ii.is is an authorized facsimile of the original book, and was produced in 197^ by microfilm- xerography by Xerox University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan, U.S.A. The Proletarian Revolution In Russia By N. LENIN and LEON TROTZKY Edited with an Intioduct'on, Note* and S rp'crrer.'a y Chapter* Ey LOUIS C. FRAINA NEW YORK THE COMMUNIST PRESS Publithcn Lenin, Vladimir U'lch, 1870-1024. The proletarian revolution in ltussin, by N. Lenin nnd Leon Trotzky. Edited with an introduction, notes nnd supplemen tary chapters, by Louis C. Frninn. New York, The Communist press ,c1918| Xix p„ 2 1., 4.13 p., 1 I. 23- "Consists Inrgcly of n mn»s of articles written by Lenin nnd Trotzky diirlnfi the ... revolution." — Jntr-'d. Mostly translated by Jacob Wittmer Mnrtmann and Andr*? Trldon. cf. p. 453. 1. Ituxsla — Mist. — Itovolutlon. 1017-1921. 2. Communism — Russia. I. Trofsldl, Lev, 1S70-10I0, J.iint author, n. Priilna, Louis C. ed. iti. llnrtmnnn, Jiicob Wlttmor, 1881- tr. iv. Trldon, Andr<5, 1877-1022, Joint tr. v. Title. i.V(im« crt'jinally: Vladimir Il'lrh I'l'ilinoVj Cuinentlp endow. Int. pence. Lll»r;ir>* for Llbrnry of Contrese I>K2i;.'t I«'{SJS20 ,:.r.i:;:ji,t A i'O-yo.J t TO The men and women who made the proletarian revolution in Russia; and to the men and womtn everywhere who are inspired fry that great event. Copyright, 1918, by Louis C Fraina INTRODUCTION History is the history of class struggles. Revolution is the culmination of the class struggle; and history, accordingly, is equally a history of revolutions, of cataclysmic epochs when the antagonisms of the class struggle flare up into revolutionary and decisive action. In these great crises of universal history, the ordinary aspects of the class struggle assume a violent, catastro phic expression, developing into war, civil war, and into the searing, magnificent upheavals of tlie Revolution. Every revolution has, during its time, been characterized asj the end of all things, as a reversion to savagery, as the rapacious terrorism of men become again primordial brutes; and after each revolution the "excesses" previously stigmatized assume their right proportions, and the revolution is visioned as a fundamental, dy namic expression of the onward and upward development of ihe world. The French Revolution is a great exemplar of the revolutions in history. The antagonisms of class against class implacably as sumed a revolutionary character, and the Revolution aroused new and more violent antagonisms. As these new antagonisms became more acute, the course of tlie Revolution became more violent and ruthless, until its whole aspect appeared superficially as one bloody insanity of assassination and ruthless terrorism. The culmination of this process was The T-fTror, which the world at -that time — that is to say, the world of aristocracy and privilege — characterized as the great infamy of the ages; and yet today, tlie historian declares that The Terror, much maligned and even more misunder stood, saved the Revolution. As the monarchy was overthrown and a mortal blow delivered at the feudal relations of society, the bourgeois revolution was on the verge of being accomplished de finitely; but the consequent antagonisms aroused ithe fears of the bourgeoisie, and they hesitated, paltered, temporized. Marat and IV THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA the Jacobins, representatives of the immature proletariat and the really great men of the Revolution, resorted to the drastic means of The Terror, equally against the bourgeoisie and the nobility, to continue tlie Revolution against all opposition. The antipathy aroused in France by the Revolution was enormous, and violent was tlie opposition ; but the antipathy and the opposition were not confined to France : the whole world of aristocracy and privilege was aroused against the Revolution. As the Revolution verged on success, its international aspects were emphasized : if it suc ceeded in annihilating monarchy and feudal privilege in France, monarcliy and feudal privilege in all Europe would verge on col lapse. Europe, aristocratic Europe and "Commercial England," moaned over the "anarchy" in France, denounced the "mass mur der," villificd Marat and the Jacobins — and even the "revolution ary" conservatives— as fiends in human form, enemies of civil ization ..nd scourges of humanity. Intrigues, corruption, propa ganda of the emigres, the organizing of counter-revolutionary plots, — all these were resorted to by England, Prussia, Russia. and Austria to crush the French Revolution from within, through the action of the people of France; and when these maneuvres failed, when the Revolution conquered in spite of all and every thing, monarchical Europe attempted "intervention"' in France to crush the Revolution by alien force. The answer of revolutionary France was the wonderful scries of revolutionary wars and the conquests of Napoleon. The national antagonisms generated by the Revolution had become international ; the class struggle of the bourgeoisie against the feudal class waged within France by means of revolution and civil war became an international class struggle waged by means of revolutionary wars provoked by the "interven tion" of that feudal, monarchic Europe threatened by the French Revolution. At Waterloo, the French Revolution, objectively expressed in Napoleon, was militarily defeated. The defeat was merely object ive ; it was not subjective. Mcttemich and the Concert of Europe, particularly the "Holy Alliance," were confident that the revolution ary ideas of France had been conquered and monarchic reaction restored. It was a characteristic error. Revolutionary France had been conquered largely by the national ideas and conditions of bourgeois emergence which it developed in Europe by its mili tary conquests. And the fundamental purposes of the French Rev olution — the overthrow of the absolute monarchy and feudal domination, the introduction of the democratic parliamentary INTRODUCTION V system, the supremacy of the capitalist class economically and po litically, and the definite establishment of the nation — ultimately conquered in Europe. But during the intervening period the Rev olution was maligned by scholars and historians; it appeared as the crime of the ages, a senseless orgy of primitive passions; and English history for years after Waterloo accepted Napoleon as the "Corsican Ogre." After, however, the ideas of the Revolution had become ascendant, after the major nations of the world defi nitely emerged as bourgeois, parliamentary republics, as democrat ic nations, the ascendancy of the bourgeois altered the prevailing conceptions of the Revolution. To-day, and for many years past, the French Revolution has been accqntcd without prejudice and distortion, as a really great event in the history of the world. The Russian Revolution, in its determining proletarian phase, is an incomparably mightier event than any previous revolution : larger in scope and deeper in ultimate meaning than the French Revolution. Napoleon visualized Russia as a menace that might make all Europe Cossack; to-day, Capitalism visualizes the rev olutionary Soviet Republic in Russia as the danger that may make Europe, and the world, all Socialist. Clearly, the antagonisms, national and international, generated by the proletarian revolution in Russia are necessarily more intense than the antagonisms of the French Revolution. That was a bourgeois revolution, a revolution that annihilated one form of class rule and tyranny in order to establish that of the capitalist class; it was not a fundamental social revolution, but overwhelmingly political in scope. This is a pro letarian revolution, the start of the international Social Revolution agnin^ Capitalism, the pur*>osc of wliich is not political recon struction, but fundamental, intensive, economic and social re construction of the basis of the world. The French Revolution annihilated one form of property rights, -the feudal, in order to introduce another form of property rights, the bourgeois ; the proletarian revolution in Russia proposes the annihilation of bour geois property rights, the annihilation of private property and its sv«*!tr*i of class oppression, — the end of the cr-ploit.-.tion of man bv man and class by class. This is the Revolution, the initial action in the Social Rev olution of the international proletariat against Capitalism and for Socialism. Internationa! Capitalism senses its great enemy in the proletarian revolution in Russia and the Soviet Republic: inter national-Capitalism and Imperialism act accordingly. In this aspect, the parallel with the French Revolution is apparent : t|,e Bolshfviki VI THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA are stigmatized as perpetrators of "mass murder," as enemies of civilization, as makers of anarchy, as brutish tyrants; the world, the bourgeois world of class tyranny and hypocrisy, is against revolutionary, proletarian Russia. The years to come will make the other parallel apparent: when Europe and the world emerge Into Socialism, organized on the basis of the Soviet Republic, then the world will admit, what only the forward-looking Socialist now appreciates, that the proletarian revolution in Russia is mightier than the French Revolution, the greatest event in all history, — isince it initiates the coming of universal Socialism, Bourgeois class interests and their ideology of class defense distort and misrepresent issues and events in Russia, and pre judice judgement. But in a very real sense, another circumstance is responsible for the general misunderstanding of the Russian situation, and that is the failure to appreciate the fact that there have been two revolutions in Russia since March, 1917, and tlvat these two revolutions are mutually exclusive and antagonistic. The revolution in March overthrew Czarism, the feudal abso lute monarchy, and introduced the rule of the capitalist class, the bourgeois parliamentary republic. That was definitely a bourgeois revolution, — bourgeois, not in the sense that the bourgeoisie made the revolution, since the task was accomplished by the revolutionary Action of the workers and peasants, but in the sense that the rev olution materialized, immediately, in a bourgeois republic. The "freedoms" of bourgeois democracy were introduced; the capitalist rlass was politically ascendant: and the government was a bour geois government operating in the interests of Capitalism, imperial istic Capitalism. This first stage of the Revolution was political, not social; it annihilated the autocracy of the Czar, but industry was still capitalist, the social system still bourgeois. But the revolutionary breach in the old order was deepened and broadened by the war and tlie prevailing economic crisis. The Revolution broke through the fetters that the bourgeois govern ment tried to rivet upon its action. Against the bourgeois republic organized the- forces of a new, oncoming revolution, the revolution of the proletariat and proletarian peasantry, the forces of a social revolution. The revolutionary class struggle -formerly (directed against Czarism now marshalled its hosts against Capitalism, de termined upon a new revolution that would expropriate the bour geoisie politically and economically. On all fundamental issues the INTRODUCTION VII two revolutions apposed cadi other; the struggle was one of Social ism against CapiUlism ; and the proletarian revolution conquered, together with its program for the expropriation of Capitalism and the establishment of a Socialist Republic. Much noise and capital has been made by the journalistic Prae torian Guard of Imperialism of the democratic character of some of the "Provisional Governments" organized during the counter-rev olutionary campaign against the Soviet Republic. The personnel of these "governments," is the argument, consist of former enemies of Czarism and members of the dispersed Constituent Assembly, and accordingly represent democracy. But there are two forms of democracy in Russia struggling each against the other. The dispersed Constituent Assembly, these "democratic Provisional Governments," represent democracy, but it is the democracy of the bourgeois order,— simply a form of authority of the capitalists over the workers; that paltry democracy which depends upon an ex propriated proletariat and impoverished peasantry. This demo cracy is counter-revolutionary, since it struggles against the funda mental democracy of Socialism. The term counter-revolutionary as used by the Soviets includes not alone the adherents of Czarism, who are unimportant, but equally the adherent of bourgeois demo cracy which is in reaction against the fundamental, oncoming com munist democracy of Socialism, — industrial self-government of the workers. The proletarian revolution in Russia marks a decisive break with the revolutionary traditions and ideology of the past. To compare it with previous revolutions, fundamentally, is to miss its) epochal significance and misrepresent its character and action. Tliere are no real historic standards by which to measure the pro letarian revolution in Russia ; it is making its own history, creat ing the standards by which alone this revolution and subsequent proletarian revolutions may be measured. This circumstance is pivotal in interpreting the course of events in Russia and the mean ing of the first general revolution of the proletariat. In the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Marx de clares that bourgeois revolutions hark to the past for inspiration; the old figures and ideology appear as means to intoxicate people with their revolutionary task. Cromwell and the English drew from the Old Testament the figures and the ideology for their bourgeois revolution. At one moment, tlie French Revolution is cloaked in the forms of the Roman Republic ; at another, in the forms of Roman Empire. 3ut, says Marx, "the Social Revolution tof the VHI THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA proletariat] cannot draw its poetry from the past, it can draw that only from the future. It cannot start upon its work before it has stricken off all supcrstitirn concerning the past. Former rev olutions required historic reminiscences in order to intoxicate themselves with their own issues. The revolution [of the prole tariat] must let the dead bury their dead in order to reach its issue. With the former, the phrase surpasses the substance ; with this one, the substance surpasses the phrase." It is only in minor phases, accordingly, that the proletarian revolution in Russia is comparable with previous revolutions. In one stage alone is this comparison actual, and that is the first stage, when, the proletariat having made the revolution, the Russian bour geoisie seized power for its own class purposes, — as in the Paris Revolution of 1848. But this stage was the initial one : the sub sequent stages are stages of a proletarian revolution against Capitalism, creating its own modes of action and its own standards, developing the modus operandi of the oncoming international pro letarian revolution. The Russian Revolution marks the entry of a new character upon the stage of history — the revolutionary pro letariat in action ; it means a new revolution, the Proletarian Rev olution, the Social Revolution against Capitalism; it establishes a new reality, the imminence of the Social Revolution, the trans formation of the aspiration for the Social Revolution into a fact of immediate importance to the world and the proletariat. The proletarian revolution in Russia is comparable only with the Paris Commune. These two great events are similar and yet vitally dissimilar. The proletarian revolution in Russia acts in accord with a fundamental canon of the Revolution developed by the Commune, — that the proletariat cannot lay hold of the ready- made machinery of the bourgeois state and use it for its purposes : the proletariat must annihilate this state, conquer power and estab lish a new state upon the basis of which the proletariat introduces the measures of the coming Socialist society. The Commune had neither the numbers, the disciplined class consciousness, nor the traditions of proletarian revolutionary action of the Russian pro letariat; nor did it break completely with the superstitions and ideology of the past. Industrial development in France at that period had not produced the mass of the typical industrial prole tariat which constitutes the revolutionary class in Capitalism, and which is the bone and sinew of the revolution in Russia. In spite of Russia being still largely a peasant community, its industry is substantial; and, moreover, is large scale, concentrated industry, INTRODUCTION IX producing a large mass of typical and potentially revolutionary pro letarians. The Commune tried to secure the support of the peas ants, and failed ; the proletarian revolution in Russia succeeded, at least temporarily. The Parisian proletariat, again, did not act in conjunction with the rest of France, nor did it operate in an tp*xh of general revolutionary crisis; the conditions of Imperialism de velop a revolutionary epoch; and Soviet Russia will act, immediate ly or ultimately, as the signal for the international proletarian rev olution. The Commune was the final, magnificent expression of the first revolutionary period of the proletarian movment; and while it signalized the end of an epoch, it simultaneously projected the determining phase of the oncoming Revolution, — the dictatorship of the proletariat. The proletarian revolution in Russia, while it acts in accord with this phase of fhe Paris Commune, projects a new epoch in the proletarian movement, — the definite revolutionary epoch, the initiation of the final struggle and the decisive victory. m The entry of Russia into the war in August, 1914, decreed by the government of the Czar, was signal for a great outburst bf patriotic enthusiasm among tlie bourgeoisie, v/hich allied itself with Czarism all along the line. Instead of using tbe war in the struggle against the autocratic re/dmc, the bourgeoisie used it to promote its imperialistic interests. The Russian bourgeoisie was no longer revolutionary: it had become imperialistic; and this circumstance was a determining issue in the course of the Revolution. The Revolution of 1905 supplemented the earlier abolition of 6erfdom in creating the partial conditions for the development of capitalistic industry. The bourgeoisie acquired new powers and influence, and a new ideology. Industry developed in great pro portions, absorbed from without and reproducing all the fea tures of large scale, concentrated industry. The industrial techno logy, not being developed slowly from within but acquired full- grown from without, did not reproduce normally all stages of the historical development of Capitalism. One consequence of this was that a large industrial middle class never developed in Russia, that class of industrial petty bourgeois which historically is the carrier of democracy and revolution. The Russian bourgeoisie was the bourgeoisie of Big Capital, of trusts and financial capital, in short, of modern Imperialism ; while the "middle class" was dominantly a -socially anemic class of intellectuals and professionals. (During the Revolution, the historic role of the middle class v. as usurped by X THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA the soldier-peasantry, temporarily, and by the bourgeois-peasants, permanently.) You had these two nxtremes : on the one hand, back ward, undeveloped peasant production ; and on the other, the typical concentrated industry of imperialistic Capitalism. The inner conditions of Russian Capitalism required the. in tensive development and exploitation of the home market. But this meant a revolutionary struggle against Czarism. The bourgeoisie re jected this policy, mortally afraid of the consequences it might have in arousing the strength and revolutionary class consciousness of the proletariat. The home market was allowed to remain largely undeveloped ; and the bourgeoisie embarked upon a policy of export trade, exploiting Asia Minor, Persia and the Far East, — in short, Im|>crialism. The monopoly of military power, dominantly, instead of the monopoly of finance-capital, was the instrument of Imperial ism. This was a policy apparently of no revolutionary consequences, and that promised, immediately, larger profits than the intensive development of the home market. But it also meant the end of the bourgeoisie .s a liberal and revolutionary force, it meant immedi ately and ultimately a compromise with Czarism. The revolution of 1905 marked the turning point of this develop ment. During this revolution, betrayed and maligned by the "liber al" forces, the bourgeoisie beheld the spectre of a proletarian re volution, of a revolution that might not persist within the limits of bourgeois interests, and that might turn against the bourgeoisie, — ns has actually been the case. The danger was too palpable: why take risks, particularly when the policy of Imperialism offered an apparently easy way out? But such are the contradictions of Cap italism, that the bourgeoisie inevitably digs its own grave no matter which way it may turn. The new policy had momentous conse quences. It made the lwurgcoisic reactionary; moreover, it assisted in clarifying the class consciousness of the proletariat by constitut ing it the revolutionary force. The significance of Russian Imperialism in the course of the Revolution should not be confused because of the fact that Im perialism generally means the maturity of the industrial develop ment of Capitalism. Events are not interpreted simply by formula. Japan is im*>crialistic in its policy, and yet it is not a fully-developed industrial country. The prevailing historical situation and modi fying factors are of the first importance. The Russian bourgcoisi**-* adopted the policy of export trade and Imperialism because of historical impulses : this Imperialism might differ in minor charac teristics, but its general purposes were identical with the Imperial- INTRODUCTION XI ism of the western nations. The social consequences were identical with those in other countries : the liberals and intellectuals generally became lackeys of Imperialism ; democracy and liberal ideas were accepted within the limits of the new autocracy necessary to pro mote the interests of the imperialistic bourgeoisie. All social groups, on the whole and essentially, except the proletariat, became re actionary and counter-revolutionary. The imperialistic bourgeoisie, accordingly, enthusiastically ac cepted the war against Germany and Austria, and for the Dardan elles, Constantinople, Asia Minor, and the promotion of its imperi alistic interests generally as against the Imperialism of Germany. But their ho**-es of a profitable victory lagged, as the corrupt and inefficient beaurcaucracy of the Czar bungled the management of the war. Defeat, instead of victory, stared the imperialists in the face. The bougeoisie tried through extra-parliamentary means to avert the collapse. This was not sufficient. There was no decline in the patriotic enthusiasm of the bourgeoisie, but their represent atives in the Duma began to criticize the policy of the government, — a criticism, mark you, strictly within the limits of legality, the Duma and the existing system. Not only was this criticism not at all revolutionary, it was distinctly counter-revolutionary. The bourgeoisie and the liberal land-owners, represented by the Con stitutional-Democrats (the Cadets) did not want a revolution, nor did they want an overthrow of Czarism ; their policy insisted upon an aggressive war against Germany, upon adequate bourgeois rep resentation in the government, upon an international policy in accord with tho Entente, upon using Czarism for the l>ourgcoisie. With the support of Anglo-French capital and the governments of the Entente, the bourgeoisie plotted to compel the abdication of Czar Nicholas, after coming to the realization of the imposihility of "reaching" Nicholas; they intrigued for a palace revolt to place upon the throne a "strong" Grand Duke who would re cognize the necessity of an aggressive bourgeois policy in accord with the requirements of Russian capitalistic Imperialism. But the bourgeoisie miscalculated. The workers and peasants did make a revolution against the bourgeoisie, and they definitely completed the proletarian tendency of the revolution by acting against the bourgeois republic and expropriating the bourgeoisie by rui-anr.. ->i the revolutionary dictatorship m thei proletariat. Tlie threat of 1905 had become the reality of 1917. XII THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA IV The persistence of Czarism in Russia after its historical necessity had ceased, its clinging to power after Capitalism had conic into being, produced a dual political and social development. Within the shell of Czarism developed the bourgeoisie, the class of capitalists, and the proletariat, — a mature and aggressive pro letariat. As the bourgeoisie developed power, the proletariat simul taneously developed its own power, while |x>litically and officially Czarism retained ascendancy. When the shell of Czarism was burst by revolutionary action, Czarism disappeared as easily zs a dream upon awakening, in violent and suggestive contrast to the painful and prolonged struggles required to overthrow the absolute monarchy in France, and in England; and the failure of the rev olutionary movement in Germany in 1848. This unparalleled ra pidity of accomplishment in Russia was directly and largely traceable to the development of the revolutionary proletariat. Upon the overthrow of Czarism, the bourgeoisie and pro letariat faced each other in battle array; where previous revolu tions found the proletariat scattered and without decisive power, the Russian Revolution found the proletariat disciplined and ins pired by traditions of revolutionary struggle, organized by the mechanism of capitalist production itself, — stronger than the bourgeoisie, and able to conquer for itself the power of the state. This emergence of the proletariat, its independent class policy and class organizations, the Soviets, constitutes the decisive feature of the Russian Revolution, — an emergence definite and sufficiently aggressive to conquer power for the revolutionary proletariat. Tbe emergence of the proletariat is not new in the Russian Revolution; it was latent and partially expressed in the French Revolution and other Iwurgeois revolutions. There were two ten dencies in the French Revolution, — the bourgeois tendecy, which directed itself to a gradual transformation of the political forms, willing to satisfy itself with a compromise with the monarchy, pro viding that bourgeois class interests became ascendant; and the tendency of the masses of the people, the workers and the poorer peasants, which directed itself to a complete destruction of feudal ism and the monarchy, and struggled to develop an economic revolu tion through the organization of a communistic society. Again and again the bourgeoisie compromised and dickered with the monarchy, terrified at the revolutionary economic aspirations of the masses; INTRODUCTION XIII the bourgeoisie was willing to betray the revolution, it acted against the revolution, in order to crush the revolutionary masses, the pro letariat of that epoch. The masses of the people instinctively acted independently, aggressively, under the impulse of its material con ditions, tried to project the revolution beyond the political form imposed upon it by the bourgeoisie, into a new form — an economi*: revolution. The struggle between tlie masses and the bourgeoisie was determined not only by purposes, hut by methods: the bour- geosie tried to limit the revolution within parliamentary bounds, conciliation and understanding with the monarchy; while the masses insisted upon revolutionary mass action, placing the centre of the revolution among the people, instead of among the parliamentary "representatives of the people." The answer of the masses to the hesitation, intrigues and betrayals of the bourgeoisie was the Jacobin terror, whioh preserved the revolution. The French Revolution developed into the Great Revolution only because of the revolution ary courage and action of the masses of the people. But while the workers and the poorer peasants were able, by an unparalleled ex pression of revolutionary energy and initiative to push the revolution on to a point where it became Great because it accomplished funda mental changes, they did not possess the means to definitely wrest all power permanently from the bourgeoisie. The proletariat was conquered: it had not developed to the objective power of the Rus sian proletariat; the white terror crushed the masses; Babcuf's con spiracy was the final desperate expression of the economic revolu tion of the masses of the people ; but while the proletariat did not accomplish the economic revolution, it accomplished one magnifi cent tiling — it sapped monarchy and feudalism so completely that political democracy was inevitable, and made the bourgeois revolu tion. In the ill-fated revolution of 1848 in Germany, the prole tariat again emerged, as the left wing of the revolution, as the one aggressive force in the revolution, crushed by the betrayals and cowardice of the bourgeois liberals who united with the monarchic reaction. Again, in the French Revolution of 1848, in Paris, the proletariat emerged as the carrier of aggressive revolutionary act ion and a program oi economic revolution, but crushed ruthlessly by the bourgeois reaction. During the struggle against Czarism the proletarian class struggle against Capitalism emerged, becoming more definite and aggressive in the measure that the bourgeois liberals approached toward a conciliation with the monarchy and Capitalism developed XIV THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA in the masses the consciousness of an economic revolution. The original joint struggle against Czarism developed, in reality though often unconsciously, into a struggle of the masses against Czarism — Capitalism ; the proletarian class struggle against the bourgeoisie did not arise during the 1917 Revolution, it has already acquired definite character and power. The struggle between bourgeois and proletarian appeared clearly during the 1905 Revolution, acquired a sharper character during the followmg period of Czarist— bour geois counter-revolutionary activity, and flared up implacably in the 1917 Revolution. The period 1905-1917 may be compared, very superficially, of course, and yet suggestively, to the period 1789- 1792 of the French Revolution; and 1917-1918 to 1792-1793, with this vital difference: that the masses in France met disaster, while the Russian proletariat and poor peasants conquered power. The proletariat in the Russian Revolution acted instinctively as the proletariat acted in previous revolutions. Its infinitely larger success was determined by the prevailing historic conditions, by the fact that it had developed much more maturity than the masses during the French Revolution. Capitalism was much more deve loped and much more t>pical, the proletariat consequently mueh^ more powerful and class conscious: it was able, accordingly, be cause of the revolutionary breach created in the old order by the momentarily joint revolution against Czarism, to conquer the bour geoisie, to project definitely and decisively a proletarian revolution. United with .fhe superior material development was an uncompro misingly revolutionary Socialism, able to direct the masses of the people to the conquest of power and the introduction of forms com petent to maintain and extend that conquest in the direction of a new society,— tlie successful expression of an economic and social revolution. The proletarian revolution in Russia accordingly, is not alone in accord vrith the purposes of revolutionary Socialism, but it is equally the definite expression of a dynamic tendency, the revolu tionary economic tendency of the masses, latent and apparent but unsuccessful in previous revolutions, characteristic of Capitalism and acquiring maturity and ascendancy as Capitalism develops. As the tendency of action of the Russian proletariat was adumbrated in previous revolutions, so its class organizations, the Soviets, are, in general features, partially, incompletely apparent in these previous revolutions in which the proletariat instinctively tried to emerge for the conquest of power. The revolutionary masses of the people, during the French INTRODUCTION XV Revolution, particularly in Paris, organized their own forms of rev olutionary struggle and government, the sections and the Commune. While the average historian dwells minutely upon the action of the various parliaments and the Clubs, the sections and the Commune of the masses were of decisive importance. These sections and the Commune were not alone instruments of revolutionary action, but usurped certain functions of government, the tendency being to place all government power in the Commune, which was simply the organized masses trying to act independently of parliamentary forms and bourgeois representatives. This tendency was expressed in a more definite form in the Paris Commune of 1871, which comp letely dispensed with the forms and functions of the bourgeois parlia mentary state, its purpose being to unite all France by means of self-governing communes, and from which Marx derived that fun damental canon of the proletarian revolution: the proletariat can not simply lay hold of the ready-made machinery of the bourgeois state, and use it for its own purposes. The Soviets, the Councils of Workers and Peasants, are a much higher form and definite expression of this tendency of the proletarian masses to become the state. Originally created as in struments of the revolution, the Soviets have become organs of government, functioning through a temporary dictatorship of the proletariat. The Soviets are revolutionary organizations of the masses; but they are more: they arc forms for the creation of a new type of government, which shall supersede the bourgeois pol itical state. Instead of being amorphous "mass organizations" as were the sections and Communes in the French Revolution, the Soviets are industrial organizations uniting the functions of in dustry and government. In the Soviets appears the true form of government of the proletariat, based upon the producers organized in the workshops, In the workshops lies not only the power of the workers for the revolution, but equally /the groupings upon which is based the self-government of the oncoming communist society of Socialism. And the Soviets, combining temporarily political and industrial functions, are developing the forms out of which will emerge the communist, industrial ¦'government" of the days to come, The tendency of previous revolutions is the dominant fact of the Russian Revolution, The proletarian revolution in Russia has revealed clearly and in definite form the methods and the puq>oscs, the action and the "state" by means of which the proletariat can conquer power and accomplish its emancipation. XVI TUB PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA The definite success of the proletarian revolution in Russia depends not alone upon the Russian masses, but much more upon tlie revolutionary action of the masses in the rest of Europe. The Russian Revolution cannot accomplish that which the French Rev olution accomplished — wage war upon the whole of Europe. The strength and the weakness of the proletarian revolution in Russia is precisely that the other European nations are much more highly developed economically. Revolutionary France was the most ad vanced nation economically in Europe (except England), and this greater economic power was a source of unparalleled political and military vigor to France, making feasible a war against all of Europe. But the proletarian revolution in Russia is vulnerable to a concerted attack of European Imperialism, because the other nations of Europe can mobilize infinitely superior economic forces; simultaneously, this situation is one favorable to the Russian Rev olution, since tne higher stage of economic development in the other nations prepares the conditions for supplementary revolutionary action, which alone can ultimately preserve the Russian Revolution. Monarchic Europe could not produce a revolution in accord with that in I*' ranee; modern Europe can produce a proletarian revolu tion in accord with that in Russia. The proletarian revolution in Russia requires and struggles for the Social Revolution in Europe. The revolution of the proletariat is an international revolution. The proletarian revolution in Russia, the climax of the war, marks the entry of the international proletariat into a new .rev olutionary epoch. In this epoch the Social Revolution is no longer an aspiration, but a dynamic process of immediate revolutionary struggles. The new epoch is an epoch of revolutionary struggles, in which the proletariat acts definitely for the conquest of power. This new revolutionary epoch has been objectively introduced by Imperialism, and subjectively initiated by the proletarian revolution in Russia. Imperialism creates a revolu.ionary situation, a crisis and a breach in the old order through which the proletariat may break through for action and the conquest of power. This is an historic fact of the utmost importance. It means the preparation of the proletariat for the final struggle against Capitalism, the necessity of clear-cut, uncompromising action in the aotivity of Socialism; — it means, moreover, the t evolutionary reconstruction of Socialist policy and tactics, in accord with the INTRODUCTION XVII imperative requirements of the new revolutionary epoch. The proletarian revolution in Russia marks a recovery from the great collapse of Socialism upon the declaration of war in 1914. and during the war; but at the same time it emphasizes that collapse. Moderate Socialism, which during the war betrayed the proletariat and Socialism by accepting the policy of imperialistic governments, developed into a counter-revolutionary force; and it .icted against and betrayed the proletarian revolution in Russia b) rejecting the call to action of revolutionary Russia. After having overcome moderate, petty bourgeois Socialism in its own councils, the pro letarian revolution in Russa had to struggle, must struggle against moderate Socialism throughout the world. And by "moderate Socialism" is meant not simply the Social ism of the "right" which accepted the war, but equally the Socialism of the "centre," which either op|>oscd the war from the start or adopted an oppositional attitude after preliminary acceptance. It was not simply the Socialism of the "right," of Plekhanov and the other social-patriots, but equally the Socialism of the "centre," of Cheidse and Tseretelli, that the revolution in Russia had to over come. This moderate Socialism in other belligerent nations refused to act in solidarity with the revolutionary proletariat of Russia, or else camouflaged its -|>etty bourgeois soul by means of honeyed words, while refusing to accept the struggle for deeds. The collapse of the "centre" is particularly emphasized, — that Socialism wliich is neither fish, flesh nor yet fowl ; expressing an atrophied Marxism, which is neither revolutionary nor of Marx; in the atti tude of wliich the phrase surpasses the substance; and which, pre cisely because it uses Marxist and revolutionary phrases in its criticism of the "right," is particularly dangerous. Plekhanov was not much of a problem to the Russian revolutionary proletariat: he was ignominiouslv cast aside; but it required much more initiat ive and energy to cast aside Tseretelli and Cheidse. When the pro letariat of Germany acts, it will unceremoniously cast aside the Scheidemanns and the Cunows; but it may be directed into the swamps of compromise by the Kautskys and and the Ilaases. Tlie proletarian revolution must discard the miserable masters of the phrase and tl>e poltroons in action. The proletarian revolution in Russia, accordingly, in its dominant Bolshevist phase, initiates not alone a new revolutionary epoch in the proletarian struggle, but equally a new epoch in Social ism, makes mandatory the reconstruction of Socialism in accord with the policy and practice of the proletarian revolution in Russia. XVIII THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA There are two vital stages in the development of Socialism —the stage of its theory, and the stage of its practice. The Communist Manifesto, roughly, marked the first stage. The Manifesto, supplemented by the general theoretical activity of Marx, provided the proletariat with a theory of its historic mission, and developed the understanding of the conditions nec essary for its emancipation. This was an epochal and revolutionary fact. The proletariat, a despised and lowly class, was conceived as a class socially the only necessary class, destined to overthrow Capitalism and realize the dream of the ages — social, economic and individual freedom. Itself an oppressed class, the proletariat, through the expression of its class interests, was to annihilate all oppression. The proletariat, through the theory of Socialism, was intellectually made equal to its historic mission — socially, economically and intellectually, the proletariat was a revolutionary class upon which history imposed a revolutionary mission. The actual practice of the movement, however, was conservative, a conservatism determined by the -conditions under which i. oper ated: Socialism was only intellectually an essentially revolu'onary thing — in ultimate purpose, but not as yet in immediate practice. The genius of Marx, to be sure, projected a general conception of revolutionary practice ; but this part of his ideas played only a secondary role in a movement dominated by conservative policy. The proletarian revolution in Russia, as determined by the practice and program of the Bolsheviki, marks the second vital stage in the development of Socialism — .the stage of its revolution ary practice. The epoch of Marx developed the theory of Social ism, the epoch of Lenin is developing its practice: and this is precisely the great fact in Russia — the fact of Socialism and the revolutionary proletariat in action. The left wing of the Social ism of yesterday becomes through the compulsion of events the Socialism of revolutionary action in the days to come. As Marx is the source of Socialist theory, so the proletarian revolution in Russia is the source of Socialist practice. Its uncompromising spirit, its sense of reality, its emphasis on the general mass action of the revolutionary proletariat, its realization of the deceptive character of the parliamentary regime and the necessity of anni hilating that regime, its use of all means compatible with its pur poses in the revolutionary struggle — all this and more marks the proletarian revolution in Russia as peculiary characteristic of the Social Revolution of the proletariat that will annihilate the ra pacious regime of Capitalism and Imperialism. INTRODUCTION XIX Capitalism and Socialism are mobilizing for the great, the final and decisive struggle. The call to action of the proletarian revolu tion in Russia will soon — now, perhaps — marshal the iron battalions of the international proletariat. The material comprised in this volume, consists largely of [a mass of articles written by Lenin and Trotzky during the act ual course of the Revolution A the material accordingly is not alone a record of history, but a maker of history — original sour ces. I lhave knit the material together by means of supplementary chapters of my own^ XDie bulk of the material is here published for the first time in this country, either in Russian or in English; a small part has already appeared in The Novy Mir, The Nav International and The Class Struggle^] I wiifh to express my appreciation to A. Menshoy, Nicholas I. Hourwich and Gregory Weinstein, editors of The Novy Mir. who provided me with a part of this material, and to John Reed, who provided me with the material comprised in Chapter III of Part One, the final chapter of Part Three, and the chapters by Trotzky in Part Six. Louis C. Fraina. October, 1918 The Proletarian Revolution in Russia CONTENTS Page PART ONE — THE FIRST STAGE OF THE REVOLUTION BY N. LENIN Introduction 3 I — The Bourgeois Revolution 17 II— The Council of Workers and Soldiers 24 III — Party Divisions 31 IV — Problems in Tactics 42 V — Supplementary 56 PART TWO — THE GENERAL PROGRAM OF THE BOLSHEVIKI BV N. LENIN Introduction 64 I — Proletarian Policy 71 II — The Agrarian Problem 74 III — Industrial and National 80 IV — The New Type of Government 82 V— War and Peace 86 VI — Socialism and the War 92 VII — Armaments and War 136 VIII — International Socialism 144 PART THREE — THE STRUGGLF. FOR STATE POWER BV N. LENIN AND LEON TROTZKY Introduction 159 I — Class Character of the Revolution 170 II — The Dual Authority 173 III — Peace and Reaction 179 ]V— The Farce of Dual Authority 185 V — Democracy, Pacifism and Imperialism 193 VI — The July Uprising 201 VII — After the Uprising 204 VIII — All Power to the Soviets! 210 IX — Constitutional Illusions 215 X — Lessons of the Revolution 223 PART FOUR — THE REVOLUTION IN CRISIS BY LEON TROTZKY Introduction 237 I— What has Happened ? 241 II — Elements of Bonapartism 247 III — The Army in the Revolution 255 IV— What Next? 263 V — The Character of the Russian Revolution 268 VI — International Tactics 275 PART IIVE — THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION CONQUERS BV LOUIS C. FRAINA I— The Kornilov Revolt 283 II — Bolshevism Conquers 287 III — Dictatorship of the Proletariat and Civil War 297 IV — Tlie Constituent Assembly 304 PART SIX — THE REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE FOR PEACE BV LEON TROTZKY AND N. LENIN Introduction , . 315 I — Peace Negotiations and Revolution 328 II— What is a Peace Program? 331 III — Status Quo Ante Bellum 335 IV— Right of Self-Determination 339 V— -The United States of Europe 343 VI— At Brest-Litovsk 348 VII— Why Soviet Russia Made Peace 353 VIII— Peace — and Our Task 361 PART SEVEN — THE SOVIET REPUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS BV N. LENIN Introduction 3-V I— The Problem of Organization 372 II— A New Phase of the Revolution 377 III — Management and Production 383 IV— Democracy and Proletarian Dictatorship" 393 V— The Old Order and the New 401 SUPPLEMENTARY — FOREIGN RELATIONS I— Socialist and Imperialist Diplomacy (Chicherin) 409 II— Intervention in Russia 428 III— The Terror in Russia (Chicherin) 438 IV— Intervention, Armistice, Peace (Chicherin) 442 V— The International Revolution (Lenin) 449 PART ONE The First Stage of The Revolution By N. LENIN INTRODUCTION The revolutionary mass action of the workers of Petfograd, thenfl strikes, demonstrations and riots, was the force the impact of which made Czarism totter on its throne and then dragged it to the ground inr ruins. It was this irresistible mass action that smaehed through the barriers* of authority and rent asunder the fetters of the ideology of submission. It was this elemental action that swept away the apathy of other groups of tuo ¦masses and rallied them for the Revolution. It was this proletarian action that encouraged the soldiers to revolt and secured their adhesion to the revolutionary cause. And this great action had been preparing itself through out the agonizing years of the war, of hunger, of misery and of oppression. Hatreds and rancors develop, the forces of revolt accumulate; but the mass of the people is apathetic, feeling itself helpless before the imposing enginery of authority, until action somewhere, somehow, breaks loose and throws the whole of society up into the air. The proletariat, united by the discipline* of industry, rendered conscious of class by a common life and common' oppression, aware of its control of the economic process, was the only class capable of developing (he initial action out of which could arise the general mass action of revolution. It is a fact of history, and a fact that Imust be emphasized, that the, workers of Petrograd made the Revolution; it was their revolutionary blows that shattered Czarism The liberal bourgeoisie and the propertied classes generally did not participate in the actual making of the Revolution; their contribution was the passive one of not opposing the workers when the forces of revolt flared up into action, and of being willing to use the conquests of the workers in their own class interests. Same months before the great revolt, Paul N. Milyukov, leader of the Constitutional Democrats, the party of the bourgeoisie, declared : "If victory enn be secured only by means of a revolution, then we don't want any victory." And on February 23, 1t*lon lot masses, that Ib, when they embrace, In the *lrst plar-e, the worker* of faetorlea and plants. To make the workers quit their machines and Htands; to make them walk out of the factory premises Into the street; to lead them to the neighboring plant; to proclaim there a cessation of work; to mako new rnaHHett walk out Into tin- street; to go thus from factory to factory, from plant to plant, Incessantly growing In numbers, sweeping fiollcn barriers, Absorbing new maRscs that happened to come across, crowd- nit the Htreetii, taking possession of buildings suitable for public meetings, fortifying those buildings, holding continuous revolutionary meetings with audiences coming nnd Kolng, bringing order Into the movements of the mnnHCH, arousing their spirit, explaining to them the aim and the meaning of what ts going on; to turn, finally, the entire city Into one revolutionary camp, 'this Is, broadly speaking, the plan of action The starting point ought to bo the factories nnd the plants. That means that street manifest ations of a serious character, fraught with decisive events, ought to begin wHih political strikes of the masses. — Leon Trotsky, "The Proletariat and tho Hcvolutlon"(l«04). INTRODUCTION 7 night the Council of Empire sent a telegram to the Czar, pleading for "the immediate convocation of the legislative bodies, the retirement of the present staff of the Council of Ministers, and the entrusting to a person deserving of the national confidence, to present to you, Sire, for confirmation, the list of a new cabinet capable of managing the country in complete accord with the representatives of the people. Every hour is precious. Further delay and hesitation threaten incalculable misfortunes." Among the signatures was that of A. F. Guchkov, a few days later to become Minister of War in the cabinet of the "revolutionary" Provisional Government The counter-revolutionary character of the "Duma Committee'' was evi dent not only in its parleys with the Czar, but in the additional fact that the first act of its head, Rodzianko, was an order to disarm the masses. Tha Committee still hoped, even after its defiance of the Czar, to prevent the monarchy from being annihilated, and it sent Guchkov and others to the front to acquaint the Czar with the situation and again plead with him. But the masses refused to limit the Revolution. A Council of Workers and Soldiers was organized in Petrograd, which in a proclamation on March H said: "All together, with united forces, we shall fight for the complete removal of the old government and the convocation of a Constituent As- esmbly, chosen on the basis of universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage." This accelerated and decided the course of events. On March 15 the Czar was arrested, and abdicated, naming Grand Duke Michael Alexandrov- itch as regent. The Duma Committee appointed the cabinet of a provisional government, with Prince Lvov as Premier, Milyukov Minister of Foreign Affairs, Guchkov Minister of War and Marine, and Kercnsky Minister of Justice. On March 16 the Provisional Government issued the following declaration: "Citizens: The Executive Committee of the Duma, with the aid and support of the troops and the people of the capital, has succeeded in triumph. ing over the dark forces of the old regime. "The new cabinet will base its policy on the following principles: "1. — An immediate general amnesty for all political and religious of fences, including terrorist acts and military and agrarian crimes. "2. — Liberty of speech and of the press, assembly, unions and strikes, with extension of political liberty to those in military service within the limits of military requirements. "3— Abolition of all social, religious and national restrictions. "4. — Immediate preparation to convoke, on the principle of universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage, a Constituent Assembly, which will establish the form of administration and constitution. "5. — Substitution of a national militia in place of the police, with chiefs elected and subject to the local administrations. "6. — Communal elections to be based on universal suffrage. "7— Troops which participated in the revolutionary movement will not be disarmed, but will remain in Petrograd. "8.— While maintaining strict military discipline for troops on active service, all limitations upon soldiers in the enjoyment of public rights accorded other citizens are to be abolished. "The Provisional Government desires to add that it has no intention to take advantage of the circumstances of war to delay the realization of the measures of reform mentioned above." 8 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA The Provisional Government, however, did not consider that the mon- ftrchy had been abolished. In a speech in Catherine Hall of the Duma, Milyukov had expressed the intentions of the new government: "The old despot, who brought Russia to the edge of disaster, will vol untarily abdicate or be deposed. The government will pass to a regent, the Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovitch, and the heir Alexis the Czarevitch. (Yells— 'But that is the old dynasty I') Yes, gentlemen, that is the old dy nasty, which perhaps you do not like and which perhaps I dislike myself. We propose a parliamentary constitutional monarchy." But the Revolution had spread throughout Russia, and in the army; it was deemed prudent to wait upon events for a restoration of the monarchy. Grand Duke Michael declined to accept the regency, urged "all citizens to submit to the Provisional Government," and said he might accept the throne if offered by the Constituent Assembly. Not only was the Provisional Government ideologically and politically inclined to the restoration of monarchy, it was part and parcel of all the imperialistic causes and purposes involved in the war previously organized and directed by Czarism. The urge for peace had animated the masses. But Milyukov declared on behalf of himself and his colleagues in the new govern ment: "We assume control of the government in order to bring victory to the Russian arms." On March 17, Foreign Minister Milyukov, in a note to the representatives of Russia abroad, said: "In the domain of foreign policy the cabinet, in which I am charged with the portfolio of the ministry of foreign affairs, will renviin mindful of the international agreements entered into by the fallen regime and » ill honor Russia's word. . . . The government of wliich I am a part will devote all its energy to preparation of victory." In a proclamation issued March 19, the Provisional Government emphasized the attitude of Milyukov : "The government will do its utmost to provide the army with everything to bring the >var to a victorious conclusion. The government "will faithfully observe all alli?nces uniting us to the other powers and all agreements made in the p..**."*.' The determination of the Provisional Gov ernment to adhere to the r.tpici >c foreign policy of Czarism was emphasized again and again. It cona'vti t':. overthrow of Czarism as being simply a means of more efficiently carrying ,ut the policy of Czarism. The imperial istic bourgeoisie was in power and its predatory character was immediately manifest. The issue of war and peace split the Revolution, and acted as an acceler ator of the struggle of class against class. Class relations and class policy became the determining factor's in the course of events. The circumstance that the Revolution occured in the midst of a general imperialistic war, in which world power was at stake, made it impossible for the bourgeoisie to compromise or conceal its class interests: the imperialistic war had to be continued. But the masses wanted peace, and it was through the issue of peace, which could not be avoided or compromised, that class antagonisms developed immediately and acutely, and aroused anew the revolutionary con sciousness and action of the masses. In the normal times of peace, it would have been much more difficult to drive on the bourgeoisie to the fatal con clusion of its class policy, much more difficult to deliver the masses from the deceptions and ideology of the bourgeoisie. The issue of peace assisted! mightly in accomplishing the work of clarification, events proving to the masses that peace itself was a class issue: the proletariat and the impover- INTRODUCTION 9 bhcd peasantry wanted peace, the imperialistic* bourgeois* and it* liberal" •ycopbants clamored for war. "Peace, land, and liberty" was the slogan of the Revolution ; the Mlyukov-Guchkov government granted the usual "bour geois freedoms" and promised fuller liberty and land— in future ; while it pre pared to wage a new and more aggressive war. The personnel of the govern ment had been changed, but its policy was still the policy of the regime of Czarism. At this stage, the Russian Revolution is identical with and yet dissimilar to the earlier, bourgeois revolutions. It is identical in this, that the bourge oisie does not make the revolution but steps in and tries to direct its course and policy, assuming control of the government; it is dissimilar in that the opposition of the proletariat to the bourgeoisie is not disorganized, inchoate, unaware of means and purposes: the masses do not disintegrate, becoming the helpless prey of the bourgeoisie, but are organized and disciplined through their own class organizations and class policy. In spite of immaturity, im mediate hesitations, compromises and defeats, these organizations and this class policy impulsively drive the masses onward toward future action, providing the mechanism for the development of fuller class consciousness and class action. The significant and determining fact was the formation of two governments: the government of the bourgeoisie, the imperialistic Provisional Government, and the "government" of the revolutionary masses, the Soviet, or Council, of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates. Immediate antagonisms developed between these two governments, antagonisms that acted as an educator of the masses and as a means of converting the general revolution into a revolution definitely and consciously of the proletariat and proletarian peasantry. Councils were organized throughout the country, and in the army. These Councils were thoroughly democratic and representative institutions, con sisting at first of Councils of Soldiers, of Workers, and Peasants; later the Bolsheviki organized separate Councils of the poorest peasants and of farm workers to intensify the agrarian class struggle, and rescue the mass of the peasantry from the domination of the more prosperous and petit-bourgeois, peasants, who naturally were conservative. The delegates to the Councils of Workers were elected directly by the workers in factories and plants, on the basis of equal male and female suffrage, each person over 20 having the, •right to vote. The representation at first was rather haphazard, but the principle was there and it gradually acquired more adequate expression. AH delegates could be recalled immediately by their constituents. The functions of the Councils of Workers' Delegates varied with conditions and the con sciousness of the masses. In certain sections they took over, even at this early stage, all the functions of government, and organized their own vol unteer police of workers. Where employers shut down plants as a means of starving the workers, many of these local Councils expropriated the plants and granted the workers power to manage them directly. The Councils of Peasants' Delegates, where dominated by the radicals, began immediately to seize the land and put in opeiation an agrarian revolution. These Soviets acted as the centre of the elemental bursting forth of the life of the people, ot their political activity and purposes. Indeed, this new life of the people, of a people awakening after the sleep of ages, was positively feverish. In spite of the attempts of the Provisional Government to suprcss them, 10 THE PROLETARIAN . REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA Councils of Soldiers' Delegates were organized in the army at the front In the early days of the Revolution, news of events in Petrograd was scarce, but the soldiers were prepared for revolt, and, scattered and without contact with each other, Soviets of Soldiers were organized. The officers acted against these organizations, but the soldiers persisted, and recalcitrant officers were often expelled. The army Soviets were not simply propaganda groups : they often assumed the functions of commissariat and of education, and often military functions when deserted and betrayed by the officers. The basis of the army Soviets were local commitees in each company, regiment, .division, corps, culminating in the general Soviet of Soldiers' Delegates. These Soviets issued literature, held meetings, published newspapers, and became the means of revolutionary expression for the soldiers. Each of the Soviets of a particular character elected delegates to an Executive Committee; and eich of the Soviets, of workers, of soldiers, and of peasants, elected delegates to a Congress of All-Russian Soviets, which tin turn elected a Central Executive Committee sitting permanantly in Petro grad. The first All-Russian Soviet Congress was held in Petrograd in June, and it was decided to convene the Congress every three months. The Soviets comprised the actual mass of the people, the only organized expression of the Revolution, and it alone possessed a real power. It was fully admitted after the organization of the Provisional Government that it had no power except in "appeals to patriotism," and it tried to obscure all issues by appeals to the patriotic emotions of the people — "The Country is in danger!" The Councils constituted the real power; and yet they yielded all power to the Provisional Government of the imperialistic bourgeoisie. The Soviet constituted itself as the active representative of the revol utionary masses. But it consisted, as yet, of the old revolutionary opposition, of the moderates whose "legal" propaganda had made it possible for them to acquire publicity and general reputations: the Council did not represent the new revolutionary activity and requirements. The Council dared not assume power, it dared not act aggressively. As eatly as the end of March a split is apparent between the Council and the revolutionary masses; the split widens under pressure of events, and upon arrival of revolutionists from Siberia and from foreign countries. Upon his arrival in Petrograd, early in April, Lenin becomes the storm-centre of the revolutionary opposition equally to the moderates in the Council and to the Provisional Government. The Provisional Government's policy of an aggressive war and an im perialistic peace aroused the anger, the impatience and the action of the masses. A strike movement of protest against the Milyukov policy is devel oping, and on April 9 Premier Lvov declares, in answer to the general dis cussion of war aims: "Free Russia does not aim at the domination of other nations, or at occupying by force foreign territories, but to establish a durable peace based on the rights of nations to decide their own destiny," The moderates in the Council used this declaration to urge support of the war and of the Provisional Government. On the same day, Cheidse, President of the Soviet Executive Committee, proclaims: "Russia's national watchword must be unity— front and rear." But on April 10, Minister of Foreign Affairs Milyukov, in an interview, expresses himself in favor of the Russian annex ation of Constantinople. On April 12, a preliminary Congress of Soviets adopted a resolution, 325 to 55, declaring it would be a good thing should the INTRODUCTION II Provisional Government make an official renunciation of any program of annexations, but as long as these conditions are unfulfilled and the war con tinues, the revolutionary democracy must support the war in all ways. This attitude was emphasized by the appearance at the Congress of George Plek hanov, Russian social-patriot, and Will Thorne and M. 'Moutct, sent by the British and French governments, who pledged Russian and Allied labor to the war. At the same time, the Congress decisively rejected a resolution of the Bolshcviki that the Soviets should assume all government power, but a proclamation was issued to the people to disregard orders of the Provisional Government where they conflicted with the Council's. All this, of course, was in contravention of the desires of the masses and the objects of the Re\olution. The Provisional Government was distincly counter .evolutionary, and yet it was supported by the representative of the masses, the Soviet. On all issues the government adopted a reactionary policy. It did not make any effort or lay plans to convene the Constituent Assembly. It did not energetically act to provide food for the people, being restrained by its capitalistic affiliations and interests. It acted against the expropriated peasantry by protecting the interests of the large propertied owners. It retained the bureaucracy of the old regime and its attitude on all large problems of policy. It proclaimed itself the government for carrying on on imperialistic war, in spite of promises and subterfuges to the contrary. The Provisional Government allowed the institutions of the old regime to exist, and directed its activity toward the disarming of the masses and the castration of the Revolution. Minister of War Guchkov used every mean! and opportunity to destroy the Soviets in the army, and the Soviets behind the front were intrigued against in an effort to destroy their influence and existence. On all general problems of the Revolution the Provisional Gov ernment was reactionary; bu> it was its reactionary attitude on war and peace that was most manifest to the masses, provoking discontent and action. On April 9, in answer to the universal unrest and questionings on war aims, Premier Lvov had declared in favor of "a durable peace based on the rights of nations to decide their own destiny." This was construed by the moderate Socialists as favoring the Revolution's program of "no annex ations, no indemnities, and self-determination of nations." But the secret treaties of Czarism had been neither repudiated nor published: until this was done, words had not even the empty value of words. And on May I, Minister of Foreign Affairs Milyukov, in a note to the representatives of the Provisional Government in the Entente countries, emphasized "the nation's determination to bring the war to a decisive victory. ... The Provisional Government in safeguarding the rights acquired for our country will main tain a strict regard for its engagements with the allies of Russia." This was the signal for the elemental bursting forth of the indignation and protests of the masses, which had been accumulating for six weeks. It was accelerated but not produced by the intensive and uncompromising propaganda of the Bolshcviki. The Council, apprehensive of the impending action of the masses, demanded that the Provisional Government withdraw Milyukov's note accepting the old treaty obligations, that the treaties should be publishcdd and active steps taken to end the war. The government de clined to modify the May 1 note of Milyukov. The masses in Petrograd broke loose. On May a and 3 the workers demonstrated in great masses, 13 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA shouting "Down with the Provisional Government I" The streets of Petro grad swarmed with furious and indignant demonstrators, including whole regiments of soldiers. The resignation of Milyukov was demanded and re fused. One regiment appeared before the Marinsky palace to arrest the iministers of the Provisional Government and depose it by force. Minor counter-revolutionary demonstrations, crying "Down with Lenin," were sub merged in the general revolutionary mass action. The demonstrations con tinued until May 5: and, the Council having by a majority of 30 voted its confidence in the Provisional Government, the masses vented their disap proval by hostile demonstrations against the Council. The Provisional Gov ernment was tottering, but the Courcil came to its support, and ordered all meetings and demonstrations prohibited for two days. At a meeting of the Council, Tseretelli declared: "The trouble is now over, and the Provisional Government will remain in power." The masses, abandoned by their own representatives, met for the moment a temporary defeat. The Provisional Government was still in power, maintained in power by the moderates in the Council of Soldiers' and Workers' Delegates; but there was, nevertheless, a profound change in the situation. The masses had been temporarily dispersed, but not appeased or suppressed. The position of the Provisional Government was insecure; the Soviet, not being responsible for the government could at any moment nullify the measures of the government. The Provisional Government, accordingly, invited the Executive Committee of the Soviets to participate in forming a coalition government, the invitation being extended through Kercnsky. The Soviet at first refused, but the Provisional Government threatened to resign unless its offer of coalition was accepted. Simultaneously General Kornilov resigned as Commander-in-Chief ; this action was followed by other generals and by Minister of War Guchkov as a protest against the Soviets, and particularly against the army Soviets, and as a concerted conspiratory move to frighten Russia by disorganizing the army. These events threw the Executive Committee of the Soviets into a panic, and on May 18, with a vote of 41 to 19, it decided to accept the coalition thrust upon it by the imperialistic Provisional Government. This action was approved by the Petrograd Council, against the opposition of the Bolshcviki, who, through Trotzky, declared: "Division of power will not cease with the Socialists' entry into the ministry, a strong revolutionary power is necessary." 'Milyukov and other ministers resigned, and on May 19 a coalition ministry was formed, which included Kerensky as Minister of War and Marine, M. I. Skobeleff, vice-president of the Soviet [Executive Committee, as Minister of Labor, Victor Chernov, Social-Revolutionist, as Minister of Agriculture, I. G. Tseretelli, Menshevik-Socialist, as Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, and the "Populist-Socialist" Pyeshekonov as Minister of Food and Supplies. The annoucement of this coalition declared that it was based "on three cardinal points upon which the Government, the Exe cutive Committee of the Duma, and the Council of Workers* and Soldiers' Delegates have agreed," the "three cardinal points" being as follows: "-¦.—Tlie unity of the Allied fronts. "2.— The fullest confidence of the revolutionary democracy in the re constructed cabinet. "3.— A plenitude of power for the Government." In other words, the Soviets officially accepted the policy of the Provis- INTRODUCTION 13 ional Government, surrendered to the government, making the Soviet the government's moral apologist and physical supporter. The Provisional Gov ernment had absolutely no power by which it could maintain itself; munic ipal elections though Russia cast an overwhelming majority of votes for Socialist candidates, the bourgeois Cadets being everywhere swamped; and yet the Council accepted coalition with the discredited Cadets. By a simple stroke of moral courage and revolutionary spirit the Council could have constituted itself tie government, discarding completely the bourgeoi lie. Hut the petet bourgeois psychology of the moderate Socialists dominating the Council resulted in »n acceptance of the ideology of a "democratic war/' of "national unity," and a naive faith in the "necessity'' of the bourgeoisie to establish the conquests of the Revolution, The representatives of the prole. tariat having taken tht initiative, it was inevitable that the peasants should accept the coalition, as they did on May 24, through the Peasants' Congress, The Soviets, howevu*, were not by any means united on the problems of the day. In the Soviets were represented three groups: the Social-Revolu tionists and Mcnshcviki, constituting the moderates (Cheidse, Skobclcff, Tse retelli, Chernov), and tht Bolshcviki, constituting the uncompromising group (Lenin, Zinovicv, Kamcmv, and, later, Trotzky, who, while not an affiliated Bolshevik, had a similar jrogram and acted with the Bolshcviki.) The Social-Revolution«ts represented the peasantry, not the mass of agricultural workers, but largely the middle class peasantry dominated by the petty bourgeois ideology. Ihey represented that conservative middle class which in previous revolution had always acted against and betrayed the proletariat. The interests of tiis class of peasants moved within the orbit of the bourgeois regime of property, and its representatives acted accordingly. In the normal times of peace the Well-to-do, bourgeois-aspiring peasants first awoke to political consciouiness, constituted the real force in the Social- Revolutionary Party, and impa-tfd to the party its petty bourgeois ideology. For a time the peasants, and particularly the soldiers, who were mostly peasants, accepted the leadership of the Social-Revolutionary moderates; but as the Revolution developed its intagonisms and awoke to political conscious ness the great mass of agricultural workers, the Social-Revolutionary Party split, and the Social-Revolution sts of the Left accepted the Bolshevik pro gram. But at this stage, and foi months after, the Social-Revolutionists and their petty bourgeois policy corttitutcd the real governing force in Russia. The Mensheviki represents the dominant, moderate Socialism, that moderate Socialism which directed the International straight to disaster by accepting the policy of their go-ernments in all belligerent nations; andi which, moreover, had become, in the words of Trotzky, the greatest obstacle to the revolutionary development »f the proletariat. The Mensheviki repre sented those social elements whi'h everywhere have dominated organized Socialism,— the intellcctualss, libc-al democrats, bourgeois reformers, the lower petit bourgeoisie, and, above all, the upper raycrs of the. working class, the skilled workers, which evcrywhee are a reactionary force in the council! of Socialism, having been corrupted by Imperialism and striving to secure a place as a caste in the governing system of things. The ideology of this group was the ideology of the petite bourgeoisie, of the bourgeois revolution in which, according to Marx, the jhrase surpasses the substance. The Mensheviki were moderate and hesitart, convinced that, the Russian Revol- *4 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA ution being a bourgeois revolution, the proletariat should support the bourge oisie; they mistrusted the masses and the action of the masses, trying td limit the Revolution with the orbit of the bourgeois democratic regime, legality and parliamentary action. The Mensheviki used the masses only when they considered action necessary, which was when their own petty purposes were in jeopardy: the masses were a tool to be used or discarded at will; independent action of the masses was discouraged and suppressed, if necessary. Instead of encouraging the dynamic action of the masses, bringing the initiative and action of the masses to bear on all the problems of the Revolution and developing the Revolution, the Mensheviki used the masses as an instrument with which to coerce the bourgeoisie into granting petty, illusory concessions. The Bolshevik! constituted the party of the revobtionary proletriat; in the words of Lenin, "the class conscious workers, day laborers, and the poorer classes of the peasantry, who are classed wih them (semi-proletar iat)." The Bolshcviki were completely revolutionary, not in the sense of revolutionary phrases, but in the sense of reprcsen'ing the industrial prole tariat and the great masses which alone constitute the instrument of the revolution. Representing the interests and ideology of tve industrial masses, and in continual and active contect with them, the Bobheviki developed that gen eral, creative and dynamic mass action out of vhich revolutions arise and develop uncompromisingly. Bolshevism insisted that the bourgeoisie was counter-revolutionary, that precisely as the Revolution had been made by the proletariat, it could be established and cortinucd only by the proletariat in a merciless struggle against the bourgeoisie, that this struggle was determ ined, not by any abstract considerations of vhether Russia was ready for Socialism, but by the actual forces of develojment and the immediate prob lems of the Revolution; and that, accordingly the revolutionary proletariat, acting together with the mass of impoverished peasants, must constitute it self into a dictatorship through the assumption by the Soviets of the com plete power of government. The Bolsheviki constituted a practical -evolutionary movement, not a group of theoreticians and mongers of dogmai. They worked out a program, * a practical program of action in accord with the immediate problems of the Revolution and out of which would necessar'ly arise the struggle and power for the larger, ultimate objectives. Revolutions do not rally round dogmas, but programs. The sense of reality of the -evolutionist is expressed in this, that he translates his revolutionary aspirations into a revolutionary program in accord with the historic conditions, an! which can rally and unite the masses for action and the conquest of pover. Revolutions make their own laws, their own programs. Revolutions ar< the great educators and develop ers of class consciousness and action. It vas the great merit of the Bolshe viki that they gauged accurately the prevailing forces, that they were rev olutionists in action, using the situation to educate the masses and awake their consciousness and revolutionary srugglcs. After the first two weeks of the itrugglc against Czarism, the course of the Revolution is determined by lie struggles within Ihe Soviets, J>c- tween the moderates, represented by tie Social-Revolutionists and the Men sheviki, and the revolutionists, represented by the Bolshcviki. INTRODUCTION XS The Council, dominated by the moderates, allows every opportunity of action to escape it, becomes a conservative factor in the existing system of things. The Council realizes the immense task it has to perform, but shrinks before the immensity of the revolutionary requirements, shrinks into conservatism and "Jie acceptance of the bourgeois policy of the Provisional Government. The Council »ppeal:i to the proletariat to overthrow the imperialistic governments, and allows 'tis own imperialistic bourgeoisie to assume power; it calls upon the Socialists to break the "civil peace" with the ruling class, and itself acquiesces in an amorphous but disastrous "national unity;" it calls for the prolcta-ian revolution in Europe, but denies and postpones its own proletarian revolution. The Council hesitates, and out of hesitancy comes compromise aid an emasculation of the Revolution. It imagines that the course of the Rcrolution may be determined by interminable discussions among the intellectuals: it acts only under pressure of the revolutionary masses. The Councl talks revolution while the Provisional Government acts reaction. It takes tefuge in proclamations, in discussion, in appeals to a pseudo-theory, in everything save the uncompromising revolutionary action of the masses directed aggressively to a solution of the pressing problems of the day. The moderaics in the Council are tangled and paralyzed in the coils of pseudo-Marxism: Russia's primitive capitalist development is not yet prepared for Socialisn, therefore the bourgeoisie must rule, a theory com pletely neglecting the hct that the coming of Socialism consists of a pro cess of struggles in which the tktemining factor is the matuarity and class power of the proletariat While indulging in this speculative theory, the moderates ignored the fact that the proletariat, and not the bourgeoisie, had I made the Revolution; that the bourgeoisie were inimical to the Revolution; that the immediate probbms of the Revolution could be solved only by the Councils, and that a:cordingly the Councils should assume control of the Revolution. But thty who always had preached Socialism now shelve Socialism as a problem of the future, conceiving Socialism as an abstract problem of the days to cone instead of as a dynamic theory of immediate revolutionary struggle. Th< Revolution was a proletarian revolution in fact — this was the great circumsnnce. Where revolutions do not act immediately and aggressively, particularly the proletarian revolution, reaction appears and controls the situation; and th? formerly revolutionary representatives of the masses accept and strengthen this reaction. Once revolutionary ardor and action cool, the force of bcurgeois institutions and control of industry weight the balance in favor cf the ruling class. Revolutions march from action to action: action, more iction, again action, supplemented by an aud acity that shrinks at nothing, — Jiesc are the tactics of the proletarian rev olution. The revolution seizes power and uses this power aggressively and uncompromisingly; it allows nothing to stand in its way save its own lack of strength. But the CouncJ hesitates and compromises, until the day comes when the accomplished fact of reaction stares it in the face. I The Council hampers and tries to control the independence and action of the masses, instead of directing them in a way that leaves the initiative to the masses — developing the action of the masses out of which class power arises. Acquiring prestige through its criticism of the government, the Council lacks the revolutionary policy and consciousness of assuming full 16 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA governmental power when conditions convert crkidaoi Into tie necessity for RCtlon. Instead of action— phrases ; instead of revolution—* paltering with the revolutionary tasks. On May 8, when the masses burst forth in an elemental protest agaist the Provisional Government, the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates might, and should, have constituted itself the government Its failure to do to marked the decline of its power and influence as then constituted? the revolutionary task now became that of revolutionizing the Council, of discarding its old policy and personnel. And this process of revolutionary transformation could develop only out of the masses, not out of the Council's Intellectual representatives: these representatives had to be thrust aside, brutally and contemptuously. The first phase of the Russian Revolution consists of the week March 8 to March 15, resulting in the overthrow of Czarism. Tie first stage of the Revolution ends with tlie formation of the coalition government on May 19,— the stage of the bourgeois revolution and the establishment of the bourgeois republic. Part One, by Lenin, deals with this first stage. Sources : Articles in Pravda, the central organ ol the Bolsheviki pub lished in Petrograd: "Letters from Abroad, Number One," and "Our Posi tion;" a lecture delivered by Lenin in Switzerland ihortly before his de parture for Russia; a speech to the Ismailoff regiricnt in Petrograd; >B. pamphlet, "Letter on Tactics;" and a pamphlet ot "Political Parties lik\ Russia," — all published during March iand April. Mote: all dates are new style, not Russian style. L. C. F. THE BOURGEOIS REVOLUTION. The first revolution arising out of the general imperialistic war has broken out. And this first revolution will certainly not be the last The first phase of this first revolution, namely, the Russian Revolution of March, 1917, has been completed. Nor will this first phase be the last phase of our Revolution. How could this "miracle" happen in eight days — the period in dicated by M. Milyukov in his boastful telegram to all the represen tatives of Russia abroad, — the "miracle" involved in the destruction of a monarchy that had maintained itself for centuries and con tinued to maintain itself during three years of powerful, universal class wars, the revolutionary period of 1905 — 1907? In nature and in history there are no miracles; yet, every great convulsion of history, including every great revolution, presents such a wealth of events and material, such unexpectedly peculiar transformations in the forms of conflict and of the alignment of the fighting forces, that there is much that must appear miraculous to the ordinary mind. In order tiiat the Czarism should be destroyed in a few days, there was required the co-ordinating action of a whole scries of con ditions of an historical imjoortance, and world-wide in bearing. Let us point out the principal ones. The main condition for the realization of the "miracle" of the Russian Revolution was the scries of revolutionary struggles during the years 1905 — 1907, slandered so much by the present masters of the situation, the Guclikovs and Milyukovs, the same gentlemen now pleased with the "glorious revolution" of 1917. But if the Revolu tion of 1905 had not effectively prepared the ground and shown to all parties what action means, exposing the supporters of the Czar in all their infamy and brutality, a rapid victory would have been im possible in 1917. J8 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA A fortunate coincidence of favorable conditions in 1917 enabled different social forces opposing Czarism to co-operate in one general (action for power. These forces are: 1. — Anglo-French financial capital, that rules and exploits the whole world through investments and Imperialism. In 1905 it was opposed to the revolution, and helped Czarism crush the revolution by means of the big loan of 1906 (largely engineered by French capital against the despairing protest of the revolutionary demo cracy). But now Anglo-French finance took an active part in the revolution by organizing the coup d'etat of the Guchkovs and Mil- yukovs, the bourgeois interests and the leading military groups for the overthrow of the Czar. From the standpoint of world-politics, the Provisional Government of Milyukov-Guchkov is simply tlie clerk of the banking firm England, France & Co., and a means of prolonging the imperialistic war. 2. — The defeats in the war waged by the government of the Czar. These resulted in clearing out the old guard in control of the army and created a new and young bourgeois group of officers. 3. — The Russian bourgeoisie in its different groups. The bour geoisie organized itself rapidly between 1905 and 1917, and has united with the nobility in the struggle against the corrupt govern ment of the Czar with tins intention of enriching itself by exploiting Armenia, Constantinople and Galicia. 4. — The further power, which combined with the bourgeois, imperialistic forces, and the most important of all, was a strong proletarian movement, the organized and revolutionary workers. The proletariat made the Revolution by demanding peace, bread and liberty. It had nothing in common with the imperialistic govern ment, and it secured the support of the majority of the army, con sisting of workers and peasants. Without the three years, 1905— 1917, of tremendous class con flicts and revolutionary energy of the Russian proletariat, this second revolution could not possibly have had the rapid progress in dicated in the fact that its first phase, the overthrow of Czarism, is accomplished in a few days. The Revolution of 1905 ploughed the ground deeply and wiped out the prejudices of centuries; it awak ened to political life and struggle millions of workers and tens of millions of peasants. The 1905 Revolution revealed to the workers and peasants, as well as to the world, all the classes (and all the principal parties) in their true character, the actual alignment of their interests, their powers and modes of action, their immediate and ultimate objects. This first revolution, and its succeeding THE BOURGEOIS REVOLUTION. *9 co-unter-revolutionary period during 1907 — 1914, fully revealed the nature of theCzarist Monarchy and brought it to the verge of ruin, exposing all its infamy and vilenoss, and the cynicism and corruption of the Czarist circles dominated by the infamous Rasputin; it ex posed all the bestiality of the Romanoff family — that band of assassins which bathed Russia in the blood of the Jews, the workers, the revolutionaries — those "first among peers," who owned millions of acres of land and would stoop to ;tny brutality, to any crime, ready to ruin or crush any section of the population, however nu merous, in order to preserve tlie "sacred property rights" o!f themselves and of their class. Without the Revolution of 1905 — 1907, without the counter revolution of 1907 — 1914, it would have been impossible to secure so clear a self-definition of all classes of the Russian people and of all the n~.;onalities in Russia, or so clear an alignment of these classes in relation to each other and to the Czarism, as transpired during th The "Advisory Commission" consisted of representatives of the Pctro. grad Council, among them Chernov and Tseretelli, who later became members of the Provisional Government cabinet. The "Commission" tried to advise and control the government, with very slight success.— L. C. F. 'The Paris Commune armed the people and abolished completely the old class of officials, as it abolished the division of functions in the legislative and (administrative deparUncnts of government. The Commune united the func tions of legislature and administration within one body, as the Soviets have been doing in Russia since the revolution of November 7, which established the supremacy of the Soviets.— L. C. F. PARTY DIVISIONS. 37 gradually to be replaced by the national militia and its various div isions. J2.— Must officers be elected by the so'diersf A and B. No, it would be bad for the landholders and the} capitalists. If the soldiers cannot otherwise be contented, we must promise them this reform and afterwards take it away from them. C. Yes. D. Not only elected, but every step of every officer and general must be subject to control by special soldiers' committees. 13. — Are arbitrary removals of their superiors by the soldiers desirable? A and B. They are very bad. Guchkov has already forbidden them, even threatening the use of force. We must support Guch kov. C. Yes, but it remains to be decided wheather they must be removed before or after consulting the Advisory Commission. D. They are in every respect indispensable. The soldiers will obey only the powers of their own choice; they can respect no others. 14. — Ifn favor of this war or against it? A and B. Unquestionably in -favor, for it brings in unheard of profits to the capitalists and promises to perpetuate their rule, thanks to dissension among the workers, who arc egged on against each other. The workers must be deceived by calling the war a war for national defence, with the special object of dethroning Wilhelm. C. In general, we are opposed to imperialistic wars, but we are willing to permit ourselves to be fooled, and to call this a war of "revolutionary defense," and to support an imperialistic war waged by the imperialistic government of Guchkov, Milyukov & Co. D. Absolutely opposed to all imperialistic wars, to all bourge ois governments which wage them, among them our own Provis ional Gofernmcnt; absolutely opposed to "revolutionary defense" pcal for international solidarity to wage the common fight for the salvation of all nations from the bloody butchery, is purposely misinterpreted and falsified to the workers and soldiers of England and France. The western masses, hampered by martial law, are made antagonistic to the Russians by this in sidious agitation. Comrades B. Brizon, A. Blanc and Raffin-Dugcns have protested in the French parliament against this despicable distortion of the truth. "Never has the revolutionary uprising of a people been ro betrayed by the very elements from which it was justified in ex- 60 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA pecting sympathy and support "The crowning act in this shameless campaign is the decision of the French parliamentary group of the Socialist Party to send three of its members, E. Lafont, M. Moutet and Marcel Cachin, to Russia to influence the Russian proletariat along lines of national sentiment. "The nature of this mission is amply characterized, according to newspaper reports, by the fact that it has the sanction of the Parliamentary Commission of Foreign Affairs, whose chairman is a typical representative of French plutocracy, Georges Leygues. And this mission is sanctioned without any pretense at hiding its official nature from the Russian proletariat, by the representatives of a party whose program is the Social Revolution and International Fraternity. "It is no more than fair to mention, however, that the members Moutet and Lafont have on several occassions in the course of the war defended the interests of Russian emigration, of tlie Russian Volunteers and of the Russian press in France against the ruling powers. But to avoid disturbing the civil peace with the exploiting classes they, like the party majority, never once protested in Parlia ment or in the public press against the despicable service that the French Republic rendered to Czarism in persecuting emigration and throttling the Socialist press. Like the majority of the party, they too avoided a break with the government at any cost, whether in connection with the execution of tlie eleven Russian volunteers in France, or in the case of the brutal suppression with the assistance of the French authorities of the uprising of the Russian expedi tionary corps in Marseilles. They did all they could to prevent the French proletariat from learning anything of these heroic deeds of the bourgeoisie, for freedom and justice, and now that they bow down lo the floor before the Russian Revolution, the Russian pro letariat is fully justified in reminding them that, to the very last, they were silent accessories to the uninterrupted series of misdeeds that constituted the essence of Czarism. "As for Marcel Cachin, it may be of value to the Russian comrades to know that he has already done similar service on an officially sanctioned mission, in going to Italy to paralyze the agita tion of our glorious comrades when they tried to prevent their government from forcing the Italian people into the world-wide slaughter. The presence of this French Sudekum In the delegation and the absence of adherents of the radical minority, which really represents the majority in the party, speaks volumes, but does not SUPPLEMENTARY 6l give evidence of a very high regard for the Russian proletariat nor of a very strong desire to come to an understanding with its repre sentatives, "In stating these things we hardly consider it necessary to emphasize that this inspired campaign travels under a false cloak in labeling itself as the solidarity of the French and English pro letariat, which latter really desires peace no less than the proletariat of Russia and Germany. These conspiracies and recommendations emanate from that portion of the working class parties which are corrupted by ministerial ambitions, and if communications of a far different tenor from the other portion do not reach us, it is solely because the censorship in conjunction with nationalist spokesmen stifles all free speech. You may be sure that the international sec tion of the French and English Socialists arc deeply and honestly interested in the battle which the Council of Workers and Soldiers is waging for peace and democracy and that they believe as you do, that the Russian Revolution can attain victory only if it is not paralyzed by the poisson gas of world war. "We are firmly convinced that the French Sudckums will be given the same sort of reception by the Russian revolutionary pro letariat as was accorded their prototype by the Italian comrades. . . The most worthy answer to all such plots and schemes will be the redoubled energy of the representatives of the Russian proletariat in their chosen course. "The confusion created by this policy against the Russian Revolution in the ranks of the proletariat of western Europe, can best be brought to a complete stop if the Council of Workers' Dele gates will, over the heads of the patriotic agents of Imperialism, address directly to the working class organizations throughout the world an appeal for international, united action in the direction of universal peace. "Long live the international solidarity of the proletariat in the battle for freedom! "Down with the agents of militarism and the advocates of murder! "Long live the democratic Republic! Long live Revolutionary Socialism !" L. C. F. PART TWO The General Program of the Bolsheviki By N. LENIN INTRODUCTION The Important characteristic of the program of the Bolsheviki is that it is an expression of general revolutionary Socialist policy; it is particular In applying itself to the concrete problems of the Russian Revolution, but international in the scope of the universality of its general principles. Bolshevism, as an expression of Socialism, is not a peculiar Russian product ; it prevails in all nations where the proletariat and Socialism are In action, and it represents everywhere the revolutionary opposition equally to Capitalism and moderate, opportunistic Socialism. Nor is the program of the Dolsheviki a spontaneous and temporary development of the peculiar conditions prevailing in Russia during the Revolution of 1917; this program in its fundamentals was developed prior to, during, and subsequent to, the Revolution of 1903, and rigidly adhered to by the Bolsheviki. Until the. Revolution of 1917, the program of the Bolsheviki was a brilliant formula tion of revolutionary Marxian Socialism; during the Revolution, it was a brilliant performance in applied revolutionary tactics. A determining phase of the Russian Revolution was the implacable struggle waged between the moderate and the revolutionary Socialists. It was the decisive struggle of the Revolution. Nor was this struggle deter mined by peculiarly Russian conditions; these conditions simply brought it to a violent climax. The -struggle between the moderate and revolutionary Socialists is in action throughout the International Socialist movement; the iniovcmcnt everywhere is split into warring groups, and the struggle between the Socialiat factions is often as bitter as the struggle against Capitalism itself. The fundamental issues in dispute arc in general the same as the issues between the Bolsheviki and the Mensheviki. Moderate Socialism, which is dominant and which acted with the imperialistic governments dur ing the war, represents the old labor movement, hesitant, interested in middle class reforms, controlled by reactionary skilled labor and animated by the petty bourgeois ideology ; and moderate Socialism, in its extreme social-patriotic expression, represents a conscious, counter-revolutionary compromise with Imperialism. The revolutionary Socialists, on the cont rary, represent the new facts of the labor movement, as determined by the epoch of Imperialism and the emergence to consciousness and action of the great industrial proletariat, the masses of unskilled lnbor. Imperialism, in its form of expression as State Capitalism, has united into one reactionary bloc all layers of the ruling class, including skilled labor; this unity ha.s swept along with it the dominant Socialism, representing skilled labor and the small bourgeoisie. Under the conditions of imperialistic State Capital- INTRODUCTION 05 ism, the old conditioiu and ideology of democracr are passing away, and th* struggle becomes the clear-cut one of Socialism against Capitalism, — the immediate struggle for the Social Revolution. This was the attitude of the Bolsheviki, the conviction that Imperialism has objectively introduced the social revolutionary era, and that the proletariat must act accordingly. The upper and the lower bourgeoisie, which previously struggled each against the other, the strength of the lower bourgeoisie determining the expressions of radical bourgeois democracy, are now united in reaction, united by the imperative necessity of national and class solidarity in (he struggles of Imperialism. This reactionary unity of the bourgeoisie is char acteristic of all large nations. But in Russia this fact was at the same time emphasized and obscured by the existence of Czarism. The reactionary character of the Russian bourgeoisie was emphasized by weakening its strug gle against Czarism in fear of the revolutionary proletariat, the action of which alone could overthrow Czarism, and by its desire to retain Czarism in the form of a capitalistic autocracy useful in the struggle against its pro letariat and its international imperialistic rivals. The reactionary character of the Russian bourgeoisie was obscured by the fact that it was compelled to criticize Czarism in the attempt to make Czarism conform to capitalistic requirements, as the autocracy did in Germany ; this developed an amorphous "liberalism" of the bourgeoisie which temporarily deceived the masses. This deception was emphasized by the moderate Socialists who argued that as the revolution was a revolution against Czarism, it was necessarily a bour geois revolution. But the social and economic conditions of twentieth cen* tury Russia were not by any means similar to those of eighteenth century France. Then, the bourgeoisie was the consciously revolutionary force; now, it was the industrial proletariat. The historic milieu was a new one. The insistence upon Russia being ripe only for the bourgeois revolution ignores a number of factors that completely alter the problem. The central factor is the existence of Imperialism, which not only makes a national democratic revolution of the bourgeoisie in semi-feudal, capital istic countries incompatible with the requirements of modern Capitalism, but which equally makes Europe as a whole ripe for the immediate revolu tionary struggle for Socialism. Imperialism determines Capitalism in a reactionary policy; but, simultaneously, it creates the conditions under which the proletariat may express its revolutionary action for the over throw of Capitalism. The bourgeois democratic revolution is not an indispensable necessity at all stages of the development of Capitalism; it occurs at particular stages and under certain conditions, end may be dispensed with, as in Germany. Imperialism negates democracy, projecting a new autocracy necessary to maintain the proletariat in subjection, expressing the requirements of con centrated industry, and indispensable in the armed struggles produced by imperialistic competition. Without *a revolutionary, class conscious pro letariat in Russia, there would in all probability have been no overthrow of Czarism. The Russian middle class had neither the will nor the homo- geniety of class to overthrow Czarism; the larger bourgeoisie wished to convert Czarism into an instrument of its own. The situation, after the abortive revolution of 190s, was shaping itself as in Germany, where the 66 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA imperialistic bourgeoisie compromised with and accepted autocracy as an instrument for promoting its brutal class interests. The requirements of Imperialism are incompatible with bourgeois democracy, with the paltry democracy of the bourgeoisie in its earlier "liberal" era. What other mean ing is there In the International reactionary trend away from democracy and toward autocracy? , Distrust of the bourgeoisie ei3ant8. This dictatorship would proceed with gradual measures for the complete OTerthrow of the rule of capital, based upon the immediate handing over of the land to the peasants and establishing workers' control over industry, and operating through a democratic state of workers and peasants, function ing, however, as a dictatorship in relation to the other classes. The Bolshevist attitude toward peace was determined by the daas struggle : they objected not to war, but to the character of the particular war being waged and to the class in control of its direction and purposes. The peace propaganda of the Bolsheviki was in accord with the policy of revolutionary Socialism; it was in no sense a pacifist propaganda, l>ut a iln a report concerning a unification meeting of Socialist groups, published In 1906, Lenin argued against the confiscation of Lands as a party demnnd. Lenin favored the •elitirr of lands by the peasants; later the Constituent Asaombly, or a similar body, would ratify the selzurj and "confiscate" the lands. Confiscation, argued Lenin, Is a Juridical procens, and must be preceded by the revolutionary action of solzure. Lenin, accordingly, favored selsure as a general revolutionary prlnclpls of action; during the Revolution of 1917, the problem of seizure had an Immediate practical Importance— the resumption of agricultural product- Ion to prevent starvation and crush the conscious sabotage practli»ot*l by the rich peasants. INTRODUCTION .69 propaganda of dasss war using the opportunity of an imperialistic war to develop the proletarian revolution and overthrow the bourgeoisie. Pacifism depends upon existing social relations and the bourgeois governments to introduce a democratic peace; the Bolshevist attitude emphasized th;it pa cifism inevitably promotes Imperialism, that during a war the proletariat must use all its forces to overthrow the government and establish itn own supremacy. Having established a dictatorship of the proletariat, revolution ary Socialism will then proceed to act upon the problems of war -and peace according to its own policy and the facts of the prevailing situatioa And the action of a proletarian dictatorship might conceivably be the promotion of a revolutionary war, or the conclusion of a temporary peace; in either case, the facts of the whole international and national situation must deter mine the immediate policy adopted. The Bolsheviki proceeded upon the theory that the proletarian revolution was the only adequate Socialist answer to the imperialistic war, and one of their objectives was to assist in developing the proletarian revolution in Europe. Unlike the moderate Socialists, however, who everywhere aspired -and worked for a revolution in the enemy country, the Bolsheviki Sniggled for their own proletarian revolution as the only acceptable revolutionary Socialist tactics and the only adequate means of inspiring the proletariat of the other nations to revolt. Revolutions are not determined by mathe matical considerations, but by opportunity; and the Socialist must create hil own opportunity and use it whether the other nations act or not. Imperialism means, generally, Capitalism at the climax of its develop ment, Capitalism ripe for the introduction of Socialism. The west European countries are ripe for the Socialist community; they have the material basis in the maturity of the industrial development of Capitalism which is in dispensable for the complete establishment of Socialism. These countries must act for the Social Revolution ; their proletariat must be encouraged to initiate the revolution against Capitalism. This is precisely what the Bolshcviki meant by "a civil war of the oppressed against the oppressors, and for Socialism." Not in Russia alone, but throughout Europe, the proletariat must be called to revolutionary action, Russian revolutionary Socialism using its power and strategic position to arouse that international proletarian class struggle which would transform itself into the Social Revolution. Two forces are necessary to establish Socialism: the material — Capitalism in the fullness of its development of the forces of production; the dynamic— a revolutionary, class conscious proletariat. The material force exists in west Europe, but not fully in Russia; the dynamic exists in Russia, but, as yet, not in west Europe. Now, consider Europe as one great social arena, as it is in fact. The revolutionary energy of the Russian proletariat, uniting with the impulse of a war that is developing intense revolutionary currents, might conceivably arouse the European proletariat to initiate the Social Revolution. It is clear, accordingly, that the program of the Bolsheviki did not de pend upon any one single feature. There are Socialists, for and against the Belsheviki, who for motives of their own separate the Bolshevist policy into two phases, internal and international, agreeing with one and disagree ing with the other, in accordance with the peculiar considerations dominant 70 TIIK PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA In their purposes. This constitutes an absurdity— it is either a negation of Socialist policy or a result of unclear thinking. The policy of the /Bolshe viki, internally and internationally, was determined by the requirements of Socialism and the class struggle; of the immediate requirements of the Russian Revolution and of the international struggle for peace; of the ne cessity for promoting the proletarian revolution in Russia and of assisting in developing the proletarian revolution in Europe as the climax of the war. It was this full-orbed character of the Bolshevist program, realized through uncompromising adherence to revolutionary Socialism and the class struggle, that, when their efforts for a revolution in the Central Empires temporarily failed, did not leave them stranded and helpless, but able to concentrate on the internal development of their own revolution as a preparation for the day when the international revolutionary struggle against Capitalism might break loose. In action, the central feature of Bolshevist policy is its emphasis upon mass action as the dynamic means of the proletarian revolution. In a crisis, and it is only in a crisis that a revolution develops, the government controls rigidly all the normal methods of action; through mass action the proleta riat sweeps away the barriers of authority, rallies and unites the workers for action and the conquest of power, sweeps into the maelstrom of revolt all the physical and moral forces of the proletariat. Through mass action, the masses are awakened to consciousness and action, become the arbiters of their own destiny: no revolution is a revolution unless the masses actively and consciously step forth upon the stage of events. The revolution cannot operate within the orbit of legality: legality may become the expression of the accomplished facts of the revolution, it is never the mechanics of the revolution itself. Legality is the ideology of the ruling class; action thte ideology of the revolutionary class. The first requirement is action thaft will produce accomplished facts. — revolutionary action, the seizure of rev olutionary power through dynamic and creative mass action. It is a process of struggle. Otherwise, the revolution withers with compromises. Sources: Chapter I, from an article on "Louis Blancism," in Pravd* (April) ; II, from a pamphlet, "Aims of the Proletariat in Our Revolution;" •nd from an article in Pravda on "Workers and Peasants;" III, IV, V and IX, from "Aims of the Proletariat in Our Revolution ;" VI, "The Collapse of the International,'' from The Communist, 1915; VII, "Disarmament," from the Sbornik Sotzial-Demokratia. Note: chapters VI and VII, written before the Revolution, are included because they are indispensable in understanding fundamental phase of the program and policy of the Bolshcviki. LCF. PROLETARIAN POLICY In the Revolution of 1848, in Paris, Louis Blanc, the French Socialist, sadly distinguished himself by passing over from the position of the class struggle to the position of petit bourgeois il lusions. These illusions, employing a phraseology not unlike that of "Socialism," actually served to strengthen the influence of the bourgeoisie. Louis Blanc expected to receive aid from the bour geoisie; his hopes aroused hopes in others, as if the bourgeoisie could aid the workers in the matter of an "organization of labor" —this unclear expression was supposed to express a "Socialistic" tendency.1 In Russia, at present, the policy of Louis Blanc has met with complete success in the "Social Democracy" of the right wing, the Menshcvik Party. Cheidse, Tseretelli and many others, who are now leaders of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates, have assumed precisely the position of Louis Blanc. In all the chief questions agitating the political life of our day, these leaders have accepted the petit bourgeois illusions of Louis Blanc. Take, for instance, the war question. The proletarian standpoint in this matter consists of a def inite class characterization of the war and irreconcilable hostility to an imperialistic war, — that is, to wars waged between groups of imperialistic countries, (no matter whether they are monarchic or republican,) for a division of the capitalist spoils. 'Upon the overthrow of the monarchy by the uprising of the Parisian masses in 1848, a Provisional Government was formed, of which Louis Blanc and other representatives of the masses of his type were members. The workers had made the revolution, but the bourgeoisie took control of the new government, Blanc and his group aiding in this consummation by their petty bourgeois policy. Blanc's great scheme was the establishment of na tional workshops for the unemployed ; the scheme was adopted by the new government, but sabotaged for the purpose of discrediting lilanc and demor alizing the masses. Roughly, the situation in Russia during the fir«t and second stages of the Revolution was similar; and measures proposed by the "Socialist" representatives in the government were sabotaged by the bour geois representatives. — L. C F. JW THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA The bourgeois standpoint consists of outright justification of tlie war, outright "defense of the fatherland," that is, a defense of the interests of the capitalists and their right tt> annexations. The petit bourgeois standpoint differs from this in that it renounces an nexations, "condemns" Imperialism, and "demands" from the bourgeoisie that it shall cease to be imperialistic, although the petit bourgeois does not require the bourgeoisie to pass out of its world- imperialistic relations, or out of the capitalistic structure of so ciety. Limiting himself to this innocent, innocuous, shallow decla mation, the petit bourgeois as a matter of fact follows meekly after the bourgeoisie, "sympathizing" somewhat with the proletariat, in words, but remaining completely dependent on the bourgeoisie, be ing unable or perhaps unwilling to grasp the revolutionary means of removing the capitalist yoke, which is the only means that can save humanity from Imperialism. "Demanding" from bourgeois governments that they make a "solemn declaration" renouncing annexations, — this seems to the petty bourgeois the height of audacity as well as an illustration of anti-imperialistic consistency of action. It is not difficult to see that this is the policy of Louis Blanc at its worst. Has the compe tent bourgeois politician ever had any difficulty in pronouncing the most "radical" and sonorous of phrases, saying little, to be sure, and binding the speaker to nothing, in discussing the matter of annexations "in general"? But when it comes to actions, it is al ways possible to walk the tight-rope, as the bourgeois Rech has been doing lately ; in fact, this paper has recently had the effrontery to declare that Courland (recently annexed by the imperialistic rob bers of the German bourgeoisie) is not a land annexed by Russia! This is the most shameless deception of the workers, the most in tolerable misrepresentation, for any man who has even the most rudimentary political education must recognize that Courland has always been a territory annexed by Russia. Admitting, if only' for a moment, that the bourgeois ministers arc models of righteousness and honesty, that they really believe implicitly in the possibility of a renunciation of annexations, while preserving Capitalism, and really leant to renounce annexations, — making, for a moment, this truly Louis-Blanc admission, here is our question : Can any man of mature intellect be content with what people think of themselves, without verifying these thoughts by their acts? Is it possible for a Marxist not to distinguish be tween desires, assertions, objective realty? Answer: It is not. PROLETARIAN POLICY 73 Annexations are imposed -by the bonds of capital: financial, banking, imperialistic capital, — that is the present economic founda tion of annexations. From this angle, annexation means the politi cal guarantee of profit on the millions of capital "invested" in thousands and thousands of enterprises in the annexed territories. It is impossible, even in one's wishes, to renounce annexations without taking decisive steps toward the overthrow of Capitalism. Is it true, as the Social-Revolutionary Rabochaya Gazetto, Pkkhanov's Yedinstvo, and the other Louis Blancs of our bour geoisie are ready to infer, and actually do infer, that we must not take any decisive steps toward overthrowing capital? That we must be content, for the present, with reducing annexations to a minimum? No. We must energetically struggle for the over throw of capital. The necessary measures must be introduced ju diciously and gradually, and must be based on the support alone of the class consciousness and organized activity of the oppressed majority of the workers and of the poorest peasants. These steps must be taken. And the Soviets of Workers' Delegates in quite a number of Russian cities have already undertaken them. There is now necessary in the order of the day a decisive, irrevocable formulation of the distinctions between us and the Louis Blancs, the Cheidses, Tscrctcllis, Stckloffs, the Mensheviki, the Social-Revolutionary Party, (etc. We must point out to the masses that the policy of Louis Blanc will destroy and is destroy ing the onward success of the Revolution; that even the newly- won liberties will be lost, unless the masses understand the danger of petit bourgeois illusions and unite with the class conscious workers in their judicious, gradual, well-planned, yet firm and immediate, steps toward the realization of Socialism. Outside of Socialism there is no deliverance of humanity from wars, from hunger, from the destruction of millions and millions of human beings. II THE AGRARIAN PROBLEM i It is impossible to tell at present with any degree of cer tainty whether a gigantic agrarian revolution will take place in the near future in Russia. We cannot say how deep the cleavage is between the two agricultural classes: hired laborers and pau perized farmers (agricultural proletariat) on the one hand, and the wealthy and well-to-do farmers (large and small capitalists) on the other. All this can only be decided by practical experience. Wc are convinced, however, that the proletarian party must at once not only formulate an agrarian program, but devise ways and means of bringing about an agrarian revolution in Russia. We must demand the nationalization of all lands, that is, the surrender of all lands in the country to a central governmental de partment. This department shall ascertain the area of agricultural lands, establish rules for the conservation of forests, and prevent anyone from standing between the land and those who till it, pre vent every form of traffic in land. The disposition of all lands, the establishment of local rules concerning the use of land must not be left to the caprice of bureaucrats and officials, but be vested in the local Councils of Peasants' Delegates. In order to pcrftct the system of bread production and in crease the production in general, in order also to develop rational cultivation on a large scale, socially controlled, we must sec to it that every Peasants' Council organizes out of the various estates c-oiifi'.c.tcd by the community a large public estate controlled by the Council of Farm Laborers' Delegates. To offset the petty bourgeois rant which (ills the speeches of the Social-Revolutionists, the empty words concerning the "stand ard of consumption," the "standard of labor," the "socialization of the lnnd," -etc., the proletarian party must make it clear to the ma-i-cs that the system of small property in the production of goods car.r.ol in any way save mankind from poverty or oppression. THE AGRARIAN PROBLEM 75 Without necessarily breaking up at once the Councils of Peas ants, the proletarian party must show the necessity of organizing special Councils of Farm Laborers' Delegates and other Councils composed of delegates of the pauperized peasants (agrarian prole tariat), or, at least, of standing committees, of delegates from these various classes, sitting as separate factions or parties within the Councils of Peasants' Delegates. Otherwise all the sonorous phraseology of the "friends of the people" on the subject of the peasants will be put to good use by the well-to-do farmers in fool ing the destitute agrarian masses ; for these farmers, after all, are 6imply another variety of capitalists. To offset the influence of the liberal, bourgeois, or purely bu reaucratic sermons delivered by many Social-Revolutionists in the Councils of Workers and Peasants, which preach that the peas ants must not seize the large estates or begin any land reform un til the Constituent Assembly meets, the proletarian party must urge the peasants to bring about at once an agrarian revolution and to confiscate at once the large estates upon the authority of the local Council of Peasants' Delegates. In this connection, we must insist on the necessity of increasing the production of food-stuffs, and absolutely forbid the destruction or wastage of cattle, tools, ma chinery, buildings, etc. n In No. 88 of the Isvestya of the All-Russian Council of Peas ants' Delegates there are printed a number of proposed laws, which are of interest in connection with tl*e agrarian problem in Russia. The first division of these laws deals with the general political premises, the requirements of political democracy, while the second division is concerned with the land question. The land demands of the peasantry in these proposed laws consist, first of all, in an abolition of all private ownership of land down to the peasant holdings, without compensation; in handing over to the state or the communes all parcels of land which are under intensive cultivation; in similarly confiscating all live stock and immovables (excluding those of peasants with small hold ings), and handing them over to the state or the communes; in the prohibition of hired labor; in equalizing the distribution of land among the toilers, with periodic redistributions, etc. Among the measures proposed for the transition period before the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, the peasants demanded the immedi-* '/6 THK PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA ate passing of laws requiring the cessation of all buying and sell ing of land, the abolition of laws permitting sales of land to the communes by persons intending to liquidate, or permitting the cutting down of forests, etc., for the conservation of forests, fish- cries, and other preserves, etc., for the abrogation of all long-term leases, and the revision of those made for shorter periods. A short reflection on these demands will show the absolute impossibility of securing the aid of capitalists in their realization — in fact, the impossrbilty of avoiding a break with the capitalist class, in short, a complete overthrow of their rule. The confiscation of all private ownership in land means the confiscation of hundreds of millions of bank capital, with which these lands, for the most part, arc mortgaged. Is such a measure conceivable unless the revolutionary plan, by the aid of revolution ary methods, shall break down the opposition of the capitalists? Besides, wc arc here touching the most centralized form of capi tal, which is bank capital, and which is bound by a million threads with all the important centers of the capitalist system of this great nation, which can be defeated only by the equally well-organized power of the proletariat of the citks. Moreover, there is the mat ter of handing over the highly cultivated estates to the state. Is it not clear that the only "state" which is capable of taking them over and actually administering them in the interest of the toilers, and not for the good of the chinovniks (officials) and of the capi talists themselves must necessarily be a proletarian revolutionary state? The confiscation of stud-farms, etc., and then of all cattle and immovables, these measures are not only increasingly crushing blows against private ownership of the means of production ; they are steps toward Socialism, for the passing over of this property "into its exclusive utilization by the state or the Communes," makes absolutely necessary a huge Socialistic system of agriculture, or, at least, a Socialistic regulation of its functioning. But, how about "the prohibition of hired labor"? This is an empty phrase, the helpless, unconsciously naive hope of the down trodden petty farmers who do not see how impossible it is "not to permit" hired labor in the country if it is to continue to be permit ted in the cities, — in short, that the "prohibition" of hired labor can never be anything else than a step toward Socialism. This brings us to the fundamental question of the relations of the workers to the peasants. The Socialist mass movement in Rus- THE ACRARIAN PROBLEM 77 sia has been going on for twenty years (if we count the great 6trikcs of 1896). Throughout this period, passing through the two great revolutions, there runs, a veritable red thread of Rus sian political history, this great question : shall the working class lead the peasantry forward toward Socialism, or shall the liberal bourgeoisie drag the peasantry back into a conciliation with Capi talism ? The revolutionary Social Democratic Party has all this time been fighting to remove the peasants from the influence of the Cadets and has offered them, in place of the Utopian middle class view of Socialism, a revolutionary-proletarian path to Socialism. "Conciliate yourself with the rule of capital, for 'we' arc not yet ready for Socialism," that is what the Mensheviki say to the peasants. In other words, they misrepresent the abstract question of "Socialism" as being the concrete question of whether the wounds inflicted by the war may be healed without taking resolute steps toward Socialism. The monarchy has been abolished. The bourgeois revolution was crowned with success, inasmuch as Russia became a demo cratic republic with a government consisting of Cadets, Menshe viki and Social-Revolutionists. But, in the course of three years the war has driven us thirty years ahead, has made compulsory military service universal in Europe, has led to a forced monop olization of industry and brought the most developed nations to hunger and unparalleled destruction, forcing them to take definite steps toward Socialism. Only the proletariat and the peasantry can overthrow the monarchy — that has been the fundamental declaration of our class policy. And it was a correct position, as the months of March and April, 1917, have once more confirmed. Only the proletariat, leading on the poorest peasants (the semi-proletariat) may terminate the war with a democratic peace, may heal its wounds, and may undertake the steps toward Social ism that have become absolutely unavoidable and non-postponable. That is the clear demand of our class policy at present. The course of history, accelerated by the war, has made such huge strides forward that the ancient slogans have been filled with a new content. For instance: "The prohibition of hired labor." Millions of impoverished peasants, in -'42 instructions, declare that they want to attack the problems of abolishing hired labor, but do not know how to go about it. But we know how. We know it can 78 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA only be done by co-operation with the workers, under their lead, and not "in agreement" with the capitalists. Only the revolutionary proletariat can actually carry out the above plan of the impoverished peasants. For the revolutionary proletariat is actually going about the task of abolishing hired labor, and by the only real approach, namely, by overthrowing Capitalism, and not by forbidding the hiring of labor. The revolu tionary proletariat is actually going to confiscate the lands, the property on them, the agricultural corporations — which is exactly what the peasants want. Here is the change to be made in the outline of the workers' appeal to the peasants : We, the workers, want to give you, and do give you, that which the impoverished peasantry wants and seeks without always knowing where to find it Wc, therefore, are de fending our interests against the capitalists, and these interests are those of the vast majority of the peasantry. Let me remind the reader of what Engels said, not long before his death, concerning the agrarian question. Engels emphasized the point that nothing was further removed from the minds ot Socialists than the intention of expropriating the smaller peas? ants, and that the latter should be made to see the advantage of the machine-process, Socialist agriculture, by the force of example alone. The war has now placed before Russia, in a practical form, this very question. Of farm property there is little. Simply con fiscate it, and "do not divide' the highly cultivated estates. The peasants have begun to see this. Need made them see it. The war made them see it. The farm accessories are not worth taking. They must be husbanded. But management on a large scale means the conservation both of labor on these accessories, and of many other things. The peasants want to retain their small holdings and to ar rive at some place of equal distribution. So be it. No sensible Socialist will quarrel with a pauper peasant on this ground. If the lands are confiscated, so long as the proletarians rule in the great centers and all political power is handed over to the prole tariat, the rest will take care of itself, will be a natural outcome of tlie "power of example"; practice itself will do the teaching. The passing of political power to the proletariat, that is the whota tiling. Then all the essential, fundamental, real points of the peas- THE AGRARIAN PROBLEM 79 ants' 242 instructions become realities. And life will point out with what modifications this realization is to proceed. iWe are not doc trinaires. We do not pretend that Marx or the Marxist know every de tail of the road which leads to Socialism. That would be folly, Wc know the direction of the road, we know what class forces will lead to it; but the concrete, practical details will appear in the experience of the millions when they tackle the job. Ill INDUSTRIAL AND NATIONAL The proletarian party cannot expect to introduce at a stroke Socialism into a land of small farmers as long as the down-trod den majority of the population does not realize the necessity of a Socialist revolution. It is only bourgeois sophists, however, juggling with pseudo- Marxist phrases, who can use that fact to justify a policy tending to put off immediate revolutionary measures, which were resorted to frequently in a practical way when the bourgeois governments went to war, for those measures were absolutely necessary to pre vent total economic bankruptcy and famine. Such measures as the nationalization of the land, of all the banks and financial syndicates, or at least their immediate regula tion by the Council of Workers' Delegates, do not mean the "in troduction" of Socialism, but they must be fought for, and as far as possible applied by revolutionary means. Without the adoption of such measures, which are mere steps toward Socialism, and which can all be enforced by economic action, it will be impossible to heal the wounds inflicted by the war and to prevent the threat ening bankruptcy, The proletarian party cannot remain idle in the face of the scandalous profits reaped by capitalists and bank ers out of the war. [The Bolsheviki advocated workers' control over industry, functioning through Councils organized for the purpose. A prac tical expression of this policy was the seizure of factories by the workers and their management through shop-committees. This was made necessary by the fact that employers, in order to strike at the revolution, either closed down their factories or sabotagd pro duction, thereby producing a terrific disorganization of the produc tive process. Out of this situation came the slogan, "Workers, seize the factories and operate them in conjunction with the techni cal staffs." The Iveavy taxation of profits, partial expropriation of INTRODUCTION 8 1 private capitals and the repudiation of national debts, were other measures urged by the Balsheviki,— F.J When it comes to the question of nationalities, the proletarian party must at once grant full freedom to secede from Russia to all the races or nationalities which were driven into subjection by the Czars, forcibly annexed to Russia', or compelled to remain within the Russian Empire. Any statements, declarations or manifestoes to the effect that we renounce annexations, and which arc not immediately followed by the granting of freedom to secede from Russia, is just bourgeois prattle calculated to deceive the people, or simply petty bourgeois scntimentalism. The proletarian party is trying to build up as large a national unit as possible, for this is in the interest of the workers; it is try ing to knit the nations closely together, but it docs not intend to bring about that consummation by the use of force, but through the free, fraternal union of the laboring masses of all nationalities. The more democratic the Russian republic will be, the more speedily it will organize itself into a republic of Councils of Work ers and Peasants, the more powerful the force of attraction of such a republic will be for the laboring masses of all nations. Full freedom of secession, the broadest local autonomy, full guarantees for the rights of minorities, — such is the program of the revolutionary proletariat. IV THE NEW TYPE OF GOVERNMENT. The significance of the Councils of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates is generally misunderstood because the ma jority of the people do not realize their class character and mean ing, the part they play in the Russian Revolution. The significance of the Councils is misunderstood for another reason, because they constitute an entirely new form of power, a new type of government. To this day, the most perfect type of bourgeois government has been the parliamentary democratic republic: power vested in a parliament, with the usual machinery of government, the usual system and organs of administration, — a standing army, a police and a bureaucracy, practically unchangeable, privileged, and standing above the nation. But the new revolutionary epoch, beginning with the end of the nineteenth century and determined objectively by Imperialism, has been pushing to the fore a new type of democratic government which in certain respects ceases to be a government, or, to quote Engels' words, "does not seem to be, properly speaking, a govern ment. " This is a government on the model of the Paris Commune, replacing the army and the police by an armed citizenry. That was the essential feature of the Commune, which has been so much mis represented and f.Iandercd by bourgeois writers, who pretend among other things that the Commune was trying to put Socialism into immediate practice. This is the new type of government which the Russian Revo lution began to organize between 1905 and 1917. The Republic of the Councils of Workers, Soldiers and Peasants, united in an All-Russian Council of Councils, — this is what is already coming into being in our midst, upon the initiative of millions of people. This is the government of a democracy which is taking the law into its own hands, which relies on itself alone and will not wait THE NEW TYPE OF GOVERNMENT 83 while certain gentlemen, Cadets and professors, elaborate nice little laws for a bourgeois republic of the parliamentary type, or while the pedants and routine worshippers of petty bourgeois Socialism, like Plekhanov and Kautsky, refuse to deviate from Marx' teach ings in governmental matters. The difference between Marxism and Anarchism is that Marx ism admits the necessity of government and governmental power in revolutionary periods generally, and during the period of transi tion from Capitalism to Socialism in particular. The difference between Marxism and the petty bourgeois, opportunistic Socialism of the Plekhanov and Kautsky type is that Marxism admits the necessity during the revolutionary period of a government not of the usual bourgeois parliamentary, republican type, but one similar to the Paris Commune. The main difference between the two types of government is this: It is extremely easy to revert from a bourgeois republic to a monarchy (as history proves), as all the machinery of repression is left undisturbed: army, police, bureaucracy. As in the Commune, the Councils of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates destroy that machinery, abolish it entirely. A republic of the parliamentary bourgeois type strangles and crushes the independent political life of the masses, prevents the masses from taking a direct part in the democratic up-building of the governmental activity from below. The Councils of Work- esr. Soldiers and Peasants do just the opposite. They reproduce the type of government established by the Paris Commune and which Marx called the "finally open form of government in which the liberation of the workers can really take place." People often say that "the Russian nation is not prepared for the introduction of a Commune." This was a favorite argument with the feudal lords when they explained that the peasants were not ready for freedom. The Commune, that is the Councils of Workers' and Soldiers' delegates, would not introduce, does not intend to introduce and should not introduce any reorganization which is not absolutely ripe not only in the economic activity but in the consciousness of the majority of the people. The more terrible the economic bankruptcy and the crisis produced by the war, the more we will need a perfect political form which will facilitate the healing of the wounds inflicted by the war upon man- 84 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA kind. The less experienced the Russian people is with organiza tion the more aggressively we must proceed with the constructive organization of the people itself, not merely through bourgeois pol iticians and bureaucrats. The sooner we cast off the prejudices instilled by the pseudo- Marxism of Plekhanov, Kautsky & Co., the more actively we will help the people every whece organize Councils of Workers and Peas ants. We must expect blunders in the first attempt at structural organization of the people, but it is better to blunder ahead than to lag behind ; for while we lag the bourgeois professors and jurists prepare bills for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, for the perpetuation of the parliamentary bourgeois republic and the suppression of the Councils of Workers' and Peasants' Delegates. If we organize and conduct an energetic propaganda, not only the proletariat but nine-tenths of the peasantry will rise against the re-establishment of the police, against an immovable and priv ileged bureaucracy, against an army which is separate from the nation. And such will be the new type of government. The sub stitution of a national militia for the police is a change which re sults logically from the whole course of the revolution and which has been adopted in most Russian communities. We must make it clear to the masses that in the majority of revolutions of the usual bourgeois type, a change of that sort was very ephemeral and that the bourgeoisie, however democratic and republican it may have been, soon returned to the former police system, the kind off police which is alien to the people, which is commanded by bour geois and is ready to assist in any attempt at oppression of the people. The only way to prevent a return to the old police system is to organize a national militia and make it part of the army, the army being replaced by an armed citizenry. The militia would comprise all citizens of both sexes between the ages of 15 and 65, these age limits being selected approximately to exclude minors and old people. Capitalists should pay their employes, servants and other subordinates for days which they have to serve in the militia. Un less women feci called upon to take an active part not only in political life generally, but and particularly in continuous general social work, it is idle to speak not only of Socialism but of complete democracy. Certain special functions of the police, such as the care of the sick, of abandoned children, the supervision of foodstuffs, THE NEW TYPE OP GOVERNMENT 85 etc., will never be satisfactorily discharged until women are on a footing of perfect equality with men, not only on paper but in re ality. We must not go back to the police system. To secure the in fluence of all organized bodies to support the project of organizing a national militia is one of the tasks that the proletariat must as sume, in order to protect and strengthen the Revolution and assure its normal development. WAR AND PEACE. The argument of "revolutionary defense" used by the moder ates to justify participation in this imperialistic war is simply one more symptom, one of the most fundamental and striking symp toms, of the petty bourgeois tide which has been swamping almost everything. It is, indeed, the worst obstacle to the furtherance of the movement and to the success of the Russian Revolution. Who ever stops short at that point and does not dare to keep his inde pendence, is lost to the Revolution. The masses, however, do not stop as leaders do and they have different ways, different methods of freeing themselves. Revolutionary defense is, on the one hand, the -result- of this deception practiced on the masses by the bourgeoisie, the result of the peasants' and workers' unthinking confidence ; and, on the other, it is an expression of the interests and standpoint of the petite bour- gcosie. The bourgeoisie deceives the people by playing upon the generous pride of the Revolution and pretending that, from a social and political point of view, the character of the war changed com pletely from the day when the Revolution substituted the bourgeois rqmblic for the Czar's monarchy. And the people believed this, for a while, still being in a measure the victims of old prejudices which caused them to see in the other races of Russia mere chattel slaves of Great Russia. The perversion of the Great Russian race by the Czars, who taught it to consider other races as inferior and belong ing "by right" to the Great Russians, could not ba straightened out all at once. Wc must make it clear to the masses that the social and politi cal complexion of the war is not determined by the good will of cer tain individuals or certain groups, but by the class which conducts the war, by the class policy of which the war seems to be a product, WAR AStf PEACE 87 by the alliances of capitalists, the dominant economic force in mod ern society, by the imperialistic character of international Capital ism, by Russia's financial and diplomatic dependence upon Eng land and France, etc. It requires skill to make these changes clear to the masses, and none of us could do that at a stroke, without somewhat blundering in the attempt. But such should be the trend or, rather, the real import of our propaganda, and it should not deviate a jot from it. The slightest concession wc make to "revolutionary defense" is an act of treason to Socialism, an abandonment of the internationalist position, re gardless of the beautiful phrases and the "practical" considerations by which we may try to justify it. The slogan "down with the war" is fine, but just now there are other duties to assume and the masses must be approached in a dif ferent way. That slogan reminds me of another slogan, "down with - the Czar," which in other days indiscreet agitators would shout in some village, after which they got thrashed. The rank and file of the "revolutionary defense" are good conscientious people; not as individuals, but as a group, they be long to the very class of workers and pauperized peasants which would not gain anything from annexations or the strangling of other races. They are quite different from the bourgeoisie and the intellectuals who know quite well that it is impossible to give up the idea of annexations as long as capital is allowed to rule, and who, devoid of conscience, fool the masses with high-sounding speeches and immediate promises. The rank and file of the "revolutionary defense" looks upon the whole thing in a simple matter-of-fact way: "I, for one, have no use for annexations, I have nothing against the Germans, I am just fighting for a good cause, not for any imperialistic interests." That is the type* of man to whom we must repeat ad nauseam. that it is not a question cf his own personal desires, but that what i? at stake is the position of the masses, their class or political posi tion, that the important thing is the connection between the war and cr:;.'talistic interests, with their international system of banks, etc. This is the only adequate way of fighting the "revolutionary defense" group, the only way wliich promises results, not quick re sults, but actual and durable results. 88 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA II The end of the war will not come by merely wishing it. Nor because one of the two belligerent groups wishes it. We can't put an end to the war by grounding arms. The war cannot be ended by "an agreement between the So cialists" of all nations," by "a decisive step on the part of the prole tarians of all nations," by "an act of will of all the nations," etc. These words are meaningless and yet they fill every article in the papers of the "revolutionary defense" group, of the half-baked in ternationalist groups, and the flood of resolutions, appeals, manifes toes and statements issued by the Council of Workers and Soldiers. These phrases simply express the empty, harmless, humanitarian longings of the small (bourgeois. There is nothing more dangerous than phrases like "the nation's declaration of peace," "the steps taken by the proletariat of one nation after after another" (after the Russians it would be the Ger mans' turn)' etc. All of which is pure sentimcntalism in the style of Ixwis Blanc, a part of the political game, The war was not started by the sinister will of robber capi talists, although it is fought purely in their interests and is not en riching anybody else. The war was a consequence of the develop ment of international Capitalism in the course of the past fifty years, of its endless connections and ramifications. Wc cannot wiggle out of an imperialistic war, we cannot have a democratic peace, but only a peace imposed by violence, until wc overthrow the power of Capitalism, until the powers of government pass into the hands of a different class, the proletarian class, The Russian Revolution of March, 1917, was the first step in the transformation of the imperialistic war into a civil war. That Revolution took the first step toward putting an end to the war. Another step, however, is needed to realize the end of the war; the surrender of governmental powers to the proletariat. This will start the assault on the international "front line trenches," the trenches of capitalistic interests. It is only after storming these trenchei that the proletariat will be in a position to save mankind from the horrors of war, and to secure for mankind the blessings of a dur able peace. In organizing the Councils of Workers' Delegates, the Russian Revolution has already given to the Russian proletariat the order to storm those trenches. WAR AND PEACE 89 III Resolution on War, passed by the General Conference of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (Bolsheviki), May 9, 1917. All voting in favor except seven, who abstained from voting. The present war, on the part of all the belligerents, is an im perialistic war, that is, it is fought by capitalists for the division of spoils through their domination of the world, for markets, for finan cial capital, for the suppression of backward nations, etc. Each day of war enriches the financial and industrial bourgeoisie and im poverishes and weakens the powers of the proletariat and the peas antry of all the belligerents, and later of the neutral countries. In Russia the prolongation of the war involves also a grave danger to the Revolution and its further development. The passing of government authority, in Russia, into the hands of the Provisional Government, that is, the government of the land holders and capitalists, did not and could not alter the character and significance of Russian participation in the war. This fact became particularly apparent when the new govern ment not only did not publish the secret treaties concluded between the late Czar and the capitalist governments of England, France, etc., but even formally confirmed these secret treaties, which prom ised Russian capitalists a free hand in China, Persia, Turkey, Aus tria, etc.. without consulting the Russian people. The concealment of these treaties from the Russian people completely deceived them as to the true character of the war. For this reason the proletarian party can support neither the present war nor the present government, no» its loans, without breaking completely with internationalism, that is, with the fra ternal solidarity of the workers of all lands in their struggle under the yoke of Capitalism. No confidence is to be placed in the promises of the present government to renounce annexations, that is, conquests of foreign territory, or in the promise to renounce forcible retention within the confines of Ru--.ia of this or that nationality. For in the first place, since capitalists arc bound together by the thousand threads} ,of banking capital, they cannot renounce annexations in the present war, as they have not renounced the profits on the billions invested in loans, in concessions, in war industries, etc. And, in the second place, the new government, having, in order to deceive the people, renounced annexations, then proceeded to state, through the mouth 90 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA of Milyukov (Moscow, April 22, 1917), that it had no intentions of renouncing annexations and to confirm in the note to the Allied gov ernments and in the elucidation of the note, the aggressive character of its policy. In warning the people against the empty promises of capitalists the Conference takes pains to point out the necessity of a sharp distinction between a renunciation of annexations in words and a renunciation of annexations in fact, that is, the immediate publication and abrogation of the secret treaties for conquest, and the immediate granting to all nationalities of the right to deter mine whether they wish to become independent governments or to become part of any other state. The so-called "revolutionary defense," which in Russia has taken possession of all the nationalist parties (national-Social ists, Laborites, Social-Revolutionists, etc.), as well as the oppor tunist party of the Social Democratic Mensheviki (Organizing Committee, Tseretelli, Cheidse, etc.), as well as the majority of the non-partisan revolutionists, embodies in itself, by reason of its class position, on the one hand the interests and the standpoint of the wealthier peasantry and a part of the small landlords, who, like the capitalists, draw a profit from their domination over the weaker nationalities; and, on the other hand, the "revolutionary de fense" is the outcome of the deception by the capitalists of part of the proletariat and semi-proletariat of the cities and villages who, by their class position, have no interest in the profits of the cap- talists and in the waging of an imperialistic war. The Conference declares that any form of "revolutionary de fense" is completely intolerable and would actually mean a total break with the principles of Socialism and internationalism. As for the "defensive" tendencies present among the great masses, our party will struggle against these tendencies by ceaselessly empha sizing the truth that any attitude of uncritical confidence in the government of the capitalists at the present movement is one of the greatest obstructions to an early conclusion of the war. As for the most important question of the manner of conclud ing as soon as possible the present capitalist war, not by an im posed peace, but by a truly democratic peace, the Conference rec ognizes and declares the following: This war cannot be ended by a refusal of the soldiers of owl side only to continue the war, by a simple cessation of warlike ac tivities on the part of one of the warring groups only. The Con ference reiterates its protests against the low intrigues circulated WAR AND PEACE 91 by the capitalists against our party, with the object of spreading the impression that we are in favor of a separate peace with Ger many. We consider the German capitalists to be the same band of robbers as the capitalists of Russia, England, France, etc., and Emperor Wilhelm to be the same crowned bandit as Nicholas II! and the monarchs of England, Italy, Rumania and the rest. Our party will explain to the people with patience and precise- ness the truth that war is always bound up indissolubly with the policies of certain definite classes, that this war may only be ter minated by a democratic peace if the governing powers of at least some of the belligerent countries arc handed over to the class of the proletariat and semi-proletariat, who arc really capable ctf putting an end to the bondage of Capitalism. The revolutionary class, having taken into its hands the gov erning power in Russia, would inaugurate a scries of measures to abolish the economic rule of capitalists, as well as of measures to bring about their complete political sterilization and would immedi ately and frankly offer to all peoples a democratic peace on the basis of a definite relinquishment of every possible form of an nexation and indemnity. Such measures, and such an open offer would create a perfect understanding between the workers of the belligerent countries and would inevitably lead to an uprising of the proletariat against such imperialistic governments as might resist tbe peace offered them under the above conditions. Until the revolutionary class in Russia shall have taken over the entire authority of the government, our party will consistently support those proletarian parties and groups in foreign countries as arc already, during the continuance of the war, fighting against their own imperialistic government and their own bourgeoisie. Particularly, our party will encourage any incipient fraternization of the masses of soldiers at the front of all the belligerent countries, with the object of transforming this vague and instinctive expres sion of solidarity of the oppressed into a class conscious move ment, with as much organization as is feasible, for the taking over of all the powers of government in all the belligerent countries by the revolutionary proletariat. VI SOCIALISM AND THE WAR [This article was published early in 1915, but its analysis is enduring. Karl Kautsky, whose tendency is indicted herein, subse quently "seceded" with others from the Social-Democratic Party and organized in the Independent Socialist Party. While against the war the Kautsky-Haase Independents pursued a peUy bour geois policy, attacked the Bolshcviki ; and during the German Rev olution adopted a Menshevik, essentially counter-revolutionary policy. This chapter should be considered in connection with the final chapter of Part Two — "International Socialism." — L. C. F.] The collapse of the International is sometimes looked upon purely from its formal side, as a rupture of the international. Cie between the Socialist parties of the belligerent countries — the im possibility to convene either an International Socialist Conference or the International Socialist Bureau, etc. This point of view has been adopted by the Socialists of the small neutral countries, per haps even by the majority of their official parties, also by opportun ists and their defenders. For class-conscious workingmen Socialism is an earnest conviction and not a convenient cover for bourgeois-conciliatory and nation ally-conflicting aims. By the collapse of the International they understand the flagrant treason of the majority of the official So cial-Democratic parties to their convictions, to their most solemn declarations expressed in the speeches at the Stuttgart and Basel International Congresses, and in the resolutions at said Congresses, etc. Only those will not sec such treason as do not want to see it, those to whom it will be disadvantageous to see it. To formulate the matter in a scientific way, i. e., from the standpoint of the rela tions of classes in modern -society, wc must state that the majority of the Socialist parties, at the head of which was the largest and most influential party of the Second International — the German party — placed themselves at the side of their general staffs, their governments, and their bourgeoisie, against the proletariat. This was an event of world-historical significance and it is impossible; to pass it without a more exhaustive analysis. It has long ago been SOCIALISM AND THE WAR 9^ recognized that wars with all the horrors and misery they bring, ¦re of more or less benefit in mercilessly exposing and destroying a great deal of the rotten, defunct and the cadaverous in human institutions. The European war of 1914-15 is beginning to bring undoubted benefit, in revealing to the mast advanced class of civil ized countries, that in its parties has ripened a sort of disgusting, purulent abscess, and from somewhere there is being emitted an unbearable, cadaverous odor. Is the treason to all their convictions and problems of the chief Socialist parties of Europe evident? It is to be understood that neither the traitors nor those who well know or vaguely guess that they will be obliged to make peace and friends with them — like to speak of this. But no matter how unpleasant it may be to various "authorities" of the Second International or their party frienels among the Russian Social-Democrats, we must look things straight in the face, give them their own names, in short tell the truth to the workers. Are there any real data as to the position taken prior to this war and in expectation of it, by the Socialist parties? Undisputably there are. They are the resolutions of the Basel International Con gress of 1912, together with the resolution of the Chemnitz German Social Democratic Convention, of the same year, which live as a remembrance of "the forgotten words" of Socialism. Summing up the propagandist and agitational literature of all countries against war the Basel resolution rqircscnts the most cor rect and full, the most solemn and formal exposition of Socialist views on war and of the tactics in relation to war. We can not call by any other name than treason the fact that no one of the author ities of the International of yesterday and of the social-patriotism of to-day — neither Hyndman, nor Cheidse, nor Kautsky, nor Plekha nov, dare to remind their readers of this resolution, and are either altogether silent about it or they cite (as does Kautsky) the unim portant, while they pass over the important parts of it. The most "extreme," arch-revolutionary resolutions and the most shameless neglect or repudiation of them — such is one of the striking manifest ations of the collapse of the International — and at the same time of the striking proofs that to believe in "the reformation" of So cialism and in the "straightening of its line" by means of resolutions alone is a belief only of people in whom an unexampled naivete is 94 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA combined with a cunning desire to perpetuate the former hypocrisy. The views of Guesde have lately been expressed by the Guesd- ist, Charles Dainas, who cites the former Socialist declarations of patriotic context (as does the German Social-Chauvinist David in his last pamphlet, on the defence of the fatherland), but who does not cite the Basel manifesto. About this manifesto Plekhanov is completely silent while offering up with an especially smug air, his chauvinistic commonplaces. Kautsky is like Plekhanov; in citing the Basel manifesto he skips all the revolutionary places (that is all wliich are substantial) very likely under the pretext of prohibition by the censor. The police and the military heads with their censor ial prohibition against mentioning the revolution and the class strug gle, have been very "handy" in helping the traitors of the Revolu tion. But perhaps the Basel manifesto presents some sort of an empty appeal, which has no definite content, neither historical or factional — which may directly refer to this present war? On the contrary the Basel resolution contains less than others of declamation, and more concrete substance. The Basel resolution deals .specifically wilh the very same war which did come and espe cially of those same imperialistic conflicts of Austria and Serbia because of the Balkans, of Austria and Italy because of Albania, etc., of England and Germany because of markets and colonics in general, of Russia with Turkey, etc., because of Armenia and Con stantinople — that is what the resolution of Basel, foreseeing the present war, deals with specifically. Precisely of the present war between "the great Powers of Europe" the Basel resolution states that such war "can not be justified under any pretext whatsoever of national interest"! And if now Plekhanov and Kautsky — to take only two of the typical Socialists of authority — are searching for all sorts of "na tional justifications" for the war, if they, with learned air and with a stock of false citations from Marx, refer for "examples" to the wars of 1813 and 1870 (Plekhanov) or 1854, 1871, 1876-77 and 1897 (Kautsky) — then, in truth, only people without a shadow of Socialistic convictions, without the least bit of Socialistic ccnscience, can take such proof seriously, and not style them as unmitigated Jesuitism, hypocricy and prostitution of Socialism. Let the Ger man "Vorstand"' of the party deliver unto damnation the new ma gazine of Mchring and Rosa Luxembourg (Internazionale) for its correct estimation of Kautsky. Let Vandervelde, Plekhanov, Hynd- man & Co., with the help of the police of the "Triple Entente" treat SOCIALISM AND THE WAR 95 their opponents in the same way we will reply simply by reprinting the Basel manifesto, which convicts these leaders of their change and for which there is no other word but treason. The Basel resolution treats not of a national, not of a people's war, examples of which have occurcd in Europe, which even were typical of the period between 17S9 and 1871, and not of a revolu tionary war which Socialists have never renounced, but of the pre sent war on the basis of "capitalistic Imperialism" and "dyr.af'ticj interests" on the basis of "a policy of conquest" of both the bellig erent groups, Austro-Gcrman as well as Anglo-French-Russian. Plekhanov, Kautsky & Co. are plainly deceiving the workers in re peating the selfish falsehoods of the bourgeoisie of all lands who strive with all their power to represent the imperialistic colonial predatory war — as a national and self-defensive war (no matter for whom), and in searching justifications for it from the sphere of historical examples of non-imperialistic wars. The question as to the imperialistic, predatory, anti-proletarian character of this war has long ago passed from the purely theore tical stage. Not only has Imperialism been theoretically appraised in all its main characteristics as the struggle of a perishing, rotting, decrepit bourgeoisie for the partition of the world and the enslave ment of "small" nations ; not only have these conclusions been re peated in all the vast literature of the Socialists of all countries,'1 not only has, for example, the Frenchman, Delcze, a representative of one of our "Allied" countries, in the pamphlet "The Inevitable War'' (in the year 191 1 !), popularly exposed the predatory char acter of the present war even from the standpoint of the French bourgeoisie. That isn't enough. The representatives of the pro letarian parties of all countries unanimously and formally declared at Basel their firm conviction that a war was imminent precisely of an Imperialistic character and drew tactical conclusion because of that. Therefore, in passing, all allusions as to failure to define the difference between international and national tactics must be re pudiated as sophistry (cf. the last interview of Axclrod in Nos. 87 and 90 of Nasche Slovo). It is sophistry because a many-sided, scientific, analysis of Imperialism is one thing — an analysis which eventually is as endless as science itself, and another thing— the principles of Socialist tactics against capitalistic Imperialism ex plained in millions of copies of Social-Democratic papers and in decisions of the International. Socialist parties are not debating clubs but organizations of a 96 THF PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA fighting proletariat and when a number of battalions have gone over to the enemy they must be named and discredited as traitors, with out any one being deceived by hypocritical phrases to the effect that not everybody comprehends Imperialism "in the same manner," that Chauvinist Cunow, and Chauvinist Kautsky are capable of writing volumes about it, that the question has not been efficiently discussed, etc., etc. Capitalism in all manifestations of its rapine; in all the smallest ramifications of its historical development and its national peculiarities, will never be learnt through and through. About de tails savants (and pedants especially) will never cease to dispute. "On this basis" to renounce the Socialist struggle against Imperial ism and also the opposition to those who have been treasonable to this conflict would have been ridiculous. Yet what else do Kautsky, Cunow, Axclrod, etc., propose? No one has as yet attempted to dissect now, after the war, the Base! resolution, and prove its in correctness! I'm perhaps sincere Socialists favored the Basel resolution in the expectation that the war would create a revolutionary situation, but the events refuted their reasoning and the revolution became impossible, Precisely with this isort of sophistry Cunow (in his pamphlet, "The Collapse of the Party," and in many articles) attempts to just ify his entry into the bourgeois camp, and wc meet hints of similar "conclusions" almost in all the Socialist Chauvinists, with Kautsky at the head. Hopes of a revolution turned out to be illusions and to defend illusions is not a function of a Marxist, reasons Cunow. At the same time he docs not say a word about the Basel manifesto, but as a highy honorable man he tries to shift the responsibility on those of the extreme left, such as Pannckoek and Radck. I^ct us examine the substance of the argument that the authors of the Basel resolution sincerely expected the advent of the revolu tion but that events refuted them. The Basel manifesto declares: (i) That the war will create an economic and political crisis; (2) that the workers will look upon their participation in it as a crime — as an iniquitous shooting at each other for the sake of Capitalist pro fits, the vanity of dynasties, the fulfilment of secret diplomatic agreements, that the war calls forth "indignation and revulsion" among the workers; (3) that the said crisis and the said psycho logical condition of the workers, Socialists should take advantage of "to rouse the people, and hasten the downfall of Capitalism"; SOCIALISM AND THE WAR 97 (4) that all "governments," without exception, can not begin the war ''without danger to themselves"; (5) that the governments "fear a proletarian revolution"; (6) that the governments should remember the Paris Commune (i. e., a civil war), the revolution of 1905 in Russia, etc., etc. All these are very clear ideas. There is no guarantee in them that the revolution will take place. In them is emphasized the precise consideration of facts and tendencies. Any one who on the basis of these ideas and arguments states that the expected advent of the revolution turned out to be an illusion, ex hibits not a Marxist but a Struvist and a renegade police relation to the revolution. For a Marxist there is no doubt that a revolution is impo-ssiblo without a revolutionary situation, and moreover not every revolu tionary situation leads to a revolution. What are the signs of a revolutionary situation? We will probably not err, if we cite the following three leading signs: (1) The impossibility of the ruling classes to preserve their domination without change of form ; one or another crisis "at the top," a political crisis of the ruling class, creating a breach through which the indignation and dissatisfaction of the masses bursts through. For the approach of the revolution it is insufficient that only "those on the bottom" did not want to, but also that those "on the top" no longer can live as before. (2) The more than usual increase of the needs and misery of the exploited classes. (3) The marked growth, because of mentioned causes, of the activity of the masses who in "peaceful periods" permit themselves to be robbed in quiet — and in stormy ones are drawn to independ ent, historical action, under the influence of those "at the top" as well as the entire atmosphere of crises, without these objective changes, independent of the will not only of separate groups and and parties, but of separate classes as well, revolution, according to general conceptions, is impossible. The conjunction of all these ob jective changes is what is called a revolutionary situation. There was such a situation in Russia in 1905 and during all revolutionary periods in the West. But there was the same revolutionary situa tion in the sixties of the last century in Germany and in i85<>i86i: and 1879-1880 in Russia although no revolutions occurred at the time. Why? Because not from every revolutionary situation there arises a revolution — but only from such in which there is joined with the objective changes a subjective change as well, viz., the 98 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA capacity of the revolutionary class to effect revolutionary mass actions, sufficiently powerful to break down or undermine the old government which will never "fall," not even in periods of crises, if it is not "overthrown." Such is the Marxist attitude toward revolution, which was very often expressed and acknowledged and confirmed for us Russians by the experiences of the year 1905. The question is what was| expected in this connection by the Basel manifesto in 1912 and what did take place in 1914-15. A revolutionary situation was expected, briefly described by the phrase "an economic and a political crisis." Did it take place? Undoubtedly, yes. The Socialist-Chauvinist, Lensch (who was much more honest in expressing his views, than the hypocrites Cunow,' Kautsky, Plekhanov & Co.), even said that we arc living through a peculiar revolution (vide page 6 of his pamphlet, "German Social- Democracy and the War," Berlin, 1915). The political crisis was self-evident. Not one of the governments was sure of the next day, not one was free from the danger of a financial collapse, loss of territory or expulsion from its own country (as, for instance, the Belgian government was expelled). All the governments are liv ing at the edge of a volcano; all are making appeals to the heroism of the masses. The political regime of Europe is completely shaken and no ons will deny that wc have entered (and entering further still— I am writing this on the day when Italy has entered the war.) into an e|x)ch of great political disturbances. If Kautsky two months after the declaration of war wrote (Oct. 2, 1914, The Neue Zeit) that never is the government so strong and the parties so weak as at the commencement of a war, it is but one of the samples of the counter feit historical science of Kautsky for the benefit of Sudckum and other opportunists. Never does a government require the agree ment of all the parties of the ruling classes and the "peaceful sub servience" to their "rule" of the exploited classes, as in times of war. "At the commencement of war," especially in a country ex pecting a quick victory, the government "appears" all-powerful, yet nobody, at no time, and nowhere in the world, connected the tx« pectation of a revolutionary situation exclusively with the mo ment of commencement of the war, and therefore never idenified "the appearance" with the actuality. That the European war will be burdensome, beyond comparison with others, everybody knew and acknowledged. The experiences SOCIALISM AND THE WAR 99 of the war confirms this more and more. The misery of the mass es is terrible, and the efforts of the governments, bourgeoisie and opportunists to conceal the misery meet with frequent disaster. The profits of certain groups of Capitatlists are scandalously high. The intensification of contradictions is enormous. Suppressed indignation of the masses, vague longing of the stupified and lowest strata of society for kindly ("democratic") peace, the beginning of revolt "below" — all these are evident. And the more war is pro longed and intensified the more governments develop and arc obliged to develop the activity of the masses, call them to excep tional, extraordinary efforts and sacrifices. The experiences of war like the experiences of every crisis in history, of every misery and catastrophe in the life of man, stupifies and breaks down some, but at the same time hardens and enlightens others. In general be sides, in the world's history, the numbers and strength of the lat ter exceeds the former, with the exception of certain instances of breakdown and destruction of this or that government. The con clusion of peace not only is unable "at once" to put an end to these miseries and to all this intensification of contradictions, but on the contrary in many respects makes the misery even more burdensome, and especially more evident for the most backward masses of the people. In a word, a revolutionary condition in the majority of the leading countries and great powers of Europe is at hand, In this respect the expectations of the Basel manifesto have been fully re alized. To deny this truth directly or indirectly or to be silent about it as do Cunow, Plekhanov, Kautsky & Co. means to be tell ing the greatest untruth, to deceive the working class and to serve the bourgeoisie, in How did it come lo pass that the; most eminent representatives and leaders of the Second International betrayed Socialism? We shall discuss this question at greater length when we review the various attempts which were made to justify that betrayal. Let us analyze the social-patriotic theory whose exponents are : Plekhanov, who liks to repeat the arguments presented by the Anglo-French chauvinists, Hyndman, and his new school, and Kautsky, whose arguments are extremely "thin" but give the appearance of great theoretical strength. All of them resort to the argument of self-defense. We were at tacked, we are defending ourselves; the cause of the proletariat de- 100 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA mands that wc resist those who have disturbed the peace of Europe. This is a re-hash of the declarations made by all the governments, and of the rant published in all the bourgeois sheets of the entire world. Plekhanov even improves upon his usual Jesuitism, and says that when facing concrete facts wc must first of all determine the guilty party and settle accounts with him, putting off till some other time the solution of all other problems. (See Plekhanov's pamphlet on The War, Paris, 1914, and a reprint of its con clusion in Axclrod's Golos, Nos. 86 and 87.) When it comes to sophistic dialectic Plekhanov beats all records. Sophists always manage to spirit away some of the evidence and even Hegel con fessed once that one could build up an argument about anything on earth. Intellectual honesty demands that one investigates all the sides of every social phenomenon and every stage of its develop ment, and all the visible manifestations of the various forces at work and of the class struggle. Plekhanov falls back upon a quo tation from the German press saying that even the Germans recog nized the guilt of Austria and Germany. And that sort of evidence is perfectly satisfactory to him. He remains absolutely quiet on the Czarist plans of conquest in Galicia, Armenia and other parts of the world, plans which have been exposed many times by the Russian Socialists. He docs not make the slightest effort to look into the diplomatic history of even the last thirty years ; that history proves incontro vertibly that the two groups of belligerents had set as their main ob ject the seizure of colonies, the annexation of foreign lands, and the destruction of their successful competitors.' "Sec the very interesting book, The War of Steel and Cold, by the Eng- lish pacifist, H. N. Ilrailsford, who leans strongly toward Socialism. The book was published in March, 19U. The author realizes clearly that na tional questions arc of secondary importance, that nobody bothers much with them and that the problems which interested diplomacy most were the Htgdad railroad, the supplying of rails for that road, the Moroccean ore deposits etc. (pages 35 and 36). One of the most illuminating incidents in the history of latter day diplomacy is the fight waged by the French patri ots and the English imperialists to defeat Caillaux' attempts at a rap prochement with Germany in 1911, 1913 and 1913, on the basis of a division of spheres of influence and the listing of German securities on the Paris Ex change. The English and French bourgeoisie broke tiiat agreement (pages 3K-40. The aim of Imperialism is to export capital into weaker countries (page 74). The profits derived from that source in England were 90 or 100 million pounds sterling for 1899, 140 million pounds in 1909 (we may add that Lloyd-George in a recent address estimated those profits at 200 million pounds). , To obtain that object, Turkish leaders arc bribed, the sons of important Hindoos and Egyptians supplied with nice little berths (pages 85-87). An SOCIALISM AND THE WAR IOI A logical analysis of war (one which is not distorted by Plekha- nov's shameless bourgeois slant) leads to the conclusion that war is simply "the continuation of politics by other means" (of a vio lent nature). This is the definition given by Clauscwitz,* one of the leading authorities on the history of wars, writing under the inspira tion of the Hegelian theories. And this was also the opinion of Marx and Engels who regarded war as the continuation of the politics of certain interested powers and of various classes within the various nations, at a certain time. Plckhanov's primitive chauvinism stands exactly on the same theoretical plane as Kautsky 's more subtle, opportunistic and wat ery chauvinism, when the latter approves the attitude of the So cialists of every country going over to the camp of "their" own capitalists in the following statement : "It is everybody's right and duty to defend his country. True internationlism grants that right to the Socialists of every country, and among them to those who arc at war with my country," (Neue Zcit, October 2, 1914, passim.) This incredible statement is such a base betrayal of Socialism, that the only way to answer it would be to have a medal coined with, on one side, the portraits of William II and Nicholas II and on the other side those of Plekhanov and Kautsky. True inter nationalism would then justify the French workers in shooting the 'Carl von Clauscwitz, Von Kricge, Vol. I. pa-jje 28, of his complete works. "Everybody knows that wars are caused simply by political rela tions between governments and between nations; but we generally imagine that at the beginning of a war those relations arc interrupted and that an entirely different state of affairs obtains, regulated only by its own laws. We wish to repeat on the contrary that war is nothing but a continuation of those political relations with the introduction of different means." insignincant minority fattens on armaments and wars, but it is backed by society and finance while the unorganized population is vainly striving for peace. (93) The pacifist who yesterday were talking for peace and disarmament, will join tomorrow a party absolutely dominated by the war contractors. (161). As soon as the Triple Entente was con cluded it seized Morocco and proceeded to dismember Persia. The Triple Alliance took Tripoli, entrenched itself in Bosnia, and dominated Turkey, (167). London and Paris gave billions to Russia in March, tor/t, thu» enab'ing Czarism to crush all the revolutionary movements (225-228). Now England is helping Russia to strangle Persia. (219). Russia lit the fires of the Balkan war. (230). This is not new. This is an old story, which has been told a thousand times in the Socialist papers of the entire world. At the eve of the war, this was very obvious to an English bourgeois. But think of what rot, what hypocrisy, what miserable lies such facts reveal in the statements of Plekhanov and Potresof on Germany's guilt, or in Kaut- sky's "prospect" of disarmament and lasting peace under a capitalistic form of government. 102 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA German workers and the German workers in shooting the French workers. If we examine the premises from which Kautsky draws his con clusions, we find the belief, whose absurdity Clausewitz demon strated eighty years ago, that at the beginning of a war all the historical relations between nations and classes are obliterated and that an entirely new order of things is ushered in. There are peo ple who were attacked and who are defending themselves, who arc "simply" repelling the "enemies of their country." The oppression of a large number of nations, of over one-half of the population of the globe, by the imperialists of the great powers, the competition between the bourgeoisies of those nations for the division of profits. the endeavor of capitalists to break up and crush out the labor movements, all of those things on which Plekhanov and Kautsky wrote extensively for ten years preceding the war, seem to have disappeared entirely from their field of vision. The two leaders of the social-patriots insult Marx by invoking him as their authority in this connection. Plekhanov points to the national wars waged by Prussia in 1813, by Germany in 1870, and Kautsky shows that Marx settled the question as to the nation, that is the bourgeoisie, whose victory was not to be wished for in the wars of 1854-5, 1859, 1870-71, and that the Marxists did the same in the wars of 1876-7 and 1897. Sophists of all times have always resorted to the same tricks: they use examples which do not apply to the case in point. The previous wars of which they speak were the continuation of a policy of many years standing, a movement of the bourgeoisie against foreign domination and against Turkish and Russian absolutism. No question could be raised then except as to the desirability of the victory of one bourgeoisie or another. In these wars, Marxists could call upon the nations to act, inflame na tional hatred, as Marx did in 1848, and later in the war with Rus sia, as Engels did in 1859 when he excited the Germans' national hatred against their oppressors, Napoleon III and the Russian*, Czar.* 8G. Gardenin, writing in Zishn, charges Marx with revolutionary chau vinism for favoring in 1848 a war against nations which he had proved to be counter-revolutionary, the Slav and Russian nations. Such a charge shows opportunism or superficiality or both. We Marxists have always favored war against counter-revolutionary nations. For instance, if Socialism should triumph in the United States or in Europe in, let us say, 1920, and if Japan and China should then mobilize against them their Bismarcks, even only on the diplomatic field, we should join hands with the Socialistic coun tries in a revolutionary war. Does that seem strange to you, Mr. Gardenin i" SOCIALISM AND THE WAR I03 To compare a continuation of the policy of struggle against feu dalism and absolutism, the policy of the bourgeoisie that strives to free itself, with the continuation of the policy of a decrepit bour geoisie, imperialist, predatory and reactionary, allied with feudal elements which are trying to oppress the proletariat is to compare an inch with a ton. One might just as well compare Robespierre, Garibaldi and Zheliabo with Millerand, Salandra and Gutchkof, and say that they were all "representatives of the bourgeoisie." No Marxist can help feeling the deepest regard for the great bourgeois revolutionists1 who had the historical right to speak in the name of bourgeois so ciety, and who urged millions of people in new nations to conquer a share of civilization by fighting the feudal system. Neither can a Marxist help feeling scorn for sophists like Plekhanov and Kaut sky, who speak of "defending the fatherland" when the German imperialists are strangling Belgium or when the French, English, Russian and Italian imperialists are rying to rob Austria and Turkey. Here is another social-patriot interpretation of Marxism: "So cialism will result from the rapid evolution of capitalism. The tri umph of my country would hasten the evolution of Capitalism and hence the coming of Socialism in my country. Defeat of my coun try's arms would delay her economic development and therefore the coming of Socialism." Struvism is not only a Russian but, as recent developments have proved, an international endeavor of the bourgeois theorists, to kill Marxism with tenderness, to strangle it in a loving embrace, by accepting its "really scientific side" but discarding its elements of "agitation" of "demagogy" of "Blanquist Utopia"; in other words, to take every part of the Marxian lore which is helpful to the liberal bourgeoisie in its fight for reform, everything which helps in the class war (stopping short of a dictatorship of the prole tariat), to accept all the "socialist ideals" and the overthrow of Capitalism in favor of "new social strata" and to discard "merely" the live part of Marxism, its revolutionary spirit. Marxism is the theory of the emancipation movement of the proletariat. Class conscious workers must therefore watch very carefully the process whereby Marxism is being transformed into Struvism. The forces tending to bring about that process are many and varied. We shall only mention three of them : 104 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA The development of science offers more and more evidence} favorable to Marxism. And, therefore, the fight against Marxism has to be waged in a hypocritical fashion. One cannot attack it openly but one can accept it, adulterating its essential points by sophistry, and transforming it into some sacred "ikon" which is not dangerous for the bourgeoisie. The growth of opportunism among the Socialist parties favors this distortion of Marxism, which is only one of the many conces sions made by the opportunists. In our imperialistic times, the world is being divided up among the large privileged powers which are enslaving all the others. Some crumbs from the feast are being picked up by certain groups of bourgeois, aristocrats, office holders and even workingmen. The latter class of the people, an insignificant minority of the proletariat and of the laboring masses, gravitate toward Struvism, for it gives them an excuse for joining hands with "their" own bourgeoisie against the exploited masses or "all" nations. We shall come back to this later, when we discuss the reasons for the collapse of thej International. iv Kautsky's theory of "ultra Imperialism" is simply a subtle form of social-patriotism attired in scientific and international trappings. Here is a clear, precise and new analysis of it by its own author: "The weakening of the protectionist movement in England, the adoption of lower tariff duties in America, the movement toward disarmament, the decreases in the export of capital from France and Germany in the years immediately preceding the war, finally, the closer international relations which had been establishing them selves between the various groups to financiers and capitalists), caused me to wonder whether our present-day imperialism was not dn the process of being displaced by a new system, ultra-Imperial ism, which in place of the strife waged among national groups of capitalists, would usher in a general exploitation of the entire world by an international alliance of capitalists. This new development of capitalism can very well be imagined. Whether it is realizable* or not, wc cannot very well say at the present time. Neue Zeit, No. 5, 30, iv, 1915, page 144) "The course and the outcome of the present war may supply an answer to that question. It may annihilate the weak germs of ultra-Imperialism by fostering an extreme hatred between national SOCIALISM AND THE WAR 105 groups of financiers and capitalists, bringing about an increase in armaments and the determination of certain groups to destroy cer tain other groups, in other words, making another world war un avoidable. Then the prophecy I made in my pamphlet, The Road to Power, would realize itself in terrible fashion, class antagonisms would become more acute and the moral decay of Capitalism would be at hand." Let us notice that by that artificial expression, Abwirtschaftung, Kautsky simply means the hostility to Capitalism manifested by the "intermediary strata separating the proletariat from the capitalists, that is the professional classes, the small bourgeois and even some small capitalists." . . . "But the war may have different results. It may strengthen those weak germs of ultra-Imperialism. The Jcssons it will teach us [save the mark] may hasten developments which were overdue at the time when the war bi oke out. If things go that far, as far as an agreement among nations, as far as dis armament, as far as the establishment of a lasting peace, then the factors which until the outbreak of the war were the most potent in the decay of capitalism may be eliminated." This new development, naturally, would bring in its wake, "new and perhaps worse forms of suffering for the proletariat," but "in time," ultra-Imperialism might "usher in an era of new hopes and expectations within the boundaries of capitalism" (page 145)- How does this theory justify social-patriotism? In the following way, which to a logical mind is rather strange: The German Socialists of the left wing say that Imperialism and the wars it causes are not a fortuitous accident but a necessary re sult of capitalism which has enthroned financial capital. Therefore the masses must engage in a revolutionary struggle, for the era of relatively peaceful development is at an end. The Socialist of the right wing simply say: since Imperialism is unavoidable let us all be imperialist?. Kautsky playing the part of a centre party reconciles them all: "The extreme radicals," he writes in his pamphlet National Power, Imperialist Power and Powers' Combines (Nuremberg, 1915), wish to oppose Socialism to Imperialism wliich is inevitable, in otlier words, they want to oppose Imperialism not only by means of the propaganda which for half a century we have conducted against every form of capitalistic domination, but by the immediate establishment of a Socialist system. This seems very radical, but 106 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA likely to drive those who do not believe in the possibility of thd immediate establishment of Socialism, into the imperialistic camp" (page 17.) (Italics mine.) Speaking of the immediate establishment of Socialism, Kautsky takes advantage of the fact that the military censorship does not allow any talk about revolutionary activities. He knows very well that the left-wing Socialists demand from the party immediate propaganda and the preparation for revolutionary action, and not "the immediate establishment of the Socialist system." From the inevitability of Imperialism, the left wing Socialists deduce the necessity of revolutionary action. The theory of ultra- Imperialism, is used by Kautsky to justify the opportunists, to throw such a light upon their behavior that they no longer seem to have gone over to the bourgeois camp ; they were simply people who did not believe in the feasibility of establishing immediately the Socialist system, and who expected the future to bring us an era of disarmament and lasting peace. His theory is purely and simply a means of justifying by the expectation of a new peaceful era of Capitalism the alliance of the opportunists and official Social-Democrats with the bourgeois, and their refusal to adopt a revolutionary, that is proletarian, attitude, when the actual storm broke out, in spite of the solemn promises of the Basel resolution. Notice that Kautsky docs not state that a new era shall result from certain conditions; he simply says: "wlictlier there will be such a new era, I cannot state at present." At the same time let us look at the tendencies to which Kautsky is pointing and which may bring about the new era. It is quite amazing to find among them economic facts cited by Kautsky, the trend toward disarmament. Which means that, Kautsky, unable to make certain positive facts chime with his contradictory theory, takes refuge in bourgeois babble and dreams. Kautsky's ultra- Imperialism, a word which by the way does not express accurately what he means, simply designates the blunt contradictions of Cap italism. Kautsky writes about "The weakening of the protectionist movement in England and America;" but how does this reveal in the slightest way the coming of a new era? Having reached its climax, protectionism in America is loosing its strength, but pro tectionism remains, as does the privileged position granted to Eng land by the colonial custom tariffs. Let us not forget what condi- SOCIALISM AND THE WAR 107 tioncd the transition from yesterday's "peaceful" Capitalism to to-day's Imperialism: the fact that unrestricted competition has been replaced by monopolistic alliances of capitalists and that the entire world ha3 been divided up among them. It is obvious that those facts and factors have a world-wide significance. Unrestrict ed commerce and world-wide competition were possible and neces sary when capital could without much difficulty establish new colonies and seize land in Africa and in other unoccupied parts of the world, and when at the same time the concentration of capital was only in its embryonic stage and there were no monopolistic concerns, powerful enough to dominate one entire branch of any industry. The appearance and growth of those monopolistic concerns (a process which is still going on in England and in America, and I wonder whether Kautsky would deny that the war has hastened that process?) makes the former competition impossible, tears the ground from under it, and the division of the earth among those large monopolies brings unavoidably in its wake an armed conflict for the division of colonies and spheres of influence. It is ridiculous to think that the weakening of the protection ist movement in two countries could change this in any way. Kautsky also mentions a decrease in the export of capital by two countries in the past few years. Those two countries, France and Germany, exported, according to statistics for 1912, some 35 bil lion marks each and England alone twice as much.4 The increase in the export of capital never was and never could be regular under Capitalism. Whether the accumulation of capi tal has decreased or whether the capacity of the home market has increased owing to an amelioration in the condition of the masses, Kautsky does not try to decide. Such being the case it is impos- - sible to predict the coming of the new era from the decrease in the export of capital in two countries. Then Kautsky tells us about "the closer relations which arc being established between groups of financiers and capitalists." This is indeed the only general and positive tendency ve have observed not for a few years only, nor for just two nations, but «Conf. Bernard Harms: Probleme der Weltwirtschaft, Jcra, 191a George Paish : "Great Britain's Capital Invesments in Colonics," in the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Vol. LXXV, 1910-1911, p. 187, Lloyd-George in an address delivered at the beginning of 1915, estimates the amount of English capital invested abroad at four billion pounds sterl ing. 108 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA the world over, as far as Capitalism is concerned. But why should this bring about disarmament instead of more armaments, as it has done thus far? Let us consider any of the concerns which manu facture guns and other implements of warfare, such as the Arm strong firm. The English Economist stated, in a recent issue (Vol, I, 1915), that the profits of that firm, which had been 606,000 pounds sterling for 1905-06, had grown to 856,000 pounds in 1913 and to 940,000 pounds in 1914. In this field of industry we observe closer and closer relations among financiers and capitalists. Ger man capitalists are interested in English firms; English firms build submarines for Austria, etc. International combinations of capi tal derive a large amount of business from armaments and wars. To conclude, from the gradual blending of the various' na tional capitalist groups into a single international unit, that disarma ment is coming is to encourage the good old bourgeois delusion that social antinomies may grow less instead of more acute. Kautsky speaks of the lessons of the war in a perfectly philistine spirit, taking those lessons to be the moral horror inspired by the sufferings due to the war. This is what he has to say on the sub ject: "No evidence is needed to prove that certain classes of the population are vitally interested in peace and disarmament: little bourgeois, farmers and also many capitalists and professional men whose interest in Imperialism would be more t!?an offset by the barm caused to them by war and armaments. (Page 21). This was written in April, 1915. Wc have seen all the prop erty-owning classes, including the little bourgeois and the profes sional classes, flocking over to the imperialist camp, but Kautsky simply dismisses actual acts with fatuous phraseology. He deter mines the interests of the bourgeoisie, not from the bourgeoisie's own actions, but from statements made by a few bourgeois, state ments which stand in absolute disaccord with their actions. It is as though we should gauge the real interests of the bourgeoisie not by the bourgeoisie's actual deeds, but by the unctuous sermons of some bourgeois priests who swear to us that the modern world is per vaded by Christian ideals. Kautsky edits Marxism in such a way that it loses all its sub stance, and only preserves some supra-real, spiritualistic interest, as it deals no longer with economic facts, but merely voices harmle*-s wishes for the welfare of mankind. SOCIALISM AND THE WAR 100 Marxism draws its conclusions as to the "interests" of the vari ous classes from class antagonisms and the class struggle revealed by innumerable acts of our every-day life. The little bourgeois blabbers sentimentally about allaying class antagonisms and brings "proofs" that their accentuation would have "harmful conse quences." Imperialism is simply the subjugation of all the propertied classes by financial capital and the partition of the world among the five or six great powers, most of whom are now engaged in the war. That partition of the world by the great powers means that all their propertied classes are interested in the conquest of col onies, in spheres of influence, in the oppression of other nations, in the more or less profitable positions and privileges, which redound from belonging to a great power and to a nation capable of oppres sing others.9 We can no longer live as we did in the past, in a quiet, cultured, peaceful environment, with Capitalism developing itself smoothly and spreading gradually over new parts of the earth, for we have entered a new era. Financial capital is removing and will remove completely cer tain countries from the ranks of the great powers, taking away their colonies and their spheres of influence (as Germany's threat is in her war with England), despoiling the small bourgeois of his "great-power" privileges and his income. This is one of the things the war has taught us. This has been brought about by the ac centuation of antinomies whose reality everybody admitted long ago, even Kautsky in his Road to Power. And at the very time when a war is being waged for the priv ileges redounding from "great powcrdom," Kautsky tells capitalists and petty bourgeois that war is an awful thing, that disarmament is "E. Schu!t7e states that in 1915 the total value of all the stocks and bonds in the whole world was 7.12 billion francs, including the loans of governments and cities, mortgages and stocks of commercial and financial enterprises. Of this amount England's share was 130 billion francs. The United States' 115, France's 100, Germany's 75; in other words, these four powers held some 4--0 billions or over one half of all the paper in existence. We can estimate from these data the advantages and privileges enjoyed by the large powers of the first rank, which arc able to dominate, subjugate and exploit the other nations. (Dr. Emil Schultzc Das Franzosischc Kafital in Russknd in pinan:. Archiv Berlin 1915. Vol. 38, page 1^7). The so-called "defense of the fatherland" when great powers arc concerned is simply one defense of .the right to plunder other nations. In Russia, as everybody knows, capitalist Imperialism is less powerful, but military-feudal Imperial ism is stronger on that account. 110 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA a fine thing, and he accomplishes about as much as the priest who from his pulpit tells capitalists that love of one's neighbor is God's behest, a source of bliss for our soul and the moral law of civiliza tion. What Kautsky calls the economic trend to ultra-Imperialism is a petty bourgeois attempt to tell the financiers they should not do wrong, The export of capital? But capital is being exported in larger quantities to independent countries like the United States than into colonial lands. To seize colonies ? But they have almost all been seized and al most all of them are trying now to free themselves. "India may cease to be an English dependency, but she will never submit as an independent empire to the domination of any other nation" (page 49). Every effort made by a commercial capitalist govern ment to create a colonial empire in order to free itself from all de pendence from any other power for its supply of raw materials, is bound to unite against that government all the other capitalist governments and to drag it into endless, exhausting wars, which will not bring it any nearer to its goal. Such a policy is the short est road to economic bankruptcy (pages 72-73). Isn't this objurgation to the financiers to avoid Imperialism pure philistinc piffle? To warn capitalists against bankruptcy is like warning brokers not to gamble in stocks, for "many have in that way lost everything they had." Capital has everything to gain from bankruptcy of competing capitalists and competing nations, for this bankruptcy will cause an even more powerful concentration. And, therefore, the sharper and the more ruthless economic competition, that is, the economic urge toward bankruptcy, grows, the more eager capitalists are to drive their competitors into bankruptcy by means of a war. The fewer countries there are left into which one can export capital profitably, such as colonies and dependent nations, like Turkey (for in such cases the financier makes larger profits than by exporting capital into independent and civilized na tions like the United States), the more bitter the fight is for the subjugation and the partition of Turkey, China and other countries. Thus speak those who are observing this era of financial capi tal and of Imperialism. Thus speak the facts. But Kautsky in jects into the whole thing his bourgeois morality: There is no use getting heated up and fighting over Turkey or India, for this thing will not last long and it is so much better to develop capital in a peaceful way. SOCIALISM AND THE WAR III Of course, it should be possible to develop Capitalism and to increase the markets by raising wages. This is perfectly "feasible"; one might give that advice to financiers and it would make a fine •subject for a sermon. Poor Kautsky all but tell German financiers that it isn't worth their while to fight England for her colonics, as those colonies are bound very soon to regain their freedom. , , , The amount of the Anglo-Egyptian export-import trade grew much more slowly from 1872 to 1912 than the general export-im port trade of England with other nations. The conclusion which the "Marxist" Kautsky draws from that fact is the following: "We have no reason to suppose that, without a military occupation of Egypt, commercial relations with that country would have been less important if left to the sole influence of economic factors (72). "Capital's efforts to increase its share of activity arc beetcr re warded by avoiding the violent methods of imperialism and only resorting to peaceful democratic means" (70). What a wonderfully earnest, scientific, marxist analysis I Kaut sky improves upon this stupid story by "proving" that the English should not have taken Egypt from the French, that German finan ciers should not have started the war and organised the Turkish campaign, and other operations to drive the English out of Egypt, All this is rot. The English would never suspect that it would have been better for them, not to use violence in Egypt, but to resort (in order to develop the exportation of capital in true Kaut- skian style) to peaceful democracy. "The bourgeois free-traders would be greatly mistaken if they thought that free trade would eliminate the economic antagonisms created by Capitalism. Neither free trade nor democracy could do away with them. But at any rate we are interested in seeing those antagonisms disappear in a struggle such as will impose upon the working class the smallest amount of suffering and sacrifice." (73) Lord have pity on us! "What is a philistinc?" Lassalle once asked. He answered the question by quoting the well known verse: "a philistine is an empty piece of gut, filled with fear and with the hope that God will take pity on him." Kautsky has gone to an incredible length in prostituting Marx ism and has made' himself the priest of that new religion. He / preaches to the capitalists the necessity of resorting to peaceful democracy and this is the way he builds up his argument: If in the beginning there was free trade, and then monopoly and Impe rialism, why not have ultra-Imperialism and after that, free trade? 112 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA In his preacher-like way he consoles the oppressed masses by de scribing all the blessings of ultra-Imperialism, although he doesn't dare to affirm that there will be such a thing. Feuerbach showed clearly to those who defended religion on the ground that it offered a consolation to men, the actual reactionary meaning of such a consolation : "Whoever, he said, "consoles a slave instead of inciting him to revolt against slavery offers help to the slaveholder." The exploiting classes in order to retain their domination need the services of two retainers: the hangman and the priest. The hangman crushes out the protests and the revolt of the oppressed; the priests depict to them the beautiful state of affairs (and he docs that the more successfully if he doesn't insist on the possibility of such a state of affairs) which will diminish their sufferings and their sacrifice while the class domination is maintained ; he reconciles them with this domination, he coaxes them away from revolutionary activity, he saps their revolutionary strength, he destroys their revolutionary determination. Kautsky has transformed Marxism into the same immoralizing kind of counter-revolutionary theory, into miserable priestlike rant. In 1909, in his pamphlet The Road to Power he admits a fact which no one has ever tried to refute, that is, the constant, exacerbation of capitalist antagonisms, the approach of an era of war and revolutions, of a ''new revolutionary era." There cannot be, he says, a premature revolution, and it would be an absolute betrayal of our cause to refuse to count on the pos sibility of victory at the time of an uprising although, before the struggle begins, one cannot deny the possibility of defeat." The war broke out. Antagonisms became even more violent. The destitution of the masses assumed terrific proportions. The war drags on and spreads more and more, and Kautsky writes pamphlet after pamphlet, meekly submitting to the pleasure of the censor, avoiding all allusions to conquest and to the horrors of war, to the scandalous profiteering of the dealers in army supplies, to the high cost of living, to the military slavery of the mobilized workers; but he keeps on consoling and consoling the proletariat, by reminding it of other wars in which the bourgeoisie showed its-elf revolutionary or progressive, when Marx himself wished for the victory of this or that bourgeoisie; and he offers still more con solation iii the shapj of columns of figures, proving the possibilitv of a Capitalism without colonies and without exploitation, without Avar and without armaments, the best evidence that "peaceful de mocracy" is preferable. SOCIALISM AND THE WAR Zl3 Not daring to deny that the sufferings of the masses are be coming more and more acute and that we aro in reality facing a truly revolutionary situation (for the censor would not let him speak of such things), Kautsky toadies before the bourgeoisie and he depicts a "perspective" (about whose possibility he does not com ment himself) of a form of struggle in the new era, entailing less suffering and fewer sacrifices. Franz Mehring and Rosa Luxem burg -were well justified in calling Kautsky a prostitute (Madchen fur alle). In August 1915 a revolutionary crisis arose in Russia. The Czar promised to the Duma "consolations" for the suffering masses, The regime which followed could be designated as "ultra-auto cracy" if we can designate by the word ultra-Imperialism the re fusal of the capitialists to go in for armaments and their decision to agree among themselves to insure a durable peace. Let us suppose that tomorrow some hundred of the world's largest financiers, interested in hundreds of interlocking enter- prices of colossal size should promise to the nations that they will insist on disarmament after the war. Let us suppose that for a minute so as to follow better the stupid arguments of Kautsky's theory. Even then it would be a betrayal of the proletariat to ad vise them against revolutionary activities, for without that activity all these promises and all this beautiful perspective would be simply an idle dream. The war has brought to the capitalists not only huge profits and the promise of new lands to exploit in Turkey, in China, etc., of new orders and of new loans at a higher rate of interest, but it has also brought to them greater political advantages, for it has divided the proletariat against itself, it has corrupted it. Kautsky has lent his help to that perversion, he has sanctioned that schism of the struggling proletarians, in the name of a union with the opportunists of his country, with the Sudekums of every water. And there are people who cannot understand that unity among the old parties simply means the alliance of the national proletariat with its national bourgeoisie and the division of the proletariat into several nations. vi The preceding chapter had been written when the Ncue Zeit for May 28, 1918, came off the press, containing Kautsky's con cluding remarks on the "Bankruptcy of the Social-Democracy." 114 T,,E PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA Kautsky sums up all the worn out sophisms (and a new one which he brings in) intended to defend social.patriotism, in the following paragraph: "It is not true that the war is purely an imperialistic war, and that the alternative when the war broke out was : either Imperial ism or Socialism. It is not true that the Socialist parties and the proletarian masses of Germany and France and, in many respects, those of England, listened stupidly to the call of a handful of par liamentarians, threw themselves into the arms of the imperialists, betrayed Socialism and thus brought about a failure without prec edent in history." A new sophism, a new lie to deceive the workers. The war, if you please was not a "purely" imperialistic war. Kautsky is terribly unsteady whenever he discusses the actual character of the present war and he dodges the precise and formal declarations of the Basel and Chemnitz conferences as carvlrlly as a thief avoids the scene of his last robbery. In his pamphlet on National Power, etc., written in February, 1915, Kauttsky states that "in the last analysis war is imperialistic" (page 64). Now he makes a new reservation; not "purely imperialistic." What is it then? Well, it is "nationalistic." And Kautsky comes to that con clusion by resorting to the following Plekhanovian logic: "The present war is a child not only of Imperialism but of the Russian Revolution." Kautsky himself foresaw as early as 1904 that the Russian Revolution would give birth to a new form of Pan-Slavism, that "democratic Russia would unavoidably arouse the desire of the Austrian and Turkish Slaves for the-r independ ence, . . . Then the Polish question would become a burning one, . . Then Austria would collapse, for with the fall of Czarism the iron yoke would be removed wliich holds together many elements eager to draw away one from the other" (Kautsky himself cites the pre vious sentence from his article written in 1904). . . . Tlie Russian Revolution . . . would give a new impetus to the nationalist aspir ations of the East, and add Asiatic problems to the European prob lems. . . . All those problems are revealing their existence through violent symptoms during the present war and are exerting a power ful influence upon the temper of the popular masses, especially of the proletarian masses at a time when the ruling classes are dom inated by imperialistic tendencies" (page 273, italics mine). There is prostitution of Marxism for you! Since ''democratic Russia" would arouse the desires of the Eastern-European nations SOCIALISM AND THE WAR IIS for freedom (and we will not controvert this) then, the present war, -which will not free any nation whatever, but will cause the exploitation of many nations, whatever its issue may be, is not a "purely" imperialistic war. Since the failure of Czarism would bring about the disruption of Austria and of her undemocratic national structure, then a counter-revolutionary Czarism, having temporarily strengthened itself, conquering Austria and imposing an even heavier yoke upon the various Austrian nationalities would not give to this war an imperialist but to a certain degree a nation alistic character. Since the ruling classes fool dull shopkeepers and brutalized peasants by yarns about the nationalistic aims of an imperialistic war, then, a scientific man, an authority on Marxism, and a repre sentative of the Second International, is justified in reconciling the masses with that deception by means of this "formula:" the ruling classes have imperialistic tendencies, but the popular classes have nationalistic aspirations. Logic is here replaced by the lowest, most lying form of soph. istry. In the present war the nationalist element is only found in the war waged by Servia against Austria. And by the way mention of this is made in the resolution of the Berne conference. It is only in Servia and among the Servians that we find a movement for national emancipation dating back to many years ago and affect ing millions of people, and of which the war waged by Servia against Austria is merely the "continuation." If that war could be isolated, if it was not so intimately con nected with the covetous and thievish plans of England, Russia and other nations, then all the Socialists would be "obliged" to wish for the triumph of the Servian bourgeoisie. This is the only just and unavoidable deduction based upon nationalist aspirations in the present war. But Kautsky never once dares to draw that conclusion. Let us go further. The Marxist form of reasoning forbids us to study a subject isolated from the environment, that is to study it from a one-sided, incomplete point of view. The nation alist factor in the Servian-Austrian war cannot and could not se riously modify the character of this Pan-American war. If Ger many should win she would strangle Belgium, seize a part of Poland and probably a part of France. If Russia should win she would take Galicia and i. part of Poland and Armenia. In case of a draw the oppression of nationalities will go on as formerly. For Servia, Il6 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA that is for about one hundredth of the peoples engaged in the present war, this war is really "the continuation" of the bourgeois eman cipation movement. For the remaining 99 per cent, the war is a continuation of the politics of the imperialistic and decaying bour geoisie, capable of corrupting but not of emancipating any nation. The Triple Entente, while "emancipating" Servia, betrays the interests of Servian freedom when it helps Italy to rob Austria. This is commjon knowledge, but Kautsky distorts it all in order to justify opportunism. There is no phenomenon, in nature or in society which is "purely" something and nothing else; this is re vealed to us by the application of the Marxist form of reasoning which shows us that the very idea of that "purity" comes from a narrow, one-sided view of things, which does not follow all the threads to tlieir very end and with all their intricacy. There cannot be any "pure" Capitalism showing absolutely no alloy of feudalism or commercialism. And therefore, to come and tell us that the war is not "purely" imperialistic when we see the imperialists fooling the popular masses and carefully concealing their crudely thievish aims under "nationalistic" phrases, is to betray either infinite pedantry and stupidity or chicanery and deceit fulness. The real fact of the matter is thc.t Kautsky actually abets the imperialists in their at tempts at deceiving the nation, when he states that "for the popular masses, among them the proletarian masses, the most important factors are nationalistic problems, 'while for the ruling masses, imperialistic tendencies are foremost," (page 273) and when he strengthens that statement by mentioning "the infinite variety of activities" on page 274. Of course, activities are extremely varied, this is gospel truth. But it is nevertheless true that in that great variety there are two main currents: in it's concrete essence the war is "a continuation" of the policy of Imperialism, that is the exploitation of foreign nations by the decaying bourgeoisie and the governments of the great powers; and abstract ideology amounts to "nationalistic" phrases scattered about to satisfy the masses. The old sophism, reiterated by Kautsky, that at the beginning of the war, the only alternative according to the left-wing Socialists was: Imperialism or Socialism, has already been shot to pieces. This presupposes a shameful mental reservation, for Kautsky knows too well that the left-wing faced an entirely different alter native: cither join hands with the imperialist thieves and deceivers, or preach and prepare revolutionary action. Kautsky also knows that it is only the censor who prevents the left-wing Socialists from SOCIALISM AND THE WAR II7 exposing the miserable lies which he is spreading while toadying to all the Sudekums. Regarding the relations between "the proletarian masses" and "a handful of parliamentarisms," Kautsky advances one of the most threadbare arguments: "Let us not speak of the German Socialists, so that we shall not seem to be pleading our own cause ; but who would seriously pretend that men like Vaillant and Guesde, Hyndman and Plekha nov turned imperialists nil of a sudden and betrayed Socialism? Let us leave aside the parliamentarians and "competent par ties" (Kautsky obviously alludes to the flood of deserved scorn which the magazine Internationale published by Rosa Luxemburg and Franz Mehring poured upon the "competent parties," that is the leaders of the German Social-Democratic party, its executive committee, its parliamentary faction, etc., "Who would pretend that four millions of class-conscious German proletarians would at the call of a handful of parliamentarians make in twenty four hours a complete round about face to the right, and turn their backs upon all their previous aims. If that was true, it would show the terrible failure, not only of our party, but of the masses (italics mine). If the masses are so completely lacking in character then we might as well go and bury ourselves." (page 274.) Karl Kautsky the great political and scientific authority had, for that matter, already buried himself under a mound of lament able evasions. Whoever fails to sec this is hopeless as a Socialist; the only attitude to assume toward Kautsky is the infinite scorn which Rosa Luxemburg, Franz Mehring and other contributors to the Internationale expressed toward him. Just think: in regard to the war, the only people who could express themselves with a certain freedom (that is because they had not been seized and led to the barracks, and were not in imme diate danger of being shot) were exclusively that "handful of parliamentarians" (they could vote freely, they could vote against the war, for even in Russia a man did not get beaten, nor threatened, nor arrested for that) and a handful of officials and journalists. Now Kautsky blames the masses for all the treachery and lack of character of that group of the population, which Kautsky himself had for many years described as being bound up with the tactics and the ideology of opportunism. The first and fundamental rule of scientific research in general, and of Marxian discussion in particular, is to examine closely the relations between the present strife among the various Socialist Il8 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA factions (the faction which howls "betrayal" and rings the alarm bell, and the faction which is unable to see any betrayal) and the strife which went on in former year9. Kautsky never says a word about it; he refuses to consider factions and tendencies. There used to be diverging tendencies hitherto. Now there are not any more. Now we only hear about big names, authorities, to whom every lackey kowtows. How handy it is for all of them to "pass the buck" to the other fellow. "What is that opportunism," Martov cried in Berne (see No. 36 of the Social Democrat), "when , . . Guesde, Plekhanov, Kautsky. . . " "We must not be so ready to bandy accusations of opportunism against men like Guesde," writes Axclrod (Golos No. 86 and 87), "I shall not defend myself," writes Kautsky, but , , . Vaillant and Guesde, Hyndman and Plekha nov. . . ," In tbe ardor of his slavish zeal, Kautsky went as far as paying homage to Hyndman, whom he not so long ago had described as standing on the side of Imperialism. How many times had Kautsky assailed Hyndman's Imperial ism in his own Neue Zeit and in all the papers of the Socialist) party, If Kautsky would pay some attention to the political biog raphies of the various men he mentions by name, he would find in those biographies a mass of facts which would show that their right-about-face toward Imperialism was not accomplished in a day, but had been prepared for years. Wasn't Vaillant trailing after the Jauresista, and wasn't Plekhanov trailing after the Mensheviki and "liquidators" ? Did he not see Gucsdism die out before his very eyes in the columns of Guesde's paper, Socialism, a lifeless arid organ, unable to take any definite stand on any question? Did not Kautsky himself (we add this for those who very justly place him in the same class with Hyndman and Plekhanov) show his lack of principles in regard to Millcrandism and when the struggle against Bersteinism began? But I do not see any scientific interest in studying the biog raphies of those leaders. Little we care whether in order to defend themselves they use their own arguments or the arguments gener ally used by opportunists and bourgeois. What gave the conduct of those leaders a serious political importance? Their own activi ties or the fact that they united themselves to a really active group, supported by the military organizations, that is the bourgeoisie? Kautsky doesn't even try to investigate that side of the problem. The only thing he cares for is to throw dust into people's eyes, to SOCIALISM AND THE WAR 119 din into their ears big-sounding names and to prevent them from asking him unpleasant questions.'' "... Four million people turned right-about-face at the com mand of a handful of politicians. . . ." This is an untruth. The German party organization did not have four million members, but one million. Furthermore, the wishes of that mass were expressed, as they arc in each and every organization by its center, the handful of men who betrayed So cialism. The handful cf men was asked questions, was called upon to pass resolutions; it did pas; them, it wrote articles, etc, . . . The masses were never asked for their opinion. They were not al lowed to vote; they were divided up and pursued, not by a handful of parliamentarians, but by the military authorities. The military machine was united and did not have traitors in its ranks. It called upon the masses to unite by giving them this ultimatum: Fight (as your leaders advise you to do) or be shot. The masses could not act as an organization, for their organization was repre sented by that handful of men, Legien, Kautsky, Scheidcmann, who had already betrayed the masses. It takes time to perfect a new organization ; it takes a good deal of strength to discard the old one when it is rotten and worn out. Kautsky tries to answer his adversaries of the left by charg ing them with thoughtlessness. The masses should, in answer to the declaration of war, have started a revolution in 24 hours, and raised Socialism against Imperialism. Having failed to do that the masses have been guilty of betrayal and showed their lack of character. This is the worst rot, the kind of rot used against "rev olutionists by stupid bourgeois and secret service publications, Kautsky's opponents of the left wing know very well that one does not start a revolution, that revolutions grow out of certain crises when a certain point is reached (this independently of party and •Kautsky's references to Vaillant, Guesde, Hyndman and Plekhanov are typical from another point of view. Outspoken imperialists, like Lentsch or Haenish (not to speak of the opportunists) always refer to Hyndman ¦nd Plekhanov when they wish to justify their attitude. And they are right in referring to them, they speak thr actual truth when they say that their attitude is similar to Hyndman'* and Plckhanov's. Kautsky speaks scornfully of Lentsch and Haenish, of those radicals who have gone over to the imperialist camp. Kautsky thanks the Lord that he is not like those publicans, that he does not agree wilh them, that he has remained a rev olutionist. . . . Don't laugh. . . . But in reality, Kautsky stands exactly where those men do. He is merely a hypocritical, soft-spoken chauvinist much more repellant than pure and simple chauvinists like Lentsch, Haenish, David and Heine. 130 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA class desires), that masses without organization have no will of their own and that the struggle against the powerful, terroristic, military organization of perfectly centralized powers is a long and arduous fight. Betrayed by their leaders at a critical moment the masses could not do anything. But that handful of men could have and should have voted against war credits, voiced their desire for the defeat of their government, opposed the national party truce and all attempts to justify the war, prepared an international organiza tion for propaganda in the trenches, produced masses of ''illegal" literature showing the necessity of revolutionary action, etc.7 Kautsky knows very well that the left wing of the German party has more or less similar plans, but cannot speak of them open ly while there is a military censorship. In his' desire to defend his opportunism, Kautsky is despicable enough to perch himself on the back of the censor and from that safe point of vantage, to charge the left wing men with all sorts of obvious nonsense. VII A serious question, a scientific and political question, which Kautsky consciously dodges by resorting to all sorts of legerde mains (an evasion which fills the opportunists with joy), is, how could the representatives of the Second International betray Socialism? When I ask this question I dismiss all thought of those men's political biographies. Their biographers will have to treat the question from this point of view, but the Socialist movement doesn't care about it just now. What it wants to know is the his torical origin, the significance and the strength of the social- chau vinist movement. Where does social-patriotism come from? What gave it its strength? How can we fight it? These are the only questions we should ask. To let the discussion stray into personalities is pure sophistry. 'It was not necessary for every Socialist to cease publication in answer to the censor's order forbidding any mention of class hatred and the class struggle. It was low cowardice on the part of the Vorwaerts to accept such conditions. The Vorwaerts is politically dead, killed by its submissiveness. Martov was right when he pointed that out. It would have been possible to keep "lawful'' papers going, by declaring that they were not party papers not Socialist papers, but devoted themselves to the technical needs of the workers, and were not therefore political papers. Why was it not possible to have "unlawful" Socialist literature discussing the war and "lawful" workingmen's literature barring all discussion of the war, printing no un truth but silent about the truth? SOCIALISM AND THE WAR 121 In order to answer the first question we must find out whether' the essential political thought of social chauvinism is not bound up with some previous tendency observable in the Socialist move ment. We must besides ask ourselves whether there is not some re lation between the present day division of Socialists into partisans and opponents of chauvinism and the various schisms which have taken place in the history of the movement. By social-patriotism wc mean the willingness to defend one's country in this imperialistic war, to justify the alliance of the So cialists with the bourgeoisie and the governments of their pwn\ country, and the refusal to preach and support the revolt of the proletarians against their national bourgeoisie. It is obvious that in its essential traits, politically and intellectually, chauvinism is identical with opportunism. Both represent one and the same tend ency. Opportunism placed in the special environment of the pres ent war becomes social-chauvinism. The main idea of opportunism is that of the co-operation of all classes. The war enforces that idea to the limit, not only by the usual method of action, but by extraordinary methods as well, forcing, as it docs, the disorganized masses of the population to co-operate with the bourgeoisie by threats and violence. This circumstance naturally increases the number of the partisans of opportunism, and explains why so many of the radicals of yesterday have gone over to the opposite camp. Opportunism sacrifices the working class interests of the masses to the temporary interests of a small minority. In other words, it bands a part of the working class with the bourgeois as against the proletariat. Opportunism began to grow in the past decade, a period of capitalistic development, when the relatively peaceful and civilized existence enjoyed by privileged classes oi workers, made bourgeois out of them, fed them crumbs from the profits made by their national capital, and rendered them indifferent to the sufferings and the revolutionary bitterness of the exploited and pauperized masses. This imperialistic war is the continua tion and the climax of that process, for it is being waged to conquer privileges for certain great powers, to allow them to divide up colonial territories among themselves and to rule over the rest of the world. When the upper middle class and the aristocracy and bu reaucracy of the working class make a stand to strengthen their privileged position, we behold a furtherance of the little bourgeois- opportunists' aspirations, and of the corresponding political activi- 123 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA tics up to the time when war broke out. Here is the economic basis of the present day's social-chauvinism.* Naturally, the force of habit, the routine of peaceful evolution, national prejudices, the fear of violent change and misgivings about them, all these things were the added factors which strengthened opportunism, and caused hypocrites and cowards to reconcile them selves to it, were it only for special reasons and motives. The war brought to the surface the opportunism which had been developing for years, raised it aloft, multiplied its degrees and varieties, in creased the number of its partisans, added to its arguments a few sophisms, let many rivulets, so to speak, flow into the main stream; of opportunism. Social-patriotism is opportunism grown so ripe that the growth of that bourgeois abscess would have previously been impossible within the body of Socialism. People who refuse to see the close and solid bonds which unite social-patriotism to opportunism, drag in "special cases" — an op portunist becoming internationalist or a radical becoming chau vinist. But this is not a serious way of discussing the evolution of 'Here are a few illustrations of the importance which imperialist and bourgeois attach to national and "great power" privileges as a means for dividing the workers among themselves and luring them away from Social ism. The English imperialist Lucas in his book Great Rome and Great Britain (Oxford 1912) admits the inequality between white and colored men in the British Empire. "In our Empire," he writes, "when colored laborers are working side by side with white laborers, they are not fellow workers, for the white -man soon becomes the colored man's boss." (98.) Ervin llclger, former secretary of the Imperial union against Socialism, writing on "Social-Democracy after the war" (1915), praises the stand of the Social-Democrats, showing that they must remain a purely working class party, (4.1) the national German workingmen's party, (45) and give up all internationalist, Utopian, revolutionary ideas. (44) The German imperialist Sartorious von Waltcrshauscn in his book on Foreign Invest ments (1907) berates the German Socialists for not realizing what is good for the country, (438) that is the conquest of colonies, and he praises the English workers for tlieir "sense of realities," for instance, for their fight against immigration. The German diplomat Rudorfer in his book on The Basis of World Politics, emphasizes the well known fact that the inter nationalization of capital does not decrease the bitterness of the struggle between capitalists of the various nations for power, influence, stock major ity, (161) and he mentions that the workingmen too. are getting entangled in that bitter fight. (175) The book was published in October 1913 and the author says very frankly that the interests of Capitalism arc the motives of contemporary war9, that the question of "national tendencies" is a nail impaling Socialism, and that governments need not feel nervous about internationalist manifestations which will assume a more and more national chatacter. (io3, no, 176) International Socialism will win if it draws the workingmen away from nationalism, for isolated efforts do not accomplish anything; it will go down in defeat if the national feeling gains the upper hand. (1/3-4.) SOCIALISM AND THE WAR 123 that tendency, First of all, opportunism and chauvinism in the labor movement have the same cause : the alliance between shop keepers and the upper crust of labor, gathering in a few crumbs from the banquet at which sit their national capitalists, against the over worked and oppressed masses of the proletariat. In the second place, both tendencies are moved by the same thoughts and ideas. Thirdly, the division of the Socialists into opportunists and revolutionary groups, which was already observ able at the time of the Second International, corresponds perfectly to their new division into chauvinists and internationalists. To realize the truth of the foregoing one must remember that social science, like science in general, deals with mass phenomena, not with isolated cases. Take ten European nations : Germany, Eng land, Russia, Italy, Holland, Sweden, Bulgaria, Switzerland, France, Belgium. In the first eight nations the new split upon the question of internationalism is the same as the old split upon the question of opportunism. In Germany that citadel of opportunism, the Sos. 'Monatshefte, has become the fortress of chauvinism. The inter nationalist idea is only defended by the extreme left. In Englandj according to the last estimates, only three-sevenths of the members of the British Socialist Party are internationalists (66 for, to 84 against the internationalist resolution). In the opportunist bloc, that is, the Labour Party, the Fabians and the Independent Labour Party, less than one-seventh of the membership is internationalist." In Russia tlje center of opportunist propaganda, Nasha Zaria, organ of the liquidators, became the organ of the chauvinists. Plek hanov and Alexinsky make much noise, but we know from what we observed in the years 1910-1914 that they are unable to con duct a systematic propaganda among the Russian masses. The stronghold of internationalism in Russia was "pravd';s*n" and the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, representing the advanced workers, and organized in January, 1912. In Italy^the party of Bissolatti & Co., purely opportunist, turned chauvinist. Internationalism was represented by the Labor Party. The masses of the workers were behind that party. The oppor- •People generally compare the Independent Labour Party with the British Socialist Party. This is not fair. It is not the form of an organ ization that counts but the work it docs. Take the matter of daily papers. There were two of them. The Daily Herald, the organ of the British So cialist Party alone, and the Daily Citizen which did service for all the opportunist groups. It is its daily newspapers which are the best evidence of the propaganda, agitation and organization work done by a party. 124 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA tunists, the parliamentary party and the petty bou/gcois were all for chauvinism. For several months, every one in Italy had a chance to make his choice, and people chose not in any haphazard way, but along the lines of class cleavage, according to whether they were proletarians or petit bourgeois. In Holland, the opportunist Troclstra faction stand on good terms with the chauvinists. We must not be deceived by the fact that in Holland the lower, as well as the upper, middle classes hate Germany, which is in a position to swallow them. The only consistent, sincere, fiery and convinced internationalists are che Marxists led by Ilorter and Pannekoek. In Sweden the opporw tunist leader Branting is indignant when the German Socialists call him a traitor, but the leader of the left wing, Hoglund, tells us that anion**; his followers there arc men who hold the same opinion (sec S-D No. 36). In Bulgaria, the foes of opportunism, "the narrow ones," have accused the German social-democrats in their organ, Novoe Vrcmya, of "a filthy deed." In Switzerland, the followers of the opportunist Greulich are inclined to justify the German social-dem ocrats (see their paper, the National, of Zurich), but the group led by the much more radical, R. Grimm, has opened the columns of its paper, the Berncr Tagwacht, to the German left wing. In the only two exceptions to that rule France and Belgium, two countries out of ten, there is a number of internationalists, but (for reasons easily understood) they are weak and crushed down. 'Vaillant himself confessed in his paper, V Humanite, that he had received from his readers many letters inspired by an international ist spirit, but he did not print a single one of them in its entirety. A glance at the situation in every country is sufficient to con vince us that the opportunist wing of European Socialism betrayed Socialism and went over to the chauvinist camp. What gave that power, that seemingly irresistible power to the official parties? Kautsky, who knows perfectly how to approach a historical question, when discussing ancient Home or a similar subject, not too close to our prcscnt-day life, pretends hypocritically that this passes his understanding. But the whole thing is as clear as daylight. The opportunists derived their giant strength from their alliance with the bourgcoif-ic, the governments and the general staffs. We often forget that fact and wc imagine that the opportunists are actually part and parcel of the Socialist party, that Socialist parties have always had and will always have two extreme wings, that the whole SOCIALISM AND THE WAR 125 thing was due to a desire to avoid extremes etc., as all the philistine scribes are writing in their sheets. In reality, the mere fact that opportunists formally belong to a labor party doesn't change that other fact, that they are obviously a section of the bourgeoisie, spreading its influence, acting as its agents in the labor movement. When the opportunist Sudekum started to demonstrate that social, class truth, some good people howled. The French Socialists and Plekhanov pointed an accus ing finger at Sudekum. Now Vandervelde, Sembat and Plekhanov could stand in front of a mirror and they would see there the image of Sudekum. The German Vorstand, which sings Kautsky's praise and whose praise Kautsky sings, hastened to declare in guarded, modest and polite terms, that they did not agree withi Sudekum, whom they did not designate by name. This is ridiculous, for at the crucial moment, Sudekum showed himself a hundred times stronger than Haase and Kautsky, just as Kasha Zarya was stronger that the Brusselian bloc which was afraid of a split. Why? Because back of Sudekum there stands the bourgeoisie, the government and the general staff of a great power. They back his policy in a thousand ways, while they oppose his adversaries in a thousand ways, too, including jail sentences and the firing squad. The voice of Sudekum is carried afar on the wings of the bourgeois papers, with their millions of copies (and so do the voices of Van dervelde, Serribat and Plekhanov), while the voice of his opponents can never be heard in the "lawful" press, for there is a military cen sorship. Opportunism is not a chance phenomenon, a crime, a low deed or an act of betrayal on the part of a few individuals, but the social pioduct of a whole period of history. But not everybody tries to realize the meaning of this fact. The labor parties between 1889 and 1914 had to take advantage of what was declared permissible by the bourgeoisie. When the crisis came their only hope lay In "unlawful" activity. This could not be done without an enormous amount of energy and determination, besides resorting to a num ber of tricks of warfare. One Sudekum was enough to prevent that change of tactics, for back of that one man there was all the old system of society, historically and philosophically speaking, for that Sudekum had always betrayed and will always betray to the bour geoisie the war plans of the bourgeoisie's enemy, to use practical and political parlance. 126 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA It is a fact that the entire Social-Democratic part of Germany docs only what is agreeable to Sudekum or, at least, what Sudekum can abide. Nothing else can be done in a lawful way. Whatever honorable, really Socialist, action is taken by the Ger man party, is against the wishes of its center, without the consent of its leaders, in violation of the discipline of the party, by factions, in behalf of the anonymous center of a new party, like, for in stance, the anonymous appeal from the German "left" printed in the Berner Tagczvacht for May 31 of this year. A new party is indeed in the process of organization and growth, a real labor party, a genuine social-democratic party, very different from the old and rotten national liberal party of Legren, Sudekum, Kautsky, Haase, Scheidcmann and others.10 It was a de,ep historical truth which the hopeless conservative, who signs himself Monitor, expressed in the Prussian Yearbook, when he said that it would fare badly with the opportunists (read bourgeoisie) if the present-day social democracy should mend its ways, for the workers would get out of it. Opportunists and bour geois need the party as it is now, "uniting" the right and left wings and officially represented by Kautsky, who knows how to reconcile all the factions by his smooth, "Marxist" phrases. In appearance it represents Socialism and the revolutionary spirit of the nation, the masses, the workers ; in reality, it is pure Sudckumism, always ready to ally itself with the bourgeoisie when ever a serious crisis arises. I said "whenever a crisis arises," for it is not only in wartimes, but whenever a serious political strike takes place that feudal Ger many and "free-parliamentary" England and France adopt under this or that name military measures of repression. No one who is of sane mind and has a good memory can gainsay this. ,0What took place before the famous vote of August 4 is very charact eristic. The official party threw over the affair the veil of its official hypo crisy. The majority ruled and the party voted like one man for the war. Put Strebel in the review Die Internationle unveiled that hypocrisy and told the truth. There were in the Social-Democratic faction two groups ready with .their ultimatums, that is with their dissenting resolutions, One group of opportunists numbering some 30 men, bad decided to vote yes in any case. Another group, the left group, with some 15 men, had decided, less resolutely however, to vote no. When the center or "frog pond" which did not stand or. firm ground, cast its votes with the opportunists the left wing saw itself beaten and submittted. T!ie so-called unity of the German Social-Democratic party is a piece of low hypocrisy, an attempt at concealing the fact that the whole party lhad to submit to the ultimatum presented by the opportunists. SOCIALISM AND THE WAR 127 How can we answer the third question : How shall we fight social-chauvinism? Social-chauvinism is opportunism so developed and so strengthened in the course of a period of relatively peace ful capitalism, so settled in its ideas and its policies, so closely allied to the bourgeoisie and the government that its presence within a workers' party is absolutely intolerable. One may wear thin soles while walking along the sidewalks of a town, but when you climb mountains you need strong hobnailed boots. European Socialism has grown beyond the narrow con fines of peaceful activity and nationalism. The war has led it into the arena of revolutionary action, and it is time it should break entirely with opportunism and drive it out of the workers' party. Merely to mention the duties which Socialism will have to ful fill at this new stage of its world evolution, is not to decide how soon or in what way the revolutionary Socialist parties of workers in every country are going to rid themselves of all the petty bour geois opportunists within their ranks. But we realize clearly that henceforth that process of elimination is essential and that all the policies of the workers' party will have to be shaped from that point of view. The war of 1914 marks such a turning point in the history of the world that the relations of the party to opportunism cannot remain unchanged any longer. We cannot undo what was done, we cannot blot out of the consciousness of the workers, nor out of the memory of the bourgeois, nor out of the record of our times thej fact that, in a crisis, the opportunists proved to be the group around which rallied all the elements from the working class who deserted into the bourgeois camp. As far as the whole of Europe is con cerned, opportunism was only in its adolescence before the war broke out. When it did break out, opportunism reached its man hood state and it will be unable to regain its youth and its innocence. There has matured a whole group of parliamentarians, journalists, bureaucrats of the labor movement, privileged employes and even a few proletarians, who cast in their lot with the pourgcoisie, and whom the bourgeoisie knew how to appreciate and to make use of, Wc cannot go back or turn backward the wheels of history, we must and wc can go ahead fearlessly, away from artificial, lawful, slavish opportunism and toward the sort of labor organization which will be revolutionary, which will not confine itself to so-called law ful action and will know how to rid itself of the opportunist treach ery, the sort of labor organization that will set out to conquer power and to overthrow the bourgeoisie. 128 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA We see what a distorted view of the whole thing those men have who are trying to deaden their conscience and the conscience of the workers, men like the recognized leaders of the Second Inter national, the Guesdes, the Plekhanovs, the Kautskys and their ilk. One thing is beyond cavil: if those men cannot understand the new duties of the party they must stay out of it, or surrender to the opportunists who hold them prisoners now. If those men break their chains there will be few obstacles to their readmission to the ranks of the revolutionists. VIII Lawful mass organizations of the working class were one of the distinctive traits of the Socialist parties at the time of the Sec ond International. In the German party especially they were very strong and hence the war of 1914 marks a sudden turning point, and made the problems more acute than ever. Any revolutionary action on their part at the time would have meant the crushing out of all lawful organizations by the policy, and therefore the old crowd from Legien to Kautsky, inclusive of tbe latter, sacrificed the old revolutionary objects of the proletariat to the preservation of the existing lawful organizations. They waste their time denying it. They sold the revolutionary rights of the proletariat for the mess of pottage of police toleration. Open a pamphlet by Legien, the leader of the German trade unionists, entittled Why Trades Union Officials Should Take a More Active Part in the Inner Life* of the Party (Berlin, 1915). This is a report read by the author on January 27, 1915, before a meeting of the leaders of the trade union movement. Legien in corporated in his printed report one interesting document which might otherwise have been suppressed by the military censorship. That document called Materials for the Delegates from the Neider- barnim District (a suburb of Berlin), presents the views of the left-wing social-democrats, their protest against the action of the party. The revolutionary social-democrats say in that document: that did not and could not foresee that: "All the organized forces of the German social-democratic party and of the, trade unions stood by the government which was conducting the war, and that all those forces were being used in order to crush out the revolutionary energies of the masses" (page 34 of Lcgicn's pamphlet). SOCIALISM AND THE WAR I29 This is the absolute truth. And the following statement is just as true: "The vote taken on August 4 by the social-democratic faction meant that the opposite view, however deeply shared by the masses, could not make itself heard through the instrumentality of the party, but against the wishes of the party's leaders, against the in superable opposition of the party and of the trade unions" (ibidem), This is true beyond doubt. "If the social-democratic faction had fulfilled its duty on Au gust 4, the outward form of the organization would have been de stroyed, but its spirit would have lived, that spirit which kept the party alive at the time of the laws of exception and helped it to brook all hardships" (ibidem). Legien's pamphlet mentions that that assemblage of "leaders" before whom he delivered his report, and who were the organizers and the officials of the trade union movement, laughed -when they heard that. It seemed to them absurd that there could and should be an unlawful revolutionary organization in existence in a crisis. Legien, fhe faithful watchdog of the bourgeoisie, beat his chest and shouted: "This is a purely anarchistic thought: to destroy an organ ization in order to leave a decision to the masses, To my mind there is no doubt but this is an anarchistic idea." "Correct." shouted in chorus those lackeys of the bourgeoisie who style themselves the leaders of the working class (page Zj). What an edifying picture. Men so completely perverted and dulled by bourgeois legalism, that they can no longer understand the necessity of different organizations, of unlawful ones. Men have gone so far that the imagine that lawful organizations, cxistinigi with the approval of the police, arc the limit which must not be crossed, and that such organizations should be saved at the time of a crisis. There is the live logic of opportunism. The pure and simple growth of lawful unions, the pure and simple routine of stu pid, though well-meaning, philistincs keeping their little union books, has led those well-meaning philistincs when a crisis arose, to betray, to sell and to strangle the revolutionary energy of the mass es. And this is not due to mere chance happenings. Revolutionary forms of organization are necessary, a changing historical situation demands them, this period of revolutionary ac tion on the part of the proletariat demands them, but they can only l30 TUB PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA be brought into life, over the dead bodies of the former leaders, over the dead body of the old party, over the ruins of that party. The counter-revolutionary philistine naturally will shout: an archy, as the opportunist Ed. Davis did when alluding to Liebk- necht. The only German Socialist leaders who have any decency left are those whom the opportunists are branding as anarchists. Consider the army of today. There is one of the most perfect examples of organization. And that organization is perfect for the simple reason that it is flexible and knows how to inspire one single desire to the millions of which it consists. Today those millions of people are sitting in their homes, in various parts of the coun try, tomorrow the mobilization orders arc sent out, and they all gather at the points designated to them. They stand in the trench es, perhaps months at a time. They charge the enemy. They do wonders under a hail of bullets and shrapnel. Their advanced troops may sink mines into the ground. They may rush ahead sev eral miles under the direction of their flyers. This is real organization, through which millions of men. lured to the same goal, moved by one single will, change their form of association and of action, change the scene and the objects of their activity, change their tools and their weapons as the changing neces- cities of warfare may require. This is the way the working class should fight the bourgeois. To-day there may not be a situation favorable to a revolution, we may not sec the conditions that would leaven up the masses and increase their activities. To-day they may give you a ballot at the polls. Cast it so as to 'beat your enemies and not to secure a nice little job in parliament for some coward afraid of going to jail. Tomorrow they may take that ballot away from you, give you arms and a big quick firing gun of the latest type. . . . Take those instruments of death and destruction, and don't listen to senti mentalists who arc afraid of war. There are too many things left on earth which should be destroyed by fire and steel before the working class can be emancipated. And if bitterness and des peration grow among the masses, if a really revolutionary crisis arises, then he ready to organize in a new way and to use the instruments of death and destruction against your own government and your own bourgeoisie. This is not an easy task. This requires difficult preparations. This requires heavy sacrifices. This is the new view of organization and struggle which we must all take. But we shall not acquire this new point of view without committing SOCIALISM AND THE WAR I31 many mistakes without occasionally going down to defeat. This view of the class struggle stands to the electoral campaigns in the same relation as a real charge stands to mere military manoeuvres, as an ordinary regimental hike stands to life in the trenches. That view of the struggle docs not come up frequently in history, because its significance and its consequences make themselves felt for entire decades. The days, however, when we will be able and obliged to resort to that form of struggle will count more than any other twenty years of past history. Let us examine Legien and Kautsky together. This is what Kautsky has to say:. "As long as the party was small, every protest against war constituted a good bit of virile propaganda. The attitude of our Servian and Russian comrades in the recent events received general commendation. But the larger the party comes to be, the more it must take into account in its decisions the practical consequences of such decisions, the more difficult it becomes to weigh properly the various motives and to choose between them. And, therefore, the stronger wc become, the more easily differences of opinion may arise among us whenever wc face a new, complex situation." Inter nationalism and war" (page 50). This statement of Kautsky's differs from Legicn's statements only by its hypocrisy and cowardice. Kautsky really approves of and justifies Legien's low abstention from revolutionary activity, but he does it on the sly, without committing himself, by way of allu sions, paying homage now to Legien, now to the revolutionists of Russia. We Russians were accustomed to observe that attitude only among liberals. Liberals are always willing to recognize the virile stand taken by the revolutionists, but never do they depart from their arch-opportunistic tactics. Self-respecting revolution ists will not accept Kautsky's expressions of approval but reject with disgust this way of presenting the question. If the situation was not favorable for a revolution, if it was not a clear duty to preach revolutionary action, then the attitude of the Servian and Russian revolutionists would be out of place and their tactics faulty. Why can't those great fighters, Kautsky and Legien, have the cour age of their opinions and speak it out frankly? If the attitude of the Russian and Servian Socialists deserves approval then it is not permissible, it is criminal to justify the attitude of strong parties like the German and the French. By using a very confusing expression "practical consequences" Kautsky tries to conceal the fact that the large parties were afraid l32 the PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA of having their organization crushed out, their funds seized, their leaders thrown into jail by the government. In other words. Kaut sky justifies the betrayal of Socialism by the fear of the unpleasant consequences revolutionary tactics might bring about. Isn't this a pure and simple prostitution of Marxism. "They would arrest us," said one of the men who voted for the credits on August 4 at a -workingmen's meeting in Berlin. And the workingmen shouted back to him: "Well, what of it?" The best thing on earth to inspire the workers of Germany and France with a revolutionary spirit and show them the necessity of preparing for revolutionary activity, would be the arrest of a representative for making a daring speech. This would be the 'best appeal to united revolutionary action addressed to the prole tarians of all nations. That unity of action is not an easy thing to bring about. This made it the more imperative for those that stood at the head of the movement, and who were shaping its pol icies to assume the initiative. It is not only in war times but whenever the political situation takes a critical turn that governments will threaten to crush out organized bodies, to seize their cash and jail their leaders, and to let them bear other practical consequences for their actions. What of it? Is this a valid ground to excuse the opportunists, as Kautsky docs? This really amounts to transforming the Social-Democratic party into a national liberal party. Socialists can only come to one conclusion : pure legalism, the legalism of the European parties has outlived its usefulness, and owing to the entrance of Capitalism into its imperialistic stage of development, has become simply a bourgeois labor policy. It must be supplemented by the adoption of an extra legal basis, by extra legal organization, extra legal Social-Democratic action, without however surrendering any of the legal positions occupied. How that can be done, experience will teach us, provided there is a firm desire for that sort of action and provided we realize clearly its absolute necessity. The revolutionary Social-Democrats of Russia showed in 1912-13 and 14 that it could be done. The labor deputy Muranof, hauled into court and sent by Czarism to Siberia, showed better than any one else that besides respectable parliamentarism of the ministerial timber (Henderson, Sembat, Vandervclde, Su dekum and Scheidcmann are made of ministerial timber, but they arc not allowed to take such lofty positions) there is also a revolu tionary and extra legal variety of parliamentarism. The Kosovskys and Potrcsoffs may kowtow as much as they want to European SOCIALISM AND THE WAR l33 parliamentarism, but we shall never tire of repeating to the working class that sort of legalism, the brand of Social-Democracy exemp lified by Kautsky, Legien and Scheidcmann, deserves nothing but scorn. XI Let us sum up. The collapse of the Second International re vealed itself clearly in the betrayal of the Social-Democratic par ties of Europe by the majority of their officials embodied in their declarations and their solemn resolutions of the Basel and Stuttgart congresses. But this bankruptcy which leaves opportunism victo rious and has transformed the Social- Democratic party into a na tional liberal labor party, is simply the product of the entire period during which the Second International was in existence, the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries. The material conditions obtaining in that period, the transi tion between the bourgeois and national revolutions of Western Europe and the dawn of social revolution, fostered the growth of opportunism. In some European countries we observe in the labor and So cialist movements a cleavage along opportunist lines (in England, Italy, Holland, Bulgaria, Russia) in others we witness a longdrawn and stubborn struggle along the same line (in Germany, France, Belgium, Sweden, Sitzerland). The crisis brought about by the great war, tore off all the veils, pricked the pus pockets, ready to break out, and showed up opportunism in its real colors, an ally of the bourgeoisie. It has become absolutely necessary to remove entirely and systematically this element from the labor movement In imperialistic times there cannot co-exist within one party cham pions of the revolutionary proletariat and semi-bourgeois aristo crats of the labor movement fed on crumbs of the "greatpowerdom" enjoyed by their country. Opportunism which was once considered as a mere emergency measure, has become the most dangerous means of deceiving the workers and the great obstacle in the path of the labor movement. Frank opportunism is not so very danger ous for the laboring masses steer clear of it, hut the theory of the golden mean, which justifies by Marxist quotations opportunistic practices, and which by dint of sophistry proves that the time has not come for revolutionary action, this is the real danger. The emi nent exponent of this doctrine and the leader of the Second Interna tional, Kautsky, has shown himself to be a first-class hypocrite and a virtuoso in the art of prostituting Marxism. Among the million l34 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA members of the Social-Democratic party there isn't a decent, con scious and revolutionary Social-Democrat who does not reject with indignation that "leader" who has been profusely defended by Sudekum and Scheidemann. The proletarian masses who lost about nine-tenths of their leaders to the bourgeois camp, found themselves isolated and im potent before rampant chauvinism, military measures and the cen sorship. But the revolutionary situation created by the war and which is steadily becoming more acute and more widespread will unavoidably foster a revolutionary spirit which will stiffen up and enlighten the proletarians of the better type, the class conscious ones. There may and there probably will develop in the mentality of the masses a state of mind similar to that which we could observe in Russia at the beginning of 1905 at the time of the Gapon incident, when out of the backward proletarian masses, there grew in a few months or even a few weeks, an army of millions of men, the van guard of the proletariat. Wc cannot tell whether a powerful rev olutionary movement will start soon after this war or during this war, but it is only agitation conducted with that purpose which deserves to be called Socialist agitation. The only thing that will give that agitation a center and a direction, that will unite and blend all the elements the proletariat needs in its fight against its government and its 'bourgeoisie is a civil war. In Russia the entire history of the labor movement has pre pared the exclusion of tlie petit bourgeois opportunist elements from the revolutionary Social-Democratic elements. It is a very bad service to render to the labor movement to ignore that history and to declaim against "factionism." One thus deprives himself of the opportunity of understanding the actual growth of the labor movement in Russia, which has been for years and years waging a stubborn fight against all opportunistic tendencies. Among all the great powers engaged in the war, Russia only has recently lived through a revolution; its bourgeois character, taking into account the decisive part played by the proletariat, could not but create a cleavage between the bourgeois and the pro letarian elements in the labor party. In the twenty years from 1894 to 1914, during which the Russian Social Democracy existed as an organization, connected with the labor movement (we do not allude simply to the ideas current from i883 to 1894) a struggle went on between the petit bourgeois opportunists and the prole tarian revolutionary wing. The "economism" of the years 1894- 1903 was nothing but opportunism. All its theories and arguments SOCIALISM AND THE WAR l35 were only a struvist distortion of Marxism, references to the mass to justify opportunism, and all that phraseology of theirs reminds us of the degenerated form of Marxism propounded at present by Kautsky, Cunow, Plekhanov and others. It might be a good idea to remember the attitude assumed in those days by papers like the Rabotshy Mysl and the Rabotshy Dielo and to compare that attitude with the one assumed nowadays by Kautsky. The Menshevism of the next period, 1903-1908, was not only in its theory but in its organization the heir of cconomism. At the time of the Russian revolution it introduced tactics which subjected the proletariat to the control of the liberal bourgeoisie and which reflect a purely bourgeois opportunist tendency. When in the following period, the main current of Menshe vism gave birth to the "Liquidation," that class bias of the party was so obvious that the best representatives of Menshevism always protested against the policy of the group centering around Nasha Zarya. But that group, the only one which conducted among the masses a systematic agitation against the revolutionary Marxist party in the following five or six years, revealed itself when the war broke out as made up of Social chauvinists. And in a nation where autocracy was in power, where the bourgeoisie had not as yet completed its revolution where 43 per cent of the population oppress the rest of the population made up of people from other racial stocks, Russia could not escape the "European" type of evolution which enables certain strata of the petit bourgeoisie, especially the professional classes, and an insig nificant minority of the workers' aristocracy to enjoy the advantages of "greatpowcrdom" pertaining to their own country. The working class and the Socialist worckcrs' party of Russia have been prepared by their entire history to assume an interna- tionalistic, that is a really consistent revolutionary attitude. VII ARMAMENTS AND WAR Certain revolutionary Socialists who are advocates of dis armament use as their main argument the claim that this demand expresses most clearly, most emphatically and most thoroughly the struggle against all forms of militarism, against every war. And this main argument constitutes precisely the fundamental mistake of all the advocates of disarmament. Socialists cannot be op posed to every war without ceasing to be Socialists. Socialists have never been opposed to revolutionary wars, and they never can accept that attitude. The bourgeoisie of the im perialistic nations is thoroughly reactionary, and we know that the war waged at present by this bourgeoisie is a reactionary, criminal war of spoliation. If this is a fact, what about a war against this bourgeoisie? For example, a war of the suppressed and subject or colonial peoples against the imperialistic bourgeoisie? In this program of the German "International Group" we read in paragraph 5: "In the period of Imperialism no national wars are possible" This is evidently wrong. The history of the twen tieth century, of this century of Imperialism, is full of colonial wars. And what we, with our dirty European chauvinism, call ''colonial wars" are often national wars or national revolts of op pressed peoples. One of the essential characteristics of Imperialism is precise ly that it accelerates the development of Capitalism in backward countries and with it the struggle against national oppression. This is a fact. And from this fact it follows inevitably that Im perialism must often breed national wars. Junius, who defends the program of the International Group, says that in the epoch of Imperialism every national war against one of the imperialistic powers results in the action of another imperialistic power competing with the first one, and that every national war accordingly changes into an imperialistic war. This ARMAMENTS AND WAR l37 argument, however, is also incorrect. It may be so, but it need not always be so. Different colonial wars in the period between 1900 and 1914 did not have this result; and it would be ridiculous to consider it possible, if this war ends in a general exhaustion of the warring countries, that there should not be a national revo lutionary war, perhaps by China together with India, Persia, Siam, etc., against the existing world powers. The negation of all possible national wars under Imperialism is theoretically and historically incorrect, and in practice promotes European chauvinism: we, belonging to nations that suppress hun dreds of millions of people in Europe, Africa and Asia, wc declare to these oppressed people that their war against "our" nation is impossible ! Civil wars are also wars. Those who accept the class struggle must accept civil wars, which, under certain circumstances, are a natural and inevitable continuance, development and accentuation of the class struggle in every society based on class divisions. All great revolutions prove this. To deny or to overlook civil wars would mean becoming a victim of the most hopeless opportunism and abandoning the Social Revolution. The victory of Socialism in one country does not all of a sud den exclude all wars in general. On the contrary, this situation implies wars. The development of Capitalism proceeds differently in different countries; this is inevitable in a society based on the production of commodities. The result is: Socialism cannot be victorious in all countries at the same time. Socialism will be vic torious first in one or in some countries, other countries continuing for a certain length of time on a bourgeois or pre-bourgcois basis. This will not only result in antagonisms, but will develop the di rect tendency of the bourgeoisie in the other countries to crush the victorious proletariat of the Socialist country. In such cases our war would be justifiable and right, it would be a war for So cialism, for liberation of other peoples from their bourgeoisie. Engels was right when he recognized clearly, in his letter to Kautsky, September 12, 1882, the possibility of wars of defense of Socialism, meaning the defense of the victorious proletariat against the bourgeoisie of other countries. Only after we have completely forced down and expropriated the bourgeoisie of the whole world and not of one country alone, will wars become impossible. And it is scientifically incorrect and not at all revolutionary to overlook or confuse the most important, l38 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA the most difficult task, the task that contributes most to the strug gle during the period of transition of Socialism: the crushing of the resistance of the bourgeoisie. The social quacks and oppor tunists like to dream of the coming of Socialism peacefully: they arc distinguished from the revolutionary Socialists precisely in this, that they refuse to consider and prepare for the desperate class struggles necessary to realize the beautiful future. Wc should not be fooled by words. Many of us hate the phrase "defensive wars" because the opportunists try to cover up and justify with those words the lie of the bourgeoisie in this war of robbery. This is a fact, but it does not follow that we must therefore neglect thinking about the meaning of political concep tions, To accept the defense of the country in the present war of Imperialism is to declare this war a "just" war in the interest of the proletariat; a fraudulent declaration. Inva«;on is always pos sible in any war. But it would simply be stupid iot to justify de fense of the country by suppressed and subject people in their war against imperialistic powers, or by a victorious proletariat in its war against the bourgeois of a capitalist country. It would be absolutely wrong, theoretically, to forget that every war is the continuation of politics by other means: the pres ent imperialistic war is the continuation of the imperialistic policy orginating and developing under the conditions of the epoch of Impcralism. But this same epoch must necessarily produce the policy of fighting against national suppression and the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie; there develops, accord ingly, the possibility and inevitability, first, of revolutionary na tional uprisings and wars, second, of wars and revolts of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, and third, of the unity of both kinds of revolutionary wars. n There is, moreover, another general argument. A suppressed class that does not strive to acquire knowledge of arms, that does not possess and use arms, such an oppressed class invites being suppressed and enslaved. We should not degrade ourselves to the level of bourgeois pacifists and opj>ortunists ; wc should not forget that we arc in a society based on class divisions, and that no salva tion is possible or imaginable other than through the class struggle. In every class society, whether based on slavery, serfdom, or as at present on wage-labor, the ruling classes are armed. Not ARMAMENTS AND WAR l39 only the present standing army, but also the militia, that in Switz erland not excepted, is armament of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat. I consider it necessary to prove this elementary truth ; it is sufficient to point to the mobilization of troops during and against strikes in all the capitalistic countries. The armament of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat is one of the most important features of capitalist society. And with this fact in view, the revolutionary Socialist should accept the "de mand" for disarmament ! That would be complete abandonment of our class policy and of every thought of the revolution. Wc claim: armament of the proletariat to overthrow, to expropriate and dis arm the bourgeoisie as the only possible tactic prepared by, based on and forced upon us by the objective development of capitalist militarism. Only after the disarmament of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat can the latter, without betraying its world historical task, throw armaments on the scrap heap, and it will do this — but not until then. When the social popes and the petty bourgeois point to the terror and fear in armed force, the blood and death produced by this war, we answer: Capitalist society has always been a terror without end. And if this most reactionary of all wars should pre pare an end of the terror of this society, there should be no reason to despair. From an objective standpoint, the theory, the demand, or, better, the illusion of disarmament is a result at this moment of despair, since it is now clearly apparent that the bourgeoisie itself prepares the way for the only acceptable revolutionary war, the civil war against the imperialistic bourgeoisie. Those who call this "pure theory" and "only theoretical talk" are referred to two facts in the world's history: the influence of the trusts and woman labor, and the Paris Commune and the events of 1905 in Russia. [And, again, the Russian Revolution of 1917.] It is a necessity for the bourgeoisie to further develop the trusts and to send women and children into the factories, to torture and exploit them. We do not support this development, we do not co-operate in this horror: we fight against it. But how do we fight? Wc explain that trusts and woman labor arc transitory periods. We want to go back neither to hand-work and pre-con- ccntrated Capitalism, nor to the period of domestic work for women. On towards the future, beyond trusts, etc., and through them to Socialism. 140 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for the present militariza tion of the people. At present Imperialism and the bourgeoisie not only militarize the whole people, but youth also. To-morrow they may, for all we care, militarize the women. We answer: so much the better! Faster, always faste — and the faster the sooner armed revolt against Capitalism. How can Socialists become frightened or discouraged by the militarization of the youth, etc., with the example of the Paris Commune in their minds? That surely was not a theory of a dream, but reality. And it would un doubtedly breed despair if Socialists, in defiance of all economic and political reality, would doubt that the imperialistic epoch and imperialistic wars must lead with elementary force and inevitably toward a repetition of the reality of the Commune. It was a bourgeois observer of the Commune who wrote in May, 1871, in an English newspaper: "If the French nation con sisted wholly of women, what a frightful nation it would be." The women and the youth, from thirteen years up, fought dur ing the Commune side by side with the men: and it will not be otherwise in the coming battles to subdue the bourgeoisie. The proletarian women will not look on passively while the well-armed bourgeoisie orders the badly armed or unarmed proletariat to be shot down; they will seize arms as they did in 1871. And from the now unnerved or discouraged nations, or, more accurately, from the labor movement, now disorganized by the opportunists more than by the governments, will arise, sooner or later, but be yond the shadow of a doubt, an international alliance of "fright ful nations" of the revolutionary proletariat. Militarism permeates the whole public life. Militarism be comes supreme. Imperialism means bitter struggle among the world powers to divide and re-divide the world — and this, there fore, militarizes even the small and neutral countries. What will the proletarian women do against this development? Condemn all war and all militarism, and demand disarmament? Never will the women of a revolutionary class accept such a contemptible task. On the contrary, they will urge their sons: "You will soon be grown up and they will give you a rifle. Take it, and qualify in all military knowledge — that is necessary for the workers, not in order to shoot at your comrades, as is done in this war of robbery and as you have been urged to do by the traitors of Socialism, but lo fight the bourgeoisie of your own country to put an end to -ex- ARMAMENTS AND WAR I4I plohation and the misery of wars, not by pious wishes, but by over powering and disarming the bourgeoisie." Those who refuse to carry on such a propaganda, and such a propaganda particularly in connection with the present war, should be kind enough to stop talking in grandiloquent phrases about international revolutionary Socialism, about the Social Rev olution, about war against war. in The advocates of disarmament arc opposed to the armament of the people because in their opinion, this demand might lead readily to concessions towards opportunism. We have examined the main issue: the relation of disarmament to the class struggle and the Social Revolution. Examining the relation of disarma ment towards opportunism, we find that one of the most convincing arguments against the demand for disarmament is precisely the fact that this demand and the illusions it creates weakens our fight against opportunism. The fight against opportunism is a very real issue in the In ternational. The fight against Imperialism is empty and deceitful if it is not combined with a fight against opportunism. One of the principal mistakes of the Zimmcrwald and Kicnthal conferences and one of the main reasons for the failure of these efforts toward organizing a third International, consist exactly in the fact that the question of a fight against opportunism was not even brought up openly, far less decided in the sense of a complete break with the opportunist Socialists. Outspoken opportunism works in the open and directly against the revolution and against developing revolts and revolutionary movements, and in co-operation with the gov ernments. The clandestine opportunists, as Kautsky & Co., are much more detrimental to the workers' interests and much more dangerous, because they cover up and make attractive their coali tion with the undisguised opportunists by using fine Marxian phrases and peace proposals. The struggle against both these forms of opportunism can only be waged on all issues of proletarian policy: parliamentary action, economic action, strikes, propaganda, etc. The fundamental character of both fonns of opportunism consists in this, that it tries to conceal and deny or else to answer in the spirit of the police, all actual questions of the revolution and of the general connection between the present war and the revolu tion. And all this notwithstanding the fact that just prior to the 142 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA war, the connection between the coming war and the proletarian revolution had been demonstrated unofficially as well as officially in the Basel Manifesto! One of the principal mistakes of dis armament advocacy is that it evades all actual problems of the revolution. Or are the advocates of disarmament altogether in favor of a new kind of disarmed revolution? Moreover, we arc by no means opposed to the struggle for reforms. We will not deny the disagreeable possibility that hu manity may have to pass through another imperialistic war if the Revolution, in spite of repeated outbreaks of mass resistance and mass revolts, and in spite of our own efforts, does not result from this war. We advocate a program of reforms directed against the opportunists. The opportunists would prefer that we abandoned the struggle for reforms to them, that we should retreat out of this bad reality to the castle in the air of disarmament. For dis armament means to run away from the reality and not to fight it. In our program we should state: "The slogan, and the ac ceptance of, 'defense of the fatherland' in this imperialistic war is nothing else than bribing the labor movement with a bourgeois lie." Such a definite answer to a definite question would be more correct theoretically, more beneficial to the proletariat, and more annoying to the opportunists than the demand for disarmament and the rejection of all wars of defense. And we could add: "The bourgeoisie of all the imperialistic powers, England, France, Ger many, Austria, Russia, Italy, Japan and the United States, has be come so reactionary and obsessed with the struggle for world power, that any war of the bourgeoisie of these countries must necessarily be reactionary. The proletariat must not only oppose such a war, but must also wish the defeat of 'its own' government and use a defeat for the revolutionary uprising, if a revolt to pre vent the war has failed." As far as the system of militia is concerned, we should say: Wc arc not in favor of a bourgeois militia, but only in favor of a proletarian militia. Accordingly, not a cent and not a man cither for the standing army or for the bourgeois militia ; and in the case of the bourgeois militia, all the more, as we see even in the most liberal republics, as in Switzerland, a continual Prussianizing of the militia, together with the use of troops against strikes. Wc might demand: Election of officers by the rank and file, abolition of all forms of military courts, no discrimination between foreign and native workers (which is especially important in im- ARMAMENTS AND WAR 143 perialistic countries that ruthlessly exploit and discriminate against foreign workers), and, furthermore, the right for, every hun dred inhabitants of a state to select freely its military instructors, to be paid by the state, etc. In this way the proletariat would ac quire military knowledge for its own use and its own interest, and not in favor of the master class. And every result of the rev olutionary movement, even when only partial, as, for example, vic tory in a town or an industrial centre or a part of the army, as has been demonstrated by the Russian Revolution, must naturally result in the adoption by the victorious proletariat of just this program. After all, it is impossible to overcome opportunism simply with paper programs; only effective action will do it. The great est and most disastrous mistake of the collapsed second Interna- ' tional was the separation of words and deeds, the furtherance of hypocrisy and "revolutionary" phrases. Disarmament as a social expression, that is, an idea that is not simply a personal fancy but arises out of a social condition and influences a social environment, evidently springs from the petty and accidentally "quiet" condi tions of some of the small nations that lie close to the bloody war and anxiously hope to continue vegetating. It is worthwhile to examine the arguments of the Norwegian advocates of disarma ment: Wc arc a small nation, our army is small, wc cannot defend ourselves against the world powers nor being forced into an im perialistic alliance with one or another of these powers, wc want to remain quietly in our corner and carry on a corner policy, we demand disarmament, courts of arbitration with binding decisions, permanent (perhaps as exhibited by Belgium) neutrality, etc. The wish of the small nations "to stay outside of great world move ments, the petty bourgeois conception of living outside of the gi gantic world struggle, to use its special situation to remain inac tive — this is the objective social condition that secures for the pol icy of disarmament a certain amount of influence and following in some of the smaller nations. Such an effort is, of course, an il lusion and reactionary, because in some way or other Imperialism will sweep the small nations into the whirl-pool of social develop ment and world policy. Objectively, disarmament only benefits the opportunistic na tionalist and narrow tendency in the labor movement. Disarma ment is the most nationalistic and the special national program of the small nations, not an international program of revolutionary in ternational Socialism. VIII INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISM The State of Affairs in the Socialist International The international duty of the Russian working class has be come very evident in these days. Wc sec not only perfectly inactive people but even chauvinists calling themselves internationalists, men like Messrs. Plekhanov and Potrcsoff, even Kercnsky himself. This imposes upon the prol etarian party a stern obligation to draw a clear, accurate line of cleavage between lip internationalism and active internationalism. Mere appeals to the workers of all lands, prcfessions of in ternationalist faith, direct or veiled attempts to organize a progres sive series of proletarian movements in the various countries at war, frantic efforts to bring about agreements between the Social ists of the belligerent countries on the subject of the revolutionary struggle, Socialistic campaigns for peace propaganda, etc. all that, when we consider its actual value regardless of the honesty of the prime movers of such enterprises is just hot air naive sentimen- talisni, which can be cleverly used by chauvinists to deceive the masses in an underhand way. The French social-patriots, the government Socialists, most adroit and best groundod in parliamentary juggling, have broken all records for sonorous and melodious manifestoes and interna tionalist phraseology, coupled with the baldests betrayal of Social ism and internationalism ; for they have accepted positions in a cabinet waging an imperialistic war, they have voted for all credits or loans (as Cheidse, Skobclcff, Tseretelli and Stekloff have been doing recently in Russia) and opposed the social struggle in their own country. Good people often forget the cruel, savage paraphernalia of a world-wide imperialistic war. Phrases and naive sentimental de sires are impotent. INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISM 145 There is only one way of being a genuine internationalist: to strain all our energies in an endeavor to develop the revolutionary movement and speed the revolutionary struggle in our own land, to support that struggle in every way, by propaganda, sympathy, material aid, and support only that struggle, in every country with out exception. Everything else is a snare and a delusion. The international Socialist and working class movements the world over have in the course of the war split into three groups. Whoever understands their tendencies, has analyzed them closely and still deserts the fight for real active internationalism, is a weak ling and a fraud. i. — Social-patriots, that is, Socialists in words and chauvinists in fact, who agree to defend their fatherland in an imperialistic war and particularly in this imperialistic war. These men are our class enemies. They have gone over to the bourgeois camp. They count among their numbers the majority of Socialist leaders in every •nation. Plekhanov & Co in Russia, Schcidemann in Germany, Renaudel, Guesde and Scmbat in France, Bissolati & Co. in Italy, Hyndman, the Fabians and the Laboritcs in England, Branting & Co. in Sweden, Troclstra and his party in Holland, Stauning and his party in Denmark, Victor Bcrgcr1 and other defenders of the fatherland in America, etc. 2. — The second group, that might be called the center, is hesi tating between social-patriotism and actual internationalism. These people swear by all that is holy that they arc Marxists, that they are internationalists, that they are for peace, for exerting pressure upon the government, for presenting all sorts of demands that show the desire of the nation for peace, they are peace propagandists and want a peace without annexations and they want peace with the social-patriots. The center is for union and against any sort of shism. The center is the heaven of petty bourgeois phrases of lip internationalism, of cowardly opportunism, of compromise with the social-patriots. The fact is that the center is not convinced of the necessity of a revolution against the government of its own country; it does not preach that kind of revolution ; it docs not wage 'Victor Berger is against America's participation in the war, but he is still a social-patriot in the meaning of Lenin's term, having repeatedly justi fied the majority government Socialists of Germany, advocated three years ago the American invasion and conquest of Mexico and urged a larger navy for "national defence." His attitude against America's participation in the war is determined by peculiar motives of his own, having nothing in com mon with revolutionary international Socialism. — L. C F. I46 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA an incessant fight for the revolution, and it resorts to the lowest, super-Marxist dodges to get the difficulty. The social-patriots are the enemies of our class, they are bour geois in the midst of the labor movement. They represent layers or groups of the working class which have been practically bought by the bourgeois through better wages, |>ositions of honor, etc., and which help their bourgeoisie to exploit and oppress smaller and weaker nations, and take part in the. division of capitalistic spoils. The members of the center group are routine worshipers, eaten up by the gangrene of legality, corrupted by the parliamentary comedy, bureaucrats accustomed to nice sinecures and steady jobs. Historically and economically, they do not represent any special stratum of society; they only represent the transition from llic old- fashioned labor movement as it was from 1871 to 1914, which ren dered inestimable services to the proletariat through its slow, con tinued, systematic work of organization in a large, very large field, to the new movement which was objectively necessary at the time of the first world-wide war of Imperialism, and which has inaugu rated the social-revolutionary era. The main leader and representative of the center is Karl Kautsky, who dominated the second International (from 1889 to 1914), who has been responsible for the complete downfall of Marxism, who has showed an unhcrd-of lack of principles and the most pitiful hesitancy and betrayed the cause since August, 1914. Among these centrists are Kautsky, Haasc, Lcdebour, and the so-called labor group in the Reichstag; in France, Longuet, Press man and the so-called minority; in England, Philip Snowden, Ram- soy MncDonald and other leaders of the Independent Labor Party, and a part of the British Socialist Party; Morris Hillquit and many others in the United States; Ttirati. Treves, Modigliani and others in Italy, Robert Grimm and others in Switzerland; Victor Adlcr & Co. iu Austria; the Mensheviki, Axclrod, Martov. Gieidse, Tsere telli and others in Russia. It goes without saying that some individual members of these groups go unconsciously from social-patriotism to ccnterism, and vice versa. Every Marxist knows, however, that classes retain their character regardless of the free migration of people from one group to another, in spite of all the efforts which are made to blend class or harmonize tendencies. INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISM 147 3.— The third, truly internationalist, is most accurately repre sented by the so-called "Zimmerwald Left."' It is characterized by its complete schism from the social-patri ots and the centrists. It has been waging a relentless war against its own imperialistic government and its own imperialistic bour geoisie. Its motto is: "Our worst enemy is at home." It has fought ruthlessly the nice and respectable social pacifist's phrase ology, for those people who arc social pacifists in words are bour geois pacifists in deeds; bourgeois pacifists dream of an everlasting peace which shall not be preceded by the overthrow of capitalist domination. They have been employing every form of sophistry to demonstrate the impossibility, the inopportunities of keep ing up the proletarian class struggle or of starting a proletarian Social Revolution in connection with the present war. The members of this group in Germany arc known as the Spartacus or International Group, to which Karl Liebknccht be- »The declaration of war on August 4. 1914, swept organized Socialism into a support of the government, in Germany, France, Austria and Rug- land. After a year of war the majority Socialists retained their pro-govern ment attitude, and the minority determined upon initiating some sort of internawon.il action. The Socialist Party of Italy, which opposed Italy's entry into war and after war was declared acted and still acts against it, on May 15, 1015, decided through its Executive Committee to take the ini tiative in calling an international conference of Socialist parties or groups and labor organizations opposed to the war and of whom it could be assumed that they would favor common action in resuming and carrying on the pro letarian class struggle against the war. The Conference met in Zimmerwald, Switzerland. September 15, 1915. Italy, Russia, Rumania and Bulgaria were officially represented by party delegates; from Germany, Prance, Sweden, Norway, and Switzerland only groups or minorities were represented. 'Ihe majority of the delegates agreed on a social-pacifist resolution, a resolution obviously a compromise and which did not break completely with the domi nant Socialism.^ A minority, however, dissatisfied with the spirit and reso lution of the Conference, broke away and adopted a revolutionary declara tion of th< ir own. Shortly after, another Conference was held at Kicnthal. Another "Zimmerwald" Conference was held in Stockholm, September 5-7, at which the Independent Socialist Tarty of Germany, which had refused to meet in the Stockholm Conference together with the Government So cialists of Germany, the Austrian minority, etc., and the Socialist Propa ganda League of the United States were represented. The resolution adopted was much more radical than the one adopted at Zimmerwald. The Government Socialists were completely condemned: "Only a peace won and shaped by the Socialist proletariat through decisive mass actions can perma nently prevent the renewal of the world-wide massacre. A capitalistic peace, no matter how it might be shaped, would lead to the shifting upon the shoul ders of the working masses of the immense war debts in every country, , . . The only guarantee against a return of the world war is the* social republic. . . . The hour has struck for beginning the great com mon battle in all countries for the bringing of peace, for the liberation of the peoples through the Socialist proletariat. The means for this is the inter national mass strike." — L. C r\ 14$ THE PROLETARIAN RKVOLUTION IN RUSSIA longs, Karl Liebknecht is the best known representative of that tendency and of the new real, proletarian international. Karl Liebknecht called upon the workingmen and soldiers of Germany to turn their guns upon their own government. Karl Liebknecht did that openly from the tribune of parliament, the Reichstag. Then he went out on Potsdamer Platz, one of the larg est public squares in Berlin, with a batch of unlawfully printed proc lamations to head a demonstration that shouted: "Down with the government." He was arrested and sentenced to hard labor. He is now serving his term in a German jail, like hundreds if not thou sands of other real Socialists of Germany who have been jailed for waging war against war, Karl Liebknecht attacked mercilessly in his speeches and his writings not only the Plekhanovs and the Potresofs of Germany (Schcidemann, Legien, David, etc.), but also the centrists of Ger many, the German Chcidscs and Tscrctellis, men like Kautsky, Haasc, Ledebour and others. Karl Liebknecht and his friend, Otto Ruhle, alone among 1 10 Socialist deputies in the Reichstag, disregarded the party discipline, destroyed the harmonious union with the centrists and the chauvin ists, and fought everybody. Liebknecht alone really represents So cialism, the proletarian cause, the proletarian revolution. The rest of the German Social Democracy, to quote the apt words of Rosa Luxemburg, also a member and leader of the Spartacus Group, it "a stinking carrion."'' Another group of real internationalists in Germany is gathered around the Bremen paper, The Workers' Politics. In France those who stand closest to real internationalism are Loriot and his friends (Bourderon and Merrheim have gone over to the social-pacifist group), Henri Guilbeaux, who publishes in Switzerland a paper called Demain. In England, the supporters of the review, The Trade Unionist, and some of the members of the British Socialist Party and of the Independent Labor Party (for instance, William Russell, who has openly separated himself from the leaders who are betraying Socialism), the Scotch teacher and Socialist, MacLcan, who has been sentenced to jail by the bourgeois •When the "minority" in the German Social Democracy, captained by Kautsky and Haase, broke away and organized the Independent Socialist Party, Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Franz Mehring and others refused to join the new party, considering it moderate and compromising, and orga nized in a group of their own. a sort of German expression of th-eoretical Bolshevism.— L. C F. INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISM 149 government for his revolutionary activity against the war; hun dreds of English Socialists are in jail for the same offense. They are the only real internationalists. In the United States, the So cialist Labor Party and certain elements of the opportunistic So cialist Party which began in 1917 to publish the paper The Inter nationalist* In Holland, the party of the "Tribunists," publishing the daily paper The Tribune (Anton Pannckock, Herman Gorter, Wcinkopp, and Hcnricttc Roland-Hoist, who, a centrist at Zimmerwald, now has, however, joined our ranks). In Sweden, the section of the younger men and of the left with such representatives as Lind- hagen, Ture, Nerman, Karlston, Strom and Z. Ileglund, who at Zimmerwald was personally active in the organization of the Zim merwald Left, and who is now serving a jail term for his activity against the war. In Denmark, Trier and his friends who have left the purely bourgeois Social Democratic Party headed by Minister Stauning. In Bulgaria, the "simon-pure." In Italy, Constantino Lazzari, secretary of the Socialist Party, and Serrati, editor of the central organ Avanti. In Poland, Karl Radck, Ganctzky and other leaders of the Social Democracy, forming the Kracv group, Rosa Luxemburg, Tyshka and others forming the "main group" of the Social Democracy. In Switzerland, the "left," which put through the referendum of January, 1917, in order to fight the social-patriots and the center, and which at the session of the Socialist Party in the canton of Zurich on February 11, 1917, carried a revolutionary reso lution against the war. In Austria, the youthful friends of Fried- rich Adlcr, whose activity manifested itself party through the "Karl Marx Club," now closed by the reactionary Austrian govern ment, which imprisoned Adler for his heroic but ill-considered at tempt upon the life of Premier Stucrgh. We shall not bother with the slight differences of opinion among the members of the "left." We are only interested in the general tendency as such. It is by no means caSy to remain a real internationalist during a ruthless imperialistic war. Those who can ?Since April. 1917, The New International, edited by Louis C Frtaina. succeeded The Internationalist. It is the official organ of the Socialist Propaganda League, the American organization of the Sociaism of the "left." The New International favored the Cause of the Bolshcviki months before their triumnh. at a time when the Socialist Party paper, tlie New York Call, was editorially stigmatizing the Bolsheviki and Lenin as "anar chists" while the Socialist Propaganda League was the only American Socialist organization to approve and agitate for the armistice proposal i»- ¦j-ue-i by the Soviet government in November, 1917.— L. C. F. 15° THE PUOLICTAKIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA do it are rare, but in them repose all the hopes of Socialism; they alone arc the leaders of the masses, not the corrupters of the masses. The differences between reformists and revolutionists in the ranks of the Social Democrats and of Socialists in general cannot but undergo a positive change in the midst of an imperialistic war. People, however, who simply present "demands" to bourgeois gov ernment? with a view to "the conclusion of peace" or "the mani festation of the nations desire for peace," are mere reformists*. I -'or the problem of war can only be solved by revolutionary means. Nothing will end the war, nothing usher in a really democratic peace, not a peace imposed by violence, nothing will free the nations from the conspiracy of greedy capitalists fattening i>i) the war, nothing hut a proletarian revolution. Wc can and wc must demand all those reforms from the bour geois governments, but it is only a mere reformist who would ex pect that type of men, fettered by thousands of capitalistic tics, to break those ties; until those ties are broken all the talk of wa-f against war will remain empty, deceitful prattle. n The Fiasco of the Zimmerwald International The Zimmerwald International assumed from the very first a hesitating, Kautsky-like "center" attitude which compelled the Left to stand by itself, to separate itself from the rest and to come forth with ils own manifesto, which was published in Switzerland in Russian, in German and in French. The fatal weakness of the Zimmerwald International and which brought about its fiasco (from a political and intellectual viewpoint it was already a fiasco), was its hesitancy, its lack of de cision, when it came to the practical and all-important question of breaking completely with the social-patriots and with the social- patriot international headed by Vandervclde and Huysmans at The Hague. We Russians do not as yet realize that the majority of the Zimmerwald International was dominated by Kautsky. But this is an absolute fact which can not be minimized and of which Western Europe is fully aware. A chauvinist, an extreme German chauvin ist, Ilcilman, editor of the arch-chauvinist Chemnitz Gazette and contributor of the arch-chauvinist Bell (a Social Democrat, of course, and an ardent partisan of the Social Democratic unity) was compelled to acknowledge in writing that the "center" (or Kautski- INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISM 151 ans) and the Zimmerwald majority were one and the same thing. By the end of 1916 or the beginning of 1917 this had become an admitted fact. In spite of the condemnation of social-pacffism pronounced by the Kienthal Manifesto, the whole Zimmerwald right, the Zimmerwald majority, went over to social-pacifism, Kautsky & Co. crossed the bridge in January and February, 1917; then followed in succession the Frenchmen Bourdcron and Mcrr- heim, who cast their votes with the social-pacifists for a pacifist res olution of the Socialist Party in December, 1916, and of the General Confederation of Labor (the national organization of French labor unions), also in December, 1916; Turati & Co. in Italy, where the entire party assumed a pacifist attitude, 1 urati personally delivering himself (and not by accident) of a few nationalistic sentences in which he praised the imperialistic war in a speech on December 17, 1916; the chairman of the Zimmerwald and Kienthal conferences, Robert Grimm, joined hands with the chauvinists of his own party, Gruclich, Pfluger, Gustavc Muller and others opposed to the real internationalists. At two conferences of Zimmcrwaldists of various countries, held in January and February of 1917, this double-faced attitude of the Zimmerwald majority was stigmatized by the "left" internation alists of several countries, by Munzerbcrg, secretary of the inter nationalist organization of the Young People's Socialist groups and editor of the fine internationalist publication, International Youth, by Zinovicv, cliairnirm of the executive committee of our party, by Karl Radek of the Polish Social Democratic Party (the Kraev movement), by Max Hartstcin, a German Social Democrat and member of the "Spartacus Group." The Russian proletariat has done much. Nowhere on earth has the working class developed as much revolutionary energy as it has in Russia. But much is expected from those who have ac complished much. We cannot remain with our feet in the Zimmer wald mud. There i* nothing to expect from the Zimmerwald Knut- skians, more or less allied with the chauvinistic International of Plekhanov and Scheidcmann. We must break away from this sort of International. Wc must at once organize a new, revolutionary, proletarian International, or rather, acknowledge frankly and fearlessly tiiat the new Interna tional is organized and working. This will be the International of those who are internationalists in their deeds, and whom I have enumerated in a foregoing paragraph. They alone represent the 152 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA revolution, the masses of internationalists, and they have not tried to corrupt the masses. Even if there are few Socialists of that type, let every Russian worker ask himself how many conscious revolutionists there were in Russia on the eve of the March Revolution in 1917. It is not so much a question of numbers; it is a question of expressing correctly the ideas and the policy of the truly revolu tionary proletariat. Never mind about "proclaiming" internation alism ; the essential thing is for us to be, even when the times are most trying, real internationalists in our deeds. We shall not allow ourselves to be deceived by agreements and international congresses. International relations will remain, as long as this imperialistic war lasts, held as in a vise by the mili tary dictatorship of the imperialistic bourgeoisie. Remember that even the republican Milyukov, who had to submit to the "auxiliary- government" of the Council of Workers' Delegates, would not al low into Russia, in April, 1917, Fran;'. Platen, the Swiss Socialist, secretary of the party and internationalist, a member of the Zim merwald and Kienthal conferences, although Platen was married to a Russian woman, although he had taken part in the Revolution of 1905 in Riga, and for that offense had served a term in a Russian jail, and who having given security to the Czar's government for his release, wanted that security returned to him. Well, if the republican Milyukov could do such a thing, in April, 1917, and in Russia, then we can see how much stock we may take in the prom ises and declarations made by the bourgeoisie on the subject of peace without annexations. How about the arrest of Trotzky by the English Government? How about Martov being refused per mission to leave Switzerland ; how about the attempt made to lure him to England, where he would have shared Trotzky 's fate? Let us beware of illusions and of self-deception. To wait for international conferences and congresses is simply to betray internationalism. Real international Socialists are not allowed to meet at Stockholm, not even to send letters, in spite of the censorship which can be exercised on all writings. Let us not wait, let us organize at once a third International and hundreds of Socialists imprisoned in England and in Germany will heave a sigh of relief, thousands and thousands of German workers, who are now trying to organize strikes and demonstra tions, will read in forbidden sheets about our decision, about our fraternal confidence in Karl Liebknecht (and in him alone among INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISM I53 their Socialist leaders), about the decision we have taken to fight now the so-called "revolutionary defense" group; they will read all this and it will inject new strength into their revolutionary interna tionalism. Much is expected from him who has accomplished much. There is no land on earth which is as free as Russia is now. Let us make use of this freedom not to prop up the bourgeoisie or the bourgeois "revolutionary defense," but to organize a third International, bold and honest and proletarian, the kind which Liebknecht would have, an International which will set its face boldly against all traitors, all social-patriots and the vacillating people of the "center." After what I have just said, I need not waste any words to explain that a union of the Social Democrats of Russia is impos sible. Rather stay alone, as Liebkneclit did, that is, remain with the revolutionary proletariat, than to entertain even for a minute any thought of a union with the Mensheviki, with Cheidse and Tsere telli, who arc willing to join hands with the Potresofs who voted for the war credit in the Executive Committee of the Council of Work ers' Delegates, and who have gone over to the "revolutionary de fense" group. Let the dead bury their dead. Whosoever wants to help hesitating souls should stop hesitat ing himself. m The Communist Party I am coming to the last question wdiich is: what shall we call our party? Wc would call it the Communist Party, using Marx' and Engels' terminology.1 We are Marxists and our policy is based upon the Communist Manifesto which has been perverted and disregarded by the "Social Democracy" on two important points: 1. — As workingmen have no country, the "defense of the fa therland" in an imperialistic war is a betrayal of Socialism. 2. — The Marxian theory of government has been perverted by the second International. The term "Social Democracy" is unscientific, as Marx ex- >In February, iqt8, the Bolsheviki, formerly simply a faction of the Social Democratic Labor Party, organized independently as the Com- rsranist Party.— L. C. F. 154 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA plained in 1875, and Engels, in a more popular form, in 1894. Man kind can only pass from Capitalism into Socialism, that is, public ownership of the means of production and the distribution of prod ucts according to individual work. Our party looks farther ahead than l!.:it: Socialism is hound sooner or later to ripen into Com munism, whose banner bears the motto: From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs. That is the first reason. Here is my second: The second part of the term "Social Democracy" is scientifical ly wrong. Democracy is only a form of authority. We Marxists arc opposed to every form of authority. The leaders of the second International (1889-1914), Plek hanov, Kautsky and their ilk, perverted and debased Marxism. The difference between Marxism and Anarchism is that Marxism ad mits the necessity of some sort of authority during the transition from Capitalism to Socialism; not the kind of authority represented by a democratic, bourgeois republic and its parliamentary system, but the kind of authority represented by the Paris Commune of 1S71 and the Councils of Workers' Delegates of 1905 and 1917. There is a third reason: Life and the Revolution have already established in a concrete way (although in a form which is still weak and embryonic) a new type of authority which does not seem to In* authority in the proper sense of the word. It is a question of the masses taking action and no longer of leaders indulging in theories. Authority in the usual sense of the word is the power exercised over tlie masses by a group of armed men distinct from the nation. The new authority, which is now in process of being born, is also a real authority, because we, too, need groups of armed men neces sary to preserve order, necessary to crush out ruthlessly all attempts at a counter-revolution, all attempts at keeping in power a Czarist, bourgeois government. But our newly-born authority isn't au thority in the proper sense of the word, because those groups of armed men found in many parts of Russia are the masses them- elves, the whole nation, not simply groups allowed to rule above the nation, not groups distinct from the nation, privileged individ uals practically immovable. Let us look forward, not backward ; let us look away from the democracy of the usual bourgeois type, which enforces the domi nation of the bourgeoisie by means of an antiquated, monarchistic machinery of government, the police, the army and the bureauc-i INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISM 1 55 racy. Let us look forward to the advent of the newly-born 6a- mocracy, which has already ceased to be a democracy, for democ racy means the people's authority and the armed masses of the nation could not exercise an authority over themselves. The word democracy cannot be scientifically applied to the Communist Party. Since March, 1917, the word democracy is simply a shackle fastened upon the revolutionary nation and pre venting it from istablishing boldly, fru-ly and regardless of all obstacles a new form of power: the Councils of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates, harbinger of the abolition of every form of authority. There is a fourth reason : the international position of Social ism. Its position is no longer what it was between the years 1871 and 1914, when Marx and Engels adopted as a makeshift the in accurate, opportunistic word "Social Democracy." In the days after the defeat of the Paris Commune what was mostly needed was slow work of organization and enlightenment. Nothing else was possible. Anarchists were then, as they are now, theoretically, economically and politically wrong. The Anarchists, who did not understand the world situation, selected the wrong moment: the workers of England had been perverted by imperial istic gains, the Commune had been beaten in Paris, the National bourgeois movement was victorious in Germany, and feudal Rus sia was still sleeping the sleep of centuries. Marx and Engels gauged the hour accurately; they understood the international situa- iton; they saw that the Social Revolution would have to go slowly at first. Wc must in turn understand the peculiarities and the duties of our day. Let us net imitate the pscudo-Marxianists of whom Marx himself said: "I sowed dragons' teeth and I reaped fleas." The natural development of Capitalism, evolving into Impe rialism has brought forth an imperialistic war. This war hate brought mankind to the brink of destruction, jeopardized all civili zation, ruined and brutalized millions of human beings. There is no way out of it except through a proletarian revolution. And just when that revolution is beginning, when it is taking its first steps, awkward, weak, diffident, leaning too much as yet on the bourgeoisie, at that moment the majority of the Social Democratic leaders, of the Social Democratic parliamentarians, of the Social Democratic papers, in a word all those who could spur the masses 1$C) THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA to action, or at least the majority of them are betraying Socialism, are selling Socialism, are going to fifight the battles of their national bourgeoisie. The masses are distracted and baffled by talk and deceived by their leaders. And should we aid and abet that deception by retain ing the old and worn out party name, which is as spent as the second International? It may be that many workers understand the real meaning of Social Democracy, but we must draw the line between what it means objectively and what it means subjectively. Subjectively those workers are Social Democrats, true leaders of the proletarian masses. Objectively, the world situation is such that the old name of our party helps fool the masses and retards the onward march. Every day, in every paper, in every parliamentary group, the masses see leaders, that is, people whose voice carries farther, whose acts are in evidence, who call themselves Social Democrats and Socialists, and who join hands with the betrayers of Socialism, the social-patriots, who are trying to cash the promissory note issued by the Social Democracy. Are there any reasons against the new names? Shall we mix with the communistic Anarchists? Why are we not afraid of mixing with the social-nationalists, the social liberals, the social patriots? The laboring masses, sonic say. are accustomed to their Social De mocratic Party, they love it. That is the only reason for retaining the old name and this reason goes counter to the teachings of Marxism, disregards the revolutionary tasks of to-morrow, the objective po sition of Socialism the world over, the shameful fiasco of the second International, and the injury done to the cause of millions of pro letarians who arc "also Social Democrats." This reason is based solely on laziness and love of routine. We want to recast the world. W-e want to end this world war waged by imperialists in which millions of people are involved and millions of dollars are invested, a war which cannot be ended in a truly democratic way without the greatest proletarian revolution in history. And here wc arc hesitating. Here we are, keeping on our backs the same old dirty shirt. It is high time we should cast off the dirty shirt and put on a new, clean one. PART THREE The Struggle for State Power By N. LENIN and LEON TROTZKY INTRODUCTION The great, the decisive problem of the Russian Revolution was the -problem of state power, the problem of which class should control the state and what form the state should assume. Every phase and tendency of the Revolution is interwoven with this problem of state power, every crisis of the Revolution is a crisis of power. Within two weeks after the over throw of Czarism and tbe organization of the Provisional Government and the Soviets of Workers, Soldiers and Peasants, the problem of state power appeared and swiftly became the determinant issue, of which all other issues were simply an expression. The bnurgcoisie, which at first desired a constitutional monarchy, re conciled itself under the pressure of events to a republic; its conception of state power was a bourgeois parliamentary republic retaining in iti machinery all the essential features of the government of Czarism, — a cap italistic autocracy disguised in the mask of democratic forms. At the start, the Provisional Government was dominated by the ultra-reactionaries of the Guchkov and Milyukov type; but after the crisis of May 2-3, the gov ernment came under the control of bourgeois liberals, the Cadets and the moderate Socialists. The Cadets were avowedly imperialistic, a policy dictated by their class relations; while the moderate Socialists were com pelled I7: " . . a publication of a treaty which Ih generally known would be completely misunderstood by public opinion and would only give rise -to demands for the publication of the agreements which 1ia.il been concluded during the war. The publication of tliere, and espe cially of the ltunnanlan and Italian treaties. Is regarded by our allies as undesirable. In any rase we have no Intention of putting difficulties In the way of Kninee ody may discredit them in advance, be cause exactly such a lack of confidence would bring the disorganization which in so dangerous at the present time. . . . The Bolsheviki road can only lead to civil war." It was exactly the exclusion of the propertied classes that was necessary to a permanent, energetic and revolutionary government; it was exactly tlie necessity for excluding the bourgeoisie from the government that was a cen tral feature of the policy of all power to the Soviets. A revolutionary So cialist would know that the bourgeoisie would prove incapable, a thing that Tseretelli was willing to learn only from experience; and when experience had proven the incapacity and treachery of the bourgeoisie beyond the shad ow of a doubt, Tseretelli and other iMenshcviki still opposed all power to the Soviets, It was precisely confidence in the Coalition Government and its bour geois policy that disorganized the country and weakened the morale of the Revolution. The problem of state power was a realistic problem: either all power to the Government or all power to the Soviets alone could cope with the situation. The duality of power simply intensified the crisis and pre vented the organization of the internal forces. The moderates desired to have the Soviets play the role of opposition, the role of the opposition party in a parliamentary government — a policy expressing neither audacity nor an understanding of the revolutionary requirements of the situation. The policy of the moderate majority in the Soviets would have, if successful, produced a permanent, strongly bourgeois government; and this would have meant the ultimate destruction of the Soviets and their potential revolutionary mis sion. The policy of the Bolshcviki, all power to the Soviets and the aboli tion of the old state and its bureaucratic machinery of government, was a realistic policy determined by the immediate practical requirements of the Revolution; and it was a policy, moreover, that by the stress of events and necessity would convert itself into the policy of the proletarian revolu tion in Russia. But the All-Russian Soviet Congress, still dominated by the moderates, persisted in the suicidal policy of coalition. Against the votes of the Bol- INTRODUCTION 165 sheviki and part of the Menshevik-Internationalists it adopted a resolution approving coalition: "(1) That under the conditions created as a result of the first ministerial crisis, the passing of all power to the bourgeois elements! would deal a blow at the cause of the Revolution ; (2) that the transfer of all power to the Councils of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates at the present moment of the Russian Revolution, would greatly weaken her powers by pre maturely driving away from her elements which arc still capable of serving the Revolution and would threaten its ruin." After expressing "full confi dence" in the "Comrade-Ministers," the resolution proceeds: "The Congress calls upon the Provisional Government to carry out more resolutely and consistently the democratic platform adopted by it, and, in particular: (a) to strive persistently for the speediest conclusion of a general peace without annexations or indemnities, on the basis of self- definition of nationalities; (b) to carry out the further democratization of the army and to strengthen its fighting power: (c) to undertake, with the direct participation of the toiling masses, the most energetic measures for combating the financial-economic disruption and disorganization of the food supply produced by the war and made acute by the policy of the propertied classes: (d) to conduct a systcmatc and resolute fight against counter revolutionary attempts; (e) to bring about the speediest realization of the measures affecting the questions of land and labor, in accordance with the demands of the organized toiling masses and dictated by the vital interests of public economy, greatly sapped by the war; (f) to aid in the organization of all forces of the Revolutionary Democracy by means of rapid and radical reforms in the systems of local government and autonomy on a democratic basis, and the speediest introduction of Zcmstvos and Municipal autonomy, where there is none as yet: (g) particularly does the Congress demand the speediest convocation of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly." Just one demand in this resolution could be accepted sincerely and en thusiastically by the Provisional Government — the demand to strengthen the fighting power of the army. The rest of the program was persistently and consistently sabotaged by the government: it was a program that could be introduced only by a Soviet government. Fettered by the coalition, afraid of revolutionary audacity and power, the Soviets were directed by the mod erate majority into the sterile policy of words and demands. But the re action scored, and prepared itself for the day when it could contemptuously! disregard the Soviets, even in words, and overthrow them completely. The attitude of the All-Russian Congress solved nothing and settled nothing. The answer to the policy of hesitation was given by the revolt In Scba^topol, where the sailors deposed Admiral Kolchak, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, and by demonstrations in Viborg, which cried, "Down with the capitalists! Long live the Social Republic!" But the real answer to the policy of hesitation, an answer sympitc-matic of the widening split between the masses and the hesitating Soviet ma jority, was given by the masses of Petrograd. It was an answer thait char acterized equally the revolutionary impatience of the masses and the coun ter-revolutionary character of the Soviet moderates. The masses of Petro grad, aware of the counter-revolutionary trend of events, disgusted with the policy of hesitation, decided on June 18 upon a formidable demonstration-* The All-Russian Congress united with the Provisional Government against the proposed demonstration. The Government posted placards calling upon the people to be calm, and declaring that any attempt at violence would be l66 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA suppressed, The Congress declared against the demonstration (a demon stration to voice the attitude and purposes of the masses) and sent delegates to all the factory districts to counteract the agitation of the Bolsheviki and to prevent the demonstration. Tseretelli accused the Bolsheviki of intentions to overthrow the government by armed force. Tseretelli had become defin itely counter-revolutionary, had constituted himself the guardian of a gov ernment that betrayed the hopes of the masses, had become a master mecha nic forging fetters with which to shackle the action of the masses. Over throw the government by armed force! Is this not a method of revolution? What an accusation, what a terrible indictment, coming from a revolutionist who had himself applauded the armed force that overthrew Czarism 1 The Soviet Congress itself issued the following appeal against the pro posed demonstration: "Comrades, Soldiers and Workmen! The Bolsheviki Party is calling upon you to go out into the streets. "This appeal is made without the knowledge of the Council of Workers' Bnd Soldiers Delegates, the All-Russian Congress, or all the Socialist Partie?. It is sounded just at the moment of supreme danger when the All-Russian Congress has called upon our comrades, the workers in the district of Viliorg, to remember that demonstrations in these days may hurt the cause of the Revolution. . . . "At this dangerous moment you arc called out into the streets to demand the overthrow of the Provisional Government, to which the All-Russian Congress has just found it necessary to give its support. "And those who are calling you cannot but know that out of your peaceful demonstration chaos and bloodshed may result. "Knowing your devotion to the cause of the Revolution, we tell you: You arc being called to a demonstration in favor of the Revolution, but we know that counter-revolutionists want to take advantage of your de monstration. Wc know that the counter-revolutionists are eagerly awaiting the moment when strife will develop in the ranks of the Revolutions,!-/ Democracy and will enable them to crush the Revolution. "Comrades! In the name of all the Councils of Workers' and Soldiers' delegates, in the name of the Council of Peasants' Delegates, in the name of the acting Army and the Socialist Parties, wc tell you: Not a single division, not a regiment, not a group of workers must go out into the street tomorrow. Not a single demonstration should be held today. , . ." As in the stormy days of May .2-3, the moderate majority in the Coun cils restrained and fettered the action of the masses. Opposed by the gov ernment, opposed by the Soviets, still unaware of its mighty strength, the Pelrograd masses abandoned the proposed demonstration. The Congress' declaration against the demonstration says that it was called without consultation with the other parties and without the sanction of the Soviets. Precisely ; and U is precisely this circumstance which is im portant : the revolutionary struggle was now definitely and fundamentally a struggle between the right and left wings of the Revolution, between the moderates and the radicals in the Soviets. The problem of the Revolution was not to overthrow the Provisional Government, but to overthrow the dom ination of the moderates in the Soviets by securing the adhesion of the masses to a revolutionary program. The Provisional Government would collapse immediately and of itself the moment the radicals secured control of the Soviets, since the Soviet moderates alone sustained the Government! All these events of June conspired to hearten the Provisional Govern ment, particularly as the All-Russian Congress had decided in favor of a INTRODUCTION 1 67 vigorous prosecution of the war and declared that "the question of an of fensive must be decided exclusively from the point of view of purely military and strategic considerations." Kerensky as Minister of War made all the necessary preparations, and on July 1 the offensive was launched against the Austro-German lines in Galicia. The offensive was temporarily successful, but then came the coutitcr-atttacks of the enemy and the offensive was smothered in its own insufficiency. The offensive was a military adventure of the most deplorable character; under the circumstances, it was sheer mur der of the Russian soldiers, who were unprepared. In spite of the declara tion of the All-Russian Congress, that an offensive was "purely military and strategic," the offensive of July I was determined by political considerations. It was a maneuvrc to restore "discipline" in the army, to strike at the revo lutionary opposition and strengthen he hands of the Provisional Government. It was, moreover, determined by diplomatic considerations: relations between Russia and the Allies were being strained by Russia's apparent refusal to fight. The pressure of the Allies and the necessity of securing their finan cial assistance determined the inauguration of the offensive. The Bolshevist organ Pravda openly asserted this character of the offensive. And, to be sure, the Provisional Government was in an impasse, because of its bour geois and imperialistic policy. The political results of the offensive were important. On July 18 the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates approved the offensive. The reaction was strength ened and moderates and government became more thoroughly one and re actionary. On July 15 a ministerial crisis flared up, resulting in the resigna tion of five Cadet members from the Cabinet on the issue of Ukrainian au tonomy. This was a challenge to the Soviets and a repudiation of the gov ernment's liberal policy. But, simultaneously, the masses were aroused, determined upon action to defend the Revolution. The trend of events was too definitely counter revolutionary to be accepted silently. And again the masses of Petrograd, always actively on the aggressive, determined to act. On July 15 the Govern ment ordered the Petrograd Machine-Gun Regiment to the front; it re fused to go, declaring it would not fight for Anglo-French Imperialism, and would obey only if the Government published the secret treaties. Two other regiments acted similarly. A demonstration was agreed upon and organized for July 17, All parties, including the Bolshcviki, tried to prevent the demon stration, the Bolsheviki liecausc they knew counter-revolutionary gangs were prepared to provoke a clash, which under the conditions they considered premature. Th Excutive Committee of the Ail-Russian Soviets issued a ptoclamation against the demonstration, mentioning that several detach ments of soldiers had demanded that it "take over all power." But the de termination of the masses of workers and soldiers was inflexible, and in spite of all opposition a demonstration was agreed upon, and an armed' dem onstration, moreover, symbol of their purpose to use force if a peaceful demonstration was unsuccessful. The Bolshcviki, realizing the strength of the masses' sentiments, participated in the demonstration as the party of the revolutionary masses. As was anticipated, the peaceful demonstration was converted into an armed uprising by the armed interference and provocation 168 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA of counter-revolutionary forces, and after two days of savage fighting die uprising was crushed by means of Cossacks and large numbers of reliable troops. A veritable counter-revolutionary reign of terror ensued. The Mensheviki and Social revolutionists actively co-operated with the gov ernment in imprisoning the Bolsheviki and disarming the masses, estab lishing ''revolutionary order" by crushing the left wing of the Revolution. This formidable uprising, however, in spite of its defeat, went far toward preserving the Revolution and energizing the morale of the masses: its de feat paved the way for the overthrow of the moderates in the Soviets, which occurred completely a few months later. Events had demonstrated the necessity of ministerial reconstruction, and on July ao Prince Lvov resigned as Premier, Kerensky being appointed the new Premier, but retaining his portfolio as Minister of War and Marine. On July 20 Kercnsky issued a proclamation to the army and navy, accusing the sailors of Cronstadt and the Baltic Fleet of being tools of "German Bgents and provocateurs," and ordering: "i. — The Central Committee of the Baltic Fleet to be immediately dis banded, a new one to be elected in its place. "2. — To declare to all crews and vessels of the Baltic Fleet that I call upon them immediately to remove from their midst suspicious persons who are inciting disobedience to the Provisional Government and agitating against an advance, and to bring them for investigation and trial to Petro grad. "3.— To the crews of Cronstadt and the ships of the line, 'Petro- pavlovsk,' 'Republica' and 'Slava,' whose honor is stained by counter-rev olutionary acts and resolutions: I order the arrest within 24 hours of all the ring leaders and that they be sent for investigation and trial to Petro grad, and be ordered to give assurance of full obedience to the Provisional Government. I declare to the crews of Cronstadt and the above-mentioned ships that in case of failure to comply with my present order they will be declared traitors to the country and the Revolution and that the most resolute measures will be taken against them." This was the first act of the "revolutionary" Premier Kerensky — an act directed against the courageous and revolutionary sailors of Cronstadt and the Baltic Fleet, who had been most active factors in the first stage of the Revolution and throughout its subsequent course, and who were now stig matized because they adhered to the revolutionary program of "'all power to the Soviets." On July 25 the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviets adopted a resolution, 300 to 11, insinuating that Lenin and Zin- ovief had received money from German sources and demanding that the Bol shcviki repudiate their leaders. An order for the arrest of Lenin was issued, who went into hiding; hundreds of Bolsheviki were inprisoncd.' sTrntzky was not directly altlllated with tbe Rolshevlkl, and capital was made of this fact to create dissension among the revolutionary opposition, After the order was Issued for the arrest of Lenin et al., Trotzky, In an open letter to the Ministry, declared: 'My principles are the sanio as those of Len-ln, Zlnovlef, and Kamenef, and I have always publicly defended these principles In my paper "Vperlod" and In all my speeches. The fact that 1 do not belong to the "Pravda" and the organiza tion of the Holslievlkl does not result from differences In politics, but Is caused by circumstances which divided the parties In the past, but have lost at present every meaning. . . . What I have here stated b'aowb clearly that there Is no loglca.1 reason whatever to omit me from the warrant to arrest Zlnovlef, Lenin and Kamenef, which arrest Is only the result of counter-revolutionary despotism." This letter was published In "Prav da," as an expression of solidarity INTRODUCTION 1 69 On August 3 there was a new ministerial crisis, Minister of Agriculture Chernov resigning, and on August 7 Premier Kerensky announced the new Cabinet, including Chernov and representatives of the Cadets, who agreed to participate in the new government, The resignation of the Cadets from the Ministry on July 15, and of Prince Lvov on July 20, was an offensive maneuvre against the Soviets, an attempt to thrust power upon the Soviets, which the Cadets knew very well would be declined. Premier Kercnsky made his peace with the Cadets by means of concessions, and the consequence of these concessions was a defi nite swing to the right by the new government, the adoption of a general policy making consistently for reaction. On July 22, the Executive Commit tee of the All-Russian Soviets, proclaimed the Kerensky Government "the Government of National Safety," and declared: "That unlimited powers be accorded the Government for re-establishing the organization and discipline of the Army for a fight to the finish against the enemies of public order and! for the realization of the whole program of the Government." The dictator ship was used against "the enemies of public order," enthusiastically, rigor ously and systematically; but the "realization of the whole program" still remained a thing of the future. The death penalty wan restored in the army. The dictatorship was in action, a counter-revolutionary dictatorship. But whose dictatorship? The fatal weakness of the whole regime was tiiat it was based on compromise, that behind it was no class capable of sustain ing a dictatorship; and the inevitable consequence was the creation of a sit uation in which either an individual would become dictator, or the whole sys tem would collapse. Kercnsky did try to become dictator; he essayed the role of Bonaparte, but he was not even a mediocre Napoleon the Great, simply a shabby, theatrical imitation of Napoleon the Little. Kercnsky talked and fumed and threatened, while the bourgeoisie patiently awaited for the moment when they could march in and assume all power. The inter nal crisis became still more acute, disintegration the order of the day. Over the mass of misery, of oppression, poured the golden flood of Kcrcnsky's eloquence; but the flood obliterated neither the sufferings of the masses nor the counter-revolutionary plots of the bourgeoisie. Reaction was to have its day. The Moscow Conference, the Fall ot Riga, the Kornilov-Kercnsky rebellion, the reactionary "Democratic Cong ress" — through all these reaction was to express itself in a last, desperate spasmodic struggle; and all the while the masses were preparing for the final action — and victory, • • • Sources: Chapter I and II, from Lenin's pamphlet, "Alms of the Prole tariat"; Chapters VII and VIII from Lenin's pamphlet, "Lessons of the Revolution;" Chapters VII and IX ftom Lenin's pamphlet, "At the Moment." All the chapters of Trotzky appeared as articles in Trotzky's paper V period during June and July. L C. F. I CLASS CHARACTER OF THE REVOLUTION (Lenin) The historical period through which we are passing is charac terized by the following fundamental features :* I. — The Imperial government, which represented only a small group of large landholders having in its control all the machinery of power, army, police and bureaucracy, has been defeated and over thrown, but not entirely done away -with. Monarchism, as such, has not been destroyed. The Romanoff coterie is still engaged in monarchistic intrigues. The grip of the large landholders on the land has not been definitely broken. The powers of government in Russia have passed into the hands of a new class: the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois-inclined landholders. To that extent the bourgeois democratic revolution in Russia is a closed chapter. The bourgeoisie in power concluded an alliance with purely monarchistic elements which, from 1906 to 1914, had shown them selves unusually faithful to Nicholas the Bloody and Stolypin the Hangman. The new bourgeois government of Lvov and his as sociates (Guchkov and other politicians more conservative than the Cadets) actually initiated negotiations with the Romanoffs aim ing at a restoration of the monarchy in Russia, while using the rev olutionary vocabulary. And that government has appointed to posi tions of authority partisans of the old regime. All the governmental machinery, army, police and bureaucracy, is being turned over to the bourgeoisie by this government with the least possible modifications and reforms. The new government is trying to prevent by every means at its disposal the development of mass action and the assumption of power from below by the people, which alone would insure the success of the Revolution. 'This chapter describes the situation prevailing until the end of April, 1917.— L. C. F. CLASS CHARACTER OF THE REVOLUTION 171 The government has not as yet announced the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. Neither does it interfere with the land- holding machine, the solid foundation of feudal Czarism. The gov ernment is not considering investigating or regulating the financial organizations of a monopolistic character, large banks, syndicates, trusts, etc. The most important and influential cabinet posts in the new government, the ministry of the interior and the ministry of war, that is, the direction of the army, police and bureaucracy and of the whole machinery for the oppression of the masses, have been given to well-known monarchists and supporters of the large landholding system. The Cadets, the republicans of yesterday, republicans much against their inclination, have been offered positions of secondary importance, in no way affecting the ruling of the nation and the machinery of government. Kerensky, a representative of the La- borites and "also a Socialist," docs very little besides lulling the peo ple asleep with well-sounding phrases and causing them to relax their attention and their watchfulness. For all these reasons, the new bourgeois government does not deserve the proletariat's confidence in the field of national politics and is not worthy of any confidence. In the domain of foreign politics, which for obvious reasons is very much to the front, the new government stands for the continu ation of an imperialistic war waged in concert with imperialistic nations, England, France, and others, a war waged to secure a share of the imperialistic booty and aiming at the strangling of smaller and weaker nations. The new government is subservient to the in terests of Russian capitalists and of their powerful protectors and masters, the capitalists of England and France, the wealthiest in the world. It turns a deaf ear to the desires expressed by the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates, expressing a clear majority of the Russian people, and has neglected to take any genuine meas ures to end the international slaughter organized in the interests of Capitalism. The new government has failed to publish the secret agree ments of frankly predatory character, which, as everybody knows, have been concluded between Russia and the imperialistic and pred atory capitalists of England and France. It has confirmed the agreements concluded by Czarism, a system which in the course of several centuries overpowered and oppressed more nationalities than any other system of tyranny and despotism, and which has 172 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA brutalized and demoralized the Great-Russian people, transforming it into a tormentor of other races. The new government, having confirmed those shameful and piratical agreements, refuses to suggest to all tlie belligerents an immediate armistice, in spite of the wishes of the large majority of the Russian people voiced by the Council of Workers and Soldiers. It has evaded the issue by confining itself to solemn, sonorous, plati tudinous phrases and declarations, all of them perfectly empty but of the kind which bourgeois diplomats have always used to deceive the gullible and naive masses of oppressed nations. And, therefore, the new government does not deserve the .slightest confidence in the domain of international politics. Moreover, it would be a waste of time to expect the govern ment to make known the peace hunger of the peoples of Russia, or to renounce all annexations; for this would simply deceive the people, awaken in them hopes which cannot be fuhilled, retard their intellectual enlightenment, and gradually reconcile them with the idea of a continuation of the war. Socially, the present war is not characterized iby any noble aims ; it only reflects the class character of the government waging it, the alliance between the class repre sented by that government and the imperialistic financiers of Rus sia, England and France, and the actual policy of their class. II THE DUAL AUTHORITY (Lenin) The most peculiar feature, the distinguishing mark of our Rev olution is the condition of dual authority it has established. This is a primary fact on which there must be clarity ; without an under standing of this fact no progress is possible. The old "formulas" of Bolshevism, for instance, must be rounded out and corrected, for while they were true in general, their actual working out has been shown to be different. Xo one could have been aware, before the fact, of the condition of dual authority. This dual power manifests itself through the existence of two different governments: the main, actual government, the govern ment of the bourgeoisie, the Provisional Government, which holds in its hands all the machinery of power, and a supplementary, sec ondary, ''controlling" government, the Councils of Workers and Soldiers, which does not have at its disposal any of the machinery of state power but which has the immediate and indubitable support of the majority of the nation, of the armed workers and soldiers. The Revolution that overthrew Czarism and placed power in the hands of the bourgeoisie almost led to a revolutionary dictator ship of the proletariat and the peasantry. And this second govern ment, the government of the Councils, representing the proletariat and the peasantry, is a revolutionary dictatorship, that is, its au thority rests directly on revolutionary usurpation exercised through the immediate pressure of the masses from below, not on laws prom ulgated by some central government power. The source of power is not in laws previously discussed and passed by parliament, but, as in the Paris Commune, in the direct pressure and action of the masses; the preservation of order is no longer the function of an army and police, but of the workers and peasants themselves, of the armed nation. Hut this power, and this is another peculiar and a most im portant feature of the Russian Revolution, — enjoying the ful confi- 174 Tnp< PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA dence of the people, — has, both by a direct understanding with the Provisional Government and by a series of virtual concessions, vol untarily placed the powers of the state in the hands of the bour geoisie and a bourgeois government. It is still surrendering posi tions to the bourgeoisie, has voluntarily accepted the domination of the bourgeoisie and agreed to support it, limiting itself to the role of a supervising body. Why ? Is it because Cheidse, Tseretelli, Stek- lof & Co. arc making a "mistake"? No such thing. A philistine may think that way, not a Marxist. The reason is to be found in the insufficient class consciousness and organization of the work ers and peasants. The "mistake" of the leaders mentioned lies in their petit bourgeois position, in their inspiring the workers with bourgeois illusions instead of fighting to destroy these illusions, in their strengthening the influence of the bourgeoisie over the masses instead of liberating the masses from this influence. This most peculiar situation, unparalleled in history, has led to the. simultaneous existence and co-action of two dictatorships: a dic tatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, the Councils of Work ers' and Soldiers' Delegates, and a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, for the Provisional Government is not based on statutes nor on the expressed will of the nation, but was simply the assumption of power by a definite class, the bourgeoisie. There is not the slightest doubt but that such a combination can not last long. There cart not be any dualism of authority in the government. One of the two powers is bound to dwindle to noth ing, and the bourgeoisie is already straining all its energies in an endeavor to weaken and finally annihilate the Councils of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates and concentrate all authority in a bourgeois government. The Provisional Government must be overthrown. It is an oligarchical, bourgeois government, not a popular one. It must not be overthrown at once, for it is being maintained by a straight and clear agreement, in form and in fact, by the Soviets, chiefly with the principal Soviet, that of Petrograd. It must not be "over thrown" in the customary manner, for it is based on the "support" of the second government, the government of the Soviets, and this second government is the only possible revolutionary government, since it expresses directly the consciousness and the will of the great majority of the workers and peasants. In order to become a pow er, the class conscious workers must win over a majority to their side : as you cannot resort to force against the masses, there is no THE DUAL AUTHORITY 175 other way to lead them on. We are not Blanquists,1 we do not stand for a seizure of power by the minority. We are Marxists, and therefore advocates of the proletarian class struggle as against the petit bourgeois vaporings and illusions, against the chauvinism of the "national defense" attitude, against a dependence on the petty bourgeoisie. Let us form a proletarian communistic party, the elements for which have already been provided by the best advocates of Bolshe vism; let us unite for the proletarian class war, and from among the proletarians, from among the poorest peasants, we shall draw to our cause an ever-increasing host. For life itself will destroy more and more of the petit bourgeois illusions of the "Social Dem ocrats" Cheidse, Tseretelli, Steklof, etc., of the "Social-Revolu tionists," and of the petty bourgeoisie in its more regular expres sions. The petite bourgeoisie — the "Social Democrats,'' Social-Rev olutionists, and others — stagger and hesitate, and thus muddle the work of enlightenment and liberation. That is the actual class rela tion between the forces that determine the outlines of our tasks. The condition of dual authority is merely a transitional symp tom in the development of the Revolution, which has gone farther than the usual bourgeois democratic revolution, but not as yet far enough to establish a complete dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. The class significance and class explanation of this transitional and unstable situation will be understood when we bear in mind the following: Like every other revolution, our Revolution demanded the greatest heroism and self-sacrifice on the part of the masses in the struggle against Czarism, and set in motion an unusually large number of human beings. One of the chief symptoms, from the point of view of science and practical politics, of every real revolu tion is the unusually brusk and sudden increase in the number of just plain people who cease to remain indifferent and assume an active, individual, efficient role in political life, in the upbuilding of the state. This is the case of Russia. Russia is in a state of ebullition. Millions of people who politically had been asleep for the past ten ¦Blanqui was a French "Socialist" whose conception of the Revolution was a conspiracy of a few resolute, intelligent spirits who would suddenly and arbitrarily seize the powers of the state and then drag the masses along with them— L C. F. 176 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA years, either lashed by the political whip of Czarism or doomed to slave labor on farms or in factories, awoke and threw themselves into the political strife. And who were these millions of people? Mostly small landlords, petty bourgeois, half way between capital ists and workers. Russia has a larger proportion of small middle class people than any other European nation. This gigantic middle class tide drowned everything, overwhelmed the class conscious proletariat not only by sheer superiority of numbers but also modi fying the proletariat's point of view, that is, instilled in huge masses of workers the political ideals of the petty bourgeoisie. The petty botirgcosic in real life is dependent upon the bour geoisie, living as an employing, not as a working class (as far as its position in social production is concerned). Its thinking processes are those of the bourgeoisie. An attitude of unreasoning confidence in the capitalists, the worst foes of peace and Socialism—such is at present the attitude of the Russian masses, such is the feeling which has been growing wilh revolutionary speed on the social-economic soil of the most middle-class nation of Europe. Such is the basis for the agreement existing between the Provisional Government and the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates; and when I say "agreement," I tlo not mean a formal agreement but a tacit understanding, a practi cal support, a naively trustful relinquishment of power. [This de scribes the situation before the Soviets accepted coalition on May 18. — P.] This sort of agreement has given to Guchkov a fat job and actual power, and to the Council . . . promises, a position of dignity (for the time being), flattery, beautiful phrases, assurances, and other marks of esteem on the part of the various Kerenskys. The weakness of the proletariat in point of numbers, its lack of class consciousness and of organization,- — such is the reverse of the medal in Russia, All popular parties, with the exception of the revolutionary Socialists, have been parties of the small middle class. The same is true of the party of the Mensheviki (Cheidse, Tseretelli, etc.). Independent revolutionists (Steklof and others) floated with the tide and did not succeed in stemming it. Owing to the peculiar situation I have described, it behooves Marxists to resort to special emergency tactics, for Marxists do not consider personalities but merely objective facts: masses and classes. This peculiar situation makes it imperative "to pour vinegar and bile into the sweetened water of revolutionary democratic elo- THE DUAL AUTHORITY I77 quence," to quote the apt words of my fellow-committeeman Teo- dorovitch at the All-Russian Convention of railroad workers in Petrograd. We must formulate criticisms and expose the mistakes of the petty bourgeois parties, the Social-Revolutionary and Social Democratic parties ; we must train and bring together what will be the elements of a class conscious proletarian communistic party, we must rescue the proletariat from its mental asphyxiation by bour geois ideas. In appearance this is nothing more than propaganda work. In reality, this is the most practical form of revolutionary activity, for a revolution can not possibly get anywhere when it stops, gets drunk on words, treads everlastingly the same spot, handicapped as it is not by opposition from the outside or by bourgeois repression (Guchkov is only talking of taking stern measures against the sol diers), but simply by the unthinkirig confidence of the masses. It is only by destroying this unthinking confidence (and wc can only destroy it by education), it is by resorting to intellectual per suasion, by pointing out the teachings of life itself, that we will succeed in emancipating ourselves from this continuous spree of mere revolutionary words. Then only will we be able to move for ward, then will wc behold a real proletarian consciousness, mass consciousness, a courageous and resolute spirit of initiative in every local group; then the people will take the law in their own hands and bring forth, develop and fortify freedom, democracy and the principle of national ownership of land. Bourgeois and feudal governments have developed a sort of in ternational technique for keeping the people enslaved. They cm- ploy two methods. The first is violence. Nicholas I, the man with the club, and Nicholas II, the Bloody, showed to the Russian people how far one could go in the use of the hangman's noose. But there is another method employed most cleverly by the English and French bourgeoisie, who gained their experience through a scries of great revolutions and revolutionary convulsions among the masses, It consists in fooling the people, in flattering them, in using big words, in making them innumerable promises, in doling out to them insignificant sops called reforms, in making them unimportant con cessions for the sake of retaining the essential things. And this is what gives to the present situation in Russia its pe> culiar interest: we are witnessing a vertiginous change from one method to the other, from violent oppression of the people to flat tery and deceitful promises. . . . The cat listens, and continues its meal. I78 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA Milyukov and Guchkov retain the power, protect the capi talists' profits, conduct an im*>erialistic war in the interests of Anglo-French Capitalism, and silence by promises, eloquence and impressive declarations "blunderbusses" like Cheidse, Tseretelli, Steklof, who threaten, exort, conjure, beseech, demand, make state ments, . . . The cat listens, and continues its meal. But from day to day the unthinking confidence and the gullible thoughtlessness of the people will dwindle away, especially among the proletarians and poorest peasants, whom their very life, their social and economic position, has taught to distrust capitalist as surances. The leaders of the petty bourgeoisie "must" teach the people to trust the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois government. Proletarians must be taught to distrust them. Ill PEACE AND REACTION (Trotzky) In a session of the National Duma held March 3, 1916, M. Milyukov replied as follows to a criticism from the left: "I do not know for certain whether the government is leading us to defeat — but I do know that a revolution in Russia will unquestionably lead us to defeat, and our enemies, therefore, have good reason to thirst for it. If any one should say to me that to organize Russia for vic tory is equivalent to organizing her for revolution, I should answer: It is better, for the duration of the war, to leave her unorganized, as she is." This quotation is interesting in two ways. It is not only a proof that, as late as last year, M. Milyukov considered pro- German interests to be at work not in internationalism alone, but in any revolution at all; it is also a typical expression of Liberal syco phancy. Extremely interesting is M. Milyukov's prediction: "I know that revolution in Russia will unquestionably lead us to de feat." Why this certainty? As an historian, M. Milyukov must know that there have been revolutions that led to victory. But as an imperialistic statesman, M. Milyukov cannot help seeing that the idea of the conquest of Constantinople, Armenia and Galicia is not capable of arousing the spirit of the revolutionary masses. M. Milyukov felt, and even knew, that in his war, revolution could not bring victory with it. To be sure, when the revolution broke out M. Milyukov at once attempted to harness it to the chariot of Allied Imperialism. That is the reason why he was greeted with delight by the sonorous, me tallic reverberations of all the banking-vaults of London, Paris and New York. But this attempt met with the almost instinctive re sistance of the workers and soldiers. M. Milyukov was thrown out of the ministry: the Revolution, evidently, did not mean victory for hint. Milyukov went, but the war stayed. A coalition government was formed, consisting of petit bourgeois democrats and those rep- l8o THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA resentatives of the bourgeoisie that had hitherto concealed, for a time, their imperialistic claws. Perhaps nowhere did this combi nation display its counter-revolutionary character better than in the domain of international politics, that is, above all, in the war. The capitalistic bourgeoisie sent its representatives to the Cabinet in the name of "an offensive on the front and unalterable fidelity to our allies" (resolution of the Cadet Conference). The petit bourgeois democrats, who call themselves Socialists, entered the Cabinet in order, "without tearing themselves away" from the capitalistic bourgeoisie and their world allies, to conclude the war in the quick est possible manner and with the least possible offense to all the participants: without annexations, without indemnities and contri butions, and even with a guarantee of national self-determination. The capitalist ministers renounced annexations, until a more favorable time ; in return for this purely verbal concession they received from tlieir petit bourgeois democratic colleagues a binding promise not to desert the ranks of the Allies, to re-invigorate the army and make it capable of resuming the offensive. In renounc ing Constantinople (for the moment) the imperialists were mak ing a rather worthless sacrifice, for, in the course of three years of war, the road to Constantinople had become not shorter, but longer. But the democrats, to compensate the purely platonic renunciation of a very doubtful Constantinople by the liberals, took over the whole heritage of the Czarist government, recognized all the treaties which that government had concluded, and put all the authority and prestige of the Revolution in the service of discipline and the of fensive. This bargain involved, first of all, a renunciation, on the part of the "leaders" of the Revolution, of any such thing as an independent international policy: this conclusion was only natural to the petty bourgeois party, which when it was in the majority, willingly surrendered all its power. Having handed over to Prince Lvov the duty of creating a revolutionary administration; to M. Shingariev the task of re-making the finances of the Revolution ; to M. Konovalov, that of organizing industry; the petit bourgeois democracy could not help handing over to Messrs. Ribot, Lloyd George and Wilson the charge of the international interests of rev olutionary Russia. Even though the Revolution, in its present phase, has not there fore altered the character of the war, it has nevertheless exerted a profound influence on the living agent of the war, namely, the army. The soldier began asking himself what it was for which he was shedding his blood, upon which he now set a higher price that tin- PEACE AND REACTION l8l der Czarism. And immediately the question of the secret treaties came up and became imperative. To restore the "preparedness" of the army under these circumstances meant breaking up the revo lutionary-democratic resistance of the soldiers, putting to sleep again their newly-awakened political sense, and, until the "revision" of the old treaties should be announced as a principle, placing the revolutionary army in the service of the same old objects. This task was more than a match for the Octobrist-Bourbon Guchkov, who broke down under it. Nothing less than a "Sociilist" would do for this purpose. And he was found in the person of tlie "most popular" of the ministers, Kerensky. Citizen Kerensky exposed his theoretical equipment at one of the first sessions of the All-Russian Congress. One can hardly imagine anything more insipid than his provincial, complacent tru isms on the French Revolution and on Marxism. Citizen Keren- sky's political formulas were characterized neither by originality nor by depth. But he! possesses, indisputably, the talent of bestow ing upon philistine reaction the necessary revolutionary trimmings. In the person of Kerensky, the intelligent and semi-intelligent bour geois recognize themselves, in more "representative" form, and in surroundings which are not those of every day, but rather the trap pings of melodrama. By lavishly exploiting his popularity in accelerating the pre paredness for an offensive (on the entire imperialistic front of the Allies), Kerensky naturally becomes the darling of the possessing classes. Not only does Minister of Foreign Affairs Tercschenko express himself approvingly of the high esteem in which our Allies hold the "labors" of Kerensky ; not only does Rech, which so severely criticizes the ministers of the left, continually emphasize its favoritism toward the minister of the Army and Navy, Kerensky; — but even Rodzianko considers it his duty to point out "the noble, patriotic endeavors which our Minister of the Army and Navy, Kerensky, is engaged in: "this young man" (to quote the words of Rodzianko, the Octobri-4 chairman of the Duma) "ex periences ( ?) daily a new lease of life, for the benefit of his coun try and of constructive work." Which glorious circumstance does not, however, in any way prevent Rodzianko from hoping that when the "constructive work" of Kercnsky shall have attained a proper eminence, it may be succeeded by Guchkov's labors instead. Meanwhile, Tereschenko's Department of Foreign Affairs is endeavoring to persuade the Allies to sacrifice their imperialistic 1 82 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA appetites on the altar of revolutionary democracy. It would be dif ficult to imagine any undertaking more fruitless, and — in spite of all the tragic humiliation of it — more ridiculous than this! When M. Tercschenko, in the manner of the provincial newspaper editorial of the democratic variety, endeavors to explain to the hardened ring leaders of the international plundcrbund that the Russian Revolution is really a "powerful intellectual movement, expressive of the will of the Russian people in its struggle for equality . . ." etc., elc, — when he furthermore "does not doubt" that "a close union between Russia and her Allies (the hardened ring-leaders of the international plundcrbund) will assure in the fullest measure an agreement on all the questions involved in the principles proclaimed by the Russian Revolution," — it is difficult to free one's self from a feeling of disgust at this medley of impotence, hypocrisy and stu pidity. The bourgeoisie secured for itself, in this document of Tere- sclienko's, it appears, all the decisive words: "unfaltering fidelity to the general cause of the Allies," "inviolability of the agreement not to make a separate peace," and a postponement of the revision of the aims of the war until "a favorable opportunity;" which amounts to asking the Russian soldier, until this "favorable opportunity" arrives, to shed his blood for those same imperialistic aims of the war which it seems so undesirable to publish, so undesirable to revise. And Tscretelli's whole political horizon is revealed in the complacent smugness with which he recommended to the attention of the All-Russian Congress this diplomatic document in which "there is clear and open speech, in the language of a revolutionary government, concerning the strivings of the Russian Revolution." One thing cannot be denied: the cowardly and impotent appeals addressed to Lloyd George and Wilson are couched in the same terms as the appeals of the Soviet Executive Committee addressed to Albert Thomas, the Scheidemanns and the Hendersons. In both there is all along the line an identity of purpose, and — who knows? — perhaps even an identity of authorship.1 'In the first flush of the Revolution, the moderates in the Soviets through the Executive Committee appealed to the Socialists and the proletariat of the belligerent countries to break with their imperialistic governments; but gradually this revolutionary policy was abandoned, and the Executive Com mittee co-operated with the infamous gathering of he social-patriots at Stockholm, against the protest of the Bolshcviki. It required only this to emphasize the non-revolutionary character of tbe Executive Committee, that they joined bands with Scheidemann, Alliert Thomas, of France, Henderson, of England, and the other social-patriots. Moderate Socialism acted as the comis voyageur of bourgeois diplomacy. One of the secret documents pub lished after the Bolsheviki came into power shows the true character of the PEACE AND REACTION l83 A perfect appreciation of these latest diplomatic notes of the Tereschenko-Tseretelli combination we shall find in a place where w« might at first not expect to find it, namely, in L'Entente, a news paper published in French in Petrograd, and the organ of those very Allies to whom Tcreschenko and Chernov swear an "unfaltering allegiance." "We readily admit," says this paper, "that in diplo matic circles the appearance of this note was awaited with a cer tain concern." ... In fact it is not easy, as this official organ ad mits, to find a formulation of the conflicting aims of the Allies. "As far as Russia is concerned, particularly, the: position of the Pro visional Government was rather delicate and full of danger. On the one hand, it was necessary to reckon with the standpoint of the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates, and, as far as pos sible, to represent this standpoint : on the other hand, it was neces sary to handle with kid gloves the international relations and the friendly powers, upon whom it was impossible to force the decision of the Council." "And the Provisional Government has come out of this quan dary shining and stainless." . . . In the document before us, therefore, we have the main points of the revolutionary catechism set down, registered and sealed with the authority of the Provisional Government. There is no lack of any essential. All the lovely dreams, all the fine words of the dic tionary, are properly mobilized. You will find there equality, liberty and justice in international relations — Done tout y est — at least in words. The reddest of the comrades can make no reply ; from this quarter the Provisional Government has nothing to fear. . . . "But— how about the Allies?" asks L'Entente. "With the aid of close study and reading between the lines ( !), with the aid of good will and friendship for the young Russian democracy, the. Allies will be able to find at various points in the note . . . certain pleasant words which are of a nature to reassure their somewhat waning confidence. They well know that the position of the Pro- Stockholm Conference, with which, by the way, the Independent Socialists of Germany refsued to have any dealings. It is a telegram dated August iH, 1917, from the Russian Ambassador in Stockholm to the Provisional Gov ernment, reporting a conversation with Branting, one of the social-patriotic arrangers of the Conference, who declared that he was willing to drop the Conference if Kerensky considered it untimely, and that Branting would use his influence with the Dutch-Scandinavian committee to this end. The telegram concludes by asking secrecy, in order not to compromise Branting, as otherwise a valuable source of information would be lost. A Socialist Conference the willing tool of diplomacy! No wonder it was a miserable failure.— L. C. F. 184 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA visional Government is not an easy one, and that its efforts in prose must not be taken too literally. . . . The fundamental guarantee that the government gives to the Allies consists in the fact that . . . the agreement signed at London on September 5, 1914 (pledging no separate peace) is not to be revised. That completely satisfies; us for the present." And us too. As a matter of fact it would be different to utter a more contemptuous judgment on the Tcreschcnko-Tseretelli "prose" than that published by the official L'Entente, which draws its inspiration from the French Embassy. This estimate, while it is by no means unfriendly to Tcreschenko or to those who stand behind him, is positively murderous to the "constructive labors" of Tseretelli, who has so warmly recommended to us the "plain, open language" of this document. "Nothing has been left out," he swears before the Congress, "it will satisfy the conscience of the reddest comrades." But they arc mistaken, these adepts in diplomatic prose: they don't satisfy anybody. Isn't it significant that the facts of actual life should answer the appeals of Kerensky and the remonstrances and threats of Tseretelli with such an awful blow as the revolt of the Black Sea sailors? We had been previously told that there among these sailors was Kercnsky's citadel, the home of the "pat riotism" that demanded an offensive. The facts once more admin istered a merciless correction. By adhering to the position of the old imperialistic agreements and obligations in external politics, and, in internal politics, capitulating before the propertied classes, it was impossible to unite the army through a combination of rev olutionary enthusiasm and discipline. And Kerensky's "big stick" has fortunately thus far been too short. No, this path, truly, leads, nowhere. IV THE FARCE OF DUAL AUTHORITY (Trotzky) The war conditions are twisting and obscuring the action of the internal forces of the Revolution. But none the less the course of the Revolution will be determined by these same internal forces, namely, the classes. The revolution which has been gathering strength from 1912 on, was, at first, broken off by the war, and later, owing to the heroic intervention of an infuriated army, was quickened into an unprecedented aggressiveness. The power of resistance on the part of the old regime had been, once for all undermined by the prog ress of the war. The political parties which might have taken up the function of mediators between the monarchy and the people suddenly found themselves hanging in the air, owing to powerful blows from below, and were obliged at the last moment to accomp lish the dangerous leap to the secure shores of the Revolution. This imparted to the Revolution, for a time, the outward appearance of complete national harmony. For the first time in its entire history, bourgeois liberalism felt itself "bound up" with the masses — and it is this that must have given them the idea of utilizing the "uni versal" revolutionary spirit in the service of the war. The conditions, the aims, the participants of the war did not change. Guchkov and Milyukov, the most outspoken of the impe rialists on the political staff of the old regime, were now the man agers of the destinies of revolutionary Russia. Naturally, the war, the fundamental character of which remained the same as it had been under Czarism — against the same enemy, with the same allies, and the same international obligations — now had to be transformed into a "war for the Revolution." For the capitalist classes, this task was equivalent to a mobilization of the Revolution, and of the powers and passions it had stimulated, in the interests of Impe rialism. The Milyukovs magnanimously consented to call the "red rag" a sacred emblem — if only the working masses would show 186 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA their readiness to die with ecstasy under this red rag, for Constan tinople and the Straits. But the imperialistic cloven hoof of Milyukov was sticking out too plainly. In order to win over the awakened masses and guide their revolutionary energy into the channel of an offensive on the external front, more intricate methods were required—but, chiefly, different political parties were needed, with platforms that had not yet been compromised, and reputations that had not yet been sullied. They were found. In the years of counter-revolution, and particularly in the period of the latest industrial boom, capital had subjected to itself and had mentally tamed many thousands of rev olutionists of 1905, being in no wise concerned about their Laborite or Marxist "notions." And among the "Socialistic" intellectuals there were therefore rather numerous groups whose palms were itching to take part in the checking of the class struggle and in the training of the masses for "patriotic" ends. Hand in hand with this intelligentsia, which had been brought into prominence in the counter-revolutionary epoch, went the compromise-workers, who had been frightened definitely and finally by the failure of the 1905 Revolution, and had since then developed in themselves the sole talent of being agreeable to all sides, The op*>ositioii of the bourgeois classes to Czarism— upon an imperialistic foundation, however — had, even before the Revolu tion, provided the necessary basis for a rapprochment between the opportunist Socialists and the propertied classes. In the Duma, Kerensky and Cheidse built up their policy as an annex to the progressive bloc, and the "Socialistic" Gvozdyevs and Bogdanovs merged with the Guchkovs on the War Industry Committees. But the existence of Czarism made an open advocacy of the "govern ment" patriotism standpoint very difficult. The Revolution cleared nway all obstacles of this nature. Capitulating to the capitalist parties was now called "a democratic unity," and the discipline of the bourgeois state suddenly became "revolutionary discipline," and finally, participation in a capitalist war was looked upon as a defense of the Revolution from external defeat. This nationalistic intelligentsia, which the social-patriot Struve had prophesied, invoked and trained, in his paper Vyekhi, suddenly met with an unexpectedly generous support in the helplessness of the most backward masses of the people, who had been forcibly organized as an army. THE FARCE OF DUAL AUTHORITY 187 It was only because the Revolution broke out in the course of a war that the petit bourgeois elements of city and country at once automatically took on the appearance of an organized force, and began to exert, upon the personnel of the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates, an influence which would have been far beyond the powers of these scattered and backward classes in any but war times. The Mcnshcvist-populist intelligentsia found in this great number of backwoods, provincial, for the most part as yet hardly awakened persons, a support that was at first entirely nat ural. By leading the petty bourgeois classes on to the path of an agreement with capitalist liberalism, which had again beautifully demonstrated its inability to guide the masses of the people in dependently, the Mcnshcvist-populist intelligentsia, through the pressure of the masses, acquired a certain position even among the proletarian sections, which had been momentarily relegated to a secondary position by the numerical imprcssivcncss of the army. It might at first seem that all class contradictions had been destroyed, that all social fixtures had been patched up with frag ments of a populist-Mcnshevist ideology, and that, thanks to the "constructive labors" of Kercnsky, Cheidse and Dan, a national Burgfricden truce between -the classes had been realized. There fore, the unparalleled surprise and wonder when an independent proletarian policy again asserted itself, and therefore the savage, in truth, disgusting wail against the revolutionary Socialists, the destroyers of the universal harmony. The petit bourgeois intellectuals, after they had been raised by the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates to heights for which they were entirely unprepared, were frightened more by the idea of responsibility than by anything else, and therefore respect fully handed over their power to the capitalist-feudal government which had issued forth from the womb of the Duma of June 3. The organic terror of the petit bourgeois in the presence of the sanctity of state power, which was transparent in the case of the populists (Laboritcs), was veiled, in the case of the Mcnshcvik-patriots, by doctrinaire notions as to the inadmissibility of having Socialists assume the burden of power in a bourgeois revolution. Thus there came about the "dual authority," which might with much more truth be termed a Dual Impotence. The capital istic bourgeoisie assumed authority in the name of order and of a war for victory; yet, without the Soviets, it coull not rule; the latter's relation to the government was that of an awed half-con- l88 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA fidence, combined with a fear lest the revolutionary proletariat, in some unguarded gesture, might upset the whole business. The cynically provocative foreign policy of Milyukov brought forth a crisis. Being aware of the full extent of the panic in the ranks of the petit bourgeois leaders when confronted with prob lems of power, the bourgeois party began availing itself, in this domain, of downright blackmail : by threatening a government strike, that is, to resign any participation in authority, they de manded that the Soviet furnish tlictn with a number of decoy So cialists, whose function in the coalition ministry was to be the. gen eral strengthening of confidence in the government on the part of the masses, and, in this way, the cessation of "dual authority." Before the pistol-point of ultimatum, the Menshevist patriots hastened to slough off tlieir last vestiges of Marxist prejudice against participation in a bourgeois government, and brought on to the same path the I.aborite "leaders" of the Soviet, who were not embarrassed by any supercargo of principle or prejudice. This vvas most manifest in the person of Chernov, who came back from the Zimmerwald and Kienthal Conferences where he had excom municated Vandervelde, Guesde and Scmbat out of Socialism — only to enter the ministry of Prince Lvov and Shingaricv. To be sure, the Russian Menshevik patriots did point out that Russian ininistcrialism had nothing in common with French and Belgian ministerialist!!, being an outgrowth of very exceptional circum stances, as had been foreseen in the resolution against ministerial- Km of the Amsterdam Socialist Congress (1904). Yet they were merely repeating, in parrot fashion, the arguments of French and Belgian ministerialism, while they continued constantly invoking the "exceptional nature of the circumstances." Kerensky, under whose wordy theatricality there is, nevertheless, some traces of reality, very appropriately classed Russian ministerialism in the same category as that of western Europe, and stated in his Helsing- fors speech, that thanks chiefly to him, Kerensky, the Russian So cialists had in two months travelled a distance that it had taken the west-European Socialists ten years to accomplish. Truly Marx vvas not wrong when he called revolution the locomotive of history! The coalition government had been sentenced by History be fore it was established. If it had been formed immediately after the downfall of Czarism, as an expression of the "revolutionary unity of the nation," it might possibly have held in check, for a time, the struggle of the forces of the Revolution. But the first THE FARCE OF DUAL AUTHORITY I89 government was the Guchkov-Milyukov government. It was per mitted to exist only long enough to expose the full falsity of "na tional unity" and to awaken the revolutionary resistance of the proletariat against the bourgeois propaganda to prostitute the Rev olution in the interests of Imperialism. The obviously makeshift coalition ministry could not, under these circumstances, stave off a calamity; it was itself destined to become the chief bone of con tention, the chief source of schism and divergence in the ranks of "revolutionary democracy.'' Its political existence — for of its "activities" we shall not speak— is simply one long dissolution, de cently enveloped in vast quantities of words, To contend against a complete breakdown on the economic and, particularly, on the food question, the Economic Department of the Executive Committee of the Soviets worked out a plan for an extensive system of state management in the most important branches of industry. The members of the Economic Department differ from the political managers of the Soviet not so much in their political tendencies as in a serious acquaintance with the eco nomic situation of the country. For this very reason they were led to conclusions of a profoundly revolutionary character. The only thing their structure lacks is the driving force of a revolutionary policy. The government, for the most part capitalistic, could not possibly give birth to a system that was diametrically opposed to the ,«clfi-h interests of the propertied classes. If Skobelcff, the Men- she vist Minister of Labor, did not understand this, it was fully understood by the serious and efficient Konovalov, the representa tive of trade and industry. Konovalov's resignation was an irreparable blow to the coali tion ministry. The whole bourgeois press gave unmistakable ex pression to this fact. Then began anew the exploitation of the panic terror of the present leaders of the Soviet: the bourgeoisie threatened to lay the babe of authority at their door. The "lead ers" answered by making believe that nothing special had hap pened. If the responsible representative of capital has left us, let us invite M. Buryshkin. But Buryshkin ostentatiously refused to have anything to do with surgical operations on private property. And then began the search for an "independent" minister of com merce and industry, a man behind whom stood rothing and no body, and who might serve as an inoffensive letter-box, in which the opposing demands of labor and capital might be dropped. Meanwhile the economic expenses continue on their course, and the 190 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA government activity assumed the fonn, chiefly, of the printing of paper-money, assignats. Having as his senior colleagues Messrs. Lvov and Shingariev, it turned out that Chernov was prevented from revealing, in the domain of agrarian matters, even the radicalism of words only, which is so characteristic of this typical representative of the petite bourgeoisie. Fully aware of the role that was assigned to him, Chernov introduced himself to society as the representative, not of the agrarian revolution, but of agrarian statistics! Ac cording to the liberal bourgeois inteqiretation, which the Socialist ministers also made their own, revolution must be suspended among the masses in a passive waiting for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, and as soon as the Social-Revolutionist^ enter the ministry of the landholders and manufacturers, the at tacks of the peasants against the feudal agricultural system are stigmatized as anarchy. In the field of international policy, the collapse of the "peace programs" proclaimed by the coalition government came about more swiftly and more catastrophically than could possibly have been expected. M. Ribot, the Premier of France, not only cate gorically and unceremoniously rejected the Russian peace formula and pompously reiterated the absolute necessity of continuing the war until a "complete victory" should be secured, but also denied the patriotic French Socialists their passports to the Stockholm Conference, which had been arranged with the co-operation of M. Ribot's colleagues and allies, the Russian Socialist ministers. The Italian government, whose policy of colonial conquests has always been distinguished by exceptional shamelessness, by a "Holy Ego tism," replied to the formula of a "peace without annexations" with its separate annexation of Albania. Our government, and that includes the Socialist ministers, held up for two weeks the publication of the answers of its allies, evidently trusting in the ef ficacy of such petty devices to stave off the bankruptcy of their policy. In short, the question as to the international situation of Russia, the question of what ii is that the Russian soldier should be ready to fight and die for, is still just as acute as on the day when the portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs was dashed from the hands of Milyukov. In the Army and Navy Department, which is still eating up the lion's share of the national powers and of the national re sources, the policy of prose and rhetoric holds undisputed sway. THE FARCE OF DUAL AUTHORITY I9I The material and psychological causes for the condition of the army are too deep to be disposed of by ministerial prose and poetry. The substitution of General Brussilov for General Alexiev meant a change of these two officers, no doubt, but not a change in the army. The working up of the popular mind and of the army into an "offensive," and then the sudden dropping of this catchword in favor of the less definite catchword of a "preparation for an of fensive," show that the Army and N'avy Ministry is still as little capable of leading the nation to victory as M. Tereschcnko's De partment was of leading the nation to peace. The picture of the importance of the Provisional Government reaches its climax in the labors of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which, to use the words of the most loyal Soviet of Peas ants' Delegates, "with partiality" filled the officers of the local administrations with feudal landholders. The efforts of the active portion of the population gain for them the communal self-govern ments, by right of conquest, and, without waiting for the Constit uent Assembly, are immediately stigmatized in the state-police jargon of the Dans as anarchy, and are greeted by the energetic opposition of the government which, by its very composition, is fully protected against all energetic action when it is really of creative character. In the course of the last few days, this policy of general bank ruptcy has found its most repulsive expression in the Cronstadt incident.1 The vile and out-and-out corrupt campaign of the bour geois press against Cronstadt, which is for them the symbol of revolutionary internationalism and of distrust in the government- coalition, both of which are emblems of the independent policy of the great masses of the people, not only took possession of the government and of the Soviet leaders, but turned Tseretelli and Skobelcff into ringleaders in the disgusting persecution of the Cronstadt sailors, soldiers and workers. At a moment when revolutionary internationalism was system atically displacing patriotic Socialism in the factories and work- 'Early in June the sailors of the Baltic Fleet and the Cronstadt masses generally rose against the Provisional Government; the mildest epithet used against them, in the Russian and the foreign press, was "anarchists." The Cronstadt Council of Workers and Soldiers had, by a vote of 210 to 40, repudiated the Provisional Government, declaring it recognized only the authority of the Petrograd Council. This action was distorted into an attempt to secede from Russia. The Baltic sailors were an active revolu tionary force in all stages of the Revolution, — against the Czarism, against the Provisional Government, and in the overthrow of Kerensky by the Bolsheviki.— L. C. F. 192 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA shops and among the soldiers at the front, the Socialists in the ministry, obedient to their masters, were risking the hazardous game of overthrowing the revolutionary proletarian advance-guard with one single blow, and thus preparing the "psychological mo ment" for the session of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. To rally the peasant-petit-bourgcois democracy around the banner of bourgeois liberalism, that ally and captive of Anglo-French and American capital, politically to isolate and "discipline" the prole tariat, — that is now the principal task in the realization of which the government bloc of Mensheviki and Social-Revolutionists is expending all its energies. An essential part of this policy is found in the shameless threats of bloody repressions and the prov ocations of open violence. The death-struggle of the coalition ministry began on the day of its birth. Revolutionary Socialism must do everything in its power to prevent this death-struggle from terminating in the convulsion of civil war. The only way to do this is not by a policy of yclding and dodging, which merely whets the appetite of the fresh-baked statesmen, but rather a policy of aggressive action all along the line. Wc must not permit them to isolate themselves: wc must isolate them. We must answer the wretched and con temptible actions of the Coalition government by making clear even to the most backward among the laboring masses the full meaning of this hostile alliance which masquerades publicly in the name of the Revolution. To the methods of the propertied classes and of their Menslicvist-Social-Revolutionist appendage in dealing with the questions of food, of industry, of agriculture, of war, we must oppose the methods of the proletariat. Only in this way can liberalism be isolated and a leading influence be assured to the revolutionary proletariat over the urban and rural masses. To gether with the inevitable downfall of the present government will come the downfall of the present leaders of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates. To preserve the authority of the Soviet as a representative of the Revolution, and to secure for it a continuance of its functions as a directive power, is now within the power only of the present minority of the Soviet. This will become clearer every day. The epoch of Dual Impotence, with the government not able and the Soviet not daring, is inevit ably culminating in a crisis of unheard-of severity. It is our part to husband our energies for this moment, so that the question of authority may be met with in all its proportions. DEMOCRACY, PACIFISM AND IMPERIALISM (Trotzky) There have never been so many pacifists as at this moment, when people are slaying each other on all the great highways of our planet. Each epoch has not only its own technology and political forms, but also its own style of hypocrisy. Time was when the nations destroyed each other for the glory of Christ's teachings and the love of one's neighbor. Now Christ is invoked only by backward governments. The advanced nations cut each other's threats under the banners of pacifism ... a league of nations and a durable peace. Kerensky and Tseretelli shout for an offensive, in the name of an "early conclusion of peace." There is no Juvenal for this epoch, to depict it with biting! satire. Yet we are forced to admit that even the most powerful satire would appear weak and insignificant in the presence di blatant baseness and cringing stupidity, two of the elements which have been released by the present war. Pacifism springs from the same historical roots as democracy. The bourgeoisie made a gigantic effort to rationalize human re lations, that is, to supplant a blind and stupid tradition by a system of critical reason. The guild restrictions on industtry, class priv ileges, monarchic autocracy — these were the traditional heritage of the middle ages. Bourgeois democracy demanded legal equality, free competition and parliamentary methods in the conduct of public affairs. Naturally, its rationalistic criteria were applied also in the field of international relations. Here it hit upon war, which appeared to it as a method of solving questions that was a complete denial of all "reason." So bourgeois democracy began to point out to the nations — with the tongues of poesy, moral philo sophy and certified accounting — that they would profit more by the establishment of a condition of eternal peace. Such were the log ical roots of bourgeois pacifism. From the time of its birth pacifism was afflicted, however, with 194 Tin: proletarian rkvoi.i'tion in ri'ssia a fundamental defect, one which is characteristic of bourgeois democracy ; its pointed criticisms addressed themselves to the sur face of political phenomena, not daring to penetrate to their eco nomic causes. At the hands of capitalist reality, the idea of eternal peace, on the basis of a "reasonable" agreement, has fared even more badly than the ideas of liberty, equality and fraternity. For Capitalism, when it rationalized industrial conditions, did not rationalize the social organization of ownership, and thus prepared instruments of destruction such as even the "barbarous" middle ages never dreamed of. The constant embitterment of international relations and the ceaseless growth of militarism completely undermined the basis of reality under the feet of pacifism. Yet it was from these very tilings that pacifism took a new lease of life, a life which differed •from its earlier phase as the blood and purple sunset differs from the rosy-fingered dawn. The decades preceding the present war have been well desig nated as a period of armed peace. During this whole period cam paigns were in uninterrupted progress and battles were being fought, but they were in colonies. Proceeding, as they did, in the territories of backward and powerless peoples, these wars led to a division of Africa, Polynesia and Asia, and prepared the way for the present world war. As, however, there were no wars in Europe after 1871 — in spite of a long series of sharp conflicts — the general opinion in petit bour geois circles began gradually to behold in the growth of armies a guarantee of peace, which was destined ultimately to be estab lished by international law with every institutional sanction. Cap italist governments and munitions kings naturally had no objec tions to this "pacifist" interpretation of militarism. But the causes of world conflicts were accumulating and the present cataclysm was getting under way. Theoretically and politically, pacifism stands on the same foundation as docs the theory of the harmony of social interests. The antagonisms between capitalist nations have the same eco nomic roots as the antagonisms between the classes. And if we admit the possibility of a progressive blunting of tlie edge of the class struggle, it requires but a single step further to accept a gradual softening and regulating of international relations. The source of the ideology of democracy, with all its tra ditions and illusions, is the petite bourgeoisie. In the second half DEMOCRACY, PACIFISM AND IMPERIALISM 195 of the nineteenth century, it suffered a complete internal trans formation, but was by no means eliminated from political life. At the very moment that the development of capitalist technology was inexorably undermining its economic function, the general suffrage right and universal military service were still giving to the petite bourgeoisie, thanks to its numerical strength, an appear ance of political importance. Big capital, in so far as it did not wipe out this class, subordinated it to its own ends by means of the applications of the credit system. All that remained for the political representatives of big capital to do was to subjugate the petite bourgeoisie, in the political arena, to their purposes, by opening a fictitious credit to the declared theories and prejudices of this class. It is for this reason that, in the decade preceding the war, we witnessed, side by side with the gigantic efforts of a reactionary-imperialistic policy, a deceptive flowering of bour geois democracy with its accompanying reformism and pacifism. Capital was making use of the petite bourgeoisie for the prose cution of capital's imperialistic purposes by exploiting the ideo logic prejudices of the petite bourgeoisie. Probably there is no other country in wliich this double pro cess was so unmistakably accomplishing itself as in France. France is the classic land of financial capital, which leans for its support on the petite bourgeoisie oi the cities and the towns, the most conservative class of the kind in the world, and numerically very strong. Thanks to foreign loans, to the colonies, to the alliance of France with Russia and England, the financial upper crust of the Third Republic found itself involved in all the interests and conflicts of world politics. And yet, the French petit bourgeois is an out-and-out provincial. He has always shown an instinctive aversion to geography and all his life has feared war as the very devil — if only for the reason that he has, in most cases, but one son, who is to inherit his business, together with his chattels. This petit bourgeois sends to Parliament a radical who has promised him to preserve peace — on the one hand, by means of a league of nations and compulsory international arbitration, and, on the other, with the co-operation of the Russian Cossacks, who are to hold the German Kaiser in check. This radical depute, drawn from the provincial lawyer class, goes to Paris not only with the best intentions, but also without the slightest conception of the location of the Persian Gulf, and what is the use, and to whom, of the Bagdad Railway. This radical-"pacifistic" bloc of deputies gives 196 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA birth to a radical ministry, which at once finds itself bound hand and foot by all the diplomatic and military obligations and financial interests of the French bourse in Russia, Africa and Asia. Never ceasing to pronounce the proper pacifistic sentences, the ministry and the parliament automatically continue to carry on a world policy which involves France in war. English and American pacifism, in spite of the differences in social and ideologic forms (or in the absence of such, as in America), is carrying on, at bottom, the same task; it offers to the petite and the middle bourgeoisie an expression for their fears of world cataclysms in which they may lose their last remnants of independence; their pacifism chloroforms their consciences — by means of impotent ideas of disarmament, international law and world courts— only to deliver them up body and soul, at the de cisive moment, to imperialistic capital, which now mobilizes every thing for its own purposes: industry, the church, art, bourgeois pacifism and patriotic "Socialism.'* "We have alway- been opposed to war: our representatives, our ministry have been opposed to war," says the French citoyen, "therefore the war must have been forced upon us, and in the name of our pacifist ideals we must fight it to the finish." And the leader of the French pacifists, Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, indorses this pacifist philosophy of an imperialistic war with a pompous jusq'au bout ("to the end.") The English Stock Exchange, in its prosecution of the war, had need first of all of pacifists of the Asquith (liberal) and Lloyd George (radical demagogue) type. "If this people go in for war," say the English masses, "right must be on our side." Thus a responsible function is allotted to pacifism in the economy of war fare, by the side of suffocating gases and inflated government loans. More evident still is the subordinate role played by petit bour geois pacifism with regard to Imperialism in the United States. The actual policy is there more prominently dictated by banks and trusts than anywhere else. Even before the war the United States, owing to the gigantic development of its industry and its foreign commerce, was being systematically driven in the direction of world interests and world policies. The European war imparted to this imperialistic' development a speed that was positively fever ish. At a time when many well-meaning persons were hoping that the horrors of the European slaughter might inspire the American bourgeoisie with a hatred of militarism, the actual influence of DEMOCRACY, PACIFISM AND IMPERIALISM 197 European events was bearing on American policy not in psycho logical channels, but in material ones, and was having precisely the opposite effect. The exports of the United States, which in 1913 amounted to 2,466 millions of dollars, rose in 1916 to 5481 millions! Of course the lion's share of this export fell to the lot of the war industries. The sudden breaking off of exports to the allied nations after the declaration of unrestricted submarine war fare meant not only the stoppage of a flow of monstrous profits, but threatened with an unprecedented crisis the whole of American industry, which had been organized on a war footing. It was impossible for this thing to go on without some resist ance from the masses of the people. To overcome their unorgan ized dissatisfaction and to turn it into channels of patriotic co operation with the government was therefore the first great task for the internal diplomacy of the United States during the first quarter of the war. And it is the irony of history that official; "pacifism," as well as "oppositional pacifism," should be the chief instruments for the accomplishment of this task: the education of the masses to military ideals. Bryan rashly and noisily expressed the natural aversion of the farmers and of the "small man" generally to all such things as world-policy, military service and higher taxes. Yet, at the same time that he was sending wagonloads of petitions, as well as deputations, to his pacifist colleagues at the head of the govern ment, Bryan did everything in his power to break the revolu tionary edge of the -whole movement. "// war should come," Bryan telegraphed on the occasion of an anti-war meeting in Chicago last February, "we will all support the government of course; yet at this moment it is our sacred duty to do all in our power to preserve the nation from the horrors of war." These few words contain the entire program of petit bourgeois pacifism: "to do everything in our power against the war" means to afford the voice of popular indignation an outlet in the form of harmless! demonstration, after having previously given the government a guarantee that it will meet with no serious opposition, in the case of war, from the pacifist faction. Official pacifism could have desired nothing better. It could now give satisfactory assurance of imperialistic "preparedness." 'After Bryan's own declaration, only one thing was necessary to dispose of his noisy opposition to war, and that was, simply, to declare war. And Bryan rolled right over into the government camp. 198 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA And not only the petite bourgeoisie, but also the broad masse** of the workers, said to themselves: "If our government, with such an outspoken pacifist as Wilson at the head, declares war, and if even Bryan supports the government in the war, it must be an unavoid able and righteous war." ... It is now evident why the sancti monious, Quaker-like pacifism of the bourgeois demagogues is in such high favor in financial and war industry circles. Our Menshevist and Social-Revolutionist pacifism, in spite of apparent differences, is, in reality, playing the same part as Ameri can pacifism. The resolution on war passed by the majority of the AlURussian Congress of Soviets of Workers, Soldiers and Peas ants, condemns the war not only from a pacifist standpoint, but also because of the imperialistic character of the war. The Congress de clares the struggle for an early conclusion of the war to be "the most important task of revolutionary democracy." But all these premises are merely mobilized so that they may lead to the con clusion ; "until such time as the war may be ended by the interna tional forces of democracy, the Russian revolutionary democracy will be obliged in every possible way to co-operate in strengthening the fighting power of our army and rendering it efficient for both offensive and defensive action." The revision of the old international treaties the Congress, like the Provisional Government, would make dependent on a voluntary agreement of allied diplomacy, which, in its very nature, neither de sires nor is it able to relinquish the imperialistic aims of the war. The Congress, following its leaders, makes the "international forces of democracy" depend on the will of the social-patriots, who are bound by iron chains to tlieir imperialistic governments. Volun tarily restricting themselves in the question of "an early end of the war" to this charmed circle, the majority of the Congress naturally arrives at a very definite conclusion in the domain of practical poli tics: an offensive on the military front. This "pacifism," which solidifies and disciplines the petit bourgeois democracy and induces it to support an offensive, ought manifestly to be on most friendly terms not only with the Russian imjierialists, but also with those of the allied nations. Milyukov says : "In the name of our fidelity to our allies and to the old (diplomatic) treaties, we must have an offensive." Kerensky and Tseretelli say: "Although the old (diplomatic) treaties have not yet been revised, we must have an offensive." The argument may differ ; the policy is the same. Nor could DEMOCRACY, PACIFISM AXO IMPERIALISM I99 it be otherwise, since Kerensky and Tseretelli are indissolubly bound up in the government with the party of Milyukov. As a matter of fact, the social-patriotic pacifism of the Dans, as well as the Quaker pacifism of the Bryans, are both operating in the service of Imperialism. In view of this slate of affairs, the chief task of Russian diplom acy is not to make allied diplomacy refrain from this act or that or to revise this thing or that, but to make allied diplomacy believe that the Russian Revolution is safe and sound and solvent. The Russian Ambassador, Bakhmeticff, in his speech before the Con gress of the United States, delivered on June 10, characterized the Provisional Government chiefly from this point of view, "All these circumstances." said the Ambassador, "|>oint to the fact that the power and significance of the Provisional Govern ment are growing day by day. that with each passing moment the Provisional Government is becoming better able to cope with all those elements that mean disaster, whether they take the form of reactionary propaganda or that of an agitation by the members of the extreme left. At the present time the Provisional Government is determined to take the most drastic steps in this direction, resorting to force, if need be, in spite of its constant endeavors for a peace ful solution of all questions." There is no doubt that the "national honor" of our "defenders" remains absolutely unruffled while the Ambassador of "revolution ary democracy" fervently persuades the parliament of the Ameri can plutocracy of the readiness of the Russian government to pour cut the blood of the Russian proletariat in the name of "order,'' the chief ingredient of which its fidelity to allied Capitalism. And at the very moment when Bakhmeticff stood hat in hand, a humiliating speech passing over his lips, in the presence of the representatives of Capitalism, Tseretelli and Kerensky were ex plaining to the "revolutionary democracy" how impossible it was to dispense with armed force in its fight with "the anarchy of the left," and threatening to disarm the workers of Petrograd and the regiment which made common cause with them. We know that these threats came just in the nick of time; they served as a strong argument in favor of the Russian Loan in Wall Street. You see Mr. Bakhmeticff was in a ]>ositioti to say: "our revolutionary paci fism differs in no respect from your own brand of pacifism, and if you put your faith in Bryan, there is no reason why you should dis trust Tseretelli." 200 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA There remains to us only the necessity of putting one question : How much Russian flesh and Russian blood will it take, on the ex ternal front as well as in the interior, in order to secure the Russian Loan, which, in its turn, is to guarantee our continued fidelity to the Allies? VI THE JULY UPRISING (Trotzky) Blood has flowed in the streets of Petrograd. A tragic chapter has been added to the Russian Revolution. Who is to blame ? "The Bolsheviki," says the man in the street, repeating what his news papers tell him. The sum total of these tragic happenings is ex hausted, as far as the bourgeoisie and the time-serving politicians are concerned, in the words: Arrest the ringleaders and disarm the masses. And the object of this action is to establish "revolu tionary order." The Social-Revolutionists and the Mensheviki, in arresting and disarming the Bolsheviki, are prepared to establish "order." There is only one question : What kind of order, and for whom? The Revolution aroused great hopes in the masses. Among the masses of Petrograd, who played a leading role in the Revolution, these hopes and expectations were cherished with exceptional ear nestness. It was the task of the Social-Democratic Party to trans form these hopes and expectations into clearly-defined political pro grams, to direct the revolutionary impatience of the masses in the channel of a plan ful political action. The Revolution was brought face to face with the question of state poiver. We, as well as the Bolshevist organization, stood for a handing over of all power to the Central Committee of the Councils of Workers', Soldiers and Peasants' Delegates. The upper classes, and among them we must include the Social-Revolutionists and the Mensheviki, exhorted the masses to support tlie Milyukov-Guchkov government. Up to the last moment, that is, up to the time when these more distinctly imperialistic figures of the first Provisional Government resigned, both the above mentioned parties were firmly united with the gov ernment all along the line. Only after the reconstruction of the gov ernment did the masses learn from their own newspapers that they had not been told the whole truth, that they had been deceived. They were then told that they must trust the new "coalition" gov- 203 , THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA crnmcnt. The revolutionary Social Democracy predicted that the new government would not differ essentially from the old, that it would not make any concessions to the Revolution and would again betray the hopes of the masses. And so it came to pass. After two months of a policy of weakness, of demands for confidence, of verbose exhortations, the government's position of beclouding the issues could no longer be concealed. It became clear that the masses had once more — and this time more cruelly than ever before — been deceived. The impatience and the mistrust of the great body of workers and soldiers in Petrograd was increasing, not day by day, but hour by hour. These feelings, fed by the prolonged war, so hopeless for all participating in it, by economic disorganization, by an invis ible setting up of a general cessation of the most important branches of production, found their immediate political expression in the slogan: "All power to the Soviets!" The retirement of the Cadets and the definite proof of the internal bankruptcy of the Provisional Government convinced the masses still more thoroughly that they were in the right as opposed to the official leaders of the Soviets. The vacillations of the Social-Revolutionists and the Mensheviki simply added oil to the flames. The demands, almost persecutions, addressed to the Petrograd garrison, requiring them to inaugurate an offensive, had a similar effect. An explosion became inevitable. All parties, including the Bolsheviki, took every step to pre vent the masses from making the demonstration of July 16; but the masses did demonstrate, and with weapons in their hands, more over. All the agitators, all the district representatives declared on the evening of July 16 that the July 17 demonstration, since the question of power remained unsettled, was bound to take place, and that no measures could hold back the people. That is the only reason why the Bolshcviki Party, and with it our organization, de cided not to stand aloof and wash its hands of the consequences, but to do everything in its power to change the July 17 affair into a peaceful mass demonstration. No other was the meaning of the July 17 ap|>eal. It was, of course, clear, in view of the certain in tervention of counter-revolutionary gangs, that bloody conflicts would arise. It would have been possible, it is true, to deprive the masses of any political guidance, to decapitate them politically, as it were, and to leave them by refusing to direct them, to their fate. But wc, being the Workers' Party, neither could nor would follow Pilate's tactics: we decided to join in with the masses and to stick to them, in order to introduce into their elemental turmoil the THE JULY UPRISING 203 greatest measure of organization attainable under the circumstances, and thus to reduce to a minimum the number of probable victims. The facts are well known. Blood has been spilled. And now the "influential" press of the bourgeoisie, and the other newspapers serving the bourgeoisie, are attempting to put on our shoulders the entire burden of responsibility for the consequences — for the pov erty, the exhaustion, the disaffection and the rebelliousness of the masses. To accomplish this end, to complete this labor of counter revolutionary mobilization against the party of the proletariat, there issue forth rascals of anonymous, semi-anonymous, or publicly branded varieties, who circulate accusations of bribery: blood has flowed because of the Bolshcviki, and the Bolshcviki were acting under the orders of Wilhelm. We are at present passing through days of trial. The steadfast ness of the masses, their self-control, the fidelity of their "friends," all these things arc being put to the acid-test. We arc also being subjected to this test, and wc shall emerge from it more strength ened, more united, than from any previous trial. Life is with us and fighting for us. The new reconstruction of power, dictated by an inescapable situation, and by the miserable half-hcartcdness of the ruling parties, will change nothing and will solve nothing. We must have a radical change of the whole system. We need revolu tionary power. The Tseretelli-Kerensky policy is directly intended to disarm and weaken the left wing of the Revolution. If, with the aid of these methods, they succeeed in establishing "order," they will be the first — after us, of course — to fall as victims of this "order." But they will not succeed. The contradiction is too profound, the problems are too enormous to be disposed of by mere police measures. After the days of trial will come the days of progress and vic tory. VII AFTER THE UPRISING (Lenin) The recent suppression of Pravda, until now, was only an "incidental" fact, not sanctioned by the legal action of the govern ment ; now, after the 16th of July, Pravda is formally suppressed by the government. When this suppression is regarded from a historical point of view, in relation to the whole course of events ar.d the process of preparing and realizing this measure of suppression, it sheds a re markably brilliant light upon the "constitutional" aspect of Russia, and upon the danger of constitutional illusions. It is known that the Cadet party, with Milyukov and the paper Retch at the head, has been demanding the repression of the Bol sheviki since April. In the most varied form, from the "govern mental" articles of Retch to the repeated demands of Milyukov to "make arrests" (of Lenin-and-the-other-Bolsheviki) this demand for repression constituted one of the most important, if not the most important, measures in the political program of the Cadets during the Revolution. Long before the intentional and fabricated, the abominable and slanderous accusations of Alexinsky & Co., the accusations made in June and July of the Bolsheviki being German spies and receiving German money; long before even the slanderous accusa tions of "armed resistance" and of mutiny, which were contradicted by universally known facts and published documents— long before all that, the Cadtt party was making a systematic, persistent de mand for the repression of the Bolsheviki. If this demand is now realized, what opinion must we have of the honesty and concep tions of those people who forget or pretend to forget the actual class and party origin of this demand? How can we help stigmatiz ing it as rank falsification or as unbelievable political stupidity, if the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki now attempt to present the situation as if they believe that the opportunity appearing on AFTER THE UPRISING 205 July 16 for the repression of the Bolsheviki was merely "inciden tal" or "unusual ?" After all, there are limits to the corruption of unquestionable historic truths. It is sufficient to compare the movement of May 2 and 3 with that of July 16 and 17, to be convinced immediately of their simi larity: the mass outburst of dissatisfaction, the impatience and action of the masses, the provocative shots from counter-revolu tionary gangs, the dead on the Nevsky, and especially the howls of the bourgeoisie and Cadets that "those Leninites were shooting on the Nevsky ;" the acute and bitter character of the battle between the proletarian mass and the bourgeoisie; the complete confusion of the petty bourgeois class, Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki, the hesitation in their politics and on the question of political power in general — all these objective facts characterize both the move ment of May 2-3 and the movement of July 16-17. And events in June and the July offensive show us in another form the same class alignment. The course of events is perfectly clear: the strug gle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie becoming continu ally more acute, particularly because of the influence on the masses of the petite bourgeoisie, and in connection with it the most per tinent historic events determining the dependence of the Social- Revolutionists and Mensheviki upon the counter-revolutionary Cadets. These events are: the coalition ministry of May 18 n which the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki have proved to be servants of the bourgeoisie, involving themselves more and more in compromise and agreements with the bourgeoisie and in a thousand "favors" to them; postponing the most urgent revolu tionary measures : and, again, the resumption of the offensive at the front. The offensive meant an unavoidable resumption of the imperialistic war, a gigantic strengthening of the influence, power and role of the imperialistic l>ourgeoisie, the extensive growth of chauvinism among the masses, and, last but not least, the transfer of power, first the military and then the political power in general, to the counter-revolutionary heads of the army. Such is the course of historic events, deepening and sharpen ing class antagonisms, from May 2-3 to July 16-17, and permitting the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie to carry out, after the 17th of July, that which on May 3 was indicated with such clarity as its program and tactics, its immediate aim and its "clean" means for attaining this aim. There is historically nothing more petty, theoretically nothing 206 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA more pitiful, and practically, nothing more ridiculous, than the middle class sobs concerning the 17th of July (indulged in, by the way, by L. Martov), concerning the fact that the Bolsheviki con trived to bring alxnit their defeat, and so on and so forth. AIL these sobs, all the conclusions that "there should not have been" any participation in the July 16-17 movement (participation which was for the purpose of imparting a "peaceful and organized" char acter to a perfectly legal Mate of discontent and activity of the masses!) — all this verges on apostasy if emanating from the Bol sheviki, or is characteristic if emanating from the petite bourgeoisie, the manifestation of its habitual indecision and intimidation. In fact, the movement of July 16-17 was a development of the move ment of May 2-3 and its subsequent period, as inevitable as that summer follows spring. It was the unquestionable duty of the proletarian party to remain with the masses, trying to give a more peaceful and organized expression to their just demands and action, not to sweep aside, not to wash their hands of it all, in the manner of Pontius Pilate, on the pedantic pretext that the masses were not organized to the last man and that excesses might follow, (As if (here were no excesses on May 2-3! As if there was ever in the history in the world a single mass movement without excesses!) After July 17 the Social-Revolutionists and the Mensheviki were so completely involved and entangled with the bourgeoisie that they could no longer disguise the fact that they were prepared for cooperation with the counter-revolutionary Cadets (for pur poses of repression, slander and the hangman's policy). The So cial-Revolutionists and the Mensheviki were completely swallowed iii the swamp of counter-revolution because their actions during May and June, their acceptance of the coalition ministry and sup port of the policy of the offensive, led directly to the swamp. I have somewhat digressed, apparently, from my theme of the suppression of Pravda to the historic evaluation of the 17th of July: but that is only apparently, since in reality we cannot un derstand the one without the other. The suppression of Pravda, the arrests of Bolsheviki and other persecutions, rqircscnt nothing more or less than the realization of the program of counter-rev olution and the Cadets in particular, if we consider the main aspect of the affair and (he course of events. It is most instructive, now, to consider just by whom and by what means this program was realized. Consider the facts. On July 15 and 16 the movement gathers AFTER THE UPRISING 207 strength, the masses are agitated and inflamed by the inactivity of the government, the high cost of living, the collapse of the July offensive. The Cadets leave the ministry, playing for time and issuing an ultimatum to the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki, leaving it to those "who are in power," though possessing no power, to liquidate the military defeat and the discontent of the masses, The Bolsheviki, on July 15-16, abstain from action. This was acknowledged even by the representative of Dyelo Naroda in re lating the incidents of July 15 in the Grenadier regiment. In the evening of July 16, the movement gets beyond bounds, and the Bolsheviki issue a proclamation alxnit the necessity of imparting to the movement "a peaceful and organized" character, On July 1", the provocative shots of counter-revolutionary gangs increase the number of victims on both sides. We must emphasize that the promise of the Soviet Executive Committee to investigate the events, to issue bulletins twice daily, etc., remained an empty prom ise! Exactly nothng was done by the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki, who did not even publish a casualty list of Iwjth sides. On the night of July 17, the Bolshcviki issued a proclamation concerning the cessation of hostilities, and the same night it vvas published in Pravda. But, the same night, there arrives a counter revolutionary army at Petrograd (evidently at the call or with the sanction of the Social-Revolutionists, Mensheviki and their Soviets, concerning which "delicate" point there has been a strict silence after the necessity of secrecy had passed). And on the same night, there begin massacres of the Bolsheviki by companies of Junkers, etc, acting under the instruction of the commander Polovtzcv and the General Staff. On the night of July 18, they suppress the Pravda, on the 18th and 19th they destroy its printing shop, kill a worker, Voynoff, in broad daylight. They hunt for and arrest the Bolshcviki and disarm the revolu tionary regiments. Who did all this? Neither the government nor the Soviets, but a counter-revolutionary military band gathered around the General Staff, acting in the name of "counter-espionage," putting into cir culation the fabrications of Pereverdeff and Alcxinsky to "arouse the savagery" of the troops, etc. The government is nowhere. Tliel Soviets are nowhere. They tremble for their own fate: they re ceive a scries of communications that the Cossacks may come and massacre them. The "Black Hundred" and the Cadet press having instituted or- 208 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA ganizcd persecutions of the Bolsheviki, begin a persecution of the Soviets. The Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki bound them selves hand and foot to these counter-revolutionary policies; and, like chained men, they called or "permitted a call" of counter-revo lutionary troops to Petrograd and that bound them still more. They sank completely into the detestable counter-revolutionary swamp. Like cowards, they dismiss their own committee appointed to in vestigate the "affairs" of the Bolsheviki. They delivered the Bol shcviki to the counter-revolution. They participate, meekly, in the funeral of the dead Cossacks, and thus kiss the hands of the coun ter-revolutionists. They are chained men ; they are at the bottom of the swamp. They toss about desperately : they give the Premier's portfolio to Kerensky: they arrange a "Zemstvo Assembly," or the "coronation" of a counter-revolutionary government in Moscow; Kercnsky discharges Polovtzcv. But these tossings remain tossings, not in the least changing the situation. Kerensky discharges Polovtzcv, but at the same time legalizes and makes formal Polovtzev's measures, his policy. Ker cnsky suppresses Pravda, introduces the death penalty for soldiers, forbids the right of assemblage at the front, continues the arrests of Bolshcviki (including even Alexandra Kollontay) — all according to tlie program of Alcxinsky. The "constitutional" condition of Russia is defined with amaz ing clarity : the offensive at the front and the coalition with the Ca dets in the rear sweep the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki in to the swamp of counter-revolution. In fact, the government power passes into the hands of the counter-revolution, into the hands of a military band, with the government of Kerensky, Tseretelli and Chernov as merely a screen for it: the government is forced indi rectly to legalize the measures and the policy of the military coun ter-revolution. The compromise of Kerensky, Tseretelli and Chernov with the . Cadets has a secondary, if not a very remote significance: whether the Cadets will gain by this compromise ; whether Chernov and Tseretelli will hold out "alone," the question will not be changed. The basic and decisive fact remains: the turning of the Social- Revolutionists and Mensheviki to the counter-revolution, the direct consequences of their whole policy since May 18. The cycle of party development is completed. The Social-Rev olutionists and Mensheviki tumbled down from step to step — from "confidence" in Kerensky during the period March 12 to May 18, AFTER THE UPRISING 209 who chained them to the counter-revolution, to the 18th of July when they landed at the bottom. A new stage opens. The victory of the counter-revolution causes disapointmcnt among the masses in the parties of the So cial-Revolutionists and Mensheviki, and opens the way for their ac cepting the policy of the revolutionary proletariat. VIII ALL POWER TO THE SOVIETS! (Lenin) The most important problem in every revolution is the prob lem of state power. In whose hands is this power — that is decisive in all things. And if Dyelo Naroda, the newspaper of the main government party in Russia, the Social-Revolutionary Party, com plains as it did recently that while arguing about power the ques tion of bread is forgotten, — then this is their answer: You have yourselves to blame, since it is precisely the hesitation and inde cision of your party, more than anything else, that is to blame both for the ministerial delays and the never-ending |X)stpoiiemeiits of the Constituent Assembly; you are to blame for the dropping of the decisive measures to establish state monopoly of bread, thus de stroying the country's chances of obtaining bread. The problem of power can not be set aside or evaded, as that is precisely the fundamental question determining all conditions in the development of the Revolution, in its external and internal pol icies. That six months of our Revolution have been "spent in vain" hesitating about the arrangements of power is a fact which one can't argue about ; it is a fact determined by the hesitating policy of these parties that was, in the long run, defined by the class position of the petite bourgeoisie and its economic instability in the struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie. The whole question now is this: Has the petit bourgeois democ racy learned anything during these six vital months of the Revo lution, or has it not? If not, then the Revolution is doomed, and only the victorious uprising of the proletariat can save it. If yes, then it is necessary to begin anew with the immediate creation of a stable power and end the period of vacillation. In a popular revolution, that is, a revolution brought about by the masses, the majority of workers and peasants, the only power that can be permanent and decisive is a power based consciously! and without reservation on the majority of the people. Up until ALL POWER TO THE SOVIETS 211 this time the government power in Russia has been, in fact, and still is, in the hands of the bourgeoisie, which is obliged only to make pri vate concessions (and taking them back the very next day), to issue promise after promise, to fool the people with the semblance of an "honest coalition," etc. In words, the government is popular, dem ocratic, revolutionary; in deeds it is against the people, anti-demo cratic, counter-revolutionary, bourgeois. This is the contradiction prevailing in the government, and which is the source of the com plete instability and vacillation of power, the source of the "minis terial leap-frog game" which Messrs. the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki played, with, for the people, such an unfortunate zeal. Either the dissolution of the Soviets and their inglorious death, cr all power to the Soviets, — that is what I said before the All-Rus sian Congress of Soviets early in June and the history of July and August unqualifiedly confirm the accuracy of my contention. "Power to the Soviets" alone can make power stable, perma nent, because based consciously on the majority of the people, in spite of how the lackeys of the bourgeoisie, Potresof, Plekhanov, etc., may lie and declaim that an actual handing over of power to an insignificant minority of the people, the bourgeoisie, the exploiters, is really a "broadening of the basis" of power. Only the Soviet power can be a stable power, it alone could not be overthrown even in the most stormy period of our stormy revolution, only this power could assure a constant and broad development of the Revolution and the peaceful party struggles within the Soviets. Until all power is in the Soviet, indecision, instability and hesitation arc in evitable, never-ceasing "crises of power," the inescapable comedy of the "ministerial leap-frog game," explosions from the right and the left, etc. But the slogan, "Power to the Soviets" is very often, if not in the most cases, absolutely misunderstood in the sense of "a ministry of the parties of the Soviet majority." This profoundly erroneous view requires consideration in detail. A "ministry of the parties of the Soviet majority" means simply a change in the personnel of the ministry, with the retention and in violability of the old apparatus of government power, an apparatus thoroughly bureaucratic and unable to carry out serious reforms which are of importance even in the programs of the Social-Revo lutionists and Mensheviki. "Power to the Soviets" means a radical and complete change in the old government apparatus, a bureaucratic apparatus choking the expression of democracy. This apparatus must be abolished 212 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA and one truly democratic must be substituted, — the popular appa ratus of the Soviet, an organized and armed majority of the people, workers, soldiers and peasants. The Soviet state would assure and deepen the initiative and independence of the people; the people would actually express their initiative, not only in the election of delegates, but in the management of the government and in the work of re-organization and reform. To make this point of difference clearly evident, let us remind you of a very valuable confession made some time ago by Dyelo Naroda, the organ of the government party, the Social-Revolution ary Party. Even in those ministries, wrote that paper, which con tain Socialist ministers, the whole apparatus of government remains antiquated and hinders all work. Quite right. The whole history of bourgeois parliamentary, and in more significant measure of bourgeois constitutional countries, proves that a change of ministers means very little, as the actual work of government is in the hands of a gigantic army of bureaucrats. And this army is permeated through and through with an anti-democratic spirit, bound up by thousands and millions of threads with landowners and capitalists, and dependent upon them in all ways. This army is in an atmos phere of bourgeois relations and breathes this atmosphere; it has be come rigid and has not the power to escape — it is unable to think, feel and act other than in the old manner. This bureaucratic army is enslaved by considerations of rank and precedence, of respect for the well-known privileges of "government" service. The upper layers of this army, by means of stocks and banks, are completely subservient to financial capital, and, moreover, themselves furnish to a certain extent agents and promoters of the interests and influ ence of financial capital. To attempt, by means of this government apparatus, to intro duce such reorganization as the abolition of private ownership of land, without re-purchase, or a state monopoly of bread, etc., is the greatest illusion, the greatest self-deception and deception of the masses. This apparatus can serve the republican bourgeoisie to create a republic in the sense of "a monarchy without a monarch," as the Third Republic of France; but it is absolutely unfit to intro duce reforms, not to abolish, but simply to seriously repress and limit the rights of capital, the rights of "sacred private property." The inevitable outcome of "coalition" ministries, therefore, participated in by Socialists, is that these Socialists, even under ab solutely conscientious agreement of individual members of their class, become in fact empty ornaments or screens of th*** bourgeois ALL POWER TO THE SOVIETS 213 government, buffers against the indignation of the masses against the government, instruments of deception of the masses. It was so with Louis Blanc in 1848; so it has been dozens of times since then, in England and France, when Socialists participatetd in the ministry ; so it has been with Chernov and Tseretelli ; so it has been and so it will be as long as the bourgeois system remains and the old bureaucratic apparatus of government is preserved intact. The Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates are especially valuable in that they represent a new, immeasurably high er and incomparably more democratic type of governrricnt. Social- Revolutionists and Mensheviki have done all that was possible and impossible to turn the Soviets (especially the Petrograd Soviet and ' the Central Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviets,) into empty talking machines, occupied under the guise of "control" in the promulgation of impotent resolutions and desires, which the government postpones until doomsday with a most courteous and polite smile. But there was quite enough of the "fresh wind" of Korni- lovism, promising a good storm, to blow away everything musty in the Soviet. The initiative of the revolutionary masses began to proclaim itself as something great, mighty and invincible. Let those of little faith learn from this historical example. Let those be ashamed who say: "We have not the means to change the old, oppressive government apparatus, which necessarily inclines to de fend the bourgeoisie." The means exist — the Soviets. Don't be afraid of the initiative and independence of the masses. Trust your self to the revolutionary organization of the masses, and you will behold in all fields of government activity an expression of the imposing power and invincible will of the workers and peasants. Distrust of the masses, fear of their initiative and independence, is directly counter-revolutionary. "Power to the Soviets" alone can break the opposition of the landowners and capitalists; an opposition that also realizes itself in the government of Kerensky (a government, in fact, absolutely bour geois and Bonapartist ), and in the direct and indirect pressure of Russian and "allied" financial capital. Audacity and resolution were lacking in our government through all its changes of personnel. Revolutionary democracy ought not to wait; it should itself take the initiative and act efficiently to end the economic chaos. If they are necessary anywhere, then firmness of course, audacity and decisive power arc necessary here. The truth is the truth — these arc golden words. But the question of 214 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA firmness of course, audacity and resolution, is not a personal question: it is a question of the class which is capable of showing courage and decision. That class is the proletariat, and the prole tariat alone. Courage and resolution, firmness of course and power, mean nothing else than the dictatorship of the proletariat and of the poorest peasants. Just what would such a dictatorship mean? Simply that the opposition of counter-revolutionary Kornilovism would be broken, and the democratization of the army re-established and perfected. Of the soldiers, 99 per cent would be enthusiastic participants in such a dictatorship two days after its establishment. The dictator ship would give the land to the peasants and full power to the local peasant committees. How can one in his senses doubt the fact that the peasants would support a dictatorship of the proletariat? That which the Social-Revolutionist. Pyeshekhonov, simply promised, "the opposition of the capitalists is broken" (the exact words of Pyeshekhonov in his celebrated speech before the Congress of So viets) would be really accomplished by this dictatorship, would be translated into reality, without in any way pushing aside the already developing democratic organizations for the control of production, of the food supply, of administration, etc. On the contrary, a dicta torship of tlie proletariat would support and strengthen these or ganizations, brushing aside all obstacles to their work. Only this dictatorship of the proletariat and poorest peasants is capable of destroying the opposition of the capitalists, of actively displaying marvels of courage and stability of power, of securing a triumphant and unlimited, truly heroic support of the masses, both in the army and among the peasants. * Power to the Soviets — that alone can assure the further devel opment of the Revolution, in accordance with the experience and decisions of the majority of the masses. Power to the Soviets signifies the complete handing over of the government and the control of its functions to the workers and peasants, whom no one would dare oppose; a government of the Soviets, which would quickly learn by experience and its own prac tice to distribute land, products and bread. IX CONSTITUTIONAL ILLUSIONS (Lenin) Constitutional illusions is a term designating the political error comprised in people accepting as existing, normal, regular, legal, in short, as "constitutional," an order which, in reality, does not exist. At first glance, it would seem that in Russia at present, in July, 1917, when there is not, as yet, any such thing as a constitution, that there could be no question of constitutional illusions being formed. But that is a grave mistake. In fact, the key to the present politi cal situation in Russia lies in the circumstances that exceedingly large masses of the people are permeated with constitutional illu sions. It is utterly imjwssible to understand anything in the pres ent political situation without having grasped this fact. It is im possible to take a single step toward properly stating the tactical problems of the present unless we first systematically and unspar ingly e.\|K>sc these constitutional illusions, disclosing their very roots, in order to secure a proper political perspective. Let us consider the most important aspects jf contemporary constitutional illusions, analyzing them carefully, The first aspect : Our country is on the eve of a Constituent As sembly. That is why everything that is now happening has a tem porary, transitory and indecisive character. Everything will soon be changed and definitely determined by the Constituent Assembly, The second aspect: That certain parties, for instance, the Social- Revolutionists or the Mensheviki, or their allies, have an evident and undeniable majority among the people or in "influential" orga nizations, such as the Soviets; and for that reason the will of these parties or organizations, being in general the will of the majority of the people, cannot be overcome or, more than that, violated in a republican, democratic, revolutionary Russia. 1 The convoking of the Constituent Assembly was promised by the Provisional Government of the first period, of Lvov-Guchkov, It acknowledged as its principal aim precisely the Constituent As- 2l6 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA scmbly. The Provisional Government of the second period, of co alition, decided that the Constituent Assembly should meet on September 30. The Provisional Government of the third period, of Premier Kerensky, after the 17th of July, most solemnly affirmed that the Constituent Assembly should meet on September 30. And yet there are ninety-nine chances out of a hundred that the Constituent Assembly will not be convoked on that date.1 And should it be convoked on that date — again there are ninety-nine chances out of a hundred that it will be just as powerless and worth less as the first Duma — until the second revolution is victorious in Russia, To become convinced of this fact, it is necessary to turn our attention for a brief moment away from the tinsel of the phrases, promises and trivialities which clog the brain, and to glance al the basic, the determining factor in all social relations—at the class struggle. It is evident that the bourgeoisie in Russia has allied itself most intimately with the land-owners. The whole press, all the elections, all the politics of the Cadet party and the parties to the right of them, arc proof of this alliance. The bourgeoisie understands perfectly well that which is in comprehensible to the petty bourgeois babblers of the Social-Revo lutionists and the left Mensheviki, namely: that it is impossible to abolish private ownership of land in Russia — and, still more, with out compensation — without a giant economic revolution, without placing the banks under public control, without the nationalization of the syndicates (trusts), without a scries of the most merciless measures against capital. The bourgeoisie understands that per fectly. And at the same time it cannot be ignorant of, it cannot blind itself to, it cannot fail to perceive the fact, that a large ma jority of the peasants would not only declare now for the confisca tion of the land, but show itself considerably more left than Cher nov, For the bourgeoisie knows better than we do the frequent nnd partial concessions that were made by that man, Chernov; for example, from May 18 to July 15, on the questions of protracting and curtailing different demands of the peasants ; also the great ef fort it required for the right Social-Revolutionists (for Chernov is •Lenin was ri«lit — the Provisional Government of Kerensky postponed the convocation of the Assembly to November 29; and in the meantime, the counter-revolution prepared itself to_ disperse the Assembly by armed force should its decisions prove "radical" and " democratic." The Consti tuent Assembly was the centre of a converging attack— the counter-rcv- oulionary attack from the right, and tlie revolutionary proletarian attack from the left.— L, C. F. CONSTITUTIONAL ILLUSIONS 21^ considered a centrist by the S.-R.'s!) at the Peasants' Convention and at the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviet of Peas ants' Delegates to "soothe" the peasants and to feed them with promises. The bourgeois class differs from the petite bourgeoisie in that it acquires from its economic and political experience a knowledge of the conditions for the preservation of "order" (that is, the sub jugation of the masses), under the capitalistic regime. The bourgeois class is composed of business people, — people with large commercial interests, accustomed to approach even poli tical problems from a strictly business standpoint, with distrust of words and with the ability to take the bull by the horns. The Constituent Assembly in Russia at present would give a large majority to the peasants, who arc more left than the Social- Revolutionists. The bourgeoisie knows this. Knowing this, it can not help but struggle more strenuously against an early convocation of the Constituent Assembly. To conduct an imperialistic war in the spirit of the secret treaties concluded by Nicholas II, to uphold the private control of land or to make compensation for its "con fiscation" — to do all this is an impossible or unbelievably difficult task through the Constituent Assembly. The war cannot wait. The class struggle cannot wait. This was visibly demonstrated even during the short period of time from March 12 to May 2. From the very beginning of the Revolution, two points of view on the Constituent Assembly were discernible. The Social-Revolu tionists and Mensheviki, who arc saturated through and through with constitutional illusions, viewed the problems with the confi dence of the petty bourgeois, unwilling to recognize the class strug gle. The Constituent Assembly will convene, and — enough I After that, the devil only knows! And the Bolsheviki declared: only insofar as the power and authority of the Soviets are strengthened, only to that extent will the convocation and the success of the Constituent Assembly be assured. The Mensheviki and the Social-Revolutionists place the centre of gravity in the juridicial act: in the proclamations, promises and declarations concerning the Constituent Assembly. The Bolshcviki place the centre of gravity in the class struggle: if the Soviets are victorious, the Constituent Assembly will be as sured; if they arc not, it will not be assured. ' So it happened. The bourgeois conducte a continuous strug- -2 '8 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA gle, at times hidden, at times open, but ceaselessly and uncompro misingly, against the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. That struggle was expressed in the desire to postpone its convoc ation untl the end of the war. That struggle was expressed by a series of postponements of the designated day of convocation of the Constituent Assembly. When finally, more than a month after tlie formation of the coalition ministry, the date was set for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, a Moscow bourgeois paper announced that it was done under the pressure of Bolshevik influence. After the 17th of July, when the subservience and the timidity of the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki secured a "victory" for the counter-revolutionists, there slipped into the Retch a brief but highly significant expression : "as soon as possible" let the Con stituent Assembly be convened ! But on July _><;, there appeared in the Volya Naroda and in the Russkaya Volya, an article stating that the Cadets demand a post ponement of the convocation of the Constituent Assembly upon the pretext that it is "impossible" to call it in so "short" a time, and the Menshevik Tseretelli, fawning before the counter-revolu tionists, has already agreed, according to that article, to postpone the Assembly until December 2. There is no doubt that such a statement could have slipped in only against the desires of the bourgeoisie. It could not afford such 'revelations." But the cat wac out of the bag. The course of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie after July 17 is accompanied by an immediate step (and an extremely serious step) against the con vocation of the Constituent Assembly. This is a fact. And this fact exposes all the emptiness of con stitutional illusions. Unless there is a new revolution in Russia, unless the people refuse to place their trust in the Social-Revolu tionary and Menshevik parties — parties which ally themselves with the bourgeoisie — the Constituent Assembly will cither never be called or will result in a "Frankfort Chaterbox," a powerless, worthless assembly of petty bourgeois who are frightened to death by the war and by the prospect of the "boycott of power" by the bourgeois class, and who are helplessly vacilating between their fears, The question of the Constituent Assembly is subordinate to the question of the cause and outcome of the class war between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. It will be remembered how Rabo- CONSTITUTIONAL ILLUSIONS 210 cJiaya Gazeta once let slip the Constituent Assembly would be a con vention That is an example of the empty, petty, contemptible brag ging of our Menshevik lackeys of the counter-revolutionary bour geoisie. In order that it shall not resolve itself into a "Frankfort chatterbox" or a first Duma, in order that it be a convention, the Constituent Assembly must have the courage, the ability, the power to strike merciless blows at the counter-revolution, and not to give in to it. In order that it succeed, it is necessary that power shold be in the hands of the most radical, the most resolute, the most revo lutionary class in a given epoch. It is necessary that it be supported by the whole mass of the town and village poor (semi-proletariat). For that purpose, it is necessary, above all, to wage a decisive war against the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. Such arc the real, the class conscious and material conditions of a convention. It is sufficient simply to enumerate these condi tions precisely and clearly, to understand how laughable is the bragging of Rabochaya Gazeta, how profoundly ridiculous are the constitutional illusions of the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki concerning the Constituent Assembly in contemptorary Russia. In attacking the petty bourgeois "Socialists" of the year 1848, Marx particularly and violently condemned their uncontrolled phrasemongery about "the people" and the majority of the people in general. That recollection is very appropriate in considering the second aspect of constitutional illusions, in analyzing the conception of "majority." In order that the majority should rcaly rule in a country, it is necessary to have definite, actual conditions, namely: it is neces sary that such a form of government be established, such a gov ernmental authority, as would furnish the opportunity to have af fairs decided by a majority and to assure the development of that opportunity into reality. From another point of view, it is neces sary that the majority, in accordance with its class composition and in relation to any other class within that majority (or outside of it) should be able to direct government co-operatively and successfully. It is evdent to every Marxist that these two real conditions play a decisive role in the question of the majority of the people, and in the course of governmental affairs in accordance with the will of this majority. Nevertheless, all the political literature of the Social- 220 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA Revolutionists and Mensheviki, and more than that, all of their political activity, discloses a complete lack of understandng of these conditions. If the power of government is in the hands of a class whose interests coincide with the interests of the majority, the admini stration of the government can then be, in realty, identical with the will of the majority. If, on the other hand, the government power is in the hands of a class whose interests diverge from the interests of the majority, then every attempt to govern inevitably becomes a fraud upon or a subjugation of that majority. Every bourgeois republic furnishes us with hundreds and thousands of examples of this. In Russia the bourgeoisie reigns politically and economically. Its interests, especially during an imperialistic war, diverge most acutely from the interests of the majority. That is the reason why the key to this question, when stated from a materialistic Marxian point of view and not from a formalist-juridical one, lies in re vealing that divergence, in fighting against the deception of the masses by the bourgeoisie. But our Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki have completely proven and revealed their real role as instruments for the deception of the masses (majority) by the bourgeoisie, being leaders and as sistants in this deception. No matter how sincere some individuals among the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki may be, their fundamental political principles — imagining that it is possible to prooeed from an imperialistic war to "a peace without annexations and indemnities" without dictatorship of the proletariat and the victory of Socialism ; imagining that it is possible to transfer the land to the people without compensation and to impose "control" over production m the interests of the people without proletarian dictatorship and Socialism — these fundamental political (and, na turally, economic) principles of the Social-Revolutionists and Men sheviki present objectively in themselves the self-deception of the petty bourgeois, or, what amounts to the same thing, the deception of the masses (majority) by the bourgeoisie. Here is our first and primary "correction" of the phrasing of the question of majorities by the petty bourgeois democrats, Social ists of the Louis Blanc type, Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki: why discuss the question of majority when the majority itself is only a formal moment, a temporary condition, whereas materially CONSTITUTIONAL ILLUSIONS 221 and in reality this majority is the majority of the party which is realizing the deception of the majority by the bourgeoisie? And, surely — here we come to the second "correction," to the second of the fundamental conditions previously indicated — surely, it is possible to interpret that deception properly, if only we clear out its cla's roots and reveal its class meaning. It is not an indi vidual deception, it is not "trickery" (I express myself roughly), it is a deception and idea which results from the economic environ ment of the class. A petty bourgeois finds himself in such an eco nomic situation, his life conditions are such, that he cannot help ileceive himself; he vacillates involuntarily and inevitably between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. There cannot be any any such thing as an independent course economically for the petty bour geois. His past draws him to the bourgeoisie, his future to the proletariat. His reason urges him to the latter course, his prejudice (according to a well known Marxian expression) to the former. That the majority govern the state, be the real beneficiary of the majority interests, the real guardian of its rights, etc., a definite class condition is necessary: the coalition of the majority of the petite bourgeoisie, at least during the decisive moment and at the decisive place, with the revolutionary proletariat. Without this class condition, the majority is a fiction, which may exist for some time, shine, sparkle, make noise, win laurels. but which is destined to crash to disaster with absolute inevitability. That, by the way, is precisely the disaster awaiting the majority of the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki, as determined by the Russian Revolution in July, 1917. Let us proceed. A revolution differs from "the ordinary con dition" of affairs in government in that disputable questions concern ing society are of necessity solved by the class struggle and the mass struggle until the moment of establishing its definite and determin ing forms. There is no otlier alternative if the masses are free and armed. From that basic fact it follows that, in a real revolution, it is not enough to announce "the will of the majority" — no, it is necessary to prove yourself stronger at the decisive moment and at the decisive place; it is necessary to conquer. Beginning with the peasants' revolts in the middle ages in Germany and continuing through all the great revolutionary movements and epochs up to 1848 and 1871, to the year 1005, we sec countless examples of how the better organized, the more conscious, the better armed minority imposes its will upon the majority and defeats it. 222 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA Frederick Engels placed special emphasis on the lesson to be learned from the experience unifying to a certain extent the peasant uprisings of the ioth century and the revolution of 1848 in Ger many, namely : the lack of unity of action and of centralization among the oppressed masses, due to their petty bourgeois form of life And, from this point of view, we come to this conclusion: the simple majority of the pcttybourgcois mass does not, as yet, decide anything and cannot decide anything, as long as the organization, the political consciousness and its centralization (inevitable for victory) is such that it gives the millions of petty bourgeois only the jKisition of serving as the instrument either of the bourgeoisie or of the proletariat. Finally, as we know, the problems of social organization are solved by the class struggle in its most aggressive, most violent form, namely, in the form of civil war. And in this civil war, as In every war the deciding factor — which as a fact and in principle is disputed by no one — is economic. It is extremely characteristic and significant that neither the Social-Revolutionists nor the Menshe viki deny this in principle, and, acknowledging the capitalistic char acter of contemporary Russia, dare not soberly look the truth in the face. They fear to acknowledge the truth, the fundamental di vision of every capitalistic country, Russia included, into three fundamental and decsive divisions: the bourgeoisie, the petty bour geoisie and the proletariat. The first and the third are universally spoken alxiut, universally acknowledged. The second — which hap pens to be the majority in point of number — is refused sober recog nition from an economic, from a political, from a military point of view. The truth is painful — that is the conclusion to which the fear of self-analvsis of the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki leads. LESSONS OF THE REVOLUTION (Lenin) Every revolution means a sudden break in the lives of great masses of people. Unless such a break matures, no real revolution can take place. And, just as every break in the life of an in dividual teaches him something, causes him new experiences and new sensations, so a revolution imparts to the whole people in a short time lessons of great import and value. In revolutionary epochs, millions and tens of millions of people learn more in a week than in a year of ordinary, every-day somno lent existence. For. a sharp crisis in the life of a whole people shows with exceptional clarity which classes exist and what ends they pursue, what forces they may utilize in their work, and by what means of action they proceed. Every class conscious worker, soldier and peasant should seri ously consider the lessons of the Russian Revolution, particularly now, when, early in August, it is perfectly clear that the first phase of our Revolution has ended disastrously. What were the masses of the workers and peasants after when they accomplished the Revolution? What did they expect from the Revolution? It is clear that the workers and peasants expected liberty, peace, bread and land. But what did they get? Instead of liberty, we see the former tyranny being re-estab lished. The death penalty is introduced for soldiers at the front. Peasants are haled to court for undertaking, of their own accord, to seize the land of the landholders. The printing offices of the workers' papers are wrecked. Bolsheviki are being arrested, either 224 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA on no charges at all, or on charges that are manifestly framed-up.1 The defense is offered that it is not the Bolsheviki who are being prosecuted, but only certain definite persons and on definite accusations. But these declarations are deliberately and manifestly untrue, for how can printing offices be wrecked for the transgres sions of individual persons, even if these persons have been found guilty and duly sentenced in court? Unless, indeed, the govern ment should legally have found guilty the whole Bolshevist party, its views and its tendencies. But the government of free Russia could not, and never did, do anything of the sort. The clearest exposure of the fictitious character of the accusa tions directed against the Bolsheviki is in the fact that the news papers of the landholders and the capitalists have been rabidly de nouncing the Bolshcviki for their agitation against the war, against the landholders and against the capitalists, and demanding the ar rest and prosecution of the Bolshcviki — before even a single accusa tion had been lodged against even one Bolshevik. The people want peace. But the "revolutionary" government of Russia continued to wage a war of conquest, on the basis of the same secret treaties which the late Czar Nicholas II concluded with the English and French capitalists, in the interests of the subjec tion of foreign races by the Russian capitalists. The government of free Russia has been very prolific in its excuses, but it has not of fered a righteous peace to all the nations. We have no bread. Hunger again approaches. Everybody knows that the capitalists and the wealthy are cheating ruthlessly on the prices of war materials, are making unheard-of profits out of high prices, but nothing at all has been done toward a serious study of the production of commodities and their distribution by the workers. The capitalists are becoming more and more impudent, even throwing the workers out of the factories into the streets, and that at a time when there is a famine of manufactured articles among the people. The great majority of the peasants have declared loudly and plainly in a long series of congresses, that they consider the feudal ownership of land to be unjust — mere usurpation. But a govern ment styling itself revolutionary and democratic continues for •This pictured the situation after the July uprising, when the Provisional Government and the moderates in the Soviet co-operated to disarm and crush ihe "left wing" of the Revolution, Trotzky was under arrest and Lenin in hiding— in Petrograd, from whence he continued to direct the agitation of the Bolsheviki t—L. C. F. LESSONS OF THE REVOLUTION 225 months to hoodwink the peasants and deceive them with promises and excuses. The capitalists for months do not permit the Chernov ministry to issue laws prohibiting the transfer of land by sale.' And no sooner is this law finally promulgated than the capitalists begin a vile and baseless legal hounding of Chernov, and continue it up to the present time. In its defense of the landholders, the govern ment was even bold enough to bring peasants to court for their "ir responsible" seizure of land. The peasants are hoodwinked and persuaded to wait for the Constituent Assembly. But the capitalists continue to postpone the opening of this Assembly, Now, when at last the Assembly is sum moned for the 30th of September, the capitalists raise a howl and declare that it is "impossible" to convene the Constituent Assembly in so short a time and demand another postponement of its convo cation, The most influential members of the capitalist and land- holding party, the "Cadet" Party, for example, openly advocate postponing the Constituent Assembly until after the war. Land? Wait for the Constituent Assembly. . . . Constituent Assembly? Wait until after the war. . . . End of the war? Wait until we have reached a victorious conclusion. That is the satisfaction we get. The capitalists and landhold ers, who have their majority in the government, thus make sport of tlie peasants. But how is it possible for such things to go on in a free coun try, a country that has overthrown its Czar? After the downfall of the Czarist power, state power passed into the hands of the first Provisional Government, The party of the revolutionary workers, the Bolshcviki, demanded a transfer of all state power to the Soviets. The greater number of delegates in the Soviets were on the side of the Mensheviki or with the Social- Revolutionists, who were against a transfer of power to the Soviets, Instead of brushing aside the bourgeois government and substitut ing a Soviet government in its place, the Mensheviki and Social- Revolutionists advocated support of the bourgeois government and a coalition with it, in other words, the formation of a new govern ment, composed of representatives of the bourgeoisie, Mensheviki »Oicrnov was the Social-Revolutionist Minister of Agriculture in the Coalition Cabinet of the Provisional Government. He resigned in June, be coming again a member in August in the Cabinet of Premier Kercnsky. The prohibition of the transfer of land by sale was a very important measure, a through these sales the bourgeois and feudal agrarians schemed to draw th« teeth out of the proposed distribution of land by the Constituent Assembly —when the Constituent Assembly finally did meet!— L. C. F. 226 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA and Social-Revolutionists. This policy of coalition with the tour-1 geoisiei on the part of the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki, who enjoyed the confidence of a majority of the people, contains the gist of the whole course of the Revolution in the five months that have elapsed since its inception. An agreement of the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki with the capitalists has been manifest, in one form or another, at every stage of the Russian Revolution. When the people, in March, had barely won their victory and Czarism had been overthrown, the Provisional Government of the capitalists added to their number the "Socialist" Kerensky. As a matter of fact, Kerensky had never been a Socialist; he had simply been a Laborite, and counted himself a "Socialist-revolutionary" only since March, 1017, when the thing was already safe and value less, It was through Kerensky, in his capacity of Vice-Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, that the Provisional Government of the capi talists now tried to win over and domesticate the Soviet. The Soviet, that is, the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki who con trolled it, permitted themselves to be soft-soaped, and agreed, im mediately after its formation, to "support" the Provisional Govern ment of the capitalists, ''provided" it would carry out its promises. The Soviet considered itself to be a sort of auditing commis sion, checking up the activities of the Provisional Government. The heads of the Soviets established the so-called "Consulting Commit tee," that is, a committee to secure contact and understanding -with the Government, Through this Consulting Cominitrce, the Social- Revolutionist and Menshcvist leaders of the Soviet conducted con tinual conversations with the government of the capitalists, since they were, pro|>crly speaking, in the situation of ministers without portfolios, unofficial ministers. Most of March and all of April passed with this state of af fairs prevailing. Tlie capitalists, in order to gain time, took refuge in delays and subterfuges. During this time the capitalist govern ment did not take a single step of any consequence for the advance ment of the Revolution. Even in its most elementary duty, the calling of the Constituent Assembly, the government did absolutely nothing, not even proposing the question of time and place nor ap pointing a central committee to consider the question. The govern ment was concerned with one thing only, namely, to renew, surrep titiously, .the predatory international treaties which the Czar had concluded with the capitalists of England and France; and to block the Revolution as carefully and imperceptibly as they could, to pro- LESSONS OF THE REVOLUTION ••. 227 n.ise everything and deliver nothing The; Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki in the Consulting Committee played the part of sim-i pletons who are fed on fine phrases, promises, "lunches"; the So-i cial-Revolutionists and Mensheviki, like the raven in the fable, lent a willing ear to flattery, delightedly swallowing the assurances of the capitab'sts that they would not undertake a single step without comi suiting the Soviets, esteeming the Soviets, of course, wry highly. As a mater of fact, time was passing, and the government of the capitalists had done absolutely nothing for the Revolution. But against the Revolution — they had already succeeded in renewing the secret predatory treaties, or rather, in emphasizing and "rcsur-. recting" them by means of supplementary agreements, just as se cret, with the diplomats of Anglo-French Imperialism. Against the Revolution— they had already succeeded in laying the foundations of a counter-revolutionary organization (or, at least, understand ing) of the generals and officers of the old army. Against the Rev olution — they had already begun to organize captains of industry,* owners of factories and works, who, under the blows of the workers, had been compelled to make one concession after another, but who were now beginning to sabotage, production and prepare for its absolute stoppage, merely waiting for an appropriate moment. But the organizing of the advanced workers and peasants into Soviets was proceeding inexorably. The best among the oppressed classes felt that the government, in spite of the agreement with the Petrograd Soviet, in spite of the eloquence of Kercnsky, in spite of the "Consulting Committee" remained an enemy of the people, an enemy of the Revolution. The masses felt that if they did not break the resistance of the capitalists, the cause of peace, of free" dom, of the Revolution would be lost forever. The impatience and ill-will of the masses was daily increasing. n On May 2 and 3 the masses burst forth. The cataclysm came with a sort of elemental fury, for no one had expected it. It ap peared all the more distinctly directed against the government since one regiment marched out armed and appeared at the Marinsky Palace in order to arrest the ministers. To every one it was clear, to the point of axiomatic truth, that the government could not hold on. The Soviets could (and should) have taken the state powet into their hands, without the slightest opposition from any side whatever. Instead of which the Social-Revolutionists and Menshe viki supported the tottering government of the capitalists, entan- 228 THE PROLETARIAN RKVOLUTION IN RUSSIA gled themselves more completely with the government by means of further agreements, and took other, even more fatal, steps to the complete undoing of the Revolution. Revolution teaches all classes with a rapidity and thorough ness never possible in ordinary, peaceful times. The capitalists, being better organized and more experienced in the class struggle and in class policy, learned more quickly than the others. Seeing that the position of the government was insecure, they resorted to a method that has been practiced by the capitalists of other countries through all the decades since 1848, to hoodwink, disunite and weaken the workers. This method is the method of "coalition," that is, a ministry formed by combining bourgeois elements with renegades from Socialism. hi countries characterized more than others by the presence of liberty and democracy side by side with a revolutionary working class movement, namely, in England and France, capitalists have frequently resorted to "coalition" with great success. "Socialist" leaders who enter a bourgeois ministry inevitably become mere figure-heads, puppets, capitalist camouflage, tools for the deception of the workers. The "democratic and republican" capitalists of Russia put this same device into practice. The Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki simultaneously permitted themselves to be fooled, and on May 19 the "coalition" ministry, including Chernov, Tsere telli & Co., became a fact. The dupes of the Social-Revolutionary and Menshevist parties love to bask in the light of the ministerial haloes of their leaders. The capitalists rubbed their hands in glee when they found they had obtained accomplices against the people in the persons of the "Soviet leaders," who had promised they would support "an offen sive at the front," that is, a renewal of the war of imperialistic aggression that had been suspended. The capitalists were aware of the puffed-up impotence of these leaders; they were aware that the promises made by the bourgeoisie (concerning the control and even organization of industry, the policy of peace, etc.) never would be kept. And so it transpired. The second phase of the Revolution, from May 19 to June 18, fully justified the calculation of the capi talists as to the ease with which they could deceive the Social Revo lutionists and Mensheviki. As soon as Pyeshekhonov and Skobeleff began fooling them selves and the people with fine phrases to the effect that they would take 100 per cent profits away from the capitalists, that the resis- LESSONS OF THE REVOLUTION 229 ance of the capitalists was broken, etc., the capitalists began to take heart. No one, absolutely no one, was at that moment occupied in curbing the capitalists. Ministers recruited from Socialist deserters made good talking machines to divert the oppressed masses, but the entire apparatus of state supervision actually remained in the hands of the bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie. The celebrated Palchinsky, an associate of the Minister of Industry, was a typical represent ative of this system: he sidetracked every attempt to curb the power of the capitalists. The ministers continued their emissions of hot air, but conditions remained unchanged. Particularly was Minister Tseretelli used by the bourgeoisie to act against the Revolution. He was sent to "placate" Cronstadt when the revolutionists there had the colossal check to remove a commissioner appointed by the Provisional Government. The bour geois press launched out into an incredibly base, malicious, insane campaign of deception and persecution against Cronstadt, accus ing the city of a desire to "secede from Russia," repeated absurdi ties of ths and similar varieties in a thousand forms, terrifying the petite bourgeoisie and the phihstines. Tseretelli, who is the most typical representative of the dull, intimidated philistincs, fell most good-naturedly of all for the bait of the bourgeois persecution, and, more angrily than anyone else, "berated and calmed" Cronstadt, being in no way aware that he was playing the role of a flunkey to the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. The outcome was that he became the instrument for bringing about an "agreement" with rev olutionary Cronstadt, providing that the Cronstadt commissioner was not to be appointed by the government, but elected by the city and confirmed by the government. In the accomplishment of such miserable compromises the ministers who deserted from Socialism to the bourgeoisie are now spending their time. There are situations in which no bourgeois minister would dare to come out in defense of the government, before the revolutionary workers or in the Soviets. But in such places there appeared (or rather, was sent by the bourgeoisie) a "Socialist" minister, a Tsere telli, Chernov, Skobeleff, or some other, who would willingly carry out the bourgeois task and work himself into a fury defending the ministry, would whitewash the capitalists and deceive the workers by grinding out promises, promises, promises, and advising the workers to wait, wait, wait. Minister Chernov was particularly busy trading with his bour geois colleagues. Up to the very month of July, up to the new 23<> THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION ' IN RUSSIA "crisis of power" which was developing at that time, after the move ment of July 16-17, up to the departure of the Cadets from the Cabi net, Minister1 Chernov was constantly occupied with the useful, in teresting, profoundly working class task of "wheedling" his bour geois colleagues, trying to persuade them to agree at least to abolish transactions of purchase and sale of land. This abolition was sol emnly promised to the peasants at the All-Russian Congress (Sov iet) of Peasants' Delegates at Petrograd. But the promise simply remained a promise. Chernov was unable to carry out the measure either in May or in June, and not until after the revolutionary wave, in the elemental uprising of July 16-17, simultaneously with the departure of the Cadets from the ministry, which provided the pos sibility of carrying out such measures. But even then this meas ure remained isolated and impotent to introduce any serious im provement in the peasants' struggle for land against the landholders. At the same time at the front, the counter-revolutionary task of renewing the imperialistic predatory war, which Guchkov, hated by the people, had not succeeded in achieving, was accomplished brilliantly by the "revolutionary democrat" Kercnsky, the newly- baked member of the Social-Revolutionary Party. Kerensky in toxicated himself with his own oratory, while the capitalists burned incense in his honor, worshiped hiin while using him as a puppet. And the reason was simple: Kerensky had been a true and faithful friend of the capitalists, persuading the "revolutionary troops" to consent to a renewal of the war, as a means of carrying out the treaties signed by Czar Nicholas II with the capitalists of England and France, a war having as its object the conquest, for the capi talists, of Constantinople and Lembcrg, Erzerum and Trebizond. Thus passed the second phase of the Russian Revolution, from the 1 9th of May to the 18th of June. The counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie was being strengthened and invigorated under the cover and with the active defense of the "Socialist" ministers, who had prepared an offensive both against the external enemy and the enemy within, the revolutionary workers. in On June 18 the party of the revolutionary workers, the Bolshe viki, prepared a demonstration in Petrograd in order to afford an organized expression to the irresistibly growing dissatisfaction and indignation of the masses. Fettered by their agreements with the bourgeoisie, entangled in the imperialistic policy of an offensive, the LESSONS OF THE REVOLUTION ' *>3* Social-Revolutionist and Menshevist leaders were beside them selves in terror when they felt they were losing their influence over the masses. A great howl was raised against the demonstration, a howl joined in by counter-revolutionary elements as well as such as were Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki. Under the leadership of the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki, as a result of their policy of agreement with the capitalists, the inclination of the petit bourgeois masses to ally themselves with the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie was further stimulated, until it was made strikingly manifest as an accomplished fact. This is the historical significance, the class interpretation, of the crisis of June 18. ' The Bolsheviki called off the demonstration, having no desire to lead the workers, at the appointed moment, into a desperate slaughter, against the united Cadets, Social-Revolutionists and Men sheviki. But the latter, in order to preserve what shreds they still held of the confidence of the masses, were obliged to call a general demonstration for the ist of July. The bourgeoisie, enraged and rightly considering this to be a vacillation on the part of the petit bourgeois democracy toward the side of the proletariat, decided upon an offensive on the front in order to paralyze the action of de mocracy. As a matter of fact, the ist of July afforded a remarkably im posing victory to the revolutionary proletariat and its slogans, the slogans of the Bolsheviki, among the Petrograd masses ; and on the 2nd of July the bourgeoisie and the Bonapartist Kerensky solemnly announced that an offensive had been started on the 1st.' The offensive of July I actually meant a renewal of the preda tory war in the interest of the capitalists and was opposed to the will of the great majority of the workers. Inevitably connected with the offensive, consequently, was a gigantic outburst of chauvinism and a passing of the military (and, of course, the national) power into the hands of the Bonapartist war clique; and a resort to force in dealing with the masses, a persecution of the internationalists, prohibition of the freedom of agitation, the arrest and execution of all opposed to the war. If the 19th of May attached the Social-Revolutionists and Men- 3Bonapartism, from the name of the two French emperors, is a name ap plied to a government that attempts to be impartial, thus availing itself of the extremely sharp conflict between capitalists and workers. In reality serving Capitalism, a "Bonapartist" government deceives the workers worse than any other by means of promises and petty concessions. 232 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA sheviki to the victorious chariot of the bourgeoisie with ropes, the ist of July bound them with chains to serve the capitalists. The anger aroused in the masses by the renewal of the war of conquest naturally increased more rapidly and became very power ful. On July 16-17 tne'r indignation vented itself in an explosion, which the Bolshcviki had tried to restrain, and which it was their duty to organize. The Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki, faithful slaves of the bourgeoisie, chained to their masters, agreed to everything, — the sending of reactionary troops to Petrograd, the re-establishment of the death penalty in the army, the disarming of the workers and the revolutionary troops, arrests and persecutions, closing up the newspapers without trial. The bourgeoisie could not entirely as sume power in the government and the Soviets did not want to take it; and this power, accordingly, was seized by the war clique, the Bonapartists, fully supported, of course, by the Cadets and the Black Hundreds, the landholders and the capitalists. The thing went on step by step. Once moving along the in clined plane of an agreement with the bourgeoisie, the Social-Revo lutionists and Mensheviki slid downward without stopping until they reached the bottom. On March 12 they promised, in the Petro grad Soviet, a conditional support of the bourgeois Provisional Gov ernment. On May 19 they saved themselves from ruin and con sented to transform themselves into servants and defenders of the government, consenting to an offensive. On June 18 they united with the counter-revolutionary bourgeois in a crusade of insane mal ice, falsehood and libel against the revolutionary proletariat. On July 2 they approved the renewal of the predatory war, already ac complished. On July 16 they agreed to a summoning of the reac tionary troops against the workers, — the beginning of a complete cession of power to the Bonapartists. This disgraceful finale of the Social-Revolutionary and Men- shevist party is not an accident, but the natural result, often seen in the experience of Europe, of the economic position of the petty em ployers, of the petite bourgeoisie. Every one must have observed how the petty business man exhausts himself to make his way in the world, to become a real business man and a "substantial" owner, a real bourgeois. Under tlie rule of Capitalism there is no other choice for the petty business man: either he must himself advance to the position of the capitalists (and in the most favorable circumstances this may be possible, for one in a hundred), or he must drop into LESSONS OF THE REVOLUTION 233 the class of has-beens, the semi-proletariat, later the proletariat. In politics, also, the petit bourgeois democracy, particularly in the per sons of its chiefs, leans towards the bourgeoisie. The leaders of the petit bourgeois democracy pacify the masses with promises and assurances of the possibility of coalition with the great capitalists, and, under the most favorable conditions, they may, for an exceed ingly short time, obtain concessions from the capitalists for the not very numerous upper layers of the working masses ; but in all de cisive matters the petit bourgeois democracy has always been an appendage of the bourgeoisie, an impotent satellite, an obedient tool in the hands of the captains of finance. The experience of England and France has confirmed this. The experience of the Russian Revolution, from March to July, emphasizes the old Marxist truth concerning the instability of the petite bourgeoisie, very clear and comprehensibly, particularly when events, under the influence of the imperialistic war and its consequent profound crisis, began to develop with unusual rapidity. The lesson of the Russian Revolution is this: There is for the toiling masses no way out of the iron ring of war, of hunger, of enslavement to the landholders and capitalists, except in a complete break with the parties of the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki, in a clear understanding of the treacherous role they have played, in the renunciation of every kind of coalition with the bourgeoisie, in a decisive stand by the side of the revolutionary workers. The rev olutionary workers alone, if they arc supported by the poorest peas ants, will be in a position to break the resistance of the capitalists, lead the people to a seizure of the land without compensation, to full liberty, to a victory over hunger and over war, and to a just and permanent peace. ¦*> * * Postscript This article, as may be seen from the text, was written early in August. Its arguments have been fully confirmed by the history of the Revolution since. And then the Kornilov uprising pro duced a new turn in the Revolution, making evident to the whole nation that the Cadets, in alliance with the counter-revolutionary generals, are aiming to disband the Soviets and re-establish the mon- rachy. How powerful is this new turn in the Revolution, whether it will succeed in finally putting an end to the disastrous policy of coalition with the bourgeoisie — this the near future will show. September 19, 1917. N. Lenin. PART FOUR The Revolution in Crisis By LEON TROTZKY INTRODUCTION The events of August marked the lowest depth of the Revolution. Re action had scored heavily, and, behind the screen of the dictatorship of the "Socialist" Kerensky, the Cadets, and other still more sinister forces of the imperialistic bourgeoisie, were preparing for the coup d'etat that would annihilate the Soviets — and the Revolution. The moderate Executive Com mittee of the All-Russian Soviets had approved of Premier Kerensky; but this was insufficient, as it was necessary for Kcrensky's purposes to secure a mandate from "all the classes;" and, accordingly, the Government con voked a National Conference which convened at Moscow on August 2fi, Tlie Conference was not only to "l/roadtn the base" of the Provisional Govern ment, it was equally an expression of Kercn-ik)'* lloiiapartitt policy,* The composition of the Conference was overwhelmingly conservative, reactionary :.nd counter-revolutionary. The delegates to the National Conference were carefully elm en, llic liulshcviki, naturally, being excluded. The four Dumas — and their character is clear, being expressions of the timid opposition legally allowed under the Czar — were represented by 188 members; the other delegates included 100 icprcsentatives of the Peasants, 220 representatives of the Soviets of Work er's and Soldiers' Delegates, 147 delegates from the Municipalities, 113 re- prcscntativese from the banks and industrial organizations of capital, 313 representatives of co-operative organizations, and 176 representatives of trades unions.2 The delegates of the Soviets consisted of moderates from t lie Menshcvist and Social-Revolutionary parties. At the Conference a concerted attack was made upon the Soviets and the Revolutionary Democracy, although it was not driven to a conclusion. It was a preliminary offensive. The representatives of the Soviets were on the- defensive. Kercnsky, in opening the Conference, declared : "The Provisional Government has not called you together here to dis cuss questions of program, or, still less, to allow any attempts, from whnt- c\er sources they may come, to take advantage of the present Conference or the exceptionally difficult position of the Russian State, or to encourage any attempts to undermine at undermining the power of the Provisional Gov ernment." liut the plea of Kercnsky— for in spite of its assuming the form of an ultimatum, it was nothing but a pica — was unavailing. His speech was a >ln an article In "Pi-avdn." nt tin- time. Klnm-l'-v P'-lii-tcd out that the Cadets were nt firm suspicious nf the- Moscow Conference, conslderlnK It ft part of Kcrensky's lionapiirtlnt policy, the policy of a dictatorship merKlrx? both forces In himself. And this nin* precisely the purpose of tine Conference, although the Cadets finally participated. 2T"hcse are the ficures jtlven In A. J. Hn/'k's "The t'.lrth Of Uusilan Democracy." from which iiource also are quoted extracts from the speeches delivered at the Conference (with the exception of the nnal quotation from Kerensky ) 238 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA mass of generalities, attacks upon the Right and Left alternating with con cessions to the Right and Left; and his statement, "We are determined that Russia shall be ranked among the World Powers" evoked boisterous ap plause. Minister of Finance Nckrasov made an attack upon the Revolution's evil influence upon the finances, declaring that the money being expended by the Pood Supply Committees and for wage increases was ruining the slate and country, and should be stopped. General Kornilov, Commander in Chief of the armies, emphasized the disintegration of the army, and urged drastic measures to restore discipline, among these measures being the practical abolition of the soldiers' committees. He attacked the measures of the Provisional Government introducing democracy into the army, and concluded with a covert threat of allowing an invasion of the country in older to compel the introduction of the necessary measures: "If decisive measures for the improvement of discipline at the front followed as a result of the devastation of Tamopol and the loss of Galicia and liukovina, we must not allow that order in the rear should be a result of the loss of Riga, and that order on the railroads be restored at the price 01 surrendering iMoldavia and Bessarabia to the enemy." General Kalcdine, of the Cossacks, was even bolder than Kopiilov, mak ing direct attacks upon ithe Socialist ministers, and suggested the following measures: "1. — The army must be kept out of politics. All meetings and assemblies v, ith their party antagonisms must be absolutely forbidden at the front. "2. — All councils and committees in the army must be abolished at the front as well as behind the lines, except those of the regiments, companies, divisions and other military units, and their rights and duties must be strictly limited to the management of the soldiers' economic affairs. "3, — The Declaration of Soldiers' Rights must be revised and amplified by a declaration of his duties. "4. — Discipline in the army must be restored and strengthened by the most decisive measures. "5. — To insure the fighting capacity of the army, the front and the rear must be recognized as one whole, and all measures required for strengthen ing discipline at the front must also be applied to the rear. "6. — The disciplinary rights of superior officers must be restored to thorn. (Applause from the Right.) "7. — The army leaders must have their full authority restored. "8. — At this terrible hour of great reverses at the front and complete cuintcgration springing from political and economic disruption, the country can be saved from final ruin only b> placing full power in the hands of firm, experienced and skilled people not bound by narrow party or group programs, (Loud applause on the Right.) not hampered by the necessity of turning lack after every step in order to find out whether the various committees i nd councils approve or disapprove of their acts, (Restlessness on the Left. Applause on the Right.) and who fully recognize that the people as a whole .-,nd not separate parties or groups are the sources of sovereign power in the State. "9. — The Central, as well as local, Government must be undivided. A stop must be put immediately and abruptly to the usurpation of power by the INTRODUCTION h 1239 central and local committees and Councils.", (Vigorous protest on 1 the Left. Shouts: "Sown with him!" "Counter-Revolutionis*!", Enthusiastic, applause ,,from the Right.) . *i,, ¦ ,.¦/., , > 1 *.,, ,, ,.1 , ;.|| , i im.<; •.i'.h 1/." ¦ ¦¦'¦¦ Cheidse, president of the Central Committee of the 'All-Russian 'Soviets, answered Kalcdine and defended the Soviets, declaring that the rcvohitionary democracy "has always placed the interests of the country and •the Revolution above the interests of separate chsscs and groups. . . . Only due to the rev olutionary organizations has the creative spirit of the Revolution been preserved ; that is saving the country from disolution and anarchy." Hut Ciieidsc's answer was not an answer to the problem, since the status quo ivas itself responsible for the prevailing situation: the status quo had to be destroyed either by the bourgeoisie or by the revolutionary proletariat. The measures proposed by General Kalcdine weri unavoidable if the army was to be icstored, but the introduction of these measures, under the prevailing conditions, would have necessarily meant the abolition of the Soviets as the active force of the Revolution, the conversion of the army into a counter revolutionary instrument, and a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. The attacks upon the Provisional Government emphasized that the end of the Soviets equally meant the end of the "liberal" government of the imperialistic Iiourgcoisie : the Provisional Government itself assailed by the Right. The lament of the former Minister of War Guchkov that the Provisional Gov ernment without power revealed the situation clearly*, the Soviets had the power and the Provisional Government could have power only with the <"e.'.truction of the Soviets. It was this abolition of the Soviets that was being engineered. The Cadets challenged the Soviets to assume full responsibility for the govern ment, or eke cease their "advisory" function. f!ut the Mensheviki and Social-Revolutionists cravenly evaded the challenge : neither a dictatorship of the proletariat nor a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Milyukov and Nabokov refused to participate in the Minitsry, feeling that the annihilation 01" the Soviets was first necessary. The Moscow Conference was called as a pledge of national unity and to promote national unity: it simply revealed the acute disunity and in tensified the antagonisms Nothing of a practical character was accomplisbecd by the Conference, and Kerensky's final address indicated the depth of the lailure: "The Government does not regret having called this Conference, for although it has not secured practical results, it has given an opportunity to all Russian citizens to say openly what they have on their minds. And that is essential for the state." Sources: All the chapters of Part Four are from Trotzky's pamphlet, What Next' published in Petrograd in September, 1917. The following is Trotzky's preface to the pamphlet, which he calls "Instead of a Preface:" "Since the July 1st offensive on the external front there begins a re treat of the Revolution on the internal front. This retreat, led by the official democracy, assumed, after the events of July 16-17, the character of a panic. At this moment it presents a somewhat more orderly appearance, without, however, ceasing its flight. The wai is devouring the Revolution before our 240 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA eyes. And as the generals control the war, they attempt to take all actual power into their own hands. "At what point is this to stop? The making of a prognosis requires that we ask ourselves what is the nature of the forces that are engaged in a struggle on the political stage, or are — surrendering without a struggle. That is the object of this study. "The first two chapters were written before the Moscow Conference. We have not altered them in any way. In our attempt to prognosticate the function and consequences of the Moscow solemnity, we proceeded, not from the statements of leaders and the declarations of newspapers (never, it seems, have leaders and newspapers lied as they lie now,) but from class interests and political activities: the latter method, which has the recom mendation of Marx, is infinitely more reliable. "Even after the Provisional Government had disarmed revolutionary Petrograd, and set up the Cossack 'Landes' over the red banners, it did not dare enrage the workers by the sight of a Conference which was stigmatized as of Government, not to say 'anti-popular.' The 'live wires' were invited to pious and peaceful Moscow. But the Moscow proletariat received the uninvited guests with a strike of protest and contempt. And, thus vindicated, the proletariat of Petrograd breathed freely on that day. "With the permission of the Moscow Worker-Comrades, I am dedicating this brochure to them." L. C. F. WHAT HAS HAPPENED? No one can explain satisfactorily why there is to be a Confer ence at Moscow. More than that : all those who are to take part in the Conference declare, truthfully or otherwise, that they do not know what can be the purpose in inviting them to Moscow. At the same time, almost all express themselves in terms of suspicion and contempt when speaking of the Conference. But just the same they arc all going. What can be the reason? If we omit the proletariat, which occupies a position of its own, the participants in the Moscow Conference may be divided into three groups : the representatives of the capitalist classes, the petit bourgeois organization, and the government. The propertied classes have their most complete representation in the Constitutional Democratic Party, the Cadets. Backing them {•re the great landholders, the organizations of trade-industrial capi tal, the financial cliques, the university faculties. Every one of these groups has its own interests and its own political prospects. Yet the common danger that threatens them all is from the masses of the workers, peasants and soldiers, and this danger drives the capitalist classes into one great counter-revolutionary union. With out suspending their monarchistic intrigues and conspiracies, the court, bureaucratic and general staff circles nevertheless consider it to be at present imperative that they should support the Cadets. And the bourgeois liberals with suspicious glances askance at the monarchistic clique, at present place a very high value on their sup port against the Revolution. In this way the Cadet party is becom ing a sort of general representative for all varieties of greater and lesser property interests. All the demands of the propertied classes, all the extortions of the exploiters, are at present blended in the capitalistic cynicism and the imperialistic insolence of Mil yukov. His policy is to lie in wait for all the false steps of tihe revolutionary regime, all its faults and mishaps, availing himself for the present of the "collaboration" of the Menshevik Socialists and 242 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA the Social-Revolutionists, to compromise them by this collaboration, and to bide his time. And, behind Milyukov's back, the Czarist Gourko is biding his time. The pseudo-democracy of the Social-Revolutionist and Men shevik type rests on the peasant masses, the petite bourgeoisie of the cities and the more backward workers. On this connection it should be noted that the further events develop, the clearer it be comes that the strength of the combination is in the Social-Revolu tionists, while the Mensheviki are the fifth wheel on the wagon. Ueing led by these two parties, the Workmen's and Soldiers' Sovi ets, which were elevated to tremendous heights by the cataclysmic convulsions of the masses, arc rapidly losing their importance and retrograding to oblivion. And why? Marx has pointed out that when History bestows a heavy punch on the nose of the petty "big guns" of the Philistines, they never seek the cause of their undoing in their own insolvency, but invariably uncover someone's malice or intrigue. Accordingly, Tseretelli grasps at the "conspiracy" of July 16-18, as the "straw" that explains the miserable failure of his whole policy. When the Social-Revolutionary and Menshevik Lieb- crs, Cictzes and Voitinskys preserved order from "anarchy," which, by the way, was not being threatened, these gentlemen firmly be lieved that, like unto the geese that had saved the Capitol, they should be given a reward. And, when they observed that the con tempt the bourgeoisie showed them increased in direct proportion tc their peace-making zeal toward the proletariat, they were dum- founded. Tseretelli, the same Tseretelli who was such an accom plished juggler with trite commonplaces, found himself cast to the waves as too revolutionary an incumbrance. It was perfectly plain : the Machine-Gun Regiment had "spoiled" the Revolution [by re fusing to obey Kcrensky's order to march to the front except under certain conditions and by participating in the events of July 16-17I. And if Tseretelli and his party appeared in the ranks of the counter-investigators, of Polovtsov and the military cadets, helping them to disarm the workers in the interests of the counter-revolu tion, the fault cannot lie with Tseretelli's political game, but rests 011 the shoulders of the Machine-Gun Regiment which the Bolsheviki had led nstray. Such is the philosophy of history professed by the political bankers of the Philistines! As a matter of fact, the days of July 16, 17 and 18 became a turning-point in the development of the Revolution, for the reason thai they exposed the complete inability of the leading parties of WHAT HAS HAPPENED? 243 the petit bourgeois •democracy to take pow-Jr into its' hands.1' "After the miserable breakdown of the coalition government, there ap peared to be no other alternative than an assumption of power by the Soviets. But the Mensheviki and Social-Revolutionists hesitated. To assume power, they reasoned, would mean a break with the bank ers and diplomats, — a dangerous policy. And when, in spite of the ominous meaning of the events of July 16-18, the leaders of the Soviet continued running after the Efimovs, the propertied classes could not fail to understand that the policies of the Soviet were wait ing upon them very much as a little storekeeper waits upon a banker, namely, with hat in hand. And that is what put courage into the counter-revolution. The whole previous history of the Revolution is in the so-called dual authority. This designation, given by the liberals, is, in truth, very superficial. The matter is not exhausted when you say that be side the government stood the Soviet, which discharged a consid erable number of government functions; for the Dans and Tscre- tellis did all in their power to annihilate, "painlessly," this division of power, by handing over everything to the government. The fact really is that behind the Soviets, and behind the government, there stood two different systems, each resting upon different class in terests. Behind the Soviets stood the workers' organizations, which were displacing, in every factory, the autocracy of the capitalist, and establishing a republican regime in industry, which was in compatible, however, with the capitalist anarchy and demanded an irrevocable state control of production. In defence of their prop erty rights the capitalists sought assistance from above, from the government, pushed it with ever-increasing energy against the Sovi ets, and compelled it to accept the conclusion that it did not possess an independent apparatus, i. e., instruments of repression against the working masses. Hence the lamentations over "dual authority." Behind the Soviet stood the electoral organization in the Army, and all the rest of the administration of the soldier democracy. The Provisional Government, keeping step with Lloyd George, Ribot and : Wilson, recognizing the old obligations of Czarism, and proceeding by the old methods of secret diplomacy, could not but meet with the active hostility of the new army regime. The opposition from above had pretty nearly lost its effect by the time it reached the Soviet. Hence the complaints of "dual authority," especially on the part of the General Staff. Finally, the Peasant Soviet, also, in spite of the miserable op- 244 THK PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA portunism and the crude chauvinism of its leaders, was subject to an increasing pressure from below, where the confiscations of land was assuming a form that became all the more threatening, the more the government opposed them. To what extent the latter was play ing the role of a representative of Big Capital is best of all illus trated by the fact that the last prohibitive police ordinance of Tsere telli differed in no respect from the ordinances of Prince Lvov. And wherever, in the provinces, the Soviets and Peasant Commit tees would attempt to install a new agrarian regime, they would find themselves involved in a bitter conflict with the "revolutionary" au thority of the Provisional Government, which was turning more and more into a watchdog of private property, The further development of the Revolution resolved itself into the necessity of all power passing into tlvc hands of the Soviet, and the use of this power in the interests of the workers against the property-owners. And the deepening of the struggle against the capitalist classes makes it absolutely necessary to assign the leading lolc among the toiling masses to their most resolute section, namely, to the industrial proletariat. For the introduction of control over production and distribution the proletariat could appeal to very valuable precedents in Western Europe, particularly in the so-called "war Socialism" of Germany. But as, in Russia, this labor of or ganization could only be accomplished on the basis of an agrarian revolution and under the supervision of an actually revolutionary power, the control over production and the gradual organization of the latter would necessarily assume a direction that was hostile to the interests of capital. At a moment when the propertied classes were striving, through the Provisional Government, to establish the rule of a "strong" capitalistic republic, the full power of the Soviets, as yet by no means synonymous with "Socialism," would in any case have broken the opposition of the bourgeoisie, and in alliance with the existing productive forces and the situation in Western Europe, would have imposed a direction and a transformation upon eco nomic organization, that would have been in the interests of the toil ing masses, Tasting aside the chains of capitalistic power, the Rev olution would have become permanent, that is, continuous; it would have applied its state power, not to the perpetuation of the rule of capitalist exploitation, but, on the contrary, to its undoing. Its ul timate accomplishments on this field would have depended on the successes of the proletarian revolution in Europe. On the other hand, the Russian revolution might give an all the greater impetus to the revolution in Western Europe, the more resolutely and cour- WHAT HAS HAPPENED? 245 ageously it put down the opposition of its own bourgeoisie. Such was and such remains the sole and only actual prospect for the further development of the Revolution. To the phantasts of the phihstines, however, this outlook was "utopian." What did t hey want ? They have never been able to say themselves. Tseretelli talked a lot about "revolutionary democ racy," without understanding what it really is. It was not only the Social-Revolutionists who formed the habit of coasting on the bil lows of a democratic phraseology; the Mensheviki also cast aside their class criteria as soon as these criteria too clearly exposed the petit bourgeois character of their policy. The rule of "revolutionary democracy" clears up everything and justifies everything. And when the old Black Hundred stick their dirty fingers into the pock ets of the Bolshcviki, they do it in the name of no less an authority than that of the "revolutionary democracy." But let us not an ticipate. Representing, as they did, the power of the bourgeoisie, or rather the neutralization of power by the means of coalition, the Social-Revolutionary and Menshevik democracy actually beheaded the Revolution. On the other hand, by defending the Soviets as their organs, the petit bourgeois democracy actually prevented the government from creating any administrative apparatus in the provinces. The government was not only powerless to do good, but rather weak in working evil. The Soviets, full of ambitious plans, were not able to carry out one of them. The capitalist republic, which had been planted down from above, and the workers' democ racy which has been shaped from below, paralyzed each other. Wherever they clashed, therefore, innumerable quarrels arose. The minister and the commissaries suppressed the organ of revolution ary self-government, the commanders fumed in rage at the army committees, the Soviets were kept running to and fro between the masses and the government. Crisis followed upon crisis, ministers came and went. The discontent among the masses increased as the repressive measures of authority became more and more fruitless and systcmless. From above, all life must have seemed a boiling torrent of "anarchy." It was evident that the timid dualism of the rule of the petit bourgeois "democracy" was internally insolvent. And the more profound became problems of the Revolution, the more painfully nianifest did this insolvency become. The whole state structure was standing on its head, or rather, on its two or three heads. An un- 246 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA guarded move ori the part of Milyukov, Kerensky, or Tseretelli threatened to upset the whole business. And daily the alternatives appeared with greater and greater inevitability: cither the Soviet must assume power, or the capitalist government will sweep aside the Soviet. An external shock was all that was needed to destroy the equilibrium of the whole structure. This external shock to a sys tem that was doomed from within came in the form of the events of July 16-18. The petit bourgeois "idyl," constructed on an "ami- cnble" union of two mutually exclusive systems, received its death blow. And Tseretelli was enabled to set down in his memoirs that his plan for the salvation of Russia had been thwarted by the Ma chine-Gun Regiment. ir ,¦,.The cowardice of the petit bourgeois policy is expressed in its most of fensive form, in the person of Dan. Tseretelli represents the fusion of this cowardice with romanticism. Tseretelli said to Martov: "Only a fool fears nothing!" The well-intentioned philistine policy, on the other hand, is afraid of everything: they arc afraid of arous ing the ire of their creditors ; they arc afraid that the diplomats may take their "pacifism" seriously; but most of all they are afraid of power. Just as a "fool fears nothing," so the petit bourgeois policy deems it expedient to insure itself against folly by a game of cow ardice on all fronts. Yet they do not relinquish their hopes of be coming Rothschilds: having stuck two or three words in Tcre- chenko's diplomatic note, they think they have brought peace near er; they hope to instill into Prince Lvov their own most loyal medi ation against the civil war. But the great petit bourgeois peace maker concludes by disarming the workers, without in any way dis arming Polovtscv of Kalcdin, the counter-revolution. And when 248 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA this whole policy falls to pieces under the first serious blow, Tsere telli and Dan explain to all who have any desire to believe them, that the Revolution was frustrated, not by the inability of the petit bourgeoisie to take all power into its hands, but by the "insurrec tion" of the Machine-Gun Regiment. 1 In the course of many years of controversy concerning -dhe character of the Russian Revolution, the Mensheviki have main tained that the true bearers of revolutionary power in Russia have been the petit bourgeois democrats. We always have pointed out that the petit bourgeois democracy is incapable of solving this problem, and that the only power than can guide the revolution to its goal is the proletariat, drawing its strength from the masses of the people. Now History has so decreed that the Mensheviki ap peared as the political representatives of the petit bourgeois democ racy, in order that they might in their own persons exemplify their complete inability to cope with the problems of power, that is, to as sume the leading role in the Revolution. In Rabochaya Gazeta, that organ of counterfeit, Danified, Dani- cizing "Marxism," the attempt is made to fix upon us the label of "July Sixteen Men." We have every reason to assert that in the 1 July 16th movement, all our sympathies were absolutely with the workers and soldiers, and not with the military cadets, the Polovt- sevs, Licbers, and the "snifflcrs."1 We would deserve contempt were it otherwise. But let the bankrupts of the Rabochaya Gazeta not be too loud in invoking the 16th of July, for that was the day of their political self-destruction. The label "Sixteenth of July Men," if I may use a very mixed meta phor, may be turned against them as a two-edged sword, for on July 16 the rapacious cliques of Czaristic Russia accomplished a coup d'etat with the purpose of placing all the authority of state in their hands. On the 16th of July, 1917, at the moment of the most serious crisis of the Revolution, the petit bourgeois democrats vo ciferously declared that they were incapable of taking over the state power. Turning their backs with hatred on the revolutionary work ers and soldiers, who demanded from them the discharge of their most elementary revolutionary duty, the Sixteenth of July men 'The "snifflers" were a secret service organization created by the mili tary governor of Petrograd, Col. Polovtscv, with the aid of V. Burtzeff and ii. Aiexinsky, formerly active in the movement against Czarism, but aligned with the counter-revolutionary moderates during the Revolution itself. The purpose of the "snifflerj" was to crush the Bolsheviki.— L. C. F. ELEMENTS OF BONARPARTISM 249 made an alliance with the Sixteenth of June men, with the object of curbing, disarming, and jailing the Socialist workers and sol diers. The treachery of the petit bourgeois democracy, its shame ful capitulation to the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, it is that which disturbed the alignment of power, and not for the first time in the history of the Revolution. Under these circumstances the last ministry was created, which was designated "the government of Kercnsky." The irresolute, pow erless, shaky regime of the petit bourgeois democracy was trans formed into a personal dictatorship. Under the name of "a dual authority" there went on a strug gle between irreconcilable class tendencies; the imperialistic re public and the workers' democracy. While the issues of this strug gle remained unsolved, it paralyzed the Revolution and inevitably produced symptoms of "anarchy." Being led by politicians who are afraid of everything, the Soviet did not dare assume power. The representative of all the propertied cliques, the Cadet party, could not yet assume power. What was needed was a great con ciliator, a mediator, an impartial referee. Already in the middle of May, at a meeting of the Petrograd Soviet, Kerensky had been called "the mathematical point of Rus sian Bonapartism." This characterization shows, at the very start, that it is not Kerensky that matters, but rather his historical func tion. It might be somewhat superficial to declare that Kerensky is made of the same stuff as the first Bonaparte; to say the least, it has not been proved. Yet his popularity seems to be more than an accident. Kerensky seemed closer to the understanding of all the Pan-Russian philistincs. A defender of political prisoners, a "so cial-revolutionist," who headed the laborites, a radical not con nected with any Socialist school, Kerensky reflected most fully the first phase of the Revolution, its "national" vagueness, the engaging idealism of its hopes and its expectations. He talked about land and liberty, about order, about the peace of nations, about the defence of the fatherland, about the heroism of Liebknecht, about the fact that the Russian Revolution would astonish the world with its greatness of soul, all the while waving a red silk handkerchief. The half- awakened philistine listened to these speeches with ecstasy: to him it seemed as if he were himself up on the platform talking. The army hailed Kerensky as a deliverer from Guchkov. The peasants heard that he was a laborite, a delegate of the muzhiks. The cxtreime moderation of his views, beneath his confused radicalism of phrase, 25° THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA was enough to take in the liberals. Only the more enlightened work ers kept at a distance. But their Soviets successfully dissolved into a "revolutionary democracy." His freedom from any doctrinal impediment permitted Keren- ksyto be the first of the "Socialists" to enter the bourgeois govern ment. He was the first to apply the name of "anarchy" to the in creasingly Insistent social demands of the masses: already in May he had threatened the P'inns with the shaqiest of reprisals and ut tered his high-sounding phrase about "risen slaves," which came as a balm to the hearts of all the injured property-holders. In this way his popularity soon involved a veritable tangle of contradic tions, thus properly reflecting the vagueness of the first stage of the Revolution and the hopelessness of the second. And when His tory was obliged to fill a vacancy in the office of referee, there was no more appropriate man at her disposal than Kerensky. "The historic night session" in the Winter Palace was only a repetition of the political humiliation which the "revolutionary" democracy had prepared for itself at the Moscow Conference. In these transactions all the trumps were in the hands of the Cadets: The Social-Revolutionary and Menshevik democracy, which was gaining successes in all the democratic elections, without exception, and which was frightened to death by these successes, humbly begs the privileged liberals for their collaboration in the government! As the Cadets had not feared on the 16th of July to~thrust power on the Soviets, and as, on the other hand, the liberals were not afraid of assuming the power altogether, it is plain that they were the mas ters of the situation. If Kercnsky was the last word of the impotent Soviet hegem ony, it was now necessary for him to stand as the first word of the lil>eration from that hegemony. For the time being, we shall take Kerensky, but only under the condition that you will sever the um bilical cord connecting him with the Soviet! — such was the ulti matum of the bourgeoisie. "Unfortunately, the debate at the Winter Palace was mere talk and uninteresting talk at that"— was Dan's complaint in his report to the Soviet. It is difficult to appreciate the full depth of these complaints on the part of the parliamentarian of "revolutionary" democracy, who left the Tauridc Palace in the evening, still at the helm, and came back empty-handed in the morning. The leaders of the Social- Revolutionists and Mensheviki respectfully laid their share of ELEMENTS OP BOS' A PART ISM 25 1 power at the feet of Kerensky. The Cadets accepted this gift gra ciously: m any event, they regarded Kerensky, not as a great im-i partial referee, but only as an intermediary agent. To take all, power into their hands at once would have been too dangerous in. view of the inevitable revolutionary resistance of the masses. It, was much more sensible to hand over to the at present "independ ent" Kerensky, with the collaboration of the AvksentiefTs, Savin- kovs, and other Social-Revolutionary moderates, the task of paving the way for a purely bourgeois government, with the aid of a system of more savage repressions. > The new coalition ministry — "the Kerensky government" — was formed. At first glance it differed in no wise from the other coalition government, which had so ignobly collapsed on July 16. Shingarev departed, Kokoshkin arrived; Tseretelli stepped out, Avksentieff stepped in. All the losses in personnel merely empha sized the fact that both sides regarded the Cabinet simply as a step ping stone. But much more important was the radical alteration in the "significance" of the two groups. Formerly — at least "in idea" — the "Socialist" ministers had been considered representative of the Soviets controlled by the Soviets : the bourgeois ministers acted as screens between them and the Allies and the capitalists. Now, on the other hand, the bourgeois minister enter, as a subordinate group, into the personnel of the frankly counter-revolutionary bloc oi the propertied classes (the Cadet Party, the leaders of trade and industry, the landowners' league, the Provisional Committee of the Duma, the Cossack Circle, the General Staff, the Allied diplomacy) and the "Socialist" ministers serve simply as a screen against the masses of the people. Meeting with the silence of the Executive Committees of the Soviets, Kerensky succeeded in obtaining ova tions by promising not to permit a restoration of the monarchy. So low had fallen the requirements of philistine democracy ! Avksen tieff called upon all for "sacrifices," lavishly distributing half-Kan tian, half-revival meeting drivel, which was his great stock in trade; and as is proper for an idealist in power, in this categorical impera tive, he constantly dragged in the Cossacks and the military cadets. And the surprised peasant deputies cast their eyes about in wonder ment, observing that before they had a chance to take away the land from the landholders, something was taking away their in fluence over the power of the state. The counter revolutionary general staffs, everywhere supplant ing the army committees, were making a very general use of them 252 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA at the same time for reprisals against the masses, and in this way undermining the authority of the soldier organizatons and prepar ing their downfall. The bourgeois counter-revolution has at its disposal for this purpose its "Socialist" ministers, but the latter drag with them in their dizzy fall the same Soviets of which they are now independent, but which are still dependent on the ministers, as before. Having renounced power, the democratic organizations should also have liquidated their authority. Thus all prepared for the advent of Milyukov. And behind him General Gurko is bid ing his time. The Moscow Conference obtains all its importance in connec tion with this general tendency of the political movement in upper circles. In the last few days the attitude of the Cadets toward the meet ing was not only not enthusiastic, but even full of distrust. lib- concealed hostility to the pilgrimage to Moscow was also the atti tude of Dyelo Naroda, the organ of that party which was repre sented in the Government by the Kerenskys, Avksentieffs, Savin- kovs, Chernovs, and Lebedieffs. "If we must go, we'll go," Rabo chaya Gazeta wrote, with a sigh, like the parrot whom the cat was dragging by its tail. The speeches of the Ryabushinskis, Alekseieffs, Kalcdins, etc., and of the ruling "band of charlatans," were by no means indicative of a readiness for the sacrifice of an embrace with Avkscnticff. And finally the government, so the papers said, did not attach any decisive importance to the Moscow Conference. Oui prodest? In whose interest and for what, was this Conference called? It was clear as the light of day that it was absolutely directed against the Soviets. The latter are not going to the Conference^ they are being dragged thither by lassoes. Th-** meeting is neces sary to the counter-revolutionary classes as an aid in finally putting down the Soviets, Why, then, do the responsible organs of the bourgeoisie observe such an attitude of holding-off with regard to the Conference? Because it is necessary first of all to establish the "classless" position of the supreme impartial referee. Milyukov is afraid that Kercnsky may depart from the Conference with his position too strongly intrenched, and that consequently Milyukov's political vacations may be too unpleasantly prolonged. Thus each patriot is preserving the fatherland in his own manner. As a consequence of the "historic" night in the Winter Palace was born the regime of Kercnsky, of sophomoric Bonapartism, let ELEMENTS OF BONARPARTISM 253 us say. But the Moscow Conference, in its personnel and in its ob jects, is a reproduction of this historic night in the light of day, so to speak. Tseretelli is fated once more to explain to all Russia that the passing of power into the hands of the revolutionary democ racy would be the misfortune and ruin of the Revolution. After this solemn declaration of their own bankruptcy, the representatives of revolutionary democracy will be privileged to listen to a dread ful indictment directed against them, and previously drawn up by Rodzianko, Ryabushiniki, Milyukov, General Alekseieff, and the other "live wires" of the country. Our imperialistic clique, to whom the government will assign the place of honor at the Moscow Con ference, will come out with the slogan : "all power should be given to us!" The Soviet leaders will come face to face with the rapa cious appetites of the propertied classes, which threaten them with an uprising of those same workers and soldiers whom Tscreteljli disarmed with the catchword "all power to the Soviets !" In his capacity as Chairman, Kerensky will merely be able to register the actual existence of "disagreement," and to call the attention of the "interested parties" to the fact that they cannot get along without an impartial referee. Quod erat demonstrandum. "If I were in the Soviet Central Executive Committee," con fessed the Menshevik Bogdanov, at a meeting of the Soviet Execu tive Committee, "I should not have called this meeting, for the government will not reach at this meeting the ends at which It Is aiming: the strengthening and broadening of its foundation." It nuiM really be admitted that these "Realnolitikcrs" actually do not know the things that are going on with their own active co-opera tion. After the disintegration of the coalition of July 16, the refusal of the Soviet to assume power precluded the possibility of the crea tion of a government on a broad foundation. The Kercnsky Gov ernment, exercising no control, is in its very nature a government without a social foundation. It was consciously constructed be- tween two possible foundations: the working masses and the imperialistic classes. In that lies its Bonapartism. The Moscow Conference has the purpose, once the privileged and democratic parties have been thrown aside, to perpetuate the personal dictator ship, which, by a policy of irresponsible adventurism, will under mine all the achievements of the Revolution. For this purpose it is as necessary to have an opposition on the left as an opposition on the right. It is only important that they should approximately counterbalance each other and that the social 2$4 THE 1'ROI.KTARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA conditions \ should maintain this equilibrium. But that is just the thing that is lacking. , , „ ,, ,, The early Czarism liad arisen out of a struggle between classes in the midst of a free society ; but beneath all the warring factions and their Czar there was a suible substructure of laboring workers. The new Czarism seeks the support that is necessary to its existence in the passive inertia of the peasantry; the chief instrument of Bonapartism meanwhile being a well disciplined army. But in our country not one of these conditions has as yet been realized. Our society is permeated with open antagonisms, which have been carried to a point of the highest intensity. The struggle between the workers and the capitalists, the peasants and the landholders, the soldiers and the general staff, the suppressed nationalities and the central state power, do not give the latter any elements of sta bility, unless the government will firmly resolve to link its fortunes with one of the struggling forces. Up to the completion of the agrarian revolution, the attempts at a "classless" dictatorship must of necessity remain of ephemeral nature. Milyukov, Rodzianko, Ryabushiniki want power to be finally lodged with them, that is, to be transformed into a counter-revolu tionary dictatorship of the exploiters over the revolutionary work ers, peasants and soldiers. Kerensky wants to frighten the democ racy by means of counter-revolution, and to frighten the counter revolution by means of democracy, and then to assure the dictator ship of personal power, out of which the masses will get nothing. But he is reckoning without his host. Tlie revolutionary masses have not yet spoken their last word. . '¦:< III THE ARMY IN THE REVOLUTION i .*¦¦¦ ¦¦: > :'¦' . I .'¦¦'. .\ The same struggle is going on, from, the very first days of the Revolution, in the matter of war and peace: between the de mocracy of the workers and peasants, which was taking shape from below, and the imperialistic republic, which the propertied classes were trying to construct from above. The illustrious generals hastened to "recognize" the republic —at least for the time being — firmly expecting that the republic would recognize and perhaps even extend their generalship, by eliminating the Archduke faineants. The "national" revolution meant, in their eyes, a court coup d'eHat to depose Nicholas and his Alice, but to preserve in their entirety class discipline and the mili tary hierarchy. A few days before, tlie telegraph had announced Hiat the Greek "leader" Venizelos had declared Greece "a republic crowned by a king"! The Brussilevs, Guchkovs, Rodziankos, and Milyukovs, on the contrary, wished to continue Russia as a mon archy, minus the Czar. But evolution proceeded by other, deeper paths. The March uprising of the Petrograd regiments was not the fruit of a conspiracy: it resulted from a universal spirit of mutiny in the whole army and the masses of the people in general. And the uprising of the workers and soldiers was directed not only against a decaying and incompetent Czarism, unable to conduct a war which it had it?elf conjured up, but against the war itself. The profound break, which the Revolution called forth in the mind and in the conduct of the soldiers threatened not only the directly imperialistic aims of the war, but also the very instrument of those aims, the old army, which had been built upon the theory of orders from above, and unquestioning obedience in the ranks. Now the generals, colonels, the politicians, the bourgeois scrib blers rave and rage against Order Np. I [issued by the first Pro visional Government, establishing democracy in the army and allow ing Soldiers' committees.] In their opinion, the order was not an outcome of an all-pervading ferment in the army, but, on the cont- 25-5 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA rary, the ferment was produced by the order. As a matter of fact, it was only yesterday that the soldiers were still obeying orders and today they have ceased to: is it not clear that they have submitted to some new "order," which is recorded in the books as "No. i"? This general-staff idiocy is at present substituted in the most exten sive bourgeois circles for a real historical point of view. The so-called disintegration of the army found its expression in the Soldiers' disobedience of superiors and a refusal to recognize this war as their war. It was just because of these circumstances that Kercnsky hurled iri the face of the awakening army his phrase: "risen slaves." If the bourgeoisie believed that it was enough to substitute Guchkovs for Sukhomlinovs. in order to harness the army anew to the chariot of Imperialism, then Kerensky, in his philistine superficiality and self-complacency, thought it would be sufficient to remove Guchkov in order to make the army once more the obedient tool of the government. In truth these were illusions! The Revolution, from the standpoint of mass psychology, is an application of the standard of reason to inherited institutions and traditions. All the hardships, sufferings and humilitations, which the war brought in its train to the people, and, more parti cularly, to the army, were crowned and sanctioned by the will of the Czar, If in Petrograd the Czar himself had been deposed, what was there to prevent the soldiers from shaking off the autocracy of those officers who had been the most zealous and debased of the advocates of the whole system of Czarism? Why should the soldiers not ask themselves the question as to the sense and the object of the war, when the very man on whom formerly had depended the question of peace had been deposed? The Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates appealed, in a manifesto early in April, to the peoples of Europe, summoning them to the struggle for a democratic peace. This was "Order No. l" as far as questions of world-policy were concerned. At the time when the manifesto appeared as an answer to the burning, ir resistible question: Shall we fight on, and if so, for what? — the im perialists were making believe that, had it not been for this mani festo, this question would never have occurred to the minds of the soldiers, who had been awakened by the thunder of the Revolu tion. Milyukov anticipated that revolution would awaken criticism and independence in the army, and would consequently involve a threat to the imperialistic aims of the war. In the Fourth Duma he had therefore come out openly against revolution. And when THE ARMY IN THE REVOLUTION 257 Milyukov now hisses venomously about the "Order," about that Manifesto, and about the Zimmerwald Socialist Conference, say ing that these things poisoned the army, it is at kast in his case a deliberate lie. Milyukov knows very well that the chief "poison" is concealed not in any of the "orders" of the Soviet, which are at best moderate enough, but in the Revolution itself, which afforded to the sufferings of the masses an expression in the shape of pro tests, demands, and open contests of force. The process of internal reconstruction of the army, and the political orientation of its soldier masses, burst forth in a fierce catastrophe at the front. The ultimate cause of this catastrophe is in the contradiction between the imperialistic policy, which made use of the Provisional Government as its tool, and the longing of the masses for an immediate and "just" peace. A new discipline and a genuine enthusiasm in the army can be evolved only out of the Revolution itself, out of a courageous solution of its internal prob lems and its definite struggle with external obstacles. The people and the army, if they felt and were convinced that the Revolution was their revolution, that the government was their government, that the latter would stop at nothing in the defense of their interests against the exploiters, that it was pursuing no external aims of op pression or conquest, that it was not curt-ying to the "Allied'' financiers, that it was openly offering the nations an immediate peace on democratic foundations, the toiling masses and their army would, under these conditions, be found lo be inspired with an in dissoluble unity, and if the German revolution would not come in time to aid us, the Russian army would fight against the Ilohenzol- lerns with the same enthusiasm that the Russian workers showed in defending the gains of the popular movement against the onslaughts of the counter-revolution. The imperialists feared this path as they feared death, and they were right. The picayune policy of the petit bourgeois did not believe in this method any more than the little shopkeeper believes in the possibility of the expropriation of the banks. Renouncing all "Utopias," that is, the policy of the further development of the Revolution, the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki continued the very same ruinous dual policy that was to bring about the catas trophe. To the soldier it was said, and truthfully said, that this was an imperialistic war, on both sides, that the Russian Government was bound hand and foot by financial, diplomatic and military agree ments, which were hostile to the interests of all the nations; and 258 THU PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION* IN RUSSIA then they added : "But for the present go on fighting on the basis of the old treaties, hand in hand with the old allies." But the sol dier, going under fire "for the present," meets with death. To go forth to make this supreme sacrifice is possible only for the soldier who has been carried away by the fire of collective enthusiasm; but this state is attainable only in a condition of complete faith in the righteousness of one's cause. The Revolution did away with the mode of thought of the unreasoning "sacred cannon-fodder." No Kornilov, no Kaledin can turn back the course of History and re store the old hangman's discipline, even temporarily, without fright ful repressions, tantamount to a prolonged period of bloody chaos. The army can only be preserved in a condition of war-time effi ciency by giving it new aims, new methods, a new organization. It was necessary to make all the deductions from the Revolution. The ambiguous, irresolute regime which the Provisional Government, aided by the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki, had prepared for the army, bore within it the germs of certain catastrophe. The army had been armed with certain standards and given an oppor tunity for open criticism. At that moment new goals were set for the army, which manifestly would not bear the stress of revolution ary criticism, and in the name of these goals it was demanded that the army, exhausted, hungry, and unshod as it was, should put forth superhuman efforts. Can there be any doubt of the result, when we remember, in addition, that certain generals of the staff were con sciously working for a Russian defeat? But the Provisional Government intoxicated itself with bom bast and empty words. Messieurs les ministres regarded the sol dier masses, who were in a state of profound ferment, as the raw material out of which could be made all that was needed in the in terests of the imperialists who had crippled our unhappy, devas tated country. Kercnsky besought them, he threatened, he went down on his knees, but he did not give the soldiers an answer to a single one of their serious problems. Having fooled himself with cheap oratory, he made sure in advance of the support of the Con gress of Soviets, where there prevailed a supercilious petit bour geois democracy, supercilious in spite of its "watchfulness," and ordered an offensive. This was, in the literal sense of the word, "Order No. 1" of the Russian counter-revolution. On the i"th of June, we internationalists openly declared our selves in the Congress of Soviets, on the subject of the offensive which was being gotten under way, and, together with a funda- THE ARMV IN THE REVOLUTION 259 mental criticism, we pointed out that in the present state of the anny an offensive was a military adventure, which threatened the very existence of the army itself. It transpired that we had seen only too clearly. The government had discounted nothing and foreseen nothing. The government party of Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki had been hurling denunciations at us instead of availing themselves of our suggestions. Naturally, as the Bolshcviki had foretold this disaster, blame was put upon — the Bolsheviki. Behind the tragedy which was brought forth by ignorance and irresponsibility, there loomed cow ardice in all its wretchedness. All the moulders of our destinies felt no more urgent duty than to find a scape-goat on whom to put the blame. The semi-official speeches and articles of these days will stand forever as monuments to human baseness. The hounding of the Bolshcviki may, to be sure, still confuse the issue for a time in the minds of the people. But it cannot elimi nate nor in any way weaken the significance of the question of the responsibility of the government. Whether the Bolsheviki are guilty or not, how is it that the government foresaw nothing? It appears to have had no understanding of the very army it had sent into battle. Without for a moment considering whether the army was capable of understanding an offensive, they ordered the army to move forward. And those at the head of the government were not Bolsheviki. Whatever may have been the facts with regard to the latter, the full weight of the responsibility for the tragic adventure of the offensive is upon the shoulders of the government of Ker ensky, Tseretelli and Chernov. , This responsibility is increased by the fact that the warning voices do not at all appear to have come from the camp of the in ternationalists. The imperialistic Noioyc Vrcmyc, which is in close relations with the reactionary general staff, had the following to say, on August 5th, concerning the preparations for the offensive: "The cautious Alckscicff, because he did not wish to hurl un prepared forces into slaughter, because he did not wish to jeopard ize for questionable results, the gains already made, — was retired. The illusion of success, the longing for an early peace, which Ger many should be forced to accept from the Petrograd ringleaders, brought Brussilov to the top of the wave, and promptly sub merged him when the billows broke.'' These eloquent lines explain and confirm the confused re marks of Retch, at the time of Alekseieff's resignation, concerning 200 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA the departure of this "vigilant strategist," in whose place there is put the "cavalryman" who knows no such thing as reflection. By forcing an offensive, the Cadets saved themselves in time from an imputation of cavalry policy or strategy, and prepared for their os tentatious departure from the July 15th Ministry. And the "So cialist" ministers explained in confidential whispers addressed to the ear of the "revolutionary democracy," that the change in military leaders which actually resulted from the gamble of the offensive, meant a substitution of the "true democrat" Brussilov for the "monarchist" Alckseicff. Thus is History made! After having "hurled unprepared forces into slaughter" — to use the language of Novoye Vremya, — and having come into col lision with the frightful consequences, there was nothing left for it but to entrust to Dan, Liber, and the other patriotic gentlemen, the task of inaugurating a systematic pogrom against the Bolsheviki. This is a portion of that same "creative labor" for national defense which is so well adapted to the shoulders of the afore-mentioned "leaders." In their effort to outdo all the bourgeois rowdies, the Dans and Libers fumed against the "demagogues" who scatter among the "ignorant masses of the soldiers" such slogans as the publication of the secret treaties, a complete break with the Im perialists, etc. "That's right," the bourgeois rowdies contemptu ously corroborate them, "but that applies just as well to Order No. 1 and to the manifesto of April, which were demagogically circu lated by you among the ignorant masses of the soldiers." And when the Dans and Libers, wiping the cold sweat from their brows, strain every effort to recall the most elementary principles of revo lutionary thought in defense of the sins of their youth, they dis cover to their terror that they need only to repeat our words. And that is a fatal point : for our slogans contain nothing but the neces sary inferences from the development of the Revolution, in the course of which Order No. 1 and the manifesto of the Soviet are merely the first milestone. But the most remarkable thing about the whole business is, at first glance, that in spite of the frightful results of the offensive the "Socialist" ministers continue to set it down to the credit side of their account, and, in their conferences with the bourgeoisie, to refer to the offensive as their great patriotic contribution. "I ask of you," shouted Tseretelli at the Moscow Conference, "who could more easily have moved forward the forces of rcvolu- THE ARMY IN THE REVOLUTION 2f5l tioriary Russia, — Minister of War Guchkov, or Minister of War Kerensky?" (Shouts of "bravo!" and applause). Tseretelli is thus openly boasting of the fact that Kerensky is carrying out the very work that Guchkov would have carried out, but which, as the latter did not have the credit of "revolutionary" democracy to draw on, turned out to be too much for him. And the bourgeoisie in spite of the catastrophe that was called forth by the offensive, gladly recognizes the services of Kerensky. "We know and we shall remember," declared the Cadet Nabo kov, at the Moscow Conference, "that the great burst of enthusiasm in the Russian army two months ago, which in those horrible days added a new glorious page to our history, was inspired by the man who now stands at the head of the Provisional Government. His tory will never forget his service at this moment." It is consequently quite clear that the "glorious page" of the offensive of the ist of July has no relation whatever to national de fense, for the military efficiency of Russia, as the consequence of the offensive, had simply been made worse. If the bourgeoisie nev- erthless speaks of the offensive in terms of appreciation, it is for the simple reason that the cruel blow inflicted upon our army as a result of Kerensky's policy created favorable conditions' for the spread of panic and for counter-revolutionary schemes. All the authority of the Social-Revolutionary and Menshevik democracy had been exerted in the direction of forcing an offensive, and the latter completely wiped out that regime of contradictions and in solvency, to the support of which the philistine leaders had applied all their narrow-minded ingenuity. Both the offensive and the question of peace are now being considered by the bourgeoisie and its generals from the angle of in ternal politics, that is, for the advancement of the counter-revolu tion. This was most clearly expressed at the Moscow Conference by General Kornilov. "Peace cannot at present be attained," he said, "if only for the reason that we are not in a position to carry out demobilization. We must first elevate the prestige of the offi cers." In the anny there had been concentrated too many per sons armed by the government, who were directing demands to the government, that were all too radical. Only a continuation of the war, regardless of the chances of success, would provide a possibility for "elevating the prestige of the officers," for regain ing control of the military masses, and for assuring a dcmobiliza- 262 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA tion of such nature as would not enable the soldiers to threaten the pillars of property and of imperialistic government. And if, in the pursuit of this object, a separate peace should be required, ihe bourgeoisie would conclude such a peace, without turning an eyelid. From the ist of July on, the counter-revolution takes great forward strides, with absolute self-confidence. And it will not stop until a heavy blow is landed on its solar-plexus. IV WHAT NEXT? There is hardly any room for doubt that the present govern ment, which is the incarnation of uncertain and malevolent incom petence, will not hold out against the Moscow attack, and will suffer new changes. It is not in vain that General Kornilov ex plains that we need not fear a new crisis of power. Such a crisis at the present moment can be most quickly overcome by a new swing to the right. Whether Kercnsky will obtain, under these circum stances, an additional degree of independence from the organized control of the democracy, which will be replaced by an all the more real "unseen government" of the imperialistic cliques; whether the new government will stand in some definite relation with that gen eral staff of the propertied classes which will be created without a doubt by the Moscow Conference; what is to be the share of the "socialistic" Bonapartists in the new government combination, — all these arc questions of secondary importance. But even if the bourgeois attack should be repulsed and the Moscow Conference should culminate in a new stepping out from the government on the part of the Cadets, the arrogated power of the "revolutionary democracy" would be by no means equivalent to a real revolution ary-democratic power. Bound hand and foot by their obligations against workers and soldiers in reserve, the official leaders of the Soviet would be obliged to continue their policy of double-dealing and opportunism. By leaving the ministry, Konovalov simply shift ed his mission to the shoulders of Skobcleff. The Kercnsky-Tscre- telli Ministry, even without the Cadets, would continue to carry out a semi-Cadet program. The elimination of the Cadets is but a drop in the bucket ; what is needed is new blood and new methods, The Moscow Conference in any event closes and summarizes that entire phase of the Revolution in which the leading role was played by the Social-Revolutionary and Menshevik tactics of co operation with the bourgeoisie, a co-operation which was based on a renunciation of the independent aims of the Revolution, on 264 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA their subordination to the idea of a coalition with the enemies of the Revolution. The Russian Revolution is a direct product of the war. The war created for it the necessary form of a nation-wide organiza tion, the army, The greater part of the population, the peasantry, at the moment of the revolution, had been forced into a condition of organization. The Soviets of Soldiers' Delegates called upon the army to send its political representatives, whereupon the peasant masses automatically sent in to the Soviets the semi-liberal intel lectuals, who translated the indefiniteness of their, hopes and aspira tions into the language of the most contemptible quibbling and hair splitting opportunism. The petit bourgeois intelligentsia, which is in every way dependent on the greater bourgeoisie, obtained the leadership over the peasantry, The Soviets of soldier-peasant rep resentatives obtained a distinct majority over the representatives of the workers. The Petrograd proletarian advance-guard was de clared to be an ignorant mass. The flower of the Revolution was revealed in the persons of the March Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki of the "provincial" intellectuals, leaning on the peas ants. Over this foundation there rose, through the agency of double and triple elections, the Central Executive Committee. The Petrograd Soviet, which, in the first period, discharged nation-wide functions, stood from the outset under the immediate influence of the revolutionary masses. The Central Committee, on the con trary, dwelt in the clouds of the revolutionary bureaucratic heights, cut off from the Petrograd workers and soldiers, and hostile to them. It is sufficient to recall that the Central Committee considered it necessary to summon troops from the front for putting down the Petrograd demonstrations, which at the moment of the arrival of the troops, had actually been already disposed of by the demon strating persons themselves. The philistine leaders committed political hara-kari when they failed to sec anything but chaos, an archy, and riot in the tendency — which was a natural outcome of the whole lay of the land-— to equip the Revolution with the ap paratus of authority. When they disarmed the Petrograd work ers, nnd soldiers, the Tseretellis. Dans and Chernovs disarmed the advance-guard of the Revolution and inflicted irreparable injury on the influence of their own Executive Committee. At present, face to face with the encroachments of the counter revolution, these politicians talk of re-establishing the authority and WHAT NEXT? 265 the significance of the Soviets. As a catch-word of the moment, they prate of organizing the masses around the Soviets. Yet put ting the question in this empty fashion is a profoundly reactionary procedure. Under an ostensible call for organization it attempts to circumvent the question as to the political aims and methods of the struggle. To organize the masses in the name of "elevating the authority" of the Soviets is a wretched and useless undertaking. The masses had faith in the Soviets, followed them, and elevated them to an immense height. As a result they witnessed the surren der of the Soviets to the worst enemies of the masses. It would be childish to suppose that the masses could or would repeat for the second time an historical experiment already disposed of. In order that the masses, having lost their confidence in the present domi nant centre of democracy, should not also lose their confidence in the Revolution itself, they must be supplied with a critical estimate of all the political work previously accomplished in the Revolution, and this is tantamount to a merciless condemnation of all the la bors of the Social-Revolutionist and Menshevik leaders. We shall say to the masses; they blame the Bolshcviki for everything, but how is it that they were powerless to fight the Bol shcviki? On their side was not only the majority in the Soviets, but all the authority of the government, and yet they managed to get themselves defeated by a "conspiracy" on the part of what they call an insignificant band of Bolshcviki. After the events of July 16-18, the S.-R.'s and Mensheviki in Petrograd grew weaker and weaker, while the Bolshcviki grew stronger and stronger. The same thing took place in Moscow. This clearly demonstrates the fact that by its policy Bolshevism gives expression to the actual demands of the revolution as the latter progresses, while the Social-Revolutionary and Menshevik "majority" simply perpetuates yesterday's helplessness and back wardness of the masses. But today, this mere standing-pat is played out; it must, therefore, be re-inforced by the most savage repression. These persons arc struggling against the logic which is inherent in the Revolution, and for that reason you find them in the same camp with the class-conscious enemies of the Revolution. For just that reason wc are in duty bound to weaken the confi dence in them, — in the name of the day of Revolution that is our tomorrow. The complete emptiness of the catchword, "strengthen the Soviets," comes out most clearly in the mutual relations of the 266 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA Central Executive Committee and the Petrograd Soviet. In view of the fact that the latter, taking its support from the advanced ranks of the working class, and the soldiers who made common cause with them, was advancing more and more resolutely to the position of revolutionary Socialism, the Central Executive Com mittee systematically undermined the authority and significance of the Petrograd Soviet. For whole months it was not convoked. As a matter of fact, they took away its organ, the Izvestya, in whose columns the thoughts and the life of the Petrograd prole tariat now find no expression at all. When the infuriated bourgeois press slanders and dishonors the leaders of the Petrograd prole tariat, Izvestya hears nothing and sees nothing. Under these cir cumstances, what can possibly be the significance of the slogan, "strengthen the Soviets"? One answer only can be given: To strengthen the Petrograd Soviet against the Ccn»**al Executive Com mittee, which has been bureaucratized, and whose membership re mains unaltered. Wc must gain for the Petrograd Soviet the complete independence of its organization, its protection, and its political functioning. This is the most important question, and the settling of it is the first order of the day. The Petrograd Soviet must become the centre of a new revolutionary mobilization of the masses of the workers, soldiers and peasants, — in a new fighting for power. We must support with all our strength the initiative of the Conference of Factory Workers' Committees at the convocation of the All- Russian Congress of Workers' Delegates. In order that the pro letariat may win over to its activity the impoverished masses of soldiers and peasants, its policy must be definitely and inexorably opposed to the tactics of the Central Executive Committee. From the above it must be clear how impotcntly reactionary and Utopian is the idea originating in Novaya Zhizn concerning a union between us and the Mensheviki. This condition may be attained only if the proletariat as a class will reorganize its central organization on a nation-wide scale. It is imposhiblc for us to predict all the twists and turns of the path of history. As a political party, we cannot be held responsible for the course of history. But we arc all more responsible to our class ; to render it capable of carrying out its mission in all the deviations of the historical journey — that is our fundamental political duty. The ruling classes together with the Government of "Salva tion" are doing everything in their power to force the political WHAT NEXT? 267 problems of the revolution to the attention not only of the workers, but also of the army and of the provinces, in as acute a form as possible. Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki have done and are doing all they can to reveal before the widest sections of the toiling population of the country, the complete insolvency of their tactics. It is now incumbent on our party, on its energy, its solicitude, it/ insistence, to draw all the inexorable conclusions from the preseT/t situation, and, at the head of the disinherited and exhausted masses, to wage a determined battle for their revolutionary dictatorship. THE CHARACTER OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION The liberal and S.-R.-Menshevik scribes and politicians are much concerned over the question of the sociological significance of the Russian Revolution. Is it a bourgeois revolution or some other kind of a revolution ? At first glance, this academic theoriz ing may appear somewhat enigmatical. The liberals have nothing to gain by revealing the class interests behind "their" revolution. And as for the petit bourgeois "Socialists," they do not as a general rule, make use of theoretical analysis in their political activity, but rather of "common sense," which is simply another name for me diocrity and lack of principle. The fact is that the Milyukov-Dan estimate, inspired by Plekhanov, as to the bourgeois character of the Russian Revolution, contains not a single grain of theory. Neither Yedinstvo, nor Retch, nor Den, nor Rabochaya Gazeta, its head seriously affected, take any pains to formulate what it understands by a bourgeois revolution. The intention of their manoeuvres is purely practical: to demonstrate the "right" of the bourgeois revolution to assume power. Even though the Soviets may represent the majority of the politically trained population, even though in all the democratic elections, in city and in country, the capitalist parties were swept out with eclat, — "so long as our revolution is bourgeois in character," it is necessary to preserve the privileges of the bourgeoisie, and to assign to it in the govern ment a role, to which it is by no means entitled by the alignment of political groups within the country. If we arc to act in accord ance with the principles of democratic parliamentarism, it is clear that power belongs to the Social-Revolutionists, either alone, or in conjunction with the Mensheviki. But as "our revolution is a bourgeois revolution," the principles of democracy are suspended, and the representatives of the overwhelming majority of the people receive five scats in the ministry, while the representatives of an insignficant minority get twice as many. To Hell with democracy! Long live Plekhanov's Sociology! THE CHARACTER OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 269 "I suppose you would like to have a bourgeois revolution with out the bourgeoisie?" asks Plekhanov, slyly, invoking the support of dialectics and of Engels. "That's just it!" interposes Milyukov. "We Cadets would be ready to relinquish power, which the people evidently do not wish to give us. But we cannot fly in the face of science." And he refers to Plekhanov's "Marxism" as his authority. Since our Revolution is a bourgeois revolution, explain Plek hanov, Dan, and Potressov, we must bring about a political coali tion between the toilers and their exploiters. And in the light of this Sociology, the clownish handshake of Bublikov and Tseretelli is revealed in its full historical significance. The trouble is merely this, that the same bourgeois character of the Revolution which is now taken as a justification of the coali tion between the Socialists and the capitalists, has for a number of years been taken by these very Mensheviki as leading to diamet rically opposite conclusions. Since, in a bourgeois revolution, they were wont to say, the governing power can have no other function than to safeguard the domination of the bourgeoisie, it is clear that Socialism can have nothing to do with it, its place is not in the government, but in the opposition. Plekhanov considered that Socialists could not under any conditions take part in a bourgeois government, and he savagely attacked Kautsky, whose resolution admitted certain exceptions in this connection. "Tcmpora lcagusque mutantur" — the gentlemen of the old regime so expressed it .... And that appears to be the case also with the "laws" of the Plekhanov Sociology. No matter how contradictory may be the opinions of the Men sheviki and their leader, Plekhanov, when you compare their state ments before the Revolution with their statements of today, one thought does dominate both expressions, and that is, that you cannot carry out a bourgeois revolution "without the bourgeoisie." At first blush this idea would appear to be axiomatic. But it is merely idiotic. The history of mankind did not begin with the Moscow Con ference. There were revolutions before. At the end of the 18th century there was a revolution in France, which is called, not without reason, the "Great Revolution." It was a bourgeois rev olution. In one of its phases power fell into the hands of the Jacobins, who had the support of the "Sans-culottes," or semi- proletarian workers of the city population, and who set up between 270 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA them and the Girondistes, the liberal party of the bourgeoisie, the •Cadets of their day, the neat rectangle of the guillotine. It was only the dictatorship of the Jacobins that gave the French Revolu tion its present importance, that made it "the Great Revolution." And yet, this dictatorship was brought about, not only without the bourgeoisie, but against its very opposition. Robespierre, to whom it was not given to acquaint himself with the Plekhanov ideas, upset all the laws of Sociology, and, instead of shaking hands with the Girondistes, he cut of their heads. This was cruel, there is no denying it. But this cruelty did not prevent the French Rev olution from becoming Great, within the limits of its bourgeois character. Marx, in whose name so many mal-practices are now perpetrated in our country, said that the "whole French terror was simply a plebeian effort to dispose of the enemies of the bour geoisie." And as the same bourgeoisie was very much afraid of the same plebeian methods of disposing of the enemies of the people, the Jacobins not only deprived the bourgeoisie of power, but applied a rule of blood and iron with regard to the bourgeoisie, whenever the latter made any atempt to halt or to "moderate" the work of the Jacobins. It is apparent, therefore, that the Jacobins carried out a bourgeois revolution without the bourgeoisie. Referring to the English Revolution of 1648, Engels wrote! "In order that the bourgeoisie might pluck all the fruits that had matured, it was necessary that the revolution should go far beyond its original aims, as was again the case in France in 1793 and in Germany in 1848. This to be sure, is one of the laws of the evolu tion of bourgeois society." We see that Engels' Law is directly opposed to Plekhanov's ingenious structure, wliich the Mensheviki have been accepting and repeating as Marxism. It may of course be objected that the Jacobins were them selves a bourgeoisie, a petite bourgeoisie. This is absolutely true. But is that not also the fact in the case of the so-called "revolu tionary democracy" headed by the Social-Revolutionists and Men sheviki? Between the Cadets, the party of the larger and lesser propertied interests, on the one hand, and the Social-Revolutionists on the other hand, there was not, in any of the elections held in city or country, any intermediate party. It follows with mathema tical certainty that the petite bourgeoisie must have found its political reperescntation in the ranks of the Social-Revolutionists. The Mensheviki, whose policy differs by not a hair's breadth from the policy of the Social-Revolutionists, reflect the same class Till: fHARACTKK OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 271 interests. There is no contradiction to this condition in the fact that they arc also sujiportcd by a part of the more backward or conservative-privileged workers. Why were the Social-Revolu tionists unable to assume power? In what sense and why did the "bourgeois" character of the Russian Revolution (if we assume that such is its character) compel the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki to supplant the plebeian methods of the Jacobins with the gentlemanly device of an agreement with the counter-revolu tionary bourgeoisie? It is manifest that the explanation must be sought, not in the "bourgeois" character of our revolution, but in the miserable character of our petit bourgeois democracy. Instead of making the power in its hands the organ for the realization of the essential demands of History, our fraudulent democracy de- ferently passed on all real power to the counter-revolutionary, military-imperialistic clique, and Tseretelli, at the Moscow Con ference, even boasted that the Soviets had not surrendered their power under pressure, not after a courageous fight and defeat, but voluntarily, as an evidence of political "self-effacement." The gentleness of the calf, holding out its neck for the butcher's knife, is not the quality which is going to conquer new worlds. The difference between the terrorists of the Convention and the Moscow capitulatcrs is the difference between tigers and calves of one age, — a difference in courage. But this difference is not fun damental. It merely veils a decisive difference in the personnel of the democracy itself. The Jacobins were based on the classes of little or no property, including also what rudiments of a proletariat were then already in existence. In our case, the industrial working class has worked its way out of the ill-defined democracy into a position in History where it exerts an influence of primary im portance. The petit bourgeois democracy was losing the most valu able revolutionary qualities to the extent to which these qualities were being developed by the proletariat which was outgrowing the tutelage of the petite bourgeoisie. This phenomenon in turn is due to the incomparably higher plan to which Capitalism had evolved in Russia as compared with the France of the closing 18th century. The revolutionary power of the Russian proletariat, which can by no means be estimated by its numerical strength, is based upon its immense productive power, which is most of all apparent in war time. The threat of a railroad strike again reminds us, in our day, of the dependence of the whole country on the concentrated l.-.bor of the proletariat. The petit bourgeois-peasant party, in the 272 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA very earliest stages of the revolution, was exposed to a crossfire between the powerful groups of imperialistic classes on the one hand, and the revoutionary-intcrnationalist proletariat, on the other. In their struggle to exert an influence of their own over the workers, the petit bourgeois continued constantly harping on their "statesmanship," tlieir "patriotism," and thus fell into a slavish dependence on the groups of counter-revolutionary capital. They simultaneously lost the possibiity of any kind of liquidation even of the old barbarism which enveloped those sections of the people who were still attached them. The struggle of the Social- Revolutionists and Mensheviki for influence over the proletariat was more and more assuming the form of a struggle by the pro letarian party to obtain the leadership of the semi-proletarian masses of the villages and towns. Because they "voluntarily" hand ed over their power to the bourgeois cliques, the Social-Revolu tionists and Mensheviki were obliged to hand over the revolutionary mission definitely to the party of the proletariat. This alone is sufficient to show that the attempt to decide fundamental questions of tactics by a mere reference to the "bourgeois" character of our Revolution can only succeed in confusing the minds of the back ward workers and deceiving the peasants. In the French Revolution of 1848, the proletariat is already making heroic efforts for independent action. But as yet it has neither a clear revolutionary theory nor an authoritative class or ganization. Its importance in production is infinitely lower than the present economic function of the Russian proletariat. In addi tion, behind 1848 there stood another great revolution, which had solved the agrarian question in its own way, and this found its expression in a pronounced isolation of the proletariat, particularly that of Paris, from the peasant masses. Our situation in this re spect is immeiisley more favorable. Farm mortgages, obstructive obligations of all kinds, oppression, and the rapacious exploitation by the church, cm. front the Revolution as inescapable questions, demanding courageous and uncompromising measures. The "iso lation" of our party from the Social-Revolutionists and Menshe viki, even an extreme isolation, even by the method of single chambers, would by no means be synonymous with an isolation of the proletariat from the oppressed peasant and city masses. On the contrary, a sharp opposition of the policy of the revolutionary proletariat to the faithless defection of the present leaders of the Soviets, can only bring about a salutary differentiation among the THE CHARACTER OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 273 peasant millions, remove the pauperized peasants from the treach erous influence of the powerful Social-Revolutionist muzhiks, and convert the Socialistic proletariat into a genuine leader of the popular, "plebeian" revolution. And finally, a mere empty reference to the bourgeois character of the Russian Revolution tells us absolutely nothing about the international character of its milieu. And this is a prime factor. The great Jacobin revolution found opposed to it a backward,, feudal, monarchistic Europe. The Jacobin regime fell and gave way to the Bonapartist regime, under the burden of the superhuman effort which it was obliged to put forth in order to maintain itself against the united forces of the middle ages. The Russian Revolu tion, on the contrary, has before it a Europe that has far out distanced it, having reached the highest degree of capitalist deve lopment. The present slaughter shows that Europe has reached the point of capitalistic saturation, that it can no longer live and grow on the basis of the private ownership of the means of pro duction. This chaos of blood and ruin is a savage insurrection of the mute and sullen powers of production, it is the mutiny of iron and steel against the dominion of profit, against wage slavery, against the miserable deadlock of our human relations. Capitalism, enveloped in the flames of a war of its own making, shouts from the mouths of its cannons to humanity: "Either conquer over me, or I will bury you in my ruins when I fall !" All the evolution of the past, the thousands of years of human history, of class struggle, of cultural accummulations, are concent rated now in the sole problem of the proletarian revolution. There is no other answer and no other escape. And therein lies the tre mendous strength of the Russian Revolution, It is not a "national," a bourgeois revolution. Anyone who conceives of it thus, is dwell ing in the realm of the hallucinations of the 18th and 19th cent uries. Our fatherland in time is the 20th century. The further lot of the Russian Revolution depends directly on the course and on the outcome of the war, that is, on the evolution of class contra dictions in Europe, to which this imperialistic war is giving a catastrophic nature. The Kerenskys and Kornilovs began too early using the lan guage of competing autocrats. The Kaledins showed their teeth too soon. The renegade Tseretelli too early grasped the contemp tuously outstreched finger of counter-revolution. As yet the Rev olution has spoken only its first word. It still has tremendous 274 Tin; proletarian revolution in Russia reserves in Western Europe. In place of the handsliake of the reactionary ringleaders with the good-for-nothings of the petite bourgeoisie will come the great embrace of the Russian proleta riat with the proletariat of Europe. VI INTERNATIONAL TACTICS The class-political groupings in the Russian Revolution have come out with unparalleled clearness, but equally unparalleled is the confusion which prevails in the field of our ideology. The belated character of Russia's historical development permitted the petit bourgeois intelligentsia to adorn itself with the peacock's feathers of the loveliest Socialist theory. Yet these fine feathers will answer no other purpose than to cover its withered nakcd.ic.ss. The fact that the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki did not assume power early in March, nor on May i6th, nor on July 16U1, has nothing at all to do with the "bourgeois" character of our Rev olution and the impossibility of putting it over "without the bour geoisie," is due to the fact that the petit bourgeois "Socialists,"' being completely enveloped in the meshes of Imperialism, arc not yet capable of performing one-tenth of the work that the Jacobins accomplished a century and a quarter ago. Chattering about the defense of the Revolution and of the country, they will nevertheless surrender to the bourgeois reaction one position after the otlier. The struggle for power, therefore, becomes the first and the fore most problem of the working class, and we shall find the Revolution simultaneously divesting itself completely of its "national" and its bourgeois raiment. Either, we shall see a tremendous backward sweep, in the direction of a strong imperialistic regime, most probably culmi nating in a monarchy ; the Soviets, the land committees, the army organizations, as well as many other things, will go to pieces, and the Kerenskys and Tscrctcllis will pass into the discard. Or, the proletariat, dragging with it the sctni-,proIctarian masses and push ing aside its leaders of yesterday (in this case also the Kcrenskys and Tseretellis go into the discard), will establish the regime of the workers' democracy. The further successes of the proletariat will then depend first and foremost on the European, particularly of the German, Revolution. 276 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA Internationalism in our eyes is not an abstract notion, existing only to be betrayed at every moment (that is for Tseretelli and Chernov), but an immediately dominant, profoundly practical prin ciple. Permanent, decisive successes are not conceivable for us with out a European Revolution. We cannot therefore purchase partial successes at the price of such procedures and combinations as may put obstacles in the path of the European proletarian movement. Just for this reason an uncompromising opposition to the social- patriots is for us the condition sine qua non of all our political! work. "International comrades!" cried one of the speakers at the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, "postpone your Social Revolution for another fifty years!" Needless to say, this well meant advice was greeted with the self-complacent applause of the Mensheviki and Social-Revolutionists. It is just at this point, in the matter of their relation to the Social Revolution, that the difference between the various forms of opportunistic petit bourgeois utopianism, on the one hand, and proletarian Socialism, on the other, becomes important. There are not a few "internationalists" who explain the crisis in the Inter national as a temporary chauvinistic intoxication due to the war, and who believe that sooner or later the former condition will be restored, and the old political parties will again take up the old path of the class struggle, of which they have lost sight for the moment. Childish and petty hopes! The war is not an external catastrophe, destroying the equilibrium of capitalist society against the uprising of the expanding forces of production in this society, against the restrictions of the national boundaries and the forms of private ownership. Either we shall see continued convulsions of the forces of production, in the form of repeatedly recurring imperialistic wars, or we shall sec a Socialistic organization of production: that is the question History is placing before us. Similarly, the crisis in the International is not an external, irrelevant phenomenon. The Socialist parties of Europe were formed at a time of comparative capitalist equilibrium and of a reformist adaptation of the proletariat to national parliamentarism and the national market. "Even in the Social-Democratic Party," wrote Engels in 1877, "petit bourgeois Socialism has its defenders. Even members of the Social-Democratic Party who recognize the fundamental concepts of scientific Socialism and the practical nature of the de- INTERNATIONAL TACTICS 277 mand that all means of production should pass over into social ownership, declare that the realization of this demand is a possib- lity of the remote future, the precise time of which is practically impossible to determine." Thanks to the long-drawn out character of the "peaceful" period, this petit bourgeois Socialism actually became dominant in the old organization of the proletariat. Its limitations and its insolvency assumed the most offensive forms, as soon as the peaceful accumulation of contradictions gave way to a tremendous imperialistic cataclysm. Not only the old national governments, but also the burcaucratized Socialist parties that had grown up with them, showed that they were not equal to the de mands of further progress. And all this might have been more or less foreseen."The task of the Socialist Party," wc wrote twelve years ago, "consisted, and still consists, in revolutionizing the consciousness of the working class, as the development of Capitalism has revolu tionized social relations. But this labor of agitation and organi zation has its internal difficulties. The European Socialist parties — particularly the most powerful of them, the German — .have already attained a certain conservatism, which is all the stronger where the most numerous masses have embraced Socialism, and where the organization and discipline of these masses is the most advanced. In view of this, the Social-Democracy, as an organization expressive of the political experience of the proletariat, may, at a given mo ment prove to be an immediate obstacle on the path of an open struggle between the workers and the bourgeois reaction. In other words, the propagandist-Socialist conservatism of the proletarian party may, at a given moment prevent the straight fight of the pro letariat for power (Kasha rcvolutsia, 1906, P. 285). But if the revolutionary Marxists were far from being fetishists with regard to the parties of the Second International, no one could foresee that the destruction of those giant organizations would be so cruel and so catastrophic. Xew times demand new organizations. In the baptism of fire, the revolutionary parties are now being everywhere created. The numerous ideologico-political offspring of the Second International have not, it appears, been in vain. But they are passing through an internal purification: whole generation of "realistic" phihstines are being cast aside, and the revolutionary tendencies of Marxism are for the first time being recognized in their full political sign ificance. 278 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA Within each country the task is not so much to support an organization that has outlived itself, as to bring together the genu inely aggressive revolutionary elements of the proletariat, who are already, in the struggle against Imperialism, gravitating into the front ranks. On the international field, the task is not to coalesce and "conciliate" government-Socialists at diplomatic conferences (as at Stockholm!), but to secure a union of the revolutionary in ternationalists of all countries and the pursuit of a common course of action in the Social Revolution within each country. To be sure, the revolutionary internationalists at the head of the working class at present constitute, throughout Europe, an insignificant minority. But we Russians ought to be the last to take fright at such a state of affairs. We know how quickly, in revolu tionary moments, the minority may become a majority. As soon as the accumulating resentment of the working class finally breaks through the crust of government discipline, the group of Liebknecht, Luxemburg, Mehring, and their adherents will immediately assume a leading position at the head of the German working class. Only a social-revolutionary policy can justify a division in the organi zation, — but at the same time, it makes such a division inevitable. The Menshevik internationalists, those who are of like mind with Comrade Martov, in opposition to us, deny the social-revolu tionary character of the political task. Russia, they declare in tlieir platform, is not yet ready for Socialism, and our function is necessarily limited to the founding of a democratic bourgeois re public. This whole attitude is based on a complete rejection of the international problems of the proletariat. If Russia were alone in the world, Martov's reasoning would be correct. But we are en gaged in carrying out a world revolution, in a struggle with world Imperialism, with the tasks of the world proletariat, which includes the Russian proletariat. Instead of explaining to the Russian work ers that the destinies of Russia are at present inextricably bound up with the destinies of Europe, that the success of the European proletariat will assure us a swifter realization of a Socialist society, that on the other hand, a defeat of the European proletariat will hurl us back into a condition of imperialistic dictatorship and mon archy, and finally into the status of mere colonies of England and the United States, instead of subordinating all our tactics to the -general aims and objects of the European proletariat, Comrade Martov looks upon the Russian Revolution from a narrow nation alistic standpoint and reduces the task of the Revolution to that of INTERNATIONAL TACTICS 279 creating a bourgeois democratic republic. This formulation of the question is fundamentally false, for over it there hovers the curse of narrow-minded nationalism, which led to the downfall of the Second International. By limiting himself, in practice, to a national outlook, Comrade Martov secures the possibility of living in the same camp with the social-patriots. He hopes, with Dan and Tseretelli, to pass through the "miasma" of nationalism unharmed, for the latter will dis appear with the war, and then he intends to come back, together with them, into the "'regular" channels of the class struggle. Mar tov is bound to the social-patriots, not by a mere empty party tra dition, but by their profoundly opportunistic attitude on the Social Revolution, for they regard it as a remote goal, which should have no share in the formulation of the problems of today. And that is what separates them from us. The struggle for obtaining power it not, for us, merely the next step of a national democratic revolution. No, it is the ful fillment of our international duty, the conquest of one of the most important ]>ositions on the whole front of the struggle against world Imperialism. And it is this standpoint that determines our relation to the so-called question of defending the fatherland. A temporary shifting of the front to one side or the other cannot halt and cannot turn aside our struggle, which is directed against the very foundations of Capitalism, which seems bent on the mutual imperialistic destruction of the peoples of all nations. An unceasing revolution against this unceasing slaughter! That is our fight ; and the stakes are the destinies of humanity. PART FIVE The Proletarian Revolution Conquers By LOUIS C. FRAINA THE KORNILOV REVOLT The openly counter-revolutionary character of the Moscov Conference, emphasized by the reactionary proposals of Kaledinc, Kornilov, Guchkov & Co.,_creatcd a revulsion of feeling among the revolutionary masses. The re-appearance upon the stage of the extreme reactionary forces pushed the Soviets into the extreme Left, and made inescapable a repudiation of its moderate policy. The Soviets could no longer play the role of the centre. The assertions of the Bolshcviki, that the Coalition Government was an instrument of reaction, were confirmed by the openly organizing forces of the counter-revolution. The everts of September and October acceler ated the acceptance of a revolutionary policy by the masses, and led inexorably to the Bolshevik Revolution in November and the as sumption of all power by the Soviets. ! On September 2 the German troops launched an offensive on the Dvina front and on September 3 Riga was captured, l All the evidence shows that the fa'l of Riga was mancuvrcd by General Kornilov and his staff in order to strike terror in the heart of Russia.! By means of contradictory orders and the desertion of the staffs Tne Riga front was opened to the Germans, who poured through; it was only the activity of the soldiers' committees that prevented a fuller disaster. 1 he documents published by the Bol sheviki offer conclusive prcx f of the conspiracy and deliberate treachery: General Kornilov's covert threat made at the Moscow Conference had become a reality. It appeared for a time as if the Germans would press the offensive, and by means of army and fleet capture Petrograd.1 Ap- 'At the time when a German attack upon Petrograd appeared imminent, the Second Congress of the Baltic Fleet was in session, and issued the following proclamation, which is an inspiring answer to the infamous slanders hurled at the Fleet : "To the Oppressed in all Countries, Comiades: In the fatal hour in which the signals of war and of death ring in our ears, we repeat and em phasize our appeal to you. We «ik' you our greetings and our last testament. —Attacked by the powerful German fleet, our warships arc (loomed in an unequal struggle.— Not one ship will refuse to fight, not one sailor will desert 284 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA prehension was general, and particularly in Petrograd. The psy chology of "The Country is in danger!" provided an excellent op portunity for a counter-revolutionary military coup. With Boris Savinkov as the intermediary, Kerensky and Kornilov plotted dras tic action against the Petrograd masses, the centre of the proletarian revolution. The dictator Kerensky required power, the annihilation of the revolutionary masses, and the military coup was to provide the power without which his dictatorship was a mere pose. It was agreed that Kornilov was to march upon Petrograd, crush and dis arm the masses; and Kornilov, with Cossacks and other reliable troops, marched upon Petrograd. But the Soviet intervened and compelled the weakling Kercnsky to issue an order for the arrest of Kornilov.' The result was not the submission of Kornilov, but his determination to march upon Petrograd for purposes of his own, and crush both the Provisional Government and the Soviets, erecting a military dictatorship. The danger was acute. A general his ship.— Our much-abused Fleet will do its duty— toward the great Rev olution. — We consider it our duty to defend Petrograd, We will fulfill our self-imposed obligation. — Not because of the request of a pitiful Russian lionapnite (Kercnsky) who retains power simply because of the unlimited patience of the Russian Revolution. Nor because of the treaties made by our government with the Allier., t> calies intended to smother the Russian Revolution. — We follow the call of our revolutionary sentiments. — We go into death with the name of the great Revolution in our hearts and on our unfaltering lips.— The Russian Fleet has always stood in the front lines of the Revolution. The names of its sailors are written in the book of the history of the struggle against Czarism. In the earliest days of the Revolu tion tlie sailors marched in the front ranks, our ultimate aim being deliverance from all misery. — And this life and death struggle with our own oppressors Rives us the right to appeal to you, proletarians of all countries, with a strong voice, with the voice of those who look into the eyes of death in the revolt against the exploiters. — Lircak the chains, you who are oppressed! Rise in revolt! — Wc have nothing to lose but our chains! — Wc believe in the victory of the Revolution, we are full of this l>eliif. — We know that our comrades in the Revolution will fulfill their duty on the barricades to the bitter end. — Wc know tli.it decisive moments arc coming. A gigantic struggle will set the world afire. On the horizon the t'.rcs of the revolt of all oppressed peoples are already glowing and becoming stronger. — At the moment that the waters of the Iialtic will became red with the blood of our comrades, will close for ever over ihcir bodies, at this moment we call upon you. — Already in the cluch of death, wc send our warm greetings and appeal to you: — Proletarians of the world, unite! Rise in revolt, you who are oppressed.— All hail, the World Revolution! — Long live Socialism!" sEven the arch-apologist of Kercnsky, A. J. Sack, admits in his Birth of the Russian Democracy, that Kerensky knew of the original movement of Kornilov's troops and was not averse to it: "Many details of the Kornilov episode arc still missing and many important documents must still be pub lished before the public will be able to come to an impartial and fair judge ment, Several things, hovcver, are almost certain. The first is that Kercnsky knew about the movement of several detachments of troops from the front towards Petrograd, and it is probable that as Prime Minister and Minister of War, realizing the growing Bolshevist danger, he called for them." THE KORNILOV REVOLT 285 mobilization of the revolutionary masses of Petrograd was immedi ately accomplished, the Bolsheviki imprisoned during and after the July uprising were released, and they marched out to meet Kornil- ov's troops, who were definitely defeated on September 15, on which day the Provisional Government went through the empty formality of officially declaring Russia a republic. The aftermath of the Kornilov rebellion was swift and certain, The counter-revolution was active, the Soviets in danger — and the Bolsheviki everywhere rapidly became the majority. Leon Trotzky was elected President of the Petrograd Soviet, the most influential of all, and as a protest Cheidse, Skobclcff and Tseretelli resigned. The period of compromise was definitely at an end, and througout Russia the Soviets recognized the necessity of revolutionary prole tarian action and policy. Life itself was making Bolshevism the accepted policy of the revolutionary masses. These events isolated the Provisional Government, Its mandate had hitherto been the support of the Soviets; the attempt to secure a new and more general mandate through the Moscow Conference had failed ; and Kercnsky tried the desperate means of convoking r. Democratic Congress to dispel the isolation of the Provisional Government and secure a mandate for its acts. The Congress met on September 27, and immediately it was rent with disputes. Cap ital punishment and coalition were discussed bitterly amid riotous disturbances. Trotzky appeared and issued a declaration of civil war in the event that the counter-revolution should oppose all power lo the Soviets. Against the protest of the Bolshcviki, who bolted the Congress, and by a wavering majority, coalition was approved, a new cabinet formed ; and it was decided to convene a Preliminary Parliament, to sit until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. Kercnsky badgered the Congress into approving all his acts by threatening to resign and by picturing tragically the situation of the country. The Preliminary Parliament opened on October 8, and in spite of the fact that the elections everywhere showed an over whelming majority for the Socialist candidates, the bourgeoisie was amply represented in the Parliament, out of all proportion to its numbers. The Parliament, officially designated as "The Council of the Russian Republic," demanded that the Provisional Government should be responsible to it, but the Government refused absolutely, and the demand was withdrawn: the Parliament was simply to have "advisory" functions. Turmoil and impotence marked the activity of the Parliament; recriminations made deliberations impossible; 286 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA not a single measure of any importance was passed. At the first ses sion, Trotzky, speaking on behalf of the Bolsheviki, charged that the propertied classes were represented out of all proportion to their numbers, and declared that the Parliament was against the Revolu tion. The Menshevik Cheidse was elected President, and against the protest of the Bolsheviki and Social-Revolutionists of the Left, it was decided to discuss in secret the constitution of the govern ment. Instead of the Preliminary Parliament providing a mandate for the Provisional Government, it provided a new instrument for ihe offensive against coalition. And throughout the country the moderates were being ousted from control of the Soviets, the Bol shcviki becoming ascendant. II , BOLSHEVISM CONQUERS The Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviets, after the Kornilov affair, was still in the control of the moderates, as a Congress had not been held since the June session, and the members of the Committee were hang-overs. The masses had, however, de serted the moderates, and the Executive Committe was becoming as isolated, as helpless as the Provisional Government itself. The Committee determined upon a final maneuvre to preserve its pres tige, a final desperate attempt to "compel" the Allies to accept the peace terms of revolutionary Russia. It adopted a series of peace terms, specifying concretely the meaning of "no annexations and no indemnities," as follows: "I. — Evacuation by the Germans of Russia, and autonomy of Poland, Lithuania, and the Lettish provinces. "2. — Autonomy of Turkish Armenia. "3. — Solution of the Alsace-Lorraine question by a plebiscite, the voting being arranged by local civil authorities after the removal of the troops of both belligerents. "4. — Restoration to Belgium of her old frontiers and compen sation for her losses from an international fund. "5. — Restoration of Serbia and Montenegro with similar com pensation, Serbia to have access to the Adriatic, Bosnia and Herze govina to be autonomous. ''6. — Disputed Balkan districts to receive provisional autonomy, followed by a plebiscite. "7. — Rumania to be restored her old frontiers on condition that she grant Dobrudja autonomy and grant equal rights to the Jews. "8.— Autonomy for the Italian provinces of Austria to be fol lowed by a plebiscite. "9. — Restitution of all colonies to Germany. "10. — Re-establishment of Greece and Persia. "11. — Neutralization of all straits leading to inner seas and 288 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA also the Suez and Panama Canals. Freedom of navigation for mer chant ships. Abolition of the right to torpedo merchant ships in war time. "12. — All belligerents to renounce war contributions or indem nities in any form, but the money spent on the maintenance of prisoners and all contributions levied during the war to be returned. "i3. — Commercial treaties not to be based on the peace treaty; each country may act independently with respect to its commercial policy, but all countries to engage to renounce an economic blockade after the war. "14. — The conditions of peace should be settled by a peace congress consisting of delegates elected by the people and con firmed by Parliament. Diplomats must engage not to conclude sepa rate treaties, which hereby arc declared contrary to the rights of the people, and consequently void. "15. — Gradual disarmament by land and sea, and the establish ing of a non-military system." The Executive Committee, which still placed emphasis on diplomacy and not on revolutionary action, delegated former Min ister of Labor Skobclef to present these terms as its delegate to the Conference of the Allies at Paris. But the Provisional Govern ment secretely advised the Allies against Skobclef,1 and Jules Cam- bon, of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, declared that "the Allied governments will absolutely refuse to consent to M. Sko bclef s taking part in the deliberations" of the Conference; and it was declared, moreover, that the Conference would discuss only military problems, and not problems of peace terms. The attitude of the Allies caused an immediate reaction in the Revolutionary Democracy, destroying completely the influence of the moderates and establishing firmly the ascendancy of the Bolsheviki, who ten days later realized their program of "All power to the Soviets." 'On October 29, Tcresclunko, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Kercnsky government, sent a secret telegram (subsequently published by the Bolshevik government) to the Russian Ambassador in London, reading in part as follows: "With regard to your conversation with Balfour, I deem it important to confirm that in our opinion the forthcoming Allied Conference shall have for its problem an appraisal of views of the Allies with regard to the same. At the same time the Conference should determine the means of further conduct of the war and mutual assistance which the Allies must show to each other. With regard to the participation at the Conference of a person [ Skobclef ] having the confidence of our Democracy, it is important to l>ear in mind that this person will be one of the personnel of the Russian government delegation, in whose name only its head wi'l speak officially." The hint was enough. This is proof that the Proviso. nai Government conspired secretly with imperialistic governments to continue the war and intrigued against the Revolutionary Democracy. BOLSHEVISM CONQUERS 289 AU through these days of storm and upheaval, in which the forces of a new revolution were accumulating strcngtth, the Pro visional Government was shifting toward the Right, and the more it drifted in that direction the greater became its isolation and its impotence. No action was taken on the pressing problems of the Revolution, on peace, on land, on reconstruction in general. The thunderbolt of complete chaos was about to shatter Russia. The government was a government of words, its policy the empty elo quence of Kerensky. The more the Government wavered, the firmer became the revolutionary policy of the Soviets. The ficti tious "unity of the parries" was rent asunder; compromise snapt under the impact of antagonisms that could no longer brook com promise. Two movements were converging upon the Provisional Government, bent upon its destruction: the movement from the Left, the Soviets, and the movenl from the Right, the imperialistic bourgeoisie. Kerensky, helpless, dazed, sickly, and a weakling, scolded alternately the Right and the Left, unaware that the issue was now definitely joined, that the basis of his dictatorship was destroyed ; and Kerensky, moreover, scolded the Allies for their unsympathetic attitude towards Russia's inability to fight. The climax of these events had come when the Bolsheviki bolted the Preliminary Parliament, and determined to convene an All-Russian Congress of Soviets to act independently and decisively upon th; vital problems of the Revolution. These two simple decisions were epochal. It was clear that they meant the overthrow of the Provis.onal Government, and it was so interpreted by all. As the Bolsheviki bolted the Preliminary Parliament, curses and imploring cries soared in a chorus through out the hall. The decision to convene an All-Russian Congress struck consternation among the moderates. The Executive Com mittee of the All-Russian Soviets refused to call a new Congress, compelling the Petrograd Soviet to take the initiative,— and this was a symbol of the waning power of the moderates and the calm, stern confidence of the revolutionary masses. This was in the middle of October, and as the Bolshcviki prepared for the Congress, the reactionary forces of the imperialistic bourgeoisie openly pre pared a coup against the Soviets and the Provisional Government. But the chief campaign was against thi convocation of the All- Russian Congress of Soviets: this was the decisive event. The Executive Committee declared against it, and sent instructions to the local Soviets not to participate; while its organ, the Isvcstya, directed an energetic campaign against the Congress. All the forces 20X) THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA of the counter-revolution, from the Centre to the Right, prepared to destroy the coming Congress, the imperialistic bourgeoisie bv means of a military coup d'etat. Thfc prevailing situation and the logic of events compelled the Bolshcviki to supplement their program for the Congress with a movement for an insurrection to overthrow the Provisional Gov eminent. At first, this projiosal met with small response ; but I e- nin," basing himself upon facts, declared in a systematic press campaign in Pravda that armed insurrection was absolutely neces sary to assure the convocation of the Congress and to thwart the plans for a coup d'etat being organized by the reactionary forces. The Provisional Government was planning the evacuation of Petro grad, Rodzianko declared the loss of Petrograd would dispose of the revolutionary workers and the Baltic Fleet. Realizing that the Petrograd troops were with the Bolsheviki, Kerensky on October 27 ordered the garison to the front; the troops refused, and retaliated by organizing the Military Revolutionary Committee, which played such an important part in the events culminating in the revolution of November 7. The action of the troops was ratified by the Petro grad Soviet. It was then discovered that the General Staff was formulating plans to seize Petrograd with the aid of reactionary regiments and forcibly prevent the meeting of the Soviet Congress ; and insurrection became inevitable, reinforced by the argument of Lenin that the insurrection should not wait until the Congress met, but that the Congress should be confronted with the accomplished fact of the overthrow of the Provisional Government. On November 6, the day before the insurrection, Kerensky ap peared before the Preliminary Parliament, and made a statement "authorised by the Provisional Government." Part of the statement follows: "I considered it my duty to cite for you the most definitely phrased passage from a number of proclamations published in the local paper Rabochy Put3 in the form of 'Letters to the Comrades' by Ulyanov-Lenin, the much-sought offender against the state who is now in hiding. This said offender against the state called upon the proletariat of Petrograd and upon the troops to repeat the ex periment of July 16-17, and argued in favor of the necessity of an 2Lenin, at this time, was still in hiding, the warrant for his arrest issued after the July uprising being still in force. But during all this time he directed the activity of the Bolsheviki; and, it is said, most of the time he was in Petrograd receiving delegations and issuing instructions. •This was the new name of the organ of the Bolsheviki, Pravda having been suppressed. BOLSHEVISM CONQUERS 20J immediate uprising. Thus, for example, in one of the issues contain ing the first of a scries of these proclamations, Ulyanov-Lenin wrote: 'On the 16th of October, in the morning, I learned that at a very important Bolshevist meeting in Petrograd the question of the uprising was being discussed in detail. At that meeting were present all who were prominent in the Bolshevist activities in the Capital, and only a negligible minority — two comrades — disapproved of the uprising. It is necessary to analyze their arguments and expose the grounds for tlieir hesitation in order to prove how dis graceful they are.' I shall not expatiate on the arguments in favor of an immediate armed uprising, but I must say that this same pro clamation ends in the following way: 'What arc you going to wait for? Are you waiting for a miracle? Are you waiting for the Constitutional Assembly? Are you waiting, you who are hungry! Kerensky has promised to call the Constitutional Assembly.' In the next appeal the very same Ulyanov definitely puts the question of an immediate uprising, and says that procrastination in this matter js equivalent to death. "Simultaneously with these appeals, .1 series of statements wen: ir-Mied b\ other leaders of the Bolshcviki at a number of meetings at which they called for an immediate armed uprising. In this respect, especially noteworthy are the speeches made by the Pres ident of the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates of Petro grad, Mr. Bronstein-Trotzky, and by some other organizers of the revolt "Thus, before the Preliminary Parliament I must state that a certain part of the population of Petrograd is now in a state of insurrection. (Remarks from the Right. "Is that what we have come to!") I have already proposed that a judicial investigation be started at once. (A noise.) I have ordered that arrests be made." (Disturbance on the extreme Left.) After this speech, the Preliminary Parliament passed a vote of confidence in Kercnsky by the small majority of 123 to 102. That night Kerensky ordered the suppression of the extreme radical and the extreme conservative papers, and reactionary soldiers seized the offices of Bolshevist papers. But that was all. The storm broke the next day, November 7, and the insurrection of the revolu tionary masses, directed by the Military Revolutionary Committee, dispersed the Preliminary Parliament and swept the Provisional Government into oblivion. There was some bitter fighting; the Bolsheviki seized the telephone and telegraph wires, and besieged the members of the Provisional Government in the Winter Palace; 292 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA but there was never any doubt of the outcome. The revolutionary masses secured a complete victory, the ministers of the Provisional Government were arrested, and Kerensky fled from Petrograd to the front to secure the adhesion of "loyal" troops, march upon Pet rograd and crush the scvolution The All-Russian Congress of Soviets convened at the Smolny institutc, confronted with the accomplished fact of the Provisional Government's overthrow. The Bolsheviki and the Social Revolu tionists of the Left, representatives of the peasants who accepted the Bolsheviki program, dominated the Congress. While the armed revolutionary masses were completing the work of overthrowing the government and preparing to meet the attack of any troops thai Kercnsky might hurl at Petrograd, the Congress heatedly de bated the problem of all power to the Soviets. A number of dele gates, a small number, wished to ignore the successful revolution of the proletariat, and yield all government power to the Constituent Assembly, the Congress, in the meanwhile, to suspend its sessions while a new bourgeois-coalition government was organized.4 But their arguments were brushed aside, and the Congress decreed that the Soviets should be constituted as the "overnment of Russia. The Congress elected a ministry in the form of a Council of People's C ommissaires, with Lenin as President of the Council (Premier) j.nd Trotzky as Commissairc of Foreign Affairs. In the meanwhile, Kerensky had succeeded in rallying some *L. A. 'Martov, on behalf of the Mcnshcvik-Intcrnarionalists, proposed the following resolution : Whereas, First, the coup d'etat which placed all authority in Petrograd in the hands of the Military Revolutionary Committee but a single day be fore the opening of the Congress, was accomplished by the action of ,the Bolsheviki Party alone, and by means which were exclusively military in their nature; and, Whereas, Second, this coup d'etat threatens to produce bloodshed, civil war and a triumph of the counter-revolution which will drown in blood the entire proletarian movement and thereby destroy all the achievements of the Revolution ; and, Whereas, 'third, tlie sole remedy for this situation, which might still prevent the outbreak of civil war, is an agreement between the insurgent section of the democracy and the remaining democratic organizations, con cerning the formation of a democratic government that would be recognized by the whole revolutionary democracy and to whom the Provisional Gov ernment could hand over its authority without a struggle; Therefore, the Menshevik Fraction calls upon the Congress to recog nize officially the absolute necessity of an amicable settlement of the crisis thus iirodueed, by forming a governnunt composed of representatives of all the democratic elements; and the Mcnshevil'-lnternationalists, with thU purpose in \ic\v, offer the Congress to ap|x>int a delegation to consult with the otlier organs of democracy and with all the socialistic parties. And, until the results of the work of this delegation shall become ap parent, the Menshcvik-Internationalist Fraction proposes to the Congress that it discontinue its lalwrs BOLSHEVISM CONQUERS 293 troops and marched upon Petrograd, simultaneously issuing procla mations. The revolutionary troops and masses marched out to meet the invaders, armed with tons of revolutionary literature. There was some fighting and more fraternizing and discussion; Kerensky's "army" melted away, and seeing that all was lost, Ker ensky fled, against the advice of his officers who urged that he ap pear in Petrograd even should he be placed under arrest. The proletarian revolution had conquered. But it still had to pass through a period of civil war and international complications that was to test its capacity, virility and integrity. Upon the basis of its magnificent achievements culminating in the events of Novem ber 7, the proletarian revolution prepared confidently and resolutely to meet coming events. The problem of the Revolution, that each development and each crisis emphasized, was: the destruction of the Soviets, or all power to the Soviets. But all power to the Soviets necessarily meant a proletarian revolution, the assumption of power by the revolutionary proletariat, leading on the poorest masses of the peasantry, And, considering the Russian Revolution retrospectively and in whole, we realize that its fundamental aspect is the develop ment, through hesitation, compromise, temporary defeat and ulti mate victory, of a proletarian revolution. The rapidity of events should not obscure their developmental character. As a revolutionary process, the proletarian revolution in Russia developed through all the necessary stages. The overthrow of Czarism resulted in the establishment of the imperialistic bour geois republic of the Mijyukov-Guchkov government. But the frankly imperialistic character of this government was incompat ible with the stage on which it operated. Imperialism was under mined by the oncoming proletarian revolution, and Imperialism had to camouflage itself in the colors of radical democracy to promote its purposes and preserve Capitalism. The camouflage assumed the form of the "radical-Socialist" government of the coalition and of Kerensky. This is a significant development. That period conies in Capitalism when, shaken by the oncoming proletarian revolution, it adopts as a last bulwark of defense the "radical democracy" of the moderate labor and Socialist movement, which is dominantly the movement of skilled labor and the petit bourgeoisie. This pheno menon assumed the form of "laborism" in Australia, where the "labor" government became the centre of Imperialism and bour geois reaction against the revolution. It seems, apparently, that a similar development may occur in England, where the Labor Party, 294 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA through its slogan of a "democratic peace," promoted the war and icaction, and is the party of social-imperialistic State Capitalism as against the proletarian revolution. Democracy serves to promote Imperialism, and democracy may serve to prevent, temporarily, the proletarian revolution. The "radical" bourgeois republic of the Mcnshcvist-Kercnsky government was precisely of this character -—the final stage of the republic of Capitalism. Pluming itself as revolutionary, it acted against the Revolution ; it put pacifism in the service of Imperialism; it used Socialism to deceive the masses; it incorporated within itself the "revolutionary democracy" of mode rate Socialism to provide Capitalism with a new lease of life. But this final stage of Capitalism multiplies the inherent contradictions of Capitalism, and is temporary. The "Socialism" of a bourgeois government is in the very nature of things mere camouflage, and be ing such it acts as a developer of class consciousness and revolution ary Socialism. The oncoming proletarian revolution in Russia, passing through a series of defeats which alternately weakened Cap italism and strengthened the Revolution, finally annihilated the bourgeois-"Socialist'' republic. The proletarian revolution in Russia was not an isolated or arbitrary seizure of power, as was the Paris Commune ; it was the outcome of an historical development charact eristic of the proletarian revolution as a process of action and development. Proclamation issued by Lenin, as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissaires, November 18, 1917. Comrades : Workers, Soldiers, Peasants, All who Toil ! The workers' and peasants' Revolution has finally been victor ious in Petrograd, scattering and capturing the last remnants of the small bands of Cossacks duped by Kerensky. In Moscow the Revo lution was successful even before a few trainloads of our fighting forces arrived there from Petrograd.. In Moscow the Junkers and other Kornilovitcs have accepted the conditions of peace: the disarming of the Junkers, the dissolution of the "committees of safety." From the front and from the provinces there flows in, daily and hourly, news of the support by the overwhelming majority of the soldiers in the trenches end by the peasants in their villages of the new government and its decrees on peace and giving the land to the peasants. The success of the Revolution of workers and peasants is assured, for the majority of the people have already come out in its favor. BOLSHEVISM CONQUERS 295 It is quite clear that the landholders and capitalists, the chinov- niks (bureaucracy) and office-holders, closely connected with the bourgeoisie, in a word, all those who are rich or who arc aiding the rich, will be hostile to the new Revolution, will oppose its success, will threaten to cease the activity of the banks, will disorganize or stop the work of certain institutions, will spread confusion and sabotage in every way, directly and indirectly. Every class con scious worker knows very well that wc must inevitably meet with such opposition, that the higher officials are opposed to the people and will not surrender their charges to the people without opposi tion. The toiling classes are in no way intimidated by this opposi tion, not for a moment do they tremble before the threats and; sabotage of the supporters of the bourgeoisie. Behind us arc the majority of the people. Behind us arc the majority of the toilers and the oppressed of all the world. We are fighting in the cause of justice, and our victory is certain. The opposition of the capitalists and of the higher officials will be broken. Not a man will be deprived by us of his possessions Avithout a special law for the nationalization of the banks and syndi cates. This law is being drawn up. Not a single worker will be de- ptived of a copek ; on the contrary, aid will be given him. Without establishing any new imposts, for the present, the Government will first take up the task of a strict supervision and control of the collection of taxes already established, without any concealment whatever. In the name of these just demands, the vast majority of the people have rallied around the Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government. Comrades and Toilers: Remember that it is you who now con trol the government. No one will help you unless you yourself unite and take all government functions into your hands. From now on your Soviets arc the organs of government power, fully authorized, decisive organs. Rally around your Soviets. Strengthen them. Take hold your selves of this task, from below, and wage relentless warfare on all attempts at anarchy on the part of drunkards, hooligans, counter- revolutionists, Junkers, Kornilovites. Introduce strict control over production and an inventory of products. Arrest and bring before the revolutionary tribunals of the people, all persons who injure the cause of the people, whether this injury takes the form of sabotage (destruction and interruption) of production, or that of hoarding supplies of grains or products, 296 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA or that of holding up carloads of grain, or disorganizing the activity of the railroads, telegraph, post office, and in general, any form of opposition to the great common cause of peace, of assuring to the worker control over the production and distribution of goods. Comrades: workers, soldiers, peasants, all who toil! Put all the power in your districts into the hands of your Soviets. Pre serve and guard as the apple of your eye, the land, grain, the fac tories, tools, products, transportation — al! these are henceforth your common possession. Gradually, in agreement with the major ity of the peasantry, and with their approval, as we learn the les sons of their practical experience and that of the workers, we shall advance steadfastly and unwaveringly to the realization of Social ism, in which we shall be aided by the advanced workers of the most civilized countries and which will give to the nations perma nent peace and delivery from all oppression and from all exploita tion. Ill DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT AND CIVIL WAR The proletarian state, brought into being by the revolution of November 7 and by the fiat of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, was a state representing exclusively the producing masses, a state of the federated Soviets. It was, in its fundamentals, the expres sion of proletarian state requirements as determined by the prevail ing revolutionary tasks, and as projected by the Paris Commune.1 'The working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state ma chinery, and wield it for its own puiposes. . . The Commune was formed of the various municipal councillors, chosen by universal suffrage in various wards of the town, responsible and revocable it short terms. The majority of its members were naturally workingmen, or acknowledged representa tives of the working class. The Commune was to be a working, not a parlia- mentary, body, executive and legislative at the same time. Instead of con tinuing to be the agent of the central Government, the police was at once stripped of its political attributes and turned into the responsible and at all times revocable agent of the Commune So were the officials of all other branches of the administration. From the members of the Commune down wards, the public service had to be done at workmen's idagcs. The vested interests and the representation allowances of the high dignitaries of State disappeared along with the high dignitaries themselves. Public functions ceased to be the private property of the tools of the central Government. Not only municipal administration, btit the whole initiative hitherto exer cised by the State was laid into the hands of the Commune. . . . The Paris Commune w*as, of course, to serve as a model to all the great industrial centers of France. The communal regime once established in Paris and the secondary centres, the old centralized Government would in the provinces, too, have to give way to the self-government of the producers. In a rough sketch of national organization which the Commune liad no time to develop, it is clearly stated that the Commune was to be the political form of even the smallest country hamlet, and that in the rural districts the standing army was to be replaced by a national militia, with an extremely short term of service. The rural communes of delegates in the central town, and these district assemblies were again to send deputies to the National Delegation in Paris, each delegate to be at any time revocable and l>ound by the inandat impcratif (formal instructions) of his constituents. The few im portant functions which still would remain for a central government were not to be supresscd, as has intentionally been misstated, but were to be . discharged by communal, and therefore strictly responsible, agents. The unity of the nation was not to be broken; but, on the contrary, to be organ ized by the Communal Constitution, and to become a reality by the destruc tion of the State power which claimed to be the embodiment of that unity independent of, and superior to, the nation itself, from which it was but a parasitic excrescence. . . . The Communal Constitution brought the rural 2*98 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA The new government was the Soviets, federated and assuming all the functions of the state, — the self-government of the producing class. The local Soviet was the local authority of government, elected directly by the suffrage of the workers in the factories and the peasants in the fields; these elections were frequent, and the representatives were at all times freely recallable by their constitu ents. The local Soviets elected delegates to the All-Russian Con gress of Soviets, on the basis of proportional representation, and this Congress was the supreme governing body of Russia. The Congress elected the members of the Council of People's Commis- saires, and a Central Executive Committee, also on the basis of pro portional representation ; this Committee sat permanently during the intervals between sessions of the Congress, and directed the activity of the Council of People's Commissaircs. At the session of the Congress, each Commissaire and the Ccntr:.I Executive Com mittee rendered reports ; the decision of the Congress on all matters was supreme. The new regime abolished the parliamentary system and the complicated bureaucratic machinery of the bourgeois state; it united legislative and executive functions. This flexible system of government was instantly responsive to the will of the people; it was the utmost in democracy, — not that bourgeois democracy which is simply a form of authority of the appropriating over the produc ing class, but the free, conscious expression of the initiative, activity and interests of the organized producers. The Soviet state presents, however, a dual character: it is a democracy in its attitude and relation to the producing class, but a stern and unrelenting dictatorship toward the bourgeoisie. This dual character is the expression of the transition period from Cap italism to Socialism, of the requirements of crushing the resistance of the counter-revolutionary elements, destroying the political power of the Capitalist Class, completing the destruction of the bourgeois regime, and gradually introducing the relations and insti tutions of Communist Socialism. In this transition period the state assumes the form of a dictatorship of the revolutionary proletariat, an instrument for the crushing of the bourgeoisie in the inevitable civil war. Civil war ensued immediately upon the assumption of power by producers under the intellectual lead of the cei.tral towns of their districts, and there secured to them, in the workingmen, the natural trustees of their interests. ... It was essentially a working class government, the product of the struggle of the producing against the appropriating class, the poltical form at last discovered under which to work out the economic emancipation of labor.— Karl Marx, The Civil War in France. DICTATORSHIP AND CIVIL WAR 299 the revolutionary proletariat and peasantry through the Soviets. The ultimate test of the proletarian revolution is the test of armed force, since the ruling class and its allies will resort to the des peration of revolt to crush the proletarian regime. The supremacy of the proletariat, accordingly, inevitably means civil war, more or less intense according to circumstances; the transition period being characterized by civil war, the proletarian state retains the repressive character of the old state until the bourgeoisie is completely crushed. The state is an instrument of coercion: the bourgeois state is an instrument for the coercion of the proletariat; the revolutionary proletarian state — the dictatorship of the prole tariat — is an instrument for the coercion of the bourgeoisie, until the complete ascendancy of Socialism renders repression unnecess ary, when the state as state, utterly disappears. In the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels projected a determining phase of the proletarian revolution: "The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees all capital from the bourgeoisie; to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the state — that is, of the proletariat organized as the ruling class; and to increase the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible Of course, in the beginning this cannot be effected ex cept by means of despotic inroads on the rights of property and on the conditions of bourgeois production; by measures, therefore which appear economically insufficient and untenable, but which, in the course of the movement, outstrip themselves, necessitate further inroads upon the old social order and are unavoidable as a means of entirely revolutionizing the mode of production." And in his Criti- cism of the Gotha Program Marx says: "Between the capitalist and the communist systm of society lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. This corresponds to a political transition period, whose state can be nothing else than the 1 evolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat." The theory of Marx is the practice of the proletarian revolution in Russia, The dic tatorship of the proletariat ruthlessly annihilates the rights and ideology of the old regime, and relentlessly crushes all counter revolutionary movements. Civil war being a phase of the transition from Capitalism to Socialism, the dictatorship of the proletariat is constrained to use force in its struggle against the counter-revolution. But the use of force is not a finality: it is a process of revolutionary develop ment. The use of force is as temporary as the dictatorship of the proletariat itself: a necessary means of pushing on the Revolution 300 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA to the pont where force and dictatorship are each equally unnecess ary because their functions have become unnecessary. The first problem of the Soviet state, accordingly, was to emerge victorious out of the civil war which immediately broke loose. Th«; defeat of Kercnsky at Gatchina. on November 14, disposed of Ker ensky, but it did not dispose of the efforts of the counter-revolution to crush the new proletarian regime. Many of the revolts against the new regime were organized by the military clique, led by Kalcdine, Kornilov & Co. The revolts of of the Cossacks were particularly menacing, and were crushed only by the heroic activity of the Red Guards. The Red Guard played a very important role in the civil war during the Soviet regime. It consisted almost wholly of armed workingmen, militant class con scious, who thoroughly understood the Revolution, were willing to die for it, and acted as the dynamic centre of the revolutionary masses in action. But the military opposition to ihe Soviet govern ment was almost negligible; the real oppo-ition came from other sources, and in a more threatening manner. The bourgeoisie and the propertied classes generally, including the petite bourgeoisie, were almost a solid mass in opposition to the Soviets. Of this opposition, that of the imperialistic bourgeoisie itself was the least important; it was the opposition of the middle class and the petty bourgeois intelligentsia which proved most for midable. And this opposition expressed itself in the form of sabot age; that is to say, the intelligentsia and the middle class generally refused to co-operate with the Soviets in the reconstruction of the country and did all in their power to hamper this reconstruction. Technicians refused their service in industry; school teachers went on strike; men and women of specialized ability refused to co operate with the constituted bodies of reconstruction. Men and women of the bourgeoisie, in hospitals, in charity organizations, t very where their service were needed, indulged in sabotage, either by open refusal of work or by cunningly interfering with the nor mal course of things. And the lies, the slanders — the output was enormous. The intelligentsia, the petty bourgeois intellectuals and professionals, constituted an active and venomous centre of resist ance to the Workers' and Peasants' Government. In this attitude, the petite bourgeoisie demonstrated in practice the rcvoultionary Socialist theory that it is the greatest enemy of the jiroletarian revolution, before and after the event. The proletarian revolution means the supremacy of the great mass of the people, of the propertilcss workers and peasants; unless these great masses DICTATORSHIP AND CIVIL WAR 301 appear upon the stage of events and determine the activity of the state, there is no proletarian revolution. In this sense, the prole tarian revolution goes to the heart of things ; it means a fundamental change, the reversal of relations in bourgeois society, where the "intellectuals" order and the masses obey. The masses in Russia had become conscious, determining the activity of the government and of the society. Against this new dispensation of things — surely "the end of the world !" — the petite bourgeoisie revolted in dismay and anger, refusing to have anything to do with masses that did not pay it homage. All the pettiness, all the arrogance, all the hypocrisy of the bourgeois system of things, which to the bourgeoisie itself are simply instruments of oppression, become in the souls of the petite bourgeoisie principles, ideals, aspirations of eternal fitness and beauty. "Since the masses refuse our tutelage, let us leave the masses to their fate!" But the masses are determined, aggressive, uncompromising; Revolution has set loose their latent energy and initiative ; they icveal unsuspected reserves of heroism, capacity and daring: the intelligentsia will yet submit to the authority of the masses. . . . The moderate Socialists were equally active against the regime of the revolutionary workers and peasants ; in fact, they constituted a merciless, inexorable opposition. The Mensheviki, including ( jeorge Plekhanov, I. G. Tseretelli, and even the "internationalist" Martov, issued declarations brinding the Revolution of November 7 and the assumption of power by the Soviets as a "crime." The Social-Revolutionists of the Right, during the week after the Bolshevist coup issued proclamations against the Bolsheviki. These moderate Socialists adopted the policy and attitude of the petite bourgeoisie, proving a relentless enemy of the proletarian revolu tion. Lenin had said that the institution of the Soviet Republic would pave the way for the peaceful, creative struggle of parties within the Soviets; but the moderates rejected the peaceful struggle within the Soviets, of party against party, program against prog ram: they resorted to conspiracy, force, terrorism against the rev- I'lutionary proletarian government of the Soviets. The "old guard" of the struggle against Czarism, animated by the ideology of the .petite bourgeoisie, resorted to similar tactics: Vladimir Burtsev con spired as in the old days; Boris Savinkov organized terrorist plots against the Soviet authority as he had organized terrorism against Czarism; Tschaikovsky declared at the Railway Workers' Conven tion in January that terrorism would be used against the Bolsheviki as in the days of Czarism. Nor was this mere threatening: terror- 30-2 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA ism was actually organized, and only the solidity of the Soviets, the support of the revolutionary masses, rendered the terrorist cam paign unsuccessful. Moderate Socialism has much to atone for. It is the arch enemy of the proletariat and of Socialism. In all nations it is the curse of the revolutionary movement. Moderate Socialism in Rus sia might have been forgiven its attitude prior to November 7; its f'.cts thereafter will be forever an indelible brand of shame. The international proletariat will learn from the history of the war, from the history of the Russian Revolution, that the proletarian revolu tion must necessarily wage a merciless, uncompromising struggle against moderate Socialism, which in its tendency is counter-revolu tionary. The Soviet government used drastic measures against the counter-revolution. Its policy was unwavering and stern; the hesi tancy of the coalition regime was a thing of the past. The Provis ional Government possessed no solidity because there was no solid class behind it, simply a fictitious unity of parties; it could not, under the conditions, determine upon and adhere to an uncompromising | olicy. But the Soviet Government was reared upon the solid basis of the revolutionary proletariat ; it could, and did, adopt a consistent, courageous and uncompromising policy. The counter-revolutionary revolts were crushed ruthlessly, not simply by armed force, but by intensifying class antagonism and thereby splitting the opposition; as among the Cossacks, for example, where the solid support of Kalcdine was divided by means of Cossacks' Soviets, organizing the propertilcss Cossacks against those of property. Against the intel ligentsia coercive measures were adopted, the only way to convince them of the futility of their course. The bourgeoisie was attacked by means of the expropriation of large enterprises and by a rigid workers' control of industry, the drastic regulation of the economic activity of the country. Perhaps the most effective measure against the opposition in general was the exclusion of the bourgeoisie from participation in the government, — which is another necessary fea ture of the dictatorship of the proletariat. And underlying all these measures was the Soviets' merciless use of mass terror against th-** counter-revolution. The armed struggle against the counter-revolution raged throughout Russia, and spread into Finland and the Ukraine, where Ihe struggle between the revolutionary workers and peasants and the bourgeoisie assumed a particularly violent form. The revolu tionists in Finland and the Ukraine were assisted bv the Bolsheviki DICTATORSHIP AND CIVIL WAR 3<3J fcnd the Red Guards, but were unsuccessful because of the interven tion of Austro-German troops, who were invited to invade the coun try in order to strike at the Revolution. The attitude of the Bolshe viki toward Finland and the Ukraine was to grant them their in dependence, trusting to the natural affinity of proletarian govern ments to unite ; and then did all in their power to produce the victory of the proletarian revolution in Finland and the Ukraine. IV THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY The Constituent Assembly was an important issue in the course of the Revolution. It represented an aspiration of democratic Rus- s;a, and particularly precious in the eyes of the petit bourgeois democracy. But Coalition Government after Coalition Government had postponed its convocation; Kerensky called conference after conference, and finally issued a call for the Constituent Assembly only under pressure, The Bolsheviki made much of the postpon- ments of the Assembly, not because they considered it important in itself, but because its postponement was an expression of the coun ter-revolutionary character of the Provisional Government. The Constituent Assembly was an expression of the bourgeois demo cratic revolution; after the proletarian revolution, it was super fluous. The Soviet Government, however, allowed the Constituent Assembly to convene on January 18. The situation was instinct with a fatal logic: if the Constituent Assembly accepted the authority of the Soviet Government, it was as an institution unnecessary, and after ratifying the accomplished fact of November 7 it would disperse; if it set itself against the Soviet authority, it was counter-revolutionary and would have to be dissolved by force, if necessary. The Constituent Assembly was in session one day. It had a majority of Social-Revolutionists of the Right. The chairman of the All-Russian Soviet Executive Committee, Sverdlov, read a declaration declaring Russia a Federal Soviet Republic, and recog nizing the authority and measures of the Soviet Government. The declaration was decisively defeated. The Bolsheviki and Social- Revolutionists of the Left, who were about a third of the delegates, thereupon withdrew from the Assembly, after reading the following proclamation : "The great majority of toiling Russia, the workers, peasants and soldiers, have demanded that the Constituent Assembly recog nize the results of the great November Revolution, the Soviets' THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY 3°5 proclamation regarding land, peace and control of working condi tions, and above all, that it should recognize the Soviet Govern ment. Fulfilling this demand of the great majority of Russian working classes, the All-Russian Executive Committee has proposed to the Constituent Assembly that it should recognize this demand as binding. The majority of the Constituent Assembly has, how ever, in accordance with the demands of the bourgeoisie, refused to approve this proposition, thereby throwing a challenge of battle to all of toiling Russia. The Social-Revolutionary right wing, the party of Kercnsky, Avksentycv and Chernov, has obtained the majority in the Constituent Assembly. This party, which calls itself a Social Revolutionary Party, is directing the fight of bour geois elements against the workers' revolution and in reality is a bourgeois counter-revolutionary party. The Constituent Assembly in its present state is a result of the relative party power in force before the great November Revolution. The present counter-rev olutionary majority of the Constituent Assembly, elected on the basis of the obsolete party li>ts, is trying to resist the movement of the workers and peasants. The day's discussions have clearly shown that the Social-Revolutionary Party of the Right Wing, as in the time of Kercnsky, makes concessions to the people, promis ing them everything, but in reality has decided to fight against the Soviet Government, against the Socialistic measures to give the land and all its appurtenances to the peasants without compensation, to nationalize the banks and to annul the debts of the nation. "Without wishing for a moment to conceal the crimes of the enemies of the people, wc announce that wc are withrawing from the Constituent Assembly in order to let the Soviet power finally decide the question of its relation toward the counter revolutionary part of the Constituent Assembly." The very same day the Constituent Assembly was dispersed by the bayonets of the Red Guard; and on January 19 the Soviet Government issued a decree officially dissolving the Assembly. The Revolution, declared the decree of dissolution, created the Workers' and Soldiers' Soviet — the only organization able to direct the strug gle of the exploited classes for complete political and economic liberation ; this Soviet constituted a revolutionary government through the November Revolution, after perceiving the illusion of an understanding with the bourgeoisie and its deceptive parliament ary organization ; the Constituent Assembly, being elected from the old election lists, and intended to be the crown of the bourgeois 3°° THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA parliamentary republic, necessarily became the authority of the bourgeois republic, setting itself against the Revolution of Novem ber and the authority of the Soviet Government ; the old bourgeois parliamentarism has had its day and is incompatible with the tasks before Socialism ; hence it was unavoidable that the Constituent Assembly, necessarily counter-revolutionary, should be dissolved.1 Any other attitude of the Soviet Government would have been self-stultification. The proletarian revolution is relentlessly logical. It is a denial of bourgeois democracy. It is openly a dictatorship. Its practice must be in accord with its theory — otherwise the prole tarian revolution limps, degrades itself, and prepares the forces for its destruction. The Soviet Government was organized not as a representative of all classes, but as the representative of the rev olutionary masses, the dictatorship of the proletariat. It had to act accordingly. All democracy is relative, is class democracy. As an historical category, democracy is the instrument of a class: bourgeois demo cracy is the form of expression of the tyranny of Capitalism, the form of authority of the oppressing class over the oppressed class. The democracy of Socialism annhilates the democracy of Capital ism — relative, authoritarian democracy is superseded by the actual ity of the full and free democracy of Communist Socialism. The proletarian revolution does not allow the "ethical concepts" of bourgeois democracy to interfere in its course; it ruthlessly casts aside bourgeois democracy in the process of establishing proletarian democracy. Capitalism hypocritically insisits upon a government of all the classes, which in reality is the government of one class, the capitalist class; the jiroletarian revolution frankly institutes the government of one class — the proletariat — which ultimately means the end of "government" as hitherto constituted. The state is an instrument of coercion; but where the bourgeois state considers itself as sacrosanct and eternal, the revolutionary proletarian state considers itself a temporary necessity that will gradually become superfluous in the measure that the process of reconstruction ¦ 'It is said: if the Bolsheviki were right in dissolving the Constituent Assembly, why did they emphasize its convocation as one of their demands prior to the November Revolution? A measure may correspond to an earlier stage of the Revolution, and not to a later. Proposed measures are developmental, not static. The November Revolution having organized a revolutionary proletarian government, the Constituent Assembly corresponded to an older, outgrown set of fads, and was no longer necessary: it had to be dispersed. THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY 307 emerges definitely into the Socialist Communist society of the organized, self-governing producers. The Constituent Assembly was an expression of government of all the classes, of the bourgeois regime; it was, accordingly,' necessarily and essentially a reaction against the proletarian rev olution. Moreover, the Constituent Assembly was a phase of the parliamentary regime of the bourgeois republic. The parliamentary system is not an expression of fundamental democracy, but of the ruling requirements of Capitalism. Parliamentarism, presumably representing all the classes, actually represents the requirements of the ruling class alone, — with due consideration to "concessions" to the subject class. The division of functions in the parliamentary system into legislative and executive has for its direct purpose the indirect smothering of the opposition — the legislature talks and represents "democracy," while the executive acts autocratically. Socalism can not conquer Capitalism by assuming control of and using the parliamentary system: the system must be destroyed; and Socialism, accordingly, actually or potentially, prepares the norms of the proletarian state, the state of the industrnally organized producers. The proletarian revolution annhilates the parliamentary system and its division of functions, legislative and executive being united into one working body, — as in the Soviets of Workers and Peasants. The parliamentary state is purely territorial ; the prole tarian state, during its period of dictatorship, is territorial and in dustrial, until it emerges definitely into Socialism, when the state disappears, being replaced by the "administration of things," an industrial "state" functioning through the organized producers. During its one day's session, the Constituent Assembly adopted a number of resolutions, declaring Russia a Democratic Federated Republic; abolishing "forever. . .the right to privately own land," placing all land, mines, forests and waters under the control of the Republic, making the use of these "free to all citizens of the Russian Republic, regardless of nationality or creed." Another resolution, "expressing the firm will of the people to immediately discontinue the war and conclude a just and general peace, appeals to the Allied countries proposing to define jointly the exact terms of a demo cratic peace acceptable to all the belligerent nations, in order to present these terms, in behalf of the Allies, to the Governments fighting against the Russian Rcpublc and her Allies." . . . "Ex pressing, in the name of the people of Russia, its regret that the negotiations with Germany, which were started without a prelhni- 3°8 THE PROLETARIAN KLVOLUTION IN RUSSIA nary agreement with the Allied democracies, have assumed the character of negotiations for a separate peace, the Constituent Assembly, in the name of the peoples of the Russian Federal Re public, while continuing the armistice, accepts the further carrying on of the negotiations with the countries warring against us in order to work towards a general democratic peace which shall be in accordance with the people's will and protect Russia's interests." Shortly after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, the All-Russian Soviet Congress approved the action of its Executive Committee in dissolving the Assembly, and about the same time a Peasant's Assembly also ratified the dissolution. The peasants, through the Social-Revolutionists of the Left, now the dominant factor in the Social-Revolutionary Party and who accepted the program of the Bolsheviki and the Soviets, approved not only the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly but the general legislative measures of the Soviet regime. Declaration of the Soviet Executive Committee, read at the opening session of the Constituent Assembly for adoption, and refected: I l. — Russia is to be declared a Republic of the workers', sold iers' and peasants' Soviets. All power in the cities and in the coun try belongs to the Soviets. 2. — The Russian Soviet Republic is based on the free feder ation of free peoples, on the federation of National Soviet Repub lics. II Recognizing as its duty the destruction of all exploitation of the workers, the complete abolition of the class system of society, and the placing of society on a Socialistic basis, and the ultimate bringing about of a victory for Socialism in every country, the Constituent Assembly decides further: i .--The socializing of land will be carried out, private owner ship of land will be abolished, all the land is proclaimed to be the common property of the people and will be given to the toiling people without compensation on the principle of equal right to use the land. All the forests, mines and waters, which are of social import- THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY 300. ance, as also all living and other property, and all agricultural enterprises will be declared national property. 2. — To confirm the Soviets' law concerning the control of working conditions, the highest Council of National Economy!, which is the first step in bringing about the ownership by the Soviets of the factories, mines, railroads and means of production and transportation as property of the Soviet Republic. 3. — To confirm the transferring of all banks over into the hands of the Soviet Republic, which is one of the steps in the freeing of the toiling masses from the yoke of Capitalism. 4. — To enforce general compulsory labor, in order to destroy the class of parasites and to organize economic life. In order to make the power of the toiling masses secure and to hinder the restoration of the rule of exploiters, the toiling masses will be armed and a Red Guard, composed of workingmen and peasants, formed, and the exploiting classes will be disarmed. Ill 1. — Declaring its firm determination to free society from the claws of Capitalism and Imperialism, which have drenched the country in blood in this, the most criminal of all wars, the Consti tuent Assembly accepts completely the policy of the Soviets, whose duty it is to publish all secret treaties, to organize the most extensive faternization among the workers and peasants of the warring armies, and to bring about by the use of revolutionary methods a democratic peace among the nations without annexations and in demnities, on the basis of free self-determination of the nations — at any price. 2. — For this purpose the Constituent Assembly demands com plete separation from the brutal policy of the bourgoisie, which is furthering the well-being of exploiters among a few selected na tions by enslaving hundreds of millions of the toiling people, in colonics generally and in small countries. The Constituent Assembly accepts the policy of the Council of People's Conimissaircs, which has given complete independence to Finland, begun the transferring of soldiers from Persia, and declared for Armenia the right of self-determination, A first blow to international bank and finance capital, declares the Constituent Assembly, is a law which annuls those loans made by the governments of the Czar, of landowners and bourgeoisie; and that the Soviet Government is to continue firmly on this road 310 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA until the final victory from the yoke of capital is won through the international workers' revolt. As the Constituent Assembly was elected rn the basis of the lists of candidates nominated before the November Revolution, when the people as a whole could not yet rise against their exploit ers, and did not know the extent of the latter's might of opposition in defending their own privileges, and had not yet begun to create a Socialistic society, the Constituent Assembly would consider it, even from a formal point of view, as unjust to put itself against the Soviet power. The Constituent Assembly is of the opinion that now, in the decisive moment of the struggle of the people against the exploiters, the exploiters cannot have any seat in any of the Government organizations. Power must completely and without exception belong to the people and to the authoriative represen tatives — to the workers', soldiers' and peasants Soviets. Supporting the Soviet rule and accepting the orders of the Council of People's Commissaires, the Constituent Assembly ac knowledges that its duty is to outline a form for the reorganization of society on a Socialistic basis. Striving at the same time to organize a free and voluntary, and thereby also a complete and strong union among the toiling classes of all the Russian nationalities, the Constituent Assembly is content to outline the basis of the federation of Russian Soviet Republics, leaving to the people, to workingmen and soldiers, to decide for themselves in their own Soviet meetings, whether they arc willing, and on what conditions, to join the federated government and other unions of the Soviet enterprises. These great principles are to be published without delay and the official representatives of the Soviets are required to read them at the opening of the Constituent Assembly. These principles are the working basis of the Assembly. Decree of the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviets officially dissolving the Constituent Assembly: The Russan Revolution has from the beginning put to the fore the workers' and peasants' Soviets as a mass organization of all workers and exploited classes, which is the only body capable of directing the struggle of these classes for their complete political and economic liberation. During the first period of the Revolution the Soviets increased, developed and were strengthened, on the THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY 311 basis of their own experience, rejecting the idea of the possibility of a compromise with the bourgeoisie and rejecting the deceptive bourgeois democratic parliamentary formalities, coming, in practice. to the conclusion that the liberation of the oppressed classes is im possible unless all such formalities and compromises are rejected. These relations were finally broken by the November Revolution which gave complete power to the Soviets. The Constituent As sembly, elected on the basis of the lists prepared prior to the Nov ember Revolution, was the result of the relative party power in force at the time when the government was composed of men favoring a policy of compromise with the Cadets. The people could not at that time, when there were only Social-Revolutionary candidates, differentiate between the supporters of the Right Wing Social- Revolutionists, the supporters of the bourgeoisie, and the Left Wing, supporters of Socialism. Therefore, this Constituent Assembly which was intended to be the crown of the bourgeois parliamentary republic, because of its very composition, had to oppose the Nov ember Revolution and the Soviet Government. The November Revolution, which gave power to the So\iets and through them to the workers and exploited class, was strongly opposed by the exploit er. The crushing of this opposition clearly showed the beginning of a Socialist revolution. The working class became convinced by their experience that the old parliamentarism had outlived its time, that it could not comply with the realization of the tasks of Social ism, and that, not the social but only class institutions, such as the Soviets, are capable of crushing the opposition of the propertied classes and to lay the foundations of a Socialistic commonwealth. The refusal of the Soviets to use their full power and to aban don the Soviet Republic, which is supported by the people, on be half of bourgeois parliamentarism and of Constituent Assembly, would now be a step backward and lead to the destruction of the November Revolution. The majority in the Constituent Assembly, which opened on the 18th of this month, is composed of the Social-Revolutionary Party's Right Wing, the party of Kercnsky, Avksentyev and Chernov. It is but natural that this party refused to take under consideration the complete, exact and clear proposition of the highest body of the Soviet Government, which proposition in no way could have been misunderstood, and that it refused to accept the proclamation of the rights of the toiling and exploited people and to recognize the Nov ember Revolution and the Soviet Government. Thus the Consti tuent Assembly broke all its ties with Russian Soviet Republic. The 3 12 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA Bolsheviki and the left wing Social-Revolutionists, who are sup ported by the great majority of the workers and peasants, were under such conditions compelled to withdraw from this Constituent As sembly. Ouside of the Constituent Assembly, the members of the Social-Revolutionary Right Wing and the Mensheviki, the majority in the Constituent Assembly, are openly fighting against the Soviet Government, agitating in their newspapers that their supporters overthrow this government, and thus they are supporting exploiters who arc opposing the transferring of land and factories to the workers and peasants. It is thus clear that the remaining part of the Constituent Ass embly can give their support only to the bourgeois counter-revolution in its fight to crush the Soviets. Therefore, the Executive Com mittee of the Soviets has decided to dissolve the Constituent Ass embly. PART SIX The Revolutionary Struggle for Peace By LEON TROTZKY and N. LENIN INTRODUCTION In the problem of peace the Soviet Government met a crucial test. As this problem had been a vital issue in the struggle against the Provisional Government, it was now a vital issue in the activity of the Workers' and Peasants' Government. The great masses of the people yearned for peace; and yet the problem was not as simple as all that. Peace had to be considered in relation to the Revolution, and the struggle for peace must be in accord v hh the policy of the Revolution. The first move toward the conclusion of peace was the offer of the Soviet Government to all belligerents to declare an armistice on all fronts and open general peace negotiations, A day or two after this offer was made, Leon Trotzky, Commissaire of Foreign Affiirs, delivered an address in Petrograd, to an audience of 12,000 people, in which he said: "In this building on November 5 I spoke to a popular meeting at which the question of an All-Russian Congress was being discussed, and all voices were raised in favor of Soviet power. The question which has been most emphatically before the people in all the eight months of the Revolution is the question of war and peace, and we maintained that only a power basing its authority directly on the people could put an end to the slaughter. We maintained that the secret treaties must he published, and declared that the Russian people, not having made these treaties, could not be bound to carry out the conquests agreed upon therein. Our enemies answered that this was demagogy. You would never dare, if you were in power, they said, to do this, for then the Allies would oppose us. But we maintained that the salva tion of Russia was in peace. We pointed out that the prolonged character of the war was destroying the Revolution, was exhausting and destroying the country, and that the longer we should fight the more complete the slavish position we should then occupy, so that at last wc should merely be left the choice of picking a master. "We desire to live and develop as a free tuition ; but, for the conclusion of peace, we had to overthrow the power of the liourgeoisie and of Keren sky. They told us we would be left without any supporters. Hut on Nov ember 7 the local Soviet of Petrograd took the initiative upon itself, as well es the responsibility; and, with the aid of the garrison and the workers, accomplished the coup d'etat, appeared before the Congress of Soviets then in session, and said : 'The old power in the country is broken, there is no authority anywhere, and we are obliged to take it into our own hands.' We have said that the first obligation devolving upon the new power is the offering of peace parleys on all fronts, for the conclusion of a peace without annexations or indemnities on the basis of self-determination of peoples, that is, each people, through popular elections, must speak for itself the de cisive word: Do they wish to enter into a confederation with their present 3l6 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA sovereign state, enjoying full autonomy under iL or do they wish to separate tlicmselves from it and have full independence? We must put a stop to a condition in which the strong can, by force of arms, compel the weak to assume wharf conditions of life the strong may desire: every people, be it great or small, must be the master of its own fate. Now, this is the program not of a party, not of a Soviet, but of the whole people, excepting the preda tory party which dares call itself the Party of Popular Liberty, but which in reality is an enemy of popular liberty, fighting against peace with all its might, and against which wc have declared our implacable hostility — with die exception of this party, the whole Russian people has declared that it will not tolerate the use of force. And this is the spirit in which we issue our peace decree, "On the day on which we passed this decree, Krasnov's Cossacks rebelled and danger threatened the very existence of the Soviet power. Yet, hardly had they been defeated and the Soviet authority strengthened, than our first act was to turn to the Allied and German authorities, simultaneously, with a proposition for peace parleys on all fronts. Our enemies, the Cadets and tlieir appendages, said that Germany would ignore us— but it has turned out otherwise, and we already have the assent of Germany and Austria-Hungary to the holding of peace parleys and preliminary peace on the Soviet form ula. And even before that, as soon as we obtained the keys to the case of secret diplomatic correspondence, we published the secret treaties, thus fulfilling an obligation that we had assumed toward the people when we were still an insignificant opposition party. We said then, and we say now, that a people cannot shed their blood and that of their brothers for treaties that they have not themselves concluded, have never read or even seen. To these words of mine the adherents of coalition made reply: Do not speak to us in this tongue: this is not the Modern Circus [a large hall for mass-meetings in Petrograd, where this particular address of Trotzky was delivered]. And 1 answered them, that I have only one tongue, the tongue of a Socialist, and 1 shall speak in this tongue to the country and to you, to the Allies and tl*e Germans. "To the adherents of coalition, having the souls of hares, it seemed that to publish the secret treaties was equivalent to forcing England and France to declare war on us. But they did not understand that their ruling circles throughout the duration of the war have been talking the people into the idea that the treacherous, cruel enemy is Germany, and that Russia is a noble land ; and it is impossible within twenty-four hours to teach them the opposite. By publishing the secret treaties wc have incurred the enmity of the governing classes in those countries, but their peoples we have won to our support. We shall not make a diplomatic peace ; it will be a people's peace, a soldiers' peace, a real peace. And the outcome of our open policy was clear: Judson appeared at the Smolny Institute, and declared, in the name of America, that the protest to the Dukhonin staff against the new power was a misunderstanding, and that America had no desire to inter fere in the internal affairs of Russia; and, consequently, the American question is disposed of. "But there is another conflict that is not yet settled. I must tell you tbout it. Because of their fight for peace, the English Government has arrested and is now detaining in concentration camp George Tchichcrin, INTRODUCTION 317 [who was released, and subsequently became Commissairc of Foreign Affairs in the Soviet Government] who has devoted his wealth and his knowledge to the peoples of Russia, England, Germany and France, and the courageous agitator of the English workers, the emigrant Pctroff. I communicated in writing with the English Embassy, saying that Russia was now permitting the presence w:thin her borders of many wealthy Englishmen, who are en gaged in counter-revolutionary conspiracies with the Russian bourgeoisie, and that we were therefore all the more disinclined to permit Russian citizens to be thrown into English prisons ; that, consequently, all those against whom there were no criminal charges should be liberated at once. Failure to com ply with this request will mean that we shall refuse passports to English subjects desiring to leave Russia. The People's Soviet Power is responsible for the well-being of the entire people; wherever its citizens may be, they shall enjoy its protection. If Kerensky spoke to the Allies like a shop- aitendant to his boss, we arc prepared to show that we shall live with them only on terms of equality. Wc have more than once said that anyone who counts on the support and friendship of the free and independent Russian reople must approach them with 'espect for them anil for their human dignity. "As soon as the Soviets found themselves with power in their hands, .vt proposed peace parleys in the rame of the Russian people. We had a right to 'peak in the name of the people, for everything that wc proposed, as well as the whole program of the People's Commissures, consists of coctrines and propositions voted on and passed in hundreds and thousands of Soviets, factories and works, that is, by the entire people. Our delegation w'll speak an open and courageous language: do you agree to the holding of an immediate peace conference on all the fronts? And if they say, Yes, v.e shall ask them to invite their governments and allies to send their dele gates. Our second question will be: Do you mean to conclude peace on a ciunocratic foundation? If we are forced to make peace alone, we shall declare to Germany that it is inadmissible to withdraw ihcir troops from the Russian front to some other front, since we aro offering an honorable peace ;'i;d cannot permit England and France to be crushed by reason of it "Secret diplomacy shall not be tolerated for a single moment during the negotiations. Our flyers and our radio-service will keep all the nations in formed of every proposition we make, and of the answers they elict from Ger.iany. We sliall be sitting in a glass house, as it were, and the German soldiers, through ihou^juds uf newspapers, in German, which we shall distrib ute to them, will be informed of every step we take and of every German answer. "We say that Lithuania and Courland must themselves decide the question, with whom they will join forces, and that Germany must, not in words only, but in deeds, heed the free expression of the will of approved the armistice: at u mass meeting held In New York City December 20, It adopted the follow ing resolution, which hnd been preceded for a month by a leaflet UKltation: "The wnrkni'D of Ihe world demand an Immediate general peace, a ponce that shall niter the Imperialistic status quo ante In accord with the International aspli ntlons of the revolutionary proletariat of Russia "The governments of the Imperialistic belligerents are determined upon n continuation of tie war In the Inte/eat of th.-lr particular Imperial ism; the proletariat alone an a clans Ik Interested In nnd can haBte-n an Immediate peace that shall promote civilization and progress. "The class Interests of the American proletariat make necessary the adoption of nn Immediate program of action: "1 — We demand that the government accept the proposal of the de facto government of Itussla for the Immediate conclusion of an armistice on nil belligerent fronts. "2. — We demand that the government Insist that Great Ilrltnln. France and Italy shall <>iu,-tllv accept this armistice. "3. — We demand that the negotiations for an armistice shall not In clude the discussion of peace terms, the discussion and formulation of thOBo terms being left to the peoples of each belligerent nation. "4 — We call upon the class conscious workers to prepare the organi sation of a proletarian peace congress, which shall discuss our action In co-npciratlon with the International proletariat and In accord with the peace principles of revolutionary Socialism. "The proletariat muxl organize, as nn Independent factor In the pro cess of securing pca'O, separate and distinct from all other groups. The proletariat alone Is Intel-rational In its Interests, and It alone on d»- itnrmlne the conclusion "f an I n t »-- national peace upon the forr.i^a of revolutionary Itussla. "We iifllrin our solidarity with the prolelai lat of Itussla, and expr.^s our fraternal nppieclnt'on of Its Intrepid class conscious activity." INTRODUCTION 321 printed millions of copies of newspapers in the German and Austrian lang uage, which were circulated by means of aeroplanes, etc This propaganda asumed enormous proportions, and seriously affected the morale of the Central Powers' troops, — how seriously only time can tell. At one of the sessions of the peace congress General Hoffman protested against the propa ganda of the Bolsheviki, to wliich Trotzky retorted that neither the condi tions of the armistice nor the character of the peace negotiations limited freeelom of speech or press! An intensive propaganda was also carried on among the Austro-German war prisoners in Russia, resolutions were adeipted repudiating the policy of their governments, and pledges made to fight in the cause of revolutionary Russia. Upon the resumption of negotiations, Germany and Austria insisted upon their proposals, which amounted to annexations of the most brutal sort. A great strike movement, verging almost on a revolution, broke loose in Austria during the middle of January. In one district alone 90,000 workers went on strike, and the total must have been near a million. It was a spon taneous mass movement of a revolutionary character, — the dynamic mass ac tion out of which revolutions arise. But the reactionary administrations of the imperialistic unions and of the government Social Democratic Party acted against the strikes. When the news of the strikes reached Trotzky, he badgered the Teuton diplomats into an adjournment of the sessions for a week, hoping that time would deepen the scope of the strikes. The great strike movement broke I*x>sc against the Socialist Party leaders, who were taken by surprise, but who immediately placed themselves at its head and led it astray. The movement spread to Germany, wliere hundreds of thou sands of workers were involved, but where the unions acted against the strike; as the Berlin Vorwaerts pleaded, "we don't want a revolution, we simply want the government to mediate its differences with the strikers." The Scheidemann faction preached incessantVy against a revolution, using the Russian situation to promote an imperialistic German peace. Mod erate Socialism again betrayed the proletariat and the revolution, openly and shamelessly eloing the vile counter-revolutionary work of their imperial istic governments. The unions refused to pay strike benefits and ordered the strikers back to work; the dominat moderate Socialism used its moral in fluence to terrorize the strikers and potential rebels into submission. The workers, betrayed and maligned by the very movement that should have di rected them to victory, were beaten sulleniy back.1 -(After the strike movement was destroyed. Dr. Drews. Prussian Min ister of Ihe Interior, said the strikes se-ved Clermnnv's enemies, nnd ¦ .«._ C... !„ , T-*..... ....... I .. ....... — # - , .V. _.... ego- . _s of . .ng peoples. Its pretended love far peace Is merely a mask. Its statement that a partial peace would bring us nearer to a general peace, Is a He and an Imposture. "A separate peace with Russia would lncre«»e the fury of the war on the other fronts and, consequently, Increase the slaughter. The suffer- $22 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA The success of the Soviet peace policy did not depend alone upon the response of the German proletariat, but of all the belligerent proletariat, an international response. The Soviet's appeal to the Entente proletariat may be characterized by the following quotation from a declaration to British Labor Issued by Maxim Litvinoff, Soviet Ambassador to Great Britain: "Our revolutionary propaganda among the German soldiers on 'the west ern front and among the prisoners of war is undermining the strength of German autocracy and militarism more effectively than military victories could, and has already provoked a strong peace movement in Germany and Austria. But these endeavors meet with opposition not only from the capi talists ill Russia, but from capitalists all the world over. The Russian Rev olution, with Its dash and vigor, has bwmic the f-xus of the hatred of inter- national Capitalism, and now the prolongation of the war, in addition to its former Imperialistic aims, has another aim — to crush the Soviets and the Revolution "Realize this I The further prolongation of the war must lead to the defeat of the* Russian Revolution and to the triumph of militarism and re action everywhere. An immediate, just, democratic peace on its principle ot no annexations, no indemnities, will spell the downfall of militarism in all countries. This peace can be achieved if only labor will speak in full voice and act with all its might. Workers of Britain, peace is in the balance! The Russian workers appeal to you to join them in their efforts to turn the scale. Labor— speak I" But British labor did not speak. Socialism in Italy made a moral res ponse, Deputy Morgari declaring in the Chamber that Italian Socialists favored an immediate general peace not only on the Bolshevist terms, but by Bolshevist methods. The French Soicalists responded by ignoring the de termined efforts of die Soviets for a general peace and covertly hurling slanders at the Bolsheviki. The Socialist group in the Chamber of Deputies issued a resolution addressed to the Russian Socialists, bearing twenty- eight signatures, among them Albert Thomas, Jules Guesde, Jean Longuet, Marcel Cachin, Compere- Morel and Sembat, from which we quote: "To-day it is with deep pain that wc have seen some of you enter upon potir-parlcrs which may lead to a separate peace. Such a consummation wiuld no* only permit the Central Empires to prepare for, or to actually achieve, a military victory and finally to dictate their conditions in the name of force, it would even serve— it already serves—the machinations of all the enemies of democracy and Socialism in the world by permitting them to in voke the Russian Revolution as an example of disintegration and of de moralization, "Has not Germany, followed by her allies, until now declined to make known her war aims? There is in war a terrible logic. The Soviets realize Ings of the Gni'imtn people would not he abated. "It becomes the duty of the German working class to battle unceas ingly for a. general peace, "There, Is only one means of putting an end to the present butchery and misery of the workers — the overthrow of the government and the bourgeois class. In the way that this was done In Russia, It Is solely by mass effort, by the revolt of the mnsses, by a moss xtrlke, paralyzing all economic octlvlty and all war Industries; It Is solely by a revolution and the setting up or a people's republic In Germany by and for the work ing class, Unit an end may be put to the murder of the tollers of all lands, that a gennrul peace can be achieved." INTRODUCTION 3a3 this, for, while affirming their desire for a general peace, they said : 'Let us ask Germany to make known her war aims and the German Socialists to have a revolution, just as we have.' "The Soviets obtained neither one answer nor the other. Nevertheless, peace can be nothing but just, nothing but lasting. It can be both only by fhe democratic will of the people. A separate peace cannot be that. ... It would be a moral disaster the burden of which would be borne everywhere by international Socialism as a perfectly natural consequence. "But most of all, Russia should find at the earliest possible moment a stable government whence shall arise the new life. A Constituent Assembly alone can furnish it; it alone can end the conflicts which unseat dictators without giving them authority and security for the morrow ; H alone can say that it governs for the people by the people. . . . "And we French Socialists who find in the seriousness of events and in the consciousress of our responsibilities the inspiration for these friendly declarations, we do not hesitate to fay to you: We also realize the extent of our duties, French Socialists will do nothing to weaken the resistance of the army and people of France, but rather strengthen the morale of both, and forcefully implore the allied governments that they clearly indii.itc by their actions their oft-repeated declarations that they arc fighting because they are attacked and that they would obtain no peace other than that of right, Thus would a promise of revision of the aim of war be imposed upon the governments." But the French Socialists did not "impose" a revision of the aims of the war upon the governments. They promised revolutionary Russia the same illusory hope against which the masses had revolted, and in the accomplish ment of wliich Kerensky has egrcgiously failed. Moreover, it wasn't a mat ter of "revision of aims" or of government promises, each of which are inconsequential ; the character of the peace will be determined by class power, by the relations of classes. The attitude of the FrcncJi Sexialists strengthened the power of the imperialistic bourgeoisie and weakened the revolutionary power of the proletariat. The proletarian class struggle alone, waged aggressively against all Imperialism, is the instrument with which to secure a peace of understanding between the workers. "It is with deep pain," says the French Socialist resolution, "that we have seen some of you enter upon pour-parlers that may lead lo a separate peace." The resolution has the grace of not accusing the Bolsheviki of desiring or planning a sepa rate peace. The offer for an armistice was on all fronts; the invitation to a peace conference was for general peace negotiations; the Soviet delegation at Brest-l.itovsk submitted proposals as a basis for a general peace; it was largely the refusal of the Entente governments to participate, an abstention justified by the moderate Socialists, which provided Germany its opportunity to convert the conference into one for a separate peace. And all through the conference, even after it had become one for a sparate peace, the Bol shcviki emphasized the necessity for a general peace, appealed to the Social ist conscience in all the belligerent nations for revolutionary action, and did not even receive moral support; aye, were reviled and slandered unmerci fully by moderate Socialism.' .tTrotztiy, answering Hie French Hoclallsfs, declared: "Experlt-sme bas shown that the war cannot be solved by force of arms. On the mil- 3^4 THK PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA Iii their isolation, abandoned equally by the Entente governments and by the Socialist proletariat, the Bolsheviki at Brest-LUovsk were overwhelmed. Ihey still presented a united front, attacking bitterly the demands of the imperialistic Austro-German representatives, when their front was morally broken by the treachery of the Ukrainian delegation. The governing body of the Ukraine, the Rada, bourgeois in spirit and personnel, and composed largely of moderate Socialists, afraid of the spread of the proletarian revo lution, secretly agreed to accept Germany"* terms in return for Germany's offer to assist the Rada with troops in retaining control of the country. The Ukrainian issue was a crucial one, and the Soviet Government poured Red Guards into the Ukraine which, in co-operation with the local Red Guards, fought gallantly to overthrow the bourgeois, pro-German Rada. A similar situation prevailed in Finland, where tJie Workers' Government used all its resources to defeat the bourgeoisie under General Mannerheim. In both the Ukraine and Finland the Bolshcviki were defeated, due to the intervention of Austro-German troops called for by the bourgeoisie. Finland and the Ukraine accepted German tutelage, betrayed the peace struggle of revolu tionary Russia, because the bourgeoisie considered the defense of its private property and class interest? the supreme consideration. While the depiscd proletariat refused to accept Germany's terms, the Ixnirgcoisie accepted enthusiastically, — Treason has a fatal leigic. The Ukrainian bourgeois- "Socialist" Rada was finally dispersed by German bayonets, and a dictator ship established; Finland became a colony of Germany; and in both states the- revolutionary proletariat waged a relentless struggle against its own Imurgeoisie and German Imperialism. The sessions of the Brest-Litovsk Conference reveal clearly the imperial istic duplicity of Germany, as they equally reveal the lofty principles and international spirit of the Bolsheviki. The correspondent of the London Daily News -described one of the sessions as follows : "The Russian delegation, acting on unequivocal instructions from the Bolshevik authorities, took up an uncompromising attitude. They said self- definition of nationalities in Poland, Courland, Esthonia and Lithuania was impossible until the last German soldier had left the country. Further, they jeered the Germans, asking whether they intended to take Petrograd and feed 3,000,000 starving folk or to disarm a revolutionary country in which every workman had a rifle. They also asked what the Germans proposed to say to their own democracy, which protested a couple of months ago against the proposed annexation of Poland and Lithuania." Itnry field wo are now as far from a decision as we were In the first days of the war. Notwithstanding Flench Socialists having voted all war credits, the government never showed any consideration. A well-defined statcimcnt of war alms has been denied, and Ihey were refused passports to International conferences. The attitude of French Boclallam Is eont- rary to Socialist principles. After having passed through the degradations Mi« French SoHallsts have submitted to, they fall to have the right to Judge Russian llolshevlsin. — We have done our share to prepare a gereral peace, and by no means a peace at any price. Our preparations are based on a democratic foundation on which all Socialist countries can unite. — What have you done In Purls? Paris has answered with a Olemenceau cabinet. The methods of (Memenceau do not lead towards peace. This certalnlv must he clear, after all. to the French proletariat. The French proletariat has to demand from Its government participation In the peace negotiations —Th"re certalnlv Is some difference In the attitude of one capltn-llst country and that of another towards the Russian revolutionary government Some want to crush the Revolution right away; others want to use the Revolution for their own dam-nable purposes and then stab It In the back." INTRODUCTION 325 The Central Committee of the All-Russia Soviets, after hearing Trot- ik/s repudiation of "Gerttuny'a hypocritical peace proposals," and his de claration that H might be necessary to defend the Revolution, adopted a resolution denouncing "the dominant parties in Germany," which "com pelled by a popular movement to grant concessions to the principles of a democratic peace, nevertheless are trying to distort this idea in the sense of their own annexationist policy." The resolution further said: "Wc now declare that the Russian Revolution remains faithful to the policy of internationalism. "We say to the people of Gemiay, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bul garia: "Under your pressure your Governments have been obliged to accept the motto of no annexations and no indemnities, but recently they have been trying to carry on their old policy of evasions. Remember that the conclu sion of an immediate democratic peace will depend actually and above all on you. All the peoples of Europe look to you, exhausted and bled by such a war as there never was before, that you will not permit the Austro- German imperialists to make war against revolutionary Russia, for the sub jection of Poland, Lithuania, Courland and Armenia." No one may accuse the Bolsheviki of insincerity; their defeat was due to the inaction and treason of others. "The Bolsheviki," declared the German press in surprise, "talk like conquerors.1' And well they might: history will be their justification: they will yet conquer! The Germans wanted peace on the basis of the war map; the Bolsheviki, peace in accord with the general principles of international democratic reconstruction, — which the Allies ac cepted "in words," but did not act to establish in deeds. They exposed the Germans, they appealed to Socialism and the proletariat; and there being no response, the hopeless struggle was doomed to defeat. Trotzky refused to sign the infamous peace, his attitude being this: "We announce the termina tion of the war and demobilization without signing any peace. We declare we cannot participate in the looting war of the Allies nor can we sign a looting peace. The fate of Poland, Lithuania and Courland we place upon the responsibility of the German working people." This expedient of a "de clared peace" for a time puzzled the Germans. It was an opportunity for the Socialists of Germany to act: but the opportunity was not used. In answer to a question, "What will you do if we do not sign your peace?" General Hoffman replied: "The German troops will advance and immediately take Reval." Now came the most infamous action of Germany, the march of her troops into a country which was defenseless and wanted peace, a crime acquiesced in by the German majority Socialists and the proletariat. This invasion aroused Russia, which mobilized its soldiers, workers and Red Guards against the invaders. The supreme decision of war and peace was up to the All-Russian Soviet Congress, which convened in Moscow on March 12. More than half of the 1,765 delegates were against ratification of the peace treaty, and in favor of a "holy war," a revolutionary war against Germany, including many promi nent members of the Bolsheviki, who in January had organized independ ently as the Communist Party. Lenin, however, was in favor of accepting the treaty, in spite of its onerous terms, on the ground that Russia needed a respite for the work of reconstruction, during which preparations could be 3^ TIIK PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA made Iter resuming the war against German Imperialism on terms that were not hopeless, and acting to develop the proletarian revolution in Germany. The discussion of the treaty in the Congress was extraordinarily violent, but Lenin's dominating personality and relentless logic carried conviction, and the treaty was ratified by an overwhelming majority. Gennany imposed upon Russia an indemnity of 6,000,000,000 rubles, and virtually annexed 780,000 square kilometres of former Russian territory, including 56,000,000 inhabitants. During the course of the peace negotiations, the German majority Social ists declared they would break with the Government should it impose an annexationist peace; and after such a peace was imposed, by means extra ordinarily brutal and infamous, these "Socialists" did not break with the Government ; indeed, they did not even vote against ratification in the Reichstag, abstaining from voting. On February 26, in a Reichstag address, Scheidemann had said : "Within a few days the curtain will fall upon the fifth act of that great tragedy, the Russian Revolution. What has happened was not the intention of the Social Democracy. Before the whole world we declare that the policies that were used against Russia were not our policies." Answering this hypocrisy, Dr. Hans Block, Independent Socialist, in an article Pontius Pilate Scheidemann, said: "There is something in the bitter tears of the Apostle Peter, in the repentance and suicide of the traitor Judas, that appeals to us. But in this great human tragedy of the past, neither the cowardly St. Peter, nor even the faithless Judas Iscariot are as con temptible as that great Pontius Pilate, the original cold 'politican,' who 'washed his hands in innocence.' Human repentance and human grief awaken sympathy, even for the faithless. But cold, self-satisfied self-justification can arouse only hatred and disgust. 'Before the whole world wc declare that the policies that were used against Russia were not our policies.' They have voted for war loans, and will continue to vote for them; they have supported the government, and will continue to support it; they have sworn allegiance to the annexationist majority bloc, — but they wash tlieir hands in innocence and declare, 'What has happened in Russia was not the intention of the German Social Democracy.' " After this acceptance of an infamous peace, the revolutionary Soviet Government set itself to the task of reconstruction, industrial, political and military. Earnest efforts were made to organize a new army; Trotzky ac cepted the post of Commissaire of War; and the All-Russian Congress in July decided to introduce conscription, the unanimous opinion being that, con sidering the international situation, an active, efficient army was necessary to preserve the Revolution against any and all aggression. Imperialistic Germany and revolutionary Russia each realized that the "peace" was tempo rary, and each awaited the ultimate decision that was pending. Germany assumed that she could hold on the west, convince the Allies of the futility of Victory over the Central Powers, and thus be able to retain the con quests in the East. Revolutionary Russia assumed that during the period of the prolongation of war, she would recuperate, economically and militarily, and then strike a blow against Imperialism cither at the moment of a Ger man Revolution, or independently when Germany was exhausted by the sanguinary struggle on the western front. In accep." . . . We answered: "Very well, we arc willing to test the AT BREST-LIT" >VSK 353 conciliatoriiiess of your collea-jttcs of tlie German delegation. Thus far wc have negotiated about the right of self-determination of the Lithuanians, Poles, Livonians, Letts, Esihonians and others, and we ascertained that with all these there v. as no room for self-determina tion. Now wc want to see wlirt i> your attitude towards the self- determination of still another people, that of Russia, and what arc your intentions and plans of military-strategic character hidden be hind your occupation *f the Moon Sound island1-. For the Moon Sound islands, as a part of the independent Esthonian republic or as the property of the federated Russian republic, have a defensive importance; in the hands of Germany, however, ihey assume an of fensive value and will menace the very life center of our country and, more especially, of Petrograd.'" But General Hoffman v. as un willing to make the slightest concession. Then came the hour of decision. We could not declare war. We were too weak. The army had lost internal cohesion. For the salvation of our country and in order to overcome the process of disin tegration, we were forced to re-establish the inner connection of the working masses. This psychological bond can be created by way of common productive effort in the fields, in the factories and in the workshops. Wc nuM bring the working masses, so long sub jected to ihe terrible sufferings and catastrophic trials of the war, back to their acres and factories where they can again find them selves in their labor and enable us to build up internal discipline. This is the only way out for a country that must now do penance for the sins of Czarism and of the bourgeoisie. Wc arc forced to give up this war and to lead the army out of this slaughter. But wc declare at the same time and in the face of German militarism : The peace you have forced upon us is a peace of force and robbery. We shall not permit lliat you, diplomatic gentlemen, can say to the Ger man workers: "You have called our demands conquests and an nexations, but sec: we bring to you, under these same demands, the signature of the Russian Revolution !"— Yes, wc are weak; wc can not now conduct a war, but we possess sufficient revolutionary force to prove that we shall not, voluntarily, place our signatures under a treaty that you write with \otir .sword upon the bodies of living peoples. We refused our signatures! — I believe, comrades, that wc acted rightly. Comrades! I shall not claim that an attack upon us by Ger many is ini'H^siblc — such an assertion would be too risky if wc visu alize the power of the imperialist party in Germany. I believe, however, that the position wc have taken in this question has made 354 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA attack more difficult for German militarism. But if Germany does attack nevertheless? As regards that, all we can say is : If in our country, exhausted and in the desperate condition that we are, it is possible to spur the courage of the revolutionary and vital elements, if with us the struggle for the protection of our Revolution and of the arena of the Revolution is possible — then it is so only because of the situation that has now been created, possible as the result of our exit from the war and of our refusal to sign the treaty of peace. VII WHY SOVIET RUSSIA MADE PEACE (Lenin) "Theses" of Lenin arguing in favor of accepting the Brest- Litovsk Treaty. i. The present state of the Russian Revolution is such (since all the workers and the great majority of the peasants arc in favor of putting all power into the hands of the Soviets, and in favor of the Social Revolution inaugurated by the Soviets) that the success of the Social Revolution in Russia seems to be assured. 2. Meanwhile, the civil war brought about by the desperate re sistance of the possessing classes, who are well aware that this is to be the last, the determining conflict for the retention of private own ership of land and of the means of production, has not yet reached its climax. In this conflict the victory of the Soviets is certain, but for some time our intensest efforts will still be required. A period of disorganization is inevitable, — that is the case in all wars, all the more so in a civil war — before the resistance of the bourgeoisie is broken. 3. This resistance takes the form chiefly of passive manifesta tions, not of a military force : of the sabotage, bribery of vagrants, bribery of agents of the bourgeoisie, who permeate the ranks of the Socialists in order to compromise their cause, etc., etc. This re sistance is so obstinate and assumes such varying forms, that the con flict must go on for some months, since the victory of Socialism is not possible until all the encumbrances have been removed. 4. Finally, the task of Socialist reorganization in Russia is so great and so difficult, both because of the petit bourgeois elements who are taking part in the Revolution, and because of the unsatis factory level of the proletariat, that its solution still requires some time. 5. All this means that the success of the Russian Revolution will require, at least for some months, that the Russian Government ihall have a free hand, in order to conquer the bourgeoisie in its own 35<> THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA country, in order then to undertake the great task of reconstruction. 6. The international policy of the Soviets must be based chiefly on the conditions of the revolution in Russia, for the international situation, in the fourth year, is such that in general, it is not possible to fix a time for the overthrow of imperialistic powers (including the German Government). There is no doubt that revolution must and shall break out in Europe. All our hope in a decisive victory ot Socialism is based on this conviction, on this scientific hypothesis. Our propaganda in general, and that of fraternization in particular. must be deepened and extended. But it would be an error to base the tactics of the Soviet Government on the probability that the European Revolution, particularly the German, will take place with in a few months. As prediction is here absolutely impossible, all efforts in this direction would be a mere gamble. 7. The negotiation of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty has shown that the military parly has gained the upper hand in the German Government, and that this party has its own way with the govern ments of the other countries in the Quadruple Alliance. The mili tary party already has actually sent an ultimatum to Russia, the offi cial form of which we may expect in a few days. This ultimatum means: either the continuation of the war or the conclusion of a peace by annexation, i. c. the Germans will retain all the districts occupied by them, while we must give up the districts occupied by Russian troops, and an indemnity will be imposed upon us (under the guise of a compensation for the maintenance of prisoners) ot nearly three milliards, to be paid in a few years. 8. The Russian Government therefore has this pressing prob lem to solve: Must this annexation-peace be accepted at once, or must the revolutionary war be waged at once? There is no middle path in this question. The solution cannot be postponed, as we have already done all in our power lo gain time and draw the thing out. <). Among the arguments made use of to show that revolution ary warfare must be waged at once, there is, in the first place, the following: an immediate, separate peace, regardless of the inten tions of those who conclude it would amount to an agreement with the German imperialists, and therefore, such a peace would be a breach of the principles of international Socialism. This reasoning is all wrong. Workingmen who lose a strike and arc compelled to accept conditions favorable to the capitalists and unfavorable to themselves, do not betray Socialism. Only those betray the interests of the proletariat, who betray Socialism, who accept inadmissible conditions. WHY SOVIET RUSSIA MADE PEACE 357 Those who call the war with Germany a righteous and defen sive war are the real betrayers of Socialism, because they arc in reality supporting French and English Imperialism and concealing the secret treaties from the people. These, on the other hand, who conceal nothing from the people and make no secret treaties with the capitalists, — they are by no means betraying Socialism when they conclude a peace which is disadvantageous for a weak people and advantageous for the capitalists of one group, at a moment when there is no possibility of continuing to wage war. to. In the second place, wc are reproached with becoming, through the conclusion of a separate peace, agents of the German Government against our will, since we are giving to it the possibility of withdrawing troops from our front and are liberating millions of their prisoners of war. But this argument also proves nothing, since a revolutionary war against Germany would make us agents of An glo-French Imperialism. The English promised outright to Kry- lenko, the commander of our army, one hundred roubles a month for each soldier if we should continue to wage war. And even if we should not accept a penny from the Entente, wc should yet, as far as the outcome is concerned, have become their agents in holding a por tion of the German troops at the front. On this point : We can free ourselves as little in one case as in the other, entirely from the imperialistic shackles, for that is impos sible without the annihilation of world-Imperialism. It therefore follows that after the victory of Socialism in one country, these ques tions must not be decided from the standpoint of a preference for one Capitalism, but from that of developing and strengthening under the most favorable conditions the social revolution that has already begun. In short, our policy must be based, not on a choice between two Imperialisms, but on the possibility of strengthening the Socialist revolution, or at least, on the necessity of enabling it to offer resist ance until the other countries join the revolutionary movement. n. It is maintained that the German Socialist minority has asked us not to yield to German Imperialism. But wc do not con sider this a good interpretation. We have always fought our own Imperialism, but the overthrow of the Imperialism of one country by means of an alliance with the Imperialism of another is a line of action that we reject both on reasons of principle and because we consider it inadmissible. This argument, therefore, is really only a repetition of the former one. If the International Socialists of Ger many should ask us to postpone the conclusion of peace for a time, 358 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA and should guarantee us the outbreak of the revolution in Germany by a fixed time, we might eventually take the matter under consid eration. But the German International Socialists not only do not say this to us, but they actually are saying, formally, "Offer as much resistance as you can, but decide on this point in agreement with the interests of the Russian Revolution, for it is impossible at present to make any definite promises with regard to the German Revolution." 12. It is maintained that wc had promised to wage revolution ary warfare and that the conclusion of a separate jieace was a be trayal of our own promise. This is not true. We spoke of the necessity of preparing and waging rci'olutionary warfare in the epoch of Imperialism. Wc said this in contradiction of the theory of abstract pacifism, the total negation of "national defense," in the epoch of Imperialism and wc said this iu order to resist the merely physical instincts of some of the soldiers; but we have never as sumed the obligation of waging a revolutionary war without asking ourselves whether it was possible to wage it at a given moment. And now it is our duty to prepare the revolutionary war. We arc keeping this promise, just as wc have kept all promises that cir cumstances have permitted us to keep: we have published the secret treaties, wc have offered a righteous peace to all nations, we have drawn out the peace conference in order to give all the peoples an opportunity to join us. But the question of the present possibility of waging a revolutionary war can be decided only from the stand point of its material possibility, and from the stand|>oint of the Rus sian Revolution that has already begun. 13. Considering the arguments in favor of an immediate revo lutionary war, as a whole, it is evident that they constitute a policy that may perhaps be in line with a fine gesture, but they have abso lutely no relation with the material and class conditions of the pre sent moment. 14. It is beyond doubt that our army can neither now, nor at any time within the next few weeks or even months, resist or push back the German offensive, in the first place because of the fatigue and exhaustion of most of our soldiers and the total disorganization of the provision supply, in the second place because of the absolute insufficiency of horses which makes defeat for our artillery a cer tainty, in the third place because it is impossible to defend the Riga coast, thus assuring the enemy of the conquest of the rest of Livland, and facilitating the occupation of Petrograd. 15. Furthermore, there is no doubt that the majority of the peasants in our army \v-711Id now be in favor of a peace of annexa- WHY SOVIET RUSSIA MADE PEACE 359 tions by the Germans and not a revolutionary war, while the or ganization of a revolutionary army and the forming of a Red Guard have hardly been begun. It would be a serious business to wage war against the will of the majority of our soldiers, now that the entire army is demoral ized; and it will be many months before a truly proletarian army, Socialistic through and through, can be formed. 1 6. The poorest section of the Russian peasants would be ready to support a revolution headed by the working class, but they are not ready to support a revolutionary war at present. It would be a seri ous error to overlook this state of things. 17. The question of revolutionary war therefore stands as fol lows: if revolution should break out in Germany within the next three or four months, the revolutionary war tactic, for immediate action, would not be fatal to our Russian Revolution. If the German Revolution docs not take place in a few months, the continuation of the war would have the consequence that still greater defeats would force Russia to accept a still more onerous peace; and peace would not be concluded by a Socialist, but by a mixed government, for example, by a coalition between the adher ents of Chernov and of the bourgeois party or something of the sort, for the peasant army, sick and tired of the war, would overthrow the Socialist government in a few weeks. 18. Conditions being as indicated above, it is intolerable thus to jeopardize the fate of the Russian Revolution. 19. The German Revolution will absolutely not be made more difficult by the conclusion of a separate peace. It will probably be weakened for a time by chauvinism, but the conditions in Germany will remain very critical. The war with America and England will last long and Imperialism will finally be unmasked completely, on both sides. The example of the Russian Revolution will continue to inspire the peoples of the world, and its influence will be enormous. On the one side will be the bourgeois system and war for conquest waged by two imperialistic groups, on the other peace and the So cialist Republic. 20. By a separate peace wc free ourselves, in so far as present conditions will permit, from the two imperialist coalitions ; by taking advantage of their warfare and their mutual enmity preventing them from uniting against us, we shall utilize the time so gained, in order to strengthen the Socialist Republic in Russia. The reorganization of Russia, based on the dictatorship of the proletariat, the nationalization of banks and of big industry, the ex- 2;(iO THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA change of the products of the cities with the cooperatives of small peasants in the country, is economically quite feasible, provided we have a few months to devote energetically to the job. Such an or ganization will make Socialism unconquerable in Russia, and will provide a permanent basis for the formation of a powerful red army of peasants and workers. 21. A truly Socialistic war could not, at this moment, have any other character than that of a war between the Socialistic republic and the bourgeois countries, with the distinct object, approved by the red army, of overthrowing the bourgeoisie in the other coun tries. But wc cannot at present attack this object. In reality, we should now fight for Livland and Courland. No Marxist, no Social ist of any kind, can deny, without contradicting the basic principles of Socialism, that the interests of Socialism transcend the right of self-determination of a nation. Our republic has done and continues to do all in its power to obtain for Finland and for the Ukraine the right to determine their own lot. B-ut, granting that the existence of the Socialist Republic is threatened by the violation of the right of Poland, Lithuania, and Finland to determine their own fate, it is nevertheless self-evident that the interests of the Socialist Republic transcend all other considerations, We are not enthusiastic about the peace based on the liberation of Poland, making German Imperial ism stronger as opposed to England, Belgium, Serbia, etc. The peace based on the liberation of Poland, Lithuania, and Courland would be a patriotic peace from the standpoint of Russia, but it would none the less be a peace with the German annexationists and imperialists. VIII PEACE— AND OUR TASK. (Lenin) This article was written early in April, after the Soviet accept ance of the Brest-Litovsk peace at the All-Russian Soviet Congress in Moscow, March 18, 1918. The history of mankind is at present passing through one of its greatest and most difficult crises; a crisis that, without exaggeration, may be said to possess a world-wide liberating significance. From war to peace, from a war between beasts of prey who have sent to the slaughter millions of the toiling and exploited, with the object of securing a redivision of spoils already acquired among the strongest of the robbers, to a war of the oppressed against the oppressors for freedom from capitalist tyranny; from the abyss of suffering, pain and hunger to the resplendent communistic society of the future, to general well-being and jicrmancnt peace, — it is no wonder that at the most acute jjoints of such a tremendous transformation, when the old is going to pieces with frightful noise and crash, and the new is being born in indescribable pain, that some should be seized with despair, and that others should seek relief from reality, which is at times too bitter, in the magic of fair, enchanting phrases. Yet it was necessary to feel vividly what was occurring, to live through, in the most excruciating and painful manner, this sharpest of all sharp turns in history, turning us out of Imperialism into the Communistic Revolution. In a few days we destroyed one of the oldest, most powerful, most savage and barbarous monarchies. In a few months we passed through a series of agreements with the bourgeoisie, of realizing the emptiness of petit bourgeois illusions, for which other countries have required decades. In a few weeks, after having overthrown the bourgeoisie, we defeated its opposition in a civil war. In a victorious, triumphal progress of Bolshevism, we have passed from one end of our great country to the other. We have raised to liberty and to independent life the lowest sections of the toiling masses that have been oppressed by Czarism and by the bourgeoisie. We have introduced and strengthened the Soviet Re public, a new type of government, immeasurably higher and more 3-52 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA democratic than the best of the bourgeois parliamentary republics. Wc organized a dictatorship of the proletariat, supported by the poorest peasants, and inaugurated a widely-planned system of So cialistic reconstruction. In millions and millions of workers in all countries we have awakened faith in their powers and kindled the fires of their enthusiasm. We have sent out in ;¦:! directions the call of the workers' international revolution. We have thrown down the gauntlet to the imperialistic robbers of all countries. And in a few days an imperialistic robber, falling upon us, who arc unarmed, has cast us to the ground. He has forced us to sign an incredibly oppressive and humiliating peace, — our punishment for having dared, if only for one short moment, to free ourselves iroin the iron bonds of the imperialistic war. The robber strangles and chokes and dismembers Russia wilh all the greater fury, the more threatening he perceives rising before him in his own country the spectre of the impending workers' revolution. We were forced to sign a "Peace of Tilsit." There is no reason for deceiving ourselves as to that. We must have the courage to look straight in the face of this bitter truth. We must sound to the depths, completely, the whole abyss of defeat and humiliation into which wc have now been cast. The better wc understand this, the harder and firmer will become our will to free ourselves, to rise again from slavery to independence; the more determined wil! become our unbending resolve, at whatever cost, to raise Russia from her pre sent poverty and weakness, to make her rich and powerful in the true sense of the words. And this Russia may become, for we still have left enough ter ritory and natural resources to supply each and every one of us, if not with a super-abundance, yet with a sufficient supply of the means of subsistence. Wc have enough in natural riches and in la bor-power, as well as in the impetus that our great revolution has communicated to our national productive forces — to create a really rich and powerful Russia. Russia may become such if we cast aside all discouragement and all oratory, if we strain every nerve and tighten every muscle, if we understand that salvation is possible only by the path of international Socialist Revolution on which we have entered. To advance on this road, undaunted by defeat, to build up, stone by stone, the firm foundation of the Socialist society, to work with untiring hand at the creation of discipline and self-discipline, at strengthening, at all times and in all places, the organization, orderliness, efficiency and harmonious co-operation of the forces of the entire nation, a central PEACE— AND OUR TASK 363 supervision and control of the production and distribution of prod ucts, — such is the path to power, whether it be power in the military sense or power in the Socialist sense. It is unbecoming in a Socialist, when he has suffered a defeat, to protest his victory loudly or to droop into despair. It is not true that we have no other alternative than that between an "inglorious" death, which is what this terrible peace amounts to, and a "heroic" death in a hopeless war. It is not true that wc have betrayed our ideals by signing this "Peace of Tilsit," Wc have betrayed nothing and no one, wc have neither sanctioned nor conceded a single false hood; to no single friend and companion in misfortune have we re fused all the aid in our power. A commander-in-chief, who with draws the remains of his army, defeated and afflicted with a panic flight, into the interior of the country, who defends this withdrawal in a case of extremity, with an intolerable and humiliating peace, is not perpetrating treason against those sections of the army which he can no longer assist and which have been cut off by the enemy. Such a commander is doing his duty when he chooses the only way that is open for saving what can still be saved, consenting to no gambles, disguising no sad truths in the eyes of the people, "giving up territory in order to gain time," utilizing every breathing-spell, no matter how short, in order to collect his forces, in order to pro vide repose and healing for his army, which has become sick with disintegration and demoralization. We have signed a "Peace of Tilsit." When Napoleon I forced Prussia in 1807 to make such a peace, he destroyed all the German armies, occupied the capital and all the large cities, introduced his police system, compelled the vanquished to provide an auxiliary army for new wars of conquest waged by the victor, dismembered Germany, and concluded with certain German states alliances against other German states. Yet, in spite of this severe peace, the German people succeeded in maintaining themselves, in gathering their forces, and in attaining for tlicmselves the rights of freedom and in dependence To all those who are willing and able to think, the ex ample of the Peace of Tilsit — which was only one of the many op pressive and humiliating treaties forced upon the Germans at that time — shows clearly how childishly naive is the thought that under all circumstances a most cruel peace is the depth of degradation, while war is the path of heroism and salvation. Warlike eras have fre quently shown that peace may often discharge the function of a breathing-spell for the gathering of forces for new battles. The Peace of Tilsit was the greatest humiliation of Germany, and, at the 364 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA same time, the point of departure for a great national awakening. Historical circumstances at that time provided no other way out than through the bourgeois state ; for, a century or more ago, history was created by a band of noblemen and the cliques of bourgeois intel lectuals, while the great masses of workers and peasants lay slumber ing and tinobscrving. History at that time, therefore, moved with frightful slowness. Capitalism has now considerably raised culture in general, and particularly that of the masses. The war has shaken up the masses, awakened them with unparalleled terrors and sufferings. The war has accelerated the march of history until it now flics with the speed of a locomotive. History is now made by the independent action of millions and tens of millions of people. Capitalism has reached the stage of Socialism. And therefore, if Russia now can pass, as she indisputably is passing, from a Peace of Tilsit to a period of national awakening, to a great war of national defense, the result of this transition will not ht the bourgeois state, but the international Socialist revolution. We have therefore become, since November 7, 1917, "defenders"; we are for the "defense of the fatherland," but the fatherland that we are defending is the Socialist fatherland. We are defending our Socialism, which is a section of the universal army of Socialism. "Haired of the Germans, down with the Germans!" — such was the cry and remains the cry of the ordinary, that is, bourgeois, patriot ism. And wc say: "Hatred to the imperialist robbers, hatred to Capitalism, death to Capitalism;" and, together with this: "We must learn from the Germans! Remain faithful to the fraternal union wilh the German workers. They have been late in coming to our assistance. We shall wait for their coming, wc shall gain time; they will come to our assistance." Yes, learn from the Germans! History moves in zig-zags and in round-about paths. It so happens that the German at present simultaneously personifies, together with savage Imperialism, the be ginnings of discipline, organization, harmonious co-operation, on the basis of the modern machine industry, and strict accountability and supervision. And that is precisely what wc lack. That is just what we must learn. That is exactly what our Revolution must have in order to proceed from a victorious beginning, through a series of difficult trials, to a victorious conclusion. That is exactly what the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic needs in order to cease being poor and weak, and to become, once for all, rich and mighty. PART SEVEN The Soviet Republic and its Problems By N. LENIN INTRODUCTION The central feature of reconstruction In Russia is that it proceeds upon the basis of a proletarian state, functioning through a temporary dictatorship of the proletariat. The policy of the Bolsheviki, in complete harmony with Marxism, is that the first requirement of Socialism in ac tion is the conquest of power by the proletariat, after which accomplish ment reconstruction becomes fundamental reconstruction and assumes the tendency of making for Socialism, instead of promoting Capitalism. The dictatorship of the proletariat, the dynamic mechanism of the introduction of Socialism, may be described as having three functions: I. The annihilation of the political power of the bourgeoisie in all its ramifications. The assumption of state power by the revolutionary pro letariat disposes of the bourgeoisie temporarily as a political force; the bourgeoisie must be disposed of permanently. This is accomplished in two ways: the political expropriation of tin- bourgeoisie and its complete ex clusion from participation in politics and government ; and then its economic expropriation. In the measure that the process of reconstruction absorbs the liourgcoibic into tlie ranks of the producers, will they again be allowed — as workers — to participate in politics and government. 2. The introduction of measures of temporary reconstruction. The transition from Capitalism to Socialism is not accomplished in a day: it is a process. But while the moderate and the revolutionary Socialist agree that the transition to Socialism is a process, there is violent dis agreement as to tlie character of the process. The moderate Socialist assumes that it is a process operating upon the basis of Capitalism and the bourgeois state; a gradual penetration of Socialism into Capitalism; but this is a process that cannot and never will emerge into Socialism, hcuig the process of petty liourgcois collectivism, find making f . , r Slate Capitalism. The revolutionary Socialist assumes that the process must be a revolutionary process operating upon the basis of the proletarian state — a process of reconstruction wliich alone annihilates Capitalism and introduces Socialism. Moreover, the transition, the overthrow of the political power of the bourgeoisie, necessarily disorganizes industry, and creates a measure of demoralization; many of the measures of the dic tatorship of the proletariat, accordingly, must be of a temporary nature in order to overcome this demoralization, and increase productive capac ity. The rapid increase of production, a vital task of the proletarian state, is accomplished also by all the measures of reconstruction, by means of a dictatorial regulation of production. 3. But these temporary measures must he, and are, in accord with the fundamental tendency making for Socialism. Measures of recon struction to solve immediate problems of disorganization may assume a 3"^ THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA «.' capitalist or a Socialist character, dominantly; and these measures of the dictatorship of the proletariat are decisively of a Socialist character. This, accordingly, is the fundamental task of the proletarian dictatorship: to initiate the tendency towards the complete transformation of Capital ism into communist Socialism.* The forms of this tendency assume a clmraeter that logically and inevitably emerge into the definite forms of a Socialist society. The Soviet government annihilated the political power of the bourgeoisie by completely excluding it from participation in politics and (.{ovci'iiinciit, by tlie abolition of the parliamentary state and bourgeois demo cracy. The Soviet state is a state of the organized producers, rep resenting exclusively the interests of the proletariat and proletarian peasantry. The political expropriation of the bourgeoisie was complete; but its economic expropriation was not pushed to the final point. This temporary cessation of the economic expropriation of capital is based upon a number of factors, chief among them being the incomplete indus trial development of Russia, but most important the necessity of empha sizing temporary measures in order to solve the pressing immediate prob lems of the resumption of economic activity. These temporary measures assumed a much more important charac ter in Russia than is typical of the transition toward Socialism upon the basis of a dictatorship of the proletariat. The Soviet regime inherited chaos, a chaos produced by Czarism and intensified by the bourgeois re public of the Provisional Government, of Kerensky. The war, the cutting off of communications with the outside world (the Allies completely iso lated the Soviet Republic), the pressing starvation, the encroachments of Germany and otlier nations, determined to crush the proletarian revolu tion — all these factors, and more, emphasized the importance of tempo rary measures out of all proportion to the general tendency of a dictator ship of the proletariat. But the chief, the all-determining problem was met, and met adequate ly: the participation in the government, dominantly and dynamically, of the lowest section of the proletariat and proletarian peasantry, the emergence upon the stage of government of the masses of the people, the initiation definitely of the tendency toward the complete socialization of industry and society. The conscious activity of the masses, the de velopment of its capacity for self-government and administrative control of industry and society, determine the rapidity of the measures toward complete Socialism introduced by the dictatorship of the proletariat— and these requirements were swiftly developed. The unifying characteristic of all measures, temporary and permanent, introduced by the Soviet government, is that they started from the bot tom, and not from the top; that the center of reconstruction was the ac tivity of the organized producers, and not the activity of the state. The local initiative and self-government of the producers had to be developed as the only basis for the fundamental industrial democracy of communist Socialism. This initiative, this self-government, and not the bureaucratic state, is the dominant factor in the process of reconstruction. The pro letarian state constituted a unifying expression and acceleration of the activity of the masses. The old state, equally the bourgeois parliamen- INTRODUCTION 3°9 tary state and the Czarist state, has been completely overthrown, with all its machinery of repression of the masses, its bureaucracy, and its anti-proletarian character. The new state is the state of the organized producers; as the old state was an instrument for the coercion of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie, so the new state is an instrument for the coercion of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat — with this fundamental dif ference: that where the old state considered itself sacrosanct and eter nal, the new state considers itself a temporary necessity that will gradu ally become superfluous in the measure that the process of reconstruction emerges definitely into the Socialist communist society of the organized producers. As an historical category, 'the Soviets are not peculiarly Russian prod ucts, but class organizations characteristic of the proletarian revolution. They constitute a dictatorship in relation to the bourgeoisie, but a democracy in relation to the workers and peasants — the real, the funda mental democracy of oncoming Socialism. The agrarian problem in revolutionary Russia plays a much more im portant part than would obtain in a proletarian revolution in a nation where industrialization has proceeded further. The peasantry, the mass of agricultural workers and expropriated peasants as against the peasant bourgeoisie, has accepted, at least for the present, the tutelage of the proletarian dictatorship, is a phase of this dictatoiship. Private owner ship of land has been abolished, the land being nationalized and dis tributed to the peasants on the basis of agricultural comunism. Local land committees take charge of production and distribution of agri cultural products, inventory the land in a particular district, allot land to the villages, regulate agricultural labor, control forests, etc., and re ceive the rental for the use of the land, which is turned over to the cen tral government. The land committees of the rural districts arc unified into the county committees, which in turn elect delegates to a provincial committee, the provincial land committees being organized into the Main Land Committee acting for all Russia. On this central agricultural body arc represented the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Peasants and Workers, the Commissaire of Agriculture, etc. The abolition of private ownership in land includes city real estate and buildings, which are de clared public property. Industry has not been completely socialized, although a drastic work ers' control has been established over all industry. Not all capitalists have been expropriated, the employer or owner in many cases being re tained as a director, but his rights as owner have been abrogated and his "profits" rigidly limited. Workers' control of industry starts with factory and works committees, elected by the employees and the technical staffs, and having almost complete jurisdiction over internal questions, wages, hours, etc. In each important industrial district, town or province, is in stituted a local workmen's organ of control, acting in accord with the local Soviet, and comprised of representatives of the factory and works committees, labor unions and workmen's co-operative societies. This control of industry is centralized in the All-Russian Workmen's Council of Control, acting for the whole of Russia. 3*0 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA The supreme factor in the control and regulation of economic activity is the Superior Council of National Economy, which unifies and directs in dustrial and agricultural production, and to which the specific agricutural and industrial councils are subsidiary, all in turn being responsible to the central organ of government, the Council of People's Commissaircs. The Council of National Economy regulates the state finances, has authority to confiscate, requisition, sequestrate and syndicate any industrial establish ments, the right to reform and re-organize all other existing institutions for the regulation of production, and supervises and directs the work of all economic departments of the Soviets. The Council of National Economy is composed of representatives of the All-Russian Workmen's Council of Control, each commissariat of the Soviet government, and specially selected persons. The Council is divided into several sections, each of which deals with a particular phase of economy; and it must submit all bills and important measures to the Council of People's Commissaires. In these measures for workers' control of industry temporary require ments arc fused with ultimate purposes: the forms are not in any sense final, although latent in the general tendency of the measures. While the representation on the local and district organs of control is indus trial, the whole system functions territorially and is not yet wholly and integrally industrial. The ultimate form of organization is the unification of all the separate parts of a particular industry in all Russia into one integrated industrial department, having immediate and particular direc tion of its industry; and the unification of all industrial departments into one central and inclusive industrial administration — as provided in the tbt"i*y of industrial unionism and the facts of production. This is pre cisely what should emerge from the present incomplete forms of workers' ronirol, together with the complete expropriation of capital. Proletarian Russia is constructing the industrial state, preparing the conditions for the final abolition of the state and the institution of Engels' "administra tion of things," Two circumstances determined the temporarily incom plete forms of workers' control of industry: the immediate necessity to resume production and crush the industrial sabotage practised by the bourgeoisie, which had to be done immediately even if functioning through incomplete forms; and the fact that Russia is not as completely industrialized as other nations, consequently much of the material for an integrated industrial administration is missing. But the tendency has been initiated out of which inevitably emerge the higher forms, as the dictatorship of the proletariat completes its task of annihilating the bourgeoisie and increasing the totality of the productive forces. The tendency, moreover, is wholly in accord with the ultimate purposes of communist Socialism. The nationalization of the banks was a crucial measure. It was, per haps, the most difficult and adventurous of all the measures introduced by the Soviet state, but inescapable. Monopolistic finance is the heart of Capitalism and Imperialism, and to strike at this heart is to deal a mortal blow at the bourgeoisie The expropriation of the banks, accordingly, is necessarily one of the first measures of the proletarian revolution. This measure is a most difficult and dangerous one, and latent with infinite complications, since it is the most definite step toward the abolition of INTRODUCTION 37 * Capitalism, and financial administration is highly technical in scope. By means of the nationalization of the banks, finance becomes exclusively a means for the development of industry, and not dominantly a means of exploitation as under the bourgeois regime. The control of finance, moreover, is an irresistible instrument for the complete annihilation of the economic and social relations of Capitalism, the complete achieve ment of which means the end of finance and money in their expression as relations of private property. Together with these general and fundamental measures, more tempo rary measures were Introduced, such as unemployment Insurance, obliga tory labor (directed particularly at the bourgeois classes), and systematic and intensive labor legislation, to improve the workers' conditions at the expense of the bourgeoisie and complete the expropriation of capital. Labor legislation, introduced during the transition period from Capital ism to Socialism and on the basis of the proletarian state, becomes a means for the expropriation of capital, not a means to strengthen the domination of capital. Through all the reconstruction activity of the Soviet Republic runs the thread of developing a sense of discipline and responsibility in the masses. There was the tremendous industrial and social disorganization; the conscious efforts of the bourgeois hirelings to create confusion and disorder; the intoxicating effect among the workers of the newly-won freedom; and the psychology of irresponsibility in the workers inherited from the old regime. All these factors necessarily produced a certain amount of license. An intense struggle had to be waged against the ideology implanted in the minds of the workers by the bourgeois order, It is not sufficient that the administrative norms of the new order shall be introduced; there must develop a new ideology, the ideology of self- mastery and social discipline, of responsibility to one's self and to one's associates, of administrative competency and management among the workers,— the ideology of the joy of work, since one now works for him self, and not for a master. The development of this ideology was a task stressed by the Soviet officials; and it is a task, international complica tions aside, upon the success of which depends the immediate success of the proletarian revolution and the Socialist Republic in Russia. The proletarian revolution in Russia initiates the epoch of the inter- li.a;. ji',.,1 Soci. I k'tolution. Not alone in the tactic?, and policy used in the conquest of power by the proletariat are the Bolshcviki the masters of the revolution, the symbol of the emerging revolutionary Socialism of the international proletariat; in their measures and tendency of action "after the conquest of power, the Bolsheviki are teaching the international proletariat how to use power after its acquisition, developing the admin- i-ir-'.i.c r.oruij of the oiuo.n.il^ Sicii.lii* !ir;.i;Mi. , • * * Part Seven consists wholly of a long article by Lenin appearing in Pro*. da early in May, i <> 1 8. It has aln ;i -I> appeared in an IJigh^i pan.plilet, 'lh. Soviets at Work, issued by The Rand School of bocial Science, Lut it i-. 1.0 ckarly understandable withou. the other material that precede. It ill ;!,; i.x,k. L. C. V. THE PROBLEM OF ORGANIZATION Thanks to the peace secured — in spite of all its oppressiveness and insecurity — the Russian Soviet Republic is now able, for a certain time, to concentrate its efforts on the most important and most difficult phase of the Socialist revolution, on the problem of organization. This problem is presented clearly and precisely to all toiling and oppressed masses in the fourth section of the resolution adopted on March 16, 1918, at the Moscow All-Russian Congress of Soviets, in the section which speaks of the self-discipline of the toilers and of the merciless struggle against chaos and disorganization. The uncertainty of the peace secured by the Russian Soviet Republic is not determined, of course, by the fact that the Republic is now considering the renewal of military activity. With the ex ception of the bourgeois counter-revolutionists and their aids (the Mensheviki, etc.), no sensible statesman thinks of that. The insecur ity of the peace is determined by the fact that in the imperialistic nations on the West and on the East of Russia, and possessing enormous military power, the upper hand may at any moment be gained by the military party, wliich is tempted by the temporary weakness of Russia and incited by the Socialism-hating capitalists. Under such conditions our real, and not paper, guarantees or peace lie exclusively in the antagonisms between the imperialistic powers, which have reached the highest point, — manifested, on the one hand, in the renewal of the imperialistic slaughter of the peoples on the West ; and, on the other, in the extremely keen imperialistic' rivalry between Japan and America for supremacy on the Pacific and its coasts. It is obvious that, in view of the weakness of such guarantees, our Socialist Soviet Republic is in an extremely precarious, un doubtedly critical international position. Wc must strain all our strength in order to utilize the respite granted us by this situation to cure the most severe wounds inflicted on the social organism of THE PROBLEM OF ORGANIZATION 373 Russia by the war, and economically rehabilitate the country, with out which there can be no serious improvement in our ability to offer resistance. It is also obvious that we can give serious aid to the Socialist revolution in the West, which has been delayed on account of a number of causes, only in so far as wc arc successful in solving* the problems of organization that confront us. A fundamental condition for the successful solution of our most urgent problems of organization is the complete comprehen sion by the political leaders of the people, that is, by the members of the Russian Communist Party (the Ilolslicviki), and then by all conscious representatives of the toiling masses, of the basic dif ference between the earlier bourgeois revolutions and our Social ist revolution, with respect to the problem under consideration. In the bourgeois revolutions the main task of the toiling masses consisted in performing the negative, destructive work — the de struction of feudalism and monarchy. The positive, constructive work of organizing a new society was performed by the propertied bourgeois minority of the population. And they accomplished this" task, in spite of the resistance of the workers and the poorest peas ants, with comparative ease, not only because the resistance of the exploited masses was then, on account of their unorganized state and their ignorance, extremely weak, but also because the funda mental organizing force of the anarchic structure of capitalist so ciety is provided by the natural, extensive and intensive develop ment of the national and international market. In every Socialist revolution, however, the main task of the proletariat, and of the poorest peasantry accepting its leadership, — and hence also in the Socialist revolution in Russia inaugurated by us on November 7, 1917 — consists in the positive and constructive work of establishing an extremely complex and delicate net work of newly organized relationships covering the systematic produc tion and distribution of products which are necessary for the exist ence of tens of millions of people. The successful realization of such a revolution depends on the original, historical and creative work of the majority of the population, and first of all, of the ma jority of the toilers. The victory of the Socialist revolution will not be assured, unless the proletariat and the poorest peasantry will manifest sufficient consciousness, idealism, self-sacrifice, and per sistence. With the creation of a new — the Soviet — type of state, offering to the oppressed toiling masses the opportunity to partici- 374 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA pate actively in the free construction of a new society, we have solved only a small part of the difficult task. The main difficulty is in the economic domain — to raise the productivity of labor, to establish strict and universal accounting and control of production and distribution, and actually to socialize production. The evolution of the Bolshevik party, which is today the gov ernment party of Russia, shows with great clearness the nature of the historical crisis characterizing the present political situation and demands a new orientation by the Soviet authority, that is. new methods applied to new problems. The first problem of any rising party consists in convincing the majority of the population that its program and policies are cor rect. This was the most important problem during Czarism and during the period of compromise of the Chernovs and Tseretellis with Kerensky and Kishkin. At present this problem, which is, of course, far from solution or immediate solution, is, in the main, solved, since the majority of the workers and peasants of Russia, as was shown beyond doubt by the last Congress of the Soviets in Moscow, are definitely with the Bolsheviki. The second problem of our party was the conquest of political power and the suppression of the resistance of the exploiters. This problem as well is not yet completely solved, and we cannot ignore that fact, for the Monarchists and Cadets, on the one hand, and the Mensheviki and right Social Revolutionists — who echo and follow them — on the other, continue their attempts to unite for the over throw of the Soviet power. But, in the main, tlie problem of the resistance of the exploiters was already solved in the period be tween November 7, 1917, and (approximately) February, 1918 — the time of the surrender of the Cossack Bogajcvsky We arc now confronted by the third problem, .-hich is the most urgent and which characterizes the present period: to organize Ihe management of Russia. Of course, we had to deal with this problem and have been at it ever since November 7, 191 7. But heretofore, as long as the resistance of the exploiters manifested it self in open civil warfare, the problem of management could not become the pincipal, the central problem. At present it has become the central problem. We, the Bol shevik party, have convinced Russia. We have 'won Russia from the lich for the poor, from the exploiters for the toilers. And now it is up to us to manage Russia. The special difficulty of the present period consists in comprehending the peculiarities of the transition THE PROBLEM OF ORGANIZATION 375 from the principal problem of convincing the people and suppressing the exploiters by force to the now principal problem of management. For the first time in the history of the world the Socialist party has succeeded in completing, essentially, the task of securing power and suppressing the exploiters, and in coming close to the problem of management. We must prove worthy of this, the most difficult (and most promising) problem of the Socialist revolution. We must not fail to see that, besides the ability to convince and to win in civil war, successful management depends on the ability for prac tical organization. This is the most difficult problem, — it means the organization, on a new basis, of the deepest foundations — the eco nomic — of the life of tens and tens of millions. And it is the most promising problem, for only after its essential solution shall wc be able to say that Russia has become not only a Soviet, but a Socialist republic. This objective situation, which was created by the extremely oppressive and insecure peace, by the terrible disorganization, un employment and starvation, which we have inherited from the war, and from the rule of the bourgeoisie (represented by Keren sky and his supporters, the Mensheviki and right Social-Revolu tionists), — all this has inevitably produced an extreme wearinesj and even an exhaustion of the toiling masses. It is but natural that they insistently demand some rest. The restoration of the produc tive forces destroyed by the war and by the mismanagement of the bourgeoisie; the curing of wounds inflicted by the war, defeats in the war, speculation, and the attempts of the bourgeoisie to estab lish the overthrown power of the exploiters; the economic rehabili tation of the country; the maintenance of elementary order; — these :.re the urgent problems to which wc must turn. It may s.em para doxical, but the fact is that in view of objective conditions, there can be no doubt that at the present moment the Soviet power can not make secure the transformation of Russia toward Socialism, unless it can solve in a practical way these most elementary prob lems of social life — in spite of the resistance of the bourgeoisie, the Mensheviki and the right Social-Revolutionists. In view of the con crete peculiarities of the present situation and in view of the exist ence of the Soviet power with its laws on socialization of the land, on workers' control of industry, etc., the practical solution of these elementary problems would mean that we will have overcome the organization difficulties of the first steps toward Socialism. Keep accurate and conscientious accounts, conduct business 37*5 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA economically, do not loaf, do not steal, maintain strict discipline at work, — these slogans, which were justly ridiculed by revolutionary proletarians when they were used by the bourgeoisie to assure their domination as a class of exploiters, have now, after the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, become urgent and fundamental slogans. And the practical realization of these slogans by the toiling masses, is, on ihe one hand, the sole condition for the salvation of the country, which has been shattered by the imperialistic war and by the im perialists (headed by Kerensky) ; and, on the other, the practical icalization of these slogans by the Soziet power, with its own meth ods, and on the basis of its own laws, is necessary and sufficient for the final victory of Socialism. This, however, is not compre hended by those who contemptuously refuse to urge such "com mon" and "trivial" ideas. In our agricultural country, which only a year ago overthrew Czarism and less than half a year ago freed itself from the Kerenskys, there remained, naturally, a good deal of unconscious anarchism, which is increased by the bestiality and barbarity accompanying every prolonged and reactionary war, and a good deal of despair and aimless anger has accumulated. If we should add to this the treasonable policy of the servants of the bourgeoisie, the Mensheviki, right Social-Revolutionists, etc., it will become clear what energetic and persistent efforts must be exerted by the best and most conscious workers and peasants to effect a complete change in the mood of the masses and to turn them lo regular, uninterrupted and dsciplined labor. Only such a change, accomplished by the masses of proletarians and semi-proletarians can complete the victory o\cr the bourgeoisie, and, especially, over the more persistent and numerous peasant bourgeoisie. II A NEW PHASE OF THE REVOLUTION We have defeated the bourgeoisie, but it is not yet destroyed and not even completely subjugated. We must, therefore, resort to a new and higher form of the struggle with the bourgeoisie, we must turn from the very simple problem of continuing the expro priation of the capitalists to the more complex and difficult prob lem—the problem of creating conditions under which the bourg eoisie can neither exist nor conic into existence again. It is clear that this problem is infinitely more important and that we shall have nc Socialism until it is solved. Comparing our revolution wilh the revolutions of Western Europe, wc are now approximately at the point which was reached in 1793 and 1871 in France. We have a right to be proud of the fact that we have reached this point and that in one respect wc have, undoubtedly, gone somewhat further, as we have decreed and estab lished throughout Russia a higher type of state — the Soviet govern ment. But we cannot possibly rest satisfied with these achievements, for we have only begun the transformation toward Socialism, and in this respect wc have not yet accomplished anything decisive. Of decisive importance is the organization of strict and uni versal accounting and control of production and distribution. But, we have not yet effected accounting and control in those enter prises and in those branches and departments of economic effort which we have taken away from the bourgeoisie, and without this there can be no question of the second, just as essential, condition for the establishment of Socialism, viz: to increase the productivity of labor on a national scale. It would therefore be impossible to formulate the problem of the present period in the simple sentence: continue the offensive against capital. In spite of the fact that we have, undoubtedly, not conquered capital — and that it is absolutely necessary to continue the attack on this enemy of the toilers, — such a proposal would lie vague and not concrete, it would not indicate the peculiarity of the 378 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA present period, when, in the interests of a successful n"« ecu re our gains, and, on the other band, is necessary to prepare the camp.rgn lo "isolate capital" and "compel its surrender." The introduction of obligatory labor service should be started immediately, but il should be introduced gradually and with great caution, examining every step in practical experience, and, of course, introducing first of all obligatory labor service for the rich. The introduction of a labor record book and a consumption-budget iccord book for every bourgeois, including the village bourgeois, would be a serious step forward toward a complete "siege" of the enemy and toward the creation of a really universal accountirj* and control of production and distribution. MANAGEMENT AND PRODUCTION 385 The state, an organ of oppression and robbery of the people, left to us. as a heritage, the greatest hatred and distrust of the people toward everything connected with the state. To overcome this is a very difficult task, which only the Soviets can master, but which requires even from them considerable time and tremendous perseverance. This "heritage" has a particularly painful effect on the question of accounting and control — a fundamental problem for the Socialist revolution after the overthrow of the bourgeoisie. 1» will inevitably take some time before the masses will begin to feel themselves free, after the overthrow of the land owners and the bourgeoisie, and will comprehend — not from books, but from their own, the Soviet, experience — will comprehend and come to feel that without thorough state accounting and control of produc tion and distribution the authority of the toilers, and their freedom, cannot last, and a return to the yoke of Capitalism is inevitable. All the habits and traditions of the bourgeoisie, and especially, of the petty bourgeoisie, arc also opposed to state control, are for the inviolability of "'sacred private property" and of "sacred" priv ate enterprise. It is especially clear to us now how correct is the Marxian proposition that anarchism and anarcho-syndicalism are bourgeois tendencies, irreconcilable with Sc«cialisrn, with a proletarian dictat orship and with Communism. The struggle to install in tlie masses the idea of Soiict state control and accounting, for the realization of this idea, for a break with the accursed past, which accustomed the people to look upon the work of getting food and clothing as a "private" affair and on purchase and sale as something that "con cerns only myself," — this is the most momentous struggle, of univ ersal historical significance, a struggle of Socialist consciousness against bourgeois-anarchistic "freedom." We have introduced workers' control as a law, but it is barely beginning to be realized or even penetrating the consciousness of the proletarian masses. That lack of accountability in production and distribution is fatal for the first steps toward Socialism, that it means corruption, that carelessness in accounting and control is a direct assistance to the German and Russian Kornilovs, who can overthrow the authority of the toilers only in case wc do not solve the problem of account ing and control, and who with tbe aid of the peasant bourgeoisie, the Cadets, tlie Mensheviki and the Right Wing Social-Revolu tionists arc watching us, waiting for their opportunity, — this is not adequately emphasized in our agitation, and is not given sufficient 38C) IIU; PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA thought or sufficient exposition by the advanced workers and peas ants. And as long as workers' control has not become a fact, as long as the advanced workers have not carried out a successful and merciless campaign against those who violate this control or who arc careless with regard to control, — until then wc cannot advance from the first step (from workers' control) to the second step toward Socialism, that is. to the regulation of production by the workers, A Socialist state can conic into existence only as a system of production and consumption Communes, which keep conscientious accounts of their production and consumption, economize labor, and steadily increase productivity, thus making it possible to lower the work-day to seven, six or even fewer hours. Anything less than rigorous, universal, thorough accounting and control of gratn and of the production of grain, and later of all other necessary- products, will not do. We have inherited from Capitalism mass organizations, which facilitate the transition to mass accounting and control of distribution — the consumers' cooperatives. They are developed in Russia less than in the advanced countries, but they comprise more than 10,000,000 members. The decree on consumers' associations which was recently issued is extremely significant, showing clearly the peculiarity of the position and of the problem of the Socialist Soviet Republic at this time. The decree is an agreement with the bourgeois cooperatives and with the workmen's cooperatives adhering to the bourgeois standpoint. The agreement or compromise consists, first, in the fact that representatives of these institutions not only participated 111 the deliberations on this decree, but practically obtained a decid ing control, for parts of the decree which met determined opposition from these institutions were rejected. Secondly and essentially, the compromise consists in the rejection by the Soviet authority of the principle of voluntary admission to the cooperatives (the only consistent principle from the proletarian standpoint) uniting the whole population of a given locality in a single cooperative. Tlie defection from this, the only Socialist principle, which is in accord with the problem of abolishing classes, allows the existence cf "workmen's class cooperatives" (which, in this case, call them selves "class" cooperatives only because they submit to the class interests of the bourgeoisie). lastly, the proposition of the Soviet government to completely exclude the bourgeoisie from the ad ministration of the cooperatives was also considerably weakened, MANAGEMENT AND PRODUCTION 3&7 and only owners of capitalistic commercial and industrial enter prises are excluded from the administration. If the proletariat, acting through the Soviets, would success fully establish accounting and control on a national scale, there would be no need for such compromises. Through the Food De partments of the Soviets, through their organs of supply, we would unite the population in one cooperative directed by the proletariat, without assistance from bourgeois cooperatives, without concessions to tbe purely bourgeois principle which compels the labor cooperat ives to remain side by side with the bourgeois cooperatives instead of wholly subjecting these bourgeois cooperatives and uniting both. Entering into such an agreement with the bourgeois cooper atives, the Soviet authority has concretely defined its tactical prob lems and characteristic methods of action for the present stage of development, — by directing the bourgeois elements, using them, making certain individual concessions to them, we are creating conditions for a forward movement which will be slower than we at first supposed, but at tbe same time more steadfast, with a more solidly protected base and line of communications, and with better fortification of the conquered positions. The Soviets can (and should) now measure tlieir successes in tbe work of Socialist re construction, among others, by very simple and practical tests; in exactly what number of communities (communes, or villages, blocks, etc.) and to what extent does the development of the co operatives approach the state when they will comprise the whole population? In every Socialist revolution, — after the proletariat has solved the problem of conquest of power, and to the extent to which the problem of expropriating the expropriators and suppressing their resistance is in the main and fundamentally solved, — it bec'omes necessary to turn first of all to the fundamental problem of the creation of a social system, higher than Capitalism, namely: to raise the productivity of labor and, in connection with this (and for this), its higher organization. Our Soviet power is in just such a position, now that, thanks to its victories over the exploiters from Kercnsky to Kornilov, it has become possible for it to approach this problem directly and to take hold of it. And here it becomes al once clear that, if it is possible to seize the central state power in a few days, if it is possible to suppress the military resistance and the sabotage of the cxpoitcrs even in the remote corners of a large country in several weeks, a final solution of the problem i*8 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA of increasing the productivity of labor requires at least several years (especially after a most distressing and destructive war). The decisive character of this work is determined by purely object ive circumstances To increase the productivity of labor we must first of all secure the material basis of large industry: the development of the pro duction of fuel, iron, machinery and of the chemical industry. The Russian Soviet Republic is in such an advantageous position that it possesses, even after the Brcst-Litovsk peace, colossal stores of ore (in the Ural) ; of fuel, in Western Siberia (hard coal) ; in Caucasia and in the Southeast (petroleum) ; in central Russia (pasture) ; vast resources of lumber, water-power and raw material for tbe chemical industry ( Karabugas) and so on. The exploit ation of these natural resources by the latest technical methods will furnish a basis for an unprecedented development of produc tion. Higher productivity of labor depends, firstly, on the improve ment of the educational and cultural condition of the masses of the population. This improvement is now taking place with un usual swiftness, but is not perceived by those who are blinded by the bourgeois routine and are unable to comprehend what a longing for light and initiative is now pervading the masses of the people, thanks to the Soviet organizations. Secondly, economic improve ment depends on higher discipline of the toilers, on higher skill, efficiency and intensity of labor and its better organization. In this respect our situation is especially bad and even hope less, — if wc should take the word of those who arc frightened by the bourgeoisie or who are paid to serve it. These people do not understand that there has never been, nor can there ever be, a rev olution in which the adherents of the old regime would not wail about disorganization, anarchy, etc. It is natural that among the masses who have just overthrown an incredibly barbarous oppres sion, there is a profound and widespread unrest and ferment, that the development of a new basis of labor discipline is a very long process ; that before the land owners and the bourgeoisie had been overcome, such a development could not even begin. But, without being influenced by this despair, often pretended, which is spread by the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois intellectuals (who have given up hope of retaining their old privileges), we* should by no means conceal any manifest evils. On the contrary, we will expose them and improve the Soviet methods of combating MANAGEMENT AND PRODUCTION 389 them, for the success of Socialism is inconceivable without the victory of conscious proletarian discipline against the instinctive petty bourgeois anarchy, this real guarantee of a possible restor ation of Kerenskyism and Kornilovism. The most conscious vanguard of the Russian proletariat has already turned to the problem of strengthening labor discipline. For instance, the central committee of the Metallurgical Union and the Central Council of tlio Trade Unions have begun work on respective measures and drafts of decrees. This work should be supported and advanced by all means. We should immediately introduce piece work and try it out in practice. We should tryj every scientific and progressive suggestion of the Taylor system, we should compare earnings with the general total of production or the operation results of railroad and water transportation, and so on. The Russian is a poor worker in comparison with the advanced nations and this could not be otherwise under the regime of the Czar and other remnants of feudalism. To learn how to work — this problem the Soviet authority should present to the people in all its aspects. The last word of Capitalism in this respect, the Taylor system — as well as all progressive measures of Capitalism — combines the refined cruelty of bourgeois exploitation and a number of most valuable scientific achievements in the analysis of mechanical motions during work, in dismissing superfluous and useless motions, in determining the most correct methods of work, the best systems of accounting and control, etc. The Soviet Republic must adopt all valuable scientific and technical advances in this field. The) possibility of Socialism will be determined by our success in com bining the Soviet rule and the Soviet organization of management with the latest progressive measures of Capitalism. Wc must in troduce in Russia the study and the teaching of the Taylor system and its systematic trial and adaptation. While working to increase the productivity of labor, wc must at the same time take into ac count the peculiarities of the transition period from Capitalism to Socialism which require, on the one hand, that we lay the found ation for the Socialist organization of emulation, and, on the other, that we use compulsion so that the slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat may not be weakened by the practice of a too mild proletarian government. Among the absurdities which the bourgeois is fain to spread about Socialism is the one that Socialists deny significance of 390 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA emulation. In reality Socialism, by destroying classes and, hence, the enslavement of the masses, for the first time opens up the road for emulation on a really mass scale. And only the Soviet organ ization, passing from the formal democracy of a bourgeois republic to the actual participation of the toiling masses in management, for the first time allows emulation on a broad basis. It is much easier to organize emulation in the political than in the economic field, but for the success of Socialism the latter is the more im portant Let us take publicity as a means for the organization of emul- alion. A bourgeois republic establishes this only formally, actually subjecting the press to capital, amusing the "mob" with spicy pol itical trifles, concealing the occurrence, in the factories, commercial transactions, etc., as a "business secret," protecting "sacred pro perty." The Soviets abolished commercial secrecy and started on a new road, but have done hardly anything to make use of publicity in the interest of economic emulation. We must systematically endeavor, — along with the merciless suppression of the thoroughly false and insolently caluminous bourgeois press,— to create a press which shall not amuse and fool the masses with spicy political trifles, but which will bring to the attention of the masses and help them to study seriously the questions of every-day economics. Every factory, every willage is a production and consumption Commune having the right and duty to apply the general Soviet regulations in its own way (not in the sense of violating the regulations, but in the sense of a diversity of forms in carrying them out), to solve in its own way the problem of accounting in production and dis tribution. Under Capitalism this was the "pri%*ate affair'' of the individual capitalist or land owner. Under the Soviets this is not a private affair, but a most important public concern. And we have hardly begun the immense and difficult, but also promising and important work of organizing emulation be tween the Communes, of introducing reports and publicity in the process of the production of bread, clothing, etc., of transforming the dry, dead bureaucratic reports into living things — either re pulsive or attractive. Under the capitalistic system of production the significance of an individual example, say, of some group of producers, -was inevitably extremely limited, and it was only a petty bougeois illu sion to dream that Capitalism could be "reformed" by the influence of models of virtuous establishments. After political power has MANAGEMENT AND PRODUCTION 391 passed into the hands of the proletariat and after the expropriation of the expropriators has been accomplished, the situation is radic ally changed, and — as was many times pointed out by the most imincnt Socialists — the force of an example can then for the first time exert a mass effect. Model Communes should and will serve the purpose of training, teaching and stimulating the backward Communes, The press should serve as a weapon of Socialist con struction, giving publicity in all details to the success of the model Communes, studying the principles of their success, their methods of economy, and, on the other hand, "blacklisting" those Communes which persist in keeping the "traditions of Capitalism," that is, anarchy, loafing, disorder and speculation. Statistics under Cap italism were used exclusively by government employes or narrow specialists, — we must bring them to the masses, we must popularize them so that the toilers may gradually learn to understand and to sec for themselves what work and how much work is needed, and how much rest they can have; so that a comparison between the results of the enterprise of different Communes may become a subject of general interest and study; that the foremost Communes may be immediately rewarded (by reducing the workday for a certain period, raising the wages, granting a larger measure of cultural or historical privileges and treasures, and so forth). The appearance on the historical stage of a new class in the role of a leader of society never occurs without a period of up heavals, struggles and storms, on the one hand,— and, on the other, without a period of false steps, experiments, wavering and hesi tation with regard to the choice of new methods that will fit the new objective circumstances. The perishing feudal nobility was accustomed to false revenge on the bourgeoisie, which was con quering and displacing them, not only by conspiracies, attempts at insurrections and restoration, but also by torrents of ridicule at the inability, clumsiness, and blunders of the "insolent upstarts" who dared to take hold of the "sacred helm" of the state without the ancient training for this work, of the princes, barons, nobility and aristocracy, — quite like the revenge of the Komilovs and Kerenskys, Gotz and Martovs, all those heroes of bourgeois moral ity or bourgeois scepticism, on the working class of Russia for its "insolent" attempt to seize power. Of course, many months and years must pass before the new social class, a class heretofore oppressed and crushed by want and ignorance, can become accustomed to the new situation, can take 392 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA account of everything, regulate its work and produce its own orga nizers. It is self-understood that the party which leads the rev olutionary proletariat could not gain the practical experience of large organizations and enterprises counting on millions and tens of millions of citizens; that to change the old, almost exclusively agitational habits must take a good deal of time. But it is not im possible, and — provided we have a clear understanding of the necessity of the change, a firm determination to accomplish it, and persistence in pursuing a great and difficult end, — we will attain It. There is a great deal of organizing talent in the "people," among the workers and among the peasants who arc not exploiters; they had been oppressed, ruined and discarded by the thousands, by capital ; wc do not as yet know how to find them, how to encourage. assist them and give them prominence. But we will learn it, pro vided we start learning with the full revolutionary zeal without which no revolution can be victorious. No profound and powerful popular movement in history ever escaped paying a price to the scum — the inexperienced innovators arc preyed upon by adventurers and crooks, boasters and shouters; there -will be stupid confusion, unnecessary bustle; individual "lead ers" -will undertake twenty tasks at once, accomplishing none of them. Let the poodles of bourgeois society scream and bark be cause of each additional splinter going to waste while the big old forest is cut down. It is their business to bark at the proletarian elephant. Let them bark. We will go ahead, trying very cautiously and patiently to test and discover real organizers, people with sober minds and practical sense, who combine loyalty to Socialism with the ability to organize quietly (and in spite of confusion and noise) the efficient and harmonious team work of a large number of people under the Soviet organization. Only such persons should, after many trials, advancing them from the simplest to the most difficult tasks, bo promoted to responsible posts to direct the work of the people, to direct the management. We have not yet learned this. Wc will learn. IV DEMOCRACY AND PROLETARIAN DICTATORSHIP The resolution of the March Congress of the Soviets advo cates, as the most important problem at present, the creation of "efficient organization" and higher discipline. Such resolutions are now readily supported by everybody. But that their realization requires compulsion, and compulsion in the form of a dictatorship, is ordinarily not comprehended. And yet, it would be tha greatest stupidity and the most absurd opportunism to suppose that the transition from Capitalism to Socialism is possible without com pulsion and dictatorship. The Marxian theory long ago con demned in no uncertain terms this petty bourgeois-democratic and anarchistic nonsense. And the Russia of 1917-1918 confirms in this respect the Marxian theory so clearly, palpably and convinc ingly that only those who are hopelessly stupid or who have firmly determined to ignore the truth can still err in this respect. Either a Kornilov dictatorship (if Kornilov be taken as the Russian type of a bourgeois Cavaignac), or a dictatorship of the proletariat, — no other alternative is possible for a country which is passing through an unusually swift development with unusually difficult transitions and which suffers from desperate disorganization cre ated by the most horrible war. All middle courses arc advanced — in order to deceive the people — by the bourgeoisie, who arc not in a position to tell the truth and admit openly that they need a Kor nilov, or — through stupidity — by the petty bourgeois democrats, the Chernovs, Tseretellis and Martovs, prattling of a united de mocracy, of the dictatorship of democracy, of a single democratic front, and similar nonsense. Those who have not learned even from the course of the Russian revolution of 1917-1918 that middle courses are impossble, must be given up as hopeless. On the other hand, it is not hard to see that during any transi tion from Capitalism to Socialism a dictatorship is necessary for two main reasons or in two main directions. In the first place, it is impossible to conquer and destroy Capitalism without the nicrci- 394 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA •less suppression of the resistance of the exploiters, who cannot be at once deprived of their wealth, of their advantages in organiza tion and knowledge, and who will, therefore, during a quite long period, inevitably attempt to overthrow the hateful (to them) authority of the poor. Secondly, every great revolution, and espe cially a Socialist revolution, even if there was no external war, is inconceivable without an internal war, thou ands and millions of cases of wavering and of desertion from one side to the other, and a state of the greatest uncertainty, instability and chaos. And, of course, all the decadent elements of the old order, inevitably very numerous and connected largely with the petty bourgeoisie (for the petty bourgeoisie is the first victim of every war and every crisis) cannot fail to "show up" during such a profound, transformation. And these elements of decay cannot "show up" otherwise than through the increase of crimes, hooliganism, bribery, speculation and otlier indecencies. It takes time and an iron hand to get rid of this. There never was a great revolution in history in which the people did not instinctively feel this and did not display salutary firninev s, shooting down thieves on the spot. The trouble with previous revolutions was this — that the revolutionary zeal of the masses, which kept them vigilant and gave them strength to merci lessly suppress the elements of decay, did not last long. The social, the class causes of such weakness of revolutionary zeal lay in the weakness of the proletariat, which is the only class capable (if sufficiently numerous, conscious and disciplined) of attracting the majority of the exploited toilers (the majority of the poor, if we should use a simpler and more popular expression) and of retain ing power for a sufficiently long time to completely suppress both all exploiters and all elements of decay. This historical experience of all revolutions, this universal historical — economic and political — lesson was summed up by Marx in his brief, sharp, exact and vivid formula: the dictatorship of the proletariat. And that the Russian revolution correctly ap proached this universal historical problem has been proven by the victorious march of the Soviet oganization among all peoples and tongues of Russia. For the Soviet rule is nothing else than tbe organized form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the dictator ship of the class conscious proletariat, rousing to a new democracy, to independent participation in the administration of the state, tens and tens of millions of exploited toilers, who through their DEMOCRACY AND PROLETARIAN DICTATORSHIP 395 experience are discovering that the disciplined and class conscious vanguard of the proletariat is their most reliable leader. But "dictatorship" is a great word. And great words must not be used lightly. A dictatorship is an iron rule, with revolu tionary daring, and swift and merciless in the suppression of the exploiters as well as of the hooligans. And our rule is too mild, quite frequently resembling jam rather than iron. We must not for a moment forget that the bourgeois and petty bourgeois en vironment is offering resistance to the Soviet rule in two ways: on the one hand, by external pressure — by the methods of the Sa- vir.kovs, Gotz, Gcgctchkoris and Kornilovs, by conspiracies and insurrections, with their ugly "ideologic" reflection, by torrents of falsehood and calumny in the press of the Cadets, Right Social- Revolutionists and Mensheviki ; and, on the other, this environment exerts internal pressure, taking advantage of every clement of decay, of every weakness, to bribe, to increase the lack of discipline, dissollutencss, chaos. The nearer we get to the complete military suppression of the bourgeoisie, the more dangerous become for us the petty bourgeois anarchic inclinations. And these inclinations cannot be combattcd only by propaganda and agitation, by the organization of emulation, by the selection of organizers; they must also be met with force. To the extent to which the principal problem of the Soviet- Republic changes from military suppression to administration, sup pression and compulsion will, as a rule, be manifested in trials, and not in shooting on the spot. And in this respect the revolutionary masses have taken, since November 7, 1917, the right road, and have proven the vitality of the Revolution, in starting to organize their own — workmen's and peasants' — tribunals, before any decrees were issued dismissing the bourgeois-democratic judi cial apparatus. But our revolutionary and popular tribunals are excessively and incredibly weak. It is apparent that the masses' view of courts, — inherited from the regime of the land-owners and the bourgeoisie, — as not their own, has not yet been completely destroyed. It is not sufficiently appreciated that the courts serve to atract all the poor to administration (for judicial activity is one of the functions of state administration) ; that the court is an organ of the rule of the proletariat and of the poorest peasantry; that the court is a means of training in discipline. There is a lack of appreciation of the simple and obvious fact that, if the chief misfortunes of Russia are famine and unemployment, these mis- 396 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA fortunes cannot be overcome by any outbursts of enthusiasm, but only by thorough and universal organization and discipline, in order to increase the production of bread for men and bread for industry (fuel), to transport it in time and to distribute it in the right way. That therefore responsibility for the tortures of famine and unemployment falls on everyone who violates labor discipline in any enterprise and in any business. That those who are respon sible should be discovered, tried and punished without mercy. The petty bourgeois environment, which wc will now have persistently to combat, is reflected particularly in the lack of comprehension of the economic and political connection between famine and unem ployment and the prevailing dissolution in organization and dis cipline, — in the firm hold of the view of the small proprietor: no thing matters, if only I gain as much as possible. This struggle of the petty bourgeois environment against pro letarian organization is expressed with particular force in the rail way industry, which embodies, probably most clearly, the economic ties created by large Capitalism. The "office" clement furnishes isaboteurs and grafters in large numbers; the proletarian element, its best part, is fighting for discipline. But between these two elcuicnls there are, of course, many who waver, who arc "weak," who arc unable to resist the "temptation" of speculation, bribery ami personal advantage, at the expense of the functioning apparatus, the uninterrupted work of which is necessary to overcome famine and unemployment. A characteristic si niggle occurcd on this basis in connection with the last decree on railway management, the decree which (granted dictatorial (or "unlimited") power to individual directors. The conscious (and mostly, probably, unconscious) representatives of petty bourgeois disintegration contended that the granting of "unlimited" (i. e. dictatorial) power to individuals was a defection from the principle of Commissariat administration, from the de mocratic and other principles of the Soviet Republic. Some of the Left Social-Revolutionists carried on a plainly demagogies agitation against the decree on dictatorship, appealing to evil instincts and to the petty bourgeois desire for personal gain. The question thus presented is of really great significance: first, the question of principle — is, in general, the appointment of indivi duals, endowed with unlimited power, the appointment of dictat ors, in accord with the fundamental principles of the Soviet rule; secondly, in what relation does this action, — this precedent, if you DEMOCRACY AND PROLETARIAN DICTATORSHIP 397 wish, — stand to the special problems of the Soviet rule during the present concrete period? Both quesions deserve serious consider ation. That the dictatorship of individuals has very frequently in the history of the revolutionary movements served as an expression and a means of realization of the dictatorship of the revolutionary classes, is confirmed by tbe undisputed experience of history. With bourgeois democratic principles, the dictatorship of individuals has undoubtedly been compatible. But this point is always treated adroitly by the bourgeois critics of the Soviet Government and by their petty bourgeois allies. On the one hand, they declare Soviet rule to be simply soincth.ng absurd and anarchically wild, carefully avoiding all our historical comparisons and theoretical proofs that the Soviets are a higher form of democracy ; nay, more, they are the beginning of a Socialist form of democracy. On the other hand, they demand of us a higher democracy than the bourgeois democracy and argue: with your Bolshevist (i. e. Socialist, not bourgeois) democratic principles, with the Soviet democratic prin ciples, individual dictatorship is absolutely incompatible. Fxtrcmcly poor arguments, these. If wc are not anarchists, wc must admit the necessity of a state; that is, of force, tor the transition from Capitalism to Socialism. The form of compulsion is determined by tbe degree of development of the particular rev olutionary class, then by such special circumstances as, for instance, the heritage of a long and reactionary war, and finally by the forms of resistance of the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie. There is therefore absolutely no contradiction in principle between the Soviet (Socialist) democracy and the use of dictatorial power of individuals. The distinction between a proletarian and a bourgeois dictatorship consists in this: that the first directs its attacks against the exploiting minority in tbe interests of the exploited majority; and, further, in this, — that the first is accomplished (also through individuals) not only by the masses of the exploited toilers, but also by organizations which are so constructed that they arouse these masses to historical creative work (the Soviets belong to this category of organization). With respect to the second question, the significance of indi vidual dictatorial power from the standpoint of the specific prob lems of the present period, wc must say that every large machine industrj — which is the material productive source and basis of Socialism — requires an absolute and strict unity of the will which 398 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA directs the joint work of hundreds, thousands and tens of thousands of people. This necessity is obvious from the technical, economic and historical standpoints and has always been recognized by all those who had given any thought to Socialism as its pre-rcquisites. But how can wc secure a strict unity of will? By subjecting the will of thousands lo the will of one. This subjection, if the participants in the common work are ideally conscious and disciplined, may resemble the gentle leader ship of an orchestra conductor; but may take the acute form of a dictatorship, — if there is no ideal discipline and consciousness. But at any rate, complete submission to a single will is absolutely neces sary for the success of the process of work which is organized on the type of large machine industry. This is doubly true of the railways. And just this transition from one political problem to nnothcr, which in appearance has no resemblance to the first, cons titutes the peculiarity of present period. The Revolution has just broken the oldest, the strongest, and the heaviest chains to which the masses were compelled to submit. So it was yesterday. And today the same Revolution — and indeed in the interests of Social ism—demands the absolute submission oi the masses to the single will ot these who direct the labor process. It is self-understood that such a transition cannot take place at once. It is self-under stood that it can be realized only after great upheavals, crises, re turns to the old; only through the greatest strain on the energy of the proletarian vanguard which is leading the people to the new order. This is ignored by those who vacillate and drop completely into the hysterics of the Kovaya Zhizn, Vpcriod, Diclo Karoda and Kash I'iek. Take the psychology of the average, ordinary type of the toil ing and exploited masses and compare this psychology with the objective, material conditions of their social life. Before the No vember revolution they had never seen the possessing exploiting classes sacrifice in their favor anything that was really of value to them. The proletarian had not seen that he would be given the often promised land and liberty, that he would be given peace, that they would sacrifice tbe interests of a "greater Russia" and of the secret treaties aiming at a "greater Russia," that they would sacrifice capital and profits. He saw this only after November 7, 191 7, — when the proletarian took these things himself by force and when he had to defend them by force against the Kerenskys, Gotz, Gcgctchkoris, Dutoffs, and Kornilovs. It is natural that for a cer- DEMOCRACY AND PROLETARIAN DICTATORSHIP 399 tain time all attention of the proletarian, all his thoughts, all his energy are turned in one direction — to breathe freely, to straighten out, to expand, to enjoy such immediate benefits of life as can be taken away and which were denied him by the overthrown exploit ers. It is natural that it must take some time before the ordinary i cpresentativc of the masses will not only see and become convinced, but will come to feel that he must not just simply "seize," grab, snatch, — and that this leads to greater disorganization, to ruin, to the return of the Kornilovs. A corresponding change in the en vironment (and, hence, in the psychology) of the rank and file of the toiling masses is barely beginning. And we, the Communist Party (the Bolsheviki), who give conscious expression to the aspirations of the exploited masses for emancipation, should fully comprehend this change and its necessity, should be in the front ranks of tbe weary masses which arc seeking a way out, atii'l should lead them along the right road — the road of labor discipline, harmonizing the problem of "holding meetings" to discuss the con ditions of work with the problem of absolute submission to the will of the Soviet director, of the dictator, during work. The "meeting-holding" is ridiculed, and more often wrath- fully hissed at by the bourgeois, Mensheviki, etc., who see only chaos, senseless bustle and outbursts of petty bourgeois egoism. But without the "meeting-holding" the oppressed masses could never pass over from the discipline forced by the exploiters to a conscious and voluntary discipline. "Meeting-holding" is the real democracy of the toilers, their straightening out, their awakening to a new life, their first steps on the field wliich they themselves have cleared of reptiles (exploiters, imperialists, landed propriet ors, capitalists), and which they want to learn to put in order them selves in their own way, for themselves, in accord with the prin ciples of their, "Soviet," rule, and not the rule of the nobility and bourgeoisie. The November victory of the toilers against the ex ploiters was necessary, it was necessary to have a whole historical period of elementary discussion by the toilers themselves of the new conditions of life and of the new problems to make possible a secure transition to higher forms of labor discipline, to a cons cious assimilation of tbe idea of the necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat, to absolute submission to the personal orders of the representatives of the Soviet rule during work. This transition has now begun. We have successfully solved the first problem of the Revolution. 400 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA Wc saw how the toiling masses constituted in themselves the fun damental condition of a successful solution: united effort against the exploiters, to overthrow them. Such stages as October, 1905, and March and November, 1917, are of universal historical signi ficance. We have successfully solved the second problem of the Rev olution : to awaken and arouse the downtrodden social classes which were oppressed by the exploiters and which only after November 7, 1017, have obtained the freedom to overthrow the exploiters and to begin to take stock and to regulate their life in their own way, The "meeting-holding" of the most oppressed and down trodden, of the least trained, toiling masses, their joining the Bol sheviki, their creating everywhere Soviet organization,-— this is the second great stage of the Revolution, Wc are now in the third stage. Our gains, our decrees, our laws, our plans must be secured by the solid forms of every day labor discipline. This is the most difficult, but also the most pro mising problem, for only its solution will give us Socialism. We must learn to combine the stormy democracy of the meetings, over flowing with fresh energy, breaking all restraint, the democracy of the toiling masses — with iron discipline during work, with ab solute submission to the will of one person, the Soviet director, during work. Wc have not learned this, but we will learn. The restoration of bourgeois exploitation threatened us yester day through the Kornilovs, Gotz, Dutoffs, Bogayevskys. We de feated them, This restoration, the very same restoration is threaten ing us today in a different form, through the environment of petty bourgeois dissoluteness and anarchism, in the form of ordinary, small, but numerous attacks and aggressions of this environment against proletarian discipline. This environment of petty bour geois anarchy we must and will conquer. THE OLD ORDER AND THE NEW The Socialist character of the Soviet democracy— that is, of proletarian democracy in its concrete particular application— con sists, firstly, in this: that the electorate comprises the toiling and exploited masses, — that the bourgeoisie is excluded. Secondly, in this: that all bureaucratic formalities and limitations of elections are done -away with,— that the masses tlicmselves determine the order and the time of elections with complete freedom of recall. Thirdly, that the best possible mass organization of the vanguard of the toilers,-~of the industrial proletariat, — is formed, enabling it to direct the exploited masses, to attract them to active partici pation in political life, to train them politically through their own experiences, that in this way a beginning is made for the first time to get actually the whole population to learn how to manage and to begin managing. Such are the principle distinctive features of the democracy which is being tried in Russia, and which is a higher type of de mocracy, which breaks away from its bourgeois distortion, and which is a transition to Socialist democracy and to conditions which will mean the beginning of the end of the state. Of course, the elemental petty bourgeois disorganization (which will inevitably manifest itself in one or another degree dur ing every proletarian revolution, and which in our Revolution, on account of the petty bourgeois character of the country, its back wardness and the consequences of reactionary methods, manifests itself with special strength) cannot but leave its mark on the Soviets. We must work unceasingly to develop the organization of the Soviets and the Soviet rule. There is a petty bourgeois tendency to turn the members of the Soviets into "parKamcntarians" or, on the other hand, into bureaucrats. This should be combatted by attracting all members of the Soviets to practical participation in management. The departments of the Soviets arc turning in many 4°2 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA places into organs which gradually merge with the commissariats. Our aim is to attract every member of the poorer classes to pract ical participation in management, and the different steps leading toward this end (the more diverse the better), should be carefully registered, studied, systematized, verified on broader experience and legalized. It is our object to obtain the free performance of state obligations by every toiler after he is through with his eight hour "lesson" of productive work. The transition to this end is especially difficult, but only this transition will secure the definite realization of Socialism. The novelty and the difficulty of thfe change naturally causes an abundance of steps made, so to speak, in the dark, an abundance of mistakes and hesitation. Without this, no sudden forward movement is possible. The originality of the present situation consists, from the standpoint of many who consider themselves Socialists, in this — that people have been used theoretically to contrast Capitalism and Socialism, and between one and the other they profoundly put the word "leap" (some, recall ing Engels, quote more profenmdly this: "a leap from the king dom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom"). That the word "leap" was used by the Socialist teachers to denote the crisis of an historical transformation, and that leaps of this kind comprise periods of tens of years — this cannot be understood by most of the so-called Socialists who study Socialism "from books," but have never given serious thought to this matter. It is natural that the so-called intelligentsia furnishes during such times an infinite number of criers after the dead; one bewails the Constituent As sembly, another bourgeois discipline, a third the capitalist order, a fourth the cultured aristocrat, a fifth the imperialistic "greater Russia," and so on, and so forth. The real interest of an epoch of great leaps consists in this: that the abundance of fragments of the old order, which sometimes accumulate more rapidly than the germs of tht new order (which are not always immediately discernible), requires ability to dis tinguish the most essential in the line or chain of development^ There are historical periods when it is most important for thd success of the revolution to pile up as many fragments as possible, — that is, to blow up as many old institutions as possible. But there arc periods when enough has been blown up, and it becomes necessary to turn to the "prosaic" (to a petty bourgeois revolu tionist, "uninteresting") work of clearing the ground of the frag ments. And there arc periods when it is most important carefully THE OLD ORDER AND NEW 403 to nourish seeds of the new order, growing under the fragments, on the soil that is yet full of rubbish. It is not enough to be a revolutionist and an adherent of So cialism or, in general, a Communist. One must be able to find at any moment, the particular link in the chain which must be grasped with all one's strength in order to hold the whole chain and to afsurc the passage to the next links, and the order of the linkjs; their form, their connections, their distinction, from one another in the historical chain of events is not as simple and obvious as in an ordinary chain which is made by a blacksmith. The struggle with the bureaucratic distortion of the Soviet organizations is insured by the firm bond of the Soviets with the 'people," in tbe sense of the exploited toilers, by the flexibility and elasticity of this bond. The bourgeois parliaments, even in the most democratic capitalist republics, arc never looked upon by the poor as "their" institutions. But the Soviets arc for the masses of the workers and peasants, "their own" and not alien institutions. The modern "Social-Democrats" of the Scheidcmann type or, what is almost identical, of the Martov type, arc just as averse to the Soviets, are just as much attracted to the well-beliaving bourgeois parliament, or to the Constituent Assembly, as Turgcniev was at tracted sixty years ago to a moderate monarchist and aristocratic constitution, as he was averse to the peasant democracy of Dobro- lubov and Chernyshevsky. This proximity of the Soviets to the toiling "people" creates special forms of recall and other methods of control by the masses which should now be developed with special diligence. For inst ance, the councils of popular education as periodical conferences cf the Soviet workers and their delegates, to discuss and to control the activity of the Soviet authorities of the particular region, de serve the fullest sympathy and support. Nothing could be more foolish than to turn the Soviets into something settled and self- sufficient. The more firmly wc now have to advocate a merciless and firm rule and dictatorship of individuals for definite processes of -eork during certain periods of purely executive functions, the more diverse should be the forms and means of mass control in order to paralyze ever)* possibility of distorting tlie Soviet rule, in order repeatedly and tirelessly to remove the wild grass of bureaucratism. An unusually grave, difficult and dangerous international situation, the necessity to be cautious and to retreat, a period of 404 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA waiting for new outbursts of revolution in the West, painfully slow in ripening; within the country, a period of slow constructive work and of merciless rigor, of a long and persistent struggle of proletarian discipline with the threatening elemental petty bour geois dissoluteness and anarchy, — such, in short, are the distinctive features of the special stage in the Socialist revolution that we are passing through. Such is the link in the historical chain of events which we must now grasp with all our strength to come out with honor, before we pass to the next link, — which draws us on by its particular glow, by the glow of the victories of the international proletarian revolution. Try to compare with the ordinary, popular idea of a "revolu tionist," the slogans which are dictated by the peculiarities of the present situation: to be cautious, to retreat, to wait, to build slowly, to be mercilessly rigorous, to discipline sternly, to attack disin tegration. It is surprising that some "revolutionists," hearing this, be come full of noble indignation and begin to "attack" us for for getting tbe traditions of the November revolution, for compro mising with bourgeois specialists, for compromising with the bour geoisie, for petty bourgeois tendencies, for reformism, etc., etc. The trouble with these woe-revolutionists is this: that even those of them who are actuated by the best motives in the world, — and are absolutely loyal to the cause of Socialism, — fail to com prehend the particular and "particularly unpleasant" stage that must inevitably be passed through by a backward country which has been shattered by a reactionary and ill-fated war and which has started the Socialist evolution long before the more advanced countries. They lack firmness in difficult moments of a difficult transition. It is natural that this kind of "official" opposition to our party comes from the Left Social-Revolutionists. Of course there are, and always will be, individual exceptions to group and class types. But social types remain. In a country where the petty bourgeois population is vastly predominant in comparison with the purely proletarian, the difference between the proletarian and the petty bourgeois revolutionist will inevitably appear, and from time to time very sharply. The petty bourgeois revolutionist hesitates and wavers at every turn of events, passes from a violently revolutionary position in March 1917, to lauding "coalition" in May, to hatred of the Bolsheviki (or to bewailing their "adventur- essness") in July, to cautiously drawing away from them in Nov- THE OLD ORDER AND THE NEW 405 ember, to supporting them in December and finally in March and April, 1918, such types usually turn up their noses scornfully and say, "I am not of those who sing hymns to organic work, to being practical and gradual." The social source of such types is the small proprietor who has been maddened by the horrors of the war, by sudden ruin, by the unheard of torments of starvation and disorganization; who is tossing hysterically, seeking a way out, seeking salvation, hesit ating between confidence and support of the proletariat, on the one hand, and fits of despair, on the other. Wc must clearly com prehend and firmly remember that Socialism cannot be built on such a social base. Only a class that marches along its road with out hesitation, that docs not become dejected and does not despair at the most difficult and dangerous crossings, can lead the toiling and exploited masses. We do not need hysterical outbursts. We need the regular inarch of the iron battalions of the proletariat. SUPPLEMENTAXY Foreign Relations I SOCIALIST AND IMPERIALIST DIPLOMACY Tschitcherin't Report to the Fifth Soviet Congress, July, 1918. During the period that followed the signing of the Brest-Litovsk peace, we fmd that our foreign policy developed along different lines than those followed during the first few months after the November Revolution. The basis of our foreign policy since the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918 has been a revolutionary offensive. This policy kept step with an immediately expected World Revolution for which the Russian November Revolution would have been the signal. It was especially meant to reach the revolutionary proletariat of all countries and to arouse them to combat Imperialism and the present capitalist system of society. (Wc remind our readers that at this time until the peace of Brest-Litovsk, not Tschitchc-rin, but Trotzky, was People's Conrmissaire for Foreign Affairs.) After the proletariat of other countries refused their direct support for the destruction of revolutionary Russia, our foreign policy was radically changed through the occupation of Finland, the Ukraine, the Baltic Pro vinces, Poland, Lithuania and White Russia by the armies of German-Austrian Imperialism. In the last four months (March to Juno, 1918) wc were com pelled to make h our object to avoid all ihe dangers which menaced us from all sides and to gain as much time as possible: in the first place, to assist the growth of the proletarian movements in other couirtrics, and in the second place, to establish more firmly the political and social ideals of the Soviet government amongst the broad masses of the people of Russia and to bring about their united support for the program of the Soviets. Soviet Russia, with as yet no force sufficient to protect rts own bound aries, surrounded by enemies waiting for its downfall, suffering from a period of unbelievable deterioration oaused by the war and Czarism, and always cognizant of the dangers wliich threatened it at every step, had to be constantly vigilant in its foreign policy. The policy of delay was pos sible thanks to the diversity of interest, not only of both coalitions (the Central Powers (and the Allied Powers), but also within each of these groups and in the respective Imperialism of all the warring countries. The position on the Western Front (Belgium-France) bound the powers of both coali tions temporarily to such an extent that neither of the two decided to aim rat the direct and entire destruction of Russia. A section of these imperialistic groups in both coalitions thinks of the future, of after the war, of economic relations with Russia, with this world market so especially ripe for development. This clement dn bofh coalitions would prefer a compromise instead of an annexation policy for the sake of economic advantages. The hope to embroil Russia in the war, while her 4'0 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA army is not built up, plays a part in the calculations of both coalitions. The military party in each group would prefer an attack for the suppression of the Soviet government of Russia. The Soviet government, although it had decided upon a waiting policy because it difl not strive for a war of revenge, was, nevertheless, compelled, after the peace of Brest-Litovsk, to work for armed resistance and at the same tune to reckon with those elements who were opposing the war parties. These elements are as yet weak and we are not able to strengthen them through our own military power. The ever-growing proletarian movement litis iv t as yet come to a climax and therefore our report is a grave and serious one. A report about our retreat, about tlie great sacrifices which wc make in order to give Russia an opportunity to get on her feet, to organ ize her forces and to wait for the mon.ent when the proletariat of othet* countries will help us to bring the Socialist Revolution of November, 1917, to n successful conclusion. The period following the signing of the Brest-Litovsk peace is charact eristic because the German offensive was not marked on the whole Eastern Front by a distinct line. Finland and the Ukraine were free of Soviet troops, but the masses of these parts continued the struggle. The Entente Powers withdrew during this time their entire military support, at the same time remaining as ruler in places from which they should have withdrawn. As a momentary proof that the relations between Russia and the Central Powers were changed to ordinary peaceful relations, wc miwt point to the arrival of Count von Mirhach (who was afterwards assassinated by Russian counter- revolutionists] in Moscow on April 23, 1918, and the arrival of our Russian comrade, JofTe, in Berlin on April 20, 1918. Concerning the former allies of Russia, we must look upon the landing of Japanese troops in Vladivostok on April 5, which landing was, never theless, accompanied by assurances from Japan's allies that this fact was not meant as an attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of Russia, In the nieantimc a great section of the English and French press was carrying on propaganda for the occupation of Russia under the slogan that such inter- veniic.ii was meant for the saving of Russia. But the governments of the Entente Powers adhered toa very careful policy regarding Russia, especially did the government of the United States States of America adopt a decidedly friendly attitude. Thi' time which now followed was indeed critical with regard to Ger many. The German-Finnish and the German-Austrian armies after having occupied the whole of Finland and the Ukraine, invaded the territory of the Soviet government and cajne face V) face with Soviet troops, so that there were continuous skirmishes along the whole line of demarkation and Petro grad was directly menaced. The White Guards (Finnish counter-revolution ists) led by Germans drove into Murman territory and Port Ino, the key to Petrograd, was in grave danger. At the same time the German army con tinued its march on the Ukraine front into the governments of Kursk and Woroncsj, into the Donnotz basin and on the river Don. *fn the south the Germans occupied the Crimea and, continuing their march beyond the Don, attacked Batoisk (opposite Rostov on the Don valley, near Azof). Counter revolutionary lands forced their way into the Don and Kuban districts (the western nan of the north Caucasus) under the protection of the Germans. SOCIALIST AND IMPERIALIST DIPLOMACY 411 At last the German troops landed in the vicinity of Porte (harbor in the South Caucasus on the Black Sea) while the Finnish troops on the other side began their march in the Caucasus in the direction of Baku (on the Caspian Sea). This critical period was settled on the Finnish frontier by an agree ment between the German and the Russian governments concerning a basis for a treaty between Russia and Finland. A gradual relaxing of -military skirmishes on the Ukraine front was directly noticeable, caused by the be ginning of peace negotiations in Kiev between Russia and the Hctman gov ernment. The result of our so sharply conducted political dealing was: the retreat of that pan of the Russian fleet (the Black Sea fleet) to Sebastopol and from there it sailed to Noworossysk (the harbor of the German menaced Kuban district). The demand for the return of this district was con sidered as an indispensable condition to territorial, as well as political and economic relations between Soviet Russia and German Ukraine. Up to this moment (beginning of July, 1918) the most critical question seems to concern the Caucasus and can be attended by grave consequences, also the crisis in the Don, where counter-revolutionary activity is not yet settled. But the retreat of the flat to Scliastopol made it possible for the mixed commission in Berlin to commence its work. This conmii.ssion was made up of two parts: one a financial and judical committee whose work consisted in planning a basis for peaceful economic relations between Russia anj Germany; the other, a political committee whose task it was to solve the questions arising out of the Brest-Litovsk treaty. The new negative moment in the relation between Russia and her former Allies was the uprisig of the Czccho-Slovaks. In this case it developed that the governments of the Entente stood with those elements who, like the Czecho-Slovaks, served to support the counter-revolution in Russia. Directly after these events followed the landing of English troops on the Murman Coast and in the press and the declaration of the diplomats the question of intervention becomes more pronounced. But those elements in the Entente countries whose aim is to reach a cc>mplete and friendly relation with Soviet Russia continue their struggle, and reveal at the same time the extraordinary shortsightedness of the policy of attacking Russia. Thus we see how complicated the problems are that the Soviet Commissaircs are called upon to solve; we have been careful in our deliberations to avoid all dangers which would lead to irreparable actions from the side of our opponents, and have taken all possible steps to bring about a peaceful solution of our diffi culties with both coalitions. The relations of Russia to the states of Central Europe were determined by the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and the principal part of our policy in relation to Germany was to execute this treaty. The indistinctness, the as yet undecided agreements and the imperfection of the treaty of Brest en couraged the exponents of the annexationist policy to develop this policy still further, with regard to Russia. The treaty of Brest is not distinct as lo the boundaries of the territory occupied by Germany, and yet it determined that at the moment of the signing of the treaty all further progress should cease. The treaty leaves the situation of territories occupied by Germany an open question. The territory of the Ukraine is not defined, and the question of the boundaries of the Ukraine, 4'2 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA together with the uncertainty of where the German troops would »top, was an extremely dangerous one. The indistinct, contradictory, and some what impracticable stipulations concerning the Russian ships create the possib ility for new demands from Germany and the Ukraine upon Russia. Be sides there was the possibility of going still further than the stipulations, under the pretext of "self-determination." The simplest method was to accept a fictitious "right of self-determination" in tlie regions occupied by Gennany. In fact, we had already received a re port concerning the "sclf-dctennination" of Dvinsk (on the railroad from YV'arviw to Petrograd and from Riga to Moscow, Warsaw in Poland and Riga in Courland being under German control) who desired to become part of Courland. We also heard from the delegation in the White Ruthenian regions (the governments of Grodno, Vilna, Vitebsk, Smolensk, Mohilef and Minsk — the region between Warsaw to a short distance from Moscow) that they wished to withdraw from the sovereignty of Russia. Section 7 of the treaty of Brest provides that a special commission determ ine the boundaries of those regions that withdrew from Russia. When this commission convened at Pskov (between Dvinsk and Petrograd) it was empowered, by the consent of both governments to determine definitely the boundaries of the regions occupied by Germany. However, after the first session of this commission, their work was interrupted, and has not been continued since. The following proposition was submitted by the Germans : tluit the basis for the right of self-determiiuition be established on the boundaries of German occupation; that every landowner whose land was bounded by the Gernuin line of occupation should have the privilege of deciding to which side (Germany or our side) hit property should belong in the future. The solution of this question of principle was referred to Berlin, where the Political Commission (a mixed commission of Soviet representatives and Germans) will be occupied with it. The position of the occupied regions is not as yet clear. The German government informed us that the railroad employees would retain their former wages, and enjoy all advantages as to the division of the necessities of life and that malicious agitators were spreading rumors amongst the employees that all those who continued their work under German occupation would lose their employment, their pension, and all their savings when later the now occupied territories were restored to Russia. Therefore, the Ger man government requested us to send a public notice to the occupied districts containing the information that these rumors were baseless and that the Russian government recommended that the railroad employees continue with their work. However, we found upon direct information that the wages of the railroad employes were reduced fifty per cent, and that these employees and all other officers were subjected to all kinds of persecution and that they did not enjoy advantage in regard to the necessities of life. We informed the German government that we could not take any part in the responsibility of the administration of the occupied district as long as (he German government insisted upon deposing all Soviets and continued to destroy traces of the Soviet system. The question of the internal administra tion of the occupied sections had also to be referred to the Political Com mission in Berlin. SOCIALIST AND IMPERIALIST DIPLOMACY 413 The military advance of the Germans after the treaty of Brest-Litovsk occured in two directions : in Finland and in the Ukraine. After the Russian Republic had submitted to the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk and had re called her troops from Finland, there remained in Finland but few Russian citizens who, upon their own responsibility, took part in the struggle of the Finnish working class. At the moment of the invasion of German troops into Finland, and after, wc received continual threatening notes from the German Government claiming that we had sent troops and munitions to Finland. But every time when the occupations complained in the notes were investigated we found that in reality they did not exist. They merely served the Germans as a pretext for delaying the cessation of military meas ures. The notes served to justify the government of the Finnish White Guards when they refused to liberate the Russian citizens, Kamcnicv, Sa- witski and Wolf, who were returning from Sweden and were arrested at the Aland Islands. The Finns pointed out our violations of the Brcst-Litovs'.c treaty when bands of Wnhe Guards invaded Karelic and the Murman regions, the south-west half of the former having been a part of Russia for two hundred years, and the later being wholly Russian. The German government constantly remainded us that wc are com pelled, according to the treaty of Brest, to reach an agreement with Finland, and the Russian Soviet Government declared their willingness time and time again, despite the extreme provocative acts of the Finnish White Guards. I remind you of the shooting of thousands of Russians in Wylwrg, of the many executions of Russian citizens, even of official members of the Soviets in Finland. I remind you of the arrest of Kowanko, the commander of Sveaborg, the Russian fortress of the Island of Hclsingfors, the capital of Finland, of whose appointment Finland was duly in formed through our re presentative ad interim and the agency of the German government. Kowanko wtii arrested immediately afterwards and had to submit to an investigation, and up to this date, July 19, 1918, has not yet been liberated. I remind you alv> of the violent seizure of the Russian ships by the Finns, of the seizure of the hospital ships, also of the enormous sums of money, amounting to many hil'loiis, taken from the safes of the fortress and the vaults of the Ku-si..:: exchequer. N'otwithstaning, the Russian government declared itself wilhr.g time and time again to negotiate, not only as an answer to the Ger man demands, but the Russian government addressed itself directly to Fin land with a proposition which was never answered. The question of our relations to Finland was especially acute when an imprtant German-Finnish army on one side advanced towards thi> Russian frontier near Bieloostrov (directly northwest of Petrograd) and the German government on the other side questioned us concerning the presence of English troops in the Murman district (which territory, as mentioned above, the German-Finnish White Guards Iiad invaded) in this inquiry, the number of English troops was grossly exaggerated by the German government. In May, the question of Fort Ino became the most prominent, when the German government followed the example set by the Finnish High Commander and demanded the surrender of this Russian fort to I'inland. This took place ii, the general critical period of the advance of the Germans, after the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, when the German troops advanced into the governments of Woronesj and Koorsk (in which governments the rivers Donctz and Don 4>4 'I'"; I'ROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA enter the Arov Sea) and the end of this advance could not l>e foreseen. Our notes to the German government at the later part of April and the beginning of 'May, containing pressing inquiries as to their exact intentions in relation to Fort Ino. resulted in he commencement of negotiations to reach a com promise. (Note: Fort Ino is one of those forts which threaten Petrograd). When, despite the negotiations, the Finnish troops demanded the im mediate surrender of Fort Ino, and the Fort was destroyed by the retreating Russian troops, the German government at last proposed as a basis for an ngreiTnent with Finland: the return of the town Ino, upon the condition that this place and the district Ravoli (on the railroad, exactly N. W. of Petrograd) in the vicinity of Bjeloostrov should not be enforced bv the Russians, and upon the condition that we abandon the western part of the Murman regions, which the Germans and Finns had invaded, to Finland. Our acceptance of this as a basis for an agreement led to the discontinuation of the critical situation of May. However, notwithstanding this, Finland still continued to refuse to answer our proposal to enter into mutual nego tiations. The separation of Esthonia and of the northern part of Courland from Russia is in no way the result of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, because this treaty only provided for the temporary occupation by Germany of these parts. Already on the 28th of January there was delivered to our representative Worofski in Stockholm a declaration from the land owners and barons of Esthonia and Courland concerning the independence of these provinces. After that, meetings of the landowners and barons were held in Esthonia and Courland, and in Riga, the capital of Livonia, on March 22, and at Reval, the capital of Esthonia, on March 28, thciy decided on the convocation of congresses. These congresses were held in Riga and Reval on April 9-10. /and they accepted the declaration as to the separation from Russia. On the 19th of May, our representative Joffe received notice to that effect through the office of the German Minister of Foreign Affairs. In his note of May 28th, addressed to die Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joffe called attention to the fact that die action taken in Riga and Reval was in re-ality but the expression of a comparatively small part of the people of Courland and Esthonia and that only by a real and general unhampered ex pression of all the people, under the condition, could the basis of self deter mination and separation be decided. The Russian government was but lately confronted with the qut--.ion of its relations to Poland, when the representative of the Polish Council of Regents, Mr. Lednitzki, came to Moscow, and in his position as represent ative of Poland, desired to enter into relation with the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. On bis first visit, wc found his credentials unintelligible, but when he came the second time, he came with the formal authority of the Council of Regents to negotiate with us, concerning matters regarding Poland. However, wc do not recognize the present situation in Poland as politically independent, and therefore cannot consider the Polish government as ex pressing the will of the people. We entered therefore into relations with Mr. Lednitzki, but, as is self explanatory, only in essential, not in diplomatic relations, and then only when Count Mirbach, who was at that time the German ambassador in Moscow, SOCIALIST AND IMPERIALIST DIPLOMACY 415 informed tis that by maintaining such relations we would gratify an expressed wish of the German government. A more intense German offensive on the Ukraine side would have been more threatening than the advance upon the side of Finland. Directly after the conclusion of the treaty of Brest the troops of the Central Soviet gov ernment were ordered to withdraw from Ukraine. The Soviet bovcrnment was maintained within the borders of the Ukraine, which, after the second conere-s formed itself into the government of the independent Soviet Re public of Ukraine. After the German troops had occupied all points belong ing to the Ukraine, they continued to advance still further in the direction of Moscow and even occupied the southern part of the Russian governments of Tvcrsk and Woronesj. Therefore, the question of determining a line of demarkation on the Ukrainian front, which would determine the limits of the German advance, was quite acute, especially on the front near Woronesj, where Germany first demanded the occupation of some districts, but later only the occupation of the Wologodski district, with the important strategic railroad junction of Woronesj. The question of the line of demarkation was closely connected with the question of cessation of hostilities, and this was the beginning of negotiations with the Ukraine. 0:t March 30, the Ukrainian Rada addressed us with the proposition to commence negotiations, and the German government repeatedly pointed to our obligations as laid out in the treaty of Brest to conclude a peace with the Ukraine. I-'rom our side, we proposed opening negotiations at Smolensk (between Moscow and Brest). Although we sent our proposition directly to the Rada in Kief, and also to Berlin, our proposition did not reach the Rada in Kief soon enough, and it was not until April 16th that the Rada sent us a courier with a note proposing to conduct the negotiations at Tvcrsk (halfway between Moscow and Kief), to where our delegates rapidly de parted. The peace delegation of the Ukraine came but to Worosjby (-half way between Twersk and Kief), but the constant hostilities made it impossible for the (''.'..gates to meet. At this time, the Kief Rada was displaced by the gnenii'ient of Skoropad>ki, and Germany insisted that the- negotiation he tran-fcred to Kief, where they commenced on May 22nd. The first question to be acted upon was the question of an armistice. The most important question, however, was the determination of a line of demarkation. We had repeatedly in the past made the question of determ ination of the boundaries of the Ukraine a topic for discussion as we con sidered this matter as most important, having to reckon with far reaching confidences >n case of an unfavorable conclusion. On March 29, wc received a telegram from the German assistant secret ary Buschc, in answer to our queries, explaining that the territory of Che Ukraine was temporarily determined upon, nine governments being added to the Ukraine. When the negotiations concerning an armistice started, the Ukrainians demanded much more. They demanded that the line of demarkation be extended further to the North and to the East, so that they occupy eight more districts. They wanted especially the government of Woronesj, making fourteen districts, with a population of three million, to be given them. 4l6 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA The extrntne moment in the negotiations occured simultaneously with the critical moment in the South, with the critical moment upon the Black Sea, when Germany demanded that the Russian fleet near Novorossisk return to Sebastojiol. The Germans did not limit their military forces to the nine governments added to the Ukraine on March 29th, but occupied Taganrog and Rostov on the Don (Iwth of the Sea of Azof) on May 6. Their further advance came to a hah at the important railroad junction Batarsk (opposite Rostov on the Don), which was occupied by a Soviet army. On April 22, tbe Gennan troops had already invaded the Crimea and had more extensively occupied the peninsula of Tauri, while a certain part of our Black Sea fleet had time to leave for Novorossisk. We received a number of notes from Germany, wherein she complincd of hostile treatment in different places upon the Black Sea, where ships belonging to our Black Sea fleet were destroyed. On the South, the Turkish army advanced into the Caucasian regions, occupied Alcxandropol (south of Tiflis) and threatened Baku, while southern Trans-Cauo.asia sent troops against Soviet Russia, against the adherents of the Soviet movement in the vicinity of Suchum (in South Caucasia on the Mark Sea), and in the entire Alxrhasie (South Caucasian Moutain region). The advance of the Germans and tlieir allies in the Kuban regions (the western part of North Caucasus) had already started. And in this critical moment the demand was made of us to order the return uf the Black Sea fleet from Novorossiesk to Sebastopol. As a result of further negotiations, we received the guarantee from Ger many that the ships would not be used during the war and after the conclusion of a general peace they would be returned to Russia. At the same time, the tre>ops would not advance further upon the entire line of demarkation on the Ukrainian front, which was similar to the real position of the occupation at the beginning of the Ukrainian negotiations, which did not extend beyond Walveki upon the Woronesj frontier at Batasjk (opposite Rostov) upon the Southwest frontier. In case we refused, the advance to Kuban would continue, and besides we were told that, the possibility of economic and political agreements, the order to cease all advances upon Ukrainian frontier, and even the beginning of the work of the joint commission in Berlin, depended upon our consent to the return of the Black Sea fleet from Novorossisk to Sebastopol, The question of the return of the fleet thus became the centre of 'Vie whole German diplomacy against us, so that they might inflence the whole further progress of our relations. The return of a pan of the fleet to Sevastopol on June 18 and the sinking of the rest on June 19 made an end of this critical event. Quickly upon this, the commission in Berlin, wliich had not convened for a long time, began to hold sessions, and the advance of the German troops upon the Ukrainian front ceased. The negotiations progressed even more rapidly. Three days after our consent was obtained for the return of our fleet, on June 12, a general armistice with the Ukraine was concluded. On June 17, an agreenKnt concerning the line of demarkation of the Northern Ukrainian front was arrived at, and representatives were sent to Vitebsk to determine u|>on this line of demarkation. The most important point in the peace negotiations was the question of the boundaries of the Ukraine. It SOCIALIST AND IMPERIALIST DIPLOMACY 4'7 was agreed that the fate of those parts over which no agreement could be reached should be decided by a referendum, held under conditions that would guarantee the free and unhampered expression of the people. The advance of the Turks, and later, of the Germans, in the South, was made easy through the policy of the Trans-Caucasian government (Social Revolutionary and Menshevik) a government supported by the privileged classes of the population, who had adopted a hostile attitude toward Soviet Russia. After the attempts of the Russian Soviet government to enter into communications with the Trans-Caucasian government did not materialize, Germany offered her mediation for "regulating" the relations between us. After we had agreed to this, Count Mirbach proposed that we send our dele gation to Kief for the negotiations with the Trans-Caucasian government. However, wc proposed that wc meet in Vladikavkas (in Caucasia) and we insisted that the negotiations be directly between the Russian Soviet Re public and the Trans-Caucasian government. Finally Count Mirbach in formed us that the representatives of the Trans-Caucasian government, Vatshabelli and Tseretelli, were on their way to Moscow, and that the German government cherished ihe urgent wish that the negotiations between us commence. But the Trans-Caucasian government collapsed. The Georgian Naiional Council, which took the place of the government of Tseretelli, sent a repre sentative, Mr. Khvendadste, to Moscow, with whom, however, wc did not start negotiations. We knew that the government of the independent Georgians represented only the privileged class and that the masses did not wish nor recognize the separation from Russia. We also received the report that fictitious representatives of the Mussalmen of Askhabad (the Trans-Caucasian region bounded by Persia) represented themselves as an independent gov ernment, while we knew very* well that the masses of the people did not wish to separate from Russia. The German government also informed us of the contents of a manifesto of a government of the Union of Mountain Tribes of North Caucasia, with the proclamation of their independence, while in reality, North Caucasus was in the control of the adherents of Soviet Russia, who rejected the proposition. The independent Georgians permitted Germany to transport her troops over the Georgian railroad, which opened the way to Baku, on the Caspian Sea, for Germany. The Turkish troops were, as we know, in the Armenian regions, in the beginning of July, 1918, where a strong Armenian movement was operating against them. The question of the Caucasus was placed upon the order of the day of the Political Commission convened at Berlin (German and Soviet represent atives). The question of economic relations between Germany and Russia was determined on one side by the necessity for the liquidation of losses through Czaristic war measures and through the social legislation of the November revolution in regard to German property in Russia, and on the other by the necessity for the creation of mutual economic relations in both countries. The treaty of Brest-Litovsk obligated us to pay indemnity for the losses of German citizens during the war through the liquidation of their undertakings, or through the cessation of payments of dividends and interest on loans. The execution of these obligations demanded from us the 4'8 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA creation of a department that should investigate the German claims. This department is now In existence as the Liquidation Department of the People'* Commissariat of Trade and Industries, and functions with success. If, therefore, the settlement of such obligations, caused by the Cmistic v»ar measures, occurs less rapidly than wc wish, which gives the German government occasion for constant complaints, then this is not caused by the partial defects of our department alone (these defects are now eliminated), but by the fact that the Russian bourgeoisie strives to take advantage of our obligations to the Central Powers, and endeavors by all kinds of fictitious contracts to make demands upon us. The question of payments of interest on old loans, dividends, etc., cannot be" separated from the question of interest obligations, caused by social legislation, and. likewise, cannot be separated from our duty to support our prisoners of war in Germany. Our t jcial legislation endeavors to unite the principal sources of the economic life of the country and place them in the bands of the Workers' and Peasants' Soviet. Many of these sources -arc in the hands of foreign subjects. If wc nationalize these branches of industry, then wc are compelled to compensate the German subjects for their losses. Our local Soviets do not always understand that the interests of the State of Workers and Peasants does not demand the indiscriminate confiscation of everything that happens to be there, but a suitable nationalization of such industries as are necessary for us, from the standpoint of the general economic plans of the state. The indiscriminate nationalization of all possible kinds of moving picture houses and apothecary shops, requisition of foreign property without plan, without direct necessity, caused the State of Workers and Peasants tn pay damages wliich run into hundreds of millions. All 3tich impracticable actions give cause for protest from the German government and also cause for conflicts which increase the obligations excess ively. The question of computation of the damage caused by us, the question of the financial liquidation of our obligations which were caused by these actions and the question of the regulation of our social legislation rclativ; to foreign, subjects, demand immediate decision. The joint Commission of German and Soviet representatives, who are at this moment is session in Berlin, is confronted by an extremely complicated problem. Our representative, Bronsky, proposed the following conditions for an agreement, in the name of the People's Commisairc of Trade and Industry: i. Russia must, for the sake of economic restoration, take up her eco nomic relations with the Central Powers again, and at the same time continue her relations with the Entente Powers as far as possible. .'. To meet our obligations to the Central Powers, according to the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, we are compelled to conclude a loan, whereby the total amount of these obligations shall be turned into a state debt. The payments of interest shall be partly in products of our country, and timber, and partly in gold and in Gennan securities in possession of the Russian government. 3. As a guarantee for this debt, and also for the payment of the more necessary products for the economic reconstruction of Russia now being bought in Germany, we propose to give certain concessions for the ex ploitation of natural resources in Russia. The condition of these concession* SOCIALIST AND IMPERIALIST DIPLOMACY 4I9 are within the existing Social and Trade laws of Russia and provide that we take part in the exploitation of these resources, retain a part of the proceeds and reserve the right of control 4. The concessions cover the following branches of the State's economy: (a) The production of oiL (b) The building of railroads, (c) The preparation and cxplortation of certain branches of agriculture by introducing more scientific and technical methods of agriculture, under the condition that Germany will receive a certain part of the products resulting from such methods, (d) The production of artifical fertilizer, (c) The exploitation of tbe gold fields. 5. For the realization of these measures all the productive forces of Russia must be mobilized. The following are the necessary conditions under which the agreement is sanctioned : (a) No interference whatsoever by Germany in our internal politics. (b) No intervention by Germany in those countries with which she was formerly united, by the conclusion of mutual economic treaties, to wit: Ukraine, Poland, the Baltic Provinces (Estland) and the Caucasus. (c) Recognition by Germany of the nationalization of foreign trade and the hanks. (d) Guarantee from Germany of the continuation of the supply of ore to Soviet Russia from Krivoi Rog in the Kherson government, and from the Caucasus, from which districts Russia has hitherto received at least half of the total ore production. (e) Ratification of the boundary between Ukraine and the Don region whereby Russia shall be awarded the Donetz coal mines, as at present this boundary line runs through the center of the mines. Concerning the de-mand that we mee-t our obligations by payment with products, wc call attention to the tact that our decided refusal to agree with these claims docs not mean that we refuse, for, as far as our position as a neutral nation -makes this possible to supply Germany with raw materials and products, we are willing to deliver to her what wc can without injury to our own interests, without conflicting with the situation of our country as a neutral nation. But our interests, the interests of an exhausted nation, -make it necessary that we receive in return for products wliich are expensive in Europe at present such products as are absolutely necessary for the restoration of the country. Relative to the opinions existing in the capitalistic centres of Germany, that our social experiments make the concessions worthless, that the na tionalization excludes the possibility of making profits for foreign capitalists, wc declare: Our country is in a state of deterioration; every other form of restoration, except the form which is pointed out by the German capital ists as a Socialistic experiment, would be resisted by strong opposition of the masses, as the people have learned by grave experience of many years never to submit again to the uncontrolled capitalistic mix-up of restoration. If German Capitalism would reckon with this fact,— and a fact it surely is— then the German capitalistic centres would understand that we have, after the inevitable period of confusion, reached the work of organization, and 420 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA that we require for this work the assistance of foreign economic apparatus, as long as we can not depend upon the assistance of a Socialistic Europe. We are prepared to pay for sudi assistance: yes, to pay. We declare it openly, as we are not to blame. The nationalization of the principal branches of industry, the national ization of foreign trade, do not exclude these payments; they but- determine the form and manner of payment which foreign capital shall demand. The question of the return of the prisoners of war and civil prisoners, and the maintenance of them until their return to their countries, played a great part in our relations to Germany and Austria-Hungary. Between Russia and Austria-Hungary, the question of the number of war prisoners to be transported presented no difficulties, as the number of prisoners on both sides was less than a million. There was difficulty with Germany, as the number of our war prisoners in Germany was more than a million, while the number of German prisoners in Russia was but little more than a hundred thousand. As the Russian-German commission in Moscow could not come to an agreement on this question of the basis for an exchange of war pris oners between Russia and Germany, it was referred to the Russian-German commission in Berlin, who adopted the principle of exchanging man for man, in accordance with an ultimatum of the German authorities oh June 24. We had to accommodate ourselves to this demand. We are yet facing a severe struggle for the improvement of the conditions of our war prisoners in Germany, where the majority of them labor under extraordinary severe conditions. We must labor unceasingly so that when the German prisoners of war shall have returned to their country the future return of Russian prisoners occurs in the same period. The relations with Austria-Hungary arc less vital than those with Ger many, as the treaty of Brest-Litovsk was only lately ratified by Austria-Hung ary. In the beginning, there was only the question of the exchange of prisoners of war, but later a financial commission arrived in Moscow from Vienna, with the object of regulating the mutual financial obligations of both states upon a basis similar to that of the Russian-German commission in Berlin. Kamcniev was appointed as our representative to Vienna. But we have not as yet received his recognition by the Austro-Hungarian government. We expect the appointment of representatives of Austria-Hungary to Moscow in the near future (this report was made in the beginning of July) which will greatly improve the relations between both countries. The Turkish ambassador, Thalib-Kemal-Bcy, came to Moscow with the Gennan ambassador, Count Mirbach, but the establishment of friendly re lations between the peoples of Russia and Turkey, which country is also the obiect of exploitation by World Capital, was prevented by the aggressive policy of Turkey in the Caucasus, where the Turkish army, after having occupied Batoum, Kars and Ardahan, commenced to advance further, oc cupied Alexandropol and threatened Baku. The horrible treatment of the Mussulmen in the Caucasus was always pointed to by the Turkish ambas sador as an answer to our protest. The lately arrived Bulgarian ambassador, Mr. Tajaprasjnikof, pointed constantly to the absence of any cause that could interrupt the friendly relations of the peoples of Bulgaria and Russia, while at the same time, the total absence of all aggressive endeavors in our policy, to which we called SOCIALIST AND IMPERIALIST DIPLOMACY 421 the attention of the Bulgarian ambassador, makes St possibk to maintain friendly relations in both countries. The most favorable attitude to Soviet Russia among the Entente Powers was adopted by the United States of North America. (We remind our readers that this report was made in the beginning of July, 1918.) We want to remind you of the telegram of greetings to the Emergency Congress by President Wilson in March. It is a public secret that at the moment when many voices were raised in favor of intervention by Japan in Siberia, the principal obstacle to inter vention was the negative position of the government of the United States of North America. Our plan is to offer an economic agreement to the United States of North America, besides our negotiations for an agreement with Germany, and to Japan, as well, with which country, despite the landing of Japanese troops in Vladivostok and despite the campaign of a part of the Japanese press in favor of intervention, we hope to maintain friendly re lations. A great number of the French people adopted an unfriendly attitude towards Soviet Russia, caused by the annulment of the State debt. When the question of a possible armed invasion of Japan and may be of its allies in the Soviet domain became acute, the interview of the French ambassador in regard to the possibib'ty of armed intervention, eventually even against the Soviet government, served as an alarming sign of a coming crisis. When the Russian government demanded the recall of the ambassador, whose de claration would prejudice flie friendly relations of both countries, the French government gave no answer, and at this moment (beginning of July) the French ambassador is still present in Vologda, although the Russian gov ernment considers him merely an ordinary individual. On the other side, the French government refused to allow admission to France of Kamicnev, who is traveling on a special mandate of the Russian government. Despite our continuous demands for the return of our troops stationed in France, only the invalids were sent home. Constant pressure was brought to bear in different ways upon our soldiers to induce them to continue the war in the ranks of the Russian legions. The great majority of the soldiers refused because they recognized the authority of the Soviet and approved the with drawal of Russia from the war. On occount of this, many were persecuted or were sent to the African penal camp. In the beginning of the year (1918), when the negotiations concerning the return of our troops from France were started, France proposed, as an indispensable condition, the return of the Czecho-Slovak division to France, as France was very much concerned with their fate. When the Czecho slovaks started their rebellion, the representative of France in Moscow declared that the disarmament of the Czecho-Slovak soldiers would be considered as an unfriendly act of the Soviet government towards France, in which opinion he was supported by the representatives of England, Italy and the United States of N'orth America. The English government has, on the other hand, kept its frontiers open to the agents of the Soviet government (this was, to remind the readers again, reported before the conspiracy of Lockhart, which caused the change in attitude of the English government) but also commenced negotiations with the authorized representative, Litvinof, of the Russian Soviet Republic. He 422 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA was allowed the rigiht to send and receive couriers, and to use the code, but notwithstanding this, the attitude of the English Government towards him is, in many respects, not in conformity with the dignity of the Russian Re public. After he had rented a house for tbe embassy of the Russian diplo mats, the owner, without any cause, declared the contract void, and the court has evidently sustained the illegal action of the owner, the court embellishing its decision with comments which were offensive to the Soviet government. Our couriers were admitted but were subject to a careful investigation. When Kamienev and Zalkind arrived in England, all their diplomatic documents were taken away from them, and only re turned when they left England. They were compelled to leave England at the first opportunity and the -police who accompanied them treated them shamefully. A few people who were working in the bureau of our diplo matic staff were expelled from England, and were not even allowed to con fer with Litvinof. The English government maintains friendly relations with the old Czar- istic embassy and consulate, as well as with the so-called Russian Govern ments and die English government consults them on all subjects which concern military service, Russian prisoners of war, Russian steamers in English harbors, and other general interests of Russia. Consul McLean in Glasgow and Simonof in Australia, appointed by Russia, were not re cognized. The situation was most difficult right after the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk treaty. The yellow press insulted McLean viciously. The position of Russian citizens in England is, in general, very difficult ; the (pogrom agitation seems to continue in the newspapers. The return of Russian citizens is made very difficult for them. The old military agreement concluded by Kerensky, which gave the English government the right to draft Russian citizens in the English army, is still made use of. In the beginning of 1918, we declared to the government of Great Britain that we do not recognize this Kerensky agreement. Comrade Litvinof de manded the liberation of those citizens who were drafted into the English army upon the basis of this agreement, but received the answer that foreigners could not live in England without performing work in the in terest of the nation and that those Russian citizens would be drafted in the workers' division for the production of munitions for the army. Soon after this many were transported into Egjpt to be drafted in the Jewish legion in Palestine. The drafting of Russian citizens in the English army was temporarily discontinued, but afterwards renewed, with the difference that those who were called in the service were not put in the army in the field but in the above-mentioned workers' division. When, on April 5, a detachment of Japanese troops landed in Vladi vostok, fifty English regiments also landed. A large section of the Eng lish press, particularly those controlled by the Northcliffc syndicate and the war industries, for a long time insisted upon further intervention by Japan in Siberia. Not only was this opposed by progressive elements in the labor movement, but also b> a large numcr of liberals and even some of the far-sighted among the conservatives. The position of the government in regard to this question was not officially determined. The further course of the relations between Russia and England will be decided by England's attitude toward intervention. SOCIALIST AND IMPERIALIST DIPLOMACY 423 While Russia was in the war together with the Entente Powers, Eng lish war vessels were always at Murmansk. The Murmansk road played an extraordinarily important part in the military traffic between Russia and its Allies. After the conclusion of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, there departed by way of Murmansk for the west the military experts and emergency expeditions of the Allies formerly in Russia. This could not continue. Frequently we addressed the English representative with the demand that the war ships should be withdrawn from Murmansk. When the Murmansk situation became apparently a permanent relation of the present international position of Russia, the People's Commissariat for For eign Affairs on June 14 demanded of England, France and the United States the withdrawal of their war ships Ten days after this demand the British landed 1 100 men in Murmansk. Our answer to this armed invasion was to demand the withdrawal of the Allied troops, and to send our own troops to Murmansk. The agents of Great Britain explain the presence of English troops in Murmansk as an endeavor of the English government to protect this region against a German-Finnish advance. At a moment when the Entente powers declare their sympathy with the Czecho-Slovak divisions which are openly engaged in counter-revolutionary activity, it is a vital necessity for the Soviet Government to completely restore its power in Murmansk. We are now tryng to accomplish this, and wv hope for a favorable result. It is the intention of Soviet Russia to arrive at an economic agree ment with Germany and the United States for the exchange of products, end it is equally our intention to conclude a similar agreement with England. It depends entirely on England to utilize this opportunity. Among the ruling class of England there are elements endeavoring to establish friendly relations, and we have many friends among the working class of England. As the English government's spokesmen in the labor movement refrain from expressions of friendship for Soviet Russia, we can find solace in the support of the as yet not powerful Socialist parties; the British Socialist Party constantly gives proof of its enthusiastic solidarity with Soviet Russia, as well as the constantly developing movement of the spokesmen of the workers in the factories. This Shop-Stewards movement is a new expression of the independent mass movement of the workers of England, representing at this moment the most powerful and the most pro gressive factor in the English labor movement. England, as well as Italy, the United States and France, participated in the declaration favoring the Czecho-Slovaks. Until this, the Italian re presentatives had always emphasized the friendly attitude of Italy toward our people. The unfortunate people of Serbia are, on account of their general con ditions, much more inclined to show its solidarity with the heavily-burdened proletariat of Russia. Contrary to this was the attitude of the official representatives of Serbia, who were always under the influence of the policy of the Entente Powers. Our relations with the Rumanian Government must not be confused with our relations with the Rumanian people, among whom the Russian Revolution had already begun to make inroads in the South when the rev olutionary movement was violently stopped. At this moment our relations 424 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA w'th the Rumanian Government arc not settled. The annexation of Bess arabia to Rumania was accomplished through a fictitious right of self-de termination by a small group of the population and accompanied by un paralleled violence. Concerning the neutral powers, Sweden protected the interests of the German subjects, Denmark those of Austria-Hungary. The questions con cerning the German and Austrian prisoners of war were always a subject of very animated discussion between ourselves and Sweden and Denmark. Wc intended to establish economic relations with the three Scandinavian states. The interests of our citize-ns, and thus of our prisoners in Germany, were taken care of by Spain, but the Spanish Government adopted an extrem ely reticent attitude toward Soviet Russia. The Spanish Embassy has deliv ered only the keys of our Embassy in Berlin to the German Government, but it refused to deliver to us the administration of our prisoners, of war. The Spanish Government also refused to allow our citizens to leave Spain. The Swiss Government, after acknowledging our authorized representative, Comrade Bcrsinc, did not immediately admit his staff and his couriers are always meeting dificulties in their travels to the Swiss Republic. Our re lations to all these states, and the foreign states in general, affect the existence of our Worker's and Peasants' Dictatorship. Our inroads on the rights of private property are of great influence. Insofar as these inroads i«re legal in method, under the power to tax, the foreigners are subject to our measures. Insofar as irregularities occur which do not come within the scope of our regulated economic policy, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs has always exercised its influence upon the local Soviets to regulate the situation of the foreigners; and at this moment instructions are being worked out in conformity with all the other People's Commissaires. Nevertheless, we inform the foreign Governments that our social reforms cannot end at the door steps of those who consider themselves foreign subjects. Our policy in the Eastern countries is determined by the peace measure adopted at the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers, Soldiers and Peasants, November 7, 1917. Imperialism has created in the East a special kind of veiled annexation}. This is the so-called right of European Concessions and Capitulations, which determines that citizens of imperialistic countries are subject to the admin istrative powers and not the local laws. The imperialistic governments have been relying upon tlieir armed power to coerce these Oriental countries, consisting partly of their own troops and partly of native elements ambiti ous for conquest. These goverriments have pursued in the Oriental countries a policy which places their subjects and tlieir interests in extraordinarily favorable circumstances, to the disadvantage of the native peoples. They have established settlements, within wliich the natives are slaves, and within which they are sometimes not even allowed to live. They have by their absolute independence of the native government protected themselves, created an impregnable citadel from which they gradually extend their power over the oppressed people of tlie East. Socialist Russia cannot reconcile itself with such a situation, despite its existence for centuries. Socialist Russia, since the November Revolution, has declared to the Oriental peoples that it is not only willing to abandon SOCIALIST AND IMPERIALIST DIPLOMACY 42$ these "privileges," but to endeavor with all means at its command, together with the peoples of the East, to demand the abolition of this crying in- jurtice, and to give to the -peoples of the East tlie opportunity to re-gain their lost liberty. We have abandoned all secret treaties, by which the ruling classes of the Oriental countries, either out of motives of aggrandizement or of fear, allied themselves with the Czarist Government, and by so doing enslaved their peoples for centuries. We have recalled our troops from the conquered territory of Persia, and also re-called our military instructors, whose task it was to create an army of the natives to protect the interests of the Russian capitalists and support the Persian absolutism. We have notified China that we relinquish the conquests of the Czarist Government in Manchuria, and that we recognize Chinese rights in this territory, where the principal trade-route runs, namely, the Eastern-Siberian Railroad. This railroad is the property of the Chinese and Russian people, which has al ready devoured millions of the money of these peoples, and therefore of right belongs to these peoples and to nobody else. More than this: we are of the opinion that as the Russian people advanced funds to defray part of the expenses of this railroad, these could be repaid and China buy the railroad outright, without waiting for the terms embodied in this particular treaty violently imposed upon China. Wc have recalled from China all troops for the protection of consulates, troops which were sent by Czarist Russia and the Government of Kercnsky to protect the power of the Russian bureaucracy. We are prepared to relinquish the right of extra-tcrritoriality (institution of capitulation, etc.) of our citizens in China, Mongolia and Persia. We are prepared to relinquish the tribute imposed upon the peoples of China, Mon golia and Persia under different pretexts by the former Russian Government. We only w^h, that all those millions would be used in behalf of the cultural development of the broad masses, and for Ihe solidarity of the Oriental and Russian democracy. We can very well imagine what impression the November Revolution has created upon the masses of the East. The events in Russia resounded especially amongs our Asiatic neighbors. The great revolution has awakened in them a desire to a new free existence. And this could not be hidden from us, not even by the representatives of the Capitalistic Governments. The prarty which accomplished the revolution in Russia is called in China the tarty of World Humanism. In Persia which is being rent to pieces, and is not able to fight for its existence, a movement has started for the establishment of democratic oiganizations, after the example of the Soviets, which are the only salvation against suppression by foreigners. In South China with its more enlightened population, there rages open revolution, and we have only lately heard con fession of the leaders of this movement, that the fact of Russia being a Socialist Republic for 8 months offers die East the assurance and pos sibility of establishing similar republics in the East. In the Far-East there is a struggle by the people against secret treaties. The open declaration of South China, that it does not recognize the alliance with bordering State, the alliance which deprives the Chinese people of the right of self-determination and is dragging them inevitably to the bloody 426 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA war, this open declaration was -presented to ui and to the whole democratic world by the representatives of revolutionary China. You may realize what impression the Russian Revolution created upon die Capitalistic Governments. In February, 1918, an uprising of the proletar ian masses in Tokio took place, an uprising which was immediately sup pressed by the Japanese Government. Five of the most prominent represent atives of the lately organized Social-Democratic Party were arrested. The war censor suppressed carefully all reports from Russia. Revolutionary Siberia is in danger of foreign intervention. On April 5 the Japanese troops landed in Vladivostok and rcmaimu there uninterrupted. And yet there begins in Japan slowly but surely the struggle for the right of self-determination of the people. And this struggle is especially noticeable in the question of interference in Russian affairs. The man who is the Tepresentative of the dying but still powerful feudal regime in Japan, Count Mo'ono, former amlw««ador in Rti«sia and who was closely connected with the Rus-.ijin reactionaries in hidiiif in Janan. was compelled to resign. At I resent a MniKglc is point' on in Japan between the repre'entatives oi t*"- "eartionary military party, who endeavor by all means to provoke a conflict wilh the Ru>«ian people, and to utilize fir w*\-ikucs« for their own advanfe"", nnd the representatives of the more moderate lil>eral opinion who desire nrliiin advantages in a peaceful manner, without making an enemy ff Russia, ns tihoy know very well, that the encroachment of Japan in Russian affairs would determine our mutual relations and possibly the whole further history of the Far East for the immediate future. We are prepared to assist to a gnat extent Japanese citizens who wish to develop the natural resources of Siberia in a peaceful way, and to i.ilow them to take part in uur industrial and business life. Wc are willing in case China gives her consent, to relinquish some of our rights in '.he Fa.st-SiiK'rian railway and to grant Japan the Southern branch of this rail road, and to extend to Japan other advantages by the importation of Japanese products lo Russia, We are willing to renew with Japan the trade treaty and the fishing agreement, wnicii agrtoiiuit was ah\a>» a source of pro.s- ipcrity for the people of Japan, l*causc tiic Russian lish is not only liie principal food of the Japanese but niuo ferves a» fertilizer lor the rice- lieUls, Wc have communicated this to die Japanese Government, and we have started with this Government unofficial discussions. The people of Japan hiin know this and must know the value of these concessions, concession** which c\tn at, other umng» wiuc.il happen in Russia are kept secret for these people, as for instance the fact that Russia would extend the hand of friendship to the people of Japan and offers to establish mutual relations with these people upon a healthy and permanent basis. The people must know, that if they refuse to grasp the hand of friendship, the respons ibility rests upon those classes in Japan who in the interest of their own greediness have kept these things secret for the people of Japan. If the destiny of history shotdd bring forth that Japan, misguided and blinded, would decide upon the insane step of tryinjg to strangle the Russian Revolu tion then the working classes of Russia will arise as one for the protection of that wliich is most cherished and valuable to them namely : the protection of the results of the Social Revolution. SOCIALIST AND IMPERIALIST DIPLOMACY 427 CONCLUSION As we now review our whole international policy of the last 4 months, we must acknowledge that Soviet Russia stands as an alien among the capitalistic governments of the world. These governmenti con duct themselves in general in regards to Soviet Russia, in such a way as to make any other attitude impossible. The condition of Soviet Russia, that in regards to the imperialistic coalitions stands between two fires, is extra ordinarily difficult. We can say, however, with absolute assurance, that the L-est, yes the only way to extricate ourselves from this situation is: our in ternal strengthening, the development of our internal life upon the basis of the Soviet policy, our economic restoration upon the basis of communist production, restoration of our defensive powers for the protection of the re sults of our Revolution. The more this is accomplished the better will be our situation from without. Our foreign policy depends upon our domestic policy. II INTERVENTION IN RUSSIA I Appeal to the proletariat of the Entente nations, issued August t, 1918, by Lenin, Chicherin and Trotsky. The entire capitalist press of your countries is howling with a hoarse voice, like a dog loosened from his chains, for the "intervention" of your governments in the internal affairs of Russia; they cry: "Now or neverr But at the very moment that these hirelings of your exploiters are throw ing off all disguise and speaking openly of an attack on the workers and peasants of Russia, they are still shamefully lying and deceiving you out rageously, for while uttering their threats of "intervention," they are al ready conducting military operations against the Russia of the workers and peasants. You who are shedding your blood on the Marne and on the Aisne in the interests of Capital, in the Balkans, in Syria, in Mesopotamia, you are now also to lie in the snows of northern Finland and in the mountains of the Ural. In the interests of Capital, you arc to be the hangman of the Russian Revolution. In order to disguise this crusade against the Russian Workers' Revolution, your capitalists also explain that the expedition is not to be undertaken against the Russian Revolution, but against Ger man Imperialism, to which wc are said to have sold ourselves. We were forced, however, to divide Russia, because your governments, which knew very well that Russia could fight no longer, would not enter int** peace negotiations, at which their strength would have saved Russia and assured us an acceptable peace. Now Russia, exhausted by 3 1-2 years of war, has betrayed your cause; rather have your governments thrown Russia under the feet of German Imperialism. They think only of squeezing out the interest on the old loans advanced by French capital to Czarism, The Allies warned us, that the Germans would occupy the Siberian and Murman Railways; these two direct lines, they said, which connect us with the outer world, must not come under German control. But in the end it was not the Go mans who actually took possession of the railroads, which wa3 impossible for them, at their distance from the railroad, but the Allies themselves. They arc thus pursuing three ob jects: 1) the occupation of as much Russian territory as possible, in order, by holding its resources, lo secure the payment of the interest on the loans made by French and English capital; 2) the suppression of the Workers' Revolution; 3) the erection of a new eastern front, in order to divert the Germans from the western front to fight on Russian soil. INTERVENTION IN RUSSIA 429 Tbe agents of your Capitalism also explain that in this way they will lessen the pressure of the German arms upon you, and hasten the victory over German Imperialism. But German Imperialism can only be crushed if the Imperialism of all governments is defeated by the simultaneous re volt of the world-proletariat. The attempts to draw Russia into the war will not save you from the shedding of blood: they can only deliver up the Revolution to the sword. Wc have endured all too long the en croachments of the representatives of Entente Imperialism, we have al lowed those who lay at the feet of the Czar, to remain in Russia, although they did not recognize the Soviets. And even now, when French offcers are recommending the Czecho-Slovaks, now that the horrors of the Munnan coast have begun, even now we have not uttered a word of protest against the presence of your diplomats in the territory of the Soviet Re public, not recognized by them; we have only demanded their removal from Vologda to Moscow in order that wc might protect them against the attacks of a people deeply enraged by their criminal enterprises. And now, after the departure of the Entente ambassadors, not a hair on the heads of the citizens of your countries who are living with us, will be touched, provided they obey the laws of the Soviet Republic. We are convinced that if we had returned two blows for each one received from the Entente usurpers, you would have witnessed not only an act of lawful self-defense, but also the defense of your own best interests; for the sal vation of the Russian Revolution constitutes a common interest of the proletariat of all countries. Forced to war against Entente capital, which wishes to add new chains to the chains already imposed upon us by Ger many, we turn to you with the cry: Long live the solidarity of the workers of the whole world! Long live the French, English, American, and Italian proletariat, together with the Russian) Down with the robbers of International Imperialism! Long live the International Revolution! Long live the Peace of the Peoplesl II Resolution adopted, shortly after Ihe landing of Allied troops in Vladivostok, by the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workmen's, Peasants', Cossacks' and Red Guard Delegates of All Siberia. The Central Executive Committee of the All-Siberian Soviets appeals to the toiling masses of the whole world and in the name of millions of the toilers of Siberia, in the name of all workers, peasants and Cossacks declares its indignation and resolute protest against the plan of seizure of Siberia which is the aim of the imperialistic governments of Japan, France, England and America. For some months there has been in those countries an agitation for intervention in the internal affairs of Siberia. The chief pretext for such intervention was the conclusion of peace be tween Russia and Germany, which peace was falsely proclaimed as strengthening German influence in Russia, the lying provocative reports concerning the arming of some hundred thousand of war prisoners in Siberia, and finally the seizure by the war prisoners of the government in Siberia. The reptile press shamelessly invented all sorts of lying re- 43° THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA ports about Russia in order to guarantee the success of the agitation. The counter-revolutionists banished from Russia came to the aid of the foreign imperialists. Being driven out of Russia by the mighty wave of the revolution, they appealed abroad to foreign Powers to intervene in Russia and Siberia for the purpose of crushing the Soviet Government and the establishment of their anti-people government. Everything was done to realize intervention in a most convenient manner through the Czecho-Slovak troops that were passing through Siberia. A sufficient number of pretexts were found to set armed Czecho slovaks against the Soviet government. The Soviets' attempts to nego tiate with the Czecho-Slovaks and satisfy their demands, and thus peace fully end the conflict at the beginning, were resolutely rejected by the army command of the Czecho-Slovaks. The Czecho-Slovaks in Vladivo stok continued to remain there, and finally also arrayed themselves against the Soviet government in Siberia. It has become clear to us, workers, peasants and Cossacks of Siberia, that the Czecho-Slovaks in stead of following their former purpose, to move toward France, had an other task— to establish the domination of foreign powers in Siberia. We are in possession of documents which show definitely that the for eign powers utilize the Czecho-Slovaks as an element most suitable for purposes of occupation. We were forced to offer armed resistance against these troops. But, evidently, the Czecho-Slovak forces were too weak for the carrying out of the task they had on hand; to their aid Brit ish, French and Japanese troops have been rushed, once more under the imaginary pretext of defending the Czecho-Slovaks against the Germans. We declare that the reptile press of the imperialists will always be able to invent sufficient lying information to justify the actions of the imperialists, and we are not inclined to prove the absurdity of all these inventions. We repeat again that all the provocative information con cerning the mass arming of the war prisoners, the seizure by the latter of Siberia, were at the time given the lie by the official representatives of America and England, and that at any moment the Czecho-Slovaks would be given permission to pass through Siberia, should they desire so. But we must emphatically protest against the intentions of Japan, France, England and America to occupy Siberia with their troops, and protest against the actions of Russian counter-revolutionists, who appeal to the Allies to intervene in Siberian affairs. We declare that Allied intervention in Siberia will inevitably result in the strengthening of German influence in Russia against the will of the toilers of Russia, and thus such an action would mean in fact a division of Russia and Siberia between the Allies and Germany. We declare that the plotting of the Russian counter-revolutionists in appealing for Allied intervention provokes the wrath and indignation of the Russian workers and peasants — any government in Siberia and Rus sia that might be established with the- aid of foreign bayonets is more repugnant to the masses of the Russian people than the absolutism of Nicholas Romanov destroyed by the Revolution, and therefore is doomed to the same fate as the absolutism of Nicholas Romanov. Let- the gov ernments of Japan, France, England and America not forget the armed stnigule of workers and peasants in the Ukraine against the government INTERVENTION IN RUSSIA 43' of Ukrainian land-owners, and their hatred of Austria, which has played the role if restorer of reaction and the gendarme of the Revolution, a role now threatened to be assumed by their governments. We remind them about the disgraceful role played by the German soldiers during the Paris Commune of 1871, and we demand of them that they refuse to carry out the role of hangman of the Revolution now, in 19'8, in Siberia and Russia. The toiling masses of Japan, France, England and America ought to make clear to their imperialistic governments that they will not tolerate shooting, gallows and prisons for the Russian workers, peasants, Cos sacks; that they will not allow the Russian revolution and freedom to be cruched. They must rise against the attempt by their governments to chain the Russian proletariat. In the name of the workers, peasants and Cossacks, the Central Ex ecutive Committee of the Soviets declares that the Russian masses will not stand for foreign domination in Siberia and will throw off the yoke which is being prepared for them by foreign imperialists in co-operation with the Russian counter-revolutionists. Russian workers, peasants and Cossacks will fight arms in hands to the last drop of their blood against armed foreign invasion in Russia and Siberia, in order to preserve their revolutionary conquests. Only over the corpses of the Russian people will foreign Imperialism march into Siberia, only by wading through the rivers of blood of Russian workers and peasants will the imperialistic counter-revolutionists be able to erect again the throne of reaction. Ill From the People's Commissaire for Foreign Affairs Chicherin to the Russian plenipotentiary in Berlin, — Moscow, September 2, 1918. A plot was unearthed to-day which had been engineered by foreign diplomats led by the head of the English mission, Mr. Lockhart, the French Consul-General and some -s'hers. Their aim was, nftcr bribing certain detachments of the Soviet's troops, to overthrow the Council of the People's Commissaircs and to proclaim in Moscow a military dic tatorship. This was a regular conspiracy relying for its success on forged documents and bribes. Among other documents brought to light there was a statement to the effect that if the revolt was successful, forged letters alleged to have passed betwe'en the Russian and German govern ments would be published, and also forged copies of treaties, whereby a sentiment would be created favorable to the declaration of a new war against Germany. The plotters took advantage of their diplomatic im munity and were protected by certificates personally signed by the head of the English Mission in Moscow, Lockhart. Several copies of the docu ments arc already in the hands of the investigating committee. It has been proved that in the past fortnight one million two hundred thousand rubles had been distributed for the purpose of bribery by the English lieutenant Reilly, one of Lockhart's agents. An Englishman arrested in the plotters' secret meeting place and brought before the investigating committee was found to he the English diplomatic representative Lock hart. He was released as soon as his identity was established. Unsuc- 432 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA cessful attempts to bribe certain corps commanders brought about the exposure of the plot. Investigations will be continued with all possible thoroughness. I IV "What the Plotters Were Planning to Do"— From the Moscow "Pravda," September 3, 1918. Lockhart and an officer of the Soviet's troops nvt for the first time at a private house on August 4th. Thev discussed the feasibility of ar ranging an uprising against the Sovie: authorities in Moscow about Seo- tember 10th, at which time the English troops would be advancing in the Murman region. The date of September 10 was considered as very im portant owing to the fact that Lenin and Trotzky were to attend a meet ing of the People's Commissaires on that day. It was also planned to seize the Imperial Hank, the Central Telephone Exchange and the Tele graph station. A military dictatorship was to be established and all meet ings prohibited pending the arrival of the English troops. The Russian officer received from Lockhart the sum of 700,000 rubles to be spent in preparing the uprising. On August 22 another conference was held at which he received another 200,000 rubles and at which plans were elaborated for seizing all the papers in Lenin's and Trotzky's offices. On August 28 the Russian officer received another 200,000 rubles and it was agreed that he should go to Petrograd and enter into communica tions with the English military group and the White Guards. The threads of the entire conspiracy converged in the British mission, the second in authority being the French Consul General Gresnard; then came General I.avergne, a French officer and several other French and English officers. The negotiations between the Russian officer and the foreign plotters took place on August 29. The possibility of starting simultaneous move ments in Nijny Novgorod and Tambov was discussed. Negotiations were carried on with the representatives of a number of allied powers with a view to paralyzing the resistance of the Soviet authorities to the Czecho slovaks and the Anglo-French forces, especially by bringing about aa acute food shortage in Petrograd and Moscow. Plans were likewise laid for blowing up bridges and railroad tracks, for incendiary fires and tbe destruction of stores of foodstuffs. V "The Arrests at the British Embassy"— from the "Pravda" of Moscow, September 3, 1918. The investigation commission holds 40 men, most of them English men, who were arrested on August 31 in the British Embassy. Dzershin- sky, chairman of the commission, had received important information on the relations existing between various counter-revolutionary organiza tions and the representatives of the British government. Miller, a member of the commission, was authorized to search in the INTERVENTION IN RUSSIA 433 British Embassy and to make arrests if necessary. Accompanied by Commissaire Polisensko and his assistants, Hiller arrived at the Embassy at five o'clock in the evening. They surrounded the building and gained access to the ground floor. But when they proceeded on their way to tbe floor above, shots were fired from there. Shenkman, one of the Com- missaire's assistants, fell with a wound in his chest. Lisson, a scout, was killed on the spot. Hiller with a detachment of scouts forced his way into the rooms on the second floor and arrested the men he found there, all of them held up their hands. The fight went on in the corridor, the scouts returned the fire, killing one of the men they had come to arrest. It was learned later that he was the naval attache Croinic, who had fired the first shot. Among the prisoners is Prince Shakhovskoy. In the course of the search letters were found which contain damag ing evidence against the British Embassy, and also a large number of weapons. VI An Editorial of Ihe Moscow "fsveslia," Ihe Official Organ of the Soviet, on Cliicherin's Telegram to Joffe. It was planned to seize the People's Commissaircs at one of the Coun cil's meetings at which important questions were to be discussed. The guards of the Kremlin were to receive bribes in consideration of which they would allow themselves to be also arrested. The members of the People's Council were to be sent to Archangel. At least such was the first plan. Soon afterward, Reilly expressed doubts about the advisa bility of sending Lenin to Archangel. Through his ability to make friends with simple people, Lenin might on the way to Archangel win the sympathy of his guards and prevail upon them to let him escape. Reilly declared it would be safer to shoot Lenin and Trotzky as soon as they were arrested. During the night of August 31, members of the investigating commis sion entered the plotters' meeting place. Among the men who were arrested there was an Englishman who refused to give his name. Brought before the commission he declared that he was Lockhart. After Peters had verified the truth of that assertion he asked Lockhart to ex plain the attempt made to bribe the commander of the Soviet's troops. I-oekhart denied categorically having ever had anything to do with that officer. When the exact dates on which he had met him were mentioned and other documents were produced. Lockhart declared excitedly that as a diplomatic representative he could not be subjected to any examina tion. It wa9 then explained to him that the question had been put to him to enable him to prove that the Lockhart who had organized the plot and the English representative of the same name were two different persons. The Fried brothers, one a major, the other a colonel, who were also arrested, were in the employ of the Soviet government. They had for some time been stealing documents and reports on conditions at the front and the movements of troops. Their reports were made in several copies and delivered to tbe English and French missions. An actress of Ihe Art Theatre acted as go-between. 434 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA VII The Allied diplomats in Russia, famine and counter revolu tionary plots. A striking light is thrown on the cause of food difficulties which are experienced by Soviet Russia, by a letter written on September 4th, 1918, by M. Rene Marchand, the well known Figaro correspondent in Russia to President Poincare, the original of which was discovered during a search made in his house by the agents of the Extraordinary Commission for Fighting the Counter-Revolution, and which was published by the Mos cow Isvestia. In the course of his letter, M. Marchand deplored the fact that — "Of late wc have allowed ourselves to be drawn exclusively into a fight against Bolshevism thus engaging, without any advantage whatso ever to the interests of the Entente, in a policy which can have no other result than intensifying unnecessarily the sufferings and despair of the Russian people, to aggravate the existing anarchy and to accentuate the famine and civil war as well as the party feuds." M. Marchand then reports a secret conference at the American Con sulate-General at the end of August last, which was attended, in addition to the American Consul-General Poole, by all the other rcpresent;:ti.es of the Allied Governments and by himself. "1 then learned that the British Agent was preparing the destruction of the railway bridge over the river Volkhoff. A glance at the map will show that the destruction of this bridge would be equivalent to the de livery of Petrograd to death by starvation. The British agent added the information that he had already made an attempt to blow up the Tcher- poff Viaduct which would have had the same disastrous effect on the food supply of Petrograd. The conversation then turned on the subject of the destruction of the various railway lines. One of the agents mentioned that he had secured the valuable assistance of the railway employees, who, however, were opposed to destruction on a large scale; the cor rupted employees were only prepared to assist in the blowing-up of trains carrying war materials. I do not want to dwell upon details but I am profoundly convinced that these were not isolated acts on the part of individual agents. But even if they were isolated arts their effect would be equally pernicious; they are calculated to draw Russia into an endless and even bloodier political fight and to deliver it to inhuman sufferings by death and starvation. Moreover, the sufferings would affect almost entirely the poor and the middle classes of the population, while the richer people and the bourgeoisie would always be able to find the means of escaping to the Ukraine or abroad." M, Marchand notes that throughout the conference, not a single word was uttered about fighting Germany and expresses his profound convic tion that the Soviet Government would not call in Gennany to its assist ance. VIII Letter to Rotnain Rolland by Capt. Jacques Sadoul, of the French Military Mission in Moscow, July 14, 1918. At the hour when Republicans of the whole world, celebrating the an niversary of the fall of the Bastille, pay homage to the French Revolu- INTERVENTION IN RUSSIA 435 tion and declare their indestructible faith in an early realization of a life of brotherhood, the Telegraph informs us that the governments of the Entente Allies have resolved to crush the Russian Revolution. Awakened through the fight against the dispossessed classes, a hostile aristocracy, against a bourgeoisie anxious above all to reconquer their privileges and their capital, more than half strangled through German Imperialism, the power of the Soviets is in danger of annihilation to-day through the offensive begun by the Entente. Senseless arc those who do not sec that this armed intervention — persistently demanded for some time by certain Russian circles which have lost all political influence — will have the result of awakening the in dignation of the invaded nation. Irrespective of what is being said, and without showing any partisanship for the Soviets, the fact is that this intervention is against the entire Russian people, against their will for peace, and their ideal of social justice. The day will come, when through the uprising of this nation, which is still capable of great things, the in vaders who have violated it, will be expelled. That day, Frenchmen and Germans, Austrians and English, will all equally be the object of hatred in Russia. The free men of Europe, those who through the turmoil have con served their opinions honestly, and who know, or at least guess the im mense value to humanity of the Communist experiment which is being tried out by the Russian proletariat, will they allow the accomplishment of this detestable injustice? What is the Bolshevik Revolution? What did il want? What has it done up to to-day? What will it be able to realize to-morrow? Is it worth being defended? The documents which I am sending you will con tribute, I feel sure, to make known the truth. I happen to be in a posi tion nearer than anybody else, to the events which have taken place in Russia during the past nine months. I have taken daily, short notes of my impressions. They were written in a hurry — necessarily incomplete, sketchy, and often contradictory. I send you enclosed a copy of the notes which I could find, that is nearly all those which I have sent to Trance. 1 am not a Bolshevik. 1 know the great mistakes that have been committed by the Maximal ists. But I also know that before signing the treaty of Brest, the Commis- saires of the people did not cease to solicit the Allies for military help which would have permitted the Boliheviki to resist the abominable de mands of the Central Empires, and have saved them from having to sub mit to a shameful peace of which they knew the dangers. 1 also know that since Brest, Trotzky and Lenin have multiplied their efforts to induce the powers of the Entente to collaborate loyally in the economic and military reorganisation of Russia. Finally, I know that these desperate appeals to the Allies, contrary to their best interests, have been opposed by a non possumus — disdainful indifference. Forgetting the teachings of history, and erring to the point of believ ing that the dismembered parts of Russia would continue the war aban- 436 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA doned by Russia, they have created the Ukraine, to the great benefit oi Austria and Germany; they have pushed with all their might the separa tist tendencies of Finland, Poland, Lithuania and the Caucasus, and with a Rumanian army they have fought the Russian army. These states as soon as created, have fallen into the arms of our enemies, as it was easy for me to predict, while the Russian government, although weakened, lost in the conferences of Brest, a great part of its authority and prestige. In the Interior where the Allies have played the game of counter-revolu tion, they have aggravated the general disorder and precipitated the dis- oiganization of this unfortunate country. Before Brest, their indifference made Russia defenceless against the ignoble appetites of the Pan-Germans. After Brest, the hostility of the Allies is bound to push this nation, which does not want to die, into the camp of the enemy of yesterday who knows admirably well how to take advantage of our numerous errors. The Conservatives approached with enthusiasm the Austro-German governments from which they rightly ex pect the restoration of the old regime. The parties of the extreme Left, with a heavy heart, have to consent to this provisional reconciliation which necessarily must bring about their destruction, but which, prolong ing their agony, maintains their hope for existence. In spite of the modifications imposed by the censor you will find in the pages which I send you, abundant proof of what I say here. These notes have been sent from Petrograd and from Moscow. Given to the care of the official Courier who left for France weekly, they have been addressed regularly to Albert Thomas, Jean Longuet, Ernest Laf- font. Many of them have also been sent to other friends, to the Deputy l'rcsseiiiane, to Pierre I lamp, Henri Barbusse, etc. Some of them must have been intercepted or gone astray. The majority reached their des tination. I can sec this from their answers dated as late as March. Since then communication by mail with the West has become extremely precarious. Among these notes you will not find a single line which could form an official reproach as an indiscretion against an officer and member of the French Military Mission in Russia. As a matter of fact they contain nothing but the personal observations of a French citizen interested in observing the facts only as an impartial, open-minded witness. They are extracts of my conversations with leaders of Bolshevism and of the Op position, which I could not pass by in silence. I have a deep conviction that in giving you these documents, I am strictly doing my duty as a Socialist and a Frenchman. In doing this I have faith that you will not abuse my confidence. I pray you to run through these notes and to communicate them to political men, to the philosophers and to the thinkers of France who in your opinion will be interested in reading them. Men such as Aulard, Cabriel Seailles, Maeterlinck and many others who after they know the truth, will be capable of enlightening our dear country. They will know how to prevent the sons of the great French Revolution from staining their names forever with such a crime as suppressing the great Russian Revolution, v/hich in spite of many blunders, is stiil an admirable force of idealism and progress. INTERVENTION IN RUSSIA 437 We will not win the war by killing the Russian Revolution. By com mitting such a crime we shall not accomplish the task towards civiliza tion which the Allies have set before them, and we shall not realize a democratic and just peace, the principles of which have been enunciated by our Socialist Party and so eloquently developed by Wilson. The Ministers of the Entente, misinformed through the blindness of their Intelligence Service, were in a position to easily delude the masses of workingmen, and now direct them against the power of the Soviets. But the day will come when the lies will be swept aside and the truth proclaimed. What bitter reproaches will then be addressed to the guilty governments for not having known better, or not having wanted to know better. What resentment, what hatred will accumulate, and what terrible and unnecessary fights are in store for the future! But the crime will be ir reparable! New ruins will not make old ruins look less ugly. Men like you who have helped so forcefully in the intellectual and moral development of my generation, have the power to prevent this. It is also their duty. Ill THE TERROR IN RUSSIA Answer of Soviel Commissaire of Foreign Affairs Chicherin to a protest of the Diplomatic Corps in Petrograd concerning the terror in Russia. To the Gentlemen representing the Capitalist Neutral Nations: The note presented to us on the 5th of September by the gentlemen representing the neutral powers represents an act of gross interference in the inner affairs of Russia. The Soviet Government would be justi fied in ignoring this act. But the Soviet Government is glad to grasp any opportunity of explaining the nature of its political tactics to the masses in all countries, for it is the spokesman not only of the Russian work ing-class, but of exploited humanity all over the earth. The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs therefore gives answer, hereby, to the natter in question. In their description of the treatment that is being accorded to the suppressed Russian bourgeoisie, the neutral powers are plainly trying to arouse the sympathy of the bourgeoisie all over the world. We do not propose to disprove the fiction of the gentlemen who represent the neu tral nations. In their note they repeat all the slander that has been in vented by the Russian bourgeoisie to discredit the Red Army. We will not refute individual occurrences, first of all because the gentlemen who represent the neutral powers have presented absolutely no concrete oc currences, secondly, because every war — and we are in the midst of a civil war — brings with it excesses on the part of individuals. The gentlemen representing the neutral powers did not protest Bfainst the individual misdeeds of irresponsible persons, but against the regime that is being carried out by the Government of the Workmen and' Peasants against the exploiting class. Before entering into the reasons why the Government of the Workers and peasants uses the Red Terror that has called forth the protest of the gentlemen representing the neutral powers, permit us to ask a few questions. Do the representatives of the neutral nations know that an interna tional war has been raging for almost five years, into which a small clique of bankers, generals and bureaucrats precipitated the masses of the civilized nations of the world? That in this war these masses are de stroying each other, cutting each other's throats that Capitalism may earn new millions thereby? Do they know .hat in this war not only mil lions of men were killed at the front, but that both belligerent parties have attacked open cities with bombs, killing unarmed women and chil dren? Do they know that in this war one of the belligerent parties THE TERROR IN RUSSIA 439 doomed millions of human beings to death by starvation by cutting off their food supply in direct contradiction to the tenets of international law, that the belligerent party hopes to force the other, by starving its children, to surrender to the victor? Do they know that the belligerent powers have imprisoned hundreds of thousands of unarmed, peaceable citizens in the enemy's country, sending them to places far from home into involuntary servitude, depriving them of every right of self-defense? Do they know that in all belligerent nations the ruling capitalist clique has deprived the masses of the right of free press and assemblage and the right to strike? That workingmen arc being imprisoned for every attempt to protest against the White Terror of the bourgeoisie, that they are sent to the front that every last thought of human rights may be killed within them? All of these instances of the destructive force that is being directed against the working-class in the name of capitalist interests, all these pictures of the White Terror of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat are more than familiar to the neutral nations and their representatives in Russia. Nevertheless, cither they forgot their high ideals of humanity or they forgot in these cases to remind the blood-dripping belligerent rations of their misdeeds. The so-called neutral nations did not dare to utter a word of protest against the White Terror of the capitalist class, nay, more, they did not wish to proi.st, for the bourgeoisie in all neutral nations have helped the capitalist powers of the capitalist nations to carry on the war be cause they are earning billions in war contracts with the belligerent na tions. We beg Ie*ve to ask another question. Have the gentlemen repre senting the neutral powers heard of the crushing of the Sinn Fciners in Dublin, of the shooting to death, without due process of the law, of hundreds of Irishmen, with Skeffington at their head? Have they heard cf the White Terror in Finland, of the tens of thousands of dead, of the tens of thousands of men and women who are languishing in jail, against whom no charges have ever been, or ever will be made? Have they never heard of the maris murder of workmen and peasants in the Ukraine? Of the mass murder of workmen by the brave Czecho-Slovaks, these hirelings of French capital? The governments of the neutral na tions have heard of all these things, but never before did it occur to them to protest against the despotism of the bourgeoisie when it oppresses ihe working class movement. For they themselves arc ready, at any rio- ment, to shoot down workingmen who fight for their rights. In tl.eir own countries they stand ready, in the name of the bourgeoisie, and in defense of its interests, to crush out every vestige of working-class up rising. It is sufficient to recall that labor demonstrations were recently routed by military force in Denmark, Norway, Holland, Switzerland, etc. The workers of Switzerland, Holland and Denmark have not yet revolted, but already the governments of these countries arc mobilizing their mili tary forces against the weakest protest of the working-class. When the representatives of the neutral nations threaten us with the indignation of the entire civilized world, and protest against the Red Terror in the 44<> me PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSStA name of humanity, we respectfully call their attention to the fact that they were not sent to Russia to defend the principles of humanity, but to preserve the interests of the capitalist State; we would advise them further not to threaten us with the indignant horror of the civilized world, but to tremble before the jury of the masses who are arising against a civilization that has thrust humanity into the unspeakable misery of endless slaughter. In the entire capitalist world the White Terror rules over the work ing-class. In Russia the working-class destroyed that Czarism whose bloody regime brought no protests from the neutral nations. The work ing-class of Russia put an end to the rule cf the bourgeoisie who, under the flag of the Revolution, again amidst tie deep silence of the neutral powers, slaughtered soldiers who refused to shed their blood in the in terests of war speculators, killed peasants because they claimed the land they had cultivated for centuries in the sweat of their brow*. The majority of the Russian people, in the person of the second Con gress of the Workmen's, Peasants', Cossacks' and Soldiers' Council, placed the power into the hands of the Workmen's and Peasants' Gov ernment. A small handful of capitalists who desired to regain the fac tories and the banks that were taken from them in the interests of the people, a small handful of landowners who wished to take back the land that had been given to the peasants, a small handful of generals who wished again to teach the workmen and the soldiers obedience with the whiplash, refused to recognize the decision of the Russian people. With the money of foreign capital they mobilized counter-revolutionary hordes with whose assistance they tried to cut off Russia from its food supply in order to choke the Russian Revolution with the bony hand of hunger. After they became convinced of the futility of their attempts to over throw the working-class republic that enjoyed the unbounded confidence and support of the working-class, they arranged counter-revolutionary uprisings in the attempt to crowd the Workmen's and Peasants' Govern ment from its positive work, to hinder it in it* task of ridding the coun try of anarchy that had taken hold of the country in consequence of the crimina' policies of former governments. They betrayed Russia on the South, North and East into the hands of foreign imperialistic states, they called foreign bayonets, wherever they could muster them, into Rus sia. Hidden behind a forest of foreign bayonets they are sending hired murderers to kill the leaders of the working-class, in whom not only the proletariat of Russia but all the massacred humanity sees tbe personifica tion of its hopes. The Russian working-class will crush without mercy this counter-revolutionary clique, that is trying to lay the noose around the neck of the Russian working-class with the help of foreign capital and the Russian bourgeoisie. In the face of the proletariat of tbe whole world we declare that neither hypocritical protests nor pleas will protect those who take up arms against the workers and the poorest farmers, who would starve them and embroil them in new wars in the interests of the capitalist class. We assure equal rights and equal liberties to all who loyally do their duty as citizens of the Socialist Workmen's and Peasants' Govern ment. To them w< bring peace, but to our enemies we bring war with- THE TERROR IN RUSSIA 441 out quarter. We are convinced that the masses in alt countries who are writhing under the oppression of a small group of exploiters will under stand that in Russia force is being used only in the hoty cause of the lib eration of the people, that they will not only understand us, but will fol low our example. We decidedly reject the interference of neutral capitalist powers in favor of the Russian bourgeoisie, and declare that every attempt on the part of the representatives of these powers to overstep the boundaries of legal protection for the citizens of their own country, will be regarded as an attempt to support the counter-revolution. IV INTERVENTION, ARMISTICE, PEACE •» Note of Soviet Commissaire of Foreign Affairs Chicherin to President Woodrow Wilson, transmitted through the Norwegian Attache in Moscow, October 24, 1918. Mr. President: In your message of January 8th to the Congress of the United States of North America, in the sixth point, you spoke of your profound sym pathy for Russia, which was then conducting, single-handed, negotia tions with the mighty German Imperialism. Your program, you de clared, demands the evacuation of all Russian territory and such a set tlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest co-operation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her political development and national policy, and assure her a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under in stitutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. And you added that "the treatment accorded to Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good-will, of their compre hension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy." The desperate struggle which we were waging at Brest-Litovsk against German Imperialism apparently only intensified your sympathy fot Soviet Russia, for you sent greetings to the Congress of the Soviets, which under the threat of a German offensive ratified the Brest peace of violence — greetings and assurances tiiat Soviet Russia might count upon American help. Six months have passed since then, and the Russian people have had sufficient time to get actual tests of your Government's and your Allies' good will, of their comprehension of the needs of the Russian people, of their intelligent unselfish sympathy. This attitude of your Government and of your Allies was shown first of alt in the conspiracy which was organized on Russian territory with the financial assistance of your French Allies and with the diplomatic co-operation of your Government as well — the conspiracy of the Czecho-Slovaks to whom your Govern ment is furnishing every kind of assistance. For some time attempts had been made to create a pretext for a war between Russia and the United States by spreading false stories to the effect that German war prisoners had seized the Siberian railway, but your own officers, and after them Colonel Robins, the bead of your Red Cross Mission, had been convinced that these allegations were abso- INTERVENTION, ARMISTICE, PEACE 443 lutely false. The Czecho-Slovak conspiracy was organized under the slogan that unless these misled unfortunate people be protected, they would be surrendered to Germany and Austria; but you may find out, among other sources, from the open letter of Captain Sadoul, of the French Military Mission, how unfounded this charge is. The Czecho slovaks would have left Rifsis in the beginning of the year had the French Government provided ships for them. For several months we have waited in vain for your Allies to provide the opportunity for the Czecho-Slovaks to leave. Evidently these Governments have very much preferred the presence of the Czecho-Slovaks in Russia — the results show for what object — to their departure for France and their participa tion in the fighting on the French front. The best proof of the real ob ject of the Czecho-Slovak rebellion is the fact that although in control of the Siberian railway, the Czecho-Slovaks have not taken advantage of this to leave Russia, but by the order of the Entente Governments, whose directions they follow, have remained in Russia to become the mainstay of the Russian counter-revolution. Their counter-revolutionary mutiny, which made impossible the transportation of grain and petro leum on the Volga, which cut off the Russian workers and peasants from the Siberian stores of grain and oilier materials and condemned them to starvation — this was the first experience of the workers and peasants ol Russia with your Government and with your Allies after your promises of the begim.'ig of the year. And then came another experience: an attack on North Russia by Allied troops, including American troops, their invasion of Russian territory without any cause and without a dec laration of war, the occupation of Russian cities and villages, execu tions of Soviet officials and other acts of violence against the peaceful population of Russia. You have promised, Mr. President, to co-operate with Russia in order to obtain for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her political development and her national policy. Actually this co-operation took the form of an attempt of the Czecho-Slovak troops, and later, in Archangel, Murmansk and the Far East, of your own and your Allies' troops, to force the Russian people to submit to the rule of the oppressing and exploiting classes, whose dominion was overthrown by the workers and peasants of Russia in No vember, 1917. The revival of the Russian counter-revolution which has already become a corpse, attempts to restore by force its bloody domina tion over the Russian people — such was the experience of the Russian people, instead of co-operation for the unembarrassed expression of their will which you promised them, Mr. President, in your declarations. You have also, Mr. President, promised to the Russian people to assist them in their struggle for independence. Actually this is what has occurred: While the Russian people were fighting on the Southern front against the counter-revolution, which has betrayed them to Ger man Imperialism and was threatening their independence, while they were using all their energy to organize the defense of their territory against Germany at their Western frontiers, they were forced to move their troops to the East to oppose the Czecho-Slovaks who were bring ing them slavery and oppression, and to the North — against your Allies 444 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA and your own troops, which had invaded their territory, and against the counter-revolutions organized by these troops. Mr. President, the acid test of the relations between the United States and Russia gave quite different results from those that might have been expected from your message to the Congress. But we have reason not to be altogether dissatisfied with even these results, since the outrages of the counter-revolution in the East and North have shown the workers and peasants of Russia the aims of the Russian counter-revolution, and of its foreign supporters, thereby creating among the Russian people ar iron will to defend their liberty and the conquests of the revolution, to defend the land that it has given to the peasants and the factories that it has given to the workers. The fall of Kazan, Symbyrsk, Syzran and Samara should make clear to you, Mr. President, what were the con sequences for us of the actions which followed your promises of January 8. Our trials helped us to create a strongly united and dis ciplined Red Army, which is daily growing stronger and more power ful and which is learning to defend the revolution. The attitude toward us which was actually displayed by your Government and by your Allies could not destroy us; on the contrary, we are now stronger than we were a few months ego, and your present proposal of international nego tiations for a general peace finds us alive and strong and in a position to give in the name of Russia our consent to join the negotiations. In your note to Germany you demand the evacuation of occupied territories as a condition which must precede the armistice during which peace negotia tions shall begin, We are ready, Mr. President, to conclude an armistice on these conditions, and wc ask you to notify us when you, Mr. Presi dent, and your Allies intend to remove your troops from Murmansk", Archangel and Siberia. You refuse to conclude an armistice unless Ger many will stop the outrages, pillaging, etc., during the evacuation of oc cupied territories. We allow ourselves, therefore, to draw the conclusion that you and your Allies will order the Czecho-Slovaks to return the part of our gold reserve fund which they seized in Kazan, that you will forbid them to continue as heretofore their acts of pillaging and outrages against the workers and peasants during their forced departure (for we will encourage their speedy departure, without waiting for your order). With regard to your other peace terms, namely, that the Govern ments which would conclude peace must express the will of their people, you are aware that our Government fully satisfies this condition. Our Government expresses the will of the Councils of Workmen's, Peasants' and Red Army Deputies, representing at least eighty per cent, of the Russian people. This cannot, Mr. President, be said about your Govern ment, But for the sake of humanity and peace we do not demand as a prerequisite of general peace negotiations that all nations participating in the negotiations shall be represented by Councils of People's Commis- saires elected at a Congress of Councils of Workmen's, Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies. We know that this form of Government will soon be the general form, and that a general peace, when nations will no more be threatened with defeat, will leave them free to put an end to the sys tem and the cliques that forced upon mankind this universal slaughter, INTERVENTION, ARMISTICE, PEACE 445 and which will, in spite of themselves, surely lead the tortured peoples to create Soviet Governments that give exact expression to their will. Agreeing to participate at present in negotiations with even such Governments as do not yet express the will of the people, we would like on our part to find out from you, Mr. President, in detail what is your conception of the League of Nations, which you propose as the crown ing work of peace. You demand the independence of Poland, Serbia, Belgium, and freedom for the peoples of Austria-Hungary. You prob ably mean by this that the masses of the people must everywhere first be.-ome the masters of their own fate in order to unite afterward in a ler.gue of free nations. But strangely enough, w'e do not find among your demands the liberation of Ireland, Egypt or India, nor even the lib eration of the Philippines, and we would be very sorry if these peoples should be denied the opportunity to participate together with us, through their freely elected representatives, in the organization of the League of Nations. Wc would also, Mr. President, very much like to know, before the negotiations with regard to the formation of a League of Nations have begun, what is your conception of the solution of many economic ques tions which are essential for the cause of future peace You do not men- nn the war expenditures — t'.ii* unbearable b'irdi i which the masses would have to carry, unless the League of Nations should renounce pay ments on the loans to the capitalists of all countries. You know as well as we, Mr. President, that this war is the outcome of the policies of all capitalistic nations, that the governments of all countries were continu ally piling up armaments, that the ruling groups of all civilized nations pursued a policy of annexations, and that it would, therefore, be extreme ly unjust if the masses, having paid for these policies with millions of lives and with economic ruin, should yet pay to those who arc really re sponsible for the war a tribute for their policies which resulted in all these countless miseries. We propose, therefore, Mr. President, the an nulment of the war loans as the basis of the League of Nations. As to the restoration of the countries that were laid waste by the war, wc be lieve it is only just that all nations should in this respect aid the unfortu nate Belgium, Poland and Serbia; and however poor and ruined Russia seems to be, she is ready on her part to do everything she can to help these victims of the war, and she expects that American capital, which has not at all suffered from this war and has even made many millions in profits out of it. will do its part to help these peoples. Liut the League of Nations should not only liquidate the present war, but also make impossible any wars in the future. You must be aware, Mr. President, that the capitalists of your country arc planning to apply in the future the same policies of encroachment and of super-profits in CHia and in Siberia; and that, fearing competition from Japanese capi talists, they arc preparing a military force to overcome the resistance which they may meet from Japan. You arc no doubt aware of similar plans of the capitalists and ruling circles of other countries with regard to other territories and other peoples. Knowing this, you will have to agree with us that the factories, mines and banks must not be left in the hands of private persons, who have always made use of the vast means 44<5 Till! PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA of production created by the masses of the people to export products and capital to foreign countries in order to reap super-profits in return for the benefits forced on them, their struggle for spoils resulting in impe rialistic wars. Wc propose, therefore, Mr. President, that the League of Nations be based on the expropriation of the capitalists of all countries. In your country, Mr. President, the banks and the industries are in the hands of such a small group of capitalists that, as your personal friend, Colonel Robins, assured us the arrest of twenty heads of capitalistic cliques and the transfer of the control, which by characteristic capitalis tic methods they have come to possess, into the hands of the masses of the world is all that would be required to destroy the principal source of new wars. If you will agree to this, Mr. President— if the sources of future wars will thus be deMroycd, then there can be no doubt that it would be easy to remove all economic barriers and that all peoples, con trolling their means of production, will be vitally interested in exchang ing the things they do not need for the things they need. It will then be a question of an exchange of products between nations, each of which produces what it can best produce, and the League of Nations will be a league of mutual aid of the toiling masses. It will then be easy to redjee the armed forces to the limit necessary for the maintenance of internal safety. Wc know very well that the selfish capitalist class will attempt to create this internal menace, just as the Russian landlords and capitalists arc now attempting, with the aid of American, English and French armed forces, to take the factories from the workers and the land from the peasants. But, if the American workers, inspired by your idea of a League of Nations, will crush the resistance of the American capitalists as wc have crushed the resistance of the Russian capitalists, then neither the German nor any other capitalists will be a serious menace to the victorious working class, and it will then suffice, if every member of the commonwealth, working six hours in the factory, spends two hours didy for several months in learning the use of arms, so that the whole people will know how to overcome the internal menace. And so, Mr. President, though we have had experience with your promises, we nevertheless accept as a basis your proposals about peace and about a League of Nations. We have tried to develop them in order to avoid results which would contradict your promises, as was the case with your promise of assistance to Russia. We have tried to formulate with precision your proposals on the League of Nations in order that the League of Nations should not turn out to be a league of capiul^ts against the nations. Should you not agree with us. wc have no objection to an ''open discussion of your peace terms," as the first point of your peace program demands. If you will accept our proposals as a basis, we will easily agree on the details. But there is another possibility. We have had dealings with the presi dent of the Archangel attack and the Siberian invasion, and we have also had dealings with the president of the League of Nations Peace Pro gram. Is not the first of these — the real president — actually directing the policies of the American capitalist Government? Is not the American Government rather a government of the American corporations, of the INTERVENTION, ARMISTICE, PEACE 447 American industrial, commercial and railroad trusts, of the American banks — in short, a government of the American capitalists? And is it not possible that the proposals of this government about the creation ol a League of Nations will result in new chains for the peoples, in the organization of an international trust for the exploitation of the workers and the suppression of weak nations? In this latter case, Mr. President, you will not be in a position to reply to our questions, and we will say to the workers of all countries: Beware! Millions of your brothers, thrown at each other's throats by the bourgeoisie of all countries, are still perishing on the battle fields, and the capitalist leaders arc already trying to come to an understanding for the purpose of suppressing with united forces those that remain alive, when they call to account the criminals who caused the war! However. Mr. President, since we do not at all desire to wage war against the United States, even though your government has not yet been replaced by a Council of People's Commissaries and your post is not yet taken by Eugene Debs, whom you have imprisoned; since we do not at all desire to wage war against England, even though the Cabinet of Mr. Lloyd George has not yet been replaced by a Council of People's Commissaries with MacLean at its head; since we have no desire to wage war against F'rance. even though the capitalist government of CIcmenceau has not yet been replaced by a workmen's government of Merhcim; just as wc have concluded peace with the imperialist gov ernment of Germany, with Emperor William at its head, from whom jou, Mr. President, feel as alien as wc, the Woikmcn's and Peasants' Revolutionary Government, from you — wc finally propose to you, Mr, President, that you take up with your Allies the following questions and give us precise and definite replies: Do the governments of the United States, England and France consent to cease demanding the blood of the Russian people and the lives of Russian citizens, if the Russian peo ple -.'.ill agree to pay them a ransom such as a man who has been sud denly attacked pays to the one who attacked him? If so, just what trib ute do the governments of the United States, England and F'rance de mand of the Russian people? Do they demand concessions, that the rail ways, mines, gold deposits, etc., shall be handed over to them on certain conditions, or do they demand territorial concessions, some part of Sibe ria or Caucasia, or perhaps the Murmansk Coast? We expect from you, Mr. President, that you will definitely state just what you and your Allies lier.-.and, and also whether the alliance between your government and the governments of the other Entente Powers is iu the nature of a com bination which could be compared with a corporation for drawing divi dends from Russia, or docs your government and the other governments of the Entente Powers have each separate and special demands, and what arc they? Particularly are we interested to know the demands of your French allies with regard to the three billions of rubles which the Paris bankers loaned to the government of the Czar — the oppressor of Russia and the enemy of his own people. And you, Mr. President, as well as your French allies, surely know that even if you and your Allies should succeed in enslaving,' and covering with blood the whole territory of Russia — which will not be allowed by our heroic revolutionary Red 44§ THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA Army — that even in that case the Russian people, worn out by the war and not having had sufficient time to take advantage of the benefit? of the Soviet rule to elevate their national economy, will be unable to p*iy to the FYcnch bankers the full tribute for the billions that were used by the government of the Czar for purposes injurious to the people. Do your French allies demand that a part of this tribute be paid in in-till- ments, and if so — what part, and do they not anticipate that their claims will result in similar claims by other creditors of the infamous govern nunt of the Czar which has been overthrown by the Russian people? We can hardly think that your government and your Allies are without a ready answer, when your and their troops are trying to advance on our territory with the evident object of seizing and enslaving our country, The Russian people, through the people's Red Army, arc guarding their territory and ate bravely fighting against your invasion and against the attacks of your Allies, But your government and the governments of the other Powers of the Entente, undoubtedly, have well prepared plans, for the sake of which you are shedding the blood of your soldiers. We expect that you will state your demands very clearly and definitely. Should we, however, be disappointed, should you fail to reply to our quite definite and precise questions, we will draw the only possible con clusion — that we are justified in the assumption that your government and the governments of your Allies desire to get from the Russian peo ple a tribute both in money and in natural resources of Russia, and ter ritorial concessions as well. We will tell this to the Russian people as well as to the toiling masses of other countries, and the absence of a re ply from you will serve for us as a silent reply. The Russian people will then understand that the demands of your government and of the gov ernments of your Allies are so severe and vast "hat you do not even want to communicate them to the Russian Government. THE INTERNATIONAL REVOLUTION Address delivered by N. Lenin, before the All-Russian Soviet Executive Committee, October 22, 1918. I believe our present situation, despite all the contradictions it con tains, can be characterized by two theses: First, that we never before stood so near to the international proletarian revolution as at present; second, that we on the other hand never found ourselves in a more dan gerous position than now And the most serious part of our situation consists in the fact that the broad masses of the people are hardly aware of the danger that menaces us Therefore, it must be one of the principal tasks of the Soviet representatives to make the present situation entirely clear to the broad masses — no matter how difficult this task may sometimes be. The weightiest objection that was raised against the Soviet Government, not only by the bourgeoisie but also from the ranks of the lower middle class that had lost faith in Socialism, was that we allegedly had begun the Socialist revolution in Russia in a reckless manner, as the revolution in Western Europe was not yet due. Comrades, now in the fifth year of the world war the general col lapse of Imperialism is an evident fact; now it is clear that the revolu tion in all the belligerent countries is unavoidable. We, however, whose existence at the beginning was counted by days or weeks, at the most, have done more in this year of the revolution than ever has been done by any otlier proletarian party in the world. The bourgeoisie no longer denies that Bolshevism is now an international phenomenon. Of course, you know that the revolution has broken out in Bulgaria and that the Bulgarian soldiers are organizing councils, or Soviets, after the Russian model. Now comes the news that similar Soviets arc in the process of being organized also in Serbia The national bourgeoisie of the various small States of Austria will not be able to hold out. In Austria, too, the revolution of the workers and peasants is knocking at the door every where. In Germany the press already talks openly of the abdication of the Kaiser and the Independent Social Democratic Party now dares to speak of the German republic. This certainly means somethingl The German revolution is already a fact. The military party talks about it openly. In East Prussia revolutionary committees have been formed; revolu tionary slogans are being uttered. The Scheidemann gang will not re main at the helm very long; it does not represent the broad masses of the people. 45° THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA So far as Italy is concerned, the revolutionary sentiment of the pro letariat of that country is evident to us. When Gompers, the social patriot who has turned himrelf over to the bourgeoisie, -»isited the cities of Italy and preached patriotism to the workers he was hissed out every where. During the war the Italian Socialist Party has taken a big step toward the Left. In France at tlie beginning of the war the number of patriots among the workers vvas only too great, for it was declared that the soil of France and Paris vvas menaced. But there, too, the attitude cf the proletariat is changing. When a letter was read to the last con vention telling what mischief the Entente was up '' in Russia there were shouts of "Long live the Russian Socialist Repi/'li' and "Long live the Soviets!" Yesterday we got word that at a r.i -cting held in Paris 2.000 metal workers greeted the Soviet Republic. And in England it is true that the so-called Independent Labor Party has not openly entered into an alliance with the Bolsheviki, but its sym pathies for us are constantly or the increase. The Socialist Labor Parties of Scotland have even come out openly for the Bolsheviki. This fact looms up before us entirely on its own initiative: Bolshe vism has become a world theory and the tactics of the international pro letariat. And the workingmen of all countries, who formerly read only the lying and calumnious articles and news reports of the bourgeois press, arc now beginning to take stock of what is happening in Russia. And when last Wednesday a demonstration took place in Berlin, and the workers — in order to show their ill-will toward the Kaiser — wanted to march in front of his palace, they then went to the Russian Embassy in order thus to announce their solidarity vvith the facts of the Russian Proletarian Government. So, Europe has got this far in the fifth year of the war. Therefore, v.'e also declare that we never were so near to the world-wide revolution ;.. v\e are today. Our allies are millions and millions of proletarians in «.'! the countries of the world. But for all that, I repeat that our situa tion never before vvas so precarious as it is at present, because in Europe, as well as in America, Bolshevism is being reckoned with as a world power and a world danper. Immediately following the conclusion of the peace of violence [Brest- Litovsk] wc began the positive work of building up the Socialist republic. As soon as wc gave an opportunity to the peasants actually to get along without the land owners, and a chance to the industrial workers to ar range their own life without the capitalists, as soon as the people under stood that it could manage the State itself, without slavery and exploita tion, then it became clear to everyone, and also manifested itself in prac tice, that no power and no counter-revolution in the world would be able to overthrow the Soviet power, i. e., the government of the workers and peasants. It required many months for us to come to this conviction in Russia. In the cities the revolution' began to consolidate itself already in No- veniber, 1917, but in the country it did not do so until the Summer of 1918. In the Ukraine, on the Don, and in various other places, the peasants have had occasion to feel the power of the Constituents and the Czecho-Slovaks in their own affairs. This required many, many THE INTERNATIONAL REVOLUTION 45' months, but our agricultural population comes out of the struggle hard ened. The peasants finally became aware of the danger menacing them from the side of the capitalists and the land owners; but were not fright ened, and merely said to themselves: "We have learned much in a single year, but we shall learn still more." The West European bourgeoisie, that up to now has not taken the Bolsheviki seriously, is now becoming aware that in Russia a power has arisen and stands there alone which is able to arouse true heroism and a genuine spirit of self-sacrifice in the masses. When this proletarian power began lo infect Europe the bourgeoisie of the world noted that it, too, must reckon with this enemy. And so the bourgeoisie began to unite more closely in proportion as we drew nearer to the proletarian world revolution which flared up, now here, now there. Now the situation for us, for the Russia of the Soviets, has changed and events are following their course at a quickened pace. Before, we had to deal with two groups of imperialistic robber States, that were striving to destroy each other. But now they have noticed, especially by the example of German Imperialism, that their principal enemy is the revolutionary proletariat. By reason of this fact a new danger for us has now arisen, a danger that as yet has not quite unfolded itself, and is not yet fully visible — the danger that the Anglo-French Imperialists are quietly preparing for us. We must keep this danger clearly before our eyes so that we, with the aid of the leaders of the masses, with the help of the representatives of the workers and peasants, may make the broad masses of the people aware of this danger. In German Government circles we may now observe two lines of thought, two plans for salvation, as it were, if there can be any talk at all of salvation. One group says: "We want to gain time and hold out until Spring; perhaps we may succeed in winning by arms!" The other says that it is of the greatest importance to arrive at an agreement with England and France at the expense of the Bolsheviki. In this connec tion one might believe that between the l.'nglish and French on the one side, and Germany on the other a tacit agreement something like this exists: "Don't you Germans leave the Ukraine so long as wc have not arrived there. Sec to it that the Bolshcviki don't get in, then everything else will be adjusted." And the Germans take great care to do so, for they know that for proved service they. too. will get some of the loot. That is the judgment of the Anglo-French imperialists, for they very well understand that the bourgeoisie of the occupied districts — ["inland, the Ukraine, or Poland — will not be able to hold its ground a single day after the withdrawal of the German garrisons. And the bourgeoisie of these countries, who only yesterday sold their territory to the Germans, are today offering their fatherland to the English and the Erench. This conspiracy of the bourgeoisie of all countries against the revolutionary workers and the Bolshcviki is constantly becoming more clearly out lined and becomes cynically apparent. So it is our direct duty to point out this danger to the workers and peasants of all the belligerent coun tries. But for us, comrades, the German revolution is favorable. Consider ing the power and the degree of organization of the German proletariat, 4."2 THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA we may believe that the German revolution will develop such power and will be so well organized that it will solve a hundred international prob lems, Only wc must know how to march in line with the German revo lution, not t6 run ahead of it and injure it, but to help it. And our com rades, the communists of the Ukraine, must bear this in mind. Our prin cipal work must be carrying on propaganda, but a daring, persistent propaganda. We must not forget that Germany forms the most important link in the revolutionary chain. The success of the world revolution depends to the greatest degree upon Germany. We must not fail to consider the changes and excrescences accompanying every revolution. In every country the revolution follows its particular ways and these ways are so different and t*>rtuous that in many countries the revolution can be de layed one or two years. Every country must pass through definite politi cal stages in order to arrive at the very same point — the inevitable pro letarian revolution. And although the international proletariat is now awakening and making important progress, wc must confess that our position is particularly difficult because our enemies direct their attacks against us as their principal enemy. Now they arc preparing to fight, l.ot against the hostile armies, hut against international Bolshevism. We must direct our entire attention at present to our southern front, where the (ate, not only of Russia, but also of the international revolu tion, is to be decided. We have many prospects of victory. Rut what favors us most of ill is the fact that a change has taken place in the popular feeling. The people have grasped the fact that in defending Soviet Russia it is nit tiefending the interests of the capitalists, but its own interests, its owii e -nnt ry and desires, its factories and shops, its life and liberty. The di.eipline of the Red Army is gaining, but it is not a discipline of the club, hi, the discipline of Socialism, the discipline of a society of equals. The army is turning rut thousands of officers who have gone through the course of study in tie new proletarian military schools, and other thousands who have only Konc through the bard school of war itself. Our southern front is the front against the whole Anglo-French Impe rialism, against the most important opponent we have in the world. But we do not fear this opponent, for wc know that it will soon face the struggle with its "internal enemy." Three months ago it vvas said that only the half-crazy Bolsheviki could believe in the German revolution; but today wc see how in the course of a few months Germany has changed from a mighty empire to a rotten tree trunk. The force that has overthrown Germany i3 also working in England. It is only weak today, but with every step that the English and French advance in Rus sia this force will steadily rise to power and will even become more terri ble than the Spanish influenza. The seriousness of the situation must be apparent to every worker who knows what he is aiming at and he must make the masses see it, too. The mass of workers and peasants is mature enough to be allowed to know the whole truth. The danger is great, but we must, and shall overcome it, and lor this purpo»c we must develop and solidify the Red Army without halting. We must make it ten times as strong and large THE INTERNATIONAL REVOLUTION 453 as it is. Our forces must grow with every day, and this constant growth will give us the guarantee, as before, that international Socialism will be the victor. [Lenin's speech was greeted with tremendous enthusiasm, and a reso lution was passed embodying his recommendations.] Credit is due to Jacob Wittmer Hart- ntann and Andri Trldon for the bulk of the translations for this volume. WBI MIKTIM CO.. ' M(«llt •»., »"»»T0«.