itiiitiliMl

YALE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

The Statesmanship of President Johnson:
A Study of the Presidential
Reconstruction Policy

BY
LAWRENCE H. GIPSON

Reprinted from the Mississippi
Valley Historical Review
Vol. II, December, 1915

Cd 14-, 2.1Z

THE STATESMANSHIP OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON
A STUDY OF THE PRESIDENTIAL
RECONSTRUCTION POLICY

THE STATESMANSHIP OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON:
A STUDY OF THE PRESIDENTIAL
RECONSTRUCTION POLICY
There has been an all but unanimous consensus of opinion
among students of history that the country suffered an irrepar
able calamity with the death of President Lincoln just at the
time when the tremendous problem of the reconstruction of the
southern states had to be faced by our national government.
His own superior qualifications to deal with this situation as well
as the utter lack of fitness of his successor have been major
premises which through long acceptance have really become axi
omatic. The basis for this conviction undoubtedly lies largely
in the fact that Lincoln succeeded in accomplishing what he set
out to do ; Johnson met with failure and repudiation. Moreover,
the former died at the psychological moment best suited to bring
with it a vast increase in fame ; the longer the latter lived, the
more complete beicame his political isolation.
However, it is only fair to ask, what might have been Lincoln's
loss of reputation among the people of the North if he had lived
to continue his policy of reconstruction and his fight against con
gress and the radical northern propagandists? Did not he, just
as Pitt, die most opportunely? For, if Pitt's health had not
forced his retirement from the British cabinet is it likely that he
would have emerged from the entanglements of the American
polonial problem without serious loss of prestige? In the light
of available facts can it be doubted that Abraham Lincoln, the
great war president — instead of Andrew Johnson, certainly a
great war governor — might have become the reconstruction
scapegoat just as Jefferson, the greatest of all American demo
crats, was obhged to bear the humiliation of the embargo fiasco ?
Surely Lincoln while in office never had a personal popularity
equal to that of Jefferson, nor a domination over congress that
was at all comparable. Yet, Jefferson failed miserably in his
endeavor to persuade the country to stand behind his plan of re
taliation against England, and his congress, earlier so blindly

364 Lawrence H. Gipson ^- ^- ^- ^
devoted to him, repudiated this cherished policy of an American
embargo even before he departed from office. Could Lincoln
with his liberal views have had any guarantees that he would
succeed better with a ra.^ical congress on his hands in providing
a proper solution of the great southern problem? Would any
really statesmanlike solution of that problem have been accept
able to the North during the decade following the war? Was not
any president inevitably doomed to disappointment, failure, and
loss of popularity should he endeavor to carry it out?
On the other hand, might not one say with equal reason that it
was a calamity that a man of the type of Johnson was not elected
president in 1860? Was Lincoln not a great war president
rather than a great war president? Is it not likely that such a
man as Hamilton would have crushed the insurrection much
more quickly, even decisively before the forces of secession could
have had time thoroughly to organize ? Was not Lincoln, while
in office, peculiarly lacking when it came to exhibiting great
driving force, such as characterized Johnson in stamping out re
bellion in Tennessee ? Might not Johnson, indeed, have become
a great war president if the opportunity had offered itself? Is
there not as much truth in the statement of Charles Francis
Adams, referring to Lincoln's election that no other "experi
ment so rash had ever been made as that of elevating to the head
of affairs a man with so little previous preparation for his
work, " ^ as there is in Rhodes 's indictment of the man con
fronted by the reconstruction crisis, that it is "difficult to con
ceive of one so ill-fitted for this delicate work"?^ In other
words, is there any reasonable basis for the maintenance longer
of the attitude by historians that Lincoln would have succeeded
where Johnson failed?
Mr. Johnson could not be called a prepossessing successor to
President Lincoln. His stocky form, swarthy complexion, deep-
set, piercing eyes, impulsive movements, voluble, brusque, tense
manner of speech unfavorably contrasted with the quiet, quaint
banter, the slow movements of the towering, angular yet digni
fied figure of the beloved martyr.
1 See the introduction to the Diary of Gideon Welles, secretary of the navy under
Lincoln and Johnson, vrith an introduction by John T. Morse, Jr. (Boston, 1911).
2 James F. Rhodes, History of the United States from the compromise of 1850
(New York, 1906-1907), 5: 518.

, No. 3 xj^Q Statesmanship of President Johnson 365
However, there was much that was common in the early years
of these men. Each had seen the light of day in the hut of a
poor mountain white; each had been raised in the midst of
squalor and ignorance ; each had struggled for an education with
almost pathetic eagerness; each personified in himself the
rugged mdependence and democracy of the West and consist
ently with this, each expressed a strong disUke for the institu
tion of slavery; one was familiarly known as "honest Abe," the
other as "incorruptible Andy." Like Patrick Henry, Lincoln
was a failure in life until he entered the legal profession; John
son, like Garfield, had a career of uninterrupted success from
the days of a self-supporting boyhood up to the attainment of
the presidential office. Both Lincoln and Johnson left the state
of their birth when young and in the state of their adoption
early in life began playing at politics — each in his own field and
in his own peculiar manner becoming a master of the art; al
though Lincoln was more often checkmated than Johnson. In
the struggle for a seat in the United States senate Johnson was
successful over Neil Brown, while Lincoln was defeated by Doug
las. In 1860 the democratic delegates from Tennessee to the
Charleston convention were as ardent in their support of John
son for president as the Illinois republicans were for Lincoln.
But when Lincoln attained the presidency he was a mere novice
in the field of public service in comparison to Johnson, who for
a score of years had been rewarded by the people of Tennessee
with one great public trust after another. When these two men
were placed at the head of the union party in 1864, one of the
newspaper correspondents sarcastically wrote: "They have a
railsplitter and a buffoon for the head of the ticket and upon the
tail they have a boorish tailor."
Although both of these men were western in training, in char-'
acter and spirit, they were totally different in temperament and
methods of approaching a problem. Lincoln put great depen
dence upon an attitude of what lately has been characterized as
''watchful waiting"; he was willing to temporize; he had great
faith in his often irresistible method of showing to an opponent
"the sweet unreasonableness of the latter's position." He was
the Fabian in American politics just as Johnson attempted to
play the role of a Gideon. For Johnson was one who — again

366 La/wrence H. Gipson M.V.H.B.
appealing to a present-day phrase — "carried a big stick."
When convinced that he was right and his opponents were
wrong there was no counting of forces for or against, but there
was a fight — and always to the finish. He breathed the same
spirit that battled in the veins of Andrew Jackson and the Ben-
tons of the earlier rough-and-tumble Tennessee days. There
was a decisiveness about him that rang like an anvil at times.
When Tennessee was on the eve of seceding Johnson hurried
from Washington to fight the movement. Warned that he would
surely be shot if he addressed a certain audience, it is related
that he went to the meeting, placed a revolver on the speaker's
desk, and with his eyes literally snapping fire, denounced in the
most terrific language the actions of this very people who had
delighted to honor him for twenty years I His state seceding,
unlike Lee, he felt there was a greater than state loyalty. Alone
of all the southem senators, he remained in his seat at Washing
ton, defying his former constituents in their attempt to wreck
the union.
While never carried away by such bursts of passion as char
acterized Andrew Jackson, he lacked none of the latter's ability
to employ on occasion language that was abusive and insulting
; in the extreme and hard for any other than a westerner to over
look in a man. Indeed, Johnson found it more difficult than
Lincoln to adapt himself to the demands of eastern society ways.
When, as a retort to a veiled thrust by Jefferson Davis at his
humble origin, he turned upon his southem opponents in the
house of representatives and denounced the "illegitimate, swag
gering, bastard, scrub aristocracy"* — he simply retorted in
that plain, unvarnished, hyperbolic language generally employed
by men of the frontier as a preliminary to the more dramatic
appeal to force.
His motto like Strafford's was "thorough." Arriving in
Tennessee in 1862 as war govemor, he put down the activities
of the guerrilla bands with an iron hand, warning the secession
ists in a proclamation that wherever in the state a union man
was mistreated he would immediately clap into irons the five
3 Varina H. Davis, Jefferson Davis, ex-president of the confederate states of
America; a memoir hy his' wife (New York, 1890), 1: 243; Congressional glohe, May
29, 1846, p. 885.

VoL II, No. 3 2^/jg Statesmanship of President Johnson , 367
most prominent confederate sympathizers of that section. * By
the time that Johnson was elected vice president his work as'war
govemor had been so thoroughly done that Tennessee then was
desirous of nothing so much as to be restored to her full rights in
the union.
A long public career, characterized by unusual achievements
most often brought about in the teeth of intense opposition, had
given the vice president unusual self-confidence and a frankness
in voicing it that was almost Napoleonic — traits, indeed, that
typify the blunt, unaffected civilization of westem communities,
and that constantly laid Johnson open to charges of offensive
egotism. It must be insisted that it is hopeless to attempt to
understand sympathetically such a personality as his without
first having an intimate appreciation of the life of the West.
One who would especially dislike to rub shoulders with an An
drew Johnson would surely feel uncomfortable in any thor
oughly "westem" community.
Decisive and bold, with a bulldog's combativeness and tenacity
when aroused, plain spoken, and even at times brutally rough in
language, the confidence of an aggressively successful career be
hind him — such was the man called upon to deal vith the most
difficult constructive problem in American history. But just as
Lincoln with all his tact, his ability to disarm opposition, his
conciliatory spirit, after his election to the presidency, failed to
check the country from drifting off into desperate civil strife,
so Johnson, in spite of a tremendous display of energy, was help
less to give the nation a rational solution of her problem in the
South in the face of the tidal wave of radicalism which swept the
North at the close of the war.
Dunning has pointed out that Andrew Johnson was not con
scious of the consternation which his accession to the presidency
produced. It was no time, men thought, in the quaint language
of the late leader, "to swap horses" — to exchange a tried and
true executive for an unknown quantity. Moreover there had]
already grown up a substantial opposition against the vice pres-j
ident. Some disliked his personality, others his western ways, |
still others of high social standing could not tolerate him on ac
count of his "low extraction" and the clinging odor of his earlier
plebeian profession of village tailor; many of orthodox com-

368 Lawrence H. Gipson ^- ^- ^- ^•
plexion were convinced that he was irreligious and a skeptic, and
the feeling had begun to spread that he was a hard drinker.
Some who had followed closely his career and knew of his domin
ating personality were alarmed for our republican institutions in
view of the fast increase in power that had come to the presiden
tial office during the past four years ; others looking forward to
an early adjustment of affairs with the South trembled lest he
should attempt to carry into effect his often-repeated threats
against the instigators of the rebellion; and everywhere there
were ardent republicans who were chagrined and made uneasy
that a life-long democrat should have slipped into office.
But while the press gives ample evidence of the existence of
these different sources of incipient opposition, it would appear
that the majority of Americans were not so much prejudiced
against Johnson as they were curious and expectant and holding
judgment in abeyance until they could see how he would carry
himself — all the while hoping for the best. Numbers undoubt
edly went further, reechoing the sentiments of a contemporary
biographer of the president who during the summer of 1865
wrote: "An individual better fitted for the place could have
hardly been selected. ' ' * This is especially true of the radical
elements of the North who had become indignant with Lincoln's
yielding attitude toward the South and who in the words of the
staunch, free-soil warrior, George W. Julian, felt "that the ac
cession of Johnson to the presidency would prove a godsend to
the country." ^
Upon entering office, Mr. Johnson wisely followed the example
set by previous vice presidents who had ascended to the presi
dency in inviting the already constituted cabinet to remain in
tact. To have done otherwise under the peculiar circumstances
would have raised a storm of opposition, especially in view of
the fact that this cabinet as a whole was made up of men who
had won the confidence of the country. There then appeared no
reason why Johnson would not be able to work successfully with
any of these men. At his first cabinet meeting he announced
that his policy "in all essentials would be the same as that of the
late president." * Gideon Welles, secretary of the navy, writing
* See George W. Bacon, Life and speeches of Andrew Johnson (London, 1866).
B George W. Julian, Political recollections, 1840-187S (Chicago, 1884), 257.
6 Welles, Diary (Morse ed.), 2: 289.

Vol. II, No. 3 xhe Statesmanship of President Johnson 369
in his diary four months afterwards was able to record: "It is
understood that the Cabinet unanimously supports the policy of
the President. No opposition has manifested itself that I am
aware of." ''
The North at his accession was in the midst of grief and un
controlled excitement over the assassination. Although the
chief conspirators had been brought to justice, the judge-advo
cate general was so sure that there was evidence to prove Davis
and other leaders connected with the plot that Johnson with
probably a good deal of grim satisfaction issued a proclamation
charging them with complicity. For Johnson realized that he
had been the peculiar object of execration in the South ever
since as a southerner he had denounced the rebellion. This
hatred for him had only been intensified, if possible, when it be
came known that he advocated the trial of the leaders for treason
and the confiscation of their plantations for the benefit of the
union war sufferers.
The repudiation of Sherman's terms to General Johnston,
whereby the South would at once become fully restored to all its
former political rights, as far as the executive arm of the gov
ernment could guarantee it, cannot fairly, according to Welles,
be charged against the president ; for, apparently, Stanton, most
characteristically, without consulting his superior's wishes, tele
graphed this "vituperative and insulting" annulling order.
However, in the light of previous utterances there is little prob
ability that Johnson at that time would have been disposed to
consider for a moment any such sweeping measure as a general
amnesty for the South.
After the capture of Jefferson Davis preparations were made
to bring him to trial on a charge of high treason. The presi
dent, consistently with his theory, strongly urged this. But
while the preparations were being made and the weeks passed
by, a great change of feeling came over the country. The al
most universal cry for vengeance raised after the assassination
had died away and just as generally in its place there appeared
a pronounced loathing at the thought of further bloodshed —
especially after the trial and execution of Mrs. Surratt. This
action and reaction of an overwhelming public opinion cannot
T Welles, Diary (Morse ed.), 2:364.

370 Lawrence H. Gipson m.v.h.b.
be too strongly insisted upon. No individual will or policy
could successfully oppose it. Indeed, there is reason to believe
that Johnson himself was affected by this sentiment against fur
ther bloodshed, in spite of the fact that McCuUoch, his secretary
of treasury, records his opinion that the president was loath to
give up his plans for the treason trials.* Theoretically, he may
have believed that the leaders of the rebellion — who were re
sponsible, according to his view, for all the terrible harvest of
woe — should be brought to the bar of justice ; but that would
not prevent the submission of his ideas of strict justice to the
call of mercy and magnanimity now that the enemy was fallen.
Whatever may have been his change of feeling personally, John
son was made to realize that the country would not support his
Spartan policy.^ To impute the abatement of his stem resolve,
as was done, to personal ambition which centered around the
building up of the democratic party into a triumphant machine,
is in direct contradiction to every trait of character previously
exhibited by Mr. Johnson during a long political career. That
Seward was chiefly responsible for the change that came over
the administration policy during the succeeding month and a
half following the taking of the oath of office, is hardly an ac
ceptable theory." It presupposes that Johnson was more easily
led from a policy and succumbed more easily to the personal
domination of another than the facts of his career justify. His
isolated and consistent stand at a great sacrifice in the Tennessee
legislature against the popular road improvement law, for con
stitutional reasons ; his refusal alone among the chief Tennessee
supporters of Bell to secede to the whig party upon the triumph
of the Polk faction ; his refusal alone among the southem sen
ators to resign his seat; his unique role as a^southerner in the
subjugation of his own state ; his determination to support Lin
coln as against his party in 1864 — all tlj-is shows that Mr. John-
8 Hugh McCuUoch, Men and measures of half a century (Ne^w York, 1888), 410.
Davis is "the head devil among the traitors."
B Such great organs of public opinion as the Nation reflect this. (Nation, 1: 390.)
Chase, who was to be depended on to keep his ear close to the ground, delighting in
radicalism, refused to counsel Johnson in this matter of bringing the leaders to
trial. See Welles, Diary (Morse ed.), 2: 366.
10 John W. Burgess, Reconstruction and ihe constitution, 1866-1876 (New York,
1902 — 'p. 32) holds to this view. This also would apply to the suggested controlling
influence of the Blairs or of Preston King. See Edward L. Pierce, Memoir and let
ters of Charles Sumner (London, 1879-1893), 4: 230, 250.

Vol. II, No. 3 j'jig Statesmanship of President Johnson 371
son was very much the sort of man who arrived independently
at important conclusions.
The theory that the president was rather guileless and as a
consequence played into the hands of versatile southerners who
managed to turn his head by means of their insinuating ways, is
even less tenable than the supposed influence exerted by Seward.
For years before the war he had been intimately associated with
these men in public affairs; his political rise had largely been
due to the fact that he had stood as the common man's champion
in opposition to the aristocratic southern element in Tennessee.
It would appear that the most satisfying explanation for the re
versal of the administration policy would lie in the fact that
Johnson, under the spell of the nation-wide reaction against
further bloodshed and now in possession of the highest office in
the nation, face to face with tremendous responsibilities, came
to realize that the new southem problem could never be solved
by attempting to hang the natural leaders of the people in that
section — "traitors though they were" — or by confiscating
their lands — "richly as they deserved it"; and, as the real
situation of the South in all its desolation, threatened by an
archy, impressed itself upon him, he arrived at the determinaf"
tion to put aside all notions of retribution and rather exert him
self to restore the wretched and thoroughly subdued region at
once to a basis upon which it might hope to realize once more se
curity of person and material prosperity — a basis, however,
that would at the same time require the complete subjection of
every part of the country to the new national ideals.
The inconsistency shown by many who bitterly complained
that Mr. Johnson had changed his policy toward the South is il
lustrated by the Nation which early in 1865 threw its influence
decidedly against the punishment of Davis and other traitors
and in September attacked Johnson in an editorial entitled, "Is
anybody to be punished?" because he had disappointed the pub
lic expectations by not carrying out his earlier views! "The
opinions about Mr. Johnson's qualifications in those dark days
were of course varied, but there was one point on which they all
agreed, and that was that he was just the man to punish trai
tors. ' ' " But he had failed to do so ; on the contrary he was ex
hibiting an unexpected zeal and sympathy for the South.
11 The Nation for September 28, 1865.

372 Lawrence H. Gipson M.V.H.B.
Not only was the president two months after taking office
charged with a reversal of his policy towards the traitors but
he had to face accusations of having deceived the leaders of his
party as to his real attitude toward the black race. Stanton,
Wade, Chase, and Sumner were aU convinced after conferring
with him at his accession that he would consider favorably a
proposition to grant universal suffrage to the Negroes. Secre
tary Welles had a different impression. "On this point I am
skeptical. He would not oppose any such move were any state
to make it." ^^ Later on in his Diary the secretary wrote that
the president "early listened to the counsel of Sumner and
others" but found that he could not adopt their extreme views
"without sacrificing his own convictions and principles. Their
aims and objects are partizan and factious ; his are patriotic and
statesmanlike."^' Welles also offers the following explanation
in replying to the charges that Johnson deceived Sumner and
others: "In our conversations he did not dissent from my
views and positions in any respect and persons not acquainted
with him would have supposed that he adopted them all, but this
is not his way. He listens, but unless he squarely and emphat
ically disapproves is disinclined to controvert. This trait has
led many to misunderstand and to misinterpret him." "
It must be admitted that Johnson on becoming president was
faced by a most extraordinary situation. He had every reason
for desiring in no wise to antagonize those with whom he must
labor in the great work of restoring the union. In his assur
ances to such men as Sumner that "there is no difference be
tween us," what he probably meant to imply in the light of pre
vious and succeeding utterances was that they both agreed there
must be full justice to the colored race, that the fruits of the
union triumph must not be lost, and that the leaders of rebellion
must not only be denied the opportunity of aiding in the estab
lishment of civil government in the South, but every means must
be employed to bring them to justice. That President Johnson
meant to imply for a moment that he would allow Sumner or any
other man to dictate to him the particular processes by which
the administration was to attempt to realize these ends seems
izWeUes, Diary (Morse ed.), 2: 304.
13 Ihid., 580.
14 Jhid., 3 : 194.

Vol. II, No. 3 j'jiQ Statesmanship of President Johnson 373
almost preposterous. ¦ Yet, that is just exactly what a clique of
influential radicals took for granted in these conversations ; that
is certainly what Wade implied in exclaiming at the accession
of Johnson : "By the gods, there will be no trouble now in run
ning the govemment." "
Johnson, in talking with these men, must have sincerely be
lieved that a common basis for reaching mutually desired ends
could surely be arrived at. He was not opposed to limited Negro
suffrage; but, significantly enough, he previously had publicly
declared in a widely reported speech: "In my judgment, the
freedmen, if they show patience and manly virtues, will sooner
obtain a participation in the elective franchise through the state
than the general govemment, even if it had power to inter
vene. ' ' " But the radicals demanded nothing less than universal
Negro suffrage to be imposed by the federal government. For
weeks there is every indication that the new president felt his
way with great caution, hoping to be able to put through his pro
gram without experiencing the hostility that Lincoln had faced.
In the cabinet meeting of May 9 the proposition of Negro suf
frage through federal authority first appeared as an issue be
tween the members present ; Johnson finding the cabinet about
equally divided refused to express himself "but took the matter
into thoughtful consideration. ' ' "
After the lapse of a month, he at last had formulated his pol
icy, which, from his own viewpoint, was, on the one hand, strictly
constitutional — and Mr. Johnson was a much better constitu
tional lawyer than many who attempted to advise him " — and
on the other hand was sane, opportune, and magnanimous for
the govemment to adopt in its relations towards the South.
Under this plan between May and December, 1865, all the south
em states with the exception of Texas were "reconstructed."
Constitutions were adopted and state governments set up. In
the reconstruction of each of these states the president issued a
proclamation of amnesty to those not disqualified by its terms
to take a prescribed oath of allegiance. A provisional governor
15 Julian, Political recollections, 257.
16 Johnson 's inaugural address as war governor of Tennessee. Cf . James S. Jones,
Life of Andrew Johnson (Greenville, Tenn., 1901), 182.
IT Rhodes, History of the United States, 5 : 524, quoting Welles in the Galaxy.
18 Ihid., 524-525, for criticisms of constitutional views of Chase and Sumner.

374 Lawrence H. Gipson ^- ^- ^- ^¦
was appointed and delegates were chosen to a constituent con
vention by all those entitled to exercise that privilege under the
particular state law "before the so-called ordinance of seces
sion" — who were allowed to take the oath and had done so.
This convention (or the legislature provided for by it) was em
powered to determine what should be the qualifications for office
holders and those exercising the franchise, ' ' a power the people
of the several states composing the Federal Union have right
fully exercised from the origin of the government to the present
time."'* In other words, Johnson acted upon the theory that the powers
of the southern states should be revived ; consistently with this,
that only those should be allowed to participate in this revival of
state activity who could qualify for the franchise under the law
of their state as it was at the outbreak of the war ; that of these
voters a majority should be allowed to resume their full civil
rights upon taking a prescribed oath ; that the others might se
cure a special pardon from the president which would restore
their full rights; and, finally, that the qualified voters of each
revived state should be allowed to determine the requirements
for office holding and the franchise for the future, as they were
entitled to do under the federal constitution.^"
These reconstruction proclamations had the support of the en
tire cabinet. Even Stanton later admitted that his "judgment
yielded to the adverse arguments . . . and the President's
conviction that to prescribe the rule of suffrage was not within
the legitimate scope of his power. ' ' " Secretary McCuUoch un
doubtedly expressed the early viewpoint of the cabinet as a
whole when in writing to Sumner and in his Fort Wayne speech
he expressed vigorously his conviction that the president's pol
icy would be "sustained by the people and that the result will
vindicate the wisdom of his course." ^^
Wise as this policy might be, the historian Rhodes contends
that Johnson's great error in judgment lay in trying to carry it
out without calling on congress to assist him. However, did
19 James D. Richardson, Messages and papers of the presidents, 6 : 315. For a
proclamation see pp. 310-314.
20 In Luther v. Borden this view was strongly upheld.
'21 See George C. Gorham, Dife and public services of Edmn M. Stanton (Boston,
1899), 2: 305.
22 McCuUoch, Men and measu/res, 381.

Vol. II, No. 3 j'fie statesmanship of President Johnson 375
Johnson have any reason to expect that congress would be more
amenable to him than to Lincoln? Had it not in opposition to
the presidential policy already embodied its theory of recon
struction in the Wade-Davis bill? Were not the published views
of the leaders who would surely dominate congress in funda
mental opposition to that for which Johnson had publicly stood
ever since in 1863 he had telegraphed to Montgomery Blair urg
ing him to use his influence with Lincoln so that the latter would
give no countenance to the project of treating the conquered
states as territories ? ^* Had not even Sumner soon after John
son took the oath of office come out in favor of executive recon
struction and in opposition to the summoning of congress?"
Had not the supreme court in 1848 in the Luther v. Borden de
cision give strong color to the view held by both Lincoln and
Johnson, that congress, responsible for guaranteeing a repub
lican form of govemment to each state, exercised that responsi
bility solely through its power to admit or refusal to admit its
representatives — leaving by implication to the initiative of the
executive the processes for erecting such a government? ^° Was
there not an even chance, at least, that Johnson, by proceeding
quietly along much the same lines as had Lincoln in restoring
the states, might be able to get the nation to accept the program
when justified by its results? Did not even the Nation admit
early in the fall of 1865 that this policy had "the miraculous
property of appearing to satisfy all parts and parties of the
country"?^* Indeed, considering the circumstances, Johnson seems to have
been amply justified in his course of action. To have summoned
congress to cooperate in this work he well knew meant an inev
itable battle. The more permanent his work could become be
fore congress had an opportunity to interfere with it, the less
likelihood there was that this body would succeed in overthrow
ing it, especially if the southern people would do their part in
satisfying the nation that they accepted the ideas embodied in
the new nationalism.
23 Welles, Diary (Morse ed.), 2: 630.
2* Pierce, Sumner, 4: 239.
25 See 7 Howard, 1; 17 Curtis, 1. James W. Fertig, Secession and reconstruction
of Tennessee (Chicago, 1898) holds strongly to this view.
25 The Nation of September 28, 1865.

376 Lawrence E. Gipson m.v.h.e.
It must be confessed that some of the southem states did not
sufficiently appreciate the magnanimous statesmanship of the
president. Their failure to give him the loyal support that he
(deserved so richly may be assigned perhaps as the chief cause
for the downfall of this program and the suljsequent shackling
of the South with Negro misrule. Above everything else it was
vitally important that the conquered states should give testi
mony to the country that, in spite of their individual misfor
tunes which they were trying to overcome, they were prepared
to exert themselves vigorously in the interests of the great body
of helpless emancipated, in establishing them in the ways of
freedom. While the passing of the black codes may have ap
peared imperative to many southerners it was the worst mis
fortune that could have befallen the administration, which up to
that time had been moving along cautiously but smoothly. A
cloud of hostile criticism arose and the president became appre
hensive, especially at the arrogant swagger of some of these
"unrepentant rebels." " It gave a handle to the opponents of
the govemment that they were not slow in seizing. For the in
dorsement of the president's work by a series of democratic con
ventions had irritated many republicans who were casting about
for some good basis upon which to raise the hue and cry against
this " life-long Democrat. ' '
The Nation, which was a faithful barometer of the attitude of
the more constructive of the radical wing of the union party,
voiced this rising temper in an editorial entitled, "The danger
of the hour," saying: "The whole question of the wisdom or
folly of President Johnson's plan of reconstruction as he. is at
present carrying it out turns upon the amount of confidence
which ought to be reposed in the good faith and good intentions
of the Southern people. What we fear from the President's
policy is not a renewal of the war, but the restoration of the
state of things which led to the war." The Nation then de
manded nothing less than the establishment in the South of
"homogeneousness, social as well as political" !^^ '
27 See James G. Blaine, Twenty years of congress (Norwich, Conn., 1884-1886),
2: 85-89. James A. Woodburn, JAfe of Thaddeus Stevens (Indianapolis, 1913), 226;
Rhodes, History of the United States, 5: 540.
28 The Nation, 1 : 357.

Vol. II, No. 3 j'j^e statesmanship of President Johnson 377
When congress met in December, President Johnson sent to
that body an "exceedingly strong and judicial" message. This
was penned by George Bancroft but as Welles pointed out in his
Diary, in referring to the possible share that Seward may have
had in framing it, "the views, sentiments, and doctrines are the
President 's — not Seward 's. " Welles had a high opinion of the
president 's intellectual powers. He wrote : " But the President
himself has vigorous commonsense and on more than one oc
casion I have seen him correct Seward's dispatches."'* The;
message was built up around the idea that the United States was
an indissoluble union of indestructible states and presented an
outline of the work accomplished in the restoration of civil gov
ernment in the South.
But congress paid slight attention to the communica-tion. Al
though members from many of the reconstructed states were ask
ing for recognition, not even those from Johnson's own state
were allowed to take their seats upon the organization of the
houses. Thus by^implication the question was raised as to
Johnson's legal title to the presidency, for the constitution pro
vides that the president must be an inhabitant of a state in the
union. Although Representative Brooks of New York made
this clear, the Tennessee members were left off the rolls.''" Now,;
upon the motion of Stevens came the selection of the joint com- \
mittee of the two houses of congress on reconstruction. The.^
executive restoration work was ignored, except in that it was*
denounced as "the greatest and most criminal error committed
by any government. ' ' '^ The impeachment of Johnson already
had been publicly demanded.^' Late in December, Welles went
to the president and informed him that he had become convinced
that an extensive intrigue was being carried on against him. As
the fury of the radicals seemed only to increase, Mr. Johnson
himself came to accept Welles 's view. It appeared that Stevens
and his associates were plotting to get rid of him by keeping
Tennessee out of the union.
Until the latter part of February the president held back, as
29 Welles, Diary (Morse ed.), 2: 392. Too much emphasis has been placed upon
Bancroft's assistance. Washington certainly made use of Hamilton.
59 Congressional glohe, 39 congress, 1 session, December 4, 1865, p. 3.
31 Welles, Diary (Morse ed.), 2: 393.
32 Ihid., 398.

378 Lawrence H. Gipson M.V.H.E.
it were, hoping that the moderates in congress would throw off
the radical domination and take control. Some of Johnson's
friends were disturbed at this forbearance and even Welles fa^
vored a "square and fierce fight" against the studied congres
sional usurpation of the constitutional powers of the executive.''
The first serious attempt to check congress came February 19
when the freedman 's bureau bill was returned to the senate with
ia veto. The chief objection to this federal means of securing
the welfare of the emancipated lay in the assumption that the
national govemment was not as yet satisfied that the South
could be trusted. For months. President Johnson had been try
ing to impress upon the South that the govemment was trust
ing her and expected her to live up to that confidence. For the
first and only time, the senate upheld a Johnson veto.
Two days after this triumph, Johnson made his first serious
mistake. At a mass meeting on Washington's birthday, al
though he had not expected to speak, the president was led into
making a typical western harangue to the people. He charac
terized the joint committee on reconstruction as "an irrespon
sible central directory"; Thaddeus Stevens, Charles Sum
ner, and Wendell Phillips — men "opposed to the fundamen
tal principles of this Government and now laboring to de
stroy them" — were denounced as enemies of the republic. He
even suggested, so intense did he feel that the hatred against
him had become, that there were some in high places who would
! be glad to see him removed even by assassination. In other
j words, Johnson at last had thrown himself into that "square
i and fierce fight" which influential supporters had been demand
ing. But to their consternation he went into it in his own char
acteristic way.** The truth of much of his arraignment can be
better appreciated today than was possible at that time. Al
though Thurlow Weed, a past-master in New York politics,
called it "a glorious speech" which "vindicates and saves our
govemment and our Union," it had the effect apparently of
alienating a large number of administration men such as Fessen-
33 Welles, Diary (Morse ed.), 2: 412-413.
34Pomey's paper, the Chronicle, conveys the impression that Johnson was under
the influence of liquor. This is denied by those in a position to know. See Crook's
testimony, the Century, 16: 654; Welles, Diary (Morse ed.), 2: 439. See also Bacon,
Johnson, 85: "He is abstemious in his personal habits."

Vol. II, No. 3 jijie statesmanship of President Johnson 379
den and Trumbull.'^ It is hardly an exaggeration to say that
from that time on the committee on reconstruction did become
"an irresponsible central directory" reducing to impotence the
executive authority. However, it is fair to assume that the re
action against the veto was more decisive in producing this result
than the effects of the speech.
The latter part of March, congress passed the civil rights bill.
To President Johnson it was not only impracticable, but revolu
tionary, unconstitutional, and represented an unwarranted in
vasion of the rights of the states. The measure was discussed
by the cabinet; Seward, McCulloch, and Welles came out in
opposition to it. This must have encouraged the president, who
in the words of Dunning "was in no mood to run counter to his
constitutional past" and on March 27, 1866, he vetoed it. The
measure, however, was promptly passed over his negative.
Desiring to secure permanently the fruits of this victory the
fourteenth amendment to the constitution was carried through
congress and its acceptance was made a condition for the read-
mission of the seceding states to the union. The president had
no idea of being a party to this measure and let it be known that
he could not favor its adoption by the states in question. While
he had no opportunity to veto it, he did veto a third freedman 's
bureau bill, which was immediately repassed by the necessary
two-thirds majority. Soon after that congress adjourned but
not before recognizing the restoration of Tennessee which had
ratified the fourteenth amendment.
During the summer there was an unusual amount of political
realignment. Although the leaders of the republican party were
making bitter war against Johnson, the latter continued to make
his appointments from the ranks of that party. Indeed, he ex
hibited ' ' an immovable fidelity to the conditions under which he
had attained his high office. " '* To vindicate the policy of the
govemment, there was called August 14 the national union con
vention, made up of delegates from the unrepresented South as
well as the North. These southem delegates gave every assur
ance that the South as a whole accepted in good faith the de-
36 In January Fessenden said: "The President has done nothing that his friends
complain of and his friends in Congress have done nothing that he can complain of. ' '
3s William A. Dunning, Reconstruction, political and econom/ic (The American
nation, 22 — New York, 1907), 74.

380 Lawrence H. Gipson ^- ^- S- ^•
cision of war with reference to the questions of slavery as well
as that of disunion. As Mr. Rhodes points out in referring to
this pledge of good faith: "After thirty years of observation,
study and reflection, I am convinced of the absolute truth of this
statement. " ^^
Mr. Johnson 's second serious mistake while in office was com-
; mitted when he made his speaking tour early in September. His
opponents knowing his combativeness when aroused encouraged
the hostile crowds which unmercifully baited him, especially at
St. Louis, Indianapolis, and Cleveland. The newspapers by dis
torting the facts succeeded in turning thousands of people in
disgust from their previous support of the president. He was
accused of drunkenness ; '* his behavior was pronounced maudlin
and his speech "positively shocking." He is said to have
dragged "the presidential office to the lowest depths of degrada
tion.'"" However, taking McPherson 's rendition of these
speeches as sufficiently accurate *° there is no one thing that Mr.
Johnson said that in itself was ' ' disgraceful. ' ' Not even the un-
'dignified retorts to his tormenters in the crowds could prove him
lacking in manhood, courage, and self-respect. He delivered the
same type of speech that hadVarried him to fame in the ante
bellum days in Tennessee. To people, of course, who demand
that the presidential office shall be enshrouded in solemnity and
formalities and made the object of a certain reverence, the ac
tions of this western-bred democrat represented a violation of
all the canons of good taste. Mr. Seward, who was in the presi
dential party, approved of the speeches. He felt that they were
aiding the cause and encouraged President Johnson to continue
making them."*^ That he did this treacherously as a confidential
advisor is inconceivable ; that he was a man of good taste has
never been seriously questioned. Secretary Welles, another
37 Rhodes, History of the United States, 5 : 615.
«' Ibid., 618. But see also Crook's testimony in the Century, v. 78. Crook took
the trip and as a guard was with the president continuously for years and he utterly
denies that Johnson was ever under the influence of liquor except at the vice presi
dential inauguration when, recovering from an attack of typhoid fever, the liquor he
took to strengthen him had an unexpected effect.
S9 Rhodes, History of the United States, 5 : 618.
*o Edward McPherson, Political history of the United States (Washington, 1876),
134-136. *i Welles, Diary (Morse ed.), 2: 588-596.

Vol. II, No. 3 j'jig Statesmanship of President Johnson 381
member of the party, recorded in his Diary his impression of the
Johnson speeches : "His speeches though assailed and ridiculed
were sound and patriotic. They were essentially but one speech
often repeated. Though poorly reported and often misrepre
sented the speech would do him no discredit as a patriot and
statesman. ' ' *' But in spite of all that can be said in extenua
tion, from the point of view of playing at politics, this speaking
tour was a mistake. What Mr. Johnson had been able to do so
successfully in his home state could not be done in the northern
cities, swayed by hostility towards him. The mere fact that the
speaking tour was in the nature of an innovation added to the
effect of the cry raised against it. Instead of giving the presi- ¦
dent a more responsive congress, there was returned at the elec- j
tions an overwhelming majority of antiadministration men.
The tenure of office act was thereupon passed which completed
the shackling of the president, now stripped of any effective ex
ecutive power. It represented a virtual overthrowal of our con
stitutional system of government, for not only was the chief
executive rendered helpless, but the United States supreme
court was cowed into submission to a congress dominated by a
group of radicals rushing off madly with the bit between the
teeth. It is not the purpose of this paper to deal with the congres
sional plan of reconstruction. To say the least, it was a dis
astrous experiment. When the nation had recovered its senses
the great work of providing each state with a political system
expressing the vital demands of an enlightened public opinion
was allowed to be carried out — legally and otherwise.
Even the harshest critics of President Johnson agree that his
actions during this period of congressional control were scrupu
lously constitutional. He attempted to impede in no way the
execution of the reconstruction measures. It was not until the
summer of 1867 that Stanton's ceaseless plotting against his su
perior became so intolerable that Johnson determined to bring
the tenure of office act to the test. It had been passed largely
to protect the secretary of war while engaged in his Machiavel
lian conspiracies. Johnson dismissed him. Congress now
jumped at the opportunity it had long been seeking to rid itself
42 Welles, Diary (Morse ed.), 2: 347-348.

382 Lawrence E. Gipson ^- ^- ^' ^'
of a president who had pubhcly questioned the legality of much
of its work and was openly accused of planning a coup d'etat to
rid himself by force of his congressional masters for the purpose
of setting up a dictatorship. The impeachment came danger
ously near succeeding in spite of the fact that every seriou^
charge fell completely to the ground. This marks the climax of
the efforts at congressional usurpation. From now on the reac
tion can be clearly traced. The president was allowed to finish
the remainder of his term of office in peace.
Before going out of office, Mr. Johnson gave proof of his keen
progressiveness by strongly recommending in two of his mes
sages measures providing for the direct election of the presi
dent, making him ineligible for a second term ; for the more ex
act determination of the presidential succession ; for the direct
election of senators ; and for the limiting of the judicial offices to
a term of years. As the election of a successor drew near, the
president could not but feel that he deserved to be vindicated at
the polls. For a time he thought that the democratic party
would look to him to carry it to victory, now that the country
was beginning to turn its back upon the congressional policies.
But such was not the case and the sixty-five votes that were
given to him in the convention on the first ballot were probably
complimentary and designed to draw to the party all the John
son union party supporters. Some man with fewer enemies and
less pronounced policies was demanded and the nomination went
to Horatio Seymour of New York. Yet Johnson was not utterly
repudiated. In 1875, Tennessee, as it were for a vindication
and token of loyalty, reinstated him in his old place' in the
United States senate. The New York Eerald commenting upon
this declared : "He is the best man Tennessee could have chosen,
not merely for herself, but for the Democracy both north and
south. ' ' But he was not allowed to perform any important labor
in the senate, for the same year that he took his seat witnessed
his death.
Nearly fifty years have passed since the memorable struggle
between the president and congress. The deep rancors of that
period have been obliterated, with the result that historical
judgments are being reversed. This is especially true with re
spect to the work of President Johnson. For as time goes on it

Vol. II, No. 3 j/jg Statesmanship of President Johnson 383
seems to testify with increasing clearness that the statesmanship
of Johnson was not at fault so much as was the statesmanship
of his leading critics. There were many men who far surpassed
him in brilliancy of mental qualities, in idealism and culture;
but it is to be doubted if there was a man living at that time
who possessed a saner insight into the more vital of the national
problems. He combined a tremendous reverence for the consti
tution with the undoubtedly rare capacity to appreciate condi
tions as they actually existed. Consequently, his policies had
the merit of being both in harmony with the best constitutional
traditions of the nation and eminently logical and proper. Al
ways in sympathy with the Lincoln program, he promised not to
break with it and he kept his promise. His chief measures were
not influenced by petty personal considerations, but showed
great generosity of soul. It is to be doubted whether Mr. Lin
coln with all his splendid gifts, could have won in the battle
against those forces that, even before his death, had determined
to give over the southem governments to Negro control. There
was too much misconception and sentimentalism to overcome;
party necessity clamored too loudly ; the danger of a democratic
victory in the near future appeared too imminent to republican
officeholders. The so-called mistakes of Johnson probably weigh
ed little in the balance when compared to the vast opposition that
al last developed under a wave of radicalism against his leading
measures and his attempts to hold back congress. It is noteworthy
that one of his opponents in the senate in after years paid this
tribute to Andrew Johnson : "After this long lapse of time, I am
convinced that Mr. Johnson's scheme of reorganization was wise
and judicious. It was unfortunate that it had not the sanction
of Congress and that events soon brought the President and
Congress into hostility."*' Such, it would seem, will be the
permanent judgment of posterity. Lawrekcb H. Gipson
W-iBASH College
Ceawfordsville, Indiana
*s John Sherman, Becollections of forty years in the house, senate and cabinet
(Chicago, 1895), 1: 361.

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