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YALE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

DEFENCES

OF

PHILADELPHIA

IN

1777,

COLLECTED AND EDITED BY
WORTHINGTON CHAUNCEY FORD.

BROOKLYN, N. Y. ;
HISTORICAL PRINTING CLUB.
1897.

FORT MIFFLIN,
FROM A MAP PREPARED BY CAPTAIN JOHN MONTRESSOR, SIR WILLIAM HOWE'S CHIEF OF ENGINEERS.

[From the " Pennsylvania Magazine of History and
Biography," i 894-1 897.]

One Hundred Copies Printed.
3^0 

NOTE.

"When I made a tender to tlie Pennsylvania Magazine of
History and Biography of a few minutes of the Councils of
"War held under Washington, I did not anticipate going
outside of those records. Finding an abundance of new
material bearing upon the operations in and around Phila
delphia in the fall of 1777, the plan was extended until the
result is this volume of nearly three -hundred pages, con
taining more than two hundred and twenty letters and
opinions, not five of which have before been in print. If
only as an evidence of the unused materials for American
history, this collection has an interest; and the interest is
heightened by the personal touches these buried and for
gotten manuscripts give of the writers. It is not so much
the importance of the military operations that appeals to
us, as the unconscious and therefore free expression these
leaders of the Continental army gave to their views and
feelings. The campaign of 1777, with its hopes and dis
appointments, is laid before us with a vividness of detail
that no historian could imitate.
In such a wealth of new material it would not be possi
ble to direct attention to the more important pieces. I
may, however, be pardoned for believing the record of the
Board of War, printed on page 175, to be an important
record because of the light it throws upon one of the lead
ing actors in the Conway cabal against Washington.
I wish to express my appreciation of the courteous and
untiring assistance rendered by the editors of the Pennsyl
vania Magazine of History and Biography while these sheets
were running through that magazine. It is not too much
to say that the success of that publication is due to the

iv Note.
liberality ofthe Pennsylvania Historical Society to students
of American history, and to the full and accurate knowledge
of Pennsylvania history possessed by Mr. Frederick D.
Stone and Mr. John W. Jordan, to whom my acknowl
edgments are specially tendered.
Worthington Chauncey Ford.
Washington, D. C, 29tli July, 1897.

CONTENTS.

PAGE
NoTB  iii
CorifciL OP Wak, 12 June, 1777  2
Howe's movements — Defence of the Highlands— Rules of promo
tion.
Opinion of Major-General Greene  5
Importance of Philadelphia — Approaches to the city — Delaware
difficult to navigate — Fort MifBin and the ehevaux-de-frise — Utility
of fire-ships — Land batteries to defend the channel — Fortifications
at Billingsport and Red Bank — Half-moon batteries suggested —
Fortifying Darby Creek — Forts a disadvantage.
Definitive Project of Dtj Coudeay, 6 August, 1777  12
Position of the floating batteries — The galleys and land battery — .
Lines of defence — Hog's Island — Billingsport the best to fortify —
Needs of the service.
Opinion op Major-Genbral Wayne, 7 August, 1777  19
Completion of the forts. — Garrisons in the forts — Troops at Marcus
Hook.
Opinion op Joseph Keed, 7 August, 1777  20
Howe's movement intended against Philadelphia — Must prevent
the English from getting behind the army — Difiiculty of effecting a
landing in the face of an enemy — Probable place of landing — New
Jersey not eligible — Advantages of Darby Creek — In case of re
treat — The river defence — Darby — Billingsport — Red Bank — Fort
Island — Stock should be removed.
Opinion of Brigadier-General Knox, 9 August, 1777  29
Fort Island should be strengthened — Red Bank, contracted — Bil
lingsport and the galleys — "Works at Darby Creek and command of
the channel.
Washington to the President op Congkess, 9 August, 1777 ... 30
Puzzling movements of Howe — Concentrating strength at one
point — Billingsport and Red Bank compared — Fort Island the
principal dependence — Works recommended — Results will be for
midable — A military survey necessary — Du Coudray.
Dtr CouDRAT TO Washington, 10 August, 1777  37
Favors Fort Island — Width of river and shallow places — Examines
Fort Island — The proposed survey.

vi Contents. PAGE
Washington to the President of Congress, 15 August, 1777 . . 40
Du Coudray's plan of the river — A weak point in Fort Island and
its remedy.
Council of War, 21 August, 1777  41
Sailing of British fleet against Charleston, as was thought — Army
not to follow — Decided to move to North River.
Du CouDKAT's Memoir on Billingsport and Fort Island, 29
August, 1777  42
Fort Mifflin greatly exposed — Le Bruu's projects — Chevaux-de-
frise — Fortifying Billingsport — Workmen less costly than militia.
Du Coudray to Washington, 30 August, 1777  45
Sends his memorial — Militia engineers for map.
Du Coudray to Congress, 7 September, 1777  45
Survey of the river — Billingsport — Landing of the enemy at Chesa
peake — Fitness of station at Wilmington — Defence of river passes —
Offer of service — Desires co-operation of Mifflin — Question of artil
lery — Casting of mortars.
Council of War, 23 September, 1777  49
Enemy has crossed the Schuylkill — Movements and plans of the
Continental army — Damage by rains — Progress of the British —
Decision to remain.
Council of War, 28 September, 1777  51
Position and strength of the British — Detachments to join the Con
tinental army — Putnam ordered to send reinforcements — Immedi
ate attack not favored by majority — Opinion of the minority.
Brigadier-General Forman to Washington, 26 October, 1777 . . 54
A letter miscarries — Importance of fort at Red Bank — Slow gath
ering of militia — British occupy Province Island — Possible attack
on Fort Mifflin — Colonel Greene sends reinforcements.
Lieutenant-Colonel Smith to Washington, 26 October, 1777 . . 56
111 health of Baron d'Arendt — Difi'erenoe with Colonel Greene as
to command — Want of artillerists — Commodore should co-operate —
Position of the enemy — Need for clothing.
Continental Navy Board to Washington, 26 October, 1777 ... 58
Return of men on frigates — Safety of vessels in case of attack —
Stores sent to Easton.
LiBUTENANT-COLONEL COMSTOCK TO WASHINGTON, 27 October, 1777 59
Garrison at Red Bank — Arms from Hessians — Intelligence from a
prisoner and from Philadelphia — Militia not to be depended on —
Cartridges.
Washington to Lieutenant-Colonel Greene, 28 October, 1777 . 61
Health of Baron d'Arendt — Question of command between Greene
and Smith.

Contents, vii
PAGB
Washington to Brigadier-General Forman, 28 October, 1777 . . 61
Reinforcing Bed Bank and Fort Mifflin — Secrecy to be observed.
Instructions to Brigadier-General Varnum, 28 October, 1777 . 62
Route to Woodbury — To reinforce forts — Caution against surprise.
Washington TO Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, 28 October, 1777 . . 63
Question of command — Fort to be reinforced — Warning against
jealousies — Banks to be cut.
Washington to Commodore Hazblwood, 28 October, 1777 .... 64
Number of sailors in the army — Mutual confidence and perfect un
derstanding enjoined — Ammunition — Guarding against surprise.
Brigadier-General Forman to Washington, 29 October, 1777 . . 65
Assembling the militia — Newcomb refuses to make a return — Rein
forcements — Strang© conduct of Newcomb — Enemy's works at Bil
lingsport — Damage by rain — Province Island — Garrison in good
spirits — Burgoyne.
Council op War, 29 October, 1777  207
Lord Stirling to Washington, 29 October, 1777  67
Roads in bad order — Casualties — Necessity of harassing enemy —
Battle should be avoided.
Brigadier-General Potter to Washington, 30 October, 1777 . . 69
Situation of the enemy — The command of the ferries — Banks to be
out.
Captain Lee to Washington, 31 October, 1777  69
Strength of the force on Carpenter's Island — Means of getting pro
visions into Philadelphia — Illicit trade — Floods shut off communi
cation.
Washington to Brigadier-General Varnum, 31 October, 1777 . 70
Question of cannon — Crews on galleys.
Washington to Brigadier-General Potter, 31 October, 1777 . . 71
Breaking the road — Dismantling flour mills — Disposition of flour —
Banks to be kept open — Assistance from Lee.
Washington to Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, 1 November, 1777 . 72
Reinforcements and clothing — Suggests laying upper end of island
under water.
Washington to Commodore Hazslwood, 2 November, 1777 ... 73
Safer to have distant combat with enemy — Part of the navy —
Landing by night — Position of the galleys.
Major Fleury's Journal, 2 and 3 November, 1777  74
Movements on Province Island. — A battery on the " Augusta's"
hulk — Need of palisades — Obstacles to his plans.
Lord Stirling to Washington, 3 November, 1777  76
Objection to his plan — No freshet outs off communication — Scow
ferries — Position of Howe.

viii Contents. PAGB
Brigadier-General Potter to Washington, 3 November, 1777 . 77
How the enemy obtain provisions — Construction of floating bat
teries — The dismantling of mills — Distribution of guards.
Brigadier-General Varnum to Washington, 3 November, 1777 78
Want of confidence between Hazelwood and Smith — Strengthening
garrison at Fort Mifflin — Militia of no consequence.
Lieutenant-Colonel Smith to Washington, 3 November, 1777 - 78
Need of clothing — The floating battery and proposed attack on
Billingsport.
Captain Lee to Washington, 3 November, 1777  79
Interrupting illicit intercourse with the British— Some prisoners
and intelligence — Enemy to make a push for Fort Mifflin — Ships
blown up — Trade at New Castle.
Major Fleury's Journal, 3 and 4 November, 1777  80
Communication between British fleet and Philadelphia — Battery
on the " Augusta."
Washington to Colonel Greene, 4 November, 1777  81
Defence of Fort Mercer — Bombproofs — Provisions for an investi
ture.
Washington to Brigadier-General Varnum, 4 November, 1777 82
Wishes for success — Jealousies among officers — Attempt against
Billingsport.
Washington to Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, 4 November, 1777 . 83
Supplies of clothing — Fleury to serve as engineer.
Washington to Commodore Hazelwood, 4 November, 1777 ... 83
A free passage for boats — Means of closing.
Lieutenant-Colonel Smith to Washington, 4 November, 1777 84
Not a battery as supposed — Free commmunioation open.
Brigadier-General Potter to Washington, 5 November, 1777 . 85
Miscarriage of the move to dismantle mills — Arrest of the officer —
Crawford's men.
Washington to Brigadier-General Potter, 5 November, 1777 . 85
Annoyance over the mills — Crawford's men may be discharged —
Precaution against surprise.
Brigadier- General Varnum to Washington, 6 November, 1777 86
Cannonading the British ships — What was accomplished —
Poor conduct of the galleys — Great damage oould be done — Bil
lingsport the key of the river — Remissness of the fleet and defence
of the commodore — His character — Hospital service wanted — Plans
of the enemy — Newcomb's troops — Clothing from Tory Quakers.
Washington to Brigadier-General Varnum, 7 November, 1777 90
Approaching attack on Fort Mifflin — MiUtia not to be placed in
forts — Fort Mifflin to be reinforced.

Contents. ix
PAGE
Brigadier-General Forman to Washington, 7 November, 1777 90
Council of Safety and Newcomb — Newcomb's retort — Distribution
of troops — Charges against him and his resignation — Clinton sails
from New York.
Washington to Major General Dickinson, 8 November, 1777 . 93
Post at Red Bank — Oysters.
Washington to Brigadier-General Varnum, 8 November, 1777 94
Cannot do more than is being done — Purposes of the British —
Resolutions of Congress.
Brigadier-General Varnum to Washington, 8 November, 1777 95
Intelligence — Movement began — Rout of the enemy's boats — Chan
nel to be closed — Expects success in repelling an attack.
Captain Lee to Washington, 8 November, 1777 ... ... 96
Prisoners — Reports of the enemy's intentions — The floating bat
teries — Provisioning Philadelphia — Intercourse checked.
Major Fleury's Journal, 5-8 November, 1777  97
His position in the fort — Possibility of intercepting communica
tions — Works on Province Island — British land batteries — Fascines
wanted.
Captain Craig to Washington, 8 November, 1777  99
Movements of the enemy.
Brigadier-General Potter to Washington, 8 November, 1777 . 99
Cannot attack — Baggage sent away — Scattered condition of his
force — Disposition of pickets — The millstones — Drowning of some
Hessians.
Council of War, 8 November, 1777  101
Reinforcements on their way — Enemy to attack Fort Mifflin — De
cision against attacking enemy near Philadelphia.
Washington to Navy Board, 9 November, 1777  101
Resolutions of Congress — Frigates to be scuttled.
Brigadier-General Varnum to Washington, 9 November, 1777 102
Situation at Fort Mifflin — Floating batteries — Enemy's disposition
— Danger of breaches — Newcomb and his militia — Commissaries —
Sickness of Arendt — Intelligence.
Colonel Smith to Washington, 9 November, 1777  105
Relief of fort garrison — Need of provisions and men.
Colonel Smith to Washington, 9 November, 1777  106
Fleury's position — Works of the enemy — The resolution of Con
gress.
Major Fleury's Journal, 9 and 10 November, 1777  106
Enemy about to open their battery — Loop-holes — ^Fixing a chain —
Commodore's chain of little service — Firing begins — Damage to
guns — No fascines or palisades — Fatigue of garrison.

X Contents. PAGI
Washington to Brigadier-General Varnum, 10 November, 1777 108
Words of cheer — Reinforcements from Fishkill.
Continental Navy Board to Washington, 10 November, 1777 . 108
Protection of fleet — Resolution of Congress — Frigates scuttled —
Mishap to one — Morris's tobacco-ship — No wish to go contrary to
orders.
Brigadier-General Varnum to Washington, 10 November, 1777 110
Bombardment by the British — Inclemency of the weather — Militia
and ammunition — Cartridges for Fort Mifflin.
Colonel Smith to Washington, 10 November, 1777 ... . . Ill
Firing from the eneray and damage done — Constant fatigue of gar
rison — Defence of the chevaux-de-frise — Place will soon be reduced
— Enemy obtains provisions.
Washington to Brigadier-General Varnum, 11 November, 1777 113
Trusts he will check Howe — Ammunition not to be wasted — Potter
to annoy the enemy.
Brigadier-General Potter to Washington, 11 November, 1777 113
Intelligence of the British fleet — Firing from the enemy's batteries.
Brigadier-General Potter to Washington, 11 November, 1777 114
Attack on Red Bank — Rankin's wager.
Jonathan Kumpord to Brigadier-General Potter, 11 Novem
ber, 1777  114
Loss of an English ship.
Major Evans to Brigadier-General Potter, 11 November, 1777 115
A fleet with troops standing up the river.
Jonathan Kumford to Brigadier-General Potter, 11 Novem
ber, 1777  116
News of the fleet.
Brigadier-General Varnum to Washington, 11 November, 1777 115
Damage to the works at Red Bank — Will probably be forced to
evacuate.
Brigadier-General Varnum to Washington, 11 November, 1777 116
Events at Fort Mifflin — An evacuation urged — Cannonade to be
reopened — Bursting of gun — Baron d'Arendt.
Colonel Smith to Brigadier-General Varnum, 11 November,
1777  117
Damage done to fort — Ammunition — Block-house to be destroyed.
Washington to Continental Navy Board, 12 November, 1777 . 118
The sinking of the frigates — Disposing of the men.
Brigadier-General Potter to Washington, 12 November, 1777 . 118
Harassing the eneray — Interrupting bridge building — Communi
cating with Red Bank.

Contents. xi
PAGE
Brigadier-General Potter to Washington, 12 November, 1777 . 119
Ships passing the island — Intelligence from the city — Trading-
boats destroyed— Prisoners.
Major Fleury to Washington, 12 November, 1777  120
Situation at the fort — Garrison dispirited.
Brigadier- General Varnum to Washington, 12 November, 1777 120
Fatigued state of garrison- The command at the fort — Must be
lost if attack continues.
Colonel Smith to Washington, 12 November, 1777  121
Is wounded — Block-houses almost destroyed — An assault must take
the fort.
Washington to Brigadier-General Varnum, 13 November, 1777 122
Copy of orders sent — Proposed descent on Province Island — Fort
Mercer to be strengthened.
Major Fleury's Journal, 13 and 14 Noveraber, 1777  123
Repairing the damage done to the fort — Floating battery — Island
may be defended — Plan of preventing a storm — High hopes for the
future — A new battery — Men needed — Battery silenced — Deser
tions.
Brigadier-General Varnum to Washington, 14 November, 1777 125
The situation at the fort.
Brigadier-General Varnum to Washington, 14 November, 1777 126
Want of troops — Whole company of artillery in the fort — The at
tempt upon Province Island.
Major Thayer to Brigadier-General Varnum, 14 November,
1777  127
No danger from cannon — Deserters.
Captain Leb to Washington, 14 November, 1777  127
Intercourse between inhabitants and British fleet — Arrival of ships
from New York.
Major-General Greene to Washington, 14 November, 1777 - . 128
The situation at Darby — Ships coming up the Schuylkill — Obstruct
ing the channel — Chain of redoubts — Enemy discouraged.
Commodore Hazelwood to Washington, 15 November, 1777 . . . 129
Council of war — Could not drive British ships away — Good behavior
in fort and ships — Minutes of the council.
Captain Craig to Washington, 15 November, 1777  131
Attack fixed for the day — Enemy dread union with Northern army.
Brigadier-General Varnum to Washington, 15 November, 1777 132
Bulletin ofthe day — Major Thayer commended.
Benjamin Kandolph to Washington, 15 November, 1777 .... 132
In charge of a flag — Intelligence.

xii Contents. PAGE
Brigadibr-Genekal Varnum to Washington, 15 November, 1777 133
Damage to fort by bombardment — General officer needed — Over
burdened with work — Shipping may lead to evacuation.
Washington to Brigadier-General Varnum, 15 November, 1777 134
Supplies for the fort — Disposition of guns — Obstructing the chan
nel — Tbe enterprise against Province Island.
Colonel Smith to Washington, 15 November, 1777  135
Visits Fort Miffiin — Possibility of defending — Artillerymen wanted.
Baron d'Arendt on Port Mifflin  136
Importance of the fort — Designs of the enemy — Preservation of
the garrison — Relief parties — Repair of works — Cannon and pro
vision — Communication with the enemy — Opinion of Varnum.
Colonel Greene to General Potter, 15 November, 1777. . . . 139
Operations against the fort and their results — Desertions.
Brigadier-General Potter to Washington, 16 November, 1777 140
Fort Mifflin abandoned.
Brigadier-General Varnum to Washington, 16 November, 1777 140
Evacuation of Fort Mifflin — Attempt to drive away the " Vigilant" —
Annoyance to shipping from the land batteries — Fatigue of force —
Conduct of the fleet.
Colonel Smith to Washington, 16 November, 1777  142
Incidents of the evacuation.
Joseph Eeed to Washington, 16 November, 1777  142
Relief for the ports — Mode of annoying the enemy.
Brigadier-General Varnum to Washington, 17 November, 1777 143
Enemy easily obtains provisions — Troops from New York — Im
portance of Fort Mercer — Suggestions on troops and stations —
Bravery of defence of Fort Mifflin.
Captain Craig to Washington, 18 November, 1777  145
Intelligence — Cornwallis in New Jersey.
Lieutenant Heard to Washington, 18 November, 1777  146
Intelligence.
Brigadier-General Potter to Washington, 18 November, 1777 146
Movement of British announced.
Joseph Ebkd to Washington, 18 November, 1777  147
A move against Rod Bank — Cornwallis in command — Cadwalader's
scheme frustrated.
Washington to Brigadier-Gsneral Varnum, 18 November, 1777 148
Enemy crosses the river — AVarning against surprise — Reconnoitre
by St. Clair, Knox, and Kalb.
Washington to Brigadier-General Glover, 19 November, 1777 149
Orders for his march.

Contents. xiii
PAGE
Washington to the Commanding Officer op Poor's or Pater-
son's Brigade, 19 November, 1777  149
Directions for marching.
Washington to Brigadier-General Varnum, 19 Noveraber, 1777 150
Orders for conduct.
Washington to Commodore Hazelwood, 19 November, 1777 . . 150
Trusts all questions have been decided.
Washington to Brigadier-General Varnum, 19 November, 1777 151
Importance of keeping Red Bank — Reinforcements ordered — Re
moval of stores and protection of galleys.
Captain Craig to Washington, 19 November, 1777  152
Intelligence.
Brigadier-General Wayne to Washington, 19 November, 1777 152
Has advanced somewhat.
Brigadier-General Varnum to Washington, 19 November, 1777 153
Reasons for moving his flying camp — Enemy getting in the rear of
the fort — Most of the troops have left Philadelphia — Force of the
enemy — New Jersey militia.
Brigadier-General Potter to Washington, 20 November, 1777 154
Capture of one of his guards.
Washington to Brigadier-General Poor, 20 November, 1777 . . 154
New orders for his march.
Washington to Brigadier-General Paterson, 20 November, 1777 155
Orders for march.
Captain MoLane to Washington, 20 November, 1777  155
Intelligence.
Brigadier-General Varnum to Washington, 20 November, 1777 156
Situation at Red Bank — Powder scattered over the fort — Feint by
the enemy — Stores taken away — -Why Howe did not attack earlier
— Greene's arrival.
Brigadier-General Varnum to Washington, 21 November, 1777 157
Fort Mercer evacuated — At Mount Holley — Distribution of force —
Good prospects of an engagement.
Major-General Greene to Washington, 21 November, 1777 . . 158
Burning of the galleys — Delay in coming to the front — An attack
on the enemy suggested — Reinforcements — Reflections on fleet.
Intelligence prom Philadelphia  159
Major-General Greene to Washington, 22 November, 1777 . . 161
Incidents of the retreat — Light-horse wanted — Militia.
Washington to Major-General Greene, 22 November, 1777 . . 162
The proposed attack on the enemy — Glover's brigade — Lee's corps.

xiv Contents. PAGE
Washington TO Captain McLane, 22 November, 1777  163
On selecting intelligencers.
Washington to Brigadier-General Varnum, 22 November, 1777 163
To receive orders from Greene — On the destruction of the fort.
Washington to Major-Gbneral Greene, 22 November, 1777 . . 164
On attacking the enemy — Glover's brigade.
Navy Board to Washington, 23 November, 1777  164
Destruction of the fleet.
Colonel Ellis to Major General Greene, 23 November, 1777 . 165
Intelligence.
Major-General Greene to Washington, 24 November, 1777 . . 165
Position of the enemy — Militia of the State — Ready for an advance
— Supplies — As to attacking the enemy — Censure and risks — Has
felt Washington's displeasure — Poor condition of the hospitals.
Colonel Ellis to Major-General Greene, 24 November, 1777 168
Number of his force — Movements of the enemy.
Brigadier-General Weedon to Major-General Greene, 24 No
vember, 1777  169
Strength and situation of the enemy.
Brigadier-General Potter to Washington, 24 November, 1777 . 170
Intelligence.
Washington to Major-Genbral Greene, 24 November, 1777 . . 171
An important matter to be discussed.
Editor's Note on Mifflin's Connection with the Board op War 172
Eeport op the Board of War, 21 November, 1777  175
ON ATTACKING BRITISH IN PHILADELPHIA.
Opinion of Major General Greene, 24 November, 1777 . . . 177
Is opposed to at^cking Philadelphia — Reasons for rash measures
— Attacking Lord Cornwallis.
Opinion op Lord Stirling, 25 November, 1777  178
Favors an attack — Outline of a plan.
Opinion of Major-Genbral Sullivan, 25 November, 1777 . . . 179
The situation of the enemy — Strength and number ofthe redoubts
— Difficulties of passing them — Approaching the city by water —
Experience against success — Dangers involved in a defeat — Rela
tive strength of the two armies — Attacks on villages.
Opinion of Major-General Armstrong, 26 November, 1777 . . 185
Does not approve of the suggested attack.
Opinion of the Chevalier Du Portail, 26 November, 1777 . . 185
Dangers of an attack — Possible destruction of the army — Plans
oritioised — Operations in New Jersey.

Contents. xv
PAGB
Opinion op Baron db Kalb, 26 November, 1777  187
Essential points to be determined in plan.
Opinion of Brigadier-General Irvinb, 25 November, 1777 . . . 188
Is not in favor of risking all in one engagement.
Opinion op Brigadier-General Maxwell, 26 November, 1777 . 189
Reasons for not favoring the enterprise.
Opinion op Brigadier-General Paterson, 25 November, 1777 . 190
Believes the attack too hazardous.
Opinion of Brigadier-General Poor, 25 November, 1777 .... 190
Is against the attack.
Opinion or Brigadier-General Scott, 25 November, 1777 . . . 190
Approves plan of Cadwalader — Suggested change.
Opinion of Brigadier-General Smallwood, 25 November, 1777 191
Is opposed to the undertaking.
Opinion op Brigadier-General Wayne, 25 November, 1777 . . 191
Believes a battle to be a necessity — If Philadelphia be not attacked,
redoubts to be constructed — Reasons for favoring the attack.
Opinion op Brigadier-General Woodford, 25 November, 1777 . 192
Is In favor of the plan.
Opinion of Brigadier-General Knox, 26 November, 1777 . . . ,193
Many after military fame — Washington's reputation not at stake —
Depreciation of the currency — Rules and maxims of war against
the attack — Force of enemy and strength of his works — Examples
from experience — Favors winter quarters.
Washington to Major-Genbral Greene, 25 November, 1777 . 197
Enemy's position very strong — Fears an attack — Orders him to join
forces — Hospitals.
Major-General Greene to Washington, 25 November, 1777 . . 198
Advance upon the enemy's rear — Awaiting orders.
Major-Genbral Greene to Washington, 25 November, 1777 . . 199
In doubt as to action.
Colonel Comstock to Major-Genbral Greene, 25 November,
1777  200
Intelligence.
Colonel Comstock to Major-Genbral Greene, 25 November,
1777  200
Information obtained from prisoners.
Major-Genbral Greene to Washington, 26 November, 1777 . . 201
A fruitless march— Enemy strongly posted at Gloucester — A pro
posed attack rejected — Lafayette's good conduct — Obstructions in
river removed — Disposition of brigades.

xvi Contents. PAGE
Major-General Greene to Washington, 27 November, 1777 . . 203
Risk of withdrawing the troops from New Jersey — Protecting the
hospitals — Move to Burlington.
Captain Craig to Washington, 28 November, 1777  204
Intelligence.
Major-General Greene to Washington, 28 November, 1777 . . 204
Brigades for head-quarters — No magazines of flour — Tench Francis
a prisoner — Intelligence.
Navy Board to Washington, 28 November, 1777  205
Care of the frigates.
Washington to Navy Board, 29 November, 1777  206
Frigates may be used as barracks.
QUESTION OF WINTER QUAETEES.
Opinion op Major-General Sullivan, 1 December, 1777 . 212
Intentions of the board — Situations proposed — Objections to hut
ting — Objections to Wilmington — Winter campaign to be avoided —
Lancaster and disposition of army — Germantown the most proper
place.
Opinion op the Marquis de Lafayette .  216
Points to be considered — Favors the line from Reading to Lancas
ter — As to Wilmington.
Opinion op Baron de Kalb, 1 December, 1777  . 218
Wilmington not a good selection — Lancaster favored.
Opinion op Major-General Greene  . . 219
Objects of cantoning — Pleasure and relaxation — Necessary to pro
tect the country — Enlistments and bounties — Discontent of officers
— Proposed places for cantonments — Favors Wilmington.
Opinion of Lord Stirling, 1 December, 1777  224
Objections to Wilmington — An encampment at Tredyffrin.
Opinion op Major-General Armstrong, 1 December, 1777 . . 226
Is opposed to wintering around Lancaster — Is in favor of Wil
mington.
Opinion op Brigadier-General Maxwell, 1 December, 1777 . . 227
Covering the country — Disposition to be made of the army.
Opinion op Brigadier-General Smallwood, 1 December, 1777 228
Consideration of the places proposed— Favors Wilmington.
Opinion of Brigadier-General Knox, 1 December, 1777 . . . 229
Objects of winter quarters — Favors the line from Lancaster to
Reading.
Opinion op Brigadier-General Poor, 1 December, 1777 .... 231
Favors the Lancaster plan.

Contents. xvii PAGE
Opinion op Brigadier-General Wayne, 1 December, 1777 . . . 231
Objections to the Lancaster idea — Is in favor of Wilmington.
Opinion of Brigadier-General Varnum, 1 December, 1777 . . . 2.33
III condition of the army — Urges the Lancaster plan.
Opinion of Brigadier-General Woodford, 1 December, 1777 . . 235
The Lancaster plan endorsed — Crowding of the villages.
Opinion op Brigadier-General Weedon  236
AU plans open to objections — Condition of the army — Wilmington
will expose the army — Necessity for providing for a new campaign.
Opinion op Brigadier-General Muhlenberg, 1 December, 1777 239
Reasons for favoring Lancaster — Reconnoitring the country.
Opinion op Brigadier-General Scott, 1 December, 1777 .... 240
Wilmington believed to be the best place.
Opinion of Count Pulaski  240
Advantages of continuing the campaign — Only invalids to retire.
Opinion op Brigadier-General Du Portail  241
Exposing the country — Advantages of Wilmington — Better combat
than disorder and desertion.
Opinion of Brigadier-General Irvine, 1 December, 1777 . . . 243
In doubt as to better plan — Sheltering the army.
Circular Letter prom Washington, 3 Deceraber, 1777  244
Question of a winter's campaign, and attacking the enemy in Phila
delphia.
Opinion of Major-General Sullivan, 4 December, 1777 .... 244
Is opposed to the attempt — III condition of the army — Alarming
spirit of resignation among officers — Disaffection of the army —
Issue should not be on a single throw of the die — Dwindling of the
army — Objection to a winter campaign.
Opinion op Major-General Greene, December, 1777  248
Cannot recommend the plan — Zeal and caution — Condition of the
troops — Mortality of militia— Winter campaigns in Europe — Opera
tions of the last winter — Covering the army — Difficulty in obtain
ing militia — iDelay in assembling — Essentials to success — Weather
must be favorable — Militia cannot attack a city — Consequences of a
disappointment — Looks for disaster from a campaign.
Opinion op Lord Stirling, 3 December, 1777  256
Requirements of the army — Ice bridge necessary in an attack on
Philadelphia — Is against the attempt.
Opinion op the Marquis de Lafayette .  258
Cannot favor the suggestion — Reasons for his decision — As to an
ice bridge — No dependence on militia — A rash and laughable expedi
tion — Precautions to be taken in case of attack — Recruiting the
army.

xviii Contents. PAGE
Opinion op Baron de Kalb  262
Measures of attack — Only if river can be crossed on ice — Steps for
a winter's campaign.
Opinion op Major-General Armstrong, 4 December, 1777 . . . 265
Unhappy condition of Pennsylvania — Advantages of keeping army
in field — Is not in favor of an attack on Philadelphia.
Opinion of Brigadier-General Maxwell, 4 December, 1777 . 267
A winter campaign ruinous — Should prepare for one in the spring.
Opinion op Brigadier-Gbnbeal Smallwood, 4 December, 1777 . . 268
Evil situation of the army — Distress among the officers — Is against
a winter campaign — Militia of no service.
Opinion op Brigadier-General Knox, 3 December, 1777 . ... 269
Reasons against a winter campaign.
Opinion of Brigadier-General Poor, 4 December, 1777 .... 270
Little dependence upon militia — Advocates going into winter quar
ters.
Opinion of Brigadier-General Paterson, 4 December, 1777 . . 271
Favors going into quarters — His own brigade in no condition for a
campaign.
Opinion op Brigadier-General Varnum, 3 December, 1777 . . . 272
General consensus against winter campaigns — Americans have im
bibed the vices of Europe — Feeble state of army — No magazines of
provisions — As to militia — Strength of the British position — Exam
ples from history — Consequences of a defeat — Uneasiness of officers.
Opinion op Brigadier-Gbneel Woodford, 4 December, 1777 . . 276
An attempt on Philadelphia out of the question.
Opinion of Brigadier-General Weedon, 4 December, 1777 . 277
Not a single advantage to be gained from an attack — Force inade
quate and discontented — Difficulties of collecting and providing for
the militia — Army cannot work miracles.
Opinion op Brigadier-General Muhlenberg, 4 December, 1777 . 279
A winter's campaign impracticable — Is in favor of going into win
ter quarters.
Opinion op Brigadier-General Scott, 4 December, 1777 .... 281
Has altered his opinion and is against an attack.
Opinion op Brigadier-General Cadwalader, 3 December, 1777 281
Needs of the army not to be controlled by military writers — Expec
tations of the people — Dangers of removing to a distance^The
experience of the last winter — Clothing and quarters — Question of
a favorable position for cantonments — Lancaster — Wilmington —
Believes an attack will be successful.

Contents. xix
PAGE
Opinion op Joseph Eeed, 4 December, 1777  286
Experience against a winter campaign — Political unrest and finan
cial disturbance — Force under Howe — Will strengthen his position
— Division in classes — Disposition and objections — Answers and
suggestions — Hospitals.
Opinion op Brigadier-General Du Portail, 3 December, 1777 . 291
Quality of proofs to be considered — Militia fail under the test.
Opinion op Brigadier-General Irvine, 4 December, 1777 . . . 293
Favors a winter's campaign — Number of militia needed — Position
of the army.
Opinion op Brigadier-General Potter, 4 December, 1777 . . . 294
Cannot favor a winter campaign — No quarters in Pennsylvania —
Wilmington to be selected for wintering — A suggestion for attack
ing Philadelphia.
Opinion of Colonel Lutterloh, 1 December, 1777  296
Provisions and magazines — Alarm posts and signals.

DEFENCES OF PHILADELPHIA IN 1777.

The following documents form a part of a volume I have
for some years intended to complete, a full record of the
councils of war held by "Washington with his general offi
cers during the Eevolution. Such a record would result in
many surprises, as the councils were more productive of
timidity and caution than of action, and came to be re
garded as the easiest method of attaining negative results.
Hamilton more than once breaks into indignant speech on the
conclusions ofthe usual council, and in time the instrument
was discarded, and the general thrown more upon his own
initiative and the advice of a few of his most trusted officers.
For action, the advice of many was a hinderance ; for infor
mation, such advice was of value. It is because the opinions
given by the respective officers on the proper defences of
Philadelphia belong to the latter that they have an histori
cal as well as a personal value and interest.
On May 31, 1777, "Washington wrote to Governor Patrick
Henry of the expected sailing of a large fleet of the enemy
— estimated at a hundred sail — from New York. What
Howe's immediate object was could only be conjectured;
but it is believed that he had one of two purposes : either to
possess the Hudson River or to attack Philadelphia by way
of the Delaware. Por either of these operations his com
mand of the sea gave him peculiar advantage, as he could
keep "Washington in suspense at Middlebrook until his blow
in either direction was ready to be struck. On the very day
of writing to Governor Henry, Du Coudray, a French officer, 1

2 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
came into camp and presented to "Washington a contract
signed by Silas Deane, practically giving him a rank above
that of Greene, Sullivan, Knox, and others, and the com
mand of the artillery in the Continental army. The coinci
dence is worth noting, as Du Coudray was employed on the
defences of Philadelphia some weeks later. The situation
early in June is given in the following record :
" At a Council of General Officers held at Head Q" at
Middle Brook, the 12'" day of June 1777
" Present
" His Excellency, the Commander in Chief
" Majors General Brigad™
"[Nathaniel] Greene [William] Maxwell
" Lord Stirling [Henry] Knox
" [Adam] Stephen [James M.] Varnum
" [Benjamin] Lincoln [Anthony] Wayne
" [Peter] Muhlenberg
" [George] Weedon
" [William] Woodford
" [Charles] Scott
" [Thomas] Conway.
" His Excellency, the Commander in Chief informed the
Council, that from various intelligence and many concurring
circumstances, it was evident. General Howe had collected
nearly the whole of his Force at Brunswic in Jersey — That
it appeared to him beyond doubt, that General Howe, had
one of two objects in view — either the defeat of the Army
under his immediate command — or to possess himself of
Philadelphia — he stated the importance of the Highland
passes & of the Fortifications on the North River, in & con
tiguous to the Highlands and then proposed the following
Questions. " Question. Will it be expedient in the present conjuncture
of things & from the information received, to draw any &
what part of the Troops stationed at Peekskill near the
Highlands, to reinforce this Army ?
" Answer. All The Troops should be drawn from Peekskill

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 3
to reinforce this Army in Jersey, except one thousand ef
fectives of the Continental Regiments — This Number with
the Convalescents & such Militia as are there & can be oc
casionally drawn in, is esteemed Sufficient to defend the
posts there under the present appearances of affairs.
" Question. Will it not be necessary to post Troops at Mor
ristown to preserve it, as a post of Communication ? — If it
will, what numb^ of men should be stationed there ?
" Answer. It will be necessary to maintain that post. — The
Detachment of Connecticut Troops under Lieu' Col" Butler
& the Two Wyoming Independent Companies should be
employed in that Service.
" Question. What will be the best mode of promotion of
Feild & other (inferior) Officers in the Army ?
" Answer. All officers below the rank of a Major, should
rise regimentally. Officers of that rank superior should be
promoted on a larger Scale, Viz on the line of their State.
These Rules however, tho they should be observed in gen
eral cases, where there lies no objection, should not be es
tablished as conclusive, or prevent promotion for particular
merit.^ " Original Minutes " Rob. H. Harrison Secy."
The movement of the fleet, mentioned by Washington to
Governor Henry, was premature, and for more than two
weeks Howe remained at Brunswick, surprising his opponent
by his inactivity, yet developing his plans to attack Phila
delphia by water. On the night of June 13 he moved a part
of his force to Somerset Court-House, with the object of
bringing Washington out of his safe position to a general
engagement. Congress was more afiected by Howe's ma
noeuvre than was Washington, and ordered Arnold, then
guarding a pass at Coryell's Ferry, to take command of all
the militia at Bristol and on every other part of the river to
the eastward of Philadelphia. Four days later Howe had
^ See " Washington to the President of Congress," June 20, 1777, in
my Writings of Washington, Vol. V. 446.

4 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
retired not only from Somerset, but from Brunswick, falling
back to Amboy, a step caused, as Washington supposed, by
despair at finding the militia of New Jersey and Pennsyl
vania turning out to oppose them. The mystery of his
intention deepened, and greatly perplexed Washington.
Burgoyne had appeared on the lake, and so threatened the
passes of the Hudson River. Yet the American commander
thought this might be only a feint, designed to draw his
force to Peekskill, and thus leave Howe a free road to Phil
adelphia. The activity of the British on Staten Island
pointed to a speedy embarkation of a considerable force,
but for what purpose could not be ascertained. If it was
for the North River, a junction with Burgoyne must be
provided against. If it was for Philadelphia, that city must
be strengthened. In this doubt, Washington sent a re-en
forcement to Peekskill, and moved the main army to Mor
ristown, whence he could the more readily move in either
direction as the plan of the enemy was unfolded. Days of
anxiety followed, aggravated by the evacuation of Ticon
deroga and Mount Independence, under unexpected and sus
picious circumstances, by St. Clair.^ Arnold was ordered to
the Northern army, leaving Philadelphia and its defences.
" I think," wrote Washington, on July 22, " the works at
Billing's-Port well worthy of attention and it is expedient to
eflfect their completion as soon as possible."
At last something definite was obtained in secret intelli
gence. The sailing of a large fieet to the Hook could be
seen ; the fact that Southern pilots were on board pointed to
Philadelphia as the object. The American army had been
edging towards Peekskill, but now moved southward to
Ramapaugh. On the 24th the British ships stood out to
sea, and the Continental army began a march to Philadel
phia. At half-past nine on the morning of July 31, Wash-
' Landon Carter, of Virginia, on learning of this event, wrote that he
never expected much of St. Clair, as he was a Scotchman. The sentence
is of interest as pointing to the prejudice among the Virginians against
the Scotch, in whose hands the tobacco trade of the colony centred.
Glasgow owes much of its importance to this commodity.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 5
ington received an express from Congress announcing the
arrival of the fleet at the capes of Delaware, leaving no
doubt as to the action to be taken. At ten in the morning
Washington and his aides were in Philadelphia and the army
close behind him. Going farther to the southward, he was
met at Chester by the annoying intelligence of the fleet
again leaving the coast, and renewing the suspense. It was
in this interval that the general asked for advice on the
fortifications of Philadelphia, and received the following
replies : OPINION OF MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE. [Undated.]
" Philadelphia is an object of such magnitude, the preju
dices of the people in the surrounding States so strong, in
its favor, as to its importance and consequence, the manu
factories and supplies for the army so numerous in that city,
that the loss of it would so aftect the country and the army
that very great injury would arise to the common cause of
America. To prevent so great an evil, it is necessary to fix
upon some plan to guard the avenues leading to the City
both by land and water, and as its security depends upon
both being eflfectually obstructed, it requires anice examina
tion into the natural strength of each and the force and
obstruction necessary for both to be pointed out as far as
^ possible. " The approaches to the City by land may be made so
many diflferent ways, the City so difficult to fortify from its
natural situation, that the only security it can have by land
is an equal or superior force to that of the enemy. If this
be granted as it evidently must, then the plan of fortifica
tion upon the river should be so constructed as to draw the
least possible force from the land army and render the ob
structions on the river so eflfectual, as to make the approaches
that way as difficult or more so than by land. The neces
sity of dividing your Excellency's attention to both objects
is so obvious, and the folly of guarding one of the passages
while the other is left open so evident that there need be no

6 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
arguments to prove howe'er secure the river passage may be
rendered, they all must fall of course unless our force proves
sujierior to the enemy in the field. Having premised these
few things, I shall briefly give my opinion respecting the
fortification upon the river with some remarks upon strong
fortified posts, the infiuence they have upon the circumjacent
country, and the pannick that generally succeeds their loss.
" The Delaware being a long and narrow river, the chan
nel crooked and very confin'd, it must be somewhat difficult
and not a little dangerous for a large fieet to get up and
moor securely in the channel ; the fear of the fire ships and
fire rafts in such a narrow channel, and quick current, will
be consider'd as so many discouraging circumstances to
attempt opening a passage to the City.
" There are very different opinions respecting Fort Miffiin ;
the situation of this fort, as it cannot be injured by regular
approaches renders it an object of greater importance and
consideration, than a fortification of twice its strength that
could be annoy'd by regular approaches ; its distance from
the Red Bank upon the Jersey shore is such as secures it
from any great injury from that quarter; the land upon
Pennsylvania side can be so easily laid under water that it
secures the fortress from any approaches from that side ; the
front is secur'd by three rows of Cheveau de Frize, and it is
impossible to approach it in the rear unless the enemy are
masters of the river above and the City also. It appears the
fortification is very secure. The natural make of this Island
is not so good as I could wish, neither is the Plan of the
Fortification so good as it may be, the plan may be im-
prov'd by an additional battery upon the left of ten or twelve
guns, this may be so constructed as to prevent the front
Battery being enfiladed and will serve to annoy the enemy
if they should attempt to post a ship or floating battery on
the left of the Cheveau de Frize to annoy the fort on that
quarter. I should think there ought to be a good enclos'd
work to contain from three to five hundred men, and about
one hundred and eighty cannoniers. This is necessary to
prevent the fort from being surpriz'd by an attempt with

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 7
the boats. This fort aided by the Ships, floating batteries,
row gallies and fire rafts, I conceive will be full sufficient to
secure the passage of the river. Those who profess the
greatest knowledge on the strength of the Cheveau de Frize,
assert with confldence and I believe with truth, that they
cannot be run down by any force; neither can they be
rais'd or remov'd from their places, unless two vessels are
fastned to each Cheveau de Frize, one on each side, at
young flood, and are rais'd by the purchase of the swelling
of the water ; the flre from the fort, the Ships, Batteries &
gallies, must inevitably sink the vessells before they could
raise the Cheveau de Frize. But suppose them to be able
to resist all this fire ; there would be no difficulty in burning
the vessels with fire rafts in such a fixt position.
" The xebeques, floating batteries and frigates should be
posted behind the upper Cheveau de Frize, because the
passage through the Cheveau de Frize raust be stop'd to
prevent the Enemy from passing. The row gallies as their
draft of water is small — may be at liberty to move up and
down the river to annoy the enemy as occation may oflfer.
" The fire ships should be posted in the inner channel
from Derby Creek, to Mifflin Fort, they will be secure in
this position protected by the row gallies from the Enemys
boats from any annoyance of consequence. No ship will dare
to approach them in that narrow channel neither will they
dare to lay a ship to obstruct the passage out of Derby
Creek, for fear of being burnt. These ships must be con
sidered as extra defence ; their execution being very uncer
tain, no dependence should be had upon them for the main
defence. The greatest injury I think these ships will be
able to do the Enemy is whilst their Ships are below or
coming up the river. The only chance of setting the
enemys fleet on fire, will be to run the fire ships among
them in the night with a good gale and quick tide under
foot ; favor'd with these circumstances, there is a probability
of doing the enemy great injury, provided the person that
has the command of the Ships behaves with spirit and exe
cutes his design with resolution.

8 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
" The Commodore and many other Gentlemen, who have
made it their business to examine the River, say the channel
is so narrow that not more than two ships can lye abreast
in it. If this be a fact, as I have no reason to doubt, from
the concurrent testimony of so many Gentlemen, it will be
impossible for the enemy to bring a greater force up the
river than there is to oppose them. How they will be able
under these circumstances to remove the obstruction in the
river, when they are constantly annoy'd and threaten'd with
the fire rafts, is difficult for me to conceive. However it is
proposed in aid to these, to add some fortifications upon the
land, one at Billingsport, one at Red Bank, and one at
Derby's Creek, the situation of all which your Excellency
had an opportunity to see. I will just examine how far they
will add to the security of the River, and what force it would
take to give this aid, and then see wether the security on
this side, will not diminish the land force to such a degree
as to render the principal object less secure than without
them, not to say any thing about the expence and trouble
attending their construction.
" The plan of the fortification at Billingsport requires four
to five hundred men ; Red Bank from two to three, Derby
Creek two hundred and fifty. Besides these there must not
be less than two hundred cannoniers for the three fortifica
tions ; the whole force will amount to upwards of 1200 men,
this is a great dimunition of the land force. The works at
Billingsport are much superior upon the present plan than
they were upon the former, but I could wish them to be
contracted still if it was possible. Nay, I could wish them
totally demolished if it was not for the prejudices of the
people, and the reproach it would bring upon administra
tion and the military councils of America. There have
been prodigious sums of money expended at that place, and
people have been taught to expect great security from its
strength. To abandon it at this time might alarm their
fears, and give the evil dispos'd a handle to censure the
leaders of the people for subjecting the Continent to such
fruitless and unnecessary expense. Altho these reasons

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 9
urge strongly for holding the work, yet those that oflfer
themselves for abandoning it, operate much more forcibly
with me. The situation of Billingsport fortress renders the
approaches easy, the enemy can make good their landing a
little below the work, the ground is very favorable but a
small distance from the fort to open Batteries, the work is not
difficult to invest, and once invested it will be difficult if
not impossible to keep open such a communication as to
take of [f] the Garrison, and it cannot be expected that a
garrison without casements, and only constructed to guard
against a storm, can stand a regular siege many days, I
should suppose not more than three or four at most, when
the Cannon and stores, if not the Garrison, will all fall into
the enemy's hands. The eflfect of such an event upon the
army and the country, can easily be conceiv'd from the
pannick such instances has produc'd. The warmest advo
cate for this work will readily grant that it cannot resist
regular approaches, but must inevitably fall if the enemy
seriously invest it. If they do not invest it, the force of the
Garrison is lost by being Idle ; if they do invest it, the Gar
rison must fall. This being granted, then the only advantage
that can result from this work is the delay it will cause to the
enemy, which not exceeding four or five days cannot warrant
the expence, and trouble, in constructing such an extensive
work ; neither will it be an equivalent for the deduction of
force, that it necessarily produces from the army.
" The fort at Red Bank may be considered much upon
the same footing with that of Billingsport; only less useful
and more unnecessary. There runs a creek into the coun
try between Red Bank and Billingsport, eight or ten miles,
which is now partly banked out. This being open, the
enemy can have no communication with Red Bank without
a march of eighteen or twenty miles. If they have a mind
to seriously invest this fort, it must fall in the same manner
as Billingsport. If there is no work there, they cannot take
possession of the ground, but with a very considerable part
of their army without laying it liable to be cut offi
"In lieu of these inclos'd works, and strong fortifications,

10 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
I would propose having a number of half moon Batteries
thrown up, at such places where the ships can come to annoy
the shipping &e, appointed for the defence of the Cheveau
de Frize ; a few eighteen pounders on travelling carriages,
to move from place to place, will more effectually annoy the
enemy than fixt Batteries. A very inconsiderable force will
execute this business. If there are no inclos'd works on the
Jersey shore, the Enemy can make no lodgements without
a considerable force, which will oblige them to divide their
army. If the shores are defended in the manner I propose
the parties may be diminish'd or increas'd as circumstances
may render necessary.
" If the enemy operates seriously on the Jersey shore, the
forts and fortifications must inevitably fall. If they do not,
the men appointed to garrison those works will be Idle and
useless. That take it in either point of view, those fortifi
cations are unnecessary, and will be a burden upon the state
without aflfording any additional security to the city.
" The fortification of Derby Creek cannot be more useful
than the other two. Its situation is upon an Island, and
when the land is laid under water to secure fort Mifflin from
approaches, this Garrison will have no opportunity to re
treat ; especially if the enemy takes possession of the Bridge
leading to the Chester road. A few troops at this place will
prevent any aid coming to the assistance of the Garrison.
This garrison, if invested, must fall in the same manner as
the others. If there are only a few Half moon Batteries,
form'd with a couple of eighteen pounders on travelling
carriages, they will aflford all the protection and security to
the fire ships that a regular fortification will : they will pre
vent a ship's laying at the mouth of the creek, or in the
back channel. This is all that can be expected from a regu
lar work properly garrison'd. It is most probable the enemy
will attempt to burn the fire ships with their boats ; the Gal
lies must protect them, and I have no doubt will. They
will be able to protect themselves from any other mode of
attack. " All fortifications in America, except for the security of

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 11
particular objects, considering the nature of the country are
rather prejudicial than useful : the country is taught to expect
security, and always loose their confidence upon any unfortu
nate event. The enemy getting possession of our works, they
serve them for strongholds to keep in awe all the circumjacent
country — By the assistance of our garrisons, the enemy is
enabled to keep a much greater extent of country in sub
jection. If they had no Garrisons to protect their troops,
they would be oblig'd to keep their forces more together.
If they were to attempt to erect those works themselves it
must necessarily fatigue their troops and delay their opera
tions. The country cannot be conquer'd and held in sub
jection but by garrisons; it should be our policy, therefore,
to have as few as may be. The enemy gains little or no ad
vantage by marching through the country ; the inhabitants
from their cruelties and abuses, generally grow more obsti
nate and confirm'd in opposition.
" If we build strong fortifications, the continent must be
subject to great expence to support the garrison, besides
that of erecting and furnishing the fortress with cannon,
military stores, &c. These garrisons only serve to secure a
small part of the country, which security is purchas'd by a
prodigious drain of men and materials from the army. I
could wish that only a few principal passes and capital citys,
should have any fortifications about them. The security of
the country must depend upon our superiority in the field ;
if our force is divided and appointed to the defence of par
ticular places, the enemy will be masters of the field, and
the country loose their confidence in the army : and notwith
standing the Garrisons at particular places may delay the
enemys operations a little, these advantages are far over-
ballanc'd by the pannick their loss generally strikes upon
the country, and the advantage they give to the enemy to
hold the circumjacent country in subjection.
" There is one strong reason why the fortifications should
not be multiplied upon the Delaware ; there is not a suffi
ciency of cannon to put in the works, without taking from
the fortifications, or the naval department ; and they cannot

12 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
be spair'd from these without weakening what I esteem the
principal security.
" Upon the whole I would trust the security of the River
to the Cheveau de Frizes, protected and defended by fort
Miffiin, the shiping, and fire rafts. The channel is so nar
row, and the difficulty of removing the Cheveau de Frize so
great, that there is very little danger of the enemys opening
themselves a passage.
" In drawing up my opinion, its bulk is swell'd much be
yond the size I intended, and the fear of enlarging the plan
has induc'd me to omit many observations that were neces
sary as explitives to several propositions.
" Nath. Greene.
"His Excellency General Washington."
A definitive project upon the defence of PHILADELPHIA
IN the present state of affairs, bt du COUDRAT.
" In the account which I have given the Honorable Con
gress of the state in which fort Mifflin, Redbank, and
billing's port, were, the first of August, I think I have
Demonstrated, that in the actual situation of things, Litle
Dependance should be had on this fort, to Defend both the
places, where the River is crossed by the chevaux de frize ;
and that the gallies, fire-ships, and fioating batteries, were
the only means in which any Confidence could be placed.
" At present, here is question to Determine the best
scene of position, and the best use of the Defensive expe-
diens, pursuent to the Litle Defense that the forts furnish
them. " The two floating Batteries are at present, behind the
Hand which is opposite to Billing's port. I aprove of their
position in this place, because these Hand being very low
and narrow, these batteries will be able to produce above
it, a formidable flre against the fregates, which may present
themselves, to attack the Line of the chevaux de jfrize, op
posite to Billing's port, these batteries consisting, the one
of nine, and the other, of ten pieces of 18, which appeared

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 13
to me very good, and in a very good Condition in every Re
spect, can Certainly Defend this passage Long enough, if, as
the commodore asserts, three fregates, at most, can present
themselves, at the same time. Being well managed they
may Defend themselves, even almost infaillibly untill the
enemy repells them from this position ; this the enemy can
not Do, neither by sending fregates in the chanel where they
are, this chanel being not deep enough ; nor Raising batter
ies upon the bank on the Right Side, which may be easily
covered with water, as the Commodore asserts; But by
making themselves masters of the eminence at billing's
port, from whence they may burn or Remove them : it is
the necessity of hindering, or at least, of Retarding the po
sition of the enemy upon this eminence, to accomplish the
forementioned Designe, which Renders absolutely necessary
to Continue constructing this fort.
" If, I had been informed sooner of the strengt of the
suport, which it is to Receive from the two floating batter
ies, to Defend the chevaux de frize, and of the small num
ber of fregates, which can appear together in the chanel
where the chevaux de frize are ; I should have Contracted
the extend of this fort, at least on the River side ; But the
map which I Require for that purpose in my first visit, could
not then be found ; and I ask'd for it several times since, to
no purpose. I shal profit, at least, by these new informa
tions, of which the Commodore alone can warant the Cer
tainty, to Diminish the number of Embrasures, and to
Leave, at the forts of Mifiin and Redbank, a part of the
Cannon, which beling's port alone should have necessarily
exhausted. " The gallies and fire ships are at present at the mouth of
Derby-creek, below, and in the same chanel, with the float
ing batteries ; a chanel in which the Commodore afflrms, as
I have already said, that the fregates can not ascend. I
aprove also of their position. As those gallies carry, some
of them, cannon of 24; others, cannon of 18; and as, by
their Construction, they present very Litle appearance to the
fregates, who offer thera a very Large one ; and the greatest

14 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
size of the cannon of the fregates being generaly only of
12, the gallies will be necessarily superior to thera ; since
according to the Commodore, they can not be attack, but
by two or three frigates at most, even in Coming out of this
chanel to Conduct the fire ships.
" But to protect their Retreat, and especially to hinder the
enemy from taking possession of the ground which Com
mands this position, and which, (as it is impossible to have
it covered with water, as well as the upper and Lower parts)
suplys them with the proper place to fix a battery, which
may Repell the gallies and fire ships : it would be necessary
to erect a battery there of 8 or 10 Large pieces, at least, de
fended by the gorge, so as to protect it, against the attack
by Land, which the enemy if they have any foresight, can
not avoid making to free themselves from the inquietude, in
which they must be Lest the gallies and fire ships may take
unawares the fregates, which may be erabarrast in the chan
nel of navigation, and which, being stoped by the chevaux
de frize, would scape with difficulty the eflfect of the fire
ships. " Instead of a well supplied and protected battery, as I have
mentioned, his Excellency has seen that this which exist at
present in this place, has only one serviceable Cannon ; that
the parapet of this battery, and particularly the defence of
its gorge, are in the worst situation ; so that, if it be attacked
by Landing boats, it must unavoidably be overcome : unless
there be a Considerable body to Defend it.
" The time is perhaps too urgent, and the means too weak
to Repare, at present, the Capital fault that had been Com-
mited in neglecting a place so favourable, to the attack of
the fire ships, upon the enemy, which Renders it almost as
important as billing's port, thus, as soon as the enemy shall
take possession of the place occupied by these bad battery,
which must be keep only as a shew, the gallies and fire ships
will be obliged to Retreat, at least, to the place of the same
channel where the floating batteries are, and where, as the
Commodore says the fregates cannot follow them, they will
not be useless there ; they will help the batteries in support-

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 15
ing the chevaux de frize, at billing's port ; which will be
accomplish then, with an assured superiority, untill the
enemy establishes batteries, upon this eminence.
" For the want of a well made draught, which we allways
have need oflF, and which I have not been able to suply, on
account of the late arrival of the engeneers, who attend me ;
as well as the perpetual undeterraination in which, both they
and I, have Lived and continue to Live in every Respect ;
such are the sentimens, that the instructions received from
commodore, permit me to propose relatively to the defence
of the first Line of the chevaux de frize, with the gallies, fire
ships, and floating batteries.
" I conclude then, that if the precautions be taken to sink
only 8 or 9 new chevaux de frize, between and behind the in-
tervalls of the first Line ; which as the Commodore asserts, are
preposterously thirty feet from one another, and Leaves cer
tainly an opening by which the small fregates may profit ;
this first Line will be easily defended, at least some days ;
even, in the bad state, in which the Land fortifications are ;
either through the neglect of administration; or the con
tracted understanding of the persons, who have been charged
to fortify the batteries of belling's port, and Derby's Creek,
which after the new Details I have just made are indispensa
bly necessary in both places.
" From the fast Line I pass now to the second, Reliyng
allways, instead of a sure draught, upon the informations
formerly and Lately furnished by the commodore.
" This second Line is formed according to him, by the
Rows of chevaux de frize ; the first of which is 920 yards Be
fore the point of fort miffiin, and supported, in one side, by
hog iland, and in the other, by the bank which begins in that
place, and take his Direction towards Red bank, where he
joignes the Land, without allowing the passage to the
fregates ; tho' it allowes them to advance, enough to cross
the batteries of miffiin fort.
" If this be the only passage ; if only three fregates can
attack it in front, by Directing their Course towards Red
bank, to cross the batteries, as I have forementioned ; the

16 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
gallies and floating batteries, will be certainly sufficient to
protect them.
" The most advantageous position, which they can be
placed for that purpose, will be to continue keeping them
in the channel where the enemy cannot come at them on
account of the shallow water, and make them flank the
chevaux de frize.
" Thirteen gallies, which present the prow only, will have
with their Large Cannon of 24 or 18, as I have foremen
tioned, sure superiority over three, and even six fregates if
this Cannon be well managed.
" But hog's iland behind which the gallies should be placed
to enjoy these Desirable position, is unhappily wider, and
more elevated than that which is opposite to billing's port ;
behind which the batteries are at present, and where I
said they should be left, and the gallies should be carried,
when the enemy, by making themselves master of Derby
creek, might have obliged the gallies to abandon these
position. " If this elevation and breadth of hog's iland are too ex
tensive to hinder the eflfect of the fire, they must be carried
between fort miffiin and the buoys, so as not to hinder the
playing of the battery of this fort, which, however ill-situ
ated and constructed, as his excellency has seen, may not
withstanding be of some utility, even at the great Distance
where it is ; specialy if there be time enough, to make the
changes and suitables Reparations, in order to place there
seven or eight Large pieces in capacity of playing and being
defended. " The fort where this battery lies is very bad, being in
closed, only on two fronts, by one palisade with bad loop
holes, and very ill flancked ; but as the enemy can Land there,
only with chaloupes, it may Resist Long time, even in this
weak situation, with six or seven hundred men to gard it;
specialy if the army was not far o£F. but this must not be
Depended upon ; as the enemy may make a march towards
the north, and be more active in their movemens than they
have been hitherto.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 17
" The fort of billing's port, when it is finished, can alone
assure by a defense of fifteen days the time necessary for
the army to arrive to protect this second Line.
" The possession which the enemy might take of Red
bank, and which they will probably do, will not be of great
advantage to them ; Considering his great Distance to Repell
the gallies and floating batteries, from this two forementioned
positions ; specialy if the first may be occupied. 'Besides
as the fort constructed upon this eminence, can be put in a
State of Defence in that short time, and with a few men, by
contracting it, as I have proposed to his Excellency, it will
be an additional obstacle to stop the enemy.
" It Results from the premisses,
" 1" That I persist in thinking that the most suitable place
to be Defended is billings port ; on account of the narrow
ness of the River there ; of the facility with which the
floating batteries can support the chevaux de frize, by re
maining behind the opposite iland; of the necessity in
which the enemy will be to take possession of the eminence
of Derby's creek, to defend themselves against the fire ships,
which they will be allwais afraid to see arrive behind the
fregates, stoped before the chevaux de frize in the channel
of navigation ; and in short, of the necessity in which they
will be of making themselves masters of the eminence at
belling's port, to drive away the floating batteries from this
position, where the gallies may come to Reinforce them;
when by their taking possession of Derby's creek they shall
have obliged them to abandon this post.
" 2™* that it is chiefly to put this post speedily in a state
of defence, that we must employ the means, which we have,
which are too few to be divided between fort miffiin and Red
bank, without being exposed to the inconveniency of making
a bad defence in both post ; instead of making a good one,
in a singly place, as I have Declared in the flrst memorial I
have given on this object.
" 3° That matters being not in this situation, thro' the fault
of the administration alone, it is necessary to procure some
Remedy for the present weakness of the first Line, by putting
2

18 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777 .
ourselves in state of protecting the second, and of giving
thereby time to the army to arrive.
" I oflfer to continue in this Respect my care and that ofthe
commissioned and non-commissioned officers, who attend
me ; but if his excellency intends that these care should not
be useless, and that an invincible disgust should not suc
ceed the most ardent zeal, it is absolutely necessary to
cause change in the conduct, which has been observed
hitherto, and to accellerate the slowness of the civil and
military administration, to wich the Congress adressed us,
to procure the means of execution.
" It is necessary, to accomplish the forementioned objects,
that the honourable Congress himself order without delay.
" 1°' thousand effective workmen every day, for billing's
port, who are to work on holy days, and Sundays, under the
proper direction of the engeneers whom I have there.
" 2°"* the necessary tools, as well as for these workmen, as
for my artillery workmen, whom I shall employ to construct
the batteries, and to repare the carriages intended either for
this, or miffiin fort, in the actual circumstances ; those that I
keep at billing's port and here, for this purpose, having not
yet been able, in spite of my Repeated solicitations, to obtain,
this month past, neither all the tools they want, nor even
clothes. " 3° 200 others workmen every day at fort mifiin and hun
dred at Red bank, under the sarae Conditions, with tho former.
" Provided this Request be granted, I engage to put these
three places in a state of defence in the course of this
raonth : viz. to be Defended, Billing's port, with 400 men
and 80 canoniers ; — fort miffling with 600 and 500 canoniers ;
Red bank with 200 men and 20 canoniers.
" During the same time I shall employ the Rest of my en
geneers to execute, suitably to the examination of the five
places of incampement to be taken between markus' hook
and Philadelphia, the project declared in the memorial
adressed to the honourable congress, and communicate the
day before yesterday, to his excellency, who honoured it with
his approbation.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 19
" I ask for these engeneers no other assistance, besides the
horses, and a raan to serve thera and carry their instruraents.
" As to the batteries so necessaries for the support of the
gallies and fire ships which are necessary to hold at Derby
creek, for reasons which have been given above, it is to be
wished that raeans could be furnished at the same time with
that of billing's port; particularly from the informations
given by the Commodore, that there may be furnished frora
the province frigate fifteen nine pounders, and six of twelf
from Captain Reed's ^ schooner ; which vessels are not in a
state of defense, for want of men.
" Upon this subject I make the raost pressing sollicitations,
and more so, if conjectures permitted his excellency to be
lieve that the enemy will leave us time to finish billing's
port, I should beg to employ for the Construction of this
battery the labourers, that I have demanded to put fort
miffiin and Red bank in a state to supply the present weak
ness of the first line of chevaux de frize, by supporting the
second.
" Du Coudray.
" Philadelphia the 6 august, 1777."
MAJOR-GENERAL ANTHONY WAYNE.
" Gen' Wayne's Opinion ofthe Defences necessary for the
River and Land in case the Enemy should attempt the Re
duction of Phil*.
" The Works as Contracted by Gen^ De Coudre to be com
pleated and supplied with six or eight pieces of artillery, and
raen sufficient to fight thera with about 500 Troops. One
Redoubt ou the High Ground at Darby Creek, sufficient to
contain 200 men. The fleet, fire ships & Rafts to lay abreast
and across the western channel, to act in Conjunction with
the Batteries so long as it is practicable or prudent to main
tain them, boats to be kept in Readiness to carry off the
Troops in case of a misfortune.
' Captain Thomas Eead, who was the first to enjoy the title of com
modore in the provincial navy of Pennsylvania. He resigned to enter
the Continental service.

20 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
" If its found necessary to avacuate these posts, the Fleet
and fire [ships] to Retire Iraraediately to Fort Island — or
act in the Rear of the Eneray Occafionally.
" It will be absolutely necessary to throw a Good Garrison
into the old Fort under the Coraraand of proper officers
with a proportionable number of men from the Corps of
Artillery to the Guns therein mounted. Red Bank being a
post of Consequence, as it over looks and enfilades the old
Fort and vessels, it will be proper to Enclose the two Bas
tions, and place therein 4 or 500 men, which with the assist
ance of the militia of New Jersey in the vicinity thereof
(after cutting away the Banks, Dams and Bridges over the
Creeks) will greatly retard, if not totally prevent the Enemy
from penetrating that way.
" Whilst this is doing, the Banks, dams. Bridges and
Roads on the west side of the Delaware ought to be broke
up frora Marcus Hook to Phil", for which purpose a judicious
and Deterrained officer with a sufficient nuraber of men and
tools ought to be on the spot ready to execute this business
at a signal being given.
" The army should be stationed near Marcus Hook in
order to oppose the Enemy should they attempt to move
from under Cover of their shiping, — or in case they should
proceed further up to the land, to be ready to move with
them, taking advantage of such Strong Grounds and Marshes
as present themselves in the way.
" As much will depend on the Mode and Manner of the
Enemies Movements, the subject admits of nothing further
than General heads, and as such they are presented by
" Ant'^ Wayne.
" Phila. 7th August, 1777." from joseph reed.
" Dear Sir
" I shall make no apology for troubling you with the fol
lowing Hints, because I well know that the Goodness, and
I may truly add the greatness of your mind would induce
you to listen with Patience and even cheerfulness to the
suggestions of the meanest soldier if properly presented.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 21
" "Whether Philadelphia is the present object of attack is
yet a Question, and every one reasons upon it as his Fears,
Hopes and Interest dictate. That the acquisition would give
eclat to their arms as subduing another of the capital cities,
the seat of the Congress, and in no small Degree the prin
cipal Magazine of all supplies — that it has been held forth
in Europe as the next Object of their Pursuit, are as certain
Truths as that one half of the summer has been lost in a
fruitless Attempt by Land. Add to this that no military
History can shew an Instance ofa Feint or Diversion made
with the Partys whole Force and especially subject to the
Chances of Wind and Weather, and the Certainty of sick
ness and mortality arising from crowding Troops on board
vessels in a hot season. When these Things are considered
one would be led to decide without Hesitation that this ie
their Object. On the other Hand the obvious Advantages
arising from a Junction with their Northern Army, the ap
parent if not real separation of the Northern and Southern
States by the Possession of Hudson's River, and the great
Accession of strength frora the disaffected Counties of New
York, seera to be equivalent to their Prospects of Philadel
phia. However, as your army is now here and the exces
sive Heat of the Weather requires their having as much
Rest as possible. Prudence and Judgment seem to require
that the same Disposition should be made at present and
the system of Defence forraed as if their Designs upon the
City were out of all Doubt. — The successful Defence of
Philadel* will comprehend not only the Preservation of the
City, but a Disappointment of the Campaign, and in this
view our Exertions cannot be too great or our Preparations
too early. And as rauch may depend upon the arrangement,
I have ventured to subrait to your Excell^ a few sentiraents
which I have formed upon a view of our several Defences,
Conversation with others both of the Land and River De-
partraents. " However the different Defences of the River as depend
ing both on the Forts, Gallies and floating Batteries may be
blended as forming one grand Plan with the Defence made

22 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
by the Army, it may be necessary to distinguish them in
Council least the Variety of Objects should confuse and dis
tract. Tho nothing seems to be raore certain than that Fail
ure in the Land Defence will be followed by that of the River
and so vice versa. — I will begin with that of the Army.
"From the conduct of the Enemy last Campaign and the
certain Consequences that would follow if it should succeed,
I think it very probable that if the River Defence should be
as formidable as I trust it will, Mr. Howe will depend raore
upon his operations by Land than Water and if his Land
ing is safely effected will endeavor by a circuitous March to
get into our Rear. It seems necessary therefore to take
such a Position as to prevent this, and yet at the sarae Time
so far advanced as to make his march as tedious as possible,
and thereby ensure as many Opportunities to check his Ad
vances as the Distance of Ground and Frequency of advan
tageous Passes will adrait — Sorae are of Opinion that at all
Events opposition should be raade at their Landing and
there is no Doubt but the Landing of Troops in the Face of
an Enemy is one ofthe raost dangerous Manoeuvres in War
— but in our Case the Sraoothness of the Water, the Flat
ness of the Ground and the heavy Fire which the Enemy
can bring to cover their operations seem almost to exclude
any Prospect of success. To throw up Lines for this Pur
pose seems also out of the Question from the Extent of
Ground on which they may land to advantage. I have
never heard two Opinions with Respect to the Place of
Landing every one without the least Hesitation has fixed it
at Marcus Hook, or its Vicinity, tho they will have fast (?)
Land between that and Wilmington in spots. I can hardly
suppose they will go lower, as they will have Christine
River (near as wide as the Delaware at Trenton) to encoun
ter, and the high Grounds of Wilmington possessed by our
Troops would give us a very advantageous Position. If the
advancing our Troops below Marcus Hook or to it, would
throw the Landing below Wilmington, it would be a very
happy Circumstance, but the Risque of their passing them
and landing seems too great, and the Consequences of it

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 23
would be fatal if the Enemy should by that raeans get be
tween Philadelphia and our array: I have soraetiraes thought
of a raiddle course viz. To take a strong Position such as
that between Ridly and Crum Creeks to make a shew of
Troops as far down as that they could make an Appearance
to the Enemy, to deter their Landing but not farther than
to be able to retire without Confusion to the East side of
Chester Creek and so up to the Main Post if it should be
necessary. " Some have thought of the Enemy's landing on the Jersey
shore and in the survey noV making for your Excellency
agreeable to what I mentioned at Head Quarters, that shore
will be included, but no Person acquainted with that
Ground will countenance au Idea of their Landing there
with a view of marching up. The number of Creeks,
Marshes and Causeways must deter them, besides that if all
these Obstacles are surmounted the Delaware is still be
tween them and their Object — The Landing between Ches
ter and Philadelphia, or at Chester, seems to be very im
probable. As to the first it is all Marsh or bank'd Meadow
except in one or two Places from which they must come
thro such Ground. It is extremely unhealthy and may be
laid under Water for several Miles. At Chester there are
but 3 or 4 wharves and they are accessible for landing
Troops only at Pligh Water and near it, so that a Landing
there must be tedious and difficult. All these Circurastances
seem to decide clearly that no Landing will be made nearer
the City than Marcus Hook. — If the Militia should be called
out, and have no Tents, which seems but too likely, they
will probably be placed in Chester. In this case it will, I
iraagine, be necessary that some Troops should be advanced
beyond thera as they will hardly have Confidence enough to
oppose the first advances of the Eneray — and a precipitate
hasty Retreat or Plight would have a very bad Effect on the
other Part of the Array.
" The Position between Crum and Ridly Creek will be
very advantageous on one account — there will be but one
Flank to guard, the River and Marsh effectually securing

24 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
the other — and tho it will not be so convenient to Fort
Island as the High Grounds near Darby, yet if the Post is
maintained at the mouth of Darby Creek, the Comraunica
tion with the whole of the River Defence will I believe be
found full as easy from the one as the other. I would also
beg Leave to suggest another Reason for preparing the Post
between the two Creeks to Darby — that if any Accident
should happen at the latter to make it necessary to retire
over Schuylkill, the Distance is so small that the Troops
would probably croud upon one another in Confusion at
the Passage of the River — whereas if they should be obliged
to retire from the other, the high Ground at Darby would
be very advantageous to check the advances of the Enemy,
while the Van of our* Army were crossing, and if necessary
in this Case a Part raust be sacrificed for the Safety of the
whole — rather than the Eneray should avail himself of our
Bridges. Here I would remark to your ExcelP that I think
if another Bridge of Boats could be thrown over Schuylkill
at the lower Ferry, it would greatly Facilitate the Comrau
nication of the Army with the City — and in Case of Retreat
I fear our Bridge would be found very insufficient for the
Troops, Artillery and Baggage.
"Ihave heard some Persons mention that in Case our
Army should be obliged to retire either on Account of a
superiority of numbers or any Disaster, they might do it on
the west side of Schuylkill and so cross the River above
the Falls — but the Country is exceedingly hilly, the Banks
of the River on both sides very steep, and if there should
be any heavy Rains, the Fords would not be passable — so
that I ara perswaded if our Army should be obliged to give
Ground, there is no Rout so easy and advantageous as that
across the Schuylkill near the City, provided the Means of
crossing the River are seasonably attended to.
" With respect to the river defense it may be properly
divided into three parts.
" First. The Fire Vessels ; secondly, the Gallies and float
ing Batteries ; thirdly, the Posts & Forts at Darby Creek
Mouth, at Billings Port, at Fort Island & Red Bank.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 25
" As to the First. The effect is very great when success
ful, but it is very uncertain; in alraost every siege of mari
time Places they have been attempted and generally failed.
Such desperate Courage is required, so many Circurastances
of Wind & Tide raust concur as to make every thinking
Person cautious how he depends too much upon them.
But as great preparation is made in this Way, & the Per
sons concerned are very sanguine, perhaps it will be best to
run a Risque of some of the Vessels to cover them while
the atterapt is raade. But to ensure as far as possible the
success, I humbly apprehend it would be best for those who
are to execute it to have the sole raanagement and Direc
tion both as to Tirae & Place. It is so detached a Business
frora the other, that I think it raay safely be left to thera
selves ; it is much to be feared that if they receive Orders
from the Land Officers they will not act with the same Con
fidence ; as in Case of Failure they will have Shelter from
the Clairas & Censure of the publick. There are some Ves
sels which move well, that I understand can be spared for
the Purpose of assisting in this Enterprize & that without
weakning the Capital Defence too much. The Effect will
be so great, if the Fire takes Place, as would seem very
well to warrant exposing them to sorae Danger in order to
give the Operation a fair Tryal.
" As to the Gallies & floating Batteries, they are so un
wieldy & raove so slow that Prudence will not warrant their
being placed but in that spot where the great Defence is to
be raade, viz, at the Chevaux de frize. There are, I believe,
sorae Difficulties with Respect to Rank & Command. It is
much to be wished they were removed before the Enemy
approaches. " The utility of all the shipping of every species will de
pend so much upon their being protected from the Shore
that I am persuaded this Circumstance will claim rauch of
your Excell''' Attention.
" First. As to the Fort at the Mouth of Darby Creek.
This Work it seems was constructed for the purpose of shel-
tring such Vessels as should have occasion to retire thro'

26 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
the shallow channel which runs on the west side of the River
between the raain Land & an Island. It was done on the
Importunity of the Captains of the Vessels, & they seem to
place great Confidence in it. In this view, rather than from
any Advantage they can perceive, I find many Gentleraen
acquiesce in retaining it ; but all agree that it ought to be
made more respectable than it is at present. I do not pre
tend to any knowledge in the Science of Engineering, so
that I do not presume to trouble your Excellency with any
Opinion as to the mode of construction, or what Alterations
should be raade so as to give it value.
" Secondly. As to Billings Port. A Fatality has attended
it from the Beginning, so that perhaps it would have been
better to have been left in a State of Nature than to have it
in the Condition it is, or probably will be, if the Enemy
should advance. However, it is a Post. Obstructions in
the River have been sunk — To abandon it totally would be
losing the Benefit of what has been done, would discourage
the Captains & Seamen who are to defend the River & have
been taught to depend upon some Protection from it. The
Enemy would probably take a Possession to swell the List
of Conquests & might perhaps annoy, tho' I think not mate
rially the Gallies & Vessels defending the upper Cheveaux
de frize. Upon these Accounts, I fear the abandoning it
would have bad Effects. But it would be equally against
my Judgment to weaken tlie Army by putting a large Gar
rison of Continental Troops in it. For should the Enemy
resolve not to pass it by, it seems too accessible in the Rear
to promise much success in the Defence of it. I would
therefore suggest the finishing it upon a smaller scale than
has been proposed, to mount a few Guns put in such a Num
ber of Artillery Men as would be wanted to work them — a
sraall Detachraent of Continental Troops, say 2 or 300,
under a good Officer — add to these so raany Jersey Militia
as would corapletely raan the Work — at the same Time
they might be provided at the Water Side with fhe Means
of Retreat whenever the Enemy's approach on the Land
Side should indicate its being no longer tenable. This

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 27
seems to be a mean, between abandoning & risquing too
much in its Defence. If the Enemy resolve to approach
by Water, this Post must be taken, or it will embarrass
thera ; they must land a considerable Force under raany
unpleasant Circumstances, the Remainder in the mean Time
laying on board the Fleet, or divided on different sides of
the River which must be dangerous. If, on the other Hand,
the great Push is made on the Land, & the Water opera
tions are to be subservient to it, nothing is lost but the
Service of those Artillery Men & that Detachment. The
Militia are upon their own Guard & probably would not
compose a Part of the Army in Pennsylvania, if they were
not at Billingsport. The Pennsylvania Militia would serve
with more alacrity & effect on this side the River than
the other, tho' they are now really defending their own
City. " As to Red bank. I have never heard any other Reason
assigned for making it a Post than to keep it out of the
Hands of the Enemy who might otherwise annoy the Gar
rison at Fort Island. But when it is considered that Red
bank is 1900 yards from Fort Island, that tho' it is higher
it is not a very commanding situation ; that it is yet un
finished ; that if the Enemy are resolved to have it, it is
accessible on the land ; that it will weaken our Force still
farther to garrison it ; that some other Post raust be stripp'd
to provide Guns for it ; I say, all these Things considered, it
should seem very questionable whether it is worth retaining
in the mode proposed by some Gentlemen.
" As to Fort Island. I cannot but say I feel a particular
Pleasure in learning that the Idea of abandoning it, break
ing up the Platforms & removing the Guns is exploded. I do
not know but sorae Improvements may be raade there, some
Gentlemen are very clear in the Necessity of them. From
all the Conversation I have had with the officers on the
River, I ara perswaded rauch will depend upon the Defence
made at this Fort. It is secured fully in the Rear — it has
Barracks for the accommodation of the Troops — Magazines
for the safety of the ammunition — comraands the obstruc-

28 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
tions in the River, and while defended, it will have inter
course with the city for all kinds of supplies. If it should be
necessary the surrounding Land can all be laid under Water.
In short, I scarcely know a Circumstance attending it which
an officer would wish to have altered or added, unless it be
to raise it higher above the water. I cannot but therefore
repeat it to your ExcelP that in my poor Opinion the Pres
ervation of the City on that side will intirely depend upon
the good manageraent of this Post & a correspondent Be
havior in the Gallies. Nor does it appear to rae that a very
great Nuraber of Men will be required for its Defence. It
cannot be stormed but from Boats landing in mud up to the
waists of the raen, or frora keys which are few and easily de
fended. I should think it raight hold out till it was battered
down by shipping, an Event not much to be feared, as this
Post will not be exposed till Billings Port is relinquished.
The Garrison retiring frora thence will make a handsome
Reinforcement to that of Fort Island if they do not bring
any Pannick with them.
" Before I conclude I would observe to your Excellency
that I believe some Hint from you to Congress or the Ex
ecutive Council of the State will be necessary, in order to
effect a timely Removal of the great Quantity of Stock from
the River side, and the necessary Preparations raade to
overflow the Land adjoining the Rivers Delaware and
Schuylkill if necessary — or it raay happen here as elsewhere
that these essential steps raay be deferr'd till it is too late.
" Thus Ihave ventured to throw together a few indigested
Thoughts. I shall be happy if they are of any Use to your
Excell^ — if they are not, I ara sure you will excuse it as
they proceed frora the same sincere Attachraent to your
Person and Farae which your Friendship and Favor must
necessarily create in a Mind of any Sensibility. I am
" Dear Sir,
" raost truly & affectionately " yours
"J. Reed.
"Philad. Aug' 7. 1777."

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 29
FROM BRIGADIER-GENERAL KNOX.
" It is the opinion of the subscriber that the Battery on
Fort Island ought to have an additional work thrown up
upon its left, and Garrison'd with 12 pieces heavy cannon, 150
cannoniers, and half as raany assistants, with 500 Infantry.
" Red Bank is to be contracted so as to have 5 or 6 can
non on the land side, and as raany heavy towards the river ;
to prevent any ships coming up the channel leading to it, in
order to flank the Gallies which may be station'd for the
defence of the Cheveaux de Frize near the Fort.
" Billingsport to be flnish'd as at present contracted, or if
possible more so ; so as to hold 300 men exclusive of 150
cannoniers and 75 assistants, to work 12 pieces heavy can
non which ought to be in this work.
" The Gallies to lye opposite to it at the break of the low
Island, in order to assist the fire of Billingsport : these Gal
lies would be for this purpose preferable to the floating
Batteries, as they can be raost easily reraov'd in case of an
accident to Billingsport.
" If rauch depends on the fire ships an inclosed Battery
ought to be constructed on sorae advantageous piece of
ground near Derbys Creek, and something higher up the
river than where the present defective Battery is ; this in
order to prevent any of the eneray's ships raooring at the
raonth of the western channel ; so to hinder the fire ships
sent round into the main ship channel. The western chan
nel is thought to be most comraodious for the free operation
of the fire ships either in the Channel leading to Billings
port or further down the river ; the Gallies ought also to lye
in the western channel if their retreat is perfectly secure ;
as the Commodore says ; as well in order to protect the fire
ships, as to annoy any of the enemy's Frigates which raay
be opposed to Billingsport ; but the two fioating Batteries
which from their unwieldiness, cannot be easily mov'd to
gether with the Frigates and Xebecques, ought to lye behind
the second row of Chevaux de Frize, upon a line with Fort
Island.

30 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
" If there should be time enough, a strong enclos'd work
ought to be thrown up on fort Island, capable of contain
ing 4 or 500 men ; an advantage may be taken of part of
the stone work already erected, and which in its present
state would be infinitely detremental to any body of men
who may seek shelter from it.
" These sentiments are respectfully submitted by Sir Y'
most obt Hble Serv'
" Henry Knox
" Brig' Gen} Artillery.
" Camp Sandy ktjn, 9*^ Aug'. 1777."
washington to the president of congress.
" Headquarteus, Camp, neak German Town,
"Aug [9], 1777.
" Sir :
" The disappearance of the enemy's fleet for so raany
days rendering it rather improbable, that they will again
return, I have thought it adviseable to remove the army back
to Coryell's where it will be near enough to succor Philadel
phia, should the enemy contrary to appearances still make
that the object of their next operations, and will be so rauch
the more conveniently situated to proceed to the Northward,
should the event of the present ambiguous and perplexing
situation of things call them that way. I was the more in
clined to this step, as the nearness of the army to the city,
beside other disadvantages, afforded a teraptation both to
officers and men to indulge themselves in licenses incon
sistent with discipline and order, and consequently of a very
injurious tendency.'
" But before ray departure, I esteera it my duty to com
raunicate to Congress the result of ray exaraination into
' " You will take every possible care in your power, as well in your
march as during your stay at that place [Maidenhead], to restrain every
species of licentiousness in the soldiery, and to prevent them doing the
least injury to the inhabitants or their property, as nothing can be more
disserviseable to our cause, or more unworthy of the characters we pro
fess—to say nothing of the injustice of the measure." — Washington to
Colonel Morgan, August 9, 1777.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 31
the nature of the River defence proper to be adopted ac
cording to the means in our possession, to prevent the suc
cess of any atterapt upon Philadelphia by water. — I there
fore beg leave to lay before Congress what appears to me
most eligible, considering all circumstances, and comparing
my own observations, with the different opinions of the
Gentlemen, whom I consulted on the occasion.
" It is generally a well founded maxim, that we ought to
endeavor to reduce our defence as rauch as possible to a cer
tainty, by collecting our strength and raaking all our prepa
rations at one point, rather than to risk its being weak and
ineffectual every where, by dividing our attention and force
to different objects. In doing this, we may disable ourselves
from acting with sufficient vigor any where, and a misfortune
in one place may pave the way for a similar one in another.
In our circumstances, we have neither men, cannon, nor any
thing else to spare, and perhaps cannot with propriety
hazard them on objects which being attended with the
greatest success we can proraise ourselves, can be pro
ductive of only partial and indicisive advantages, and which
may possibly fail of the end proposed, may have some seri
ous ill-consequences, and must at all events have some dis
advantages. " It is then to be considered, where our defence can be
most effectually made, — whether at Billingsport, or at Fort
Island. " It appears to rae, that the last deserves greatly the
preference. Billingsport has but one row of Chevaux de
frize, Port Island has three; and in addition to them, a
boom and another Chevaux de frize, ready to be sunk in
the channel, on the approach of the enemy ; of course the
obstructions in this respect are four times as great at the
one as at the other. The Gallies and floating batteries, that
could be brought for the defence of the chevaux de frize at
Billingsport, would be unable to maintain their station,
when once the enemy were in possession of the command
ing ground on the Jersey side, to which they would be en
tirely exposed, and notwithstanding the works raising there.

32 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
even supposing them coraplete, the strongest advocates for
making our defence in this place do not pretend, that that
event can be protracted more than fifteen or twenty days at
most, at the end of which time, we should be obliged with
the loss of our cannon at least to abandon the defence, and
leave it in the power of the enemy to remove or destroy the
chevaux de frize at pleasure. Nor is it by any means certain
that a single row of chevaux de frize would be an irapene-
trable barrier to the enemy's ships. Experiments have been
made that lead to a contrary supposition, and if they should
hazard one, which it raight be well worth their while to do,
with some of their less valuable ships, under favor of a
leading breeze and tide, and should succeed in it, — the
consequence might be the loss of our gallies and floating
batteries, which I apprehend might be intercepted, and with
the assistance of their gallies and small armed vessels, taken
and this would greatly weaken the opposition we might
otherwise give at Fort Island, and tend powerfully to render
it abortive. But if they should not attempt this, contenting
theraselves with safer though slower operations, I have
already observed, that it is agreed, on all hands, in fifteen
or twenty days they would be able to possess theraselves of
infallible raeans of frustrating our opposition there, by the
capture of our works ; and if we add to this, that it might
very possibly happen in less time, — if frora no other cause,
— yet from the garrison being intimidated, by a conscious
ness of its own inferiority and inability to support itself
against a so much superior force of numbers, — which raight
occasion a conduct destructive to itself — there will remain
no sufficient reasons to justify the making this the principal
point of defence.
" At Fort Island the boom and chevaux de frize are an
ample security against any forcible impression of the enemy's
ships which it would be imprudent in them to attempt. On
the Jersey side the situation of the ground is such, that the
gallies, fioating batteries and forts employed in the defence
of the obstructions would have little to fear from any bat
teries erected there. Red-bank seems, by its elevation to

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 33
be the only advantageous spot for annoying them ; but as it
is computed to be above 1900 yards frora Fort Island, the dis
tance is rather too great to allow any battery raised there to
act with so much effect as to be able to silence our fire. On
this side, the ground by dykes and sluices raay be laid under
water to so considerable an extent as to leave no danger of
our River force being annoyed from thence ; for which pur
pose suitable precautions ought, at once, to be raade, against
it may be necessary to carry them into effect.
" But, though a battery upon Red-bank, would not in ray
apprehension, be able to prevent the efficacy of our defence
or give any raaterial disturbance to Fort Island, in particu
lar, yet it might serve to make the situation of some of our
gallies rather uneasy ; and this perhaps raakes it worth
while to pre-occupy it in order to keep it out of the eneray's
hands erecting a sraall, but strong work there capable of
containing about two hundred raen, with six or eight pieces
of light cannon, and a proportionable quantity of stores. As
the approaches to it are difficult on account of the adjacent
creeks, and a communication can be kept open between it
and our army, by which means the garrison raight receive
succors from time to time, though we could not expect to
make it impregnable, yet we should have a prospect of hold
ing it rauch longer than we could the work at Billingsport.
" In the position, which frora ray present view of it, I
should think it best for our array to take, the left wing of it
would be nearly opposite to Red-bank, and therefore in a con
dition to relieve and support it; whereas Billingsport being
more remote frora the probable position of the array, and
detached from any other work, could not easily derive any
assistance from without and must rely wholly upon its own
strength. " Either at Billingsport or at Fort Island, I believe there
is not much to be apprehended from the fire of the enemy's
ships unaided by land batteries ; For as by the information
of those who ought to be acquainted with the fact, not more
than three ships can act abreast at a time at either place,
and as the gallies, not requiring the same depth of water,

34 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
can extend themselves at pleasure, and besides carry a supe
rior weight of metal to that which frigates coramonly have,
a much superior fire, could be opposed to them than any
they could bring and from the difference of size and make
between the frigates and gallies, to much better effect than
theirs. The coraparative extent of the River at Billings
port and at Fort Island has been assigned as a motive of
preference to the former, the river being narrower there
than at the latter, and supposed to admit of fewer ships
operating at a time ; but as it is asserted by the gentlemen
in the River department, that the sand banks and shallow
ness of the River in most places near Fort Island, compen
sate for the width of it and make it irapossible for more
than three ships to act together at a time, this reason of
preferring the position at Billingsport seems to have no
foundation. And if we consider, that our whole force of
gallies and floating batteries, would be collected at Fort
Island, assisted by the fort itself and that it would not be
safe to trust them all out for the defence of Billingsport, for
fear of the disaster already suggested, it seems evident
enough that this is the place where our defence may be
most successfully made.
" One of the raost weighty considerations with rae is, that
our Array as before intiraated, could more conveniently
co-operate with the defence by w'ater here than at Billings
port. The ground on this side is better situated here than
at the other place, and the Array being so rauch nearer the
city, it is so ranch the less likely, that the enemy should be
able, by a circuitous route to fall into the rear of it and sep
arate it from the city, which is a circumstance that ought
carefully to be attended to.
" Sorae Gentleraen are of opinion that our principal de
pendence ought to be upon Fort Island and its appendages ;
but at the same time, that we should raake a part of our
defence at Billingsport proposing for that purpose that the
works there should be continued on the new contracted
scale to be garrisoned by four or five hundred men. The
reasons for this are — that it would serve to delay the enemy

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 35
and give our army time to come up, should it be at any dis
tance and that it would prevent those disagreeable impres
sions which never fail to accompany the abandoning works
that have been once raised and plans that have been once in
execution ; especially when the persons concerned in the
defence of thera repose a degree of confidence in them ; —
which is said to be the case in the present instance. But
these reasons may perhaps not be so conclusive as 'tis
imagined ; for 'tis a question whether, if our army was so
remote as to make such a delay necessary, the enemy would
embarrass themselves with removing the water obstructions
in the first place, but would not rather debark and make
a rapid raarch by land ; possessing themselves of the city
and of those positions which would raake the surrender of
the gallies, &c., in some sort a natural consequence ; and it
is worthy of consideration, whether the abandoning the
works begun at this time, which will probably allow some
leisure for any disagreeable impressions it might raake to
be effaced, will not be less injurious than the abandoning
thera hereafter when they have cost more expence, tirae and
labor, and in the critical raoraent of an attack, when every
misfortune, and the loss of the most inconsiderable post is
too apt to have a much worse influence on the mind than
the real importance of it will justify. Add to this the pos
sibility that the garrison dismayed at the approach of nura
bers so superior to their own, might not answer the end
expected from them, and might even be lost by their ti
midity — the certainty of losing the cannon after the time
limited for thg defence and thereby weakening that of the
upper position — the chance of losing the gallies and floating
batteries, requisite for covering the chevaux de frize, by a
hazardous and successful attempt to break through them,
and the garrison with them, which would fall of course upon
such an event, — It is however, submitted to Congress to
ballance the advantages and disadvantages and deterraine
accordingly. I would only beg leave to give it clearly as
my opinion, that our principal dependence ought to be upon
Fort Island and the obstructions there, and that Billingsport

36 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
ought not by any means to be defended, more than as a
secondary object.
" And to that end, I would recomraend that the works on
Fort Island, which on their present construction are by no
means calculated for the defence of the Chevaux de frize be
immediately altered and 'adapted to that purpose, taking
care, at the same time, to make them defensible with a
small number of men against any sudden atterapt to land
in boats and carry them by assault. — But whatever scheme
is pursued, I could wish the greatest diligence and despatch
may be used in bringing it to maturity; for though the
danger which lately threatened seems to have subsided,
there is no knowing how soon it may return and certainly
it will be prudent to do every thing in our power to be pre
pared for it, as we can lose nothing by being so, and may
lose a great deal by neglecting to improve the interval
of leisure they have given us should it be their intention
to revisit this quarter. As the raeans to this — it will be
necessary to furnish Mr. Coudray to whom the Superin-
tendency of those works is intrusted, with a competent
number of workmen, tools, and what other things he may
want to enable hira to carry them on with propriety, ease
and expedition.
" On the whole I ara of opinion that the obstructions in
the River, with the help of gallies, floating batteries, and
with tolerable industry to put the land works in a proper
state, will be extreraely formidable to the enemy aud author
ise a reasonable expectation of their being effectual. The
fire ships also will contribute to this end, for though there
are raany obstacles that render their success precarious, and
a happy concurrence of circumstances is necessary towards
it, any of which failing may disappoint the project, and
there is therefore no room to be sanguine, yet there is sorae
probability of its succeeding and they will be at least an
erabarrassraent and terror to the eneray, and will oblige
them to use precautions inconvenient to them and service
able to us.
" As an accurate knowledge of the country is essential to

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 37
a good defence and as the eneray's approach may be sud
den and we may be called to act, without having tirae, when
it happens, to examine it sufficiently if it is not done before
hand, it would answer a valuable purpose to have it imme
diately carefully reconnoitred, and sketches taken of all
the landing places, great roads and bye-paths, Incamping
grounds, heights, rivers, creeks, morasses, and every thing
that it can be of any importance to know.
" Marcus Hook seems to be the most advanced place at
which it is conjectured the enemy will land, the survey should
therefore comprehend all the country between that & Phil*.
" Mr. Du Coudray has offered his services with his Engi
neers to do this business, if authorized by Congress, only
requiring that they be supplied with horses and a hand or
two. If Congress approve of it, I shall be glad they may
be desired to enter upon it, without loss of tirae. I have
the honor, &c. " G? Washington."
FROM Dtr coudray.
" Philadelphia, 10 August, 1777.
" Sir, " I have received with the raost Respectful gratitude, the
new proofs of esteem and kindness, with which, your Ex
cellency has honoured me, in making Colonel Hamilton
communicate to me the Letter, which you have addressed
to the Congress, with regard to the defence of the aproaches
of the enemy to Philadelphia.
" The manner in which your Excellency has discussed
the different opinions about the fortifications of the River,
places in the most evident Light the sentiment which you
preferably adopt.
" It is beyond all Dispute, that the situation of fort iland
is more advantageous, than that of billing's port, by the
difficulty which the enemy shal have of aproaching it ; by
the Resources which the ground affords of erecting there a
better fortification ; and by the facility of conveying assist
ance. The chief Reason which induced me to prefer Bil
lingsport, was the narrowness of the river in this place.

38 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
which is in Reality two third less than at fort iland, and
upon that account, seems to Reduce the enemy to a neces
sity of bringing to action, at the same time, a far less num
ber of vessels to Destroy the means of Defending the
chevaux de frize. But the informations given your excel
lency, having demonstrated, as you say in your Letter, to
the Congress, that notwithstanding the breadth of the river
at fort iland, the enemy can present there but three fregates
at a tirae ; it is certain that preferable aplication raust be
given to defend that part of the river; if there be time
enough, to put this fort in a condition of Resisting the
forces which the enemy, by the means of small vessels and
chaloupes, might conduct there a number sufficient to nail
up the cannon, and destroy the single palissade badly
flanked, badly [ ? ], which constitutes actually its only De
fence on three of its four fronts.
" The immediate assistance which your excellency De
mands, of Congress for this object, and the Reasons which
you Lay before them to show the importance of a Ready
Complayance, cannot fail of changing iraraediately the
critical situation in which matters are in this Respect, and
in which the raost unavoidably Remain a far longer tirae
than at billing's port, if the means employed be similar.
" Tho' your excellency has Declared nothing Definitive
to me on this subject, when I left you before yesterday, the
idea however which I had of your opinion, has induced me
yesterday to go to fort iland with four engeneers, where we
passt the whole day in examining, combining and drawing
all its particulars circumstances, as well as those of the en
virons, which have any Relation to it. The aproach of the
night, and the absolute cessation from all work in this
country during Sundays, even in the most urgent momens,
obliged us to deffer the continuation of this work till to
morrow, when I hope we will finish it. I believe we shal
be employed tuesday and wenesday in drawing these par
ticulars in such a raanner as to put them in a Condition of
being presented to your excellency ; which I intend to do
thursday or friday at farthest. I shall deliver at the same

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 39
tirae the Result of the exaraination of the cannons, and the
carriages which are at present fit to be eraployed, or may be
rendered so in the course of this month ; the end of which
I think ought to be Declared of the time when all these
works are to be finished, both at fort island and Red bank,
which your excellency think proper to be put in a state of
Defense. " I hope also that the sarae period will be sufficient to
execute the rainute examination which I proposed to your
excellency, to make from raarkus' hook to Philadelphia ; a
project which you have honoured of your aprobation, and
sollicitations to Congress.
" I shal think myself happy if the execution of these
different objects should afford me, as well all the officers
who accompany me, an occasion of engaging with the
eneray, and of carrying with us proofs of that esteem, which
we came so far to seek for ; and the certainty of which will
at the same time constitute our consolation and glory.^
" I am with greatest Respect
"Sir
" of your excellency
" the most obedient servant
"Du Coudray."
' " That A. met Ld B. & Gen. Howe at the entrance of the Delaware,
that he informed them of the state of the river, and the chain, the
chevaux de frize, &c. ; that they on that inquired into the state of Chesa
peake, and the possibility of landing at the head of Elk. It was urged
to them that it would be better to land below the impediments, as they
would by that means save the sea voyage, and be almost as near Phila
delphia. To this was answered, that the taking of the city was not the
principal object, but as it afterwards appeared that all the magazines
were then at York Town or Carlisle, and the taking of them would
effectively crush Gen. Washington, and therefore they pursued their in
tention of going up the Chesapeak, as the demolition of the magazines
was to be more easily effected by so doing. After having landed at the
Head of Elk with this view, the Gen'l gained secret intelligence that
Gen. W. had promised his officers to risk a battle, and preparations were
accordingly made to tempt him to keep his promise, which ended in the
affair of Brandywine. That led on to the taking of Philadelphia, the
danger the army incurred at German Town, and the laying aside all in-

40 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
washington to the president of congress.
"Head Quarters, Camp at Cross Eoads,
" 15 August, 1777.
" Sir, " Mr. Du Coudray has laid before rae a plan of the river,
by which it appears that for a considerable space between
the two sand banks on the east side of Fort Island there is
frora four to 4|^ fathoras depth of water. According to this
representation there would be roora for three frigates to lie
between those banks, in such a position as to enfilade the
works at Fort Island, and raake it difficult to maintain them.
There are but two ways of remedying this inconvenience;
one by having a sufficient number of chevaux de frize sunk
at the entrance between the two banks, and the other by
having the left flank of Fort Island fortification supported
by a good battery, capable of resisting the cannon of the
ship, & obliging them to quit their station. The first is
evidently preferable because the efficacy of it will be raore
certain. A few chevaux de frize properly placed might
effectually bar all access to the ships ; but there is a possi
bility that any battery we can construct might be overpow
ered by the fire of the shipping. And as we have few
cannon and Fort Island is itself a marshy spot incapable of
affording earth for the batteries necessary to be raised upon
it, which must be brought from the opposite shore, it would
not be prudent to multiply works there more than cannot
be avoided. It would also be a great advantage gained, to
secure the island frora annoyance, except in one point and
that in front frora only three ships at a time, which would
be effected by stopping up the passage between the two
banks with chevaux de frize. I should therefore think it of
importance to have this measure immediately adopted and
carried into execution. " With great respect &c.
" G° Washington."
tentions upon the magazines, which has never been renewed during the
whole winter, or before the opening of the campaign in the Spring, tho'
those magazines subsisted the whole army of the enemy." — Earl of Car
lisle; note ofa conversation. Stevens's " Fac-similes," "Vol. I. folio 82.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 41
COUNCIL OF WAR,
"At a Council of General Officers, held at Neshamini
Camp, in Bucks County the 21"' day of August 1777.
" Present
" His Excellency, the Commander in Chief,
" Major Generals Greene Brigad" Muhlenburgh
" Lord Stirling Weedon
" Stephen Woodford
" Marquis Fayette Scot
" Brigadiers Gen' Maxwell Conway
" Knox
" Wayne
" The Commander in Chief inforraed the Council that
the British Fleet left the capes of Delaware on the 31" of
July and have not been seen, from any information he has
obtained, since the 7"" Instant, when they were off Sina-
pixon and steering to the Southward, and propounded the
following Questions for the opinion of the Council.
" First Question. "What is the most probable place of their
destination, whether Eastward or Southward & to what
part? ^^ Answer. The Southward, & that Charles Town, from
a view of all circumstances, is the most probable object of
their attention.
" Second. If it should be thought, from a consideration of
all circumstances, that the Fleet is gone far to the South
ward, will it be adviseable for this Army, taking into view,
the length of distance & unhealthiness of that climate at
this season, to March that way ? — or will there be a proba
bility of their arriving there in Time, should it be attempted,
to give any effectual opposition to the Eneray, or to pre
vent thera accomplishing their purposes ?
'¦' Anm)er. It will not be adviseable for the Array to march
to the Southwards, as they could not possibly arrive at
Charles Town in tirae to afford any succour.
" Third. If It should not be thought adviseable in such
case for the Army to march to the Southward, How shall it
4

42 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
be employed ? Shall it remain where it now is, or move
towards Hudsons River to act as the situation of affairs
shall seem to require ?
" Answer. The Army should raove iramediately towards
the North River.
" Peter Muhlenberg B. G. G° Washington
" G. Weedon B. Genl. Nath^ Greene M. G.
" W Woodford Brigd Gen^ Stirling M. G.
" Adam Stephen, M. G.
" Ch^ Scott B. G. The Mrquis de Lafayette M. G.
" W" Maxwell B. G.
" T. Conway B. G. H. Knox B. G. Artillery
"Antt. Wayne B. G''^
memoir upon the defence of the two passages of the
RIVER, — viz., billingsport AND FORT ISLAND.
" The soundings raade yesterday by the navy board having
confirraed those which I made last week with Mr. Donald
son, who have sunk the chevaux de frize, it is demonstrated
in the most incontestible manner that Fort Mifflin, instead
of having to act against three frigates only, as his Excel
lency General Washington had been assured, and as this
General has informed the Congress in the letter in which he
discusses the preference that ought to be given to one of
these forts ; it is incontestible, I say, that as Fort Mifflin,
being exposed to the fire of about 15 frigates, is thereby in
a situation of being demolished in a few hours, if it be
attacked in the condition in which it is at present; viz.,
surrounded by a single palissade, or with a wall without a
terrass, which can only defend it against a coup-de-main,
and cannot by any means resist the cannon.
" It is not less evident that the ground being almost upon
a level with the water, it is only with vast expences and a
considerable time that by a rampart, and other convenient
alterations, this fort can be put in a situation of resisting so
many vessels, the eftect of which would be so rauch the
¦ See my " Writings of Washington," Vol. VI. p. 47.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 43
more dangerous to it, as being upon a level with the river,
and on its banks, the balls which could not arrive on
account of the distance of sorae frigates, would get there
by rebounding.
" I join, however, to this raeraorial two projects suggested
upon this head by Augustus le Brun, one of the Engineers
who have accompanied me from France. These projects
suppose that for reasons which particularly regard the State
of Pennsylvania, or the plan of his excellency General
Washington for the defense of the Delaware, it would be
absolutely necessary to put this fort in a condition of sus
taining some time the attacks of the eneray.
" That of these projects, which is the plainer and affords
only a very iraperfect defense, could not be executed with
out eraploying the earth brought from the dikes which
surrounds the Isle and putting it under water; this would
render it a very unwholesome place of abode.
" The second project, which affords a very complete and
well conceived defense, requires that beside this earth more
perhaps should be fetched from the other side of the
river. " But the execution of even the plainest of these projects,
could only be accoraplished for the next carapaign ; unless
raeans which would be very expensive to this country were
employed. " This, however, would not dispense (as it is certainly
necessary in the present State of the fort) from hindering
the enemy by chevaux de frize to place themselves in the
two chenals where the soundings lately perforraed, shew
that they can place so raany frigates.
" But to support these chevaux de frize it would be neces
sary to have on the opposite bank a battery of 12 or 15
pieces at least, of eighteen or twenty four pounders on
account of the great distance, to which they would fire ;
and that their battery raight not be taken, it should be
fortified on the land side, or in other words, a new fort
should be constructed, which would also be intended with a
great expence in Artillery, ammunition and construction.

44 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
although the ground I have examined with the Deputies is
very favourable.
" If we count the expence of this fort which should [be]
built quite new ; that of red bank being by far too much
above the position of the chevaux de frize; and that of
Bush Island being only a child's plaything; if to this ex-
pence be added that of the chevaux de frize, which are to
be sunk either in the channel where there are yet none or
in that channel where there are some already, but which are
separated 40 feet the one from another ; if in short we add
to all those expences these of the most necessary alterations
to be made in fort Mifflin, it will appear evident, as I have
declared in the first meraorial which I laid before the Con
gress in the beginning of June, when they consulted me on
this head, that there can be no thoughts of defending this
passage of the river, unless, as I have forementioned some
reasons regarding particularly the State of Pennsylvania, or
the future operations of the array should absolutely require
to enable this fort to resist for sorae tirae the attacks of the
enneray. " If these reasons do not exist, it is evident that we raust
confine ourselves to the defense of that passage alone of
Billingsport, where the river is raore than two thirds nar
rower than at fort Mifflin ; where the enneray can present
no raore than three frigates at a time ; where the frigates
can do very little harra to the battery which protects the
chevaux de frize, because this battery, being very high, is
safe frora the rebounding of the balls and coraraands the
frigates ; where the galleys and fire ships are more capable
of acting with more profit and facility than at fort Mifflin ;
and where in short the work is far advanced, and propor
tioned to the small quantity of artillery which is at present
in a state of serving.
" If the Government intend to unite all their efforts in
finishing this fort, I would propose to hire instead of militia
raen, workracn by the day, which after an exact calculation
of all expences, will cost incomparably less, I believe, will
work a great deal more, give far less trouble to those who

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 45
conduct the works, and not consume such an immense quan
tity of tools of all kinds. " Du Coudray.
" Philadelphia, 29 August, 1777."
du coudray to washington.
" Sir, " According to the desire of the board of War I have the
honour to send to your excellency a meraorial which I have
written yesterday upon the request of the Navy board, on
the two passages of the river, after the verification that this
board caused to be made of the soundings performed by me
in the last week before fort Mifflin, and the result where of
I had the honour to give an account verbally to your Excel
lency, conformable to the letter which I had directed before
to Colonel Hamilton, one of your aid de camps, who ought
to have received that letter since his departure frora hence.
" I ara waiting for an answer to the letter which I had
the honour to direct to your Excellency three days ago by
Colonel Pinckney with regard to the nine militia raen whora
General Arrastrong took away from the Engineers era
ployed about the map frora Walraington to Philadelphia,
which remain interrupted since the taking away of these
militia men who are not yet replaced. I am with great respect.
" Sir," of your Excellency
" the raost obedient and
" respectful servant "Du Coudray.
"Philad. 30 Aug. 1777."
du coudray to congress. "Philadelphia 7 7""' 1777
" Sir, " "When the eneray's Fleet threatened the Delaware, Gen
eral Gates, and General Mifflin did me the honour to invite
me to reconnoitre the country with them, to determine the
place where it was probable the landing of their Troops

46 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
would be raade, and the principal situations which raight be
taken successively to stop their March to Philadelphia.
" The Result of this recconnoitring having been addressed
to Congress, and afterwards coraraunicated to General
Washington, was thought by his Excellency worthy of his
Attention, and recommendation to Congress, to employ my
service, and that of ray Engenieurs, to survey these different
positions in the raost rainute detail, and deterraine on the
best manner of fortifying them ; whilst, in the mean time,
we determined by an accurate exaraination of the river,
round fort Mifflin, if it was possible to defend this post as
his Excellency desired, and as he had reason to think could
be effected, from the assurances given him that the Enemy
could only bring three frigates to act against it.
" I have addressed to the Board of War and to the Suprerae
Council of Pennsylvania, the result of the soundings of the
river near Fort Mifflin, which I have raade and which have
been confirraed by those taken by the Navy Board ; both
which shew the necessity of defending only the passage of
Billingsport, as I proposed in June, upon the first view of
this spot, and upon considering the sraall nuraber of Artillery
that could be furnished.
"I have been waiting these twelve days to know the
raeasures that the Board of War, and Supreme Council
would take upon this subject, but whatever it may be, it is
evident that from the part which the enneray have taken of
raaking a descent in Cesepeak bay, the object the least
pressing is the defense of the Delaware.
" This being supposed, it is clear that the greatest atten
tion ought to be directed to defend as well as possible, the
Route which the Eneray have deterrained upon, by 'their
landing in Chesapeak.
" It is certain that fixing on this spot to land, instead of
Mark's hook (which General Gates, Mifflin, and rayself
thought they would chuse) will encrease considerably the
Posts, which in proportion as they advance in the Country,
they will be oblig'd to establish to keep up a Communica
tion with their fleet. But the greatest disadvantage attend-

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 47
ing this, gives not however an entire certainty against the
success of their march to Philadelphia, which I always
judged and declared, since ray arrival here, to be the true
object of their Carapaign.
" To ensure, as rauch as possible, the success of this Cara
paign, it is necessary not to be merely contented with
securing the Position of Wilmington, where his Excel
lency has very wisely thought proper to collect his first
Efforts. " However strong this position raay be supposed by na
ture, or may be rendered by Art; it appears to rae, after
what I have heard, that it will be possible for the enemy to
pass it on the flank, or perhaps force it; considering es
pecially the small number of Artillery belonging to his
Excellency's army.
" It appears to me then prudent for Congress to think of
providing beforehand for their army, another fortyfied Posi
tion, which may secure the army in case they are obliged to
abandon the first, and where they raay collect new force
against an eneray, whom the first success raay render raore
audacious; raore especially as Schuylkill is the only con
siderable river that irapedes their March to Philadelphia;
and that this River offers at Grays-ferry a Passage which no
officer can (I should think) propose to defend.
" For this purpose, I offer again my service and that of
my officers ; in hopes that there will result from it an oppor
tunity of our being in action, which the delay of Congress
in pronouncing definitively upon our existence in the service
of the United States, always removes at a distance, and
which probably we raight wait for in vain at the forts on
the Delaware ; at least before our return in France, should
this take place. If the Congress consent to the proposition
which I make, to prepare a fortified Camp between Wil
mington and Philadelphia, I beg thera 1° to coraraunicate
this proposition to his Excellency General Washington.
" 2° To give me, as a principal cooperator. General Mif
flin, who knows perfectly well this country; who has a
very great ascendant over the Inhabitants, by whom the

48 Defences of Philadelphig, in 1777.
works would be executed and whose great activity and
penetration I have had occasion to observe.
" 3* To bring forward, as soon as possible, the remainder
of the fifty two pieces brought in the Amphitrite, of which
twelve alone are in the northern army, ten, within these
few weeks, at the army of his Excellency General Washing
ton; the rest in Springfield, and, at other Places on the
east side of Hudson's River.
" These thirty remaining pieces of the said fifty two, will
be so much the more necessary, as artillery is the founda
tion of all defensive war; and that of these thirty pieces,
there are twenty one which being of a greater length than
the others, and even any pieces in the army, are for that
reason better for defending the intrenchments.
" Besides this there will be an occasion to try, if these
pieces, which weigh only one thousand one hundred weight,
tbat is to say, rauch less than the lightest loaded baggage-
wagon, are so difficult to be transported, as some have
endeavoured to persuade his Excellency ; and if their ser
vice is so useless that they ought to be cast over again, in
the raiddle of a campaign in order to make from each of
them three six pounders, which at most could only weigh
three hundred weight each, and would be of a service as
little durable as safe; supposing even that the founders at
Boston, or Philadelphia, were capable of executing this
casting without hazarding not only the loss of the fashion
of these pieces, but also the loss of the metal, so difficult to
replace in this country ; this a disinterested, and intelligent
person will not believe, who has seen the pieces cast by
these different founders, and particularly the cannon and
Howitzers, which were sent to carap the other day.
" The Proposition which I have the honour to present to
the Congress as a mark of my zeal for the service of the
United States of America, appears to rae worthy of all their
attention; considering the important consequence which
would follow, if the army failing of support in its retreat
(a case which may possibly happen) should be obliged to
abandon Philadelphia.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 49
" I cannot avoid erabracing this Opportunity of recalling
the attention of Congress to another proposal, which ap
pears to rae of equal iraportance, and what I had about a
fortnight since, the honour of making to the Board of War,
who, I suppose have coramunicated it to Congress, it is to
cast in some of the forges most contiguous to the City of
New York twelve Iron Mortars with the necessary number
of shells in order to drive the eneray frora that Place, or,
at least, to prevent its being a safe harbour, for their ves
sels. The success of such a measure appears to me almost
infallible, if the Geographical accounts which I have re
ceived of the situation of that place raay be depended
upon. "lam "Sir " with great respect
" Your humble servant
" Du Coudray.
" Hon John Hancock, Esq
" Presd' of Congress."
council of war.
"At a Council of War held at the Camp near Potts
Grove the 23* day of Septem' 1777.
" Present
" His Excellency the Commander
" Major Generals Brigadiers General
" SuUivan Knox
" Green Weedon
" Lord Stirling Nash
" Stephen Scott
" Armstrong Conway
" Potter
" Besides the above Major Gen' St. Clair and John Cad
walader Esquire were also present.
" His Excellency inforraed the General Officers that the
Reason of his calling them together was to acquaint them
that the Enemy had, the preceding Night crossed the

50 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
Schuylkill by several Fords about twelve Miles below and
by the best accounts were proceeding towards Philadelphia.
He also informed thera that the Troops under Generals
Sraallwood & Wayne had not yet rejoined the Army and
that a Brigade of Continental Troops under the coraraand
of General McDougaU raight be expected in a few days
frora Peekskill and about one thousand Militia frora Jersey
under Gen' Dickinson in the sarae time. He therefore de
sired the opinion of the Council whether it would be most
advisable to advance upon the Enemy with our present
Force or wait till the Reinforcements and detachments
above mentioned should come in ?
" Previous to taking the Voices upon the foregoing
Question His Excellency begged leave to inform the Coun
cil of the present State of the Army and the Reasons
which had induced him to make the late raoveraents which
(tho' well known to raost of them) were not so fully to
Major Gen' Armstrong and Brig. Gen' Potter, who had
been detached frora the raain Body of the Array. This
being agreed to. His Excellency proceeded to inform the
Council " That when the Army left Germantown upon the 15""
instant it was with a determination to meet the Enemy and
give them Battle whenever a convenient opportunity should
be found — that they advanced the sarae day to the Sign of
the Buck and the day following to the Warren Tavern upon
the Lancaster Road. On the 17"' in the raorning intelli
gence was brought that the Enemy were advancing upon
which the Army were paraded and a disposition made to
receive them, the pickets had exchanged a few shott when
a violent Storm of Rain which continued all the day and
the following night prevented all further operations. Upon
an exaraination of the Arms and Ammunition on the 18""
it was found that the former were much impaired and all
the latter that was in Cartouch Boxes was intirely ruined,
wherefore it was judged expedient to withdraw the Array
to sorae place of security untill the Arms could be repaired
and the Ammunition recruited. Before this could be fully

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 51
effected advice was received that the Enemy had quitted
their former position near the "White Horse Tavern and
were marching down the Road leading to the Swedes Ford,
but the Array not being in a condition to attack them
owing to the want of Araraunition, it was judged most pru
dent to cross the River at Parkers Ford and take post in
the Rear of the Fat Land Ford opposite to the Enemy.
In this position the Armies continued for two days
when on the 20"" instant that of the Enemy appeared to
be in raotion, and from our own observation and the
accounts of our reconnoitring parties were marching rap
idly up the Reading Road this induced us to move up
likewise to hinder them from crossing above us and by get
ting between us and Reading take an opportunity of
destroying a large collection of Military Stores deposited
there. On the night of the 20"" the Army decamped and
marched up to the Trap and on the 21" to within four railes
of Potts Grove, the Enemy's Van then being at French
Creek upon the West Side of Schuylkill. In the night of
the 22* advice was received that the Enemy had crossed
Schuylkill at Gordons Ford below us, but the account was
again contradicted, but in the morning of the 23* certain
accounts carae to hand that they really had crossed in large
nurabers and were Moving towards Philad*. His Excellency
further inforraed the Council that the Troops were in no
condition to make a forced raarch as many of them were
barefooted and all excessively harrassed with their great
Fatigue. The Question being then put — The Council were
unaniraously of opinion
" That, from the present state of the Army it would not be
adviseable to advance upon the Enemy, but remain upon this
Ground or in the neighbourhood till the detachments and
expected Reinforcements come up."
council of war.
" At a Council of War held at Head Q" at Pennibeckers
Mill the 28"" day of Sept' 1777.

52 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
" Present
" His Excellency, the Commander in Chief.
"Majors Genl Brigad'Gen''
" Sullivan McDougal
" Greene Maxwell
" L* Stirling Smallwood
"Stephens Knox
" Arrastrong Wayne
" Muhlenberg
" Nash
" Weedon
" Scott
" Conway
" Potter
" Irvine
" Besides these, John Cadwalader & Joseph Read [Reed],
Esq' were present.
"His Excellency informed the Board, that the main body
of the Eneray, by the last accounts he had obtained, lay
near Gerraan Town and that part had marched into the
city of Philadelphia whether to remain there or not he could
not learn. That their whole force from the best accounts he
could get, and from a comparative view & estimate, amounts
to about 8000 raen.
" That a detachraent of Continental Troops from Peeks-
kill, under the coraraand of Brigad' Gen' McDougal, con
sisting of about 900 raen had joined the Army. That Gen'
Smallwood, with the Militia of Maryland, amounting to
about 1100 — had also arrived, and that Brigad' Foreman
with about 600 — Jersey Militia, would be near the Army to
day on the Skippack Road. That of Continental Troops,
at this time in Camp, exclusive of the Detachment under
Gen' McDougal and that under Gen' Wayne at the Trap,
there were returned present fit for duty 5472, to which is
to be added the light Corps, lately under Gen' Maxwell
supposed to amount to 450 — Men, and the Militia of the
State of Pennsylvania under the command of Major Gen'
Armstrong. That upon the whole, the Array would con-

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 53
sist of about 8000 Continental Troops rank & file and 3000
Militia. " His Excellency further inforraed the Board that a Body
of Militia was coraing from Virginia & that part had
arrived at Lancaster. — That he understood from Report,
that the number of 'em amounted to near 2000 men, but,
that from good authority, he was advised they were badly
armed and many of them without any at all.
" His Excellency also informed the Board that on the 24""
Inst he dispatched an Express to Gen' Putnara with a letter
dated the day before ordering a Detachment to be sent imme
diately frora Peekskill to reinforce the Army under his Com
mand, which Detachment in addition to the Corps then on the
march under Gen' McDougal, should make the whole force
directed from that post amount to 2500 Effective Rank &
file. " Under these circumstances he had called a Council of
War to consult & resolve on the most adviseable measures to
be pursued but more especially to learn from thera, whether
with this Force it was prudent to raake a general & vigorous
attack upon the Eneray or to wait further Reinforceraents
upon which he prayed their opinions.
" The Board having taken into consideration the whole
circumstances and the Question propounded, are of opinion
that an iraraediate attack should not be made ; But they ad
vise, that the Array should move to some grounds proper
for an Encampment within about 12 miles of the Enemy,
and there wait for a further Reinforcement, or be in readi
ness to take advantage of any favourable opportunity that
may offer for raaking an attack.
"Alexander McDougal
"J^° Sullivan
" H. Knox B. G. Artillery Nath^. Greene
" F. Nash B. G.
" P. Muhlenberg B. G. Stirling
" T. Conway B. G. Adam Stephen B. G.
"John Armstrong

54 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
" The subscribers being of opinion our Force was suffi
cient to attack with, but being overruled concur with the
above " W. Smallwood Jas. Potter
" An'' Wayne James Irvine
"Ch« Scott"

brigadier-general forman to general WASHINGTON.
" Eed Bank Fort, 26 October, 1777.
" Sir :
" Your Exce" fav' of the 22* Directed to rae at the Salt
Works unfortunately went to the Salt Works by the lower
road at the sarae Time I came to Freehold by the upper, by
which means your Excel^' orders ware not handed rae until
Friday afternoon — previous to which I had rec* an Express
giveing an Acct. of The Defeat of y" troops your Excels men
tioned to have Crossed to attack the Forts and their retreat.
— Nevertheless being fully Impressed with the Iraportance
This Fort is to us and Equally so to the British Array, I raade
no Doubt but a second Attempt woold shortly be made. —
I therefore gave Directions for the Troops y' Could be
possably spared frora y' station, viz' one hundred, to Hold
theraselves in readiness to raarch Next Day, viz'. Saturday —
& Early in the morning Come forward my self to, if possable,
give a spurr to the Burlington Militia & put thera in raotion —
But ara sorry to Inform your ExceF y' Neither our Late suck-
sesses or the Danger of haveing their Country ravaged gives
y' spring to Their sprits y' is Necessary to bring them out —
I have however in the Most Express raanner ordered The
Colo'" to Exert Themselves and am in hopes y' a few Days
will produce Two or Three hundred men. —
" The Lower Militia under Gen' Newcomb have not as yet
produced a single Man — As being Elder in command Then
Newcomb I have taken the Liberty this Day to Issue orders
for Their Iraraediate Assembling, and will from Time to
Tirae do every thing in my power to assemble Them.
" I got to this post before Noon This day and rec* Informa-

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 55
tion from the Commodore that his Boats on Guard last Night
near the mouth of Schoolkill Heard a Constant rurabling
of Wagons coraing from Philad* Ward and Crossing over to
Province Island from Ten o'clock untill Near Day Break. —
Col° Green informs me y' he saw a Large Body of men
passing the Ferry; at one Tirae they could Discover y' Those
who had Crossed wore Diferent Uniforraes, sorae red, some
Blue — & y' a very Considerable body ware Waiting on the
Crossway and in the Woods on Philad* side to Cross. The
Day was too Dark to make any Nice Discoveries. — When I
Got Down There ware plainly to be discovered a Large Num
ber of Wagons on the Crossway — but it was become too Hazy
to Discover whither they Crossed to the Island or returned —
at four o'clock I was informed y' a Body of British Troops
had landed at Billingsport last Evening in thirty five Boats
— I think from the Ace" its tolerably well Ascertained y'
There are sorae Troops There, but the Tirae of their Landing
and Number of boats appear rather a loose Ace' not to be
depended on. The Garrison at Red Bank has been lately
so Exceedingly Fatigued and in its size sraall y' They have
not been able to keep any party on the Shoor. — The Move
ments of Last Night & to Day amongst the Enemy has occa
sioned the Officir Commanding at Fort Mifiin to Imagine
They mean to Attack y' fort & has This day Drawn a rein
forcement of seventy men from Col" Green and wished to
have Drawn 100 more.
" I make no Doubt but the Gen" request to Col" Green
was judicious at it respects fort Miffiin. But at The same
Tirae ara fully Convinced y' Col" Green woold in Case of an
Attack Absolutely stand in need not only of Thera men but
a greater Number to Defend it. As soon as any of ray
Troops arrive, I will send as raany of Them into the Forts as
will Compleatly mann it.
" By these means the fort will be in as good state of De
fence as before The late Attack should they make a second
Attempt to carry it by Assault, but should they Attempt to
take the Fort by regular Approaches they will be so many
men Lost.

56 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
" The Gen' who have been on this Station for sorae Time
may be better able to Judge of the Enemies movements
of last Night and This day than I can. — it may be y' the[y]
Iramediately mean to attack Fort Miffiin or Red Bank or
Boath. But I should rather be of opinion (frora the Ace', of
their Wagons moving at night), that thej' ware moveing
There stores and Baggage from Philad* a Cross Province
Island & to Chester. Tomorow morning will perhaps De
terraine. I have the honor &c
"David Forman."

lieutenant-colonel smith to WASHINGTON.
" Fort Mifflin, 26 Oct' 1777
« Sir :
"I rec* your Excell'" Order to reraain in the Garrison &
shall obey it. When I wrote I expected there would not
have been that Occasion for ray being here which I now see
there will. Baron d'Arendt's ill State of Health will oblige
hira to retire to Red Bank for three or four days perhaps
raore. Whether Coll. Green or I are to Coramand I know
not. I presume I am to have the Command untill an express
Order frora your Excell^ to the Contrary, even should he be
an Elder Officer, for if an Elder Officer (for Instance Coll.
Green of Red Bank) was to throw in his Reg', to our As
sistance, would not d'Arendt Coraraand. I believe so if he
would, then I certainly after hira have the Coraraand by
your ExcelF' Order. Coll. Green says his Coraraission will
be dated y° 23* Dec' last, mine ought & I expect will be
dated the 10"" as all the Officers from Maryland have their
Commissions from that Date, 'tis true the Commissioners
flrst appointed me Major, the Lieu' Coll" who they had
appointed, did not Serve, the Assembly disapproved of
many of their Appointments, alterd Some among the Rest
made me a Lieu' Coll. these are my Reasons for thinking
that my Comraission will bear that date, if your Excell'

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 57
thinks them good Coll. Green will be Satisfied to Serve
under me.
" A Reinforcement of 100 or 200 Men would not be too
much to resist a Spirited Attack of 2000 Men. with 100 In
fantry & 20 or 30 good Artillery, we raight do. Our Artillery
are & will be very ill-serv'd. the few Artillery of Militia are
Constantly taring [?] to be discharg'd. their Times will be
out in Ten or 15 days. I am Clearly of Opinion if we had a
Coraraodore who would do his Duty, it would be irapossible
for the Eneray ever to get Possession of this fort, without
we are properly guarded the Eneray may be with us before
we can form, the Channell which they are to cross is so
narrow, in the Night they raay bring their Boats & Embark
opposite to us without our seeing them, the Baron has just
rec* an Answer to a Request he made for the Galleys, to be
sent early & begging that 6 might be sent, three to guard
above Reed's House who would rake all that part of the
Island, and three below Hog Island & the Battery, with
this Guard (if they would do their duty) all Sir Williams
Array could not take the fort, his answer the Baron in-
closd to you. The enemy are very busy raaking some work
near the ferry Wharf opposite to our Wharf, for what I
cannot Conceive, unless 'tis to cover their landing, or to
fortify the Island against our attack & by that Means to keep
open their Communication by Tinnicura. they have all
this Day been Carrying fascines & waggons, & in the Even
ing Earth to fill up the Breaches in the Causeway.
" Fifty Blankets as many p' of Shoes, 4 Coats 1 Vest 4 p'
Breeches & two Great Coats (all farmers) were all I rec* this
day for my poor ragged fellows, now chiefly without Breeches,
who are oblig'd to turn out before day, & perhaps may
Soon be oblig'd to be so all Night, the last reinforceraent
are equally unfurnish'd. This Garrison ought to be well-
cloth'd or we destroy their Constitutions. I Hope your Ex-
cell^ will give Order. My Officers & Men think they ought
to be reliev'd but could they be cloth'd I could make them
Content. I have the Honor &c. " Sam Smith."
5

68 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.

continental navy board to WASHINGTON.
"Continental Navy Board
" Borden Town, 26 October, 1777
''Sib: " As soon as we had the Honour of receiving your Letter
of yesterday, we ordered exact Returns to be iraraediately
raade of every Man on Board the Frigates Washington &
Effingham ; these Returns we have enclosed for your In
spection. " We have the fullest Conviction of the Necessity there is
to exert every Power for the Defence of the Pass near Fort
Miffiin, & happy should we be, could we furnish Men in the
least likely to be of service there. But as these Frigates
have been only officer'd & no attempt ever made to man "
thera, we have few or no Searaen, on board. The men we
have are, for the most part, militia left sick at Burlington
& Bristol, & being found on the Recovery were taken on
Board raerely to assist in getting the ships up to this Place.
With these Hands such as they are, & the Assistance of a
few on Board private Vessels that have taken shelter here,
we have put the Frigates in as good a Posture of Defence
as we could, against small armed Boats ; not apprehending
Danger from any larger Force by Water, on account of the
Difficulties of the Channel.
" Your Excellency's Desires shall always be a Law to us,
& if you think the Men in the enclosed Returns will be of
more service in our Fleet, they shall be imraediately or
dered down. Every thing may be got ready for scuttling
the Frigates in Case of irapending Danger, but we appre
hend that Business raay be safely deferred 'till the Enemy
have got up to the City with their Shipping.
" We have removed the chief of our Stores to Easton,
particularly our Canvass, of which we have a considerable
Quantity; agreeable to Orders we saw from your Excel
lency sorae Time ago.
" There are a number of Shallop men, & a few Sailors on
Board the Vessels here which, if you think proper to un-

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 59
man our Frigates, we will endeavor to Enlist for a temporary
service. But as there are but few of these, & fewer still we
fear will be induced by any means to leave their .vessels
destitute, we apprehend little can be expected from such an
Expedient. " One thing your Excellency raay depend upon, that
whatever method you may point out in our Line, for the
public service; our Abilities shall be exerted to the utter
most to fulflll your Desires. We have the Honour &c
"Fra' Hopkinson
"John Wharton."'

LIBUTBNANT-COLONEL comstock to WASHINGTON.
" Red Bank, Oct". 27'" 1777
" Sir :
" By order of Co' Greene I again put Pen to Paper, and
inform your Excellency ; that Yesterday he received your
Favour of the 24"' instant by Express ; in which your Ex
cellency was pleased to express your warmest approbation
of the conduct of the whole Garrison on the 22*, accora-
pan'd with your ' particular Thanks.'
" The whole Garrison entertain a grateful Sence of the
Honour done thera ; and hope their future Conduct raay be
such as will render essential Service to their Country, and
continue 'era in your Excellency's Good Opinion.
" The Nuraber of Arras taken frora the Hessians the late
Action were about 300. The poorest of our Arras were
yesterday exchanged for the same Nuraber of those taken.
The spare Arras in the Garrison are this day ordered
away agreeable to your Excellency's directions; and the
Wounded Prisoners delivered to the care of M' Clyraer,
Commissary of Prisoners ; and all judg'd fit to reraove will
be iramedeately sent to Allin Town.
' A letter from Commodore Hazelwood, of this date, is printed in
Sparks's " Correspondence of the Revolution," Vol. II. p. 18. Washing
ton wrote to the Navy Board on the 27th. — "Writings of Washington,"
Vol. VI. p. 145.

60 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
" Col. Greene directs rae to acquaint your Excellency that
Yesterday a Party of the Enemy landed from their Fleet
with Cannon at Billing's Fort ; at Night Co' Greene sent a
Patrol that way to observe their raoveraents, who took a
Prisoner near the Enemy's Lines, & brot him in. The
Prisoner says he is a Marine & that a Number of High
land Granadiers & Marines (in all 300 Men) with 10 Days'
Provisions and 2 Eighteen Pounders were in Billing's
Fort strengthening the works, and at present Coraraanded
by the Cap' of the Eagle. — he likewise says it is given out
that part of the Army at Philadelphia are to take post
there. " I ara directed to inforra your Excellency ; that by a
Person who last Night went from hence into Philadelphia
and return'd, and by several ways of inteligence we are in-
form'd that Yesterday, and last Night, the Enemy im-
ploy'd near 200 Waggons in carrying Brush and Plank
across the Schoolkill toward Fort Miffiin, & that they have
repaired the lower Bridge across that River. The Persons
imploy'd in this work say it is preparitory to Attack on
Fort Mifflin.
" Co' Greene begs your Excellency would send hira a
Reinforceraent of 200 Continental Troops, the Militia he
cannot depend upon, as no one has yet raade his appearance
here when there has been the least appearance [of] an
attack. " We have rec'd sorae Powder of the Fleet and iraploy'd
this rainy Day in making Cartriges; and this moment
some Waggon lo'ded with Cartriges for us and Fort Miflin
— now we have a fine supply. I have the Hon' &c
"Adam Comstock, "i! Cbf"
' A return dated October 27 showed that flve hundred and thirty-
four raen flt for duty were at Eed Bank, as follows : Colonel Greene's
regiment, two hundred and forty-four; Colonel Israel Angell's, two
hundred and twenty-seven ; and Captain David Cook's company of
artillery, sixty-three.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 61
WASHINGTON TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL CHRISTOPHER GREENE.
" Head Quarters, Oct. 28*" 1777
" Sir :
" Colonel Arendt writes me, that the state of his health
will make it absolutely necessary for him, to withdraw him
self awhile from the Garrison. I am apprehensive, that
during his absence, there may arise sorae difficulty about
the command between you and L' Col: Smith; as it is un
certain which of your Commissions is oldest, and cannot
now be easily determined. The good of the service how
ever requires, that disputes of such a nature should be
waved, and as L' Col : Smith had originally the coraraand
of the post, has been longer in it, and may be supposed to
have more thoroughly considered every circumstance of its
defence, than one who has been less time there ; these are
arguraents, with me, in the present uncertainty, respecting
rank, that it should be waved in his favour. — I have no
doubt that they will have their full weight with you when
duly considered, and that you will readily avoid any differ
ence about punctilios, when the advancement of the service,
in the least degree, raay seem to require it. Relying upon
this, I fiatter myself you will chearfuUy acquiesce in Colonel
Smith's coraraand, in the absence of the Baron, and that
there will be the most perfect harmony subsisting between
you. I am &c.' " G° Washington."
WASHINGTON TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL FOREMAN.
"Head Q", 28'" Octo', 1777
" D= S^
" I wrote you last evening with respect to reinforceing Red
Bank & Fort Mifflin. My anxiety frora the importance of
these places is so great, that I cannot help urging you again
to throw in without loss of time, what assistance the Com
manding officers and yourself raay think necessary, and
such as you may be able to afford them. I inform'd you
' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton.

62 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
that the reinforceraent order'd from hence was detain 'd by
the weather, a continuance of which, still prevents the
march of it, and may retard their passage, when they put
off'; for which reason, I wish your iraraediate consultation
with the officers, that you raay know what reinforceraents
are necessary by them, if possible without loss of time.
" I am &e.
" G" Washington.
" P.S. — If you raention the coraeing down of a reinforce
ment, it raay reach the Enemy's Ears, and they endeavour
to intercept it, for which reason I wish it may be kept as
secret as may be."

WASHINGTON'S INSTRUCTIONS TO GENERAL VARNUM.
" Head Quarters, 28'" Oct' 1777.
" Sir :
" You are immediately, or as soon as the weather will
permit, to proceed to Woodberry with the Brigade under
your command. Your most convenient rout will be from
this to Bristol, thence to Mt. Holly, across the Delaware,
thence to Haddonfield and thence to the place of your des
tination. You will be circumspect on your march, and use
every precaution to prevent your party being surprised or
intercepted. The design of sending you to Woodberry is
to aid and give greater security to the Garrisons at Red
Bank and Fort Mifflin ; for which purpose you will co
operate with them in every necessary measure. You will
probably find General Foreman at the head of a body of
Jersey Militia, in the neighbourhood of Red Bank; as he is
there for the sarae end that you will be, a co-operation
between you and hira will be also requisite.
" I cannot delineate particularly the line of conduct you
are to observe. — I leave it to your own discretion, to be
adapted to circurastances. — The general idea, I would throw
out is, that you are in conjunction with the Jersey railitia to
give the Garrisons and fleet all tbe assistance and relief in
your power. As the men in them must be greatly bar-

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 63
rassed by labour and watching, and in need of rest and
refreshment, I would have you send detachments from time
to time to relieve and replace an equal nuraber frora the
garrisons ; who are during the interval to reraain and act
with you. — ^You are also occasionally to reinforce them with
additional numbers, as they raay stand in need of it. — In
case of an attack upon or investiture of Red-bank, you are
to act upon the rear or flanks of the eneray; not to throw
your troops into the Fort, except such reinforcements from
them as may really be wanted in defence of the works.
"Woodberry I have pitched upon as a general station,
frora its nearness to the forts, and the greater facility there
will, on that account, be, to answer in common the ends
proposed. — In case of the approach of the eneray towards
you, you are to take such a situation as shall seera to you
most eligible.
" I hope it is unnecessary to caution you to be, in every
circumstance upon your guard against surprises. At Wood
berry you will be between two creeks — if you can draw any
security from this, by breaking down bridges or otherwise,
so as to render the march of the enemy in their approach
raore circuitous, or to lessen the nuraber of approaches, it
will be an advantage worth iraproving. I ara, &c.
" G° Washington." '

WASHINGTON TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SAMUEL SMITH.
" Head Quarters, 28 October, 1777
" Sir :
" I ara fav* with yours of the 26'". As there seems to be
a doubt of the priority of the date of your or L'.-Colonel
Green's Corara" I have, in a letter of this date, desired him
to wave the matter in dispute for the present, and act under
your command, as you have been in the Fort from the
Beginning and raust be better acquainted with the nature of
the defences than a stranger.
" I have ordered a very handsorae detachraent for the
' Body of instructions is in Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton's writing.

64 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
reinforcement of Forts Mifflin and Mercer and the Gallies
— they have been ready since yesterday, but the weather has
been such, that they could not raarch. When they arrive,
the duty will not be so severe, and if the men that you car
ried down at first can possibly be spared they shall be re
lieved. I will send them down necessaries out of the first
that arrive frora Lancaster. You seem to have mistaken
the Commodore's meaning. From his letter I understand
that he will always assist you whenever it is in his power.
He tells you that in rough weather his Gallies and armed
Boats cannot live and therefore guards you against expect
ing much assistance from them at such tiraes. I beg you
of all things, not to suffer any Jealousies between the land
and sea service to take place. Consider that your rautual
security depends upon acting perfectly in concert. I have
wrote to Col" Green to afford you every possible assistance
frora Red Bank till the reinforceraent gets down. I have
the greatest hopes that this Storm of Rain and Wind at N. E.
will overflow all the enemy's lower works upon province
Island, and ruin the new Roads they have been making. I
recomraend every attention to you and I hope a glorious
success will reward your exertions. I am &c
" G° Washington.
" P.S. — Keep the Banks of province Island constantly cut
and you will erabarrass the Enemy excessively. Do not
raention anything of the expectation of a reinforcement lest
the Enemy take means to intercept them." '
WASHINGTON TO COMMODORE HAZELWOOD.
" Head Quarters, 28 October, 1777
" Sir :
"In consequence of your representation of the Weak
ness of your Fleet, I have order'd a return of Sailors in
the Army to be made to rae, & find they amount to more
than 100, which will March with a Detachment for the
Forts, as soon as the Weather will permit.
^ In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel Tench Tilghman.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 65
" This Re-enforcement, I expect, will amply supply your
wants, & enable you to give every assistance to the Forts
that can be reasonably expected from you, & as their
Strength will be greatly augmented, it is my most earnest
desire, that every raode may be adopted, by which your
force may be brought to co-opperate against the designs &
approaches of the Enemy, & that a mutual confidence &
perfect understanding may chearfully take place.
" The Ammunition you have & will receive is to be con
sidered sent for the use of the whole, & distributed accord
ingly. " As there is a greater possibility that the reduction of the
Forts raight be effected by surprize than any other raeans,
you will see the necessity of giving thera every Aid by
your Gondolas & Guard Boats as may effectually prevent
any mischance of this kind. I ara &c. " G° Washington."

" Sir :
" Your Exc'y" fav' of the 27'" was handed to rae This
afternoon, previous to ray rec' of it I had given orders to
several of the Militia officers of This part of the Country
to Assemble their men — and have used my endeavours with
Gen' Newcomb to obtain a return of The men it is said he
has asserabled That They raight be put on sorae Duty either
in the Garrisons or on sorae out guards — But the Gen' abso
lutely refuses to render rae any Ace' of hiraself or his raen
— y' I ara not able to Inform your Excel^ whether Gen'
[Silas] Newcomb really has or has not any men Assembled.
" The Excessive rainy weather has prevented the Troops
from Monmouth and Burlington Coraing forward as fast as
I could have wished — They are however sorae of Them This
' In connection with these letters should be read a series from Major
John Clark, Jr., to Washington, published by this Society in the first
volume of its Bulletin, 1845-1847. Major Clark was under orders to
obtain intelligence ofthe enemy's movements in and about the city, and
acquitted himself in a highly satisfactory manner.
6

66 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
day advanced as far as haddon field, and will in The Morn
ing be down when I will Iramediately incorporate them
with the Two Garrisons — They will not be equal to there
wants, yet they will be a feeling reinforcement. — had it not
been for the Excessive rains for some Days past I should have
had raore raen Collected Then woold have been Necessary
to raan Red Bank and Fort Mifflin ; and yet Think I Could
be able to Collect a respectable body of Militia was I able
to overcome the Obstinacy of, or to Displace, Gen' Newcomb.
" frora the best information I can Collect he has at no
tirae given any assistance either to The Garrisons or the
fleet — ^particularly in The late Attack on red Bank he
neither harrassed The Enemy in their Advance, During
the Assault or in Their retreat.
" he Thinks himself only Accountable to The Gov' [Liv
ingston] and Major Gen' Dickinson — I should be glad of
your Excel''' directions respecting my treatment of him.'
" On Sunday Last a number of Marines and Highlanders
Landed at Billings Port — and have been Imployed in Throw
ing up a five gun Battery on the water side below the Bank,
as we suppose to prevent our Gaily raen geting the Guns
and provisions out of the Two Ship of war y' were blown
up the Day of the attack on the Chevaux de frize. The
Deserters and prisoners Differ in their Ace" of Their Nura
bers — some of Thera say Three or four hundred, others say
not raore then 160.
" The Late rain and Winds have Occasioned an Uncora-
raon High Tide, all the Meadowes are under Water, and I
ara sorry to inform your Exce'^ y' we have much reason to
fear Fort Miflin will receive Very Considerable Daramage.
' " General Newcomb's conduct is such as might naturally be expected
from a Gentleman who was made a General, because your Excellency did
not think him fit for a Collonel. ... If he makes any more Difficulties
of that kind, I doubt not, by his present down-hill character with the
present house, he will run a great risque of being superceded, which I
may venture to say would prove no Loss to his Country." — Oovemor Lii>-
ingston io Washington, November 5, 1777. For Washington's opinion of
Newcomb's uselessness, see my " Writings of Washington," Vol. VI. pp.
157, 169.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 67
" One of the Enemies Bridges of Boats over the Schuyl
kill has broak loose in the Deluge and Drifted off — A very
Considerable part of it is allready brought under red Bank,
and at sun down when I left The Fort the row Gallymen
ware going after the reraainder.
" At Two o'clock This day a Nuraber of the British
Troops (by Estiraation 1000) ware seen Crossing the Mouth
of Schuylkill to province Island & for a Considerable Tirae
stood paradred on The hill round y" Pest House — (the only
Dry ground in y' Nabourhood,) a small mist prevented our
observing where They afterwards went to — The Troops y'
I mentioned to have Crossed on Sunday, we have heard
nothing of since — but Think it highly probable They re
turned. " from the spirits of the Garrison at red Bank, the rein
forcements your Exce'y mentions sending and the Militia y'
I flatter rayself I shall raise, I hope we shall be able to give
a good Ace' of The Eneray should They raake a Second
Attempt on this post — all though This post is of great Im
portance to Thera — I cannot believe They will Dare to send
a Very Considerable body of Men to invest it — Least They
Lay Their grand Army too open to an Attac from your
Exce'y. " We have the pleasure to hear y' your Excels has re"* The
Articles of Capitulation of Gen' Burgoin's Array. I beg
raost Heartily to Congratulate your Excel^ on pleasing
appearance of our affairs. I have &c
"David Forman.
" M" Ladds Near Red Bank
" 29 October, 1777."
LORD STIRLING TO WASHINGTON. " Reading, October 29 1777
"Dear Sir
" After leaveing Potsgrove I could not meet with any
place where I could Conveniently put up 'till I came to this
place, and I find myself so much better for the Rest I had
here that I intend to set out for Camp again as soon as I
find the Roads are passable with a Carriage. On Saturday

68 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
last I sent off to Camp an Officer with 64 men fit for Duty,
there remain in this place 244 wounded, 63 sick, & 57 Con-
valessents — in a very few days near 100 more of them may
be sent to Camp I am &c " Stirling.
" Poor Smith, D. A. G. is dead of his wound. Lieut.
Baylor recovering fast. Major Clow very HI. Lieut. Ran
dolph better.
" P.S. — I take the Liberty of enclosing a Memorandum
of a few thoughts which have occurred to me, for your Ex
cellency's peruseal. {^Enclosure.l
" The Enemy probably will detach another Body of Men
to Attack Red Bank with heavier Cannon, & by a Cannon
ade in breach endeavour to render an Assault raore practi
cable & more successfuU. I say it is probable, because I
believe they are now Convinced that it is their only Chance
of Opening the Communication between their fleet and
Army at Philadelphia; and that without it, they cannot
long exist there. We should therefore do everything in
our power to retard & render difficult their Operations on
that side; by Collecting the Militia & setting them at
work in destroying all the Bridges, Causeways, & Roads
between Cooper's ferry & that fort, & in harrassing thera
whenever they do approach, & whenever it is discovered
that they are about to raake an Atterapt that way, I would
send a respectable Body of Continental Troops to Counter
act their operations.
" If this should not soon appear to be their Intentions,
they must raean to retire from Philadelphia to the other
side of Schuylkill, or to give this Army Battle — the first
should be prevented, and the latter in our present scituation
avoided, if possible ; I would therefore be for passing the
whole Army (except 1000 men) over the Schuylkill and
takeing post soraewhere near Radnor Meeting House, where
we should be equally distant frora all the fords on Schuyl
kill below the Valle}- forge, & by Vigilantly watching them

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 69
on such timely Notice of their Motions as would put it in
our power to attack them on their March with the greatest
Advantages. Our Station on that side the Schuylkill would
put it in our power Effectually to Cutt off their Communi
cation by land between their fleet & Army, and would
reduce Gen' Howe to force a march under every disadvan
tage. The 1000 raen left on this side the River would
under a Vigilant Officer be Sufficient to prevent their small
parties from Ravaging the Country & gaining intelligence ;
our whole Array in their present Scituation can do no more."
brigadier-general JAMES POTTER TO WASHINGTON.
" Darbey, Oct' 30*" 1777, 3 oClock.
" Sir :
" I have been Round all the ferreys, and taking a vew of
Carpenters Island the enemy sent over to the Island a large
Reinforcement yesterday, all the Meddows are under watter
and the breeches we raaid are all opned there Bridge is
carreyed off by the flnd, a part of it is on this side of the
River which I have Just Hard of at this place, and I will
go Imraedatly and destroy it. I will do every thing in my
power to prevent there Gating a Bridge across again, and
live in hopes that your excelancey will send over some Can
non and raen to command the ferreys. I am of opinion
that if the communication between the eneray and there
shiping was cut off the wold be son oblidged to move there
Quarters, this night I will cut places in the Banks that has
not been opened yet, and 1 am In hops it will be Imposable
for them to get aney provision by Rodalphs ferrey. in Hast
I ara &c " Ja« Potter."
captain lee to washington.
"Sir " I wrote your Excellency yesterday, since which I have
been active in acquainting myself with the disposition &
connexion of the enemy on this side the Schuylkill.
" They have a body of men (not flve hundred in number)
on Carpenters island; the possession of this post secures a

70 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
constant & ready supply of provision. It is brought up by
water, frora the fleet off Chester, deposited under cover of
the ships against the chiveaux de frise, & then conducted
thro' Carpenters island to the new lower ferry, & so on to
Philad*. If this communication is not interrupted, supplies
of provisions will be as abundant, as if the fleet lay off the
wharf of the city.
" There is a beef trade carried on between the inhabit
ants, & the eneray at a place called Grubs Landing, about
six miles below Chester. This illicit correspondence came
to my knowledge but yesterday. I have detached a party
of dragoons to disturb them ; & make no doubt my en
deavours to interrupt this connexion, will be effectual. I
have &c.
"Hen^ Lee.
" Oct. 31, 1777.
" N.B. — At present, the coraraunication between the fleet
& Carpenters island is totally cut off by the inundation of
the Schuylkill. The fleet are engaged daily in bringing up
provision to the mouth of Darby Creek, which will be con
veyed to Carpenters Island as soon as the roads will adrait."
WASHINGTON TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM.
" Head Quarters, 31 October, 1777
" Sir :
" The loss of our heavy Cannon on the North River, and
the possibility however remote of our losing those which are
in the Forts on the Delaware, in which case we should be
totally divested of these necessary opponents to the Enerays
Fleet, raake it adviseable to remove frora Red Bank and Fort
Mifflin all the large Calibers that can possibly be spared from
the necessary defence of those posts — to some Place of safety
where they may be kept in Reserve. Fort Mifflin has had
an acquisition of Cannon, taken from the Wreck of the
Augusta,' by which this will probably have a superfluous
number. The Approaching Frosts will effectually stop the
' See Lee to Washington, November 3, post.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 71
Blasts of our Furnaces, which isa further cogent Reason for
making a store of heavy Cannon in case of accidents to our
Forts. I raentioned in my Letter to General Forman that
the Crews on board the Galleys should not expose them
selves to the flre of the Battery which he thinks the Enemy
have raised for the purpose of interrupting them — but if a
Plan which I have suggested to him can be carried into exe
cution, the difficulty will be removed and a farther acqui
sition made of the valuable Article in question.' I am &c
" G° Washington."
WASHINGTON TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL POTTER.
"Head Quarters, 31 October, 1777
"Sir " As soon as the Schuylkill is fordable, I shall send over
a large body of Militia to you, for the purpose of executing
sorae particular raatters. The principal are, to endeavour to
break up the Road by which the enemy have a corarauni
cation with their shipping over the Islands, if it is practi
cable, and to reraove the running Stones frora the Mills in
the neighbourhood of Chester and Wilmington. This last, I
would have you undertake immediately with your present
force, as I have information that the Enemy are about raaking
a detachment to Wilmington, probably with an intent to take
post there, and secure the use of the Mills. To execute this
matter at once, you should irapress a sufflcient number of
Waggons for the purpose, without letting any person know
what they are for, and send them under good Officers with
sufficient parties to the following Mills — Lloyd's about two
Miles on this side of Chester. Shaw's, about one Mile
back of Chester. Robinson's, on Naaman's Creek, and the
Brandywine Mills. If there are any others that I have not
mentioned, contiguous to the River, they are also to be dis
mounted. Many of the Mills have spare runners, they must
also be removed. The stones should be marked with Tar
and Grease, or in sorae other manner, that it may [be]
known to what Mills they belong, that they raay be returned
' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens.

72 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
and made use of in future. And they should be moved to
such distance that the Enemy cannot recover them. If there
is any Flour in the Mills, it should be removed, if possible,
after the stones are secured. I am inform'd that there is a
considerable quantity in Shaw's, particularly, which there is
reason to believe is intended for the Enemy. It is very
convenient to the Navigation of Chester Creek and should
therefore be flrst taken care of. I beg you may instantly
set about this Work for the reason before mentioned. That
no previous alarm maybe given, let a certain day and a cer
tain hour be fixed upon for the execution of the whole at one
tirae, and even the officers who are to do the Business should
not know their destination till just before they set out, lest
it should take wind.
"Ihave yours of yesterday afternoon, and am glad to hear
that the flood has done so much damage to the meadows —
endeavour by all means to keep the breaches open. When
the party that I mentioned in the former part of ray letter
gets down, I hope you will be able to break up the dykes
effectually. I am &c. " G° Washington.
"P.S. — I have desired Cap'. [Henry] Lee of the light
Horse to give you any assistance that you raay want." ^
WASHINGTON TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SMITH.
" Head Quarters, 1 November, 1777
" Sir :
" I have this raoraent received your favor of yesterday, &
hope General Varnum with the Detachment from this Army,
have by this time arriv'd to your support, & that your little
Garrison will, with the greatest confldence & Vigor, exert
itself to baffle every attempt of the Enemy to reduce it.
When I last saw Gen' Foreman I authorized him to collect
all the Cloathing, such as Shoes, Stockings, Shirts, Breeches,
&c*, which he possibly could ; & by this Opportunity I have
requested him to let you have as raany of them as he can
' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel Tench Tilghman.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 73
spare for your men, who, I make no doubt must be greatly
in want of them. You will therefore apply to him.
" Frora the Idea I at present bear of the Island on which
your fort stands, I ara of opinion, that, if the upper End of
it was laid under water it would very rauch retard any
operations of the Enemy against you — but whether this is
practible, or whether opening the Banks to effect it would
not be productive of Inconvenience to the Fort, I leave to
you and the Officers with you to determine, & only mean
to propose it for your consideration. I am &c
" G° Washington." '
WASHINGTON TO COMMODORE HAZELWOOD.
" Whitpin, Morris's, 2 November, 1777
"Sir: .
" Upon maturely considering the nature of the Fortress on
Mud Island incomplete in such works as would secure it
against Storm, and investigation what raode of defence is
best adapted to its deficiency in this respect — it appears abso
lutely necessary to keep the Enemy at bay as much as pos
sible and confine them to distant Combat — this can only be
effected by the co-operation of the Fleet under your com
mand, or such part of it as may appear to you proper to be
detached for the purpose. Nothing but the Fire of your
Vessels and Galleys can prevent the Enemys making a
descent upon the Island, if they are determined to effect it
by such a Sacrifice as the importance of the object to them
certainly deserves. I would advise therefore in case of the
Enemy's attempting to throw a number of men over in boats,
not to suffer the attention of the Fleet to be intirely call'd
off by any concerted attempt which may be made on the
Chevaux-de-frise at the same time — but to order a sufficient
number of Galleys to meet their boats and keep up a well
directed fire, or board them, as circumstances may require
— in a word every measure should be taken which your
^ A letter of this date to the President of Congress is printed in my
" Writings of Washington," Vol. VI. p. 156. Also letters to Brigadier-
General Varnum and Governor Livingston, pp. 168 and 169.

74 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
skill in naval manoeuvres can dictate to prevent them from
getting footing on the island. A fire of Red-hot balls thrown
with judgement from a few Vessels, and the Solidity of the
work itself will be a sufficient security in the meantime to
the Chevaux-de-frise. If the Enemy can be foiled in this
stratagem of causing a diversion to your fleet, by cannon
ading frora their ships, and making preparations to clear the
Chevaux-de-frise, there will be but one way left them, which
is to attempt a Landing by night. How necessary the
Guardianship of the Galleys will be in such Case, must
be obvious. If a sudden Assault frora superior numbers,
taking the advantage of weak parts, would be dreadful by
day, when someth^ of the Enemys designs is to be discovered,
how fatal might it be in the confusion of darkness when the
Guns of the Fort could not be brought to bear.
" Galleys stationed between the Fort and province Island
at night are the only Security which the Garrison could have
in such case against a sudden Descent from the Enemy,
cover'd perhaps by false Attacks and Demonstration from
the Shipping.
" You are the best Judge of the most proper Situation
for the Galleys. However, if there is no cogent Reason for
keeping the whole of them on the Jersey Side, it appears to
me that station^ them or part of thera where they will be
within distance for giving immediate Support to the Garrison
on Mud Island would be turning their Service to the best
account.' " I am &c " G° Washington."
MAJOR fleury's JOURNAL,^ AND LETTER TO COLONEL HAMILTON.
^'Novem. 2*. About 2 O'Clock in the morning we hear a
great noise of oars near the Shore of Province Island, and
the Mouth of Schuylkil — a great number of Troops as far
as we could judge by their voices, and the noise fil'd off
' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens.
' At Fort Mifiiin.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 75
upon the Bank towards the Pest-house — at 5 oClock every
thing was quiet again.
" 3. For two days past we had suspected that the Enemys
Vessels raade different turns in the course of the night to
the Augusta's wreck — either to carry off the Cannon which
the Galleys had neglected throwing into the water, or taking
possession of, or to tow oft" the Hulk — ^but they had a raore
important object which they have been permitted to execute
without interruption — and this morning's daylight dis-
cover'd to us their two nights' labour — they are raising a
battery of heavy Cannon upon the hulk which is aground
on the sag^ bank, the Galleys do not disturb thera in their
work, which, if they finish it, will do great injury to our
Fort — where you know there is no Shelter for the Troops —
it is important to drive them from that particular spot of
the River, and thirteen Galleys with two fioating Batteries
may do it if they please.
" As we are in want here of Joist, Pickets, Palisades, and
even Earth, and as it is irapossible to fortify a place with
water unless one has means to stop it — I went yesterday
with 20 men to endeavour to get wood on the Jersey Shore,
but I could get only a few Pickets, of which I shall make
palisades, if I ara perraitted to use them according to my
Ideas. " When His Excellency approved my Zeal and my re
maining at Fort Miffiin in quality of Engineer, he did not
give rae an order to act in that capacity, and I can only
advise without being heard. While Baron Arendt was
present he understands the Military Art, and my Opinions
in point of fortification were his — but he is absent, and you
know there are persons who know a great deal without
having ever learnt — and whose obstinacy is equal to their
Insufficiency. However I do not complain of any one, I
confine myself only to observing that my Zeal for your
Cause cannot be useful unless I am permi^.^'^ -*? display it,
in a branch which I have studied, on a"spot with which I
am well acquainted, by my own Remarks, and those of
many other Engineers skilful and accurate men.

76 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
" Honour comraands me to do everything in my power. I
hope to do my Duty in whatever way I am made use of-^-and
to die in the breach if necessary — but I will observe only
that I thought myself employ'd in a different capacity frora
that of a Grenadier." '

LORD STIRLING TO WASHINGTON. " Reading Nov' 3* 1777
"Dear Sir:
" Your Excellency's letter of the first Instant, I received
yesterday, and am happy to find that any part of my thoughts
on the measures necessary to be taken Coincided so nearly
with those you had already pursued : and I am in hopes
they will be amply Sufficient to render abortive any meas
ures the Eneray may atterapt on the side of Red Bank.
The objection to the other raeasure is indeed a very Capital
one, and the Communication is Certainly better kept up
from the present position : But it is my duty to inform your
Excellency no freshet whatever does totally Cut off the
Comraunication between the two Sides of Schuylkill, for at
this place there are two rope ferry's with excellent large
Scows which can carry near an hundred men at a time, and
move so quick that a Column of Troops would p^ss at each
of them as soon as at the best ford at any tirae ; there is
also a good ferry at Potts Grove ; I mention this least they
should be wanted on some future Occasion. I believe Gen
eral Howe is in a very awkward Scituation, he cannot
attempt another attack on Red Bank without detaching a
larger body than he can spare from his Army, nor will he
this season be able to advance a Battery on province nearer
to fort Miflin, in short he cannot cooperate with the Navy
in attacking the forts or raizeing the Cheva. de frize ; unless
it be by some desperate attempt to storm fort Miflin in Boats
— but desperation he is almost drove to. . . . " Stirling."
' Translated by Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 77

brigadier- general potter to WASHINGTON.
" Sir :
" The eneray brings provision in Boats in the night along
the side of the Shore, and up the Schulkill about a mile
above the lowest ferrey, on Saterday evining last there went
down 30 Boats I think the came up Last night in the Time
of the flud they maid a voige.
" You may be asured that the Enemy are Bulding three
floting Battereys one at Ougdons [?] ferrey and two about
a mile above, the lowest ferrey the two letter ones we can
see Clearly one seems allmost finished the other the Began
to Nale the plank on last Saterday, if these Battereys are
once finished, and they have persession of Carpenters Island,
our fourts and Galleys must unavetable fall into there Hands.
I can see no way of saving our fourts and Galleys but by
Imraedatly Taking there fourt, and Battreys on carpenters
Island, which I think can be dun with good Troops with no
crait Loss if that was dun we coud use there Battrey at the
pest Hous against themselves and by that Means Defiat
there intencions — I hope a great part of the mill Stones
were Reraoved yesterday as I had sent out for that purpose
150 raen — the eneray are in hopes of gating up there ship
ing and has brought up there Bagage as far as Chester. I
wold Refare your Excelancey to Mess' Lytle Hunter and
Mountgomrey for a more full Account of these Metters —
they have Been with me in meaking Discovereys. I am &c
"Ja^ Potter.
"M^ Willings
"Nov' 3, 1777
" P.S. — I mount a gaurd of 100 men at the raiddle ferrey
and at Grayes, 30, near Boons dam 50 with a proper num
ber of Officers.
" My men have severe duty to do.
" I have Been Reinforged my Strenth is about 950 raen
with Arras and wanting arms 300 Exclusive of Officers."

78 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777,
brigadier-general varnum to WASHINGTON.
" Woodberry, 3* Nov' 1777
" Sir :
"We arrived at this Place yesterday. I have taken a
View of the Forts, and think them in a good State of Defence.
The Want of Confidence between the Commodore and Col°
Smith is very great. I shall do every Thing in my Power
to cause that mutual Support between the Land and Water
Forces, which appears very essential for the Security of Fort
Mifflin. I ara not yet fully acquainted with the Ground, so
as to give your Excellency that satisfaction w""" I coud wish.
Have ordered Four Cap*", Eight Subs, Twelve Serjeants,
Twelve Corporils and Two Hundred Privates into Fort
Mifflin. I shall give that Post a still greater Support, by
relieving the Invalids. The Eneray are in Possession of
Billing's Port : Sorae of their Shipping lay above that Place,
about Two Miles below Fort Mifflin. In this Situation it is
impossible for the Commodore to drag for the Cannon &c.
as mentioned in your Orders of the 31" ult". There are no
more Cannon in the Forts than are really necessary. There
are no Militia of Consequence in Force here. General New
comb has perhaps between one and two Hundred, General
Foreman is not upon the Ground. I am &c.'
" J. M. Varnum."
lieutenant-colonel smith TO WASHINGTON.
" Fort Mifflin, Novemb' 3'* 1777
" Sir :
" I have this Ins' the honor to receve your Excellency's
Letter of the 1". Gen' Vernum has arriv'd and will send
me 200 men this morning. Gen' Foreman has some
Cloathing of small consequence, which I am to have this
day. We by order of Gen' Vernum begin this day to take
the Inhabitants Cloaths. I fear it will be a very poor Re
source — this Garrison must be well cloathed or they will
' A postscript omitted, as of no consequence.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 79
perish. I always keep the part of the Island you mention
under water, and hope now to be able to maintain the Fort.
" The Industrious enemy turn their Misfortunes to advan
tage, these two nights they have been eraployed in raising
the wreck of the 64 Gun Ship, and have this morning shewn
a floating Battery alraost corapleat. I presurae to morrow
they will open it, unless Gen' Vernon [Varnum] takes Bil
lingsport from them. I think that one of the raost effectual
strokes that can be struck in our favor, and have recora
mended it to hira, if he takes it, they then will have no
alternative but storraing this Island which they appear to
be rauch afraid of. I have the honor &c "Sam Smith."

captain lee to WASHINGTON. "N"3n7
" Sir :
" I mentioned to your Excellency in my last let', an inter
course subsisting between the inhabitants & fleet near Grub's
landing. Having received a confirraation of this intelligence
I pushed down with twelve dragoons & reached the place
early yesterday raorning. At Robinsons mill on Naraur
Creek I fell in with a foraging party ; on the appearance of
my dragoons the enemy ran without giving one fire. A
Captain of the Queen's Rangers, a factor from Baltimore
County & seven raariners & soldiers were raade prisoners.
The Captain I indulged with his parole, till the 10 ins', on
or before which day, he will wait on your Excellency to be
farther disposed off. The transports have all raoved up
from New-castle to Chester. They are generally loaded
with the wounded & baggage ; so that their being ordered
up, predicts another attempt on the fort, which they suppose
will be effectual. Major Cuyler, Sir W™ Howe's first Aid de
Camp sailed in a packet the day before yesterday for Lon
don — his business is to press Administration for strong &
early reinforcements.
" Araong the mariners taken yesterday is a mate belonging
to the Union transport, he informs, that Lord Howe had sent

80 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
orders to the Captains of the transports to send up each, four
or more of their seamen. What he can want with them is
not certainly known. I conjecture they are designed to
raann the floating batteries now building in the Schuylkill.
It is a certainty frora the intelligence received frora various
characters, that the enemy design shortly to make a push
on fort Mifflin. Their only possible mode, by which they
can proraise theraselves success, is their floating batteries.
In this they may be totally blasted ; if we take possession
of Carpenters island. From this post throwing up strong
works, we most assuredly can put a stop to their favourite
scheme, & what is of great consequence, co-operate with the
gallies in preventing those supplies of provision which go
up by water every night to Philad*. Your Excell^ may rely
on it, that thirty or more boats, with muffled oars, pass our
fort & gallies every night to the city. The ships blown up
the other day were the Augusta, & Merlin sloop of 18
guns. The Augusta took fire from her own cannonading,
one L', chaplain & forty privates perished in the explosion.
The Merlin being fast on ground was set fire to, by order.
" There is brisk trade carried on at New-castle. I have
detached a party of dragoons to that place, with directions
to visit the several landings on the river, to disperse the late
resolutions of Congress' among the inhabitants, & to assure
the people, that they will be strictly carried into execution.
I set out myself this moraent with a desire to burn sorae of
the eneray's sraall craft which lay at Grubs landing, under
cover of an eight gun schooner. Your Excellency's &c
« Hen"^ Lee."
major fleury's journal.
" 3* night — a considerable number of the Enemys boats
pass'd and repass'd in the course of the night, near the Shore
of Province Island — it appears that this Communication
between their Fleet and Philadelphia is established, and
what will surprise you perhaps, is that it is a sure one, there
being no Interruption ou our part — we cannot cannonade
' Journals of Congress, October 8, 1777.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 81
them from the Fort, the shade of Trees prevents our being
informed of their passage otherwise than by the noise of
oars, and firing at sounds would be wasting pretious Ammu
nition. " 4. The work of the Enemy upon the Augusta's Hulk is
interrupted by the difficulties which they must have met
with in raising a Battery on it — I believe however that they
will make a further Trial , if they know their own Interest.
" The Enemy's Land-batteries are likewise silent." '

" White Marsh, 4 November, 1777
" Sir :
" I am led to believe frora the conversation I have had
with L' Col" Green, that you have raade Fort Mercer ira-
pregnable against an assault; and that nothing is to be
feared but from regular approaches and shells — to guard
against the first, it would be found necessary to have sorae
out works, which time may, possibly, allow you to raise — to
secure the garrison against the second, some Bomb proofs
should be constructed. — The first you can easily do, but
how far the jother is practicable I know not, for want of
competent knowledge of the place — its extent — &c* — I would
suggest to you however, by way of quaere, whether caverns
could not be cut out of the Bank below the work, and sup
ported (the Earth) by Pillars, would not be the quickest,
and raost effectual raethod. — If this should be found to
answer, all your Men, in case of a Bombardment, raight be
concealed in them, except such as should be found necessary
for Guards.
"It is unnecessary, I am persuaded, to suggest to you the
propriety of keeping a sufflcn' quantity of salt provision and
Bread or Flour in the Fort in case of an Investiture — as
also Wood for Fires and Cooking. I am &c'
" G° Washington."
^ Translated by Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens.
' At Red Bank. ' In manuscript of Washington.

82 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
WASHINGTON TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM.
" White Marsh, 4 November, 1777
"Dear Sir
" The Inclosed I had written to Col" Greene before your
favour of yesterday reached my hands. — I ara happy in re
ceiving so favourable a report, as your Letter contains,
of the situation of the Forts — I most devoutly wish that
the exertions of yourself & Offlcers may be crownd with
the success that so good a cause, and such labours de
serve. " My Letters to Coraodore Hazlewood, & Col" Green, go
unopened under this cover, that you raay read — seal, &
deliver thera. — If the raeasure proposed in the Letter to
Col" Green can be carried into execution no tirae should be
lost. — I thank you for your endeavours to restore confidence
between the Com' & Sraith. I find soraething of the sarae
kind existing between Sraith & Mons' Fleury, who I con
sider as a very valuable officer. How strange it is that Men
engaged in the same Iraportant Service, should be eternally
bickering, instead of giving mutual aid ! Offic'^ cannot act
upon proper principles who suffer trifles to interpose to
create distrust & jealousy. — All our actions should be regu
lated by one uniform Plan — & that Plan should have one
object only in view, to wit, the good of the Service. Where
this is the case, although there may be a deversity of opin
ion, there can be no real obstruction. — I hope all these little
rubs will be done away by your prudent Managem*. I
am &c " G° Washington.
" P.S. — What force have the Enemy at Billingsport? Is
there a moral certainty (with your force) of driving them
from thence ? If there is, I have no objection to the at
tempt; but wish circumstances to be well consider'd before
any resolution is come to."'
' All but the postscript is in the manuscript of Washington.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777, 83
WASHINGTON TO LIBUTENANT-COLONEL SAMUEL SMITH.
" Head Quarters, November 4, 1777
" Sir :
" I have received your Letter dated yesterday, giving an
account of the reinforcement which you expect frora Gen'
Varnura and the supplies of clothing frora Gen' Forman.
It gives me pain to learn that the latter are likely to be so
inadequate to your wants, but hope that by taking proper
raeasures, the Contributions of the Inhabitants will not
prove so poor a Resource as you seem to fear.
" Inclosed is a Letter to Maj' Fleury, whom I order'd
to fort Mifflin to serve in quality of Engineer, as he is a
Young Man of Talents and has made this branch of Mili
tary Science his particular Study, I place a confidence in
hira. You will therefore make the best Arrangement for
enabling him to carry such Plans into Execution as come
within his Department. His Authority at the same time
that it is subordinate to yours must be sufficient for putting
into practice what his knowledge of Fortification points out
as necessary for defending the post. — and his Department,
tho' inferior being of a distinct and separate nature, requires
that his orders should be in a great degree discretionary —
and that he sh* be suffered to exercise his Judgement. Per
suaded that you will concur with him in every raeasure
which the good of the service raay require, I reraain &c.'
" G° Washington.."

WASHINGTON TO COMMODORE HAZELWOOD.
" Head Quarters, Whitemarsh, 4 November, 1777
" Sir :
" Gen' Potter and Cap' Lee, who are posted upon the
West side of Schuylkill to intern:^<i*the Enemy's communi
cation across the Islands, both assure me that they un
doubtedly pass by Night with Boats between province and
' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens.

84 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
Mud Island and into Schuylkill. If this passage is not
stopped in some measure, it is in vain to think of hindering
them from getting supplies from their shipping as long as
the River remains free of Ice. I will not undertake to
point out to you the mode of doing this, but in my opinion
the most probable is, to keep small Boats rowing guard be
tween the south end of Mud Island and the Pennsylvania
shore, and a Galley or two under the north end of Mud
Island, when the weather will permit. If the guard Boats
make a signal, the Gallies may get ready to intercept the
Convoy. The Enemy will not chuse to fire in the dark,
because there will be a greater chance of damaging their
own craft, than hurting our armed Vessels, as being greater
in number. I beg you will imraediately fall upon this or any
other Scheme, which to you may seem raore effectual to put
a stop to this intercourse. I am &c.' " G° Washington."
LIEUTBNANT-COLONEL SMITH TO WASHINGTON.
" FoRT Mifflin, 4*" November, 1777
" Sir :
" I wrote your Excellency yesterday — am happy to find
I was mistaken. The enemy have not constructed a Bat
tery on their work as I then expected. I was deceiv'd by
the water being much lower than usual, which left a greater
part of the wreck naked. General Varnum's reinforcement
arriv'd yesterday. Last night about 8 o'clock we were
alarm'd with the rowing of Boats between this and Province
Island. We at fijst conceived they intended an attack, but
found they passed us with the Ebb, they came out of Schuyl
kill and passed along the Shore of Province Island to their
Shiping, with the flood they return'd up again to Schuylkill.
We informed the Gallies that lay near us. Unless some
method is taken to prevent that communication, they will
without much risk supply themselves with everything want
ing from their ships. I have the honor &c
"Sam. Smith."
' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel Tench Tilghman.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777, 85
brigadier-general potter to WASHINGTON.
"Sir " I'm a sorey to Inforra your excelancey that the Officer I
send to the Brandwine Mills has not obay'd my orders In
stead of Taking the stons away he has taken the Spinnels
Rines and Ironnale heads. I was preparing to send a party
to move the Runners But as it is Hard to get waggans and
as I am Inforraed that the Taking these Artecals answers
the sarae end as Removeing the stons, I wait to know your
Plesure in this matter. I gave writen orders to the officer.
I will Trey him for disobedance I am oppresed with Bad
Officers. I wold Rather be a shew boy [?] then what I am,
if it wold sarve ray Countrey as well. I am &c.
"Ja^ Potter.
" Camp, Nov' 5'" 1777.
" P.S. — Col : Crafords men are uneasey and wanting to go
home. I will not detain them. I think I have raen suf
ficient for all I can do in this place, as the eneray has got
that new way of carreying their provision."
WASHINGTON TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL POTTER.
"Head Quarters, 5 November, 1777
" Sir :
" I have received your Letter of this raorning : and am
sorry to find that your orders respecting the Mills have not
been carried into execution. — it is ray desire that the Officer
eraployed in this business should be put under Arrest and
tried for disobedience of orders — the parts of theraachinery
which he has reraoved raay be very easily replaced, whereas
had he followed the directions given him, the end in view
would have been effectually answer'd.
" Colonel Crawford's party was order'd to join you only
for the particular purpose of distressing the Enemy by cutting
their Banks ; if this service can be done without them or is
found impracticable altogether, I have no motive for detain
ing them. I am &e
" G° Washington.

86 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777,
"As the Corps under your Coraraand will probably be an
object for the Enemy, you cannot be too vigilant nor guard
yourself by too many precautions against surprize. I men
tion this in consequence of hints given me of their Inten
tions — and hope therefore it will have its proper effect.'"
brigadier-general varnum to WASHINGTON.
" Woodberry, 6'" Nov', 1777
" Sir :
" Great Manto Creek is situated two Miles and an half
from Redbank, where it empties into the Delaware. On the
west side of this Creek is the Promontory Billingsport, for
tified, and garrisoned by three hundred Men, made up of the
seventy first Regiment, and of Marines, according to the
best Information I have been able to obtain. On the east
side of the Creek upwards of a Mile from Billingsport, is a
small Eminence on w°" the Evening before last, we erected
a small Fascine Battery, intending to play upon the Ship
ping, the morning following, with one Eighteen, and one
Twelve Pounder. The Eighteen was overset on the way,
and could not be got to the Battery 'till two o'Clock in the
afternoon. The Twelve in the intermediate Time, was
ply'd with great Advantage upon the Sommersett, a ship of
sixty four Guns. The Roebuck and a Frigate were soon
driven from their Stations, and the Somraersett fell down to
the Distance of a Mile and a Quarter from the Battery, where
she touched upon the Beach, and was obliged patiently to
take our Fire. In this situation, the Commodore sent down
four Gallies, which began their Fire at the Distance of raore
than two Miles. They advanced however 'till the Soramer-
sett & Roebuck, with a Galley began to discharge their Bow
Guns upon thera, when they immediately retreated. The
Flood Tide making, fioated the Somraersett; but, as there
was no Wind, she could not get far frora us, by w"""
means she suffered extremely from our Eighteen & twelve
Pounders. She hoisted Signals of Distress ; the Commo-
' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777, 87
dore came down with a great naval Force, and began a tre
mendous Fire, out of Gun Shot, he advanced firing 'till
some of his Shot reached the Ships. He expended an im
mense Quantity of ammunition, &, I ara pretty certain, hit
the large ship once, in her stern; soon after he retired.
The Battery discharged, frora both Guns, more than one
hundred and twenty Pounds ; two Thirds of w"" at least took
place : And as alraost every Shot was directed at the sixty
four, she raust be greatly shattered. Capt" Lee who com
manded the Guns, behaved perfectly well. Had the Gallies
behaved tolerably well, the Soraraersett raust beyond a
Doubt have fallen into our Hands' — Could we be fur
nished with sufficient Ammunition for a Twenty four and
an Eighteen Pounder, without drawing frora the Forts, I
am confident we should oblige the Shipping to keep down
the River as low as Billingsport. By w"'' means they cou'd
not attempt raising the Chievaux de Frise. We should be
provided with proper Harness & Horses for these Pieces,
to move them to any part of the Shore at Pleasure. I ara
apprehensive we raight do much by throwing up a Battery
about one Third of a Mile below Billings Port, from which,
& the Battery before raentioned, we could easily cross fire
upon every Intch of Channel Way opposite the Mouth of
Manto Creek, and oblige the Shipping to raove farther
down, liable to be di8en[?]ed from our lower Battery; or
farther up, when they would probably stick upon the
Chievaux de Frize, and be in danger from Fort Mifflin and
the Fire Craft. The great Injury their Shipping would
receive might probably draw them out from Billings Port
to attack us — their present numbers we could beat, & by
that means possess ourselves of their works, should they
considerably reinforce, w°" I iraraagine they raight occa
sionally do from their Shipping, we raight loose our Cannon,
by being obliged to retreat. Billingsport is the key of the
' During this engagement Washington was at the Chew house, in Ger
mantown, and, looking from the top, " could discover nothing more than
thick clouds of smoak, and the masts of two vessels, the weather being
very hazy."

88 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777,
Delaware, as the Ship Channel is within Musket shot of it.
I can perceive but one Objection to a Manouvre of this kind ;
and indeed that is an iraportant one ; Should the Enemy
attack Red Bank in the mean Time, by landing below
Timber Creek, which they might do, we could not afford
that Garrison timely aid. The Remainder of General
M°Dougairs Division, could they be spared, would forra a
Counter ballance to that Difficulty. — Col" Smith is con
tinually complaining of the Remissness of the Fleet. I
have conversed freely with the Commodore upon the Subject
of Defence, w°h he ought to afford. He has pointed out to
me the Plans where he has ordered his Guard Boats and
some of his Gallies stationed by night. His Plan, if
spiritedly executed, would sufficiently aid Fort Mifflin,
and Prevent the Enemy from raaking a Lodgraent in its
rear. The Commodore says he cannot prevent the Enemies
Boats from passing up aud down the River, as they are
covered by their Batteries upon Province Island and at the
Mouth of Schuylkill. In short, the Commodore appears to
be a very good kind of a Man ; but his extreme good Nature
gives too great a Licence to those under his Command, who
would obey only from severity, if any such he has, to ' their
Duty. From the Conduct of the Fleet yesterday, your
Excellency will be able to know my sentiments respecting
their Prowess. I shall religiously avoid any personal Dis
putes myself, where I cannot be of service by them, to the pub
lic ; I shall continue however, to create, if possible, greater
Harmony between the Fleet and Garrisons. — As the Garri
sons have necessarily many sick, we are in great Want of
some Gentlemen frora the Hospital Department, to establish
a Plan for their Reception, with Medicine and other Arti
cles to make them comfortable. Indeed they suffer on that
account. " I should have mentioned, when speaking of Fort Mifflin,
that the Enemy were busy, yesterday, in erecting a Fortifi
cation upon Province Island, in such a Position as to play
' A word that is illegible.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 89
obliquely upon the Palisadoes. This Circurastance con
vinces rae that they do not intend a very sudden Attack
upon the Port. Should they destroy the Palisadoes, the
Defence of the Island will then greatly depend upon the
Gallies ; altho' it will be difficult to approach to the Rear of
the Work, as the Eneray raust pass upon a Meadow w°h is
very miry. They cannot surmount that Difficulty by laying
Fascines, unless the Gallies quit the Passage between Red
Bank and Mud Island intirely. In fine, I must beg Liberty
to repeat that Billingsport is of far more Importance than all
the Forts and Gallies put together. This seems also to be
the concurring sentiment of the Gentleraen here univer
sally. " I have not seen Gen' Foreman, nor can I learn where
he is.' There are about sixty of his Militia at Red bank.
Gen' Newcomb is still here, & his Troops raay amount to
two Hundred. I cannot tell their number exactly, and
believe he cannot. They are badly provided, and can be of
little Service in any serious Operation.
" I hope your Excellency will excuse the Prolixity of this,
& believe me sincerely yours
"J. M. Varnum.
" P.S.— 12 oClock. This Moraent your Excellency's ofthe
4"" Instant comes to Hand. In your letter to Col" Smith
you raention Clothing. Since my arrival, have vested three
Officers frora Fort Mifflin with full Powers of gathering
Clothing. Have sent them to Salera araong the Tory
Quakers, directing them to procure the Articles necessary
for the Garrison, giving their Receipts, specifying the Quan
tities and Qualities. I should not have presumed upon such
a measure, but from the urgent Necessity ; & being persuaded
it was agreeable to what your Excellency had ordered in
Pennsylvania." ' " General Foreman has to my great concern, & contrary to my warmest
sollicitations, resigned his Commission, upon some misunderstanding
with the Assembly." — Governor Livingston to Washington, November 9,
1777.

90 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
WASHINGTON TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM.
" Head Quarters, 7 November, 1777
" Sir :
" From various accounts I am convinced that the Enemy
are upon the point of making a grand effort upon Fort
Mifflin. A person in confidence of one of their principal
artificers thinks it will be today or tomorrow. No time is
therefore to be lost in making that Garrison as respectable
as your numbers will admit, for should the attack commence
before they are reinforced, it may probably be out of your
power to throw them in. I think you had for the present
better draw all the continental Troops into or near Forts
Mercer and Mifflin, and let what Militia are collected lay
without, for I ara of opinion that they will rather disraay
than assist the continental Troops if shut up in the Forts.
Acquaint the Coraraodore that my informant says there are
three floating Batteries and sorae fire rafts prepared which are
to fall down upon his Fleet at the same time that the Island
is attacked, and desire hira to keep a look-out and make the
necessary preparations to receive them. As Fort Mercer
cannot be attacked without considerable previous notice, I
would have you spare as many raen to Fort Mifflin as you
possibly can ; for if accounts are to be depended upon that
is undoubtedly the post the Enemy have their designs upon.
I am very anxious to hear what was the occasion of the
heavy firing of Musketry on the Evening of the 5'"- It
seemed to us to be at Fort Mifflin. I ara &c'
" G° Washington."

brigadier-general forman to WASHINGTON.
" Prince Town, 7'" Nov' 1777
"Sir " Your Exce"'° fav' of the 31' I rec* the 1" Nov', and the
same Morning I rec* an answer from the Council of Safety
to a Letter I had wrote to Gov' Livingston Respecting the
Conduct of Brig' Gen' Newcomb. — The Council of Safely
'¦ In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel Tench Tilghman.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 91
in their Letter to me enclosed one for Gen' Newcomb which
they assured me contain'd their orders to him to raake me
returns of his Brigade and receive my orders — I Imme
diately sent a Horseman to Gen' Newcomb with the Letter,
but rec* no kind of answer from hira. — I then wrote a Note
requesting hira to furnish a Number of men to mount Cer
tain Guards as were Necessary to insure early inteligence
of the Eneraies raoveraents should they make a second De
cent on this Shoar as to prevent a Coraraunication with the
Enemy, and sent Lieu' Colo' Laurence with it to Gen' New
comb. "At the Colo'" return I rec* a Verbal Answer y' the
Counsil of safety had no right to give him any Directions.
Neither woold he furnish me with one Man or receive any
orders from me — That He had called the Militia together
without any order and woold if he pleased Dismiss them
the Next Day and requested he raight not be troubled with
any further Applications from Gen' Forman.
" The Militia from y' Quarter was then Coraeing in, in
Considerable Nurabers — it struck me very fully y' by pur-
sueing any rough raeasures towards Gen' Newcomb, the
Militia might make a pretence of our Dispute to refuse to
Assemble & y' it was not Improbable to Conclude Gen'
Newcomb woold even Disraiss those y' ware allready As
sembled — I thought it very Imprudent to risque either of
these events at y' critical time — on Considering y' part of y'
Excels" Letter of the 31' wherein your Excel^ recommends
my making a Pointed representation of Gen' Newcomb's
Conduct, I come to the Following resolution, Viz'.
" The Troops y' marched from Monmouth with me ware
previously incorporated with the Garrison in red Bank fort.
Those from Burlington I ordered to mud Island as soon as
They should arrive — Conceiving I could at no Time be
better spared to make the Necessary representation in per
son to the Gov' Counsil & Assembly of Gen' Newcomb's
Conduct & at the same time give the Militia Tirae to Assem
ble — Gen' Varnum's being in the Nibourhood allso Con
spired to make my Presence less Necessary — On Coming

92 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
to Trentown I found the Assembly had adjourned to prince
Town — To which place I followed thera on Monday — The
Gov' was not then come.
" On Teusday Evening he arrived, but too Late to do any
Business — Wednesday morning I waited on hira Early and
fully Explaind Gen' Newcomb's Conduct — a Counsil of
Safety was called and a Letter wrote by the Gov' with the
Advice of the Counsil to Gen' Newcomb to give me the
Command as being the Eldest officer — and No farther
Notice Taken of him.
" While I was here Two Petitions ware handed into the
Assembly most unjustly charging me and sundry other Gen'
with undue practices on the Day of Election & praying
the Election to be set aside — The Petition was read in the
House and a Hearing ordered on Teusday next and a Notice
served on me to attend.
" I immediately went to the Assembly, Inforraed them of
ray then situation and requested the hearing raight be De
ferred for a few Days until the militia ware assembled and
put in some order — my request was Denyed.
" I informed them y' it was impossable for rae to do Jus
tice to my Coraraand at red Bank, and attend the House on
Teusday — y' I found rayself hurt as a Gen' by the Illiberal
Charges in the petition — y' ray reputation as such might
suffer should I Neglect to attend —
" On the other hand my reputation as an Officer might
be injured by ray absence frora my post for so long a Time
as I Conceived my Attendance on their House would be
Necessary. " Y' I knew of no way to save my reputation as a Gen'
and at the same time to risque nothing as an officer but re
signing my Commission — Which I then Delivered to M'
Speaker and Left the House — a few Minutes after I rec* a
Message From the House Informing y' as I had not rec* my
Commission from Them, they could not receive it and re
turned it to me. I went Immediately to the Gov' from him
I rec* it and returned it to him.
" Although I have long been Disgusted with the Indo-

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 93
lence and want of Attention to railitary Matters in the
Legislature of this State, I was Determined to spin out this
campaign in my Slavery, untill I found a set of Men Ploting
by the most unfair Means to stain my Reputation.
" for I am well perswaded they ment to take advantage of
my Absence & at a Time when they conceived I woold not
have been able to attend. — Gen' Varnums being at red Bank
will I doubt not abundantly supply my absence.
" I have at pres' no anxiety but y' the steps I have taken
may not so fully raeet your Excel^' approbation as I could
wish, & y' I flatter myself I shall have it when I have an
opportunity fully to Explain to your Exce'^ my Treatment.
I have the Hon' &c
" David Forman.
" N.B. — I This minute rec* good Information y' 36 sail of
ships sailed from New York and Sandy Hook on the fifth
of This Inst Supposed to be Gen' Clinton."

WASHINGTON TO MAJOR-GENBRAL DICKINSON.
" Head Quarters, 8'" November, 1777
" Dear Sir :
" I have received your Letter of the 6"' Inst., and thank
you for the intelligence contained in it. You will farther
oblige me by communicating immediately whatever new
raatter of public consequence may occur.
" The iraportance of the Post at Red-bank raakes it neces
sary for us to eraploy all possible resources in rendering it
so respectable by the strength of the Garrison, and the
nuraber of Troops stationed within distance to co-operate
with it, as not to fear even a more formal Attack than was
exhibited in the first successless effort ofthe Hessians. All
the men in your State that can be spared should therefore
be collected and raarch'd to join Gen' Varnum.
" Your present of salt-water delicacies will be the more
acceptable to us, as they are so great a Rarity, and as I an-

94 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
ticipate the pleasure they will give, I return you my thanks
for them before their arrival. I am &c.' "G. Washington."
WASHINGTON TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM.
" Head Quarters, Whitemarsh, 8 Nov. 1777.
" Sir :
" Your fav' of the 6'" relieved rae from much anxiety as
it was confidently reported that the firing upon the Sth was
upon Fort Mifflin. I am pleased to hear of the Success of
your cannonade against the Shipping, and I ara very certain
if we had more heavy Cannon raounted upon travelling car
riages to move up and down the Beach occasionally, that
we should annoy and distress them exceedingly. To pos
sess Billingsport as well as Red Bank is certainly a most
desirable object, but circumstanced as we are at present in
respect to nurabers it is impossible. In a letter from Gen'
Dickinson ofthe 6"' he informs me that he had ordered two
detachments of Militia to march from Elizabeth Town to
Red Bank, one consisting of 160 men ; he does not raention
the number of the other. I have just seen a very intelli
gent person from Philadelphia. He has been conversant
with many people who stand high in the confidence of the
British officers of the first rank. He finds frora all their
discourse that a formidable attack is to be raade upon Fort
Mifflin very soon ; if that fails they will be obliged to change
their quarters, as they find they cannot subsist in the city
without they have a free coraraunication with their shipping.
I therefore repeat what I wrote yesterday that you should
iraraediately reinforce Fort Mifflin as strongly as possible,
and give the Coraraodore notice of the intended attack. I
approve of the Measures you have taken to procure Cloathing
for the Troops, and ara. Sir, &c.
" G° Washington.
' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens. " I am pre
paring a Waggon Load of the Woodbridge Oisters, they are too fresh,
but are Oisters, as such, hope they will be acceptable, shall send them on
in a few Days to Head-Quarters, when I shall beg your Excellency's
acceptance of them." — Dickinson to Washington, November 6, 1777.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 95
" The inclosed for Commodore Hazelwood, Col" Green
and Lt. Col" Smith are from Congress, and as they bear
honorable testiraony of their behaviour hitherto, I beg they
may be put into their hands immediately. Perhaps it may
prove a further incentive to their gallant exertions." '
BRIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM TO WASHINGTON.
" Woodberry, 8'" Nov', i past 5pm 1777
"Sir: " I have to acknowledge the Rec' of your Orders of 7"'
Instant. The Intelligence you are pleased to comraunicate,
I received last Evening, by two Persons who came out of
Philadelphia yesterday, & by a Spy whora I had in Billings
port yesterday, two Hours. — My Ace" give these additional
Circumstances, That the Garrison at Billingsport consist of
two Hundred of the seventy first Battalion,^ & two Hundred
Marines. That they were, this Day, to be reinforced by two
Hessian Regiments. That there were four Row Gallies &
two floating Batteries in Schuylkil ; That an attack was to be
made upon Fort Mifflin by the way of Schuylkill ; That they
were to attack Red bank at the same Time, landing just
below Timber Creek (a fine beach, and no Obstruction be
tween that and Fort Mercer) ; that the Troops from Billings
port were to move across Manto Creek, at a Signal given
from Philadelphia, & act in Conjunction with Those from
Philadelphia, against Fort Mercer; — That they were to
attack this Day Morning at four, if possible ; If not, the
first Time they should be Ready — Last Evening, at Ten,
Sky Rockets were seen on Province Island, w°h determined
me the Action was about to comraence. I took every Pre
caution in my Power ; justbefore Sunsett this Evening, There
appeared to be a large Number of Men, Horses, & I tho't
Fascines, passing Schuylkill to Province Island. The Ships
below fired Guns, w°h were supposed to be Signals. The
^ In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel Tench Tilghman. The in
closures were the resolutions printed in Journals of Congress, November
4, 1777.
' The Scotch regiment, commanded by Simon Fraser.

96 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
Acct° respecting the Enemy's Intended Movements were
given in the sarae Manner, by two Prisoners of the second
Battalion of the seventy first Regiment, whom ray Scouts
captured yesterday, near Billingsport. — I shall send a De
tachment this Night into Fort Mifflin, tho' upon my Honor,
I think that Garrison sufficiently manned. — I have the Pleas
ure to Inforra you, that we had Guard Boats last night be
tween Hog and Province Islands, the Rout of the Enemy's
Boats, w"h raet with, fired upon, & caused them to retreat.
The Commodore will fix a chain this Night that is already
prepared with dry logs to buoy it up, & anchors to fasten it
down, between those Islands. Fourteen Gun Boats will lay
in the Passage; the Commodore with all his Gallies will
lay close to the North End of Mud Island, the Floating
Batteries, & Xebecks to guard the chievaux de Frize, &
oppose the shipping, should they attempt to advance. And
the Continental Vessells under Cap'. Robinson's Command
will lay at the Mouth of Schuylkill, and at the Mouth of
Timber Creek. I have placed the Continental and Militia
Guards, upon Timber & Manto Creeks. In a word, I ara
perfectly satisfied with the different arrangements, & the
universal spirit, w"h apparently pervades the whole ; & un
less I am too ignorant of military Dispositions, the Great
Governor of the Universe will give to your Arms Success in
this Quarter, should the mercenaries attack, as we sincerely
expect and wish they will ; and to your Excellency, addi
tional Laurels ! Pardon me — I write upon the Run, and am
thinking of many things at once. — The rausketry you raen
tion was the Ecco of Cannon in the Groves. I ara &c
"J. M. Varnum."

CAPTAIN LEE TO WASHINGTON.
"No. 8'" 77
"Sir "Mr. Lindsay' is just returned from New-castle & has
brought with hira two Prisoners, the one Cap' Nicholas of
the Eagle-packet, the other Cap' Fenwick of a sloop in
' Lieutenant William Lindsay, of Bland's regiment.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777, 97
the service of Government. These two gentlemen being
fatigued with their ride, will not arrive at Head-quarters
'till tomorrow.
" The transports have received orders to furnish themselves
with six weeks provision, & make ready for sailing with all
despatch. A french ship laden with arms & ammunition
lately taken by some of the enemy's cruisers, was the other
day brought into New-castle harbour. There prevails a
report in the fleet, that a channel has been discovered which
avoids the chiveaux-de-frise, & that, the Somersett man of war
ordered up to try her success on the fort, by that route.
" One of the enemy's batteries on the Schuylkill has been
launched two days past, & another is near finished. The
raode now pursued by the enemy in transporting supplies,
to the city, is as follows. They land their provision above
Jones wharf, near a branch of Eagle-creek, they are carried
from hence by water to Guien ' dam, where they again put
them in boats & readily convey them down another creek to
the Schuylkill. There is no way of interrupting thera in
this business, but by taking possession of Carpenters Island.
" Mr. Lindsay acquaints rae, that the enemy obtain large
supplies of fresh provision, &c., from the inhabitants in the
lower Counties ; his report of this & several other raatters
engage rae to wish for an excursion for a few days in that
country. " There is not the sraallest intercourse now subsisting
between the country & Navy from Wilmington to the Schuyl
kill. Your Excellency will please favor me by return of
the dragoon with your instructions respecting this route.
Enclosed is a let' found; supposed to be wrote by Gen.
Grant. I am &c
" Hbn^ Lee."
extract op a letter from major fleury.
"I have received His Excellency's order authorizing rae
to exercise the functions of Engineer at Fort Mifflin. Since
' I am unable to determine what name this is intended for, as the
writing is illegible. General Potter speaks of " Giers WarflF."

98 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
my being placed here I think I have neglected nothing to
gain the Esteem of my superiors, by my constant attention
I have endeavour'd to second the Zeal, Intelligence and
Activity of Colo. Smith.
" I never have undertaken any work without previously
consulting the Commandant and Principal Officers, and
rectifying ray Ideas by theirs.
" Colonel D'Arendt entrusted me with the Command of
the Reserve and Colo. Smith has continued me in it."

Journal.
" Novem. S"" 6"'. The Enemy's boats continue to go up
the River with the Tide every night — ^they seera to direct
their course towards the raouth of the Schuylkill. I believe
it would be possible to intercept this comraunication, but
our Cannon would be of no service in it — & to fire by guess
is throwing away Ammunition.
" The Enemy seera deterrained to Winter in Province
Island if they can't take Fort Mifflin. They are raising a
4'" work between the two bank batteries, and half way to
Gayers house, where their great work is situated on an
erainence. I believe it would be possible to interrupt or
even to ruin their works. If His Excellency would form
some Enterprise on their Rear, I believe we might make a
useful diversion — as I know the Island I offer to serve as
Guide to any party that shall be order'd there, in concert
with Col. Smith I intend this night to reconnoitre in an
arm'd boat the position of their Sentinels, and the safest
Landing places, of which I shall make a Report.
" 7'". The Enemy appear desirous of fortifying themselves
in province Island to maintain the Communication with
their Fleet at Billingsport — they are raising Redouts from
5 to 600 yds from the Bank, and the Fort on the rising
ground advances rapidly towards Perfection.
" 8"". The Enemy have enlarged the upper Battery opposite
the Fort, we this raorning discover 5 Embrasures, masked
as yet with Fascines — it is probable they will all open at

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 99
once — their project seems to be, to knock down our pali
sades, and storm our west front between the two block
houses. To cover our palisades on this side we have
apply'd to Gen' Varnum to furnish us with fascines, which
we shall place on the Suramit of the bank to serve instead
of Earth, which is not to be had — I don't know whether we
shall be able to procure the Fascines." '
CAPTAIN CRAIG TO WASHINGTON. " Feankfoed, 8'" Nov' 1777
"Sir " By every Ace' from the City the enemy intend to Attackt
the Fort tomorrow. The Hessians are to stand Guard, the
Highlanders, Grannattier and Light Infantry to make the
Attackt. One of their Floating Batteries that was lanced
[launched] Yesterday is sunk to the bottom. My Guard was
rainforced Last Night. I hope I shall have it in my power
to prevent the Enemy a Coraraing into the Country as much
as the[y] have done. I am with rauch Truth &c.
"C. Craig."
brigadier- GENERAL POTTER TO WASHINGTON.
" I Receved your excelancys favour of yesterday leat last
evining, ocasioned by my being leat on the enerays lins,
there is nothing perticquler that I see in ray power to do
heare, could I Belive that my Troops were fit to storra
Brestworks I wold have actacted the Island before this time.
But Comraon prudance considring who I coraraand has
forbid it — altho I flater myself I have not the worst of men.
I have sent all ray Bagage six railes Back of where I am
encamped and there unloaded all my waggins and ordered
carridges to be maid for the waggons to move the stones
from the Brandewine Mills and sent off one Hundred raen
for that purpose, at present the raen under ray coraraand
are mutch scattred on difrent Coraraands as the lines I have
' Translated by Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens.

100 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
ocqupeyed are from Vanderings on the Schuylkill to Grubs
on the Dalawer. I Keep a Piquit at Brooms Dam of one
Cap'" 2 sub' 3 sajants, 50 raen one at the Brest Works of
12 raen one at Grays ferrey of 30 raen one at the raiddle
ferrey of 100 raen one at the uper ferrey 25 men up by Van
derings a Reconoitring party under Major Miller, all these
parties has a shutable number of officers I have all ways
a number of other partys on difrent Coraraand I raount a
guard in and about Camp of 100 men and Officers to cora
mand thera as soon as it is in my power to collect in these
men I will order as maney as is over six Hundred privats
to join the Carap at Head Quarters agreeable to your orders.
There is one Batt" tiraes out yesterday and two raore to
morrow and when there times is out they will go the Mi
litia under Col. Crawford Came to me at Night and went
off in the morning. I Requested that the[y] might assist in
Moving the mill stons, Col. Crawford thought the[y] wold
not and we did not ask them, as for Breaking the Banks
there is Enuf of that sort of works dun alredey the[y] have
found out an easer way of Bringing there provision the[y]
unload at Joneses warff about 100 yarrds from Eagle Creek
and Careys it up the Creek to Giers warff, thence to Mingas
Creek and into the Schulkill at Everleys the floting Batf
the[y] Bult at Everleys sunk in the lancing the enemy has
Carried down a Great number of fagats to the point whether
for the purpose of Defence or for to raake Bridges I cant
say, when I send the Troops away I must draw back, and
work on a smaller scale. I ara &c. " Ja^ Potter.
" P.S. — James Gray, son of M' George Gray carae out
of Town yesterday who says it is Reported in town that a
Bot load of Hessens was latly sunk amounting to 60 men
ocasioned by a Cannon Ball going throo the Boat, there
was a number more drounded on Provance Island in the
flud."' ' The endorsement shows the date of the letter to have been Novem
ber 8.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 101
COUNCIL OF WAR.
" At a Council of War &c. S"" Novem. 1777
" Present
" Major Generals Sullivan Brigadiers Maxwell
" Greene Knox
" Marquis La Fayette Wayne
" McDougaU Weedon
" Woodford
" Scott
" Conway
" Huntington
" Irvin
" His Excellency having informed the Council of the Rein
forceraents that were expected from Peekskill and that
araong them was 1600 Militia from Massachusetts under
Gen' Warren, whose times would expire the last of Novera
ber. " His Excellency informed the Council, that from a variety
of circumstances he was of opinion that the Eneray raean a
formidable attack upon Fort Miffiin very soon, and desired
their opinion whether under our present circumstances as
to Nurabers, &c., we could afford further assistance to the
Ports than has been hitherto given without endangering the
Safety of this array.
" The following Question was put : Whether, in case the
Eneray should make an attack upon the Forts upon Dela
ware, it would be proper with our present Force to fall
down and attack the Enemy in their Lines near Philad* ?
" Ans* in the Negative unanimously."
WASHINGTON TO FRANCIS HOPKINSON AND JOHN WHARTON.
" Head Quarters, Whitemarsh, 9 November, 1777
" Gentlemen :
" I yesterday rec* a letter frora Congress informing me
that they had received a Report frora your Board with your
opinion upon the most probable means of securing the
Frigates. Whereupon they came to the following Resolu
tion on the 4"' ins' :

102 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
" ' Ordered, that a Copy of the said report be sent to Gen'
Washington for his approbation and if he approve the sarae
that a detachment of troops be sent to assist in the Con
struction and Management of the Batteries aforesaid."
" Upon the Rec' of this I took the opinion of the General
Officers who unanimously agreed that, as we had not any
men to spare to construct and defend the works recom
raended by you, there were no other possible means of
effectually securing the Frigates but by scuttling them.
You will therefore be pleased to have it done in such man
ner as will render the weighing of them raost easy in future,
and in such depth of Water as will secure them from being
damaged by the floating Ice in the Winter. All the other
Vessels capable of being converted into arraed ships should
be scutled also. This should be done as speedily as possi
ble, and as secretly, for should the Eneray get notice of
your intentions, I should not at all wonder at their sending
up a force purposely to destroy thera or bring thera down.
You will dispose of the men that were on Board of them as
directed in my former. I ara &c " " G° Washington."
BRIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM TO WASHINGTON.
"Woodberry 9th Nov. J past 6 Ev., 1777
" Sir :
" Previous to the Rec' of your Comraands of yesterday,
I had sent an additional Reinforcement of a Cap' two Subs,
three Serjeants and fifty Rank & File into Fort Mifflin. .1
have been at Fort Mifflin to day ; The Enemy are prepared
to open a Batery of five Guns, I take them to be Eighteens
or Twenty fours, this Night or to morrow Morning ; In Con
junction with their two Howitzers, besides two small Bat
teries, w"h they have heretofore fired from. They have been
' See Journals of Congress, November 4, 1777.
' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel Tench Tilghman. It will be
remembered that it was on this day that Washington received from Lord
Stirling the sentence from Brigadier-General Conway's letter to Gates
which gave him the first definite intimation of the cabal against him.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 103
very busy this Day iu Crossing the Mouth of the Schuylkill
with Waggons, Fascines &c. — Two double Deckers more
have pass'd thro' the lower Frize. There are Eight in the
whole upon this upper Station, but all of them are below
my two Gun Battery. Thirsday last one Floating Battery
was launched in Schylkil. it sunk with its Guns w"h were
bro't from the Eagle ; Two more upon the stocks, one to
have been launch'd this day. They are very busy in build
ing two Bridges across Schuylkill, all their Force seeras to
be in that Quarter, w"h is destined to the Attack of Fort
Mifflin. Their Boats are raoved from Delaware; This is
Intelligence gained from a Ferryman opposite Cooper's
Ferry, who came from Philadelphia this Day — Our Guard
Boats keep the Enemy frora transporting Provisions &c.,the
usual Way, but they pass unmolested over Tinnicura Island,
by the Way of Derby Creek, a Rout that lays out of our
Power — They enemy will make Fort Mifflin very warm. I
shall relieve them from Time to Tirae to my utraost. I
think they will Open their Batteries with great Activity :
Soon after w°h, it is probable they will bring down their
Water Craft from Schylkill, which will make a Line of
Fire intersecting that frora their Principal Battery on Prov
ince Island, at an Angle of about thirty Degrees. — The
Commodore seems determined to raeet thera with Spirit,
adhering to the sarae Dispositions, w°h I had the Honor of
raentioning in my Letter of Yesterday — The two Mischiefs
the Enemy will Effect by their cannonade, will be making
of Breeches in the mud walls, and knocking down the Palli-
sades. To reraedy w°h, as rauch as possible, I am sending
nurabers of Pallisades, into the Fort, & great Quantities of
Fascines. — I hope to God, our rautual Efforts here raay be
pleasing to your Excellency ; I ara certain they arise from
Good Intentions. — I ardently wish to see Gen' Foreraan !
I cannot yet hear frora hira. Gen' Newcomb has, he tells
me, about five hundred Militia here. — They are principally
without Araraunition. — They are good Men, & have raany
good Officers with thera. It is a Pity they cannot be properly
furnished. The Old Gentleraan, like Iralach of old, is anx-

104 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
ious to do all the good he can. But, unfortunately the Mo
tions of the Stars are not coraraitted to Superintendence.
I ara like a body without a soul, for the want of light Horse.
I have not been able to procure any.
" I am out of patience with the commissaries. No Pro
visions of any consequence in the Garrisons — I have strip'd
this Post today, & sent to Fort Mifflin — I will continue
sending in Supplies as fast as I can. — If these Gentleraen
do not act with a little more Sincerity, I will lessen their
Number. " The Baron is really unfit to be in this Neighbourhood.
He will not be fit for Duty for a long Time, if ever. — I hope
he may obtain Permission to retire. — His letter is inclos'd.
" Be pleas'd to accept of my sincerest Thanks for your
Excellency's repeated Informations, and the paternal Care
you exercise towards this little part of your Family.
" I am, in due Submission, &c.
"J. M. Varnum.
" N.B. — In Justice to Col" Frink I must mention, he de
livered your letter of yesterday, at Nine, last Evening.
" P.S. — J past Seven. W" Ward is bro't in by my Scouts,
a Prisoner frora Camilla, who was this afternoon taken.
' He come ashore with the Captain to dine at Billingsport ;
— He says the Ships are in Readiness to move up upon a
Signal, w"h is to be given from Province Island, w"h will
be an English Jack hoisted. They are to attack Red Bank,
saying that if they should take fort Mifflin, red Bank would
cover the Garrison. Says the Shipping have orders to move,
some to New York, some to one Place, & some to another,
in a Fortnight, should they not take the Forts. — Says the
Ships have not more than a Third of their Complement, &
are very sickly.'
" Whether their Preparations against Mifflin are real or
a Feint, I cannot say; but believe the forraer; however
shall attend to both Circumstances." '
' Endorsed : " This goes by Quartermaster Wheatly, who is permitted
to pass all Guards, and others, unmolested."

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 105
COLONEL SMITH TO WASHINGTON.
" Fort Mifflin, 9'" November, 1777
" Sir :
" About the 20"' Instant if we are not attacked sooner, I
ara of Opinion we shall have put this Fort in a good posture
of defence, at which tirae the Officers of the Virginia Regi
ments and my party hope your Excellency will relieve them
and their men. Your Excellency will see the propriety of
this request when I assure you that out of 200 Men com
pleatly Officer'd which ray Party consisted of, there are not
now in Garrison more than 4 Officers and 65 Privates, the
gth Yirginia Reg' brought 120 rank and file, and this morn
ing returned only 46 fit for duty, the first nearly in propor
tion, and the party from Gen' Varnum have already sent off
4 officers and 16 privates besides Convalescents, for some
time past there has not been one night without one two or
three Alarms — one half of the Garrison are constantly on
fatigue and guard, these reasons I hope will induce your
Excellency to send the Relief they request.
" As the Business and Duty Incurabent on the Coraraand-
ing Officer of this Garrison has been of a very difficult nature
and attended with much fatigue, I shall be oblig'd if your
Excellency will also relieve me. I shall expect to stay
several days after the Relief arrives to shew the officers the
Advantages and weak parts of this place. This Garrison
will require 500 Rank and file during the winter besides 80
Artillery Men, they will perhaps not be so sickly as we have
been, as the fatigue will be chiefly finished, and the sickly
season over. A Large stock of Salted Provision ought
immediately to be laid in, for in the Winter they will not
always be able to cross for Provisions &c. a want of Rum
has occasion'd our late very extraordinary sickness. A
quantity sufficient for a Gill each man p' Day ought to be
provided for Winter. I have the Honor &c
" Sam. Smith."

106 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777 .
COLONEL smith TO WASHINGTON.
" Fort Mifflin 9'" November, 1777.
" Sir :
" I receiv'd your Excellency's favour of the 4"'. I pre
surae you must have mistook Major Fleury's meaning, he
has since he arrived acted fully in his departraent of En
gineer, when I proposed anything he has generally been so
polite to approve it. he writes and I presurae will acknowl
edge that his Ideas have been adopted as far as the strength
of the garrison would permit.
" The eneray since I wrote you last have been fortifying
their Island for an advanced post and for a pass to the City,
they have strengthened the first work which they made on
the height with Pickquets and Abbatees, and yesterday threw
up a breast work or Redoubt, a quarter of a mile below that,
I Iraraagine to defend sorae narrow part of the Creek where
you might pass to repossess the Island. Within these two
nights they have thrown up a long Breast work to the left
of their first Bomb Battery, it is not yet opened, but we
can distinguish 5 Embrasures and Ship Carriages for their
Cannon. I am of opinion their Intentions now raust be to
knock down our pallisades on that side, destroy our Block
houses & storm us. We had your Excellency's notice last
night and prepared accordingly, but I conceive they will not
atterapt any thing until they make a breach.
" The Honble the Congress have done me too rauch
Honor ; perhaps the eneray raay give us an Opp*'' to merit
the high approbation they are pleased to express of my con
duct and the Officers under rae. I have the Honor &c
"Sam Smith."
CONTINUATION OF MAJOR FLEURY's JOURNAL.
" 9'" at night. The Enemy appearing ready to open their
batteries, we raised the bank which covers our Palisades on
the west Front, against which the whole Fire of the Eneray
is directed, and which will be the point of attack in case of

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 107
their storming the Fort. I have some fascines making at
Red-bank, but shall want a great number.
" 10— The 24 and 18 pound shot from the Batteries No. 16
and 17 broke some of our Palisades this morning, but this
does not make us uneasy — they save us the trouble of cut
ting thera to the height of a man — which we should do, as
the fire of loop-holes [is] in itself not very dangerous, and
our loop-holes in particular are so badl}' contrived as to
leave two-thirds of the Glacis unrak'd.
" It is probable that the Eneray will undertake to carry
this place by storm, and I should not fear them if we could
fix the floating Chain described in the Figure ; it would cover
the Front which is likely to be attacked, and by delivering
us from our uneasiness for this side, would enable us to post
the men destined for its defence, at the Wall of Masonry
which is ten feet high and is not out of the reach of an Esca
lade, notwithstanding the Ditches, Pits and Stakes &c* with
which we have endeavour'd to surround it.
" The Commodore, Master of the incomparable Chain in
question, proposes to stretch it by means of Buoys, between
our Island and Province Island. I believe this obstacle to
the communication between the Enemy's Fleet and Array
will be of little consequence, and if he would spare us the
Chain, the Eneray would pay dear for their Hardiness if they
dared attack us. Colonel Sraith wrote this raorning to ask
this favour, but I am afraid that public Interest will suffer
by private misunderstandings. I am interrupted by the
Bombs and Balls which fall thick.
" 10 at noon. The Firing increases but not the effect — our
barracks alone suffer.
" At 2 o'clock. The Direction of the fire is changed — our
Palisades suffer — a dozen of them are broke down — one of
our Cannon is damaged near the Muzzle — I am afraid it will
not fire streight.
" 11 at night. The Enemy keep up a firing of Cannon
every half hour — Gen' Varnum promised us Fascines and
Palisades, but they are not arrived — and they are absolutely
necessary.

108 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
" The Commodore has promised the Chain — Our Garrison
diminishes, our soldiers are overwhelmed with Fatigue —
they spend nights in watching and Labour without doing
much on account of their weakness." '
WASHINGTON TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM.
" Head Quarters, 10*" November, 1777
" D? Sir :
" I ara pleased to find by yours of the 8"' that proper dis
positions were forraed for the reception of the Enemy at
Forts Mercer & Miffiin and that the Garrisons were so full
of confidence. We already hear a firing which we suppose
a prelude to soraething raore serious. I sincerely wish you
success ; but let the event be fortunate or otherwise, pray
let me have the speediest intelligence. I am &c
" G° Washington.
"P.S. — Your Detachments are on their raarch frora
Fishkill to join you."
continental navy board to WASHINGTON.
"Continental Navy Board
" Borden Town 10'" Nov'. 1777
" Sir :
" In Answer to your Letter of yesterday, we would in
forra your Excellency that when we first fixt the Navy
Board at this Place & got our Frigates up, we had formed a
Plan for defending them by a small Battery; of which
among many other Things we gave Notice to the Marine
Committee of Congress. We had no Answer to our Letter
from that Committee till the Day before yesterday, when
they sent us the Resolve of Congress referred to in your
Letter. In the mean Time, however, we had the Honour
of a Correspondence with your Excellency on this Subject ;
in which you fully declared your Judgment of the Matter
and explicitly told us what you would have done. We
have the satisfaction of assuring your Excellency that your
Orders were imraediately complied with, & as punctually
' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 109
executed as our Situation would admit of The Frigates
have been long since sunk, and now lie fast aground in a
Place where they can receive no Damage from the Ice &
cannot possibly be got off by the Enemy unless they knew
the particular Parts where they have been bored, & of which
we have a secret Gage that will enable us to raise thera with
Ease when a suitable Tirae shall offer. We gave you our
Words that your Desire should be coraplied with & we have
fulfiU'd our Engagement so far as respected the Frigates ;
the men indeed have not been discharged owing to the fol
lowing Accident : In sinking one of the Ships she unfortu
nately lay against a steep Bank, which on the Tide's falling,
caused her to heal outwards from the Shoar. As this is an
uneasy Situation & raay injure the Ship we have been obliged
to retain all the Hands & even hire raore to get her up-right
again. We have not yet been able to Effect this Purpose,
but hope to do it in a few Days with the Purchases & Powers
we are preparing to apply. All other Vessels great & sraall
(one only excepted) we have with great Labour crouded up
Crosswick's Creek, where raost of thera lye aground at high
water, nor can any be got down but by raeans of an extra
ordinary Tide, or Fresh, nor then, but with the utraost Skill
& Patience. Not trusting wholly to this, however, our De
termination is to sink a Vessel at the Mouth of the Creek,
which raust effectually secure them frora the Enemy. The
Ship excepted above, is a large Vessel belonging to M'.
Robert Morris, having on Board a valuable Cargoe of To
bacco, part Continental & part his private Property. This
ship cannot possibly be got up the Creek with her Cargoe,
we are therefore unloading her into Shallops & when empty
shall get her also up the Creek, or sink her, which ever raay
be most suitable. We request your Excellency would be
perfectly easy as to the Shipping at this Place. The Enemy
may possibly send up & burn them, — this we cannot help —
but you raay depend upon it none of thera shall fall into
their Hands, so as to become an Annoyance to your military
Operations. " It gives us great Concern to think your Excellency

110 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777 .
should for a Moment suppose us capable of neglecting your
earnest Instructions after having so solemnly assured you
we would strictly obey them. We confess, however, the
Resolve of Congress in Consequence of our forraer Repre
sentation, gave you sufficient Reason to suppose we had
applied to that Body, instead of following your Advice.
But the mystery will unfold when you consider that our
Application to Congress was prior to the Letters we received
from you on this Subject. We did indeed write to Con
gress a second Time, enclosing a Copy of your Instructions
to us, and declaring our Determination of complying with
them. But Congress, anxious, as we suppose to save the
Frigates, & not so apprehensive of Danger from the Enemy,
fraraed their Resolve parellel to our first Scheme ; which on
further Consideration appears to be ineffectual.
" We shall be happy in hearing frora your Excellency
that the above Representation is satisfactory; & that our
Conduct in this Affair meets with your Approbation. If
anything is amiss, or you would wish anything further to
be done in our Department, you may depend on our earnest
Endeavours to coraply with your Desire.
"We request your Excellency would be so good as to
forward the enclosed Packet to York Town by the first
Opportunity. We have therein inforraed Congress of what
we have done & our Reasons for so doinar.
" With the utraost Esteera & sincere Prayers for your
Health & Success, we have the Honor to be &c.
"Fra^ Hopkinson.
"John Wharton."
brigadier-general varnum to washington.
"Woodberry, 7 o'clock Ev. 10'" Nov' 1777
" Sir :
" The Eneray this Morning opened against us with five
Batteries. At two this afternoon, no Man was killed or
wounded. The Cannonade and Bombardment have con
tinued feebly since that Hour. I suppose the Rain has pre
vented their being raore brisk— Thev have thrown some

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. Ill
Shot araong our Shipping : Theirs remain below us. They
have made but little Impression upon the Works or Palli
sades. — I have just desired Col". Smith to put his Men into
their Barracks, thinking that it is better to have a few
killed or wounded, than to have the whole suffer, expos'd
to the Inclemency of the weather, upon mear Mud.
" I have reason to expect the Attack will be more severe
tomorrow as Cannon have been observed to pass over
Schylkill this Day — Happy might it be for Troops to
attack Province Island upon the rear of the Batteries —
Should Heaven continue the Rain, so as to overflow the
Meadows, we shall attack it upon this Side.
"It would be serviceable either to furnish the Militia
here, with Araraunition, or discharge them. The important
Moments are swiftly rolling on, in w"h they can assist us.
It is with your Excellency only to supply them.
" Fort Mifflin will soon be in want of Cartridges for
their Cannon. The supplies are very inadequate to the
present Siege. I am &c.
"J. M. Varnum."

COLONEL SMITH TO WASHINGTON.
" Fort Mifflin, 10'" November, 1777
" Sir :
" This raorning the Enemy open'd their Battery in the
Rear of our Nor' West Block House, about 500 Yards dis
tance from it of 6 Pieces of Cannon 18 to 32 Pounders, and
one Eight inch howitz, one other eight inch Howitz oppo
site the right of our Battery, they were so fortunate to
strike one of our 18 Pounders in the two Gun Battery on
the Muzzle, by which she is rendered useless ; their Shott
from that Battery rakes the Pallisades fronting the Meadow,
and cuts down 4 or 5 at a time, they have laid open a great
part of that side, and chiefly destroyed that range of Bar-
rocks, they also keep up an incessant fire frora the Hospital,
they have disraounted 3 of our Block house Guns, and
much injured the Block houses and the other Range of

112 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
Barrocks. We cover our Men under the Wall, and have
the good fortune as yet to escape unhurt, in 5 or 6 Days
(unless the Seige can be rais'd) the fort will be laid open,
and every thing destroyed, if they continue to cannonade
and Bombard us as they have done, of which I haven't the
smallest Doubt. Our Men already half Jaded to Death
with constant fatigue, will be unfit for service.
" Gen' Varnum has prorais'd to prepare for us new Pal
lisades, if so, we will replace at night what is destroy'd in
the day, and endeavour to keep the Fort as long as it is in
our power. As the principal object I presurae of your Ex
cellency is to hinder the enemy frora raising the Chevaux
de frize this winter, I am of Opinion it could be done
nearly as well from the other Shore as from this fort, was
our Cannon there. Gen' Varnura inform'd you of the two
Gun Battery he erected, with which the enemy raight be
hindered from raising the Obstructions with the Assistance
of the fleet and 2 Guns that may be placed on Bush Island.
My Opinion & the Opinion of the Officers in this Garrison
is, that unless the Seige can be rais'd the enemy raust in a
short tirae reduce this place. We are deterrained to defend
it to the last extreraity, but we are of Opinion that it wou'd
be for the coramon good to destroy the whole of the works
and take the Guns to the Jersey Shore, where they'll serve
to guard the River, and in case we could get Possession of
Billingsport to mount on it, had we that post it would
secure the River Effectually. The Galleys will be much
annoyed from the enemies Batteries, and when the Shiping
comes up, we shall have the whole of their fire. A Saylor
taken this morning says they are prepar'd to come up and
act in concert with their Batteries.
" Our present Situation strikes us in the light I have
described, shou'd circurastances alter our Sentiraents I shall
give you the earliest notice. I have the Honor &c
"Sam Smith.
" P.S. — The eneraies Boats still pass up and down the
river. I presume with provision."

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 113
WASHINGTON TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM.
"Head Quarters, 11 November, 1777
" Dear Sir :
" Your Favors ofthe 9'" & 10'" Instant I have duly received.
I think we may reasonably Hope, that, from the good dispo
sition of the Troops in your Quarter, & the Zeal & activity
of the officers and men, join'd to the present very advanced
& cold Season, which must greatly retard if not prevent the
Operations of the Eneray; Matters raay Terrainate with
you agreeable to our Expectations, this must have the great
est Influence upon the Conduct of Gen' Howe & force him
to adopt disadvantageous or disgraceful Measures.
" Gen' Knox informs me that he has sent down a person
to get an exact return of the Ammunition which you now
have, & of what may be want'd, & that he has sent down
17 Waggons loaded with Ball, which you will receive about
this tirae. — A Waggon with 20,000 Musket Cartridges will
be iramediately despatch'd to be deliver'd to the Militia (if
you see fit) by your order only. — It is greatly to be wish'd
that all firing could be prevented except where there is a
real Necessity & the distance such as might promise a good
effect. " I have wrote to Gen' Potter ordering him to take every
Step by which he can assist you & distress the Enemy on
Province Island — he may alarm thera & draw off their Atten
tion from Fort Mifflin if nothing more. — You are ac
quainted with the reasons why a greater Force is not sent
to annoy them in that quarter. I am &c
" G° Washington."
BRIGADIER-GENERAL POTTER TO WASHINGTON. "Nov' 11'" 1777
"Sir " I have just Received Intelagance of 38 sail of the enemey
fleet coraing up the River the latters was wrote five oclock
yesterday evining altho the[y] are dated as of this day.
the fiering yesterday was frora the enemys Battereys on

114 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
province Island near the River Banks I Believe the[y] have
dun little damige if any I Riceved your excelanceys of the
10'" of Nov', as for ray doing any thing that can be of us[e]
to the fourt — I can't conseve how I can do it. I am &c.
"Ja= Potter."

brigadier-general potter to washington.
"Sir "Yesterday I sent Col. Rankan and Capt. Livis to give
me an account of the fiering. Rankan is Returned, and
says that about eight o'cLock there was an Attact maid on
Rid Bank which continued one hour and a half, about 11
oClock the Attact Began and continued upwards of one
hour, and about 3 oClock the[y] attact"* again and Con
tinued about 3 Quarters of an hour about one quarter after
3 oClock the[y] Began again and Continued about one hour
and a half and after the small Arms seased, the cannaiding
Continued about 3 rainits, and all seased. Col. Rankan is
confidant that the fourt is ours yet and says he will wiger
his hors against a gill of Whisque. I hope your Excelancey
vdll have Glorious Accounts from Rid Bank. I ara &c
" Ja^ Potter.
" Nov' 11'" 1777 ten o'clock."

jonathan rumford to brigadier-general potter.
" Wilmington 9"" 11«" 77
" D? General
" This will acquaint you with the loss of a 64 Gun Ship —
Wednesday last, shee was drawn up with springs to her
cables to fire on forte Miflin, alias raud Island, but as Heven
would have it, the Springs broke or by some means gave
way. The Ship ran a Shore n'r [M]anto Crick. Our People
Errected a small Batery on Billings Port & soone sunk the
Ship — there is now three Ships more going up one of which
a 64. I am &c. " JoN'^ Rumford."

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 115
major evans to brigadier-general potter.
" Wilmington, Nov' 11'" 1777
" Dear Sir :
" Having Just arived at this place I had account of thirty
Eight large ships lying at or near reedy Island yesterday
with a number of troops on board some say 3 sorae 4 & 5
thousand, the ships are all now standing up the River by
this place now flve of the Clock, therefore thought it ray
indispensible duty to give you the earliest intelligence that
you might provide yourself accordingly. I am &c.
" Geo : Evans, Major M."
JONATHAN RUMFORD TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL POTTER.
" Wilmington Nov 11'" 1777
" Dr. General
" I ara acquainted by Cap' Hugh Mongoraery who is Just
come from the River Shore that hee Counted thirty Eight
Sales of Vessels Cheifly ships & that hee heard from M'
Whitehead Jones these had Ten Solders landed & came to
his House who acquainted him That there was a fleete now
in the Delawar with Several Thousand Brittish Soldears on
Borde. The Ships are Now Passing by I therefore send
you this Inteligance & am &c. " JoN-^ Rumford.'*
BRIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM TO WASHINGTON.
" Woodberry 11'" November, 1777
"Sir " Cap' [Samuel] Treat of the Artillery and one Man be
sides was killed this Morning. The Enemy have battered
down a great Part of the Stone Wall. The Pallisades and
Barracks are prodigiously shattered. The Eneray fire with
Twenty four & thirty two Pounders. Upon these, and other
Considerations, Col" Smith is of Opinion that the Fort must
be evacuated. A storm would not be dreaded; But it ap
pears impossible for the Garrison to withstand point blank

116 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777,
shot. I am now going to consult the Baron & Col" Greene.
I expect we shall cause an evacuation this Night. I
am &c.
"J. M. Varnum.
" N.B. — The Evacuation may enable us to take Billings
port." BRIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM TO WASHINGTON.
" Woodberry, 11'" Nov' 12 o'Clock P.M. 1777
" Sir :
" I am this Moment returned from Fort Mifflin — Every
Defence is almost destroyed. Poor Col" Smith is on this
Shore, slightly wounded. — I have ordered the Cannon, least
in use, to be brought off. L' Col" [Giles] Russell of Col"
[John] Durkee's Battalion coraraands. T have ordered the
Garrison to defend at all Events 'till your Pleasure can be
known. Nothing shall be wanting to support them, which
we can give — They cannot hold out more than two Days. —
Col" Smith urges an Evacuation still ; at least, to continue
a small Garrison only, w°h might be bro't oft' occasionally, I
cannot acceed to the Measure, as long as we have lost but
few Men. — The Enemy have pass'd seven Boats this Evining
between the Fort and Province Island. — The Cannonade is
renewed ; If as great Injury should take Place to morrow
as to Day, we may be obliged to relinquish the Place. — I
wish to know your will — The Fort shall be held, at all
events, 'till then.
" Your Commands of this Day, just come to Hand. I am
rauch obliged.
" At Red Bank, an Eighteen Pounder burst — one raan
killed and several wounded; at the two Gun Battery, a
Serg' killed and one wounded.
" The Baron ought to know whether he shall go farther
than this, as he is extreraely unwell. I am &c
" J. M. Varnum."

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777, 117
colonel smith to brigadier-general varnum.
"Sir " I am clearly of your opinion to keep the fort to the last
extreraity, which in my opinion raay as well be done with
100 as 500 men. By tomorrow night every thing will be
levelled — our block houses next the enemy are almost
destroyed — the N. West Block has but one piece of cannon
fit for service — one side of it is entirely fallen down — they
have begun on that next Read's House & dismounted two
pieces — the Pallisades next the raeadow are levelled; the
small battery in front of the gate torn up — the [a word that
is illegible] battery torn up also. The wall is broke thro' in
different places. In fine should they storm us I think we
raust fall. However, as it is your opinion I will keep the
garrison tho' I lose mine and my soldiers lives. I hope the
night raay prove sufflciently favorable to get out some of our
cannon ; and then should we fall, you may still defend the
River. I am now without 18 cartouches — raust beg you will
send rae 300 which will serve me to-morrow — it must be
done in the night. I would advise the garrison to be with
drawn except about 50 raen, who could just keep up the
sarae fire that is done now, and might escape in case of a
storm — This would be my advice. 'Tis true I fight for glory,
but at the sarae time raust study the general good. I ara &c
" Sam Smith.
" Fort Mifflin, 11 Nov. 1777.
" N.B. — Reflect if they raake the attack that their cannon
will be placed against our Block house, in which case no
raan can stay in them. I expect to see the whole of the
N. W. Block house fall every minute. If you should be of
my opinion send boats in the first place to get over the
cannon, and before day take off the raen leaving as I raen
tioned." '
^ " General Dickenson, to whose Discretion it was left to take the Com
mand of our Militia now under General Newcomb, or to continue on his
present station as he should conceive most for the Publick Interest, has
preferred the latter, on account of a Plan he has formed to make a
Descent on Staten Island, which he says is a favorite scheme of his ; and

118 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777,
WASHINGTON TO FRANCIS HOPKINSON AND JOHN WHARTON.'
" Head Quarters, 12 November, 1777
" Gentlemen :
" I have your fav' of the 10'" and am only sorry that I did
not sooner know ray request of sinking the Frigates had
been coraplied with. The delay of the Resolve of Congress,
frora the time you first applied for their advice, was what
led me into a mistake, and I am obliged to you for the gen
teel raanner in which you excuse me. I am perfectly satis
fied with the raeasures which you have taken to secure the
shipping and desire when you have no further occasion for
Men that they may be disposed of as directed in my former
letters. I am &c ^ " G° Washington."
BRIGADIER-GENERAL POTTER TO WASHINGTON.
" I received your Excelanceys favour of yesterday at 10
o'Clock last night. I was out Reconnitring, the Shiping are
cora up. the nuraber of soldiers I cant assurtain.
" As to the marching of the Militia the[y] were all at Head
Quarters before I Rec* your Letter, as for my Harrassing
the Enemy the sitation of the pi eaee is such that I can do
Little, and my numbers so Trifiing, that I cant prevent there
coming over the Bridge, they are alarmed on the Island, and
have strenthened that place with raen and works and cannon
there will be rautch raore dificqualty in Redusing it than
would have been eight days ago,
" I am sorey that Gen' [John] Arrastrong is under a mistake
from which he expects to derive considerable Advantage to the Cause.
From the frequent Complaints I have had of General Newcomb's Inac
tivity and utter want of all Discipline, I have sent for him to this place
to account for his conduct to General Forman ; & hope his friends here
will embrace that opportunity to persuade him to resign a Post, which
most of them seem now convinced he is incapable of discharging either
with Honour to himself, or Advantage to the State." — Governor WiUiam
Livingston to Washington, November 11, 1777.
' Some letters of this date are printed in my " Writings of Washing
ton," Vol. VI. pp. 187, 188.
' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel Tench Tilghman.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777, 119
in Regard of my givin Interruption to the enemy in Bulding
there Bridge, I drove there gaurd three tiraes down to the
warf, but my men were oblidged to Run back again the
ground on the other side commands that on this side and
they soon drive us off with there cannon — If it is agreeable
to your Excelancey I could wish sorae other offlcer was to
take the command here.
" I will do all in my power to get a Coraraunication with
Ridbank But cant vew it in such an easy light as some
Gentlemen do. " I am your Excelanceys &c " Ja" Potter.
" Nov' 12'" 1777."
brigadier-general potter to washington.
"Sir " I ara sorey to Inforra your excelancey that Last night in
the night the eneray got two Briggs and one sloop up past
the Island on the side nixt the Island, and this day they
were unloading thera at the Lowast ferrey in Schulkill,
there has been a verey hevey fiering this day at the fourt
from the Battereys on the Islands the fourt seldom Re
turned the fier the Galleys went lower down the River
[ J and fired on the ships.
" I hope I will Receve Accounts tomorrow from Red bank
this Evining I have Receved the within closed frora a gen
tleman that was in the City several days he assures me that
I will get Intiligance from two good whigs in the City — I
have just Receved a letter frora George Reed, Esq' of the
Dalawer State Informing me that there Militia hav Destroyed
6 Vessels in Duck Creek with provisions going to the enemys
shiping and Taken a nuraber of the Treaders he can give
no Account of the numbers of soldiers that were in the fleet
that carae up — sum says there did not appear to be meney
on Board. I ara &c "Ja^ Potter.
" Nov' 12'" 1777 9 oClock
" P.S. — We have Taken five Prisners this day and will
send them to your Excelancey tomorrow."

120 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
MAJOR fleury to WASHINGTON.
"EXCBLLENCEY " in my quality of engineer in chief at fort raifflin I think
that ray duty obliges me to informe you of the present
situation of the fort.
" the Fire of the eneray has been successfuU enough to
spoile our three Block houses, and dismount the canon of
all, except two. the great lockes [logs ?] of which we had
covered them are not strong enough to preserve the inside
of the block houses, and we have none others to mend them.
" some of our Palissades at the nordside are broken, but
we can mend thera every night.
" in all the fort is certainly yet in state to be defended,
but the garrison is so dispirited that if the eneray will at
terapt to storra us, I ara afraid that they will succeed, they
are so exhausted, by watch, cold. Rain & fatigue, that their
Courage is very Low, and in the Last allarrae one half was
unflt for duty.
" I have inforraed Gen' Varnam of the situation of the
fort, and how small was the garrison considering how large
is our enclosure.
" I think it necessary for my honour to put under your
eyes the same observation, to not be thought guilty in case
of bad event. I ara excellency &c
" Fleury.
" 10 o'clock 12 9"" 1777"
BRIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM TO WASHINGTON.
" Woodberry, 12'" Nov' Sunset 1777
" Sir. " The Garrison holds out ; tho' the Enemy continue to
batter with great Success upon the Works, but few Men are
killed and wounded. The Troops are extremely fatigued.
I shall send one Hundred fresh Troops this Night, & all that
I have toraorrow Night, if the Fort should remain defensi
ble. The most fatigued will be taken from the Garrison. —

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777, 121
Col" Smith will be unable to return to his Command for
some Time ; It is a misfortune, but. Col" Russell will com
mand with Spirit, & Col" Durkee will go in tomorrow Morn
ing, should Col" Russell be much fatigued. Inclosed you
have Major Fleury's opinion.' I am anxious to hear from
you. Have no particular Intelligence save that Forty sail
of Vessells with Troops, on Saturday last, entered the Dele-
ware. — Should the Eneray continue their Cannonade the
Island will be lost : however, the Garrison will continue 'till
your Excellency shall order otherwise. I ara &c.
" J. M. Varnum."
COLONEL SMITH TO WASHINGTON. " Woodberry, 12 Nov' 1777
" Sir :
" I yesterday unfortunately rec* a Contusion on ray Hip
& left Arra, both which give me rauch pain. I iraprudently
went into my Barracks to answer a Letter from Gen. Varnum
& a Ball came through the Chimney & struck me on the Hip
so forcibly that I remained senseless for some time, however
I am happy to find myself much less hurted than I at first
iraagin'd & Hope in 5 or 6 days to be again fit for duty.
Coll. Russell now coraraands in fort Mifflin, The troops
there are worn out with fatigue, watchings & cold. All the
Guns in the Block Houses are render'd unfit for service &
the Houses alraost destroy'd. the Pallisades were renew'd
last Night & this Day destroy'd again, the other Guns on
my two Gun Battery render'd unfit for service. An 18 p'
next to the right of the Battery dismounted, the New Well
very much injur'd, the whole of the Garrisons Heap of
Ruins, this Night Gen. Varnum intends removing some
of the heavy Cannon. We shall perhaps be able to keep
the fort three days, in which Time it will be levell'd to the
Ground. Yesterday Cap' [Samuel] Treat was kill'd by a
Ball which carae through the Grand Battery & this Day his
' This opinion is not different in detail from that submitted to Wash
ington, p. 120, ante.

122 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
Lieut. [John] George wounded, so that there are now but 2
Artillery Officers in Garrison, if they attempt a storm, I
fear the Garrison must fall. Such weather as this the Gallies
can give no Assistance. I Have advis'd the Garrison to be
withdrawn, except the Artillery & ab' 50 Men who could
keep up the same fire that the whole can. But to be pre
par'd & in Case the Enemy atterapt a Storm they might set
fire to every part & withdraw. Gen. Varnum waits your
Order. I have the Honor &c.
" Sam Smith."
washington to brigadier-general varnum.
" Head Quarters, 13 November, 1777
" Sir :
" I wrote you two Letters yesterday ; the first contained
positive orders to raaintain the Fort on Mud Island at all
events, the second in consequence of subsequent advices frora
you gave discretionary powers to evacuate the post, and a
copy of it was sent to guard against miscarriage ; I refer you
to its contents and repeat that I would have a Show of de
fence kept up as long as possible by such a number of raen as
you shall judge necessary. The iraportance of delaying the
farther progress of the Eneray and preventing their raaking
a lodgement on the Island is too obvious to need my insist
ing upon it. In addition to the perseverance of the Garri
son, I think an Enterprise of a more active nature might
be carried into execution in concert with a detachment from
the Fleet. I mean a Descent upon Province Island for the
purpose of spiking the Enemy's Cannon and levelling their
Batteries — which would considerably embarrass the Enemy
and gain us a great deal of time. This is proposed however
only by way of consulting you upon the subject : you will
be best able, being on the spot, to judge of the practicability
of such a Scheme. Voluntiers and pick'd Men would be
most likely to do this Service effectually : and as a Stimulus
to their Courage and Exertions I promise ample Rewards
in case of Success. I would have Fort Mercer strengthen'd
as much as Circumstances will allow — it may be put in such

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 1 23
a condition as to require a greater Sacrifice than the Enemy
can afford to make in attempting it. I am &c
" G° Washington.
" P.S. — Present my Compliments to Col" Sraith. The
Contents of his Letter are fully answer'd by this to you." '
MAJOR fleury's JOURNAL.
"Nov. 13'" at night. — The Eneray have kept up a firing
part of the night — their shells greatly disturb our workmen,
and as the moon rises opposite to us, her light discovers
to the Eneray where we are. As long as ray Workraen
would remain with me, I employed them in covering the
two western Blockhouses with Joist within and without and
filling the interstices with rammed Earth. I have closed
the breaches made in our Palisades, with Planks, Centry-
boxes. Rafters, and strengthen'd the whole with earth —
General Varnura has sent rae neither Ax, Fascine, Gabion
nor Palisade, altho he promised me all these Articles, I sup
pose it has not been in his power — it is irapossible however
with watry raud alone to make works capable of resisting
the Enemys 32 Pounders.
" 14"' Day light discovers to us a floating battery of the
Enemy, placed a little above their grand battery, and near
the Shore ; it seeras to be a Borah-battery.
" Fort Mifflin is certainly capable of defence if the raeans
be furnished — if they supply us frora Red-bank with Tools,
Fascines, Palisades, &ca all which they may do in abun
dance — the Fire of the Eneray will never take the Fort, it
may kill us raen but this is the Fortune of War. and all
their bullets will never render them masters of the Island,
if we have courage enough to remain on it — but they are
removing our Cannon frora the grand battery under pre
text that it is necessary to raise a battery on the Jersey side
to keep the Enemys shipping at a distance — but what signi
fies it, whether their Fleet be at the point of Hog Island or
a quarter of a mile lower — will they not by taking this
' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens.

124 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
Fort have the Channel of province Island open, for their
small Sloops and other light vessels — will they not drive the
Gallies from the River — Fort Mifflin is the iraportant
Object, it must be maintained and furnish'd with means of
defence. Men, Earth and Fascines to cover thera — Our
new Garrison consists of 450 Men — what can they do in a
circumference of works so extensive as ours — being weak
everywhere, they could make a defence nowhere and the
Fort would be carried — The apparent Project of the Eneray
is to debark on the Island ; either to risque a Storm, or to
establish a battery on the old ferry wharf, or nearer if they
can — what means have we of hindering them — with a Gar
rison so feeble, can I make any advantageous Sallies — can I
dislodge the Eneray — if I raise a battery against thera will
it not serve against ourselves in case of attack — for without
a sufflcient number to defend it, it must be given up — our
grand Battery has 19 Embrasures and 8 cannon, two of
which are dismounted — we must have Artificers to make
Wheels — Fascines and Palisades for breaches. Gen' Var
num supplies us scantily — We must have men to defend
the Ruins of the Fort — our Ruins will serve us as breast
works, we will defend the Ground inch by inch, and the
Enemy shall pay dearly for every step — but we w^ant a com
manding Officer, ours is absent and forms projects for our
defence at a distance.
" P.S. — As the Light becomes clearer, I perceive the En
erays floating battery, not to be a mortar battery but that it
contains two 32 Pounders — we are going to raise a Counter
battery of two eighteen Pounders taken out of our River
battery — which will now have no more than 7 Guns, the
Wheels of two of which have been disabled by the Enemy's
Cannon. We are so much neglected that we have been 7
days without wood, and at present have only cartridges of
eighteen pounders for a Piece of 32 which does considerable
michief to the Enemy.
" 14'" at 7 oClock. The Enemy keep up a great Fire
from their Floating Battery and the shore.
" I repeat it, our Comraanding Officer issues orders frora

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 125
Woodberry — if he were nearer he would be a better judge
of our Situation.
" Our blockhouses are in a pitiful condition, but with
fascines I hope to cover two pieces in each lower story which
will be sufficient to flank us. I say again the Enemys fire
will not take our fort, if they attempt a storm we shall
still have a little parapet to oppose to thera, but we must
have men to defend it.
" Novem 14'" at noon.
" We have silenced the Enemy's floating Battery, I know
not whether we have dismounted her Cannon, or whether
her present Station exposes her too much, but the firing
from her has ceased. I suspect that she is destined to land
raen on this Island.
" Their grand battery is in little better condition than our
block-houses — We have open'd an erabrasure at the Corner of
the Battery, and two pieces here joined to two others on the
left which we have reinstated, throw the Enemy into disorder.
"I repeat it — their fire will kill us men, because we have
no cover, but it will never take the Fort, if we have suffi
cient courage to keep our ground — but a stronger Garrison
is indispenslbly necessary, we are not secured against Storm,
if the Enemy attempt it — I fear they will succeed — in pene
trating a Circumference of 1200 Paces defended only by
450 men and half ruined Palisades — A boat which this day
deserted from the Fleet, will have given the Enemy suffi
cient intimation of our weakness — they will probably attack
us or attempt a Lodgraent on the Island which we cannot
prevent with our present strength.
" Tonight an Attempt is to be made on the floating battery
of the Eneray.'" BRIGADIER- GENERAL VARNUM TO WASHINGTON.
" Woodberry, i p' 4 Mor.
" 14 Nov. 1777
" Sir " One Hour since, all was pretty well in Fort. Three
killed yesterday, and seven wounded. Our greatest misfor-
' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens.

126 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
tune has been, that so high, we could get nothing across the
River. However it is now calm, & the time improving. I
have sent all the fresh Troops into the Fort & shall, in every
Respect pursue your Orders signified IS'", 5 oClock P.M.
The Garrison may continue for some Time. Possibly we
shall keep the Island. To day we shall open upon their
Shipping with three Ciuns frora the lower Battery. I ara &c.
"J. M. Varnum."

BRIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM TO WASHLSGTON.
"Woodberry, i past 3 P.M. 14" Nov' 1777
" Sir :
¦' Your Favor of yesterday is received. Major [Simeon]
Thayer has the Coramand at Fort Miffiin at Present. In
clos'd you have his Sentiments. I have continued nearly
four hundred Rank & File in the Garrison. All Col" Sraith's
Troops are brought to the Main to get a little Rest. I have
no raore Troops fit for Duty. I am very happy that a toler
able Prospect of holding the Post appears — Last Evening
my whole Company of Artillery went into the Fort. Capt.
[James] Lee comraands. He ia brave and good. — It is very
unhappy that the Wind has been so great ; However, we shall
be now [better] able to send supplies, than for several Days.
— An Attempt upon Province Island is desirable, but impos
sible for us, who have no Troops, but fatigued ones, & those
in less Force than the Eneray's upon that Place. As your
Orders appear discretionary, in some measure, we shall
risque many things in attempting to keep the River. — I
think we may hold the Island till such Time as you can send
us five Hundred Troops to make a second Relief. — If that
cannot be done, we will endeavour to hold it.
" The large Howitz we want very much. I ara &c.
" J. M. Varnum.
" N.B. — I ara now going with Col" Sraith to Fort Mifflin,
& shall be able, in the Morning, to give you a particular
ace'."

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 127
MAJOR THAYER TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM.
" Fort Mifflin, Nov. 14, 1777
"Sir " By this I would give you to understand that the can
onade we have here we value not, nor can conceive how
any one would dream of delivering up so important a post
as this at present ; from Cannon we have nothing to fear, if
there should be no sudden storm. If, Sir, you will send us
a reinforcement tonight of 100 or raore raen, it will certainly
be a great raeans of the salvation of this garrison. A float
ing battery of the eneray appeared this morning. We have
silenced her for the present. I am &c
" Simeon Thayer Com*.
" P.S. — A Boat with a number of raen deserted frora our
fleet but this rainute — they raay give some unfavorable
account of our state, and insinuate some notion of our
evacuating the fort. All well — none hurt since my arrival
here — The garrison in good spirits."
CAPTAIN lee to WASHINGTON. " N° 14'" 77
" Sir :
" I have just returned from the lower counties on Dela
ware. In our excursion thro' that country, the several
landings on the river were visited, but to our satisfaction, we
learned that the intercourse between the inhabitants & fleet
was totally broke up. Lord Howe has positively forbid the
least connexion under severe penalties.
" I should have proceeded down as far as Dover, in order
to destroy sorae small craft, that were employed in furnishing
the enemy with fresh provision fuel &c, from Duck creek,
but this business being completed by Gen Patterson, I con
cluded the route unnecessary, & returned to my former
station. Thirty eight sail of Transports arrived in the
delaware while I was down & joined the fleet off Chester.
It was expected they had troops on board frora N. York, but

128 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
none could be discovered as they passed up the river. I
am &c.
"Hen^ Lee."

major-general GREENE TO WASHINGTON.
" At BIe Morris, Nov. 14'" 8 oClock P.M. 1777
" Dr. Sir.
" We have just returned from reconnoltering the grounds
about Darbj', the Islands below and up to the middle ferry —
we purpose to go out again in the morning — from the present
view Darby appears the only eligible position for the army
for the purpose of their crossing the river. It is the opinion
of several of the gentlemen that the enemy may be kept
dislodged from the Islands by detachraent, others are of
opinion that it would be dangerous unless the party was
covered, by the Array, but all are of opinion, it is practicable
either the one way or the other and considering the good con
sequences that will result from it, it ought to be atterapted.
Darby is not the most eligible post I ever saw, but it is not
so dangerous as to discourage the attempt to relieve fort
Miffiin. " The flag was flying at Fort Mifflin at sunset this evening,
there has been a very severe cannonade today. — inclosed is
a letter frora Col" Greene respecting the condition of the
fort. The enemy have got up two or three vessels into the
Schuylkill, they were attempting to get up a two and thirty
gun frigate, between hog Island and Province Island — by
the best observation we could raake her guns were taken
out and foUow'd her in a sloop. — She did not get up, but
what was the reason, I know not. — The Coraraodore should
be directed to sink a vessel or two in the new channel as
soon as possible, and the fort encouraged to hold out to the
last. — There is but one bridge over the Schuylkill and that
is at the middle ferry. I examined the river myself from
the falls to the mouth.
" The enemy have got a chain of redoubts with Abatis
between them from one river to the other, part of this is
from information and part from my own observation — The

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 129
Schuylkill is very deep and rapid, too deep for foot to ford
it — the bridge at Matteson's ford is not in so great forward
ness as I could wish, the commanding offlcer sais it will be
done in three days — but a bridge of waggons can be thrown
over for the foot to pass if that should not be done.
" The enemy are greatly discouraged by the forts holding
out so long, and it is the general opinion of the best of the
citizens that the enemy will evacuate the city if the fort
holds out until the middle of next week.
" There is plenty of forage in this country, especially about
Darby — we purpose to exaraine the ground a little raore
about Darby toraorrow, and if possible return toraorrow
evening — ^Frora the best accounts we can get there is but
flve ships with troops on board in the river. I ara &c
" Nath. Greene."
commodore hazelwood to washington.
"Red Bank, Nov' 15'" 1777
" Sir. " Agreeable to your Excellencys request by letter to me
of 13 Nov', I have inclosed you the opinion of myself &
Officers in Council of War held of [f] Red Bank the 14'"
Ins', a copy of which you have inclosed, where your Excel
lency will see we are all unanimously of opinion in regard
to our holding this Station with the Fleet. While we were
on this business their Fleet carae up & attacked this Fort.
I immediately carried all our force against them, & after a
long & heavy Cannonading, with the assistance of a two
Gun Battery, we drove or caused their Ships to drop down,
but they getting their Ship Battery & a Sloop Battery up in
the inner Channel close under our Fort Mifflin & under
cover of all their Cannon & Bomb Batterys, & keeping up
such a warm & hot flre, it was irapossible for the Fort &
that brave & good Officer to hold it longer, without that
Ship could be destroyed. I ordered one half of our Galleys
with as brave an officer as I had, to destroy the Ship & Sloop,
but he returned & said it was impossible while they was so
well supported by all their Batterys, so at last that brave &
10

130 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
good Officer Major Thayer was obliged to set fire to their
works & quit the Fort. Our Fleet has received much
damage, & numbers kill'd & wounded, which cannot now be
exactly ascertained, but as soon as I can get a return made
out, shall send it. We shall hold our Post as long as pos
sible, & shall anxiously wait to have your answer to this.
Whether your Excellency approves of our determination.
Our Men & Officers behaved with spirit & bravery. Having
not to add for the present, am &c. "John Hazelwood."
" In Council of War held on board the Chatham Galley,
Nov' 14"", 1777, sumraoned by Commodore Hazlewood to
deliberate on a letter wrote him by his Excellency Gen'
Washington dated Whitemarsh, 13"" Nov' 1777.
" After maturely considering the contents of his Excel
lencys Letter, this Council are unanimously of opinion.
That should Fort Mifflin be evacuated & so fall into the
enemys hands, it will be altogether impracticable for our
Fleet or any of them to keep their present station, or to
prevent in such case the enemys raising works at the afore
mentioned Fort Mifflin, as in their present situation they
are within reach of Shot & Shells from the enemys Bat
terys on Province Island. But should such evacuation ou
our side, & possession on that of the enemy take place,
this Council are of opinion, that by the Batterys raised & to
be raised on this the Jersey Shore on the upper side of
Mantua Creek, & above that opposite the Chevaux de Friez,
the passage of the enemys Shipping especially those of any
considerable force, will be altogether obstructed, as without
raising, or removing the Chevaux de Friez, it is impossible
such Ships can have a passage.
" Much, indeed all depends on our keeping possession of
the Jerseys, for should the enemy prevail there, it is our
opinion that our Fleet will be altogether annihilated, as in
that case our retreat & resources will be entirely cut offi
" Should we be by the enerays getting possession of Fort
Mifflin be obliged to retire further up, we have a sure retreat

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 131
into Timber Creek where all our Fleet may shelter in safety,
from whence the Galleys might in a very short time salley
out & we trust defeat any light Vessels of the eneray, for
which the pass thro' in the intervals between the Chevaux
de Frieze raight be practicable, but those Vessels in such
case must meet with many obstacles not only the risque of
venturing thro' almost impracticable passes, but be also
exposed to the fire of those large Batterys of ours on this
the Jersey Shore.
" We of the Council are therefore unanimously of opinion.
That on our Forces keeping possession of the Jerseys, de
pends altogether the preservation of our Fleet, & conse
quently every expectation to be formed frora its Manoeuvres
in future. " John Hazelwood Isaac Roach
" John Rice John Mitchell
"Richard Eyres James Josiah
" Thomas Moore Edward York
" Nathan Boyce John Harrison
" Hugh Montgomery Robert Hardie
" Benjamin Dunn William Watkin
" Thomas Houston Isaiah Robertson
" William Brown  Warner
" Jeremiah Simmons Peter .Bbuster."
" George Garland
captain CRAIG TO WASHINGTON.
" Frankford, 15'" Nov' 1777
" Sir :
" I believe your Excellency raay Depend upon the eneray's
force being drawn to Attact the Fort to day, a very severe
and heavy firing began this morning about 10 oClock and
has continued ever since, the Eneray Dread the Northern
Arrays joining your Excellency and have been raaking every
preparation to attact before the N  army joyn'd, and have
not been prepared before today. I have the honor &c
"C. Craig."

132 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
brigadier-general varnum to WASHINGTON.
" Fort Mercer 15'" Nov' 1777 6 oClk P.M.
"Sir " The Firing is universal from the Shipping Batteries &c.
— We have lost a great raany Men today — a great many of
the officers are killed and wounded — My fine Company of
Artillery is almost destroy'd — We shall be obliged to
evacuate the Fort this Night. I am &c
" J. M. Varnum.
" Major [Silas] Talbut is badly wounded. Major Fleury is
wounded also. It is impossible for an Officer to possess
more merit than Major Thayer, who commands the brave
little Garrison." '
benjamin RANDOLPH TO WASHINGTON.
" Burlington, IS"" Nov' 1777
"Sir " Being apointed by General Waman to take charge of
the Flag with Docter Glentuth, yesterday we atemted it.
the Capton of the Friggat Rec'd it & detained us til he sent
it to General How who Return'd for ansur we could not be
Receved raust return back to the warf at Coopers &c.
" at 9 oClock in the morning just as we got to the ferry
I heard a uni vr sal Ratle of their drums in town and all
moveing downwards below town. I likewise heard from a
Quaker that Just Left it & the ferryman that brought them
over, that on the 7"" Inst, the Enemy Brought Stoors from
their Shiping to last them for two weeks, that they sayd no
more could corae for two weeks after that on acc't the moon
light nits, they said they were hail'd by our men on the fort
three times as they were Passing up. Likewise heard thera
cry out All" well as they Passd, likewise told me the enemy
ware moveing sorae Boats down towards the mouth Schul
kill. The officer ofthe Friggot told rae they had just been
sending two floting Batteries down the Schulkill with four
32 Pounders on board to assist against our fort that they
'"Major Ballard carries this." — Endmsevient by Brigadier- General
Varnum.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 133
ware in want of Provisions but expected their Shiping up
in two or three days — ^he wanted to no wheather General
Putnam was Likely to Join your Excellency soon or not, I
could not tell anything about the matters of that sort, they
seamed much concerned it apeared to rae. I am &c
"Benj* Randolph."
brigadier-general varnum to WASHINGTON.
"Woodberry, 15"" Nov' 1777 11 oCk A.M.
"Sir " I was a great part of last night in Fort Miffiin ; It is
greatly shattered, but very defensible, had we the Men men
tioned in my letter of yesterday. — I shall send two Hundred
Militia in this night. They will be able to work & fight
upon Occasion. — What put it into the Eneray's Head, I
cant say. But they kept up a constant cannonade and
Bombardment all night, so as to prevent in a great Measure,
the necessary Repairs in the Breaches. — I ara under the
Necessity of beseeching your Excellency to send a General
Officer, whose concurring Sentiraents, or Orders, should he
be of superior standing, will be very advantageous. The
Objects here are so various that I cannot fully do what I
know is essential to the Service. — The Militia are without a
Commander. — It is very difficult getting Matters done in a
speedy Manner. I am obliged to attend every department
myself. — I do not make this Request because I ara not fond
of coraraanding, — ^But from a Consciousness that the service
demands it. We want another coraraanding Officer of
Artillery, & more Artillery Men. Indeed, I think a Field
Officer of Artillery should be here. Capt. [Jaraes] Lee will
do all that a brave, good Officer can, but a Shot raay claira ;
then we should be badly off indeed. I am just inforraed
the Shipping are in Motion — Our Battery below has just
opened. I ara &c
" J. M. Varnum.
"N.B. — Should the Shipping play upon the Island, we
must evacuate it, But I am in hopes we shall keep them
down."

134 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
WASHINGTON TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM.
" Head Quarters, 15 November, 1777
" Sir :
" I have received your Letter of yesterday inclosing the
opinion of Maj. Thayer, the present Commandant at Fort
Mifflin respecting the defence of that Post — and am happy
to find that he and Maj' Fleury coincide in their Sentiments
as to the practicability of maintaining it in spite of the
Enemy's Land and Floating Batteries. Their perseverance,
however, may expose them to falling a sacrifice in case of
an Attack by Storra, unless the necessary raaterials be fur
nish'd them from your side of the River, for repairing the
daily destruction caused by the Enemy's Cannon. There
should be a never failing supply of Fascines & Palisades —
large Gabions will be useful — and a quantity of earth loaded
in bulk on board of Flats, will be very serviceable in cor
recting the oozy nature ofthe soil on which they are obliged
to work. They are likewise in want of Araraunition for
their 32 pounder, for which they have been obliged to use
the Cartridges of their eighteen Pounders. — A stock of Fire
wood, an indispensible Article at this season of the year
should be laid in at every convenient opportunity, so that
they raay not be deficient in it, in case of the Coraraunica
tion between thera and the main being interrupted by high
wind or bad weather. One or two of their gun carriages
are dismounted, which will require the presence of such
Artificers as you can spare. M' Fleury seeras desirous of
retaining the Cannon on the Island. I cannot at this dis
tance decide as to the propriety of suffering thera to reraain,
which raust depend upon the State of the Works, and the
prospect of reestablishing sorae essential parts of them.
Your visit to the Island will enable you to speak decisively
upon this and other matters of importance.
" Gen' Greene in a Letter received from hira this morn
ing inforriis me that the Enemy are attempting to get a
Frigate thro the Channel between Hog Island and Province
Island. This passage raay be render'd impassable for Ves
sels of a respectable size by sinking a hulk there, or throw-

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 135
ing some other obstruction in the ways. It will be proper
therefore that you should have a conference with the Com
modore upon this subject iraraediately, and consult with
him upon the best means for frustrating the Enemy's
Designs. " With respect to the Enterprise upon Province Island
which I recomraended in my last — I must observe that tho
ray expressions gave it a great Latitude and that I proposed
the ruin of the Enemy's works as part of the End in view
— ^yet I should be content if nothing more could be effected
to have the Cannon of those works, or any part of them,
spik'd. A resolute body of Voluntiers and chosen raen I
still think might be employed with success in this Under
taking — and tho the time gain'd by us and the Embarrass
ment occasioned the Enemy would not be so considerable
as in the other case, yet it appears to me worth the attempt,
especially as by the means of surprise, the service might be
done before the party could be opposed in force — and at all
events the Retreat is easy.'
Gen' Greene in his Letter calls the Channel in question
the New Channel. I ara not certain which he means, but
you will be able to determine. I am &C.''
" G° Washington."
colonel smith to WASHINGTON. "Woodberry, 15 Nov' 1777
" Sir :
" My Arm will this Night or tomorrow Night permit me
to take the Command at fort Mifflin. I was there last Night,
^ This attempt, suggested in Washington's letter to Varnum, dated No
vember 13, 1777, ante, probably led to the proposed expedition outlined
in Wayne's letter to Richard Peters, of November 18, printed in Still6,
" Major-General Wayne and the Pennsylvania Line," p. 105. I can find
no evidence that the suggestion came from Wayne ; and I think it more
likely that when Varnum raised difSculties, Washington undertook the
matter, and selected Wayne as a fit man to lead. He determined to
await the re-enforcements from the north, and the opportunity was lost.
This reconciles the statements of the two men as given by Dr. Stilll.
'' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens.

136 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
it is now one Heap of Ruin & must be defended with mus-
quetry in Case of Storm. I presume the Enemy will con
tinue to cannonade for four or five days & then they will be
obliged to storm. When they do, I am of Opinion they
will succeed. With 600 Men I think we could defend it as
an Island. Our great dependance must be their being to
rauch afraid to storm. I hope it will hinder them from
the Attempt untill your Excell^ can send such Number as
will give the Men a Relief every 3 Days — in that Case I
think we might defend it as an Island, & I Hope your Ex-
cell^ will soon be able to attempt Something that will hasten
their Departure to their Shipping — such parties of Men
would rebuild in the Night what they destroy in the Day.
I have the Honor &c " Sam Smith.
" Gen. Varnum has been oblig'd to send Cap' Lee to take
the Command ofthe Artillery at fort Mifflin. Mr. Comstoc'
who took the Coraraand after Cap' Treat was very unfit, we
want a good Offlcer & raore Artillery Men very much — We
are oblig'd to fire much Powder away & shall want Cartridges
for 12", 18* & 32 pounders iraraediately."
BARON ARENDT ON FORT MIFFLIN.
" As long as we have a design to prevent a Junction be
tween the Enerays Fleet and their Army, the maintaining
Fort Mifflin is indispenslbly necessary — not that this place
in itself hinders the Junction, tho it certainly contributes to
that valuable purpose, but it gives Security to our Fleet,
which could not keep its present Station if the Enemy
should raake themselves masters of the Fort & raise bat
teries against it — this is the opinion of the Coraraodore
whom I consulted upon this subject.
" Although therefore this post ought to be maintained to
the last extremity, yet I grant that there are many difficulties
in the way — the fatigue and inclement weather to which
the Garrison is exposed, are not the least considerable.
' Probably William Comstock, of Rhode Island,

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777 . 137
" The Design of the Enemy seems to be to make them
selves masters of the Island, by constant bombarding and
cannonading so as to ruin the works and either drive out
the Garrison, or exhaust them by keeping up a fire at night
— if however they find themselves disappointed it is probable
they will venture another attack with Troops.
" Whatever be their designs, we have only two points in
view — the Preservation of the Garrison — and repairing as
rauch as possible the ruined works. I propose this expedi
ent which is not irapracticable, because frequently used in
besieged Fortresses.
" 1. To preserve the Garrison let it be disposed in the most
secure places — this has been done hitherto by placing the
men behind the Stone Wall, but as it is considerably dam
aged and begins to fall, it can't afford shelter rauch longer.
My opinion is that the men ought to go out every morning
at day break, and lie down in order to be better conceal'd
upon Planks behind the Bank which is opposite to Province
Island — they should make no fire, but keep theraselves warm
with their blankets, and have their victuals either cook'd
over night, or on the eastern side of the Island — to keep
them in spirits there should be an additional allowance of
Rura or strong-beer — especially as the Soil and Water are
exceedingly unwholesome — it is morally certain that the
Enemy will not fire upon the spot proposed, but direct their
shot against the Fort — where there should be only a few
Gentries left, and a few necessary hands to serve the
Artillery. " 2. The Garrison should be relieved as often as possible —
Gen' Varnum says he has not men enough to relieve every
night, but that it might be done every 48 hours — which is
sufficient — thus the Health of the Soldiers will be preserved,
they will not be worn out with Fatigue, and their Courage
will be renew'd — The Garrison ought always to be 400 strong
— the Coramanding Officer and Engineer ought likewise to
be relieved.
" 3. For repairing the works, and in order to spare the
Garrison, it would be well to send every night for fatigue a

1 38 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
Detachment of 100 Militia with their Arras, they would be
so many fighting men — they should carry with thera Pali
sades, Fascines and Gabions — the work to be done, will
depend upon the Daraage sustain'd in the course of the day
— I am of opinion that a Parapet of Fascines and Gabions
should be substituted to the Palisades, it might be made
under cover of them, and would be infinitely more service
able — they might afterwards be taken away.
" It has been proposed to construct a battery upon the
same bank, which I have pointed out above as Shelter for
the Garrison, — and it is thought that this would change the
direction of the Enemy's Fire so as to divert it from the
Fort — but my plan would be inconsistent with this, and be
sides many of the Balls intended to take the battery pro
posed obliquely and in flank, would go beyond it and batter
the Fort.
" 4. I think that the heavy Cannon, which are not pointed
against the Enemy's batteries, should be removed and placed
in the battery lately open'd on the other side of the River
— there they would be out of the reach of the Enemy's
balls, and would be more dangerous to their Shipping — as
they would give a plunging Fire — ^the Commodore is of the
sarae Opinion.
" 5. As to Araraunition and Provision I think a sufficient
quantity for a few days only should be left at the Fort and
the rest deposited in sorae vessel or vessels.
" 6. For the Security of the Garrison in case of extreraity,
the Coraraodore should be required to send upon a conven
tional signal being given at the Fort, all the Vessels and
boats to take thera off.
" Lastly to hinder the Communication which still subsists
between the Army and Navy of the Enemy, and is kept up
by means of little boats upon which Fort Mifflin has fired
without success — there is no other method that I know of
than having arraed boats and Gallies stationed in a proper
place for driving away the Enemys boats.
"Bar. Arendt.

Defences of PhUadelphia in 1777 . 139
" I have communicated most of these Ideas to Gen' Var
num and Col. Smith." '

" General Varnura inforraed me this morning, that Col"
Smith had sent him word by an officer, that he thought it
impossible for the Fort to hold out longer than till tonight
— and asked my opinion upon the subject. It was that the
Port should be maintained to the last extremity, but that
the Cannon of the Battery should be brought off with all
the superfluous Provision and Military Stores — that the
Cannon brought off might be placed with advantage else
where — and that provision and Ammunition for two days
only should be left in the Fort.
" I went to Fort Mercer, with a design to cross to the
Island and resume ray Command, but my strength was not
equal to my Good Will."^
colonel GREENE TO GENERAL POTTER.
"Red Bank, 15 Nov. 1777
"Sir " Since my last the Cannonade has been very severe upon
Fort Mifflin — this Day the Ships have come as near as the
Chevaux de Frize would allow them. A floating Battery
with 18-24 p" came up between Fort Mifflin & Province
Island, and the Fire from Them togather with that of their
Batteries has dismounted all the Guns but two. Almost
destroyed the works — and have killed and wounded a very
considerable Number — Among the latter is Major Talbut
and two Cap' of Co' Durkee's Regm't. Our Shipping have
kept up a warm Fire, and a two Gun Battery about 2J miles
from this has annoyed the Enemy very much — We have sent
Boats to the Brave Major Thayer, who has discretionary
Orders to maintain the Post as long as he thinks practicable
' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens. The endorse
ment shows it to have been written on November 15.
^ An undated sheet in manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel John
Laurens.

140 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
— that the brave Garrison may have a secure retreat when
the Post is no longer tenable  'tis too true that the
boat deserted, another run away the next morning — We
apprehend Nothing here. I am &c.
"C. Greene."
brigadier-general potter to WASHINGTON.
[" 16 November, 1777.]
"D" Sir
" I ara sorey to be the mesenger of Bad news last night
at Ten oClock our Breve Garrison at fort Mifflin set fier to
the Barracks and set off to Ridbank this Intiligance I have
by my express that Brought me the in Closed — I see myself
that our Barricks are Burnt and the enerays ships Viglint
and a sloop are leying a long side of the Island this raoment
I Receved your favour of this day and will observe the Con
tents. I am &c "Ja° Potter'"
brigadier-general varnum to WASHINGTON.
" Woodberry i after 11, A.M. 16 Nov' 1777
"Sir " Agreeable to what I wrote you last Evening, we were
obliged to evacuate Fort Mifflin. Major Thayer returned
from thence a little after two this morning. Every Thing
was got off, that possibly could be. The Cannon could not
be removed without making too great a Sacrifice of men, as
the Erapress of Russia, alias Vigilant, lay within one Hun
dred Yards of the Southwest part of the Works, & with
her incessant Fire, Hand Grenades & Musketry frora the
Round Top, killed every Man that appeared upon the Plat-
forras. — The Coraraodore gave positive Orders to six Gallies
to attack, and take that Ship. They warp'd over to the
Island, & there held a Council, lost a few of their men, &
then returned without atterapting any Thing, I left the Com-
' On November 28 Congress directed an inquiry to be made by Gen
eral Washington into the loss of Fort Mifllin, on the river Delaware,
in the State of Pennsylvania, and into the conduct of the principal
officer commanding.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777, 141
raodore since one this Morning. He had positively ordered
six Gallies, well manned, to attack the same Vessel — how
they succeeded, I ara not inform'd, but, according to Major
Thayer's Sentiments, we could have held the Island, had the
Ship been destroy'd. — I dont think the Shipping can pass
the Chevaux de Frize while we keep this Shore. — The two
Gun Battery, near Manto Creek, annoy'd them very
much Yesterday. It is still firing slowly ; but the Shipping
having remov'd out of direct Distance, too much firing
would be Profusion. — We are erecting a Battery, directly
opposite the Frizes, w"h I believe will be finished to-day —
I am not of Opinion that the Enemy can possess themselves
of the Island without too great a Loss. Whether we shall
keep a Guard upon it or not, I cannot determine 'till, from
a critical Observation, I shall be furnished with new Circura
stances. While we keep the Shipping down, our Navy will
be safe ; but should our Defences prove ineffectual, we shall
take out a Part of their Guns, & let the others attempt
passing the City. — Our Troops are so extremely fatigued
that no time will be lost in knowing your Excellency's
Orders, whether the Troops commanded by Col" Smith shall
remain here, or return to Camp. The Officers seera anxious
to join the Army, as their Men are rauch harrass'd — How
ever, they have had two Nights Rest, & are necessary here,
should we attack Billings Port — As a great part of ray own
Brigade have been lost at Fort Miffiin I shall not be able to
raake any hostile Atterapt this Night ; but am of Opinion
that the Eneray should at all Hazards, be dispossess'd of
this Shore. — We shall want the large Howitz, w°h I raen
tioned before.
" Your Excellency's Letter of yesterday carae to rae this
Morning early — I ara just told the Gallies last order'd to
attack the Vigilant, did nothing : That raisfortune will pre
vent us frora keeping Men upon the Island. I ara &c
" J. M. Varnum.
"P.S. — Col" Greene offered to Officer and Man three
Gallies, that would destroy the Empress of Russia, or perish
11

142 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777,
to a Man. Cap' Robinson, of the continental Fleet, offered
to go hiraself & the Commodore proposes a fine Disposition,
but cannot coraraand his Fleet."
colonel smith to WASHINGTON.
" Woodberry, 16'" Nov' 1777
"Sir " Gen. Varnum will have inform'd your Excell^ of the
Evacuation of fort Miffiin. I am extreraely sorry for the
Circurastance. Major Thayer defended it too bravely.
" My party taken (as your Excell^ knows) from the pic
quet, think they have done their Tour of Duty, & hope for
your Excell'' permission to join their respective Regiments,
who (they say) want their iraraediate Attention — the Officers
have no Cloths with them. My Arra is yet very painful.
Major Fleury is hurt but not very rauch, he is a Treasure
that ought not to be lost. Cap' [Edmund B.] Dickinson of
the first Virg* Reg' deserves much Attention — he stayed with
& assisted Fleury — he is a brave, industrious good Officer.
Cap' [George] Walls of the 4'" Virg* has distinguish'd him
self on every Occasion, for a brave, industrious & prudent
Officer. Cap' [Williara Dent] Bell of the 6'" Maryland has
rauch Merit. I have the Honor &c. "Sam Smith."
joseph reed to washington.
" Capt. Lee's Quarters — near Springfield
" Meeting House, 6 Miles from Darby
" Nov. 16, 1777
" Dear Sir :
" General Green will give you so perfect au Idea of what
he has seen here as to raake any Remark unnecessary from
any one else. I hope & believe it is not yet too late to give
the Forts some effectual Relief, but every Moment is precious,
in the present advance Season & after the Injury so heavy
a Cannonade must have done thera.
" As I know you are pleased with having the Sentiraents
of every Person M^ho gives hiraself the Trouble of reflecting,
I have no Difficulty in giving you raine as to the Mode of
Annoyance. I ara rauch inclined to think that unless the

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 143
Attack upon the Works in the Islands is either a total
or partial surprize it will fail — should they take Alarra at
any Moveraent of ours, & throw over a Body of Troops
on the Islands, the Approaches are so difficult that I think
the Attack will fail or at least will be attended with great
Loss. — The late heavy Rains have broke one of the Daras
& the Meadows are rauch softer than they were when this
Matter was under Consideration formerly. — But I should
hope these Difficulties may be obviated by Gen' Potter's
moving down to some convenient Distance — a Detachraent
of at least 3000 Men raoving over to him with Artillery, the
latter if concealed by a Night march I think the better.
The Tirae of Attack previously fixed & the raain Body of
the Array to cross agreeably so as to destroy the Bridge, &
cut off all Coraraunication of support at the same Time.
Should the Surprize fail I still think the whole Force of the
Array raay be drawn to a Point so as to make the Islands
too warm but I think it will be effectual & more likely to
bring on a general Action which it seemed to be a general
Sentiment should be avoided, & which I also in our present
Circumstances am of Opinion we ought not to seek.
" I shall trouble your Excell'' no farther at present. Cap'
Lee will give you an Account of the Observation of the
Day, which affords a happy Prospect. I am &c "J. Reed.
"P.S. — General Cadwallader desires me to mention that
a Party will go frora Gen. Potter toraorrow to meet the 12
pounder & Howitz which are expected for the purposes Gen.
Cadwallader suggested." '
BRIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM TO WASHINGTON.
" Fort Mercer, 17'" Nov' 1 oClk P.M., 1777
" Sir :
" In Consequence of the Enemy's arraed Vessells, laying
at Fort Mifflin, their Provision Vessells pass unraolested up
' See a letter from Colonel Christopher Greene to Washington, dated
Red Bank, November 17, 1777, in Sparks's " Correspondence of the Rev
olution," Vol. II. p. 43.

144 , Defences of Philadelphia in 1777,
to the Mouth of Schylkill, between Mud Island and Prov
ince Island. A considerable Nuraber of Shipping have
moved up this Day & anchored off Billingsport. It is prob
able they may intend landing the Troops from New York,
w°h in Addition to those already there, (I raean Billings
port) their Force may be such as to put it out of my Power
to prevent a Siege. — It is ray Opinion, if your Excellency
intends taking Possession of Province Island, this Post
should be held. If you give up all Ideas of preventing the
large Shipping's going up the River, this Post is of no essen
tial Consequence ; Batteries along the Shore, between this
& Manto Creek, might annoy greatly, or totally prevent the
Shipping from raising the Cheveau de Frize, if the Troops
besieging should be dislodged. — If your Excellency should
think of establishing a strong post at Cooper's Ferry, I
imagine all the large Cannon should be removed to Mount
Holley. In that Case the Troops here would be of great
Service. — It will require a large Force to keep the Shore so
as to play directly upon the Shipping — Was our Fleet to
continue under the Cover of this Place, the Enemy's Ship
ping would be in a worse Situation ; but, as they seem to be
upon the Wing, the Enemy will soon be able to open Bomb
Batteries from Fort Mifflin. This would not be terrible in
itself, but connected with an Investiture, would deprive the
Garrison of that Cover, w°h might otherwise be derived from
the Bank of the River. — Col" Greene will write you the Sen
tiraents ofthe principal Officers ofthe Garrison, upon their
present Situation. Provided the Eneray should attempt
crossing Timber and Manto Creeks at the sarae Tirae,
Woodberry will be a raore ineligible Situation than Haddon
field, as it will throw ray Troops between the Eneray's
Front and Fort Mercer; and prevent that Coraraunication
w°h would be necessary. However, in that Case, I shall act
according to iramediate Circumstances. — I hope j'our Excel
lency's Earliest Orders may be given upon these Matters. —
It is a great Misfortune, that we have lost Fort Miffiin;
Nothing but the undaunted Bravery, & persevering Pru
dence of Major Thayer, prevented a much greater Effusion

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777, 145
of Blood, than has taken Place. — The Ground was held
until the principal Cann[ona]de was over, when the greater
part of the Garrison were put off. The Major with a rear
Guard of about forty Men, reraained, 'till with araazing
Address, he had sent off the most part of the Stores, he
then came away. Had the Garrison been bro't away in the
Day time, the Loss must have been very great, as the ship
ping would have sunk raany of the Boats. I raention these
Circumstances, in repetition of what was said in ray last, as
it raay be said by some, that the Major continued too long
upon the Island. — If that was the Case, the Fault was mine,
not his. I can say from ray Conscience, I think never did
Man behave better.
" I have called for an exact return ofthe killed & wounded,
w°h will soon be transraitted; It is not so great as was
imagined or expected. " I am &c.
"J. M. Varnum."
captain CRAIG TO WASHINGTON.
" Frankfort, 18'" November, 1777
" Sir :
" I have not been able to gain any intelligence of Conse
quence since I had the Honour of Addressing your Excel
lency. " The enemy intend sorae Grand Menouver in Jersey
very shortly which I hope to be informed of — the[y] have
been making sraall enquiries respecting the Northern Array,
and what number of Men your Excellency has in Jersey.
" Enclosed is a rough Draught of the enemy's lines. I
have been so unfortunate as to raeet with an Accident
which prevents my being so active on the lines as I wou'd
wish to be — shoud anything new Transpire I shall embrace
the earliest Opportunity of coraraunicating it. I have &c.
" Charles Craig.
" I have this Moment received information of Lord Corn--
Wallace' crossing in Jersey last night with four thousand

146 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777,
Men. I shall write raore particularly this evening. I
have &c. "C. Craig.
"J past 11 o'clock.
" Since my last I have had I believe a True Acct. of Lord
Cornwals"' rout. Last night about 12 o'Clock his Lordship
Marchd from the City with Two thousand Granadiers, &
light Infantry, he intends his raarch for Willraington where
he is to Cross the river and march up the other side and
make an Attackt on Red Bank Fort. I have the Honor &c.
"C. Craig.
" Near Frankfort, J past 3 oClock."
lieutenant heard to WASHINGTON.
" Frankford, 18'" Novemb' Half past 2 P.M.
"Sir " I am just now creditably inform'd by M' Petre, direct
from the City, that last Night at 11 oclock, a large Body of
the Enemy under the command of Cornwallis, march'd to
the Neck, their intentions are to cross over the River
below the Fort. Mr. Cooper further adds, that this detach
ment has so much weaken'd them, that they have not now,
in the City, Men sufficient to Man their Lines. I have
receiv'd various Ace" of this, which, tho' in themselves they
do not all agree, yet all in this, that a large Nuraber has
actually gone off.
"M' Cooper received this piece of Intelligence from a
Sergeant, who supposing him & two or three who were with
him to be well affected to the Royal Army, had communi
cated this to hira. As Cap' Craig is now absent & I now
command, I have thought proper to send this. I have the
honor &c
" John Heard."
brigadier-general potter to WASHINGTON.
" Squair, Nov' 18*" Eight oClock P.M., 1777
" Sir :
" You have been inforraed of the enemys move to Ches
ter last night and of Generals Reed and Cadwalder & rae

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 147
Reconnitring them — by Reeds letter of this day frora Darbey
I am now to inform you that the[y] are all Imbarked on
Bord there ships and gon over to the Jarsey — Redbank
must now fall. I ara &c " Jas. Potter.
" P.S. — I send you enclosed the Deposition of Mr. Sel
lers.'" joseph reed to washington.
" Lewis Davis's 5 miles from Darby & near
" Springfield Meeting House, Nov. 18, 1777
" J past 9 oClock.
" Dear Sir :
" Since I wrote you this Afternoon we have got Intelli
gence, out of Chester, which may be depended on that the
Troops at Chester began to embark at 11 oClock this Morn
ing & past over to Billingsport with their Cannon, Wag
gons, &c. — they made no Secret of their Intentions to attack
Red Bank — They gave out their Number was 5000 & the
Inform' says there was certainly a great Number chiefly
British. " They said they would storm it to night if practicable
but they were so late that the Informant thinks they could
not effect it to night. He farther adds that Troops went
from on Board the Ships on the sarae Errand. L* Corn
wallis commands this Detachraent. We have thought it
best to despatch this Intelligence this Evening that you raay
be fully apprized of every Circurastance necessary for your
ExcelF to forra a Judgment of what raay be proper to be
done in our present Circurastances.
" Gen' Cadwallader supposing from the Position of the
British Troops that his Scheme was wholly frustrated, had
directed Proctor to return & proposed crossing the River to
Head Quarters tomorrow morning, but upon this Intelli
gence he has determined to stay. You may depend upon it
that every Precaution will be taken for the Safety of the
' Nicholas Sellers, of the borough of Wilmington, a shallopman, and
lately a prisoner with the English. The deposition refers to the cruel
treatment meted out to prisoners, and the efforts of the British to starve
them into enlisting on their side.

148 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777,
Pieces, & I make no Doubt they will be safely returned. I
ara &c' "Jos: Reed."

WASHINGTON TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM.
" Head Quarters, 18 November, 1777
" 10 o'clock P.M.
" Dear Sir :
" A Body of the Enemy marched last Night frora Phila
delphia, across the Bridge at the Middle Ferry and pro
ceeded to Chester. Their nuraber is variously reported,
being from 1500 to 3000, but I iraagine the former is most
likely, although some people, from the city, think their
numbers are rauch lessened upon their lines. They this
day erabark'd their Horses from Chester on Board Ships
and Brigs. This would seem as if they were going away,
but in ray opinion it is only a feint, and that they intend to
cross over to Jersey and pay you a visit. Therefore keep a
good look-out below ; if you do this, they cannot surprise
you because they raust raake a tedious debarkation of their
Horses. To all raatters contained in yours of yesterday I
refer you to the Generals St. Clair, Knox and Kalb, who
went down to consult with you and the Coraraodore. I
expect a report frora them to govern me in ray operations,
towards assisting you. If you could get some countrymen
to go into Billingsport with a small supply of provisions, he
might learn something of their intentions and numbers. I
ara &c*
" G° Washington."
' From Major Clark's letters I obtain the numbers of the regiments,
exclusive of the Hessians and light infantry, which enable me to give
the names of the colonels :
Fifth Regiment, Hugh, Earl Percy.
Fifteenth Regiment, Richard, Earl of Cavan.
Seventeenth Regiment, Hon. Robert Monkton.
Thirty-third Regiment, Charles, Earl Cornwallis.
Fifty-sixth Regiment, John Irwin.
' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel Tench Tilghman.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777, 149
WASHINGTON TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL GLOVER.
" Head Quarters, 19 November, 1777
"11 o'clock P.M.
" Sir :
" The Enemy having thrown a considerable part of their
force over Delaware, with an Intention as I suppose of
making an attack upon our Fort at Red Bank, occasions
me to Reinforce the Garrison & troops already their with
a large Detachraent frora this Array — in addition to which
it is ray desire & you are hereby order'd to March by the
raost convenient Route after receipt of this to Join the
Continental Array which may be in the Neighbourhood of
Red Bank under command of Major Gen' Greene, or any
other Officer there commanding, & take his directions with
respect to your conduct at that Post. You will take the
Necessary precaution for the Subsistance of your Troops
on their march to this place by Detaching Comraissaries
&c*, to provide for them. Your first Route should be
Directed to Haddonfield & from thence as Circurastances
will require. I am &c
" G° Washington."
WASHINGTON TO THB COMMANDING OFFICER OF EITHER POOR'S
OR PATERSON'S BRIGADE.
" Head Quarters, 19'" November, 1777
" Sir :
" Instead of proceeding to Coryels Ferry which I imagine
is your intended Rout, I desire you will raarch down as far
as Trenton, and there wait ray orders before you cross the
River. The moment you receive this, dispatch an Officer
to me, to inform me where you are, when you will be at
Trenton, & by what Road you will march, that I raay send
orders to meet you. I ara &c. " G° Washington.
" If this should reach you between Fleraington and Cor
yels Ferry, you are not to raarch towards Trenton, but
cross at Coryels, as first intended.'
' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens.

150 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
WASHINGTON TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM.
" Head Quarters, 19 November, 1777
" Dear Sir :
" In Consequence of advices rec* since I wrote you last
Night, I have ordered Gen' Huntington to march to your
Assistance. You will please to direct the detachment that
went first down to Fort Mifflin under the command of Col"
Sraith to return to carap, they are in so much want of
Necessaries that it is impossible for them to remain longer.
Let the Militia that are with you be put in the best order,
that they can be. I wish they had a good officer at their
Head to arrange them properly. I ara &c
" G° Washington.
"P.S. — It would not be amiss to collect all the Militia
you can in the Country adjacent." '
WASHINGTON TO COMMODORE HAZELWOOD.
" Head Quarters, 19 November, 1777.
"Sir "I am favor'd with yours of 15'" Instant covering the
Resolution of a Council of War held the preceding day
upon the Subject of my Letter of the 13'".
" The General officers who have been sent frora here
to Exaraine into & deterraine upon the Measures to be
adopted in that quarter have, I expect, by this time put
things in such a Train as will be most conducive to the
public Interest, & agreeable to the Officers concerned.
Should any matter be left undeterrained by thera, I shall
be able frora their Report to forra ray Opinion thereon &
shall immediately communicate it to you. In the mean
time I have no doubt but you will afford every Assistance
in your Power to repell any atterapt which raay be raade to
clear the channell or reduce the Fort.
" Inclosed you have a Letter from Presid' Wharton
which he requested might be forwarded to you. I am &c
" G° Washington."
' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel Tench Tilghman.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 151
WASHINGTON TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM.
" 19 November, 1777
" Sir :
" The Generals St. Clair, Knox and Kalb returned to
Camp this Evening — they are all clear in their opinions
that keeping possession of the Jersey shore at or near Red
Bank is of the last iraportance.' I have therefore deter
rained to raake such an addition to the Reinforceraent that
raarched this morning under Genl. Huntington that I am
in hopes you will be able to give an effectual Check to the
force which the Enemy at present have in Jersey. Gen'
Greene will take the coramand of the Reinforcement — Very
much will depend upon keeping possession of Fort Mercer,
as to reduce it the Eneray will be obliged to put theraselves
in a very disagreeable situation to thera and advantageous
to us, upon a narrow neck of land between two Creeks,
with our whole force pressing upon their Rear — Therefore
desire Colonel Green to hold it if possible till the relief
arrives. All superfluous Stores raay be reraoved if it can
be done after this reaches you ; that in Case of Accident
as little may fall into the hands of the Enemy as possible.
While we hold the fort it will be necessary for some of the
Gallies to lay close under the Bank to keep the Enemy
frora making any lodgment under it, and it will also secure
your Communication with the Water, which perhaps may
be essential, for I do not remeraber whether there is a Well
in the Works. There can be no danger to the Galleys while
we keep the Bank above them, and if we evacuate, if they
cannot get off", they raay destroy thera and put the Men on
Shore. I have recoramended this upon a supposition that
they will be very serviceable to you ; if you do not think
they will, you need not keep them.
" Altho I am anxious to have the fort kept, I do not mean
that it should be done at all events so as to endanger the
^Joseph Reed gave to President Wharton another account of the
conclusion of these generals, saying they " were of opinion that the
fort would not be tenable against regular approaches, and that the gal
leys would be of no use."

152 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
safety of the Men without any probability of success. I
ara &c' " G° Washington."
captain craig to washington.
" Sir :
"I received various Accounts yesterday respecting the
Enemy's Measures for making an Attack on Red Bank in
ray last Letter to your Excellency I raentioned the Eneray's
intending to raarch by Willraington, having receiv'd that
inforraation frora the City, But I think it very improbable —
That Cornwallace is march'd with a party of Troops is a
Certainty, said to be two Thousand Granadiers and Light
Infantry. But where he intends Crossing I am not able to
learn. The Enemy were last Night alarmed, and Drew in
their Piquets. Nothing New has Transpired since my last.
In that Sketch of the Eneray's lines I sent yesterday is
mentioned a Corap^ frora each Reg' being Draughted —
Those raen were Draughted before the reduction of Fort
Miffiin. I have the Honor &c. " C. Craig.
" Frankfort, 19"" Nov' 1777
" Since ray last Letter I have received a Certain Account
of a Nuraber of Highlanders crossing to Jersey last Night
about nine oClock. The[y] cross'd at Coopers ferry — their
Piquets were Drawn in last night, their lines very weak by
every inforraation. I ara &c.
" Wednesday one o'Clock"
BRIGADIER-GENERAL WAYNE TO WASHINGTON.
"Two Mile Stone, 2 oClock P.M. 19'" Nov. 77
"Dear Gen^
" The light Infantry who were Encaraped on the Right
between third & fourth Street have struck their tents this
morning — their Picquets are drawn in — we took possession
of the advanced Redoubt made of Rails, where they vacated
this day. I am just proceeding along the line to the left.
' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel Tench Tilghman.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 153
They have turned out the Guards from a house near the
City with a few of their Horse, but don't seem Inclined to
Advance — there is no Abetiu to the Right. I am &c
"Ant"^ Wayne."
brigadier-general varnum to washington.
" Haddonfield, Nov. 19'" 5 P.M., 1777
" This Morning my flying Camp was removed frora Wood
berry to this Place, as a raore fit Situation for benefiting Red
Bank. One principal Induceraent was a Concurrence of
Reports that the Enemy from Philadelphia were to form a
Junction with those from Billingsport. In w°h Case we
have a proper Position for attacking the Party first raen
tioned, & thereby facilitate the Retreat of the Garrison over
Timber Creek, w°h otherwise would be impracticable. — My
Videts have just inforraed me from Manto Creek Bridge,
Sunton, that the Enemy raoved, three Hours since with
about one Thousand towards that Bridge, but as it was
taken up, which they could not fail knowing, I imagine
their Principal Manoeuvre was filing off' frora their Rear to
their Right, in Order to cross five Miles above, where the
Creek is easily fordible. Should this be the Case, I fear
the Garrison must retreat in the Morning. However, I ara
this Moment going to Red Bank, & its Vicinity to satisfy
myself more fully, & consult with Col" Greene. I am so
fully of Opinion that they will bend their whole Force to
get full Possession of the Jersey shore, rather than ' I shall
recommend holding the Post longer than otherwise, think
ing that you will contend with them here, in great force,
rather than suffer their Points to be carried. Nevertheless,
not knowing what your Result may be, I shall not suffer the
Garrison to be sacrificed upon Conjecture; but continue
thera as long as I can cover thera — That most of the Troops
have left Philadelphia, appears in Corroboration of your
Excellency's ' Intelligence,' by daily Deserters who come
to me. I have no Doubt of it, and ara fully of your
Opinion respecting their Intentions. — I have Accounts
' In turning the leaf the general seems to have omitted some words.

154 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777 .
from Billingsport, by Deserters, two of whora came to
me last Night, of the sixty-third Regiment, that their
Force consists of three British Regiments from New
York, fifty five Rank & File in a Corapany. I am induced
to believe the Calculation true in part, as all the recruits
from England have joined in New York — Sorae Corapanies
of Guards, three and an half Hessian Battalions, two Green
Coats & Preston's Regiraent of Horse. These in Addition
to those before there. I have nothing raore to add, but that
I ara &c. "J. M. Varnum.
" By Major Ward, I now have your favor of this Day;
ara much obliged for the Reinforcement proposed; but can
not think much of the Militia of this part of Jersey. A
Reg' from the Eastern part has left us to Day, but another,
larger, came to us."
BRIGADIER-GENERAL POTTER TO WASHINGTON. "Nov' 20*" 1777
" I am under the disagreeble necessity of Informing
your Excilancey that on the eighteenth Instant one of my
picquats that Consisted of 1 Cap' 2 sub' 50 privits had 28
privits, Lieut. & 2 Sarg' taken prisners, and 3 wounded, as
to the perticulars I Refare you to General Cadwalder. I
ara &e. " Ja^ Potter."
washington to brigadier-general poor.
" Head Quarters, 20 November, 1777
"Sir " Upon receipt of this you are to direct your march to
wards this Army, and to be as expeditious as possible in
forraing a Junction. I ara &c " G° Washington.
" If in consequence of yesterday's orders you should have
filed off towards Trenton, continue that Rout and give me

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 155
notice of it by a Messenger. He will probably find rae at
the Crooked Billet." '

WASHINGTON TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL PATERSON.
" Head Quarters, 20'" November, 1777
" Sir " I yesterday wrote you a Letter with conditional direc
tions relative to your march ; upon receipt of this, you will
proceed by the way of Cory el's Ferry and join this army
as expeditiously as possible. I am &c
" G" Washington."
CAPTAIN MCLANE TO WASHINGTON.
" DiCKESON HOUSE, Nov' 20'" 1777
"Sir " Intelligences this day agree that the Enemy have but few
Troops in the City its currently reported that our people
have avaccuated Red Bank last night this Evening I fell in
with one Thornton as he was going to his faraily near the
lines he is a [ ] to the Gallys & left them this morn
ing in Bristol he left the River opposite Red Bank this
morning at 3 oClock he thinks that the fort was then in
our Posission and that our people had received Intilligence
that their was a reinforcement Coraeing to their assistance
he saw last Tuesday a Great Body of the Eneray Cross over
province Island to Billingport this day the Eneray's advance
Sentrys consist of horse and they are on aline frora delaway
to Schuylkill distance about one & half miles from the City —
no Picquits of foot his discovered this day outside their lines
this Evening I heard a smart fire of small Arms for about
one Minute it appeared to be across the Delaway towards
Cooper's ferry. Inclosd you have a few lines from the
same person that sent the last — this morning one Thomas
Smith of my party deserted to the Enemy he was one of
the Sixth Maryland regiment has raany of ray party are
Bare of Cloaths & desire to be Actife [?] if his Excellency
' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens. The letter to
General Paterson contained the same P.S. as that to General Poor.

156 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
thinks propper I will be prepared to receive the relief in
German Town tomorrow Evening. I reraain &c.
"Allan MT^ane.
\_Enclosure.']
" The Meadows Before the Redouts under water fortifica
tion acrost the roads of 2* & 3* Streets Intrenching along the
Brow of the hills all the rest of works as before raentiond
The longer you Delay the more Difficult it will be."
brigadier-general varnum to WASHINGTON.
"Haddonfield, 20'" Nov' 11 A.M., 1777
"Sir " Upon my Arrival at Red Bank last Evening, I found
that Col" Greene had rec* the same Ace" w°h I mentioned
to your Excellency in my Letter of yesterday; he was
farther informed that the Enemy were actually crossing
the Ford, In Consequence, he had given Orders for an
Evacuation. The Powder by Cap' Duplissis, was strewed
over the Fort. However, upon an Apprehension that your
Excellency might make a great Effort to save it, the Gar
rison agreed to reraain; Hoping to take up the scattered
Powder by Day Light. Iraraediately they were alarraed by
the rowing of many Boats near the Shore. This changed
the Scene and induced us to bring off the Men, leaving a
strong rear Guard to fire upon the Boats. Upon the
Approach of this Party the Boats retired. This caused a
diversity of Opinion at first ; But, it was finally the prevail
ing Sentiment, that the Boats retiring was a feint to draw
the attention of the Garrison, & lull them into Security,
'till a Party frora the Ford should throw theraselves be
tween Tim[b]er Creek and the Fort. From these Con
siderations, added to a dismal Circumstance that the firing
a single Musket in the Garrison would blow it up, or the
bursting of a single shell, — it was concluded to take away
the Men, leaving a small Number to set Fire in Case of
Necessity, & trust to their Fate. — We have bro't off many
Stores; a large Number of Waggons have gone this Morn
ing for the same Purpose. I believe the Possission will be

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 157
ours 'till we can get away every thing valuable, except the
heavy Cannon, or till a strong Force might again be sent
in. I am now ascertained the Enemy's Reason for not
attacking us here before. By a young Gentleraan, who
left Philadelphia last Evening, It appears that General
Howe iraagined there was a very large Force in New Jersey,
coraraanded by Gen' Greene. He has therefore ordered all
the Grenadiers down, with some other Troops to join Gen'
Willson : Lord Cornwallis commands the whole. It is
given out that they will take Red Bank or sacrifice their
whole Army — This Young Gentleman farther adds, that he
verily believes there are not to exceed one Thousand Men
in Philadelphia. J past 12. Your Excellency's Favor of
yesterday is delivered to me. — We shall send some Men
into the Fort. The Gallies have gone past Philadelphia. —
I cannot think the Eneray will atterapt the Force, [fort?]
after being once convinced that we are equal, or superior
to them in the Field. Should General Greene arrive before
they attack, & have sufficient Force to move over Manto
Creek, they must fight us, before they make any other
Attempt. If we beat them, Billingsport as well as red
Bank will be ours. Should they possess themselves of
Red Bank previous to General Greene's Arrival, that will
not prevent an Action, as the Fort will contain but few
Men, and, in the Result, will be his who conquers in the
Field. I am &c
"J. M. Varnum."
brigadier-general varnum to WASHINGTON.
" Mount Holley, 21" Nov' 1777
"Sir " Last Evening Fort Mercer was evacuated. Some of the
Shipping burnt this Morning. Most of the Stofes bro't
safely off. The Enemy, part at Billingsport, part between
Manto & Tiraber Creeks, and sorae at Fort Mercer. We
have moved to this Place as the first safe Position on
Account of the Creeks. Frora hence we can raove by the
Head of the Creeks, go down upon the Enemy, secure both
12

1 58 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
our Flanks by the Creeks, and by the sarae means, secure a
Retreat in Case of Disaster. It is a fit Situation for raaking
a Junction of the respective Cors. Gen' Huntington has
already joined rae. Gen' Greene is at Burlington. The
Militia araount to Twelve Hundred. Three Hundred here,
seven Hundred at Haddonfield. I have ordered them here,
but am just told ' they dont like the Manoeuvre.' Two
Hundred at Coopers Ferry & Gloucester : They are to join.
With the Great Force you have ordered, we shall be
superior, I believe, to the Enemy in the Field. We have
the Advantage by being at the Head of the Creeks; & it is
my firm Sentiment we ought & shall attack thera to Advan
tage. The Success of that Manoeuvre, as I raentioned before,
will determine the Possession of the Forts. I am &c.'
" J. M. Varnum."
major-general GREENE TO WASHINGTON.
" Burlington, 5 oClock P.M. Nov. 21. 1777
" D= Sir.
" General Varnum this raoraent acquaints me that fort
Mercer was evacuated last evening — Commodore Hassel-
wood informs me also that the greater part, if not all the
fleet except the thirteen Gallies were burnt this raorning;
one or two of the smallest vessels attempted to pass the
city and could not effect it, one was set on fire and one
other fell into the eneraies hands owing to the matches
going out — the People made their escape. My division
arrivd on the other side of the river about ten this morn
ing, but the want of scows to get over the waggons will
prevent our raarching until this raorning the greater part
of the night if not the whole will be employd in geting
over the baggage & Artillery-.
" General Varnum has retreated to mount Holly. I pur
pose to see him and General Huntington early in the
raorning if it is practicable to raake an attack upon the
' See a letter of this date from Joseph Reed to President Wharton, in
Reed's " Life of Reed," Vol. I. p. 338, where it is wrongly dated the
25th.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 159
enemy it shall be done ; but I am afraid the enemy will put
it out of my power as they can so easily raake us take such
a circuitous raarch by taking up the bridges over tiraber
creek — I cannot proraise any thing until I learn raore of
the designs of the eneray, their strength and the position
they are in. If it is possible to raake an attack upon em
with a prospect of success it shall be done.
" Col. Shrieve [Israel Shreve] was with rae this afternoon
about turning out the Militia. I wish he raay succeed, but
from the temper of the People, .there appears no great
prospect — I have heard nothing frora General Glover's
brigade. I hope Col. Morgan's Corps of light troops will
be on in the morning and Cap' Lee's troop of light Horse.
" The fleet are greatly disgusted at the reflections thrown
out against the officers ; the Commodore thinks the Officers
are greatly injured, he asserts they did their duty faithfully.
I am &c.
"N. Greene.
" N.B. — The Coraraodore this raora' informs me there is
three Sloops & a Brigg past safe by the City." '

" The lines at the North End of the City are nearly com
pleat, they are ditch'd & facin'd from Delaware to Schuylkill,
between each Redoubt — They have dara'd the Run at the
upper end of second street, in order to keep the back water
in, the raore to obstruct your coraing up to their works —
On Monday night Lord Cornwallis & Sir W"" Erskine, with
a large detachm' some say four, some 5 thous* men marchd
thro' Derby downwards, cross'd the Delaware & took Red
bank which was evacuated before they came to it, in Con-
' " Resolved, That an enquiry be made into the causes of the evacuation
of Fort Mercer, on the river Delaware, and into the conduct of the
principal officers commanding that garrison ; and that a committee be
appointed to report the mode of conducting the enquiry." — Journals of
Congress, November 28, 1777. The members of the committee were
William Duer, Francis Dana, and Francis Lightfoot Lee.
* From a new correspondent.

160 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
sequence of which, our brave little fleet were put to the
rout. I believe all the Gondelows & two topsails raade a
safe retreat up the River, the others are all burnt — this
raorning 21" Nov' 1777.
" One o'clock P.M. Just now a boat carae from W""
Cooper's ferry with a flag of truce. Bringing a Hessian
Doctor & four Ladies over, soon after she left the wharff,
the Delaware Frigate fired a Shot at her, she proceeded, till
the frigates Boat raet her took thera all out & made the
officer & his Crew prisoners, the passengers were sett at
liberty & the others took to jail. The reason of this
Violation I cannot guess, perhaps the fiag was not properly
authenticated by a General Officer, or they were Exasper
ated at the Burning our Fleet.
" They continue getting up Provisions by way of Schuyl
kil], they sell Rum at a Guiney p' Gall : pork they [have in]
plenty. Beef & Butter they have none, their flower all very
Musty — they begin at the Chevaux de frees tomorrow — they
say Cornwallis is to scower the Jerseys, whilst How is to
raaintain this City with about 3000 raen, they appear to be
in the greatest security, notwithstanding I have the greatest
reason to believe from every Ace' that they do not exceed
that Number.
" Their different preparations plainly denote their deter
mination of wintering here.
" They have pulled down peal hall & all the rest of the
houses facing their Redoubts. They have ordered all the
wood within their lines to be cutt for the use of the Array,
they are takeing up houses & when the empty ones are full
they quarter the rest on the Inhabitants — Beef in Market
is sold for 5/ p' lb. paper, & 3/9 hard money — thank God, the
Quakers Idol is fallen \ already, & I hope soon will to
nothing; 'tis reported & I believe it to be fact the Quakers
have lent thera 90,000 pounds the better to carry on the war
& some of thera at this tirae refuse to take it for goods.
" The array are very healthy & very saucy, say they have
men enough to defend their Lines whilst Cornwallis clears
the Country.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777, 161
" I hope His Excellency General Washington will soon
convince thera to the contrary."

major-general greene to washington.
" Mount Holly, Nov' 22, 1777
"D» Sir
" I carae to this Place yesterday morning — the Difficulty
of crossing the Baggage over the River prevented its coraing
up last night. The Boats & Scows at Burlington are under
very bad Regulations. — Gen. Varnura had retreated as I
wrote your Excellency before to this place. He left a
Party of Militia at Haddonfield : I ara afraid there has a
very considerable Quantity of Stores fallen into the Eneraies
Hands, but principally belonging to the Fleet. The Eneray
and the Militia had a sraall Skirraish at little Timbercreek
Bridge, the Enemy crossed there in the afternoon & en
caraped. They say they are going to take Post at Haddon
field to cover the lower Counties & open a Market from
thence; Those Counties are sorae of the raost fertile in the
State, from whence great Quantities of Provisions can be
drawn — A large Nuraber of Boats went up to Philadelphia
frora the Shiping yesterday raorning — there were sorae
Soldiers on board of thera.
" Col" Morgan's Corps of Light Infantry advanced this
morning for Haddonfield. If the Troops can be got in
Readiness I intend to put the whole in raotion this after
noon. We are greatly distrest for want of a Party of Light
Horse. I raust beg your Excellency to forward sorae as
soon as possible.
" I have heard nothing from Glover's Brigade. I sent an
Express to the commanding Officer yesterday, but from the
present Situation of things, I believe it will be best not to
wait their coraing up.
" Everj'^ Piece of Intelligence necessary for ray Inforraa
tion with Regard to the Moveraents of the Enemy in the
City, I must intreat your Excellency to forward to me by
Express.

162 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777,
" Col" Shreeve will attempt to turn out the Militia, but the
Commissary's Department is in such a bad Situation & the
People so unwilling to furnish Supplies, that it will be diffi
cult to subsist a large Body.
" A considerable Body of light Horse would be very use
ful here.
" Your Excellency's Letter of the 22* Ins' is just corae to
Hand. You have in this, all the Intelligence which I have
received. I ara &c.
"Nath. Greene."

WASHINGTON TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.
" Head Quarters, Whitemarsh, 22 November, 1777
" Dear Sir :
" I ara fav* with yours of yesterday afternoon frora Bur
lington. As you have crossed the River, an attack upon the
Enemy's detachment, if it can be made with success, would
be a most desirable object. But I must leave the propriety
of it entirely to your own judgment. I have heard nothing
more of Glover's Brigade than that they are advancing down
the Road frora Morris Town. I sent an Express to raeet
thera, and to turn thera down towards you, but I think you
had better despatch one of your family or an Officer to guide
them to you. There are not more than one hundred and
seventy of Morgan's Corps fit to march as they in general
want Shoes — they went yesterday and will join you I sup
pose this day. Capt. Lee's Troop are not yet come from
the other Side of Schuylkill, but they are expected every
instant, and will be sent immediately over to you. If you
can procure any account that you think can be depended
upon of the Number that the Enemy detached from Philad',
I beg you will send it to me. Or if they send any part of
their force back, let me know it instantly. I shall be anxious
to hear of every movement of you or the Enemy, and I
therefore wish to have the most constant advices. I am &c.
" G. W.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777, 163
"P.S. — I shall order an express to be stationed at Bristol
to bring on your despatches." '
WASHINGTON TO CAPTAIN ALLAN MCLANB.
" Head Quarters, 22 November, 1777
" Sir :
" I have this moraent received your Letter containing the
Proposals of sorae of the Inhabitants near the Enemy's
Lines. I will undoubtedly accept their offers of service
on condition that they give in a list of their naraes, and
engage to be under the absolute coraraand for the time
specified of such Officer as I shall appoint. This precau
tion is necessary, for otherwise they may only receive the
Public Money without perforraing the Duty expected of
them. I am &c.^ " G° Washington."
WASHINGTON TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM.
" 22 November, 1777.
"Sir " I have rec* your favors of 20 & 21" Inst, by this Express
I shall write to Maj. Gen' Green from whom you will re
ceive your Instructions respecting your Operations on that
Shore. " I ara at a loss to determine upon what Principle the
Powder was strewed over the fort at Red bank as I expected
that if an Evacuation was found necessary it might be
brought off, & if that was impracticable I considered the best
mode of destroying it was to throw it into the River unless
it was determined to blow up the Works with it, which
could never be effected by the raode which was adopted.
" As the Destruction of the Fort would naturally accom
pany the Idea of being obliged to Abandon it, I shall be
much disappointed if I hear it has not been executed. I
am &c " G° Washington."
' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel Tench Tilghman.
' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens.

164 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777,
WASHINGTON TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.
" Head Quarters, 22 November, 1777
" Dear Sir.
" I have received your Letter of this Day's date — it does
not appear frora any account worthy of credit, that any
part of the Detachraent which cross'd the Delaware under
Lord Cornwallis has return'd to Philadelphia. I am in
clined therefore to wish that you would advance to meet it
as rauch in force as possible — and that for this purpose you
would use every means to hasten the junction of Glover's
Brigade. I ara at a loss to account by what raistake Capt.
Lee's Troop is not with you ; that was originally intended
for the Service you raention, as it was esteemed the best
calculated for it. As a party of horse appears so essential,
that or some other will be ordered to join you immediately.
I ara &c " G° Washington.
"By an officer frora Glover's Brigade I was inforraed
that it reached Morris Town the evening of the 20""- I
sent a message to him to urge them forward and have
reason to think they are by this time in your Neighbor
hood.'" the navy board to washington.
" Continental Navy Board
" BoEDEN Town, 23* Nov' 1777
" Sir :
" It is with the greatest Concern we inform you of the
total Destruction of the Continental Fleet at Red Bank;
having been burned by our own Officers in Consequence of
a Determination of a Council of War. We have not yet
had an Opportunity of raaking a regular Enquiry into the
Reasons of so desperate a Measure. As far as we can
collect from the Officers and Crews here, it was occasioned
by the Assurances of the Coraraander of the Land Forces,
that they raust expect no further Protection from his Army ;
not even to secure a Retreat in Case of Emergency. But
' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777, 165
this must be the Subject of future Enquiry. Be the Cause
what it may, the Loss seeras at present, to be irreparable.
" We request the favour of your Excellency to let the
enclosed Packet go with your next Despatches to Congress,
& are &c. " Fra^ Hopkinson.
" John Wharton."

colonel JOSEPH ELLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.
" [Haddonfield], Nov' 23* 1777
" By a Woraan who came thro' the Enemy encampments
this day, says, that their raain Body lay at Woodbury &
Lord Cornwallis quarter'd at M' Coopers — That they have
a large encampment at Great Tiraber Creek Bridge and
their advanced picquet consisting of about thirty are posted
at Little Tiraber Creek Bridge. — They give out that they
have 10,000 Men, but she thought they had not half the
nuraber; raost of the Troops she saw were cloathed in
Greene — she thought they had between 80 & 100 Light
Horse." [Unsigned.]
MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE TO WASHINGTON.
" Mount Holly, Nov' 24, 1777
" D" Sir
" I have nothing new to coraraunicate to your Excellency
with Respect to the Motions of the Enemy — they remain or
did remain last night at Woodbury, with a Guard at Tiraber
Creek, consisting of about six hundred men. The Boats
that went up, raentioned in ray forraer Letter, I conjecture
had on Board the Baggage of the Array ; the Soldiers seen
on board, were the regimental Guards to the Baggage.
" The Militia of this State is dwindling to nothing. Gen.
Varnum says, there was upwards of 1400 a few days since
— they are reduced now to between seven & eight. Col"
Shreeve is gone out to see what Impression he can raake upon
the People, and to endeavour to draw together as large a
13

166 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777,
Nuraber as possible ; but I cannot flatter myself with any
considerable reinforcement. — I will endeavour to inclose
your Excellency a Return of our Strength in Continental &
Militia this Afternoon if possible.
" We are all ready to advance ; but the General Officers
think it advisable to wait the Return of the first Express
sent to Glover's Brigade ; to learn the strength & tirae the
Junction may be forraed with that Brigade. — I have heard
nothing where it is, notwithstanding I have sent three Ex
presses. — Capt. Lee is not arrived, neither have I heard any
thing of him — I could wish if possible, some Horse might
be sent, as every Array is an unwieldy Body without thera ;
& in this Country, they are raore immediately necessary,
to prevent the Enemy from sending out theirs to collect
Stock. "Col" Cox who is with me at this Place, says, if the
Eneray can open a Communication with the three lower
Counties, they will be able, independant of all the sur
rounding Country, to draw Supplies of every kind, neces
sary for the Subsistance of the Army & Inhabitants of the
City of Philadelphia.
"Your Excellency observes in your last, you must leave
the Propriety of attacking the Eneray to rae. Would you
advise me to fight thera with very unequal nurabers. Most
People, indeed all, agree they are near or quite 5000 strong
— Our Force is upwards of three, exclusive of the Militia,
which raay be from seven to eight hundred at raost. The
Situation the Eneray are in, the Ease with which they
can receive Reinforcements, & the Difficulty of our knowing
it, will render it absolutely necessary, whenever we advance
from this Place, to make the Attack as soon as possible. —
I had much rather engage with three thousand against five,
than attack the Eneray's Lines, & there is a rauch greater
prospect of succeeding, but still I cannot promise rayself
victory, nor even a Prospect of it, with Inferior Numbers.
I have seen of late, the difficulty your Excellency seemed
to labour under, to justify the Expectations of an ignorant
Populace, with great Concern. It is our misfortune to have

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777, 167
an Extent of Country to cover, that deraands four times our
Numbers — the Eneray so situated as to be very difficult to
approach, and from pretty good Authority superior to us in
numbers. Under these Disadvantages, your Excellency has
the choice of but two things, to fight the Enemy without
the least Prospect of Success, upon the common Principles
of War, or remain inactive, & be subject to the Censure of
an ignorant & impatient populace. In doing one you may
make a bad matter worse, and take a measure, that, if it
proves unfortunate, you raay stand conderaned for by all
military Gentlemen of Experience ; pursuing the other you
have the Approbation of your own mind, you give your
Country an opportunity to exert itself to supply the present
Deficiency, & also act upon such military Principles as
will justify you to the best Judges in the present day, & to
all future Generations. For my own Part, I feel Censure
with as great a Degree of Sensibility, as is possible,. and I
feel ambitious of doing every thing that coraraon Sense can
justify ; but I ara fully persuaded, in atterapting more you
raay raake a teraporary a lasting Evil. — The Cause is too
iraportant to be trifled with to shew our Courage, & your
Character too deeply interested to sport away upon un-
railitary Principles. —
" For your Sake, for my own Sake, & for ray Country's
Sake I wish to atterapt every thing which will meet with
your Excellency's Approbation — I will run any Risque or
engage under any Disadvantages if I can only have your
Countenance if unfortunate. With the Publick I know
Success sanctifies every thing and that only. I cannot help
thinking frora the raost Dispassionate Survey of the Opera
tions of the Campaign that you stand approved by Reason
& justified by every military Principle. — With Respect to
my own Conduct, I have ever given my Opinion with
Candour & to my utraost executed with Fidelity whatever
was coraraitted to ray Charge.
" In some Instances we have been unfortunate. — iln one
I thought I felt the Lour of your Excellency's Countenance,
when I am sure I had no Reason to expect it — It is out; of

168 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777,
my Power to coraraand success, but I trust I have ever
endeavoured to deserve it.
" It is mortifying enough to be a common Sharer in
Misfortunes, but to be punished as the Author, without
deserving it, is truly afflicting.
" Your Excellency's Letter of the 22*, but I suppose it
was of yesterday, this moraent came to hand. As I have
wrote so fully upon the Subject I have nothing to add, only,
that to advance frora this place before Glover's Brigade
joins us, unless we attack the Enemy without them, will
rather injure than facilitate our Designs. But if your
Excellency wishes the Attack to be raade immediately —
give me only your Countenance & notwithstanding it is
contrary to the Opinion of the General Offlcers here, I will
take the Consequences upon rayself.
" Inclosed is a copy of a letter frora Colo. [Joseph] Ellis
at Haddonfield.
" The Hospitals in the Jerseys are greatly coraplained of
— they prove a grave for raany of the poor Soldiery — prin
cipally oweing to the Negligence of the Surgeons who have
the Care of the Hospitals. How far these Coraplaints are
well grounded I cannot pretend to say — but I would beg
leave to recoraraend the sending of good trusty Officers to
inspect the Management of the Hospitals & to reraain there
until regularly relieved. I ara &c.
"Nath Greene.
" Major Burnet has just returned frora Glover's Brigade
— they will be at the black Horse to Night — Eight miles
frora this place.
" half past three oClock."
colonel ELLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.
" Haddonfield, Nov' 24'" 1777
"Dear Sir
" In complyance with your Letter of yesterday, I send
you a state of the Militia under my Command, which is

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777 . 169
about 400 Effective at this place, and about 100 in the
neighbourhood below Manto Creek ; the tirae of service for
which they carae out will for the greater part expire in a few
days ; Orders are out for Assembling the other Classes, so
that I hope to keep up the number. — As to the Enemy, frora
the best discoveries we have been able to raake, their raain
strength is at Woodbury, and their lines extend from Manto
Creek, to Little Timber Creek, an extent of six or seven
miles : their whole force about 5000, consisting of Brittish,
Hessians, and Marines; The Marines are employ'd in de
stroying the Works at Red Bank, when that is effected they
give out, they intend moveing their Array upwards, to Bur
lington and Mount Holly ; Their Post at Woodbury is ad
vantageous & difficult to attack. — Thus you have an Account
of matters in this quarter. If any thing interesting comes
to my knowledge, I shall transmit it with all possible speed.
I am &c. " Jos : Ellis.
" N.B.— The Enemy have 8 or 9 Field pieces on the dif
ferent Roads near Woodbury.
" Just now receiv'd Intelligence by a Person who carae
thro' part of the Eneray's lines on the upper-side of Great
Tiraber Creek, who says there is about 300 at and between
the two Tiraber Creeks."

brigadier-general weedon to major-general GREENE.
" Haddonfield, Nov' 24, 7 oClock
"D" General.
" We only arrived here a few rainutes ago. Sorae of our
parties have taken 9 prisoners, which will get to you early
to raorrow. From thera we have had I believe pretty exact
accounts of their nurabers, which the Marquis will enclose
you a particular account of They amount to 4250, 60
pieces of Artillery and 100 Light Horse. The Infantry
and artillery may be nearly right, but I doubt the informa
tion respecting the horse. They have this day advanced on

1 70 Defence's of Philadelphia in 1777,
this side Great Timber Creek with their Main Body, and
have pitched on this side of Little Timber Creek also —
Sorae of the prisoners were taken within two miles of the
town — They have no troops at Red Bank, and but few at
Billingsport. The prisoners say they intend crossing the
Delaware at Cooper's ferry. We shall look about us in the
morning, and shall communicate any thing of importance.
From' yours very sincerely " G. Weedon."
[On; back,'] — "I have this moraent rec* your Orders to
return; — myself & Horse is so rauch fatigued, that can't
get further than Moors Town tonight. Shall join you early
in y' Morning."

BRIGADIER-GENERAL POTTER TO WASHINGTON.
" Camp at the Squair, Nov' 24'" 1777
" Sir :
" I was at Chester yesterday the most of the shiping is
gon up the River as far as the Bend below Billingsport — ^the
enclosed lines I Received from a good honest whig that
would not assart a falce hood knowing it to be such he lives
in the City." [Unsigned.]
lEnclosure.']
"Sir " I Received y" Beef & Return thanks till better paid.
" The troops in thee Jerseys under Comand of Lo*
Cornwalis are not come back Neither is any others ar
rived here, but Shipping with Stores for array. No ace'
at all from y° Jerseys their Numbers here I cant find out
but I Beleave it takes one third part Daily for Guards in
& about town.
" Tbe meaning of that fire you see was the Americans

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 171
set fire to their fire ships & the reports of their guns
when the fire had got to them & the great Explosons
of Magazines on board the Galleys all got up safe to
Burlington." '

WASHINGTON TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.
" Head Qbs 24 November, 1777
" D» Sir :
"If you have not moved from Mount Holley when this
comes to hand, I wish you to wait there till you see Col"
Meade, who will set off immediately charged with some
important matters which I thought it improper to commit
to paper. This, however, you are to understand under this
restriction — That I do not mean to prevent you a moment
from prosecuting any Objects you have immediately in view
that promises success. I am &c ^
" G° Washington."

'This was from the same correspondent as gave the lines printed on
page 156.
' In manuscript of Robert Hanson Harrison. A council of war sat on
November 24 to consider the possibility of attacking successfully the
enemy in Philadelphia. No decision appears to have been reached, and
Washington requested each officer to submit his opinion in writing.

172 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.

[Note. — To properly understand the importance of the following
documents, it is necessary to recall the political position occupied by
Washington. The success of Gates at the northward had directed
public attention to his supposed capacity as a commander. The plot
which has passed into history as the Conway Cabal originated some
time before Conway had anything to do with it, and was in its nature
political rather than military. The idea entertained by some members
of Congress, notably those from the Eastern States, of the necessity
of having two commanders instead of one, offered a basis for scheming
in the military line. Did anything happen to Washington, it was felt
there was no man to take his place; and Gates, at the head of the
northern army, reaping the benefits of the preparation and leader
ship of others against Burgoyne, gave promise of a brilliant military
future, and thus presented himself as a legitimate successor to Washing
ton. This was early the feeling among certain members of Congress,
and their prepossessions were used in an illegitimate way to further the
ambitions of men wishing to advance themselves by means of Gates.
There is not enough evidence to prove that Gates was a party to any
scheme having a definite purpose to supplant Washington ; but there is
abundant evidence of a wish on the part of certain officers in close con
nection with Gates to push him for the chief command of the American
army. In seeking this they sought even more their own advancement
and advantage, and it is to Conway and Mifflin, out of Congress, and to
Samuel Adams, James Lovell, and, as is generally supposed, Richard
Henry Lee, in Congress, that the alleged Cabal owed a support and
encouragement that eventually led to an actual plot to advance Gates
even at the expense of removing Washington.
The surrender of Burgoyne directed attention to Gates. To accomplish
that object Washington had so far depleted his own army as to be in no
position to offer effective resistance to the advance of Howe upon Phil
adelphia. The battle of Brandywine and the reduction of Fort Miffiin
practically determined which army should hold the city, and the general
public, seeing only defeat in one quarter and a brilliant success in another,
jumped to the conclusion that the one was due to inefficiency, while the
other was caused by splendid military ability. It was, therefore, easy
to foment an opinion that Washington had been derelict in his share of
the campaign ; and as day after day passed with the two armies almost
within gunshot of one another, yet no engagement taking place, the popu
lace clamored for action. They could not understand why, with forces
supposed to be nearly equal in strength, an assault upon the British in
Philadelphia should not be attempted. They could not know how much
Washington had sacrificed of his strength to assist Gates, and they did
not know that the force returning from the northern army after its suc
cess did not rejoin Washington until after Fort Miffiin had fallen. It

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 1 73
was only when Glover's brigade and Morgan's corps had joined the
main army that Washington felt himself strong enough to entertain an
assault upon the city. Not only did he wish to make this assault, but
he was urged to it by the popular clamor, as it was thought that good
political results would follow a striking military success. He knew that
he had enemies in the army, and felt that he had them in Congress. The
sentence from Conway's letter gave him knowledge of the one, while his
friends in Congress kept him advised of the other. It was to determine
whether his idea of an attack on the British was practicable that he
called a council of war and requested the opinion in writing of each
general officer. These opinions are now published for the first time, and
must be considered in the light of something besides military policy,
although they are naturally concerned more with the military than the
political features.
One bit of evidence which I believe has not been heretofore known is
to be found in a report submitted to Congress by the Board of War on
November 21, or three days before this council was held. The military
questions in Congress had been under the control of a " Board of War
and Ordnance" until October, 1777, when a " Board of War" was estab
lished, to consist of three persons not members of Congress. As a begin
ning of a separation of executive from legislative functions, this was a
decided step in advance. It was on October 17 that the report consti
tuting the Board of War was adopted, or about two weeks after the
knowledge of Gates's victory had been obtained. On November 7 the
members ofthe Board were elected : Major-General Thomas Mifflin, Colo
nel Timothy Pickering, and Colonel Robert Hanson Harrison. Mifflin
and Pickering accepted their appointments. On November 17 Congress
determined to add two members to the old Board of War, and selected
Mr. Dana and Mr. J. D. Smith. This old Board, composed of members of
Congress, met on the morning of the 21st of November ; and, by a strange
oversight, the report they laid before Congress contained the name of
Major-General Mifflin as present and apparently taking a full part in the
proceedings as one of the members. This error was afterwards corrected
and his name stricken out. In this report is to be found the first sugges
tion formally made that Gates should be the President ofthe new Board.
It also contained other matter of such interest as to warrant its publica
tion in full. It will be seen that the paragraph applying to Gates was
postponed, as well as that which provided for the retention of Richard
Peters as Secretary to the Board. Six days later Congress proceeded to
the election of three Commissioners for the Board, and elected Major-
General Gates, Joseph Trumbull, and Richard Peters as the Commis
sioners, and specially appointed Gates as the President of the Board. It
is thus established that it was due to Mifflin that Gates received this high
appointment to a place in which he could more easily work upon the
sympathies and influence of the members of Congress, led rather by the

174 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
ambitions of others than by his own wishes. The general impression to
be gained of Gates, from his correspondence, is that of a rather dull,
well-meaning, and easily influenced man, such a man as would readily
become the tool of others possessed of greater capacity and more
unscrupulous. Nothing could be more cutting to Washington than the terms of this
report urging the claims of Major-General Gates to the position of Presi
dent of the Board. The principal matter urged by Washington upon
Congress as essential to future operations — a measure on which the future
of America would depend — was the formation of a new army of compe
tent number and engaged for the war, or for a longer service than twelve
months. As the end of the year was approaching, he found himself once
more face to face with the formation of a new establishment. He had
been providing for this contingency for months, and after an experience
of short enlistments through two campaigns, had become so convinced
of the attending evils as to see no safety in any other course than in a
reasonably permanent force of sufficiently long service to become dis
ciplined and accustomed to their offlcers, — a prime necessity in an effi
cient army. Nothing could have hurt him more than to have one
intoxicated by an unusual success cut in under him with the remark
that his policy was a " theory" and that there were other things more
important. The committee urged Gates's military skill as competent
to suggest "reformations" in the different departments of the army,
while his " character and popularity in the army" would facilitate the
execution of such reformations, — " a Task in the opinion of this Com
mittee more arduous and important than the formation of any new
Establishment, however wise it may be in Theory."
Fortunately, no such language was used in a formal resolution ; for it
is hardly possible to believe that Washington would have remained at
the head of the army under such a studied rebuke of his policy. Con
gress rejected the words of the report, and ou the 27th passed the
following :
Resolved, That Mr. President inform Maior-G-eneral Gates of his being
appointed president of the new constituted Board of War, expressing the
high sense Congress entertain of the general's abilities and peculiar fitness
to discharge the duties of that important office, upon the right execution of
which the success of the Araerican cause does eminently depend ; that he
inform general Gates, that it is the intention of Congress to continue his
rank as major-general in the army, and that he officiate at the Board, or in
the field, as occasion may require ; and that the general be requested to
repair to Congress witli all convenient despatch, to enter on the duties ofhis
new appointment. WOHTHINQTON 0. FoRD.]

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.

175

REPORT OP THE BOARD OF WAR.

Ag*

" At a Board of War, y" 21" Nov' A.M. 1777.
" Present, Major General Mifflin, M' Lee, M' Duer, M'
Jones, M' Harvey, M' Williaras & M' Dana.
" The Board beg leave to report to Congress
" That they have had a Conference with Gen
eral Mifflin on the late Establishment made by
Congress for conducting the War Department,
and are unaniraously of opinion, that a sufficient
number of Comraissioners have not been ap
pointed for giving due weight to the execution
of the Regulations which raay be recommended
by the Board, and adopted by Congress, and
particularly for enabling one of the Board of
Commissioners to visit from Time to time the
different Arraies, Posts, or Garrisons in order
to see that the Regulations adopted by Congress
are carried into Execution, and to examine what
are the wants of the Army, and what Defects or
Abuses prevail frora time to time in the difter-
^ ent departments.'
" That it wou'd further greatly tend to facili
tate the Business of the Department, especially
at the Coraraenceraent of the new Establish
raent, to secure the Continuation of the Services
of the Secretary of the late Board of War, who
in their Opinion has discharged the Duties of an
arduous and coraplicated Departraent in its In
fant stage, with Honour to himself, and much
Disinterestedness, and with Fidelity and advan-
^ tage to the Public.

Prio Qy

' Printed in the Journals of Congress, November 24, 1777.

176

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.

Postp*

Ag*

" The Board further beg leave to represent
that General Miffiin has express'd a warm Sol-
licitude that Major General Gates shou'd be
appointed President of this Board, frora a Con
viction that his Military Skill would suggest
Reforraations in the different Departments of
the Army essential to good Discipline, Order &
(Econoray, and that his Character and Popu
larity in the Array would facilitate the execu
tion of such Reformations when adopted by
Congress ; a Task in the opinion of this Cora
raittee raore arduous and important than the
formation of any new Establishment, however
wise it may be in Theory.
" On these Principles your Coraraittee are of
opinion " That two additional Coraraissioners should
be appointed to execute the Department of the
War Office in P'Saance of the Resolution of
Congress of the [I7th of October' ], and that
any three of the said Coraraissioners should be
a Quorura to transact Business; anything in
the former Resolutions respecting the Board to
^ the contrary notwithstanding. ^
" Extract frora the Minutes.
"Jos. NoURSE
" D. S. B^ War."

Endorsed by Thomson as " passed." In the hand
writing of Richard Peters is added :
" The Board are further of Opinion that the Resolution
pass'd on the Inst, relative to the Execution of the
War Departraent should be annuU'd; and that the Mem
bers forraer Committee of Congress Board of War should be
authoris'd to proceed on the Business of that Departraent,
* In manuscript of Charles Thomson.
' Printed in the Journals of Congress, November 24, 1777.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 177
till such Time as a Quorum of the Commissioners of the
War Office shall attend."

opinion of major-general GREENE.
" Mount Holly, 9 o'clock Nov. 24, 1777
" D" Sir
" I received your favor by Col. Mead who has coramuni
cated to me the design of an attack upon Philadelphia, the
consequences if successful are so desireable that I wish it
appeard to me raore practicable. — In war there must be
always soraething left to chance and I would always recom
mend to trust sorae consequences to the spirit and bravery
of the troops. An excess of caution which councils of war
are generally productive of, often deprives a country of the
advantages of a due exertion of the spirit & bravery of the
troops — but I have viewed this subject in and out of council,
I have weighed the good and bad consequences — I have
surveyd it in a Historical point of light, I have exaraind
it from ray own observations in the course of the war, and
I cannot think there is that degree of probability of the
atterapts succeeding that will warrant the undertaking. I
have not tirae without detaining Col. Mead too long to give
my reasons against the attack in full detail, but I think it a
hazardous attempt and will terminate to the injury of the
Continent and disgrace of the army. — I ara sensible that
many things pronounced impracticable before they were
atterapted have been crowned with success in the undertak
ing — ^But prudence forbids that being made a principle
which necessity alone can justify — I wish that it was in our
power to give that Army sorae capital wound — the reputa
tion of the Army and the happiness of the country loudly
call for it — but in consulting our wishes rather than our
reason, we may be hurried by an irapatience to atterapt
something splendid into inextricable difficulties.
" The depreciation of money, the corruption ofthe people
and the dislike to service that prevails throughout the army
will justify measures at this day that might wear the com
plexion of rashness under different circumstances. How

178 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
far these considerations may authorise the attempt I cannot
pretend to say. One thing I would beg leave to recom
raend, that is if your Excellency thinks of attacking the City
this winter improve the present moraent for sure I am what
ever reinforceraents of militia may be drawn in to aid the
army they cannot render it so formidable and equal to the
attempt as it is at this hour. I am very willing to lay aside
my own private Judgraent and second the attempt — you
may depend upon it Sir that I will as freely embark in the
attempt if your Excellency thinks it warrantable as if I was
of the same sentiraent, and whatever raay be the event my
opinion never shall be known.
" The troops here are under marching orders — Glover's
Brigade will join us in the raorning — I intended to advance
in the raorning at nine, but Col. Mead's coraing and recom
mending the postponing the raarch until I hear further from
your Excellency, and as the troops coming in will want one
day's rest I thought it best to countermand the orders for
raarching until I hear from your Excell^ and I am further
induced to the raeasure because I dont apprehend the diffi
culties of attacking Lord Cornwallis will be increasd from
one or two days delay. The Eneray give out they are
10,000 strong and that they intend to march to Burlington.
" I wish your Excellency to weigh the subject coolly and
take your measures accordingly — I shall be perfectly satis
fied be the result what it may. " I am &c.
"N. Greene."
OPINION OF LORD STIRLING.
" Camp, Nov' 25'" 1777
" Sir :
" In Compliance with your Excellency's request that each
of the General Officers met in Council yesterday Evening,
should give you their Sentiments in writing on what Meas
ures had best be pursued in the present Exigency of our
affairs ; I must now beg leave to give it as my opinion that
as all the reinforcements we had any reason to expect, have
now Joined the main Army, and as a Considerable body of

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 179
the Enemy's army is detached into New Jersey under the
Command of Lord Cornwallis, a favorable opertunity is
presented for an immediate Attack of the Enemy. That
other Circumstances render this measure absolutely neces
sary. That from all I have heard said, or that has occurred
to me on the Subject, I think the following plan of Attack
most feaseable, 1" That the Enemy's Lines on this side
Philadelphia be attacked at Daylight by three Columns
properly flanked and supported. 2* That two thousand
men be drawn from General Green and embarked in Boats
at Dunker's ferry, to proceed to Philadelphia, land at or
near Spruce Street, push thro' to the Comraon, endeavour
with part to secure the Bridge over Schuylkill, and with
the reraainder to Attack the Eneray in the Rear of their
Lines. 3* That five hundred Continental Troops with the
Millitia under General Potter possess such of the hills on the
other side of Schuylkill as command an Infilade of the
Enemy's Lines, and while part of them carry on a Brisk
Canonade in that place, the rest of them proceed to the
Bridge over Schuylkill and wait an oppertunity of attacking
the Works there in front, when the party from Spruce Street
make an Attack in the Rear. The Landing of the party at
Spruce Street should he effected if possible just before day
light, as it would greatly facilitate their passage thro' the
Town and bring the Alarm to the Rear of the Enemy's lines
in time to Cooperate with the raain Attack in front. These
are outlines of the plan I would propose, and subrait it to
your Excellency & am with great Regard and Respect
" Your Excellency's most Hurable Servant
" Stirling."
opinion of major-general sullivan.
" Camp, Whitemarsh, Novem' 25'" 1777.
" Dear General :
" Agreeable to y' Ord" of Last Even* I have cons* the prac
ticability of making an Attack upon the Eneray in Ph 
& weighed its probable Consequences in every view That
occurred to me.

180 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
"In order to Deterraine whether such an Attempt is Likely
to succeed it is necessary to consider the Enemys situation —
The Manner of our making the Attack on the Lines — the
Mode of Attack we raust adopt for carrying the city after
we have made ourselves masters of their Lines & the prob
able method the Eneray raay adopt to Render our Designs
abortive. The Right of the Enemy is secured by the Dela
ware, their Left by Schuylkill & their Rear by the Junction
of those Rivers. Their front is partly secured by an Inac-
cessable Pond & the Residue by a Chain of Redoubts
strengthened by Abbatties in part & partly by circular
Works — These Redoubts being 14 in number. The Attack
upon them raust be total or partial if the whole are to be
attacked, as works cannot be carried but by Columns. The
attacking part of your force in Front must be Disposed in
fourteen Colurans to carry 14 Redoubts raanned with 100
men each. After carrying those they are to assurae a Dif
ferent Forra to attack the city which will then be on their
Left Defended by 4600 raen, even if we suppose the Enemys
whole Force in Philadelphia to amount to no raore than
6000. If a partial attack is made upon these Redoubts, it
raust be on these Left, for if these Right be attacked &
carried those Redoubts which reraain on their Left will with
their field pieces play obliquely on the Rear of y' Troops
while Forraing & raaking the attack on the city. Should
then their Left be attacked & carried & your Troops pass
thera & forra agreeable to your most Sanguine Expecta
tions & advance towards the city they will have the chains
of Redoubts on their Left, the Schuylkill in their Rear, the
city & the Delaware in front & the Delaware & Schuylkill
on their Right. When your Troops advance to the city in
Line they will find the A^all of Brick Houses opposed to y°
right of their Line, The upper stories of those Houses well
filled by musqueteers & the main streets by which alone
they can penetrate filled with men. Drawn across of sufficient
Depth to oppose any part of your Line that may come
against them, & the whole Defended by a Train of artillery
surely (?) superior to any you can possibly bring against

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 181
them, & this artillery being placed in front of the Houses
makes no Interval in their Line & is compleatly covered by
The Musqueteers occupying the upper Lofts of The Houses.
This Disposition will oblidge you once more to form Columns
to penetrate the Streets, in Doing which your Troops must the
moment they enter the city expect a Fire in front frora the
Troops opposed to thera & on both Flanks from the Houses :
These circumstances must occur to the party attacking in
Front. How far they may be assisted by a party thrown
into the city by water I will not Determine. If the party in
front is successful they may be saved — if not they are inevi
tably lost — before we promise ourselves Success from this
Stratagem it will be proper to consider how far this plan
will be Likely to be Discovered by the Enemy in Season to
prevent its Effects. Every person who has attended to the
Noise made by a Fleet of Boats Rowing in the Night raust
be sensible that they will be heard at Lest two miles & the
Noise will Direct the Eneray where to raake their opposi
tion — It cannot be supposed that the Enemy will be stupid
enough to Let their whole army run to oppose them — they
have alarm posts which they will repair to & send a sufficient
Number of the Reserve with field pieces to oppose or entrap
thera. It will be far frora having the Eftect Designed by a
Feint which answers no other purpose but to Induce the
Enemy to suppose your whole force being thrown to a point
with an Intention to make your raost vigorous effort there
& by this means Draw them from the posts you wish to
carry. They will easily know that you have not boats to
Transport any considerable part of your army to the City
by water, nor would it be prudent in you so to do. They
will therefore consider this as a Feint & Treat it accord
ingly while they prepare to Receive your Real Attack in
Front which this Feint will sufficiently announce to them —
with Respect to the probability of carrying the Lines &
afterward the City Defended by an army almost equal in
Number to that part of yours which you can expect any
thing from is what both reason & experience speaks Loudly
against. I have soraetimes Read of Lines & partial Retrench-
14

182 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777 .
ments being carried but in the course of my Reading (which
has not been Inconsiderable) I have never Read of a Chain
of Redoubts Covering the whole Front of an Army being
carried (even where they had not as in the present Case
rivers covering every other side of them). I cannot help
observing that some Gentlemen who think we can easily
carry those Redoubts say that if we are Defeated we have a
Strong and secure Carap to Retreat to. how it can be sup
posed that a Carap without Lines or Redoubts can be
better Defended by a Defeated array against a victorious
one than Lines & Redoubts can with Troops, against others
upon equal footing only is beyond ray Conception. I know
it is Said that these Redoubts are weak, but it would b|e ab
surd to suppose that the Redoubts they have been Labour
ing at six weeks are not as perfect as those Thrown up by
Peter the Great in one night which Defeated the best army
in the world or equal to that single Redoubt which Ruined
the British Array at Bunkers Hill. Mr. Howe has never
atterapted a Redoubt since but at Red Bank & was Defeated
— ^he was several Days with Double your nurabers within
musket shot of y' Lines on Long Island & White Plains &
feared to attack you — he has no Conception that Lines are
so easily carried but if in this he is mistaken all military
writers agree that the attack of a village is the most Hazard
ous Enterprise in war, & has seldom been attended with
Success. Experience has so far convinced the King of Prus
sia that he is deterrained never to attack another, if it be
said we must Reduce it by Cannonnade my answer is that
raust be a work of tirae, especially as they have raore cannon
& heavier raettle than we.
" I know the world expect something from this Army &
our affairs call for it, but no Caprice of the Greedy Multitude
should induce us to Sacrifice the Army — a Defeat will be so
far from helping that in my opinion it will ruin our affairs.
The comraon people will Discover Howes superiority to
both our arraies without Considering the advantage he had
against them — those who have sense enough to Discover the
advantages he had against them will condemn the attempt

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 183
as unwarranted by Reason or Experience — so that from
Different views the Country will become universally Dis
couraged, which I fear will end in the Ruin of our Cause —
Upon the whole I think the most certain method to retrieve
our affairs, to strengthen our friends & Discourage onr Ene
mies as well as to establish the Currency of our money will
be to put the army in such a Situation as will render it neces
sary for Mr. Howe to fight us or Loose his honor & the con
fidence the people have in his arms. Once it is known that
by avoiding you he acknowledges your Superiority in the
field his very friends will Despise him for his weakness &
Deceit. Yours will be encouraged & value your money at
a high rate when supported by those Arms which (this
hitherto) arrogant Invader dare not Attack. — There is still
another mode of attack upon the Enemys Lines which is to
pass your Columns between the Redoubts, if this should
be attempted & the Enemy should retire & Draw up in Rear
of their Works Leaving in them a sufficient Number to
man thera your Troops raust advance under a Front & Two
Flank Fires till they have passed the Redoubts when they
will have an additional one in their Rear frora the Redoubts
they have passed & after Enduring all this they will have to
attack the City under all the Disadvantages before men
tioned, in which if they are successfuU they will do what no
other Troops have ever accoraplished.
" I know it is said by sorae that your Excellency's charac
ter & that of the whole Array will suffer if soraething is not
attempted as the Northern Army is called to our Assistance,
&c. I am far from thinking so. But Let us consider what
foundation there can be for censure. It is beyond a Ques
tion that General Howe has been much Superior to you in
Numbers thr" the whole Campaign. Yet you have fought
him & th" the field remained his the victory was yours — he
to add to his Force & to get a Decisive Superiority over you
in the field called for a Reinforcement & you to counteract
him did the same. You by this raeans becarae 13000 strong
& he remains at Least twelve, if your additional railitia
will make up for the want of Discipline in your young

184 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
Troops I think it is all we can expect. Where then is this
Superiority in nurabers on your side which will warrant your
raaking an attack so Likely to Compleat the Ruin of your
Currency : an attack condemned by every military writer
& unwarranted by Reason or Experience ? Actions always
take their Character from the Success that attend thera, &
those Gentlemen who urge this matter to save the Credit of
the Army Deceive themselves & you ; for if you are unsuc
cessful the Credit of the Army will be Destroyed & the
Confidence of the people Lost beyond recovery & your own
Character must suffer. It has been urged that these works
may be carried by Surprize : I have ever understood that
works were constructed to prevent a Surprize & never
once conceived it possible to surprize & carry 14 redoubts
especially when the Enemy's first line is encamped in Front
of them — it would be needless to give your Excellency in
stances of such attempts upon Redoubts alone and unforti
fied Villages being rendered abortive. Military Books are
full of them those writers tell us that a single Stone House,
mill or Church if well defended cannot be reduced by [but ?]
by cannon, if this be true with respect to one a Regular
Line of them opposed to your whole Front must be much
more Difficult. What success a Cannonnade from Troops in
the open field is Likely to have upon others covered by a
village & redoubts & possessed of a Superior Train of artil
lery requires no great share of military knowledge to Deter
mine. I have mentioned some unfortunate attacks upon
Redoubts that have fallen within our own knowledge. I
will at present mention but two that have proved so upon
villages not Defended by Lines or Redoubts. One was in
Corsica the first campaign made by the French ag' it, where
the whole French army were cut to pieces in storming a
small village defended by Paschal Paoli's Brother with a
Handful of Corsicans & at German Town one Stone House
snatched from us a victory which was about compleated. I
am therefore clearly of opinion that the attempt would
be Hazardous & must End in Ruin to the Army & to the
American Cause, but should y' Exce^ think the attempt

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777 . 185
practicable I shall cheerfully give up my opinion & use every
effort in my power to carry it into Execution with Success.
I have the honor to be your Excey' raost obed' Serv'
"Jn" Sullivan."
opinion of major-general armstrong.
" Camp at Whitemarsh, 25'" Nov, 1777
" Sir :
" Without such an acquaintance of the Eneraies lines as
wou'd discover to you where they are raore or less accessi
ble, I cannot well approve of an attack upon them, nor can
I conceive the opposite nurabers at Philad' under six thou
sand or upward. — And question whether an attack can be
successful if the lines are not penetrated in so short a space
of time (perhaps some seven or at most ten minutes) as will
render it irapossible for the party thrown into the City
shou'd the flrst atterapt on the lines fail, to contribute any
effectual influence. The principle upon which that part of
the disposition is forraed is perfectly just, but the nurabers
too few, and the contingencies various.
" In the present view of things I rather approve carrying
the Army over Scuilkill & making tryal of any advantages
that yet raay be derived from a possession of the Islands
&c. &c., by which raeans either the Eneray tnay be drawn out
or the Scuilkill pass'd to advantage on the Ice. At the same
tirae I am totally submissive to y' Excellency's coraraands,
beging leave only to add that whether the attack is raade or
not, but especially if it is, the far greater part of y' force in
the Jersey raay suddenly be recalled and join the Array.
And that I ara with the greatest respect &c
"John Armstrong."
opinion of the chevalier du portail.
" 25 9"" 1777.
" To attack the Eneray in their Lines appears to me a
difficult and dangerous Project. It has especially this very
considerable Inconvenience — the exposing our Army in case
it does not succeed to a total Defeat. This is easily demon-

186 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
strated. One of the principal raeans proposed is to throw
two thousand raen in the rear of the Eneray — if we do not
succeed these are so many men absolutely lost. As to the
main body of the Array which is to attack in front, it must
pass through the Intervals left between the Abattis and
Redoubts, which they say form very narrow Passages — if
after penetrating we should be repulsed can Troops in dis
order return easily by the Passages through which they
were introduced — will it not be very easy for the English to
cut off their Retreat. Our whole Army then may be de
stroy'd or made prisoners. Now does it become this Army
which is the principal one, to run such Risques — does it be
come it to stake the Fate of America on a single Action ? I think
not. For my part I never would place this Army in a Situ
ation where its Rear was not perfectly free, much less where
it will be inclosed on all sides without raeans of Retreat.
To justify such an Enterprise the success raust be alraost
certain. To judge of this we have only to take a view of
the Dispositions which must be made for this attack. This
View will render the Difficulties evident. First — two thou
sand men are to be introduced by a River of which the
Enemy are wholly Masters. If we embark them near the
Enemy the noise raay alarm them — if at a distance, the
cold which they will undergo, will render the use of their
Arms exceedingly difficult in the raorning — besides can we
flatter ourselves that the River side is unguarded. Let us
reflect that a single man is sufficient to make this project
miscarry and cause us the loss of two thousand men.
"As to the Attack in front — these are nearly the Dispo
sitions which would be followed — We should raarch upon
as raany Columns as there are Roads leading to the Enemy
— upon our arrival in their presence, each Commanding
Officer of a Column, according to the size of the works be
fore hira, and the nuraber of raen which he judges are con
tained in them, divides his Troops into two parts, one of
which surrounds the works and attacks them vigorously,
while the other marches boldly through the Intervals and
falls upon the troops in the Rear. But every one sees how

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 187
much harmony is required in all these dispositions. How
much presence of mind in the Superior Officers — how rauch
firmness in the troops who have to execute all their ma
noeuvres under the fire of an Enemy who are in a great
raeasure cover'd.
" If the Enemy's works are not inclosed, the Enterprise
would be rauch less dangerous — if they are, the Enterprise
is too hardy.
" His Excellency I think desired us to say a word respect
ing the operations in Jersey. In general it seems to rae
that we can do nothing better than to endeavour to attack
the Enemy's Force there with superior numbers — but there
is a very important Observation to be raade, which is that
we should not weaken ourselves too rauch here ; for we are
to consider that the Enemy may recross their Troops in one
night and attack us by day break with their whole force.
" If however an attack be determined upon, the Enemy's
Works should be raore particularly reconnoitred.
" The Chevalier Du Portail." '
opinion of baron de kalb.
" According to His Excellency General Washington's or
ders, and desire of having every Gentleman's opinion on
the Subjects laid before the Council last evening.
" Mine is to attempt an attack on the lines & City, as soon
as the Plans thereof can be properly laid, all necessary dis
positions and calculations made, as to the raode & time. In
respect to the Plan much raust depend on intelligences of
the Eneray's Position & collected or separated forces, and
the whole Enterprise on secrecy and Expedition.
"Two essential points would be necessary to be known.
" 1" Whether a passage for a Column will be practicable
on the Bridge or middle ferry on Schuylkill river, to make
there a strong attack, or whether the Enneraies take down
the Bridge in night time. In this case a small body of
' This opinion was given in French. I have used a translation made
by Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens.

188 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
troops and sorae artillery would be sufficient on the right
bank ofthat river to disquiet & annoy thera in their Lines,
and the whole army to be Employed to attack in front with
different Columns.
" 2" Whether the Key & City Shore of Delawar be not
strongly defended, either by Pickets, intrenchments, row
Gallies, floating and other Batteries, and whether the Noise
of the Boats to be employed there, will not prevent or de
feat the Execution of a landing, for if th' attempt should
fail by such obstructions, the boats could hardly be brought
off and these troops would be in great danger of being either
sunk or taken. If on the contrary no such obstacles were
to be feared, a surprise on that side and a well timed attack
in the rear of the lines woud undoubtedly insure a com
pleat Victory.
" Many more things could be said on this subject.
" As for rayself and Division we will do our best in what
ever part of the Enterprise and attack. His Excellency will
find proper to Eraploy rae.
"Baron de Kalb.
" At Camp, 25 9"" 1777"
opinion of brigadier-general irvine.
" Whitemarsh, Nov' 25*" 1777
" Sir :
" I have seriously revolved in my mind the subject that was
debated in Council last night, and notwithstanding the pres
ent disagreeable situation of our affairs, cannot think that we
are yet reduced to the necessity of hazarding the total destruc
tion of the array by a general attack, on the very ground
that general Howe would wish to fight us on ; to attack re
doubts &c* with any prospect of success, we should be rauch
superior in nurabers to the enemy and at least equal to them
in discipline, were we possessed of these advantages„,& had
boats sufficient to throw about 3000 raen into their rear I
should chearfully vote for the proposed attack, as in my
opinion the defeat of gen' Howe would then be as certain,
as, I am afraid ours would be were we to attack him with
our present strength.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 189
" I could therefore wish that the array was placed in such
a position (either on this or the other side of Schuylkill) as to
invite or oblidge general Howe to leave his strongholds &
seek us in the field, as the probability of success in a general
action then, would be raore in our favour with equal numbers,
than in an attempt upon his lines with our present triffiing
superiority. " I have had but little experience in war, & therefore give
my opinion on this important question with diffidence, should
your excellency or the major part of the council determine
on the attack, I shall chearfully sustain the part assigned to
me, & exert my utmost abilities to procure success. I
have &c. "James Irvine."

opinion of brigadier-general maxwell.
" Sir :
" Agreeable to your Excellency's request of last night that
I should give ray opinion this raorning in writing concern
ing the raaking an attact on Philadelphia iraraediately — I
ara not for attacting it at present, and will proceed to give
some reasons why I would not, viz : It is but a few days ago ;
before General Green & Huntington crossed the Dellaware
that we determined in a full council that an Attact on the
Enemy in their Fortifycations &c. was by no raeans eligible,
and I think we was as strong then as we are now on this
side. It is urged that if we do not raake an attact on the
Town we raust be put to the greatest difficultys to raise
another Arraey, keep up our credit, &c*. I am of opinion
if we throw the Armey away we have, without some good
appearance of success we are much raore likely not to get
another one nor support the Credit of our raoney. I ara
for attacting and Harrassing thera by every raeans in our
power ; by any other method than that of attacting them in
their works. I am &c.
"W" Maxwell.
"White Marsh, 25'" Novbr. 1777.

190 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
" N.B. — I have heard that the Eneray has got up 2 or 3
small arraed Vessels to Philadelphia by people that carae
out yesterday." opinion of brigadier-general paterson. " Nov. 25, 1777
"Sir: " The proposed attack on Philidelphia in ray Opinion will
be so hazardous that we cannot be justified in prosecuting
of it, as a Failure will raost certainly be attended with the
loss of great Numbers of our Troops, which I am fearfull
would be attended with Fatal Consequences My perfect
Ignorance of the Country renders me intirely incapable of
recommending any other Plan, but shall with Chearfulness
do ray utraost to put in Execution this or any other your
Excellency shall think adviseable. I am &c.
" Jn" Paterson."
opinion of brigadier-general poor.
" November 25*" 1777
" Sir :
" I am sencable that the Situation of our Country loudly
Calls for the Exertions of this Army.
" But fear an atact upon the Lines Round the City of
Philidelphia will be unsucesful therefore dont advize to it.
" as I have jest arived to Camp & not acquainted in the
Countrey beg to be Excused from proposing a new Dis-
posistion of the Array. I am &c
" Enoch Poor.
"-B. (?'."
opinion of BRIGADIER-GENERAL SCOTT.
" White Marsh, 25"" Nov' 1777
" Sir :
" I am for making an attack, so soon as things Can be put
in readiness. As to the plan I can Think of none better
than that propos'd by Gen' Cadwalader, with this Altera
tion, that the partie proposed to land in the City be detached
from Gen' Green and not taken from this army. I Have

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 191
two reasons for this, the one is that those raen with him are
the Flower of the army, and that it will requier the best
men we can pick to effect the landing if opposd. My other
Is that we cant well spare them from this army. I have &c
" Ch' Scott."

opinion op BRIGADIER-GENERAL SMALLWOOD.
" Camp, Novemb' 25'" 1777
" Sir :
" I have revolved in my Mind the Subject of your Requisi
tion last Night, and placed it in every Point of View, and must
confess I am much embarrassed. I see the Propriety and
Necessity of an Attact, I view with Pain the pressing Ex
pectations of the Public, the Reputation of the Array at
Stake, the depression of our Money, the difficulty & hazard
of the proposed Attact, and the Misfortunes, and I may add
the alraost inevitable destruction which must ensue upon a
Defeat, — and upon due Reflection let it suffice to say I am
against an Attact on the Enemy's Lines, from an Impres
sion that our Troops are not equal to it, unless there was a
moral certainty of throwing in the Parties proposed, down
the Delaware & across the Schuylkill, to alarm & make a
Diversion on the Flanks & in their Rear, but I think this
Event wou'd be doubtful & uncertain, as well as extremely
hazardous for the Delaware Party & might in general sub
ject the Army to too great a Sacriflce upon such a Contin
gency. " I shou'd therefore think it raore eligible to raanoeuvre,
and endeavor to draw Gen' Howe out of his Lines to an
Engageraent, w°" I shou'd judge is both Practicable, and
probable. I have the Honor &c. " W. Smallwood."
OPINION of BRIGADIER-GENERAL WAYNE.
" Camp at White Marsh, 25'" Novem. 1777
" Sir :
" After the most Dispationate & Deliberate Consideration
of the Question your Excellency was pleased to propose to

192 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777 .
the Council of General Officers last Evening; I am Soleranly
and Clearly of Opinion — that the Credit of the Array under
your Coramand, the Safety of the Country — the Honor of
the American Arras — the Approach of Winter which in a
few days will force you frora the field, and above all the
Depreciation of the Currency of these States, — Points out
the Immediate Necessity of giving the Eneray Battle.
Could they possibly be drawn frora their Lines, it's a Meas
ure Devoutly to be wished.
" But if that cannot be Effected, It is my Opinion that
your Excellency should March tomorrow morning and take
post with this Army at the Upper or North End of German-
town — and from thence Imraediately Detach a Working
party to throw up, or effect to throw up some Redoubts
under the direction of your Engineers. — this Intelligence
will reach the Enemy — they will Conclude that you Intend
to make good your Quarters there, and however desirous
they raay be to dislodge you — yet it will take up sorae time
to withdraw their force frora tbe Jersey.
" by this Manoeuvre you will be within Striking Distance,
the Enemy will be deceived by your Works, your Troops
will be fresh and ready to raove the same Night so as to
arrive at the Enemies Lines before day light on thirsday
Morning Agreeable to the proposed plan of Attack — with
great part of which I am in fellowship — the outlines are good
— they may be Improved to Advantage and Crowned with
Success. " It has been Observed by some Gentleraen that the At
tack is Hazardous — that if we prevail it will be attended
with great loss.
" I agree with the Gentlemen in their Position — but how
ever hazardous the Attempt— and altho some Loss is certain,
yet it is my Opinion — that you will not be in a worse Situa
tion — nor your Arms in less Credit, if you should even raeet
with a Misfortune — than if you were to Remain Inactive.
" The eyes of all America are fixed on you, the Junction
of the Northern Army— which Obliged Gen' Burgoyne to
lay down his Arms, gives the Country & Congress some ex-

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 193
pectation, that a vigorous Effort will be made to Dislodge
the Enemy.
" Its not in our Power to Command success — ^but it is in
our Power to produce a Conviction to the World that we
Deserve it. Interim I am &c. "Ant^ Watne, a G."
opinion of brigadier-general WOODFORD.
"Dear Gen''
"I cannot help viewing the purposed attack upon the
Enemy's Lines as attended with many Hazards & Dificulties.
But these are over Ballanced by the following considera
tions viz' first the necessity that something should be at
tempted by this Army before it retires into Winter Quarters,
both for its own C & the support of our paper currency.
" Secondly that from my knowledge of the State of the
soldiery we are not likely to be in a better condition, if so
good a one, at any Future time.
" Thirdly, that all the Force we expected is arrived — and
lastly, that the present Detach'd situation of the two Arrays
promises a fairer prospect of success than is likely to pre
sent itself whilst we are able to continue in the Field.
" I am therefore for making the Attack so soon as your
Excellency & sorae of the Gen' Officers have had sufficient
time toT)igest a proper plan. I have &c.
"W" Woodford.
"Nov' 25'", 1777"
opinion of brigadier-general KNOX.
" Park of Artillery, Camp, Whitemarsh 26'" Nov' 1777
" Sir :
" I exceedingly lament my want of experience and ability
to fill properly the iraportant station in which I am, and I
am raore particularly distress'd when such iraportant Ques
tions are referr'd to my decision as those which your Excel
lency gave us in Charge the last evening. The happiness
or misery of the people of America may be the consequence
of a right or erroneous judgment.

1 94 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
" Much lately has be[en] urg'd concerning the reputation
of our arras, as if we had long been a warlike nation whose
existence like the antient Romans depended on their mili
tary Farae. I confess I view the matter differently and
cannot bring rayself to believe (how much soever I may
wish it) that we are upon a par in military knowledge and
skill with our enemies. Indeed it is not possible and the
sensible part of mankind well know it.
" We set out in the contest with notions and sentiments
very different frora these. We then considerd we were con
testing for our all, for everything dear to humanity : But it
now seeras otherwise with many persons, whose anxiety for
railitary Farae seeras to absorb every other consideration.
" I have also heard it urg'd that your Excellency's repu
tation would suffer. I freely confess an Idea of this kind
pains rae exceedingly and were I fiilly to believe it, I should
be irapelled to give my opinion for measures as desperate as
I conceive the atterapt to storm the enemies works and
Philadelphia. I am not of opinion that your Excellency's
character suffers in the least with the well affected part of
the people of Araerica. I know to the contrary, the people
of America look up to you as their Father, and into your
hands they intrust their aU, fully, confident of every exertion
on your part for their security and happiness — and I do not
believe there is any raan on Earth for whose welfare there
are more sollicitations at the Court of heaven than for yours.
" I believe perfectly that there are sorae people who speak
disrespectfully of your Excellency, but I as perfectly believe
that these are people who have never given any unequivocal
evidence of their attachment to our rights ; or whose bound
less ambition has been check'd by your well try'd patriotism.
" The state of the depreciation of our Currency has also
been urg'd as a principal inducement to some desperate
attack — That its value diminishes every day. It is but too
true that the large emissions and some other causes have
effected a diminution of the value of our paper currency.
Had the same enorraous emissions taken place in a time of
profound peace and flourishing Comraerce as have taken

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 1 95
place during the war, without sinking any part of them by
taxes, I do assert that the Currency would be equally de
preciated as at present.
" The circumstances of the respective states would not
permit them 'till lately to endeavor to sink their proportions
of the paper currency — butt now almost every state on the
Continent are making large strides towards it. The Cur
rency in the eastern States from their large taxes will in
crease in its value every day. I cannot therefore perceive
the force of the argument urg'd, deriv'd from the consider
ation of the failure of the currency.
" The Gentleraen who urge the desperate raeasure of at
tacking the eneraies Line, Redoubts and city of Philadelphia
seera to forget the many principles laid down by people ex
perienc'd in the art of war against our engaging in General
actions upon equal terms — against our risquing our all on
the event of single Battles — In the beginning of the Contest
our friends in England urg'd the impropriety of such con
duct, giving instances of numbers of States who lost their
liberties by means of them. It is an invariable principle in
War, That it cannot be the interest at the same time of
both parties to engage. It is also another fix'd principle
that the invaders of a Country ought to bring the defenders
of it to action as soon as possible. But I believe there is
not a single maxim in War that will justify a number of un-
disciplin'd troops attacking an equal number of disciplind
troops strongly posted in redoubts and haAdng a strong city
in their rear such as Philadelphia.
" It is proposed to attack the enemies redoubts without
being perfectly acquainted with their number, strength, or
situation, with troops of whom we have had the experience
in two capital actions, that it was impossible to rally after
they were broken. By the mode of attack propos'd we are to
stake the Liberties of Araerica on a single atterapt in which
the probability of success is against us, and if defeated of
sacrificing the happiness of posterity to what is call'd the
reputation of our arms.
" It has been agreed that the enemies Force consists of

196 Ikfences of PhUaddphia in 1777.
10,000 rank and file fit for duty — it is said Lord Cornwallis
has taken with him frora 1,500 to 3000. Suppose the num
ber 2500, which is 500 more than I believe he has — ^there
remains 7,500 rank and file fit for duty. Our returns are
8000. (I say 8000 because I hold the militia in case of an
attack of this kind useless entirely, for we know they will
not stand within the range of a Cannon ball.) We are to
attack 7500 strongly posted in redoubts, having batteries
and a strong City in their rear. In this instance the Idea
that is necessary among disciplined troops of having three
to one to storm works is laid aside, not because our troops
are better disciplined than the enemies, bat because from a
concurrence of circumstances our affairs are in a desperate
situation, and we must retrieve them or perish.
" Marshall Saxe says redoubts are the strongest and most
excellent kind of field Fortification, and infinitely preferable
to extended lines — because each redoubt requires a separate
attack, one of which succeeding does not facilitate the reduc
tion of the others. Charles the 12"" with the best troops in
the World was totally ruin'd in the attack of some redoubts
at Pultowa, altho he succeeded in taking three of them.
" The Character ofthe British troops in Europe is far above
mediocrity — and the experience we have had of their dis
cipline and valor by no means proves them contemptible.
In the comraencement of the War they storm'd an unfinish'd
work on Bunker Hill, but the experience gain'd there has
entirely prevented them from making any similar attempts.
Indeed the Germans lately raade an attempt on red Bank,
the event of which will hardly give them a fiivorable opinion
of the attack of redoubts by storm.
" The situation of the American army on long Island after
the Battle of the 27"" Aug* was exceedingly ineligible, and
the enemy must have known it ; but they did not attempt
to carry our redoubts, Jay storm, altho' had they succeeded
in one instance and made a sufficient opening for the intro
duction of a large Column of troops, the greater part of our
army then on the Island must have fallen a sacrifice or have
been taken prisoners.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 197
" From the experience deriv'd from reading and some little
service and the knowledge of the strength of the enemies
works, my opinion is clearly, pointedly, and positively against
an attack on the enemies redoubts, because I am fully con-
vinc'd a defeat certain and inevitable.
" My opinion is to draw our whole strength together, take
post at and Fortify Germantown, considering it as our
Winter Quarters. — When the Works there are in a toler
able state of defence, I should propose taking our whole
force (except one brigade to guard the redoubts) and pro
ceed near the enemies Lines, offering them Battle, which if
they declin'd would in the opinion of every rational raan
fully evince our superiority in point of strength — if they
should corae out, fight and defeat us, we have a secure re
treat and Winter Quarters.
" I have thus offer'd ray sentiraents to your Excellency with
freedom, but if a contrary disposition should take place and
an attack be resolv'd upon, I shall endeavor to execute the
part that may be assign'd me to the utmost of my ability.
I am &c. H. EJNOX,
"5. Gen' Artillery."
WASHINGTON TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.
" Head Quarters, 25 November, 1777
8 o'clock P.M.
" D^ Sir :
" Col" Mead delivered rae yours this morning, as I was
upon my way to reconnoitre the Enemy's Lines from the
West side of the Schuylkill. I had a full view of their left
and found their works much stronger than I had reason to
expect frora the Accounts I had received. The Eneray have
evacuated Carpenters Island and seera to be about doing the
same by Province Island. Accounts from the city say Lord
Cornwallis was expected back today or tomorrow, which
corresponds with the information sent you by Gen. Weedon.
All their movements make rae suspicious that they mean to
collect their whole force while our's is divided, and raake an
Attack on the Army on this side. I therefore desire (except
16

198 Defences qf Philadelphia in 1777.
you have a plan or prospect of doing soraething to advantage)
that you will rejoin rae with your whole force as quick as
possible. I have ordered all the Boats down to Burlington
to give you despatch and when you have crossed, all those
not necessary for the common use at the Ferries, should be
immediately sent up to Coriels again. Yours of yesterday
that appears to have been written before that sent by Col"
Meade has reached me since I got Home. The Hospital at
Burlington deserves your consideration. If you leave it
uncovered and Lord Cornwallis should detach a party, the
patients will certainly be made prisoners. I therefore beg
you will endeavour to have them removed, or think of some
way of giving them protection by posting some Militia or
leaving some Other Troops while the Eneray reraain in that
Quarter. The Hospital at Princeton also will be left naked
if the Enemy should move farther up. You will therefore
leave them sorae cover, if you think there will be occasion.
I ara &c.' G° Washington.
" P.S. — As leaving a Guard at Princeton will still divide
our force, if the patients could be removed further from
thence, I think it would be for the better. I told D' Ship-
pen when he fixed it there, it would be dangerous." ^
MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE TO WASHINGTON.
" Mount Holly, Nov' 25'" 4 oClock
" D» Sir
" This raoraent received intelligence the enemy are em
barking frora Glocester and crossing over to Philadelphia.
Col. Comstock sends this intelligence and says it may be
depended upon. — I have order'd General Varnum's & Gen
eral HuDtington's brigade to advance immediately to fall
upon the eneraies rear and prevent their geting off their
stock. I wait your Excellencies orders to raarch where you
may think advisable. Colo. Sheppard * got into carap about
noon — the whole body of the troops will be ready to move
' In manuscript of Robert Hanson Harrison.
' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel Tench Tilghman.
' Colonel William Shepard, in command of Glover's brigade

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 199
at a moments warning — The Riffie Corps & about 600
militia are upon the eneraies flanks.
" A detachment from Cap' Lee's Horse took nine pris
oners yesterday, the first account I ever had of their being
in this quarter. I am &c. N. Greene."
MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE TO WASHINGTON.
" Mount Holly Nov. 25»" 12 o'Clock
" D« Sir :
" I wrote your Excellency this afternoon that the enemy
were crossing frora the Jerseys to Philadelphia and that the
intelligence carae frora Col. Corastock — ^he is stationd at Had
donfield to collect intelligence. — I have received two letters
from the Col. today the first dated at 12 o'Clock the last at
three both of which I have enclosd. — It appears to me the
enemy are crossing their Cattle, but I much doubt whether
any part of the troops have crost the river — perhaps they
may begin in the morning — I am divided in my raind how
to act — If your Excellency intends an attack on Philadel
phia our moving down to Haddonfield will prevent our co-
opperating with you — but if the enemy are crossing, the
attack upon the city would not be warrantable now if be
fore, without our whole collective force at least, and as part
is below and part here, I wish to move forward for the
support of the troops below and attack the enemy if prac
ticable. " I expected before this to have received your Excellen
cies further Orders but as I have not and from the intelli
gence there appears a prospect of attempting something
here I have ventured to put the troops in motion — if I
should receive orders to the contrary I can speedily return.
" If the enemy cross to the city they may be attackt at
any time hereafter as well as now — if they have not crost
and are in a situation to be attackt we shall have an oppor
tunity to attempt something. I ara anxious to do every
thing in my power and more especially as the People seems
to be dissatisfied at the evacuation of red bank fort. I
am &c. N. Greene."

200 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
colonel COMSTOCK TO MAJOR-GBNERAL GREENE.
a gjjj . "Haddonfield, 25 Nov. J past 12, 1777
" This moment I arrived from a reconnoltering tour near
Little Timber Creek Bridge, sent a smart young woman
who had a sister in Gloster as a spy to Gloster; she has
returned and I believe has rec* no other damage than
receiving a kiss frora the Hessian General (this is as she
says). She reports that a very large number of British &
Hessian troops are in Gloster, that they are embarking in
boats & going to Philadelphia, and that her sister there in
formed her they had been embarking ever since early in the
morning. That Lord Cornwallis quartered at Col. Ellis'
house & the Hessian General in a house opposite — who
asked the young woman where the Rebels were? She
answered, she could not tell — she had seen none of them !
She said she passed many sentrys before she carae to little
Tiraber Creek Bridge where she passed the last.
"I doubt not this inforraation. I fear they will be too
quick for us. Col. Hart's Reg' is here. With great esteem,
"Adam Comstock."
COLONEL comstock TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.
" Hadenfield, 25'" November, 1777
a gjg 3 oClock P.M.
" Seven prisoners just arrived here from the Eneray taken
by the Militia, about 3 raile frora this place on the Road to
Glos'ter. — the prisoners I have examined. Two of thera
are Gunners and 2 Matros, belonging to the first Reg' of
Artilary, the other 3 belong to the 33* Reg' — they were
about J a raile from their Picket plundering, those belong
ing to the Artilary had 3 of the Artilary Horses with them
marked G. R. which are also taken. This Express rides
one of em. The Prisoners on Exaraination say the Main
Body Lye about 4 Mile from this on the Gloster Road
encamp'd that their Line form a Tryangle, that they are to
wait there till they have erabark'd all the Stock for Phila
delphia, which will take em all Day, & that the Army ex
pects to embark tomorrow and go into winter Quarters, that

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 201
they have 2 6 pounders in front, 2 ditto in the Rear & some
smaller in the Center, that they were not in the least appre
hensive of any of the American Array being within 10
miles of them, otherwise they should not have been taken
in the manner they were. This raoment 7 Hessian Pris
oners arrived here taken in the same manner. I have not
examined them. I could wish your Army was here now, for
I think they may be supprised very easy. They give various
Ace** of their Numbers, from 5 to 8 thousand. They mostly
agree that Billings Fort & Fort Mercer are leveled. — O how
I want to give em a Floging before they Leave the Gersey.
With every sentiraent of Esteem & Respect &c
" Adam Comstock."
majpr-general greene to washington.
" Haddonfield, Nov' 26'" 4 o'clock P.M. 1777
" D» Sir
" Your Excellency's letter of the 25'" reached me at this
place — I halted the troops on the receipt of it, those that
had not got into the town — Gen' Varnum's & Huntington's
Brigades got to this place before the letter came to hand.
I am sorry our raarch will prove a fruitless one — the enemy
have drawn themselves down upon the Peninsula of Glou
cester — the Ships are drawn up to cover the troops — there
is but one road that leads down to the point, on each side
the ground is swampy, & full of thick underbrush, that it
makes the approaches impracticable almost — these diffi
culties might have been surmounted, but we could reap no
advantage frora it — the Shipping being so posted as to cover
the troops, and this country is so intersected with creeks,
that approaches are rendered extremely difficult, and re
treats very dangerous. — I should not have halted the troops,
but all the Gen' Officers were against making an attack, the
eneray being so securely situated — and so effectually cov
ered by their Shipping.
" We have a fine body of troops & in fine spirits, & every
one appears to wish to come to action : — I proposed to the
Gentlemen drawing up in front of the enemy, & to attack
their Picquet and endeavour to draw them out, but they

202 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
were all against it, from the improbability of the enemies
coming out. The Marquis with about 400 Militia & the
rifle Corps, attack'd the enemies Picquet last evening,
kill'd about 20 & wounded many more, & took about 20
prisoners — the Marquis is charmed with the spirited be
haviour of the Militia & Rifle corps — they drove the eneray
above half a raile & kept the ground until dark — the
eneray's picquet consisted of about 300 & were reinforced
during the skirraish — The Marquis is determined to be in
the way of danger.
" From the best observations I am able to make & from the
best intelligence I can obtain it is uncertain whether any
of the enemy have crossed the river, the boats are con
stantly going but I believe they are transporting stock —
there is as many men in the returning boats, as there goes
over — by toraorrow it will be reduced to a certainty. — I be
lieve the enemy have reraoved the great Chiveaux de frize —
there went up 60 sail of Vessels this raorning. If the ob
structions are reraoved in the river it accounts for the
eneraies evacuating Carpenters & Province Islands as they
are no longer necessary — the prisoners say the enemy are
going into Winter quarters as soon as they get up the river.
" Inclosed was our order for battle, with a plate agreeing
to the order.
"I purpose to leave General Varnum's brigade & the
rifle corps at this place for a few days, especially the rifle
men who cover the country very rauch. — Gen' Varnura's
brigade will return to Mount Holly tomorrow or the next
day. — I will make further enquiry respecting the hospitals,
& give such directions as appear necessary.
"My division, Huntington's & Glover's Brigades will
proceed with all despatch to join your Excellency — I could
wish the eneray might leave the Jersies before us.'
" I am &c.
" Nath. Greene."
' The body of the letter is in the manuscript of J. Burnet, V. aide-de
camp. Greene's other aides at this time were William Blodget and James
Lloyd.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 203
major-general GREENE TO WASHINGTON.
,, .^ „ " Mount Holly, Nov. 27, 1777
" D» Sir
" Your favor of yesterday' I received last night about 12
oClock. The greater part of the troops returned to this
place last night and marched early this morning to cross
the Delaware — I staid at Haddenfield rayself with General
McDougal's division to give the necessary Orders to the
Militia — I have left the rifle Corps at Haddenfield and Cap'
Lee's troop of light Horse to encourage the Militia and awe
the eneray; to prevent their coraing out in sraall parties —
Col. Olney had orders to make an attack upon their Piquet
this morning but they drew them in so close to their main
body, and there being but one road he could not effect it —
their Piquet consisted of about 300 raen — I ara rauch afraid
the withdrawing the troops will greatly alarra the Country —
Any position below this with any considerable force would
be very dangerous — the country is so exceedingly inter
sected with creeks ; and lies so contiguous to Philadelphia —
I think any body of troops raay be surprised from the city
at Haddenfield in five hours, and at almost any place in its
neighbourhood. " The Hospitals will be in some danger at Burlington,
Burdenton & Princetown if all the troops are withdrawn
from this state, but if the sick were ordered to be imme
diately removed, it would still increase the alarm in the
country, for which reason I would risque what are there at
present and order the Director General not to send any
more there.
" I shall set out imraediately for Burlington — I have given
Lt. Col. Abale orders to procure waggons and send off all
the spare araraunition to Huntingdon, the heavy cannon to
Bordenton — At my arrival at Burlington I will enquire of
the Commodore respecting the matters by you directed.
" General McDougal's division will quarter here to night
and march at five in the morning for Burlington — I think
1 Printed in my "Writings of Washington," Vol. VI. p. 220.

204 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
there are as raany troops gone forward as will be able to
get over to day.
" I shall push on troops as fast as possible without in
juring their health. I sent forward one of ray aids to Bur
lington early this raorning to superintend the embarkation
of the troops & baggage — I am with sincere regard & due
respect &c. N. Greene."
captain CRAIG TO WASHINGTON.
"Sir " I have this moraent been Honoured with your Excel
lency's Letter — and erabrace this opportunity of returning
an Answer. By every Account, Lord Cornwallis is returned,
it is a Certainty that a nuraber of Troops are Arived at
the City — both Horse and foot. I wrote y' Excellency this
Morning the Eneray ware under raarch^ orders, it is ex
pected the[y] will March tonight. Your Excellency raay
Depend on the earliest inforraation of their Moveraents —
by some Accounts the enemy intend to send their Boats one
way, and the greater part of their Array another, it is
thought the boats are intended for Delaware. I have the
Honour &c. C. Craig.
" Frankfort, 28*" Nov' 1777. "
MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE TO WASHINGTON.
" Burlington, Nov. 28«" 9 oClock, 1777.
" D« Sir
" Three Brigades are now on their raarch for Head Quar
ters, my division & Glover's Brigade — General McDougall's
division is not yet come to town — they had orders to raarch
at four this morning and I was in hopes they would have been
in town, by the tirae Glovers brigade got over the River — I
am afraid the want of provision has detained them this
morning. It is with the utmost difficulty we can get bread
to eat — the Comraissary of purchases of flour is very ill
managed — there is no magazines of consequence, and the
army servd from hand to raouth — The Baggage cannot be
got over by toraorrow night.
" Mr. Tench Francis an uncle of Col. Tilghman was
brought to me a prisoner this morning — he was taken at

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 205
Glocester — he sais Lord Cornwallis' detachment consisted
of about 6,000, that none embarked until yesterday — he
also adds that the reinforcement consisted of about 2500
from New York. General Howe designs to make an im
mediate attack upon the Army unless the weather is bad —
this is the general conversation of the Officers of all ranks —
Mr. Francis sais he thinks the enemy design to burn and
destroy wherever they go — Germantown is devoted to de
struction — The eneray plundered every body within their
reach, and almost of every thing they had. It is the comraon
conversation araong the officers of all ranks that they design
to divide our lands as soon as the Country is conquered —
The obstinate resistance they say made at Mud Island has
broke the campaign. I am &c. N. Greene." '
the navy board to washington.
" Continental Navy Board
" Borden Town, 28 Nov' 1777
"Sir "We are under a Necessity of drawing your Excellency's
Attention once raore to the Frigates at this Place. — Not
withstanding our Endeavours, we have not been able to
raise the Effinghara — she still lyes on her Beam Ends in a
very disagreeable situation. After the Destruction of our
Fleet at Red Bank, the Officers & Crews of the several
Vessels came up to this Place, to the Amount of between
three & four Hundred. We are much at a Loss for Accom
modations for these Men ; but if we had our Frigates afloat,
this Difficulty would be obviated. As we have now so many
Hands at Coraraand, we are of Opinion, we can with Cer
tainty get these Ships ready for their Reception ; & at the
sarae Tirae have the Plugs so fixed that they raight be drawn
at a rainutes Warning & the vessels sunk, should the Eneray
raake an attempt upon thera. Nevertheless, however safe
or convenient this Plan raay appear to us, we do not think
proper to put it in Execution without your Approbation.
' For a letter from Washington to Greene, written at seven o'clock on
the evening of this day, see my " Writings of Washington," Vol. VI.
p. 228.

206 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
As the winter is now approaching fast & must soon put an
End to all our Water Schemes, we request your Excel
lency's Answer by the Return of the Bearer (Cap' Poraeroy).
Whatever your Advice may be in this Matter, you may de
pend on our strict Compliance with it.
" Several Captains of the Vessels lately destroyed have
saved sorae of their Sails, Stores &c. We wish to know
whether you are of Opinion they may be kept here with
Safety or not.
"A Report is circulated & again contradicted respecting
a French War. We should thank your Excellency for In
formation, whether it is so or not. We have &c.
" Fra^ Hopkinson
" John Wharton
" P.S. — We are sorry to trouble you with Letters to Con
gress; but hope it will be attended with no great Incon
venience ; apprehending that you have frequent Occasions
to send to York Town & that our Packets may go with your
Despatches." WASHINGTON TO FRANCIS HOPKINSON AND JOHN WHARTON.
" Head Quarters, 29 November, 1777
" Gent''
"I am fav* with yours of the 20'". I see no Reason for
changing my former opinion in respect to sinking the Frig
ates to ensure their safety. If they are weighed again,
and converted into Barracks for the Searaen, they must be
brought near the shore and when the Frosts sets in, they
cannot be sunk should the Enemy approach at such tirae.
I however, leave the Matter to your judgraent.
" The Hulks of the Vessels will be all that are necessary
for Barracks, if you should deterraine to put them to that
use. The sails. Rigging and all other Stores of them and
the Vessels that have been burned should be removed to
some distance frora the Water Side. I am &c.'
" G° Washington."
' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel Tench Tilghman.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777, 207

council of war.'
[The following papers were overlooked and therefore are not in the
place they would have occupied had a strictly chronological order been
followed.] " At a Council of War held at Head Quarters at Whit-
pain 29'" October 1777.
" Present
" His Excellency The Commander in Chief
" Major Generals — Sullivan Brigadier Generals — Maxwel
" Greene Smallwood
" Stephen Knox
" Marquis Payette Varnum
" McDougaU Wayne
" Mughlenberg
" Weedon
" Huntington
" Conway
" Pulaski
" His Excellency informed the Board, That the enemys
whole force according to the best estimate he could form,
founded on general returns of their Army which had acci-
dently fallen into his hands bearing every raark of au
thenticity, and from probable calculations of such changes
as may have happened since the date of them, amounted to
abt. 10,000 rank and file, present fit for duty. That their
main body by the last accounts were in and near Philadel
phia. That they had established several batteries on Prov
ince Island, opposite to Fort Mifflin, from which, they
continually annoyed the garrison there ; but hitherto with
out any material effect, — That they had on the 22* instant
attempted to carry Red Bank by storm, but were repulsed
with considerable loss. That the day following several of
' The call for this council is printed in my " Writings of Washington,"
Vol. VI. p. 143, and did not contain the question of an exchange of
prisoners, suggested by the letter of Lieutenant-Colonel Persifor Frazer.
An opinion by Brigadier-General Wayne is in Stilll's " Wayne," p. 109.

208 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
their ships of war drew up against Fort Mifflin ; which, in
conjunction with their batteries before mentioned began a
severe attack upon the fort ; but were compelled to quit the
enterprise and retire with loss — That however, notwith
standing the obstacles they encounter in the River obstruc
tions, they have found means to open a communication with
their ships by way of Tinicum Island.
" He further inforraed them, That our whole force at this
time amounted by the last returns to 8313 Continental
troops and 2717 Militia rank and file present fit for duty.
That besides these, were the garrisons at Fort Island and
Red bank, the former consisting of about 300 Continental
troops, the latter 350 ; in addition to which a detachraent of
three hundred Militia raarched the 26"' to reinforce the two
posts — also the troops on the other side the Schulkill in
nuraber about 500 — Militia, under Brigadier General Potter.
" That this force was likely soon to suffer a diminution of
1986 Militia, by the expiration of the term of service for
which those frora Virginia and Maryland engaged.
" That on the other hand. He had called upon the State
of Pennsylvania in the strongest terras, to afford all the
assistance and reinforcement in its power to this army; and
that he had also written to Generals Dickinson, Foreman,
and Newcomb, pressing them in the most earnest manner,
to endeavour to collect all the militia of the State of New
Jersey, that can possibly be spared frora other objects, in
the neighbourhood of Red bank, as an additional aid and
security to that post; but was uncertain what degree of
success these different applications might have.
"He finally inforraed thera that by advices from the
Northward, it appeared that General Burgoyne and his
whole Army had capitulated to General Gates, on condition
of being permitted to return to Great Britain, and not bear
ing arms again in North Araerica during the present contest.
" That by a letter of the 25'" instant from General Dick
inson, there was reason to believe Sir Harry Clinton and
the forces with him had returned down the North River ;
and that the troops heretofore stationed at Rhode Island

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777,

209

were arrived at New York — That he was not able to afford
any precise information of the dispositions made by General
Gates and Putnam, in consequence of the forementioned
events ; but had heard that General Gates had detached two
brigades to join Governor Clinton at Esopus.
" Observing, that under these circumstances, he had
called a Council to consult and resolve upon the measures,
best to be persued; He accordingly requested the senti
ment of the Gentlemen present on the following subjects —

Questions,
' ' 1" Whether it will be pru
dent in our present circum
stances and with our present
strength to attempt by a gen
eral attack to dislodge the
enemy from Philadelphia ?
"2* If prudent — and in
case we are unsuccessful —
Where shall we retreat to ?

" 3* If not thought eligible
— What general disposition
of the army had best take
place, till the season forces
us from the field ?

" 4. Supposing the enemy
to keep possession of the
City — Where, and in what
manner, shall the Conti
nental troops be cantonned,
when they can no longer
keep the field ?

Answers.

It will not.

Precluded by the above
answer. The army should take post
on the ground a little to our
left, which has been recon
noitred and reported by the
Engineers; and sufficient re
inforcements should be sent
to the garrisons of Red-
bank and Fort Mifflin, to
complete the number of
men requisite for their de
fence.

Deferred.

210

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.

"5. What measures can be "
adopted to cover the Country
near the enemy and prevent
their drawing supplies from
it during the Winter ?

"6. Can any — and what
succours may with propriety
be drawn from the Northern
armies at this tirae ?

Deferred.

Succours should be drawn
from the Northern armies
to Consist of twenty Regi
ments — fifteen of Massachu
setts — three of New Hamp
shire and Lee's and Jack
son's regiraents.

" The deliberations on the foregoing subjects finished, —
The Coraraander in Chief proceeded to the following
questions —
" As the whole time of the
Adjutant General seems to
be engrossed with other du
ties — Will the offlce of In
spector General to our army
for the purpose principally
of establishing and seeing
practiced one uniform sys
tem of manuel and raa-
noeuvres, be adviseable ?

Such an office is advisea
ble. The Manuel Manoeu
vres or any regulations to
be established, previously to
be settled or agreed to by
the Coraraander in chief, or
a board of officers, appointed
by hira for that purpose.

" Should Regiraental pro- -\ Promotions should beregi-
raotions extend only to the I mental as high as Captains
rank of a Captaincy or to | inclusively. All from that
that of a Majority ? J rank in the line of the State.

" Will it be consistent with
propriety or policy to allow
soldiers the reward offered
to others for apprehending
deserters ?

The reward should be al
lowed to soldiers.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777,

211

" The Commissaries com
plain of the number and dis
proportion of the rations
issued to the troops, and at
the sarae time of the exor
bitant price of all kinds of >
spirits, owing to the imposi
tions of the suttlers on the
soldiery — What regulations
or remedies can be applied
to rectify these abuses ?
" Col. Frazer, in a letter of
the 9'" instant having repre
sented that he had ' liberty
to mention it as General
Howes earnest desire, that
a general exchange of pris
oners should take place on
equitable terms, or that the
officers, prisoners of War
on both sides should be re
leased and have liberty to
go to any place in possession
of their friends on their
paroles' — What measures
might it be proper for us to
take in consequence of that
information ?
"Jno. Sullivan
"Nath^ Greene
"Adam Stephen
" Lb Mquis de Lafayette
"Alex= McDougall
"W. Smallwood
"H. Knox
" J. Varnum."

Deferred.

Deferred.

An''^ Wayne
P. Muhlenberg
G. Weedon, B. G.
Jed Huntington, B. Gen'
T. Conway, B. G.

212 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777 .
[Note. — With the failure of any plan for attacking the British in
Philadelphia the question of future operations became of importance.
The popular view was still in favor of some active measure which
should give the enemy an idea of the fighting ability of the Continental
army, and this view found support in Congress, where it was urged as
much on political as on military grounds. No one denied the expe
diency, even the necessity, of a partial victory to inspire the States with
a little energy, infuse a little vitality into the sinking currency, and
wipe out the depressing atmosphere of a retreating and somewhat dis
organized army. But this was only one side of the question. It appeared
to Washington that a present and temporary advantage might be obtained
at too great a cost. A defeat or failure might complete the ruin of the
army, give strength to the jealousies and rising plots among the officers,
and, by dispersing the army, scatter throughout the continent the seeds of
complaint, of fancied wrongs, and suffering under inaction and defective
commissary and hospital service, which would obstruct the enrolling of
a new army. However brilliant a successful dash might be, it was too
late in the season to retrieve the fortunes of war, and the husbanding of
the existing force, seasoned and disciplined as it was, seemed of greater
moment than devising an attack on the issue of which all might depend.
To consider the question of winter-quarters a council of war was called,
and the following are the opinions.
Worthington C. Ford.]

OPINION OF major-general SULLIVAN.
" Camp at Whitemarsh, Decem' 1, 1777
" Dear General
" Agreeable to your Excellenceys Commands I have Con
sidered upon the most suitable place to Canton the Army
During the winter. The several places proposed in Councill
have their Advantages and Disadvantages but that which has
the Least objections ought to be fixed upon. The Inten
tions of the Board is to take that Station which will answer
best to cover the Country, Refresh the Troops & Discipline
the Army & by adding to the Nurabers by Recruits & other-
ways prepare it to take the field with vigour Early in the
Spring — in order to Deterraine what place will be most
Likely to answer this purpose it will be proper to consider
the several places proposed with the objections that may
justly be made to each : The first is The Great Valley ou
the other side of Schulkill. There it is proposed to Hutt

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777, 213
the Army for the winter. The second is to canton the
Troops in Wilmington & its Neighbourhood. The Third is
to canton thera from Lancaster to Reading. —
" The first place proposed will cover the Country west of
Schulkill, provided Large Detachments are kept near the
Schulkill & on the Delaware to prevent the Eneray frora
making Inroads and Collecting Forage &c. in the Neigh
bourhood of Darby, Chester & Wilmington but in case
the Eneray should take post with a large party at Wilraing-
ton, you must send a Force superior to theirs to attack
them, or move a large part if not the whole of your Army
near that place to prevent them from Foraging & Drawing
provisions, in which Case your Huts raust be forsaken & of
Course become useless. One great objection to Hutts is
that they are exceeding unhealthy and are at Best but a
miserable Shelter from the Incleraency of the weather. —
The mortality among the Hessians at Brunswick Last
Spring as well as common observation will justify this as
sertion. Should you be able to cover the west side of the
Schulkill by adopting this plan it must be by making a
Winters Campaign ; but it is to be Remeraberd at the
sarae tirae that you Leave Exposed the State of New Jersey
and all that part of Pensylvania which Lies on the East
of Schulkill, and put it in the power of the Eneray to ren
der your Coramunications with the Eastern States across
the Delaware very Difficult, if not impracticable. The
second post proposed namely Wilmington & its Environs
will not only Leave New Jersey & the Eastern part of Pen
sylvania, with raost of your Hospitals & Stores Exposed but
even the Western part of Pensylvania will be in great
Measure Exposed unless you keep a Force near the Schul
kill to prevent the Incursions of the Enemy. This will also
occasion a Winter's Campaign, without answering any other
purpose but that of covering part of Maryland & the Dela
ware States & your Situation will put it in the power of the
Enemy compleatly to cut off your Coramunications with all
the States east of Schulkill. In addition to those Diffi
culties There is another of great weight in my mind, which
16

214 Defences of Philaddphia in 1777,
is that Though it is not Easy to Surprize the post, it is by
no means Impracticable. This will necessarily Increase our
out Guards & Pickets, & make the Duty of the Soldiers
something severe — & to add to it M' How by a move of his
array up the Schulkill towards y' Stores may compel you to
move your Army as often as he chuses to repeat the raa
noeuvre. If, therefore either of the before mentioned posts
are taken a Winter's Campaign must be the Consequence.
This in my opinion ought if possible to be avoided. The
most warlike nations in the World both in Ancient and
Modern times have endeavoured to avoid them, even when
they had a sufficiency of Cloathing for their Troops, & were
in Climates much raore teraperate than ours. Experience
convinced thera that the gain was by no raeans equal to the
Loss and though in raost Instances whole Provinces have
been given up, this Consideration has not been thought of
sufficient weight to keep Armies in the Field through the
winter Season.
" The Situation of your Army will be scarcely Tolerable if
placed in the warmest Houses During the winter the whole
of thera without Watch Coats one half without Blankets &
raore than a Third without Shoes Stockings or Breeches &
raany of Thera without Jackets. Indeed there are some
without Coats & not a few without Shirts Even the Officers
in sundry Instances are Destitute of proper Cloathing, some
of them being alraost naked. These Considerations should
Induce us to avoid a winter's Carapaign if it raay be Done
without the Greatest Inconveniencys. — The Third place will
leave exposed the East & West Side of Schulkill near the
Eneray & at the sarae time expose New Jersey. It will,
however cover the Back parts of the Country give oppor
tunity of Recruiting & Disciplining your Army & at the
same Time furnish Houses that will supply the want of
Comfortable Cloathing to your Troops, & give you & your
officers a proper opportunity of turning your Thought to
proper Measures for Regulating your Army & enabling it to
take the field with vigor in the Spring. To secure the
Country as much as possible one Brigade should be placed

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. lib
in New Jersey for the militia to collect to in Case of Inva
sion & scouting parties of the railitia should be constantly
near the enemy to intercept the small parties frora raaking
inroads into that State — at Potsgrove or Reading in Penn
sylvania should also be another Brigade or Division for the
sarae purpose & the militia of this State should be constantly
scouting near the Enemies' Lines to keep them from foraging
with impunity. This Disposition will cover your Hospitals
& Stores & keep open your Communications with all the
States — Though you may in taking the above Situation be
under a necessity of Removing sorae Inhabitants who have
fled from Philadelphia farther Back into the Country, yet
this is a much Less Evil than Exposing the Array to be
Ruined by the Incleraency of the Seasons & the want of
Cloathing, but this may in some Measure be Remedied, as
the Distance between you & the Enemy will permit you to
canton your Troops in Towns considerably back of the Line
which marks your Front. I know that there are also Ob
jections against this Disposition which have great weight,
among which is that of Leaving so much Country open to
the enemy, but in every view of the Subject I think this the
Least Liable to objection. I cannot help giving it as my
opinion if we are to make a winter's Campaign, & our Force
is Deemed sufficient to dispute the field with the eneray
after the seven Virginia Regiraents Leave us : that Gerraan-
town will be the raost proper place for the purpose — as that
& Beggars Town will afford cover for most of the Troops.
The several Roads leading to it may soon be fortified against
a surprize & Corps selected to defend the Houses which
will supply in great raeasure our want of numbers. The
proximity of our Situation to the Enemy will keep them
within Bounds & by keeping a strong party of Pensylvania
Militia on the west of Schulkill and 1 of the Jersey Militia
on the East of Delaware, their Incurtions into the Country
will be totally prevented, if a winters Campaign is to be
carried on this will be the most advantageous and comfort
able Quarters for the purpose — but if a winters Campaign
is to be avoided, the other is to be preferred for the Reasons

216 Defences of Philaddphia in 1777,
afore assigned. I know that both officers & soldiers Dread
a winter's Campaign, the prospect of which Induces our
officers to Resign in such Numbers k prevents privates from
Engaging in the Service. With Respect to the post our
Army takes previous to Retiring to Winter Quarters, I
think it imraaterial at present, for if M' Howe Declines a
general Action no situation we can take either on this or
the other side the Schulkill will corapell him to fight us as
he has the Delaware open to furnish him with supplies, and
if he is Determined to bring on an Engagement he will
seek out the Army let their Station be where it will. D'
General, the above is submitted with all Due Defference &
Respect by your Excellencey's most obed' serv*
"Jn** SrujVAN."
OPINION OF THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.
" Your excellency ordered me to give my opinion about
the three plans for winter quarters : 1" the chain from about
the Sculckill till bethehem — 2" this from reading to lancas-
ter — 3" building hutts about and quartering in willraington.
" I must confess my being prevented of fixing my senti
raents in a decisive raanner by ray want of knowledge about
very interesting points araong thera are 1° how far we
should distort and perhaps disaffect those persons who
schould be turned out frora the diferant places they are in.
" 2° how far we may expect to collect and keep with the
army all the officers who perhaps will think themselves in-
titled to go home, to occupate themselves with theyr busi
nesses or pleasures if we are not in a kind of warlike
quarters, and then we will took the [ ] advantage of
theyr being instructed and disciplined we schould endeavour
to gaite [get?] in going into peaceful places.
" 3° What effect can it raake upon the people our leaving
the country entirely oppened to the execution, cruelties, and
also to the seduction of the enemy, when we shall give
them all the opportunities they can wish to draw all the
provisions from everywhere aud in the same time to inlist
provincial soldiers.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777, 217
" 4" if our giving a greater idea of the army in covering
the country and laying near the enneray will more facilitate
our making recruits than if we were in good comfortable
towns and not in a place and in a manner which shall seem
to the eyes of the people a kind of winter campaigne.
" 5" till what point those different measures will please or
distress the officers and (what is generally to the railitur
world the less attended to, and deserves the greater atten
tion) our private soldiers.
" 6" till what point we may depend upon our intelligences
and light troops to avoid equally and being surprised and
tiring the troops by false alarms.
" 7" if we can hope that the soldiers will now receive
cloathes &c. in order to be fit for some winter marches and
operations, if in case where they schould be defeated we
may hope to meet them again.
" Such are the points of knowledge which I ara deprived
of by my being stranger in this country, and my being
stranger in the array, if I can speak to, for I have no officers
no soldiers under ray particular direction whom I could
consult and know theyr temper theyr inclinations, and all
what it is possible to expect from thera.
" however I'l tell your excellency my very imperfect sen
tiraents about the raatter.
" 1" the first proposition seeras to rae the less eligible, and
my reason for it is the scarcity of villages and principally
the report of the commissaires and other gentlemen who
know the country.
" 2° the second seeras to rae the raost prudent : there we
schall be quiete, there we can discipline and instruct our
troops, we can be able to begin a early carapaign, and we
schall not fear to be carried into a winter carapaign if it
pleases General howe. therefore in consulting only pru
dence, and as far as ray little knowledge can go, I ara at lest
certain that I'l have nothing to reproach to me in giving ray
choice to this second proposition.
" however (and in raaking excuses to your excellency for
such an indecision and referring rayself to your knowledge

218 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
about the suppositions I will make) if it was not diswilling
neither for officers neither for soldiers, if going to lancaster
will disafect and raake a bad impression as far as to prevent
our recruiting, if we can keep better our officers when we ,
schall be in a kind of encampment near the enneray, if prin
cipally you think that we schould be fit for sorae winter
raarch's we should be able to support sorae disadvantages
then I ara fully and with a great chearfulness of opinion
that we must go to willraington ray reasons would be these.
" 1° this position enable us to do in the course of the winter
what we schall think proper to annoy, to deprive of res-
sources of every kind to attack if possible the enneray.
" 2" this position has soraething shining and military like
which will make the best effect and upon the continent and
even in Europe.
" 3" the doctors, and americain ones who know the man
ners and phisik constitution of our soldiers say that nothing
is so comfortable as well made hutts.
" prudence orders me to choose lancaster, but if the incon
veniences I fear (without being able to know them) if those
inconveniences I explain to your excellency are not as strong
as they can be, if principally our civil situation ask from us
soraething shining and perhaps bold then I give all ray
wishes and all my choice to willraington.
"the Mquis de Lafayette "Jf. G."
OPINION OF BARON DE KALB.
" Rest, Recruiting c& Cloathing being most necessary to the
array I ara of opinion that taking winter quarters at Wil
mington alraost behind the Enneray, will not answer the
purpose, because every movements the Enneraies will make
up Schuylkill river we raust follow their raotions or be
cut off from our Stores, or forced to fight whether it will
suit us or not. I am apprehensive this position will of
necessyty bring on a Winter Campaign.
" It appears to rae, unless His Excellency has very strong
reasons, to maintain Delawar State & part of Chester

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777 . 219
County, that raore tranquility & safety could be expected
between Lancaster & Reading by building partly hutts for
that purpose, if it is equally (as was observed by several
Gentleraen) unavoidable to have hutts near & about Wil
mington. "Baron db Kalb.
"AT Camp 1" X""' 1777."
opinion of major-general GREENE.
" Agreeable to your Excellency's command I shall in a few
words give my Sentiments with respect to the necessity of
puting the troops into winter quarters and the properest
place to canton thera in. — Every one that views the Condition
of the array and is acquainted with the severe duty they
have gone through will readily agree that good warra cora
fortable quarters are necessary to supply the defect of cloath
ing, and that sorae relaxation is essential to give a proper
tone to both raen and Officers to prepare thera for the
ensuing carapaign — In doing this we raust have regard not
only to the army, but the country.
" An array without a country is like an infant incapable of
feeding or cloathing itself — Every part of the country
whether Whigs or Tory that we suffer to be ravaged is a
dirainution of our strength, and an increase of theirs. — Men
are essential in war, but provisions, cloathing and accoutre-
raents are equally so. — The first and great object in canton
ing the troops is to take a position secure from surprize ; the
next is covering; the third is a situation convenient for
drawing forage and provisions for the subsistence of the
army and the cattle belonging to it. — These are the great
principles to be attended to in quartering the troops and
cannot be dispensed with without certain and inevitable
ruin to the whole railitary raachine. — There are other
secondary considerations such as covering the country and
distressing the enemy in drawing their supplies; where a
position can be found to answer all these valuable purposes
is the object of enquiry.
" It is said by raany that a total relaxation is necessary for

220 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
the good of the army — for enabling the officers to recruit
their Reg'° and to give the men time to recover their spirits.
— I must confess ifi was to speak from ray own feelings and
declare ray wishes instead of my sentiments, I should be of
that opinion — Pleasure is ever agreeable to huraan nature,
but never raore so than after long and severe duty an oppor
tunity to unbend the raind raust be the wish of every one,
and it is not very difficult to accommodate our reason* to our
wishes ; but whether a total or a partial relaxation will be for
the general interest of the array is worth enquiring into.
" If we retire so far back as to be totally out of danger,
pleasure and dissipation will be the consequence. Officers
of all ranks will be desirous of visiting their friends — the
men will be left without order, without government — and
ten to one but the men will be more unhealthy in the spring
than they now are, and much worse disciplined. — The health
and discipline of troops can only be preserved by constant
attention and exercise — we must not flatter ourselves that
going into quarters will recover the health or discipline of
the troops without regard is paid to one and attention to the
other. " It is said we must carry on war upon the great Scale,
and that particular interest must not be brought in compe
tition with the general interest and that by attending to the
minutiae, we shall sacrifice the principle object. I readily
agree that it is perfectly consistent with the maxiras of sound
policy for the lesser to give place to the greater — ^but is it
necessary for us to throw open a great extent of country to
give a necessary relaxation to the Army ? It is the country
that feeds, cloaths, and furnishes us with troops. If the
subsistance of the Inhabitants is destroyed they will be in
capable of giving us the necessary aid — if the army iu the
winter season leaves the country unprotected — will it not be
a disco-iraging circurastance to sending recruits to join us —
which v^ill be a diminution of their local security, if they
can expect no protection frora the collective force. — I ara
no advocate for taking raeasures frora popular opinions, but
it is necessary to preserve the confidence of the country ;

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777 . 221
for by the union and spirit of the people alone can the op
position be continued. —
" The Legislator is in some measure under the necessity
of accommodating his measures to the prejudices of the
people — raankind will only be subservient to your purposes
in proportion as they conceive their interest and happiness
connected with your raeasures — I have heard it reraarked
that the sufferings of tbe army spread in all directions
throughout the continent, alarms the people and prevents
them from entering into the service.
" The same may be said with regard to the poor plundered
inhabitants. — It is true the eyes of all the continent are upon
us for protection — but it is natural for man to reason, what
is my neighbours condition may bye and bye be raine. —
" If the army seems disposed to exert its force to shelter
the country from ravage ; it is natural to expect the people
will be anxious to strengthen its hands ; but if the enemy
are left at liberty to ravage at large, and the inhabitants of
our State make the condition of another their own, it will
be an alarraing consideration. Therefore I think sorae re
gard should be had in taking our measures to afford as rauch
cover to the country as possible without militating with the
principal design — not for the sake of the particular spot
that is covered, but to prevent the disagreeable influence it
will have upon the surrounding Inhabitants.
" I cannot conceive a total relaxation to be necessary to
recruit the array, or recover its spirits. I am fully persuaded
that recruiting by voluntary inlistments is in a great meas
ure at an end. The enormous bounties that are given so
far exceed the araerican funds, and the continental bounty
now allowed falls so far short of private bounties, that few
if any recruits are to be expected through that channel — If
this be granted then the recruiting service will wholly de
pend upon the exertion of the civil authority of the respec
tive States, and this exertion doubtless will be in proportion
to the reputation and confldence the legislative bodies place in
the army — For it cannot be expected frora the local prejudices
of mankind that the several legislative bodies will be will-

222 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777 .
ing to strip themselves of their inhabitants, & lessen their
own internal safety unless they are well persuaded the meas
ure is essential to their own happiness and security.
" It is absolutely necessary the army should have an op
portunity to relax and recover its spirits — but there is a
great difference between constant duty and total relaxation
— A proper raediura between these two extreraes will be
found better adapted to restore the spirits of the army and
preserve its discipline — We raust be in a situation to take
off that constant watching and yet not so reraote frora
danger but that some attention to duty is necessary.
" Men are naturally apt to sink into negligence without
there is something constantly to rouse their attention — The
objects of pleasure are so much more inviting than those of
Duty that without a restraint is laid on one and a necessity
imprest to attend to the other it is ten to one that the ob
jects of Pleasure steal the mind wholly from the discharge
of its duty. — I do not mean to urge these reasons for taking
a position near the enemy to oblige us to be constantly on
the watch but to shew that a total relaxation raay be dan
gerous — Remember Hannibal's army at Capua. —
" The general discontent among the officers of alraost all
ranks renders winter quarters essential to redress the pre
vailing grievances and new organize the array for the spring
— but the fatigues and hardships of the campaign and the
want of rest and relaxation are not the great sources of the
discontent that prevails. It springs from a different foun
tain. It is the pay and subsistance which are found to
be incompetent to the necessary deraands of the officers
to preserve their dignity and support their farailies. —
This is the great evil and this raust be reraedied or else
this array raust and will dissolve. — There are some other
things complained of — Such as, Rank, that railitary Jewel,
being confered on almost all orders of men to the disgrace
of rank, and great raortification of officers who flnd them
selves often reduced to a level with persons they despise,
from the prostitution of railitary dignity. —
" The raanner of cloathing the troops is a subject of com-

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 223
plaint. — There is no provision made proportionable to the
demand of the army; and the difficulty of obtaining that
which is provided has given great disgust to sorae and dis
content to others. — These are some of the principal subjects
of complaint — and a partial relaxation frora railitary duty is
necessary to put every thing in a proper train for opening
the next carapaign.
" It is necessary that an appearance should be kept up as
much as possible of besieging the enemy, not only to cover
the country, but to preserve the credit of our currency which
will always rise and fall as our army appears superiour or
inferior to the eneray. The enemy will also draw out of the
country many recruits without they are kept within bounds.
— All these are objects worthy our attention.
" There have been two plans proposed for cantoning the
troops. One from Bethlehem to Lancaster, the other at
Wilmington and it's environs. — There can be great objec
tions raised to both. — It is said (with how rauch truth I
know not) that all the back towns are crouded with inhab
itants, refugees frora Philadelphia ; if that be true, to turn
thera out to make room for the Soldiery will bring great
distress upon the inhabitants & be productive of no small
discontent. — I have no doubt in ray own mind but that there
can be quarters procured in the proposed Line of canton
ment from Bethlehem to Lancaster, but there appears to me
to be many evils attending it. — It is a great distance back
in the country and leaves the Enemy a great range in front
and upon each flank. It raust distress the back inhabitants.
We shall be consuraing the substance in the bowels of the
country which should be always held as a reserve against a
misfortune. — In withdrawing ourselves to so great a distance
it will be improved abroad into a kind of dispersion into the
mountains and among ourselves it will wear the coraplexion
of a retreat, and raany will be suing for Protection.
" I raust confess however that, if safety and relaxation
are the only objects under consideration, the geography of
the country from Bethlehem to Lancaster is more favorable
for a Cantonment than Wilmington — but I cannot help

224 Defences qf Philadelphia in 1777.
thinkine that quarters can be got at Wilm:'.:gTon with much
less distress to the Inhabitants of the Stare — that the posi
tion will be secure enough with the force cantoned in and
about it — That provision & forage can be got easier and
cheaper in that position than in the other — ^in this Position
we ean draw it from the enemy while the other will leave it
for them — that this gives us a better opportunity to protect
the lower Jersey and not less the upper — that this will dis
tress the enemy in drawing supplies — and upon the whole
cover a greater extent of cotmtry than any other. — For these
Reasons I am for the Position of Wilmington, and if any
part of our stores are insecure I would immediately have
them removed. — I would have about a brigade of continen
tal Troops in the Jerseys and about one thousand militia
between the Delaware i Schuylkill, and about a thousand
more at or near the Gulph — and an advance post at Chester
— of continental troops.
••Nath. Greene •• M. G."
OPINION OF LOBD STIBLING.
"Ca3£p White "March. Decem 1. 1777.
•• Sir: " In agitating the General Question which your Excel
lency put to the Council of General Officers yesterday, there
arose three propositions as to the Stationing of this Army
for the winter, all attended with very great Inconveniences.
That of placing it at Wilmington does not answer the pur
pose of Quartering the Army, as the buildings in and about
that place are not Capable of receiving above one third part
of the Army : besides I think it is one of the most danger
ous Scituations that I know of, for if the Enemy were to
make a sudden movement and take post near Kennet
Square or New Garden, our Army would have no Retreat,
we should be reduced to the Neoessitv of fightins them,
with the Delaware and two other Impassable Waters on
our fianks and Rear. It is true it would cover the three
lower Country s and part of Maryland from the Incursions
of the Enemy by land, yet they would have what Commu-

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 225
nication they pleased with it by water, this advantage would
therefore be trifiing, & for it we should give up all pensil-
vania & New Jersey, for the Enemy to Ravage at large ; and
put it in their power Effectually to Cut of our Comraunica
tion with all the Country to the Eastward of Delaware
River : these are reasons I think sufficient to Induce us to
drop all thoughts of Quartering the Array at Wilmington.
As to the plan of putting the Army into Huts in the Town
ship of Tryduflfrin in the great Valley, I must acknowledge
it is a Scituation well Calculated for Covering Chester &
Lancaster Counties, and for Checking any Atterapts the
Enemy raay design against Maryland & the Lower Counties
on the one side and a Great part of the Country between
the Schuylkill and Delaware on the other, the Coraraunica
tion with Jersey and the Northern States will be preserved,
the Encarapraent will be easily guarded as there is but one
Way to approach it from Philadelphia ; But it is still only an
Encampment. It is not going into Winter Quarters, It is
not procuring for the Officers and Men that Comfort and
Opportunity of recruiting which they richly deserve after a
long and fatigueing Campaign ; these perhaps are not in our
power to give them anywhere, and should that be the Case,
this may be as good a Scituation to hut in as any ; provision
can be handily brought in frora all Quarters, but how it is
for forage I know not. The third proposal was to Cantoon
the Array in the Towns of Reading and Lancaster and the
Villages between them or in their Vicinity. If this is
practicable I should like it best of any, as the Men would
have a Chance of getting better refreshed than by either of
the other two proposals ; but it has been objected that it is
impracticable, as those towns and Villages are already filled
with persons who have fled to them for Refuge, and if it is
so we must be Content. If the Safety and Corafort of the
Army is principally to be Considered, they can Easily be
Cantooned in the Towns in New Jersey which are in a
great Measure deserted by the Inhabitants. But I think it is
also of high Importance to Cover as much of the Country
as we can ; and that the possition in the Valley will Cover

226 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
as much or raore of the Country than any other that can be
pointed out ; the Eneray will never Venture out as far as
Chester on that side, as we Can Cut them off by taking
post at Darby, to which there is a direct Road ; nor would
they be fond of penetrating far to the Northward of Phila
delphia, least we raight pass a body of troops over between
them and the Town. Upon the Whole I should be for
hutting the Army somewhere in or near Tryduffrin, espe
cially if it is so fine and Rich a Country as has been repre
sented. I ara &c. " Stirling."

OPINION OF major-general ARMSTRONG.
"Camp at W. Maech l" Dec'r 1777.
"May IT PLEASE Y" EXCBL'^:
" I beg leave to recomraend that as early as it may be
safe, to raake such raoveraent, the Array raay pass over the
Scuilkill & take for sorae time a position on that side.
" With respect to Winter Quarters for the Army — the
longer I consider the raeasure pointed out in the back Vil
lages of this State, the more inadmissable that step appears
to be, as by the large lattitude thereby given the eneray
thro' the vnnter & early part of the spring, every doleful &
pernitious consequence raust be expected — The hearts of
good-men thro' all the States depressed, and this State in
particular, little less than sacrificed to the whole without
real necessity ! Amongst the innuraerable evils resulting
from that situation, the impossition of the Oaths of Alle
giance & an end to Government & the future aids of the
Militia thro' great part of the State, must inevitably follow.
" I'm therefore of Opinion that in proper time, part of
your Army take possession of Wilmington, and the Resi
due form a Chain from thence to Dowingstown & perhaps
to White Horse on the Lancaster road, at these two some
Cover may be had, & Hutts with some use of Houses in the
interraediate space — these are the best outlines that appears
to rae, which may be corrected and better determined when

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 227
the Army is on that Side. And am with perfect respect y*
Excellency's Most Obed' hurab' Serv' " John Armstrong.
" P.S. — I hear that sorae part of the Bridge is already
broken or carried off. G' Potter is not yet corae over, I
suppose owing to the bad weather. I expect him today.
"J: A."
opinion of brigadier-general maxwell.
" Sir :
" Agreeable to your Excellencys request of last evening,
that we should give our opinion concerning the most eligi
ble place for Quartering or incamping the Troops during
the winter. As rauch has been said on the Subject of
Quartering in different places sorae with a view of covering
the Country, & others for recovering, recruiting, and gath
ering the Troops together, for another Carapaign, and to ly
at such a distance frora the Eneray that they were not liable
to be harrassed by them during the winter. If covering
the Country is your Excellency's chiefest object I would
recomraend that our armey should be moved to the west
side of Schoolkil, at the distance of about 30 miles from
Phil" with our left tolerable near that River, leaving a party
of observation on the East side; and there Hutt in the
raost convenient place. But if the other part viz the re
freshing and recruiting our Arraey be your Excellency's
chief object in that case I would recomraend that our Arraey
should retire back in the Country on a line frora Reading
to Lancaster and in the Neighbourhood of that line, and try
to collect all our scattered Troops of every sort near the
main body, and take every Method in our power to get the
Reg*" filled up during the winter, and those well cloathed
we have. If the last proposition takes place I would
recommend that a party of observation be stationed one
on the West S., the other on the East side of Schoolkill to
prevent the Enemys partys from penetrating far into the
Country. " Likewise a party should be sent into New Jersey to

228 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
relieve the Militia there who has been a long time on duty
& to give them an opertunity to fill up their Quotas in
the Continental line. Those Troops raight return in the
Spring as soon as the roads was fit for traveling on, should
it be thought necessary. This last Scheme I prefer to the
first — and am your Excellencys Most Obedient Humble
Servant
"W" Maxwell.
" White Marsh the 1" Decem' 1777."
OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL SMALLWOOD.
" Camp, Decem' 1« 1777
"Sir "The Distresses of the Army, the Inclemency of the
weather, & the approaching Season, corabine to point out
the Expediency of fixing on Winter Quarters ; and in doing
this all local Attachraent ought to be sacrificed to the Public
Good, to reduce the Enemy, & free ourselves, I wou'd chear
fully resign myself to a Den the ensuing & raany other
Seasons if found necessary. — Three Positions have been
pointed out — frora Bethlehem to Lancaster — the VaUey in
Hutts — & Wilmington — three Capital Objects are in view —
The Health & Security, the Discipline of the Array — &
the support and covering the Country — the first Position
would be incorapetent to any other than the first of these
Objects. The second wou'd not araply adrait of, or be ade
quate to any other than the second Object, for it woud im
pair the men's Health, & leave not only the Jerseys, but also
the Delaware Government & Eastern Shore of Maryland
open, which the Eneray woud avail themselves of, & get
fully suppli'd this Season. — The Third tho it does not fully
coincide with our Views, yet in a more inlarged & general
Degree, it answers the Object of our wishes, more than the
preceeding or any other Position I know of under our
present circurastances — I woud recoraraend sending the sick
to the first mentioned Position, but I am strongly impressed
that the hail & active part of the army ought to take post at
Wilmington, to awe, & perhaps annoy the enemy, or at least

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 229
prevent and deter them from taking possession of, or draw
ing their supplies from such an extensive Tract of Country
as either of the other Positions than Wilmington wou'd
lay open to them — Wilmington & its vicinage will cover
more Troops, & is more compact, raay annoy the Enemy,
will obstruct thera, & cover raore of the Country than any
other Position I ara acquainted with under our present
Situation, & will adrait of Exercise & manoeuvring (from
the compact station) upon as large a Scale & as often as
raay be necessary, & with respect to insecurity against sur
prize think no Post within a Night's March of the Dela
ware below Philad"' cou'd be rendered more secure — a Post
that's perfectly secure is eligible, but I ara induced to think
it wou'd have a bad Tendency on our Army. Officers of
all Ranks & Denominations wou'd be going Home, their Im
portunities wou'd be irresistible, the Soldiers wou'd follow
their Example, & if Furloughs were not granted, Desertion
wou'd ensue, & in most Instances a Neglect of, & inattention
to Discipline.
" Being Officer of the Day Time admits not of my en
larging more on this Subject; or adding further than that I
have the Honor to be with great Respect, your Excellencys
most Obed' H"'" Serv'
" W. Smallwood."
opinion of brigadier-general KNOX.
"Park of Artillery, Dec' 1, 1777
" Sir, " Your Excellency last evening referr'd to your General
Officers the consideration of the position proper for Winter
Quarters, and order'd us to give our opinions respectively
on that subject.
"I shall be concise in my opinion, establishing the prop
osition that Winter Quarters are indispensably necessary
for the Army in order to give it that rest and refreshment
of which it stands rauch in need — to repair the Carriages
of various kinds which are damag'd ; to recruit the ex
hausted horses ; to recruit and fill up the reg" ; to reform
the army in some essential particulars, in a word to put the
17

230 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
army in all its branches on such a footing as to be able to
take the field next Campaign with the greatest probability
of Success.
" The King of Prussia says ' the first object in Winter
Quarters is Tranquility' — it is very evident if we take our
Winter Quarters so near the enemy, as to be subject to fre
quent alarms and constant hard duty, we shall have but a
small part of the present army to oppose to our enemies.
Could a place be found about 30 railes distant frora & North
or N. W. of Philadelphia in which it was possible to quarter
the troops, I should prefer it to a greater distance or differ
ent direction as by it we should be able to cover a greater
extent of Country than by taking post at Wilmington or
retiring so far back as Lancaster & Reading.
" Two Ideas present themselves in considering a place
proper for Winter-quarters. The ease and safety of the
troops and the covering the Country, thereby preventing
the enemies deriving supplies from it. I consider the first
the greater objects and all inferior ones should give place to
them, and therefore give my opinion that the troops should
at the time appointed retire into Winter Quarters, the right
of the Cantonment to be at Lancaster & the left at Reading,
provided a sufficiency of houses and good cover can be pro-
cur'd there — an officer of reputation on whose veracity your
Excellency could rely can easily ascertain this matter. —
parties of 500 or 600 to be kept out on command advauc'd
30 or 40 miles, under the command of active partizan Offi
cers who should be directed to be constantly moving
about to prevent the enemy making any disposition to sur
prize them.
" Advantages may by these means be taken of any smaller
detachments sent out by the enemy — indeed the militia of
the State may be kept considerably advauc'd, thej- being
light troops, will cover the Country & be but in little danger
of being surpriz'd.
" If the Cover in the range from Lancaster to Reading
should be found to be insufficient, I should be for hutting
the whole army about 30 railes distant from Philadelphia,

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 231
in some position which should have the Schuylkill about 10
or 12 miles on the right or left — the goodness of the position
to determine this. General Muhlenberg mention'd a po
sition which coraes within this description which perhaps
on examination might be found to be proper.
" I have the honor to be with the greatest respect
" Your Excellencys raost obedient Hurable Ser'
" Henry Knox,
" B. G. Artillery."
OPINION OP brigadier-general POOR.
" Monday, 1" December, 1777
" Sir, ^
" in answer to the questions propos'd yesterday, Rispect-
ing the Quartering Army this winter I am clear of apoinyen
that the grait Object is to secure our men from the Inclem
ency of the wather Incres our numbers Dissapline our men
and make our Army as Formadable as possable that we
may be able to take the field early in the Spring.
" I am not acquainted with this Country so as to point
out the raost sutiable place — by Information do think that
the line from Lankester to Reading is the most Elagable of
the three places mention'd. I am Sir your most obedient
Humble Serv' "Enoch Poor, B. Gen'."
OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL WAYNE.
" Camp at White Marsh, 1" Dec' 1777
" Sir :
" The procuring good and easy Winter Quarters for the
Troops under your Excellencies Command — and Covering
the Country from the Depredations of the Enemy as far as
Possible without too much fatigue to the Army — are Objects
of the first Consequence, & to which too much Attention
cannot be paid.
" A Chain of Cantonraents has been proposed (and sup
ported with very plausible Arguraents) from Lancaster to
Reading and the Intermediate villages between them, — to
which Cantonments I can't agree for the following Reasons.

232 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
"Because by taking Quarters at the Distance of sixty
miles west of Philadelphia, you at once give up to the
enemy all the Delaware State, the Eastern shore of Mary
land, the Counties of Phil"', Bucks and Chester.
" Because by this access of fine Country the Eneray will
be enabled to draw supplies, not only for the Winter — but
to lay up Stores for the next Campaign — to vittual their
Transports — carry Gen' Burgoyne's army to Great Brittain
— and perhaps bring out an Equal Number to Re-enforce
Gen' Howe early in the Spring.
"Because the sick and feeble of the Army in the Re
spective Hospitals will in a great Measure be left between
the Enemy and us — Otherwise Intermixed with the healthy
Troops — and subject them to the same Disorders that the
Sick raay be Infected with.
" Because you cannot in these Villages procure cover for
more than one-third of your Effective's without casting to
the Mercy of Weather and Howling Wilderness — those
families who flew before the Eneray to these very places for
Shelter — giving up ease & Affluence, for Liberty and Pro
tection. " Because other States are Subject to Invasion — who will
naturally conclude if these are given up to Distruction —
that it may be their case next, and will thereby be deterred
from giving that aid, which they otherwise would afford —
least they should first Irritate, & afterwards be left to the
Mercy of a more than savage foe.
" Because the Eyes of the World are upon us — and we
have given the Country sorae Ground to expect, some Pro
tection — since the Junction of so great a part of the
Northern Army.
" For these Reasons I am positively against taking
Quarters at the places before Mentioned — but would pro
pose making good our Quarters in a Position that will at
once afford cover to the Country aud enable you to draw
supplies for your Army — from the Vicinity of the Enemy
— in doing of which you will not only Distress thera — but
save for the use of the next Campaign those Stores which

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 233
you would be necessitated to expend if Quartered at the
Distance of Sixty Miles from the Delaware River.
" You will also leave such Houses as can be procured in
that Country to be Converted into Hospitals for the use of the
Sick and Convalescents — to which the feeble of the Array
may be collected & Commissioned Offlcers sent (in Propor
tion to the Number of the Sick) to superintend thera — who
will not only preserve Order but Introduce Discipline
amongst the Convalescents, by obliging them to appear
clean on the parade and Manoeuvre them whenever the
weather will permit, which will be more conducive to their
health and be a raeans of saving raen's lives than the whole
powers of the Materia Medica — they will also afford protec
tion to our Stores by Detering any sraall party frora attempt
ing their Destruction.
" For these Reasons, and to sweeten the terapers of those
Officers that at present raay be a little sowered as well as
for the ease & Conveniency of others, I ara Induced to raeet
those Gentleraen in Sentiraent, who are for Quartering the
Array at Willraington & in its Vicinity — which with the aid
of sorae Hutts will afford Cover sufficient.
" The Position is such as to give the Enemy the Greatest
Annoyance — with the least fatigue to your own Troops.
" Your Excellencies own good Judgraent will point out
the proper Measures necessary to guard against that Surprize
which some Gentleraen Effect so rauch to dread — I can only
assure your Excellency that whatever Position you raay
think most proper, I shall always be ready to acquiesce with,
& to serve you with the best Service of your most Ob' and
very Hum' Ser'
" Ant"^ Wayne."

OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM.
" Whitemarsh, 1" Dec' 1777
"May it please your Excellency!
" From a cursory view of the present state of your Army
compared to the Position of the Eneray I ara fully con-

234 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
vinced that your Troops should iraraediately go into quiet,
peaceable Winter Quarters. By the various Fatigues of the
Carapaign, your Men are dispersed thro' raany parts of the
Country, incapable of taking the Field at this advanced
Season. The Hospitals are crouded with Sick and Invalids,
occasioned, in a great Measure, by the want of clothing &
Rest — ^Your Officers are very discontented, as their Families
are suffering at Home, not being able to purchase the Neces
saries of Life. The Credit of the Mony is so amazingly
decreased, by the prevailing Avarice of the Tiraes, that the
recruiting Service rests upon a very precarious Basis. Your
great Dependence must therefore be upon the present
Army. To raake it respectible, it is necessary to collect
the feeble together; to nurse and cloath them, and give to
the whole such a Spirit of Discipline and Order, as will
make thera truly forraidable. The Eneray is in good Quar
ters, not to be attack'd, without the greatest Hazard. He
will not attack you, unless he iraagines he has a raanifest
Advantage. In this Situation, you have rauch to loose,
nothing certain to gain. — As therefore another Carapaign
is morally inevitable, your Troops should be put in the best
Situation, to open it early, with vigor & Activity. To fix
upon the Line of Cantonment, is a raatter of Perplexity.
If you atterapt covering the Country from the Excursions
of the Enemy, you raake a Winter's Campaign necessary.
But that Position w°h will give them the greatest Check,
consistant with the Ease of the Troops, is the most eligible.
That part of Pennsylvania w°h lays between the Delaware
and the Schylkill seeras best calculated for this Purpose.
While it preserves a Coraraunication with the Southern and
Northern States, it gives sorae kind of Security to New
Jersey. A reraoval to Wilraington and Places adjacent,
would give the Enemy the full coramand of the Delaware,
and perhaps. Effect a Separation of the States. It cannot be
supposed that the large Villages in the back parts of Penn
sylvania are so crouded with Inhabitants as to give no Shel
ter to the Army. Should the Buildings be too scanty to
receive all the Troops, the Deficiency might be made up

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 235
by substituting Hutts, w"h would prove a sufficient cover
for the raore healthy and robust.
" I am, with great Submission, your
" Excellency's most obed' Serv'
"J. M. Varnum."

OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL WOODFORD.
" Camp, 1"' Decem' 1777
" Dear Gen"'
" Upon considering the several places purposed for the
winter cantoonments of the army, I think the Villages
from Reading to Lancaster, with the addition of some
Hutts, the most Eligable position for the Troops in their
present situation.
" Were the raen warraly clad, I should give it as ray
Opinion that Willraington, or sorae post nigher the Eneray
should be taken in preference to the above, where we raight
annoy thera in their Forrageing &c. in the course of the
Winter. " But upon considering our present circurastances &
looking forward to the opperations in the spring, I think
the advantages we should give thera of possessing a part
of this state & the Lower Countys, would be overballanced
by our having a vigorous array ready to take the Field
early in the next carapaign, with sufficient Magazines of
provision & Forrage laid up in the course of this Winter.
"If the Range of Cantoonraents I purpose should raeet
the approbation of your Excellency, after hearing the senti
ments of the Gen' Officers, I would purpose that as much
Forrage & provisions as possible, of every kind, be imme
diately drawn from the Country between our Quarters &
the Enemy & that such as we had it not in our power to
remove be destroy'd, saveing a bare sufficiency for the
subsistance of the Inhabitants, & that the Country in our
Rear be kept as a Reserve.
" Previous to the reraoval of the Array, I would recora
raend that one or more, Gen' Officer go with the D. Q' Master

236 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
Gen' to view the cover that can be procured for the Troops, &
make their Report to your Excellency as speedily as possible.
" If these Villages are found too rauch crouded with the
Refugees frora Philadelphia & its neighbourhood, I should
think it no great hardship for them to be obliged to reraove
to the Farm Houses contiguous, & that the D. Q' Master
Gen' (after having ascertain'd their numbers), be order'd to
assign them Quarters at a distance that it would be unsafe
to squander the Troops in, & that the publick waggons re
move their affects. I am with great respect your Excellencys
raost Obed' hurable Serv'
" W* Woodford."
opinion of BRIGADIER-GENERAL WEEDON.
" Dear Sir :
"I have agreeable to your Excellency's direction, consid
ered in every point of view I ara able ' a proper position for
this Array during the winter' — Three plans for facilitating
this desirable purpose have been proposed, viz' Hutting,
Drawing thera down to Wilmington & its vicinity, or can
toning them in the back country from Reading to Lancas
ter. — In my opinion there will be great inconveniences at
tending any measure we may take — The first plan is certainly
the most desirable, but I fear the least eligible ; & both for
reasons so obvious that they hardly need mentioning. Does
not the present situation of affairs promise another Cam
paign ? Tis true that by wintering your Troops within
ten or fifteen miles of the enemy you raight in some meas
ure cover the country contiguous thereto, but would not
this subject your Army to a winter carapaign? Add to
this the unhealthy quarters they would be confined to,
rendered still the raore so by the very nature of the ma
terials which compose them. Our service has already driven
us to this necessity on a former occasion, which proved
more fatal to the troops than all the actions they fought
during the campaign ! — Let us benefit by experience. —
Your army, Sir, is now much reduced by hard service &
other sufferings during this Suraraer & Fall ; I fear & be-

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 237
lieve, I raay say with truth, (& consequently on this occa
sion with propriety) that a third of thera tho' now in the
field, are raore fitting for the Hospital than the Carap:
without Blanketts, without Shoes, & in short almost desti
tute of every comfort required by the strong & robust,
much raore the weak & feeble. What then raust be the
effects of keeping thera out all winter in this dispiriting
situation ? Can you proraise yourself service from them
in the spring? When the Eneray find your troops ex
hausted by fatigue, they will no doubt avail theraselves of
it. What must then necessarily follow is disagreeable &
needless to anticipate — Troops undisciplined, worn-out by
service, deprived of every corafort which is necessary to
restore health & vigor, cannot be supposed to support an
attack against those who thro' the Winter have been in
corafortable quarters, constantly trained in Manoeuvring &
other exercises. That this will be the case, I make not the
least doubt.
" A position at Wilmington, I should have no very great
objection to, if the troops could be covered in a tolerable
compact body, but this I fear cannot be done ; & Cantoning
by Detachment is a dangerous experiment. — I look Sir, on
this Army as the Herculean hinge, on which American
Independence turns. — The covering this, or the other spot
for the space of three or four months is not a motive suffi
cient to hazard, or expose this Array for, the object is in
nowise adequate to the disadvantages that may result from
it: you would in ray opinion subject yourself to frequent
alarras by taking post at Wilraington, Christiana, Newport
& Chester, particularly at the latter. The Enemy are mas
ters ofthe River, have a nuraerous Fleet at their coraraand,
and within one nights raarch of you — I should not indeed
dread a surprize, but supposing the enemy not inclined to
attack you by a sudden raarch, (which at the sarae tirae
they would have in their power) but to raanoeuvre up the
Schuylkill & cross above you, should we not be in the pre-
dicaraent we have all this campaign been endeavouring to
shun, by keeping their left-flank must we not instantly

238 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
leave our quarters, perhaps at a season of the year when
our magazines could not be got off. — The sick must fall
into their hands also, unless we fight thera & are success
ful — Should any disaster attend us, by an action with them
in this situation, what would be the consequences? a total
Annihilation of this Army, & with it, the Liberties of
America ! — Upon the whole sir, distressing as it is to leave
a country uncovered, & at the mercy of an ungenerous
Enemy, who no doubt will ravage & plunder the inhabit
ants ; yet Sir, we must view our affairs in a more extensive
Scale. Subjugating a few individuals who must be left at
their mercy, or possessing a sraall tract of country for a
few months goes but a small way in the American cause,
while you have this Army in full health. — That we must
have another Campaign is, I believe, beyond controversy,
prudence therefore dictates a timely provision for the same,
the success of it will depend on the health & discipline of
your Troops, the care & vigilance of your Officers, and
early operations in the Field. — To provide for such im
portant purposes, I give it as my opinion this army be
quartered as soon as circumstances will perrait, in a country
where not only your Officers may have it in their power to
make themselves comfortable during the winter, but your
troops be relieved from heavy guards, covered from the in
clemency of the weather, nursed in sickness, disciplined &
restored to their former health & vigor — This Sir, & this
alone, will give you the Superiority over your Eneray. —
Your Hospitals are now as strong nearly as your Battal
ions : & while you are followed by an army of feeble in
valids, what reward can you expect for your unwearied
exertions, by any atchievements such Troops can obtain?
The Chain of Cantonraents frora Reading to Lancaster has
been raentioned, I cannot with precision say they are the
most eligible, but from the small knowledge I have of the
country, should suppose them the most likely to cover the
troops, & afford them rest thro' the winter.
" I am Sir y very H'bl Serv'
"G. Weedon."

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 239
OPINION OF brigadier-general MUHLENBERG. " December 1" 1777
"Sir: " Agreeable to your Excellency's requisition I transrait
you my Sentiraents on the Question proposed in Council
yesterday. " I would beg leave to premise that agreeable to my Sen
timents, the Army should continue in a Position, where
they can raost effectually Annoy the Eneray, untill it shall
be absolutely necessary on Account of the Severity of the
Weather to Quit the Field— 2*"' That the Preservation of the
Army by getting them into good Winter Quarters, will be
of much greater Utility, than any sraall Advantages, which
can be gain'd over the Eneray by keeping the Array near
their Lines.
" With regard to the place, Propper for the Army to
take Winter Quarters, I must confess, I am raore inclined
to join in sentiment with those Gentleraen who propose Lan
caster for the Right of the Cantonment & Reading for
the left, than with those who propose Wilmington — my
reasons are these. Wilmington &c. are so near the Enemy
that there is the greatest probability of their frequent Alarm
ing us, consequently the end intended, that is, the Ease of
the Army will not be answered.
" 2*'^ Our Army will certainly diminish, at least for the
Winter, by a Number of the Soldiers receiving permis
sion to return to the different States they came from which
would perhaps enable the Enemy to gain material Advan
tages over us, especially if it should be found necessary,
on account of Covering, to Quarter the Men some distance
apart. " 3*'^ The upper Part of Pensylvania would be left entirely
to the Mercy of the Eneray, & the Coraraunication with the
Eastern States cut of.
" 4"'''' The Eneray will have it in their power to draw
raore Supplies frora the Jersey, than it would be possible
for thera to draw frora the lower Counties, even if they

240 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
were entirely given up to them, for if the Army lay at Wil
mington, one armed Vessell would be sufficient to prevent
us from affording any relief to the Jerseys.
" Perhaps if your Excellency was to order some Person
to Reconnoitre the Country from Reading to Easton it
would be found more Eligible, to make Reading the right
of the Cantonment, & Easton the left, than any other place
proposed, especially if the Hint thrown out by a Gentleraan
in Council, was adopted, that is, to erect Hutts for the raore
Robust, & let the Feeble be quartered in Houses, &c. — In
Reading the Refugees frora Philadelphia are less numerous
than in Lancaster, Lebanon, &c. Reading, Allentown Beth
lehem & Easton lie in a direct line, very near the sarae
distance from Philadelphia — a few miles in front of this
Line, is Maxetawnj' & Macungy, one, if not two Divisions
raay be Quartered with the greatest ease, & here the Troops
would be ready, either to protect our Stores, or prevent
any considerable Ravages in the Country. Your Excel
lencys " Most obed' & humble Serv'
" P : Muhlenberg."
OPINION OF brigadier-general SCOTT.
" White Marsh, 1" Dec' 1777
" Sir :
" After Considering maturely the matter Proposed Yes
terday with reguard to the Quartering the Troops for this
Winter, I have at Length thought that Wilraington and its
Neighbouring Villages the most EUigable.
" I would not wish to Trouble your Excellency with ray
Reasons as it was so very Fully spoke upon Yesterday.
I am Your Excellencys " Ob' Serv' " Ch^ Scott."
opinion of count PULASKI.
" I leave the choice of Ground to those who are well
acquainted with the Country, & confine myself to considering

Defences of Philaddphia in 1777. 241
the advantages which will attend a continuance of the Cam
paign, and the Inconveniences which will fiow from retiring
to Winter Quarters — Our continuing in a state of activity
will give courage to our Friends, be an antidote to the
effeminacy of young Soldiers, and enure them to the
fatigues which Veterans undergo — keep them in the exer
cise of their profession and instruct them — Whereas the in
activity of winter quarters will ruin the Army, discourage
the Country, leave an extent of Territory for the Eneray to
ravage and depopulate ; besides how do we know what Re
inforcements the Enemy raay receive before the next Cara
paign. For ray part therefore I only think that the invalids
of each Regiraent should be suffer'd to retire where they
may under the direction of proper officers be refreshed and
recruited — with all the rest collected I would raake a vigor
ous attack upon the Eneray as soon as the Schuylkill is
frozen. " C. Pulaski.
"In case winter quarters are determined upon, I soUicit
His Excellency to allow me the body of Cavalry and In
fantry to remain near the Eneray's Lines." '
OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL DU PORTAIL.
" By taking Winter Quarters from Lancaster to Reading,
we abandon to the Enemy, Jersey, and all the Country ad
jacent to Derby, Chester, and Wilraington, one of the richest
Tracts in this part of the Continent. By establishing them
at Wilmington we cover the Country, and do not so cora
pletely abandon that part of it which is before Philadelphia,
nor even Jersey, because our proximity to the Enemy and
the ease with which we could throw ourselves upon the Rear
of their Lines in case the Schuylkill should be frozen, will
keep thera in respect, and put it out of their power to send
considerable Detachraents on the other side of Delaware
frora the fear of weakening theraselves too rauch — and the
small detachments which they raay send will be greatly
' Translated by Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens.
18

242 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
restrained by the Jersey Militia — The Position then of Wil
raington answers the end of making subsistence very diffi
cult to Gen' Howe, who has not only his Array to feed but
likewise the Inhabitants of the Town, and who must besides
furnish Provisions for the Army of Gen' Bourgoyne if he
raeans that they should embark for England. — This position
farther deprives him of the means of recruiting in the
Country, extending himself in it, adding to the number of
his Partisans, in a word gaining the Country. It has besides
the advantage of rendering his Communication with his
fleet difficult, for I imagine the Vessels will not be able to
approach Philadelphia when the Ice prevails — I should not
omit mentioning a case in which this Inconvenience would
be very considerable — if War should be declared between
France and England, and Gen' How from a dread of flnding
himself blocked up in the Spring by a French Fleet, should
wish to quit Philadelphia, we shall be within distance at
Wilmington for hindering his Embarkation of which we
should have timely notice.
" This Position then unites great Military advantages —
but it raust be confess'd at the sarae time that these very
advantages ought perhaps to prevent our taking it — because
the Enemy probably will not suffer us there, and will march
against us. — Thus to ask whether the Position of Wilming
ton is eligible, is to ask at the sarae time whether it is eligible
to expose ourselves to an Action, and perhaps more than one.
" If the season were less advanced, I don't see why we
should avoid them — but at present — what end would be
answer'd. if we should gain an advantage we should be
unable to pursue it — if we Experience a Check, we run the
risque of seeing our Army dissipated in the rude raarches
consequent on a defeat — Consistently with the plan which
we ought to forra of putting our Army iu good condition
this winter and preparing it for a good Campaign, we ought
not to have it's Repose preceded by a Defeat.
"As to the other points to be consider'd in this Question,
whether Wilraington or Lancaster will be the raost proper
Situation for furnishing the Army with every necessary — I

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 243
cannot decide, being ignorant of the Country — but it ap
pears to me in general that this point deserves our raost
serious attention — it is rauch better to lose Soldiers in Com
bats with the Enemy to whom we cause a Loss at the same
time, than to lose them by Disorders, & Desertion arising
from their Misery. Misery destroys a part of an Army and
leaves the other without Vigour, without Courage, and with
out good Will — we should find ourselves then in the Spring
with a Body of an Army incapable of any thing, and con
sequently have no right to expect a successful Campaign.'
" Du Portail."
opinion of brigadier-general irvine.
"Sir: " Whether the army should retire into winter quarters
in the interior part of this State or to Wilmington and its
environs, or whether it ought not to take post nigher to the
enemy and remain in huts during the winter, are questions
of such importance and the arguments for and against each
of those raeasures so many and cogent that I confess rayself
at a loss how to decide upon them. — To leave so large a
proportion of the raost valuable part of the State uncovered
as we unavoidably raust do should we quarter in either of
the places raentioned may have a very unhappy effect upon
the minds of the inhabitants, and render it extrearaly
doubtfuU whether much, if any assistance could be drawn
from this State the ensuing carapaign — few raen have a less
opinion of the importance of the militia in their present
state than myself, but I ara apprehensive that should our
friends be disgusted as it is highly probable they would be,
the executive powers would not be able to make drafts
therefrom to fill up the thirteen regiments raised in the state
which form no inconsiderable part of the continental army.
" If the observations made yesterday are founded on
facts, that so great a part of the array are in a sickly situa
tion, it does not appear clear to me that wc should find
shelter for more than the invalids, the question then is
' Translated by Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens.

244 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
whether the remaining part of the army would be more
comfortably lodged in huts at the distance of sixty miles
frora Philadelphia, than they could be at twenty or thirty.
I ara of opinion that they could not, and therefore advise,
that the weak and infirra be iraraediately collected together
and quartered between lancaster & reading, that the resi
due of the array take a strong position on the other side
Schuylkill, where wood is plenty, out of surprising distance,
and there hut theraselves for the winter. I ara with the
greatest respect, Sir, your most obedient & hurab : serv'
"James Irvine.
" Whitemarsh, Decem' 1, 1777."
circular letter.'
"Sir " I wish to recall your attention to the iraportant raatter
recoraraended to your consideration sorae tirae ago — naraely
— the advisability of a winter's Carapaign and, practicability
of an attack upon Philadelphia with the aid of a consider
able body of railitia, to be asserabled at an appointed tirae
& place — particular reasons urge me to request your Senti
ments on this raatter by the raorning, and I shall expect to
receive them in writing accordingly by that tirae. I ara,
Sir, Y' most Obed' Ser.
" G° Washington.
" Dec' 3, 1777." opinion of major-general SULLIVAN.
" Camp, Whitemarsh, Decem' 4*" 1777
"Dear General
" Agreable to your Excellency's Directions I have con
sidered upon the Advisability of making a Winter's Cam
paign, and the practicability of raaking an Attack upon
Philadelphia with the Aid of a Body of Militia to be called
in for that purpose.
' For some reason the written opinions just given were inconclusive,
and the General again desired an expression of sentiment. It was doubt
less owing to some political pressure brought to bear upon him, urging
an attack on the British in Philadelphia.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 245
" Though the attacking & carrying Philadelphia is an
object much to be wished yet as the Attempt carries with
it an Idea of a Winters Campaign I must give my opinion
against it — When this raotion was first raade I was in favor
of it, but I was then taught to believe by those who pre
tended to have view'd the Eneray's Lines that their Re
doubts were not Inclosed in Rear but my own observation
has since convinced me of the contrary, ray own opinion
as well as that of a Great raajority of the General Officers
has been that an Attack upon the Enemies Redoubts in
Front & upon the City afterward would be Hazardous &
must End in Ruin to the Army ; & as we find their Re
doubts are Equally strong in Rear, the attempt will be
Equally Dangerous — but if not altogether so, it must at
Least be attended with great Hazard — and in order to raake
the Attempt, your naked Army must be kept in the field
the greater part if not the whole of the winter. This in
my opinion should never be Done but where the object is
of great importance and where there is a moral certainty
of obtaining the End in view, even when an Array is
properly cloathed against the Incleraency of the Seasons :
but of your Army one third of thera at Least are now con
fined to their cold Tents & unwholesome Hutts for want
of Shoes, Stockings & other Cloathing, a very Large num
ber of thera unable Longer to endure the Severity of their
Situation have retired (sick) to the Hospitals or to Country
Houses. The nurabers which Daily fall sick in Camp is
surprizing — They have neither Cloaths to keep thera warra
by Day or Blankets by night. Most of the Officers are in
the sarae Situation. This is what Induces so raany of thera
to Resign. Many Officers who have behaved with Credit
have petitioned rae for Leave to Retire for a Season, or to
resign their Coraraissions & assigned as a Reason for not
waiting on me that they were so naked they were ashamed
to be seen. That Cloathing was not to be had & even if it
was their wages would not enable them to purchase; I
have taken pains to Inquire from the raost sensible officers
& have conversed with several General Officers upon the

246 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
alarraing Sjiirit of Resignation which takes place in the
Army i find they in General say this : • that they and their
raen have been raarching and countermarching all the year,
that they have fought no General Action beside Skirmishes,
tbat the Cloathes ^t Shoes which they wore out has amounted
to their wages, which leave their Families to suffer at home.
That the Baggage they sent to Bethlehem has been mostly
plundered <t they have no possible way of replacing it :
That the price of Articles bears no proportion to their
wages — they further say that their Rank has not been
settled, that they have been told from time to time that this
should be done when they Retired to winter Quarters of
which they see not the Least prospect, i that while they
have contentedly borne all this they Daily see Congress
placing men over their heads without any Regard to their
Ranks or Services.' Dear General, I feel for you when I
tell you that this is not the Language of a few officers of
Inferior Rank, but of high & Low. Such a Disaffection I
never could have conceived had not ray inquiries convinced
me. I know it must give you pain as it is not in your
power to Redress these grievances, but Duty oblidges me
to give the information. I am fully convinced and fear the
Event will prove that more than half your officers will
leave you in a month, unless sorae Remedy is found out to
quiet their minds &: relieve their Distresses. — Under these
circumstances a Winters Campaign will iu ray opinion Dis
solve the Array : I know it has been urged that the above
sad state of our affairs should induce us to Risque an Action
as soon as possible and I am rayself fully of that opinion —
but can we corapell the Eneray to it if they Decline it — if
M' Howe does not corae to attack us when we Lay so near
hira it is Evident he does not mean to fight us unless we
attack his Lines — Whoever would advise to this measure
puts the fate of America upon the Toss of a single Die
without Refiecting upon the Dismal Situation our affiiirs
must be in if unsuccessful in an attempt, where there are
at least twenty chances to one agiiinst us — to reraedy those
Evils as rauch as possible, I most sincerely Recommend

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 247
that the Army be removed iraraediately to Winter Quarters ;
That Congress fall upon sorae methods of affording a proper
support to officers & Soldiers and that the Rank through
out the Army be settled & made known, that in Instances
of Rank which give universal Dissatisfaction, the Honor of
a few Individuals should be sacrificed to the good of the
whole, and every method taken to Recruit the Array collect
the scatter'd. Recover the Feeble & Discipline the whole, in
order to take the field with vigor early in the Spring which
raay be by March or April & in the raean while an Appa
ratus should be collecting to set down before Philadelphia
in forra so early in the Spring as will enable us by Regular
approaches to carry the Town before a Reinforceraent can
arrive. A Body of Militia may (if tho't necessary) be
seasonably notified to join us on the Day your Excellency
may fix for opening the Carapaign — I know it raay be ob
jected to this plan that During the winter we leave a vast
Tract of Country exposed to the Eneray, but this may be
said in all cases of taking Winter Quarters. Every Army
that retires to Winter Quarters must leave some Country
exposed & I think it much better to give them all Pensyl
vania for the winter than to Ruin that Array which must
save America, if saved at all. If a winter Carapaign is
carried on barely for the purpose of preventing the Enemy
from Drawing provisions & Forage we shall in my opinion
be the greatest sufferers — the Array cannot in a Little tirae
act but in the partizan way. Sorae of Colo. Steward's
Reg' will soon leave you, nine Virginia Regiraents raust
soon go Horae — The Drafts frora Connecticut Leave you
the first of January — this with what will be taken off by
fatigue &c. will render M' Howe superior to you in the
field through the winter, & if our attention is taken up in
carrying on a partizan winter Carapaign, you will have in
the Spring the raiserable reraains of an Army worn out
with Fatigue & totally unfit for any opperations. The King
of Prussia speaking of winter Campaigns says that no raan
having his eyes open will carry on a winters Campaign
unless he has Infinite objects in view — this he says of winter

248 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
Campaigns generally, but I believe if his opinion was
taken upon an Arrays carrying one on under our Disad
vantages he would adopt a language still raore forceable ;
he says, good winter quarters are to give Tranquillity to
the rainds of the Soldiers to Recruit your Army, restore
Constitutions reduced by Fatigue, mend Carriages, fill up
your Regiraents, raanoeuvre your Troops, refresh your Horse,
raake your Arrangements & Lay your Plans for the Ensuing
Carapaign. All This is Essentially necessary for us at
present to be about. I ara therefore clearly of opinion
that no time should be lost in taking the Troops to winter
Quarters, & that we should iraraediately fall upon some
method of giving Ease to our Soldiers & Satisfaction to
our Officers : unless this is Done & unless all other Con
siderations give Way to it, I fear the Event of the next
Carapaign will prove that in striving to do too much we
have ruined all. I am confident that if the plan I propose
is adopted we shall be able in the Spring to take the field
with an Army vastly superior to the Eneray even if our
new Recruits should not be nuraerous, we have a vast nura
ber of sick, raany have Deserted to their own Horaes, there
are upwards of a hundred Deserters frora the Delaware
Regiment only, who are secreted by the Tories. Many
other Regiraents have alraost an equal proportion, these
might all be collected in the winter and with the sick which
raay recover & Recruits which may be added to our Array
will be able to take the field with great advantage in the
Spring. " The above is with all due Subraission offered by. Dear
General, your Excellencys raost obed' Serv' "Jn° Sullivan.
" P.S. — The best raode I could Devise for covering the
Country I pointed out in ray last — Therefore forbear to
repeat it in this." OPINION OF major-general GREENE.
" The Subject under Consideration before the board is
whether a plan to draw together a large Body of railitia in

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 249
aid of the Continental Troops in the dead of winter to
attack General Howe in his winter quarters is eligible or
not. However desirable the destruction of General Howe's
army may be & however impatient the public may be for
this desirable event, I cannot recomraend the raeasure.
I have taken the most serious View of the Subject in every
point in which I am able to examine it, & cannot help think
ing the probability of a disappointment is infinitely greater
than of success. We must not be governed in our meas
ures by our wishes — the love of glory natural to man often
prompts them to exceed the bounds of huraan nature in
their enterprizes. I ara sensible in many instances, that
things pronounced impracticable have been crowned with
success in the attempt. I know it is justifiable in war to
leave soraething to chance, yet prudence forbids that being
raade a principle which necessity alone can justify ; I ara
by no means inclined from an excess of caution in a council
of war to rob ray Country of the happy consequences tbat
raay result from a due exertion of the spirit and bravery of
the Soldiery — but at the same time let us not flatter our
selves from the heat of our zeal that men can do more than
they can. To judge properly upon the subject we must
first consider what human nature is capable of when aided
by all the powers of art, and what is to be expected when
unsupported by those necessary Assistants. In the second
place we have to consider how reluctantly people will leave
the pleasures of domestic life and engage in a hard and
dangerous enterprize at such a rugged season of the year,
especially after being out great part of the Suraraer. In
the third and last place let us consider what a combination
of circurastances are necessary to give success to the enter
prize ; weigh this in the Scales of probability and see how
far we can proraise ourselves a happy issue to the design.
" In the first place supposeing our Soldiery the best of
veterans, capable of the boldest attacks, are they cloathed,
are they appointed with every thing necessary for such a
severe and difficult Atterapt ? Let any body exaraine the
Condition of the troops, one half without breeches, shoes.

250 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
or stockings, and some thousands without Blankets, and
judge how far men in this situation are capable of enduring
the severity of a winter's carapaign. The continental troops
raust be out in the field during all the tirae the railitia are
drawing together, and in the natural order of things there
raust be a great dirainution of their Force ; the troops must
be subject to this evil or else go into winter quarters untill
the militia are collected, in which case the officers will be
dispersed, which will render it very difficult if not imprac
ticable to draw the troops out of quarters in a condition to
undertake the attack. I would not wish to spare either
blood or treasure necessary to work the destruction of Gen
eral Howe's Army ; the object is so important that it de
raands every sacrifice that huraan nature or national policy
can justify, but to make a great sacrifice of men and money
without accomplishing the design will be disgraceful to the
army and discouraging to the Country.
" The militia perhaps raay corae together soraething
better cloathed than the continental troops, but the different
raanner of their living in carap to what they have been ac
custoraed to, together with the extraordinary hardships they
raust be necessarily subject to in the undertaking, cannot
fail of producing a great raortality, or at least sorae thou
sands may be expected to fall sick and be rendered incapable
of duty. This will not only produce a great diminution of
strength, but a numerous sick must be very distressing to
those that are well.
" In Europe where they are much older in war than we
can pretend to be, and where there are as hardy a race of
men as are on the Globe, where the severity of the season
little exceeds that of ours and where necessity, ambition and
military Glory all conspire to produce winter carapaigns,
yet they are never undertaken without the soldiers being
well cloathed and each furnished with a good watch coat
and Blanket. Experience is the best of schools and the
safest guide in huraan affairs — yet I ara no advocate for
blindly following all the maxims of European policy, but
where reason corresponds with what custom has long sane-

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 251
tified, we may safely copy their Exaraple. It raust be con
fessed, and the fatal effects of last winter's campaign will
confirm it, that unless men are well cloathed they must fall
a sacrifice to the severity of the weather when exposed to
the hardships of a winter's campaign. — The successes of
last winter were brilliant and attended with the most happy
consequences, in changing the coraplexion of the tiraes,
but if the bills of raortality were to be consulted, I fancy it
would be found we were no great gainers by those operations.
" There is not only the difficulty of cloathing, but that
of covering also. Tents cannot be procured, houses in the
country are too scattering to quarter the troops in either for
attack or defence. If the troops lye out in the weather
they raust soon, very soon, be rendered unfit for duty.
Buch a nuraerous body of men, hastily drawn together,
all unconnected cannot be speedily so arranged as to co
operate in one great and general design. To these diffi
culties may be added, that of subsisting such a nuraerous
body of troops without having large magazines previously
established for that purpose, when such a cold and rigid
season, and the variableness of the weather will render
transportation by land and water very difficult and un
certain. " Hospitals proper to receive such a number of sick as
we may reasonably expect there will be, will increase the
distresses of the army and add to the coraplaints of the
country — especially if the event should be unfortunate.
" The second objection I have to the raeasure is the dif
ficulty of drawing out such a body of railitia from the dif
ferent States as will be necessary to ensure success to the
Enterprise. Those States which are reraote frora danger,
whose militia have been harassed in the Course of the
Campaign will be unwilling to call thera out without the
most pressing necessity, and supposing the Legislators to
feel all the military enthusiasm we could wish we cannot
flatter ourselves that that spirit will pervade all orders of
men which will be necessary to draw out such bodies as
will be requisite for the Design.

252 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
" Every one that has attended to the difficulties of calling
out large bodies of railitia, the uncertain success of the
most spirited exertions, the irapatience they discover to
be gone, and the trouble of manageing them when here,
may form a good judgment what success we can promise
ourselves when we have all those difficulties to encounter
in the different stages.
" It is highly probable that a requisition frora the Con
gress to the neighboring states raay produce a resolution in
each to furnish their quota, but out of the nuraber deraanded
perhaps not two thirds would actually march and out of the
number that did march, ten to one, whether more than
three fifths ever arrive at camp.
" The time of the troops being drawn together and for
warded on to camp depends on the coercive power of Gov
ernraent; some being stronger and some weaker, those
that arrive first will get out of patience before the arrival
of the others — Desertion and Disgust will be the conse
quence, and if either the one or the other should prevail
to any considerable degree, the whole plan would be de
feated. I would ask any one if these observations are not
founded in truth and human nature, & whether it is not the
true history of the militia ?
" If it is, what can we proraise ourselves frora the attempt;
when if the whole force was to arrive safe in camp — still
there is a great combination of circumstances necessary to
compleat the work ; the failure of either may render abortive
the whole scheme —
" The best way of judging of men and measures at a
future period is to recur to their past conduct under similar
circumstances — How difficult have we found it to draw the
railitia of one State to the aid of that of another even
where it was necessary to give a check to the enemy from
entering the State to which they belong. —
" This measure must go recommended to Congress. —
From the Congress after a week or ten days consultation
a resolve will take place, recommending it to the different
States. — The Assemblies of each one are to be called to-

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 253
gether, their Deliberations and judgement to be had upon
the propriety of the measure, and then an order after ten
or twelve Days issues, to assemble the railitia, — if the officers
are slow and tardy as usual, to collect and raarch thera to
camp will be the business of a month. — The continental
troops raust be out in the field near two months on the most
moderate calculation before the Scherae will be ripe for
execution — We shall all this tirae be wasting the very vitals
of the array, and risqueing a certain evil for an uncertain
good, dependent upon too raany contingencies for us to be
very sanguine of success.
" The different States will be put to no sraall difficulty to
provide arms for a numerous militia, which raust protract
the tirae for collecting it — Consider likewise what delays
great and heavy Storras will produce. How distressing they
raust prove to those that are coming to carap as well as those
waiting their arrival there. —
" The third and last objection Ihave to the raeasure is the
great corabination of circumstances necessary to crown it
with success, and the iraprobability of such a raultitude of
circurastances ever harmonizing together that are inde
pendant of each other and originate from such different
springs. " There is in the first place a sufficient force so appointed
as to be able to execute the plan of attack, it is highly im
probable that such force can be put in motion and still more
improbable that they will be properly equipt — Supposing
the necessary force to meet properly appointed, they will be
a very unwieldy raachine, and it must take up a very con
siderable tirae to organize the whole in such a manner as to
move in concert — Such a numerous railitia cannot be drawn
together very near the Eneray, where their force is collected,
and always ready to take advantage of circumstances, with
out being very liable to surprize and defeat. Therefore, if
they must be drawn together at a considerable distance from
the enemy's Lines, and first organized, and then raove to
the attack the variableness of the weather raay interfere —
Heavy storras of either rain or snow will put a total Bar to

254 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
the operations for a tirae, and more especially the former —
but suppose neither of these difflculties interferes, still the
operations will be dependant upon the temper of the weather
which raust be neither too severe or too raoderate to enable
us to prepare and execute the raanoeuvre — If the weather
is very severe the men cannot live out in the Field long
enough to prepare and execute the attack — If the weather
is not so severe as to freeze the rivers hard enough for raen
& artillery to pass over, there can no attack be made only in
front of the Enemy's lines — and how far such an attack can
be expected to succeed I leave every one to judge — I am
told the weather is very variable here and that Storms are
frequent — both of which raust ruin the platform of our
operations ; our whole success depending upon the Rivers
being sufficiently frozen to enable us to pass over on the
ice —
" But suppose all these circumstances should happen to
corabine to give success to the design, which by the bye is
scarcely within the limits of possibility & far out of the
bounds of probability can we promise ourselves a victory ?
Does history afford us an instance as a foundation for such
a hope ? It is agreed on all hands that there is a very
forraidable force in Philadelphia and every house is a forti
fication — can it be expected that young troops unaccus-
toraed to such enterprises will have steadiness enough to
push the Enemy from place to place untill they are totally
routed from the City? — to make the attack and not totally
defeat them will fall far short of the importance of the
design or the expectations of the public.
" What aid can be expected from the militia ? Will they
corae up to storra the houses ? Let us recur to past ex
perience of the railitia & such a militia too as we cannot
expect for the present attack and see how far we can hope
for success with such troops opposed by such as we have to
attack. — I must confess I think it right to trust everything
to the spirit & bravery of troops that is warranted by huraan
nature. History or our own observation. Has the present
Scherae these Sanctions ? Are we not rather drawn into

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 255
the atterapt by the brilliancy of the object than by the
probability of its Success founded in either nature or
Reason. " The King of Prussia the greatest General of the age
strongly protests against attacking troops by storm in vil
lages, much more in large regular brick cities — He observes,
it often proves the ruin of the best part of an army — this
was verified in several attacks he raade upon towns and
villages last war. — Philadelphia is a great object, but I wish
our reason raay not be seduced frora its importance to take
measures to repossess it that are not warranted by history
or our own observation — An attack of this nature will not
depend upon the multitude that attacks, but upon their
bravery — for the greater the multitude the worse the con
fusion when once they are thrown into disorder; and we
have no reason to expect anything else frora our own or
others experience — Men who are brought frora home with
all their family feelings about thera, commanded by officers
who in general have little or no ambition for military glory,
are not fortified for such scenes of carnage as are generally
exhibited in attacks raade upon towns defended by a large
body of veteran troops. —
" I ara not against a winter's campaign if the temper of
the officers and the condition of the troops would admit of
it, neither have I the least objection to raaking an attack
upon Philadelphia if there was a probability of succeed
ing founded in huraan nature or the experience of raan
kind. —
" Let us consider the consequences that will result from a
disappointment in a measure of this nature. — In the first
place, it will be attended with a vast expence, and the loss
of raany lives to no valuable purpose — it will prove a great
obstruction to the recruiting service and a defeat will give
a general alarra and spread universal discontent throughout
the continent — It will expose the weakness of our militia
to the enemy and not only to thera but to all Europe who
now consider them much more formidable than they really
are. —

256 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
" A winter's carapaign in the present discontented state of
the officers and an attack upon the city of Philadelphia
appear to rae like forraing a crisis for American liberty
which if unsuccessful I fear will prove her grave. If the
army goes through a winter's Campaign and the recruiting
service is as much injured as I expect from calling out the
railitia, it will be in a raiserable plight to open the carapaign
with in the Spring; and we may reasonably expect that
great britain will rake all the kennels of Europe for troops
to repair their affairs in Araerica.
"I have wrote ray mind so fully upon the subject of
winter quarters, and with respect to a winter campaign that
it is unnecessary to add anything further here — I would beg
leave to recoraraend the raeasure suggested in that paper for
recruiting the array — and filling up the continental Bat
talions — if the raeasure is adopted the array can be recruited
nearly or quite as soon as the railitia can be got together —
the attack can be raade with rauch more hopes of success &
if we are defeated we shall still have a force to carry on a
regular siege as soon as the military apparatus can be pre
pared and the season will perrait us to open batteries against
the eneray's lines.
" These are my sentiraents Sir upon the subject which
with all due deference are subraitted to your Excellency's
consideration, but if your Excellency thinks a winters cara
paign a necessary raeasure, or an attack upon Philadel
phia, an eligible plan, I will lend every possible aid in ray
power to carry it into execution ; notwithstanding that this
is the third year since I have paid the least attention to my
own private affairs. ,, „ „ ,, ^
^ " Nath. Greene M. G.
" Camp, December 3*, 1777."
OPINION OF LORD STIRLING. " Camp, Decem' 3* 1777
"Sir: "Your Excellency's letter of this date requesting my
Sentiments on ' the Adviseability of a Winters Campaign,'
' aud the practicability of an Attack upon Philadelphia with

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 257
the Aid of a Considerable Body of Militia to be Assembled
at an Appointed Time and Place,' I have duly Considered,
and in Answer to the first Question am of Opinion That
in order to undertake a Winters Campaign the Troops
should be fresh, in good Order and well Cloathed with at
least two warm Vests two pair milled Woolen Stockings &
mittens, good Shoes, Woollen Overhalls, a Good blanket
Coat besides a blanket to Lodge in. Our Troops are not
iu this Condition, nor are they like to be provided in this
Manner, they are already worn out by a long fatigueing
Campaign, a Considerable part of them in the Hospitals,
above one half of those in Camp are almost naked, and are
walking barefooted on the Ice or frozen Ground. In short
if a Winters Campaign should be attempted with them, our
hopes will be deceived, the Army will be totally ruined ;
and we shall find ourselves v/ithout one in the Spring, the
Consequences of which in the Affairs of the American
States are too evident to need an enuraeration, and there
fore raust Conclude that a Winter's Carapaign [is] extrearaly
Unadviseable. " As to the second Question, I have already declared ray
Opinion (after your Excellency's own view of the Enemy's
lines) that it is irapracticable on the side Schuylkill with the
Troops now under your Command, and were you aided by
all the Militia the States on this Continent can furnish by
the first of february they would only serve to make the
Carnage, or the Route, the greater : the only Chance we
have of attacking Philadelphia to advantage, is, over the
Schuylkill when it is sufficiently frozen to bear a Column of
Troops to pass it; this happens to be the Case in raost
Winters, sometimes in one Month, sometiraes in another,
last Winter it was so in the beginning of January, it broke
up by the Middle of that Month, and did not get firm again
in the remainder of the Winter, this Uncertainty would
render the Atterapt very precarious. After an Iramense
expence in Collecting a Great body of Militia we might
have no opportunity of passing the Schuylkill; the Men
would be disgusted with the Service at that severe Season,
19

258 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
without any thing to Cover them, they would return dis
pirited, the disappointment in the Expedition would bear
the Character of a defeat & would have all the bad effects of
one, it would increase our sick, hurt the Recruiting Service
and prove Ruinous to the Army, but should the Schuylkill
prove passable at a proper Season, I should have but little
hope of our Carrying philaddphia; to storm the Streets
thro' the fire frora Redoubts houses & Colurans of Men, is
too rauch to expect from any Troops. — to set down before
it at that Season, and to drive them out of it by Battering,
is to us irapracticable, and any Atterapt of the kind highly
unadviseable. I am your Excellency's
" Most Obedient Humble Servant
" Stirling."
OPINION OF the marquis DE LAFAYETTE.
" The project of calling a large body of militia for such
a day, in order to attack the enneray in philaddphia, seeras
to me attended with so many difficulties, inconveniences,
and bad chances, that if it is not looked upon as a necessary
and almost desperate enterprise, tho' it is a very shining
and highly pleasing idea, however I cannot think it is a
prudent and reasonable one. The reasons for my rejecting
it are as follows —
" 1" I do not believe that any body could advise your
excellency to attack only the redoubts in front, whatever
could be our force ; such an attack vould be attended with
a greater loss but not a greater succes than if we had only
continental troops.
" 2° We must therefore expect the raoment when the ice
upon the Schullckill will oppen to us all the left side of the
enemy's line and encarapraents. but or the climate makes
a great difference between this country and the european
ones, or one single fine day may frustrate all our hopes and
preparations in putting a way all the ice. then we schould
expect one other moment before dismissing the troops, and
in my actual supposition they are to be kept a very schort
time.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 259
" 3" in europe ice is brooked every night when it can
facilitate the projects of the enemy; if all is not cleared, at
least a ditch can be forraed in the river. I know that we
schould annoy theyr workraen, I know that such an opera
tion would be very hard an[d] troublesome for them, but
in the first case I'l answer that everywhere railitary works
are perforraed with the same inconveniences, in the second
the people of philaddphia can be employed there, when I
say that we could trouble theyr operation, I suppose that
our winter quarters are not in the back country.
" 4" We can't expect any secrecy in our collecting those
forces, we can't deceive the ennemy for theyr destination.
therefore (untill we could have a respectable body in the
jirsay) he can go of before fighting and then we must not
entertain the hope of oppressing and destroying all that
array, but only of recovering philaddphia.
" 5" Supposing that we could go upon the ice we have only
one way of attacking, for if we put the railitia in first line,
they will fall back upon the continental troops, and we can
not depend enough upon our raen to believe that we could
raaintain order and resolution araong them, if the militia
is in the rear, and the regulars were repulsed, certainly they
will not advance where continental troops don't succeed.
if amongs us, I don't believe it would do better, therefore
our only way should be to raake false attacks of railitia, and
true ones of continental troops, to have a curtain of troops
(what we call in French un rideau) in the whole lenght of
the Schulckill, and on this side of the redoubts, in order
to cover the heads of our colurans, and our points of attack,
and to put the disorder araongs the enneray by an eavy
fire. I wishond [?] too a body should be in the jirsay in
case it would be possible for the ennemy to retreat by the dela
ware. and does your excellency think that such a quantity
of troops could be raised ?
" 6" When I consider all the difficulties of turning out
some militia in interesting occasions, I can't flatter mysdf
that all that people could be sent to your army for such a
day, without the utmost difficulties, each state will have

260 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
an excuse fbr not sending as many men as they'l be desired.
the cold, the rivers, the want of cloathes of every thing will
seem sufficient reasons, if not to stay at home, at least to
arrive after the time of the rendezvous, every one will
trust upon the another, and if we do not succeed all will be
against us.
" 7° have we in the continent all the cloathes, arras ara
raunition, &c. &c. which would be necessary for so raany
soldiers. Would it be possible to find subsistances enough
in cattle, forage, &c. All things which I can't know, but
however I think worthy of being raentioned, and that prin
cipally because the want of exactitude, the necessity of
giving to thera a light idea of what they are to do will en
gage us to keep them longer than we think.
" 8. I know that all these inconveniences can not be
together; because if we keep them some time, then we
schall find an opportunity of going over the schulckill in
case that we can prevent theyr braking the ice; on the
other hand if we have thera only for a few days, difficulties
of subsistence will be rauch lesser ; and if it is impossible
for the ennemy to pass the delaware, certainly a body in
jersay is quite useless. I can add that in case we could
not go over the ice, it is possible to throw bridges upon the
river, but, Sir, I have mentionned all the difficulties which
strike me, because my opinion is not to begin such an enter
prize unless we shall be certain of succeeding. A great
schame for our arras, a great mischief for our cause would
attend our being repulsed when we schould attack a part of
the british forces with all the united forces of America.
europe has a great idea of our being able to raise when we
please an immense array of railitia, and it is looked upon
as our last but certain ressource. if we fall this phantora
will fall also, and you know that the Araerican interest has
alwais been since the beginning of this war to let the world
believe that we are stronger than we can ever expect to be.
if we destroy the english array, our generous effort will be
admired everywhere, if we are rupulsed it will be called a
rash and laughable expedition, therefore we musst not let a

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 261
shining appearance and the pleasing charms of a bold fine
enterprize, deceive us upon the inconveniences and dan
gers of a gigantesque and in the sarae time decisive expe
dition. " However perhaps the interest of araerica, the wish of
all the states, the instruction of Congress, the necessity of
finishing the war, all these circumstances which are un
known to me, raake it necessary for your excellency to
hazard soraething in this occasion, perhaps the difficulties
in the physick and raoral ressources of this country are not
so great as I ara affraid to find them, perhaps it is possible
to raise, to arm, to cloath, to subsist, to keep together and
give some instructions to that so considerable army which
according to my opinion is necessary, perhaps the weather
is not so changeable in this country as it is in europe, or
some other means than going upon the ice could seera
eligible to your excellency, but if the difficulties which I
fear are indeed true (what you can judge, and I can not know
rayself) then I am not for that expedition in considering it
as only a railitar one.
" if however I was deceived, or if politic circurastances
schould make it necessary to try such an enterprise, the
following precautions seem me to be taken.
" 1" I do not ascertain the number of railitia to be raised
because it raust be as large as we can arra, cloath and subsist.
" 2" All possible exertions are to be taken for having
thera at the appointed tirae which tirae must be now as
soon as it is possible.
" 3" Some instructions should take place before the opera
tion, only for some days, because if they were marched to
the ennemy without the lest idea of raarching together such
a disorder would prevent the succes of the less difficult
enterprize. " 4" the continental troops should be sent in theyr winter
quarters as soon as possible, to take a good rest, to recom-
fort theraselves, to be reinforced by theyr raen now scattered
everywhere, by sorae recruits, and the whole to be managed
and by theyr officers, under that point of vue,

262 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
and principally cloathes should be delivered to them, and
theyr arms put in a good order, it seems to rae that this
prospect could engage us to be nearer from the ennemy
than lancaster is.
" 5" the soldiers and principally the officers of our array
schould not be perraitted to go horae till it would be over.
" 6" proper raeans for recruiting the army schould be
taken as soon as possible, one of the best according to my
opinion would be (after having suppressed the substitutes)
to annex a part of the militia of each state to theyr conti
nental divisions in order to serve there for twelve months.
I think such a regulation is eligible in all cases, for a
strong continental army well managed and disciplined, and
ready to begin an early campaign, and to make use of all
the unforeseen and soudain occasions, would do much
greater service than all the railitia in the world, and their
railitia should be raade use of only in a less great number
or in particular circumstances.
" The Mquis de Lafayette "Jf. (?."
opinion of baron de kalb.
"Sir " When your Excellency recommended sorae tirae ago
the Consideration of the practicability of an attack on the
Enneray, I was already of opinion for such an attack if it
was possible to make an attempt on the City behind the
lines, either by sending troops in Boats down Delawar River
to land on, or below the wharf, or by crossing Schuylkill
river below raiddle ferry either by throwing over Bridges,
or upon the ice in great frosts, to fall into the Enneraies
rear at the sarae tirae the army was to attack the lines in
front, with several Colums.
" Sending down Troops Delawar river, seeras at least
very dangerous if not entirely irapracticable.
" The Passage over Schuylkill appears raore eligible if
attempted by a considerable body of militia, or other
Troops. (I say militia, because I think the regulars would

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 263
be all necessary for the chief attack in front.) Posted
along the right bank of said river, on the best and most
advantageous spots, frora whence the artillerie & even
sraall arras could annoy the Enneray and protect the work
raen for erecting Bridges, and in sorae places seeraingly
working, for the better drawing the Enneray on that side,
there ought to be made such seeming or reall attempts in
several places at the same time. As this is the weak side,
there is no doubt they would considerably divide their
forces, and give room to break in upon them either in front
or on this side, perhaps on both at once.
" If the necessary Boats and Materials for such bridges
could not be provided, or carried to the proper places to be
employed, or if there was an irapossibility of erecting
Bridges, or preventing the Enneraies of cutting a Channel
through the ice, in fine if a Passage over Schuylkill should
be irapracticable, it appears to rae, that the attack ought
rather to be dropped, then to attack the Enneraies in their
strong hold, in front only, this would be running the risk
of a repulse, or of a total defeat and the bad consequences
thereof. " If on the contrary the river may be crossed especially
upon the Ice, the principal attack could be made on this
side with the best troops, and the Militia be drawn up in
Battle or in Columns before the lines to make a show, and
keep up the attention of the Ennemy. for that purpose a
Large body of militia from all States should be drawn to
gether, and such raeasures taken for their raarch as to arrive
all on the sarae day or very near, that on one hand, the
expedition raay take place iraraediately after their arrival,
the Enneraies may be surprised or at least not have sufficient
time to collect more forces or to add to their works, and on
the other hand that the army may not be distress'd for
Provisions, nor the Militia kept a long tirae in the field,
for fear of sickness, or disgust, which is by all means to be
avoided. " Upon the whole this attack is subject to many incon
veniencies, and the greatest of all, will be the necessity of

264 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
a winters campaign, this will ruin the array by sickness
and discontent, perhaps too by desertion, and how will
another almost new one be raised, except Congress take
such raeasures as to oblige the railitia to serve constantly
at least for two years, and to be put into the regulars to
corapleat the regiraents, in fixing a certain nuraber for every
State and to be all levied at a Limited time, and there is
none to be lost, if your Excellency resolve for a Winter
Campaign, the Troops ought to be imraediately supplied
with cloathing at any rate, if not Winter quarters to take
place without loss of tirae. But in this case where and
how to take thera is a matter of the highest consideration.
if real Winter quarters and rest are intended, they must be
taken at a distance (as between Lancaster & Reading, or
Reading and Easttown) from the Ennemy. But this would
give up to the Ennemy the Jeseys, the whole State of
Delawar, the eastern part of Maryland, Chester, Philadel
phia & Bucks Counties in this State of Pen sil vania, the
Ennemy would draw out of these lands, forrage. Provisions,
live-stock, and what would be still worse, numbers of able
raen to bear arras against their country, either by consent,
delusion, or by force, besides the bad Effect it would have
or produce in Political matters. This may partly be pre
vented by taking up Winter quarters at Wilmington and
Environs with the addition of Hutts, but then there will
be little or no rest, and no possibility of sending home
many Officers & Soldiers for recruiting their regiraents, and
at the least raoveraent of the Ennemy on Schuylkill, we
raust corae up with thera, iu order not to be surprised in
some of our quarters or cut off frora the neighbouring
States and from our Stores ; the greatest alertness will be
required from all Comraanders in those quarters, and the
fatigues the army would lie under and the Sicknesses they
would be subject to, call aloud on Congress for recruits and
Cloathing.
"Baron de Kalb
" Major General."

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 265
OPINION OF major-general ARMSTRONG.
" Camp at Whitemarsh, 4'" Dec' 1777
"Sir "In regard to the Advisability of a Winters Campaign,
I answer — In keeping the Field, the hardships on both
officers and privates are manifestly great, nor is there an
alternative presenting your Excellency with less incon
venience, at best you have but a choice of difficulties of
which Hutting in the field is in ray Opinion the least of the
two, and most in charecter for the Array.
" The only semblance of Quarters known to us being so
remote from the Enemies Post as to leave a great part of
Pennsylvania for several months fully in their power — an
acquisition this, too great to be yielded to these cruel &
haughty intruders, unless under a greater degree of necessity
than has yet reached your Army — To the advantages of the
Eneray we raust here subjoin the piteous sufferings of the
well rainded populace, too raany to enuraerate, too tender
to express — I wish Sir to be divested of every local preju
dice in the present enquiry where the publick weal is not
clearly involved, but raost certainly if in present or equal
Circumstances the Whole of the Army shall retire to dis
tant Villiages already crowded with her own refugees,
Pennsylvania is that moment a publick Sacrifice, her Spirits,
her hopes & future exertions Civil & Military, are blasted at
once ! unhappy State ! & well if her diseases do not con
taminate sorae of her neighbours — a rautillated victim cursed
of the other twelve — and by Britain too, who for her many-
fold services to Congress & to this Army, hath now made
her the capital Seat of War.
" To considerations of this sort raay naturally be added a
train of things relative to the great design uses & reputation
of the Array, all pointing against the inelligible quarters,
but at present shall orait these.
" Discipline & (Economy will be better raaintain'd in the
field than in the villages, where quarters are so far detatched
— Health & vigour better raaintain'd than in bad Quarters,

266 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
and liable to debauchery. Hutting in the field in a dry
cold winter, is by no raeans incompatible with health — ^this
hath been experienced. If our Army is remote the lower
Counties & sorae part of Maryland will probably be sub
ject to the like incursions ofthe Eneray with the uncovered
parts of Pennsylvania — In the field favourable Openings for
annoying the Eneray raay happen & be improved — Great
Quantities of Provisions and Forage now convenient to the
Enemy raay be saved — If in the Field the Eneray will be
cautious, if in quarters they will triuraph, and their small
partys dispersed abroad will serve their purposes & do us
much daraage. — On the whole I ara fully of Opinion how
ever arduous, that the present situation of our Affairs calls
aloud for a Carapaign, that it is advisable, practicable, hon
orable and will be found to be salutary. — But as far as pos
sible to reconcile jarring difflculties, suppose one half of the
Continental Troops with sorae Militia alwais in the field,
and the other in quarters alternately, by which raeans sorae
publick good raay still be done, whilst all that ease that the
nature of things can possibly adrait will be granted to the
Troops generally?
" With respect to the practicability of an attack on Philad"
with the aid of a Considerable body of Militia to be as
serabled at a certain time and place — 'tis a pleasing idea at
first view, and ready to elate the anxious mind, in it there
is soraething noble & consonant to the great points in view,
and did they assemble in convenient time, the attack raight
doubtless be made with probable success — Or their very
numbers occasion the Enemy to abscond, or a desertion in
their Army — Cooper's Ferry wou'd best annoy the Eneray
with carcasses — but the Engineers should be knowing, pro
vided with raaterials, & might throw light on the best means
of attack, on whatever side of the Town it might be made.
Notwithstanding these wishful things, so raany are the con
tingencies attending the convention of a distant Militia, and
the ice serving in proper tirae, together with the great
prejudice of a disappointraent, that a raeasure the efficacy
of which raust depend on such an exact coincidence of things

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 267
can scarcely be advised, but raust be given up as rather to
be wished than expected. Such an atterapt vrith the ad
vantage of Boats might perhaps be matter of consideration
for the Spring. I am with perfect Subraission
" Y' Excellencys Most Obed' Serv'.
"John Armstrong."

opinion of brigadier-general maxwell.
" Sir, " Your Excellencys Favour of yesterday I received con
cerning the Adviseability of a winter Carapaign, and the
practicability of an attack upon Philad", with the Aid of a
considerable body of Militia asserabled at an apointed time
and place. I do ashure your Excellency I think the object
a verry desirable one could it be put properly into execution
and without taking a winter Campaign to it, which in our
present circumstances would be sufficient to ruin us of
itself. " It appears to me verry plain that General How does not
think himself strong enough now to meet us in the field
therefore will give us no opertunity of attacking hira but to
our great disadvantage. Our expectations have never been
verry sanguine that we could prevent our Enerays frora
taking possession of sorae of our Seaports but if they can
not raeet us in the field they will raake verry slow work in
conquering the Country. It appears verry plain we raust
have another Campaign next summer, and the sooner we
begin to prepair for it the better by taking every method
in our power to prepare our present Armey, and Increase it.
" The Attack proposed on Philad" appears to rae to be
liable to so many Accidents that the success of it woud be
verry doubtfuU and should it fail our Armey would be
ruined waiting for it.
" I ara therefore against the Attack and the Winter Cara
paign, and ara your Excellency's
" Most Obedient Hurable Servant
" W" Maxwell.
"White Marsh, 4*" December, 1777."

268 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
OPINION OF brigadier-general SMALLWOOD.
" Camp, December 4"" 1777
"Sir " It will be unnecessary to point out the sufferings of the
Continental Troops, from their various hard Duty, & dis
tresses for want of Cloathing, particularly in the Articles of
Blankets, Shoes & Stockings, the most essential part to
enable them to encounter the severity of a Winter Cam
paign, and the improbability of procuring those necessary
supplies, without which our prospect of success in an un
dertaking of this Nature must be unproraising and fruitless
— The Army has already & is daily diminishing by sickness,
which has in a great Measure proceeded frora the want of
these necessary Articles — The discontent, the disposition
for resigning, & the complaints which so generally pre
vail among the Officers, arising in some Instances from the
unsettled State of their Recruiting Accounts (which pre
vents the Draft of their Pay) of their Rank, in other In
stances the partial Proraotions which have been made, & the
exorbitant Prices paid for what they must unavoidably pur
chase (overrunning their Pay) renders them destitute &
unable to appear suitable to their Rank, or even decent &
corafortable, which call for redress & respite to regulate &
reraedy, this cannot be made or obtained in the course of a
Winters Carapaign.
" Your Excellency can be no stranger to their Distress,
and the justice & raotives of their Complaints, & desire to
resign, which if not speedily remedied raust have a danger
ous Tendency, & a Winter Carapaign raust rather increase
than dirainish their Sufferings in, & Objections to the service
— abstracted frora which it raust lessen, inervate, & render
your troops less formidable, & raay give an irretrievable
check to your Advances in the Spring, at a Tirae when the
Eneray will corae out in high Spirits & Vigor, & perhaps
raay raore than avail theraselves of any acquisitions gained
by it — from which, & sundry other Reasons which might
be suggested, I ara against a Winter Campaign, tho' at the

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 269
same Time I shou'd object to the Troops being canton'd so
reraote as to afford little or no cover to the Country, this
might have a bad Tendency in several Respects, as it wou'd
enable the Enemy to procure Supplies without any Risque
at the sarae Time that it wou'd discourage the Inhabitants,
& subject them to be insulted & plundered, & the Soldiery
being lulled into Security wou'd be inattentive to Discipline,
& in all probability so scattered over the Country, as to
render it difficult to draw them to a Point, in order to open
the Campaign early in the Spring, & prosecute your Meas
ures with Vigor & Success.
"An Attack on Philad" this Winter, I think neither ad
visable or practicable without subjecting the Army to too
great a Loss, this cannot be effected in Front, & an Attempt
in Rear & on the left Flank (the only probable way of
raaking an irapression) must depend upon Contingencies,
which in all probability upon our taking a Position on the
other side of the Schuylkill, will be sufficiently guarded
against, nor in this cold, dead Season do I think the Aids
expected from Militia are at all to be depended on.
" I should therefore judge it raore prudent, iraraediately
to take the raost eligible Position, for the Security, relief &
discipline of the Troops, having in View to cover as rauch
as may be the Country, and awe the Enemy from making
depredations, & should the States fall on Measures of filling
up their Regiments or supplying you with a formidable
Body of Militia early in the Spring, your Prospects of Suc
cess wou'd be enlarged & better'd, & it's likely a deep
stroke raight be made, before the Enemy cou'd possibly be
reinforced. I have the Honor to be &c.
" Your Excellency's raost Obed' H"'" Serv'
" W. Smallwood."
OPINION OF brigadier-general KNOX.
"Camp, White Marsh, 3* December 1777
"Sir
" I receiv'd your Excellencys orders to give ray sentiraents
'upon the advisability of making a Winters Campaign, and

270 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
Practicability of an attack upon Philadelphia, vrith the aid
of a considerable body of militia to be assembled at an ap
pointed time & place.' Were it probable that S' W"" Howe's
destruction would be the consequence of a Winter's Cam
paign I would raost chearfully give ray voice and opinion
for one — I think a Winter's Campaign, under the present
circumstances, will be the inevitable destruction, if not of
the Liberties of the Country, yet of the present Army ; my
opinion is founded on the following Reasons.
" Our entire want of Cloathing to keep the raen from
Perishing by the cold winters season.
" The iraprobability & irapracticability of surprizing 10,000
veteran troops in a well fortified city.
" The irapossibility of our keeping the field to besiege
their works and city regularly, and being alraost totally
deficient of any warlike apparatus for so arduous an enter
prize. " The uncertainty of obtaining such a sufficient nuraber
of Militia as to raake the enterprize warranted by reason,
or coraraon Military knowledge.
" My Opinion is for putting the Army in good Winter
Quarters, to repair the damages done : to recruit^ reform
the Array; to provide Magazines &c. In the Spring we
may be enabled to strike the enemy a decisive blow, which
by making a Winters Campaign I think iraprobable and
irapossible. " I ara Sir with the greatest respect. Your
" Excellency's Most Obed' H'ble Servant
"H. Knox
" -B. G. Artillery."
OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL POOR.
" Camp, 4"" Decem' 1777
" Db Sir
" In answer to the question Recv'd by note frora your
Excellency yesterday — a winters Campain, I ara sure it
will be attended with Gruel loss of our numbers.
" As to the Militia troops their is but little Dependence

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 271
upon them in Case you raake an Asolt upon Philid""' —
besides if the Rivers should be froze over the Eneray Dout-
less will Contract lines & raake their Situation nearly as
strong as it is now.
" I think that if your Array should be Emediatly sent
into winter Quarters — the Absentees Colected, that early
next Spring you'd be able to take the field with Dubble the
numbers that you'l have if a winters Campain is kept up.
" as your men are much fatigued & numbers falling sick
every day for want of Clothing and Corafertable habitations.
" I ara Clear of Opinion that it's Best to put your Array
into winter quarters without Loss of tirae.
"however am Ready to Compile with any Disposition
that shall [be] Concluded upon.
" I am Sir your Excellency's raost obedient
" H'" Serv'-
" Enoch Poor, B. G."
opinion of brigadier-general paterson.
"Sir
" The bad States of our Array at present destitute of
Clothing and raany other Necessaries, the Necessity of its
being recruited this Winter, that we may be superior to
M' How in the Spring, induces me to give my Opinion in
favour of going to Winter Quarters. The Attack on Phila
delphia, from the best knowledge I can obtain of the
Strength of their River Works, I must think woud fail,
the Consequences of which would be a universal Discour
agement to the Country and Army, I find my Brigade
falling sick very fast, and ara informed that others nigh me
are equally unfortunate, should therefore think it adviseable
to retire to sorae convenient Place for the Winter, and
recruit the Array as much as possible, that we may at an
early Day in Spring, take the Field & give Gen' How the
80 much desired Defeat.
" I am your Excellencies most
" hurable Servant "Jn" Paterson.
" Camp, 4 Decern' 1777."

272 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
OPINION OF brigadier-general VARNUM.
" Whitemarsh, 3* DeC, 1777
"Sir " Having been favored with your Excellencys commands
of this day, I shall give my sentiraents respecting the sub
ject raatters thereof, uninfiuenced by any motives but the
sincere dictates of my own mind.
"Not being at Head Quarters when the subject of a
' winters campaign was proposed,' in order ' to make an
attack upon Philadelphia, aided by a considerable body of
railitia,' I cannot be acquainted with the reasons offered in
support of the proposition : your Excellency will therefore
excuse rae, if I do not go so fully into the arguments as
otherwise raight be expected.
" Winter carapaigns have not, in raodern tiraes, been
approved of or practised by great coraraanders, but upon
the most iraportant occasions — Araong the ancients they
were raore common. Two reasons conspired to raake thera
so ; the hardiness of the soldiery, from their abstemious
manner of living ; and the sraall preparations necessary to
furnish their railitary apparatus. The modern use of gun
powder, and the tedious preparations in the laboratory,
added to the luxury and effeminacy of the tiraes have con-
cured, among other things, to form the modern taste. All
Countries, in the same age, equally civilized seera to forra
their customs and manners upon a sirailar basis. It is not
strange therefore that Araericans have, in some measure,
imbibed the vices of Europe. And, altho' the living of the
American army is necessarily founded upon the strictest
frugality, yet a few months service has not given them
strength of constitution and patience of raind adequate to
the severities of a winter's carapaign. This will appear
raore evident, if your Excellency will be pleased to consider
that the array is composed of men from the various parts of
an extensive continent; born in different climates; accus
tomed, in some degree, to a different mode of living, and
scarcely any of them acquainted with the raanner of sub-

Defences of Philaddphia in 1777. 273
sisting in camp. A considerable tirae is requisite to form
them to the same standard. 'Till when, sickness will raore
or less prevail in jproportion to the irregularity of their
duty. Prom this consideration it is in part, that so very
great a proportion of the troops are unfit for duty.
" Another and not inconsiderable Cause of the feeble
state of the army, is their want of cloathing. From what
ever source it is, I shall not decide, but it is a melancholly
truth, that the men are naked. And what can we expect
from them, opposed to British veterans, well clad, well pro
vided with every necessary, when they are not in a situation
to corabat the severities of the season ? Permit me Sir for
a moment to indulge a moral sentiraent. The Soldiers,
their nearest connections, the country at large, nay, God
hiraself, has committed them to our charge ! We are an
swerable for their safety, their health, their comfort & their
lives — If unnecessarily we deprive them of either, a con
sciousness thereof will plant daggers in our breasts that
time cannot remove ! — I must therefore conclude that your
raen are not in a situation to keep the field.
"Where are the magazines necessary for the execution
of this great and extensive plan? The commissary's de
partraent is in such a situation, that provisions can scarcely
be obtained frora day to day. I know of nothing like
preparations to subsist a large army near the eneray's lines.
In that position, we cannot depend upon live stock. Salted
provisions and hard bread must be had. Where are they ?
In the eastern parts of Connecticutt. The horses are ex
tremely fatigued ; they want rest and keeping. But, sup
pose they were in good plight ; from what quarter is forage
to be drawn to feed them ? It is very difficult to obtain
it in our present quiet camp. How much raore so will it
be when near the enemy ? In what condition is our labo
ratory? Where are our battering cannon? Where are
our mortars, shells, carcases, &c. ? By a general assault
upon the City, many of these objections would be ob
viated ; but that I esteem utterly impracticable. The col
lecting a large body of militia in aid of the continental
20

274 Defences of Philaddphia in 1777.
troops, I presume would be attended with unsurmountable
difficulties. The distance from whence many of them must
come, would either totally discourage them from attempting
it, or protract the tirae in such a raanner, that when they
are asserabled, arranged, & provided with ammunition
&c., the winter season would be past, and your army ruined.
They cannot be subsisted on the raarch, neither could they
live here without great alterations. But suppose these
difficulties were reraoved, & we provided with covering and
other accommodations for a numerous army, of what ser
vice would they be in such a kind of attack as is proposed ?
I will venture to say, that the scene of confusion. Horror
and carnage that must ensue, would only heighten those
miseries which result from a total defeat ! In this kind of
war, I conceive of militia, proraiscuously asserabled, as an
huge unaniraated machine, incapable of regular motion or
activity ; and must infallibly share the fate of that numerous
host of undisciplined barbarians, who ventured to fight the
Roraan Marius. I will beg liberty to extend my Ideas
further, and presume we had an army of regular, well
appointed troops, sufficiently numerous to ensure victory in
the field, even then the attack would appear to me iraprac
ticable. It cannot be doubted but that General Howe has
strongly fortified the front of the City by a chain of Re
doubts, connected by Abbatis, or lines. The flanks are
secured by Rivers. The City itself is raade up of houses,
the walls of which are proof against small shot. Thus
securely posted, what probability have we of success ? To
rush impetuously on certain destruction, would be acting the
part of madmen rather than of brave commanders. — It is
the duty Sir, of all raen to seek their own happiness. In
military characters this is derived from glorious actions;
from those exploits and successes which claim the approba
tion and applause of mankind. Rashness and timidity are
alike unfriendly. Prudence and real magnanimity form
the Hero.
" In matters of great importance, it is the sentiment of
byographical writers, that we call to our assistance the

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 275
example of shining characters. It is frora their experience
we may form our own conduct ; and from the success at
tending their efforts, under sirailar circumstances, we may
probably conjecture the event of our measures. What
would a Marlborough have done on such an occasion?
* He never besieged a town but he carried it ;' but he never
attacked a strong village or town by assault. What would
a Pyrrhus have atterapted ? He undertook to storm a city —
He lost his army and his own life. Thus, by one rash
manoeuvre that dazzling Glory which astonished the uni
verse, was sullied and eclipsed ! As many instances of the
like kind will be recent in your Excellency's memory I
shall not trouble you with selecting more; but observe,
that, if your councils are to be formed upon popular opin
ions, & vulgar prejudices ; or even by bodies in high au
thority, you will be pleased to recollect the misfortune of
the Martial Turenne, who, to gratify the court of Paris,
attacked a town sword in hand; the Event proved their
ignorance and folly.
"Altho' Philadelphia is a splendid object, — altho' a total
destruction of General Howe's army would corapleat your
Excellency's felicity in relieving the country from all her
calamities ; yet, the consequences of a defeat, would be
attended with miseries beyond Description.
" The salvation of America does not depend upon a suc
cessful victory this winter; but a severe defeat would
plunge us into difficulties, out of which we could scarcely
extricate ourselves. In short, I dread the Consequences,
and do esteem an attack, upon the principles proposed, in
every respect unadviseable. However, should your Excel
lency order it, I shall be happy in relinquishing my own
objections, knowing that if the worst should happen, we
shall fall like the sacred band of Thebes.
" I am obediently your Excellency's
" most humble Servant
"J. M. Varnum.
"4'" Dec 1777

276 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
"Sir "Haring only the last Evening to forra, adjust & write
my Opinion upon an iraportant Question ; Being very rauch
indisposed and full of Pain, I must apologize to your Excel
lency for the obscure manner in w°h my Ideas are conceived
and expressed. But for the Circurastances raentioned, I
should have added raany raore Arguments in support of
ray Sentiments. I have mentioned in a written Opinion
lately, the Uneasiness of the Officers ; I hope that may be
considered in Connection with this. " I ara as before
" J. M. V."

OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL WOODFORD.
" Camp 4'" December, 1777
" Dear Gen"-
" I did not receive your Excellency's Letter till ray return
frora Head quarters last Evening, or I should have cora-
ply'd with your requisition sooner.
" I have before given ray reasons for being against ex-
poseing this Array to a Winters Carapaign in their present
condition. I would add to thera the present Teraper of the
soldiery, who I ara convinced are very gener'ly against it.
" The practicability of an attack upon Philadelphia I have
look'd upon to be entirely out of the question since your
Excellency's return frora viewing the Eneray's Works.
" As to the Aid of the Militia, I cannot be brought to
think they will be of any in such an atterapt. I ara inclined
to think whilst this Boddywere assembling we should loose
more Continental officers & soldiers by waiting for them in
the Field, then double the value of them that would arrive.
Experience shewes that few Militia can be brought to stand
in the line of Battle, & it would be deceiving ourselves to
expect thera upon this creation to raarch up to the attack
of the Eneray's Works.
" If such an attack is to be raade, I would advise it to be
put in execution Iramediately with the Force we have in

Defences of Philaddphia in 1777. 277
the Field, because I think we are stronger than we shall be
any time this winter, it is possible our nurabers raay en-
crease, but our real strength will diminish.
"Without some new light could be thrown upon this
matter, or other reasons urged then I heard at the late
Council , I am clearly against either raaking a winter's Cam
paign, or attacking the Eneray's works.
" I have the Honour to be your Excellencys
" Most Obed' hurable Serv'
"W" Woodford."

OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL WEEDON.
" D" Sir
" I have from the first moment it was suggested to your
Excellency, ' that an attack on Philadelphia this winter
with the aid of Militia was practicable and proraised suc
cess,' kept in mind the desirable object; have compaired
and viewed it in every light, and on every ground I could
place it, and after mature consideration on the matter
cannot promise a single Advantage that would justifie the
measure, nor can I see the least prospect of anything honor
able or advantagious by adopting it. On the other hand I
foresee numberless Obstacles to retard, and perplex that
with sober reasoning stares any man in the face who views
it with an impartial eye, places it on a railitary scale, and
reflects on what huraan nature is. — It has been found, I
believe, by most of your Officers who you have advised with
on the matter, that your Continental Force is far, very
far. Inadequate to an attack on the eneraies lines, in their
present strength and situation. — Operations like those pro
posed, are of too extensive a nature to carry into sudden
execution. Reasons sufficiently cogent, must diminish your
force every day you keep the field at this season ofthe year,
and to resolve on the raeasure, ensures a winters Campaign
to this Array, which in their Circumstances also ensures
certain destruction to great part of thera, without the Aid
of an enemy — your principle dependence raust then be on

278 Defences of Philaddphia vn 1777.
the Militia, to carry this important matter into execution.
Glory and our Countries good is no doubt what every up
right soldier would wish to obtain, but we may be too keen
in pursuit of it, and like the Dogs in the fable, suffer the sub
stance to escape while we Grasp at the Shadow. — I would
only mention to y' Excellency sorae Difficulties that occur
in drawing a sufficient force of Militia together for this pur
pose, and providing for thera ; particularly at a season of the
year when our Fields, and Rivers are Ice & Snow. — Cov
ering we have not for them when they arrive. Hospital
Stores we could not furnish for the nurabers that would fall
sick by being exposed to the severity of the winter, nor do
I know that even provisions & forrage, could be procured
with any degree of certainty, which shorely should be ren
dered beyond a doubt in such cases ; take the raatter still
on a more extensive scale. Every one that reflects on
human nature and considers raankind at large must know
how reluctantly they relinquish the ease and more calmer
pleasures of domestick & social life to share the hardships
& Fatigue of a Camp, even in more pleasant weather than
what winter generally affords us. Men that are not taught
and compelled to obey, will never render service, and Obe
dience & perseverance is not to be expected from a perrais-
cuous body of men drawn together from all Quarters of the
Globe, ware they to assemble, but you would flnd one half
would desert in their way to Camp, others probably raight
arive, a day or two before their tirae of service expired.
No object on Earth would keep thera afterwards, nor could
an [ ] influence thera after their tirae was out. What
would follow must be distressing to an exalted mind. You
would find your regular Troops by this tirae much Dirain
ished. They raust bare the burthen of all necessary duties, in
such cases, while this body of men are collecting, — expensive
preparations are daily accumulating. The Eyes of the Con
tinent are turned towards you. Much speculation on the
practicability of the expedition terrainating with success,
which you at last find yourself obliged to relinquish, leaving
the unthinking world (who want nothing more to blast

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 279
reputation than a miscarriage, without inquiring into it's
causes,) at liberty to sensure boath you & array. — Your Ex
cellency is perfectly acquainted with my Sentiments respect
ing this Army — it is Sir the BuUwork of America and should
be nursed and cherished as the salvator of her Liberties.
The Troops that compose it are not more than mortal, and
cannot work Maricles. The bravest spirits raay be exausted
by uncoraraon, and constant fatigue. And Sir, there is not
in my Opinion an Object on the Continent that justifies
subjecting them, at this particular time, to a winters Cam
paign, unless there was a raoral certainty of obtaining that
Object, and with it, a perminant and honorable end to any
further Hostilities. I give it therefore as my clear Opinion,
that keeping this Array in the Field for the purpose of
attacking Philadelphia, under the uncertainty of sufficient
aid and support of Militia, is by no means Advisable, and
am Bir, with high esteera
" Y' Excellencies raost obed' Serv'
" G. Weedon

"^. GenK

' Camp White Marsh
" Dec' 4, 1777"

opinion of brigadier-general MUHLENBERG.
" Camp, Dec' 4'", 1777
"Sir " Your Excellency was pleas'd to desire the Opinion of
your General Officers on ' The Adviseability of a Winters
Campaign, & practicability of an Attack upon Philadelphia,
vrith the Aid of a considerable Body of Militia to be Assera
bled at an appointed Tirae & place.' I raust Confess that
to me this Question seems so rauch interwoven, with the
Question your Excellency was pleasd to put a few days ago,
that I can hardly seperate thera : The raain point, I con
ceive, is still, whether a Winters Campaign is practicable ;
if not, the last Question falls of Course, unless the Tirae is
the Spring. A Winter's Carapaign to rae, seeras not only

280 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
unadviseable, on account of our Situation, but impracticable,
at least if I ara to Judge of other Brigades by ray own ; one
single Reg' of mine have turned out Ninety Men unfit for
duty, on Account of Shoes & other Necessarys. The Sick
become Nuraerous, & the Men, notwithstanding the utraost
Care of their Officers, will be Frostbitten, & subject to
raany other disorders, if they are to keep the Field, until
the Militia can be collected, which if we are to Judge from
the past, cannot be done in less than two Months — in the
meantirae it cannot be expected that the Eneray will re
raain Idle, Their Works will be Continued, Their Vessells
who are now before the Town, will not only furnish them
with Cannon, but with Marines, Sailors &c., so that in all
probability, before the Militia can be collected an Attack
will be thought irapracticable, upon the same Grounds &
perhaps with more reason than at present. — At the Tirae
when this Hint was first thrown out in Council, I was
pleasd with it, there seerad a probability of success ; but
I had no Idea, that a Winter's Carapaign was so closely
Connected with the plan, which in my Opinion would prove
more fatal to the Army under your Excellencys Comand
than an unfortunate Attack on the Town — but I am far
from thinking the plan ought to be dropped entirely. If
the Army was to go into Winter Quarters where the Men
could be refreshd & Clothd, & remain there untill the
latter end of March ; the Militia could be Collected in the
meantime. Then a Vigorous Attack could be raade with
a probability of success.
" Thus I have given your Excellency ray Sentiraents on
-the Question proposd, as Clear as the shortness ofthe time
I had for Consideration would permit me, which was only
a few Minutes this Morning. The utility of hearing a
Question debated is great, at least to a Young Soldier —
Should the Question be decided otherwise your Excellency
raay be assured that any part entrusted to rae shall be ex
ecuted with the greatest Chearfullness.
" Your Excellencys Most Obed' & very hurable Serv'
" P : Muhlenberg."

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 281
opinion of brigadier-general scott.
" White Marsh, 4'" Dec' 1777
"Sir " I rec* your Excellencys letter of yesterday. I well re
member the proposition made. I then thought there was
a probability of Success in such an atterapt, but after your
Excellency returnd frora Reconoitring the Enemy's Lines
and hearing your oppinion with regard to their strength, I
lost every Idea of a Winters Campaign. I must confess I
never Promised my self any Certainty of success In it. But
the many Waity reasons then given for a Vigorous Execu
tion Induced rae to think something possably might be
done, but since your Return from the lines, as before raen
tiond, I have not had a single thaught of such a thing
Ither with or without the Militia.
" I ara your Excellency's Ob' Serv'
"Ch= Scott."
opinion of brigadier-general cadwalader.
"Head Quarters, 3'' Dec' 1777
" Dear Sir
" Whether the Army under your Excellency's coraraand
should continue in the field this winter; and whether it is
expedient to call to your assistance a great body of railitia
to make an attack on the Citty, are very iraportant Questions
— the deterraination ofwhich raay decide the fate of Araer
ica — they therefore require our raost serious consideration.
" It is certainly usual with all nations, in every cold
cliraate, to retire with their arraies into winter quarters —
The raen want cloathing & want rest; and the army is
generally much reduced by inaction, sickness & a variety of
casualties. To repair these losses, to nurse & recruit the
Soldiers, & to raake the necessary arrangeraents for an
other carapaign are certainly great objects : but. Sir, if the
practice of other nations, & the rules laid down in the
books by railitary authors, are, implicitly, to regulate the
armies of these States, I cannot help thinking our ruin is

282 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
inevitable: — precedents raay justify us to railitary pedants,
but not to the sensible Citizen. —
" The situation of the Araerican States is very different
frora that of a nation whose independance is acknowledged
& established. It requires great management to keep up
the spirits of the well-affected, & to subdue those who; have
taken a part against us — Imprisonment, confiscation & death
are the punishments for those who engage in the support of
a revolution — these are terrors not so much dreaded in
coraraon wars — To remove these fears, and to secure the
inhabitants from danger, appears to rae to be measures of
the utmost iraportance. The people of this State had the
greatest expectations that the Array under your Excel
lency's coraraand would have prevented General How from
penetrating thro' the country & taking possession of the
capital of this State. — They were disapointed! — and it is
very evident what conclusions they raust have drawn — The
superiority of the eneray was easily discovered, and it natu
rally affected their spirits. Our successes to the northward
have enabled you to draw great reinforceraents frora thence
— our whole force, now collected, gives thera new hopes ;
and tho they may not expect a successful attack will be
made on the city this winter, they expect to be protected.
The withdrawing your army to a great distance will not
only magnify the eneray's strength (in the Opinion of the
Inhabitants) but will be construed into an acknowledgraent
of our own weakness. — The enemy raay then detach a body
of troops to take post at Bordenton or Mount Holly ; another
to Newtown on this side, and a third to Wilmington — with
these (having possession of the Capital) they have perfect
command of an imraense country; from which they can
draw provision, forage & raen. — The State of delaware must
be totally subjected — the eastern shore of maryland & Vir
ginia left open to be ravaged at will ; in short, the inhabit
ants within this great Circle, raust corae in for protection,
must swear allegiance to the king, & deliver up their
arras. Those raen who are to corapose a very considerable
part of your army the next Campaign will be engaged

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 283
against you ; the inhabitants of other States, who are event
ually concerned in these misfortunes, will feel very sensibly
their dreadful effects — the power of Legislatures will be
weakened & the States may find it impossible to enlist,
draft, or, by any other means, to furnish their quota's for
the ensuing Campaign. — All the manufactures that raight
be drawn frora the Country you desert, will be lost to us. —
The depreciation of our money will encrease ; and, in a
short time, the Credit of the States will be totally ruined —
Your array too, cantooned in a scattered raanner, at so great
a distance frora the Eneray, will be dispersed thro' the
States, by Leave-of-absence, Furlows, & Desertion — and in
stead of your troops coraing into the Field better disci
plined (as some Gentlemen expect) they will become licen
tious, ungovernable & total strangers to military Discipline.
" Last winter, after repeated ill-successes, you was obliged
to retire from post to post, as the enemy advanced, and in
addition to your misfortunes, your army was every day re
duced, by whole Brigades, leaving you, in ^ight of the
Enemy — When you crossed the Delaware, tho' reinforced
with the Philad" Militia, you had but a handful of men, &
these in a wretched ragged condition — What then would
have been the consequence if you had retired to the back-
country to nurse & recruit the miserable reran ant of your
army ; and to enlist men for the next Carapaign. The Conse
quences are so evident they need no explanation. By
having the river as a Barrier you kept the field till an
opportunity offered; and by a well tiraed, well executed
blow, you gave hopes again to all the States — in conse
quence of this, the Prince-town affair happened, which drew
the eneray to one point ; and, at once, recovered N. Jersey
& set America again on her Legs.
" The King of Prussia (in the last war) overpowered by
numbers, had almost lost all his Dominions during the
Summer; but by a noble exertion, with those very troops
that had been harrassed & almost torn to pieces by repeated
actions and constant Marches, he recovered his Losses by a
winter Campaign.

284 Defences of Philadelphia, in 1777.
" Your raen, I know. Sir, are in great want of cloathing,
but I conceive they will be sooner equipped by remaining
in the field than in winter Quarters — because by being in
the field, the necessity will appear more evident, will induce
those employed to proride cloathing to exert themselves,
and will justify raeasures that otherwise would disgust &
exasperate those frora whora they are taken. — Let the robust,
& best cloathed, do the duty of Guards ; let the Invalids be
sent to the most comfortable Quarters ; & let premiums be
given to those who shall make the best Hutts.
" If you are out of the reach of a surprize, the Duty will
be easy ; and you raay effectually annoy the eneray as if you
was nearer.
" I ara far frora thinking that a winter Carapaign will not
be attended with great distress to the poor Soldiers, & do
not raean to insinuate that good winter Quarters raay not
be raore comfortable ; but I ara obliged frora the necessity
of the case to declare, that I think, if your army was re
duced by action & sickness, to one half its present number,
the consequences would not be so fatal, as if we were to
take winter Quarters.
" I have confined myself raerely to the Question ' whether
a Winter Carapaign is adviseable,' but beg leave to raake a
few remarks on the two Positions that have been proposed.
" To cover our stores, to afford the most protection to
the country, to procure the best shelter (& out of the reach
of a surprize) where there is plenty of water, forage & pro
visions — these appear to rae to be the considerations that
should deterraine the choice of the position for winter quar
ters. — Lancaster & the line from thence to Easton, has
been mentioned as a proper place for winter Quarters. —
Others have mentioned Wilmington & its neighbourhood.
— Let us compare them ! Lancaster &c., tis said, from the
best information, are so crouded with Families frora the
City & its Invirons, that a traveller can with difficulty get
a night's lodging. I cannot conceive that any person can
seriously propose to turn out those inhabitants, while their
Husbands, Fathers & Brothers are now, perhaps, in the

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 285
Field— Hutts then must be substituted in the place of
hduses. — You have plenty of water, forage, & perhaps pro
visions, and you leave a vast country exposed as has been men
tioned above — You are to live on that country from whence
you must draw your chief supplies in the next Campaign,
& every article brought a great distance in waggons.
" Wilmington has not its usual nuraber of Inhabitants : &
several other Towns in the neighbourhood are under the
like circurastances; there are 9 or 10 mills at Brandywine,
all these will afford shelter for a great body of troops. —
This situation is out of the reach of surprize, & near enough
to annoy the Enemy, cover your stores, & a great part of the
country, which in the other case is left exposed. Wood,
water & forage in great plenty and provisions, as the
Com : General informs, may be had in large quantities frora
Maryland & Virginia by water, to the Head of Elk.— Hutts
may be built, in such places as will best answer the pur
poses of defence, for that part of the Army that cannot find
shelter in Houses. —
" I am so perfectly convinced, that nothing but success,
can keep up the spirits of our Friends, confirm the doubt
ful Characters, convert our Enemies & establish our Credit,
(on which the bringing another army into the Field very
much depends), that every Effort ought to be made to pro
cure it — I have not doubt but a successful attack could be
made upon the City this winter by calling a considerable
Body of Militia to your assistance if the enemy remain in
their present position. — But I ara apprehensive, that by de
claring your Intention (which will be necessary to induce
the militia to turn out) it would imraediately alarra the
Eneray — they would find it necessary to surround the City
with works, on the west side, and by drawing their force
within a narrow compass, might defeat your Scheme — as
they could only be carried by storm, at this season of the
year. " It would probably take two months to collect the Militia
from the distant States, which would bring us to the first
of February, at which time the Ice is often gone, or at

286 Defences of Philaddphia in 1777.
least, so weak as not to answer our purpose. — I am there
fore inclined to think it will not be proper to give the
railitia so fatiguing a march at this severe season, or put
the States to so great an Expence without a greater pros
pect of success.
" I am, D' Sir, with great respect & esteem,
"Your Excellency's most ob' very h'ble Serv'
"John Cadwalader."
OPINION of JOSEPH REED, ESQ.
"Dear Sir
" Tho' the Consideration of a Winters Carapaign, & Prac
ticability of an Attack on Philad" have been so lately pro
posed, every Gentleraan who extended his riews beyond the
present Hour, raust have turned his Thoughts upon these
Subjects so as to be able to form something more than a
sudden Opinion. There cannot be any Person, Sir, either
on a publick or private Account, upon whom the Motives
for a Winters Campaign can operate more forcibly. I have
every Reason to wish it — & yet in the State & Condition
of our Army my Judgment is against it. — The History of
every Winters Campaign raade in Europe closely erinces
how destructive they have ever proved : during the Course
of the last War the allied Array under Prince Ferdinand
was alraost ruined tho' victorious, & pursuing the Enemy.
— Charles the 12"' failed & fell from the very Summit of
Victory, & Success by keeping the Field a part of the
Winter. It is true, these Climates were more severe than
ours, but the Troops were so well appointed, or at least so
much better than ours, as to give Force to the Argument.
Nay the Experiences of the Enemy last Winter confirms
the Observation — a great Mortality, Discontent among Offi
cers & Men, & considerable Desertions, were the Conse
quences, tho' they were much better provided than we are.
The Nakedness of the Army, & Temper of the Troops seem
to be insurmountable Objections, possibly the latter might
subside if the former was reraoved, but as it is, from every
Observation I have been able to make, unless a competent

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
Supply of Cloathing can be procured all Argument is vain.
— The Dissafection of the Country, Distress to the Whigs, re
cruiting & refreshing the British Army, a general Despond
ency & above all, — Depreciation of the Currency stare me
in the Face as the Consequences of Retirement to distant
Quarters : I shall share personally in this Distress — With a
Family I have a Habitation to seek at this inclement Season,
& every other Accommodation to provide, & yet I cannot
desire the Array so unprovided to reraain for my Protec
tion. The general Calamity I fear will not be reraoved by
atterapting it. The Credit of the Currency in ray Opinion,
will depend raore upon an effective Army, than any other
Circumstance. If Sickness, Discontent & Desertion should
disperse or greatly reduce our Army ; I think the general
Cause would suffer raore than from the Evils I have noticed
before : these Erils will admit of some Remedy, but the
other will not. With a recruited & refreshd Army, we
may recover what we lose, but with a fatigued worn out,
dispirited one what can we expect but that General Howe
will next Spring take the Field with every Superiority — But
in this Case it appears to me, the true & proper Line may
be between such a distant Cantonraent as has been proposed,
& taking Post so near the Enemy as to make a Winters
Campaign. The Arguments of disciplining the Troops, re
cruiting the Army &c. at a distance have little weight with
me; such a Security would afford, & be used as the best
Excuse for going Home, & the Officers Commissions have
not such an inherent Value as to make them fearful of
losing them by Disobedience, or Neglect of Duty. The
surest Pledge of Fidelity, & Attention, would be putting
them in such a Situation as to require it. I do believe a
partial Dispersion of the Array would follow, on putting it
in any other Situation. Military Rules & Maxiras laid down
in long establish'd Armies do not allways apply to ours, &
this Case I think is an Exception.
"An Attack upon the Enemy in his Quarters when the
River is froze, has been much thought of— if the Proba
bility of Success was in our Favour, no Exertion ought to

288 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777.
be left untried, & even the present Situation of our Army
should be made if possible to bend to it. But if after [cu{\
Efforts, the Chances will be still against us. Prudence for
bids our venturing upon a Measure, which if unsuccessful
would be attended with very fatal Consequences. Gen'
Howe frora the best Calculation, has now 12000 Men on
one side strongly posted with Redoubts & Abbatis, so for
raidable as to discourage our raost enterprizing Genius's,
when a large Detachraent seeraed to favor an Attack — on
the others two unfordable Rivers, I fear we cannot oppose
a greater Number of Continental Troops to him ; but this is
to be supplied with Militia from Jersey, Pennsylvania Mary
land & Virginia — as to the first they are very fully employed
at Horae, the second frora a Variety of Circurastances we
find will not turn out but in two or three Classes & even of
these there are Numbers allways unarra'd. — The two latter
in Point of Arras are in the same Condition. They are at
a Distance & will raarch in at different Tiraes, those who
corae early will be irapatient, of Delay & hard Service, their
Subsistence will be difficult, & after all the very Possi
bility of it will depend on the Weather — A South Wind
with a little Rain will make the Ice impassable in a few
Hours, But supposing them to corae into Carap in great
Nurabers, & good Humour, well arm'd, & fed — the Frost to
continue — from the Nature ofthe Thing it can be no Secret
— the Enemy will probably throw up Works, or make up
other Preparations. On the opposite Bank therefore you
will meet with an equal Army ready to receive you : for
every one acquainted with our Militia will allow, that the
Nature of the Attack will require too rauch Firmness &
Discipline, to expect them to be equal to it farther than as
a Support. Upon the whole there are such a Variety of
Circurastances each of which are iraportant, indeed essen
tial, all to coincide, that I think it would be alraost miracu
lous if no one of them should fail us.
" We are so circumstanc'd. Sir, as to have only a Choice
of Difficulties, true Wisdora will direct us to select that
Plan which will be attended with the least. — As to the

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 289
main Body of the Army laying on the East Side of Schuyl
kill, & taking Post between that & Delaware, it is not prac
ticable in my Opinion — as the Country does not supply
Forage or Means of Subsistence. No Magazines being
established but at a great Distance, nothing, or next to
nothing now to be procured from the surrounding Country,
the Supplies would be too precarious in the Winter Season.
I therefore cannot but join in Opinion with those Gentle
men, who advise passing the Schuylkill with the greatest
Part of the Army. The left Wing, & as much of it as
could flnd Cover in Wilmington to take Post there, ex
tending as they can find Accommodation or good Ground
to Hut, as far or farther than Downing-town. I would also
propose that upon an exact Estimate of our present Force
it be dirided into 3 or 4 Parts or Classes. The raost robust,
healthy & well cloath'd to form the first Class; & so on.
The first Class to take the first Tour of Duty on this side
Schuylkill, taking Post at such a Distance from Philadel
phia as not to risque a Surprize, having with thera only
their light Baggage or even bare Necessaries. I would
have a Body of Militia advanced between thera & the
Enemy, their Line & Parties to extend to Delaware or as
near it, as their Strength would admit. This Body of Men
will not find Cover sufficient I believe, without going too
far or too near, they will therefore hut, or perhaps Boards
may be procured. — I am very sensible that Objections &
very plausible ones may be framed to this Plan & so there
may be to every other, this answers the most valuable
Purposes & such as appear to rae to require our running
some Risque to obtain. — I will just enumerate a few. In
the first Place, a very valuable Country, the three lower
Counties & Chester will be covered, & a Degree of Protec
tion afforded to the Country on the East side of Schuylkill.
2*. The Army will find some Cover ; a Country abounding
in Forage, & many other Articles necessary for their
Comfort, those Countries having suffered as yet very little
by the War, & being very fertile. 3*. The Enemy will be
deprived of this Supply which they will otherwise obtain.
21

290 Defences of Philaddphia in 1777.
4'". The Troops will be within striking Distance, if Circum
stances should favour that Measure without being exposed
to a Winters Carapaign. 5'". A Tour of Duty will not
adrait the Officers neglecting the service by going Home,
or entering into Scenes of Dissipation, & Arauseraent,
which will in the sarae Degree infect the Soldiery. 6"".
Sorae Annoyances raay be given to the Enemys Intercourse
by Ships. 7'". It will prevent any Insurrection in those
lower Counties, or the Eastern Shore of Maryland of which
every Year has furnish'd us with an Instance. 8'". The
Passage of the Enemy has occasioned Wilraington, & that
Neighbourhood to be evacuated by the Friends to Araerica,
they with raany others have retir'd to those very Places
sorae Gentleraen propose to go & occupy — in the one Case
you will have erapty Houses, in the other you raust exercise
a Spirit of Hardship by turning Families out to experience
every Species of Distress. 9'". You will reserve the Supplies
of the back Country for the next Campaign which otherwise
you will eat up in the Winter.
" I would farther beg leave to add that the support of the
Array, the Success of the Cause & even the Supply of
Cloathing & Necessaries for the Troops depends very much
on the Opinion & Spirits of the People, they rise or fall
according to the Appearances of Success & of our Force ;
abandoning a large Body of the Country to the Enemy, will
to them be a sure Proof of our Inferiority & Inability to op
pose the British Army, of course they will seek Protection,
take the Oaths, & throw themselves under the Enemys
Governraent. — A Circle of 30 Miles at least including
Jersey will be under the Coraraand of the Eneray.
" It is a great Objection & has rauch Weight that this
Post raay be liable to Affront frora the Eneray & Disturb
ance in their Quarters, but I do not think our Affairs or
Situation will adrait of total Tranquillity. — 2*. The Schuyl
kill will afford sorae Security after the Destruction of the
Bridge which raust be effected. 3. Sorae Works raay be
thrown up for Defence. 4'". The Array will be within sup
porting Distance of each other, so as to require a great

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 291
Exertion & Movement of the Enemy, which they will not
be fond of after being settled in their Quarters. These
Circumstances in a Degree obviate this Objection.
" 2* Object. That Bucks County & Jersey will be exposed
to the Depredations or Practices of the Enemy.
"Answ. This Position will afford a partial Cover & in
my Opinion a better than the distant Cantonment. I am
confident the Country will esteem it so.
" 3. We have Hospitals in this Country & are establish
ing Magazines at Places that may be exposed by these
Movements. " Answ. These Hospitals are scattered about, they hardly
make an Object for an Enemy, but I should think they raight
be removed as fast as the Patients recover & no new ones
sent, so that in a little Time the Difficulty will be removed.
" Upon the whole. Sir, I can think of no other Expedient
to reconcile the raany Difficulties which present themselves
in every view of this important Question. The shortness
of Tirae & a sore Finger has obliged me to throw together
these Sentiments vvith very little Accuracy — they raay serve
as Hints perhaps for better Heads to iraprove.
" I am with the greatest Respect & Regard, D' Sir,
" Your obed & aff' Hble Serv'
" Jos : Reed."
[December 4, 1777.]
OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL DU PORTAIL.
" 3* December, 1777
"Sir " I have examined anew with all the attention of which I
am capable, the Project of attacking the English and it
still appears to me too dangerous — the great Body of Militia
with which we might be reinforced for this purpose does
not give me any additional hope of succeeding — it is not
the number of Troops which is of importance in this case,
but it is the quality, or rather their nature and manner of
fighting. — The Troops wanted are such as are capable of
attacking with the greatest vivacity, the greatest firmness.

292 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777,
— Troops that are not astonished at suffering a considerable
Loss in the first onset, without causing any to the Enemy —
for this must be the case in an Attack of Intrenchments —
although when the Works are carried the Chance turns and
the Loss is on the side of the intrenched. — Now, are the
Militia or even Continentals capable of undergoing this
Trial, in which the best Troops in the World cannot always
support themselves — I am very sorry in giving the motives
of my opinion to be obliged to speak so unfavorably of our
Army — but the Battle of Gerraan Town ought to be a Les
son to us — if our Array had proceeded with vigour on that
occasion, would not the English have been completely de
feated — The Disposition was excellent. — Your Excellency
in that instance really conquer'd General How, but his
Troops conquered yours. — if then notwithstanding the ad
vantage of a complete surprize, notwithstanding the ad
vantages of ground, we were repulsed, what would happen
before a Line of R,edoubts well disposed in all appearance,
and the Intervals of which are closed with Abbatis.
" There is however a case in which I think we raight attack
the Enemy with success — I raean if the Schuylkill should
be sufficiently frozen below their left to adrait of our throw
ing our greatest Force on their Rear at the sarae tirae that
we should raake an attack in front. Gentlemen acquainted
with the Country must decide this point — if indeed the
Schuylkill is sufficiently frozen every year to afford a pas
sage for Columns of Troops with Artillery — my opinion is
fixed. I think the Array ought to be marched to the other
side of Schuylkill, to be reinforced with all the militia that
can be collected, while we wait for the favorable moraent.
" I would go raore rainutdy into the Subject, if your Ex
cellency did not order rae to send my Answer this morning.
I did not receive your Excellency's Letter 'till half after
twelve, and it is now half after one.
" I am with great Respect, Sir, your &c
" Le Chev" Du Portail." '
^ Translated by Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens.

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 293
OPINION OP BRIGADIER-GENERAL IRVINB.
'«SlR " If posting the army in a position sirailar to that I ad
vised in my last letter, be to form a winter's campaign, the
measure in my opinion is not only adviseable, but abso
lutely necessary, as the more I think on the subject the
more I ara convinced that retiring into winter quarters and
leaving the country uncovered will be followed with the
ruin of our friends, give ease and plenty to our enemies,.
and do an irreparable injury to the cause we are ingaged to
defend ; the aids to be drawn from this State in future will
be triffiing indeed, the inhabitants of new jirsey will be
intimidated, the delaware state lost, and an opportunity
given to the tories on the eastern shore of maryland once
more to appear in arms against us. When I proposed
hutting the army it was not so much with a riew of annoy
ing the enemy in their present possessions as to prevent
them from ravaging the country ; and to give our officers a
better opportunity of attending to the discipline of the
troops than they could possibly have were they dispersed
in extensive cantonments; — how far the former may be
effected by drawing together a large body of militia, is a
question not easily deterrained — The idea I confess is a
noble one, and could it be reduced to practice might be
attended with the most happy consequences, but the great
variety of circumstances that must concur to insure those
consequences is a strong argument against raaking the
experiment. — I take it for granted that not less than eighteen
or twenty thousand militia would be called, it is uncertain
whether so large a body could be collected on the short
notice they will receive, it is equally uncertain whether the
different states could arra their quotas, and their asserabling
at the place of rendezvous at or near the time to be fixed,
still more so, as it may depend upon circumstances not in
their power to foresee or prevent : allowing they came in
time and properly armed, the ice or weather may be against
our striking a capitol stroke for some time, and the diffi
culty of keeping such a body of militia in the field at that

294 Defences of Philaddphia in 1777.
season of the year (when they expected to be discharged in
a day or two) is easier to foresee than get over. Upon the
whole, I ara of opinion that tho' it is necessary for this
array to reraain somewhere between twenty and thirty miles
of Philadelphia this winter, it is not adviseable to attempt
collecting a large body of militia together with a view of
attacking that place.
" I am with the greatest respect Sir
" Your most obedient & hurab. Serv'
"James Irvine.
" Whitemarsh, Decern' 4*", 1777"
OPINION OF brigadier-general POTTER.
"Sir " Your excelancey by your letter of yesterday Requested
ray Senteraents on two points —
"first the advisability ofa winter Campaign, secondly the
Practicability of an Attact upon Philadelphia — Ass to the
first of these points my Senteraents is that a winter cam
paign is Practable. — I confess the verey thought of a win
ter Campaign in our Sircumstances appeers dredfuU. But
it is liek raany other Evels, that befaul us in this life, before
we under go them we are Redey to conclud the are unse-
. portable, but when the are over we dont find them so dred
fuU as we apprehended. I can from experance say so of a
winter Carapaign — I have not found it, to have so raany
Evels attending it as I have hard warraly Represented — But
on suposition that those evels were Reale, how shall they be
reraeded the answer will be by goining into winter Quarters.
" I assart winter Quarters is not to be found In the state
of Pennsylvania my Reasons for this assartion is, the
Capatale is in persession of the Eneray, and there is such
large numbers fled from it, and the neghbourhood, adjasant,
and the Towns and Viledges along the River Dalawer, that
all the Towns and Viledges Back in the Country are full of
Refugees all Redey.
" What will be dun with those people Turn them out of
Dores to raake Roora for the Solders, god for Bid it — that
would be cruilty unaxaraplyfied by General How himself

Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 295
" then it Reraains that we must Buld Huts, for our sol
diers go where we will, in this state — and I take it for
granted we will not leave the State Entily to the marcey of
the enemy.
" I would Recomraend the taking persision of Wilraing
ton and Newport and what other Houses we could find in a
Conveneant place in Chester County, and Rais Huts for the
Remainder of our Troops, so as to prevent, the enemys fur-
idging in that County by this Station being Ocqupied By us,
we will get the furridge and provisions that our enemies
would otherwise get, and the Back parts of the Countrey will
be Resarved for the ensuing Campaign, and in Case the[y]
should be able to force there way into our Countrey in the
spring, the furridge and provisions being Acosted [ex
hausted] will retard there raarch, and will be mutch in our
favour that our stors are safe in our Reer — Another advan-
tige will follow by Quartering in the aforesaid raaner it
will be In your power to keep a nuraber of raen in Bucks
and Philadelphia Countys to prevent the enerays coraing
out in sraall partys to force the Inhabitance to Take the
Oath of Elegance to the King. Nor will the have it in there
power to get that suckuer frora the disaficted part of the
community, if they are closley shut up in the City. I am
Convinced a winter Campaign will give Spirits and Vigor to
all the Inhabitance of these United States and will do Hon
our to the Army and Good to our cause In genral. —
" Ass to the Provibility of an Attact on the City of Phil
adelphia with the aid of a Bodey of Militia, it is unsartain
when or at what time it would be possible to cross the
Rivers to attact them, for that is the way that appeers raost
provable to me at present.
" If your Enjineers are Confidant that they can set the
City on fier from the other side of the Dalawer or Schuyl
kill in case the Ise did not answer I would be for cauling
the Militia to aid the Army, if they could not set it on fier,
I think we would be verey liable to a disapointment.
" I am &c.
" Camp, Dec' 4'", 1777" " ^^^ Potter.

296 Defences of PhUadelphia in 1777,
OPINION OF colonel LUTTERLOH.
*' Remarks, " As the present Camp wants Wood & other comfords
for the Men, in this Severe Weather, and the Enemys Situ
ation being to strong for an Attaque, I would propose to
post our Army into Refreshing Quarters, (as We do abroad
in such cases). I have been lucking out where you could
forme such a Line, Sufficiently stocked with houses for that
purpose & find we would forra such a Line between the
Two Rivers Schuylkill & Delawar, where we could effect
ually cover our Country, Stores, & provide the Necessary
Supplyes easy, as allso prevent the Enemy from doing our
Array any raaterial hurt. To do this we should place our
Right Wing allongst the Schuylkill & the left on the Dela-
var. Our Van Troops in German Town & those bights
&c. &c. in [ ] up towards Reading all the Army could lay.
Head Quarter to be at Pots Grove which I find a good
large Town for it. The great Magazin to be in Reading
& in the Trap & Hickery Town the Mooving Magazines &
Backerys must be established — to which those places are
proper. All that Country is full of Forrage & these Sup
plyes can be got easy as allso over the Schuylkill. The
Right Whing Melitia could be over the Schuylkill as from
Mottrora's ford upwards I find the Country very advanta
gious with hills where no Surprise could happen to thera
at the Van postes & in each Division some poles must be
fixed on it a Caske with Pich & Combustibles which are
fired & lightered directly upon the AUarm Gun from the
Commander of the Van, by which all the Troops march to
their Larra-postes forwards, pointed out to thera by their
going into the Quarters. All Commanders do keep in the
Nights their Troops in their houses together &c. &c. Over
Schuylkill raust be Two bridges raore one by WoUey forge
& one near Potsgrove to get quik Communications. When
this is done directly we keep our Men in health & are re
freshed to stand any attaque & our Supplyes can be good
& Regulair. " H. E. Lutterloh.
"Decbr 1" 1777"

INDEX.

Alarm posts, 296.
Ammunition for Fort Mifflin, 113.
"Amphitrite," cannon from, 47.
Angell, Israel, 61.
Arendt, Baron d', illness of, 66, 61, 104,
116. Opinion on Fort Mifflin, 136.
Armstrong, John, 45, 118. Opinions of,
185, 226, 265.
Army, British, in Philadelphia, 52, 180.
strength of, 52, 183, 207. Movements
of, 169, 197.
Army, Continental, liahle to license, 30.
To move southward or to the North
River, 41. Condition and strength of,
51, 62, 208. Must not risk destruction,
186. Proposed distribution, 215. In
need of rest and care, 219, 237, 257.
Arnold, Benedict, 3.
Artillery, nature of French, 48.
"Augusta," wreck of the, 70, 75, 80, 81.
Batteries, floating, 12, 25, 77, 103, 123.
On shore, 144.
Baylor, George, 68.
Beef, trade in, with the enemy, 70, 79.
Bell, William Dent, 142.
Billingsport, works at, 8. Du Coudray
on, 17, 37. Reed's views, 26. Wash
ington's opinion, 31, 34. Base of de
fending, 44. British at, 56, 60, 66.
Suggested assault on, 79. Approved
hy Washington, 82. Force at, 86, 95.
Importance of, 89, 94.
Block house, destruction of, 117, 125.
Blodget, William, 202 n.
Board of War, constitution, 173. Report
of, 175.
Bounty, height of, 221.
Brandywine Mill, 71.
Bridges, destruction of, 63. Bridge of
boats taken, 67. Building of, inter
rupted, 119. Over the Schuylkill, 129.
Bristol, express stationed at, 163.
Bunker Hill, 196.
Burgoyne, surrender of, 67, 208.
Burlington, hospital at, 198, 203.
Burnet, J., 202 n.
Bush Island Fort, 44.
Cadwalader, John, present at councils,
49, 52. Mention of, 143. Opinion of,
281.
Campaign, winter, 247, 260, 264, 272.
Cannon, loss of, 70.
Carlisle, Earl of, 39 n.
Carpenter's Island, 69, 77.

Carter, Landon, on St. Clair, 4.
Chains in river, 96, 107.
Channel, closing of, 128, 134.
Charleston, probable object of British,
41.
Chesapeake, landing of enemy, 46.
Chester, as a point of Landing, 23.
Chevaux-de-frise, 6, 15, 32, 43, 97, 112.
Clark, John, Jr., 65 n.
Classes, division suggested, 289.
Clinton, Henry, 208.
Clothing for Fort Mifflin, 67, 72, 78, 83,
89. For army, 214, 223.
Clow, 68.
Clymer, in charge of prisoners, 69.
Commissaries denounced, 104.
Commissioners in War OfBce, 176.
Comstock, Adam, 69, 200.
Congress, Continental, resolutions, 95.
Orders inquiry into loss of Fort Mif
flin, 140, 169 n. And Gates, 174.
Conwav, Thomas, 1 02 n, 172.
Cook, David, 61.
Cooper, intelligencer, 146.
Cornwallis, raid into New Jersey, 146,
147, 152.
Coryell's Ferry, 30.
Council of war, June 12th, 2; August
21st, 41 ; September 23d, 49 ; Septem
ber 28th, 51; October 29th, 207; No
vember Sth, 101; November 24th, 177.
Indecision of, 177.
Cox, 166.
Craig, Charles, letters from, 99, 131, 145,
152, 204.
Crawford's militia, 85, 100.
Crosswick's Creek, fleet secured in, 109.
Crum Creek, 23.
Currency, depreciation of, 194.
Cuyler, Major, 79.
Darby, 128.
Darby Creek, 10, 24, 29.
Delaware River, width of, 34, 40.
Deserters from Continental navy, 127,
140. Rewards for apprehending, 210.
Dickinson, Edmund B., 142.
Dickinson, Philemon, 50. Proposed de
scent on Staten Island, 117 n.
Disaffected persons, 216. Army, 246,
268.
Donaldson, 42.
Du Coudray, projects of defence, 12, 42.
Offers his services, 37, 47. Survey of
river, 40, 46. On fortifying Billings
port, 44.
22 297

298

Index,

Du Portail, Chevalier, opinions of, 185,
241, 291.
Duty and pleasure in army, 222.
Easton, stores deposited at, 58.
" Effingham," frigate, 58, 205.
Ellis, Joseph, 165, 168.
Enlistments, voluntary, at an end, 221.
Establishment, the new, 174.
Evans, George, 114, 115.
Fat Land Ford, 51.
Fenwick, Captain, 96.
Ferries on the Schuylkill, 76.
Fire ships, 7, 25, 36.
Flag, violation of, 160.
Fleet, British, moving to the south, 41.
Communication with, 80, 83, 84. Oper
ation against, 86, 94. Moves up the
river, 113, liS. Passes island, 119.
Movement of, 144.
Fleet, Continental, weakness of, 64. Di
rected to prevent descent on Mud
Island, 73. Council, 130.
Fleury, journal of siege, 74, 80, 98, 106,
123. Complains of ignorant obstinacy,
75, 82. Rank of, 83, 97. Letters from,
97, 120. Engineer, 106. Wounded,
132.
Flour, no magazines, 204.
Forman, David, questions Newcomb's
rank, 54, 66. Letters from, 64, 65, 90.
To co-operate with Varnum, 62. Re
signs, 89 n, 92.
Port Island, Reed's opinion of, 27.
Knox's opinion, 29. Washington on,
31, 32, 34. Du Coudray favors, 37.
Further defences of, 40.
Fort Mercer, 64, 151. Bombproofs at,
81. To be strengthened, 122. Evac
uated, 167, 159.
Fort Mifflin, exposed position of, 42.
To be attacked, 55, 60. Reinforcing,
62, 78. Operations in, 74, 80. To be
attacked, 90, 94, 99. Garrison at, 105.
Attack opens, i07, 110. Damage to,
111, 115, 120, 123. Evacuation con
sidered, 115, 122. Fatigue of garri
son, 120. Removing cannon, 123. Bad
condition of, 126, 133. Evacuation
suggested, 130, 132. To be held, 134.
Needs of, 134. Importance of main
taining, 136. The end approaching,
139. Evacuated, 140.
Forts, prejudicial, 10.
France, war with, 206.
Francis, Tench, 204.
Fraser, Simon, 95 n.
Frazer, Persifor, 207 n, 211.
French Creek, 51.
Frigates, condition, of, 58. Securing,
101, 108. Scuttling of, 118. Used as
barracks, 206.
Frink, Colonel, 104.

Galleys, Continental, condition of, 13.
Disposition of, 26, 29, 57. Poor con
duct of, 86, 87. Attack on the " Vigi
lant," 141. Position of, 151. Burned,
158, 160, 164.
Gates, Horatio, 172. Board of War, 174,
176.
George, John, 121.
Germantown, 50, 215. Battle of, 184.
For winter quarters, 197.
Gloucester, enemy occupy, 201.
Glover, John, 149. Brigade of, 161, 162,
164, 168.
Gordon's Ford, 51.
Gray, George, 100.
Gray, James, 100.
Gray's Ferry, indefensible, 47.
Great Manto Creek, 86.
Greene, Christopher, on night operations
of British, 65. Question of command,
56, 61, 63. Letter from, 139.
Greene, Nathanael, opinions of, 5, 177,
219, 248. Letters from, 128, 158, 161,
166, 198, 199, 201, 203, 204. Directed
to meet Cornwallis, 164. On public
censure, 167. Ordered to join Wash
ington, 198.
Grub's Landing, 70, 79.
Hamilton, Alexander, 1, 37.
Hazelwood, John, to cooperate with the
forts, 65. Difference with Smith, 78,
82. To break communication with fleet,
84. Character of, 88. Chain, 107.
Letter from, 129. To cooperate with
general plan, 150.
Hazleton, 66.
Health of men, 233.
Heard, John, letter from, 146.
Hessians, arms taken from, 59. Drown
ing of, 100.
Highlander's cross Cooper's Ferry, 152.
Hog's Island, 16.
Hospitals, bad condition of, 168. At Bur
lington and Princeton, 198, 203.
Howe, William, sails from New York, 3
21. Objects in going south, 39 n.
Awkward position, 76. Forbids inter
course, 127. Misled as to Greene's
force, 167. Intention to attack, 205.
Huntington, Jed, 150.
Huts, objections to and advantages, 213,
218.
Inspector-General, 210.
Intelligence, 60, 66 n., 119, 132, 155, 169,
165,170, 200.
Intelligencers, conditions for selecting,
163,
Irvine, James, opinions of, 188, 243,
293.

Jealousies, warning against, 64, 82.
Jones, Whitehead, 115.

Index,

299

Kalb, Baron de, opinions of, 187, 218,
262.
Kiss, Hessian, 200.
Knox, Henry, opinions of, 29, 193, 229,
269.
Lafayette, good conduct at Gloucester,
202. Opinions of, 216, 258.
Lancaster, a« winter quarters, 214, 217,
223, 225, 230, 231, 235, 239.
Landing places on the river, 22.
Le Brun, Augustus, project for strength
ening Fort Mifflin, 43.
Lee, Henry, 69, 72, 79, 96, 127.
Lee, James, 126, 133.
Lindsay, William, 96.
Livingston, William, on Newcomb, 66 n.
Lloyd, James, 202 n.
Long, Island, 196.
Loopholes in battery, 107.
Loyd's mill, 71.
Lutterloh, H. B., letter from, 296.
McDougall, Alexander, 50, 52.
McLane, Allen, letter from, 155.
Marcus Hook, 20, 22.
Maxwell, William, opinions of, 189, 227,
267.
Men for navy, 58.
" Merlin," wreck, 80.
Mifflin, Thomas, knowledge of country,
47. Connection with Board of War,
173, 175.
Militia, of Pennsylvania, 27. Costly for
fortifying, 44. Not to be depended on,
60, 243, 251. Delaware destroys pro
vision boats, 119. Prospect of collect
ing, 169, 165. Mortality of, 250.
Millstones to be removed, 71, 77, 85.
Montgomery, Hugh, 116.
Morris, Robert, tobacco vessel of, 109.
Mortars, casting of, 49.
Muhlenberg, P., opinions of, 239, 279.
Navy Board, letters from, 58, 108, 164,
206.
Navy, Continental, reflections on, 169.
New Castle, trade at, 80.
Newcomb, Silas, question of rank, 64.
Refuses to make a return, 66, Livings
ton criticises, 66 n. Force and condi
tion, 89, 103. Council of Safety orders,
90. Sent to defend himself, 118 n.
New Jersey, militia, 166, 169. Opera
tions in, 187.
Nicholas, Captain, 96.
North River, defence of, 2, 42.
Officers, rules of promotion, 3. Poor
quality of, 85. Discontent among, 222,
246.
Oysters for Washington, 94 n.
Palisades for Fort Mifflin, 75.
Paoli, Paschal, 184.

Parker's Ford, 51.
Paterson, John, ordered to join the army,
155. Opinions of 190, 271.
Peale Hall destroyed, 160.
Pennibecker's Mills, headquarters, 51.
Pennsylvania, call for militia, 208.
Pest House, 67.
Peters, Richard, 173, 175.
Philadelphia, importance of, to British,
21. Occupied by the enemy, 52. Con
dition of, 159. Opinions on attacking,
177. British return to, 198, 204. A
second proposition to attack, 199.
Refugees from, 223, 236. Suggested
firing of, 295.
Picket, capture of a, 154.
Pinckney, Colonel, 46.
Pomeroy, Captain, 206.
Poor, Bnoch^, ordered to join army, 154.
Opinions of, 190, 231, 270.
Potter, James, ordered to remove mill
stones, 71, 75. Failure, 85. Letters
from, 69, 77, 85, 99, 113, 114, 118,
119, 140, 146, 164, 170. Opinion of,
294.
Potts Grove camp, 51.
Prices in Philadelphia, 160.
Princeton, hospital at, 198, 203.
Prisoners, 199. Exchange of, 211.
Promotions, 3, 210.
Province Island, British operations, 55.
Cutting of banks, 64. British works
on, 88, 98. Diversion against, 113, 122,
126, 135.
Provision, trade in, 70, 77, 97, 100, 296.
Public, dissatisfaction of, i77.
Pulaski, opinion, 240.
Putnam, Israel, ordered to send reinforce
ments, 53.

Quakers, Tory, supplies from, I
idol, 160.
Quarters, on selecting, 219.

Their

Radnor Meeting-House, 68.
Rains, heavy, 50, 66.
Randolph, Benjamin, 132.
Randolph, Lieutenant, 68.
Rank in navy, 25. Questions of, 50, 61,
63. Complaints of, 222.
Rankin's wager, 114.
Rations, regulation of, 211.
Read, George, 119.
Read, Thomas, 19.
Recruiting, effect of winter on, 217.
Red Bank, Fort, 9. Wayne on, 20.
Reed's opinion, 27. Knox's opinion.
29. Washington advises its occupa
tion, 32. Small garrison, 56, 60. Re
inforcing, 61, 62. Stirling on import
ance of, 68. Defence, 93. Attack on,
114, 147, 149. Bursting of gun, 116.
To be maintained, 161, 153, Evacu
ated, 156. Powder strewn at, 166, 163.
Destruction of, 169.

300

Index.

Redoubts, British, in Philadelphia, 180,
182, 195.
Reed, Joseph, letters from, 20, 142, 147.
Present at council, 52. On decision
upon Red Bank, 151 n. Opinion of,
286.
Reed's house, 57.
Refugees from Philadelphia, 223, 236.
Relaxation of array, 220.
Resignation, alarming spirit of, 245.
Ridley Creek, 23.
Robinson's Mill, 71.
" Roebuck" forced to retire, 86..
Rum wanted, 106.
Rumford, Jonathan, intelligence, 114,
116.
Russell, Giles, in command at Fort Mif
flin, 116, 121.
St. Clair, Arthur, evacuates Ticonderoga,
4. Present at council, 49.
Schuylkill, crossed by British, 50. Win
ter quarters in valley of, 212.
Scott, Charles, opinions of, 190, 240, 281.
Sellers, Nicholas, on treatment of pris
oners, 147.
Shaw's Mills, 71.
Shepard, William, 198.
Ship, loss ofa British, 114.
Shreve, Israel, 169, 162, 166.
Sign of the Buck, 50.
Smallwood, W., joins the main army, 50,
52. Opinions of, 191, 228, 268.
Smith, Sam., question of command, 56,
61, 63. Letters of, 66, 84, 105, 106,
111, 117, 120, 135, 142. Desires to be
relieved, 105. Wounded, 116, 121.
Proposes evacuation, 117.
Smith, Thomas, deserts, 155.
Smith (D. A. G.), death of, 68.
" Somerset" forced to retire, 86.
Stille, Dr., 135 n.
Stirling, Lord, sends reinforcements, 67.
Letters from, 67, 76. Opinions of, 178,
224,256.
Stock, removal of, 28.
Stores from Red Bank, 151.
Success, effect on public, 167.
Sullivan, John, opinions of, 179, 212,
244.
Surprise, guarding against, 65. Difficul
ties attending a, 181.
Survey of country, 37, 40, 46.

Talbut, death of, 139.
Thayer, Simeon, in command at Fort Mif
flin, 126, 127. Wounded, 132. Good
conduct of, 144.
Thornton, 165.
Timber Creek, 96, 161.
Tinicum, 57.
Trade with enemy, 127.
Tranquillity in winter quarters, 230.
Treat, Samuel, killed, 115, 121.
Tredyffrin, hutting in, 225.
Varnum, James M., instructions to, 62.
At Woodbury, 78. Letters from, 78,
86, 96, 102, 110, 116, 116, 120, 125,
126, 132, 133, 140, 143, 163, 166, 167.
Cannonades British ships, 86, 94. Dis
tracted by many calls, 133. Opinions
of, 233, 272.
" Vigilant," attempt to capture, 140.
Villages, storming of, 382, 255.
Virginia, troops from, 53.
Walls, George, 142.
Ward, William, 104.
War OfBce, commissioners in, 176.
Warren Tavern, 50.
Washington, George, letters from, 30, 40,
61, 62, 63, 64, 70, 71, 72, 73, 81, 82, 8.3,
86, 90, 9:-i, 94, 101, 108, 113, 118, 122,
134, 148, 149, 150, 161, 154, 156, 162,
163, 164, 171, 197, 206, 244. On de
fences, 30. Rumor of determination to
give battle, 39 n. On jealousies, 82.
Alternatives presented, 167. Conway's
cabal, 172. Reputation, 194.
" Washington" frigate, 58.
Wayne, Anthony, not joined army, 60.
To lead an attempt on Province Island,
135 n. Opinions of, 19, 191, 2:;]. Let
ter from, 152.
Weather, campaign and, 253.
Weedon, George, letters, 169, 236, 277.
Wheatley, 104 n.
White Horse Tavern, 51.
Wilmington, fortifying, 47. As winter
quarters, 213, 218, 224, 226, 228, 240,
242.
Winter campaign to be avoided, 214, 236.
Winter quarters discussed, 212.
Woodbury, 62, 63.
Woodford, William, opinion of, 1911, 235,
276.

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