people on a definite system.
It is true that the concessions made by the King
were more apparent than real. The monarch pre
served his sovereignty and his entire independence
of the Chambers. The Lower House, held in check
by the House of Lords, had no real influence over the
Government. The method of election to the Lower
House was such as to secure the preponderating voice
to the most highly taxed electors. Prussia, therefore,
did not suddenly become a parliamentary state— she
remained an absolute monarchy, on to which had been

FOUNDATION OF UNITY 127
more or less badly grafted the chief characteristics
of a constitutional system. But at least the Crown
had had the wisdom not to profit by its victory in
order completely to overwhelm its foes. It had had
the good sense to assimilate a large part of the Liberal
programme and institute of its own free will a system
which was on the whole acceptable to the more mode
rate among the middle classes of Germany. By these
clever concessions, which did not weaken its influence
or compromise its authority, it succeeded in con
ciliating the sympathies of an important section of
public opinion, and thus consolidated its power on
a broader and more secure foundation.
With the accession of William to power, first as
Prince Regent and then as King, and, above all, with
the appointment of Bismarck to the post of Prime
Minister, the attitude of the Prussian Throne to
wards the various political parties became still more
clearly defined.
It proclaimed itself more loftily than ever a mon
archy by right divine. The king possessed, by virtue
of a special grace, the instinct for supreme decisions
which would realise the will of God upon earth. In
his hands were placed the right and the duty of dis
posing, in accordance with the dictates of his in
spiration, of all the vital forces which together
constituted the strength of the nation. In Prussia,
the king, according to Bismarck, was not a mere
ornamental accessory of the constitutional edifice ;
he did not only reign — he governed. After having
been illuminated by the advice of his councillors, he
gave his orders in the plenitude of his sovereignty.
He was free to choose the ministers in whom he
reposed confidence, without Parliament having any
right to impose upon him the councillors whom they

128 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
wanted. Upon him, in the last resort, rested the
right of deciding the great questions of armaments,
diplomacy, peace and war, and the ratification of
treaties ; the House had no business to interfere in
these matters over which it possessed no jurisdiction.
And lastly he had the right of supplying all " de
ficiencies " in the constitution and of ensuring, if
the need arose, the normal working of the State on
his own responsibility alone, and of acting on his own
initiative without the consent of Parliament, in any
case in which the usually necessary agreement
between the will of the king and the House had
failed to be secured.
But the royal will did not draw its inspiration
only from the feudalists of the Right. It acted in
accordance with the sum-total of all the national
forces. It was the necessary arbitrator between the
parties who struggled for power, but was the prisoner
of none of them. And Bismarck excelled in dis
covering this aggregate of the national will.
About 1860 he gauged with marvellous accuracy
the power which the love of monarchy had among
the mass of the people in Prussia. He realised that
the immense majority of the nation, sick of political
agitation and little desirous of renewing the attempt
which had failed in 1848, would gladly range itself
behind a master who was capable of satisfying the
fundamental aspirations of the new realistic and
positivist generation and its will to economic and
political power. And thus with admirable certainty
of instinct he determined the bold outlines of his
policy. An imperialist with regard to foreign affairs,
he led Prussia with indefatigable zeal and energy to
the conquest of Germany, and thus succeeded in
contenting both the champions of Prussian expan-

FOUNDATION OF UNITY 129
sion and the believers in German unity, as the victory
of Prussia seemed definitely to promise the practical
realisation of the dream of unification. An upholder
of absolutism at home, he satisfied the loyalty of
the country to the Crown by maintaining the royal
authority intact. But he also reconciled the capi
talist middle class by giving his support to the new
movement towards a system of enterprise, and he
remained sufficiently free from all class prejudice
and from any taint of Conservative doctrinairism to
be able, when the decisive crisis arrived, to appeal
in all sincerity to the support of democratic public
opinion. In 1866 he brought against the reactionary
federalism of Austria the identical Liberal programme
of 1848, including the convocation of a German
parliament elected by the universal suffrage of the
whole nation, from which Austria was to be excluded.
And whilst the policy of Bismarck was grouping
all the forces of the nation around the Prussian
Throne, it was working at the same time to raise the
might of Prussia to its highest power in every do
main. The Zollverein, extended to Hanover and her
Steuerverein, was renewed in spite of the intrigues of
Austrian diplomacy, which attempted, after 1850, to
introduce Austria into the Customs Union, and
thereby to snatch away from Prussia the direction
of the economic development of Germany. The army,
whose inefficiency had been revealed by the crisis
of 1850, was reorganised by the efforts of the Prince
Regent and Roon. In spite of the violent oppo
sition of Parliament, which was afraid of seeing the
national army, as it had been organised by the
patriots of the War of Independence, transformed
into a body of Prastorian Guards, and which stiffened
its back for foolish and barren resistance, the military
9

130 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
forces of Prussia, largely increased and modernised,
became an excellently drilled and disciplined weapon
of war, kept well in hand by the King, and ready to
act at the first signal against any adversary that
might be pointed out. Moreover, the diplomacy of
Bismarck was constantly engaged in placing every
possible contingency in his favour for the decisive
struggle with Austria, which he foresaw long before
it actually took place. He secured for Prussia the
sympathies of the Muscovite Empire by remaining
neutral during the Crimean War, and by consenting
in 1863, to help the Tsar in his bloody suppression
of the Polish insurrection. He broke with the
traditions of the Holy Alliance and with Legitimist
prejudices by trying to put himself on good terms
with Napoleon III. through negotiating an alliance
with revolutionary Italy. In short, he managed with
marvellous dexterity to plot the necessary war with
Austria, to ensure its birth at a propitious time, and
at the psychological moment to force the hands both
of Austrian statesmen, who could not be ignorant
of the perils of the venture, and of King William,
who was reluctant to engage in a fratricidal
struggle. Nevertheless, it was on the field of Koniggratz
that Prussia for the first time proved in the most
brilliant manner the superiority of her power. The
decisive step towards unity was taken there. The
old dualism was abolished by the defeat of Austria,
who was wiped out of Germany, and thenceforward
ceased to hold the influence of Prussia in check.
Prussia, reinforced by the accession of Hanover,
Nassau, Hesse-Cassel, Frankfort, and the Duchies of
the Elbe, definitely grouped the minor states north of
the Main around her, under the title of the Northern

FOUNDATION OF UNITY 131
Confederation. A constitution, which ingeniously re
conciled the claims of unity and particularism, which
preserved the independence of the princes whilst it
secured the undeniable supremacy of the King of
Prussia and the close cohesion of the whole country
in the face of the foreigner, bound the states together
by a solid tie without suppressing their individuality
or enslaving them, at all events openly, to Prussia.
And the latter, owing to her size, and thanks to the
glory of victory, found herself in the first place in
the position to dominate the Confederation of the
North. Moreover, she exercised an irresistible power
of attraction over the states situated south of the
Main, who were destined to form the Confederation
of the South, and who already found themselves
bound to the Confederation of the North by the
material tie of the Zollverein. The Customs Union
between these two groups in Germany prepared the
way for their political unity. It only required the
princes of the Southern Confederation to be repre
sented in the Bundesrat and for the Customs Parlia
ment, which every year united the delegates of the
South with those of the North for the discussion of
indirect taxation, to extend its functions to the
domain of politics and legislation, for the German
Empire to be realised. As early as 1867 Bismarck
asserted in the Reichstag : "From the day that the
Confederation of the South becomes a reality and
only two national parliaments meet in Germany, no
human power will be able to prevent their joining
any more than the waters of the Red Sea could
have remained divided after the crossing of the
hosts of Israel."
The war of 1870, by uniting the whole of Germany

132 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
in a paroxysm of hatred against the hereditary foe,
put the finishing touches to the work of unification,
which had remained incomplete in 1866, and gave
birth to the German Empire.
The causes of this war are still very obscure. It is
impossible, even to-day, to tell with absolute cer
tainty the exact intentions of the leading statesmen
either on the French or the German side.
At all events it is in the first place certain that
France, generally speaking, did not want war. The
myth, upheld by Bismarck and afterwards repeated
ad nauseam by official historians, of a bellicose and
vindictive France who had long been brooding an
invasion, and who, in the belief that her forces
were superior, would suddenly have attacked peace-
loving and unsuspecting Germany under the most
frivolous of pretexts, cannot hold water.
As a matter of fact, the soul of France was torn in
two by conflicting sentiments. At heart no one
wanted war. The Emperor, who was a phlegmatic
fatalist, had faith in the wisdom of the nations, and
believed in the gradual pacification of all men's minds.
His advisers — the most clear-sighted at least — could
not shut their eyes to the possibility of a struggle
with the victors of Sadowa. The middle classes, un
accustomed to warlike virtues and the spirit of
sacrifice, dominated by the love of comfort and
luxury, in their positivist materialism hated the
barbarism of bloody conflicts between one nation and
another, and gladly plumed themselves on possessing
a generous though vague humanitarian idealism.
And lastly the great majority of the people was as
peaceably inclined as the middle classes, and nourished
no violent animosity against neighbours of whom
it knew next to nothing. But, on the other

FOUNDATION OF UNITY 133
hand, France could not disguise the fact that after
Sadowa all national security was at an end, and that
the birth of a bold and ambitious military power
upon her eastern frontier was a serious menace to
her tranquillity and to her position in Europe. All
this produced a complex state of mind, made up of
surprise, irritation, and anxiety. The friends of the
Imperial Government passionately desired some
foreign victory, which would to a certain extent
counterbalance in the eyes of public opinion the
enormous advantages gained by Prussia. The repre
sentatives of the middle classes — men like Thiers —
pointed out, not without some anxiety, the danger
to France of the growth of Prussia, and bitterly
denounced the mistake made by French diplomacy
in allowing German unity to come into existence
without securing any compensation for its own
country. They were angry with Prussia and with
Bismarck for having " deceived " France, and they
contemplated the possibility of war without believing
in it. They even talked of military preparations.
But the middle classes, whilst they refused to accept
the situation and consent to the renunciations which
the position of affairs inevitably entailed upon French
men, were also not willing to resign themselves to the
sacrifices which would have been required if France
had really meant to fight. And the Government,
who demanded a thorough reorganisation of the
army, did not, on the other hand, possess sufficient
energy to impose it forcibly upon a public opinion
that was against it. And thus a dangerous spirit of
vacillation sprang up in France, in which the desire
for peace was the chief factor, but in which there
was also a certain element of dull irritation, per
meated by vague desires for war, which evaporated

134 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
in words and schemes without ever resulting in a
practical act or a virile resolution.
The public opinion of Germany was infinitely
simpler and more decided. Hatred for the frivolous,
vain, and blustering Welsche,1 resentment against
the perfidious nation, which in 1815 had only escaped
the extermination it deserved, thanks to the ill-timed
and cowardly weakness of England and Russia, the
desire to win back Alsace, which had been fraudu
lently snatched away from the German Empire by
Louis XIV., were feelings very generally prevalent
in Germany, especially in Prussia, and revived
periodically, with an elemental force, during the
nineteenth century, every time that Germany im
agined herself menaced by the ambitions of France.
These feelings had much greater consistency and
real weight than the superficial Chauvinism, which
before 1870 made itself conspicuous in France
by its vain boasting and harmless chatter. Ger
many, moreover, had at her head a man who knew
what he wanted, and realised all the advantage he
could derive from this hatred of the hereditary foe
in order to put the coping-stone to the edifice of
German unity.
Did Bismarck in the bottom of his heart share the
national prejudice against the hereditary enemy ? It
may well be doubted ; and French historians have
pointed out that he was at all events free from any
taint of romantic Chauvinism, and perhaps better
able than the majority of his fellow-countrymen to
render justice to the sterling qualities of their race.
It is suggested that he even believed in the inevitable
necessity of a Franco-German war, and that he
1 A term applied generally to the foreigner by the ancient
Teutons, just as the Anglo-Saxons used the word Welsh. — Tb,

FOUNDATION OF UNITY 135
worked systematically to hasten its outbreak. The
question as to the exact date on which the necessity
for war became clear in his mind has often been
discussed. Did this happen in 1866, when the in
discreet attempt of France to act as mediator, and
the blustering of the imperial press, unloosed a
unanimous paroxysm of rage throughout the whole
of Germany ? Was the Luxemburg affair a trap
laid for the French Government to push France into
war ? Or did Bismarck only make his decision in
1869, when he realised that Bavaria would never join
the German Confederation peacefully of her own free
will, and that it was necessary to reduce her to
the dilemma of either marching with France against
Germany or with Germany against France ? No one
can tell for certain. But the fact which is beyond
dispute is that sooner or later the hour arrived when
Bismarck was convinced that war was inevitable, as
France would never resign herself to the formation
of a great military power on her frontier, and that
consequently she must not be allowed to choose her
own time, but must be forestalled. Nothing, more
over, would be a better seal for German unity than
blood spilt upon the common field of battle. Ger
man unity under the hegemony of Prussia had been
imposed upon Austria and Germany by the war of
1866 ; it only remained to impose it upon the rest
of the world by a national war against France, which
would convince Europe of the power of united
Germany. From the day that Bismarck realised this neces
sity he decided upon his plan of action. It was
necessary to hasten the outbreak of war. But it
was also essential to make France the aggressor.
We all know the consummate art with which he

136 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
made capital out of the state of exasperation and
irritation existing in French public opinion to pre
cipitate France into a war which, in the bottom of
her heart, she did not want, and which a little level
headedness might have been enough to ward off. We
also know how he forced the Imperial Government
into committing the irrevocable mistake of appear
ing to be the disturber of the public peace, and thus
put every semblance of right on his side, while he
persuaded his countrymen and the rest of Europe
that Germany was the victim of an unjustifiable act
of aggression. The war might perhaps have been
avoided had the French Government known how to
obtain a clear conviction that a pacific spirit was
prevalent in the country, and had France remained
calm in the presence of the cunning methods where
by her adversary tried to rouse her into action.
From this point of view, certainly, the onus of
the war rests upon the French nation. But the
will that desired it most passionately, that plotted
and planned it with a fully conscious cleverness,
and which in the end made it inevitable by his
" audacious emendations " of the Ems despatch,
was without a shadow of doubt Bismarck. And this
desire was not due to the arbitrary resolution of
personal ambition. Bismarck had the firm convic
tion that in letting loose the dogs of war he was
leading his country to the fulfilment of her divine
mission ; he was the incarnation of the will to power
of imperial Germany, which impelled her to regain
her position in Europe and brought her, after cen
turies of eclipse and humiliation, to the threshold
of a glorious and prosperous future.
When the verdict of war had been pronounced,
when for the second time the boldness of the great

FOUNDATION OF UNITY 137
minister had been crowned with success, and when
on January 18, 1871, in the Galerie des Glaces at
Versailles, King William had resumed " the throne
of the German Empire, which had remained vacant
for over sixty years," national unity was once for
all secured. It is true that the treaties by which
the southern states, like Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and
Baden, were in their turn bound to the Confederation
of the North proved at first a disappointment to the
Liberal believers in unity. They would have liked a
radical reconstruction of Germany, and dreamt of a
great kingdom with a strong central government.
But the " reserved rights " which Bismarck con
sented to recognise in the southern states were merely
harmless, formal concessions made to particularist
susceptibilities or prejudices, and were never a real
menace to the unity of the nation. The German
princes kept up the appearance of a fairly wide
autonomy ; but in reality they had lost all effective
power for ever. The rivalries which had before
paralysed the strength of Germany could never again
arise ; they were from that time forward reduced
to the level of insignificant provincial bickerings,
to which no serious importance could be attached.
After the war of 1870 there were no longer any
states in Germany, but only provinces. The author
ity of the Emperor grew stronger and stronger,
and the institutions of the Empire were developed
on lines favourable to unity. The new Germany
founded by Bismarck was not merely a federation
of independent states, but a really strong military
monarchy hardly less centralised than the other
states of Europe.

CHAPTER IV
THE GERMAN EMPIRE AND HER FOREIGN POLICY

Force had accomplished the task in which free will
had failed. Conquered by Prussian bayonets and
then led forward to victory under the auspices of
Prussia, Germany had succeeded in gaining unity,
not by virtue of any spontaneous decision on the
part of the nation, but through the indomitable will
to power of the Prussian State. But none the less
had she attained the goal towards which her hopes
had soared for a whole century. The Empire was
restored. And from that moment Germany became
sincerely desirous of peace. Indeed, it is a remark
able fact, and one entirely to the credit of the nation,
that her successes in war did not inspire her with a
lust for battle or tempt her to continue the exten
sion of her territory by force of arms. After 1870
neither the people nor their rulers desired fresh wars.
They realised that Germany was " satiated," and
that she required long years of peace in order to
consolidate her conquests, organise her internal
affairs, and develop her industry. All classes alike
longed for peace.
But the position Germany had won by force of
arms could not be maintained unless she commanded
the respect of her adversaries by the superiority of
her power. 138

THE EMPIRE AND FOREIGN POLICY 139
Internal difficulties, it is true, were no longer to
be feared. Germans quickly forgave Prussia for
having handled them rather roughly in order to lead
them to unity. Complaints were, indeed, occasion
ally heard of Prussian pride and arrogance. But
the bitterness which existed here and there and the
trifling differences which occasionally arose in no
way compromised the feeling of national solidarity.
Particularism had been conquered once for all, and
was incapable of creating any serious difficulties for
the new masters of Germany.
But the opposition on the part of the non-German
nations which the victories of Prussia had incor
porated in the Empire was more serious. On the
east, the Poles continued to prove refractory against
every attempt to Teutonise them, and obstinately
maintained their nationality in the face of their
German masters. In the north, Northern Schleswig
remains to this day so irreconcilably Danish, that
even after forty years of separation the people have
not ceased to protest against an annexation about
which, in spite of the stipulations made by the
Treaty of Prague, they were never consulted, and
which did violence to their national feelings. In
the west, Alsace-Lorraine, after having for years
asserted her loyalty to defeated France and her
hatred for the victors, at last, it is true, ended
by bowing to the inevitable. But although to-day
she makes no difficulties for Germany from the
national and political point of view, she none the
less continues to oppose her in matters of culture, and
openly proves her determination not to be stripped
of her own individuality, but to remain a land of
mixed culture— half -French and half-German. Thus,
immediately after 1870, and even to-day, there are

140 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
a certain number of subjects of the Empire who
submit with more or less resignation to the estab
lished state of things, and have never given their
heartfelt adhesion to the verdict of battle which
made them Germans. But it must be remembered
that these cases of opposition, however legitimate
and imposing may have been the causes which
inspired them, remained as a rule fairly passive
and ineffectual. They were too isolated and too
obviously impotent for the nation to take offence
at them.
But if the material and moral unity of the Empire
was an accomplished fact, Germany had provoked
external enmities, which immediately after the war,
it is true, were not very formidable, but which might
become dangerous. The Treaty of Frankfort created
between France and Germany a condition of covert
hostility, which by being indefinitely prolonged, was
destined to inflict a reign of armed peace and mutual
mistrust upon them both.
Germany did not think it necessary to show France
any consideration after her defeat. Convinced that
a war of revenge was inevitable after a short interval,
and that France, as soon as she had renewed her
strength, would reopen the everlasting conflict
against Germany, Bismarck and the military party
had concerned themselves exclusively with the task
of making it impossible for her to do any harm
for a long time to come, and of securing for Germany,
in view of the future war, a favourable strategic
position. Under these circumstances, they did not
hesitate to demand the cession of Alsace-Lorraine,
which they regarded as a military bulwark, the
glacis which was indispensable to the security of
Germany, and also a gate of entry which gave them

THE EMPIRE AND FOREIGN POLICY 141
the power of invading France at any moment. Little
did they care for the heartbreaking protestations of
public opinion against a stipulation which lacerated
the profoundest depths of the French spirit. They
placed the interests of their own country before every
other consideration. That which force had created,
force would surely know how to retain. And thus
the worship of force became more deeply rooted than
ever in the German mind. It was in this case not
merely the expression of that feverish desire for
material power in every shape and form, which we
have seen was one of the fundamental psychological
characteristics of the new era. It was also fortified
by the feeling that the international compact which
laid the foundations of the German Empire of to-day
was never accepted by the enemy save as the ex
pression of an established condition of things. The
maintenance of that superior strength upon which
her present greatness was based, therefore seemed
to Germany a matter of life and death !
Thus the maintenance and development of her
military power continued to hold the first place in
the mind of Germany. She was persuaded — and
carefully cultivated this conviction among the people
— that France desired revenge, that she was pre
paring for it with determination, and that she would
take it without a moment's hesitation the instant
she felt herself the stronger power. It was there
fore imperative for Germany to be, in Bismarck's
words, " ever on the watch " and for her to keep
" her powder dry and her sword sharp." The more
formidable the German army was, the more crushing
and indisputable would be her superiority, and the
better would peace be assured. Immediately after
the war, preparations began to be made for the con-

142 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
flict of the future. A war fund was put in reserve in
the fortress of Spandau to meet the expenses of the
first days of mobilisation. The principal fortresses
were restored and rebuilt and numberless strategic
fortifications constructed. Then in 1874 the " sep-
tennarian " military law was passed by the Reichstag,
fixing for seven years the peace footing of the army
and the amount of the military budget. In 1875
came the law about the Landwehr, and in 1887-88
fresh military grants were wrung from Parliament
by means of a dissolution, and by parading before
the country the spectre of an immediate war with
France and Russia. In 1890 there was the reform
of the artillery, followed in 1892-93 by the successful
establishment of compulsory military service for all,
which increased the peace strength of the army by
over a hundred thousand men, and was made accept
able to the nation by the reduction of the period of
service to two years. In 1899 a fresh increase in the
army estimates was obtained from the Reichstag by
the Government. In short, there was an untiring
solicitude to keep alive the military spirit of the
whole nation, classes and masses alike, and to main
tain the prestige of the army and of the career of the
soldier. And these persevering and methodical efforts bore
their fruit. Preached to the children in school, firmly
implanted in the breasts of the soldiers during their
service in the regiment, carefully fed by numberless
patriotic associations throughout the country, the
cult of the army has few infidels in Germany. It is
true that the more disagreeable aspects of militarism
have begun to make themselves felt. Opposition
papers, novels, and plays, to-day attack certain
abuses, denounce the bad treatment meted out to the

THE EMPIRE AND FOREIGN POLICY 143
soldiers, criticise the aristocratic organisation of the
staff of officers, and paint in the blackest colours
the artificial and depressing life led by the soldier in
time of peace. But these pessimistic opinions are
certainly only current in a very restricted circle. The
country as a whole remains profoundly attached to
the army, and is imbued with the martial spirit which
made the greatness of Prussia. It bears without a
murmur the heavy weight of its formidable arma
ments. It regards the maintenance of great military
power as an inevitable necessity, which is even bene
ficial and glorious, and considers all idea of wishing
to alleviate this heavy burden as purely illusory.
At the same time as Germany brought all the
weapons of pride and good management to bear in
order to raise her armaments to the highest pitch
of perfection, and ensure her position as the first
military power in the world, she also aimed at
making her situation in Europe impregnable by a
system of alliances which were intended, in the case
of war, to secure her a conspicuous superiority over
any enemy.
It will be sufficient to recall in a few words the way
in which the diplomatic genius of Bismarck succeeded
in solving this problem, how he reassured Europe as
to the pacific intentions of his country, how he pre
vented a coalition of the discontented and jealous
elements which existed in nearly every nation owing
to the sudden elevation of Germany, and how he
negotiated first the Treaty of the Three Emperors
and the organisation of the Austro-German Alliance
(1879), then the Triple Alliance (1883), thus grouping
round Germany against Russia on the one side, and
France on the other, first Austria, who had been
cleverly humoured after Sadowa, and then a little

144 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
later on Italy, who found her interests conflicting
with those of France on account of her Mediterranean
policy. And we all know the strong position which
this diplomatic combination won for Germany in
Europe. It can, of course, be pointed out that other
groups also came into being which combined forces
that were almost as strong. The Franco-Russian
Alliance and the more recent Anglo-French under
standing were counterweights to the Triple Alliance.
It has even been open to question whether Italy had
not some idea of loosening a little the bonds which
united her to her Teutonic allies. At the Algeciras
Conference Austria alone upheld the pretensions of
Germany against all the Western Powers. And in
fluential organs of the German press have had reason
to complain of the " isolation " of Germany in Europe
and to blame the policy which led to this result.
Nevertheless it must be confessed that the Austro-
German Alliance, even if it is reduced to these two
powers alone, forms an exceedingly impressive body,
and is sufficient to ensure for Germany, in the con
cert of Europe, an influence which no one will dream
of disputing.
Under these circumstances German public opinion
considers that France has ceased to be a formidable
rival to Germany. Germans regard her as definitely
out-distanced and incapable of ever again being in
a position to reopen the struggle for supremacy
with any chance of success. They consider it proved
that the superhuman effort made by France immedi
ately after the war to create for herself a military
force as strong as that of Germany has failed. The
ever-increasing difference between the population of
France and that of Germany ensures the military
superiority of the latter with ever greater certainty.

THE EMPIRE AND FOREIGN POLICY 145
Moreover the decrease in the number of marriages
and in the birth-rate in France are symptoms of a
deep-seated evil, of a dangerous exhaustion, which
deprives her of all chance of regaining lost ground.
And it is also admitted, on the other hand, that the
Russian Alliance and the understanding with Eng
land have not modified the situation in her favour.
These alliances, in which France is obliged to be
satisfied with the minor r61e in relation to the more
enterprising and " expansive " Powers with whom
she has allied herself, have at present brought her no
nearer to the goal at which she is aiming- — that con
tinental revenge for which we are assured she has
never ceased to hope. Russia has gained consider
able financial advantages from her alliance with
France. But none the less has she continued to
follow an entirely independent international policy,
and has apparently put off to some dim future all
idea of a Franco-Russian crusade against Germany.
As for England, she would like nothing better
than to set Germany and France by the ears as
she did Japan and Russia, and the Anglo-French
understanding almost involved France in a war
in which, on the Continent, her armies would have
found themselves alone in the field against the
forces of Germany. This is a combination which
has had but small advantages for France. And the
Morocco business has just proved — in the eyes of
certain German publicists — that if France was obliged
some time ago to renounce all idea of acting as a
counterweight to the military power of Germany,
she must in the future also give up all hope of kindling
a coalition war against Germany, and of destroying
her legitimate power by the menace of a Franco-
Russian or a Franco-Anglo-Russian Alliance.
10

146 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
We cannot hide from ourselves the fact that con
servative Germany regards France with a suspicion
tinged with contempt. She is looked upon as in
fected to the marrow with the poison of revolution,
given over to the hands of Jacobins and Socialists,
condemned to inefficient government and chaotic
administration, diseased even in her living institutions
and in her military power, to which the internation
alist and anti-militaristic propaganda is such a grave
menace. She is considered a nation undermined by
decadence, whose vitality is too low to allow of her
entering boldly into international politics, and who
is gradually falling to the position of a second-rate
Power. Too vain to confess her weakness and too
impulsive to know how to consent to the necessary
renunciations, France remains in spite of everything
capable of sudden outbursts of violence, because at
heart she is uneasy and not quite mistress of herself.
People still believe that an ardent desire for revenge,
the aspiration to the hegemony of Europe, and lastly
the lust of conquest — the only one of the old tradi
tions of French policy which has survived under the
Third Republic — still inspire her acts to-day. And,
under these circumstances, the foreigner's attitude to
wards France is one of watchfulness. German public
opinion is periodically filled with the suspicion that
she is nourishing designs of invasion, and is constantly
interpreting — or pretending to interpret — as warlike
designs or as calculated insults any efforts made by
her to free herself from the position of restraint and
dependence in which she was placed immediately
after the war, and to secure her own safety, as others
have done, by increased armaments and diplomatic
machinations. And Germany on her side sometimes
arouses in the hearts of Frenchmen, by the stiff-

THE EMPIRE AND FOREIGN POLICY 147
ness of her attitude and the ostentatious display
of her forces, the suspicion — unjustifiable perhaps —
that her intentions may possibly be less pacific than
she declares, and that she would not be sorry to re
peat against France the manoeuvre in which Bismarck
succeeded so well in 1870.
This is not the place in which to discuss this
" legend " about France which is current in an
important section of public opinion in Germany. Is
France undergoing a process of social decomposition,
or is she simply in the midst of a transformation ?
Does the French democracy, which is so resolutely
pacifist, really dream of any act of aggression against
Germany, carried out with the object of winning back
her lost provinces by force ? Or is it not rather
Germany who is haunted by the suspicion that
France is spending her whole time in planning a war
of revenge ? These are questions which it seems to
me useless to discuss here. I will confine myself to
pointing out that although intellectual and artistic
intercourse between the two nations is more active
than ever, though great progress has been made
towards a closer understanding, which all regard as
in the highest degree rational and desirable, and
though on both sides people are learning to know
and respect each other better, yet, ever since the
peace of Frankfort, there has existed between France
and Germany a certain mutual mistrust difficult to
eradicate, which is ever ready to spring once more
into existence.
Just as in the domain of economics the unchaining
of universal competition everywhere gave rise to a
vague feeling of discomfort, that profound sentiment
of insecurity which hovers over the whole of modern
existence, so too in the life of nations the intense

148 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
development of the will to power and of " national
istic " or " imperialistic " policy has resulted in the
pessimistic conviction that brute force is the only
arbitrator between countries, and that the weak are
always exposed to the danger of being violated by
the strong. Hence arose the passionate desire to be
strong at all costs, and to push to its most extreme
limits the offensive and defensive strength of the
nation. It was, beyond a doubt, the experiences of
1870 — corroborated and confirmed, moreover, by
many other episodes in contemporary history —
which inclined the mind of France, as well as that
of Germany, to this way of thinking. To what
extent is this attitude justified by the nature of
things themselves ? To what point is it neces
sary for an increasingly large proportion of national
energy to be expended with the sole object of
securing a country against the brutal aggression
of a powerful neighbour ? Will the efforts of the
pacifists succeed in creating an international code of
morality which will make armed conflicts between
nations an impossibility ? These are questions
which with painful insistency demand an answer from
the man of to-day. German public opinion, by an
overwhelming majority, has decided that they are
still very far from being solved. Germany remains,
as we have seen, faithful to the cult of the army,
proud of her power, and determined not to allow it
to decline. Even among the mass of Socialists the
feeling of the international solidarity of the masses
has not seriously undermined the patriotic spirit.
More than ever does united Germany stand erect
upon the threshold of the new century as an admir
ably organised will to power, which is quite deter
mined not to go in for disarmament.

THE EMPIRE AND FOREIGN POLICY 149
II
Nevertheless, the ambition of Germany no longer
aims entirely at asserting her power, in the midst
of Europe in arms, by the superiority of her military
organisation and the solidity of her alliances. She
has no longer an exclusively European policy — she
has also a universal one. The idea of German im
perialism underwent, during the last stage of the
national evolution, a fresh extension, which we must
now describe in all its bearings.
In the first place, the present German Empire does
not consist of Germany. It is — and German his
torians are quite willing to acknowledge it — an in
complete and doubtless provisional solution of the
German question. " Germany " extends to every
region in which the German language is supreme and
German culture flourishes. On every side she over
flows the boundaries of the Empire. Cisleithanian
Austria contained in 1900 a sum-total of 9,171,000
Germans — that is to say, 36 per cent, of the whole
population — who energetically preserve their nation
ality, their language, their culture, and their domi
nating influence, and are engaged in a bitter struggle
for territory — especially in Bohemia — with the Slav
majority among whom they live, and endeavour by
every possible means to establish their superiority.
Trans-Leithanian Austria, in spite of the desperate
struggle of the Magyars against the Teutonic element,
still contains 2,135,000 Germans— that is to say, 33"3
per cent, of the whole population — who keep their
footing with tenacity, or even gain ground, as in
Croatia and Slavonia, where the German population
has more than quadrupled during the last fifty years.
To the east " Greater Germany " claims the 250,000

150 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
Germans who constitute the rich cultured minority
in the Baltic provinces of Russia. To the south she
embraces German Switzerland, though here appar
ently the Teutonic element has undergone a slight
decrease in comparison with the Welsche popu
lation.1 On the west she includes Holland and
Flemish Belgium, with their large German colonies
(32,000 in Holland, 68,000 in Belgium and Luxem
burg). In these two countries of Teutonic extraction,
whose commercial relations with Germany grow more
active every day, an independent culture has sprung
up in opposition to the French culture, which must
necessarily renew the traditional bonds which once
bound them to Teutonic civilisation.
Then, in addition to the countries in which the
Teutonic element has flourished for a long time, and
in more or less compact masses, ideal Germany also
contains all Germans who have left their native land
either with or without the intention of returning ;
soldiers who offered their services to foreign masters,
Catholic and Protestant missionaries, Asiatic and
African explorers, and above all emigrants who,
driven out by poverty or by a spirit of adventure,
go to seek their fortunes across the seas. All these
Germans, whom destiny has planted in every corner
of the globe, form also a very appreciable element in
the power of Germany.
The increase in emigration, especially since 1830,
is well known. It is estimated that at least 5
million Germans left the mother country during the
nineteenth century, and that chiefly during the ten
years from 1881 to 1890 (1-3 millions). Thus large
numbers of German colonies have come into existence,
the most important of which is that in the United
1 See note on p. 134.

THE EMPIRE AND FOREIGN POLICY 151
States. According to statistics, there are 25 million
Americans of German extraction, and 10 to 12 million
whose German origin is more clearly marked, either
by the fact that they have German parents or that
they have preserved, in their customs and their
culture, some tie with the mother country. And this
imposing colony — there are almost as many Germans
in the United States as in Austria — would be an
asset of the highest importance for Teutonic power
were it not that the German element allows itself
to be assimilated with such facility, and loses its
racial characteristics in the second and third and
sometimes even in the first generation.
In South America the emigrants, who are far less
numerous than in the United States — their numbers
have not quite reached half a million — have on the
contrary preserved their national character better.
Important establishments are to be found in Chili,
in Bolivia, in Buenos Ayres, and above all in Brazil,
where, in the state of Rio Grande do Sul especially,
a flourishing colony of almost 200,000 people has
sprung up — that is to say, about half the entire
German population of Brazil. In Australia the
German colonies seem destined, as in the United
States, to become rapidly absorbed by the Anglo-
Saxon element. On the other hand, the German
colonies which have emigrated eastwards in the
direction of Turkish and Russian possessions, or
which have penetrated as far as the Caucasus,
Turkestan, and Siberia on the one side, and Palestine
on the other, seem to have preserved their racial
characteristics better and are likely to develop and
prosper. The same may be said of the other German
centres in Asia (especially in the Dutch colonies) and
in Africa, where — above all in the Cape — the German

152 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
element is exceedingly strong, and may one day be
called upon to play a very important part in spite
of the recent defeat of the Boers. Lastly, in order
to complete this enumeration of the forces of
Teutonism, we must include the crowds of Germans
scattered throughout the countries of Europe, especi
ally in France (87,000), in England (53,000), in Italy
(11,000), in Denmark (35,000), in Scandinavia,
Servia, Bulgaria, Roumania, Turkey, etc.
At the end of the nineteenth century the sum-total
of Germans resident in Europe was estimated at
76 \ millions, to which must be added 12 million
Germans settled in other parts of the world — that is
to say, over 10 million in the United States, 400,000
in North America, 18,000 in Central America, a few
less than 500,000 in South America, 623,000 in Africa,
110,000 in Australasia, and 88,000 in Asia.
We have now completed the enumeration of the
living forces of Teutonism outside the Empire. But
Germany does not confine herself to sending forth
her people all over the world : her capital also seeks
for good investments abroad. In proportion as she
has become an exporting country and has increased
her industry and developed her maritime trade,1 her
material interests abroad have grown to considerable
proportions. In Central Europe Italy is the chief country to

1 The German mercantile marine has, as we know, developed
since the foundation of the Empire to an extraordinary degree.
Statistics show that its transport capacity has trebled since 1871
and doubled since 1880. It does not only trade between German
ports or between German and foreign ports : it has been calcu
lated that in 1901 out of 53"9 milhon tons of goods carried by
the German marine, 3 '3 million tons went from one German port
to another, 12'4 million from » German to a foreign port or uice
versd, 38"1 million from one foreign port to another.

THE EMPIRE AND FOREIGN POLICY 153
see her industry being developed, thanks to German
capital. In the East the influence of Germany
makes itself felt principally in Turkey. The rela
tions between these two countries, which have been
very cordial ever since the Russo-Turkish War, were
still more firmly cemented in 1882 when the military
mission under Von der Golz and Rustow-Pacha
undertook the reform of the Ottoman army. Soon
Turkey became a regular happy hunting-ground for
German merchants, bankers, and engineers. Ger
man finance gradually became mistress of the chief
railways of the Ottoman Empire. And by a bold
policy of peaceful penetration, based upon the con
struction of great railways, German finance is en
deavouring to open up Asia Minor and then Meso
potamia, and thus by a great trans-continental
railway connect Constantinople with the Persian
Gulf.1 The commercial relations of Germany with
the Far East have also become exceedingly active
since the Norddeutscher Lloyd organised in 1886 a
regular service between the German ports and the
principal ports of Asia and Australia, and above all
from the moment when Germany obtained in 1896
the concession of Tientsin and Han-kow, and in the
following year occupied Kiao-chou. And if the
influence of German capital is not felt so much m
Australia or North America, and if it is not de
veloping in Africa either as much as Pan-German
" colonials " would like, it is on the other hand very
powerful in South America, especially in Mexico,
1 German capital built in Asia Minor the lines from Haidar-
Pacha to Eski-Cheir and Angora, from Eski-Cheir to Konia, and
from Afiaun to Smyrna. Of the Mesopotamian Railway it has
as yet only succeeded in building the portion from Konia to
Boulgourlou, and is for the time being stopped by the expense
incidental to the crossing of the Taurus range.

154 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
Guatemala, and Venezuela ; but above all in Southern
Brazil, where, as we have already seen, there is a
very flourishing German colony.
In 1899 statistics gave 7,000 or 7,500 millions of
marks as the sum-total of German capital invested in
concerns abroad, and 12,500 to 13,000 millions of
marks as the aggregate of German capital invested
in foreign securities.
The growth of German industry and the necessity
of protecting her interests abroad was inevitably
destined to lead the Empire to the gradual formation
of a colonial territory.
Germany, it is true, only ventured upon this path
very late in the day, and then with great prudence
and almost against her will. Public opinion showed
but little enthusiasm for colonial expansion, and
Bismarck was of the opinion that the Government
could not successfully embark upon an active colonial
policy unless it was forced into it by a strong current
of national feeling. Under these circumstances, next
to nothing was done to acquire colonies during the
ten years following the foundation of the Empire.
The Government contented itself with protecting
German subjects and German interests abroad. This
it believed it could do quite efficaciously, without
proceeding to any annexations of large tracts of land,
by confining itself to occupying at most a port or a
coaling station, and by putting into practice in favour
of its subjects the policy of the " open door." Now
this policy resulted in some disappointments. Ger
many found herself involved on several occasions in
disagreeable and by no means glorious conflicts with
England, the United States, and Spain. And in the
end she was turned out from various places in which
she had tried to secure a footing. The Fiji Islands,

THE EMPIRE AND FOREIGN POLICY 155
South Africa, and the coast of Somaliland slipped out
of her hands altogether ; and her attempts on the
north coast of Borneo, on the Sulu Isles, the Caroline
Isles, the Pelew Isles, the Marianne Isles, Samoa,
Formosa, and the Philippines, only ended in defeat or
in moderate success.
About the end of the 'seventies a fresh feeling sprang
up in Germany with regard to colonial policy. A
number of powerful societies — of which the principal
one was the Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft, whose presi
dent was first Prince Hohenlohe, and then the Duke of
Mecklenburg — were formed with the object of obtain
ing colonies for Germany into which she could pour
her surplus population and to which emigration would
henceforward be directed. The idea of colonisation
and of national expansion was thus one of their
principal ambitions. As a minor object they also
hoped — and this afterwards became the chief goal
of German colonisation — to secure fresh outlets for
German industry and to offer good investments for
any available German capital. During the 'eighties
a distinct movement in public opinion could be dis
cerned ; bold traders, courageous pioneers, and enter
prising financiers, worked hard to gain and organise
some colonies, and, thanks to the intelligent initia
tive and the persevering push of high finance and
commerce, Germany laid the foundations of a colonial
empire in Africa on the one side and in the Pacific
on the other.
Bismarck, who, on principle, looked with mistrust
on any colonial enterprise, and who was above aU con
cerned with preserving the power of Germany intact,
was dragged into this movement. It was impossible
for him to refuse his support to schemes which arose
in this way, but he only pledged himself with extreme

156 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
caution. His first idea was to allow the large com
panies themselves to organise and administer the con
quered territories on their own responsibility. The
only practical help he promised them was to sub
sidise the quick steamer service to East Africa and the
Pacific. He thus counted on encouraging the com
mercial expansion of Germany in Africa, the Far East,
and in the Australian Archipelago. Circumstances,
however, forced him to make this protectorate much
more active and effective than he had at first intended.
He was driven not only to create a number of maritime
mails, and to secure the existence of the young Ger
man colonies by means of laborious negotiations with
England, but was also obliged to form a Colonial
Office in Berlin, and administer the colonies in the
name of the Empire, and give them military protec
tion. The task of colonisation, begun without him
and almost against his will by private enterprise, thus
gradually became a national concern.
Public opinion in high places, moreover, still
showed some hesitation with regard to colonial policy.
If Bismarck had followed the development of the task
of colonisation with growing sympathy, his successor,
Chancellor Caprivi, on the contrary, showed himself
decidedly hostile. Under the influence of the dis
taste, prevalent among an important section of the
community, for distant enterprises, the Government
for some time gave up any active colonial policy, and
even showed signs of being inclined to proceed to a
sort of liquidation of the past. The Anglo-German
Treaty of 1890, which ceded the protectorate of
Zanzibar and Pemba to England, in exchange for the
little island of Heligoland, marks the profound change
which had taken place in official circles with regard to
colonial enterprises.

THE EMPIRE AND FOREIGN POLICY 157
But this system only prevailed for a fairly short
period. After the fall of Caprivi, the new Chancellor,
Prince Hohenlohe, once more revived the traditions
of Bismarck. And from that moment colonial ques
tions have never ceased to grow in importance. They
formed an essential part of the imperialistic policy into
which Germany has thrown herself ever since the
'nineties, and which we shall describe in greater detail
presently. Germany has experienced the difficulties
which no colonising power is ever spared. The re
claiming of new countries from barbarism was not
accomplished as quickly as hasty speculators hoped.
Germany learnt to know what bloody revolutions,
military expeditions, and " colonial scandals " meant.
But apparently the country is not yet tired of the
policy of expansion. The Colonial Minister, Herr
Dernburg, said recently, in one of his propagandist
speeches, that during twenty-two years Germany,
with an average expenditure of 20 millions of marks
a year, had increased the value of her colonial empire
by 30,000 millions. These were certainly encouraging
results full of promise. We do not know, of course,
to what extent the future will confirm or disprove the
optimistic prophecies of the Colonial Minister. The
fact remains that for the time being he is gaining
popularity in public opinion, and that, in spite of
recent disappointments, Germany shows herself more
determined than ever in her desire to maintain,
exploit, and if possible extend, the colonial empire
she has actually won, or over which her influence is
growing. Ill
We are now in a position to give a more detailed
description of the new path upon which the Germany

158 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
of to-day has entered. For a long time her policy
had been above all national. Taking as her basis the
German State, she had had as her aim the power and
prosperity of this state. She had therefore been
above all a European nation, chiefly if not exclusively
concerned with the European interests of Germany
and her position in that continent. Then gradu
ally her policy began to grow universal and imperial
istic. She founded it no longer solely upon the real
and concrete German Empire, but on Germans and
German interests throughout the world. And she
tended to favour German expansion in every shape
and form in the four quarters of the globe. Imperial
istic " Germany " is not confined within the limits
of the Empire — she embraces the whole domain of
Teutonic interests ; she can be extended to the same
limits as those interests, and she is capable of a peace
ful development in proportion as the rays of German
activity spread not only in German territory, but also
abroad. In her conception states are no longer
territories with rigidly barricaded frontiers, but rather
spheres of influence with ever-varying limits, which
become every day more inextricably involved in each
other, which penetrate each other mutually, and are
constantly being modified according to the develop
ment of the activity and industry of a certain race.
In other words, the struggle for power no longer
takes place only between organised states, and is
not only embodied in wars and the conquest of fresh
territory. It is incessantly going on between Ger
man, American, English, and French " enterprises."
It is a never-ending war — no longer a military con
test, but an industrial, commercial, and scientific one,
whose seat is the whole world, and every spot in
which rival interests find themselves face to face.

THE EMPIRE AND FOREIGN POLICY 159
German imperialism, therefore, does not stop at
claiming a dominant position among the Powers of
Europe. It aims at developing German might every
where and in every shape. It works hard to tighten
the bonds of solidarity between the Germans of the
Empire and their brethren abroad, and to develop
all the German communities and all the emigrant
colonies in foreign lands. It encourages the outside
investment of German capital and takes an interest
in the diffusion of German culture in the world by
means of schools, science, and books. Imperialism is,
in short, the programme of the system of enterprise
applied to politics.
The transition from a national to a universal policy
has, however, not been carried out without opposition,
and has not even yet been radically accomplished.
The history of the economic policy of Germany
shows very distinctly how the change from nationalism
to imperialism was brought about, the obstacles with
which it met, and the extent to which imperialism in
the end succeeded. The crisis was reached in 1891 —
the year in which the commercial treaties which were to
come into operation in the following year, and bind the
contracting parties for twelve years, were negotiated
and discussed by public opinion and in the Reichs
tag. We all know the important alternative which
was then placed before the country. Did Germany
wish to preserve her full autonomy in the matter of
the Customs dues and involve herself more deeply in
the system of industrial and agricultural protection,
and thus progress towards the ideal of a close State
which is sufficient unto herself and makes herself as
independent as possible of the foreigner ? Or, on the
contrary, after her experience of the protectionist
policy carried out since 1878, did she wish to return

160 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
to a more liberal standpoint, and-, while still granting
to home industries the protection they required, yet
by means of commercial treaties favour the develop
ment of international intercourse and the growth of
the German export trade ?
The German Government decided in favour of the
Liberal solution, and that not only for economic
reasons, but also for political considerations— the
desire to cement the friendship between the Powers
forming the Triple Alliance and their satellites, by
means of economic bonds, and also the hope of
gradually opening up the path to a European Customs
Union. Under these circumstances the Government
was supported by the whole of Liberal public opinion,
including even the Socialists, who saw in the abandon
ment of the Protectionist system an approach to the
ideal of Free Trade, but met with decided opposi
tion on the partof the Conservatives, who imperatively
demanded an effective protection for agriculture,
and showed themselves hostile to the conclusion of
treaties of commerce with countries that exported
corn-stuffs. Thus Germany was divided into two
camps. On the one side were ranged the repre
sentatives of capitalistic enterprise, who called for
a policy which would facilitate the development of
international exchange, and thus favour the growth
of industry and commerce. On the other side were
the agrarian Conservatives — the large landed pro
prietors east of the Elbe — who~protested against the
radical transformation of Germany into aif industrial
country, as they considered the maintenance of Ger
man agriculture an essential condition of national
health and strength, and detested from the bottom
of their hearts the idea of entering upon the perils
of world politics.

THE EMPIRE AND FOREIGN POLICY 161
As may be seen, it was the very destiny of Germany
that was at stake. Was she to carry out to the
bitter end the evolution she had already undergone
under the influence of the system of enterprise ?
Was she resolutely to turn her back upon agriculture
in order to take up industry and transform herself
into a huge factory, and sacrifice everything to the
development of her export trade ? Or, on the con
trary, should she have a reaction against the tide
which was sweeping her on towards industrialism,
subsidise her agriculture by means of protective
tariffs, and thus preserve her economic independence
and her national character more securely ? These
were the vital questions which were fought out
between the representatives of industrial capitalism
on the one hand and the agricultural feudalists
on the other, with the Government as arbitrator
between them.
We know the spirit in which the German Govern
ment solved the problem. It was manifestly im
possible for it to curb the great movement towards
industrial expansion which was dragging the country
in its wake, or to restore the patriarchal, agricultural,
and individualistic Germany of the first half of the
nineteenth century. It was at the same time not
anxious to throw overboard the Conservatives, who
had always furnished the kingdom with its highest
civil and military officials, and who represented a
social power with which it had no wish to dis
pense. It also considered that the hour for making
a radical decision had not yet struck. Although
there was no question of sacrificing German industry
to agriculture, it was nevertheless premature to
sacrifice agriculture to the development of the
export trade. It was therefore necessary to find a
11

162 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
via media between an imperialistic and a national
istic policy, which would allow industry and agri
culture alike the opportunity of developing in
accordance with their strength, and not to pledge
the future irrevocably to either alternative. This is
the policy which the Imperial Government attempted
to put into effect. And in this task it relied chiefly
upon the Catholic Centre, which, as we shall see
later on, was itself a composite party embracing the
representatives of the most diverse political and
economic opinions. This party, which was obliged
by its constitution to support moderate measures
under pain of dissolution, was for this very reason
peculiarly qualified to serve as the pivot for a policy
of balance and conciliation.
I will confine myself to describing in a fe'w words
the most important contemporary eyents in which
this policy of the Imperial Government was carried
out. In the first place, under the Chancellorship of
Caprivi, the German Government concluded between
1891 and 1894 a series of commercial treaties with
the various Powers of Europe, and thus definitely
became involved in a universal policy in spite of the
vigorous hostility-.on the part of the Conservatives.
Then from 1894 onwards there were constant dis
cussions about the opening up of a, system of canals
from the Trave to the Elbe, from Dortmund to the
Rhine, and between the Rhine, the Weser, and the
Elbe. Though these great schemes were violently
opposed by the Conservative Agrarian Party, who
saw that they were tantamount to a subsidy to in
dustry, they were strongly supported by the Govern
ment in the Reichstag, which ended by giving way
on nearly every point to the powerful will of the

THE EMPIRE AND FOREIGN POLICY 163
Emperor. On the fall of Caprivi (1894), who had
always shown himself hostile to the policy of
colonisation — the Pan-Germanists have never for
given him for having said that the greatest evil
that could befall him would be the offer of the
continent of Africa as a present — a new spirit
began to animate German diplomacy. The im
perialistic ambitions of Germany began to make
themselves ever more distinctly and consciously felt.
The extension of Germany as a colonial and world
wide Power in the Far East, in Africa, in Turkey,
and in Morocco, took the first place in the mind of
William II. In 1896 the Government, by submitting
to the Reichstag a scheme for the increase of the
navy, showed its desire to give Germany a fleet
capable of providing a strong support for this new
imperialistic policy. It is well known how public
opinion, worked up to enthusiasm by an ardent
propaganda in which the Emperor himself played an
active part, ended in 1898 by imposing upon Parlia
ment, in spite of its unwillingness in the first in
stance, the adoption of the schemes demanded by
the ministry, and how, ever since, Germany has
never ceased from methodically developing her
navy, which is to-day one of the strongest in Europe.
Thus by its commercial policy, by its attitude
towards the canal question, and the development of
the navy, and by its new spirit of solicitude with
regard to colonial questions, the Imperial Government
has proved its determined desire to favour the
universal expansion of Germany. But, on the other
hand, it has quite recently, by the establishment of
a general customs tariff in 1902, and the renewal of
the treaties of commerce in 1904, also shown that
it does not intend, on that account, to withdraw its

164 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
protection from German agriculture. By an increase
in the duty on agricultural products and by re
strictions with regard to the cattle and meat trade,
it has made great concessions to agrarian interests.
The new treaties of commerce are, on the whole, a
distinct victory for Protection. In a large number of
cases the customs barriers separating the various
countries of Europe have been materially raised, and
in spite of a few slight improvements in the mechanism
of commerical relations, the exchange of goods has
by this means been made more difficult than it
was in the past. At the same time the evolution of
Germany towards industrialism, and of Europe to
wards economic unity and the rational organisation
of trade, have been thrown back.
To what extent has the German Government suc
ceeded in its mission of arbitrator ? It is clearly
impossible for the historian to give an answer to this
question yet. The imperial policy has been the
object of violent attacks both by the Agrarian Party
and by the representatives of industry, as well as
the Liberals. The latter have recently shown them
selves exceedingly discontented. Without disputing
the economic development of modern Germany,
without even denying that the year 1906 was particu
larly prosperous, and that the national industry was
continuing to increase in the most brilliant manner,
they yet refuse to admit that the Government has
had anything to do with this progress. It was to be
laid entirely at the door of the felicitous initiative
on the part of capitalists and business men. The
Government, according to them, has done nothing
to facilitate their task. On the contrary, it has
handicapped them by a commercial policy which
sacrifices the interests of German labour to those of

THE EMPIRE AND FOREIGN POLICY 165
the agricultural party, and by a too personal foreign
policy, which through its ambitious designs and its
capricious and blustering behaviour has sown unrest
and suspicion everywhere, and has ended by isolating
Germany in Europe.
But if the parties of the Left have clearly but
little sympathy for a Government which " combines a
universal and imperialistic policy with that of the
Prussian country squire," their discontent is appar
ently not shared by the mass of the people. Uni
versal suffrage has just given its verdict in favour of
the policy of national expansion favoured by the
Government, and has thus proved the Emperor right,
in distinction to the " pessimists " (Schwartzseher),
who decry the " new system." Under these circum
stances one is tempted to admit that the imperial
will has hitherto succeeded fairly well in unravelling
the multifarious tendencies which have come to
light in the country, and that the imperialism of
contemporary Germany has its roots not only in
the ambitious dreams of a single monarch, but in
the soaring will to power of the nation itself.

CHAPTER V
THE GERMAN EMPIRE AND HER HOME POLICY

If after the foreign policy of Germany we turn to
the consideration of her internal evolution, we find
in the first place that the new Empire, from a con
federation of nominally autonomous and independent
states, is steadily progressing towards unity. It shows
itself a vigorous monarchy, in which the real power
is placed in the organs of the Central Government
— the Emperor, the Chancellor and his Secretaries
of State, and the Reichstag. The central power has
the supreme control of the army and the navy. It
directs foreign policy without the individual states
having ever attempted to make use of the legal rights,
conferred upon them by the treaties, to exercise any
control over the actions of the imperial diplomacy.
It has its own revenues, derived from the customs
and from certain indirect taxes and monopolies ; and
in this way it is no longer obliged to have constant
recourse, for the balancing of its budget, to the matri-
cular ' contributions of the states of the Empire. It
has not succeeded in putting its hand upon the rail
ways, which have definitely remained the property
of the various individual states. But as Prussia, by
1 This refers to the " Matricula," which is the list of the con -
tributions in men and money, which the several states are bound to
furnish to the Empire. — Tb. 166

THE EMPIRE AND HOME POLICY 167
reason of the importance of her own railway system,
has gradually acquired an ever-increasing influence,
first over the systems of Northern Germany and
subsequently over those of the centre and south as
well, the Central Government finds itself in a position
to exercise considerable control over the administra
tion of the railways and the whole transport policy.
It has, moreover, the chief voice in the postal and
telegraphic services. The currency and the issue of
bank-notes have been made uniform throughout the
Empire. Legislation also tends more definitely
every day towards being carried out for the Empire
as a whole. In short, in all the chief departments of
public life, the central power exercises the pre
ponderating influence.
" Germany," says a recent historian of the Empire,
" remains a relatively decentralised country, but
she has no longer any states — she has only parties."
We shall not, therefore, have to occupy our minds
in the future as we did in the past with the rivalries
between the various sovereigns of Germany. They
form a chapter in German history which we may re
gard as closed. In the foreground of the political life
of the nation we now see the conflict between political
parties fighting for power. What are these parties ?
What do they want ? What influence have they
over the existence of the nation ? How and under
what conditions does the Emperor exercise his
functions of arbitrator between the rival pretensions
of these parties ? These are the questions which
immediately spring to the mind, and with which I
propose to deal in this chapter.
Let me first point out one general characteristic,
which stands out clearly when one examines political
life in the new Empire : and that is that even the

168 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
idea of a party has undergone, during the last stage
in the evolution of Germany, a most remarkable
transformation. We have already seen how, towards
the middle of the century, political struggles assumed
a more and more realistic complexion, and how con
flicts of ideas and principles gradually gave place to
conflicts of forces. We also saw how, in consequence
of the development of capitalistic enterprise, the
will to power and the lust for wealth everywhere
increased in intensity. Now these tendencies were
only accentuated during the last thirty years of the
century, and their influence can be traced very clearly
in the internal evolution of political parties. In
this case also the original idealism gave way to an
ever stronger realism.
In the early stages the bond which united the
members of a party was above all one of ideas ;
men fought for the triumph of a principle. The
Liberals struggled, in the name of liberty, for the
establishment of a constitutional or a republican
system, the Socialists for the realisation of the
communist or collectivist ideal. The Conservatives
defended, under the banner of the principle of
authority, the power of the King and the preroga
tives of the nobility. But, little by little, parties
" socialised " themselves in some way, and became
social groups which no longer struggled for some
abstract general principle, but for class interests.
From the very beginning the Socialist Party had
stood for the " Fourth Estate," the proletariat,
whose cause it espoused. The Liberal Party
gradually became the party of the middle classes,
especially of the middle-class capitalists, and sup
ported the interests of German industry and com
merce. The Conservative Party included the landed

THE EMPIRE AND HOME POLICY 169
nobility and the large landed proprietors, and con
stituted itself the champion of agricultural interests.
In short, one gradually sees the conflict of ideas
giving way to class antagonism. The party tends
to become a syndicate of vested interests. Let us
examine this transformation a little more closely.
II
The Socialist Party, as is well known, sprang from
the welding of two distinct elements — the intel
lectual and the popular.
On the one side we see the proletariat rising up
against the conditions of existence imposed upon
it by capitalism, and against the exploitation to
which it was subjected and the hardships which re
sulted therefrom. From this arose the spontaneous
sporadic revolts, which had no plan or organisation,
in which bands of working men, driven on by hunger
and despair, entered into violent rebellion against
the power which oppressed them, broke machines,
burnt factories, and rifled the houses of the detested
manufacturers. A typical example was the revolt
of the Silesian weavers, immortalised by Hauptmann
in his famous drama, The Weavers. On the other
hand, there took place in the educated classes an
intellectual and sentimental revolt against the abuses
of capitalism. Philosophers undertook the task of
criticising modern society, and elaborated systems
destined to make the whole community profit by
the discoveries of science and the improvements in
technical processes. And they saw in communism,
and in a more equitable redistribution of wealth, the
only remedy for the evils of the working classes and
for the colossal injustice which is at the basis of the

170 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
social life of to-day. Out of the blending of these
two currents Socialism was born. It was necessary
for the instinctive and brutal revolt of the masses to
become calculated, disciplined, and organised. Arid
it was necessary for the philosophical " Utopia,"
germinated in the brain of a few idealists and writers,
to be spread among the populace. Thus Socialism
became the rational organisation of the proletarian
forces with the object of a conflict against capitalism.
By very reason of its ancestry, Socialism was from
the beginning a Utopian idea. The problem which
it faced with the greatest eagerness at this period
of its evolution was that of the redistribution of
property. And it solved it by the simple process of
transferring to the economic and social sphere the
political ideal of liberty, equality, and fraternity.
Thus Heine, for instance, changed from an ardent
political Liberal to a Socialist with views strongly
tinged by the doctrines of Saint-Simon, and pro
claimed the advent of a " democracy of terrestrial
divinities, who would all be equal in their blessedness
and sanctity."
But in proportion as Socialism became organised
as a doctrine and as a party, it also became more
and more practical and positive. It turned from
wild speculations upon the ideal " State " to investi
gate in the first place the problem of production.
Its object was from that time forward to organise
and regulate the production of wealth in such a way
as to secure to the working classes the highest pos
sible amount of security and well-being. With Marx,
Socialism turned resolutely and consciously in this
direction. It remained " revolutionary " in the
sense that it proclaimed the necessity of a radical
social upheaval and incited the masses to unite for

THE EMPIRE AND HOME POLICY 171
the conquest of political power. It foresaw, as a
result of this conquest, the general expropriation of
the capitalists and the centralisation in the hands of
the State of all the means of production, which would
bring about the advent of a new society " in which
the free development of each individual was the
necessary condition of the free development of all."
But on the other hand, it discouraged any vague
dreams about the social organisation of the future,
it definitely condemned all recourse to violence, and
repudiated Blanqui's doctrine of forcible measures
on the part of minorities. It confined itself more
and more to the perfectly practical task of the
organisation of the masses with the object of a class
conflict, and the peaceful conquest of power by
means of the verdict of the ballot-box and the propa
gation of ideas.
And the recent development of Socialism shows
us the constant increase in the practical activity of
the party. Its attitude was at the beginning purely
negative, and the " revolutionary " spirit was every
where uppermost among its adherents. But in the
course of its evolution, it occupied itself more and
more with positive reforms, and it may be said that
the " opportunist " frame of mind made constant
progress in its ranks. The party thus finds itself
as a rule balanced between radical and reforming
tendencies, without, however, either of them succeed
ing in stifling the other. The " red " revolutionaries,
with their Blanquian and anarchist aims, the anti-
parliamentarians, such as Most and Hasselmann, at
the beginning of the era of repression, and men like
Wildberger, Werner, and Auerbach, after the Social
ists had been given back their civic rights, never
succeeded in dragging the majority of the party in

172 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
their wake. And in the same way the party refused
to give an unqualified submission to " moderates "
like Bernstein, who regarded the hypothesis of a
great social cataclysm as an illusion, cast doubt upon
the theory of revolutionary expropriation, and from
his colossally creative mind advocated the organisa
tion and systematisation of labour from inside the
capitalistic form of society, and pointed out how
by schemes of nationalisation, by the progress of
Syndicalism and co-operation, and by improvements
in legislation, the new society is gradually developing
out of the world of to-day.
Thus the Socialist Party is at once a revolutionary
and a reforming body— reforming because it has
always definitely repudiated violence and forcible
measures, and advocated a peaceful and positive
policy ; revolutionary because, in spite of all, it has
kept its faith in a radical transformation of society,
because it has remained hostile to " a state containing
orders of rank " of middle classes and capitalists, such
as it exists to-day, and because it intends to go on
defending the interests of the working classes against
all others. But the sum-total of these two tendencies
shows without a doubt a marked progress in the
direction of reform. Socialism has made its way
into the Reichstag, into several Landtags, and many
municipal bodies. It has entered into alliance with
the middle-class parties in order to secure the triumph
of its candidates. It tends more and more to re
pudiate all extreme solutions of questions, such as
internationalism, anti-militarism, and general strikes.
It exercises a vigilant control over the application of
the laws for protecting and insuring labour, and
demands the organisation of a scheme of state
insurance against unemployment. If Socialism is

THE EMPIRE AND HOME POLICY 173
still hesitating between the creed of reform and that
of revolution, if, as Milhaud asserts, " the ideas and
the way of regarding and feeling things tend to group
themselves, as though they were attracted to two
opposite poles, around the conception of organic and
continuous development and that of revolution," it
is none the less clear that the side of reform is gaining
ground every day, and that the activities of the party
are now tending far less towards the planning of a
radical upheaval than towards hastening the gradual
socialisation of capitalistic society.
What is the strength of the Socialist Party in Ger
many ? It is without doubt considerable. Bismarck
felt some anxiety about its increase as early as the
'seventies. He tried to stop it by passing special
laws against Socialists in 1878, by destroying their
organisations, and by hindering their propaganda in
every possible way. The futility of all these coercive
measures is well known. The masses continued to
organise in spite of the interference of the police.
And if the Socialist Party lost votes in the elections of
1878 and 1881, it let no time slip by to make itself
more powerful than before. Ever since the elections
of 1884, when its candidates obtained about 550,000
votes, it found its strength steadily increasing. In
1902 it secured over 3,000,000 votes, and sent a body
of 79 members to take their seats in the Reichstag.
Nevertheless this triumphal march could not
continue indefinitely. It is certain, in the first place,
that the electoral successes were not entirely to be
accounted for by the diffusion of the ideas of Marx.
There are not 3,000,000 militant collectivists in the
whole of Germany. The Socialist Party, as the most
advanced portion of the Opposition, benefited by all
the discontent aroused by the Imperial Government.

174 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
It rallied around it not only active Socialists, but the
majority of those who wished to show their hostility
to the " new system " in as forcible a way as possible.
Then, if for a long time the labour movement in Ger
many confined itself chiefly to the realm of politics,
the proletariat ended by forming a solid organisa
tion in the domain of economics also. In addition
to the political Social Democratic Party powerful
syndicalist organisations have lately come into being.
And these, without doubt, in many respects combine
in action with the political party, though they none
the less constitute to some degree a power which is
up to a certain point a rival. Between syndicalist
and political Socialism controversies have occurred
which, especially recently, have assumed an extremely
acrimonious tone, and have given the impression that
a considerable portion of the proletariat shows a
tendency towards losing interest in political activity
and is inclined to concentrate its efforts upon Syn
dicalism. These circumstances explain the defeat of Socialism
in the elections of 1907. This defeat was certainly
a warning to the party. The Socialists are paying for
the bitterness of their internal discord, the violence of
their attacks against individuals and of their press
campaigns, and perhaps also for the arrogance they
display towards their opponents of the " reactionary
section " and the contempt which they heap at every
opportunity upon middle-class Liberalism. Their
prestige in the eyes of the country, and above all in
the eyes of the younger members of society, has been
more or less gravely compromised. But if the verdict
of the last elections proved once more that nationalist
and imperialist feeling has preserved its strength in
Germany, it is nevertheless doubtful whether this

THE EMPIRE AND HOME POLICY 175
implies a reaction against socialistic ideas in the
country. The nation has shown its disapproval of
certain methods and proceedings on the part of the
Socialists, but there is nothing to show that the knell
has sounded in Germany for the downfall of collecti-
vist doctrines. With the votes of 3,259,000 electors
in its favour, Socialism, although it has lost thirty-six
seats, remains the most important party numerically
— if not in Parliament, at all events in the country.1
Ill
The Liberal Party, unlike the Socialists, was not at
first founded upon a definite class of society. Al
though it drew its recruits chiefly from the educated
and industrial middle classes, and from the working
men bordering upon the lower middle class, it also in
cluded a fairly large number of nobles. As Liberalism
was above all a political doctrine it welcomed in
discriminately, regardless of their origin, all those
who subscribed to its essential principles. It was
only during the period of reaction which followed the
Revolution of 1848, from 1850 to 1870, that the
antagonism between the Conservative Party, in which
the nobility and clergy were grouped, and the Liberal
Party became accentuated. The latter from this
time forward became exclusively middle-class, and
shared the destinies of that section of the community.
Now the middle classes, as we have already seen,
underwent, in consequence of the development of
1 The Centre and the Opposition members received 2,904,000
votes ; the Liberals and Democrats 2,052,000 ; the Conservatives
of all shades 1,802,000. Since the redistribution of seats, which
was extremely unfavourable for the Socialists, the latter have had
on the average one member to every 72,000 electors, whilst the
Centre, the Liberals, and the Conservatives have one member to
every 22,000, 18,000, and 17,000 voters respectively.

176 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
capitalism, an exceedingly grave crisis at the end of
the century. The artisans who clung to the skirts
of the lower middle class sank in the social scale. The
educated middle class also found its influence de
clining. On the other hand, the representatives of
capitalistic enterprise acquired an ever larger share
of power. The evolution of Liberalism shows us the
reflection of this internal crisis. The artisans, menaced
by the development of capitalism, became more and
more hostile to the principle of unrestricted competi
tion, and ended by swelling the ranks of the Conserva
tive or the Catholic Centre Party. The idealistic and
purely political element in Liberalism began to grow
weaker, and dropped to a subordinate position. It
only maintained its power among a small section of the
middle class who formed the left, progressive, and
democratic wing of the party, both in the north and
south of Germany. This section was opposed both to
Conservatism and to Socialism, and seemed con
demned for the moment, in spite of some temporary
successes, to a chiefly negative attitude and a some
what barren and futile opposition. The bulk of the
party, however, was formed of the representatives of
the system of enterprise, who, after having fought
in the front rank of the cause of German liberty and
unity, are struggling to-day, not so much for any
abstract principles, as for the defence of their economic
interests. The evolution of this section of the party — the
National Liberal group — is peculiarly instructive and
deserves our attention for a moment. It shows in
a significant way how the party tended to become
the political organ of a social group.
Just after 1848 the representatives of the middle
classes, especially in the Prussian Landtag, were at

THE EMPIRE AND HOME POLICY 177
once believers in unity, and Liberals, as much from
the political as from the economic point of view.
The doctrines of Free Trade and unrestricted com
petition seemed to them merely an extension into the
domain of economics, of the great principle of liberty
which inspired the whole of their political action.
Moreover, until 1866 the political struggle against
reaction and against the arbitrary exercise of the
royal prerogative occupied the first place in their
minds. In 1867, after the battle of Sadowa, the elections
made a clean sweep of the democratic and progressive
opposition, and in the place of these advanced ele
ments we find a new party come into being — the
National Liberal group, containing renegade progres
sives, the friends of the Crown Prince, and the repre
sentatives of the newly annexed provinces or of the
small duchies. The motive power of this section
was patriotic faith and enthusiasm for unity. They
became the firm supporters of the policy of Bismarck.
Their Liberalism, which had gained curiously in
wisdom and was ready for every compromise, had
become with regard to politics more theoretical than
real. On the other hand, it faithfully reflected at this
moment the tendencies of the business world, which
was in favour of Free Trade, and passed a series of
Liberal measures in the domain of economics. During
the 'seventies this was the strongest party in the
Reichstag. But in 1878 a decisive crisis occurred in their history,
Bismarck, moved by a very sound presentiment with
regard to the industrial and agrarian interests of the
country, abandoned Free Trade for Protection. And
from that moment the National Liberals found them
selves face to face with a formidable dilemma. They
12

178 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
had to choose the alternative of either remaining
faithful to their principles, and consequently breaking
both with the Government and the business world,
which was being dragged in the wake of the Protec
tionist reaction, or else denying their faith of economic
Liberalism as they had denied — or almost denied —
their political Liberalism, and thus throwing overboard
the fundamental principle in the name of which they
had in the beginning formed themselves into a group.
Under these circumstances a split took place in the
party. The minority remained faithful to their
principles, and in 1880 organised a movement towards
the Left, and held out their harids to the Progressives,
whose irnportance was thus once more increased.
The majority, on the contrary, followed the evolution
which was dragging the business world in its wake,
and from that moment fell into an ever more complete
dependence upon the representatives of the system
of enterprise. The latter had, since the middle of the
century, and more especially since 1870, gradually
formed innumerable local or professional societies,
and had ended by constituting enormous associations
like the Zentralverband Deutscher Industrielle (founded
in 1876), which included about three-quarters of the
industrial workers of Germany, or the Bund der
Industrielle (founded in 1900), to which a certain
number of industries belonged which did not consider
themselves adequately represented in the Zentral
verband. These colossal organisations and the great
employers' syndicates, which possessed very con
siderable power, naturally aimed at defending the
interests of German industry in official and parlia
mentary circles. And their influence among the
various parties of the Reichstag, and especially among
the National Liberals, is such that the latter party

THE EMPIRE AND HOME POLICY 179
has come to be regarded, probably justly, as a sort of
political instrument in the hands of the great German
industries. On the whole, therefore, the political power of
middle-class Liberalism does not seem for the mo
ment to be very great in Germany. The progressive
section has remained faithful to the Liberal idea,
but inasmuch as it is a party of democratic reform,
it is menaced by the rivalry of the Socialistic reformers,
who are attracting an ever-increasing following among
the working classes. And it may well be doubted
whether Liberalism possesses a sufficiently com
prehensive and vital basis in the heart of the nation
to enable it to increase or even maintain its power.
As for the National Liberals, they have sacrificed
their political and economic principles in order to
follow the capitalistic middle class they represent.
But their future is far from secure. Whilst the rural
populations vote, as a rule, with the large landed
proprietors, the working classes, won over by the
Socialist propaganda, have emancipated themselves
politically from the tutelage of their employers.
Consequently the industrial middle class finds its par
liamentary power more and more seriously menaced
every day. Moreover, the aristocracy of wealth has
for some time past been striving to give to its position
in the State some stronger basis than that constituted
by a political party. It aims at exercising a direct
influence over the Government, and even over the
Emperor himself, and has thus entered into rivalry
with the old Conservative and agrarian nobility.
IV
The Conservative Party was, like the Liberal Party,
founded upon an ideal . In opposition to the principle

180 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
of liberty, they upheld that of authority. Against
the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people they
maintained the legitimacy of the royal power and
the sacredness of historical tradition. The political
ideas of Conservatism found expression in the theories
of romanticism, of the historical school, of Savigny
or of Eichhorn, and above all during the reactionary
period in the doctrine of Stahl, who exercised a very
considerable influence over the young Conservatives
of the day. Against the Liberals and Democrats the
Conservatives defended the prerogatives of the King
and the privileges of the nobility. In the face of
rationalistic scepticism they gladly avowed themselves
the champions of religion, whether Catholic or Pro
testant, and advocated an alliance between the Throne
and the Church. In opposition to the believers in
unity they upheld the cause of particularism, and
showed themselves, especially in Prussia, very hostile
to the absorption of the small states by that great
German nation which roused the enthusiasm of the
National Liberals.
But, from a very early period, the Conservatives
sheltered behind these principles exceedingly positive
ambitions and exceedingly realistic desires. In their
capacity as large landed proprietors, more especially
in Eastern Prussia, they aimed at preserving their
supremacy in the rural districts, at consolidating
their economic power, and consequently at taking in
hand the interests of agriculture. As the accredited
supporters of the monarchy, the feudalists occupied
a very important position in the army, in the higher
Civil Service posts, at Court, and in the immediate
circle of the sovereign. This position they had every
intention of maintaining, and thus preserving for
themselves a practical influence in the State, by which

THE EMPIRE AND HOME POLICY 181
they set great store. Regarded from this realistic
point of view, the Conservatives were an aristocratic
body, whose power depended upon a fairly large
following in the country, consisting of peasants,
members of the lower middle class, and artisans. They
form " a small but powerful party," which stoutly
defends its own economic and social interests, and
even to-day possesses an authority, perhaps justified
if one is to believe certain historians, by its experience
of affairs and its political knowledge, but which at
all events seems out of proportion with its numerical
importance, if not with its wealth and talents.
Forced into opposition for some time by the policy
of Bismarck, who had ceased to share the prejudices
of his feudal friends and did not hesitate, in the
interests of German unity, to put a great strain upon
the dynastic principle, the Conservative Party was
at first hostile to the new order of things. Bismarck,
in the pursuit of his Liberal German policy, and sup
ported by the National Liberals, was opposed by the
Conservatives in Parliament, in the country, and at
Court, with incredible determination.
Gradually, however, their sound common sense
won the day. They silenced their dynastic and
particularist prejudices, frankly accepted the accom
plished fact, and reconciled themselves to the idea
of national unity. At the same time the agrarian
crisis, which was beginning to make its power felt,
and directly attacked their interests, induced them
to seek help from the State, and to demand that
agriculture should be protected by a tariff. Bis
marck, on his side, was beginning to grow tired of his
alliance with the Liberals, and considered that by
founding and organising the new German Empire
he had realised the greater part of their programme,

182 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
and that, consequently, he had less need of their
support. He became convinced of the economic
and financial necessity for the Empire to abandon
Free Trade and defend by a protective tariff her
agriculture, which was menaced by the competition
of new countries, and her industry, which was in the
process of development.
Under these circumstances a reconciliation was
cemented between the Conservatives and the Chan
cellor about the end of the 'seventies. The Govern
ment engineered a change of front, and looked for its
majority no longer among the Liberals, but in the
Centre Party and the feudalists. The "Black
Syndicate " of the Conservative Parties, backed as a
rule by National Liberals, who had gained in wisdom
and become a little more domesticated, formed the
parliamentary basis of the imperial policy. But
these defenders of the Throne preserved a very in
dependent attitude with regard to the sovereign, and
did not hesitate, when their own interests were at
stake, to oppose him, on occasion, in a very lively
fashion. The obstinate struggles of the Agrarian
Party against the commercial policy of the Chancellor
Caprivi, and against the canal schemes advocated
by the Emperor, are well known. Nevertheless, the
Conservatives, as a rule, in spite of some outbursts
of discontent and temporary estrangements, rallied
wholeheartedly round the new Empire, and became
one of the constant elements in the Government
majorities. At the same time as the Conservative Party
abandoned its particularist opposition, it also under
went an exceedingly curious modification in a demo
cratic direction. Under the system of universal
suffrage it was clearly impossible for it to dispense

THE EMPIRE AND HOME POLICY 183
with seeking the favour of the masses without seeing
its own power rapidly decline.
Now it attempted to win the masses by various
devices. It endeavoured to exploit the hatred against
the Jews, which is always smouldering somewhere
in the country districts of Germany, and held out its
hand to the anti-Semites. It also tried its luck with
Christian Socialism, first under Stocker and Wagner,
and afterwards in a more radical form under Nau-
mann. And lastly it above all took under its pro
tection the cause of German agriculture. In 1893 the
Bund der Landwirte was founded for the defence of
the agrarian interests menaced by Caprivi's com
mercial policy, and this society at the end of the
century had 250,000 subscribers, 3,000 delegates, a
well-organised press, and a whole army of agitators
and speakers at its disposal. This powerful and
active association lost no time in securing an alto
gether preponderating influence in the Conservative
Party. It rapidly became an agrarian party, with
Christian and anti-Semitic tendencies, and a strongly
demagogic bias, little hindered by any scruples of
loyalty to the Crown, but ready, on the contrary, to
carry on the most violent opposition against the
Government if the latter showed the slightest signs of
refusing the claims it imperatively demanded.
Thus the Conservative Party developed into the
agricultural party, just as the National Liberals had
become the industrial party. It tried, more or less
successfully, to reconcile its old traditions with the
new developments it had undergone. It endeavoured
to be at once the aristocratic Court Party and a
popular league of agriculturists — out of 250,000
members there are 177,000 small proprietors in
the Bund der Landwirte! It sometimes pushed its

184 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
opposition to the imperial policy to such lengths, and
especially over the canal question, that the Emperor
was obliged to warn it, in a speech he made in
September 1894, that if it persisted in such dema
gogic courses a complete rupture would be the in
evitable result. But on the other hand the right
wing of the party reacted vigorously against the
Socialistic tendencies which had come to light in
certain quarters, and which it considered incom
patible with the traditional Conservative position at
Court. Thus the party oscillated between the attitude
of docility becoming to loyal defenders of the Throne,
and the rebellious behaviour demanded on behalf
of agrarian interests. And the Conservatives — up
to the present at all events — have apparently found
this double policy a fairly paying one, as it allows
them on the one hand to keep their influence at
Court and in the army and the higher Civil Service,
and at the same time secures their power over the
rural populations, whose interests they defend, and
whose claims they support.

V
When we come to the study of religious thought in
Germany, we shall examine in greater detail the
tendencies of the fourth great political party — the
Catholic Centre. For the moment it is sufficient to
point out that this party has not been " socialised "
to the same extent as the others. The tie which
binds its members together is not one of common
interests, but has remained an ideal principle. While
Socialism forms the party of the people, Liberalism
that of the middle classes and of industry, and Con-
servativism that of the nobility and Of agriculture,

THE EMPIRE AND HOME POLICY 185
the Centre is the party of Catholicism. It has,
properly speaking, no political and social programme,
as it includes members belonging to the most varied
social positions — from the great Catholic nobles of
Silesia to the industrial population in the Valley
of the Rhine. It is therefore obliged by the very
force of circumstances, and in order to preserve its
unity, to find such lines of policy as shall more or less
combine the various class interests of its members.
Perhaps it would be right to agree with Lamprecht
in saying that the Centre Party includes all those
who, in the various different layers of society, dis
approve of the system of capitalistic enterprise and
aim at restricting free competition and at substitut
ing a united system based upon Christian principles
for the unlimited development of subjectivist indi
vidualism characteristic of the new era. This would
explain, for instance, the great solicitude which
Catholicism has for centuries shown for the Fourth
Estate, and its persistent and time-established efforts
to solve the social problem in a Christian way. But
one is also forced to acknowledge that although the
Catholic Centre condemns in general terms the spirit
of free enterprise, it is yet difficult to find among its
representatives any clear idea as to what that Chris
tian society should be which would cure the evils
caused by the inordinate growth of subjectivism.
It appears to-day much more in the light of a group
of clever opportunists, who show a rare genius for
defending the temporal interests of Catholicism,
rather than a really idealistic party which is syste
matically endeavouring to find a Christian solution
of the great international, political, and social pro
blems of the moment.

186 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
VI
We are now in a position to sum up the internal
evolution of the various parties in Germany. They
were, in the beginning, international groups founded
upon abstract principles, such as equality, liberty,
or authority. Then they became " socialised," each
party including a certain class of society to the ex
clusion of the others — the masses, the middle class,
the nobility, and the peasantry. Lastly, they
developed into mere syndicates based upon economic
interests — the interests of the workers, of industry, and
of agriculture. Of course this evolution did not take
place in any regular or uniform way. Socialism, for
instance, was from the very beginning founded upon
a certain social stratum. The Centre, on the other
hand, has hardly been " socialised " at all. And
none of the parties has altogether renounced the
idealistic basis upon which it was first built. But,
generally speaking, this evolution of parties in the
direction of economic realism is most distinctly un
deniable. And the results of this are not always good.
German historians do not hesitate to confess that
the intellectual level in the deliberative assemblies
was far higher in 1848, or during the period of re
action, than it is in our days. They remark that
the debates have become less interesting and less
profound, and that the democratic "grand style" of
modern assemblies has yet to be discovered. They
all agree that the output from the legislative machine
is mediocre, and they believe that decadence is to
be found throughout the whole of political life.
Members attend the meetings of Parliament less and
less, and the intellectual worth of the delegates of

THE EMPIRE AND HOME POLICY 187
universal suffrage grows constantly lower. The
political influence of the representative body of the
nation is consequently on the decline.
" It is almost impossible to believe," writes Som-
bart, " that the country where a hundred years ago
men like Stein, Hardenberg, Schon, and Thaer made
laws; where during the 'twenties and 'thirties a
Nebenius, a Humboldt, and a List set the tone ;
where fifty years ago an assembly like that which
met in St. Paul's Church deliberated over the des
tinies of the nation ; where, only a generation ago,
a Treitschke and a Lassalle hurled their thunder
bolts on the political horizon ; where scarcely ten
years ago men like Bennigsen, Lasker, Bamberger,
Windhorst, and Reichensberger crossed swords in
Parliament with a Bismarck — it is I repeat, almost
impossible to believe that such a nation could have
fallen into the political decay in which we find our
selves at the end of the century."
What is the reason for this decline in public life ?
The first and foremost is apparently the evolution
made during the nineteenth century towards economic
materialism. " The great ideals," Sombart con
tinues, " which still inspired our fathers and grand
fathers, have lost their lustre ; the ideal of nationality
ceased to be current coin as soon as the new Empire
had been founded in a powerful access of enthusiasm.
That which we are offered to-day under the name
of nationalism is a feeble copy for which no one can
get up any lasting warmth of feeling. The hollow
phrase but poorly conceals the emptiness within.
And it is the same with the other great political
ideals for which our fathers faced death. Some have
been realised, and the vanity of others has been
recognised. The rising generation only gives a

188 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
superior smile when the struggles for political liberty
are mentioned, and the festivals in honour of times
of great enthusiasm are grotesque farces. But the
neAV political ideal has not yet come into being.
The incredible poverty of our times in the domain
of idealism is revealed by the remarkable fact that
the so-called revolutionary party of the present — the
Social Democratic Party — gets all the equipment of
political formulae it requires from the arsenal of the
old Liberal Parties. To this day nothing better, in
fact, nothing else, has been offered to the people
than the battle-cry which was re-echoed on the day
the Bastille was taken by assault : ' Liberty, Equality,
Fraternity ! ' "
Discussions on questions of interest have taken the
place of political debates ; and an opportunist in
difference to all principle has become prevalent in
Parliament. Men of ideas, who are not so well
endowed for economic and political bargaining, have
been gradually ousted from the assemblies. Legis
lation and administration have been handed over to
specialists, who fulfil these difficult duties like expert
operators, with as much skill and as little trouble
as possible. Hence that decadence in political life
which numbers of German historians deplore so much
at the present moment.
In the presence of the decline in the influence of
Parliament, it is natural that the power of the Crown
should have preserved a considerable prestige in the
Germany of to-day. This is due in the first place to
the fact that loyalty to the dynasty and respect for
authority are sentiments which are deeply engraved
upon the German mind, and have preserved their
strength even in our democratic age ; and secondly
because Germany has hitherto had at her head

THE EMPIRE AND HOME POLICY 189
princes who were in some way or other remarkable,
who were filled with a lofty consciousness of their
mission, and derived from a deep and sincere belief
in monarchy the energy and authority necessary to
impose their sovereign will ; and lastly and chiefly
because the Emperor, who is the heir of the " tribu-
nician mission " of the Hohenzollerns, is still the
arbitrator between the parties and the classes who
struggle for power. It is before the Emperor that,
in the last resort, the interests of the various great
powers that come into conflict in modern Germany
are fought out — from the feudal nobility and the
capitalist middle classes to the lowest strata of the
working proletariat. It is the person of the Emperor
that the two aristocracies who are struggling for
supremacy — the aristocracy of birth and landed pro
perty, and the aristocracy of industry and finance —
are trying to win over to their cause. And it is the
rivalry between these two parties which has to a
large extent contributed towards consolidating the
power of the Emperor and maintaining the authority
he enjoys to-day.
Will the Emperor be able to play this part much
longer ? Will he be capable of remaining the
sovereign of the whole nation, and escape becoming
the prisoner of one party or one privileged group ?
There is no doubt that a fairly large section of public
opinion in Germany is beginning to show signs of
growing tired of it, and is raising ever louder pro
testations against the system of personal govern
ment, the instability of the " new system," and the
abuses which spring from it. But it is difficult to
say how much weight these complaints will have, and
to what extent they are indications that Germany
is progressing towards a more democratic system.

190 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
It is sufficient at present to say that the royal
power does not yet seem to be seriously menaced.
It can rely absolutely upon its two chief weapons —
the Civil Service and the Army. And the last elec
tions have once again proved the popularity it enjoys
among the masses. The defeat of the Socialists, who
represented the decided opposition to the system of
personal rule, the success of all the parties of the
Right, from the Conservatives and the National
Liberals to the anti-Semites, and the victory gained
by the Government, which from that moment ceased
to be at the mercy of a coalition between the Social
ists and the Centre, and found its national and
universal policy highly approved by the voice of
general suffrage, are so many signs that the country,
as a whole, is not seriously discontented with the
actual state of affairs, and that no radical change in
the direction of the internal policy of Germany is
to be expected for the time being. The Emperor has
been justified in showing his satisfaction at seeing
the great majority of the country giving its entire
adhesion to his imperialistic policy. And the people
loudly applauded the speech in which he borrowed
a metaphor from Bismarck, and compared Germany
to a good rider who could not only sit firm in his
saddle, but was able by the fury of his gallop to
" sweep aside " all the adversaries who tried to bar
his path.

CHAPTER VI
MODERN POLITICAL IDEALISM

It only remains for us to end our study of political
Germany by pointing out certain symptoms which
various observers interpret as indications of a pro
found change which is being prepared in the very
depths of the nation's soul.
I have hitherto described the evolution of Germany
as essentially a struggle for material power in every
shape and form, and as a triumph of the principle
of imperialism. But it also seems to have been a
struggle for a higher and more complete national
culture. In fact, it is clear that if in the eighteenth
century the State considered its chief task was to
organise its offensive and defensive forces, to insure
an increase in its population and its wealth, and to
guard the security and material well-being of its
subjects, the idea of the functions of the State was
widened during the nineteenth century. From the
beginning of that century German idealism, under
the influence of Fichte and Hegel, saw in it " the
realisation of the moral idea in an institution," and
the organism by means of which a nation raised
itself to its highest attainments. And this belief has
never ceased since that time to develop and grow
stronger. 191

192 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
This has brought two great results in its train.
On the one hand the State has gradually usurped
the place of the Church in the task of organising
and controlling instruction, and it has at the same
time developed educational facilities of all kinds to
enormous proportions. And on the other hand the
nation thus organised has become more and more
conscious of its responsibility towards all its members.
It has learnt to feel that it is its duty to preserve its
human capital, and especially to protect the humble
and the weak, to defend them against a demoralising
and depressing exploitation, to sustain them in
times of crisis, and to ensure them against the danger
of invalidity. Thus the progress of public education
and the organisation of social insurance take the first
place among the functions of the State in Germany.
In the first place, the State has been gradually
secularising education. It has destroyed in this
department the supremacy of the Church, which in
the Middle Ages was the only channel of culture.
From the end of the Middle Ages the universities
began to fall under State control. Then after the
Reformation a similar fate befell the institutions for
secondary education. Lastly, in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries came the turn of the elementary
schools. And at the same time as the State took in
hand the organisation of education, it also changed the
very nature of the instruction given.
Formerly the principal mission of the universities
and the Latin schools had been the training of priests
and theologians, and the task of the elementary
schools had been to spread among the people the
elements of religious faith and prepare the children
to follow the Sunday sermon later on. Now these
educational establishments were gradually stripped of

MODERN POLITICAL IDEALISM 193
their ecclesiastical character. The universities be
came scientific institutions, and the chief place in
them to-day is no longer occupied as it once was by
theologians, or even, as was the case at the beginning
of the nineteenth century, by philosophers or philolo
gists, but by men of science and doctors of medicine.
The German public school, a type of institution which
came into being at the beginning of the nineteenth
century, has no longer anything ecclesiastical about
it either. It is entirely impregnated by that classical
and neo-Hellenic spirit which spread about that
time throughout Germany, and it dispenses an en-
clyclopsedic instruction, including philology and
history, mathematics and natural science. And
lastly the schools in their turn have detached them
selves from the Church, and under the impulse given
by Pestalozzi, consciously strive to stimulate their
pupils to spontaneity and activity, and to develop
in them, in accordance with the ethical doctrines
of Kant, the belief in free autonomous personality.
And if, even as late as about the middle of the
eighteenth century, popular instruction maintained
a strictly denominational character, especially in
Catholic districts, the elementary schools of the nine
teenth century tended more and more, owing to the
importance ascribed to the teaching of the German
language and German history, to become national
schools, in which the cult of the Fatherland was in
culcated upon the minds of the children like a second
religion. Nevertheless, the Church still possesses, even to-day,
a fairly important influence in Germany, especially
in the domain of elementary education. The schools
have as a rule remained denominational, and con
tinue to give dogmatic instruction — although it is
13

194 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
somewhat paradoxical to see Catholic, Lutheran, and
dissenting establishments teaching, under the pat
ronage of the State, absolutely contradictory religious
truths. They are even subjected, in many cases,
to ecclesiastical inspection. It is, indeed, asserted
that more and more numerous protestations are being
raised against this condition of things. Those who
object complain of being forced to see their children
taught doctrines which are contrary to their own
faith or to their scientific beliefs. In the teaching
body, above all, many masters protest against being
obliged to give religious instruction in accordance with
the tenets of a creed which is at variance with their
own deepest convictions. An important section of
public opinion demands the immediate institution of
Simultanschulen which shall include pupils of every
denomination. Nevertheless, Germany does not for
the moment seem disposed to " dechristianise " the
schools. Even free-thinkers, who are not subject to
any denominational narrowness, regard the radical
secularisation of education in Germany as neither
possible nor even desirable. They are convinced
that if ever the schools become " atheistic," a large
part of the population of the Empire, among the
Catholics especially, will leave the State schools
and organise private schools in which the children
will receive the religious instruction their parents
regard as indispensable. And, moreover, many Ger
mans do not consider the " neutral " school of the
French type as by any means a model to be
copied. Paulsen, one of the most influential and
highly esteemed historians of education in Germany,
is of the opinion that although Catholic France
was obliged to institute a secular and neutral school
system for education to be made national, this neces-

MODERN POLITICAL IDEALISM 195
sity fortunately does not exist in the case of Germans.
The very circumstances of their religious history have
made them accustomed to reconcile science and re
ligion, knowledge and faith ; they have in the Bible a
peerless instrument of moral culture, which the finest
" chosen extracts from the literature of the world "
could not replace. There is consequently nothing to
prevent the teachers " from keeping religious instruc
tion and the Bible in their hands," and from moulding
the minds of German children by teaching them the
elements of a historic and interdenominational Chris
tianity, shorn of its dogmatic character, and reduced
to its moral principles. And I should not be sur
prised if these conciliatory views of Paulsen were
more in harmony with the general opinion of the
country than the more radical doctrine which would
banish all religious instruction from the schools.
At the same time as public instruction emancipated
itself from the Church, it also became more demo
cratic. Education had from the beginning been the privi
lege of a caste. There had first of all existed in Ger
many in the Middle Ages a clerical culture ; this was
followed by a worldly and aristocratic culture, from
the Renaissance to the eighteenth century, and lastly
by a middle-class culture, when, with the diffusion of
rationalism and neo-Hellenism, the middle classes of
Germany took the lead in the intellectual movement.
During the nineteenth century a gradual approach was
made to the national culture preached by Fichte in
his Discourses to the German Nation.
The barriers between the various kinds of instruc
tion were gradually lowered. Latin ceased to be the
language necessary for all high culture, and the
grammar school lost more and more of its character

196 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
as a " Latin school " of the old order. On the other
hand, the progress made by the elementary schools
brought them constantly nearer to the level of the
secondary schools, and the distinction between the
masters who had been trained in the seminaries
(Seminarisch gebildet) and those who had received a
university education (Akademisch gebildet) gradually
grew less and less. But above all education in every
rank assumed an ever more realistic and practical
character. The culture of the higher classes of society
was at the end of the eighteenth century chiefly
aesthetic and literary, and the classical education of
the public school at the beginning of the nineteenth
century was of a similar nature. But we have already
seen the evolution towards realism, which took place
among the educated classes in consequence of the
development of the system of enterprise. This evo
lution was very naturally reflected in the domain of
learning. Instruction in all ranks became less
exclusively literary or philosophical, less confined to
books. In addition to the classical public school,
there came into being the more modern type of
polytechnic and of technical and commercial schools
(Realgymnasium, Oberrealschule, Realschule, Reform-
gymnasium), which, by increasing the attention paid
to the teaching of science and living languages, cor
responded better with the needs of the middle classes
engaged in trade and commerce. Side by side
with the universities, technical institutes (Technische
Hochschulen) everywhere sprang up and grew more
flourishing, and were held in higher esteem every day.
And thus the old distinction which separated the
classical and philological " man of letters " of the past
from the " unlettered " man who had no knowledge
of the classical languages, tended gradually to dis-

MODERN POLITICAL IDEALISM 197
appear. Thus the idea of a specifically aesthetic and
philological culture reserved for the intellectual
elite alone, little by little gave way to the more
democratic conception of a universal culture, an
infinitely complex and differentiated one it is true,
which nobody was expected to assimilate in its
entirety, and which was not the same for all, but of
which each individual was at liberty to appropriate
whatever he could, according to the measure of his
intellectual or physical abilities.
In short, Germany, during the course of the last
century, worked with untiring energy to dispense
instruction with an ever more liberal hand to all her
children. It is true that her enthusiasm for the task
of education had many ups and downs. It was
exceedingly intense during the first thirty years of the
century, when the foundations for the reorganisation
of public instruction from the elementary schools to
the universities were laid. It cooled down in an
extraordinary way in the course of the second forty
years of the century, when, during the revolutionary
and reactionary era between 1830 and 1870, the
various governments showed themselves suspicious
even to the point of hostility with regard to the task
of public education. But it was rekindled once more
after the great military triumphs of Prussia and the
restoration of the Empire. It is regarded as an
axiom that it was the German teacher who really won
Sadowa and Sedan, and that the victories of Germany
are essentially due to the superiority of her culture.
But it cannot be denied that doubts are again be
ginning to be felt to-day with regard to the efficacious
virtue of education. In university circles it is possible
to discover symptoms of fatigue here and there, and
a state of mind similar to that which drove certain

198 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
thinkers in France to proclaim " the bankruptcy of
science." The melancholy observation is made that
science, from which some complete conception of the
universe was expected, and a general guidance to direct
the will of man, never results in any definite or
absolute truths, but only gives partial and pro
visional solutions, which are always open to revision
and correction. Many a man feels himself weighed
down by the enormous mass of knowledge which must
be assimilated by any one who wants to be " up to
date " in any particular branch of science, and is
also not a little discouraged by the state of perpetual
development and by the endless evolution into which
science is always plunged.
In the ruling class and in certain middle-class
circles also, the pessimistic tendencies which were
prevalent about the middle of the century occasionally
reappear to-day. Men are beginning to wonder
whether the task of popular instruction has not
been carried to inordinate lengths — whether, for
the greater part of the nation, education is not
more a source of danger than of benefit, and whether
people are not infinitely more difficult to govern
when they are half-educated. The anxiety caused
by the recent progress of Socialism may have helped
to spread these doubts in circles which, only a short
time ago, would never for a moment have enter
tained them, but really believed that the State had
no more pressing duty than to give education on a
liberal scale to all its subjects.
Nevertheless, generally speaking, the average
opinion is, in the words of Paulsen, that " in the
universal struggle for power and pre-eminence,
the superiority will rest with those nations who
have succeeded best in securing for their children

MODERN POLITICAL IDEALISM 199
a solid education and culture by means of well-
equipped schools, and by the formation of economi
cally prosperous and morally healthy families."
The successes attained by Germany are attributed
to the fact that she forestalled other countries by
starting compulsory education early in the day,
and by applying her mind to training excellent
teachers for every branch of instruction. And
the conclusion is drawn that the ignorance of the
masses can never be a guarantee of order and
stability in the State, that the obvious interests
of the monarchy demand an ever wider diffusion
of knowledge, and that the future belongs to those
nations who have solved the problem of national
education most successfully. II
At the same time as it pursues an ideal of national
culture, the German State also forms a clearer
conception of the social mission it is called upon
to fulfil.
And, indeed, the development of the system of
free enterprise puts the social question into an
absolutely new form. All the relationships of
personal dependence which formerly existed between
the employer and his men, between the lord and
his peasants, the master and his journeymen and
apprentices, disappeared during the nineteenth cen
tury. The labourer no longer owes his time, or part
of his time, as he once did, to a master to whom
he is personally subjected. In this respect he is freed
from any sort of obligation. He is at liberty to
sell his labour under the best possible conditions,
and no one can force him to accept a contract for

200 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
work which he considers unfair or merely disad
vantageous. But the worker, in breaking the per
sonal bonds which united him to his master, also
at the same time lost the right of being protected
by him. The modern capitalist who purchases
labour has the right to secure this commodity on the
conditions most advantageous to himself, and without
having to worry his head about ensuring a com
petency for those he employs when he does not
need their services any longer.
Theoretically, the " liberty " of the worker and
that of the employer are supposed to balance each
other. The one is free not to sell his labour under
unfavourable conditions ; the other, on his side,
is free not to buy the labour for which too high a
price is asked. Thus by the normal interplay of
supply and demand the just price of labour should
be established in a natural way.
But as a matter of fact the extreme precariousness
of labour under the system of free enterprise is well
known. It is in the first place exposed without
any protection to all kinds of risks — illness, accident,
old age, and unemployment — which are constantly
weighing down the life of the working man. And,
moreover, it is clear that he is very far from being
in a position, as a rule, to contest the conditions of
his contract with his employer " freely." He is,
in the last resort, obliged to sell his labour under
pain of dying of hunger. And he therefore con
stantly runs the risk of having disastrous terms
dictated to him by an unscrupulous employer who
is ready to speculate on his need. A great problem
is thus presented to modern society. It has become
imperative to organise upon a new basis the pro
tection afforded to workers, which under the patri-

MODERN POLITICAL IDEALISM 201
archal system, was provided by the lord or the
employer. It was necessary to find a remedy for
the condition of the labourer by the development
of workmen's insurance schemes, and by instituting
normal relationships between an employer and his
men. The maintenance of public health and national
strength and the preservation of social peace de
pended upon the solution found for this problem.
German public opinion soon recognised the evils
produced by the system of free enterprise, and
realised the necessity of fighting them. As early
as the 'forties there was founded in Berlin an Asso
ciation for the Improvement of the Condition of
Labourers and Artisans, which was recruited chiefly
from the ranks of those engaged in enterprise, and
received a large donation from the King of Prussia,
Frederick William IV., himself. About the same
time the first signs of Christian Socialism began to
appear. Men like Wichern, the founder of the
Home Mission, on the Protestant side, and the priest
Kettler on the Catholic side, drove the Church to
descend into the region of practical acts, and preached
the fundamental application of Christian morality
to social life. Then the political economists in their
turn came upon the scene, and in the name of science
rose up against the gospel of unrestricted competition
and the doctrines of Adam Smith and the Manchester
School. During the 'forties the trend of thought
afterwards known as " Pulpit Socialism " came into
being, and resulted in 1872 in the foundation of
the Social Policy Association, whose principal mem
bers were scientific men like Brentano and Nasse,
Schmoller and Schcenberg.
Thus, whilst the Socialists looked for the cure of
all the evils from which the masses were suffering

202 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
to the conquest of power by the democracy and a
radical upheaval of the social order, a constantly
growing group, consisting of members of the capi
talist middle classes, Protestant and Catholic
Christians, and political economists, supported, on
their side, a gradual reform of the obvious and un
deniable abuses of the capitalistic system. Among
these reformers some saw in the Church and Christian
principles the chief power capable of regenerating
modern society. Others preferred to pin their faith
upon the State to put an end to the oppression and
degradation of the lower classes. The part the
latter played in the evolution of Germany is very
important. The Prussian State, and afterwards
the German Empire, as we shall see, has to a large
extent adopted their programme and gone far enough
along the path of State Socialism.
But it must also be admitted that, although the
Government has given at least partial satisfaction
to certain Socialist demands, it remains invariably
hostile to the tendencies of the Democratic Socialist
Party. It is true that it is perfectly conscious of
the duties it owes to the working classes. Bismarck,
for instance, declared in the Reichstag that he
accepted, without hesitation, the Socialistic doctrine
of the right to work. He found this idea in embryo
in the federal legislation. One of the principles of
the Prussian Landrecht was that it was unlawful for
any one in the kingdom to be reduced to death by
starvation. There was, consequently, no reason why
the modern German Empire should refuse workers
the protection which had been afforded them by the
old Prussian monarchy. On the contrary, stern
duty called it to take an interest in their fate and
to bind them to it by material benefits. On the

MODERN POLITICAL IDEALISM 203
other hand, however, the Government would not
on any account tolerate the social upheaval of
which the followers of Marx dreamt. It opposed
every effort on the part of the democracy and its
adherents to take in hand the direction of public
affairs, and defended the prerogatives of the Crown
against them with the greatest energy. It vigorously
opposed all revolutionary or even merely republican
tendencies. In short, the German State was by no
means in subjection to the capitalist middle classes,
but meant to play the part of a loyal arbitrator
between employers and employed. But if it was
determined to put a curb upon the absolute power
of the masters, it did not, on the other hand, tolerate
any attempts on the part of the workers to bring
pressure to bear upon it or to dictate their own
terms. The workers, on their side, had but a very limited
confidence in the feudalistic, capitalist, and middle-
class State, and they were impatient of being held
in tutelage by it. They suspected it of partiality
and weakness towards employers, and regarded it
less as a just arbitrator than as an ally of their
adversaries. Just as there existed in the heart
of the Government a mixture of sympathy and
suspicion with regard to the working classes, there
was noticeable among the workers a deep-seated
mistrust of the capitalistic State. And it was not
astonishing if, under these circumstances, the work
of social reform advanced with a somewhat uneven
and capricious pace.
Until the end of the 'seventies, and as long as
Bismarck relied chiefly upon the National Liberals
for support, his economic policy was, very naturally,
also " Liberal." The State did not, so to speak,

204 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
intervene in order to restrict free competition. The
Chancellor, it is true, felt " that there was much to
be done for the working man," and he endeavoured
to get enlightenment with regard to the social
question from all quarters, and drew his information
as much from Wagener, the sociologist of the parties
of the Right, as from Lassalle, Rodbertus, and
Duhring, or the Pulpit Socialists. But for the
time being he limited all positive action to a few
discreet attempts to organise co-operative schemes
of production, and to a few measures for the pro
tection of the working man, which were of no great
significance or any real effective power.
But in 1878, after the attempts made by Hcedel
and Nobiling upon the life of the Emperor William,
Bismarck took in hand the task of fighting the
dangerous progress of the Socialist Party by means
of drastic measures, and applied his mind to the
severe repression of the impetus towards emancipa
tion which was beginning to manifest itself among
the masses. And, moreover, he also inaugurated
at precisely the same moment a social policy of
a perfectly fresh kind. In short, he completely
realised that the solution of the social question
required something more than coercion, and that
positive benefits were needed. And it was for this
reason that at the same time as he suppressed
" Socialist excesses " with the severity which is
familiar to all, he also endeavoured to " improve
the condition of the working man by substantial
concessions." He perceived quite clearly the grave
evils which unrestricted competition entailed for the
masses, and he considered that the State ought to
give such help and protection to the workers as it
could safely do without injuring the great industries

MODERN POLITICAL IDEALISM 205
or placing too heavy a burden upon them. " We
wish to create the greatest possible contentment,"
said the Chancellor. And to this he added, with
an eye to the eventuality which might necessitate
a bloody suppression of revolutionary intrigues :
" I say this in case we have to come to blows."
From this moment an era of social reform was in
augurated for Germany. Bismarck now relied chiefly
upon the Conservatives, who for a long time past
had shown a disposition to criticise the industrialism
of the towns, and were quite ready to support a
policy which set itself the task of destroying the
abuses of the capitalistic system. He was, more
over, supported in this object by the Catholic Party,
who, ever since the middle of the century, had felt
the necessity of reforming society in accordance
with the principles of Christian morality. With the
help of this majority, which was increased by the
adherence of a few powerful industrialists, like Baron
von Stumm, who wished for the re-establishment of
patriarchal relations between masters and men, the
Chancellor undertook the task of laying the founda
tions of the great scheme of workmen's protection
with which he desired to endow the country. And
after years of struggle he succeeded at last in securing
the triumph of his ideas. Under his initiative, and
thanks to his tenacious will, the great laws of social
insurance of which Germany is justly proud to-day
— insurance against sickness and against accident,
invalidity and old age pensions — were drawn up and
forced upon the acceptance of the Emperor, the
Federal Council, and Parliament. It is true that
from the lack of sufficient resources he was not able
to carry out the work on as ample a scale as he had
intended. He was refused a monopoly in tobacco,

206 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
which would have formed the " patrimony of the
disinherited," and would have allowed him to dis
pense succour and pensions to the masses of Germany
with a less niggardly hand. But even as it is, and
in spite of its imperfections, the system of workmen's
insurance in Germany is an exceedingly impressive
monument, and forms one of the most lasting titles
to glory of the great Chancellor.
Thus the German workman found himself insured
against some of the greatest risks which the develop
ment of the system of capitalistic enterprise brought
in its train. On the other hand, hardly anything
had been accomplished in the direction of protecting
labour. The right of forming societies and the right
to go out on strike were badly secured. Women and
children, in the absence of sufficient regulations for
work, were exposed to the most ruthless exploita
tion. Arbitration was not regularly organised. The
inspection of work remained almost an illusion, owing
to the limited number of inspectors and the inefficacy
of the control they were allowed to exercise. Nothing
was done to improve this state of things. Every
scheme of reform came up against the passive resist
ance of Bismarck. In fact, the Chancellor did not
wish to enter upon this path systematically. He
admitted that the insurance laws, by bringing into
being a host of people with small independent means,
put the working classes under the protection and
in the power of the State. He hoped, on the other
hand, to attach the class of contractors to his cause
by refraining from passing too rigorous measures for
the protection of labour, and by thus leaving the
former free to organise industrial work to the best
advantage for themselves. Thus the employers and
the men alike found themselves in a position of

MODERN POLITICAL IDEALISM 207
dependence upon the State. But Bismarck regarded
this as a good thing. In case the working classes
ever showed any indiscreet desire to free themselves
from this control, there always remained the possi
bility of having recourse to military measures of
repression to keep them in the path of duty.
The check which this over-clever policy of balance
received is well known. The working classes never
for a single moment felt inspired by any affection
for the State. They accepted as their due the pen
sions and compensations which the insurance laws
gave them. But they did not feel the smallest grati
tude towards the statesman who presumed to keep
the masses under control because he had conferred
material benefits upon them, denied them the right
of organising, and persecuted the trade unions. Bis
marck's calculations accordingly did not work out
as he had expected. Arrested for a moment in its
ascent by the police regulations made after the as
sassination attempts of 1878, Socialism, during the
course of the 'eighties, once more resumed its upward
march. In 1890 a new era of social reform was inaugurated.
The repeal of the law against Socialists, the appoint
ment of Herr von Berlepsch to the Board of Trade,
the famous rescripts of William II. , the convocation
at Berlin of an international commission to prepare
the ground for a European understanding on matters
connected with the protection of labour, and the
resignation of Bismarck, marked the beginning of it.
The organisation of arbitration tribunals for the
settlement of disputes between employers and their
men, and the law securing a holiday once a week,
were the principal results of this movement. But,
in spite of opening well, it did not take long to grow

208 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
slack. It soon became evident that the representa
tives of capitalistic enterprise were strong enough to
make most of the proposed reforms miscarry. The
Conservatives, who were for the moment thrown into
opposition under the government of the Chancellor
Caprivi, showed themselves just as hostile to the
schemes for protecting labour as the Liberals and
Progressives who defended the interests of capitalism.
Reactionary influence gained the upper hand more
and more in the immediate circle of the sovereign.
The war against Socialistic tendencies was renewed.
A law proposed against revolutionary intrigues
(Umsturzvorlage) aroused the greatest anxiety in
Liberal circles. The attacks against the Pulpit
Socialists were redoubled in intensity. The social
agitation in the ranks of Protestantism was stopped
by a rescript of the Supreme Evangelical Council
(December 16, 1895). A sensational telegram from
the Emperor declared that the " Christian Social "
movement was nonsense, and that the clergy should
cultivate charity and abstain from politics, of which
they understood nothing. And at last, in June 1896,
the reform minister, Herr von Berlepsch, sent in his
resignation. Yet the movement in favour of social reform was
not dead in the country. In spite of the disapproval
of the Emperor, Christian Socialism, in the first place,
spread further and further. On the Protestant side
it detached itself from the Conservative Party and
assumed a complexion more nearly approaching to
Socialism, especially in the case of the pastor Nau-
mann and the group of thinking men who followed
him. On the Catholic side, also, social propaganda
became more active and more practical, in spite of
the occasionally sharp dissensions which took place

MODERN POLITICAL IDEALISM 209
among the promoters of the movement. Statistics
show that in 1906 evangelical workmen's associations
contained about 80,000 members, the specifically
Catholic associations about 81,000, and the inter
denominational Christian workmen's syndicates,
whose membership increased with marvellous rapidity,
numbered altogether at least 250,000 adherents.
And this current of social idealism was not only
found in religious circles. It seems to have gained
ground in all directions. It spread more and more
among the representatives of enterprise, whose solici
tude for the welfare and protection of the working
man grew ever more active. In scientific and
artistic circles questions of social hygiene, the problem
of cheap housing, and that of popular education and
democratic art, were studied and discussed with
renewed ardour. The municipal councils of the large
towns gave particular attention to any measures
which might better the condition of workers, from the
construction of workmen's dwellings to the building
of public libraries and the laying out of public
gardens. In Parliament, also, a few new measures
for the protection and insurance of labour have been
discussed or passed during the last few years. And
there are also signs that in Government circles the
possibility is being broached of once more carrying
out a social policy in the spirit of the rescripts of
1890. The check given to the Socialists by the result
of the elections has only strengthened this inclina
tion. Everything points to the assumption that the
task of protecting labour, which was interrupted or
abandoned in 1896, is about to be resumed with re
newed activity.
This renewal of social idealism may well be regarded
as an interesting symptom in the general evolution
14

210 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
which is taking place in Germany at the present
moment. We have already seen how in the domain
of economics ever more significant signs are appear
ing of a reaction against the system of free enter
prise and the principle of unrestricted competition.
In politics similar tendencies are making themselves
felt among the enlightened members of the Conserva
tive Party, among the Christians, whether Protestant
or Catholic, and in highly cultured scientific and
artistic circles. In addition to the realistic struggle
for national and universal power, there has also come
into being a distinct movement towards national
culture and social peace. It seems certain that an
important section of German public opinion is tend
ing to-day towards a system of restricted competition
resting upon an idealism founded upon religion, and
is endeavouring to solve the social problem by the
help of modern Christianity and the practice of
Christian ethics. To what extent will these ten
dencies prevail over the more definite solutions
advocated by the Right or the Left, absolute authority
on the one hand, or democratic Socialism on the
other ? The future alone can decide to what degree
a compromise of this nature between imperialistic
rationalism and the religious instinct that believes in
tradition is either possible or practicable.

BOOK III
THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGIOUS AND
PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT

211

CHAPTER I
THE RENAISSANCE OF CATHOLICISM IN GERMANY AT
THE BEGINNING OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

I showed at the beginning of this study how the
development of science and the scientific organisa
tion of life are the principal facts which differentiate
the modern era from the Middle Ages. Now this
profound modification of man's attitude of mind
brought in its train a radical transformation of all
the traditional ideas about human destiny. The
modern mind no longer regards the universe in the
same way as the Christian of the Middle Ages ; it
no longer feels the same religious emotions or sets
itself the same problems. It may, perhaps, be
correct to say that a " scientific " conception of the
world is tending to take the place of a " religious "
interpretation. I should prefer to express the same
idea by saying that the rise of theoretical and practi
cal rationalism has renewed the " religion " of the
modern European.
In fact, I do not believe that any diminution of the
religious spirit has taken place, especially in Germany
of the nineteenth century. Men perceive more and
more clearly, it is true, the fundamental differences
that exist between the religion of to-day and that of
the past, but they do not, as a rule, willingly resign
themselves to admit that they necessarily represent
213'

214 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
two irreconcilable principles. It is, of course, im
possible for me to say whether this belief is right or
wrong, whether the future evolution of rationalism
will prove fatal to Christianity or not, whether we
shall see a definite and irrevocable rupture between
the old religion and modern thought effected, and
whether man in the future will be content with science
and take refuge in absolute agnosticism with regard
to everything else. But this is a question we may
well set aside in a work like the present. The fact,
however, which to my mind seems absolutely certain,
is that modern Germany does not, as a rule, maintain
the necessity of antagonism between_Religkm and
Sciencej but, on the contrary, endeavours passionately
toiecojmyjej^igjtwo. She does not desire in the do
main of the spirit that violent rupture with tradition
for which she strove in the political sphere. She
believes that a continuity exists between the Chris
tianity of the past and the " religion " of the present
day, and she is convinced that Christianity is capable
of development, and will prove able to assimilate to
some extent the successive conquests of the human
mind. Let us, then, turn to the examination of the evolu
tion of religious thought in Germany during the
nineteenth century, and begin our study of it with
the history of Catholicism.

II
Catholicism, relying as it does more upon tradition
and authority than Protestantism, which we shall
discuss later on, seemed at first to be most seriously
menaced, by the development of the rationalistic
spirit, with regard to its time-established pretensions

RENAISSANCE OF CATHOLICISM 215
to rule the souls of men. And it is true that in Ger
many, both at the beginning and towards the end of
the nineteenth century, it passed through some grave
crises. Yet, at the same time, it must be pointed out
that they do not seem to have weakened Catholicism
to any appreciable extent, but that its practical and
visible power is apparently more secure at the pre
sent moment than it was a century ago.
Towards the end of the eighteenth century it was
open to question whether Catholicism, with its
authoritative and absolutist doctrines, would not be
obliged to make the most serious concessions to the
modern spirit, and whether it was not even marching
towards disasters which might perhaps prove irre
parable. The rationalist spirit, which until about that
time had allied itself to the Protestant spirit and had
determined the course of the " era of enlightenment,"
did, as a matter of fact, also invade Catholicism.
A reforming party came into existence, and were
animated by a desire to amend Catholic institutions
in conformity with liberal thought.
In the first place, the reformers aimed at restrict
ing and bringing back to justifiable limits the
authority of the Pope in the Church, which they re
garded as exorbitant. They rebelled against the
oppression under which the Roman Curia weighed
down the German episcopacy, and demanded the
independence and prerogatives of the bishops with
regard to the Pope. They accused the Papacy of
having in the past fraudulently usurped the sovereign
power it had appropriated to itself by basing its claims
upon the celebrated pseudo-Isidorian decretals. In
short, they asserted that the supreme authority over
the Church was handed down, not to the Bishop of
Rome, but to the OEcumenical Council. This attitude

216 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
led them, on the other hand, to show themselves, on
the question of the relationship between Church and
State, respectful towards the rights of the State.
They aimed at freeing the national Church as far as
possible from all outside influence. They acknow
ledged the right of temporal sovereigns to exercise an
extensive superintendence and a considerable influence
in the administration of the Church. Lastly, they
endeavoured to reform Catholic theology in a liberal
sense, and tried to introduce a more independent
spirit and a more scientific method into the study of
history, to simplify the ceremonial of the services,
and to restrict processions and pilgrimages. They
waged war against certain religious orders like the
Jesuits and the mendicant friars. They denounced
the ignorance of the clergy, and demanded that
religious instruction should be freely distributed to the
people. And they aimed at effacing or diminishing
as much as possible the difference which separated
Protestants and Catholics, especially from the moral
point of view.
And during the second half of the eighteenth
century, the Roman Catholic cause visibly lost ground.
It is true that Pope Pius VI. succeeded in extracting
a semblance of recantation from Johann Nikolaus
von Hontheim (Febronius), the most famous represen
tative of reform. But the liberal ideas, of which this
man had made himself the champion, nevertheless
made significant progress. The dissolution of the
order of the Jesuits (1773) was an important victory
won over the spirit of intolerance and of war to
the death against reformation and rationalism. In
Austria Joseph II. loosened the yoke of Rome by a
series of bold reforms ; he appointed himself the head
of the Church in his own empire, made enormous

RENAISSANCE OF CATHOLICISM 217
reductions in the number of monks, and by the Edict
of Toleration of 1781 placed Protestants upon the
same footing as Catholics with regard to civil rights
and the holding of public offices. In Germany a few
years later the three ecclesiastical electors, together
with the Archbishop of Salzburg, proclaimed in the
famous Punctatio of Ems (1786) principles which were
identical with those circulated byHontheim-Febronius
on the independence of bishops in relation to the
Holy See. The reform movement penetrated into
most of the Catholic universities of Germany. The
spirit of toleration spread further and further, and
everywhere moderated denominational hostility. All
propaganda for securing converts ceased almost entirely
until the end of the century. The philosophy of Kant,
which is inspired by an exceedingly Protestant spirit,
found numerous disciples among Catholics. At this
juncture the French Revolution seemed to level a
decisive blow at Roman Catholicism in the very heart
of Rome herself. In 1798 the Roman Republic was
proclaimed, and a statue of Liberty with her heel
upon the Triple Crown was erected. Pius VI., in
spite of his eighty years, was carried into captivity
at Sienna, and afterwards at Valencia, where he died
in the following year. And his successor, Pius VII.,
was appointed by a conclave which met at Venice
under the protection of schismatic Russia. At last,
a few years later, the Recesses x of 1803 accomplished
the definite ruin of the temporal power of Catholicism
in Germany. The Church lost her sovereignty over
a territory exceeding 1,700 square miles, containing
a population of over 3,000,000 and producing a
revenue estimated at over 21,000,000 florins.
1 A Recess, it should be noted, is a resolution, decree, or act of
the Imperial Diet of Germany. — Tb.

218 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
At the end of the eighteenth century it looked as
though Catholicism were on the eve of extinction.
Spittler, a famous historian of that time, at the end
of his lectures on the history of the Papacy, expressed
his conviction that the celibacy of the priesthood
and the use of Latin would shortly disappear, even
in Austria, that the Catholic Church would cease
to be Roman, and that the people would resume
the rights of which they had been deprived by the
clergy. And again, in 1799, Novalis wrote in a simi
lar spirit : " The non-essential form of Catholicism
is almost played out. The old Papacy is laid in the
tomb, and Rome for the second time has become a
ruin." But after the last years of the eighteenth century
there appeared in Germany a very strong reactionary
movement in favour of " positive " forms of religion.
This movement, which flourished at the expense
of liberal ideas, proved above all advantageous to
Roman Catholicism, and in a very short time suc
ceeded in increasing to enormous proportions the
influence of the Catholic Church, which seemed to be
dangerously menaced.
The principal reason for this sudden change should
apparently be sought in the impression produced
upon German public opinion by the development
of the French Revolution, which in the beginning
had been hailed with enthusiasm by all the cultured
classes in Germany, who saw in it the practical
realisation of the philosophical theories of the eight
eenth century and of rationalism and the doctrines
of Rousseau. The Revolution had appeared in the
light of a terrible experience sent to prove the organ
ising power of Reason. It had solemnly recognised
as its god, the god of the philosophers. People had

RENAISSANCE OF CATHOLICISM 219
seen it celebrate the cult of the goddess Reason with
great pomp in Notre Dame, and proclaim by the
mouth of Robespierre that " without constraint and
without persecution all sects would of their own
accord become merged in one body through the
universal Religion of Nature," and it had instituted
in 1794 the public and official worship of this Supreme
Being. But the excesses of the revolutionaries, and
the violence they displayed against their political and
religious adversaries, quickly changed into terror,
aversion, and hatred the feelings of admiration which
the Revolution had at first inspired. And the more
severely people condemned the Revolution, the more
surely did they turn gradually away from its funda
mental principle and from that religion of Reason
which was guilty, if not of having inspired the revolu
tionary crimes, at least of not having prevented them.
And they lent an ever more attentive ear to the asser
tions of the Emigres, who made " philosophy " and its
impious doctrines responsible for the great social
upheaval. Thus in opposition to the Revolution and to
rationalism there gradually grew up a coalition of
the historical and traditional powers, the sovereigns
by divine right, the hereditary nobility, and the
Church — the alliance between " the Throne and the
Altar." And was not the " Altar " above all per
sonified by the Roman Catholic Church, which had
always with indefatigable consistency defended the
principle of authority against philosophical infidelity
and the sacrilegious usurpations of rebellious Reason ?
From the moment that the Revolution appeared
(whether rightly or wrongly, does not matter here)
as the practical realisation of the rationalistic ideal,
the terror it inspired logically turned to the ad-

220 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
vantage of the power which was the embodiment
of the opposite principle — the Papacy; and this to
the detriment of reformed Catholicism and of Pro
testantism, which were both under suspicion of having
entered into covenant with the errors of the century,
and of having allowed themselves to be led astray
into making culpable concessions to subversive
ideas. In the face of the revolutionary upheaval
which endangered both the Throne and the Altar,
these two rival powers made a truce to their differ
ences. The everlasting conflict between the Papacy,
which embodied the international power of the
Church, and the temporal sovereigns who repre
sented the national power of the State, became a
secondary consideration. Reconciled by the immi
nence of danger, the two adversaries found them
selves constantly united against the common foe,
against the Revolution and its chief doctrine of
rationalist " irreligion." Even among the Protestant
princes of Germany it was possible in many cases
to discern a certain sympathy for Catholicism in
asmuch as it was a conservative force capable of
holding the revolutionary spirit in check, and of
inclining the people to docility and submission.
Nevertheless it was not at the hands of kings
nor of the highest in the land that the Church found
salvation. The renaissance of Catholicism also
appears in certain aspects as an impulse towards
" liberty " and as a popular movement. A glance
at the position of Catholicism after the crisis of
1803 will help us to understand this fact.
The Recesses of 1803 had resulted in the dis
appearance in Germany of the last vestiges of
theocratic government. If matters are regarded
from this point of view, it is clear that the process

RENAISSANCE OF CATHOLICISM 221
of secularisation did great harm to Catholicism.
It deprived the Church and her congregations of
considerable wealth, and to a large extent diminished
their material power. Above all it seemed to level
a blow at the very independence of the Church,
which was subjected much more directly than before
to the frequently oppressive and officious tutelage
of the temporal sovereigns and their officials. His
torians with ultramontane sympathies have not
failed to point out the precarious and dependent
position in which the Recesses left Catholicism in
Germany. Armed with overwhelming evidence, they
have depicted the Church, stripped of her most
necessary rights and liberties, the authority of the
bishops annihilated by the power of the officials,
who were chiefly Protestants or hostile to Roman
Catholicism, the convents closed, their goods con
fiscated, and their wealth sometimes plundered.
They have shown how the Church, deprived of the
free administration of her own resources, was reduced
to live by the charity of secular powers and subjected
to the financial tutelage of the State, which was
mean with regard to the expenses of public worship,
and prevented many of the religious foundations
from fulfilling their original functions. They com
plained that denominational impartiality was not
preserved by the State, which systematically gave
the preference to Protestants rather than to Catholics
in all appointments in the army, the Civil Service,
and the universities. They drew attention to the
fact that public instruction, in every rank, was
taken away from the influence of the Church, that
even the services were restricted by the State, which,
under the pretext of suppressing abuses, tried to
diminish the pomp of the ceremonies, limit the

222 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
number of feast-days, prohibit processions and
pilgrimages, and even introduce reforms into the
liturgy on its own authority.
But it is also easy to perceive the extent to which
these grievances were specious and calculated to
win sympathy to the Catholic cause. Catholicism —
which we have just seen as an ally of royalty in
the struggle against the Revolution — now made its
appearance before the public as a victim of govern
mental oppression. What did it demand, in fact, if
not the same as every Liberal and Radical : " liberty "
and emancipation from the tyrannical control of the
State ? The great principle of autonomy, which in
spired all the claims of democracy against monarchical
absolutism, also appeared as the basis of the com
plaints raised by Catholicism against the State !
Its opponents, indeed, replied on their part by
denouncing the ambitions of the clergy. They
tried to prove that Catholicism was in reality in no
way oppressed either in its religious convictions or
in the freedom of worship, whilst the " liberty "
it demanded was, as a matter of fact, the right to
oppress its enemies and to be supreme in the State,
and that in the very heyday of modern life it was
endeavouring to realise its old theocratic dreams.
But they did not succeed in robbing Catholics of
the conviction that they too were champions of
the modern cause of autonomy, that they were
fighting against an officious State the good fight
of liberty, and that the emancipation, of the people
must go hand in hand with the emancipation of
the Church. And it is for this reason that during
the nineteenth century the Catholic movement
proved not merely an anti-revolutionary mani
festation, but also ever more and more distinctly

RENAISSANCE OF CATHOLICISM 223
a popular movement and an impulse on the part
of the " Christian populace " towards religious
independence. Another consequence of the Recesses of 1803 was
the weakening of liberal and " national " Catholicism
to the benefit of Roman Catholicism.
The powerful prince-bishops and the rich prelates
of the old German Church, who had nothing to fear
from the encroachments of secular influence, were
in a much better position to defend the independence
of the bishops and the rights of the national Church
against the absolutist pretensions of the Papacy.
" If the bishops," said Cardinal Pacca, at the time
when the chief clergy were supporting the policy of
Joseph II. against the Curia, " had been less rich
and less powerful, they would have listened with
more deference to the voice of the Supreme Head of
the Church, and would not have tried to emulate
the example of the proud and ambitious patriarchs
of Constantinople and acquire an independence
which was well-nigh schismatical." The Recesses,
by reducing the temporal power of the bishops,
also struck a blow at the head of the reform party.
The new clergy, deprived of all real influence, and
with their independence menaced by secular power,
stood in much greater need than their predecessors
had done of the support of the Curia, and quickly
accustomed themselves to take the word of command
from Rome with docility. Before 1803 a large pro
portion of the German bishops endeavoured, with
the help of the temporal princes, to defend the
prerogatives of the national Churches against the
Bishop of Rome. After 1803 the resistance was
less vital and more easily broken. The clergy found
themselves gradually driven to fight, with the

224 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
support and under the direction of the Pope, against
the pretensions of the secular State. The Papacy
appeared to good Catholics in the light of the surest
guarantee of religious independence ; the sovereignty
of the Pope alone, who was independent of any
particular State, could guarantee the autonomy of
the Church, and protect it from the attempts of the
civil power to invade the domain of religion.
The ancient episcopal system had in the past
presumed to lay down the law for the Pope. The
new episcopacy did not take long to perceive that
it had to choose between two alternatives : either
obedience to Rome or slavery under the State.
And it threw itself emphatically on the side of Rome.
A modern historian of German Catholicism says
that the Papacy appears as the emancipator of the
Church in Germany.
At the same time as Catholicism disciplined its
forces and concentrated them in order to reach
out for power with redoubled energy, it also revealed
itself as a spiritual principle capable of gaining the
respect of men's minds, of inflaming their hearts,
and of inspiring the imagination of artists. The
romantic movement, which bound together about
the beginning of the nineteenth century the highest
intellects of Germany, resulted in an apotheosis of
Catholicism. There is nothing more curious than
to watch the transitions by which these free spirits
passed from the most audacious and independent
philosophical speculations to the strictest religious
faith. Romanticism first appeared as a protestation
against the somewhat childish rationalism of the
" era of enlightenment." The rationalists had
deified and worshipped conscious organising in-

RENAISSANCE OF CATHOLICISM 225
tellect, and had considered it capable of conceiving
and defining with perfect clearness God or the First
Cause of all reality, and able by its own light alone
to guide the conduct of individuals and of nations.
Romanticism, on the contrary, posited the existence
of other powers besides the intellect, such as moral
will, love, intuition, and poetic imagination, which
play a decisive part in the destinies of man. Con
tinuing the work of Kant and Goethe, whom it
recognised as its masters, and inspired, moreover,
by Spinoza and Plato, Bcehme and Hemsterhuys,
it reached a new solution of the religious problem.
The power by which man attains the knowledge
of God was not, in its opinion, the intellect alone.
Kant had already founded religion, not upon
knowledge, but upon moral will, not upon theoretical,
but upon practical reason. Following in his foot
steps, the romanticists proclaimed that the existence
of God could not be proved by rational arguments,
that religion was not a certain kind of knowledge,
and that it was not by intellect but by love, con
templation, moral will, and poetical imagination,
that man could find God.
It is true that at the beginning at least the roman
ticists were very far from wishing to do violence
to reason, to subordinate it to other faculties, or
to subject it to the authority of a supernatural and
historical revelation which it must accept without
reservation. They repudiated none of the modern
conquests of reason and science, they had no desire
to make man retrace his footsteps and return to
obsolete beliefs. They prided themselves, on the
contrary, on being in the van of thought, and pre
sumed to be able to explore into new regions of
the human soul. Their ambition was not to contra-
15

226 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
diet rationalism, but to surpass it. They did not
wish to correct the scientific conception of the
universe by a religious conception ; they merely
affirmed that they each had their own value and
mutually complemented one another. In short,
they had their eyes fixed not upon the past, but upon
the future.
Nevertheless, romanticism insensibly became more
disdainful of the power of reason. Directed in the
beginning against an imprudent rationalism, which
exaggerated the power of the intellect beyond all
bounds, it came gradually to place theoretical reason
lower and lower in the scale of values and to treat
it as an inferior and suspicious character, and finally
as an enemy. As early as Novalis theoretical intelli
gence was regarded merely as a sullen and grumbling
scribe, which with great difficulty succeeded now and
again in incorporating some morsel of eternal Truth
into its precepts, and became positively pernicious
when it tried to rebel against the superior forces,
such as love, wisdom, and poetry, which rule the
world. According to Friedrich Schlegel philosophy
was merely a barren attempt to explain the world
without God, an illusion which made man imagine
that he could draw from himself the virtues which
divine revelation had planted in his heart, so that
he regarded as the natural and normal products of
human reason ideas which were in reality confused
reminiscences of the word which God Himself once
gave to sinful man. Speculative reason, which was
for the rationalist an infallible guide to man, became
in the end a mistress of falsehood and a creator of
delusions in the eyes of the romanticists, who had
recovered from the disease of intellectual pride.
And in proportion as rational truth went down in

RENAISSANCE OF CATHOLICISM 227
the scale of values, specifically religious truth rose
higher in their estimation. At the beginning they
attached but small importance to the historical and
positive elements in religion. Fichte, for instance,
professed a pantheistic monism, which he thought
identical in its essence with the Christianity of the
Fourth Gospel, but which was in reality a philo
sophical religion containing the elements common to
the various Christian denominations and destined in
the end to reconcile them in one last synthesis. But
if at first romanticism, far from being a denomina
tional reaction, pushed toleration, indifference to
dogma, and freedom in the matter of religious organi
sation to their most extreme limits, it came gradu
ally to pay an ever more sincere and reverent re
spect to positive Christianity. All its thinkers, from
Novalis and Schlegel, to Wackenroder and Tieck, waxed
enthusiastic over the glorious history of Christianity
in the past — the Middle Ages with their moving and
pious impulse towards art and religion, the glorious
days of the Crusades, when the whole of Europe
shared one faith, and that golden age of Christianity
when one grand common interest united the pro
vinces of that vast spiritual kingdom. And finally
Friedrich Schlegel, after burying himself in the study
of languages, mythology, and the philosophy of the
East, arrived at the conviction that " man did not
begin his career without God." He taught that the
evolution of the human species was inconceivable
without the admission of a divine revelation at the
beginning. We could find traces of this in the most
ancient and venerable document we possessed on
the origin of man — the books of Moses ; and we might
hear the faint echo and discover more or less con
fused recollections of it in the ancient systems of

228 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
the East. In the depths of mankind's past, there
fore, there shone forth a supernatural light, and all
our efforts should be directed to the sole end of
finding once more by a pious study of the Bible that
divine truth, which alone could secure our salvation.
Let us advance a little further along this path, and
we shall also understand the growing sympathy of
the romanticists with Catholicism.
If one is not disposed to eliminate from religion
all its positive elements as being vain superstitions,
if reason has no right to correct religious intuition,
is one not in the end led to the logical conclusion
that reform may, perhaps, be the first manifestation
of that impious rebellion of reason against faith, and
that the simplifications which Protestantism has
introduced into the religion of tradition may perhaps
level a blow at the very integrity of that religion ?
The Protestant Novalis reproached reform with
having broken the unity of Christianity, and accused
it of being " a revolutionary government which pro
claims its own permanence." And on the other
hand he praised in Catholicism precisely those
characteristics which rationalism condemned with
the greatest vehemence. He extolled the Popes for
having in their consummate wisdom opposed in the
past " the insolent development of certain human
faculties as well as premature and dangerous dis
coveries in the realm of knowledge." He also up
held the celibacy of the priesthood. He defended
the Jesuits, in whom he saw an admirable creation
on the part of the ecclesiastical spirit and a magnifi
cent attempt to restore the Papacy to its pristine
glory. And if a large number of romanticists, like
Novalis, Wackenrode, Tieck, and Gentz, did not push
their sympathy for Catholicism to the point of being

RENAISSANCE OF CATHOLICISM 229
publicly converted, others actually took this final
step. Friedrich Schlegel roundly condemned the
culpable indifference of lukewarm minds, who, under
the pretext that the external forms of religion matter
very little, were content out of laziness to remain
true to the faith in which they had been brought up.
Every man should be under the obligation to decide
for himself the capital question as to whether the
one immutable religious truth is to be found on
the Protestant or the Catholic side. In Schlegel's
opinion, by the abolition of the external forms of
religion, reform had at the same time rejected the
most essential and most sublime elements of Chris
tianity. And he acted in accordance with his beliefs.
Partly through his reasoned convictions as a his
torian and a critic, and partly as an act of faith, and
the free choice of his deepest feelings, he became an
official convert to Catholicism at Cologne on April
the 16th, 1808.
And his was not an isolated case. Conversions of
this kind became very frequent at that time. Men
of science and learning, like the philosopher Moller,
Rumohr the aestheticist, the political economist
Adam Muller ; authors like Zacharias Werner ; artists
like the two Veits, Klinkowstrom, Overbeck, and the
two Schadows ; statesmen like Platner and Eduard
von Schenk ; publicists like Jarcke ; princes like
Frederick of Hesse-Darmstadt or Adolphus of
Mecklenburg-Schwerin, went over to Catholicism.
The fact that " human " motives may have contri
buted to these conversions is probable and even
likely. Political considerations or artistic dilettan
tism, the idea that Catholicism was an effective
method of keeping nations under control, or that it
was par excellence the aesthetic religion, the faith

230 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
which inspired the great artists of the Middle Ages,
and gave birth to the masterpieces of painting and
music, was probably an important factor in the con
version of many individuals. But, generally speak
ing, it is certain that their sincerity was above
suspicion, and that they were simply induced to go
to the extreme limit by the strong current which
bore away the minds of men from rationalism and
carried them imperceptibly towards religious faith.
Thus the cycle of the religious evolution of roman
ticism was completed. Innovators and revolution
aries at the beginning, the romanticists wished at
first to continue the work of the classical era, and to
explore a domain of the human soul unknown to the
rationalism of the eighteenth century. We find
them carefully fixing the limits of the religious sphere,
attributing in the psychic life of humanity an ever
greater importance to irrational elements, to mystic
intuition, to sentiment and to love, and paying an
ever more respectful attention to the historical data
of religion. From an almost entirely rational con
ception of religion, a sort of philosophical Protes
tantism stripped of every historical and dogmatic
element, romanticism, after holding theoretical
reason in ever lower esteem, finally ended in an idea
of religion which was ever more and more " irrational-
istic." Its sympathies increased in ardour for
religious beliefs in which the superhuman element
predominated. It showed an ever more decided
preference for Catholicism in which the ecclesiastical
hierarchy and the strict discipline, the character of
long tradition and authoritative principles, formed
the most marked contrast with the rational religion
of the Categorical Imperative. The precept of auto
nomy, which pervaded the moral and religious

RENAISSANCE OF CATHOLICISM 231
doctrines of Kant, seemed thenceforward an impious
belief inspired by a rash confidence in the organising
power of human reason. Rationalistic pride became
merged in a respectful adoration of the impenetrable
mystery of the universe and in a confession full of
humility of the weakness and poverty of man. The
contrite and repentant romanticist, fallen from his
high hopes and his arrogant pride, returned humbly
to the school of divine revelation and sought relief
for his anxiety and doubt at the foot of the Cross
and in the bosom of the Catholic Church.
Thus we see the importance of the romantic move
ment in the development of Catholicism. Obviously
the adhesion of a few cultured minds or the en
thusiasm of a few artists could not determine its
success. But it is none the less significant to find
that Catholicism was able to regain its influence over
the educated minority. Rationalism was full of
disgust for " superstition." The German mind at the
end of the eighteenth century treated the Catholic
idea as a negligible quantity. " The Church of
Rome," said Herder, " is merely an old ruin into
which fresh life can never be breathed." But thence
forward this was not so. It is true that positivism,
true to rationalistic tradition, considered religious
thought an anachronism which was destined to dis
appear. But the cause of religion found at this
time convinced and able defenders in the ranks of
cultured men. Romanticism considered that the
highest step Reason could take was precisely to
realise her own incompetence and raise herself to
religion ; positivist rationalism, far from being the
last stage in the mental evolution of man, was in its
eyes merely a transitory and outgrown phase.
The romantic movement, moreover, was not a

232 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
mere stage which was quickly left behind in the
evolution of the German spirit. It was prolonged
throughout the whole of the nineteenth century with
varying success, but without ever stopping. The
early romanticism of Schlegel, Novalis, Schelling,
Wackenroder and Tieck was followed by the ro
manticism of the Heidelberg, Dresden, and Berlin
circles, then by the era of young Heine, the reign
of Frederick William IV., the reactionary period
which followed upon 1848, and lastly by the modern
neo-romanticism of our own day. And throughout
all these transformations it remained unchanged in
all its essential characteristics. The religiosity which
inspired Richard Wagner's doctrine of regeneration,
and which is voiced in his Parsifal, is reminiscent in
many respects of the early romantic school — even
to the vague perfume of Catholicism, which Nietzsche
thought he could detect in it.
In short, there is no doubt whatever that the
philosophy and the religious psychology of ro
manticism, by lowering on the one hand the pride of
our " little sagacity," 1 and on the other by repre
senting Catholicism as perfectly compatible with the
highest intellectual and artistic culture, largely con
tributed to the renaissance of the Catholic faith
among the civilised nations of the world.
At the same time as it won over an important
section among the cultured minority, Catholicism
also imposed itself by a different process upon the
lowest of the people. It conquered them by giving
ample satisfaction to the somewhat ponderous
1 This is an allusion to a distinction which Nietzsche makes be
tween the "great sagacity" which consists of the instincts of the
body and the "httle sagacity " which is the mind. See Zarathustra,
pp. 35, 36.— Tk.

RENAISSANCE OF CATHOLICISM 233
appetite for the supernatural, which is always to be
found in the breast of the multitude. During the
nineteenth century the use of indulgences increased.
In almost all the large churches in Germany to-day
there is a " special altar " upon which the Pope has
conferred the following privilege — that if a priest says
a Mass before it for the soul of a Catholic who died
in the love of Christ, that soul will receive plenary
indulgence, and is immediately delivered from the
torments of Purgatory. Similarly the worship of the
saints took on a fresh development, and above all the
adoration of the Sacred Heart of Jesus, which dates,
it is true, from the seventeenth century, but only
attained its complete significance in the second half
of the nineteenth century. The idea of worship
became attached even to the most external and
material objects : Catholics were taught that con
secrated incense had a " supernatural spiritual effect "
and produced " an odour of sanctity," that vessels used
at the services " had something of the divine " and
ought therefore to be honoured by a sort of religious
respect. The popular faith was exalted by the solemn
exhibition of the relics of the saints. In 1844
1,100,000 pilgrims gathered from every corner of
Germany and thronged round the Sacred Tunic of
Treves in a fever of devotion, and with a thirst for
miracles, which was somewhat disconcerting to the
modern sceptic. From that moment spectacles of
this nature increased in number, and miraculous
cures, which were piously placed upon record, as in
the case of Treves, or marvellous apparitions, which
were regarded as adding to the glory of the Church,
as at Marpingen, constantly kept alive and stimulated
the old love of the people for the supernatural and for
material miracles.

234 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
Lastly, the activity of Catholic propaganda among
the masses was increased by the creation of an enor
mous number of guilds, brotherhoods, and religious
societies, which were multiplied more particularly in
the second half of the nineteenth century, and some
of which contained thousands of German members.
" All these associations and their members," says
a recent historian, " live under the spiritual domina
tion of neo-Catholicism and its ritual ; they are bound
together by the special worship of the saint of their
particular brotherhood, and carry out their obliga
tions as citizens in the spirit of this neo-Catholicism.
They take part in processions, and are sometimes
honoured by being allowed to bear a banner or hold
the canopy over the head of the priest, who carries
the Host. Each one of them quivers with pious thrills
inspired by the ritual, whether he mingles with the
rest of the congregation or kneels before the special
altar of his brotherhood, and they all live in the
hope of obtaining the indulgences which, since the
time of Pius IX., have been dispensed with the
greatest liberality." The numberless associations,
headed by the ordinary clergy and the Jesuits, and
supported by an increasingly important religious
press, have exercised a decisive influence over the
destinies of German Catholicism. They have made
the Catholic movement "democratic." The influ
ence of the bishops and the high dignitaries of the
Church, which was formerly exercised in favour of
aristocratic principles, was considerably reduced at the
end of the century — from the day on which the Pope,
summing up in his own person the tradition of the
Church, proclaimed his infallibility. It was by this
means that German Catholicism has come at the
present day to represent an essentially popular party,

RENAISSANCE OF CATHOLICISM 235
admirably organised, controlled and disciplined,
which plays a clever and successful part in political
struggles, fights eagerly for power, and obediently
takes the word of command from the infallible Pope,
who furnishes it with the general outlines of its policy.
Invigorated in this way by a number of favourable
conditions which hastened its diffusion, both among
the classes and the masses, the Catholic Renaissance
proclaimed its existence after the first few years of the
nineteenth century by a series of significant symp
toms. In 1800 the conversion of Count Friedrich
Leopold of Stolberg took place ; after long years of
hesitation he went over to Catholicism out of dis
gust "for the pitiable condition of the Lutheran
religion, which under our very eyes is melting into
theism and atheism." This conversion was a sign of
the times, all the more important because it was
followed (as we have already seen) by a long series
of similar conversions. Gradually, active centres of
Catholic propaganda were formed. At Munster
there was the group founded by the Princess Amelia
of Gallitzine, at Wiirzburg and Eichstadt the Catholic
circles directed by Bishop Zirkel, and at Vienna the
Ultramontane Party organised after 1808 by Father
Clemens Maria Hofbauer. After the concordat of
1802, concluded with Napoleon, which marks the first
important victory of the Curia, the influence of Rome
grew ever more important through the complicated
negotiations which paved the way for the reorganisa
tion of the Catholic Church in the west and south
of Germany. The vehement and malevolent oppo
sition displayed towards a Liberal prelate, like the
celebrated Vicar-General Ignatius Henry of Wessen-
berg, whose deposition the Pope demanded in 1814,
proves the weakness of the reforming party. Lastly,

236 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
the fall of Napoleon marked the decisive victory of
the Papacy. In 1814 the triumphal entry of Pius VII.
into Rome took place, followed in the same year by
the restoration of the order of the Jesuits to their
old constitution and privileges, and shortly after
wards by the renewal of the Inquisition and the
revival of the Index.
And in 1832, in the Bull Pastor Aeternus, by which
he proclaimed his elevation to the pontifical throne,
Gregory XVI. launched a haughty declaration of
war against modern subjectivism : " The cause of
the progress of unbelief and rebellion against the
sacred dogma of the Church is pseudo-science. It
is the teaching and the example of the masters that
has turned away the hearts of the young, brought
about the defeat of religion, and the terrible decadence
of morals. It is therefore needful, for the preserva
tion of the Church from all these innovations, to recall
at once to men's minds that the Pope alone can decide
the doctrines and the government of the Church ;
the bishops must always agree with the Holy Father,
and the priests must obey the bishops. The disci
pline ordained by the Church must never be called in
question, or above all be subordinated to the power of
the State. It is absurd to talk about the regeneration
of the Church, and an abomination to attack the vow
of celibacy and to cast doubt upon the indissolubility
of the marriage tie. Above all it is needful to fight
against indifference and the illusion that salvation
can be found in any creed. For from this arises
that foolish error that every man has the right to
liberty of conscience."

CHAPTER II
THE PROGRESS OF CATHOLICISM DURING THE NINE
TEENTH CENTURY

During the nineteenth century Roman Catholicism
met with two chief adversaries in Germany — reformed
Catholicism, on the one hand, and the secular State
on the other. But it obtained an almost uninterrupted
series of victories over them both.
The triumph of the Church of Rome over Liberal
Catholicism was complete and apparently decisive.
From the end of the eighteenth century the Church
entered upon a campaign of extermination against it,
which it continued from that time forward with in
vincible pertinacity. As early as about 1794 com
plaints from the pens of Liberal writers are to be
found about the gradual disappearance of the pro
gressive spirit. And the measures taken in the same
year against several Liberal professors in the Catho
lic University of Dillingen, of whom the gentle
mystic Sailer was one, prove the growing power of
anti-rationalistic tendencies. Nevertheless Liberal
Catholicism was still a power at the beginning of the
nineteenth century. Its principal supporters were
to be found among the superior clergy and in the
Catholic universities. Baron von Wessenberg, the
Vicar-General of the Bishopric of Constance, Christian
von Hohenlohe-Waldenburg, the Prince-Bishop of
237

238 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
Breslau, Count Spiegel, the Archbishop of Cologne,
and numerous other prelates, like Bishop Frint at
Saint-Polten, Bishop Gruber at Salzburg, and Bishop
Milde in Vienna, gave evidence of a wide Liberalism
in their administration, and showed a more or less
open sympathy with the idea of a national Church
which should preserve a certain independence in
its relations with the Chair of St. Peter. At the same
time the Liberal spirit began to make itself felt in the
Catholic universities. Professor Hermes of Bonn,
the most famous representative of these tendencies,
constructed a system which founded Catholic dogma
upon the basis of Kant's philosophy. He succeeded
in securing the triumph of his ideas among the facul
ties and seminaries of Treves, Cologne, Munster,
Breslau, and Braunsberg. But Roman Catholicism
was not slow to regain the upper hand. At the Con
gress of Vienna, as well as at the Bundestag of Frank
fort, the organisation of the " Church of Germany,"
dreamt of by Wessenberg, failed to be carried out
owing to the dissensions among the German states
and the intrigues of the Ultramontanes. The over
whelming hostility with which Wessenberg met at
Rome compelled him to retire in 1827, and death
gradually freed the Papacy of its other adversaries
in the ranks of the superior clergy in Germany.
Finally, at the end of the 'thirties, after the death of
Hermes and his protector, Count Spiegel, Hermesian-
ism, which had been condemned by the Pope, was
violently eradicated from the Catholic faculties,
and after a futile resistance slowly died out. Thus
the decisive blow was struck at the Reform Party,
which, stripped of its influence over ecclesiastical
education, found itself reduced to the alternative of a
full and complete submission or to a fruitless struggle.

PROGRESS OF CATHOLICISM 239
It was from that time forward condemned to im
potence in spite of a few attempts at resistance, which
did not seriously trouble the victorious Church of
Rome. The campaigns against the celibacy of the
priesthood, which for some time agitated Silesia and
Baden, the movement in favour of a German liturgy
and the simplification of the ritual, which gave rise
to fairly lively polemics, the synodal agitation, which
before 1848 demanded an equal distribution of power
between the ecclesiastical hierarchy and the internal
opinion of the Church, produced no result of any im
portance. The " German Catholic " movement, let
loose by Ronge and Czerski at the time of the exhi
bition of the Sacred Tunic at Treves in 1844, and which
resulted in the formation of one or two separatist
communities, remained confined to a very limited
circle, and had not the slightest effect upon the life of
Catholicism as a whole. And when at last ultra-
montanism plucked the final fruit of its victory and
proclaimed in 1870 the dogma of the infallibility of
the Pope, the protestations of Liberal Catholicism in
Germany were feeble and impotent. In spite of the
great personal merit of the protesters, men like Dol-
linger, Friedrich, Schulte, and Reinkens, the " Old
Catholics," who refused to acquiesce in the dogma of
infallibility or to accept the complete domination of
Rome, did not meet with any lasting success. Though
they were able to offer a certain resistance, especially
at Bonn and Munich, which were their chief centres
of influence, and to organise independent parishes,
and even in 1863 to appoint a special bishop, their
numbers always remained insignificant. They never
had more than 100,000 followers in Germany and
Switzerland, and these gradually declined to less
than 30,000. Everywhere the bishops, even those

240 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
who had been hostile to the promulgation of the
dogma of infallibility, bowed before the accomplished
fact, and obediently proclaimed the new dogma in
their dioceses, and succeeded, without meeting with
any serious opposition, in making their well-disciplined
flock of true believers follow in their train.

II
Just as Roman Catholicism broke the resistance of
the Reforming Party, it also vigorously opposed the
pretensions of the State, and finally, after a great
conflict, secured that Catholic "liberty" which it con
sidered necessary for the independence of the Church.
It gradually forced the German states to loosen
the bonds of dependence in which they wished to
keep the Church. This design was already clearly
outlined in the negotiations which led to the ecclesi
astical reorganisation of Germany at the time of the
Peace of Vienna. After having succeeded in prevent
ing, both at the Congress of Vienna and subsequently
at the Diet of Frankfort, the constitution of a
" Church of Germany " capable of developing into
an autonomous body independent of Rome, papal
diplomacy entered into separate negotiations with
the various German states, and concluded during the
years between 1817 and 1821 advantageous con
cordats with Bavaria, Prussia, and the petty
states of the South. The resistance of Catholicism
to State control was afterwards accentuated when
the controversy between the Government and the
two Archbishops of Cologneand of Posen, respectively,
took place on the subject of the Church's blessing
on mixed marriages. This conflict was terminated
by the almost unreserved capitulation of the Prussian

PROGRESS OF CATHOLICISM 241
Government to the demands of the Church. In
1848 the Conclave of German Bishops assembled at
Wiirzburg solemnly formulated the demands of the
new German episcopate. They protested against
the encroachments which, under the pretext of
rights of patronage, the temporal princes had made
upon the domain of the Church, asserted the privi
leges of the ecclesiastical hierarchy in connection
with seminaries and theological faculties, claimed
for the bishops the right of free communication with
the Sovereign Pontiff, and rose against the exercise
of the right of placet by the civil authority. Most
of these demands, with the approval of the Pope,
passed during the 'fifties into the legislation of Prussia
(1848 and 1850) and of Austria (Concordat of 1855),
who, after having been for a long time the strong
hold of reform, became once more the central hearth
of Roman Catholicism in Germany. About 1860
the hierarchy, relying upon the clerical democracy
and the numberless Catholic associations, which had
spread their roots through the whole country, had
obtained from the secular powers throughout Ger
many a sum-total of concessions which went far to
secure the independence necessary for the free
exercise of Catholicism.
Nevertheless, a fresh conflict, more grave than all
the preceding ones, was in course of preparation.
On the one hand the evolution of Ultramontane
Catholicism produced its final consequences. A
series of dogmatic decrees of capital importance — the
promulgation of the dogma of the Immaculate Con
ception in 1854, the Syllabus of 1864, and above all
the proclamation of Papal Infallibility by the Vatican
Council in 1870 — crowned the imposing edifice of the
Romish system, and made the most rigorous absolu-
16

242 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
tism predominant in the Church. The authority
of the Pope unequivocably proclaimed itself as the
supreme tribunal of Catholicism, and exercised a
direct influence upon the lowest masses of the
Catholic democracy. The bishops, stripped of their
autonomy, and held in check by the infallibility of
the Supreme Head of the Church, were reduced to
the position of docile intermediaries between the
Pope and the " Christian populace." And on the
other hand, to counterbalance this mighty spiritual
power, which displayed ever more clearly its desire
to dominate the civil power, the German Empire
was brought to life once more in the very centre
of Europe. But this Empire was not the res
toration of the Holy Roman Empire which had
existed before the Revolution, and it had not been
formed under the hegemony of Catholic Austria.
Fierce political struggles and two great wars had
placed a Hohenzollern at its head, and the new
Empire was dominated by Protestant influences.
Thus the Roman Curia, despoiled of its temporal
power by revolutionary Italy, also saw its influence
in Europe menaced by the rise of a great Protestant
State. From that moment it prepared itself for a
struggle which it regarded as inevitable. In alliance
with all the particularistic elements, which had been
injured by the hegemony of Prussia, the Catholic
democracy of Germany, under the able guidance
of the Guelf Windthorst, mobilised its forces. A
Catholic party, the Centre, which united the appar
ently most heterogeneous elements, in which Bavarian
aristocrats, Prussian Junkers, and Polish magnates
rubbed shoulders with Liberals and Radicals from
the Valley of the Rhine, was formed during the
elections of March 1871 for the defence of Catholic

PROGRESS OF CATHOLICISM 243
interests. Between German Catholicism hostile to
the Empire and the Imperial Government very
jealous of its power and resolved not to have the
law laid down by a rival, war was inevitable. The
Kulturkampf represented the duel between the
Empire and the Curia.
On the question of the scope and significance of
the Kulturkampf there exists a great difference of
opinion on the part of historians.
Some of them depict Bismarck as having been
surprised by the clerical aggression, which he had
not foreseen, and in which he did not wish to believe.
Driven by his too exclusively realistic nature into
imagining that he would make an end of the clerical
opposition by having recourse to police measures,
he gradually learnt to realise the futility of his brutal
policy. He therefore beat a retreat, in spite of his
vow that he would " not go to Canossa," ' and
allowed the May Laws one after the other to fall into
desuetude. And finally he found himself obliged
to purchase, by means of concessions, the support
of the Centre Party, which became the arbiter of
the political destinies of Germany and the pivot of
the Government majority.
Others represent the religious policy of the great
Chancellor in a less primitive and more favourable
light. They insist on the impossibility for Bismarck
to come to any understanding by means of diplomatic
negotiations, and through the instrumentality of a
concordat with a Power which declared itself in
fallible and aspired to dominate every civil authority.
1 Meaning he would not humiliate himself before the Pope.
The mention of Canossa refers, of course, to the fact that the
Emperor Henry IV. waited three days and three nights in a court
yard at that place for the pardon of Pope Gregory VII. (1077). — Ta.

244 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
They approve of Bismarck's policy of having, under
the circumstances, preferred to regulate the relations
between Church and State in an authoritative way,
by means of legislation, so as subsequently to be in
a position to negotiate secretly with the Head of
the Church, and gradually to modify the law in such
a manner as to make it acceptable to both sides
alike. And they praise the Chancellor for having
carried out this delicate policy with marvellous skill,
for having fought with a warlike spirit and a vigorous
resolution the battle against clerical demagogy, and
for having afterwards, in his negotiations with the
Curia and the diplomats of Rome, shown a very
keen insight into the political necessities and possi
bilities of the moment. And they give him credit
for having in the end succeeded in organising the
relationship between Church and State in such a way
as to provide sufficient safeguard for the rights of the
State, and at the same time with enough liberality
to give satisfaction to the Church and reconcile the
Catholic particularistic Centre with the new Empire.
In short, it is quite open to question who was the
real victor in this conflict between the spiritual and
temporal powers. Events can be represented either
in the light of a triumph for Catholicism, which vic
toriously repulsed an awkward and brutal attempt
at oppression, or else as a success for the State, which
vigorously held its own against the particularistic
and clerical opposition directed against the Protes
tant Empire of the Hohenzollern.
In distinction to these two views the one thing
certain is that an understanding was finally reached
between the two adversaries, and that it was an
exceedingly curious evolution which rendered this
change of front possible.

PROGRESS OF CATHOLICISM 245
There was, as a matter of fact, no necessary or
inevitable antagonism between the Catholic Church
and the German Empire. It required time for both
sides to realise that a system of mutual tolerance
and even of profitable co-operation was possible.
But an agreement was eventually reached between
them. The State learnt that it could with advantage
give up the hostile legislation and severe measures
passed at the beginning of the conflict, and little by
little it laid down its arms. In 1879 Falk, who had
directed the war against clericalism, resigned his
ministry. Between 1881 and 1887 most of the
regulations enforced by the famous " May Laws "
were abrogated one after the other. And in 1904 one
of the last vestiges of the Kulturkampf, the clause
shutting out the Jesuits from German territory, dis
appeared. The Centre, for their part, realised
that if they did not wish to condemn their party
to an implacable and in the long run barren oppo
sition, they must recognise the accomplished fact,
frankly accept the new Empire, and rally round a
national policy. They consequently succeeded very
cleverly in moderating their particularistic tendencies,
on the one hand, in such a way as not to lay them
selves open to the suspicion of separatist ambitions,
and on the other hand so tempered their ultra-
montanism as no longer to give any grounds for the
reproach which had often been made against them
of being an unpatriotic association. It is possible that
this evolution was, as some have asserted, facilitated
by the direction favourable to France and the Dual
Alliance given by the diplomacy of Rome under Leo
XIII. after 1890. This policy perhaps upset a number
of German Catholics and led them, in their turn, to
take up a"more independent attitude towards Rome.

246 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
Under these circumstances an understanding could
be cemented between the Centre Party and the Im
perial Government. And this understanding was all
the more obvious because, from the political point
of view, the Centre had not and could not have
any decided policy. We have already seen how
Catholicism assumed a character at once Conserva
tive and democratic, aristocratic and popular. The
Centre was, therefore, quite logically able to contain,
with a view to common action, feudalists, who were
fundamentally Conservative and Liberals with very
advanced views. It always avoided accentuating its
attitude too violently in one direction or the other.
At a certain moment in 1889 it seemed likely that
under the guidance of the members of its aristo
cratic section — Count Ballestrem, von Huene, von
Schorlemer, and von Frankenstein — the Centre would
form an alliance with the Right for the purpose of
introducing reforms of a Conservative nature into
educational and religious legislation. But in spite of
these considerations, from the economic and social
point of view the Centre had no intention of making
common cause with the agrarian feudalists. And in
1893, under the direction of Dr. Lieber, the balance
of power inclined once more to the advantage of the
Democratic Party. So that finally the sum-total
of divergent forces, which were grouped in the
Catholic Party, resolved itself into a slightly pro
gressive attitude.
Thus the requirements of the Centre very naturally
fitted in with those of the Imperial Government.
In fact, the central authority considered that its
mission was precisely the establishment of a sort
of court of arbitration between the different con
flicting parties and the discovery of some golden

PROGRESS OF CATHOLICISM 247
mean between the various aspirations which appeared
in the country. What, then, could be more natural
than for it to seek its chief support in a party whose
line of conduct was already precisely the result of
a compromise between Conservative and democratic
tendencies ?
The Centre knew very well how to adapt itself
to its new role. A party of implacable opposition
until 1881, it began from 1881 to 1887 to take a
part in public affairs. Then from 1890 onwards its
share grew gradually more active and more im
portant. From 1898 until the most recent elections
the President of the Chamber was a member of the
Centre, which was thus officially proclaimed the
most influential party in the Reichstag. And,
as a matter of fact, it does possess considerable
authority. Without binding itself to the Govern
ment it has, nevertheless, given its support to nearly
all the great legislative measures of the last twenty-
five years — the workmen's insurance acts, the
commercial treaties during Caprivi' s ministry, the
Civil Code, and the laws on the increase of the navy,
which marked the evolution of Germany towards a
universal policy. And its position is still extremely
strong to-day. " Katholisch ist Trumph " is an oft-
quoted saying. The Catholic Party has been able
to regard itself, of recent years, as the arbiter of
the political situation in Germany. For the moment,
it is true, it finds itself once again thrown into
opposition. The terrible rupture between the Centre
and the Government over colonial questions is well
known. But the elections immediately furnished
the proof that the hostility of the Ministry had
in no way shaken the credit of the Catholic Party
among the electoral body. And it may safely be

248 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
asserted, moreover, that the solidity of the Liberal-
Conservative bloc, upon which the Government at
the present moment relies, only inspires on the whole
a fairly limited confidence. It therefore seems
certain that the political power of the Centre has
not received any mortal blow, and there is nothing
to prevent its regaining in a more or less immediate
future the decisive influence it still possessed a
short time ago.
The almost predominant position of Catholicism
in an Empire which is chiefly Protestant will seem
less paradoxical if we examine the tendencies of the
Emperor William II. with regard to religious policy
a little more closely. A recent historian thought
he could detect, among Protestants as well as among
the most highly educated Catholics, the actual
development of a disposition which might be termed
" interdenominational," and which is calculated, if
not to eradicate, at least to attenuate the differences
either between the various shades of Protestantism
or between Protestantism and Catholicism. In any
case, it is certain that it is in this direction that the
private religious sympathies of the Emperor are
directed. His Christianity, which is exceedingly
sincere and exceedingly " positive," is strictly inter
denominational. He not only shows for Catholicism
that deferential toleration which the traditions of
the Hohenzollern impose upon him, and which is
natural in the lord of an Empire living under a
system of religious " equality," but it is also plain
that he does not consider himself outside the pale
of Catholicism, but regards himself, inasmuch as he
represents German Christianity, as a sovereign who
is both Protestant and Catholic. This accounts for
the attitude of William II. at the time of the Chinese

PROGRESS OF CATHOLICISM 249
war, to which he tried to give the complexion of a
Crusade on the part of Christian Europe under the
leadership of Germany against the yellow race.
Hence his courtesy to the Holy See, his three visits
to Rome, and his pilgrimage to the Holy Land.
It is quite true of course that this conduct was dic
tated by political considerations. The Emperor
does not only require the support of the Centre in
the House for his parliamentary policy. He also
relies upon the help of the Catholics to subdue the
anti-German agitation in Alsace and Poland. He
fully appreciates the importance of the support
which can be given to the universal policy of Germany
by an international power like the Papacy, especially
in questions such as the protectorate over Chris
tians in the East. Nevertheless the sympathy of
William II. with Catholicism is very probably not
only dictated by considerations of interest, but
has its deepest roots in the religious nature of the
Emperor himself.
Is the Catholic world inclined to respond to the
imperial advances ? Some observers think they
can see amongst German Catholics signs which
indicate a new development. And it is certain
that Catholicism increased, during the century,
not only as a political, but also as a spiritual power.
It numbers among its followers philosophers like
Wilmann, historians like Janssen or Willy Pastor,
and poets like Weber. It is a matter of constantly
recurring controversy to decide whether Catholic
culture in Germany to-day has regained or not
the superiority which, by the common consent of
all, it had allowed Protestant culture to win. It
seems certain that Catholics — and as representatives
of this tendency the names of such theologians are

250 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
quoted as Franz Xaver Kraus of Friburg, Schell
of Wiirzburg, Ehrhard of Strasburg, or historians
like Spahn of Strasburg — would like Catholicism to
rest satisfied with the strong position it has con
quered, and to relax its combative attitude a little
and cease aspiring to political power, in order to
develop itself above all as a principle of the inner
life and as a religious ideal for modern man. Is
this budding opposition between political clericalism
and religious Catholicism destined to increase ?
Will it be favourable, as the similar evolution of
Protestant pietism was, to the rise of that inter
denominational Christianity which we mentioned
above ? It is quite possible. At all events, it is
a fact that the " White Pope " and the " Black
Pope," the Sovereign Pontiff and the Head of the
Jesuits, are to-day notoriously well disposed towards
Germany, and inclined to march in unison with the
Protestant Empire.
Is this a fleeting phase in the history of the Church,
or is it, on the contrary, an important sign of the
times ? Shall we, after a passing truce, see the
struggle between the German Empire and the Black
Internationalist reopened ? Or shall we, on the
contrary, see the intimacy between the Pope and
the Emperor become again as close as it was in
days gone by ? Shall we, perhaps, witness the
two great Conservative forces working in concert
for the solution of the social problem by means of
Christianity ? These are questions which in the
presence of certain contemporary events one may
be allowed to ask, but to which the historian, of
course, is not able for the moment to give any
decisive answer.

CHAPTER III
THE PROTESTANT SPIRIT

Rothe, a Protestant historian of the reform move
ment, has described the evolution of Protestantism
since the Peace of Westphalia as " the gradual
decadence of Protestant Christianity as a Church,
and its progress as a moral and political principle."
And it is, indeed, true that the history of the Protes
tant spirit is infinitely more glorious than that of
the Protestant Church. The one with a praiseworthy
courage attacked the chief religious problem of the
present day — the reconciliation of the traditional
religion of the past with rational science. It is
open to question whether it has finally attained its
end ; it is, nevertheless, difficult to deny that, in
the course of its development, it has accomplished
a great work in the domain of history, philology, and
religious psychology, and that it has produced
men of exceptionally lofty moral attainments. The
Protestant Church, on the contrary, holds its own
with difficulty in the midst of almost universal
indifference, and its decadence is so obvious that
one merely wonders whether it is on the road towards
transformation or towards evanescence. Whence
comes this cdntrast between the destiny of the
Protestant spirit and that of the Protestant Church ?
251

252 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
This is the problem I propose to examine when I
put the question : What is the Protestant spirit ?
One of the first distinctive characteristics of the
Protestant spirit is that it proclaims on principle
the absolute independence of reason and faith and
also the necessary harmony between them.
It would be well to point out here its fundamental
antagonism in this respect to Catholicism, which
denies and condemns independent science. The
system of St. Thomas, which has been accepted and
revived once more in the Germany of to-day by
the neo-Thomistic School, is a combination of the
two great factors in the spiritual life of the Middle
Ages — the Catholic faith and the philosophy of
Aristotle. It aims at proving that scientific truth
and Catholic dogma do not clash, but are comple
mentary to each other. Reason, by means of its
own light, realises, as the Greek philosophers had
done, that the ultimate cause of all must be sought
for in an eternal Reason — that is to say, in God. It
also demonstrates that although the specific dogmas
of the Church cannot be derived from reason, they
are at all events not contrary to it. But reason alone
is not the only source of Truth. Above human
science there is a superior truth derived from divine
inspiration — revelation, which is the criterion of all
truth. In the domain of faith the Church, guided
by the spirit of God, is the supreme authority. And
thus faith is made the crown and coping-stone of
worldly science ; it is the human anticipation of
the one universal truth which is to be found in
God. Now this Thomistic " semi-rationalism," to use
Paulsen's expression, is absolutism in its strongest
form. The principle of authority may have been

THE PROTESTANT SPIRIT 253
proclaimed with greater insistence by some of St.
Thomas's successors. Duns Scotus and Occam de
clared that no higher truths were capable of demon
stration, and that reason must submit exclusively
and without reserve to the authority of the Church
in every matter touching the articles of faith. But
this absolutist and ascetic Radicalism had its dangers.
Reason, if violated and ill treated, runs the risk of
being pushed into rebellion by the very excess of the
despotism to which it is subjected. It may resign
itself, for the love of peace, to acts of external sub
mission, but it will emancipate itself internally in the
depths of its conscience, and wait for a propitious
moment in order to shake off the yoke that weighs
too heavily upon it. It is better policy to give
reason some partial satisfaction and allow it, as St.
Thomas did, to have a share in the direction of life
and in the elaboration of a general idea of the universe.
By accustoming it to work in the second rank under
the guidance of faith, by utilising its energies whilst
forcing it to feel at every moment the limits beyond
which it must not go, it is cajoled into submission
and modesty, and made to play the part of an active
but humble servant, a diligent and docile auxiliary
to the Christian Faith.
As early as Luther Protestantism opposed the
Thomistic semi-rationalism by a resolute " irration-
alism." Far from wishing to make reason work
under the control of faith, it aimed, on the contrary,
at separating as completely as possible the domain of
faith from that of reason, and at a radical denial of
the power of reason in religious matters. The " Word
of God " contained in the Holy Scriptures was the
only source of faith. Now in relation to the Bible
the work of reason was a mere formality — it simply

254 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
had to decide the exact meaning of the sacred books.
Theology was reduced to the philological interpreta
tion of the Bible. As for the rational and philo
sophical proof of religious truth, this was neither
necessary nor possible. Reason left to itself led to
a mechanical or natural explanation of the Universe ;
the supernatural was beyond its grasp. Separation was
therefore necessary. Let reason abstain from opening
its mouth upon sacred subjects into which it could only
bring obscurity and confusion. In return it would be
lawful for it to explain natural phenomena in its own
way, and with perfect freedom ; faith had nothing to
do with physics or cosmology.
The great religious crisis of Luther's life resulted
in his liberation from scholastic theology and from
semi-rationalism. It was, indeed, over the im
portant question of grace that reason revealed to him
its powerlessness in matters of faith. Reason, if
asked what was necessary to salvation, would, in fact,
answer that it must be won by works, or at least that
good intention should be manifested in works, in
which case God could pardon our shortcomings.
This was the doctrine of the Church, and she exhorted
her members to do good works. But Luther had
learnt from his own experience that the soul does not
attain ease by this method. He therefore concluded
that reason was blind with regard to matters of faith,
and the Church blind for having given reason so
much credit. One of the principal causes of the
corruption of the Church was, accordingly, in his
eyes, the intrusion of reason into the realm of theology.
The Church had set up as a Professor in all her schools
and universities Aristotle, " that Greek who soweth
illusion in all men's minds, that serpent with a thou
sand heads who brought forth the Scotists and the

THE PROTESTANT SPIRIT 255
Thomists, and who taught the vile doctrine that the
whole of justice is in our own hearts."
Protestant irrationalism therefore resulted in an
immense simplification of theological science. There
were to be no more complicated speculations about
the existence, the personality, and the attributes of
God, or on " natural " religion and morality, but men
were to return to the simple faith of primitive Chris
tianity. Christ did not give humanity a theological
system, but said to children and to the simple hearted :
" Believe in Me and ye shall be saved." Men must
once again forget the science of books and shut their
ears to the babblings of the Doctors in the Temple
and the Pharisees.
Protestant irrationalism may at first sight appear
even more hostile than Catholicism to the development
of any science not founded upon a religious basis.
And it is, indeed, true that Luther occasionally hurled
the most violent anathemas against the proud pre
tensions of reason, and that until quite recent times
Protestantism has often shown itself full of mistrust
and contempt towards the modern spirit and inde
pendent science.
Nevertheless, generally speaking, the sharp line of
demarcation which Protestantism made between the
domain of faith and that of reason was favourable to
the development of science. In fact, if it imposed
silence upon reason in the realm of faith, it left it,
on the other hand, absolutely free in its own sphere,
and allowed it complete liberty in its attempt to
find a rational explanation for natural phenomena.
The Catholic must always be ready to make his reason
bow before authority. Reason always remains, in
his eyes, in the position of a minor under the tutelage
of faith ; he regards it with suspicion, and is per-

256 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
suaded that if it becomes emancipated and is allowed
to go its own way, it will separate man from God,
and lead him to pride and rebellion. Very different
is the fundamental conviction of Protestantism.
Firmly persuaded that religion has nothing to fear
from true science, that reason cannot separate man
from God as long as it is confined to its proper sphere,
Protestantism does not aim at exercising any control
over science, but leaves it entirely free to develop as
it pleases. The Protestant does not ever expect
science to support religious truth by its arguments,
but at the same time he does not see in it an enemy
against whom he should be on his guard — a source of
error and perdition. He holds out his hand to it
without fear. The Protestant is allowed, when he
takes up the study of nature, history, or philosophy,
to seek the natural truth without bias of any sort, and
without any preconceived desire to find in science an
apology for religion. He can consequently put him
self into the position most favourable to scientific
research. The conviction that the unrestricted re
search for truth cannot possibly be bad or lead to
results contrary to those inculcated by religious faith,
is one of the ideas which showed themselves with
ever greater clearness in the breast of Protestantism,
and it made the reconciliation of the religion of the
Gospel with that of science an easy task.
This Protestant irrationalism is formulated with
the greatest clarity, and pushed to its extreme logical
conclusion in Schleiermacher's celebrated Discourses
on Religion.
In the first place, no one has recognised more frankly
than he the progress of modern culture and the
legitimacy of independent science. His Discourses
constitute a " defence " of religion. His apology,

THE PROTESTANT SPIRIT 257
however, is never made at the expense of science and
secular philosophy. The author never addresses him
self to the " despisers of religion " with any idea
whatsoever of confuting them or of constraining them
to abjure their heresies and submit to some superior
authority. He does not attack either their meta
physics or their ethics, nor yet their conception of art.
Schleiermacher had fully assimilated the most refined
culture of his day, and was impregnated by the ideas
of German classicism and by Kant and Goethe. But
in his opinion this culture was not in any way irre
concilable with the religious spirit. He hurls no
anathemas against the unbelievers who " in their
sumptuous abodes have no other household gods
but the maxims of the sages and the songs of the
poets," who, full of love for humanity and their own
country, science and art, have no room left in their
hearts for the Beyond and for Eternity. He only
asks of them one thing, and that is "to be fully and
perfectly cultured in their disdain of religion." In
short, he was persuaded that the irreligion of these
intellectualists arose not from their positive culture,
but simply from their ignorance of the true nature of
religion, and consequently from a defect in their culture.
And this defect he undertakes to remedy by giving
an exact definition of the domain proper to religion,
and by showing that it is absolutely independent of
the sphere of science and ethics.
According to Schleiermacher the real cause of the
discredit into which religion had fallen was precisely
the fact that this definition had not been made
with sufficient care. Religion was very rarely to be
found in all its purity, but was nearly always mixed
up with alien elements. And this led to the belief
that it consisted of a combination of certain meta-
17

258 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
physical conceptions — the idea of a Supreme Being,
the First Cause of the Universe — together with
certain moral principles — the idea of the law of duty.
There was nothing more erroneous than the concep
tion which turned religion into an aggregate of hetero
geneous elements — a mediocre " chrestomathy for
beginners." Religion had nothing to do with either
metaphysics or morality. Metaphysics were the
result of reflection, the image of the Universe re
flected in our conscious thought. Morality appealed
to the will, it aimed at extending indefinitely the
Kingdom of Liberty and at making the Universe con
form to the law it laid down. Religion was neither
thought nor action : it was, according to Schleier
macher, contemplation and feeling. The moment the
religious spirit ceased contemplating and feeling and
tried to define the nature of the All, it could give
birth only to a " vain mythology," a mass of dogmas,
symbols, poetical images, and metaphysical concepts,
which were devoid of any value either for science or
for the religious consciousness. Religion, moreover,
could not be a substitute for morality. Moral law in
fact should regulate all our actions, and we should
fulfil it with perfect consciousness, with calm and
reflexion. Religious feelings, on the contrary, should
accompany all our actions like sacred music, but
it should not guide them. " Man should do every
thing with religion, nothing through religion." Per
fectly distinct from both metaphysics and from
morality, religion was an original and independent
force, which possessed in every heart " a province
which belonged to it alone, and in which it was
sovereign." It was, together with speculative reason
and practical reason, " the third necessary and in
dispensable element " in the human soul.

THE PROTESTANT SPIRIT 259

II
If religion and science have each their distinctive
sphere, where shall we find the domain proper to
religion ?
When one tries to define in what the essence of
religion in the eyes of the Protestant consists, one
finds that he sees in it above all an intimate experience,
an inner flame which is kindled in the heart of the
believer. Religion is the adhesion of the man in his
entirety to the " Word of God " and to the Gospel
Christ came to bring. It is a mystic impulse of the
heart, a state of the soul which requires to be lived
in order to be realised, and of which no verbal de
scription can give any adequate idea.
This inner experience was the great event in the
spiritual life of Luther. As a matter of fact, in his
case we find at the basis of his doctrine of grace and
predestination a mystic illumination which in a way
formed the origin of his whole religious life. When,
from the depths of his cell in the Augustinian monas
tery at Erfurt, he sought in the agony of his heart for
the road to salvation, it was not through reason or
philosophy, nor by the discovery of a metaphysical
theory or of a new dogma that he won peace for his
soul. It was the mystical doctrines of his friend
Staupitz, the Vicar-General of the Order of St.
Augustine, that delivered him from his doubts. He
was raised to a direct and lively faith in God who
had promised men pardon through Christ, and gave
it to them in spite of their state of profound and
irremediable degradation, in spite of the radical in
adequacy of their works, by virtue of a free and
unmerited gift, without their being able to claim the

260 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
smallest share in this work of grace. The immediate
faith in the God of pity, the living consciousness of
possessing Him— this was for Luther the very essence
of religion. In the experience of the Protestant,
therefore, faith is a certain state of feeling, a definite
aggregate of subjective emotions, and not a doctrine
conceived by the mind or a sum-total of clearly
apprehended ideas to which human language can
give precise expression.
From the historical point of view this mystic and
individualistic element in religion shows itself more
particularly in the vast number of very different
manifestations which appeared from the seventeenth
to the nineteenth century in the Protestant as well as
in the Catholic world, in France and Holland, England
and America, Germany and Austria, and which were
designated by the common title of pietism.
Pietism was the ascetic and mystical reaction of
religious feeling against the decadence of living faith
and of the visible Church. It was a rebellion against
the scholastic dogmatism which reduced religion to
a mass of theological formulae, and stirred up irrita
ting and barren controversies in every department.
In order to combat this parching intellectualism it
endeavoured to stimulate religious feeling and
imagination. It also condemned the dangerous
alliance of the modern State with the official Church,
and denounced the survival of Popery in the institu
tion of State Churches. Abandoning the hope of
organising the whole of society upon the basis of
Christianity, it founded, either within or in opposition
to the official Church, sects and pious conventicles
where, in a narrower circle, a more sincere, efficient
and intense Christianity might at least flourish.
The pietists thus voluntarily placed themselves

THE PROTESTANT SPIRIT 261
outside the pale of society, but they did not exalt
their asceticism to a principle, or hurl forth anathemas
against the world. They explained their attitude
as a temporary necessity, and believed they were
living at the end of the period of rebellion against
God, which preceded the Second Advent of Christ.
And in their struggle against scholasticism in dogma,
and against the corruption of the official Church,
they endeavoured to rekindle the flame of Christian
mysticism and to found their religion upon the lively,
intimate, and personal experience of divine grace.
They wanted that inner illumination felt by Luther
and the great mystics to be renewed in every Chris
tian. And finding no food for their faith in the
barren theological controversies of their day, they
revived the taste for neo-Platonic and mystic litera
ture, in which they found the religious psychology
adapted to their needs, the description of mystic
ecstasy and of gradual absorption into the bosom of
Divine Unity. They plunged into the study of St.
Augustine and St. Bernard, into the writings of
anabaptists, spiritualists, and theosophists, in order,
by contact with thought of this nature, to exalt their
sense of religion.
This pietism was at once a reactionary and a pro
gressive movement — reactionary because it tried to
revive the old Christian and Protestant asceticism in
all its rigour, and because it voluntarily associated
itself with orthodox tendencies in matters of dogma ;
progressive, inasmuch as it developed religious sub
jectivism and was inclined to regard faith, not as the
assent of a body of men to certain objective truths,
but as the entirely personal experience of certain
subjective emotions and the creation of the indi
vidual conscience.

262 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
Born amid the reformed circles of Holland in the
seventeenth century, and imported into Germany
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
pietism developed more especially among the
Lutheran communities, where, under Spender and
Francke, it became one of the most important
elements in the religious life of the period. Then
during the second half of the eighteenth century it
lost ground. Mystic enthusiasm slowly died out
and resolved itself into moral preaching and senti
mental piety. It thus gradually lost its essential
characteristics and became one of the elements of
which the culture based upon rationalism prevalent
during the era of enlightenment was formed.
After the end of the eighteenth century, however,
it entered upon a fresh lease of life, especially among
the southern Teutonic peoples, in Wurtemburg,
Alsace, and Switzerland. At that time it welcomed
to its breast all who had made a shipwreck of life —
and their numbers during the period of strife and
war were great, especially in the ranks of the aris
tocracy, who provided many recruits for the con
venticles. From that moment pietism became an
active factor in the spiritual life of Germany. It had
its own writers, its own philosophers, and saints,
like Hamann and Lavater, Claudius and Jung Still
ing, Oberlin and Pfeffel, Jacobi and Novalis. And
as a matter of fact it displayed some offensive
characteristics at this juncture. The piety of these
votaries often contained an element of moroseness,
anxiety, and discontent ; it was narrow and had no
broad outlook, and was too strictly immured within
the intimate bounds of the religious life, too in
different to public affairs, and too disdainful of
scientific and artistic culture. At times it was even

THE PROTESTANT SPIRIT 268
intolerant. A small group of ecstatic pietists and
theosophists, during the era of reaction inaugurated
by Wcellner in the reign of Frederick William IV.,
made the yoke of their demoralising despotism weigh
heavy upon the necks of the Prussian clergy. But
intriguing and ambitious pietism was still the excep
tion. Piety was not yet turned into a career, and
people did not frequent conventicles in order to
insinuate themselves into aristocratic circles and
push themselves on in the world. Pietism had many
points in common with reformed Catholicism, and
like it combated the dogmatic narrowness and the
traditional formalism of the official Church. But it
also held out its hand to Pestalozzi and his disciples,
and supported them in the great work of popular
education and the material and moral elevation of
the lower classes.
Then came what is known as the period of the
" Awakening." It seemed as though the temperature
of the Protestant spirit had risen again. Pietistic
tendencies mingled in a thousand different ways
with the rousing of national feeling and with the
political romanticism of the restoration. Hence
arose a series of multifarious and diverse currents in
the breast of Protestantism. Schleiermacher, as we
have just seen, founded his religion upon contempla
tion and feeling, and led pious souls to approach
as near to Christ as possible, in order, through His
mediation, to succeed in themselves living the
fundamental truths of faith and revelation. This
grade of pietism, which was tinged with philosophy
and literature, spread more particularly in the north
and centre of Germany. Neander and Tholuck are
considered its most typical representatives. In
other quarters a simple piety based upon an un-

264 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
sophisticated faith in the Bible was spread abroad.
It was to be found in the extreme north, at Kiel,
where Claus Harms published in 1817, in honour of
the anniversary of the Reformation, ninety-five
theses against the modern Antichrist — that is to say,
Reason elevated to the position of an infallible Pope.
And similarly in Swabia and Bavaria there flourished
an interdenominational pietism, in which the lay
element predominated, and whose members held
communion by personal faith in Jesus, the divine
Saviour of men. The theological faculties of Tubin
gen and Erlangen, under Beck, Thomasius, and
Hoffmann, were instrumental in spreading this
particular form of Protestantism. In other quarters
pietism allied itself with political romanticism, it
spread among the aristocracy and the higher Civil
Service, and even ended by ascending the throne in
the person of Frederick William IV. Under this
form we find it holding out its hand to orthodoxy,
founding belief in revelation and the Scriptures
upon the intimate personal experience of conversion
through the Bible, and thus restoring the divine
character of Holy Writ and favouring a conservative
exegesis of the sacred text. This orthodox pietism,
which was ambitious and militant, tried to impose its
doctrine upon university professors and the clergy,
and aimed at exercising a predominating influence
over the official Church.
About 1848, however, rationalist ideas once more
gradually took the offensive ; they grew stronger
and stronger, and even at one moment seemed upon
the point of getting the upper hand in the sphere of
politics. From that time the importance of pietism
as a factor in the spiritual life of Germany also began
to decline, Its alliance with orthodoxy became

THE PROTESTANT SPIRIT 265
closer. In fact, among the professing Protestants of
the official Church there existed a form of religion
which was pietistic on account of its subjective
character and orthodox because of the positive
nature of the doctrines it professed. But on becom
ing an integral portion of official Protestantism,
pietism also found itself involved in the decline of
the State Church. It lost its practical influence over
men's minds in proportion as it accentuated the re
actionary tendency, the seeds of which it carried
from its birth.
The pietistic spirit, at all events, is still to be
found to-day, in quite different social strata, in which
even now it gives proofs of vitality. Nearly every
where the dissenting sects formed in England or
America by pietism — the Methodists, the Irvingites,
the Memnonites, the Baptists, etc. — carry on an
ardent propaganda, and form in almost all parts of
the world conventicles which sometimes live in good
harmony with the official Church, but more often
maintain a defiant and critical attitude towards the
State clergy, and seduce from public worship pre
cisely those natures in whom the need for religion is
most strongly developed. Hence arose that popular
form of pietism which now draws its recruits by
preference from the lower social strata and harms
the orthodox pietism of the public church. And the
official clergy are filled with anxiety by this con
dition of things without, however, being able to
protest overmuch. For these very sects and com
munities, which are independent and separatist, form
an exceedingly ardent centre of Christian activity,
and have given birth to a number of charitable
works, teaching institutions, and home and foreign
missions, which do honour to Protestantism,

266 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
We thus see, in rough outline, the part which
pietism played in the evolution of Protestantism.
It kept alive the religious spirit by insisting upon
the necessity for every Christian to feel personally
in his own heart that mystic impulse which raises
man to God, and which was to be found at the be
ginning of Luther's religious life. By the very fact
that it founded religion upon individual experience, it
also tended to separate itself from the State Church —
the official body which demanded from its members
merely the external adherence to a certain creed
and gave shelter haphazard to all those who sub
scribed to its doctrines, the religious and the luke
warm alike, the pious and the indifferent. Pietism
formed conventicles in opposition to the Church,
limited groups and guilds composed by the free
membership of believers who lived in a real com
munion of feeling, and acted as a mutual control
upon each other. Thus pietism also frequently
appeared as a conservative force. In order to
satisfy an exceedingly intense religious need it
willingly inclined to the restoration of the positive
forms of the old Protestantism, and made itself an
ally and accomplice of the orthodoxy of which, in
other respects, it nevertheless combated the for
malist spirit and dogmatic dryness. And sometimes
it presented itself in an aspect which astonished
and shocked modern feeling, manifesting itself as
a strict, narrow, and bitter piety, hostile to the
world and wrapped up in itself, a blind and intolerant
fanaticism, a mystic ecstasy which became inflamed
to hysteria and nervous disorder, an extravagant
form of superstition.
The part which pietism played in the heart of
Protestantism has been compared to that of the

THE PROTESTANT SPIRIT 267
monastic orders in Catholicism. Like these in
stitutions it was constantly reminding the Church
of her spiritual mission. But whilst the monasteries
turned their backs upon the world in ascetic re
nunciation, and at the same time enrolled themselves
in the ranks of the worldly hierarchy of Catholicism,
the pietists, for their part, did not bow their in
dividualism to any compromise, but continued,
although they too were animated by the spirit of
asceticism, to act in accordance with their age,
and on their age. Thus pietism was an independent
spiritual force which periodically revived religious
subjectivism in the breast of Protestantism, con
stantly created new religious sects and rekindled
lively piety in the old ones. It was an influence
which acted more particularly upon the lowest
strata of the nation, and satisfied their need of
religious excitement. For this reason, also, it was
popular among the feudalists, who wished to keep
religion alive among the people.
But it was something more than all this. It was
in fact the really living principle of Protestant
religiosity in its purest form. It was the experiences
of pietism which made possible, in the breast of
the enfranchised Protestant conscience, the modern
science of religious psychology. " All the theories,"
says Troeltsch, " which represent religion as being
essentially an emotion, a presentiment, poetry, a
symbolical representation of ideas which are active
in the subconscious depths of human nature, a
practical and active conviction, and a general con
dition of the soul — in short, the most precious results
of the modern science of religion have their root
in Radical pietism." It was upon pietism that
Lessing built his foundations when he realised that

268 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
feeling was the essence of religion and conceived the
idea of his " eternal Gospel," which was destined
to take the place of religion based upon dogma
and authority. The religion of Kant was also, in
the last instance, pietistic in postulating as a funda
mental truth the " existence of practical reason,"
and thus founding religion upon the persevering
effort of the Will to triumph over evil and be born
again. Similarly in the religion of Herder, Jacobi,
and Goethe — who were romanticists in their pro
testation against the dryness of rationalism and
in the insistence with which they cast into relief
the emotional, mystical, and voluntary element in
religion, and the affinity between poetry and religion
— it is easy to see the influence of pietism. And it
appears most clearly in the doctrines of Schleier
macher, who defined religion as a mystic intuition
of God, " a sense and love of the Infinite," as a
vision of the universe and the emotion which accom
panies this vision. It still lives to-day in the breasts
of many German Protestants, and even among
those of them who have no positive faith, but in
whom the need for religion survives in the shape of
a yearning of the heart towards the divine principle
in the world, and a more or less joyous and confident
adhesion to a universal order.

Ill
The subjective and mystical character of the
Protestant religion had as its direct consequence
the gradual crumbling away of Christian dogma.
For Catholics religious truth is one, positive and
unchanging. It has no longer to be discovered, but
was found long ago, and received expression in

THE PROTESTANT SPIRIT 269
dogma, whilst the Church's mission consists in pre
serving this dogma in all its purity, and fighting
heresy wherever it appears. Dogma, in the eyes
of Catholics, is an aggregate of doctrines which
are objectively true, which are external to the spirit
of the believer and humbly received by him — an
organic whole, a synthesis which is either accepted
or rejected en bloc, but which allows of no discussion
in detail or any arbitrary eliminations.
Now Luther resolutely repudiated Catholic dogma.
Determined to bring back .religion to its essential
principle, that mystic impulse of the soul illuminated
-by- the"vision of the Divine, he was firmly resorvedT
to destroy the edifice of scholastic theology, and
put an end to dogmatic intellectualism in order
to substitute in its place " the Word of God " and
the " Gospel " of Jesus alone. It is true that Luther
found great difficulty in establishing a clear dis
tinction between what was " Gospel " and what
was " dogma." And he ended — as we shall see
later on — in laying the foundations of a new dog
matism almost as complicated and intolerant as the
old one. But he had, nevertheless, levied a very
decisive blow at the ancient edifice of orthodoxy —
and the work of demolition was carried on after
his day. In fact, it was quite impossible for Protes
tantism, in consistency with its own principles, to
support the idea of an intangible dogma. If religion
is essentially a state of the soul, an intimate subjective
experience, it is evident that the categories " true "
and " false " have no application in matters of
faith. A man either feels or does not feel a state
of the soul, an emotion ; but such a state of the
soul or such an emotion is neither "true" nor "false,"
and cannot be brought home to the outsider. Dogmas

270 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
necessarily give only an inadequate and approximate
and consequently provisional and changeable inter
pretation of the intimate, subjective experiences
which constitute religion. From the Protestant
point of view, therefore, it is illusory and iniquitous
to gauge the " religion " of a believer by his accept
ance of such and such a dogma — that is to say, by
metaphysical and historical conceptions which
belong to the realm of reason. Religion has its
roots, not in the domain of intelligence and know
ledge, but in a much more profound region of the
human soul.
As early as the end of the eighteenth century
the progress towards subjectivism had reached its
furthest limits. Schleiermacher refused to admit
that a dogma, or any metaphysical conception,
could be an essential element of religion. It may
be argued that faith in the Supernatural is necessary
in the believer. But every contingent phenomenon
is either " miraculous " or not, according to the
point of view from which it is regarded, whether it
is considered in relation to the Infinite or in con
nection with the finite world, with the eyes of the
religious or of the scientific man. Or perhaps faith
in the Bible is a prerequisite ? But the Holy Scrip
tures, far from being a code of intangible truths,
form " merely a mausoleum of religion, a com
memorative monument recording the fact that
there once existed a powerful spirit which no longer
lives to-day." Even the belief in God and the
immortality of the soul have not, from the religious
point of view, the importance which is generally
attributed to them, and an " atheist " may have a
profoundly religious nature, as, for instance, Spinoza,
in whom Schleiermacher venerated one of the

THE PROTESTANT SPIRIT 271
sublimest spirits, most thoroughly permeated with
the divine, that has ever existed. One should even
go further. A religion, inasmuch as it is a vision
of the Universe, is an absolutely individual ex
perience. No man can boast of possessing in himself
alone the whole of religious truth. Religion is neces
sarily " infinite " and is the sum-total of all private
religious experiences. Every one must feel conscious
of the fact that his religion is only a fraction of the
All, and respect the originality of every soul that
has understood the language of the Infinite. True
religion, therefore, is absolutely tolerant, as "in
the bosom of the Infinite all things co-exist side by
side in peace ; all is one and all is true."
And just as Protestantism eliminated from religion
all obligatory belief in a metaphysical idea, it also
gradually stripped Christianity of its historical
elements. Here once again Luther set the example. By
allotting to Reason the task of interpreting the Bible
and of fixing its " true " meaning, and by thus
instituting the critical study of the Holy Scriptures,
he threw open to human Reason an enormous field
for research. But this critical examination of the
Bible, prolonged through centuries, from Reimarus
and Lessing to Strauss and Harnack, has led in the
present day to results which Luther certainly never
anticipated, and which would have filled him with
horror if he had foreseen them, but which are in
themselves in no way contradictory to the spirit
of Protestantism. In fact, from the moment that
the Reformation recognised the right of Reason to
submit the sacred text to its investigation, it also
became impossible for it to assign any limits to these
researches, or to fix the point at which criticism

272 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
ceased to be " Protestant," and to pass sentence on
principle against the results of that philological
inquiry which it had itself provoked.
From the eighteenth century onwards, the criticism
of the Bible boldly attacked the belief in the super
natural. In fact, the rationalism of the era of en
lightenment was convinced that science and faith
must inevitably agree. Philosophy and science led
the man of learning to a " natural religion," which
postulated the existence of a God, who was omni
potently good, powerful and wise, as the creator
of the Universe. Consequently all well-conducted
criticism of the Bible must necessarily lead to the same
results. Theologians, therefore, tried to eliminate
from the Bible everything that was irrational. For
instance, they eradicated the miracles, which they
explained away as illusions or pious frauds. They
denied the divinity of Christ, Whom they no longer
regarded as a God, but as a superior man, Who enunci
ated the moral law and deserved to have Christianity
called after Him, though He Himself never had any
such pretension. In short, they reduced the moral
teaching of Christianity to a reasoned and somewhat
prosaic moral eudaemonism. The supernatural was
thus eliminated from Holy Scripture by means of
" natural " explanations, which were often, it is true,
puerile and devoid of all semblance of probability.
Religious psychology and the criticism of the
rationalists were too inadequate for their interpreta
tion of the Eible to survive for long. But the progress
of the historical and philological sciences in the nine
teenth century resulted in the birth of a Biblical
criticism, which was infinitely more methodical, better
informed, and more radical in its conclusions than the
rationalistic; one had been.

THE PROTESTANT SPIRIT 273
The criticism of the eighteenth century had elimi
nated the supernatural element from the Bible, but
it did not deny in any comprehensive manner that
the Bible records provided authentic sources of
knowledge which brought to our consciousness an
aggregate of facts which were historically true. It
was at this point that the higher criticism of the
nineteenth century stepped in to cast doubt pre
cisely upon the historical value of the Scriptures.
Strauss, followed by Baur and the Tubingen School,
saw in the Biblical stories not historical records,
but myths. Regarded as historical facts, all the
positive data upon which the traditional faith
was based — the supernatural birth of Jesus, His
miracles, His resurrection, and His ascension into
heaven — were stripped of all likelihood. In fact,
they depicted for us, not the historical Jesus, but the
Christ of sacred legend, and were not the correct
records of chroniclers, but the products of the religious
imagination and the poetic myths brought forth by
the unconsciously creative fancy of the people. The
Bible narratives about the founder of Christianity
were simply legends which had their birth in the
primitive Christian community, and among the
various groups which sprang from it, and they clothed
in a pseudo-historical cloak the ideas and the senti
ments which were active in these circles. The Gospel
stories did not form a biography of Jesus, but were a
sort of legendary poem breathing forth the desire
which the primitive community felt to glorify their
founder and the need they experienced of seeing the
idea of the Messiah realised. Thus the Bible, in which
the old believers saw a sacred book inspired by God
Himself, became in the eyes of modern critics a human
document, in which were reflected the thoughts, the
18

274 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
passions, and the hopes of a body of enthusiasts who
formed the primitive Church.
Thus the progress of religion towards subjectivism
was completed. The historical data of Christianity
ceased, for the Protestant, to contain objective facts,
which every Christian must accept. They were
simply the poetical description of the religious experi
ences of the first believers. They too were the pro
duct of religious subjectivism, the figurative expres
sion of certain states of the soul. In the present, as
in the past, the essence of religion was the individual
impulse towards the Divine. Christian history, or,
more properly speaking, Christian legend was, like
dogma, merely a provisional and imperfect transcript
of the Christian conscience. To reconstruct by the
light of the Gospel story the actual facts which gave
them birth and the real life of Jesus, to find out history
from the myth, which alone had come down to us,
to unravel from all these subjective testimonies the
consciousness which Jesus possessed of Himself — das
Selbstbewusstein Jesu — became a hazardous enter
prise, a problem which had a great attraction for
Protestant critics, from Strauss to our own day, but
of which they realised the insurmountable difficulties
ever more clearly. So much was this the case that
a Catholic historian of Protestantism, after pointing
out the necessarily subjective character of these
attempts, and the divergencies which existed between
them, was able to wonder, without appearing para
doxical, whether Christ had not once more become for
the scientific Germany of to-day that which He was
to the Athenians in the time of St. Paul — " The
Unknown God ! "
At the same time as Protestantism, by reducing
religion to the rank of a mere matter of experience,

THE PROTESTANT SPIRIT 275
cast doubt upon the objective nature of Christianity,
it also called in question its absolute character.
In the Middle Ages, as well as in primitive Pro
testantism, there was only one true religion com
municated to men by the miracle of divine revelation,
which alone was capable of securing their salvation.
Paganism was not a religion, but an error which had
its source in original sin, and was punished by eternal
damnation. Religion, therefore, was one and abso
lute, and outside its pale there was no possible salva
tion for men. The very notion of a history of religions,
the attempt to conceive a general idea of " religion,"
and to explain by means of this idea the genesis of
the various religious conceptions of humanity, would
have been regarded as impious, and those who
actually did attempt it, like Pic de la Mirandole or
Erasmus, were the objects of general reprobation.
And thus, about the eighteenth century, there
gradually came into existence, thanks to the efforts
of English and French thinkers especially, a science
of religion which made a comparative study of the
various religious manifestations, from Christianity
to the grossest superstitions of the most primitive
savages, which endeavoured to unravel the laws
governing this complex aggregate of phenomena
and set itself the task of tracing the genesis of the
" religious sense " of humanity. This science was
based, not upon the Bible and the tradition of the
Church, but upon the inner experiences by which
the religious life is revealed. It regarded religious
phenomena as a particular subdivision of psychic
phenomena as a whole. It considered religious faith
in the light of a spiritual activity, and drew up a
classification of the objective contents of this faith
and the positive dogma the " truth " of which was

276 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
precisely the problematical point. In this way it
enlarged our religious horizon considerably. The
modern man gradually learnt to realise the small
compass of Christianity in relation to humanity as a
whole, and he accustomed himself to regard the
various religions of mankind as identical in principle,
and to utilise the same critical methods in the study
of their myths and documents. He ceased to con
sider religion as an unchangeable and positive
" truth." On the contrary, he acknowledged that
religion was a thing which varied in different times
and places, and which was subjected, like every
other manifestation of life, to the great law of evolu
tion. After the end of the eighteenth century the
science of religion resulted in two opposing theories,
which grew more and more divergent. Some critics,
like Hume, saw in religious phenomena a character
istic manifestation of primitive human thought ;
they believed that religions were begotten by fear
or by hope, and were exceedingly sceptical with
respect to the " truth " of their positive contents.
From this theory there was derived, during the nine
teenth century, the positivist idea of the three epochs
of humanity — the religious, the metaphysical, and the
scientific epochs. This hypothesis, which resulted in
the more or less open denial of the eternal value
either of positive religions or of religious feeling in
general, was fundamentally opposed to that German
idealism which regarded the evolution of the religious
sense as the central factor of psychical development
as a whole, and even for some time agreed with Hegel
in discerning in Christianity the highest form and the
perfect bloom of the religious idea.
From that moment Protestantism was confronted
with a grave problem. To what extent could it

THE PROTESTANT SPIRIT 277
assimilate the results of the science of religion ? To
what extent could it sacrifice the " absolute " char
acter of religious truth 1
By virtue of its own fundamental principles, Pro
testantism was bound to be accommodating with
respect to these new ideas. And as a matter of fact
this was perfectly possible. In short, Protestantism
tended, as we have already seen, to minimise the
dogmatic and historical elements of religion as much
as possible. By the distinction it made between the
Christianity of the Church and the " Christianity of
Christ," by the contrast it established between the
teaching of St. Paul and that of Jesus, and by the
final reduction of the essence of Christianity to the
Gospel of Christ alone, it ended by so simplifying
the principle of that faith as to render it possible to
identify it with the fundamental principle of morality
and religion. The evolution of the Christian con
science thus seemed the final stage in the evolution
of the religious sense in the heart of mankind.
And inasmuch as Schleiermacher admitted religious
subjectivism, so also did he recognise that Chris
tianity was not the only religion, and that, moreover,
it was not fixed once and for all. There were as
many religions as there were original intuitions re
garding the universe and the Infinite. Religion in
itself was the aggregate of all the possible forms of
positive religion. And similarly no positive religion
could be the whole of religion — Christianity not ex
cepted. The intuition upon which it was based was
on the one hand the eternal contrast between the
Finite and the Infinite, between imperfect and sinful
man and God, and on the other hand the eternal act
of mediation between the Finite and Infinite, salvation
by means of a number of mediators between the God-

278 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
head and man the sinner. Christianity was, there
fore, in a certain sense, an eternal religion. Having
as its particular object the very history of religion,
the succession of the religious intuitions of the Uni
verse, it was a faith which was capable of infinite
development, a " potential religion," a " religion of
religions." But Schleiermacher expressly stated that
although Christ was one admirable mediator among
many, He was not the only possible mediator. The
Christian idea continued to develop after Christ ; it
gave birth to new religious ideas, and would do so
again. But more than that ; it might even become
superfluous at a time when there would no longer be
any need for a mediator between the Finite and the
Infinite, and when religious truth would shine forth
upon all men alike. But he also thought that,
practically speaking, this state of holiness was still
in the dim distance, and that, in any case, it could
not last ; corruption would return unceasingly, and
consequently the necessity for redemption would
always make itself felt anew. Thus each epoch in
the life of mankind would be a sort of " palingenesis
of Christianity," which from time to time would re
appear in a constantly more spiritualised form.
We now have a clear conception of the direction
in which Protestantism evolved. It tended to strip
religion of its objective, historical, and absolute
character. Christianity no longer appeared in the
light of an aggregate of revealed truths which were
external to the believer and in which he must have
faith, but as a state of feeling which every individual
must live for himself. It no longer demanded from
its followers a belief in the reality of certain historical
facts. Protestant criticism ended by discovering in
the Gospel narrative merely the mythical expression

THE PROTESTANT SPIRIT 279
of the religious experiences of the primitive Chris
tians, and only allowed us to perceive, through a
more and more impenetrable fog, the personality
and teaching of the historical Christ. Protestantism,
in short, tended to strip Christianity of its qualities
as a revealed religion that was one and eternal. The
Christian faith was merely one of the myriad mani
festations of humanity's religious sense, an admirable
manifestation certainly, a superior one maybe ; but
certainly not a unique or even, perhaps, an eternal
one ; and in any case it was subject to change. In
short, Protestantism inclined towards instituting a
Christianity devoid of dogma, which developed a
subjective religion involved in an endless cycle of
evolution.

IV
Thus Protestantism, by its very nature, aimed at
reconciling into a synthetic whole as perfect as
possible the two great conceptions of the universe
over which the mind of modern man was divided —
Christianity and scientific rationalism. Whilst in
Catholic countries, especially in France, the collision
between religion and science resulted in an open and
violent conflict between the Church and the philoso
phers, it was accomplished in Protestant Germany
in the most peaceful manner. The two rival powers,
instead of mutually exterminating each other, tried
to come to terms and concluded an alliance.
In the eighteenth century the rationalistic deism
of the era of enlightenment had already appeared
as a preliminary attempt to reconcile these two con
flicting principles. The identity between the system
of nature constructed by the philosophers and the

280 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
explanation of the universe taught by theologians
was proclaimed. " Reason and revelation," said
Wolf, " cannot be contradictory, since both come
from God, the sole source of truth, who transmits it
through these two channels." And as a matter of
fact everything was arranged at the expense of a
few concessions on either side. The philosophers
proved by means of rational arguments the existence
of an omnipotently good, powerful, and wise God,
as Creator of the universe, and also the immortality
of the soul. They insisted upon the harmony of
nature, and asserted their optimistic faith in the
indefinite progress of mankind. The theologians, as
we have already seen, eliminated the supernatural
from the Bible, toned down the pessimistic character
of primitive Christianity, and promoted moral teach
ing to the foremost rank. And thus a religious
philosophy was established, which gave satisfaction
both to religious natures and men of science. It
faced the " radicals " of both parties at once. It
combated atheists and the despisers of " natural
religion." It hurled its fulminations against Spinoza,
who was the scapegoat that had to be cast forth
into the wilderness in order to point out to those who
believed in the philosophy of Descartes and Leibnitz
the dangerous paths into which they must not
stray. It condemned Voltaire, Helvetius, and the
Encyclopaedists, whose unbridled materialism was of
a nature to alarm moderate spirits and throw them
back into the arms of superstition. But it also, on
the other hand, opposed the fanatical and ignorant
sectarians of the " positive religions," as well as the
intolerant and hypocritical members of the orthodox
faith, the bigoted and narrow pietists, and above
all the Jesuits, the invisible and omnipresent insti-

THE PROTESTANT SPIRIT 281
gators of a colossal conspiracy against liberty and
enlightenment. There is no doubt whatever that rationalism ren
dered great services to Germany. Its generous faith
in the power of the intelligent will, its attempt to
smooth over denominational differences and to un
ravel from the positive religions a universal ideal
for mankind, deserve admiration and respect for all
time. And its action proved above all beneficial,
inasmuch as it favoured the diffusion in Germany of
a patrimony of ideas and feelings common to the
whole nation. Accepted not only by men of high
culture, but also by the clergy, and protected by the
Government, rationalism was able to penetrate into
the lowest strata of the people. By means of preach
ing, and through the elementary schools, it was able
to spread its fundamental principles, liberty of thought
and conscience, the free exercise of reason in all
circumstances of life, the habit of reflection and of
consciousness of self — even among the masses. It
placed its seal upon a very considerable fraction of
the nation, and it thus maintained a certain unity in
the spiritual life of the country. Thanks to it the
upper classes did not lose all touch with the religious
ideal of the masses ; and the masses were not en
tirely ignorant of the culture which had spread among
the upper strata of society.
But it must, on the other hand, be confessed that
this culture of the era of enlightenment was of a
very mediocre description. Optimistic and dogmatic
as it was, and convinced that it had explained the
mystery of the world and found a solution for all
great psychological, moral, metaphysical, and religious
problems, firmly believing that through a precise
science it knew the meaning of life, and peremptory

282 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
in all its assertions, rationalism was a conception of
life suitable to profoundly honest and respectable
men, who were filled with no indiscreet curiosity of
mind, who were not much inclined to any refinements
of thought and feeling, and as little accessible to
doubt or to uneasiness of conscience as they were
incapable of any passionate religious exaltation.
But it could not, in the long run, satisfy the cultured
minority. Its psychology was, as a matter of fact,
too rudimentary. In its shortsighted enthusiasm
for reason and science it did not know how to estimate
at their proper valuation the " irrational " forces in
human nature. It either despised imagination or
regarded it with suspicion ; it was mistrustful of
sensitiveness and passion ; it thought it could reduce
morality to a question of interest, and it almost
eliminated the element of mysticism from religion.
All these forces, which it opposed or despised — in
stinct, sensitiveness, creative imagination, and moral
and religious faith — combined together to put an end
to an unjustifiable domination which was becoming
intolerable. And at the same time it began to be realised that
the attempted reconciliation between science and
faith was no real solution, but a halting compromise
which did not take long to dissatisfy everybody.
Religious spirits saw in rationalism a thinly veiled
atheism. As for the really scientific minds, they
regarded it, like Lessing, as "a patchwork put to
gether by clumsy pseudo-philosophers," and accused
the champions of enlightenment of having " far too
little of the theologian about them and not enough,
by a very long way, of the philosopher." And if in
our own days a Nietzsche has risen up with so much
vehemence against Protestantism, which he calls " the

THE PROTESTANT SPIRIT 283
semi-paralysis of Christianity and reason," it is
precisely on account of its capacity for producing
bastard and misbegotten compromises like rational
ism. Towards the end of the eighteenth century it
was wholly discredited among the cultured classes
of the nation, and melted away beneath a hail of
scorn and ridicule.
Whilst worn-out rationalism gradually died be
neath the scoffing of cultured Germany, a new and
impressive attempt at reconciling science and faith
was made through the instrumentality of Kant and
of German idealism.
The rationalists had made themselves the cham
pions of the rights of reason, or, more accurately, to
use Fichte's expression, " of the natural intelligence
which is developed outside all culture and all
morality." German idealism, on the contrary, sub
jected these pretensions to a severe criticism, and
put an end to the despotic sovereignty of theoretical
reason. Against the pure intellectualists, who asserted that
the real dignity of man was to be found in know
ledge, Kant proclaimed " the supremacy of practical
reason." Man was not merely a thinking creature —
he was above all an acting one. It was not by man's
theoretical reason alone that he attained to certainty.
In the existence of the consciousness of duty, which
dominated our actions, we possessed a certainty as
complete and as absolute — even more absolute —
than rational certainty. But the moral law, if we
analysed its premises, revealed to us the law of the
Categorical Imperative of Duty — a law which was not
imposed upon us from without, but which we laid
down for ourselves, and which commanded us to do
good, not with an eye to any particular advantage,

284 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
nor for the attainment of any practical object, but
in an absolute fashion simply because it was good.
This law of duty was for Kant an absolutely certain
truth, which admitted of no possible doubt. It was
a postulate of practical reason. It was, in short, an
act of faith, but one which provided us with evidence
as startling as that of science itself.
And upon the basis of the " existence of practical
reason " Kant built the religion of idealism. God
existed because He was the necessary condition for
the moral law. The existence of God was a postulate
of practical reason, not a theoretical but a practical
affirmation, which had its source in a moral need — a
need, moreover, which was not merely an individual,
but a universal one, as necessary as reason itself.
We believed in God because we believed in the
reality of duty, because without God the Categorical
Imperative would cease to be conceivable as a real
law of the human will. Thus religious faith, accord
ing to the doctrine of Kant, was a " rational belief"
(Vernunftglauben). Having thus demonstrated that the essence of the
religious life of mankind was to be found in the
eternal effort of the will towards regeneration and
salvation, Kant unveiled for us the genesis of this
religious ideal. As man was incapable of rising all
at once to a clear consciousness of his destination
and of his true nature, " rational faith " first mani
fested itself in the heart of the human species in the
shape of a divine revelation, which authoritatively
demanded belief as the expression of the will of God
Himself. The visible Church, which was the vessel
and guardian of this revelation, obliged the faithful
to believe a certain number of historical facts, which
they had to admit without discussion, and dogmas

THE PROTESTANT SPIRIT 285
and statutes to which they were called upon to sub
mit blindly. But these irrational elements in religion
tended gradually to become spiritualised and ab
sorbed. In proportion as humanity reached nearer
to maturity it " rationalised " the historical elements
of the ecclesiastical faith and learnt gradually to
identify it with rational faith.
This identity was not only possible, but necessary.
The faith in Christ Himself, in fact, was not belief in
an historical fact. It was faith in the most ideal type
of humanity, in man wholly regenerate, fundamen
tally good, and consequently the Son of God ; it was
faith in the possibility of our regeneration, in the
reality of the law of duty and of our moral destination.
Humanity, shaped in the school of the visible Churches,
thus gradually tended to form a " Church invisible,"
in which there would no longer be any ecclesiastical
hierarchy or revealed dogma, in which every believer
would be a priest, and in which the historical faith
in a divine revelation and unreasoning obedience to
the orders of God would finally develop into an
autonomous and conscious " rational faith."
The conclusion of all this was a general conception
of life founded not upon intelligence alone, but upon
human nature in its " completeness," and upon
reason and the moral will in particular ; a religion
based upon the existence of moral obligation, and
which gushed forth from the depths of the human
soul, without being imposed upon mankind from
without, through the channel of a supernatural revela
tion — a religious philosophy which bound the past
to the present, and showed in the traditional religions
the necessary stages by which man gradually raised
himself to the consciousness of natural religion.
Such were, apparently, the essential traits of German

286 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
idealism. This movement thus revealed itself as an
effort on the part of the Protestant spirit to provide
a comprehensive interpretation of the universe, which
should be in conformity with its own most funda
mental tendencies, at once strictly scientific and pro
foundly religious, holding all the conquests of modern
Reason in high esteem, and at the same time full of
respect for the beliefs of the past. Contemporary
historians of German thought are quite right when
they agree as a rule in seeing in Kant the greatest
modern representative of the Reformation and the
philosopher par excellence of Protestantism.
It is obviously impossible for me to trace the
evolution of German idealism in the space at my
command. To give the narrowest interpretation of
the term, it means the philosophical movement of
which Kant, Fichte, Schleiermacher, Schelling, Hegel,
Jacobi, and Fries are the best-known representatives.
On the one hand, this philosophical movement was
in intimate connection with the contemporary literary
movement, with the classicism of Goethe and Schiller,
and with romanticism. But, on the other, German
idealism was not confined to the period between
Kant and Hegel, and did not end with the dissolution
of the Hegelian School and the crashing failure of
metaphysical speculation. After a short interval of
eclipse it came to light again in the second half of
the century in the persons of Fechner, Lotze, Wundt,
Eucken, and Bergmann. It brought forth a new
idealistic philosophy, opposed the progress of material
ism with the help of the tenets of Kant, and once
more set flowing in literature and in art the modern
idealistic and neo -romantic current of thought,
which can be perceived side by side with realism and
naturalism. It goes without saying that in the

THE PROTESTANT SPIRIT 287
course of this long evolution German idealism clothed
itself in the most diverse forms. Speculative and
adventurous in the beginning, with the grandiose
constructions of a Fichte or a Hegel, it became more
scientific at the end of the century, and endeavoured
to found an inductive metaphysics upon the solid basis
of the exact sciences. In some respects it was very
similar to pantheism and absorbed God into the
universe. In others again it tended towards a
religion of beauty and harmony and a restoration of
the Hellenic ideal. But on the whole, under all its
various manifestations, it preserved certain essential
characteristics. It opposed the narrow dogmatism
of the old rationalists, the scepticism or agnosticism
of the pure empiricists, and the utilitarian materialism
of the positivists. And above all, in spite of its
independent and on occasion apparently irreligious
airs, it remained conscious of its connection with
Christianity. The philosophers from Kant to Hegel,
the artists from Goethe to the romanticists, or Richard
Wagner, all agreed in regarding modern " religion "
as identical with the religion of Christ. And thus
German idealism appeared in the light of a new com
bination of the two great elements of Western culture
— the classical element and the Christian element —
and as an ingenious and profound attempt to unite
into one original whole the spiritualised religion of
Christ and that of science and beauty.
This religion of the cultured minority, the influence
of which spread far beyond the bounds of Germany, to
France, England, and America, certainly possesses afar
greater scientific interest than the rationalism of the
eighteenth century which preceded it. But neverthe
less it must be confessed that its sphere of action
remained much more limited than that of rationalism.

288 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
It was never able, like the latter, to become a really
popular religion, and never penetrated into the
lowest strata of the nation. It was too intellectual,
too complicated, and also too subjective. It de
manded from its adherents too high a degree of culture,
and above all it always remained indifferent to any
kind of organised ritual. It had as its basis a popular
religion, but it rose above the level of that faith, and
it did not arouse in its followers the need of a common
religious life or of public services. It remained in
the condition of an entirely intimate and personal
religiosity without resulting in any reformation of
the existing Church. Schleiermacher was the only
one of the great representatives of idealism who had
the reorganisation of the Church really at heart. But
the tendencies which came to light in his Discourses
on Religion were never realised in practice. And
from his time the idealistic Protestantism of the
minority always remained upon the outskirts of the
official Church, incapable of finding expression for. its
most intimate aspirations in the dogmas, the liturgy,
and the ritual of the conservative Landeskirchen,
freed from the worship of the Bible, which had ceased
in its eyes to be the spiritual food par excellence, and,
moreover, but little inclined to regard as a possible
consummation an intimate and lively intercourse
between the human soul and the immanent and im
personal God which it worshipped.
Hence also a certain impotence in the domain of
actual life. This religion of metaphysicians, men of
letters, artists, and speculators of all sorts was lacking
in consistency. These idealists, conscious of their
own intellectual superiority, were, with an incurable
simplicity, periodically astonished at the successes
won by the organised religions, by Catholicism or by

THE PROTESTANT SPIRIT 289
a ponderous orthodox pietism. And thus, opposed
on the one hand by the " positivists," who cast
aspersions upon its pantheism and suspected the
authenticity of its Christianity, and menaced on the
other by materialism, which accused it of being
lacking in scientific exactitude and won over in
numerable converts in the capitalistic and labouring
classes, German idealism remained a force which was
held in esteem in the higher ranks of culture. But it
had little influence over the lower strata of ordinary
life, and but a small hold upon the mass of the people,
whilst its power of attraction and organisation was
not by any means considerable.
This does not mean, however, that this vanguard
of Protestantism did not play an important part in
the spiritual life of Germany. Naturally this small
aristocracy of intellect, to whom it was very doubtful
whether even the appellation of Christian could be
applied, had no very great importance for denomina
tional Protestantism as a dogmatic creed and as a
Church. But none the less was it an exceedingly
vital element of Protestantism ; it was the lever
which made it a " progressive " religion, and pre
vented it from becoming petrified in the dogma and
ritual of the past. If, in accordance with the positivist
doctrine, universal evolution leads to the gradual
disappearance of the feeling and need for religion,
German idealism would be nothing but an interesting
but barren period in the history of civilisation. It
would only have served to delay the final dissolution of
Protestantism by concealing the fundamental incom
patibility between faith and science beneath specious
though deceptive hypotheses, and thus keeping a
certain number of good souls a little longer in cap
tivity to an illusion of religion. But if the need of
19

290 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
religion is an integral element in human nature, if the
" religion " of the future must grow from that of the
past by a regular and progressive evolution, it becomes
at once evident that German idealism has perhaps a
great career before it. In this case, it is justifiable
to ask whether it is not this minority — which is at
once a reforming body, and one that believes in tradi
tion — that is drawing up the table of values which will
rule the society of the future. And without wishing
to pass any premature verdict upon the solution
which this problem may one day receive, it is possible,
at all events, to assert that this idealistic religion,
which is in high favour to-day in the cultured society
of Germany, is a very characteristic manifestation of
the German genius, which, in politics as well as in
religion, shows itself to be distinctly progressive,
though it is hostile to all revolutionary Radicalism,
and is an advocate of historical continuity and a
seemly compromise between the past and the future.

CHAPTER IV
THE PROTESTANT CHURCH

Protestantism, as we have said, tended towards a
subjective religion free from dogma. But at the
same time it also constantly gave expression to the
uncontrollable need of restoring a dogma and a
creed in some shape or form.
We have already pointed out this contradiction in
Luther. At the very moment when he was working
with all his might to demolish the edifice of Catholic
dogma, he was impelled by a sort of fatality which was
almost tragic to formulate a new form of dogmatism.
He wished only the " Gospel of Jesus " to remain
standing. But how was the distinction between
" Gospel " and " dogma " to be drawn ? The de
parture taken by Luther was upon many points an
arbitrary one. He regarded as an integral portion
of the " Gospel " some of the old dogmas, such as
that of the Trinity and the twofold nature of Christ.
Hostile towards any superstitious reverence for the
letter of the Bible, he nevertheless did not refrain from
constraining others to bow before the text of the
Scriptures when this text seemed to him particu
larly important or convincing. Although he was
an enemy of scholastic hair-splitting, yet he allowed
himself to be inveigled into interminable contro
versies of a subtle description. And thus willy-nilly
291

292 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
he laid the foundations of a new dogmatism. After
him Melanchthon furnished the Protestant faith
with an ample basis of philosophical formulae. In
this connection he restored the philosophy of Aristotle,
the very man against whom Luther had hurled his
fulminations in such violent terms. From the seven
teenth century onwards there was to be found in all the
Protestant universities, as well as in the Catholic
ones, a scholastic philosophy at the service of theology
— ancilla theologice. And the theologians, taking up
their stand upon these formulae, vied with each other
in drawing distinctions between Protestantism and
Catholicism, and differentiating the various Protestant
sects and in convicting each other of heresy.
Thus the idea of " orthodoxy " sprang up once
more in the breast of Protestantism. A problematical
and dangerous idea certainly ! For how was it
possible to conceive of orthodoxy in the case of a
religion which tended to suppress dogma in favour
of religious intuition, a faith which was susceptible
of variation ? What is orthodoxy if the " true
doctrine " is not definite and unchanging ? And
yet Protestantism necessarily tended, as every
other religion had done, to set up a dogma. A
religion, in fact, ought to be susceptible of com
munication, and should serve as a bond between
all who have had similar religious experiences.
Now it is evident that it is extraordinarily difficult
for people to communicate intuitions, states of the
soul, and emotions to each other ; and that conse
quently, in the case of a subjective religion, it is
far from easy to know whether the faithful possess
a communion of sentiment or not. Conceptions
and ideas, on the other hand, are easily communicated,
and from the practical point of view are more easily

THE PROTESTANT CHURCH 293
utilised as signs of recognition and as rallying-points.
Hence the tendency, which Protestantism was
clearly incapable of overcoming, to accept dogma
to a certain extent as a substitute for religious
intuition, and to allow intellectual conceptions to
supplant and take the place of intimate experience,
and to define, by means of metaphysical formulae
or historical assertions the essence of that " Word
of God," that " Gospel of Jesus " which Luther
regarded as the basis of the Christian religion.
In the nineteenth century the Conservative and
orthodox tendency manifested itself with as much
energy as the opposing Liberal one.
From the 'twenties, orthodox Lutheranism became
a power in Germany. We have already pointed
out how, in alliance with pietism, it ended by exer
cising a considerable influence over the public
authorities and gaining the real supremacy in the
official Church. The chief personage in whom this
renaissance of orthodoxy became incarnate was the
famous zealot Hengstenberg, the founder of the
Evangelische Kirchenzeitung. He anathematised with
the fury of a sectarian all the progressive tendencies
of Protestantism, from the old rationalism of the
eighteenth century to the subjective spiritualism
of Schleiermacher and the idealism of Hegel. He
levelled a fierce attack not only at doctrines, but
also at men, and made an unscrupulous use of
invective and denunciation, and of his own accord
appealed to the authority of the Government against
his religious opponents. This neo-Lutheran ortho
doxy originated in the reign of Frederick William III.,
and was predominant in Prussia under Frederick
William IV. Driven back at the time of the Revolu
tion in 1848, it regained its footing in the 'fifties,

294 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
and denounced the subjectivism of Liberal Protes
tantism and the aberrations of " besotted Science "
with redoubled energy. Its power, moreover, made
itself felt not only in Prussia, but also in the rest of
Germany, and it celebrated its greatest triumph
in Mecklenburg and the Electorate of Hesse. Here,
under Kliefoth and Vilmar, it did not merely confine
itself to demanding a literal belief in traditional
dogma. It taught the miraculous and divine efficacy
of the Sacraments, which were the veritable acts
of God ; it proclaimed the direct action of super
natural powers upon human life, and especially
that of the devil. Vilmar asserted that he had
with his own eyes seen the enemy of the human
race with his horrible gnashing teeth. And if to-day
orthodoxy scarcely ever manifests itself in such super
annuated shapes, it nevertheless remains a real
power. Not only does it maintain a compact group
of convinced believers, but it is also considered the
natural auxiliary of royalty in its struggle against
revolutionary parties. The alliance between the
Throne and the Altar, once denounced by Schleier
macher as one of the Church's gravest dangers,
still existed up to the end of the century. Political
conservatism and religious conservatism gladly made
common cause against those who did not believe in
positive dogma, whether religious or monarchical.
And it cannot be denied that for German Pro
testantism the conflict between the positive and
the negative attitudes, between the denomination-
alism of the orthodox and the subjectivism of the
" infidels," constituted a serious problem. Critics
hostile to reform have frequently pointed out the
inconveniences and dangers of this position.
They depict for us the sorry condition of the

THE PROTESTANT CHURCH 295
parson, who during his sojourn at the university
had assimilated contemporary religious science. Such
a man no longer believed in dogma or in the his
torical elements of Christianity. But he found
himself constrained to preach this dogma in his
parish, to explain and to comment upon the great
events of sacred history. Under these circumstances
he could only get out of his difficulties by means
of equivocation, mental reservation, and tricks of
symbolical interpretation, which perpetually exposed
him to the degrading taunt that he did not believe
in the truths he preached to his parishioners. We
find Protestantism obliged to enforce a uniform
liturgy in the ceremonies of baptism, confirmation,
and ordination, and to demand, under certain cir
cumstances, the use of the apostolic symbol. And
on the other hand, the " modernists " showed their
repugnance to having forced upon them a public
adhesion to dogmas which, in their eyes, no longer
expressed the essence of the Christian faith, which
were liable to be incompatible with their deepest
beliefs, and which in any case dealt a blow at private
conviction. They insist more especially upon the embarrassing
problem with which Protestantism was faced in
connection with religious teaching in the universities.
The German parson was the pupil of professors of
theology, criticism, and ecclesiastical history, who
often belonged to the most advanced wing of Pro
testantism, and destroyed in him all belief in the
positive and historical elements of religion. He
was subjected, on the other hand, to Civil Service
authorities, who thought it important to maintain,
at least nominally and on principle, a more or less
strict orthodoxy, and endeavoured to eliminate

296 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
from the service of the Church all who were too
audaciously heterodox or too avowedly sceptical.
Between the intellectual minority who ruled the
universities and shaped the minds and consciences
of the future clergy, and the mass of believers,
together with the official authority which ruled
over the Church, there existed profound and
permanent dissension. The drawbacks of such a
situation are patent, as well as the difficulty of
remedying them. What could the authorities do,
placed as they were between the representatives of
orthodoxy, who denied that infidels had any right
to administer a parish of Protestants who believed
in tradition, and the modernists who demanded
liberty of conscience and the rights of independent
science ? Should they regard the claims of the
believers in tradition as null and void ? But in
this case they would run the risk of wounding the
sincere convictions of the most zealous majority
of believers, and that in order to keep at the head
of a parish some free-thinker, who perhaps no longer
had the right to the name of " Christian " ! Ought
they to take severe measures against the advanced
thinkers ? Ought they to expel infidel professors
from the universities ? But then they would put
themselves into conflict with the essential principle
of Protestantism, they would lay violent hands
upon the independence of scientific teaching, and
they would lay themselves open to the reproach of
wishing in the name of religion to place fetters upon
free research. In order to avoid this twofold danger,
the Government endeavoured to manoeuvre tactfully
between the two parties, and not to quarrel irrevo
cably with either the one or the other. And it
thus involuntarily favoured a spirit of equivocation

THE PROTESTANT CHURCH 297
and compromise, to the detriment of honesty of
opinion. It created thorny cases of conscience
and false and painful situations for precisely the
most interesting among the clergy — those who would
not agree to any compromise upon the subject of
scientific, moral and religious honesty.
We thus see the formidable dissension in which
the evolution of the Protestant spirit in Germany
resulted. The picked intellects of Protestantism
ended in conceiving and professing a purely sub
jective religion, which no longer demanded from
the believer an obligatory adhesion to any meta
physical, moral or historical dogma. Between the
idealistic Protestantism and the positive Protestant
ism of tradition ever more fundamental divergences
came to light. So much was this the case that it
was possible to wonder, on occasion, whether the
Protestant spirit were capable of creating a "re
ligion," a faith common to the whole aggregate of
believers, or whether it were not merely a dissolvent
which gradually eliminated from Christianity every
positive element, until at last it faded into a vague
religiosity which was stripped of all power of attrac
tion and was incapable of becoming the guiding
principle of any genuine religious body.
II
We have just seen the difficulties experienced by
Protestantism in formulating once and for all a creed
common to all believers. The internal dissensions of
Protestantism will appear more clearly than ever if
we examine the evolution of the Protestant Church.
The Middle Ages saw in the Church a supernatural
and miraculous institution created by God Himself
for the salvation of sinful man. The religious orders,

298 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
who alone were expected to observe in all its severity
the rule of life laid down by Christ, constituted a
grand hierarchy, which was subjected to one of the
most severe systems of discipline that history has
ever known. In both the parallel groups of the
regular and the secular clergy the religious orders
were always bound to the duty of the strictest
obedience. The bishops and the Heads of Orders
themselves bowed before the supreme authority of
the Pope, who was the chief head of Christianity
and the Vicar of God upon earth. Separated from
the clergy by a strong barrier, the mere laity, who
remained " in the world " and obeyed the laws of
a morality which was simply " adequate," were in
perpetual tutelage. The priest, upon whom the
Sacrament of Ordination conferred a sacred character,
was the only depository of true doctrine, and he
alone had the right to read and interpret the Bible.
The faithful remained for ever dependent upon
dogma, the priest and the ritual. They could gain
salvation only in and through the Church.
But Protestantism, as Pariset has pointed out,
tended from the beginning to reverse this wise
organisation of the Church. By denying the authority
of the Pope and the bishops, it at once ruined the
whole hierarchical edifice. And on the other hand
it abolished the distinction recognised by Catholicism
between the priest and the congregation, between the
" religious " life and the " worldly " life, between
the higher morality and the adequate morality. It is
true that it allowed a body of clergy to survive, in
the pastors. But the latter did not constitute an
organised and hierarchical body. Distinctions of
rank were almost entirely done away with. All the
pastors were equal with regard to discipline, and

THE PROTESTANT CHURCH 299
the conditions of life were almost identical for each.
And, moreover, no barrier separated them from their
faithful flocks. The sacerdotal sacraments were
abolished as well as the vows which made the Catholic
member of a religious order a being set apart. The
pastor was free to take a wife and found a family.
He was not even master in his own church, since he
was assisted in his ministry either by a body of
laymen, as in the case of the Presbyterian consis
tories, or by State officials in the Government con
sistories. Consequently there no longer really existed,
according to Protestant ideas, either a close body
of clergy, a special organism, or a Church which had
a life of its own and formed an independent power.
In distinction to the Catholic conception of a
Church with a strict hierarchy which led up to
a theocracy, Protestantism upheld the idea of a
universal priesthood. Every believer was a priest.
The Church was wheresoever any two persons were
assembled together in the name of God, and where
soever any believer in his solitude addressed his
prayer to the Eternal Father. We find this idea
formulated with the most perfect clarity by Schleier
macher. The ideal Church, the " City of God," as
he called it, had for its object the fruitful exchange
of religious impressions and communion in religious
emotions. " Every man is a priest when he can
draw others to himself into the domain which he has
especially appropriated, and in which he can demon
strate his virtuosity. Every one is a believer when
he submits to the direction and guidance of another
in order to penetrate into regions of religion with
which he is unfamiliar." There was in the City of
God no caste and no ecclesiastical despotism ; it
formed " a priestly nation," an ideal republic in which

300 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
every man was a leader or a subject by turns. In it
there existed no advantage for one sect over another,
as the groups formed in it by the free play of natural
affinities did not tend to fall apart, but were bound to
each other by imperceptible transitions. In the bosom
of the ideal Church men lived peacefully side by side
without attempting to convert each other. They were
conscious of all participating in the religion of the
whole community, in that "infinite religion" of which
all particular religions were so many subdivisions,
but which no man could embrace in all its entirety.
Thus Protestantism tended towards the ideal of a re
ligion without priests, and instituted a universal priest
hood. But in practice no religion can exist withoutsome
ecclesiastical organisation. Consequently a Protestant
Church was formed. But the strange phenomenon
occurred that in Germany, and especially in Prussia,
this Church was in many respects contradictory to
the most profound tendencies of the Protestant spirit.
It must be remembered that at the beginning
Protestantism admitted, just as much as Catholicism,
the supernatural character of the Church, as well as
the idea of a Christian community, a corpus christi-
anum, which should be the outcome of the harmonious
co-operation between Church and State. But, in
addition to this, Protestantism, by renouncing the
hierarchical Catholic system, contracted with the
State a union much more intimate than Catholicism
had ever consummated. In fact, it confided to the
sovereign authority of the Christian princes the
mission of safeguarding the existence of the Christian
community. And never for one moment did it
doubt that these sovereigns would remain effectually
impregnated by the purest Christian spirit and not
fail conscientiously to carry out this task,

THE PROTESTANT CHURCH 301
The result of this abdication by the clergy of their
organising power was the supremacy of the State in
the government of the new churches. In Prussia
especially, where a strong monarchy was established
during the eighteenth century under the Hohen-
zollern, the Church, according to Pariset, fairly
quickly developed into a regular State institution.
The King of Prussia considered himself the supreme
head of the churches in his dominions. He had the
title of Supreme Bishop (summus episcopus), and in
this capacity he administered and protected the
Church, regulated the lives of the clergy and ecclesi
astical discipline, kept a strict superintendence over
everything which in the life of the Church emanated
from the free initiative of the faithful, and restricted
the shreds of an authority which ancient customs
had left to the clergy and the ecclesiastical bodies.
Thus the State became the guardian of the Church,
and the clergy acted in the capacity of royal officials
and collaborators of royal officials in education, the
public service, and the administration of justice and
even of the Church. For they were occasionally
called upon to publish edicts, and were obliged to
pray publicly for the King and preach obedience to
his commands. The Prussian State, which concen
trated the whole of public life into itself, thus ended
by monopolising even the Church and by creating,
with its support, a sort of State religion. Obedience
to Prussian discipline, which was accepted as a
dogma by Protestantism, was elevated to the rank
of a supreme virtue and a religious conviction for
the sovereign as well as the lowest of his subjects.
This intimate alliance between the Throne and the
Altar, between the Prussian State and the Protestant
Church, was the source of some advantage to the

302 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
Church and country, and, above all, to the State.
The Church thereby found security, wealth, and
material power. By associating itself with the
royal family of Prussia the triumphs of the latter
were its triumphs. For the country also this intimate
union between the spiritual and temporal power was
in certain respects beneficial. In Catholic countries
where the State and the Church are independent and
sometimes rivals, there may, on occasion, arise in the
consciences of the faithful a conflict between religious
and civic duty. Nothing of this kind was possible in
Prussia, where the national feeling was never at vari
ance with religious and moral faith, and where the
people, in the decisive crises in the life of the country
— in 1813, and also perhaps in 1870 — were able,
without any hypocrisy, to feel convinced that they
were fighting both for God and the King. In short,
in the case of the Prussian monarchy the support
of the Church was a most valuable resource, and
it utilised the authority of religion for the main
tenance of public order. It charged the clergy to
preach obedience, resignation, and submission to
the powers that be, and to fight the spirit of dis
content and revolt in the breast of secular society.
It thus tried to make the Church auxiliary to the
police, and to enrol the clergy in the ranks of the
Conservative party.
In the long run, however, this association between
Church and State could not last ; and this for an
exceedingly fundamental reason. The State gradu
ally became secularised. It ceased to be " Chris
tian," and no longer put before itself the task of
realising the will of God upon earth. It set itself up
as an independent sovereignty, and knew no other
ends than the increase of its own temporal prosperity

THE PROTESTANT CHURCH 303
and the attainment of power. And this power it
desired for its own purposes and not for the sake
of placing it at the disposal of the Church and its
spiritual ends. Thus the Church and the State broke
their time-established alliance and followed each
its own path. The Church aimed at establishing its
spiritual kingdom, whilst the State consecrated its
energies exclusively to its own task and dissociated
itself more and more from the destinies of the
Church. It ceased to intrude itself upon the internal
life of the Church, and was no longer concerned with
maintaining orthodox doctrine in all its purity. It
proclaimed its neutrality from the religious point of
view, practised toleration, and secured liberty of
conscience and freedom of worship for the various
denominations. It continued, moreover, to exercise a
superintendence over the Church, though it did so no
longer in the interests of that body, but on its own
behalf, aiming at making sure that the Church did
not stand in the light of its own designs or trouble
the public peace. Otherwise it no longer meddled
in ecclesiastical matters. It left the Church to itself,
and allowed it the liberty to follow its own ends in
any way it might deem advisable.
This evolution came about by a gradual process.
Even to-day it is not complete, and has only reached
its final development in America. But, in any case,
it is evident that the idea of the sovereign State,
which aims exclusively at the development of its
own independent power and is indifferent on principle
to every religious ideal, is imposing itself more and
more forcibly upon the modern conscience even in
countries like Germany, for instance, in which the
traditional bond which united the Church and the
State has not yet been finally broken.

304 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
This novel attitude on the part of the State brought
in its train a new conception of the mission and
nature of the Church also.
In proportion as the idea of a sovereign State was
elaborated in modern society and the notion of
religious subjectivism was developed in the Pro
testant conscience, the conception of the Church also
underwent a radical transformation. In the eyes of
Catholicism and of primitive Protestantism the
Church was a divine institution, an absolute miracle.
For the modern Protestant it became more and
more evident that the religious " miracle " was no
external fact, such as the constitution of a Church
which could dispense eternal salvation, but on the
contrary, the absolutely internal fact of " conver
sion," of private religious illumination. From the
Gospel of Jesus there emanated a principle of life
which, spreading from man to man, gradually grouped
an ever-increasing number of disciples into a more
or less complete spiritual communion. Identity of
certain religious experiences created the community,
and the community created the Church. The
Church thus gradually ceased to be considered a
supernatural body. It was a human institution,
susceptible to variation and capable of development
just like the religious feeling which gave it birth.
It was an association of individuals who felt them
selves united by one religious sentiment and formed
free groups in order to communicate to each other
their impressions and emotions. It was a guild
formed by the spontaneous adhesion of the faithful,
and capable of assuming as many shapes as there
were different shades in men's ideas of Christianity.
Consequently there was no longer one Church
established by God and working with the State for

THE PROTESTANT CHURCH 305
the development of the Christian life. There were
a multitude of churches corresponding with the
diversity of private religious experiences, and were all
of them imperfect human attempts to fix in a con
crete and precise form the undenominational idea
of Christianity in its pristine purity.
Thus the Church was both one and infinitely di
verse. As Schleiermacher would have said, it should
be neither a State institution nor a multiplicity of
small sects strictly differentiated from and hostile to
each other. Just as religion was one, continuous and
infinite, so also the Church would never be a real
school of religion until the day when, instead of
breaking itself up into a series of separate individual
institutions, it became " a fluid and amorphous mass,
without any definite outlines, and of which each part
found itself now in one place and now in another,
whilst all its elements mingled peacefully together."
Thus the conception of an official State Church
gradually gave place in the Protestant conscience to
the idea of Free Churches.
Of course this charge was not consummated in a
day, or all of a sudden. The official Church did not
cease to exist in Germany, it merely found itself
imperceptibly gliding into a position opposed to the
Protestant spirit.
The princes tried to conciliate to the best of their
ability their temporal mission as monarchs of a
secular self-governing State and their spiritual mis
sion as chiefs of the national Church. But it gradu
ally became apparent that they were above all secular
sovereigns, who were imperceptibly subordinating re
ligion to the service of the State, and that the spiritual
authority of the Church was thus gravely com
promised. At the end of the eighteenth century
20

306 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
Schleiermacher eloquently denounced the sacrilegious
compact by which it was bound to the State. " Would
to God," he exclaimed, " that the chiefs of the State,
the experts and artists in politics, had remained for
ever shut out from the remotest intuition of what
religion means ! Would to God that no man among
them had ever been gripped by the power of that
epidemic of enthusiasm, when once they ceased to
know how to separate their own individuality from
their duties as public officials ! . . . You wish that the
hem of a priestly robe had never swept the floor of
a royal apartment. So be it. But allow us in our
turn to wish that the royal purple had never kissed
the dust before the altar. A prince should never have
been allowed to cross the threshold of the temple with
out having laid aside the fairest ornament of his royal
dignity, his cornucopia of favours and distinctions."
The alliance with the State, continues Schleier
macher, perverted the Church, which allowed a
political and social mission to be imposed upon it
incompatible with the pure manifestation of the
religious sentiment. The State relieved itself by
placing upon the shoulders of the Church the duty of
providing the education of the people through giving
them elementary instruction and inculcating upon
them some notions of morality. It profaned the
symbolical acts of the Church — Baptism, Communion,
Marriage, and Extreme Unction — by connecting them
with civil acts. It arrogated to itself the right of
filling ecclesiastical posts. And inasmuch as it
expected from the clergy services which had nothing
to do with religion, it ended by excluding religious
men from the government of the Church. In short,
it stripped the Church of liberty and self-government,
without which she remained for ever incapable of

THE PROTESTANT CHURCH 307
fulfilling her real mission, which was to prepare souls
to receive the revelation of religion.
Thus the divorce between the religious spirit and
the official Church was consummated. The modern
German Protestant is a subjectivist. In his eyes the
true Church is not a political and social institution,
but the " City of God " of which Schleiermacher
dreamt, the ideal Church which groups into one
spiritual community all those whom the same mystic
impulse of the soul draws towards God. And this
ideal Church should receive a practical incarnation
in an infinite variety of free Churches, composed by
the spontaneous membership of the faithful. The
official Church, when it became simply a conservative
organ of the State, appears, from this point of view,
an anachronism, a survival of the old system which
has no meaning in the present day. Everywhere a
growing dissatisfaction with it is to be found among
the people. The large towns had become " spiritual
cemeteries." Outside the official world, which, follow
ing the example of the Emperor, professed a strict
Evangelicalism, there were hardly any believers.
The enlightened middle classes, out of respect for
tradition and as a matter of form, associated religion
with the most important acts of their lives, and found
in it a salutary curb to keep the masses in subjection.
But they had lost all lively faith and any real need
of religion. As for the working masses, fermented
as they were by Socialism, they displayed merely
indifference or hostility. They were quite ready to
suspect the parson of being in league with the
police and the Church, " of working for the safety
of the Throne and the security of wealth much more
than for the glory of God." And in the country
districts as well it seemed that the preaching and

308 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
teaching of the clergy had almost no hold upon the
minds of the peasants or over public morality.
In short, a diminution in the vitality of the official
Church was everywhere apparent. It was kept alive
artificially, thanks to the energetic support of the
Government, in the midst of a society which was
indifferent to its practices. The Prussian princes,
especially, continued to take their functions as
summus episcopus of the Kingdom very seriously.
They endeavoured to maintain in the Protestant
Church a certain cohesion and a certain unity.
Frederick William IV. succeeded in establishing in
his dominions the union of all the denominations
which were the outcome of the Reformation, by
decreeing certain compromises between them on
matters of dogma. And similarly the Emperor
William II. took the interests of Protestantism
actively in hand. In the course of the debates upon
the Agenda, he intervened personally in favour of the
divinity of Christ ; in a famous telegram he denounced
the political and social intrigues of the " Christian
Socialist " party, and attempted to combat religious
indifference by increasing the number of churches
in Berlin. But all these efforts did not avail to
infuse fresh life into the official Church. It seemed
more and more of an anachronism and a bar to
the normal development of Protestant principles.
The Protestant spirit continued its evolution during
the nineteenth century, by making the idea of religion
ever more spiritual, by giving birth to a science of the
Bible and a new theology, and by endeavouring
with indefatigable ingenuity to reconcile science and
faith into one bold synthesis. And in proportion to
its progress it felt itself constantly fettered by the
rigid framework of a State Church, the creation of

THE PROTESTANT CHURCH 309
a bygone age, which no longer satisfied the modern
mind. The result is that the Church is to-day nothing
but a body without a soul, a showy edifice whose im
posing exterior but poorly hides its real organic ruin.
It is therefore probable that the ecclesiastical
organisation of evangelical Germany has not yet
found its true form, but that it is at present going
through a period of transition from the system of
State Churches (Landeskirchen), to that of Free
Churches (Freikirchen). Not only do we find to-day
in Germany a very large number of sects which have
sprung from the pietist movement and which have
free self-government, but the official Church itself is
also aspiring towards enjoying a rather more inde
pendent existence. The constitution of 1873-76,
by developing synodic institutions, gave congrega
tions the opportunity of expressing their opinions
fairly freely upon matters connected with the life of
the Church. It is true that even to-day the Evan
gelical Church, which is subjected to the placet of
the Government in all its internal legislation, is per
haps less free than the Catholic Church, which was
liberated from this necessity as a result of the Kultur
kampf. Nevertheless it cannot be denied that the first
steps towards the independence of the Church have
been taken. How far will Germany go along this
path ? Will the Protestant Church and the State
one day enter upon the perilous venture of a com
plete divorce ? There is nothing to show that this
radical solution will be tried in the near future. Even
among the " modernist " Protestants there are those
who believe that a synodic system would put more
fetters upon the audacities of free theological research
than State administration, and therefore feel a certain
sympathy for the system of Landeskirchen. Yet,

310 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
generally speaking, recent historians of religion are
quite ready to admit that, to use Troltsch's words,
" Protestantism on the whole, as a spiritual principle
and as a Church, is involved in an evolution whose
essence is the idea of independence."
This situation is not without its inconveniences
and dangers. It reveals once more the fundamental
contradictions which we have already pointed out in
Protestantism. The Protestant faith is progressing
towards a purely spiritual and internal religion,
without dogmas, priests, sacrifices, good works, or
external ceremonies. And yet, apparently in order
to have a tangible existence and an outside influence,
it cannot avoid promulgating a creed and binding
itself to the historical and traditional past of Chris
tianity and constituting itself as a Church. It is
obviously open to question whether on the one hand
the Protestant spirit will not necessarily feel itself
cramped in any Church, and on the other whether a
religion without a Church is not sheer nonsense.
Naturally upon this question opinions are divided.
Some, like Goyau, insist upon the impossibility of
reconciling the religious feeling of the few with the
religion of the masses. They point out the growing
gulf between the mental outlook of the enlightened
Protestants who are capable of making their own
belief, and the crowd of the mediocre, the lukewarm
and half-hearted believers who do not make their
Christianity, but submit to it and thus remain attached
to the old forms and the ancient practices. And from
this they draw the conclusion that Protestantism
contains a contradiction within itself which is destined
to become ever more intolerable in proportion as it
develops, and will entail the more or less fatal dis
solution of the Protestant Church.

THE PROTESTANT CHURCH 311
Others, on the contrary, are of the opinion that
Protestantism will know how to put an end to this
contradiction by a series of successive compromises,
and that it will give birth during the course of its
evolution to provisional types of organisation which
will be adapted to the various states of conscience and
the degrees of culture through which the Protestant
soul will pass. And they see in this capacity for
change the real greatness of Protestantism. From
this point of view a religion is not something absolute
and unchangeable, but something which becomes — the
product of human striving after perfection, the fruit
of painful and ceaseless groping. And, like religion
itself, the Church also must evolve and be transformed.
The difficulties with which it meets, the contradictions
which are set before it, arise from the very nature of
circumstances. Protestantism will show its value, not
by finding the solution of the Church's problem — which
is impossible — but by raising itself step by step to
ever less imperfect forms of religious association.
The discussion finally resolves itself into the ques
tion of ascertaining whether the specifically Protestant
idea still possesses sufficient vitality to exercise a
real influence over the life of to-day, whether it is
capable of producing fresh compromises between
religious traditionalism and wilful rationalism, and
of rallying around its dogmas a sufficiently large and
compact body of adherents. Catholics, as a rule, do
not estimate its power of attraction very highly. And
even in the Protestant world there are some who ask
themselves to what extent the existing organisation
of Protestantism is still a living principle of life and an
effective organising force. And they do not blink the
fact that in any case the Protestant Church is going
through a crisis the end of which is not yet in sight.

312 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
On the whole, however, there is a tendency to be
optimistic with regard to the result of this crisis. It
is recognised that the problem of the maintenance of
Protestantism is exceptionally complicated and diffi
cult at the present moment, based as it is upon the
lowest layers of the nation, upon a crowd which
needs, above all, an organised religion, a Church with
rites, doctrines, and traditional ceremonies. As for
the cultured few, they are emancipated from all
dogmatic belief, and live on the outskirts of the
Church, picking out their path in perfect independ
ence, allied with all the idealistic energies of the day
in their struggle against scepticism pure and simple,
as well as against the utilitarian realism which has
no higher aspirations. That such incongruous ele
ments sometimes find it difficult to agree, is not
surprising. But the strength of Protestantism lies
in the very fact that it unites these two elements.
It has more fundamental vigour than purely idealistic
philosophy, as it thrusts out its roots into a popular
religion and relies upon an organised Church. And
it carries the day over authoritative religions inas
much as it blossoms into an idealistic faith which is
purely human, and because it is, according to its
followers, the only religion by which the modern
man, who is an individualist and in love with liberty,
can live. The members of the Protestant camp are
therefore confident of the future. They feel that the
German genius, which is at once conservative and
progressive, will prove supple and resourceful enough
to maintain indefinitely, without having to subject
it to irreparable humiliation in either one direction or
the other, a religion so well adapted to the funda
mental tendencies of the race.

CHAPTER V
FREE THOUGHT

In the course of the last chapter we described the
prodigious effort made by idealism to reconcile
reason and faith, and to elaborate a general concep
tion of the universe which should be in harmony
with the conclusions of the positive sciences and yet
of such a nature as to satisfy the traditional religious
needs of the modern mind. We shall not recur in
the present chapter to this exceedingly original
creation of the German spirit, although it was
obviously the outcome of free thought. We shall
only occupy ourselves with the attempts on the part
of the German mind to emancipate itself completely
from religious tradition and to constitute outside
Christianity, or even in conscious opposition to it,
an idea of the world and a rule of life which should
be purely rational, or, at all events, " irreligious."
In opposition to Christianity, and in direct an
tagonism with it, the nineteenth century witnessed
the development, in the first place, of a vigorous
militant materialism which was absolutely confident
of the soundness of its doctrines and numbers its
adherents to-day by the million.
Fostered during the 'thirties and 'forties by the
antichristian sensualism of Young Germany and
313

314 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
the apostles of the rehabilitation of the flesh, by the
theological radicalism of men like Strauss and Baur,
by the philosophical and political radicalism of men
after the stamp of Ruge or the Bauer brothers, and
by the naturalism of Feuerbach, materialism domi
nated German thought during the 'fifties and 'sixties
in the persons of Karl Vogt and Moleschott, Buchner
and Czolbe on the one hand, and Marx and Engels
on the other. The triumph of Darwin's ideas on
evolution in the sphere of natural science accentuated
its success still more forcibly among the representa
tives of modern culture ; whilst in the domain of
actual life, the diffusion of Socialism, and with it of
Marxian materialism, among the masses, won over
numberless followers to its cause.
Energetically combated after 1870, in the name
of Kant's philosophy, with its theory of knowledge
on the one hand, and later on also by the repre
sentatives of neo-romanticism, materialism certainly
lost much of its credit among the cultured minority.
But the enormous success of Haeckel's works, which
were circulated by the thousand, clearly proves that
it kept its hold over a very important fraction of
the educated public. And its power of attraction
over the Socialist masses does not seem to have
diminished. It is true that the programme of Erfurt
proclaimed that " religion is a private concern " ;
and the Socialist Congresses have on many occasions
thrown out motions aimed at making the party leave
this position of neutrality and take up a more mili
tant attitude against religion. But if, out of con
sideration for political tactics, the party refuses to
inscribe Atheism on its programme, so as to avoid
compromising its success among certain elements of
the population, the bulk of its adherents are never-

FREE THOUGHT 315
theless converts to Marxian materialism. On account
of the philosophy upon which its programme is based
Socialism is radically opposed to the idea of religion,
and the mass of its followers — as is evident to all —
is quite ready to admit with Bebel that " Christianity
and Socialism are like fire and water together."
And apparently the efforts recently made to prove
that Socialism is not necessarily allied to the economic
materialism of Marx, and can equally well find its
justification in the doctrines of Kant, have not
modified the position the least bit in the world.
We must therefore examine what this spread of
materialism means.
Its success is due in the first place to the fact that
it is regarded as the philosophical doctrine which
co-ordinates the results of natural science. It in
spires confidence because its champions, men like
Karl Vogt and Haeckel, for instance, are at the same
time naturalists of great merit. As they possess the
right to speak in the name of science, they derive the
benefit, in their capacity as philosophers, from their
very legitimate authority as scientists. I have
already had occasion to point out several times how,
in consequence of the marvellous progress made
during the nineteenth century in science and rational
technical processes, the conviction grew up that
science was capable of solving the riddle of the
universe, fixing standards of conduct for men, and
leading humanity to the attainment of happiness.
Preached by a certain number of scientists, and
accepted by the bulk of the public as the scientific
philosophy par excellence, materialism benefited by
the enormous prestige in which exact science re
joices at the present day. Like the materialism of
Democritus, Epicurus and Lucretius, and that of

316 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
Lamettrie and Baron Holbach, modern German
materialism was born from the enthusiasm for the
great scientific discoveries of the age, and the belief
that it was quite easy to found upon purely scientific
bases a metaphysical explanation of the universe.
Materialism arose, in the second place, from the
general evolution towards realism which is one of
the characteristic features of the modern world, and
which has its source in the development of the spirit
of capitalistic enterprise. Just as Germany aimed
more and more consciously, as the century advanced,
at the conquest of economic and political power ; just
as the middle classes, especially, consigned to the
second place their desire for culture and political
liberty in order to concentrate all their energies
upon the attainment of wealth ; just as art evolved
from romantic subjectivism to modern naturalism;
so also, in the domain of philosophy, external and
material realism carried the day over ideas. The
representative of modern capitalistic enterprise is
incessantly absorbed in calculations of interest ; he is
jostled by the increasing rush in which life is lived,
accustomed to regarding existence as an unceasing
and endless race for wealth, driven to considering
feverish work and business as an end in itself, and
shaped to a purely utilitarian morality which in
everything values only immediate tangible and solid
success and holds in esteem only those qualities
which lead to it. Consequently, in the domain of
thought he feels himself peculiarly in touch with
materialism which seeks for fundamental reality, not
in any spiritual principle, but in concrete and pal
pable matter. And similarly he is quite ready to
admit the theory of evolution which raises to a
universal law the struggle for existence, that law of

FREE THOUGHT 317
competition which holds supreme sway in the world
of enterprise.
And at the other end of the social ladder the
populace who labour hard and ceaselessly to gain
their daily bread, who see their happiness, and even
their very existence menaced by forces over which
they have no control, who live in poverty or at best
in humble circumstances, whilst under their very
eyes and in their immediate neighbourhood they
have the enormous material resources of urban life,
agree with the capitalists and tend to turn life
and the world into purely materialistic conceptions.
The aristocratic materialism of the great capitalists
is balanced in the lower social scale by the levelling
and boundless materialism of the socialistic masses.
But there is yet another and rather more curious
reason which has contributed to the diffusion of
materialism among certain minds, and that is a kind
of pessimism which has sprung up in our day with
regard to the demands of sentiment. Humanity
hitherto has found consolation in the religious hypo
thesis, in the idea of the immortality of the soul, in
the hope of a celestial justice which will make good
the inequalities of life and fate, in the faith in a
God of mercy and goodness who will keep watch
over His children and have pity upon their sufferings.
But there is no doubt that the modern man, at
the same time as he learnt no longer to trust his
reason, learnt also to feel greater suspicion with
regard to the demands of his heart. Not only did
the consoling hypotheses of Christianity no longer
appear to him ipso facto true, but he also developed
within his breast a sort of ascetic honesty which for
bade him to indulge in any longings for a Beyond,
and inclined him to take sides with the theories that

318 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
most rudely contradicted hopes which from that
moment were regarded as illusions. A materialist
like Czolbe, for instance, was convinced that the
demand for eternity necessarily had its source in a
certain weakness of soul, and scientific and moral
honesty commands the man of to-day to resign him
self, once and for all, to look life in the face and to
limit his desires to existence upon earth. Regarded
from this point of view, materialism appears in the
light of an effort towards intellectual sincerity, and
as a determined desire no longer to be the dupes
of the illusions in which men found joy for many
centuries. And lastly, materialism is also the response of the
modern spirit to the attacks of the champions of
religion. We have already seen how Roman Catholicism
hurled its fulminations against " pseudo-science," how
it violently stifled the rationalistic tendencies which
made their appearance in the bosom of Catholicism,
and how rigidly it made human reason bow before
the principle of authority. But orthodox and
pietistic Protestantism nourished almost as much
suspicion as Catholicism with regard to independent
science. The representatives of religion evidently
showed an inclination to treat reason with suspicion
or as an enemy. And when they were in power they
did not hesitate to oppose it not only with spiritual
weapons, but by force, and by appealing to the
authority of the State to stamp out heresy. The
persecutions of which such men as Fichte and Strauss,
Biichner and Moleschott, were the victims, the
innumerable annoyances to which the universities
were exposed, during the Restoration period as well
as during the reign of Frederick William IV., and the

FREE THOUGHT 319
reactionary era which followed upon 1848, and the
ill-will of orthodox pietism in connection with many
a representative of German intellect, gave rise, in a
certain section of public opinion, to profound irrita
tion, and spread in it the conviction that between
religion and science there existed a normal and
necessary antagonism.
The Church gave rise to even greater hatred, as it
so often appeared as the ally of the monarchy against
revolution, as the enemy of the democratic move
ment, as the great conservative power which, by
means of fallacious promises, kept the people in
obedience, made them bow before authority and
tradition, preached to them a cowardly resignation
in their troubles, and turned them away from the
energetic demand for their right to happiness. Thus
materialism seemed to many the most radical form
of anti-clericalism, as the declaration of a loyal
and resolute war against the feeling of oppression
which the Church and religion aimed at imposing
upon the consciences of men. I do not mean to
say, of course, that antagonism between religion
and science is really a necessity, or that the Church
must inevitably be a tyrannical and reactionary
power. I merely wish to point out that in the
course of history it has frequently proved intolerant
and oppressive, and too friendly with the powerful
in the- land. Materialism is, in some respects, the
classical form which the anti-clerical and anti-re
ligious reaction, provoked by this attitude, assumes.
Materialism, however, seems recently to have lost
some of its prestige in Germany, at least among the
cultured classes.
Its "heyday" was during the reactionary period
inaugurated after the upheavals of 1848. This was

320 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
the time when Karl Vogt made fun of the " collier's
faith " of his colleague, Rudolf Wagner, who tried
to prove the existence of a vital energy and of
a soul-substance. The protagonists of materialism
showed themselves so superior to their philosophical
and scientific adversaries that the Government, in
order to reduce them to silence, could find no better
course than that of driving Moleschott and Biichner
from their professorial chairs. The publication of
Darwin's Origin of Species, in 1859, seemed to give
the death-blow to the spiritual theory. And D. F.
Strauss, breaking his last ties with Christianity,
announced by his book The Old and the New Faith
(1872) his solemn adherence to the doctrine of evolu
tion and materialistic monism.
But by the time Strauss's book appeared the
reaction had already set in. A Kantian Renaissance
could be discerned, and a really scientific criticism
of knowledge which was of high philosophical im
portance was elaborated. And by the light of this
criticism materialism was soon shown to be a meta
physical dogma quite as unproved and quite as
undemonstrable as any idealistic system that had ever
existed, a hazardous hypothesis in connection with
problems about which human reason should make
up its mind to a definite ignorabimus. Materialism,
consequently, was not able to make itself, as it
aspired to do, the scientific philosophy par excellence.
There is no serious thinker to-day who does not
frankly accept all the conclusions of the exact
sciences and loyally aim at giving them as satisfactory
an interpretation as possible. The materialists were
foolish in arrogating to themselves a monopoly in
this respect. The whole point is to know which ex
planation best covers the facts. Now the material-

free Thought 321
istic explanation from the neo-Kantian point of
view had one grave defect — it ignored the positive
and certain results of the criticism of knowledge.
And it had therefore to be rejected as inadequate.
The materialist was a dilettante at philosophy who
ventured upon ground with which he was not familiar
and where he went grossly astray.
Opposed on the one hand by the school philoso
phers in the name of the principles of criticism, mate
rialism found itself, on the other hand, discredited in
the eyes of the representatives of neo-romanticism.
The Old and the New Faith by Strauss was greeted
by the strident shriek of Nietzsche's terrible
pamphlet against the " Philistine of Culture " and
the " Socratic " rationalism of the modern world.
Materialism had once seduced men's minds by its
radicalism. It was now outgrown and contemptu
ously cast aside by a new radicalism which was even
more uncompromising, which was pessimistic to the
point of nihilism, sceptical by the very power of its
intellectual consciousness, immoralist and antichris
tian through the extreme refinement of its moral
honesty. Materialism had once gained adherents
on account of its democratic tendencies, because
it took in hand the cause of the people and
dreamt of the establishment on earth of a social
state which would secure comfort and happiness for
all. Now it was decried as Utopian and foolishly
optimistic. Its faith in the omnipotence of science
was derided, and it was denied that science could
ever be in a position to bring back paradise on earth.
The materialists got to be suspected of intellectual
mediocrity or moral dishonesty because they refused
to understand, as Nietzsche would have had them
do, that the slavery and poverty of the multitude is
21

322 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
the shameful and lamentable side of every civilisa
tion, and because they tried to hide the bankruptcy
of their beautiful promises by extolling the dignity
of work, and proclaiming that it was nobler to earn
one's bread by the sweat of the brow than to live
in idleness. Banned by the official representatives
of philosophy as not sufficiently scientific, materialism
was rejected by advanced philosophers as being
tainted by cowardice and " Philistinism."
Yet it is true that its credit is not ruined — very
far from it. It keeps its hold over the Socialist
masses, and from this point of view it remains an
important factor in the spiritual life of Germany.
Moreover, at intervals it springs to new life in a
rejuvenated form, and the immense success which
the works of Haeckel have attained among the bulk
of the public is a sure indication that materialism has
preserved considerable influence over a very large
number of minds. But it must at the same time be
pointed out that this triumph from the point of view
of circulation is not accompanied by any success in
philosophical " estimation." However sympathetic
and respected the personality of Haeckel himself may
be, scientific criticism has passed very severe judg
ment upon the work of that great populariser. It
has been treated as a " philosophical cypher " ; and
The Riddle of the Universe is mentioned in much the
same tone as certain widely circulated novels, the
material triumph of which is placed on record, whilst
it is pointed out that this circumstance does no
credit to the German reader, but merely proves the
poverty in philosophical culture of the bulk of the
public. Generally speaking, it may, I think, be said
that materialism still exercises a fascination over
the masses but has scarcely any hold over German

FREE THOUGHT 323
intellect, which is, apparently, far more severe upon
it than French public opinion. The German mind
has no great respect for any conception of the uni
verse which it regards as out of date, unscientific,
pretentiously mediocre, and at best only suitable for
the illiterate masses, or the half-educated, who
hastily accept the oracles of a sham science.
II
Hegel claimed to have given an explanation, in
his system, of the rational evolution of the universe.
Convinced of the identity of thought and being,
persuaded that ideas do not merely correspond with
reality as the picture does to the model, but that
ideas are the very essence of reality and that the
science of thought or logic is one and the same thing
with the science of being or metaphysics, he thought
he could give a fundamental and perfectly satis
factory explanation of the mystery of the world.
By retracing the evolution of reason which raises
itself from logic to the philosophy of nature, then to
the philosophy of the subjective spirit (psychology),
and subsequently to the philosophy of the objective
spirit (philosophy of law and of history) till at length
it reaches the philosophy of the absolute spirit
(philosophy of art, religion, and philosophy) he
thought he had given a complete description of the
process by which the spirit becomes conscious of
itself and also of the origin of the universe itself.
In opposition to this metaphysical dogmatism
modern positivism came into existence and agreed
with materialism in substituting for the speculative
method of idealism the empirical method of the posi
tive sciences, in order to cast doubt upon the identity

324 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
of thought and being, and to deny any objective
value to the grandiose and fragile constructions of
speculative reason. But whilst in the place of the
idealistic dogmatism of Hegel materialism provided
a naturalistic dogmatism which was quite as peremp
tory in its assertions and claimed in its turn to give
a metaphysical explanation of the world, positivism
brought a radical scepticism to bear against all
metaphysics, and proceeded to a general liquidation
of the philosophy of the past, rejecting as defective
and devoid of scientific value all former attempts to
give a comprehensive interpretation of the universe.
It tended, in the first place, to supplant in philo
sophy the speculative method of the great repre
sentatives of idealism by the scrupulous objective
examination of reality — the empirical method, which,
when applied to natural science, had produced such
magnificent results. And thus there grew up during
the nineteenth century a psychology which became
every day more strictly empirical. The way for it
was paved by Herbart, and above all by Beneke, and
during the 'fifties and 'sixties it was placed on its feet
by the fundamental works of Ernst Heinrich Weber,
Lotze, Helmholz and Wundt, and afterwards matured
in the writings of men like Ebbinghaus, Lipps, Mach,
Rehmke, Hceffding and Paulsen. To-day it is a
flourishing science based upon an immense number
of exact observations, and is still accumulating an
ever greater mass of materials, descriptions and
positive facts, with the object of instituting a com
plete natural history of psychic phenomena.
And at the same time as positivism is aiming at
turning philosophy into an empirical science it also
tends, on the other hand, to make a clear distinction
between problems which are capable of receiving a

FREE THOUGHT 325
scientific solution and those which remain for ever
inaccessible to reason, and thus to define precisely
the limits beyond which it is impossible for human
knowledge to go. With this object in view it revived
the criticism of Kant, whose wise prudence it con
trasts with the rashness of the speculative philosophy
of the epoch that followed him. The " return to
Kant " was announced in 1847 by Christian Hermann
Weisse, preached in 1862 by Eduard Zeller, and
afterwards by F. Albert Lange, Otto Liebmann and
Kuno Fischer. From this time forward a Kantian
criticism arose which was as precise and detailed as
the criticism of Goethe ; it had a review of its own,
the Kantstudien, which has been its organ ever since
1896, and since 1900 the Berlin Academy of Sciences
has been bringing out a monumental annotated
edition of Kant. At the same time a neo-critical
school has been organised. Following in the footsteps
of Kant it enunciates the principle that for man
there is, properly speaking, no knowledge outside the
bounds of experience, and that consequently no
scientific assertion is possible about things in them
selves or on anything transcendental. It thus
rigorously proscribes all metaphysics, and tends to
assign to philosophy, as its essential task, the criticism
of knowledge and the determination of the first
principles and postulates upon which the exact
sciences are founded. Among the neo-Kantians some,
like Lange, Liebmann, Hermann Cohen and Alois
Riehl, remain fairly faithful to the teaching of the
master. Others stray further from Kant's philo
sophy. Some, like Laas, Schuppe, Rehmke and von
Schubert-Soldern, follow both Hume and Kant.
They have much in common with phenomenism, and
aim at proceeding to an analysis, which shall be as

326 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
exact as possible, of the immediate phenomena of
consciousness. Others like Avenarius and E. Mach,
sketch out an " empiro-critical " system which is
rigorously hostile to all metaphysics, which regards
" pure experience," the facts of our immediate
experience, as the only basis of a science of objective
reality, endeavours to replace man in the midst of
nature and, finally, attempts to project some light
into the darkness of the future towards which our
species is evolving.
Positivism is certainly far superior from the
scientific point of view to materialism. Idealism
generally reproaches it with being too sceptical with
regard to reason and too severely suspicious with
respect to metaphysics. It accuses positivism, on the
one hand, of not always succeeding in making clear
the difference between that which is a certain fact, a
demonstrable truth, and that which is a speculative
addition, a mere hypothesis. And on the other hand
it blames it for its critical asceticism, which leads it
to barricade itself behind a cautious agnosticism
with regard to the questions which most interest man
kind. If one is to believe the idealists, mankind is
impelled by an irresistible metaphysical necessity to
fashion for himself at all costs some comprehensive
conception of the world. But the positivist absti
nence which refuses to satisfy this legitimate desire
thereby does violence to an instinct which is deeply
imbedded in human nature. Positivism therefore
cannot be the last word in wisdom, but is perfectly
explicable as a reaction against the intolerable dog
matism of Hegel. It will, however, remain incapable,
according to the idealists, of stifling the need for
metaphysics in the breast of man. The very success
of materialism, which is a metaphysical hypothesis —

FREE THOUGHT 327
while it is in the eyes of the idealists a depressing
symptom of the mediocrity of the philosophical cul
ture of our day — is at least also an indication that
the necessity for metaphysics has not been abolished,
but that it has taken on a fresh lease of life, and
seeks to satisfy its needs by producing at all costs a
comprehensive interpretation of the universe.
Thus positivism, it is said, will inevitably remain
the property of a small group of distinguished minds
in whom the critical faculty has been abnormally
developed. More vigorous temperaments and the
mass of the people will always be incapable of taking
refuge in agnosticism, and will of necessity, at some
given moment, feel the need of quitting this over-
negative and over-cautious position in order to
hazard some more or less speculative hypothesis re
garding the riddle of the universe.
The Radicalism of our own day, moreover, sees
in this positivist abstinence a last remainder of Chris
tian asceticism. Nietzsche, who is so hard upon
materialism, is on the other hand full of respect for
the positivists. He feels no contempt for " these
deniers, these lonely ones of to-day, . . . these hard,
severe, self-denying and heroic spirits, who do honour
to our time, . . . these last idealists of knowledge,
in whom alone the intellectual consciousness of our
day resides and is incarnate." He thinks very highly
of the laudable philosophical abstinence actuated by
such a belief, of this "intellectual stoicism which ends
by denying itself the Nay as severely as the Yea,
this determination to hold by positive reality, the
factum brutum, the petit fait — this renunciation of all
interpretation, of all that savours of violence, shuffling,
abbreviation, omission, addition, poetical development
and falsification — in short, the renunciation of all that

328 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
constitutes the essence of every art of interpretation."
But he also maintains that this will to truth at all
costs, this belief in the absolute and unqualified
value of science is nothing else than the infinitely
refined, subtle and sublimated form of the ascetic
Christian spirit. " Our faith in Science," he con
cludes, " is still founded upon a metaphysical belief ;
and we too, we thinkers of to-day, we atheists and
anti-metaphysicians, we too believe in this faith
which inspires us to that form of incendiarism which
the belief of ages has kindled, to that Christian
religion which was also the religion of Plato, that
God is Truth and that the truth is divine. . . ."
Thus it is clear that for Nietzsche the uncom
promising scientific honesty of the positivists was
simply the ultimate manifestation, spiritualised and
scarcely recognisable, of the religious instinct.
These " free spirits " were still at heart Christians,
as they had not yet called in question the value of
truth itself. And if not every one will hasten to agree
with Nietzsche that they are not yet sufficiently
" freed," yet, on the other hand, this affords a simple
explanation of the fact that German positivists are,
on the whole, less hostile to Christianity than the
materialists, and are fairly frequently inclined to
admit the possibility and the desirability of an agree
ment between Faith and Science.
Ill
In addition to materialism and positivism, pes
simism is undeniably one of the characteristic
tendencies of the second half of the nineteenth
century. As a philosophical doctrine, the pessimism formu-

FREE THOUGHT 329
lated by Schopenhauer was, as we know, derived from
the teaching of Kant, and is thus connected with the
great movement of German idealism. The author
of The World as Will and Idea professed a monistic
metaphysics with idealistic tendencies. But he defi
nitely separated himself from his predecessors by
denying most emphatically that reason could be the
fundamental principle of the real, and that the
Absolute was identical with Being. The essence of
the world was according to him the Will — but not
that free will whose evolution towards consciousness
Fichte delighted in describing. The Will which
Schopenhauer placed at the base of the world, which
he recognised as one and the same in every being,
which he saw asserting itself with painful energy
in the whole of creation, was the independent Will
of time, space and causality, the unconscious Will
without a purpose, which strove and desired without
ceasing, but which could never find lasting satisfaction.
This Will became concrete in phenomena, and grew
ever sharper, more selfish and more formidable in
proportion as it attained to higher forms. Until at
last, when it had reached the supreme heights of
consciousness, the Will realised that its blind effort
resulted of necessity in universal suffering, and per
ceived through the illusion of individualisation the
fundamental unity behind all phenomena, and thus
felt all sorrow as pertaining to itself. It thereby
came to the conclusion that nonentity was far pre
ferable to living, and by one supreme effort was
converted, abdicated the will-to-live, and sought in
the great peace of Nirvana the only refuge to be
found from the unending torture of life.
This pessimism has been interpreted, not without
some plausibility, as the last legacy of Christianity

330 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
which was on the point of dying out. The great task
of Christianity had been to provide an absolute
meaning and goal for life. The desire for the King
dom of Heaven and the salvation of the soul had
become the rule of life for the Christian. But gradu
ally faith in this goal and in this rule of life grew
weaker in men's minds, and they ceased to believe
in the " glad tidings " brought by Christ. But al
though this faith in the promises of religion slowly
died out, there still survived in the Christian heart
an intensely painful need to find a meaning for life
and to assign to it a definite goal towards which it
might progress. This ardent desire for an absolute
purpose, combined with the radical scepticism with
regard to the real existence of any sort of purpose,
had its logical conclusion in the pessimism of Schopen
hauer, and the hypothesis of a meaningless will-to-
live that is condemned to eternal torture.
It was only in the second half of the century that
pessimism found a favourable soil for its develop
ment. It is well known that Schopenhauer's chief
work, The World as Will and Idea, published in 1819,
remained without any influence over public opinion
for thirty years, that it was ignored by the bulk of
the people, and despised by the scientific world. It
required the wreck of Hegelianism, the bankruptcy of
speculative philosophy and of optimistic rationalism,
the epoch of depression which followed the failure
of the Revolution of 1848-49, and the trials of all
kinds to which the reactionary period exposed the
intellectual minority of Germany, but, above all,
the sufferings which the development of the system
of capitalistic enterprise entailed for multitudes, the
profound uneasiness which the economic upheaval,
the increase in the pace of life, and the growing

FREE THOUGHT 331
complexity of psychology, produced in modern
humanity, for the publication in 1851 of the Parerga
and Paralipomena to draw the attention of the world
upon the misanthropist of Frankfort.
But from that moment p^im^m rapidly gained
ground, and spread the dark waters of its rising tide
far and wide over Germany and the whole worldT
It invaded philosophy. iitTntnw °n^ ^i±. The
doctrines of pessimism were elaborated after Schopen
hauer by Taubert, Bahnsen. Mainlaenderr and Vpnfv
Tianer. but above all by TTa.rtmann. whose Philosophy
of the Unconscious (1869) won a brilliant success as
soon as it was published, though after a short inter
val it fell into almost entire oblivion. The most
illustrious representative of pessimism among the
poets was Heine, who at the very end of his days
descended to the weary nihilism of the Romancero
and the Last Poems. In these verses which vibrate
with the keenest emotion he celebrates the inevitable
defeat of all beauty and of all grandeur, and finds
his only semblance of comfort in a piety in which the
sneers of a bitter and exasperated irony are mingled
with a bottomless despair. During the 'sixties
Leopardi became one of the favourite poets of the
rising generation. But it was above all Richard
Wagner who appeared, in the light Of a living ir\os,r-
hailon of this new tendency in the German mind,
Ah optimist and a disciple of Feuerbach before 1848,
but after that year rapidly disillusioned by the failure
ul his revolutionary nopes, he found in the perusal
^oT Schopenhauer the revelation which enlightened
him upon himself and his own inclinations. And
I'rmri that, moment aosoiute renunciation, thfi abdica
tion of the selfish will to live, the religion of suffering
and pitv became the deepest sources from which his

332 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
inspiration was derived. In Tristan, the desperate
deSire of the modern soul to reach Mirvana and the
TNight that sets it free, the great peace ofdeath in
which all the painful illusions of the day~cTie~awav,
wnciL all the VTun~Torments of Jhis terrible life
are ::e58ed^~ was exprpsspd^ with tremendous force
and undeniable sincerity. And in Parsifal Wagner
chanted with equal fervour the ineffable victories of
the Will over itself, the infinite value of redeeming
pity and the hope for a regeneration of sinful man
through resignation and asceticism.
Little by little, however, the spiritual atmosphere
of Germany cleared. The military successes of 1866
and 1870, the magnificent economic rise of the
country and the advent of a great imperialist and
universal policy gave birth to fresh developments
in men's minds. The period of depression was fol
lowed by a joyous striving for power. The exalta
tion of the spirit of enterprise no longer allowed the
world to be regarded as a meaningless wilderness.
Action was considered of higher value than con
templation, and thus pessimism gradually became
obsolete. It was not merely opposed by optimists
of every kind, by the disciples of the religion of
progress, by those who laboured with Marx for the
advent of an era of happiness and justice among
men, and by all who believed that life could have a
meaning and humanity a mission. It was rejected,
or rather " outgrown," by the very minds which
showed the least disposition to accept consoling
hypotheses and optimistic interpretations. Nietzsche
placed the problem of the value of existence in a
fresh light. For Schopenhauer, life, since it had
neither a meaning nor an object, was something
absolutely detestable and bad. He felt in the pre-

FREE THOUGHT 333
sence of the will-to-live that instinctive horror which
certain delicate and timid natures experience before
any manifestations of elementary life. He had not
the smallest comprehension of that festive joy which
others feel in similar circumstances. Nietzsche, on
the other hand, had learnt from Darwin the great
fact of universal evolution. He thereupon saw in
the idea of an ascending evolution of the human
species a conception which allowed him to say " yea "
to life without on that account necessarily believing
in the existence of a final aim. Life is holy, not
because it tends to any particular end, but in itself,
because it grows and increases and amplifies itself.
Far from regarding it with repulsion, like Schopen
hauer, he loved it with a joyous and almost mystic
exaltation. He saw in it a magnificent festival, an
incomparable adventure, a marvellous joy. In his
poet's imagination, the Darwinian theory of evolu
tion was transfigured into that vision of an infinite
ascent to power which he celebrated in all his work
with such splendid lyric beauty.
What became of pessimism on this hypothesis ?
It was nothing but a disease, or, more correctly
speaking, the typical symptom of decadence. There
was according to Nietzsche a " pessimism of strength"
which points out the road to power and beauty
through suffering. But the weary pessimism which
will not suffer any more and which casts aspersions
upon life is the conception of the decadent in whom
the vital instinct is weak, and who no longer feels
within himself the creative force to beget anything
new. The pessimist is a degenerate, a sick man,
who must either get well or go away, but has no
business to poison the existence of healthy men, to
demoralise the powerful and to calumniate life.

334 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
Christianity, the democratic movement, Schopen-
hauerian pessimism, and Wagnerian romanticism,
were in Nietzsche's eyes so many manifestations of
this decadence and this weakening of vitality. And
he combated them not as one would refute an error,
but as one fights a disease. The triumph of pessimism
he would have regarded as the signal for a great
retrogression on the part of humanity. According to
him it was necessary for the present day to eliminate
this poison with which it was infected, to recover
the health and the joy in life, and to learn to say
" Yea " to life, to the whole of life, including suffer
ing and evil.
And gradually towards the end of the century the
worship of life spread further and further. The idea
that life by its very essence and on account of its
fundamental energies is something which is capable
of eternally " surpassing itself " and of evolving ever
higher forms, the faith in the development which is
not necessary, but quite possible, of the type man,
and the will to participate as energetically as pos
sible in this ascent to power are becoming more and
more prevalent among modern men. These ten
dencies found their most fundamental and charac
teristic poetical and philosophical expression in the
doctrines of Nietzsche, about which we must now
say a few words. IV
" We immoralists," said Nietzsche in his Will to
Power, " we are the most advanced." And he per
fectly well understood that this " magic of the
extreme " was doubtless the subtle and somewhat
perverse charm which drew to him the spirits of his
contemporaries.

FREE THOUGHT 335
Nietzsche was the incarnation of that profound
mistrust experienced by the nineteenth century for
every religious interpretation of the universe and
for all the comforting hypotheses in which humanity
had till then found consolation. The modern man
is afraid of being deceived ; he will not allow himself
to be taken in by his desire for beauty and goodness,
kindness and happiness ; he aspires to look reality
in the face without any illusions. Nietzsche experi
enced this feeling in the highest degree. He en
deavoured not only to form a theoretical conception
but also to realise and live in spirit by the hypothesis,
which was most diametrically opposed to the Chris
tian idea and to every optimistic philosophy — the
hypothesis that " God is dead," the nihilistic idea
of a universe without a God, without unity, without
law, and without any permanent substance — an
absolute phenomenism in which the only reality is
a process of Becoming which is quite callous and
devoid of meaning. The psychological penetration,
the superhuman energy and the concentrated passion
with which he gave himself up to this formidable
task, are his titles to a great and important position
in the history of thought during the nineteenth
century. It is possible, of course, to " lay a wager "
against the nihilistic hypothesis, as Pascal and Fichte,
for instance, did. It is also possible to condemn
the solution proposed by Nietzsche in order to escape
from pessimistic nihilism. But the most elementary
intellectual honesty commands us at least to examine
this possibility in all its bearings, if only in order
to win the right of rejecting it with a full knowledge
of the subject. Whatever objective value we may
assign to Nietzsche's theories, we can but render
homage to the bravery with which he threw himself

336 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
entirely, heart and soul, into the hazardous intel
lectual adventure which ended in that most tragic
catastrophe, the loss of his reason.
Moral optimism demands that the universe and
humanity should have a law, a final goal towards
which they should progress ; and man, by virtue of
time-established custom, has learnt to rise in his
own estimation in proportion as he conforms his
actions to this law and thus feels himself a collabo
rator with God. But, according to Nietzsche, this is
an illusion which is gradually dissipated as man
grows more self-conscious. In the beginning man
believed that at the head of the universe there was
a supreme legislator, and regarded the moral law as
the expression of the will of the Lord of the world.
Then gradually he arrived at the conviction that
" God was dead " and that the world had no master.
Whereupon he searched feverishly for a substitute
for God, for some power that was capable of laying
down the law and of authoritatively imposing a
mission upon man. Instead of a personal God he
tried worshipping the " moral consciousness " and
its categorical imperative, or Reason, or the " social
instinct " of " history " and the laws it contained ;
he found a goal for human life in " happiness," or
in the " happiness of the greatest number." Or,
again, he resigned himself to agnosticism, main
taining all the while that evolution must " lead
somewhere, no matter whither." Finally, after one
deception and another, man discovered that Becom
ing led nowhere, but merely unfurled its infinite
and senseless combinations by pure chance. At
the end of this path nihilism stared him in the face :
" Life — something which understands its nothingness,
and in the end suppresses itself."

FREE THOUGHT 337
Scientific optimism posited harmony between
thought and reality, and demanded for man the
hope of being able to form a more and more satis
factory image of the universe. " Illusion again,"
answered Nietzsche. Becoming is unthinkable. There
is in reality neither a thinking " subject " nor
" things " thought, neither " identical things " nor
cause and effect, nothing stable, permanent or
regular. All our knowledge of the universe is founded
upon a series of fundamental errors, upon an aggre
gate of fictions which are useful to life, upon a tre
mendous falsification of reality. But the instinct for
knowledge, which in its extreme form is the will to
truth at all costs, becomes, when it tries to dissipate
this useful biological phantasmagoria, a power which
is destructive to life — a form of nihilism.
Metaphysical optimism asserted that behind " the
world of phenomena," behind the stream of Becoming
there lay a " true world," the final home and last
refuge of the human soul. But soon this illusion
too was dissipated. Man confessed that he himself,
through his desire for eternity, was the author of this
" true world," and that he had fashioned this life
merely in order to believe himself immortal. And
from that moment intellectual honesty compelled
him to forgo all faith in a metaphysical reality or in
things or in himself, and he knew no other reality
but Becoming.
Thus we see what nihilism meant in Nietzsche's
eyes. Man began by distorting reality in conformity
with his own needs. He wished the world to de
velop towards an end appointed by God ; he wanted
it to be subjected to fixed and well-organised laws,
an immutable eternal substance free from change
and death. And he saw and imagined the universe
22

338 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
as he wished it to be. He valued reality in proportion
as it corresponded to this conception of his mind.
And then gradually he realised that he had been the
victim of an illusion. He therefore corrected the
image of the world he had made for himself, and
stripped reality of the qualities with which he had
authoritatively endowed it. But the universe im
mediately lost its charm. Man loved the lie to
which he had given birth. Reality — Becoming in
eternal motion, changeable and void of sense — seemed
hateful to him. Whereupon he was faced by a formid
able dilemma and he found himself, to use Nietzsche's
expression, obliged " to destroy either his table of
values or himself." For, if the table of values by
virtue of which he loves a fictitious world and con
demns the real world is correct and legitimate, it is
obvious that the nihilist should logically detest and
try to destroy this bad reality. But if on the con
trary the table of values is a fictitious one, it is
none the less evident that the judgment passed by
it upon reality is also erroneous, and should be
rejected ; in this case he must revise his table of
values from top to bottom, he must proceed, accord
ing to Nietzsche's celebrated formula, to a " trans-
valuation of all values."
This transvaluation Nietzsche urges men to make.
The hypothesis he proposes to induce them to do so
is well known.
The table of values in the name of which the nihil
istic pessimist condemns reality and adores fiction
is the product of " decadence." The belief in a
metaphysical world beyond Becoming, the faith in a
world of Being, of finality and of unity — in other
words the Christian faith, for according to Nietzsche
it is Christianity that embodies this conception of life

FREE THOUGHT 339
— is essentially a consolatory fiction by means of
which a crowd of degenerates, weaklings and wretches
have provided themselves with a plausible interpreta
tion of their sufferings, and have hidden from their
own eyes the sight of their weakness and decay. Take
away this " vital falsehood," place them face to face
with reality with all its ugliness and misery, and
these people would succumb to despair. Very
different is the outlook upon the world on the part
of the Strong, who have a superabundance of health
and energy. Why should the spectacle of Becoming
without end inspire them with fear and horror ? If
the decadent rejects it with terror, it is because, con
scious as he is of his own degeneracy, he feels the need
of thinking himself a collaborator with God, in order
to believe his own value ; because he has not the
strength to give a meaning to life and to lay down
his own law. But the Man of Power who feels his
own creative energy and knows that he is able to
give a form to the " chaos " of Becoming, and can
impose his own law upon a callous life-force, who has
faith in his will to organise the universe, can also
accept without revolt the idea that universal evolu
tion should be meaningless in itself. His nihilism,
instead of being pessimistic, is Dionysian. The
spectacle of Becoming, the hypothesis of eternal re
currence, which is so crushing for the weak, becomes
a triumphant and intoxicating vision for the creator
who has succeeded in giving a meaning to life and in
saying " Yea " to the eternal recurrence of Becoming.
In short, European nihilism was, in Nietzsche's
eyes, a decisive and salutary crisis. By dissipating
the mirage with which Christianity and Christian
philosophy had surrounded reality, it acted in the
capacity of an extremely powerful selective agent.

340 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
It was the touchstone by which to test the strong and
the weak, healthy men and decadents. The latter
it would break, and help them to disappear more
quickly, which would be an advantage alike to them
selves and to the world at large. But it would inspire
the courage of the others and fill them with fresh
enthusiasm for the conquest of power and for the
infinite development of the type man.
Thus we see how, in the philosophy of Nietzsche,
the principal tendencies which predominated in the
nineteenth century are asserted and exalted.
The modern man believes in the organising power
of the human will and intelligence. Nietesche pro
claims that the man of genius is the creator of all
values, that he determines good and evil, that he
creates " truth " itself and gives a meaning to Be
coming. Superman takes the place left empty by
the death of God : " Superman is the meaning of the
world," says Zarathustra. " Your will should say :
Let Superman be the meaning of the world."1
The modern man has learnt to disbelieve in miracles
and grows more and more sceptical with regard to
the Christian conception, which subjects man and
the universe to the will of God, and he is also exceed
ingly doubtful about a Church in which he sees
a power which is supremely hostile to human free
dom. Nietzsche loudly proclaims his uncompromising
hatred of Christianity. God is only a creation on the
part of human suffering and weakness, a mirage
which will vanish as soon as man has regained his
1 For the benefit of all those who are unacquainted with
Nietzsche's philosophy it should be noted that behind the idea
of the Superman no new physiological species was anticipated by
Nietzsche, but merely a " Ruler -man "• — a man superior in spirit
and will to his fellows and with power and capacity to govern
them. — Tb.

FREE THOUGHT 341
health and learnt to realise the energies he hides
within himself. Christianity is the great conspiracy
of the miserable and the " physiologically botched "
against the strong and powerful ; it is the gigantic
lie by means of which decadents have attempted to
poison the intellectual and moral atmosphere of
Europe ; it is the terrible virus which, if its effects
became universal, would turn the world into a laza
retto ; it is, in the scornful words of the Antichrist,
"the one immortal blemish of mankind. . . ."
The modern man is inclined to intellectual and
moral scepticism ; he is a pessimist, full of suspicion
with regard to all consolatory hypotheses, and he
remains in a state of perplexity before the threatening
problem of suffering. Nietzsche pushes his scepticism
to the point of nihilism. He professes the most
radical form of phenomenism. His " immorality "
realises that vices and virtues proceed from the same
source ; that man, in order to develop, must inevit
ably grow both in good and evil, just as a tree plunges
its roots all the more deeply into the ground the more
proudly it lifts its branches in the air ; that the
superior type of the human race is not the " good "
man of the old traditional morality, but the powerful
man who can endure without being broken " that
tension of the antagonistic elements " in human
nature, and sums up in his own harmonious and
complex personality the two contradictory aspects
of life, its creative force and its destructive power.
Lastly, Nietzsche is a profound pessimist inasmuch
as he holds an essentially " combative " and " tragic "
view of life. But his Dionysian nihilism, instead of
allowing itself to be depressed by the formidable
vision of senseless Becoming and eternal human
suffering, finds in this very spectacle a cause of en-

342 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
thusiasm. His " pessimism of strength " recognises
that suffering and evil have no need of justification,
and that evil is the necessary " complement " of good.
And he finally ends by the whole-hearted acceptance
of human destiny, and with an enthusiastic hymn to
life, with all its magnificence and cruelty — prolific
and devouring life, which incessantly and without
pity destroys its own creations, and yet remains ever
lastingly the same, indestructible, constantly reborn,
eternally young and fair.

The influence of Nietzsche upon the German thought
of to-day has been considerable. The nobility of his
moral nature, his magnificent intrepidity of thought,
his infectious passion as an apostle and a prophet
have won respect from all. Even those who were
most diametrically opposed to his tendencies, the
Christians and the Socialists, could not refuse to
grant him their esteem, and brought themselves at
least partially to assimilate his ideas. A Protestant
pastor has written Zarathustra Sermons, and a militant
Socialist has endeavoured to adapt to the needs of
the people the aristocratic thought of the three great
hermits of art and philosophical meditation — Schopen
hauer, Wagner and Nietzsche. The prophet of the
Will to Power and the Superman is not only admired
as a great poet, a psychologist of the first rank, and a
profound connoisseur of the human heart, but he has
also had great influence as an initiator into the life
of the spirit.
Yet to what extent has this influence been a pro
found, a widespread and durable one ? It is, in my
opinion, very difficult to decide this point as yet.

FREE THOUGHT 343
The outside observer is clearly convinced that
Nietzsche cannot stand as the typical mouthpiece of
the aspirations which are to-day predominant in Ger
many. He is a brilliant exception, an extraordinary
" case " which is studied and admired. But I should
be very much surprised to find that the number of
those who go to him for rules of conduct and an
interpretation of life is very great. It seems to me
that he is still or has once more become " out of
season," to use his own well-known expression.
" Modern Germany," says Nietzsche, " represents
such an enormous store of inherited and acquired
capacity, that for some time it might spend this
accumulated treasure even with some prodigality.
It is no superior culture that has ultimately become
prevalent with this modern tendency, nor is it by any
means delicate taste, or noble beauty of the instincts,
but rather a number of virtues more manly than
any that other European countries can show. An
amount of good spirits and self-respect, plenty of
firmness in human relations and in the reciprocity
of duties ; much industry and much perseverance,
and a certain inherited soberness which is much more
in need of a spur than of a brake. Let me add that
in this country people still obey without feeling
that obedience humiliates. And no one despises his
opponent." '
What has this modern Germany, which is by no
means decadent, this somewhat ponderous, robust,
and well-disciplined Germany, with her magnificent
army, her solid administration, her strong organisa
tion of scientific work, her powerful industrial and
1 This English rendering is taken from Dr. Oscar Levy's
Authorised English Translation of Nietzsche's Complete Works.
(See The Twilight of the Idols, p. 50).— Tr.

344 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
commercial activity, her great schemes of insurance
and social forethought — what has she to do with
Nietzschean Radicalism ? Nietzsche, who had small
admiration for the new Empire, said about it :
" Power stupefies." And this new Germany on her
part pays but scant courtesy to the Superman. At
times she rejects Nietzsche with horror. At others
she despises him as a " dilettante " who did not
master any science fundamentally and in detail. Or
else she politely pays him the tribute of homage
due to a national celebrity, but seeks elsewhere for
inspiration and guidance. She disapproves of the
uncompromising thoroughness with which he pushes
his ideas to their most extreme logical conclusions.
She sees in him a romantic exaggeration with which
a few idealists and men of letters can toy, but which
remains extremely problematical and has no future
before it. At heart this practical and positive Ger
many seems but little disposed to indulge in any
extremes, either in the domain of action or of thought.
We have already seen how in politics she sought
out moderate solutions, provisional compromises
between the monarchical and democratic principles,
between nationalism and imperialism, between the
interests of the agrarian Conservatives and the in
dustrial middle classes, between those of capitalistic
enterprise and the working masses. By its very
nature, this Germany is not, apparently, " Radical,"
and it seems to me, that in the spiritual sphere as
well, any extreme solutions, such as those advanced
by Nietzsche, appear picturesque but improbable in
her eyes, and she does not take them altogether
seriously. We have already seen, on the other hand, how the
Germany of to-day, which is so realistic, so tenacious

FREE THOUGHT 345
in her struggle for power and wealth, has proclaimed
a fresh return to idealism, a new aspiration for a high
culture, and a will for social justice and charity. But
this reactionary movement against the utilitarian
realism of the second half of the century is not
apparently tending in the direction of Nietzsche's
ideas. It is true that the poet of Zarathustra is in
a certain sense a " romantic," an opponent of intel-
lectualism and even, in spite of his atheism, a highly
religious nature — " the most pious of all them that
believe not in God," as Zarathustra says. And in
this respect he is certainly a representative of the
new idealism. But, on the other hand, it must not
be forgotten, that this romanticist has judged and
condemned romanticism with the utmost vigour,
that this profoundly religious spirit has proclaimed
with all the energy at his command and with pas
sionate conviction the absolute bankruptcy of Chris
tianity and every religious ideal. And on this point
he has not been followed by his countrymen.
On the contrary, the characteristic feature of the
last few years seems to be a renaissance, in Germany,
of a certain religious mysticism, which is revealed by
a series of significant symptoms : the victorious
resistance of Catholicism to the Kulturkampf, the
political triumph of the Centre ; the growth of a new
Catholic literature and philosophy ; and in the
Protestant camp the success of the " social evan
gelical " party and its effort to fashion out of Christian
thought some principle of social policy. And the
renewal of the vitality of the churches is not the
only symptom of this movement. The lay world is
also lured into participating in this new tendency.
A breath of vague and mystic idealism suffuses novels
and plays, from Hauptmann's Sunken Bell and

346 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
Sudermann's Johannes to Rosegger's Gottsucher. As
was the case at the beginning of the nineteenth
century, men are apparently seeking a " new God."
Criticism is plunging with growing curiosity into the
history of German romanticism and is analysing its
religious idealism with a sympathetic spirit. And
the bulk of the public is seeking food for its need
of religious emotion in books like Harnack's Essence
of Christianity.
And what precisely does this neo-romanticism
which is not peculiar to Germany, and the symptoms
of which are to be found everywhere in Europe,
signify ? Is it a sincere revival of traditional re
ligious beliefs — a vague homesickness for the lost
paradises of faith ? Or is it something less than
this — a mere literary vogue which will die like the
fashion for naturalism and symbolism ? People will
lean to one or other of these interpretations in
accordance with their own convictions and impres
sions. But the significance of this movement,
especially in Germany, can certainly not be regarded
as negligible. It is clear, at all events, that this
neo-romantic atmosphere is not favourable to the
diffusion of an anti-Christian radicalism. Germany
seems quite as little inclined to cast Christianity
finally aside in the spiritual domain as to reject the
monarchical principle in the sphere of actual life.
She seeks to amend rather than to destroy. She is
of the opinion that each of the two antagonistic
principles contains an element of truth, and en
deavours to reconcile them rather than to eliminate
one by an arbitrary and violent process of simplifica
tion. And it is for this reason that I am doubtful whether
Nietzsche, in spite of his admirable moral nobility

FREE THOUGHT 347
and his genius, is really, in the eyes of the present
generation in Germany, the prophet of a new era.
People believe in the advent of a new idealism.
They believe that Germany, after her military and
economic successes, is to-day marching towards an
artistic, philosophical, and moral renaissance. They
hope for the swift return of an epoch of " classical "
culture, which will be steadier and more balanced
than the age of feverish and hasty transition in
which we are at present living. After the violent
and often anarchical struggle of the individual
towards power, wealth, and scientific utilitarian
rationalism, men began to aspire towards a new
" order," more stable in all its departments, in the
domain of actuality as well as in that of thought.
Average public opinion in Germany does not demand
war to the knife against the old powers, but rather
a happy compromise between the tendencies of the
past and the present.
Under these circumstances, the master whom
those who have undertaken to draw up the balance-
sheet of the century proclaim most loudly is Goethe.
To the radically uncompromising attitude and the
" combative " philosophy of the prophet of Super
man they prefer the rule of tolerance, fair intellectual
and moral equilibrium, and the marvellous self-
possession of the sage of Weimar. It is under his
patronage that they would place the German cul
ture of the future. And indeed they could not find
a better one. Let us accept the omeii and wish, for
our part also, that the Germany of to-morrow may
become more and more a Germany " according to
Goethe."

BOOK IV
EVOLUTION IN ART

349

CHAPTER I
THE VALUE OF ART

At the same time as the anti-rationalist reaction
which set in towards the end of the eighteenth
century gradually gave religious sentiment the pre
cedence of theoretical reason, it also tended to place
art at the head of the tables of values.
The era of enlightenment had but a mediocre
comprehension of the nature of art. Absolutely per
suaded of the sovereign power of reason, it saw in
art, not an end in itself, but merely a convenient
instrument for communicating to the multitude
certain philosophical or moral truths in an agreeable
form. And, moreover, it formed a mechanical and,
as a rule, somewhat primitive conception of artistic
creations. It compared the poet, the painter or the
musician to clever craftsmen who fashion more or
less successful articles according to whether or not
they have imitated good models and used the best
means prescribed by their craft. Hence the pre
sumptuous indiscretion with which the critic allowed
himself to domineer over the artist, to formulate
theoretical rules for the creation of masterpieces,
and to judge whether the works were beautiful or
not — that is to say, whether they were in conformity
with these rules. 351

352 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
But modern subjectivism repudiated this mechan
istic interpretation. Like the majority of the great
creations of the human spirit, like religion and
language, morality and law, poetry and art did not
seem to it the products of reflection and intelligence,
but were rather organisms which were born and
developed, which prospered or died by virtue of the
germ of vitality within them, organisms which de
manded care and respect as living entities, and
which must only be touched with a wise precaution,
if they were not to wither away immediately. The
work of art, therefore, was no longer regarded as a
product of human industry. Quite the contrary.
The work which seemed to be the fruit of a too self-
conscious art, that was over-clever in calculating its
effects, was now condemned. A masterpiece was not
made, but born. It was a living organism brought
into the world by the genius, in virtue of an inner
necessity. In the act of artistic creation the genius
was unconscious and in a sense passive. He was
compared to the woman with child, to the bee that
secretes honey, to the bird that sings, to the somnam
bulist who succeeds in his perilous climbing. Hence
also the predilection of the age for works in which
the art was quite spontaneous and even anonymous,
and which seemed to be the creation not of one
individual but of an epoch, a race, a tribe ; hence
the taste for popular poetry — whether real or
spurious — for Macpherson-Ossian as much as for the
old English and Scotch songs, for Homer, or the
poets of the Bible.
At the same moment as the Germans learnt to
conceive of art as a living organism, they also dis
covered in ancient Greece the classic land of beauty.
The old humanism had set itself the task of con-

the Value of art 353
tinuing the work of classical antiquity and of Roman
antiquity in particular, and thus of making the
student capable of writing and philosophising like
the ancients. Neo-Hellenism in the form in which
it was revived in the German universities of the
eighteenth century under the guidance of such masters
as Gesner and Heyne, had very different aims. It
no longer wished to imitate antiquity ; it simply
aimed at understanding and savouring it, and at
moulding the minds of modern men, their tastes and
judgment by contact with the most perfect works
which the human genius had ever produced. And
in this form it obtained considerable success. Not
only did it triumph in the universities from the end
of the eighteenth century ; not only did it, from
the beginning of the nineteenth century, inspire the
reform of secondary education with its spirit ; but
it also spread beyond university centres, and won
over the educated public. Winckelmann opened out
fresh horizons for his contemporaries on the subject
of Greek art by showing that the masterpieces of
Greek sculpture were not the artificial products of
academic aesthetics, but the natural and spontaneous
fruit of the Hellenic genius. Lessing opposed the
dramatic aesthetics of the French with Aristotle and
the true dramatic doctrines of the ancients. Herder
represented Greek civilisation as the age of the
radiant adolescence of humanity, and proclaimed
that no nation was superior to the Greeks, among
whom for the first time mankind was raised to
clear self -consciousness. William of Humboldt main
tained that " no people combined such great simpli
city and naturalness with so great a culture." And
lastly Frederick Augustus Wolff regarded the study
of Hellenic civilisation as the best introduction to the
23

354 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
knowledge of man, and taught that Greece alone
among the nations " afforded us the spectacle of a
people which had developed organically till it reached
its full bloom." He asserted the independence and
self-sufficiency of philology, which had till then been
considered an auxiliary science to jurisprudence and
theology, and raised it to an end in itself and almost
a religion for humanity.
With the great classicists of Germany, therefore —
with Goethe, Schiller and Humboldt — there came
into being an idealistic conception of Hellenism which
ended in a veritable religion of beauty. Hellenic
civilisation was in their eyes the period of synthesis
which followed upon the wane of Asiatic and Egyptian
civilisation. It seemed to them that the soul of
humanity had in a sense concentrated all its energies
in order to create this marvellous bud which summed
up and gave expression to the whole of the Indo-
European culture of the past and the future. In
fact, the chief characteristic of the Greeks was that
they were the epitome of mankind as a whole and
realised as individuals that ideal of harmonious
abundance, of " completeness," which used to hover
before the mind of Goethe. They had the unique
privilege of condensing every human energy into one
perfect whole, a marvellously refined sensitiveness,
a lucid intellect, a magic imagination and a powerful
will. All these diverse gifts were in their case har
moniously welded and authoritatively combined in
each individual unit. The Greek soul was in a sense
the primordial and superior prototype of the human
soul. It was really divine, because humanity is
nothing less than the manifestation par excellence of
the divine in nature.
And this splendid efflorescence of Hellenic culture

THE VALUE OF ART 355
was a unique period in the annals of humanity. To
the epoch of contraction which had given it birth
there succeeded in fact a period of expansion. In
modern nations also the ideal image of the species
could be found. But this image instead of being
manifested in its completeness in every man was now
only partially realised by the individual. The beauti
ful synthetic unity of ancient Hellas had been shat
tered. Modern man developed his faculties one by
one, and he never developed them all ; he was, gener
ally speaking, merely a fragment of humanity.
Chained to some strictly circumscribed task, riveted
to a particular point in the great social mechanism,
he was shaped or rather deformed by his duties. He
was no longer a " man," but simply a special wheel
in the vast machine. The same applied to nations
as to individuals. Greek culture had been perpetu
ated in modern countries, but each nation displayed
the exaggerated development of a particular charac
teristic of the Hellenic genius. In the Roman the
practical wisdom and the solid reason of the Greeks
lived again ; in the Italian their sparkling imagination ;
in the Spaniard that inclination towards exaltation
which he held in check with so much care ; in the
sentimental Englishman that sweet melancholy which
enveloped the whole of Greek life like a light veil ;
in the Frenchman, the sense of beautiful form ; in
the German, profundity of thought. Thus modern
culture regarded as a whole was certainly the blossom
of ancient culture ; but the Eternal-Human was
no longer realised in its entirety, either by an isolated
people or in an individual.
The task of the future must therefore be an effort
in the direction of concentration. The era of dis
integration through which humanity was at present

356 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
passing must be again followed by a period of syn
thesis. And for this the Greeks must be studied, not,
indeed, with the object of returning once more to
Hellenic culture, but in order to " give birth to a new
Greece," and restore the complete image of Humanity
— of a Humanity, moreover, which would be richer
and more complex than that which once flourished
in Greece, a Humanity that had assimilated the re
sults of two thousand years of culture. This was the
ideal towards which a Faust or a Wilhelm Meister
aimed. And the great representatives of classicism
were persuaded that, of all the nations of the world,
the Germans were predestined one day to attain this
ideal. They possessed a suppleness of mind which
helped them to comprehend all foreign productions,
an instinctive impartiality which rendered them
capable of understanding and judging other nations
from an absolutely objective standpoint, and a
certain universality in their gifts and abilities which
explained why their national genius did not present
such accentuated features as that of other countries,
but which permitted them, on the other hand, to
assimilate the fruits of the most diverse cultures.
The Germans were, in a word, " the most human of
all the nations," and consequently the best fitted
one day to realise that harmonious synthesis of all
the elements of human nature of which the Greeks
set the example, and which was the goal towards which
modern times were tending.
The high position which art holds in the conception
of life as it was pictured by the great German clas
sicists is evident. The end which they assigned for
humanity was the imitation of the Greeks, the
aesthetic culture of the ego. Knowledge, in Goethe's
eyes, was not merely theoretical and rational, it was

THE VALUE OF ART 357
also intuitive — it was the result not only of abstract
thought, but also of the direct and concrete vision
of things. The Good, according to Schiller, was not
simply the outcome of the absolute triumph of
practical Reason over the inclinations, as Kant taught ;
but " beautiful souls " could realise in themselves
the perfect concord between natural impulses and the
moral law. In the eyes of both Goethe and Schiller
moral superiority consisted in the harmonious develop
ment of all the energies which the human microcosm
contained. Art thus led to the True and the Good.
And the Good and the True in their turn, when they
attained perfection, would blossom into Beauty.
And this religion of Beauty exercised a profound
influence upon the thought of the whole of the nine
teenth century. It is to be found in the great repre
sentatives of philosophical idealism. Fichte saw, in
the mists of the future, beyond the era of Science,
in which Reason and her law are perceived with
perfect clearness, a period of art in which humanity,
by the exercise of the perfect liberty which it will
realise at the end of its evolution, will again clothe
truth and science in beauty. Schelling maintained
that art, in which the complete balance between con
scious and unconscious activity is revealed, is the
most perfect expression of the ego. He admitted the
fundamental identity of genius and nature ; the ideal
world of art and the real world of objects are the
products of one and the same activity, which, in its
unconscious action, creates the real and visible world
of things, and in its unconscious manifestation gives
birth to the aesthetic world of art. The world taken
as a whole, therefore, is a work of art ; it is " the
still unconscious poetry of the Spirit." Art reveals
the identity of the real and the ideal, it is the key to

358 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
the mystery of the world, it shows how the ideal
becomes incarnate and how intelligence is the creator
of nature. For Hegel, art, religion and philosophy
were the three degrees that could be distinguished
in the sphere of absolute Spirit : Art was the absolute
Spirit perceiving its own essence in complete freedom,
it was Spirit penetrating matter and transforming
it into its own image. With Schopenhauer genius
was the marvellous gift, imparted to a small number
of the elect, of rising to the disinterested contempla
tion of things ; and the work of genius, art, had the
privilege of " reproducing the eternal ideas which it
had conceived by means of pure contemplation — that
is to say, the essential and the permanent among all
the phenomena of the world."
The romanticists in their turn vied with each
other in proclaiming the sublime mission of art.
Friedrich Schlegel transfigured in his own way in the
domain of art the idealism of Fichte, which showed us
the ego opposing to itself the non-ego in order finally
to realise the identity of the ego and the non-ego.
He compared the creative act of the ego, such as
Fichte described it, to the act of artistic creation.
The poet and the artist created a fictitious world ; but,
at bottom, this world had as much reality as the
external and so-called real world. The only difference
which existed between these two worlds was that the
latter was an unconscious creation of the ego, whilst
the former was the conscious creation of the same ego.
We merely attributed an independent existence to the
non-ego by virtue of an illusion which would disappear
with the progress of consciousness. Thus, in pro
portion as we came to see more clearly into ourselves,
we should perceive more and more distinctly the
identity between the world of reality and that of

THE VALUE OF ART 359
poetry, and the fact that the universe was the work
of art of the supreme ego and that the real artist
was a creator of worlds.
Novalis, in his theory of magic idealism, pushed
to its most extreme consequences this paradoxical
comparison between the poetic genius and the creator
of the real world. Art seemed to him the liberating
power by which the ego would gradually raise itself
to omnipotence. The artist of to-day created partial
illusions by making use of such and such an organ,
of which he disposed authoritatively. Thus the
painter, who by means of his palette called a whole
world of dreams into being, in a certain sense exer
cised power over the organ of sight ; similarly the
musician disposed of hearing and the poet of the
imagination and the sentiment. Now imagine all
these partial geniuses synthetised into one unique
and supreme genius, who moulded a universe according
to his fancy, and created his own particular world,
complete in all its parts, instead of having to submit
to contact with a strange reality, and the type of the
magic idealist was obtained. Art was thus the first
stage in the conquest of the world by the ego at
which the mystic aimed. And the supreme victory of
idealism, the advent of the " Kingdom of Eternity,"
would also be the apotheosis of poetry. When the
Kingdom of the Sun together with the reign of dual-
istic illusion had been annihilated, Fable would take
the place of the Parcae, Poetry would replace Fate
and weave the woof of universal destiny. Really
happy life did not mean, as philosophical idealism
would have it do, the reign of absolute Reason ; it
was also the triumph of Beauty, it unravelled itself
freely, like a harmonious poem or a divine dream.
And if all romanticists do not go to such lengths

360 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
as Novalis in the deification of art and the glorifica
tion of its magic power, they were all artists at heart
and inclined to identify art, philosophy, and religion.
They regarded the mission of the artist as that of a
priest, and sought in poets, painters, and musicians
the most profound revelations concerning the mystery
of the universe, looking up to them as seers who
expressed by their poetical, musical, or plastic symbols
truths of a superior order to which the intellect by
its own unaided efforts could not rise.
This cult of art confined to evist, ronphly spenlr-
ing, throughout the whole of frh<» nineteenth "etitiny
It is to be found (to give two examples only) in two
of the greatest artists of modern GprrriQriy — ir> TTqbb.p1
and Richard Wagner.
In agreement with the romanticists, Hebbel pro
claimed that, in order to attain to a consciousness
of human destiny such as it really is in its tragic
necessity, man can choose two paths, that of the
intellect and that of intuition, the path of science or
the path of art. In common with them he was also
persuaded of the inferiority of the conscious intellect
as a means of knowledge, and deeply convinced that
the most complete image of reality could only be
attained by intuition, by that " inner illumination "
which sprang up in the soul of the poet. Art was,
in his eyes, the continuation of the act of creation ;
it was the expression at once private and symbolical
of universal Becoming; it was the sublime sob of
human pain, the moral consciousness of humanity,
the living proof of philosophy, and the highest form
of life.
. And in Wa.gnoi'?« ww "1g'\ nrf wag the liberating
principle par excellence. The artist, in the ideal
images he created, made man perceive _by direct

THE VALUE OF ART 361
intuition the goal towards which he was aiming in
every branch of his activity. Whilst the man of
MclWlce and tne philosopher endeavoured to understand
the universe and to formulate by means of the in
tellect and for the sake of the intellect the physical
"and moral laws of the world, the artist through his
symbols translated for the complete man the purely
theoretic and nhctront ^v.r.opf jnn of the man of
thought. Whilst the " religious " man regarded the
conversion of the selfish will as the final goal to
which all the efforts of humanity should be directed,
the poet conjured up before our eyes the consoling
image of our future victories and the radiant spec
tacle of regenerated humanity. The work of art,
Wagner proclaimed, was " the living representation of
religion." The fictions of artists, like the religious
allegories of priests, were symbolical images of that
eternal truth which eluded all direct representation.
Music especially, which Wagner agreed with_^chopen-
hauer in regarding as the direct expression ofthe
will, was marvellously adapted Lu Lull the UhroflEe'
-great tragedy of the fairamTtfe"iidLiii|jlisft-trl: man
as it really was in its most fundamental reality. A
symphony by Beethoven was a higher and purer
revelation of Christian faith than all the dogmas of
the priests. Modern religious faith was tired of the
traditional religious allegories, which were so touch
ing in their simplicity and yet so imperfect, and
which became lies as soon as an attempt was made
to impose them as historical or metaphysical dogmas.
It was in the great creations of a Sophocles, a
Shakespeare or a Beethoven, and above all in musical
drama, that superior form of symphony, that we
found the highest expression of the religious senti
ment, the religious myth in its modern shape.

362 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
Thus throughout the nineteenth century we find
under various forms the fundamental conviction of
the infinite value of art and of the superior mission
of the artist. Whether it regards a beautiful exist
ence as the final end of human culture, whether it
identifies artistic creation with the creative act from
which the world has proceeded, whether it attributes
to the poetical interpretation of the universe a
degree of " truth " as great as, or even greater than,
the scientific interpretation, or whether it sees in
the artist the successor of the priest and the best
authorised interpreter of our religious faith, German
thought at all events assigns to art an exceedingly
^^Slgh paaitioiK — rb'QT iL honours in art a power of the
same rank as science, mSraiityT~Qr__re1 '

II
The development of the system of enterprise
levelled a serious blow at this modern religion of art
and a high level of general culture.
In the first place, it had the result of putting the
problem of culture in an absolutely positive and
prosaic light. For the modern commercial mind,
culture was merely a commodity which was valued
very highly by an ever larger section of the public.
The production of culture was accordingly regarded
as an industry, and a flourishing industry. And in
deed with the general growth in wealth there was a
very large increase in the number of those who could
lay claim to a finished education, and especially in
the number of intellectual workers who were in a
position to devote themselves exclusively to a pro
fession which was not directly useful to material
existence. Under these circumstances people aimed

THE VALUE OF ART 363
at producing culture " wholesale." And during the
nineteenth century the tremendous extension was
witnessed in all enterprises calculated to spread
culture in every shape and form among all ranks of
the nation.
Firstly, public education was developed to con
siderable proportions. A few figures will give a
rough idea of the progress made. In 1882 Prussia
had 20,440 primary schools with 1,427,045 scholars ;
in 1901 she had 4,413 schools with 35,733 classes in
the towns, and in the country 32,332 schools with
68,349 classes and a school population of over
5,680,000 scholars. Secondary education increased
in similar proportions : in 1835 Prussia had 136
grammar schools and preparatory schools ; in 1905
she had 363, to which must be added 335 technical
schools and colleges. Not less striking, in spite of
the marked falling off in the faculty of theology,
which during the course of the century lost almost
half its numbers, is the increase in the total number
of students at the universities, which from 15,870 in
1830 and 12,426 in 1850 rose to 37,677 in 1905. The
expenditure on public instruction and culture in
Prussia grew from about 10 millions of marks in
1850 to 185 millions in 1905.
In every respect the progress was remarkable.
Not only were the institutions and the old type of
teaching developed, but during the course of the
nineteenth century a whole host of new creations
came into existence — schools, superior technical,
agricultural and commercial schools, technical and
commercial colleges, classes for adults and professional
instruction of all kinds, popular universities, free or
paid lectures, public libraries, collections and museums
of all sorts. The school population and the teaching

364 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
staffs increased enormously at the same time as the
professional capacity of these teachers was also im
proved. The total amount of instruction dispensed
to the nation showed a prodigious increase. Ger
many, as we have already seen, prides herself upon
marching at the head of the civilised nations of the
world with regard to the organisation of education ;
and she applies herself with jealous care to the task
of not allowing herself to be out-distanced, in this
sphere, by rival countries.
Second in importance to the schools are books.
Germany, as is well known, is the greatest book-
producer in the world. At the beginning of the cen
tury the number of new works published was not
more than 3,900 a year. It rose in 1900 to 24,792,
in 1905 to 28,886; whilst France, which holds the
second place as a book-producer, only reached in
1904 a total of 12,139 works. If the average number
of books in an edition is placed at 1000, it has been
estimated that Germany prints every year about one
book to every two inhabitants ! The book trade is
in the most flourishing condition : it possessed in
1905, 7,152 establishments, and exported abroad
290 millions of marks' worth of goods. It seems,
moreover, that the production of books is assuming
a more and more industrial character. The author —
even in the case of scientific works — is tending to
become nothing more than a kind of executive agent,
almost completely subordinated to the publisher,
who commissions him to produce such and such a
work. The multiplication of dictionaries, encyclo
paedias, " collections " and libraries of all sorts, and
of books that come out in parts, etc., clearly proves
that the majority of works actually published have
their origin in speculation on the part of the pub-

THE VALUE OF ART 365
Usher rather than in any artistic thought or scientific
idea, Germany is inundated with books, whilst news
papers and reviews swarm in even greater numbers.
As early as 1825 Goethe hurled his fulminations
against journalism, with its " disintegrating criticism "
and its blustering publicity — which, it is true, spread
among the masses a sort of semi-culture, but " was
for all creative talent a fatal fog, a seductive poison
which blighted the young shoots of the imagination,
stripped it of its brilliant foliage, and penetrated into
the depths in which the vital spunk and the most deli
cate fibres lay hid." Now, about that time there were
845 newspapers in Prussia. In 1869 there were 2,127.
In 1891 the number of papers subjected to the postal
tax reached 7,082. And the circulation of all these
papers increased to most formidable proportions.
During the last twenty years the number of news
papers which have passed through the post has
almost trebled, rising from 500 millions in 1885 to
1,500 millions in 1905. Complaints against the abuse
of journalism and against the mediocre quality of
the semi-culture which these papers pour forth in
floods among the public have not ceased since Goethe's
time. But the evil — if evil it is — has only grown
worse. And like the book trade, the trade in news,
propagated either by means of print or pictures, has
acquired a more and more colossal circulation.
Under these circumstances artistic production in
its turn tends more and more to become indus
trialised. Concerts, theatrical representations, and
artistic exhibitions of all kinds show a ceaseless
increase. From 1882 to 1895 the number of people
earning their livelihood as musicians or in connection
with the theatre rose from 46,508 to 65,565, thus

366 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
showing an increase of 41 per cent., whilst in the same
lapse of time the population only increased by 14 per
cent. We know the loud anathemas which Richard
Wagner hurled, in the middle of the century, against
the " selfish " art which sprang from the capital
istic system, the art which was vitiated and perverted
in its essence out of covetousness for " golden guineas "
— the venal and artificial art destined not to satisfy
the instinctive need of beauty, which always lies
dormant in the hearts of the people, but the fictitious
and demoralising need of luxury, or the unhealthy
thirst for distractions and pleasures which tortures
the rich. In their romantic exaggeration Wagner's
diatribes express an undeniable fact, which is that
under the impulse of the spirit of capitalistic enter
prise art tends less and less to become a disinterested
and idealistic effort to attain beauty, but develops
into the methodical and organised exploitation of the
need of luxury and adornment, of distraction and
amusement, not only among the rich but also among
the mass of the people. There is no doubt that great
theatrical and musical enterprises, exhibitions of
pictures or decorative art are above all of the nature
of industrial enterprises. Just as the " man of
science " sometimes appears as the mere paid crafts
man in some great publishing venture, so too the
" artist " often becomes merely a purveyor to the
theatre, the review, or the library, and works, not
in obedience to his inner " genius," but simply to
^atisfy some well-known and undeniable public taste.
There exists to-day a trade in the theatre and in
novels, in opera and singing, in pictures and statues ;
and every day it becomes more difficult to decide
where industry ends and art begins, and to fix the
limit which separates the manufactured article devoid

THE VALUE OF ART 367
of all aesthetic value from the superior work in which
is embodied a disinterested attempt at beauty.
At the same time as the change, the general char
acter of which I have just sketched, took place in the
domain of culture and art, the position the latter
held in the scale of values was also modified.
From the moment that the will to power and to
wealth became the dominating instinct, and the
pursuit of the useful tended, in an ever more marked
fashion, to take the first place in public estimation,
it was also natural that culture and art should lose
their prestige. Classical or romantic idealism saw
in the free play of the spiritual energies of man, in
philosophy, art, poetry and religion the highest form
of human activity, and proclaimed with Friedrich
Schlegel : " The highest good and the only thing in
the world that matters is culture." The realistic
and positive spirit of the nineteenth century soon
contradicted this verdict. As early as Goethe this
change of opinion was announced in the Travels of
Wilhelm Meister. In distinction to the ideal of a
complete culture and the harmonious development of
all the energies of the ego, Goethe insisted upon the
necessity for specialisation which alone would make
the individual a useful member of society : "To
know and do one thing well secures a higher develop
ment than to do a hundred fairly well." The first
duty of man was to learn one trade well. For mediocre
spirits this trade would remain a trade ; in the case
of superior natures it would become an art. And the
genius himself would see in the one thing he did to
perfection, the emblem of all that was well done, the
symbol of every really fruitful and useful activity.
The exercise of some activity that was practical and
useful to society was thus imposed by Goethe as an

368 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
obligation upon every man, even upon those belonging
to the highest society. Far from being sacrificed or
subordinated to general culture, the useful, on the
contrary, was the only path which led to the true
and the beautiful.
And this conviction grew stronger and stronger in
German society during the second half of the century.
The progress of industry and commerce, the rise of
Bismarckian realism in politics, and the development
of materialistic and positivist ideas in philosophy,
had as their corollary a recrudescence of the utili
tarian spirit. In the scholastic domain this tendency
was manifested by the creation, in addition to the
classical system of education, of a modern type of
instruction in which science and modern languages
played a greater part, which was more " practical "
and consequently better adapted to the needs of
the industrial and commercial middle classes. The
" culture " which developed in modern Germany upon
the basis of the natural and historical sciences is
not, perhaps, above criticism. We know the anger
and contempt which Nietzsche poured forth in his
Thoughts out of Season upon the civilisation dear to
the Philistine of Culture, the Bildungsphilister— that
" Socratic " civilisation founded upon the instinct of
knowledge and ignorant of the necessities of life,
trivially optimistic, full of mistrust of genius, and a
slave to routine as well as intolerant in its medio
crity. One remembers the invectives of Zarathustra
against the " civilised " men of to-day who have the
presumption to say " we are entirely real, free from
all belief and all superstition," and who are in reality
" tattooed with the symbols of the past," " moulded
out of colours and out of glued scraps," and present
to our gaze a miscellaneous aggregate of features

THE VALUE OF ART m
borrowed from all the civilisations in the history of
the world through which they have been hurriedly
led by foolhardy educators.
But it must be recognised that if this prudently
utilitarian culture, so odious to an aristocratic
temperament like Nietzsche's, is perhaps lacking in
prestige and grandeur of style, it is yet the normal
production of the general evolution of the German
mind. It may be urged that it is not very interesting
in itself, but none the less did it inspire the men who
won Sadowa and Sedan. And the very vehemence
of Nietzsche's attacks shows that he felt isolated and
" out of season " in his antipathies. And I doubt
whether, in spite of his enormous success, he is really
much less " out of season " to-day. In spite of his
passionate outbursts against the abuse of history,
against philological erudition, against abstract science
and specialisation, against cheap social optimism
and the belief in the continual progress of humanity,
the average culture of modern Germany is apparently
still chiefly historical, philological, scientific, utili
tarian and optimistic, suspicious of extreme solutions,
always disposed to resolve by means of more or less
happy compromises the great conflicting principles
which present themselves to our era, and practical
rather than aesthetic in its essential tendencies.
Under these circumstances it is impossible for art
to enjoy the unique position which it held in the
estimation of the country at the beginning of the
nineteenth century. The progress of imperialistic
rationalism was a menace to both religious and
aesthetic faith. Contemporary positivism does not
hesitate, occasionally, to contest the value of art. It
foresees that, in the life of future generations, art and
poetry will perhaps occupy but a very small space.
24

370 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
It points out that the natural development of man
is from instinct to knowledge, from spontaneous
emotion to reflective judgment. It proclaims that
artistic intuition is a confused perception, inferior in
value to rational ideas. And it predicts that scientific
observation will continue to prevail more and more
over the imagination, that the man of culture will
consecrate himself ever more exclusively to science,
and leave the arts and poetry to the more emotional
fraction of humanity, to women, youths and children.
And contemporary naturalism shares to a certain
extent the doubts felt by utilitarian positivism.
Nietzsche subjects to the most ruthless criticism the
religion of art of the classicists and the romanticists.
Naturally artists would like to persuade us that
they are the oracles of a superior wisdom which is
inaccessible to the vulgar. They believe, as Zara
thustra says, " that the dreamer that listeneth, lying
in the grass or on the slope of the lonely vale, getteth
light upon those things that are between heaven and
earth." But this is merely a pose, says Nietzsche.
A sincere psychology of the artist dissipates the
glorious halo with which he delights to adorn his
brow. It is not true that genius is a miraculous
gift from heaven ; it is, on the contrary, a " long
patience," and we know to-day, from Beethoven's
note-books, that his most sublime melodies, far from
being improvisations, were the result of a long pro
cess of pruning and of severe selection. It is not true
that the work of art possesses that character of
" necessity " proper to living organisms : those alone
can go into ecstasies before the " superior reality " of
a poetic creation who see in the real man merely a
silhouette and not the unique incomparable individual
that he really is, every one of whose manifestations is

THE VALUE OF ART 371
necessary. The artist is not a sincere man, a " con
scientious man of the spirit " : he does not fight for
truth, but for those interpretations of life from which
he can obtain the most beautiful results. He is not
a seer who presents us with the symbolical expression
of truths that he foresees by virtue of his divining
instinct. Far from being a pioneer of culture, he is
a man behind the times, an epigone, a " raiser of the
dead," who puts a little colour into pale and faded
institutions and artificially revives obsolete modes
of thought. Art blooms when religions are losing
ground and when their dogmas are dissipated and
overthrown by criticism and inspire insuperable
suspicion. Then feeling which is chased out of the
religious sphere by the progress of enlightenment
flows over and finds an opening for itself in the
domain of art. The artist becomes the successor of
the priest. It is the artist who, when the shades of
evening are falling about religion, revives and keeps
alive the sacred flame of enthusiasm, consoles hu
manity by giving it in its turn a fictitious explanation
of suffering and evil, and relieves it for the moment
without, however, curing it, by means of palliatives
and narcotics. But the reign of art is as ephemeral
as that of religion. The appetite for knowledge,
which grows ever more imperious, pushes man in
exorably towards the science of nature and historical
research. Even now men regard art simply as an
emotional remembrance of the joys of youth, as a
magnificent legacy of the past, as the fascinating
reflection of a sun already set, whose rays no longer
reach us directly, but which still lights the sky of our
life and sets it aglow, although we can no longer see
it ourselves.
From yet another point of view the time in which

372 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
we live reacts against the romantic cult of art. We
have just seen that it definitely repudiates the pre
tensions of art to set itself up as a rival power to
Science and to represent the work of art as an inter
pretation of reality endowed with a value as great
as that of a rational representation. Similarly it
deprives art of all pretension to rise above the real.
Art cannot " excel " life or correct it ; on the con
trary it is never greater than when it is at the service of
life, and endows it with beauty and makes it more
worthy of being lived.
From this point of view, once more, certain of
Nietzsche's ideas seem to me to have a value which
is not only an individual but a typical one, expressing
some of the deepest tendencies of the soul of modern
Germany. We know that, in his eyes, all higher
art had its origin in Dionysian intoxication, in the
feeling of increased strength and of superabundance
of life which impels man to enrich all that surrounds
him by his own plenitude, and to transform all
things until they become the reflection of his will
to power. Man creates Beauty by instinctively
projecting into things his own perfection, by making
the superabundance of that vitality which he feels
bubbling within himself overflow into nature. He
is the cause and the measure of all beauty and all
ugliness. The Beautiful is the sovereign joy which
the triumphant and magnificent will to power feels
when it contemplates in itself and outside itself
the image of its glorious perfection. The Ugly is
degenerate man, it is the weakening of the will to
power. Beauty is a tonic and a cordial ; ugliness
lowers and depresses. Thus in the eyes of the true
artist, art becomes an auxiliary to life. Before
trying to create a work of art properly so called,

THE VALUE OF ART 373
before preaching the " art of works of art " he will
labour to embellish life, to make man tolerable and,
if possible, worthy of love from man. He will aim
at refining him, polishing him, teaching him courtesy,
elegant manners and tact. To ennoble human life
by endowing it with beauty, such is the colossal and
glorious task of true art, of healthy art, which has
it& source in exuberant life, and which tries to make
life better worth living. The production of works
of art is only the last efflorescence which springs
from an exceptionally rich and fruitful nature.
The superior genius, who feels within himself an
excess of beneficent energies, ends by unloading
himself of his superabundance by giving birth to
the work of art, the apotheosis of full-blown and
harmonious life. It is this rich and really classic
art which radiates in the works of Homer and
Sophocles, Theocritus and Calderon, Racine and
Goethe — a really superior, healthy and beneficent
art, in which an exceptional will to power discharges
its superabundance and blossoms into a flower of
miraculous beauty for the joy and happiness of men.
This idea that art should not barricade itself in
disdainful isolation, that it should not reduce itself
to being only a precious recreation for a small
symposium of refined spirits, that it cannot with
impunity detach itself from reality, but that on
the contrary it should work for the benefit of life,
has been widely spread in Germany during the last
few years. Not that " art for the few " is repudiated,
or that the boldness and refinements of modern
impressionism, especially in the domain of lyrics
and music and even in painting, are condemned. But
a fairly well defined reactionary movement against
" decadent " art and against the exaggeration of

374 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
neo-romanticism can be observed. More and more
numerous voices are making themselves heard,
demanding a " return to Goethe." And by this
a restoration of the hellenising sestheticism of the
eighteenth century is certainly not meant, but rather
an attempt towards a new " classicism," a healthy
and harmonious art which proceeds from exuberant
health, and which sets itself the task of making life
more worthy of being lived. And this same tendency
is to be found even more clearly in the development
that has taken place to-day in art industries, which
aim at evolving a style for the modern dwelling,
and thus at trying to beautify the surroundings in
which everyday life is spent.
And at the same time as art places itself at the
service of life it seems also to aim at becoming more
democratic. Nothing in this respect is more char
acteristic than the example of Wagner. An irresist
ible need impelled him to communicate himself as
liberally as possible to the outside world, to the
crowd. He aspired with all his energy to a popular
art similar to that which blossomed in Greece in
the drama of the classic period, and in Germany
in the Volkslied. He wanted art to respond to a
need really experienced by the nation, instead of
being a pastime at the disposal of a few rich idlers,
or a recreation for the capitalist, or the man of
enterprise tired out by the mad rush for wealth.
He worked with superb enthusiasm to create a
" communist " drama, by organising a brotherly
collaboration between the arts, the co-operation of
the poet, the performers and the public. And this
feeling of human solidarity which moved Wagner
to descend from the empyrean of ideal art to the
people, as Lohengrin descended to earth from the

THE VALUE OF ART 375
serene heights of the Holy Grail to help Elsa in her
distress, was shared in the nineteenth century by a
number of artists. Painters and poets vied with
each other in drawing near to the masses, in tracing
in detail the destinies of workers in towns and
dwellers in the country, in describing with scrupulous
fidelity popular life in all its diverse provincial
and local aspects ; in short, at making known, in a
shape directly accessible to all, the life of the German
people of their day. Architects and decorators,
on their side, resolutely attacked the difficult task
of providing healthy and comfortable homes for the
people, and thus putting a little beauty into the
daily life of the poor. There is certainly some
romantic illusion in most of these attempts. The
immense majority of the works produced were
" popular " only in appearance, and really appealed
only to a more or less limited minority. And if one
considers the gulf that exists to-day between the
culture of the masses and the culture of the refined,
one may well ask to what point the advent of an
authentically popular art, capable at once of pleasing
the masses and of satisfying the exigencies of an
educated taste, is possible at the present time. But
it must at least be acknowledged that the desire to
find the formula for this art does exist, in a very
sincere and very active form, in the breasts of many
German artists.
It must also be noted that this impulse on the
part of the artists towards the people was answered
by a powerful effort on the side of the people to
attain culture and art. The Socialist movement
resulted in awakening scientific curiosity and a
taste for the beautiful in the hearts of the masses.
And there can be no doubt that Socialism expects

376 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
from the society of the future only the free access
of all to the domains of the True and the Beautiful,
that magnificent intellectual and artistic efflorescence
which is the final goal in which social evolution
should find its consummation. It believes that
social revolution alone can give the people free
access to high culture. But in the meantime it
aims in the domain of education as well as in that
of economics to ameliorate the condition of the
masses at once. Just as it endeavours, even within
the confines of middle-class life, to make the con
ditions of life pleasanter for the worker, it also tries
to raise the intellectual level of the labourer. And
to a large extent it succeeds.
Certainly the effort of the Socialists to attain
culture is not altogether disinterested. They realise
that science is a formidable instrument of power,
and that, in the words of Bacon, " knowledge is
power." And they also reckon that, in order to
attain power, workers should not only have regard
for the maintenance of their physical strength, but
also make their brains ever more capable of re
flection and reasoning, and stock them with as large
an amount as possible of solid and well-classified
knowledge. But they do not confine themselves to
seeing in culture an efficient weapon of war ; they
have also gradually come to esteem it for its own
sake. A sincere and disinterested scientific curiosity
is developing among the working classes. The most
intelligent Socialists are not merely interested in the
economic doctrines of their party, but also realise
that Marxism rests upon a general conception of
life, and consequently look out for opportunities
for becoming acquainted with the general results
of the natural and historical sciences. Hence the

THE VALUE OF ART 377
success of enterprises which aim at diffusing culture
among workmen — debating and reading clubs,
lending libraries, scientific and literary lectures,
associations for study like the Workmen's School
at Berlin. And just as the worker desires instruction,
he also claims the right to artistic culture, he wants
" art to belong to the people." He hurries enthu
siastically to see plays performed at popular theatres
which put within reach of the working classes the
masterpieces of social drama, the plays of Ibsen
and Hauptmann, Tolstoi and Gorki, and of the
" realistic " school of modern German writers. He
reads with interest some of the German classics,
especially Heine, who is held up by Socialist writers
as one of the champions of German democracy.
The fine arts also begin to have a fascination for
him, and it is an ascertained fact that numbers of
working men buy the excellent cheap reproductions
of the masterpieces of painting which certain art
publishers put on the market nowadays.
Under these circumstances, the democratic move
ment, it seems, need not necessarily be regarded as
a menace to art. Since the time of Heine and
Nietzsche, Socialists have frequently been represented
as " barbarians at heart," and as destroyers of all
superior civilisation. This is, apparently, an in
justice and an error. There is probably to-day as
much scientific and artistic idealism among the
masses as among the middle classes in Germany.
On the other hand it must be confessed that for
the time being the alliance dreamt of between the
masses and modern art scarcely exists except in
the shape of more or less confused aspirations and
desires. With what luck will the movement that is
being inaugurated to-day meet ? Shall we one day

378 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
see rise up, face to face with our arts of luxury, a
national art in the real interpretation of the word,
veritably upheld by the intelligence and the enthu
siasm of the masses ? There is nothing to prevent
our desiring and hoping for it ; but I do not see how
the historian can make any sort of positive statement
in this connection. The future alone can decide.

CHAPTER II
ROMANTICISM, REALISM AND IMPRESSIONISM

After having indicated the general aims which
art in Germany is following, I should now like to
give a summary of the fundamental tendencies
which are to be found in the history of German art
during the nineteenth century.
To proceed in accordance with historical sequence,
it is " romanticism " with which we first meet at
the dawn of the century, and which I shall begin
by describing. It must be clearly understood that
in this category are included not only the groups of
writers and thinkers which historians of literature
as a rule designate by the name of first and second
romantic group, but, more generally speaking, the
whole aggregate of writers and artists in whom a
certain " romantic " turn of mind predominates,
the chief tendencies of which I will try to define.
When the romantic movement came into existence
in the last years of the eighteenth century it did not
rise up in rebellion against classicism, as French
romanticism afterwards did. The adversaries whom
it riddled with its sarcasms were the majority of self-
satisfied and overweening mediocrities, the last
champions of the era of enlightenment which was
tottering to its fall. Now the philosophic and literary
classicism of Germany had itself just issued from a
movement of reaction against degenerate rationalism
379

380 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
with its withering intellectualism and its dull utili
tarianism. The romanticists, in the beginning, had
no other ambition than to carry on the classical
tradition. When they made mock of Nicolai and
his laboratory for concocting anti-philosophical
elixirs, when they hurled polemics against the
" harmonious platitudes " of self-satisfied Philistines
and against the puling utilitarianism of the " moral
economists " who reduced life to a calculation of
interests and saw nothing beyond an exceedingly
virtuous, regular, and narrow middle-class existence ;
when they made fun of the literary mediocrities of
the day, men like Lafontaine and Clauren, Iffland and
Kotzebue, Voss and Schmidt von Werneuchen, they
felt they were conducting the campaign of making
healthy the German Parnassus inaugurated by the
Xenien of Goethe and Schiller. For a long time the ro
manticists and the classicists were in alliance and held
each other in mutual esteem. The romanticists loudly
proclaimed themselves the followers of Kant in their
philosophy and of Goethe in literature. Only gradually
did they come to distinguish clearly the differences
which separated them from their models and to take
up their stand against the classicism whose standpoint
they had outgrown in the course of their evolution.
The romanticists, therefore, were in the beginning
innovators in open revolt against senile intellectu
alism, over-cautious wisdom, and the dull common-
sense of a worn-out rationalism, which, unconscious
of its own nullity, flaunted untenable pretensions to
infallibility. It is quite wrong to represent romanti
cism as a movement of religious and political reaction.
Its disciples were not the least bit in the world
cowards whom the excesses of a reason that had
become too audacious terrified, and who wished to

ROMANTICISM 381
go back and find refuge in the faith of the past and
in historic tradition. They were, on the contrary,
spirits who were courageous to the point of rashness,
freed from prejudice to the point of nihilism, and
impregnated by the highest culture of their day.
They were intrepid explorers who aimed at pene
trating into regions of the human soul to which their
mediocre predecessors had no access. They never
denied the triumphs of rational science, but they
avowed that theoretical reason was not the only instru
ment by means of which man could grasp reality.
In the domain of science they opposed prudent
empiricism and the analytical method by intuition
and idealistic speculation. They aspired to know
the Cosmos in all its prodigious unity, and constructed
a philosophy of nature which was independent of
experience and which saw unconscious spirit every
where in nature, conceived of natural forces as the
organs of hidden wills, and aimed at showing in
everything the mysterious mingling of the conscious
and the unconscious. In the religious sphere we
have already seen how they denied the competence of
reason and founded religion upon the direct con
templation of the universe, and upon the emotion
which fills the soul in the presence of the infinite. In
the domain of politics they agreed with Fichte in
opposing the cosmopolitanism of the eighteenth
century by patriotic enthusiasm. For the individual
istic conception which made the State merely an
" undertaking for public security " which safe
guarded the citizens against foreign invasions or
attacks on the part of their fellow citizens, they
substituted a social conception according to which
man as an individual could not attain liberty, but
could only realise it in society through the medium

382 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
of the State. With the example of revolutionary
France before their eyes they were full of scepticism
with regard to the organising powers of reason, and
insisted upon the importance and the rights of history
and tradition. They professed the greatest respect
for all institutions which had developed gradually in
the course of centuries, and appeared as the normal
fruit of historical evolution, like the English con
stitution in distinction to that of the republic of
Berne. Such institutions, if we are to believe the
romanticists, had by their very antiquity an in
trinsic value, and were infinitely superior to those
which sprang from the brain of a legislator or the
debates of a constituent assembly. They reinstated
the Middle Ages, which had been decried by the
rationalists as an era of obscurantism and barbarism.
They extolled its institutions, its civilisation, its
literature, and its arts. Like Hugo and Savigny,
they represented right not as the result of a conscious
act of will, a social contract, but as an unconscious
and necessary action on the part of the national soul,
of the Volksgeist, which lives and breathes in all the
individuals who form part of the same community.
In the sphere of art also, they combated the
rationalistic conception according to which the work
of art was the product of the reasoned and conscious
industry of man. They did not consider the intellect
or technical knowledge as by any means the essential
elements of genius, but rather creative imagination on
the one hand and the gift of emotion on the other.
In the first place the romanticists had the highest
opinion of the creative faculties of the artists. Their
aesthetic was based, as we have already seen, upon
the idealism of Fichte. It identified the artist with
Fichte's ego, which found its position by standing

ROMANTICISM 383
in opposition to the non-ego and finally recognised
the identity between the ego and the non-ego. It
thus made the poet a kind of creator whose conscious
fictions were scarcely less " real " than the uncon
scious fictions of the ego, that is to say, of the external
world, the non-ego, to which we attribute an inde
pendent existence only by virtue of an illusion which
is destined to disappear with the progress of con
sciousness. In the eyes of Friedrich Schlegel, there
fore, the most profound theorist of romanticism, the
artist was supreme. " Romantic poetry," he pro
claimed, " is infinite ; it recognises as its supreme
law that the arbitrary fancy of the poet should
submit to no law above it." The artist was as free
in the face of the universe as the independent and
autonomous ego, and should become conscious of
his liberty with regard to the non-ego.
From this sovereign independence of the artist
there also arose the famous law of romantic irony.
Fichte's " absolute ego," the primordial and original
ego, the point of departure for all society and all
speculation, was not, but eternally became. There
was and always would be an everlasting antagonism
between the " absolute ego," which only existed as
an ideal that was never realised, and the " empirical
ego," which was always realised, but also constantly
appeared in an individual, limited, and, as such, im
perfect form. The romantic artist, therefore, accord
ing to Schlegel, ought to realise the necessary dis
crepancy which existed between his " absolute ego " —
that is to say, his creative imagination — and his
particular manifestations. In other words he ought
to feel himself superior to all the works of art he
produced. And this contrast would find expression in
irony, that supreme irony which Schlegel admired

384 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
so much in Goethe's Wilhelm Meister, and which in
his opinion no really superior work should be with
out. The romantic poet should not deceive himself,
and should prove that he did not. He should aim with
whole-hearted sincerity to communicate himself as
much as possible and to put himself entirely into
his work. But he should also know that no partial
creation can ever be an adequate expression of the
ego. He must therefore remain sufficiently free in
spirit to " raise himself above his highest creations "
and prove, by means of irony, that he did not take
them altogether seriously himself.
Lastly, romantic poetry as well as being " ironical "
should also become a " poetry of poetry." In
Fichte's eyes the transcendental philosopher did
not restrict himself to taking cognisance of himself
and to attempting to give an explanation of the
system of his representations. He also reflected upon
the attempt itself — in other words, he philosophised
about philosophy. At the same time as he produced
a work of art he should describe himself in his
capacity as poet. He should exercise his poetic
activity, and also reflect upon that activity at the
very moment when he was exercising it. This is
what Schlegel called making poetry raised to the
second power, or the " poetry of poetry."
Thus romanticism resulted in an absolute sub
jectivism with respect to art. It proclaimed in
theory the sovereignty of creative fancy, its inde
pendence with regard to all conventional rules, and
even with regard to external reality, and its right
to destroy by irony the fictions it creates. In
practice it gave birth to strange and sometimes dis
concerting works, in which the subjectivity of the
artist spread itself out and overflowed in all direc-

ROMANTICISM 385
tions, whether he conjured up before men's imagina
tions a more or less fantastic dream-world, whether
he amused himself with his own creations and
suppressed illusion by means of irony, or whether
he obtruded his own personality into his fictions and
wove confessions, philosophical reflections and aesthetic
dissertations into his tale. Works like Schlegel's
Lucinde, Novalis's Ofterdingen, Wackenrode's Out
pourings of an Art-loving Monk, and Tieck's Genevieve
may be cited as typical productions in this respect.
Another essential characteristic of romanticism
was, that full of contempt as it was for intellectualism,
it attached the highest importance to pure emotion
and thus tended towards music and lyricism.
The deep feeling for nature and its diverse aspects,
the cult of friendship and love were more and more
strongly developed during the second half of the
eighteenth century. The life of the soul grew ever
richer and more complex, and men learnt to feel
its various shades more and more. This faculty was
manifested by a rapid and colossal development of
the musical instinct. The beginning of the nine
teenth century appears in this respect as a period of
marvellous fruitfulness. It witnessed the advent of
Beethoven and the resurrection of Bach, whose
immense value began to be understood after a long
period of eclipse. It brought the growth of the song
in the person of Schubert, and the efflorescence of
romantic opera with Weber. With Beethoven especi
ally music became conscious of the extent of its
domain and the greatness of its task. It felt that it
was able to express in a different form, but quite as
well as poetry, the most profound aspirations and the
highest emotions of the human soul.
Now the romanticists foresaw the fresh popu-
25

886 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
larity which music was destined to enjoy. They
felt that in order to describe the psychic emotions
of the new era which was being inaugurated, in
order to express all the world of more or less vague
and hovering impressions which can be divined
above the level of clear thought, and which has such a
strong fascination for the modern mind, tired out by
the excess of rationalistic common sense, there was
perhaps no more suitable vehicle than music. And
from that moment there developed in them a growing
cult of music, an ever more marked tendency to
pure lyricism. Music was in their eyes " the most
romantic of the arts " — that which best taught us
to " feel emotions." They loved to give descriptions
of types of musicians. Thus Wackenrode intro
duces us to his Joseph Berlinger and Hoffmann to
his celebrated Johann Kreisler. Some romanticists,
like Hoffmann, were both musicians and poets.
Others like Tieck insistently proclaimed the supremacy
of music over the other arts, declared that a symphony
was superior to the richest drama, tried to vie with
music by means of poetry and words, amused them
selves by writing poetic " symphonies," and sought
to produce in their lyrical verses purely musical effects
by the accumulation of certain rhymes and the
repetition of certain sonorous sounds. Many, without
going to the lengths of this somewhat superficial
and fictitious imitation of musical processes, were
profoundly lyrical natures, whose chief preoccu
pation was to express states of the soul and pure
emotions, to discharge, in floods of lyrics, that Sehn-
sucht, that indefinite longing, at once sweet and pain
ful, made up of regrets, expectation, vague aspira
tions, despair and enthusiasm, which vibrates in
romantic hearts. And it is in this lyricism which is

ROMANTICISM 387
entirely impregnated by music that Romanticism, from
Novalis's Hymns to the Night, to Heine's Intermezzo
and Nietzsche's Zarathustra, found its happiest inspira
tions and produced its most perfect masterpieces.
There remains for us to draw attention to one last
characteristic necessary for the understanding of
German romanticism ; and that is the evolution by
means of which, after starting out from the Hellenism
of the classicists, it resulted gradually in the concep
tion of an autochthonous national and popular art.
The romanticists, as we have already pointed out,
posed at first as the heirs of classicism and as the
disciples of Goethe and Kant. Schlegel began by a
brilliant apology for Hellenism. Its historical evolu
tion seemed to him the logical development of the
Beautiful, which, taking its rise in the naturalism of the
Ionic School, rose in Attic art to sublimity and per
fection, only to founder in the end in the anarchy and
barbarism of the Alexandrians. Thus the Greeks
were the fairest example of humanity that had ever
existed in the world, and their history showed us not
only the destinies of a privileged people, but the most
admirable type which men of all ages could realise
in accordance with their various degrees of develop
ment. Greek poetry produced in every department
and at every stage of its history the most perfect works
to which the human genius had ever given birth.
Taken in its entirety it was, according to Schlegel,
" the ideal and the canon of poetry itself in its natural
evolution." Thus budding romanticism began by
pushing to its extreme the Hellenic "legend" as it was
elaborated by classicism. I doubt whether any German
poet ever experienced such an intense longing for
the beauty of antiquity as the unfortunate Holderlin,
who is often classed in the earliest Romantic School.

388 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
But romanticism did not remain long in this first
phase. Schlegel, after having at the outset sacrificed
the " characteristic " and " individual " poetry of
the modern to the " objective " poetry of the Greeks,
was not slow to confess that modern art was not
inferior to Greek art, that at bottom they were both
of equal value, and that the duty of the critic was to
realise " the absolute identity between ancient and
modern art." And thus he claimed for " romantic "
art the same degree of grandeur as for " classical "
art. Born in Germany, where in the bosom of a
young and pure race there existed a fine store of
heroic legends, romantic poetry was developed by
contact with the old Latin culture or the civilisation
of the East, in Italy through Dante, in Spain through
Cervantes, and in England through Shakespeare.
And after a period of eclipse which was manifested
by the classical epoch in France and England which
Schlegel regarded as " a system of false poetry," it
reached its culminating point in Germany. There
the torch of Greek culture was once again rekindled.
It was Winckelmann who revealed to his contempo
raries the splendours of Greek art, and Goethe who,
as a new Dante, appeared as the restorer of poetry,
and brought about the reconciliation of the ancient
and the modern. And lastly it was the romanticists
who realised the unity between poetry, philosophy
and religion, and who, by raising the translation of
foreign poets and the imitation of their metres to a
fine art, made a science of criticism and paved the way
for a regular " history of poetry." Wilhelm Schlegel,
in his celebrated Berlin lectures, which are recognised
as the most authoritative exposition of the doctrines
of German romanticism, does scarcely more than
develop that species of the " Legend of the Ages "

ROMANTICISM 389
of" poetry which had been sketched out by his
brother. From being classical romanticism became cosmo
politan. It consciously set itself the task of initiating
Germany into the literatures of other lands. It
vaunted as one of the typical virtues of the Germans
that gift for assimilation which allowed them to par
take freely of exotic masterpieces and proclaimed that
it was precisely this quality which was destined to
raise them to the highest rank among the nations of
Europe. " We aim at nothing less," wrote Wilhelm
Schlegel, "than at uniting in ourselves the various
merits of the most diverse nations, at assimilating
them by means of intelligence and sensitiveness, and
thus constituting ourselves a cosmopolitan centre for
the mind of man." Numerous translations — of which
the most celebrated, that of Shakespeare by A. W.
Schlegel, was a masterpiece of its kind — adaptations
and imitations of all kinds from that moment familiar
ised the German public with the literatures of the
" united Europe," of the Middle Ages, of Italy and
Spain, ancient France, and England in the time of
Shakespeare, and even with the poetry and civilisa
tion of the East, which Friedrich Schlegel, in his
famous book On the Language and Wisdom of the
Indians (1808), presented to the reading public as
a document of the first importance for the study of
human thought. Without fear of losing her own
originality, romanticist Germany endeavoured to
assimilate the treasures of universal art and to enlarge
the field of German thought to such an extent as
to make her, in a way, the spiritual and artistic
conscience of civilised Europe.
And, at the same time as it explored exotic litera
tures in this way, romanticism, by reviving and con-

390 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
tinuing the tradition of Herder and young Goethe,
became devotedly absorbed, on the other hand, in
the study of the past history of Germany. And this
was perfectly natural. The hatred of the roman
ticists for intellectualism, their religious and mystic
aspirations, their suspicion of the organising power
of reason in the sphere of politics, their aversion for
" artificial " art, their worship of Nature, necessarily
led them to reinstate the Middle Ages, which had been
decried by rationalism as the era of obscurantism
and barbarism. They were enamoured of the Middle
Ages because they saw in them an epoch in which a
glowing and simple faith was supreme, in which the
Holy Roman Empire shone with incomparable lustre
under the Ottos and the Hohenstaufen, in which
poetry found a magnificent expansion on the lips of
popular jugglers, or of the noble Minnesinger, and in
which the arts, in the persons of Albert Diirer and
Peter Vischer, shed a marvellous brilliance. In
1793 Tieck and Wackenroder discovered in the course
of a summer's journey, the picturesque and uncon
ventional beauty of the old city of Nuremburg. And
from that moment they fell in love with ancient Ger
man art. And this enthusiasm, which spread from man
to man, was shared by almost all the romanticists.
Poets, writers, philologists, painters and artists, all
went for inspiration to the Middle Ages. They
published or adapted old poems, which till then had
been buried in dusty libraries. Tieck reinstated the
Minnesinger in a place of honour ; and Schlegel
recalled the attention of the public to the Nibelungen-
lied. People studied the old traditions, they made
collections of folk tales — the Volksbucher and the
Volkslieder. They raved about anonymous and im
personal popular poetry and all works which seemed

ROMANTICISM 391
to proceed from a collective impulse. They placed
the creations of the poetical instinct that lived in the
masses above the artificial productions of conscious
art. They extolled the incomparable civilisation of
the Middle Ages ; they were full of admiration for the
marvellous enthusiasm of the Crusades ; they tried
to defend the custom of tournaments ; they found
beauty even in the religious wars, and discovered a
certain poetry even in heraldic science. The poets
showed a predilection for subjects drawn from German
history, and took particular delight in resuscitating
the old epic and heroic traditions. The legend of
the Nibelungen alone gave birth to a whole host of
adaptations and imitations. Or else they depicted
the life of the people in its characteristic aspects, the
existence of the humble and simple souls who were
very near to Nature.
Painters as well as writers were involved in the
Romantic movement. Some like Overbeck and
Ph. Veit tried to restore a " Christian " art and aimed
at attaining beauty by means of fervid religious
feeling and a deep mysticism which impelled some
of them to find refuge in the bosom of the Catholic
Church. Others, like Steinle and Schwind, found
inspiration in the traditions of the Middle Ages, and
gave form and colour to all the legendary or fantastic
world called into being by the poets and tale-tellers.
In architecture there was a revival of the taste for
the Gothic, which was considered to be the national
art of Germany (which is historically incorrect) as
well as the religious art par excellence, an art which
" scaled the skies " and raised the soul to God.
Great enthusiasm was shown for the completion of
Cologne Cathedral. Sculptors extolled the simple
perfection of the Gothic art of the end of the Middle

392 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
Ages, and endeavoured to give their statues a really
Christian expression. The cult of Germany's past
showed itself even in the dress of the men and women,
and an attempt was made to revive the old German
costume !
Thus, after its worship of Hellenism and its
voyages of discovery through the art of the world,
romanticism returned to its native land. It aimed
at becoming national and religious, and sought its
inspirations in the past of Germany, and in the
religious art of the Middle Ages.
II
Nevertheless, romanticism clearly contained the
germs of dissolution. When it discarded its original
revolutionary character and became decidedly re
actionary, when it made itself the ally of feudal
absolutism and clericalism, when its subjectivism
degenerated with certain enthusiasts into a sort of
mystic folly and ended in some cases in clearly
pathological symptoms, and when its anti-rationalism
became studied eccentricity or affected puerility, it
gradually lost its hold on men's minds. Immediately
after 1830, Heinrich Heine, though he was still half
a romanticist himself, nevertheless denounced with
a cruel irony the weaknesses and faults of his old
leaders, and covered them with floods of ridicule. It
was, moreover, clear that the development of the
system of enterprise was hardly compatible with
the essential tendencies of romanticism. How could
people who were aiming at material power and
wealth, who were toiling with all their might for the
advancement of natural science, and for the gradual
rationalisation of technical processes — how could

REALISM 393
such people have continued to pay homage to men
who placed reason below imagination and emotion,
who despised all useful activity, spent their lives in
defending " the divine art of idleness," found pleasure
in the eccentricities of mysticism or spiritualism,
professed a fantastic philosophy of nature from
which up-to-date men of science turned aside with
contempt, and reduced art to the level of a frivolous
pastime as meaningless as the capricious outlines of
an arabesque ! How was it possible for the middle
and lower classes of Germany, who were marching
to the conquest of political liberty and social emanci
pation, to avoid protesting against the apologists of
the Middle Ages, the champions of the Holy Alliance,
Catholic clericalism and orthodox pietism, the sworn
enemies of the Revolution and democracy ? It is
obvious that the table of values of the representative
of capitalistic enterprise could not be the same as
that of romanticism. Theoretic and practical reason
was in their eyes superior to poetic fantasy, or
reverence for the past, and the minute and patient
study of objective reality had greater value than the
brilliant and inconsistent constructions of the artistic
imagination. And thus a more realistic spirit came to light in
literature and art. Out of romanticism realism
gradually sprang up. People still continued to take
an interest in the Middle Ages and in the past history
of Germany ; but they were not content with an
approximate and fantastic reconstruction. The his
torical sense became more exacting and demanded a
more rigorous correctness and a greater precision
than before. With the brothers Grimm and their
successors, scientific philology took the place of
romantic dilettantism and set itself to make a

394 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
methodical examination of the nation's past. At the
same time, the historical novel and historical paint
ings endeavoured to reproduce with accurate sincerity
the spirit of the old days and the great moments in
the evolution of humanity. And thus in the spirit
of the rising generation enamoured of accurate
observation, the mediaeval conventions brought into
fashion by romanticism gave way to ever more
objective restorations of historical reality.
And with a similar avidity for truth and sincerity
literature and art turned on the other hand to the
reality of the present, and applied themselves to de
scribing the life of the nation. This was studied in
its most diverse manifestations, in all the degrees of the
social scale, in all its local variations, either in descrip
tions of* the life of the upper classes, of the cultured
minority, of the working middle classes, the peasant
and the urban masses, or by conjuring up before our
eyes the various aspects of provincial or local life, from
Pomerania to Switzerland, and from Swabia to Styria.
And at the same time as art became impregnated
by realism it also allied itself on occasion with ten
dencies of a practical nature. Whilst romanticism
inclined towards conservative or reactionary tradi
tionalism, realism seemed, on the whole, and in spite
of certain exceptions, to show an affinity with the
various shades of democratic opinion from middle-
class Liberalism in its most moderate form to the
extremes of Socialism.
Lastly, whilst from the point of view of form
romanticism frequently resulted, through its excess
of subjectivism, in works of a somewhat amorphous
nature, in an entirely musical lyricism or an un
bridled fantasy, realistic art reacted against this
tendency. From the literary point of view, the

REALISM 395
increased attention paid to form had the happiest
results, particularly for the drama, in which romanti
cism had proved itself quite inferior. In the history
of painting its influence was even more important.
The romanticists willingly subordinated technique
to ideas. They made religious images, symbolical
paintings, and colossal theatrical scenery ; they re
counted episodes from history, or daubed pictures
of a humorous or touching nature. The essential
point in their eyes was not so much the real pictorial
interest of a picture as its sentimental and historical
interest, its symbolical value and its story-telling
power. This fundamental misunderstanding of the
importance of form in matters of art had fatal results
for romanticist painting, and every one to-day is
agreed that the works of men like Overbeck, Cor
nelius, Piloty, and Makart, are of very little value.
But with the development of realistic tendencies,
German artists gradually corrected this mistake.
They endeavoured to give a sincere representation
of reality, and at the same time to interest the public
not by some beautiful " thought," but simply by
means of the resources proper to their art, and by
their technical excellence.
It is obviously impossible for me to attempt, within
the limits of this work, to give an outline sketch of
this evolution towards realism which in literature as
well as in the fine arts was prolonged throughout the
whole of the nineteenth century, without it being
possible, of course, to draw a distinct line of demarca
tion between the romanticists and the realists. In
this connection it is enough to recall the case of
Kleist, in whom the realistic and the " classical "
sides are both so much developed that the critic
sometimes hesitates to classify him as a romanticist.

396 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
Conversely there are a number of realists like Gott
fried Keller, in whom it is easy to discern a very
strong romantic vein. And one of the greatest artists
of the century, Heine, fluctuated all his life between
romanticism and realism, equally attracted and
repelled by these two conflicting principles — an un
repentant romanticist through his gift of imagina
tion, an incorrigible realist through his reason, and,
moreover, conscious of occasionally suffering by this
dualism in his nature. Nothing, then, could present
a more delicate task than to describe in detail the
transition from romanticism to realism. Without
undertaking any such analysis we will confine our
selves to pointing out the fact that the outburst of
realism in Germany was almost contemporaneous
with the development of German imperialism. The
culminating point of the curve it described might
be marked in painting by such a man as Wilhelm
Leibl, whose scrupulously realistic work, with its
unimpeachable command of technique, is one of the
most distinctive creations of modern German art.
In literature, the naturalistic drama of Gerhard
Hauptmann and his imitators seems to be the most
characteristic effort to depict with the utmost
possible objectivity the real life of the present day in
its most minute details, and that without adulterating
it by any philosophical or aesthetic considerations.
And we must not forget, in passing, that this " con
sistent naturalism," in spite of its conscious objec
tivity, has been realised by the popular mind to be
a democratic production, and that the Socialist
working-classes have " by the free choice of their
own inclination " welcomed naturalism in literature
just as, in the domain of speculation, they made
straight for materialism.

IMPRESSIONISM 397
III
At the same time as the German art of the nine
teenth UHlimry evolved from romanticism to, realism
it also developed in the direction of impressionism.
There is no doubt that the nervOus sensitiveness
of the modern man increased considerably during
the course of the last century. Lamprecht sees in
the wealth, the complexity, and the growing intensity
of elementary nervous life the great psychic fact
which dominated our era. And, whatever may be
our opinion of the ingenious hypothesis by means of
which he lays at the door of susceptibility (Reizsam-
keit) all the economic, political, and artistic phenomena
of modern German life, the fact itself of the intensifi
cation of nervous activity is indisputable. It is also
certain that the history of art in the nineteenth
century reflects this acceleration in the rhythm
of existence, that over-excitement of the emotional
faculties, that gradual refinement in the sense per
ceptions, which everybody regards as one of the
characteristic features of the world of to-day.
The earliest and perhaps also the most striking
"manifestation ol this e Volution tuwaids impressionism
is apparently to be lolllid ill the history of music.
""-Vvnatever opinion one may have upon the much-
disputed question as to the significance of music, it
seems, in the first place, an incontrovertible fact that
if one examines its development since about the
sixteenth century, it has become more and more a
subjective art which expresses or reflects more and
more finely shaded states of the individual soul.
During the Middle Ages, when the psychic life of the
individual had not yet separated itself from that of
the community, when everywhere, in literature as

398 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
/well as in art, in the moral as well as the religious
life, and in the law, the same impersonal character
was always to be found, and the same conventional
faithfulness to a type, music also was an impersonal
art. In the period during which counterpoint
flourished, that art of complex rules which Wagner
called " the arbitrary game that art plays with
itself, the mathematics of feeling, the mechanical
rhythm of selfish harmony," musical composition
obeyed mathematical and architectonic principles.
It formed combinations of sounds by means of
objective and purely formal rules without troubling
for a moment to make them express anything, a
state of the soul, a passion, a desire or a will. What
the musician required in order to be able to create
was technical skill and savoir-faire. His works
sprang from his brain rather than from his heart.
They had, as a rule, for their elementary principle
no subjective emotion which, by virtue of an inner
necessity, tended to overflow and find expression in
the language of sound.
In modern music, on the contrary, we find a con
stant increase in the importance of this emotional
and sentimental element. Pure beauty of form in
music ceased to be an end in itself. The musician
is no longer merely an industrious craftsman ; he is
moved himself and wishes to move others. He finds
the fundamental inspiration for his works in a
certain state of the soul, in certain vibrations of
his nervous sensibility — vibrations which may be and
certainly are unconscious or semi-conscious, in the
sense that the artist is as a rule incapable of analys
ing them in speech, or of defining their meaning and
various degrees of intensity. And these vibrations
he instinctively endeavours to translate into the

IMPRESSIONISM 399
language of sound, and then to communicate to his
hearers and to arouse in them, by means of this
language, vibrations similar to those which he has
himself experienced. The evolution of music is thus
to a large extent determined by a factor of a psychic
nature. The more intense the psychic life of a
particular era is the more will men be susceptible to
feeling emotions, delicate, refined, and differentiated
nervous impressions, and the more also will music
endeavour to renovate and perfect its technique in
order to reproduce these impressions in all their
various shades of intensity. The capital importance
of music, not only in the history of art, but also in
the history of the modern soul, and especially of the
German soul, thus becomes clear. It is the eloquent
witness to the development of the nervous life. By
means of music and through the divining effort of
the musician, the elementary psychic life, which till
then had been obscure and confused, tended to leave
the domain of pure unconsciousness in order gradu
ally to blossom out into conscious clarity.
And thus the aim of music in the nineteenth cen
tury tended towards translating as adequately as
possible, and by ever more perfect technical processes,
the complexity of the modern soul. And conversely,
the increasing complexity of the nervous life of
the modern man was attested by the very fact of
the progress made in the language of music. If one
compares the language of the musicians at the be
ginning of the century, such as Beethoven, Schubert
and Weber, with that of the great artists of the
middle and the end of the century, a Liszt, a Wagner
and a Strauss, one is immediately struck by the
thought of how much richer and more complicated
the latter are. Musical composition became at once

400 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
a more complex organism and • one that was more
differentiated in its elements and also possessed a
more rigorous unity. Harmony became more scien
tific and more refined owing to the substitution of
an ever bolder use of the chromatic in the place of
the diatonic upon which the existing system is still,
at least in theory, founded. Polyphony grew more
and more complex in consequence of the increasing
importance given to the accompaniment, which had
for a long time been subordinated to the melody.
Rhythm constantly gained in liberty and variety, and
became ever more supple and natural and less sub
servient to the schematism of the time. Thus the
elements forming a musical composition became
more complicated, and were differentiated in such a
way as to be able to express more and more subtle,
delicate, tenuous, and fugitive nervous impressions —
impressions which the consciousness of an earlier
age would have been incapable of seizing and fixing.
And these elements, at the same time as they
became differentiated, tended also to form organisms
of a more rigorous unity. To use Herbert Spencer's
expression, there was a differentiation, and at the
same time a growing integration in the elements of a
musical composition. Harmony became more com
plex, and the use of the chromatic bolder than ever.
But the sense of tone unity was also sharpened and
refined in similar proportions ; and it has been
pointed out that in Parsifal, for instance, the unity
of the general tonality (A flat major) is perhaps
stricter than the tone unity of many symphonies of
an earlier period. Rhythm became infinitely more
subtle than before, the divergencies between rhythm
and time were of ever more frequent occurrence, and
yet the ear perceived and appreciated the unity of

IMPRESSIONISM 401
the most extensive and complicated systems of
rhythm. But, above all, the need of organic unity
in composition became infinitely stronger than it
was in the past. There had once been no difficulty
in admitting that a symphony or a sonata was an
aggregate of perfectly distinct and occasionally
frankly incompatible parts. People were not scan
dalised by the fact that an opera was an arbitrary
succession of isolated pieces, but faintly con
nected with each other by the slenderest threads,
an agglomeration of overtures, airs, duets, concerted
numbers, choruses, ballets, and intermezzos. To-day
the strictest unity of impression and construction is
demanded. In the symphony as well as in the
sonata this unity is sought by binding the different
parts together in various ways ; and it is hardly
necessary in this connection to point out the care
with which Wagner, in his dramas, abolished the
traditional divisions of opera in such a way as to
endow his works with the strictest unity. It is, for
instance, a well-known fact, that the whole of the
Flying Dutchman is only the development of motifs
contained in the ballad of Senta. The harmonious
symmetry of the plan of Tristan has often been ob
served, and one ingenious critic has endeavoured to
prove, without laying himself open to a charge of
absurdity, that the whole score of the Meistersinger
might be regarded as founded upon one single theme
— that known by the name of the " spring " theme, in
which the " organic-moft'/ " of the whole work was
to be found.
To sum up, it is clear that musical language, in the
course of the last century, became infinitely richer,
more scientific and subtle than before. It is pos
sible to hold the opinion that this evolution was not
26

402 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
[progress, and that the musicians of the past were
quite equal to those of our own day. I must not
enter into any discussion on this subject. But it is
at all events certain that they do not say the same
things. If one compares an opera or a symphony
by Mozart, or even one of Beethoven's early sym
phonies, with the great musical works which reflect
the tendencies of modern Germany, with Wagner's
latest operas, with symphonic poems, or with Strauss's
Salome, one sees at once the radical change which has
taken place in the depths of the soul of modern Ger
many. For these new works to have been conceived,
and for them to be understood by the public, it was
not merely necessary for the specifically musical
sense to become extraordinarily refined. It was
requisite for the emotional faculties to be funda
mentally modified, and for the modern soul to become
susceptible to ever more subtle, more refined and
more intense vibrations than in the past.
And the same thing holds good in the case of
painting as with music. Visual sensitiveness in
creased in the same degree as auditory sensitiveness.
Lamprecht gives an ingenious explanation of the
evolution towards impressionism which, in the domain
of the fine arts, appeared first in England and France,
and afterwards in Germany also. Instead of simply
reproducing the external outlines of objects and
afterwards colouring these designs by means of more
or less arbitrary processes, painters gradually accus
tomed themselves to note down directly the impres
sions produced by coloured light upon the optic
nerve, and thus ended by no longer reproducing- the
external world, as we represent it to ourselves by
virtue of our acquired habits, but the instantaneous
pictures which are reflected upon our retina — that is

IMPRESSIONISM 403
to say, a phenomenon which is in reality internal,
neurological and psychological. Whatever may be
said for this curious interpretation, it is clear that
artists also have learnt to see things they did not
perceive before, or which they instinctively over
looked. They have learnt, for instance, to see and
to paint light in its variegated play and reflections,
whilst the artists of the old school used to declare
the impossibility of fixing light upon canvas. They
became conscious of subjective impressions which in
their predecessors did not get beyond the threshold of
consciousness. And if, among modern German im
pressionists, such as Liebermann, Stuck, Exter, and
Hoffmann, there was apparently no genius to com
pare with Wagner or Strauss, and if, on the whole,
visual sensitiveness is perhaps less developed in
Germany than musical sensitiveness, it has none the
less evolved in the same direction.
Poetry also followed the same path, as is at once
obvious if one compares the sensitiveness of a Goethe
with that of Heine or Nietzsche. Goethe's was a
healthy, normal and harmoniously balanced nature.
Heine's was an excessively nervous temperament,
whose manifestations quickly assumed a character
of excessive and abnormal intensity ; he suffered from
an acute hyperaesthesia which made him able to
analyse down to the smallest details of their com
plexity the apparently most simple states of the
soul ; a capacity for emotion so great that all his
feelings of joy or sadness, love or hate, were ex
aggerated beyond measure, and filled his whole being
with painful vibrations ; a cruel irony which con
demned him never to feel simple emotions, but
obliged him to scoff while he was suffering and to
suffer in the midst of happiness. In Nietzsche we

404 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
may also observe a singularly complex and many-
sided personality, who united the very diverse gifts
of the artist and the thinker, the philologist and the
musician, an ardent and passionate nature who
lived his thoughts with an unheard-of intensity, and
pushed them to their most extreme and most tragic
consequences ; who aimed at perpetually " surpass
ing " himself, who knew the most unspeakable agonies
of solitary meditation as well as the most extra
ordinary ecstasies of fruitful inspiration, and pursued
his path without stopping or resting with the energy
of despair, until the day when his overwrought nervous
system, stretched to breaking-point, suddenly became
unhinged and was engulfed in the night of madness.
He is a particularly typical example of modern sen
sitiveness. And if among our contemporaries we
can apparently no longer find such extreme natures, yet
even now there is no doubt that men like Richard
Dehmel, Stefan George, Hugo von Hofmannsthal
are, in spite of all the individual differences that
separate them, highly nervous temperaments. Their
impassioned and refined lyricism, subtle and full of
mystery, shows into what depths of the human soul
they attempt to plunge and what obscure regions of
our elementary nervous life they delight to explore.
Lastly, it must be pointed out that just as realism
superimposed itself upon romanticism, impressionism
in its turn came and planted itself upon realism
and romanticism without, however, ousting them.
Modern men are at once romanticists, realists, and
impressionists. These tendencies are to be found
among them in different degrees, and are mingled in
various proportions without excluding each other.
And the greatest are precisely the " problematical
natures " who resist all attempts at simple classifica-

IMPRESSIONISM 405
tion. In men like Wagner, Nietzsche, Bocklin,
Klinger, and Gerhard Hauptmann, the most diverse
elements are to be found. They are at once true to
nature, idealists, realists, and symbolists, but above
all impressionists ! " The symbol of the modern
soul," says Nietzsche, " is the labyrinth." When the
present day is defined as an era of neo-romanticism,
when it is asserted that Germany is now entering
upon a period of emotional culture in which the most
important part will belong to art, certain character
istic features of the time are undoubtedly explained«
Romanticism is enjoying a fresh popularity, and the
writers and thinkers belonging to that category are
being studied with redoubled energy. To-day just
as was the case before, doubts are being raised with
respect to " the little sagacity." 1 People are plung
ing with sympathy and curiosity into the study of
religious phenomena. Spiritualism and even the
occult sciences are rejoicing in fresh favour, as they
did at the beginning of the last century. Music and
lyric poetry are held in high esteem, and symbolism
flourishes in literature and art. But contemporary
Germany is none the less enamoured of realism,
which is the classical ground of imperialistic ration
alism. And this characteristic is to be found in
artists and thinkers as well. Nietzsche is, perhaps,
a romanticist, but he is also one of the greatest
realistic observers that Germany has ever known.
Gerhard Hauptmann is the romanticist of The
Sunken Bell, but the realist of The Weavers. And
it is difficult to decide whether in the work of a man
like Klinger one should admire the realism and the
impeccable technique or the intense lyricism and
profound symbolism most.
i See note on p. 232..— Tb.

406 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
Is this rich and complex culture really healthy ?
Does it not present some rather morbid features ?
German critics have asked themselves this question,
and occasionally display some anxiety in this re
spect. The menace of " decadence " to which some
chosen spirits like Heine and Nietzsche succumbed,
is clearly a danger for the society of to-day. The
same symptoms as are to be found in the victims
of this evil, nervous over-excitability, enthusiastic
emotion, weakness of will, the undermining of the
unity of the personality, are to be observed in various
degrees in a large number of individuals. And we
may, perhaps, be allowed to feel some anxiety on
this account. If the attacks against Nietzsche, for
example, have been exceedingly violent, and if even
to-day a certain amount of adverse criticism against
him has not died out, it is probably because he is
hated as a type of " decadent," and a tendency in
him which is regarded as dangerous for the psychic
health of the nation is opposed. Generally speaking,
however, fears of " decadence " are not apparently
very widespread in Germany to-day. People have
faith in the somewhat ponderous robustness of the
race, in the powers of expansion it has shown in
the domain of economics, in its military instinct and
its sense of discipline and solidarity. It is willingly
admitted that the excesses of present-day impres
sionism are only due to a crisis of growth, and an
overbalancing of equilibrium which is necessary for
the realisation of future syntheses and superior
harmonies. And it is hoped that this crisis will
result in a renaissance of Goethean classicism and
scientific rationalism, and an era of renewed health
in which will flourish a type of man as rich, but more
subtle and harmonious, than his ancestor of to-day.

CHAPTER III
SYNTHETIC ART
I
Evolution, to quote once again Herbert Spencer's
expression which we have already used, is not only
carried out by means of differentiation, but also
through integration. Natural development in the
first instance goes from the homogeneous to the
heterogeneous, from unity to diversity. The law of
gradual specialisation is as true in the domain of art
as in natural and physical science. It is thus that
the " integral " work of art of primitive times with
which one meets at the dawn of human society, which
is a combination of dancing, poetry, music, and
religious worship, tends to split up. We find art
gradually becoming separated from religion, the
various arts which were at first intermingled be
coming differentiated, and ever more numerous sub
divisions growing up in each of the branches of art.
But the fundamental law of evolution is none the
less integration. In every department of natural
phenomena, in astronomy as well as in natural his
tory, in biology and in language, progress is made
by the birth of ever more complex organisms and
ever vaster unities. The history of art forms no
exception to this rule. At the same time as it shows
us the disintegration of the primitive " communion "
407

408 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
of the arts, it presents us, on the other hand, with
various attempts to produce synthetic works of art
resulting from the collaboration of several distinct
arts. Germany of the nineteenth century affords
us, in the domain of poetry and music as well as in
the plastic arts, extraordinarily interesting examples
of this effort towards synthesis.
One may perhaps be tempted to find an explana
tion for this integrating movement in a curious and
well-established phenomenon of our psychic life —
that phenomenon of the correspondence of the
various kinds of sensation with each other by virtue
of which waves of sound, for instance, can summon
up impressions of light, feelings of touch result in
impressions of sound, waves of light engender sensa
tions of smell, etc. This phenomenon would obvi
ously belong to that general development of nervous
sensitiveness which we described above as one of the
essential characteristics of modern times. And this
is certainly to be found in Germany, especially among
certain romanticists in whom nervous life seems to
have acquired an extreme intensity which is some
what abnormal. Thus Tieck makes various instru
ments, violins, hautboys, and horns, sound in his
verses ; he composes poetic symphonies, sees the
sound of the flute as a blue sound, or gives us a
picture in which the song of the nightingale is set
upon canvas. In a man like Hoffmann, who suffered
from alcoholic and neurotic hallucinations, these
correspondences were still more frequent and strange.
He proclaimed that for the musician sight was an
external sense of hearing, that colours, perfumes,
rays of light, were like sounds to him, and that their
combination was a marvellous concert. The scent
of a red carnation roused in him the sensation of

SYNTHETIC ART 409
hearing hunting horns in the distance. He per
sonified musical intervals. His fantastic creation,
Kreisler, says without blinking that he is wearing a
coat the colour of which turns upon C sharp minor,
and that it is finished by a collar in D major, and
moreover he threatens to stab himself with a dagger
in the augmented fifth. And after Hoffmann phe
nomena of this kind were multiplied among artists —
from the painter Feuerbach, who always connected
colours with musical impressions, to the dramatist
Otto Ludwig, in whose case the thought of Goethe
and Schiller was always connected with impressions
of colour, or the Kapellmeister Hans von Biilow,
who used to implore his orchestra to play such and
such a passage in a more " red " or more " green "
way. These extreme and doubtless' somewhat morbid
cases were probably the excessive and exaggerated
manifestations of a much more common phenomenon.
If to-day we find the technical processes of the
various individual arts drawing nearer together, if
more than ever before we see artists excelling in very
different branches of art at the same time, this is
perhaps an indication that in modern man the
different psychic and physiological functions tend
to react more and more upon each other, and to
vibrate simultaneously in a kind of mysterious sym
pathy as soon as any one of them is brought into play.
However this may be, it is at all events certain
that we find in the nineteenth century more than
ever before the tendency for music to approach
poetry and poetry to approach music. In the mag
nificent development of the symphonic poem from
Liszt to Strauss, in the addition of words set to
the symphony from Beethoven to Mahler, the
attempt made by pure music to be completed by

410 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
words and thoughts is already marked. We have
also pointed out in another connection how, in
the case of the romanticists more particularly, the
attempt to express pure emotion impelled them to
exalt the art of sound and to solicit the help of the
musician in some form. The union between music
and the word seemed realised, though still in an
elementary manner, in the song, which from Schubert
and Carl Lowe to Schumann, Brahms and Hugo
Wolff, attained a marvellous artistic perfection. And,
finally, it was also manifested with incomparable
richness and brilliance in the domain of drama by the
extraordinary works of Wagner.
The conception of a lyrical drama which would
not, like the opera, be merely a more or less in
congruous aggregate of pieces of pure music, of
singing and dance tunes, but which should be the
veritable result of the sincere collaboration of all the
arts, made its appearance long before Wagner in
the history of German civilisation. It was formulated
from the eighteenth century onwards by aestheticians
like Sulzer or poets like Wieland. It played a part,
which was exact to the smallest detail, in a celebrated
passage in Herder's Adrastaa. And from that time
it never disappeared from the literary horizon. It
has often been observed that Schiller's drama, " with
its internal melody and its musical rhythm," tended
of its own accord to find its completion in music, and
that a work like The Bride of Messina was an opera
without music. Similarly the second part of Goethe's
Faust would demand, in order to produce its full
scenic effect, the help of all the arts, and contains a
large number of regular opera motifs. And so also
Wagner himself attached great importance, especially
n the second part of his life, to connecting his work

SYNTHETIC ART 411
with that of the classicists and to establishing the
fact that the art of the future, which was so loudly
scoffed at by his contemporaries, should be nothing
more than the blossoming out of certain seeds which
were already to be found in The Bride of Messina
and William Tell. And he delighted to prove that
his artistic idealism was descended in a direct line
from the idealism of Schiller.
Musical drama was also the form of art towards
which romanticism gravitated. Romanticist thinkers
like Schelling, Solger, or Schleiermacher had a pre
sentiment of this, or else endeavoured to define it.
Hoffmann, who was both a musician and a poet,
formulated with perfect lucidity the programme of
the work of art of the future, and himself laboured
to carry it out, without, however, meeting with
much success. And even among the contemporaries
of Wagner two of the most celebrated masters of the
German theatre, Otto Ludwig and Friedrich Hebbel,
also conceived the idea of musical drama previous
to 1850, quite independently of Wagner, and during
the years that the latter was producing his first great
composition. The idea of " the complete work of
art, " therefore, was not the isolated fantasy of one
artist of genius, but the necessary and normal pro
duct of centuries of evolution. It was the realisation
of a programme formulated long before the days of
the master of Bayreuth, and made its appearance as
the successful outcome of the converging efforts of
numberless generations of poets and artists.
It was not, of course, and could not be, the only
form of art or the final one. Profound as was the
influence which Wagner exercised over modern art,
the epoch of his exclusive predominance has already
for some time past ceased to exist in Germany.

412 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
Musicians and dramatists are trying to emancipate
themselves from his formulae, and critics are en
deavouring to determine his precise historical im
portance. The first of these was Nietzsche, who,
after having in his Richard Wagner in Bayreuth
hymned Wagner in almost lyrical accents as the
Dionysian artist par excellence, afterwards, as we all
know, denied with incredible violence this god whom
he had adored, and proclaimed his grievances against
Wagnerism with exasperated passion to his contem
poraries. He described Wagner as an essentially
romantic genius. He saw in him a marvellous mime,
an incomparable actor, who knew how to utilise
the resources of all the arts to produce a colossal
whole, who turned himself into a poet, a musician,
a scene-painter, and a mime, in order to get a firmer
hold over his audience. By his superior under
standing of theatrical effect, by his religious aspira
tions, his sympathies for a mystic and vaguely
Catholic asceticism, by his resigned pessimism, his
mistrust of conscious will and reflective action, he
was the genial representative of the neo-romanticism
of his day. But, in Nietzsche's eyes, this neo-
romanticism had its roots to a large extent in
" decadence " and in physiological degeneracy. If
the influence of Wagner were allowed to grow and
the evolution of culture to progress indefinitely in the
same direction, the inevitable result would be pessi
mistic nihilism, and subsequently practical nihilism,
and the downfall and death of modern civilisation.
The time had come to confront the romantic ideal
with the classical ideal, the religion of human suffer
ing with the worship of life and the will to power,
Richard Wagner with Bach and Beethoven — or even
Bizet — Sophocles, Racine and Goethe.

SYNTHETIC ART 413
And contemporary critics, whilst they render full
homage to the most powerful artistic genius that
modern Germany has produced, frequently agree
with Nietzsche in realising that the Wagnerian ideal
could not be an artistic and philosophical creed for
the men of to-day. They hesitate to place Wagner
on a level with the real heroes of German culture,
men like Luther and Goethe, Bach or Beethoven.
The latter were robust and healthy natures, full of
admirable vitality, in whom energy seemed concen
trated, and as it were summed up in a single point
in order to develop itself harmoniously in all direc
tions. Wagner's, on the contrary, was an extreme
and discordant nature, which was swayed between
a strong instinct for power and a religious mysticism
which aspired to Nirvana. His art, which vibrated
and shook with emotion, did not take its source, as
was the case with the other great geniuses of German
culture, in the richness of a personality which was
overflowing with life, but in the terrific discords of a
torn and tortured nature. He could not therefore
be the prophet of a new era. In his integral drama
he melted into one marvellous whole all the creations
of those fruitful epochs in which religions, cosmogonies
and myths had been born. His work summed up
the productions of primitive ages, and with prodigious
intensity suggested the idea of the energies which
created German and European culture in the past.
It was not a forecast of the future, it was not a pro
phetic vision of the latent forces which lay dormant
in the heart of the nation and determined the task of
future generations. By the all-powerful magic of its
accents, it was, according to Max Graf, the swan-song
which accompanied the twilight of the old gods, the
death-sigh of a culture which was drawing to its close.

414 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
It would seem that the ideal towards which modern
Germany is tending is no longer Wagnerian roman
ticism. She endeavours no longer to realise the
integral work of art, the great mythical drama which
by its symbols expresses the most profound ideas
of philosophy and religion. She would prefer, as
we have already pointed out, to conjure up by her
prayers the advent of a Goethean art, an ideal of
proportion and harmony, of self-mastery, and a
valiant and virile acceptance of the realities of life.
She must therefore seek outside Wagnerism for the
formula, as yet undiscovered, of that art for which
she longs, but has not found as yet.
II
In the domain of the plastic arts as well, Germany
endeavoured to produce synthetic works of art with
the help of architecture, painting, and sculpture.
In other words she attacked the difficult task of
creating for modern houses a harmonious style which
should be strictly suitable for the needs of the life
of to-day. It is, moreover, only quite latterly that
German artists seem to have gained a clear idea of
the exact form in which this problem was posed and
began to draw near to a solution.
The economic evolution which took place during
the course of the nineteenth century obviously
brought in its train profound modifications in the
conditions of material life. In the construction of
public buildings or private houses, in the arrange
ment and decoration of houses and flats, architects
found themselves confronted by fresh demands.
Moreover, technical innovations of prime importance
had been introduced. The use of iron and glass as

SYNTHETIC ART 415
constructive materials increased every day, and gave
rise to new architectonic possibilities. In a large
number of cases, too, and especially in the production
of furniture and utensils, mechanical machinery
took the place of the craftsman's handiwork. Thus
the modern artist found himself faced by fresh re
quirements, and to meet them had new technical
resources at his disposal. And consequently the
very force of circumstances imposed upon him the
task of creating an original style in harmony with
the conditions of modern life.
Germany endeavoured at first to get out of the
difficulty by imitating the old styles. Artists copied
the Greek or the Gothic, and found inspiration in
the Italian or the French Renaissance. In short, they
reproduced the forms of the past instead of frankly
tackling the problem of finding new ones. Thus they
frequently sank into conventionality and artifici
ality. They produced works devoid of architectural
" truth," works whose form was fictitious and not
the necessary outcome of the use to which the edifice
was to be put or of the materials used in its con
struction. They also frequently employed inferior
material instead of the genuine stuff — plaster and
stucco, for instance, in the place of stone — without
deigning to consider that the nature of the materials
employed should determine the architectonic forms,
and that any kind of " imitation " was to the last
degree inartistic.
From this point of view, the industrial art which
was developed in the new German Empire just after
the war of 1870 marks the acme of bad taste. It
raised to the position of a principle the machine-
made imitation, in cheap materials, of external
ornaments which had been shaped by hand in good

416 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
material at the time of the German Renaissance,
when the " Baroque " and " Rococo " styles were in
fashion. As it was proud of producing cheap manu
factured articles within reach of the most modest
purses, it dumped its appalling stock in enormous
quantities over all the houses in Germany, even the
most humble, and thus really perverted the taste of
the public belonging to the middle and the lowest
classes of the population. Owing to its influence
there were to be found everywhere sham-bronzes,
made of zinc covered with a patina, imitation leather
made of paper, windows of transparent paper stuck
on to ordinary glass to represent the leaded lights of
real windows, beer pots overladen with renaissance
ornament or adorned with rustic scenes, crockery
heavily decorated with printed pictures or patterns,
mouldings in papier-mache, and painted imitations
of wood and marble. And the manufacturers who
exploited this branch of industry, not content with
inundating the home market with their goods, ex
ported their shoddy art wares abroad, more particu
larly to England and America, where they naturally
excited the contempt of all who had the smallest
artistic taste, but nevertheless found a market owing
to their cheapness. Yet this speculation was not
altogether a profitable one. If even at the present
moment the public opinion of other countries is very
sceptical with regard to German " taste," and some
what disposed to despise the artistic output of
Germany en bloc, this state of mind can certainly be
largely explained by the fact that in foreign countries
German art is chiefly represented by this pretentious
and shoddy stock of goods, which the cultured public
of Germany itself hates and condemns with the
utmost severity.

SYNTHETIC ART 417
It would be exceedingly unjust at the present day
to continue to judge contemporary German art by the
mediocre productions of an unscrupulous industry.
It is true that Germans still export their trashy art
wares, and adorn their houses with pretentious
" imitation " atrocities. But among the cultured
Mite there has been developing, for about ten
years past, a vigorous movement of reaction against
the errors of the past. The promoters of this move
ment, drawing their inspiration from the principles
of decorative art in England, have endeavoured to
revive a sincerely modern Teutonic art in Germany.
They resolutely turn their backs upon the imitation
of ancient forms, believing that it is the duty of our
age to create original forms which are suited to it.
Above all, they proscribe without mercy the cheap
imitation of external ornaments borrowed from the
art of the past. They proclaim the principle that
the use of good material and honesty in execution
form a moral condition indispensable for the produc
tion of any work of an artistic nature. They desire
that an object should by its form express the use
to which it is to be applied and the material of which
it is made.
And at the same time as they are making a dis
tinct rupture with the errors of their predecessors
and loudly proclaiming the fundamental principle
of " truth " and loyalty, without which no art
worthy the name is possible, they also lay down
the general principles which should govern the
creation of new forms.
Instead of limiting their attention to isolated
objects, they take as their unit the room, the inside
or the whole of a house. Their aim is to create
synthetic works of art, aggregates which are entirely
27

418 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
adapted to the use for which they are destined, in
which the architectonic arrangement, the general
scheme of colour, every decorative feature, and each
piece of furniture combine to produce a whole im
pression of perfect convenience, harmony, and light.
They do not confine themselves, moreover, to creating
expensive interiors for the use of the rich, but also
endeavour to do work suitable for more modest
purses. And, in this connection, they have suc
ceeded in producing suites of furniture entirely made
by machinery, but of good quality and irreproach
able workmanship, which can compete in price with
the pretentious rubbish which still for the moment
encumbers the large furniture warehouses of Ger
many. German critics based the greatest hopes upon
this artistic movement, which is barely ten years old
and which may be destined to a brilliant future.
Even to-day the promoters of this renewal of the
art industry, who were isolated at the beginning,
have founded a school. Important local centres have
been established — notably in Darmstadt, Dresden,
Vienna, and Munich. The new German art, which
was very much discussed and criticised at first, has
vindicated its value not only at local exhibitions
like the Darmstadt Exhibition of 1901, which was
the first imposing manifestation on the part of the
new school, but also at International Exhibitions,
especially at St. Louis, where it had a very distinct
success. It would no doubt be premature to attempt to
prophesy the fate of so recent an undertaking. But,
on the other hand, there is now no doubt that it
draws its inspiration from a fruitful source, which in
some shape or form will certainly be realised in

SYNTHETIC ART 419
time. Our era is obviously aiming at producing an
honest, practical, and sober art, which will banish all
superfluous ornament, which aims through the col
laboration of technical knowledge and artistic taste
at creating forms which are at once rational and
aesthetically satisfactory, and which does not limit
itself to building homes of sumptuous luxury for a
few rich persons, but also knows how to descend to
the people and endow with a little beauty the sur
roundings in which the life of the humble is passed.
From this point of view the birth of the new syn
thetic art, which tries to make the whole modern
house into a Avork of art and to give it a style in its
entirety as well as in detail, may perhaps be a more
important fact than the rise of some fresh tendency
in painting and sculpture. The Germany of to-day
clearly understands the new duties of art towards
life, and has formulated the most interesting principles
of artistic reform. It now remains to be seen to
what extent artists will be able to realise the pro
gramme which they have set themselves, and also
to what degree the public, whether at the top or the
bottom of the social scale, will second their efforts,
and prove themselves capable of that aspiration
towards the beautiful without which no synthetic
and collective art can ever be developed.

CONCLUSION
If, now that we have reached the end of our sketch,
we endeavour to formulate the general impression
made upon our minds by the spectacle of the evo
lution of modern Germany, I think there is one
sentiment that will impress itself upon us and
take precedence of all others, and that is a feeling
of astonishment in the presence of the prodigious
development which German power underwent during
the course of the past century.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century Ger
many as a great Power did not exist. The Holy
Roman Empire was merely a ruin which was falling
lamentably to bits in the midst of the general in
difference. There was no longer any Germany.
There were only German princes, widely separated
from each other and mutually jealous, whose sole
care was their own petty dynastic interests, who
were capable of every meanness and every crime for
the protection or strengthening of their precious
sovereignty, unable to subordinate their selfish ends
to the good of the nation, but always ready, on the
contrary, to treat with the foreigner and even on
occasion to make war on their own countrymen if
they thought they could derive any profit from their
treason. In this disunited and powerless nation
there was no political life. Everywhere there reigned
supreme a monarchical absolutism which was fre-
420

CONCLUSION 421
quently a depressing despotism accepted by the
people with a docility which bordered upon servility.
Rigorously excluded from public matters, the peasants
and citizens, artisans and townsmen submitted pas
sively to the imperious and officious tyranny of the
State and its officers, took not the smallest interest
in the national life, and confined themselves to the
narrow circles of their private occupations. The
economic life of the nation, moreover, was narrow
and petty ; the population was sparse, the country
poor, capital small, and industry almost non-existent.
To escape from this poverty only one path remained
open — that of thought and art. The intellectual
minority threw themselves into it in a magnificent
outburst of enthusiasm. And in this partitioned,
humiliated Germany, half ruined by wars and in
vasions, there blossomed a literary and philosophical
culture which perhaps constitutes the nation's
greatest title to glory. From that time forward Ger
many had the reputation of being the classic ground
of idealism and dreams. Just as England had made
herself mistress of the seas, and France of the land,
all that remained for Germany was, according to
the well-known proverb, the kingdom of the air.
And she created for herself an empire of incompar
able splendour in this domain.
When, lo and behold ! in this backward nation,
which from the point of view of earthly realities was
disinherited and apparently absorbed in dreams and
mirages, the spirit of enterprise began to develop !
And soon it became evident that, of all the Western
nations, the German people were perhaps the most
happily endowed to succeed in the economic struggle.
In her prodigious stride Germany not only caught
up but left behind the Latin races who had had a

422 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
long start upon the path of material progress, and
to-day she even menaces the old industrial and com
mercial supremacy of England.
It has been discovered that this somewhat slow
and heavy, though robust and healthy nation, pro
vides an exceptionally favourable basis for the de
velopment of a capitalistic civilisation. Germany is
not by any means artistic, voluptuous and passionate,
like the Latins. She is not, like the latter, enamoured
of far niente, leisure, and a life of beauty and gay
sociability. She is serious and strong, a stubborn
and conscientious worker, who from the earliest days
has been adapted to severe moral discipline, and
subjected to rigorous military training. And lo ! in
this nation devoid of grace and brilliance, but solid
and long-suffering, there sprang up a vigorous,
patient, and methodical will to power, which was
capable of pursuing with untiring perseverance the
end it had set itself, without once being dis
tracted by a caprice or a passion, without once
being rebuffed by a difficulty or an obstacle. The
German wishes for power, not so much from any
personal desire to push himself forward and make
himself respected, and not even for the sake of the
material advantages he may procure ; he wants
power for its own sake, because it is the measure of
the true value of a man, a group, a party, or a people.
He is impelled towards enterprise by an economic
law and by virtue of a necessity imposed upon him
by fate. The German, as we have already shown, is
extraordinarily prolific. The annual increase in the
population of the Empire between 1816 and 1900
was 1-01 per cent. ; between 1900 and 1905 it reached
1-50 and 1-45 per cent. The population increased
from almost 25 million inhabitants in 1816 to over

CONCLUSION 423
36 millions in 1855 and over 60 millions in 1905.
About 1820 France had four million more inhabitants
than Germany. Shortly before the middle of the
last century the two countries each had about 34^
million inhabitants. To-day Germany has 20 millions
more than France, and the difference between them
is increasing daily. These figures are an eloquent
testimony to the extent in which the birth-rate of
Germany exceeds that of France, and to the fact
that large families are consequently more frequent
in Germany than in the Republic.
Now this is a circumstance which is in the highest
degree favourable to the development of capitalism.
The annual increase of population has furnished Ger
many with the army of workers which is required
for the development of industry. And in the well-
to-do classes of the population the spirit of enterprise
has developed enormously. The German father of a
family has not the ambition that is prevalent among
French parents of leaving a ready-made position and
a secure income for his children. He gives them a
good education, equips them well for the struggle of
life, and then leaves it to their own efforts to make a
place in the sun for themselves. Under pain of
sinking and falling below the level attained by his
parents it is necessary for a young man to Avork hard
and exert himself. Thus the fecundity of the race
has in the case of Germany been one of the strongest
stimuli in the rush for wealth and power.
And this desire for power is growing and getting
stronger in all ranks of life in Germany and in all
domains of human activity. It is to be found in
individuals, in political parties, in social groups and
in States. It asserts itself in the breast of the whole
German community in the shape of imperialism and

424 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
a universal policy. It tends towards military, naval,
and diplomatic supremacy, towards economic, indus
trial and commercial hegemony, and scientific pre
eminence — for science also is a form of human power,
and it is certainly to German science that Germany
owes a large share of her success. The will to power
is gradually ousting from the German mind the
aspiration for culture, and is imperceptibly pushing
the latter into the second place. The cult of art is
cooling down, or rather is changing in character ; art
is no longer regarded as an end in itself, but merely
as an accessory to life. And the worship of force is
increasing in Germany. But it must be confessed
that the power the Germans revere is not brutal,
tyrannical, capricious, and arbitrary force, which
delights in stupid oppression and denies all rights.
They worship intelligent and deliberate power which
imposes itself lawfully through its own virtue ;
because it is not only inevitable, but also useful, wise
and normal for strength to take the lead of weakness
and for the superior monad to hold the inferior one
in subjection. They revere that Might which is at
the same time the Right, because it is the expression
of a real superiority which should in all justice be
recognised and respected.
It must, moreover, be pointed out that the effort
to gain power is as orderly a process as possible
among the Germans.
The system of unrestricted competition, by insti
tuting war on the part of each individual against
all the rest and thus stimulating private selfishness
to the highest degree, certainly contained within
itself an anarchical and dissolving principle. It was
capable of exciting, as it once did in Italy at the
time of the Renaissance, exasperated individuals to

CONCLUSION 425
fight desperately against each other for supremacy,
and to destroy each other without mercy. Yet it is
a very remarkable fact that the development of the
system of free enterprise in Germany has not en
tailed consequences of this nature. The competition
among individuals or bodies is very keen, but it
never degenerates into disordered convulsions.
The struggle between the German States for
political hegemony Avas very long and fierce, and it
was finally decided by war. But once the verdict
of force had been given, antipathies were calmed
after quite a short interval, and hatreds died out.
And instead of wasting time in useless grudges, or
squandering her power in vain rebellions, Germany
rapidly accepted the new order of things imposed
upon her, and united all her forces with a view to
political and economic struggles in Europe or the
world. Similarly the struggle between political
parties was obstinate and persistent. But it hardly
ever ended in any serious trouble. The conflict be
tween the classes Avas perhaps more serious than
anywhere else. But it was not of a revolutionary
character. Even among the Socialists, the irrecon
cilable adversaries of the capitalistic state in Ger
many, the reforming type of mind tended more and
more to gain the upper hand. They condemned
without exception all appeal to violence, all attempts
to gain their ends by force ; they openly repudi
ated anti-militarism and recourse to general strikes.
Industrial and commercial competition is very keen
and private initiative exceedingly bold and vigorous.
Yet Germany, the classic ground of cartels and great
associations of masters and men, is certainly also
one of the countries where the most has been done
to regulate production, to institute control over the

426 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
rate of exchange, and consequently to restrict com
petition, limit the frequency of crises, and diminish
their severity when they do occur.
To sum up : personal enterprise is very strong in
Germany, but it does not result in anarchic indi
vidualism. And the explanation of this fact is to
be found in a well-known racial characteristic. The
German has less need than men of other countries
to develop his complete personality. He willingly
confines himself to some special occupation, to which
he delivers himself up unreservedly. He gladly
sacrifices a part of his individuality and limits him
self, to use the expressive German word, to being
merely a Teilmensch, a fraction of a man, a specialist
who performs with conspicuous superiority some
particular task, without troubling his head about
anything that exists outside the carefully bounded
domain in which he barricades himself. And for
this reason too he loves to join associations and to
be a subordinate. He takes delight in becoming a
member of the innumerable Vereins of all kinds that
have sprung up in Germany, and enjoys the feeling
that he is an integral portion of a vast organisation
of which he is a more or less essential wheel. He is
pleased to associate his private destiny with the fate
of some vast enterprise, to the success of which he
is ready to devote his life. In a word he has the
instinct of discipline. He knows how to obey and
also how to command ; he knows how to execute
punctually the orders he has received, as well as how
to display initiative in the sphere assigned to him.
The German nation thus provides admirable
human material wherewith to build up the colossal
organisms of all kinds which go to constitute the
system of enterprise : national armies, great adminj-

CONCLUSION 427
strative bodies, vast financial, industrial and com
mercial enterprises, syndicates and cartels. There
is no department of life, even to the domain of art,
in which he does not aim at producing a synthetic
work, either in the shape of musical drama or an
edifice with a style in all its various parts. And this
taste for association and subordination is innate in
the German. He is not obliged to resign himself to
discipline. He practises it with joy. He becomes a
specialist by desire, and feels no regret for the things
which will for ever remain beyond his horizon. He
shuts himself up within the limits of his means, in
his Fach, with a certain austere joy which is often
mixed with a slight disdain or amused irony with
regard to the dilettante who meddles with matters
he knoAvs little about, and who professes to discuss
de omni re scibili and boldly tackles the deepest pro
blem of politics or religion, art and morality. His
serious side, his Grundlichkeit1 instinctively despises
improvisers, bunglers, Jacks-of-all-trades, who touch
upon every subject with an audacity only to be
equalled by their incompetence. He takes pride in
not transgressing beyond the bounds of things he
knows. Or, to put the matter more simply, he is
lacking in curiosity and for him the universe ends
with the limits of his own speciality.
This instinct for discipline, this sense for an order
of rank which is so widespread in Germany, has as
its first consequence the conservative attitude of the
nation as a whole. Individual thought in Germany
is extremely bold ; it recoils from no problem, and
examines them one and all with complete independ
ence. But at bottom it detests radical solutions.
In religious matters Germany is neither " atheisti-
1 Thoroughness. — Tb,

428 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
cal " nor " clerical." She repudiates none of the
conquests of scientific rationalism. But she still
preserves a sincere veneration for the instinctive
Avisdom which finds its expression in the religious
evolution of humanity. And she tries her best to
reconcile science and faith, rational truth and tradi
tional truth. Similarly in politics she endeavours
to unite the principle of authority with that of
democracy. She would no longer tolerate despotic
absolutism. Yet she keeps a spontaneous respect for
monarchy, for the established hierarchy and for
" qualified " authorities. German democracy does
not arrogate to itself the position of being the only
mistress of the nation's destinies, but willingly
shares its power with a supreme head it has not
chosen but whom tradition has provided.
Moreover, it seems that, thanks to her sense of
discipline and order, Germany is gradually raising
herself to a conception of life as a unity which is
little by little correcting and completing the com
bative idea of unrestricted competition. And it is
in this respect that, in my opinion, her evolution
most deserves our admiration. The development of
political parties, social groups, syndicates of masters
and men, and the tremendous extension of social
insurance schemes prove the continual progress made
in the idea of solidarity. The unchaining of universal
competition, and the war of each man against his
neighbour, have gradually given place to the realisa
tion of the necessity for a united struggle for power.
After a period of great upheavals, of instability and
insecurity, caused by the development of the system
of free enterprise, Germany expects and hopes for
the advent of a more secure economic and social
order, a more stable hierarchy, and a less uncertain

CONCLUSION 429
moral " faith." After the colossal struggle for
political supremacy and material wealth, she aspires
to a renaissance of the idealistic impulse towards
culture and art. These are certainly beautiful aims.
However uncertain they may be, it is enough for
them not to appear impossible of realisation for
Germans to have the right to look with legitimate
pride at the road already covered, and to gaze with
some optimism into the future towards which they
are marching.
It now remains for us to point out that for the
moment the consciousness of unity among Germans
remains almost exclusively national. The German
feels himself more and more at one with other
Germans. But in connection with other nations he
generally holds the combative idea of unrestricted
competition. The fundamental strength of German
nationalism to-day forms in this respect a striking
contrast with its generous cosmopolitanism a hun
dred years ago. Pan-German imperialism which is
so robust and combative, so confident in its power
and in the star of its fate, so energetic in its
enterprises, and moreover so vigilant and inclined to
take alarm, so prompt to threaten on occasion, and
so decided in repelling all solicitations on the part
of peace-advocates and internationalists, is cer
tainly an example and a warning to other nations.
It shows that the era of competition is not even
to-day at an end, either in the case of individuals or
of nations, and proves moreover that a country
should in any case still keep its strength intact.
Is the present nationalism of Germany destined to
be the end of her evolution for some time to come ?
There may, perhaps, be some reason to hope that
she will not stiffen herself indefinitely into this

430 EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY
pugnacious attitude, and will not prove herself an
obstacle to the realisation of a less anarchical state
of things in the civilised world. And why, indeed,
should not the country, which in her own national
development showed such a clear understanding of
the necessity for competition and combination, of
fruitful emulation and unity, why should she not
gradually raise herself from the point of view of
national solidarity to that of the unification of
Europe and of the human race ? There are numerous
symptoms which indicate that from many points of
view, but especially in the domain of science and
economics, as well as in scientific and artistic cul
ture, this evolution has long since begun in Germany
as well as in other countries. Perhaps it is not
altogether chimerical— and it is with this hope that
I would end this study — to think that the twentieth
century will see the growth and spread of the
modern religion of unity, and that we shall gradually
approach the ideal of the " good European " which,
during the height of the nationalistic enthusiasm,
Nietzsche had the courage to preach to his country
men.

INDEX

Africa, German Colonies in, 151,
152, 155
— 163
Algeciras, Conference of, 144
Allgemeine Deutsche Burschen-
schaft, Students of, 89
Allmenden, 31
Alsace-Lorraine, 90, 102, 134,
139, 140, 249, 262
Anglo-French Understanding,
144, 145
Anglo-German Treaty, 156
Argentina, 43
Aristotle, 252, 292, 353
Asia, German emigration to,
151, 152
Asia Minor, 153
Auerbach, 171
Augustine, Saint, 261
Australia, German colonies in,
151, 152
Austria, 66-70, 143, 242, 260
— Attitude and policy towards
German Federation, 72, 73,
74-76, 79, 84, 121, 122, 124
— Pohcy in European politics,
73, 74
- — Defeat of and exclusion from
Germany, 129-130
¦ — German population of, 149
Austrian Empire, The, 74
Austro-German Alliance, 143, 144
Avenarius, 326

Bach, 385, 412, 413
Bacon, 376
Baden, 137, 239
— Grand Duchy of, 96, 104
— Grand Duke Charles Freder
ick, 97, 105
 Charles, 97
— Revolt of Radicals in, 107

Bahnsen, 331
Ballestrem, Count, 246
Bamberger, 187
Barmen-Elberfeld, 22
Bassermann, 104
Bauer, The Brothers, 103, 314
Baur, 273
Bavaria, 96, 98, 135, 137, 240,
264
Bayreuth, 411
Bebel, 315
Beck, Karl, 104, 264
Beethoven, 361, 370, 385, 399,
402, 409, 412, 413
Belgium, Flemish, 66, 150
— Constitution of, 126
Beneke, 324
Bennigsen, 187
Bergmann, 286
Berlepsch, Herr von, 207, 208
Berlin, 21, 201
— Rising in, 105, 107
— Convocation of, 207
— Workmen's School at, 377
Bernard, Saint, 261
Berne, Republic of, 382
Bernstein, 172
Bismarck, Prince, 112, 187,
190, 202, 203
 Character and Ideals, 116-
120
 Appointed Prime Minister,
127
 Pohcy of, 127-130, 173,
177, 181, 182, 204-208
 Quotation from, 131
 Attitude to France, 132-
137, 140
 Foreign pohcy, 143-145,
154
 Colonial policy, 155-157
 Attitude to Cathohcism,
243, 244
Bizet, 412
Blanqui, 171

431

432

INDEX

Bliicher, 88
Bocklin, 405
Boehme, 225
Bonn, 239
Bourbon Family, The, 73
Brahms, 410
Brentano, 201
Brunswick, 28
— Elector of, 76
Biichner, 314, 318, 320
Biilow, Hans von, 409
Bund der Industrielle, 178
— der Landwirte, 183

Calderon, 373
Canossa, 243
Caprivi, 156, 157, 162, 163, 182,
208, 247
Cathohc Centre Party, aims
and pohcy, 185, 246-250
 Formation of, 23
Catholicism, Reforming of, 215-
217
— Effect of French Revolution,
217, 218, 219
— Decline of, 218, 221
— Renaissance of, 220, 229-236
— Conflict with State, 222-224,
240-244
— Influence of Romanticism,
224-231
— Opposition of Rationalism,
231
— Triumph over Liberal Catho
licism, 237, 240
— Consolidation of, 246-250
— Attitude to Science, 252,
.253, 255, 318
Chinese War, 248
Claudius, 262
Clauren, 380
Cohen, Hermann, 325
Cologne, 229
— Archbishop of, 240
Communistic Federation, Mani
festo of, 51
Confederation of the North, 131
— of the South, 131
Conservative Party, Ideals,
180
 Pohcy, 180-184
Constantinople, 153, 223
Cornelius, 395
Crimean War, The, 130

Croatia, 149
Czerski, 239
Czolbe, 314, 318 D
Dahlmann, 91
Dante, 388
— The Monorchia, 88
Darmstadt, Exhibition of, 418
Darwin, 314, 333
— Origin of Species, 320
Dehmel, Richard, 404
Democritus, 315
Dernburg, Herr, 157
Descartes, 280
Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft,
155
Diet, The. See Frankfort.
Dillengen, University of, 237
Dingelstedt, 104
Dollinger, 239
Dresden, 107, 418
Duhring, 204
Durer, Albert, 390
E
Ebbinghaus, 324
Egypt, 101
Ehrhard of Strasburg, 250
Eichhorn, 103, 180
Eiehstadt, 235
Elbe, country of, 28
— Duchies of, 130
Ems, Despatch of, 136
— Punctatio of, 217
Engels, 51, 314
England, 67, 134, 154, 262, 265,
416, 417
— Demand for German agri
cultural products, 8
— Competition with German
industry, 10, 422
— Pohtical condition of, 98, 99
— Alliances and foreign pohcy,
145
— Commercial supremacy of,
17, 422
— Socialism in, compared with
Germany, 52
Epicurus, 315
Erasmus, 275
Erfurt, 259
— Programme of, 314
Erlangen, 264
Erzegebirge, 21

INDEX

433

Eueken, 286
Europe, German population in,
152
Exter, 403

FaUersleben, Hoffmann, von,104
Febronius. See Hontheim.
Fechner, 286
Federation, Act of, 70, 72, 75
 Revision of, 105
Feudalism, 32, 33
— Abolition of, 34-37
— Revival of, 126
Feuerbach, 103, 314, 331, 409
¦ — and Young Germany, 51
Fichte, 51, 191, 227, 283, 286,
287, 318, 329, 335, 357, 358,
381-384
— Attitude to German Unity,
87, 88
— Discourses to the German
People, 88
— Discourses to the German
Nation, 195
Fiji Islands, 154
Fischer Kuno, 325
Flurzwang, Law of, 32
France, 142, 260, 279
— Physiocrats of, 5
— Commercial position of, 1 7
— Administration, 83
 Influence on Germany, 97,
98
— Designs on Egypt, 101, 102
— Demand for war with Ger
many, 102
— Outbreak of Revolution, 104,
105
— Army of, 144
— Population of, 145, 426
— Foreign policy, 145, 146, 147
— Book production, compared
with Germany, 364
Francis, Emperor, 68, 72, 73
Franco-German War, 11
 Effect on German Com
merce, 12
 Causes of, 132, 136
Franco-Russian Alliance, 144,
145
Francke, 262
Frankenstein, von, 246
Frankenwald, 21
Frankfort, 21, 70, 331

Frankfort, Diet of, 70, 75, 105,
240
— Parliament of, its failure,
106-113, 121, 123
— Treaty of, 140, 147
Frederick I., King of Wurtem
berg, 97, 105
Frederick William III., 92, 95,
293
 IV., 92, 96, 101, 103, 104,
116, 118, 201, 232, 263, 264,
293, 294, 318
 Refusal of the Imperial
Crown, 110, 121, 123
Free Syndicates, 53
Freihgrath, 104
French Revolution, Effect of,
6, 72, 82, 217-219
Friedrich, 239
Fries, 286
Frint, Bishop of Saint-P61ten,238
Furth, 10 G
Gallitzine, Princess Amelia of,
235
Gemengelage, Abolition of, 36
Gentz, 229
George, Stefan, 404
Germany, Industries and com
merce, 8-17, 20-24, 46, 47,
152-154, 160-164, 416, 417
— Agricultural development,
18-20, 28-42, 160
 and foreign competi
tion, 43
— Towns, growth of, 21, 22
— Wholesale production, 25-27
— Population, growth of, 42-
45, 422, 423
— Exports and imports, 45-47
— Class distinctions, old and
new, 48-51, 55-57
— Labour movement in, 52-54
— Economic position of, 58,
59, 67
— Growth of Imperialism, 65,
66, 100, 158-160, 165, 423,
424, 429
— Colonies, 66
— Maritime power, Foundation
of, 66 ; extension of, 163
— Conflict of PoUtical Parties,
67, 160-164, 168
— Foreign Pohcy, 66-68 ; to-

28

434

INDEX

wards France, 140-142, 146-
148;
Germany, Foundation of Con
federation, 70-72, 79, 89
— Failure of Confederation, 84,
85
— Unity, Struggle for, 88, 89,
124 ; achievement of, 130-
132, 137, 425
— Liberalism in. See Liberalism
— Constitutional Government
established in South, 98-100
— Army of, 142, 143
— Extension of Empire and
Colonies, 149-157
— Socialism in. See Socialism.
— Education, Growth and ex
tension of, 192-199, 363, 364
— Social Reform, 202-210
— Catholicism in. See Catholi
cism.
— Protestantism in. See Pro
testantism.
— Materialism, Growth of in
Rehgion, 313-320
 Dechne of, 321-323
— Influences of Positivism, 324-
328
 Nietzsche and the Pessi
mists, 328-347
 HeUenism, 352-356
— Art, Effect of Utilitarianism,
362, 363, 368, 369. See
Romanticism, Realism, Im
pressionism.
— Book production, 365
— Architecture in, 375, 414, 415
— Consolidation of Power, 422
German character, 58, 80, 356,
422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428
Gesner, 353
Gneisenau, 88
Goethe, 225, 257, 268, 286, 287,
325, 347, 354, 357, 373, 374,
380, 387, 388, 390, 403, 409,
412-414
— Hellenic Culture, 354-356
— Faust, 356
— Travels of Wilhelm Meister,
356, 367, 368, 384
— Quotation from, on Journal
ism, 365
Gorki, Maxim, 377
•Gorres, 88
Gotha, Congress of, 51

Goyau, 310
Graf, Max, 413
Greece and Neo-HeUenism in
Germany, 352, 353
Greeks, The, 387
Gregory VII., Pope, 243
Gregory XVI., Pope, quota
tion from the Bull Pastor
Mternus, 236
Grimm, The Brothers, 393
Gruber, Bishop of Salzburg, 238
Grundherr, 33
Grun, Karl, 51
Guelf Windthorst, 242
Guilds : their effect on Ar
tisans, 4, 5
— Destruction of system, 7,
22-24 H
Haeckel, 314, 315
— The Riddle of the Universe,
322, 323
Hamann, 262
Hambach Festival, 91
Hanover, King of, 76
Hanover, 28, 123, 130
Hapsburg Family, The, 78
Hardenberg, 6, 187
— Policy of, 78, 79, 95
— Reforms of, 82, 83
Harms, Claus, 264
Harnack, 271
— Essence of Christianity, 346
Hartmann, Philosophy of the
Unconscious, 331
Hartz Mountains, 21
Hasselmann, 171
Hauptmann, Gerhard, 377, 396
 The Weavers, 21, 169, 405
 Sunken Bell, 345, 405
Hebbel, Friedrich, 360, 411
Hecker, 104
Heeren, 117
Hegel, 51, 191, 276, 286, 287,
293, 323, 324, 326, 358
Heidelberg, 107
Heine, Heinrich, 100, 101, 170,
232, 377, 396, 403, 406
 Attitude to France,102, 103
 Romancero, 331
 Last Poems, 331
 Intermezzo, 387
 and Romanticism, 392
Heligoland, 156

INDEX

435

Helmholz, 324
Helvetius, 280
Hemsterhuys, 225
Hengstenberg, 293
Henry IV., Emperor, 243
Herbart, 324
Herder, 231, 268, 353, 390
— Adrastaa, 410
Hermes, Professor of Bonn, 238
Hess, Moses, 51
Hesse, Electorate of, 294
— Princes of, 76, 105
Hesse-Cassel, 130
Hesse-Darmstadt, Prince Fre
derick of, 229
Heyne, 353
Hirsch-Duncker Professional
Associations, 52
Hoedel, 204
Hceffding, 324
Hofbauer, Father Clemens
Maria, 235
Hoffmann, 117, 264, 386, 403,
408, 409, 411
Hofmannstahl, Hugo von, 404
Hohenlohe, Prince, 155, 157
Hohenlohe-Waldenburg, Chris
tian von, Prince Bishop of
Breslau, 237
Hohenstaufen, The, 390. See
Ottos
Hohenzollern, House of, 74, 78,
93, 189, 242, 248, 301
— Empire of, 244
Holbach, Baron, 316
Holderhn, 387
Holland, 9, 66, 150, 260, 262
Holy AUiance, 102, 116, 130,
393
Homer, 352, 373
Hontheim, Johann Nikolaus von
(Febronius), 216, 217
Huene, Von, 246
Hufe, 31
Hugo, Victor, 117, 382
Humboldt, Wilham of, 16, 187,
353, 354
 Pamphlet on Limits of
State Interference, 5
 Policy of, 78, 79, 81, 95
Hume, 276, 325
Hungary, Rising of, 105, 107

Ibsen, 377

Ifnand, 380
Impressionism, Effect on Ger
man Music, 398-402
Independence, German War of,
69, 77, 78, 89, 90, 100, 116, 129
Independent Syndicates, 53
India, 43
Italy, 73, 130, 144, 152, 242
— Rising of, 105
— Renaissance in, 424, 425
Itzstein, 104

Jacobi, 262, 268, 286
Janssen, 249
Jarcke, 229
Jena, Battle of, 6, 81, 82, 87
Jesuits, The, 216, 228, 234, 236,
245, 250, 280, 281
Joseph II. of Austria, 216, 223
Junker, The, 3, 4
K
Kant, 193, 217, 225, 231, 238,
257, 268, 287, 314, 315, 325,
329, 380, 387
— Rehgion of Idealism, 283-286
Keller, Gottfried, 396
Kiel, 264
Kinkel, Gottfried, 104
Kleist, 395'
Kliefoth, 294
Klinger, 405
Khnkowstrom, 229
Koniggratz, Battle of, 130
Kotzebue, 380
Kraus, Franz Xaver of Friburg,
250
Kreisler, 409
Kulturkampf, The, 243, 245

Laas, 325
Lafontaine, 380
Lamettrie, 316
Lamprecht, 60, 397, 402, 403
Lange, F. Albert, 325
Lasker, 187
LassaUe, Ferdinand, 51, 187, 204
Lavater, 262
Leibl, Wilhelm, 396
Leo XIII., Pope, 245
Leopardi, 331
Lessing, 267, 268, 271, 282, 353

436

INDEX

Levy, Dr. Oscar, Translation of
The Twilight of the Idols, 343
Liberalism, Growth of in Ger
many, 89-92, 103, 104
— Conflict with Government, 90,
91, 104
— Attitude to France, 100, 102-
104
 German Revolution, 101
— Aims of, 105-113
— Leaders of, 111, 112
— Foundation of Liberal Party,
175
— Pohcy, 176-179
Lieber, Dr., 246
Liebermann, 403
Liebmann, Otto, 325
Liebnitz, 280
Lipps, 324
Lips, Professor, 88
List, 8, 122, 187
Liszt, 399, 409
London Convention, 101
Lotze, 286, 324
Louis XIV., 134
Lowe, Carl, 410
Lucretius, 315
Ludwig I., King, 105
Luther, Martin, 254, 255, 259,
260, 261, 266, 269, 271, 291,
292, 293, 413
Luxembourg, 135, 150
M
Mach, E., 324, 326
Macpherson, 352
Mahler, 409
Main, 130
Mainlsender, 331
Mainz Gazette, 69
Makart, 395
Manchester School, 201
Marpingen, 233
Marx, Karl, 51, 103, 170, 203,
314, 315, 332
Mathy, Karl, 104
Maximilian II., King, 105
Mecklenburg, 294
— Duke of, 155
Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Prince
Adolphus of, 229
Meissner, 104
Melanchthon, 292
Mesopotamia, 153

Metternich : his pohcy towards
Germany, 72, 73, 75, 76, 105
Milde, Bishop, 238
Milhaud, 173
Moleschott, 314, 318, 320
Moller, 229
Morgen or Joch, 32
Morocco, 163
Most, 171
Mozart, 402
Muller, Adam, 229
Munich, 21, 105, 239, 418
Munster, 235 N
Nagler, 9
Naples, Kings of, 73
Napoleon I., 68, 69, 89, 235, 236
Napoleon III., 130
Nassau, 130
Nasse, 201
Naumann, 183, 208
Neander, 263
Nebenius, 187
Nicolai, 380
Nietzsche, 60, 232, 282, 327,
328, 369, 372, 377, 403, 404,
405, 406, 430
— Pamphlet against the " Philis
tine of Culture," 321, 322
— His philosophy, 332-347
— Quotation from Will to Power,
334
 Antichrist, 341
 The Twilight of the Idols,
343
 Zarathustra, 345, 368,
370, 387
— Thoughts out of Season, 368
— Richard Wagner in Bay
reuth, 412, 413
Nobiling, 204
Norddeutscher Lloyd, Organisa
tion and operations of, 153
Novalis, 218, 226, 227, 228,
232, 262, 359, 360
— Ofterdingen, 385
— Hymns to the Night, 387
Nuremburg, 10, 21, 390
O
Oberhn, 262
Occam, 253
Olmutz, Battle of, 124

INDEX

437

Ossian, 352
Ottoman Empire, The, 74
Ottos and Hohenstaufen, 390
 Fall of Empire, 69
— Empire of, 88
Overbeok, 229, 391, 395

Pacca, Cardinal, 223
Palatinate, The, 24
Papal Infallibility, Proclama
tion of, 241
Pariset, 298, 301
Pascal, 335
Pastor, Willy, 249
Paul, Saint, 274, 277
Paulsen, 194, 195, 198, 199,
252, 324
Peasantry, German, Develop
ment of, 18-20
— Emancipation, effect on, 36-
41
Pemba, 156
Persian Gulf, 153
Pestalozzi, 193, 263
Pfeffel, 262
Pic de la Mirandole, 275
Piloty, 395
Pius VL, Pope, 216, 217
— VII., Pope, 217, 236
— IX., Pope, 234
Platner, 229
Plato, 225, 328
Poland, 249
Poles, The, 139
Pomerania, 394
Posen, Archbishop of, 240
Prague, Treaty of, 139
Protestantism, contrasted with
Catholicism, 252-256, 268,
269, 298, 299
— Lutheran Influence on, 269
— Attitude to Reason and
Science, 256-258, 279-280,
283
— Pietism, Influence of, 260-268
— Rationalism in, 264, 272-
274, 281
— Relation to Christianity, 277-
279, 287
— Kant's Philosophy of Ideal
ism in, 283-286
— Philosophy in connection
with, 286-290

Protestantism, Orthodoxy in,
291-294
— Relations with the State,
294-297, 300-310
— Founding of the Protestant
Church, 300
— Relation towards the masses,
307, 310
Prussia, 70, 74, 75, 121, 240,
242, 294
— Annihilation of, 6
— State of in 1816, 8
— Growth of population, 45
— Contrasted with Austria, 76,
77
— Power, Growth of, 77, 121-
131, 143, 197
— Policy of, 77-79, 81-84
¦ — Attitude of German Princes
towards, 84, 85
 towards monarchy, 92-96
— Landtag, proposals, 92-96
— Conquest of Germany, 100,
128-131, 138, 139
— Modern education in, 363
R
Racine, 373, 412
Radical Party, Formation of,
104
Radwitz, General von, 123
Reahsm, Growth of, 393
— Affinity with Democracy,
394, 395, 396
— Effects upon Art, 395, 396
Rehmke, 324, 325
Reichensberger, 187
Reichstag, 52, 71, 131, 142,
159, 162, 172, 177-179, 202,
247
Reimarus, 271
Reinkens, 239
Rhein Mercury, 88
Rhine, The, 102
— Valley of, 28, 185, 242
Riehl, Alois, 325
Robespierre, 219
Rodbertus, 204
Rome, RepubUc proclaimed, 217
Roman Empire, The Holy, 68,
242, 390, 420
Romanticism, Influence on
Catholicism, 224-231
— Conflict with Intellectualism,
380, 381

438

INDEX

Romanticism, Attitude to Re
ligion, 381
 State, 382
— Exponents of and their teach
ings, 383-392
— Transition into Realism, 392
Ronge, 239
Roon, 129
Rosegger, Gottsucher, 346
Rothe, 251
Roumania, 43
Rousseau, 218
Ruge, Arnold, 103, 314
Rumohr, 229
Russia, 43, 134, 142, 143, 217
— Baltic Provinces of, 66, 150
Russo-Turkish War, The, 153
Riistow-Pacha, 153
S
Sadowa, Battle of, 132, 133, 143,
177, 197, 369
Sailer, 237
St. Louis, 418
Salzburg, Archbishop of, 217
Savigny, 117, 180, 382
Scandinavian countries, 9
Schadows, The, 229
Scharnhorst, 88, 90
Schell of Wiirzburg, 250
Schelling, 232, 286, 357, 411
Schenk, Eduard von, 229
SchiUer, 286, 354, 357, 380,
409
— The Bride of Messina, 410,
411
— William Tell, 411
Schlegel, A. W., 389
Schlegel, Friedrich : his teach
ings, 226, 227, 228, 229, 232,
358, 367, 383, 384, 388, 390
 Lucinde, 385
 and Hellenism, 387
 On the Language and
Wisdom of the Indians, 389
Schlegel, Wilhelm, 388
 Quotation from, 389
Schleiermacher, 263, 269, 270,
277, 278, 286, 293, 294, 299,
305, 411
— Discourses on Religion, 256,
257, 258, 288
Schleswig, 28, 139
SchmoUer, 201

Schoen, 95, 187
Schoenberg, 201
Schopenhauer, 331-333, 342,
358, 361
— The World as Will and Idea,
329, 330
— Parerga and Paralipomena,
331
Schorlemer, von, 246
Schubert, 385, 399, 410
Schubert-Soldern, von, 325
Schulte, 239
Schulze, 33
Schumann, 410
Schuppe, 325
Schwarzenberg, 125
Schwind, 391
Scotus, Duns, 253
Sedan, 197, 369
Shakespeare, 361, 389
Sienna, 217
Silesia, 21, 185, 239
Slavonia, 149
Smith, Adam, 5, 201
Socialism, Growth of Socialist
party, 51-55, 169, 170, 171,
173
— Ideals, 170-172, 201
— PoUcy and reasons for
failure, 174, 175
— Attitude of State towards,
202, 204, 207-210
 of Bismarck to, 204-209
 to culture and Art, 375,
376, 377, 378, 425
Solger, 411
Sombart, 49
— Quotation from, 187, 188
Sophocles, 361, 373, 412
South America, 24
 German population in, 151,
152
 German exploitation of,
153, 154
Spahn of Strasburg, 250
Spain, 73, 154
Spencer, Herbert, 262, 400, 407
Spiegel, Count, Archbishop of
Cologne, 238
Spinoza, 225, 270, 280
Spittler, 218
Stahl, 180
Staupitz, Vicar-General of the
Order of Saint Augustine,
259, 260

INDEX

439

Stein, Baron von, 6, 71, 79, 88,
116, 187
 Reforms of, 82, 83
Steinle, 391
Stettin, 21
Stilling, Jung, 262
Stocker, 183
Stolberg, Count Friedrich Leo
pold of, 235
Strauss, D. F., 103, 271, 273,
274, 318
— The Old and the New Faith,
320, 321
Strauss, Richard, 399, 403, 409
— Salome, 402
Struve, 104, 107
Stuck, 403
Stumm, Baron von, 205
Stuttgart, 21
— Rumpfparlament of, 106
Styria, 394
Sudermann, Johannes, 346
Sulzer, 410
Swabia, 24, 264, 394
Switzerland, 66, 150, 262, 394

Tacitus, 79
Taubert, 331
Thaer, 9, 187
Theocritus, 373
Thiers, 133
Third Estate, Enfranchisement
of, 7
Tholuck, 263
Thomas, Saint, System of, 252,
253
Three Emperors, Treaty of, 143
Tieck, 227, 228, 232, 386, 390,
408
— Genevieve, 385
Toleration, Edict of, 217
Tolstoi, 377
Tomasius, 264
Trades Unionism, Organisation
and growth of, 52-55, 60
Treitschke, 90, 187
Treves, 233
Triple AUiance, 143, 144, 160
Troeltsch, Quotations from, 267,
310
Tscheck, attempted assassina
tion of Frederick William IV.,
104

Tubingen, 264, 273
Turkey, Exploitation by Ger
many, 153, 163 U
United States, 43, 67, 154, 260,
265, 303, 416
 Commercial position of, 1 7
 German population of, 151,
152
Uruguay, 43

Valencia, 217
Veit, Ph., 391
Veits, The, 229
Venetianer, 331
Venice, 217
Versailles, 137
Vienna, 235, 418
— Treaties of, 8, 68
— Congress of, 70, 71, 72, 75,
78, 85, 89, 238, 240
— Outbreak of Revolution in,
105, 107
Vilmar, 294
Vischer, Peter, 390
Vogt, Karl, 314, 315, 320
Voltaire, 280
Von der Golz, 153
W
Wackenrode, 386
— Outpourings of an Art-Loving
Monk, 385
Wackenroder, 227, 228, 232, 390
Wagener, 204
Wagner, Richard, 183, 232,
287, 331, 342, 360, 361, 366,
398, 399, 402, 403, 405, 410,
411, 412, 413, 414
 Parsifal, 332, 400
 Lohengrin, 374, 375
 Meistersinger, 401
 The Flying Dutchman, 40 1
 Tristan, 332, 401
— Rudolf, 320
Wartburg Festival, 91
Weber, Carl Maria, 249, 385, 399
Weber, Ernst Heinrich, 324
Weimar, 347
Weisse, Christian Hermann, 325
Welcker, 104

440

INDEX

Werner, Zacharias, 229
Werneuchen, Vos von, 380
— Schmidt von, 380
Wessenberg, Vicar-General Igna
tius Henry of, 235, 237, 238
Westphalia, 21, 28
— Peace of, 251
Wichern, 201
Wieland, 410
Wildberger, 171
WiUiam I., Emperor, 130, 131,
137, 204
— Accession to power, 127
— Reorganisation of Army, 129,
WiUiam IL, 207, 208, 248, 249,
308
— Naval pohcy, 163
Willmann, 249
Winckelmann, 353, 388
Windhorst, 187

Woellner, 263
Wolf, Quotation from, 280
Wolff, Frederick Augustus, 353,
354
— Hugo, 410
Wundt, 286, 324
Wurtemberg, 96, 137, 262
Wiirzburg, 235
— Conclave of Bishops, 241

Zanzibar, 156
Zeller, Eduard, 325
Zentralverband Deutscher In
dustrielle, 178
Zirkel, Bishop, 235
Zollverein, EstabUshment of, 9,
122
— Extension of, 129, 131

Printed ty Bazell, Watson it Viney, Ld., London and Aylesbury, England.

1321

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