THE WORKS

OF

JOSEPH BUTLER, LL.D.

LATE LORD BISHOP OF DURHAM.

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THE WORKS OF
JOSEPH BUTLER, LL. D.
LATE LORD BISHOP OF DURHAM.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED
A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR,
BY DR KIPPIS ;
WITH A PREFACE, GIVING SOME ACCOUNT OF HIS CHA
RACTER AND WRITINGS;
BY
SAMUEL HALIFAX, D. D.
LATE LORD BISHOP OF GLOUCESTER.
IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.
CONTAINING,
THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION,
NATURAL AND REVEALED,
' ^ TO THE
CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE,
S^c. 8gc. S^c.

EDINBURGH :
Printed by James Ballantyne,
FOR ARCHIBALD CONSTABLE AND CO. AT THE CROSS, AND
WILLIAM WHYTE, SOUTH ST ANDREW'S STREET.
1804.

THE LIFE

OF

Bu BUTLER.

THE LIFE

OF

Dr BUTLER.

J3r Joseph Butler, a prelate ofthe most
distinguished character and abilities, was born
at Wantage, in Berkshire, in the year 1692.
His father, Mr Thomas Butler, who was a
substantial and reputable shopkeeper in that
town, observing in his son Joseph * an ex-*
cellent genius and inclination for learning,
determined to educate him for the ministry,
among the Protestant dissenters of the pres
byterian denomination. For this purpose,
after he had gone through a proper course of
grammatical literature, at the free-grammar
school of his native plac6, under the care of
the Rev. Mr Philip Barton, a clergyman of
the church of England, he was sent to a dis*-
* He was the youngest of eight children.

viii THE LIFE OF
senting academy, then kept at Gloucester,
but which Avas soon afterwards Removed to
Tewkesbury. The principal tutor of this aca
demy was Mr Jones, a raan of uncommon
abilities and knowledge, who had the honour
of training up several scholars, who became
of great eminence, both in the established
church and among the dissenters. At Tewkes
bury, Mr Butler made an extraordinary pro
gress in the study of divinity ; of which he
gave a remarkable proof, in the letters ad
dressed by him, while he resided at Tewkes
bury, to Dr Samuel Clarke, laying before
him the doubts that had arisen in his mind,
concerning the conclusiveness of some argu
ments in the Doctor's demonstration of the
being and attributes of God. The first of these
letters was dated the 4th November 1713 ;
and the sagacity and depth of thought dis
played in it, immediately excited Dr Clarke's
particular notice. This condescension en
couraged Mr Butler to address the Doctor
again upon the same subject, which likewise
was answered by him ; and the correspon
dence being carried on in three other letters,
the whole was annexed to the celebrated trea
tise before mentioned, and the collection has
been retained in all the subsequent editions

DR BUTLER. IX
of that wcfi'k. The management of this cor
respondence was entrusted by Mr Butler, to
his friend and fellow-pupil, Mr Seeker, who,
in order to conceal the affair, undertook to
convey the letters to the post-office at Glou
cester, and, to bring back Dr Clarke's an
swers. When Mr Butler's name was disco
vered to the Doctor, the candour, modesty,
and good sense with which he had written,
immediately procured him the friendship of
that eminent and excellent man. Our young
student was not, hoAvever, during his continu
ance at Tewkesbury, solely employed in me
taphysical specvilations and enquiries. An
other subject of his serious consideration was,
the propriety of his becoming a dissenting
minister. Accordingly, he entered into an
examination of the principles of non-confor
mity ; the result of which was, such a dissa
tisfaction with them, as determined him to
conform to the established church. This in
tention was, at first, disagreeable to his father,
who endeavoured to divert him frora his pur
pose; and, with that view, called in the assist
ance of sorae eminent presbyterian divines ;
but finding his son's resolution to be fixed, he
at length suiFered him to be removed to Ox
ford, where he was admitted a commoner of

THE LIFE OF

Oriel college on the 17th March 1714. At
what time he took orders doth not appear,
nor who the bishop was by whora he was or
dained ; but it is certain that he entered
into the churcli soon after his admission at
Oxford, if it be true, as is asserted, that he
sometimes assisted Mr Edward Talbot in the
divine service, at his living of Hendred, near
Wantage. With this gentleman, who was the
second son of Dr Williara Talbot, successive
ly bishop of Oxford, Salisbury, and Durhara,
Mr Butler forraed an intiraate friendship at
Oriel college ; which friendship laid the foun
dation of all his subsequent preferraents, and
procured for hira a very honourable situation
when he Avas only twenty-six years of age.
For it was in I7I8 that, at the recoraraenda
tion of Mr Talbot, in conjunction with that
of Dr Clarke, he was appointed by Sir Jo
seph Jekyll to be preacher at the Rolls. This
was three years before he had taken any
degree at the university, where he did not
go out bachelor-of-law till the 10th June
1721, which, however, was as soon as that
degree could suitably be conferred upon him.
Mr Butler Continued at the Rolls till 1726 ;
in the beginning of which year he published]
in one volume octavo, •' Fifteen Sermons

DR BUTLER. iii
preached at that Chapel." In the meanwhile,
by the patronage of Dr Talbot, bishop of
Durham, to whose notice he had been re
commended (together with Mr Benson and
Mr Seeker) by Mr Edward Talbot, on his
death-bed, our author had been presented
first to the rectory of Haughton, near Dar
lington, and afterwards to that of Stanhope,
in the same diocese. The benefice of Haugh
ton was given to him in 1722, and that of
Stanhope in 1725. At Haughton, there Avas
a necessity for rebuilding a great part of the
parsonage-house, and Mr Butler had neither
money nor talents for that work. Mr Seeker,
therefore, who had always the interest of his
friends at heart, and acquired a very consi
derable influence with Bishop Talbot, per
suaded that prelate to give Mr Butler, in ex
change for Haughton, the rectory of Stan
hope, which was not only free from any such
incumbrance, but was likcAvise of much su
perior value, being indeed one of the richest
parsonages in England. Whilst our author
continued preacher at the Rolls-chapel, he
divided his time betAveen his duty in town
and country; but when he quitted the Rolls,
he resided, during seven years, Avhoily at
Stanhope, in the conscientious discharge of

Xll THE LIFE OF
every obligation appertaining to a good pa
rish priest. This retireraent, however, was
too solitary for his disposition, which had in
it a natural cast of gloominess. And though
his recluse hours were by no means lost, ei
ther to private iraprovement or public utility,
yet he felt at times, very painfully, the want
of that select society of friends to Avhich he
had been accustomed, and Avhich could in
spire hira with the greatest chearfulness. Mr
Seeker, therefore, who knew this, was ex
treraely anxious to draw him out into a raore
active and conspicuous scene, and omitted
no opportunity of expressing this desire to
such as he thought capable of promoting it.
Having himself been appointed king's chap
lain in 1732, he took occasion, in a conver
sation Avhich he had the honour of holding
Avith Queen Caroline, to mention to her his
friend Mr Butler. The queen said she thought
he had been dead. Mr Seeker assured her
he Avas not. Yet, her majesty afterwards
asked Archbishop Blackburn if he was not
dead ; his answer was, " No, madam ; but
he is buried." Mr Seeker continuing his pur
pose of endeavouring to bring his friend out
of his retirement, found means, upon Mr
Charles Talbot's being made lord-chancellor,

DR BUTLER. XIU
to have Mr Butler recommended to him for
his chaplain. His lordship accepted, and
sent for him ; and this promotion calling him
to toAvn, he took Oxford in his way, and was
admitted there to the degree of doctor-of-
law, on the Sth Deceraber 1733. The lord-
chancellor, who gave him also a prebend in
the church of Rochester, had consented that
he should reside at his parish of Stanhope
one half of the year. «
Dr Butler being thus brought back into
the world, his merit and his talents soon in
troduced him to particular notice, and paved
the way for his rising to those high dignities
which he afterAvards enjoyed. In 1736, he
was appointed clerk-of-the-closet to queen
Caroline ; and, in the sarae year, he present
ed to her majesty a copy of his excellent
treatise, entitled, " The Analogy of Religion,
Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution
and Course of Nature." His attendance upon
his royal mistress, by her especial command,
was from seven to nine in the evening every
day : and though this particular relation to
that excellent and leamed queen was soon
determined by her death in 1737, yet he
had been so effectually recommended by her,

xiv THE LIFE OF
as Avell as by the late lord-chancellor Talbot,
to his majesty's favour, that, in the next year,
he Avas raised to the highest order of the
church, by a nomination to the bishopric of
Bristol ; to which see he Avas consecrated on
the third of Deceraber 1738. King George
II. not being satisfied Avith this proof of his
regard to Dr Butler, promoted him, in 1740,
to the deanry of St Paul's, London ; into
which he Avas installed on the 24th of May
in that year. Finding the demands of this
dignity to be incompatible Avith his parish-
duty at Stanhope, he imraediately resigned
that rich benefice. Besides our prelate's un-
reraitted attention to his peculiar obligations,
he Avas called upon to preach several dis
courses on public occasions, which Avere af
terwards separately printed, and have since
been annexed to the latter editions of the
Sermons at the Rolls-chapel. In 1746; upon
the death of Dr Egerton, bishop of Here
ford, Dr Butler was raade clerk-of-the-closet
to the king ; and on the l6th October 1750,
he received another distinguished mark of
his majesty's favour, by being translated
to the see of Durham. This was on the
16th of October ; in that year, upon the

DR BUTLER. XV
decease of Dr Edward Chandler, our pre
late, being thus appointed to preside over a
diocese Avith Avhich he had long been con
nected, delivered his first, and indeed his last
charge to his clergy,- at his primary visitation
in 1751. The principal object of it Avas,
" External Religion." The bishop having
observed, with deep concern, the great and
groAving neglect of serious piety in the king
dora, insisted strongly on the usefulness of
outward forms and institutions, in fixing and
preserving a sense of devotion and duty in
the minds of men. In doing this, he was
thought by several persons to speak too fa
vourably of Pagan and Popish ceremonies,
and to countenance, in a certain degree, the
cause of superstition. Under that apprehen
sion, an able and spirited writer, who was
understood to be a clergyraan of the church
of England, published, in 1752, a pamphlet,
entitled, " A serious Enquiry into the Use
and Importance of External Religion : occa
sioned by sorae passages in the Right Rev.
the Lord Bishop of Durham's Charge to the
Clergy of that Diocese ; -Humbly addressed
to his Lordship." Many persons, however,
and we believe the greater part of the clergy

XVI THE LIFE OF
of the diocese, did not think our prelate's
charge so exceptionable as it appeared to
this author. The Charge, being printed at
Durham, and having never been annexed to
any of Dr Butler's other works, is now be
corae extremely scarce ; 9,nd it is observable,
that it is the only one of his publications
which ever produced him a direct literary
antagonist *.
By this promotion, our worthy bishop was
furnished Avith araple raeans of exerting the
virtue of charity ; a virtue which erainently
abounded in him, and the exercise of which
was his highest delight. But this gratifica
tion he did not long enjoy. He had been
but a short time seated in his ncAV bishopric,
when his health began visibly to decline ; and
having been compliraented, during his indis
position, upon account of his great resigna
tion to the Divine Avill, he is said to have ex
pressed sorae regret, that he should be taken
from the present Avorld so soon after he had
been rendered capable of becoming much
more useful in it. In his last illness, he was
* This Charge, with all the rest of Bishop Butler's writ
ings, is included in the present edition of his Works.

DR BUTLEE. XVU
carried to Bristol, to try the Avaters of that
place ; but these proving ineffectual, he re
moved to Bath, where, being past recovery,
he died on the l6th of June, 1752. His
corpse Avas conveyed to Bristol, and interred
in the cathedral there, Avhere a monument,
with an inscription, is erected to his raeraory.
On the greatness of Bishop Butler's cha
racter we need not enlarge ; for, his profound
knowledge, and the prodigious strength of
his mind, are amply displayed in his incom
parable Avritings. His piety was of the most
serious and fervent, and, perhaps, somewhat
of the ascetic kind. His benevolence was
Avarm, generous, and diffusive. Whilst he
was bishop of Bristol, he expended, in re
pairing and improving the episcopal palace,
four thousand pounds, which is said to have
been more than the whole revenues of the
bishopric amounted to, during his continu
ance in that see. Besides his private bene
factions, he was a contributor to the infir
mary at Bristol, and a subscriber to three of
the hospitals at London. He was likewise a
principal promoter, though not the first foun
der, of the infirmary at Newcastle, in Nor
thumberland. In supporting the hospitality
b

XVIU THE LIFE OF
and dignity of the rich and powerful diocese
of Durham, he was desirous of imitating the
spirit of his patron. Bishop Talbot. In this
spirit, he set apart three days every week for
the reception and entertainment bf the prin
cipal gentry of the country. Nor were even
the clergy Avho had the poorest benefices, ne
glected by hira. He not only occasiorially
invited them to dine with him, but condes
cended to visit them at their respective pa
rishes. ' By his will he left five hundred
pounds to the society for propagating, the
gospel in foreign parts, and some legacies to
his friends and domestics. His executor and
residuary legatee Avas his chaplain, the Rev.
Dr Nathaniel Forster, a divine of distinguish
ed literature. Bishop Butler was never mar
ried. Soon after his decease, the following
lines, by way of epitaph, were Avritten con
cerning liim ; and Avere printed first, if Ave
recollect aright, in the London Magazine,
Beneath this marble Butler lies entombed.
Who, with a soul inflamed by love divine.
His life in presence ofhis God consumed.
Like the bright lamps before the holy shrine.
His aspect pleasing, mind with'learning fraught.
His eloquence was like a chain of gold.
That the wild passions of mankind controlled ;
Merit, wherever to be found, he sought.

DR BUTLER. XIX
Desire of transient riches he had none ;
These he, with bounteous hand, did well dispense ^
Bent to fulfil the ends of Providence ;
His heart still fixed on an immortal crown.
His heart a mirror was, of purest kind,
Where the bright image of his Maker shined ;
Reflecting faithful to the throne above.
The irradiant glories of the Mystip Dove.

PREFACE

BY THE

EDITOR.

PREFACE

BY THE

EDITOR.

" When I consider how light a matter very often subjects the best
" established characters to the suspicions of posterity, posterity often
" as malignant to virtue as the age that saw it was envious of its
" glory; and how ready a remote age is to catch at a low revived
" slander, which the times that brought it forth saw despised and
" forgotten almost in its birth ; I cannot but think it a matter that
" deserves attention." — Letter to the Editor of the Letters ori the
Spirit qf Patriotism, &c. by Bishop Warburton. See his Works,
Vol. VH. p. 547.
Ihe Charge to the Clergy of the Diocese of Durham
was printed and published in the year 1751 by the learn
ed Prelate, whose name it bears ; and, together with the
Sermons and Analogy of the same writer, both too well
known to need a more particular description, completes
the collection of his works, it has long been considered
as a matter of curiosity, on account of its scarceness;
and it is equally curious on other accounts, its subject,
and the calumny to which it gave occasion, of represent
ing the Author as addicted to superstition, as inclined to
popery, and as dying in the communion qf the church qf
Rome. The improved edition of the Biographia Britan
nica, published under the care of Dr Kippis, having un
avoidably brought this calumny again into notice ; it may

XXIV PREFACE
not be unseasonable to offer a few reflections in this place,
by way of obviating any impressions that may hence arise,
to the disadvantage of so great a character as that of the
late Bisliop Butler ; referring those, who desire a more
particular account of his life, to the third volume of the
same entertaining work, printed in 1784. Art. Butler
(Joseph) *.
I. The principal design of the bishop in his Charge, is
to exhort his clergy to " do their part towards reviving a
practical sense of religion amongst the people committed
to their care j" and, as one way of effecting this, to " in
struct them in the Importance of External Religion," or
the usefulness of outward observances in promoting in
ward piety. Now, from the compound nature of man,
consisting of two parts, the body and the mind, together
with the influence which these are found to have on one
another, it follows, that the religious regards of such a
creature ought to be so framed, as to be in some way pro
perly accommodated to both. A religion which is purely
spnitual, stripped of every thing that m ay affect the senses,
and considered only as a divine philosophy o^ the mind,
if it do not mount up into enthusiasm, as has frequently
been the case, often sinks, after a few short fervours, into
indifference : an abstracted invisible object, like thatwhich
natural reUgion offers, ceases to move or interest the
heart ; and something farther is wanting to bring it nearer,
and render it more present to our view, than merely an in
tellectual contemplation. On the other hand, when, in
order to remedy this inconvenience, recourse is had to in
stituted forms and ritual injunctions ; there is always dan
ger lest men be tempted to rest entirely on these, and per
suade themselves that a painful attention to such obsei-
vances will atone for the want of genuine piety and virtue.
Yet, surely there is a way of steering safely between these
* The account here alluded to, the reader will observe, is prefixed to
the present edition of Butler's AVorks.

BY THE EDITOR. XXV
two extremes ; of so consulting both the parts of our con
stitution, that the body and the mind may concur in ren
dering our religious services acceptable to God, and at
the same time useful to ourselves. And what vvay can this
be, but precisely that which is recommended in the charge;
such a cultivation of outward as well as inward religion,
that from both may result, what is the point chiefly to be
laboured and at all events to be secured, a correspondent
temper and behaviour ; or, in other words, such an appli
cation of the forms of godliness as may be Subservient in
pron^oting the power and spirit of it? No man who be
lieves the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament, and
understands what he believes, but must know, that ex
ternal religion is as much enjoined, and constitutes as
real a part of revelation, as tha^ which is internal. The
many ceremonies in use among the Jews, in consequence
of a divine command ; the baptism of water, as an emblem
of moral purity ; the eating and drinking of bread and
wine, as symbols and representations of the body and
blood of Christ, required of Christians, are proofs ofthis.
On comparing these two parts of religion together, one,
it is immediately seen, is of much greater importance than
the other ; and, whenever they happen to interfere, is
always to be preferred : But does it follow from hence,
that therefore that other is of little or no importance, and,
incases where there is no competition, may entirely be
neglected ? Or rather is not the legitimate conclusion di
rectly the reverse, that nothing is to be looked upon as of
little importance, which is of any use at all in preserving
upon our minds a sense of the Divine authority, which
recals to our remembrance the obligations we are under,
and helps to keep us, as the Scripture expresses it, " in
the fear ofthe Lord all the day long*?" If, to adopt the
instance mentioned in the Charge, the sight of a church
* Prov, xxiii. 17.

xxvi PREFACE
,;/•-' •.,,.• (¦/,;>
should remind a man of some sentiraent of piety ; 'if, from
the view of a material building dedicated to the service of
God, he should be led to regard himself, his own body,
as a living " temple of the Holy Ghost *," and therefore,
no more than the other, to be profaned or desecrated by
anything that defileth or is impure ; could it be truly said
of such a one that he was superstitious, or mistook the
means of religion for the end ? If, to use another, and
what has been thought a more obnoxious instance, taken
from the Bishop's practice, a cross, erected in a place of,
public worship •\; should cause us to reflect on Him who
died on a cross for our salvation, and on the necessity of
our " own dying to sin :[:," and of " crucifying the flesh
with its affections and lusts ||;" would any worse conse
quences follow from such sentiments, so excited, than if
the same sentiments had been excited by the view of a
picture, of the crucifixion suppose, such as is commonly
placed, and with this very design, in foreign churches,
and indeed in' many of our own ? Both the instances here
adduced, it is very possible, may be far from being ap
proved, even by those who are under the most sincere
convictions ofthe importance of true religion : and it i^
easy to conceive how ofien to scorn and censure they must
be from others, who think they have a talent for ridicule,
and have accustomed themselves to regard all pretensions
to piety as hypocritical or superstitious. But " Wisdom
is justified of her children |." Religion is what it is,,
" whether men will hear, or whether they will forbear;*"
and whatiever in the smallest degree promotes its interests^
and assists us in performing its commands> whether? that
as:iistance be derived from the medium of the body'or the
mind, ought to be esteemed of great weight, apd deser
ving of our most serious attention.

' 1 Cor. vi. 19. f See note [A], at the end of this preface.
Rom. vi. IJ. l|Gal. V. 24. § Matth. xi. 19. * Ezek. ii. 5.

BY THE EDITOR. XXVII
However, be the danger of superstition what it may, no
one was more sensible of that danger, or more in earnest
in maintaining that external acts of themselves are no
thing, and that moral holiness, as distinguished from bo
dily observances of every kind, is that which constitutes
the essence of religion, than Bishop Butler. Not only
the Charge itself, the whole intention of vvhich is plainly
nothing more than to enforce the necessity of Practical
Religion, the reality as well as form, is a demonstration
of this, but many passages besides to the same purpose,
selected from his other writings. Take the two following
as specimens. In his Analogy he observes thus: "Though
mankind have, in all ages, been greatly prone to place
their religion in peculiar positive rites, by way of equiva
lent for obedience to moral precepts ; yet, without ma
king any comparison at all between them, the nature of
the thing abundantly shews all notions of that kind to be
utterly subversive of true religion : as they are, moreover,
contrary to the whole general tenor of Scripture ; and
likewise to the most express particular declarations of it,
that nothing can render us accepted of God, without mo
ral virtue *." And to the same purpose in his Sermon,
preached before the society for the propagation of the
gospel^ in February 17S8-9. " Indeed, amongst creatures
naturally formed for religion, yet' so much under thepower
of imagination as men are, superstition is an evil, wbich
can never be out of sight. But even against this, true
religion is a great securitj', and the only one. True reli
gion takes up that place in the mind, vvhich superstiliou
would usurp, and so leaves little room for it ; and likewise
lays us under the strongest obligations to oppose it. On
the contrary, the danger of superstition cannot but be in
creased by the prevalence of irreligion : and by its general
prevalence, the evil will be unavoidable. For the common.
* Analogy, Part II, Cliap, L

XXVni , PREFACE
people, wanting a religion, will, of course, take up with
almost any superstition, which is thrown in their way :
and, in process of time, amidst the infinite vicissitudes
of the political world, the leaders of parties will certainly
be able to serve themselves of that superstition, whatever
it be, which is getting ground ; and will not fail to carry
it to the utmost length their occasions require. The ge
neral nature of the thing shews this : and history and fact
confirm it. It is therefore wonderful, those people who
seem to think there is but one evil in hfe, that of super
stition, should not see that atheism and profaneness must
be the introduction of it *."
He, who can think and write in such a manner, can
never be said to mistake the nature of real religion : And
he, who, after such proofs to the contrary, can persist in
asserting of so discreet and learned a person, that he was
addicted to superstition, must himself be much a stranger
both to truth and charity.
And here it may be worth our while to observe, that the
same excellent prelate, who by one set of men was sus
pected of superstition, on account of his Charge, has by
another been represented as leaning to the opposite ex
treme of enthusiasm, on account of his two discourses 0«,
the Love ofGod. But both opinions are equally without
foundation. He was neither superstitious nor an enthu
siast : His mind was much too strong, and his habits of
thinking and reasoning much too strict and severe, to
suffer him to descend to the weaknesses of either charac-
ter. His piety was at once fervent and rational. Wh^n
impressed with a generous concern for the declining cause
of religion, he laboured to revive ita dying interests ; no-'
thing he judged would be more effectual to that end,
among creatures so much engaged with bodily things,
and so apt to be affected with whatever strongly solicits
* Ser. XVI.

BY THE EDITOR. Xxix
the senses, as men are, than a religion of such a frame as
should in its exercise require the joint exertions of the
body and the mind. On the other hand, when penetrated
with the dignity and importacice of " the first and great
commandment*," love to God, he set himself to enquire,
what those movements of the heart are, which are due to
Him, the Author and cause of all things; he found, in
the coolest way of consideration, that God is the natural
object ofthe sajne affections of gratitude, reverence, fear,
<lesire of approbation, trust, and dependence, the same
affections in kind, though doubtless in a very dispropor
tionate Je-gref, which anyone would feel from contem
plating a perfect character in a creature, in which good
ness, witli wisdom and power, are supposed to be the pre
dominant qualities, with the further circumstance that this
creature was also his governor and friend. The subject
is manifestly a real one ; there is nothing in it fanciful or
unreasonable : This way of being affected towards God is
piety, in the strictest sense : This is religion, considered
as a habit of mind ; a religion, suited to the nature and
condition of man -\.
II. From superstition to popery the transition is easy :
No wonder then, that, in the progress of detraction, the
simple imputation of the former of these, with which the
attack on the character of our author was opened, should
be followed by the more aggravated imputation of the lat
ter. Nothing, I think, can fairly be gathered in support
of such a suggestion from the Charge, in which popery is
barely mentioned, and occasionally only, and in a sen
tence or two ; yet even there, it should be remarked, the
Bishop takes care to describe the peculiar observances re
quired by it, " some, as in themselves, wrong and super
stitious, and others of them as being made subservient to

« Matth. xxii. 38.
\ See note [B], at the end of this preface.

X\'X 1»REI"ACE

the purposes of superstition." With respect to his other
writings, any one at all conversant with them needs not
to be told, that the matters treated of both in his Ser
mons and his Analogy did, none of them, directly lead
him to consider, and much less to combat, the opinions,
whether relating to faith or worship, which are peculiar
to the church of Rome: It might therefore have happen
ed, yet without any just conclusion arising from thence,
of being himself inclined to favour those opinions, that
he had never mentioned, so much as incidentally, the sub
ject of popery at all. But fortunately for the reputation
of the Bishop, and to the eternal disgrace of his calum
niators, even this poor resource is wanting to support
their malevolence. In his Sermon at St Bride's before
the Lord Mayor in 1740, after having said that, " Our
laws, and whole constitution, go more upon supposition
of an equality amongst mankind, than the constitution
and laws of other countries;" he goes on to observe, that
" this plainly requires, that raore particular regard should
be had to the education of the lower people here, than in
places where they are born slaves of power, and to be
made slaves qf superstition *:" meaning evidently in this
place by the general term superstition, the particular er
rors of the Romanists. This is something ; but we have
a still plainer indication what his sentiments concerning
popery really were, from another of his additional Ser
mons, I mean that before the House of Lords on June the
1 1th, 1747, the anniversary ofhis late majesty's accession.
The passage alluded to is as follows; and my readers will
not be displeased that Ijgive it them at length. "The
value of our religious establishment ought to be very much
heightened in our esteem, by considering what it, is a se
curity from ; I mean that great corruption of Christianity,
popery, which is ever hard at work to bring us again un-
* Ser. XVII.

BY THE EDITOR. XXxi
der its yoke. Whoever will consider the popish claims,
to the disposal of the whole earth, as of divine right, to
dispense vvith the most sacred engagements, the claims to
supieme absolute authority in religion ; in short, the ge
neral claims which the Canonists express by the words,
plenitude of power — whoever, I say, will consider popeP^
as it is professed at Rome, may see, that it is manifest
open usurpation ofali human and divine authority. But
even in those Roman-catholic countries where these mon
strous claims are not admitted, and the civil power does,
in many respects, j-estrain the papal ; yet persecution is
professed, as it is absolutely injoined by what is acknow
ledged to be their highest authority, a general council, so
called, with the pope at the head of it ; and is practised
in all of them, I think without exception, where it can be
done safely. Thus they go on to substitute force instead
of argument; and external profession made by force in
stead of reasonable conviction. And thus corruptions of
the grossest sort have been in vogue, for many genera
tions, in many parts of Christendom; and are so still,
even where popery obtains in its least absurd form : and
their antiquity and wide extent are insisted upon as proofs
of their truth ; a kind of proof, which at best can only be
presumptive, but which loses all its little weight, in pro
portion as the long and large prevalence of such corrup
tions have been obtained by force *." In another part of
the same Sermon, where he is again speaking of our ec
clesiastical constitution, he reminds his audience that it
is to be valued, " not because it leaves us at liberty to
have as httle religion as we please, without being accoun
table to human judicatories ; but because— it exhibits to
our view, and enforces upon our consciences, genuine
Christianity, free from the superstitions-with which it is
defiled in other countries;" which superstitions, he ob-
* Serm XX.

xxxu PREFACE
serves, " naturally tend to abate its force." The date
of this sermon should be here attended to. It was preach
ed in June, 1747 ; that is, four years before the delivery
and publication of the Charge, which was in the year
1751 ; and exactly five years before the Author died,
which was in June 1752. We have then, in the passages
now laid before the reader, a clear and unequivocal proof,
brought down to within a few years of Bishop Butler's
death, that popery was held by him in the utmost abhor
rence, and that he regarded it in no other light, than as tht
great corruption of Christiamty, and a manifest, open usur
pation of all human and divine authority. The argument
is decisive ; nor will any thing be of force to invalidate
it, unless from some after-act during the short remaiuder
of the Bishop's life, besides that of delivering and printing
his Charge, (which, after vvhat I have said here, and in
the Notes added to this Preface and to the Charge, I must
have leave to consider as affording no evidence at all of
his inclination to papistical doctrines or ceremonies) the
contrary shall incontrovertibly appear.
III. One such after-act, however, has been alleged,
which would effectually demolish all that we have urged
in behalf of our prelate, were it true, as is pretended, that
he died in the communion of the church of Rome. Had a
story of this sort been invented and propagated by papists,
the wonder might have been less :
Hoc Ithacus velit, ct -magno mercentur Atridcs,
But to the reproach of Protestantism, the fabrication of
this calumny, for such we shall find it, originated from
among ourselves. It is pretty remarkable that a circum
stance so extraordinary should never have been divulged
till the year 1767, fifteen years after the Bishop's decease.
At that time Dr Thomas Seeker was archbishop of Can
terbury ; who, of all others, was the most likely to know

BY THE EDITOR. XXXIU
the truth or falsehood of the fact asserted, having been
educated with our Author in his early youth, and having
lived in a .constant habit of intimacy with him to the very
time of his death. The good archbishop was not silent
on this occasion : with a virtuous indignation he stood
forth to protect the posthumous character of his friend ;
and in a public newspaper, under the signature of Misop-
seudes, called upon his accuser to support what he had ad
vanced by whatev'er proofs he could. No proof, however,
nor any thing like a proof, appeared' in reply ; aud every
man of sense and candour at that time vvas perfectly con
vinced the assertion was entirely groundless*. As a fur-
' ther confirmation of the rectitude of this judgraent, it may
not be amiss to mentipn, there is yet in existence a strong
presumptive argument at least in its favour, dravvn from
the testimony of those vvho attended our Author in the
sickness of which he died. The last days of this excellent
Prelate were passed at Bath ; Dr Nathaniel Forster, his
chaplain, being continually with him ; and for one day,
and at the very end of his illness, Dr Marlin Benson also,
the then bishop of Gloucester, who shortened his own life
in his pious haste to visit his dying friend. Both these
persens constantly wrote letters to Dr Seeker, then bishop
of Oxford, containing accounts of Bishop Butler's de
clining health, and of the symptoms and progress of his
disorder, which, as vvas conjectured, soon terminated in
his death. These letters, which are still preserved in the
Lambeth library f, 1 have read ; and not the slenderest
argument can be collected frora them, in justification of
the ridiculous slander we are here considering. Jf at that
awful season the tiishop vvas not known to have expressed
any opinion, tending to shew his dislike to Popery ; nei
ther was he knovvn to have said any thing, that could at
* See note [C], at the end of this preface.
t See note [D], at the end of this preface,
c

xxxiv PREFACE
all be construed in approbation of it : and the natural pre
sumption is, that whatever sentiments he had formerly en
tertained concerning tbat corrupt system of religion, he
continued to entertain them to the last. The truth is,
neither the word nor the idea of Popery seems once to
have occurred either to the Bishop himself, or to those
who watched his parting moments : Their thoughts were
otherwise engaged. His disorder had reduced him to such
debility, as to render him incapable of speaking much or
long on any subject : the few bright intervals that occur
ed were passed in a state of the utmost tranquillity and
composure; and in that composure he expired. "^ Mark
the perfect man, and behold the upright ; for the end of
that man is peace *." " Let me die the death of the
righteous, and let my last end be like His f."
Out of pure respect for the virtues of a man, whom I
had never the happiness of knowing, or even of seeing,
but from whose writings I have received the greatest be
nefit and illumination, and which I have reason to be
thankful to Providence for having early thrown in my
way ; I have adventured, in what 1 have now offered to
the public, to step forth in his defence, and to vindicate
¦ his honest fame from the attacks of those, who, with the
vain hope of bringing down superior characters to their
own level, are for ever at work in detracting from their
just praise. For the literary reputation of Bishop Butler,
it stands too high in the opinion of the world, to incur
the danger of any diminution : but this, in truth, is the
least of his excellencies. He was more than a good wri
ter, he was a good man ; and, what is an addition even to
this eulogy, he was a sincere Christian. His whole study
was directed to the knowledge'and practice of sound mo
rality and true religion : these he adorned by his hfe, and
has recommended to future ages in his writings ; in which,
* Psal. xxxvii. 27. t Numb, xxiii. 10.

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BY THE EDITOR. xli
Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and
Course of Nature."
" All things are douhle one against another, and God
hath made nothing imperfect*." On this single observa
tion of the son of Sirach, the whole fabric of our Prelate's
defence of religion, in his Analogy, is raised. Instead of
indulging to idle speculations, hovv the world might pos
sibly have been better than it is ; or, forgetful of the dif
ference between hypothesis and fact, attempting to ex
plain the divine oeconoiny vvith respect to intelligent crea
tures from pre-conceived notions of his own ; he first in
quires vvhat the constitution of nature, as made known to
us in the way of experiment, actually is ; and from this,
now seen and acknowledged, he endeavours to form a
judgment of that larger constitution, which rehgion dis
covers to us. If the dispensation of Providence we are
now under, considered as inhabitants of this world, and
having a temporal interest to secure in it, be found, on
examination, to be analogous to, and of a piece with, that
further dispensation, which relates to us as designed for
another vvoild, in vvhich vve have an eternal interest, de
pending on our behaviour here ; if both may be traced up
to the same general laws, and appear to be carried on ac
cording to the same plan of administration; the fair pre
sumption is, that both proceed from one and the same
Author. And if the principal parts objected to in this lat
ter dispensation be similar to, and of the same kind with,
what we certainly experience under the former ; the ob
jections, being clearly inconciu'^ive in one case, because
contradicted by plain fact, must, in all reason, be allow
ed to be inconclusive also in the other.
This way of arguing from vvhat is acknowledged to what
is disputed, from things known to other things that re
semble them, from that part of the divine eRlablishment
* Eccles. xiii. 24.

j^lii PREFACE
which is exposed to our view to that more important one
which lies beyond it, is on all hands confessed to be just.
By this method Sir Isaac Newton has unfolded the system
of nature ; by the same method Bishop Butler has ex
plained the system of grace, and thus, to use the words
of a writer, whom I quote with pleasure, " has formed
and concluded a happy alhance between faith and philo
sophy *." '
And although the argument from analogy be allowed
to be imperfect, and by no means sufficient to solve all
difficulties respecting the government of God, and the de
signs of his Providence with regard to mankind ; (a de
gree of knowledge, which we are not furnished with fa
culties for attaining, at least in the present state) yet sure
ly it is of importance to learn from it, that the natural
and moral world are intimately connected, and parts of
one stupendous whole, or system ; and that the chief ob
jections, which are brought against religion, maybe urged
with ?qual force against the constitution and course of na
ture, where they are certainly false in fact. And this in
formation we may derive from the work before us ; the
proper design of which, it may be of use to observe, is
not to prove the truth of religion, either natural or re
vealed, but to confirm that proof, aheady known, by con
siderations from analogy.
After this account of the method of reasoning employ
ed by our Author, let us now advert to his manner of ap
plying it, first, to the subject of Natural Religion, and,
" secondly, to that of Revealed.
]. The foundation of all our hopes and fears is a future
Life ; and with this tbe treatise begins. Neither the reason
of the thing, nor the analogy of nature, according to
Bishop Butler, give ground for imagining, that the un
known event, death, will be our destruction. The states
Mr Mainwaring's Dissertation, prefixed to his volume of Sermons.

BY THE EDITOR. xliii
in which we have formerly existed, in the womb and in
infancy, are not more different from each other than frorti '
that of mature age in which we now exist: therefore, that
we shall continue to exist hereafter, in a state as different
from the present as the present is from those through
which vve have passed already, is a presumption favoured
by the analogy of nature. All that vve know from reason
concerning death, is the effects it has upon animal bo
dies : and the frequent instances among men of the intel
lectual powers continuing in high health and vigour, at
the very time vvhen a mortal disease is on the point of put
ting an end to all the powers of sensation, induce us to
hope that it may have no effect at all on the human soul,
not even so much as to su,spend the exercise of its facul
ties : though, if it have, the suspension of a powder by no
means implies its extinction, as sleep or a swoon may
convince us *.
The probabihty of a future state once granted, an im
portant question arises. How best to secure our interest in
that state. We find from what passes .Haily before us,
that the constitution of nature admits of misery as well as
happiness ; that both of these are the consequences of our
own actions ; and these consequences we are enabled to
foresee. Therefore, that our happiness or miserj' in afu
ture world may depend on our ovvn actions also, and that
rewards or punishments hereafter may follow our good or
ill behaviour here, is but an appointment ofthe same sort
with what we experience under the divine Government,
according to the regular course of Nature '|-.
This supposition is confirmed from another circum
stance, that the natural government of God, under vvhich
we now live, is also moral; in which rewards and punish
ments are the consequences of actions, considered as vir
tuous and vitious. Not that every man is rewarded or pu-
* Part I. Chap. i. t Chap. ii.

xliv PREFACE
nished here in exact proportion to his desert ; for the es
sential tendencies of virtue and vice, to produce happiness
and the contrary, are often hindered from taking effect
from accidental causes. However, there are plainly the
rudiments and beginnings of a righteous administration to
be discerned in the constitution of nature : from whence
we are led to expect, that these accidental hindrances
will one day he removed, and the rule of distributive jus
tice obtain completely in a raore perfect state *.
The moral government of God, thus established, im
plies in the notion of it sorae sort of trial, or a moral pos.-
sibihty of acting wrong as well as fight, in those who are
the subjects of it. And the doctrine of religion, thatthe
present life is in fact a state of probation- for a future one,
is rendered credible, from its being analogous throughout
to the general conduct of Providence towards us with re
spect to this world ; in which prudence is necessary to se
cure our temporal interest, just as we are taught that vir
tue is necessary to secure our eteVnal interest ; and both
are trusted to ourselves -f.
But the present life is not merely a state of probation,
implying in it difficulties and danger ; it is also a state of
discipline and improvement ; and that, both in our tem
poral and religious capacity. Thus, childhood is a state
of discipline for youth; youth for manhood, and that for
old age. Strength of body, and maturity of understand
ing, are acquired by degrees ; and neither of them with
out continual exercise and attention on our part, not only
in the beginning of life, but through the whole course of
it. So again, with respect to our religious concerns, the
present world is fitted to be, and to good men is in event,
a state of discipline and improvement for afuture one.
The several passions and propensions, implanted in our
hearts, inchne us, in a multitude of instances, to forbid-
* Chap. iii. | Chap. iv.

BY THE EDITOR. xlv
den pleasures : this inward infirmity is increased by vari
ous snares and "temptations, perpetually occurring from
without : hence arises the necessity of recollection and
self-government, of withstanding the calls of appetite, and
forming our minds to habits of piety aud virtue : habits,
of which we are capable, and which, to creatures in a
state of moral imperfection, and fallen from their origi
nal integrity, must be of the greatest use, as an addition
al security, over and above the principle of conscience,
from the dangers to which vve are exposed *.
Nor is the credibility here given, by the analogy of na
ture, to the general doctrine of rehgion, destroyed or
weakened by any notions concerning necessity. Of itself
it is a mere word, the sign of an abstract idea ; and as
much requires an agent, that is a necessary agent, in order
to effect any thing, as freedom requires a free agent. Ad
mitting it to be speculatively true, if considered as influ
encing practice, it is the same as false : for it is matter of
experience, that, with regard to our present interest, and
as inhabitants of this world, we are treated as if we were
free ; and therefore the analogy of nature leads us to con
clude, that, with regard to our future interest, and as de
signed for another vvorid, we shall be treated as free also.
Nor does the opinion of necessity, supposing it possible, at
all affect either the general proof of religion, or its exter
nal evidence'}-.
StiU objections maj' be made against the wisdom and
goodness of the divine government, to which analogy,
which can only shew the truth or credibility of facts, af
fords no answer. Yet even here analogy is of use., if it
suggest that the divine government is a scheme or system,
and not a number of unconnected acts, and that this sys
tem is also above our comprehension. Now, the govern
ment ofthe natural world appears to be a system of this
* Part I. Chap. v. f Chap, vi.

xlvi PREFACE
kind ; with parts, related to each other, and together com-»
posing a whole ; in which system, ends arc brought about
by the use of means, many of which means, before expe
rience, would have been Suspected to have had a quite
contrary tendency ; which is carried on by general laws,
similar causes uniformly producing similar effects ; the
utility of which general lavv.s, aud the inconveniences
which would probably arise from the occasional or even
secret suspension of them, we are in some sort enabled
to discern*; but of the whole we are incompetent judges,
because of the small part which comes within our view.
Reasoning then from what we know, it is highly credible,
that the government of the moral world is a system also,
carried on by general laws, and in which ends are ac
complished by the intervention of means ; and that both
constitutions, the natural and the moral, are so connect
ed, as to form together but one scheme. But of this
scheme, as that of the natural world taken alone, we are
not quahfied tojudge, on account of the mutual respect
of the several parts, to each other and to the whole, and
our ovvn incapacity to survey the whole, or, with accu
racy, any single part. All objections, therefore, to the
wisdom and goodness of the Divine Government may be
founded merely on our ignorance f ; and to such objec
tions our ignorance is the proper, and a satisfactory, an
swer :|:.
2. The chief difficulties concerning Natural Rehgion be
ing now removed, our Author proceeds, in the next place,
to that which is Revealed ; and as an introduction to an
enquiry into the Credibility of Christianity, begins with
the consideration of its Importance.
* See a Treatise on Divine Benevolence, by Dr Thomas Balguy,
Part. II.
t See note [F], at the end of this preface.
t Part I. Chap. vii.

BY THE EDITOR. xlvU
The Importance of Christianity appears in two respects.
First, in its being a republication of Natural Religion, in
its native simplicity, with authority, and with circum
stances of advantage ; ascertaining, in many instances of
moment, vvhat before was only probable, and particularly
confirming the doctrine of a future state of rewards and
punishments *. Secondly, as revealing a new dispensa
tion of Providence, originating from the pure love and
mercy of God, and conducted by the mediation of his
Son, and the guidance of his Spirit, for the recovery and
salvation of mankind, represented in a state of apostacy
and ruin. This account of Christianity being admitted to
be just, and the distinct offices of these three Divine Per
sons being once discovered to us, we are as much obliged
in point of duty to acknowledge the relations we stand in
to the Son and Holy Ghost, as our Mediator and Sancti
fier, as we are obliged in point of duty to acknowledge
the relation we stand in to God the Father ; although the
two former of these relations be learnt from revelation
only, and in the last we are instructed by the light df Na
ture ; the obligation in either case, arising from the offices
themselves, and not at all dependitig on the manner in
which they are made knovvn to us -j-.
The presumptions against revelation in general are, that
it is not discoverable by reason, that it is unlike to what
is so discovered, and that it was introduced and support
ed by miracles. But in a scheme so large as that of the
universe, unbounded in extent and everlasting in dura
tion, there must of necessity be numberless circumstan
ces vvhich are beyond the reach of our faculties to discern,
and which can only be known by divine illumination.
And both in the natural and moral government of the
world, under vvhich we live, we find many things unlike

* See note [G], at the end of this preface.
t Part II. Chaptei: .

xlviii TREFACE
one to another, and therefore ought not to wonder if the
same unlikeness obtain between things visible and invisi
ble : although it be far from true/ that revealed religion
is entirely unlike the constitution of natuj-e, as analogy
may teach us. Nor is there any thing incredible in reve
lation, considered as miraculous ; whether miracles be
supposed to have been performed at the beginning of the
world, or after a course of nature has been established.
Not at the beginning of the -toorld ; for then there was ei
ther no course of nature at all, or a power must havebeen
exerted totally different from what that course is at pre
sent: All men and animals cannot have been born, as
they are now; but a pair of each sort must have been pro
duced at first, in a way altogether unlike to that in which
theyhave been since produced ;• unless we affirm, that
men and animals have existed from eternity in an endless
succession : One miracle, therefore, at least there~ must
have been, at the beginning of the world, or at the time
of man's creation. Not after the settlement of a course of
nature, on account of miracles being contrary to that-
course, or, in other words, contrary to experience : for,
in order to know whether miracles, worked in attestatiop
ofa divine religion, be contrary to experience or not, we
ought to be acquainted with other cases, similar or parallel
to those, in which miracles are alleged to have been
wrought. But where shall we find such similar or parallel
cases? The world which we inhabit affords none: We
know of no extraordinary revelations from God to man,
but those recorded in the old and new Testament; all of
which were estabhshed by miracles : It cannot therefore
be said that miracles are incredible, because contrary to
experience, when all the experii nee we have is in favour
of miracles, and oa the side of religion *. Besides, in
reasoning concerning mir^icles, they ought not to be com-
* See note [U], at the end of this Preface.

BY THE EDITOR. xhx
pared with common natural events, but with uncommon
appearances, such as comets, magnetism, electricity ;
which, to one acquainted only with the usual phenomena
of nature, and the common powers of matter, must, be
fore proof of their actual existence, be thought incredi
ble *.
The presumptions against Revelation in general being
dispatched, objections against the Christian Revelation in
particular, against the scheme of it, as distinguished from
objections against its evidence, are considered next. Now,
supposing a Revelation to be really given, it is highly pro
bable beforehand, that it must contain many things, ap
pearing to us hable to objections. The acknowledged dis
pensation of nature is very different from what we should
have expected ; reasoning then from analogy, the reveal
ed dispensation, it is credible, would be also different.
Nor are we in any sort judges at vvhat time, or in what
degree, or manner, it is fit or expedient for God to instruct
us, in things confessedly of the greatest use, either by na
tural reason, or by supernatural information. Thus, argu
ing on speculation only, and without experience, it would
seem very .unlikely that so important a remedy as that pro
vided by Christianity for the recovery of mankind from
a slate of ruin, should have been for so many ages with.-
held ; and, when at last vouchsafed, should be imparted
to so few ; and, after it has been imparted, should be at
tended with obscurity and doubt. And just so we might
have argued, before experience, concerning the remedies
provided in nature for bodily diseases, to which by nature
we are exposed : for many of these were unknown to
mankind for a number of ages ; are known but to few
now; some important ones probably not discovered yet;
and those which are, neither certain in their application,
nor universal in their use : And the same mode of reason-
* Chap, 2.
d

1 PREFACE
ing that would lead us to expect they should have been
so, would lead us to expect that the necessity of them
should have been superseded, by there being no diseases;
as the necessity ofthe Christian scheme, it may be thought,
might also have been superseded, by preventing the fall
of man, so that he should not have stood in need of a
Redeemer at all *.
As to objections against the wisdom and goodness of
Christianity, the same answer may be applied to them as
was to the like objections against the constitution of Nature.
For here also, Christianity is a scherae or oeconomy, com
posed of various parts, forming a whole; in which scheme
means are used for the accomplishing of ends ; and which
is conducted by general laws ; of all of which we know as
little as We do of the constitution of Nature. And the
seeming want of wisdom or goodness in this system is to
be ascribed to the same cause, as the like appearances of
defects in the natural system ; our inability to discern the
whole scheme, and our ignorance ofthe relation of those
parts which are discernible to others beyond our view.
The objections against Christianity as a matter of fact,
and against the wisdora and goodness of it, having been
obviated together, the chief of them are now to be consi
dered distinctly. , One of these, which is levelled against
the entire system itself, is of this sort : The restoration
ofraankind, represented in scripture as the great design
of the Gospel, is described as requiring a long series of
means, and persons, and dispensations, before it can be
brought to its completion ; whereas the whole ought to
have been effected at once. Now every thing we see in
the cour.se of Nature shews the folly of this objection. For
inthe natural course of Providence, ends are brought about
by means, not operating immediately and at once, but
deliberately and in a way of progression ; one thiug
* chap. 3.

BY THE EDITOR. ll
being subservient to another, this to somewhat further.
The change of seasons, the ripening of fruits, the growth
of vegetable and animal bodies, are instances of this. And
therefore that the same progressive method should be
followed in the dispensation of Christianity, as is observ
ed in the common dispensation of Providence, is a reason
able expectation, justified by the analogy of Nature *.
Another circumstance, objected to in the Christian
scheme, is the appointment of a mediator, and the saving
of the world through him. But the visible government of
God being actually administered in this way, or by the
mediation and instiumentality of others ; there can be no
general presumption against an appointment of this kind, '
against his invisible government being exercised in the
same manner. We have seen already that, with regard
to ourselves, this visible government is carried on by re
wards and punishments ; for happiness and misery are the
consequences of our own actions, considered as virtuous
and vicious, and these consequences we are enabled to
foresee. It might have been imagined, before consulting
experience, that after we had rendered ourselves liable to
misery by our own ill conduct, sorrow for what was past,
and behaving well for the future, would, alone and of
themselves, have exempted us from deserved punishment,
and restored us to the divine favour. But the fact is
otherwise ; and real reformation is often found to be of
no avail, so as to secure the criminal from poverty, sick
ness, infamy, and death, the never-failing attendants on
vice and extravagance, exceeding a certain degree. By the
course of nature then it appears, God does not always
pardon a sinner on his repentance. Yet there is provision
made, even in nature, that the miseries, vvhich men bring
on themselves by unlawful indulgencies, may'in many cases
be mitigated, and in some removed : partly by extraor-
¦•^' chap, 4,

.lii PREFACE
dinary exertions of the offender himself, but more es
pecially and frequently by the intervention of others, who
voluntarily, and from motives of compassion, submit to
labour and sorrow, such as produce long and lasting in
conveniences to themselves, as the means of rescuing an
other from the wretched effects of former imprudences.
Vicarious punisment, therefore, or one person's sufferings
contributing to the relief of another, is a providential dis
position, in the oeconomy of nature * : And it ought not-
to be matter of surprise, if by a method analogous to this
we be redeemed from sin and miser}', in the oeconomy of
grace. That mankind at present are in a state of degra
dation, different from_^that in which they were originally
created, is the very ground of the Christian revelation, as
Contained in the Scriptures. Whether we acquiesce in
the account, that our being placed in such a state is ow
ing to the crime of our first parents, or chuse to ascribe
it to any other cause, it raakes no difference as to our con
dition : the vice and unhappiness of the world are still
there, notwithstanding all our suppositions ; nor is it-
Christianity that hath pui us into this state. We learn'
also from the same Scriptures, what experience and the
use of expiatory sacrifices from the most early tiraes might
have taught us, that repentance alone is not sufficient to
prevent the fatal consequences of past transgressions:
But that still there is room for mercy, and that repent
ance shall be available, though not of itself, yet through
the mediation of a divine person,, the Messiah ; who,
from the subliraest principles of compassion, when
we were dead in trespasses and sins f, suffered and
died, the innocent for ^ the guilty, the just for the un
just X, that we might have redemption through his
blood, even the forgiveness of sins §. In what way the
death of Christ was of that efficacy it is said to be, in pro-
* See note [I], at the end of this Preface.
t Ephes. ii. 1. J 1 Pet. iii. 18. § Coloss, i, 14.

BY THE EDITOR. liii
euring the reconcihation of sinners, the Sciiptures have
not explained : It is enough that the doctrine is revealed ;
that it is not contrary to any truth which reason and ex
perience teach us ; and that it accords in perfect harmony
with the usual method of the divine conduct in the govern
ment of the world *.
Again it hath been said, that if the Christian revelation
were true, it must have been universal, and could not
have been left upon doubtful evidence. But God, in his
natural providence, dispenses his gifts in great variety, not
only among creatures ofthe same species, but to the same
individuals also at different times. Had the Christian re
velation been universal at first, j'et from the diversity of
men's abihties both of mind and body, their various
means of improveraent, and other external advantages,
some persons must soon have been in a situation, with re
spect to religious knowledge, much superior to that of
others, as much perhaps as they are at present : And all
men will be equitably dealt with at last ; and to whom
little is given, of him little will be required. Then as to
the evidence of religion being left doubtful, difficulties of
this sort, like difficulties in practice, afford scope and op
portunity for a virtuous exercise of the understanding, and
dispose the mind to acquiesce and rest satisfied with anj'
evidence that is reaS. In the daily commerce of hfe, men
are obliged to act upon great uncertainties, with regard
to success in their temporal pursuits : and the case with
regard to religion is parallel. However, though religion
be not intuitively true, the proofs of it which we have are
amply sufficient in reason to induce us to embrace it; and
dissatisfaction with those proofs may possibly be men's own
fault *.
Nothing remains but to attend to the positive evidence
there is for the truth of Christianity. Now, besides its di
rect and fundamental proofs, which are miracles and pro-
Chap. 5. t Chap. 6.

liv PREFACE
phecies ; there are many collateral circumstances, which
may be united into one view, and all together may be con
sidered as making up one argument. In this way of treat
ing the subject, the revelation, whether real or otherwise,
may be supposed to be wholly historical : the general de
sign of which appears to be, to give an account of the
condition of religion, and its professors, with a concise
narration of the political state of thiilgs, as far as re
ligion is affected by it, during a great length of time, near
six thousand years of which are already past. More par
ticularly it comprehends an account of God's entering
into covenant with one nation, the Jews, that He would
be their God, and that they should be His people; of
his often interposing in their affairs ; giving them the
promise, and afterwards the possession, of a flourishing
country ; assuring them of the greatest national pro
sperity, in case of their obedience, and threatening the
severest national punishment, in case they forsook Him,
and joined in the Idolatry of their Pagan neighbours.
It contains also a prediction of a particular person, to ap
pear in the fulness of time, in whorn all the promises of
God to the Jews were to be fulfilled : And it relates
that, at the time expected, a person did actually ap
pear, assuming to be the Saviour foretold ; that he work
ed various miracles among them, in confirmation of his
divine authority ; and, as was foretold also, was rejected
and put to death by the very people who had long desired
and waited for his coming : but that his religion, in spite
of all opposition, was established in the world by his dis
ciples, invested with supernatural powers for that pur
pose : of the fate and fortunes of which religion there is a
prophetical description, carried down to the end of time.
Let any one now, after reading the above history, and
not knowing whether the whole were not a,fiction, be sup
posed to ask, whether all tliat is here related be true .? and
instead of a direct answer, let him be informed of the se-

BY THE EDITOR. Iv
veral acknowledged facts, which are found to correspond
to it in real life ; and then, let him compare the history
and facts together, and observe the astonishing coinci
dence of both : such a joint review must appear to him of
very great weight, and to amount to evidence somewhat
more than human. And unless the whole series, and
every particular circum>tance contained in it, can be
thought to have arisen from accident, the truth of Christ
ianity is proved *.
The view here given ofthe moral and religious systems
of Bishop Butler, it will immediately be perceived, is chief
ly intended for younger students, especially for students in
divinity ; to whom it is hoped it may be of use, so as to
encourage them to peruse, vvith proper dihgence, the ori
ginal works of the author himself. For it may be neces
sary to observe, that neither of the volumes of this excel
lent prelate are addressed to those, who read for amuse
ment, or curiosity, or to get rid of time. All subjects are
not to be comprehended with the same ease ; and morali-
* Chap. 7, To the Analogy are subjoined two dissertations, both ori
ginally inserted in the body of the work. One on Personal Identity, in
which are contained some strictures on Mr Locke, who asserts that
consciousness makes or constitutes personal identity ; whereas, as our
author observes, consciousness makes only personality, or is necessary
to the idea of a person, i. e, a thinking intelligent being, but pre-sup-
poses, and therefore cannot constitute, personal identity; just as know
ledge pre-supposes truth, but does not constitute it. Consciousness of
past actions does indeed shew us the identity of ourselves, or gives us a
certain assurance that vve are the same persons or living agents now, which
we were at the time to which our remembrance can look back : but
Still we should be the same persons as we were, though this conscious
ness of what is past were wanting, though all that had been done by us
formerly were forgotten ; unless it be true that no person has existed a
single raoment beyond what he can remember. The other .dissertation
is On the Nature of Virtue, which projperly belongs to the_moral systera
of our author, already explained.

Ivi PREFACE.
ty and religion, when treated as sciences, each acconr-
panied with difficulties of its own, can neither of them be
understood as they ought, without a very peculiar atten
tion. But morality and religion are not merely to be
studied as sciences, or as being speculatively true ; they
are to be regarded in another and higher light, as the
rule of life and manners, as containing authoritative direc
tions by which to regulate our faith and practice. And in
this view, the infinite importance of them considered, it
can never be an indifferent matter whether they be re
ceived or rejected. For both claim to be the voice of
God ; and whether they be so or not, cannot be known,
till their claims be impartially examined. If they indeed
come from Him, we are bound to conform to them at our
peril : nor is it left to our choice, whether we will submit
to the obhgations they impose upon us or not; for submit
to them we raust in such a sense, as to incur the punish
ments denounced by both against wilful disobedience to
their injunctions.

The following Epitapb, said to be written by Dr Nathaniel Forster, i?
inscribed on a flat marble stone, in the cathedral church of Bristol,
placed over the spot where the remtiins of Bishop Butler are deposit
ed ; and which, as it is now almost obliterated, it may be worth while
here to preserve.

H. S.
Reverendus admodum in Christo Pater
JOSEPHUS BUTLER, LL.D.
Hvjusce prima Diceceseos
Deinde Dunelmensis Episcopus.
Qualis quantusq ; Vir erat
Sua libentissime agnovit atas :
Et si quid Prtssuli aut Scriptori ad farnam valent
Mens altiisima,
Ingenii perspicacis et subacti Vis,
Animusq ; pius, simplex, candidus, liberalis,
Mortui haud facile evanescet memoria,
Obiit Bathonia l6 Kalend. Jiilii,
A. D. 1752.
Annos natus 60.

NOTES TO THE PREFACE,
BY
THE EDITOR.

Page xxvi. [A].
JL)r Butlek, when Bishop of Bristol, put up a cross, a plain piece of
marble inlaid, in the chapel of his episcopal house. This, which was
intended by the blameless Prelate merely as a sign or memorial, that
true Christians are to bear their cross, and not to be ashamed of fol
lowing a crucified master, was considered as affording a presumption
that he was secretly inclined to Popish forms and ceremonies, and had
no great dislike to Popery itself. And, on account of the offence it oc
casioned, both at the time and since, it were to be wished, in prudence,
it had not been done. Page xxix. [B],
Many of the sentiraents, in these Two Discourses of Bishop Butler,
concerning the sovereign good of man ; the impossibility of procuring it
in the present life; the ansatisfactoiiness of earthly enjoyments; to
gether with the somewhat beyond and above them all, which once at
tained, there will rest nothing further to be wished or hoped ; and
which is then only to be expected, when we shall have put off this mor
tal body, and our union with God shall be complete ; occur in Hooker's
Ecclesiastical Polity, Book I. § xi.
Page xxxiii, [C],
When the first edition of this Preface was published, I had in vain
endeavoured to procure a sight of the papers, in which Bishop Butlef

Ix KOTES TO THE PREFACE
was accused of having died a Papist, and Archbishop Seeker's replies to
them ; though I well remembered to have read both, when they first ap
peared in the public prints. But a learned professor in the university
of Oxford has furnished me with tlie whole controversy in its original
form ; a brief history of which it may not be unacceptable to offer here
to the curious reader.
The attack was opened in the year 1767, in an anonymous pamphlet,
entitled, " The Root of Protestant Errors examined :" in which the au
thor asserted, that, " by an anecdote lately given him,'' that " same
Prelate," (who at the bottom of tlie page is called B — p of D — m) " is
said tn havc died in the communion of a church, that makes much use
ofsaints, saint's days, and all the trumpery of saint worship.'' When
this remarkable fact, now first divulged, came to be generally known,
it occasioned, as might be expected, no little alarm : and intelligence
of it was no sooner conveyed to Archbishop Seeker, than in a short let
ter, signed Misopseudes, and printed in the " St James's Chronicle of
May 9," lie called upon the writer to produce his autliority for publish
ing " so gross and scandalous a falsehood." To this challenge an imme
diate answer was returned by the autlior of the pamphlet, vvho, now as
suming the name of Phileleutheros, informed Misopseudes, through the
channel of the same paper, that " such anecdote had been given him ;
and that he was yet of opinion that there was nothing improbable in it,
when it is considered that the sarae Prelate put up the Popish insignia
of the cross in his chapel, when at Bristol ; and in his last Episcopal
Charge, has squinted very much towards that superstition." Here we
find the accusation not only repeated, but supported by reasons, such
as they are ; of which it seemed necessary, that some notice should be
taken : nor did the Archbishop conceive it unbecoming his own dignity
to stand up on this occasion, as the vindicator of innocence against the
calumniator of the helpless dead. Accordingly, in a, second letter in
the same newspaper of May 23, and subsciibed Misopseudes, as before ;
after reciting from Bishop Butler's Sermon before the Lords the very
passage, here printed in the Preface, and observing that, " there are,
in the same Sermon, declarations, as strong as can be made, against
temporal punishment for heresy, schism, or even for idolatry ;" his
grace expresses himself thus -. " Now be (Bishop Butler) was universally
esteemed, throughout his life, a man of strict piety and honesty, as well
as uncommon abilities. He gave all the proofs, public and private,
which his station led him to give, and they were decisive and daily, of
his continuing to the last a sincere member of the church of England
Nor had ever any of his acquaintance, or most intimate friends, nor
have they to this day, the least doubt of it," As to putting up a cross
in his chapel, the archbishop frankly owns, that for himself he wishes

BT THE EBITOB. kt
he had not ; and thinks that in so doing the Bishop did amiss. But
then he asks, " Can that be opposed, as any proof of Popery, to all the
evidence on the other side ;, or even to the single evidence of the above-
mentioned Sermon ? Most of our churches have crosses upon thera :
Are they therefore Popish churches i* The Lutherans have more than
crosses in theirs : Are the Lutherans therefore Papists ?" And as to the
Charge, no Papist, his grace remarks, would have spoken as Bishop
Butler there docs, of the observances peculiar to Roman Catholicsj
some of which he expressly censures as wrong and superstitious, and
others, as raade subservient to the purposes of superstition, and, on
these accounts, abolished at the Reformation, After the publication of
• this letter, Phileleutheros replied in a short defence of his own conduct>
but without producing any thing new in confirmation of what he had ad
vanced. And here the controversy, so far as the two principals were
concerned, seems to have ended.
But the dispute was not suffered to die away quite so soon. For in
the same year, and in the same newspaper of July 21, another letter
appeared ; in which the author not only contended that the cross in the
Episcopal chapel at Bristol, and the Charge to the clergy of Durhara ia
1751, amount to full proof of a strong attachment to the idolatrous
communion of the church of Rorae, but, with the reader's leave, he
would fain account for the Bishop's " tendency this way." And this he
attempted to do, " from the natural melancholy and gloominess of Dr
Butler's disposition ; from his great fondness for the lives of Romish
saints, and their books of mystic piety ; from his drawing the notions
of teaching men religion, not from the New Testament, but frora philo
sophical and political opinions of his own : and above all, from his tran
sition from a strict dissenter amongst the presbyterians to a rigid church
man, and his sudden and unexpected elevation to great wealth and dig
nity in the church.'' The attack, thus renewed, excited the archbishop's
attention a second time, and drew frora him a fresh answer, subscribed
also Misopseudes, in the " St James's Chronicle of August 4." In this
letter, our excellent Metropolitan, first of all obliquely hinting at the
unfairness of sitting in judgment on the character of a man who had
been dead 15 years; and then reminding his correspondent, that " full
proof had been already published that Bishop Butler abhorred Popery
as a vile corruption of Christianity, and that it might be proved, if need
ful, that he held the Pope to be the antichrist;" (to which decisive tes
timonies of undoubted aversion from the Romish church, another is
also added in the Postcript, his taking, when promoted to the see of
Durham, for his domestic chaplain, Dr Nath. Forster, who had pub
lished, not four years before, a Sermon, entitled. Popery destructive of
the Evidence of Christianity :) proceeds to observe, " That the natural

Ixii KOTES TO THE PREFACE
melancholy of the Bishop's temper would rather have fixed hiin amongst
his first friends, than promoted him to the change he made : That he
read books of all sorts, as well as books of mystic piety, and knew how ta
pick the good that was in them out of the bad : That his opinions were
exposed without reserve in his Analogy and his Sermons, and if the doc
trine of either be Popish or unscriptural, the learned world hath mis
taken" strangely in admiring both : That instead of being a strict dissen
ter, he never was a communicant in any dissenting assembly ; ou the
contrary, that he went occasionally, from his early years, to the esta
blished worship, and became a constant conformist to it, when he was
barely of age, and entered himself, in 1714, of Oriel College : That his
elevation to great dignity in the church, far from being sudden and un
expected, was a gradual and natural rise, through a variety of prefer
ments, and a period of 32 years : That, as Bishop of Durham, he had
very little authority beyond his brethren, and, in ecclesiastical matterSj
had none beyond them; a larger income than most of them he had;
but this he employed, not, as was insinuated, in augmenting the pomp
of worship in his cathedral, where, indeed, it is no greater than in
others, but for the purposes of charity, and in the repairing of his
houses." After these remarks, the letter closes with the fpUowing
words : " Upon the whole, few accusations, so entirely groundless, have
been so pertinaciously, I am unwilling to say maliciously, carried on, as
the present : and surely it is high time for the authors and abettors of
it, in mere common prudence, to shew some regard, if not to truth, at
least to shame."
It only remains to be mentioned', that the above letters of Archbishop
Seeker had such an effect on a writer, who signed himself in the " St
James's Chronicle of August 25," a dissenting viinister, that he .de
clared it as his opinion, that " the author of the pamphlet, called. The
Root of Protestant Errors exarained, and his friends, were obhged Ib
candour, injustice, andin honour, to retract their charge, unless they
could establish it on much better grounds than had hitherto appeared :"
and he expressed his " hopes that it would be understood that the dis
senters in general had no hand in the accusation, and that it had only
been the act of two or three mistaken men." Another person also, " a
foreigner by birth," as he says of himself, -who had been long an ad
mirer of Bishop Butler, and had perused with great attention all that
had been written on both sides in the present controversy, confesses he
had been " wonderfully pleased with observing, with what candour and
temper, as well as clearness and solidity, he was vindicated from the
aspersions laid against him." All the adversaries of our Prelate, how
ever, had not the virtue or sense to be thus convinced ; some of whom
still continued, under the signatures of Old Martin, Latimer, An Im-

BY THE EDITOR. IsLli
partial Protestant, Paulinus, Misonothos, to repeat their confuted
falsehoods iu the public prints ; as if the curse of calumniators had fallen
upon them, and their memory, hy being long a traitor to truth, had
taken at last a severe revenge, and compelled them to credit their own
lie. The iirst of these gentlemen. Old Martin, who dates from New
castle, May '.!9, from the rancour and malignity with which his letter
abounds, and from the particular virulence he discovers towards the
characters of Bishop Butler and his defender, I conjecture to be no
other than the very person who had already figured in this dispute, so
early as the year 1752 ; of whose work, entitled, " A serious Enquiry
into the L'se and Importance of External Religion/' the reader will find
some account in the notes subjoined to the Bishop's Chaise, in the
second volume. Page xxxiii. [D.]
The letters, with a sight of which I was indulged by the favour of our
present most worthy Metropolitan, are all, as 1 remember, wrapped to
gether under one cover ; on the back of which is written, in Archbishop
Seeker's on-n hand, the following words, or words to this effect, " Pre
sumptive Arguments that Bishop Butler did not die a Papist."
Page xxxix. [E].
" Far be it from me," says the excellent'Br T. Balguy *, " to dispute
the reality of a moral principle in the human heart. 1 feel its exist
ence : I clearly discern its use and importance.. But in no respect is it
more important, than as it suggests the idea of a moral goi-enwr. Let
this idea be once effaced, and the principle of conscience will soon be
fonnd weak and ineffectual. Its influence on men's conduct has, indeed,
been too much undervalued by some philosophical inquirers. But be
that influence, while it lasts, more or less; it is not a steady and per
manent principle of action. Unhappily we always have it in our power
to lay it asleep. — Neglect alone will suppress and stifle it, and bring it
almost into a state of stupefaction. Nor can any thing, less than the
terrors of religion, awaken onr minds from this dangerous and deadly
sleep. It can never be a matter of indifference to a thinking man,
whether he is to be happy or miserable beyond the grave."
Page xlvi. [¥].
The ignorance of man is a favourite doctrine with Bishop Butler. It
occurs in the secoud Part of the Analogy ; it makes the subject of his
* Discourse IX.

Ixir NOTES TO THE PREFACE
fifteenth Sermon; and we meet with it again in his Charge. Whether
sometimes it be not carried to a length, which is excessive, may admit
of doubt. Page xlvii. [G].
Admirable to this purpose are the words of Dr T. Balguy, in the 9th
of his Discourses, already referred to, p, Ixiii, " The doctrine of a fi/e
to come, some persons will say, is a doctrine of natural religion ; and
can never, therefore, be properly alleged to shew the importance of re
velation. They judge, perhaps, from the frame of the world, that the
present system is imperfect : they see designs in it, not yet compleated ;
and they think they have grounds for expecting another state, in which
these designs shall be farther carried on, and brought to a conclusion,
worthy of infinite wisdom. I am not concerned to dispute thejustness of
this reasoning; nor do I wish to dispute it. But how far will it reach }
Will it lead us to the Christian doctrine of a judgment to come ? Will
it give us the prospect of an eternity of happiness ? Nothing of all this.
It shews us only, that death is not the end of our beings; that we are
likely to pass hereafter into other systems, more favourable than the
present to the great ends of God's providence, the virtue and the happi
ness of his intelligent creatures. But into what systems we are to be re
moved'; what new scenes are to be presented to us, either of pleasure
or pain ; what new parts we shall have to act, and to what trials and
temptations we. may yet be "posed; on all these subjects we know just
nothing. That our happiness for e-ver depends on our conduct here, is
a most important proposition, which we learn only from revelation''
Page xlviii. [H].
In the common affairs of life, common experience is suflicient to di
rect us. But will common experience serve to guide our judgment con
cerning the fall and redemption of mankind ? frora what we see every
day, can we explain the commencement, or foretel the dissolution of the
world ? To judge of events'like these, we should be conversant in the.
history of other planets ; should be distinctly informed of God's various
dispensations to all the different orders of rational beings. Instead then,
of grounding our religious epinions on what zee call experience, let us ap
ply to a more certain guide, let us hearken to the testimony of God
himself. The credibility of human testimony, and the conduct of hu
man agents, are subjects perfectly within the reach of our natural facul
ties ; and we ought to desire no firmer foundation for our belipf of re
ligion, than for the judgments we form in the common affairs of life :
where we see a little plain testiraony easily outweighs the most specious

BY THE EDITOR. Ixv
conjectures, and not seldom even strong probabilities." Dr Balguy's
4th Charge. See also an excellent pamphlet, entitled, " Remarks on
Mr Hume's Essay on the Natural History of Religion, § 5. And the
6th of Dr Powell's Discourses'. Page lii. [I].
Dr Arthur Ashley Sykes, from whose writings some good may be col-"
lected out of a multitude of things of a contrary tendency, in what he ia
pleased to call " The Scripture-doctrine of Redemption *," opposes what
is here advanced by Bishop Butler ; quoting his words, but without
mentioning his name. If what is said above be not thought a sufficient
answer to the objections of this authoi-, the reader may do well to con
sult a chaise " On the Use and Abuse of Philosophy in the study of
Religion," by the late Dr Powell ; who seems to me to have had the
observations of Dr Sykes in his view, where he is confuting the reason
ings of certain philosophizing divines against the doctrine of the atone
ment. Powell's Discutu-ses, Charge III. p. 342 — 348.
• See the observations on the texts cited in his first chapter, and also in
chapters the fifth and sixth.

THE

ANALOGY OF RELIGION,
NATURAL AND REVEALED,

TO THE

CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE.

TO THE
RIGHT HONOURABLE
CHARLES, LORD TALBOT,
BARON OF HENSOL,
LORD HIGH CHANCELLOR OF GREAT
BRITAIN,
V
THE F0LL0WI1!TG
TREATISE
IS, WITH ALL RESPECT, INSCRIBED,
IN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE HIGHEST OB
LIGATIONS TO THE LATE
LORD BISHOP OF DURHAM AND TO
HIMSELF,
:by his lordship's most dutiful,
MOST devoted,
AND MOST HUMBLE, SERVANT,
JOSEPH BUTLER.

ADVERTISEMENT.

J.F the reader should meet here with any thing
which he had not before attended to, it will not be
in the observations upon the constitution and
course of nature, these being all obvious ; but in
the application of them : in which, though there
is nothing but what appears to me of some real
weight, and therefore of great importance ; yet he
will observe several things, which vvill appear to
him of very little, if he can think things to be of
little, importance, which are of any real weight at
all, upon such a subject as religion. However, the
proper force of the following treatise, lies in the
whole general analogy considered together.
It is come, I know not how, to be taken for
granted, by many pierson.s, that Christianity is not
so much as a subject of inquiry ; but that it is,
now at length, discovered to be fictitious. And
accordingly they treat it, as if, in the present age,
this were an agreed point, among all people of dis-
Gernment ; and nothing remained, but to set it up

lxxii advertisement.
as a principal subject of mirth and ridicule, as it
were by way of reprisals, for its having so long in
terrupted the pleasures of the world. On the con
trary, thus much, at least, -will be here found, not
taken for granted, but proved, that any. reasonable
man, who will thoroughly consider the matter,
may be as much assured, as he is of his own being,
that it is not, however, so clear a case, that there
is nothing in it. There is, I think, ' strong evi
dence of its truth ; but it is certain no one can,
upon principles of reason, be satisfied of the con
trary. And the practical consequence to be drawn
frora this, is not attended to, by every one who js .
concerned in it.
Ma;y 1736.

CONTENTS.

\o\ Wv^t!^

Page.
INTRODUCTION,  l

PART I.
OF NATURAL RELIGION.
CHAP. I.
Ofa Future Life,  15
CHAP. II.
0/ the Government of God by Rewards and
Punishments ; and particularly ofthe lat
ter,  .... 39
CHAP. III.
Of the Moral Government of God,  55

lxxiv contents.

CHAP. IV.
Page.
Of a State of Probation, as implying Trial,
Difficulties, and Danger^  87
CHAP. V.
Of a State qf Probation, as intended for Mo
ral Discipline and Improvement,  98
CHAP. VI.
Of the Opinion of Necessity, considered as
influencing Practice,  130
CHAP. VII.
Of the Government of God, considered as a
Scheme, or Constitution, iviperfectly com
prehended,  152
CONCLUSION,  167

i J < . . J.'

'. Vv">^ iV/i '"J_. ': '.\ ":• .

CONTENTS. lxxv
PART II.
OP REVEALED RELIGION.

CHAP. I. . Page.
Of the Importance of Christianity,  177
CHAP. II.
Of the supposed Presumption agai?ist a Re
velation, considered as miraculous,  201
CHAP. III.
Of our Incapacity of Judging, what were to
be expected in a Revelation ; and the Cre
dibility, from Analogy, that it must con
tain Things appearing liable to Objections, 2 1 1
CHAP. IV.
Of Christianity, considered as a Scheme, or
Constitution, imperfectly comprehended, . 232
CHAP. V.
Of the particular System of Christianity ; the
Appointinent of a Mediator, and the Re
demption of the World by Hiin,  243

lxxvi CONTENTS.
CHAP. VI. Page.
Of the Want of Universality in Revelation ;
and of the supposed Deficiency in the Proof
of it,  268
CHAP. VII.
Of the particular Evidence for Christianity, 295
CHAP. VIII.
Of the Objections which may be made against
arguing from the Analogy of Nature to
Religion,  34^
CONCLUSION,  *36l

INTRODUCTION.

X ROBABLE evidence is essentially distinguished
from demonstrative by this, that it admits of de
grees, and of all variety of them, from the highest
moral certainty, to the very lowest presumption.
We cannot, indeed, say a thing is probably true
upon very slight presumption for it ; because, as
there may be probabilities on both sides of a ques
tion, there may be some against it: and though
there be not, j'^et a slight presumption does not
beget that degree of conviction, which is implied
in saying a thing is probably true. But that the
slightest possible presumption is of the nature of a
probability, appears from hence, that such low
presumption, often repeated, will amount even to
moral certainty. Thus, a man's having observed
the ebb and flow of the tide to-day, affords some
sort of presumption, though the lowest imaginable,
that it may happen again to-morrow : but the ob
servation of this event for so many days, and
months, and ages together, as it has been observed
by mankind, gives us a full assurance that it will.

2 rNTRODUCTION.
That, which chiefly constitutes probability, is
expressed in the word likely, i. e. hke some truth*
or true event ; like it, in itself, in its evidence, in
some more or fewer of its circumstances. Eor,
when we determine a thing to be probably tme,
suppose that an event has or will come to pass, 'tis
from the mind's remarking in it a likeness to some
other event, which we have observed has come to
pass. And this observation forms, in numberless
daily instances, a presumption, opinion, or full
conviction, that such an event has or will come to
pass ; according as the observation is, that the hke
event has sometimes, most commonly, or always,
so far as our observation reaches, come to pass at
like distances of time, or place, or upoij like occa
sions. Hence arises the belief, that a child, if it
lives twenty years, will grow up to the stature and
strength of a man; that food will contribute to the
preservation of its life, and the want of it for such
a number of days be its certain destruction. So,
likewise, the rule and measure of our hopes and
fears concerning the success of our pursuits ; our
expectations that others will act so and so in such
circumstances; and our judgment that such actions
proceed from such principles ; all these rely upon
our having observed the like to what we hope,
fear, expect, judge ; I say,- upon our having ob
served the hke, either with respect to others or
ourselves. And thus, whereas the prince f, wha
* Verisimile.
t Tha story is told by Mr Locke, in the chapter of Probability.

INTRODUCTION. 3
had always lived in a warm chmate, naturally con
cluded, in the way of analogy, that there was no
.such thing as water's becoming hard ; because he
had always observed it to be a fluid, and yielding :
we, on the contrary, from analogy, conclude, that
there is no presumption at all against this ; that
'tis supposeable there may be frost in England any
given day in January next ; probable, that there
will on some day of the month ; and that there is
a moral certainty, i. e. ground for an expectation,
without any doubt of it, in some part or other of
the winter.
Probable evidence, in its very nature, affords but
an imperfect kind of information, and is to be con
sidered as relative only to beings of limited capa
cities. For nothing which is the possible object of
knowledge, whether past, present, or future, can
be probable to an infinite Intelligence ; since it
cannot but be discerned absolutely as it is in itself,
certainly true, or certainly false. But to us, pro
babihty is the very guide of life.
From these things it follows, that, in questions
of difficulty, or such as are thought so, Avhere more
satisfactory evidence cannot be had, or is not seen ;
if the result of the examination be, that there ap
pears, upon the whole, any the lowest presumption
on one side, and none on the other, or a greater
presumption on one sida^ though in the lowest de
gree greater, this determines the question, even in
matters of speculation; and, in matters of practice,
will lay us under an absolute and formal obligation,
in pbint of prudence and of interest, to act upon

4 INTRODUCTION.
that presmnption, or low probabihty, though it be
so low as to leave the mind in very great doubt
which is the truth. For surely a man is as really
bound in prudence to do what upon the whole' ap
pears, according to the best of his judgment, tO' be
for his happiness, as what he certainly knows to be
so. Nay, further,, in questions of great conse
quence, a reasonable man will think.it concerns
him to remaik lower probabilities and presuiiip-
tions than these ; such as amount to no more, than
showing one side of a question to be as supposeable
and credible as the other: nay, such as but amounit
to much less even than this. For numberless in
stances might be mentioned respecting the com
mon pursuits of life, where aman would be thought,
in a literal sense, distracted, who would not ac(^
and with great application too, not only upon an
even chance, but upon much less, and where the
probability or chance was greatly against ' his, suc
ceeding *,
It is not my design to inquire further into the
nature, the foundation, and measure of probability;
or whence it proceeds that likeness should beget
that presumption, opinion, and full conviction,
which the human mind is foimed to receive from
it, and whicli it does necessarily produce in every
one ; or to guard against the errors to which rea
soning from analogy is liable. This belongs to the
subject of logic; and is a part of that subject which
has not yet been thoroughly considered. Indeed^
* See Chap. vi. Part. IL

INTRODUCITON. ^
I shall not take upon me to say, how far the ex
tent, compass, and force, of analogical reasoning,
can be reduced to general heads and rules, and the
whole be formed into a system. But though so
little in this way has been attempted by those who
have treated of our intellectual powers, and the
exercise of them, this does not hinder but that we
may be, as we unquestionable are, assured, that
analogy is of weight, ^in various degrees,, towards
determining our judgment, i and our practice. Nor
daes it in any wise cease to be of weight in those
cases, because persons, either given to dispute, or
who require things to be stated with greater exact
ness than our faculties appear to admit of in prac
tical matters, may find other cases, in which 'tis
not easy to say, whether it be, or be not, of any
weight ; or instances of seeming analogies, which
are really of none. It is enough to the present pur
pose tb observe, that this general way of arguing
is evidently natural, just, and conclusive. For
there is no man can make a question but that the
sun will rise to-morrow, and be seen, where it is
seen at all, in the figure ofa circle, and not in that
of a square.
Hence, namely from analogical reasoning, Ori
gen * has, with singular sagacity, observed, that
" he who believes the Scripture to have proceeded
" from him, who is the Author of Nature, may
X^ fih To» ys Ton a.7ca^ 7roi^oi^e^cip,svot tS 57Ttcra»To; rot xia-fiov si'vai
TauTosf Ta; ypatpou; ininTer^M, oVt oa-a, iri^t T?; KTicreju; a.-jravra. Toi; fj;TSfft
To» WEgi avT^i XoyoK, ravTa xa) wsgi tZv y^a^wK. Ehilocal. p. 23.
Ed. Cant.

6' INTRODUCTION.
" well expect to find the same sort of difficulties in
" it, as are found in the constitution of Nature."
And, in like way of reflection, it may be added,
that he, who denies the Scriptures to have been
from God upon account of these difficulties, may,
for the very same reason, deny the world to have
been formed by him. On the other hand, if there
be an analogy, or likeness, between that system of
things and dispensation of Providence, which ex
perience, together with reason, informs us of, i. e.
the known course of Nature ; this is a presump
tion, that they have both the same author and
cause; at least so far as to answer objections against
the former's being from God, drawn from any
thing which is analogical or similar to what is in
the Idtter, which is acknowledged to be from him;
for an Author of Nature is here supposed.
Forming our notions of the constitution and go
vernment of the World upon reasoning, without
foundation for the principles which we assume,
whether from the attributes of God or any thino*
else, is building a world upon hypothesis, like Des
Cartes. Forming our notions upon reasoning from
principles which are certain, but applied to cases
to which We have no ground to apply them (like
those who explain the structure of the human bo
dy, and the nature of diseases and medicines, from
mere mathematics, without sufficient data), is an
error much a-kin to the former : since what is as
sumed, in order to make the reasoning applicable,
is hypothesis. But it must be ahowed just, to join
abstract reasonings with the observation of facts.

INTRODUCTIok. 7
and argue from such facts as are known, to otheis
that are like them ; from that part of the Divine
government over intelligent creatures, which comes
under our view, to that larger and more general
government over them,, which is beyond it ; and,
from what is present, to collect what is likelyj cre-^
dible, or not incredible, will be hereafter.
This method, then, of concluding and deter^
mining, being practical, and what, if we will act at
all, we cannot but act upon in the common pur
suits of life; being evidently conclusive, in various
degrees, proportionable to the degree and exact
ness ofthe whole analogy or likeness; and having
so great authority for its introduction into the sub^
ject of religion, even revealed religion, my design
is to apply it to that subject in general, both na
tural and revealed : taking for proved, that there is
an intelligent Author of Nature, and natural go
vernor of the world. For, as there is no presump'*-
tion against this prior to the proof of it, so it has
been often proved Avith accumulated evidence;
from this argument of analogy and final causes ;
from abstract reasonings ; from the most ancient
tradition and testimony ; and from the general con
sent of mankind. Nor does it appear, so far as I
can find, to be denied, by the generality of those
who profess themselves dissatisfied with the evi
dence of religion.
As there are some, who, instead of thus attending
to what is in fact the constitution of Nature, form
their notions of God's government upon hypothe
sis; so there are others, who indulge themselves in.

INTRODUCTION.

vain and idle speculations, how the world might
possibly have been framed otherwise than it is ;
and upon supposition that things might, in ima
gining that they should,, have been disposed and
carried on after a better mqdel, than what appears
in the present disposition and conduct of them.
Suppose, now, a person of such a turn of mind to
go on with his reveries, till he had at length fixt
upon some particular plan of Nature, as appearing
to him the best. — One shall scarce be thought guilty
of detraction against human understanding, if one
should say, even beforehand, that the plan which
this speculative person would fix upon, though he
were the wisest of the sons of men, probably would
not be the very best, even according to his own no
tions of best ; whether he thought that to be so,
which afforded occasions and motives for the ex-
ei'cise of the greatest virtue, or which was producr
tive of the greatest happiness, or that these two
were necessarily connected, and run up into one
and the same plan. However, it may not be amiss,
once for all, to see what would be the amount of
these emendations and imaginary improvements
upon the system of nature, or how far they would
mislead us. And it seems there could be no stop
ping, till we came to some such conclusions as
these : That all creatures should at first be made as
perfect and as happy, as they were ever capable of
being: that nothing, to be sure, of hazard or dan
ger should be put upon them to do ; some indolent
persons would perhaps think nothing at aU : or
certainly, that effectual care should be taken, that

INTRODUCTION. 9
they should, whether necessarily or not, yet even
tually and in fact, always do what was right and
most conducive to happiness, which would be
thought easy for infinite power to effect ; either
by not giving them any principles which would
endanger their going wrong, or by laying the
right motive of action, in every instance, before
their minds continually, in so strong a manner, as
would never fail of inducing them to act confor
mably to it: and that the whole method, of go
vernment by punishments should hie rejected, as
absurd ; as an awkward round-about method of
carrying things on ; nay, as contrary to a princi
pal purpose, for which it would be supposed crea
tures were made, namely happiness.
Now, without considering what is to be said in
particular to the several parts of this train of folly
and extravagance, what has been above intimated
is a full, direct, general answer to it, namely, that
we may see beforehand that we have not faculties
for this kind of speculation. For, though it be ad
mitted, that, from the first principles of our nature,
we unavoidably judge or determine some ends to
be absolutely in themselves preferable to others,
and that the ends now mentioned, or, if they run
up into one, that this one is absolutely the best ;
and, consequently, that we must conclude the ulti
mate and designed, in the constitution of Nature
and conduct of Providence, is the most virtue and
happiness possible : yet we are far from being able
to judge, what particular disposition of things
would be most friendly and assistant to virtue ; or

10 INTRODUCTION.
what means might be absolutely necessaty to pro
duce the most happiness in a system of such extent
as our own world may be, taking in all that is past
and to come, though we should suppose it de
tached from the whole of things. Indeed, we are
so far from being able to judge of this, that we
are not judges what may be the necessary means of
raising and conducting one person to the highest
perfection and happiness of his nature. Nay, even
in the little affairs of the present life, we find men
of different educations and ranks are not compe
tent judges of the conduct of each other. Our
whole nature leads us to ascribe all moral perfec
tion to God, and to deny all imperfection of him.
And this will for ever be a practical proof of his
moral character, to such as will consider what a
practical proof is ; because it is the voice of God
speaking in us. And from hence we conclude, that
virtue must be the happiness, and vice the misery,
of every creature ; and that regularity, and order,
and right, cannot but prevail, finally, in a universe
under his government. But we are in no sort
judges what are the necessary means of accomplish
ing this end.
Let us, then, instead of that idle and not very
innocent employment of forming imaginary models
of a world, and schemes of governing, turn our
thoughts to what we experience to be the conduct
of Nature with respect to intelligent creatures;
which may be resolved into general laws, or rules,
of administration, in the same way as many of the
laws of Nature, respecting inanimate matter, may

INTRODUCTION. U
be collected from experiments. And let us com
pare the known constitution and course of things
with what is said to be the moral system of Na
ture, the acknowledged dispensations of Provi
dence, or that government which we find ourselves
under, with what religion teaches us to believe and
expect, and see whether they are not analogous,
and of a piece. And upon such a comparison, it
willy I think, be found that they are very much so;
that both may be traced up to the same general
laws, and resolved into the same principles of Di
vine conduct.
The analogy, here proposed to be considered, is
of pretty large extent, and consists of several parts;
in some more, in others less, exact. In some few
instances, perhaps, it may amount to a real practi
cal proof, in others not so ; yet in these it is a
confirmation of what is proved otherways. It will
undeniably show, what too many want to have
shown them, that the system of religion, both na
tural and revealed, considered only as a system,
and prior to the proof of it, is not a subject of
ridicule, unless that of Nature be so too. And it
will afford an answer to almost all objections against
the system both of natural and of revealed reh
gion, though not perhaps in so great a degree,
yet in a very considerable degree an answer, to the
objections against the evidence of it : for, objec
tions against a proof, and objections against what
is said to be proved, the reader will observe, are
different things.

12 INTRODUCTION.
Now, the Divine government of the world, im
plied in the notion of religion in general, and of
Christianity, contains in it ; that mankind is ap
pointed to live in a future state* ; that there every
one shall 'be'rewarded or punished t ; rewarded or
punished respectively for all that behaviour here,
which we comprehend under the words, virtuous
or vitious, morally good or evil J : that our present
life is a probation, a state of trial §, and of disci
pline ||, for that future one ; notwithstanding the
objections, which men may fancy they have, frora
notions of necessity, against there being any such
moral plan as this at all^;; and whatever objectiibns
may appear to lie against the wisdom and goodness
of it, as it stands so imperfectly made known to us
at present^* : that this world being in a state of
apostacy and wickedness, and consequently of ruin,
and the sense both of their condition and duty be
ing greatly coiTupted amongst men, this ga;ve occa
sion for an additional dispensation of Providence ;
of the utmost importance ft; proved by miracles J| ;
but containing in it many things appearing to us
strange, and not to have been expected § § ; a dis'
pensation of Providence, which is a scheme or
system of things |{|| ; carried on by a divine person,
the Messiah, in order to the recovery ofthe world^^;
yet not revealed to all men, nor proved with the

* Ch. i.

tCh. ii.

t Ch. iii.

§ Ch. iv.

II Ch. v.

IT Ch. vi.

** Ch. vii.

•tt Par n. ch. i.

n Ch. ii.

§§ Ch. iii.

IIII Ch. iv.

iri[Ch.v.

INTRDOUCTION. ly
strongest possible evidence to all those to whom it
is revealed ; but only to such a part of mankind,
and with such particular evidence, as the wisdom
of God thought fit *. The design, then, of the
following Treatise will be to show, that the several
parts principally objected against in this moral and
Christian dispensation, including its scheme, its
publication, and the proof which God has afford
ed us of its truth ; that the particular parts princi
pally objected against in this whole dispensation,
are analogous to what is experienced in the consti
tution and course of Nature, or Providence ; that
the chief objections themselves, which are alledged
against the former, are no other than what may be
alledged with like justness against the latter, where
they are found in fact to be inconclusive; and that
this argument, from analogy, is in general unan
swerable, and undoubtedly of weight on the side of
religion t, notwithstanding the objecrions which
may seem to lie against it, and the real ground
which there may be for difference of opinion, as to
the particular degree of weight which is to be laid
upon it. This is a general account of what may be
looked for in the following Trearise. And I shall
begin it with that, which is the foundation of all
our hopes and of all our fears ; all our hopes and
fears, which are of any consideration ; I mean a
Future Life. * Ch. vi. vii. t Ch. viii.

THI
ANALOGY OP
RELIGION TO THE
CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE.

PART I.
OF NATURAL RELIGION,

CHAP. I.
Of a Future Life.

Strange difficulties have been raised by some
concerning personal identity, or the, sameness of
.living agents, implied in the notion of our existing
now and hereafter, or in any two successive mo
ments ; which whoever thinks it worth while, may
see considered in the first Dis'sertation at the end
of this Treatise. But, without regard to any of
them here, let us consider what the analogy of
nature, and the several changes which we have
undergone, and those which we know we may under-^

16' Ofa Future Life. Part I.
go without being destroyed, suggest, as to the effect
which death may, or may not, have upon us ; and
whether it be not from thence probable, that we
may survive this change, and exist in a future state
of life and perception.
I. From our being born into the present world
in the helpless imperfect state of infancy, and
having arrived from thence to mature age, we find
it to be a general law of nature in our own species,
that the same creatures, the same individuals,
should exist in degrees of life and perception, with
capacities of action, of enjoyment, and suffering,
in one period of their being, greatly different from
those appointed them in anpther period of it. And
in other creatures the same law holds. For the dif
ference of their capacities and states of life at their
birth (to go no higher) and in maturity; the change
of worms into flies, and the vast enlargement of
their locomotive powers by such change : and birds
and insects bursting the shell, their habitation, and
by this means entering into a new world, furnished
with new accommodations for them, and finding a
new sphere of action assigned them ; these are in
stances of this general law of nature. Thus, all
the various and wonderful transformations of ani
mals are to be taken into consideration here. But
the states of life in which we ourselves existed for
merly, in the womb and in our infancy, are almost
as different from our present, in mature age, as it is
possible to conceive any two states, or degrees, of
life can be. Therefore, that we are to exist here
after in a state as different (suppose) from our

Chap.i. Of a Future Lij^e. 17

present, as this is from our former, is but according
to the analogy of nature ; according to a natural
order, or appointment, of the very same kind,
with what we have already experienced.
II. We know we are endued with capacities of
action, of happiness and misery : for we are con
scious of acting, of enjoying pleasure, and suffering
pain. Now, that we have these powers and capa
cities before death, is a presumption that we shall
retain them through and after death ; indeed, a
probability of it sufficient to act upon, unless there
be some positive reason to think that death is the
destruction of those living powers: because there is
in every case a probability, that all things will
continue as we experience they are, in all respects,
except those in which we have some reason to think
they will be altered. This is that kind * of pre
sumption, or probability, from analogy, expressed
in the very word continuance, which seems our
only natural reason for believing the course of the
world v/ill continue to-morrow, as it has done so
far as our experience or knowledge of history can
carry us back. Nay, it seems our only reason for
believing, that any one substance, now existing,
will continue to exist a moment longer ; the self-
existent substance only excepted. Thus, if men
Avere assured that the unknown event, death, was
not the destruction of our faculties of perception
* I say kind of presumption or probability : for I do not mean
to affirm that there is the same degree of conviction, that our
living powers will continue after death, as there is, that our sub
stances will. B

18 Of a Future Life. Partl.
and of action, there would be no apprehension that
any other power, or event, unconnected with this
of death, would destroy their faculties just at the
instant of each creature's death ; and therefore no
doubt but that they would remain after it : which
shows the high probability that our living powers
Avill continue after death, unless there be some
ground to think that death is their destruction *,
For, if it would be in a manner certain that we
should survive death, provided it were certain that
death would not be our destruction, it must be
highly probable we shall survive it, if there be no
ground to think death will be our destruction.
Now, though I think it must be acknowledged,
that, prior to the natural and moral proofs of a fu
ture life commonly insisted upon, there would arise
a general confused suspicion, that, in the great
shock and alteration which we shall undergo by
death, we, i. e. our living powers, might be wholly
destroyed ; yet even prior to those proofs, there is
• Destruction of living poivers, is a manner of expression una
voidably ambiguous ; and may signify either the destruction ofa
living being, so as that the same living being shall be incapable of ever
perceiving or acting again at all; or the destruction of those means
and instruments, by ihhich it is capable of its present life, of its
present state of perception and of action. It is here used in the
former sense. When it is used in the latter, the epithet present is
added. The loss of a man's eye is a destruction of living powers
in the latter sense. But we have no reason to think the destruc
tion of living powers, in the former sense, to be possible. We
have no more reason to think a being, endued with living powers,
ever loses them during its whole existence, than to believe that a.
stone ever acquires them.

Chap. L Of a Future Lfe. \q
really no particular distinct ground, or reason, for
this apprehension at aH, so far as I ean find. If
there be, it must arise either from the reason of the
thing, or from the analogy of Nature.
But we cannot argue from the reason of the
thing, that death is the destruction of living agents,
because we know not at all Avhat death is in itself ;
but only some of its effects, such as the dissolu
tion of flesh, skin, and bones. And these effects
do in no Avise appear to imply the destruction of a
living agent. And, besides, as we are greatly in
the dark, upon what the exercise of our living
powers depends, so we are wholly ignorant what
the powers themselves depend upon ; the powers
themselves, as distinguished, not only from their
actual exercise, but also from the present capacity
of exercising them ; and as opposed to their de
struction : for sleep, or, however, a swoon, shows
us, not only that these powers exist Avhen they are
not exercised, as the passive power of motion does
in inanimate matter; but shews also that they
exist, Avhen there is no present capacity of exer
cising them ; or that the capacities of exercising
them for the present, as well as the actual ex
ercise of them, may be suspended, and yet the
powers themselves remain undestroyed. Since,
then, Ave know not at all upon Avhat the existence
of our living powers depends, this shews, further,
there can no probability be collected from the rea
son of the thing, that death will be their destruc -
tion : because their existence may depend upon
somewhat in no degree affected by death ; upon

20 Of a Future Lif e. Partl.
somewhat quite out of the reach of this king of
terrors. So that there is nothing more certain,
than that the reason of the thing shows us no con
nection between death, and the destruction of liv
ing agents. Nor can we find any thing through
out the whole analogy of Nature to afford us even
the slightest presumption, that animals ever lose
their living powers ; much less, if it were possible,
that they lose them by death ; for we have no
faculties Avherewith to trace any beyond or through
it, so as to see what becomes of them. This event
removes them from our view. It destroys the sen
sible proof, which we had before their death, of
their being possessed of living powers, but does
not appear to afford the least reason to believe
that they are then, or by that eveiit, deprived of
them. And our knowing, that they were possessed of
these poAvers, up to the very period to which we have
faculties capable of tracing them, is itself a proba
bility of their retaining them beyond it. And this
is confirmed, and a sensible credibihty is given to
it, by observing the very great and astonishing
changes which we have experienced ; so great,
that our existence in another state of life, of per
ception and of action, wiU be but according to a
method of providential conduct, the hke to Avhich
has been already exercised, even with regard to
ourselves ; according to a course of nature, the
like to which we have already gone through.
However, as one cannot but be greatly sensible,
how difficult it is to silence imagination enough

Chap. L Of a Future Life. 21
to make the A'oice of reason even distinctiy heard
in this case; as Ave are accustomed, from our
youth up, to indulge that forward delusive facul
ty, ever obtruding beyond its sphere; of some
assistance, indeed, to apprehension, but the author
of all error : as Ave plainly lose ourselves in gross
and crude conceptions of things, taking for grant
ed that we are acquainted with what indeed we are
Avholly ignorant of; it may be proper to consider
the imaginary presumptions, that death will be our
destruction, arising from these kinds of early and
lasting prejudices : and to shcAV how little they
can really amount to, even though we cannot
Avholly diATst ourselves of them. And,
I. All presumption of death's being the destruc
tion of living beings, must go upon supposition
that they are compounded, and so discerptible.
But, since consciousness is a single and indivisible
power, it should seem that the subject, in which it
resides, must be so too. For, were the motion of
any particle of matter absolutely one and indivisi
ble, so as that it should imply a contradiction to
suppose part of this motion to exist, and part not
to exist, i. e. part of this matter to move, and part
to be at rest ; then its power of motion would be
indivisihle ; and so also would the subject, in
which the poAver inheres, namely, the particle of
matter : for, if this could be divided into two, one
part might be moA^ed and the other at rest, which
is contrary to the supposition. In hke manner,
it has been argued *, and, for any thing appearing
" See Dr Clarke's Letter to Mr Dodwell, and the defences of it.

S2 Of a Flit are Life. Partl.
to the contrary, justly, that since the perception,
or consciousness, Avhich Ave haA-e of our own ex
istence is indivisible, so as that it is a contradic
tion to suppose one part of it should be here and
the other there; the perceptive power, or the
power of consciousness, is indivisible too : and,
consequently, the subject in Avhich it resides ; i. e.
the conscious Being. Noav, upon supposition that
living agent each man calls himself, is thus a single
being, Avhich there is at least no more difficulty in
conceiving than in conceiving it to be a com
pound, and of Avhich there is the proof noAV men
tioned ; it fohoAVs, that our organized bodies are
no more ourselA'es, or part of ourselves, than any
other matter around us. And it is easy to con
ceive hoAV matter, Avhich is no part of ourselves,
may be appropriated to us in the manner which
our present bodies are ; as how Ave can receive im
pressions from, and have poAver over any matter.
It is as easy to conceive, that we may exist out of
bodies, as in them ; that Ave might have animated
bodies of any other organs and senses wholly dif
ferent from these noAV given us, and that Ave may
hereafter animate these same or new bodies vari
ously modified and organized; as to conceiA'e hoAV
Ave can animate such bodies as our present. And,
lastly, the dissolution of all these several organized
bodies, supposing ourselves to have successively
animated them, Avould have no more conceivable
tendency to destroy the liA'ing beings, ourselves, or
deprive us of living faculties, the faculties of per
ception and of action, than the dissolution of any

Chap.i. Of a Future Llf e. 23
foreign matter, which we are capable of receiving-
impressions from, and making use of for the com
mon occasions of life.
II. The simplicity and absolute oneness of a
living agent cannot, indeed, from the nature of the
thiug, be properly proved by experimental obser-
A'ations. But as thes,t fall in Avith the supposition
of its unity, so they plainly lead us to conclude
certainly, that our gross organized bodies, with
which Ave perceive the objects of sense, and with
Avhich Ave act, are no part of ourselves, and there
fore shcAv us, that Ave have no reason to believe
their destruction to be ours : even Avithout deter
mining Avhether our liA^ng substances be material
or immaterial. For Ave see by experience, that
men may lose their limb.s, their organs of sense,
and even the greatest part of these bodies, and yet
remain the same living agents. And persons can
trace up the existence of themselves to a time,
when the bulk of their bodies was extremely small,
in comparison of what it is in mature age : and we
cannot but think, that they might then have lost
a considerable part of that small body, and yet
have remained the same living agents ; as they
may noAV lose great part of their present body,
and remain so. And it is certain, that the bodies
of all animals are in a constant flux, from that
never-ceasing attrition, which there is in every part
of them. Now, things of this kind unavoidably
teach us to distinguish between these living agents,
ourselves, and large quantities of matter, in which
we are very nearly interested : since these raay be

24. Of a Future Lif e. Part L
alienated, and actually are in a daily course of
succession, and changing their OAvners ; Avhilst Ave
are assured, that each living agent remains one and
the same permanent being*. And this general
observation leads us on to the following ones.
First, That we have no way of determining by
experience, what is the certain bulk of the living
being each man calls himself : and yet, till it be
determined that it is larger in bulk than the solid
elementary particles of matter, Avhich there is no
ground to think any natural poAver can dissolve,
there is no sort of reason to think death to be the
dissolution of it, of the living being, even thoiigh
it should not be absolutely indiscerptible.
Secondly, From our being so nearly related to,
and interested in, certain systems of matter, sup
pose our flesh and bones, and afterAvards ceasing
to be at all related to them, the living agents, our-'
selves, remaining all this while undestroyed, not
withstanding such alienation ; and consequently
these systems of matter not being ourselves : it
folloAvs further, that Ave have no ground to con
clude any other, suppose internal systems of mat
ter, to be the living agents ourselves ; because we
can have no ground to conclude this, but from our
relation to, and interest in, such other systems of
matter : and, therefore, we can have no reason to
conclude, what befalls those systems of matter at
death, to be the destruction of the living agents.
We have already, several times over, lost a great
* See Dissertation I,

Chap.i. Of a Future Life. 25
part, or perhaps the Avhole of our body, according
to certain common estabhshed laws of nature; yet
Ave remain the same living agents : Avhen we shall
lose as great a part, or the Avhole, by another
common established law of nature, death ; why
may Ave not also remain the same ? That the alie
nation has been gradual in one case, and in the
other will be more at once, does not prove any
thing to the contrary. We have passed undestroy
ed through those many and great revolutions of
matter, so peculiarly appropriated to us ourselves;
Avhy should aa'^c imagine death Avill be so fatal to
us? Nor can it be objected, that what is thus alie
nated, or lost, is no part of our original solid body,
but only adventitious matter ; because Ave may
lose intire limbs, Avhich must ha\'e contained many
solid parts and vessels of the original body : or if
this be not admitted, Ave have no proof that any of
these solid parts are dissolved, or alienated, by
death. Though, by the Avay, we are very nearly
related to that extraneous or adventitious matter,
Avhilst it continues united to and distending the
several parts of our solid body. But after aH; the
relation a person bears to those parts of his body,
to Avhich he is the most nearly related ; what does
it appear to amount to but this, that the living
agent and those parts of the body mutually affect
each other ? And the same thing, the same thing
in kind, though not in degree, may be said of all
foreign matter, Avhich gives us ideas, and which
we have any poAver over. From these observations
the whole ground of the imagination is removed,

ga Of a Future Life. Part L
that the dissolution of any matter is the destruc
tion of a living agent, from the interest he once
had in such matter.
Thirdly, If Ave consider our body somcAvhat
more distinctly, as made up of organs and instru
ments of perception and of motion, it Avill bring
us to the same conclusion. Thus, the common
optical experiments shoAV, and CA-en the observation
hoAV sight is assisted by glasses shoAvs, that Ave see
Avith our eyes in the same sense as we see with
glasses. Nor is there any reason to believe, that
Ave see Avith them in any other sense ; any other,
I mean, which Avould lead us to think the eye
itself a percipient. The like is to be said of hear
ing: and our feeling distant solid matter by means
of somcAvhat in our hand, seems an instance of the
like kind, as to the subject Ave are considering.
All these are instances of foreign matter, or such
as is no part of our body, being instrumental in
preparing objects for, and conveying them to, the
perceiving poAver, in a manner similar, or like to
the manner in which our organs of sense prepare
and convey them. Both are, in a like way, instru
ments of our receiving such ideas from external
objects, as the Author of nature appointed those
external objects to be the occasions of exciting in
us. HoAvever, glasses are evidently instances of
this ; namely of matter, Avhich is no part of our
body, preparing objects for, and conveying them
toAvards, the perceiving poAver, in like manner as
our bodily organs do. And if Ave see with our eyes
only in the same manner as Ave do Avith glasses,

Chap.i. Of a Future Life, £7
the like may justly be concluded, from analogy,
of all our other senses. It is not intended, by any
thing here said, to alfinn, that the whole appa
ratus of vision, or of perception by any other of
'our senses, can be traced, through all its steps,
quite up to the living poAver of seeing, or perceiv
ing : but that so far as it can be traced by experi
mental observations, so far it appears, that our
organs of sense prepare and convey on objects, in
order to their being perceived, in like manner as
foreign matter does, Avithout affording any shadow
of appearance, that they themselves perceive. And
that Ave have no reason to think our organs of sense
percipients, is confirmed by instances of persons
losing some of them, the living beings themselves,
their former occupier.s, remaining unimpaired. It
is confirmed also by the experience of dreams ; by
Avhich Ave find Ave are at present possessed of a la
tent, and what Avould otherwise be an unimagined
unknoAvn power of perceiving sensible objects, in
as strong and lively a manner without our external
oro-ans of sense, as Avith them.
So also with regard to our poAver of m.oving, or
directing motion by Avill and choice : upon the
destruction of a limb, this active power remains,
as it evidently seems, unlessened ; so as that the
living being, Avho has suffered this loss, would be
capable of moving as before, if it had another limb
to move Avith. It can walk by the help of an ar
tificial leg, just as it can make use of a pole, or a
leaver, to reach tOAvards itself and to move things
beyond the length and the power of its natural

28 Ofa Future Life. Part I.
arm : and this last it does in the same manner as it
reaches and moves, with its natural arm, things
nearer and of less weight. Nor is there so much
as any appearance of our limbs being endued with
a power of moving or directing themselves ; though
they are adapted, like the several parts of a ma
chine, to be the instruments of motion to each
other ; and some parts of the same limb, to be in
struments of motion to other parts of it.
Thus, a man determines that he Avill look at such
an object through a microscope ; or, being lame
suppose, that he will walk to such a place with a
staff a AATck hence. His eyes and his feet no more
determine in these cases, than the microscope and
the staff. Nor is there any ground to think they
any more put the determination in practice; or
that his eyes are the seers or his feet the movers,
in any other sense than as the microscope and the
staff are. Upon the Avhole then, our organs of
sense and our limbs are certainly instruments,
which the living persons, ourselves, make use of to
perceive and move Avith : there is not any proba
bility, that they are any more ; nor, consequently,
that Ave have any other kind of relation to them,
than what Ave may have to any other foreign mat
ter formed into instruments of perception and mo
tion, suppose into a microscope or a staff (I say
any other kind of relation, for I am not speaking
of the degree of it) ; nor, consequentiy, is there
any probability, that the alienation, or dissolution,
of these instruments is the destruction of the per
ceiving and moving agent.

Chap. I. Of a Future Life, 29
And thus, our finding that the dissolution of
matter, in Avhich hving beings Avere most nearly
interested, is not their dissolution ; and that the
destruction., of several of the organs and instru
ments of perception and of motion belonging to
them, is not their destruction ; shoAvs, demonstra-
tiA^ely, that there is no ground to think, that the
dissolution of any other matter, or destruction of
any other organs and instruments, will be the dis
solution, or destruction, of living agents, fiom the
like kind of relation. And Ave have no reason to
think we stand in any other kind of relation to
any thing Avhich Ave find dissolved by death.
But it is said, these observations are equally ap
plicable to brutes : and 'tis thought an insuperable
difficulty, that they should be immortal, and by
consequence capable of everlasting happiness. Now,
this manner of expression is both invidious and
AA^eak : but the thing intended by it, is really no
difficulty at all, either in the way of natural or
moral consideration. For, 1st, suppose the invi
dious thing, designed in such a manner of expres
sion, Avere really implied, as it is not in the least
in the natural immortality of brutes; namely, that
they must arrive at great attainments, and become
rational and moral agents ; even this Avould be no
difficulty, since we knoAV not what latent powers
and capacities they may be endued Avith. There
was once, prior to experience, as great presump
tion against human creatures, as there is against
the brute creatures, arriving at that degree of un
derstanding which we have in mature age ; for we

30 Of a Future Lif e. Partl.
can trace up our own existence to the same origi
nal with theirs. And Ave find it to be a general
law of nature, that creatures, endued with capaci
ties of A'irtue and religion, should be placed in a
condition of being, in Avhich they are altogether
without the use of them, for a considerable length
of their duration, as in infancy and childhood.
And great part of the human species go out of the
present world, before they come to the exercise of
these capacities in any degree at all. But then,
sdly, the natural immortality of brutes does not
in the least imply, that they are endued Avith any
latent capacities of a rational or moral nature. And
the economy of the universe might require, that
there should be living creatures without any capa
cities of this kind. And all difficulties, as to the
manner how they are disposed of, are so apparently
and wholly founded on our ignorance, that 'tis
Avonderful they should be insisted upon by any,
but such as are Aveak enough to think they are
acquainted Avith the whole system of things. There
is, then, absolutely nothing at all in this objection,
Avhich is so rhetorically urged against the greatest
part of the natural proof or presumptions of the
immortality of human minds : I say the greatest
part ; for 'tis less apphcable to the following ob
servation, which is more peculiar to mankind :
III. That as 'tis evident our present powers and
capacities of reason, memory, and affection, do
not depend upon our gross body, in the manner in
Avhich perception by our organs of sense does ; so
they do not appear to depend upon it at all in any

Chap.i. Of a Future Life. 31
such manner, as to give ground to think, that the
dissolution of this body will be the destruction of
these OUT present poAvers of reflection, as it Avih of
our pOAvers of sensation; or to give ground to con
clude, even that it aviH be so much as a suspension
of the former.
Human creatures exist at present in two states
of life and perception, greatly different from each
other; each of Avhich has its OAvn peculiar laAvs,
and its oAvn peculiar enjoyments and sufferings.
When any of our senses are affected, or appetites
gratified Avith the objects of them, Ave may be said
to exist, or live, in a state of sensation. When
none of our senses are affected, or appetites grati
fied, and yet Ave perceive, and reason, and act; Ave
may be said to exist, or live, in a state of reflection.
Now it is by no means certain, that any thing which
is dissolved by death is any Avay necessary to the
living being, in this its state of reflection, after ideas
are gained. For though, from our present consti
tution and condition of being, our external organs
of sense are necessary for conveying in ideas to
our reflecting poAvers, as carriages, and leavers,
and scaffolds, are in architecture : yet, Avhen these
ideas are brought in, Ave are capable of reflecting
in the most intense degree, and of enjoying the
greatest pleasure, and feeling the greatest pain, by
means of that reflection, without any assistance
from our senses ; and without any at all, Avhich we
know of, from that body, Avhich will be dissolved
by death. It does not appear, thpn, that the re
lation of this gross body to the reflecting being is,

32 Of a Future Llf e. Part L
in any degree, necessary to thinking; to our intel
lectual enjoyments or sufferings ; nor, consequent-.
ly, that the dissolution, or alienation, of the former
by death Avill be the destruction of those present
powers, Avhich render us capable of this state of
reflection. Further, there are instances of mortal
diseases, Avhich do not at all affect our present in
tellectual powers ; and this affords a presumption,
that those diseases Avill not destroy these present
poAvers. Indeed, from the observations made
above *, it appears, that there is no presumption,
from their mutually affecting each other, that the
dissolution of the body is the destruction of the
living agent. And by the same reasoning it must
appear, too, that there is no presumption, from
their mutually affecting each other, that the disso
lution of the body is the destruction of our present
reflecting poAver; but instances of their not affect
ing each other afford a presumption of the con
trary. Instances of mortal diseases not impairing
our present reflecting powers, evidently turn our"
thoughts even from imagining such diseases to be
the destruction of them. Several things, indeed,
greatly affect all our living powers, and at length
suspend the exercise of them; as, for instance,
droAvsiness, increasing tiH it ends in sound sleep :
and from hence Ave might have imagined it Avould
destroy them, till Ave found, by experience, the
Aveakness of this Avay of judging. But, in the
diseases now mentioned, there is not so much as
* Pages 24., 25, 26, 27.

Chap.i. Of a Future Life. 33
this shadow of probability, to lead us to any such
conclusion, as to the reflecting poAvers whicli Ave
have at present. For in these diseases, persons the
moment before death appear to be in the highest
vigour of life. They discover apprehension, me
mory, reason, all entire ; Avith the utmost force of
affection; sense of a character, of shame and ho
nour ; and the highest mental enjoyments and suf
ferings, even to the last gasp : and these surely
prove even greater vigour of life than bodily
strength does. Noav, Avhat pretence is there for
thinking, that a progressive disease, when arrived
to such a degree, I mean that degree which is
mortal, Avill destroy those powers, which were not
impaired, which were not affected by it, during its
whole progress, quite up to that degree? And if
death, by diseases of this kind, is not the destruc
tion of our present reflecting powers, 'twill scarce
be thought that death by any other means is.
It is obvious that this general observation may
be carried on further : and there appears so little
connection between our bodily powers of sensa
tion, and our present poAvers of reflection, that
there is no reason to conclude, that death, which
destroys the former, does so much as suspend the
exercise of the latter, or interrupt our continuing
to exist in the like state of reflection, which we
do now. For suspension of reason, memory, and
the affections which they excite, is no part of
the idea of death, nor is implied in our notion
of it And our daily experiencing these powers
to be exercised, Avithout any assistance, that we

34 Of a Future Lif e. Part L
know of, from those bodies, which will be dissolved
by death ; and our finding often, that the exercise
of them is so hvely to the last ; these things afford
a sensible apprehension, that death may not per
haps be so much as a discontinuance of the exer
cise of these powers, nor of the enjoyments and
sufferings which it irhphes * ; so that our posthu
mous life, whatever there may be in it additional
to our present, yet may not be entirely beginning
anew, but gojng on. Death may, in some sort,
and in some respects, answer to our birth, which
is not a suspension of the faculties which we had
before it, or a total change of the state of life in
which we existed Avhen in the womb, but a con^
tinuation of both, with such and such great alterT
ations. Nay, for ought Ave know of ourselves, of our
present life, and of death, death may immediately,
in the natural course of things, put us into a higher
and more enlarged state of life, as our birth does-l";
* There are three distinct questions, relating to a future life,
here considered : Whether death be the destruction of living
agents ? if not, Whether it be the destruction of their present
powers of reflection, as it certainly is the destruction of their pre
sent powers of sensation ? and if not, AVhether it be the suspen
sion, or discontinuance of the exercise, of these present reflecting
powers ? Now, if there be no reason to believe the last, there
will be, if that were possible, less for the next, and less still for
the first.
t This, according to Strabo, was the opinion of the Brach-
mans, nfuQu)! f/.iv yaq Sri tsv pEV evOixJ'e ^iok, af a.) a.y.ft.yi« xvofiiyav eliiai'
Tot Je ^avxTOf, ytvia-it ei? toj iniix; jSioj, xai toj iv^cUjMva. roi^i (piTuun^i-
ceKTi. Lib. XV. p. 1039. Ed. Amst. 1707. To which opinion

Chap.i. Of a Future Life. '35
a state in which our capacities and sphere of per
ception and of action, may be much greater than
at present. For, as our relation to our external
organs of sense renders us capable of existing in
our present state of sensation, so it may be the
only natural hindrance to our existing, immedi
ately and of course, in a higher state of reflection.
The truth is, reason does not at all shew us in what
state death naturally leaves us. But were we sure
that it would suspend all our perceptive and active
powers, yet the suspension of a power, and the
destruction of it, are effects so totally different in
kind, as we experience from sleep and a swoon,
that Ave cannot in any Avise argue from one to the
other ; or conclude, even to the lowest degree of
probability, that the same kind of force which is
sufficient to suspend our faculties, though it be
increased ever so much, will be sufficient to de-r •
stroy them.
These observations together may be sufficient
to shcAv how little presumption there is, that death
is the destruction of human creatures. HowcA'^er,
there is the ishadow of analogy, which may lead us
to imagine it is ; the supposed likeness which is
observed betAveen the decay of vegetables and of
living creatures. And this likeness is indeed suffi
cient to afford the poets very apt allusions to the
flowers of the field, in their pictures of the frailty
perhaps Antoninus may allude in these words, «{ mt irs^ii/.heii, •a'ati
h y TO ¦^v^aqiov an t5 jArr^a Tsra i-KViiruTat. Lib. IX. C. 3.

36 Ofa Future Life. Part L
of our present life. But in reason, the analogy is
so far from holding, that there appears no ground
even for the comparison, as to the present question :
because one of the two subjects compared is wholly
void of that, which is the principal and chief thing
in the other, the poAver of perception and of action ;•
and which is the only thing we are inquiring about
the continuance ef. So that the destruction of a
vegetable is an event not similar, or analogous, to
the destruction of a living agent.
But if, as was above intimated, leaving off the
delusive custom of substituting imagination in the
room of experience, we would confine ourselves to
Avhat we do know and understand ; if we would
argue only from that, and from that form our ex
pectation, it would appear, at first sight, that as no
probability of living beings ever ceasing to be so,
can be concluded from the reason of the thing ; so
none can be collected from the analogy of Nature;
because Ave cannot trace any living beings beyond
death. But as we are conscious that we are endued
with capacities of perception and of action, and are
living persons, Avhat we are to go upon is, that we
shall continue so till Ave foresee some accident, or
event, Avhich will endanger those capacities, or be
likely to destroy us : which death does in no wise
appear to be.
And thus, Avhen Ave go out of this world, we may
pass into ncAV scenes, and a new state of life and
action, just as naturally as Ave came into the pre
sent. And this new state may naturally be a social
one. And the advantages of it, advantages of

Chap.i. Of a Future Lif e. 37
every kind, may naturally be bestowed, according
to some fixt general laws of wisdom, upon every
one in proportion to the degrees ofhis virtue. And
though the advantages of that future natural state
should not be bestowed, as these of the present in
some measure are, by the will of the society ; but
¦ entirely by His more imraediate action, upon whom
the whole frame of nature depends : yet this distri
bution may be just as natural, as their being distri
buted here by the instrumentality of men. And,
indeed, though oue were to allow any confused
undetermined sense, which people please to put
upon the word natural, it would be a shortness of
thought scarce credible to imagine, that no system
or course of things can be so, but only what we see
at present * : especially whilst the probability of a
future life, or the natural imraortality of the soul,
is admitted upon the evidence of reason ; because
this is really both admitting and denying at once, a
state of being different from the present to be natu
ral. But the only distinct meaning of that word
is, stated, fixed, or settled : since what is natural
as much requires and presupposes an intelligent
agent to render it so, i. e. to effect it continually,
or at stated times ; as what is supernatural, or mi
raculous, does to effect it for once. And from
hence it must follow, that persons' notion of what
is natural will be enlarged, in proportion to their
greater knowledge of the works of God, and the
dispensations of his Providence. Nor is there any
* See Part II. ch. ii. and Part II. ch. iii.

38 Of a Future Lif e. Partl.
absurdity in supposing, that there may be beings in
the universe, whose capacities, and knowledge,
and views, may be so extensive, as that the whole
Christian dispensation may to them appear natural,
i. e. analogous or conformable to God's dealings
with other parts of his creation ; as natural as the
visible known course of things appears to us. For
there seems scarce any other possible sense to be
put upon the word, but that only in Avhich it is
here used ; similar, stated, or uniform.
This credibility of a future life, which has been
here insisted upon, how little soever it may satisfy
our curiosity, seems to answer all the purposes of
religion, in like manner as a demonstrative proof
would. Indeed, a proof, even a demonstrative
one, of a future life, would not be a proof of reli
gion. For, that we are to live hereafter, is just as
reconcileable with the scheme of atheism, and as
Avell to be accounted for by it, as that we are now
alive is : and therefore nothing can be more absurd
than to argue from that scheme, that there can be
no future state. But as religion implies a future
state, any presumption against such a state is a
presumption against religion. And the foregoing
observations reraove all presumptions of that sort,
and prove, to a very considerable degree of proba
bility, one fundamental doctrine of religion; Avhich,
if believed, would greatly open and dispose the
mind seriously to attend to the general evidence of
the whole.

CHAP. II.
Of the Government of God by Rewards and Pu
nishments ; and particularly of the latter.
1 HAT which makes the question concerning a fu
ture life to be of so great importance to us, is our
capacity of happiness and misery. And that which
makes the consideration of it to be of so great im
portance to us, is the supposition of our happiness
and misery hereafter, depending upon our actions
here. Without this, indeed, curiosity could hot
but sometiraes bring a subject, in which we raay
be so highly interested, to our thoughts ; especially
upon the mortality of others, or the near prospect
of^t)ur own. But reasonable men would not take
any farther thought about hereafter, than what
should happen thus occasionally to rise in their
minds, if it were certain that our future interest no
way depended upon our present behaviour : where
as, on the contrary, if there be ground, either from
analogy or anything else, to think it does ; then
there is reason also for the most active thought and
solicitude to secure that interest ; to behave so as
that we may escape that misery, and obtain that
happiness in another life, which we not only sup
pose ourselves capable of, but Avhich we apprehend
also is put in our oAvn power. And whether there

40 Of the Government of God Partl.
be ground for this last apprehension, certainly
would deserve to be most seriously considered,
were there no other proof of a future life and inte
rest than that presumptive one, which the forego
ing observations amount to.
Now, in the present state, all which we enjoy,
and a great part of what we suffer, is put in our
own power. For pleasure and pain are the conse*
quences of our actions : and Ave are endued by the
Author of our Nature with capacities of foreseeing
these consequences. We find, by experience, He
does not so much as preserve our lives, exclusively
of our oAvn care and attention to provide ourselves
with, and to make use of, that sustenance, by
which he has appointed our lives shall be preserved,
and without which he has appointed they shall not
be preserved at all. And in general Ave foresee,
that the external things, Avhich are the objects of
our various passions, can neither be obtained nor
enjoyed, without exerting ourselves in such and
such manners : but by thus exerting ourselves, we
obtain and enjoy these objects, in which our natu
ral good consists ; or by this means God gives us
the possession and enjoyment of them. I know
not that we have any one kind, or degree, of en
joyment, but by the means of our own actions.
And by prudence and care, we may, for the most
part, pass our days in tolerable ease and quiet : or,
on the contrary, we may, by rashness, ungoverned
passion, wilfulness, or even by negligence, make
ourselves as miserable, as ever Ave please. And many
do please to make themselves extremely miserable,

Chap. II. hy Rewards and Punishments. 41
i. e. to do Avhat they knoAV beforehand Avill render
them so. They follow those ways, the fruit of
Avhich they know, by instruction, example, expe
rience, will be disgrace, and poverty, and sickness,
and untimely death. This every one observes to
be the general course of things ; though it is to be
allowed, Ave cannot find by experience, that all our
sufferings are owing to our own follies.
Why the Author of Nature does not give his
creatures promiscuously such and such perceptions,
without regard to their behaviour ; why he does
not make them happy without the instrumentality
of their own actions, and prevent their bringing
any sufferings upon themselves, is another matter.
Perhaps there may be some impossibilities in the
nature of things, which we are unacquainted with*.
Or less happiness, it may be, would, upon the
whole, be produced by such a method of conduct,
than is by the present. Or, perhaps, divine good
ness, with Avhich, if I mistake not, Ave make very
free in our speculations, may not be a bare single
disposition to produce happiness ; but a disposition
to make the good, the faithful, the honest man
happy. Perhaps an infinitely perfect Mind may be
pleased with seeing his creatures behave suitably
to the nature which he has given them ; to -the re
lations which he has placed them in to each other ;
and to that which they stand in to himself: that
relation to himself, Avhich, during their existence,
is even necessary, and which is the most important
* Part I. Ch. vii, .

42 Of the Government of God Part I.
one of all. Perhaps, I say, an infinitely perfect
Mind may be pleased with this moral piety of raoral
agents, in and for itself; as well as upon account
of its being essentially conducive to the happiness
ofhis creation. Or the Avhole end, for which God
made, and thus governs the Avorld, may be utterly
beyond the reach of our faculties : there may be
somewhat in it as impossible for us to have any
conception of, as for a blind man to have a con
ception of colours. But hoAvever this be, it is cer
tain matter of universal experience, that the gene
ral method of divine adrainistration is, forewarning
us, or giving us capacities to foresee, Avith raore or
less clearness, that if we act so and so, we shall
have such enjoyments, if so and so, such suffer
ings ; and giving us those enjoyments, and making
us feel those sufferings, in consequence of our ac
tions. "But all this is to be ascribed to the general
course of nature." True. This is the very thing
which I am observing. It is to be ascribed to the
general course of nature ; i. e. not surely to the
Avords, or ideas, course of nature ; but to him
AA'ho appointed it, and put things into it : or to a
course of operation, from its uniformity, or con
stancy, called natural * ; and which necessarily
implies an operating agent. For, when men find
themselves necessitated to confess an Author of
Nature, or that God is the natural governor of the
world ; they must not deny this again, because his
* Pages 36, 37.

Chap. II. by Rexvards and Punishments. 43
government is uniform ; they must not deny that
he does things at all, because he does them con
stantly ; because the effects of his acting are per
manent, whether his acting be so or not ; thouo-h
there is no reason to think it is not. In short,
every man, in every thing he does, naturally acts
upon the forethought and apprehension of aA^oidino-
evil, or obtaining good : and if the natural course
of things be the appointment of God, and our na
tural faculties of knowledge and experience are
given us by him, then the good and bad conse
quences which follow our actions, are his appoint
ment, and our foresight of those consequences is
a warning given us, by him, how we are to act
" Is the pleasure, then, naturally accompany
ing every particular gratification of passion, intend
ed to put us upon gratifying ourselves in CA'ery
such particular instance, and as a reward to us for
so doing ?" No, certainly. Nor is it to be said,
that our eyes were naturally intended to give us
the sight of each particular object, to which they
do or can extend ; objects which are destructive of
them, or which, for any other reason, it may be
come us to turn our eyes from. Yet there is no
doubt, but that our eyes were intended for us to
see with. So nei+'her is there any doubt, but
that the foreseen pleasures and pains, belonging to
the passions, were intended, in general, to induce
mankind to act in such and such manners.
Now, from this general observation, obvious to
every one, that God has given us to understand
he has appointed satisfaction and delight to be the

44j Of the Government of God Partl.
consequence of our acting in one manner, and pain
and uneasiness of our acting in another, and of
our not acting at all : and that we find the conse
quences, which we Avere beforehand informed of,
uniformly to folloAV ; we may learn, that Ave are at
present actually under his government, in the strict
est and most proper sense ; in such a sense, as that
he rcAvards and punishes us for our actions. An
Author of Nature being supposed, it is not so rauch
a deduction of reason, as a matter of experience,
that we are thus under his governraent : under his
goA-ei-nment in the same sense, as Ave are under
the government of civil magistrates. Because the
annexing pleasure to some actions, and pain to
others, in our power to do or forbear, and giving
notice of this appointment beforehand to those
whom it concerns, is the proper formal notion of
government. Whether the pleasure or pain, which
thus follows upon our behaviour, be owing to the
Author of Nature's acting upon us every moment
Avhich we feel it ; or to his having at once con
trived and executed his own part in the plan of
the world ; makes no alteration as to the matter be
fore us. For, if civil magistrates could make the
sanctions of their laws take place, without inter
posing at all, after they had passed them ; with
out a trial, and the formalities of an execution : if
they Avere able to make their laws execute them
selves, or every offender to execute them upon him
self; Ave should be just in the same sense under their
government then, as we are now : but in a much
higher degree, and more perfect manner. Vain ia

Chap. II. by Rewards and Punishments. 45
the ridicule, with which, one foresees, some per
sons will divert themselves, upon finding lesser
pains considered as instances of divine punishment.
There is no possibility of ansAvering or evading the
general thing here intended, Avithout denying all
final causes. For, final causes being admitted, the
pleasures and pains now mentioned must be ad
mitted, too, as instances of them. And if they
are ; if God annexes delight to some actions, and
uneasiness to others, with an apparent design to
induce us to act so and so ; then he not only dis
penses happiness and misery, but also rewards
and punishes actions. If, for example, the pain
which we feel, upon doing Avhat tends to the de
struction of our bodies, suppose upon too near
approaches to fire, or upon Avounding ourselves,
be appointed by the Author of Nature to prevent
our doing Avhat thus tends to our destruction ; this
is altogether as much an instance of his punishing
our actions, and consequently of our being under
his government, as declaring by a voice from
heaven, that, if we acted so, he would inflict such
pain upon us, and inflicting it, whether it be greater
or less.
Thus we find, that the true notion, or concep
tion, of the Author of Nature, is that of a master,
or governor, prior to the consideration of his
moral attributes. The fact of our case, Avhich Ave
find by experience, is, that he actually exercises
jdominion, or government, over us at present, by
rewarding and punishing us for our actions, in as
strict and proper a sense of these Avords, and even

4.6 Of the Government of God Part!
in the same sense, as children, servants, subjects,
are rcAvarded and punished by those who govern
them. And thus the Avhole analogy of Nature, the
Avhole present course of things, most fully shows,
that there is nothing incredible in the general doc
trine of religion; that God wiHrcAvard and punish
men for their actions hereafter : nothing incredi
ble, I mean, arising out of the notion of rewarding
and punishing : for the whole course of nature is
a present instance of his exercising that govern
ment over us, Avhich implies in it rcAvarding and
punishing.

But, as divine punishment is what men chiefly
object against, and are most unwilling to allow,
it may be proper to mention some circumstances
in the natural course of punishments at present,
which are analogous to what religion teaches us
concerning a future state of punishment: indeed
so analogous, that as they add a farther credibility
to it, so they cannot but raise a rnost serious
apprehension of it in those who Avill attend to
them. It has been noAV observed, that such and such
miseries naturally follow such and such actions of
imprudence and Aviifulness, as well as actions more
coraraonly and more distinctly considered as vi
tious ; and that these consequences, Avhen they
may be foreseen, are properly natural punishments
annexed to such actions. For the general thing

Chap. II. by Punishments. 47
here insisted upon is, not that we see a great deal
of misery in the Avorld, but a great deal which
men bring upon themselves by their OAvn behaviour,
which they might have foreseen and avoided. Noav
the circurastances of these natural punishments,
particularly deserving our attention, are such as
these: That oftentimes they folloAv, or are inflicted
in consequence of, actions, which procure many
present advantages, and are accompanied Avith
much present pleasure ; for instance, sickness and
untimely death is the consequence of intemperance,
though accorapanied with the highest mirth and
jollity : That these punishments are often much
greater than the advantages, or pleasures, obtained
by the actions, of which they are the punishments
or consequences : That though Ave may imagine a
constitution of nature, in Avhich these natural pu
nishments, which are in fact to follow, Avould
follow, immediately upon such actions being done,
or very soon after ; Ave find, on the contrary, in
our world, that they are often delayed a great
while, sometimes even tiU long after the actions
occasioning them are forgot ; so that the constitu
tion of nature is such, that delay of punishment is
no sort nor degree of presumption of final impu-
punity : That after such delay, these natural pu
nishments, or miseries, often come, not by degrees,
but suddenly, with violence, and at once ; hoAV^
ever, the chief misery often does : That as cer
tainty of such distant misery foHoAving such ac
tions is never afforded persons, so, perhaps, during
the actions, they have seldom a distinct, fuU ex-

48 Of the Government of God Partl.
pectation of its following * : and many times the
case is only thus, that they see in general, or may
see, the credibility that intemperance, suppose,
Avill bring after it diseases ; cIa^I crimes, civil
punishments ; when yet the real probability often
is, that they shall escape: but things notAvith-
standing take their destined course, and the misery
inevitably follows at its appointed time, in A'-ery
many of these cases. Thus, also, though youth
may be alleged as an excuse for rashness and folly,
as being naturally thoughtless, and not clearly
foreseeing all the consequences of being untract
able and profligate ; this does not hinder, but that
these consequences folloAV", and are grievously felt,
throughout the whole course of mature life. Ha-
bits contracted, even in that age, are often utter
ruin : and men's success in the Avorld, not only
in the common sense of worldly success, but their
real happiness and misery, depends, in a great de
gree, and in various ways, upon the manner in
Avhich they pass their youth ; which consequences
they, for the most part, neglect to consider, and
perhaps seldom can properly be said to believe
beforehand. It requires also to be mentioned,
that, in numberless cases, the natural course of
things affords us opportunities for procuring advan
tages to ourselves at certain times, Avhich we can
not procure when we will ; nor ever recal the op
portunities, if Ave have neglected thera. Indeed,
the general course of nature is an exaraple of this.
* See Part 11. chap. vi.

Chap. II. by Punishments. 49
If, during the opportunity of youth, persons are
indocile and self-Avilled, they inevitably suffer in
their future life, for want of those' acquirements,
Avhich they neglected the natural season of attain
ing. If the husbandman lets his seed-time pass
Avithout soAving, the whole year is lost to him
beyond recovery. In like manner, though after
men have been guilty of folly and extravagance, up
to a certain degree, it is often in their power, for
instance, to retrieve their affairs, to recover their
health and character ; at least in good measure :
yet real reformation is, in many cases, of no avail
at all towards preventing the miseries, poverty,
sickness, infamy, naturally annexed to folly and
extravagance, exceeding that degree. There is a
certain bound to imprudence and misbehaviour,
which being transgressed, there remains no place
for repentance in the natural course of things. It
is, further, very much to be remarked, that ne
glects from inconsiderateness, Avant of attention *,
not looking about us to see what we have to do,
are often attended Avith consequences altogether as
dreadful as any active misbehaviour, from the
most extravagant passion. And, lastly, civil go
vernment being natural, the punishments of it are
so too: and some of these punishments are capital;
as the effects of a dissolute course of pleasure are
often mortal. So that many natural punishraents
are final -j" to him, who incurs them, if considered
* Part II. chap. vi.
t The general consideration of a future state of punishment
most evidently belongs to the subject of natural religion. But if

50 Of the Government of God Partl.
only in his temporal capacity : and seem inflicted
by natural appointment, either to remove the
offender out of the Avay of being further mischie
vous ; or as an example, though frequently a dis
regarded one, to those who are left behind.
These things are not what we call accidental,
or to be met Avith only now and then ; but they
are things of every days experience : they proceed
from general laws, very general ones, by which
God governs the world, in the natural course of
his Providence: And they are so analagous to

any of these reflections should be thought to relate more peculi
arly to this doctrine, as taught in Scripture, the reader is desired
to observe, that Gentile writers, both moralists and poets, speak
of the future punishment of the wicked, both as to the duration
and degree of it, in a like manner of expression and of description
as the Scriptuie does. So that all which can positively be asserted
to be matter of mere revelation, with regard to this doctrine,
seems to be, that the great distinction between the righteous and
the wicked shall be made at the end of this world ; that each shall
then receive according to his deserts. Reason did, as it well
might, conclude, that it should, finally and upon the whole, be
well with the righteous, and ill with the wicked : but it could not
be determined upon any principles of reason, whether human
creatures might not have been appointed to pass through other
states of life and being, before that distributive justice should
finally and effectually take place. Revelation teaches us, that
the next state of things, after the present, is appointed for the
execution of this justice; that it shall be no longer delayed : but
the mystery of God, the great mystery of his suffering vice and
confusion to prevail, shall then be finished ; and he will take to
Mm his great po-wer, and -will reign, by rendering to every one
according to his works.

Chap II. by Punishments. 51
what religion teaches us concerning the future
punishment of the Avicked, so much of a piece with
it, that both would naturally be expressed in the
verj^ same words, and manner of description. In
the book of PrcA^erbs *, for instance. Wisdom is in
troduced, as frequenting the most public places of
resort, and as rejected when she offers herself as
the natural appointed guide of human life. "How
long," speaking to those who are passing through
it, " how long, ye simple ones, will ye love folly,
and the scorners delight in their scorning, and
fools hate knowledge ? Turn ye at my reproof.
Behold, I Avill pour out my spirit upon you, I will
make knoAvn my Avoids unto you." But upon be
ing neglected, " Because I have called, and ye
refused, I have stretched out my hand, and no
man regarded ; but ye have set at nought all my
counsel, and Avould none of my reproof: I also
Avill laugh at your calamity, I Avill mock when
your fear cometh; Avhen your fear cometh as deso
lation, and your destruction cometh as a whirl-
Avind; when distress and anguish cometh upon
you. Then shall they call upon me, but I will not
answer; they shall seek me early, but they shall
not find me." This passage, every one sees, is
poetical, and some parts of it are highly figurative;
but their meaning is obvious. And the thing in
tended is expressed more literally in the following
words : " For that they hated knowledge, and did
not chuse the fear of the Lord ; therefore shall
* Chap. i.

52 Of the Government of God Part I.
they eat of the fruit of their own way, and be
filled Avith their own deAdces. For the security of
the simple shall slay them, and the prosperity of
fools shah destroy them." And the whole passage
is so equally applicable to what Ai^^e experience in
the present Avorld, concerning the consequences of
mens actions, a,nd to what religion teaches us is
to be expected in another, that it may be que
stioned which of the two was principally intended.
Indeed, when one has been recollecting the
proper proofs of a future state of rewards and pu
nishments, nothing, methinks, can give one so
sensible an apprehension of the latter, or represent
ation of it to the mind, as observing, that after the
many disregarded checks, admonitions, and Avarn-
ings, which people meet with in the ways of vice,
and folly, and extravagance; warnings from their
A^ery nature ; from the examples of others ; froin
lesser inconveniences which they bring upon them
selves ; from the instructions of wise and virtuous
men: after these have been long despised, scorned,
ridiculed : after the chief bad consequences, tem^
poral consequences, of their follies, have been de
layed for a great while ; at length they break in
irresistibly, like an armed force : repentance is too
late to relieve, and can serve only to aggravate,
their distress : the case is become desperate : and
poverty and sickness, remorse and anguish, infa
my and death, the effects of their own doings,
overwhelm them, beyond possibihty of remedy or
escape. This is an account of what is in fact the
general constitution of nature.

Chap. II. by Punishments. 53
It is not in any sort meant, that, according to
Avhat appears at present of the natural course of
things, men are always uniformly punished in pro
portion to their misbehaviour : but that there are
very many instances of misbehaviour punished in
the several Avays now mentioned, and very dread
ful instances too, sufficient to shew Avhat the laws
of the universe may admit; and, if thoroughly
considered, sufficient fully to answer all objections
against the credibility of a future state of punish'-
ments, from any imaginations, that the frailty of
our nature and external temptations almost anni
hilate the guilt of human vices : as Avell as objec
tions of another sort ; from necessity ; from sup
positions, that the will of an infinite Being cannot
be contradicted ; or that he must be incapable of
offence and provocation *.
Reflections of this kind are not without their
terrors to serious persons, the most free from en
thusiasm, and of the greatest strength of mind :
but it is fit things be stated and considered as they
really are. And there is, in the present age, a
certain fearlessness, with regard. to what may be
hereafter under the government of God, whicli
nothing but an universally acknowledged demon
stration on the side of atheism can justify, and
which makes it quite necessary, that men be re
minded, and, if possible, made to feel, thatthere
is no sort of ground for being thus presumptuous,
even upon the raost sceptical principles. For, may
* See Chap. iv. & vi.

54 Of the Government of God, &c. Part I.
it not be said of any person, upon his being born
into the Avorld, he may behave so, as to be of no
service to it, but by being made an example of
the woful effects of vice and folly : That he may,
as any one may, if he Avill, incur an infamous exe
cution, from the hands of civil justice; or in some
other course of extravagance shorten his days ; or
bring upon himself infamy and diseases worse than
death ? So that it had been better for him, even
AAdth regard to the present world, that he had
never been born. And is there any pretence of
reason, for people to think themselves secure, and
talk as if they had certain proof, that, let them
act as licentiously as they will, there can be nothing
analogous to this, with regard to a future and more
general interest, under the providence and govern
ment of the same God ?

CHAP. IIL
Of the Moral Government ofGod,
As the manifold appearances of design and of
final causes, in the constitution of the world, prove
it to be the work of an intelligent Mind ; so the
particular final causes of pleasure and pain, distri
buted amongst his creatures, prove that they are
under his government : what may be called his
natural government of creatures, endued with sense
and reason. This, however, implies somewhat
more than seems usually attended to, when we
speak of God's natural government of the world.
It implies government of the very same kind with
that, which a master exercises over his servants,
or a civil magistrate over his subjects. These latter
instances of final causes, as really prove an intelli
gent Governor of the world, in the sense now
mentioned, and before * distinctly treated of, as
any other instances of final causes prove an intel
ligent Maker of it.
But this alone does not appear, at first sight, to
determine any thing certainly, concerning the mo
ral character of the Author of Nature, considered
in this relation of governor; does not ascertain his
*Chap. ii.

56 Of the 3Ioral Part I.
government to be moral, or prove that he is the
righteous judge of the world. Moral government
consists, not barely in rcAvarding and punishing
men for their actions, Avhich the most tyrannical
person may do; but in rewarding the righteous
and punishing the Avicked ; in rendering to men
according to their actions, considered as good or
evil. And the perfection of moral government
consists in doing this, with regard to all intelli
gent creatures, in an exact proportion to their
personal merits or demerits.
Sorae men seem to think the only character of
the Author of Nature to be that of simple absolute
benevolence. This, considered as a principle of
action, and infinite degree, is a disposition to pro
duce the greatest possible happiness, without re
gard to persons' behaviour, otherwise than as such
regard Avould produce higher degrees of it. And
supposing this to be the only character of God,
veracity and justice in him Avould be nothing but
benevolence conducted by Avisdom. Noav surely
this ought not to be asserted, unless it can be
proved ; for we should speak Avith cautious reve
rence upon such a subject. And Avhether it can be
proved or no, is not the thing here to be inquired
into; but whether, in the constitution and conduct
of the Avorld, a righteous government be not dis-
cernibly planned out : Avhich necessarily implies a
righteous governor. There may possibly be in
the creation beings, to whom the Author of Na
ture manifests himself under this most amiable of
all characters, this of infinite absolute benevolence;

Chap. III. Government ofGod. 57
for it is the most amiable, supposing it not, as per
haps it is not, incompatible with justice : but he
manifests himself to us under the character of a
righteous governor. He may, consistently with
this, be simply and absolutely benevolent, in the
sense now explained : but he is, for he has given
us a proof in the constitution and conduct of the
world that he is, a governor over servants, as
he rewards and punishes us for our actions. And
in the constitution and conduct of it, he may also
have given, besides the reason of the thing, and
the natural presages of conscience, clear and dis
tinct intimations, that his government is righteous
or moral : clear to such as think the nature of it
deserving their attention; and yet not to every
careless person Avho casts a transient reflection upon
the subject *.
But it is particularly to be observed, that the
divine government, which we experience ourselves
under in the present state, taken alone, is alloAved
not to be the perfection of moral government. And
yet this by no means hinders, but that there may

* The objections against religion, from the evidence of it not
being universal, nor so strong as might possibly have been, may
be urged against natural religion, as well as against revealed.
And therefore the consideration of them belongs to the first part
of this Treatise, as well as the second. But as these objections
are chiefly urged against revealed religion, I chose to consider
them in the second Part. And the answer to them there, ch. vi.
as urged against Christianity, being almost equally applicable to
them as urged against the Religion of Nature; to avoid repetition,
the reader is referred to that chapter.

58 Ofthe Moral Part I.
be somewhat, be it more or less, truly moral in it.
A righteous goA'^ernment raay plainly appear to be
carried on to some degree : enough to give us the
apprehension that it shall be completed, or carried
on to that degree of perfection which religion
teaches us. it shall ; but which cannot appear, till
much more of the divine administration be seen,
than can in the present life. And the design of
this Chapter is to enquire, how far this is the case:
how far, over and above the moral nature * which
God has given us, and our natural notion of him,
as righteous governor of those his creatures, to
whom he has given this nature f ; I say how far,
besides this, the principles and beginnings of a
moral gOA^ernment over the world may be discern
ed, notwithstanding and amidst all the confusion
and disorder of it.
Noav one might mention here, what has been
often urged with great force, that, in general, less
uneasiness, and more satisfaction, are the natural
consequences J of a virtuous than of a Adcious
course of life, in the present state, as an instance
of a moral government established in nature ; an
instance of it, collected from experience and matter
of fact. But it must be owned a thing of difficulty
to Aveigh and balance pleasures and uneasinesses,
each amongst themselves, .and also against each
other, so as to make an estimate with any exact
ness, of the overplus of happiness ou the side of
* Dissertation II. f Chap. vi.
X See Lord Shaftesbury's Inquiry concerning Virtue, Part II.

Chap. IIL Government of God. 59
virtue. And it is not impossible, that, amidst the
infinite disorders of the Avorld, there may be excep
tions to the happiness of virtue, even Avith regard
to those persons, Avhose course of life, from their
youth up, has been blaraeless ; and more with re
gard to those, Avho haA''e gone on for some time in
the ways of vice, and have afterwards reformed.
For suppose an instance of the latter case ; a per
son Avith his passions inflamed, his natural faculty
of self-government impaired by habits of indul
gence, and Avith all his vices about him, like so
many harpies, craving for their accustomed grati
fication: who can say how long it might be before
such a person would find more satisfaction in the
reasonableness and present good consequences of \'ir-
tue, than difficulties and self-denial in the restraints
of it ? Experience also shews, that men can, to a
great degree, get over their sense of shame, so as
that by professing themselves to be Avithout prin
ciple, and avowing even direct villainy, they can
support themselves against the infamy of it But
as the ill actions of any one will probably be more
talked of, and oftener thrown in his way, upon his
reformation ; so the infamy of them will be much
more felt, after the natural sense of virtue and of
honour is recovered. Uneasinesses of this kind
ought indeed to be put to the account of former
vices : yet it will be said, they are in part the con
sequences of reformation. Still I am far from al
lowing it doubtful, whether virtue, upon the whole,
be happier than vice in the present world ; but if
it were, yet the beginnings of a righteous admini-

60 Of the Moral Part I.
stration may, beyond all question, be found in
nature, if Ave wiU attentively inquire after them.
And, I. In whatever manner the notion of God's moral
government over the world might be treated, if it
did not appear, Avhether he Avere, in a proper sense,
our governor at all : yet when it is certain matter
of experience, that he does manifest himself to us
under the character of a governor, in the sense ex
plained * ; it must deserve to be considered, whe
ther there be not reason to apprehend, that he may
be a righteous or moral governor. Since it appears
to be fact, that God does govern mankind by the
method of rewards and punishments, according to
some settled rules of distribution ; it is surely a
question to be asked. What presumption is there
against his finally rewarding and punishing them,
according to this particular rule, namely, as they
act reasonably or unreasonably, virtuously or vi
ciously ? since rendering men happy or miserable
by this rule, certainly falls in, much more falls in,
Avith our natural apprehensions and sense of things,
than doing so by any other rule whatever : since
rewarding and punishing actions by any other rule,
Avould appear much harder to be accounted for, by
minds formed as he has formed ours. Be the evi
dence of religion, then, more or less clear, the ex
pectation which it raises in us, that the righteous
shaH, upon the whole, be happy, and the wicked
miserable, cannot, however, possibly be considered
* Chap. ii.

Chap. IIL Government of God. 6\
as absurd or chimerical: because it is no more than
an expectation, that a method of government, al
ready begun, shall be carried on, the method of
rcAvarding and punishing actions ; and shall be
carried on by a particular rule, which unavoidably
appears to us, at first sight, more natural than any
other, the rule Avhich we call distributive justice.
Nor, IL Ought it to be entirely passed over, that
tranquillity, satisfaction, and external advantages,
being the natural consequences of prudent manage
ment of ourselves and our affairs ; and .rashness,
profligate neghgence, and wilful folly, bringing
after them many inconveniences and sufferings ;
these afford instances of a right constitution of
nature: as the correction of children, fortheir own
sakes, and by way of example, when they run into
danger, or hurt themselves, is a part of right edu
cation. And thus, that God governs the world by
general fixt laAVS, that he has endued us with ca
pacities of reflecting upon this constitution of
things, and foreseeing the good and bad conse
quences of our behaA'iour, plainly implies some sort
of moral government : since from such a constitu
tion of things it cannot but follow, that prudence
and imprudence. Avhich are of the nature of virtue
and vice *, must be, as they are, respectively re-
Avarded and punished.
III. From the natural course of things, vicious
actions are, to a great degree, actually punished as
** See Dissert. II.

62 Of the Moral PartL
mischievous to society : and besides punishment
actually inflicted upon this account, there is also
the fear and apprehension of it in those persons,
whose crimes have rendered them obnoxious to it,
in case of a discovery ; this state of fear being itself
often a A^ery considerable punishment. The natu
ral fear and apprehension of it too, which restrains
from such crimes, is a declaration of nature against
thein. It is necessary to the very being of society,
that vices destructive of it should be punished as
being so; the vices of falsehood, injustice, cruelty:
which punishment, therefore, is as natural as so
ciety ; and so is an instance of a kind of moral
government, naturally established and actually
taking place. And, since the certain natural course
of things, is the conduct of Providence, or the go
vernment ofGod, though carried on by the instru
mentality of men ; the observation here made
amounts to this, that mankind find themselves
placed by him in such circumstances, as that they
are unavoidably accountable for their behaviour,
and are often punished, and sometimes rewarded
under his government, in the view of their being
mischievous, or eminently beneficial to society.
If it be objected, that good actions, and such as
are beneficial to society, are often punished, as in
the case of persecution, and in other cases ; and
that ill and mischievous actions are often rcAvard-
ed : it may be ansAvered distinctly ; first, that this
is in no sort necessary, and consequently not na
tural, in the sense in which it is necessary, and
therefore natural, that ill or mischievous actions

Chap. IIL Government of God. 65
should be punished : and in the next place, that
good actions aj-e never punished, considered as
beneficial to society, nor ill actions rcAvarded, un
der the view of their being hurtful to it. So that
it stands good, without any thing on the side of
vice to be set over against it, that the Author of
Nature has as truly directed, that vicious actions,
considered as mischievous to society, should be
punished, and put mankind under a necessity of
thus punishing them ; as he has directed and ne
cessitated us to preserve our lives by food.
IV. In the natural course of things, virtue, as
such, is actually rcAvarded, and vice, as such, pu
nished : Avhich seems to afford an instance, or
example, not only of government, but of moral
government, begun and established ; moral in the
strictest sense, though not in that peifection of
degree, which religion teaches us to expect. In
order to see this more clearly, we must distinguish
between actions themselves, and that quality as
cribed to them, which Ave call virtuous or vicious.
The gratification itself of every natural passion
must be attended with delight : and acquisitions
of fortune, hoAvever made, are acquisitions of the
means, or materials, of enjoyment. An action,
then, by which any natural passion is gratified, or
fortune acquired, procures. delight or advantage ;
abstracted from all consideration of the morality
of such action. Consequently, the pleasure or ad
vantage in this case, is gained by the action itself,
not by the morality, the virtuousness or vicious
ness of it, though it be, perhaps, virtuous or vicious.

64 Of the Moral PartL
»
Thus, to say such an action, or course of beha
viour, , procured such pleasure or advantage, or
brought on such inconvenience and pain, is quite
a different thing from saying, that such good or
bad effect was owing to the virtue or vice of such
action or behaviour. In one case, an action, ab
stracted from all moral consideration, produced its
effect : in the other case, for it will appear that
there are such cases, the morality of the action,
the action under a moral consideration, i. e. the
virtuousness or viciousness of it, produced the effect.
Noav I say virtue, as such, naturally procures consi
derable advantages to the virtuous, and vice, as
such, naturally occasions great inconvenience, and
even misery, to the vicious, in very many instances.
The immediate effects of virtue and vice upon the
mind and temper, are to be mentioned as instances
of it. Vice, as such, is naturally attended with some
sort of uneasiness, and, not uncommonly, with
great disturbance and apprehension. That inward
feeling, which, respecting lesser matters, and in
familiar speech, Ave call being vexed with one's-self,
and in matters of importance, and in more serious
language, remorse ; is an uneasiness naturally aris
ing from an action of a man's own, reflected upon
by himself as wrong, unreasonable, faulty, i. e. vi
cious in greater or less degrees : and this manifestly
is a different feeling from that uneasiness, which
arises from a sense of mere loss or harm. What is
more common, than to hear a man lamenting an
accident or event, and adding  but hoAvever he
has the satisfaction that he cannot blame himself

Chap. III. Government of God. ^5
for it; or, on the contrary, that he has the unea
siness of being sensible it was his own doing ? Thus
also the disturbance and fear, which often follow
upon a raan's having done an injury, arise from a
sense of his being blame-Avorthy ; otherwise there
Avould, in many cases, be no ground of disturbance,
nor am' reason to fear resentment or shame, On
the other hand, inward security and peace, and a
mind open to the several gratifications of life, are
the natural attendants of innocence and virtue. Tq
which must be added, the complacency, satisfac
tion, and even joy of heart, which accompany the
exercise, the real exercise, of gratitude, friendship,
benevolence. And here, I think, ought to be mentioned, the
fears of future punishment, and peaceful hopes of a
better life, in those who fully believe, or have any
apprehension of religion : because these hopes and
fears are present uneasiness and satisfaction to the
mind ; and cannot be got rid of by great part of
the world, even by men who have thought most
thoroughly upon the subject of religion. And no
one can say how considerable this uneasiness and
satisfaction may be, or what, upon the whole, it
may amount to.
In the next place comes in the consideration,
that all honest and good men are disposed to be
friend honest good men, as such, and to discounte
nance the A'icious, as such, and do so in some de
gree ; indeed in a considerable degree : from Avhich
favour and discouragement cannot but arise consi
derable advantage and inconvenience. And though

66 Of the Moral PartL
the generality of the world have little regard to the
morality of their oAvn actions, and may be supposed
to have less to that of others, Avhen they themselves
are uot concerned; yet let any one be known to be
a man of virtue, some how or other, he will be fa
voured, and good offices Avill be done him, from
regard to his character, without remote views, oc
casionally, and in some low degree, I think, by the
generality of the Avorld, as it happens to corae in
their Avay. Public honours too, and advantages,
are the natural consequences, are soraetimes at least
the consequences in fact, of virtuous actions ; of
eminent justice, fidelity, charity, love to our coun
try, considered in the view of being virtuous. And
sometimes even death itself, often infamy and ex
ternal incouAeniences, are the public consequences
of vice, as vice. For instance, the sense which man
kind have of tyranny, injustice, oppression, addi
tional to the mere feeling or fear of misery, has
doubtless been instrumental in bringing about re
volutions, which make a figure even in the history
of the world. For it is plain, men resent injuries
as implying faultiness, and retaliate, not merely
under the notion of having received harm, but of
having received Avrong; and they have this resent
ment in behalf of others, as Avell as of themselves.
So, likewise, even the generality are, in some de
gree, grateful, and disposed to return good offices,
not merely because such an one has been the oc
casion of good to thera, but under the view that
such good offices implied kind intention and good
desert in the doer. To all this may be added two

Chap. III. Government of God. 67
or three particular things, which raany persons Avill
think frivolous ; but to rae nothing appears so which
at all comes in towards determining a question of
such importance, as, Avhether there be, or be not,
a moral institution of governraent, in the strictest
sense moral, visibly established and begun in na
ture. The particular things are these ; That in
domestic government, which is doubtless natural,
children, and others also, are very generally punished
for falsehood, and injustice, and ill-behaviour, as
such, and rewarded for the contrary : which are
instances Avhere veracity, and justice, and right be
haviour, as such, are naturally enforced by rewards
and punishments, Avhether more or less consider
able in degree : That, though civil government be
supposed to take cognizance of actions in no other
view than as prejudicial to society, without respect
to the imraorality of them ; yet as such actions are
immoral, so the sense Avhich men have of the im
morality of them, very greatly contributes, in dif
ferent Avays, to bring offenders to justice : and, that
intire absence of all crime and guilt, in the moral
sense, when plainly appearing, will almost of course
procure, and circumstances of aggravated guilt
prevent, a remission of the penalties annexed to
civil crimes, in many cases, though by no means
in all.
Upon the whole, then, be^ide's the good and bad
effects of virtue and vice upon men's own minds,
the course of the world does, in some measure, turn
upon the approbation and disapprobation of them,
as such, in others. The sense of well and ill doing,

68 Of the Moral PartL
the presages of conscience, the love of good cha
racters and dislike of bad ones, honour, shame,
resentment, gratitude ; all these, considered in
themselves, and in their effects, do afford manifest
real instances of virtue, as such, naturally favour
ed, and of vice, as such, discountenanced, more
or less, in the daily course of human life; in every
age, in every relation, in every general circum
stance of it. That God has given us a moral na
ture *, may most justly be urged as a proof of our
being under his moral government : but that he
has placed us in a condition, which gives this na
ture, as one raay speak, scope to operate, and in
which it does unavoidably operate ; i. e. influence
mankind to act,' so as thus to favour and reward
virtue, and discountenance and punish vice ; this
is not the same, but a further, additional proof of
his moral government : for it is an instance of it.
The first is a proof that he will finally favour and
support virtue effectually : the second is an exam
ple of his favouring and supporting it at present,
in some degree.
If a more distinct inquiry be raade, whence it
arises, that virtue, as such, is often rewarded, and
vice, as such, is punished, and this rule never in
verted: it will be found to proceed, in part, irarae
diately from the moral nature itself, which God
has given us : and also, in part, from his having
given us, together Avith this nature, so great a
poAver over each other's happiness and raisery. Foi>
" See Dissert. II.

Chap. IIL Government of God. 69
first, it is certain, that peace and delight, in some
degree and upon some occasions, is the necessary
and present effect of virtuous practice ; an effect
arising immediately from that constitution of our
nature. We are so made, that well-doing, as such,
gives us satisfaction, at least in some instances ;
ill-doing, as such, in none. And, secondly, from
our moral nature, joined Avith God's having put
our happiness and misery, in many respects, in each
other's poAA^er, it cannot but be, that vice, as such,
some kinds and instances of it at least, Avill be in
famous, and men will be disposed to punish it as in
itself detestable ; and the villain will by no means
be able ahvays to avoid feeling that infamy, any
more than he Avill be able to escape this further pu
nishment, which mankind will be disposed to inflict
upon him, under the notion of his deserving it.
But there can be nothing on the side of vice to
answer this; because there is nothing in the human
mind contradictory, as the logicians speak it, to
virtue. For virtue consists in a regard to what is
right and reasonable, as being so ; in a regard to
veracity, justice, charity, in themselves: and there
is surely no such thing, as a like natural regard to
falsehood, injustice, cruelty. If it be thought,
that there are instances of an approbation of vice,
as such, in itself, and for its own sake, (though it
does not appear to me that there is any such thing
at all ; but supposing there be, ) it is evidently
monstrous : as much so, as the most acknowledged
perversion of any passion whatever. Such instances
ef perversion, then, being left out, as merely ^ini4-

70 Of the Moral PartL
ginary, or, however, unnatural ; it must follow,
from the frame of our nature, and from our condi
tion, in the respects uoav described, that vice can
not at all be, and virtue cannot but be, faA'oured,
as such, by others, upon some occasions ; and
happy in itself, in some degree. For Avhat is here
insisted upon, is not the degree in which virtue
and vice are thus distinguished, but only the thing
itself, that they are so in some degree ; though the
Avhole good and bad effect of virtue and vice, as
such, is not inconsiderable in degree. But that
they must be thus distinguished, in sorae degree,
is in a manner necessary : it is matter of fact of
daily experience, even in the greatest confusion of
human affairs.
It is not pretended but that, in the natural course
of things, happiness and misery appear to be distri
buted by other rules, than only the personal raerit
and demerit of characters. They may sometimes
be distributed by way of mere discipline. There
may be the Avisest and best reasons, why the Avorld
should be governed by general laAvs, from Avhence
such proraiscuous distribution perhaps must folloAv;
and also why our happiness and misery should be
put in each other's power, in the degree which they
are. And these things, as in general they contribute
to the rcAvarding virtue and punishing vice, as such;
so they often contribute also, not to the inversion
of this, Avhich is impossible ; but to the rendering
persons prosperous, though wicked; afflicted, though
righteous ; and, which is worse, to the rewarding
¦,s«me actions, though vicious; and pmiishing other

Chap. IIL Government of God. 71
actions, though virtuous. But all this cannot
drown the voice of nature in the conduct of Provi
dence, plainly declaring itself for virtue, by way
of distinction from vice, and preference to it. For,
our being so constituted, as that virtue and vice
are thus naturally favoured and discountenanced,
rewarded and punished respectively as such, is an
intuitive proof of the intent of nature that it should
be so : otherwise the constitution of our mind,
from Avhich it thus immediately and directly pro
ceeds, Avould be absurd. But it cannot be said,
because virtuous actions are sometimes punished,
and vicious actions rewarded, that nature intended
it. For, though this great disorder is brought about,
as all actions are done, by means of some natural
passion; yet this may be, as it undoubtedly is,
brought about by the perversion of such passion,
implanted in us for other, and those very good
purposes. And indeed these other and good pur
poses, even of every passion, may be clearly seen.
We have then a declaration, in some degree of
present effect, from Him, who is supreme in Na
ture, which side He is of, or what part He takes :
a declaration for virtue, and against vice. So far,
therefore, as a man is true to virtue, to veracity
and justice, to equity and charity, and the right
of the case, in whatever he is concerned ; so far he
is on the side of the divine administration, and co
operates with it : and from hence, to such a man,
arises naturally a secret satisfaction and sense of
security, and implicit hope of somewhat further.
And,

72 Of the Moral Part L
V. This hope is confirmed by the necessary ten
dencies of virtue, which, though not of present
effect, yet are at present discernible in nature; and
so afford an instance bf somewhat moral in the es*
sential constitution of it. There is, in the nature
of things, a tendency in virtue and vice to produce
the good and bad effects now mentioned, in a
greater degree than they do in fact produce them.
For instance ; good and bad men would be much
more rewarded and punished as such, were it not,
that justice is often artificially eluded, that cha
racters are not known, and many, Avho would thus
favour virtue and discourage vice, are hindered
from doing so by accidental causes. These ten
dencies of virtue and vice are obvious Avith regard
to individuals. But it may require more particu
larly to be considered, that power in a society, by
being under the direction of virtue, naturally in
creases, and has a necessary tendency to prevail
over opposite power, not under the direction of it;
in like manner as power, by being under the direc
tion of reason, increases, and has a tendency to
prevail over brute force. There are several brute
creatures of equal, and several of superior strength,
to that of men ; and possibly the sum of the whole
strength of brutes may be greater than that of
mankind : but reason gives us the advantage and
superiority over them ; and thus man is the acknow
ledged governing animal upon the earth. Nor is
this superiority considered by any as accidental ;
but as what reason has a tendency, in the nature
of the thing, to obtain. And yet, perhaps, diffi-

Chap. in. Government of God. 73
culties may be raised about the meaning, as Avell
as the truth, of the assertion, that virtue has the
like tendency.
To obviate these difficulties, let us see more dis
tinctly how the case stands, with regard to reason;
which is so readily acknowledged to have this ad
vantageous tendency. Suppose, then, two or three
men, of the best and most improved understanding,
in a desolate open plain, attacked by ten times the
number of beasts of prey : would their reason secure
them the victory in this unequal combat ? Power,
then, though joined with reason, and under its
direction, cannot be expected to prevail over oppo
site power, though merely brutal, unless the one
bears some proportion to the other. Again : put
the imaginary case, that rational and irrational
creatures Avere of like external shape and manner :
it is certain, before there were opportunities for the
first to distinguish each other, to separate from
their adversaries, and to form an union among
themselves, they might be upon a level, or, in
several respects, upon great disadvantage ; though
united they might be vastly superior : since union
is of such efficacy, that ten men, united, rnight be
able to accomplish, Avhat ten thousand of the same
natural strength and understanding, wholly un
united, could not. In this case, then, brute force
might more than maintain its ground against rea
son, for want of union among the rational crea
tures. Or suppose a number of raen to land upon
an island inhabited only by Avild beasts ; a number
of men, who, by the regulations of civil goverment.

74 Of the Moral Part I.
the inventions of art, and the experience of some
years, could they be preserved so long, would be
really sufficient to subdue the wild beasts, and to
preserve themselves in security from them : yet a
conjuncture of accidents raight give such advantage
to the irrational animals, as that they might at
once overpower, and even extirpate, the whole spe
cies of rational ones. Length of time, then, proper
scope and opportunities, for reason to exert itself,
may be absolutely necessary to its prevailing over
brutal force. Further still : there are many instances
of brutes succeeding in attempts, Avhich they could
not have undertaken, had not their irrational na
ture rendered them incapable of foreseeing the
danger of such attempts, or the fury of passion hin
dered their attending to it ; and there are instances
of reason and real prudence preventing men's un
dertaking Avhat, it hath appeared afterwards, they
might have succeeded in by a lucky rashness.
And in certain conjunctures, ignorance and folly,
weakness and discord, may have their advantages.
So that rational aniraals have not necessarily the
superiority over irrational ones : but, how irapro
bable soever it may be, it is evidently possible,
that, in some globes, the latter may be superior.
And Avere the former wholly at variance and dis
united, by false self-interest and envy, by treachery
and injustice, and consequent rage afid malice
against each other, whilst the latter Avere firmly
united among themselves by instinct ; this might
greatly contribute to the introducing such an in-
yerted .order of things. For every one Avould con^

Chap. III. Government of God. 75
sider it as inverted : since reason has, in the .na
ture of it, a tendency to prevail over brute force ;
notwithstanding the possiblity it may not prevail,
and the necessity Avhich there is of many concur
ring circumstances to render it prevalent. -1
Now, I say, virtue in a society has a like ten
dency to procure superiority and additional power:
whether this power be considered as the means of
se-curity from opposite power, or of obtaining other
advantages. And it has this tendency, by ren
dering public good, an object and end, to every
member of the society; by putting every one upon
consideration and diligence, recollection and self-
government, both in order to see what is the most
effectual method, and also in order to perform their
proper part, for obtaining and preserving it ; by
uniting a society Avithin itself, and so increasing
its strength; and, which is particularly to be men
tioned, uniting it by means of veracity and justice.
For, as these last are principal bonds of union, so
benevolence, or public spirit, undirected, unre
strained by them, is — no body knows what.
And suppose the invisible world, and the invisi
ble dispensations of Providence, to be, in any sort,
analogous to what appears : or, that both together
make up one uniform scheme, the two parts of
Avhich, the part which Ave see, and that which is
beyond our observation, are analogous to each
other : then, there must be a like natural tendency
in the derived power, throughout the universe,
under the direction of virtue, to prevail in general
over thatj Avhich is not under its direction; 9^§

76 Of the Moral Part I.
there is in reason, deriA^ed reason in the universe,
to prevail over brute force. But then, in order to
the prevalence of virtue, or that it may actually
produce Avhat it has a tendency to produce, the
like concurrences are necessary as are to the preva
lence of reason. There must be some proportion
between the natural power, or force, which is, and
that which is not, under the direction of virtue :
there must be sufficient length of time : for the
complete success of virtue, as of reason, cannot,
from the nature of the thing, be otherwise than
gradual : there must be, as one may speak, a fair
field of trial, a stage large and extensive enough,
proper occasions and opportunities for the virtuous
to join together, to exert themselves against law
less force, and to reap the fruit of their united la
bours. Noav indeed it is to be hoped, that the
disproportion betAveen the good and the bad, even
here on earth, is not so great, but that the former
have natural power sufficient to their prevailing to
a considerable degree, if circumstances Avould per
mit this pOAver to be united. For, much less, very
much less, poAver, under the direction of virtue,
would prcA^ail over much greater, not under the
direction of it. HoAvever, good men over the face
of the earth cannot unite ; as for other reasons, so
because they cannot be sufficiently ascertained of
each other's characters. And the known course
of human things, the scene we are uoav passing
through, particularly the shortness of life, denies
to virtue its full scope in several other respects.
The natural tendency, Avhich Ave have been consi-

Chap. III. Government of God. 77
dering, though real, is hindered from being carried
into effect .in the present state : but these hin
drances may be reraoved in a future one. Virtue,
to borrow the Christian allusion, is militant here;
and various untoward accidents contribute to its
being often overborne : but it may combat with
greater advantage hereafter, and prevail complete
ly, and enjoy its consequent rewards, in some fu
ture states. Neglected as it is, perhaps unknown,
perhaps despised and oppressed, here ; there may
be scenes in eternity, lasting enough, and in every
other way adapted, to afford it a sufficient sphere
of action ; and a sufficient sphere for the natural
consequences of it to follow in fact. If the soul
be naturally immortal, and this state be a progress
towards a future one, as childhood is to mature
age, good men may naturally unite, .not only
amongst themselves, but also with other orders of
virtuous creatures, in that future state. For virtue,
from the very nature of it, is a principle and bond
of union, in some degree, amongst all who are en
dued with it, and known to each other ; so as that
by it a good man cannot but recoramend himself to
the favour and protection of all virtuous beings,
throughout the whole universe, who can be ac
quainted with his character, and can any Avay in
terpose in his behalf in any part of his duration.
And one might add, that suppose all this ad
vantageous tendency of virtue to become effect,
amongst one or more orders of creatures, in any
distant scenes and periods, and to be seen by any
orders of vicious creatures, throughout the universal

78 Of the Moral Partl
kingdom ofGod; this happy effect of virtue would
have a tendency, by Avay of example, and possibly
in other Avays, to amend those of them who are
capable of amendment, and being recovered to a
just sense of virtue. If our notions ofthe plan of
Providence were enlarged, in any sort proportion
ably to Avhat late discoveries have enlarged our
vicAVS with respect to the material world ; repre
sentations of this kind would not appear absurd or
extravagant. HoAvever, they are not to be taken,
as intended for a literal delineation of what is in
fact the particular scheme of the universe, Avhich
cannot be knoAvn Avithout revelation : for supposi
tions are not to be looked on as true, because not
incredible : but they are mentioned to shew, that
our finding virtue to be hindered from procuring
to itself such superiority and adA^antages, is no ob
jection against its having, in the essential nature
of the thing, -a tendency to procure them. And
the suppositions noAV mentioned do plainly shew
this : for they shew, that these hindrances are so
far from being necessary, that Ave ourselves can
easily conceive hoAv they may be removed in future
states, and full scope be granted to virtue. And
all these advantageous tendencies of it are to be
considered as declarations of God in its faA'our.
This, however, is taking a pretty large corapass :
though it is certain, that, as the material world ap
pears to be, in a manner, boundless and immense,
there must be some scheme of Providence, vast in
proportion to it.

Chap. III. Government ofGod. 79
But let us return to the earth, our habitation j
and we shall see this happy tendency, by imagin
ing an instance not so vast and remote : by sup
posing a kingdom, or society of men, upon it,
perfectly virtuous, for a succession of many ages ;
Avhich, if you please, may be given a situation ad
vantageous for universal monarchy. In such a
state there would be no such thing as faction : but
men of the greatest capacity Avould of course, all
along, have the chief direction of affairs willingly
yielded to thera ; and they would share it among
themselves without envy. Each of these Avould
have the part assigned him, to Avhich his geniuS
was peculiarly adapted : and others, who had not
any distinguished genius, would be safe, and think
theraselves very happy, by being under the pro
tection and guidance of those Avho had. Pubhc
determinations would really be the result of the
united wisdom of the community : and they Avould
faithfully be executed, by the united strength of
it. Some would in a higher way contribute, but all
Avould in some Avay contribute, to the public pros--
perity : and in it each would enjoy the fruits of his
own virtue. And as injustice, Avhether by fraud
or force, would be unknown among themselves ;
so they would be sufficiently secured from it in
their neighbours. For cunning and false self-in
terest, confederacies in injustice, ever slight, and
accompanied Avith faction and intestine treachery;
these, on one hand, would be found mere childish
folly and weakness, Avhen set in opposition against
Avisdom, public spirit, union inviolable, and fidelity

80 Of the Moral Part. I.
on the other : allowing both a sufficient length of
years to try their force. Add the general influence,
which such a kingdora would have over the face of
the earth, by way of example particularly, and the
reverence which would be paid it. It would plainly
be superior to all others, and the world must gra
dually come under its empire : not by means of
lawless violence ; but partly by Avhat must be al
lowed to be just conquest ; and partly by other
kingdoms submitting themselves voluntarily to it,
throughout a course of ages, and claiming its pro
tection, one after another, in successive exigencies.
The head of it would be an universal monarch, in
another sense than any raortal has yet been ; and
the eastern style would be literally applicable to
him, that all people, nations, and languages should
serve him. And though indeed our knowledge of
human nature, and the whole history of mankind,
shew the impossibility, without some miraculous
interposition, that a number of men, here on earth,
.should unite in one society, or government, in the
fear of God and universal practice of virtue ; and
that such a government should continue so united
for a succession of ages : yet admitting, or suppo
sing, this, the effect would be as now drawn out.
And thus, for instance, the wonderful power and
prosperity promised to the Jewish nation in the
Scripture, Avould be, in a great measure, the con
sequence of what is predicted of them ; that the
" people should be all righteous, and inherit the
land for ever * :" were we to understand the latter
* Isa. lx, 21.

Chap. III. GoveriMent of God. 81
phrase of a long continuance only, sufficient to
giA^e things time to Avork. The predictions of this
kind, for there are many of them, cannot come to
pass, in the present known course of nature ; but
suppose them come to pass, and then the dominion
and pre-eminence promised must naturafly foHow,
to a very considerable degree.
Consider now, the general system of religion :
that the government of the Avorld is uniform, and
one, and moral; that virtue and right shall finally
have the advantage, and prevail over fraud and
lawless force, OA'er the deceits, as well as the vio
lence, df wickedness, under the conduct of one
supreme goA'ernor : and, from the observations
abov^e made, it Avill appear, that God has, by our
reason, given us to see a peculiar connection in the
several parts of this scheme, and a tendency to
wards the completion of it, arising out of the very
nature of Anrtue : Avhich tendency is to be consi
dered as somcAvhat moral in the essential constitu
tion of things. If any one should think all this
to be of little importance, I desire him to consider
Avhat he Avould think, if vice had, essentially and
in its nature, these ad A^antageous tendencies; orit
virtue had essentially the direct contrary ones.
But it may be objected, that, notwithstanding
all these natural effects, and these natural tenden
cies of virtue ; yet things may be noAV going on
throughout the universe, and may go on hereafter,
in the same mixt Avay as here at present upon
earth : virtue sometimes prosperous, sometimes' de
pressed ; vice sometimes punished, sometimes sue-

82 Of the Moral Part I.
cessful. The answer to Avhich is, that it is not the-
purpose of this chapter, nor of this treatise, pro
perly to prove God's perfect moral government
over the world, or the truth of religion ; but to
observe what there is in the constitution and course
of nature, to confinn the proper proof of it, sup-^
posed to be known : and that the Aveight of the
foregoing obserA^ations to this purpose may be thus
distinctly proved. Pleasure and pain are indeed to a
certain degree, say to a A'eryhigh degree, distributed
amongstus, Avithout any apparent regard to the merit
or demerit of characters. And Avere there nothing
else, concerning this matter, discernible in the con
stitution and course of nature, there would be no
ground, from the constitution and course of na
ture, to hope or to fear, that men would be re-
Avarded or punished hereafter according to their
deserts : Avhich hoAvever, it is to be remarked, im
plies, that even then there would be no ground,
from appearances, to think, that vice, upon the
Avhole, would have the advantage, rather than that
virtue would. And thus the proof of a future state
of retribution Avould rest upon the usual known
arguments for it : Avhich are, I think, plainly un
answerable ; and would be so, though there were
no additional confirmation of them from the thino-s
above insisted on. But these things are a very
strong confirmation of them. For,
First, They shew, that the Author of Nature is
not indifferent to virtue and vice. They amount
to a declaration from him, determinate, and not
to be evaded, in favour of one, and against the

Chap. iii. Government of God. 89
other : such a declaration, as there is nothing to
be set over against, or answer, on the part of vice.
So that Avere a man, laying aside the proper proof
of religion, to determine from the course of nature
only, Avhether it Avere most probable, that the
righteous or the wicked Avould have the advantage
in a future life ; there can be no doubt, but that
he would determine the probability to be, that the
former Avould. The course of nature, then, in the
view of it now given, furnishes us with a real prac
tical proof of the obligations of rehgion,
Secondly, When, conformably to what religion
teaches us, God shall reAvard and punish virtue
and vice, as such, so as that every one shall, upon
the whole, have his deserts ; this distributive jus
tice Avill not be a thing different in kind, but only
in degree, from what Ave experience in his present
government. It Avill be that in effect, toward
Avhich Ave noAv see a tendency. It will be no more
than the completion of that moral government, the
principles and beginning of which have been shewn,
beyond all dispute, discernible in the present con
stitution and course of nature, iind from hence it
follOAVS, Thirdly, That, as under the natural government
of God, our experience of those kinds and degrees
of happiness and misery, Avhich we do experience
at present, giA^es just ground to hope for, and to
fear, higher degrees and other kinds of both in a
future state, supposing a future state admitted : so
under his moral gOA'^ernment, our experience, that
virtue and vice are, in the manners above-men-

84 Of the Moral Part L
tioned, actually rewarded and punished at present,
in a certain degree, gives just ground to hope and
to fear, that they may be rewarded and punished
in an higher degree hereafter. It is acknowledged,
indeed, that this alone is not sufficient ground to
think, that they actually will be rewarded and pu
nished in a higher degree, rather than in a lower :
but then.
Lastly, There is sulhcient ground to think so;
from the good and bad tendencies of virtue and
vice. For these tendencies are essential, and foun
ded in the nature of things : whereas the hindrances
to their becoming effect are, in numberless case?,
not necessary, but artificial only. Now it may be
much more strongly argued, that these tendencies;,
as well as the actual rewards and punishments, of
virtue and vice, which arise directly out of the
nature of things, will remain hereafter, than that
the accidental hindrances of them will. And if
these hindrances do not remain ; those rewards
and punishments cannot but be carried on much
further towards the perfection of moral govern
ment ; i. e. the tendencies of virtue and vice will
become effect : but when, or where, or in what
particular way, cannot be known at all, but by
revelation. Upon the whole : there is a kind of moral go
vernment implied in God's natural government * :
virtue and vice are naturally rewarded and punish
ed as beneficial and mischievous to society -j- ; and
* Page 61. t Page 62.

Chap. III. Goternment ofGod. 85
rcAvarded and punished directly as virtue and vice*.
The notion, then, of a moral scheme of govern
ment is not fictitious, but natural; for it is sugges
ted to our thoughts by the constitution and course
of nature : and the execution of this scheme is ac
tually begun, in the instances here mentioned.
And these things are to be considered as a decla
ration of the Author of Nature, for virtue, and
against vice : they give a credibihty to the suppoT
sition of their being rewarded and punished here
after ; and also ground to hope and to fear, that
they may be rewarded and punished in higher
degrees than they are here. And as all this is
confirmed, so the argument for rehgion, from the
constitution and course of nature, is carried on
farther, by observing, that there are natural ten
dencies, and, in innumerable cases, only artificial
hindrances, to this moral scheme's being carried on
much farther towards perfection than it is at pre
sent -f". The notion, then, of a moral scheme of
government, much more perfect than Avhat is seen,
is not a fictitious, but a natural notion ; for it is
suggested to our thoughts, by the essential ten^
denciei of virtue and vice. And these tendencies
are to be considered as intimations, as implicit
promises and threatenings, from the Author of
Nature, of much greater rewards and punishments
to follow virtue and Ance, than do at present. And,
indeed, every natural tendency, which is to con-
¦^nue, but whicli is hindered from becoming eflect
* Page QS, &c. f Page 72, &c.

86 Of the Moral Government of God. Part I.
by only accidental causes, affords a presumption,
that such tendency AviH, some time or other, be
come effect : a presumption in degree proportion
able to the length of the duration, through Avhich
such tendency Avill continue. And from these
things together arises a real presumption, that the
moral scheme of government, established in nature,
shall be carried on much farther tOAvards perfection
hereafter ; and, I think, a presutnption that it will
be absolutely corapleted. But froni these things,
joiried with the moral nature which God has given
us, considered as given us by him, arises a practi
cal proof* that it will be Completed: a proof from
fact; and therefore a distinct one from that, Avhich
is deduced from the eternal and unalterable rela
tions, the fitness and unfitness of actions.
* See this proof drawn out brie/ly. Ch. vi.

CHAP. IV.
Of a state of Probation, as implying Trial, Diffi
culties, and Dqnger.
Ihe general doctrine of religion, that our present
life is a state of probation for a future one, com
prehends under it several particular things, distinct
from each other. But the first, and most common
meaning of it, seems to be, that our future interest
is noAV depending, and depending upon ourselves ;
that Ave have scope and opportunities here for that
good and bad behaviour, Avhich God Avill reward
and punish hereafter ; together with temptations to
one, as Avell as inducements of reason to the other.
And this is, in great measure, the same with say
ing, that we are under the moral government of
God, and to give an account of our actions to him.
For the notion of a future account, and general
righteous judgment, iraplies some sort of tempta
tions to what is wrong: otherwise there would be
no moral possibility of doing Avrong, nor ground
for judgment or discrimination. But there is this
difference, that the vford^ probation is more distinct
ly and particularly expressive of allureraents to
Avrong, or difficulties in adhering uniformly to

as Of a State of Trial. PartL
what is right, and of the danger of miscarrying by
such temptations, than the words moral govern
ment. A state of probation, then, as thus particu
larly implying in it trial, difficulties, and danger,
may require to be considered distinctly by itself
And as the moral government of God, which
religion teaches us, implies, that Ave are in a state
of trial, with regard to a future Avorld; so also his
natural government over us implies, that we are in a
state of trial, in the like sense, with regard to the
present world. Natural government, by rewards
and punishments, as much implies natural trial, as
moral gOA'^ernment does moral trial. The natural
government of God, here meant *, consists in his
annexing pleasure to some actions, and pain to
others, Avhich are in our power to do or forbear,
and in giving u.s notice of such appointment be
forehand. This necessarily implies, that lie has
made our happiness and misery, or our interest, to
depend in part upon ourselves. And so far as men
have temptations tq any course of action, Avhich
will probably occasion them greater temporal in
convenience and uneasiness than satisfaction ; so
far their temporal interest is in danger froin them
selves, or they are in a state of trial with respect
to it. Noav people often blame others, and even
themselves, for their misconduct in their temporal
concerns. And we find many are greatly Avanting
to themselves, and miss of that natural happiness,
Avhich they might have obtained in the present life:
perhaps CA'ery one does in sorae degree. But many
* Chap. ii.

Chap. IV. Ofa State of Trial. 89
run theraselves into great inconvenience, and into
extreme distress and misery : not through incapa
city of knowing better, and doing better for them
selves, which Avould be nothing to the present
purpose; but through their own fault. And these
things necessarily imply temptation, and danger of
miscarrying, in a greater or less degree, Avith re
spect to our worldly interest or happiness. Every
one, too, Avithout having rehgion in his thoughts,
speaks of the hazards Avhich young people run,
upon their setting out in the world : hazards from
other causes, than raerely their ignorance, and un
avoidable accidents. And some courses of vice, at
least, being contrary to men's worldly interest or
good; temptations to these must at the same, time
be temptations to forego our present and our future
interest. Thus, in our natural or temporal capa
city, Ave are in a state of trial, i. e. of difficulty and
danger, analogous, or like to our moral and reli
gious trial.
This will more distinctly appear to any one,
Avho thinks it worth whfle, raore distinctly, to
consider Avhat it is which constitutes our trial in
both capacities, and to observe how mankind be
have under it.
And that, which constitutes this our trial, in
both these capacities, raust be somewhat either in
our external circumstances, or in our nature. For,
on the one hand, persons may be betrayed into
wrong behaviour upon surprise, or overcome upon
any other very singular and extraordinary external
pccasions ; who Avould, otherAvise, have preserved

90 Ofa State of Trial. Part I .
their character of prudence and of virtue: in which
case, every one, in speaking of the wrong beha
viour of these persons, would impute it to such par
ticular external circumstances. And, on the other
hand, men, Avho have contracted habits of vice and
folly of any kind, or have some particular passions
in excess, will seek opportunities, and, as it were,
go out oftheir way, to gratify themselves in these
respects, at the expence of their wisdom and their
virtue ; led to it, as every one Avould say, not by
external temptations, but by such habits and pas
sions. And the account of this last case is, that
particular passions are no more coincident with
prudence, or that reasonable self-loA-e, the end of
Avhich is our Avorldly interest, than thej^ are Avitli
the principle of virtue and religion; but often draAV
contrary ways to one, as Avell as to the other : and
so such particular passions are as much tempta
tions to act imprudently Avith regard to our worldly
interest, as to act vitiously *. HoAvever, as when
we say, men are misled by external circumstances
of temptation, it cannot but be understood, that
there is somewhat within themselves to render those
circumstances temptations, or to render them sus
ceptible of impressions from them : so, Avhen we
say, they are misled by passions, it is ahvays sup
posed, that there are occasions, circumstances, and
objects, exciting these passions, and affording
means for gratifying them. And, therefore, temp
tations from within, and from without, coincide,
* See Sermons preached at the Rolls, 1726, 2d Ed, 205, &c.
Pref. p. 25, &c. Serm. p, 21, &c.

Chap. IV. Of a State of Trial 91
and mutually imply each other. Noav the several
external objects of the appetites, passions, and af
fections, being present to the senses, or offering
theraselves to the mind, and so exciting emotions
suitable to their nature ; not only in cases Avhere
they can be gratified consistently Avith innocence
and prudence, but also in cases Avhere they cannot,
and yet can be gratified imprudently and vitiously :
this as really puts them in danger of voluntarily
foregoing their present interest or good, as their
future ; and as really renders self-denial as neces
sary to secure one as the other : i. e. Ave are in a
like state of trial with respect to both, by the very
same passions, excited by the very same means.
Thus, mankind having a temporal interest depend
ing upon themselves, and a prudent course of be
haviour being necessary to secure it, passions in
ordinately excited, whether by means of example,
or by any other external circumstance, towards
such objects, at such times, or in such degrees,
as that they cannot be gratified consistently with
worldly prudence ; are temptations, dangerous, and
too often successful temptations, to forego a greater
teraporal good for a less ; i. e. to forego what is, upon
the whole, our teraporal interest, for the sake ofa
present gratification, This is a description of our
state of trial in our temporal capacity. Substitute
noAV the 'WOyA future for temporal, and virtue for
prudence, and it will be just as proper a descrip
tion of our state of trial in our rehgious capacity :
so analogous are they to each other,

92 Of a State of Trial. PartL
If, from considerations of this our like state of
trial in both capacities, we go on to observe farther,
how mankind behave under it ; Ave shall find there
are some, Avho have so little sense of it, that they
scarce look beyond the passing day : they are so
taken up with present gratifications, as to have, in
a manner, no feeling of consequences, no regard
to their future ease, or fortune, in this life ; any
more than to their happiness in another. Some
appear to be blinded and deceived by inordinate
passion, in their worldly concerns, as much as in
religion. Others are, not deceived, but, as it Avere,
forcibly carried away by the like passions, against
their better judgment, and feeble resolutions, too,
of acting better. And there are men, and truly
they are not a fcAv, who shamelessly avow, not their
interest, but their mere Avill and pleasure, to be
their law of hfe; and Avho, in open defiance of every
thing that is reasonable, will go on in a course of
vitious extravagance, foreseeing, with no remorse
and little fear, that it Avill be their temporal ruin ;
and some of them, under the apprehension of the
consequences of wickedness in another state. And,
to speak in the most moderate way, human crea
tures are not only continually liable to go wrong
voluntarily, but we see likcAvise that they often
actually do so, with respect to their temporal inte-
i^sts, as Avell as with respect to religion.
Thus, our difficulties and dangers, or our trials,
in our temporal and our religious capacity, as they
proceed from the same causes, and have the same

Chap. IV. Of a State of Trial. 93
effect upon men's behaviour, are evidently analo
gous, and of the same kind.
It may be added, that, as the difficulties and
dangers of miscarrying in our religious state of
trial are greatly increased, and one is ready to
think, in a manner Avholly made, by the iH beha
viour of others ; by a Avrong education, Avrong in a
moral sense, sometimes positively vitious ; by ge
neral bad example; by the dishonest artifices which
are got- into business of all kinds ; and, in very
many parts of the world, by religion's being cor
rupted into superstitions, which indulge men in
their vices : so, in like manner, the difficulties of
conducting ourselves prudently in respect to our
present interest, and our danger of being led aside
from pursuing it, are greatly increased by a foolish
education ; and, after we come to mature age, by
the extravagance and carelessness of others, whom
Ave have intercouise with ; and by mistaken no
tions, very generally prevalent, and taken up from
common opinion, concerning temporal happiness,
and wherein it consists. And persons, by their
own negligence and folly in their temporal affairs,
no less than by a course of vice, bring themselves
into new difficulties; and, by habits of indulgence,
become less qualified to go through them : and one
irregularity after another embarrasses things to
such a degree, that they know not Avhereabout
they are ; and often makes the path of conduct so
intricate and perplexed, that it is difficult to trace
it out ; difficult even to determine what is the pru
dent or the moral part. Thus, for instance, wrong

94 Of a State of Trial. PartL
behaviour in one stage of life, youth ; Avrong, I
mean, considering ourselves only in our temporal
capacity, without taking in rehgion; this, in seve
ral ways, increases the difficulties of right beha
viour in mature age ; i. e. puts us into more dis
advantageous state of trial in our temporal capa
city. We are an inferior part of the creation of God.
There are natural appearances of our being in a state
of degradation *. And we certainly are in a con
dition, Avhich does not seem, by any means, the
most advantageous Ave could imagine or desire, ei
ther in our natural or moral capacity, for securing
either our present or future interest. However, this.
condition, low, and careful, and uncertain as it is,
does not afford any just ground of complaint. For,
as men may manage their temporal affairs Avith
prudence, and so pass their days here, on earth, in
tolerable ease and satisfaction, by a moderate de
gree of care ; so, likewise, with regard to religion,
there is no more required than what they are well
able to do, and what they must be greatly Avanting
to themselves if they neglect. And for persons to
have that put upon them, which they are Avell able
to go through, and no more, we naturally consider
as an equitable thing ; supposing it done by pro
per authority. Nor have we any more reason to
complain of it, Avith regard to the Author of Na
ture, than of his not having given us other advan
tages, belonging to other orders of creatures.
* Part II. Ch. V,

Chap. IV. Of a State of Trial. 95
But the thing here insisted upon is, that the
state of trial, which rehgion teaches us we are in,
is rendered credible, by its being throughout uni-r
form and of a piece Avitli the general conduct of
ProA'idence tOAvards us, in all other respects Avithin
the compass of our knowledge. Indeed, if man
kind, considered in their natural capacity, as inha
bitants of this world only, found themselves, from
their birth to their death, in a settled state of se
curity and happiness, Avithout any solicitude or
thought of their own : or, if they were in no danger
of being brought into inconA'eniences and distress,
by carelessness, or the folly of passion, through
bad example, the treachery of others, or the de
ceitful appearances of things : were this our natural
condition, then it might seera strange, and be some
presumption against the truth of religion, that it
represents our future and more general interest, as
not secure of course, but as depending upon our
behaviour, and rcquiring recollection and self-go
vernment to obtain it. For it might be alledged,
" What you say is our condition in one respect, is
not in any wise of a sort with what we find, by
experience, our condition is in another. Our whole
present interest is secured to our hands, Avithout
any solicitude of ours ; and why should not our
future interest, if we have any such, be so too ?"
But since, on the contrary, thought and consi
deration, the voluntary denying ourseh^es many
things which we desire, and a course of behaviour,
far from being always agreeable to us, are abso
lutely necessary to our acting even a common de^

96 Ofa Stats of Trial. Part I.
cent, and common prudent part, so as to pass
with any satisfaction through the present world,
and be received upon any tolerable good terms
in it: since this is the case, all presumption against
self-denial and attention being necessary to secure
our hie-her interest is removed. Had we not ex-
perience, it might, perhaps speciously, be urged,
that it is improbable any kind of hazard and dan
ger should be put upon us by an infinite Being ;
when every thing Avhich is hazard and danger in
our manner of conception, and Avill end in error,
confusion, and misery, is now already certain in
his fore-knowledge. And, indeed, why any thing
of hazard and danger should be put upon such
frail creatures as we are, may well be thought a
difficulty in speculation ; and cannot but be so,
till we knoAV the whole, or, howcA^er, much more
of the case. But still the constitution of nature is
as it is. Our happiness and misery are trusted to
our conduct, and made to depend upon it. Some-
Avhat, and, in many circumstances, a great deal
too, is put upon us, either to do, or to suffer, as we
chuse. And all the various miseries of life, which
people bring upon themselves by negligence and
folly, and might have avoided by proper care, are
instances of this : which miseries are beforehand,
just as contingent and undeterrained as their con
duct, and left to be deterrained by it.
These observations are an answer to the objec
tions against the credibility of a state of trial, as
implying temptations, and real danger of miscar
rying, Avith regard to our general interest, under

Chap. IV. Of a State of Trial. 97
the moral government of God : and they shew,
that, if we are at all to be considered in such a
capacity, and as having such an interest, the ge
neral analogy of Providence must lead us to appre
hend ourselves in danger of miscarrying, in differ
ent degrees, as to this interest, by our neglecting
to act the proper part belonging to us in that ca
pacity. For we have a present interest, under the
government of God which we experience here up
on earth. And this interest, as it is not forced
upon us, so neither is it offered to our acceptance,
but to our acquisition ; in such sort, as that we
are in danger of missing it, by means of tempta
tions to neglect, or act contrary it : and without
attention and self-denial, must and do raiss of it.
It is then perfectly credible, that this raay be our
case, with respect to that chief and final good,
Avhich religion proposes to us.

G

98 Of a State of PartL

CHAP. V.
Of a State of Probation, as intended for Moral
Discipline and Improvement.
From the consideration of our being in a proba
tion-state, of so much difficulty and hazard, na
turally arises the question, hpw we came to be
placed in it. But such a general inquiry as this
would be found involved in insuperable difficulties.
For, though some of these difficulties would be
lessened by observing, that all wickedness is vo
luntary, as is implied in its very notion ; and that
many of the miseries of life have apparent good
effects: yet, when we consider other circumstances
belonging to both, and what must be the conse
quence of the former in a life to come ; it cannot
but be acknowledged plain folly and presuraption,
to pretend to give an account of the whole reasons
of this matter : the whole reasons of our being
allotted a condition, out of which so much Avick-
edness and misery, so circumstanced, would in fact
arise. Whether it be not beyond our faculties,
not only to find out, but even to understand, the
whole account of this : or, though Ave should be
supposed capable of understanding it, yet, whether

Chap. V. Moral Discipline, 99
it would be of service or prejudice to us to be in
forraed of it, is impossible to say. But as our
present condition can in no Avise be shcAvn incon
sistent with the perfect moral governmentof God;
so religion teaches us we are placed in it, that we
might qualify ourselves, by the practice of virtue,
for another state, which is to follow it. And this,
though but a partial answer, a very partial one
indeed, to the inquiry now mentioned ; yet, is a
more satisfactory answer to another, which is of
real, and of the utmost importance to us to have
answered : the enquiry. What is our business here ?
The knoAvn end, then, why we are placed in a statd
of so much affliction, hazard, and difficulty, is,
our improvement in virtue and piety, as the requi
site qualification for a fliture state of security and
happiness. Noav, the beginning of life, considered as an
education for mature age in the present world, ap
pears plainly, at first sight, analogous to this our
trial for a future one : the former being in our
temporal capacity, what the latter is in our reli
gious capacity; But some observations common
to both of them, and a more distinct consideration
of each, will raore distinctly shew the extent and
force of the analogy between thera ; and the cre
dibility, which arises from hence, as well as from
the nature of the thing, that the present life was
intended to be a state of discipline for a future!
one. I. Every species of creatures is, we see, designed
for a particular Avay of life ; to which, the nature.

100 Ofa State of Part L
the capacities, temper, and qualifications, of each
species, are as necessary as their external circum
stances. Both come into the notion of such state,
or particular way of life, and are constituent parts
of it. Change a man's capacities or character to
the degree in which it is conceivable they may be
changed, and he AVould be altogether incapable of
a human course of life, and human happiness ; as
incapable as if, his nature continuing unchanged,
he were placed in a Avorid, where he had no sphere
of action, nor any objects to answer his appetites,
passions, and affections of any sort. One thing is
set over against another, as an antient writer ex
presses it. Our nature corresponds to our external
condition. Without this correspondence, there
would be no possibility of any such thing as hu
man life and human happiness : which life and
happiness are, therefore, a result from our nature
and condition jointly : meaning by huraan life,
not living in the literal sense, but the whole com
plex notion commonly understood by those words.
So that, without determining what will be the em
ployment and happiness, the particular life, of good
men hereafter, there must be some determinate ca
pacities, some necessary character and qualifica
tions, without which persons cannot but be utterly
incapable of it : in like manner, as there raust be
sorae, without which men would be incapable of
their present state of life.. Now,
II. The constitution of human creatures, and
indeed of all creatures which come under our no
tice, is such, as that they are capable of naturally

Chap. V. Moral Discipline. 101
becoming qualified for states of life, for Avhich they
were once Avholly unqualified. In imagination we
may indeed conceive of creatures, as incapable of
having any of their faculties naturally enlarged, or
as being unable naturally to acquire any new qua
lifications : but the faculties of every species known
to us are made for enlargement ; for acquireraents
of experience and habits. We find ourselves, in
particular, indued with capacities, not only of per
ceiving ideas, and of knowledge or perceiving
truth, but also of storing up our ideas and knoW'-
ledge by memory. We are capable, not only of
acting, and of having different momentary impres
sions made upon us, but of getting a new facility
in any kind of action, and of settled alterations in
our temper or character. The power of the two
last is the power of habits. But neither the per
ception of ideas, nor knoAvledge of any sort, are
habits, though absolutely necessary to the forming
of them. However, apprehension, reason, memo
ry, which are the capacities of acquiring know-
Jedge, are greatly improved by exercise. Whether
the word habit is applicable to all these improve
ments, and, in particular, how far the powers of
memory and of habits may be powers of the same
nature, I shall not inquire. But that perceptions
come into our minds readily and of course, "by
means of their having been there before, seems a
thing ofthe same sort, as readiness in any particu
lar kind of action, proceeding from being accus
tomed, to it. And aptness to recoHect practical
observations of service in our conduct, is plainly

102 Of a State of PartL
habit in many, cases. There are habits of per
ception, and habits of action. An instance of
the former, is our constant and even involuntary
readiness, in correcting the impressions of our sight
concerning magnitudes and distances, so as to
substitute judgment in the room of sensation, im
perceptibly to ourselves. And it seems as if all
other associations of ideas, not naturally connect
ed, raight be called passive habits ; as properly as
our readiness in understanding languages upon
sight, or hearing of words. And our readiness in
speaking and writing thera is an instance of the
latter, of active habits. For distinctness, we may
consider habits as belonging to the body or the
mind ; and the latter will be explained by the
former. Under the former are comptehendted all
bodily activities or raotions, whether graceful or
unbecoming, which are owing to use : under the
latter, general habits of life and conduct ; such as
those of obedience and submission to authority, or
to any particular person; those of veracity, justice,
and charity ; those of attention, industry, self-go
vernment, envy, revenge. And habits of this
latter kind seem produced by repeated acts, as
well as the former, And in like manner, as habits
belonging to the body are produced by external
acts, so habits of the mind are produced by the
exertion of inward practical principles, i. e. by
carrying them into act, or acting upon them ; the
principles of obedience, of veracity, justice, and
charity. Nor can those habits be forraed by any

Chap. V- Moral Discipline. 103
external course of action, otherwise than as it pro
ceeds frora these principles : because it is only these
inward principles exerted, which are strictly acts
ofobedience, of veracity, of justice, and of charity.
So, likewise, habits of attention, industry, self-go
vernment, are, in the same manner, acquired by
exercise ; and habits of euA'y and revenge by in
dulgence, Avhether in outward act, or in thought
and intention, i. e. inward act : for such intention
is an act. Resolutions also to do Avell are properly
acts. And endeavouring to enforce upon our own
minds a practical sense of virtue, or to beget in
others that practical sense of it, which a man really
has himself, is a virtuous act. All these, therefore
may and will contribute towards forming good ha
bits. But going over the theory of virtue in one's
thoughts, talking weH, and drawing fine pictures
of it; this is so far. from necessarily or certainly
conducing to forra an habit of it in hira Avho thus
employs himself, that it may harden the mind in a
contrary course, and render it gradually more in
sensible, i. e. form an habit of insensibility to all
moral considerations. For, from our very faculty
of habits, passive impressions, by being repeated,
grow weaker. Thoughts, by often passing through
the mind, are felt less sensibly : being accustoraed
to danger, begets intrepidity, i. e. lessens fear ; to
distress, lessens the passion of pity; to instances of
others raortality, lessens the sensible apprehension
of our own. And from the.se two observations
together ; that practical habits are formed and
strengthened by repeated acts, and that passive im-

104 Of a State of Partl.
pressions grow weaker by being repeated upon us ;
it must follow, that active habits may be gradually
forming and strengthening, by a course of acting
upon such and such motives and excitements, whilst
these motives and excitements themselves are, by
proportionable degrees, growing less sensible, i. e.
are continually less and less sensibly felt, even as
the active habits strengthen. And experience con
firms this ; for active principles, at the very time
that they are less lively in perception than they
were, are found to be, some how, wrought more
thoroughly into the temper and character, and be
come more effectual in influencing our practice.
The three things just mentioned may afford in
stances of it. Perception of danger is a natural ex
citement of passive fear and active caution : and,
by being inured to danger, habits of the latter are
gradually Avrought, at the sarae tirae that the forraer
gradually lessens. Perception of distress in others
is a natural exciteraent, passively to pity, and ac
tively to relieve it : but let a raan set himself to
attend to, inquire out, and relieve distressed per
sons, and he cannot but grow less and less sensibly
affected with the various miseries of life, with Avhich
he must become acquainted ; Avhen yet, at the same
time, benevolence, considered not as a passion, but
as a practical principle of action, will strengthen :
and whilst he passively compassionates the distres
sed less, he will acquire a greater aptitude actively
to assist and befriend them. So also, at the same
time that the daily instances of mens dying around
us give us daily a less sensible passive feeling, or

Chap. V. Moral Discipline. 105
apprehension, of our oAvn mortality, such instances
greatly contribute to the strengthening a practical
regard to it in serious men ; i. e. to forming an ha
bit of acting with a constant view to it. And this
seems again further to shew, that passive impres
sions made upon our minds by admonition, expe
rience, exaraple, though they may have a reraote
efficacy, and a very great one, towards forming
active habits, yet can have this efficacy no other
wise than by inducing us to such a course of action;
and that it is, not being affected so and so, but act
ing, Avhich forras those habits : only it raust be al
ways reraerabered, that real endeavours to enforce
good impressions upon ourselves, are a species of
virtuous action. Nor do we know how far it is
possible, in the nature of things, that effects should
be wrought in us at once, equivalent to habits, i. e.
what is wrought 'by use and exercise. However,
the thing insisted upon is, not what raay be possi
ble, but what is in fact the appointment of nature;
which is, that active habits are to be forraed by ex
ercise. Their progress may be so gradual, as to be
imperceptible in its steps : it may be hard to explain
the faculty, by which we are capable of habits,
throughout its several parts ; and to trace it up to
its original, so as to distinguish it from all others
in our mind : and it seems as if contrary effects
were to be ascribed to it. But the thing in gene
ral, that our nature is formed to yield, in some such
manner as this, to use and exercise, is matter of
certain experience.

106 Of a State of PartL
Thus, by accustoming ourselves to any course of
action, we get an aptness to go on, a facility, rea
diness, and often pleasure in it. The inclinations
Avhich rendered us averse to it grow weaker : the
difficulties in it, not only the imaginary, but the
real ones, lessen : the reasons for it offer themselves
of course to our thoughts upon all occasions : and
the least glimpse of them is sufficient to make us go
•on in a course of action, to Avhich we have been
accustomed. And practical principles appear to
grow stronger, absolutely in themselves, by exer
cise ; as Avell as relatively, Avith regard to contrary
principles; which, by being accustomed to submit,
do so habitually, and of course. And thus a new
character, in several respects, raay be formed ; and
many habitudes of life, not given by nature, but
which nature directs us to acquire.
III. Indeed we may be assured, that we should
never have had these capacities of improving by
experience, acquired knoAvledge and habits, had
they not been necessary, and intended to be raade
use of And accordingly we find them so neces
sary, and so much intended, that without them we
should be utterly incapable of that, which was the
end for which Ave were made, considered in our
temporal capacity only : the eraployraents and sa
tisfactions of our mature state of life.
Nature does in no Avise qualify us wholly, much
less at once, for this mature state of life. Even
raaturity of understanding and bodily strength are
not only arrived to gradually, but are also very
much owing to the continued exercise of our powers

Chap. V. Moral Discipline. 107
of body and mind from infancy. But if we sup
pose a person brought into the world Avith both
these in maturity, as far as this is conceivable ; he
Avould plainly at first be as unqualified for the hu
man life of mature age as an idiot. He would be in
a manner distracted with astonishment, and appre
hension, and curiosity, and suspense : nor can one
guess how long it would be before he would^e fa
miliarized to himself and the objects about him
enough, even to set himself to any thing. It may
be questioned too, whether the natural information
of his sight and hearing would be of any manner of
use at all to him in acting, before experience. And
it seems, that men would be strangely headstrong
and self-willed, and disposed to exert themselves
with an impetuosity, which would render society
insupportable, and the living in it impracticable ;
were it not for some acquired moderation and self-
government, some aptitude and readiness in re
straining themselves, and concealing their sense of
things. Want of every thing of this kind, Avhich
is learnt, would render a man as uncapable of so
ciety, as want of language would ; or as his natu
ral ignorance of any of the particular employments
of life would render him uncapable of providing
himself with the common conveniences, or supply
ing the necessary Avants of it. In these respects,
and probably in many more, of Avhich Ave have no
particular notion, mankind is left, by nature, an
unformed, unfinished creature ; utterly deficient
and unqualified, before the acquirement of know
ledge, experience, and habits, for that mature state

108 Ofa State of Part I.
of life, which Vas the end of his creation, consi
dering him as related only to this world.
But then, as nature has endued us with a power of
supplying those deficiencies, by acquired knowledge,
experience, and habits ; so, likewise, we are placed
in a condition, in infancy, childhood, and youth,
fitted for it; fitted for our acquiring those qualifica
tions of all sorts, which we stand in need of in ma
ture ^e. Hence children, from their very birth,
are daily growing acquainted with the objects about
them, AVith the scene in which they are placed, and
to have a future part ; and learning somewhat or
other, necessary to the performance of it. The sub
ordinations, to which they are accustomed in do
mestic life, teach them self-government in comraon
behaviour abroad, and prepare thera for subjection
and obedience to civil authority. What passes be
fore their eyes, and daily happens to them, gives
them experience, caution against treachery and de
ceit, together with numberless little rules of action
and conduct, which we could not live without, and
which are learnt so insensibly and so perfectly, as
to be mistaken perhaps for instinct ; though they
are the effect of long experience and exercise ; as
much so as language, or knowledge in particular
business, or the qualifications and behaviour be
longing to the several ranks and professions. Thus,
the beginning of our days is adapted to be, and is,
a state of education in the theory and practice of
mature life. We are much assisted in it by exara
ple, instruction, and the care of others: but a great
deal is left to ourselves to do. And of this^ as part

Chap. V. Moral Discipline. 109
is done easily and of course ; so part requires di
ligence and care, the voluntary foregoing raany
things which we desire, and setting ourselves to
what we should have no inchnation to, but for the
necessity or expedience of it. For, that labour and
industry, whicli the station of so many absolutely
requires, they would be greatly unqualified for in
maturity ; as those in other stations would be, for
any other sorts of application ; if both were not
accustomed to them in their youth. Arid accord
ing as persons behave themselves, in the general
education which all go through, and in the parti
cular ones adapted to particular employments ; their
character is formed, and made appear; they recom
mend themselves more or less ; and are capable of,
and placed in, different stations in the society of
mankind. The former part of life, then, is to be considered
as an important opportunity, which nature puts
into our hands ; and which, when lost, is not to be
recovered. And our being placed in a state of dis
cipline throughout this life, for another world, is a
providential disposition of things, exactly of the
same kind as our being placed in a state of disci
pline during childhood, for mature age. Our con
dition in both respects is uniform and of a piece,
and comprehended under one and the same gene
ral law of nature.
And if we were not able at all to discern how or
in what way the present life could be our prepara
tion for another, this would be no objection against
the credibility of its being so. For we do not

110 Of a State of PartL
discern how food and sleep contribute to the growth
of the body : nor could have any thought that they
would, before we had experience. Nor do children
at all think, on the one hand, that the sports and
exercises, to which they are so much addicted, con
tribute to their health and growth; nor, on the
other, of the necessity which there is for their being
restrained in them : nor are they capable of under
standing the use of many parts of discipline, Avhich
nevertheless they must be made to go through, in
order to qualify them for the business of mature
age. Were we not able, then, to discover in what
respects the present life could forra us for a future
one ; yet nothing would be more supposeable than
that it might, in som.e respects or other, from the
general analogy of providence. And this, for ought
I see, might reasonably be said, even though Ave
should not take in the consideration of God's moral
government over the world. But,
IV. Take in this consideration, and consequent
ly, that the character of virtue and piety is a ne
cessary qualification for the future state ; and then
we may distinctly see how, and in what respects, the
present life raay be a preparation for it : since we
xvant, and are capable of improvement in that
character, by moral and religious habits ; and the
present life is fit to be a state of discipline for such
improvement : in hke raanner as we have already
observed, how, and in what respects, infancy,,
childhood, and youth, are a necessary preparation,
and a natural state of discipline, for mature ao-e.

Chap. V. Moral Discipline. 1 1 1
Nothing which we at present see would lead us
to, the thought of a solitary inactive state hereafter:
but, if we judge at all from the analogy of nature,
we must suppose, according to the Scripture ac
count of it, that it will be a community. And there is
no shadow of any thing unreasonable in conceiving,
though there be no analogy for it, that this com
munity will be, as the Scriptiire represents it, under
the more immediate, or, if such an expression may
be Used, the more sensible government of God.
Nor is our ignorance, what will be the employments
of this happy community, nor our cqnsequent ig
norance, what particular scope or occasion there
will be for the exercise of veracity, justice, and cha
rity, amongst the merabers of it with regard to
each other ; any proof that there will be no sphere
of exercise for those virtues. Much less, if that
Avere possible, is our ignorance any proof that there
will be no occasion for that frame of mind, or cha
racter, which is formed by the daily practice of
those particular virtues here, and which is a result
from it. This at least must be owned in generalj
that, as the government established in the universe
is moral, the character of virtue and piety must, in
some way or other, be the condition of our happi
ness, or the qualification for it.
Now, from what is above observed concernina:
our natural power of habits, it is easy to see, that
we are capable of moral improvement by discipline.
And how greatly we want it, need not be proved to
any one who is acquainted with the great wicked
ness of mankind; or even Avith those imperfections,

112 Ofa State of Part L
which the best are conscious of. But it is not per
haps distinctly attended to by every one, that the
occasion which human creatures have for discipline,
to improve in them this character of virtue and
piety, is to be traced up higher than to excess in
the passions, by indulgence and habits of vice.
Mankind, and perhaps all finite creatures, from the
very constitution of their nature, before habits of
virtue, are deficient, and in danger of deviating
from what is right : and therefore stand in need of
virtuous habits, for a security against this danger.
For, together with the general principle of moral
understanding, we have in our inward frame va
rious aflfections toAvards particular external objects.
These affections are naturally, and of right, subject
to the government of the moral principle, as to the
occasions upon which they may be gratified ; as to
the times, degrees, and manner, in which the ob
jects of them may be pursued : but then the prin
ciple of virtue can neither excite them, nor prevent
their being excited. On the contrary, they are
naturally felt, when the objects of them are present
to the mind, not only before all consideration, whe
ther they can be obtained by lawful means, but
after it is found they cannot. For the natural ob
jects of affection continue so: the necessaries, con
veniences, and pleasures of life, remain naturally
desireable ; though they cannot be obtained inno
cently : nay, though they cannot possibly be ob
tained at all. And when the objects of any affec
tion whatever cannot be obtained Avithout unlawful
means; but may be obtained by them : such affec-

Chap, V. Moral Discipline. 113
tion, though its being excited, and its continuing
some time in the mind, be it as innocent as it is
natural and necessary ; yet cannot but be con
ceived to have a tendency to incline persons to
venture upon such unlawful means : and therefore
must be conceived as putting theni in some danger
of it. Now, Avhat is the general security against
this danger, against their actually deviating from
right ? As the danger is, so also riiiist the security
be, from within ; from the practical principle of
virtue *. And the strengthening or improving this
principle, considered as practical, or as a principle
of action, Avill lessen the danger, or increa.se the
security against it. And this moral principle is
capable of improvement, by proper disciphne and
* It may be thought, that a sense of interest would as effectually
restrain creatures from doing wrong. But if, by a sense of inter
est, is meant a speculative conviction, or belief, that such and
such indulgence would occasion them greater uneasiness, upo^
the whole, than satisfaction ; it is contra,ry to present experience
to say, that this sense of interest is sufficient to reislrain them from
thus indulging themselves. And if, by a sense Of interest, is
meant a practical regard to what is upon the whole our happiness :
this is not only coincident with the principle of virtue, or moral
rectitude, but is a part of the idea itself. And it is evident this
reasonable self love wants to,be improved, as really as any prin
ciple in our nature. For, we daily see it overmatched, not only
by tfie more boisterous passions, but by curiosity, shame, love of
imitation, by any thing, even indolence : especially if the interest,
the temporal interest, suppose, vvhich is the end of such self-love,
be at a distance. So greatly are profligate men mistaken, when
they affirm they are wholly governed by inter^stedness and self-
love. And so little cause is there for moralists to disclaim thi&
principle. See p. 89, QO. H

114 Of a State of PartL
exercise : by recollecting the practical impressions
which example and experience have made upon us :
and, instead of following humour and mere incli
nation, by continually attending to the equity and
right of the case, in whatever Ave are engaged, be
it in greater or less matters: and accustoming our
selves always to act upon it ; as being itself the
just and natural motive of action: and as this rao
ral course of behaviour must necessarily, under
divine government, be our final interest. Thus the
principle of virtue, improved into an habit, of
which improvement we are thus capable, will plainly
he, in proportion to the strength of it, a security
against the danger which finite creatures are in,
from the very nature of propension, or particular.
affections. This way of putting the matter sup
poses particular affections to remain in a future
state; which it is scarce possible to avoid sup
posing. And if they do, Ave clearly see, that ac
quired habits of virtue and self-government may
be necessary for the regulation of them. .How
ever, though Ave Avere not distinctly to take in this
supposition, but to speak only in general, the
thing really comes to the same. For habits of
virtue, thus acquired by discipline, are improve
ment in virtue ; and improvement in virtue must
be advancement in happiness, if the government
of the universe be moral.
From these things we may observe, and it AviU
farther shcAv this our natural and original need of
being improved by disciphne, how it comes to
pass, that creatures, made upright, fall ; and that

Chap. V. Moral Discipline. 115
those AA-^ho preserve their uprightness, by so doing-
raise themselves to a more secure state of virtue.
To say that the former is accounted for by the na
ture of liberty, is to say no more, than that an
event's actually happening is accounted for by a
mere possibility of its happening. But it seems
distinctly conceivable frora the very nature of par
ticular affections or propensions. For, suppose
creatures intended for such a particular state of
life, for Avhich such propensions were necessary :
suppose them endued Avith such propensions, to
gether with moral understanding, as weH including
a practical sense of A^irtue, as a speculative percep
tion of it ; and that all these several principles,
both natural and moral, forming an inward consti
tution of mind, were in the most exact proportion
possible; i. e. in a proportion the raost exactly
adapted to their intended state of life ; such crea
tures would be made upright, or finitely perfect.
Noav, particular propensions, from their very na
ture, must be felt, the objects of them being pre
sent ; though they cannot be gratified at all, or
not Avith the alloAvance of the moral principle.
But if they can be gratified without its allowance,
or by contradicting it ; then they must be con
ceived to have some tendency, in how low a de
gree soever, yet some tendency, to induce persons
to such forbidden gratification. This tendency,
in sorae one particular propension, may be in
creased, by the greater frequency of occasions na
turally exciting it, than of occasions exciting others.
The least voluntary indulgence in forbidden cir-

116 Of a State of PartL
curastances, though but in thought, will increase
this wrong tendency ; and may increase it further,
till, peculiar conjunctures perhaps conspiring, it
becomes effect ; and danger of deviating from
right, ends in actual, deviation from it : a danger
necessarily arising from the very nature of propen
sion ; and Avhich, therefore, could not have been
prevented, though it raight have been escaped, or
got innocently through. The case would be, as if
we were to suppose a strait path raarked out for a
person, in which such a degree of attention would
keep him steady : but if he would not attend in
this degree, any one of a thousand objects, catch
ing his eye, might lead him out of it. Now, it is
impossible to say, how much even the first full
overt act of irregularity might disorder the inward
constitution, unsettle the adjustments, and alter
the proportions, which forraed it, and in which
the uprightness of its make consisted : but repeti
tion of irregularities would produce habits. And
thus the constitution would he spoiled ; and crea
tures, made upright, become corrupt and depraved
in their settled character, proportionably to their
repeated irregularities in occasional acts. But on
the contrary, these creatures might have improved
and raised themselves, to an higher and raore secure
state of virtue, by the contrary behaviour : by stea
dily following the moral principle, supposed to be
one part of their nature ; and thus withstanding
that unavoidable danger of defection, which neces
sarily arose from propension, the other part of it
For, by thus preserving their integrity for soine

Chap. V. Moral Discipline. 117
tirae, their danger would lessen; since propensions,
by being inured tb subrait, would do it raore easily
and of course : and their security ag-ainst this les
sening danger Avould increase; since the raoral
principle would gain additional strength by exer
cise: both which things are iraplied in the notion
of virtuous habits. Thus, then, Ancious indulgence
is not only criminal in itself, but also depraves the
inward constitution and character. And virtuous
self-government is not only right in itself^ but also
iraproves the inward constitution or character:
and may iraprove it to such a degree, that though
Ave should suppose it irapossible for particular af
fections to be absolutely coincident with the raoral
principle ; and consequently should allow, that
such creatures as have been above supposed would
for ever reraain defectible ; yet their danger of ac
tually deviating from right may be almost infi
nitely lessened, and they fully fortified against what
remains of it : if that may be called danger, against
which there is an adequate effectual security. But
still, this their higher perfection may coritinue to
consist in habits of virtue formed in a state of dis
ciphne, and this their more complete security re
main to proceed from them. And thus it is plainly
conceivable, that creatures without blemish, as
they came out of the hands of God, may be in
danger of going wrong; and so may stand in need
of the security of virtuous habits, additional to the
moral principle wrought into their natures by him.
That which is the ground of their danger, or their
want of security, may be considered as a deficiency

118 Of a State of PartL
iathem, to Avhich virtuous habits are the natural
supply. And as they are naturally capable of be
ing- raised and improved by discipline, it may be a
thing fit and requisite, that they should be placed
in circurastances Avith an eye to it: in circurastances
pecuharly fitted to be, to thera, a state of discipline
for their iraprovement in virtue.
But hoAV much more strongly must this hold
Avith respect to those, who have corrupted their
natures,' are fallen frora their original rectitude,
and Avhose passions are become excessive by re
peated violations of their inward constitution ?
Upright creatures raay Avant to be iraproved : de
praved creatures want to be rencAved. Education
and discipline, which raay be in all degrees and
sorts of gentleness and of severity, is ejtpedient
for those : but must be absolutely necessary for
these. For these, discipline, of the severer sort
too, and in the higher degrees of it, must be ne
cessary, in order to Avear out vicious habits ; to
recover their priraitive strength of self-govern
ment, which indulgence must have weakened ; to
repair, as well as raise into an habit, the moral
principle, in order to their arriving at a secure
state of virtuous happiness.
Now, whoever will consider the thing may clear
ly see, that the present world is pecuUarly fit to be
a state of discipline for this purpose, to such as
Avill set themselves to mend and iraprove. For,
the various teraptations with which we are sur
rounded; our experience of the deceits of wicked
ness ; having been in raany instances led wrong

Chap. V. Moral Discipline. 119
ourselves ; the great viciousness of the world ; the
infinite disorders consequent upon it ; our being
made acquainted with pain and sorrow, either from
our OAvn feehng of it, or from the sight of it in
others ; these things, though some of them may
indeed produce Avrong effects upon our minds, yet,
Avhen duly reflected upon, have, all of them, a di
rect tendency to bring us to a settled moderation
and reasonableness of temper : the contrary both
to thoughtless levity, and also to that unrestrained
self-will, and violent bent to follow present incli
nation, which may be observed in undisciplined
minds. Such experience, as the present state af
fords, of the frailty of our nature ; of the bound
less extravagance of ungoverned passion ; of the
power which an infinite Being has over us, by the
various capacities of misery which he has given us ;
in short, that kind and degree of experience, which
the present state affords us, that the constitution
of nature is such, as to adrait the possibility, the
danger, and the actual event, of creatures losing
their innocence and happiness, and becoming vi
cious and Avretched ; hath a tendency to give us 9,
practical sense of things very different from a mere
speculative knowledge, that we are liable to vice,
and capable of misery. And who knows, whether
the security of creatures in the highest and raost
settled state of perfection, raay not, in part, arise,
from their having had such a sense of thing-s as
this, formed, and habitually fixed within them, in
some state of probation ? And, passing through
the present world with that moral attention, which

1?0 Of a State of PartL
is necessary to the acting a right part in it, may
leave everlasting impressions of this sort upon our
rainds. But to be a little more distinct: allurements
to Avhat is wrong; difficulties in the discharge of our
duty ; our not being able to act an uniform right part
Avithout sorae thought and care ; and the opportuni
ties which we have, or iraagine we have, of avoiding
what Ave dislike, or obtaining- what we desire, by
unlaAvful raeans, when we either cannot do it at
all, or at least not so easily, by lawful ones ; these
things, i. e. the snares and teraptations of vice,
are what render the present world peculiarly fit to
be a state of discipline to those who Avill preserve
their integrity : because they render being upon
our guard, resolution, and the denial of our pas
sions, necessary in order to that end. And the
exercise of such particular recollection, intention
of mind, and self-government, in the practice of
virtue, has, from the raake of our nature, a pecu
liar tendency to form habits of virtue ; as imply
ing, not only a real, but also a raore continued,
and a raore intense exercise of the virtuous princi
ple; or a more constant and a stronger effort of
virtue exerted into act. Thus, suppose a person
to know himself to be in particular danger, for
sorae time, of doing any thing wrong, which yet
he fully resolves not to do : continued recollection,
and keeping upon his guard, in order to make
good his resolution, is a continued exerting of that
act of virtue in a high degree^ which need have
been, and perhaps would have been, only instan
taneous and xceak, had the teraptation been so. It

Chap. V. Moral Discipline. 121
is indeed ridiculous to assert, ^hat self-denial is
essential to virtue and piety : but it would have
been nearer the truth, though not strictly the truth
itself, to have said, that it is essential to discipline
and. improvement. For, though actions materi
ally virtuous, which have no sort of difficulty, but
are perfectly agreeable to our particular inclina
tions, may possibly be done only from these parti
cular inclinations, and so may not be any exercise
of the principle of virtue, i. e. not be virtuous ac
tions at all ; yet, on the contrary, they may be an
exercise of that principle : and when they are,
they have a tendency to form and fix the habit of
virtue. But when the exercise of the virtuous
principle is more continued, oftener repeated, and
more intense ; as it iriust be in circumstances of
danger, temptation, and difficulty, of any kind
and in any degree ; this tendency is increased pro
portionably, and a more confirmed habit is the
consequence. This undoubtedly holds to a certain length : but
how far it may hold, I knoAv not. Neither our
intellectual powers, nor our bodily strength, can
be improved beyond such a degree : and both may
be over-Avrought. Possibly there may be some
what analogous to this, Avith respect to the moral
character ; which is scarce worth considering.
And I mention it only, lest it should come into
some persons thoughts, not as an exception to the
foregoing observations, which perhaps it is ; but
as a confutation of them, which it is not. And
there may be several other exceptions, Obsef-

122 Ofa State of Part I.
vations of this kind cannot be supposed to hold
minutely, and in every case. It is enough that
they hold in general. And these plainly hold so
far, as that from them may be seen distinctly,
Avhich is all that is intended by thera, that the pre
sent world is peculiarly fit to be a state of disci
pline for our improvement in virtue atid piety :
in the same sense as some s"ciences, by requiring
and engaging the attention, not to be sure of such
persons as will not, but of such as Avill, set thera
selves to them ; are fit to form the mind to habits
of attention.
Indeed, the present state is so far from proving,
in event, a disciphne of virtue to the generality of
men, that, on the contrary, they seem to make it
a discipline of vice. And the viciousness of the
Avorld is, in different ways, the great temp'tation,
Avhich renders it a state of virtuous discipline, in
the degree it is, to good raen. The Avhole end,
and the whole occasion, of mankind's being- placed
in sueh a state as the present, is not pretended to
be accounted for. That Avhich appears araidst
the general corruption is, that there are sorae per
sons, who, having within them the principle of
amendraent and recovery, attend to and follow the
notices of virtue and religion, be they more clear
or more obscure, Avhich are afforded them ; and
that the present Avorld is, not only an exercise of
virtue in these persons, but an exercise of it in
ways and degrees, peculiarly apt to improve it :
apt to improve it, in some respects, even beyond
what would be, by the exercise of it required in a-

Chap. V- Moral Discipline. 123
perfectly virtuous society, or in a society of equally
imperfect virtue Avith themselves. But that the
present world does not actually become a state of
moral discipline to many, even to the generality,
i. e. that they do not improve or grow better in it,
cannot be urged as a proof, that it was not intend
ed for raoral discipline, by any who at all observe
the analogy of nature. For, of the nuraerous seeds
of vegetables and bodies of aniraals, which are
adapted and put in the Avay, to improve to such a
point or state of natural maturity and perfection,
we do not see perhaps that one in a million actu
ally does. Far the greatest part of them decay
before they are iraproved to it ; and appear to be
absolutely destroyed. Yet no one, who does not
deny all final causes, will deny, that those seeds
and bodies, which do attain to that point of ma
turity and perfection, answer the end for which
they were really designed by nature ; and there
fore that nature designed thera for such perfection.
And I cannot forbear adding, though it is not to
the present purpose, that the appearance of such
an amazing zvaste in nature, with respect to these
seeds and bodies, by foreign causes, is to us as un
accountable, as, what is much raore terrible, the
present and future ruin of so raany moral agents
by themselves, i. e. by vice.
Against this whole notion of moral discipline, it
may be objected, in another Avay, that so far as a
course of behaviour, materiaHy virtuous, proceeds
from hope and fear, so far it is only a discipline
and strengthening of self-love. But doing what

1 24 Ofa State of Part I.
Qod commands, because he commands it, is obe
dience, though it proceeds ffom |iope or fear.
And a course of suc]i obedience wil} form habits
of it. And a constant regard to veracity, justice,
and charity, raay form distinct habits of these par-^-
ticular virtues ; and will certainly form habits of
self-government, and of denying our inclinations,
whenever veracity, justice, or charity requires it.
Nor is there any foundation for this great nicety,
with which some affect to distinguish in this case,
in order to depreciate all rehgion proceeding froin
hope or fear. For, veracity, justice, and charity,
regard to God's authority, and to our own chief
interest, are not only all three coincident, but each
of them is, in itself, a just and natural motive, or
principle of action. And he Avho begins a good
life from any one of them, and perseveres in it, as
he is already in some degree, so he cannot fail of
becoming more and more of that character, which
is correspondent to the constitution of nature as
moral ; and to the relation which God starids in
to us as moral governor of it : nor, consequently;
can he fail of obtaining that happiness, Avhich this
constitution and relation neciessarily suppose con
nected with that character.
These several observations, concerning the active
principle of A'irtue and obedience to God's com
mands, are apphcable to passive submission or re
signation to his will ; which is another essential
part of a right character, connected with the
former, and very much in our poAver to form our
selves to. It may be imagined, that nothing but

Chap. V. Moral Discipline, 125
afflictions can give occasion for or require this vir
tue ; that it can have no respect to, nor be any
way necessary to qualify for, a state of perfect hap
piness : but it is not experience Avhich can make
us think thus. Prosperity itself, whilst any thing
supposed desireable is not ours, begets extrava
gant and unbounded thoughts. Imagination is
altogether as much a source of discontent as any
thing in our external condition. It is indeed true,
that there can be no scope for patience, when sor
row shall be no more: but there may be need ofa
temper of mind, which shall have been formed by
patience. For, though self-love, considered merely
as an active principle leading us to pursue our chief
interest, cannot but be uniformly coincident with
the principle of obedience to God's commands, our
interest being rightly understood ; because this
obedience, and the pursuit of our own chief in
terest, must be, in every case, one and the same
thing : yet it may be questioned, whether self-love,
considered merely as the desire of our oavii interest
or hapjpiness, can, fiom its nature, be tiiiis abso
lutely and uniformly coincident with the will of
God ; any more than particular affections can * :
coincident in such sort, as not to be liable to be
excited upon occasions and in degrees, impossible
to be gratified consistently with the constitution of
things, or the divine appointments. So that habits
of resignation may, upon this account, be requisite
for all creatures : habits, I say, which signify what
* Page 95.

126 Of a State of PartL
is formed by use. HoAvever, in general it is ob
vious, tbat both self-love and particular affections
in human creatures, considered only as passive feel
ings, distort and rend the mind ; and therefore
stand in need of discipline. Now, denial of those
particular affections, in a course of active virtue
and obedience to God's will, has a tendency to mo
derate them; and seeins also to have a tendency to
habituate the mind to be easy and satisfied with
tiiat degree of happiness Avhich is allotted us, i, e.
to moderate self-love. But the proper discipline
for resignation is affliction. For a right behaviour
under that trial; recollecting ourselves so as to
consider it in the view in which religion teaches us
to consider it, as from the hand ofGod ; receiving
it as Avhat he appoints, or thinks proper to permit,
in his world and under his government ; this will
habituate the mind to a dutiful submission. And
such submission, together with the active principle
ofobedience, make up the temper and character in
us, which answers to his sovereignty ; and which
absolutely belongs to the condition of our being,
as dependent creatures. Nor can it be said, that
this is only breaking the raind to a submission to
mere power; for mere poAver may be accidental,
and precarious, and usurped : but it is forming
Avithin ourselves the teraper of resignation to his
rightful authority, who is, by nature, supreme over
all. Upon the Avhole : such a character, and such
qualifications, are necessary, for a mature state of

Chap, V. Moral Discipline. .127
life in the present Avorld, as nature alone does in no
wise bestow: but has put it upon us, in great part,
to acquire, in our progress frora one stage of life
to another, from childhood to mature age : put it
upon us to acquire them, by giving us capacities of
doing it, and by placing us, in the beginning of
life, in a condition fit for it. And this is a general
analogy to our condition in the present world, as
in a state of moral discipline for another. It is in
vain, then, to object against the credibility of the
present life's being intended for this purpose, that
all the trouble and the danger, unavoidably accom
panying such discipline, might have been saved us,
by our being- made at once the creatures and the
-characters, which we zvere to be. , For Ave experi
ence, that what we were to be, Avas to be the effect
of what we would do: and that the general conduct
of nature is, not to save us trouble or danger, but
to make us capable of going through them, and to
put it upon us to do so. Acquireraents of our own,
experience and habits, are the natural supply to
our deficiencies, and security against our dangers :
since it is as plainly natural to set ourselves to acquire
the qualifications, as the external things, which Ave
stand in need of. In particular, it is as plainly a
general law of nature, that we should, with regard
to our teraporal interest, form and cultivate prac
tical principles within us, by attention, use, and
discipline, as any thing Avhatever is a natural law ;
chiefly in the beginning of life, but also throughr
put the whole course of it And the alternative is

128 Ofa State of Part L
left to our choice : either to improve ourselves, and
better our condition ; or, in default of such im-
proA'ement, to reraain deficient and wretched. It
is therefore perfectly credible, frora the analogy of
nature, that the sarae may be our case, Avith respect
to the happiness of a future state, and the qualifi
cations necessary for it.
There is a third thing, which may seem implied
in the present world's being a state of probation ;
that it is a theatre of action, for the manifestation
of persons characters, with respect to afuture one:
not, to be sure, to an all-knowing Being, but to his
creation, or part of it. This may, perhaps, be
only a consequence of our being in a state of pro
bation in the other senses. However, it is not im-
Jjossible, that mens shewing and making manifest
what is in their heart, what their real character is,
may have respect to a future life, in ways and man
ners which we are not acquainted with : particu
larly it may be a means, for the Author of Nature
does not appear to do any thing without raeans, of
their being disposed of suitably to their characters;
and of its being known to the creation, by A\'ay of
example, that they are thus disposed of But not
to enter upon any conjectural account of this ;
one may just mention, that the manifestation of
persons characters contributes very much, in va^
rious ways, to the carrying on a great part of
that general course of nature, respecting mankind,
Avhich comes under our observation at present. I
shall only add, that probation in both these senses,

Chap. V. Moral Discipline. 129
as well as in that treated of in the foregoing chap
ter, is implied in moral government : since by
persons behaviour under it, their characters can
not but be manifested, and, if they behave Avell,
improved.

1 30 Of the Opinion of Necessity, Part I.

CHAP. VL
Of the Opinion of Necessity, cotisidered as influr
encing Practice.
1 HROUGHOUT the forcgoing Treatise it appears'
that the condition ofraankind, considered as inha
bitants of this world only, and under the govern
ment of God, which we experience, is greatly ana
logous to our condition, as designed for another
world, or under that farther government, which re
ligion teaches us. If, therefore, any assert, as a
fatalist must, that the opinion of universal necesr
sity is reconcileable with the forraer ; there imme
diately arises a question in the way of analogy,
whether he must not also own it to be reconcile
able with the latter, i. e. with the system of religion
itself, and the proof of it. The reader, then, will
observe, that the question now before us is not ab
solute. Whether the opinion of Fate be reconcile
able with religion ; but hypothetical. Whether,
upon supposition of its being- reconcileable Avith the
Constitution of nature, it be not reconcileable with
religion also : or, what pretence a fatalist, — not
other persons, but a fatalist, — has to conclude, from
his opinion, that there can be no such thing as re
ligion. And as the puzzle and obscurity, Avhich
must unavoidably arise from arguing upon so ab
surd a supposition as that of universal necessity^;

Chap, VI. as influencing Practice. 131
Avill, I fear, easily be seen ; it Avill, Iho[ie, as easily
be excused.
But since it has been all along taken for granted,
as a thing proved, that there is an intelligent Au
thor of Nature, or natural Governor of the world ;
and since an objection raay be raade against the
proof of this, frora the opinion of universal neces
sity, as it may be supposed that such necessity
Avill itself account for the origin and preservation
of all things; it is requisite that this objection be
distinctly ansAvered ; or tiiat it be shewn, that a
fatality, supposed consistent with what Ave certainly
experience, does not destroy the proof of an intel
ligent Author and Governor of Nature ; before we
proceed to consider, whether it destroys the proof
of a moral Governor of it, or of our being in a state
of religion.
Now, when it is said by a fatalist, that the whole
constitution of nature, and the actions of men, that
every thing, and every raode and circurastance of
every thing, is necessary and could not possibly
have been otherwise ; it is to be observed, that this
necessity does not exclude deliberation, choice,
preference, and acting from certain principles, and
to certain ends: because air this is matter of un
doubted experience, acknowledged by all, and what
every man raay, every moraent, be conscious of.
And from hence it foUoAVS, that necessity, alone
and of itself, is in no sort an account of the con
stitution of nature, and how things come to be and
to continue as they are ; but only an account ofthis
circumstance relating to their origin and continu-

132 Of the Opinion of Necessity, PartL
ance, that they could not haA'e been otherwise than
they are and have been. The assertion, that every
thing- is by necessity of Nature, is not an answer
to the question ; Whether the world came into be
ing as it is, by an inteHigent Agent forming it
thus, or not : but to quite another question ; Whe
ther it came into being as it is, in that Avay and
manner Avhich Ave call necessarily, or in that way
and raanner Avhich we call freely. For, suppose
farther, that one, who Avas a fatalist, and one, Avho
kept to his natural sense of things, and believed
hiraself a free agent, were disputing together, and
vindicating their respective opinions ; and they
should happen to instance a house : they would
agree that it was built by an architect. Their dif
ference, concerning necessity and freedom, would
occasion no difference of judgment concerning this;
but only concerning another matter ; whether the
architect built it necessarily or freely. Suppose,
then, they should proceed to enquire concerning
the eonsitution of nature : in a lax w^y of speak
ing, one of them might say, it was by necessity ;
and the other, by freedora : but, if they had any
meaning to their words, as the latter must mean a
free agent, so the former raust at length be reduced
to raean an agent, whether he would say one or
more, acting by necessity: for abstract notions can
do nothing. Indeed, we ascribe to God a neces
sary existence, uncaused by any agent. For wc
find within ourselves the idea of infinity, i. e. ira»
mensity and eternity, impossible, even in imagina
tion, tp be removed out of being. We seem to

Chap, VI, as influencing Practice. 1 33
discern intuitively, that there must, and cannot
but be, somcAvhat, external to ourselves, answering
this idea, or the archetype of it. And frora hence
(for this abstract, as niuch as any other, iraplies a
-concrete) Ave conclude, that there is, and cannot
but be, an infinite and immense eternal Being ex
isting, prior to all design contributing to his exis
tence, and exclusive of it. And, from the scanti
ness of language, a manner of speaking has been
introduced ; that necessity is the foundation, the
reason, the account of the existence of God. But
it is not alledged, nor can it be at all intended,
that every thiiig exists as it does, by this kind of
necessity; a necessity antecedent in nature to de
sign ; it cannot, I say, be meant that every thing-
exists as it does, by this kind of necessity, upon
several accounts ; and particularly because it is ad
mitted, that design, in the actions of men, contri
butes to raany alterations in nature. For, if any
deny this, I shall not pretend to reason with thera.
From these things it foHows : Firsts That when
a fatalist asserts, that every thing is by necessity i
he must mean, by an Agent acting necessarily ;
he must, I say, mean this ; for I am very sensible
he would not chuse to mean it; And, secondly.
That the necessity, by which, such an Agent is sup
posed to act, does not exclude intelligence and de
sign. So that, Avere the system of fatality admitted,
it would just as much account for the formation of
the world, as for the structure of an house, and no
more. Necessity as much requires and supposes a
necessary Agent, as freedom requires'and supposes

134 Of the Opinion of Necessity, Part. L
a free a^ent to be the former of the world. And the
appearances of design and of final causes in the con
stitution of nature, as really prove this acting Agent
to be an intelligent designer, or to act from choice,
upon the scheme of necessity, supposed possible, as
upon that of freedom.
It appearing thus, that the notion of necessity
does not destroy the proof, that there is an intelli
gent Author of Nature, and naturalGovernor of the
world ; the present question, which the analogy
before mentioned * suggests, and which, I think,
it will answer, is this : Whether the opinion of ne
cessity, supposed consistent with poS3.ibility, Avith
the constitution of the world, and the natural go
vernment Avhich we experience exercised over it,
destroys all reasonable ground of belief, that we are
in a state of religion : or Avhether that opinion be
reconcileable with relig-ion ; Avith the system and
the proof of it.
Suppose, then, a fatalist to educate any one, from .
his youth up, in his oavu principles; that the child
should reason upon them, and conclude, that since
he cannot possibly behave otherwise than he does,
he is not a subject of blame or commendation, nor
can deserve to be rewarded or punished : iraagine
him to eradicate the very perceptiofls of blame and
coraraendation out of his raind, by raeans of this
systera ; to forra his teraper, and character, and
behaviour to it ; and from it to judge of the treat
ment he Avas to expect, say, from reasonable men*
* Page 130.

Chap. VI. as influencing Practice. 135
upon his first coming abroad into the world ; as the
fatalist judges from this systera, what he is to ex
pect from the Author of Nature, and Avith regard
to a future state. I cannot forbear stopping here
to ask, whether auy one of common sense would
think fit, that a child should be put upon these spe
culations, and be left to apply them to practice ?
And a man has little pretence to reason, who is not
sensible, that we are all children in speculations of
this kind. However, the child would doubtless be
highly delighted to find himself freed from the re
straints of fear and shame, with which his play-fel
lows were fettered and embarrassed ; and highly
conceited in his superior knowledge, so far beyond
his years. But conceit and A'anity Avould be the
least bad part of the influence^ which these princi
ples must have, when thus reasoned and acted upon,
during the course of his education. He must ei
ther be allowed to go on and be the plague of all
about him, and himself too, even to his own de
struction ; or 'else correction must be continually
made use of to supply the want of those natural
perceptions of blame and coraraendation, which we
have supposed to be removed ; and to give him a
practical impression of what he had reasoned him
self out of the belief of, that he was, in fact, an ac
countable child, and to be punished for doing what
he was forbid. It is therefore in reality impossible,
but that the correction which he must meet with,
in the course of his education, must convince him,
that, if the scheme he was instructed in were not
-false, yet that he reasoned inconclusively upon it,

1 56 Of the Opinion of Necessity, Part I.
and, somehow or other, misapplied it to practice
and common life : as what a fatalist experiences of
the conduct of Providence at present, ought, in all
reason, to convince him, that this scheme is mis
applied, when applied to the subject of religion *.
But, supposing the child's teraper could remain still
formed to the system, and his expectation of the
treatment he was to have in the world be regulated
by it; so as to expect that no reasonable raan would
blarae or punish him for any thing which he should
do, because he could not help doing it : upon this
supposition, it is manifest he Avould, upon his coming •
abroad into the Avorld, be insupportable to society,
and the treatraent which he would receive from it,
would render it so to him ; and he could not fail
of doing somewhat, very soon, for which he would
be delivered over into the hands of civil justice. And
thus, in the end, he would be convinced of the obli
gations he Avas under to his wise instructor. Or sup
pose this scheme of fatality, in any other way, appli
ed to practice, such practical application of it Avill be
found equally absurd ; equally fallacious in a prac
tical sense : for instance, that, if a man be destined
to live such a time, he shall live to it, though he
take no care of his own preservation ; or if he be
destined to die before that time, no care can pre
vent it : therefore, all care about preserving one's
life is to be neglected: Avhich is the fallacy in
stanced in by the ancients. But now, on the con
trary, none of these practical absurdities can be
* Page 149.

Chap. VL as influencing Practice. 137
drawn, from- reasoning upon the supposition, that
Ave are free ; but all such reasoning, with regard to
the common affairs of life, is justified by experience.
And therefore, though it were adraitted that this
opinion of necessity were speculatively true ; yet,
with regard to practice, it is as if it were false, so
far as our experience reaches; that is, to the whole
of our present life. For, the constitution of the
present world, and the condition in which we are
actually placed, is, as if we were free. And it may
perhaps justly be concluded, that, since the whole'
process of action, through every step of it, suspense,
deliberation, inclining one way, determining, and
at last doing as we deterraine, is as if we were free,
therefore we are so. But the thing here insisted
upon is, that, under the present natural governraent
of the Avorld, we find we are treated, and dealt with,
as if we Avere free, prior to all consideration whether .
we are or not. Were this opinion, therefore, of ne
cessity, admitted to be ever so true ; yet such is iu
fact our condition and the natural course of things,
that, whenever we apply it to life and practice, this
application of it always misleads us, and cannot but
mislead us, in a most dreadful manner, with regard
to our present interest. And how can people think
themselves so very secure then, that the same ap
plication of the sarae opinion may not raislead them
also, in sorae analogous manner, Avith respect to a
future, a raore general, and more important interest?
For, religion being a practical subject; and the
analogy of nature shewing us, that we have not
faculties to apply this opinion, were it a true one.

138 Of the Opinion of Necessity, Partl.
to practical subjects ; whenever we do apply it to
the subject of religion, ahd thence conclude, that
we are free from its obligations, it is plain this con
clusion cannot be depended upon. There will still
remain just reason to think, whatever appearances
are, that we deceive ourselves; in somewhat ofa
hke manner, as when people fancy they can draw
contradictory conclusions frora the idea of infi
nity. From these .things together, the attentive reader
will see it foUows, that if, upon supposition of free
dom, the evidence of rehgion be conclusive, it re^
mains so, upon supposition of necessity ; because
the notion of necessity is not applicable to practi
cal subjects ; i. e. with respect to them, is as if it
were not true. Nor does this contain any reflec
tion upon reason ; but only upon Avhat is unrea
sonable. For to pretend to act upon reason, in
opposition to practical principles, which the Author
of our Nature gave us to act upon ; and to pretend
to apply our reason to subjects, with regard to
which our own short views, and even our expe
rience, will shew us, it cannot be depended upon ;
and such, at best, the subject of necessity must
be ; this is vanity, conceit, and unreasonableness.
But this is not all. For we find within, ourselves
a will, and are conscious of a character. Now, if
this, in us, be reconcileable with fate, it is recon
cileable with it, in the Author of Nature. And,
besides, natural government and final causes im
ply a character and a will in the Governor and

Chap. VI. as influencing Practice. 1 39
Designer * ; a Avill concerning the creatures whom
he governs. The Author of Nature, then, being
certainly of some character or other, notwithstand
ing necessity ; it is evident this necessity is as re
concileable Avith the particular character of bene
volence, veracity, and justice in him, which attri
butes are the foundation of religion, as with any
other character : since we find this necessity no
more hinders men from being benevolent, than cruel;
true, thau faithless ; just, than unjust ; or, if the
fatalist pleases, what Ave call unjust. For it is said,
indeed, that what, upon supposition of freedom,
would be just punishment; upon supposition of
necessity, becomes manifestly unjust : because it
is punishment inflicted for doing that, which per
sons could not avoid doing. As if the necessity,
which is supposed to destroy the inju.stice of mur
der, for instance, would not also destroy the in
justice of punishing it. HoAvever, as little to the
purpose as this objection is in itself, it is very much
to the purpose to observe from it, how the notions
of justice and injustice reraain, even whilst Ave en
deavour to suppose thera removed ; how they force
themselves upon the mind, even Avhilst we are
making suppositions destructive of them: for there

* By -will and character is meant that, which, in speaking of
men, we should express, not only by these words, but also by
the words, temper, taste, dispositibns, practical principles ; that
'whole frame qf mind, from -whence we act in one manner rather tluin
another.

140 Of the Opinion of Necessity, Part I.
is not, perhaps, a man in the world, but would be
ready to make this objection at first thought.
But though it is raost evident, that universal
necessity, if it be reconcileable with any thing, is
reconcileable Avith that character in the Author of
Nature, which is the foundation of relig-ion; " Yet,
does not it plainly destroy the proof, that he is of
that character, and consequently the proof of reli
gion ?" By no means. For Ave find, that happiness
and misery are not our fate, in any such sense as
not to be the consequences of our behaviour ; but
that they are the consequences of it *. We find
God exercises the same kind of governraent over
us, Avith that, which a father exercises over his
children, and a civil raagistrate over his subjects.
Noav, whatever becoraes of abstract questions con
cerning liberty and necessity, it evidently appears
to us, that veracity and justice raust be the natural
rule and raeasure of exercising this authority, or
government, to a Being, who can have no compe
titions, or interfering of interests, with his crea
tures and his subjects.
But, as the doctrine of liberty, though we expe
rience its truth, may be perplexed Avith difficultiesJ^^
Avhich run up into the most abstruse of all specu
lations; and as the opinion of necessity seeras to
be the very basis upon which infidehty grounds
itself, it may be of some use to offer a more parti
cular proof of the obligations of religion, Avhich.
* Chap. ii.

Chap, VL as influencing Practice. 141
may distinctiy be shewn not to be destroyed by
this opinion.
The proof, from final causes, of an intelligent
Author of Nature, is not affected by the opinion of
necessity ; supposing necessity a thing possible in
itself, and reconcileable with the constitution of
things*. And it is a matter of fact, independent on
this or any- other speculation, that he governs the
Avorld by the method of rewards and punishments'!":
and also that he hath given us a moral faculty, by
which we distinguish between actions, and approve
some, as virtuous and of good-desert, and disap
prove others, as vicious and of ill-desert J. Now
this moral discernment implies, in the notion of it,
a rule of action, and a rule: of a very pecuhar kind :
for it carries in it authority and a right of direc
tion ; authority in such a sense, as that we cannot
depart frora it without being self- condemned §.
And that the dictates of this moral faculty, which
are by nature a rule to us, are moreover the laws
of God, laws in a sense including sanctions ; may
be thus proved. Consciousness of a rule, or guide
of action, in creatures who are capable of consi
dering it as given thera by their Maker, not only
raises iraraediately a sense of duty, but also a sense
of security in following it, and of danger in devi
ating frora it. A direction of the Author of Na
ture, given to creatures capable of looking upon it
* Page 131, &c. + Chap. ii.
I Dissert. II. § Sermon 2d at the Rolls.

1 42 Of the Opinion of Necessity, Part I.
as such, is plainly a command from hira : and a
comraand from him necessarily includes in it, at
least, an iraplicit promise in case of obedience, or
threatening in case of disobedience. But then the
sense or perception of good and ill desert*, which
is contained in the moral discernment, renders the
sanction explicit, and makes it appear, as one may
say, expressed. For, since his method of governT
ment is to reward and punish actions, his having
annexed to some actions an inseparable sense of
good desert, and to others of ill, this surely amounts
to declaring- upon whom his punishments shall be
inflicted, and his rewards be bestOAved. For he
must have g-iven us this discernment and sense of
things, as a pre-sentiment of what is to be here
after : that is, by Avay of inforraation before-hand,
what we are finally to expect in this world. There
is, then, raost evident ground to think, that the
govemment of God, upon the whole, wiU be found
to correspond to the nature which he has given us :
and that, in the upshot and issue of things, happi
ness and misery shall, in fact and event, be made
to follow virtue and vice respectively ; a,s he has
already, in so peculiar a manner, associated the
ideas of them in our minds. And from hence
might easily be deduced the obligations of religious
Avorship, Avere it only to be considered as a means
of preserA'ing upon our minds a sense of this moral
government of God, and securing our obedience
* Dissert. II.

Chap. VL as influencing Practice. 143
to it : which yet is an extremely imperfect view of
that raost iraportant duty.
Now, I say, no objection frora necessity can lie
against this general proof of religion. None against
the proposition reasoned upon, that we have such
a moral faculty and discernment ; because this is a
mere raatter of fact, a thing of experience, that
huraan kind is thus constituted : none against the
conclusion ; because it is immediate, and wholly
from this fact. For the conclusion, that God Avill
finally reward the righteous and punish the wicked,
is not here drawn, from its appearing to us fit *
that he should; but from its appearing, that he has
told us he will. And this he hath certainly told
us, in the promise and threatening, which, it hath

* However, I am far from intending to deny, that the will of
God is determined by what is fit, by the right and reason of the
case ; though one chuses to decline matters of such abstract
.speculation, and to speak with caution when one does speak of
them. But if it be intelligible to say, that it is fit and reasonable
for every one to consult his own happiness, thenfitness qf action, or
the right and reason of the case, is an intelligible manner of speak
ing. And it seems as inconceivable, to suppose God to approve
one course of action, or one end, preferably to another, which yet
his acting at all from design implies that he does, without sup
posing somewhat prior iu that end, to he the ground of the pre
ference ; as to suppose him to discern an abstract proposition to
be true, without supposing somewhat prior in it to be the ground
of the discernment. It doth not, therefore, appear, that moral
Tight is any more relative to perception than abstract truth is :
or that it is any more improper to speak of the fitness and right-
ness of actions and ends, as founded in the nature of things, thart
to speak of abstract truth, as thus founded.

144 Of the Opinion of Necessity, Partl.
been observed, the notion of a comraand implies,
and the sense of good and ill desert, Avhich he has
given us, more distinctly expresses. And this rea
soning from fact is confirmed, and, in some de
gree, even verified, by other facts ; by the natural
tendencies of virtue and of vice * ; and by this,
that God, in the natural course of his providence,
punishes mischievous actions, as mischievous to
society ; and also raischicA^ous actions, as such, in
the strictest sense f- So that the general proof of
religion is unanswerably real, even upon the Avild
supposition Avhich Ave are arguing upon.
It raust likcAvise be observed farther, that natural
religion hath, besides this, an external evidence ;
which the doctrine of necessity, if it could be true,
Av'ould not affect. For^ suppose a person, by the
observations and reasoning above, or by any other,
convinced of the truth of religion ; that there is a
God, who made the Avorld, who is the moral go
vernor and judge of mankind, and Avill, upon the
whole, deal with every one according to his works;
I say, suppose a person convinced of this by rea
son ; but to knoAv nothing at all of antiquity, or
the present state of mankind : it would be natural
for such an one to be inquisitive, what was the
history of this sysfera of doctrine ; at what time,
and in what manner, it came first into the world ;
and whether it were believed by any considerable
part of it. And were he upon inquiry to find, that
a particular person, in a late age, first of all pre-
* Page 72. + Page 62. &c.

Chap. VI. as influencing Practice. 145
posed it as a deduction of reason, and that mankind
Avere before wholly ignorant of it; then,, though
its evidence from reason would remain," there would
be no additional probability of its truth, from the
account of its discovery. But, instead ofthis being
the fact of the case, on the contrary, he would find
Avhat could not but afford hira a very strong- confir-.
mation of its truth : First, That somewhat of this
system, Avith more or fewer additions and altera
tions, hath been professed in all ages and countries of
Avhich we have any certain information relating to
this matter, S.econdly, That it is certain historical
fact, so far as Ave can trace things up, that this
whole system of belief, that there is one God, the
creator and moral governor of the world, and that
mankind is in a state of religion, was received in
the first ages. And, thirdly. That as there is no
hint or intimation in history, that this system was
first reasoned out ; so there is express historical or
traditional evidence, as antient as history, that it
was taught first by revelation. Now, these things
must be alloAved to be of great weight. The first
of them, general consent, shews this system to be
conformable to the coramon sense of niankind.
The second, namely, that religion was believed in
the first ages of the world, especially as it does
not appear that there were then any superstitious
or false additions to it, cannot but be a farther
confirmation of its truth. For it is a proof of this
alternative : either that it carae into the world by
revelation; or that it is natural, obvious, and forces
itself upon the mind. The fonner of these is the

146 Of the Opinion of Necessity, Partl.
conclusion of learned men. And whoever will con
sider how unapt for speculation rude and unculti
vated minds are, will, perhaps from hence alone,
be strongly inclined to believe it the truth. And
as it is shewn in the Second Part * of this Treatise,
that there is nothing of such pecuhar presumption
against a revelation in the beginning of the Avorld,
as there is supposed to be against subsequent ones :
a Sceptic could not, I think, give any account,
which would appear more probable even to him
self, of the early pretences to revelation ; than by
supposing some real original one, from whence
they were copied. And the third thing above-
mentioned, that there is express historical or tra
ditional evidence, as antient as history, of the
system of religion being taught mankind by reve
lation ; this must be admitted as some degree of
real proof, that it was so taught. For Avhy should
not the most antient tradition be admitted as some
additional proof of a fact, against which there is no
presumption ? And this proof is mentioned here,
because it has its weight to shew, that religion
came into the Avorld by revelation, prior to aU
consideration of the proper authority of any book
supposed to contain it ; and even prior to all con
sideration, whether the revelation itself be un-
corruptly handed down and related, or mixed and
darkened with fables. Thus the historical account,
which we haA'e, of the origin of religion, taking
in all circumstances, is a real confirmation of it«
• Chap. ii.

Chap. VI. as influencing Practice. 147
truth, no Avay affected by tiie opinion of necessity.
And the external evidence, even of natural reli
g-ion, is by no means inconsiderable.
But it is carefully to be observed, and ought to
be recollected after all proofs of virtue and reli
gion, Avhich are only general, that as speculative
reason may be neglected, prejudiced, and deceived;
so also may our raoral understanding- be irapaired
and perverted, and the dictates of it not irapar
tially attended to. This, indeed, proves nothing
against the reality of our speculative or practical
faculties of perception; against their being intend
ed by nature to inform us in the theory of things,
and instruct us how Ave are to behave, and what
we are to expect, in consequence of our behaviour.
Yet our liableness, in the degree Ave are liable, to
prejudice and perversion, is a most serious admo
nition to us to be upon our guard, with respect to
what is of such consequence, as our determina
tions concerning virtue and religion ; and particu
larly not to take custom, and fashion, and slight
notions of honour, or imaginations of present ease,
use, and convenience to rriankind, for the only mo
ral rule *.
The foregoing observations, drawn from the na
ture of the thing, and the history of religion,
amount, when taken together, to a real practical
proof of it, not to be confuted: such a proof as,
considering the infinite importance ofthe thing, I
apprehend, would be admitted fully sufficient, in
* Dissert. II.

148 Of the Opinion of Necessity, PartL
reason, to influence the actions of men, who act
upon thought and reflection; if it were admitted
that there is no proof of the contrary. But it may
be said : " There are many probabilities, which
cannot indeed be confuted, *. e. sheAvn to be no
probabilities, and yet may be overbalanced by
greater probabilities on the other side ; much more
by demonstration. And there is no occasion to
object against particular arguments alledged for
an opinion, Avhen the opinion itself may be clearly
shcAvn to be false, Avithout meddling with such
arguraents at all, but leaving thera just as they
are *. Now, the method of government by re
wards and punishraents, and especially rewarding
and punishing good and ill-desert, as such, re
spectively, must go upon supposition, that we arc
free, and not necessary agents. And it is incredi-r
ble, that the Author of Nature should govern us
upon a supposition as true, which he knows to be
false: and therefore absurd to think he will re
ward or punish us for our actions hereafter; espc/-
cially that he will do it under the notion, that they
are of good or ill desert." Here,^ then, the matter
is brought to a point. And the ansAver to all this
is full, and not to be evaded : that the Avhble con
stitution and course of things, the whole analogy
of providence shcAvs, beyond possibility of doubt,
that the conclusion from this reasoning is false,
wherever the fallacy lies. The doctrine of free
dom, indeed, clearly shews where : in supposing
* Pages 1, n.

Chap. VI. as influencing Practice. 149
ourselves necessary, when in truth we are free
agents. But, upon the supposition of necessity,
¦ the fallacy lies in taking for granted; that it is in
credible necessary agents should be rewarded and
punished. But that, somehow or other, the con-
elusion noAV mentioned is false, is most certain.
For it is fact, that God does govern even brute
creatures by the raethod of rewards and punish*
ments, in the natural course of thing-s. And men
are rewarded [and punished for their actions, pu
nished for actions mischievous to society, as being
so, punished for vicious actions as such, by the
natural instrumentality of each other, under the
present conduct of providenee. Nay, even the
affection of gratitude, and the passion of resent
ment, and the rewards and punishments following
from them, which in general are to be considered
as natural, i.e. from the Author of Nature; these
rewards and punishments, being naturally * an
nexed to actions considered as implying good in
tention and good desert, ill intention and ill desert;
these natural rewards and punishments, I say, are
as much a contradiction to the conclusion above,
and shew its falsehood, as a more exact and com
plete rewarding and punishing of good and ill de
sert as such. So that, if it be incredible that
necessary agents should be thus rewarded and pu
nished, then men are not necessary, but free.; since
it is matter of fact, that they are thus rewarded
and punished. But if, on the contrary, which
* Sermon 8tb, at the Eolk.

150 Of the Opinion of Necessity, Part. 1
is the supposition we have been arguing upon, it be
insisted, that men are necessary agents, then there
is nothmg incredible in the farther supposition of
necessary agents heing thus rewarded and punish
ed : since we ourselves are thus dealt Avith-
From the Avhole, therefore, it must follow, that
a necessity supposed possible, and reconcileable
with the constitution of things, does in no "sort
prove, that. the Author of Nature AviH not, nor
destroy the proof that he will, finally, and upon
the whole, in his eternal government, render his
creatures happy or raiserable, by sorae raeans or
other, as they behave well or ill. Or, to express
this conclusion in words conformable to the title
of the chapter, the analogy of nature shews us^.
that the opinion of necessity, considered: as prac
tical, is false. And if necessity, upon the suppo
sition above-mentioned, doth not destroy the proof
of natural rehgion, it evidently makes no alteration
in the proof of revealed.
From these things, likcAvise, we may learn in
what sense to understand that general assertion,
that the opinion of necessity is essentially destruc
tive of all reUgion. First, in a practical sense ;
that by this notion atheistical men pretend to sa
tisfy and encourage themselves in viOe, and justify
to others their disregard to all religion. And, se
condly, in the strictest sense ; that it is a contra
diction to the whole constitution of nature, and
to what we may every moment experience in our
selves, and so overturns every thing. But by no
means is this .assertion to be understood, as if

Chap; VI. as influencing Practice. 15%
necessity, supposing it could possibly be recon
ciled with the constitution of things, and with
what we experience, were not also reconcileable
with religion : for upon this supposition it demon
strably is so.

152 The Government of God, PartL

CHAP. VlL
Of the Government ofGod, considered as a Scheme^.
or Constitution, imperfectly comprehended.
1 HOUGH it be, as it cannot but be, acknowledged^
that the analogy of nature gives a strong creidibi-
lity to the general doctrine of religion, and to the
several particular things contained in it, considered
as so many matters of fact ; and likewise that it
shews this credibility not to be destroyed by any
notions of necessity : yet stiil, objections may be'
insisted upon agairist the wisdom, equity, and
goodness of the divine government, implied in the
notion of rehgion, and against the method by Avhicb
this governraent is conducted; to which objec
tions analogy can be no direct ansAver. For the
credibility, or the certain truth, of a matter of fact,
does not immediately prove any thing concerning
the Avisdom or goodness of it: and analogy can do
no more, immediately, or directly, than shew such
and such things to be tme or credible, considered
only as matters of fact. But still, if, upon suppo
sition of a raoral constitution of nature and a raoral
government over it, analogy suggests and makes it
credible, that this government must be a scheme.

Chap. VII. a Scheme incomprehensible. 153
system, or constitution of government, as distin
guished from a number of single unconnected acts
of distributive justice and goodness ; and likewise,
that it must be a scheme, so imperfectly compre
hended, and of such a sort in other respects, as to
afford a direct general answer to all objections
against the justice and goodness of it : then ana
logy is, remotely, of great service in answering
those objections ; both by suggesting the answer,
and shewing it to be a credible one^
Now this, upon inquiry, will be found to be the
case. For, first, upon supposition that God exer
cises a moral government over the world, the ana
logy of his natural government suggests, and makes
it credible, that his moral governraent raust be a
scheme quite beyond our comprehension : and this
affords a general answer to all objections against
the justice and goodness of it. And, secondly, a
more distinct observation of some particular things
contained in God's scheme of natural government,
the like things being supposed, by analogy, tobe
contained in his moral government, will farther
shew how Httle weight is to be laid upon these ob
jections. I. Upon supposition that God exercises a moral
government over the world, the analogy of his na
tural government suggests and raakes it credible,
that his moral governraent raust be a scherae, quite
beyond our coraprehension : and this affords a ge
neral ansAver to all objections against the justice and
goodness of it. It is raost obvious, analogy ren
ders it highly credible, tbat upon supposition of a

154 The Government of Ged, Part I.

moral government, it must be a scheme : for the
Avorld, and the whole natural government of it,
appears to be so : to be a scheme, system, or con
stitution, Avhose parts correspond to each other,,
and to a whole ; as really as any AVork of art, or
as any particular model of a civil constitution and
government. In this great scherae of the natural
world, individuals have various peculiar relations
to other individuals of thefir own species. And,
Avhole species are, we find, variously related to
other speciesi upon this earth. Non do Ave know
how much farther these kinds of relations may ex
tend. And, as there is not any action, or natural
event, which we are acquainted with^, so single and
unconnected, as not to have a respect to sorae other
actions and events ; so, possibly, each of them, where
it has not an immediatCj may have yet a remote,.
natural relation to other actions and events, muck
beyond the compass of this present world. There
seems, indeed, nothing from whence we can so
much as make a conjecture, whether all creatures^.
actions, and events, throughout the whole of na
ture, have relations to each other. But, as itia.
obvious that all events have future unknown con^
sequences ; so, if we trace any, as far as we can
go, into what is connected with it ; Ave shall find,
that if such event were not connected with some
what farther in nature unknown to us, somewhat
both past and present, such event could not possi
bly have been at all. Nor can Ave give the Avhole
account of any one thing whatever : of all its
eauses, ends, and necessary adjuncts; those ad-

Chap. VII. a Scheme incomprehensible. \5S
juncts, I raean, Avithout which it could not have
been. By this most astonishing connexion, these
reciprocal correspondencies and mutual relations,
every thing Avhich we see in the course of nature is
actually brought about. And things, seeraingly
the most insignificant imaginable, are perpetually
observed to be necessary conditions to other things
of the greatest importance : so that any one thing
Avhatever may, for aught Ave know to the contrary,
be a necessary condition to any other. The natu
ral world, then, and natural government of it, being
such an incomprehensible scheme ; so incompre
hensible, that a man raust, really in the literal
sense, know nothing at all, who is not sensible of
his ignorance in it : this immediately suggests, and
strongly shews the credibility, that the moral world
and government of it may be so too. Indeed, the
natural and moral constitution and government of
the world are so connected, as to raake up together
but one scherae : and it is highly probable, that the
first is forraed and carried on raerely in subserviency
to the latter ; as the vegetable Avorld is for the animal,
and organized, bodies for minds. But the thing in
tended' here is, without inquiring how far the admi
nistration of the natural world is subordinate to that
ofthe moral, only to observe the credibility, that one
should be analogous or similar to the other : that,
therefore, every act of divine justice and goodness
may be supposed to look much beyond itself and
its immediate object ; may have some reference to
©ther parts of God's raoral adrainistration, and to

156 The Government ofGod, Part I.
a general raoral plan : and that every circumstance
of this his moral government may be adjusted be
forehand with a view to the Avhole of it. Thus foi*
example : the determined^ length of time, and the
degrees and ways, in which virtue is to remain in a
state of warfafe and discipline, and in which Avick-
edness is permitted to have its progress ; the times
appointed for the execution of justice; the appointed
instruments of it; the kinds of rewards and punish
ments, and the manners of their distribution ; all
particular instances of divine justice and goodness,
and every circumstance of them, raay have such
respects to each other, as to make up all together
a whole, connected and related in all its parts : a
scheme, or system, Avhich is as properly one as the
natural world is, and of the like kind. And sup
posing this to be the cas6 ; it is most evident that
we are not corapetent judges of this scheme, from
the small parts of it which come within our view
in the present life ; and therefore no objections
against any of these parts can be insisted upon by
reasonable men.
This our ignorance, and the consequence here
draAvn from it, are universally acknowledged, upon
other occasions ; and, though scarce denied, yet are
universally forgot, AVhen persons come to argue
against religion. And it is not perhaps easy, even fbr
the most reasonable men, always to bear in mind the
degree of our ignorance, and make due allowances
for it. Upon these accounts, it may not be useless
to go on a httle farther, iu order to shew raore

Chap. VII. a Scheme incomprehensible. 157
distinctly, how just an answer our ignorance is, to
objections against the scheme of providence. Sup
pose, then, a person boldly to assert, that the things
complained of, the origin and continuance of evil,
might easily have been prevented by repeated inter
positions * ; interpositions so guarded and circum
stanced, as Avould preclude all mischief arising from
them : or, if this were impracticable, that a scheme
of government is itself an imperfection; since raore
good mig-ht have been produced, Avithout any
scheme, system, or constitution at all, by continued
single unrelated acts of distributive justice and
goodness; because these would have occasioned no
irregularities. And farther than this, it is presumed
the objections will not be carried. Yet the answer
is obvious : that, were these assertions true, still the
observations above, concerning our ignorance in
the scheme of divine government, and the conser
quence draAvn from it, would hold in great mea^
sure; enough to vindicate religion against all ob-r
jections from the disorders of the present state.
Were these assertions true, yet the government of
the world might be just and good notwithstanding;
for, at the most, they would infer nothing more,
than that they raight have been better. But indeed
they are raere arbitrary assertions : no man be
ing sufficiently acquainted Avith the possibilities of
things, to bring any proof of them to the lowest
degree of probabiHty. For, however possible what
is asserted may seem ; yet many instances may b§
* Pages 161, 162, 163,

1 5 8 The Government of God, Part L
alledged, in things much less out of our reach, of
suppositions absolutely impossible; and reducible
to the most palpable self-contradictions, which not
every one by any means would perceiA^e to be such,
nor perhaps any one at first sight suspect. From
these things, it is easy to see distinctly how our
ignorance, as it is the common, is really a satisfac
tory answer to all objections against the justice and
goodness of Providence. If a man, coiitemplating
any one providential dispensation, which had no
relation to any others, should object, that he dis
cerned in it a disregard to justice, or a deficiency
of goodness, nothing would be less an ansAver to
such objection, than our ignorance in other parts
of providence, or in the possibilities of things, no
Avay related to what he Avas conteraplating. But
Avhen we knoAv not, but the parts objected against
may be relative to other parts unknown tp us ; and
Avhen we are acquainted Avith what is, in the nature
of the thing, practicable in the case before us ;
then our ignorance is a satisfactory ansAver; be
cause, sorae unknown relation, or some unknown
impossibility, may render what is objected against
just and good; nay good in the highest practicable
degree. IL And how little weight is to be laid upon such
objections Avill farther appear, by a raore distinct
observation of sorae particular things contained in
the natural governraent of God, the like to which
may be supposed, from analogy, to be contained in
his moral government

Chap. VIL a Scheme incomprehensible. 159
First, As in the scheme of the natural world no
ends appear to be accoraplished Avithout means ; so
we find that means very undesirable often conduce
to bring about ends in such a measure desirable,
as greatly to overbalance the disagreeableness of
the means. And in cases where such means are
conducive to such ends, it is not reason, but ex
perience, which shews us that they are thus con
ducive. Experience also shews many raeans to be
conducive and necessary to'accomplish ends, which
means, befoi-e experience, we should have thought,
would have had even a contrary tendency. Now,
from these observations relating to the natural
scherae of the Avorld, the raoral being supposed ana
logous to it, arises a great credibility, that the put
ting our misery in each other's po^er to the degree
it is, and making men liable to vice to the degree
we are ; and, in general, that those things, Avhich
are objected against the moral scheme of Provi
dence, may be, upon tlie whole, friendly and assis
tant to virtue, and productive of an over-balance
of happiness ; i. e. the things objected against
may be means, by which an overbalance of good
will, in the end, be found produced. And from
the same observations, it appears to be no presump
tion against this, that we do not, if indeed we do
not, see those meaus to have any such tendency :
or that theyseem to us to have a contrary one.
Thus, those things, Avhich we call irregularities,
may not be so at all : because they may be raeans
of accomplishing wise and good ends more consi-

1^0 The Government of God, PartL
derable. And it may be added, as above *, that
they raay also be the only raeans by which these
wise and good ends are capable of being accora
plished. After these observations it raay be proper to add,
in order to obviate an absurd and wicked conclu
sion frora any of them, that though the constitu
tion of our nature, from whence Ave are capable of
vice and misery, may, as it undoubtedly does, con
tribute to the perfection and happiness ofthe Avorld;
and though the actual permission of evil raay be
beneficial to it (j. e, it would have been niore rais
chievous, not that a Avicked person had hiraself
abstained from his oAyn wickedness, but that any
one had forcibly prevented it, than that it Avas per
raitted :); yet notwithstanding, it might havebeen
much better for the world, if this very evil had
ncA^er been donCc Nay, it is raost clearly con
ceivable, that the very coraraission of wickedness
may be beneficial to the world, and yet, that it
would be infinitely raore beneficial for men to re
frain from it For thus, in the wise and gpod
constitution of the natural world, there are disor
ders, which bring their own cures : diseases, which
are themselves remedies. Many a man would have
died, had it not been for the gout or a fever ; yet
it would be thought raadness to assert, that sickness
is a better or raore perfect state than health; though
the like, with regard to the moral world, has been
asserted. But, * Page 159.

Chap. VII. a Scheme incomprehensible. \6\
Secondly, The natural governraent of the world
is carried on by general laws. For this there raay
be wise and good reasons : the wisest and best, for
aught Ave knoAv to the contrary. And that there
are such reasons, is suggested to our thoughts by
the analogy of nature ; by our being- made to ex
perience good ends to be accoraplished, as indeed
all the good Avhich we enjoy is accoraplished by
this raeans, that the laws, by Avhich the world is
governed, are general. For Ave have scarce any
kind of enjoyments, but what we are, in some way
or other, instrumental in procuring ourselves, by
acting in a raanner which we foresee likely to pro
cure thera ; now this foresight could not be at all,
were not the government bf the world carried on,
by general laws. And though, for aught we know
to the contrary, every single case may be, at length,
found to have been provided for even by these ;
yet to prevent all irregularities, or remedy them as
they arise, by the Avisest arid best general laws,
may be impossible in the nature of things; as we
see it is absolutely impossible in civil governraent.
But then we are ready to think, that the constitu
tion of nature reraaining as it is, and the course bf
thing-s being perraitted to go on, in other respects,
as it does, there raight be interpositions to prevent
irregularities ; though they could not have been
prevented or reraedied by any general laws. And
there would indeed be reason to wish— which, by
the way, is very different frora a right to claim: —
that all irregularities were prevented, or remedied,
by present interpositions, if these interpositions

l62 The Government ofGod, Part I.
would have no other effect than this. But it is
plain they would have some visible and irarae^
diate bad effects : for instance, they would encou
rage idleness and negligence ; and they would ren^
der doubtful the natural rule of life, which is ascer^
tained by this very thing, that the course of the
world is carried on by general laws. And farther,
it is certain they would have distant effects, and
very great ones too, by raeans of the wonderful
connexions before-mentioned *. So that we cannot
so rauch as guess, what would be the Avhole result
of the interpositions desired. It raay be said, any
bad result raight be prevented by farther interpo
sitions, whenever there Avas occasion for them : but
this again is talking quite at random, and in the
dark ¦\. Upon the Avhole, then, we see wise reasons
why the course of the world should be carried on
by general laws, and good ends accoraplished by
this means : and, for aught we knoAV, there raay be
the Avisest reasons for it, and the best ends accom
plished by it. We have no ground to believe, that
all irregularities could be reraedied as they arise,
or could have been precluded, by general laws.
We find that interpositions would produce evil,
and prevent good : and, for aught Ave know, they
would produce greater evil than they would prevent;
and prevent greater good than they would produce.
And if this be the case, then the not interposing is
so far from being a ground of complaint, that it is
an instance of goodness. This is inteUigible and
* Page 154, &c. f Pages 156, 157, 158.

Chap. VIL a Scheme incomprehensible. l63
sufficient : and going farther seeras beyond the ut
most reach of our faculties.
But it raay be said, that, " after all, these sup
posed impossibilities and relations are what we are
unacquainted with ; and we raust judge of religion,
as of other thing-s, by Avhat Ave do knoAv, and look
upon the rest as nothing- : or, however, that the
answers here given to what is objected against re
ligion, may equally be made use of to invalidate
the proof of it ; since their stress lies so very much
upon our ignorance." But,
First, Though total ignorance in any matter
does indeed equally destroy, or rather preclude, all
proof concerning it, and objections against it ; yet
partial ignorance does not. For Ave may in any
degree be convinced, that a person is of such a
character, and consequently will pursue such ends ;
though we are greatly ignorant what is the proper
Avay of acting, in order, the inost effectually, to
obtain those ends : and in this case, objections
against his manner of acting, as seemingly not con
ducive to obtain them, might be answered by our
ignorance ; though the proof that such ends were
intended, might not at all be invalidated by it.
Thus, the proof of religion is a proof of the moral
character of God ; and, consequently, that his go
vernment is moral, and that every one, upon the
whole, shall receive according to his deserts : a
proof that this is the designed end of his g-overn
ment. But we are not corapetent judges Avhat is
the proper way of acting, in order the raost effec-

l64 The Government ofGod, Part I.
tually to accomplish this end *. Therefore our ig
norance is an ansAver to objections against the con
duct of Providence, in permitting irregularities, as
seeming contradictory to this end. Noav, since it
is so obvious, that our ignorance may be a satisfac
tory ansAver to objections against a thing, and yet
not affect the proof of it ; till it can be shewn, it is
frivolous to assert, that our ignorance invalidates
the proof of religion, as it does the objections
against it.
Secondly, Suppose unknown impossibilities, and
unknown relations, raight justly be urged to inva
lidate the proof of religion, as well as to answer ob
jections against it ; and that, in consequence of
this, the proof of it were doubtful : Yet still, let the
assertion be despised, or let it be ridiculed, itis un
deniably true, that raoral obligations Avould reraain
certain, though it were not certain what would',
upon the whole, be the consequences of observing
or violating thera. For these obligations arise im
mediately and necessarily from the judgment of
our own mind, unless perverted, Avhich we cannot
violate without being self-condemned. And they
would be certain, too, frora considerations of inte
rest. For though it were doubtful what will be the
future consequences of virtue and vice ; yet it is,
however, credible, that they may have those conse
quences, which religion teaches us they will : and
this credibility is a certain f obligation in point of
prudence, to abstain from all Avickedness, and to
* Page S- 10. t Page 3. and Part II. chap. vi.

Chap. VII. a Scheineincoriiprehensible. \65
live in the conscientious practice ofali that is good.
But, Thirdly, The ansAvers above given to the objec
tions against religion cannot equally be made use
of to invahdate the proof of it. For, upon the sup
position that God exercises a moral g-overnment
over the world, analogy does most strongly lead us
to conclude, that this moral government must be
a scheme, or constitution, beyond our comprehen*
sion. And a thousand particular analogies shew
us, that parts of such a scheme, from their relation
to other parts, may conduce to accoraplish ends,
which we should have thought -they had no tenden
cy at all to accoraplish ; nay, ends, which, before
experience, we should have thought such parts Were
contradictory to, and had a tendency to preventi
And, therefore, all these analogies shew, that the
way of arguing, made use of in objecting against
relig-ion, is delusive ; because they shew it is not
at all incredible, that, could we comprehend the
whole, Ave should find the permission of the disor
ders objected ag-ainst, to be consistent with justice
and goodness ; and even to be instances of them.
Now this is not applicable to the proof of religion,
as it is to the objections against it * ; and there
fore cannot invalidate that proof, as it does these
objections. Lastly, From the observation now made, it is
easy to see, that the answers above given to the ob
jections against Providence, though in a general
* Sermon at the Rolls, p. 312. 2d Edit.

166 The Government of God, kc. Partl.
way of speaking, they may be said to be taken from
our ignorance ; yet are by no means taken raerely
from that, but from somewhat Avhich analogy shews
us concerning it. For analogy shews us positively,
that our ignorance in the possibilities of things,
and the various relations in nature, renders us in
corapetent judges, and leads us to false conclu
sions, in cases sirailar to this, in Avhich we pretend
to judge and to object. So that the things above
insisted upon, are not mere suppositions of un-
knoAvn impossibilities and relations ; but they arc
suggested to our thoughts, and even forced upon
the observation of serious men, and rendered cre
dible, too, by the analogy of nature. And, there
fore, to take these things into the account, is to
judge by experience, and Avhat we do know : and
it is not judging so, to take no notice of them.

CONCLUSION.

Ihe observations of the last chapter lead Us to
consider this little scene of human life, in which we
are so busily engaged, as having a reference, of
some sort or other, to a rauch larger plan of things.
Whether we are any way related to the raore dis
tant parts of the boundless universe, into which we
are brought, is altogether uncertain. But it is evi
dent, that the course of things, which comes with
in our vicAv, is connected with somewhat past, pre
sent, and future, beyond it *. So that we are pla
ced, as one may speak, in the middle ofa scheme,
not a fixt, but a progressive one, every Avay incom
prehensible ; incomprehensible, in a manner equal
ly, with respect to what has been, what now is, and
what shall be hereafter. And this scheme cannot
but contain in it soraewhat as wonderful, and as
much beyond our thought and conception f , as any
thing in that of religion. For, will any raan, in his
* Page 154, &c. f See Part II. chap. ii.

168 Conclusion. . Part I.
senses, say, that it is less difficult to conceive how
the world came to be, and to continue as it is, with
out, than with, an intelligent Author and Gover
nor of it ? or, admitting an intelligent Governor of
it, that there is some other rule of government
more natural, and of easier conception, than that
Avhich we call moral ? Indeed, without an intelli
gent Author and Governor of Nature, no account
at all can be given, hoAV this universe, or the part
of it particularly in Avhich Ave are concerned, came
to be, and the course of it to be carried on, as it is ; ,
nor any of its general end and design, Avithout a
inoral Go,vernor of it. That there is c^n intelligent
Author of Nature, and natural Governor of the
Avorld, is a principle gone upon in the foregoing
treatise, as proved, and generally known and con
fessed to be proved. . And the very notion of an
intelligent Author of Nature, proyed by particular
final causes, implies a will and a character*. Now,
as our whole nature, the nature which he has given
us, leads us to conclude his will and character to
be moral, just, and gqod,; so Ave can scarc,e, in ima
gination, conceive that it can be otherwise. How
ever, in consequence of this,his will and character,
whatever it be, he formed the universe as it is, and
carries on the course of it as he does, rather than
in any other manner ; and has assigned to us, and
to all living creatures, a part and a lot in it Irra
tional creatures act this their part, and enjoy and
undergo the pleasures and the pains allotted them,
* Pasje 130.

Part I. Conclusion. ] 69
without any reflection. But one Avould think it
impossible, that creatures endued with reason could
avoid reflecting sometimes upon all this ; reflect
ing, if not from whence Ave came, yet, at least,
whither we are going ; and Avhat the mysterious
scheme, in the midst of which we find ourselves,
will at length come out and produce : a scheme in
which it is certain we are highly interested, and iu
which we may be interested even beyond concep
tion. For many things prove it palpably absurd to
conclude, that we shall cease to be at death. Par
ticular analogies do most sensibly shew us, that
there is nothing to be thought strange in our being
to exist in another state of life. And that we are
now living beings, affords a strong probability that
we shall continue so ; unless there be some positive
ground, and there is none from reason arid analo
gy, to think death will destroy us. Were a persua
sion ofthis kind ever so well-grounded, there would,
surely, be little reason to take pleasure in it. But,
indeed, it can have no other ground, than some
such imagination, as that of our gross bodies being
ourselves ; which is contrary to experience. Ex-
perienc'e, too, most clearly shews us the folly of con
cluding, from the body and the living agent affect
ing each other mutually, that the dissolution of
the former is the destruction of the latter. And
there are remarkable instances of their not affect
ing each other, which lead us to a contrary con
clusion. The supposition, then, which, in all rea
son, we are to go upon, is, that our living nature
Avill continue after death. And it is infinitely un^'

1 70 Conclusion. Part L
reasonable to form an institution of life, or to act,
upon any other supposition. Now all expectation
of immortality, whether more or less certain, opens
an unbounded prospect to our hopes and our fears :
since we see the constitution of nature is such, as
to adrait of misery, as Avell as to be productive of
happiness, and experience ourselves to partake of
both in some degree ; and since we cannot but
know what higher degrees of both Ave are capable
of. And there is no presumption against believing
farther, that our future interest depends upon our
present behaviour : for we see our present interest
doth ; and that the happiness and miseiy, Avhich
are naturally annexed to our actions, A^ery frequent
ly do not folloAv till long after the actions are
done, to which they are respectively annexed. So
that, were speculation to leave us uncertain, whe
ther it Avere likely, that the Author of Nature, in
giving happiness arid raisery to his creatures, hath
regard to their actions or not : yet, since we find
by experience that he hath such regard, the whole
sense of things which he has given us, plainly leads
us, at once, and Avithout any elaborate inquiries, to
think, that it may, indeed must, be to good actions
chiefly.that he hath annexed happiness, and to bad
actions miseiy ; or that he Avill, upon the whole,
reward those Avho do well, and punish those who
do evil. To confirm this from the constitution of
the world, it has been observed, that some sort of
moral government is necessarily implied in that na
tural government of God, Avhich we experience
ourselves under; that good and bad actions, at

Partl. Conclusion. 171
present, are naturally rewarded and punished, not
only as beneficial and mischievous to society, but
also as virtuous and vicious ; and that there as, in
the very nature of the thing, a tendency to their
being rewarded and punished in a much higher de
gree than they are at present. And though this
higher degree of distributive justice, which nature
thus points out and leads towards, is prevented for
a time from taking place : it is by obstacles which
the state ofthis world unhappily throws in its Avay;
and Avhich, therefore, are in their nature tempora
ry. Now, as these things, in the natural conduct
of Providence, are observable on the side of virtue ;
so there is nothing to be set against them on the
side of vice, A moral scheme of government, then,
is visibly established, and, in some degree, carried
into execution ; and this, together with the essen
tial tendencies of virtue and vice duly considered,
naturally raise in us an apprehension, that it Avill
be carried on farther toAvards perfection, in afuture
state, and that every one shall there receive accord
ing to his deserts. And if this be so, then our future
and general interest, under the raoral government of
God, is appointed to depend upon our behaviour ;
notwithstanding the difficulty Avhich this may oc
casion, of securing it, and the danger df losing it:
just in the same manner as our temporal interest,
under his natural government, is appointed to de
pend upon our behaviour, notwithstanding the like
difficulty and danger. For, from our original con
stitution, and that of the world Avhich we inhabit,
we are naturally trusted vvith ourselves, with our

172 Conclusion^ Part. I.
own conduct and our own interest. And from the
same constitution of nature, especially joined with
that course of things Avhich is owing to men, we
have teraptations to be unfaithful in this trust;
to forfeit this interest, to neglect it, and run our
selves into raisery and ruin. Frora these tempta
tions arise, the difficulties of behaving- so as to se
cure our teraporal interest, and the hazard of be
having so as to raiscarryin it. There is,, therefore,
nothing incredible in supposing, there raay be the
like difficulty and hazard with regard to that chief
and final good, which religion lays before us. In
deed the Avhole account, how it carae to pass, that
we Avere placed in such a condition as this, raust
be beyond our comprehension. But it is in part
accounted for by Avhat rehgion teaches us, that the
character of virtue and piety must be a necessary
qualification for a future state of security and hap^
piness, under the moral government of God ; in
hke manner, as sorae certain qualifications or other
are necessary for every particular condition of life,
under his natural governraent : and that the pre
sent state was intended to be a school of discipline,
for iraproving in ourselves that character. Noav,
this intention of nature is rendered highly credible
by observing, that we are plainly raade for im
provement of all kinds ; that it is a general appoint-
ment of Providence, that we cultivate practical
principles, and form within ourselves habits of ac
tion, in order to becorae fit for Avhat we were
Avholly unfit for before ; that, in particular, child
hood and youth i? naturally appointed to be a

Part I. Conclusion. ] 73
state of discipline for mature age ; and that the pre
sent Avorld is peculiarly fitted for a state of moral
discipline. And, Avhereas objections are urged
against the whole notion of raoral governraent and
a probationary state, frora the opinion of necessity,
it has been shcAvn, that God has given us the evi
dence, as it Avere, of experience, that all objec
tions against religion on this head are vain and de
lusive. He has also, in his natural governraent,
suggested an answer to all our short-sighted objec
tions, against the equity and goodness of his raoral
governraent ; and, in general, he has exemplified to
us the latter by the former.
These things, Avhich, it is to be remembered, are
matters of fact, ought, in all comraon sense, to awa
ken raankind, to induce thera to consider, in earnest,
their condition, and what they have to do. It is ab
surd, absurd to the degree of being ridiculous, if the
subjectwere notof so serious a kind, for raen to think
themselves secure in a A'icious life, or even in that
iraraoral thoughtlessness, Avhich far the greatest part
of them are fallen into. And the credibility of re
ligion, arising from experience and facts here con
sidered, is fully sufficient, in reason, to engage
them to live in the general practice of all virtue and
piety ; under the serious apprehension, though it
should be mixed with some doubt *, of a righteous
administration established in nature, and a future
judgment in consequence of it ; especially when Ave
Part II. ch. vi.

174 Conclusion. PartL
consider how A'ery questionable it is AA-hether any
thing at all can be gained by vice * ; how unques
tionably little, as Avell as precarious, the pleasures
and profits of it are at the best ; and how soon they
must be parted with at the longest. For, in the de
liberations of reason, concerning Avhat we are to
pursue, and Avhat to avoid, as teraptations to any
thing from mere passion, are supposed out of the
case ; so inducements to vice, from cool expecta
tions of pleasure and interest, so small, and uncer
tain, and short, are really so insignificant, as, in
the view of reason, to be almost nothing in them
selves ; and, in comparison with the iraportance of
religion, they quite disappear and are lost. Mere
passion, indeed, may be alleged, though not as a
reason, yet as an excuse for a vicious ' course of
life. And how sorry an excuse it is Avill be mani
fest by observing, that Ave are placed in a condition
in Avhich Ave are unavoidably inured to govern our
passions, by being necessitated to govern them ;
and to lay ourselves under the same kind of re
straints, and as great ones too, from temporal re
gards, as virtue and piety, in the ordinary course
of things, require. The plea of ungovernable pas
sion, then, on the side of vice, is the poorest of all
things ; for it is no reason, and but a poor excuse.
But the proper raotives to religion are the proper
proofs of it from our moral nature, from the pre
sages of conscience, and our natural apprehension
* Pas;e58.

PartL Conclusion. 175
of God, under the character of a righteous gover
nor and judge ; a nature, and conscience, and ap
prehension given us by him ; and, from the confir
mation of the dictates of reason, by life and im
mortality brought to light by the Gospel ; and the
wrath of God revealed from heaven, against all
ungodliness, and unrighteousness of men.

END OF PART FIRST.

THE
ANALOGY

OP

RELIGION

TO THE
CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE.

PART IL
OF REVEALED RELIGION.

CHAP. I.
Of the Importance of Christianity.
^om£ persons, upon pretence of the sufficiency of
the light of nature, avowedly reject all revelation,
as, in its very notion, incredible, and what must
be fictitious. And, indeed, it is certain no reve
lation would have been given, had the light of na
ture been sufficient in such a sense, as to render
one not wanting and useless. But no man, in se
riousness and simplicity of mind, can possibly think
it so, who considers the state of religion in the

178 Of the Importance PartiL
heathen world before revelation, and its present
state in those places whicli have borroAved no light
from it, particularly, the doubtfulness of some of
the greatest men concerning things of the ut
most iraportance, as Avell as the natural inatten
tion and ignorance of raankind in general. It is
irapossible to say who would have been able to
have reasoned out that whole systera, which we
call natural religion, in its genuine simplicity, clear
of superstition ; but there is certainly no ground to
affirm that the generality could ; if they could,
there is no sort of probability that they would..
Adraitting there were, they Avould highly want a
standing adraonition, to reraind them of it, and
inculcate it upon them. And farther still, were
they as much disposed to attend to religion, as the
better sort of men are, yet even upon this supposi
tion, there would be various occasions for super
natural instruction and assistance, and the greatest
advantages raight be afforded by thera. So that
to say, revelation is a thing superfluous, what there
Avas no need of, and what can be of no service, is,
I think, to talk quite wildly and at randora. Nor
would it be more extravagant to affirm, that man
kind is so entirely at ease in the present state, and
life so completely happy, that it is a contradiction
to suppose our condition capable of being, in any
respect, better.
There are other persoris, not to be ranked with
these, who seem to be getting into a way of ne
glecting, and, as it were, overlooking revelation,
as of small importance, provided natural religion

Chap.i. of Christianity. 179
be kept to. With little regard, either to the evi
dence of the forraer, or to the objections against
it, and even upon supposition of its truth ; " the
only design of it," say they, "raust be to establish
a belief of the raoral system of nature, and to en
force the practice of natural piety and virtue. The
belief and practice of these things were, perhaps,
much promoted by the first publication of Chris
tianity ; but Avhether they are believed and prac
tised, upon the evidence and motives of nature or
bf revelation, is no great matter *." This way of
considering revelation, though it is not the same
with the former, yet borders nearly upon it, and
very much, at length, runs up into it, and re
quires to be particularly considered, with regard
to the persons, Avho seem to be getting into this
way. The consideration of it will likewise far
ther shew the extravagance of the former opinion,
and the truth of the observations in answer to it,
just mentioned. And an inquiry into the Import
ance of Christianity, cannot be an improper in
troduction to a treatise concerning the credibihty
of it.
* Invenis multos  propterea nolle fieri Christianos, quia
quasi sufficiunt sibi de bona vita sua. Bene vivere opus est, ait.
Quid mihi prsecepturus est Christus ? Ut bene vivam ? Jam bene
vivo. Quid roihi necessarius est Christus ? Nullum homicidium,
nullum furtum, nullum rapinam facio, res alienas non concu-
pisco, nullo adulterio contaminor. Nara inveniatur in vita mea
aliquid quod reprehendatur, et qui reprehenderit faciat Christia-
mim. Aug. in Psal. xxxi.

1 80 Of the Importance Part 11-
Now, if God has given a revelation to mankind,
and commanded those things which are command
ed iu Christianity, it is evident, at first sight, that
it cannot in anywise be an indifferent matter,
whether we obey or disobey those commands, un
less Ave are certainly assured, that we know all
the reasons for thera, and that all those reasons
are now ceased, with regard. to mankind in gene
ral, or to ourselves in particular. And it is ab
solutely impossible Ave can be assured of this ; for
our ignorance of these reasons proves nothing in
the case, since the whole analogy of nature shews,
what is indeed in itself evident, that there may
be infinite reasons for things, with which we are
not acquainted.
But the importance of Christianity will raore
distinctly appear, by considering- it raore distinct
ly : First, as a repubhcation, and external institu
tion, of natural or essential religion, adapted to
the present circurastances of mankind, and intend
ed to promote natural piety and virtue : And, Se
condly, as containing an account of a dispensation
of things, not discoverable by reason, in conse
quence of which, several distinct precepts are en
joined us. For, though natural rehgion is the
foundation and principal part of Christianity, it
is not in any sense the whole of it.
I. Christianity is a republication of natural re
ligion. It instructs mankind in the moral system
of the Avorid : that it is the Avork of an infinitely
perfect Being, and under his government; that
virtue is his laAV ; and that he will finally judge

Chap. I. of Christianity. 181
mankind in righteousness, and render to all accord
ing to their Avorks in a future state. And, Avhicli
is very raaterial, it teaches natural religion, in its
genuine siraplicity ; free frorii those superstitions,
with Avhich it Avas totally corrupted, and under
which it was in a raanner lost.
Revelation is, farther, an authoritative publica
tion of natural religion, and so affords the evidence
of testiraony for the truth of it. Indeed the rai
racles and prophecies recorded in Scripture, were
intended to prove a particular dispensation of Pro
vidence, the redemption of the Avorld by the Mes
siah : but this does not hinder, but that they may
also proA'e God's general providence over the world,
as our moral governor and judge. And they evi
dently do prove it ; because this character of the
Author of Nature is necessarily connected with, and
implied in, that particular revealed dispensation of
things : it is likewise continually taught expressly,
and insisted upon, by those persons Avho Avrought
the miracles, and delivered the prophecies. So
that, indeed, natural religion seems as rauch pro
ved by the Scripture revelation, as it Avould haVe
been, had the design of revelation been nothing-
else than to prove it.
But it raay possibly be disputed, how far rairacles
can prove natural religion ; and notable objections
may be urged ag-ainst this proof of it, considered as
a matter of speculation ; but, considered as a prac
tical thing, there can be none. For, suppose a per
son to teach naturaLreligion to a nation, who had
lived in total ignorance or forgetfulness of it, and

18S Of the Importance Part II.
to declare he was commissioned by God so to do ;
suppose hira, in proof of his commission, to foretel
things future, which no human foresight could
have guessed at ; to divide the sea with a word ;
feed great multitudes with bread from heaven ; cure
all manner of diseases ; and raise the dead, even
himself, to life : would not this give additional cre
dibility to his teaching, a credibihty beyond what
that of a common man Avould have, and be an au
thoritative publication of the law of nature, i, e. a
new proof of it ? It would be a practical one, of
the strongest kind, perhaps, which huraan creatures
are capable of having given theiri. The Law of
Moses, then, and the Gospel of Christ, are autho
ritative publications of the religion of nature : they
afford a proof of God's general providence, as raoral
governor of the world ; as well as of his particular
dispensations of providence towards sinful crea
tures, revealed in the Law and the Gospel, As they
are the only evidence of the latter ; so they are an
additional evidence of the forraer.
To shew this fiirther, let us suppose a raan of the
greatest and raost iraproved capacity, who had ne
ver heard of revelation, convinced upon the whole,
notwithstanding the disorders of the world, that it
was under the direction and moral goverument of
an infinitely perfect Being ; but ready to question,
whether he were not got beyond the reach of his
faculties : suppose him brought, by this- suspicion,
into great danger of being carried aAvay by the uni
versal bad example of almost every one around
him, who appeared to have no sense, no practical,

Chap. I. of Christianity. 183.
sense at least, of these things : and this, perhaps,
Avould be as advantageous a situation, with regard
to religion, as nature alone ever placed any man in.
What a confirraation now must it be to such a per
son, all at once, to find, that this moral system of
things was revealed to raankind, in the name of
that infinite Being, whora he had, frora principles
of reason, believed in ; and that the publishers of
the revelation proved their commission from him,
by making it appear, that he had intrusted thera
with a pOAver of suspending and changing the ge
neral laws of nature.
Nor must it, by any raeans, be omitted, for it is
a thing of the utmost iraportance, that life and im
mortahty are eminently brought to light by the
Gospel. The great doctrines of a future state, the
danger of a course of wickedness, and the efficacy
of repentance, are not only confirmed in the Gos
pel, but are taught, especially the last is, Avith a
degree of light, to which that of nature is but dark
ness. Farther : As Christianity served these ends and
purposes, when it was first published, by the raira
culous publication itself; so it was intended to
serve the sarae purposes, in future ages, by raeans
of the settleraent of a visible church : of a society,
distinguished frora common ones, and from the rest
of the world, by peculiar religious institutions ; by
an instituted method of instruction, and an insti
tuted form of external religion. Miraculous powers
Avere given to the first preachers of Christianity,
in order to their introducing Jt into the world : a

184 - Of the Importance Part II.
visible church was established, in order to continue
it, and carry it on successively throughout all ages.
^lad Moses and the Prophets, Christ and his A-
postles, only taught, and by miracles proved, reli
gion to their contemporaries ; the benefits of their
instructions would have reached but to a small part
of mankind. Christianity must haA^e been, in a
great degree, sunk and forgot in a very few ages.
To prevent this, appears to have been one reason
why a visible church was instituted ; to be, like a
city upon a hiH, a standing raeraorial to the world
of the duty which we owe our Maker : to call men
continually, both by example and, instruction, to
attend to it, and, by the form of religion ever bC'
fore their eyes, remind them of the reality,: to be
the repository of the oracles of God : to hold up
the light of revelation in aid to that of nature, and
propagate it throughout all generations to the end
of the world — the light of revelation, considered
here in no other view, than as designed to enforce
natural religion. And, in proportion as Christiani
ty is professed and taught in the Avorld, religion,
natural or essential religion, is thus distinctly and
advantageously laid before mankind, and brought
again and again to their thoughts, as a raatter of
infinite iraportance. A visible church has also a
farther tendency to promote natural religion, as be
ing an instituted raethod of education, originally
intended to be of raore peculiar advantage to those
who would conforra to it. For one end of the in
stitution was, that, by adraonition and reproof, as
well as instruction ; by a general regular discipline,

Chap. I. of Christianity. 185
and public exercises of religion ; the body ofChrist,
as the Scripture speaks, should be edified; i. e. train
ed up in piety and virtue, for a higher and better
state. This settlement, then, appearing thus be
neficial ; tending, in the nature of the thing, to
answer, and, in some degree, actually answering,
those ends ; it is to be remembered, that the very
notion of it implies positive institutions : for the
visibility of the church consists in them. Take
away every thing of this kind, and you lose the
very notion itself. So that, if the things now men
tioned are advantages, the reason and importance
of positive institutions in general, is most obvious ;
since, without them, these advantages could not be
secured to the AVorld. And it is raere idle wanton
ness, to insist upon knowing- the reasons Avhy such
particular ones Avere fixed upon, rather than others.
The benefit arising frora this supernatural assist
ance, Avhich Christianity affords to natural religion,
is what some persons are very slow in apprehend
ing ; and yet it is a thing distinct in itself, and a
very plain obvious one. For will any, in good ear
nest, really say, that the bulk of mankind in the
heathen world, were in as advantageous a situation,
Avith regard to natural religion, as they are noAV
araongst us ? that it A\'as laid before thera, and en
forced upon thera, in a raanner as distinct, and as
much tending to influence their practice ?
The objections against all this, from the perver
sion of Christianity, and from the supposition of
its having had but little good influence, hoAvever
jnnocentiy they may be proposed, yet cannot be

1 86 Of the Importance Part II.
insisted upon as conclusive, upon any principles,,
but such as lead to downright Atheism : because
the manifestation of the laAv of nature by reason,
Avhich, upon all principles of Theism, must have
been from God, has been perverted and rendered
ineffectual in the same manner. It may indeed, I
think, truly be said, that the good effects of Chris
tianity have not been small ; nor its supposed ill
effects, any effects at all of it, properly speaking.
Perhaps, too, the things theraselves done have been
aggravated : and ifnot, Christianity hath been often
only a pretence ; and the same evils, in the main,
Avould have been done upon some other pretence.
However, great and shocking as the corruptions
and abuses of it have really been, they cannot be
insisted upon as arguments against it, upon prin-^
ciples of Theism. For one cannot proceed one step
in reasoning upon natural religion, any more than
upon Christianity, witbout laying it down as a first
principle, that the dispensations of Providence are
not to be judged of by their perversions, but by
their genuine tendencies ; not by Avhat they do ac
tually seem to effect, but by Avhat they would ef
fect if mankind did their part ; that part which is
justly put and left upon them. It is altogether as
much the language of one, as of the other : He
that is unjust, let him be unjust still : and he that
is holy, let him be holy still *. The light of rea
son does not, any more than that of revelation,
force men to submit to its authority : both admo-
* Rev. xxii, 1 1 ,

Chap. I. of Christianity. 187
nish them of what they ought to do and avoid, to
gether with the consequences of each ; and after
this, leave them at full liberty to act just as they
please, till the appointed time of judgraent, Everj'-
moment's experience shews, that this is God's ge
neral rule of government.
To return, then : Christianity being a promulga
tion of the laAv of nature ; being, moreover, an au
thoritative promulgation of it; with new light,
and other circumstances of peculiar advantage,
adapted to the Avants of raankind : these things ful
ly shew its iraportance. And it is to be observed
farther, that as the nature of the case requires, so
all Christians are coraraanded to contribute, by
their profession of Christianity, to preserve it in the
Avorld, and render it such a promulgation and en-
forceraent of religion. For it is the A'ery scheme
of the Gospel, that each Christian should, in his
degree, contribute towards continuing- and carry
ing it on : all by uniting in the public profession,
and external practice, of Christianity ; some by in
structing, by having the oversight, and taking care
of this religious community, the church of God.
Now this farther shews the importance of Christia
nity ; and, Avhich is what I chiefly intend, its im
portance in a practical sense : or the high obligations
we are under, to take it into our most serious con
sideration ^ and the danger there must necessarily
be, not only in treating it despitefully, which I am
not now speaking ofj but in disregarding and ne
glecting it. For this is neglecting to do Avhat is
expressly enjoined us, for continuing those benefits

1 88 Of the Importance Part IL
to the world, and transmitting them do\ni to fu
ture tiraes. And all this holds, even though the
only thing to be considered in Christianity, Averc
its subserviency to natural rehgion. But,
II. Christianity is to be considered in a further
vicAv ; as containing an account of a dispensation
of things, not at all discoverable by reason, in con
sequence of which several distinct precepts are en
joined us. Christianity is not only an external in
stitution of natural religion, and a new promulga
tion of God's general providence, as righteous go
vernor and judge ofthe Avorld ; but it contains also
a rcA'elation of a particular dispensation of provi
dence, carrying on by his Son and Spirit, for the
recovery and salvation ofraankind, who are repre
sented, in Scripture, to be in a state of ruin. And,
in consequence of this revelation being- made, we
are commanded to be baptized, not only in the
name of the Father, but also, of the Son, and of
the Holy Ghost : and other obligations of duty,
unknoAvn before, to the Son and the Holy Ghost,
are revealed. Now, the importance of these duties
may be judged of, by observing that they arise,
not from positive command merely, but also from
the offices, which appear, from Scripture, to be
long to those divine persons in the Gospel dis
pensation ; or from the relations, which, Ave are
there informed, they stand in to us. By reason
is rcA'ealed the relation, Avhich God the Father
stands in to us. Hence arises the obligatibn of
duty which Ave are under to him. In Scripture
are revealed the relations, which the Son and Holy

Chap. I. of Christianity. \ 89
Spirit stand in to us. Hence arise the obligations
of duty which Ave are under to them. The truth of
the case, as one may speak, in each of these three
respects, being admitted : that God is the governor
of the world, upon the evidence of reason ; that
Christ is the mediator between God and man ; and
the Holy Ghost our guide and sanctifier, upon the
evidence of revelation : the truth ofthe case, I say,
in each of these respects, being adraitted ; it is no
more a question, why it should be commanded, that
Ave be baptized in the name of the Son and of the
Holy Ghost, than that we be baptized in the narae
of the Father. This raatter seems to require to be
more fully stated *.
Let it be remembered, then, that religion comes
under the twofold consideration of internal and ex
ternal ; for the latter is as real a part of religion, of
true religion, as the former. Now, Avhen religion
is considered under the first notion, as an inward
principle, to be exerted in such and such inward
acts of the mind and heart ; the essence of natural
religion may be said to consist in religious regards
to God the Father Almighty : and the essence of
revealed rehgion, as distinguished frora natural, to
consist in religious regards to the Son, and to the
Holy Ghost. And the obligation Ave are under,
of paying these religious regards to each of these
divine persons respectively, arises from the re-

* See the Nature, Obligation, and Efficacy, of the Christian
Sacraments, &c. and Colliber of revealed Religion, as there quo
ted.

190 Of the Importance Part IL
spective relations which they each stand in to us.
How these relations are made known, whether by
reason or revelation, raakes no alteration in the
case ; because the duties arise out of the relations
theraselves, not out of the raanner in which we are
informed of them. The Son and Spirit have each
his proper office, in that great dispensation of pro
vidence, the redemption of the world : the one our
mediator, the other our sanctifier. Does not, then,
the duty of religious regards to both these divine
persons, as immediately arise, to the view of reason,
out ofthe very nature of these offices and relations,
as the inward good-will and kind intention, which
we owe to our fellow-creatures, arises out of the
comraon relations between us and them ? But it
will be asked, "What are the inward religious re
gards, appearing thus obviously, due to the Son and
Holy Spirit, as arising, not merely from command
in Scripture, but from the very nature of the re
vealed relations which they stand in to us ? " I
answer, the religious regards of reverence, honour,
love, trust, gratitude, fear, hope. In what exter
nal manner this inward Avorship is to be expressed,
is a matter of pure revealed comraand ; as, perhaps^
the external raanner, in which God the Father is to
be worshipped, may be more so than avc are ready
to think : but the worship, the internal worship it
self, to the Son and Holy Ghost, is no farther mat
ter of pure revealed command, than as the relations
they stand in to us, are matter of pure revelation ;
for the relations being known, the obligations to
such internal worship are obligations of reason, ari-

Chap. I. of Christianity. 19I
sing out of those relations theraselves. In short,
the history of the Gospel as immediately shews us
the reason of these obhgations, as it shews us the
meaning ofthe words. Son and Holy Ghost.
If this account of the Christian religion be just,
those persons who can speak lightly of it, as of little
consequence, provided natural religion be kept to,
plainly forget, that Christianity, even wh^t is pe
culiarly so called, as distinguished from natural re
ligion, has yet soraewhat very iraportant, even of
a moral nature. For the office of our Lord being
made known, and the relation he stands in to us,
the obligation of religious regards to him is plain
ly moral, as much as charity to mankind is ; since
this obligation arises, before external comraand,
iraraediately out of that his office and relation it
self. Those persons appear to forget, that revela
tion is to be considered as inforraing us of sorae
what new in the state of raankind, and in the go
vernraent of the world ; as acquainting us with
some relations we stand in, which could not other
wise have been knoAvn. And these relations being
real (though before revelation we could be under
no obUgations from them, yet upon their being re
vealed), there is no reason to think, but that ne
glect of behaving suitably to them, will be attend
ed with the same kind of consequences under God's
government, as neglecting to behave suitably to
any other relations made known to us by reason.
And ignorance, whether unavoidable or voluntary,
so far as we can possibly see, will, just as much,
and just as little, excuse in one case as in the other :

192 Of the Importance Part IL
the ignorance being- supposed equally unavoidable,
or equally voluntary, in both cases.
If, therefore, Christ be indeed the mediator be
tween God and man, i. e. if Christianity be true ;
if he be indeed our Lord, our Saviour, and our
God ; no one can say what may foHow, not only
the obstinate, but the careless disregard to him, in
those high relations. Nay, no one can say what
may follow such disregard, even in the way of na
tural consequence *. For, as the natural conse*
quences of vice in this life, are doubtless to be con
sidered as judicial punishments inflicted by God ;
so hkcAvise, for aught we know, the judicial pu*
nishments of the future life may be, in a like way,
or a like sense, the natural consequence of vice f ;
of raen's violating, or disregarding, the relations
Avhich God has placed thera in here, and raade
knoAvn to them.
Again : If raankind are corrupted and depraved
in their raoral character, and so are unfit for that
state which Christ is gone to prepare for his dis
ciples ; and if the assistance of God's Spirit be ne
cessary to renew their nature, in the degree requi
site to their being- qualified for that state ; all which
is implied in the express, though figurative, decla
ration. Except a man be born of the Spirit, he can
not enter into the kingdom of God% : supposing
this, is it possible any serious person can think it a
slight raatter, whether or no he raakes use of the
means, expressly coraraanded by God, for obtain-
* Pages 37, 38. f Chap. v. J John iii, 5.

Chap. I. of Christianity. 193
ing this divine assistance ? especially since the
Avhole analogy of nature shews, that we are not to
expect any benefits, without making use of the ap
pointed means for obtaining or enjoying them.
Noav, reason shews us nothing of the particular or
iraraediate raeans of obtaining either temporal or
spiritual benefits. This, therefore, we must learn,
either from experience or revelation. And expe
rience, the present case does not admit of.
The conclusion from all this evidently is, that,
Christianity being supposed either true or credible,
it is unspeakable irreverence, and really the most
presumptuous rashness, to treat it as a light mat
ter. It can never justly be esteemed of little con
sequence, till it be positively supposed false. Nor
do I know a higher and more important obligation
Avhich we are under, than that of examining most
seriously into the evidence of it, supposing- its cre
dibility ; and of embracing it, upon supposition of
its truth.
The two foUoAving deductions may be proper to
be added, in order to iHustrate the foregoing- ob
servations, and to prevent their being- mistaken.
First, Hence Ave may clearly see, Avhere lies the
distinction between Avhat is positive and what isi
moral in religion. Moral precepts are precepts,
the reasons of which we see ; positive precepts are
precepts, the reasons of which we do not see *.
* This is the distinction between moral and positive precepts,
considered respectively as such. But yet, since the latter have
somewhat of a moral nature, we may see the reason of thera, con-
N

194 Of the Importance PartIL
Moral duties arise out of the nature of the case
itself, prior to external comraand. Positive duties
do not arise out of the nature of the case, but
frora external Coraraand : nor would they be duties
at all, Avere it not for such comraand received from
hira, Avhose creatures and subjects we are. But the
manner in Avhich the nature of the case, or the fact
of the relation, is raade known, this doth not deno
minate any duty, either positive or raoral. That
we be baptized in the narae of the Father, is as
rauch a positive duty, as that avc be baptized in the
narae of the Son ; because both arise equally from
revealed command : though the relation Avhich wc
stand in to God the Father, is made known to us
by reason ; the relation Ave stand in to Christ, by
revelation only. On the other hand, the dispensa
tion of the gospel adraitted, gratitude as immedi
ately becomes due to Christ, frora his being the
voluntary rainister of this dispensation ; as it is
due to God the Father, frora his being- the foun
tain of all good : though the first is raade knowii
to us by revelation only, the second by reason.
Hence also we may see, and, for distinctness sake,
it raay be Avortli raentioning, that positive institu
tions corae under a twofold consideration. They
are either institutions founded on natural religion,
as baptism in the narae of the Father ; though this
sidered in this view. Moral and positive precepts are in some
respects alike, in other respects different. So far as they are alike,
we discern the reasons of both ; so far as they are different, we
discern the reasons of the former, but not of the latter. See p..
183, &c. and p, 195.

Chap. I. of Christianity. 195
has also a particular reference to the gospel dispen
sation, for it is in the narae ofGod, as the Father
of our Lord Jesus Christ : or they are external in
stitutions founded on revealed religion, as baptisra
in the name of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.
Secondly, Frora the distinction betAveen Avhat is
moral and Avhat is positive in religion, appears the
ground of that peculiar preference, which the Scrip
ture teaches us to be due to the former.
The reason of positive institutions in general is
very obvious ; though Ave should not see the rea
son Avhy such particular ones are pitched upon,
rather than others. Whoever, therefore, instead of
cavilling at words, will attend to the thing- itself,
may clearly see, that positive institutions in gene
ral, as distinguished from this or that particular
one, have the nature of moral commands : since
the reasons of them appear. Thus, for instance,
the external AVorship ofGod is a raoral duty, though
no particular mode of it be so. Care then is to be
taken, when a comparison is made between posi
tive and moral duties, that they be compared no
farther than as they are different : no farther than
as the former are positive, or arise out of mere ex
ternal command, the reasons of Avhich Ave are not
acquainted Avith ; and as the latter are raoral, or
arise out of the apparent reason of the case, Avith
out such external command. Unless this caution
be observed, we shall run into endless confusion.
Now, this being premised, suppose two standing
precepts enjoined by the sarae authority ; that, in
certain conjunctures, it is irapossible to obey both ;

196 Of the Importance PartIL
that the forraer is raoral, i. e. a precept of which we
see the reasons, and that they hold in the particu
lar case before us ; but that the latter is positive,
i. e. a precept of which we do not see the reasons :
it is indisputable that our obligations are to obey
the forraer ; because there is an apparent reason for
this preference, and none against it. Farther, po
sitive institutions, I suppose all those which Chris
tianity enjoins, are raeans to a moral end ; and
the end must be acknowledged more excellent than
the raeans. Nor is observance of these institutions
any religious obedience at all, or of any value,
othei-Avise than as it proceeds frora a moral principle.
This seems to be the strict logical way of stating
and determining this matter ; but will, perhaps, be
foilnd less applicable to practice, than raay be
thought at first sight.
And therefore, in a more practical, though more
lax way of consideration,' and taking the words,
moral law and positive institutions, in the popular
sense ; I add, that the whole moral law is as much
matter of revealed comraand, as positive institu
tions are: for the Scripture enjoins every raoral
virtue. In this respect then they are both upon a
level. But the raoral law is, moreover, written
upon our hearts ; interAvoven into our very nature.
And this is a plain intimation of the Author of it,
Avhich is to be preferred, when they interfere.
But there is not altogether so much necessity for
the determination of this question, as some persons
seem to think. Nor are we left to reason alone to-
determine it. For, First, Though mankind have^

Chap. I. of Christianity. 197
in all ages, been greatly prone to place their reli
gion in peculiar positive rites, by.Avay of equivalent
for obedience to moral precepts ; yet, Avithout
making any comparison at all between them, and
consequently without determining which is to have
the preference, the nature of the thing abundantly
shews all notions of that kind to be utterly subver
sive of true religion : as they are, moreover, con
trary to the whole general tenor of Scripture, and
likewise to the most express particular declarations
of it, that nothing can render us accepted of God,
without moral virtue. SecondW, Upon the occa
sion of mentioning together positive and moral du
ties, the Scripture always puts the stress of religion
upon the latter, and never upon theforirier; Avhich,
though no sort of alloAvance to neglect the former,
Avhen they do not interfere Avith the latter ; yet it
is a plain intimation, that when they do, the latter
are to be preferred. And farther, as mankind are
for placing the stress of their religion any where,
rather than upon virtue ; lest both the reason of th6
thing, and the general spirit of Christianity, appear
ing in the intimation now mentioned, should be
ineffectual against this prevalent folly : our Lord
himself, from whose comraand alone the obligation
of positive institutions arises, has taken occasion to
make the comparison between them and moral pre
cepts, Avhen the Pharisees censured him for eati?ig
with publicans and sinners ; and also 'when they
censured his disciples for plucking the ears of corn
on the Sabbath-day. Upon this coraparison he has
determined expressly, and in form, Avhich shall have

198 Of the Importance PartIL
the preference Avhen they interfere. And by de
livering his authoritative determination in a pro-
A-erbial raanner of expression, he has raade it gene
ral : I will have mercy, and not sacrifice *. The
propriety of the Avord proverbial is not the thing
insisted upon; though, I think, the manner 'of
speaking is to be called so. But that the manner
of speaking very remarkably renders the determi
nation general, is surely indisputable. For, had it,
iu the latter case, been said only, that God pre
ferred mercy to the rigid observance of the Sab
bath; even then, by parity of reason, raost justly
might Ave have argued, that he preferred mercy,
likewise, to the observance of other ritual institu'
tions; and, in general, moral duties to positive
ones. And thus the determination would have been
general ; though its being- so Avere infei-red, and
not expressed. But as the passage really stands in
the Gospel, it is much stronger : for the sense, and
the very literal words of our Lord's answer, are as
applicable to any other instance of a coraparison,
between positive and raoral duties, as to this upon
Avhich they were spoken. And if, in case of com
petition, mercy is to be preferred to positive insti
tutions, it will scarce be thought, that justice is to
give place to them. It is remarkable too, that, as
the words are a quotation from the Old Testament,
they are introduced, on both the foreraentioned oc
casions, with a declaration, that the Pharisees did
not understand the meaning of them. This, I say,
* Matth, ix, J3, and xii, 7,

Ch^. I. of Christianity. 199
is very reraarkable : for, since it is scarce possible
fbr the raost ignorant person not to understand the
literal sense of the passage in the Prophet *, and
since understanding the literal sense would not
have prevented their condemning the guiltless '\ ;
it can hardly be doubted, that the thing Avhich our
Lord really intended in that declaration Avas, that
the Pharisees had not learnt frora it, as they might,
wherein the general spirit of religion consists :
that it consists in moral piety and virtue, as distin
guished from forms and ritual observances. How-
ever, it is certain we raay learn this frora his divine
application of the passage, in the Gospel,
But, as itis one of the peculiar weaknesses of hu
man nature, Avhen, upon a coraparison of two things,
one is found to be of greater importance than the
other, to consider this other as of scarce any im
portance at all : it is highly necessary that we
remind ourselves, hoAV great presumption it is to
make light of any institutions of divine appoint
ment ; that our obligations to obey all God's com
mands whatever are absolute and indispensable; and
that commands merely positive, admitted to be from
him, lay us under a moral obligation to obey them ;
an obligation moral in the strictest and most pro
per sense.
To these things I cannot forbear adding, that
the account uoav given of Christianity, most strongly
shews and enforces upon us the obligation of search
ing the Scriptures, in order to see what the scheme
* Hos. vi. t See Matth. xii. J.^

200 Of the Importance^ 'S^c. Part II.
of rcA'clation really is ; instead of determining be
forehand, from reason, Avhat the scheme of it must
be *. Indeed, if in reA^elation there be found any
passages, the seeming meaning of Avhich is contrary
to natural religion, we may most certainly conclude
such seeraing raeaning not to be the real oiie. But it
is not any degree of a presuraption against an inter
pretation of Scripture, that such interpretation con
tains a doctrine, Avhich the light of nature cannot
discover f ; or a precept, Avhich the laAV of nature
does not oblige to.
* See Chap. iii. f .Pages 202, 203.

CHAP. II.
Ojthe supposed Presumption against a Revelation,
considered as miraculous.
Maa^ing shewn the iraportance of the Christian
rcA-elation, and the obligations which Ave are under
seriously to attend to it, upon supposition of its
truth, or its credibility ; the next thing in order is,
to consider the supposed presumptions against re
velation in general, which shall be the subject of
this chapter ; and the objections against the Chri
stian in particular, which shall be the subject of
some following ones *. For it seems the most
natural method to remove the prejudices against
Christianity, before we proceed to the consideration
of the positive evidence for it, and the objections
against that evidence f.
It is, I think, commonly supposed, that there
is some peculiar presumption, from the analogy of
nature, against the Christian scherae of things ;
at least against miracles : so as that stronger evi
dence is necessary to prove the truth and reality of
thera, than Avould be sufficient to convince us of
other events, or matters of fact. Indeed, the con
sideration of this supposed presumption cannot but
be thought very insignificant by many persons;
* Chap. iii. iv. v. vi. t Chap, vii.

202 Of the supposed Presumption Part IL
yet, as it belongs to the subject of this treatise, so
it may tend to open the mind, and remove some
prejudices ; hoAvever needless the consideration of
it be, upon its own account.
I. I find no appearance of a presumption, from
the analogy of nature, agaiust the general scheme
of Christianity, that God created and invisibly go^
verns the Avorld by Jesus Christ ; and by him also
Avill hereafter judge it in righteousness, i. e. render
to every one according to his works; and that good
men are under the secret influence of his Spirit.
Whether these things are, or are not, to be called
miraculous, is, perhaps, only a question about words;
or, hoAvever, is of no moment in the case. If the
analogy of nature raises any presumption against
this gener.al scherae of Christianity, it raust be,
either because it is not discoverable by reason or
experience, or else because it is unlike that course
of nature, which is. But analogy raises no pre
sumption against the truth of this scherae, upon
either of these accounts,
First, There is no presumption, from analogy,
against the truth of it, upon account of its not be
ing discoverable by reason or experience. For,
suppose one Avho never heard of revelation, of the
most improved understanding, and acquainted with
our whole system of natural philosophy and natural
rehgion ; such an one could not but be sensible,
that it was but a very small part of the natural
and moral system of the universe, Avhich he was
acquainted Avith. He could not but be sensible,
that there must be innumerable things, in the dis-

Chap. II. agaiiist Miracles. 203
pensations of Providence past, in the invisible go
vernment over the Avorld at present carrying on,
and in Avhat is to come ; of Avhich he Avas Avholly
ignorant *, and Avhich could not be discoA'ered with
out revelation. Whether the scheme of nature be,
in the strictest sense, infinite or not; it is evidently
Aast, even beyond all possible iraagination. And
doubtless that part of it, Avhich is opened to our
view, is but as a point, in comparison of the Avhole
plan of Providence, reaching throughout eternity,
past aud future ; in comparison of Avhat is even
now going on in the remote parts of the boundless
universe ; nay, in comparison of the whole scheme
of this world. And, therefore, that things lie be^
yond the natural reach of our faculties, is no sort
of presumption against the truth and reality of
them : because it is certain, there are innumerable
things, in the con.stitution and government of the
universe, which are thus beyond the natural reach
of our faculties. Secondly, Analogy raises no pre
suraption against any of the things contained in
this general doctrine of Scripture now raentioned,
upon account oftheir being unlike the known course
of nature. For there is no presumption at all, from
analogy, that the whole cow:&e of things, or di\'ine
government, naturally unknown to us, and every
thing in it, is like to any thing iu that which is
known; and therefore no peculiar presumption
against any thing in the forriier, upon account of
its being unlike to any thing in the latter. And
\n the constitution and natural government of the
* Page 155.

204 Of the supposed Presumption Part II.
Avorld, as Avell as in the moral government of it,
Ave see thing-s, in a great degree, unlike one an*
other : and therefore ought not to Avonder at such
unlikeness betAveen things visible and invisible.
However, the scheme of Christianity is by no raeans
entirely unlike the scheme of nature ; as will ap
pear in the following part of this Treatise.
The notion of a miracle, considered as a proof
of a divine mission, has been stated Avith great
exactness by divines ; and is, I think, sufficiently
understood by every one. There are also invisi
ble rairacles ; the Incarnation of Christ, for in
stance, which, being secret, cannot be alleged as
a proof of such a raission ; but require themselves
to be proved by visible rairacles. Revelation it
self, too, is miraculous ; and miracles are the proof
of it ; and the supposed presumption against these,
shall presently be considered. All which I have
been observing here is, that, whether Ave choose
to call every thing in the dispensations of Provi
dence, not discoverable without revelation, nor
like the known course of things, miraculous ; and
Avhether the general Christian dispensation now
mentioned, is to be called so^ or not ; the fore
going observations seera certainly to shew, that
there is no presuraption against it, from the ana
logy of nature.
II. There is no presumption, from analogy,
against sorae operations, which we should now
call miraculous ; particularly none against a reve
lation at the beginning of the world : nothing of
such presumption against it, as is supposed to be

Chap. II. against Miracles. Q05
implied or expressed in the word miraculous.
For a miracle, in its very notion, is relative to a
course of nature ; and implies soraewhat different
frora it, considered as being- so. Now, either there
was no course of nature at the tirae Avhich Ave are
speaking of ; or if there Avere, Ave are not acquaint
ed what the course of nature is upon the first peo
pling of worlds. And therefore the question, whe
ther mankind had a revelation made to them at
that time, is to be considered j not as a question
concerning a miracle, but as a comraon question
of fact. And we haA''e the like reason, be it raore
or less, to adrait the report of tradition, concern
ing this question, and concerning comraon mat
ters of fact of the same antiquity ; for instance,
what part of the earth was first peopled.
Or thus : When mankind was first placed in
this state, there was a power exerted, totally dif
ferent from the present course of nature. Noav,
whether this poAver, thus wholly different from
the present course of nature, for we cannot pro
perly apply to it the word miraculous ; whether
this power stopped imraediately after it had raade
man, or went on, and exerted itself farther in
giving him a revelation, is a question of the same
kind, as Avhether an ordinary power exerted itself
in such a particular degree and manner, or not.
Or suppose the power exerted in the formation
of the world, be considered as rairaculous, or ra
ther, be called by that name, the case Avill not be
different; since, it must be acknowledged, that
such a power Avas exerted. For, supposing it ac-

206 Of the supposed Presumption Part II.
knowledged that our Saviour spent sorae years in
a course of Avorking rairacles ; there is no raore
presuraption, worth raentioning, against his ha
ving exerted this miraculous power, in a certain
degree greater, than in a certain degree less ; in
one or tAvo more instances, than in one or two
fcAver ; in this, than in another manner.
It is evident, then, that there can be no pecu
liar presumption, from the analogy of nature,
against supposing a revelation, when man Avas first
placed upon the earth.
Add, that there does not appear the least inti
mation in history or tradition, that religion Avas
first reasoned out : but the whole of history and
tradition makes for the other side, that it came
into the Avorld by revelation. Indeed, the state
of religion in the first ages, of which we have any
account, seems to suppose and iraply, that this
Avas the original Of it amongst mankind. And
these reflections together, Avithout taking in the
peculiar authority of Scripture, amount to real and
a very material degree of evidence, that there Avas
a revelation at the beginning of the world. Now
this, as it is a confirmation of natural religion,
and therefore mentioned in the forraer part of this
Treatise * ; so likcAvise it has a tendency to re-
moA^e any prejudices ag-ainst a subsequent revela
tion. III. But stiH it may be objected, that there is
some peculiar presumption, from analogy, ag-ainst
' Page 144, &c.

Chap. IL against Miracles. 207
miracles ; particularly against revelation, after the
settlement and during the continuance of a course
of nature.
Now, with regard to this supposed presumption,
it is to be observed in general, that before we
can have ground for raising what can, with any
propriety, be calledanar^e/mew^ from analogy, for
or ag-ainst revelation considered as somewhat mi
raculous, Ave must he acquainted with a similar or
parallel case. But the history of some other world,
seeraingly in like circumstances witii our own, is
no raore than a parallel case ; and therefore no
thing short of this can be so. Yet, could we
corae at a presuraptive proof, for or against a re
velation, frora being inforraed, Avhether such Avorld
had one, or not ; such a proof, being drawn from
one single instance only, raust be infinitely pre
carious. IVIore particularly : First of all ; There
is a very strong presumption against comraon spe
culative truths, and against the most ordinary
facts, before the proof of them ; which yet is
overcome by alraost any proof. There is a pre
suraption of millions to one, against the story of
CcEsar, or of any other man. For, suppose a num
ber of comraon facts so and so circurastanced, of
which one had no kind of proof, _ should happen
to corae into one's thoughts ; every one Avould,
Avithout any possible doubt, conclude them to be
false. And the like may be said of a single com
mon fact. And, from hence it appears, that the
question of importance, as to the matter before us,

208 Of the supposed Presumption Part II.
is, concerning the degree of the peculiar presump
tion supposed against miracles ; not whether there
be any peculiar presumption at all against them.
For, if there be the presumption of milhons to
one, against the raost common facts ; what can a
small presumption, additional to this, amount to,
though it be pecuhar ? It cannot be estimated,
and is as nothing. The only material question is,
Avhether there be any such presumption against mi
racles, as to render them in any sort incredible.
Secondly, If Ave leave out the consideration of re
ligion, we are in such total darkness, upon what
causes, occasions, reasons, or circumstances, the
present course of nature depends ; that there does
not appear any improbability for or against sup
posing, that five or six thousand years raay have
given scope for causes, occasions, reasons, or cir
curastances, from whence rairaculous interposi
tions raay have arisen. And from this, joined
Avith the foregoing observation, it will follow, that
there must be a presumption, beyond all conipa-
rison, greater, against the particular common facts
just now instanced in, than against miracles in
general ; before any evidence of either. But,
Thirdly, Take in the consideration of religion, or
the moral system of the world, and then we See
distinct particular reasons for miracles : to afford
mankind instruction additional to that of nature,
and to attest the truth of it. And this gives a
real credibility to the supposition, that it might
be part of the original plan of things, that there

Chap. II. against Miracles, 209
shpuld be miraculous interpositions. Then, Last
ly, Miracles must not be compared to comraon na
tural events ; or to events which, though uncom
mon, are sirailar to Avhat Ave daily experience ; but
to the extraordinary phenomena of nature. And
then, the comparison will be between, the pre
sumption ag-ainst miracles ; and the presuraption
against such uncoramon appearances, suppose, as
comets, and against there being- any such powers
in nature as magnetism and electricity, so con
trary to the properties of other bodies not endued
Avith these powers. And before any one can de
termine, Avhether there be any peculiar presurap
tion against miracles, more than against other ex
traordinary things ; he raust consider, Avhat, upon
first hearing,, Avould be the presumption against
the last-mentioned appearances and poAvers, to a
person acquainted only Avith the daily, monthly,
and annual, course of nature respecting this earth,
and with those common poAvers of matter which
we every day see.
Upon all this I conclude ; that there certainly
is no such presumption against miracles, as to ren
der them in any Avise incredible : that, on the con
trary, our being- able to discern reasons for them,
gives a positive credibility to the history of them,
in cases where those reasons hold : and that it is
by no means certain, that there is any peculiar
presumption at all, from analogy, even in the low
est degree, against miracles, as distinguished from
other extraordinary phenomena : though it is not
0

210 Of the supposed Presumption, Bcc. Part II,
worth while to perplex the reader with inquiries
into the abstract nature of evidence, in order to
determine a question, which, without such inqui
ries, Ave see * is of no iraportance.
* Page 207.

CHAP. HI.
Of our Incapacity of judging, xvhat were to be ex
pected in a Revelation ; and the Credibility,
from Analogy,' that it must contain Things ap
pearing liable to Objections.
xJesides the objections against the evidence for
Christianity, many are alleged against the scherae
of it ; against the whole raanner in which it is put
and left with the Avorld ; as well as against several
particular relations in Scripture : objections drawn,
from the deficiences of revelation ; from things in
it appearing to men foolishness *; from its con
taining matters of offence, Avhich have led, and it
must have been foreseen would lead, into strange
enthusiasra and superstition, and be raade to serve
the purposes of tyranny and Avickedness ; from its
not being universal; and, whichis a thing of the sarae
Jiind, from its evidence not being so convincing- and
satisfactory as it might have been : for this last is
soraetimes turned into a positiA^e argument against
its truth f. It would be tedious, indeed impossi
ble, to enuraerate the several particulars corapre-
* 1 Cor. i. 28. t See Chap. vi.

212 The Credibility of Revelation PartIL
bended under the objections here referred to ; they
beino- so various, according to the different fancies
of raen. There are persons, who think it a strong
objection against the authority of Scripture, that it
is not coraposed by rules of art, agreed upon by
critics, for polite and correct Avriting. And the
scorn is inexpressible, Avitli which sorae of the pro
phetic parts of Scripture are treated: partiy through
the rashness of interpreters ; but very rauch, also,
on account of the hieroglyphical and figurative
language in Avhich they are left us, Sorae of the
principal things of this sort shall be particularly
considered in the following chapters. But ray de
sign at present is to observe in general, with respeqt
to this whole way of arguing, that, upon supposi
tion of revelation, it is highly credible beforehand,
Ave should be incompetent judges of it, to a great
degree; and that it would contain ^many things ap
pearing to us liable to great objections, in case we
judge of it otherwise than by the analogy of na
ture. And therefore, though objections against the
evidence of Christianity are most seriously to be
considered ; yet objections against Christianity, it
self are, in a great measure, frivolous : alraost all
objections against it, excepting those Avhich are
alleged against the particular proofs of its coming
from God. I express myself Avith caution, lest I
should be inistaken to vilify reason ; which is in
deed the only faculty we have wherewith to judge
concerning any thing, even revelation itself: or
be misunderstood to assert, that a supposed reve
lation cannot be proved false from internal charat-

Chap. Ill, liable to Objections. ' g 1 3
ters. For, it may contain clear irambrahties, or
contradictions ; and either of these Avould proA^e it
false. Nor Avill I take upon me to affirra, that
nothing else can possibly render any supposed reve
lation incredible. Yet stfll the observation above is,
I think, true beyond doubt; that objections against
Christianity, as distinguished frora objections
against its eA'idence, are frivolous. To raake out
thi.s, is the general design of the present Chapter,
And, with regard to the whole of it, I cannot but
particularly Avish, that the proofs raight be at
tended to ; rather than the assertions cavilled at,
upon account of any unacceptable consequences,
Avhether real or supposed, Avhlch may be draAvn
from them. For, after all, that which is true,
raust be adraitted, though it should shew us the
shortness of our faculties ; and that avc are in no
wise judges of raany things, of Avhich we are apt
to think ourselves very corapetent ones; Nor Avill
this be any objection with reasonable men, at
least upon second thought it avHI not be any ob
jection Avith such, against the justness of the foi*
lowing observations.
As God governs the AVorld, and instructs his
creatures, according- to certain kAvs or rules, in
the known course of nature ; known by reason to
gether Avith experience : so the Scripture informs
us pf a scheme of Divine Providence, additional
to this. It relates, that God has, by revelation,
instructed men in things concerning his govern
ment, which they could not otherAvise have known;
and reminded them of things, which they might

214 The Credibility of Revelation PartIL
otherwise knoAv ; and attested the truth of the
whole by miracles. Now, if the natural and the
revealed dispensation of things are both from God,
if they coincide Avith each other, arid together
make up one scheme of Providence ; our being
incompetent judges of one, must render it credi
ble, that we may be incorapetent judges also of
the other. Since, upon experience, the acknow
ledged constitution and course of nature is found
to be greatly different frora what, before experi
ence, would have been expected ; and such as,
men fancy, there lie great objections againsti
this renders it beforehand highly credible, that
they may find the revealed dispensation likewise,
if they judge of it as they do of the constitution
of nature, very different from expectations formed
beforehand ; and liable, in appearance, to great
objections : objections against the scheme itself,
and against the degrees and manners of the mira
culous interpositions, by which it Avas attested
and carried on. Thus, suppose a prince to govern
his dominions in the wisest manner possible, by
common known laws, and that upon some exi
gencies he should suspend these laAVS : and govern,
in several instances, in a different manner : if one
ofhis subjects were not a competent judge before
hand, by what coramon rules the government
shpuld or would be carried on ; it could not be
expected, that the same person would be a compe
tent judge, in what exigencies, or in what man
ner, or to Avhat degree, those laws coraraonly ob
served would be suspended or deviated frorai If

Chap. III. liable fo Objections. 215
he were not a judge of the wisdom of the ordinary
administration, there is no reason to think he
would be a judge of the Avisdom of the extra
ordinary. If he thought he had objections against
the forraer ; doubtless, it is highly supposable,
he raight think also, that he had objections
against the latter. And thus, as we fall into infi
nite follies and raistakes, whenever we pretend,
otherwise than from experience and analogy, to
judge of the constitution and course of nature ; it
is evidently supposable beforehand, that we should
fall into as great, in pretending- to judge, in the
like mianner, concerning re\'elation. Nor is there
any more ground to expect that this latter should
appear to us clear of objections, than that the for
mer should.
These observations, relating to the whole of
Christianity, are applicable to inspiration in parti
cular. As we we are in no sort judges beforehand,
by what laws or rules, in what degree, or by what
means, it were to have been expected, that God
would naturally instruct us ; so, upon supposition
of his affording us light and instruction by revela
tion, additional to what he has afforded us by rea
son and experience, we are in no sort judges, by
what raethod,s, and in Avhat proportion, it were to
be expected, that this supernatural light and in
struction Avould be afforded us. We know not be
forehand, what degree or kind of natural inforraa
tion, it were to be expected God would afford
raen, each by his own reason and experience : nor
how far he would enable, and effectually dispose

216 The Credibility of Revelation PartIL
them to comraunicate it, whatever it should be,
to each other : nor whether the evidence of it would
be, certain, highly probable, or doubtful ; nor
Avhether it would be given with equal clearness
and conviction to all. Nor could Ave guess,
upon any good ground I mean, Avhether natural
knowledge, or even the faculty itself, by which
we are capable of attaining it, reason, would be
given us at once, or gradually. In like man
ner, Ave are Avholly ignorant, Avhat degree of ncAV
knoAvledge, it were to be expected, God Avould
give raankind by revelation, upon supposition of
his affording- one : or hoAV far, or in Avhat Avay, he
would interpose rairaculously, to qualify thera, to
Avhora he should originally raake the revelation,
for coraraunicating the knowledge g-iven by it; and
to secure their doing it to the age in Avhich they
should liA^e ; and to secure its being transmitted to
posterity. We are equally ignorant, whether the
evidence of it Avould be, certain, or highly proba
ble, or doubtful * : or whether all who should have
any degree of instruction from it, and any degree
of evidence of its truth, Avould have the same :
or Avhether the scheme would be revealed at once,
or unfolded gradually. Nay, ,we are not in any
sort able to judge, Avhether it Avere to have been
expected, that the rcA^elation should have been
coramitted to writing ; or left to be handed down!,
and consequently corrupted, by verbal tradition,
and at length sunk under it, if mankind so pleased,
* See Chap. vi.

Chap. III. liable to Objections. 217
and during such time as they are permitted, in the
degree they evidently are, to act as they will.
But it raay be said, " that a revelation in some
of the above-mentioned circumstances ; one, for
instance, which Avas not comraitted to writing, and
thus secured against danger of corruption, would
not haA'e answered its purpose." I ask, what pur
pose ? It Avould not have answered all the purpo
ses, Avhich it has uoav answered, and in the same
degree : but it would have ansAvered others, or the
same in different degrees. And Avhich of these
were the purposes of God, and best fell in with his
general government, we could not at all have de
terrained beforehand.
Now, since it has been sheAvn, that Ave have no
principles of reason, upon which to judge before
hand, how it Avere to be expected revelation should
have been left, or Avhat was raost suitable to the
divine plan of governraent, in any ofthe fore-men
tioned respects ; it must be quite frivolous to ob
ject afterwards as to any of them, against its be
ing left in one Avay, rather than another : for this
would be to object against things, upon account
of their being different from expectations, Avhich
have been shcAvn to be without reason. And thus
Ave see, thatthe only question concerning the truth
of Christianity, is, whether it be a real revelation ;
not whether it be attended Avith every circumstance
which we should have looked for : and concerning
the authority of Scripture, whether it be Avhat it
claims to be ; not Avhether it be a book of such
sort, and so proraulged, as Aveak men are apt to

218 The Credibility of Revelatidn PartIL
fancy, a book containing a divine revelation should.
And therefore, neither obscurity, nor seeraing in
accuracy of stile, nor various readings, nor early
disputes about the authors of particular parts ; nor
any other things of the like kind, though they had
been rauch more considerable in degree than they
are, could overthrow the authority of the Scrip
ture : unless the Prophets, Apostles, or our Lord,
had promised, that the book, containing the divine
revelation, should be secure from those things.
Nor indeed can any objections overthrow such a
kind of revelation as the Christian claims to be,
since there are no objections against the morality
of it *, but such as can shew, that there is no proof
of miracles Avrought originally in attestation of it ;
no appearance of any thing "miraculous in its ob
taining in the world ; nor any of prophecy, that
is, of events foretold, Avhich huraan sagacity could
not foresee. If it can be shewn, that the proof
alleged for all these, is absolutely none at all, then
is revelation overturned. But were it allowed, that
the proof of any one, or all of them, is lower than
is allowed ; yet, whilst any proof of them remains,
revelation will stand upon much the same foot it
does at present, as to all the purposes of life and
practice, and ought to have the like influence upon
our behaviour.
Frora the foregoing observations, too, it will fol-
loAV, and those Avho avHI thoroughly exaraine into
revelation Avill find it Avorth remarking, that there
* Page 227.

Chap III. liable to Objections. 219
are several Avays of arguing, which, though just
with regard to other writings, are not applicable to
Scripture ; at least not to the prophetic parts of it.
We cannot argue, for instance, that this cannot be
the sense or intent of such a passage of Scripture ;
for if it had, it would have been exprest more
plainly, or have been represented under a more apt
figure or hieroglyphic : yet we raay justly argue
thus, with respect to comraon books. And the
reason of this difference is very evident; that in
Scripture, Ave are not competent judges, as we are
in common books, hoAV plainly it Avere to have been
expected, what is the true sense should have been
exprest, or under how apt an image, figured. The
only question is, what appearance there is, that this
is the sense ; and scarce at all, how much more
determinately or accurately it might have been ex
prest or figured.
" But is it not self-evident, that internal irapro-
babilities of all kinds, weaken external probable
proof ?" Doubtless. But to Avhat practical purpose
can this be alleged here, Avhen it has been proved
before *, that real internal iraprobabilities, Avhich
rise even to raoral certainty, are overcorae by the
most ordinary testimony ; and when it now has
been made appear, that Ave scarce know what are
improbabilities, as to the matter we are here consi
dering ; as it will farther appear from what foHoAvs.
For though, frora the observations above raade, it
is manifest, that Ave are not in any sort competent
* Page 207.

220 Tlie Credibility of Revelation PartIL
judges, what supernatural instruction Avere to have
been expected ; and though it is self-evident, that
the objections of an incompetent judgment must be
frivolous : yet it raay be proper to go one step far
ther, and observe ; that if raen will be regardless
of these things, and pretend to judge of the Scrip
ture by preconceived expectations ; the analogy of
nature shcAvs beforehand, not only that it is high
ly (-redible they may, but also probable that they
Avill, imagine they have strong objections against
it, however really unexceptionable : for so, prior
to experience, they Avould think they had, against
the circumstances, and degrees, and the whole
manner of that instruction, Avhich is afforded by
the ordinary course of nature. Were the instruc
tion which God affords to brute creatures by in
stincts and raere propensions, and to mankind by
these together Avith reason, matter of probable proof,
and not of certain observation ; it would be object
ed as incredible, in raany instances of it, only upon
account of the means by which this instruction is
giA'Cn, the seeming disproportions, the limitations,
necessary conditions, and circumstances of it. For
instance : Would it not have been thought highly
improbable, that men should have been so much
more capable of discovering, even to certainty, the
general laws of matter, and the magnitudes, paths,.
and revolutions of the heavenly bodies ; than the
occasions and cures of distempers, and many other
things, in which human life seems so much more
nearly concerned, than in astronomy ? Hoav capri
cious and irregular a way of information, Avould it

Chap. TIL liable to Objections. 221
be said, is that of invention, by means of which,
nature instructs us in matters of science, and in
many things, upon Avhich the aflairs of the Avorld
greatly depend : that a man should, by this facul
ty, be made acquainted with a thing in an instant,
Avhen perhaps he is thinking- of somewhat else,
Avhich he has in vain been searching after, it may
be, for years. So likewise the imperfections at
tending the only method, by which nature enables
and directs us to comraunicate our thoughts to each
other, are innuraerable. Language is, in its very
nature, inadequate, ambiguous, liable to infinite
abuse, even from negligence ; and • so liable to it
from design, that every man can deceive and be
tray by it. And, to mention but one instance
more ; that brutes, without reason, should act, in
many respects, with a sagacity and foresight vastly
greater than what men have in those respects, Avould
be thought impossible. Yet, it is certain they do
act Avith such superior foresight-: whether it be their
own indeed, is another question. Frora these thing-s,
it is highly credible beforehand, that upon suppo
sition God should afford raen sorae additional in
struction by revelation, it would be Avith citcura-
stances, in raanners, degrees, and respects, which
we should be apt to fancy Ave had great objections
against the credibility of. Nor are the objections
against the Scripture, nor against Christianity in
general, at all raore or greater, than the analogy
of nature would beforehand  not perhaps give
ground to expect ; for this analogy may not be suf
ficient, in some cases, to ground an expectation

222 The Credibility of Revelation PartIL
upon ; but no more nor greater, than analogy
would shew it, beforehand, to be supposable and
credible, that there might seem to lie against reve
lation. By applying these general observations to a par
ticular objection, it will be more distinctly seen,
how they are apphcable to others of the like kind :
and indeed to almost all objections against Chris
tianity, as distinguished frora objections against
its evidence. It appears from Scripture, that, as
it was not unusual in the apostolic age, for per
sons, upon their conversion to Christianity, to be
endued Avith rairaculous gifts ; so, some of those
persons exercised these gifts in a strangely -irregu
lar and disorderly raanner ; and this is raade an
objection against their being really miraculous.
Now, the foregoing- observations quite remove this
objection, how considerable soever it may appear
at first sight For, consider a person endued with
any of these gifts ; for instance, that of tongues :
it is to be supposed, that he had the same power
over this miraculous gift, as he would have had
over it, had it been the effect of habit, of study,
and use, as it ordinarily is ; or the same power over
it, as he had over any other natural endoAvraent
Consequently, he would use it in the sarae raanner
he did any other ; either regularly and upon pro
per occasions only, or irregularly and upon irapro-
per ones : according to his sense of decency, and
his character of prudence. V/here then is the ob
jection } Why, if this miraculous power was indeed
given to the world, to propagate Christianity and

Chap. III. liable to Objections. 2'JJ
attest the truth of it, we might, it seeras, liaAC
expected, that other sort of persons should have
been chosen to be invested with it ; or that these
should, at the same time, have been endued with
prudence ; or that they should have been, conti
nually, restrained and directed in the exercise of
it ; i. e. that God should have rairaculously inter
posed, if at all, in a different manner, or higher de
gree. But fl'om the observations made above, it is
undeniably evident, that we are not judges, in Avhat
degrees and manners, it were to have been expect
ed, he should miraculously interpose ; upon suppo
sition of his doing it in some degree and manner.
Nor, in the natural course of Providence, are su
perior gifts of memory, eloquence, knoAvledge, and
other talents of great influence, conferred only on
persons of prudence and decency, or such as are
disposed to make the properest use of them. Nor
is the instruction and admonition naturally afford
ed us for the conduct of life, particularly in our
education, comraonly given in a manner the most
suited to recomraend it ; but often with circum
stances apt to prejudice us against such instruc
tion. One might go on to add, that there is a great
resemblance between the light of nature and of re
velation, in several other respects. Practical Chris
tianity, or that faith and behaviour which renders
a man a Christian, is a plain and obvious thing :
like the common rules of conduct, with respect to
our ordinary temporal affairs. The raore distinct
and particular knowledge of those things, the study

224 The Credibility of Revelation Part II.
of which the Apostle calls going on unto perfec
tion *, and of the prophetic parts of revelation,
like many parts of natural and even civil know
ledge; may require very exact thought, and care
ful consideration. The hindrances too, of natural,
and of supernatural light and knowledge, have
been of the sarae kind. And as, it is OAvned, the
whole scherae of Scripture is not yet understood ;
so, if it ever coraes to be understood, before the
restitution of all things t, and Avithout rairaculous
interpositions ; it raust be in the sarae Avay as na
tural knoAvledge is corae at : by the continuance
and progress of learning and of liberty ; and by
particular persons attending to, comparing and
pursuing, intimations scattered up and down it,
which are overlooked and disregarded by the gene
rality ofthe Avorld. For this is the way, in which
all improveraents are made ; by thoughtful men's
tracing on obscure hints, as it were, dropped us by
nature accidentally, or which seem to come into
our minds by chance. Nor is it at all incredible,
that a book, which has been so long in the posses
sion of raankind, should contain raany truths, as
yet undiscovered. For, all the same phenomena,
and the samefaculties of investigation, frora Avhich
such great discoveries in natural knowledge have
been raade in the present and last age, were equally
in the possession of mankind, several thousand
years before. And possibly it raight be intended,
?Heb. vi. 1. f Acts iii. 21.

Chap. III. liable io Objections. S^5
that events, as they come to pass, should open and
ascertain the meaning of several parts of Scripture.
It may be objected, that this analogy fails in a
material respect ; for that natural knowledge' is of
little or no consequence. But I have been speak
ing of the general instruction, which nature does
or does not afford us. And besides, some parts of
natural knowledge, in the more comraon restrained
sense of the words, are of the greatest consequence
to the ease and convenience of life. But suppose
the analogy did, as it does not, fail in this respect ;
yet it raight be abundantly supplied, from the whole
constitution and course of nature ; which shews,
that God does not dispense his gifts, according to
our notions of the advantage and consequence they
would be of to us. And this in general, with his
method of dispensing knowledge in particular, Avould
together make out an analogy full to the point be
fore us.
But it raay be objected still farther and raore ge
nerally ; " The Scripture represents the world as in
a state of ruin, and Christianity as an expedient
to recover it, to help in these respects where nature
fails ; in particular, to supply the deficiences of na
tural light. Is it credible then, that so many ages
should have been let pass, before a raatter of such
a sort, of so great and so general importance, Avas
made known to mankind ; and then that it should
be made known to so small a part of them ? Is it
conceivable, that this supply should be so very de
ficient, should have the like pbscuritv and doubt-

226 The Credibility of Revelation Part IL
fulness, be liable to the like perversions, in short,
lie open to all the like objections, as the light of
nature itself*?" Without determining- hoAvfar this
in fact is so, I answer ; it is by no means incredi
ble, that it raight be so, if the light of nature and
of rcAxlation be frora the sarae hand. Men are na
turally hable to diseases; for which God, in his
good providence, has provided natural reraedies -\.
But remedies existing in nature have been un
known to mankind for raany ages ; are known but
to fcAV now ; probably many valuable ones are not
known yet. Great has been, and is, the obscuri
ty and difficulty, in the nature and application of
them. Circumstances seem often to make them
very improper, where they are absolutely necessary.
It is after long labour and study, and many unsuc
cessful endeavours, that they are brought to be as
useful as they are ; after high contempt and abso
lute rejection of the most useful Ave have ; and after
disputes and doubts, which have seemed to be end
less. The best remedies, too, Avhen unskilfully,
much raore if dishonestly, applied, raay produce
neAV diseases ; and, Avith the lightest application,
the success of thera is often doubtful. In many
cases, they are not at all effectual : Avhere they are,
it is often very sloAvly : and the application of them,
and the necessary regimen accorapanying- it, is,
not uncoramonly, so disagreeable, that sorae will
not submit to them ; and satisfy themselves with
* Chap. vi. f See Chap, v.

Chap. III. liable to Objections. 227
the excuse, that if they wsuld, it is not certain
Avhether it Avould be successful. And many per
sons, Avho labour under diseases, for Avhich there
are known natural remedies, are not so happy as
to be always, if ever, in the Avay of them. In a
Avord, the remedies Avhich nature has provided for
diseases, are neither certain, perfect, nor universal.
And indeed the same principles of arguing, which
Avould lead us to conclude^ that they must be so^
Avould lead us likewise to conclude, that there could
be no occasion for them ; i. e. that there could be
no diseases at all. And therefore, our experience
that there are diseases, shews, that it is credible
beforehand, upon supposition nature has provided
remedies for them, that these remedies may be, as
by experience we find they are, not certain, nor
perfect, nor universal ; because it shews, that the
principles upon Avhich we should expect the con
trary, are fallacious.
And now, Avhat is the just consequence from all
these thing-s ? Not that reason is no judge of Avhat
is offered to us as being of divine revelation. For,
this would be to infer, that we are unable tojudge
of any thing, because Ave are unable tojudge ofali
things. Reason can, and it ought to judge, not
only of the meaning, but also of the morality and
the evidence, of revelation. First, It is the pro-
A'ince of reason to j udge ofthis morahty of the Scripr
ture ; i. e. not whether it contains things different
from Avhat Ave should have expected from a wise,
just, and good Being ; for objections from hence

228 The Credibility of Revelation PartIL
have been uoav obviated : but whether it contains
things plainly contradictory to wisdom, justice, pr
goodness ; to what the light of nature teaches us
of God. And I knoAV nothing of this sort ob
jected against Scripture, excepting such objections
as are formed upon suppositions, which would
equally conclude, that the constitution of nature
is contradictory to wisdora, justice, or goodness ;
Avhich most certainly it is not. Indeed there are
some particular precepts in Scripture, given to par
ticular persons, requiring actions, Avhich would be
iraraoral and vicious, Avere it not 'for such precepts.
But it is easy to see, that all these are of such a
kind, as that the precept changes the whole na
ture of the case and of the action ; and both coii-
stitutes and shews that not to be unjust or immo
ral, which, prior to the precept, must have ap
peared and really ha\'e been so : which may Avell
be, since none of these precepts are contrary to
irarautable raorality. If it Avere coraraanded, to
cultivate the principles,, and act frora the spirit
of treachery, ingratitude, cruelty ; the coramand
would not alter the nature of the case, or of the
action, in any of these instances. But it is quite
otherwise in precepts, which require only the doing
an external action : for instance, taking aAvay the
property or life of any. For men have no right
to either life or property, but what arises solely
from the grant of God : Avhen this grant is re
voked, they cease to have any right at all in either :
and Avhen this rcA^ocation is made knoAvn, as sure-

Chap.' III. liable to Objections. 229
ly it is possible it may be, it must cease to be un
just to deprive them of either. And though a
course of external acts, which without coraraand
would be immPral, must raake an immoral habit ;
yet a few detached commands have no such na
tural tendency. I thought proper to say thus
much of the feAV Scripture precepts, Avhich re
quire, not vicious actions, but actions which
Avould have been vicious had it not been for such
precepts ; because they are sometimes Aveakly urged
as imraoral, and great Aveight is laid upon objec
tions drawn frora thera. But to rae there seems
no difficulty at all in these precepts, but what
arises from their being offences : i. e. from their
being hable to be perverted, as indeed they are,
by wicked designing men, to serve the most hor
rid purposes ; and, perhaps, to mislead the Aveak
and enthusiastic. And objections from this head
are not objections against revelation ; but against
the whole notion of religion, as a trial ; and
against the general constitution of nature. Se
condly, Reason is able to judge, and must, ofthe
evidence of revelation, and of the objections urged
against that evidence : Avhich shall be the subject
of a following Chapter *.
But the consequence of the foregoing observa
tion is, that the question upon which the truth
of Christianity depends, is scarce at all, what ob
jections there are against its scheme, since there
* Chap. vii.

230 The Credibility of Revelation PartIL
are none against the morahty of it ; but what ob
jections tliere are against its evidence : or, what
proof there remains of it, after due alloxvances
made for the objections against that proof : because .
it has been shcAvn, that the objections againstChris
tianity, as distinguished from objections against
its evidence, are frivolous. For surely very littie
weight, if any at all, is to be laid upon a way of
arguing and objecting, Avhich, when applied to
the general constitution of nature, experience shcAvs
not to be conclusive : and such, I think, is the
whole way of objecting treated of throughout this
Chapter. It is resolvable into principles, and goes
upon suppositions, Avhich mislead us to think, that
the Author of Nature Avould not act, as Ave expe
rience he does ; or would act, in such and such
cases, as we experience he does not, in like cases.
But the unreasonableness of this way of objecting
will appear yet raore evidently frora hence, that
the chief things thus objected against, are justified,
as shall be farther shewn *, by distinct, particular,
and full analogies, in the constitution and course
of nature.
But it is to be remerabered, that, as frivolous as
objections of the foregoing sort against revelation
are, yet, when a supposed revelation is raore con
sistent with itself, and has a more general and uni
form tendency to promote virtue, than, aH circum
stances considered, could have been expected from
» * Chap. iv. latter Part ; and v. vi.

Chap- III. liable to Objections. 2.31
enthusiasm and political views ; this is a presump
tive proof of its not proceeding from them, and so
of its trutii : because Ave are competent judges,
what mig-ht have been expected from enthusiasm
and political views.

232 Christianity a Scheme, Part IL

CHAP. IV.
Of Christianity, considered as a Scheme or Consti
tution, imperfectly comprehended.
It hath been now shcAvn *, that the analogy of na
ture renders it highly credible beforehand, that,
supposing a revelation to be made, it must con
tain raany things very different from Avhat we
should have expected, and such as appear open to
great objections : and that this observation, in
good measure, takes off the force of those objec
tions, or rather precludes them. But it may be al
leged, that this is a very partial ansAver to such ob
jections, or a very unsatisfactory way of obviating
them : because it doth not shew at all, that the
things objected against can be wise, just, and good ;
much less, that it is credible they are so. It will
therefore be proper to shew this distinctly ; by ap
plying to these objections against the wisdom,
justice, and goodness of Christianity, the answer
above f given to the like objections against the con
stitution of nature : before we consider the parti
cular analogies in the latter, to the particular things
* In the foregoing Chapter.
t Part I. Chap. vii. to which this all along refers.

Chap IV. imperfectly comprehended. 233
objected against in the former. Noav, that which
affords a sufficient answer to objections against the
Avisdom, justice, and goodness of the constitution
of Nature, is its being a constitution, a system, or
scheme, imperfectly comprehended ; a scheme in
which means are made use of to accomplish ends ;
and which is carried on by general laws. For, from
these things it has been proved, not only to be
possible, but also to be credible, that those things
which are objected against, may be consistent Avith
wisdom, justice, and goodness ; nay, may be in
stances of them : and even that the constitution
and government of Nature may be perfect in the
highest possible degree. If Christianity, then, be a
scheme, and of the like kind ; it is evident, the like
objections against it must admit of the like an-
SAver. And,
I. Christianity is a scheme, quite beyond our
coraprehension. The raoral government of God is
exercised, by gradually conducting things so in the
course ofhis providence, that every one, at length,
aud upon the whole, shall receive according- to his
deserts ; and neither fraud nor violence, but truth
and right, shall finafly prevail. Christianity is a
particular scheme under this general plan of Provi
dence, and a part of it, conducive to its comple
tion, with regard to mankind : consisting itself also
of various parts, and a mysterious oeconomy, Avhich
has been carrying on from the tirae the world came
into its present Avretched state, and is still carrying
on, for its recovery, by a divine person, the Mes
siah ; " Avhp is to gather together in one, the chil-

234 Christianity a Scheme, Part IL
dren of God, that are scattered abroad *," and esta
blish "an everlasting kingdom, Avherein dweHeth
righteousness t." And, in order to it ; after vari
ous manifestations of things, relating to this great
and general scherae of Providence, through a suc
cession of raany ages : " For the Spirit of Christ,
which Avas in the prophets, testified beforehand his
sufferings, and the glory that sliould folloAV : unto
whom it was revealed, that not unto themselves,
but unto us they did minister the things which are
now reported unto us by them that have preached
the Gospel ; which things the angels desire to look
into:{::" After various dispensations, looking for
ward, and preparatory, to this final salvation : "in
the fulness of time," when infinite wisdom thought
fit ; He, " being in the form of God, raade himself
of no reputation, and took upon him the forra of
a servant, and Avas raade in the likeness of raen :
and being found in fashion as a man, he humbled
himself, and became obedient to death, even the
death of the cross : Avherefore God also hath high
ly exalted him, and given him a name Avhich is
above every name : that, at the name of Jesus,
every knee should boAv, of things in heaven, and
things in the earth, and things under the earth :
and that every tongue should confess, that Jesus
Christ is Lord, to the glory ofGod the Father ||."
Parts likewise ofthis oeconomy, are the rairaculous
mission ofthe Holy Ghost, and his ordinary assise
* John xi.;52. f 2 Pet. iii. 13.
J 1 Pet. i. 11, 12. II Phil. ii.

Chap. IV. imperfectly comprehended. 235
tances given to good men : the invisible govern
ment, Avhich Christ at present exercises over his
church : that which he himself refers to in these
Avords * ; "In my Father's house are many man
sions — I go to prepare a place for you :" and his
future return to "judge the Avorld in righteous
ness," and completely re-establish the kingdom of
God. " For the Father judgeth no man : but hath
comraitted all judgment unto the Son : that all raen
should honour the Son, even as they honour the
Father "f. AH power is given unto him in Heaven
and in earthj. And he must reign, till he hath
put all enemies under his feet. Then cometh the
end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom
to God, even the Father ; Avhen he shall have put
doAvn all rule, and all authority and power. And
when all things shall be subdued unto him, then
shall the son alsohimself be subject unto himthatput
all things under him, that God may be all in all§."
Now little, surely, need be said to ,shew, that this
system, or scheme o,f things, is but imperfectly
comprehended by us. The Scripture expressly as
serts it to be so. And, indeed, one cannot read a
passage relating to this "great raystery of Godli
ness II," but what immediately ru,ns up into some
thing which us shews our ignorance in it ; as every
thing in nature shcAvs us our ignorance in the con
stitution of nature. And Avhoever wiH seriously
* John xiv. 2. t ^ohn v. 22, 22.
I Matth. xxviii. 18. § 1 Cor. xv.
II 1 Tim. iii. l6.

236 Christianity a Schem^, PartIL
consider that part of the Christian scherae, which
is revealed in Scripture, Avill find so rauch more un
revealed, as will convince him, that to all the pur
poses of judging and objecting, we know as httle
of it, as of the constitution of nature. Our igno
rance, therefore, is as much an ansAver to our objec
tions against the perfection of one, as against the
perfection ofthe other *.
II. It is obvious, too, that, in the Christian dis
pensation, as much as in the natural scheme of
things, means are made use of to accomplish ends.
And the observation of this furnishes us with the
same answer, to objections against the perfection
of Christianity, as to objections of the like kind,
against the constitution of nature. It sheAvs the
credibility, that the things objected against, how
foolish f soever they appear to men, may be the
very best means of accomplishing the very best
ends. And their appearingybo/?5Awe,y5 is no pre
sumption against this, in a scheme so greatly be
yond our conoprehension:!;.
III. The credibility, that the Christian dispen
sation raay have been, all along, carried on by ge
neral laws ll, no less than the course of nature, may
require to be more" distinctly made out. Consider,
then, upon what ground it is we say, that the
whole comraon course of nature is carried on accord- ,
ing to general fore-ordained laws. We know, in
deed, several of the general laAVS of matter : and a
* Page 147, &c. + 1 Cor. i.
} Page 152. |1 Pages 153, 154.

Chap. IV. imperfectly comprehended. 237
great part of the natural behaA'iour of living agents
is reducible to general laws. But Ave knoAV, in a
manner, nothing, by what laws, storras, and tem
pests, earthquakes, famine, pestilence, become the
instruments of destruction to mankind. And the
laAVS, by which persons born into the Avorld at such
a time and place, are of such capacities, genius's,
terapers ; the laws, by which thoughts come into
our raind, in a raultitude of cases ; and by which
innumerable thing-s happen, of the greatest influ
ence upon the affairs and state of the world ; these
laAVS are so Avholly unknown to us, that Ave call the
events, which come to pass by them, accidental :
though all reasonable men know certainly, that
there cannot, in reality, be any such thing as
chance : and conclude, that the things which have
this appearance are the result of general laws, and
may be reduced into them. It is then but an ex
ceeding little Avay, and in but a A'-ery few respects,
that Ave can trace up the natural course of things
before us to general laws. And it is frora analogy,
that we conclude the whole of it to be capable of
being reduced into them ; only from our seeing,
that part is so. It is from our finding, that the
course of nature, in some respects and so far, goes
on by general laAvs, that Ave conclude this of the
rest. And if that be a just ground for such a con
clusion, it is a just ground also, ifnot to conclude,
yet to apprehend, to render it supposable and cre
dible, which is sufficient for answering objections,
that God's miraculous interpositions may have
been, all along, in like manner, by general laAvs of

238 Christianity a Scheme, PartIL
Avisdom. Thus, that miraculous powers should be
exerted at such times, upon such occasions, in such
degrees and manners, and Avith regard to such per
sons, rather than others ; that the affairs of the
Avorld,' being permitted to go on in their natural
course so far, should, just at such a point, have a
new direction given them by miraculous interposi
tions ; that these interpositions should be exactly
in such degrees and respects only ; all this may
have been by general laws. These laws are un
known, indeed, to us : but no more unknown, than
the laAVS frora Avhence it is, that sorae die as soon
as they are born, and others live to extrerae old
age ; that one raan is so superior to another in un
derstanding ; Avith innumerable more things, which,
as was before observed, Ave cannot reduce to any
laws, or rules, at all, though it is taken for grant
ed, they are as much reducible to general ones as
gravitation. Now, if the revealed dispensations of
Providence, and miraculous interpositions, be by
general laAvs, as well as God's ordinary g-overnment
in the course of nature, made knoAvn by reason and
experience ; there is no more reason to expect, that
every exigence, as it arises, should be provided for
by these general laws, or miraculous interpositions,
than that every exigence in nature should, by the
general laws of nature : yet there might be Avise
and good reasons, that miraculous interpositions
should he by general laws ; and that these laws
.should not be broTcen in upon, or deviated from,
bv other miracles.

Chap. IV. imperfectly comprehended. 239
Upon the Avhole, then, the appearance of defi
ciencies and irregularities in nature, is owing to its
being a scheme but in part made known, and of
such a certain particular kind in other respects.
Now Ave see no more reason, Avhy the frame and
course of nature should be such a scheme, than
Avhy Christianity, should. And that the former is
such a scheme, renders it credible, that the latter,
upon supposition of its truth, may be so too. And
as it is raanifest, that Christianity is a scherae re
vealed but in part, and a scheme in Avhich means
are raade use of to accomplish ends ; like to that of
nature : so the credibility, that it may have been
all along carried on by general laws, no less than
the course of nature, has been distinctly proved.
And, from all this, it is beforehand credible that
there might, I think probable that there would, be
the like appearance of deficiencies and irregularities
in Christianity as in nature : i. e. that Christianity
Avould be liable to the like objections, as the frame
of nature. And these objections are answered by
these observations concerning Christianity ; as the
like objections against the frame of nature, are an
swered by the like observations concerning the
frarae of nature.

The objections against Christianity, considered
as a raatter of fact*, having, in general, been obvi-

' Page 238.

240 Christianity a Scheme, Part IL
ated in the preceding Chapter ; and the same, con
sidered as made against the Avisdom and goodness
of it, having been obviated in this : the next thing,
according to the raethod proposed, is to shew, that
the principal objections, in particular, againstChris
tianity, raay be answered by particular and full ana
logies in nature. And as one of them is made
ag-ainst the whole scheme of it together, as just now
described, I choose to consider it here, rather than
in a distinct Chapter by itself. The thing- object
ed against this scheme of the Gospel, is, " That it
seeins to suppose, God Avas reduced to the necessity
of a long series of intricate means, in order to ac
coraplish his ends, the recovery and salvation of
the world : in like sort as raen, for want of under-
derstanding, or poAver, not being able to corae at
their ends directly, are forced to go round-about
ways, and make use of many perplexed contrivan
ces to arrive at them." Now, every thing which
we see, shews the folly ofthis, considered as an ob
jection against the truth of Christianity. For, ac
cprding to our manner of conception, God makes
use of variety of means, Avhat we often think tediJ
ous ones, in the natural course of providence, for
the accomplishment of all his ends. Indeed, it is
certain, there is somewhat in this raatter quite be-'
yond our comprehension : but the raystery is as
great in nature as in Christianity. We know
Avhat Ave ourselves aim at, as final ends : and what
courses we take, merely as. means conducing to
those ends. But we are greatly ignorant, how far
things are considered by the Author of Nature, un-

Chap. IV. imperfectly comprehended. 241
der the single notion of raeans and ends ; so as
that it may be said, this is'merely an end, and that
merely means, in his regard. And Avhether there
be not sorae peculiar absurdity in our very raanner
of conception, concerning this raatter, soracAvhat
' ' contradictory arising from our extreraely iraperfect
views of things, it is impossible to say. HoAvever,
thus much is manifest, that the Avhole natural world
and government of it is a scheme, or system ; not
a fixed, but a progressive one : a scherae, in which
the operation of various raeans takes up a great
length of tirae, before the ends they tend to can
be attained. The change of seasons, the ripening
of the fruits of the earth, the very history of a
flower, is an instance of this, and so is huraan life.
Thus, vegetable bodies, and those of aniraals, though
possibly formed at once, yet grow up by degrees to
a mature state. And thus rational agents, who
animate these latter bodies, are naturally directed
to form, each his OAvn raanners and character, by
the gradual gaining of knowledge and experience,
and by a long course of action. Our existence is
not only successive, as it raust be of necessity ;
but one state of our life and beirig is appointed by
(jrod to be a preparation for another ; and that, to
be the raeans of attaining to another succeeding
one : infancy to childhood ; childhood to youth ;
youth to raature age. Men are irapatient, and for
precipitating things : but the Author of Nature
appears deliberate throughout his operations ; ac
complishing his natural ends by sIoav successive
steps. And there is a plan of things beforehand
a

242 Christianity a Scheme, &c. Part II.
laid out, which, from the nature of it, requires
various systems of means, as well as length of time,
in order to the carrying on its several parts into
execution. Thus, in the daily course of natural
providence, God operates in the very sarae raan
ner, as in the dispensation of Christianity : raaking
one thing subservient to another ; this, to some
what farther ; and so on, through a progressive
series of means, Avhich extend, both backward and
forward, beyond our utmost vicAV. Of this man
ner of operation, CA'ery thing we see in the course
of nature, is as much an instance, as any part of
the Christian dispensation.

CHAP. Vi
Of the particular System of Christianity ; the Ap
pointment of a Mediator, and the Redemption
of the World by Him.
There is not, I think, any thing relating to
Christianity, Avhich has been more objected against,
than the mediation of Christ, in some or other of
its parts. Yet, upon thorough consideration, there
seems nothing less justly liable to it. For,
I. The whole analogy of nature removes all ima
gined presumption against the general nPtion of
" a Mediator between God and man *." For we
find all living creatures are brought into the wPrld,
and their life in infancy is preserved, by the in
strumentality of others : and every satisfaction of
it, some way or other, is bestowed by the like
raeans. So that the visible governraent, which
God exercises over the world, is by the instru
mentality and mediation of others. And how far
his invisible governraent be, or be not so, it is
impossible to determine at all by reason. And the
supposition, that part of it is so, appears, to say
* 1 Tim ii. 5.

The Appointment of Part IL
the least, altogether as credible, as the contrary.
There is then no sort of objection, frora the light
of nature, against the general notion of a me
diator between God and raan, considered as a doc
trine of Christianity, or as an appointraent in this
dispensation : since we find, by experience, that
God does ' appoint raediators, to be the instru
ments of good and evil to us ; the instruments of
his justice and his mercy. AnA. the objection here
referred to is urged, not against mediation in that
high, eminent, and pecuhar sense, in Avhich Christ
is our mediator ; but absolutely against the whole
notion itself of a mediator at all.
II. As we must suppose, that the world is un
der the proper moral government of God, or in a
state of religion, before avc can enter into consi
deration of the revealed doctrine, concerning the
redemption of it by Christ ; so that supposition is
here to be distinctly taken notice of Now, the di
vine moral governraent Avhich rehgion teaches us,
implies, that the Consequence of vice shall be mi
sery, in soCme future state, by the righteous judg
ment of Grod. That such consequent punishment
shall take effect by his appointment, is necessa
rily implied. But, as it is not in any sort to be
supposed, that we are made acquainted with all
the ends or reasons, for which it is fit future pu
nishments should be inflicted, or why God has
appointed such and such consequent raisery should
folloAV vice ; and as Ave are altogether in the dark,
hoAV or in.Avhat manner it shall follow, by Avhat
immediate occasions, or by the instrumentahty of

Chap. V. a Mediator and Redeemer. 24^3
Avhat means ; there is no absurdity in supposing, it
may follow in a Avay analogous to that, in which
many miseries follow such and such courses of ac
tion at present ; poA'^erty, sickness, infamy, un
tiraely death by diseases, death from the hands of
civil justice. There is no absurdity in supposing
future-punishment raay foHow wickedness of course,
as we speak, or in the Avay of natural consequence
from God's original constitution of the AA-^orld ;
frora the nature he has given us, and frora the con
dition in which he places us : or, in a like man
ner, as ^ person rashly trifling upon a precipice, iu
the way of natural consequence, falls down ; in
the Avay of natural consequence, breaks his lirabs,
suppose ; in the Avay of natural consequence of
this, without help, perishes.
Sorae good raen raay, perhaps, be offended, Avith
hearing it spoken of as a supposable thing, that
the future punishments of wickedness may be in
the way of natural consequence : as if this Avere ta
king the execution of justice out of the hands of
God, and giving it to nature. But they should
remember, that when things come to pass accord
ing to the course of nature, this does not hinder
them from being his doing, Avho is the God of
nature : and that the Scripture ascribes those pu
nishments to divine justice, which are known to
be natural ; and which must be called so, Avhen
distinguished frora such as are rairaculous. But,
after all, this supposition, or rather this way of
speaking, is here raade use of only by way of illus
tration of the subject before us. For, since it must

246 The Appointment of PartIL
be admitted, that the future punishment of Avick
edness is not a matter of arbitrary appointment,
but of reason, equity, and justice ; it comes, for
ought I see, to the same thing, whether it is sup
posed to be inflicted in a way analogous to that,
in which the temporal punishments of vice and fol
ly are inflicted, or in any other way. And though
there Avere a difference, it is alloAvable in the pre
sent case, to make this supposition, plainly not an
incredible one ; that future punishment may follow
wickedness in the way of natural consequence, or
according to sorae general laAVs of government al
ready established in the universe.
III. Upon, this supposition, or even without it,
we may observe soraewhat, rauch to the present
purpose, in the constitution of nature, or appoint
ments of Providence : the provision which is made,
that all the bad natural corisequences of men's ac
tions should not always actually follow ; or, that
such bad consequences, as, according to the settled
course of things, Avould inevitably have followed
ifnot prevented, should, in certain degrees, be pre
vented. We are apt, presumptuously, to imagine,
that the world might have been so constituted, as
that there Avould not have been any such thing as
misery, or evil. On the contrary, we flnd the Au
thor of Nature permits it : but, then, he has provi
ded reliefs, and, in many cases, perfect remedies
for it, after some pains and difficulties ; reliefs and
remedies even for that evil, Avhich is the fruit of our
own misconduct ; and which, in the course of na
ture, AA'ould have continued, and ended in our de-

Chap. V. a Mediator and Redeemer. 247
struction, but for such remedies. And this is an
instance both of severity and of indulgence, in the
constitution of nature. Thus, all the bad conse
quences, now mentioned, of a man's trifling upon
a precipice, might be prevented. And, though all
Avere not, yet some of them might, by proper in
terposition, if not rejected : by another's coming to
the rash raan's relief, with his own laying hold on
that relief, in such sort as the case required. Per
sons raay do a great deal themselves toAvards pre
venting the bad consequences oftheir follies : and
more may be done by themselves, together with
the assistance of others, their fellow-creatures ;
which assistance Nature requires and prompts us
to. This is the general constitution of the Avorld.
Noav, suppose it had been so constituted, that af
ter such actions Avere done, as Avere foreseen natu
rally to draw after them misery to the doer, it
should have been no more in human power to
have prevented that naturally consequent misery, in
any instance, than it is, in all ; no one can say,
whether such a raore severe constitution of things
mig-ht not yet have been reafly good. But that,
on the contrary, provision is made by nature, that
Ave may and do, to so great degree, prevent the bad
natural effects of our folhes ; this may be called
mercy, or compassion, in the original constitution
of the world : compassion, as distinguished from
goodness in general. And, the whole known con
stitution and course of things affording us instances
of such compassion, it would be according to the
analogy of nature to hope, that, however ruinous

248 - The Appointment of Part II.
the natural consequences of vice raight be, from
the general laws of God's government over the uni
verse ; yet provision might be made, possibly mig-ht
havebeen originally made, for 'preventing those rui
nous consequences from inevitably following ; at
least from, following universally, and in all cases.
Many, 1 am sensible, will wonder at finding this
made a question, or spoken of as in any degree
doubtful. ¦ The generality of mankind are so far
from having that awful sense of things, which the
present state of vice and raisery and darkness seeras
to raake but reasonable, that they have scarce any
apprehension, or thought at all, about this raatter,
any way ; and sorae serious persons may have spo
ken unadvisedly concerning it. But let us ob
serve, what we experience to be, and what, from
the very constitution of nature, cannot but be, the
consequences of irregular and disorderly behaviour;
even of .such rashness, wilfulness, neglects, as we
scarce call vicious. Now, it is natural to appre
hend, that the bad consequences of irregularity
will be greater, in proportion as the irregularity is
so. And there is no comparison between these ir
regularities, and the greater instances of vice, or a
dissolute profligate disregard to all religion ; if
there^be any thing at all in religion. For, consider
Avhat it is for creatures, moral agents, presumptu
ously to introduce that confusion and misery into
the kingdom of God, Avhich mankind have, in
fact, introduced ; to blaspheme the Sovereign Lord
of all ; to conteran his authority ; to be injurious
to the degree they are, to their fellow-creatures, tlie-

Chap. V. a Mediator and Redeemer. 249
creatures ofGod. Add, that the effects of vice, in
the present world, are often extreme misery, irre
trievable ruin, and even death : and, upon putting
all this together, it will appear, that as no one can
say, in what degree fatal the unprevented conse
quences of vice may be, according- to the general
rule of divine government,; so it is by no means
intuitively certain, how far these consequences
could possibly, in the nature of the thing, be pre
vented, consistently Avith the eternal rule of right,
or with what is, in fact, the moral constitution of
nature. However, there Avould be large ground
to hope, that the universal government was not
so severely strict, but that there was room for par
don, or for having those penal consequences pre
vented. Yet,
IV. There seems no probability, that any thing
we could do, would alone, and of itself, prevent
them ; prevent their folloAving, or being inflicted.
But one Avould think, at least, it were impossible,
that the contrary should be thought certain. For,
Ave are not acquainted Avith the whole of the case.
We are not inforraed of all the reasons, Avhich ren
der it fit that future punishraents should be inflict
ed.: and, therefore, cannot know, whether any
thing we could do, would make such an alteration,
as to render it fit that they should be remitted. We
do not knoAv, Avhat the whole natural, or appointed
consequences of vice are ; nor in what Avay they
Avould follow, if not prevented : and, therefore,
can, in no sort, say, whether we could do any
thing, which would be sufficient to prevent them.

250 The Appointment of Part IL
Our ignorance being thus raanifest, let us recollect
the analogy of Nature, or Providence. For, though
this may be but a slight ground to raise a positive
opinion upon, in this matter ; yet, it is sufficient to
ansAver a mere arbitrary assertion, Avithout any kind
of evidence, urged by Avay of objection against a
doctrine, the proof of which is not reason, but re
velation. Consider, then, people ruin their for
tunes by extravagance ; they bring diseases upon
themselves by excess ; they incur the penalties of
civil laws, and surely civil government is natural :
Avill sorrow for these follies past, and behaving Avell
for the future, alone and of itself, prevent the na
tural consequences of them ? On the contrary,
men's natural abilities of helping- themselves are of
ten impaired ; or, ifnot, yet they,are forced to be
beholden to the assistance of others, upon several
accounts, and in different Avays : assistance Avhich
they Avould havq had no occasion for, had it not
been for their misconduct ; but which, in the dis
advantageous condition they have reduced them
selves to, is absolutely necessary to their recovery,
and retrieving their affairs. Now, since this is
our case, considering ourselves merely as inhabi
tants of this world, and as having a temporal in
terest here, under the natural government of God,
which, however, has a great deal moral in it : Avhy
is it not supposable that this raay be our case al
so, in our raore iraportaiit capacity, as under his
perfect raoral governraent, and having a raore ge
neral and future interest depending- ? If Ave have
misbehaved in this higher capacity, and render- >

Chap. V. a Mediator and Redeemer. 251
cd ourselves obnoxious to the future punishment,
which God has annexed to vice ; it is plainly cre
dible, that behaving Avell for the tirae to come,
may be— not useless, God forbid — but Avholly in
sufficient, alone and of itself, to prevent that pu
nishment ; or to put us in the condition, which
we should have been in, had avc preserved our in
nocence. And, though we ought to reason Avith all re
verence, Avhenever Ave reason concerning the di
vine conduct; yet, it may be added, that it is
clearly contrary to all our notions of government,
as well as to what is, in fact, the general constitu
tion of nature, to suppose that doing well for the fu
ture, should, in all cases, prevent all the judicial bad
consequences of having done evil, or all the pu
nishraent annexed' to disobedience. And Ave have
manifestly nothing frora Avhence to determine, in
Avhat degree, and in what cases, reformation would
prevent this punishment, even supposing that it
would in some. And, though the efficacy of re
pentance itself alone, to prevent what mankind had
rendered themselves obnoxious to, and recover
what they had forfeited, is now insisted upon, in
opposition to Christianity ; yet, by the general
prevalence of propitiatory sacrifices over the hea
then world, this notion, of repentance alone being
sufficient to expiate guilt, appears to be contrary
to the general sense of mankind.
Upon the whole, then, had the laws, the gene
ral laws of God's governmerit, been permitted to
pperate, without any interposition in our behalf.

253 The Appointment of Part II.
the future punishment, for aught Ave know to the
contrary, or have any reason to think, raust inevi
tably have folloAved, notwithstanding- any thing Ave
could have done to prevent it. Now,
V. In this darkness, or this hght of nature, call
it which ypu please, revelation coraes in ; confirms
every doubting fear, which could enter into the
heart of raan, concerning the future unprevented
consequence of wickedness ; supposes the world to
be in a state of ruin (a supposition Avhich seems
the very ground of the Christian dispensation, and
which, if not proveable by reason, yet it is in no
wise contrary to it) ; teaches us, too, that the rules
of divine government are such, as not to' adrait of
pardon iraraediately and directly upon repentance,
or by the sole efficacy of it : but then teaches, at
the sarae time, what nature raight justly haA-^e hoped,
that the raoral governraent of the universe was not
so rigid, but that there was roora for an interposi
tion, to avert the fatal consequences of vice ; which,
therefore, by this means, does adrait of pardon.
Revelation teaches us, that the unknown laws of
God's raore general governraent, no less than the
particular laws by which Ave experience he governs
us at present, are corapassionate *, as Avell as good,
in the raore general notion of goodness : and that
he hath mercifully provided, that there should be
an interposition tp prevent the destruction of hu
man kind ; whatever that destruction unprevented
Avould have been. " God so loved the world, that
» Page 246, &c.

Chap V. a Mediator and Redeemer. 253
he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever be-
heveth," not, to be sure, in a speculative, but in
a practical sense, " that Avhosoever believeth in
him, should not perifeh f :" gave his Son in the
same Avay pf goodness to the world, as he affords
particular persons the friendly assistance oftheir
fellow- creatures ; when, without it, their temporal
ruin would be the certain consequence of their fol
lies : in the sarae Avay of goodness, I say ; though
in a transcendent and infinitely higher degree.
And the Son of God " loved us, and gave himself
for us, " Avith a love, which he himself corapares to
that of human friendship : though, in this case, all
comparisons must fall infinitely short of the thing
intended to be illustrated by them. He interposed
in such a raanner, as was necessary and effectual to
prevent that execution of justice upon sinners,
which God had appointed should otherAvise have
been executed upon them: or, in such a manner,
as to prevent that punishment from actuaUy fol
lowing, which, according to the general laws of
divine g-overnment, must have followed the sins of
the world, had it not been for such interposition ;];.
t John, iii. l6.
X It cannot, I suppose, be imagined, even by the most cursory-
reader, that it is, in any sort, affirmed, or applied, in any thing
said in this chapter, that none can have the benefit ofthe general
Redemption, but such as have the advantage of being made ac
quainted with it in the present life. But, it may be needful to
mention, that several questions, which have been brought into the
subject before us, and determined, are not in the least -entered
into here :' questions, which have been, I fear, rashly determined,
and, perhaps, with equal rashness, contrary ways. For instance.

254 The Appointment of PaitIL'
If any thing here said should appear, upon first
thought, inconsistent Avith diA'ine goodness ; a se
cond, I am persuaded, Avill entirely remove that
appearance. For, Avere we to suppc/se the consti
tution of things to be such, as that the whole crea
tion must baA-e perished, had it not been for some-
Avhat, which God had appointed should be, in or
der to prevent that ruin ; even this supposition
would not be inconsistent, in any degree, with the
most absolutely perfect goodness. But, still it may
be thought, that this Avhole raanner of treating the
subject before us, supposes mankind to be natural
ly in a very strange state. And truly so it does.
But it is not Christianity, which has put us into
this state. Whoever will consider the raanifold
miseries, and the extreme Avickedness of the world ;
that the best have great Avrongnesses within them
selves, which they complain of, and endeavour to
amend ; but, that the generality grow raore profli
gate and corrupt with age ; that heathen moralists

whether God could have saved the World by other means than the
death of Christ, consistently with the general laws of his govern-'
ment. And had not Christ corae into the vvorid, what would
have been the future condition of the better sort of men ; those
just persons over the face ofthe earth, for whom Manasses, in his
prayers asserts, repentance was not appointed. The meaning of
the first of these questions is greatly ambiguous : and neither of
them can properly be answered, without going upon that infinite
ly absurd supposition, that we know the whole ofthe case. And,
perhaps, the very inquiry, -what -would liave followed if God had not
done as he has, may have in it some very great impropriety ; and
ought not to be carried on any further, than is necessary to help
OUT partial and inadequate conceptions of things.

Chap. V. a Mediator and Redeemer. 255
thought the present state to be a state of punish
ment; and, Avhat might be added, thatthe earth,
our habitation, has the appearances of being a ruin :
Avhoever, I say, Avill consider all these, andsom.eother
obvious things, will think he has little reason to ob
ject against the Scripture account, that mankind is
in a state of degradation; against this being the
fact: how difficult soever he may think it to ac
count for, or even to forra a distinct conception of,
the occasions and circurastances of it. But that
the crirae of our first parents Avas the occasion of
our being placed in a raore disadvantageous condi
tion, is a thing throughout, and particularly analo
gous to what we see^ in the daily course of natural
Providence ; as the recovery of the Avorld, by the
interposition of Christ, has been shewn to be so in
general. VI. The particular manner in which Christ in
terposed in the redemption of the world, or his of
fice as Mediator, in the largest sense, betxveen God
andman, is thus represented to us in the Scripture :
" He is the light of the world* ;" the revealer ofthe
will of God in the most eminent sense. He is a
propitiatory sacrifice f ; " the lamb of God \ : and,
as he voluntarily ofl'ered himself up, he is stiled our
high-priest §. And,, which seems of peculiar weight,
he is described beforehand in the Old Testament,
under the sarae characters of a priest, and an expi-
* John, i. and viii. 12.
t Rom. iii. 25. and v. 11. Cor. v 7. Eph. v. 2. 1 John, ii. 2.
Matth. xxvi. 28.
J John i. 29, 36. and throughout the book of Revelation.
§ Throughout the Epistle to the Hebrews

S,5S The Appointment of Part IL
atory victim *. And whereas- it is objected, that
all this is raerely by Avay of allusion to the sacrifices,
of the Mosaic law, the apostle on the contrary
affirras, that the "law was a shadow of -good
things to corae, and not the very iraage of the
things t : and that the priests that offer gifts ac
cording to the law — serve into the exaraple and
shadow of heavenly things, as Moses was admoni
shed of God, Avhen he was about to make the ta
bernacle. " For see," saith he, " that thou make all
things according- to the pattern shewed to thee in
the mount J" i. e. the Levitical priesthood Avas a sha
dow of the priesthood of Christ ; in like manner
as the tabernacle made by Moses Avas according
to that shewed him in the mount. The priesthood
of Christ, and the tabernacle in the mount, were
the originals : of the former of which, the Levitical
priesthood was a type ; and of the latter, the taber
nacle made by Moses A^jas a copy. The doctrine of
this epistle, then, plainly is, tliat the legal sacrifices
were allusions to the great and final atonement to
be made by the blood of Christ ; and not that this
Avas ari allusion to those. Nor can any thing be
more express, or determinate, than the following
passage : "It is not possible that the blood of
bulls and of goats should take away sin. Where
fore, Avhen he coraeth into the world, he saith, sa
crifice and offering," i. e. of bulls and of goats,
" thou Avouldest not, but a body hast thou prepa
red rae — Lo, I come to do tby will, 0 God — By
a * Isai. liii. Dan. ix. 24. Psalm, ex. 1, f Heb, x. 4.
J Heb. viii. 4, 5.

Chap V. a Mediator and Redeemer. 257
which Avill We are sanctified, through the offering
of Jesus Christ once for all*." And to add one
passage more of the like kind : " Christ was once
offered to bear the sins of many ; and unto them
that look for him shall he appear the second time,
without sin;" i. e. Avithout bearing siri, as he did
at his first coraing, by being an offering for it ;
Avithout haAdng our iniquities again laid upon him,
without being any more a sin-offering :  "Un
to thera that look for hira shall he appear the second
tirae, without sin, unto salvation f." Nor do the
inspired writers at all confine themselves to this
manner of speaking concerning the satisfaction of
Christ ; but declare an efficacy in what he did and
suffered for us, additional fo, and beyond, mere
instruction, example, and government, in great
variety of expression : " That Jesus should die for
that nation," the Jews : " and not for that nation
only, but that also," plainly by the efficacy of his
death, " he should gather together in one, the chil
dren of God, that were scattered abf oad % :" that
" he suffered for sins, the just for the unjust § :"
that " he gave his life,, himself, a ransom |j :" that
" we are bought, bought with a price %: tbat " he
redeemed us with his blood ; redeemed us from the
curse of the law, being tntade a curse for us **:" that
he is our " advocate, intercessor, arid propitia-
* Heb. X. 4, 5, 7, 9, 10. f Heb. ix. 28. | Joh. ix. 51, 52.
§ 1 Pet. iii. 18. || Matth. xx. 28. Mark x. 45. 1 Tim. ii. 6.
IT 2 Pet. ii. l. ReV. xiv. 4. 1 Cor. vi. 20.
"* X Pet. i. 19. Kev. v. p. Gal. iii. 13.
R

258 The Appointment of Part IL
tion*:" that "hcAvas made perfect (or consum
raate) through suffering: and being thus raade per
fect, he becarae the author of salvation f:" tiiat
" God Avas in Christ reconciling the world to. hira
self ; by the death of his son, by the cross ; not
iraputing their trespasses unto them J :" and, last
ly, that " through death he destroyed him that^
had the power of death §." Christ then having
thus " humbled himself, and become obedient to
death, even the death of the cross ; God also hath
highly exalted him, and given him a name which
is above every name : hath given all things into
his hands : hath comraitted all judgment unto him;
that all men should honour the Son, even as they
honour the Father ||." For, " Avorthy is the lamb
that was slain, to receive power, and riches, and
wisdora, and strength, and honour, and glory, and
blessing. And every creature which is in heaven,
and on the earth, heard I, saying. Blessing, and
honour, and glory, and poAver, be unto him that
sitteth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb, for ever
and' ever ^."
These passages of Scrrpture seem to comprehend
and express the chief parts of 'Christ's office, as me
diator between God and man, so far, I mean, as the
nature of this his office is revealed y and it is usu^
ally treated of by divines under three heads.
* Heb. vii. 25. 1 Joh. ii. 1, 2. t Heb. ii, 10. & v. 9.
X 2 Cor. V. 19. Rom. v, 10. Eph. ii. 16.
§ Heb. ii. 14. See also a remarkable passage in the book oi ,
Job, xxxiii. 24, || Phil. ii. 8, 9. Joh. iii. 35, & v, 22, 23.
IT Rev. V. 12, 1 3.

Chap. V. a Mediator and Redeemer. Q59
First, He was, by way of erainence, the Prophet :
" that Prophet that shall corae into the world*,"
to declare the divine will. He published ancAv the
law of nature, which raen had corrupted ; and the
very knowledge of which, to sorae degree, Avas lost
among them. He taught mankind, taught us au
thoritatively, to " live soberly, righteously, and
godly in the present world," in expectation of the
future judgment of God. He confirmed the truth
of this moral systera of nature, and gave us addi
tional evidence of it ; the evidence of testiraony (".
He distinctly revealed the raanner in Avhich God
would be worshipped, the efficacy of repentance;
and the rewards and punishments of a future life.
Thus he was a prophet in a sense, in Avhich no
other ever was. To Avhich is to be added, thathe
set us a perfect " e?;ample, that we should folIoAv
his steps."
Secondly, He has a " kingdora, which is not of
this world." He founded a church, to be to raan
kind a standing raeraorial of religion, and invita
tion to it ; Avhich he proraised to be with always,
even to the end. He exercises an invisible govern
ment over it, himself, and by his Spirit : over that
part of it, which is militant here on earth, a g-overn
ment of discipline, "for the perfecting of the saints,
for the edifying his body : tiH we all come in the
unity of the faith, and of the knowledge of the
Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the mea
sure of the stature of the fulness of Christ |." Of
* Joh,. vi. 14. t Page 181, &c. t Eph. iv. 12, 13.

360 The Appointment of Part IL
this church, all persons scattered over the world,
who live in obedience to his laws, are merabers.
For these he is "gone to prepare a place, and AviU
corae again to receive them unto himself, that
where he is, there they may be also ; and reign
with hira for ever and ever*:" and likewise "to
take vengeance on them that know not God, and
obey not his gospel t<"
Against these parts of Christ's office, I find no
objections, but what are fully obviated in the be
ginning of this chapter.
Lastly, Christ offered hiraself a propitiatory sa
crifice, and raade atonement for the sins of the
Avorld ; which is mentionefl last, in regard to what
is objected against it. Sacrifices of expiation were
commanded the Jews, and obtained amongst most
other nations, from tradition, whose original pro
bably was revelation. And they were continually
repeated, both occasionally, and at the returns of
stated times : and made up great part of the ex
ternal religion of mankind. " But now once in the
end of the world Christ appeared to put aAvay sin
bythe sacrifice of himself J." And this sacrifiGe.
was in the highest degree, and with the most ex
tensive influence, of that efficacy for obtaining
pardon of sin, which the heathens may be supposed
to have thought their sacrifices to have been, and
which the Jewish sacrifices really were in some de-"
gree, and with regard to sorae peraans.
* Joh. xiv. 2, 3. Rev. iii. 21, & xi. 15.
t iThes. i. 8. t Heb,ix.26.

chap. V. a Mediator and Redeemer. 26 1
How, and in what particular way, it had this
efficacy, there are not AVanting persons who have
endeavoured to explain: but I do not find that the
Scripture has explained it. We seera to be very
much in the dark concerning the manner in Avhich
the ancients understood atonemeut to be made, i. e.
pardon to be obtained by sacrifices. And if the
Scripture has, as surely it has, left this matter of
the satisfaction of Christ mysterious, left soraeAvhat
in it unrevealed, all conjectures about it must be,
if not evidently absurd, yet at least uncertain.
Nor has any one reason to coraplain for want of
farther information, unless he can shew his claim
to it.
Some having endeavoured to explain the efficacy
of what Christ has done and suffered for uS, beyond
what the Scripture has authorized : others, proba
bly because they could not explain it, have been
for taking it away, and confining his office as re
deemer of the Avorld to his instruction, example,
and government of the church ; whereas the doc
trine ofthe gospel appears to be, not only that he
taught the efficacy of repentance, but rendered it
of the efficacy Avhich it is, by what he did and suf
fered for us : that he obtained for us the benefit of
having our repentance accepted unto eternal life :
not only that he revealed to sinners, that they were
in a capacity of salvation, and hoAV they might ob
tain it ; but, moreover, that be put thera into this
capacity of salvation, by what he did and suffered
for them; put us into a capacity of escaping future
punishment, and obtaining fiiture happiness. And

262 The Appointment of Part 1 1.
it is our wisdom thankfully to accept the benefit, by
performing the conditions, upon which it is offered,
on our part, Avithout disputing hpw it Avas procured
on his. For,
VII. Since we neither knoAv by what means pu
nishment in a future state Avould have followed
wickedness in this ; nor in what manner it would
have been inflicted, had it not been prevented ;
nor all the reasons why its, infliction Avould have
been needful ; nor the particular nature of that state
of happiness, which Christ is gone to prepare for
his disciples : and since Ave are ignorant how far
any thing which we could do, Avould, alone, and of
itself, have been effectual to prevent that punish
ment, to Avhich Ave are obnoxious, and recover that
happiness, Avhich we had forfeited ; it is most evi
dent we are not judges, antecedently to revelation,
Avhether a mediator was or was not necessary, to
obtain those ends : to prevent that future punish
ment, and bring mankind to the final happiness of
their nature. And for the very sarae reasons, upon
supposition of the necessity of a mediator, we are
no more judges, antecedently to revelation, of the
Avhole nature of his office; or the several parts of
which it consists ; of what Avas fit and requisite to
be assigned him, in order to accomplish the ends
of divine providence in the appointraent. And
from hence it follows, that to object against the
expediency or usefulness of particular things, re
vealed to have been done or suffered bv him, be-
cause Ave do not see how they Avere conducive to
those ends, is highly absurd. Yet nothing is more

Chap, V. a Mediator and Redeemer. 263
comraon to be met with, than this absurdity. But
if it be acknoAvledged beforehand, that we are not
judges in the case, it is evident that no objection
can, with any shadow of reason, be urged against
any particular part of Christ's mediatorial office
revealed in Scripture, till it can be shewn positively,
not to be requisite, or conducive, to the ends pro
posed to be accomplished ; or that it is in itself un
reasonable. And there is one objection made against the sa
tisfaction of Christ, Avhich looks to be of this posi
tive kind : that the doctrine of his being appointed
to suffer for the sins of the world, represents God as
being indifferent whether he punished the innocent
or the guilty. Now, from' the foregoing observa
tions, we may see the extreme slightness of all such
objections ; and (though it is most certain all Avho
make them do not see the consequence) that they
conclude altogether as much against God's whole
original constitution of nature, and the AvhoIe daily
course of divine Providence, in the government of
the AA'^orld, i. e. against the whole scheme of Theism
and the whole notion of religion ; as against Chris
tianity. For the world is a constitution, or sys
tem, whose parts have a mutual reference to each
other : arid there is a scheme of things gradually
carrying on, called the course of nature, to the car
rying on of which, God has appointed us, in vari
ous ways, to contribute. And when, in the daily
course of natural providence, it is appointed that in
nocent people should suffer for the faults of the
gjuilty, this is liable to the very sarae objection, a§

264 The Appointment of PartIL
the instance avc are now considering. The infi
nitely greater importance of that appointment of
Christianity Avhich is objected against, does not
hinder but it may be, as it plainly is, an appoint
ment of the very same kind, with what the Avorld
affords us daily examples of Nay, if there were
any force at all in the objection, it Avould be strong
er, in one respect, against natural providence, than
against Christianity : because under the former,
Ave are in many cases commanded, and even neces
sitated whether we will or no, to suffer for the
faults of others ; whereas the sufferings of Christ
Avere voluntary. The Avorld's being under the
righteous governraent of God, does, indeed, im
ply, that finally, and upon the whole, CA-^ery one shall
receive according to his personal deserts : and the ge
neral doctrine of the whole Scripture is, that this shall
be the completion of the divine government. But,
during the progress, and, for aught Ave knoAv, even
in order to the completion of this moral scheme, vi
carious punishments raay be fit, and absolutely ne
cessary. Men, by their follies, run theraselves in
to extrerae distress ; into difficulties Avhich would
be absolutely fatal to thera, were it not for the in
terposition and assistance of others. God com
mands by the law of nature, that Ave afford them
this assistance,' in many cases where we cannot do
it without very great pains, and labour, and suffer
ings to ourselves. And Ave see in Avhat variety of
Avays, one person's sufferings contribute to the re
lief of another : and how, or by what particular
means, this comes to pass, or follows, from the con-

Chap. V. a Mediator and Redeemer. Q65
•
stitution and laAvs of nature, Avhich corae under our
notice : and being farailiarized to it, raen are not
shocked with it. So, that the reason of their in
sisting upon objections of the foregoing kind a-
gainst the satisfaction of Christ, is, either that they
do not consider God's settled and uniform appoint
ments as his appointraents at all ; or else, they for
get that vicarious punishment is a providential ap
pointment of every day's experience : and then,
from their being unacquainted Avith the more gene
ral laws of nature, or divine government over the
Avorld, and not seeing how the sufferings of Christ
could contribute to the redemption of it, unless by
arbitrary and tyrannical avHI ; they conclude his
sufferings could not contribute to it any other Avay.
And yet, Avhat has been often alleged in justifica
tion of this doctrine, even frora the apparent natu
ral tendency ofthis method of our rederaption ; its
tendency to vindicate the authority of God's laws,
and deter his creatures frora sin ; this has never yet
been answered, and is, I think, plainly unanswera
ble : though I ara far frora thinking it an account
of the whole of the case. But without taking this
into consideration, it abundantly appears, from the
observations above made, that this objection is,
not an objection of Christianity, but ag-ainst the
whole general constitution of nature. And if it
Avere to be considered as an objection agairist Chris
tianity, or, considering it as itis, an objection against
the constitution of nature ; it amounts to no more
in conclusion than this, that a divine appointment
cannot be necessary, or expedient, because the ob-

265 The Appointmeiit of Part II.
«
jector does not discern it to be so : though he must
owu that the nature of the case is such, as ren
ders him incapable of judging, Avhether it be sb or
not ; or, of seeing it to be necessary, though it
A\ere So.
It is, indeed, a matter of great patience to reaso
nable men, to find people arguing in this manner :
objecting against the credibility of such particular
things revealed in Scripture, that they do not see
the necessity or expediency of them. For, though
it is highly right, and the most pious exercise of
our understanding, to enquire with due reverence
into the ends and reasons of God's dispensations :
yet, when those reasons are concealed, to argue
from our ignorance, that such dispensations cannot
be from God, is infinitely absurd. The presump
tion ofthis kind of objection, seeras almost lost in
the folly of them. And the folly of them is yet
greater, Avhen they are urged, as usually they are,
against things in Christianity analogous, or like to
those natural dispensations of Providence, Avhich
are matter of experience. Let reason be kept to :
and if any part of the Scripture account of the re
deraption of the Avorld by Christ, can be shewn to
be really contrary to it, let the Scripture, in the
narae of God, be given up : but let not such poor
creatures as avc, go on objecting ag-ainst an infinite
scherae, that avc. do not see the necessity or useful
ness of all its parts, and call this reasoning ; and,
Avhich still farther heightens the absurdity in the
present case, parts which we are not actively con
cerned in. For, it m.ay be worth mentioning,

Chap. V. a Mediator and Redeemer. sl67
Lastly, That not only the reason of the thing,
but the Avhole analogy of nature, should teach us,
not to expect to have the like information concern
ing the divine conduct, as concerning our oAvn du
ty. God instructs us by experience, (for it is not
reason, but experience Avhich instructs us) what
good or bad consequences Avill follow from our
acting in such and such manners : and by this he
directs us, hoAV Ave are to behave ourselves. But,
though Ave are sufficiently instructed for the com
mon purposes of life : yet it is but an almost infi
nitely small part of natural providence, Avhich Ave
are at all let into. The case is the same Avith re
gard to revelation. The doctrine of a mediatpr
betAveen God and raan, against which it is object
ed, that the expediency of sorae things in it is not
understood, relates only to what was done on God's
part in the appointment, and on the Mediator's in
the execution of it. For what is required of us, in
consequence of this gracious dispensation, is ano
ther subject, in Avhich none can complain for Avant
of information. The constitution ofthe Avorld, and
God's natural government over it, is all mystery, as
much as the Christian dispensation. Yet under the
first, he has given men all things pertaining to life ;
and under the other, all things pertaining unto
godliness. And, it may be added, that there is no
thing hard to be accounted for in any of the cora
mon precepts of Christianity : though if there Avere,
surely a divine coraraand is abundantly sufficient
to lay us under the strongest obligations to obe
dience. But the fact is, that the reasons of all the

268 The Appointment of , 8gc^ Paitll.
«
Christian precepts are CA'ident. Positive institu
tions are manifestly necessary to keep up and pro
pagate religion amongst mankind. And our duty
to Christ, the internal and external Avorship ofhim;
this part of the religion of the Gospel raanifestly
arises out of what he has done and suffered, his au
thority and dorainion, and the relation which he
is revealed to stand in to us *.
* Page 188, &c.

CHAP. VL
Of the Want of Universality in Revelation : and
of the supposed Deficiency in the Proof of it.
It has been thought by sorae persons, that if the
evidence of revelation appears doubtful, this itself
turns into a positive argument against it : because
it cannot be supposed, that, if it were true, it would
be left to subsist upon doubtful evidence. And tbe
objection against revelation from its not, being uni
versal, is often insisted upon as of great weight.
Now the Aveakness of these opinions may be
shewn, by observing the suppositions on which they
are founded ; Avhich are really such as these ; that
it cannot he thought God Avould have bestowed any
favour at all upon us, unless in the degree which,
Ave think, he might, and Avhich, Ave imagine, Avould
be most to our particular advantage ; and also that
it cannot be thought he would bestow a favour up
on any, unless he bestowed the sarae upon all :
suppositions Avhich we find contradicted, not by
a few instances in God's natural government of
the world, but by the general analogy of nature
together. Persons who speak of the evidence of religion
as doubtfulis and of this supposed doubtfulness as a

270 Revelation not universal : Part II.
positive arguraent against it, should be put -upon
considering, what that evidence indeed is, which
they act upon, with regard to their teraporal in
terests. For, it js not only extremely difficult,
but, in many cases, absolutely impossible, to ba
lance pleasure and pain, satisfaction and uneasi
ness, so as to be able to say, on Avhich side the
overplus is. There are the like difficulties and im
possibilities, in making the due allowances for a
change of teraper and taste, for satiety, disgusts,
ill health : any of Avhich render men incapable of
enjoying, after they have obtained, Avhat they most
eagerly desired. Nuraberless, too, are the acci
dents, besides that one of untiraely death, Avhich
may even probably disappoint the best concerted
schemes : and strong- objections are -often seen to
lie against them, not to be reraoved or answer
ed, but which seem overbalanced by reasons on
the other side ; so as, that the certain difficulties
and dangers of the pursuit are, by every one,
thought justly disregarded, upon account of the
appearing greater advantages in case of success,
though there be but little probabihty of it. Last
ly, every one observes our liableness, if we be not
upon our guard, to be deceived by the falsehood
of men, and the false appearances of things : and
this danger must be greatly increased, if there be
a' strong bias within, supposed frora indulged pas
sion, to favour the deceit. Hence arises that great
uncertainty and doubtfulness of proof, Avherein our
temporal interest really consists ; what are the
most probable means of attaining it ; and Avhether

Chap VI. supposed Deficiency in its ProoJ\ 27 1
those means will eventually be successful. And
numberless instances there are, in the daily course
of life, in which all men think it -reasonable to en
gage in pursuits, though the probability is greatly
against succeeding; and to raake such provision
for themselves, as it is supposeable they may have
occasion for, though the plain acknoAvledged pro
bability is, that they never shall. Then those Avho
think the objection ag-ainst revelation, frora its
light not being universal, to be of weight, should
observe, that the Author of Nature, in numberless
instances, bestOAVs that upon some, which he does
not upon others, Avho seem equally to stand in
need of it Indeed, he appears to bestow all his
gifts with the most promiscuous variety araong
creatures of the sarae species : health and strength,
capacities of prudence and of knowledge, means of
improveraent, riches, and all external advantages.
And as there are not any two men found, of ex
actly like shape and features : so it is probable,
there are not any two, of an exactly like constitu
tion, temper and situation, Avith regard to the
goods and evils of life. Yet, notwithstanding
these uncertainties and varieties, God does exercise
a natural government over the world : and there is
such a thing as a prudent and imprudent institu
tion of life, Avith regard to our health and our af
fairs, under tbat his natural government.
• As neither the Jewish nor Christian revelation
have been universal ; and as they haA'e been afford
ed to a greater or less part of the Avorld, at differ
ent times ; so likewise, at different times, both re-

272 Revelation not universal : Part IL
velations have had different degrees of evidence.
The JcAVS, who lived during the succession of pro
phets, that is, from Moses till after the Captivity,
had higher evidence of the truth of their religion,
than those had, Avho lived in the interval between
the last mentioned period, and the coming of
Christ. And the first Christians had higher evi
dence of the miracles wrought in attestation of
Christianity, than what we have now. They had
also a strong presuraptive proof of the truth of it,
perhaps of rauch greater force, in way of argument,
than many think, of Avhich Ave have very httle re
maining ; I mean the presumptive proof of its
truth, from the influence which it had upon the
lives of the generality of its professors. And AVe,
or future ages, may possibly have a proof of it,
which they could not have, from the conformity
between the prophetic history, and the state of
the world, and of Christianity. And farther : if
we were to suppose the evidence, which some
have of religion, to araount to little raore, than
seeing that it may be true ; but that they reraain
in great doubts and uncertainties about both its
evidence and its nature, and great perplexities
concerning- the rule of life : others to have a full
conviction, of the truth of religion, with a distinct
knoAvledge of their duty ; and others severally to
have all the intermediate degrees of religious light
and evidence, Avhich lie between these two — if we
put the case, that, for the present, it was intended,
revelation should be no more than a sraall light, in
the raidst of a world greatly overspread, notwith-

Chap. VI. supposed Deficiency in its Proof. 273
standing it, with ignorance and darkness : that
certain gliraraerings of this light should extend,
and be directed, to reraote distances, in such a
raanner as that those who really partook of it should
not discern from whence it originally came : that
some, in a nearer situation to it, should have its
light obscured, and, in different ways and degrees,
intercepted : and that others shoulc} be placed with
in its clearer influence, and be much more enliven
ed, cheared, and directed by it ; but yet that even
to these it should be no more than ' ' a light shining
in a dark place:" all this Avould be perfectly uni
form and of a piece with the conduct of Providence,
in the distribution of its other blessings. If the
fact of the case really were, that sorae have received
no light at all from the Scripture ; as many ages
and countries in the heathen world : that others,
though they have, by means of it, had essential or
natural religion enforced upon their consciences,
yet have never had the genuine Scripture-revela
tion, with its real evidence, proposed to their con
sideration ; and the ancient Persians and modern
Mahometans may possibly be instances of people in
a situation somewhat like to this : that others,
though they have had the Scripture laid before
them as of divine revelation, yet have had it with
the system and evidence of Christianity so inter
polated, the systein so corrupted, the evidence so
blended with false miracles, as to leave the mind in
the utmost doubtfulness and uncertainty about the
whole ; which may be the state of sorae thought
ful men ih most of those nations who call them-

274 Revelation not unixiersal : Part II.
selves Christian : and, lastly, that others have had
Christianity off(?red to them in its genuine simpli
city, and with its proper evidence, as persons in
countries and churches of civil and of Christian
liberty ; but, hoAvever, tbat even these persons are
left in great ignorance in many respects, and have
by no means light afforded them enough to satisfy
their curiosity, but only to regulate their life, to
teach thera their duty, and encourage them in the
careful discharge of it : I say, if we Avere to sup
pose this somewhat of a general true account of the
degrees of moral and religious light and evidence,
which Avere intended to be afforded mankind, and
of what has actually been and is their situation, in
their moral and religious capacity ; there would be
nothing in all this ignorance, doubtfulness, arid
uncertainty, in all these varieties, and supposed
disadvantages of some in comparison of others, re
specting religion, but may be paralleled by mani
fest analogies in the natural dispensations of Provi
dence at present, and considering ourselves merely
in our teraporal capacity.
Nor is there any thing shocking in all this, or
Avhich would seem to bear hard upon the moral ad
ministration in nature, if Ave would really keep in
mind, that every one shall be dealt equitably with :
instead of forgetting this, or explaining it away,
after it is acknowledged in words. All shadow of
injustice, and indeed all harsh appearances, in this
various economy of Providence, Avould be lost; if
Ave would keep in mind, that every merciful allow
ance shall be made, and no more be required of any

Chap. VI. supposed Deficiency in its Proof . 275
one, than Avhat might have been equitably expected
pf him, from the circumstances in Avhich he Avas
placed ; and not Avhat might have been expected,
liad he been placed in other circumstances: i. e. in
Scripture-language, that every raan shall be "ac
cepted according to what he had, not according to
Avhat he had not*." This, howeA'cr, doth not by
any means imply, that all persons condition here
is equally advantageous Avith respect to futurity.
And Providence's designing- to place some in great
er darkness with re-spect to religious knowledge, is
no more a reason Avhy they should not endeavour
to get out of that darkness, and others to bring
thera out of it, than Avhy ignorant and slow people,
in raatters of other knowledge, should not endea
vour to learn, or should not be instructed.
It is not unreasonable to suppose, that the sarae
Avise and good principle, whatever it was, Avhich
disposed the Author of nature to make different
kinds and orders of creatures, disposed him also to
place creatures of like kinds in different situations ;
and that the sarae principle which disposed hira to
make creatures of different moral capacities, de
posed him also to place creatures of like raoral capa
cities in different religious situations; and even the
sarae creatures, in different periods of their being.
And the account or reason of this, is also most
prqbably the accouut, why the constitution of things
is such, as that creatures of moral natures or capa
cities, for a considerable, part of that duration in
*2 Cor. viii. 12.

276 Revelation not universal : Part IL'
Avhich they are living agents, are not at all subjdtets
of morality and religion ; but grow, up to be so,
and grow up to be so more and more, gradually
from childhood to mature age.
What, in particular, is the account or reason of
these things, Ave raust be greatly in the dark, were
it only that Ave know so very little even of our own
case. Our present state may possibly be the con
sequence of soraewhat past, which we are Avholly
ignorant of : as it has a reference to soraewhat to •
come, of Avliich we know scarce any more than is
necessary for practice. A systera, or constitution,
in its notion, implies variety; and so complicated
an one as this Avorld, very great variety. So t;hat
were revelation universal, yet frora men's differ
ent capacities of understanding, from the different
lengths of their lives, their different educations and
other external circumstances, and from their dif
ference of temper and bodily constitution ; their
religious situations would be widely different, and
the disadvantage of some in comparison of others,
perhaps, altogether as much as at present. And
the true account, whatever it be, why mankind, or
suchapart of mankind, are placed in this condition
of ignorance, raust be supposed also the true ac
count of our farther ignorance, in not knowing the
reasons why, or whence it is, that they are placed
in this condition. But the following practical re
flections may deserve the serious consideration of
those persons, who think the circumstances of man
kind, or their OAvn, in the forementioned respects,
a ground of coraplaint

Chap. VI. supposed Deficiency in its Proof. 277
First, The evidence of religion not appearing ob
vious, may constitute one particular part of some
men's trial in the religious sense ; as it gives scope
for a virtuous exercise, or vicious neglect, of their
understanding, in exaraining or not examining into
that evidence. There seems no possible reason to
be given, Avhy we may not be in a state of moral
probation, with regard to the exercise of our un
derstanding upon the subject of rehgion, as we are
with regard to our behaviour in comraon affairs.
The former is as much a thing within our power
and choice as the latter. , And I suppose it is to be
laid doAvn for certain, that the same character, the
same inward principle, Avhich, after a raan is con
vinced of the truth of religion, renders him obe
dient to the precepts of it, would, Avere he not thus
convinced, set him about an examination of it,
upon its system and evidence being offered to his
thoughts ; and that in the latter state, his exami
nation would be with an impartiality, seriousness,
and solicitude, proportionable to what his obedience
is in the former. And as inattention, negligence,
Avant ofali serious concern, about a raatter of such
a nature and such iraportance, when offered to
men's consideration, is, before a distinct convic
tion of its truth, as real iraraoral depravity and dis
soluteness, as neglect of religious practice after
such conviction : so active solicitude about it, and
fair impartial consideration of its evidence before
such conviction, is as really an exercise of a mor
rally right temper, as is religious practice after.
Thus, that religion is not intuitively true, but a

278 Revelation: not universal : PartIL
matter of deduction and inference ; that a convic
tion of its truth is not forced upon every one, but
left to be, by sorae, collected with heedful attention
to preraises ; this as rauch constitutes religious pro
bation, as rauch aftbrds sphere, scope, opportunity,
for right and Avrong behaviour, as any thing Avhat
ever does. And their manner of treating this sub
ject, Avhen laid before thera, shews Avhat is in their
heart, and is an exertion of it
Secondly, It appears to be a thing- as evident,
though it is not so rauch attended to, that if, upon •
consideration of religion, the evidence of it should
seem to any persons^ doubtful, iu the highest sup
posable degree ; even this doubtful evidence Avill,
hoAvever, put them into a general" state of proba
tion, in the moral and religious sense. For, sup
pose a man to be really in doubt, whether such a
person had not done him the greatest favour ; or,
Avhether his Avhole temporal interest did not depend
upon that person : no one, who had any sense of
gratitude and of prudence, could possibly consider
hiraself in the sarae situation, with regard to such
person, as if he had no such doubt. In truth, it is
as just to say, that certainty and doubt are the
same ; as to say, the situations now mentioned
would leave a raan as entirely at liberty, in point of
gratitude or prudence, as he would be, were he cer
tain he had received no favour frora such person,
or that he no way depended upon him. And thus,
though the evidence of religion which is afforded
to some men, should be little more than that they
are given to sec, the system of Christianity, or re-

Chap. VL supposed Deficiency in its Proof . 279
Hgion in general, to be supposable and credible ;
this ought in all reason to beget a serious practical
apprehension that it raay be true. And even this
Avill afford matter of exercise, for religious suspense
and deliberation, for raoral resolution and self-go-
vernraent ; because the apprehension that religion
raay be true, does as really lay raen under obliga
tions, as a full conviction that it is true. It giA'Cs
occasion and raotives to consider farther the irapor
tant subject; to preserve attentively upon their
minds a general implicit sense that they raay be
under divine moral government, an awful solicitude
about religion, whether natural or revealed. Such
apprehension ought to turn raen's eyes to every
degree of new light Avhich raay be had, frora what
ever side it coraes, and induce them to refrain, in
the mean time, from all immoralities, and live in
the conscientious practice of every common virtue.
Especially are they bound to keep at the greatest
distance from all dissolute profaneness ; for this the
very nature of the case forbids ; and to treat Avith
highest reverence a matter upon whicli their own
- whole interest and being, and the fate of nature
depends. This behaviour, and an active endeavour
to maintain within themselves this teraper, is the
business, the duty, and the Avisdora of those per
sons, who coraplain of the doubtfulness of religion,
is what they, are under the raost proper obligations
tb ; and such behaviour is an exertion of, and has
a tendency to improve in them, that character,
which the practice of all the several duties of reli
gion, from a full conviction of its truth, is au

280 Revelation not universal : Part II.
exertion of, and has a tendency to improve in
others : others^ I say, to whom God has kfforded
such conviction. Nay, considering the infinite
importance of religion, revealed as well as natural,
I think it may be said in general, that whoever will
Aveigh the matter thoroughly, raay see there is not
near so rauch difference, as is commonly imagined,
between Avhat ought in reason to be the rule of life,
to those persons who are fully convinced of its truth,
and to those who have only a serious doubting ap
prehension that it may be true. Their hopes, and
fears, and obligations, will be in various degrees :
but, as the subject-matter of their hopes and fears
is the sarae, so the subject-matter of their obliga
tions, Avhat they are bound to do and to refrain
from, is not so very unlike.
It is to be observed farther, that, from a charac
ter of understanding, or a situation of influence in
the world, some persons have it in their power to
do infinitely more harra or good, by setting an ex
araple of profaneness and avowed disregard to all
religion ; or, on the contrary, of a serious, though
perhaps doubting, apprehension of its truth, and
of a reverend regard to it under this doubtfulness,
than they can do by acting well or ill in all the
coramon intercourses amongst mankind ; and con
sequently they are most highly accountable for a
behaviour, which, they may easily foresee, is of
such iraportance, and in which there is raost plainly
a right and a wrong; even admitting the evidence
of religion to be as doubtful as is pretended.

Chap. V I. supposed Deficiency in its Proof. 281
The ground of these observations, and that which
renders them just and true, is, that doubting ne
cessarily implies some degree of evidence for that
of which Ave doubt. For no person Avould be in
doubt concerning the truth of a number of facts so
and so circurastanced, which should accidentally
corae into his thoughts, and of which Ave had no
CAddence at all. And though in the case of an even
chance, and Avhere consequently we were in doubt,
we should in common language say, that we had
no evidence at all for either side; yet that situation
of things, which renders it an even chance and no
more, that such an event Avill happen, renders this
case equivalent to all others, where there is such
evidence on both sides of a question *, as leaves the
mind in doubt concerning the truth. Indeed, in
all these cases there is no more evidence on the
one side than on the other ; but there is (Avhat is
equivalent to) much more for either, thau for the
truth of a number of facts Avhich corae into one's
thoughts at random. And thus, in all tiiese cases,
doubt as rauch presupposes evidence, lower degrees
of evidence ; as belief presupposes higher, and cer
tainty higher still. Any one, who will a little at
tend to the nature of evidence, will easily carry this
observation on, and see, that between no evidence
at all, and that degree of it Avhich affords ground
of doubt, there are as raany interraediate degrees, as
there are between that degree, Avhich is the ground
of doubt, and deraonstration. And though Ave haA'e
* Introduction.

282 Revelation not universal : Pait IL
not faculties to distinguish these degrees of evi
dence, Avith any sort of exactness ; yet, in propor
tion as they are discerned, they ought to influence
our practice. For it is as real an imperfection in
the moral character, not to be influenced in prac
tice by a lower degree of evidence- Avhen discerned,
as it is, in the understanding, not to discern it
And as, in all subjects Avhich men consider, they
discern the loAver as aa'cH as higher degrees of evi
dence, proportionably to their capacity of under
standing ; so, in practical subjects, they are influ-
cnce<:l in practice, by the loAver as Avell as higher
degrees of it, proportionably to their fairness and
honesty. And as, in proportion to defects in the
understanding, men are unapt to see lower degrees
ofcA'idence, are in danger of oA'erlooking evidence
when it is not glaring, and are easily iraposed upon
in such cases : so, in proportion to the corruption
of the heart, they seem capable of satisfying thera
selves Avith having no regard in practice to evidence
acknowledged real, if it be not overbearing. From
these things it must follow, that doubting concern
ing religion implies such a degree of evidence for
it, as, joined with the consideration of its impor
tance, unquestionably lays men uuder the obliga
tions before mentioned, to have a dutiful regard to
it in all their behaviour.
Thirdly, The difficulties in Avhich the evidence
of religion is involved, which some complain of, is
no raore a just ground of coraplaint, than the ex
ternal circumstances of temptation, which others
are placed in ; . or than difficulties in the practice

Chap. VI. supposed Deficiency in its Proof . 283
of it, after a fuH conviction of its truth. Tempta
tions render our state a more improving state of
disciphne *, than it would be otherwise : as they
ffive occasion for a raore attentive exercise of the
virtuous principle, which confirms and strengthens
it more, than an easier or less attentive exercise of
it could. Noav speculative difficulties are, in this
respect, ofthe A-erysame nature Avith these external
teraptations. For the evidence of religion not, ap
pearing obvious, is, to sorae persons, a teraptation
to reject it, without any consideration at all ; and
therefore requires such an attentive exercise of the
virtuous principle, seriously to consider that evi
dence, as there would be no occasion for, but for
such teraptation. And the supposed doubtfulness
of its evidence,. after it has been in some sort consi
dered, affords opportunity to an unfair mind of ex
plaining away, and deceitfully hiding from itself^
that evidence Avhich it might see ; and also for
men's encouraging themselves in vice from hopes
of impunity, though they do clearly see thus much
at least, that these hopes are uncertain : in hke
raanner as the coramon temptation to many in
stances of folly, which end in temporal infamy and
ruin, is the ground for hope of not being detected,
and of escaping Avith impunity ; i. e. the doubtful
ness of the proof beforehand, that such foolish be
haviour will thus end in infamy and ruin. On the
contrary, supposed doubtfulness in the evidence of
religion calls for a more careful and attentive ex
* Part I. chap. 5.

284 Revelation not universal : PartIL
ercise of the virtuous principle, in fairly yielding
themselves up to the proper influence of any real
evidence, though doubtful; and in practising con
scientiously all virtue, though under sorae uncer
tainty, Avhether the governraent in the universe may
not possibly be such, as that vice may escape Avith
impunity. And in general, temptation, meaning
by this word the lesser allurements to Aviong and
difficulties in the discharge of our duty, as Avell as
the greater ones, temptation, I say, as such, and of
every kind and degree, as it calls forth some virtu
ous efforts, additional to Avhat Avould otherAvise
have been wanting, cannot but be an additional
discipline and improveraent of virtue, as Avell as
probation of it, in the other senses of that Avord *.
So that the A'ery sarae account is to be given, why
the evidence of religion should be left in such a
raanner, as to require, in some, an attentive, soli
citous, perhaps painful, exercise of their under
standing about it ; as Avhy others should be placed
in such circurastances, as that the practice of its
coraraon duties, after a full conviction of the truth
of it, should require attention, solicitude, and pains:
or, Avhy appearing doubtfulness should be permitted
to afford matter of temptation to some ; as why ex
ternal difficulties and allureraents should be perr
mitted to afford matter of temptation to others. The
same account also is to be given, Avhy some should
be exercised Avith temptations of both these kinds ;
as why others should be exercised with the latter
¦* Part I. chap, iv. & page 128. ,

Chap. VI. supposed Deficiency iti its Proof. 285
in such very high degrees, as some have been, par
ticularly as the primitiA'-e Christians were.
Nor does there appear any absurdity in suppo-.
sing, that the speculative difficulties in which the
evidence of religion is involved, may make everi the
principal part of sorae persons trial. For, as the
chief temptations of the generality of the Avorld,
are, the ordinary raotives to injustice or unrestrain
ed pleasure ; or, to live in the neglect of religion
from that frarae of raind, Avhich renders raany per
sons almost without feeling, as to any thing dis
tant, or Avhich is not the object of their senses : so
there are other persons without this shallowness of
temper, persons of a deeper sense as to Avhat is in
visible and future ; who not only see, but have a
general practical feeling, that what is to come will
be present, and that things are not less real for
their not being the objects of sense : and who,
from, their natural constitution of body and of
temper, and from their external condition, raay
have sraall temptations to behave ill, small difficul
ty in behaving Avell, in the common course of life.
Now, when these latter persons have a distinct, full
conviction of the truth of religion, without any
possible doubts or difficulties, the practice of it is
to them unavoidable, unless they will do a constant
violence to their own minds ; and religion is scarce
any more a discipline to them, than it is to crea
tures in a state of perfection. Yet these persons
may possibly stand in need of moral discipline and
exercise in a higher degree, than they Avould haA'e
by such an easy practice of religion. Or it may

286 Revelation not universal : Part IL
be requisite, for reasons unlsnown to us, that they
should give some further manifestation * Avliat is
their moral character, to the creation of God, than
such a practice of it Avould be. Thus, in the great
A'ariety of religious situations in Avhich men are
placed, Avhat constitutes, Avhat chiefly and pecu
liarly constitutes the probation, in all senses, of
some persons, may be the difficulties in which the
evidence of religion is involved : and their princi
pal and distinguished trial may be, how they Avill
behaA'e under and Avitli respect to these difficulties.
Circumstances in men's situation in their temporal
capacity, analogous in good measure to this, re
specting- religion, are to be obserA-ed. We find,
some persons are placed in such a situation in the
Avorld, as that their chief difficulty, Avith regard to
conduct, is not the doing Avhat is prudent when it
is knoAvn ; for this, ' in numberless cases, is as easy
as the contrary : but to some, the principal exer
cise, is, recollection, and being upon their guard a-
gainst deceits, the deceits, suppose, of those about
them ; against false appearances of reason and pru
dence. To persons in some situatipns, the princi
pal exercise, Avith respect to conduct, is attention,
in order to inforra theraselves what is proper, what
is really the reasonable and prudent part to act.
But as I have hitherto gone upon supposition^
that raen's dissatisfaction Avith the evidence of re
ligion, is not OAvingto their neglects or prejudices;
it raust be added, on the other hand, in all com-
P. 128.

Chap. VL supposed Deficiency in'its Proof. 287
mon reason, and as Avhat the truth of the case
plainly requires should be added, that such dissa
tisfaction possibly may be owing to those, possi
bly may be raen's own fault. For,
If there are any persons, Avho never set them
selves heartily, and in earnest, to be inforraed in
religion ; if there are any, who secretly Avish it
may not prove true ; and are less attentive to evi
dence than to difficulties, and more to objections
than to Avhat is said in ansAver to them : these per
sons Avill scarce be thought in a likely Avay of see
ing the evidence of religion, though it were most
certainly true, and capable of being* ever so fully
proved. If any accustom themselves to consider
this subject usually in the way of mirth and sport ;
if they attend to forms and representatioris, and
inadequate manners of expression, instead of the
real things intended by them (for signs often
can be no more than inadequately expressive of
the things signified) : or, if they substitute hu
man errors, in the room of divine truth ; why may
not all, or any of these things, hinder spme men
from seeing that evidence, which really is seen
by others ; as a hke turn of mind, Avith, respect to
matters of common speculation and practice, does,
we find by experience, hinder thera from attaining
that knowledge and ri^ht understanding, in raat
ters of coramon speculation and practice, which
more fair and attentive minds attain to ? And the
effect will be the same, Avhether their neglect of
seriously considering the evidence of religion, and
their indirect behaviour with regard to it, proceed.

288 Revelation not universal ': Part If.
from mere carelessness, or from the grosser vices ;
or, whether it be OAving to this, that forms, and fi
gurative raanners of expression, as well as errors,
adrainister occasions of ridicule, Avhen the things
intended, and the truth itself, would not. Men
raay indulge a ludicrous turn so far, as to lose all
sense of conduct and prudence in Avorldly affairs,
and even, as it seeras, to irapair their faculty of
reason. And in general, levity, carelessness, pas
sion, and prejudice, do hinder us frora being right
ly inforraed, Avith respect to comraon things : and
they raay, in like manner, and perhaps in some
farther providential raanner, with respect to raoral
and religious subjects : may hinder evidence from
being laid before us, and from beings seen when it
is. The Scripture* does declare, " thatCA'ery one
shall not understand." And it makes no differen ce
by what providential conduct this comes to pass :
Avhether the evidence of Christianity was, original
ly and with design, put and left sO, as that those
Avho are desirous of evading moral obligations,
should not see it, and that honest-minded persons
* Dan. xii. 10. See also Is. xxix. 13, 14. Matth. vi, 23. and
xi. 25. and xiii. 11, 12. Joh. iii. ig. Joh. v. 44. 1 Cor. ii.
14-, and 2 Cor. iv. 4. 2 Tim. iii. 13. and that affectionate, as well
as authoritative admonition, so very many times inculcated, " He
that hath ear^ to hear, let him hear." Grotius saw so strongly.^he
thing intended in these and other passages of Scripture ofthe like
sense, as to say, that the proof given us of Christianity, was less
than might have been, for this very purpose : Ut ita sermo Evan
gelii tanquam lapis esset Lydius ad quem ingenia sanabilia explo-
rarent-ur. De Ver. R. C. L. 2. towarrh the end.

Chap. VI. supposed Deficiency in its Proof. 289
should : or, Avhether it comes to pass by any other
means. Farther : The general proof of natural religion
and of Christianity, does, I think, lie level to com
mon raen ; even those, the greatest part of Avhose
tirae, from childhood to old age, is taken up with
providing, for themselves and their families, the
comraon conA'eniences, perhaps necessaries of life :
those, I mean, of this rank, who ever think at all
of asking after proof, or attending to it. Coramon
men, were they as rauch in earnest about religion,
as about their teraporal affairs, are capable of being
convinced upon real evidence, that there is a God
Avho governs the world : and they feel theraselves
to be of a raoral nature, and accountable creatures.
And as Christianity entirely falls in Avith this their
natural sense of things ; so they are capable, not
only of being persuaded, but of being raade to see,
that there is evidence of rairacles wrought in attes
tation of it, and raany appearing corapletions of
prophecy. But though this proof is real and con
clusive, yet it is liable to objections, and may be
run up into difficulties ; Avhich, however, persons
who are capable, not only of talking of, but of
really seeing, are capable also of seeing through :
2Ne. not of clearing up and answering them, so as
to satisfy their curiosity, for of such knowledge we
are not capable with respect to any one thing in na
ture ; but capable of seeing that the proof is not
lost in these difficulties, or destroyed by these ob
jections. But then a thorough examination inta

:>

290 ^ Revelation not universal : Part IL
religion, with regard to these pbjeptions, which can
not be the business of every man, is a matter of
pretty large compass, and^ from the nature pf it,
requires some knowledge, as Ayell as time and atten
tion ; to see, how the evidence comes out, upon
balancing one thing Avith another, and what, upon
the whole, is the amount of it. Now, if persons
Avho have picked up these objections from others,
and take for granted they are of weight, upon the
word of those from Avhoin they received them, or,
by often retailing of them, come to see, or fancy
they see, them to be of Aveight ; will not prepare
themselves for such an examination, with a compe
tent degree of knowledge ; or will not give that
time and attention to the subject, which, frora the
nature of it, is necessary for attaining such infor
mation : in this case, they must remain in doubt
fulness, ignorance or error ; in the same way as
theymust, with regard- to conmron sciences, and
matters of cornmon life, if they neglect the neces
sary means of being informed in them.
But still, perhaps, it Avijl be objected, that if a
prince or common master were to send directions
to a servant, he Avould take care, that they should
always- bear the certain marks, Avho they came frora,
and that their sense should be always plain : so as
that there should be no possible doubt, if he could
help it, concerning- the authority or raeaning of
them. Now, the proper ansAver to all this kind of
objections is, that, wherever the fallacy lies, it is
even certain we cannot argue thus with respect to

Chap. VI. supposed Deficiency in its Proof 29 1
Him, who is the governor of the world : and par
ticularly that he does not afford us such informa
tion, Avith respect to our temporal affairs and inte
rests, as experience abundantly shews. HoAvcA'er,
there is a full ansAver to this objection, from the
very nature of religion. For, the reason Avhy a
prince Avould give his directions in this plain man
ner, is, that he absolutely desires such an external
action should be done, Avithout concerning himself
with the motiA'e or principle upon which it is done :
i. e. he regards only the external event, or the
thing's being done ; and not at all, properly speak
ing, the doing of it, or the action. Whereas the
whole of raorality and religion consisting raerely in
action itself, there is no sort of parallel between
the cases. But if the prince be supposed to regard
only the action ; i. e. only to desire to exercise, or
in any sense prove, the understanding or loyalty
of a serA'ant ; he Avould not always give his orders
in such a plain manner. It raay be proper to add,
that the will of God, respecting raorality and reli
gion, raay be considered, either as absolute, or as
only conditional. If it be absolute, it can only be
thus, that we should act virtuously in such given
circumstances ; not that avc should be brought to
act so, by his changing of our circumstances. And
if God's Avill be thus absolute, then it is in our
poAver, in the highest and strictest sense, to do or
to contradict his Avill ; which is a most weighty
consideration. Or his Avill may be considered only
as conditional, that if Ave act so and so, we shall

292 itevelation not universal: Part IL
be rcAvarded ; if otherAvise, punished : of which
conditional will of the Author of Nature, the Avhole
constitution of it affords most certain instances.
'Upon the whole : that we are in a state of reli
gion necessarily implies, that we are in a state of
probation : and the credibihty of our being at all
in such a state being admitted, there seeras no pe
culiar difficulty in supposing our probation to be,
just as it is, in those respects Avhich are above ob
jected against There seeras no pretence, from' the
reason of the thing, to say, that the trial cannot
equitably be any thing, but whether persons will
act suitably to certain infoiniatiori, or such as ad
mits no roora for doubt ; so as that there can be
no danger of raiscarriage, but either frora their not
attending to what they certainly know, or frora over
bearing passion hurrying thera on to act contrary
to it. For, since ignorance and doubt afford scope
for probation in all senses, as really as intuitive
conviction or certainty ; and since the two forraer
are to be put to the same account, as difficulties in
practice ; raen's raoral probation may also be, whe
ther they will take due care to inforra theraselves
by irapartial consideration, and afterwards whether
they M'ill act as the case requires, upon the evidence
Avhich they have, however doubtful. And this, we
find by experience, is frequently our probation *,
in our temporal capacity. For, the information
Avhich we want Avith regard to our AVorldly interests,
* P. 48, 282, 286, 287.

Chap. VI. supposed Deficiency in its Proof. 293
is by no means always given us of course, without
any care of our OAvn. And Ave are greatly liable to
self-deceit from inward secret prejudices, and also
to the deceits of others. So that to be able to judge
Avhat is the prudent part, often requires rauch and
difficult consideration. Then, after Ave have judged
the very best we can, the evidence upon Avhich avc
must act, if we AviH live and act at all, is perpetually
doubtful to a very high degree. And the consti
tution and course of the Avorld in fact is such, as
that want of impartial consideration Avhat Ave have
to do, and venturing upon extravagant courses be
cause it is doubtful what avHI be the consequence,
are often naturally, i. e. providentially, altogether
as fatal, as misconduct occasioned by heedless in
attention to what we certainly know, or disregard
ing it from overbearing passion.
Several of the observations here raade, raay Avell
seem strange, perhaps unintelligible, to many good
men. But if the persons for Avhose sake they are
made, think so ; persons who object as above, and
throw off all regard to religion-under pretence of
Avant of evidence ; I desire them to consider again,
Avhether their thinking so, be owing to any thing
unintelligible in these observations, or to their own
not having such a sense of religion and serious so
licitude about it, as even their state of scepticism
does in all reason require ? It ought to be forced
upon the reflection of these persons, that our na
ture and condition necessarily require us, in the
daily course of life, to act upon evidence much

294 Revelation not universal, See. Part II.
lower than what is commonly called probable ; to
guard, not only against what we fully believe Avill,
but also against what we think it supposable may,
happen ; and to engage in pursuits when the pro
bability is greatly against success, if it be credible,
that possibly we raay succeed in thera.

CHAP. VIL
Of the particular Evidence for Christianity.
1 HE presumptions against revelation, and objec
tions against the general scheme of Christianity,
and particular things relating to it, being removed ;
there remains to be considered, Avhat positive evi
dence Ave haA'e for the truth of it : chiefly in order
to see, Avhat the analogy of nature suggests Avith
regard to that evidence, and the objections ag-ainst
it : or to see Avhat is, and is alloAved to be, the
plain natural rule of judgment and of action, in
our temporal concerns, in cases Avhere Ave, have the
same kind of evidence, and the sarae kind of ob
jections against it, that avc have in the case before
us. Noav, in the evidence of Christianity, there seem
to be several things of great Aveight, not reducible
to the head, either of miracles, or the corapletion
of prophecy, in the coraraon acceptation of the
Avords. But these two are its direct and fundamen
tal proofs : and those other things, however consi
derable they are, yet, ought never to be urged
apart from its direct proofs, but always to be join
ed Avith them. Thus the evidence of Christianity
Avill be a long series of things, reaching, as it seems,

296 Of the particular Evidence Part II.
from the beginning of the Avorld to the present
time, of great variety and compass, taking in both
the direct, and also the collateral, proofs ; and
making up, all of them together, one argument:
the conviction arising from which kind of proof
may be corapared to Avhat they call the effect in
architecture or other works of art ; a result frora a
great number of things so and so disposed, and
taken into one view. I shall therefore. First, make
sorae observations relating to rairacles, and the ap
pearing corapletions of prophecy ; and consider
what analogy suggests, in answer to the objections
brought against this evidence. And, Secondly, 1
shall endeavour to give some account of the gene
ral argument noAV mentioned, consisting both of
the direct and collateral evidence, considered as
making up one arguraent : this being the kind of
proof, upon Avhich avc deterraine rapst questions of
difficulty, concerning coraraon facts, alleged to
have happened or seeraingly likely to happen ; es
pecially questions relating to conduct.
First, I shall make sorae observations upon the
direct proof of Christianity frora rairacles and
prophecy, and upon the objections alleged against
"it. I. Now the foHoAving observations, relating to
the historical evidence of miracles Avrought in at
testation of Christianity, appear to be of great
weight. 1. The Old Testament affords us the sarae histo
rical evidence of the rairacles of Moses and of the
prophets, as of the common civil history of Moses

Chap. VII. for Christianity. 297
and the kings of Israel ; or, as of the affairs of
the Jewish nation. And the Gospels and the
Acts afford rnis 'the same historical evidence of the
miracles of Christ and the Apostles, as of the
comraon raatters related in thera. This, indeed,
could not have been affirmed by any reasonable
man, if the authors of these Books, like many other
historians, had appeared to make an entertaining
manner of Avriting their aim ; though they had in
terspersed miracles in their works, at proper dis
tances and upon proper occasions. These might
have animated a dull relation, amused the reader,
and engaged his attention. And the same account
Avould naturally have been given of them, as of the
speeches and descriptions of such authors : the same
account, in a manner, as is to be given, Avhy the
poets make use of wonders and prodigies. But the
facts, both miraculous and natural, in Scripture,
are related in plain unadorned narratives : and both
of them appear, in all respects, to stand upon the
same foot of historical evidence. Farther : sorae
parts of Scripture, containing an account of mira
cles fully sufficient to prove the truth of Christiani
ty, are quoted as genuine, from the age in which
they are said to be written, down to the present :
and no other parts of them, material in the present
question, are omitted to be quoted in such manner,
as to afford any sort of proof of their not being ge
nuine. And, as common history, when called in
question in any instance, may often be greatly
confirmed by contemporary or subsequent events
more known and acknowledged ; and as the com-

298 Of the particular Evidence Part tP.
mon Scripture-history, like many othei-s, is thus
conflrraed : so likewise is the miraculOuS histbry of
it, not only in plarticiilar instances, but in gerteral.
Fcfr, the establishment ofthe Jewish and Christian
rehgions, which Avere events coilteraporaty with the
miracles related to be Avrought in aitestatibii bf
both, or subsequerit to them, these events are just
what we should have expected, upon supposition
such miracles Avere really wrought to attest the truth
of those religions. These miracles are a satisfac
tory account of those events : of which no other
satisfactory account can be given ; rior any ac
count at all, but what is imaginary merely and in-
A'cnted. It is to be added, that the inost obvious,
the most easy and direct account of this history,
how it came to be Avritten and to be received in the
world, as a true histoiy, is, that it really is so :
nor can any other account of it be easy and direct.
Noav, though an account, not at all obvious, but
very far fetched and indirect, may indeed be, and
often is, the true account of a matter ; yet, it can
not be admitted on the authority of its being- as
serted. Mere guess, supposition, and possibility,
Avhen opposed to historical evidence, prove no
thing, but that historical evidence is not demon
strative. Noav, the just consequence from all this, I think,
is, that the Scripture-history, in general, is to be
admitted as an authentic genuine history, till sorae
Avhat positive be alleged sufficient to invalidate it
But no raan avHI deny the consequence to be, that it
cannot be rejected, or thrown by as of no authority,

Chap. VII. for Christianity. 299
tifl it can be proved to be of none ; even though
the evidence now raentioned for its authority were
doubtful. This evidence may be confronted by
historical evidence on the other side, if there be
any : or general incredibility in the things related,
or inconsistence in the general turn of the history,
would prove it to be of no authority. But since,
upon the face of the matter, upon a first and gene
ral view, the appearance is, that it is an authentic
history ; it cannot be determined to be fictitious
without some proof, that it is so. And the follow
ing observations, in support pf these and coincident
with thera, Avill greatly confirra the historical evi
dence for the truth of Christianity.
2. The epistles of St Paul, from the nature of
epistolary Avriting, and raoreover, from several of
thera being written, not to particular persons, but
to churches ; carry in thera evidences of their be
ing genuine, beyond Avhat can be in a mere histo
rical narrative, left to the Avorld at large. This
evidence, joined with that Avhich theyhave in cora
mon Avith the rest of the New Testament, seems not
to leave so much as any particular pretence for de
nying their genuineness, considered as an ordinary
matter of fact, or of criticisra : I say particular
pretence, for denying it ; because any single fact,
of such a kind and such antiquity, raay have ge
neral doubts raised concerning it, from the A-ery
nature of human affairs and human testimonv.
There is also to be mentioned, a distinct and par
ticular evidence of the genuineness of the epistle
chiefly referred to here, the first to the Corinthians ;

300 Of the particular Evidence PartTl.
from the manner in Avhich it is quoted by Clemens
Romanus, in an epistle of his own to that church *.
Now, these epistles afford a proof of Christianity,
detached frora all others, which is, I think, a thing
of weight; and also a proof of a nature and kind
peculiar to itself. For,
In them the author declares, that he receiA'ed the
gospel in general, and the institution of the cora
munion in particular, not from the rest of the apos
tles, or jointly together Avith them, but alone, from
Christ himself; Avhom he declares likewise, con
formably to the history in the Acts, that he saAV
after his ascension f. So that the testiraony of St
Paul is to be considered, as detached from that of
the rest of the apostles.
And he declares farther, that he Avas endued Avith
a power of working miracles, as Avhat Avas publicly
known to those very people, speaks of frequent and
great variety of miraculous gifts as then subsisting
in those very churches, to which he Avas Avriting ;
Avhich he was reproving for several irregularities ;
and Avbere he had personal opposers : he mentipns
these gifts incidentally, in the raost easy raanner,
and without effort ; by way of reproof to those who
had them, for their indecent use of them ; and by
Avay of depreciatirg them, in comparison of moral
virtues : in short, he speaks to these churches, of
these miraculous poAvers, in the raanner any one
Avould speak to another of a thing, whicli was as

* Clem. Rom. Ep. I. c. 4/.
t Gal. i. 1 Cor. xi. 23, &c. 1 Cor. xv. 8.

Chap. VIL for Christianity. 301
ferafliar, and as rauch known in coraraon to them
both, as any thing in the Avorld *. And this, as
hath been observed by several persons, is surely a
A'ery considerable thing.
3. It is an acknowledged historical fact, that
Christianity offered itself to the world, and de
raanded to be received, upon the allegation, i.e.
as unbelievers avouIcI speak, upon the pretence, of
rairacles, publicly wrought to attest the truth of
it, in such an age ; and that it Avas actually recei
ved by great numbers in that very age, and ' upon '
the professed belief of the reahty of these miracles.
And Christianity, including the dispensation of the
Old Testament, seems distinguished by this from
all other religions. I mean, that this does not ap
pear to be the case Avith regard to any other : for
surely it will not be supposed to lie upon any per
son, to prove by positive historical evidence, that
it Avas not. It does in no sort appear that Maho-
metanism Avas first received in the Avorld upon the
foot of supposed miracles f, i. e. public ones : for,
as revelation is itself miraculous, all pretence to it
must necessarily imply sorae pretence of miracles.
And it is a known fact, that it Avas iraraediately,
at the very first, propagated by other means. And
as particular institutions, Avhether in Paganism or
Popery, said to be confirmed by miracles after
those institutions had obtained, are not to the pur-
* Rom. XV. 19. 1 Cor. xii. 8, 9, 10 — 28, &c. and chap. xiii.
X, 2, 8, and the whole xivth chap. 2 Cor. xii. 12, 13. Gal.
iii. 2, 5. t See tha Koran, chap, xiii. and chap. xvii.

302 Of the particular Evidence PartIL
pose : so, Avere there Avhat might be called histori
cal proof, that any t)f them were introduced by a
supposed divine coramand, belicA'cd to be attested
by miracles ; these Avould not be in any wise pa
rallel. For single things'of this sort are easy to be
accounted for, after parties are formed and have
power in their hands ; and the leaders of them are
in veneration with the raultitude ; and political in
terests are blended Avith religious clairas, and reli
gious distinctions. But before any thing of this
kind, for a few persons, and those ofthe lowestrrank,
all at once, to bring over such great numbers to a
ncAV religion, and get it to be received upon the
particular evidence of rairacles ; this is quite an
other thing. And I think it Avill be alloAved by
any fair adversary, that the fact uoav mentioned,
taking- in all the. circumstances of it, is peculiar to
the Christian religion. However, the fact itself
is allowed, that Christianity obtained, i. e. was
professed to be received in the world, upon the
belief of miracles, iraraediately in the age in Avhich
it is said those rairacles were wrought : or that this
is Avhat its first converts would have alleged, as the
reason for their erabracing- it. Nov/, certainly it
is not to be supposed, that such numbers of men,
in the most distant parts of the Avorld, should for
sake the religion of their country, in which they
had been educated ; separate themselves frora their
friends, particularly in their festival shoAvs and so
lemnities, to Avhich the coraraon people are so
greatly addicted, and Avhich Avere of a nature to
engage them much more, than any thing of that

Chap, VII, for Christianity. 303
sort araongst us ; and embrace a religion, Avhich
could not but expose them to many incouAenien-
ces, and indeed must have been a giving up the
Avorld in a great degree, even from the very first,
and before the empire engaged in form against
them : it cannot be supposed, that such numbers
should make sp great, and, to say the least, so in
convenient a change in their Avhole institution of
hfe, unless they Avere really convinced of the truth
of those miracles, upon the knowledge or belief of
which, they professed to make it. And it Avill, I
suppose, readily be acknowledged, that the gene
rality of the first converts to Christianity, must
have believed them : that as by becoming Chris
tians they declarpd to the world, they were satis
fied of the truth of those miracles ; so this declara
tion Avas to be credited. And this their testimony
is the same kind of evidence for those miracles, as
if they had put it in Avriting, and these Avritings
had come doAvn to us. And it is real evidence, be
cause it is of facts, AA'hich they had capacity and
full opportunity to inform themselves of. It is also
distinct from the direct or express historical evi
dence, though it is of the same kind : and it would
be allowed to be distinct in all cases. For, Avere a
fact expressly related by one or raore ancient his
torians, and disputed in after ages ; that this fact
is acknowledged to have been belicA'^ed, by great
nurabers of the age in which the historian says it
was done, Avould be allowed an additional proof of
such fact, quite distinct frora the express testiraony
of the historian. The credulity of mankind is ac-

30^1 Of the particular Evidence Pait IL
knowledged : and the suspicions of mankind ought
to be acknowledged too ; and their backwardness
even to believe, and greater still to practise, what
makes against their interest. And it must parti
cularly be remembered, that education, and preju
dice, and authority, were ag-ainst Christianity, in
the age I am speaking- of. So that the imraediate
conversion of such numbers is a real presumption
of somewhat more than human in this raatter : I
say presuraption, for it is not alleged as a proof,
alone and by itself. Nor need any one of the
things mentioned in this chapter be considered as
a proof by itself : and yet all of them together raay
be one of the strongest.
Upon the whole : as there is large historical evi
dence, both direct and circurastantial, of miracles
Avrought in attestatioii of Christianity, collected by
those Avho haA'e writ upon the subject ; it lies upon
unbelievers to shew, Avhy this evidence is not to
be credited. This Avay of speaking is, I think,
just ; and Avhat persons, Avho Avrite in defence of re
ligion, naturally fall into. Yet, in a matter of such
unspeakable importance, the proper question is,
not Avhom it lies upon, according to the rules of
argument, to raaintain or confute objections : but,
whether there really are any, ag-ainst this evidence,
sufficient, in reason, to destroy the credit of it.
However, unbelievers seera to take upon them the
part of shewing that there are.
They allege, that nuraberless enthusiastic peo
ple, in different ages and countries, expose thera
selves to the same difficulties which the primitive

Chap'. VIL for Christianity. S05
Christians did ; and are ready to give up their
lives, for the raost idle follies iraaginable. But it
is not very clear, to Avhat purpose this objection is
brought. For every one, surely, in every case,
raust distinguish between opinions and facts. And
though testiraony is no proof of enthusiastic opi
nions, or of any opinions at all; yet, it is allowed,
in all other cases, to be a proof of facts. And a
person's laying down his life in attestation of facts
or of opinions, is the strongest proof of his belie
ving thera. And if the Apostles and their con
teraporaries did believe the facts, in attestation of
Avhich they exposed theraseh'es to sufferings and
death ; this their belief, or rather knoAvledge, raust
be a proof of those facts : for they Avere such as
carae under the observation of their senses. And
though it is not of equal weight, yet it is of weight,
that the martyrs of the next age, notwithstanding
they Avere not eye-witnesses of those facts, as were
the Apostles and their contemporaries, had, how
ever, full opportunity to inforin themselves, whe
ther they were true or not, and give equal proof
of their believing them to be true.
But enthusiasm, it is said, greatly weakens the
evidence of testimony even for facts, in matters re
lating to religion : some seem to think, it totally
and absolutely destroys the evidence of testimony
upon this subject. And, indeed, the powers of
enthusiasm, and of diseases, too, Avhich operate in
a like manner, are very Avonderful, in particular
instances. But if great nurabers of men, not ap
pearing in any peculiar degree weak, nor under
u

306 Of the particular Evidence Pait IL.
any peculiar suspicion of negligence, affirm that
they saw and heard such things plainly with their
eyes and their ears, and are admitted to be in ear
nest: such testimony is evidence of the strongest
kind Ave can have, for any matter of fact. Yet,
possibly it maybe OA-ercome, strong as itis, by
incredibility inthe things thus attested, or by con
trary testimony. And in an instance where one
thought it Avas so overcome, it might be just to
consider, how far such evidence could be account
ed for, by enthusiasm : for it seems as if no other
imaginable account were to be giA'en of it. But
till such incredibility be shewn, or contrary testimo
ny produced, it cannot surely be expected, that so
far fetched, so indirect and Avonderful an account
of such testimony, .as that of enthusiasm must be ;
an account so strange, that the generality ofraan
kind can scarce be made to understand what is
meant by it : it cannot, I say, be expected ; that
such account Avill be admitted of such evidence ;
Avhen there is this direct, easy, and obvious ac
count of it, that people really saw and heard a thing
not incredible, which they altinn sincerely, and
Avith full assurance, they did see and hear. Grant
ing then, that enthusiasm is not (strictly speaking)
an absurd, but a possible account of such testimo
ny ; it is raanifest that the very mention of it goes
upon the previous supposition, that the things so
attested are incredible : and theiefore need not be
considered, till they are shewn to be so. Much
less need it be considered, after the contrary has
been proved. And I think it has been proved, to

Chap. VII, for Christianity. 307
fiiH satisfaction, that there is no incredibility in a
revelation, in general ; or in such an one as the
Christian, in particular. HoAvever ; as religion is
supposed peculiarly liable to enthusiasm, it may
just be observed, that prejudices alraost Avithout
nuraber and without name, romance, affectation,
humour, a desire to engage attention or to surprise,
the party-spirit, custom, little competitions, unac
countable likings and dislikings ; these influence
men strongly in common matters. And as these
-prejudices are often scarce known or reflected upon
by the persons themselves Avho are influenced by
them, they are to be considered as influences of a
like kind to enthusiasm. Yet human testimony in
comraon raatters is naturally and justly belicA'cd
notwithstanding. It is intiraated farther, in a raore refined Avay of
observation, that though it should be proved, that
the apostles and first Christians could not, in sorae
respects, be deceived theraselves, and, in other re
spects, cannot be thought to have intended to im
pose upon the Avorld ; yet, it Avill not folloAV, that
their general testimony is to be believed, though
truly handed doAvn to us : because they might still
in part, i. e. in other respects, be deceived them
selves, and in part also designedly impose upon
others ; which, it is added, is a thing very credi
ble, from that mixture of real enthusiasm, and real
knavery, to be raet Avith in the sarae characters.
And, I raust confess, I think the raatter of fact
contained in this obserA'ation upon mankind, is not
to be denied ; and that somcAvhat very much a-kin

308 Of the particular Evidence Part II.
to it, is often supposed in Scripture as a very com
mon case, and most severely reproved. But it were
to have been expected, that persons capable of ap
plying this observation as applied in the objection,
might also frequently have met Avith the like mixt
character, in instances Avhere religion Avas quite
out of the case. The thing plainly is, that man
kind are naturally endued with reason, or a capa
city of distinguishing between tiuth and falsehood;
and as naturally they are endued Avith veracity, or
a regard to truth in what they say : but frora raany
occasions, they are liable to be prejudiced, and
biassed, and deceived theraselves, and capable of
intending to deceive others, in every different de
gree ; insorauch that, as avc are all liable to be de
ceived by prejudice, so likewise it seeras to be not
an uncommon thing, for persons, Avho, from their
regard to 'truth, Avould not invent a lie entirely
without any foundation at all, to propagate it Avith
heightening circumstances, after it is once invent
ed and set agoing. And others, though they Avould
not propagate a lie, yet, Avhich is a lower degree
of falsehood, avHI let it pass Avithout contradiction.
But notwithstanding all this, human testiraony re
mains still a natural ground qf assent ; and this as
sent, a natural principle of action.
It is objected farther, that hoAvever it has hap
pened, the fact is, that mankind have, in different
ages, been strangely deluded Avith pretences to mi
racles and wonders. But it is by no means to be
admitted, that they have been oftener, or are at

Chap. VII. for Christianity. 309
aH more liable to be deceiA'ed by these pretences,
than by others.
It is added, that there is a very considerable de-
sree of historical evidence for miracles, Avhich are,
on all hands, acknoAvledged to be fabulous. But
suppose there Avere even the like historical evidence
for these, to Avhat there is for those alleged in proof
of Christianity, Avhich yet is in no Avise allowed,
but suppose this ; the consequence Avould not be,
that the evidence of the latter is not to be admitted.
Nor is there a man in the Avorld Avho, in common
cases, Avould conclude thus. For Avhat Avould such
a conclusion really amount to but this, that evi
dence confuted by contrary evidence, or any Avay
overbalanced, destroys ths credibility of other evi
dence, neither confuted, nor OA'erbalanced ? To
argue, that because there is, if there Avere, like
evidence from testimony, for miracles acknow
ledged false, as for those in attestation of Christia
nity, therefore the evidence in the latter case is not
to be credited ; this is the sarae as to argue, that if
two raen of equally good reputation had given evi
dence in different cases no Avay connected, and
one of them had been convicted of perjury, this
confuted the testimoay Pf the other.
Upon the whole, then, the general observation
that human creatures are so liable to be deceived,
from enthusiasm in religion, and principles equiva
lent to enthusiasm in comraon- raatters, and in both
frora negligence; and that they are so capable of
dishonestly endeaA'ouring to deceive others ; this
does indeed weaken the evidence of testimony i^

310 Of the particular Evidence PartIL
all cases, but does not destroy it in any. And
these things will appear, to different men, to Aveak-
en the evidence of testiraony, in different de
grees : in degrees proportionable to the observa
tions they ha\'e raade, or the notions they have any
Avay taken up, concerning the Aveakness, and negli
gence, and dishonesty of mankind ; or concerning
the powers of enthusiasm, and prejudices equiva
lent to it. But it seems to me, that people do not
knoAv Avhat they say, Avho affirm these things to
destroy the evidence from testimony, which Ave
have of the truth of Christianity. Nothing- can
destroy the evidence of testimony in any case, but
a proof or probability, that persons are not compe
tent judges of the facts to which they give testi
mony ; or that they are actually under some indi
rect influence in giving it, in such particular case.
Till this be raade out, the natural laAvs of huraan
actions require, that testimony be adraitted. It
can never be sufficient to overthrow direct histori
cal evidence, indolently to say, that there are so
raany principles, from Avhence men are liable to be
deceived themselves and disposed to deceive others,
especially in matters of religion, that one knoAvs
not Avhat to believe. And it is surprising persons
can help reflecting, that this very manner of speak
ing, supposes they are not satisfied' that there is
nothing in the evidence, of Avhich they speak thus ;
or that they can avoid observing, if they do make
this reflection, that it is, on such a subject, a very
material one *. * See the foregoing chapter.

Chap. VII. for Christianity. 311
And over against all these objections, is to be
set, the importance of Christianity, as what nuist
have engaged the attention of its first converts, so
as to have rendered thera less liable to be deceived
frora carelessness, than they would in co.ramon raat
ters; and likewise the strong- obligations to veraci
ty, Avhich their religion laid them under : so that
the first and most obvious presumption is, that they
could not be deceived themselves, nor Avould de
ceive others. And this presuraption in this degree,
is peculiar to the testimony we have been consider

ing.

In arguraent, assertions are nothing in them
selves, and ha\'e an air of positiveness, which some
times is not ACiy easy : yet they are necessary, and
necessary to be repeated ; in order to connect a
discourse, and distinctly to lay before the vicAv of
the reader, Avhat is proposed to be proved, and
Avhat is left as proved. Noav, the conclusion from
the foregoing observations is, I think, beyond all
doubt, this : that unbelievers must be forced to ad
mit the external evidence for Christianity, i. e. the
proof of miracles Avrought to attest it, to be of real
Aveight and very considerable ; though they cannot
allow it to be sufficient, to convince them of the
reality of those rairacles. And as they must, in
all reason, admit this ; so it seems to me, that upon
consideration they Avould, in fact, admit it ; those
of" them, I mean, Avho know any thing at all ofthe
matter: in like manner as persons, in many cases,
OAvn, they see strong evidence from testimony, for
the truth of things, which yet they cannot be con-

512 Of the particular Evidence PartIL
vinced are true : cases, suppose, Avhere there is con
trary testimony ; or things Avhich they think,
whether Avith or without reason, to be incredible.
But there is no testiraony contrary to that Avhich
Ave have been considering- : and it has been fully
proved, that there is no incredibility, in Christia
nity in general, or in any part of it
II. As to the evidence for Christianity frora pro
phecy, I shall only raake sorae few general obser
vations, which are suggested by the Analogy of
Nature, i. e. by the acknowledged natural rules of
judging- in common matters, concerning evidence
of a like kind to this frora prophecy.
1. The obscurity or unintelligibleness of one part
of a prophecy, does not, in any degree, invalidate
the proof of foresight, arising from the appearing
completion of those other parts Avhich are under
stood. For the Case is evidently the same, as if
those parts, Avhich are not understood, Avere lost,
or not Avritten at all, or written in an unknoAvn
tongue. Whether this observation be coraraonly
attended to or not, it is so evident, that one can
scarce bring oneself to set down an instance in
comraon raatters, to exemplify it. However, sup
pose a writing, partly in cypher, and partly in plain
Avords at length ; and that in the part one under
stood, there appeared mention of several known
facts : it would never come into any raan's thoughts
to iraagine, that if he understood the whole, per^
haps he raight find, that those facts were not, in
reality, known by the writer. Indeed, both in
this exaraple, and the thing intended to be exem?

' 'Chap. VII. for Christianity. 313
plified by it,, our not understanding- the whole (the
whole suppose of a sentence or a paragraph) might
sometimes occasion a doubt, - Avhether one under
stood the literal meaning of such a part : but this
coraes under another consideration.
For the same reason, though a man should be
incapable, for Avant of learning, or opportunities
of inquiry, or from not having- turned his studies
this Avay, even so much as to judge, whether par
ticular prophecies have been throughout complete
ly fulfifled ; yet he may see, in general, that they
have been fulfifled to such a degTce, as, upon very
good ground, to be convinced of foresight more
than human in such prophecies, and of such CA'ents
being intended by them. For the same reason also,
though, by means of the deficiencies in civil his
tory, and the different accounts of historians, the
most learned should not be able to make out to sa
tisfaction, that such parts of the prophetic history
have been minutely and throughout fulfilled ; yet
a very strong proof of foresight may arise, from
, that general completion of them, Avhich is made
out ; as much proof of foresight, perhaps, as the
giver of prophecy intended should ever be afforded
by such parts of prophecy.
2. A long series of prophecy being applicable to
such and such CA'cnts, is itself a proof, that it was
intended of them : as the rules, by Avhich we na
turally judge and deterraine, in common cases pa
rallel to this, Avill shew. This observation I make
in answer to the common objection against the ap^
plieation of the prophecies, that considering each

314 Ofthe particular Evidence Part IL
of thera distinctly by itself, it does not at all ap
pear, that they were intended of those particular
events, to Avhirh they are applied by Christians ;
and therefore it is to be supposed, that, if they
meant any thing, they were intended of other events
unknown to u.s, and not of these at all.
Now, there are two kinds of writing, Avhich bear
a great resemblance to prophecy, Avrth respect to
the matter before us : the mythological, and the
satirical, Avhere the satire is, to a certain degree,
concealed. And a raan might be assured, that he
understood what an author intended by a fable or
parable, related Avithout any application or moral,
merely from seeing it to be easily capable of such
application, and that such a moral might naturally
be deduced from it And he might be fully as
sured, that such persons and events were intended
in a satirical writing, raerely from its being appli
cable to them. And, agreeably to the last obser
vation, he might be in a good measure satisfied of
it, though he were not enough informed in affairs,
or in the story of such persons, to understand half
the satire. For, his satisfaction, that he under
stood the meaning, the intended meaning, of these
Avritings, would be greater or less, in proportion as
he saw the general turn of them to be capable of
such application ; and in proportion to the nuraber
of particular things capable of it. And thus, if a
long series of prophecy is applicable to the present
state of the church, and to the political situations
of the kingdoms of the world, some thousand
years after these prophecies Avere delivered, and a

Chap. VII. for Christianity. 315
long series of prophecy delivered before the coming
of Christ is applicable to him ; these things are in
theraselves a proof, that the prophetic history Avas
intended of hira, and of those events : in propor
tion as the general turn of it is capable of such ap
plication, and to the number and variety of parti
cular prophecies capable of it. And, though in
all just way of consideration, the appearing- com
pletion of prophecies is to be allowed to be thus
explanatory of, and to determine their meaning ;
yet it is to be reraembered farther, that the ancient
Jews applied the prophecies to a Messiah before his
coming, in rauch the same manner as Christians
do now : and that the priraitive Christians inter
preted the prophecies respecting the state of the
church and of the Avorld in the last ages, in the
sense, Avhich the event seems to confirm and verify.
And frora these things it may be raade appear :
3. That the shcAving even to a high probabihty,
if that could be, that the prophets thought of some
other CA'ents, in such and such predictions, and not
those at all Avhich Christians allege to be coraple
tions of those predictions ; or that such and such
prophecies are capable of being- applied to other
events than those, to which Christians apply them
— that this would not confute or destroy the force
of the argument from prophecy, even with regard
to those very instances. For, observe how this
matter really is. If one knew such a person to be
the sole author of such a book, and was certainly
assured, or satisfied to any degree, tiiat one knew
the whole of Avhat he intended in it ; one should be

316 Of the particular Evidence Part IL
assured or satisfied to such degree, that one knew
the whole meaning of that book : for the meaning
of a book is nothing- but the meaning of the au •
thor. But if one knew a person to have corapiled
a book out of memoirs, Avhich he received from
another, of A'astly superior knoAvledge in the sub
ject of it, especially if it were a book full of great
intricacies and difiiculties ; it would in no wise fol
low, that one knew the Avhole meaning of the book,
from knowing the whole meaning of the corapiler :
for the original memoirs, i. e. ' the author of them,
might haA'e, and there would be no degree of pre
sumption, in raany cases, against supposing him
to haA'e, some farther meaning than the compiler
saw. To say then, that the Scriptures and the
things contained in them can have no other or far
ther meaning,- than those persons thought or had,
who first recited or Avrote them ; is evidently say
ing, that those persons were the original, proper,
and sole authors of those books, i. e. that they are
not inspired : Avhich is absurd, Avhilst the authori
ty of these books is under exaraination ; i. e. till
you have determined they are of no divine autho>-
rity at all. Till this be determined, it must in all
reason be supposed, not, indeed that they have, for
this is taking for granted that they are inspired, but
that they may have, some farther meaning than what
the compilers saAV or understood. And upon this
supposition, it is supposeable also, that this farther
meaning may be fulfilled. Now, events corres
ponding to prophecies, interpreted in a different
meaning from that, in AA'hich the prophets are sup«

Chap. VII. for Christianity. 317
posed to have understood them ; this affords, in a
manner, the same proof, that this different sense
Avas originally intended, as it Avould have afforded, '
if the prophets had not understood their predictions
in the sense it is supposed they did ; because there
is no presumption of their sense of them being the
Avhole sense of thera. And it has been already shewn,
that the apparent completions of prophecy, must be
alloAved to be explanatory of its raeaning. So that
the question is, Avhcther a series of prophecy has been
fulfifled, in a natural or proper, i. e. in any real,
sense of the Avords of it. For such completion is
equally a proof of foresight more than huraan, Avhe
ther the prophets are, or are not, supposed to have
understood it in a different sense. I say, supposed :
for, though I think it clear, that the prophets did
not understand the full meaning of their predic
tions ; it is another question, how far they thought
they did, and in what sense they understood them.
Hence may be seen, tp hoAv little purpose those
persons busy theraseh'es, Avho endeavour to prove
that the prophetic history is applicable to events,
of the age in which it Avas written, or of ages be
fore it. Indeed, to have proved this before there
was any appearance of a farther completion of it,
mig-ht have answered some purpose ; for it mig-ht
have prevented the expectation of any such farther
completion. Thus, could Porphyry have shewn,
that sorae principal parts ofthe book of Daniel, for
instance, the seventh verse of the seventh chapter,
which the Christians interpreted of the latter ages,
was applicable to events, Avhich happened before

318 Of the particular Evidence Part IL
or about the age of Antiochus Epiphanes ; this
might have prevented thera frora expecting- any
farther completion of it And, unless there Avas
then, as I think there raust have been, external
evidence concerning that book, raore than is come
down to us ; such a discoA'ery might have been a
stumbling-block in the Avay of Christianity itself :
considering the authority Avhich our Saviour has
given to the book of Daniel, and hoAV rauch the
general scheme of Christianity presupposes the
truth of it. But even this discovery, had there been
any such *, Avould be of very little Aveight Avith rea
sonable men. Noav ; if this passage, thus appli
cable to events before the age of Porphyry, ap
pears to be applicable also to events, Avhich suc
ceeded the dissolution of the Roraan empire. I
mention this, not at all as intending to insinuate,
that. the division of this empire into ten parts, for
it plainly Avas divided into about that number, Avere,
alone and by itself, of any moraent in verifying
the prophetic history : but only as an exaraple of
the thing I ara speaking of. And thus upon the
Avhole, the raatter of enquiry CA-idently raust be, as
above put. Whether the prophecies are applicable,
to Christ, and to the present state ofthe Avorld and
^ It appears, that Porphyry did nothing worth mentioning in
this waj-. For .Terom on the place says : Duas posteriores bestias
— in uno Macedonum regno ponit. And as to the ten kings ; De
cem reges enumerat, qui fuerunt sa;vissimi : ipsosque reges non
•unius ponit regni, verbi gratia, Macedonia, Syrice, As'ue, et Mgypti;
sed de diversis regnis unum efficit regum ordinem. And in this
way of interpretation, any thing may be made of any thing.

Chap. VII. for Christianity. .319
pf the church; applicable in such a, degree, as to
imply foresight : not Avhether they are capable of
any other application ; though I knoAV no pretence
for saying, the general turn of them is capable of
any other.
These observations are, I think, just ; and the
evidence referred to in them, real : though there
may be people who will not accept of such imper
fect information from Scripture. Some too have
not integrity aud regard enough to truth, to attend
to evidence, Avhich keeps the mind in doubt, per
haps perplexity, and Avhich is much of a different
sort from Avhat they expected. And it plainly re
quires a degree of modesty and fairness, beyond
what every one has, for a man to say, not to the
world, but to himself, that there is a real appear
ance of somewhat of great Aveight in this matter,
though he is notable thoroughly to satisfy himself
about it ; but it shall have its influence upon him,
in proportion to its appearing reality and Aveight.
It is much raore easy, and raore falls in with the
negligence, presumption, and Avilfulness of the
generality, to deterraine at once, Avith a decisive
air, there is nothing in it. The prejudices arising
from that absolute contempt and scorn, Avith Avhich
this evidence is treated in the Avorld, I do not
mention. For Avhat indeed can be said to persons,
who are weak enough in their understandings, to
think this any presumption against it ; or, if they
do not, are yet weak enough in their teraper to
be influenced by such prejudices, upon such a sub
ject.?

320 Of the parlicular Evidence Part II.
I shall now, secondly, endeavour to g-ive some
account of the general argument for the truth of
Christianity, consisting both of the direct and cir
curastantial evidence, considered as raaking up
one aro-uraent. Indeed to state and examine this
argument fully, would be a Avork much beyond the
compass ofthis Avhole treatise : nor is so rauch as
a proper abridgment of it to be expected here. Yet
the present subject requires to have sorae brief ac
count of it given. For it is the kind of evidence,
upon Avhich raost questions of difficulty, in cora
mon practice, are determined : evidence arising
frora A'arious coincidences, which support and con
firm each other, and in this .manner prove, Avith
more or less certainty, the point under considera
tion. And I chuse to do it also : First, because it
seeras to be of the greatest iraportance, and not
duly attended to by every one, that the proof of
rCA'elation is, not sorae direct and express things
only, but a great variety of circumstantial things
also ; and that though each of these direct and cir
cumstantial thing-s, is indeed to be considered sepa
rately, yetthey are afterAvards to be joined together ;
for that the proper force of the evidence consists
in the result of those several things, considered in
their respects to each other, and united into one
vicAv : and in the next place, because it seeins to
me, that the matters of fact here set down, Avhich
are acknoAvledged by unbelievers, must be ac
knoAvledged by them also to contain together a
degree of evidence of great Aveight, if they could
be brought to lay these seA^eral things before thera-

Chap, VII, for Christianity. 32 1
selves distinctly, and then Avith attention consider
them together ; instead of that cursory thought of
them, to which avc are familiarised. For being:
familiarised to the ' cursory thought of things, as
really hinders the weight of them frora being seen,
as from having- its due influence upon practice.
The thing asserted, arid the truth of which is
to be enquired into, is this : that over aud above
our reason and affections, which God has given us
fo'r the inforraation of our judgraent and the con
duct of our lives, he has also, by external revela
tion, given us an account of hiraself and his moral
government over the world, iraplying- a future state
of rewards and punishraents ; i. e. hath revealed
the systera of .natural relig-ion : for natural religion
may be externally* revealed by God, as. the igno
rant may be taught it by mankind their fellow-
creatures — that God, I say, has given us the evi
dence of revelation, as Avell as the evidence of rea
son, to ascertain this moral system ; together with
an account of a particular dispensation of Provi
dence, Avhich reason could no Avay have discovered,
and a particular institution of religion founded on
it, for the recovery of mankind out of their present
wretched condition, and raising them to the perfec
tion and final happiness of their nature.
This revelation, Avhether real or supposed, may
be considered asAvholly historical. For prophecy
is nothing but the history of events before they
come to pass : doctrines also are matters of fact:
* P. 180, &c.
X

322 Of the particular Evidence Part H.
and precepts come under the same notion. And
the o-eneral design of Scripture, which contains in
it this revelation, thus considered as historical,
may be said to be, to give us an account of the
world, in this one single view, -as God's world : by
whieh it appears essentially distihguished from all
other book.s, so far as I have found, except such as
are copied frora it. It begins with an account of
God's creation of the world, in order to ascertain,
and distinguish frora all others, Avho is the object
of our worship, by Avhat he has done : in order to
ascertain, Avho he is, concerning Avhose providence,
commands, promises, and threatenings, this sacred
book, all along, treats; the Maker and proprietor
of the world, he Avhose creatures Ave are, the God
of nature : in order likcAvise to distinguish him from
the idols ofthe nations, which are either imaginary
beings, i. e: no beings at all ; or else part of that
creation, the historical relation of Avhich is here
given. And St. John, not improbably, Avith an
eye to this Mosaic account ofthe creation, begins
his gospel with an account of our Saviour's pre-
existence, and that, "all things were raade by hira ;
and without hira was not any thing raade that was
made *: " agreeably to the doctrine of St. Paul, that
" God created all things by Jesus Christ f." This
being premised, the Scripture, taken together, seems
to profess to contain a kind of an abridginentof the
history ofthe world, in theviewjust now mentioned:
that is, a general account ofthe condition of religioi^
* Joh. i. 3. t Eph. iii. 9.

Chap. VII. for Christianity. 323
and its professors, during the continuance of that
apostacy from God, and state of wickedness, which
it every Avhere supposes the world to lie in. And
this account of the state of religion, carries with it
sorae brief account of the political state of things,
as religion is affected by it. Rev-elation indeed
considers the coraraon affairs of this world, and
what is going on in it, as a raere scene of distrac
tion ; and caunot be supposed to concern itself
with foretelling, at what time, Rome or Babylon or
Greece, or any particular place, should be the most
conspicuous seat of that tyranny and dissoluteness,
which all places equally aspire to be ; cannot, I
say, be supposed to give any account of this wild
scene for its oavu sake. But it seeras to contain
some very general account of the chief governraents
of the world, as the general state of religion has
been, is, or shall be, affected by thera, frora the
first transgression, and during the whole interval
of the world's continuing in its present state, to
a certain future period, spoken of both in the Old
and New Testament, very distinctly, and in great
variety of expression : " The tiraes of the restitution
ofali things * :" when " the mysteiy of God shall be
finished, as he hath declared to his servants the
prophets f :" Avhen " the God of heaven shall set up
a kingdom, which shall never be destroyed : and
the kingdom shall not be left to other people J," as
it is represented to be during this apostacy, but
"judgment shall be given to the saints ||," and " they
*Ac^3iii. 21. fRev. X. 7; I Dan. ii. || Dan. vii, 22.

324 0/ the particular Evidence Part IL
shaH reign * : and the kingdom and dominion,
and the greatness of the kingdom under the whole
heaven, shall be given to the people of the saints
of themost Hight-"
Upon this general view of the Scripture, I would
reraark, how gieat a length of time, the Avhole re
lation takes up, near six thousand years of Avhich
are past : and ' how great a variety of things it
treats of; the natural and moral systein or history of
the Avorld, including the tirae when it was forraed,
all contained in the very first book, and evidently
Avritten in a rude and unlearned age ; and in sub
sequent books, the various coramon and prophe
tic history, and tbe particular dispensation of
Christianity. Now all this together gives the
largest scope for criticism ; and for confutation of
what is capable of being confuted, either from rea
son, or from coraraon history, or frora any incon
sistence in its several parts. And it is a thing
which deserves, I think, to be raentioned, that
whereas some imagine, the supposed doubtfulness
of the evidence for revelation iraplies a positive ar
gument that it is not true ; it appears, on the con
trary, to iraply a positive arguraent that it is true.
For, could any coramon relation, of such antiquity,
extent, and variety (for in these things the stress
pf what I ara now observing lies) be proposed to
the exaraination ofthe world : that it could riot,
in an age of knowledge and liberty, be confuted,
or shewri to have nothing in it, to the satisfaction
¦*, Rey. I Dan. vii.

Chap. VII. for Christianity. 325
of reasonable raen ; this Avould be thouglit a strong
presuraptive proof of its truth. And indeed it raust
be a proof of it, just in proportion to the probabili
ty, that if it Avere false, it might be shewn to be so :
and this, I think, is scarce pretended to be shewn,
but upon principles and in ways of arguing, which
have Ijeen clearly obviated *. Nor does it at all ap
pear, that any set of men Avho believe natural religi
on, are of the opinion, that Christianity has been
thus confuted. But to proceed :
Together with the moral system of the world, the
Old Testaraent contains a chronolosrical account of
the beginning of it, and from thence, an unbroken
genealogy of mankind for many ages before com
mon history begins; and carried on as rauchfarther,
as to make up a continued thread of history of the '
length of between three and four thousand years. It
contains an account of God's making a covenant
with a particular nation, that they should be his
people, and he Avould be their God, in a peculiar
sense ; of his often interposing miraculously in
their affairs ; giving them the promise, and, long
after, the possession, of a particular country ; as
suring them of the greatest national prosperity in
it, if they would worship hira, in opposition to the
idols which the rest ofthe world worshipped, and
obey his commands ; and threatening them with un
exampled punishraents, if they disobeyed hira, and
fell into the general idolatry : insorauch that this
one nation should continue to be the observation
* Ch. ii. iii. &c.

326 Of the particular Evidence Part II.
and the wonder of all the world. It declares parti
cularly, that " God would scatter them among all
people, from one end of the earth unto the other:" but
that " when they should return unto the Lord their
God, he would have compassion upon them, and
gather them, from all the nations, whither he had
scattered them :" that " Israel should be saved in
the Lord, Avith an everlasting salvation ; and not be
asharaed or confounded, Avorld without end." And
as sorae of these promises are conditional, others
are as absolute, as any thing can be expressed : that
the tirae should corae, when " the people should be
all righteous, and inherit the land for ever :" that
" though God would raake a full end of all nations
whither hehadscattered thera, yet would henotmake
a full end of them:" that " he would bring again
the captivity of his people Israel, and plant them
upon their land, and they should be no more pul
led up out oftheir land :" that "the seed of Israel
should not cease from being a nation for ever *." It
foretells, that God would raise them up a particular
person, in Avliom all his promises should finally be
fulfilled ; the Messiah, who shpuld be, in an high
and erainent sense, their anointed Prince and Savi
our. This was foretold in such a raanner, as raised
, a general expectation of such a person in the nation,
as appears from the New Testaraent, and is an ac
knowledged fact ; an expectation of his coming at
Such a particular time, before any one appeared,
* Deut. xxviii. 64. Ch. xxx. 2. 3. Is. xlv. 17. Ch. Ix, 21.
jer. xxx. 11. Ch. xlvi. 28. Amos. ix. 15. Jer. xxxi. 36.

Chap. VII. for Christianity. 327
claiming to be that person, and when there was no
ground for such an expectation but from the pro
phecies : which expectation, therefore, must in all
reason be presumed to be explanatory of those pro
phecies, if there were any doubt about their mean
ing. It seeras raoreover to foretell, that this per
son should be rejected by that nation, to whora he
had been so long" proraised, and though he was so
much desired by thera *. And it expressly fore
tells, that he should be the Saviour of the Gentiles ;
and even that the completion of the scheme, con
tained in this book, and then begun, and in its
progress, should be somewhat so great, that, in com
parison with it, the restoration of the Jews alone
would be but of small account. "It is a light
thing that thou shouldest be my servant to raise up
the tribes of Jacob, and to restore the preserved of
Israel : I will also give thee for a light to the
Gentiles, that thou mayst be for salvation unto the
end ofthe earth." And, " In the last days, the moun
tain of the Lord's house shall be established in the
top of the mountains, and shall be exalted above
the hills ; and all nations shall flow into it — for
out of Zion shall go forth the law, and the word of
the Lord from Jerusalem. And he shall judge
among the nations — and the Lord alone shall be
exalted in that day, and the idols he shall utterly
abolish f ." The Scripture farther contains an ac-
* Is. viii. 14, 15. Ch. xlix. 5. Ch. liii. Mai. i. 10. 11. and
Ch. iii.
t Is. xlix. 6. Ch. ii. Ch. xi, Ch. ivi. 7. Mai. i. 11. Te

328 Of the particular Evidence Part II.
count, that at the time the Messiah was expected,
a person rose up, in this nation, clairaing to be that
Messiah, to be the person, whom all the prophecies:
referred to, and in whom they should center : that
he spent some years in a continued course of mira
culous work; and endued his iraraediate disciples
and followers with a power of doing tiie same, as
a proof of the truth of that religion, which he com
missioned thera to publish : that, invested with this
authority and power, they raade numerous converts
in the remotest countries, and settled and establish
ed his religion in the world ; to the end of which,
the Scripture professes to give a prophetic ac
count of the state of this rehg-ion amongst man
kind. •
Let us now suppose a person utterly ignorant of
history, to have all this related to hira, out of the
Scripture. Or suppose such an one, having the
Scripture put into his hands, to reraark these things
in it, not knowing but that the whole, even its
civil history, as well as the other parts of it, might
be, from beginning to end, an intire invention ;
and to ask. What truth Avas in it, and whether the
revelation here related, A\'as real or a fiction ? And
instead of a direct answer, suppose him, all at once,
to be told the following confest facts ; and then to
unite them into one view.

which must be added, the other prophecies of the like kind, seve
ral in the New Testament, and very many in the Old ; which
describe what shall be the completion of the revealed plan of
Providence,

Chap. VII. for Christianity. 32^
Let him first be told, in how great a degree the
profession and establishraent of natural religion,
the belief that there is one God to be Avorshipped,
that virtue is his law, and that mankind shall be re
warded and punished hereafter, as they obey and
disobey it here ; in how very great a degree, I say,
the profession and establishment of this inoral
system, in the world, is owing to the revelation,
whether real or supposed, contained in this book :
the establishment of this raoral systera, even in
those countries which do not acknowledge the pro
per authority of the Scripture *. Let him be told
also, what number of nations do acknowledge its
proper authority. Let hira then take in the consi
deration, of AA'hat importance relig-ion is to man
kind. And upon these things, he might, I think,
truly observe, that this supposed revelation's obtain
ing and being received in the world, with all the
circumstances and effects of it, considered together
as one event, is the most conspicuous and impor
tant event in the story of mankind : that a book
of this nature, and thus proraulged and recoraraend
ed to pur consideration, deraands, as if by a voice
from heaven, to have its clairas raost .seriously ex
amined into : and that, before such exaraination,
to treat it with any kind of scoffing and ridicule,
is an offence against natural piety. But it is to be
remembered, that hoAv much soever the establish
ment of natural religion in the world is owing to
the Scripture-revelation, this does not destroy the
* P. 273.

330 Of the particular Evidence Part IL
proof of religion from reason ; any more than the
proof of Euclid's Elements is destroyed, by a man's
knowing or thinking, that he should ncA'er have
seen the truth of the several propositions contain
ed in it, had not those propositions come into his
thoughts, but for that matheraatician.
Let such a person as Ave are speaking of, be, in
the next place, inforraed, of the acknowledged an
tiquity ofthe first parts ofthis book : and that its
chronology, its account of the tirae when the earth,
and the several parts of it, were first peopled with
huraan creatures, is no Avay contradicted, but is'
really confirraed, by the riatural and civil history
of the Avorld, collected frora coraraon historians,
frora the state of the earth, and frora the late inven
tion of arts and sciences. And as the Scripture
contains an unbroken thread of coraraon and civil
history, frora the creation to the captivity, for be
tween three and four thousand years : let the per
son Ave are speaking of be told in the next place,
that this general history, as it is .not contradicted,
but is confirraed by profane history as rauch 'as
there would be reason to expect, upon supposition
of its truth ; so there is nothing in the whole his
tory itself, to give any reasonable ground of suspi
cion, of its not being, in the general, a faithful
and literally true genealogy of raen, and series of
things, I speak here only of the coraraon Scrip
ture-history, or of the course of ordinary events re
lated in it ; as distinguished from miracles, and
frora the prophetic history. In all the Scripture-

Chap. VII. for Christianity. 331
narrations of this kind, foUoAving events arise out
of foregoing ones, as in all other histories. There
appears nothing related as done in any age, not
conforraable to the raanners of that age : nothing
in the account of a succeeding age, which, one
would say, could not be true, or Avas iraprobable,
from the account of things in the preceding one.
There is nothing in the characters, which would ¦
raise a thought of their being feigned ; but all the
intemal marks imaginable of their being real. It
is to be added also, that mere genealogies, bare
narratives of the number of years, which per
sons called by such and such names lived, do
not carry the face of fiction ; perhaps do carry
some presumption of veracity : and all unadorned
narratives, which have nothing to surprise, may
be thought to carry somewhat of the like presump
tion too. And the domestic and the political
history is plainly credible. There may be incidents
in Scripture, which, taken alone in the naked Avay
they are told, may appear strange ; especially to
persons of other manners, teraper, education : but
there are also incidents of undoubted truth, in
many or most persons lives, which, in the same
circumstances, would appear to the full as strange.
There raay be raistakes of transcribers, there raay
be other real or seeming mistakes, not easy to be
particularly accounted for : but there are certainly
no raore things of this kind in the Scripture, than
what were to have been expected in books of
such antiquity ; and nothing, in any Avise, suffi
cient to discredit tbe general narrative. Now, that

332 Of the particular Evidence PartIL
a history, clairaing to coraraence frora tbe creation,
and extending- in one continued series, through
so great a length of tirae, and variety of events,
should have such appearances of reality and truth
in its Avhole contexture, is surely a very reraarka
ble circurastance in its favour. , And as all this is
apphcable to the common history of the Ncav Tes
tament ; so there is a farther credibility, and a A'ery
high one, given to it, by profane authors : mariy
of these Avriting of the sarae times, and confirming
the truth of customs and events, Avhich are inci
dentally as well as more purposely raentioned in it.
And this credibility of the coraraon Scripture-his
tory, gives sorae credibility to its riiiraculous his
tory : especially as this is interwoven Avith the
coraraon, so as that they imply each other, and both
together make up one relation.
Let it then be raore particularly observed to this
person, that it is an acknoAvledged matter of fact,
Avhich is indeed implied in the foregoing obser
vation, that there was such a nation as the Jews,
of the greatest antiquity, whose government and
general pohty Avas founded on the law, here re
lated to be given thera by Moses as frora heaven :
that natural rehgion, though with rites additional,
yet no way contrary to it, was their establisbed re
ligion, which cannot be said ofthe Gentile world :
and that their very being- as a nation, depended
upon their acknoAvledgraent of one God, the God
ofthe universe. For, suppose in their captivity in
Babylon, they had gone over to the religion of
their conquerors, there would have reraained no

Chap. VII. for Christianity. ' 333
bond of union, to keep thera a distinct people.
And whilst they Avere under their own kings, in
their oavu country, a total apostacy frora God
would have been the dissolution of their Avhole
governraent. They, in such a sense, nationally
acknowledged and worshipped the Maker of hea
ven and earth, Avhen the rest of the world were
sunk in idolatry, as rendered thera, in fact, the
peculiar people of God. And this so remarkable
an establishmept and preservation of natural reli
gion araongst thera, seems to add sorae peculiar
credibility to tbe historical evidence for the mira
cles of Moses and the Prophets : because these
miracles area full satisfactory account ofthis event,
whicli plainly wants to be accounted for, and can
not otherwise.
Let this person, supposed Avholly ignorant of
history, be acquainted farther, that one clairaing
to be the Messiah, of JcAvish extraction, rose up at
the tirae when this nation, frora the prophecies
above-raentioned, expected the Messiah : that he
was rejected, as it seeraed to have been foretold he
should, by the body of the people, under the di
rection of their rulers : that in the course ofa very
few years, he Avas believed on and acknowledged
as the proraised Messiah, by great nurabers araong
the Gentiles, agreeably to the prophecies of Scrip
ture, yet not upon the evidence of prophecy, but
of miracles *, of which rairacles we have also strong
* P. 301, &c.

334 Of the particular Evidence Part IL
historical evidence ; (by which I mean here no
raore than must be acknowledged by unbelievers ;
for let pious frauds arid follies be admitted to
weaken, it is absurd to say they destroy, our evi
dence of miracles wrought in proof of Christiani
ty * :) that this religion approving itself to the rea
son of raankind, and carrying its own evidence
with it, so far as reason is a judge of its system,
and being no Avay contrary to reason in those
parts of it Avhich require to be believed upon the
mere authority of its author ; that this religion, I
say, - gradually spread and supported itself, for
sorae hundred years, not only without any assist
ance frora teraporal power, but under constant
discouragements, and often the bitterest persecu
tions from it ; and then became the religion of the
world : that in the mean tirae, the JcAvish nation
and g-overnment were destroyed, in a very remark
able raanner, and the people carried away captive
and dispersed through the raost distant countries ;
in which state of dispersion they have remained
fifteen hundred years : and that they remain a nu
merous people, united amongst themselves, and
distinguished from the rest of the world, as they
Avere in the days of Moses, by the profession of
his law ; and everywhere looked upon in a manner,
Avhich one scarce knoAvs how distinctly to express,
but in these words of the prophetic account of it,
given so many ages before it came to pass; "Thou
*P. 310. &c.

Chap. VIL for Christianity. 335
shalt become an astonishment, a proverb, and a by
word, among all nations whither the Lord shall
lead thee *."
The appearance of a standing miracle, in the
Jcavs reraaining a distinct people in their disper
sion, and the confirmation Avhich this event appears
to give to the truth of revielation ; may be thought
to be answered, by their religion's forbidding- them
inter-marriages with those of any other, and pre
scribing them a great many peculiarities in their
¦food, by which they are debarred from the means
of incorporating with the people in vs'bose coun
tries they live. This is not, I think, a satisfactory
account of that which it pretends to account for.
But what does it pretend to account for ? The cor
respondence between this event and the prophecies;
or the coincidence of both, with a long dispensation
of Providence of a pecuhar nature, towards that
people formerly ? No. It is only the event itself,
which is offered to be thus accounted for ; which
single event taken alone, abstracted from all such
correspondence and coincidence, perhaps would
not have appeared miraculous : but that correspon
dence and coincidence may be so, though the
event itself be supposed not. Thus the concur
rence of our Saviour's being born at' Bethlehem,
with a long foregoing series of prophecy and other
coincidences, is doubtiess miraculous, the series of
prophecy, and other coincidences, and the event,
being admitted : though the event itself, his birth
' Deut. xxviii. S7.

336 Of the particular Evidence Part II.
at that place, appears to have been brought about
in a natural way ; of which, hoAvever, no one can
be certain.
And as several of these events seera, in some de
gree expressly, to haA'e verified the prophetic his
tory already : so hkewise they may be considered
farther, as having a peculiar aspect towards the
full corapletion of it ; as affording some presump
tion that the whole of it shall, one time or other,
be fulfifled. Thus, that the Jews have been so
Avonderfully preserved in their long and wide dis
persion; which is indeed the direct fulfilling- of
sorae prophecies, but is uoav raentioned only as
looking forward to soraewhat yet to corae : that na
tural religion carae forth frora Judea, and spread,
in the degree it has done over the world, before
lost in idolatry ; Avhich, together with sorae other
things, have distinguished that very place, in like
raanner, as the people pf it are distinguished: that
this great change of religion over the earth, was
brought about under the profession and acknoAV-
ledgraent, that Jesus was the proraised Messiah :
things of tbis kind naturally turn the thoughts of
serious men towards the full completion of the pro
phetic history, concerning the final restoration of
that people ; concerning the establishment of the
everlasting kingdom" araong- thera, the kingdom
of the INIessiah ; and the future state of the world,
under this sacred government. Such circumstan
ces and events corapared Avitb these prophecies,
though no completions of them, yet would not, I
think, be spoken of as nothing in the argument.

Chap. VII. for Christianity. 337
by a person upon his first being informed of them.
They fafl in Avith the prophetic history of things
stifl future, give it some additional credibihty, have
the appearance of being somcAvhat in order to
the full completion of it.
Indeed it requires a good degree of knoAvledge,
and great calmness and consideration, to be able
to judge, thoroughly, of the evidence for the truth
of Christianity, frora that part of the prophetic
history, which relates to the situation of the king
doms of the AvorkI, and to the state of the church,
frora the establishment of Christianity to the pre
sent time. But it appears, from a general view of
it, to be very material. And those persons Avho
have thoroughly examined it, and some of them
Avere raen of the coolest terapers, greatest capaci
ties, and least liable to imputations of prejudice,
insist upon it as deterrainately conclusive.
Suppose now a person quite ignorant of history,
first to recollect the passages above mentioned out
of Scripture, without knowing but that the whole
Avas a late fiction, then to be inforraed of the cor
respondent facts noAv mentioned, and to unite
them all into one view : that the profession and
establishment of natural religion in the Avorld, is
greatly owing, in different Avays, to this book, and
the supposed revelation which it contains ; that it
is acknowledged to be of the earliest antiquity;
that its chronology and coraraon history are entircr
ly credible ; that this antient nation, the Jews, of
Avhom it chiefly treats, appear to have been, in fapt,
Y

338 Of the particular Evidence PartIL
the people of God, in a distinguished sense ; that,
as there Avas a national expectation araongst them,
raised frora the prophecies, of a Messiah to appear
at such a tirae, so one at this tirae appeared claim
ing to be that Messiah ; that he was rejected by
this nation ; but received by the Gentiles, not
upon the evidence of prophecy, but of miracles ;
that the religion he taught supported itself under
the greatest difficulties, gained ground, and at
length became the religion of the world ; -that in
the mean ¦ tirae the Jevvish pohty was utterly de
stroyed, and the nation dispersed over the face of
the earth ; that notwithstanding this, they have
remained a distinct nuraerous people for so many
centuries, even to this day ; which not only ap
pears to be tbe express corapletion of several pro
phecies concerning- them ; but also renders it, as
one raay speak, a visible and easy possibility, that
the proraises raade to thera as a nation, raay yet
be fulfilled. And to these acknoAvledged truths,
let the person we have been supposing, add, as I
think he ought, whether every one will alloAV it or
no, the obvious appearances which there are, of
the state of the world, in other respects besides
what relates to the Jews, and of the Christian
Church, having so long- ansAvered, and stifl ctnswer-
ing to the prophetic history. Suppose, I say,
these facts set over against the things before raen
tioned out of the Scripture, and seriously corapa
red with tpem ; the joint view of both together,
must, I think, appear of very great Aveight to a

Chap. VIL for Christianity. 339
considerate reasonable person : of rauch greater
indeed, upon having thera first laid before him,
than is easy for us, Avho are so familiarised to thera,
to conceive, Avithout sorae particular attention for
that purpose.
All these things, and the several particulars con
tained under thera, require to be distinctly and
most thoroughly examined into ; that the Aveight of
each may be judged of, upon such examination,
and such conclusion draAvn as results from their
united force. But this has not been atterapted
here. I have gone no farther than to show, that
the general iraperfect view of thera now g-iven, the
confest historical evidence for miracles, and the
many obvious appearing corapletions of prophecy,
together with the collateral things * here raention
ed, and there are several others of the like sort ;
that all this together, Avhich, being fact, raust be
acknowledged by unbelicA'crs, araounts to real
evidence of soraewhat raore than huraan in this
matter : evidence much more iraportant, than
careless men, who have been accustomed only
to transient and partial views of it, can imagine ;
and indeed abundantly sufficient to act upon. And
these things, I apprehend, raust be acknowledged
by unbelievers. For though they raay say, that
the historical evidence of rairacles, wrought in at
testation of Christianity, is not sufficient to con-
* All the particular things mentioned in this chapter, not re
ducible to the head of certain miracles, or determinate comple
tions of prophecy. See pp. 295, 296.

340 Of the particular Evidence Part IL
A'ince them, that such rairacles were really Avrought;
they cannot deny, that there is such historical
evidence, it being a known raatter of fact that
there is. They raay say, the conforraity between
the prophecies and events, is by accident ; but
there are many instances in which such conforrai
ty itself cannot be denied. They raay say, with
regard to such kind of collateral things as those
aboA^e mentioned, that any odd accidental events,
without meaning, will have a meaning found in
thera by fanciful people : and that such as are
fanciful in any one certain Avay will raake out
a thousand coincidences, which seera to favour
their peculiar follies. Men, I say, may talk
thus : but no one who is serious, can possibly
think these things to be nothing, if he considers
the iraportance of collateral things, and even of
lesser circurastances, in the evidence of probabili
ty, as distinguished, in nature, frora the evidence
of deraonstration. In raany cases, indeed, it seeras
to require the truest judgraent, to deterraine Avith
exactness the weight of circurastantial evidence :
but it is very often altogether as convincing, as
that Avhich is the raost express and direct.
This general view of the evidence for Christiani
ty, considered as raaking one arguraent, raay also
serve to recomraend to serious persons, to set down
every thing, which they think raay be of any real
weight at all in proof of it, and particularly the
many seeming corapletions of prophecy : and they
Avill find,^j that, judging by the natural rules, by
which we judge of probable evidence in comraon

Chap. VIL for Christianity, 341
matters, they araount to a rauch higher degree of
proof, upon such a joint review, than could be sup
posed upon considering- them separately, at different
times ; how strong soever the proof raight before
appear to thera, upon such separate views of it.
For probable proofs, by being added, not only in
crease the evidence, but multiply it. Nor should
I dissuade any one from setting- down, Avhat he
thought made for the contrary side. But then it is
to be remembered, not in order to influence his
judgment, but his practice, that a mistake on one
side, may be, in its consequences, rauch raore
dangerous, than a mistake on the other. And
what course is raost safe, and what raost danger
ous, is a consideration thought very material,
when Ave deliberate, not concerning events, but
concerning conduct in our temporal affairs. To
be influenced by this consideration in our judge
ment, to believe or disbelieve upon it, is indeed
as much prejudice, as any thing Avhatever. And,
like other prejudices, it operates contrary ways,
in different men. For some are inchned to be
lieve, what they hope; and others, Avhat they
fear. And it is manifest unreasonableness, to apply
to men's passions in order to gain their assent.
But in deliberations concerning conduct, there is
nothing Avhich reason raore requires to be taken
into the account, than the iraportance of it. For,
suppose it doubtful, Avhat would be the consequence
of acting in this, or in a contrary raanner : still,
that taking one side could be attended Avith littie
or no bad consequence, and taking the other might

342 Of the particular Evidence Part II.
be attended Avith the greatest, raust appear, to un
prejudiced reason, of the highest raoraent towards
deterraining, how we are to act. But the truth of
our religion, like the truth of coraraon raatters, is
to be judged of by all the evidence taken together.
And unless the whole series of things which may
be alleged in this arguraent, and every particular
thing in it, can reasonably be supposed to have
been by accident (for here the stress of the "argu
ment for Christianity lies) then is the truth of it
proved : in like manner, as if in any comraon case,
nuraerous events acknowledged, were to be alleged
in proof of any other event disputed ; the truth
of the disputed event AVould be proved, not only if
any one of the acknowledged ones did of itself
clearly iraply it, but, though no one of thera singly
did so, if the Avhole of the acknowledged events
taken together, could not in reason be supposed
to have happened, unless the disputed one Avere
true. It is obvious, how much advantage, the nature
of this evidence gives to those persons, who attack
Christianity, especially in conversation. For it is
easy to shew, in a short and lively irianner, that
such and such things are liable to objection, that
this and another thing, is of little weight in itself;
but irapossible to shew, in like manner, the united
force of the whole argument in one vicAV.
However, lastly, as it has been made appear,
that there is no presuraption against a revelation as
miraculous ; that the general scherae of Christiani
ty, and the principal parts of it, are conforraable

Chap. VIL for Christianity. 343
to the experienced constitution of things, and the
whole perfectly credible : so the account now given
of the positive evidence for it, shcAvs, that this
evidence is such, as, from the nature of it, cannot
be destroyed ; though it should be lessened.

344 Objection^ against the Analogy Part II.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the Objections xvhich may be made against
arguing from the Analogy qf Nature to Re
ligion.
JLf every one Avould consider, Avith such attention
as they are bound, even in point of morality, to
consider, Avhat they judge and give characters of;
the occasion of this chapter would be, in some
good measure at least, superseded. But since this
is not to be expected ; for some we find do not
concern themselves to understand even Avhat they
Avrite ag-ainst : since this treatise, in common Avith
raost others, lies open to objections, Avhich raay ap
pear very raaterial to thoughtful raen at first sight;
and, besides that, seeras peculiarly liable to the ob
jections, of such as can judge without thinking,
and of such . as can censure without judging ; it
raay not be amiss to set doAvn the chief of these
objections which occur to me, and consider them
to their hands. And they are such as these :
" That it is a poor thing to solve difficulties in
revelation, by saying, that there are the same in
natural religion ; when what is wanting is to clear
both of them, of these their coraraon, as Avell as
other their respective, difficulties : but that it is a

Chap. VIIL of Nature to Religion, 345
strange way indeed of convincing men ofthe obli
gations of religion, to shew them, that they have
as little reason for their Avorldly pursuits ; and a
strange way of vindicating the justice and good
ness ofthe Author of Nature, and of removing the
objectipj^ against both, to Avhich the systera of re
hg-ion lies open, to shew, that the like objections
lie against natural providence ; a way of answering
objections against religion, Avithout so much as pre
tending to make out, that the systera of it, or the
particular things in it objected against, are rea
sonable — especially, perhaps sorae may be inatten
tive enough to add, must this be thought strange,
Avlien it is confessed that analogy is no answer to
such objections : that when this sort of reasoning
is carried to the utmost length it can be imagined
capable of, it will yet leave the mind in a very
unsatisfied state : and that it must be unaccounta
ble ignorance ofraankind, to imagine they Avill be
prevailed with to forego their present interests and
pleasures, from regard to religion, upon doubtful
evidence." Now, as plausible as this Avay of talking may ap
pear, that appearance will be found in a great raea
sure owing to half-views^, Avhich shew but part of
an object, yet shcAV that indistinctly ; arid to un-
determinate language. By these means weak men
are often deceived by others, and ludicrous raen,
by themselves. And even those, who are serious
and considerate, cannot ahvays readily disentangle,
and at once clearly see through the perplexities, in
which subjects themselves are involved ; and which

346 Objections against the Analogy Part II.
are heightened by the deficiencies and the abuse of
words. To this latter sort of persons, the follow
ing reply to each part of this objection severally,
raay be of sorae assistance ; as it raay also tend a
little to stop and silence others.
First, The thing wanted, i. e. Avhat raen require,
is to have all difficulties cleared. And this is, or,
at least for any thing Ave know to the contrary, it
may be, the sarae, as requiring- to coraprehend the
divine nature, and the Avhole plan of Providence
from CA'erlasting to everlasting. But it hath always
been allowed to argue, frora what is acknowledged,
to Avhat is disputed. And it is in no other sense a
poor thing, to argue from natural religion to reveal
ed, in the manner found fault A^ith, than it is to
argue in numberless other ways of probable deduc
tion and inference, in matters of conduct, Avhich
Ave are continuafly reduced to the necessity of do
ing. Indeed the epithet poor, raay be applied, I
fear as properly, to great part, or the Avhole, of hu
raan life, as it is to the things mentioned in the
objection. Is it not a poor thing, for a physician
to have so little knoAvledge in the cure of diseases,
as even the most erainent have ? To act upon con
jecture and guess, where the life of raan is concern
ed ? Undoubtedly it is : but not in coraparison of
having- no skill at all in that useful art, ahd being
obhged to act Avholly in the dark.
Further : siuce it is as unreasonable, as it is cora
mon, to urge objections against revelation, Avhich
are of equal weight against natural religion ; and
those who do this, if they are not confused, thera-

Chap., VIII. of Nature to ReUgion. 347
selves, deal unfairly Avith others, in making it seem,
that they are arguing- only against revelation, or
particular doctrines of it, Avhen in reality they are
arguing ag-ainst moral providence ; it is a thing of
consequence to shew, that such objections are as
much IcA'elled ag-ainst natural religion, as against
revealed. And objections, Avhich are equally ap
phcable to both, are, properly speaking, answered,
by its being shcAvn that they are so, provided the
former be adraitted to be true. And without taking
inthe consideration how distinctly this is adraitted,
it is plainly A'ery raaterial to observe, that as the
things objected against in natural religion, are of
the same kind Avith Avhat is certain matter of ex
perience in the course of providence, and in the in
forraation Avhich Crod affords us concerning our
temporal interest under his government ; so the
objections against the system of Christianity and
the evidence of it, are of the very sarae kind Avith
those which are made against the system and evi
dence of natural religion. However, the reader
upon review may see, that most of the analogies
insisted upon, even in the latter part of this treatise,
do not necessarily require to have more taken for
granted than is in the former ; that there is an
Author of nature, or natural Governor of the Avorld:
and Christianity is vindicated, not from its analogy
to natural religion, but chiefly, frora its analogy to
the experienced constitution of nature.
Secondly, Religion is a practical thing, and con
sists in such a deterrainate course of life ; as being
what there is reason to think, is commanded by the

34S Objections against the Analogy Part IL
Author of nature, and AviH, upon the Avhole, be our
happiness under his governraent Now if raen can
be convinced, that they have the like reason to be
lieve this, as to believe, that taking care of their
teraporal affairs Avill be to their advantage ; such
conviction cannot but be an argument to them for
the practice of religion. And if there be really any
reason for believing one of these, and endeavouring
to preserve life, and secure ourselves the necessaries
and conA'eniences of it : then there is reason also
for believing the other, and endeavouring to secure
the interest, it proposes to us. And if the in
terest Avhich religion proposes to us, be infinitely
greater than our whole temporal interest ; then
there raust be proportionably greater reason, for
endeavouring to secure one, than the other : since,
by the supposition, the probability of our secu
ring one, is equal to the probability of our secu
ring- the other. This seems plainly unanswer
able ; and has a tendency to influence fair minds,
Avho consider Avhatour condition really is, or upon
Avhat evidence Ave are naturally appointed to act ; '
and who are disposed to acquiesce in the terms
upon which we live, and attend to and follow that
practical instruction, whatever it be, whichis afford
ed us.
But the chief and proper force of the argument
referred to in the objection, lies in another place.
For, it is said that the proof of religion is involv
ed in such inextricable difficulties, as to render
it doubtful ; and that it cannot be supposed, that
if it Avere true, it Avould be left upon doubtful

Chap. VIIL of Nature to Religion. 3i9
evidence. Here then, over and above the force
of each particular difficulty or objection, these
difficulties and objections taken together, are turn
ed into a positive arguraent against the truth of
religion : which arguraent Avould stand thus. If
religion were true, it Avould not be left doubtful,
and open to objections to the degree in which it is :
therefore that it is thus left, not only renders the
evidence of it weak, and lessens its force, in pro
portion to the Aveight of such objections ; but also
shcAvs it to be false, or is a general presuraption of
its being- so. Now the observation, that frora the
natural constitution and course of things, avc must
in our temporal concerns, almost continually, and
in matters of great consequence, act upon evidence
of a like kind and degree to the evidence of reli
gion ; is an ansAver to this argument : because it
shews, that it is according to the conduct and cha
racter ofthe Author of nature to appoint avc should
act upon evidence like to that, which this argu
ment presumes he cannot be supposed to appoint
Ave should act upon : it is an instance, a general
one made up of numerous particular ones, of sorae
what in his dealing- Avith us, sirailar to what is said
to be incredible. And as the force of this answer
lies merely in the parallel, which there is between
the evidence for religion and fbr our temporal con
duct ; the answer is equally just and conclusive,
whether the parallel be made out, by shcAving the
evidence of the forraer to be higher, or the evidence
of the latter to be lower.
Thirdly, The design of this treatise is not to

350 Objections against the Analogy Pait II.
vindicate the character of God, but to shew the
obhgations of raen ; itisnot to justify his provi
dence, but to shew Avhat belongs to us to do. These
are two subjects, and ought not to be confounded.
And though they may at length run up into each
other, yet observations may immediately tend to
make out the latter, which do not appear, by any -
iraraediate connection, to the purpose of the forraer;
which is less our concern than raany seem to think.
For, 1st, It is not necessary we should justify the
dispensations of Providence against objections, any
farther than to shew, that the things objected
against may, for aught Ave knoAv, be consistent
with justice and goodness. Suppose, then, that
there are things in the system of this Avorld, and
plan of Providence relating- to it, Avhich taken
alone Avould be unjust : yet it has been shcAvn un- '
ansAverably, that if we could take in the reference,
which these things raay have, to other things pre
sent, past, and to come ; to the Avhole scherae,
Avhich the things objected against are parts of;
these very things might, for aught we know, be
found to be, not only consistent Avith justice, but
instances of it. Indeed it has been shewn, by the
analogy of what we see, not only possible that this
may be the case, but credible that it is. And thus
objections, drawn from such things, are answered,
and Providence is vindicated, as far as religion
'makes its vindication necessary. Hence it appears,
2dly, That objections against the Divine justice and
goodness are not endeavoured to be reraoved, by
shewing that the like objections, alloAved to be

Chap. VIIL of Nature to Religion. 351
really conclusive, lie against natural providence :
but those objections being- supposed and shewn not
to be conclusive, the things objected against, con
sidered as raatters of fact, are farther shewn to be
credible, from their conformity to the constitution
of nature ; for instance, that God Avill reward and
punish men for their actions hereafter, from the ob
servation, that he does reward and punish thera for
their actions here. And this, I apprehend, is of
weight. And I add, Sdly, It would be of weight,
even though those objections Avere not ansAvered.
For, there being the proof of religion above set
down ; and religion iraplying- several facts ; for in
stance again, the fact last mentioned, that God avHI
reward and punish men for their actions hereafter ;
the observation that his present method of goA-ern-
ment is .by rewards and punishments, shews that
future fact not to be incredible : whatever objec
tions men may think they have against it, as un
just or unraerciful, according- to their notions of
justice and mercy ; or as improbable from their be
lief of necessity. I say, as improbable : for it is
evident no objection ag-ainst it, as unjust, can be
urged from necessity ; since this notion asmuch
destroys injustice, as it does justice. Then 4thly,
Though objections against the reasonableness of the
system of religion, cannot indeed be answered with
out enterino- into consideration of its reasonable-
... 1
ness ; yet objections against the credibihty, or truth
of it, may. Because the system of it is reducible
into what is properly matter of fact : and the truth,
the probable truth, of facts, may be shcAvn without

352 Objections against the Analogy PartIL
consideration of their reasonableness. Nor is it
necessary, though, in some cases and respects, it is
highly useful and proper, yet it is not necessary,
to give a proof of the reasonableness of' CA'cry pre
cept enjoined us, aud of every particular dispensa
tion of Providence, which comes into, the system
of religion. Indeed the more thoroughly a person
of a right disposition is convinced of the perfection
of the Divine nature and conduct, the farther he
will advance towards that pea-fection of religion,
which St John * speaks of But the general obli
gations of religion are fully made out by proving
the j-easonableness of the practice of it. And that
the practice of religion is reasonable, may be shewn,
though no more could be proved, than that the
system of it may be so, for aught we knoAv to the
contrary : and even without entering into the dis
tinct consideration of this. And from hence, 5thly,
It is easy to see, that though the analogy of nature
is not an immediate answer to objections against
thcAvisdom, the justice, org-oodness, of any doctrine
or precept of religion ; yet it may be, as it is, an
immediate and direct answer to what is really in
tended by such objections ; Avhich is, to shcAv that
the things objected against are incredible.
Fourthly, It is most readily acknowledged, that
the foregoing treatise is by no raeans satisfactory ;
very far indeed from it : but so Avould any natural
institution of life appear, if reduced, into a systera,
together with its evidence. Leaving religion out
* 1 Joh. iv. iS.
• 5

Chap. VIIL of Nature to Religion. 353
of the case, men are divided in their opinions,
whether our pleasures overbalance our pains ; and
whether it be, or be not, eligible to live in this
world. And were all such controversies settled,
which perhaps, in speculation, would be found in
volved in great difficulties ; and were it determi
ned upon the evidence of reason, as nature has de
termined it to our hands, that life is to be preser
ved : yet still, the rules which God has been plea
sed to afford us, for escaping the miseries of it, and
obtaining its satisfactions, the rules, for instance,
of preserving health and recovering it when lost,
are not only fallible and precarious, but very far
from being exact. Nor are avc informed by na
ture, in future contingencies and accidents, so as
to render it at all certain, Avhat is the best raethod
of managing our affairs. What will be the success
of our temporal pursuits, in the comraon sense of
the word success, is highly doubtful. And what
will be the success of thera, in the proper sense of
the word ; i, e. what happiness or enjoyment Ave
shall obtain by them, is doubtful in a much higher
degree. Indeed the unsatisfactory nature of the
evidence, Avith which we are obliged to take up,
in the daily course of life, is scarce to be expressed.
Yet raen do not throAV aAvay life, or disregard the
interests of it, upon account of this doubtfulness.
The evidence of religion then being- adraitted real,
those who object against it, as not satisfactory, i. e.
as not being Avhat they wish it, plainly forget the
very condition of our being : for satisfaction, in
z

354 Objections against the Analogy Part II.
this sense, does not belong to such a creature as raan.
And, Avhicli is raore raaterial, they forget also the ve
ry nature of religion. For, religion presupposes, in
all those who avHI embrace it, a certain degree of in
tegrity and honesty ; Avhich it Avas intended to try
whether man have or not, and to exercise in such
as have it, in order to its improvement. Religion
presupposes this as much, and in the sarae sense,
as speaking to a raan, presupposes he understands
the language in which you speak ; or as Avarning
araan of any danger, presupposes that he hath such
a regard to himself, as that he Avill endeavour to
avoid it. And therefore the question is not at all.
Whether the evidence of religion be satisfactory ;
but. Whether it be, in reason, sufficient to prove
and discipline that virtue, Avhich it presupposes.
Noav the evidence of it is fully sufficient for all
those purposes of probation ; how far socA'er it is
from being satisfactory, as to the purposes of cu
riosity, .or any other : and indeed it ansAvers the
purposes of the former in several respects, Avhich
it Avould not do, if it Avei'e as overbearing as is re
quired. One might add farther ; that Avhether
the motives, or the evidence for any course of ac
tion, be satisfactory, meaning here by that word,
what satisfies a man, that such a course of action
Avill in event be for his good ; this need never be,
and I think, strictly speaking, never is, the prac
tical question in common matters. But the prac
tical question in all cases, is. Whether the evi
dence for a course of action be such, as, taking in
all circumstances, makes the faculty Avithin us.

Chap. VIIL of Nature to Religion. 355
Avhich is the guide and judge of conduct *, deter
mine that course of action to be prudent. Indeed
satisfaction that it avHI be for our interest or hap
piness, abundantly determines an action to be pri-
dent : but evidence, almost infinitely lower than
this, determines actions to be so too ; even in the
conduct of every day.
Fifthly, As to the objection concerning- the in
fluence Avhich this argument, or any part of it,
may, or may not, be expected to have upon men :
I observe, as above, that religion being intended
for a trial and exercise of the morality of every
person's character, Avho is a subject of it; and
there being, as I have shewn, such eviderice for it,
as is sufficient, in reason, to influence raen to erii-
brace it : to object, that it is not to be imagined
mankind will be influenced by such evidence, is
nothing to the purpose of the foregoing treatise.
For the purpose of it is not to inquire. What sort
of creatures raankind are; but, What the hght'and
knowledge, Avhich is afforded them, requires they
should be: to shew how, in reason, they ought to
behave ; not how, in fact, they will behave. This
depends upon them.selves, and is their own concern;
the personal concern of each raan in particular.
And hoAV little regard the generality haX^e to it, ex
perience indeed does too fully shew. But religion,
considered as a probation, has had its end upon all
persons, to Avhom it has been proposed, with evi
dence sufficient in reason to influence thejr prac
tice : for by this means they have been put into a
' See Dissert. II.

356 Objections against the Analogy Part II.
state of probation ; let thera behave as they will
in it. And thus, not only revelation, but reason
also, teaches us, that by the evidence of religion
being laid before men, the designs of Providence
are carrying on, not only with regard to those who
Avill, but likewise with regard to those who will
not, be influenced by it. However, lastly, the ob
jection here referred to, allows the things insisted
upon in this treatise to be of sorae weight : and if
so, it may be hoped it will have some influence.
And if there be a probability that it wiU have any
at afl, there is the same reason in kind, though not
in degree, to lay it before men, as there would be,
if it Avere likely to have a greater influence.
And farther, I desire it may be considered, with
respect to the Avhole of the foregoing objec
tions, that in tliis treatise I have argued upon the
principles of others *, not my own : and have
omitted what I think true, and of the utmost im
portance, because by others thought unintelligible,
or not true. Thus I have argued upon the princi
ples of the Fatalists, which I do not believe : and
have omitted a thing of the utraost importance,
which I do believe, the raoral fitness and unfitness
of actions, prior to all will whatever ; which I ap
prehend as certainly to deterraine the Divine con
duct, as speculative truth and falsehood necessari-
*' By iarguing upon the principles of others, the reader vvill ob
serve is meant ; not proving any thing from those principles, but
notwithstanding them. Thus religion is proved, not from the
opinion of necessity, which is absurd ; but notwithstanding, or
even though, that opinion were admitted to be true. .

Chap. VIIL of Nature to ReUgion. 357
ly determine the Divine judgement. Indeed the
principle of liberty, and that of moral fitness, so
force theraselves upon the raind, that raorahsts, the
ancients as Avell as moderns, have forraed their
language upon it. And probably it may appear
in mine, though I have endeavoured to avoid
it ; and in order to avoid it, have soraetimes been
obhged to express myself in a manner, which
Avfll appear strange to such as do npt observe the
reason for it : but the general argument here pur
sued, does not at all suppose, or pioceed upon,
these principles. Now, these two abstract princi
ples of liberty and moral fitness being omitted, re
ligion can be considered in no other view than
merely as a question of fact : and in this vicAv it is
here considered. It is obvious, that Christianity,
and the proof of it, are both historical. And even
natural religion is, properly, a matter of fact. For,
that there is a righteous Governor of the Avorld, is
so : and this proposition contains the general sys
tem of natural relig-ion. But then, several abstract
truths, and in particular those tAVo principles, are
usually taken into consideration in the proof of it:
whereas it is here treated of only as a matter of
fact To explain this : that the three angles of a
triangle are equal to tAvo right ones, is an abstract
truth : but that they appear so to our mind, is only
a matter of fact. And this last must have been
admitted, if any thing Avas, by those ancient scep
tres, who would not have admitted the former ;
but pretended to doubt, Whether there Avere any
such thing as truth ; or, Whether Ave could certain--

358 Objections dgainst the Analogy Part 1 1.
ly depend upon our faculties of understanding for
the knowledge of it in any case. So likcAvise, that
there is, in the nature of things, an original stand
ard of right and Avrong in actions, independent
upon all will, but which unalterably deterraines the
Avili of God, to exercise that moral government
over the Avorld which religion teaches, i. e. finally
and upon the whole to reward and punish raen re
spectively as they act right or Avrong ; this asser
tion contains an abstract truth, as Avell as raatter of
fact. But suppose in the present state, every raan,
without exception, Avas rewarded and punished, in
exact proportion, as he folloAved or transgressed that
sense of right and wrong, Avhich God has iraplant
ed in the nature of every man : this would not be
at all an abstract truth, but only a matter of fact.
And though this fact Avere acknowledged by eveiy
one ; yet the very same difficulties might be raised,
as are now, concerning the abstract questions of
liberty and moral fitness : and avc should have a
proof, even the certain one of experience, that the
government of the Avorld Avas perfectly moral,
Avithout taking in the consideration of those ques
tions : and this proof Avould remain, in what way
soever they Avere deterrained. And thus, God ha
ving g-iven raankind a raoral faculty, the object of
AA'hich is actions, and Avhich naturally approves
some actions as right and of good-desert, and con
demns others as Avrong, and of ill-desert; that he
will, finally and upon the Avhole, reward the forraer
and punish the latter, is not an assertion of an ab
stract truth, but of Avhat is as m.ere a fact, as his

Chap. VIIL of Nature to Religion. 359
doing so at present Avould be. This future fact I
have not indeed proved with the force with which
it might be proved, from the principles of liberty
and moral fitness ; but Avithout them have giA-en a-
really conclusive practical proof of it, Avhich is
greatly strengthened by the general analogy of na
ture : a proof, easily cavilled at, easily shewn not
to be deraonstrative, for it is not offered as such ;
but impossible, I think, to be evaded or answered.
And thus the obligations of religion rare made out,
exclusiA'ely ofthe questions concerning liberty and
inoral fitness ; Avhich have been perplexed with dif
ficulties and abstruse reasonings, as every thing-
may. Hence therefore may be observed distinctly,
Avhat is the force of this treatise. It will be, to
such as are convinced of religion, upon the proof
arising out of the two last mentioned principles, an
additional proof and a confirmation of it : to such
as do not admit those principles, an original proof
of it *, and a confirraation of that proof. Those
who belicA'e, Avill here find the scheme of Christi
anity cleared of objections, and the evidence of it
in a peculiar raanner strengthened : those who do
not beheve, Avill at least be shewn the absurdity of
all atterapts to prove ('hristianity false, the plain
undoubted credibility of it ; and, 1 hope, a good
deal raore.
And thus, though some perhaps raay seriously
think, that analogy, as here urged, has too great
" P. Ul, 142, &c.

360 Objections, Sec. Part IL
stress laid upon it ; and ridicule, unanswerable ri
dicule, may be applied, to shew the argument from
it in a disadvantageous light ; yet there can be no
question, but that it is a real one. For religion,
both natural and revealed, implying in it numerous
facts ; analogy, being a confirraation of all facts to
which it can be applied, as it is the only proof of
most, cannot but be admitted by every one to be a
material thing, and truly of Aveight on the side of
religion, both natural and revealed : and it ought
to be particularly regarded by such as profess to
follow nature, and to be less satisfied Avith abstract
reasonings.

CONCLUSION.

W HATEVER account maybe giA'en, ofthe strange
inattention and disregard, in some ages and coun
tries, to a matter of such importance as religion ;
it would, before experience, be incredible, that
there should be the like disregard in those, Avho
have had the moral system of the Avorld laid before
them, as it is by Christianity, and often inculcated
upon them : because this moral system carries in it
a good degree of evidence for its truth, upon its
being barely proposed to our thoughts. There is
no need of abstruse reasonings and distinctions, to
convince an unprejudiced understanding, that there
is a God who made and governs the world, and
will judge it in righteousness ; though they may
be necessary to answer abstruse difficulties, Avhen
once such are raised : when the very meaning of
those words, which express most intelligibly the
general doctrine of religion, is pretended to be un
certain ; and tbe clear truth of the thing itself is
obscured by the intricacies of speculation. But to
an unprejudiced mind, ten thousand thousand in
stances of design, cannot but prove a designer.

362 Conclusion. Part II.
And it is intuitively raanifest, that creatures ought
to live under a dutiful sense of their Maker ; and
that justice and charity raust be his laws, to crea
tures Avhom he has raade social, and placed in
society. Indeed the trutii of revealed religion,
peculiarly so called, is not self-evident; but re
quires external proof, in order to its being- received,
Yet inattention, among us, to reA'ealed religion,
wiH be found to imply the same dissolute iramoral
teraper of raind, as inattention to natural religion :
because, Avhen both are laid before us, in the man
ner they are in Christian countries of libeity ; our
obligations to enquire into both, and to enjbrace
both upon supposition of their truth, are obliga
tions of the sarae nature. For, revelation claims
to be the voice of God : and our obligation to at
tend to his voice, is, surel3'^, moral in all cases.
And as it is insisted, that its evidence is conclusive,
upon thorough consideration of it ; so it offers it
self to us with manifest obvious appearances of ha
ving something- more than human in it, and there
fore in all reason requires, to have its claims most
seriously exarained into. It is to be added, that
though light and knowledge, in Avliat raanner so
ever afforded us, is equally from God ; yet a mira
culous revelation has a peculiar tendency, from the
first principles of our nature, to aAvaken mankind,
and inspire them Avith reverence and aAve : and this
is a peculiar obligation, to attend to Avhat claims
to be so Avith such appearances of truth. It is there
fore most certain, that our obhgations fo enquire
seripusly into the evidence of Christianity, and,

Patt II. Conclusion. 363
upon supposition of its truth, to embrace it ; are
ofthe utmost iraportance, and raoral in the highest
and raost proper sense. Let us then suppose, that
the evidence of rehg-ion in general, and of Chris
tianity, has been seriously enquired into, by all
reasonable men among us. Yet Ave find many pro
fessedly to reject both, upon speculatiA'c principles
of infidelit)^ And all of them do not content
themselves Avith a bare neglect of religion, and en
joying their imaginary freedom from its restraints.
Some go much beyond this. They deride God's
moral governraent over the Avorld. They renounce
his p-otection, and defy his justice. They ridicule
and A'ilify Christianity, and blaspheme the Author
of it; and take all occasions to manifest a scorn
and contempt of revelation. This amounts to an
active setting themselves against religion ; to Avhat
may be considered as a positive principle of irreli
gion : Avhich they cultivate A\'ithin theraselves, and,
Avhether they intend this effect or not, render ha
bitual, as a good raan does the contrary principle.
And others, who are not chargeable with all this
profligateness, yet, are in avowed opposition to re
ligion, as if discovered to be groundless. Noav
admitting, Avhich is the supposition Ave go upon,
that these persons act upon what they think prin
ciples of reason, and otherwise they are not to be
argued with ; it is really inconceivable, that they
should iraagine they clearly see the whole evidence
of it, considered in itself, to be nothing at all ^ nor'
do they pretend this. They are far indeed frora ha-

364 Conclusion. Part II.
ving a just notion of its evidence : but they would
not say its evidence was nothing, if they thought
the systera of it, Avith all its circumstances, Avere
credible, like other matters of science or -history.
So that their manner of treating it must proceed,
either frora such kind of objections against all re
ligion, as have been answered or obviated in the
forraet part of this , Treatise ; or else frora objec
tions and difficulties, supposed more peculiar to
Christianity. Thus, they entertain prejudices
against.the Avhole notion of a revelation, and mi
raculous interpositions. They find things in Scrip
ture, Avhether in incidental passages, or in the ge
neral scheme of it, which appear to thera unreason
able. They take for granted, that if Christianity
Avere true, the light of it must have been raore ge
neral, and the evidence of it more satisfactory, or
rather overbearing : that it raust and Avould have
been, in sorae Avay, otherwise put and left, then it
is. Now this is not iraagining they see the evi
dence itself to be nothing, or inconsiderable ; but
quite another thing. It is being fortified against
the evidence, in sorae degree acknowledged, by
thinking they see the systera of Christianity, or
somewhat Avhich appears to them necessarily con
nected Avith it, to be incredible or false : fortified
against that evidence, which might, otherwise,
make great impression upon them. Or, lastly, if
any of these persons are, upon the whole, in doubt
concerning the tmth of Christianity ; their be
haviour seems owing to their taking for granted,

Pait IL Conclusion. 365
through strange inattention, that such doubting is,
inamanner, the same thing, as being certain against
it To these persons, and to this state of opinion
concerning religion, the foregoing Treatise is adapt
ed, For, all the general objections against the
inoral systein of nature having been obviated, it is
shcAvn, that there is not any peculiar presuraption
at all against Christianity, either considered as not
discoverable by reason, or as unlike to what is so
discovered ; nor any AVorth mentioning, against it
as miraculous, if any at all ; none certainly, which
can render it in the least incredible. It is shewn,
that upon supposition of a divine revelation, the
analogy of nature renders it beforehand highly cre
dible, I think probable, that many things in it
must appear liable to great objections ; and that
Ave must be incorapetent judges of it, to a great
degree. This observation is, I think, unquestion
ably true, and of the very utmost iraportance : but
it is urged, as I hope it Avill be understood, with
great caution of not vilifying- the faculty o reason,
Avliich is " the candle of the Lord Avithin us * ;"
though it can afford no light, Avhere it does not
shine; nor judge, Avhere it has no principles to
judge upon. The objections here spoken of, being
first answered in the view of objections against
Christianity as a raatter of fact, are in the next
place considered as urged, more immediately,
against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of
'¦ Pror. x.\. 27.

366 Conclusion. Part IL
the Christian dispensation. And it is fully made
out, that they admit of exactly the like ansAver, in
every respfect, to Avhat the like objections against
the constitution of nature adrait of: that, as partial
views give the appearance of wrong to things,
Avhich, upon further consideration and knoAvledge
of their relations to other things, are found just
and good ; so it is perfectly credible, that the
things objected, against the wisdom and goodness
of the Christian dispensation, may be rendered
instances of wisdom and goodness by their re
ference to other things beyond our Aiew: because
Christianity is a scheme as much above our cora
prehension, as that of nature ; and like that, a
scherae in Avhich means are raade use of to accom
plish ends, and which, as is most credible, may be
carried on by general laws. And it ought to be
attended to, that this is not an answer taken mere
ly or chiefly from our ignorance ; but from some-
Avhat positive, Avhich our observation shews us. For,
to like objections, the like answer is experienced
to be just, in numberless parallel cases. The objec
tions against the Christian dispensation, and the
method by Avhich it is carried on, having been thus
obviated, in general and together ; the chief of
thera are considered distinctly, and the particular
things objected to are shcAvn credible, by their per
fect analogy, each apart, to the constitution of na
ture. Thus; if man be fallen frora his primitive
state, and to be restored, and infinite Avisdora and
poAver engages in accomplishing our recovery : it

Part II. Conclusion. 367
were to have been expected, it is said, that this
should have been effected at once ; and not by
such a long series of means, and such a various
oeconomy of persons and things ; one dispensation
peparatory to another, this to a farther one, and so
on through an indefinite number of ages, before
the end of the scheme proposed can be complete
ly accomplished ; a scherae conducted by infinite
Avisdom, and executed by alraighty power. But
now, on the contrary, our finding that every thing
iu the constitution and course of nature is thus
carried on, shcAvs such expectations concerning re
velation to be highly unreasonable ; and is a satis
factory ansAver to thera, Avlien urged as objections
against the credibility, that the great scheme of
Providence in the rederaption of the Avorld raay be
of this kind, and to be accoraplished in this raan
ner. As to the particular raethod of our rederap
tion, tliC appointraent of a Mediator between God
and raan ; this has been shcAvn to be raost obvious
ly analogous to the general conduct of nature, i, e.
the God of nature, in appointing others to be the
instruraents of his mercy, as we experience in the
daily course of Providence. The condition of this
Avorld, which the doctrine of our redemption by
Christ presupposes, so much falls in Avith natural
appearances, that heathen moralists inferred it from
those appearances : inferred, that human nature
Avas fallen from its original rectitude, and, in con
sequence of this, degraded from its primitive hap
piness. Or, however this opinion carae into the

368 Conclusion. Part II.
world, these appearances must have kept up the
tradition, and confirmed the belief of it. And as
it M'as the general opinion under the light of na
ture, that repentance and reformation, alone and
by itself, was not sufficient to do away .sin, and pro
cure a full remission of the penalties annexed to it ;
and as the reason of the thing does not at all lead
to any such conclusion : so every day's experience
shews us, that reformation is not, in any sort, suf
ficient to prevent the present disadvantages and
miseries, which, in the natural course of things,
God has annexed to folly and extravagance. Yet
there may be ground to think, that the punish
ments, Avhich, by the general laws of divine govern
ment, are annexed to vice, may be prevented :
that provision may have been, even originally,
made, that they should be prevented by some raeans
or other, though they could not by reformation
alone. For we have daily instances of such mercy,
in the general conduct of nature : compassion pro
vided for misery *, medicines for diseases, friends
against eriemies. There is provision raade, in the
original constitution of tiie Avorld, that rauch of
the natural bad consequences of our follies, which
persons themselves alone cannot prevent, may be
prevented by the assistance of others ; assistance,
Avhich nature enables, and disposes, and appoints
them to afford. By a raethod of goodness analo
gous to this, when the world lay in Avickedness, and
consequently in ruin, " God so loved the Avorld.
* Serra. at the Rolls, p. 106.
4

Ptrt II. Conclmhn. 369
that be gave hjs only begotten Son" to save it :
and " he being made perfect by suffering, becarae
the author of eternal salvation to all thera that obey
hira *." Indeed neither reason nor analogy would
lead us to think, in particular, that the interposition
of Christ, in the manner in Avhich he did interpose,
wpuld be of that efficacy for recovery ofthe world,
which the Scripture teaches us it Avas : but neither
would reason nor analogy lead us to think, that
other particular means Avould be of the efficacy,
which experience shews they are, in numberless iur
stances. And therefore, as the case before us does
not admit of experience ; so, that neither reasoii
nor analogy can shew, how, or in what particular
way, the interposition of Christ, as revealed in
Scripture, is of that efficacy, which it is there re
presented to be ; this is no kind nor degre;e of prcr
sumption against its being really of that efficacy.
Farther : the objections against Christianity, from
the hght of it npt being universal, nor its evidence
so strong as might possibly be given us, have been
answered by the' general analogy of nature. That
God has raade such variety of creatures, is indeed
an answer to the former : but that he dispenses his
gifts in such variety, both of degrees and kinds,
amongst creatures ofthe same species, and even to
the same individuals at different times ; is a more
p})vious and full answer to it. And it is so far
from beina: the raethod of Providence in other
cases, to afford us such overbearing evidence, as.
* Joh. iii. 16. Heb. v. 9.
2 A

370 Conclusion. Part IL
sorae require in proof of Christianity ; that, on the
contrary, the evidence upon which we are natural
ly appointed to act in coraraon matters, throughout
a A'ery great part of life, is doubtful in a high degree.
And admitting the fact, that God has afforded to
some, no more than doubtful evidence of religion:
the same account raay be given of it, as of dif
ficulties and teraptations with regard to practice.
But as it is not irapossible *, surely, that this al
leged doubtfulness raay be raen's own fault ; it
deserves their most serious consideration, whether
it be not so. However, it is certain, that doubting
implies a degree of evidence for that, of which we
doubt: and that this degree of evidence, as really lays
us under obligations, as demonstrative evidence.
The whole then of religion is throughout credi
ble : nor is there, I think, any thing relating to
the revealed dispensation of thing-s, raore different
frora the experienced constitution and course of
nature, than sorae parts of the constitution of na
ture, are frora other parts of it. And if so, the
only question which reraains is. What positive evi
dence can be alleged for the truth of Christianity ?
This too, in general, has been considered, and the
objections against it estiraated. Deduct therefore
what is to be deducted frora that evidence, upon
account of any weight which may be thought to
remain in these objections, after what the analogy
of nature has suggested in answer to them : and
then consider, Avhat are the practical consequences
* P, 289, &c.

Part IL Conclusion. ¦ 371
from all this, upon the most sceptical principles,
one can argue upon (for I am Avriting to persons
who entertain these principles) : and upon such
consideration, it avHI be obvious, that immoralitv,
as little excuse as it admits of in itself, is greatly
aggravated, in persons who have been made ac
quainted Avith Christianity, whether they believe
it, or not : because the raoral systera of nature, or
natural religion, Avhich Christianity lays before us,
approA'es itself, almost intuitively, to a reasonable
mind upon seeing it proposed. In the next place,
with regard to Christianity, it Aviil be observed ;
that there is a raiddle, between a full satisfaction
of the truth of it, and a satisfaction of the contrary.
The middle state of mind between these two, con
sists in a serious apprehension, that it raay be true :
joined with doubt, Avhether it be so. And this,
upon the best judgraent 1 ara able to raake, is as
far towards speculative infidelity, as any sceptic
can at all be supposed to go, Avho has had true
Christianity, with the proper evidence of it, laid
before hira, and has in any tolerable measure con
sidered them. For I would not be mistaken to
comprehend afl, Avho have ever heard of it : because
it seems evident that, in many countries called
Christian, neither Christianity, nor its evidence,
are fairly laid before men. And in places where
both are, there appear to be some, who have very
little attended to either, and who reject Christiani
ty Avith a scorn proportionate to their inattention;
and yet are by no raeans without understanding in
other matters. Now it has beeu sliewn, tiiat a se-

372 Conclusion. Part I|.
rious apprehension that Christianity may be true',
lays persons under the strictest obligations of a
serious regard to it, throughout the whole of their
life : a regard not the same exactly, but in many
respects nearly the same, with AA'hat a full convic
tion of its truth would lay thera under. Lastly,
it will appear, that blasphemy and profaneness, I
raean with regard to Christianity, are absolutely
without excuse. For there is np teraptation to it,
but from the Avantonness of vanity or mirth : and
these, considering the infinite iraportance of the
subject, are no such teraptations as to afford any
excuse for it. If this be a just account of things,
and yet raen can go on to vilify or disregard Chris
tianity, Avhich is to talk and act, as if they had a
deraonstration of its falsehood ; there is no reason
to think they would alter their behaviour to any
purpose, though there were a deraonstration of ita
truth.

END OF THE EIRST VOLUME.

EDINBURGH :
Priuted by James Ballantyne.

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