i.m

.'n »

i»f>-'
Mi. \
:it.
s i4 i^
if .
'? , ;
YALE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

S H E E M A N

HIS CAMPAIGNS

A MILITARY BIOGRAPIIY.

GEN. S . M . BOWMAN, U . S . VOLS,

NEW YORK:
RICHARDSON & COMPANY.
186S.

^7

ft.

.O

Entered aoconling to Act of Conirress. in tlie year 1SG5.
By CHAltLES B. rvICTTAllDSOX.
In the Clerk's Ollice of the District Cnuit of tlie United Stfttes fur the Soiiiliein District of
New York.

c.^,

PREFACE.

This history of Sherman's army is written in the single in
terest of truth.
Usiag the authentic sources of information at our command,
we have endeavored to render full and exact justice to all, and
to perpetuate no errors that, under the circumstances, it was
possible to avoid.
It is hoped that the disadvantages usually attending the
pubKcation of a biography during the lifetime of its subject,
are to some extent neutraliz,ed, in the present instance, by the
co-operation in our task of many of those who themselves
made the history we propose to recount.
Nevertheless, and in spite of the most friendly offers of
material assistance from Lieutenant-General Geant and Ma-
jor-General Sheeman ; from the army commanders, Thomas,
HowAED^ Slocum, and Schofield ; from Major-Generals Lo
gan, Blaie, and Jeffeeson 0. Davis; brevet Major-General
Kilpateick, brevet Brigadier-General Hickenloopee, of the
staff of the lamented MoPheeson, and from very many other
officers whose names we cannot now give at length, several of
whom generously tendered free access to their reports, jour
nals, and private letter-books; the editors caimot but feel,
that, on many points of interest, their work is lacking in those
details essential to historical completeness, which time alone
can supply.

4 PEEFACE.
The events treated are, in some instances, perhaps too
recent for enlightened and impartial criticism ; in others,
respect for the Uving or for the honored dead, whose memo
ries are yet green, may have imposed reticence or silence upon
the Hps of those on whose evidence depends our knowledge of
the truth ; in still others, it will probably require the careful
collection and severe analysis, in the future, of niiaute frag
ments of evidence, to-day widely scattered, neglected, or in
accessible, ia order to refute errors now prevalent, but un
suspected. The editors believe, however, that laboring with a sincere
and constant desire to attain correctness, they have, at least,
succeeded in estabhshiug the essential outlines which the
criticism and controversy, hostile as well as friendly, they
cannot hope to escape, and the new testimony that wiU there
by be elicited, will enable them or their more favored suc
cessors to perfect and finish.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.
BEFORE THE WAR. — General Sherman's Ancesbrt and Birth. — Career
at West Point. — Service in Florida — at Mobile — in Charleston Uak-
BOR — IN Georgia— IN North Carolina— in California. — His Marriage.
SisRViCE AT St. Louis. — His Resignation. — In California. — President
OF Louisiana State Military AavDEMY.— Re-enters the Army . . o

CHAPTER II.
AN EXPERIMENT.— Battle of Bull Run.— Appointed Brigadier-General 26
CHAPTER III.
THE SECESSION JUGGLE IN KENTUCKY. — Kentucky Neutrality.— Sher
man IN Command in ICentucky — at St. Louis- at I'aduoah ... 37
CHAPTER rV.
SHILOH.— Battle of Pitsburgh Landing  47

CHAPTER V.
CORINTH.— The Battle of Corinth.— The .Evacuation.- Appointed Major-
General OF Volunteers  (

CHAPTER VI.
MEMPHIS.— Repairing Railways. — In Command at Memphis. — Organiza
tion OF Army Corps. — Preparation for tub Movement on Vicksburg 71

CHAPTER VII.
THE ATTEMPT ON VibKSBURG.— Sherman's Orders.— The Movement be
gun. —The N* v'Y co-operating. — The Attack on Chickasaw Bluffs.—
Failure of 1 he Attack. — Change op Commanders  80

CHAPTER Vni.
'ARKANSAS POST. — Sherman in Command of the Thirteenth Corps.— The
Attack on Arkansas Post.— Its Surrender  91

6 CONTENTS.

CHAPTER IX.
THE SIEGE AND FALL OP VICKSBURG. — Preparation for the Siege.—
Up the Yazoo.— Grand Gulf. — Jackson.— Vicksburg.— The Surrender 98
CHAPTER X.
THE LULL AFTER VICKSBUEG. — THE Armies at Rest. — Sherman's Cor
respondence  ^"
CHAPTER XI.
TO CHATTANOOGA. — BATTLE OF MISSIONARY RIDGE.- The March to
CHATtAKOOGA. — CHANGE OF COMMANDERS. — LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN. — MIS
SIONARY Ridge. — Rlnggold  131
CHAPTER Xn.
KNOXVILLE.— Relief.— Re-organizing.— Treatment of the Inhabitants 147
CHAPTER XIII.
THE MERIDIAN RAID.— A New Command.— Polk's Defeat.— Banks's Expe
dition to Red River. — Grant's Letter to Sherman upon his Promotion 169

CHAPTER XrV.
THE ARMY OF THE CENTRE. — Its Organization and Position. — Sketch
OF Generals Thomas and McPherson. — Organization of the Army . K

CHAPTER XV.
BEYOND THE MOUNTAINS.— Tunnel Hill.— Buzzard's-Roost Gap.— Resaca.
¦ —Rome. — Kingston.— Allatoona Pass  183
CHAPTER XVI.
ACROSS THE CHATTAHOOCHEE. — Attack on Kenesaw Mountain.— Death
OF McPherson  190
CHAPTER XVII.
ATLANTA WON. — STONEMAN's Raid on Andersonville.- Hooker relieved 204
CHAPTER XVni.
TAKING BREATH. — Removal op Citizens from Atlanta. — Hood's Letter
TO Sherman.- The Negro Question  219
CHAPTER XIX.
HOOD'S INVASION. — Sketch op General Ransom  2«

CONTENTS. 7

CHAPTER XX.
THE COLORS POINT TO THE SOUTH. — Sketches of Generals Howard,
Blair, Slocum, Kilpatrick, and Osterhaus.- Destruction of Atlanta 25(i

CHAPTER XXI.
THE LOST AEMY  273
CHAPTER XXII.
TO THE SEA. — Line OF March. — Approach to Savannah .... 279
CHAPTER XXin.
A CHRISTMAS GIFT. — ASSAULT ON Fort McAllister. — Meeting of Sher
man AND the Secretary of War. — Tilanks of the President . . 291
CHAPTER XXrV.
THE END OF HOOD.— BATTLE AT Franklin. — Victory at Nashville . 301
CHAPTER XXV.
SAVANNAH. — SHERMAN'S Orders respecting the Freedmen. — Duties of a
Conquered People , . '  314
CHAPTER XXVI.
NORTHWARD.— Sketch OF General Logan.— Capture OF Columbia . 330
CHAPTER XXVn.
THROUGH SOUTH CAROLINA.— BuRNiNO OF Columbla.— Destruction of
Cotton  S-TO
CHAPTER XXVIII.
CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENTS IN NORTH CAROLINA.-Staeting for Golj>s-
boro'. — Capture of Fort Fisher and AYilminqton  ,357
CHAPTER XXIX. s
TO GOLDSBORO'  BATTLE OF Bentonsville  387
CHAPTER XXX.
THE LAST STROKE. — Orders TO the Army.— STONEMAN's Raid . , . 378

8 CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XXXI.
dawn. — News of Lee's Surrender.- Surrender of General Johnston 388
CHAPTER XXXn.
CORRESPONDENCE DURING THE TRUCE. — Orders Ttf General Stoneman
— General Gillmore— General Wilson.— Letters to General Johnston
AND FROM him— To Admiral Dahlgren — To General Thomas . . 40S
CHAPTER XXXin.
THE REJECTED AGREEMENT. — Secretary Stanton's Nine Reasons.— The
Virginia Legislature. — President Lincoln's Policy.— The Truce. — Its
Rejection. — General Halleck's Action  ' . .417
CHAPTER XXXTV.
HOMEWARD. — The Homeward March. — Arrival at Washington. — The
Grand Review.— Sherman's Farewell to his Army  436
CHAPTER XXXV.
DIGRESSIVE.- Newspaper Correspondents. — Railways.— Disloyal News
papers. — Negro Recruiting  447
CHAPTER XXXVI.
AT HOME.— Sherman's Speeches at Lancaster — Cincinnati — St. Louis 464
CHAPTER XXXVn.
CONCLUSION  Sherman's Personal Appearance and Characteristics. —
Regard for the Disabled. — Promptness and Decision. — Religious Con
victions. —Andersonville Prisoners. — His Views on Reconstruction 475
APPENDIX.
TESTnioNY of General Sherman before the Committee on the Conduct
OF THE War relative to tjie Truce  491

portraits imtr ^ap.

POKTRAITS. — Major-Genebai. Wji. T. Sheeman — Majoe-Geneeal 0. O. HOWABD — Majob-
Gekeeal H. W. Slocom — Majok-Gexeeal Jonu a. Logan — Majok-Gekeeai, Frank P.
Blaie, Jb. — Majoe-Gexeeal John M. Schofield — Beevei Majoe-Genebal J. C. Davis
— Beevet Majoe-Geneeal J. Kilpateick.
MAPS. — THE Atlanta Campaion, and Siege of Atlanta — Feom Atlanta to the Ska —
Fbou Savannah to Goldsboeo* — Opeeations abound Hesaca.

SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.

CHAPTEE I.
BEFORE THE WAE.

WniiAM Tecumseh Sheeman was bom in Lancaster, Ohio,
on the 8th of February, 1820. The branch of the Sherman
family to which he belongs is descended from the Honorable
Samuel Sherman, of Dedham, in the County of Essex, Eng
land, who came to Massachusetts in the year 1634, in company
with his brother, the Reverend John Sherman, and their
cousin, Captain John Sherman. The two latter settled at Mil-
ford, in Connecticut, and became the iounders of useful and
influential families. Roger Sherman was a descendant of the
captain's. Samuel Sherman, after residing for a time at Weth-
ersfield, Connecticut, removed to Stamford, and finally to
Stratford, in the same State. His son, Deacon John Sherman,
went early in life to Woodbury, Connecticut, where the family
remained until the death, in 1815, of his gi'eat grandson, Tay
lor Sherman, for many years judge of one of the courts
of his native State. His widow removed, with her children,
to what is now the town of Lancaster, in Fairfield County, in
the State of Ohio. Charles Robert Sherman, the son of Tay
lor Sherman, and the father of the subject of this sketch, was
bom on the 26tli of September, 1788. He was an accomphshed
lawyer, very successful as an advocate, and from 1823 to
1829, when he died of cholera, was one of the judges of the

10 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
SuperioiT Court of the State of Ohio. On the 8th of May,
1810, he married MaryHoyt, by whom he had eleven children;
first, Charles Taylor, a prominent lawyer, formerly of Mans
field, OhiOj now of Washiugton City ; second, Mary Elizabeth ;
third^ James; fourth, Amelia; fifth, Julia; sixth, William
Tecumseh ; seventh, Parker ; eighth, John, for many years an
influential member of the House of Representatives from
Ohio, now senator from the same State ; ninth, Susan ; tenth,
Hoyt ; and eleventh, Frances.
His death left this large family in very moderate circum
stances. Shortly afterwards, being then but little past, nine
years of age, WUKam Tecumseh was adopted by the Honor
able Thomas Ewing, one of his father's most intimate friends,
as a member of his own family. Mr. Ewing sent him to
school in Lancaster until the spring of 1836, when having, as
a member of Cdngress from Ohio, the privilege of nominating
a youth from his congressional district for appointment as a
cadet at the United States MiHtary Academy at West Point,
he exercised this right by procuring the warrant for his youth
ful charge.
In June, 1836, Cadet Sherman entered the Academy, where,
with the exception of the months of Jidy and August, 1838,
which his class was permitted to spend at home on furlough, he
remained, pursuing the course of studies and military duties
then in force, until the 30th of June, 1840, when he graduated,
standing sixth in the order of general merit of his class of
forty-two members — all that were left of a hundred and forty
who had entered the institution with him. Among his class
mates were Stewart Van Yhet, George H. Thomas, Richard S.
EweU, George W. Getty, William Hays, Bushrod E. Johnson,
and Thomas Jordan.
His letters to his friends during the four important if
uneventful years of cadet Hfe, are very iuteresting, as ex
hibiting the variety and force of his thoughts, and the
energy and decision of his character, at that early age.
Through them aU runs the elastic spirit of youth, and a
manly candor and directness of speech that have never left

BEFORE THE WAR. H
him since. In one of these letters, dated February 17, 1839,
he writes : —
" Bni is very much elated at the idea of getting free of West
Point next June. He does not intend remaining in the army
more than one year, then to resign, and study latv, prob
ably. No doubt you admire his choice; but, to speak
plainly and candidly, I would rather be a blacksmith. Indeed
the nearer we come to that dreadful epoch, graduation-day,
the higher opinion I conceive of the duties and life of an officer
of the United States Axmj, and the more confirmed in the
wish of spending my life in the service of my country. Think
of that. The church bugle has just blown, and iu a moment
I must put on my sidearms and march to church, to hsten to
a two-hours' sermon, with its twenty divisions and twenty-one
subdivisions ; . . . but I beheve it is a general fact, that
what people are compelled to do they dishke." 
" As we have, then, two or three dancing-parties each week,
at which the gray bobtail is sufficient recommendation for an
introduction to any one, you can weU conceive how the cadets
have always had the reputation, and have stiU, here in the
East, of being great gallants and ladies' men. God only knows
how I will sustain that reputation 1"
Speaking of the appointment, by the War Department, of
the Board of Visitors to attend the annual examination, he
says. May 18, 1839 :—
" There is but little doubt of its being nearly as well selected
as circumstances would admit of. Party seems to have had
no influence whatever ; and, for my part, I am very glad of it.
I hope that our army, navy, or the Military Academy may
never be affected by the party rancor which has for some time
past, and does now, so materially injure other institutions."
Here is a ghmpse of his tastes and occupations : —
" The last encampment, taken all in all, I think was the most^
pleasant one I have ever spent, even to me, who did not par
ticipate ia the dances and balls given every week by the dif
ferent classes ; besides, the duties were of altogether a different
nature fi'om any of the previous ones, such as acting as officers

12 SHERMAN AJSTD HIS CAMPAiaNS.
upon guard and at artillery drills, practising at target firing
with long twenty-fours and thirty-twos, mortars, howitzers, &c.,
as also cavalry exercise, which has been introduced this year.
As to lording it over the plebs, to which you referred, I had
only one, whom I made, of course, tend to a pleb's duty, such
as bringing water, pohcing the tent, cleaning my gun and
accoutrements, and the hke, and repaid ia the usual and cheap
coin — advice ; and since we have commenced studying I make
Dcm bone (study), and explain to him the difficult parts of al
gebra and the French grammar, since he is a good one and
fine fellow ; but should he not carry himself straight, I shoultl
have him found in January and sent off, that being the usual
way in such cases, and then take his bed, table, and chair, to
pay for the Christmas spree 
" I presume you have seen the register of cadets for the last
year, and remarked that I stUl maintain a good stand in my
class ; and if it were not for that column of ' demerit' it would
be stUl better, for they are combined with the proficiency in
study to make out the standing in general merit. In fact, this
year, as well as the last, in studies alone, I have been among
the stars. ... I fear I have a difficult part to act for the
next three years, because I am almost confident that your
fatEer's wishes and intentions will clash with my incUnations.
In the first place, I tliink he wishes me to strive and graduate
in the engineer corps. This I can't do. Next, to resign, and
become a civil engineer. . . . Whilst I propose, and intend,
to go into the infantry, be stationed in the far West, out of the
reach of what is termed civilization, and there remain as long
as possiblie."
He had already imbibed from his association with Mr. Ewing
the doctrines of the Whig party, but his nature and education
compelled him to repel with indignation the trickery and shams
even of his own side. Thus, he writes, April 13, 1840, of the
approaching presidential election : —
" You, HO doubt, are not only firmly impressed, but abso
lutely certain, that General Harrison wiU be our next president.
For my part, though of course but a ' superficial observer,' I

BEFORE THE "WAR. 13
do not think there is the least hope of such a change, since
his friends have thought proper to envelop his name with log
cabins, gingerbread, hard cider, and such humbugging, the
sole object of which plainly is to deceive and mislead his ig
norant and prejudiced, though honest, fellow-citizens ; whilst
his quahfications, his honesty, his merits and services are
merely alluded to."
In the same letter is this dash of descriptive humor : —
" Sometimes it appears that war with England is mevitable ;
books are thrown in- the corner, and broadswords and foils
supply their place. Such lunging, cutting, and slashing —
enough to dispose of at least a thousand British a day ; but
the mail or recitation soon destroys the illusion with — ' It's aU
a hoax;' or, ' Sir, you've been neglecting your studies.' "
Immediately after his, graduation. Cadet Sherman was ap
pointed, in accordance with the customary recommendation of
the Academic Board, to a second lieutenancy in the Third
Regiment of^-tUlery, then commanded by Colonel William
Gatespand was assigned to Company A of that regiment.
After enjoying the usual furlough of three months granted to
cadets on graduatingT^lie was^orSered to join liis_compianyL_at
Fort Pierce, in East Florida, where he servedjuntH November,
iSHT^when the company was removed to Fort Lauderdale.
In January, 1842, he received his commission as a firstlieu-
tenant^Jn.the same regiment, dating from November 30, 1841,
and also an Qrder^from the War Departmentjransferring him
to CompanyG^tationed at Saint Augustine. This was
rapid promotion_for those days, when six or seven years were
often required for a second lieutenant to obtain the next grade.
Lieutenant Sherman was now placed in command of a small
detachment of his new company engaged in guarding the post
of Picoluta, situated on the Saint John's River, opposite the
town of Saint Augustine.
The service in Florida was not of a very inviting character.
The summep was generally passed in idleness, the heat of the
almost tropical sun and the swarms of mosquitoes rendering
active exertion nearly impossible ; and the winter was spent in

14 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
frequent incursions against the hostile Seminoles, under tho
leadership of the wily and cruel chief Sain Jones. These
expeditions, sometimes scouting on foot, sometimes penetrat
ing the everglades in boats, were always attended by severe
labors, and involved no slight degree of risk, the numbers
of our troops being small, and unceasing vigilance being
necessary to guard against an ambuscade. The climate dur
ing the long summer season was exceedingly unhealthy.
Lieutenant Sherman was, however, contented^slong as there
was ajgrospect of activity^and, fortunately, continued to en
joy good^ealtE during his entire tour of duty in this section.
From the outset, he conceived a clear and decided opinion of
the pohcy that, should govern the war against the Seminoles.
He was earnestly opposed to parleys or truces, believing that
no rehance could be placed in the promises of the Indians ;
and was strongly in favor of the energetic exertion of the
whole military power in the Territory in combined operations,
having in view the prompt and relentless extermination of aU
the Indians who should continue to cany on hostUities, and
the removal, in accordance with treaty stipulations, of those
who should sue for peace. By such a course, he considered,
and events have fully justified the opinion; that the war would
be ended in a single campaign, thousands of human lives
saved, both of whites and Indians, and peace permanently
given to the Territory. The Government should then en
deavor, he thought, to attract to the country a better class
of white settlers, organize them into small communities,
and require them to defend themselves for the future. Thus
the army could be withdrawn from Florida, with the excep
tion of small garrisons at the more important permanent
posts. Here is a view of his Hfe in quarters at Fort Pierce, written
April 10, 1841 :—
" Now that we are at peace, and our minds withdrawn from
those pleasant excursions and expeditions in which we have
been engaged for the four past months, we are thrown upon
our ingenuity to devise means of spending the time. Books

BEFORE THE WAR. 15
we have few, but it is no use, you cannot read any but the
lightest trash; and even the newspapers, which you would
suppose we would devour, require a greater effort of mind to
search than we .possess. We attribute it to the climate, and
biing up these native lazy Minorcans as examples, and are
satisfied. Yet, of course, we must do something, however
little. WeU, in this, each pursues his own fancy. The major
and I have a parcel of chickens, in which we have, by com
petition, taken enough interest to take up a few minutes of
the day ; besides, I have a httle fawn to play with, and crows,
a crane, &c. ; and if you were to enter my room you would
hesitate whether it was the abode of man or beasts. In one
corner is a hen, sitting ; in another, some crows, roosted on
bushes ; the other is a little bed of bushes for the little fawn ;
whilst in the fourth is my bucket, wash-basin, glass, &c. So
you see it is three to one."
In a subsequent letter he touches the same vein : —
" I've got more pets now than any bachelor in the country
— ^innumerable chickens, tame pigeons, white rabbits, and a
fuU-blood Indian pony — rather small matters for a man to
deal with, you doubtless think, but it is far better to spend
time in trifles such as these than drinking or gambling."
His desire for the freedom of frontier life is thus again
shown : —
" We hear that the new Secretary of War intends proposing
to the next Congress to raise two rifle regiments for the West
ern service. As you are at Washington, I presume you can
learn whether it is so or not, for I should hke to go in such a
regiment, if stationed in the far West ; not that I am the least
displeased with my present berth, but when the regiment
goes North, it wiU, in aU likelihood, be stationed in the vicinity
of some city, from which God spare me."
His indignation at any thing not perfectly straightforward,
shows itself in an energetic remonstrance to a fiiend : —
" If you have any regard for my feelings, don't say the word
'insinuation' again. You may abuse me as much as you
please, but I'd prefer, of the two, to be accused of telling a

16 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. ,
dh:ect falsehood than stating any thing ev&sively or under
hand ; and if I have ever been guilty of such a thing, it was
unintentionally." In March, 1842, his company was removed to FortMorgan,
situated on Mobile Point, at the entrance of the Bay of Mo
bile, and twenty miles from the city. Here Lieutenant Sher
man remained, performing garrison service, varied, in the
intervals of duty, by fishing, boating, and occasional, though
not frequent, visits to the city, until the following June,^ when
the^station of the companywas again changed to Fort Moul-
trie^jon^uUiyan'^^Island, Charleston Harbor. MoultrieviQe,
on Sullivan's Island, quite near theToriTwas, at that time, a
place of fashionable resort during the summer season for the
wealthy famUies of Charleston and South Carohna generally,
many of whom had temporary residences there, to which they
removed on the approach of hot weather, to escape from the
malarious influences of the city and lower country, and enjoy
the cool breezes and the sea-bathing. Officers of the army
were at that time sought after, and hospitably entertained by
nearly all of the better classes of society in the South, and
Lieutenant Sherman was thus, upon his arriva,l at Fort Moul
trie, ushered into a hfe entirely new to him. During the sum
mer he made many agreeable and some valuable acquaint
ances, which were cemented. and extended during the following
¦winter, when he, in common with the other officers, was
almost overwhelmed with invitations to accept the hospitali
ties of the citizens of Charleston, to whom they had been
attentive at the fort.
Himting was always a favorite amusement with him, and
while stationed at Fort Moultrie, he enjoyed frequent oppor
tunities of indulging this taste. Thus, with boating and
drum-fishing, were passed his leisure, hours during the first
year of his stay. In jhe fall ojL1843. he^availed Jiimself
of a four-months' leave of absence to visit his home at
~!^^casterPand while there becaine^-gngaged to Miss _Ellen
Ewing, the accomphshed da^hter jQf_his_guardian, and the
fiiend and companion of his school-days. At the expira-

BEFORE THE WAE. 17
tion of his leave, in December, 1843, he rejoined his post,
making an interesting detour down the Mississippi river to
New Orleans, and thence by way of Mobile and Savannah.
During the months of February, March, and April, 1844, he
was associated with Colonel Sylvester Churchill, on a board
of three officers, appointed by the War Department, to inves
tigate a large number of claims for horses lost by the Georgia;
and Alabama militia, in the Florida war in 1837 and 1838.
Most of these claims were supposed by the Government to' bo
fraudulent, and the members of the board were required to
hear and jpatiently sift the evidence on the spot, and after
wards report the facts and their opinions to the War Depart
ment. During the course of the investigation the board was
in session at Marietta, Georgia, at Belief onte, Alabama, and
at several other places in the central and northern sections of
those States. Their report gave great satisfaction to the De
partment, and was considered by it as the means of saving
vast sums of money to the treasury, wlule, at the same time,
awarding justice to all concerned.
AH this time the young officer was not unmindful of the
necessity of professional study and improvement. He took
care to inform himself of the topographical features of the
country in which he was stationed or through which he
travelled, as well as in regard to the occupations, character,
social organization, and sentiments of the inhabitants. The
value of geography he specially appreciated. He wrote to liis
friend, Philemon Ewing : —
" Every day I feel more and more in need of an atlas, such
as your father has at home ; and as the knowledge of ge
ography, in its minutest details, is essential to a true military
education, the idle time necessarily spent here might be prop
erly devoted to it. I wish, therefore, you would procure for
me the best geography and atlas (not school) extant."
After the adjournment of the Board, he began to turn his
attention to such legal studies as might prove useful to him in
his profession. Thus he writes, under date of June 12, 1844,
from Fort Moultrie : — 2

18 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
" Since my return, I have not been running about in the
city or the island, as heretofore, but have endeavored to
interest myself in Blackstone, which, with the assistance of
Bouvier's Dictionary, I find no difficulty in understanding. I
have read all four volumes, Starkie- on Evidence, and other
books, semi-legal and semi-historical, and would be obliged to
you if you would give me a list of such books as you were re
quired to read, not including your local or State laAV. I in
tend to read the second and thu-d volumes of Blackstone
again, also Kent's Commentaries, which seem, as far as I am
capable of judging, to be the basis of the common-law prac
tice. This course of study I have adopted, from feehng the
want of it in the duties to which I was lately assigned."
And again, on the 20tli of October : —
" I have no idea of making the law a profession, by no
means ; but, as an officer of the army, it is my duty and inter
est to be prepared for any situation that fortune or luck may
offer. It is for this alone that I prepare, and not for profes-',
sional practice."
Early in 1845, he again paid a brief visit to his home in
Ohio, to recover from the effects of Ulness. After his return
to the South, he was, for, a short time, stationed on detached
service at thearsenal at Augusta, Georgia; and, on another
occasion, was detailed as a member of a general court-martial
sitting at Wilmington, North CaroHna, where he had the pleas
ure of meeting once more with his old comrades of Company
A., Third Artillery.
O^ihe-irraftkingOTt of the Mexican war, Lieutenant-Shfir
_ man was assigned toJ:Luty as recruiting officer at Pittsburgh,
^£finns^lj:aniau___JEe_rem^ineiJ^ but httle more
than a month, when his repeated applications for active ser
vice were met' by an order from the War Department, trans
ferring him to Company F, of his regiment, then about to sail
for California, to meet Colonel Kearny's expedition across the
plains. The first intimation he received of this change was
conveyed by a letter, which reached him on the 28th of Jtme,
1846, from his friend, Lieutenant E. O. C. Ord, who was

BEFORE THE WAR. 19
attached to his new company. On tho 29th of June ho re
ceived the official orrlprH^ and on the following day, without
seeking to visit his home and friends, pausing only to make a
few hasty arrangements Avith regard to his private affairs, he
get out for New York. The company sailed from New York
about the middle of July, in the ship Lexington, and after a
voyage marked by no special incidents, touching at Rio de
Janeiro and Yalparaiso, landed at San Francisco. Contrary
to the anticipations of active service entertained at the outset,
the career of the company in Cahfornia, far away from the
theatre of war, proved uneventful. During his service there.
Lieutenant Sherman was detailed as acting assistant adjutant-
general of the forces in the Tenth Military Department, under
the command of Brigadier-General Stephen W. Kearny, after
wards under that of Colonel Richard B. Mason, First Dra
goons ; and in this capacity attracted the notice of his brother
officers by the efficiency, clearness, and administrative ability
he showed in the discharge of the responsible duties confided
to him. In 1850 he returned to the Ailantic States, and on
the Istof May, in the same year, was^jjned^jo_Miss Ellen
Ewing, at^ the residence, in Washington City, of her father,
then Secretary of the Interior under President Taylor. In
the following September he received what was, in those days,
considered one of the highest prizes the military profession
had in store for the subaltern, being appointed a commissary
of subsistence with the rank of captain. He was^ immediately
assigned to duty, as such, upon the staff of the commanding
officer of the military department of the West, and stationed
at St. Louis. In March of the following year he receive?
from the President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, a commission as captain, by brevet, to date from May
30, 1848, "for meritorious services in Cahfornia during the
war in Mexico."
On the 6th of September, 1853, Captain Sherman resigned
his commission in the army, and Hke many of his companions
at that time, sought for such advancement in civil life as the
army seemed Httle Hkely to afford. He was offered and

20 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
accepted the position of manager^ofjhfiJbranp.h banklug-hgu^e
of MessrS;_Jjaeas,Jl3]rngi^& Compag^ at San Francisco,
Cahfomia, and accordingly went a second,jtilii£J;QjheJPacific£
intending now to estabHsh his home there.
During all this time the seeds of discord had been ripening
in the hot soil of slavery. The Southern statesmen, accus
tomed to mle, began to perceive that the coimtry would not
always submit to be ruled by them ; that hostUity to slavery
was a sentiment deeply rooted in the minds of the people of
the Free States, and daily spreading its influence ; and that
the accession of men holding these opinions to power in the
national councils and the national executive, meant nothing
less than such a limitation of the further extension of slavery
as would be fatal to its existence, even where it was ah'eady
estabhshed. Slavery, they beHeved, could not thrive in con
tact with fi-eedom ; and they had come to regard slavery as
essential to their political and social existence. Without a
slave caste, they could have no aristocratic caste. No class
can enjoy exclusive rights except at the expense of another,
whose rights are cm-tailed or extinguished. They began to
isolate themselves fi-om the North, as they termed the Free
States ; from its dangerous opinions, by refusing to read or
hear them ; fi-om its society, by withdrawing their sons and
daughters fi-om Northern schools and colleges, and by declin
ing to associate with Northern men and women who were not
well kno-mi to be free fi-om the pernicious doctrines ; and finally,
they prepared to throw off their pohtical allegiance to the
Government of the United States the moment it should have
passed beyond then* control. The Northern pohticians, accus
tomed to foUow the lead of their Southern associates, gen
erally beheved that the defeat of Fremont, in 1856, as the
Eepubhcan candidate for the presidency, had insui'ed the
perpetuity of the Union ; the Southern pohticians, generally,
beHeved that the date of its dissolution was postponed during
the next presidential term, and that four years and a facile
President were given them to prepare for it. And they began.
to do so.

BEFORE THE WAR. 21
The pro-slavery leaders were weU aware that the attempted
overthrow of the National Government would be Hkely, eVen
in the disguise of peaceable secession, to be resisted by force.
They accordingly got every thing in readiness to carry out
their plans by force. The wiser heads among them hoped, if
they did not altogether expect, to be aUowed to secede in
peace, but they were as determined as the rest to appeal to
war in the last resort. Accordingly, during Mr. Buchanan's
Administration, there was set on foot throughout the slave-
holding States a movement embodying the reorganization of
the mUitia, the estabhshment and enlargement of State mHi-
tary academies, and the coUection of arms, ammunition, and
warHke materials of aU kinds. The federal Secretary of War,
Mr. Floyd, thoroughly in the interests of the pro-slavery
conspirators, aided them by sending to the arsenals in the
Slave States large quantities of the national arms and mHi-
tary suppHes ; the quotas of the Southern States under the
militia laws were anticipated, in some cases by several years ;
and he caused large sales of arms to be secretly made, at low
prices,, to the agents of those States. The pro-slavery leaders
then began, quietly, to select and gather round them the men
whom they needed, and upon whom they thought they could
rely. Unable always to explain to these men their purposes,
they were often compeUed to trust to circumstances and the
force of association to complete the work ; and in doing so,
they occasionally, though not often, made mistakes.
Among the men they fixed upon was Captain Sherman.
Recognizing his aptitude in mHitary art and scietfce, the lead
ers in Louisiana determined to place him at the head of the
new State MiHtary Academy at Alexandria. It was explained
to him that the object of estabHshing the school was to aid in
suppressing negro insurrections, to enable the State to protect
her borders from the Indian incursions, then giving trouble in
Arkansas and Texas, and to form a nucleus for defence, in case
of an attack by a foreign icnemy.
It is rare, indeed, that a man whose youth has been spent
in the army does not, in his maturer years, retain a lurking de-

22 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
su'e for the old Hfe, the old companions, the old ways. Let
the temptation be offered in a moment when the cares and de
tails of civil Hfe look more than ordinarily duU, when the future
seems clouded, and the warm memories of former days may
present a contrast too vivid for most men to resist. Cincia-
natus leaves the plough and returns with the senators to the
camp. So it was with Captain Sherman. _ Messrs. Lucas
Turner & Company had broken up their branch-house at Siiri
Francisca_ The offer was in a line with his associations, his
tastes, and his ambition. He accordingly accepted the office,
and entered upon his duties as Superintendent of the Louisiana
State MiHtary Academy, early in the year I860. The Hberal
salary of five thousand doHars a year was attached to the
office.

The efficiency which Captain Sherman here displayed con
firmed the leaders ^in that State in the correctnessof their
ghoice, and satisfied them that he was a man to be kept at any
price. They were met at the outset by a deep-seated loyalty,
by a deep-rooted attachment and fideHty to the Union, upon
which they had by no means calculated. Every effort was
expended to convert him to their way of thinking, but in vain.
Surface opinions change with the wind, but it is useless to
argue against fimdamental beHefs. And such was the charac
ter of Sherman's attachment to the Union.
As events ripened^_he_saw_clearly that__the election of Mr.
jjincoln_to__the presidenc)r.^would be_jollowed~T5y~lire general
secaagipn of_Uie_ Southern^ States. and_Jhat secession meant
MM^ 'WTien, at length, after using hisinfluence to itsluIIesF
extent in favor of the Union, he perceived that the result could
no longer be avoided, he decided upon his own course, and
communicated his decision to the Governor of the State in
this clear and straightforward letter, dated January 18, 1861 :
" SiE— As I occupy a gwasi-nuHtary position under this State,
I deem it proper to acquaint you that I accepted such position
when Louisiana was a State in the Union, and Avhen the motto
of the seminary, inserted in marble over the main door, was :

BEFORE THE WAR. 23
' By tlie liberality of the General Government of the United States :
The Union — JEsto Ferpetua.'
" Recent events foreshadow a great change, and it becomes
aU men to choose. If Louisiana withdraws from the Federal
Union, I prefer to maintain my aUegiance to the old Constitu
tion as long_as_a^agment of it survives, and my longer stay
hero would be WTong in every sense of the word. In that
event, I beg you wiU send or appoint some authorized agent
lo take charge of the arms and munitions of war here belong
ing to the State, or direct me what disposition should be made
of them.
" And furthermore, as President of the Board of Supervisors,
I beg you to take immediate steps to reheve me as superin
tendent the moment the State determines to secede ; for on no
earthly account wiU I do any act, or think any thought, hostile
to or in defiance of the old Government of the United States."
*, His resignation was, of course, promptly accepted^ and he
at once returned to St. Louis. In consequence of the uncer
tain aspect of pohtical affairs, he had deemed it most prudent
that his family should not accompany him to the South.
He was not destined to remain long inactive. The crisis for
which the pro-slavery leaders had been so long preparing was
precipitated by the rashhess of the more incautious among
themselves, and hurried forward by the frenzy of the people.
The far-sighted conspkators had proposed to themselves to
capture Washington before the North should be able to organ
ize resistance, and to proclaim themselves the true and lawfid
Government of the United States. They would have declared
Mr. Lincoln's election, with the avowed purpose, among others,
of disregarding what they considered as then.- constitutional
right of holding slaves in the Territories, as unconstitutional, and
therefore nuU, and would have based their assumption of power
on the right of self-preservation. From their knowledge of the
disposition of most of the foreign ministers resident at the Fed
eral capital, they expected their recogiution by the leading
European powers to foUow closely upon the act. They counted

24 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
upon thetrade-lovingandthepeace-loving instincts of thepeople
of the Free States to keep the North inert. The great Central
and Westem States would probably be with them, and New
England they would gladly leave, as they were accustomed to
say, " out in the cold." But while the cool-headed conspira
tors plotted thus sldlfuUy, one element of their calculation
failed. It had been necessary to their plans to fire the Southei^
heart to the pomt of rebeUion : the Southern brain took fire
as weU. Events took the bit in their teeth. On the 12th of
April, 1861, Mr. Davis gave the order to open upon Fort Sum
ter. At noon the first gun was fired, and the war was begim.
Sherman had gone to Washington about the time of Mr. Lin
coln's inauguration, and had talked of the state of affairs with
characteristic freedom. He beHeved that war was inevitable ;
that it would be no pantomime of wooden swords, but a long
and bitter struggle. He endeavored in vain, in earnest
nervous language, to impress his convictions upon the Ad
ministration. Nobody Hstened to him except the President,
who Hstened to everybody. Sherman went to him to offer his
services in any capacity. His strong words and strong
thoughts elicited a smHe from Mr. Lincoln.' "We'|shall not
need many men Hke you," he said ; " the affair -mR soon blow
over." Some of Sherman's friends in the army, who knew his
talents, and, Hke him, beHeved there would be a war, urged
his appointment to the chief clerkship of the War Department,
a position which at that time was always held by a confiden
tial adviser of the Secretary of War ; and somewhat later he
was strongly recommended for the position of quartermaster-
general of the army, made vacant by the resignation of Briga
dier-General Joseph E. Johnston. Neither appHcation was
successful. Sherman knew the Southern people ; the Administration
did not, nor did the people of the North in general. In his
own words, we were sleeping upon a volcano.
On the 15th of AprU, 1861, the President caUed for seventy-
five thousand men to serve for three months, to be employed
for the purpose of enforcing the laws of the United States, and

BEFORE THE WAR. 25
to hold and occupy the forts, arsenals, navy-yards, and other
pubHo places belonging to the National Government which
had been seized by the rebels. Sherman was urged by his
fiiends to go home to Oliid, and raise one of the three months'
regiments. He declined to have any thing to do with such a
trifling expedient, as lie considered it. He did not beheve
that the three months' men would do any good, or that they
could do any good. This affair was no riot, but a revolution.
It was not a mob, to be put down by the posse comitatus, but a
war, to be fought by an army. " Why," he said, " you might
as well attempt to put out the flames of a burning house with
a squirt-gun." He used aH the influence at his command to induce the
authorities to recognize his view of the case, and, by at once
organizing the whole mUitary force of the country, to crush
the rebeUion in its infancy. But the authorities stiU beHeved
there would be no fight, that the rebelhon would succumb at
the sight of the power of the Union.
When the Government presently decided to add a regiment
of artiUery, one of cavalry, and nine of infantry to the regular
army, Sherman at once appHed for a command in this force,
and, on the 13th of June, received a commission as colonel of
the Thirteenth Regiment of Infantry, to date from May I4th.
A.S very little was done, just then, in regard to the organization
of the new regiments, beyond the appointment of officers and
a Httle feeble recruiting, Colonel Sherman's services were, like
those of most of the newly-appointed officers who were known
to possess military sldH, made use of in another direction.
Richmond had been made the capital of the Confederate
States. A force was coUected to move on that city, capture
it, and so suppress the rebelhon at a blow. Major Irvin
McDoweU, assistant adjutant-general on the staff of Lieuten
ant-General Scott, had been appointed a brigadier-general in
the regular army, and was assigned to the command of these
troops. Colonel Sherman was ordered to report to him, and
received the command of a brigade in the division of Brigadier-
General Daniel Tyler.

2(J SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS

. CHAPTER IL

AN EXPEEIMENT.

The troops which were to move "on to Richmond," in
accordance with the popular cry, were encamped in some sort
of order on the south bank of the Potomac, from the Chain
Bridge to Alexandria, and were thrown together, with more or
less haste, into what were caUed five divisions, of two, three,'
or four brigades each. Brigadier-General Daniel Tyler, of
the Connecticut Volunteers, commanded the 'Fu'st Division,
Colonels David Hunter, Sixth Cavalry, Samuel P. Heintzel-
man, Seventeenth Infantry, and Dixon S. Miles, Second In
fantry, the Second, Third, and Fifth, respectively, and Briga
dier-General Theodore Runyon, of the New Jersey mihtia, the
Fourth Division. Three of these were old and experienced
officers of the regular army, who had seen service in Mexico
and in many Indian fights. Brigadier-General Robert C.
Schenck commanded the FHst Brigade of Tyler's division;
Colonel Erasmus D. Keyes, Eleventh Infantry, the Second;
Colonel Sherman the Third Brigade, composed of the Thir
teenth, Sixty-ninth, and Seventy-ninth New York, and Second
Wisconsin regiments of infantry, with Captain Ayres's Battery
E, Thu'd Regular ArtiUery ; and Brigadier-General Israel B.
Richardson commanded the Fourth Brigade. The troops
were aU raw. Most of them had volunteered for three months.
As the end of that period approached, these men naturaUy
thought more of home than they did of battle, more of living
to see their friends than of dying for their country. Many of
the volunteers had never fired a gun before, and felt nearly as
much trepidation in loading their own pieces, and as much

AN EXPERIMENT. 27
alarm in discharging them, as the most deadly fire of the ene
my could have occasioned. Captains knew Httle or nothing
of tactics beyond the manual of arms and the facings. Colonels
could not put their regiments through the simplest manoeuvres.
Regimental commanders did not know their brigade command
ers, and brigade commanders made the acquaintance of their
division commanders upon the field of battle. According to
the ideas of those days, there was a deficiency of transporta
tion ; that is to say, each regiment had not a score of wagons :
xnd the quartermasters in Washington were at their wits'
end to supply the demand. Wagons intended for General
McDoweU's army went to General Patterson's, and General
McDoweU's armymust therefore wait. The District of Columbia
was embraced in a separate miHtary department, caUed the
Department of Washington. Its commander was overwhelmed
by office detaUs ; so the troops which were to go to the Army
of Northeastern Virginia got mislaid, and had to be hunted
up and hurried into brigades at the fifty-ninth minute of the
eleventh hour. Every thing that was done was rushed into
the newspapers, and most things that were intended to be
done. The raiboad Hues leading SoutB, with only sHght
breaks, were stUl in use, and passes over them were freely
issued, so that the rebel authorities might read the plan of to
day's operations at breakfast. But the people, drunk with
hope, saw none of these things, or saw them double ; and
those who might have led the people, ran after them.
It may be said, in defence of the delusions of the hour, that
our army was numericaUy stronger, as well officered, better
equipped, and as weU instructed as the rebel forces ; and so
indeed it was. But the rebel army was to act upon the defen
sive, ours upon the offensive. The advantage of ground would
be with the enemy, the advantage of sui'prise, and the great
advantage of cohesion at the moment of attack. On the other
hand, our troops would have to move, to find the enemy, and
to attack him in his chosen position, or sustain his fire de-
Hvered from behind cover or behind earthworks. But the
salient point of this question is, that the result of any move-

28 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
ment, by either side, was left to chance ; no man could have
indicated the causes which would determine the result. It
was purely chance whether any movement ordered from head
quarters would be made at aU; a rare chance whether it
would be made at the time designated in orders ; a miracu
lous chance if it were made exactly as ordered. By waiting a
very Httle while, the result might have been reasonably
assured. We could not wait. In the American character,
Hope crowds Patience to the waU.
After much pubhc discussion and excitement, the order was
given to General McDoweU to move forward.
The enemy had a force of about twenty-two thousand men,
organized in eight brigades, with twenty-nine guns, encamped
and intrenched at Manassas Junction, and commanded by
General Gustave T. Beauregard. They had outposts at Fair
fax Courthouse, and at Oentreville, seven mUes from the Junc
tion. The brigades were commanded by Brigadier-Generals
EweU, Holmes, D. R. Jones, Longstreet, and Bonham, and
Colonels Cocke, Evans, and Early.
General Joseph E. Johnston was at Winchester, with about
twelve thousand m'en, watching our forces under Major-Gen
eral Robert Patterson, one of the Pennsylvania three months'
mUitia. Generals Bee and Bartow and Colonel Jackson com
manded the brigades of General Johnston's army. General
Patterson's force amounted to twenty-three thousand men of
aU arms, chiefly three months' mihtia.
General McDoweU was to move directly upon Manassas on
the 9th of July, and, turning the enemy's right flank, cut off
lus forces from Richmond. The movement began on tho 16th,
The men, unaccustomed to marching, moved very slowly.
Long years of peace had nourished in the minds of our citizens
a reluctance to endure pain and privation, and the citizens had
not become soldiers by a mere change of clothing. The men
stopped every few moments to pick blackberries, stepped
aside to avoid mud-puddles, crossed fords gingerly, emptied
their canteens and fiUed them with fresh water whenever they
came to a stream. Thus the army did not reach Centreville

AN EXPERIMENT. 29
untU the night of the 18th. Two days were spent here in re-
connoissances, and on the 21st the final movement began. AU
this time the enemy, fuUy advised of our movements by the
daUy papers, was busily engaged in concentrating his avail
able forces to meet our attack. That he would do so was
obvious. General Scott had undertaken to guard against this,
so far as the army under Johnston was concerned, by instruct
ing General Patterson to observe him. Accordingly, after
many delays, General Patterson moved from Martinsburg to
Bunker HiU, nine miles from Winchester, and then turned
aside and marched to Charlestown. At the very moment
when Johnston was withdrawing with aU speed from Winches
ter, and hurrying to Beauregard's aid, Patterson was retreat
ing to the Potomac.
Tyler's division, which had marched from its camp near the
Chain Bridge, on the extreme right of our lines, by the Vienna
Road, was the first to reach CentrevUle. General Tyler's
orders were to seize and hold this position, but not to bring on
an engagement. He had no sooner arrived there than, elated
at fincHng our progress undisputed by the enemy, he took the
road to the left and pushed on, with Richardson's brigade,
Ayres's battery, and a few cavalry, to Blackburn's Ford, where
the Manassas and Centreville road crosses BuU Run. The
ground on the left bank of that stream is, just here, open and
gently undulating; on the other side it becomes at once
heavily wooded, and ascends rather abruptly to the elevated
plateau on which Manassas Junction is situated. General
Tyler was surprised to find that the enemy had not occupied
the left bank at the ford ; and stiU more, that they permitted
our men to approach it unmolested. Nor was the enemy to
be seen on the opposite bank. He deployed the infantry, and
caused Captain Ayres to open fire from his battery on the
woods opposite. Instantly a hot fire, as if from four thousand
inuskets at once, says the general, was opened from the woods.
Our troops repHed for a short VhUe, and then retired. This
movement was contrary to orders ; had no object worth mention
ing ; and its result had a most dispiriting effect upon the whole

30 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
army of General McDoweU. Before it, the men had been aU en
thusiasm. They either would not meet the enemy at aU, they
dreamed, or they would whip him and chase him to Richmond,
The enemy had been met, had not fled at the sight of us, and
had not been whipped. The enthusiasm, which had been at the
boihng point, was chUled by a doubt. The delay of the 19th
and 20th, whUe waitmg for the subsistence to come up, spread
and increased the flatness.
The origmal plan was to turn the enemy's right, and so cut
off his communication with Richmond. General McDowell
had objected to moving by his right to turn the enemy's left,
because the movement would be indecisive. At the eleventh
hour, this iudecisive course was adopted, for the reasons that
the roads on the left appeared impracticable, that the enemy's
attention had been attracted to Blackburn's Ford by the
blunder of the ISth, and that it had now become an object to
guard against the expected arrival of Johnston, by occupying
his line of raUway communication.
On the night of Saturday, the 20th of July, General Mc
DoweU issued his orders for the attack. Runyon's Fourth
Division was left in the rear near Fairfax Courthouse. Tyler's
division — except Richardson's brigade, which was to remain
at Blackburn's Ford and report to Colonel Miles — ^was to
march at half-past two o'clock on Sunday morning down the
Warrenton road, and threaten the Stone Bridge. Schenck's
and Sherman's brigades were encamped on the WarrentoB
road, about a mUe beyond CentrevUle; Keyes's brigade,
which had become separated from the rest of the division, had
gone into camp half a nule east of CentrevUle. Hunter's
division, which was about a mUe and a half beyond Keyes's,
was to move at two o'clock, and close up on Tyler. Heuitzel-
man's division, which was encamped on the Braddock road,
two mUes east of CentreviUe, was to march at half-past two,
and faU in in the rear of Hunter. Under cover of Tyler's
attack. Hunter and HeintzeLman were to move to the right,
cross BuU Run at Sudley's Springs, and turn the enemy's left.
MUes's division was held in reserve at CentrevUle, to guard

AN EXPERIMENT. 31
against a movement of the enemy by Blackburn's Ford, to cut
off our rear.
These dispositions, except as to Runyon's division, were
weU made. Had they been executed, the result of tho day
must haA'e been very different.
At a blacksmith's shop, about a mUe in advance of Tyler's
position, a branch road leads from the Warrenton pike towards
Sudley's Springs. If Tyler had marched boldly forward, the
rear of his division should have cleared that point in an hour,
or, at the very latest, in an hour and a half. This would have
enabled Hunter to file to the right certainly by four o'clock.
In fact, the rear of Tyler's cHvision did not pass the junction
of the roads untU half-past five, or fuUy an hour and a half
later than it should have done. Schenck's brigade, which led
the advance, started punctuaUy at the time fixed in orders,
but, as General Tyler himself explains, he felt caUed upon to
move slowly and with caution, feehng his way down to the
Stone Bridge. Thus occurred a fatal delay.
The head of Schenck's brigade reached the Stone Bridge
about six o'clock, and the artiUery of his and Sherman's
brigades opened fire about half an hour later. Hunter's di
vision could not find the road by which it was to march, and
having been led by its guide by a mde detour through the
woods, cHd not reach the ford untU between half-past nine and
ten o'clock, and occupied more than an hour in passing, so
that it was after eleven o'clock before HeintzeLman began to
cross. The head of Hunter's column became engaged almost
immediately after crossing BuU Run, and drove the enemy
steadily untU about noon. T\Tiile Hunter was crossing, orders
were sent to Tyler to press his attack. Colonel Sherman, with
his brigade, accordingly crossed Bidl Run at a ford just above
the Stone Bridge, and pushed forward down the Warrenton
road untU he joined the left of Burnside's brigade of Hunter's
division, then hotly engaged; Ayres's battery, being unable
to cross the ford, was left behind. Sherman came into action
about half-past twelve, and was at once ordered by General
McDoweU to join in the pursuit of the enemy, then. faUing

32 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS."
back on the left of the Groveton road. Placing Colonel
Quimby's Thirteenth New York regiment in front, in column
by division, Colonel Sherman ordered the other regiments to
foUow in line of battle, in the order of the Second Wisconsin,
Seventy-ninth New York, and Sixty-ninth New York.
Thus far the tide of success had been unbroken. Our troops
had effected the passage of BuU Rim, had driven the enemy
before them in confusion a mUe and a half, and we had sue
ceeded in uniting three divisions under the crest of the hill,
which was to be the decisive point of the battle. On the left
Keyes was driving back the enemy, enabHng, Schenck to cross
and remove the obstructions in his fi-ont, and to turn the
enemy's right. The crisis was at hand.
In his official report. Colonel Sherman thus graphicaUy de
scribes the operations of his brigade at this time : " Quimby's
regiment advanced steadily down the hill and up the ridge,
from which he opened fire upon the enemy, who had made an
other stand on ground very favorable to him ; and the regiment
continued advancing as the enemy gave way, till the head of
the column reached the point near which Eicketts's battery
was so severely cut up. The other regiments descended the
hiU in Hne of battle, under a severe cannonading; and the
ground affording comparlative shelter against the enemy's ar-
tUlery, they changed direction by the right flank and followed
the road before mentioned. At the point where this road
crossed the bridge to our left the ground was swept by a most
severe fire by artiUery, rifle, and musketry, and we saw in suc
cession several regiments driven from it, among them the
Zouaves and battaUon of Marines. Before reaching the crest
of the liiU the roadway was wom deep enough to afford shelter,
and I kept the several regiments in it as long as possible ; but
when the Wisconsin Second was abreast of the enemy, by
order of Major Wadsworth, of General McDoweU's staff, I
ordered it to leave the roadway by the left flank and to attack
the enemy. This regiment ascended to the brow of the hiU
steadUy, received the severe fire of the enemy, returned it with
spirit, and advanced, dehvering its fije. This regiment is uni-

AN EXPERIMENT. 33
formed in gray cloth, almost identical with that of the great
bulk of the secession army, and when the regiment fled in
confusion, and retreated towards the road, there was a uni
versal cry that they were being fired upon by our own men.
The regiment rallied again, passed the brow of the hill a
second time, and was again repulsed in disorder. By this
time the New York Seventy-ninth had closed up, and, in like
manner, it was ordered to cross the brow of the hill and drive
the enemy from cover. It was impossible to get a good view
of the ground. In it there was one battery of artillery, which
poured an incessant fire upon our advancing column, and the
ground was irregular, with small clusters of pines, affording
shelter, of which the enemy took good advantage. The fire
of rifles and musketry was very severe. The Seventy-ninth,
headed by its colonel (Cameron), charged across the hiU, and,
for a short time, the contest was severe. They rallied sever
al times under fire, but finally broke, and gained the cover of
the hill. This left the field open to the New York Sixty-
ninth, Colonel Corcoran, who, in his turn, led his regiment
over the crest, and had a full, open view of the ground so
severely contested. The firing was very severe, and the
roar of cannon, musketry, and rifles incessant. It was mani
fest the enemy was here in great force, far superior to us at
that point. The Sixty-ninth held the ground for some time,
but finally fell back in disorder."
It was now half-past three o'clock in the afternoon. The
men had been up since two in the morning, had been on their
legs ever since, had been engaged for four hours, and had
'eaten nothing. The day was intensely hot. The troops, un
used to any of these things, were fagged.
There was a slight luU on the extreme right. Porter's
brigade of Hunter's division, and Griffin's and Eicketts's
batteries, were sent forward to occupy the crest of the hill,
from which the enemy had been pushed. Hardly had they
reached the position, when a murderotis volley was poured
intothem, at pistol range, from the clump of pines that skirted
the hiU. Early's brigade, of Johnston's army, had arrived,
3

34 SHERilAN AND HIS CAJIPAIGNS.
and thrown itself on our right flank. Our Hne began to melt.
The movement was taken up reluctantly by some regiments,
but soon became general. The retreat became confused, and,
beyond BuU Run, the confusion became a rout. The enemy
did not pursue. That night, whUe a councU of war was dis
cussing the expediency of holding CentreviUe, the sea of panic-
stricken fugitives was making for Washington. Orders were
issued for the coherent remains of the army to foUow.
I Colonel Sherman says, of his OAvn command : " This retreat
was by night, and disorderly in the extreme. The men of
^different regiments mingled together, and some reached the
pver at Arlington, some at Long Bridge, and the greater part
returned to their former camps at or near Fort Corcoran. I
reached this point at noon next day, and found a misceUaneous
crowd crossing over the aqueduct and ferries. Conceiving
this to be demoralizing, I at once commanded the guard to be
increased, and aU persons attempting to pass over to be
stopped. This soon produced its effect. Men sought their
proper companies, comparative order was restored, and aU are
now (July 25) posted to the best advantage."
The loss in Sherman's brigade was one hundred and eleven
kiUed, two hundred and five wounded, two hundred and ninety-
three missing ; total, six hundred and nine. Our total loss in
this engagement, exclusive of missing, was four hundred and
eighty-one kUled, one thousand and eleven wounded. The
loss in kUled and wounded in Sherman's brigade was nearly a
fourth of that of the entire army. The enemy lost, in aU, three
hundred and seventy-eight kUled, fourteen himdred and eighty-
nine wounded, and tMrty missing. His loss in kUled and
wounded was considerably greater than ours, but he picked
up many prisoners from among the wounded and the lagging
stragglers. The prime causes which led to this disgraceful defeat are to
be sought in the many delays attending the commencement
and execution of the movement, in consequence of which our
forces had to contend with the combined forces of Beauregard
and Johnston.

AN EXPERIMENT 35
The panic which foUowed the defeat inust be traced to
internal defects ; to the utter absence of coherence or cohesion
in the masses of mUitia ; to the want of confidence of men in
their officers, of officers in themselves and in their men ; to the
sudden apparition of a new and undefined terror in place of the
confidently expected triumph. The mass easUy became a jum
bled crowd of individuals, because it had never been an army.
As to the general plan of campaign, it was certainly a fatal
mistake that our army clung to the banks of the Potomac a
long month after it should boldly have seized upon CentreviUe
and Manassas ; and equaUy so, that a force of nearly eighty
thousand should have been wasted by breaking it up into
three fractions, destined to stand stUl on exterior Hnes, watch
ing the enemy concentrate on the key-point.
But the mortifying and humiliating disaster was necessary,
by crushing the sheU at once, to show us in a moment our
weakness and utter want of soHdity. Disguised untU the
rebeUion had developed and estabhshed its strength, the dis
ease would have been incurable. Laid bare at a stroke, the
reaction set in at once, and the Hfe of the nation was saved.
Trust in every thing and everybody aroimd the capital was
for the moment destroyed. Major-General George B. Mc-
CleUan, who had been successful in his operations in Westem
Virginia, an accomphshed officer, weU known in the army, and
possessing the confidence of the Heutenant-general, was at
once summoned to Washington, and assigned to the command
of aU the troops for its defence. At the end of July, he found
a few scattered regiments cowering upon the banks of the
Potomac. The mUitia went home. The North rose. Four
months later, the Army of the Potomac counted two hundred
thousand soldiers ready for their work.
The sharpness with which Colonel Sherman criticised the
conduct of some of the officers and men of his brigade, at BuU
Run, both in his official report and in his free conversations,
made him many enemies ; but the vigor he had displayed on
the field, added to the influence of his brother, the Honorable
John Sherman, led the Ohio delegation in Congress to recom-

36 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
mend his promotion. He was commissioned as a Brigadier-
General of Volunteers on the 3d of August, 1861, to date back
to the 17th of May, as was the custom at that time. For a
short time after this he had command of a brigade in the Army
of the Potomac, but early in September, upon the organization
of the Department of Kentucky, he was transferred to that
theatre of operations, and ordered to report, as second in
command, to Brigadier-General Eobert Anderson, who was
placed at the head of the department.

THE SECESSION JUGGLE IN KENTUCKF. 37

CHAPTEE m.
THE SECESSION JUGGLE IN KENTUCKY.
The legerdemain by which the extreme Southern States were
juggled out of the Union to feed the ambition of their leaders,
had proved eminently successful. A Confederate dictionary
had been made, in which slavery was caUed " the South ;" re
beUion, " secession ;" the execution of the laws, " coercion ;"
and the desires of the conspirators, "the Constitution." A
Confederate logic had been constructed, in which a system of
postulates was substituted for the old-fashioned syUogism, and
every thing taken for granted which it was impossible to prove.
Only let it be granted that where thirteen or more parties have
entered into an agreement with each other, any one of them
can rightfuUy withdraw from the arrangement whenever he
chooses, without the consent of the others, and you can prove
any thing. A man whose mind is so organized that he can
beheve that, can beheve any thing. And the Southern people
were carefuUy taught to beheve it.
It foUowed, of course, that whUe those States which chose
to " secede" coiUd not rightfuUy be " coerced" to remain in the
Union, those States which chose to stay must be forced to
secede. Unexpectedly, Kentucky chose to stay. Then the inventors
of the Confederate dictionary and the Confederate logic put
their heads together and hatched a new He. They caUed it
Neutrahty. It meant that Kentucky was to be neutral untU the rebeUion
should become strong enough to swaUow her at a mouthful.
She was to arm herseU to resist invasion from the South or

38 SHERMAN AND HIS CAilPAIGNS.
from the North. The governor, Beriah Magoffin, a secessionist,
organized the State mUitia in the interest of his faction, and
issued a proclamation declaring' that Kentucky would remain
neutral. A few prominent gentlemen, stUl retaining an at
tachment for the Union, suffered themselves to be luUed to
rest by the tranquU sound of the new word. Their names had
great weight at Washington. The unconditional Union men
were few in numbers and weak in influence. The Govern
ment could not make up its mind what to do. The secessionist!?
prepared for war.
Governor Magoffin caUed a special meeting of the Legisla
ture, and urged that body to assemble a State Convention to
consider the crisis. The Legislature met on the 28th of April.
Two days afterwards the governor issued a proclamation de
claring in effect that Kentucky would assume a position of
beUigerent neutrahty, and woiUd defend herself against in
vasion from any quarter. On the 22d of May, the Legislature
resolved that the governor's proclamation of neutrahty was not
a true exponent of the views of the people. The State Mihtia
law was so amended as to require the State Guard to take the
oath of aUegiance to the United States. On the 24th of May,
the last day of the session, the Senate passed resolutions de
claring that " Kentucky wiU not sever connection from the
National Government, nor take up arms for either beUigerent
party, but arm herself for the preservation of peace within
her borders, and tender their services as mediators to effect a
just and honorable peace." The resolutions were lost in tho
House by a vote of forty-nine to forty-three. The secession
ists began to be seriously alarmed. Their fears were not
diminished when the result of the election for members of Con
gress, held on the 1st of July, showed a majority for the Union
candidates of more than fifty-five thousand.
The Legislature met again on the 3d of September. In the
mean time, the Government had authorized LoveU H. Eousseau
to raise a brigade in Kentucky for the United States service,
and the Confederate troops, under Polk, had just invaded the
«tate and occupied Hickman and Chalk Bluffs. General Grant.

¦iHE SECESSION JUGGLE IN KENTUCKY. 39
who had been watching the progress of affau's, immediately
took the responsibUity of occupying Paducah. The seces
sionists, headed by the governor, loudly demanded that both
beUigerents should withdraw their forces. They hoped to
frighten the Government of the United States into compHance,
whUe the rebel authorities, being under no obligation to Hsten
to them, should absorb the State. On the 11th, the Legisla
ture, by a vote of 71 to 26, requested the Governor to order
the Confederate troops to evacuate the State. A series of
test resolves was at once introduced, declaring that the neu
trahty of Kentucky and the rights of her people had been in
vaded by the so-caUed Southern Confederate forces, requesting
the governor to caU out the mUitary force of the State to expel
the invaders, and invoking the assistance of the United States
to that end. In the Assembly, the vote stood sixty-eight to
twenty-six. On the 13th, the governor vetoed the resolutions.
The Legislature promptly repassed them over his veto, by
more than a two-thirds vote.
The Confederate tactics changed at once. The men who
had declared they must go with their State found they were
under no obligation to stay with then- State. The men who
had protested that it was a crime to coerce a State to remain
in the Union, discovered that it was their sacred duty to coerce
Kentucky to leave the Union. Buckner and Breckinridge fled,
and at once took commands as general officers in the Con
federate service. They were foUowed by their fellow-conspira
tors, and by aU whom theu' arguments or promises had se
duced. On the 17th of September, Buckner seized a railway-train,
and moved from Bowling Green upon LouisviUe. An accident
to the train delayed him within forty mUes of the city, and by
the time he was ready to move again, Eousseau's brigade and
a battahon of Home-guards was ready to oppose him ; so Hp
abandoned the attempt.
In compHance with the caU of the Legislatm-e, and by order
of the President, Brigadier-General Eobert Anderson assumed
command of the MUitary Department of Kentucky on the 21ht

40 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
September, and immediately made preparations for organizing
the fuU quota of troops which the State had been caUed upon
to furnish for the national service. The invasion of the State
by the Confederate troops had torn the mask from the designs
of thfe secessionists, and it was no longer possible to favor
them openly. A strong pressure was, however, stUl exerted,
in more or less secrecy, to keep men out of the Union army, to
encourage their enhstment in the Confederate army, and to
obstruct the operations of the Union authorities. The young
men had nearly aU been seduced into the rebel service, at first
by the cry that they must fight for their State, and next by
the cry that they must fight for slavery, under the name of
" the South," against then' State. Eecruiting for the Union
army went on very slowly, and meanwhile, at Bowling Green
and NashvUle, Polk and ZoUicoffer were gathering large bodies
of rebel troops to invade and hold Kentucky.
Brigadier-General Anderson, finding his health, akeady deh-
cate, unequal to the demands made upon his strength by the
cares and responsibUities of his position under these trying
circumstances, asked the War Department to reheve him from
command. His request was compHed with, and on the 7th of
October he was reheved by Brigadier-General Sherman, then
in command of a brigade at Lexington.
General Sherman at once set to work with gi-eat energy to
organize his department, and prepare the troops for the task
before them.
The quota of volunteers which Kentucky was caUed upon
to raise was forty thousand, and with these General Sherman
was expected by the War Department to defend the State and
drive the enemy from her soU. They were raised very slowly,
and but few reinforcements came from any quarter. At the
close of October, Sherman had succeeded in coUecting and or
ganizing a force of nine thousand men at Lexington, and ten
thousand in fi-ont of LouisvUle. The enemy had at the same
time about fifteen thousand at BowHng Green, under Buckner,
and a strong force at Cumberland Gap, under ZoUicoffer.
BowHng Green is the key to the mUitary possession of Cen-

THE SECESSION JUGGLE IN KENTUCKY. 41
tral Kentucky, and Cumberland Gap to that of Eastern
Kentucky. General McCleUan, who succeeded to the chief command of
the army on the 1st of November, immediately adopted a
general plan of campaign, in which the operations in the De
partment of the Cumberland were subordinate to and formed
a co-operative part of those of the principal army on the Po
tomac ; but the people, the press, and the Administration had
become impatient of the general inactivity of om- forces, and
were clamoring for then- advance. On the 16th of October,
the Secretary of War, Mr. Cameron, accompanied by Briga
dier-General Lorenzo Thomas, Adjutant-General of the Army,
visited General Sherman at LouisvUle, for the purpose of as
certaining, in a personal interview, the precise condition and
prospect of affau's in tliis quarter. Sherman shared the objec
tions entertained by Lieutenant-General Scott, and nov.' by
Major-General McCleUan, to what the former termed " a little
war," and beHeved, with them, with aU the ardor of his tem
perament, in the necessity of concentrated and decisive move
ments by armies large enough not merely to undertake a suc
cessful advance, but to finish the war. He did not, however,
as General McCleUan seems to have done, overlook the im
portance of schooling his troops by minor operations, and
keeping up theu- spuits by minor successes ; but he looked
further ahead than was agreeable in a subordinate commander.
Short views, generaUy the happiest, are often the wisest ; but
it is not always possible for a man of powerfiU nervous organ
ization, and strong perceptions of cause and effect, to take
short views. He frequently sees the future too clearly to con
template the present with calmness. So it was now with Sher
man. The secretary of war asked him how many troops he would
require in his department. Sherman repHed, " Sixty thousand
to drive the enemy out of Kentucky ; two hundred thousand
to finish the war in this section." Convinced of the inutUity
of advancing against the enemy imtU our strength would ren
der success decisive as weU as reasonably certain, whUe defeat

42 SHERiL^N AXD HIS CATNIP AIGXS.
would not be irreparable, and aware of the ease with which
the enemy, di-iven out of Kentucky, could concentrate and
recuperate in Tennessee, and caUing to his aid the vast re-
'jcrves then at his command, would finaUy compel us hastUy to
summon to the field at the eleventh hour, and concentrate upon
an advanced and exposed position, a much larger force than
would ];iave been required in the first instance ; perceiving these
things clearly and sharply, he could not sympathize with, or
even comprehend the spirit of his superiors, who were aU fof
present success, and for trusting to-morrow entHely to the fu
ture. On the other hand, the secretary of war and the adjutant-
general could not understand Sherman, nor see the utiHty of a
delay which they regarded as merely temporizing. Looking
only at the force of the enemy then actuaUy in arms in Sher
man's immediate front, they considered that he vastly over
estimated the obstacles with which he woiUd have to contend.
Calculations of difficulties generaUy seem to earnest men, not
thoroughly famihar with the subject-matter, to spring from
timidity or want of zeal. In a few days the report of the
adjutant-general, embracing fuU particulars of the condi
tion of aU the Westem armies, as shown by this inspection,
was given to the pubhc in aU the newspapers. In referring to
General Sherman, General Thomas simply stated that he had
said he would require two hundred thousand men. Great ex
citement and indignation was occasioned in the popular mind
by this announcement. A writer for one of the newspapers
declared that Sherman was crazy. Insanity is hard to prove ;
harder stUl to disprove, especiaUy when the suspicion rests
upon a difference of opinion ; and then the infirmities of great
minds are always fascinating to common minds. The pubhc
seized with avidity upon the anonymous insinuation, and ac
cepted it as an established conclusion.
On the 12th of November, Brigadier-General Don Carlos
BueU was ordered by Major-General McCleUan to reheve
Brigadier-General Sherman from the command of the Depart
ment of the Cumberland ; and the latter was ordered to report
to Major-General HaUeck, commanding the Department of the

THE SECESSION JUGGLE UST KENTUCKY. 43
West. General BueU was at once strongly reinforced, so as
to enable him to take the offensive during the latter part of
winter. These events embody the same useful lesson of tolerance
for thje conflicting opinions of others that has been pointedly
taught us again and again during this war. At this distance
of time, Sherman's views seem scarcely so extraordinary as
they did to the pubhc in 1861. Many more than two hundred
thousand men have been required to hold permanently Ken
tucky and Tennessee ; for, indeed, here as elsewhere, we have
had to contend not alone against the force which the enemy
has actuaUy had in the field at any given time, but against
that force augmented by the whole able-bodied male popula
tion behind it.
Fortunately, indeed, under a powerful nervous organization,
in spite of the workings of a myriad of irritable fibres, there
lay at the bottom the germs of a patience that was to render
the genius of Sherman stiU useful to the repubhc.
Although thus suffering in the poprdar estimation and in
the confidence of the War Department, General Sherman did
not altogether lose the hold he had so long maintained upon
the respect of his brother officers. The general-in-chief
thought he might stUl be useful in a subordinate capacity,
although he had failed to give satisfaction in command of an
important department. Major-General HaUeck, to whom he
now reported, considered him competent to the charge of
the rendezvous for volunteers at the Benton Barracks, near
St. Louis, and assigned him to that duty. With the monot
onous and endless detaUs of such a camp, Sherman was
occupied during the winter of 1861.
General HaUeck's command was the largest in extent of any
of the departments, as organized at the time, and was considered
by the general-in-chief as only inferior in importance to that
of the Potomac, to which his personal attention was given.
It embraced two distinct theatres of operations, extending from
the Hne of the Cumberland Eiver westward towards Kansas,
and divided by the Mississippi Eiver. Of these, the chief in

44 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
importance was east of the Mississippi. The enemy held
Columbus on the Mississippi, Forts Henry and Donelson
on the Tennessee, and BowHng Green in the adjoining De
partment of the Cumberland. These positions gave him tho
control of Western and Central Kentucky, and each of them was
strongly fortified and occupied in large force. Major-Gen
eral Leonidas Polk commanded at Columbus, Brigadier-Gen
eral John B. Floyd at Fort Donelson, and Brigadier-General
Simon B. Buckner at BowHng Green. The Cumberland was
the dividing Hne between the Department of the Ohio, com
manded by General BueU, and the Department of the West.
It was determined to endeavor to break through the centre
of the enemy's long Hne by ascending the Cumberland and
Tennessee rivers, aided by a fiotUla of gunboats which had
been prepared at Cairo and at St. Louis, under the command
of Captain A. H. Foote, of the navy. To Brigadier-General
Ulysses S. Grant, then commanding at Paducah, was assigned
the chief du-ection of the movement. Very Httle was known
of this officer. He had graduated at West Point in 1843,
had served in the Fourth Infantry untU 1854, when having
risen to the grade of captain, he resigned his commission
and settled in private Hfe, in lUinois, as a surveyor. On the
breaking out of the war, having offered his services to Gover
nor Yates in any capacity in wliich he could be useful, he was
for some time engaged in assisting the adjutant-general of the
State in organizing the three months' volunteers. On the organ
ization of the three years' troops, he accepted the colonelcy of
tho Sixty-Third lUinois regiment, and exhibited such marked
efficiency in its instruction and discipline, that he was soon
commissioned as a brigadier-general of volunteers. He had
commanded the brigade engaged in the demonstration against
Behnont, Missoui'i, on the 7th of November, 1861.
Suddenly the gloom of that dark winter, during which our
large armies slept, our smaU forces encountered defeat,
and the signs of anarchy gathered ominously from every
quarter, was broken by a victory. Fort Henry was taken by
Brigadier-General Grant on the 6th February, 1862. On

THE SECESSION JUGGLE IN KENTUCKY. 45
the 16th of the same month, Port Donelson surrendered un
conditionally to the same officer, with a garrison of about
twelve thousand men. In answer to the request of the rebel
commander Buckner, for a parley and more favorable terms,
Grant replied that he could consent to no terms but those of
unconditional surrender, and tersely added, "I propose to
move immediately upon your works." A shout of joy rang
throughout the land. Grant was made a major-general with
out an hour's delay. In a fervid letter to the New York
Tribune, the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, vented his en
thusiasm in raptures over the unconditional surrender, and
cited with admiration the proposal to move immediately upon
the enemy's works. Grant was the hero of the hour.
By the President's War Order, No. 3, dated March 11, 1862,
relieving Major-General McCleUan from the chief command
of the arvaj, Major-General HaUeck was assigned to the com
mand of the Department of the Mississippi, embracing all the
troops west of a line drawn indefinitely north and south
through Knoxville, Tennessee, and east of the westem bound
aries of Missouri and Arkansas. Major-General Grant was
shortly afterwards assigned by General HaUeck to the com
mand of the army in the field, operating on the line of the
Tennessee Eiver.
When Grant moved upon Fort Donelson, Sherman was or
dered to Paducah, to take charge of the duty of forwarding
supplies and reinforcements from that point. He set to work
with a characteristic energy that must have found room enough
to expand itself, for troops were hard to move in those daj's,
and suppHes, owing to the greenness of some and the rusti-
ness of other officers of the quartermaster's department
harder still. General Grant took occasion to acknowledge the
great importance of the services thus rendered.
The Army of the Tennessee, after some changes, was
finally organized in six divisions, of which Major-General John
A. McClernand commanded the first; Major-General Charles
F. Smith, the second ; Brigadier-General Lewis Wallace, the
third ; Brigadier-General Stephen A. Hurlbut, the fourth ;

46 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
Brigadier-General WUHam T. Sherman, the fifth ; and Briga
dier-General B. M. Prentiss, the sixth. The fifth division was
composed almost entkely of the rawest troops, hastUy gathered
together and thrown into brigades, none of whom had ever
been under fire, or, indeed, under discipline. Sherman took
command of his division at Paducah early in March.
During aU this time the pubhc heard nothing of Sherman.
The press said nothing against him ; it had ostracised and
then forgotten him. He was under a cloud stUl, but it was
about to Hft for a brief period.

SHLLOH.

47

CHAPTEE rV.
SHILOH.
The enemy's forces under General A. S. Johnston, consisting
of the corps of Polk, Bragg, and Hardee, of two cHvisions
each, and the reserve di^vision of Brigadier-General Breckin
ridge, having successively evacuated Columbus and Nash^dUe,
and abandoned Tennessee and Kentucky, with the exception
of Memphis and Cumberland Gap, had concentrated at Cor
inth, in Mississippi, and were there awaiting the development
of our plans, ready to act according to ckcumstances, on the
• offensive or defensive, and to take advantage of any error we
might make. The position was weU chosen for observing our
movements, for covering the Hne of the Mississippi, or for
menacing the flank and rear of an army iavading Mississippi
and Alabama.
General HaUeck decided to advance up the Tennessee Eiver
as far as practicable by water ; then to debark on the west
bank, attack the enemy at Corinth, and endeavor to cut him
off from the East, and compel his surrender either at Corinth
or on the banks of the Mississippi. Grant was ordered to
move up the Tennessee, and BueU to march from NashviUe
and join him near Savannah, Tennessee.
On the 14th of March, Sherman, with the leading diAasion
of Grant's army, passed up the Tennessee on transports, and
after making a feint of landing at Eastport, dropped down the
stream and disembarked at Pittsburgh Landing. It was Sher
man's intention to march from this point seven miles in the
direction of luka, and then halting his infantry, to dispatch
the cavalry to the nearest point on the Memphis and Charles-

48 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
ton raUway. The attempt was made, but the enemy was en
countered in greater force than had been expected, and it did
not succeed. In the mean whUe, Major-General Charles F.
Smith, who had command of the advance, having landed his
own second division at Savannah, had selected Pittsburgh
Landing as the most favorable position for the encampment
of the main body of the army, and under his instructions
Sherman and Hurlbul, who, with the fourth division, had
closely foUowed him, went into camp there. In the course of
a few days they were joined by the first and sixth divisions of
McClernand and Prentiss, and by Smith's own division from
Savannah ; and Major-General Grant himself arrived and took
command in person. During the last week of March, the
Army of the Tennessee only waited for the Army of the
Ohio. General BueU had informed General Grant that he
would join him before that time ; but he had encountered
great delays, and on the morning of the sixth of AprU the
Army of the Ohio had not yet come. It was hourly expected.
Instructions had been sent by General Grant to expedite its
advance, and to push on to Pittsburgh. The importance of
the crisis was apparent, for Johnston would naturaUy seek to
strike Grant before BueU's arrival ; but BueU marched his
troops with the same dehberation as if no other army depended
upon his promptness. By express orders he even caused in
tervals of six miles to be observed between his divisions on
the march, thus lengthening out his column to a distance of
over thirty mUes.
Pittsburgh is not a viUage, but simply a steamboat landing,
containing a log hut or two, and is situated in a deep ravine,
down which the Corinth road leads to the Tennessee River.
The distance to Corinth is twenty miles. The ground in front
of Pittsburgh is an undulating table-land, about a hundred
feet above the road bottom, lying between two small tribu
taries of the Tennessee, Lick Creek on the south, and Snake
Creek on the north, and having a front of about three miles
between the two streams. Owl Creek rises near the source of
Lick Creek, and flowing northeasterly, empties into Snake

SHILOH. 49
Creek. Towards the river the bank is broken mto abrupt
ravines, and rises graduaUy to a range of low liiUs, which
form the steep north banks of Lick Creek. The country is
covered with a heavy forest, easUy passable for troops, except
where the dense undergrowth now and then constitutes an
obstruction, and is sparsely broken by a few smaU cleared
farms of about eighty acres each. The soU is a tenacious
clay. About two mUes fi'om* the landing the road to Corinth
forks into two branches, forming the Lower Corinth road and
the Eidge Corinth road ; and another road leads off, stUl fur
ther to the left, across Lick Creek to Hamburgh, a few mUes
up the Tenn' see Eiver. On the right, two roads lead almost
due west to Purdy, and another in a northerly direction across
Snake Creek, down the river to Crump's Landing, six mUes
below. Innumerable ^mailer roads intersect these.
On the front of this position, facing to the south and south
west, five divisions of the Army of the Tennessee were encamped
on the morning of the 6th of AprU. On the extreme left lay
Stuart's brigade of Sherman's division, on the Hamburgh
road, behind the abrupt bank of Lick Creek. Prentiss's smaU
division, facing to the south, carried the Hne across a branch
of the main Corinth road, nearly to Sherman's left. Sherman
facing to the south, with his right thrown back towards the
landing, extended the front to the Purdy road, near Owl Creek.
This advanced Hne was about two mUes from the landing.
Near the river, about a mUe in rear of Prentiss and Stuart,
Huiibut's division was encamped'; McClernand's was posted
to the left and rear of Sherman, covering the interval between
him and Prentiss; and C. F. Smith's division, commanded
during his severe Ulness at Savannah by Brigadier-General
W. H. L. WaUace, was on the right of Hurlbut. Lewis Wal
lace's division was six miles distant, at Crump's Landing.
Q ur whole force in front of Pittsburgh was about thiity thou
sand men.
On Friday, the 4th of AprU, the enemy's cavalry had made a
demonstration upon the picket Hne, drove it in on Sherman's
centre, and captured a Heutenant and seven men. They were
4

50 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
driven back by the cavaHy of Sherman's division, and pursued
for a distance of about five mUes, with considerable loss. The
next day the enemy's cavalry had again showed itseH in our
front, but there was nothing to mdicate a general attack untU
seven o'clock on Sunday morning, when the advance guard on
Sherman's front was forced in upon his main Hne. Sherman
at once got his men under arms, sent a request to General
McClernand to support his left, and informed Generals Pren
tiss and Hurlbut that the enemy was before him in force. Sher
man's division was posted as foUows : The first brigade, under
Colonel J. A. McDoweU, consisting of his own regiment, the
6th Iowa; 40th lUinois, Colonel Hicks; 46th Ohio, Colonel
Worthington, and Captain Behr's " Morton" Battery held the
right, guarding the bridge over Owl Creek, on the Purdy road..
The fourth brigade, commanded by Colonel Buckland of the
72d Ohio, and including that regiment ; the 48th Ohio, Colo
nel SuUivan, and the 70th Ohio, Colonel CockerUl, continued
the Hne, its left resting on ShUoh meeting-house. The third
brigade, commanded by Colonel HUdebrand of the 77th Ohio,
was composed of that regiment, the 53d Oliio, Colonel Ap
pier, and the 57th Ohio, Colonel Mungen, and was posted
to the left of the Corinth road, its right resting on ShUoh
meeting-house. Taylor's battery of Hght artiUery was in
position at the meeting-house, and Waterhouse's on a ridge
to the left commanding the open ground between Appier's
and Mungen's regiments. Eight companies of the 4th Illinois
cavaHy, Colonel Dickey, were placed in a large open field in
rear of the centre of the division. Stuart's second brigade
was, as we have seen, detached, and on the extreme left of
the army.
The enemy formed under cover of the brush that Hnes the
Owl Creek bottom, and at eight o'clock opened fire from his
artillery, and moved forward his infantry across the open
ground and up the slope that separated him from our lines.
It now became evident that a general and determined attack
was intended. Under cover of the advance on Sherman's
front, the enemy was seen moving heavy masses to the left to

SHILOH. 51
attack Prentiss. Abou^ nine, the firing told that Prentiss was
giving ground, and presently Colonel Appier's Fifty-third
Ohio and Colonel Mungen's Fifty-seventh Ohio regiments
broke in disorder, exposing Waterhouse's battery. A brigade
of McClernand's division, which had been promptly moved
forward by General McClernand to the support of Sherman's
left, formed the immediate supports of this battery ; but the
enemy advanced with such vigor, and kept up so severe a fire,
that the three regiments composing it were soon also in dis
order, and«the battery was lost. McDoweU's and Buckland's
brigades, and the remaining regiment of HUdebrand's brigade,
maintained the position at ShUoh for an hour longer ; but ten
o'clock found the enemy pressing heavily upon Sherman's
front, their artUlery supported by infantry entirely in rear of
the left flank of the division, and HUdebrand's own regiment
broken up also ; so that it was found necessary to change
position at once, and- Sherman accordingly gave orders
to retire his line to the Purdy and Hamburgh road, near
McClernand's first position, and there continue the defence.
Taylor's battery was sent to the rear at once to take up
the new position, and hold the enemy in check whUe the
movement was in progress. Eiding across the angle, General
Sherman met, at the intersection of this road with the
Corinth road. Captain Behr's battery, attached to Colonel
McDoweU's brigade, and ordered it to come into battery.
The cajjtain had hardly given the order to his men, when
he was struck by a mmsket-baU and feU from his horse.
Dismayed, the drivers and gunners incontinently fled without
firing a single shot, carrying with them the caissons and one
gun, and abandoning the other six to the enemy, who was
vigorously pressing forward. General Sherman being thus
reduced to the necessity of again choosing a new Hne, and of
abandoning the attempt to maintain his old one, promptly moved
the coherent remainder of his division, consisting of Colonel
McDoweU's and Colonel Buckland's brigades, Captaki Tay
lor's battery, and three guns of Captain Waterhouse's battery,
to the support of General McClemand's right, which was just

62 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
then seriously menaced. At half-past ten the enemy made a
furious attack on the whole front of McClernand's division,
and for some time pressed it hard ; but the opportune move
ment of Colonel McDoweU's brigade dHectly against his left
flank, forced him back, and reheved the pressure. Taking'
advantage of the cover which the trees and felled timber
afforded, and of a wooded ravine on the right, Sherman held
this position for four hours, stubbornly contesting it with the
enemy, who continued to make the most determined efforts to
drive us back ilpon the river. General Grant visited this part
of the lines about thi-ee in the afternoon, conversed with Mc
Clernand and Sherman, and informed them of the condition
of affau's on the other parts of the field, where our resistance
had been less successful. An hour later it became evident to
both the division commanders, from the sounds heard in that
direction, that Hurlbut had f aUen back towards the river ; and
having been informed by General Grant that General Lewis
WaUace was on his way fi'om Crump's Landing with his entire
cHvision, they agreed upon a new line of defence, covering the
bridge over Snake Creek, by which these reinforcements were
expected to approach. The retirement to the position so
selected was made dehberately, and in as good order as could
have been expected. Many stragglers and fragments of troops
were encountered during the movement, and united with the
two divisions. The enemy's cavahy attempting a charge was
handsomely repulsed. The Fifth Ohio cavah-y arriving upon
the ground, held the enemy in check for some time, until
Major Ezra Taylor, cliief of artUlery of Sherman's division,
came up with Schwartz's battery of McClemand's division,
and opened an effective fire upon the enemy's flank as he
pressed forward against McClemand's right. McClernand
having now deployed his division on its new Hne, ordered a
charge, which was handsomely executed, driving the enemy
from his front, and forcing them to seek cover in the ravines
in advance of our right. It was now five o'clock. The new
Hne had been weU selected, and afforded us a decided advan
tage, the ground along its front being open for a distance of

SHILOH. 53
about two hundred yards. The enemy's momentum was spent,
and he did not afterwards attempt to cross this open space.
On the left the day had scarcely gone so weU. The weight
of the enemy's attack was chiefly directed against this wing.
The two brigades of Prentiss gave way early in the morning,
and drifted to the rear as Hurlbut advanced to their support,
and by ten o'clock the division had melted away. Hurlbut
made a gaUant fight, obstinately contesting the ground with
varying success, imtil four o'clock in the afternoon, when his
division also was pressed to the rear, and the whole line com
peUed to retire. Smith's division, under the command of
Brigadier-General W. H. L. WaUace, had been moved upon
Hurlbut's right, and had materiaUy aided in holding our
ground there, but had in its turn been forced back. Colonel
Stuart's brigade held the extreme left until the pressure of
the enemy on its front, and the exposure of its flank by the
disaster to Prentiss, forced it successively to take up new Hnes
of defence on the ridges which broke the gi'ound towards the
river. Our troops held this last Hne firmly. It was now after
six o'clock in the afternoon. The battle had lasted nearly
twelve hours. Our troops had been driven from aU their camps
of the morning, except WaUace's, to the line of woods in the
rear, had been dislodged from that position, and again pressed
back, and now held a line perpendicular to the river, with its
left resting on the bluff behind which the landing was situated,
and only half a mUe fi'om it. The enemy gathered up hia
forces, and made a last desperate effort to gain this positioii-
Byt his losses had been very heavy, his troops were much
shaken by the hard fighting they had encountered, and tho
spirit which characterized thek first onset in the morning had
burned out. Cheatham's division and Gladden's brigade,
which now held the extreme right of the Confederate line on
the river, lay directly under the fire of our artUlery. They
attempted to take it, but were repulsed in great disorder.
A galling fire of artiUery and musketry was poured into them ;
and the gunboats " Lexington" and " Tyler" swept the flanks
with theu" nine-inch sheU. Their troops were re-formed with

54 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
difficulty. Night was closing in. General Beauregard gave
the orders to retire out of range, and the battle was over.
Darkness feU upon the disordered and confused remnants
of two large armies. In each the losses had been very heavy,
the straggling fearful, and the confusion almost inextricable.
But the enemy had faded. He had attempted to force us back
upon the river and compel our surrender, and had not done
so. In the morning we would attack him and seek to drive
him from the field. General Grant had given verbal orders
to that effect to General Sherman about 3 p. m., before the
last repulse of the enemy.
General Albert Sidney Johnston, the Confederate com
mander-in-chief, was mortally wounded in front of Sherman's
division, and died shortly afterwards at half-past two o'clock.
Two regiments of Nelson's division, of the Army of the Ohio,
crossed the river, and arrived upon the extreme left of the
field about six o'clock, in time to fire a few shots just before
the final repulse. As Nelson's troops came up, they met an
appalling sight. A crowd of from seven to ten thousand
panic-stricken wretches thronged the landing, crouching be
hind trees and under the bluff to avoid the enemy's shell,
which had begun to drop in among them, and giving vent to
the most sickening cries that we were whipped, and cut to
pieces, and. imploring their newly-arrived comrades to share
their shame. But the gaUant men of Nelson's division were
unmoved by the scene, and greeted the loathsome pack with
jeers and sarcasm. It is perhaps natural enough that those
who saw only the stragglers should have found it hard to be
lieve that any one had fought. Yet the greater portion of
the Army of the Tennessee had stood to their arms, and had
repulsed the enemy.
The troops slept that night in good spirits, although about
midnight they were drenched by the heavy rain which began
to faU. They knew that the enemy had failed, that Lewis
WaUace would be up during the night, that BueU was arriv
ing, and that in the morning these fresh battalions would be
hurled against the shaken and broken foe. The " Lexington"

SHILOH. 55
dropped a sheU into the enemy's Hnes every ten minutes, unlU
1 A.M,, when the "Tyler" took her turn at the same task,
firing every quarter of an hour tUl dayhght. The demoraliz
ing shriek of the, navy sheUs, whUe it robbed the enemy of rest,
vas inspiring music to the ears of our wearied troops. Dur-
:i]g the night the remainder of Nelson's division crossed the
liver, and took position in the left front; and later came Crit
tenden's division, foUowed by McCook's, successively extending
the Hne to the right and connecting with Huiibut's left.
Lewis Wallace arrived about 1 A. m., and came into position
on Sherman's right.
Daybreak of the 7th found the enemy out of sight in our
front. He showed no signs of advancing. Beauregard did
not know that BueU had come, and yet he cHd not attack.
As soon as it was fairly Hght, the division commanders re
ceived the orders promised by General Grant at the close of
the previous day's battle, to move upon the enemy and drive him
from our front. By six o'clock our artUlery opened fire on the
left. About seven. Nelson, Crittenden, and McCook pushed
forward, and by ten were warmly engaged with the enemy ia a
contest for the possession of the old camps. Hurlbut, Mc
Clernand, Sherman, and WaUace now moved steadUy forward.
The open fields hi front of the log church of ShUoh were
reached. The enemy's position here was a strong one, and
he contested it obstinately. For more than three hours he
held his ground in the scrub-oak thicket. But by one o'clock
his weakness had become apparent. He was yielding every-
ivhere, and giving palpable signs of exhaustion. General
Beauregard gave orders to withdraw from the contest. About
2 P. M. his right retired, and two hours later his left foUowed.
The movement was made in tolerable order. Near the junc
tion of the Hamburgh and Pittsburgh road with the Ham
burgh and Corinth road, his rear-guard under Breckinridge
made a stand ; and the next day his retreat was continued to
Corinth. On the 8th, Sherman, with, two brigades, foUowed
Breckinridge to the point where he made his first stand. But
our troops were worn out, disorganized, out of suppHes, and

56 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
in no condition to enter upon a campaign. They returned to
Pittsburgh to refit and reorganize. Sherman lost 318 kiUed,
1,275 wounded, and 441 missing; total, 2,034. Brigadier-
General W. H. L. WaUace was kiUed during the first day, and
Brigadier-General B. M. Prentiss taken prisoner, and their
divisions broken up and distributed.
The enemy went into battle on the 6th with forty thousand
three hundred and fifty-five effective men. His losses, as
stated by General Beauregard in his official report, were, in
kiUed, 1,728; wounded, 8,012; missmg, 959; total, 10,699.
General Beauregard says : " On Monday, from exhaustion and
other causes, not twenty thousand men could be brought into
action on our side." If we suppose two-thirds of the casual
ties to have occurred on Sunday, there should stUl have been
over thirty-eight thousand men with the rebel colors on Mon
day ; and even imagining, for the sake of Ulustration, that all
the losses took place on the first day, the enemy should have
had nearly thirty-five thousand fighting men on the second.
Yet that number was less than twenty thousand. Here are
from fifteen to eighteen thousand men to be accounted for, or
about half of his remaining force. These are the stragglers.
General Beauregard, in his official report, estimate the
Union forces engaged on Sunday at forty-five thousand, the
remnant of General Grant's forces on Monday morning at
twenty thousand, and the reinforcements received during the
preceding night at thirty-three thousand, making fifty-three
thousand arrayed against him on that day, or seventy-eight
thousand on both days ; and he set down our aggregate losses
at twenty thousand.
The enemy's troops were comparatively old. Bragg's corps
had been under fire at Pensacola; Polk's, at Columbus; and
Hardee's, at MiU Spring, in Kentucky. A considerable por
tion of them had been organized and driUed since the summer
of 1861, but there was also a large infusion of new regiments
and new men, troops which had never been under fire, and
mihtia just from the States. The commander-in-chief, Gen
eral Albert Sidney Johnston, was one of the ablest officers of

SHILOH. 57
the old regular army of the United States. General Beaure
gard, his second in command, had been known as a skUful
officer of engineers, and by the exercise of his popular talents
had suddenly achieved a reputation which his subsequent his
tory has faded to sustain. Of Grant's army only two divisions
had been under fire. Sherman's, Prentiss's, Hurlbut's, and
Lewis WaUace's were aU new and raw.
The Union soldiers showed that they could fight, and that
they would. They proved themselves superior to defeat.
General Sherman says in his official report : —
" My division was made up of regiments perfectly new, aU
having received their muskets for the first time at Paducah.
None of them had ever been under fke, or beheld heavy
columns of an enemy bearing clown on them, as this cHd on
last Sunday. To expect of them the coolness and steadiness
of older troops would be -^Tong. They knew not the value of
combination and organization. When individual fear seized
them, the first impulse was to get away. My third brigade
did break much too soon, and I am not yet advised where
they were Sunday afternoon and Monday morning. Colonel
Haldebrand, its commander, was as cool as any man I ever
saw, and no one could have made stronger efforts to hold his
men to their places than he did. He kept his own regiment,
with indi"vidual exceptions, in hand an hour after Appier's and
Mungen's regiments had left their proper field of action.
Colonel Buckland managed his brigade weU. I commend
him to your notice as a cool, intelligent, and judicious gentle
man, needing only confidence and experience to make a good
commander. His subordinates. Colonels SuUivan and Cocker-
iU, behaved with great gaUantry, the former recei"\ang a severe
wound on Sunday, and yet commanding and holding his regi
ment weU in hand aU day ; and on Monday untU his right arm
was broken by a shot, CockerUl held a larger proportion of his
men than any colonel in my division, and was with me from
first to last. Colonel J. A. McDoweU, commanding the £rst
brigade, held his ground on Sunday tUl I ordered him to faU
b ick, which he did in Hne of battle ; and when ordered, he con-

58 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
ducted the attack on the enemy's left in good style. In faUing
back to the next position he was thrown from his horse and
injured, and his brigade was not in position on Monday morn
ing. His subordmates, Colonels Hicks and Worthington,
displayed great personal courage. Colonel Hicks led his regi
ment in the attack on Sunday, and received a wound which is
feared may prove fatal. He is a brave and gaUant gentleman,
and deserves weU of his country. Lieutenant-Colonel Walcutt,
of the Ohio Forty-sixth, was severely wounded on Sunday,
and has been disabled ever smce. My second brigade. Colo
nel Stuart, was detached near two mUes from my headquarters.
He had to fight his own battle on Sunday against superior
numbers, as the enemy interposed between him and General
Prentiss early in the day. Colonel Stuart was wounded
severely, and yet reported for duty on Monday morning, but
was compeUed to leave during the day, when the command
devolved on Colonel T. Kilby Smith, who was always in the
thickest of the fight, and led the brigade handsomely. . . .
Lieutenant-Colonel Kyle, of the Seventy-first was mortaUy
wounded on Sunday. . , . Several times during the battle
cartridges gave out, but General Grant had thoughtfuUy kept
a supply coming from the rear. When I appealed to regiments
to stand fast although out of cartridges, I cHd so because to
rethe a regiment for any cause has a bad effect on others. I
commend the Fortieth lUinois and Thirteenth Missouri for
thus holcHng their ground under heavy fire, although their
cartridge-boxes were empty. Great credit is, due the frag
ments of men of the cHsordered regiments, who kept in the
advance. I observed and noticed them, but untU the briga
diers and colonels make their reports, I cannot venture to name
individuals, but wUl in due season notice aU who kept in our
front, as weU as those who preferred to keep back near the
steamboat landing."
Sherman was everywhere ; encouraging his troops, raUying
the stragglers, directing the batteries with his own hands, ad
vising with other commanders, superintending every movement
in person. Those who stUl fancied him crazy did not, after

SHILOH. 59
this, deny his energy, coolness, courage, skiU, and persever
ance upon the battle-field. This was his first battle, and yet
so ingTainecl were the details of war upon his mind, that his
spirit leaped at once above the novelty of the situation, and
wore the new experience lUie an old habit. On Sunday, he was
wounded by a buUet through the left hand, but bandaged it,
and went on with his work. On Monday, he was again wounded,
and had three horses shot under him, but mounted a fourth
and stayed on the field.
General Grant says, in his official report, otherwise suffi
ciently formal : " I feel it a duty to a gaUant and able officer,
Brigadier-General W. T. Sherman, to make special mention.
He not only was with his command during the entire two days
of -the action, but displayed great judgment and skiU in the
management of his men. Although severely woimded in the
hand on the first day, his place was never vacant."
A few days later, Major-General HaUeck, not given to un
mixed praise, having arrived upon the ground, went so far
as to observe, " It is the unanimous opinion here that Briga
dier-General W. T. Sherman saved the fortunes of the day on
the 6th, and contributed largely to the glorious victory of
the 7th. ... I respectfully recommend that he be made
a major-general of volunteers, to date from the 6th instsfnt."
And on the 26th of July, 1863, in urging Sherman's pro
motion as a brigadier-general in the regular army. General
Grant wrote to the War Department : "At the battle of ShUoh,
on the first day, he held, with raw troops, the key point of tho
lauding. It is no disparagement to any other officer to say,
that I do not believe there was another division commander
on the field who had the skUl and e'xperience to have done it.
To his individual efforts I am indebted for the success of that
battle."

50 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.

CHAPTEE Y.
coeinth.
Immediately after the battle of ShUoh, Major-General Hal-
leck left Saint Louis, proceeded to Pittsburgh Landing, and
there took personal command of the forces, which he caused
to be reinforced from other parts of his department. Major-
General Pope was placed in. command of the left vidng, Major-
General BueU of the centre, Major-General Thomas of the
right wing, and Major-General McClernand of the reserve,
whUe Major-General Grant was assigned, by General HaUeck,
to nominal duty as second in command.
After his repulse at ShUoh, Beauregard concentrated his
army at Corinth, and, strongly fortifying that position, and
summoning to his aid aU the avaUable troops in the south
west, including the armies of Price and Van Dorn, from Mis
souri 'and Arkansas, as weU as the militia of the States of
Alabama, IMississippi, Louisiana, prepared for a determined
defence. " Soldiers of ShUoh and Elkhorn !" he said to his
troops, "we are about to meet once more in the shock of
battle the invaders of our soil, the despoUers of our homes,
the disturbers of our family ties, face to face, hand to hand.
. . . With your mingled banners, for the first time during
this war, we shaU meet the foe in strength that should give
us victory. Soldiers, can the residt be doubtful ? ShaU we
not diive back into Tennessee the presumptuous mercenaries
coUected for our subjugation ? One more manly effort, and,
trusting in God and the justness of our cause, we shaU recover
more than we have lately lost."
Bragg, too, addressed his men in the same strain, teUing
them : " You wiU encounter him in your chosen position, strong

CORINTH. 61
by nature and improved by art, away from his main support
and rehance — gunboats and heavy batteries — and for the first
time in this war, "with nearly equal numbers."
Corinth, ninety-three mUes west-southwest from Memphis,
and twenty-nine mUes from Pittsburgh, is the junction of the
MobUe and Ohio and the Memphis and Charleston raUroads.
These two great lines intersecting each other at right angles,
connect the Mississippi with the Atlantic and the Ohio with
the Gulf.
On the 13th of May, having three thousand four hundred
and ten absent, sick, and wounded, out of a total of five thou
sand four hundred and sixty men, Sherman found it necessary
to consolidate his division into three brigades, as follows : First
brigade, to be commanded by Brigadier-General Morgan L.
Smith, Eighth Missouri, Fifty-fifth lUinois, Fifty-fourth Ohio,
and Fifty-seventh Ohio ; second brigade. Colonel J. A. Mc
Dowell, Sixth Iowa, Forty-sixth Ohio, Fortieth Illinois, and
Seventy-seventh Ohio ; third brigade. Colonel E. P. Buckland,
Seventy-second Ohio, Seventieth Ohio, Forty-eighth Ohio, and
Fifty-third Ohio. On the foUowing day, however, Brigadier-
General James W. Denver arrived, reported to General Sher
man for duty, and was assigned to the command of the thu-d
brigade. General HaUeck advanced cautiously and by slow marches,
intrenching at every step. On the afternoon of 17th of. May,
in conformity with instructions previously received by him
from the commander-in-chief. General Sherman made cHsido-
sitions to drive the enemy from his position at Russell's house,
on a hiU situated about a mile and a quarter from the outer
intrenchments of Corinth, and about two mUes in advance of
the main camps of our army. Requesting General Hurlbut
to put in motion two regiments and a battery of artiUery, at
three o'clock p. m., on the road which passes the front of his
Hne and runs to Russell's house, Sherman ordered General
Denver to take a right-hand road with two regiments of his
brigade and one battery of Hght artillery, namely, the Seven
tieth and Seventy-second Ohio, and Barrett's battery, and

62 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
gave him a guide so to conduct his march as to anive on the
left of the enemy's position by the time he was engaged in
front ; and ordered General Morgan L. Smith's brigade, with
Bouton's battery, to foUow the main road, drive back a brigade
of the enemy's forces that held the position at RusseU's, with
theu skirmishers and pickets, down to the causeway and bridge
across a smaU stream about eight hundred yards east of Rus
seU's house.
AU these forces were put in motion at three p. M., General
Denver's forces taking the right-hand road, and General
Smith's the direct main road. On reaching the causeway,
General Smith deployed his skirmishers forward, and sent out
his advance-guard. The column advanced, and the skirmish
ers became engaged at once. The firing was very brisk, but
the enemy's pickets were driven steadUy back tiU they reached
the position of their brigade at EusseU's house, where their
resistance was obstinate.
The ground was unfavorable to artiUery tUl the skirmishers
had cleared the hiU beyond the causeway, when Major Tay
lor, chief of artiUery, of Sherman's division, advanced first one
of Bouton's guns, and very soon after the remaining three
guns of the battery. These, upon reaching the hUl-top, com
menced firing at EusseU's house and outhouses, in which the
enemy had taken shelter, when their whole force retreated,
and full possession was obtained of EusseU's house and the
ground for three hunched yards in advance, where the roads
meet. This being the limit to which the brigade was intended
to go, it was halted. The head of General Denver's column
reached its position as the enemy was beginning to retreat.
General Morgan L. Smith conducted the advance of his bri
gade handsomely, and the chief work and loss fell upon his two
leacHng regiments, the Eighth Missouri and Fifth-fifth lUinois,
He held the ground tUl about daylight next morning, when,
by General Sherman's order, he left a strong picket there,
and placed his brigade back a short distance in easy support,
where it remained until reheved.
No loss was sustained by Hurlbut's or Denver's commands

CORINTH. 63
in their flank movements on EusseU's; the loss in General
Morgan L. Smith's brigade was ten kiUed and thirty-one
wounded. The position thus gained proved to be one of great natural
strength, and Sherman at once proceeded to fortify it. Lines
were laid off by the engineers, and although the advance on
Corinth had witnessed their first experiment with intrenching
tools, the troops in Sherman's division succeeded in construct
ing a parapet that met the approval of the critical eye of the
commander-in-chief. The dense woods and undergrowth
were cleared away in front, to give range to the batteries.
The work went on day and night without interruption. The
division continued to occupy the intrenched camp at EusseU's
untU the night of May 27th, when an order was received fi-om
General HaUeck by telegraph — through which means regular
communication had been estabhshed between general head
quarters and the several cHvision commanders — directing Gen
eral Sherman to send a force the next day to drive the rebels
from his fi'ont on the Corinth road, to drive in their pickets as
far as possible, and to make a strong demonstration on Corinth
itself. Under authority conferred upon him by the same
order, Sherman caUed upon Major-( teneral McClernand, com
manding the Eeserve Corps, and Major-General Hurlbut, who
commanded one of the adjacent divisions, to furnish one bri
gade each, to co-operate in the proposed movement with the
two brigades of Denver and Morgan L. Smith, detached fi'om
Sherman's own division for the same purpose. Colonel John
A. Logan's brigade of Judah's cHvision, of McClernand's
reserve corps, and Brigadier-General J. C. Veatch's brigade
of Hurlbut's division, accordingly reported to General Sher
man for this duty. /
The house referred to was a double log buUding, standing on
a high ridge on the upper or southern end of a large field,
and was used by the enemy as a block-house, from which to
annoy our pickets. The large field was perfectly overlooked
by this house, as weU as by the ridge along its southern Hne of
defence, which was covered by a dense grove of heavy oaks

64 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
and underbrush. The main Corinth road runs along the east
ern fence, whilst the field itself, about three hundred yards
wide by about five hundred yards long, extended far to the
right into the low land of PhilHp's Crook, so densely wooded as
to be impassable. On the eastern side of the field the woods
were more open. The enemy could be seen at all times in and
about the house and the ridge beyond, and our pickets could
not show themselves on our side of the field without attracting
a shot. Sherman ordered General J. W. Denver, with his thud
brigade, and the Morton battery of four guns, to march in
perfect silence at eight A. m., keeping well under cover as he
approached the field ; General Morgan L. Smith's first brigade,
with Barrett's and Waterhouse's batteries, to move along the
main road, keeping his force weU masked in the woods to the
left ; Brigadier-General Veatch's brigade to move from Gen
eral Hurlbut's Hnes through the woods on the left of and con
necting Avith General M. L. Smith's ; and General John A.
Logan's brigade to move clown to Bowie's HUl Cut of the
MobUe and Ohio raUroad, and thence forv.-ard to the left, so
as to connect with General Denver's brigade on the extreme
right ; aU to march at eight a. m., with skirmishers weU to the
front, to keep weU eonc^^iled, and, at a signal, to rush quickly
on to the ridge, thus avd^Jaing as much as possible the danger
of crossing the open field, exposed to the fire of a concealed
enemy. The preliminary arrangements having thus been made, two
twenty-pounder Parrot rifle-guns of SUfversparre's battery,
under the immecHate supervision of Major Taylor, cliief of
artUlery of Sherman's division, were moved sUently through
the forest to a point behind a hiU, from the top of wliich could
be seen the house and ground to be contested. The guns
were unlimbered, loaded with sheU, and moved by hand to the
crest. At the proper time he gave the order to commence firmg
and demolish the house. About a dozen sheUs weU directed
soon accomphshed this ; then designating a single shot of the
twenty-pound Parrot-gun of Silfversparre as a signal for the

CORINTH. 65
brigades to advance, he waited tUl aU were in position, and
ordered the signal, when the troops dashed forward, crossed
the field, drove the enemy across the ridge and field beyond
into another dense and seemingly impenetrable forest. The
enemy was evidently surprised. By ten A. M. we were masters
of the position. Generals Grant and Thomas were present
during the affair, and Avitnessed the movement, which was ad
mirably executed.
An irregular piece of cleared land lay immediately in front
of General Denver's position, and extended obhquely to the
left, in front of and across Morgan Smith's and Veatch's bri
gades, which were posted on the right and left of the main
Corinth road, leading directly south. About three p. M. Sher
man's troops were startled by the quick rattle of musketry
along our whole picket-Hne, foUowed by the cheers and yeUs
of an attacking column of the enemy.
Sherman's artiUery and Mann's battery of Veatch's brigade
had been judiciously posted by Major Taylor, and before the
yeU of the enemy had died away arose our reply in the cannon's
mouth. The firing was very good, rapid, weU-directed, and
the sheUs burst in the right place. Our pickets were at first
driven in a Utile, but soon recovered theu ground and held it,
and the enemy retreated in utter confusion. On further ex
amination of the ground, with its connection on the left with
General Hurlbut, and right restmg on the railroad near
Bowie HUl Cut, it was determined to intrench. The Hnes
were laid out after dark, and the work substantially finished
by morning. AU this time Sherman was within one thousand
three hunch-ed yards of the enemy's main intrenchments, which
were concealed by the dense foHage of the oak forest, and
without a battle, which at that time was to be avoided, Sher
man coiUd not push out his skirmishers more than two hundred
yards to the front. For his own security he had to destroy
two farmhouses, both of which had been loopholed and occu
pied by the enemy. By nine A. m. of the twenty-ninth our
works were substantiaUy done, and our artUlery in position,
and at four p. M. the siege-train was brought forward, and
5

66 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
Colonel McDoweU's second brigade had come from the foimei
Hnes at EusseU's, and had reheved General John A. Logan's
brigade. Sherman then had his whole division in a sHghtly curved
Hne, facmg south, his right resting on the MobUe and Ohio
raUroad, near a deep cut known as Bowie HUl Cut, and left
resting on the main Corinth road, at the crest of the ridge,
there connecting with General Hurlbut, who, m tum, on his
left connected with General Davies, and so on down the whole
Hne to its extremity. So near was the enemy that the Union
troops could hear the sound of his drums, and sometimes of
voices in command, and the raUroad cars arriving and depart
ing at Corinth were easUy distinguished. For some days
and nights cars had been arriving and departing very fre
quently, especiaUy in the night. Before daybreak, Sherman
instructed the brigade commanders and the field-officers of
the day to feel forward as far as possible, but aU reported
the enemy's pickets stUl in force in the dense woods to our
front. But about six A. M. a curious explosion, sounding hke
a voUey of large siege-pieces, foUowed by others singly and in
twos and threes, arrested Sherman's attention ; and soon after
a large smoke arose from the direction of Corinth, when he
telegraphed General HaUeck to ascertain the cause. The
latter answered that he could not explain it, but ordered Sher
man " to advance his division and feel the enemy, if stUl in his
front." Sherman immediately put in motion two regiments
of each brigade, by different roads, and soon after foUowed
with the whole division, infantry, artUlery, and cavalry.
Somewhat to his surprise, the enemy's chief redoubt Tvas
found within thirteen hundred yards of our line of intrench
ments, but completely masked by the dense forest and under
growth. Instead of being, as had been supposed, a continuous
Hne of intrenchments etncircHng Corinth, the defences con
sisted of separate redoubts, connected in part by a parapet
and ditch, and in part by shaUow rifle-pits, the trees being
feUed so as to give a good field of fire to and beyond the mam
road. General M. L. Smith's brigade moved 'rapidly down the

CORINTH. 67
main road, entering the first redoubt of the enemy at seven A. M.
It was completely evacuated, and he pushed on into Corinth, and
beyond, to CoUege HUl. General Denver entered the enemy's
Hnes at the same time, seven A. M., at a point midway between
the wagon and raUroad, and proceeded on to Corinth, and
Colonel McDoweU kept further to the right, near the MobUe
and Ohio Eaiiroad. By eight A. m. aU Sherman's division was
at Corinth and beyond.
On the whole ridge extending from Sherman's camp into
Corinth, and to the right and left, could be seen the remains
of the abandoned camps of the enemy, fiour and provisions
scattered about, and every thing indicating a speedy and con
fused retreat. In the town itself many houses were stUl burn
ing, and the ruins of warehouses and buUdings containing
commissary and other confederate stores were stiU smoulder
ing ; but there stUl remained pUes of cannon-baUs, sheUs, and
shot, sugar, molasses, beans, rice, and other property, which
the enemy had faUed to carry off or destroy.
From the best information obtained from the few citizens
who remained in Corinth, it appeared that the enemy had for
some days been removing their sick and valuable stores, and
had sent away on railroad-cars a part of theu effective force
on the night of the 28th. But, of course, even the vast
amount of their roUing-stock could not carry away an army
of a hundred thousand men. The enemy was therefore com
peUed to march away, and began the march by ten o'clock on
the night of the 29th — the columns filling aU the roads leading
south and west aU night — the rear-guard firing the train, which
led to the explosions and conflagration. The enemy did not
relieve his pickets that morning, and many of them were cap
tured, who did not have the slightest intimation of the pro
posed evacuation.
Finding Corinth abandoned by the enemy, Sherman ordered
General M. L. Smith to pursue on the Eipley road, by which
it appeared they had taken the bulk of their artUlery.
General Smith pushed the pursuit up to the bridges
and narrow causeway by which the bottom of Tuscumbia'

68 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
Creek is passed. The enemy opened with canister on the
smaU party of cavalry, and burned every bridge, leaving the
woods fuU of straggUng soldiers. Many of these were gath
ered up and sent to the rear, but the main army had escaped
across Tuscumbia Creek. Sherman says, in his official report
of the siege :
" The evacuation of Corinth, at the time and in the manner
in which it was done, was a clear back-down from the high
and arrogant tone heretofore assumed by the rebels. The
ground was of their own choice. The fortifications, though
poor and mdifferent, were aU they supposed necessary to our
defeat, as they had had two months to make them, with an
immense force to work at their disposal. If, with two such
raUroads as they possessed, they could not supply theu army
with reinforcements and provisions, how can they attempt it
in this poor, arid, and exhausted part of the country?"
From the time the army moved on Cormth, up to the date
of its evacuation, the troops of Sherman's division had con
structed seven distinct Hnes of intrenchments. Scarcely had
one Hne been completed before they were called upon to ad
vance a short distance, take up a new position, and construct
another Hne. Occupying as it did the extreme right flank of
the army, this division was necessarUy more exposed, and was
compeUed to perform harder work, and furnished heavier de
taUs than any other single division in the entire command.
But every task was performed with a cheerfulness and alacrity
that eUcited the highest encomiums from the division com
mander. " But a few days ago," he says in his congratulatory ordel
of May 31st, " a large and powerful rebel army lay at Corinth,
with outposts extending to our very camp at ShUoh. They
held two railroads extending north and south, east and west,
across the whole extent of their country, with a vast number
of locomotives and cars to bring to them speedily and cer
tainly their reinforcements and suppHes. They caUed to their
aid aU their armies from every quarter, abandoning the sea-
?oagt and the great river Mississippi, that they might over-

CORINTH. 69
whelm us with numbers in the place of their own choosing.
They had their chosen leaders, men of high reputation and
courage, and they dared us to leave the cover of our iron-clad
gunboats to come to fight them in their trenches, and stiU more
dangerous swamps and ambuscades of their Southern forests.
Their whole country, from Eichmond to Memphis and Nash
viUe to MobUe, rung with their taunts and boastings, as to
how they would immolate the Yankees if they dared to leave
the Tennessee Eiver. They boldly and defiantly chaUenged
us to meet them at Corinth. We accepted the chaUenge, and
came slowly and without attempt at concealment to the very
ground of their selection ; and they have fled away. We yes
terday marched unopposed through the burning embers of
their destroyed camps and property, and pursued them to
their swamps, untU burning bridges plainly confessed they had
fled, and not marched away for better ground. It is a victory
as briUiant and important as any recorded in history, and
every officer and soldier who lent his aid has just reason to
be proud of his part.
" No amount of sophistry or words from the leaders of the
rebeUion can succeed in giving the evacuation of Corinth, un
der the circumstances, any other title than that of a signal
defeat, more humUiating to them and theu cause than if we
had entered the place over the dead and mangled bodies of
their soldiers. We are not here to kiU and slay, but to vindi
cate the honor and just authority of that government which
has been bequeathed to us by our honored fathers, and to
whom we would be recreant if we permitted their work to pass
to our chUdren marred and spoUed by ambitious and wicked
rebels. "The general commanding, whUe thus claiming for his
division their just share in this glorious result, must, at the
same time, remind them that much yet remains to be done,
and that aU must stUl continue the same vigUance and pa
tience, industry and obedience, tUl the enemy lays doAvn his
arms, and pubHcly acknowledges, for their supposed grievances,
they must obey the laws of their country, and not attempt its

70 SHEPtMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
overthrow by threats, by cruelty, and by war. They must be
made to feel and acknowledge the power of a just and mighty
nation. This result can only be accomphshed by a cheerful
and ready obedience to the orders and authority of our lead
ers, in whom we now have just reason to feel the most imphcit
confidence. That the fifth division of the right wing wUl do
this, and that in clue time we wUl go to our famUies and friends
at home, is the earnest prayer and wish of your immediate
commander." The abUity and untuing energy displayed by General Sher
man during the siege eUcited the warm praise of General
Grant, who afterwards, in an official dispatch to army head
quarters, wrote : " His services as division commander in the
advance on Corinth, I wiU venture to say, were appreciated by
the now general-in-chief (General HaUeck) beyond those of
any other division commander."
On the 2d of June, Sherman was ordered by General Hal-
leck to march with his own division and Hurlbut's through
Corinth and dislodge the enemy, supposed to be in position
near Smith's bridge, seven mUes southwest of Corinth, where
the Memphis and Charleston raUway crosses Tuscumbia Creek,
He set out immediately, his own division in advance ; but on
the morning of the 3d, Colonel T. Lyle Dickey, Fourth Illinois
Cavalry, who was sent forward to reconnoitre, returned and
reported the bridge burned, and no enemy near it. Sherman
then went into bivouac near ChewaUa, and set to work to save
such of the roUing-stock of the raUway as could probably be
rendered serviceable, and by the 9th, chiefly through the exer
tions of the Fifty-second Indiana, Major Main, which was
generaUy known as "the raUroad regiment," succeeded m
coUecting and sending to Corinth seven locomotives in toler
able order, a dozen platform-cars, over two hundred pahs of
tmck-wheels, and the uon-work of about sixty cars.
On the 26th of May, Sherman had received from the War
Department, and had accepted, a commission as Major-Gen
eral of Volunteers, dating from May 1st.

MEMPHIS. 71

CHAPTEE VI.
MEMPHIS.
Gband Junction, fifty-two mUes west of Memphis, and one
hundred and fifty-four south from Cauo, is the junction of
the Memphis and Charleston with the Mississippi Central
EaUway. Ninety-nine mUes from Memphis, and a hun
dred and two from Grand Junction, the latter road joins
the Mississippi and Tennessee EaUway at Grenada. An army
operating from Memphis as a base, and holding in force
Corinth, HoUy Sprmgs, and some such point as Hernando, on
the Mississippi and Tennessee EaUway, are in a position to
defend West Tennessee from the Tennessee Eiver to the
Mississippi, and to take the offensive against an enemy pro
tecting Northern Mississippi.
No sooner was Corinth occupied, and the semblance of a pur
suit of the enemy ended, than General HaUeck ordered General
BueU to march with the Army of the Ohio by HuntsviUe and
Stevenson on Chattanooga, Tennessee, and seize the key of
the debouches from the mountain region of the centre ; whUe
General Grant, again restored to the command of the Army of
the Tennessee, was left in command of the District of West
I'imnessee and Northern Mississippi, and General Pope's
troops were sent back to Missouri. The enemy was concen
trated at Tupelo, Mississippi, forty-nine mUes below Corinth,
on the line of the MobUe and Ohio Eaiiroad, under the com
mand of General Braxton Bragg, who had reheved Beaure
gard in consequence of the latter's Ulness. ,
On the 9th of June, at ChewaUa, Sherman received General
HaUeck's orders to march with his own division and Hurlbut's
Fourth division to Grand Junction, to repair the Memphis and

72 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
Charleston EaUway west of that point, and then to assume
the duty Of guarding the road against any attempt of the
enemy to interrupt its operations. Sending forward Denver's
third brigade of the fifth division, and the whole of Hurlbut's
division in advance, to repair the bridges on the rqad, Sher
man marched on the 11th with the remainder of his command,
reached Grand Junction on the night of the 13th, and, finding
no water there, occupied La Grange, three miles further west,
on the morning of the 14th. WhUe engaged here in repair
ing two pieces of broken trestle-work, he sent Veatch's
brigade, of Huiibut's and Morgan L. Smith's brigade of his
own division, to HoUy Springs to clear his fianks of the enemy.
After driving a smaU force of the enemy out of the town, and
as far south as Lamar, the detachment remained two days at
HoUy Springs, and then rejoined the main body. On the
21st, Sherman marched from HoUy Springs ; on the 23d, three
mUes west of Lafayette, met a raUway train from Memphis ;
and on the 25th, having buUt two long sections of trestle-
work at La Grange, two large bridges at Moscow, and two
smaU ones at Lafayette, was able to report his task accom
phshed, and the raUway in running order from Memphis to
Grand Junction. His force was then disposed so as to pro
tect the Hne of the raUway, Hurlbut's division at Grand Junc
tion and La Grange, his own at Moscow and Lafayette.
On the 29th of June, in accordance with instructions
received by telegraph from General HaUeck, leaving one regi
ment and a section of artUlery at each of these points, Sher
man marched on HoUy Springs, twenty-five miles eqmcHstant
from La Grange and Moscow, to co-operate with HamUton's
division, of Eosecrans' corps, which he was informed would
reach there at a given time. Concentrating at HudsonvUle by
converging roads, the two divisions reached the Coldwater,
five mUes from HoUy Springs, early on the morning of the ap
pointed day. Denver's brigade, and the Fourth Illinois Cav
alry, the latter two hundred strong, were sent forward, and
drove the enemy, consisting of about fifteen hundred cavalry,
through and beyond the town of HoUy Springs. Nothing was

MEMPHIS. 73
heard of HamUton, who had approached within nineteen mUes
of HoUy Springs and then retired to Corinth ; but, on the 6th,
orders were received from General HaUeck to faU back to the
raUway and protect it, and the command accordingly returned
to its former position.
Early in July, upon the appointment of General HaUeck
as general-in-chief of the Armies of the United States, the
Department of the Mississippi was broken up, and General
Grant was assigned to the command of the Department of
the T'ennessee, embracing the theatre of his previous opera
tions. That officer taking advantage of the period of in
activity which now foUowed, turned his attention to the con-
¦ dition of the country occupied by his command. Memphis
in particular was in a sad phght. Nearly aU of its young
men were in the rebel army, many of its old men had fled
upon the approach of the Union troops, or in anticipation
of such an event, and in their places appeared a horde of
unscrupulous traders, eager to make money in any legitimate
way, and deeming any way legitimate that brought them large
profits. They struck hands with other men of the same stamp
whom they found in Memphis ready for their use, and the city
became a nest of contraband trade. Commerce and war are
mortal foes. Wherever they meet or cross each other's path,
one of them must die. If the trader's gold is stronger than
the soldier's honor, the soldier's honor trails in the dust, war
grows languid, barter duUs the sword, treason flourishes, and
spies reign. If the soldier spurns the bribe, in whatever in
nocent shape it may creep, trade perishes, merchants walk
the streets idly, or crowd the headquarters uselessly, stoie-
houses gape vacantly or turn into hospitals, women and chU
dren starve, and the provost-marshal is king. And these
tilings are necessarUy so. War itself is so cruel that those
means are most truly humane which tend to bring the con
test soonest to a close, regarcUess of every intermediate con
sideration apart from its object. The general must think only
of his army.
On 15th of July, fi-om Corinth, General Grant sent tele-

74 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
graphic orders to Sherman, to march at once, with his own
and Hurlbut's division, to Memphis, reheve BrigacHer-General
Hovey m command of that place, and send aU the infantry of
WaUace's cHvision to Helena, Arkansas, to report to General
Curtis. Accordingly, on Monday, July 21st, Sherman assumed
command of the district of Memphis, stationmg liis own di
vision in Fort Pickering, and Hurlbut's on the river below, and
on the 24th sent the other troops to Helena.
General Grant had strongly impressed upon him the neces
sity of immediately abatmg the evils and disorders prevailing
within the Hmits of his new command. He was to put Mem
phis in a thorough state of defence. With regard to civU
matters, his instructions were few. When the head of a f amUy
had gone South, the famUy must be made to foUow. The quar
termaster was to seize, and rent for account of whom it may
concern, aU buUdings leased or left vacant and belonging to
disloyal owners. AH negroes working for the United States
were to be registered, and an account kept of their time, so
that an adjustment could afterwards be made with their
owners, if the Government should decide on taking that course.
It wUl be remembered that the Government had not yet de
clared, or even adopted, any definite policy with respect to the
slaves in the country occupied by our forces.
Memphis was a camp of the Confederate Army, was cap
tured by the United States Army, and was occupied and held
by it as a mUitary post. In a country, or in any part of it,
held by an army in time of war, whether offensively or defen
sively, there is no law but the law of war. The law of war is
the viU of the commander. He is accountable only to his
superiors. Nothing exists within the Hmits of his command,
except by his choice. With respect to his army, he is gov
erned by the Articles of War and the army regulations ; with
regard to aU others, his power is unlimited, except to the ex
tent that it may be abridged or controUed by the instructions
of his Government.
Sherman permitted the mayor and other civil officers of the
city to remain in the exercise of their functions, restricting

MEMPHIS. 75
i
them to the preservation of law and order among the citizens,
and the Hghting and cleaning of the streets, and confining the
action of the provost-marshal and his guards to persons in the
mUitary service and to buUdings and grounds used by the army.
The expenses of the local government were to be defrayed
by municipal taxes. Sherman held that aU persons who re
mained in Memphis were bound to bear true aUegiance to the
United States, and, therefore, did not always exact an oath of
loyalty ; that they must make their choice at once between
the rebelhon and the Union ; and that if they stayed and
helped the enemy in any way, they were to be treated as spies.
He required no provost-marshal's passes for inland travel, but
restricted it to the five main roads leading from the city, and
stationed guards on them to minutely inspect aU persons and
property going in or out. No cotton was aUowed to be bought
beyond the Hnes and brought in, except on contracts to be
paid at the end of the war, so that the enemy might get no
aid therefrom. Gold, sUver, and treasury notes, when sent into
the Confederate Hnes in exchange for cotton, always found
their way, as he knew, sooner or later, voluntarUy or by force,
into the Confederate treasury, and were used to buy arms for
the Confederate army in the British colonies. He, therefore,
absolutely prohibited their use in payment. He forbade the
exportation of salt, because it was used to cure bacon and
beef, and thus to mobUize the Confederate army. A strict
search was also made for arms and ammunition, which were
often employed by the rapacious and unscrupulous traders as
a means of accompHshing their ends. AU able-bodied male
negroes were required to work, either for their masters or for
the Government, and the women and chUdren, as weU as the
feeble, he refused to support or feed ; but in no case did he
permit any intimidation or persuasion to be used, with those
who chose to leave their masters, to compel or induce them to
return. With regard to aU these subjects, he preferred not to
meddle with detaUs or individual cases, but laid down fuU,
clear, and precise rules, in the form of written instructions for
the guidance of his subordinates, and left the execution to

76 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
them. His constant endeavor was to apply severe and exact
justice to aU, and to avoid the entanglements and anomahes
of exceptions in favor of particular persons. Shortly after
wards, when the Government issued orders removing the mU
itary' restrictions imposed on the purchase of cotton, Sherman
yielded a ready acquiescence, but at once addressed strong
^remonstrances on the subject to the authorities at Washington,
assuring them that the measure would greatly strengthen the
hands of the Confederate forces. He also turned his attention
;to the depredations of the guerriUas who had hitherto infested
the district, harbored and assisted by the more evU-disposed
of the inhabitants, protected against capture by the vicinity
of a large friencUy army, and secured against punishment by
threats of retahation upon the persons of our prisoners of
war in the hands of the enemy. A guerriUa is a person who,
alone or in company with a few comrades, wages war within
or behind the Hnes of an enemy, for the purpose of inflicting
incidental injury upon the persons or property of isolated
persons or parties belonging to the opposing forces, adhering
to the cause, or not adhering to the cause, of the army by
which the guerriUa is sustained. He is careless as to the means
he employs and the persons against whom he employs them.
He wears no uniform. Eobbery, arson, and murder he com
mits as a solcHer. When in danger of capture, he throws away
his arms and becomes a citizen. When captured, he produces
his commission or points to his muster-roU, and is again a
soldier. A few guerrUlas endanger the Hves and property of
the thousands of non-combatants from whom they cannot be
distinguished by the eye. The rebel government and the rebel
commanders seem to have considered every thing justifiable
that could be done by them in connection with the war : so
they justified guerriUas and upheld them. Sherman regarded
them as wUd beasts, hunted them down and destroyed
them. Where Union famUies were harassed, he caused the
famUies of secessionists to be punished. Where steamboats,
engaged in peaceful commerce, were fired upon, he caused the
property of secessionists to be destroyed, and he finaUy an-

MEMPHIS. 77
nounced that, for every boat attacked by guerrUlas, ten seces
sion famihes should be exUed from the comforts of Memphis.
If, however, the inhabitants would resist the guerrUlas, he would
aUow them to bring in produce and take out suppHes. Thus,
order and quiet were, for the time being, restored throughout
the Hmits of his command.
During the faU several important expeditions were sent out
from Memphis. Early in September, Hurlbut moved with his
division to BrownsviUe, for the purpose of threatening the
flank of any force moving from the line of the TaUahatchie
against General Grant's position at BoHvar; whUe, at the
same time, Brigadier-General Morgan L. Smith with his
brigade, a battery of artUlery, and four hunched cavah-y under
Colonel B. H. Grierson, Sixth Illinois Cavahy, moved to HoUy
Springs, destroyed the road and raUway bridges over the Cold-
water, and then returned, having held in check and cHverted
the enemy's forces assembUng at HoUy Springs to threaten
Grant's commimications, and by destroying the bridges having
prevented the enemy from harassing the flank of a column
moving eastward from Memphis.
In the latter part of October, General Grant summon^
General Sherman to meet him at Columbus, Kentucky, to
arrange the plan of the coming campaign. Grant's army occu
pied, substantiaUy, the line from Memphis eastward along the
Chattanooga raUway to Corinth. The Army of the Potomac
remained inactive in Western Maryland ; the Army of the
Ohio, having defeated Bragg's invasion by the decisive victory
at Eichmond, Kentucky, held the passive defensive ; and in
Missouri, General Curtis was preparing to resist invasion fi-om
Arkansas. The gTeat work before the Army of the Tennessee
was the capture of Vicksburg. But the enemy, about forty
thousand strong, under Lieutenant-General Pemberton, must
first be dislodged fi-om the Hne of the TaUahatchie, which
they held hi force, with aU the fords and bridges strongly for
tified. Grant was to move his main army direct from Jackson
by Grand Junction and La Grange, foUowing generaUy the
Hne of the MobUe and Ohio EaUway. Sherman was to move

78 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
out of Memphis with four brigades of infantry on the Tchula-
homa road, to strike the enemy at Wyatt's simultaneously
with Grant's arrival at Waterford. Major-General C. C. Wash-
burne, over whom Grant had been authorized to exercise
command in case of necessity, was instructed by Sherman
to cross the Mississippi with above five thousand cavalry fi-om
Helena, Arkansas, and march rapidly on Grenada, to threaten
the enemy's rear. Precisely on the day appointed, the three
columns moved as indicated. WhUe Pemberton was intent
in preparations to meet Grant and Sherman behind his fortifi
cations, he learned that Washburne, with a force of which he
could not conjecture the size, source, or destination, had
crossed the TaUahatchie, near the mouth of the YaUabusha,
and was rapicUy approaching the raUways in his rear. There
was no time to hesitate. Abandoning his works, Pemberton
relinquished the line of the TaUahatchie without a battle, and
hastUy retreated on Grenada.
During the faU, and in preparation for the movement on
Vicksburg, a sufficient number of the regiments caUed out by
the President, after the failure of the summer campaign in
Virginia, reported to General Sherihan, to sweU his division to
six brigades ; and by persistent and repeated appHcations he
finally succeeded in adcHng the only organized battahon of his
own regTilar regiment, the Thirteenth Infantry, under the com
mand of Captain Edward C. Washington. Early in Novem
ber, the division, which in the latter part of October had been
renumbered as the First Division of the Army of the Tennes
see, was organized as foUows :
The first brigade, Brigadier-General Morgan L. Smith, con
sisted of the Sixth Missouri, Eighth Missouri, Fifty-fourth
Ohio, One Hundred and Thirteenth Illinois, and One Hundred
and Ttuentidh Illinois.
Second brigade. Colonel John A. McDoweU, of the Sixth
Iowa ; Sixth Iowa, Fortieth EHnois, Forty-sixth Ohio, Thir
teenth U. S. Infantry, and One Hundredth Indiana.
Third brigade, Brigadier-General James W. Denver ; Forty-

MEMPHIS. 79
eighth Ohio, Fifty-third Ohio, Seventieth Ohio, Ninety-seventh
Indiana, and Ninety-ninth Indiana.
Fourth brigade, Colonel David Stuart, of the Fifty-fifth HU-
nois; Fifty-fifth EHnois, Fifty-seventh Ohio, Eighty -third In
diana, One Hundred and Sixteenth Illinois, and One Hundred
and Twenty -seventh Illinois.
Fifth brigade. Colonel E. P. Buckland of the Seventy-second
Ohio ; Seventy-second Ohio, Thirty-second Wisconsin, Ninety-
third Illinois, and One Hundred and Fourteenth Illinois.
Sixth, or reserve brigade; the Thirty-third Wisconsin, and
One Hundred and Seventeenth lUinois.
Besides these regiments of infantry, there were attached to
the division, and unassigned to brigades, seven batteries of
Hght artUlery, and the Sixth lUinois CavaHy, Colonel Ben
jamin H. Grierson. The new regiments are designated in
itahcs. Early in the winter of 1862, the organization of army corps
cominenced in the Army of the Potomac, just before its spring
campaigm was introduced in the West. In December, the
troops serving in the Department of the Tennessee were desig
nated as the Thirteenth Army Corps, and Major-General
Grant as the commander. He immediately subdivided his
command, designating the troops in the cHstrict of Memphis
as the right wing of the Thirteenth Corps, to be commanded
by Major-General Sherman, and to be organized for active
service in tliree divisions. Sherman assigned Brigadier-
General Andrew J. Smith to the command of the first division,
consisting of the new brigades of Burbridge and Landrum ;
Brigadier-General Morgan L. Smith to the second division,
including the brigades of Colonel GUes A. Smith, Eighth
Missouri, and David Stuart, Fifty-fifth lUinois, formerly the
first and fourth brigades ; and Brigadier-General George W.
Morgan to the third division, comprising the new brigades of
Osterhaus and Colonels Lindsay and De Courcey. The other
brigades remained as the garrison of Memphis.

80 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.

CHAPTEE VII.
THE ATTEMPT ON VICKSBUEG.
Geneeal Geant directed General Sherman to proceed with
the right vring of the Thirteenth Corps to the mouth of the
Yazoo Eiver, and there disembark and attempt the capture of
Vicksburg from the north side, while he himself, with the left
wing, should move on Jackson, against the enemy from the
rear, and, uniting the two columns, proceed to invest the place,
in the event of the first part of the plan proving impracti
cable. Before entering upon the duty now confided to him, Sher
man issued the foUowing characteristic orders, dated Memphis,
December 18, 1862 :
" I. The expedition now fitting out is purely of a miHtary
character, and the interests involved are of too important a
character to be mixed up with personal and private business.
No citizen, male or female, wUl be aUowed to accompany it,
unless employed as part of a crew, or as servants to the trans
ports. Female chambermaids to t%e boats, and nurses to the
sick alone, wiU be aUowed, unless the wives of captains and
pilots actuaUy belonging to the boats. No laundress, officer's
or soldier's wife must pass below Helena.
" n. No person whatever, citizen, officer, or sutler, wiU, on
any consideration, buy or deal in cotton, or other produce of
the country. Should any cotton be brought on board of any
transport, going or returning, the brigade quartermaster, of
which the boat forms a part, wiU take possession of it, and in
voice it to Captain A. E. Eddy, chief quartermaster at Mem
phis. " III. Should any cotton or other produce' be brought back

THE ATTEMPT ON VICKSBURG 81
to Memphis by any chartered boat, Captam Eddy wiU take
possession of the same, and seU it for the benefit of the United
States. If accompanied by its actual producer, the planter or
factor, the quartermaster will furnish him with a receipt for
the same, to be settled for on proof of -his loyalty at the close
of the war.
" IV. Boats ascending the river may take cotton from the
shore for bulkheads to protect their engines or crew, but on
arrival at Memphis it must be turned over to the quarter
master, with a statement of the time, place, and name of its
owner. The trade in cotton must await a more peaceful state
of affairs.
"V. Should any citizen accompany the expedition below
Helena, in violation of those orders, any colonel of a regiment,
or captain of a battery, wiU conscript him into the service of
the United States for the unexpired term of his command. If
he show a refractory spirit, unfitting him for a soldier, the
commanding officer present wUl turn him over to the captain
of the boat as a deck-hand, and compel him to work in that
capacity, without wages, untU the boat returns to Memphis.
" VI. Any person whatever, whether in the service of the
United States or transports, found making reports for publi
cation which might reach the enemy, giving them information,
aid, and comfort, wiU be arrested and treated as spies."
Sherman embarked at Memphis on the 20th of December,
1862, two days later than the time originally designated, hav
ing been delayed by the great want of steamboat transporta-
. tion. The three divisions of A. J. Smith, M. L. Smith, and Mor
gan, reported a grand aggregate of thirty thousand and
sixty-eight officers and men of aU arms for duty. At Helena
his force was increased by the division of Brigadier-General
Frederick Steele, twelve thousand three hundred and ten
strong, comprising the brigades of Brigadier-Generals C. E.
Hovey, John M. Thayer, Wyman, and Frank P. Blair, Jr.
The place of rendezvous was at Friar's Point, on the left bank
of the Mississippi, below Helena. The fleet reached MUliken's
6

82 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
Bend on the night of the twenty-fourth. On Christmas day
BrigacHer-General Burbridge landed with his brigade of A. J.
Smith's division, and broke up the Vicksburg and Texas
raUway for a long distance near the crossing of the Tensas ;
and without waiting for his return, Sherman pushed on to a
point opposite the mouth of the Yazoo, landed on the west
bank, and sent Morgan L. Smith with his division to break
up the same road at a point eight miles from Vicksburg. On
the 20th, the transports, led and convoyed by the gunboat
fleet, under Acting Eear Admiral D. D. Porter, ascended the
old mouth of the Yazoo about twelve miles. Of the tran
sport fleet, Morgan's cHvision led the advance, foUowed in order
by Steele, Morgan L. Smith, and A. J. Smith. By noon on
the 27th, the entire command had disembarked on the south
bank of the river, near the mouth of the Chickasaw bayou, a
smaU stream, which, rising near the town of Vicl^sburg, finds
its way across the bottom land about midway between the
bluffs and the river. The clay bluffs, which are about three
hundred feet high, and very steep, recede from the Mississippi
on the north side of the town, and foUow the course of the
river at a distance of about four miles, the intermediate space
being an aUuvial swamp, full of lagoons, bayous, and quick
sands, and covered with cottonwood, cypress, and a dense
undergrowth of tangled vines. The Yazoo was very low, and
its banks were about thirty feet above the water. On reach
ing the point of debarkation, De Courcey's, Stuart's, and
Blau's brigade, were sent forward in the direction of Vicks
burg about three miles, and as soon as the whole army had
cHsembarked it moved out in four columns, Steele's above the
mouth of Chickasaw bayou ; Morgan, with Blair's brigade of
Steele's division, below the same bayou ; Morgan L. Smith's
on the main road from Johnson's plantation to Vicksburg,
with orders to bear to his left, so as to strike the bayou
about a raUe south of where Morgan was ordered to cross it,
and A. J. Smith's division on the main road.
AU the heads of columns met the enemy's pickets, and
drove them towaids Vicksburg. During the night of the

THE ATTEMPT ON VICKSBURG. 83
27th, the ground was reconnoitred as weU as possible, and it
was found to be as difficult as it could possibly be from nature
and art. ImmecHately in front was a bayou, passable only at
two points, on a narrow levee and on a sand-bar, Avhich were
perfectly commanded by the enemy's sharpshooters that lined
the levee or parapet on its opposite bank. Behind this was
an irregular strip of beach or table-land, on which were con
structed a series of rifle-pits and batteries, and behind that a
high abrupt range of hUls, whose scarred sides were marked
aU the way up with rifle-trenches, and the crowns of the
principal hiUs presented heavy batteries. The cxjunty road
leading fi'om Vicksburg to Yazoo City ran along the foot of
these hUls, and served the enemy as a covered way along
which he moved his artiUery and infantry promptly to meet
the Union forces at any point at which they attempted to
cross this cHfficult bayou. Nevertheless, that bayou, with its
levee parapet backed by the Hnes of rifle-pits, batteries, and
frowning hiUs, had to be passed before they could reach firm
ground, and meet their enemy on any thing Hke fair terms.
Steele, in his progress, foUowed substantiaUy an old levee
back fi'om the Yazoo to the foot of the liiUs north of Thomp
son's Lake, but found that in order to reach the hard land he
would have to cross a long corduroy causeway, with a battery
enfilacHng it, others cross-firing it, with a similar line of rifle-
pits and trenches before described. He skumished with the
enemy on the morning of the 28th, whUe the other columns
were similarly engaged ; but on close and critical examination
of the swamp and causeway in his front, with the batteries
and rifie-pits weU manned, he came to the conclusion that it
was impossible for him to reach the county road without a
fearfid sacrifice of life.
On his reporting that he could not cross from his position
to the one occupied by the centre, Sherman ordered him to
retrace his steps and return in steamboats to the southwest
side of Chickasaw bayou, and support Morgan's division.
This he accomphshed during the night of the 28th, arriving
in time to support him, and take part in the assault of the 29th.

84 SHERIVUN AND Hia CAMPAIGNS.
Morgan's division were evidently on the best of existing
ways from Yazoo to firm land. He had attached to his trains
the pontoons with which to make a bridge, in addition to the
ford or crossing, wliich was known to be in his fi-ont, and by
which the enemy's picket had retreated.
The pontoon bridge was placed during the night across a
bayou, supposed to be the main bayou, but which turned out
to be an inferior one, and it was therefore useless ; but the
natural crossing remained, and Morgan was ordered to cross
with his division, and carry the line of works to the summit of
the hiU by a determined assault.
During the morning of the 28th a heavy fog enveloped the
whole of the country. General Morgan advanced De Courcey's
brigade and engaged the enemy : heavy firing of artiUery and
infantry was sustamed, and his column moved on untU he en
countered the real bayou, which again checked his progress,
and was not passed until the next day.
At the point where Morgan L. Smith's division reached the
bayou was a narrow sand strip with abattis throwm clown by
the enemy on our side, having the same deep boggy bayou
with its levee parapet and system of cross-batteries and rifle-
pits on the other side.
To pass it in the front by the flank would have been utter
destruction, for the head of the column would have been swept
away as fast as it presented itself above the steep bank.
Wlule reconnoitring it on the morning of the 28th, during the
heavy fog. General Morgan L. Smith was shot in the hip by
a chance rifle-buUet, and disabled, so that he had to be re
moved to the boats, and th.us at a critical moment was lost
one of the best and most daring leaders, a practical soldier
and enthusiastic patriot. Brigadier-General David Stuart,
who succeeded to his place and to the execution of his orders,
immediately stucHed the nature of the ground in his front, saw
aU its difficulties, and made the best possible disposition to
pass over his division as soon as he should hear General Mor
gan engaged on his left.
To his right General A. J. Smith had placed General Bur-

THE ATTEMPT ON VICKSBURG. 85
bridge's brigade of his cH-\dsion, mth orders to make rafts and
cross over a portion of his men, to dispose his artillery so as
to fire at the enemy across the bayou, and produce the effect
of a cHversion.
Landrum's brigade of A. J. Smith's division occupied a high
position on the main road, with pickets and supports pushed
weU forward into the tangled abattis within throe-fourths of
a mUe of the enemy's forts, and in plain view of the to^vn of
Vicksburg. The boats stUl lay at the place of debarkation, covered by
the gunboats and four regiments of infantry, one of each di
vision. Such was the cHsposition of Sherman's forces during
the night of the 28th.
The enemy's right was a series of batteries or forts seven
mUes above us on the Yazoo, at the first bluft' near Snyder's
house, called Drumgould's Bluff ; his left the fortified town of
Vicksburg ; and his Hne connecting these was near foiuteen
mUes in extent, and was a natural fortification, strengthened
by a year's labor of thousands of negroes, duected by educated
and skilful officers.
Sherman's design was by a prompt and concentrated move
ment to break the centre near Chickasaw Creek, at the head
of a bayou of the same name, and once in position, to tum to
the right, Vicksburg, or left, Drumgould's. According to
information then obtained- he supposed the organized force of
the enemy to amount to about fifteen thousand, which could
be reinforced at the rate of about four thousand a day, pro
vided General Grant did not occupy aU the attention of Pem-
berton's forces at Grenada, or Eosecrans those of Bragg in
Tennessee. Nothing had yet been heard from General Grant, who was
supposed to be pushing south ; or of General Banks, who was
supposed to be ascending the Mississippi, but who in reahty
had but very recently reached New Orleans, and was engaged
in gathering his officers there and at Baton Eouge, and in
regulating the civU details of his department. Time being aU-
important, Sherman then determined to assault the hUls in

86 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
front of Morgan on the morning of the 29th, — Morgan's divi
sion to carry the position to the summit of the hUl, Steele's
division to support him and hold the county road. General
A. J. Smith was placed in command of his own first division,
and M. L. Smith's second division, with orders to cross on the
sand-spit, undermin'e the steep bank of the bayou on the fur
ther side, or carry at aU events the levee parapet and first line
of rifle-pits, to prevent a concentration on Morgan. It was
nearly noon when Morgan was ready, by which time Blair's
and Thayer's brigades of Steele's division were up with him,
and took part in the assault, and Hovey's brigade was also
near at hand. AU the troops were massed as closely as possi
ble, and the supports were weU on hand.
The assault was made, and a lodgment effected on the
hard table-land near the county road, and the heads of the
assaulting columns reached different points of the enemy's
works ; but here met so withering a fire from the rifle-pits, and
cross-fire of gxape and canister from the batteries, that the
columns faltered, and finaUy feU back to the point of starting,
leaving many dead, wounded, and prisoners in the hands of
the enemy.
General Morgan at first reported that the troops of his di
vision were not at aU discouraged, though the losses in Blair's
and De Ccfurcey's brigades were heavy, and that he would re
new the assault in HaH an hour.
Sherman then urged General A. J. Smith to push his attack,
though it had to be made across a narrow sand-bar, and up a
narrow path in the nature of a breach, as a diversion in favor
of Morgan, or a real attack, according to its success. Durmg
Morgan's progress, he crossed over the Sixth Missouri, covered
by the Tliirteenth Eegulars deployed as skirmishers up to the
bank of the Bayou, protecting themselves as weU as possible
by faUen trees, and firing at any of the enemy's sharpshooters
that showed a mark above the levee. AU the ground was
completely swept beforehand by the artUlery, under the hn-
mediate supervision of Major E. Taylor, chief of artUlery.
The Sixth JMissouri crossed rapidly by companies, and lay

THE ATTEMPT ON VICKSBURG. 87
under the bank of the Bayou with the enemy's sharpshooters
over their heads within a few feet, so near that these sharp
shooters held out their muskets and fired clown verticaUy
upon our men. The orders were to undermine this bank and
make a road up it ; but it was impossible, and after the repulse
of Morgan's assault, Sherman ordered General A. J. Smith to
retire this regiment under cover of darkness, which was suc-
cessfuUy done, though Avith heavy loss.
Whilst this was going on, Burbridge was skirmishing across
the Bayou in his front, and Landrum pushed his advance
through the close abattis and entanglement of faUen timber
close up to Vicksburg. Wlien the night of the 29th closed in
we stood upon our original ground, and had suffered a re
pulse. During the night it rained very hard, and our men
were exposed to it in the miry, swampy ground, sheltered
only by their blankets and rubber ponchos, but during the
following clay it cleared off, and the weather became warm.
After a personal examination of the various positions, Sher
man came to the conclusion that he could not break the ene
my's centre without being too much crippled to act with any
vigor, afterwards. New combinations having therefore be
come necessary, he proposed to Admual Porter that the navy
should cover a landing at some point close up to the Drum
gould's Bluff batteries, while he would hold the present
ground, and send ten thousand choice troops to attack the
enemy's right, and carry the batteries at that point ; which, if
successful, would give us the substantial possession! of the
Yazoo Eiver, and place Sherman in communication with Gen
eral Grant. Admiral Porter lent his hearty concurrence to
this plan, and it was agreed that the expeditionary force
should be embarked immediately after dark on the night of
the 31st of December, and under cover of aU the gunboats,
proceed before clay slowly and sUently up to the batteries ;
the troops there to land, storm the batteries, and hold them.
Whilst this was going on, Sherman was to attack the enemy be
low, and hold him in check, preventing reinforcements going up
to the bluff, and, in case of success, to move aU his force thither.

88 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
Steele's cHvision and one brigade of Morgan L. Smiths
division were designated and embarked ; the gunboats were aU
in position, and up to midnight every thing appeared favorable.
The assatdt was to take place about four a. m. Sherman had
aU his officers at their posts, ready to act on the first sound
of cannonading in the direction of Drumgould's Bluff; but
about dayhght he received a note from General Steele, stating
that Admiral Porter had found the fog so dense on the river,
that the boats could not move, and that the expedition must
be deferred tUl another night. Before night of January 1,
1863, he received a note from the admiral, stating that inas
much as the moon would not set untU twenty-five minutes
past five, the landing must be a dayhght affau, which in his
judgment would be too hazardous to try.
Thus cHsappeared the only remaining chance of securing a
lodgment on the ridge between the Yazoo and Black rivers,
from which to operate upon Vicksburg and the raUAvay to the
east, as weU as to secure the navigation of the Yazoo Eiver.
One thud of the command had akeady embarked for this
expecHtion, and the rest were bivouacked in Ioav, swampy, tim-;
bered ground, which a single night's rain would have made a
quagmire. Marks of overfiow stained the trees from ten to
twelve feet above their roots. A further attempt against the
centre was deemed by aU the brigade and cHvision command
ers impracticable.
It had now become evident to aU the commanders that for ¦
some cause unknown to them, the co-operating column under
General Grant had faUed. A Aveek had elapsed since tlie
time when it should have reached the rear of Vicksburg, yet
nothing was heard from it. Sherman accordingly decided to
abandon the attack and return to MUliken's Bend, Avhich had
a large extent of clear land, houses for storage, good roads in
the rear, plenty of corn and forage, and the same advantages
as any other point for operating against the enemy inland, on
the river below Vicksburg, or at any point above where he
might attempt to interrupt the navigation of the Mississippi
River.

THE ATTEMPT ON VICKSBURG. 89
On the morning of the 2d of January, the troops and
materiel were embarked, and at 3 o'clock that afternoon the
last of the transports, under convoy and protection of the
gunboats, passed out of the Yazoo. At the mouth of that
river. General Sherman met and reported to Major-General
McClernand, who had come down on the steamer " Tigress,"
with orders to assume command of the expedition. On arriv
ing at MUHken's Bend, on the 4th of January, 1863, Sherman
at once relinquished the command to General McClernand,
and announced the fact to the army in the foUoAving fareweU
order :
" Pursuant to the terms of General Order No. 1, made this
day by General McClernand, the title of our army ceases to
exist, and constitutes in the future .the Army of the Missis
sippi, composed of tAvo ' army corps,' one to be commanded
by Gen. G. W. Morgan, and the other by myseU. In relin
quishing the command of the Army of the Tennessee, and re
stricting my authority to my own ' corps,' I desire to express
to. aU commanders, to the solcHers and officers recently oper
ating before Vicksburg, my hearty thanks for the zeal, alac
rity, and courage manifested by them on aU occasions. We
faUed in accompHshing one great purpose of our movement,
the capturing of Vicksburg ; but we were part of a whole.
Ours Avas but part of a combined movement, in which others
were to assist. We were on time. Unforeseen contingencies
must have delayed the others.
" We have destroyed the Shreveport road, we have attacked
the defences of Vicksburg, and pushed the attack as far as
prudence would justify, and having found it too strong for our
single column, we have drawn off in good order and good
spirits, ready for any new move. A new commander is now
hero to lead you. He is chosen by the President of the United
States, who is charged by the Constitution to maintain and
defend it, and he has the undoubted right to select his ovm
agents. I know that aU good officers and soldiers wUl give
him the same hearty support and cheerful obedience they have

90 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
hitherto given me. There are honors enough in reserA^e for aU,
and Avork enough too. Let each do his appropriate part, and
our nation must in the end emerge from this dire conffict
purified and ennobled by the fires which now test its strength
and purity."
The disgraceful surrender of HoUy Springs, on the 20th of
December, Avith its immense depot of supf)lies, essential to the
movement of the column under General Grant, had delayed
the march of that officer, and unexpectedly demanded his at
tention in another quarter, AvhUe the enemy was thus enabled
to concentrate for the defence of Vicksburg, behind positions
naturaUy and artificiaUy too strong to be carried by assault.
Thus it was that the expecHtion under Sherman faded. In an
official communication, -^-itten after the capture of Vicksburg,
General Grant says : " General Sherman's arrangement as
commander of troops in the attack on Chickasaw Bluffs, last
December, Avas admuable. Seeing the ground from the oppo-"
site side from the attack, afterwards, I saw the impossibUity
of making it successful."

ARKANSAS POST. 91

CHAPTEE Vin.
ARKANSAS POST.
Majoe-Geneeal McCleenand brought with him an order,
issued by the War .Department, dividing the Army of the
Tennessee into four separate army corps, to be knoAvn as
the Thirteenth, FUteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth, and
to be respectively commanded by Major-Generals John A.
McClernand, WiUiam T. Sherman, Stephen A. Hurlbut, and
James B. McPherson, whUe General Grant Avas to retain
command of the Avhole. The army corps had noAV become
the unit of administration and of field movements. Com
pletely organized, generaUy possessing within itself aU the
elements of a separate army, its commander was enabled
to cHspose promptly of the great mass of administrative de
taUs Avithout the necessity of carrying them up to general
headquarters, to breed delay and vexation and to distract the
mind of the general-in-chief from the essential matters upon
which his mind should have leisure to concentrate its energies.
Immediately on assuming command, General McClernand
assigned Brigadier-General George W. Morgan to the imme-
iiate command of his own corps, the Tlurteenth, composing
the left wing, and consisting of A. J. Smith's cHvision and
Morgan's OAvn cHvision, now to be commanded by Brigadier-
General P. J. Osterhaus.
Sherman's Fifteenth Corps, which was to constitute the
right wing, comprised the First DiAdsion, under tho command
of Brigadier-General Frederick Steele, and the Second Divi
sion, temporarUy under the command of BrigacHer-General
David Stuart, in the absence of Brigadier-General Morgan L
Smith.

92 SHERJIAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
Steele's first division was now organized as foUows : br aU,
Fust brigade, BrigacHer-General Frank P. Blair— Tlli*^ and
HHnois, TAventy-ninth Missouri, Thirty-first Missouri^nfljct
second Missouri, Fifty-eighth Ohio, Thirtieth Missouri. ->,gth
Second brigade, BrigacHer-General C. E. Hovey— Se\
teenth Missouri, TAventy-fifth Iowa, Third Missom'i, Sevent'i
sixth Ohio, Thirty-first Iowa, Twelfth Missouri.
Thud brigade, Brigadier-General John M. Thayer — Fourth'
Iowa, Thuty-fourth Iowa, Thirtieth Iowa, Twenty-sixth loAva,
Ninth Iowa, infantry.
' ArtiUery — First Iowa, Captain Griffiths ; Fourth Ohio, Cap
tain Hoffman, and First Missouri horse artUlery.
Cavalry- — Third lUinois, and a company of the Fifteenth
Illinois. The second cHvision, formerly Sherman's fifth division, of the
Army of the Tennessee, consisted of the following named troops :
First brigade, Colonel G. A. Smith, commanding — Eighth
Missouri, Sixth Missouri, One Hundred and Thuteenth lUinois,
One Hundred and Sixteenth lUinois, Thirteenth United States.
'Second brigade. Colonel T. Kilby Smith, commanchng —
Fifty-fifth lUinois, One Hundred and Twenty-seventh Illinois,
Fifty-fourth Ohio, Eighty-third Indiana, Fifty-seventh Ohio,
infantry. ArtUlery — Companies A and B, First Illinois Light ArtiUery,
and Eighth Ohio battery.
Cavah-y — Tavo companies of Thielman's Illinois battahon,.
and Company C, Tenth Missouri.
On the 4th of January, 1863, the expedition sailed on the
same transports that had brought them from Vicksburg, con
voyed by Admiral Porter's fleet of gunboats, to attack Fort
Hindman, commonly knoAvn as Arkansas Post, an old French
settlement situated on the left or north bank of the Arkansas
Eiver, fifty mUes from its mouth and one hundred and seven
teen below Little Eock. This fort was a very strong bastioned
work, constructed by the rebels at the head of a horse-shoe
bend, on an elevated bluff which here touches the river and
defines for some cHstance its left bank. The work has four

ARKANSAS POST. 93
bastion fronts, inclosing a space about one hundred yards
square, and a line of rifle-pits extended three-quarters of a mile
across a neck of level ground to a bayou on the Avest and
north. In the fort three heavy iron guns, one three-inch rifled
gun, and four six-pounder smooth bores were mounted at the
saHents and flanks, and six tAvelve-pounder howitzers and three-
inch rifles Avere distributed along the rifle-pits. The garrison
consisted of about five thousand men, under BrigacHer-General
T. J. ChurchUl, of the Confederate army. He was ordered by
Lieutenant-General Holmes, commanding the rebel forces in
Arkansas, to hold the post " tUl all are dead."
The expecHtion Avas suggested by General Sherman, and the
idea was promptly adopted by General McClernand. Its
object Avas to employ the troops, which would otherwise have
remained idly waiting for the fuU development of the combina
tions against Vicksburg, in opening the way to Little Eock ;
thus placing the Arkansas Eiver under the control of the Union
armies, and putthig an end to the dangerous detached opera
tions C9,rriecl on from that point against our communications
on the Mississippi. The former river traversing and nearly
bisecting Arkansas from northwest to southeast, is the key to
the mUitary possession of the State.
The expedition moved up the White Eiver through the cut
off which unites its waters with those of the Arkansas, up the
latter stream to Notrib's farm, three miles below Fort Hind-
man, where the troops began to disembark at five o'clock on
the afternoon of January 9th. By noon on the lOtli the land
ing was completed, and the troops were on the march to invest
the post. Sherman's Fifteenth Corps took the adva nee, and was
to pass round the rear of the enemy's works, and form Hne with
his right resting on the river above the fort. The Thirteenth
Corps, under Brigadier-Getieral Morgan, was to foUow, and
connecting with General Sherman's right, complete the invest
ment on the left. The gunboats opened a terrific fire upon
the enemy during the afternoon, to distract his attention. By
nightfall the troops were in position, Steele on the right, rest
ing on the bayou, Stuart next, A. J. Smith's division on Stuart's

94 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
left, and Osterhaus's cHvision on the extreme left near the river.
During the night of the 9th and the following day Colonel D.
W. Lindsay's brigade of Osterhaus's division had landed on the
right bank of the river below Notrib's farm, and marching
across the bend had taken up a position and planted a battery
on that bank above the fort, so as to effectually prevent the
succor of the garrison, or its escape by water.
Admual Porter kept up a furious bombardment untU after
dark. Early on the morning of the 11th, Sherman moved his
corps into an easy position for assault, looking south, across
ground encumbered by faUen trees and covered with low
bushes. The enemy could be seen moving back and forth
along his lines, occasionaUy noticing our presence by some
iU-directed shots Avliich did us Httle harm, and accustomed the
men to the sound of rifle-cannon. By ten A. m. Sherman re
ported to Gener,al McClernand in person that he was aU ready
for the assault, and only awaited the simultaneous movement
of the gunboats. ^ They were to silence the fort, and save the
troops fi'om the enfilacHng fire of its artUleiy along the only
possible line of attack.
About half-past twelve notice was received that the gun
boats were in motion. Wood's Battery, Company A, Chicago
\ Light ArtiUery, was posted on the road which led duectly into
I the Post ; Banett's Battery B, First lUinois Ai-tUlery, was in
the open space in the interval between Stuart's and Steele's
divisions, and Steele had two of his batteries disposed in his
front. Sherman's orders were, that as soon as the gunboats
opened fire aU his batteries in position should commence firing,
and continue untU he commanded " cease firing," when, aftei
three minutes' cessation, the infantry columns of Steele's and
Stuart's cHA'isions were to assault the enemy's line of rifle-pits
and defences.
The gunboats opened abqut one p. m., and our field-batteries
at once commenced firing, directing their shots at the enemy's
guns, his line of defences, and more especiaUy enfilading the
road which led directly into the fort, and 'which separated
Morgan's line of f),ttack from Sherman's. The gunboats could

ARKANSAS POST. 95
not be seen, and their progress had to be judged by the
sound of their fire,— at first slow and steady, but rapicUy
approaching the fort and enveloping it with a storm of sheUs
and shot. The field-batteries continued their fire rapicUy for
about fifteen minutes, the enemy not replying, Avhen Sherman,
having Avithdrawn the skumish line^ ordered the firing to cease
and the columns to advance to the assault. The infantry
sprang forward with a cheer, rapidly crossed the hundred
yards of clear* space in their immediate H'ont, and dashed into
a belt of ground about three hundred yards wide, separating
them from the enemy's parapets, sHghtly cut up by gaUleys and
depressions, and covered with standing trees, brush, and faUen
timber. There they encountered the fire of the enemy's ar
tUlery and infantry, weU directed from their perfect cover.
The speed of our advance was checked, and afterwards became
more cautious and prudent. By three p. m. Sherman's lines
were Avithin one hundred yards of the enemy's trenches, and
flanking him on our right, and completely euA^eloping his
position. The gunboats could be seen close up to the fort, the
admiral's flag cHrectly under it. AU artiUery fire from the fort
had ceased, and only occasionally could be seen a few of the
enemy's infantry firing from its parapets ; but the strongest
resistance continued in our immediate front, where the enemy's
infantry was massed, comparatively safe from the gTinboats,
which were compeUed to direct their fire weU to the fi-ont, lest
it should injure our own troops. A brisk fire of musketry
was kept up along our Avhole front Avith an occasional discharge
of artiUery through the intervals of the infantry Hnes untU four
p. M., when the white flag appeared aU along the enemy's lines.
Sherman immediately ordered General Steele to push a brigade
doAvn the bayou on his right, to prevent the escape of the
enemy. Simultaneously Avith Sherman's assault, Burbridge's brigade
Avith the One HimcHecl and Eighteenth lUinois' and Sixty-ninth
Indiana, of Landrum's, and the One Hundred and Twentieth
Ohio, of Colonel Sheldon's brigade, dashed forward under a
deacUy fire quite to the enemy's intrenchments ; the Sixteenth

96 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
Indiana, Lieutenant-Colonel John M. Orr, with the Eighty-
third Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Baldwin, of Burbridge's bri
gade, and the One Hundred and TAventieth Ohio, Colonel D.
French, of Colonel Sheldon's brigade, being the first to enter
the fort. Presenting himself 'at the entrance of the fort. Gen
eral Burbridge was halted by the guard, Avho denied that they
had surrendered, until he caUed their attention to the white
flag, and ordered them to ground their arms.
Colonel Lindsay, as soon as a gunboat had passed above
the fort, hastened Avith his brigade doAvn the opposite shore,
and opened an oblique fire from Foster's two twenty, and
Lieutenant WUson's two ten pounder Parrott's, into the
enemy's Hne of rifle-pits, carrying away his battle-flag and
kUling a number of his men.
The fort had surrendered. With cheers and shouts our
troops poured into the works.
As soon as order could be restored, Brigadier-General A.
J. Smith was assigned to the command of the fort itseH, and
Brigadier-General David Stuart to the charge of the prisoners
and the exterior defences.
Our entire loss in kUled was 129 ; in wounded, 831 ; and in
missing, 17 ; total, 977. Sherman's corps lost 4 officers and
75 men kUled, and 34 officers and 400 men wounded ; making
a total of 519.
General ChurchUl, in his official report, dated Eichmond,
May 6, 1863, to Lieutenant-General Holmes, commanding the
Department of Arkansas, states that his loss "wiU not ex
ceed — kiUed, and 75 or 80 wounded." He estimates the
Union force at 50,000, his OAvn at 3,000, and our loss at from
1,500 to 2,000.
By the surrender there feU into our hands 5,000 men, m-
cludihg three entire brigades of the enemy, commanded re
spectively by Colonels Garland, Deshler, and Dunnington;
seventeen pieces of cannon ; three thousand serviceable smaU-
arms ; forty-six thousand rounds of ammunition ; and five
hundred and sixty-three animals.
After sending the prisoners to St. Louis, having destroyed

ARKANSAS POST. 97
the defences and aU buUdings used for mUitary purposes, on
the 15th of January the troops re-embarked on the transports
and proceeded to Napoleon, Arkansas, whence on the 17th, in
obedience to orders received from Major-General Grant, they
returned to MUHken's Bend. Sherman had been in favor of
taking advantage of a rise in the Arkansas to threaten Little
Eock, and force aU scattered bands of the enemy to seek
safety south of that river ; but General McClernand was un-
AviUing to take so great a responsibUity in addition to that he
had akeady incurred, by entering upon so important an enter
prise without orders.
In noticing the services of the subordinate commanders,
General McClernand remarks : " General Sherman exhibited
his usual activity and enterprise ; General Morgan proved his
tactical skUl and strategic talent ; whUe Generals Steele,
Smith, Osterhaus, and Stuart, and the several brigade com
manders displayed the fitting quahties of brave and successful
officers." At Napoleon, Sherman was joined by the brigade of Brig
adier-General Hugh Ewing, which had been on the way to
join General Eosecrans ; but that officer having just defeated
Bragg in the desperate and decisive action of Stone Eiver, no
longer needed reinforcements. Ewing's command was as
signed to Morgan L. Smith's second division, as the thud
brigade of that division. The effective force of the Fifteenth
Corps was now fifteen thousand nine hundred and nine men
of aU arms-. 7

98 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIG^¦S.

CHAPTEE rS.
THE SIEGE AND FALL OF 'VICKSBUEG.
On the 19th of January, Sherman proceeded with his corps
to Young's Point, opposite Vicksburg, and reported to Grant.
Here he was joined by the division of Brigadier-General J. M.
Tuttle, consisting of Mower's, Buckland's, and Woods' bri
gades. From the moment of taking personal command of the
army at MUHken's Bend, General Grant became convinced that
Vicksburg could only be taken from the south. He immedi
ately caused work to be prosecuted on the canal begun the pre
vious summer by Brigadier-General Thomas WUHams, under
the orders of Major-General Butler, with the view of effecting
an artificial cut-off across the peninsiUa opposite Vicksburg,
through which transports, troops, and suppHes might safely
pass to the river below the enemy's batteries at that place.
Somewhat later he also caused a channel to be cut through
the west bank into Lake Providence, Avith the design of pass
ing doAvn tluough Bayou Baxter, Bayou Macon, and the
Tensas, Wachita, and Eed rivers ; and a tlurd canal through
the Yazoo Pass into the Coldwater by means of which 'troops
might enter the TaUahatchie, and thence descending the
Yazoo, land on the high ground above Haines' Bluff. For
various reasons, none of these plans succeeded.
WhUe the gunboats and troops sent through Yazoo Pass
were delayed near Greenwood at the junction of the YaUa
busha and TaUahatchie, where the rebels had taken advan
tage of a bend in the river to constract a formidable work.
Admiral Porter reconnoitred stiU another route. Seven mUes
above the mouth of the Yazoo, Steele's bayou empties into

THE SIEGE AND PALL OP VICKSBURG. 99
that river ; thirty mUes up Steele's bayou, Black bayou enters
it from Deer Creek, six mUes distant ; ascending Deer Creek
eighteen mUes, EoUing Fork connects it Anth the Big Sun
flower Eiver, ten mUes cHstant ; and descending the Big Sun
flower forty-one mUes, you again enter the Yazoo, sixty mUes
from its mouth. By taking this course, the troops and gun
boats would reach a strong position between Haines' Bluff
and Greenwood ; the enemy's forces at the latter point would
be placed between tAvo strong columns of the Union army, and
would be compeUed to faU back on Vicksburg ; one of the most
important sources of suppHes would be lost to the enemy, and
a valuable line of operations gained f®r us. Satisfying him
self by a personal reconnoissance, in company A\ith Admiral
Porter, that the chances of success were sufficient to warrant
so important an undertaking, on the 16th of March, General
Grant ordered General Sherman to take Stuart's second divi
sion of the Fifteenth Corps, open the route, in co-operation Avith
the gunboats, and seize some tenable position on the east
bank of the Yazoo, whence to operate against Vicksburg and
the forts at Haines' Bluff. Sherman started immediately with
the Eighth Missouri regiment, and a detachment of pioneers,
to open the bayou, and the next morning was foUowed by the
remainder of the troops, who, in order to economize trans
portation, ascended the Mississippi to Eagle's Bend, where
Steele's bayou approaches within a mile of the river, connected
with it by Mud bayou, and there disembarking, marched across
by land to. Steele's bayou. The 18th and the forenoon of the
19th were spent in bridging Mud bayou, which was greatly
swoUen by a crevasse. Marching to Steele's bayou, but one
transport was found there, and the tliree foUoAving days were
spent in transporting the troops up the bayou, in such boats
as became avaUable. At the mouth of Black bayou the troops
were transferred from the steamers to coal barges and taken
in tow by a tug. Admual Porter had started on the 14th of
March Avith the gunboats LouisviUe, Lieutenant-Commander
Owen; Cincinnati, Lieutenant-Commanding Bache; Caronde-
Uit, Lieutenant^Commanding Murphy; Mound City, Lieuten-

100 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
ant-Commanding WUson ; Fittsburgh, Lieutenant-Commandmg
Hoel, four mortar-boats, and four tugs. The fleet easUy
passed up Steele's bayou, which, though very narroAV, con
tained thuty feet of water ; but Black's bayou was foimd to
be obstructed by faUen and overhanging trees, which had to
be puUed out by the roots and pushed aside before the gun
boats could pass, and the frequent bends were so abmpt that
the boats had to be heaved around them, Avith hardly a foot of
room to spare. Twenty-four hours were occupied in going
four mUes into Deer Creek. The gunboats entered Deei Creek
safely, aud pushed theu way through the overhanging branches
of cypress and widow, with which it was obstructed, at the
rate of about a mUe an hour at first, graduaUy diminishing as
the difficulties increased, to haH a mUe an hour. When within
seven mUes of the Eolling Fork, the Confederate agents and'
some of the planters forcibly compeUed the negroes to cut
doAvn immense trees duectly across the Creek, for the purpose
of delaying the advance. EemoAdng these artificial obstruc
tions, in adcHtion to the natural ones, Avith almost incredible
labor, when Avithin three mUes of Eolling Fork, smoke was
discovered in the direction of the Yazoo, and information
reached Admiral Porter that the enemy was advancing vrith
five thousand men, to dispute his progress. The Ca7-onddet,
Lieutenant-Commanding Murphy, was sent ahead to hold the
entrance to EoUing Fork, and on the night of the 20th March
found the gunboats Avithin eight hundred yards of that stream,
Avith only two or three trees and a narrow lane of Avillows be
tween them and open navigation. The next morning about
six hundred of the enemy, vrith a battery of field-piecea, made
theu appearance, and began to annoy the fleet by sharp
shooters, and to feU trees in front and rear. Sherman had
not yet arrived. The road lay along the banks of the bayous,
and he had found the banks overflowed below HUl's planta
tion on Deer Creek, at the he ad of Black bayou, so that the
troops had to be transported twenty-eight mUes to the mouth
of Black bayou, on two smaH steamers, there transferred to a
single coal-barge, and towed by a smaU tug two mUes, to the

THE SIEGE AND FALL OF VICKSBURG. IQl
first dry ground. The wooden transports encountered the
same difficulties that met the iron-clad gunboats, without the
same means of overcoming them. It was a slow process.
Sherman was now at HUl's plantation, with only three regi
ments. But upon receipt of a note from Admiral Porter,
stating his condition, on the morning of the 21st, Colonel
Smith, with the Sixth and Eighth Missouri and One Hundred
and Sixteenth HHnois regiments of his brigade, was at once
sent forward, and by a forced march of twenty-one miles over
a terrible swamp road, succeeded in reaching the gimboats, to
find them almost completely surrounded by the entire force
sent out by the enemy through the Yazoo, and unable to move
in either duection. The creek was so narrow that the broad
side guns were quite useless, and only one boAV-gun could be
brought to bear by either of the gunboats, and .the steep
banks requued this to be fired at too great an angle to have
much effect. The enemy had estabhshed a battery of fifteen
guns in front. Colonel Smith disposed his force to protect
the fleet, and prevent the felling of trees in the rear. On the
morning of the 22d, after removing about forty of the feUed
trees, the enemy appeared in large force in rear of the gun
boats, and opened fire Avith artiUery. The gunboats repHed,
and soon drove them off. The enemy then attacked Colonel
Smith's brigade, and after a sharp sldrmish, was again repulsed.
When the firing began, Sherman, who had by great exertions
succeeded in getting up the remainder of Colonel GUes A.
Smith's brigade, consisting of the Thuteenth Eegulars and One
Hundred and Fifteenth Illinois, as weU as the Eighty-third
Indiana, One Hundi-ed and Sixteenth lUinois, Fifty-fourth and
Fifty-seventh Ohio, of Colonel T. KUby Smith's brigade, under
the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Eice, Fifty-seventh Ohio,
was advancing Arith them by a forced march, having led the
troops by candlehght through the dense canebrake, and was
six mUes distant. Hearing the guns, he pressed rapidly for
ward in the direction of the sound, and arrived just in time to
meet and disperse the enemy, who were preparing to pass round
the rear of the boats, and again dispute their movement. The

102 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
fleet was saved. The expedition might now have been con
tinued, but officers and men of army and navy were alike
exhausted ; the army had not brought rations for so long a
work, and the navy provision-boat was too large to get through ;
moreover, the enemy had had time to prepare, and fuU indi
cations of the direction and progress of the movement. There
was nothing to do but to return. All of the 22d and 23d, and
part of the 24th of March, was consumed in tediously retracing
the route to HiU's plantation. The enemy, kept at bay by the
army, did not molest the gunboats further. At Hijl's the ex
pedition rested on the 25th, and on the 26th the fleet passed
doAvn, and in accordance Avith orders received from General
Grant, Sherman returned Avith his troops to Young's Point.
" The expecHtion faded," says General Grant, " more from
want of knowledge as to what would be required to open this
route than from any impracticabihty in the navigation of the
streams and bayous through which it was proposed to pass.
Want of this knowledge led the expedition on untU difficulties
were encountered, and then it would become necessary to
send back to Young's Point for the means of removing them.
This gave the enemy time to remove forces to effectuaUy
checkmate further progress, and the expecHtion was withdraAvn
when Avithin a few hundred yards of free and open navigation
to the Yazoo."
Admual Porter also, in his official report, speaks of the
want of means of moving the troops through the bayohs as
the chief difficulty ; " for," he remarks, " there Avere never yet
any two men who would labor harder than Generals Grant
and Sherman to forward an expecHtion for the overthrow of
Vicksburg." He continues : " The army officers worked like
horses to enable them to accompHsh what was desued. . . ¦
No other general could have done better, or as weU, as Sher
man, but he had not the means for this peculiar kind of trans-
fjortation." General Grant now determined to march his army by land
to New Carthage, twenty-three miles below MUliken's Bend,
to run the transports past the batteries or through the canal,

THE SIEGE AND PALL OP VICKSBURG. 103
should the latter course prove feasible, to cross the river, and
to attack Vicksburg from the south. The movement Avas com
menced by McClernand's Thirteenth Army Corps on the 29th
of March. New Carthage was found to be an island, in conse
quence of the breakage of the levees, and the march had to be
continued twelve mUes further to Perkins' plantation. The
roads were found to be level, but very bad, and the movement
was necessarUy slow. Over these roads the suppHes of ord
nance and provisions had to be transported thirty-five mUes in
wagons. On the night of the 16th AprU, Acting Eear-Admiral Porter,
who had entered Avith alacrity and energy into the general's
plans, ran the Vicksburg batteries Avith his fieet and three
transports carrying stores, and protected by hay and cotton.
One of the transports only was lost, though aU the boats were
frequently struck. A few days later, five more transports,
simUarly prepared, and toAving twelve barges, ran the batteries
safely, a sixth being sunk, and haH the barges disabled. The
crews of the transports consisted of volunteers from the army,
picked out of many hundreds of officers and men of the army,
who offered themselves for this dangerous service. The
Hmited amount of water transportation avaUable below Vicks
burg now rendered it necessary for the army to march by a
cucuitous route, avoiding' the flooded lands, thuty-five mUes
further to Hard Times, thus lengthening the Hne of communi
cation with MUHken's Bend to seventy mUes. The final orders
of General Grant for the movement, issued on the 20th of
AprU, gave McClernand's Thuteenth Corps the right, Mc-
Pherson's Seventeenth Corps the centre, and Sherman's Fif
teenth Corps the left, and directed the army to moA^e by the
right flank, no faster, however, than suppHes and ammunition
could be transported to them. On the 26th of AprU, when it
was discovered that the march must be continued below New
Carthage, General Grant sent orders to General Sherman to
wait untU the roads should improve, or the canals be finished ;
and, on the 28th, he notified Sherman that the foUoAring day
was fixed upon for attacking Grand GuH, and suggested that

104 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
a simultaneous feint on the enemy's batteries on the Yazoo,
near Haines' Bluff, would be most deskable, provided it
could be made without the Ul-effect on the army and the
country of an apparent repulse. The object was to make as
great a show as possible, in order to prevent reinforcements
being sent from Vicksburg to the assistance of the forces
which would have to be encountered at Grand GuH. " The
ruse," says General Grant, "succeeded admirably." In his
official report, dated May 21st, 1863, convinced that the army
could distinguish a feint from a real attack by succeeding
events, and that the country would in due season recover
from the effect, Sherman gave the necessary orders, embarked
Blau's second division on ten steamboats, and about 10 A. Ji.
on the 29th AprU, proceeded to the mouth of the Yazoo, where
he found the flag-boat Black Hawk, Captain Breese, with the
Choctaw and De Kalb, kon-clads, and the Tyler, and several
smaller Avooden boats of the fleet, already Avith steam up, pre
pared to co-operate in the proposed demonstration against
Haines' Bluff.
The expedition at once proceeded up the Yazoo in order;
lay for the night of AprU 29th at the mouth of Chickasaw
bayou, and early next morning proceeded to within easy range
of the enemy's batteries.
The gunboats at once engaged the batteries, and for four
hours a vigorous demonstration was kept up. Towards evening,
Sherman ordered the division of troops to disembark in full
view of the enemy, and seemingly prepare to assault ; but he
knew fuU weU that there was no road across the submerged
field that lay between the river and the bluff. As soon as the
troops were fauly out on the levee, the gunboats resumed their
fire, and the enemy's batter: is repHed with spkit. The enemy -
could be seen moving guns, artiUery, and infantry back and
forth, and evidently expecting a real attack. Keeping up ap
pearances untU night, the troops were re-embarked. During
the next day simUar movements were made, accompanied by
reconnoissances of aU the country on both sides of the Yazoo.
WhUe there, orders came from General Grant to hurry for-

THE SIEGE AND PALL OP VICKSBURG. 105
ward to Grand GuH. Dispatching orders to the divisions of
Steele and Tuttle at once to march for Grand GuH via Eich
mond, Sherman prolonged the demonstration tiU night, and
quietly dropped back to his camp at Young's Point. No casu
alties were sustained, except one man of the'Eighth Missouri,
sHghtly wounded.
In the mean time, as many of the Thuteenth Army Corps as
could be got on board the transports and barges were embark
ed, and were moved down to the front of Grand Gidf, for the
purpose of landing and storming the enemy's works as soon
as the navy should have silenced the guns. Admiral Porter's
fleet opened at eight A. M. on the 29th of AprU, and gaUantly
kept up a vigorous fire at short range for more than five hours ;
by which time General Grant, who Avitnessed the engagement
from a tug-boat, became conAonced that the enemy's guns were
too elevated to be sUenced, and his fortifications too strong to
be taken from the water-front. He at once ordered the troops
back to Hard Times, there to cHsembark and march across the
pohit to the plain immediately below Grand GuH. During the
night, under cover of the fire of the gunboats, aU the trans
ports and barges ran safely past the batteries. They were
immediately foUowed by the fleet, and at dayhght, on the 30th,
the work of ferrying the troops over to Bruinsburg was com
menced. The Thirteenth Corps was started on the road to
Port Gibson as soon as it could draw three days' rations, and
the Seventeenth Corps followed as fast as it was landed on the
east bank. The enemy was met in force near Port Gibson at
two o'clock on the afternoon of the 1st of May, was driven back
on the foUowing day, was pursued across the Bayou Pierre,
and eight mUes beyond the north fork of the same bayou, both
which streams were bridged by McPherson's corps ; and on
the 3d of May, with sHght skumishing aU day, was pushed to
and across the Big Black Eiver, at Hankinson's Ferry. Find
ing here that the enemy had evacuated Grand Gulf, and that
we were akeady fifteen mUes from that place on the direct
road to either Vicksburg or Jackson, General Grant halted
his army to wait for wagons, suppHes- and Sherman's corps,

106 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
and went back to Grand Gulf in person, to move the depot of
supplies to that point.
Sherman reached Yoimg's Point on the night of May 1st.
On the foUowing morning, the second division, now com
manded by General Blair, moved up to MUHken's Bend to
garrison that place untU reheved by troops ordered from
Memphis for that purpose; and at the same time, General
Sherman himseH, with Steele's and Tuttle's divisions, took
up the Hne of march to join General Grant. They reached
Hard Times at noon on the 6th, crossed the Mississippi to
Grand GuH during the night and the foUoAving day, and on
the 8th marched eighteen mUes to Hankinson's Ferry, rehev-
ing Crocker's division and enabHng it to join McPherson's
corps. General Grant's orders for a general advance had
been issued the day previous, and the movement had akeady
begun. McPherson was to take the right-hand road by Eocky
Springs and Utica to Eaymond, and thence to Jackson;
McClernand, the left-hand road, through WUlow Springs, keep
ing as near the Black Eiver as possible ; Sherman to move on '
Edwards' Station, and both he and McClernand to strike the
raUroad between Edwards' Station and Bolton. At noon on
the 10th, Sherman destroyed the floating bridge over the Big
Black and marched to Big Sandy ; on the 11th he reached
Auburn, and on the morning of the 12th encountered and dis
persed a smaU force of the enemy endeavoring to obstruct the
crossing of Fourteen MUe Creek. Pausing for the pioneers,
to make a new crossing in Heu of a bridge burned by the
enemy's rear-guard, towards evening Sherman met General
Grant on the other side of Fourteen Mile Creek, and was
ordered to encamp there, Steele's division towards Edwards'
Depot and Tuttle's towards Eaymond. During the night, news
was received that McPherson, with the Seventeenth Corps,
had the same day met and defeated two brigades of the enemy
at Eaymond, and that the enemy had retreated upon Jackson,
where reinforcements were constantly arriving, and where
General Joseph E. Johnston was hourly expected to take per
sonal command.

THE SIEGE AND PALL OP VICKSBURG. 107
Determining to make sure of Jackson, and to leave no
enemy in his rear, if it could be avoided. General Grant at
once changed his orders to McClernand and Sherman, and
directed them to march upon Eaymond. On the 13th, Mc
Pherson moved to Chnton, Sherman to a paraUel position at
Mississippi Springs, and McClernand to a point near Eaymond.
Having communicated during the night, so as to reach theu
destination at the same hour, on the 14th, Sherman and Mc
Pherson marched fourteen mUes, and at noon engaged the
enemy near Jackson. At this time McClernand occupied
Clinton, Mississippi Springs, and Eaymond, each with one
division, and had Blau's division of Sherman's corps near
New Auburn, and had halted, according to orders, Avithin
supporting distance. The enemy marched out with the bulk
of his forces on the Chnton road and engaged McPherson's
corjjs about two and a half mUes from Jackson, whUe a smaU
force of artUlery and infantry took a strong position in fr'ont
of Sherman, about the same distance from the city, on the
¦ Mississippi Springs road, and endeavored by unusual activity,
aided by the nature of the ground, to create the appearance
of great strength, so as to delay Sherman's advance untU the
contest vntli McPherson should be decided.
During the day it rained in torrents, and the roads, which
had been very dusty, became equaUy muddy, but the troops
pushed on, and about 10 A. m. were within three mUes of Jack
son. Then were heard the guns of McPherson to the left, and
the cavalry advance reported an enemy in front, at a smaU
bridge at the foot of the ridge along which the road led.
The enemy opened briskly with a battery. HastUy recon
noitring the position, Sherman ordered Mower's and Matthie's,
formerly Woods', brigades of Tuttle's division, to deploy forward
to the right and left of t!he road, and Buckland's to close up.
Waterhouse's and Spohre's batteries were placed on com
manding ground and soon sUenced the enemy's guns, when he
retked about haH a mUe into the skirt of woods in front of the
intrenchments at Jackson. Mower's brigade foUowed him up,
and he soon took refuge behind the intrenchments.

108 SHERMAN AND HIS CAISIPAIGNS.
The stream, owing to its precipitous banks, could only be
passed on the bridge, which the enemy did not attempt to
destroy, and forming the troops in similar order beyond the
bridge, only that Mower's brigade, from the bourse he took in
foUowing the enemy, occupied the ground to the left of the
road, and Matthie's brigade to the right, the two batteries in
the centre, and Buckland's brigade in reserve.
As the troops emerged from the woods in theu front, and
as far to their left as they could se6, appeared a Hne of in
trenchments, and the enemy kept up a brisk fire Anth artUlery
from the points that enfiladed the road. In order to ascertain
the nature of the flanks of this line of intrenchments, Sher
man duected Captain Pitzman, acting engineer, to take the
Ninety-fifth Ohio, and make a detour to the right, to see what
was there. WhUe he was gone Steele's division closed up.
About one p. m. Captain Pitzman returned, reporting that he
found the enemy's intrenchments abandoned at the point
where he crossed the raUroad, and had left the Ninety-fifth
Ohio there in possession. Sherman at once orde^'ed General
Steele to lead his whole diAdsion into Jackson by that route,
and as soon as the cheers of his men were heard, Tuttle's
division was ordered in by the main road. The enemy's in
fantry had escaped to the north by the Canton road, but we
captured about two hundred and fifty prisoners, Avith aU the
enemy's artUlery (eighteen guns), and much ammunition and
valuable pubhc stores. MeanwhUe, after a warn^ engagement,
lasting more than two hours, McPherson had badly defeated
the main body of the enemy, and driven it north. The pur
suit was kept up untU nearly dark.
Disposing the troops on the outskkts of the town, in obe
dience to a summons from General Grant, Sherman met him
and General McPherson near the State-house, and received
orders to occupy the Hne of rifle-pits, and on the foUoAmg
day to destroy effectuaUy the raUroad tracks in and about
Jackson, and aU the property belonging to the enemy. Ac
cordingly, on the morning of the 15th of May, Steele's divi
sion was set to work to destroy the raUroad and property to

THE SIEGE AND PALL OP VICKRSBURG. 109 .
the south and east, including Pearl Eiver Bridge, and Tuttle's
division to the north and west. The raUroads were destroyed
by burning the ties and warping the iron for a distance of f our
mUes east of Jackson, three south, three north, and ten west.
In Jackson the arsenal buUdings, the government foundry,
the gun-carriage estabhshment, including the carriages for tAvo
complete six-gun batteries, stable, carpenter and paint shops,
Avere destroyed. The penitentiary was burned, as is supposed,
by some convicts who had been set free by the Confederate
authorities. A valuable cotton factory was also burned to the
ground, as machinery of that kind could so easUy be convert
ed into hostUe uses ; and the United States could better afford
to compensate the OAvners for their property, and feed the
poor famihes thus thrown out of employment, than to spare
the property. Other buUdings were destroyed in Jackson by
some mischievous solcHers, who could not be detected, includ
ing the Cathohc church and the Confederate hotel — the former
accidentaUy, and the latter from mahce.
Immediately on entering Jackson, General Grant had or
dered McClernand Avith his corps and Blak's division of Sher
man's corps to face towards Bolton, and march by roads con
verging near that place to Edward's Station. McPherson was
also dkected to retrace his route to Chnton and foUow Mc
Clernand. Early on the morning of the 16th, hearing that
Pemberton, with a force estimated by the enemy at ten bat
teries of artUlery and twenty-five thousand men, was taking
up positions to attack him. General Grant, who had intended
to leave one division, of the Fifteenth Corps a day longer in
Jackson, ordered Sherman to bring up his entire command at
once, and move Avith aU possible dispatch untU he should
come up Avith the main body near Bolton. At the same time
McClernand was ordered to move from the position reached
on the night of the 15th, near Bolton, upon Edward's Station,
and McPherson was ordered to join him.
Sherman received his orders at ten minutes past seven A. m.
In an hour his advance division, Steele's, was in motion, Tuttle's
foUoAved at noon, and by night the corps had marched twenty

210 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
miles to Bolton. During the day the main body met the
enemy in strong force at Champion HiUs, and after a terrible
contest of several hours' duration, fought chiefly by Hovey's
division of McClernand's corps, and Logan's and Quimby's
divisions of McPherson's corps, defeated him, capturing a
large number of guns and prisoners, and .cutting off the whole
of Loring's division from Pemberton's army. That night
Sherman was ordered to turn his corps to the right and move
on Bridgeport, where Blau's division was to join him. On
the morning of the 17th, McClernand and McPherson con
tinued the pursuit along the raUroad, the former in advance.
In a brUliant affau, Lawler's brigade, of Carr's division, Mc
Clernand's corps, stormed the enemy's works on the east bank
of the Big Black, defending the crossing of that stream, and
captured the entue garrison, Avith seventeen guns. The enemy
immediately burned the bridge over the Big Black, and thus
finally isolated his forces on the west bank. At noon, Sher
man reached Bridgeport, where Blair met him with his divi
sion and the pontoon train, which was the only one in the
entke army. With trifling opposition the pontoon bridge was
laid by night, and Blair's and Steele's divisions passed over,
foUowed by Tuttle's division in the morning. Dming the
night of the 17th, McClernand and McPherson bridged the
Big Black, and by eight A. m., on the 18th, began to cross, the
former on the Jackson and Vicksburg road, the latter above
it. McClernand marched to Mount Albans and there turned
to the left, on the BaldAvin's Ferry road. McPherson came
into the same road with Sherman, and turned to the left, where,
as wUl be presently seen, the latter turned to the right, at the
fork of the Bridgeport road, within three and a haH mUes of
Vicksburg. Starting at daybreak, Sherman pushed rapidly forward, and
by haH-past nine A. M., of. May 18th, the head of his column
reached the Benton road and commanded the Yazoo, inter
posing a superior force between the enem-y at Vicksburg and
the forts on the Yazoo. Besting a sufficient time to enable the
column to close up, Sherman pushed forward to the point

THE SIEGE AND PALL OP VICKSBURG. m
where the road forks, and sending out on each road the
Thkteenth Eegulars to the right, and the Eighth Missouri to
the left, with _ a battery at the fork, awaited G'eneral Grant's
arrival. He very soon came up, and dkected Sherman to
operate on the right, McPherson on the centre, and McCler
nand on the left. Leaving a sufficient force on the main road
to hold it tUl McPherson came up, Sherman pushed the head
of his column on this road tiU the skirmishers were within
musket-range of the defences of Vicksburg. Here he disposed
Blair's division to the front, Tuttle's in support, and ordered
Steele's to foUow a blind road to the right tUl he reached the
Mississippi. By dark his advance was on the bluffs, and
early next morning he reached the Haines' Bluff road, getting
possession of the enemy's outer works, camps, and many
prisoners left behind during thek hasty evacuation, and had
his pickets up within easy range of the enemy's new Hne of
defences. By eight A. M. of May 19th we had encompassed
the enemy to the north of Vicksburg, our right resting on the
Mississippi Eiver, within view of our fleets at the mouth of the
Yazoo and Young's Point ; Vicksburg was in plain sight, and
nothing separated the two armies but a space of about four
hundred yards of very difficult ground, cut up by almost im
practicable ravines and the enemy's line of intrenchments.
Sherman ordered the Fourth Iowa Cavaky to proceed rapidly
up to Haines' Bluff and secure possession of the place, it being
perfectly open to the rear. By four p. M. the cavaky were on the
high bluff behind, and Colonel Swan, finding that the place
had been evacuated, dispatched a company to secure it.
Oommunicaition was opened Anth the fleet at Young's Point
and the mouth of the Yazoo, and bridges and roads made to
bring up ammunition and provisions from the mouth of the
Chickasaw bayou, to which point supply-boats had been
ordered by General Grant. Up to that time, Sherman's men
had HtcraUy lived upon the country, having left Grand GuK
May 8th Arith three days' rations in thek haversacks, and
having received Httle or nothing from the commissary untU
the 18th.

112 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
The three corps being in position, and Vicksburg as com-.
pletely invested as our strength admitted, and, relying upon
the demorahzation of the enemy, in consequence of his re
peated and disastrous defeats outside of the works. Genera]
Grant ordered a general assault to take place at two o'clock
in the afternoon of the 19th. At that hour, Blair's division
moved forward, EAving's and GUes Smith's brigades on tho
right of the road, and KUby Smith's brigade on the left,
Avith artiUery disposed on the right and left to cover thu
point where the toad enters the enemy's intrenchments.
Tuttle's division was held on the road, Avith Buckland's bri
gade deployed in line to the rear of Blau and the othei
two brigades tmder cover. , At the appointed signal the
Hne advanced, but the ground to the right and left was
so impracticable, being cut up in deep chasms, filled Avith stand
ing and faUeh timber, that the line was slow and irregular in
reaching the trenches. The Thirteenth Infantry, on the left of
GUes Smith, reached the works first, and planted its colors on
the exterior slope ; its commander. Captain Washington, was
mortaUy wounded, and five other officers, and seventy-seven
men, out of two hundred and fifty, kiUed or wounded. The
Eighty-thkd Indiana, Colonel Spooner, and the One Hundred
and Twenty-seventh Illinois, Colonel Eldridge, attained the
same position nearly at the same time, held thek ground, and
fired upon any head that presented itseH above the parapet ;
but it was impossible to enter. Other regiments gained posi
tion to the right and left close up to the parapet ; but night
found them outside the works, unsuccessfuh As soon as dark
ness closed in, Sherman ordered them back a short distance,
where the formation of the ground gave a partial shelter,
to bivouac for the night. McClernand and McPherson only
succeeded in gaining advanced positions under cover.
Spending the 20th and 21st in placing the artUlery in
commanding positions, in perfecting communications, and
in bringing up suppHes to the troops — ^who, having now
been marching and fighting for twenty days on about
five days' rations fr-om the commissary department, were

THE SIEGE AND PALL OP VICKSBURG. 113
beginning to suffer for want of bread — on the afternoon
of the latter day, General Grant issued orders for a second
assault to be made simultaneously, by heads of columns, at ten
o'clock on the morning of the 22d of May. The thiee corps
commanders set thek time by his. Precisely at the appointed
hour, and simultaneously along the whole front, the assault
commenced. In Sherman's corps, Blair's division was placed at the head
of the road, Tuttle's in support, and General Steele was to
make his attack at a point in his front about haH a mUe to
the right. The troops were grouped so that the movement
could be connected and rapid. The road Hes on the croAvn
of an interior ridge, rises over comparatively smootl' ground
along the edge of the ditch of the right face of the enemy's
bastion, and enters the parapet at the shoulder of the bas
tion. No men could be seen in the enemy's works, except oc
casionaUy a sharpshooter, who would show his head and
quickly dischargti his piece. A Hne of picked skirmishers
was placed to keep them doAvn. A volunteer storming party
of a hundred and fifty men led the column, carrying boards
and poles to bridge the ditch. This, Avith a smaU interval,
was foUowed in order by EAving's, GUes Smith's, and Kilby
Smith's brigades, bringing up the rear of Blau's division.
All marched by the flank, foUowing a road by which the
men were partiaUy sheltered, untU it was necessary to take
the crown of the ridge and expose themselves to the fuU view
of the enemy. The storming party dashed up the road at the
double-quick, foUowed by EAving's brigade, the Thktieth Ohio
leading, whUe the artiUery of Wood's, Barrett's, Waterhouse's,
Spoor's, and Hart's batteries kept a concentric fire on the bas
tion constructed to command this approach. The storming
party reached the sahent of the bastion, and passed towards
the saUy-port. Then rose from every part commanding it a
double rank of the enemy, and poured on the head of the col
umn a terrific fiire. It halted, wavered, and sought cover.
The rear pressed on, but the fire was so hot that very soon aU
foUowed this example. The head of the column crossed
8

114 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
the ditch on the left face of the bastion, and climbed up
on the extericr slope. There the colors were planted, and
the men burrowed in the earth to shield themselves from
the flank fire. The leading brigade of EAving being unable
to carry that point, the next brigade of GUes Smith was
turned doAvn a ravine, and, by a ckcuit to the left, found
cover, formed Hue, and threatened the parapet about three
hundred yards to the left of the bastion ; whUe the brigade
of KUby Smith deployed on the furthe;r slope of one of
the spurs, where, Avith EAving's brigade, they kept up a con
stant fire against any object that presented itseH above the
parapet. About two p. M., General Blak having reported that none of
his brigades could pass the point of the road swept by the
terrific fire encountered by Ewing's, but that GUes Smith had
got a position to the left in connection Avith General Eansom,
of McPherson's corps, and was ready to assault, Sherman or
dered a constant fire of artUlery and infantry to be kept up
to occupy the attention of the enemy in his front, whUe Ean-
som's and GUes Smith's brigades charged up against the par
apet. They also met a staggering fire, before which they
recoUed under cover of the hiU-side. At the same time, whUe
McPherson's whole corps was engaged, and having heard from.
General Grant General' McClernand's report, which sub
sequently proved inaccurate, that he had taken three of the
enemy's forts, and that his flags floated on the stronghold
of Vicksburg, Sherman ordered General Tuttle at once to
bend to the assault one of his brigades. He detaUed General
Mower's, and whUe General Steele was hotly engaged on the
right, and heavy firing could be heard all doAvn the line
to his left, Sherman ordered their charge, covered in hke
manner by Blak's division deployed on the hUl-side, and the
artUlery posted behind parapets Arithin point-blank range.
General Mower carried his brigade up bravely and weU, but
met a fire more severe, if possible, than that of the first assault,
with a simUar result. The colors of the leading regiment, the
Eleventh Missouri, were planted by the side of those of Blak's

O^/^^^

7^ ^^~^

THE SLEQE AND FALL OP VICKSBURG. 115
storming party, and there remained tUl AvithdraAvn, after night
fall, by Sherman's orders. General Steele, with his division,
made his assault at a point about midway between the
bastion and the Mississippi River. The ground over which
he passed was more open and exposed to the flank fire of the
enemy's batteries in position, and was deeply cut up by
guUeys and washes, but his column passed steadUy through
this fire, and reached the parapet, which was also found to
be weU manned and defended by the enemy. He could not
carry the works, but held possession of the hUl-side tUl mght,
when he withdrew his command to his present position. The
loss in Sherman's corps in this attack was about six hundred
kUled and wounded.
In the mean while portions of each of the storming columns
on McPherson's and McClemand's fronts planted their columns
on the exterior slope of the parapet, where they kept them
tiU night. But the assault had failed. The enemy's works
were naturaUy and artificiaUy too strong to be taken in that
way. The enemy was able to maintain at each point assaUed,
and at aU simultaneously the fuU force the position admitted ;
and the nature of the ground was such that only smaU col
umns could be used in the assault.
General Grant now determined to undertake a regiUar siege.
The troops worked dihgently and cheerfuUy. On the evening
of the 3d of July the saps were close to the enemy's ditch,
the mines were weU under his parapet, and every thing was in
readiness for a final assault. MeanwhUe the investing force
had been strengthened by Landrum's division from Memphis ;
Smith's and KimbaU's divisions of the Sixteenth Corps, under
Major-General C. C. Washburne ; Herron's division from Ar
kansas, and two divisions of the Ninth Corps, under Major-
General John G. Parke, from the Department of the Ohio.
By the 25th of June, our intrenchments being now as formidable
against a sortie as the enemy's works were against assault, and
there being more troops than were needed for the investment.
General Grant placed Sherman in command of the Ninth Corps
at Haines' Bluff, Landrum's division, and one division each from

116 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
the Thirteenth, Fifteenth, and Seventeenth corps, and assigned
to him the duty of watching the movements of Johnston, who
had coUected a large army at Jackson, and was apparently
about to attack the rear of the investing force, Avith the
design of raising the siege. Our position was a strong one.
The Big Black covered us from attack, and would render
Johnston's escape in the event of defeat impossible. Never
theless the condition of affairs Avith his army was so desperate
that he moved from Jackson on the 29th of June ; but whUe
he was making reconnoissances to ascertain the best point for
crossing the river, on the 4th day of July, 1863, Vicksburg
surrendered. General Grant in his official report of the siege, dated July
6th, thus aUudes to Sherman's operations while guarding the
rear : " Johnston, however, not attacking, I determined to attack
him the moment Vicksburg was in our possession, and ac
cordingly notified Sherman that I should again make an assault
on Vicksburg at dayhght on the 6th, and for him to have up
suppHes of aU descriptions ready to move upon receipt of
orders, if the assault should prove a success. 'His prepara
tions were immediately made, and when the place surrendered
on the 4th, two days earher than I had fixed for the attack,
Sherman was found ready, and moved at once with a force
increased by the remainder of both the Thirteenth and Fif
teenth Army corps, and is at present investing Jackson, where
Johnston has made a stand."
Johnston occupied the Hnes of rifle-pits covering the front
of Jackson vrith four divisions of Confederate troops, under
Major-Generals Loring, Walker, French, and Breckinridge, and
a division of cavalry, under Brigadier-General Jackson, ob
serving the fords.
After toiHng for nearly two months in the hot and stifling
trenches, vrithout pausing to share the general outbreak of joy
for the national triumph which croAvned thek labors, Sher
man's men marched fifty mUes in the heat and dust through a
country almost destitute of water, to meet the enemy.
The advance of his troops appeared before the enemy's

THE SIEGE AND FALL OP VICKSBURG. II7
works ui front of Jackson on the 9th of Jidy, and on the 12th
had invested that place, untU both flanks rested upon Pearl
Eiver. Constant and vigorous skkmishing was kept up in
front, whUe a cavalry expedition was sent off to the east of
Jackson to destroy the raUroads, untU the night of the 16th of
July. Sherman now had aU his artiUery in position, and a large
ammunition train for which he had been waiting had arrived
during the day. Learning this fact, and perceiving the im-
possibiHty of longer maintaining his position, Johnston having
previously removed the greater portion of his stores, marched
out of Jackson the same night, and destroyed the floating-
bridges over the Pearl River. Early on the morning of the
17th, the evacuation was discovered, and Sherman's troops
entered and occupied the city. Johnston continued the re
treat to Morton, thkty-five mUes east of Jackson. Two divis
ions of our troops, Avith the cavaky, foUowed as far as Brandon,
through which place they drove the enemy's cavalry on the
19th. General Sherman at once sent out expeditions in aU
quarters, to thoroughly and permanently destroy aU the
bridges, culverts, embankments, water-tanks, rails, ties, and
roUing-stock of the raUways centring in Jackson. Our loss
during the operations before Jackson was about one thousand
in aU ; the enemy's was estimated by General Johnston at 71
kUled, 504 wounded, and about 25 stragglers. We took 764
prisoners on entering the city. Leaving a smaU garrison in
Jackson, Sherman returned to the Hne of the Big Black, to
recuperate. Thus terminated, in one hundred and nine days from its first
inception, a campaign which resulted in the surrender of an
entire army of thkty-seven thousand prisoners, including fif
teen general officers ; the discomfiture and partial dispersion
of a second large army under a leader of approved skUl ; the
capture of Vicksburg ; the opening of the Mississippi River ;
and the division of the rebelhon in twain.
Of Sherman's part in the campaign General Grant remarks :
"The siege of Vicksburg and last capture of Jackson and
dispersion of Johnston's army entitle General Sherman to

118 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
more credit than usuaUy faUs to the lot of one man to earn.
His demonstration at Haines' Bluff, in April, to hold the ene-
emy about Vicksburg, whUe the army was securing a foothold
east of the Mississippi ; his rapid marches to join the army
afterwards ; his management at Jackson, Mississippi, in the
first attack ; his almost unequaUed march from Jackson to
Bridgeport, and passage of Black River ; his securing Walnut
HUls on the 18th of May, attest his great merit as a soldier."
The army now rested.

THE LULL AFTER VICKSBUEG. HQ

CHAPTER X.
THE LULL APTEE VICKSBUEG.
Immedutely after the surrender, whUe waiting for the move
ment of his columns, Sherman seized a few moments to Avrite
these hasty Hnes to his friend Admkal Porter : —
" I can appreciate the intense satisfaction you must feel
at lying before the very monster that has defied us Avith such
deep and mahgnant hate, and seeing your once disunited
fleet again a unit ; and better stUl, the chain that made an in
closed sea of a Hnk in the great river broken forever. In
so magnificent a resiUt I stop not to count who did it. It is
done, and the day of our nation's bkth is consecrated and bap
tized anew in a victory won by the united Navy and Army of
our country. God grant that the harmony and mutual respect
that exists between our respective commanders, and shared by
aU the true men of the joint service, may continue forever and
serve to elevate our national character, threatened Avith ship
wreck. Thus I muse as I sit in my soHtary camp out in the
wood far from the' point fof which we have justly striven so
long and so weU, and though personal curiosity would tempt
me to go and see the froAvning batteries and sunken pits that
haA'e defied us so long, and sent to their silent graves so many
of our early comrades in the enterprise, I feel that other tasks
He before me, and time must not be lost. Without casting
anchor, and despite the heat and the dust and the drought, I
must again into the bowels of the land to make the con
quest of Vicksburg fulfil aU the conditions it should in the
progress of this war. Whether success attend my efforts or
not, I know that Admkal Porter wUl ever accord to me the

120 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNa
exhibition of a pure and imselfish zeal in the service of our
country. " Though further apart, the navy and army avUI stUl act ia
concert, and I assure you I shaU never reach the banks of the
river or see a gimboat but I avUI think of Admiral Porter,
Captain Breese, and the many elegant and accomphshed gen
tlemen it has been my good fortune to meet on armed or
unarmed decks of the Mississippi Squadron."
There was now a luU in the war. After the great straggles
which closed the summer campaign of 1863, the combatants
relaxed thek grasp for a moment, to breathe. The Army of
the Potomac rested upon the Rapidan. The Army of the
Cumberland, gathered for the leap, lay in front of TuUahoma.
The Army of the Tennessee reposed on the banks of the river
it had won. Steele was sent to occupy Little Rock. Ord Avith
the Thkteenth Corps, went to New Orleans. By the remain
der of Grant's army the interval was spent in reorganizing
and recuperating. The Fifteenth Corps was reorganized so as
to consist of four divisions. The First, commanded by Briga
dier-General P. J. Osterhaus, was composed of two brigades,
led by BrigacHer-General C. E. Woods and Colonel J. A. WU-
Hamson, of the Fourth Iowa. The Second, commanded by
Brigadier-General Morgan L. Smith, comprised the brigades
of Brigadier-Generals GUes A. Smith and J. A. D. Lightbum.
The Thkd, commanded by Brigadier-General J. M. Tuttle,
consisted of three brigades, under Brigadier-Generals J. A.
Mower, and E. P. Buckland, and Colonel J. J. Wood, of the
TweHth Iowa. The Fourth, commanded by Brigadier-General
Hugh EAring, included the brigades led by General J. M. Corso,
Colonel Loomis, of the Twenty-sixth lUinois, and Colonel J.
E. Cocker eU, of the Seventieth Iowa. Major-General Frank
P. Blair was temporarUy reheved from duty Avith the corps,
and Major-General Steele's division accompanied that officer
to Arkansas.
We may now avaU ourselves of the luU to glance briefly at
General Sherman's correspondence, during' this period and the

THE LULL AFTER VICKSBURG. 121 ,
campaign just ended, relating to other matters than the move
ments and battles of his corps.
WhUe the new levies of 1863 were being raised, in a letter
to the governor of his native State he took occasion to urge
the importance of fiUing up the ranks of the veteran regiments
rather than raising new ones. "I beheve," he said, "you
¦wiU pardon one who rarely travels out of his proper sphere to
express an earnest hope that the strength of our people avUI
not again be wasted by the organization of new regiments,
whilst we have in the field skeleton regiments, Avith officers,
non-commissioned officers, and men, who only need numbers
to make a magnificent army.
" The President of the United States is now clothed Avith a
power that should have been conferred just tAvo years ago,
and I feel assured he avUI use it. He wUl caU for a large mass
of men, and they should aU be privates, and sent so as to
make every regiment in the field equal to one thousand men.
Time has convinced aU reasonable men that war in theory and
practice are two distinct things. Many an honest patriot,
fuU of enthusiasm, zeal, and thkst for glory, has in practice
found himseH unequal to the actual requkements of war, and
passed to one side, leaving another in his place; and, now,
after two years, Ohio has in the field one hundred and twenty-
six regiments, whose officers noio are qualified, and the men of
which would give tone and character to the new recruits. To
fiU these regiments wUl requke fifty thousand recruits, which
are as many as the State could weU raise. I therefore hope
and pray that you wUl use your influence against any more
new regiments, and consoHdation of old ones, but fiU up aU
the old ones to a fuU standard. Those who talk of prompt
and speedy peace know not what they say."
Eeverting to the enlarged scope of the war, and its probable
future, he continues : " The South to-day is more formidable
and arrogant than she was two years ago, and we lose far
more by having an insufficient number of men than from any
other cause. We are forced to invade — we must keep the war
So'ith; they are not only ruined, exhausted, but humbled in

122 SHERJLAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
pride and spkit. Admitting that our armies to the front are
equal to the occasion, which I know is not the case, our hnes
of communication are ever threatened by thek dashes, for,
which the country, the population, and character of the ene
my are aU perfectly adapted.
" Since the first hostUe shot the people of the North has had
no option, they must conquer or bo conquered. There can be
no middle course. I have never been concerned about the
copperhead squabbhngs ; the South spurns and despises this
class worse than we do, and would only accept thek overtures
to substitute them in their levies, in the cotton and corn-fields,
for the slaves who have escaped. I do not pretend, nor have
I ever pretended to foresee the end of aU this, but I do know'
that we are yet far from the end of war. I repeat that it is no
longer an open question ; we must fight it out. The moment
Ave relax, down go aU our conquests thus far. I know my
views on this point have ever been regarded as extreme, even
verging on insanity; but for years I had associated with
Bragg, Beauregard, and extreme Southern men, and long be
fore others could realize the fact that Americans would raise
thek hands against our consecrated government, I was forced
to know it, to witness it. Two years wiU not have been spent
in vain if the North now, by another magnificent upheaving
of the real people, again fiU the ranks of your proven and
tried regiments, and assure them that, through good report
and evU report, you wUl stand by them. If Ohio wUl do this,
and H the great North wiU do this, then wiU our army feel
that it has a country and a government worth dying for.
As to the poltroons, who falter and cry quits, let them dig
and raise the food the army needs — -but they should never
claim a voice in the councils of the nation."
A general order, issued from the adjutant-general's office,
directed that aU regiments which had faUen below one haH
thek maximum strength should be consoHdated by reducing
the number of companies, and mustering out such of the
field and staff officers as should thereby be rendered super
numerary. Strictly carried out, the effect of this order would

THE LULL AFTER VICKSBURG. 123
have been to reduce a very large proportion of the regiments
composing the army to the condition of feeble battahons,
Avith impaked powers for the assimUation of recruits, and Avith
the loss of many of the ablest and bravest officers. In many
cases this actuaUy occurred. To the poHcy of this order,
Sherman felt caUed upon to object. " If my judgment do not
err," he Avrote to Adjutant-General Thomas, " you have the
power to save this army from a disintegration more fatal than
defeat. "You wUl pardon so strong an expression, when I Ulus-
trate my meaning ; and if I am in error I shaU rejoice to
know it.
" The Act of Congress, known as the ' Conscript BUI,' though
containing many other provisions, was chiefly designed to or
ganize the entire avaUable mUitary strength of the nation, and
provide for its being caUed out to the assistance of the armies
now in the field. These armies are composed in great part of
regiments which, by death in battle, by disease, and discharges
for original or developed causes, have faUen far below the
minimum standard of law, and many even below ' one-haH of
the maximum strength.' Yet aU these regiments, as a general
rule, have undergone a necessary and salutary purgation.
Field-officers have acquired a knowledge which they did not
possess when first caUed to arms by the breaking out of the
war ; they have learned how to drUl, to organize, to provide
for and conduct their regiments. Captains, Heutenants, ser
geants, and corporals, have aU been educated in the dear but
necessary school of experience, and begin to have a knowl
edge which woiUd enable them to make good companies, had
they the proper number of privates. We had aU supposed
the conscript law would furnish these privates, and that at last
we would have an army with a due proportion of aU grades.
The receipt of General Orders No. 86 dispels this Ulusion,
and we must now absolutely discharge the colonels and majors,
and assistant-surgeons of aU regiments below the standard of
' one-haH the maximum.' This wUl at once take the very life
out of our army. The colonels and majors of our reduced

124 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
regiments are generaUy the best men, and are the fruit
of two years' hard and constant labor. Then the ten com
panies must be reduced to five, and of course there Avill
be discharged in each regiment — field and staff, three ; cap
tains, five ; Heutenants, ten ; sergeants, twenty ; corporals,
forty; aggregate, seventy-eight. So that each regiment
vriU be reduced in strength by seventy-eight of its chosen
and best men. Extend this to the whole army, for the army
is now or must soon faU below the standard, and the
result AriU be a very heavy loss, and that confined to the best
men. " Then, after regiments are made battahons, and again are
restored to their regimental organization, AviU come in a new
set of colonels, majors, captains, etc., etc., and what guarantee
have we but the same old process of costly elimination Avill
have to be gone over? . . A new set of colonels and majors,
and a strong infusion of new captains and Heutenants, avUI
paralyze the new organization. The army is now in about the
right condition to be re-enforced by recruits — ^privates ; but if
this consoHdation is effected, I have no hesitation in saying
that my army corps is and AviU be paralyzed by the change.
It AviU be aU loss and no gain. Eegiments wUl lose their
identity, thek pride, thek esprit. If there be no intention to
enlarge the present volunteer army, I admit that consoHda
tion is economical and right ; but when we aU feel the armies
must be fiUed up, it does seem strange we should begin by
taking out of our smaU but tried regiments some of the very
best materials in them, especiaUy their colonels."
To a lady whose sight and hearing were shocked by the con
duct and language of some of the troops, and who took
occasion to represent the matter at length, he repHed, defend
ing his men against the charges of misconduct, which, as in
aU other portions of the army, were continuaUy brought
against them in terms so vague and general that no civil
magistrate woidd have given them an instant's thought; and
himself against the aUegation that he tolerated irregulari
ties.

THE LULL AFTER VICKSBURG. 125
"Mrs. Z  has faUen into a common error in saying
it was useless to complain of a whole regiment to Brigadier-
General Smith or Major-General Sherman. We naturaUy
demanded more specific complaint against incendiary acts
than a mere vague suspicion that the  did all iniquitous
things, when twenty other regiments were camped round
about Mempliis, six thousand vagabonds and refugees hang
ing about, and the city itseH infested by gangs of thieves and
incendiaries, turned loose upon the world, and sheltered in
their deeds of darkness by charging them upon soldiers.
Neither General Morgan L. Smith or myseH ever faUed to
notice a specific complaint against any soldier of our com
mand, if accompanied by reasonable proofs ; but we did, and
rightfuUy too, resent a mere general charge, that every fire
originating from careless chimneys, careless arrangement of
stove-pipes, and the designing acts of wicked incendiaries,
shiould Avithont even an attempt at proof be charged to the
 . That regiment is one of the bravest and best dis-
cipHned in our service, and being composed mostly of young
and energetic men from the city of  , is somewhat fa
mous for its acts of fun, froHc, mischief, and even crime,
Avith a perfect skill in evading detection and pursuit. They
are lawless and violent, and, Hke aU our volunteer soldiers,
have for years been taught that the people, the masses,
the majority, are 'king,' and can do no Avrong. They
are no worse than other volunteers, aU of whom come to us
fiUed Avith the popular idea that they must enact war, that
they must clean out the secesh, must waste and not protect
thek property, must burn, waste, and destroy. Just such
people as Mrs. Z  have taught this creed, sung this
song, and urged on our men to these disgraceful acts ;
and it is such as Morgan L. Smith and W. T. Sherman
who have been combating this foul doctrine. During my
administration of affaks in Memphis, I know it was raised
from a condition of death, gloom, and darkness, to one of
hfe and comparative prosperity. Its streets, stores, hotels,
and dweUings were sad and deserted as I entered it, and

126 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
when I left it, Hfe and business prevaUed, and over fourteen
huncked enroUed Union men paraded its streets, boldly and
openly carrying the banners of our coimtry. No citizen.
Union or secesh, wUl deny that I acted laAvfuUy, firmly, and
fairly, and that substantial justice prevaUed Avith even balance.
I do feel thek testimony better than the hearsay of any would-
be notoriety."
To General Steele, whUe temporarUy detached from the
main body of his command, Sherman thus wrote respecting
the destruction of the enemy's property : —
" I most heartUy approve your purpose to return to famUies
thek carriages, buggies, and farming tools, wherewith to make
a crop. War at best is barbarism, but to involve aU — chUdren,
women, old and helpless — ^is more than can be justified. Our
men AviU become absolutely lawless unless this can be checked.
The destruction of com or forage and provisions in the enemy's
country is a weU-estabHshed law of war, and is as justffiable
as the destruction of private cotton by the Southern Confed
eracy. Jeff. Davis, no doubt, agrees that they have a right
to destroy thek people's cotton, but the guerrUlas do not stop
to inquire whose cotton they bum ; and I know, as you know,
the Confederate Government claim the war-right to bum aU
cotton, whether belonging to thek adherents ^^ to Union men.
We surely have a simUar right as to corn, cotton, fodder, &c.,
used to sustain armies and war. StUl, I always feel that the
stores necessary for a famUy should be spared, and I think it
injures our men to aUow them to plunder indiscriminately the
inhabitants of the country."
Near Jackson, Miss., at a house caUed " Hurricane," formerly
occupied as a residence by Jefferson Davis's brother, Joseph
Davis, some men of Ewing's division discovered, in a garret,
only reached through a trap-door in the ceiling, a box of letters
and papers. By the time the box reached Sherman's head
quarters, whither it was forwarded, many of the contents had

THE LULL AFTER VICKSBURG. 127
been abstracted, but the remainder were found to consist of
letters addressed to Jefferson Davis by various persons during
the preceding ten years. After attempting to arrange them
in convenient shape for examination, Sherman found the task
too great a tax on his time, and early in August forwarded
them to the adjutant-general's office at Washington.
The circumstances which form the groimdwork of some of
Whittier.'s finest verses are thus related, in an official dispatch
to the secretary of war, dated August 8th, 1863 : —
" I take the Hberty of asking, through you, that something
be done for a young lad named Orion P. Howe, of Waukegan,
Illinois, who belongs to the Fifty-fifth Illinois, but is at present
at his home wounded. I think he is too young for West Point,
but would be the very thing for a midshipman. When the
assault at Vicksburg was at its height, on the 19th of May,
and I was on foot near the road which formed the line of at
tack, this young lad came up to me wounded and bleeding,
with a good healthy boy's cry : ' General Sherman, s6nd some
cartridges to Colonel Walmbourg, the men are aU out.'
' What is the matter Avith my boy ?' ' They shot me in the
leg, but I can go to the hospital ; send the cartridges right
away.' Even where we stood, the shot feU thick, and I told
him to go to the rear at once, I would attend to the cartridges,
and off he Hmped. Just before he disappeared over the hUl,
he turned, and caUed, as loud as he could, ' Calibre 54.'
" I have not seen the boy since, and his colonel, Walm
bourg, on inquiry, gives me his address as above, and says
he is a bright inteUigent boy, Avith a fine prehminary educa
tion. "What arrested my attention then, was — and what renews
my memory of the fact now, is— that one so young, carrying
a musket-baU wound through his leg, should have foimd his
way to me on tli it fatal spot, and de'hvered his message, not
forgetting the very important part, even, of the cahbre of the
musket, which you know is an unusual one.
" I'U warrant that the boy has in him the elements of a man,

128 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
and I commend him to the Government as one worthy the
fostering care of some one of its national institutions."
On the 14th of August he received from the War Depart
ment a commission as brigadier-general in the Eegular Army
of the United States, dating from the 4th of July, 1863, and
thus acknowledged his indebtedness to General Grant for this
new honor : —
" I had the satisfaction to receive last night the appoint
ment as brigadier-rgeneral in the regular army, Avith a letter
from General HaUeck very friendly and compHmentary in its
terms. I know that I owe this to your favor, and beg to ac
knowledge it, and add, that I value the commission far less
than the fact that this AviU associate my name with yours and
McPherson's in opening the Mississippi, an achievement the
importance of which cannot be over-estimated.
"I beg to assure you of my deep personal attachment, and
to express the hope that the chafices of war AriU leave me to
serve near and under you tUl the daAvn of that peace for which
we are contending, with the only purpose that it shaU be hon
orable and lasting."
President lancoln had at the same time conferred on Gen
eral Grant himseH a commission as major-general in the regu
lar army from the same date ; and Meade for Gettysburg,
and McPherson for Vicksburg, had also been added to the
Hst of the regular brigadier-generals. To understand the
nature of the compHment thus bestowed by the Government
upon its faithful servants, it must be remembered that the
major-generals of the regular army number but five, and the
brigadier-generals but nine.
It has been aUeged in some of the newspapers of the day,
that while the army was encamped at Young's Point, General
Sherman handed to General Grant a Avritten protest against
the proposed movement on Grand GuU, and the statement
has been coupled Avith sich a show of ckcumstances as to

THE LULL AFTER VICKSBURG. 129
obtain ready credence in many quarters. In fact. General
Sherman never protested, either in writing or verbaUy, against
any movement ever proposed or adopted by General Grant ;
and throughout the entke campaign these two commanders
acted together in perfect harmony and corcHahty ; the com
mander-in-chief freely and constantly availing himseH of Sher
man's advice, the subordinate promptly and faithfuUy carrying
out the orders of his superior. But the movement on Grand
GuH was not Sherman's plan. It was the conception of Gen
eral Grant's OAvn mind, and was adopted by him, against the
opinion, though with the fuU consent and support of the
Executive. Sherman considered the north front of Vicksburg
the true point of attack, and the Hne of the YaUabusha the
best base of operations. On the 8th of AprU he frankly ex
pressed this opinion to General Grant in the foUowing com
munication :
" I would most respectfully suggest that General Grant
caU on his corps commanders for their opinions, concise and
positive, on the best general plan of campaign.
" My OAvn opinions are —
" 1st. That the Army of the Tennessee is far in advance of
the other grand armies.
" 2cl. That a corps from Missouri should forthwith be moved
from St. Louis to the A'icinity of Little Eock, Arkansas, sup
plies coUected whUe the river is full, and land communication
with Memphis opened via Des Ark, on the White and Madi
son, on the St. Francis rivers.
" 3d. That as much of Yazoo Pass, Coldwater, and TaUahat-
chee rivers as can be regained and fortified be held, and the
main army be transported thither by land or water ; that the
road back to Memphis be secured and reopened, and as soon
as the waters subside, Grenada be attacked, and the swamp
road across to Helena be patroled by cavaky.
" 4th. That the line of the YaUabusha be the base from which
to operate against the points where the Mississippi Central
crosses Big Black above Canton, and, lastly, where the Vicks-
9

130 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
burg and Jackson EaUroad crosses the same river. The cap
ture of Vicksburg would result.
" 5th. That a force be left in this vicinity not to exceed ten
thousand men, Avith only enough steamboats to float and
transport them to any desked point. This force to be held
always near enough to act with the gunboats, when the main
army is knoAvn to be near Vicksburg, Haines' Bluff, or Yazoo
City. " The chief reason for operating solely by water was the sea
son of the year, and high-water in TaUahatchee and YaUa
busha. The spring is now here, and soon these streams Avill
be no serious obstacle, save the ambuscades of forest, and
whatever works the enemy may have erected at or near
Grenada. North Mississippi is too valuable to aUow them to
hold and make crops.
" I make these suggestions with the request that General
Grant simply read them, and simply give them, as I know he
afUI, a share of his thoughts. I would prefer he should not
answer them, but merely give them as much or as Httle weight
as they deserve."
And he added in conclusion : —
" Whatever plan of action he may adopt AviU receive from
me the same zealous co-operation and energetic support as
though conceived by myseH."

MARCH TO CHATTANOOGA 13 1

CHAPTER XI.
THE MAEOH TO CHATTANOOGA AND THE BATTI4: OF MISSIONAEY
EIDGE.
While Sherman's corps was resting on the Big Black, the
situation of affaks in the central region became such as to
requke the concentration of aU avaUable troops for operations
in that theatre of war. Eosecrans had in August expeUed
the enemy from Middle Tennessee, and, by the 9th of Septem
ber, by a brUHant series of flank movements, had compeUed
Bragg to evacuate his strong fortified position at Chattanooga,
and faU back belund the Lookout and Mission mountains.
Eurnside had, at the same time, driven the rebels fr-om East
Tennessee, and had occupied KnoxviUe and Cumberland Gap.
Having lost the Mississippi, the enemy was now endeavoring
to save Tennessee, and was bringing troops from the east and
from the west to reinforce Bragg, so as to enable him to take
the offensive, and drive the Union army to the Ohio. Long-
etreet's corps was on its way from Virginia, and Loring's di
vision had arrived from Johnston's army. ,
On the 13th September, orders were sent from Washington
to Bumside to move down the Tennessee towards Chattanooga,
and to Hurlbut at Memphis and Grant and Sherman at Vicks
burg, to send aU their avaUable forces to Corinth and Tus
cumbia to co-operate with Eosecraiis, in case Bragg should
attempt to turn his right flank and invade Tennessee. On
the 23d, Howard's eleventh corps and Slocum's twelfth
corps were detached from the Army of the Potomac, united
under the command of Major-General Hooker, and ordered to
NashvUle.

132 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
On the 22d, having received a telegram from General Grant,
dkecting him to detaU one division to march to Vicksburg,
and there embark for Memphis, Sherman dispatched Oster
haus Avith his first division. At four o'clock that afternoon it
was on the march, and embarked the next day. On the 23d,
Sherman was caUed in person to Vicksburg, and instructed to
prepare to foUow with his whole corps, except Tuttle's thkd
cHvision, which was to be left with General McPherson to
guard the line of the Big Black, and to be replaced in the
FHteenth Corps by John E. Smith's division of the Seven
teenth Corps, consisting of three brigades, commanded respec
tively by BrigacHer-General Matthias, Colonel G. B. Baum,
Fifty-sixth lUinois, and Colonel J. J. Alexander, Fiftieth lUi
nois. This division was akeady on the way, and, by the 27th,
at the earhest moment when it was possible to procure steam
boat transportation, Sherman foUowed in person, Avith Morgan
L. Smith's second division, and Ewing's fourth dirision.
OAving to the low stage of water in the river and the scarcity
of wood on the banks, the last of the fleet did not reach Mem
phis untU the 4th of October. There Sherman found orders
fr-om the general-in-chief. General HaUeck, to conduct the
FHteenth Army Corps, with aU other troops -which could be
spared from the line of the Memphis and Charleston raUway,
to Athens, Alabama, and thence report for orders to General
Eosecrans, at Chattanooga. He was substantiaUy to foUow
the raUway eastwardly, repaking it as he moved, looking to
his OAvn Hnes for suppHes, and was in no event to depend for
them upon Eosecrans, the roads in whose rear were akeacly
overtaxed to meet the wants of his own army. Osterhaus'
first division was akeady in front of Corinth, and John E.
Smith's, styled the thkd, at Memphis, moving out by raU,
but the capacity of the raUroad was so Hmited that it was soon
found that animals and wagons could be moved more rapidly
by the common road, and the whole of EAving's fovuth division
moved in the same manner.
On the 11th of October, having put in march the rear of
the column, Sherman started for Corinth by raUway, in a special

MARCH TO CHATTANOOGA. 133
train, escorted by the battahon of the Thirteenth Eegular In
fantry, and reached CoUierville station at noon. The Sixty-
ninth Indiana, under Colonel D. C. Anthony, was at that
moment gaUantly defending the post against the attack by the
rebel General Chalmers with a force of nearly three thousand
cavaky and eight field-guns, and Sherman's escort arrived just
in time to assist in his defeat. The next day Sherman reached
Corinth, and ordered General Frank P. Blair, who had again
reported to him at the outset of the march, and whom he had
assigned to duty as his second in command, to take charge of
the advance, and push forward to luka with the first and
second divisions of Osterhaus and Morgan L. Smith, whUe he
hunseU remained behind a few days to push forward the troops
as they came up, and to direct the repairs. On the 19th, he
reached luka, and on the foUowing day, in accordance with a
previous agreement with Eear-Admiral Porter, two gunboats
and a decked coal-barge reached Eastport to assist in crossing
the Tennessee. WhUe the repairs of the railway Avere progress
ing, Sherman ordered General Blair to push forward with the
two divisions under his command, and drive the enemy, con
sisting of Eoddy's and Ferguson's cavaky brigades, and a
number of irregular cavalry, in aU about five thousand strong,
under the command of Major-General Stephen D. Lee, beyond
Tuscumbia. After a short engagement, Blair drove the enemy
from his front, and entered Tuscumbia on the 27tli of October.
In the mean time, on the 19th and 20th of September, Eose
crans, endeavoring to concentrate his scattered columns in the
presence of the enemy, had been attacked by Bragg, had fought
the bloody battle of Chickamauga, had retreated to Chatta
nooga, and was there practicaUy invested. On the 18th of
October, Major-General Grant, who had been sent for some
time before, arrived at LouisviUe, and in pursuance of orders
issued by the War Department on the 16th, and dehvered to
him by the Secretary of war in person, assumed command
of the MUitary Division of the Mississippi, comprising the de-
pfirtments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee,
and the three large armies operating therein. Upon his

134 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
recommendation, the secretary of war immediately issued
orders assigning Major-General Thomas to the command of
the Department of the Cumberland, and Major-General Sher
man to that of the Department of the Tennessee. Sherman
received these orders at luka, on the 25th of October, accom
panied by instructions from General Grant to retain personal
command of the army in the field. Investing Major-General
McPherson, at Vicksburg, Avith fuU authority to act in his
stead in regard to the State of Mississippi, and conferring
upon Major-General Hurlbut a simUar authority as to West
Tennessee, he at once pubHshed the foUoAving' instructions
for the guidance of the officers and soldiers of his department
in thek relations Avith the citizens : —
" AU officers in command of corps and fixed mUitary posts
AviU assume the highest military powers aUowed by the
laws of war and Congress. They must maintain the best
possible discipHne, and repress aU disorder, alarms, and
dangers in their reach. Citizens who fail to support the Gov
ernment have no right to ask favors and protection ; but if
they actively assist us in vindicating the national authority,
aU commanders AviU assist them and their famUies in every
possible way. Officers need not meddle with matters of frade
and commerce, which by law devolve on the officer of the
Treasury Department ; but whenever they discover goods con
traband of war being conveyed towards the pubhc enemy,
they AriU seize aU goods tainted by such transactions, and im
prison the parties impHcated ; but care must be taken to make
fiiU records and report such case. When a district is infested
by guerrUlas, or held by the enemy, horses and mules, wagons,
forage, etc., are aU means of war, and can be fr-eely taken, but
must be accounted for as pubhc property. If the people do
not want thek horses and com taken, they must organize and
repress aU guerriUas or hostile bands in their neighborhood.
"It is represented that officers, provost-marshals, and
others in the mUitary service, are engaged in business or
speculation on thek OAvn account, and that they charge fees

MARCH TO CHATTANOOGA. 135
for permits and passes. AU this is a breach of honor and
law. Every salaried officer of the miHtary service should de
vote every hour of his time, every thought of his mind, to his
Government, and if he makes one cent profit beyond his pay,
it is corrupt and criminal. AU officers and soldiers in this
department are hereby commanded to engage in no busi
ness whatever, save thek sworn duty to thek Govern
ment. "Every man should be with his proper corps, division,
brigade, and regiment, unless absent, sick, wounded, or de
tached by a Avritten order of a competent commander. Soldiers
when so absent must have thek descriptive joUs, and when not
provided AA'ith them the supposition is that they are improperly
absent. Mustering officers wUl see that aU absentees not
away by a Avritten order from th6k proper commander are re
ported on the muster-roUs as deserters, that they may lose
thek pay, bounty, and pensions, which a generous Government
and people have provided for soldiers who do thek whole
duty. The best hospitals in the world are provided for the
wounded and sick, but these must not be made receptacles for
absentees who seek to escape the necessary exposures and
dangers of a soldier's Hfe. Whenever possible, citizens must
be employed as nurses, cooks, attendants, stewards, etc., in
hospitals, in order that enhsted men may be where they be
long — with their regiments. The medical inspectors wiU at
tend to this at once. The general commanding announces
that he expects the wounded and sick to have every care pos
sible ; but this feeling must not be abused to the injury of the
only useful part of an army — a soldier in the field.
"In time of war and rebeUion, districts occupied by our
troops are subject to the laws of war. The inhabitants,
be they friendly or unfriendly, must submit to the controUing
power. If any person in an insurgent district corresponds or
trades Arith an enemy, he or she becomes a spy ; and aU in
habitants, moreover, must not only abstain from hostUe and
unfriendly acts, but must aid and assist the power that pro
tects them in trade and commerce."

136 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.

jor-General Blak was placed in immediate command of
the Fifteenth Army Corps, and Brigadier-General George M.
Dodge was summoned from Corinth to. organize and assume
command of a picked column of eight thousand men from the
Sixteenth Army Corps, and Avith it to foUoAV Sherman east
ward as rapidly as possible. Having made these dispositions,
Sherman pushed forward Avith the advance of his troops.
On the 27th of October, General Blak being, as has been
akeady seen, at Tuscumbia, Avith the first and second di
visions, Sherman ordered General Ewing, with the fourth
division, to cross the Teimessee, by means of the gunboats
and scow, as rapidly as possible, at Eastport, and push for
ward to Florence ; and the same day a messenger from Gen
eral Grant fioated doAm the Tennessee over the Muscle Shoals,
landed at Tuscumbia, and was sent to headquarters at luka,
bearing this short message : " Drop all work on the raikoad
east of Bear Creek. Put your command towards Bridgeport
till you meet orders." Instantly the order of march was re
versed, and aU the columns directed to Eastport, the only
place where the crossing of the Tennessee was practicable.
At first the troops- had only the gunboats and coal-barge,
but two transports and a ferry-boat arrived on the 31st of Oc
tober, and the work of crossing was pushed Avith aU the rigor
possible. Sherman crossed in person, and passed to the head
c»f the column on the 1st of November, leaving the advance
division of Osterhaus, now become the rear, to be conducted
by General Blak to EogersvUle and the Elk Eiver. This
stream was found impassable, and there was no time to bridge
it or to cross in boats, so that no altemativ'e remained but to
ascend the Elk to the stone bridge at FayettevUle, where the
troops crossed and proceeded to Winchester and Decherd.
At FayettevUle, having received orders from General Grant to
repair to Bridgeport with the Fifteenth Corps, learing Briga
dier-General Dodge's detachment of the Sixteenth Corps at
Pulaski and along the raUroad from Columbia to Decatur, to
protect it, Sherman instmcted General Blair to foUow in order
Arith the second and first divisions of Morgan L. Smith and

MARCH TO CHATTANOOGA. I37
Osterhaus, by way of NoAvmarket, LarkinsviUe, and BeUe-
fonte, whUe he himseH should conduct the thk-d and fourth
divisions of Jolm E. Smith and EAving, by Decherd. Sher
man reached Bridgeport on the night of the 13th, reported
by telegraph to General Grant, was immediately summoned to
his headcjuarters, left on the first boat, and on the morning of
the 15th of November rode into Chattanooga.
Previous to this, on the night of the 27th of October, Briga
dier-General W. F. Smith, chief engineer of the Army of the
Cumberland, had rapidly throAvn a pontoon bridge across the
Tennessee. On the foUowing morning, before the enemy could
recover fr-om his surprise. Hooker Arith his two corps had crossed,
seized the heights rising from Lookout VaUey at its outlet to
the river, emerged into the vaUey, and taken up positions de
fending the road over which he had marched, and the roads
leading to and connecting the ferries ; and thus two Hnes of
suppHes had been gained at the moment when, after more than
ten thousand horses and mUles had perished in supplying half
rations to the troops over seventy mUes of terrible roads, the
remaining animals were so reduced that they could not have
i^uppHed the army a week longer. After vainly endeavoring
to regain the advantage thus lost, Bragg detached Long-
street to ckive Bumside out of East Tennessee, and in order
to compel the rebel commander to retain aU his force, as weU
as to recaU the troops he had sent away, it was Grant's inten
tion to attack Missionary Eidge the moment Sherman should
arrive with his army and trains. The constraint imposed by
the immediate presence of the enemy in his strong positions,
with his cavah-y constantly threatening our exposed and
heavUy-tasked communications, was severely felt, and the
anxiety for Burnside's safety was acute.
Sherman was to cross the Tennessee, effect a lodgment on
the end of Missionary Ridge, and with a part of his command
demonstrate against Lookout Mountain, near Trenton. By
General Grant's orders, pontoons had akeady been prepared
for laying a bridge over the Ter nessee, and aU other necces-
sary arrangements perfected.

138 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
Ordering EAving to march, \rith his fourth diAdsion lead
ing the advance, by way of SheU Mound to Trenton and
to demonstrate against Lookout Mountain, but to be pre
pared rapicUy to change dkection on Chattanooga, Sher
man got in a smaU boat at KeUy's, rowed dovm to Bridge
port, there put his troops in motion, and, on the after
noon of the 20th, upon arriving at General Hooker's head-
qiiarters, received General Grant's orders for a general attack
the foUoAving morning. But the third division of John E
Smith was the only one in position ; Osterhaus' first and
Morgan L. Smith's second division were slowly making thek
way over a terrible road from SheU Mound to Chattanooga ;
and EAving's fourth dirision had not left Trenton. Learning
these facts, General Grant postponed the attack.
On the 21st, Morgan L. Smith's second division crossed the
bridge at BroAvn's Ferry, in spite of frequent accidents to that
fraU structure, and EAring reached the head of the bridge Anth
his fourth division, but was unable to cross by reason of its
breakage, in spite of repeated attempts to repak it, untU the
23d. The bridge baring again broken, leaving Osterhaus still
on the left bank, at BroAvn's Ferry, Sherman then proposed to
the general-in-chief to go into action Arith the three dirisions
akeady with him, supported by Jefferson C. Davis' dirision of
the Fourteenth Corps, whUe Osterhaus' first division should
report to General Hooker, and act with him against Lookout
Mountain. On the same day, Morgan L. Smith's and John
E. Smith's divisions being behind the hUls opposite the
mouth of the Chickamauga, Sherman caused Brigadier-General
GUes A. Smith, Arith his second brigade of the former cHrision,
to march under cover of those HUls to a point opposite the
North Chickamauga, there to mai;! the pontoon boats ; at mid
night to drop sUently doAm to a point above the South Chickar
mauga, land, move along the river, capture the enemy's pickets
along its banks ; and then to re-embark, drop quickly doAvn be
low the mouth of the Chickamauga, take position there on the
left bank, and dispatch the boats to the opposite side for re-en
forcements. This having been done, the remainder of Morgan

MARCH TO CHATTANOOGA. I39
L. Smith's division was raj idly ferried across, foUowed by that
of John E. Smith, and by dayhght of the 24th, these tAvo di
visions, numbering eight thousand men, were across the
Tennessee, and had thrown up a line of rifle-pits to cover
the crossing. As soon as it was Hght, some of the boats
were taken fr-om the ferry for use in the consti-uction of a
pontoon bridge, under the direction of Major-General WUHam
F. Smith, chief engineer of the mUitary dirision, and by noon
a fine bridge, thkteen hundred and fifty feet in length, had
been laid down, and was practicable for aU arms. A steamer
having arrived during the morning to assist in the crossing,
aU three divisions were now concentrated on the left bank ;
and, at the same time. General Jefferson C. Davis reported
himself ready to take the Missionary HUls.
At one P. M. the troops marched from the river in three
columns in echelon ; the left, Morgan L. Smith, the column of
dkection, foUowing substantiaUy Chickamauga Creek; the
centre, John E. Smith, in column, doubled on the centre at fuU
brigade intervals to the right and rear ; the right, Ewing, in
column at the same distance to the right and rear, prepared
to deploy to the right, to meet an enemy in that cHrection.
Each head of column was covered by a Hne of skirmish
ers, with supports. A Hght drizzling rain prevailed, and the
clouds hung low, cloaking the movement from the enemy's
tower of observation on Lookout Mountain. The foot of the
hiUs was soon reached, the skirmishers continued up the face
foUowed by thek supports, and at haH-past three P. M. the
ridge was gained without loss. Not untU a brigade of each
division was pushed up rapidly to the top of the hUl did the
enemy seem to realize the movement, but it was then too late,
for our troops were in possession. The enemy opened Avith
artUlery, but General Ewing soon got some of Captain Richard
son's guns up the steep HiU, and returned the fire, and the
enemy's skirmishers made one or two ineffectual dashes at
General Lightburn, who Arith his brigade had swept around
and gained the real continuation of the ridge.
Up to this time it had been supposed, from the map, that

140 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
Midsionary Ridge was a continuous hiU, but Sherman now
found himseH on two high points, Arith a deep depression be
tween them, and a thkd hUl immediately over the tunnel, which
was his chief objective. The ground gained, however, was so
important that nothing could be left to chance, and it was
therefore fortified during the night. One brigade. of each
dirision was left on the hiU, one of General Morgan L. Smith's
closed the gap to Chickamauga Creek, two of General John E.
Smith's were clraAvn back to the base in reserve, and General
EAving's right was extended doAvn into the plain, thus crossing
the ridge in a general line facing southeast.
The enemy felt Sherman's right flank about four p. m., and
a sharp engagement Arith artUlery and muskets ensued, when
he drew off. Brigadier-General GUes A. Smith was severely
wounded, and the command of the brigade devolved on
Colonel Tupper, One Hundred and Sixteenth EHnois. Just'
as Sherman himseH had crossed the bridge. General How
ard had appeared, having come Arith three regiments from
Chattanooga along the east bank of the Tennessee, con
necting Sherman's new position Arith that of the main army in
Chattanooga. The three regiments were attached temporarUy
to General EAring's right, and General Howard returned to
his corps at Chattanooga. As night closed, Sherman ordered
General Jefferson C. Daris to keep one brigade at the bridge,
one close up to the main body of the FHteenth Corps, and one
between the two. Heavy detaUs were kept at work on the
intrenchments until morning.
During the night the sky cleared away bright, a cold frost
fiUed the ak, and the camp-fires revealed to the enemy, and to
the army in Chattanooga, Sherman's position on Missionary
Ridge. About midnight, orders came from General Grant
to attack the enemy at daAvn of day, Arith notice that Gen
eral Thomas would attack in force early in the morning.
Accordingly, before Hght, Sherman was in the saddle, and,
attended by aU his staff, rode to the extreme left of his posi
tion, near Chickamauga, thence up the h Ul held by General
Lightbum, and round to the extreme right of General Ewing.

MARCH TO CHATTANOOGA. 141
Catching as accurate an idea of the ground as was possible by
the dim Hght of morning, he saw that his Hne of attack was in
the direction of Missionary Ridge, Ajith Avings supporting on
either flank. A vaUey lay betAveen him and the next hUl of
the series, and this latter presented steep sides ; the one to
the west partially cleared, the other covered with the native
forest. The crest of the ridge was narrow and wooded. The
further point of the hUl was held by the enemy with a breast
work of logs and fresh earth, fiUed A\"ith men and mounting
two guns. The enemy was also seen in .great force on a stiU
higher hUl beyond the tunnel, giving a plunging fire on the
ground in dispute. The gorge between, through Avhich several
roads and the railway tunnel pass, could not be seen from
Sherman's position, but formed the natural citadel where the
enemy covered his masses, to resist the contemplated move
ment to turn his right and endanger his communications Arith
the depot at Chickamauga.
The brigades of Colonel Cockerell, of EAring's division. Colonel
Alexander, of John E. Smith's, and General Lightburn, of
Morgan L. Smith's divisions, were to hold their HUl as the key
point ; General Corse, with as much of his brigade of Ewing's
division as could operate along the narrow ridge, was to attack
from the right centre ; General Lightburn was to dispatch
a regiment from his position to co-operate with General
Corse ; and General Morgan L. Smith was to move along the
east base of Missionary Ridge, connecting with General Corse,
and Colonel Loomis, of Ewing's division, in like manner, to
move along the west base, supported by Matthias' and Baum's
brigades, of John E. Smith's division, in reserve.
The sun had akeady risen before General Corse had com
pleted his preparations, and his bugle sounded the " forward."
The Fortieth lUinois, supported by the Forty-sixth Ohio,
on the right centre, with the Twentieth Ohio, Colonel Jones,
moved down the face of the hill, and up that held by the
enemy. The Hne advanced to within about eighty yards of
the intrenched position, where General Corse found a second
ary crest, which he gained and held. To this point he caUed

142 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
his reserves, and asked for reinforcements, which were sent,
but the space was narrow, and it was not weU to crowd the
men, as the enemy's artiUery and musketry fire swept the ap
proach. As soon as General Corse had made his preparations
he assaulted, and a close, severe contest ensued, lasting more
. than an hour, giring and losing ground, but never the posi
tion first obtained, from which the enemy in vain attempted
to drive him. General Morgan L. Smith steadily gained
ground on the left spur of Missionary Ridge, and Colonel
Loomis got abreast of the tunnel and the raUroad embank
ment on his side, drawing the enemy's fire, and to that extent
reHeving the assaulting party on the hiU-crest. Captain Cal-
ander had four of his guns on General Ewing's hUl, and Cap
tain Wood his battery of Napoleon guns on General Lightburn's ;
and two guns of DiUon's battery were Arith Colonel Alexander's
brigade. The day was bright and clear. The columns of the
enemy were streaming towards Sherman, and the enemy's artU
lery poured its concentric fire upon him from every hiU and
spur that gave a -new of any part of his position. AU Sherman's
batteries directed thek fire as carefuUy as possible to clear the
hiU to the fr-ont Arithout endangering our OAvn men. The fight
raged furiously about ten A. M., when General Corse received
a severe Avound, and was carried off the field, and the com
mand of the brigade, and of the assault at that key-point,
devolved on Colonel Wolcott, of the Forty-sixth Ohio, who
continued the contest, pressing forward at aU points. Colonel
Loomis had made good progress to the right ; and at about
two p. M. General John E. Smith, judging the battle to be
severe on the hill, and being requked to support General
EAving, ordered Colonel Baum's and General Matthias' bri
gades across the fields to the disputed summit. They moved
up under a heavy fire of cannon and musketry, and joined
Colonel Wolcott, but the crest was so narrow that they neces
sarUy occupied the west face of the hiU. The enemy at the
time being massed in great strength in the tunnel gorge,
moved a large force, under cover of the ground and the thick
bushes, and suddenly appeared on the right and rear of this

MARCH TO CHATTANOOGA. 143
command. The two reserve brigades of John E. Smith's
division, being thus surprised, and exposed as they were in the
open ground, feU back in some disorder to the lower end of the
field, and reformed. This movement, seen from Chattanooga,
five mUes distant, gave rise to the report that Sherman Avas
repulsed on the left. The enemy made a show of pursuit, but
were caught in flank by the weU-directed fire of the brigade
on the wooded crest, and hastily sought cover behind the liiU.
About three p. M., a white Hne of musketry fire in front of
Orchard KnoU, extending further right and left and front, and
a faint echo of sound, satisfied Sherman that General Thomas
was moving on the centre.- The attack on the left had drawn
vast masses of the enemy to that flank, so that the result on
the centre was comparatiA'ely assured.
The advancing Hne of musketry fire from Orchard KnoU
disappeared behind a spur of the hUl, and could no longer be
seen, and it was not until night closed that Sherman knew that
Thomas had swept across Missionary Ridge, and broken the
enemy's centre.
The victory was won, and pursuit was the next step. Sher
man ordered General Morgan L. Smith to feel the tunnel,
which was found vacant, save by the commingled dead and
wounded of both armies.
The reserve of General Jefferson C. Daris was ordered to
march at once, by the pontoon bridge across the Chickamauga
at its mouth, and push forward for the depot. General Howard
had reported to Sherman, in the early part of the day, with the
remainder of his corps, the Eleventh, and had been posted to
connect the left Arith Chickamauga Creek. He was ordered to
repair an old broken bridge about two mUes up the Chick
amauga, and to foUow General Davis at four A. M. The
Fifteenth Army Corps was to march at daylight. But General
Howard found the repairs too difficult, and aU were compeUed to
cross the Chickamauga on the new pontoon bridge. By eleven
A. M., Jefferson C. Davis' dirision appeared at the depot, just
in time to see it in flames. He entered with one bri
gade, and found the enemy occupjdng two hiUs partially in-

144 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
trenched just beyond the depot. These he soon drove
away. Corn-meal and corn, in huge burning pUes, broken
wagons, abandoned caissons, two thirty-two pounder rifled
guns Arith carriages burned, pieces of pontoons, balks,
chesses, etc., destined for the, invasion of Kentucky, and aU
manner of things, were found burning and broken. A good
supply of forage for the horses, and meal, beans, and the hke,
for the men, were also discovered in good condition.
Pausing but a short whUe, Sherman pressed forward, the road
lined with broken wagons and abandoned caissons, tUl night.
Just as the head of his column emerged from a dense, miry
swamp, it encountered the rear-guard of the retreating army.
The fight was sharp, but the night closed in so dark that our
troops could not move. Here Sherman was overtaken by
General Grant.
At dayhght the march was resumed, and at GreysvUle, where
a good bridge spanned the Chickamauga, the Fourteenth Corps
of General Palmer was met on the south bank. From him
Sherman learned that General Hooker was on a road stiU
further south. His guns could be heard near Ringgold. As
the roads were fiUed with aU the troops they could accom
modate, Sherman then turned to the east to fulfil another
part of the general plan, by breaking up aU communications
between Bragg and Longstreet.
General Howard was ordered to move to Parker's Gap, and
thence send a competent force to Red Clay, or the CouncU
Ground, and there destroy a large section of the raUway
which connects Dalton and Cleveland. This work was most
successfuUy and completely performed that day. The di
vision of General Jefferson C. Davis was moved up close to
Ringgold, to assist General Hooker, H needed, and the Fif
teenth Corps held at GreysvUle, to take advantage of circum
stances. About noon a message came from General Hooker, say
ing that he had had a hard fight at the mountain pass just be
yond Ringgold, and wanted Sherman to come forward and tum
the position. Howard, by passing through Parker's Gap to
wards Eed Clay, had akeady done so. Sherman therefore rode

MARCH TO CHATTANOOGA. 145
forward to Einggold, to find that the enemy had faUen back
to Tunnel HUl, abandoned the vaUey of Chickamauga and the
State of Tennessee, and was descending the southern slopes,
whose waters flow to the Atlantic and the Gulf.
At Einggold Sherman again met General Grant, and re
ceived orders, after breaking up the raikoad between that
point and the State Hne, to move slowly back to Chattanooga.
On the foUoAring day, the FHteenth Corps effectuaUy de
stroyed the raikoad from a point haH-way between GreysviUe
and Einggold, back to the State line; and General Grant,
coming to GreysvUle, consented that, instead of returning to
Chattanooga, Sherman might send back his artUlery, wagons,
and impediments, and make a ckcuit to the north as far as
the Hiawassee Eiver.
Accordingly, on the morning of November 29th, General
Howard moved fr-om Parker's Gap to Cleveland, General
Daris by way of McDaniel's Gap, and General Blair, with two
dirisions of the Fifteenth Army Corps, by way of JuHan's
Gap ; aU meeting at Cleveland that night. Here another
effectual break was made in the Cleveland and Dalton road.
On the 30th, the army moved to Charlestom, General Howard
approaching so rapicUy that the enemy evacuated in haste, leav
ing the bridge but partiaUy damaged, and five car-loads of
flour and provisions on the north bank of the Hiawassee.
The losses in Sherman's OAvn corps during this brief cam
paign were as foUows : Osterhaus' first division, 87 kUled, 344
wounded, and 66 missing ; M. L. Smith's second cHvision, 10
kUled, 90 wounded, and 2 missing; John E. Smith's thkd
division, 89 kUled, 288 wounded, and 122 missing ; EAring's
fourth division, 72 kUled, 535 wounded, and 21 missing ; total,
258 kUled, 1,257 wounded, and 211 missing. The loss in
Jefferson C. Daris' dirision of the Fourteenth Corps was smaU.
Bushbeck's brigade of the Eleventh Corps lost 37 kUled, 145
wounded, 81 missing; total, 263. Among the kUled were
Colonels Putnam of the Ninety-third Illinois, O'Meara of the
Ninetieth EHnois, Torrence of the Thktieth Iowa, Lieutenant-
Colonel Taft of the Eleventh Corps, and Major BushneU of
10

146 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
the Thkteenth lUinois Volunteers ; whUe in the Hst of wounded
appeared the names of Brigadier-Generals GUes A. Smith,
J. M. Corse, and Matthias ; Colonel Baum, FHty-sixth EHnois ;
Colonel Wangehne, Twelfth Missoiui Volunteers ; Lieutenant-
Colonel Patridge, Thkteenth EHnois Volunteers ; Major P. J.
Welch, Fifty-sixth EHnois Volunteers ; and Major M. AUen,
Tenth Iowa Volunteers. Lieutenant-Colonel Archer, Seven
teenth Iowa, was reported missing.
The army which eight days before had laiu besieged, and
barely subsisting behind the Missionary range, had shaken off
its enemy, broken his strength and his spkit, pushed his
shattered forces out of reach, and was returning to its camps
holding the keys of the whole central region, and of the gates
of Georgia.

THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE 147

CHAPTEE XIL
THE EEUEF OF KNOXVILLE. — EEOBGANIZING.
It was General Grant's desire to continue the pursuit, but
Burnside Avas closely beleaguered at KnoxvUle and Long-
street was steadUy pushing his approaches. The commander-
in-chief had instructed Burnside to hold on to the last. " I
can hardly conceive," he Avrote, " the necessity of retreating
from East Tennessee. If I did it at aU, it would be after
losing most of the army, and then necessity would suggest the
route. I wUl not attempt to lay out a Hne of retreat."
On the 3d of December, according to General Burnside's
report, the suppHes would be exhausted. EUiott's dirision of
cavaky had akeady started for KnoxviUe, and Granger had
been ordered thither with the Fourth Corps. Finding that the
latter moved slowly and without energy, on the 28tli of Novem
ber, General Grant decided to send Sherman Arith his com
mand, and accordingly gave him orders to take Granger's
troops and his OAvn, and go with aU possible dispatch to the
reHef of the besieged garrison.
A large part of Sherman's command hfid marched from
Memplus, had gone into battle immediately on arriving at
Chattanooga, and had had no rest since. In the late campaign
officers and men had carried no luggage or provisions. The
week before, they had left thek camps, on the right bank of the
Tennessee, with only two days' rations, without a change of
clothing, stripped for the fight, each officer and man, from tho
commanding general doAvn, having but a single blanket or
overcoat. They had now no provisions, save what had been
gathered by the road, and were Ul-suppHed for such a marcL

148 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
Moreover, the weather was intensely cold. But twelve thou
sand of thek feUow-soldiers were beleaguered in a mountain
toAvn eighty-four mUes distant : they needed rehef, and must
have it in three days. This was enough. Without a miumur,
¦without waiting for any thing, the Army of the Tennessee di
rected its course upon KnoxviUe.
On the night of November 28th, General Howard repakod
and planked the raUroad bridge, and at dawn the army
passed the Hiawassee, and during the day marched to Athens,
a distance of fifteen mUes. Granger, who was then near the
mouth of the Hiawassee, was at first ordered to join the main
column at Kingston ; but on reaching Athens, Sherman sent
him duections to meet him at PhUadelphia. The smaU force
of cavaky which was, at the time of the receipt of General
Grant's orders, scouting near Benton and Columbus, overtook
the column at Athens during the night.
On the 2d of December, the army moved rapidly north,
towards Loudon, twenty-six mUes distant. About 11 A. M.,
the cavaky passed to the head of the column, and was ordered
to push to Loudon, and, if possible, save the pontoon bridge
across the Tennessee, held by a brigade of the enemy, com
manded by General Vaughn. The cavaky moved Arith such
rapidity as to capture every picket ; but Vaughn had artiUery
in position, covered by earthworks, and displayed a force too
large to be dislodged by a cavaky dash, and darkness closed
in before General Howard's infantry arrived on the ground.
The enemy evacuated the place in the night, destroying the
pontoons, running three locomotives and forty-eight cars into
the Tennessee, and abandoning a large quantity of prorisions,
four guns, and other material, which General Howard took at
dayhght. But the bridge being gone, Sherman was forced
to tum east, and trust to the bridge at KnoxvUle.
It was now aU-important that General Burnside should
have notice of Sherman's approach, and but one more day of
the time remained. Accordingly, at PhUadelphia, during the
night of December 2d, Sherman sent an aid-de-camp for
ward to Colonel Long, commanding the brigade of cavalry,

THE RELIEF OP KNOXVILLE. 149
ordering him to select the best material of his command, to
start at once, ford the Little Tennessee, and push into Knox
viUe at whatever cost of Hfe and horseflesh. The distance to
be traveUed was about forty miles, and the roads viUanous.
Before day the . cavalry marched. At dayhght the Fifteenth
Corps was turned from PhUadelphia to the Little Tennessee, at
Morgantown, where the maps represented the river as very
shaUow ; but it was found impossible to ford it, as the water
was, in some places, five feet deep, and fr-eezing cold, and the
stream was two hundred and forty yards wide. A bridge was
indispensable. Brigadier-General James H. Wilson, who ac
companied Sherman, undertook to superintend the work, and
with only such tools as axes, pi^ks, and spades, working partly
¦with crib-work and partly Arith trestles made of the houses of the
late toAvn of MorgantoAvn, by dark of December 4th the bridge
was completed, and by daylight of the 5th the FHteenth Corps,
General Blair, Avas over, and General Granger's corps and Gen
eral Davis' cHrision were ready to pass ; but the diagonal
bracings were imperfect, for want of proper spikes, and the
bridge broke, causing delay.
General Blak had been ordered to march out on the Marys-
vUle road five miles, there to await notice that General Gran
ger was on a paraUel road abreast of him. At the fork of the
road a messenger rode up to General Sherman, bringing a few
words from General Burnside, dated December 4th, stating
that Colonel Long had arrived at KnoxvUle with his cavalry,
and aU Avas weU there ; that Longstreet stiU lay before the
place, but there were symptoms of a speedy departure.
As soon as the bridge was mended, all the troops moved
forward. General Howard had marched fr-om Loudon, had
found a good ford for his wagons and horses at Davis, seven
mUes from Morgantown, and had made a bridge of the wagons
left by Vaughn at Loudon. He marched by Unitia and Louis
vUle. On the night of the 5th, aU the heads of column com
municated at MarysvUle, where an officer of General Bum-
side's staff arrived with the news that Longstreet had, the
night before, retreated on the Eutledge, EodgersvUle, and

150 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
Bristol roads, towards Vkginia; and that General Bum-
side's cavaky was on his heels ; and with word that
the general desked to see General Sherman in person as soon
as he could come to KnoxviUe. Ordering aU the troops to
halt and rest, except the two cHvisions of General Granger,
which were dkected to move forward to Little Eiver and
report to General Bumside, on the morning of December 6th
Sherman rode from MarysviUe into KnoxviUe, and there met
General Burnside.
The siege had been already raised. Longstreet had
hurled three brigades against the works, and met Arith a bloody
repulse. The inteUigence of Bragg's defeat, and the arrival
of Colonel Long's cavaky, as the forerunners of the army
knoAvn to be marching for the rehef of the besieged garrison,
had shoAvn Longstreet the necessity of prompt movement, and
he had taken the only line of retreat that continued practi
cable. General Burnside now asked for nothing but General
Granger's command, and suggested to Sherman, in riew of the
large force he had brought from Chattanooga, that he should
return with due expecHtion to the Hne of the Hiawassee, lest
Bragg, re-enforced, might take advantage of his absence to
assume the offensive.
In the foUoAring communication General Burnside took oc
casion to express his thanks for the timely rehef :
" HEADQUAKTEHa ArMT OF THE OhIO,
Kuoxville, December 7, 1863.
" Major-General W. T. Sherman, Oommanding, etc. :
" Geneeal — I deske to express to you and your command my
most hearty thanks and gratitude for your promptness in
coming to our rehef during the siege of KnoxAdUe ; and I am
satisfied your approach served to raise the siege.
" The emergency having passed, I do not deem for the pres
ent any other portion of your command but the corps of
General Granger necessary for operations in this section;
and inasmuch as Genera. Grant has weakened the force imme
diately with him in order to reheve us, thereby rendering the

THE RELIEF OP KNOXVILLE. 151
position of GcLeral Thomas less seciue, I deem it advisable
that aU the troops now here, save those commanded by Gen
eral Granger, should return at once to Arithin supporting
distance of the forcesrin front of Bragg's army.
" In behaH of my command, I deske again to thank you and
your command for the kindness you have done us.
" I am, general, very respectfuly, your obedient servant,
A. E. BUENSIDE,
Major-General commanding."
Having seen the forces of General Burnside move out of
KnoxviUe in pursuit of Longstreet, and General Granger's
move in, Sherman put his OAvn command in motion to return.
General Howard was ordered to move, by way of Davis'
Ford and Sweetwater, to Athens, with a guard formed at
Charleston, to hold and repair the bridge which the enemy
had retaken after the passage of the army up the river. Gen
eral Jefferson C. Davis moved to Columbus on the Hiawassee
by way of MadisonvUle, and the two divisions of the Fifteenth
Corps moved to TeHre Plains, in order to cover a movement of
cavaky across the mountain into Georgia to overtake a wagon
train of the enemy's which had escaped by way of Murphy.
Subsequently, on a report from General Howard that the enemy
stUl held Charleston, Sherman dkected General Ewing's di
rision on Athens, and went in person to TeHre Arith General
Morgan L. Smith's division. By the 9th, aU the troops were
in position, holding the rich country between the Little Ten
nessee and the Hiawassee. The cavalry under Colonel Long
passed the mountains at Telke, and proceeded about seventeen
raUes beyond Murphy, when, deeming his further pursxut of
the wagon train useless, he returned on the 12th to Telke.
Sherman then ordered him and the dirision of General
Morgan L. Smith to move to Charleston, to which point he
had preriously ordered the corps of General Howard.
On the 14th of December, aU of the command lay en
camped along the Hiawassee. HaAong communicated to Gen
eral Grant the actual state of affah-s, Sherman received orders

152 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
to leave on the line of the Hiawassee aU the cavaky and proceed
to Chattanooga Arith the balance of his command. Learing
at Charleston the brigade of cavaky commanded by Colonel
Long, re-enforced by the FHth Ohio cavaky, Lieutenant-
Colonel Heath, which was the only cavaky properly belonging
to the FHteenth Army Corps, Arith the remainder Sherman
moved by easy marches by way of Cleveland and Tymus
Depot into Chattanooga. There he received orders from
General Grant to transfer back to the appropriate commands
the Eleventh Corps of General Howard and the division of the
Fourteenth Corps, commanded by General Jefferson C. Davis,
and to conduct the FHteenth Army Corps to its new field of
operations in Northern Alabama.
In closing his report of the memorable campaign thus closed,
Sherman Avrote to General Grant : —
" It vriU thus appear that we have been constantly in motion
since our departure from the Big Black, untU the present mo
ment. " In rericAring the facts, I must do justice to my command
for the patience, cheerfulness, and courage which officers and
men have displayed throughout, in battle, on the march, and
in camp. For long periods, without regular rations or sup
pHes of any kind, they have marched through mud and over
rocks, sometimes barefooted, Arithout a murmur, Arithout a
moment's rest. After a march of over four hundred mUes,
Arithout stop for three successive nights, we crossed the Ten
nessee, fought our part of the battle of Chattanooga, pursued
the enemy out of Tennessee, and then turned more than one
hundred mUes north, and compeUed Longstreet to raise the
siege of KnoxviUe, which gave so much anxiety to the whole
country. " It is hard to realize the importance of these events Arithout
recaUiug the memory of the general feehng which pervaded aU
minds at Chattanooga prior to our arrival. I cannot speak of
the FHteenth Army Corps Arithout a seeming vanity, but as I
am no longer its commander, I assert that there is no better

V^.^\\ V^vv^wv-

VI

V.v^

THE RELIEF OP^ KNOXVILLE. I53
body of soldiers in America than it, or who have done more or
better serA'ice. I wish aU to feel a just pride in its real honors.
To General Howard and his command, to General Jefferson C.
Davis and his, I am more than usuaUy indebted for the inteUi
gence of commanders and fideHty of command. The brigade
of Colonel Buschbeck, belonging to the EleventkCorps, which
was the first to come out of Chattanooga to my flank, fought
at the Tunnel HiU in connection with General Ewing's diri
sion, and displayed a courage almost amounting to rashness :
foUowing the enemy almost to the tunnel gorge, it lost many
valuable Hves, prominent among them Lieutenant-Colonel
Taft, spoken of as a most gaUant soldier.
" In General Howard throughout I found a poHshed and
Christian gentleman, exhibiting the highest and most chival
rous traits of the soUcHer.
" General Daris handled his division with artistic skUl, more
especiaUy at the moment we encountered the enemy's rear
guard near GreysvUle, at nightfaU. I must award to tlus di
rision the credit of the best order during our marches through
East Tennessee, when long marches and the necessity of for
aging to the right and left gave some reasons for disordered
ranks. " I must say that it is but justice that colonels of regiments
who have so long and so weU commanded brigades, as in tho
following cases, should be commissioned to the grade which
they have fiUed with so much usefulness and credit to the pub-
He service, namely : Colonels J. E. CockereU, Seventieth Ohio
volunteers ; J. M. Loomis, Twenty-sixth lUinois ; C. E. Wol
cott, Forty-sixth Ohio ; J. A. WiUiamson, Fourth Iowa ; G. B.
Baum, FHty-sixth Illinois ; J. J. Alexander, FHty-ninth In
diana. "
Taking advantage of the inactivity at Chattanooga, Sherman
now turned his attention to his OAvn immediate department,
and returned to Memphis and Vicksburg to inspect and reor
ganize his command. He reached Memphis on the 10th of
January.

154 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
WhUe preparing for future mUitary operations, it was ne
cessary for him to meet and dispose of many questions of a
civU nature presented to him by his subordinates. With re
gard to the treatment of the inhabitants of a conquered
country, he wrote on the 24th January, 1864, to Lieutenant-
Colonel E. M. SaAvyer, assistant adjutant-general at depart
ment headquarters at HuntsviUe : —
" The Southern people entered into a clear compact of gov
ernment, but stUl maintained a species of separate interests,
history, and prejucHces. These latter became stronger and
stronger, tiU they have led to a war which has developed
fruits of the bitterest kind.
" We of the North are, beyond aU question, right in our laAvful
cause, but we are not bound to ignore the fact that the people
of the South have prejudices, which form a part of their
nature, and which they cannot throw off vvithout an effort of
reason or the slower process of natural change. Now, the
question arises, should we treat as absolute enemies aU in the
South who differ from us in opinion or prejudice, — kUl or
banish them ? or should we give them time to think and grad
ually change thek conduct, so as to conform to the new order
of things which is sloAvly and graduaUy creeping into their
country ?
" When men take arms to resist our rightful authority, we
are compeUed to use force, because all reason and argument
cease when arms are resorted to. When the provisions, for
age, horses, mules, wagons, etc., are used by our enemy, it is
clearly our duty and right to take them, because otherwise
they might be used against us.
" In Hke manner, aU houses left vacant by an inimical people
are clearly our right, or such as are needed as storehouses,
hospitals, and quarters. But a question arises as to dwelhngs
used by women, chUdren, and non-combatants. So long as
non-combatants remain in their houses and keep to thek
accustomed business, their opinions and prejudices can in no
wise influence the Avar, and, therefore, should not be noticed.

THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE. 155
But if any one comes out into the public streets and creates
disorder, he or she should be punished, restrained, or ban
ished, either to th" rear or front, as the officer in command
adjudges. If the ] eople, or any of them, keep up a corres
pondence Arith parties in hostihty, they are spies, and can be
punished Arith death, or minor punishment.
" These are well-estabHshed principles of war, and the peo
ple of the South, having appealed to war, are barred from
appealing to our Constitution, which they have practicaUy and
pubHcly defied. They have appealed to war, and must abide
its rules and laws.
" The United States, as a beUigerent party claiming right
in the soU as the ultimate sovereign, have a right to
change the population ; and it may be, and is, both politic
and just, we should do so in certain districts. When the
inhabitants persist too long in hostility, it may be both
politic and right we should banish them and appropriate thek
lands to a more loyal and useful population. No man wiU
deny that the United States would be benefited by dispossess
ing a single prejudiced, hard-headed, and disloyal planter, and
substituting in his place a dozen or more patient, industrious,
good famUies, even if they be of foreign birth. I think it does
good to present this view of the case to many Southern gentle
men, who grew rich and wealthy, not by virtue alone of thek
industry and skUl, but by reason of the protection and impetus
to prosperity given by our hitherto moderate and magnani
mous Government. It is aU idle nonsense for these Southern
planters to say that they made the South, that they own it,
and that they can do as they please, — CA^en to break up our
Government and to shut up the natural avenues of trade,
intercourse, and commprce  /
" WliUst I assert foi our Government the highest miUMiy
prerogatives, I am wUHng to bear in patience that pdlitical
nonsense of slave-rights, State-rights, freedom of c<5nscience,
freedom of press, and such other trash, as haye^eluded the
Southern people into war, anarchy, bloodshejj; and the foulest
crimes that have disgraced any time or anj^eople.

156 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
" I would advise the commanding officers at HuntsviUe, and
such other towns as are occupied by our troops, to assemble
the inhabitants and explain to them these plain, seH-evident
propositions, and teU them that it is for them noiu to say
whether they and their children shaU inherit the beautiful
land which by the accident of nature has faUen to their share.
The Government of the United States has in North Alabama
any and aU rights Avhich they choose to enforce in war, — to
take their lives, thek homes, thek lands, their every tiling;
because they cannot deny that war does exist there ; and war
is simply power, unrestrained by Constitution or compact. E
they Avant eternal war, well and good : we wiU accept the issue
and dispossess them and put our friends in possession. I
know thousands and miUions of good people who, at simple
notice, Avould come to North vUabama and accept the elegant
houses and plantations now there. If the people of HuntsvUle
think cHfferently, let them persist in war three years longer, and
then they AviU not be consulted. Three years ago, by a httle
reflection and patience, they could have had a hundred years
of peace and prosperity, but they preferred war. Very weU.
Last year they could have saved thek slaves, but now it is too
late : aU the powers of earth cannot restore to them thek
slaves, any more than their dead grandfathers. Next year
thek lands wUl be taken, — for in war we can take them, and
rightfully too, — and in another year they may beg in vain for
thek lives. A people who AriU persevere in war beyond a cer
tain limit ought to know the consequences. Many, many peo
ple, with less pertinacity than the South, have been Ariped out
of national existence."
-^ On the 20th, in a hasty reply to a letter from a citizen, on
tli©.^ame subject, Arith special reference to the treatment of
slavefy^ the cultivation of abandoned plantations, and the pro
posed cailing of a convention of the people of Tennessee, he
wrote: " Slavery is already dead in Tennessee.
" The moment a negro cannot be bought and sold, or when

THE RELIEF AT KNOXVILLE. 157
be can run off Arithout danger of recapture, the question is
settled. Conventions cannot revive slavery. It should be
treated as a minor question.
" If a Convention is caUed in Tennessee it should be Arithor r
regard to slavery, or any other single question. When assem
bled, the members would naturaUy discuss any and aU ques
tions, and no doubt would waste more sound on the history of
Greece and Eome than on the commonplace business be
fore H."
Under date of the 27th he addressed a fuU letter of instruc
tions to Brigadier-General E. P. Buckland, who was to be left
in command of the district of Memphis. In the course of it
he said :
" You know how much stress I have put on honesty in the
character of a United States officer.
" Merchants naturaUy make gains. It is their caUing, but
an officer has a salary, and nothing else, and H you see by an
officer's style of Hving, or any external symptoms, that he is
spending more than his pay, or H you observe him interested
in the personal affaks of business men, stop it, and send biTn
to some other duty. Don't let officers settle doAvn into com
fortable houses, but make camps, and coUect in them aU this
floating mass, and send them to thek regiments 
" You can confer in the most friendly spkit vrith the people
here and in the country. Assure them that H they act in good
faith to the United States, we wUl fuUy reciprocate. They
must, however Act, — good faith of itseH is of no value in war.
" As an army we vriU take care of aU large hostUe bodies,
but cannot undertake to do the work of local poHce.
" We have heretofore done too much of this, and you can, in
your own Avay, gTaduaUy do less and less of it, tUl finaUy the
city and county authorities can take it aU off our hands.
" Memphis as a mUitary depot must be held with the tenacity
of Hfe ! The fort must be impregnable, the river secure, and
the levee, and incidentaUy the toAvn, or so much of it as gives
storage and offices ; but H these are at aU in danger, move
them to the cover of the fort.

158 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
" Encourage the mihtia in aU manner of ways. I know the
poorer classes, the working men, are Union, and I would not
mind the croaking of the richer classes. Thek power is pass
ing from their hands, and they talk of the vulgarity of the new
regime ; but such arguments AriU be lost on you. Power and
success AriU soon replace this class of grumblers, and they AriU
graduaUy disappear as a pohtical power."

THE MERIDIAN RAID. I59

CHAPTEE Xin.
THE MEEIDIAN EAID. — A NEW COMMAND.
McPheeson's seventeenth corps was stUl at Vicksburg .•
part of Hurlbut's sixteenth corps, with Smith's and Grier-
son's diAdsions of cavalry, at Memphis. Lieutenant-General
Polk, Avho commanded the Confederate forces in Mississippi,
was at MericHan Arith French's dirision, and had Loring's di
vision at Canton; Forrest was, Arith twenty-five hundred ir-
regiUar cavaky, in the northern part of the State ; Cash's and
Whitfield's brigades of cavaky patroUing from Yazoo City,
along the Big Black to Port Gibson ; and Wirt Adams' bri
gade doing simUar duty in the rear of Port Hudson and
Baton Eouge.
To the Army of the Tennessee was assigned by General
Grant the duty of keeping open the Mississippi Eiver and
maintaining intact our control of the east bank.
Sherman decided to do this by occupying prominent points
in the interior with smaU corps of observation, threatening a
considerable radius ; and to operate against any strong force
of the enemy seeking to take a position on the river, by a
movable column menacing its rear. To destroy the enemy's
means of approaching the river Arith artUlery and trains, he
determined to organize a large column of infantry and move
Arith it to Meridian, effectually breaking up the Southern
Mississippi raUway ; whUe a cavaky force should move fr-om
Memphis to meet him, and perform the same work with
respect to the Mobile and Ohio raUway.
BrigacHer-General WiUiam Sovy Smith, chief of cavaky on
General Grant's staff, was placed in command of aU the cavaky

160 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
of the department, and instructed to move Arith it from Mem
phis on or before the 1st of February, by way of Pontotoc,
Okalona, and Columbus, to Meridian, a distance of two hun
dred and fifty miles, so as to reach' that place by the lOth;
General Smith was speciaUy instructed to disregard aU smaU
detachments of the enemy and aU minor operations, and
striking rapidly and effectuaUy any large body of the enemy,
to be at his destination precisely at the appointed time,
Simultaneously the Eleventh EHnois Volunteers and a colored
regiment, under Colonel Coates, of the former regiment, Arith
five tin-clad gunboats under Lieutenant-Commander Owen,
were sent up the Yazoo to ascend that stream and its tributa
ries as far as possible, so as to create a diversion and protect
the plantations on the river ; and Brigadier-General Hawkins
was directed to patrol the country in the rear of Vicksburg
towards the Big Black, and to collect some fifty skiffs, by
means of which detachments of two or three hundred men
might be moved at pleasure through the labyi-inth of bayous
between the Yazoo and the Mississippi, for the purpose of
suppressing the depredations of the horde of gueriUas then
infesting that region.
Having made aU these arrangements, Sherman himseH,
Arith two divisions of the Sixteenth Corps under Hurlbut,
two cHrisions of the Seventeenth Corps under McPherson,
and a brigade of cavaky under Colonel E. F. Winslow,
Fourth Iowa Cavalry, marched from Vicksburg on the 3d
of February. The expedition moved out in tAVO columns,
' Hurlbut's corps by Messenger's, McPherson's along the raU
way. The former met the enemy at Joe Davis' plantation,
the latter at Champion HiUs, on the .5th, and for eighteen
mUes kept up a continual skkmish, without delaying the
march of the troops, and entered Jackson the same night;
thus entirely disconcerting the enemy's plan, which was at
that moment in process of execution, of concentrating at that
place Loring's and French's divisions, and Lee's division of
cavalry. On the 6th, both columns being united, and Mc
Pherson taking the lead, crossed the Pearl Eiver on a pontoon

THE MERIDAN RAID. 161
bridge captured from the enemy the day before ; on the
7th marched into Brandon ; on the 8th reached Live Creek,
five mUes west of Morton ; and on the 9th entered Mor
ton, where McPherson's corps halted to destroy the raUways
for five mUes around, and Hurlbut took the advance. From
this point the troops moved by easy piarches, Arith no greater
opposition than the annoyance of foraging parties and strag
glers by the enemy's cavaky hovering on the flanks, through
HUlsboro' and Decatur to the TaUahatchie Eiver, twenty-five
mUes west of Meridian, where the road was found obstructed
by feUed trees. Leaving the trains under sufficient guard,
Sherman pushed on over these obstructions for the Ocktib-
beha Eiver, where he found the bridge burning ; but in two
hours the troops had built a new one, and at three and a half
o'clock on the afternoon of the same day entered Meridian,
vrith slight opposition. French's and Loring's dirisions, of
the Confederate troops, Arith General Polk in person, had evac
uated the place during the morning and the preceding night,
Lee's cavaky covering their retreat ; and aU the locomotives
and cars, except one train found burning, had been removed
towards Mobile and Selma. It was evidently impossible to
overtake the enemy before they should cross the Tombigbee.
The army therefore rested on the 15th, and on the 16th com
menced the destruction of the raUways centring in Meridian.
The depots, storehouses, arsenals, offices, hospitals, hotels
and cantonments in the town were burned, and during the
next five days, Arith axes, sledges, crowbars, clambars and fire,
Hurlburt's corps destroyed on the north and east sixty miles
of ties and iron, one locomotive, and eight bridges ; and Mc
Pherson's corps, on the south and west, fifty-five mUes of raU
way, fifty-three bridges, 6,075 feet of trestle-work, nineteen
locomotives, twenty-eight steam-cars, and three steam saw-
niUls. Thus was completed the destruction of the raUways
for one hundred mUes from Jackson to Meridian, and • for
twenty mUes around the latter place, in so effectual a manner
tliat they could not be used against us in the approaching
campaigns. 11

162 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
The cavaky, under General W. Sovy Smith, had not an-ived.
As was afterwards learned, that officer had not left Memphis
untU the 11th of February ; and had proceeded no further
than West Point, from which place he turned back on the
22d, and rapidly retraced his steps to Memphis.
Ascertaining that the enemy's infantry had crossed the
Tombigbee on the 17th of February, and hearing nothing
of Smith, on the 20th General Sherman ordered McPherson to
move slowly back on the main road, whUe he himseH, Arith Hurl
but's corps and the cavaky, marched north, to feel for Smith.
Sherman moved through Marion and Muckalusha-Old-ToAvn
to Union, whence he dispatched Colonel Winslow vrith three
regiments of cavaky to PhUadelphia and LouisviUe, fifty mUes
distant, towards Columbus, on the road by which Smith was
expected to come ; whUe the main body moved to HUlsboro',
where, on the 23d, it was joined by McPherson's corps. On
the 24th the army continued the march on two roads, and on
the 25th and 26th crossed the Pearl Eiver at Eatchcliffe Ferry
and Edwards' Station, and bivouacked near Canton, learing a
division at the crossing to look for the cavaky. From Louis-
riUe, Colonel Winslow sent out two scouts to seek for Smith,
and, SAringing round through Kosciusko as ordered, rejoined
the army at Canton, Arithout news of the missing cavalry. The
return march was unmolested.
About one thousand white refugees, four hundred prisoneis,
five thousand negroes, three thousand animals, and a large
number of wagons, were brought in by the troops on thek
return. Our total loss was in kUled, twenty-one ; wounded,
sixty-eight; missing, eighty-one; total, one hundred and
seventy. During the entke expedition, the army subsisted
chiefly upon the stores belonging to the enemy, and such as
were found in the country. In spite of the faUure of the
cavaky, the isolation of Mississippi, which was the main object
of the expedition, was accomphshed, and after marching from
three hundred and sixty to four hundred and flf ty-three miles,
and driving the enemy out of the State, Arithin four weeks the
army returned in better health and condition than when it

THE MERIDIAN RAID. 163
started, confident in itself, and schooled for the trying cam
paigns before it.
On the 28th of February, leaving the army at Canton,
Sherman Avent to Vicksburg ; thence sent back orders to Hurl
but to come in on the 3d of March, and at once proceeded to
New Orleans, to confer with General Banks and Admiral
Porter, in regard to the detaUs of the combined movement up
the Eed Eiver.
General Banks had asked General Sherman for a force of
ten thousand men, to leave Vicksburg on the 7tli of March,
and remain Arith him thirty days, and Sherman had promised
to comply with this request. His idea was for a heavy
column, supported by the iron-clad gunboats, to move up the
Eed Eiver during high-Avater to Alexandria, and thence, if the
gunboats could pass the rapids as far as Shreveport, to fortify
and hold in force one or the other of those places ; and thus to
perform for the west bank of the river the same serrice, in pre
venting any large body of the enemy from reaching the Mis
sissippi, that the destruction of the raikoads and the occupa
tion of the line of the Big Black was expected to accomplish
on the east bank. General Banks now informed him that he
would in person march on the 5th or 7th from Frankhn,
Louisiana, up the Bayou Teche, with a picked force of
seventeen thousand men, and would reach Alexandria by the
17th of March, and requested that the troops from the Army
of the Tennessee and Admual Porter's fleet should meet him
there at that time. Simultaneously, Steele was to move from
Little Eock on Shreveport or Natchitoches, with ten thousand
men. Sherman at once returned to Vicksburg, and on the 6th of
March gave the necessary instractions to Brigadier-General
A. J. Smith, who had been preriously dkected to organize
and command the expedition, which was to consist of seven
thousand five hundred men of Hurlbut's sixteenth corps, and
twenty-five hundred men of McPherson's seventeenth corps.
General Smith was to report to General Banks, and obey his
orders. He was to move up the river on transports, while the

164 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
troops from the Department of the GuH marched by land.
The duration of his absence was not to extend beyond thirty
days. At the end of that time he was to return to Vicksburg,
gather up aU the detachments, equipage, and transportation of
the Sixteenth Corps, and conduct the troops under his com
mand belonging to that corps to Memphis, where he Avas told he
would probably find orders to join the Army of the Tennessee
at HuntsviUe or Bridgeport.
We need not follow the steps of this expedition in detaU.
General Smith landed at Simmesport, on the west bank of the
Atchafalaya, on the 13th of March, took Fort De Eussy by
assault on the 14th, and reached Alexandria on the 16th. The
advance-guard of the cavalry of the Army of the GuH arrived
the same day, and the main body of that army several days
later. The river was very high. The head of the column left
Alexandria on the 27th. The army marched from Grand
Ecore, where it had halted, on the 6th of April ; — the main body
1 y land ; one division under General T. Kilby Smith on trans
ports accompanying Admkal Porter, who started on the same
day, aiming to reach Springfield Landing on the 10th, where
General Banks undertook to be at that time. On the 8tli, Gen
eral Banks was met near Mansfield, and his attenuatetd column
beaten in detail, by an inferior but concentrated force of the
enemy, under General E. Kirby Smith. The army retreated in
considerable disorder to Pleasant HUl, thirty-five miles distant,
and there on the 9th again encountered the enemy, checked
his pursuit, and routed him. The next day General Banks con
tinued the retreat to Grand Ecore. Admiral Porter and Gen
eral Smith reached Springfield Landing at the appointed time,
heard of the disaster, and returned, Arith difficulty, to Grand
Ecore. Here the army waited nearly three Aveeks, when hav
ing been re-enforced by aU the available troops in the Depart
ment of the Gulf, General Banks continued the retreat to
Alexandria. The river had fallen. The gunboats and trans
ports could not pass the rapids. By means of a dam, con-
stracted at the suggestion and under the superrision of
Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph BaUey, Fourth Wisconsin Cavalry,

THE MERIDIAN EAID. 165
the water in the river was raised sufficiently to aUow the boats
to descend, and on the 14th of May the army marched on
Simmesport. On the 21st it reached Morganzia Bend, on the
west bank of the Mississippi. General Smith at once em
barked his command and returned to Vicksburg, after an
absence of just two months and a haH, instead of the thu-ty
days originally agreed upon.
In the mean while, nearly ten thousand veteran volunteers
of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Corps, and the local garri
sons, had been frirloughed for thirty days, on condition of re-
enHsting, and had returned Arith the ranks of their regiments
sweUed by recruits. Early in March, Veatch's dirision of the
Sixteenth Corps had been ordered to report to General Dodge
at HuntsviUe.
On the 4th of March, at NashviUe, Major-General Grant re
ceived telegraphic orders to report in person at Washington.
Congress had passed an act authorizing the appointment of a
Heutenant-general to command the armies of the United States,
and the president had nominated General Grant for the ap
pointment. Before starting on his journey. Grant seized his
pen, and in the very moment of his greatest elevation, filled
Arith generosity towards those others, to whose exertions he
modestly chose to ascribe his oahi deserved reward, hastUy
Avrote these touching lines : —
"Deae Sherman — The bUl reriving the grade of lieuten
ant-general in the army has become a law, and my name has
been sent to the Senate for the place. I now receive orders
io report to Washington immediately w person, which indicates
a confirmation, or a likehhood of confirmation.
" I start in the morning to comply Arith the order.
" TMiUst I have been eminently successful in this war, in at
least gaining the confidence of the public, no one feels more
than I how much of this success is due to the energy, skiU,
and the harmonious putting forth of that energy and skUl, of
those wlion) it has been my good fortune to have occupying
subordinate positions under me.

166 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
" There are many officers to whom these remarks are apph-
cable to a greater or less degree, proportionate to thek abUity
as soldiers ; but what I want is to express my thanks to you
and McPherson, as the men to whom, above aU others, I feel
indebted for whatever I have had of success.
" How far your adrice and assistance have been of help to
me, you know. How far your execution of whatever has been
given you to do entitles you to the reward I am receiving, you
cannot know as weU as I.
" I feel aU the gratitude this letter would express, giving it
the most flattering construction.
" The word you I use in the plural, intending it for McPher
son also. I should Avrite to him, and wUl some day, but start
ing in the morning, I do not know that I AriU find time just now.
" Your friend,
"U. S. Geant,
" Major-General."
Sherman received this letter near Memphis, on the 10th of
March, and immediately repHed : —
" Deae Geneeal : — I have your more than kind and charac
teristic letter of the 4th inst. I avUI send a copy to General
McPherson at once.
" You do yourself injustice and us too much honor in assign
ing to us too large a share of the merits which have led to
your high advancement. I know you approve the friendship
I have ever professed to you, and AviU permit me to continue,
as heretofore, to manHest it on aU proper occasions.
"You are now Washington's legitimate successor, and oc
cupy a position of almost dangerous elevation ; but H you can
continue, as heretofore, to be yourseH, simple, honest, and un
pretending, you AriU enjoy through Hfe the respect and love of
friends and the homage of mUHons of human beings, that AriU
award you a large share in securing to them and thek descend
ants a government of law and stabUity.
" I repeat, you do General McPherson and myseH too much
honor. At Belmont you mamfested your traits — ^neither of us

THE MERIDIAN RAID. 167
being near. At Donelson, also, you Ulustrated your whole
character. I was not near, and General McPherson in too sub
ordinate a capacity to influence you.
"UntU you had Avon Donelson, I confess I was almost
cowed by the terrible array of anarchical elements that pre
sented themselves at every point ; but that admitted a ray of
hght I have foUowed since.
"I beheve you are as brave, patriotic, and just, as the
great prototype, Washington — as unselfish, kind-hearted, and
honest as a man should be — but the chief characteristic is the
simple faith in success you have always mauHested, which I
can Hken to nothing else than the faith a Christian has in the
Saviour. " This faith gave you victory at ShUoh and Vicksburg. Also,
when you have completed your best preparations, you go into
battle without hesitation, as at Chattanooga — no doubts — no
reserves ; and I teU you, it Avas this that made us act with
confidence. I knew, wherever I was, that you thought of me,
and H I got in a tight place, you would help me out, H ahve.
" My only point of doubts was, in your knowledge of grand
strategy, and of books of science and history ; but, I confess,
your common sense seems to have suppHed aU these.
" Now as to the future. Don't stay in Washington. Come
West : take to yourseH the Avhole Mississippi VaUey. Let us
make it dead-sure — and I teU you, the Atlantic slopes and
Pacific shores wiU foUow its destiny, as sure as th.e Hmbs of a
tree Hve or die with the main trunk. We have done much, but
stiU much remains. Time, and time's influences, are with us.
We could almost afford to sit stUl, and let these influences work.
" Here Hes the seat of the coming empire ; and from the
West, when our task is done, we AriU make short work of
Charleston and Eichmond, and the impoverished coast of th«
Atlantic. " Your sincere friend."
On the 12th of March, 1864, the President reheved Major-
General HaUeck from duty as general-in-chief, and assigned

168 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
Lieutenant-General Grant to the command of the armies of
the United States, with headquarters in the field, and also at
Washington, where General HaUeck was to remain as chief-of-
staff. By the same order, Sherman was assigned to tho com
mand of the MiHtary Dirision of the Mississippi, and Major-
General McPherson to the command of the Department and
Army of the Tennessee.
Sherman received this order at Memphis, on the 14th, whUo
on his way to HuntsviUe, to prepare for the great campaign in
Georgia. In accordance Arith the request of General Grant,
accompanying the order, he immediately proceeded to Nash
vUle, where he arrived on the 17th, and accompanied the
Heutenant-general as far on his way to Washington as Cin
cinnati. During the journey, they had a fuU and free con
ference as to the plan of operations in the approaching cam
paign, and a complete understanding of the work to be done by
each. In a parlor of the Burnet House, at Cincinnati, bend
ing over their maps, the two generals, who had so long been
inseparable, planned together that colossal structure whereof
the great campaigns of Eichmond and Atlanta were but two
of the parts, and, grasping one another firmly by the hand,
separated, one to the east, the other to the west, each to strike
at the same instant his haH of the ponderous death-blow.

C.B,TlicTiaTdsoii-.Pii]:)JiB>:c

THE ARMT OP THE CENTRE. 169

CHAPTEE XrV.
THE AEMY OF THE OENTEE.
As the army corps had relieved the commanders of depart
ments from the care of the great mass of minor and personal
detaUs relating to the troops under them, so the organization
of miHtary divisions, now for the first time introduced into
our service — although something simUar had been intended
when General McCleUan was first caUed to Washington — left
the generals selected to command them entirely free to devote
their minds to the organization, administration, and movement
of their armies against the enemy. Tactical details devolved
upon the department commanders. The unit habitually con
templated by the commander of the miHtary division became
an army ; his detachments were army corps.
The miHtary division of the Mississippi, in the personal
command of Avhich Sherman had just reheved the Heutenant-
general, consisted of the four large departments of the Ohio,
the Cumberland, the Tennessee, and Arkansas. Embracing
the great central belt of territory from the AUeghanies to the
Avestem boundary of Arkansas, it included the entire theatre
of war from Chattanooga to Vicksburg. Four .large Union
armies occupied this central zone.
The army of the Ohio, consisting of the Ninth and Twenty-
thkd Army Corps, was at KnoxviUe. Major-General John
M. Schofield had just taken command of it. Longstreet had
disappeared from its front, and was retreating into Vkginia to
join Lee, and the Ninth Corps was on the way to re-enforce the
army of the Potomac. The Twenty-third Corps, as it presently
took the field, consisted of the divisions of Brigadier-Generals
MUes S. HascaU and Jacob D. Cox. Three divisions remained
to garrison East Tennessee and Kentucky.

170 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
The Army of the Cumberland was at Chattanooga, under
the command of Major-General George H. Thomas. It con
sisted of the Fourth, Fourteenth, and Twentieth corps, com
manded respectively by Major-Generals OHver O. Howard,
John M. Palmer, and Joseph Hooker. The Fourth Corps
included the dirisions of Brigadier-Generals D. S. Stanley,
John Newton, and Thomas J. Wood ; the Fourteenth, those of
Jefferson C. Davis, E. W. Johnson, and Absalom Bakd;
and the Twentieth, those of A. S. WiUiams, John W. Geary, and
Daniel Butterfield.
The Army of the Tennessee, comprising the Fifteenth, and
portions of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth corps, under
Major-Generals John A. Logan, George M. Dodge, and Frank
P. Blak, Jr., was at HuntsvUle, commanded by McPherson.
The remaining divisions of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth
Corps were at Memphis and Vicksburg, under Hurlbut and
Slocum, except those absent on the Eed Eiver expedition.
The FHteenth Corps embraced the divisions of Generals P. J.
Osterhaus, Morgan L. Smith, John E. Smith, and Harrow;
the Sixteenth, those of Thomas E. G. Eansom, John M. Corse,
and Thomas W. SAveeney ; and the Seventeenth, those of
Charles E. Woods and MUes D. Leggett.
The cavalry consisted of McCook's division of the Army of
the Ohio, Kilpatrick's and Garrard's dirisions of the Army of
the Cumberland, and Edward McCook's brigade of the Army
of the Teimessee.
The Department of Arkansas, including the Avhole of that
State, was commanded by Major-General Frederick Steele,
who, Arith the main portion of his troops, was at Little Eock,
holding the Hne of the Arkansas Eiver, with the object of
keeping an army of the enemy away from the Mississippi and
out of Missouri. This department, however, did not long
continue attached to Sherman's command, being added to the
MiHtary Dirision of West Mississippi, under Canby, when
that organization was formed in May.
John McAUister Schofield, the son of a clergyman, the
Eeverend James Schofield, residing in Chatauqua County, in

THE ARMY OP THE CENTRE. 171
the State of Ncav York, was bom there on the 29th of Sep
tember, 1831. When about twelve years of age his father
took him to reside at Bristol, lUinois, whence, in 1845, they
removed to Freeport, in the same State. In June, 1849,
young Schofield entered the MUitary Academy at West Point,
and graduated four years later, standing seventh in the order
of general merit in the same class with Generals McPherson,
Sheridan, SiU, TerrUl, E. O. Tyler, and the rebel General
Hood. He was appointed a brevet second-lieutenant, and at
tached to the Second Eegiment of Artillery, on the 1st of July,
1853, and in regular course of promotion advanced to the
grades of second-Heutenant in the First Eegiment of ArtUlery
on the 30th of August in the same year ; first-lieutenant in the
same regiment on the 1st of March, 1855 ; and captain on the
14th of May, 1861. After serving for two years with his
company in South CaroHna and Florida, in the faU of 1855,
Lieutenant Schofield was ordered to West Point, as Assistant
Professor of Natural and Experimental PhUosophy ; Avhich
position he held untU June, 1860, Avhen he obtained leave of
absence for twelve months to accept the Chak of Physics
in Washington University, at St. Louis, Missouri, intending
to quit the army at the end of the leave. This desig-n he
abandoned immediately upon the pubhcation of the Presi
dent's proclamation of the 15th of AprU, 1861, caUing for
seventy-five thousand volunteers, and Avairing the remainder
of his leave, reported HimseH for orders and Avas assigned to
duty as mustering officer at St. Louis. Shortly afterwards,
by permission of the War Department, Lieutenant Schofield
accepted the position of major of the Fkst Eegiment of
Missouri Volunteers, offered him by the governor of the
State, and in that capacity participated with his regiment in
the bold capture and dispersion of the nest of secessionists at
Camp Jackson on the 10th of May, planned and executed
by Captain, afterwards BrigacHer-General Nathaniel Lyon.
Major Schofield soon afterwards became General Lyon's
principal staff-officer, and served Arith that gaUant commander
throughout the campaign which ended in his death. In the

172 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
faU, the Fkst Missouri Volunteers was converted into a heavy
artiUery regiment, and Major Schofield charged with its
equipment. At Fredericktovm, Missouri, he participated Arith
Battery A, the first one mounted, in the defeat of Jeff.
Thompson, by Plummer and Carlin. On the 20th of No
vember, 1861, Major Schofield was appointed by the President
a brigadier-general of volimteers — and at the same time
received from the governor of Missouri a corresponding.
commission in the Missouri Militia, with orders to organize,
equip, and command a force of ten thousand mihtia, to be
called into the service of the United States, Arithin the hmits
of Missouri, during the war. With this force General Schofield
was enabled to reheve the main armies for active serrice in
more important fields. In the spring of 1862, he was desig
nated by Major-General HaUeck, commanding the Depart
ment of the West, as commander of the district of Missouri,
and in the faU organized and took personal command of the
Army of the Frontier, serAring in the southwestern portion of
the State. He rehnquished the former command in September,
to give his undivided attention to the suppression of the
terrible guerrUla warfare which then raged in Missouri. On
the 29th of November, 1862, the President appointed him a
major-general of volunteers, but his straightforward, decided,
and just administration of affaks as commander of the chstrict
of Missouri haAdng greatly dissatisfied the local politicians,
they made a combined and determined effort to defeat his
nomination, and so far succeeded that the Senate faded to act
upon it, and his commission consequently expked on the 8d
of March, 1863, by constitutional limitation. Immediately
reheved, at his oavu request, from duty in Missouri, Brigadier-
General Schofield was now ordered to report to Major-Gen
eral Eosecrans, commanding the Army of the Cumberland,
at Murfreesboro', Tennessee, by whom he was assigned to
the command of Thomas' old division of the Fourteenth
Army Corps. A month later. President Lincoln reappointed
him a major-general of volunteers, and sent hini back to
St. Louis, to reheve Curtis, in command of the Department

THE ARMY OP THE CENTRE. I73
of Missouri. In May, 1863, he assumed command, and realiz
ing the paramount importance of the operations before Vicks
burg, suspended all active operations in his OAvn department
and lent himself heartily to a co-operation with the plans oi
General Grant, then merely the commander of an adjacent de
partment, by furiushkig him with Major-General F. J. Her
ron's fine division of the Army of the Frontier, and aU other
troops not necessarUy required for a strictly defensive attitude
in Missouri. After the capture of Vicksburg, Schofield was
re-enforced by General Grant Avith Steele's division, lately of
Sherman's corps. SencHng a division of cavalry under Briga
dier-General J. W. Daridson to join Steele at Helena, he
ordered the latter forthwith to move on Little Eock, the key
to the mUitary possession of the line of the Arkansas Eiver
and the control of the State, whUe he sent another column
from Kansas, under Brigadier-General Blunt, to occupy Fort
Smith and open communication with Little Eock. Both
movements having proved successful, Missouri being thus
secured from the ravages of a border war, and his army
holding securely the Hne of the Arkansas, AvhUe menacing
offensively the forces of the enemy between that river and the
Eed, General Schofield was engaged«in concerting with Major-
General Banks, commanding the GuH department, the detaUs
of a joint occupation of Shreveport and the line of the Eed
Eiver, when, in January, 1864, the President appointed Major-
General Eosecrans to reheve him fr-om command. There
were then three principal pohtical parties in Missouri, which,
under different names or various pretences, had existed ever
since the outbreak of the war. The entire control of affaks
in Missouri necessarily rested with the mUitary commander of
the department. As it was impossible to please aU parties,
so, in looking only upon his duty and his orders fr-om a stand
point different fr-om that of either, he generaUy ended by
pleasing none. Fremont, Hunter, and Curtis had been suc
cessively reheved from command ; Schofield himself had been
degraded for a time ; and now he was again to give way to the
demands of the dissatisfied pohticians. Perceiving at last

174 SHERMAN AND HIS CAJIPAIGNS.
that the hostUity of these gentlemen was indeed dkected
against himseH, and not against his subordinates. President
Lincoln, although he indorsed and supported Schofield's entire
pohcy and acts, yielded to the demands of the pohticians for
the purpose of demonstrating thek motives, and gave them a
new commander of thek oAvn choice. In a foAV weeks, the
howls against Eosecrans were as loud as those previously
raised against any of his predecessors. At the request of
General Grant, Schofield was now assigned to the command
of the Army of the Oluo, which he assumed on the 9th of
February. George H. Thomas, bom in Southampton County, Vk
ginia, on the 31st of July, 1816, of wealthy and respectable
parents, entered West Point in June, 1836, and graduated
tweHth in a class of forty-five members; on the first of
July, 1840, was appointed a second-Heutenant in the Thkd
Eegiment of ArtiUery, attained by regular promotions the
grades of first-Heutenant, on the 17th of May, 1843, captain
in the month of December, 1853, and on the 12th of May, 1855,
was selected as major of the newly raised Spcond Eegiment of
Cavah-y. On the 25th of AprU, 1861, by regular promotion,
consequent upon the resignation of the disloyal officers, he be
came Heutenant-colonel and on the 5th of May colonel of
the same regiment, then and since knoAvn as the Fifth Cavalry.
During this time, he served eighteen months in Florida, ¦was
brevetted first-heutenant, on the 6th of November, 1841, for
gaUantrj' in the war against the Seminoles ; served some time
Arith his company at New Orleans Barracks, Fort Moultrie, in
Charleston Harbor, and Fort McHenry, near Baltimore ; in
July, 1845, was sent to Corpus Christi, Texas, to report to
General Taylor; took part in the defence of Fort BroAvn
against a short siege by the Mexicans, and in the battle of Ee-
saca de la Palma ; was brevetted captain for gaUant conduct
at the battle of Monterey, September 23, 1846 ; commanded
Company E, Thkd Artillery, during the foUoAring Arinter ; was
brevetted major for highly distinguished serrice with his bat
tery in the decisive action at Buena Vista ; recrossed the Eio

THE ARMY OP THE CENTRE. 175
Grande at the conclusion of the war and was placed in charge
of the commissary depot at Brazos Santiago ; served in Flor
ida, in command of Company B, of his regiment, in 1849 and
1850 ; served at Fort Independence, Boston Harbor, during
the first three months of 1851 ; was stationed at West Point
as instructor of artiUery and cavah-y from that time until the
spring of 1854, Avhen he was ordered to Cahfornia Arith a bat
tahon of Ids regiment and stationed at Fort Yuma, until July,
1853 ; served with the Second Cavaky, into which he had now
been promoted, untU early in 1856, when it went to Texas,
where he commanded it for three years ; and in April, 1861, was
ordered to Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, to remount his
regiment, which had been betrayed and robbed of its outfit
and equipment by Twiggs, in his infamous surrender of
the entire department under his command, after he had
received orders reHeving him, and with indecent haste to
anticipate the hourly expected arrival of his successor. In
May, 1861, Colonel Thomas took command of a brigade in
the Department of Pennsylvania, under Major-General Patter
son, afterwards the Department of the Shenandoah, under
Major-General Banks, and continued to hold that position
untU the end of August. On the 17th of August he was ap
pointed a brigadier-general of volunteers, and shortly after
wards ordered to Kentucky to report to Brigadier-General
Anderson, who gave him the command of Camp Dick Eobin-
son with about six thousand new troops. On the 26th of
October, a brigade sent out by him under Brigadier-General
Schoepf defeated the enemy under ZoUicoffer, in the battle of
Wildcat. On the 18th of January, after a march of nineteen
days, over nearly impassable roads, with part of the first
dirision of the Army of the Ohio, to which General BueU as
signed him, he met the fierce attack of ZoUicoffer, near MUl
Spring, Kentucky, repulsed it, attacked in his turn, broke the
enemy and pursued the disordered remnants to the Cumberland
Eiver, which they crossed during the night, abandoning aU
thek artillery and baggage. In March, Thomas with his divi
sion, now forming the reserve of BueU's army, occupied Nash-

176 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
viUe, and in April joined the rest of that army after the battle
of ShUoh, and moved Arith it and Grant's army on Corinth.
On the 25th of AprU, 1862, he was promoted to be a major-
general of volunteers, and on the 1st of May his ovm division
was transferred to the Army of the Tennessee, and he was as
signed by General HaUeck to command the five cHvisions, in
cluding Sherman's, constituting the right wing of the forces
before Corinth. After the evacuation of that place by Beau
regard, Thomas returned to the Army of the Ohio and was
placed on duty as second in command of that army, during
Bragg's invasion and the remarkable series of movements by
which BueU manoeuvred it out of Tennessee, through Ken
tucky, and back to LouisriUe. On the 1st of October he was
assigned to the command of the right wing of that army, and
in that capacity took part in BueU's nominal pursuij; of Bragg.
On the 5th of November, 1862, he was assigned by General
Eosecrans, who had just reheved BueU, to the command of a
corps com]jrising his OAvn thkd dirision, now under Eousseau,
and Negley's division. At Stone Eiver, on the 31st of Decem
ber, 1863, Avhen Bragg impetuously hurled his entire army
against Eosecrans' right and routed it, Thomas, with Eous
seau's diA'ision unbroken, stood firm, held his groimd, and
aided in the selection of the new line, whose strength enabled
Eosecrans to tum back the enemy's second attack on the fol-
loAving day. On the 20th of September, 1863, at the battle of
Chickamauga, when McCook aud Crittenden on either flank
yielded to the fury of the enemy's assault, and streamed back
in such utter rout to Chattanooga that even Eosecrans gave
up the day as lost, and hastened thither in person to prepare a
ncAv Hne of defence, Thomas with his corps, somewhat later
augmented by Granger's dirision, stood hke a Hon at bay,
and resting his fianks upon the sides of the mountain gap,
resisted and severely punished every attempt of Bragg, either
to force his position m front or to turn his' flanks. Faffing
back m the night three mUes to a better position, he agam
formed hne of battie and waited aU the day of the 21st
for Bragg's expected attack, which never came. Havmg

THE ARMY OF THE CENTRE. 177
alone saved the Army of the Cumberland from destruc
tion, Thomas was very justly selected as the successor of
General Eosecrans, when on the 19th of October it was
determined to relieve the latter. On the 27th of the same
month he was made a brigadier-general in the regular army.
Faithful over aU things and free from aU petty deskes,
when Sherman, his junior in years, in experience, in commis
sion, and at no remote period his subordinate, was ele
vated to the command of the MUitary Division of the Missis
sippi, Thomas yielded a ready acquiescence in the selection,
and a thorough, efficient, and essential co-operation in aU the
plans of his new superior. It is characteristic of Thomas,
that in the twenty-five years that have elapsed since his
graduation he has had but two short leaves of absence, one in
1848, and one in 1860, and has never been on favored duty of
any kind. In his most marked traits, Thomas is the antithesis
of Sherman, his habitual repose of mind and temper being,
perhaps, only less strongly marked than Sherman's electric
restlessness. James Birdseye McPherson was born in Sandusky County,
Ohio, on the 14th of November, 1828, entered the MUitary
Academy towards the close of his twenty-first year, in June,
1849, graduated at the head of the same class vrith Schofield,
and on the 1st of July, 1853, was appointed a brevet second-
Heutenant, and assigned to the corps of engineers. By regu
lar promotion, he attained the grades of second-Heutenant, on
the Istof December, 1854, first-Heutenant, December 13, 1858,
and captain, August 6, 1861. Upon the expiration of his
graduating furlough, he was stationed at "West Point as as
sistant instructor of practical engineering, and remained there
untU September, 1854, when he was detaUed as assistant
engineer of the harbor defences of New York. From January
to July, 1857, he was in charge of the construction of Fort
Delaware, in the Delaware Eiver. In December, 1857, he
took charge of the erection of the fortifications on Alcatras
Island, in the Bay of San Francisco, Cahfornia. In August,
1861, he was detaUed to superintend the construction of the
13

178 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
fortifications of Boston Harbor. On the 12th of November,
of the same year, Captain McPherson was, at the request of
Major-General HaUeck, appointed an additional aid-de-camp,
Arith the rank of Heutenaut-colonel, and, on reporting to him
at St. Louis, was assigned to engineer duty on his staff.
Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson served as chief engineer on
General Grant's staff, at Forts Henry and Donelson, and at
ShUoh, and was brevetted major in the regular army for the
two former and Heutenant-colonel for the latter. On the 1st
of May he was promoted to be additional aid-de-camp, Arith
the rank of colonel, and served on General HaUeck's staff as
chief engineer of the army before Corinth. He was soon
afterwards promoted to be brigadier-general of volunteers,
from May 15th, 1862. After serving under Grant as gen
eral superintendent of the miHtary raUways in the Depart
ment of the Tennessee and upon the staff of that general in the
battle of luka, he saw his first service in command of troops
early in October, when, Arith a division, he fought his way
through the rebel General Price's lines, then investing Corinth,
marched in to the rehef of the garrison, and the next day
joined in the attack and pursuit of the enemy. In recognition
of his continued meritorious services, he was, upon General
Grant's request, promoted to be a major-general of volun
teers on the 8th of October, 1862. In December, 1862,
he was assigned to the command of the Seventeenth Army
Corps. He was appointed a brigadier-general in the regu
lar army, to date from the capture of Vicksburg. His
share in the campaign which resulted in the conquest of
the Mississippi Eiver, in the battles of Port Gibson, Eay
mond, Jackson, and Champion's HUl, and in the siege of
Vicksburg, we have akeady noticed, as weU as his subsequent
assignment to the command of the district of Vicksburg, and
the control of operations on that part of the river, and his
part in Sherman's Meridian raid. He was taU in person, being
over six feet in height, weU proportioned and erect ; easy and
agreeable in his manners ; frank in conversation ; accessible to
aU; gaUant and dashing in action; regardless of danger;

THE ARMY OF THE CENTRE. 179
strictly honorable in aU his dealings Arith men and vrith the
Government. Schofield, young but matured, weU poised, thoroughly scien
tific by education, thoroughly practical by contact Arith men,
habituated to command ; McPherson, in the fuU flower of his
Hfe, bold and enthusiastic, just emerging from a complete
mastery of the science of defensive war into the wider field of
the offensive, trained to command imder the eye, and by the
example of Grant and Sherman ; Thomas, the ripe growth of
years and experience, of balanced and crystaUized mind,
strong and patient, steadfast and prudent, a true soldier, no
genius, but a master of his profession, exhaustive in prepara
tion, dehberate in action, ponderous and kresistible in execu
tion : such were the men upon whom, under the leadership of
Sherman, the destiny of the campaign was to rest.
On the 25th of March, Sherman set out to inspect his com
mand, and prepare it for action. He risited Athens, Decatur,
HuntsriUe, and Larkin's Ferry, Alabama; and Chattanooga,
Loudon, and Knoxville, Tennessee. Meeting General McPher
son at HuntsviUe, General Thomas at Chattanooga, and General
Schofield at KnoxvUle, he arranged with them in general terms
the lines of communication to be guarded, and the strength
of the columns and garrisons, and fixed the first of May as the
date when every thing throughout the entire command was to
be ready for a general movement. Leaving the department
commanders to complete the detaUs of organization and pre
paration, Sherman returned to his headquarters at NashvUle,
to look after the vital question of suppHes. Two paraUel
lines of raUway from the Tennessee Eiver on the east, and a
thkd line from the Ohio at LouisviUe, bring suppHes to Nash-
riUe. Thence by the NashviUe and Decatur EaUroad they
are carried south to Decatur, and by the NashvUle and Chat
tanooga Eaikoad southeast to Chattanooga, passing through
HuntsviUe, Stevenson, and Bridgeport. The Memphis and
Charleston Eaikoad forms the base of a triangle, one hundred
and twenty-one mUes from Decatur to Chattanooga; from
near Decatur to Bridgeport it Hes north of the Tennessee.

180 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
Thus in case of accident or destruction to either of the dkect
Hnes, there was generaUy communication by the circuitous
route, and during the season of navigation the Tennessee
Eiver added a thkd. The raUways were ki fine condition, in
spite of the repeated injuries inflicted upon them by the
enemy's cavaky in thek frequent raids, but the people in East
Tennessee were so impoverished that the Union commanders
had hitherto felt obhged to issue rations to them from the
miHtary stores. Sherman at once found that the army and
the people could not both be fed by the raUways. The army
must be supphed, must remain, and must move forward ; the
people could bring suppHes by private means or could mi
grate to other parts of the country. Sherman's first duty was
the success of his army. He accordingly issued orders stop
ping the issue of stores to the citizens, and made strenuous ex
ertions to increase the carrying capacity of the raUways. " At
first," he says, in his official report of the campaign, " my orders
operated very hardly, but the proHfic soU soon afforded early
vegetables, and ox-wagons hauled meat and bread from Ken
tucky, so that no actual suffering resulted, and I trust that
those who clamored at the cruelty and hardships of the day
have already seen in the result a perfect justification of my
course." By the 1st of May the storehouses at Chattanoog-a
contained prorisions for thirty days, the ammunition-trains
were fuUy suppHed, the re-enhsted veterans had come forward,
and aU was ready.
On the 10th of AprU, Sherman received his final instruc-
'. tions from the Heutenant-general. From them he learned
that Grant would march Arith the Army of the Potomac from
Culpepper on the 5th of May, against Lee. Sherman was to
move against Johnston at the same time, vrith Atlanta as his
immediate objective. He immediately repHed, giving the
details of his plans, and concluding :
" Should Johnston faU behind Chattahoochee, I would feign
to the right but pass to the left, and act on Atlanta or its
eastern commimications, according to developed facts. This
is about as far ahead as I feel disposed to look ; but I would

THE ARMY OF THE CENTRE. 181
ever bear in mind that Johnston is at aU times to be kept so
busy that he cannot in any event send any part of his com
mand against you or Banks. If Banks can at the same time
carry MobUe and open up the Alabama Eiver, he wUl in a
measure solve a most difficult part of my problem — provisions.
[But in that I must venture. Georgia has a mUHon of inhab
itants. If they can Hve, we should not starve. If the enemy
interrupt my communications, I wUl be absolved from aU
obHgations to subsist on my oavti resources, but feel perfectly
justified in taking whatever and wherever I can find. I AviU
inspke my command, if successful, Arith my feehngs, and that
beef and salt are aU that are absolutely necessary to Hfe ; and
parched corn fed General Jackson's army once, on that very
ground." On the 27th of April, Sherman issued orders to aU the troops
that were to form part of the moving columns to concentrate
towards Chattanooga, and on the 28th removed his headquar
ters thither.
On the morning of the 6th of May the Army of the Tennes
see was near Gordon's MiU, on the Chickamauga Creek, the
Army of the Cumberland at and near Einggold on the raU
way, and the Army of the Ohio near Eed Clay on the Geor
gia Hue, directly north of Dalton. It had been Sherman's
deske and intention to move with one hundred thousand men
and two hundred and fifty guns ; fifty thousand men in the
Army of the Cumberland, thkty-five thousand in that of the
Tennessee, and fifteen thousand in that of the Ohio. His
actual force was ninety-eight thousand seven hundred and
ninety-seven men, and two hundred and fifty-four guns, dis
tributed as foUows : —
Army of the Cumberland. — Infantry, 54,568; artUlery, 2,377;
cavaky, 3,828 : total, 60,773 ; guns, 130.
A'^my of the Tennessee. — ^Infantry, 22,437; artUlery, 1,404;
cavaky, 624 : total, 24,465 ; guns, 96.
Army of the Ohio. — Infantry, 11,183 ; artillery, 679 ; cavaky,
1,697 : total, 13,559 ; guns, 28.
A. J. Smith's and Mower's divisions, which were to have

182 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
joined the Army of Tennessee early in AprU, were stiU de
tained on the Mississippi, in consequence of the unexpected
length and disastrous end of the Eed Eiver expedition.
The Confederate army under Johnston, now numbering,
according to his official report, forty thousand nine hundred
infantry, in the three corps of Hardee, Hood, and Polk, and
four thousand cavaky, under Wheeler, was grouped around
Dalton, on the line of the Chattanooga and Atlanta EaUway,
Johnston's plan was to take the initiative, Arith his oavu force
increased from other sources as largely as practicable; but
whUe Mr. Davis and General Bragg, then stationed in Eich
mond, as general-in-chief of the Confederate armies, were
engaged in discussing detaUs, and objecting to General John
ston's suggestions, Sherman advanced.

BEYOND THE MOUNTAINS. 18c

CHAPTEE XV. I
BEYOND THE MOUNTAINS.
The two hostile armies were separated by an inaccessible
spur of the AUeghanies, called Eocky Face Eidge, cloven by
Buzzard's Boost Gap, through which run the raUway and
MUl Creek. This narrow pass was strongly fortified, was
flooded by the waters of the creek, artificially raised by means
of a dam, and was swept by strong batteries on the projecting
spurs and on a ridge at the southern extremity. To assault
the enemy in this almost unapproachable position, formed no
part of Sherman's plan. He decided to turn the enemy's left.
McPherson was ordered to move rapidly by Ship's Gap, VU-
lanow, and Snake's Creek Gap, on the railway at Eesaca,
eighteen mUes below Dalton, or a point nearer than that
place, make a bold attack, and after breaking the raUway
weU, to retire to a strong defensive position near Snake Creek
Gap, ready to faU on the enemy's fiank when he retreated,
as it was thought he would do.
On the 7th of May, with sHght opposition, Thomas occu
pied Tunnel Hill, directly in front of Buzzard's Boost Gap.
On the 9th, Schofield moved down close to Dalton, from
his camps at Eed Clay, and Thomas renewed liis demon
stration against Buzzard's Boost and Eocky Face Eidge
with such rigor, that Newton's division of Howard's fourth
corps carried the ridge, but turning south, found the crest too
narrow and too weU protected by rock epaulements to enable
it to reach the gorge. Geary's division of Hooker's twentieth
corps, made a bold push for the summit, but the narrow road
was strongly held by the enemy, and could not be carried.

184 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
MeanwhUe McPherson had reached Snake Creek Gap on
the 8th, completely surprising a brigade of Confederate cav
alry which was coming to watch and hold it. The next day
he approached Arithin a mUe of Eesaca, but finding that place
very strongly fortified, and no road leading across to it, Arith
out exposing his left flank to an attack from the north, he
retired to Snake Creek Gap and there took up a strong posi
tion. Leaving Howard's Fourth Corps and a smaU force of cavalry,
to occupy the enemy's attention in front, on the 10th, Sherman
ordered General Thomas to send Hooker's twentieth corps
over to McPherson, and to foUow Arith Palmer's fourteenth
corps, and Schofield was dkected to march by the same route.
On the 12th, the whole army, except Howard's corps, moved
through Snake's Creek Gap on Eesaca ; — ^McPherson, in ad
vance, by the dkect road, preceded by KUpatrick's division of
cavalry ; Thomas to the left, and Schofield to the right.
General KUpatrick, Arith his division, led, and drove Wheel
er's division of the enemy's cavaky from a cross-road to Arithin
two mUes of Eesaca, but received a wound which disabled
him, and gave the command of his brigade to Colonel Murray,
whOj according to his orders, wheeled out of the road, leaving
General McPherson to pass. General McPherson struck the
enemy's infantry pickets near Eesaca, and drove them Arithin
thek fortified Hnes, and occupied a ridge of bald hiUs, his
right on the Oostanaula, about two mUes below the raUway
bridge, and his left abreast the toAvn. General Thomas came
up on his left, facing Camp Creek. General Schofield broke
his way through the dense forest to General Thomas' left.
Johnston had left Dalton on the night of the 12th and morn
ing of the 13th, and General Howard entered it and pressed
his rear. Eocky Face Mountain and the southern extremity
of Snake Creek Gap had effectuaUy concealed the flank
movement of the Union army, and nothing saved Johnston's
army at Eesaca but the impracticable nature of the country,
which made the passage of troops across the vaUey almost
impossible. This enabled him to reach Eesaca from Dal-

Orf ItAf IjOiS mourn 8 iSACA
fVei.,iv<'il l<v Bi-vl . Brig Gen> 0. M Vuv.
H^iiifiiiri// Jill .S7irrrtitni aiiiJ Jiu- fhiiifnujflit/.

E :^ ?f K S ^) E JC

BEYOND THE MOUNTAINS. 185
ton along the comparatively good roads constructed before
hand, by his OAvn foresight. On the 14th of May, the whole
rebel army was met in a strong position behind Camp
Creek, occupying the forts at Eesaca, the right on some
high hUls to the north of the toAvn. , Sherman at once ordered
a pontoon bridge to be laid across the Oostanaula at Lay's
Ferry, in the dkection of Calhoun ; Sweeney's division of the
Sixteenth Corps, to cross and threaten CaUioun, and Garrard's
cavaky division to move from its position at VUlanow towards
Eome, cross the Oostanaula, and break the raUway below
CaUioun and above Kingston, H possible, whUe the main army
pressed against Eesaca at aU points. General McPherson got
across Camp Creek near its mouth, and made a lodgment
close up to the enemy's works, driving Polk's corps from the
hills that commanded the raUroad and trestle bridges ; and
General Thomas pressing close along Camp Creek VaUey,
threw Hooker's corps across the head of the creek to the main
Dalton road, and down it close to Eesaca.
General Schofield came up on his left, and a heairy
battle ensued during the afternoon and evening of the 15th,
during which General Hooker drove the enemy from several
strong hUls, capturing a four-gun battery and many prisoners.
That night Johnston escaped, retreating south across the
Oostanaula, and the next morning Sherman entered the toAvn
in time to save the road bridge, but not the raUway bridge,
which had been burned.
The wh'olt! utim^ cJllailTd in pursuit, General Thomas dkectly
on the heels of Hardee, who was bringing up the Confederate
rear. General McPherson by Lay's Ferry, and General Scho
field by bHnd roads to the left. In Eesaca another four-gun
battery and a considerable quantity of stores were found.
During the 16th the whole of Sherman's army crossed the
Oostanaula. and on the 17th moved south by as many different
roads as practicable. General Thomas had sent Jefferson
C. Davis' division along the west bank of the Oostanaula, to
Eome. Near AdaksvUle, the rear of the rebel army was again
encountered, and about sunset of that day General Newton's

186 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
dirision, in the advance, had a sharp encounter Arith his rear
guard, but the next morning he was gone, and the Union troops
pushed on through Kingston, to a point four mUes beyond,
where they found the enemy again formed on ground compar
atively open, and well adapted for a great battle. General
Schofield approached CassviUe from the north, to which point
General Thomas had also dkected General Hooker's corps,
and General McPherson's army had been draAvn from Wood
land to Kingston in. order to be in close support. On the 19th
the enemy was in force about CassviUe, strongly intrenched,
but as our troops converged on him again he retreated, in the
night-time, across the Etowah Eiver, burning the road and
railway bridges near CartersviUe, but leaving us in possession
of the valuable country about the Etowah Eiver.
That morning Johnston had ordered Polk's and Hood's
corps to advance and attack the Fourteenth Corps, General
Palmer's, which had foUowed them from AdairsvUle, but
Hood, who led the advance, being deceived by a report that
the union troops had turned his right, delayed until the op
portunity was lost. On the night of the 19th, the Confed
erate army held a commanding situation on a ridge before
CassvUle, but acting upon the earnest representations of Lieu-
tenant-Generals Polk and Hardee, that thek positions were
untenable, Johnston crossed the Etowah on the foUowing
morning. Holding General Thomas's army about CassviUe, General
McPherson's about Kingston, and General Schofield at Oass-
viUe's depot, and towards the Etowah bridge, Sherman gave
his army a few days' rest, and time to bring forward supphes
for the next stage of the campaign. In the mean time General
Jefferson C. Davis, with his division of the Fourteenth Corps,
had got possession of Eome, with its forts, eight or ten guns
of heavy cahbre, and its valuable mUls and foundries. Two
good bridges were also secured across the Etowah Eiver near
Kingston. Satisfied that the enemy would hold him in check
at the AUatoona Pass, Sherman resolved, without even at
tempting it in front, to txun it by a ckcuit to the right, and

BEYOND THE MOUNTAINS. 187
having loaded the wagons with forage and subsistence for
twenty days' absence from the raUway, left a ganison at Eome
and Kingston, on the 23d put the army in motion for DaUas.
General McPherson crossed the Etowah at the mouth of
Conasene Creek, near Kingston, and moved for his position to
the south of DaUas by way of Van Wert. Daris' division
of the Fourteenth Corps moved directly from Eome for Dallas
by Wan Wert. General Thomas took the road by Euharlee
and Burnt Hickory, whUe General Schofield moved by other
roads more to the east, aiming to come up on Thomas' left.
The head of Thomas' column skkmished with the enemy's
cavalry, under Jackson, about Burnt Hickory, and captured a
courier Arith a letter of General Johnston, shoAring that he had
detected the move, and was preparing to take a stand near
DaUas. The country was very rugged, mountainous, and
densely wooded, Arith few and obscure roads.
On the 25th May, General Thomas was moving from Burnt
Hickory for DaUas, his troops on three roads. Hooker's corps
having the advance. When he approached the Pumpkin Vine
Creek, on the main Dallas road, he found Jackson's dirision
of the enemy's cavaky at the bridge to his left. Eapidly
pushing across the creek, he saved the bridge, though on
fire, and foUoAring eastward about two miles, encountered
and drove the infantry some distance, untU he met Hood's
corps in line of battle, and his leading dirision. General
Geary's, had a severe encounter. WUHams' and Ward's (late
Butterfield' s) dirisions of Hooker's corps, were on other roads,
and it was nearly four o'clock p.m. before General Hooker
got his whole corps well in hand, when he deployed, and,
by Sherman's order, made a bold push to secure possession
of New Hope Church, where three roads from Ackworth, Ma
rietta, and DaUas meet. Here a hard battle -tvith Stewart's
dirision of Hood's corps was fought, lasting two hours, but
the enemy being covered by hastUy constructed earthworks,
and a stormy dark night having set in, General Hooker was
unable to drive him from these roads. The next morning
General McPherson was moved up to DaUas, General Thomas

188 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
deployed against New Hope Church, and General Schofield
dkected towards the left, so as to strike and tum the enemy's
right. General Garrard's cavaky operated with General Mc
Pherson, and General Stoneman's vrith General Schofield.
General McCook looked to the rear. OAring to the difficult
nature of the ground and dense forests, it took several days
to deploy close to the enemy, when, Sherman resolved gradu
aUy to work towards our left, and as soon as aU things should
be ready to push for the raUway east of AUatoona. In making
the development before the enemy about New Hope, many
severe encounters occurred between parts of the army. On
the 28th, General McPherson was on the point of closing
to his left on General Thomas, in front of New Hope Church,
to enable the rest of the army to extend stUl more to the left,
and to envelop the enemy's right, when suddenly the enemy
made a bold and daring assault on him at DaUas. Fortu
nately our men had erected good breastworks, and gave, the
enemy a terrible and bloody repulse. After a few days' delay,
for effect, Sherman renewed his orders to General McPherson,
to move to the left about five mUes, and occupy General
Thomas' position in front of New Hope Church, and directed
Generals Thomas and Schofield to move a corresponding dis
tance to thek left. This was effected vrithout resistance on
the 1st of June, and by pushing the left weU around, aU the
roads leading back to AUatoona and Ackworth were occupied,
after which Sherman sent General Stoneman's cavalry rapidly
into AUatoona, at the east end of the Pass, and General" Gar
rard's cavaky around by the rear to the west end of the Pass.
This was accomphshed, AUatoona Pass was turned, and Sher
man's real object gained.
Ordering the raUway bridge across the Etowah to be at
once rebuilt, Sherman continued working by the left, and by
the 4th of Jime had resolved to leave Johnston in his in
trenched position at New Hope Church, and move to the raU
way about Ackworth, when the latter abandoned his intrench
ments, and feU back to Lost Mountain. The Union army
then moved to Ackworth and reached the raUway on the 6th.

BEYOND THE MOUNTAINS. 189
On the 7th the Confederate right was extended beyond the
raUway, and across the Ackworth and Marietta road. - On ex
amining the AUatoona Pass, Sherman found it admkably
adapted for use as a secondary base, and gave the necessary
orders for its defence and garrison. As soon as the raUway
bridge was fimished across the Etowah, stores came forward to
camp by raU. At Ackworth, General Blak came up on the 8th
of Jtme Arith two divisions of the Seventeenth Corps, that had
been on furlough, and one brigade of cavaky, Colonel Long's,
of Gen"eral Garrard's division, which had been awaiting horses
at Columbia. This accession of force nearly compensated for
the losses in battle, and the detachments left at Eesaca, Eome,
Kingston, and AUatoona.

190 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.

CHAPTEE XVI.
ACEOSS THE CHATTAHOOCHEE.
On the 9th of June, his communication in the rear being
secure and suppHes ample, Sherman moved forward to Big
Shanty. Kenesaw Mountain lay before him, Arith a high range of
hiUs, covered with chestnut-trees, trending off to the north
east, terminating in another peak, caUed Brushy Mountain.
To the right was a smaUer hiU, caUed Pine Mountain, and
beyond it, in the distance, Lost Mountain. AU these, though
links in a continuous chain, present a sharp, conical appear
ance, prominent in the vast landscape that presents itseH from
any of the hUls that abound in that region. Pine Mountain
forms the apex, and Kenesaw and Lost Mountains the base
of a triangle, perfectly covering the town of Marietta and the
raUway, back to the Chattahoochee. On each of these peaks
the enemy had his signal-stations. Hardee's corps held the
left of the enemy's Hne, resting on Lost Mountain, Polk's the
centre, and Hood's the right, across the Marietta and AckAV'orth
road. The enemy's Hue was fuUy two mUes long — more than
he had force to hold. General McPherson was ordered to
move towards Marietta, his right on the raikoad ; General
Thomas on Kenesaw and Pine Mountains, and General
Schofield off towards Lost Mountain : General Garrard's cav
aky on the left. General Stoneman's on the right ; and General
McCook looking to the rear and communications. The depot
was at Big Shanty.
By the 11th of June Sherman's Hnes were close up, and he
made dispositions to break the enemy's Hne between Kenesaw

ACROSS THE CHATTAHOOCHEE. 191
and Pine Mountains. General Hooker was on its right and
fr-ont, General Howard on its left and front, and General
Palmer between it and the raUroad. During a sharp can
nonading from General Howard's right and General Hooker's
left, Lieutenant-General Polk, of the Confederate army, was
kUled on the 14th, and Major-General LoveU succeeded to the
command of his corps. On the morning of the 15th Pine
Mountain was found abandoned by the enemy. Generals
Thomas and Schofield advanced, and found him again strongly
intrenched along the line of rugged hUls connecting Kenesaw
and Lost Mountains. At the same time General McPherson
advanced his line,, gaining substantial advantage on the left.
Pushing the operations on the centre as vigorously as the
nature of the ground would permit, Sherman had again or
dered an assault on the centre, when, on the 17th, the enemy
abandoned Lost Mountain, and the long Hne of breastworks
connecting it with Kenesaw. Our troops continued to press
at aU points, skirmishing in dense forests of timber, and across
most difficult ravines, untU, on the 19th, they found him again
strongly posted and intrenched, his right Aving, composed of
Hood's corps, thrown back to cover Marietta, resting on the
Marietta and Canton road ; the centre on Kenesaw Mountain,
held by Loring's corps ; and the left, Hardee's corps, across
the Lost Mountain and Marietta road, behind Nose's Creek,
and covering the raUroad back to the Chattahoochee.
From Kenesaw the enemy could look down upon the Union
camps, and observe every movement, and his batteries thun
dered away, but did little harm, on account of the extreme
height, the shot and sheU passing harmlessly over the heads of
the men. During the operations about Kenesaw the rain fell
almost continuously for three weeks, rendering the narrow
wooded roads mere mud guUeys, so that a general movement
would have been impossible ; but the men daUy worked closer
to their intrenched foe, and kept up an incessant picket firing
to aimoy him.
General McPherson was watching the enemy on Kene
saw and working his left forward; General Thomas swing-

192 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
ing, as it were, on a grand left wheel, his left on Kene
saw connecting with General McPherson ; and General Scho
field aU the time working to the south and east, along the old
SandtoAva road. On the 21st, Hood's corps was moved to the
left of the Confederatb lines, and his former position on the
right fiUed by Wheeler's cavaky. On the 22d, General
Hooker had advanced his Hne, Arith General Schofield on his
right, when Hindman's and Stevenson's dirisions of Hood's
corps suddenly saUied forth, attacked WUHams' dirision of
Hooker's corps and a brigade of HascaU's division of General !
Schofield's army, and drove in thek skkmish lines, but on reach
ing the line of battle received a terrible repulse and feU back,
leaving dead, wounded, and many prisoners in our hands.
Upon studying the ground, Sherman now considered that he
had no alternative but to assault the enemy's Hnes or tum his
position. Either course had its difficulties and dangers ; and
he perceived that the enemy, as weU as his OAvn officers, had
settled doAvn into a conviction that he would not assault forti
fied lines. AU expected him to " outflank." An army, to be
efficient, must not settle doAvn to one single mode of offence, but
must be prepared to execute any plan which promises success.
Desking, therefore, for the moral effect, to make a successful
assault against the enemy behind breastworks, Sherman re
solved to attempt it on the left centre ; reflecting that H he
could thrust a strong head of column through at that point,
by pushing it boldly and rapidly two and a haH mUes, it
woidd reach the raUway below Marietta, cut off the enemy's
right and centre from its Hne of retreat, and then, by turning
on either fragment, that fraction could be overwhelmed and
destroyed. On the 24th of June, he ordered that an assault
should be made at two points south of Kenesaw on the 27th,
one near Little Kenesaw by McPherson, and the other about
a mUe further south by Thomas. On the 27th of June, the
two assaults were made exactly at the time and in the man
ner prescribed in Sherman's orders, and both faded, costing
us many valuable Hves, among them those of Generals Harker
and McCook — Colonel Eice, and others badly wounded ; our

ACROSS THE CHATTAHOOCHEE. I93
aggregate loss being nearly three thousand, whUe we inflicted
comparatively Httle loss to the enemy, behind his weU-formed
breastworks. The losses in Hardee's and Loring's corps, by
which the brunt of the assault was sustained, are reported by
General Johnston at about five hundred and forty. In his
official report, Sherman says : " FaUure as it was, and for
which I assume the entire responsibUity, I yet claim it pro
duced good fruits, as it demonstrated to General Johnston
that I Avould assavdt, and that boldly ; and we also gained and
held ground so close to the enemy's parapets that he could
not show a head above them."
On the 1st of July, Sherman ordered General McPherson to
be reheved by General Garrard's cavalry in front of Kenesaw,
and rapidly to throw his whole army by the right to threaten
Nickajack Creek and Turner's Ferry across the Chattahoochee ;
and he also pushed Stoneman's cavaky to the river below
Turner's. General McPherson commenced his movement on
the night of July 2d, and, at the same moment, Johnston, finding
his left turned, and in danger of being cut off from Atlanta,
abandoned his strong position at Kenesaw Mountain, and feU
back to Smyrna Church, five mUes from Marietta. The next
morning General Thomas' whole hne was moved foi-Avard to
the raUway, and turned south in pursuit towards the Chatta
hoochee. General Logan's corps, of General McPherson's
army, was ordered back into Marietta by the main road, and
General McPherson and General Schofield were instructed to
cross Nickajack and attack the enemy in flank and rear, and,
if possible, to catch him in the confusion of crossing the
Chattahoochee ; but Johnston had covered his movement too
weU, by a strong tete-de-pont at the Chattahoochee and an ad
vanced intrenched Hne across the road at Smyrna Church, to
admit of this.
Leaving a garrison in Marietta, and ordering General Logan
to join his oavu army near the mouth of Nickajack, Sherman
overtook General Thomas at Smyrna. On the 4th of July,
Thomas pushed a strong skirmish line doAvn the main road,
captm-ing the entke line of the enemy's pits, and made strong
13

194 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
demonstrations along Nickajack Creek and about Turner's
Ferry. This had the desked effect, and during the night
Johnston feU back to the Chattahoochee, covering the cross
ings from Turner's Ferry to the raUway bridge, and sending
Wheeler's and Jackson's cavaky to the left bank to observe
the river for twenty miles above and below. The next morn
ing, Sherman advanced to the Chattahoochee, General Thomas'
left flank resting on it near Price's Ferry, General McPherson's
right at the mouth of the Nickajack, and General Schofield in
reserve. Heavy skkmishing along the whole fr-ont, during the
6th, demonstrated the strength of the enemy's position, which
could alone be turned by crossing the main Chattahoochee
Eiver, a rapid and deep stream, only passable at that stage
of water by means of bridges, except at one or two very
difficult fords.
Conceiving that this would be more easy of execution be
fore the enemy had made more thorough preparation or re
gained fuU confidence, Sherman ordered General Schofield to
cross from his position on the Sandtown road to Smyrna
camp ground, and next to the Chattahoochee, near the mouth
of Soap's Creek, and effect a lodgment on the east bank.
This was most successfuUy and skUfuUy accomphshed on the
7th of July, General Schofield capturing a gun, completely
surprising the guard, laying a good pontoon bridge and a
trestle bridge, and effecting a strong lodgment on high and
commanding ground, Arith good roads leading to the east. At
the same time. General Garrard, Arith his cavaky dirision,
moved rapidly on EosweU, and destroyed the cloth factcndes
which had suppHed the rebel armies. General Garrard was
then ordered to secure the shaUow ford at EosweU, and hold
it untU he could be reheved by infantry ; and, as Sherman con
templated transferring the Army of the Tennessee from the
extreme right to the left, he ordered General Thomas to send
a division of his infantry that was nearest to EosweU to hold
the ford untU General McPherson could send a corps from the
neighborhood of Nickajack. General NcAvton's dirision was
sent, and held the ford untU the arrival of General Dodge's

r VK :x ?s E H H IK E

THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN';
tiirin.slied Ijv
Brevet Bn^ Gen. O. M. Poe/;
CMei' Eiiameer.

£nff^ijpdi for- SJtertrf/JJi a/if/ /iis (hrtipajxfii.f

ACROSS THE CHATTAHOOCHEE. I95
corps, which was soon foUowed by the remainder of General
McPherson's army, General Howard had also built a bridge
at Powers' Ferry, two miles below General Schofield, and had
crossed over and taken position on his right. Thus, during the
9th, we had secured three good and safe points of passage over
the Chattahoochee above the enemy, with good roads leading
to, Atlanta. Learning these facts, Johnston crossed the river on
the night of the 9th, and burned the bridges in his rear ; and
thus, on the morning of the 10th, Sherman's army held undis
puted possession of the right bank of the Chattahoochee ; one
of the chief objects of his campaign was gained ; and Atlanta
lay before him, only eight mUes distant. It was too impor
tant a place in the hands of an enemy to be left undisturbed
Arith its magazines, stores, arsenals, workshops, foundries, and
converging raUways. But the men had worked hard and
needed rest.
In anticipation of this contingency, Sherman had coUected
a weU-appointed force of cavaky, about two thousand strong,
at Decatur, Alabama, Arith orders, on receiving notice by
telegraph, to push rapidly south, cross the Coosa at the
raikoad bridge or the Ten Islands, and thence by the most
direct route to Opehka, for the purpose of breaking up the only
finished railway connecting the channels of trade and travel
betAveen Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi, running from
Montgomery to Opehka, and thereby to cut off Johnston's
army from an important source of supply and re-enforcement.
Major-General LoveU H. Eousseau, commanding the district
of Tennessee, had asked and received permission to command
the expedition. As soon as Johnston was weU across the
Chattahoochee, and Sherman had begun to manoeuvre on At
lanta, the requisite notice was given. General Eousseau started
punctuaUy on the 10th of July, fulfiUed his orders and instruc
tions to the very letter, passed through TaUadega, reached the
railway on the 16th, about twenty-five miles west of Opehka,
and effectuaUy broke it up to that place, as weU as three mUes
of the branch towards Columbus, and two miles towards
West Point. He then turned north, and, on the 22d, joined

196 SHtRMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
Sherman at Marietta, having sustained a loss of about timiy
men. The interval to the 16th of July, was employed in coUecting
stores at AUatoona, Marietta, and Vining's Station, strengthen
ing the raUway g-uards and garrisons, and in improA-ing the
pier bridges and roads leading across the river. Generals
Stoneman's and McCook's cavalry had scouted weU doAm
the river to draw attention in that direction, and all things
being ready for a general advance, on the 17th, Sherman
ordered it to commence. General Thomas was to cross at
Powers' and Price's ferry bridges, and march by Buckhead ;
Schofield, who, as has been seen, was akeady across at
the mouth of Soap's Creek, to march by Cross Keys ; and
General McPherson to dkect his course from EosweU di
rectly against the Augusta road at some point east of Deca
tur, near Stone Mountain. General Garrard's cavaky acted
with General McPherson, and Generals Stoneman and Mc
Cook watched the river and roads beloAv the raUAvay. On the
17th the Avhole army advanced from their camps, and formed
a general line along the old Peach-tree road.
The same day, Jefferson DaAis relieved General Johnston
from the command of the Confederate Army of the Tennessee,
and designated Lieutenant-General J. B. Hood as his succes
sor. The telegram from General Samuel Cooper, adjutant-
general of the Confederate army, communicating this order
assigned as a reason for it that Johnston had failed to arrest
the advance of the Union army to the vicinity of Atlanta, and
expressed no confidence that he could defeat it. From the
moment that stiffly bencHng to the pressure of pubhc opinion,
unmistakably uttered through the lips of the rebel Congress,
.Jefferson Davis had, against his wiU, restored General John
ston to command in the west, that wrong-headed man, ever
warped by his private griefs to the injury of his oavu cause,
had suUenly refr-ained from giving to his subordinate any as
sistance whatever, had spent the time for action in cavilling at
details, had Arithheld the troops needed to render either offence
or defence successful, and had left Johnston in entke igno-

ACROSS THE CHATTAHOOCHEE. 19 7
ranco as to the approval or condemnation of his plans until
their consummation afforded the hungrUy watched chance for
his cHsgrace. With an army less than half the size of Sher
man's, a victory by Johnston on the banks of the Tennessee,
by no means probable would even if possible, have proved in
decisive ; whUe defeat, which he ought to have regarded as
certain, AvoiUd have been his utter destruction. Falling back
successively to the strong mountain positions at Eesaca, Alla
toona, AckAvorth, and Kenesaw, and in turn interposing be
tween himself and the Union army three large riA'^ers, tho
Oostanaula, Etowah, and Chattahoochee, Johnston had forced
Sherman to consume seventy-two days in passing over the
hundred mUes that measured the distance between Einggold
and Atlanta, and there, behind secure fortifications, with an
army larger than at the start, was preparing to attack the
Union army, largely reduced bj losses, by detachments, and
by expiration of enhstmeaits, in a position south of aU the
barriers it had passed, where a defeat avouIcI be so far decisive
for Sherman as to cost him aU the fruits already gained and
months of delay, but indecisive for the Confederates, avHo could
retire behind thek works, too strong for assault and too exten
sive for investment. At this crisis of the campaign, Johnston,
prudent, wary, and exhaustive in his plans, brave and skUful
in their execution, was displaced by a successor, brave indeed
but also rash, capable of fighting, but incompetent to direct.
The Confederate tactics changed at once and the battle which
Johnston, at the very moment he was reheved, was about to
dehver upon the decisive point Avith thorough preparation was
delivered by Hood, upon the first point that presented itseH,
with rash impetuosity.
The Confederate army, numbering forty-one thousand infan
try and artUlery and ten thousand cavaky, was now strongly
posted, about four miles in front of Atlanta, on the hUls
which form the south bank of the broad channel knoAvn as
Peach-tree Creek, holding the Hne of that stream and the
Chattahoochee for some distance below the mouth of the
creek.

198 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
On the 18th, continuing on a general right wheel. General
McPherson reached the Augusta raUway, at a point seven
mUes east of Decatur, and with General Garrard's cavalry and
General Morgan L. Smith's division of the FHteenth Corps,
broke up a section of about four mUes. General Schofield
reached the toAvn of Decatur the same day.
On the 19th, General McPherson turned along the raUway
into Decatur. General Schofield foUowed a road towards At
lanta, leading by Colonel Howard's house and the distUlery,
and General Thomas crossed Peach-tree Creek in force by nu
merous bridges in the face of the enemy's intrenched Hnes. AU
found the onemy in more or less force and skkmished heavUy.
On the 20th, aU the armies had closed in, converging towards
Atlanta, but as a gap existed between Generals Schofield
and Thomas, two dirisions of General Howard's corps of
General Thomas' army were moved to the left to connect Arith
General Schofield, leaving Newton's division of the same corps
on the Buckhead road. During the afternoon of the 20th,
about 4 p. m., the enemy saUied from his works in force, and
feU in line of battle against Sherman's right centre, composed
of Newton's diA-ision of Howard's corps, on the main Buck-
head road, of Hooker's corps, next towards the south, and
Johnson's division of Palmer's corps. The blow was sudden
and somewhat unexpected, but General Newton had hastUy
covered his front by a Hne of rail-pUes, which enabled him to
meet and repulse the attack on him. General Hooker's corps,
although uncovered, and compeUed to fight on comparatively
open ground, after a very severe battle, drove the enemy back
to his intrenchments. The action in front of Johnston's diri
sion was comparatively Hght, as the position was weU intrench
ed. Sherman's entke loss was about fifteen hundred kUled,
wounded, and missing, — chiefly in Hooker's corps, by reason of
its exposed condition.
On the morning of the 22d, to his surprise, Sherman discov
ered that the Confederate army had, during the succeeding
night, abandoned the Hne of Peach-tree Creek, where he
should have interposed an obstinate resistance, and faUen back

ACEOSS THE CHATTAHOOCHEE. 199
to a strong line of redoubts, forming the immediate defences
of Atlanta, and covering aU the approaches to that town.
These works had been long since prepared, and the enemy
was now engaged in connecting the redoubts with curtains
strengthened by rifle-trenches, abattis, and chevaux-de-frise.
The whole of Sherman's army crossed Peach-tree Creek and
closed in upon Atlanta, — McPherson on the left, Schofield next,
and Thomas on the right.
General McPherson, who had advanced from Decatur, con
tinued to foUow substantiaUy the Augusta railway, with the
Fifteenth Corps, General Logan, and Seventeenth, General
Blair, on its left, and the Sixteenth, General Dodge, on its
right ; but as the general advance of aU the armies contracted
the circle, the Sixteenth Corps was thrown out of line by the
FHteenth connecting on the right with General Schofield near
the Howard House. General McPherson, the night before,
had gained a high hiU to the south and east of the railway,
where the Seventeenth Corps had, after a severe fight, driven
the enemy, and it gave him a most commanding position
Arithin riew of the very heart of the city. He had thrown out
working parties to it, and was making preparations to occupy
it in strength with batteries. The Sixteenth Corps, General
Dodge, was ordered from right to left to occupy this position
and make it a strong general left flank. General Dodge was
moving by a diagonal path or wagon-track leading from the
Decatur road in the dkection of General Blair's left flank.
About noon Hood attacked boldly. At the first indications
of a movement, on his flank. General McPherson parted from
General Sherman, with whom he was engaged in discussing the
state of affaks and the plans for the future, and with his staff
rode off to direct matters on the field. In a few moments, the
sounds of musketry to McPherson's left and rear, groAving in
volume and presently accompanied by artiUery, indicated to
Sherman Hood's purpose of throAring a superior force against
his left, AvhUe his front would be checked by the fortifications
of Atlanta ; and orders were accordingly at once dispatched
to the centre and right to press forward and give fuU employ-

200 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
ment to all the enemy in his Hnes, and for General Schofield
to hold as large a force in reserve as possible, awaiting devel
opments. About haH-past twelve o'clock, Lieutenant-Colonel
WUHam T. Clark, assistant-adjutant-general, rode up and
communicated to General Sherman the appalling inteUigence
that General McPherson was either dead or a prisoner, that
he had ridden to General Dodge's column, which was then
moving as heretofore described, and had sent off nearly aU his
staff and orderhes on various errands, and himseH had passed
into a narrow path or road that led to the left and rear of
General GUes A. Smith's division, which was General Blak's
extreme left ; that a few minutes after he had entered the
woods a sharp volley was heard in that direction, and his horse
had come out riderless and wounded in two places. There
was no time to yield to the grief caused by this terrible calam
ity. Not an instant was to be lost. Sherman instantly dis
patched a staffrofficer to General Logan to teU him what had
happened and that he must assume command of the Army of
the Tennessee, and hold stubbornly the ground already chosen,
more especiaUy the hUl gained by General Leggett the night
before. Already the whole line was engaged in battle. Hardee's
corps had saUied from Atlanta, and, by a wide circuit to the
east, had struck General Blair's left flank, enveloped it, and
had SAvung round to the right untU it struck General Dodge in
motion. General Blair's line was substantially along the aban
doned line of rebel trench, but it was fashioned to fight out
wards. A space of wooded ground of near haH a mile inter
vened between the head of General Dodge's column and
General Blak's line, through which the enemy had poured.
The last order known to have been given by General McPher-
sen was to hurry Colonel Wangehn's brigade of the Fifteenth
Corps across from the railway to :)ccupy this gap. Oppor
tunely, it came on the double-quick and checked the enemy.
WhUe Hardee assailed our left flank, Lieutenant-General A.
P. Stewart, who had been placed in command of Polk's cc«7)fl,

AlROSS THE CHATTAHOOCHEE. 201
on the 7th, was intended to move dkectly out from his main
works and faU upon McPherson in front, but fortunately both
attacks were not made simultaneously. The enemy SAvept
across the HiU Avhich owe men were fortHying, captured the
pioneer company, its tools, and almost the entire Avorking
party, and bore doAvn on our left until he encountered General
GUes A. Smitji's division of the Seventeenth Corps, who being
somewhat in ak, was forced to fight first from one side of the
old rifle parapet and then from the other, graduaUy withdraAV-
ing, regiment by regiment, so as to form a flank to General
Leggett' s division, which held the important position on the
apex of the liiU. General Dodge received and held in check
the attack of Hardee's corps, and punished him severely, cap
turing many prisoners. General GUes A. Smith had graduaUy
given up the extremity of his line, and formed a new one, con
nected on the right with General Leggett, and the left refused,
facing southeast. On this ground and in this order the men
fought weU and desperately for nearly four hours, checking and
repulsing all the enemy's attacks. The execution on the ene
my's ranlis at the angle was terrible, and gi-eat credit is as
cribed by Sherman to Generals Leggett and Giles A. Smith
and their men for thek hard and stubborn fighting. The
enemy made no further progress on that flank, and by four
p. M. had almost given up the attempt. In the mean time,
Garrard's cavalrj' division having been sent off to Covington,
Wheeler, Avitli his Confederate cavaky, had reached Decatur
and attempted to capture the wagon trains, but Colonel
Sprague covered them with great skUl and success, sending
them to the rear of Generals Schofield and Thomas, and not
draAring back fr-om Decatur tUl every wagon was safe except
three, which were abandoned by the teamsters. On our ex
treme left the enemy had taken Murray's regular battery of
six guns, Avith its horses, as it was moving along imsupported
and unapprehensive of danger in a narrow wooded road in
the unguarded space between the head of General Dodge's
column and the Hne of battle on the ridge above, but most of

202 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
the men escaped to the bushes. Hardee also captured two
other guns on the extreme left flank, that were left on the
ground as General GUes A. Smith drew off his men. About
four p. M. there was a luU, during which the enemy advanced
on the raUway and the main Decatur road, and suddenly
assaUed a regiment which, with a section of guns, had been
throAvn forward as a picket, moved rapidly forward, and broke
through our Hnes at that point. The force on this part of the
line had been materiaUy weakened by the Arithdrawal of Colonel
Martin's brigade, sent by General Logan's orders to the extreme
left, and Lightburn's brigade feU back in some cHsorder about
fom- hundred yards, to a position held by it the night before,
leaving the enemy for a time in possession of two batteries,
including a valuable 20-poimder Parrott battery of four guns,
and separating the two dirisions of the FHteenth Corps,
which were on the right and left of the raUAvay. Being in per
son close by the spot, and appreciating the vast importance
of the connection at that point, Sherman ordered several bat
teries of Schofield's army to be moved to a position command
ing the interval by a left-flank fire, and ordered an incessant
fire of sheUs on the enemy Arithin sight, and in the woods
beyond to prevent his re-enforcing. Orders were also sent to
General Logan to cause the FHteenth Corps to regain its lost
ground at any cost, and to General Woods, supported by
General Schofield, to use his division and sweep the parapet
doAvn from where he held it until he saved the batteries and
recovered the lost ground. With soldierly instinct, Logan had
anticipated these orders, and Avas already in motion. The
whole Avas executed in superb style, our men and the enemy
at times fighting across the narrow parapet ; but at last the
enemy gave Avay, and the FHteenth Corps regained its position
and all the guns except the two advanced ones, which were
out of riew, and had been removed by the enemy Avithin his
main work. With this terminated the battle of the 22d,
which cost us 3,722 officers and men in kiUed, wounded, and
prisoners.

ACROSS THE CHATTAHOOCHEE. 203
But among the dead was one whose loss no numbers can
fitly represent. The accomphshed, the brave, the noble Mc
Pherson had faUen !
The Army of the Tennessee had lost its commander, every
man in its ranks a friend, America a great soldier, and
humanity a bright ornament.

204 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.

CHAPTEE XVn.
ATLANTA WON.
On the 23d, General Garrard, with his division of cavaky,
returned from the expedition sent to Covington to break up
the Augusta railway, and reported that, Arith tlie loss of only
two men, he had succeeded in accompHshing that object, m
such a manner as to render the road useless to the enemy
during the pending operations, having effectuaUy destroyed
the large bridges across the Ulcofauhachee and YeUow rivers,
which are branches of the Ocmulgee.
The Macon railway, running at first almost due south, was
now the only Hne by which the Confederate army in Atlanta
could receive the suppHes requisite to maintain the defence of
the place. The problem before Sherman was to reach that
road. Schofield and Thomas had closed weU up, holding the
enemy behind his inner intrenchments, and Logan, Arith the
Army of the Tennessee temporarUy under his command, was
ordered to prepare to vacate the position on the left of the
Hne and move by the right to the opposite flank, below Proc
tor's Creek, wliUe General Schofield should extend up to. and
cover the Augusta road. General Eousseau, who had arrived
from his expedition to Opehka, bringing about two thousand
good cavaky, of course fatigued vrith its long and rapid march,
was ordered to reheve General Stoneman in the duty of guard
ing the river near SandtoAvn, below the mouth of Utoy Creek.
Stoneman was then transferred to the extreme left of the hne,
and placed in command of his own division and Garrard's,
numbering in aU about five thousand effective troopers. The
new cavaky brought by General Eousseau, and which was

THE ATLANTA CAM PAIG^
fumi.slied hv
Brevet Briii- Gen. O.M. Poe.
Chief ETisfineer.
fr L. . ?9.'^-.^^ ""¦ ATLANTA

ATLANTA WON. 205
commanded by Colonel Harrison, of the Eighth Indiana
Cavalry, was added to the command of Brigadier-General
Edward M. McCook, making with it a dirision of about four
thousand. The plan now was that while the Army of the Tennessee
should move by the right on East Point to seize the Macon
railway, Stoneman and McCook, Avith their weU-appointed
columns, were to march in concert, the former by the left
around Atlanta to McDonough, and the latter by the right on
Fayetterille, and, on the night of July 28th, to meet on the
Macon raUway, near Lovejoy's, and destroy the road in the
most effectuii' manner. At the moment almost of starting,
General Stoneman addressed a note to General Sherman,
asking ]^)ermission, after fulfiUing his orders and breaking the
raUway, to proceed Avith his command proper to Macon and
AndersonvUle, and release our prisoners of war confined at those
points, thirty thousand in number, suffering the extremities of
starvation, and rotting by hundreds from the loathsome dis
eases that foUoAv in its train. " There was something captiva
ting in the idea," says Sherman, and deeming the execution
Arithin the bounds of probable success, he consented that after
the defeat of Wheeler's cavalry and breaking the road. Gen
eral Stoneman might' make the attempt with his cavalry
proper, sending that of General Garrard back to the army.
Both cavaky expeditions started at the time appointed.
General McCook, in the execution of his part of the move-
inent, went down the west bank of the Chattahoochee to near
Eivertown, where he laid a pontoon bridge with Avhich he was
provided, crossed his command, and moved rapidly on Pal
metto station, on the West Point raUway, where he tore up a
section of track, learing a regiment to create a diversion to
wards CampbeUtoAvn, which was successfuUy accomphshed.
McCook then rapidly moved to FayettevUle, where he found
a large number of wagons belonging to the rebel army in
Atlanta, kUled eight hundred mules, and captured two hundred
and fifty prisoners. He then pushed for the Macon raUAvay,
reached it at Lovejoy's station «t the time appointed, burned

206 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
the depot, tore up a section of the road, and continued to work
until forced to leave off to defend himseH against an accumula
ting force of the enemy. He could hear nothing of General
Stoneman, and, finding his progress east too strongly opposed,
moved south and west, and reached Newman on the West
Point road, where he encountered an infantry force coming
from Mississippi to Atlanta, and which had been stopped by
the break he had made at Palmetto. This force, with the
pursuing cavaky, hemmed him in and forced him to fight.
He Avas compeUed to drop his prisoners and captures and cut
his way out, losing some five hundred officers and men ; among
them Colonel Harrison, Eighth Indiana Cavauy, a valuable
officer, who was taken prisoner whUe fighting his men as
skkmishers on foot. McCook succeeded, however, in cutting
his way out, reached the Chattahoochee, crossed the river, and
got to Marietta without further loss.
Sherman says in his official report : —
" General McCook is entitled to much credit for thus saving
his command, which was endangered by the faUure of General
Stoneman to reach Lovejoy's. But on the whole, the cavalry
raid is not deemed a success, for the real purpose was to
break the enemy's communications, which, though done, was
on so Hmited a scale that I knew the damage would soon be
repaked." Pursuant to the general plan, the Army of the Tennessee
drew out of its lines on the left, near the Decatur road, during
the night of July 26th, and on the 27th moved behind the rest
of the army to Proctor's Creek, the extreme right beyond it, to
prolong the Hne due south, facing east. On the same day, by
appointment of the President, Major-General OHver 0.
Howard assumed command of the Army of the Tennessee,
reHeving General Logan, who had exercised the command
with great abUity since the death of McPherson on the 22d,
and who now returned to the immediate charge of his oato
Fifteenth Corps. Dodge got into line on the evening of the
27th, and Blak came into position on the right early on the
morning of the 28th, his right reaching an old meeting-house.

atilANta won. 207
caUed Ezra Church, on the BeU's Ferry road. Here Logan's
fifteenth corps joined on and formed the extreme right flank
of the army before Atlanta, along a wooded and commanding
ridge. About ten a. m., aU the army was in position, and
the men were busy in throAving up their accustomed pUes of
rails and logs, which, after awhUe, assumed the form of a para
pet. In order to be prepared to defeat the enemy H he should
repeat his game of the 22d, Sherman had, the night before,
ordered Jefferson 0. Davis' division, of Pakner's fourteenth
corps, which, by the movement of the Army of the Tennessee,
had been left in reserve, to move down to Turner's Ferry, and
thence towards White HaH or East Point, aiming to reach the
flank of HoAvard's new Hne. The object of this movement was
that in case of an attack this dirision might in turn catch the
attacking force in flank or rear at an unexpected moment.
Brigadier-General Morgan, who commanded the division dur
ing the temporary iUness of General Daris, marched early for
Turner's Ferry, but many of the roads laid down on the maps
did not exist at aU ; and from tliis cause, and the intricate
nature of the wooded ground, great delay was experienced.
About noon, Hardee and Lee saUied forth from Atlanta by the
BeU's Ferry road, and formed thek masses in the open fields
behind a SAvell of ground, and after some heavy artUlery firing,
advanced in paraUel Hnes against the FHteenth Corps, expect
ing to catch it in ak. The advance was magnificent ; but Sher
man had prepared for this very contingency ; our troops were
expecting this attack, and met it with a galling and cooUy de
hvered fire of musketry that swept the ranks of the enemy and
drove him back in confusion. But they were raUied again and
again, as often as six times at some points, and a few of tho
rebel officers and men reached our Hnes of raU piles only to
be hauled over as prisoners. About four p. M., the enemy
disappeared, leaving his dead and wounded in our hands.
General Logan on this occasion was again conspicuous, his
corps being chiefiy engaged. Our entke loss was less than
six hundred. Had Davis' dirision not been delayed by causes
beyond control, what was simply a complete repulse of the

208 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
enemy would have been a disastrous rout. Instructed by the
terrible lessons of the 22d and 28th of July, Hood abandoned
his rash offensive and assumed a strict defensive attitude,
merely meeting Sherman's successive extensions of his right
flank by continuing his own Hne of works to the south.
FincHng that the right flank of the Army of the Tennessee
cUd not reach to East Point, Sherman was forced to trans
fer Schofield to that flank also, and afterwards Palmer's
fourteenth corps of Thomas' army. Schofield moved from
the left on the 1st of August, and Palmer's corps foUowed at
once, taking a Hne below Utoy Creek, which Schofield pro
longed to a point near East Point.
About the 1st of August, General Hooker, deeming himseH
aggrieved by the promotion of General Howard, who had
served under him in the Army of the Potomac and had but
recently come to the West as his subordinate, to the command
of the Army of the Tennessee, was, at his own request, reheved
from command of the Twentieth Corps and ordered to report
to the adjutant-general at Washington. Major-General Henry
W. Slocum, then at Vicksburg, was sent for to assume the
command, which, untU his arrival, devolved upon Brigadier-
General A. S. WiUiams. Brigadier-General Jefferson C. Davis
was promoted to the command of the Fourteenth Corps, in
Heu of General Palmer, reheved at his own request ; and
Major-General D. S. Stanley succeeded to the command of
the Fourth Corps, vacated by General Howard.
From the 2d to the 5th, Sherman continued to extend to the
right, demonstrating strongly on the left and along the whole
line. EeiUey's brigade of Cox's division of Schofield's army, on
the 5th, tried to break through the enemy's line about a mUe
below Utoy Creek, but faUed to carry the position, losing about
four hundred men, who were caught by the entanglements and
abattis ; but the next day this position was turned by General
HascaU, and General Schofield advanced his whole line close
up to and facing the enemy below Utoy Creek. StUl he did
not gain the desired foothold on either the West Point or
Macon raUway. The enemy's line at that time was nearly

•' u-y/i v:..'

7

ATLANTA WON 209
fifteen miles in length, extending from near Decatur to below
East Point. He was enabled to hold this long and attenuated
front by the use of a large force of State mUitia, and his posi
tion was so masked by the shape of the ground that it was
impossible for the Union commanders to discover the weak
parts. To reach the Macon road, Sherman now saw he would have
to move the whole army ; but, before beginning, he ordered
doAvn fr-om Chattanooga some four-and-a-haH-inch rifled guns,
which arrived on the 10th, and were put to work night and
day, and did execution on the city, causing frequent fires and
creating confrision.
On the 16th of August, Sherman issued orders prescribing
the mode and manner of executing the grand movement by the
right flank, to begin on the 18th. This movement contem
plated the Avithdrawal of the Twentieth Corps, General
WiUiams, to the intrenched position at the Chattahoochee
bridge, and the march of the main army to the West Point
raUway, near Fair burn, and thence to the Macon road, at or
near Jonesboro', with wagons carrying provisions for fifteen
days. About the time of the pubhcation of these orders,
Wheeler, A^ith his corps of ten thousand cavaky, Avas detached
by General Hood to break up the Union communications.
Passing round by the East and North, Wheeler made his
appearance on the Chattanooga raUway, near AclausviUe, cap
tured nine hundred beef-cattle, and made a break in the road
near Calhoun. Hood could not have more distinctly evinced
his want of mental perspective than by detaching so large a
force on the eve of a battle momentarily to be expected. At
the best, Wheeler could only annoy Sherman ; his absence
might destroy Hood. Sherman was not slow to take advantage
of a blunder so weU-timed for his plans. Suspending the exe
cution of his orders for the time being, he directed General KU
patrick to make up a weU-appointed force of about five thou
sand cavalry, to move from his camp about Sandtown during
the night of the 18th to the West Point raUway, and effectuaUy
break it near Fairbum ; then to proceed across to the Macon
14

210 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
raUway, and thoroughly destroy it ; to avoid, as far as possible,
the enemy's infantry, but to attack any cavalry he could find.
Sherman expected that this cavalry expedition would save the
necessity of moving the main army across, and that in case of
success it would leave him in a better position to take full
advantage of the result.
KUpatrick got off at the time appointed, broke the West
Point road, and afterwards reached the Macon road at Jones
boro', where he whipped Eoss' cavaky, and got possession of
the raUway, which he held for five hours, damaging it con
siderably ; but a brigade of the enemy's infantry, which had
been dispatched below Jonesboro' in cars, was run back and
cHsembarked, and, Arith Jackson's rebel cavaky, made it im-
]iossible for him to continue his work. He drew off to the
east, made a ckCuit, and struck the raUway about Love
joy's Station, but was again threatened by the enemy, who
moved on shorter lines ; when he charged through thek cavahy,
taking many prisoners, of whom he brought in seventy, and
captured a four-gun battery, of which he brought in one gun
and destroyed the others. Eeturning by a ckcuit north and
east, KUpatrick reached Decatur on the 22d. He estimated
ihe damage done to the raUway as sufficient to interrupt its
use for ten days ; but, upon learning aU the details of the ex
pedition, Sherman became satisfied that it had not accom
phshed the chief object in riew, and accordingly at once
renewed his original orders for the movement of the whole
nrmy. This involved the necessity of raising the siege of Atlanta,
taking the field with the main force, and using it against
the communications of Atlanta, instead of against its in
trenchments. The army commanders were immediately noti
fied to send thek surplus wagons, encumbrances, and sick
back to the intrenched position at the bridge over the Chat
tahoochee, and that the movement would begin during the
night of the 25th. Accordingly, aU things being ready, the
Fourth Corps, General Stanley, drew out of its Hnes on the
extreme left, and marched to a position below Proctor's

ATLANTA WON. 211
Creek^ whUe the Twentieth Corps, General WiUiams, moved
back to the river. Both movements were effected without loss.
On the night of the 26th the Army of the Tennessee broke
camp, and moved rapidly by a circuit towards SandtoAvn and
across Camp Creek, a smaU stream about a mUe below Proc
tor's Creek ; the Army of the Cumberland moved below Utoy
Creek, while the Army of the Ohio remained in position to mask
the movement, Avhich was attended with the loss of but a single
man in the Army of the Tennessee, wounded by a sheU. On
the 27th, the Army of the Tennessee moved to the West Point
railway, above Fairburn ; the Army of the Cumberland to Eed
Oak, and the Army of the Ohio closed in near Diggs' and
Mims'. The three columns were thus massed on the line of
the West Point raUway from Diggs', two miles beloAv East
Point, to within an equal distance of Fairbum. The 28th was
consumed in destroying the road. For twelve and a haH mUes
the ties were burned, and the iron rails heated and twisted
with the utmost ingenuity of old hands at the work. Several
cuts were fiUed up with the trunks of trees, logs, rock, and
earth, intermingled with loaded sheUs. prepared as torpedoes,
to explode in case of an attempt to clear them out. Having
personaUy inspected this work, and being satisfied with its
execution, Sherman ordered the whole army to face eastAvard
and move the next day by several roads ; General Howard, on
the right, towards Jonesboro', General Thomas in the centre
to Couch's, on the Decatur and FayetteviUe road, and General
Schofield on the left, by Morrow's MiUs. The railway from
Atlanta to Macon foUows substantiaUy the ridge which diA-ides
the waters of the Fhnt and Ocmulgee Eivers, and from East
Point to Jonesboro' makes a wide bend to the east. The
position now selected by Sherman, paraUel to the railway,
facing eastwardly, was therefore a very important one, and he
was anxious to seize it as a necessary prehminary to his
ulterior movements.
The several columns moved punctually on the morning of
the 29tli. General Thomas, who encountered Httle opposition
or difficulty, save what resulted from the narrow roads, reached

212 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
his position at Couch's early in the afternoon. General Scho
field, being closer to the enemy, who stiU clung to East Point,
moved cautiously on a smaU ckcle around that point, and
came into position towards Eough and Eeady ; and General
Howard, having the outer ckcle, and consequently a greater
distance to move, encountered cavaky, which he drove rapidly
to the crossing of Shoal Creek. Here a short delay occurred,
and some cannonading and skkmishing, but Howard soon
drove the enemy, passed the Eenfrew House, on the Decatur
road, which was the point indicated for him in the orders
of the day, and Arisely pushed his march towards Jonesboro',
saved the bridge across Flint Eiver, and halted only when
the darkness compeUed him, within haH a mUe of Jonesboro'.
Here he rested for the night, and on the next morning, find
ing himself in the presence of a heavy force of the enemy, he
deployed the Fifteenth Corps, and disposed the Sixteenth and
Seventeenth on its left and right flanks. The men covered
thek front Arith the usual parapet, and were soon prepared to
act offensively or defensively as the case caUed for.
As soon as Sherman, who made his headquarters Arith
Thomas at Couch's, learned that General Howard had passed
Eenfrew's, he dkected General Thomas to send to that place
a dirision of' General Jefferson C. Davis' fourteenth corps,
to mo^¦e General Stanley's fourth corps, in connection irith
General Schofield, towards Eough and Eeady, and then to
send foiAvard due east a strong detachment of General Davis'
corps to feel for the railway. General Schofield was also
ordered to move boldly forward and strike the raUroad near
Eough and Eeady. These movements were progressing during
the 31st, when Stephen D. Lee's and Hardee's corps of the
enemy came out of the Avorks at Jonesboro', and attacked
General Howard in the position just described. After a con
test of over two hours, the attack was repulsed, Arith great loss
to the enemy, who Arithdrew, learing his dead and many
wounded on the ground.
In the mean whUe, Sherman was aiming to get his left aud
centre between Stewart's corps remaining in Atlanta and the

ATLANTA WON. 213
corps of Hardee and Lee engaged in Howard's front. Gen
eral Schofield had reached the raUway, a mile below Eough
and Eeady, and was working up the road, breaking it as he
went ; General Stanley, of General Thomas' army, had also
struck the road below General Schofield, and was destroying
it, working south ; and Baird's division of Davis' corps had
struck it stUl lower down, within four miles of Jonesboro'.
The Confederate forces being thus dirided, orders were at
once given for aU the army to turn on the fraction at Jones
boro ; General Howard to keep the enemy busy, whUe General
Thomas should move down fr-om the north, Avith General
Schofield on his left. The troops were also ordered as they
moved doAvn to continue the thorough destruction of the rail
way, as it was impossible to say how soon our hold of it might
be rehnquished, from the necessity of giring attention in other
quarters. General Garrard's cavaky was directed to watch
the roads to the north, and General KUpatrick was sent
south, to the west bank of the Fhnt, with instructions to
attack or threaten the raUway below Jonesboro'. On the 1st
of September Daris' corps, having a shorter distance to travel,
was" deployed, facing south, his right in connection Arith
General Howard, and his left on the raUway ; while General
Stanley and General Schofield were coming down the Eough-
and-Eeady road, and along the railway, breaking it as they
came. When General Davis joined to General Howard, Blak's
corps, on General Howard's left, was thrown in reserve, and
was immediately sent weU to the right below Jonesboro', to act
on that flank in conjunction Arith General KUpatrick's. About
5 P. M., General Davis assaulted the enemy's Hnes across open
fields, carrying them very handsomely, and taking as prisoners
the greater part of Gowan's brigade, including its com
mander, with two four-gun batteries. Eepeated orders were
sent to Generals Stanley and Schofield to hasten their move
ments, but OAring to the difficult nature of the country and the
absence of roads, they did not get weU into position for attack
before night rendered further operations impossible. About
2 o'clock that night, the sounds of heavy explosions were heard

214 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
in the dkection of Atlanta, distant about twenty miles, Arith a
succession of minor explosions, and what seemed Hke the
rapid firing of cannon and musketry. These sounds con
tinued for about an hour, and again about 4 A. M. occurred
another series of simUar discharges, apparently nearer, which
coidd be accounted for on no other hypothesis than of a
night attack on Atlanta by General Slocum, or the blow
ing up of the enemy's magazines. At daybreak it was dis
covered that Hardee and Lee had abandoned their Hnes at
Jonesboro', and Sherman ordered a general pursuit south ;
General Thomas foUowing to the left of the railway, General
Howard on its right, and General Schofield diverging two
mUes to the east. Near Lovejoy's Station the enemy was
again overtaken in a strong intrenched position, with his
flanks AveU protected, behind a branch of Walnut Creek to the
right, and a confluent of the Fhnt Eiver to his left. Pushing
close up and reconnoitring the ground, Sherman found he
had evidently halted to cover his communication with the
McDonough and FayetteviUe road, and presently rumors
began to arrive, through prisoners captured, that Atlanta had
been abandoned during the night of September 1st, that Hood
had blown up his ammunition trains, Avliich accounted for the
unexplained sounds so plainly heard ; that Stewart's corps Avas
then retreating towards McDonough, and that the mUitia had
gone off towards Covington. It was then too late to interpose
and prevent their escape, and Sherman being satisfied with
the substantial success already gained, ordered the work of
destroying the railway to cease, and the troops to be held in
hand, ready for any movement that further information from
Atlanta might warrant.
On the same night, a courier arrived from General Slocum,
reporting the fact that the enemy had evacuated Atlanta,
bloAvn up seven trains of cars, and retreated on the Mc
Donough road, and that he himseH with the Twentieth Corps
had entered and taken possession on the morning of 2d of
September. Atlanta being won, the object of the movement against

ATLANTA WON. 216
the raUway being therefore akeady concluded, and any pur
suit of the enemy with a view to his capture being futUe in
such a country, Sherman gave orders, on the 4th, for the army
to move back slowly to Atlanta. On the 5th, the army
marched to the vicinity of Jonesboro', five mUes, where it re
mained a day. On the 7th, it moved to Eough and Eeady,
seven mUes, and the next day to the camps selected. The
Army of the Cumberland was then grouped round about At
lanta, the Army of the Tennessee about East Point, and the
A.rmy of the Ohio at Decatur, all in clean and healthy camps,
at last enabled to enjoy a brief period of rest, so much needed
for reorganization and recuperation.
To return to the erratic movements of Wheeler, whom, in
the presence of the campaigns of tAvo large armies, we have
almost forgotten. He succeeded in breaking the raUway about
Calhoun, made his appearance at Dalton, Avhere Colonel Lei-
bold held lum in check until General Steedman arrived from
Chattanooga and drove him off, then passed up into East
Tennessee, and remained a short whUe at Athens ; but on the
first show of pursuit he moved beyond the Little Tennessee,
and crossing the Holston, near Strawberry Plains, reached
the Clinch near Clinton, passed over towards Sequatchee
and McMinnviUe, and thence to Murfreesboro', Lebanon, and
Frankhn. From Franklin he was pursued towards Florence,
and out of Tennessee, by Generals Eousseau, Steedman, and
Granger. He did great injury to many citizens, and destroyed
the raUway nearly as fast as the construction parties were
able to repair it ; but, except by being absent from Hood's
army at the critical moment, had no influence Avhatever upon
the campaign.
Thus ended, four months after its inception, one of the great
est campaigns of the war ; a campaign which doubly secured
the possession of the mountain regions of the centre, and laid
the Atlantic and Gulf slopes at the mercy of the Union com
mander. Divided in twain by the conquest of the Mississippi,
the domain of the rebeUion was quartered by the capture of
Atlanta. A vital spot had been reached ; the granary of

216 SHERilAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
Georgia was lost ; and there was suddenly presented to the
Confederate authorities the alternative, to concentrate their
two remaining armies or to perish.
Tavo dangers had menaced the success of Sherman's cam
paign. The first was the question of suppHes. This was in
great part solved by the energetic and successful management
of the superintendent of mUitary raUAvays, Colonel W.
W. Wright. "No matter when or where a break has been
made," says Sherman, "the repair train seemed on the spot,
and the damage was generally repaked before I knew of the
break. Bridges have been buUt Arith surprising rapidity, and
the locomotive whistle Avas heard in our advanced camps
almost before the echoes of the skirmish fire had ceased.
Some of these bridges, those of the Oostanaula, Etowah, and
Chattahoochee, are fine, substantial structures, and were buUt
in inconceivably short time, almost out of the materials im
provised on the spot." But the solution was mainly due to the
forethought exercised by Sherman himself in successively
estabHshing secondary depots, strongly garrisoned, as at Chat
tanooga, Eesaca, Eome, and vUlatoona, and by great exer
tions accumulating at each stores sufficient to render the army
independent of the rear during any temporary interruption
of the communications. The second danger ever present con
sisted in the rapid diminution of the army, not only by the
heavy casualties incidental to offensive warfare, but also by
the expiration of the terms of service of a large number of the
regiments. This was prevented from becoming fatal, by the
bravery of the army in attacking ; by the skUl of its com
mander, in turning obstacles too gi-eat to be surmounted by
dkect approach ; by the patriotism of the veterans, in re-
enhsting ; by the noble exertions of the governors of the
Western States, in encouraging and expediting re-enhstments,
and pushing the veterans to the front ; and by the foUy of
Hood, in attacking the Union troops in strong positions, pro
tected by earthworks, instead of attempting to take them at a
disadvantage, as in crossing Peach-tree Creek. On the 12th
of August, President Lincoln conferred upon General Sher-

ATLANTA WON.

217

man a commission as major-general in the regular army, as a
reward for his services in this campaign.
Stoneman marched from Decatur on the day appointed, Arith
the whole effective strength of his division, numbering about
two thousand in all, organized in three brigades, commanded
by Colonels Adams, Biddle, and Capron. The first brigade
consisted of the Fkst and Second regiments of Kentucky cav
aky ; the Second, of the Fifth and Sixth Indiana ; the third
brigade, of the Fourteenth lUinois, Eighth Michigan, and a
squadron of Ohio cavalry under Captain McLoughhn.
Stoneman moved out along the line of the Georgia Central
railway to Covington, and thence turned South and pushed by
way of Monticello, HiUsboro', and Chnton, for Macon. A
battalion of the Fourteenth lUinois cavaky of Capron's brigade
succeeded in entering Gordon, destroying eleven locomotives
and several trains of cars laden Arith munitions of war. The
bridge over the Oconee was also destroyed by General Stone
man's orders, by another detachment from his command.
On arriving Arithin fifteen mUes of Macon on the evening
of the 30th of July, General Stoneman ascertained from reh-
able sources that, in anticipation of such an attempt, the
probabihty of which had been freely discussed in the Northern
newspapers, the Confederate authorities had taken the pre
caution to remove all the Union prisoners previously confined
in the miHtary prisons at Macon and MiUen, in the cHrection
of Florence, South CaroHna ; and that this movement had only
been completed on the preceding day. The prime object of
the expedition being thus, unfortunately, frustrated, Stoneman
reluctantly determined to return to the main body. But in
the mean while the enemy had concentrated in heavy force,
and was now moving upon his Hne of retreat.
On the morning of Sunday, the 31st of July, finding what
seemed to be a heavy force of the enemy in his front, Stone
man deployed a strong Hne of skkmishers, which soon de
veloped the fact that, taking advantage of the unfavorable
nature of the country for the operations of cavalry, Allen's
brigade of Confederate infantry had passed around his flank

218 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
and taken up a strong position dkectly across the Hno of his
homeward march, while Armstrong's brigade of the enemy's
cavalry, in connection Avith Aden's infantry, Avas dangerously
menacing his left flank. With the Oconee in his rear and a
formidable enemy in his fr-ont, Stoneman had evidently no re
source but to destroy that enemy or be himself destroyed.
Dismounting the troopers of one brigade, he caused them
repeatedly to charge the enemy on foot, but they were as often
repulsed Avith heavy loss. EaUying the broken columns by his
personal exertions and Arith the assistance of the gallant Major
Keogh and other officers of his staff, Stoneman placed himself
at the head of his men, and again charged, but without more
favorable result. At the critical moment, Armstrong's brigade
assailed his left flank. The Union cavalry gave way before
the combined opposition, and Avere Avith cUfficulty reformed,
By this time the enemy had completely surrounded them.
Perceiring this, and deeming all further resistance useless,
Stoneman gave permission to such of liis officers and men as
wished to try the apparently desperate chance of cutting their
way through the opposing lines, to make the attempt, and then,
causing hostihties to cease on his part, sent in a flag of truce,
and unconditionaUy surrendered the remainder of his force.
Among those who cut their way through the enemy's hnes,
and thus escaped and rejoined the main army, was the bulk of
Colonel Adams' brigade and a number of Colonel Capron's men.
The entire number captured was less than fifteen hundred.
The failure to unite with McCook, Avliich was the prime
cause of this disaster, undoubtedly occurred in consequence
of false, but apparently rehable, information concerning the
roads and the crossings of the Ocmulgee Eiver, whereby Gen
eral Stoneman was led to beheve he could prolong his east-
tirly march to Covington without sacrificing the combination.
Yet in all concerted operations, the co-operative movements
are of the first importance ; all others, no matter how great
their intrinsic value, must be deemed secondary. Great suc
cess alone can excuse, while not even success can justify, any
departure from the primary features of the plan.

TAKING BREATH. 219

CHAPTEE XVm.
TAKING BEEATH.
Feom Lovejoy's Station, Hardee and Lee retreated tc
the Hne of the West Point raUway at Palmetto Station,
tAventy-five mUes southwest fr-om Atlanta, and situated at
about the same distance fr-om the Chattahoochee as that
city is. Here Hood joined them Arith Stewart's corps, took
up a position confronting Sherman, threw a pontoon bridge
across the Chattahoochee, and sent a cavaky detachment be
yond the river, twenty-five mUes westward to CarroUton, and
another in a northerly dkection to Powder Springs, about ten
mUes south of Lost Mountain, and an equal distance west of
the Chattanooga raUway. He also occupied Jonesboro' in
some force. Lieutenant-General Stephen D. Lee succeeded
Hardee in the command of his corps, the latter officer being
reheved by orders from Eichmond, and sent to Charleston to
replace Beauregard. Lieutenant-General B. F. Cheatham had
command of Hood's old coi-ps, and Lieutenant-General A. P.
StcAvart stUl retained his assignment to Polk's old corps.
The cavah-y Avas largely reinforced and united in one corps,
ander the command of Major-General James Wheeler. Gen -
eral Beaiuegard was summoned from Charleston, and placed
at the head of aU the Confederate armies operating in the
central region.
During the month of September, Sherman's army remained
grouped about Atlanta. The terms of enhstment of many of
his regiments had expired, a large number went home on fur
lough, and others, previously fm-loughed on concHtion of re-
onlisting, returned to the field with thek ranks sweUed by

220 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
additions of stragglers, convalescents, and recruits. Many
changes were thus rendered necessary in the composition of
the different commands. The Army of the Teimessee was
consoHdated into two coi-ps, the FHteenth and Seventeenth,
respectively commanded by Major-General P. J. Osterhaus
and Brigadier-General Thomas E. G. Eansom; the former
comprising the four cHvisions of Brigadier-Generals Charles
E. Woods, WiUiam B. Hazen, John E. Smith, and John M.
Corse ; the latter those of Major-General Joseph A. Mower,
and Brigadier-Generals MUes D. Leggett and GUes A. Smith,
Arith the Fkst Alabama Cavaky, and the Fkst Missouri engi
neer regiment, haring in charge a large pontoon-bridge train.
This organization was effected by transferring aU the troops of
the Seventeenth Corps remaining on the Mississippi to the Six
teenth Corps, breaking up the detachment of the latter corps
in the field, and transferring Eansom's division, now com
manded by Brigadier-General GUes A. Smith, and Corse's di
rision to the Seventeenth Corps. Major-Generals Logan and
Blak were temporarUy absent, engaged in the important pohti
cal canvass then in progress. Major-General Schofield re
turned to the headquarters of the Department of the Ohio, at
KnoxvUle, to give his personal attention to affaks in that
quarter, leaA-ing Brigadier-General Jacob D. Cox in command
of the TAventy-thkd Corps. The cavaky was reorganized so
as to consist of two chA'isions under Brigadier-Generals Ken-
ner Garrard and Judson KUpatrick.
As stated in the last chapter, the Army of the Cumberland,
under Major-General Thomas, held Atlanta ; the Army of the
Tennessee, commanded by Major-General Howard, was at
East Point ; and the Army of the Ohio occupied Decatur.
Garrard's caA-aky diAdsion was also at Decatur, and KUpat
rick's at Sandtown watching for any westward movement of
the enemy. To render the communications more secure, Arith
a view to the present wants of the army and possible future
operations, Sherman sent Newton's cHAision of Stanley's fourth
corps, and Morgan's division of Jefferson C. Daris' fourteenth
coqis, cf the Army of the Cumberland, to Chattanooga, and

TAKING BREATH. 221
Corse's dirision of Osterhaus' fifteenth corps, of tho Army of
the Tennessee, to Eome, to garrison those places.
The topography of the country in the immediate ricinity of
Atlanta was carefuUy stucHed, and a new line of works con
structed for the defence of the place, capable of being
maintained by a much smaUer garrison than was contem
plated by the Confederate authorities when laying out the
old Hne.
Sherman now determined to make Atlanta exclusively a
mUitary post. On the 4th of September, he issued the foUow
ing orders : —
" The city of Atlanta belonging exclusively for warHke pur
poses, it AvUl at once be vacated by aU except the armies of
the United States and such ciAdhan employes as may be re
tained by the proper departments of the Government. . . .
At a proper time fuU arrangements AriU be made for a supply to
the troops of aU the articles they may need over and above
clothing, prorisions, &c., furnished by Government, and on no
pretence whatever wUl traders, manufacturers, or sutlers be
aUowed to settle in the Hmits of fortified places ; and H they
manage to come in spite of this notice the quartermaster wiU
seize thek stores, apply them to the use of the troops, and de
hver the parties, or other unauthorized citizens who thus place
their indiridual interest above that of the United States, over
to the hands of some provost-marshal, to be put to labor on
forts or conscripted into one of the regiments or battery al
ready in service. The same mUitary principles wiU apply to
aU miHtary posts south of Atlanta."
This order feU upon the ears of the inhabitants of Atlanta
like a thunderbolt. Though they had lent aU the moral and
physical assistance in thek power to the cause of the rebelhon,
they had begun to dream of the advent of the Federal troops
as the commencement of an era of quiet. They had never
imagined that the war would reach Atlanta. Now that it had
come, and kept its rough, hot hand upon them for so many

222 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
days, they were beginning to look forward to a long period
when they might enjoy at once the advantage of the protec
tion of a just and powerful government, and the luxury of con
sidering the means whereby that protection was enforced
agamst their chosen fr-iends as a grievance. On the 11th of
September the toAvn authorities addressed the foUoAving petition
to General Sherman, praying the revocation of his orders :—
" SiE — The undersigned, mayor, and two members of coimcil
for the city of Atlanta, for the time being the only legal organ
of the people of the said city, to express their wants and
wishes, ask leave most earnestly, but respectfuUy, to petition
you to reconsider the order requking them to leave Atlanta.
" At first riew, it struck us that the measure would involve
extraordinary, hardship and loss, but since we have seen the
practical execution of it, so far as it has progressed, and the
individual condition of many of the people, and heard thek
statements as to the inconveniences, loss, and suffering attend
ing it, we are satisfied that it a^oII involve, in the aggregate,
consequences appaUing and heartrending.
" Many poor women are in an advanced state of pregnancy ;
others now having young chUdren, and whose husbands are
either in the army, prisoners, or dead. Some say : I have
such a one sick at home ; who wUl wait on them when I am
gone ? Others say : What are we to do ? we have no houses
to go to, and no means to buy, buUd, or to rent any — no
parents, friends, or relatives to go to. Another says : I will
try and take this or that article of property, but such and such
things I must leave behind, though I need them much. We
reply to them : General Sherman wiU carry your property to
Eough and Eeady, and General Hood wiU take it from there
on. And they AriU reply to that : But I want to leave the
raUway at such a point, and cannot get conveyance from
there on.
" We only refer to a few facts to try to illustrate in part how
this measure avUI operate in practice. As you advanced, the
people north of us feU back, and before your arrival here a

TAKING BREATH. 223
large portion of the people had retked south, so that the
country south of this is already crowded, and without houses
to accommodate the people, and we are informed that many
are now starring in churches and other out-buildings. This
being so, how is it possible for the people stiU here (mostly
women and chUdren) to find any shelter ? and how can they
Hve through the winter in the woods — no shelter nor subsist
ence — in the midst of strangers who know them not, and Avith-
dut the power to assist them, H they were willing to do so ?
" This is but a feeble picture of the consequences of this
measure. You know the woe, the horror, and the suffering can
not be described by words. Imagination can only conceive
of it, and we ask you to take these things into consideration.
" We Icnow your mind and time are constantly occupied
Avith the duties of your command, which almost deters us from
asking your attention to this matter ; but thought it might be
that you had not considered the subject in aU its awful conse
quences, and that on more refiection you, we hope, would not
make this people an exception to aU mankind, for we knoAv of
no such instance ever liaAdng occurred ; surely none such in
the United States ; and what has this helpless people done
that they should be driven from their homes, to wander as
strangers, outcasts, and exiles, and to subsist on charity ?
" We do not knoAV, as yet, the number of people still here.
Of those Avho are here, Ave are satisfied a respectable number,
if allowed to remain at home, could subsist for several months
Arithout assistance, and a respectable number for a much
longer time, and who might not need assistance at any time.
"In conclusion, we must earnestly and solemnly petition
you to reconsider this order, or modHy it, and suffer this un
fortunate people to remain at home and enjoy what Httle
means they have. " EespectfuUy submitted,
" James M. Calhoun, Mayor.
"E> E. Eawson, CouncUman.
"L. C. Wells, Councilman."

224 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
To this General Sherman repHed, in fuU and clear terms, on
the foUoAring day :
" Gentlemen : I have your letter of the 11th, in the nature
of a petition to revoke my orders removing aU the inhabitants
from Atlanta. I have read it carefuUy, and give fuU credit to
your statements of the distress that AriU be occasioned by it,
and yet shaU not revoke my order, simply because my orders
are not designed to meet the humanities of the case, but to
prepare for the future struggles in which millions, yea hun
dreds of miUions of good people outside of Atlanta have a deep
interest. We must have peace, not only at Atlanta, but in aU
America. To secure this we must stop the war that now
desolates our once happy and favored country. To stop the war,
we must defeat the rebel armies that are amayed against the
laws and Constitution, which aU must respect and obey. To
defeat these armies, we must prepare the Avay to reach them in
thek recesses, prorided with the arms and instruments which
enable us to accompHsh our purpose.
" Now, I know the vindictive nature of our enemy, and that
we may have many years of mUitary operations from this
quarter, and therefore deem it Arise and prudent to prepare in
time. The use of Atlanta for warHke purposes is inconsistent
Arith its character as a home for famihes. There wUl be no
manufactures, commerce, or agriculture here for the mainten
ance of famihes, and sooner or later want avUI compel the in
habitants to go. Why not go now, when aU the arrangements
are completed for the transfer, instead of waiting untU the
plunging shot of contending armies AviU renew the scenes of
the past month ? Of course I do not apprehend any such
thing at this moment, but you do not suppose this army Anil
be here tiU the war is over. I cannot discuss this subject
vrith you fakly, because I cannot impart to you what I pro
pose to do, but I assert that my miHtary plans make it neces
sary for the inhabitants to go away, and I can only renew my
offer of services to make their exodus in any dkection as easy

TAKING BREATH. 225
and comfortable as possible. You caimot quahfy war in
harsher terms than I wUl.
" War is cruelty, and you cannot refine it ; and those who
brought war on our country deserve aU the curses and male
dictions a people can pour out. I know I had no hand in
making this war, and I know I avUI make more sacrifices to
day than any of you to secure peace. But you cannot have
peace and a division of our country. If the United States
submit to a division now, it AriU not stop, but wUl go on tUl we
reap the fate of Mexico, which is eternal war. The United
States does and must assert its authority wherever it has
power ; if it relaxes one bit to pressure, it is gone, and I know
that such is not the national feeling. This feehng assumes
various shapes, but always comes back to that of Union. Once
admit the Union, once more acknowledge the authority of the
National Government, and instead of devoting your houses,
and streets, and roads to the dread uses of war, I and this
army become at once your protectors and supporters, shield
ing you fr-om danger, let it come from what quarter it may. I
know that a few individuals cannot resist a torrent of error
and passion such as has swept the South into rebeUion ; but
you can point out, so that we may know those Avho deske a
government and those who insist on war and its desolation.
" You might as well appeal against the thunder-storm as
against these terrible hardships of war. They are inevitable.
and the only way the people of Atlanta can hope once more to
live in peace and quiet at home, is to stop this war, which
can alone be done by admitting that it began in error and is
perpetuated in pride. We don't want your negroes or your
horses, or your houses or your land, or any thing you have ;
but we do want, and AriU have, a just obedience to the laws of
the United States. That we wUl have, and H it involves tho
destruction of your improvements, we cannot help it.
" You have heretofore read public sentiment in your news
papers, that Hve by falsehood and excitement, and the
quicker you seek for truth in other quarters the better for
you. I repeat, then, that by the original compact of govern -
15

226 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS
ment, the United States had certain rights in Georgia which
have never been relinquished, and never avUI be ; that the
South began the war by seizing forts, arsenals, mints, custom
houses, etc., etc., long before Mr. Lincoln was instaUed, and
before the South had one jot or tittle of provocation. I my
seH have seen, in Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missis
sippi, hundreds and thousands of women and children fleeing
from your armies and d^peradoes, hungry, and with bleeding
feet. In Memphis, Vicksburg, and Mississippi, we fed thous
ands upon thousands of the famihes of rebel soldiers left on
uur hands, and whom we could not see starve. Now, that war
comes home to you, you feel very differently — you deprecate its
horrors, but did not feel them when you sent car-loads of
soldiers and ammunition, and moulded shells and shot to carry
war into Kentucky and Teimessee, and desolate the homes of
hundreds and thousands of good people, who only asked to
live in peace at thek old homes, and under the government of
thek inheritance. But these comparisons are idle. I want
peace, and beheve it can only be reached through Union and
war, and I wUl ever conduct war purely Arith a view to perfect
and early success.
" But, my dear sks, when that peace does come, you may
caU upon me for any thing. Then AriU I share Arith you the
last cracker, and watch Arith you to shield your home and
families against danger from every quarter. Now, you must
go, and take with you the old and feeble ; feed and nurse
them, and buUd for them in more quiet places proper habita
tions to shield them against the weather, until the mad pas
sions of men cool doAvn, and aUow the Union and peace once
more to settle on your old homes at Atlanta."
As soon as his arrangements were completed. General Sher
man Avrote to General Hood, by a flag of truce, notifying him
of his orders, and proposing a cessation of hostihties for ten
days, from the 12th of September, in the country included
within a radius of two miles around Eough and Eeady Sta
tion, to enable him to complete the removal of those famihes

TAKING BREATH. 227
electing to go to the south. Hood immediately repHed on the
9th, acceding to the proposed truce, but protesting against
Sherman's order. He concluded : —
" Permit me to say, the unprecedented measure you propose
transcends in studied and iniquitous cruelty aU acts ever be
fore brought to my attention in this dark history of the war.
In the name of God and humanity, I protest, behoving you
are expeUing from homes and firesides vrives and children of
a brave people."
To this Sherman answered on the same date : —
"Geneeal: — I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt
of your letter of this date, at the hands of Messrs. BaU and
Crew, consenting to the aiTangement I had proposed to facUi-
tate the removal south of the people of Atlanta who prefer to
go in that dkection. I inclose you a copy of my orders, which
AviU, I am satisfied, accompHsh my purpose perfectly.
" You style the measures proposed ' unprecedented,' and
appeal to ' the dark history of war for a paraUel as an act
of studied and ingenious cruelty.' It is not unprece
dented, for General Johnston himseH very Arisely and prop
erly removed the famUies aU the way from Dalton doAvn,
and I see no reason why Atlanta should be excepted. Nor
is it necessary to appeal to ' the dark history of war,' when
recent and modern examples are so handy. You yourseH
burned dweUing-houses along your parapet ; and I have seen,
to-day, fifty houses that you have rendered uninhabitable
because they stood in the way of your forts and men. You
defended Atlanta on a Hne so close to the toAvn that every
cannon-shot, and many musket-shots from our Hne of invest
ment, that overshot their mark, went into the habitations of
women and chUdren. General Hardee did the same thing at
Jonesboro', and General Johnston did the same last summer
at Jackson, Mississippi.
" I have not accused you of heartless cruelty, but merely in-

228 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
stance these cases of very recent occurrence, and could go on
and enumerate hundreds of others, and chaUenge any fair man
to judge which of us has the heart of pity for the famUies of
' brave people.' I say it is kindness to these famUies of At
lanta to remove them at once from scenes that women and
shUdren should not be exposed to; and the 'brave people'
should scorn to commit their wives and chUdren to the rude
barbarians who thus, as you say, violate the rules of war as U-
lustrated in the pages of its ' dark history.'
" In the name of common sense, I ask you not to ' appeal to
a just God ' in such a sacrUegious manner — you who, in the
midst of peace and prosperity, have plunged a nation into war,
dark and cruel war ; who dared and badgered us into battle ;
insulted our flag ; seized our arsenals and forts that were left
in the honorable custody of a peaceful ordnance sergeant ;
seized and made prisoners even the very first garrisons sent
to protect your people against negroes and Indians, long
before any other act was committed by the, to you, ' hateful
Lincoln government ;' tried to force Missouri and Kentucky
into rebeUion, in spite of themselves ; falsified the vote of
Louisiana ; turned loose your privateers to plunder unarmed
ships ; expeUed Union famUies by the thousands, burned thek
houses, and declared by.acts of yom- Congress the confiscation
of aU debts due Northern men for goods had and received.
Talk thus to the Marines, but not to me, who have seen these
things, and Avho wiU this day make as much sacrifice for the
peace and honor of the South as the best-born Southerner
among you. If we must be enemies, let us be men, and fight
it out as we propose to-day, and not deal in such hypocritical,
appeals to God and humanity.
" God AvUl judge us in due time, and he AriU pronounce
whether it wUl be humane to fight with a toAvn fuU of women
and the families of ' a brave people ' at our back, or to remove
them in time to places of safety among thek own friends and
people." "During the truce, four hundred and forty-six faipihes were

TAKING BREATH. 229
moA^ed south, comprising seven hundred and five adults, eight
hundred and sixty chUdren, and seventy-nine servants, with
an average of sixteen hundred and fifty-one pounds of furni
ture and household goods of all kinds to each famUy.
On the 8th, General Hood wrote to General Sherman pro
posing an exchange of prisoners captured by both armies since
the commencement of the campaign just closed. Sherman
replied on the same day, agreeing to this proposition, on the
basis of the old cartel, made by Generals Dix and HiU in 1862,
but stating that he feared most of the prisoners in his hands
were already beyond Chattanooga on their way north, and in
custody of the commissary-general of prisoners. The next
day he again wrote : —
" Geneeal — As I engaged yesterday, I consent to an actual
exchange of prisoners, man for man, and equal for equal,
differences or balance to be made up according to the cartel
of 1862. I have appointed one of my inspector-generals,
Lieutenant-Colonel W. Warner, to carry out this exchange,
and wiU empower him to call for the prisoners, and all such
guards as he may need to affect the actual transfers. We have
here twenty-eight officers and seven huncked and eighty-two
enlisted men ; and en route for Chattanooga, ninety-three
officers and nine hundred and seven men, making one thou
sand eight hundred and ten on hand that I AriU exchange for a
like number of my OAvn men, captured by you in this campaign,
who belong to regiments with me, and who can resume thek
places at once, as I take it for granted you wiU do the same
with yours. In other Avords, for these men I am not wUling
to take equivalents belonging to other armies than my OAvn,
or who belong to regiments whose times are out and who have
been discharged.
"By your laAvs aU men eligible for serrice are ipso facto
soldiers, and a very good one it is ; and, if needed for civU
duty, they are simply detailed soldiers. We found in Atlanta
about a thousand of these fellows, and I am satisfied they are
fit subjects of exchange ; and H you wUl release an equal num-

230 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
ber of our poor feUows at Anderson I avUI gather these together
and send them as prisoners. They seem to have been detaUed
for raikoad and shop duty, and I do not ask for them an equal
number of my trained soldiers, but AriU take men belonging
to any part of the United States army subject to your
control. " We hold a good many of your men styled ' deserters,'
who are reaUy stragglers, and would be a good offset to such
of our stragglers and foragers as your cavaky pick up of our
men ; but I am constrained to give these men, though sorely
against the grain, the benefit of thek character, pretended or
real. " As soon as Colonel Warner agrees upon a few points Arith
the officer you name, I wUl send the prisoners to the place
appointed, and recaU those not beyond Chattanooga ; and you
may count on about two thousand in the aggregate, and get
ready to give me a Hke number.
" I am willing to ' appoint Eough and Eeady or Jonesboro'
as the place of exchange, as also for the place of dehvering
the citizens, male and female, of Atlanta, who start to go
south. To this Hood answered on the 11th : —
" SiE — I had the honor, on the 9th instant, to propose to
you an exchange of prisoners — officers and men captured by
both armies since the commencement of the present cam
paign. " On the same day you answered my communication, stating
that you accepted my offer ' to exchange prisoners of war in
hand at this moment.' There being no condition attached to
the acceptance, on your part, of my offer to exchange prisoners,
I regarded it as obHgatory to the extent of the number of
prisoners represented by you to be within your jurisdiction.
At the meeting on the 11th instant between our respective
staff officers. Major J. B. Eustis and Lieutenant-Colonel
Warner, intended to arrange such preliminaries as the time

TAKING BREATH. 231
and place of deUvery, etc., a communication was received from
you rendering, I regret to inform you, an exchange of prisoners
impossible. " Your refusal to receive, in exchange, your soldiers belong
ing to ' regiments whose times are out, and who have been dis
charged,' discloses a fixed purpose on the part of your Govern
ment to doom to hopeless captivity those prisoners whose
term of service have expked, or wiU soon expke.
" The new principle which you seek to interpolate on the
cartel of our respective governments, as weU as upon the laws
and customs of war, wUl not be sanctioned by me. AU captives
taken in war, who owe no obligations to the captors, must
stand upon the same equal footing. The duration of these
terms of serrice can certainly impose no duties or obHgations
on the captors. The volunteer of a day, and the conscript for
the war, who may be captured in war, are equaUy subject to
aU the burdens, and equally entitled to aU the rights secured
by the laws of nations. This principle is distinctly conceded
in the cartel entered into by our respective governments, and
is sanctioned by honor, justice, and the pubhc law of aU
civilized nations.
" My offer to exchange the prisoners captured cluring the
campaign precludes an intention on my part in the dehvery to
(Hscriminate between your prisoners, as aU would have been
delivered ; and even had it been intended, this discrimination
between your men, whose term of service had and had not
expired, would have been impossible, and could not have been
effected, as I had no rehable means of ascertaining what por
tion of your men were entitled to thek discharge.
" Your avowal that this class of your soldiers vriU not be
exchanged, but wiU be rewarded by the sufferings and priva
tions incident to miHtary imprisonment because their boldness
and courage subjected them to capture, although their terms
of service had nearly expked, is deeply regretted by me, as I
have the earnest deske of my Government to release from pro
longed confinement the large number of prisoners held by
both parties.

SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
" Permit me to hope tha.t this declared poHcy of your Gov
ernment AviU be reconsidered, as it is imjustly oppressive to
those whom the hazards of miHtary serrice have rendered
prisoners, and is violative of the weU-understood obHgations
of a Government towards those who are enhsted in its
service. " As was proper, I notified my Government of my offer to
you to effect an exchange of prisoners captured during this
campaign ; and not only was my action approved, but my
Government placed at my entke disposal for immediate ex
change, man for man, aU the prisoners at AndersonviUe.
" I have the honor to renew my offer to exchange prisoners
as proposed in my first communication, and remain your
obedient servant,
"J. B. Hood,
" General."
By gathering up aU the Confederate prisoners at Chatta
nooga and Atlanta, and aU smaU squads in various quarters,
Sherman succeeded in coUecting about two thousand of them,
and, notAvithstanding the difficulties raised in the foregoing
correspondence, a special exchange of these for an equal num
ber of Union prisoners in the hands of the enemy was presently
agreed upon and carried into effect.
It was found necessary to confine the operations of the long
hnes of mUitary railways connecting Atlanta Arith the Ohio
Eiver to the transportation of troops and materials of war.
Sherman gave the most stringent orders on this subject to aU
his subordinates having charge of the matter. They were not
to aUow a person or thing not needed and intended for the
army to come to the front, nor a person or thing not sent from
the army to go to the rear, Arithout passes from himseH or one
of the three army commanders. Such passes were very spar-
mgly given, and only in clearly exceptional cases. Every ton
of freight, animate or inanimate, not strictly necessary for the
immediate purposes of his army, diverted just so much power
and occupied just so much space absolutely needed for those

TAKING BREATH. 233
purposes. The raUways had not sufficient capacity to serve
both the army and the citizens, and the army alone was now to
be considered.
We may now glance briefly at Sherman's correspondenc^e
during this interval and the preceding campaign.
With regard to the treatment of guerrUlas he Avrote to Gen
eral Burbridge in June : —
" Even on the Southern State-rights theory, Kentucky has
not seceded. Her people, by thek vote and by their action,
have adhered to thek aUegiance to the National Government
and the South would now coerce her out of our Union and into
theks, — the very dogma of coercion upon which so much stress
was laid at the outset of the war, and which carried into rebel-
¦Hon the people of the Middle or Border Slave States. But
poHtics aside, these acts of the so-caUed partisans or guerrU
las are nothing but simple murder, horse-stealing, arson, and
other well-defined crimes which do not sound as weU under
thek true names as the more agreeable ones of warlike mean
ing. Now, before starting on this campaign, I foresaw, as you
remember, that this very case would arise, and I asked Gov
ernor Bramlette to at once organize in each county a smaU
trustworthy band, under the sheriff, H possible, and at once ar
rest every man in the community who was dangerous to it, and
also every feUow hanging about the toAvns, viUages, and cross
roads who had no honest caUing, the material out of which
guerriUas are made up ; but this sweeping exercise of power
doubtless seemed to the governor rather arbitrary. The fact
is, in our conntrj persoiial liberty has been so well seciued, that
public safety is lost sight of in our laws and constitutions ; and
the fact is we are thrown back a hundred years in cirihza-
tion, law, and every thing else, and wUl go right straight to
anarchy and the devU, if somebody don't arrest our downward
progress. We, the mUitary, must do it, and we have right and
law on our side. AU governments and communities have a
right to guard against real or even supposed danger. The
whole people of Kentucky must not be kept in a state of sus-

234 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
pense and real danger, lest a few innocent men should be
AvrongfuUy accused.
" 1st. You may order aU your post and district commanders,
that guerrUlas are not soldiers, but Arild beasts, unknown to
the usage of war. To be recognized as soldiers, they must be
enhsted, enroUed, officered, unHormed, armed, and equipped
by some recognized beUigerent power, and must, . if detached
from a main army, be of sufficient strength, Arith Avritten orders
from some army commander, to do some mUitary thing. Of
course, we have recognized the Confederate Government as a
beUigerent power, but deny thek right to our lands, territories,
rivers, coasts, and nationahty, admitting the right to rebel
and move to some other country, where laws and customs are
more in accordance Arith thek own ideas and prejudices.
" 2d. The civU power being sufficient to protect IHe and prop
erty, ' ex necessitate rei,' and to prevent anarchy, ' which nature
abhors,' the miHtary steps in, and is rightful, constitutional,
and laAvful. Under this law, everybody can be made to 'stay
at home, and mind his or her own business,' and H they won't
do that, can be sent away where they won't keep thek honest
neighbors in fear of danger, robbery, and insult.
" 3d. Your mUitary commanders, provost-marshals, and other
agents, may arrest aU males and females who have encouraged
or harbored guerriUas and robbers, and you may cause them to
be coUected in Louisville ; and when you have enough, say
three hundred or four hundred, I AriU cause them to be sent
doAvn the Mississippi, through thek guerrUla gauntlet, and by
a saUing ship send them to a land where they may take their
negroes and make a colony, Arith laws and a future of thek
OAvn. If they won't Hve in peace in such a garden as Ken
tucky, why we wiU kindly send them to another, if not a better
land, and surely this would be a kindness and a God's blessing
to Kentucky. I Arish you to be careful that no personahties
are mixed up in this ; nor does a fuU and generous love of
country, ' of the South,' of their State or country, form a
cause of banishment, but that devUish spirit which AriU not
be satisfied, and that makes war the pretext for murder,

TAKING BEEATH. 235
arson, theft in aU its grades, and aU the crimes of human
nature. " My OAvn preference was and is ' that the civU authorities of
Kentucky would and could do this in that State ; but H they
AriU not, or cannot, then we must, for it must be done. There
must be an ' end to strHe,' and the honest, industrious people
of Kentucky, and the whole world, wUl be benefited and re
joiced at the conclusion, however arrived at. I use no con
cealment in saying that I do not object to men or women
having what they caU ' Southern feelings,' if confined to love
of country, and of peace, honor, and security, and even of
Httle famUy pride ; but these become ' crimes ' when enlarged
to mean love of murder, of war, desolation, famine, and aU the
horrible attendants of anarchy.' "
A few days later, on the 5th of July, Sherman's representa
tions to the War Department, to the Hke effect, induced Presi
dent Lincoln to order the declaration of martial law and the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus throughout Kentucky.
With regard to the use of torpedoes, concerning which he
apprehended trouble, he Avrote in advance to General Steed
man, left in command at Chattanooga : —
" As the question may arise, and you have a right to the
support of any authority, I now decide that the use of the
torpedo is justifiable in war, in advance of an army, so as to
make his advance up a river or over a road more dangerous
and difficult. But after the adversary has gained the coim
try by fak warlUce means, then the case entirely changes.
" The use of torpedoes in bloAring up our cars and the road
after they are in our possession, is simply mahcious. It can
not alter the great problem, but simply makes trouble. Now
if torpedoes are found in the possession of an enemy to our
rear, you may cause them to be put on the ground, and tested
by wagon loads of prisoners, or H need be, by citizens im
pHcated in thek use. In like manner, H a torpedo is sus
pected on any part of the road, order the point to be tested

236 SHERMAN AOT) HIS CAMPAIGNS.
by a car-load of prisoners, or citizens impHcated, draAvn by a
long rope. Of course an enemy cannot complain of his OAm
traps." At this time Sherman considered the expediency of enlisting
negroes in the army as an open question, which he was, indeed,
vriUing and deskous to have decided by a fak test, but stUl an
open one ; whUe thek adaptation to serrice as teamsters and
laborers he regarded as demonstrated by experience, and the
necessity for thek use in some capacity as obrious. Northern
Georgia haA-ing been almost denuded of its able-bodied colored
population by thek removal by thek former masters to the
southern portion of the State, and the number stiU avaUable
not being more than sufficient to fiU up the ranks of the ex
isting colored regiments akeady belonging to his army, he
opposed the practice, just then begun, of sending commis
sioners to his command to recruit for men to fiU the quotas of
the Northern States. Under date of July 30, he Avrote to Mr.
John A. Spooner, agent for the State of Massachusetts, then
at NashviUe : —
"On applying to General Webster, at NashvUle, he AriU
grant you a pass through our lines to those States ; and, as I
have had considerable experience in those States, I woiUd sug
gest recruiting depots to be established at Macon and Colum
bus, IMississippi ; Sehna, Montgomery, and MobUe, Alabama ;
and Columbus, MUledgevUle, and Savannah, Georgia.
" I do not see that the law restricts you to black recruits,
but you are at Hberty to coUect white recruits also. E is
waste of time and money to open rendezvous in northwest
Georgia, for I assure you I have not seen an able-bodied man,
black or white, there, fit for a soldier, who was not in this
army or the one opposed to it.
" You speak of the impression going abroad that I am op
posed to the organization of colored regiments. My opinions
are usuaUy very positive, and thfere is no reason why you
should not know them. Though entertaining profound rever-

TAKING BREATH. 237
ence for our Congress, I do doubt thek Arisdom in the passage
of this law :
" 1. Because civUian agents about an army are a nuisance.
" 2. The duty of citizens to fight for their country is too
sacred a one to be peddled off by buying up the refuse of
other States.
" 3. It is unjust to the brave soldiers and volunteers who are
fighting as those who compose this army do, to place them on
a par Arith the class of recrxuts you are after.
" 4. The negro is in a transition state, and is not the equal
of the white man.
" 5. He is Hberated from his bondage by act of war, and the
armies in the field are entitled to aU his assistance in labor
and fighting, in addition to the proper quotas of the States.
" 6. This bidding and bartering for recruits, Avhite and black,
has delayed the re-enforcement of the armies at the times
when such re-enforcements would have enabled us to make
our successes permanent.
" 7. The law is an experiment which, pending war, is uuArise
and unsafe, and has delayed the universal draft, which 1 firmly
beheve wUl become necessary to overcome the Aride-spread
resistance offered us ; and I also beheve the universal draft
wUl be Arise and beneficial, for, under the proridence of God,
it wUl separate the sheep from the goats, and demonstrate
what citizens AriU fight for thek country, and whatVUl only
talk. " No one wiU infer from this that I am not a friend of the
negro as weU as the white race. I contend that the treason
and rebeUion of the master freed the slave, and the armies I
have commanded have conducted to safe points more negroes
than those of any general officer in the army ; but I prefer
negroes for pioneers, teamsters, cooks, and servants ; others
graduaUy to experiment in the art of the soldier, beginning
with the duties of local garrisons, such as we had at Memphis,
Vicksburg, Natchez, NashvUle, and Chattanooga ; but I would
not draw on the poor race for too large a proportion of its
active, athletic young men, for some must remain to seek new

238 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS
homes, and prori.de for the old and young, the feeble and
helpless. " These are some of my pecuHar notions, but I assure you
they are shared by a large proportion of our fighting men."
In further explanation of these views, he subsequently An:ote
to Adjutant-General Thomas, then in special charge of the
duty of raising colored troops in the West and Southwest :—
" My preference is to make this racHcal change vrith natural
sloAvness. If negroes are taken as soldiers by undue influence
or force, and compeUed to leave thek women in the uncertainty
of thek new condition, they cannot be rehed on ; but H they
can put thek famUies in some safe place, and then earn money
as soldiers or laborers, the transition AviU be more easy and
the effect more permanent. What my order contemplated was
the eagerness of recruiting captains and Heutenants to make
up thek quota, in order to be commissioned. They would use
a species of force or undue influence, and break up our gangs
of laborers, as necessary as soldiers. We find gangs of negro
laborers, weU organized, on the IMississippi, at NashviUe, and
along the raikoads, most useful, and I have used them Arith
great success as pioneer companies attached to divisions ; and
I think it would be weU H a law would sanction such an organ
ization, say of one hundred to each division of four thousand
men. The first step in the Hberation of the negro from
bondage avUI be to get him and famUy to a place of safety ;
then* to afford him the means of proriding for his famUy, for
thek instincts are very strong ; then gradually use a propor
tion, greater and greater each year, as saUors and soldiers.
There AviU be no great diffictdty in our absorbing the four
millions of slaves in this great industrious country of ours ;
and, being lost to thek masters, the cause of the war is gone,
6)r this great money interest then ceases to be an element in
our poHtics and civU economy. H you divert too large a pro
portion of the able-bodied men into the ranks, you AviU leave
t<io large a class of black paupers on our hands.

TAKING BREATH. 239
" The great mass of our soldiery must be of the white race,
and the black troops should for some years be used Arith cau
tion, and with due regard to the prejudice of the races. As
was to be expected, in some instances they have done weU, in
others, badly ; but, on the whole, the experiment is worthy a
fak trial, and aU I ask is, that it be not forced beyond the laws
of natural development."
On the 29th of August he issued the foUoAring compre
hensive order on the subject of trade within the limits of his
command, for the purpose of iparrying out the provisions of
the act of Congress, approved July 2, 1864, and the regula
tions of the Secretary of the Treasury, made in pm-suance
thereof : —
" I. AU trade is prohibited near armies in the field, or moving
columns of troops, save that necessary to supply the wants of
the troops themselves. Quartermasters and commissaries avUI
take such suppHes as are needed in the countries passed
through, giving receipts, and taking the articles up on thek
returns. When cotton is found, and transportation to the rear
is easy and does not interfere vrith the suppHes of the army
dependent on the route, the quartermaster vriU ship the cotton
to the quartermaster at NashviUe or Memphis, who AriU de
hver it to the agent of the Treasury Department. It AriU be
treated as captured property of an enemy, and invoiced ac
cordingly. No claim of private interest in it avUI be enter
tained by the miHtary authorities.
" H. In departments and mUitary districts, embracing a
country Arithin our miHtary control, the commanders of such
departments and districts may permit a trade in articles not
contraband of war or damaging to the operations of the army
at the front, through the properly appointed agents and sub-
agents of the Treasury Department, to an extent proportionate
to the necessities of the peaceful and worthy inhabitants of tffe
locaHties described ; but as trade and the benefits of civU gov
ernment are conditions not only of the fideHty of the people,
but also of an abUity to maintain peace and order in thek dis-

240 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
trict, county, or locahty, commanding officers will give notice
that aU trade AviU cease where guerriUas are tolerated and
encouraged ; and moreoAjer, that in such districts and locaHties,
the army or detachments sent to maintain the peace must be
maintained by the district or locahty that tolerates or en
courages such guerriUas.
" III. AU mUitary officers wUl assist the agents of the Treas-
iry Department in securing the possession of aU abandoned
pioperty and estates subject to confiscation under the law.
" IV. The use of weapons for hunting purposes is too dan
gerous to be aUowed at this time, and therefore the introduc
tion of aU arms and powder, percussion-caps, buUets, shot,
lead, or any thing used in connection Arith firearms, is pro
hibited absolutely, save by the proper agents of the United
States ; and when the inhabitants requke and can be trusted
Arith such things for seH-defence, or for aiding in maintaining
the peace and safety of thek famUies and property, command
ing officers may issue the same out of the pubhc stores in
limited quantities.
" V. Medicines and clothing, as weU as salt, meats, and pro
risions, being quasi-contraband of war, according to the con
dition of the district or locahty, when offered for sale, AriU be
regulated by local commanders, in connection Arith the agents
of the Treasury Department.
" VI. In articles non-contraband, such as the clothing needed
for women and chUdren, groceries and imported articles, the
trade should be left to the Treasury agents, as matters too un
important to be noticed by miHtary men.
" VII. When mUitary officers can indicate a preference to
the class of men aUowed to trade, they avUI always give the
preference to men who have served the Government as soldiers,
and are wounded or incapacitated from further serrice by such
Avounds or sickness. Men who manifest loyalty by oaths, and
nothing more, are entitled to Hve, but not to ask favors of a
Government that demands acts and personal sacrifices." ,

HOOD'S INVASION.

241

CHAPTEE XIX.
hood's INVASION.
The condition of affaks in the several theatres of war in the
month of September, 1864, may be summed up in a few AVords,
Grant held Lee firmly at Petersburg, vrith a large force under
Sheridan stopping the debouches from the VaUey of the Shen
andoah, and shoAved an evident purpose of persisting in his
operations untU a decisive result should be reached. In North
and South CaroHna matters were passive. Sherman, as we
have seen, was at Atlanta and Hood southwest of that place,
both watching each other ; each preparing to take the initia
tive. Along the Mississippi and west of that river no opera
tions of importance were in progress. MobUe was constantly
threatened, more to compel the Confederates to keep a garri
son there than Arith any intention of resorting to decisive
measures. For practical purposes, aU the troops of the enemy
west of the Mississippi might be considered out of the war,
since, unless by some unhkely accident, they were powerless
to influence the decisive campaigns about to commence.
In point of fact, the issue of the war was now concentrated
upon the result of the approaching campaigns of the%wo main
armies on either side. It was obvious that the Union armies
would, H aUowed to complete aU thek preparations and select
thek time and dkection, continue the offensive. Should Sher
man move to the southeast, whUe Hood maintained his pres
ent position, it would be in the power of the former, should he
be able to reach the sea-coast in safety, to place himseH in com
munication Arith Grant, and thus Avrest fr-om the Confederates
thek great advantage of interior Hnes. Under these circum
stances, it was evidently Hood's true pohcy to abandon aU at
tempts to hold the line of the Chattahoochee or the country west
16

242 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
of it, and placing his army east of Atlanta, to be prepaied to resist
an advance of Sherman down the Atlantic slope, or to operate
upon his flanks in case he should essay a movement towards
the GuH. At the same time the Confederate cavaky should
have been constantly engaged in destroying the raUways lead
ing to the north, thus interrupting Sherman's communications,
and retarding, H not entkely preventing, the accumulation of
the ammunition and other stores requisite to enable him to
push the invasion. Had Hood's army been held between Lee
and Sherman, the Confederates could, at some favorable
moment, have concentrated the bulk of both thek main
armies, augmented by numerous garrisons and detachments,
upon either theatre of war, according to ckcumstances, and
placing one army on the strict defensive, suddenly assume the
bold offensive Arith the other, Arith greater chances of success
than were presented by any other course.
But Jefferson Davis saw only a foe to be destroyed and but
one speedy means of destroying him. To have foUowed the
course we have indicated, might have appeared to the pubhc
and the press of the Confederacy as an indorsement of Johns
ton's mode of warfare. Such a thing could not be tolerated
for an instant. Hurrying from Eichmond to the West, Daris
visited his army, conversed Arith his generals, and gave his
orders for thek future government. To the army he promised
that thek feet should again press the soU of Tennessee. To
the citizens he avowed that vrithin thkty days the barbarous
invader Vould be driven from thek territory. The retreat of
Sherman from Atlanta, he said, should be Hke Napolecm's
from Moscow.
About the 20th of September, Forrest, vrith his cavalry,
crossed the Tennessee near Waterloo, Alabama, destroyed a
portion of the raUway between Decatur and Athens, and on the
23d appeared before the latter place, and drove the garrison,
consisting of six hundred men of the One Huncked and Sixth,
One Hundred and Tenth, and One Hundred and Eleventh
regiments of colored troops, and Thkd Tennessee Cavalry,
the whole under command of Colonel CampbeU, of the One

HOOD'S INVASION. 243
Hundred and Tenth, into the fort constructed for the defence
of the place. On the 24th, Forrest haring completely invested
the fort, succeeded in persuading Colonel CampbeU, in a jDer-
sonal interriew which that officer granted him, after refusing
to comply Arith his summons to surrender, that it was useless
to resist the odds against the garrison ; and Colonel CampbeU
accordingly capitulated. HaH an hour afterwards the Nine
teenth Michigan and One Hundred and Second Ohio regiments
arrived, but Forrest being now at hberty to use his entire
force against them, they were soon compeUed to yield, after a
hard fight. Forrest then moved on, destroying the raUway
as he went, untU the 27th, when he arrived before Pulaski,
where he was confronted and successfuUy resisted by a garri
son hastUy coUected by Major-General LoveU H. Eousseau.
Finding his progress barred in this dkection, on the 29th
Forrest swung round to the NashviUe and Chattanooga raU
way and began to break it up between TuUahoma and Decherd ;
but General Eousseau, divining this plan, moved so rapidly
by raU through NashviUe to TuUahoma that he reached that
place before the main body of Forrest's command could come
up, and Major-General Steedman with five thousand men from
Chattanooga, having crossed the Tennessee on the same day
to check his movements, Forrest feU back through FayetteviUe
during the night. The next day the raUway was again in
running order. Forrest then divided his command into two
columns, one under Buford being four thousand strong, and
the other, commanded by himself in person, numbering three
thousand. Buford appeared before HuntsvUle on the eA-ening
of the 30th, demanded the sm-render of the garrison that night
and again on the foUoAring morning, and being on both occa
sions refrised, moved on Athens and attacked that place on the
afternoon of October 1st and the morning of the 2d, but was
gaUantly repulsed by the Seventy- third Indiana, under Lieuten
ant-Colonel Slade, which Brigadier-General E. S. Granger had
just sent to reoccupy the place. Buford then abandoned his
portion of the expedition and recrossed the Tennessee on the
3d at Brown's Ferry. Forrest, Arith his oavu column, appeared

244 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
before Columbia on. the 1st of October, but did not attack,
and on the morning of the 3d he too turned his face to the
south, passed through LaAvrenceburg on the night of the 4th,
and on the 6th, though closely pressed, succeeded in effecting
his escape across the Tennessee at Bainbridge. MeanwhUe,
dangers had been thickening in his path, for NoAvton's dirision
of Stanley's fourth corps, now under Brigadier-General Wag
ner, left Atlanta on the 26th and replaced Steedman at Chatta
nooga two days later ; Morgan's second division of Jefferson
C. Davis' fourteenth corps started north on the 29th, reached
Stevenson early on the 1st of October and HuntsviUe the same
night, Athens on the night of the 2d, EogersviUe on the 4th,
and came up and skkmished Arith Forrest's rear-guard at
Shoal Creek bridge ; Eousseau, Arith four thousand cavaky
and mounted infantry, foUowed Forrest from Columbia, at
Pulaski was joined by Major-General C. C. Washbume Arith
three thousand cavaky from Memphis, and together they
reached Waynesboro' on the 6th. Moreover, on the 28th of
September, as soon as he became convinced of the enemy's
designs, Sherman had dispatched Major-General Thomas to
Nashrille to take personal command of the rear, and on the
3d, Thomas had reached that place and put in motion this
combination, which but for unforeseen causes, such as the rise
of Elk Eiver in front of Morgan, must, in aU probabihty, have
resulted in Forrest's destruction.
On the 1st of October, Hood began his fatal march to tho
north. Sending his cavaky in advance to move rapidly
against Sherman's communications beyond Marietta, he
crossed the Chattahoochee Arith his three corps of infantry,
and pushed north by way of DaUas.
Leaving Slocum Arith his Twentieth Corps to hold Atlanta
and the raUway bridge over the Chattahoochee, on the 4th of
October, in accordance Arith his previous intentions and ar
rangements, Sherman marched Arith the remainder of his
army to Smyrna Camp Ground, and on the foUoAving day to a
strong position at Kenesaw Mountain. The enemy's cavahy
and French's division of Stewart's corps had struck the rail

HOOD'S INVASION. 245
way at Big Shanty, effectuaUy destroyed it and the telegraph
for a distance of twenty mUes, and was now moving on AUa
toona Pass, where were stored a mUHon of rations, guarded
by the Ninety-third EHnois regiment, under Lieutenant-Col
onel TourteUotte, behind the redoubts previously constructed.
The telegraph wkes being broken by the enemy, and the in
termediate country occupied by his troops, Sherman sent a
message by signals to Brigadier-General Corse, who, as we
have seen, was at Eome Arith his division of the FHteenth
Corps, directing that officer to re-enforce the threatened post
without delay. Corse started immediately by raUAvay Arith
the Fourth Minnesota and Seventh EHnois, and reached
AUatoona at one o'clock, A. M., on the 5th of October ; but,
OAring to an accident to the train, it was so late in return
ing that no more troops had arrived when, an hour after
Corse's arrival, French with his dirision appeared before
the place and opened a brisk skirmish fire. By dayhght,
the works at AUatoona, manned by one thousand nine hun
dred and forty-four men, were completely invested by French's
entke dirision of the Confederate army. At haH-past eight,
on the 5th, after a sharp cannonade of two hours' duration.
General French sent a note to General Corse, under a flag
of truce, intimating that he would give the garrison just
five minutes to surrender, in order to spare the unnecessary
effusion of human blood. Corse instantly repHed that he
should not surrender, and that he was prepared for this un
necessary effusion of blood as soon as his assaUant chose to
begin it. The enemy immediately assaulted with great fury ;
and again and again, during the day, his columns surged
madly up against the parapets, only to be as often hurled
back Arith great slaughter by the intrepid Httle garrison, stand
ing as grim and immovable as the rock itseH ; untU at mght
the shattered remnants of the enemy were at length driven
from every position, and the possession of AUatoona Avas
secure. At ten o'clock in the mommg Sherman in person
reached Kenesaw Mountain, eighteen mUes distant, and

246 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
thence saw and faintly heard, but only too fuUy comprehended,
what was transpiring at his depot. The distance was too
great to offer any hope of being able to render dk-ect assist
ance before the struggle should be decided, but Sherman at
once sent the Twenty-third Corps, . under Cox, out on the
Burnt Hickory road, toAvards DaUas, to move against the
flank and rear of the forces threatening AUatoona. From
mountain to mountain the Httle signal flags, speUing thek
message in quiet defiance of hostUe force, waved from Sher
man to Corse the words few and simple, but of thrilling im
port, which announced to him the presence of the commander-
in-chief on the overlooking height of Kenesaw, the movement of
fa-oops for his rehef, and exhorted him to hold out to the last.
Quickly the flags moved again Arith Corse's brave reply, which
would show his commander, even H there had been misgiv
ings on the subject, that here was a captain who would fight
to the death for AUatoona and the safety of the army, resting
at that moment upon the imaided strength of his single arm,
But there were no such doubts. No sooner did the flags speak
Corse's name, than Sherman exclaimed, " If Corse is there he
AviU hold out. I know the man !" In this stubljom defence
against apparently overwhelming odds, the garrison, number
ing less than two thousand, lost seven huncked and seven
officers and men kiUed and wounded ; among the latter,
Brigadier-General Corse himseH, who, though struck in the
face by a buUet about noon, declined to leave the field, and
by his OAvn energy and spirit imbued his command with the
strength that gave them the victory. Colonel Eichard Eowell,
Seventh Illinois, and Lieutenant-Colonel TourteUotte, Ninety-
thkd Illinois, both of whom behaved Arith remarkable gal-
lanti-y, were also wounded. The garrison captured eight hun
dred muskets, three stands of colors, and four hundred and
eleven prisoners, and after the enemy retked, buiied two hun
dred and thkty-one of thek men, who were kiUed outright.
The arrival of the Fourth and Fourteenth Corps at Pine
Mountain, and the movement of the Twentj'-third Corps on

HOOD'S INVASION 247
DaUas, hastened French's withdrawal towards the latter place,
after his severe defeat.
Hood now moved rapidly to the northwest, aiming to reach
the raUAvay at Eesaca. On the 6th and 7th, holding his army
about Kenesaw, Big Shanty, and Kenesaw Mountain, Sher
man sent his cavaky towards Burnt Hickory and DaUas, and
discovered this movement of the enemy. Accordingly, on the
afternoon of the 10th, he put the troops in motion through
Allatoona Pass, on Kingston. By a forced march of thkty-eight
mUes, the three armies reached Kingston on the 11th. On tho
12th, the march was continued to Eome, a brigade of Hazen's
dirision of Osterhaus' fifteenth corps being sent in advance,
by railway, from AUatoona, to occupy the pla(Ce, in anticip;i-
tion of Hood's movement against it. Sherman pushed Gar
rard's cHvision of cavaky and the Twenty-third Corps across
the Oostanaula, to menace the enemy's flanks, and Garrard
succeeded in driving a brigade of the enemy through the narroAv
entrance of the vaUey of the Chattooga, capturing two guns,
wh'Ue, at the same time, Corse crossed the EtoAvah with his
dirision, and the brigade of Hazen's dirision that had come
forward by raU, and made a reconnoissance a^ ith a vicAv to
develop the force of the enemy guarding thek pontoon bridge,
sixteen mUes below. Having thus ascertained that Hood's
movement upon Eome had been merely a feint, and that he
had in fact crossed the Coosa with his entke army, and was
hastening with aU speed towards Eesaca and Dalton, Sherman
put his command, except Corse's division, left to hold Eome,
in motion, on the 13th, towards the former place, and ordered
Howard to send forward Belknap's dirision of Eansom's
seventeenth corps by raUAvay to the rehef of the garrison, ar
riving about midnight. From Kingston, Sherman had sent
two regiments of Howard's army, under Colonel Weaver, to
occupy Eesaca, and had afterwards caused them to be re-en
forced by Baum's brigade of John E. Smith's division of the
Fifteenth Corps. Hood appeared before the smaU garrison
Arith his entire army, but General Baum showed so bold and
extended a front that, probably retaining a virid recoUection

248 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
of AUatoona, and knoAving the contagious effect of such an
example both upon besieged and besiegers. Hood contented
himseH Arith an attack by a skirmish line, and a summons to
surrender, coupled Arith a threat that no prisoners would be
taken in case he were compeUed to carry the placeby assault.
During the parley, portions of Hood's army were engaged in
effectuaUy destroying the raUway for twenty mUes to the
northward, and in capturing the smaU and unresisting gar
risons at TUton and Dalton. On the evening of the 14th,
Sherman, vrith the main body of the army, arrived in Eesaca,
and on the loth, dkecting the Army of the Tennessee to move
to Snake Creek Gap, and hold the enemy there, he caused
Stanley, Avkh the Fourth and Fourteenth Corps, to move by
TUton, across the mountains towards ViUanow, in order to
strike Hood in flank or force him to fight. But Hood evi
dently considered it his pohcy, at this time, to avoid a battle,
for his lines gave way about noon before the advance of How
ard's skkmishers, and, foUowed by Hpward, he escaped
through Snake Creek Gap before Stanley had time to reach
the other end of the Pass, and rapidly retreated, in a south
westerly dkection, doAvn the vaUey of the Coosa, to the
ricinity of Gadsden, and occupied the narrow gorge formed by
the Lookout Mountains abutting against the river. On the
16th, Sherman moved towards Lafayette Arith the view of cut
ting off Hood's retreat, and found him intrenched at Ship's
Gap ; but Woods' division of Osterhaus' fifteenth corps, hav
ing the advance, rapidly carried the advanced posts, capturing
two companies of a South CaroHna regiment, and driving the
remainder back on the main body at Lafayette. That night
the armies went into camp at Taylor's Eidge, where Ship's
Gap dirides it.
On the 17th, the Army of the Tennessee moved to Lafayette,
whUe the other corps remained in camp at the Eidge.
On the 18th, Howard crossed the Chattooga at Tryon's
Factory, and encamped near SummerviUe. Stanley moved in
the same dkection, through Mattock's Gap, in Taylor's Eidge,
crossed the river at Perm's Ford, and halted foiu mUes be-

HOOD'S INVASION. 249
yond it. On the 19th, the Army of the Tennessee reached
Alpine, and the Army of the Cumberland, after a short march,
encamped at SummerviUe, and, on the 20th, both these com
mands marched into GaylesvUle ; whUe Cox, with the Twenty-
thkd Corps and Garrard's division of cavaky, having moved
by VUlanow, Dkt Toavu, and Gover's Gap, arrived on the same
day. In the mean whUe, Thomas had disposed of his smaU forces
so as to oppose the greatest resistance in his power to Hood's
movement on Bridgeport and Chattanooga, both of which
places were seriously menaced by the dkection of his advance.
Leaving Decatur, HuntsviUe, Stevenson, and the rest ¦ of
Northern Alabama to the care of thek ordinary garrisons,
Thomas caused Eousseau to recaU his mounted troops from
the pursuit of Forrest and concentrate at Athens ; Croxton's
brigade of cavaky to observe and protect the crossings of the
Tennessee Eiver fr-om Decatur to Eastport ; Morgan's division
of Jefferson C. Daris' fourteenth corps to move by rail to
Chattanooga, where, it wUl be remembered, Wagner already
was Arith NoAvton's dirision of Stanley's fourth corps, and
Steedman to foUow Morgan to Bridgeport. On the 14th,
Morgan reached his designated position, and Steedman's
destination was also changed to Chattanooga.
The Army of the Tennessee was now posted near Little
Eiver, with orders to support the cavaky engaged in watching
Hood ; the Army of the Ohio was at Cedar Bluff, Arith orders
to lay a pontoon bridge across the Coosa, and feel towards
Centre and Blue Mountains ; and the Army of the Cumberland
was held in reserve at GaylesvUle, In this position, in the
heart of the rich vaUey ' Df the Chattooga, in a country
abounding Arith. food, Sherman determined, whUe Hving upon
the country, to pause in his pursuit of his erratic enemy, and
giving him sufficient rope wheroArith to entangle himseH, to
watch his movements. Communications were estabhshed
\rith Eome, and a large force put to work, under Colonel W.
W. Wright, chief engineer of the United States miHtary raU
ways in this division, in repaking the damages inflicted by

250 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
Hood upon the raUway. Slocum at Atlanta Avas ordt red to
send out strong foraging parties, coUect aU the com and fod
der possible, and put his trains in condition for service. As
early as the 21st, telegraphic communication was restored be
tween Chattanooga and Atlanta, and by the 28th, although
thkty-four mUes of raUs and ties had been destroyed, and
several important bridges carried away by floods, trains be
gan running through on the raUway.
Hood had turned westward from Gadsden towards Decatur,
and taken up a position threatening the Chattanooga and
Atlanta raUway, and at the same time menacing Tennes
see. His movements and strategy had conclusively de
monstrated that he had an army at aU times capable of
endangering Sherman's communications, but unable to meet
and cope Arith him in battle. To foUow Hood indefinitely
towards the west and north would, Arithout much prospect
of overtaking and overwhelming his army, be for Sherman
equivalent to being decoyed out of Georgia. To remain
on the defensive, on the other hand, would be to lose the
main effectiveness of the great Army of the Centre. Sher
man had previously proposed to General Grant, in the early
stages of the pursuit, to break up the raUway from Chatta
nooga to Atlanta, and strike out for MiUedgeviUe, MUlen, and
Savannah. "UntU we can repopulate Georgia," he Avrote, "it
is useless to occupy it ; but the utter destruction of its roads,
houses, and people AviU cripple thek mihtary resources. By
attempting to hold the roads we AriU lose a thousand men
monthly, and AviU gain no result. I can make the march, and
maT{e Georgia hoid." And again : " Hood may tum into Ten
nessee and Kentucky, but I beheve he AriU be forced to foUow
me. Instead of being on the defensive I would be on the
offensive. Instead of guessing at what he means, he would
have to guess at my plans. The difference, in war is full
twenty-five per cent. I can make Savannah, Charleston,
or the mouth of the Chattahoochee. I prefer to march
through Georgia, smashing things, to the sea." He now pro
posed to the Heutenant-general to modify these plans, so far

HOOD'S INVASION. 251
as to give him the choice of either of the three alternatives
just named.
" I must have alternatives," he said ; " else being confined to
one route the enemy might so oppose that delay and want
would trouble me ; but having alternatives, I can take so
eccentric a course that no general can guess at my objective.
Therefore, when you hear I am off, have lookouts at Morris
Island, S. C. ; Ossabaw Sound, Georgia ; Pensacola and
MobUe bays. I avUI turn up somewhere, and beheve me I can
take Macon, MiUedgeviUe, Augusta, and Savannah, Georgia,
and wind up with closing the neck back of Charleston, so that
they AviU starve out. This movement is not purely mUitary
or strategic, but it AriU Ulustrate the vulnerabihty of the
South." General Grant promptly authorized the proposed move
ment, incHcating, however, his preference for Savannah as the
objective, and fixing Dalton as the northern hmit for the de
struction of the railway. Preparations were instantly under
taken and pressed forward for the consummation of these
plans. On the 26th of October, Sherman detached the Fourth Corps
under Major-General Stanley, and ordered him to proceed to
Chattanooga and report to General Thomas at Nashville. On
the 30th of October, he also detached the TAventy-thkd Corps,
Major-General Schofield, with the same destination, and dele
gated to Major-General Thomas fuU power over the troops,
except the four corps with which he himself designed to move
into Georgia. This gave Thomas the two divisions of the
Sixteenth Corps, under A. J. Smith, then in Missouri but
on the way to Tennessee, the Fourth and Twenty-third
corps, as just mentioned, and aU the garrisons in Tennes
see, as weU as aU the cavalry of the Military Dirision, except
the division under Brigadier-General KUpatrick, which was
ordered to rendezvous at Marietta. Brevet Major-General
WUson had arrived from the Army of the Potomac to assume
command of the cavalry of the Army of the Centre, and he
was sent back to NashvUle Arith all dismounted detachments,

252 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
and orders as rapidly as possible to coUect the cavahy serving
in Kentucky and Tennessee, to mount, organize, and equip
them, and report to Major-General Thomas for duty. These
forces, Sherman considered, would enable General Thomas to
defend the raUway from Chattanooga back, including Nash
vUle and Decatur, and give him an army Arith which he could
successfuUy cope Arith Hood, should the latter cross the Ten
nessee northward. The entke plan of the campaign was
communicated to General Thomas, and he was instmcted
that, as an essential portion of it, he was expected to defend
the line of the Tennessee Eiver, to hold Tennessee, in any
event, and to pursue the enemy should Hood foUow Sherman.
On the 26th, the enemy appeared in some force before
Decatur, but after skirmishing for three days Arithdrew. On
the 31st, in spite of aU the efforts to the contrary of Croxton's
brigade of cavalry, which, as has been seen, was engaged in
guarding the river, the enemy succeeded in effecting a lodgment
on the north bank of the Tennessee, about three mUes above
Florence. On the 28th November, Forrest, coming from Cor
inth Arith seventeen regiments of cavaky and nine pieces of
artUlery, having captured a gunboat and two transports, and
burned a third at Fort Heiman, seventy -five mUes from Padu
cah, planted batteries above and below JohnsonvUle, and after
cannonading that place for three days, during which our troops
burned thek transports and stores, Arithdrew and crossed the
Tennessee just above the toAvn.
The same day Schofield, Arith the Twenty-thkd Corps,
reached NashriUe and was hurried on to JohnsonvUle ; and
arriving there the night after Forrest's Arithdrawal, was sent
on to join the Fourth Corps at Pulaski, leaving a garrison
at JohnsonviUe. General Schofield was charged Arith the
immediate dkection of the operations of these two corps, vnth
instructions to watch Hood's movements, and delay them
as much as possible, vrithout risking a general engagement,
so as to aUow time for A. J. Smith to arrive from Missouri
and for WUson to remount his cavalry. Thomas' effective
force, at this moment, numbered twenty-two thousand infantry

HOOD'S INVASION 253
and seven thousand seven hundred cavaky, exclusive of the
numerous detachments garrisoning Murfreesboro', Stevenson,
Bridgeport, HuntsviUe, Decatur, and Chattanooga, and dis
tributed along the raUways to guard them. With these he
had to oppose Beauregard, Arith Hood's three corps and
Forrest's, Wheeler's, and Eoddy's cavaky, now grouped about
Florence, threatening the invasion of Middle Tennessee.
MeanwhUe, Sherman, having completed his preparations,
received his final instructions, and explained his plans in detaU,
under strict confidence, to his corps commanders and heads of
staff departments, had changed front to the rear and was once
more marching towards the south.
Duiing the campaign just closed, the army and the country
were caUed upon to lament the death of the gaUant commander
of the Seventeenth Corps, Brigadier-General Thomas Edward
Greenfield Eansom. He had been suffering at the outset from
the fatal dysentery which caused his death, but esteeming it as
merely a temporary malady, and unAviUing to quit his post at
such a time, he had remained in command, continuing to exert
himseH day and night to the utmost of his power, untU, on the
20th, on arriring at GaylesvUle, the aggravated nature of
his symptoms compeUed him to yield his inclinations and
go to the rear. On the 29th of October, his end being
evidently nigh at hand, he was taken from the stretcher on
which he was being carried to Eome, and borne into a house
by the roadside, Avhere shortly afterwards he breathed his
last. Bom in NorArich, Vermont, on the 29th of November, 1834,
and graduating at Noi-Arich University in his seventeenth year,
he removed to LasaUe County, Illinois, in 1851, and entered
upon the practice of his profession as civU engineer. In 1854,
he embarked in the real estate business, at Peru, Illinois, in
connection Arith an uncle, Mr. GUson, and in December, 1855,
joined the house of GaUoway and Company, at Chicago, who
were largely engaged in land operations. When the rebeUion
broke out he was Hving in Fayette County, EHnois, acting as
an agent of the EHnois Central EaUway Company. Imme-

254 SHERMAN ANT) HIS CAMPAIGNS.
diately after the issue of the President's proclamation of April
16, 1861, caUing for seventy-five thousand three months'
mUitia, Eansom raised a company, which was presently at
tached to the Eleventh Eegiment of EHnois Volunteers, where
of, by a vote of the company officers, he was elected major, and
duly commissioned accordingly by the governor of the State.
On the reorganization of the regiment for the three years'
serrice at the end of July, 1861, Eansom was made its Heuten
ant-colonel. On the 19th of August he was severely wounded
in the shoulder, in a charge at Charleston, Missouri. He
took part in the capture of Fort Henry, and led his regiment
in the assault on Fort Donelson, where he was again severely
wounded, and narrowly escaped death, his clothing being
pierced by six buUet-holes, and his horse being shot under
him. Though suffering from prolonged sickness, consequent
upon his wound and continued exposure, he insisted on re
maining Arith his command, and being soon promoted to the
position vacated by the appointment of Colonel W. H. L.
WaUace as a brigadier-general, led the regiment through the
battle of ShUoh, though again wounded in the head in the
early part of the engagement. In January, 1863, he was
appointed a brigadier-general, dating fr-om the 29th of No
vember prerious, and as such coinmanded a brigade of
Logan's division of McPherson's seventeenth corps during the
siege of A''icksburg. Early in August his brigade was sent to
occupy Natchez, and was soon afterwards transferred to the
Thirteenth Corps, under Major-General Ord, when that corps
was assigned to the Department of the GuH, and he was placed
in command of a division. He took part in the brief occupatioi
of the Texas coast by General Banks in the Arinter of 1SG3,
and in the Ul-fated Eed Eiver expedition, being so severely
wounded in the knee at the battle of Sabine Cross-roads, on
the 8th of AprU, 1864, that the surgeons were dirided in
opinion on the question of amputation. General Eansom
himseH decided the dispute in favor of retaining the leg, and
recovered, though suffering Arith a stiff knee, in time to job

HOOD'S INVASION. 255
Sherman and take command of a dirision of Blak's seven
teenth corps, just before the capture of Atlanta.
By his talents, his patience, his courage, his aptness for
command, he had rapidly mounted almost to the highest
rewards of Ids profession, when death closed a caieer of honor
apparently Arithout other Hmit. Young, enthusiastic, and un-
tking, brave and skUful, in Eansom's death the Army of
the Tennessee lost a jewel second only in lustre to that which
feU from its diadem ia the death of McPherson.

256 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.

CHAPTEE XX.
the COLOES POINT TO THE SOUTH.
SHEEJLi.N moved the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps by
slow and easy marches on the south of the Coosa back to
the neighborhood of Smyrna camp-groimd, and the Four
teenth Corps to Kingston, whither he repaked in person on
the 2d of November. From that point he dkected aU sur
plus artUlery, aU baggage not needed for the contemplated
march, aU .the sick and wounded, refugees and other encum
brances to be sent back to Chattanooga, and the three corps
above-mentioned, as weU as KUpatrick's cavaky, and the
Twentieth Corps, then at Atlanta, to be put in the most efficient
condition possible for the long and difficult march before them.
This operation consumed the time untU the 11th of Novem
ber, when, every thing being ready, General Corse, who still
remained at Eome, was dkected to destroy the bridges
there, as weU as aU foundries, mUls, shops, warehouses, and
other property that could be useful to the enemy, and to
move to Kingston. At the same time the raUway in and
about Atlanta, and between the Etowah and the Chatta
hoochee, was ordered to be utterly destroyed. General
Steedman was also instmcted to gather up the garrisons from
Kingston northward, and to draw back to Chattanooga, tak
ing vrith him aU pubhc property and aU raUway stock, and
to take up the raUs from Eesaca back, preserving them, that
they might be replaced whenever future interests should de
mand it. The raUway between the Etowah and the Oostanaula
was left untouched, in view of General Grant's instructions,
and because Sherman thought it more than probable that

THE COLORS POINT TO THE Sv'iJTH. 0,-7
General Thonias would find it necessary to reoccupy the
country as far forward as the line of the Etowah, which, by
reason of its rivers and other natural features, possesses an
enduring mUitary importance, since from it all parts of Georgia
and Alabama can be reached by armies marching down the
vaUeys of the Coosa and Chattahoochee.
On the 11th of November, Sherman sent his last dispatch
to General HaUeck, at Washington, and, on the 12th, his army
stood detached and cut off from aU communication with the
rear. For the purpose of the great march, it had been dirided into
two wings : the right, commanded by Major-General OHver O.
Howard, comprising the Fifteenth Corps, under Major-Gen
eral P. J. Osterhaus, and the Seventeenth Corps, under Major-
General Frank P. Blak, Jr., who had now rejoined the army ; the
left, under Major-General Henry W. Slocum, consisting of the
Fourteenth Corps of brevet Major-General Jefferson C. Daris,
and the Twentieth Corps, to which Brigadier-General A. S.
WiUiams was assigned. The aggregate force of infantry was
sixty thousand ; the cavaky division, under Brigadier-General
Judson KUpatrick, numbered fifty-five hundred men ; and
there was one field-gun to every thousand men.
The Fifteenth Corps consisted of the divisions of Brigadier-
Generals Charles E. Woods, WUHam B. Hazen, John E.
Smith, and John M. Corse. Hazen's second division, though
greatly changed in aU its parts 'oy time and hard serrice, was
substantiaUy the same dirision which Sherman organized at
Paducah and commanded at Shiloh, and whose history we
have foUowed in these pages, successively under the leadership
of David Stuart, Morgan L. Smith, and Blak.
The Seventeenth Corps comprised three dirisions, under
Major-General John A. Mower and Brigadier-Generals MUes
D. Leggett and Giles A. Smith, besides the detachments above
mentioned. The Fourteenth Corps was composed of three divisions, led
by Brigadier-Generals WUHam P. Carhn, James D. Morgan,
and Absalom Bakd. 17

258 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
The Twentieth Corps, which it avUI be remembered was
formed by consohdating the Eleventh and TweHth Corps from
the Army of the Potomac, included the dirisions of Brigadier-
Generals Norman J. Jackson, John W. Geary, and WUHam T.
Ward. KUpatrick's dirision of cavaky consisted of two brigades,
commanded by Colonels EH H. Murray, Thkd Kentucky
Cavaky, and Smith D. Atkins, Ninety-second EHnois Mounted
Infantry. This whole force moved rapidly, and on the 14th of Novem
ber was once more grouped about Atlanta.
Here let us pause to glance at such of the more prominent
actors in the approaching scenes, as we have not akeady
sketched. OHver 0. Howard was born in Leeds, in Kennebec County,
Maine, on the 8th of November, 1830, the eldest of three chil
dren of parents in independent but moderate ckcumstances.
He worked on his father's farm untU his tenth year, when his
father died, leaving him to the care of his uncle, the Honor
able John Otis, of HaUoweU. He enjoyed the advantages of a
good common-school education untU, at the age of sixteen, he
entered Bowdoin CoUege, at BrunsArick, Maine. Upon finish
ing the coUegiate course, after some hesitation he decided to
avaU himseH of the opportunity just then offered of comple
ting his education at the United States MUitary Academy at
West Point. He accordingly entered that institution in 1850,
and graduated in 1854, ranking fourth in the order of general
standing of his class. He was appointed brevet second lieu
tenant in the Ordnance Department, and two years later
served in a campaign against the Indians in Florida, as chief
ordnance officer of the department. The 1st of July, 1855, by
regular promotion, he became second Heutenant and on the 1st
July, 1857, first Heutenant of ordnance, and held the latter
rank at the opening of the war, when he was stationed at West
Point as assistant professor of mathematics. At an early date
his services were offered to the governor of Maine, Avho, on
the 28th of May, 1861, commissioned bim as colonel of the

THE COLORS POINT TO THE SOUTH. 259
Third Maine Volunteers, the first three years' regiment that
left the State.
At the battle of BuU Eun he commanded a brigade as senior
colonel, and on the 3d of September, 1861, was commissioned
brigadier-general of volunteers, and was soon afterwards as
signed to the command of a brigade of Sumner's division of
the Army of the Potomac, which, in March, 1862, became a
part of Sumner's second army corps, Brigadier-General Israel
B. Eichardson succeeding to the command of the dirision.
General Howard was Arith the Army of the Potomac on the
Peninsula untU the battle of Fak Oaks, where he lost his right
arm whUe leading his brigade in a charge against the enemy.
Two buUets entered the arm, one near the Avrist and the other
at the elbow ; but he did not leave the field until, on being
wounded the second time, his strength gave out, and he was
obhged to go to the rear, and submit to an amputation. After
an absence of two months, he returned to the army in season
to be Arith his corps at the second battle of BuU Eun, and on
the retreat from CentreviUe he commanded the rear-guard.
At the battle of Antietam, when General Sedgwick was
wounded, and compeUed to quit the field, General Howard
succeeded him in command of his division of Sumner's corps.
At the battle of Fredericksburg this division formed the
right of the Hne, and lost heavUy.
On the 29th November, 1862, he was appointed major-gen
eral of volunteers, and on the 1st AprU, 1863, took command
of the Eleventh Army Corps, reHeving General Sigel. He led
his corps at ChanceUorsvUle and Gettysburg. He took a gal
lant part in the capture of Lookout Mountain and the battle
of Mission Eidge, and accompanied Sherman in his march to
the relief of Burnside at KnoxviUe. His services in the At
lanta campaign, in command of the Fourth Army Corps, and,
after McPherson's death, at the head of the Army of the Ten
nessee, have akeady been fuUy Ulustrated in these pages.
Thoroughly educated, an accomphshed scholar, a true gen
tleman, and a brave soldier, General Howard is eminently cal
culated to inspke the confidence of his superiors, the respect

260 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
and obedience of his foUowers, the affection and esteem of all
irith whom he may be associated. Quiet and unassuming in
his deportment ; a fervent and devoted Christian, not only in
his behef but in his daUy hfe ; conscientious to a degree in the
performance of the smaUest duty; careless of exposing his
person in battle, to an extent that would be attributable to
rashness or fatahsm H it were not known to spring from re-
Hgion ; strictly honorable in aU things ; warm in his sympa-
pathies and cordial in his friendships, Howard presents a rare
combination of quahties, no less grand than simple, equaUy to
be imitated for thek vktue and loved for thek humanity.
Judson Kilpatrick was born in New Jersey, in 1838. In
June, 1856, as a reward for his pohtical serrices in the support
of the re-election of the member of Congress from the district
wherein he resided, he was selected by that gentleman to rep
resent the district at West Point. In AprU, 1861 , he gradu
ated fifteenth in his class, and was immediately appointed a
second-Heutenant in the Fkst Eegiment of ArtiUery, but soon
afterwards received permission fr-om the War Department to
accept a captaincy in the FHth Eegiment of New York Vol
unteers, generaUy knoAvn as Duryea's Zouaves, and served
with that regiment in the skkmish or battle, in June, at Big
Bethel, where he was slightly wounded.
In the faU, KUpatrick succeeded in obtaining a commission
as heutenant-colonel of the Second Eegiment of New York Cav
aky, or " Harris Light Cavaky," commanded by Colonel J.
Mansfield Davies. Participating in command of that regiment,
and afterwards at the head of a brigade of Gregg's dirision, in
nearly aU the principal operations of the cavaky of the Army
of the Potomac, under Generals McCleUan, Burnside, and
Hooker, in May, 1863, he was promoted to be a brigadier-
general for gaUant and distinguished serrices in the battle of
Brandy Station, and was soon afterwards, on the appointment
of General Meade to reheve Hooker, placed in command of
Stahl's division, which, Arith the dirisions of Buford and
Gregg, now constituted Pleasonton's cavaky corps. This
command he continued to hold until, on the failure of the iU-

THE COLORS POINT TO THE SOUTH. 261
considered raid for the rehef of the Union prisoners at Eich
mond, wherein he and the brave young Dahlgren were jointly
engaged, he was reheved and ordered to report to General
Sherman, who readily discovered in Kilpatrick those sterling
quahties which, though marred and partiaUy concealed by an
extravagant craring for admiration and a ceaseless straining
after dramatic effect, nevertheless constituted him, Avlien his
judgment was properly strengthened and developed by contact
with a master mind, and his love of daUy popularity strongly
restrained by a master AriU, a valuable and deserring cavaky
commander. Frank P. Blak, Jr., the son of Francis P. Blak, Sr., of
Montgomery County, Maryland, was born in Lexington, Ken
tucky, on the 19th of February, 1821. After completing his
education at Princeton CoUege, he appHed himseH to the study
of the law in his native town, and after being admitted to the
bar, removed to St. Louis, and commenced practice in 1843.
He served in Mexico, during the war Arith that country in
1846-47, as a Heutenant of volunteers, and returned to. St.
Louis after the peace, resumed the practice of his profession,
and entered into poHtics with the activity characteristic of his
famUy, supporting Mr. Van Buren for the Presidency in 1848,
on the Buffalo platform. Becoming from that time identified
vrith the free-soU party, opposed to the extension of slavery
into the territories, he was elected to the Legislature of Mis
souri in 1852, as a delegate from St. Louis, and re-elected in
1854. At the expkation of his second term, in 1856, as the
candidate of the Eepubhcan party, he was chosen representa
tive in Congress fr-om the St. Louis district, and has been suc
cessively re-elected as such in the years 1858, 1860, and 1862.
From the spring of 1861 untU he left his seat in Congress,
he was chakman of the Committee on MUitary Affaus in the
House of Eepresentatives.
On the breaking out of the rebeUion, he raised the Fkst
Infantry Eegiment of Missouri Volunteers, and on the 7th of
August, having in the mean time attended the special session
of Congress in his civU capacity, and immediately afterwards

262 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
returned to Missouri and raised a brigade, he was appointed
by the President a brigadier-general of volunteers. On the
29th of November, 1862, he was promoted to be a major-
general. General Blak's miHtary record whUe in command of a bri
gade at Chickasaw Bayou and Arkansas Post ; of Sherman's
old division of the Fifteenth Corps in the siege of Vicksburg and
the capture of Jackson ; of the FHteenth Corps in its marches
from luka to Chattanooga, and thence to KnoxviUe, and the
battle of Missionary Eidge ; and of the Seventeenth Corps
in the Atlanta campaign, we have akeady foUowed, step by
step. When the Army of the Tennessee went into Avinter-quarters
at HuntsviUe, in 1863, General Blak, at the personal request
of President Lincoln, returned to Washington, and resumed
his place in Congress. At the reopening of active operations
he hastened back to the army, and was assigned the command
of the Seventeenth Army Corps, in place of General McPher
son, who had succeeded General Sherman at the head of the
Army of the Tennessee.
Peter Joseph Osterhaus was a native of Prussia, and held a
commission in the Prussian army, but afterwards emigrated
to the United States, and took up his residence at St. Louis,
in Missouri. During the Arinter of 1860, in anticipation of
the war, he organized and commanded a company of mUitia,
and subsequently took part Arith it in the capture of the seces
sion camp near the city by General Lyon, in May, 1861. His
company being mustered into the service of the United States,
on the 17th of July, 1861, he took part, under General Lyon,
in the battle of BooneviUe ; on the 2d of August fought at
Dug Springs, in Southwestem Missouri, and on the 10th of the
same month was engaged in the battle of WUson's Creek,
during which Lyon was kUled. He was then promoted to be
colonel of the TweHth Missouri Volunteers, and at the head
of that regiment took part ki the brief campaign under Fre
mont. At the battle of Pea Eidge, on the 7th and 8th of
March, 1862, Colonel Osterhaus commanded with abUity the

THE COLORS POINT TO THE SOUTH. 263
first brigade of General Sigel's dirision, and was wounded and
compeUed to leave the field. He, however, soon rejoined his
regiment and took part in the arduous march of General
Curtis' troops through Arkansas to Helena, where the forces
arrived in July, 1862. On the 9th of June, 1862, he was pro
moted to be a brigadier-general of volunteers, and in that
capacity took part, as we have akeady seen, in command
of a brigade, in Sherman's attempt on Vicksburg, in December,
1862, at the head of a dirision of the Thkteenth Army Corps,
in the capture of Arkansas Post, the siege of Vicksburg, where
he was again wounded, and subsequently in Sherman's cap
ture of the town of Jackson. From that time, as the com
mander of the first dirision of the FHteenth Army Corps, his
history has been fuUy traced in these pages. It may be said
of General Osterhaus, that no officer of foreign birth and edu
cation so successfuUy exercised, during the late war, com
mands of equal extent and responsibUity.
Henry Wadsworth Slocum was bom in Syracuse, in Onon
daga County, in the State of New York. Entering the MUi
tary Academy at West Point as a cadet in June, 1848, he
graduated four years later, seventh in the general standing
of his class, and on the 1st of July, 1852, was commissioned
a brevet second-Heutenant and attached to the First Eegi
ment of ArtiUery. In the foUowing year he attained, by
regular promotion, to a fuU second-lieutenancy in the same
regiment, and in March, 1855, became a first-Heutenant. On
the 31st of October, 1856, he resigned his commission in the
army, settled in his native place, and embarked in the prac
tice of the law as a profession, at the same time taking an
active part in political affairs. His resignation was accepted
in the height of the excitement attending the contest of 1856
between Buchanan and Breckinridge and Fremont and Day
ton, as opposing candidates for the Presidency and Vice-
Presidency of the United States. Slocum became a warm
supporter of the principles and nominees of the Eepubhcan
party, then just organized, and continued from that time to
act with it.

264 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
On the outbreak of the war, Slocum appHed for a commis
sion as captain of artUlery in the regular army, that being the
highest grade for which, as he then considered, his experience
qualified him ; but failing to receive the appointment, he
shortly afterwards yielded to the current of events, and ac
cepted the colonelcy of the Twenty-seventh Eegiment of New
York Volunteers, raised in Onondaga County. This regiment
was among the first troops sent from the State for three
years, or during the war. At the battle of BuU Eun it formed
a part of Franklin's brigade of Hunter's division, and did
good service. In the organization of the Army of the Poto
mac, in the faU of 1861, by General McCleUan, Franklin re
ceived the command of a division on the left of the line, in
front of Alexandria, and Colonel Slocum, being promoted to
be a brigadier-general of volunteers, succeeded to the com
mand of Frankhn's brigade. In March, 1862, when the army
Avas dirided into army corps, Franklin's division became a part
of McDoweU's first corps, and remained Arith it on ,the Hnes of
the Potomac and the Eappahannock, but in AprU was sent to
join the main army before Yorktown.
Arriving there just before the conclusion of the siege, Gen
eral Franklin was presently placed by General McCleUan in
command of the Sixth Provisional Army Corps, afterwards
regularly constituted the Sixth Army Corps, consisting of W.
F. Smith's division detached from Keyes' fourth corps and
of Frankhn's OAvn, to the command of which Slocum succeeded.
The division took part on the Peninsula in the battles of West
Point, Goldings' Farm, Gaines' MUl, Savage Station, White
Oak Swamp, Glendale, and Malvern Hill. For his services in
this campaign Slocum was promoted to be a major-general
from the 4th of July, 1862. In the Maryland campaign, in the
fall of the same year, Slocum led the division with great dis
tinction in the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.
After the latter he was selected, in consideration of the high
qualities he had displayed, for the command of the TwelftL
Army Corps, made vacant by the faU of General Mansfield,
•and continued to command it Arith abUity and gaUantry

THE COLORS POINT TO THE SOUTH. 265
throughout the campaigns of Burnside, Hooker, and Meade
of 1862 and 1863, including the three great battles of Fred
ericksburg, ChanceUorsvUle, and Gettysburg. At ChanceUors-
riUe, Slocum, by his bold and rapid change of front, saved the
army from the disastrous consequences that might have fol
lowed the rout of the Eleventh Corps. In the faU of 1863,
when the Eleventh and TweHth corps, united under Hooker,
were sent to NashviUe to re-enforce Thomas' army at Chat
tanooga, General Slocum, preferring not to serve again under
General Hooker, was, at his own request, reheved from com
mand of the corps and ordered to Vicksburg. Here he feU
under the keen eye and appreciating judgment of General
Sherman, and was wisely selected by him for the command of
the TAventieth Corps, when Hooker, indignant in his turn at
the promotion of Howard, quitted the Army of the Cumber
land.* On the 9th of November, at Kingston, Sherman issued the
folloAring orders for the government of his subordinate com
manders : —
" I. The habitual order of march wUl be, whenever practi
cable, by four roads, as nearly paraUel as possible, and con
verging at points hereafter to be indicated in orders. The
cavalry, Brigadier-General KUpatrick commanding, vriU re
ceive special orders from the commander-in-chief.
" II. There wUl be no general trains of supplies, but each
corps wUl have its ammunition and provision train, distributed
habituaUy as foUows : Behind each regiment should foUow one
Avagon and one ambulance ; behind each brigade should fob
loAV a due proportion of ammunition wagons, prorision wagons,
and ambulances. In case of danger, each army corps com
mander should change this order of march by haring his
advance and rear brigade unencumbered by wheels. The
separate columns AriU start habituaUy at seven a. m., and

* General Slocum, having been nominated by the Democratic party of New
Vork for Secretary of State, resigned hia commission in the army.

266 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
make about fifteen mUes per day, unless otherArise fixed in
orders. " m. The army AviU forage hberaUy on the country during
the march. To this end, each brigade commander vriU organ
ize a good and sufficient foraging party, under the command
of one or more discreet officers, who wUl gather near the route
traveUed corn or forage of any kind, meat of any kind, vege
tables, corn-meat, or whatever is needed by the command;
aiming at aU times to keep in the wagon trains at least ten
days' prorisi'ons for the command and three days' forage.
Soldiers must not enter the dwelhngs of the inhabitants, or
commit any trespass : during the halt or at camp they may
be permitted to gather turnips, potatoes, and other vegetables,
and drive in stock in front of their camps. To regular for
aging parties must be intrusted the gathering of provisions
and forage at any distance from the road traveUed.
" V. To army commanders is intrusted the power to destroy
mUls, houses, cotton-gins, etc., and for them this general prin
ciple is laid doAvn : In districts and neighborhoods where the
army is unmolested, no destruction of such property should
be permitted ; but should guerrUlas or bushwhackers molest
our march, or should the inhabitants burn bridges, obstruct
roads, or otherwise manHest local hostUity, then army corps
commanders should order and enforce a devastation more or
less relentless according to the measure of such hostihty.
" VI. As for horses, mules, wagons, etc., belonging to the
inhabitants, the cavaky and artiUery may appropriate freely
and without Hmit, discriminating, however, between the rich,
who are usuaUy hostUe, and the poor or industrious, usuaUy
neutral or friendly. Foraging parties may also take mules or
horses to replace the jaded animals of thek trains, or to serve
as pack-mules for the regiments or brigades. In all foraging,
of whatever kind, the parties engaged wiU refrain from abusive
or threatening language, and may, when the officer in com
mand thinks proper, give vn.'itten certificates of the facts, but
no receipts ; and they AriU endeavor to leave Arith each famUy
a reasonable portion for thek maintenance.

THE COLORS POINT TO THE SOUTH. 267
" VII. Negroes who are able-bodied, and can be of serrice
to the several colutnns, may be taken along ; but each army
commander wUl bear in mind that the question of suppHes is
a very important one, and that his first duty is to see to those
who bear arms.
" Vni. The organization at once of a good pioneer battal
ion for each corps, composed, H possible, of negroes, should
be attended to. This battahon should foUow the advance
guard, should repak roads, and double them H possible, so
that the columns wUl not be delayed after reaching bad places.
Also, army commanders should study the habit of giving the
artUlery and wagons the road, and marching thek troops on
one side ; and also instruct thek troops to assist wagons at
steep hUls or bad crossings of streams.
" IX. Captain O. M. Poe, chief engineer, wUl assign to each
wing of the army a pontoon-train, fuUy equipped and organ
ized, and the commanders thereof AriU see to its being properly
protected at aU times."
Captain Poe had thoroughly destroyed Atlanta, save its
mere dweUing-houses and churches f General Corse had done
the same Avith regard to Eome ; and the right wing, Arith
General KUpatrick's cavalry, Avas put in motion in the cHrec
tion of Jonesboro' and McDonough, with orders to make a
strong feint on Macon, to cross the Ocmulgee about Planters'
MUls, and rendezvous in the neighborhood of Gordon m seven
days, exclusive of the day of march. On the same day. Gen
eral Slocum was to move with WUHams' twentieth corps
by Decatur and Stone Mountain, Arith orders to tear up the
raUroad from Social Ckcle to Madison, to burn the large and
important railway bridge across the Oconee, east of Madison,
and turn south and reach MiUedgeviUe on the seventh day, ex
clusive of the day of march. Sherman in person left Atlanta
on the 16th, in company with Jefferson C. Daris' fourteenth
corps, marching by Lithonia, Covington, and Shady Dale,
dkectly on MUledgevUle. AU the troops were prorided Arith
good wagon-trains, loaded with ammunition, and suppHes

2G8 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
approximating forty days' bread, sugar, and coffee, a double al
lowance of salt for the same period, and beef-cattle equal to
forty days' suppHes. The wagons were also supphed Arith
about three days' forage in grain. AU the commanders were
instructed, by a judicious system of foraging, to maintain this
order of things as long as possible, Hving chiefly, if not solely,
upon the country, which was knoAvn to abound in corn, sweet
potatoes, and meats. The flrst object was, of course, to place
the army in the very heart of Georgia, interposing between
Macon and Augusta, and obhging the enemy to diride his
forces, in order to defend not only those points, but also
MUlen, Savannah, and Charleston.
Howard, with the right Aring, marched from WhitehaU on
the 15th of November, dividing his army into two columns.
The right-hand column, consisting of Osterhaus' fifteenth
corps. General Howard's headquarters train, and the cattle-
herds, marched by Eough and Eeady, turning to the left
towards McDonough when about five miles from Jonesboro'.
The left-hand column, comprising Blak's seventeenth corps,
the bridge train, and Fkst Missouri Engineer Eegiment,
KUpatrick's supply train and the Fkst Alabama Cavaky
leading the advance, marched on McDonough by the direct
road. KUpatrick, who accompanied the right Aving during
this stage of the campaign, met the enemy's cavaky skirmishers
near East Point, and drove them before him to the crossing of
Flint Eiver ; and Osterhaus also met them near Eough and
Eeady, and again near Stockbridge.
On the 16th, Howard marched to the ricinity of McDonough
by three routes. At the crossing of the Cotton Eiver, Oster
haus once more met the enemy's cavalry, who retreated
rapidly, setting fire to the bridge. Some mounted infantry in
advance drove them off in time to put out the fire, and save
every thing but the planking, and the bridge was immediately
repaked, haring detained the column but forty minutes. KU
patrick crossed the Fhnt Eiver at the bridge near Jonesboro',
at 7 A. M. Finding the enemy had left that place, he foUowed
them to Lovejoy's, where they occupied a strong position,

THE COLORS POINT TO THE SOUTH. 2G9
having tAvo brigades of cavaky and two pieces of artiUery,
and holding the old rebel works. Dismounting Murray's
brigade, KUpatrick charged the works, and carried them,
driving back the enemy, whose artiUery was subsequently
overtaken by Atkins' brigade, charged, and captured. KU
patrick drove the enemy beyond Bear Station, capturing over
Mtj prisoners, and then moved to the left, and encamped on
the Griffin and McDonough road.
On the 17tli the right wing moved to Jackson and its
A-icinity in three columns, Osterhaus encamping near Indian
Springs, Blak at Hendrick's MUl, and KUpatrick at Towahgo
Creek. Some cavaky of the enemy crossed the creek, burning
the bridges.
The nearest dirision was pushed to Hatting's or Planters'
Factory, on the Ocmulgee Eiver, early next morning, and
a part of it crossed over by the ferry. The bridge-train
arrived at about 10 A. M., was laid, and the troops commenced
crossing at 1 P. m. During that day and night, Blair's seven
teenth corps, John E. Smith's dirision of the Fifteenth Corps,
and aU the cavaky had crossed. The hUl on the east side
was steep, and the heavy rain during the night rendered the
the ascent extremely difficult.
On the morning of the 19th, regiments were detailed in
each division to assist the trains in getting up the hiU. Oster
haus, with the FHteenth Corps, foUowing the cavaky, took
country roads to HUlsborough. Blak, Arith the Seventeenth
Corps, moved in the vicinity of HUlsborough, by way of
Monticello. The roads now becoming very heavy, the pro
gress was slow. The two bridges at the point of crossing
were fiUed Arith troops and trains aU day, yet the crossing
was not completed by the rear-guard untU the foUowing
morning. On the 20th, the right wing moved on Gordon in two
columns, Kilpatrick, with his cavaky, taking the Chnton
road and the river road towards Macon, Osterhaus moving
towards Clinton, and Blak by way of BlountsvUle. The head
of the right column encamped at Clinton, and the left near

270 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
FortvUle. KUpatrick waited at Clinton untU the arrival of the
head of the infantry column at 12 M., when he moved out
towards Macon, on the left-hand road met the enemy's
cavalry about four mUes from Macon, drove them in, and
charged thek works, defended by infantry and artiUery. The
head of his column got inside the works, but could not hold
them. He succeeded in reaching the raUway, and destroyed
about one mUe of the track. The road was struck in two or
three other places by the cavaky, and a train of cars burned.
It rained hard during the entke night.
On the 21st, the cavaky took up an advance position cover
ing aU the roads debouching fr-om Macon. Blair continued his
march dkect on Gordon, reaching that place Arith his leading
division. Osterhaus' column was subdivided; two dirisions,
Arith smaU trains, taking the road towards IrArinton, and the
rest, Arith headquarters, bridge-train, and cattle, the dkect
Gordon road. The centre and left column met at a point six
mUes from Gordon, caUed Pitt's MUl, where the centre took a
paraUel road into Gordon. The dirision of General GUes A.
Smith reached Gordon the same day.
On the 22d the troops and trains were closed up towards
Gordon, excepting Woods' division of the FHteenth Corps,
which was dkected to take up a strong position on the IrArin
ton road, and demonstrate towards Macon. The demonstra
tion was made by General Walcott's brigade, in conjunction
vrith the cavaky on the different roads. The rebel cavalry, in
force, made a charge early in the morning, capturing one of
our cavaky picket-posts. After a sharp engagement the enemy
were driven from the field in confusion, Walcott's infantry do-
ployed as skkmishers taking part in the repulse. In the after
noon, Walcott had taken up a position two mUes in advance
of his dirision, towards Macon, haring two pieces of artillery,
and had throAvu up raU barricades, when he was attacked by
a large body of infantry, accompanied by a battery of four
guns. The assault was made with great vigor, but was met
and completely repulsed. The action continued for some three
hours. Walcott was assisted by a regiment of cavaky on

THE COLORS POINT TO THE SOUTH. 271
either flank. General Woods was present during the action.
and General Osterhaus part of the time. In this affak. Gen
eral Walcott was wounded. On arriving at Gordon, General
Howard directed General Blair to send forward the Fkst Ala
bama Cavaky and GUes A. Smith's division eight or tbn mUes
towards the Oconee bridge, Arith instructions to move forward
at once, and, H possible, to secure that bridge and plank it
over for infantry to cross. Corse's fourth division of the FH
teenth Corps, with the bridge-train, having found the roads
almost impassable, did not reach the vicinity of Chnton untU
night. On the morning of the 23d, the right Aring was in and near
Gordon, Woods' and Corse's dirisions of the FHteenth Corps
occupying that place, Hazen's dirision of the Fifteenth Corps
marching on IrAvinton, and Blak moving along the Macon and
Savannah raUway, engaged in destroying it.
Let us now turn to the left Aring under Slocum and foUow
its movements doAvn to the same period.
WUHams' twentieth corps marched out of Atlanta on the
morning of the 15th of November, on the Decatur road, and
encamped that night near the Augusta raUway, south of Stone
Mountain. On the 16th it marched to Eock Bridge, on the 17th
to Cornish Creek, and on the 18th to within three miles of Madi
son. There Geary's division was detached and sent, Arithout
wagons or baggage, to destroy the Georgia Central raUway
bridge over the Oconee ; whUe Jackson's and Ward's dirisions,
Arith the trains, taking the MUledgevUle road, moved the same
day to a point four mUes beyond Madison, on the 20th to Eaton-
ton, and on the 21st to Little Eiver, a branch of the Oconee.
There Geary rejoined the corps, which on the 22d crossed
Little Eiver on a pontoon bridge and moved forward to the
suburbs of MUledgevUle, Jackson's and Geary's dirisions en
camping on the east and Ward's on the left bank of the Oconee,
near the bridge on the Augusta road ; whUe the Thkd Wis
consin and One Hundred and Seventh New York regiments,
under Colonel Hawley, were placed in the toAvn as a gamison.
Jefferson C. Davis' fourteenth army corps moved from At-

272 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
lanta on the morning of the 16th of November, by Decatur, on
Covington, and by night had marched fifteen mUes. On the
17th this corps marched to the west bank of the YeUow Eiver ;
crossed that stream, on the 18th, on two pontoon bridges, and
passing through Covington took the road leading to MiUedge
viUe, by way of Shady Dale, and encamped on the west side
of the Ulcof auhatchee Eiver ; on the 19th crossed and marched
to Shady Dale, on the 20th reached Eatonton Factories ; on
the 21st deflected to the right, in order to avoid coming in con
tact Arith the Twentieth Corps on the main MiUedgeviUe road,
and moved with difficulty, oAring to a heavy rain, to cross
Murder Creek ; reached Cedar Creek on the next day ; and on
the 23d went into camp in the vicinity of MUledgevUle.
During the movement of both wings the raUway had been
effectuaUy destroyed wherever the hne of march touched or
approached it. The Georgia Central Hne was broken up from
Lithonia to Yellow Eiver, a distance of fifteen mUes, for seven
teen miles between Social Ckcle and Madison, and at several
points between the last-named town and the Oconee ; the
Atlanta and Macon Hne at various places above Lovejoy's,
and the road from Macon to the east between that city and
Gordon. Sherman himself had thus far accompanied the Fourteenth
Corps. He now ordered Howard to move eastward from Gor
don, destroying the raUway Hne leading to MUlen as far as
TennUle Station, and Slocum to march by two roads on San-
ciersvUle, four miles north of TenniUe ; while KUpatrick should
move fr-om Gordon to MUledgeviUe, thence rapicUy towards the
east, break up the raUway between MUlen and Augusta, aud
then turn upon MUlen and rescue the Union prisoners there
confined under torture.

FROM ATLANTA to the SEA
Frffiiii-eU bi'
Bnl Brio Gen. o.>[.Poe.
.^mprn'eil Jer Sftemuut luid fjis thnipiutflis ."
 Li^.\j-iiii- Corps
17-

KsitN.

BumesA^ '

RuUierfijrdlono

/ Ja.spcc
^„
1^ Pwlioi/ ^ •. bain^iL'
/^i\i(m\
\
¦eiiceV ^J^.^i^iS^
Lexfrioluii /
' At  Vx ¦'Ml>TilK;fIl{h ,) ^^arin^
/ /
/ \ ' >lWemon
THE COLORS POINT TO THE SOUTtt 273

CHAPTEE XXI.

THE LOST ARMY.

DuEiNG this march the commander-in-chief made his head
quarters with the Twentieth Corps.
On the 24th of November, the right w^g marched from
Gordon in two columns, Osterhaus' fifteenth corps by way
of Ewinton to BaU's Ferry, and Blair's seventeenth corps
along the railway, with instructions to oboss the Oconee at
Jackson's Ferry, two and a haH mUes north of the raUway
bridge. General GUes A. Smith, who had preceded his column
with the Fkst Alabama Cavaky, drove quite a force of the
enemy from two stockades and across the bridge, and found
that Jackson's Ferry was an old abandoned route through the
swamp, completely impracticable. General Howard therefore
dkected Blair's corps to move to BaU's Ferry, Avhere the two
heads of column arrived about the same time on the 25th inst.
A detachment of the First Alabama had the day before recon
noitred the ferry, finding a smaU force of the enemy, made a
raft, crossed the rivej-, and drove the enemy back, but were,
subsequently, themselves forced to recross the river with some
loss. On arriving at the river the enemy was found in
trenched behind barricades, Arith an extended line of skkmish
ers. Osterhaus and Blair confronted them Arith a line which
extended beyond the enemy's flanks both up and doAvn the
river; the former placed artiUery in position and made a
demonstration on the front, along the road, while the latter
sent a detachment some two mUes up the river to cross in
boats, but the current being too SAvift for roAving, the boats
were finaUy swung over, after the fashion of a flying ferry.
18

274 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
After working tluough the bayous and swamps tiU near morn
ing the detachment reached the road in the rear of the enemy's
position ; but the enemy had retreated. The Oconee at this
place is narrow, but the current is very SArift, and there are
some two mUes of swampy ground on the right bank. The
immediate approach to the ferry on the left bank is, however,
very good. The bridges were laid so that the troops com
menced crossing in two columns about noon, and by night
Corse's and Woods' divisions reach Irwin's Cross-roads, about
ten mUes east of the ferry, and the remainder of the Fifteenth
Corps crossed on the 26th, during which day the Seventeenth
Corps took up a position near the fork of the road leading to
Station No. 14, and General Blak detached a division to de
stroy the raUway from the Oconee to a point north of Irwin's
Cross-roads, and General Osterhaus caused the destruction
to be continued thence as far east as Station No. 13.
Slocum marched fr*om MUledgevUle on the 24th, the
Fourteenth Corps taking the right, by Black Spring, Fak
Play, and Long's Bridge, and the Twentieth Corps the more
dkect road by Hebron ; and both corps entered SandersvUle
by paraUel roads, almost simultaneously, on the morning of
the 26th. The advanced guard of Wheeler's cavaky was en
countered near the toAvn, and skirmished Arith, but offered no
serious opposition.
The two Avings being now abreast of each other. General
Slocum was ordered to tear up and destroy the Georgia Cen
tral EaUroad, from TennUle Station, No. 13, to Station No. 10,
near the crossing of Ogeechee ; one of his' corps substantiaUy
foUoAring the raUway, the other the more ckcuitous route to
the left by LouisvUle, in support of KUpatrick's cavalry.
Sherman himseH now changed his headquarters to the
right Aring, and accompanied Blak's seventeenth corps on
the south of the raUway, tUl abreast of Barton Station, or No.
9i; General Howard, in person, with the FHteenth Corps,
keeping further to the right, and about one day's march
ahead, ready to tum against the flank of any enemy who
§hoidd oppose his progress.

THE LOST ARMT. 275
On the 27th, Osterhaus' corps was divided into two col
umns. The left, consisting of Woods' and Corse's (Hrisions,
marched from Irwin's Cross-roads, by the LouisviUe road, to
its intersection Arith the road leading from SandersvUle to
Johnson, and thence to the latter place. The right, consisting
of Hazen's and John E. Smith's dirisions, ^as to foUow the
next morning, by plantation roads, to Johnson.
On the 28th the right column of the Fifteenth Corps en
camped at WrightsriUe, the left column at EiddleviUe. Blak
marched with the Seventeenth Corps from L-Arin's, on the
Louis-riUe road, and turning into cross-roads on the Sanders-
viUe and Savannah road, at the intersection, encamped abreast
of Eiddlerille.
On the 29tli the two lower columns nearly formed a junction ;
the advance, under General Woods, encamping near Summer-
riUe, and the rest along the lower Savannah road and near Sun
derland's MUl, about Sebastopol, or seven mUes to the rear of
General Woods. The Seventeenth Corps encamped on the
upper Savannah road, abreast of Station No. 10, on the Geor
gia Central raUway. The country was covered with open
pine woods and wke-grass. Numerous swamps were found
along the Ohospee Eiver and its tributaries, and there were
very few clearings or plantations. Quito a number of mules
and horses were captured in the swamps, the citizens having
run them off in the hope of escaping the Union army and
Wheeler's cavaky, both equaUy dreaded.
Let us now turn to the left wing. On the afternoon of the
26th of November, Jackson's and Geary's dirisions of WU
Hams' twentieth corps were moved doAvn to TennUle Station,
leaving Ward's division to cover the train. The Fkst Mi
chigan Engineers reported for duty with the corps.
On the 27th, 28th, and 29th, the Central raUway, and aU the
wagon-bridges over WUHamson's Swamp Creek, were destroyed
from TennUle Station to the Ogeechee Eiver, including the
long raUAvay bridge over that stream, by Jackson's and Geary's
dirisions, and the Michigan Engineers. Ward's dirision
marched with the trains, by way of Darisboro', across the

276. SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
Ogeechee and Eocky Comfort rivers, and encamped near
LouisviUe. On the 30th, Jackson and Geary moved up the Ogeechee to
Coward's Bridge, which was found partly destroyed, but easUy
repaked, and the whole corps encamped about three mUes
south of LouisviUe.
MeanwhUe, on the 27th of November, the trains of the
Fourteenth Corps, under escort of Carlin's division, moved by
the way of Darisboro' upon LouisvUle, whUe Bakd's and
Morgan's dirisions, unencumbered, moved on the Finn's
Bridge road ; thus protecting the left flank fr-om any demon
strations the enemy's cavalry might make from that direction
upon the trains.
These two dirisions, united under the command of Brig
adier-General Bakd, marching on a road between the Ogee
chee Eiver and Eocky Comfort Creek, reached LouisvUle
early in the afternoon of the 28th, immediately laid a
pontoon bridge across the creek, and commenced the pas
sage of troops. Owing to the movements of Ward's division
of the Twentieth Corps with the trains, occupying the main
road from Davisboro' to LouisviUe, Carlin's division and the
trains of the Fourteenth Corps moving on that road Avere only
able to reach the Ogeechee about three o'clock, p. M. The
Fifty-eighth Indiana Pontoniers, under Colonel G. P. BueU,
under the personal supervision of General Slocum, imme
diately commenced laying their bridges, and repaking the
roads destroyed by the enemy, and before night the troops
and trains were passing both streams into thek camps around
LouisvUle. The road, running as it does here through an immense
cypress swamp, requked considerable labor to put and keep
it in condition for the passage of trains, and it was not
until noon the next day that the entire column succeeded in
getting into camp. Early on the morning of the 29th, a re
port was received from General KUpatrick that he was about
ten mUes from LouisriUe, on the road leading dkect to Buck-
head Bridge, hard pressed by Wheeler.

THE LOST ARMT 277
KUpatrick, having received his instructions from General
Sherman, had also started trom MUledgeviUe on the 25tli, and
marching by Sparta, crossed the Ogeechee Eiver at the
shoals, and thence continuing his course by Spread Oak,
Woodbum, and St. Clair, struck the raUway on the 27th at
Waynesboro' ; the advance, under Captain Estes, assistant-
adjutant-general, having destroyed a portion of the track,
and partly burned the raUway bridge over Briar Creek the
day prerious. During the march, KUpatrick's fianks and rear
had been repeatedly attacked by Wheeler's cavalry, but with
out delaying the movement. Passing through Waynesboro',
Kilpatrick encamped his division in Hne of battle on the raU
way, three mUes south of the toAvn. Several attacks Avere made
during the night upon Colonel Murray's Hne, but they were
easUy repulsed, and did not prevent the destruction of the
track, one battahon being detailed from each regiment for that
purpose. Here Kilpatrick learned that our prisoners had
been removed from MUlen two days previous, and the great
object of his movement in that direction being thus frustrated,
after destroying sufficient track to prevent transportation on
the road for a few days, he deemed it prudent to retke to the
support of the infantry. Accordingly, Colonel Atkins' brigade
was ordered to move out to the intersection of the Waynes
boro' and LouisviUe road, and there take up position, whUe
Colonel Murray should move past him and take up position
in his rear, and so on in succession retke from any force that
might be sent in pursuit. By some misunderstanding, Colonel
Atkins moved on without halting as directed, and the conse
quence was, that two regiments, the Eighth Indiana, Colonel
Jones, and Ninth Michigan Cavaky, Colonel Acker, together
Arith General KUpatrick himseH and aU his staff, were cut off
and partly surrounded. But these two regiments, by thek
splendid fighting, led by Kilpatrick, broke through the rebel
Hnes, and slowly fell back, repulsing every attack of the enemy,
untU the main column was again reached. The cavaky moved
on, crossed Buckhead Creek, burned the bridge, and halted
two mUes from the creek, where information soon reached KU-

278 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. i
patrick that Wheeler was crossing vrith his entke force.
Parties sent out having ascertained this report to be true,
KUpatrick took up a strong position, and constructed a long
line of barricades, Arith his flanks throAvn weU to the rear.
These dispositions were scarcely completed ere the enemy came
in sight and made a most desperate charge, but was hand
somely repulsed at aU points, and Arith but sHght loss. The
cavaky moved on a few mUes further, and encamped at the
first place where forage could be obtained, the enemy making
no frirther attempts to foUow.
Immediately on receipt of General KUpatrick's message.
General Jefferson C. Daris sent a brigade of Bakd's dirision
of his corps, under Colonel Morton C. Hunter, to the support
of the cavaky ; but Wheeler having been akeady repulsed in
the thorough manner just narrated, these re-enforcements were
not needed.
During the 29th Kilpatrick came in and took position near
the Fourteenth Corps, on the east bank of Big Creek.
Having successfuUy, and almost vrithout opposition, passed
the last of the three large rivers, the Ocmulgee, the Oconee,
and the Ogeechee, that crossed its path and formed the strong
natural lines of defence against its movements, Sherman's
army now lay Arith its left wing and the cavaky on the east
bank of the latter stream, its right in close communication
Arith it on the other side, and on the morrow would begin the
easy and unbroken descent to the sea.

THE LOST ARMT. 279

CHAPTEE XXn.
TO THE SEA.
We shaU flrst foUow the movements of the right Aring doAvm
the Ogeechee. Osterhaus, with the Fifteenth Corps, kept thei
right, and Blak, with the Seventeenth Corps, stUl accompanied
'by General Sherman, the left.
On 'the 30th of November, 1864, Woods' and and Corse's
divisions, of the Fifteenth Corps, pushed on through Summer
viUe northward, tUl they reached the upper Savannah road,
and encamped near Deep Creek. Blak moved forward to
Barton, or Station No. 9^ ; he rebuilt the partiaUy destroyed
wagon bridge, laid a pontoon bridge, and crossed the Ogeechee
at that point.
On the 1st of December, the three columns moved as foUows :
the lower one, consisting of Hazen's and John E. Smith's diri-
sons, on the Statesborough road ; the middle column, compris
ing Woods' and Corse's divisions, upon the Savannah road;
and Blair's seventeenth corps, constituting the left, along the
Georgia Central raUway, destroying it as it marched. The
two right columns encamped opposite Station Nq. 8, General
Woods securing and repaking the wagon bridge across the
Ogeechee at that point ; and a smaU force crossed over, made,
break in the railway, and destroyed the depot. The Seven
teenth Corps succeeded in reaching Station No. 9.
On the 2d the column preserved the same order of march.
General Blak reached MUlen, having completely destroyed the
raUway up to that point, iucluding the depot and a large
quantity of lumber, ties, etc. The middle column encamped

280 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
near Chfton's Ferry, having throAvn a bridge over the Ogeechee
at that point, and sent a brigade of Corse's dirision to assist the
Seventeenth Corps in breaking up the raUway. ScuU's Creek,
a Aride stream, too deep to be forded, was carefuUy bridged in
two places. Scouting parties hurried on to Scarborough, a
Httle below, and seized a maU Arith Savannah papers of that
day. On the 3d, the FHteenth Corps remained in position, ex
cepting that two brigades of Corse's division crossed the river,
and aided the Seventeenth Corps in destroying the raUway
from MUlen to Scarborough. The Seventeenth Corps came up
abreast, encamping near Scarborough, or Station No. 7.
On the 4th the central column. Woods and Corse, marched to
WUson's Creek ; the left, Blak and part of Corse's dirision,
reaohed Station No. 5^, having continued the destruction of
the railway up to that point ; and the right, Hazen and John
E. Smith, proceeded as far as Statesborough. Hazen's diri
sion, leading, encountered a smaU body of the enemy's cavalry,
said to be four hundred strong, and had a successful skkmish
Arith them. The road being boggy, Hazen was obhged to cor
duroy several long stretches during the day.
On the 5th the two columns of the Fifteenth Corps moved
along their respective roads to a position nearly opposite Guy-
ton, or Station No. 3. General Howard, who was with the
central column, hearing that some resistance was offered to
General Blair near Ogeechee Church, caused a feint of cross
ing the Ogeechee to be made at Flat Ford. Some men were
throAvn over in boats, but no bridge was laid. General Sher
man detained General Blak near Station No. 4^, for the left
vring to come up.
On the 6th, reconnoissances were made towards Wright's
Bridge and Jenks' Bridge at Eden Station Arith a riew of saving
them, H possible. Colonel WiUiamson's brigade of General
Woods' cHrision reached the former in time to save much of the
timber, but aU the planking and several of the trestles were
akeady burned. He, however, constructed a foot-bridge and
crossed over a smaU force which he pushed forward towards the

TO THE SEA. 281
raUway. A smaU detachment went as far as the Twenty-Mile
Station and returned, skirmishing aU the way. Colonel Oliver's
brigade, of Hazen's dirision, made the reconnoissance to
Jenks' Bridge, but found it destroyed. General Howard sent
an officer. Lieutenant Harney, Arith a select party to strike the
GuH raUway, but he found the bridge across the Cannouchee
burned and the approaches were guarded by rebels, so that he
was compeUed to return without doing the work.
On the 7th, Woods remained at Wright's Bridge, except
one brigade of infantry, that crossed the foot-bridge and
marched down the east bank of the Ogeechee towards Eden
Station. On the arrival of the pontoons at Jenks' Bridge,
Captain C. B. Eeese, chief-engineer of the Army of the Ten
nessee, finding the enemy on the other bank, threw over a
regiment of Colonel Oliver's brigade and cleared the way.
The bridge Avas immediately laid. General Corse's division
had arrived by this time. One brigade. General Eice com
manding, crossed over, met the enemy's skirmishers some five
hundred yards beyond, drove them in, and in a very handsome
manner routed a battahon of rebels behind raU-pUes, captur
ing seventeen prisoners, and killing and wounding several more.
The brigade lost two kUled and two or three wounded. It then
formed a junction Arith a brigade of Woods' dirision from
Wright's Bridge, at Eden Station. Hazen's dirision moved
on to Black Creek, sending forward Colonel OHver's brigade
to the Cannouchee. The rest of the FHteenth Corps encamped
near Jenks' Bridge. The Seventeenth Corps encamped in the
vicinity of Guyton, or Station No. 3, ceasing to destroy the
raUway after learing Ogeechee Church.
On the 8th of December, as the enemy was reported in some
force near the twelve-mUe post, having a line of works in his
front. General Howard resolved to turn Ids position by sending
two divisions of the Fifteenth Corps doAvn the west bank of
the Ogeechee to force a crossing of the Cannouchee, and throw
forward sufficient detachments to break the GuH raUway, and
if possible secure King's Bridge over the Ogeechee, about a
mUe above the raUway, and also to reconnoitre with one

282 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
division between the Big and Little Ogeechee rivers. The
movement on the right bank began first, led by General Oster
haus in person, Arith Woods' and Hazen's dirisions. General
Howard himseH accompanied General Corse, who found a
good ridge road doAvn the left bank of the main Ogeechee,
and came upon some carefuUy constructed but abandoned
works three mUes and a haH from Eden, or Station No. 2.
The road was obstructed Arith feUed trees at several points,
but the impediments were so qidckly removed by the pioneers
that the column did not halt. On reaching the* Savannah
Canal, the bridge over it was found to have been burned, but
a new one was made in less than haH an hour. The Ogeechee
bridge, near the mouth of the canal, at DiUen's Ferry, was
found practicable for a pontoon bridge. General Corse sent
forward a reconnoissance, which discovered the enemy in force
at the junction of this road and the King's Bridge and Sa
vannah road. General Osterhaus effected a crossing of the
Cannouchee Arith two brigades, as dkected. The Seventeenth
Corps, meanwhUe, moved up abreast of Eden, or Station No.
2, having much corduroying to do and many obstructions to
clear away. After reaching the canal. General Howard re
turned to Station No. 2, and communicated Arith General
Sherman in person, who directed him to aUow General Blak
to continue on the LouisviUe road.
The next day, December 9th, the Seventeenth Coi-ps came
upon the enemy in rifle-pits, three and a haH mUes from
Station No. 2. General Blak drove the rebels from them,
but soon came upon an intrenched line with guns in position.
At this place the road led through a swamp densely covered
vrith the wood and undergrowth pecuHar to this region,
and apparently impassable ; but General Blair moved three
lines of battle, preceded by a skirmish Hne, along on the right
and left of the road for some two or three mUes, occasionaUy
in water knee-deep, drove the enemy from every position
where he made a stand, and encamped for the night near
Pooler, or Station No. 1. The detached brigades of the
FHteenth Corps succeeded in reaching the Savannah and

TO THE SEA 283
GuH raUway at different points, and "destroying it. The
third division. General John E. Smith, closed up on Corse's
at the canal. As soon as he was within supporting dis
tance. General Corse moved forward towards Savannah. He
encountered about six hundred rebel infantry with two pieces
of artUlery near the cross-roads. His advance brigade
quickly dislodged them, capturing one piece of artiUery and
several prisoners. He foUowed them up across the Little
Ogeechee, and by General Howard's direction took up a
strong position about twelve miles from Savannah, and thence
sent out a detachment to break the GuH raUway. His advance
crossed the Little Ogeechee, and halted about eight mUes
fr'om the city. King's Bridge had been burned by the rebels.
AU the enemy's force was withdrawn from Osterhaus' front
in the morning, except the independent garrison at Fort
McAUister, situated on the right bank and near the mouth of
the Ogeechee. During the day that section of the pontoon-
bridge which had been with General Blair's column, was sent
to DiUen's Ferry, near Fort Argyle, and laid across the Ogee
chee, thus substantiaUy uniting the two right columns of
Howard's army.
To return to the left Aring.
WUHams' twentieth corps marched from LouisvUle on the
1st of December. From that time to the 8th, its Hne of march
was down the Peninsula between the Ogeechee and Savannah
rivers, foUoAving the LouisriUe and Savannah road, encamping
on the 1st on Baker's Creek ; on the 2d at Buckhead Church ,
on the 3d at Horse Creek ; on the 4th at Little Ogeechee ; on
the 5th at Sylvania Cross-roads ; on the 6th near CoAvpens
Creek ; on the 7th on Jack's Branch, near Springfield ; and on
the 8th near Eden Cross-roads. As the coast neared, the
surface of the country became flat and swampy. Large ponds
or pools were met every mile or so, and the creeks spread out
into several mky branches. The roads between the creeks
and ponds, though apparently of sand, and of substantial
character, proved to be upon a thin crust, which was soon cut
through by the long trains into the deep quicksand, thus

284 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
requiring mUes of corduroy. At several of the swamps, tho
enemy had attempted to obstruct the march by felling timber.
On the 9th the direction of march was changed to the east,
taking the road fr-om Eden to Monteith Post-office, on the
Charleston raUway. At the large Monteith swamp, the enemy,
besides obstructing the road for nearly a mUe by feUing trees,
had built two smaU earthworks, and Arith a single gun and
about four hundred infantry made a show of stopping the
march of the corps. Jackson's division being in advance, was
ordered to throw out several regiments on each flank, while a
brigade in the centre should make a feint, to engage attention
and enable the pioneers to clear the obstructions. As soon as
a portion of Eobinson's brigade, under Colonel West, Thirty-
first Wisconsin Volunteers, could cross the swamp the enemy
fled, leaving behind a considerable quantity of new clothing
and accoutrements. Jackson's loss was one man killed and
four wounded.
On the moi-ning of the 10th, the corps moved down to
Monteith Station, on the Charleston raUway, and after de
stroying some mUes of the road, marched to a point near the
five-mUe post, on the Augusta and Savannah raUway. Here,
meeting the enemy's strong line of defences behind swamps
and artificial ponds, the corps was ordered to encamp for the
night. During the afternoon a party of foragers, Arith some
cavaky, succeeded in capturing, near the foot of Argyle Island,
a rebel dispatch-boat caUed the Ida, having on board Colonel
Chnch, of General Hardee's staff, Arith dispatches for the rebel
gunboats on the river above. The boat was unfortunately set
on fire and burned.
On the 30th of November, Carhn's cHvision of Jefferson C.
Daris' fourteenth corps marched to Sebastopol, with a riew
to uncovering the crossing of the Ogeechee by other troops
advancing in that dkection. The next day, in the general
advance of the army upon MUlen, Daris was ordered to
cross Buckhead Creek, at some point between Waynesboro'
and BirdsviUe, for which place the Twentieth Corps was
moving.

TO THE SEA. 285
Bakd's dirision, A\-ith KUpatrick's cavalry, was ordered to
move in the direction of Waynesboro', and after crossing Buck-
head Creek, to mov^ doAvn the east bank of that stream
and take position near Eeynolds, not far from Buckhead
bridge. Morgan's division, in charge of the whole corps train, moved
on the dkect road to the bridge, and encamped ten mUes from
IjouisvUle. On the 2d of December, Bakd and Kilpatrick completed
the movement just indicated, Carlin's cHvision joined the
column from the direction of Sebastopol, and the whole corps
went into camp at the crossing of the BkdsvUle and Waynes
boro' roads, about two miles from the bridge.
The change in the direction of march of the TAventieth Corps
to the LouisvUle and Springfield road again caused a deflection
in the hne of march of the Fourteenth Corps ; and on the morn
ing of the 3d, pontoon bridges were laid across the creek, at a
point about five mUes higher up the stream, and the troops and
trains began crossing at half-past ten o'clock. Jacksonboro'
had by this time been designated, by General Sherman, as the
next objective point for the concentration of the corps ; and
General Daris ordered Baird and Kilpatrick to move from
Eeynolds, in the direction of Waynesboro', with a view to
leading the enemy to believe that the next advance woidd be
upon Augusta. Carhn and Morgan, after a hard clay's work
upon the roads, went into camp at Lumpkin's Station, where
the Jacksonboro' road crosses the Aug-usta and Savannah
railway. Baird and Kilpatrick took position near Thomas'
Station, where the enemy was found in considerable force.
On the 4th, Carlin's and Morgan's dirision, with the three
corps trains, after destroying three mUes of raUway, moved in
the dkection of Jacksonborq', and encamped thkteen miles
beyond Lumpkin's Station. Bakd and KUpatrick, after some
fighting Arith Wheeler's cavaky, drove the enemy from
Waynesboro', and across Brier Creek. Bakd, in the mean
time, destroyed three mUes of raUway near Thomas' Station.
On the 5th, after a hard day's march over country roads.

286 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
which requked much repaking, the whole corps, Arith KUpat
rick's cavaky, encamped in the vicinity of Jacksonboro', tho
advance being at Buck Creek Post-office, on the Savannah
road. During the night, the bridge across Beaver-dam Creek,
at Jacksonboro', which had been destroyed, was rebuUt by
Colonel BueU, of the Fifty-eighth Indiana, and his pontoniers;
and early on the morning of the 6th, the whole column marched
on the river-road, and went into camp at and in advance of
Hudson's Ferry, on the Savannah Eiver, making an average
march of about twenty mUes.
On the 7th, the column moved in the same order of march,
Bakd and KUpatrick, with Colonel Atkins' brigade, unencum
bered by the trains, covering the rear. Morgan's division,
Arith the pontoon train, reached Ebenezer Creek late in the
evening, and began cutting away the faUen timber which
obstructed the roadway through the immense swamp which
skkts the creeks on both sides at this point. NotArithstand-
ing an exceecHngly hard clay's march, the pontoniers, under
Colonel BueU, set to work at once to reconstruct the bridge,
and by noon the next day the column commenced crossing
this formidable defile ; but in spite of the immense amount of
labor expended upon the road and bridge, to make them pass
able, much was stiU requked to maintain them in condition,
and it was not until dayhght on the 9th that the rear of
the column had completed the crossing.
During the 8th, the enemy's cavah-y made several attempts
to drive in the rear pickets of the Fourteenth Corps, but did not
succeed. The loss in the corps during these attacks was but
sHght, although at times the skirmishing was quite animated,
On the morning of the 9th, the crossing of Ebenezer Creek
being now completed, as already stated, the corps marched
from its camp at Ebenezer Church to Cuyler's plantation,
where General Morgan, who was in the advance, found the
enemy occupying a strongly-erected field-work, and disposed
to dispute his advance. Morgan immediately placed two
field-pieces in position and opened fire upon the work. His

TO THE SEA. 287
infantry was soon deployed for an attack, but the near approach
of night, and the impossibihty of assaidting the position,
through the impassable swamp in the front, caused General
Davis to defer the attack untU morning, when it was discovered
the enemy had abandoned his position.
On the 10th, Morgan's and Carhn's divisions, with trains,
moved to the Ten-mUe House, and went into camp, giring the
road to the Twentieth Corps, advancing from Monteith and
intersecting the Augusta road. Baird's division was left to
cover the rear, and tear up the railway track in the vicinity
of the crossing of the Savannah Eiver, and H possible to
destroy the bridge at that point.
To preserve the historical sequence, it is necessary to glance
separately at the movements of the cavalry division under
Kilpatrick, already briefly touched upon so far as they
were dkectly connected with the operations of the several
corps. On the 2d of December, as has been seen, Kilpatrick moved
from the vicinity of LouisriUe, on the Waynesboro' road, sup
ported by Bakd's division of the Fifteenth Corps, to cover the
movement of several columns on MiUen. A smaU force of the
enemy was encountered and dispersed by the Eighth Indiana,
Colonel Jones, and the Fifth Kentucky, Colonel BaldArin, nine
mUes from Waynesboro', not Arithout a severe skirmish. On
reaching Eocky Creek, the enemy was found in considerable
force on the opposite bank. Bakd's dirision came up, and a
force of both cavah-y and infantry crossed the creek and simul-
taneoubly- charged the enemy, who rapidly retreated towards
Waynesboio' and Augusta, closely pursued for some cHstance
by the cavaky.
On the bd, KUpatrick marched to Thomas' Station and
encamped foi the night, having made such disposition of his
forces as to protect Bakd's division, then deployed along
the raUway and engaged in its destruction. Wheeler,
who had been encamped between Waynesboro' and Brier
Creek, moved in the early part of the evening to Waynes
boro', and, Arith a portion of his command, made a vigorous

288 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS..
attack upon one of Colonel Atkins' regiments, stationed upon
the raUway, three miles south of the town. This attack was
easUy repulsed, as were several others, made during the
night. Having received orders that day from General Sher
man to make a strong reconnoissance in the direction of
Waynesboro', and to engage Wheeler whenever he might be
met, KUpatrick dkected his brigade commanders to send the
surplus animals and aU non-combatants to the wagon-trains,
and notify them that in the morning he would move to engage,
defeat, and rout the rebel cavaky encamped at Waynesboro'.
At dayhght on the 4th the cavaky moved out of camp,
Atkins' brigade leading the advance. The enemy's skkmish
line was met, c[uickly driven in, and finaUy retked upon his
main line, consisting of cHsmounted cavaky, strongly posted
behind long Hnes of barricades, with thek fianks weU secured.
Colonel Atkins was dkected to move forward and take the
barricades ; but the enemy was found to be more strongly
posted than was anticipated, and the first attempt was a faU
ure. The Ninety-second Illinois Mounted Infantry was dis
mounted; the Tenth Ohio and Ninth Michigan Cavalry, in
columns of fours, by battahons, were sent in on the right, and
the Ninth Ohio Cavaky was placed in the same order on the
left ; the Tenth Wisconsin battery, Captain Beebe, was
brought up to Arithin less than six hundred yards, and opened
upon the barricades, and the enemy's artiUery, in aU five
pieces, was forced to Arithdraw. At this moment, aU being
ready, the charge was sounded ; the whole Hne moved forward
in splendid order, and never halted for one moment until the
barricades were gained and the enemy routed. A few hun
dred yards beyond, the enemy made several counter-charges,
to save his dismounted men and check KUpatrick's rapid ad
vance. At one time he had nearly succeeded, when the Eighth
Ohio Cavaky, Colonel Heath, which had been sent out on KU
patrick's right, charged the enemy in flank and rear, and forced
them to give way at aU points, and rapidly to faU back to the
toAvn of Waynesboro'. Here the enemy was found occupying a
second Hne of barricades, Arith artillery, as before, and his flanks

TO THE SEA. 289
SO far extended that it was useless to attempt to tum them.
KUpatrick therefore determined to break his centre. Colonel
Murray, having the advance, was directed to make a disposi
tion accordingly. The Eighth Indiana, Colonel Jones, was
dismounted and pushed forward' as skkmishers ; the Ninth
Pennsylvania, Colonel Jordan, in columns of fours, by battal
ions, had the left ; the Thkd Kentucky, Lieutenant-Colonel
King, the centre ; the Fifth Kentucky, Colonel Baldwin, and
Second Kentucky, Captain Foreman, the right. The advance
was sounded, and in less than twenty minutes the enemy was
driven fr-om his position, the toAvn gained, and Wheeler's en
tire force completely routed. The FHth Ohio, FHth Kentucky,
and a portion of the Ninth Pennsylvania Cavaky, foUowed in
close pursuit to Brier Creek, a distance of eight mUes from
the point from where the first attack was made. After burn
ing the bridges above and below the raUway bridge, as weU as
the latter, the cavaky marched to Alexander, on the Waynes
boro' and Jacksonboro' road, and encamped for the night.
On the 5tli, KUpatrick marched from Alexander to Jackson
boro', covering the rear of the Foiuteenth Army Corps, as
akeady stated.
On the 6th, Colonel Murray's brigade marched to Spring
field, moving in rear of the Twentieth Corps, and Colonel
Atkins' brigade moved to Hudson Ferry.
On the 7th, when near Sister's Ferry, the Ninth Michigan,
Colonel Acker, acting as rear-guard of Colonel Atkins' brigade,
received and repulsed an attack made by Ferguson's brigade
of Confederate cavaky.
On the 8th, Atkins' brigade crossed Ebenezer Creek, and
the whole dirision united on the Monteith road, ten mUes
south of Springfield. From this point the cavah-y moved in
rear of the Seventeenth Corps, covering the rear of the other
corps by detachments.
Thus, on the 10th of December, 1864, the enemy's forces
under Hardee were driven Arithin the immediate defences of
Savannah, and Sherman's entke army having leisurely marched
over three hundred mUes in twenty-four days vrith trifling
19

290 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
opposition through the vitals of the enemy's country, subsist
ing upon his stock-yards and granaries, was massed in front
of the city, entkely across the peninsula lying between the
Ogeechee and Savannah rivers, and occupying aU the Hnes of
raUway communication and supply.

A CHRISTMAS GIFT. 291

CHAPTEE XXm.

A CHEISTMAS GUT.

The defensive works constructed by the enemy to cover the
rear of Savannah, and now garrisoned by the Confederate
forces uncler Lieutenant-General Hardee, foUowed substantiaUy
a swampy creek which empties into the Savannah Eiver about
three mUes above the city, across to the head of a correspond
ing stream flowing into the Little Ogeechee. These streams
proved singularly favorable to the enemy as a cover, being very
marshy and bordered by rice-fields, which were flooded either
by the tide-water or by inland ponds, the gates to which were
controUed and covered by his heavy artUlery. The only ap
proaches to the city were by five narroAv causeways, namely,
the two raUways, and the Augusta, the LouisvUle, and the
Ogeechee roads, aU of which were commanded by the enemy's
heavy ordnance.
To assault an enemy of unknoAvn strength at such a dis
advantage appeared to Sherman unArise, especiaUy as he
had brought his army, almost unscathed, so great a distance,
and could surely attain the same result by the operation
of time. He therefore instructed his army commanders closely
to invest the city from the north and west, and to recon
noitre weU the ground in their respective fronts, whUe he
gave his personal attention to opening communications Arith
the fleet, which was knoAvn to be waiting in Tybee, Wassaw,
and Ossabaw sounds, in accordance Arith the preconcerted plan.
WUHams' twentieth corps held the left of the Union Hne, rest
ing on the Savannah Eiver, near WiUiamson's plantation ; Jef
ferson C. Daris' fom-teenth corps was on its right, extending
from the Augusta raUway, near its junction* Arith the Charles-

292 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMI'AIGNS.
ton raUway, to LaAvton's plantation, beyond the canal ; Blak's
seventeenth corps next, and Osterhaus' fifteenth corps on the
extreme right, with its fiant resting on the Gulf raUway, at
Station No. 1. General KUpatrick was instructed to cross the
Ogeechee by a pontoon bridge, to reconnoitre Fort McAUister,
and to proceed to St. Catherine's Sound, in the dkection of
Sunbury or Kilkenny Bluff, and open communication with the
fleet. General Howard had previously sent Captain Duncan,
one of his best scouts, doAvn the Ogeechee in a canoe for a hke
purpose ; but it was also necessary to have the ships and thek
contents, and the Ogeechee Eiver, close to the rear of the
camps, as the proper avenue of supply.
The enemy had burned King's Bridge, over the Ogeechee,
just below the mouth of the Cannouchee; but although a
thousand feet long, it was reconstructed in an incredibly short
time, and in the most substantial manner, by the Fifty-eighth
Indiana, Colonel BueU, uncler the dkection of Captain C. B.
Eeese, of the Engineer Corps ; and on the 13th of December,
Hazen's division of Osterhaus' fiifteenth corps crossed the
bridge, gained the west bank of the Ogeechee, and marched
doAvn the river Arith orders to carry by assault Fort McAUister,
a strong inclosed redoubt, manned by two companies of artU
lery and three of infantry, numbering in aU about two hundred
men, and mounting twenty-three barbette guns and one mortar.
On the morning of the 13th of December, General Sherman
and General Howard went to Dr. Cheves' rice-mUl, whence
Fort McAllister was in fuU view. At the rice-mill a section of
De Grass' battery was firing occasionaUy at the fort opposite,
three mUes and a haH distant, as a diversion, having for its
principal object, however, to attract the attention of the fleet.
During the day the two commanders watched the fort and the
bay, endeavoring to catch gUmpses of the division moving upon
the work, and of vessels belonging to the fleet. About noon,
the rebel artiUery at McAUister opened inland, firing occasion
aUy from three or four different guns. By thek glasses the
generals could observe Hazen's skkmishers firing on the fort ;
and about the same time a movable smoke, Hke that from a

A CHRISTMAS GIFT. 293
steamer, attracted thek attention near the mouth of the
Ogeechee. Signal communication was estabhshed with General Hazen,
who gave notice that he had invested the fort, and also that
he observed the steamer. General Sherman signaUed him from
the top of the mUl that it was important to carry the fort by
assault that day.
The steamer had approached near enough to draw the fire
of the fort when her signal-flag was descried. Captain McChn-
tock, of the Signal Corps, aided by Lieutenant Sampson,
speedily communicated Arith the vessel, and ascertained that
she was a tug, sent by General Foster and Admkal Dahlgren
for the purpose of communicating Arith the army. The signal-
officer of the ste^imer inquired, "Is McAlHster ours ?"
Just at that moment a brisk firing was observed at the
fort. Hazen had sounded the charge, and instantly his brave
dirision had rushed through the torpedoes and abattis which
obstructed the approach to the fort, and gaining the parapet,
after a hand-to-hand struggle of a few moments' duration,
the garrison had surrendered.
From thek position at the rice-mUl, Sherman and Howard
could see the men discharge thek pieces in the air, and hear
thek shout of triumph as they took possession of the fort and
raised the old flag over their conquest.
Hazen's loss in kiUed and wounded was about ninety men,
while the garrison lost between forty and fifty, killed and
wounded ; and the remainder, about one hundred and fifty in
number, were captured, together with twenty-two pieces of ar
tiUery and a large quantity of ammunition.
The substantial fruit of this victory, however, was to be
found in the fact that communication with the sea was estab
hshed, and the prompt receipt of suppHes secured.
As soon as he saw the Union colors planted upon the waUs
of the fort, Sherman ordered a boat, and, accompanied by
General Howard, went down to the fort, and there met General
Hazen, who had not yet communicated Arith the steamer, nor
indeed seen her, as the riew was interrupted by some trees.

294 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
Determined to communicate that night with the fleet, Sherman
got into another boat, and caused himself to be rowed down
the Ogeechee, untU he met the navy tug-boat Dandehon, com
manded by Lieutenant-Commander WUhamson, avHo informed
him that Captain Duncan, who, it avUI be remembered, was sent
down the river a few days previously by General Howard, had
safely reached Major-General Foster and Eear-Admiral Dahl
gren, commanding the land and naval forces on the South At
lantic coast, and that thes§ officers were hourly expected to
arrive in Ossabaw Sound, where the Dandehon Avas then lying.
At midnight, Sherman Avi-ote brief notes to General Foster and
the admiral, and a dispatch to the secretary of war, recount
ing the main facts of the campaig-n, and the present situation.
" The weather has been fine," he said to Mr. Stanton, " and
suppHes Avere abundant. Our march was most agreeable, and
we were not at aU molested by guerriUas  We have
not lost a wagon on the trip, but have gathered in a large supply
of negroes, mules, horses, etc., and our trains are in far better
condition than when we started. My first duty avUI be to clear
the army of surplus negroes, mules, and horses 
The quick work made Arith McAlHster, and the opening of
communication with our fleet, and the consequent independence
for supplies, dissipates aU their boasted threats to head me off
and starve the army. I regard Savannah as akeady gained."
He then returned to Fort McAlHster, and before daylight
was overtaken by Major Strong, of General Foster's staff, with
inteUigence that General Foster had arrived in the Ogeechee,
near Fort McAlHster, and was very anxious to meet General
Sherman on board his boat. Sherman accordingly returned
Arith the major, and met General Foster on board the steamer
Nemaha ; and, after consultation, determined to proceed with
him down the soimd, in hopes of meeting Admiral Dahlgren,
which, hoAvever, they did not do untU about noon, in WassaAv
Sound. General Sherman there Avent on board the admiral's
flagship, the Harvest Moon, after having arranged with Gen
eral Foster to send from HUton Head some siege ordnance
and boats suitable for navigating the Ogeechee Eiver. Ad-

A CHRISTMAS GIFT. 295
mkal Dahlgren furnished aU the data concerning his fleet and
the numerous forts that guarded the inland channels between
the sea and Savannah; and Sherman explained to him how
completely Savannah was invested at aU points, save only the
plank-road on the South Carolina shore, knoAvn as the " Union
Causeway," Avhich he thought he could reach from his left
flank across the Savannah Eiver. The general also informed
the admiral that H he would simply engage the attention of
the forts along WUmington Channel, at BeauHeu and Eosedew,
the army could carry the defences of Savannah by assault as
soon as the heavy ordnance arrived from HUton Head.
On the 15th, Sherman returned to the lines in the rear of
Savannah. •
Having received and carefully considered aU the reports of
division commanders, he determined to assault the lines of the
enemy as soon as the heavy ordnance should arrive from Port
Eoyal, first making a formal demand for surrender. On the
17th, a number of thirty-pounder Parrott guns having reached
King's Bridge, Sherman proceeded in person to the head
quarters of Major-General Slocum, on the AugTista road, and
dispatched thence into Savannah, by flag of truce, a formal
demand for the surrender of, the place, accompanied by a
copy of Hood's threat, at Dalton, to take no prisoners, and on
the foUoAving day received an answer from General Hardee
conveying his refusal to accede thereto. In his reply. General
Hardee pointed out that the investment was stUl incomplete.
In the mean time, further reconnoissances from the left
flank had demonstrated that it was impracticable and unwise
to push any considerable force across the Savannah Eiver,
since the enemy held the river opposite the city with kon-clad
gunboats, and could destroy any pontoons laid down between
Hutchinson's Island and the South Carohna shore, and thereby
isolate any force sent over from that flank. Sherman, there
fore, ordered General Slocum to get into position the siege-
guns, and make aU the preparations necessary to assault, and
to report the earhest moment when he could be ready.
General Foster had akeady estabhshed a dirision of troops

296 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
on the peninsula or neck between the Coosawhatchie and TuUi-
flnney rivers, at the head of Broad Eiver, whence he could reach
the raUway Arith his artUlery. Sherman HimseH went to Port
Eoyal, and made arrangements to re-enforce that command by
one or more dirisions, so as to enable it to assault and carry
the raUway, and thence tum towards Savannah untU it should
occupy the causeway. He made the voyage on board Admkal
Dahlgren's flag-ship, the Harvest Moon, which put to sea the
night of the 20th ; but the Arind was high, and increased during
the night, so that the pUot considered Ossabaw Bar impassable,
and ran into Tybee, whence the steamer proceeded through
the inland channels into Wassaw Sound, and thence through
Eomney Marsh. But the ebb-tide having caught the Harvest
Moon, so that she was unable to make the passage, Admkal
Dahlgren took the general in his barge, and puUing in the di
rection of Vernon Eiver, the army-tug Eed Legs was there
met, bearing a message from Captain Dayton, assistant-adju
tant-general, dated that morning, the 21st, to the effect that
the troops were akeady in possession of the enemy's hnes,
and were advancing Arithout opposition into Savannah. Ad
mkal Dahlgren proceeded up the Vernon Eiver in his barge,
whUe General Sherman went on board the tug, in which he
proceeded to Fort McAlHster, and thence to the rice-mUl,
whence he had riewed the assault, and on the morning of the
22d rode into the city of Savannah.
After firing heavily from his kon-clads and the batteries
along the hnes, aU the afternoon, and late into the evening of
the 20th, Hardee had evacuated the city during that night,
on a pontoon bridge, and marched towards Charleston on the
causeway road. The night being very dark, and a strong
Avesterly Arind bloAring, although the sounds of movement
were heard in Geary's front, it was impossible to make out its
(Hrection or object, and when the pickets of that dirision
advanced early on the morning of the 21st the evacuation had
been completed, and nothing remained but to occupy the
city. Immediately on his arrival, Sherman dispatched the foUow-

A CHRISTMAS GIFT. 297
ing brief note to President Lincoln, announcing this happy
termination o the campaign : —
" I beg to present you, as a Christmas gift, the city of Sa
vannah, Arith one hundred and fifty heavy guns and plenty of
ammunition, and also about twenty-five thousand bales of
cotton." The number of pieces of artUlery captured, as subsequently
ascertained by actual inspection and count, was one hundred
and sixty-seven.
Thus, as the result of this great campaign, was gained the
possession of what had from the outset been its chief object.
Its present value was mainly as a base for future operations.
The army marched over three hundred mUes in twenty-four
clays, dkectly through the heart of Georgia, and reached the
sea with its subsistence trains almost unbroken. In the
entke command, five officers and fifty-eight men were kiUed,
thirteen officers and two hundred and thirty-two men wounded,
and one officer and two hundred and fifty-eight men missing ;
making a total list of casualties of but nineteen commissioned
officers and five hundred and forty-eight enhsted men, or five
hundred and sixty-seven of all ranks. Seventy-seven officers,
and twelve hundred and sixty-one men of the Confederate
army, or thirteen hundred and thkty-eight in aU, were made
prisoners. Ten thousand negroes left the plantations of thek
former masters and accompanied the column when it reached
Savannah, without taking note of thousands more who joined
the army, but from various causes had to leave it at different
points. Over twenty thousand bales of cotton were burned,
besides the twenty-five thousand captured at Savannah. Thir
teen thousand head of beef-cattle, nine miUion, five hundred
thousand pounds of com, and ten million five hundred thousand
of fodder, were taken from the country and issued to the troops
and animals. The men Hved mainly on the sheep hogs,
turkeys, geese, chickens, sweet potatoes, and rice, gathered by
the foragers from the plantations along the route of each day's

298 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
march. Sixty thousand men, taking merely of the sm-plus which
feU in thek way as they marched rapidly on the main roads,
subsisted for three weeks in the very country where the Union
prisoners at AndersonviUe were starved to death or idiotcy.
Five thousand horses and four thousand mules were impressed
for the cavaky and trains. Three hundred and twenty mUes
of raUway were destroyed, and the last remaining links- of
communication between the Confederate armies in Vkginia
and the West effectuaUy severed, by burning every tie, tArist-
ing every raU whUe heated red-hot over the flaming pUes of
ties, and laying in ruin every depot, engine-house, repair-
shop, water-tank, and turn-table.
From the time that the army left Atlanta, untU its arrival
before Savannah, not one word of inteUigence was received by
the Government or people, except through the Confederate
newspapers, of its whereabouts, movements, or fate ; and it
was not untU Sherman had emerged from the region lying
between Augusta and Macon, and reached MUlen, that the
authorities and the press of the Confederacy were able to make
up their minds as to the dkection of his march.
Marching in four columns, on a fr-ont of thirty mUes, eacl
column masked in aU dkections by clouds of skirmishers
Sherman was enabled to continue tUl the last to menace s
many points, each in such force that it was impossible for th r
enemy to decide whether Augusta, Macon, or Savannah were
his immediate objective ; the GuU or the Atlantic his destina
tion ; the Fhnt, the Oconee, the Ogeechee, or the Savannah his
route ; or what his ulterior design.
Immediately upon receipt of Sherman's laconic message.
President Lincoln repHed : — "BxECDTrvE Mansion,
" Washington, D C, Dec. 26, 1864
" My Deak Geneeal Sheeman :
" Many, many thanks for your Christmas gHt, — ^the capture
of Savannah.
" When you were about to leave Atlanta for the Atlantic

A CHRISTMAS GIFT. 299
coast, I was anxious, H not fearful ; but feeling you were the
better judge, and remembering that ' nothing risked nothing
gained,' I did not interfere. Now, the undertaking being a
success, the honor is aU yours, for I beheve none of us went
further than to acquiesce. And taking the work of General
Thomas into the count, as it should be taken, it is indeed a
great success.
" Not only does it afford the obvious and immediate miHtary
advantages, but in showing to the Avorld that your army could
be dividecl, putting the stronger part to an important ncAv ser
rice, and yet leaving enough to vanquish the old opposing
forces of the whole- -Hood's army — it brings those Avho sat
in darkness to see a great Hght.
" But what next ? I suppose it AriU be safe H I leave Gen
eral Grant and yourseH to decide.
" Please make my grateful acknowledgments to your whole
army, officers and men. " Yours very truly,
" A. Lincoln."
In concluding his official report, Sherman thus speaks of the
serrices rendered by his subordinate commanders, and of the
character of his army : —
" Generals Howard and Slocum are gentlemen of singular
capacity and inteUigence, thorough solcHers and patriots,
working day and night, not for themselves, but for their
country and their men. General Kilpatrick, Avho commanded
the cavalry of this army, has hancUed it with spkit and dash
to my entire satisfaction, and kept a superior force of the
enemy's cavalry from even approaching our infantry columns
or wagon-trains. AU the division and brigade commanders
merit my personal and official thanks, and I shaU spare no
efforts to secure them commissions equal to the rank they
have exercised so weU.
" As to the rank and file, they seem so fuU of confidence in
themselves, that I doubt H they want a compliment from me ;

300 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
but I must do them the justice to say that, whether caUed on
to fight, to march, to wade streams, to make roads, clear out
obstructions, buUd bridges, make ' corduroy,' or tear up raU
roads, they have done it Arith alacrity and a degree of cheer
fulness unsurpassed. A Httle loose in foraging, they ' did
some things they ought not to have done,' yet on the whole
they have suppHed the wants of the army with as httle
riolence as could be expected, and as Httle loss as I calculated.
Some of these foraging parties had encounters Arith the enemy
which would, in ordinary times, rank as respectable battles.
" The behavior of our troops in Savannah has been so
manly, so quiet, so perfect, that I take it as the best eridence
of discipline and true courage. Never was a hostUe city, fiUed
Arith women and chUdren, occupied by a large army Arith less
disorder, or more system, order, and good government. The
same general and generous spirit of confidence and good feel
ing pervades the army which it has ever afforded me especial
pleasure to report on former occasions."

THE END OF HOOD. 301

CHAPTEE XXIV.
THE END OF HOOD.
In order fuUy to comprehend how it was possible for a cam
paign so vast in its magnitude, so decisive in its results, to be
conducted to a successful termination Arith only nominal oppo
sition, it is necessary to recur to the position of Hood's army,
which we left at Florence in the early part of November, con
fronted by the Union army under Thomas, then concentrated
at Pulaski, under the immecHate command of Major-General
Schofield. It wUl be remembered that, in riew of the numerical
inferiority of his army, comprising the Fourth and Twenty-
thkd Corps, Hatch's dirision, and Croxton's and Capron's
brigades of cavalry, amounting to less than thirty thousand
men of aU arms. General Thomas had decided to maintain a
defensive attitude, untU the arrival of A. J. Smith with two
dirisions of the Sixteenth Corps from Missouri and the rem
nant of dismounted cavaky should enable him to assume the
offensive, Arith equal strength, against Hood's forces, consist
ing of the three old corps of the Confederate army of the
Tennessee, under Lee, StcAvart, and Cheatham, estimated at
thkty thousand strong, and Forrest's cavaky, supposed to
number twelve thousand. In preparation for his great in
vasion of Middle Tennessee, with the declared intention of re
maining there, Hood had caused the MobUe and Ohio raUway
to be repaked, and occupied Corinth, so that his suppHes
could now be brought from Sehna and Montgomery by raU to
that point, and thence to Cherokee Station, on the Memphis
and Charleston raUway.

302 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
On the afternoon of the 12th of November the last telegram
was received from General Sherman, and aU railway and tele
graphic communication with his army ceased. From that
time untU the 17th of November was an anxious period for
Thomas, uncertain whether he should have to pursue Hood in
an endeavor on his part to foUow Sherman, or defend Tennes
see against invasion; but on that day Cheatham's corps
crossed to the south side of the Tennessee, and suspense was
at an end. Hood could not foUow Sherman now if he would,
for Sherman was akeady two days' march from Atlanta on his
way to the sea.
On the 19th of November, Hood began his advance, on par
aUel roads fr-om Florence towards Waynesboro'.
General Schofield commenced removing the pubhc property
from Pulaski preparatory to falhng back towards Columbia.
Two divisions of Stanley's fourth corps had akeady reached
LynnviUe, fifteen mUes north of Pulaski, to cover the passage
of the wagons and protect the railway. Capron's brigade of
cavaky was at Mount Pleasant, covering the approach to
Columbia fr-om that direction ; and in addition to the regular
garrison, there was at Columbia a brigade of Euger's division
of the Twenty-thkd Corps. The two remaining brigades of
Euger's dirision, then at Johnsonrille, were ordered to move,
one by railway around through NashvUle to Columbia, the
other by road via Waverley to Centreville, and occupy the
crossings of Duck Eiver near Columbia, WiUiamsport; Gordon's
Ferry, and CentreviUe. About five thousand men belonging to
Sherman's column had coUected at Chattanooga, comprising
convalescents and furloughed men returning to their regiments.
These men had been organized into brigades, to be made
avaUable at such points as they might be needed. Thomas
had also been re-enforced by twenty new one-year regiments,
most of winch, however, were absorbed in replacing old regi
ments whose terms of serrice had expired.
On the 23d, in accordance Arith dkections previously given
him, General E. S. Granger commenced withdrawing the
garrisons fr-om Athens, Decatur, and HuntsA-iUe, Alabama, and

THE END OF HOOD. 303
moved off towards Stevenson, sending five new regiments of
that force to Murfreesboro', and retaining at Stevenson the
original troops of his command. This movement was rapidly
made by raU, and without opposition on the part of the enemy.
The same night General Schofield evacuated Pulaski, and
reached Columbia on the 24th. The commanding officer at
JohnsonviUe was directed to evacuate that post and retke to
ClarksviUe. During the 24th and 25th, the enemy skkmished
Arith General Schofield's troops at Columbia, and on the morn
ing of the 26th his infantry came up and pressed Schofield's
hne strongly during that day and the 27th, but Arithout assault
ing. As the enemy's movements showed an undoubted inten
tion to cross. General Schofield withdrew to the north bank of
Duck Eiver, during the night of the 27th. Two dirisions of
the Twenty-third Corps were placed in line in front of the
toAvn, holdmg aU the crossings in its ricinity ; whUe Stanley's
fourth corps, posted in reserve on the Franklin pike, was held
in readiness to repel any rigorous attempt the enemy should
make to force a passage ; and the cavaky, under WUson, held
the crossings above those guarded by the infantry.
About 2 A. M. on the 29th, the enemy succeeded in pressing
back General WUson's cavaky, and effected a crossing on the
LoArisburg pike : at a later hour part of his infantry crossed at
Huey's MiUs, six mUes above Columbia. Communication Arith
the cavaky haring been interrupted, and the Hne of retreat
towards Franklin being threatened, General Schofield made
preparations to withdraw to Frankhn. General Stanley, Arith
one dirision of his Fourth Corps, was sent to Spring HUl, fifteen
mUes north of Columbia, to cover the trains and hold the road
open for the passage of the main force ; and dispositions were
made, preparatory to a withdrawal, to meet any attack coming
from the dkection of Huey's MUls. General Stanley reached
Spring HUl just in time to drive off the enemy's cavalry and
save the trains; but he was afterwards attacked by the
enemy's infantry and cavah-y combined, who nearly succeeded
in dislodging him from the position. Although not attacked
from the dkection of Huey's MUls, General Schofield was

304 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
busUy occupied aU day at Columbia resisting the enemy's
attempts to cross Duck Eiver, which he successfuUy accom
phshed, repulsing the enemy many times Arith heavy loss.
Giving dkections for the Arithdrawal of the troops as soon as
covered by the darkness, at a late hour in the afternoon Gen
eral Schofield, with Euger's dirision, started to the rehef o.^f
General Stanley at Spring HUl, and when near that plauc
came upon the enemy's cavaky, bivouacking Arithin eight
hundi-ed yards of the road, but easUy drove-them off. Post
ing a brigade to hold the pike at this point. General Schofield,
with Euger's division, pushed on to Thompson's Station, three
mUes beyond, where he found the enemy's camp-fires stiU
burning, a cavalry force having occupied the place at dark,
but subsequently disappeared. The withdrawal of the main
force in front of Columbia was safely effected after dark on
the 29th ; Spring HUl was passed Arithout molestation about
midnight, and, making a night march of twenty-five mUes, the
whole command got into position at Frankhn at an early hour
on the morning of the 30th, the cavalry moving on the LoAris
burg pike, on the right or east of the infantry.
At Franklin, General Schofield formed Hne of battle on the
southern edge of the toAvn, and hastened the crossing of the
trains to the north side of Harpeth Eiver.
The enemy foUowed closely after General Schofield's rear
guard in the retreat to Franklin, and repeatedly assaulted his
works untU ten o'clock at night ; but Schofield's position
was exceUently chosen, with both fianks resting on the river,
and his men firmly held their ground, and repulsed every
attack along the whole Hne. Our loss was one hundred and
eighty-nine kiUed, one thousand and thkty-three wounded, and
one thousand one hundred and four missing, making an aggre
gate of two thousand three hundred and twenty-six. Seven
hundred and two prisoners were captured, and thkty-three
stands of colors. Major-General Stanley was severely wounded
while engaged in raUying a portion of his command which had
been temporarUy overpowered by an overwhelming attack of
the enemy. The enemy lost seventeen hundred and fifty kiUed,

THE END OF HOOD. 305
three thousand eight hundred wounded, and seven hundred
and two prisoners, making an aggregate loss to Hood's army
of six thousand two hundred and fifty-two, among which
number were six general officers kUled, six wounded, and one
captured. On the evacuation of Columbia, General Thomas sent orders
to General MUroy, at TuUahoma, to abandon that post and
retke to Murfreesboro', joining forces Arith General Eousseau
at the latter place, but to maintain the garrison at the block
house at Elk Eiver bridge. NashviUe was placed in a state of
defence, and the fortifications manned by the garrison, re-
enforced by a volunteer force which had been previously
organized into a dirision uncler brevet Brigadier-General J.
L. Donaldson, from the employes of the quartermaster's and
commissary departments. This latter force, aided by rail
way employes, the whole under the direction of Brigadier-
General ToAver, worked assiduously to construct additional
defences. Major-General Steedman, Avith the Ua^c thousand
men isolated from General Sherman's column, and a brigade
of colored troops, started from Chattanooga by raU on the
29th November, and reached Cowan on the morning of the
30th, where orders were sent him to proceed dkect to Nash
viUe. At an early hour on the morning of the 30th the advance
of Major-General A. J. Smith's command an-ived at NashvUle
by transports from St. Louis. Thus, General Thomas had
now an infantry force nearly equal to that of the enemy,
though stUl outnumbered in effective cavalry ; but as soon as
a few thousand of the latter arm could be mounted he would
be in a condition to take the field offensively and cHspute the
possession of Tennessee Arith Hood's army.
Not wiUing to risk a renewal of the battle on the morrow,
and having accomphshed the object of the day's operations,
namely, to cover the Arithdrawal of his trains. General Scho
field, by direction of General Thomas, feU back during the
night to NashvUle, and formed line of battle on the surround
ing heights on the 1st of December, connecting with the rest
of the army , A. J. Smith's corps occupying the right, resting
20

306 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
on the Cumberland Eiver, below the city ; the Fourth Corps,
temporarUy commanded by Brigadier-General Thomas J.
Wood, in consequence of General Stanley's wound, the centre ;
and Schofield's twenty-thkd corps the left, extending to the
NolensviUe pike. The cavaky under General WUson took
post on the left of Schofield, thus securing the interval betv.-een
that fiank and the river above the city.
General Steedman's troops reached NashvUle on the even
ing of the 1st, and on the 3d, when the cavalry was moved
to the north side of the river at Edgefield, occupied the space
on the left of the line vacated by its withdrawal.
On the morning of the 4th, after skirmishing during the two
preceding days, the enemy succeeded in gaining a position
with its sahent on the summit of Montgomery HiU, A^-ithin six
hundred yards of the Union centre, his main line occupying
the high grpund on the southeast side of Brown's Creek, and
extending from the NolensviUe pike, on the enemy's extreme
right, across the Franklin and Granny White's roads, in a
westerly direction to the hills south and southwest of Eichland
Creek, and doAva that creek to the HUlsboro' road, Arith cavalry
extending from both flanks to the river.
Between this time and the 7th of December, the enemy, with
one dirision each from Cheatham's and Lee's corps, and two
thousand five hundred of Forrest's cavaky, attempted to take
the blockhouse at the raUway crossing of OveraU's Creek,
and Fort Eosecrans at Murfreesboro', but were repulsed
with loss by Generals Mikoy and Eousseau, commanding the
garrisons. Buford's Confederate cavalry entered Murfreesboro,' but was
speedUy driven out by a regiment of infantry and a section of
artiUery, and on retiring moved northward to Lebanon and
along the south bank of the Cumberland, threatening to cross
to the north side of the river and interrupt the railwa}- com
munication Arith LouisriUe, at that time the only source of
suppHes for Thomas' army, the river below NashvUle being
blockaded by batteries along the shore. The gunboats under
Lieutenaii t-Commanding Le Eoy Fitch patroUed the Cumber-

THE END OF HOOD. 307
land above and below NashviUe, and prevented the enemy
from crossing. General WUson sent a cavalry force to Gallatin
to guard the country in that vicinity.
The position of Hood's army around NashviUe remained
unchanged, and nothing of importance occurred from the 3d to
the 15th of December, both armies being ice-bound during the
latter part of the time. In the mean AvhUe Thomas was pre
paring to take the offensive without delay ; the cavalry Avas
being remounted and new transportation furnished.
On the 14th, Thomas caUed together his corps commanders,
announced his intention of attackin"' on the morrow, should
the weather prove propitious, and explained his plan of opera
tions. A. J. Smith, holding the right, was to form on the
Harding road and make a vigorous attack on the enemy's left,
supported by three divisions of WUson's cavaky, ready to
assaU the enemy as occasion might serve. Wood, with the
Fourth Corps, leaving a strong skirmish line on Laurens' HiU,
was to form on the HUlsboro' road, supporting Smith's left,
and act against the left and rear of the enemy's advanced post
on Montgomery HiU. Schofield was to be in reserve, covering
Wood's left. Steedman's troops from Chattanooga, the regular
garrison of NashviUe, under Brigadier-General MiUer, and the
quartermaster's employes, under Brevet Brigadier-General
Donaldson, were to hold the interior Hne constituting the im
mediate defences of the city, the whole under command of
Major-General Steedman.
On the appointed day, every thing being favorable, the army
was formed and ready at an early hour to carry out this plan.
The formation of the troops was partiaUy concealed from the
enemy by the broken nature of the ground, as also by a dense
fog, which only Hfted toAvards noon. The enemy was ap
parently totally unaware of any intention on the part of
Thomas to attack his position, and especiaUy did not seem
to expect any moven ent against his left.
General Steedman had, on the previous evening, made a
heavy demonstration against the enemy's right, east of the
NolensviUe pike, succeeding in attracting the enemy's attention

308 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
to that part of his line and inducing him to draw re-enforce
ments from his centre and left. As soon as Steedman had com
pleted this movement. Smith and WUson moved out along the
Harding pike, and commenced the grand movement of the day
by wheeHng to the left and advancing against the enemy's
position across the Harding and HUlsboro' roads. Johnson's
division of cavalry was sent at the same, time to look after a
battery of the enemy's on the Cumberland Eiver, at BeU's
Landing, eight mUes below Nashville. The remainder of Gen
eral WUson's command. Hatch's dirision leading and Knipe in
reserve, moving on the right of A. J. Smith, first struck the
^nemy along Eichland Creek, near HarcHng's house, and rap
idly drove him back, capturing a number of prisoners; and
continuing to advance, whUe sHghtly swinging to the left, came
upon a redoubt containing four guns, which was splenchdly
carried by assault at one P. M. by a portion of Hatch's dirision,
dismounted, and the captured guns turned upon the enemy. A
second redoubt, stronger than the first, was next assaUed and
carried by the same troops that captured the first position,
taking four more guns and about three hundred prisoners.
McArthur's dirision of A. J. Smith's corps, on the left of the
cavah-y, participated in both of the above assaults, and reached
the position nearly simultaneously.
Finding General Smith had not taken as much distance to
the right as he had expected. General Thomas directed Gen
eral Schofield to move his Twenty-thkd Corps to the right of
General Smith, thereby enabling the cavalry to operate more
freely in the enemy's rear. This was rapidly accomphshed by
General Schofield, and his troops participated in the closing
operations of the day.
The Fourth Corps formed on the left of A. J. Smith's corps,
and as soon as the latter had struck the enemy's flank, as
saulted and carried Montgomery HUl, Hood's most advanced
position, at one p. M., capturing a considerable number of
prisoners-. Connecting Arith Garrard's dirision, forming the
left of Snuth's troops, the Fourth Corps continued to advance,
carried the enemy's entke line in its front by assault, and

THE END OF HOOD. 309
captured sevei al pieces of artUlery, about five hundred prison
ers, and several stands of colors. The enemy was driven out
of his original Hne of works and forced back to a new position
along the base of Harpeth HiUs, stUl holding his Hne of retreat
to Frankhn by the main road through Brentwood and by the
Granny White road.
At nightfall, General Thomas readjusted his line paraUel to
and east of the HUlsboro' road ; Schofield's command on the
right. Smith's in the centre, and Wood's on the left, Arith the
cavaky on the right of Schofield ; Steedman holding the
position he had gained early in the morning.
During the day sixteen pieces of artiUery and twelve hun
dred prisoners were captured. The enemy was forced back
at aU points Avith 'heavy loss, whUe the Union casualties were
unusuaUy Hght. The behavior of Thomas' troops was un
surpassed for steadiness and alacrity in every movement.
The boastful invasion of Tennessee was ended. In the
morning nothing would remain for Hood but flight.
The whole command bivouacked in line of battle during the
night on the ground occupied at dark, whUe preparations
were made to renew the battle at an early hour on the
morrow. At six A. M. on the 10th, Wood's corps pressed back the
enemy's skirmishers across the Franklin road to the eastward
of it, and then SAringing sHghtly to the right, advanced due
south from NashviUe, driving the enemy before him until he
came upon a new main line of works constructed during the
night, on Overton's HUl, about flve mUes south of the city
and east of the Franklin road. General Steedman moved out
from NashviUe by the NolensvUle pike, and formed his com
mand on the left of General Wood, effectuaUy securing the
latter's left flank, and made preparations to co-operate in the
movements of the day. A. J. Smith's corps moved on the
right of the Fourth Corps, and estabHshing connection with it,
completed the new line of battle. General Schofield's troops
remained in the position taken up by them at dark on the day
previous, facing eastward and towards the enemy's left flank.

310 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
the hne of the corps running perpendicular to that of Smith's
corps. General WUson's cavalry, which had rested for the
night at the six-mUe post on the HiUsboro' road, was dis
mounted and formed on the right of Schofield's compiand, aud
by noon of the 16th had succeeded in gaining the enemy's
rear, and stretched across the Granny White pike, one of the
two outlets towards Frankhn.
As soon as these dispositions were completed, and haring
risited the different commands. General Thomas gave dkec
tions that the movement against the enemy's left flank should
be continued. The entke Hne approached to within six hun
dred yards of the enemy at aU points. His centre was weak
as compared Arith his right at Overton's HUl, or his left on
the hUls bordering the Granny White road ; but stUl General
Thomas had hopes of gaining his rear and cutting off his
retreat fr-om Franklin.
About three P. M., Post's brigade of Wood's corps, supported
by Streight's brigade, was ordered by General Wood to
assault Overton's HUl. This intention was communicated to
General Steedman, who ordered the brigade of colored troops
commanded by Colonel Morgan, Fourteenth United States
colored troops, to co-operate. The ground on which the two
assaulting columns formed being open and exposed to the en
emy's riew, he was enabled to draw re-enforcements from his
left and centre to the threatened points. The assault was
made, and received by the enemy with a tremendous fire of
grape, canister, and musketry, the Union troops moving
steadUy onward up the hUl untU near the crest, when the
reserves of the enemy rose and poured into the assaulting
column a most destructive fire, causing it first to waver and
then to faU back, leaving dead and wounded, black .:.nd white
indiscriminately mingled, lying amid the abattis. General
Wood at once reformed his command in the position it had
preriously occupied, preparatory to a renewal of the assault.
Immediately foUowing the efiort of the Fourth Corps, Gen
erals Smith's and Schofield's commands moved against the
enemj's AVorks in thek respective fronts, carrying aU before

THE END OF HOOD. , 3II
them, breaking his Hnes in a dozen places, and capturing aU
of his artUlery and thousands of prisoners, among the latter
four general officers. The Union loss was scarcely mention-
able. All of the enemy that did escape were pursued over
the top of Brentwood and Harpeth HUls. General WUson's
cavaky dismounted, attacked the enemy simultaneously with
Schofield and Smith, striking him in reverse, and gaining firm
possession of the Granny White pike, thus cut off his retreat
by that route. Wood's and Steedman's troops hearing the
sh«uts of victory coming from the right, rushed impetuously
forward to renew the assault on Overton's HiU, and although
meeting a very heavy fire, the onset was irresistible. The
artUlery and innumerable prisoners fell into our hands. The
enemy, hopelessly broken, fled in confusion through the Brent
wood pass, the Fourth Corps in a close pursuit for several
mUes, when darknefes closed the scene, and the troops rested
from their labors.
As the Fourth Corps pursued the enemy on the Franklin
pike. General Wilson hastUy mounted Knipe's and Hatch's
dirisions, and dkected them to pursue along the Granny
White pike and endeavor to reach Frankhn in advance of the
enemy. After proceecHng about a mile they came upon the
enemy's cavaky under Chalmers, posted across the road and
behind barricades. The position was charged and carried by
the Twelfth Tennessee Cavaky, Colonel Spalding, scattering
the. enemy in aU directions, and capturing quite a number of
prisoners, among them Brigadier-General E. W. Eucker.
During the two days' operations there were four thousand
four hundred and sixty-two prisoners captured, including two
hundred and eighty-seven officers of all grades from that of
major-general, fifty-three pieces of artiUery, and thousands of
smaU-arms. The enemy abandoned on the fleld aU of his
dead and wounded.
WUson's cavaky, closely foUowed by Woods' corps, and by
easy marches by Smith and Schofield, pursued the flying and
demorahzed remnants of Hood's army across the Harpeth
Eiver, Eutherford's Creek, and Duck Eiver, aU much swoUen

312 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
by heavy rains and very difficult to cross, and only discontinued
the p'ursuit on the 29th of December, when it was ascertained
by General Thomas that,, aided by these obstructions to our
movement, and by the vigorous resistance of his rear-guard
under Forrest, Hood had successfuUy recrossed the Tennessee
at Bainbridge.
" With the exception of his rear-guard," says Thomas, " his
army had become a disheartened and disorganized rabble of
haH-armed and barefooted men, who sought every opportunity
to fall out by the wayside and desert thek cause, to put an end
to thek sufferings."
Thus ended Hood. A week before, the victorious colunms
of the army he had set out to destroy entered Savannah.
Sherman's army passed on to future and final rictories :
Hood's, as an organized force, disappears from history.
When Jefferson Daris ordered Hood to destroy the raU
ways leacHng north and invade Tennessee, and assured his fol
lowers that in thirty days the Yankee invader would be driven
out of Georgia, he had counted, Arith a mind obscured by long
concentrated hate, upon Sherman's being compeUed to follow
Hood. " If Hood wiU go into Tennessee," Sherman had ex
claimed, halting at the last stage of his northward march, " I
AriU give him his rations." And so saying, he changed front to
the rear and marched doAvn to the sea. He knew that Daris
had thus throAvn away the last chance of success, the last
hope even of prolonging the war, and for the phantom of an
invasion had exchanged the controlling advantage of interior
Hnes. In order that the Union arms should profit by tliis advan
tage, however, it was an essential condition that Hood should
be held in check. To this end Sherman left behind him an
equal army and Major-General Thomas. Slowly and doggedly
retking Arith inferior numbers, whUe waiting for the re-en
forcements which were to render them equal to the force of
the enemy, and draAring Hood after him far beyond the barrier
of the Tennessee, Thomas saved his concentration by Scho
field's masterly battle of Frankhn, and gathering up his force

THE END OF HOOD. 313
and completing his preparations with such dehberation that it
seemed to many the hour for action would never come, in the
fuU'time he hurled his kresistible blow squarely against the
weak front of the enemy and crushed it. Then the machinery
so carefuUy studied and thoroughly organized seized the frag
ments and ground them to irrecoverable atoms.

314 SHERiLAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.

CHAPTEE XXV.
SAVANNAH.
While in Savannah, General Sherman received a risit from
the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, and had the satisfaction of
obtaining the promotions he had recommended on his subordi
nate commanders.
General Sherman placed General Geary in temporary com
mand of the city of Savannah, and directing him to restore and
preserve order and quiet, adopted at the same time a pohcy
of conciliation and justice which soon bore its fruits in the
altered tone of the former adherents of the Confederate cause.
The mayor, E. D. Arnold, who but a short time before had
caUed upon the inhabitants to arm and go to the trenches to
defend their city against the invader, now invoked the citizens
to recognize the existing condition of affairs and to yield a
ready obedience to the actual authorities. The mayor was
continued in the exercise of his functions, so far as they were
exclusively connected Arith persons not in the mUitary or naval
serrice. A large public meeting of the citizens was held, at which
Mayor Arnold's vieAvs were substantially adopted and Governor
BroAvn requested to take measures for restoring the State to
the Union. A National Bank was established, and actiA'e
measures taken to resume trade Arith the North and foreign
nations so soon as the mUitary restrictions should be removed.
Divine service was resumed in the churches, and soon Savan
nah was more tranquU than it had been at any time since its
capture was first threatened in 1862.

SAVANNAH. 315
On the 14th of January, General Sherman issued the foUow
ing orders in regard to internal trade, the conduct of the
citizens, and the outrages of the Confederate guerriUas : — ;
" It being represented that the Confederate army and armed
bands of robbers, acting professedly under the authority of the
Confederate government, are harassing the people of Georgia
and endeavoring to intimidate them in the efforts they are
making to secure to themselves prorisions, clothing, security
to Hfe and property, and the restoration of law and good
government in the, State, it is hereby ordered and made
public :—
" I. That the farmers of Georgia may bring into Savannah,
Fernandina or Jacksonville, Florida, marketing such as beef,
pork, mutton, vegetables of any kind, fish, etc., as weU as
cotton in small quantities, and seU the same in open market,
except the cotton, which must be sold by or through the
treasury agents, and may invest the proceeds in famUy stores,
such as bacon and floiu, in any reasonable quantities, groceries,
shoes, and clothing, and articles not contraband of Avar, and
carry the same back to their families. No trade-stores wUl be
attempted in the interior, or stocks of goods sold for them,
but famUies may club together for mutual assistance and pro
tection in coming and going.
" II. The people are encouraged to meet together in peace
ful assemblages to discuss measures looking to thek safety and
good government, and the restoration of State and national
authority, and wiU be protected by the national army when so
doing ; and aU peaceable inhabitants who satisfy the command
ing officers that they are earnestly laboring to that end, must
not only be left undisturbed in property and person, but must
be protected as far as possible consistent with the mUitary
operations. E any farmer or peaceful inhabitant is molested
by the enemy, viz., the Confederate army of guerrUlas, because
of his friendship to the National Government, the perpetrator,
if caught, wUl be summarily punished, or his family made to
suffer for the outrage ; but if the crime cannot be traced to the

316 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
actual party, then retahation avUI be made on the adherents to
the cause of the rebeUion. Should a Union man be murdered,
then a rebel selected by lot AviU be shot ; or H a Union famUy
be persecuted on account of the cause, a rebel famUy wiU be
banished to a foreign land. In aggravated cases, retaliation
wiU extend as high as five for one. AU commanding officers
wiU act promptly in such cases, and report thek action after
the retahation is done."
A large delegation of colored men caUed upon the Secretary
of War, Mr. Stanton, to represent their views as to the con
dition and requkements of thek race. Twenty of the number
were clergymen of various denominations. In the presence of
General Sherman and the acting adjutant-general of the army,
Brevet Brigadier-General E. D. ToAvnsend, the secretary put
a number of c[uestions to them, in order to develop the extent
of thek knowledge and comprehension of thek legal and moral
rights and duties under the existing state of affairs. These
questions Avere answered Arith great clearness and force by the
Eeverend Garrison Frazier, one of the number. General
Sherman having left the room for the purpose, the secretary
inquked thek opinion of him. Mr. Frazier repHed : —
" We looked upon General Sherman prior to his arrival as a
man in the providence of God speciaUy set apart to accompHsh
this Avork, and we unanimously feel inexpressible gratitude to
him, looking upon him as a man that should be honored for
the faithful performance of his duty. Some of us caUed on
him immediately upon his arrival, and it is probable he would
not rneet the secretary Arith more courtesy than he met us.
His conduct and deportment towards us characterized him as
a friend and a gentleman. We have confidence in General
Sherman, and think whatever concerns us could not be under
better management."
ImmecHately afterwards, Arith the approval of the secretary,
General Sherman issued the foUoAving orders, devoting the

SAVANNAH. 317
abandoned sea-islands and rice-fields to the exclusive use of
the freedmen : —
" I. The islands from Charleston south, the abandoned rice-
fielcls along the rivers for thkty mUes back from the sea, and
the country bordering the St. John's Eiver, Florida, are re
served and set apart for the settlement of the negroes now
made free by the acts of war and the proclamation of the
President of the United States.
"II. At Beaufort, HUton Head, Savannah, Fernandina,
St. Augustine, and JacksonviUe the blacks may remain in their
chosen or accustomed vocations ; but on the islands, and in
the settlements hereafter to be estabhshed, no Avhite person
whatever, unless mUitary officers and solcHers detaUed for
duty, wUl be permitted to reside, and the sole and exclusive
management of affairs wiU be left to the fr-eed people them
selves, subject only to the United States miHtary authority,
and the acts of Congress. By the laws of war and. orders of
the President of the United States, the negro is free, and must
be dealt with as such. He cannot be subjected to conscription
or forced into mihtary service, save by the Avi-itten orders of the
highest mihtary authority of the department, under such regula
tions as the President or Congress m<iy prescribe ; domestic
servants, blacksmiths, carpenters, and other mechanics wiU be
free to select their OAvn work and residence ; but the young
and able-bodied negroes must be encouraged' to enhst as sol
diers in the service of the United States, to contribute thek
share towards maintaining their oavu freedom, and securing
thek rights as citizens of the United States.
" Negroes so enhsted wUl be organized into companies, bat
tahons, and regiments under the orders of the United States
mUitary authorities, and vriU be paid, fed, and clothed accord
ing to law. The bounties paid on enhstment may, with the
consent of the recruit, go to assist his famUy and settlement in
procuring agricultural implements, seed, tools, boats, clothing,
and other articles necessary for thek Hvelihood.
" III. Whenever three respectable negroes, heads of famUies,

318 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
shaU desire to settle on lands, and shall haA'e selected for that
purpose an island or a locahty clearly defined within the Hm
its above designated, the inspector of settlements and planta
tions wiU himseH, or by such subordinate officer as he may
appoint, give them a Hcense to settle such island or district,
and afford them such assistance as he can to enable them to
establish a peaceable agricultural settlement. The three par
ties named avlU subdivide the land, under the superrision of
the inspector, among themselves and such others as may
choose to settle near them, so that each famUy shaU have a
plot of not more than forty acres of tiUable ground, and,
when it borders on some water-channel, with not more than
eight hundred feet water-fr-ont, in the possession of which land
the mihtary authorities AviU afford them protection untU such
time as they can protect themselves, or untU Congress shaU
regulate their title.
" The quartermaster may, on the requisition of the inspector
of settlements and plantations, place at the disposal of the in
spector one or more of the captured steamers to ply between
the settlements and one or more of the commercial points
heretofore named in orders, to afford the settlers the opportu
nity to supply thek necessary wants, and to seU the products
of their land and labor.
" IV. Whenever a negro has enlisted in the mUitary serrice
of the United States, he may locate his family in any one of
the settlements at pleasure, and acquke a homestead and aU
other rights and privUeges of a settler as though present in
person. " In Hke manner, negroes may settle thek famUies and engage
on board the gunboats, or in fishing, or in the narigation of
tho inland waters, without losing any claim to land or other ac
vantages derived fr-om this system. But no one, unless an
actual settler as above defined, or unless absent on Govern
ment service, wUl be entitled to claim any right to laiyi or
property in any settlement by rirtue of these orders.
" V. In order to carry out this system of settlement, a gen
eral officer AA'ill be detaUed \s inspector of settlements and

SAVANNAH. 319
plantations, whjse duty it shaU be to visit the settlements to
regulate their poHce and general management, and who avUI
furnish personaUy to each head of a famUy, subject to the ap
proval of the President of the United States, a possessory title
in Avriting, giving, as near as possible, the description of boun
daries, and who shaU adjust aU claims or conflicts that may
arise under the same, subject to the Hke approval, treating
such titles altogether as possessory. The same general officer
wiU also be charged with the enhstment and organization of
the negro recruits, and protecting thek interests while absent
from their settlements, and AviU be governed by the rules and
regulations prescribed by the War Department for such pur
poses." On the 26th of December, he issued the foUoAring orders in
regard to the government of the city of Savannah during its
occupancy by the army : —
" The city of Savannah and surrounding country AviU be
held as a mUitary post and adapted to future mUitary uses,
but as it contains a population of some twenty thousand peo
ple who must be provided for, and as other citizens may come,
it is proper to lay doAvn certain general principles, that aU
within its miHtary juriscHction may understand thek relative
duties and obligations.
" I. During war, the mUitary is superior to civU authority,
and Avhere interests clash, the civU must give way : yet, where
there is no conflict, every encouragement should be given to
weU- disposed and peaceful inhabitants to resume their usual
pursuits. Famihes should be disturbed as Httle as possible
in thek residences, and tradesmen aUowed the fr-ee use of
their shops, tools, etc. Churches, schools, aU places of amuse
ment and recreation, should be encom-aged, and streets and
roads made perfectly safe to persons in their usual pursuits.
Passes should not be exacted Arithin the line of outer pickets ;
but H any person shaU abuse these privUeges by communi
cating with the enemy, or doing any act of hostUity to the

320 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
Government of the United States, he or she AriU be punished
AA'ith the utmost rigor of the law.
" Commerce vrith the outer world avUI be resumed to an
extent commensurate Arith the wants of the citizens, governed
by the restrictions and rules of the Treasury Department.
" II. The chief quartermaster and commissary of the army
may give suitable employment to the people, white and black,
or transport them to such points as they choose, where em
ployment may be had, and may extend temporary rehef in the
way of prorisions and vacant houses to the worthy and needy,
untU such time as they can help themselves. They AriU se
lect, first, the buUdings for the necessary uses of the army ;
next, a sufficient number of stores to be turned over to the
treasury agent for trade-stores. AU vacant storehouses or
dwellings, and aU buUdings belonging to absent rebels, AriU
be construed and used as belonging to the United States untU
such times as thek titles can be settled by the courts of the
United States.
" ni. The mayor and city council of Savannah avOI continue
and exercise thek functions as such, and avUI, in concert Arith
the commanding officer of the post and chief quartermaster,
see that the fire companies are kept in organization, the
streets cleaned and Hghted, and keep up a good understand
ing between the citizens and soldiers. They AriU ascertain
and report to the chief commissary of subsistence, as soon as
possible, the names and number of worthy families that need
assistance and support. ,
" The mayor vriU forthArith give pubhc notice that the time
has come when aU must choose thek course, namely, to re
main A^dthin our Hnes and conduct themselves as good citi
zens, or depart in peace. He AriU ascertain the names of aU
who choose to leave Savannah, and report their names and
residence to the chief quartermaster, that measures may be
taken to transport them beyond the lines.
" IV. Not more than two newspapers wiU be pubhshed in
Savannah, and their editors and proprietors avOI be held to
the strictest acconntabUity, and avUI be punished severely, in

SAVANNAH. 321
person and property, for any HbeUous pubhcation, mischievous
matter, premature news, exaggerated statements, or any com
ments Avhatever upon the acts of the constituted authorities :
they AvUl be held accountable even for such articles though
copied from other papers."
On the 15th of January, Sherman estabhshed the foUoAring
trade regulations, for Savannah : —
" The Department of the South having been placed within
the sphere of this command, and it being highly deskable
that a uniform policy prevaU touching commerce and inter
course with the inhabitants of the South, the foUoAving general
rules and principles wUl be adhered to, unless modified by
law or the orders of the War Department :
" I. Commerce with foreign nations cannot be permitted or
undertaken until the national authority is estabhshed to an
extent that wUl give the necessary courts and officers to con
trol and manage such matters. Trade wUl be confined to a
mere barter and sale proportioned to the necessary wants of
the army, and of the inhabitants dependent on it for the
necessaries of life ; and even that trade must be kept subject
to strict military control or surveUlance.
"II. Trade-stores will be permitted at Beaufort, HUton
Head, Savannah, Fernandina, St. Augustine, and Jackson-
vUle, in all articles of food and clothing, groceries, ladies' and
children's goods generaUy, and articles not contraband of
war. " III. To trade is a privUege, and no person wiU be aUowed
to buy and seU for profit unless he be a citizen of the United
States, and subscribe to any legal oath or obhgation that is
or may be prescribed by law ; and at points threatened by an
enemy, the officer commanding may further exact as a concH
tion, that the trader shaU himseH engage to serve in some
miHtary capacity, to aid in defence of tha^place.
" IV. Persons desking to trade wUl apply to the command
ing officer of the post, and obtain his written consent, specify-
21

322 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS
ing the kind, nature, and extent of the trade, and when he
requkes importations from Northern cities, he avUI, in hke
manner, apply for his permit. The commanding officer of the
post may appoint some good officer to supervise these mat
ters, who AviU frequently inspect the stores, and when there is
not sufficient competition, avUI fix the prices of sale. These
stores vriU, in Hke manner, be subject to the superrision of the
commanding general of the Department of the South, by him
seH or an inspector-general.
" V. In order that purchases may be made vrith economy,
the commanding officer of each post avUI make reports of his
action in regard to trade, Arith the names of traders, amounts
of goods desked for sale, etc., to the commanding general of
the department, who AriU, in Hke manner, make fuU report to
the secretary of the United States treasury, to the end that he
may instruct the coUectors of ports, from which shipments are
expected, as to the necessary permits and clearances. It
being utterly impracticable that a general commanding mili-
tary operations should give his personal attention to such
matters, it is deskable that as much power as possible should
be delegated to post cemmanders, and they should be held to
the strictest account that no trade is permitted injurious to
the military interests of the United States.
"VI. Sales of cotton avOI be restricted absolutely to the
United States treasury agents, and no title in cotton or biU of
sale AriU be respected untU after the cotton is sold at New
York. Country people having smaU lots of cotton are per-
noitted to bring the same in to be exchanged for food and
clothing for thek famUies. The quartermaster avUI set aside a
store or warehouse, to which each wagon bearing cotton AriU,
after entering the miHtary Hnes, proceed dkect, where an
agent of the Treasury Department vriU receive and weigh the
same, and pay for it the price fixed in the eighth section of
the Act of Congress, approved July 2, 1864 — namely, three-
fourths the value of cotton as quoted in the New York
market ; and the secretary of the treasury is hereby requested
to make appointments of agents to carry out the provisions

SAVANNAH. 32.6
of said act at the posts of Hilton Head, Savannah, Fernandina,
and JacksonvUle.
"Vn. In order that the duties hereby imposed on com
manding officers of posts may not be neglected or slighted by
the changes incident to rank and changes of troops, the com
manding general of the Department of the South avUI appoint
a special officer to command at each of said posts, with a small
garrison, not to be changed Arithout his order ; and when
other troops, commanded by a senior, are added or arrive, the
command of the post avUI not change, but the additional
troops wiU be encamped near by and act according to special
instructions." In reply to a gentleman who addressed him a note asking
his views as to the present relations of Georgia to the Federal
Government, Sherman wrote, on the 8th of January :
" Deae Sie — Yours of the 3d instant is received, and in
answer to your inquiries, I beg to state I am merely a mUitary
commander, and act only in that capacity ; nor can I give any
assurances or pledges affecting civil matters in the future.
They wiU be adjusted by Congress when Georgia is again
represented there as of old.
" Georgia is not out of the Union, and therefore the talk of
' reconstruction' appears to me inappropriate. Some of the
people have been and stUl are in a state of revolt ; and as long
as they remain armed and organized, the United States must
pursue them vrith armies, and deal Arith them according to
miHtary law. But as soon as they break up their armed
organizations and return to their homes, I take it they wUl be
dealt with by the civU courts. Some of the rebels in Georgia,
in my judgment, deserve death, because they have committed
murder, and other crimes, which are punished with death by
aU civUized governments on earth. I think this was the course
indicated by General Washington, in reference to the Whisky
Insurrection, and a Hke principle seemed to be recognized at
the time of the Burr conspkacy.

324 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
" As to the Union of the States under our Government, we
have the high authority of General Washington, who bade us
be jealous and careful of it ; and the stUl more emphatic words
of General Jackson, ' The Federal Union, it must and shaU be
preserved.' Certainly, Georgians cannot question the authority
of such men, and should not suspect our motives, Avho are
simply fuHiUing thek commands. T\Tierever necessary, force
has been used to carry out that end ; and you may rest as
sured that the Union wUl be preserved, cost what it may. And
H you are sensible men you A^'^U conform to this order of things
or else migrate to some other country. There is no othei
alternative open to the people of Georgia.
" My opinion is, that no negotiations are necessary, noi
commissioners, nor conventions, nor any thing of the kind.
Whenever the people of Georgia quit rebelling against theii
Government and elect members of Congress and Senators, and
these go and take thek seats, then the State ot Georgia A\il]
have resumed her functions in the Union.
" These are merely my opinions, but in confirmation of them,
as I think, the people of Georgia may weU consider the foUow
ing words referring to the people of the rebellious States, which
I quote from the recent annual message of President Lincoln
to Congress at its present session ; —
" ' They can at any moment have peace simply by laying
dovm thek arms and submitting to the national authority
under the Constitution. After so much, the Government
would not, if it could, maintain war against them. The loyal
people would not sustain or aUow it. If questions should re
main, we would adjust them by the peaceful means of legisla
tion, conference, courts, and votes. Operating only in consti
tutional and laAvful channels, some certain and other possible
questions are and would be beyond the executive power to
adjust ; as, for instance, the admission of members into Con
gress, and whatever might requke the appropriation of
money.' " The President then aUudes to tho general pardon and
amnesty offered for more than a year past, upon^pecified and

SAVANNAH. 325
more Hberal terms, to aU except certain designated classes,
even these being ' stUl Arithin' contemplation of special
clemency,' and adds :
" ' It is stiU so open to aU, but the time may come Avhen
pubhc duty shaU demand that it be closed, and that in Heu
more vigorous measures than heretofore shaU be adopted.'
" It seems to me that it is time for the people of Georgia to
act for themselves, and return, in time, to thek duty to the
Government of thek fathers."
This letter, which was immediately made pubhc through
the local newspapers, was shoAvn by General Sherman, before
its pubhcation, to the secretary of war, who read and returned
it, f imply remarking that, Hke all the general's letters, it was
sufficiently emphatic, and not likely to be misunderstood.
The views contained in it afterwards assumed a special im
portance, arising out of this ckcumstance.
To the secretary of war he Avrote on the 2d of January,
1865 :—
" Sie — ^I have just received from Lieutenant-General Grant
a copy of that part of your telegram to him of 26th Decem
ber, relating to cotton, a copy of which has been immediately
furnished to General Eaton, my chief quartermaster, who wUl
be strictly governed by it.
" I had akeady been approached by aU the consuls and
haH the people of Savannah on this cotton question, and my
invariably ansAver has been that aU the cotton in Savannah
was prize of war, and belonged to the United States, and no
body should recover a bale of it Arith my consent ; and that as
cotton had been one of the chief causes of this war, it should
help pay its expenses ; that aU cotton became tainted vrith
treason from the hour the first act of hostihty was committed
against the United States, some time in December, 1860, and
that no biU of sale subsequent to that date could convey title.
" My orders were, that an officer of the quartermaster's de
partment, United States army, might furnish the holder,

326 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
agent, or attorney a mere certificate of the fact of seizure,
with description of the bales, marks, etc. ; the cotton then to
be turned over to the agent of the Treasury Department, to
be shipped to New York for sale. But since the receipt of
your dispatch, I have ordered General Eaton to make the
shipment himseH to the quartermaster at New York, where
you can dispose of it at pleasure. I do not think the Treas
ury Department ought to bother itseH with the prizes or
captures of war.
" Mr. Barclay, former consul at New York — ^representing
Mr. Molyneux, former consul, but absent since a long time —
caUed on me in person with reference to cotton claims by Eng-
Hsh subjects. He seemed amazed when I told him I should
pay no respect to consular certificates, and that in no event
would I treat an Enghsh subject Arith more favor than one of our
own deluded citizens ; and that for my part I was unwUling
to fight for cotton for the benefit of Enghshmen openly en
gaged in smugghng arms and munitions of war to kUl us ;
that, on the contrary, it would afford me great satisfaction to
conduct my army to Nassau and wipe out that nest of pkates.
I explained to him, however, that I was not a diplomatic
agent of the General Government of the United States ; but
that my opinion so frankly expressed was that of a soldier,
which it would be well for him to heed. It appeared also
that he OAvned a plantation on the Hue of investment to Sa
vannah, which, of course, is destroyed, and for which he ex
pected me to give him some certificate entithng him to in
demnification, which I dechned emphaticaUy.
" I have adopted in Savannah rules concerning property,
severe but just, founded upon the laws of nations and the
practice of civilized governments ; and am clearly of opuuon
that we should claim all the beUigerent rights over conquered
countries, that the people may realize the truth that war is no
chUd's play.
" I embrace in this a copy of a letter dated December 31,
1864, in answer to one from Solomon Cohen, a rich laAvyer, to
General Blak, his personal friend, as foUows : —

SAVANNAH. 327
" • MAJOR-GBNERAii F. P. Blair, commanding SemnteentJi, Army Corps :
" ' Genkkal — Tour note, inclosing Mr. Cohen's of this date, is received, and
I answer frankly, through you, his inquiries.
" ' First — No one can practise law as an attorney in the United States with
out acknowledging the supremacy of our Government. If I am not in error, an
attorney is as much an officer of the court as the clerk, and it would be a novel
thing in a Government to have a court to administer law that denied the
supremacy of the Government itself.
" ' Second — No one will be allowed the pritHeges of a merchant — or rather, to
trade is a privilege which no one shoiHd seek of the Government, without in
like manner acknowledging its supremacy.
" ' Third — If Mr. Cohen remains in Savannah as a denizen, his property, real
and personal, will not be disturbed, unless its temporary use be necessary for
the military authorities of the city. The title to property will not be disturbed
in any event, until adjudicated by the courts of the United States.
" ' Fourth — If Mr. Cohen leaves Savannah under my Special Order, No. 143,
it is a public announcement that he ' adheres to the enemies of the United
States,' and all Ms property becomes forfeited to the United States. But as a
matter of favor, he wUl be allowed to carry vrith him clothing and furniture for
the use of himself, family, and servants, and wUl be transported ¦svithin the
enemy's lines — but not by way of Port Royal.
•' ' These rules will apply to all parties, and from them no exception will be
made. " ' I have the honor to be, general, your obedient servant,
" ' W. T. Shebman,
" ' Major-General.'
" This letter was in answer to specific inquiries ; it is clear
and specific, and covers aU the points, and should I leave
before my orders are executed, I wUl endeavor to impress
upon my successor. General Foster, their wisdom and pro
priety. " I hope the course I have taken in these matters avUI meet
your approbation, and that the President wUl not refund to
parties claiming cotton or other property without the strong
est eridence of loyalty and friendship on the part of the
claimant, or unless some other positive end is to be gained."
And again on the 19th : —
" SlE — When you left Savannah a few days ago, you forgot
the map which General Geary had prepared for you, shoAring
the route by which his division entered the city of Savannah —

328 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
being the first troops to occupy that city. I now send it to
you. I avaU myseH of the opportunity also to inclose you
copies of aU my official orders touching trade and intercourse
Arith the people of Georgia, as weU as for the estabhshment of
the negro settlements. Delegations of the people of Georgia
continue to come, and I am satisfied a Httle judicious hand
ling, and by a Httle respect being paid to their prejudices, we
can create a schism in Jeff. Davis' dominions. AU that I
have conversed Arith reaHze the truth that slavery, as an insti
tution, is defunct, and the only questions that remain are,
what disposition shaU be made of the negroes themselves. I
confess myseH unable to offer a complete solution for these
questions, and prefer to leave it to the slower operations of
time. We have given the initiative, and can aflbrd to wait
the working of the experiment.
" As to trade matters, I also think it is to our interest to
keep the people somewhat dependent on the articles of com
merce to which they have been hitherto accustomed. General
Grover is now here, and AriU, I think, be able to manage this
matter judiciously, and may graduaUy relax and inrite CKitton
to come in in large quantities.
" But at first we should manHest no undue anxiety on that
score, for the rebels would at once make use of it as a power
against us. We should assume a tone of perfect contempt for
cotton and every thing else, in comparison Arith the great ob
ject of the war— the restoration of the Union, vrith aU its
rights and powers. H the rebels bum cotton as a war meas
ure, they simply play into our hands, by taking away the
only product of value they now have to exchange in foreign
ports for war-ships and munitions. By such a course, also,
they ahenate the feelings of the large class of smaU farmers,
that look to thek Httle parcels of cotton to exchange for food
and clothing for thek families. I hope the Government AriU
not manHest too much anxiety to obtain cotton in large quan
tities, and especiaUy that the President wUl not indorse the
contracts for the purchase of large quantities of cotton. Sev
eral contracts, involving from six to ten thousand bales, m-

SAVANNAH. 329
dorsed by Mr. Lincoln, have been shoAvn me, but were not in
such a form as to amount to an order for me to facUitate
their execution.
" As to Treasury trade-agents, and agents to take charge
of confiscated and abandoned property, whose salaries depend
on thek fees, I can only say that, as a general rule, they are
mischievous and disturbing elements to a mUitary govern
ment, and it is almost impossible for us to study the law and
regulations so as to understand fuUy thek powers and duties.
I rather think the quartermaster's department of the army
could better fulfil aU thek duties, and accomplish all that is
aimed at by the law. Yet, on this subject, I wUl leave Gen
erals Foster and Grover to do the best they can."

330 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.

CHAPTEE XXVI.
NOETHWAED.
Hood's army being effectuaUy broken up, T&fuiessee and
Kentucky being secure, and no considerable force occupying
the Atlantic slope except Lee's army, held at Petersburg by
Lieutenant-General Grant, the next move for Sherman was
obriously Northward. His proposal for the march through
Georgia had looked forward another step to this contingency.
At Savannah, he was accordingly met by instructions from the
Heutenant-general to embark his army on transports and
hasten to the James Eiver to participate in the final combina
tion for the destruction of the main army of the rebeUion.
Upon Sherman's earnest representations of the difficulty of
moving sixty thousand infantry and ten thousand cavah-y, Arith
thek due proportion of artiUery, so great a distance by water ;
of the great length of time that would be consumed in the
operation ; of the comparative immunity the enemy would
enjoy in his intermediate combinations ; and finaUy, on his
assurance that he could place his army at the desked point
sooner, in better condition, and Arith more injury to the enemy
by marching overland ; General Grant consented to this modi
fication and gave the necessary orders to Sherman to act upon
it, and to the other commanders concerned to co-operate with
him in the manner we shaU presently perceive. AU the detaUs
were left entkely to Sherman.
A dirision of Emory's nineteenth corps, under Brevet Major-
General Cuvier Grover, was drawn from Sheridan's Army of
the Shenandoah, and sent to Savannah as a garrison, and Gen
eral Grover was appointed to the command of the city. This

Ura

aimano--^ \

-, ^

\r XH Ta^arsV((^ ^

\^ * x^J^K

s iy

, 

.'— t?^

/Io. A^oroS

(

^.'lidori^Vt— -^

SaKsIflinf

\ T^ )

vV^^

Nflwltin* \

^\. \^(^

^--v^

CoiM'urd/

\ X^Tro^

Cai-th^

cohiloit'K,^

' X

/ %/

P^

dby Huirlw

V^ ^

A.7'~7^'i\X^

V--.^

iltsbon

Ro£
tove^T-. y^#
nos^ifeck iiibertun
' I,aiO(nvj£Jpr'
lii;ster\ ,
/¦\'."<^'"y*""-2i£'i.-. v*^.< T -.1
irlbori/
rCX\
1/
i;5^'' \ ))
\T
!ades
rt'Lo
Sj>ii»va.vborQ(
iTeeJJunct.
ingsV: / r /^^ l/M y M'/'/
)/;,
Jf
'Iff If PULASKI
¦ANNflll^ A';';-'"
^Ti^k^MMr
fY<'pai'e<i bv
Bi-vl .Brig.Gen . O.M.Poe.
ChieJ' Sliitfuief I'
Jfjtiliwe/l J'fir '\?herniufi and liu Ca/ripttu/ns '
— /.> '*Artii4 ¦ Corps
— n*^
<- Caralry
r /

^'

NORTHWARD. 331
division, and the troops previously serving in the Department
of the South, were placed under the command of Major-Gen
eral Foster, the department commander, to whom General
Sherman imparted the plan of campaign, instructing him to
foUow its successful progress by occupying Charleston and any
other points along the coast that circumstances might render
important. This enabled Sherman to take with him the entke
army with which he had made the campaign through Georgia.
Sherman determined to make but one stride from Savannah
to Goldsboro', N jrth Carolina.
A month was 3onsumed in preparations. By the 15th of
January, 1865, aU wq,s ready, and the movement began.
In the mean time, Major-General John A. Logan returned
from the North and resumed the command of the Fifteenth
Corps, relieving General Osterhaus.
John Alexander Logan, the eldest son by an American wHe
of Doctor John Logan, a native of Ireland Avho emigrated to
Elinois in 1823, was born near Murphysboro', in Jackson
County, lUinois, on the 9th of February, 1826. His parents
had eleven chUdren. UntU his fourteenth year, in conse
quence of the unsettled condition of the State, he enjoyed few
of the advantages of education. At the breaking out of the
war with Mexico, in 1846, he entered the army as a second-
Heutenant in the Fkst Eegiment of lUinois Volunteers, and
served with credit untU the peace. In 1848, being then
twenty-two years of age, he returned to his « native State, and
commenced the study of the law. In November, 1849, he
was elected clerk of his native county, and held the position
untU 1850. In that year he attended a course of laAv studies
at LouisviUe, and in 1851 received his diploma. Upon his
return home he at once commenced the practice of his profes
sion, Arith his maternal uncle, Judge Alexander M. Jenkins.
The practical character of Logan's mind, and his pleasant
manners, connected with his rare abUities as a ready speaker,
soon gained for him great popularity among the voters of his
county. Success quickly foUowed. In 1852 he was elected
prosecuting attorney of the third judicial district, and estab-

332 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
Hshed his residence at Benton, in Frankhn County ; and in
the autumn of the same year was elected to the State Legis
lature, to represent Frauklin.^and Jackson counties. On the
27th November, 1855, he married, at Shawneetown, Miss Mary
Cunninglijim, daughter of John W. Cunningham. In May,
1856, he was appointed presidential elector for the Ninth Con-
gTessional District on the Democratic ticket, and in that capa
city cast his vote for James Buchanan for President, and John
C. Breckinridge for Vice-President, and- the foUowing Novem
ber was re-elected to the Legislature. In 1858, as the candi
date of the Democratic party, he carried the Ninth Congres
sional District for Congress by a large majority over his
Eepubhcan opponent. In 1860 he was re-elected as the
nominee of the Douglas wing of the same party.
WhUe occupying his seat in the House of Eepresentatives,
the battle of BuU Eun was fought, and Logan took part in it
as a volunteer, shouldering a musket in the ranks of Colonel
Israel B. Eichardson's Second Michigan regiment. In Sep
tember, 1861, he returned home, and by his energy, aided by
his popularity, succeeded in two weeks in raising the Thirty-
first Eegiment of Illinois Volunteers, whereof he was appointed
colonel on the 18th of that month. On the 7th of November
he led Ids regiment, then forming a part of McClernand's bri
gade, Arith conspicuous gaUantry in the battle of Belmont,
where he had his horse shot under him. At Fort Donelson he
was severely wounded by a musket-ball in the left arm and
shoulder, and was tArice wounded in the thigh ; but remained
on the field, exliorting his men, untU removed by the surgeon.
On the 5th of March, 1862, he was promoted to be a brigadier-
general of volunteers ; and returning to the field in April,
shortly after the battle of Shiloh, held command of a brigade
of McClemand's dirision in the siege of Corinth. Succeed
ing to the command of a division, he participated in General
Grant's campaign in Northern Mississippi in the Arinter of
1862-'63, and was rewarded for his serrices therein by a commis
sion as major-general, dating fr-om the 29th of November, 1862.
Upon the organization of McPherson's seventeenth army corps.

NORTHWARD. 333
in December, 1862, General Logan was assigned to the command
of its third division, which he led with marked abihty and
bravery throughout the campaign of Vicksburg. After the
surrender of that stronghold, he obtained a leave of absence,
risited the North, and made a series of stirring and effective
speeches in aid of the cause of the war-party in the then
pending elections, and in bitter denunciation of the peace
agitators, or " Copperheads." On the 27th of October, 18G3,
he was assigned to the command of the Fifteenth Army Corps,
rendered vacant by the promotion of General Sherman to the
command of the Army of the Tennessee, and the temporary
retkement of General Frank P. Blair to take part in political
affairs. His military serrices since that time have akeady
been traced in these pages. Suddenly caUed by the calamitous
death of its gaUant leader to the command of the Army of the
Tennessee, at a critical moment in the battle of the 22d of
July, 1864, Logan threw himself with fire into the action, re
established his broken line, and dashing along the front, ex
claiming, " McPherson and revenge !" hurled his excited troops
against the enemy and swept them fr-om the field with terrible
slaughter. His warm, impulsive character gives him a powerful hold
on the affections of his men, and a high courage and indomi
table spirit enable him to lead them to victory.
Logan is the most notable iUustration of the success that
has attended the efforts of those officers who, entering the
army from civU life, have been content, instead of grasping at
once at the highest honors, to learn the duties of their new
profession in the subordinate grades, and to rise step by step
according to their talents and experience. Beginning as a
colonel of volunteers, for which position his Mexican services
qualified him, he Successively rose through the command of a
brigade and division to that of Sherman's old corps, and being
temporarily placed at the head of a separate army, discharged
the high responsibUities of that post, at an important period,
Arith signal abihty. ^AVhUe others, more a^fibitious but less
patient or less deserring, feU from the height which, in a

334 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
moment of laxity and want of knowledge they had been per
mitted to attain, Logan mounted steadUy.
Only less remarkable is the case of Major-General Blak ;
but Logan abandoned poHtics at the outbreak of the war and
refused to be a candidate for any civU office, whUe Blair ad
hered to his position as a member of the lower House, and
continued to discharge its duties untU Congress interfered by
a direct legislative prohibition.
Howard, Arith Blak's seventeenth corps, embarked on trans
ports at Thunderbolt, proceeded to Beaufort, South CaroHna,
and there disembtirking, struck the Charleston and Savannah
raUway near Pocotahgo station, and effected a lodgment, Leg-
gett's dirision driving away the enemy, and estabhshed a
secure depot of suppHes at the mouth of Pocotahgo Creek,
within easy water communication by the Broad Eiver, having
the main depot at HUton Head. Logan's fifteenth corps
moved partly by land and partly by water ; Woods' and Ha
zen's dirisions foUoAving the Seventeenth Corps to Beaufort ;
John E. Smith's marching by the coast road ; and Corse's,
cut off by the freshets, being compeUed to move Arith the
left Aring.
Slocum, Arith the left Avkig and KUpatrick's cavalry, was to
move on Coosawhatchie, South Carolina, on the Charleston and
Savannah raUway, and EobertriUe, on the Columbia road. A
good pontoon bridge had been throAvn across the Savannah
Eiver, opposite the city, and the Union causeway, leading
through low rice-fields, had been repaked and corduroyed ;
but before the time fixed for the movement'arrived, the river
became swoUen by heavy rains, so that the pontoons were
swept away, and the causeway was four feet under water.
General A. S. WiUiams, Arith Jackson's and Geary's dirisions
of the Twentieth Corps, crossed the Savannah at Purysburg,
and marched to HardeeviUe, on the Charleston raUway, where
they were in communication Arith Howard at Pocotahgo ; but
the rains presently cut these divisions off from the rest of the
left Aring at Savannah, which was compelled by the freshet to
seek a crossing higher up at Sister's Ferry, opposite which

NORTHWARD. 335
point, on the Carolina side, the two divisions indicated accord
ingly directed thek course ; while Slocum, with Jefferson C.
Daris' fourteenth corps, Geary's division of the Twentieth
Corps, and Corse's division of the Fifteenth Corps, temporarUy
separated from the right wing by the flood, marched up on the
Georgia side, leaAring Savannah on the 26th January. , The
gunboat Pontiac, Lieutenant-Commander S. B. Luce, was de
taUed by Admkal Dahlgren to move up to the ferry in ad
vance of the troops, and cover the passage. When Slocum at
length reached the river, he found the bottom three mUes in
vridth, so that it was only on the 7th of February, and Arith
great difficulty and labor, that the crossing was completed,
and the Aring concentrated and in fuU march for the Charleston
and Augusta raUway. WiUiams, Arith Jackson's and Ward's
divisions of the Twentieth Corps, reached the railway at
Graham's Station, fourteen mUes west of BranchriUe, on the
8th of February, and Slocum, with Davis' fourteenth corps
and Geary's division, arrived at BlackviUe, seven mUes further
west, on the 10th. Eolpatrick's cavaky, which was the first of
this Aving to cross at Sister's Ferry, immediately took the ad
vance on BlackvUle, by BamweU, and kept the extreme left
flank from this time forward.
To return to the right Aring. On the 19th of January, aU
his preparations being complete, and all his orders for the
march pubHshed, Sherman instructed his chief quartermaster
and chief commissary. Brevet Brigadier-Generals L. C. Easton
and Amos Beckwith, to fiU thek depots at Sister's Ferry and
Pocotahgo, and then to quit the army, go to Morehead City,
North CaroHna, and stand ready to forward suppHes thence to
Goldsboro' about the 15th of March.
On the 22d of January, Sherman embarked at Savannah for
HUton Head, where he held a conference Arith Admkal Dahl
gren, United States navy, and Major-General Foster, com
manding the Department of the South, and next proceeded to
Beaufort, riding out thence on the 24th to Pocotahgo, where
the Seventeenth Corps was encamped. On the 25th a demon
stration was made against the Combahee Ferry and raUroad

336 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
bridge across the Salkehatchie, to amuse the enemy, who hao
evidently adopted that river as his defensive line against Sher
man's supposed objective, the city of Charleston. The gen
eral reconnoitred the line in person, and saw that the heaA^
rains had swoUen the river so that Avater stood in the swamps
for a breadth of more than a mUe, at a depth of from one to
twenty feet. As he had no intention of approaching Charles
ton, a comparatively small force was able, by making a sem
blance of preparations to cross, to keep in thek front a con
siderable force of the enemy disposed to contest the advance
on Charleston. On the 27th, Sherman rode to the camp of
General Hatch's division of Foster's command, on the Tuli-
finny and Coosawhatchie rivers, and directed those places to
be evacuated. Hatch's cHvision was then moved to Pocotahgo,
to keep up the feints akeady begun, untU the right wing shoiUd
move higher up and cross the Salkehatchie about Elver's or
Broxton's Bridge. By the 29th of January, three divisions
of the FHteenth Corps — Woods', Hazen's, and John E.
Smith's — had closed up at Pocotahgo, and the right wing
had loaded its wagons and was ready to start. Sherman
therefore dkected General Howard to move the Seventeenth
Corps along the Salkehatchie to Elver's Bridge, and the FH
teenth Corps by Hickory HUl, Leper's Cross-roads, Anglesey
Post-office, and Beaufort's Bridge, whUe Hatch's cHvision was
ordered to remain at Pocotahgo, feigning on the Salkehatchie
raUway bridge and ferry, untU the movement should have
turned the enemy's position, and fo<rced him to faU back be
hind the Edisto.
Blair's seventeenth and Logan's fifteenth corps drew out of
camp on the 31st of January, but the real march began on the
1st of February. AU the roads northward had for weeks been
held by "^lieeler's cavaky, who had, by detaUs of negro labor
ers, feUed trees, burned bridges, and made obstructions to im
pede our march. But so weU organized Avere the pioneer bat
tahons, and so strong and inteUigent our men, that feUed trees
were removed and bridges rebuUt by the heads of columns
before the rear could close up. On the 2d of February,

NORTHWARD. 337
Logan's fifteenth corps reached Leper's Cross-roads, and
Blak's seventeenth corps was at Elver's Bridge. From Leper's
Cross-roads Sherman communicated Arith General Slocum, who
was then stUl struggHng Arith the fioods of the Savannah Eiver
at Sister's Ferry, and instructed him to overtake the right Aving
on the South CaroHna railway. General Howard, Arith the
right Aring, was dkected to cross the Salkehatchie, and push
rapidly .for the South CaroHna raUway at or near Midway.
The enemy held the line of the Salkehatchie in force, haring
infantry and artiUery intrenched at Elver's and Beaufort's
bridges. Blak, Arith the Seventeenth Corps, was ordered to
carry Elver's bridge, and Logan, Arith the Fifteenth Corps,
Beaufort's bridge. The former position was carried promptly
and skilfuUy by Mower's and Corse's dirisions of the Seven
teenth .Corps ; the latter under GUes A. Smith, on the 3d of
February, by crossing the swamp, nearly three miles wide,
with water varying from knee to shoulder deep. The weather
was bitter cold. Generals Mower and Smith led their dirisions
in person, on foot, waded the swamp, made a lodgment below
the bridge, and turned on the rebel brigade which guarded it,
driring it in confusion and disorder towards BranchviUe. Our
casualties' were one officer and seventeen men kiUed, and
seventy men wounded, who were sent to Pocotahgo. The Hne
of the Salkehatchie being thus broken, the enemy retreated at
once behind the Edisto at BranchvUle, and the whole army
was pushed rapidly to the South. CaroHna raUway. Blak's
corps and General Howard in person, at Midway, seven mUes
west of BranchviUe ; Logan's corps at Bamberg, three mUes
further west ; and at Graham's Station, Blair's seventeenth
corps, by threatening BranchvUle, forced the enemy to bum
the raUway bridge and Walker's bridge below, across the
Edisto. The whole army was at once set to work to destroy
raUway track. From the 7th to the 10th of February this
work was thoroughly prosecuted by the Seventeenth Corps
from the Edisto up to Bamberg, and by the FHteenth Corps
from Bamberg up to BlackviUe. In the mean time. Genera]
KUpatrick had brought his cavaky rapidly by BaruAvell to
33

d38 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
BlackviUe, and had turned towards Aiken, with orders to
threaten Augusta, but not to draw needlessly into a serious
battle. This he skiHuUy accomphshed, skumishing heavUy
Arith Wheeler's cavalry, first at BlackviUe and afterwards at
WUHston and Aiken. The left wing being now up, the Twen
tieth Corps at Graham's Station and the Fourteenth at Black
viUe, the destruction of the raUway was continued by that Aring
from BlackviUe up to Windsor. AU the army was thus on the
raUway from Midway to Johnson's Station, thereby diriding
the enemy's forces, which stUl remained at BranchriUe and
Charleston, on the one hand, and Aiken and Augusta, on the
other. The enemy was aU this time uncertain as to Sherman's des
tination or immediate objective. He might tum on Charles
ton, Augusta, or Columbia, and at neither, nor at aU com
bined, had the Confederates an army able to oppose him.
Hardee was at Charleston, Arith a force estimated at fifteen
thousand men, compelled to hold the place untU it should be
untenable, or the object of maintaining it should have passed.
Wheeler, vrith that portion of his cavaky so frequently met
and defeated by KUpatrick during the Georgia campaign, was
at and near Columbia, strengthened by Wade Hampton's di
rision from Lee's army. Augusta was occupied by the Georgia
mihtia. Meanwhile, the remnants of the Confederate Army
of the Tennessee were being hurried East ; but the road from
Mississippi was a long one, stripped of food for a great
portion of the route, the raUways generaUy useless, and the
bridges destroyed. To use the figurative expression of the
soldiers, " A crow could not fly from Atlanta to Savannah
Arithout a haversack."

THROUGH SOUTH CAROLINA. 839

CHAPTEE XXVn.
THEOUGH SOUTH CAEOLINA.
Leaving the left Aving to complete the work of destroying
the Charleston and Savannah raUway west of BranchviUe,
Sherman InmseH, Arith the right Aring, moved on Orangeburg,
situated thkteen miles north of BranchviUe, on the State road,
between Charleston and Columbia, near its intersection with
the raUway connecting the latter with BranchviUe. UntU
this point should be reached and passed, the direction of
Sherman's movement would not be fuUy developed, for he
stUl continued to menace Charleston, Augusta, and Columbia ;
and the position of the left wing might equaUy satisfy the
conditions of either theqry, as weU as the supposition that he
might move by his right by Florence or Cheraw dkectly on
WUmington or FayetteviUe.
Blak's seventeenth corps crossed the South Fork of the
Edisto Eiver at Binnaker's Bridge, and moved straight on
Orangeburg ; while Logan, with the Fifteenth Corps, crossed
at Holman's Bridge, and moved to Poplar Springs in support.
On the 12th of February, the Seventeenth Corps found tho
enemy intrenched in front of the Orangeburg Bridge, but swept
him away by a dash, and followed him, forcing him across the
bridge, which was partiaUy burned. Beliind the bridge was a
battery in position, covered by a cotton and earth parapet,
Arith wings as far as could be seen. General Blair held
Giles A. Smith's division close up to the Edisto, and moved
the other tAvo to a point about two mUes below, where he
crossed Force's dirision by a pontoon bridge, holding Mower's
in support. As soon as Force emerged from the swamp the

340 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
enemy gave ground, and GUes A. Smith's dirision gained the
bridge, crossed over, and occupied the enemy's parapet. He
soon repaked the bridge, and by four p. M. the whole corps
was in Orangeburg, and had begun the work of destruction
on the railway. Blak was ordered to destroy this raUway
effectuaUy up to LewisviUe, and to push the enemy across the
Congaree, and force him to burn the bridges, which he did on
the 14th.
Hardee now perceiving Sherman's immediate objective,
evacuated Charleston, retreating on Florence, paraUel to the
Hne of march just passed over by Sherman's army, and General
GUlmore's troops entered and occupied the city on the 18th.
Blak's seventeenth corps foUowed the State road, and
Logan's fifteenth corps crossed the North Edisto from Poplar
Springs at SchUHng's Bridge, above the mouth of Cawcaw
Swamp Creek, and took a country road which entered the
State road at Zeigler's.
On the 15th, the Fifteenth Corps found the enemy in a
strong position at the bridge across Congaree Creek, Arith a
tete-de^ont on the south side, and a weU-constructed fort on
the north side, commanding the bridge Arith artiUery. The
ground in front was very bad, level and clear, with a fresh
deposit of mud from a recent overflow. General Charles E.
Woods, who commanded the landing dirision, succeeded, Hoav-
ever, in turning the flank of the tete-de-pont by sending Stone's
brigade through a cypress swamp to the left ; and foUowing up
the retreating enemy promptly, got possession of the bridge
and the fort beyond. The bridge had been partiaUy damaged
by fire, and had to be repaked for the passage of artUlery), so
that night closed in before the head of the column could reach
the bridge across Congaree Eiver in front of Columbia. That
night the enemy sheUed the camps of the right wing from a
battery on the east side of the Congaree above Granby.
Early on the morning of the 16th the head of the column
reached the bank of the Congaree, opposite Columbia, but too
late to save the fine bridge which spanned the river at that
point, and which was burned by the enemy. WhUe waiting

THROUGH SOUTH CAROLINA. 34I
for the pontoons to come to the front, people could, be seen
running about the streets of Columbia, and occasionally smaU
bodies of cavaky, but no masses. A single gun of Captain
De Grass' battery was fired at their cavaky squads, but General
Sherman checked his firing, Hmiting him to a few shots dkected
at the unfinished State House waUs, and a foAV shells at the raU
way depot, to scatter the people engaged in carrying aAvay sacks
of corn and meal. There was no white fiag or mam'festation
of surrender. Sherman directed General Howard to cross the
Saluda at the Factory, three mUes above the city, and after
wards Broad Eiver, so as to approach Columbia fr-om the north.
Slocum, Avith the left Aving, crossed the South Edisto on the
15th of February, at New and Guignard's bridges, and moved
to a position on the Orangeburg and Edgefield road, there to
await the result of the movement of the right wing upon the
former place ; Howard haring entered Orangeburg on the
12th, and being then in march on Columbia. On the 14th
Slocum crossed the North Edisto, the Twentieth Corps at
Jones' Bridge, the Fourteenth Corps at Horsey's Bridge, and
KUpatrick at Gunter's Bridge ; and, aU three columns uniting
at and beloAV Lexington, the advance appeared at the Saluda,
Arithin an hour after the head of Howard's column reached the
river on the 16th.
General Howard effected a crossing of the Saluda, near the
Factory, on the 16th, skkmishing Arith cavaky, and the same
night threw a flying-bridge across Broad Eiver, about three
mUes above Columbia, by whichdie crossed over Stone's Bridge
Woods' dirision of the FHteenth Corps. Under cover of this
tVnce a pontoon bridge was laid on the morning of the 17th.
Sherman was in person at this bridge, and at eleven a. m.
learned that the mayor of Columbia had come out in a carriage
and made a formal surrender of the city to Colonel Stone,
Twenty-fifth Iowa regiment, commanding the third brigade of
Woods' dirision of the Fifteenth Corps. About the same time,
a small party of the Seventeenth Corps had crossed the Con
garee in a skiff, and entered Columbia fr-om a point imme
diately Avest of the city.

342 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
In anticipation of the occupation of the city, Sherman had
given -written orders to General Howard touching the con
duct of the troops. These instructions were, to destroy abso
lutely aU arsenals and pubhc property not needed for our oavu
use, as aU raUways, depots, and machinery useful in war to an
enemy, but to spare aU dweUings, coUeges, schools, asylums,
and harmless private property. Sherman was the first to cross
the pontoon bridge, and, in company Arith General Howard,
rode into the city. The day was clear, but a perfect tempest
of wind was raging. The brigade of Colonel Stone was akeady
in the city, and was properly posted. Citizens and soldiers
were on the streets, and general good order prevaUed. Gen
eral Wade Hampton, who commanded the Confederate rear
guard of cavaky, had, in anticipation of the capture of
Columbia, ordered that cotton, public and private, should be
moved into the streets and fired, to prevent the Yankee in
vaders from benefiting by its use. Bales were pUed every
Avhere, the rope and bagging cut, and tufts of cotton were
bloAvn about in the Arind, lodged in the trees and against
houses, so as to resemble a snow-storm. Some of these pUes
of cotton were burning, especiaUy one in the very heart of the
city, near the courthouse, but the fire was partiaUy subdued
by the labor of the Union soldiers.
During the day, Logan, Arith the FHteenth Corps, passed
through Columbia and out on the Camden road. The Seven
teenth Corps did not enter the toAvn at aU.
Before a single pubhc buUding had been fired by orders, the
smouldering fires, Hghted by Haimpton's men, were rekindled by
the wind, and communicated to the buUdings around. About
dark, the flames began to spread, and got beyond the control
of the brigade on duty Arithin the city. The whole of Woods'
cHvision was brought in, but it was found impossible to check
the progress of the fire, which, by midnight, had become
immanageable, and raged until about four A. m., when, the
Arind subsiding, it was got under control. Sherman himseH
was up nearly aU night, and Arith Generals Howard, Logan,
Hazen, Woods, and others, labored hard to save houses and

THROUGH SOUTH CAROLINA. 343
protect famUies thus suddenly deprived of shelter and of
bedding and wearing apparel. In his official report, Sherman

" I disclaim on the part of my army any agency in this fire,
but, on the contrary, claim that we saved what of Columbia
remains unconsumed. And, without hesitation, I charge
General Wade Hampton with having burned his OAvn city of
Columbia, not with a mahcious intent, or as the manifestation
of a siUy ' Eoman stoicism,' but from foUy and want of sense,
in filhng it with lint, cotton, and tinder. Our officers and men
on duty worked weU to extinguish the fiames ; but others not
on duty, including the officers who had long been imprisoned
there, rescued by us, may have assisted in spreading the fire
after it had once begun, and may have indulged in unconcealed
joy to see the ruin of the capital of South Carolina."
During the 18th and 19th, the arsenal, raUway depots,
machine-shops, foundries, and other buUdings were properly
destroyed by detailed working parties, and the raUway-track
torn up and destroyed to EingsvUle, and the Wateree or Ca
tawba Bridge in the dkection of Winnsboro'.
On the 16th, as soon as the head of Slocum's column ap
peared Arithin two mUes of Columbia, as akeady stated, Sher
man directed him to march by the left again directly upon
Winnsboro'. Accordingly, Slocum crossed the Saluda at
Hart's Ferry, and on the 17th, marching by OakviUe and Eock-
vUle, reached the Broad Eiver, near Alston. Encamping there
on the 18th, on the 19th the left wing crossed the Broad,
entered Alston, and began breaking up the raUways near that
place. The Spartansburg raUway was destroyed for fourteen
mUes to the northward of Alston, as far as and including the
bridge over the Broad Eiver. On the 20th, Slocum crossed
Little Eiver and reached Winnsboro' on the 21st.
Sherman, with the right wing, having destroyed aU that
remained of Columbia likely to be of any use for mihtary pur
poses, marched on the 20th directly on Winnsboro', the
FHteenth Corps moving along the raUway and destroying it,

344 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
and the Seventeenth Corps on a paraUel road. On the 21st,
Howard reached Winnsboro'.
The movements of the cavaky acting separately on the ex
treme left fiank of the army, and concealing as weU as covering
the movements of the infantry columns, must noAv be brought
doAvn to the same period. KUpatrick, as we have already seen
in foUowing the march of the infantry, reached EobertvUle on
the 3d of February, and thence marched on the 4tli to Law-
tonviUe, on the 5th to AUandale, and on the 6th, having de
monstrated weU towards Augusta, driring a brigade of the
enemy's cavalry before him, turned short to the right and
crossed the Salkehatchie just below BamweU.
The enemy, about three hundred strong, occupied a weU-
chosen position, behind earthworks on the opposite side of the
river, commanding the bridge, which was already on fire ; but
the Ninth Ohio Cavaky, Colonel Hamilton, and the Ninety-
second lUinois Mounted Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Van
Buskirk, dashed through the swamp, the men wading in the
water up to thek arm-pits, crossed the stream on trees feUed
by the pioneers, and under cover of a rapid fire of artiUery,
gaUantly carried the works, driAong the enemy in confusion
towards the toAvn of Barnwell. Only a portion of the bridge
being destroyed, the fireAvas extinguished, and it was quickly re
paked, and KUpatrick entered the town of BamweU at four p. m.
On the morning of the 7th, he struck the Charleston and
Atlanta railway at BlackviUe, driving a brigade of Wheeler's
cavah-y from the toAvn. The advance was engaged alone with
the enemy at this point, in a very spirited affair, Avherein
Colonel Jordan, Captain Estes, assistant-adjutant-general,
and Captain Northrope greatly distinguished themselves.
Here the cavaky rested, destroying track during the 7tli
and 8th, and on the evening of the 8th moved up the raUway
in the direction of Augusta, as far as WUHston Station. After
posting pickets on the various roads leading from the town,
and before going into camp, an attack was made on Spencer's
brigade, holding the dkect road to Augusta. KUpatrick di
rected Colonel Spencer at once to move out with his brigade, feel

THROUGH SOUTH CAROLINA. 345
the enemy and ascertain his strength. A spkited fight ensued,
in which six regiments of Allen's dirision of Wheeler's cavaky,
namely, the Fkst, Third, Seventh, Ninth, TweHth, and Fifty-
first Alabama, were totaUy routed. Colonel Spencer conducted
the fight unaided, and displayed skUl and gaUantry. One
officer and many men of the enemy were kUled, a large number
wounded, several prisoners were taken, and five battle-fiags
captured. Colonel Spencer pressed the pursuit so closely, for
a distance of seven or eight mUes, that the enemy was finaUy
forced to leave the road and scatter through the woods and
swamps, in order to escape. At WUHston, KUpatrick re
mained till ten A. M. next day, one-thkd of his entire command
being employed in tearing up the track, three miles of which
were effectuaUy destroyed, together with the depot and two cars.
On the 9th of February, he moved along the raihvay to
Windsor, and thence to Johnson's Station,' destroying portions
of the track up to that point.
The cavalry had moved from BlackriUe in such a manner,
and KUpatrick had so manoeuvred, as to create the impression
on the minds of the enemy in Augusta, that his movement was
the advance of the main irmy dkectly on that place. On the
morning of the 11th, it was found that this feint was a com
plete success. Wheeler haring left the Edisto unguarded and
uncovered Columbia, had, by marching day and night, reached
Aiken at daylight that morning with his entke command.
To make certain of this, Atkins' brigade was dkected to move
from Johnson's Station, and reconnoitre in the direction of
Aiken. His advance entered the toA^-n without opposition, and
a moment afterwards, being furiously attacked by Wheeler's
entire force, fell back, gaUantly fighting and disputing every
foot of ground to the position of the main body at Johnson's,
thus giving Kilpatrick sufficient time to make aU neces
sary arrangements to check Wheeler's further advance. At
eleven A. m., Wheeler, Arith one brigade, feigned upon KUpat
rick's left fiank, and charged, mounted, Arith his entke command,
but was handsomely repulsed Arith a loss on his part of thkty-
one kUled, one hundred and sixty wounded, and sixty taken

346 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS
prisoners. Wheeler made no further attack, but fell back to
his former position at Aiken.
Ealpatrick remained at Johnson's, destroying the raUway
and constantly demonstrating towards Augusta, tUl the night
of the 12th, when he left Wheeler's front, crossed the South
Fork of the Edisto at Guignard's Bridge, and encamped four
mUes beyond, picketing the river as high up as Pine Log
Bridge. On the 14th, the cavaky encamped on the south bank of the
North EcHsto, crossed on the 15th, and moved weU in on the
left of Daris' fourteenth corps, and marching paraUel with it,
struck the Lexington and Augusta road, northward of and
nine mUes from the former place. Only fifteen hundred of
Wheeler's cavaky had then passed over the road in the dkec
tion of Columbia, the majority of his command being inter
cepted by KUpatrick's movement, as Cheatham's corps was by
that of the infantry.
On the 17th, KUpatrick crossed the Saluda Eiver, moved
north, and found that Wheeler had akeady crossed and was
moving for the raUway bridge over the Broad Eiver at Alston's.
AU day on the 18th, KUpatrick marched paraUel to Cheat
ham's corps, moving on Newberry, and at some points not
over three mUes distant from it, a bad stream alone preventing
him from striking the enemy in flank. KUpatrick struck the
railway at Pomaria Station, destroyed a portion of the track,
the depot, and several bridges between that point and Broad
Eiver, and reached Alston's Station, on Broad Eiver, on the
evening of the 18th.
On the 19th he crossed the Broad Eiver, and on the evening
of the 20th reached MonticeUo, and found that Wheeler had
akeady crossed the river and was moring on Chesterfield.
Winnsboro', where Sherman's infantry was now massed, is
situated on the Charlotte and South CaroHna raUway, seventy
mUes south of Charlotte, North Carolina, and thkty-nine mUes
north of Columbia. MonticeUo is nearly opposite, between
Winnsboro' and the Broad Eiver. The movement of the en
tke army so far in this dkection served to support the theory

THROUGH SOUTH CAROLINA. 347
that Sherman was aiming to reach Virginia by the inland
route, by way of Charlotte.
In the mean whUe, Beauregard had been reheved from the
chief command of the Confederate forces operating against
Sherman, and the Confederate Congress, stung into actirity by
the presence of an unexpected and alarming danger threaten
ing to overwhelm thek cause, had Asnmg from Jefferson Davis
the reappointment of General Johnston to the dupreme con
trol of aU the troops west of the Chattahoochee Eiver and
south of Virginia. Johnston had taken up a position at Char
lotte, concentrating there the forces with which Beauregard had
evacuated Columbia and the local garrisons and mihtia of North
Carolina, re-enforced to some extent from Lee's army, and was
awaiting the arrival of the remnants of the Confederate Army
of the Tennessee. The remains of Cheatham's corps had
reached BranchriUe as Sherman pushed rapidly past that
place and on to Orangeburg, and had been cut off fr-om John
ston by the dkection of Sherman's march and the burning of
the bridges over the Saluda.
With an army so greatly inferior, not only in numbers,
but noAV also in spkit and morale, Johnston's task was an
exceedingly difficult one. The abandonment of Columbia was
the turning point of the campaign. That gained, Sherman
could choose his line of march and feint on Charlotte whUe
moving on FayetteviUe or WUmington, or march on the
former place whUe feigning on the latter, at his pleasure.
That lost, the Confederate commander must choose Char
lotte or Goldsboro' as his defensive point. They are too
far distant to warrant the attempt to defend both. E he
chose Goldsboro', he would not only seriously expose his rear
and flank to a movement from the dkection of Newborn or the
Eoanoke, but Sherman would be able to march quietly
through Charlotte to the James. E, on the contrary, he de
cided to defend Charlotte, the defence of Goldsboro' and the
seaboard must be left to chance. An army too weak to hold
Columbia against an enemy moring from Georgia on North
Carolina would almost necessarUy loose the whole country

348 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
south of the Eoanoke. Daris took no steps to restore the
campaign untU Columbia was abandoned. Then the cam
paign was lost.
Sherman pushed his advantage to the utmost. On the 22d
of February, Slocum continued his march towards Charlotte,
thoroughly destroyed the raUway as far as Blackstock, or
Blackstakes Station, fifteen mUes from Winnsboro' and fifty-
five from Charlotte, and then facing to the right, marched for
the Wateree or Catawba Eiver, and reached it that night at
Rocky Mount. During the night a pontoon bridge was laid
across the Catawba, and WUHams' twentieth corps crossed on
the morning and afternoon of the 23d, followed in the night by
KUpatrick's cavalry, which moved rapidly on Lancaster, dis
tant about forty mUes from Charlotte, Arith the object of keep
ing ahve the idea entertained by the Confederates that the
army was moring on the latter place. On the evening of the
23d, a heavy rain began to faU, lasting until the 26th, and
sweUing the rivers so that the pontoons were carried away,
and it was impossible for the troops to cross, and rendering
the roads almost impracticable. WUHams' twentieth corps
reached Hanging Eock on the 26th, and there waited untU the
1st of March for Jefferson C. Davis to come up with the
Fourteenth Corps, which had been left on the left bank of the
Catawba by the flood and the consequent destruction of the
pontoon bridge.
Howard's right Aving haring destroyed the raUway up to
Winnsboro', marched thence on the 22d of February, crossed
the Catawba at Peay's Ferry, and moved on CheraAv, Blair's
seventeenth corps on the right, by TUler's and KeUy's bridges
over Lynch's Creek, and Logan's fifteenth corps taking the
direct road on the left by way of Young's Bridge. A detach-
,ment of Logan's fifteenth corps, by a detour to the right.
entered Camden on the 28th of February, and burned the
bridges over the Catawba, and the depot of the Camden
Branch raihvay. A small force of mounted men, under Captain
Duncan, sent out to break the WUmington and Manchester
raUway, was met by Butler's cHris'"on of Confederate cavahy,

THROUGH SOUTH CAROLINA. 349
at Mount CHo, and after a sharp skkmish returned unsuccess
ful. At Lynch's Creek, Sherman halted the right Aving for three
days to give time for Slocum Arith the left Aring to come up.
From MonticeUo, the cavaky moved to Blackstock, or
Blackstakes, on the Columbia and Charlotte raUway, and dem
onstrated strongly in the dkection of Chester untU the main
army had secured the passage of the Catawba', then drew off
across that river, moved to Lancaster, and again demonstrated
in the dkection of Charlotte. Wheeler and Hampton had now
combined thek forces weU in KUpatrick's front, but by dem
onstrations, feints, and weU-planned derices, were deceived
as to his real movements for several days ; and it was not untU
the main army had crossed Lynch's Creek and reached the
Great Pedee that they discovered thek mistake.
WUHams' twentieth corps having waited at Hanging Eock
from the 26th to the 28th of February, for Daris' fourteenth
corps to come up, on the 1st of March the left wing, united,
moved to Horton's Ferry on Lynch's Creek ; and on the 2d,
the Twentieth Corps entered Chesterfield, skkmishing Arith
Butler's division of the enemy's cavaky.
At noon, on the 3d, Blair's seventeenth corps entered
Cheraw, capturing twenty-five pieces of artUlery and a large
quantity of ammunition and material, which had been removed
from Charleston when that city was evacuated. The guns and
stores were destroyed, and the trestles and bridges of the
Cheraw and Darhngton raUway burned as far as the latter
place ; but a mounted force sent out to destroy the com
munication between Florence and Charleston encountered a
superior body of the enemy, comprising both cavalry and
infantry, and was compeUed to return without accomplishing
its chief object. Logan's iHteenth corps met with great difficul
ties in crossing Lynch's and Black creeks, four days being
occupied in the passage of the former stream, which rose to
such an extent immediately after Corse's dirision, leading,
reached the east bank, that the other three divisions could
not have foUowed at once without SArimming the animals more
than three-quarters of a mUe. Upon the occupation of Cheraw

350 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
by Blak the enemy retreated beyond the Great Pedee Eiver,
and burned the bridge over that stream.
On the 5th of March, the army began to cross the Great
Pedee, the right Aring at Cheraw, the left Aving and the cavaky
at Sneedsboro'.
On the 6th, both Arings were massed on the east bank of the
Great Pedee, and the army began its movement dkectly on
FayetteviUe ; Blak's seventeenth corps leading the right wing,
and Davis' fourteenth corps taking the right of the left vring,
and moving by Love's Bridge over the Lumber Eiver, so as
to be the first to enter the toAvn, whUe Kilpatrick's cavaky
was kept well out on the left fiank.
From the time of learing Cheraw and Chesterfield, the
heavy rains, which had previously so greatly obstructed the
movements of the army, continued Arithout intermission untU
FayetteviUe was reached. The numerous smaU streams be
came swoUen by the floods and very difficult to pass, and the
loose soU was soon worked, by the passage of troops and
trains, into a quicksand of unknoA^oi depth, in which the ani
mals became hopelessly mked, and many were even lost. The
days were spent by the soldiers in wearUy dragging through
the mud ; the nights, in corduroying to make a way for the
trains. DaA'is, vrith the Fourteenth Corps, reached Love's Bridge
over the Lumber Eiver on the 7th of March, crossed, marched
to Arithin twenty mUes of FayetteriUe on the 9th, ten mUes
nearer on the 10th, and on the 11th entered the toAvn.
Blair's seventeenth corps reached Laurel TTin on the 8th,
GUchrist's Bridge over the Lumber on the 9th, and marched
into FayetteviUe on the 12th.
As the army approached this point both Arings moved more
cautiously, expecting Hardee to make a fight in front of the
toAvn, and to defend the crossing of the Cape Fear Eiver ; but,
undoubtecUy in consequence of his inferiority in numbers, he
retked Arithout offering any serious opposition, retreated be-
j ond the river, and burned the bridge after him.
KUpatrick, having sent out a part of his command to Mon-

THROUGH SOUTH CAROLINA. 351
roe and Wadesboro', crossed the Great Pedee on the night of
the 6th of March, and occupied Eockingham on the 7th, after
a skirmish with Butler's division of Hampton's Confederate
cavalry. On the 8th, Kilpatrick crossed the Lumber Eiver at Love's
Bridge, and at Solemn Grove came upon the rear of Hardee,
¦who was then in fuU retreat on FayettevUle, on the Charlotte
road. Learning from prisoners that Hampton's cavaky was
stUl in the rear of Hardee's troops, but rapidly moving in the
same dkection, Kilpatrick now determined to intercept him.
Hampton was marching upon two roads ; the Morgantown
road, and one three miles further to the north and paraUel
Arith it. Dkectly south and east from Solemn Grove, KUpat
rick posted upon each road a brigade of cavaky ; and learning
that there was a road' stiU further north, upon which the en
emy's troops might move, he made a rapid night's march Arith
Colonel Spencer's brigade, increased by four hundred dis-
moimted men and one section of artUlery, and took post at a
point where the road last mentioned intersects the MorgantoAvn
road. During the early part of the evening, KUpatrick Arith
his staff had left General Atkins and joined Colonel Spencer,
and actuaUy ridden through one division of Hampton's cavaky,
which by eleven o'clock had flanked General Atkins, and was
encamped Arithin three miles of Colonel Spencer. KUpatrick's
escort, consisting of fifteen men and one officer, was captured,
but the general himseH escaped with his staff.
General Atkins and Colonel Jordan discovered, about nine
o'clock, that whUe Hampton was amusing them in fr-ont, he
was passing Arith his main force on a road to the right. These
officers at once made every effort to reach Kilpatrick before
dayhght, but failed to do so owing to the bad roads and almost
incessant skkmishing with the enemy, who were marching
paraUel with them, and at some points scarcely a mUe distant.
Hampton had marched aU day, and rested his men about
three mUes from Colonel Jordan's position. At two o'clock
Ln the morning, just before dayhght, he suddenly and furiously
charged Kilpatrick's position Arith Horner's, Allen's, and

352 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
Butler's divisions. Hampton led the centre dirision, Butler's,
and in an instant had driven back the Union troops, taken
possession of the headquarters, and captured aU the artUlery,
and KUpatrick's whole command was in fuU flight. Colonel
Spencer and a large portion of the general's staff were taken
prisoners. Kilpatrick succeeded in escaping on foot and gaining the
cavah-y camp, a few hundred yards in the rear, where he found
the men fighting Arith the Confederate cavaky for thek camp
and animals. FinaUy they were forced back five hundred
yards further to an impassable swamp, and there, whUe the
enemy, eager for plunder, was engaged in pUlaging the cap
tured camp, KUpatrick raUied them. Inspked by his example,
and led by the general in person, on foot, they advanced
upon the enemy, retook thek camp, and, encouraged by this
success, charged the enemy in the act of harnessing the battery
horses and plundering the headquarters, retook the artiUery,
turned it upon the enemy, hardly twenty paces distant, and
finaUy forced them out of the camp with great slaughter.
KUpatrick then immediately re-estabhshed his line, and for
an hour and a haH foUed every attempt of Hampton to retake
it. At about eight o'clock. General MitcheU, with a brigade of
infantry, came within musket range, having rapidly marched
across the country from the plank-road to the assistance of the
cavalry, and at once moved into position and remained there
untU half-past one o'clock, rendering every assistance possible,
though the battle was now over.
In this engagement Kilpatrick lost four officers and fifteen
men kiUed, sixty-one men wounded, and one hundred and
three of all ranks taken prisoners.
On the 11th of March the cavaky moved into FayetteviUe,
in advance of the Fourteenth Corps, and on the 12th the
entire army was massed at that place.
From Laurel HiU, on the 8th of March, Sherman had dis
patched a brief note, by two picked couriers, through the
enemy's country, doAvn the Cape Fear Eiver to WUmington,
to apprize the commander of the Union forces on the North

THROUGH SOUTH CAROLINA. 353
Carolina coast of his progress. "We are aU weU," it said,
" and have done finely. DetaUs are, for obrious reasons,
omitted." Both of these scouts reached WUmington safely,
and on the 14th of March these glad tidings, the very first
received from the army since it swung loose from Savannah
and Beaufort, were spread before the country in an official
buUetin from the secretary of war.
On the 12th, the army-tug Daridson, Captain Ainsworth,
and the gunboat Eolus, Lieutenant-Commander Young, of the
navy, reached FayetteviUe from WUmington, with fuU intelli
gence of the important events that had transpired in other
quarters, in the eventful six weeks during which Sherman's
army was burroAring through the Carolinas. The same day
the Davidson carried back to WUmington detaUed information
of the movements and condition of the army, and fuU instruc
tions concerning Sherman's future plans, to General Terry,
who had captured Wilmington, and now commanded there, and
to General Schofield, who was at Newborn.
WhUe in South Carolina the troops exercised scarcely any
restraint with respect to the property of the inhabitants ;
plundering and destroying without stint. They regarded the
people of this State, as a body, and practicaUy Arithout
exception, as Hfe-long enemies of the Union, and conceived
that upon the army devolved the duty of punishing them for
thek sins. So general and deeply-seated was this impression,
on the part of officers and men, that it was often impossible
for thek commanders to control the manHestation of it ; but
from the moment of entering North CaroHna the whola
demeanor of the army changed, and the men yielded with
alacrity to the customary restraints of discipHne.
During the campaign General Wheeler addressed the fol-
loAving commimication to General Howard, on the subject of
destroying houses and cotton : — "Grahams, S. C, February 7, 1865.
" Genebal — I have the honor to propose that, if the troops
of your army be requked to discontinue burning the houses
of our citizens, I AriU discontinue burning cotton.
23

354 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
"As an earnest of the good faith in which my proposition is
tendered, I leave at this place about three ' hundred bales of
cotton unbumed, worth, in New York, over a quarter of a
miUion, and in our currency, one and a haH miUions. I trust
my having commenced avUI cause you to use your influence to
insure the acceptance of the proposition by your whole
jprmy. " 1 trust that you wUl not deem it improper for me to ask
that you AriU requke the troops under your command to dis
continue the wanton destruction of property not necessary for
thek sustenance.
" EespectfuUy, general, your obedient servant,
" J. Wheelee,
" Major-General C. S. A.
' Major-General 0. 0. Howard,
" United States Army, Commanding, etc."
To this General Sherman chose to reply himseH, in the fol-
loAring characteristic terms : —
" Headquaetees MxiiPrAET Division of the Mississippi,
In the field, February 8, 1865.
" Geneeal — Yours, addressed to General Howard, is re
ceived by me.
" I hope you AriU bum aU cotton, and save us the trouble.
We don't want it ; and it has proven a curse to our country.
AU you don't burn I AviU.
"As to private houses, occupied by peaceful famihes, my
orders are not to molest or disturb them, and I think my
orders are obeyed. Vacant houses, being of no use to any
body, I care httle about, as the OAvners have thought them of
no use to themselves. I don't want them destroyed, but do
not take much care to preserve them.
" I am, Arith respect, yours truly, etc.
" Major-General J. Wheeler,
Commanding Cavalry Corps Confederate Army."

THROUGH SOUTH CAROLINA. 355
On the 24th of February, after some sharp, but ineffectual,
correspondence between KUpatrick and Wheeler, in regard to
the murder of the Union prisoners and foragers, Sherman
wrote to General Wade Hampton : —
" Geneeal — It is officiaUy reported to me that our foraging
parties are murdered, after being captured, and labeUed, ' Death
to aU Foragers.' One instance is that of a Heutenant and
seven men near Chester, and another of twenty, near a ravine
eighty rods from the main road, and three mUes from Easter-
viUe. I have ordered a simUar number of prisoners in our
hands to be disposed of in Hke manner. I hold about one
thousand prisoners captured in various ways, and can stand it
as long as you, but I hardly think these murders are commit
ted with your knowledge, and would suggest that you give
notice to your people at large that every Hfe taken by them
simply results in the death of one of your confederates.
" Of course, you cannot question my right to forage in an
enemy's country. It is a war right, as old as history. The
manner of exercising it varies with ckcumstances, and H the
country wUl supply my requisitions, I avUI forbid aU foraging ;
but I find no civU authorities who can respond to caUs for
forage or prorisions, and therefore must coUect directly of the
people. " I have no doubt this is the occasion of much misbehavior
on the part of our men, but I cannot permit an enemy to
judge or punish Arith wholesale murder. PersonaUy, I regret
the bitter feelings engendered by this war, but they were to
be expected, and I simply aUege that those who struck the
first blow, and made war inevitable, ought not, in fairness, to
reproach us for the natural consequences. I merely assert
our war-right to forage, and my resolve to protect my foragers
to the extent of Hfe for Hfe.
" I am, with respect, your obedient servant."
To this General Hampton repHed at great length, and Arith
acrimony, denying his knowledge of any such murders, and

356 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
instead of investigating the ckcumstances, declaring his fixed
intention of executing two federal prisoners, preferably com
missioned officers, for every one put to death by Sherman.
As a beginning, he stated that he should hold fifty-six Union
prisoners as hostages for the safety of the twenty-eight Con
federates ordered to be executed by Sherman.
" The army," Sherman Avrote to the Heutenant-general, " is
in splendid health, condition, and spirit, although we have
had foul weather, and roads that would have stopped travel
to almost any other body of men I ever heard of. Our march
was substantiaUy what I designed  I could leave here
to-morrow, but want to clean my columns of the vast crowd of
refugees and negroes that encumber me  I hope you
have not been imeasy about us, and that the fmits of this
march AriU be appreciated."

CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENTS IN NORTH CAROLINA. 35J

CHAPTEE XXYm.
CO-OPEEATTVE MOVEMENTS IN NOETH OAEOUNA.
As soon as Sherman had reached Savannah, reported the
condition of his army, developed his plans, and received the
assent of General Grant to his proposal to march through the
Carolinas, instead of moving by water dkectly to the support
of the armies before Eichmond, as had been originaUy intended
and ordered, the Heutenant-general proceeded to put in motion
the paraUel combination necessary to insure the success of the
campaign. Sherman's objective being Goldsboro', the first step to be
taken obriously was to secure possession of WUmington, and
the control of the Cape Fear Eiver, so that suppHes might, if
needful, be sent up that stream, and KkeArise in order that no
formidable and strongly fortified garrison might be left to
menace the fiank and rear of the moving column.
In anticipation of the occasion for such an operation, and
desking to secure control of the mouth of the Cape Fear
Eiver, at a time when attention was less strongly dkected in
that quarter than would be the case when the execution of his
plans should be more fuUy developed. General Grant had, in
December, sent a large force from the Army of the James,
under Major-General Godfrey Weitzel, and the Navy Depart
ment had dispatched a powerful fleet, under Eear-Admiral
David D. Porter, to co-operate in the reduction, first of Fort
Fisher and its adjacent works on Federal Point, and after
wards of WUmington.
Major-General Benjamin F. Butler, the commander of the

358 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
Army of the James, accompanied the land forces, and assumed
control of thek movements. After numerous delays and mis
understandings, the navy opened a furious bombardment on
the afternoon of the 24th of December, 1864, and kept it up
untU nightfaU, and aU Christmas-day, at the rate of about one
shot in every two seconds. During the afternoon of the 25th,
under cover of this fire, a portion of the troops landed and
made a reconnoissance of the Confederate works ; but a storm
coming up, General Butler, after consulting Arith General
Weitzel, and ascertaining that the opinion of that officer
coincided Arith his oavu, ordered the troops akeady landed to
re-embark, and, on the 27th, Arithdrew his command on the
transport fleet and returned to the James Eiver. Admkal
Porter, however, decided to remain and continue the naval
operations as opportunity might offer.
General Grant immediately selected Major-General Alfred
Howe Terry to command the expedition, and dkected him to
renew the attempt Arithout delay, whUe the enemy were evi
dently counting on its abandonment. The choice was an
exceUent one. General Terry was a young, brave, and ac
comphshed officer, who had entered the army in the earhest
period of the war as colonel of the Tenth Eegiment of Con
necticut Volunteers ; and by active serrice, zeal, fideHty, and
gaUantry, had, step by step, won his promotion to his present
position, for which, by study and careful attention to duty, he
had taken pains to quahfy himseH. The troops placed under
his orders for the present movement, including those which
had taken part in the previous faUure, consisted of a dirision
of thkty-three hundred picked men from Ord's twenty-fourth
army corps, under Brigadier-General Adelbert Ames ; a divi
sion of like strength from Weitzel's twenty-fifth corps, under
Brigadier-General Charles J. Paine ; a brigade fourfeen hun
dred strong, also from Ord's corps, commanded by Colonel J.
C. Abbott, of the Seventh New Hampshke ; and two detached
batteries of Hght artiUery.
The expedition saUed from Hampton Eoads on the 6tk of
January, 1865, but, OAring to a severe storm, foUowed by con-

CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENTS UST NORTH CAROLINA. 359
tinuous unfavorable weather, did not reach its destination off
Federal Point and begin the disembarkation untU the morn
ing of the 13th. By three o'clock that afternoon, however,
through a heavy surf, eight thousand men, Arith three days'
rations in thek haversacks and forty rounds of baU cartridges
in thek boxes, had been landed on the beach above the fort,
under cover of the admirable disposition and effective fire of
Admkal Porter's fleet, and every thing was in readiness for an
attack. After some time lost in endeavoring to find a suitable
point for the estabhshment, across the peninsula whereon Fort
Fisher is situated, of a. Hne of defence against reinforcements
seeking to aid the garrison from the dkection of Wilmington,
by two o'clock on the 14th, Paine, with his OAvn dirision and two
brigades of Ames' division, reached a favorable position for that
purpose, and by eight o'clock had throAvn up a secure Hne of
intrenchments. During the day the enemy's works were thor
oughly reconnoitred, and General Terry determined on his
plan of attack for the morrow. Into this Admkal Porter
entered heartUy.
Accordingly, at eight o'clock on the morning of the 15th of
January, aU the fleet, except one dirision left to support the
line of defence across the neck, went into action, and opened a
powerful and accurate fire upon the fort. Withdravring the
two brigades of Ames' dirision, and leaving Paine to hold this
defensive Hne with his own dirision and Abbott's brigade, at
twenty-five minutes past three o'clock in the afternoon Terry
gave the order for Ames to move to the assault of the western
fr-ont. Simultaneously, by a concerted signal, the dkection of
the fire of the navy was changed, and Curtis' brigade of Amc s'
diA'ision sprang to the assault, whUe a battahon of marines and
seamen, under Commander Breese of the navy, rushed for
ward to storm the northeast bastion. The naval assault was
soon repulsed Arith heavy loss, but, aided by a weU-dkected
and effective fiank fire of the fleet, continued against the fort
up to six o'clock p. M., Ames, afterwards re-enforced by Ab
bott's brigade and the Twenty-seventh United States Colored
regiment, of Paine's division, succeeded in effecting an entrance

360 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
into the work, and, fighting hand to hand across the embank
ments, from traverse to traverse, over nine in succession, by
nine o'clock at night the last opposition of the enemy died out,
the entke work was in undisputed possession of General Terry
and his gaUant troops, and the garrison were prisoners.
Hoke's dirision of the Confederate army came doAva from
Wilmington during the fight, and observed Paine's Hne, but
did not attack it.
On the 16th and 17th of January, the enemy blew up Fort
CasweU, and abandoned it and the extensive works on Smith's
Island, at SmithvUle and Eeeve's Point. These points were
immediately occupied by General Terry, and the fleet took
up position in the river and along the coast, to defend his
flanks. Thus the mouth of Cape Fear Eiver was in the secure pos
session of the combined land and naval forces under General
Terry and Admiral Porfer. The next step was to take WU
mington. In the mean whUe, other troops were moving in the same
dkection from the far west. As soon as the crushing defeat
of Hood, and the substantial destruction of the offensive power
of his army by Thomas, had Hberated a portion of the Union
armies defending Tennessee and Kentucky for active opera
tion in other quarters, the Heutenant-general had detached
Schofield Arith his Twenty-thkd Corps, and ordered him to An-
napoHs. The order to this effect was received by General
Schofield on the 14th of January, at Clifton, on the Tennessee
Eiver, where water transportation had been coUected to move
the command to Eastport, in accordance vrith prerious plans,
and on the foUowing day the movement began.
The troops moved Arith thek artiUery and horses, but Arith
out' wagons, by steam transports to Cincinnati, Ohio, and
thence by raUway to Washington and Alexandria, Virginia ; a
second order from Washington having, in the mean time,
changed the destination from AnnapoHs. Although in mid-
vrinter, and the weather unusuaUy severe, even for that season,
the movement was effected Arithout delay, accident, or suffer-

CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENTS IN NORTH CAROLINA. 361
ing on the part of the troops, and by the 31st of January the
whole command had arrived at Washington and Alexandria.
At the latter place great and unavoidable delay was caused
by the freezing of the Potomac, which rendered its narigation
impossible much of the time for several weeks. MeanwhUe
General Schofield went to Fort Monroe, met General Grant,
and proceeded Arith him to the mouth of Cape Fear Eiver to
consult with Admiral Porter and General Terry relative to
future operations. On thek return to Washington an order was
issued from the War Department creating the Department of
North Carolina, and assigning General Schofield to its com
mand, and he now received General Grant's instructions
charging him Arith the conduct of the campaign in that de
partment, and indicating its plan and objects.
As soon as it became possible to narigate the Potomac,
Schofield started from Alexandria Arith Major-General Cox's
dirision of the Twenty-thkd Corps, reached the mouth of Cape
Fear Eiver on the 9th of February, and landed upon the pen
insula near Fort Fisher.
The enemy stiU occupied Fort Anderson on the west bank
of the river, with a coUateral Hne running to a large swamp
about three-quarters of a mUe distant, and a Hne opposite
Fort Anderson running across the peninsula from Cape Fear
Eiver to Masonboro' Sound. This position was impregnable
against direct attack, and could be turned only by crossing
Masonboro' Sound above the enemy's left, or passing around
the swamp which covered his right.
The force which General Schofield then had was eridently
too smaU for so extended a movement as either of these ; but
time being aU-important, he determined to make the attempt
Arithout waiting for the arrival of reinforcements.
On the 11th of February, he pushed forward General Terry's
line, supported by General Cox's dirision, drove in the enemy's
pickets, and intrenched in a new position, close enough to tho
enemy's line to compel him to hold the latter in force. He
then made preparations to send a fleet of navy boats and pon
toons by sea to a point on the beach above the enemy's posi-

362 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
tion, whUe a force composed of Cox's division of the Twenty-
thkd Corps and Ames' cHrision of the Twenty-fourth Corps,
was to march along the beach in the night to the point where
the boats were to land, haul them across into the sound, and
cross the latter to the main-land in rear of Hoke's position at
WUmington. The weather, however, became so stormy as to render the
execution of this plan impossible. On the night of February
14th, Schofield attempted to move the pontoons upon thek
wagons along the beach with the troops, but the unusuaUy
high tides caused by the heavy sea-Arind made it impracticable
to reach the point of crossing before dayhght in the morning,
when the movement would be discovered by the enemy before
a crossing of the sound could be secured. Hence, after a hard
night's work, the attempt was abandoned, and Schofield turned
attention to the enemy's right, where the difficulties of both
land and sea would not have to be jointly encountered.
Cox's and Ames' dirisions were crossed over to SmithvUle,
where they were joined by Colonel Moore's brigade of Couch's
dirision of the Twenty-thkd Corps, which had just debarked,
and advanced along the main WUmington road untU they
encountered the enemy's position at Fort Anderson and the
adjacent works. Here two brigades were intrenched to oc
cupy . the enemy, whUe General Cox, Arith his other two
brigades and Ames' dirision, marched around the swamp
covering the enemy's right, to strike the WUmington xoad in
rear of Fort Anderson. The distance to be traveUed was about
fiifteen miles.
The enemy, warned by his cavaky of General Cox's move
ment, hastUy abandoned his works on both sides of the river
during the night of the 19th of February, and feU back behind
ToAvn Creek on the west, and to a corresponding position,
covered by swamps, on the east. Thus, with but trifling loss
and Asithout serious opposition. General Schofield gained the
main defences of Cape Fear Eiver and of WUmington, Arith
ten pieces of heavy ordnance and a large amount of ammu
nition.

CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENTS IN NORTH CAROLESTA. 363
On the foUowing day General Cox pursued the enemy to
Tovm Creek, behind which he was found intrenched, having
destroyed the only bridge across that stream. General Terry
also encountered the enemy in his new position, and in force
superior to his own. Ames' division was recrossed to the east
bank, and joined Terry during the night of the 19th.
On the 20th, General Cox crossed Town Creek below tho
enemy's position, by the use of a single flat-boat found in the
stream ; and, by wading through swamps, reached the enemy's
flank and rear, attacked and routed him, capturing two pieces
of artUlery, three hundred and seventy-five prisoners, besides
the kiUed and wounded, and dispersed the remainder. During
the night General Cox rebuUt the bridge, crossed his artUlery,
and the next morning pushed on towards WUmington without
opposition. General Terry was unable to make any further
advance, but occupied the attention of aU of Hoke's force, so
that he could not send any to replace that which Cox had de
stroyed. On the 21st, General Cox secured a portion of the enemy's
pontoon bridge across Brunswick Eiver, which they had at
tempted to destroy, placed a portion of his troops on Eagle
Island, and threatened to cross the Cape Fear above Wilming
ton. The enemy at once set fire to thek steamers, cotton, and
miHtary and naval stores, and abandoned the toAvn of WU
mington. General Terry's troops entered it Avithout opposition
early in the morning of the 22d of February, and pm-sued the
enemy*across Northeast Eiver.
The total loss of General Schofield's troops in the operations
fr-om February 11th to the capture of Wilmington was about
two, hundred officers and men, kUled and wounded. FHty-one
pieces of heavy ordnance, fifteen Hght pieces, ' and a large
amount of ammunition feU into the hands of the captors.
The next thing to be done was to take and hold Goldsboro'.
The instructions given to General Schofield by the heutenant-
general contemplated, in the event of a faUure to reach that
place, the occupation of some point as far as possible from the
coast on the raUway lines connecting it with Goldsboro', and

364 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
the reconstruction of the raUways leading to the rear. Either
WUmington or Newborn would be the base according to cir
cumstances. The object was twofold : Fkstly, to render
material assistance to Sherman, if necessary, in his northward
march ; Secondly, to open a secure base of suppHes for him
on Hne of that march.
Having no roUing-stock at WUmington, and being nearly
destitute of wagon transportation, Schofield was compeUed to
operate from Newborn alone for the capture of Goldsboro'.
He had akeady sent thither about five thousand troops belong
ing to Sherman's army, and dkected Brigadier-General Innis
N. Palmer, commanding the garrison, to move, Arith as Httle
delay as practicable, with aU his avaUable force towards Kins-
ton, to cover the workmen engaged in repaking the raUway.
As soon as WUmington was secured, Euger's division of the
Twenty-thkd Corps, which was then arriving at Cape Fear
inlet, was also sent by sea to Morehead City, to re-enforce the
column moving from Newborn.
On the 25th, finding that General Palmer, instead of moving
promptly, had come to Wilmington to consult in regard to
detaUs and difficulties. General Schofield ordered Major-
General Cox to take command at Newborn, and push forward
at once.
Couch's dirision of the Twenty-thkd Corps, which had
nearly completed its debarkation when WUmington was cap
tured, was brought to that place, and Arith Cox's, temporarUy
commanded by Brigadier-General EeUly, was prepared as
rapidly as possible to join the column moving from Newborn
by a land march. These arrangements were made because
of the scarcity of both land and sea transportation. Itjpyas
not untU March 6th that wagons enough became avaUable,
including those belonging to General Terry's command, to
move the two dirisions from WUmington to Kinston*
On the 6th, General Couch set out Arith his oavu and Cox's
divisions of the Twenty-thkd Corps, and marched by Onslow
and Eichland's for Kinston.
On the same day General Schofield went by sea to More-

CO-OPERATIVE MOATEMENTS IN NORTH CAROLINA. 365
head City, and joined General Cox beyond Newborn on the
8th. General Cox had advanced to Wise's Forks, about one
and a haH mUes below Southwest Creek, and the raUway was
in rapid progress.
The force in front of General Cox, which, from the best in
formation at hand, was supposed to consist of Hoke's dirision
and a smaU body of reserves, had faUen back behind South
west Creek, and General Cox had sent two regiments, under
Colonel Upham, Fifteenth Connecticut Volunteers, to secure
the crossing of the creek on the Dover road. The enemy, hav
ing been re-enforced by a portion of the old Confederate Army
of Tennessee, recrossed the creek some distance above the
Dover road, came doAvn in rear of Colonel Upham's position,
and surprised and captured nearly his entire command, num
bering about seven hundred men. The enemy then advanced,
and endeavored to penetrate between Carter's and Palmer's
dirisions, respectively occupying the Dover -road and the raU
way, but was checked by Euger's dirision of the Twenty-thkd
Corps, Avhich was just arriving upon the field. There was no
further engagement during the day beyond Hght skkmishing,
and the loss on either side, ¦with the exception of the prisoners
captured Arith Colonel Upham, were insignificant.
It being evident that the enemy's force was at least equal
to that of General Cox, and that reinforcements were reaching
them as rapidly as they could -be brought by raU, General
Schofield dkected General Cox to put his troops in position,
intrench them securely, and await the arrival of General
Couch. On the 9th of March, the enemy pressed Schofield's line
strongly, and felt for its flanks. Heavy skkmishing was kept
up during the day, but no assault was made.
On the 10th, the enemy having been largely re-enforced, and
doubtless learning of the approach of General Couch's column,
made a heavy attack upon General Cox's left and centre, but
was decisively repulsed, and vrith heavy loss. Both attacks
were met mainly by Euger's division of the Twenty-thkd
Corps, a portion of which had been rapidly transferred from

360 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
the centre to the left to meet the attack there, and then re
turned to the centre in time to repel the attempt on that portion
of the line. The enemy retreated in confusion fr-om the field,
leaving his kUled and wounded, as weU as a large number of
arms and intrenching tools, and during the night feU back
across the Neuse, and burned the bridge over that river. The
loss of Schofield's army in this engagement was about three
bfndred kiUed and wounded.
On the 11th, vrithout further opposition. General Couch
aiTived with his two dirisions of the Twenty-third Corps, and
effected a junction Arith f&e forces uncler General Cox.
Having no pontoon train, Schofield was unable to cross the
Neuse untU the bridge could be repaked, or the pontoons,
which had just arrived from the North, could be brought by
raUway from Morehead City. The crossing was effected with
out opposition on the 14th, the enemy haring abandoned
Kinston, and moved rapidly towards Smithfield to join the
force under Johnston, who was then actively engaged in con
centrating aU his avaUable force to oppose Schofield's advance
from FayetteviUe.
General Schofield showed equal energy in pushing his ad
vance straight on its destination in spite of obstacles, and skill
in resisting the attempt of the enemy to break up his concen
tration on Kinston. The junction at that place, in the pres
ence of the enemy, though behind the Neuse, of two columns
moving simultaneously from WUmington and Newborn was
not only justified but demanded, at once by the lack of trans
portation for a preparatory concentration at Newborn, and by
the necessity for avoiding a moment's delay ; but it was an
operation of exceeding dehcacy, and in the hands of a com
mander less skiHul in his designs, less mature in judgment,
less prompt in decision, or less complete in execution, might
have produced the most unfavorable results. The manner inV
which it was accomphshed proved the wisdom displayed by
the Heutenant-general in the selection of General Schofield for
this important command.

TO GOLDSBORO'. 367

CHAPTEE XXIX.
TO GOLDSBOEO*.
.The 12th, 13th, and 14th of March were passed by Sher
man's army at FayetteviUe, in totaUy destroying the United
States arsenal and the extensive machinery which had formerly
belonged to the old United States armory at Harper's Ferry,
and which had been removed thence after the attempted de
struction of the works by fire in AprU, 1861, and used since
that time in the manufacture and repair of arms for the Con
federate troops. Every buUding was knocked doAvn and
burned, and every piece of machinery utterly broken up and
ruined, by the Fkst Eegiment Michigan Engineers, under the
immediate supervision of Colonel O. M. Poe, chief-engineer
of the Mihtary Division. Much valuable property of great
use to an enemy was here destroyed, or cast into the river.
Up to this period, Sherman had perfectly succeeded in in
terposing his superior army between the scattered parts of the
enemy. But the fragments that had left Colunibia under
Beauregard had been re-enforced by Cheatham's corps from
the West and the garrison of Augusta, and ample' time had
been given to move them to Sherman's front and flank about
Ealeigh. Hardee had also succeeded in getting across Cape
Fear Eiver, and could therefore complete the junction with
Hoke. These forces, when once united, would constitute an
army, probably superior to Sherman's in cavaky and formida
ble enough in artUlery and infantry tO justHy him in extreme
caution in taking the last step necessary to complete the
march. Sherman accordiugly sent orders to Schofield to move
immediately, with aU his avaUable force, dkectly on Goldsboro',

368 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
aiming to reach that place nearly simultaneously Arith the main
army on the 20th of March. WhUe the work of destruction
was going on at FayetteviUe, two pontoon bridges were laid
across Cape Fear Eiver, one opposite the toAvn, the other three
mUes below it.
General KUpatrick was ordered to move up the plank-road
to and beyond Averysboro'. He was to be foUowed by four
dirisions of Slocum's left Aring, Arith as few wagons as possi
ble ; the rest of the train, under escort of the two remaining
dirisions of that Aring, to take a shorter and more dkect road
to Goldsboro'. In Hke manner. General Howard was ordered
to send his trains, under good escort, weU to the right, to
ward Faison's Depot and Goldsboro', and to hold four divi
sions Hght, ready to go to the aid of the left Aring H attacked
whUe in motion.
The weather continued very bad, and the roads had become
a mere quagmke. Almost every foot of them had to be cordu
royed to admit the passage of wheels. StUl, time was so im
portant, that punctuaUy, according to orders, the columns
moved out from Cape Fear Eiver on Wednesday, the 15th of
March. General Sherman himseH accompanied General Slocum,
who, preceded by KUpatrick's cavaky, moved up the river or
plank-road that day to Kyle's Landing, KUpatrick skkmishing
heavUy Arith the enemy's rear-guard about three mUes beyond,
near Taylor's Hole Creek. At General KUpatrick's request,
General Slocum sent forward a brigade of infantry to hold a
line of barricades.
Next morning, the 16th, the column advanced in the same
order, and developed the enemy, Arith artiUery, infantry, and
cavaky, in an intrenched position iu front of the point where
the road branches off towards Goldsboro' through BentonvUle.
Hardee, in retreating from FayetteviUe, had halted in the
narrow swampy neck between Cape Fear and South rivers, m
the hope of holding Sherman there, in order to save time for
the concentration of Johnston's armies at some point to his
rear, such as Ealeigh, Smithfield, or Goldsboro'. Hardee's force

,^-

^'K7C rv

li '(ii.harclson, P'/blu-.tie

TO GOLDSBORO'. 369
was now estimated by General Sherman at twenty thousand
men. It was necessary to dislodge him, that the advancing
army might have the use of the Goldsboro' road, as also to
keep up the feint on Ealeigh as long as possible. General
Slocum was therefore ordered to press and carry the position,
only difficult by reason of the nature of the ground, which was
so soft that horses would sink everywhere, and even men could
hardly make their way over the common pine-barren.
Williams' twentieth corps had the lead, and Ward's
division the advance. Thisiwas deployed, and the skirmish
line developed the position of Ehett's brigade of Confederate
Heavy ArtiUery, armed as infantry, posted across the road
behind a light parapet, with a battery of guns enfilading the
approach across a cleared field. General WiUiams sent Case's
brigade by a ckcuit to his left, turned this Hne, and by a
quick charge broke Ehett's brigade, which rapidly retreated
to a second Hne better constructed and more strongly held.
Winnegar's battery of artiUery, weU posted, under the imme
diate cHrection of Major Eeynolds, chief of artUlery of WiUiams'
corps, did good execution on the retreating brigade, and, on
advancing Ward's diAdsion of the Twentieth Corps over this
ground. General WUHams captured three guns and two hun
dred and seventeen prisoners, of whom sixty-eight were
wounded and left in a neighboring house Arith a rebel officer
four men, and five days' rations. As Ward's dirision advanced,
the enemy developed a second and stronger Hne, when Jack
son's dirision was deployed forward on the right of Ward, and
the tAvo divisions of Jefferson C. Daris' fourteenth corps on the
left, Avell towards the Cape Fear Eiver. At the same time, KU
patrick, who was acting in concert Arith General WiUiams, was
ordered to draw back his cavaky, and mass it on the extreme
right, and, in concert Arith Jackson's right, to feel forward for
the Goldsboro' road. He got a brigade on the road, but it
was furiously attacked by McLaws' rebel division, and though
it fought weU and hard, was compelled to return to the flank
of the infantry. The whole line advanced late in the afternoon,
drove the enemy weU Arithin his intrenched line, and pressed
34

370 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
him so hard, that next morning he was gone, having retreated
in a very stormy night over the worst of roads.
The aggregate loss of the left Aving, in the battle of Averys
boro', was twelve officers and sixty-five men killed, and four
hundred and seventy-seven wounded.
Ward's division foUowed to and through Averysboro', de
veloping the fact that Hardee had retreated, not on Ealeigh,
but on Smithfield. Sherman had the night before directed
KUpatrick to cross South Eiver at a mUl-dam to the right rear,
and move up on the east side towards Elevation.
Leaving Ward's dirision to keep up a show of pursuit,
Slocum's column was turned to the right, buUt a bridge across
the swollen South Eiver, and took the Goldsboro' road, Kil
patrick crossing to the north in the direction of Elevation,
with orders to move eastward, watching that flank. In the
mean time, the wagon-trains and guards, as also Ho^ward's
column, were waUoAring along the miry roads towards Ben-
tonviUe and Goldsboro'. The enemy's infantry, as before
stated, had retreated on Smithfield, and his cavalry retked
across Sherman's front in the same dkection, burning the
bridges over MUl Creek.
Sherman continued with the head of Slocum's column, and
encamped, on the night of the 18th, with him on the Goldsboro'
road, twenty-seven mUes from Goldsboro' and about five mUes
from BentonviUe, at a point where the road fr-om Chnton to
Smithfield crosses the Goldsboro' road. Howard was at Lee's
Store, only two mUes south of that place, and both columns
had pickets throAvn three mUes forward to the point where
the two roads unite and become common to Goldsboro'.
Every indication conduced to the behef that the enemy
would make no further opposition to Sherman's progress, and
would not attempt to strike him in flank whUe in motion.
Accordingly, dkecting Howard to move his right Aring by the
new Goldsboro' road, by way of FaUing Creek Church, Sher
man in person joined Howard's column, Arith a view to open
communication Arith General Schofield, coming up from New-
bem, aud Terry from Wilmington. He found General Howard's

TO GOLDSRORO'. 371
column weU strung out, owing to the very bad roads, and
did not overtake him in person untU he had reached Falhng
Creek Church, with one regiment thrown forward to the
cross-roads near Cox's Bridge across the Neuse. The gen
eral had reached a distance of about six mUes fr-om General
Slocum when he heard artUlery in that direction, but was soon
made easy by one of his staff-officers overtaking him, explain
ing that Carlin's dirision of the Fourteenth Corps, leading, had
encountered DibbreU's dirision of rebel cavalry, which it was
easUy driring. But soon other staff-officers came up, report
ing that Slocum had developed near BentonviUe the whole of
the rebel army under General Johnston himseH. Sherman
immediately sent orders to Slocum to caU up the two divisions
guarding his wagon-trains, and Hazen's diA'ision of the FH
teenth Corps, stUl back near Lee's Store ; and to fight de
fensively untU Blak's corps, then near Mount OHve Station,
with the three remaining divisions of the FHteenth Corps,
came up on Johnston's left rear from the direction of Cox's
Bridge. In the mean time, while on the road, Sherman received a
courier from General Schofield, who reported himseH in
possession of Kinston, somewhat delayed by want of pro
visions, but able to march so as to make Goldsboro' on the
21st. A dispatch also arrived from General Terry, who was at
or near Faison's Depot.
Sherman at once sent orders to Schofield to push for Golds
boro', and to make dispositions to cross Little Eiver in the
dkection of Smithfield as far as MUlard ; to General Terry to
move to Cox's Bridge, lay a pontoon bridge, and estabhsh a
crossing; and to General Blair to make a night march to
FaUing Creek Church ; and at dayhght, the right wing, under
General Howard, less the necessary wagon guards, was put in
rapid motion on BentonviUe. General Slocum's head of col
umn had advanced from its camp of March 18th, and first
encountered DibbreU's cavaky, but soon found his progress
impeded by infantry and artUlery. The enemy attacked his
advance guard, gaining a temporary advantage, and took

372 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
three guns and caissons from Carlin's dirision of Daris' four
teenth .corps, driving the two leading brigades back on the
main body. As soon as General Slocum realized that he had
in his front the whole Confederate army, he promptly de
ployed the two divisions of Davis' fourteenth corps, and rap
idly brought up on thek left the two dirisions of WUHams'
twentieth corps. These he arranged on the defensive, and
hastUy prepared a line of barricades. General KUpatrick
also came up at the sound of artiUery, and massed on the
left. In this position, the left Aving received six distinct
assaults by the combined forces of Hoke, Hardee, and Cheat
ham, under the immediate command of General Johnston
himseH, Arithout giving an inch of ground, and doing good
execution on the enemy's ranks, especiaUy Arith artUlery,
whereof the enemy had httle or none.
Johnston had moved by night from Smithfield Arith great
rapidity, and Arithout unnecessary wheels, intending to over
whelm Sherman's left fiank before it could be reheved by its
co-operating columns. But Sherman had aU along expected
just such a movement, and was prepared for it.
During the night of the 19th, General Slocum got up his
wagon-train Arith its guard of two cHA-isions, and Hazen's
division of the FHteenth Corps, which re-enforcement enabled
bim to make his position impregnable. The right Aving found
the Confederate cavalry watching its approach, but unable to
offer any serious opposition untU the head of column encoun
tered a considerable body behind a barricade at the forks of
the road near BentonviUe, about three mUes east of the battle
field of the day before. This force was, however, quickly dis
lodged, and the intersection of the roads secured. On moving
forward the Fifteenth Corps, General Logan found that the
enemy had throAvn back his left flank, and had constructed a
line of parapet connecting Arith that towards General Slocum,
in the general form of a bastion, having its sahent on the
main Goldsboro' road, interposed between General Slocum on
the west and General Howard on the east, whUe the flanks
rested on MUl Creek, covering the road back to Smithfield.

TO GOLDSBORO'. 373
Sherman instructed General Howard to proceed with due
caution untU he should have made a strong connection on his
left with General Slocum. This he soon accomphshed, and,
by four p. m. of the 20th, a complete and strong line of battle
confronted the enemy in his intrenched position, and General
Johnson, instead of catching Sherman's army in detail, as he
had designed, was himseH on the defensive, with MUl Creek in
his rear, spanned by but a single bridge. Nevertheless, Sher
man having no object to accompHsh by a battle, unless at an
advantage, continued to press steadUy forward with skirmish
ers alone, using artUlery freely on the wooded space held by
the enemy, and feeling strongly the fianks of his position,
which were as usual covered by the endless swamps of this
region of country. He also ordered aU empty wagons to be
sent at once to Kinston for suppHes, and aU other impedi
ments to be grouped near the Neuse, south of Goldsboro',
holding the main army in close contact Arith the enemy, ready
to fight him H he should venture outside of his parapets and
obstructions. Immediately upon the occupation of Kinston, General Scho
field put a large force of troops to work upon the raUway, in
aid of the Construction Corps under Colonel W.W. Wright,
rebuUt the wagon-bridge over the Neuse, and brought forward
suppHes, preparatory to a further advance.
Schofield moved from Kinston on the morning of the 20th,
and entered Goldsboro' Arith but sHght opposition on the
evening of the 21st.
The portion of his command which had remained at WU
mington, under Major-General Terry, moved thence on the
15th of March, reached Faison's Depot on the 20th, and in
compHance with the orders just cited, moved from that point
to Cox's Bridge, and secured a crossing of the Neuse on
the 22d.
Thus, the main army, under Sherman in person, being at
BentonviUe in the situation described. General Schofield oc
cupying Goldsboro', and General Terry holding the Neuse
Eiver, ten mUes above, the three armies were in actual connec-

374 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
tion, holding both banks of the Neuse and having free com
munication Arith the sea, by the river and the double line of
raUway to Newborn and WUmington, and the great object of
the campaign was accomphshed.
On the 21st of March, a steady rain prevaUed, during which
Mower's division of Blak's seventeenth corps, on the extreme
right of the main army, worked weU to the right around the
enemy's fiank, and nearly reached the bridge across MiU Creek,
the only hne of retreat open to the enemy. Of course, there
was extreme danger that the enemy would tum on him aU his
reserve, and, it might be, let go his parapets to overwhelm
Mower. Accordingly, Sherman at once ordered a general
attack by the skirmish Hne from left to right. Quite a noisy
battle ensued, during which General Mower was enabled to
regain his connection vrith his oavu corps by moving to his left
rear. He had developed a weakness in the enemy's position
of which advantage might have been taken ; but that night the
enemy retreated on Smithfield, leaving his pickets to be taken
prisoners, Arith many dead unburied, and wounded in his field
hospitals. At daybreak of the 22d, pursuit was made two mUes beyond
MiU Creek, but checked by Sherman's order.
Slocum's left Aring lost at BentonriUe nine officers and one
himdred and forty-five men kiUed, fifty-one officers and eight
hundred and sixteen men wounded, and three officers and two
hundred and twenty-three men missing — taken prisoners by
the enemy ; total, twelve hundred and forty-seven.
Howard's right Aring lost two officers and thkty-five men
MUed, twelve officers and two hundred and eighty-nine men
wounded, and one officer and sixty men missing ; total, three
hundred anO. ninety-nine.
KUpatrick's cavaky was held in reserve. His loss was
trifling. The aggregate loss of the army at BentonviUe was
sixteen hundred and forty-six.
Two hundred and sixty-seven of the Confederates were
buried on the field by the two Arings, and sixteen hundred and
twenty-five made prisoners.

TO GOLDSBORO'. 375
Leaving General Howard Arith the right Aring and KUpa
trick's cavaky at BentonviUe during the 22d, to bury the dead
and remove the wounded, on the foUowing day all the armies
nioved to the camps assigned them about Goldsboro', there
to receive the clothing and suppHes of which they stood in
need. Sherman went in person on the 22d to Cox's Bridge to
meet General Terry, and on the foUowing day rode into Golds
boro', where he found General Schofield and his army. The
left wing came in during the same day and next morning, and
the right wing foUowed on the 24th, on which day the cavalry
moved to Mount OHve Station and General Terry back to
Faison's. In the mean time the EaUway Construction Corps, under
the superintendence of the indefatigable Colonel Wright, had
been actively at work repaking the raUways leading to WU
mington and Newborn. As early as the 25th of March, only
four days after the occupation of Goldsboro', the latter hne
was finished and the first train of cars came in, and the ample
supphes prorided at Morehead City, by the forethought of
General Grant, began to come forward to the army.
Sherman, in his official report of the campaign, thus sums
up its results : —
" I caimot, even Arith any degree of precision, recapitulate
the vast amount of injury done the enemy, or the quantity of
guns and materials of war captured and destroyed. In general
terms, we have traversed the country from Savannah to Golds
boro', with an average breadth of forty mUes, consuming aU
the forage, cattle, hogs, sheep, poultry, cured meats, corn-
meal, etc. The public enemy, instead of draAring suppHes
from that region to feed his armies, avUI be compeUed to send-
provisions from other quarters to feed the inhabitants. A
map heroAvith, prepared by my chief engineer. Colonel Poe,
with the routes of the four corps and cavaky, wiU show at a
glance the country traversed. Of course the abandonment to
us by the enemy of the whole sea-coast from Savannah to
Newborn, North CaroHna, Arith its forts, dock-yards, gun-

376 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
boats, etc., was a necessary incident to our occupation and
destruction of the inland routes of travel and supply. But the
real object of this march was to place this army in a position
easy of supply, whence it could take an appropriate part in the
spring and summer campaigns of 1865. This was completely
accomphshed on the 21st of March by the junction of the three
armies and occupation of Goldsboro'.
" In conclusion, I beg to express, in the most emphatic
manner, my entire satisfaction Arith the tone and temper of the
whole army. Nothing seems to dampen thek energy, zeal,
or cheerfulness. It is impossible to conceive a march involving
more labor and exposure, yet I cannot recaU an instance of
bad temper by the way, or hearing an expression of doubt as
to our perfect success in the end. I beheve that this cheer-
fulnes's and harmony of action refiects upon aU concerned
quite as much real honor and fame as 'battles gained' or
' cities won,' and I therefore commend aU, generals, staff,
officers, and men, for these high quahties, in addition to the
more soldierly ones of obedience to orders and the alacrity
they have always manHested when danger summoned them
'to the front.'"
We have akeady remarked that the faUure to defend
Columbia was the turning point of the campaign, and neces
sarUy involved its loss, since it enabled Sherman to move
either on Charlotte or FayetteviUe at his pleasure, and com
peUed Johnston to sacrifice one of these Hnes to the defence
of the other. In like manner, the inabihty to cripple Sher
man's army in detaU, and thus prevent his occupation of Golds
boro', carried Arith it the impossibUity of preventing his junc
tion vrith the Army of the Potomac. For, should Johnston
attempt to oppose Sherman in his progress to the Eoanoke,
on the Weldon road, he must necessarUy expose himseH to the
danger of having his right turned and being compeUed to
fight a battle between the Neuse and the Eoanoke, Arith his
back to the sea. Should he retke behind the Eoanoke to
dispute its passage, his rear would be at the mercy of Grant,

TO GOLDSBORO'. 377
and Arith a large river and a powerful enemy in his front, he
must then choose whether to abandon the attempt or submit
to be hemmed in Arithout suppHes. Again, H Johnston should
decide to refuse his left and retke on Ealeigh or on the south
bank of the Neuse, he would, by that very act, abandon all hope
of being able to restrain the accomphshment of his adversai-y's
purpose. The last alternative, though ineffectual to oppose
Sherman, was the best of the three, being the only one that
did not point to immediate destruction, and it was the one
which General Johnston promptly and very properly adopted.

378 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.

CHAPTEE XXX.
the last steoke.
Sheeman immediately began to prepare for the new cam
paign.
On the 24th of March, the day after his arrival at Golds
boro', he issued the foUoAving orders for the reorganization
and supply of the army as the first step in that dkection : —
" I. Major-General Schofield, commanding the Department
of North CaroHna, avOI, out of the troops of his command,
organize a force equivalent to two corps, or five dirisions, and
proceed to equip them in the most complete manner for field
serrice. This force, whUe operating Arith the other armies in
the field, vriU be styled the ' Centre.' For the present, Gen
eral Schofield AriU post his command to hold Goldsboro', and
cover the raikoad back to Wilmington and Morehead City.
He wUl also aid the raUroad department Arith detaUs, to
enable it to finish, in the shortest possible time, the two roads,
and equip them for serrice.
"11. Colonel W. W. Wright, of the raUroad department,
AviU use extraordinary means, night and day, to complete the
two railroads from Goldsboro' back to Morehead City and
WUmington, and to equip them to the capacity of three hun
dred tons per day of freight.
" He may pay any price for labor, caU for detaUs of soldiers,
and draw roUing-stock from Savannah, Charleston, or any
point Arithin this command, and aU commanding officers and
quartermasters avUI give preference to the shipment of such
stock over any other work whatever, not involving Hfe. The

THE LAST STROKE. 379
work of these raikoads is limited and restricted to the trans
portation in the order foUowing : * Army stores' — 1. Ammuni
tion ; 2. Food for men ; 3. Clothing for men ; 4. Grain for
animals ; 5. Camp and garrison equipage ; 6. Hay and long
forage. " UntU there is an accumulation of suppHes at Goldsboro',
enough to fiU the wagons of the army, no officer, soldier, or
citizen, or any private stores whatever, AriU be carried on the
up trip, unless it be maU matter, and officers or couriers bear
ing orders for army headquarters, nor these to exceed one car
load per day. AU else must march or use horses and wagons,
from the salt-water to Goldsboro', untU the army is thorough
ly clothed and equipped. Eetum cars may load according to
the discretion of the quartermaster in charge, provided there
be no delay.
" To facihtate the completion of these roads, Colonel Poe
AriU cause the First Michigan Engineers to work back towards
Newborn. General Howard avUI cause to be built the raUroad
over the Neuse, near Goldsboro' ; General Slocum, the wagon-
road bridge on the Mount OHve road, and General Schofield
the raiko ad-bridge over Northeast Branch, near WUmington,
leaving Colonel Wright Arith his working parties to look after
the laying or baUasting the track, and getting the cars in
motion. " III. The chief quartermaster and commissary of the army
in the field. Generals Easton and Beckwith, wUl repak at
once to Goldsboro', and there control the movement of sup
pHes according to the necessities of the army and orders
issued at these headquarters. AU estimates and reqmsitions
AriU be addressed accordingly.
" IV. The right wing of the army avUI group to the front
and right of Goldsboro', looking north ; the left Aving, in front
and left of Goldsboro' ; the centre to Goldsboro', with detach
ments to cover the railroads to the rear. The cavaky vriU be
posted at or near Mount OHve Station. AU vriU send forag-
ing-parties into the country, being careful to have them strong
enough and weU guarded."

380 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
Slocum's left wing now adopted the title of the Army ol
Georgia, and Major-General Joseph A. Mower succeeded
General WUHams in the command of the Twentieth Corps.
The centre, under Schofield, composed of the Tenth and
Twenty-thkd Army Corps, respectively commanded by Major-
General Alfred H. Terry and Jacob D. Cox, perpetuated the
use of the name of the Army of the Ohio, hitherto belonging
only to the latter organization. Terry's tenth corps consisted
of the dirisions of Brigadier and Brevet Major-General Adel
bert Ames and Brigadier-General Charles J. Paine. Cox's
twenty-thkd corps comprised the dirisions of Brigadier-Gen
erals Darius N. Couch, Thomas H. Euger, and John T. EeiUy.
The right Aring, under Howard, stUl retained its original
designation as the Army of the Tennessee, and was composed,
as during the preceding campaign, of Logan's fifteenth and
Blak's seventeenth army corps.
Having given the dkections just quoted, Sherman turned
over the chief command of his army to Major-General Scho
field, the next in rank, and hastened to City Point, to have an
interview Arith Lieutenant-General Grant, for the purpose of
arranging the time and manner of thek co-operation during
the coming campaign. He arrived at General Grant's head
quarters on the evening of the 27th of March, and there met
President Lincoln, for the first time since the year 1861, Gen
eral Grant himseH, and Generals Meade and Ord, commanding
the Armies of the Potomac and James. After a long and fuU
conference as to the campaign just closed, and the final opera
tions now proposed. General Sherman received his instructions
from General Grant, and set out on the naval dispatch-boat
Bat, to return, by way of Hatteras Inlet and Newborn, to his
headquarters at Goldsboro', where he arrived on the night of
the 30th of March.
General Sherman had informed General Grant that the 10th
of AprU would be the earhest date at which he could be ready
to move, and aU things were now arranged accordingly.
The troops were stiU busy in repaking the wear and tear of
their recent hard march from Savannah, and in replenishing

THE LAST STROKE. 381
clothing and stores necessary for a further progress. OAring
to a mistake in the raUway department in sending locomotives
and cars of the five-foot guage, the army was now limited to
the use of the few locomotives and cars of the four-foot eight-
and-a-haH-inch guage akeady in North Carolina, Arith such of
the old stock as was captured by Major-General Terry at WU
mington and on his way up to Goldsboro'. Yet such judi
cious use was made of them, and such industry displayed in the
railway management by Generals Easton and BeckArith,. Colo
nel Wright and Mr. Van Dyne, his assistant, that by the 10th
of AprU aU the men were clad, the wagons reloaded, and a
sufficient amount of forage accumulated for the proposed
march. On the 5th of AprU, Sherman issued the foUoAring orders for
the guidance of his army and corps commanders, and heads
of staff departments : —
" The next grand objective is to place this army with its full
equipment north of Eoanoke Eiver, facing west, with a base of
supphes at Norfolk and at Wynton, or Murfreesboro' on the
Chowan, and in fuU communication vrith the Army of the Po
tomac, about Petersburg, and also to do the enemy as much
harm as possible en route.
"I. To accompHsh this result, the foUoAving general plan
wiU be foUowed, or modified only by Avritten orders from these
headquarters, should events requke a change : —
"1st. On Monday, the 10th of AprU, aU preparations are
presumed to be completed, and the outlaying detachments AriU
be caUed in, or given dkections to meet on the next march. AU
preparations A^'iU also be completed to place the railway stock
back of Kinston on the one road, and below the Northeast
Branch on the other.
" 2d. On Tuesday, the 11th, the columns AriU draw out on
thek Hnes of march, say about seven miles, and close up.
" 3d. On Wednesday, the march AriU begin in earnest, and
wiU be kept up at the rate say of about twelve mUes a day, or
according to the amount of resistance. AU the columns wiU

382 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
dress to the left, which is the exposed flank, and commanders
AriU study always to find roads by which they can, H necessary,
perform a general left wheel ; the wagons to be escorted on to
some place of security on the dkect route of march.
" Foraging and other details may continue as heretofore, only
more caution and prudence should be observed, and foragers
should not go in advance of the advance guard, but look more
to our right-rear for corn, bacon, and meal.
"11. The left Aving, Major-General Slocum commanding,
AriU aim straight for the raUway bridge near Smithfield, thence
along up the Neuse Eiver to the raUway bridge over Neuse
Eiver, northeast of Ealeigh (PoweU's), thence to Warrenton,
the general point of concentration. The centre, Major-Gen
eral Schofield commanding, AriU move to Whitley's MUl, ready
to support the left untU it is past Smithfield, when it avlU foUow
up, substantiaUy, Little Eiver to EolesviUe, ready at aU times
to march to the support of the left, after passing Tar Eiver,
en route to Warrenton.
" The right Aring, Major-General Howard commanding, pre
ceded by the cavaky, wiU move rapidly on PikevUle and Folk's
Bridge, ready to make a junction Arith the other armies in case
the enemy offers battle this side of Neuse Eiver about Smith-
field, thence, in case of no serious opposition on the left, AriU
work up towards Earpsboro', Andrews' Bridge, and Warrenton.
" The cavaky. General KUpatrick commanding, leaving
its encumbrances Arith the right wing, AviU push as though
straight for Weldon, untU the enemy is across Tar Eiver and
that bridge burned ; then it avUI deflect towards NashviUe and
Warrenton, keeping up a general communication Arith general
headquarters. " III. As soon as the army starts, the chief quartermaster
and commissary AriU prepare a supply of stores at some point
in Pamhco and Albemarle sounds, ready to be conveyed to
Kinston, or Wynton and Murfreesboro', according to develop
ments. As soon as they have satisfactory information that
the army is north of the Jloanoke, they avUI forthArith establish
a depot at Wynton Arith a sub-depot at Murfreesboro'.

THE LAST STROKE. 333
" Major-General Schofield wiU hold, as heretofore, WUming
ton, with the bridge across Northeast Branch as an outpost,
Newborn and Kinston as its outpost, and wUl be prepared to
hold Wynton and Murfreesboro' as soon as the time arrives
for that move. The navy has mstructions from Admiral Por
ter to co-operate, and any commanding officer is authorized to
caU on the navy for assistance and co-operation, always in
Avriting, setting forth the reasons, — of which, of necessity, the
naval commander is the judge.
" IV. The general-in-chief AviU be Arith the centre habituaUy,
but may in person shHt to either flank where his presence may
be needed, leaving a staff-officer to receive reports. He re
qukes absolutely a report of each army or grand detachment
each night, whether any thing material has occurred or not :
often the absence of an enemy is a very important fact in mU
itary prognostication."
In the mean time, Major-General George Stoneman, in com
mand of a dirision of cavaky, operating from East Tennessee
in connection with Major-General Thomas, in pursuance of
Sherman's previous orders, had reached the raUway about
Greensboro', N. C, had utterly destroyed it, and had pushed
along it to Sahsbury, destroying in his march bridges, cul
verts, depots, and aU kinds of rebel suppHes, and had ex
tended the breach in the raUway doAvn to the Catawba Bridge.
This was fatal to the hostUe armies of Lee and Johnston, who
depended on that road for suppHes, and as thek ultimate hne
of retreat.
Brevet Major-General J. H. WUson, in command of the
cavalry corps organized by himseH, under the orders issued
by Sherman before turning south from his pursuit of Hood
into Tennessee, had started from the neighborhood of De
catur and Florence, Alabama, and moved straight into the
heart of Alabama, on a route prescribed for General Thomas
after he had defeated General Hood at NashviUe, Tennes
see. But the road being too heavy for infantry, and Gen
eral Thomas being akeady greatly weakened by detachments

384 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
for service in other quarters, he had devolved the duty on
that most energetic young cavaky officer. General WUson,
who, imbued Arith the proper spirit, thus struck one of the best
blows of the war at the waning strength of the Confederacy.
His route by Tuscaloosa, Selma, Montgomery, Columbus, and
Macon, being one never before traversed by the Union troops,
afforded him ample suppHes for men and animals as long as
his column was in motion.
MeanwhUe, Grant was intently watching Lee, seeking to
fathom his course under the new combinations now being
developed. E Lee should remain behind his Hnes at Peters
burg, in the passive defensive attitude he had for so many
months successfuUy maintained, his defeat and destruction
would be almost mathematicaUy certain the moment Sherman
should cross the Eoanoke ; and this, as we have shown, John
ston was powerless to prevent. On the other hand, the Con
federate general might summon Johnston, by forced marches,
to his aid, whUe Sherman was refitting and getting ready to
move, and then, Arith the two armies united, strike Grant a
vigorous blow ; but the two armies united would not possess
sufficient strength to overpower Grant's army, behind its
secure intrenchments : and before even the semblance of a
siege could be undertaken, even supposing the Confederates
to possess the means for such a task, Sherman would arrive,
and the game would be lost, for the only remaining Confeder
ate forces would find themselves in a cul-de-sac, without
present means of subsisting so large a number of men, and
Arithout a possibUity of escape. Lee's best alternative was
undoubtedly to be sought in a junction Arith Johnston at
Ealeigh or on the north bank of the Neuse, and a rigorous
blow for Sherman's destruction before Grant could foUow.
It was for the first signs of the adoption of such a course
that Grant now looked Arith sleepless eyes. There was but one
way to meet it — to strike the evacuating column in ak, in the
first moment of retreat, and force it to a battle. Accordingly,
on the last day of March, thinking he saw the symptoms of
such a movement. Grant strack. After a series of battles.

THE LAST STROKE. 335
among the most determined and sanguinary of the entke
war, on the 3d of April his line crushed Lee's sheU at aU
points, and by the next morning Petersburg and Eichmond
Avere evacuated ; Lee, with the remnants of his army, was in
full flight, his men scattering Hke chaff before the wind ; and
the officers of the Confederate government were individual
fugitives, vainly seeking the protecting wing of the remains of
their armies.
The news of the battles about Petersburg reached Sherman
at Goldsboro', on the 6th of April. Up to that time his pur
pose was, as we have akeady seen, to move rapidly northward,
feigning on Ealeigh, and striking straight for BurkesvUle,
thereby interposing between Johnston and Lee. But the
problem was now greatly changed, and, in the expressive lan
guage of Lieutenant-General Grant in his instructions to
Sherman, the Confederate armies of Lee and Johnston be
came the strategic points. General Grant was fuUy able to
take care of the former, and Sherman's task was to destroy
or capture the latter.
Johnston at that time had his army weU in hand about
Smithfield. Sherman estimated his infantry and artiUery at
thkty-five thousand, and his cavalry from six to ten thousand.
Thus deeming his adversary superior in cavalry, General KU
patrick was held in reserve at Mount OHve, with orders to re
cruit his horses, and be ready to make a sudden and rapid
march on the 10th of AprU.
At daybreak on the day appointed aU the heads of col
umns were in motion against the enemy ; — Major-General
Slocum taking the two dkect roads for Smithfield ; Major-
General Howard making a circuit by the right, and feigning
up the Weldon road to disconcert the enemy's cavaky ; and
Generals Terry and KUpatrick moving on the west side of the
Neuse Eiver, aiming to reach the rear of the enemy between
Smithfield and Ealeigh. General Schofield foUowed General
Slocum in support. All the colunms met, within six mUes of
Goldsboro', more or less cavalry, behind the usual rail barri
cades, which were swept before them, and by ten A. m. of the
35

386 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
11th Davis' fourteenth corps entered Smithfield, closely fol
lowed by Mower's twentieth corps.
Johnston had rapidly retreated across the Neuse Eiver, and
haring his raUway to hghten up his trains, could faU back
faster than Sherman could pursue. The rains had also set in,
making the resort to corduroy absolutely necessary for> the
passage even of ambulances. The enemy had burned the
bridge at Smithfield, and as soon as possible General Slocum
got his pontoons up, and crossed over a division of the Four
teenth Corps.
" Then," says Sherman, " we heard of the surrender of
Lee's army at Appomattox Courthouse, Virginia, which was
announced to the armies in orders, and created universal joy.
Not one officer or soldier of my army but expressed a pride
and satisfaction that it feU to the lot of the Armies of the
Potomac and James so gloriously to overwhelm and capture
the entke army that had held them in check so long ; and
thek success gave us new impulse to finish up our task." '
Without a moment's hesitation, Sherman gave orders to
drop aU trains, and the army marched rapidly in pursuit to
and through Ealeigh, reaching that place at haH-past seven
A. M. on the 13th, in a heavy rain.
The next day the cavalry pushed on through the rain to
Durham's Station, Logan's fifteenth corps foUowing as far as
Morris^riUe Station, and Blak's seventeenth corps to John's Sta
tion. On the supposition that Johnston was tied to his raUway,
as a line of retreat by HiUsboro', Greenboro', Sahsbury, and
Charlotte, Sherman had turned the other columns across the
bend in that road towards Ashboro'. KUpatrick was ordered to
keep up a show of pursuit towards the Company's Shops, in
Almancer County ; Howard to tum the left by Hackney's Cross
roads, Pittsburg, St. LaAvrence, and Ashboro' ; Slocum to cross
Cape Fear Eiver at Avon's Ferry and move rapidly by Car
thage, Caledonia, and Cox's MUls ; whUe Schofield was to hold
Ealeigh and the road back, with spare force to foUow by
an intermediate route.
By the 15th, though the rains were incessant, and the roads

THE LAST STROKE. 387
almost impracticable, Major-General Slocum had Jefferson C.
Daris' fourteenth corps near Martha's Vineyard, vrith a pon
toon bridge laid across Cape Fear Eiver at Avon's Ferry,
and Mower's twentieth corps in support ; and Major-General
Howard had Logan's fifteenth and Blak's seventeenth corps
stretched out on the roads towards Pittsboro' ; whUe General
KUpatrick held Durham's Station and Capitol HUl University,
Johnston's army was retreating rapidly on the roads from
HiUsboro' to Greensboro', he himseH being at Greensboro'.
Thus matters stood when General Sherman received a com
munication from General Johnston that arrested aU hostUe
movements for the time being.

388 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.

CHAPTEE XXXI.

DAWN.

Feom Smithfield, on the 12th of AprU, Sherman Avrote to
General Grant : —
" I have this moment received your telegram announcing
the surrender of Lee's army. I hardly know how to express
my feelings ; but you can imagine them. The terms you have
given Lee are magnanimous and Hberal. Should Johnston
foUow Lee's example, of course I wUl grant the same. He is
retreating before me on Ealeigh, and I shaU be there to-mor
row. Eoads are heavy and bad ; but under the inspiration of
the news from you we can march twenty-five mUes a day. I
am twenty-eight miles from Ealeigh, but a part of my army
is eight mUes behind. H Johnston retreats south I AriU foUow
him ; but I take it he AriU surrender at Ealeigh. I shaU expect
to hear from General Sheridan in case Johnston does not sur
render, for in such case I AviU need a Httle more 43avalry. I
would make sure to capture the whole army."
When Sherman entered Ealeigh, on the 13th, he found that
the inhabitants had not heard of Lee's sumender, and could
hardly credit the report. Johnston had retreated westward, and
Sherman dispatched to Grant that he would move at once to
Ashboro', Saulsbury, or Charlotte, according to ckcumstances.
KUpatrick, Arith most of the cavaky, had been left ten mUes
to the south and west of Smithfield, busy after the enemy's
locomotives and railway trains, and had reported some cap
tures. He was now ordered to " keep pushing the enemy."

DAWN. 389
" To-night," writes Assistant Adjutant-General Dayton, " tho
general wUl inform you of the coming move. The columns
are closing up here now."
Late on the same day, General Sherman Avrote to KU
patrick : —
" I have been out and am just back, and hasten to answer
yours of to-day. I wUl send a locomotive to bring up the
cars you have captured. Send pickets along the road to ad-
rise the conductor where to stop. It avUI take aU day to
morrow to close up our trains, and to draw out on the new line
of operations. Best your animals, and confine your opera
tions to mere feints, and get ready for work by day after to
morrow." On the 14th, Sherman had information that Johnston was
about Greensboro' and Saulsbury, and had his troops ready to
move in that dkection. And again he writes to KUpatrick : —
" I sent you orders to-day, by which you AriU see I am to
put my army where, if Johnston tries to pass out by Charlotte,
I can strike him in flank, or, if he remains at Greensboro', I
can capture the whole. AU I expect of you is to keep up the
delusion that we are foUoAring him via the University and
HiUsboro' until I get my infantry heads of column across the
Haw Eiver, when I want you to cross also, and feel out to
wards Greensboro' tiU I get to Ashboro', where, H he remains
at Greensboro', I can approach him from the south, and force
him to battle, to surrender, or disperse. You wUl perceive we
AvUl save a couple of days by cutting acioss the bend in the
direction of Saulsbury. I am anxious to prevent his escape
towards Georgia."
In the same letter General Sherman informed his chief of
cavalry that on the foUoAving day General Howard would have
one corps at Jones' Station, and another corps at Morrison's,
and that on the day after aU would move by separate roads

390 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNa
for Ashboro' ; and added : " The people here manHest more
signs of subjugation than I have yet seen ; but Jeff. Davis has
more Hves than a cat, and we must not trust him. H you
reach the university do not bum its Hbrary,^ buildings, or spe-
ciflc property."
On the 14th of AprU, after aU the dispositions for the ad
vance on Ealeigh had been completed. General Sherman re
ceived a communication from General Johnston, by a flag of
truce, requesting an armistice, and a statement of the best
terms on which he could be permitted to sumender the army
under his command. General Sherman instantly dispatched
his answer, and sent it through General KUpatrick with a note
of instruction, as foUows : " The letter by flag of truce was
from General Johnston, which is the beginning of the end.
HeroArith is my answer ; send it at once, and do not advance
your cavaHy beyond the university, or to a point abreast of it
on the raUway. I wUl be at MorrisvUle to-momow."
" I am fuUy empowered to arrange Arith you," he Avrote to
General Johnston, " any terms for the suspension of hostUities
as between the armies commanded by you and those com
manded by myseH, and am ArilHng to confer vrith you to that
end. " That a basis of action may be had, I undertake to abide
by the same terms and conditions entered into by Generals
Grant and Lee at Appomattox Courthouse, Vkginia, on the
9th instant."
On the evening of the same day, the three army commanders
were informed of the communication just received from the
enemy, and that under existing ckcumstances it was probable
the long march contemplated, and for which such careful prep
aration had been made, might become unnecessary. General
Schofield was nevertheless ordered to place one corps of the
Army of the Ohio at HoUy Springs, and the other just outside
of Ealeigh, in the direction of the proposed route, and there
await further instructions.
General Howard was dkected to put one corps of the Army
of the Tennessee at MorrisvUle, and the other at Jones' Station,

DAWN. 391
and then expect the arrival of the commander-in-chief at Mor-
risrille ; and General Slocum was ordered to remain as he then
was untU further orders.
General Sherman then immediately prepared copies of his
correspondence with General Johnston, and Avrote to General
Grant on the same day, as foUows : —
"I send copies of a correspondence begun Arith General
Johnston, which I think wiU be foUowed by terms of capitula
tion. I wUl accept the same terms as General Grant gave
General Lee, and be careful not to compHcate any points of
civU pohcy. 11 any cavaky has started towards me, caution
them that they must be prepared to find our work done. It is
now raining in torrents, and I shaU await General Johnston's
reply here, and avUI propose to meet biTn in person at Chapel
HiU. I have inrited Governor Vance to return to Ealeigh
Arith the civU officers of his State. I have met ex-Governor
Graham, Mr. Badger, Moore, Holden, and others, aU of whom
agree that the war is over, and that the States of the South
must reassume thek allegiance, subject to the constitution and
laws of Congress, and that the mUitary power of the South
must submit to the national arms. This great fact once ad
mitted, aU the detaUs are easy of arrangement."
MeanwhUe, Major McCoy, of General Sherman's staff, then
at Durham's Station, was directed by General Sherman to re
main Arith KUpatrick untU Johnston's second communication
should be brought within the lines ; so that, in case of neces
sity, the contents of the message could be sent over the tele
graphic Avkes, and an answer returned forthwith. But no
message came from Johnston on that day. On the 16th, Sher
man Avrote to Brevet Brigadier-General Easton, assistant
quartermaster-general at Newborn : — " I expect every hour
an answer from Johnston, and unless he makes clear and satis
factory terms to-day, I AviU start to-morrow towards Ashboro'.
Hold yourseH in readiness to give us forage here (at Ealeigh)
when the raUway is done." On the same day. General KU-

392 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
patrick having telegraphed to General Sherman that he sus
pected bad faith on the part of Johnston, and suggested pos
sible surprise, and having described certain movements of the
enemy, not consonant with the maintenance of the condition
of things existing at the time of the commencement of the
armistice, Sherman rephed : — " I have faith in General John
ston's personal sincerity, and do not believe he would resort
to a subterfuge to cover his movements. He could not weU
stop the movement of his troops untU he got my letter, which
I now hear was delayed aU day yesterday  in sending
it forward. But H Johnston does gain time on us by such
we AviU make up for it at the expense of North CaroHna. We
wUl be aU ready to move to-morrow H necessary."
Later on the same day, the message from General Johnston
was received by General Sherman, and the result made knoAvn
to Generals Slocum, Howard, and Schofield, viz., that General
Johnston desked an interriew with General Sherman, near
Durham's Station, with a view to arrange terms of capitula
tion. Sherman fixed the time at twelve o'clock on the next
day, the 17th.
The meeting was had according to appointment. Sherman
frankly tendered the same terms accorded by General Grant
to General Lee. Johnston acknowledged the terms to be
both fak and hberal, but asked the consideration of additional
facts. He suggested the treaty between Generals Grant and
Lee had reference to a part only of the Confederate forces,
whereas he proposed the present agreement should include
aU the remaining armies of the Confederacy, and thus the war
should be at an end. He admitted, frankly and candidly,
there was no longer any ground for hope of success on the
part of the Confederacy, " that the cause was lost," and that
this admission included slavery, State rights, and every other
clakn for which the war had been inaugurated. And now he
desked the fragments of the Confederate armies to preserve
thek company and regimental organizations, that they be
marched to the States where they belonged in such order that
they might not be broken up into predatory bands, to overrun"

DAWN. 393
the country and vex the inhabitants ; and urged that that was
the favorable occasion to inaugurate the beginning of a period
of peace and good-wiU between aU the people destined to Hve
under the same Government.
Sherman declared that whUe he honored the motives of
Johnston, and would be most happy to promote the results
suggested, he had grave doubts whether he, Johnston, had the
power to make a binding treaty beyond the usual capitulation
entered into by and between commanders of armies when one
surrenders, on terms, to the other. And H the needed au
thority did exist, so far as Johnston was concerned, he, Sher
man, did not deem himseH in possession of the necessary
power to bind the Government of the United States to such
terms. As to the first objection, the lack of power on his part,
General Johnston repHed that he felt sure he could satisfy
General Sherman he had aU necessary power in the premises,
and suggested that the conference might be adjourned over
until the next day, to enable him to confer with General
Breckinridge, the Confederate secretary of war. And as to
the second objection, he urged the repeated declarations of
President Lincoln, that he was AviUing, at aU times, to nego
tiate a peace with any person or persons who could control
the Confederate armies. FinaUy, the convention was ad
journed untU the next day at twelve o'clock at the same place.
On the same day General Sherman wrote a letter to Colonel
Webster at Newborn, to be telegraphed to General Grant, as
foUows : — ¦
" I have returned from a point twenty-seven mUes up the
raUroad, where I had a long interview with General Johnston,
Arith a fuU and frank interchange of opinions.
" He evidently seeks to make terms for Jeff. Davis and his
cabinet. "He wanted to consult again Arith Mr. Breckinridge at
'Greensboro', and I have agreed to meet him at noon to-mor
row at the same place.

394 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
" We lose nothing in time, as, by agreement, both armies
stand stUl ; and the roads are drying up, so that H I am forced
to pursue, Arill be able to make better speed.
" There is great danger that the Confederate armies wUl
dissolve, and fiU the whole land Arith robbers and assassins,
and I think this is one of the difficulties that Johnston labors
unfler. " The assassination of Mr. Lincoln shows one of the ele
ments in the rebel army which avUI be almost as difficult to
deal with as the main armies. Communicate substance of this
to General Grant ; and also, that if General Sheridan is march
ing doAvn this way, to feel for me before striking the enemy.
" I don't want Johnston's army to break up into fragments."
It AvUl be remembered that during his hurried visit to City
Point to confer with General Grant, General Sherman also had
the good fortune to meet President Lincoln, and freely inter
change vioAvs Arith him. Any one who knows any thing of the
personal opinions and desires of Mr. Lincoln, knows that,
above aU things, he desked an end of the war on any terms
that proposed a permanent peace. He was now, more than
ever, impressed by the sacrifices and sufferings of the people
on both sides of the contest. Here, in the neighborhood of
Petersburg, he had seen war for the first time, and it har
rowed his generous soul to the very bottom. He walked over
ground covered vrith the bodies of the slain, more numerous
than he could count or cared to count ; he saw bring men Arith-
broken heads and mangled forms, and heard the hopeless
groans and piteous waUs of the dying, whom no human hand
could save ; he Aritnessed the bloody work of the surgeons —
those carpenters and joiners of human frames — and saw am
putated legs and arms pUed up in heaps to be carted away
Hke the offal of a slaughter-house ; and he turned from the
horrid sight, exclaiming f "And this is war — horrid war — tJie
trade of barbarians /" And, appealing to his principal officers,
he inquked : " Gentlemen, is there no way by which we can.
put a stop to this fighting ?"

DAWN. 395
¦ The President wg,s in this frame of mind when General
Sherman reported to him at City Point. He had infused the
same feehng among aU the officers who were near him. He
was AviUing to recognize the existence of State governments,
to convene rebel State legislatures, to confer Arith rebel State
ciril officers, and to exercise the pardoning power to the ut
most extent ; in fact, to concede any thing that he could safely
concede, and to do any thing that he could safely do, to end
the war and restore the supremacy of the Government of the
United States.
Deeply impressed with these riews, General Sherman re
turned to his command in North Carolina.
On the 17th of AprU, the army was shocked by the appaUing
inteUigence of President Lincoln's assassination on the evening
of the 14th. The deep gloom which settled upon the hearts
of men overshadowed a terrible determination. It there were
those in the South who did not thoroughly detest this infamous
and cowardly act, for them there need be no appeal for mercy.
Sherman at once announced the melancholy news to the
army in the foUowing general orders : —
" Hbadquaetees MrLiTARV Division of the Mississipei,
In the Field, Raleigh, AprU 17, 1805.
SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 50.
"The general commanding announces with pain and sorrow
that, on the evening of the 14th instant, at the theatre in
Washington City, his ExceUency, the President of the United
States, Mr. Lincoln, was assassinated by one who uttered the
State motto of Virginia. At the same time the secretary of
state, Mr. Seward, whUst suffering from a broken arm, was
also stabbed by another murderer in his OAvn house, but stUb
sm-rives, and his son was wounded, supposed fataUy.
" It is beHeved by persons capable of judging, that other
¦high officers were designed to share the same fate. Thus it
seems that our enemy, despaking of meeting us in manly
, warfare, begin to resort to the assassin's tools. Your general
does not Arish you to infer that this is universal, for he knows

396 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
that the great mass of the Confederate army would scorn to
sanction such acts, but he beheves it the legitimate consequence
of rebeUion against rightful authority. We have met every
phase which this war has assumed, and must now be prepared
for it in its last and worst shape, that of assassins and guerril
las ; but woe unto the people who seek to expend thek Arild
passions in such a manner, for there is but one dread result.
" By order of Majoe-Geneeal W. T. Sheeman.
" L. M. Dayton, Major and Asst. Adjt.-Gen."
On the 18th of AprU negotiations were resumed. After the
first meeting General Sherman conferred Arith his principal
officers, aU of whom favored a treaty on the basis proposed by
Johnston. The course pursued at Eichmond, the general tone
and spirit of the newspaper press, private letters from home,
aU indicated a general spkit of amnesty and forgiveness. It
is a singular fact that soldiers who suffer privation, wounds,
and death in the cause of thek country, are much more forgiv
ing, generous, and considerate towards thek enemies than
thek friends at home, who Hve in comfort and read thek
patriotic sentiments reflected in the morning papers. FinaUy,
the foUoAring memorandum, or basis of agreement, was draAvn
up by General Sherman himseH, which, for the time being,
was satisfactory to aU present as a proposition to be submitted
to the President of the United States for ratification or re
jection : —
" Memorandum, or basis of agreement, made this, the 18th
day of AprU, A. D. 1865, near Durham's Station, in the State
of North CaroHna, by and between General Joseph E. John-
stoui commanding the Confederate army, and Major-General
W. T. Sherman, commanding the Army of the United States,
both present.
" I. The contending armies now in the field to maintain the
status quo until notice is given by the commanding general of
any one to his opponent, and reasonable time, say forty-eight
hours, aUowed.

DAWN. 397
" n. The Confederate armies now in existence to be dis
banded and conducted to thek several State capitals, there to
deposit their arms and pubhc property in the State arsenal ;
and each officer and man to execute and file an agreement to
cease from acts of war, and to abide the action of both State
and Federal authorities. The number of arms and munitions
of war to be reported to the chief of ordnance at Washington
City, subject to the future action of the Congress of the United
States, and in the mean time to be used solely to maintain
peace and order within the borders of the States respectively.
" in. The recognition by the executive of the United
States of the several State governments, on their officers and
legislatures taking the oath prescribed by the constitution of
the United States ; and where conflicting State governments
have resulted from the war, the legitimacy of aU shaU be sub
mitted to the Supreme Court of the United States.
" IV. The re-estabhshment of aU Federal courts in the
several States, with powers as defined by the constitution and
laws of Congress.
" V. The people and inhabitants of aU States to be guaran
teed, so far as the Executive can, thek pohtical rights and
franchise, as weU as thek rights of person and property, as
defined by the constitution of the United States and of the
States respectively.
" VI. The executive authority or Government of the United
States not to disturb any of the people by reason of the late
war, so long as they Hve in peace and quiet, and abstain from
acts of armed hostihty, and obey the laws in existence at the
place of their residence.
" VII. In general terms, it is announced that the war is to
cease ; a general amnesty, so far as the Executive of the United
States can command, on condition of the disbandment of the
Confederate armies, the distribution of arms, and the resump
tion of peaceful pursuits by officers and men hitherto compos
ing said armies.
¦ " Not being fuUy empowered by our respective principals to
fulfil these terms, we individuaUy and officiaUy pledge ourselves

398 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
to promptly obtain authority, and wUl endeavor to carry out
the above programme."
Immediately General Sherman made his arrangements to
send the agreement to Washington Arith aU possible haste, and
Avrote the foUoAving private letter of advice and explanation,
dkected to both General Grant and General HaUeck : —
" I inclose heroArith a copy of an agreement made this day
between General Joseph E. Johnston and myseH, which, H
approved by the United States, wiU produce peace from the
Potomac to the Eio Grande. Mr. Breckinridge was present
at our conference, in his capacity as major-general, and satis
fied me of the abihty of General Johnston to carry out to the
fuU extent the terms of the agreement ; and H you AriU get the
President to simply indorse the copy, and commission me to
carry out the terms, I AriU foUow them to the conclusion.
" You wiU observe that it is an absolute submission of the
enemy to the lawful authority of the United States, and dis
perses his armies absolutely ; and the point to which I attach
most importance is, that the dispersion and disbandment of
these armies is done in such a manner as to prevent thek
breaking up into guerrUla bands.
" On the other hand, we can retain just as much of our army
as we please. I agreed to the mode and manner of the sur
render of arms set forth, as it gives the States the means of
repressing guerriUas, which we could not expect them to do if
we stripped them of aU arms.
" Both Generals Johnston and Breckinridge admitted that
slavery was dead, and I could not insist on embracing it in
such a paper, because it can be made Arith the States in detaU.
I know that aU the men of substance South sincerely want
peace, and I do not beheve they avUI resort to war again
during this century. I have no doubt but that they wUl in the
future be perfectly subordinate to the laws of the United States.
" The moment my action in this matter is approved, I can
spare five corps, and wUl ask for orders to leave General Scho-

DAWN. 399
field here with the Tenth Corps, and to march myseH Arith the
Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-
third corps via BurkesvUle and GordonsvUle to Frederick or
Hagerstown, there to be paid and mustered out.
" The question of finance is now the chief one, and every
soldier and officer not needed should be got home at work.
I would hke to be able to begin the march north by May 1st.
I urge on the part of the President speedy action, as it is im
portant to get the Confederate armies to thek homes as weU
as om- own."
On the same day General Sherman Avrote the foUowing pri
vate note to General HaUeck in regard to the assassination of
Mr. Lincoln, and the man Clark, supposed to have been de
taUed to murder himseH : —
"Geneeal — I received your dispatch describing the man
Clark detaUed to assassinate me. He had better be in a hurry,
or he AviU be too late. .
" The news of Mr. Lincoln's death produced a most intense
effect on our troops. At first I feared it Avould lead to ex
cesses, but now it has softened down, and can easUy be
guided. " None evinced more feeling than General Johnston, who
admitted that the act was calculated to stain his cause Arith a
dark hue. And he Contended that the loss was most serious
to the people of the South, who had begun to realize that Mr.
Lincoln was the best friend the South had.
" I cannot behove that even Mr. Davis was privy to the
diabolical plot ; but think it the emanation of a set of young
men at the South, who are very devils. I want to throw upon
the South the care of this class of men, who wUl soon be as
obnoxious to their industrial classes as to us.
"Had I pushed Johnston's army to an extremity, these
would have dispersed, and would have done infinite mischief."
AU things being now ready. Major Hitchcock, a staff-officer,

400 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
was sent forward Arith dkections to keep his OAvn counsel ; to
proceed as fast as possible dkect to Washington, and dehver
his charge to the new President, await his pleasure, and re
turn Arith his answer. The messenger arrived at Washington
at a moment HI suited to the favorable consideration of Hberal
terms of peace. Mr. Lincoln had been crueUy mui-dered by
a dastardly Avretch in the supposed employ of the rebel gov
ernment ; another conspkator had stealthUy entered the
domicU of Mr. Seward, who was then Ul and helpless in his
bed, and, after hoAving his way over the prostrate forms of the
attendants of the sick-chamber and of the members of the
famUy present, to the bedside of the helpless minister, pounced
upon him Arith aU the ferocity of a fiend vrith a purpose to
destroy his Hfe. It had been discovered that the conspkacy
not only compassed the Hfe of Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Seward,
but that of other high officials of the Government, and in the
army as weU. Such indignation was never felt in this country
before ; and the sorrow experienced by reason of the death of
the great and good Mr. Lincoln, as aU were wont now to caU
him, was spontaneous, deep, and universal. Every head was
bowed down, every heart was sad, and every mind was occu
pied Arith thoughts of the aAvful crime.
It was under such ckcumstances that the newly inaugurated
President and the panic-stricken members of the old cabinet
met to break the package sent by General Sherman, and to
dehberate on terms of peace 1
The document was read, but a funeral sermon would have
sounded better. Every paragraph, every Hne, and every word
of the unfortunate document, when read by the Hght of sur
rounding ckcumstances, and Hstened to by men in such frame
of mind, appeared Hke an amnesty for unpardonable sins, and
a pardon in advance for the assassins. Nay more, the hberal
spirit of the soldier which pervaded the entke document, so
discordant Arith the sentiment of the hour, was suggestive of
comphcity with treason itseH. Under the ckcumstances, any
terms short of utter annihilation of aU rebels and rebel sym-

DAWN. 401
pathizers, were not to be considered for a moment. Peace
itseH was treason, and only vengeance loyalty.
It was the desire of the secretary of war, Mr. Stanton, to
reheve General Sherman from command at once, but Gen
eral Grant, who was present at the cabinet meeting, himseH
volunteered to take the answer of the President to General
Sherman ; and to him was accordingly confided fuU control
and discretion in the matter.
General Grant proceeded at once to North CaroHna, and on
the evening of the 23d arrived at Morehead City, whence he
sent word to General Sherman that the truce with Johnston
had been disapproved, and notified him of the contents of the
foUowing letter of instructions from the secretary of war :—
" Wak Dbpaktmbnt,
" Washington City, April 21, 1865.
" Geneeal — The memorandum or basis agreed upon between
General Sherman and General Johnston haring been submit
ted to the President, they are disapproved. You wiU give no
tice of the disapproval to General Sherman, and direct him to
resume hostUities at the earUest moment.
" The instructions given to you by the late President, Abra
ham Lincoln, on the 3d of March, by my telegram of that date
addressed to you, express substantiaUy the views of President
Andrew Johnson, and vriU be observed by General Sherman.
A copy is horoArith appended.
" The President deskes that you proceed immediately to
the headquarters of General Sherman, and dkect operations
against the enemy. " Yours truly, " Edwin M. Stanton,
" Secretary of War.
"To Lieutenast-Generai, Gkant."
This dispatch was received on the morning of the 24th.
General Sherman instantly gave notice to General Johnston
as foUows : — • 26

402 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
" You win take notice that the truce or suspension of hos
tihties agreed to between us on the 18th instant AviU close in
forty-eight hours after this is received at your Hnes."
At the same time he Avrote : — r
" I have repHes from Washington to my communications of
the 18th. I am instructed to limit my operations to your im
mediate command, and not attempt civU negotiations. I
therefore demand the surrender of your army on the same
terms as were given to General Lee at Appomattox, Va., on
the 9th AprU, instant, purely and simply."
Within an hour after the reception of General Grant's dis
patch, a courier was riding Arith aU haste towards Durham's
Station Arith this notice and demand for General Johnston.
Immediately on the return of the messenger. General Sherman
issued orders to his troops terminating the truce on the 26th,
at twelve o'clock M., and ordered aU to be in readiness to
march at that time, on routes previously prescribed in the
special field-orders of AprU 14th, from positions held AprU
18th. These dispositions were akeady made when General
Grant arrived at Ealeigh. He then informed General Sher
man that he had orders from the President to dkect aU miH
tary movements, and General Sherman explained to him the
exact position of the troops. General Grant was so weU satis
fied Arith the situation, that he concluded not to interfere Arith
the arrangements akeady made, and to leave thek execution
in the hands of General Sherman.
As for General Johnston, he was powerless ; he could nei
ther fight nor retreat. He must either disperse his army or
surrender it on the terms proposed. On the 25th he invited
General Sherman to another conference, Arith a view to sur
render. It was now the province of General Grant to take
tiie lead in the negotiations, but he prefemed that the entke
business should be consummated by General Sherman. Nev
ertheless, he recommended and even urged General Sherman

DAWN. 403
to afford General Johnston another interview, which was finaUy
appointed to take place at the hour designated for the termi
nation of the truce.
At this conference final terms were soon concluded, and the
second grand army of the Confederacy was surrendered to the
power of the United States upon the foUoAving terms : —
" Terms of « mUitary convention entered into this twenty-sixth (36th) day ol
April, 1865, at Bennett's house, near Durham's Station, North Carolina, be-
t'ween General Joseph E. Johnston, commanding the Confederate Army,
aud Major-General W. T. Sherman, commanding the United States Army in
North Carolina.
" AU acts of war on the part of the troops under General
Johnston's command to cease from this date. AU arms and
pubhc property to be deposited at Greensboro', and dehvered
to an ordnance officer- of the United States Army. EoUs of
aU officers and men to be made in dupHcate, one copy to be
retained by the commander of the troops, and the other to bo
given to an officer to be designated by General Sherman.
Each officer and man to give his individual obhgation in Avri
ting not to take up arms against the Government of the United
States untU properly released from this obhgation. The side-
arms of officers, and thek private horses and baggage, to be
retained by them.
" This behig done, aU the officers and men avUI be permitted
to return to thek homes, not to be disturbed by the United
States authorities so long as they observe thek obHgationa
and the laws in force where they may reside.
"W. T. Sheeman, Major-General,
" Commanding the Army of the United States in
North Carolina.
"J. E. Johnston, General,
" Commanding Confederate States Army
in North Carolina.
"Api«oved: U. S. Gkant, Lieutenant-General.
" Raleigh, N. C, April 86, 1865."

404 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
General Sherman says, in his report : —
" And although undue importance has been given to the so-
caUed negotiations which preceded it, and a, rebuke and pubhc
disfavor cast on me whoUy unwarranted by the facts, I rejoice
in saying it was accomphshed without further ruin and de
vastation to the country ; Arithout the loss of a single Hfe of
those gaUant men who had foUowed me from the Mississippi
to the Atlantic ; and without subjecting brave men to the un
gracious task of pursuing a fieeing foe that did not Arish to
fight. And I chaUenge the instance, during the last four years,
when an armed and defiant foe stood before me, that I did not
go in for a fight ; and I would blush for shame if I had ever
struck or insulted a faUen foe."
It AriU now become necessary to recur to events transpiring
at Washington and Eichmond during the absence of the Heu
tenant-general.

CORRESPONDENCE DURING THE TRUCE. 4O6

CHAPTEE XXXn.
COEEESPONDENCE DURING THE TBUCE.
In order to a more perfect understanding of the intentions
of the framers of the original memorandum of agreement, in
proposing and consenting to the terms of the armistice, it is
now necessary to refer to the correspondence that took place
during the period that intervened between the signature of the
agreement by General Sherman and General Johnston on the
18th of AprU, 1865, and the night of the 23d of the same month,
when General Sherman received the first notification that the
Government had refused to ratify his action.
Immediately on signing the truce, Sherman dispatched the
foUoAring order, by a fiag of truce, through the hnes of the
Confederate ' army to General Stoneman, commanding the
cavalry in Johnston's rear : —
" Geneeal — General Johnston and I have agreed to maintain
a truce in the nature of statu quo, by which each agrees to
stand fast tiU certain propositions looking to a general peace
are referred to our respective principals. You may, therefore,
cease hostUities, but suppHes may come to me near Ealeigh.
" Keep your command well in hand, and approach Durham's
Station or Chapel HiU, and I AriU supply you by our raikoad.
As soon as you reach the outer pickets report to me in person
or by telegraph."
This was indorsed by General Johnston for the guidance ol
his troops, as foUows : —

406 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
" The above order is given by agreement between Major-
General Sherman and myseH. The march of Major-General
Stoneman's command under it is not to be interfered Arith by
Confederate troops. " J. E. Johnston, " General."
At the same time the foUoAving communication was dis
patched, through the same channels, addressed to the com
manding general of the armies of the United States in
Vkginia : —
" Geneeal — I have agreed Arith General Joseph E. Johnston
for a temporary cessation of active hostUities, to enable me to
lay before our Government at Washington the agreement made
between us, Arith the fuU sanction of Mr. Daris, and in the
presence of Mr. Breckinridge, for the disbandment of aU the
armies of the Confederacy from here to the Eio Grande.
" If any of your forces are moving towards Johnston, I beg
you to check them where they are, or at the extremity of any
raikoad where they may be suppHed, until you receive orders
from General Grant, or imtU I notify you that the agreement
is at an end and hostUities resumed."
On the 19th, orders were sent to General GiUmore to cease
active operations in South Carolina.
" You may now recaU General Hatch to the Santee," Sher
man Avrote to General GiUmore. " Keep pickets about
BranchviUe and the Santee Bridge, and await the further de
velopments. I have no doubt that a general surrender of aU
the Confederate armies is arranged, and only awaits a con
firmation from Washington. AU is weU Arith ua and every
where." Thus far, however, no measures had been taken to check the
devastation caused by the bold WUson's imembarrassed raid
through Georgia and Alabama. General Johnston, therefore,
wrote to General Sherman as foUows : —

CORRESPONDENCE DURING THE TRUCE. 407
" Grebnsboeo', April 19, 1865.
" General — ^As your troops are moring from the coast to
wards the interior of South CaroHna, and from Columbus
towards Macon, Georgia, I respectfuUy suggest that you send
copies of your orders announcing the suspension of hostUities
for transmittal to them, supposing the interior route to be the
shortest. " Most respectfuUy, your obedient servant,
"J. E. Johnston, " General C. S. A."
To this General Sherman repHed on the 20th : —
" Geneeal — ^At your request I send you, by Major Saunders,
several Avritten and printed copies of an order I have made to
this army, which announces the cessation of hostihties, etc. I
dispatched a steamer from Morehead City yesterday, for
Charleston, Arith orders to General GiUmore to cease all acts
of destruction, pubhc or private, and to draw Generals Hatch
and Potter back of the frontier. Also, by haH-past eleven A, m.
yesterday. Major Hitchcock was on a fleet steamer at More-
head City, carrying a request to General Meade to check the
movement of his army on DanvUle and Weldon ; so that I
hope your people wiU be spared in the Carohnas. But I am
apprehensive of WUson, who is impetuous and rapid. If you
AriU send by telegraph and courier a single word, he wUl stop,
and then the inclosed order AriU place his command at a
point convenient to our suppHes. .
" I send you a late paper, shoAring that in Vkginia the State
authorities are acknowledged and invited to resume thek law
ful functions."
On the 20th, whUe this dispatch was on the way, WUson ap
peared before Macon and demanded the surrender of the city.
Being informed by the commanding officer of the existence of
the armistice, he sent the foUoAring dispatch, under flag of
truce, to be telegraphed to Sherman : —

408 SHEBMAN 'AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
" To Majoe-Geneeal W. T. Sheeman,
Through headquarters of Geneeal Beaueegaed :
" My advance received the surrender of this city Arith its
garrison this evening. General Cobb had previously sent me,
under a flag of truce, a copy of the telegram from General
Beauregard, declaring the existence of an armistice between
aU the troops under your command and those of General
Johnston. Without questioning the authority of this dispatch,
or its appHcation to my command, I could not communicate
orders in time to prevent the capture. I shaU therefore hold
the garrison, including Major-Generals Cobb and G. W. Smith
and Brigadier-General McCaU, prisoners of war.
" Please send me orders. I shaU remain here a reasonable
length of time to hear from you.
" J. H. Wilson,
"Brevet Major-General U. S. A."
This dispatch was transmitted by telegraph by General
Beauregard to General Johnston, and by the latter forwarded
through General Wade Hampton, by flag of truce, to its des
tination, accompanied by the foUoAving letter from General
Johnston : — " Hbadquartees Army of the Tennessee,
April 21, 1865—9.30 a. m.
" Majoe-Geneeal W. T. Sheeman,
Care Lieutenant-Geneeal Hampton, via HiUsboro' :
"I transmit a dispatch, just received by telegraph from
Major-General WUson, United States Army. Should you de
ske to give the orders asked for in the same manner, I beg
you to send them to me through Lieutenant-General Hamp
ton's office.
" I hope that, for the sake of expedition, you are AriUing to
take this course. I also send, for your information, a copy of
a dispatch received from Major-General Cobb.
"J. E. Johnston."
With this letter General Johnston also transmitted a copy

CORRESPONDENCE DURING THE TRUCE. 409
of the foUowing telegram from Major-General HoweU Cobb,
commanding the Confederate troops at Macon : —
" To Geneeal G. T. Beatjeegaed :
"On receipt of your dispatch at eleven o'clock to-day, I
sent a flag of truce to General Wilson, with copy of the same,
and informuig him that I had issued orders to carry out armis
tice, desisting from miHtary operations. The flag met the
advance fourteen miles from the city. Before hearing from it
the advance moved on the city, and having moved my picket,
were in the city before I was aware of thek approach.
" An unconcHtional surrender was demanded, to which I was
forced to submit, under protest. General WUson has since
arrived, and holds the city and garrison as captured, notArith-
standing my protest. He informs me he wUl remain in his
present position a reasonable length of time to hear from his
dispatch to General Sherman, sent to your case.
"Howell Cobb,
" Major-General."
Sherman immediately issued the foUowing orders to General
Wilson, and caused them to be transmitted through the same
channels by which he had received the report of that officer : —
" Headquarters Military Division op the Mississippi,
In the Field, Raleigh, N. C, April 21, 1865.
"Geneeal James H. Wilson,
Commanding Cavalry Division Mississippi, Macon, Oa. :
" Geneeal — A suspension of hostihties was agreed on be
tween General Johnston and myseH, on Tuesday, AprU 18, at
twelve noon. I want that agreement religiously observed, and
you may release the generals capkired at Macon. Occupy
ground convenient, and contract for suppHes for your com
mand, and forbear any act of hostUity untU you hear or have
reason to believe hostihties are resumed. In the mean time,
it is also agreed the position of the enemy must not be altered
to our prejudice.

410 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
" You know by this time that General Lee has siurendered
to General Grant the rebel Army of Northern Vkginia, and
that I only await the sanction of the President to conclude
terms of peace coextensive Arith the boundaries of the United
States. You avUI shape your conduct on this knowledge, un
less you have overwhelming proof to the contrary."
At the same time Sherman Avrote to General, Johns
ton: —
" Geneeal — I send you a letter for General WUson, which,
if sent by telegraph and courier, AviU check his career. He
may cHstrust the telegraph, therefore better send the original,
for he cannot mistake my handAvriting, Arith which he is fa-
mUiar. He seems to have his blood up, and avUI be hard to
hold. If he can buy corn, fodder, and rations doAvn about
Fort VaUey, it avUI obriate the necessity of his going up to
Eome or Dalton.
" It is reported to me from Cako that MobUe is in our pos
session, but it is not minute or official.
" General Baker sent in to me, wanting to surrender his
command, on the theory that the whole Confederate army was
surrendered. I explained to him, or his staff-officer, the exact
truth, and left him to act as he thought proper. He seems to
have disbanded his men, deposited a few arms about twenty
mUes fr-om here, and himseH awaits your action. I wUl not
hold him, his men, or arms subject to any condition other than
the final one we may agree on.
" I sliaU look for Major Hitchcock back from Washington
on Wednesday, and shaU promptly notHy you of the result.
By the action of General Weitzel in relation to the Vkginia
Legislature, I feel certalin we AriU have no trouble on the score
of recognizing existing State governments. It may be the
laAvyers AriU want us to define more minutely what is meant
by the guarantee of rights of person and property. It may
be construed into a compact for us to undo the past as to the
rights of slaves and 'leases of plantations' on the Mississippi,

CORRESPONDENCE DURING THE TRUCE. 411
of 'vacant and abandoned' plantations. I wish you would
talk to the best men you have on these points ; and, H pos
sible, let us in our final convention make these points so clear
as to leave no room for angry controversy.
" I behove H the South would simply and pubHcly declare
what we aU feel, that slavery is dead, that you would inaugu
rate an era of peace and prosperity that would soon efface the
ravages of the past four years of war. Negroes would remain
in the South, and afford you abundance of cheap labor, which
otherwise AviU be driven away ; and it avlU save the country
the senseless discussions which have kept us aU in hot water
for fifty years.
" Although, strictly speaking, this is no subject for a mUi
tary convention, yet I am honestly convinced that our simple
declaration of a result wUl be accepted as good law every
where. Of course, I have not a single word from Washington
on this or any other point of our agreement, but I know the
effect of such a step by us avUI be universaUy accepted."
Johnston immediately repHed, suggesting a modification of
Sherman's orders to WUson : —
"Headquarters Army of the Tennessee,
"April 22, 1865—2.30 p. m.
" Majoe-Geneeal W. T. Sheeman,
Commanding U. S. Forces, Raleigh, N. C. :
" Yoiu telegram to brevet MajorrGeneral WUson is just re
ceived. I respectfuUy suggest that the sentence, ' In the
mean time it is also agreed that the position of the enemy's
forces must not be altered to our prejudice,' be so modified as
to read, ' In the mean time it is also agreed that the position
of the forces of neither beUigerent shaU be altered to the pre
judice of the other ;' and on this principle you dkect Major-
General WUson to ¦withdraw from Macon and release its
garrison. " J. E. Johnston, General."

412 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
To this General Sherman felt impeUed to decHne acceding,
and accordingly answered on the 23d : —
" Geneeal — ^Your communication of twenty minutes past two
p. M. of yesterday is received. My Hne of communication Arith
General WUson is not secure enough for me to confuse him by a
change in mere words. Of course the status quo is mutual, but
I leave him to apply it to his case according to his surroundings.
I would not instruct him to undo aU done by him between the
actual date of our agreement and the time the knowledge of it
reached him. I beg, therefore, to leave him free to apply the
rule to his own case. Indeed, I have almost exceeded the
bounds of prudence in checking him without the means of di
rect communication, and only did so on my absolute faith in
your personal character.
" I inclose a dispatch for General WUson, in cipher, which,
translated, simply adrises him to keep his command weU to
gether, and to act according to the best of his abihty, doing
as Httle harm to the country as possible, untU he knows hos
tihties are resumed."
MeanwhUe, General Sherman had received, through Gen
eral Johnston, a dispatch Avritten in the cipher of the War
Department, and on causing it to be translated, read as
foUows : — "Headquarters Cavairy Corps, Military Dtvibion
OF the Mississippi, Macon, Ga., April 21, 1865.
" Majoe-Geneeal W.- T. Sheeman,
Through Geneeal Johnston :
" Your dispatch of yesterday is received. I shaU at once
proceed to carry out your instructions. H proper amange-
ments can be made to have sugar, coffee, and clothing sent
from Savannah to Augusta, they can be brought thither by
the way of Atlanta by raUroad, or they can be sent by boat
dkectly to this place from Darien. I shaU be able to get for
age, bread, and meat from Southeastem Georgia. The raU-

CORRESPONDENCE DURING THE TRUCE. 413
road from Atlanta to Dalton or Cleveland cannot be repaked
in three months. I have arranged to send an officer at once,
via Eufala, to General Canby, with a copy of your dispatch.
General Cobb wiU also notify General Taylor of the armistice.
I have about three thousand prisoners of war, including Gen
erals Cobb, Smith, McCaU, Mercer, and Eobertson. Can you
arrange with General Johnston for their immediate release ?
Please answer at once. I shaU start a staff-officer to you to
morrow. "J. H. Wilson,
" Brevet Major-General commanding."
He immediately repHed as foUows, on the 23d : —
" Cipher dispatch received. There is a general suspension
of hostUities, awaiting the assent of our new President to cer
tain civU points before^ making a final mUitary convention of
peace. Act according to your ovm good sense until you are
certain the war is over. Keep possession of some key-point
that AvUl secure your present advantages, rest your men and
horses, and in a few days you AriU receive either positive in
formation of peace, or may infer the contrary. My messenger
should be back from Washington to-morrow."
On the 22d, Sherman reported his action as foUows to Lieu
tenant-General Grant, sending the dispatch by telegraph to
Morehead City to be iorwarded by a fleet steamer to Fort
Monroe, and thence telegraphed to Washington : —
" General WUson held Macon on the 20th, Arith HoweU Cobb,
G. W. Smith, and others as prisoners ; but they claimed the
benefit of my armistice, and he has telegraphed to me through
the rebel Hnes for orders. I have answered him that he may
draw out of Macon, and hold his command for further orders,
unless he has reason to behove that the rebels are changing
the status to our prejudice. A brigade of rebels offered to sur
render to me yesterday ; but I prefer to make one grand finale,

414 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
which I beheve to be perfectly practicable. There AviU be no
trouble in adjusting matters in North CaroHna, Georgia, and
Alabama, and I think South CaroHna ought to be satisfied,
Arith Charleston and Columbia in ruins. All we await is an
answer from you and the President. Weather fine ; roads
good. Troops ready for fight or home."
On the 23d, he Avrote to Generals Johnston and Hardee : —
" I send a bundle of papers for you jointly. These are the
latest. Telegraph dispatches are here to 19th. Young Fred.
Seward is ahve, having been subjected to the trepan, and may
possibly recover.
"There appears no doubt the murder of Mr. Lincoln was
done by Booth, and the attempt on Mr. Seward by Surratt,
who is in custody. AU wUl sooner or later be caught. The
feeling North on this subject is more intense than any thing
that ever occurred before. General Ord, at Eichmond, has
recaUed the permission given for the Virginia Legislature,
and I fear much the assassination of the President AviU give a
bias to the popular mind which, in connection Arith the deske
of our pohticians, may thwart our purpose of recognizing
' existing local governments.' But it does seem to me there
must be good sense enough left on this continent to give order
and shape to the now disjointed elements of government. I
behove this assassination of Mr. Lincoln wiU do the cause ol
the South more harm than any event of the war, both at home
and abroad, and I doubt H the Confederate military authori
ties had any more comphcity with it than I had. I am thus
frank Arith you, and have asserted as much to the War De
partment. But I dare not say as much for Mr. Davis or some
of the ciril functionaries, for it seems the plot was fixed for
March 4th, but delayed, awaiting some instructions from
' Richmond.' You avUI find in the newspapers I send you, aU
the information I have on this point.
"Major Hitchcock should be back to-morrow, and if any
delay occurs it avUI result from the changed feehng about

CORRESPONDENCE DURING THF TRUCE. 415
Washington, arising from this new and unforeseen compHca-
tion." On the night of the 23d, Major Hitchcock returned from
Washington with the dispatches which we read in the pre
ceding chapter, and Lieutenant-General Grant arrived in per
son to dkect operations.
On the 25th General Sherman Avrote to Admkal Dahlgren : —
"I expect Johnston AviU sumender his army to-morrow.
We have had much negotiation, and things are settling doAvn
to the terms of General Lee's army.
" Jeff. Davis and cabinet, with considerable specie, are mak
ing their way towards Cuba. He passed Charlotte going
south on the 23d, and I think he wiU try to reach Florida
coast, either Cedar Keys or lower down. Catch him H you
can. Can't you watch the east coast and send Avord round to
the west coast ?
" Copy for General GiUmore, who has the cipher."
And on May 2d he Avrote to General Thomas : —
" Captain Hasea is here en route for NashviUe, from General
Nelson, now at Macon. He got possession of that place just
as he learned of the suspension of hostUities that preceded the
final surrender of Johnston's army at Greensboro'. I have sent
word to General Nelson to parole his prisoners there on the
same terms as prescribed to Johnston and Lee, and to return
to the neighborhood of Decatur, Alabama, and then report to
you or me. I came to Savannah from Ealeigh to send stores
up to Augusta by boat for Nelson, and to take steps to occupy
Augusta. " I AvUl have much to teU you, at some future time, of the
detaUs of my negotiations with Johnston, which have been
misconstrued by the people at the North ; but I can afford to
let them settle doAvn before teUing aU the tmth. At my first
interriew with Johnston he admitted the Confederate cause

416 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
was lost, and that it would be murder for him to aUow any
more conflicts ; but he asked me to help him aU I could to
prevent his army and people breaking up into guemiUa bands.
I deemed that so deskable, that I did make terms, subject
to the approval of the President, which may be deemed too
Hberal. But the more I reflect, the more satisfled I am that
by dealing with the. people of the South magnanimously we
AriU restore four-fifths of them at once to the condition of good
citizens, learing us only to deal Arith the remainder. But my
terms were not approved, and Johnston's present surrender
only apphes to the troops in his present command, viz., east
of Chattahoochee.
" The boat is in motion, and I Avrite Arith great difficulty,
and AviU wait a more convenient season to give you fuUer de
taUs."

TdE REJECTED A.GREEMENT. 417

CHAPTEE XXXm.
THE EEJECTfiD AGEEEMENT.
On the 22d day of April the secretary of war, Mr. Stanton,
caused to be prepared and pubHshed in the daUy newspapers
of the city of New York the foUowing buUetin : —
" Majoe-Geneeal Dix, New York :
" Yesterday evening a bearer of dispatches arrived here from
General Sherman. An agreement for a suspension of hostUi
ties, and a memorandum of what is caUed ' a basis of peace,'
had been entered into on the 18th instant, by General Sher
man with the rebel General Johnston, the rebel General Breck
inridge being present at the conference.
" A cabinet meeting was held at eight o'clock in the even
ing, at which the action of General Sherman was disapproved
by the President, by the secretary of war, by General Grant,
and by every member of the cabinet. General Sherman was
ordered to resume hostUities immediately, and he was directed '
that the instructions given by the late President, in the foUow
mg telegram, which was penned by Mr. Lincoln himself, at the
Capitol, on the night of the 3d of March, were approved by
President Andrew Johnson, and were reiterated to govern the
action of miHtary commanders.
" On the night of the 3d of March, whUe President Lincoln
and his cabinet were at the Capitol, a telegram from General
Grant was brought to the secretary of war, informing himi
that General Lee had asked for a conference to make arrange
ments for terms of peace. The letter of General Lee was pub
hshed in a message of Davis to the rebel Congress. General^
27

418 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
Grant's telegram was submitted to Mr. Lincoln, who, aftei
pondering a few minutes, took up his pen, and wrote with his
OAvn hand the foUowing reply, which he submitted to the secre
tary of state and the secretary of war. It was then dated, ad
dressed, and signed by the secretary of war, and telegraphed
to General Grant. " ' Washington, March 3, 1865—12.80 p. m,
' Lleutenant-General Grant :
" ' The President directs me to say to you that he wishes you to have no con
ference ¦with General Lee, unless it be for the capitulation of General Lee's
army, or some minor and purely military matters. He instructs me to say you
are not to decide or confer upon any political questions. Such questions the
President holds in his own hands, and ¦will submit them to no military confer
ence or conditions. Meantime you are to press to the utmost your military
advantages. " ' Edavin M. Stanton,
" ' Secretary of War.'
" The orders of General Sherman to General Stoneman to
vrithdraw from Sahsbury and join him, wiU probably open the
way for Daris to escape to Mexico, or Europe, with his plun
der, which is reported to be very large, including not only the
plunder of the Eichmond banks, but previous accumulations.
A dispatch received by this department from Eichmond says :
" ' It is stated here by respectable parties, that the amount
of specie taken south by Jefferson Daris and his partisans is
very large, including not only the plunder of the Eichmond
banks, but previous accuinulations. They hope, it is said, to
make terms Arith Sherman, or some other Southern com
mander, by which they avUI be permitted, with thek effects,
including the gold plunder, to go to Mexico or Europe. John
ston's negotiations look to this end.'
" After the cabinet meeting last night. General Grant started
for North CaroHna, to dkect future operations against John
ston's army. "Edavin M. Stanton,
" Secretary of War.'
To this cHspatch was appended in the newspapers the fol-
loAring remarks : —

THE REJECTED AGREEMENT. 419
"It is reported that this proceeding of General Sherman
was disapproved for the foUoAving, among other reasons : —
" First.— It was an exercise of authority not vested in Gen
eral Sherman, and on its face shows that both he and John
ston knew that General Sherman had no authority to enter
into any such arrangement.
" Second. — It was an acknowledgment of the rebel govern
ment. " Third.— It is understood to re-estabhsh rebel State gov
ernments that had been overthrown at the sacrifice of many
thousands of loyal Hves and immense treasure, and placed
arms and munitions of war in the hands of rebels, at their
respective capitals, which might be used as soon as the armies
of the United States were disbanded, and used to conquer and
subdue loyal States.
" Fourth. — By the restoration of the rebel authority in their
respective States, they would be enabled to re-estabhsh sla
very. " Fifth. — It might furnish a ground of responsibility, by the
Federal Government, to pay the rebel debt, and certainly sub
jects loyal citizens of the rebel States to debts contracted by
rebels in the name of the States.
"Sixth. — It put in dispute the existence of loyal State
governments, and the new State of Westem Vkginia, which
had been recognized by every department of the United States
Government. "Seventh. — It practicaUy aboHshed the confiscation laws,
and relieved rebels of every degree Avho had slaughtered our
people from all pains and penalties for thek crimes.
" Eighth. — It gave terms that had been dehberately, repeat
edly, and solemnly rejected by President Lincoln, and better
terms than the rebels had ever asked in thek most prosperous
condition. " Ninth. — It formed no basis of true and lasting peace, but
reheved the rebels from the pressure of our victories, and left
them in condition to renew their effort to overthrow the United
States GoA'emmont, and subdue the loyal States, whenever

420 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
thek strength was recruited, and any opportunity should
offer."

The agreement between General Sherman and General
Johnston was in perfect accord with President Lincoln's pol
icy at that time, so far as it was known to his generals or the
pubhc. The telegram dated 3d of March, and sent by Mr.
Stanton to General Grant, was a special instruction intended
to govern the conduct of General Grant alone at that particu
lar time and in that particular case. It was not communicated
to General Sherman for his guidance, and was whoUy unknoAvn
to him. Whatever may have been the reasons for that in
struction, it was entirely ignored a month afterwards by Mr.
Lincoln himseH. After Lee's surrender, Mr. Lincoln concluded
to recognize the existing Legislature of Virginia, and author
ized the then mUitary commandant at Eichmond to permit it
to assemble. On the 6th day of AprU, whUe at City Point, he
made this memorandum and handed it to Senator WUkinson,
who dehvered it to General Weitzel on the 7th : —
" Majoe-Geneeal Weitzel, Richmond, Virginia :
" It has been intimated to me that the gentlemen who have
acted as the Legislature of Vkginia, in support of the rebel
lion, may now deske to assemble at Eichmond and take meas
ures to withdraw the Virginia troops and other support from
resistance to the General Government. If they attempt it,
give them permission and protection, until, if at aU, they at
tempt some action hostUe to the United States, in which case
you wUl notify them, give them reasonable time to leave, and
at the end of which time arrest any who remain. AUow Judge
CampbeU to see this, b'^"* do not make it pubhc.
"Yours, etc., "A. Lincoln."
General Weitzel, so authorized, approved a caU for the
meeting of the Legislature at Eichmond on the 11th. The
caU was in these words : —

THE REJECTED AGREEMENT. • 42I
" The undersigned, members of the Legislature of the State
of Virginia, in connection with a number of citizens of the
State, whose names are attached to this paper, iu vioAv of the
evacuation of the city of Eichmond by the Confederate gov
ernment and its occupation by the military authorities of the
United States, the surrender of the Army of Northern Vir
ginia, and the suspension of the jurisdiction of the civU power
of the State, are of the opinion that an immediate meeting of
the General Assembly of the State is caUed for by the exigen
cies of the situation. The consent of the military authorities
of the United States to a session of the Legislature hi Eich
mond, in connection with the governor and Heutenant-govemor,
to their free dehberation upon the pubhc affaks, and to the
ingress and departure of aU its members under safe conduct,
has been obtained.
" The United States authorities wiU afford transportation
from any point under thek control to any of the persons before
mentioned. " The matters to be submitted to the Legislature are the
restoration of peace to the State of Virginia, and the adjust
ment of the questions, involving Hfe, liberty, and property,
that have arisen in the State as a consequence of war.
" We, therefore, earnestly request the governor, Heutenant-
governor, and members of the Legislature to repak to this
city by the 25th of AprU, instant.
" We understand that fuU protection to persons and prop
erty AriU be afforded in the State, and we recommend to
peaceful citizens to remain at their homes and pursue thek
usual avocations with confidence that they wUl not be inter
rupted. " We earnestly sohcit the attendance in Eichmond, on or
before the 25th of AprU, instant, of the foUoAving persons,
citizens of Virginia, to confer Arith us as to the best means of
restoring peace to the State of Vkginia. We have secured safe
conduct fr'om the mUitary authorities of the United States for
them to enter the city and depart Arithout molestation."

422 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
The foregoing was pubHshed in the Eichmond papers on the
12th, and announced in hand-biUs, posted in aU conspicuous
places. On the same day the Eichmond Whig contained the
foUoAring editorial article, congratulating the country on this
pleasing state of things : —
" It is understood that this invitation has been put forth in
pursuance of the plan of proceeding assented to by President
Lincoln. At all events, it AriU be haUed by the great body of
the people of Virginia as the first step toivards the reinstatement
of the Old Dominion in the Union. It is probable that some of
the members of the Legislature may decline to come. In
every such case the people of the county or senatorial district
should select some influential and inteUigent citizen, who is
AvUhng to take part in this business, and commission him, as
far as they can, to represent them at the conference.
" The views and purposes of the members of the Legislature
should be ascertained at once. Every one can foresee diffi
culties in the way of formal action : in the beginning several
complex questions are to be met at the threshold ; but " where
there is a avUI there is a way," and whatever the difficulties
presented, the important business must be undertaken.
" In this connection we may say that the recent interview
between the President and Judge CampbeU related to the res
toration of peace in aU the States, and not to Vkginia alone,
as might be inferred from the brief notice of the ' consultation
of citizens' pubHshed in the Whig of Saturday. Whilst every
one wUl rejoice at the restoration of peace and prosperity in
all the States, we caimot refrain fr-om the expression of the
hope that the pubhc men who are to take part in the reinstate
ment of Vkginia to her ancient position in the sisterhood of
States, wUl address themselves to that business without un
necessary delay. Virginia was not consulted nor waited for
when secession became the determined poHcy of the ' cotton
States,' and there is no sound reason why 'co-operation'
with them, in accepting the President's terms of peace, should
'be the iide of proceeding now. Let Vkginia lead the way

THE REJECTED AGREEMENT. 423
back to the Union, and present an example of prompt action
to the other States of the late ' Confederacy.' "
These publications were made in Eichmond six days before
the agreement between Sherman and Johnston was concluded.
and the facts were weU known in both armies, were freely
commented upon, and the movement highly approved by the
commanding officers, who generaUy regarded the policy thereby
indicated as wise and of universal appHcation. This caU and
the Eichmond comments were reproduced by the leading noAvs-
paperS of the United States, with approving comments, on the
14th of April, the very day of the assassination, and four days
anterior to the agreement. The New York Herald of that
date contained a leading article vindicating the pohcy indi
cated, and claiming for Mr. Lincoln great credit for inaugu
rating it. Other leading journals, such as the Noav York Tri
bune, Post, and World, aU concurred in the most hberal terms
of peace. The Herald article says :—
" The rebeUion is indeed demoHshed. Eead the caU which
we publish to-day from congressmen, assemblymen, editors,
judges, lawyers, planters, etc.— a powerful body of the most
conspicuous rebels of old Vkginia — ^inviting the rebel gov
ernor, lieutenant-governor, and Legislature of that State to
meet in Eichmond, under the protection of the ' old flag,' to
consider their present situation. Old Virginia, the head and
front of the rebeUion, surrenders, and, broken up, disorganized
and exhausted, aU her confederates in the service of Jefferson
Davis, under the same protection, wiU speedUy foUow her
good example.
"This is a shrewd and sagacious movement on the part of
President Lincoln. He not only pardons the leading rebels
of Virginia, from the governor down, but invites him and them,
and their late rebel ^Legislature, to meet in council at Eich
mond, to deliberate upon the ways and means for the restora
tion of the State to the blessings of the Union, under the new
condition of things produced by this tremendous war. The

424 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. ^
assemblage thus convened caimot faU to be influenced by the
generous spirit of President Lincoln. It avUI reaHze the fact
that Virginia haring been, like a brand from the flames, res
cued from the Moloch of her Southern Confederacy, vengeance
is at an end, charity prevaUs, and that the ' Old Dominion'
must prepare for a new State charter, upon new ideas, and for
the noAV hfe of regeneration and prosperity that Hes before her.
At the same time, whUe the moral influence of this great and
Arise concession in behaH of reconstruction in Virginia wiU
have a powerful effect upon the leading spkits of aU the other
rebelhous States, we may expect from the debates of the
meeting thus assembled, that the administration wUl derive
much valuable information, and vriU be greatly assisted in the
solution of the difficult details of reconstruction in aU the re
conquered States.
" We are inchned to suspect that Mr. Lincoln, in this exhi
bition of the spkit of concihation, did not forget a certain
anecdote in the hfe of Herod the Great, of Judea, as the king
of that country under the supreme authority of Eome. In the
war of the Eoman factions which followed the deatji of JuHus
Caesar, Herod took the side of the unfortunate Brutus and
Cassius. Marc Antony, then faUing into the possession of
Judea, caUed Herod to an account, and asked him what he
had to say in his defence. Herod rephed : ' Only this : H I
have been troublesome as your enemy, may I not be useful as
your friend?' Marc Antony took the hint, and Herod con
tinued useful as a servant of Eome to the day of his death.
The same idea, we infer, influenced the President in those
recent consultations at Eichmond, to which we may trace the
experiment of this extraordinary caU for the meeting of tho
rebel Legislature of Vkginia. He wants to make those men
useful as friends of the Union who have been so energetic and
troublesome as its enemies."
Such was the pubhshed pohcy of Mr. Lincoln, as it came
under the notice of General Sherman, and such the arguments
by which it was sustained. With his opportunities for correct

THE REJECTED AGREEMENT. 425
information, Sherman approved of both. He had the most
satisfactory evidence of the complete overthrow of the powef^
of the Confederacy and the subjugation of the spirit of the
rebeUion. For four long years he had been constantly em
ployed in destroying the armies of the Confederacy and wast
ing its power of resistance. He had just marched his -grand
army from the mountains, in Georgia, to the sea, and fr'om the
sea back to the mountains, in North Carohna ; he had over
come every foe, laid waste every field, destroyed every article
of subsistence, every instrument of war, and every means of
transportation, in his desolate track ; and noWj with his grand
army weU in hand, he stood amid a AvUdemess of ruin, with
no resolute foe wiUing to accept the gage of battle. He knew
the poAver of the enemy was broken, and every particle of the
spirit of war taken out of the Southern people..
General Sherman is no petty dealer of smaU wares ; he fights
an enemy Arith aU' his might, and having conquered, he for
gives with aU his heart; and in the spirit of Mr. Lincoln,
whose teachings he foUowed, he was wiUing to say to General
Johnston: "^ake your army home in good order, turn over
your arms at the State capitals, there to remain subject to the
disposition of the Congress of the United States; let your
men go to work to repair your desolate country, under the
ample folds of the flag of the Union ; — go and sin no more, and
may God bless you !"
To denounce Sherman's truce, therefore, is to denounce the
pohcy of Mr. Lincoln ; and to condemn Shei-man, is to defame
" the memory of the man the -nation mourns. If Sherman was
slow in mastering racHcal ideas, so was Mr. Lincoln. Indeed,
Sherman moved faster than Lincoln ; for whUe Lincoln was
contemplating the effect of his emancipation proclamation,
and comparing it to the "pope's buU against the comet,"
Sherman declared that the subject-matter of the proclamation
was within the war-power of the President, and that nothing
remained to make it effective but the triumph of our arms ;
and this reduced the question to one of material power. If
the rebeUion triumphed, the nation was conquered and slavery

426 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
survived ; H the nation conquered, slavery died as an incident
of the war, by force of a lawfrd proclamation, issued by proper
authority during the war. If Sherman had been a pohtician
and not a soldier, his pohtical ideas might haA'e developed
and improved more rapidly : but if his pohtical progress was
slow, his army moved fast, and brought home peace ; and if he
erred, it was on the side of magnanimity, and the attributes
of Deity prescribe no penalty for such sins.
It is important to remember that General Sherman con
cluded his agreement with General Johnston whUe fiUed with
the spirit of President Lincoln's pohcy with respect to the Vk
ginia Legislature, and that no notice of the change of that
pohcy or the revocation of the order to General Weitzel, of
AprU 6th, reached him untU the agreement had been akeady
disapproved. Mr. Stanton deemed that General Sherman had transcended
his authority. The surrender of aU rebels in arms, as pro
posed to Johnston by him, was, however, a purely mihtary
question, and he treated it as a soldier ; but when the terms
proposed by Johnston were found to embrace political subjects,
he neither finaUy accepted nor decidedly rejected them, but
promptly referred them to his superior, the President. If he
had been invested with the requisite authority to conclude a
treaty on purely civU matters, he would not have referred the
stipulations to the President for his approval, but would have
closed the matter at once. Sherman declared to Johnston he •
had no authority, and Johnston knew he had no authority,
to make a final agreement without the approval of the Presi-'
dent, and it was so stated iu the instrument itseH as a reason
for sending it to Washington for the consideration and action
of the President.
Furthermore, it was objected that it was a " practical ac
knowledgment of the rebel government." It has ever been an
unpleasant thing to do, to acknowledge even the actual exist
ence of the rebel government ; nevertheless we had previously
done so in many ways : by declaring the ports of the Southern
States blockaded, by sending flags of tmce to rebel com-

THE REJECTED AGREEMENT. 427
manders to obtain leave to carry off our wounded and bury our
dead, by appointing commissioners to arrange a cartel for
the exchange of prisoners, and by fighting its armies on a
hundred battle-fields at an expense of hundreds of miUions of
treasure and hundreds of thousands of lives. But the agree
ment did not in any way recognize the rightful existence of
the rebel government, and never since the war began was it
proposed to recognize its actual existence under such agree
able circumstances. Its condition was utterly hopeless.
General Johnston, at the head of the only formidable miHtary
force belonging to it, presented himseH to General Sherman
and made this proposition : " I propose to stop the war and
surrender all the armies of the Confederacy, on condition that
the Southern people shaU be allowed to Hve Hke other respect
able people under the free and enhghtened Government of the
United States." AU he asked besides was a receipt. Sher
man promptly wrote out a voucher, and sent it to Washington
for approval. It was not the acknowledgment of the exist
ence of tho rebel government so much as a receipt for the
rebel government itseH, soul and body, Avhich Johnston was
to deliver into the hands of Sherman. And it could make
no difference in Avhose name the A'oucher was given, since
the rebel government was to perish the instant it Avas de
hvered. Again : " By the restoration of the rebel authority in their
respective States, they would be enabled to re-establish
slavery." This objection is weU founded, and, indeed, as we shaU
presently perceive, occurred to General Sherman himseH on
further reflection. It would have constituted a valid reason
for requiring the amendment of the agreement by the insertion
of a distinct declaration on this subject, if it had not been al
ready decided by the administration not to permit any terms
except those necessarUy involved in the surrender of the Con
federate armies. But the ruling conviction of General Sher
man's mind, that slavery had received its death-blow beyond
the power of resurrection, caused him to lose sight of the

428 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
necessity for a formal recognition of a fact, as he thought,
already patent to all. Johnston so admitted at his conference
with Sherman, and Sherman so beHeved. Sherman was of
opinion that slavery was abohshed by act of war, and that it
was wiped out of existence by the President's proclamation.
As far back as the 1st of January, 1864, he wrote, for the in
formation of the people of Alabama : " Three years ago, by -a
Httle reflection and patience, you could have had a hundred
years of peace and prosperity, but you preferred war. Very
weU. Last year you could have saved your slaves, but now
it is too late : all the poiuers of earth cannot restore your slaves
any more than your dead grandfathers."
On his march from Atlanta, in Georgia, to Goldsboro', in
North Carolina, the negroes came in croAvds to see him, and to
inquke H it was true "Massa Lincoln," as they designated the
President, had reaUy made them free ; when General Sherman
gave them every assurance that they had been made free, they
and their chUdren forever, but advised them to remain at
home and work, and do thek best to make a Hving for them
selves, untU President Lincoln should send them AVord what
else to do.
It appears, however, that after the messenger left for Wash
ington with the agreement, General Sherman reflected that an
article declaring slavery aboHshed should properly have been
inserted ; when he immediately addressed a letter to General
Johnston, with the view to fr-aming such a clause, to be added
when the agreement should be returned. This letter, dated on
the 21st of AprU, and given in fuU on page 407, proceeds : —
" The action of General Weitzel in relation to the Legisla
ture of Virginia, indicates that existing State governments
AviU be recognized by the General Government. It may be,
however, the lawyers wUl want us to define more minutely
what is meant by the guarantee of the rights of persons and prop
erty. It may be construed into a compact for us to undo the
past as to the rights of slaves, and leases of plantations on the
Mississippi, of vacant and abandoned plantations, etc.

THE REJECTED AGREEMENT. 429
" I wish you would talk to the best men you have on these
points, and, if possible, let us, in the final convention, make
them so clear as to leave no room for angry controversy. I
beheve, H you would simply and pubHcly declare what we all
feel and know, tJiat slavery is dead, that you would inaugurate
an era of peace and prosperity that Avould soon efface the
ravages of the past four years of war. Negroes would remain
in the South, and afford you an abundance of cheap labor, which
otherwise wiU be driven away ; and it wUl save the country
the unhappy discussions which have kept us aU in hot water
for fifty years. Although, strictly speaking, this is no subject
of a military convention, yet I am honestly convinced that our
simple declaration of a result AviU be accepted as gopd law
everywhere." This letter was Avritten under the fuU behef that his agree
ment Arith Johnston would be approved, for nothing had oc
curred as yet to cast a shadow of doubt upon the matter.
There was no question in his own mind that slavery was a
dead institution, and there seemed to be no question on the
subject in the minds of Johnston and Breckinridge. Johnston
admitted it frankly, and declared Daris himseH had settled
that matter when he caUed upon the negro for help ; and
Breckinridge said, at the interview on the 18th : " The dis
cussion of the slavery question is at an end. The constitu
tional amendment forever forbidding slavery is perfectly fak,
and wUl be accepted in that spirit by the people of the South."
Hence Sherman had no doubt the additional article would be
conceded, and he thought it might do good. But the utter
rejection of the agreement by the President and cabinet, put
an end to aU further efforts in that direction. E the adminis
tration at Washington had accepted the stipulations as an
initiatory proceeding, to be altered and amended to suit aU
the exigencies of the new peace, and had sent thorn back Arith
amendments and instructions, an opportunity seemed pre
sented for at once estabHshing a peace on an enduring basis.
It is to be regretted that Sherman's after-thought, on the

430 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
slavery subject, had not been his fore-thought. It was fit and
proper that the question of slavery, the substantial cause of
the war, should be then and there settled by an express stip
ulation, declared in the presence of the two armies by thek
commanders. This would have settled the matter forever ; an
amendment of the constitution forbidding slavery would then
have been unnecessary, except for the benefit of the border
States not in rebeUion, and to prevent any of the States from
rcA'iving the institution at some future day, and the new era
would immediately have been inaugurated.
It was our misfortune during the war, from first to last, that
we had no leading head that could rightly comprehend the
situation, and at the same time grasp and organize the power
and resources of the country, so as to put doAvn the rebeUion
by a short, sharp, and vigorous conflict. At first our rulers
undertook to do it by three months' mUitia — by a mere show
of power and by moral suasion ; but the people saw, in ad
vance of the Government, it required a great effort, and, under
the inspiration of the hour, two hundred thousand volunteers
tendered their services for the war. A few of these were ac
cepted, and many rejected, and the golden moment was past.
Afterwards, when they were called for, they could not be had.
The first two years of the war were HteraUy frittered away.
Then the Government offered and paid large bounties, and ob
tained raAv recruits, and also many mercenaries who deserted,
— aU costing the Government more money for actual services
rendered than would have- been necessary to pay the same
number of men from the beginning ; and the war was prolonged.
Then came a law for a draft, Arith a commutation clause at
tached Avhich rendered it inoperative, so far as raising men for
the army was concerned. Then came a Httle trick of a pohcy
for raising negro troops in Maryland ; and then more negro
ti-oops ; and then another draft. As to the treatment of the
inhabitants of conquered territory, and as to trade in cotton,
there was no pohcy. No one knew, and none could teU
whether the rebel States were to be considered in the Union
or out of the Union. H any thing like a pohcy for the army

THE REJECTED AGREEMENT. 431
was ever thought of, it was first urged upon the Government
by officers in the field, or committees or individuals of the
people at home : H by the former, it was usuaUy rejected, and
the authors rebuked ; H by the latter, it was ventUated first in
newspapers, and H found sufficiently popular, it Avas accepted,
to be in its turn throAvn aside, Hke the old kon of a machine-
shop. The Government, in fact, felt itseH unprepared to make an
ultimate decision on the complex question of a final peace, and
preferred, by a temporizing pohcy, to gain time for a more ma
ture consideration of its perplexing problems. Grant's terms
to Lee were Hberal, but, in some respects, indefinite. Lee's
men were to lay down thek ai;ms and go home, where they
should be protected in thek persons and property so long as
they remained there and obeyed the laws. But whether the
word property meant slave property, or the word laius meant
the laws passed by the rebel State of Virginia, does not appear
by the treaty, and must be left to judicial construction, or to
the arbitrary decision of the Government. But that was a
partial arrangement, and related to the submission of one of
the armies of the Confederacy only ; whereas General Johnston
offered to act on behaH of eight miUions of people, whose
mihtary head he practicaUy was, and proposed, nay, insisted,
as far as it was in his power to insist, that terms of peace
should then and there be agreed upon and forever settled.
Here was an opportunity for statesmanship. The armies of
the United States had fought the armies of the Confederacy
as long as the latter were AviUing to fight — they could do no
more ; it remained now for diplomacy to do the rest, and Sher
man held up the opportunity.
The administration, however, desued no compact, demanded
simply the absolute surrender or destruction of the miHtary
power of the rebeUion, and reserved to itseH the control of the
entke subject of reorganization in aU its parts. Both methods
had and stUl have many zealous partisans. Time alone can
decide between them.
That Mr. Stanton and General Sherman should differ in

432 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
opinion is not strange. Two men beholding the same object
from difterent points of observation are apt to describe it di
versely ; and yet neither may see it aright : and it is to be re
gretted that, at such a crisis, the administration should mo-
mentarUy have lost sight of the consideration manHestly due
to Sherman's great and patriotic services, and should have
permitted that cHsapproval of his action to be presented to the
people in such a manner as naturaUy to arouse their indigna
tion and distrust against him. The excitement of that moment
may indeed excuse what nothing can fuUy justify. General
Sherman had given most noble testimony in favor of the Union
cause ; every thought of his mind and every aspkation of his
heart were given to the best interests of his country. He
never faded us in the hour of need ; and on the very date of
this buUetin, AprU 21st, he Avrote a letter to an old personal
friend in North Carolina, which is here reproduced, and which
has the same ring of intense patriotism which characterized
every act and every thought of his eventful career, and shows
how foreign from his mind aU unworthy motives were at that
time. " I have before me your letter addressed to General Hawley,
inclosing a paper signed by John Dawson, Edward Kiddon,
and others, testifying to your feelings of loyalty -and attach
ment to the Government of the United States. Of course, I
am gratified to know the truth as to one for whom I entertained
friendship, dated far back in other and better days. I AviU be
fr-ank and honest with you. Simple passive submission to
events, by a man in the prime of Hfe, is not aU that is due to
society in times of revolution. Had the Northern men resid
ing at the South spoken out manfuUy and truly at the outset,
the active secessionists could not have carried the masses of
men as they did.
" It may not be that the war could have been avoidftd, but
the rebeUion would not have assumed the mammoth propor
tions it did. The idea of war to perpetuate slavery in 1861
was an insult to the inteUigence of the age. As long as the

THE REJECTED AGREEMENT. 433
South abided by the conditions of our fundamental compact
of government, the constitution, aU law-abiding citizens were
bound to respect the property in slaves, whether they approved
or not; but when the South violated that compact openly,
pubhcly, and violently, it was absurd to suppose we were
bound to respect that kind of property, or in fact any kind of
property. "I have a feehng aUied to abhorrence towards Northern
men resident South, for their silence or acquiescence was one
of the causes of the war assuming the magnitude it did ; and,
in consequence, we mourn the loss of such men as John F.
Eeynolds, McPherson, and thousands of noble gentlemen, any
one of whom was worth aU the slaves of the South, and haH
the white population thrown in.
" The result is nearly accomphshed, and is what you might
have foreseen, and in a measure prevented — desolation from
the Ohio to the GuH, and mourning in every household."
Of General Sherman's mUitary ability, vigor, enterprise,
patriotism, and zeal for the pubhc good, no generous or just
mind can entertain a doubt. Of the general soundness of his
judgment, he has also given conspicuous proofs. His pohcy
in regard to trade in cotton, and in regard to the proper treat
ment of the inhabitants of conquered territory during the ex
istence of war, was much in advance of the President and
cabinet ; and his personal knowledge of the condition, temper,
and spirit of the Southern people entitled his opinions to
greater weight than those of any other general officer in the
field. Nevertheless, conditions of peace which may appear fak
to a soldier, may, in the view of a statesman, appear inad
missible ; but the fact that an able and experienced soldier
entertains them, ought to shield them from that sort of con
demnation which belongs to voluntary comphcity Arith treason.
Nor did this unfortunate affair begin and end vrith Mr.
Stanton alone. On the 26th of AprU, General HaUeck, then
at Eichmond, in command of the MiHtary Dirision of the
James, dispatched a telegram to the War Department at
28

434 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
Washington, amongst other things, advising that instructionf
be given to General Sherman's subordinate officers to obey no
orders given by him. This telegram was immediately commu
nicated by the secretary of war to General Dix, and made
pubhc through the daily newspapers. Meeting Sherman's
notice a fortnight later, it excited his indignation to the high
est pitch. In his anger, he would Hsten to no excuse for what
he deemed the treachery of his former friend. He considered
the action of General HaUeck as uncaUed for and unpardon
able ; and Avhen the fact became knoAvn to him, on the 10th
of May, Avrote to General HaUeck : " After your dispatch to
Mr. Stanton, of April 26th, I cannot have any friendly inter
course Arith you. I AviU come to City Point to-morrow, and
march Arith my troops, and I prefer we should not meet."
Further correspondence ensued between the same officers,
but General Sherman seems to have felt that his honor had
been assaUed through design or indifference, and that in either
case the act was too gross for pardon. He curtly dechned a
compHmentary reriew tendered his troops by General HaUeck,
and caused his troops to march through the city without
taking any notice whatever of that officer.
Neither Grant or Sherman knew of Mr. Stanton's buUetin
untU several days after its pubhcation. Indeed, General Sher
man was profoundly ignorant of it, and of the storm of indig
nation it had raised at home against him, untU on his way
home from Savannah, whither he had gone to make sundry
dispositions for the government of his subordinate command
ers, while his army was on the march to Eichmond, and not
knowing of the instructions issued from the War Office to dis
regard his orders, and at a moment when, unconscious of hav
ing done Avrong, happy that the war was over, justly proud
of the honorable part he had acted in it, and dehghted Arith
the prospect of soon meeting his famUy and friends from
whom he had been long separated, he was on his way home
to rest from his hard labors. Instead of commendation for
having done his country some serrice, it seemed to his sensi
tive mind that he could read of nothing and hear of nothing

THE REJECTED AGREEMENT 435
but abuse or suspicion. Instead of coming home fiUed with
a soldier's pride and happiness, he felt he was returning like a
culprit to defend himseH against the unjust suspicions of a
Government and people he had so faithfuUy served. Smart
ing under the rebuke of the Government and the comments of
the press, he attributed both to personal hostUity and a settled
prearranged design of undermining his influence and destroy
ing his popularity, and resented both on aU occasions, pubhc
and private. The most offensive part of the entke matter to
him was that General HaUeck should have recommended and
Mr. Stanton pubHshed, that subordinate officers should be in
structed in the same manner and to the same effect of General
Washington's orders after the defection of Benedict Arnold 1

436 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.

CHAPTEE XXXIV.

HOMEWAED.

The historian who shaU hereafter chronicle, in fuU, the
events of the civU war in America, and sketch the men who
therein figured most prominently, avUI find the path by which
General Sherman ascended as straight as it was difficult of
ascent. His patriotism was not of that doubtful character
which seeks reward through the forms of Government con
tracts. He was bom Arith the instincts of a soldier, was edu
cated for a soldier, and was ambitious to do the work of a
soldier. He loved the Union, and ever set himseH against the
dangerous heresy that would admit of its peaceful dissolution.
A resident of the South before the war, as soon as he divined
the purposes of the secessionists, he broke away and arranged
himseH Arith the friends of the Union. WhUe Mr. Stanton was
yet a member of Mr. Buchanan's cabinet, and whUe such men
as Jefferson Davis, Judah P. Benjamin, and Jacob Thompson
were yet in office under the Government of the United States,
and aU-powerful in thek influence over President Buchanan,
Sherman had akeady determined to resign an honorable po
sition in the State of Louisiana and offer his services to
sustain the cause of the Union. On the 18th of January, 1861,
as we have akeady seen, he Avrote to Governor MoSre : " E
Louisiana vrithdraws from the Federal Union, I prefer to
maintain my aUegiance to the old constitution as long as a
fragment of i'. remains, and my longer stay here would be
Avrong ki every sense of the word." He saw the war coming,
and gave the alarm, whUst others cried, " Peace ! be stUl !"

HOME"WARD. 437
As soon as Mr. Lincoln was inaugurated, he risited him, and
warned him that the South Was organizing a formidable rebel
hon, that the Southern people were united and in earnest, and
that they would take us aU unprepared. He declared to his
countrymen they were sleeping on a volcano, aU unconscious
of the danger. He scouted the idea of putting doAvn the
rebeUion Arith three months' mihtia. The disastrous result
of the battle of BuU Eun confirmed him in his views of the
utter inutUity of the temporary expedients of the Government,
and he so declared. Sent to the West, he caUed for an army
of two huncked thousand men, to operate from Kentucky as a
base, and reclaim the navigation of the Mississippi Eiver.
As early as 1862, he declared cotton prize of war, long in ad
vance of the Government ; and in 1863 he estabhshed trade
regulations for Memphis and other places Avithin his depart
ment ; and finaUy, after aiding in that series of brUHant
mUitary operations which opened the Father of Waters " to
go unvexed to the sea," he assisted Lieutenant-General Grant
in planning the two conclusive campaigns of the war — the one
towards Eichmond, and the other towards Atlanta — so event
ful of result ; and in executing his part of the programme,
fought Joe Johnston one hundred and twenty-five days suc
cessively, and at length captured Atlanta, at a moment when
our natural resources were well-nigh exhausted, and the na
tional heart sick with long Avatching and waiting for success.
Striking out boldly from Atlanta to the sea, guided solely by
his own judgment, against the advice of General HaUeck, and
Arith the approbation of General Grant alone, he cut loose
from his base, descended into Georgia, struck terror into the
heart of the rebeUion, captured Savannah, and planted our
rictorious standards on the shore of the Atlantic. Striking
out again, he captured Pocotahgo and Columbia, compeUed
the evacuation of Charleston, laid waste the State of South
Carohna, again met and whipped Joe Johnston, and after
marching and fighting for twelve months, without rest, he
halted his victorious army at the capital of North CaroHna,
in time to Aritness the funeral ceremonies of the Confederacy

438 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
and the complete triumph of our cause. And for what ?— to
be the subject of such utterly unfounded suspicions, as to be
by some even suspected for a traitor ! History furnishes no
example of such cruel ingratitude and injustice.
Immediately on the conclusion of the definitive cartel of
surrender. General Sherman issued the foUoAring orders, for
the future movement of his army. Its work was done, and
nothing remained for the greater portion of it, not requked
to garrison the conquered territory, but to return home and
disband. "Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
" In the Field, Raleigh, N. C, AprU 37. 1865.
"Special Field Orders, No. 66."
" HostUities having ceased, the foUoAving changes and dis
positions of the troops in the field AviU be made Arith as Httle
delay as practicable : —
" I. The Tenth and Twenty-thkd corps wUl remain in the
Department of North CaroHna, and Major-General J. M. Scho
field AviU transfer back to Major-General Gillmore, command
ing Department of the South, the two brigades formerly be
longing to the division of brevet Major-General Grover, at
SaA'annah. The Third dirision, cavaky corps, brevet Major-
General J. KUpatrick commanding, is hereby transferred to
the Department of North CaroHna, and General KUpatrick
wiU report in person to Major-General Schofield for orders.
" n. The cavaky command of Major-General George Stoiie-
man avUI return to East Tennessee, and that of brevet Major-
General J. H. Wilson wiU be conducted back to the Tennes
see Eiver, in the neighborhood of Decatur, Alabama.
" in. Major-General Howard AriU conduct the Army of the
Tennessee to Eichmond, Virginia, foUoAving roads substan
tiaUy by Lewisbrug, Warrenton, LaAvrenceriUe, and Peters
burg, or to the right of that line. Major-General Slocum wiU
conduct the Army of Georgia to Eichmond by roads to the
left of the one indicated for General Howard, riz., by Oxford,
Boydton, and Nottoway Courthouse. These armies avUI turn

HOMEWARD. 439
in at this point the contents of thek ordnance trains, and use
tho wagons for extra forage and prorisions. These columns
wUl be conducted slowly and in the best of order, and aim to
be at Eichmond, ready to resume the march, by the middle of
May. " IV. The chief-quartermaster and commissary of the miH
tary division, Generals Easton and Beckwith, after making
proper dispositions of their departments here, wiU proceed to
Eichmond and make suitable preparations to receive those
columns, and to provide them for the further journey."
On the 10th of March, Sherman himseH set out for Alexan
dria, Vkginia, whither he arrived on the 19th. During those
nine days of dreary march along the war-paths and across the
battle-fields of the Army of the Potomac, he had ample op
portunity for reflection on the vanity of aU human glory. He
thought much and anxiously upon his oavu peculiar situation,
reriewed carefuUy aU his former relations with Mr. Stanton, to
discover, if possible, what motive he had for turning upon him ;
and looked into the newspapers hoping to find some disavowal
or note of explanation, on the part of Mr. Stanton, that would
disabuse the public mind of the false impressions he had him
seH created ; but aU in vain. The public mind had settled
doAvn into the opinion that General Sherman was not quite
as bad as had been supposed ; but stUl there was something,
it was beheved, in regard to his case, very inexpHcable. Under
such circumstances it was some rehef to his sense of injury,
to Avrite and forward to a personal fr-iend the foUowing letter,
dated at Camp Alexandria, — the first word to the pubhc from
him in regard to the matter : —
" I am just arrived. AU my army wUl be in to-day. I have
been lost to the world in the woods for some time, yet, on
arriving at the ' settlements,' find I have made quite a stir
among the people at home, and that the most sinister motives
have been ascribed to me. I have been too long fighting Arith
real rebels Arith muskets in their hands to be scared by mere

440 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
non-combatants, no matter how high their ciril rank or sta
tion. It is amusing to observe how brave and firm some men
become when aU danger is past. I have noticed on field of
battle brave men never insult the captured or mutUate the
dead ; but cowards and laggards always do. I cannot now re
caU the act, but Shakspeare records how poor Falstaff, the
prince of cowards and Arits, rising from a feigned death,
stabbed again the dead Percy, and carried his carcass aloft in
triumph to prove his valor.
" Now that the rebeUion in our land is dead, how many Fal-
staffs appear to brandish the eridence of thek valor, and seek
to appropriate honors and the pubhc applause for deeds that
never were done !
" As to myseH, I ask no reward, no popularity ; but I sub
mit to the candid judgment of the world, after aU the facts
shaU be knoAvn and understood.
" I do want peace and security, and the return to law and
justice fr-om Maine to the Eio Grande ; and H it does not exist
noiv, substantiaUy, it is for State reasons beyond my compre
hension. It may be counted strange that one who has no
fame but as a soldier should have been so careful to try and
restore the civU power of the Government, and the peaceful
jurisdictions of the federal courts ; but it is difficult to discover
in that fact any just cause of offence to a free and enlightened
people. But when men choose to slander and injure, they can
easUy invent the necessary facts for the purpose when the
proposed victim is far away engaged in public service of their
OAvn bidding. But there is consolation in knowing that though
truth Hes in the bottom of a weU, the Yankees have persever
ance enough to get to that bottom."
General Sherman now determined not to visit Wasliington,
but to remain in camp Arith his army until he should receive
further orders from General Grant. Afterwards, on being in
vited by General Grant, he risited him at his headquarters in
Washington ; and, on being informed by him that the President
had expressed a deske to see him, he caUed immediately on

HOMEWARD. 441
the President, and then learned, for the first time, that the tel
egram pubHshed by Mr. Stanton on the 22d of AprU, and the
" nine reasons" given as those of the President and cabinet
were the work of Mr. Stanton alone. This fact settled, there
wa^ now no ill-feeling between General Sherman and the officers
of the Government, and the matter thus became a personal
affair between him and Mr. Stanton alone. General Sherman
did not complain that his agi'eement with Johnston was disap
proved. The. merits and demerits of that agreement were
matters of opinion and judgment, and the President had the
right, and it was his duty, to exercise his best judgment, and
his action in the premises could be no just ground of complaint.
It was the pubhcation that constituted the gravamen of the
offence ; its tone and style, the insinuations it contained, the
false inferences it occasioned, and the offensive orders to the
subordinate officers of General Sherman, which succeeded the
publication — these were the causes of the trouble, and for
these Mr. Stanton was alone responsible.
On the 20th of May, both the grand armies of the Union
were encamped in the vicinity of the national capital. The
war was over, and our noble volunteers were about to be dis
banded. Before these grand armies should be dispersed,
however, the Heutenant-general proposed to give them a
handsome revioAv. The Aride streets of Washington were ad
mirably adapted for such purpose. The review of the Army
of the Potomac was ordered for the 23d, and that knoAvn as
Sherman's army, for the 24th. Thousands of people, fr-om all
parts of the country, flocked to Washington to witness the
grand pageant, and to express thek admiration for the noble
men who had brought home peace. The most ample prepa
rations had been made for the occasion. The President was
seated on an elevated stand, surrounded by his cabinet officers,
foreign ministers, distinguished strangers, their Arives and
daughters and personal friends ; Pennsylvania Avenue was
fined on both sides, and from end to end, Arith admiring people ;
every Avindow presented its tableau of fak spectators ; and
the occasion was such as never before was Aritnessed on the

442 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
American continent. Those great armies now passing in
reriew Arithin sight of that vast assemblage were, surely,
calculated to impress aU beholders vrith a profound sense
of the greatness and power of the United States ; and were
it not for those tattered banners, which teU us of the distant
battle-fields on which these regiments contended for the
mastery, of the hand to hand conflict, and of comrades slain,
we might rejoice without a feehng of sorrow. Nevertheless
we may rejoice, for those brave men by their marching
and fighting brought home to thek distracted land the bless
ing of peace, and we can now look up to heaven and bless
God that it is so ! From end to end, from side to side, along
the shore, amid the vaUey and on the mountain-top — aU are
at peace !
As before mentioned, the reriew of General Sherman's
army was on the 24th of May. The day was exceedingly
beautHul. The army was uniformed and equipped as on the
march ; there was no attempt at mere mUitary display. Com
manders appeared to take pride in presenting their respective
commands as they served on the march and in the field. The
foragers were out in force, Arith thek pack-trains loaded with
forage and prorisions ; the pioneer corps, composed of black
men, carried thek axes, spades, and shovels ; whUe the cavaky,
infantry, and artUlery made an imposing display of the three
arms of the serrice. General Sherman rode at the head of
the column, and as he moved slowly along the avenue, he was
greeted Arith cheers on every side ; the ladies in the exuber
ance of thek joy waved thek congratulations, covered him
with bouquets of flowers, and bedecked his horse with ever
greens. None were so much surprised at these mauHestations
of respect as himseH. Arriving opposite the headquarters of
Major-General Augur, the chief was observed to turn aside,
halt, and lift his hat, in token of the most profound respect.
This was an act of courtesy from the soldier to the statesman.
Mr. Seward, too iU to take his place beside the President, had
been brought to General Augur's headquarters, and Avrapped
in the robes of the sick-chamber, stood for a moment at the

HOMEWARD. 443
Arindow to exchange salutations Arith the great mUitary chief.
It was a touching sight.
The President's stand was erected in front of the White
House ; from it wings had been extended to the right and left,
so that the grounds of the White House, fronting on Pennsyl
vania Avenue, were nearly covered. These were aU soon
passed by the head of the column, when the general wheeled
out, dismounted, and ascended the staks, to take his place
near the lieutenant-general. On making his appearance on
the stand, he was cordiaUy met by the President, Lieutenant-
General Grant, and Messrs. Dennison, Speed, and Harhn of
the cabinet, and received thek hearty congratulations whUe
his veteran army moved on in thek triumphal march. Mr.
Stanton rose also and offered his hand, as H pleased to con
gratulate General Sherman ; bid the latter affected not to see him !
There are those who, Hghtly estimating injuries to character
and reputation, especially when thek OAvn are not involved, who
regretted General Sherman should have taken that occasion
to resent what he deemed a personal insult; and AviU stUl
more regret to find the memory of the event herein perpetu
ated ; yet there is some consideration due to the sensitiveness
of a soldier who felt his honor had been questioned : and since,
under the ckcumstances, he could not, Arithout hypocrisyj re
ceive Mr. Stanton's congi-atulations, it was weU he did not
observe thek tender.
General Sherman now prepared to take leave of his army.
There is something exceedingly touching in the exhibition of
that ardent attachment which always exists between the
officers and men of a weU-ordered and properly discipHned
army. AU General Sherman's dispatches show his high esti
mate of the valor of his troops ; and on the other hand, his
officers and men were equaUy proud of thek chief. In truth,
the material of that army Avas never surpassed in any age or
country. Lord MelvUle once declared in parhament, that
" bad men made the best soldiers," and we are told the un
worthy sentiment had many aclmkers in England. But not so
in this country. The men who fought the battles of the

444 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
Union were among the best in the land, and in the general,
were improved by thek patriotic experience. They now
understand betfer the unspeakable blessings of peace ; they
know better the value of friendships ; they can better submit
to hardships ; they are better qualified to preserve order and
obey the laws, and are better Christians than when they first
entered the mihtary serrice. Bad men are made worse by
mUitary service, but good men are made better. And it is
confidently beHeved that " Sherman's men," as they are
famUiarly caUed, and as they are proud to caU themselves,
wUl prove to be as distinguished in the pursuits of peace as
they were renoAvned in the feats of war.
We conclude this chapter Arith General Sherman's fareweU
order to his troops. To be the author of such an order, Arith
such good cause to Avrite it, is a happiness but few soldiers
ever enjoyed. "Headquarters Military DrvrsioN of the Mississippi,
In the field, Washington, D. C, May 30, 1865.
"Special Field Orders, No. 76.
" The general commanding announces to the Armies of the
Tennessee and Georgia, that the time has come for us to part.
Our work is done, and armed enemies no longer defy us.
Some of you AviU be retained in service until further orders.
And now that we are about to separate, to mingle with the
civU world, it becomes a pleasing duty to recaU to mind the
situation of national affaks when, but Httle more than a year
ago, we were gathered about the tAvining chffs of Lookout
Mountain, and aU the future was Avrapped in doubt and im-
certainty. Three armies had come together from distant fields,
Arith separate histories, yet bound by one common cause — ^the
union of our coimtry and the perpetuation of the Government
of our inheritance. There is no need to recaU to your memo
ries TunneU HUl, Arith its Eocky Face Mountain, and Buzzard
Eoost Gap, Arith the ugly forts of Dalton behiud. We were
in earnest, and paused not for danger and difficulty, but
dashed through Snake Creek Gap, and feU on Eesaca, then

HOMEWARD. 445
on to the EtoAvah, to DaUas, Kenesaw ; and the heats of sum
mer found us on the banks of the Chattahoochee, far from
home and dependent on a single road for supplies. Again we
were not to be held back by any obstacle, and crossed over
and fought four heavy battles for the possession of the citadel
of Atlanta. That, was the crisis of our history. A doubt stiU
clouded our future ; but we solved the problem, and destroyed
Atlanta, struck boldly across the State of Georgia, secured aU
the main arteries of Hfe to our enemy, and Christmas found
us at Savannah. Waiting there only long enough to fiU our
wagons, we again began a march, which for peril, labor, and
results wUl compare with any ever made by an organized
army. The floods of the Savannah, the swamps of the Com
bahee and Edisto, the high hUls and rocks of the Santee, the
flat quagmkes of the Pedee and Cape Fear rivers, were aU
passed in midAvinter, with its floods and rains, in the face of
an accumulating enemy ; and after the battles of Averysboro'
and BentonsvUle, we once more came out of the AvUderness to
meet our friends at Goldsboro'. Even then we paused only
long enough to get new clothing, to reload our wagons, and
again pushed on to Ealeigh, and beyond, untU we met our
enemy, suing for peace instead of war, and offering to submit
to the injured laws of his and our country. As long as that
enemy was defiant, nor mountains, nor rivers, nor swamps, nor
hunger, nor cold had checked us ; but when he who had fought
us hard and persistently, offered submission, your general
thought it Avrong to pursue him further, and negotiations fol
lowed which resulted, as you aU know, in his surrender. How
far the operations of the army have contributed to the over
throw of the Confederacy, of the peace which now daAvns on
us, must be judged by others, not by us. But that you have
done aU that men could do has been admitted by those in
authority ; and we have a right to join in the universal joy
that fiUs our land becaiise the war is over, and our Govern
ment stands vindicated before the world by the joint action o
the volunteer armies of the United States.
" To such as remain ia the mUitary service, your general

446 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
need only remind, you that successes in the past are due to
hard work and discipline, and that the same work and disci
pline are equaUy important in the future. To such as go home,
he AviU only say, that our favored country is so grand, so ex
tensive, so diversified in climate, soU, and productions, that
every man may siuely find a home and occupation suited to
Ms tastes ; and none should yield to the natural impotence
sure to result from our past Hfe of excitement and adventure.
You AvUl be invited to seek new adventure abroad ; but do noi
yield to the temptation, for it AviU lead only to death and dis
appointment. " Your general now bids you aU fareweU, Arith the fuU behef
that, as in war you have been good soldiers, so in peace you
AviU make good citizens ; and H, unfortunately, new war should
arise in our country, Sherman's army AriU be the first to buckle
on the old armor and come forth to defend and maintain the
Government of our inheritance and choice.

DIGRESSWE. 447

CHAPTEE XXXV.
digeessive.
In preparing the foregoing pages, in order to avoid those
digressions which often mar the continuity of a narrative, we
have omitted several letters of interest which wUl be given in
this chapter.
During the first year of the war, the newspaper press unwit
tingly occasioned great embarrassment to the army. Such was
the public greed for news, that pubhshers had thek correspond
ents in every camp, who did. not hesitate to give pubHcity to
any and aU operations of the army ; so that, whUe the people
were merely gratified, the enemy was adrised and greatly
benefited. General Sherman was among the first to perceive
and attempt to reform this evU. It required a bold man to
ran counter to the Arishes of the newspaper press. Neverthe
less he did not hesitate to do so, when he judged that the best
interests of the country requked it. In 1861, whUe in com
mand in Kentucky, he was not only embamassed but alarmed,
in finding aU his operations telegraphed and pubHshed in the
daUy papers, even his plans foreshadowed, and the number
and strength of his forces given. At that time, the aUegiance
of Kentucky was hoUow and compulsory. In fact, many of
her young men had gone into the armies of the Confederacy,
leaving thek relatives and friends behind to act the part of
spies and informers. Kentucky was then our point of support
for the operations of the Valley of the Mississippi, and we were
obhged to draw our hues through counties and districts whose
people were only bound to us by a fear that was taciturn.

448 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
supple, and treacherous, and which, Hke the ashes of volcanoes,
concealed terrific flames, the eruption of which might be in
duced or provoked by the sHghtest cause. General Sherman,
conscious of his weakness, and of the dangers by which he
was surrounded, banished every newspaper comespondent
from his Hnes, and declared summary punishment for aU Avho
should m future give information of his strength, position, or
movements. A proceeding so unusual was iU-appreciated by
the press, and the result was a Hvely fire in the rear, which
was somewhat annoying to him. Nevertheless he persisted
in this pohcy throughout the war ; and the further our lines
were advanced into the enemy's country, the more valuable
became the rule. The foUowing letter was Avritten, early in
1863, in vindication of his pohcy : —
" When John C. Calhoun announced to President Jackson
the doctrine of secession, he did not bow to the opinion of
that respectable source, and to the vast array of people of
whom Mr. CaUioun was the representative. He saw the Aris
dom of preventing' a threatened evU by timely action. He
answered instantly : ' Secession is treason, and the penalty for
treason is death.' Had Jackson yielded an inch, the storm
would then have swept over this country.
" Had Mr. Buchanan met the seizure of our mints and
arsenals in the same spkit, he would have kept this war within
the Hmits of actual traitors, but by temporizing he gave the
time and opportunity for the organization of a rebelhon of
haH the nation.
" So in this case. Once estabHsh the principle asserted by
you, that the press has a right to keep paid agents in our
camps, independent of the properly accredited commanders,
and you would be able soon to destroy any army ; we would
then have not only rebeUion on our hands, but dissensions and
discord in our armies, mutiny in our camps, and disaster to
our arms. In regard to this matter I may be mistaken, but
for the time being I must be the judge.
" I am no enemy to freedom of thought, freedom of speech

DIGRESSIVE.

449

and of the press ; but the army is no proper place for con
troversies. When armies take the field aU discussion should
cease. No amount of argument wUl move the rebeUion ; the
rebels have throAvn aside the pen and taken the sword. We
must do the same, or perish or be conquered, and become the
contempt of aU mankind."
But newspaper correspondents are not so easily put doAvn
by the pen alone, although it may be vrielded by the hand that
holds the sword as weU. During the forepart of 1863, Mr.
Thomas W. Knox, a correspondent for the New York Herald,
was excluded from our Hnes in the department commanded by
General Grant, in consequence of offensive language used by
him in letters published in the newspaper with which he was
connected. Mr. Knox appealed to the President, who, after
hearing his stateinent of the case, aUowed him to return to
General Grant Arith a letter, as foUows : —
" Whereas, it appears to my satisfaction that Thomas W.
Knox, a correspondent of the New York Herald, has been, by
the sentence of court-martial, excluded from the mUitary de
partment of Major-General Grant, and also that General
Thayer, president of the court, and Major-General McClernand,
in command of a corps of that department, and many other
respectable persons, are of opinion that Mr. Knox's offence
was technicaUy rather than AvilfuUy Avrong, and that the sen
tence should be revoked, therefore said sentence is hereby re
voked, so far as to aUow Mr. Knox to return to General Grant's
headquarters, and to remain, H General Grant shaU give his
express assent, and to again leave the department if General
Grant refuse such assent."
Whereupon General Grant addressed Mr. Knox : —
" The letter of the President of the United States authoriz
ing you to return to these headquarters, and to remain with
39

450 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
my consent, or leave H such consent is Arithheld, has been
shown to me.
" You came here first in violation of a positive order from
General Sherman. Because you were not pleased vrith his
treatment of army foUowers who had violated his orders, you
attempted to break doAvn his influence Arith his command and
to blast his reputation Arith the pubhc ; you made insinuations
against his sanity, and said many things which were untrue,
and so far as your letter had influence, it was calculated to
injure the pubhc serrice. General Sherman is one of the
purest men, and one of the ablest soldiers in the country ; you
have attacked him and have been sentenced to expulsion from
the department for such offence. WhUst I would conform to
the shghtest Arish of the President, where it is founded on a
fair representation of both sides of any question, my respect
for General Sherman is such, that in this caSie I must decHne,
unless General Sherman flrst gives his consent for your re
maining." Mr. Knox then addressed General Sherman : —
" Inclosed please flnd copy of the order of the President,
authorizing me to return to this department, and to remain,
Arith General Grant's approval. General Grant has expressed
lus willingness to give such approval, provided there is no
objection from yourseH.
" Without referring in detaU to past occurrences, permit me
to express my regret at the want of harmony between portions
of the army and the press, and the hope there may be a better
feeling in future. I should be pleased to receive your assent
in the present subject-matter. The eyes of the whole North
are now turned upon Vicksburg, and the history of the events
soon to culminate in its faU avUI be watched vrith great eager
ness. Your favor in the matter AriU be duly appreciated by
the ijoumal I represent as weU as myseH."
The secular press of this country is a great power, for both
good and .evU, and the man who can show us how we may

DIGRESSIVE. 451
have tli6 one Avithout the other, wUl prove himseH a great
benefactor of his race. But this is impossible. Honest truth
is too slow for enterprising error ; truth stays at home, and
waits to entertain suCh friends as come to seek her counsels,
while error, Arith her specious promises and plausible theories,
advertises in the newspapers, and careers through the world.
The reason why the press is not an unmixed good, is because
aU editors, publishers, and correspondents are not cultivated,
high-toned, honest, and honorable men. But if they were so,
and if they earnestly and faithfuUy set themselves to work to
teach the people vktue, and to pubhsh nothing but unvar
nished truth, such is the character of mankind, they would
have but few pupils. The stream can rise no higher than its
fountain, and a people are no better than the Newspapers
they read.
The calling of the editor, in this country, is as high and
honprable as that of any of the learned professions. If his
errors and folhes are more apparent than those of the lawyer,
it is because they are more exposed to observation. The
editor speaks every day to the public — the laAvyer speaks but
seldom, and then carefuUy before the judges. The man who
talks much, is apt sometimes to talk unwisely. But the stand
ard of each is elevated or lowered according to the pubhc
demand. During the early part of the war, the pubhc demand
Avas for the sensational, and army correspondents were, for
the most part, as deficient in good sense and judgment as in
good manners. Subsequently, the public demand was for
truth and fact, and only such as might be consistent Arith the
pubhc interests ; and then, the letters from army correspond
ents became valuable contributions to authentic history. But
the foUoAving letter to Mr. Knox in reply to the one just cited,
bears on the former period, and the action in this case ended
aU controversy between General Sherman and army corres
pondents. " Yours of AprU 6th, inclosing a copy of the President's action
in your case, and General Grant's letter to you, is received.

452 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
I am surprised to loam that the officers named in the Presi
dent's letter have certified to him that the offence, for which
you were tried and conricted, was merely technical — viz., dis
obedience of orders emanating from the highest miHtary au
thority, and the pubhcation of wilful and mahcious slanders
and libels against thek brother officers. I cannot so regard
the matter.
" Aside from the judgment of a court, and upon your own
theory of your duties and obHgations alone, you must be ad
judged unfit to be here. After having enumerated to me the
fact that newspaper correspondents were a fraternity, bound
together by a common interest, that must write down aU who
stand in their way, and bound to supply the pubhc demand
for news, even at the expense of truth and fact, H necessary, I
cannot consent to the tacit acknowledgment of such a princi
ple by tolerating such a comespondent. Come with a musket
or sword in your hand, prepared to share with us our fate in
sunshine and in storm, in success and in defeat, in plenty and
in scarcity, and I AriU welcome you as a brother and associate.
But come as you now do, expecting me to aUy the honor and
reputation of my country and my fellow-soldiers vrith you as
a representative of the press, — you who, according to your
own theory, avUI not carefully distinguish between truth and
falsehood, — and my answer is, never !"
The mUitary student of this day AriU find a new element in
his calculations, of which the campaigns of Napoleon AriU fur
nish no iUustrations — namely, the value of the railway. It was
the fortune of General Sherman, in his Atlanta campaign, to
furnish an iUustrious example of this interesting problem.
Previous to that campaign, a single track, Arith suitable
switches and turnouts, Avas estimated as being capable of
transporting supplies and ammunition sufficient for an army,
duly proportioned, one hundred thousand strong, one hundred
miles from its base. Sherman's problem was to make it do
the work for such an army at a distance of five hundred mUes
from its base. He started Arith three thousand and five hun-

DIGRESSIVE. 453
dred Avagons, ambulances included. He had thirty-five thou
sand horses besides the cavaky. The hne of march was
across a mountainous region, furnishing no supplies of pro
visions or forage. It was estimated the cavalry could gather
sufficient forage for 'its own use, but forage for aU other ani
mals had to be transported. AU the beef was to be carried
on the hoof. Baggage was economized to the last pound.
Non-combatants of every character and description, except
such as pertained to the medical department, were denied
transportation. Even the agents of the Christian Commission,
whose mission it was to administer to the bodily and spkitual
wants of the dying soldier, were left in the rear, because they
could not march on foot and carry thek own suppHes. But
the problem was one of logistics and not of benevolence. It
was a strictly mathematical calculation of food for a hundred
thousand men, whose business it was to march and fight, and
of ammunition with which to fight, and of forage for animals
necessary and in constant use, with no margin for accidents
or unusual misfortunes ; it was a problem ®f pure war, to
which aU other matters must yield. And in nothing did Gen
eral Sherman display the high quahties of a great commander
more conspicuously, than in the firmness with which he ad
hered to the logic of his own calculations. When the agents
of the Christian Commission presented a petition for trans-
])ortation of themselves and supplies, he indorsed on it : —
" Certainly not — oats and gunpowder are more indispensable
at the front than benevolent agents. The weight of every
non-combatant transported deprives me of so many pounds of
bread that I must have. Each regiment has its chaplain, and
these must do the work desked."
In 1863^, our Government adopted the humane and Hberal
pohcy of issuing rations to the non-combatants of Eastern and
Middle Tennessee, impoverished by the war, a pohcy which
gave some embarrassment to mUitary commanders in that re
gion. General Sherman found it so prejudicial to the miHtary
serrice that he discontinued it ; whereupon President Lincoln,

454 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
at the request of influential citizens of that State, expressed a
deske the pohcy should be resumed. The Atlanta campaign
had been planned Arithout reference to the business of feeding
the inhabitants of Tennessee, and it was evident, H the means
of transportation were to be used for this purpose, the cam
paign must stop. General Sherman received the President's
dispatch on the 5th of May, the day before his troops Avere
put in motion, and dispatched the foUoAving answer : —
" We have worked hard Arith the best talent of the counti-}-,
and it is demonstrated the raikoad caimot supply the army
and the people both. One or the other must quit eating ra
tions, and the army must be the last to quit, and don't intend
to quit unless Joe Johnston makes us quit. The issue to citi
zens has been enormous, and the same weight in com or oats
would have saved thousands of mules whose carcasses now
corduroy the roads in Tennessee, and which we need so much.
We have paid Tennessee ten for one of provisions taken in
war. I am now about to move, and cannot change the order.
Let the petitioners hurry into Kentucky and make up a cara
van of cattle and wagons, and come over the mountains by
Cumberland Gap and Somerset to reheve thek suffering
friends, as they used to do before a raUroad was buUt. I am
AriUing to reheve aU actual cases of suffering vrithin our reach
by appropriating the savings from soldiers' rations, which are
considerable. A people long assisted by a generous Govern
ment are apt to rely more on the Government than on thek
ovm exertions."
The earnestness which characterized aU of General Sher
man's dispatches about this time, and the tenacity Arith which
he adhered to mUitary rules, show he felt he had work to do,
and that he had resolved to do it. He thought of nothing but
his army ; aU others must take care of themselves.
In aU wars of long duration there are periods of reaction
and irresolution among the people at home, whose duty it is
to sustain the war. Our great civU war turned out to be a

DIGRESSIVE. 455
greater affak than was at first supposed. The exhibitions of
confidence and enthusiasm with which our early volunteers
were greeted on their way to the field wiU not soon be forgot
ten. How the people cheered ! how the beUs pealed out ! how
the flags waved ! Even the little boys and girls Avaved their
tiny bunting in token of patriotic zeal. But when the tug of
war came, and the contending armies, wresthng like giants for
the mastery, after years of terrible struggling, inarching, and
fighting without success, needed re-enforcements in order to
secure eventual triumph, and none seemed AviUing to help, our
troops in the field were not a Httle disheartened, and some de
serted. Nor was thi^ aU. There were those at home who
tried to arrest the war, and tried to discourage recruiting, and
tried to promote desertions ; and, availing themselves of a free
press, spread their vicious sentiments through the army itseH.
It was to prevent such results that General MUroy applied to
General Sherman for a remedy, wliich application called forth
the foUowing response, addressed to Major-General Thomas : —
" In the Field, near Atlanta, August 5, 1864.
" General MUroy's letter of July 26, with your indorsement,
is now before me. He asks to suppress the sale and ckcula-
tion, in his district, of certain mischievous and treasonable
newspapers, and transmits to me certain shps as proofs of the
mischievous character of such papers. I Avould wUHngly sup
press them were it possible to do so, but in human nature
there is so much of the mule left, that prohibition of a news
paper only increases its ckculation. The press is a power in
the land. For a quarter of a century past it had been sowing
the whklwind, and now we reap the storm. It is my opinion
that the freedom of the press to publish mischievous matter,
hke personal slander, Hbel, false statements of facts, or other
matter calculated to promote desertions in the army, or do-
signed to give information to the enemy, should be regulated
by statute law. At present we are going through the expensive
but natural process which may result in a resort to the knHe
and pistol for the defence of reputation. It is akeady demon-

456 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
strated, we must use the mUitary power to put doAvn the cir
culation of newspapers hurtful to the pubhc service.
" The suppression of the few papers mentioned by General
Mikoy would be something Hke undertaking to dam up the
tributaries of the Ohio to stop the flood of the Mississippi.
If General Mikoy finds anybody selling mischievous pubH-
cations Arithin the sphere of his authority, he might give him
a good thrashing, or put him in the stocks; but he cannot
reach the editors and pubhshers, who are making money by
the pubhcation in New York, Chicago, or LouisviUe.
" Each mUitary commander, subject to me, may suppress
aU disorders and immorahties in the sphere of his command
as best he can : but my boHef is, the proper remedy is to pun
ish the men who pubhsh the objectionable matter, H residing
in his jurisdiction ; or H absent, then the party who ckculates
the papers. Give a good horsewhipping to any man who
would dare adrise a soldier to desert. This is aU the notice I
would take of such things at this epoch of the war."
In May, 1863, the Union Club at Memphis, Tennessee,
passed some resolutions commemorative of the restoration of
law and order in that city, which were transmitted to General
Sherman by a gentleman of that place, to which he responded
as foUows : — " Walnut Hills, Mississippi, May 25, 1868.
" Yours of 18th instant is received. I thank you for the
kind sentiments expressed, and desire you to express to the
Union Club the assurance of my continued regard and in
terest. " In union are strength, power to do good, power to repress
eril — ^honor, fame, and glory to our beloved country. In dis
union are weakness, discord, suspicion, ruin, and misery.
How any weU-balanced mind can hesitate in a choice between
these passes my comprehension. Therefore, on aU proper
occasions, do honor to that day which saw our national emblem
restored to its proper place in Memphis. Eejoice, and let
your chUdron rejoice, at each anniversary of the day which

DIGRESSIVE. 457
beheld the downfaU, in your city, of that powerful faction
which had for a long period usurped aU the functions of gov
ernment, and made patriots tremble for their personal safety
in the very centre of the repubhc. Now aU is changed ; right
ful government once more prevaUs. The great VaUey of the
Mississippi comprises the principal interests of this country ;
and Memphis is in the centre, and, lUie the heart, must regulate
the pulsation of Hfe throughout the more remote arteries and
veins. Let me exhort you to be calm, magnanimous, and pa
tient. Boast not over your faUen neighbors, but convince
them of thek delusion, and that the Union men are above
petty mahce, and wiU even respect their prejudices, H not in
curable. "I deplore the devastation and misery that attend the pro
gress of the war ; but aU history teaches that war, pestilence,
and famine are the usual means by which the Almighty arrests
the progress of error, and aUays the storm of human passion"
The long duration of the war, and the necessity of more
troops to re-enforce our wasting armies, compeUed Congress to
pass a conscript law. The idea of a universal draft was espe
ciaUy unwelcome to the people of New England. Thek repre
sentatives were on the sharp lookout for expecHents to save
their people from the sweeping operations of a general draft.
To satisfy them, it was provided in the laAv that any State
might raise volunteers in rebel States, to be credited to the
quota of the States raising them, respectively ; and as the
negroes were the only loyal people available in the rebel States,
of course the only prospect of obtaining volunteers was in
that dkection. Eecruiting agents soon presented themselves
to commanders of armies, duly certified from thek respective
States, fuU of confidence and zeal, and weU assured that for
every negro sent to the war, one white man would be left at
home. General Sherman, Hke many others, did not hke that
prorision of the law. There was something about it unmanly ;
it showed a disposition to shkk the duties of the citizen in a
time of danger ; it showed that the deske of ease and the love

458 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
of gain were beginning i/t prevaU against the suggestions of
patriotism and honor ; and the idea bf shHting on the shoulders
of the poor negroes the sacred duty of fighting the battles of
the country, to the extent suggested, was offensive to our brave
white men, Avho had been fighting hard and long to sustain
our common Government, leaving aU others home to profit by
the war ; and they felt that those they left at home should
now bear a hand. Besides this, the thing was whoUy imprac
ticable. General Sherman submitted his objections, and the
impracticable features of the measure, to the President, who,
"in answer, sent the foUowing dispatch : —
" Executive Chamber, July 18, 1864.
"I have seen your dispatch, and objections to agents of
Northern States opening recruiting near your camps. An act
of Congi-ess authorizes this, giving the appointment of agents
to the States, and not to the executive government. It is not
for the War Department or myseH to restrain or modHy the
law in its execution, further than actual necessity may requke.
To be candid, I was for the passage of the law, not apprehend
ing at the time it would produce Ruch inconvenience to armies
in the field as you now cause me to fear. Many of the States'
were very anxious for it. I hoped that, with State bounties
and active exertions, they would get out substantial adcHtions
to our colored forces, which, unlike white troops, help us Avhere
they come from as weU as where they go to. I stUl hope for
advantage from the law, and being a law, it must be treated as
such by aU. We here wUl do aU we can to save you from cHf-
ficulties arising fr-om it. May I ask, therefors, that you AviU
give it your hearty co-operation?"
This letter of the President's was sufficient. Tliere was the
law, and there the expression of Mr. Lincoln's deske to see it
carried out. It could make no difference that tho h'>.wwasnot
practicable of execution — it must be obeyed, and Sherman
proceeded to give dkections to carry it out.
General Sherman did not always Avrite in the vehement style.

DIQRESSn^E. 459
Some of his letters have a spice of humor in them quite re
freshing, as the foUowing specimen AviU show. The gentleman
to whom it was adckessed was a chaplain in the rebel army,
who had been captured at Chattanooga, and relieved fr-om
capture, and, as it would seem, was relieved of his horse at the
same time, whi^h latter fact he felt to be a great hardship ;
and when Sherman arrived at Atlanta the chaplain applied by
letter, sent through our lines, for an order to compel the feUoAv
who deprived him of his horse to restore him, or the general
to send him another one in his stead. This was the gen
eral's decision, dated at Atlanta, on the 16th of September,
1864 :—
" Deae Sie — Your letter of September 14th is received. I
approach a question involving a title to a ' horse' with defer
ence for the laws of war. That mysterious code, of which we
talk so much but know so Httle, is remarkably sUent on the
' horse.' He is a beast so tempting to the soldier, — to him of
the wUd cavalry, the fancy artiUery, or the patient infantry, —
that I find more difficulty in recovering a worthless, sparined
beast than in paying a miUion of ' greenbacks ;' so that I fear
I must reduce your claim to one of finance, and refer you to
the great Board of Claims in Washington, that may reach
your case by the time your grandchild becomes a great-grand
father. " Privately, I think it was a shabby thing in the scamp of
the Thkty-first Missouri who took your horse, and the colonel
or his brigadier should have restored him. But I cannot un
dertake to make good the sins of omission of my oavu colonels
or brigadiers, much less those of a former generation. ' When
this cruel war is over,' and peace once more giA^es you a parish,
I AvUl promise, if near you, to procure, out of one of Uncle
Sam's corrals, a beast that wUl replace the one taken from you
so AvrongfuUy ; but now it is impossible. We have a big jour
ney before us, and need aU we have, and, I fear, more too ; so
look out Avhen the Yanks, are about and hide your beasts, for
my experience is that aU soldiers are very careless in a search

460 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
for title. I know that General Hardee avUI confirm this my
advice." It AriU be recoUected that Chief-Justice Chase, in the spring
of 1865, doffed his official robes, and, Hke a true American,
made a journey South in search of a cure for the national dis
temper. The civU war had come to a pause. The leaders of
the rebeUion had been overthroAvn, and were now, Hke a com
munity of pkates, cast upon a desolate island in mid ocean,
cursing each other, and dividing their iU-gotten gains amid
thunder, and lightning, and storm. Abstract justice .was on
a tour of observation and inquiry ; and the presiding officer of
the highest civil tribunal in the land met a leader of armies,
when the two fr-iends talked together. The topic of discussion
was, the healing of the nation. The foUowing letter indicates
the convictions of the soldier. " Steamer Prussia, Beaufort Harbor,
May 6, 1865—6 A. M.
" On reaching this ship late last night, I found your valued
letter, with the printed sheet, which I have also read.
" I am not yet prepared to receive the negro on terms of
pohtical equality, for the reason it wiU raise passions and pre-
iudices at the North, which, superadded to the causes yet
dormant at the South, might rekindle the war, whose fires are
noAV dying out, and which by skUful management might be
kept down. As you must observe, I prefer to work with
knoAvn facts, rather than to reason ahead to remote conclusions.
By way of Ulustration, we are now weather-bound. Is it not
best to lay quiet at anchor till those white-cap breakers look
less angry, and the southwest winds shHt ? I think aU old
saUors will answer yes ; whUst we, impatient to reach our goal,
are tempted to dash through at risk of Hfe and property. I
am AvUling to admit that the conclusions you reach by pure
mental process may be aU correct ; but don't you think it
better first to get the ship of State in some order, that it may
be handled and guided ? Now, aU at the South is pure anarchy.

DIGRESSIVE. 461
The mUitary power of the United States cannot reach the
people who are spread over a vast surface of country.
" We can control the local State capitals, and, it may be,
slowly shape pohtical thoughts, but we cannot combat existing
ideas Arith force. I say honestly, that the assertion openly of
your ideas of universal negi-o suffrage, as a fixed pohcy of our
General Government, to be backed by physical power, AviU pro
duce new war, sooner or later, and one which, from its des
ultory character, wUl be more bloody and destructive than
the last.
" I am rejoiced that you, upon whom devolves so much, are
aiming to see facts and persons with your own eye.
" I think the changes necessary in the future can be made
faster and more certain, by means of our constitution, than by
any plan outside of it. If now Ave go outside of the constitu
tion for a means of change, we rather justHy the rebels in thek
late attempt. Whereas now, as General Schofield teUs us, the
people of the South are ready and AriUing to make the neces
sary changes vrithout shock or violence. I have felt the past
war as bitterly and keenly as any man could, and I fr-ankly
confess myseH ' afraid' of a new Avar ; and a new war is bound
to result from the action you suggest, of giving to the enfr-an-
chised negroes so large a share in the dehcate task of putting
the Southern States in practical working relations Arith the
General Government. The enfranchisement of the negro should
be exceptional and not general, founded upon a standard of
inteUigence, or by-reason of valuable mUitary seiA-ice during
the war or hereafter."
At the close of the war General Howard was made chief of
the Freedmen's Bureau, headquarters at Washington. His
duties were, " to correct that in which the law, by reason of
its universahty, was deficient." He was placed at the head of
a species of Poor Law Board, Arith vague powers to define
justice, and execute loving-kindness between four miUions of
emancipated slaves and aU the rest of mankind. He was to
be not exactiy a mihtary commander, nor yet a judge of a

462 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
Court of Chancery, but a sort of combination of the rehgious
missionary and school commissioner, vrith power to feed and
instruct, and this for an empire haH as large as Europe. But
few officers of the army would have had the moral courage to
accept such appointment, and fewer stUl were as weU fitted to
fiU it, and discharge one-half its compHcated and multifarious
duties. As soon as General Howard concluded to accept his
new appointment, he apprized his old commander of the fact
by a friendly letter, and received the foUowing in answer : —
" In tee Field, Dumfries, Va., May 17th, 1865—9 p. m.
" Your letter of May 12, inclosing General Orders, War De
partment, No. 91, of May 12, reached me here, on arrival at
camp, about dark.
" Colonel Strong is camped just behind me. General Logan
about tAVO mUes back, and the FHteenth Corps at Acquia
Creek, eight miles back. Copies of orders No. 91 are being
made, and wUl be sent back to. them. I hardly know whether
to congratulate you or not, but of one thing you may rest
assured, that you possess my entire confidence, and I cannot
imagine that matters that may involve the future of four mU-
lions of souls could be put in more charitable and more con
scientious hands. So far as man can do, I behove you avUI,
but I fear you ha.ve Hercules' task! God has Hmited the power
of man, and though, in the kindness of your heart, you would
alleriate aU the iUs of humanity, it is not in your power ; nor
is it in your power to fulfil one-tenth part of the expectations
of those who framed the bureau for the freedmen, refugees,
and abandoned estates. It is simply impracticable. Yet you
can and AriU do aU the good one man may, and that is aU you
are caUed on as a man and Christian to do ; and to that extent
count on me as a friend and feUoAv^eoldier for counsel and
assistance. I beheve the negro is free by act of master and
by the laws of Avar, now ratified by actual consent and power.
The demand for his labor, and his abUity to acquire and work
land, wUl enable the negro to work out that amount of free
dom and pohtical consequence to which he is or may be en-

DIGRESSIVE. 463
titled by natural right and the acquiescence of his feUow-
men. " There is a strong prejudice of race, which over our whole
country exists. The negro is denied a vote in all the Northern
States, save two or three, and then qualified by conditions not
attached to the white race ; and by the constitution of the
United States, to States is left the right to fix the quahfication
of voters. The United States cannot make negroes vote in
,the South, any more than they can in the North, without
revolution ; and as we have just emerged from one attempted
revolution, it would be Avrong to begin another. I notice in
our country, one class of people make war and leave others
to fight it out.
" I do behove the people of the South realize the fact that
their former slaves are free, and if aUowed reasonable time,
and are not harassed by confiscation and pohtical compHca-
tions, wiU very soon adapt thek condition and interests to
their new state of facts.
" Many of them vriU seU, or lease on easy terms, parts of
their land to thek former slaves, and graduaUy the same
pohtical state of things wiU result as now exists in Maryland,
Kentucky, and Missouri. The people cannot afford to pay
the necessary taxes to maintain separate colonies of negroes,
or the armies needed to enforce the rights of negroes dwelling
in the Southern States, in a condition antagonistic to the feel
ings and prejudice of the people, the result of which wUl be
internal war, and the final extermination of the negro race.
But I am not famUiar Arith the laws of Congress Avhich origin
ated your bureau, but repeat my entire confidence in your
pure and exalted character, and your abUity to do in the prem
ises aU that -any one man can do."

464 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.

CHAPTEE XXXVI.

AT H OME.

Eelieved from the cares and responsibihties of his command,
and whUe awaiting the further orders of the Government,
Sherman sought and obtained permission from the Heutenant-
general to visit his home, his famUy, and his friends.
On his arrival at his old home, at Lancaster, Ohio, on the
24th of June, 1865, General Sherman was met at the raUway
station by several thousands of his friends, neighbors, and
veteran soldiers, and was welcomed by Judge Hunter, on the
part of the citizens, and Colonel ConneU, on behaH of the
veterans. The general repHed : —
" Feeends of my Boyhood :
" I thank you for this most hearty welcome. I am especiaUy
thankful for the kind words of the tried and valued friend of
my famUy, Mr. Hunter, and for the warmth Arith which Colftnel
ConneU and the soldiers have received me. With the latter, I
can deal in very few words, for they know that vrith us words
are few and mean much, and that when the time comes again,
we AviU go where the stars and stripes lead, without asking
many questions.
" My old friends and neighbors, I knew your fathers before
you better than yourselves, for it is near thirty years since I
left here a boy ; and now, iu full manhood, I find myseU again
among you, Arith a name connected Arith the history of our
country.

AT HOME. 465
"During the past four years my mind has been so intent
upon but one thing — the success of our arms — that I have
thought of nothing else. I claim no special honor, only to
have done a fuU man's share ; for when one's country is in
danger, the man who wiU not defend it, and sustain it, Arith
his natural strength, is no man at aU. For this I claim no
special merit, for I have done simply what aU the boys in blue
have done. I have only labored with the strength of a single
man, and have used the brains I inherited and the education
given by my country. The Avar through which we have just
passed has covered a wide area of country, and imposed upon
us a task which, like a vast piece of machinery, required many
parts, aU of which were equally important to the working of
the whole. Providence assigned me my part, and H I have
done it, I am weU satisfied.
"The past is now Arith the historian, but we must stUl
grapple Arith the future. In this Ave need a guide, and, fortu
nately for us aU, we can trust the constitution which has safely
brought us through the gloom and danger of the past. Let
each State take care of its own local interests and affaks — Ohio
of hers, Louisiana of hers, Wisconsin of hers — and the best
results AviU foUow. You aU know weU that I have Hved much
at the South, and I say that though we have had bitter and
fierce enemies in war, we must meet this people again in peace.
Tho bad men among them will separate from those who ask
for order and peace, and when the people do thus separate we
can encourage the good, and, H need be, we can cut the head
of the bad off at one blow. Let the present take care of the
present, and vrith the faith inspked by the past, we can trust
the future to the future. The Government of the United
States and the constitution of our fathers have proven thek
strength and power in time of war, and I believe our whole
country wUl be even more briUiant in the vast and unknown
future than in the past.
" FeUow-soldiers and neighbors, again I thank you. I do
not wish you to consider this a speech at aU, for I do not pro
fess to be a man of words. I prefer to see you separately, at
SO

466 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS,
your leisure, in a social way. I shaU be with you for some
days, and shaU be pleased to have you call in whenever you
feel like it, in the old famUiar way, without any of the formahty
and reserve which were proper enough in the midst of the
armies." He remained with his famUy but a few clays when an invita
tion from his old comrades of the Army of the Tennessee to
attend thek barbecue at LouisviUe, on the approaching 4th of
July, in honor of victory and peace, again drew him fr-om his
retkement. On his way to LouisriUe, he passed through
Cincinnati, arriring there on the night of the 30th of June, to
find that the citizens had hastUy arranged a formal welcome.
On making his appearance on the balcony of the Burnett
House, General Sherman was greeted Arith deafening cheers.
Mr. Stanberry, in a pleasant and courteous speech, formaUy
tendered the welcome of the city, and then, with a brief refer
ence to the general's extraordinary career, introdiLced him to
the citizens. Mr. Stanbemy was frequently interrupted by
applause, and at the close of his address three cheers were
given for Sherman, who, in response, said : —
" Fellow Citizens — I am not so accustomed to speaking as
my fr-iend Stanberry, and therefore you must be a little more
silent as to noise, and charitable as to words. I am very
proud that he, before every other man, has received me here
on this portico, for, as he says, he knew my father before me,
and aU my famUy. He knew me when I was a little red
headed boy, running about Lancaster stealing his cherries. I
am thankful that he has introduced me, for I behove he un
derstands the workings of my heart as weU as I do myseH, and
I know that he can teU it better than I can, thsrefore I accept
his version Arithout quahfication.
" WhUe we are here together to-night let me teU you, as a
point of historical interest, that here, upon this spot, in this
very hotel, and I think almost in the room through which I
reached tins balcony. General Grant and I laid doAvn our maps

AT HOME. 467
and studied the campaign which ended our war. I had been
away doAVn in Mississippi finishing up an unfinished job I had
down there, when he caUed for me by telegraph to meet him
in Nashrille. But we were bothered so much there that avo
came up here, and in this hotel sat down Arith our maps and
talked over the hnes and the operations by means of which
we were to reach the heart of our enemy. He Avent to Eich
mond, and I to Atlanta. We varied as to time ; but the result
was just as we laid it out in this hotel, in March, 1864.
" General Grant and I had only one object to fulfil. Our
hearts and feehngs are one: we were determined the United
States should survive this war with honor ; and that those who
came after us, in future years and centuries, should never tum
upon this generation and say we were craven cowards. Now
what is the truth ? Are you not proud ? You are not proud
of me, but you are proud of the result. General Grant, and
General Sherman, and every other patriot think of but one
thing ; we don't bother ourselves about local details ; we think
of only one idea — the supremacy of our country represented
by Congress, the judiciary, and the executive — the people be
ing a part of the grand whole. We may think differently
about the roads, the mud, about horses and mules ; but in one
thing we do not differ — that this country shaU survive, and be
honored not only here but aU over the world.
" When our thoughts are of this character, don't let us bother
ourselves about Httle things. There are great thoughts abroad
in America, and you and I and all of^us are charged with them,
and let us see that our country stands unchanged as to boun
daries. We have the best country on earth. Our history in
the past is beautHul, and her future is in our keeping. I hope
and pray that the present generation AviU maintain the present ;
and I know that those who come after us avUI make that pres
ent more glorious than it now is. We have but begun the
work. I have traveUed from one part of the country to the
other, and I know that we are almost in a state of wilderness
yet. Not one acre in ten in Ohio, and not one in forty in Ten
nessee, is improved as it ought to be. When, we are as popu-

468 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
lous as Europe, it avUI be time to tread upon our neighbor's
heels. You in Ohio have the most lovely country the sun
ever shone upon; and every returned Ohio soldier, I hope,
AvUl take my advice and go to his farm and cultivate it the
best he can, rather than wander away into new enterprises.
For fifty years to come, at least, I never want to hear a word
about war in America. If anybody, at home or abroad, treads
upon our coat-taUs we AviU be ready for a fight. But I am for
peace now. The Army of the Tennessee is now peaceably
disposed. We simply warn our friends not to tread upon
our coat-taUs ; that is aU. "
The general then thanked the people for the interest they
had taken in his presence, and bid them good-night.
The army received thek old leader with cordial and unre
strained enthusiasm. After spending an agreeable anniver
sary among his old feUow-soldiers, Sherman went to St. Louis
to assume formal command of his new military dirision, pre-
parafory to availing himseH of a more extended hoHday.
At a pubhc dinner given to him by the citizens at St. Louis
he spoke as foUows : —
" Here, in St. Louis, probably began the great centre move
ment which terminated the war- — a battle-field such as never
before was seen, extending from ocean to ocean almost, Arith
the right Aving and the left Aving ; and from the centre here I
remember one evening, up in the old Planters' House, sitting
with General HaUeck and General CuHum, and we were talk
ing about this, that, and the other. A map was on the table,
and I was explaining the position of the troops of the enemy
in Kentucky when I came to this State. General HaUeck
knew weU the position here, and I remember weU the question
he asked me — ^the question of the school teacher to his chUd
— ' Sherman, here is the Hne : how avUI you break that line ?'
' PhysicaUy, by a perpencHcular force.' ' Where is the per
pendicular ?' ' The Hne of the Teimessee Eiver.' General
HaUeck is the author of that first beginning, and I give biin

AT HOME. 469
credit for it Arith pleasure. Laying doAvn his pencU upon the
map, he said, ' There is the Hne, and we must take it.' The
capture of the forts on the Tennessee Eiver by the troops led
by Grant foUowed. These were the grand strategic features
of that first movement, and it succeeded perfectly.
" General HaUeck's plan went further — not to stop at his
first line, which ran through Columbus, Bowling Green, cross
ing the river at Henry and Donelson, but to push on to the
second hue, which ran through Memphis and Charleston ; but
troubles intervened at NashviUe, and delays foUowed ; oppo
sition to the last movement was made, and I myself was
brought an actor on the scene.
" I remember our ascent of the Tennessee Eiver : I have
seen to-night captains of steamboats who first went with us
there. Storms came, and we did not reach the point we de
sked. A't that time General C. F. Smith was in command.
He was a man indeed : aU the old officers remember him as a
gallant and exceUent officer ; and had he hved, probably some
of us younger feUows would not have attained our present
positions. But that is now past. We foUowed him the
second time, and then came the landing of forces at Pittsburg
Landing. Whether it was a mistake in landing them on the
west instead of the east bank, it is not necessary now to dis
cuss. I think it was not a mistake. There was gathered the
first great army of the West, commencing with only twelve
thousand, then twenty, then thkty thousand, and we had about
thkty-eight thousand in that battle ; and all I claim for that
is, that it was a contest for manhood : there was no strategy.
Grant was there, and others of us, aU young at that time, and
unknoAvn men, but our enemy was old, and Sidney Johnston,
whom aU the officers remembered as a power among the old
officers, high above Grant, myseH, or anybody else, led the
enemy on that battle-field, and I almost wonder how we
conquered. But, as I remarked, it was a contest for
manhood — man to man — soldier to soldier. We fought, and
we held our ground, and therefore accounted ourselves victo
rious.

470 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
" The possession of the Mississippi Eiver is the possession
of America, and I say that had the Southern Confederacy (caU
it by what name you may) — had that power represented by
the Southern Confederacy held with a grip sufficiently strong
the lower part of the Mississippi Eiver, we would have been
a subjugated people ; and they would have dictated to us H we
had given up the possession of the lower Mississippi. It was
rital to us, and we fought for it and won. We determined to
have it ; but we could not go doAvn with our fr-aU boats past
the batteries of Vicksburg. It was a physical impossibUity ;
therefore what was to be done ? After the TaUahatchie hne
was carried, Vicksburg was the next point. I went with a
smaU and hastUy coUected force, and repeatedly endeavored
to make a lodgment on the bluff between Vicksburg and
Haines' Bluff, whUe General Grant moved with his main army
so as to place himseH on the high plateau behind Vicksburg ;
but ' man proposes and God disposes,' and we faded on that
occasion. I then gathered my hastUy coUected force and went
down further ; and then, for the first time, I took General Blak
and his brigade under my command.
" On the very day I had agreed to be there I was there, and
we swung our flanks around, and the present governor of Mis
souri fell a prisoner to the enemy on that day. We failed. I
waited anxiously for a co-operating force inland and below us,
but they did not come, and after I had made the assault I
learned that the depot at HoUy Springs had been broken up,
and that General Grant had sent me word not to attempt it.
But it was too late. Nevertheless, ,although we were unable
to carry it at first, there were other things to be done. The
war covered such a vast area there was plenty to do. I thought
of that affak at Arkansas Post, although others claim it, and
they may have it H they want it. We cleaned them out there,
and General Grant then brought his army to Vicksburg. And
you in St. Louis remember weU that long winter — how we
were on the levee, with the waters rising and drowning us like
muskrats ; how we were seeking channels through Deer Creek
and Yazoo Pass, and how we finaUy cut a canal across the

AT HOME. 471
peninsula, in front of Vicksburg. But aU that time the true
movement was the original movement, and every thing ap
proximating to it came nearer the truth. But we could not
make any retrograde movement. Why ? Because your peo
ple at the North were too noisy.
" We could not take a,ny step backward, and for that reason
we were forced to run the batteries at Vicksburg, and make a
lodgment on the ridges on some of the bluffs below Vicksburg.
It is said I protested against it. It is foUy. I never protested
in my hfe — never. On the contrary. General Grant rested on
me probably more responsibihty even than any other com
mander under him ; for he Avrote to me, ' I want you to move
on Haines' Bluff to enable me to pass to the next fort beloAv —
Grand GuH. I hate to ask you, because the fervor of the
North wUl accuse you of being rebeUious again.' I love Grant
for his kindness. I did make the feint on Haines' Bluff, and
by that means Grant ran the blockade easily to Grand GuH,
and made a lodgment down there, and got his army up on the
high plateau in the rear of Vicksburg, while you people here
were beguUed into the behef that Sherman was again repulsed.
But we did not repose confidence in everybody. Then fol-
lowed4he movements on Jackson, and the 4th of July placed
us in possession of that great stronghold, Vicksburg, and then,
as Mr. Lincoln said, ' the Mississippi went unvexed to the sea.'
"From that day to this the war has been vktuaUy and
properly settled. It was a certainty then. They would have
said, ' We give up ;' but Davis would not ratHy it, and he had
them under good cHsciphne, and therefore it was necessary to
tight again. Then came the affak of Chickamauga. The
Army of the Mississippi, lying along its banks, were called into
a noAv field of action, and so one morning early I got orders to
go to Chattanooga. I did not know where it was, harcUy. I
did not know the road to go there. But I found it, and got
there in time. And although my men were shoeless, and the
cold and bitter frosts of winter were upon us, yet I must stUl
go to KnoxvUle, one hundred and thirteen miles further, to re
heve Burnside. That march we made. Then winter forced

472 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
US to He quiet. During that Avinter I took a Httle exercise
doAvn the river, but that is of no account."
General BueU has since pubHshed a lengthy reply to this
speech, shoAving, by official documents : I. That as early as
the 3d of January, 1862, he himseH proposed to General Hal-
leck the identical plan of operations that was subsequently
foUowed ; 11. That General HaUeck had at that time neither
formed nor adopted any plan of operations for the ensuing
campaign. General BueU also endeavors to prove that the
delays which occurred in the execution of the plan were not
chargeable to him.
The prime object of General Sherman's remarks, however,
was simply to award credit which he supposed due to one who
had become his enemy. To that end he stated the facts as
they came within his knowledge, and could hardly have been
expected to be cognizant of the confidential dispatches quoted
by General BueU.
From St. Louis, General Sherman went to Chicago, Colum
bus, and other places, on his way home, everywhere heartUy
greeted by the people and the returned soldiers, and every
where compeUed, in spite of himseH, to satisfy the deske of
the crowd for a speech.
After his return to St. Louis, General Sherman was present,
Arith General Grant, at a banquet given to a party of Enghsh
capitahsts, consisting of Mr. James McHenry, the Hon. T.
Kinnaird, Sk Morton Peto, and others, at the Southern Hotel,
on Thursday night, September 14th, 1865. General Grant,
who was present, haring been in vain caUed upon to reply to a
toast, General Sherman said : —
"Gentlemen — I regret exceedingly that my commanding
general wUl not respond to the sentiment. As a citizen of St.
Louis, rather than as an officer in the army, I wUl thank these
gentlemen for the kindly mention they have made of General
Grant, the whole army, and myself. I behove it is sincere. I
beheve they appreciate and reahze- the fact that General

AT HOME. 473
Grant, as the representative of the Army of the United States
has had, fr-om the beginning to the end, but one single pur
pose in view. He has not sought to kUl, slay, and desti'oy,
but resolved on the first day of the war that this coimtry
should Hve one and inseparable forever. He felt as we aU
should feel, prepared for this very occasion, when honorable
gentlemen may come fr-om abroad, and not have occasion to
blush that the sons of Enghshmen permitted anarchy and
downfaU in the country intrusted to them. And notwith
standing the spkit of the press at one time in England, I be
heve then and now every true Anglo-Saxon, every Irishman,
and every Scotchman rejoiced, and rejoice now, that we are
men, and that we did not permit our country to break in two
or many sections. And, moreover, I believe every foreign
nation — France, Spain, Germany, and Eussia — ^have as much
interest in our national existence as we have ourselves ; and
now, that peace is once more attained, these gentlemen come
of their own accord, generously and kindly, to see for them
selves whether we merit the assistance which they have in
abundance to develop the resources of our country, yet new,
Arith forests stUl standing on nine-tenths of it. They seem to
be impressed favorably, and I have no doubt, in their influen
tial stations abroad, they avUI induce thousands and miUions
to think and feel as they do. They have seen this day the
kon-clads stripped of thek armor. They have seen your levee
for three mUes Hned Arith peaceful steamboats loaded with
corn and oats to go to that Southern country with which we
have been at war. They see the Heutenant-general of aU our
armies dressed as a citizen at this table, and they wUl carry
abroad a perfectly comprehensive, clear, and mathematical
inteUigence that we are at peace, that we want peace, and that
we wiU have it, even at the expense of war.
" But I am weU assured that there is no nation that deskes
war Arith us ; that every question that can possibly arise can
be adjusted by statesmen, by merchants, by men of inteUi
gence and pubhc citizens, assembled together just as you are,
discussing just as you would the affairs of the Pacific Eaikoad,

474 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
or any thing else — adjusting differences, striking the balance,
and paying it out in bank when caUed for. Therefore, gentle
men, I am glad to see you among us, and I know the people
of St. Louis are glad to see you. You can see in one hour
what you could not procure by reading one thousand columns
of closely printed matter in the London Times. There are
things seen, things felt within, which cannot be described.
Even Shakspeare faUs to convey a fuU and inteUigent descrip
tion of many thoughts, and no author can convey a description
of a place or locahty that AviU give you in a month of reading
what you acquke to-day by simply running back and forth by
our city, and traversing it right and left in carriages.
" You have seen the streets of the city and the form and
maimer of buUding, and the character of the buildings ; and
you have seen where but a few years ago there was nothing
but a vrild prairie, and where, as has been stated, forty years
ago there was but a French viUage of four thousand inhabit
ants, and you find yourseH in a palace — in a room which AviU
compare favorably vrith any on earth. From these facts, you
can arrive at conclusions in regard to the future. Whether
virid or not, it is for the future. The present you have seen
for yourselves. You have seen the material resources of the
country. The people of the country have heard the kindly
words which you have spoken, and I know we receive it in the
plain British meaning. I, therefore, simply, gentlemen, beg
to assure you of my respect — a respect which aU educated
officers in the army bear to England, and aU nations that act
fairly, manfuUy, and without concealment."

CONCLUSION. 475

CHAPTEE XXXVn.

CONCLUSION.

When Count Segur, in giving his graphic account of Napo
leon's great Eussian campaign, declared it was impossible to
comprehend the great events of history without a perfect
knowledge of the character and manners of the principal actors,
he disclosed a profound knowledge of his art. Such know
ledge of Sherman, however, can only be had by being associated
Arith him both at home and in the field. If we form our esti
mate of General Sherman's character and manners from his
briUiant but hasty letters and miHtary reports alone, or from
the record of his miHtary career, or from such descriptions of
him as have been given by army correspondents, or from aU
these sources of information together, we AriU be hkely to have
a very imperfect idea of the man. The country, however, and
the world AvUl probably agree in according him mUitary genius
of a high order. Indeed, this judgment can hardly be Arith
held Arithout obliterating the most briUiant achievements of
the war, stUl fresh in the memory of aU.
It has been the fortune of but few eminent men hke General
Sherman, to receive both the applause and abuse usuaUy ac
corded to greatness, in the short space of four years. It is too
early to Avrite his history. FHty or a hundred years hence he
wiU be better understood than now, and more appreciated.
In personal appearance and manners. General Sherman is
not ossentiaUy different from other men of American education
and culture. At this writing, he is past forty-five years of age,
of taU and commanding form ; and a stranger, introduced to
him for the first time, Arithout any previous knowledge of his

476 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
real character, would be more impressed by his individuahty
than by his personal presence. His head is large and weU-
developed, and covered Arith straight auburn hak. His eyes
are dark hazel, large and piercing. He wears his hair care
lessly, and his beard short-cropped. The pictures of him in
the shop Avindows hardly do justice to his actual personal ap
pearance, the deep lines of his face giring him the aspect of a
man of rather harsh and repulsive manners, not consonant
Arith his ordinary habits and character.
General Sherman always aims at what is practical, sohd,
and usefrd, and not to what is merely specious and attractive.
His historical researches have, accordingly, been of greater
use to him. in actual experience than those of many a more
widely-read student. He seems to have read history for the
useful lessons it imparts ; to learn what men have said and
done in the past, which may be used as guides for the future,
just as he would judge of the topography of a country on the
far side of a river, which he cannot see, by carefuUy surveying
the side he can see. In conversation he is clear, dkect, com
prehensive, and inteUigent. In social Hfe he is exceedingly
agreeable, polite, and hospitable, and is very fond of chUdren,
generaUy selecting a dancing partner from the Httle girls. His
action in the case of the boy Howe, wounded at Vicksburg,
and who showed such remarkable presence of mind amid
danger, Ulustrates his appreciation of boys who give evidence
of uncommon abUity and promise. Young Howe was sent to
a naval school, at his suggestion ; and two other youths were
selected by him, for meritorious conduct in the field, and sent
to the Government academy at West Point.
During the autumn of 1863, General Sherman sent for his
famUy to visit him at his mUitary camp on the Big Black, in
Mississippi, to enjoy theu society for a month or more, whUe
bis corps was being prepared for other operations. On the
way back his eldest boy, WUHe, was taken Ul and died. He
had been made, by vote of the Thirteenth Eegiment United
States Infantry (his father's old regiment), an honorary ser
geant at nine years of age. This regiment escorted the re-

CONCLUSION.

477

mains of the Httle sergeant, and bestowed the same honors as
H he had been such officer in fact, which so touched the heart
of the father that he wrote the foUowing letter of acknowledg
ment, which is worthy of preservation : — -
" Gatoso House, Memphis, Tenn.,
October 4th — Midnight.
" Captain C. C. Smith,
Commanding Battalion, Thirteenth Regulars :
" My Deae Feiend — I cannot sleep to-night tUl I record an
expression of the deep feehngs of my heart to you and to the
officers and solcHers of the battahon for thek kind behavior
to my poor chUd. I reaHze that you aU feel for my famUy
the attachment of kindred, and I assure you aU of fuU reci
procity. " Consistent with a sense of duty to my profession and of
fice I could not leave my post, and sent for my family to come
to me in that fatal chmate and in that sickly period of the
year ; and behold the result ! The chUd that bore my name,
and in whose future I reposed with more confidence than I
did in my own plans of Hfe, now floats a mere corpse, seeking
a grave in a distant land, with a weeping mother, brother,
and sisters clustered about him. But for myself, I can ask
no sympathy. On, on I must go to meet a soldier's fate,
or see my country rise superior to aU factions, tUl its flag
is adored and respected by ourselves and aU the powers of
the earth.
" But my poor WiUie was, or thought he was, a sergeant of
the Thirteenth. I have seen his eye brighten and his heart
beat as he beheld the battahon under arms, and asked me H
they were not real soldiers. ChUd as he was, he had the en
thusiasm, the pure love of truth, honor, and love of country
which should animate aU soldiers.
" God only knows why he should die thus young. He is
dead ; but wUl not be forgotten tUl those who knew him in hfe
have foUowed him to that same mysterious end.
" Please conA'ey to the battahon my heartfelt thanks ; and

478 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
assure each and aU that H in after years they caU on me or
mine, and mention that they were of the Thirteenth Eegulars
when my poor WUHe was a sergeant, they avUI have a key to
the affections of my famUy that wUl open aU it has — that we
AviU share Arith them our last blanket, our last crust.
" Your friend,
" W. T. Sheeman,
'Major-General."
General Sherman is a thorough organizer, and believes in
the necessity of adapting means to proper ends. He is no
fatahst ; but, hke Napoleon, seems to think " the gods gener
aUy favor the strongest battalions ;" nevertheless, he prefers to
have them weU appointed, disciplined, and handled, in battle,
lest the gods might happen to help the other side. But he
is not one of those cool, scientific, methodical, and tenacious
men, bent on OAving every thing to tactics and nothing to for
tune, and calculating every thing, even the chances of hazard ;
nor yet does he rush into battle relying chiefly on the inspira
tion of his OAvn genius and the happy chances of fortune.
Different from aU this, his theory is, so far as it can be deduced
from his miHtary operations, first to have a properly appointed
and duly proportioned army equal to the undertaking in hand ;
next, to school his army in tactics, so as to make it capable of
quick and accurate movement ; then to accustom it to battle
in minor engagements and secondary victories ; and finaUy, to
strike home for grand results. And in doing this. General
Sherman hesitates at no detail of preparation however trifling,
and never loses sight of the idea that every thing, after aU,
must depend on the head that plans and the hand that guides
the whole. He has a constitution of kon and nerves of steel 5
and his thoughts come to him Arith the quickness of the Hght-
ning and as clear as the Hght. Before starting out for battle
or on a campaign, he always makes himseH acquainted with
every road, stream, and farm-house on his hne of march ; and
haring these, he calculates, with surprising accuracy, the to
pography of the country though he never saw it. He was

CONCLUSION. 479
three years studying the route of his campaigns through
Georgia and the Carolinas ; not that he had any reason to be
heve he would be caUed upon to lead an army over it, but
because he saw in the dim future such a campaign would
eventuaUy be necessary to put down the rebeUion. He was so
impressed with this idea at the very beginning of the war, that
he obtained from the Census Bureau in Washington a map,
made at his OAvn request, of the Cotton States, Arith a table
shoAving the cattle, horses, and products of each county, ac
cording to the last census returns reported from those States ;
so that afterwards, when the time for such enterprise arrived,
he was practicaUy familiar with the resources of the whole
country on his line of march.
General Sherman's miHtary orders and letters are models of
composition ; and those written and issued by him during his
operations from Chattanooga to Ealeigh would, without much
alteration, make an instructive hand-book of war. His habit
is to look at every thing from a mUitary standpoint ; and he
invariably touches the sahent point of his subject in the cen
tre. By both natural gift and education a soldier, he possesses
a soldier's strength, and a soldier's high sense of honor ; and
is not without a soldier's foibles. Straight-forward, high-
minded, just, and honorable himseH, he has no patience with
such as resort to trickery or subterfuge to accomplish thek
ends. Of the trade of pohticians he knows but Httle, and ever
seemed careless to learn. He was once nominated for pubhc
office, some years ago, in Cahfornia. His good-natured but
sarcastic reply was : " Gentlemen, I am not ehgible ; I am not
properly educated to hold office." To understand the fuU
force of the expression, it must be remembered it was uttered
in San Francisco ten years ago. This nomination was the
commencement of his pohtical career, and his reply was the
end of it.
General Sherman's master quahties are of the miHtary
order. His miHtary estimate of men requires the most heroic
proportions ; his AVTitten orders are luminous of the inspkation
of his oAvn matchless genius ; and when his dkections to sub-

480 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
ordinates in command are given oraUy, they are absolutely
kresistible ; and, estimating difficulties by his own abUity to
overcome them, he usuaUy Arinds up by saying : " And this
must be done .at any expense of Hfe or horseflesh." He
speaks rapidly and distinctly, Arithout hesitation, and using the
fewest words possible. He is no orator, but Arith practice
could easUy become a pubhc speaker of more than ordinary
power. General Sherman, in moral resources and in that pecuHar
power to inspke confidence and command men, is not unhke
the popular idea of Andrew Jackson, who, as aU the world
knows, never hesitated to " take ,the responsibUity," and do
what he thought to be right, no matter who opposed. His
marveUous power over his troops in the field consists in his
being able to make them feel they are the best troops in the
world, taking good care to make them so by never aUowing
them to be unnecessarUy beaten, and by being himseU equal
to the high courage of his army and the occasion at the proper
moment. When he commanded the Fourth Corps, it was, in
his estimation, the best corps in the Armies of the United
States ; afterwards the Army of the Tennessee was the best
army in the West, because it was his ; and, finaUy, when he
had two other armies under his command, they were aU best.
" Show me," said Napoleon, " the best officer in the regiment."
" Ske, they are aU good." " WeU, but point out to me the
best." " Sire, they are aU equally good." " Come, come, that
is not an answer ; — say, Hke Themistocles, ' I am the first, my
neighbor is the second.' " " Ske, I mention Captain Moncey,
because he is absent — he was wounded." " What," said Na
poleon, " Moncey, my page, the son of the' marshal ? Men
tion another." " Ske, he is the best." " WeU, then, he shaU
have the decoration."
General Sherman seems to have had a simUar regard for
such as were wounded or disabled while serving in his com
mand. His letter-books show many instances of this, which
the foUoAring extract from a letter written to a wounded officer
wUl sufficiently Ulustrate : —

CONCLUSION. 481
" I see you desire promotion, and to be returned to duty in
the field. Indeed wUl I aid you aU in my power to obtain
what you merit and must have. The loss of your hand is no
objection, and in your case is an evidence of title to promo
tion — with your one arm you are worth half a dozen ordinary
men. Your left hand, guided by a good head and wilhng
heart, can wield the sword to good purpose. I inclose you a
strong letter to Governor Todd, urging your promotion."
General Sherman's .favorites among his officers were such as
could do the best. He was always severe on such as sought
personal advancement by unfak means. The foUoAving letter
Avritten by him from Atlanta, under date of July 25th, 1864,
dkected to Colonel Har die at the War Office in Washington,
is of itsoH more descriptive of General Sherman's method of
treatment in such cases than any description we could give : —
"I have your dispatch of yesterday announcing the ap
pointment of General  as majof -general. I am not ob
jecting to this appointment, but I Arish to put on record this
my emphatic opinion, that it is an act of injustice to officers
who stand at their post in the day of danger to neglect them
and advance such as Generals  and  , who left us
in the midst of buUets to go to the rear in search of personal
advancement. If the rear be the post of honor, then we had
better change front on Washington."
In further Ulustration of General Sherman's characteristics
in the field, the folloAring incident is given. When General
HaUeck ordered a junction of .the Armies of the Ohio and
Tennessee at Pittsburg Landing, in the spring of 1862, it was
a part of his plan to destroy as much as possible of the
Charleston and Memphis Eaikoad between Corinth and luka,
in order to embarrass the enemy in coUecting his forces and
supplies at the former place. This had been tArice attempted
by General Sherman Arithout success. It was noAV determined
to make another attempt, and break the road east of luka,
31

482 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
when he started for that purpose up the river Arith two gun
boats and a detachment of infantry under command of Gen
eral Fry, and a hundred picked cavah-y selected from the
thkd battahon of the Fourth Illinois Cavaky, under command
of Major BoAvman, on transports, and landed in the night at
Chickasaw, above the mouth of Bear Creek, and quietly in
vested the toAvn whUe the inhabitants were asleep. Before
dayhght General Sherman had succeeded, by some means, in
finding an inteUigent negro acquainted Arith the country and
the roads, and from information derived from him quickly
sketched a map of the country for the use of the cavaky. AU
tilings being arranged for the start, he caUed General Fry and
Major BoAvman one side and gave them thek orders : " The
object of this expedition is," said Sherman, " to destroy the
raUroad-bridge across Bear Creek and the tressel-work on this
side. I have tried tArice to break that road — it must be done
now at any cost — it is worth miUions to the Government — to
faU now AviU be a disgrace to us aU. Major, I expect you to
surprise the guards, seize the bridge and bum it. I wiU look
for the smoke about noon. General Fry, you march out on
the pike and prevent the enemy from sending forces from luka,
i» cut off the retreat, and H you hear fighting by the cavaky,
'bum the turnpike bridge and hurry on to the support of the
cavaky." The work was done precisely as ordered, and our troops
returned to the gunboats the same night, a part of the infantry
iaving marched thirty-four mUes.
Tt AriU be seen, by the foregoing, there is much in Sherman's
manner and style of command to remind the reader of Soult :
"T have chosen you," said that consummate general, address
ing himseH to that most daring officer, Major Dulong — "I
have chosen jou, from the whole army, to seize the Ponte
Neva, which has been cut by the enemy. Select a hundred
grenadiers and twenty-five horsemen ; endeavor to surprise
the guards and secure the passage of the bridge. H you
succeed, say so ; but send no other report — ^your sUence avUI
suffice."

CONCLl.fSION. 483
General Sherman seems to comprehend the value of time in
war. Every thing that he says in the presence of his officers,
and aU that he does, inspkes all around him with the idea
tliat not a moment must be lost. Above aU his other exceUences
shine his promptitude, celerity, and immeasurable activity.
Always ready for the start, indefatigable on the march, omni
present in battle, relentless in pursuit, unfailing in mental
resources, fruitful of expedients, enthusiastic in victory, he
seems to carry his army in his hand and push it forward with
irresistible power. In aU mihtary movements his strict
punctuahty is observable. In his own words, he " is always
on time ;'' whether starting from Vicksburg to Chattanooga on
an hour's notice, or turning to the rehef of KnoxvUle, or mov
ing doAvn on Dalton on the very day appointed, or in the great
marches to the sea and through the Carohnas.
" TeU my old friend, D. D. Porter, to look out for me about
Christmas," he Avrote from GaylesviUe ; four days before that
time his army occupied Savannah. His chief quartermaster
and chief commissary were told to expect him on the North
Carolina coast on the 15th of March. On the 14th he entered
FayettevUle and communicated Arith the sea.
It wiU probably be the judgment of history that the deliver
ance of the country was not due so much to the foresight and
abUity of the administration and Congress as to the skiU of
our generals in the field, and the courage of our troops, whom
no dangers could daunt and no hardships cHshearten. Grant
was made lieutenant-general to remedy the internal errors of
the War Department at Washington, and Sherman's capture
of Atlanta saved the presidential election and stimulated the
patriotism of the people. While Sherman was leading his
conquering legions to the sea. Congress was hesitating about
filhng up cur decimated ranks by a general draft, rendering
the great result doubtful at the very threshold of eventful
triumph. " Give us a universal draft," Avrote Sherman from
the battle-field near Atlanta ; " any man who can fight and
won't fight now, ought to be made to fight, or be banished or
denationahzed."

484 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
Mr. Lincoln, Mr. Stanton, and General HaUeck had jointly
and severaUy managed the war until the miHtary estabhsh
ment had been weU-nigh destroyed, and the resources of the
country weU-nigh exhausted. No one understood this better
than Mr. Lincoln himseH, and none were more free to acknow
ledge it. " You know," he declared to Mr. Stanton, " we have
been trying to manage this war thus far, but Arithout success.
I promised General Grant, when he accepted his present office,
he should not be interfered Arith in his mihtary plans and
operations by mere civUians. I think we wiU be obhged to
let Mr. Grant (as Mrs. Grant caUs him) have his OAvn way ;"
and this simple declaration was worth forty thousand men in
the field.
" When you were about to leave Atlanta for the Atlantic,"
wrote Mr. Lincoln to General Sherman, " I was anxious, H not
fearful. Now, the undertaking being a success, the honor is
aU yours, for I beheve none of us went further than to acqui
esce." " Not only, he continued, " does it afford the obrious
and immediate military advantages," etc., but " it brings those
who sat in darkness to see a great Hght."
The preacher teUs us, "no man can serve two masters," and
the maxim is as true in war as in rehgion. General Sherman
found it comparatively easy to co-operate vrith the President
his honest, candid, out-spoken, and enterprising charactei
were such as Mr. Lincoln most needed and most admired.
Sherman's practical character, his knowledge of business, his
quickness of perception, and rapidity of execution, his clear
statement, his ready answers, his accurate and varied inteUi
gence on all subjects, whether as to the quahties of a horse,
the proper keel of a steamboat, the length and depth of a
river, the outfit of an army, or the laws of war, were precisely
those qualities that charmed Mr. Lincoln, whose mind ever
recurred to what was useful rather than ornamental. Even
Sherman's frank, bold, and honest opposition to measures
favored by Mr. Lincoln himseH pleased him, especiaUy in re
gard to matters connected with the army, such as trade in
cotton and negro recruiting by Massachusetts agents ; and no

CONCLUSION. 485
one enjoyed Sherman's peculiar spice more than he did. Mr.
Lincoln sought that light which comes from above, but he did
not arrogantly despise the wisdom of man. He gTeatly ad-
mked Sherman, and Sherman in turn strove earnestly and
honestly to execute his pohcy.
But not so with Mr. Stanton, who is hable to false impres
sions beyond most men, is arrogant and proud of his arro
gance, as H it were a virtue ; fond of power, and unscrupidous
in its exercise ; tenacious of his opinions, and holding on to
them Arith a tenacity in proportion to their grossness, and often
rash in the exercise of his enormous power, he wUl appear to
the reader in strange contrast with the mild, and judicious
character of Mr. Lincoln. But he was probably the man for
the place for the time being. It was the boast of Prince Met-
ternich that he served, during the period Avhen Napoleon was
upturning thrones, as the grand high-constable for aU the
crown-heads of Europe, and Mr. Stanton has been ours during
our OAVU great civU war. Such a man was necessary, and he
wUl take his place in the history of the country. But H Sher
man dishked Stanton because he could not understand him,
Stanton in tum hated Sherman ; and the personal coUision
which came at last makes it necessary for the reader to make
the acquaintance of both. Like Castor and PoUux among the
consteUations, it is difficult to look at one without seeing the
other. If Mr. Stanton is a great organizer of war — " like
Carnot" — he fights battles hke a Brutus. " I Httle cheamed,"
Avrote Sherman to General HaUeck, " when you warned me of
the assassin Clark being on my track, he would turn up in
the dkection and guise he did." Caesar's last speech — " Et
tu Brute" — was more terse, but not more expressive than
this. General Sherman was born of New England parents, and
descended from New England stock. He was probably aU the
better for being born in the then far West, amid the Avilds, the
hardships, and primitive people of the fr-ontier. The children
of New England, Hke cereals, are often improved by trans-

486 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
planting. On the western slope of the AUeghany Mountains
the lands are richer, the rivers larger and longer, the lakes are
magnificent, the prairies are almost boundless, and the chmate
is salubrious. There is ample room for aU, food for aU, work
for aU, and happiness for all. It was good fortune and happi
ness to be born in such a country. Society there was less
conventional than in any other section of the country ; reh
gious denominations were more tolerant, rehgious creeds
pinched the conscience less, and the population was more
transient. In early times in the West, men seemed to forget
for awhUe the creeds to which they were educated. Presby
terians often became Methodists or Baptists, and Baptists be
came Presbyterians ; and some of each became CathoHos, and
Cathohcs, in turn, became Protestants, according to the cir
cumstances of each case. The ways to heaven were regarded
Hke railways — the traveUer ready to start on his momentous
journey would generaUy take the first train of cars that came
along, without special inquky as to the character of the parties
who OAvned the stock and run the road, taking his chances of
making connections with the gi-eat " highway" as he neared
his eternal home. Sherman's parents were EpiscopaHans, but
the Episcopal Church was not woU adapted to smaU settle
ments in the backwoods ; or H well adapted, was unable to
keep track of aU its flock scattered throughout the broad ex
panse, and hence the famUy avaUed themselves of such pious
advantages, for awhUe, as the Presbyterian Church could
afford. But General Sherman, while he has a sincere admka-
tion for good Christians, has a most provoking disregard for
rehgious creeds, regarding them as a sort of relative good or
necessary eril, depending more or less upon the inteUigence,
honesty, and general exceUence of the men who instruct, lead,
and control the rehgious impulses of the human heart in their
respective " commands." His appreciation of a Christian sol
dier may be inferred from the following.
" At my last interview with Mr. Lincoln," he Avrote to Mr.
James E. Yeatman of the United States Sanitary Commission,
May 21, 1865, " on his boat anchored iu James Eiver, in the

CONCLUSION. 487
midst of the army, your name came up as one spoken of to fill
the office of commissioner of refugees, freedmen, etc., and I vol
unteered my assertion that H you would accept office, which
I doubted, the bureau could not go into more kind and chari
table hands ; but since that time the office has, properly
enough, been given to General Howard, who has held high
command under me for more than a year ; and I am sure you
AviU be pleased to know that he is as pure a man as ever Hved,
a strict Christian, and a model soldier, the loss of an arm at
testing his serrice. He wUl do all that one man can do, H not
forced to undertake impossibihties," etc.
General Howard, it is weU known, has been pious and ex
emplary from his boyhood, was ever faithful and devoted in
the discharge of his rehgious duties, and this even whUe a
student at West Point. He carried his rehgious principles
with him into the army, and was guided and governed by
them in aU his relations Arith his officers and men. No matter
who was permitted to share his mess or partake of his repast,
whether the lowest subaltern of his command or General
Sherman himseH, no one thought to partake, if General How
ard were present, without first the invocation of the Divine
blessing, himself usuaUy leading, Hke the head of a famUy.
General Sherman seems greatly to have admked the Christian
character of General Howard, making frequent mention of him
in his correspondence in terms simUar to those above quoted ;
and not only as a Christian but as a soldier, preferring him
and promoting him to the command of one of his armies.
From the same letter from which the last extract was taken,
we make a further extract in regard to the AndersonvUle pris
oners and the conclusion of the war : —
" I was as glad as you could have been to learn that those
boxes of stores, prepared by you with so much care and
promptness for the AndersonviUe prisoners, reached them at
last. I don't think I ever set my heart so strongly on any
one thing as I did in attempting 'to rescue those prisoners ;
and I had almost feared instead of doing them good I had

SHERMAN AND HIS CA3IPAIGNS.
actuaUy done them harm, for they were changed from place
to place to avoid me, and I could not with infantry overtake
raikoad trains. But at last thek prison-doors are open ; and
I trust we have arrived at a point when further war or battle,
or severity, other than the punishment of crime by civU tribu
nals, is past.
" You AviU have observed how fiercely I have been assaUed
for simply offering to the President ' terms' for his approval
or disapproval, according to his best judgment — terms which,
H fakly interpreted, mean, and only mean, an actual submis
sion by the rebel armies to the ciril authority of the United
States. No one can deny I have done the State some service
in the field, but I have always desked that strHe should cease
at the earhest possible moment. I confess, Arithout shame, I
am sick and tked of fighting — its glory is aU moonshine ; even
success the most briUiant is over dead and mangled bodies,
vrith the anguish and lamentations of distant famihes, appeal
ing to me for sons, husbands, and fathers. You, too, have
seen these things, and I know you also are tked of the war,
and are AviUing to let the civil tribunals resume thek place.
And, so far as I know, aU the fighting men of our army want
peace ; and it is only those who have never heard a shot, never
heard the shrieks and groans of the wounded and lacerated
(friend or foe), that cry aloud for more blood, more vengeance,
more desolation. I Tcnow the rebels are whipped to death, and
I declare before God, as a man and a soldier, I AviU not strike
a foe who stands unarmed and submissive before me, but
would rather say — ' Go, and sin no more.' "
In another letter, to Chief-Justice Chase, Avritten about the
same time. General Sherman says : —
" I have had abundant opportunities of knowing these people
(the people of the South), both before the war, during its ex
istence, and since thek pubhc acknowledgment of submission
to the national authority, and I have no fear of them, armed
or disarmed, and boHeve that by one single stroke of the pen.

CONCLUSION. 489
nine-tenths of them can be restored to fuU relations with our
Government, so as to pay taxes and hve in peace ; and in war
I would not hesitate to mingle with them and lead them to
battle against our national foes. But we must deal with them
with frankness and candor, and not with doubt, hesitancy, and
prevarication. The nine-tenths would, from motives of seH-
interest, restrain the other mischievous tenth, or compel them
to migrate to some other country, Hke Mexico, cursed wit
anarchy and civil war."
And in a letter to General Schofield, under date of May 28,
1865, General Sherman Avrote on the same subject : —
" I have watched your course in North Carohna and approve
it. Maintain peace and good order, and let law and harmony
grow up naturaUy. I would have preferred to leap more
dkectly to the result, but the same end may be attained by the
slower process you adopt.
" So strong has become the National Government, by reason
of our successful war, that I laugh at the fears of those who
dread that rebels may regain some political power in their
several States. Supposing they do, it is but local, and can in
no way endanger the whole country.
" I think I see akeady signs that events are sweeping all to
the very conclusion I jumped at in my ' terms,' but I have re
frained from discussing them on thek merits, tUl in after times
when it may be demonstrated that the plan sketched by me
was at least in the right direction and constitutional, whether
popular or not. The people of this country are subject to the
constitution, and even they cannot disregard it Arithout a revo
lution, the very thing we have been fighting against."
Such were General Sherman's riews and sentiments, as
stated by himseH, in the midst of stirring events of the times.
They may be popular or unpopular, but no one wUl dispute
the sincerity Arith which they were uttered. A more honest
man than General Sherman does not hve, and he is as gen-

490 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
erous as he is honest. Let those who shaU come after us
judge the man and his actions. To this test aU men must
submit. Time ever Arithers the laurels of the selfish and
base, but freshens the beauty of vktue. Sherman can afford
to wait.

APPENDIX.

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL SHERMAN
befoee the committee on the conduct op the wae, eelative
to the teuce.
Examined by the Chaibman :
Question. What is your rank in the army ?
Answer. I am major-general in the regular army.
Q. As your negotiation with the rebel General Johnston, in
relation to his surrender, has been the subject of much pubhc
comment, the committee deske you to state aU the facts and
ckcumstances in regard to it, or which you wish the pubhc to
know. A. On the 15th day of AprU last I was at Ealeigh, in com
mand of three armies, the Army of the Ohio, the Army of the
Cumberland, and the Army of the Tennessee ; my enemy was
General Joseph E. Johnston, of the Confederate army, who
commanded fifty thousand men, retreating along the raUroad
from Ealeigh, by HiUsboro', Greensboro', Sahsbury, and Char
lotte. I commenced pursuit by crossing the curve of that road
in the dkection of Ashboro' and Charlotte. After the head of
my column had crossed the Cape Fear Eiver at Avon's Ferry,
I received a communication from General Johnston, and an
swered it, copies of which I most promptly sent to the War
Department, with a letter* addressed to the secretary of war,
as foUows.

See page 391.

492 sheplMan and ms campaigns.
I met General Johnston in person, at a house five mUes from
Durham's Station, under a flag of truce. After a few prelim
inary remarks, he said to me, since Lee had surrendered his
army at Appomattox Courthouse, of which he had just been
adrised, he looked upon further opposition by him as the
greatest possible of crimes ; that he wanted to know whether
I could make him any general concessions ; any thing by
which he could maintain his hold and control of his army, and
prevent its scattering ; any thing to satisfy the great yearning
of thek people. E so, he thought he could arrange terms
satisfactory to both parties. He wanted to embrace the
condition and fate of aU the armies of the Southern Confed
eracy to the Eio Grande, — to make one job of it, as he
termed it.
I asked him what his powers were, — whether he could com
mand and control the fate of aU the armies to the Eio Grande.
He answered that he thought he could obtain the power, but
he did not possess it at that moment ; he did not know where
Mr. Davis was, but he thought H I could give him the time,
he could find Mr. Breckinridge, whose orders would be obeyed
everywhere, and he could pledge me his personal faith that
whatever he undertook to do would be done.
I had had frequent correspondence vrith the late President
of the United States, Arith the secretary of war, Arith General
HaUeck, and A\ith General Grant, and the general impression
left upon my mind was, that if a settlement could be made,
consistent vrith the constitution of the United States, the laws
of Congress, and the proclamation of the President, they would
not only be AriUing, but pleased to terminate the war by one
single stroke of the pen.
I needed time to finish the raikoad from the Neuse Bridge
up to Ealeigh, and thought I could put in four or five days of
good time in making repaks to my road, even H I had to send
propositions to Washington. I therefore consented to delay
twenty-four hours, to enable General Johnston to procure
what would satisfy me as to his authority and abihty, as a
mihtary man, to do what he undertook to do. I therefore

APPENDIX. 493
consented to meet him the next day, the 17th, at twelve o'clock
noon, at the same place.
We did meet again ; after a general interchange of courte
sies, he remarked that he was then prepared to satisfy me that
he could fulfil the terms of our conversation of the day before.
He then asked me what I was vriUing to do. I told him, in
the first place, I could not deal vrith anybody except men
recognised by us as " beUigerents," because no miHtary man
could go beyond that fact. The attorney-general has since so
decided, and any man of common sense so understood it be
fore ; there was no difference upon that point as to the men
and officers accompanying the Confederate armies. I told
him that the President of the United States, by a published
proclamation, had enabled every man in the Southern Con
federate army, of the rank of colonel and under, to procure
and obtain amnesty, by simply taking the oath of aUegiance
to the United States, and agreeing to go to his home and Hve
in peace. The terms of General Grant to General Lee ex
tended the same principles to the officers, of the rank of brig
adier-general and upward, including the highest officer in the
Confederate army, viz.. General Lee, the commander-in-chief.
I was, therefore, willing to proceed with him upon the same
principles. Then a conversation arose as to what form of government
they were to have in the South. Were the States there to
be dissevered, and were the people to be denied representa
tion in Congress ? Were the people there to be, in the com
mon language of the people of the South, slaves to the people
of the North ? Of course, I said " No ; we deske that you
shaU regain your position as citizens of the United States, free
and equal to us in aU respects, and wish representation upon
the condition of submission to the lawful authority of the
United States, as defined by the Constitution, the United
States courts, and the authority of the United States sup
ported by those courts." He then remarked to me that Gen
eral Breckinridge, a major-general in the Confederate army,
was near by, and H I had no objection, he would Hke to have

494 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
him present. I caUed his attention to the fact that I had, on
the clay before, explained to him that any negotiations between
us must be confined to beUigerents. He repHed that he tm-
derstood that perfectly. " But," said he, " Breckinridge,
whom you do not know, save by pubhc rumor as secretary of
war, is, in fact, a major-general ; I give you my word for that.
Have you any objection to his being present as a major-gen
eral?" I repHed, "I have no objection to any mUitary officer
you desire being present as a part of your personal staff." I,
myseH, had my oavu officers near me at caU.
Breckinridge came, a stranger to me, whom I had never
spoken to in my hfe, and he joined in the conversation ; while
that conversation was going on a courier arrived and handed
to General Johnston a package of papers ; he and Breckin
ridge sat down and looked over them for some time, and put
them away in thek pockets : what they were, I know not, but
one of them was a shp of paper, Avritten, as General Johnston
told me, by Mr. Eeagan, postmaster-general of the Southern
Confederacy : they seemed to talk about it sotto voce, and
finaUy handed it to me. I glanced over it : it was preceded by
a preamble and closed with a few general terms. I rejected it
at once.
We then discussed matters ; talked about slavery, talked
about every thing. There was a universal assent that slavery
was as dead as any thing could be ; that it was one of the
issues of the war long since determined ; and even General
Johnston laughed at the foUy of the Confederate government
in raising negro soldiers, whereby they gave us aU the points
of the case. I told them that slavery had been treated by us
as a dead institution, first by one class of men from the initia
tion of the war, and then from the date of the emancipation
proclamation of President Lincoln, and finaUy by the assent
of aU parties. As to reconstruction, I told them I did not
know what the views of tb e administration were. Mr. Lincoln,
up to that time, in letters and telegrams to me, encouraged mo
by aU the words which could be used in general terms, to
behove, not only in his willingness, but in his deskes that I

APPENDIX.

495

should make terms with civU authorities, governors, and legis
latures, even as far back as 1863. It then occurred to me
that I might Avrite off some general propositions, meaning
httle or much, according to the construction of parties — what
I would term "glittering generahties" — and send them to
Washington, which I could do in four days. That would
enable the new President to give me a clue to his pohcy in the
important juncture which was then upon us : for the war was
over ; the highest military authorities of the Southern Con
federacy so confessed to me openly, unconcealedly, and re
peatedly. I therefore drew up the memorandum (which has
been pubHshed to the world)* for the purpose of referring
it to the proper executive authority of the United States, and
enabling him to define to me what I might promise, simply to
cover the pride of the Southern men, who thereby became
subordinate to the laws of the United States, civU and mUitary.
I made no concessions to General Johnston's army, or the
troops under his direction and immediate control ; and H any
concessions were made in those general terms, they were made
because I then beHeved, and now behove, they would have
delivered into the hands of the United States the absolute
control of every Confederate officer and soldier, aU their
muster-roUs, and aU their arms. It would save us aU the
incidental expense resulting from the mihtary occupation of
that country by provost-marshals, provost-guards, military
governors, and aU the machinery by which alone mUitary
power can reach the people of a civUized country. It would
have surrendered to us the armies of Dick Taylor and Kkby
Smith, both of them capable of doing infinite mischief to us,
by exhausting the resources of the whole country upon which
we were to depend for the future extinguishment of our debt,
forced upon us by thek wrongful and rebeUious conduct. I
never designed to shelter a human being from any Habihty
incurred in consequence of past acts to the civU tribunals of
our country, and I do not beheve a fak and manly interpreta-
• See the original tmce, page 396.

496 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
tion of my terms can so construe them, for the words " United
States courts," " United States authorities," " hmitations of
executive power," occur in every paragraph. And H they
seemingly yield terms bettor than the pubhc would deske to
be given to the Southern people, H studied closely and well it
AviU be found that there is an absolute submission on thek
part to the Government of the United States, either through
its executive, legislative, or judicial authorities. . Every step
in the programme of these negotiations was reported punctu
aUy, clearly, and fully, by the most rapid means of communica
tion that I had. And yet I neglected not one single precau
tion necessary to reap the fuU benefits of my position, in case
the Government- amended, altered, or absolutely annuUed
those terms. As those matters were necessarily mingled vrith
the mUitary history of the period, I would like, at this point,
to submit to the committee my official report, which has been
in the hands of the proper officer, Brigadier-General Eawlins,
chief of staff of the Army of the United States, since about the
12th instant. It was made by me at Manchester, Vkginia,
after I had returned from Savannah, whither I went to open up
the Savannah Eiver, and reap the fruits of my negotiations
with General Johnston, and to give General WUson's force in
the interior a safe and sure base from which he could draw
the necessary supply of clothing and food for his command.
It was only after I fulfilled aU this that I learned for the first
time, through the pubhc press, that my conduct had been
animadverted upon, not only by the secretary of war,* but by
General HaUeck and the press of the country at large. I did
feel hurt and annoyed that Mr. Stanton coupled Arith the terms
of my memorandum, confided to him, a copy of a telegram to
General Grant, which he had never sent to me. He knew, on
the contrary, that when he was at Savannah, I had negotia
tions with civU parties there, for he was present in my room
when those parties were conferring with me ; and I wrote him
a letter, setting forth many points of it, in which I said I
* See page 418.

APPENDIX. 497
aimed to make a spht in Jefferson Daris' dominions, by segre
gating Georgia fr-om thek course. Those were civU negotia
tions, and, far fr-om being discouraged from making them, I
was encouraged by Secretary Stanton himself to make them.
By couphng the note to General Grant with my memoran
dum, he gave the world fakly and clearly to infer that I was
in possession of it. Now I was not in possession of it, and I
have reason to know that Mr. Stanton knew I was not in pos
session of it. Next met me General HaUeck's telegram,* in
dorsed by Mr. Stanton, in which they publicly avowed an act
of perfidy — namely, the violation of my terms, which I had a
right to make, and which, by the laws of war and by the laws
of Congress, is punishable by death, and no other punish
ment. Next, they ordered an army to pursue my enemy,
who was knoAvn to be surrendering to me, in the presence of
General Grant himseH,- theu superior officer ; and, finaUy, they
sent orders to General WUson and to General Thomas — my
subordinated, acting under me, on a plan of the most magnifi
cent scale, admirably executed — to defeat my orders, and to
thwart the interests of the Government of the United States.
I did feel indignant — I do feel indignant. As to my OAvn
honor, I can protect it. In my letter of the 15th of AprU, I
used this language : " I have inrited Governor Vance to return
to Ealeigh, with the civU officers of his State." I did so be
cause President Lincoln had himseH encouraged me to a
simUar course Arith the governor of Georgia, when I was at
Atlanta. And here was the opportunity which the secretary
of war should have taken to put me on my guard against
making terms with civU authorities, H such were the settled
pohcy of our Government. Had President Lincoln Hved, I
know he would have sustained me.
The foUoAring is my report,t which I deske to have incor
porated into, and made part of, my testimony :

* See page 433. f See Chapters XXVI. to XXX., ante.
32

498 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
Q. Did you have, near Fortress Monroe, a conference A^ith
President Lincoln ; and H so, about what time ?
A. I met General Grant and Mr. Lincoln on board a steam
boat, lying at the wharf at City Point, during the evening of
the 27th of March ; I resumed my visit to the President on
board the same steamer anchored in the stream the foUowing
day. General Grant being present on both occasions.
Q. In those conferences was any arrangement made with
you and General Grant, or either of you, in regard to the
manner of arranging business Avith the Confederacy in regard
to terms of peace ?
A. Nothing definite ; it was simply a matter of general con
versation, nothing specific and definite.
Q. At what time did you learn that President Lincoln had
assented to the assembling of the Virginia rebel Legislature ?
A. I knew of it on the 18th of AprU, I think ; but I procured
a paper with the specific order of General Weitzel, also a copy
of the amnesty proclamation on the 20th of April.
Q. You cHd not know, at that time, that that arrangement
Jiad been rescinded by the President ?
A. No, sir ; I did not know that untU afterwards ; the mo-
."ment I heard of that I notified General Johnston of it.
(^ Then at the time you entered into this arrangement with
'General Johnston, you knoAv that General Weitzel had ap-
j proved of the caUing together of the rebel Legislature of Vk
¬ginia, by the assent of the President?
A. I-imew of it by some source unofficiaUy ; I succeeded in
•getting a.'Copy of the paper containing General Weitzel's order
on;the 20lh or 21st of April.*
(^ JBut- bA the time of your amangement you did not know
that that order had been rescinded ?
A. No, ^k-; I learned that several days afterwards, and at
.once sent woui to General Johnston.t
Q. At the ihsne of your arrangement you also knew of the
ismcrender of Lee's army, and the terms of that surrender ?
* isee page 438. f See page 436.

APPENDIX. 499
A. I had that officially fromi General Grant ; I got that at
Smithfield, on the 12th of April.
Q. I have what purports to be a letter from you to John
ston, which seems to imply that you intended to make the
arrangement on the terms of Lee's surrender. The letter is
as follows.*

A. Those were the terms as to his oavu army ; but the con
cessions I made him were for the purpose of embracing other
armies. Q. And the writings you signed were to include other armies?
A. The armies of Kirby Smith and Dick Taylor, so that
afterwards no man within the limits of the Southern Confed
eracy could claim to belong to any Confederate army in ex
istence. Q. The President addressed a note to General Grant, per
haps not to you, to the effect of forbidding officers of the
army from entering into any thing but strictly mihtary arrange
ments, leaving civU matters entirely to him ?
A. I never saw such a note signed by President Lincoln.
Mr. Stanton made such a note or telegram, and says it was by
President Lincoln's dictation : he made it to General Grant,
but never to me ; on the contrary, whUe I was in Georgia, Mr.
Lincoln telegraphed to me encouraging me to discuss matters
with Governor Brown and Mr. Stephens.
Q. Then you had no notice of that order to General Grant.
A. I had no knowledge of it, officially or otherwise.
Q. In the pubHshed report of your agreement there is nothing
about slavery, I believe ?
A. There Avas nothing said about slavery, because it did
not fall within the category of mUitary questions, and we could
not make it so. It was a legal question, which the President
had disposed of, overriding aU our action. We had to treat
the slave as free, because the President, our commandei-in-
* See page 390.

500 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
chief, said he was free. For me to have renewed tho question
when that decision was made, would have involved the ab
surdity of an inferior undertaking to quahfy the work of his
superior. Q. That was the reason why it was not mentioned ?
A. Yes, sk ; subsequently I wrote a note to Johnston, stat
ing that I thought it would be weU to mention it for pohtical
effect, when we came to draw up the final terms with pre
cision : that note was Avritten pending the time my memoran
dum was going to Washington, and before an answer had been
returned. Q. At the time you entered into these negotiations was
Johnston in a condition to offer any effective resistance to
your army ?
A. He could not have resisted my army an hour, H I could
have got hold of him ; but he could have escaped from me by
breaking up into smaU parties, or by taking the country roads,
travelling faster than my army, vrith trains, could have ptu-
sued. Q. Then your object in negotiating was to keep his army
from scattering into guerriUa bands ?
A. That was my chief object ; I so officiaUy notified the
War Department.
Q. And not because there was any doubt about the result
of a battle ?
A. There was no question as to the result of a battle, and I
knew it ; every soldier knew it. Johnston said, in the first
five minutes of our conversation, that any further resistance
on his part would be an act of foUy, and aU he wanted was to
keep his army from dispersing.
By Me. Loan:
Q. In your examination by the chakman you stated that
you were acting in pursuance of instructions from Mr. Lin
coln, derived from his letters and telegrams at different
times ?
A. Yes, sk.

APPENDIX. 501
Q. Have you any of these letters and telegrams which you
can furnish to the committee ?
A. I can furnish you a copy of a dispatch to General Hal-
lock from Atlanta, in which I stated that I had invited Gov
ernor BroAvn and Vice-President Stevens to meet us ; and I can
give you a copy of Mr. Lincoln's answer, for my dispatch was
referred to him, in which he said he felt much interested iu
my dispatch, and encouraged me to aUow their visit : but the
letter to which I referred specially was a longer letter, which I
Avrote to General HaUeck from my camp on Big Black, Mis
sissippi, at General HaUeck's instigation, in September, 1863,
which was received in Washington, and submitted to Mr.
Lincoln, who desired to have it pubhshed, to which I would
.not consent. In that letter I gave my opinions fuUy and frankly,
not only upon the miHtary situation, but also the civU policy
necessary. Mr. Lincoln expressed himself highly pleased Arith
my riews, and desired to make them public, but I preferred
not to do so.
Q. And by subsequent acts he induced you to behove he
approved of these views?
A. I knoip he approved of them, and always encouraged me
to carry out those views.
By the Chaieman :
Q. The foUowing is a letter pubHshed in the newspapers,
purporting to have been adckessed by you to Johnston, dated
AprU 21, 1865.*

This is the letter in which you say that it would be weU to
declare pubHcly that slavery is dead ?
A. Yes, sir ; that is the letter.
By Me. Loan:
Q. WUl you furnish the committee a copy of the letter
See page 410.

502 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS
written by you to Mr. Stanton, in January last, from Sa
vannah ?
A. I AriU do so.
The Chaieman:
Q. And when the manuscript of your testimony is prepared
it AriU be remitted to you for rerision, and you can add to it
any statement or papers that you may subsequently desire or
consider necessary.
A. I have the above, and now subjoin copies of letters from
my letter-book, in the order of the bringing in the questions
revised by this inquiry : —
" Headquaetebs Middle Department of the Mississippi,
In the Field, Raleigh, N. C, AprU 18, 1865.
"T'o Lieutenant-Gexeral JJ. S. Grant, or Major-General IIalleck,
Wasliington, J). C. :
"General — I inclose herewith a copy of an agreement made this
day between General Joseph E. Johnston and myself, which, if approved
by the President of the United States, will produce peace from the Po
tomac to the Eio Grande. Mr. Breckinridge was present at the confer
ence in the capacity of a major-general, and satisfied me of the ability
of General Johnston to carry out to the full extent the terms of this
agreement; and if you •n-ill get the President to simply indorse tho
copy, and commission mc to carry out the terms, I Avill follow them to
the conclusion. You will observe that it is an absolute submission oi
the enemy to tho lawful authorities of the United States, and disperses
his armies absolutely ; and the point to Avhich I attach most importance
is, that the disposition and disperscment of the armies is done in such »
manner as to prevent them breaking up into a guerrilla crew. On the
other hand, Ave can retain just as much of an army as we please. I
agree to the mode and manner of the surrender of armies set forth, as
it gives the States the means of suppressing guerrillas, which avc could
not expect them to do if we strip them of all arms.
"Both Generals Johnston and Breckinridge admitted that •slavery was
dead, and I could not insist on embracing it in such a paper, because it
can bo made with the States in detail. I know that all the men of sub
stance South sincerely want peace, and I do not believe they will resort
to war again during this century. I have no doubt but that they Avill
in the future be perfectly subordinate to the laws of the United Statesi.

APPENDIX. 503
The moment my action in this matter is approved, T can spare five corps,
and will ask for and leave General Schofield hero with the Tenth Corps,
and go myself with tho Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Twentieth,
and Twenty-third corps, via Burkesvillc and Gordonsvillo, to Frederick
or Hagerstown, there to be paid and mustered out.
"The question of finance is now the chief one, and every soldier and
oiBcor not needed ought to go home at once. I would like to be able
to begin the march North by May 1.
" I urge on the part of the President speedy action, as it is important
to get the Confederate armies to their homes, as well as our own.
" I am, with groat respect,
" Your obedient servant,
"W. T. Sherman,
" Major-General commanding."
"Headquarters Military Department op the Mississippi,
In the Field, Raleigh, N. C, April 18, 1865.
" General H. W. Halleck, Chief of Staff, Washington, D. 0. :
"General^ — I received your dispatch descrfbing the man Clark de
tailed to assassinate mc. He had better be in a hurry or he will be too
late. The news of Mr. Lincoln's death produced a most intense effect
on our troops. At first I feared it would lead to excesses, but now it
has softened down, and can easily be quieted. None evince more feel
ing than General John.ston, who admitted that the act was calculated to
stain his cause with a dark hue; and he contended that the loss was
most severe on the South, Avho had begun to realize that Mr. Lincoln
was the best friend the South had.
" I cannot believe that oven Mr. Davis was privy to the diabolical
plot, but think it the emanation of a lot of yoi\ng men of the South, Avho
are very devils. I want to throw upon the South the care of this class
:f men, who will soon be as obnoxious to their industrious class as to us.
"Had I pushed Johnson's army to an extremity, it would have dis
persed and done infinite mischief. Johnston informed me that General
Stoneman had been at Salisbury, and was now about Statcsvillo. I
have sent him orders to come to mo.
" General Johnston also informed me that General Wilson was at Co
lumbus, Ga, and ho Avanted mc to arrest his progress. I leave that to
you. Indeed, if the President sanctions my agreement with Johnston,
our interest is to cease all destruction. Please give all orders necessary,
according to the views the E.pcutive may take, and inform him, if pos
sible, not to vary the terras at all, for I have considered every thing, and

504 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
believe that the Confederate armies are dispersed. We can adjust all
else feirly and well. " I am yours, etc.,
" W. T. Sherman,
" Major-General commanding."
Lest confusion should restUt to the mind of the committee
by the latter part of the above letter, I state it was addressed
to General HaUeck, as chief of staff, when he was in the proper
" line of order" to the commander-in-chief. The whole case
changed when, on the 26th of AprU, he became the command
er of the separate dirision of the James.
As stated in my testimony. General Grant reaoJied Baleigh
on the 24th, and on the 25th, on the supposition that I would
start next day to chase Johnston's army, I wrote to him the
foUoAving letter, dehvered in person : —
" ELbadquaeters Department op the Mississipei,
In the Field, Raleigh, N. C, April 25, 1865.
Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant — Present :
" General- — I received your letter of April 21, with inclosures, yes
terday, and was well pleased that you came along, as you must have
observed that I held the military control, so as to adapt it to any
phase the case might assume.
"It is but just that I should record the fact that I made my terms
with General Johnston under the influence of the liberal terms you ex
tended to the army of General Lee, at Appomattox Courthouse, on the
9th ; and the seeming policy of our Government, as evinced by the
call of the Virginia Legislature and governor back to Richmond, under
yours and President Lincoln's' very eyes. It now appears that this
last act was done without any consultation with you, or any know
ledge of Mr. Lincoln, but rather in opposition to a previous policy
weL considered.
'' I have not the least desire to interfere in the civil policy of our
Government, but would shun it as something not to my liking. But
occasions arise when a prompt seizure of results is forced on militarv
commanders not in immediate communication with the proper authority.
It is possible that the terms signed by General Johnston and myself
were not clear enough on the point well understood between us — that
our negotiations did not apply to any parties outside the officers

APPENDIX. 505
and men of the Confederate armies, which could easily have been
remedied. " No surrender of any army, not actually at the mercy of the an
tagonist, was ever made without ' terms,' and those always define the
military status of the surrendered. Thus you stipulated that the ofincers
and men of Lee's army should not be molested at their homes so long
as they obeyed the laws at the place of their residence. I do not wish
¦ to discuss these points involved in our recognition of the State govern
ments in actual existence, but will merely state my conclusion, to await
the solution of the future.
" Such action, on one point, in no manner recognizes for a moment
the so-called Confederate government, or makes us liable for its debts or
acts. The laws and acts done by the several States during the period
of rebellion are void, because done without the oath prescribed by the
constitution of the United States, which is a condition precedent. We
have a right to use any sort of machinery to produce military results ;
and it is the commonest thing for military commanders to use the civil
government, in actual existence, as a means to an end. I do believe we
could and can use the present State governments lawfully, constitution
ally, and as the very best possible means to produce the object desired,
viz., entire and complete submission to the lawful authority of the
United States.
" As to punishment of past crimes, that is for the judiciary, and can
in no manner or way be disturbed by our acts; and, so far as I can, I
will use my influence that rebels shall suffer all the personal punishment
provided by law, as also the civil liabilities accruing from their past
acts. " What we now want is the new form of law, by which common men
may regain their position of industry, so long disturbed by the war.
"I now apprehend that the rebel army will disperse, and instead of
dealing with six or seven States, we will have to deal with numberless
bands of desperadoes, headed by such men as Moseby, Forrest, Red Jack
son, and others, who know not and care not for danger and its conse
quences. " I am, with great respect,
" Your obedient servant,
" W. T. Sherman,
" M.TJor-General."
On the same day I wrote and maUed to the secretary of war
the foUowing : —

506 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
"Headquarters Milit.art Division op the Mississippi.
In the Field, Ealeigh. N. C, AprU 25, 1805.
" Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War, Wasldnr/ton :
"Dear Sir — I have been furnished a copy of your letter of April
21st, to General Grant, signifying your disapproval of the terras on
Avhich General Johnston proposed to disarm and disperse tho in
surgents, on condition of amnesty, etc. I admit my folly in em
bracing, in a military convention, any civil matter ; but, unfortunately,
such is the nature of our .situation, that they seem inextricably united,
and I understood from yon at Savannah that the financial state of the
country demanded military success, and would warrant a little bending
to poh'cy.
" When I had my conference with General Johnston, I had the
public example before me of General Grant's terms to Lee's army, and
General W'eitzel's invitation to the Virginia Leffislature to assemble.
I still believe the general government of the United States has made
a mistake; but that is none of my business. Mine is a different task;
and I had flattered myself that by four years of patient and unremit
ting and successful labor, I deserved no reminder such as is contained
in the last paragraph of your letter to General Grant,
"You may assure the President that I heed his suggestion.
" I am, truly, etc.,
"W. T. Sherman,
" Major-General commanding."
The last sentence refers to the fact that General Grant had
been sent to Ealeigh to direct military movements. That was
the first time in my Hfe I had ever had a word of reproof from
the Government of the United States, and I was naturaUy sen
sitive. But aU I said to any one was to General Meigs, who
came with General Grant : " It was not kind on the part of
Mr. Secretary Stanton." The fact knoAvn did not gratify my
mUitary conduct. The first interview with General Johnston
foUoAved, and tlie terms of capitulation Avere agreed upon and
signed, and General Grant started for Washington bearing tho
news. When, on the 28th of April, I received, in the New York
Times, the most extraorcHuary budget of Mr. Stanton, AAdiich for
the first time startled me, I wrote to General Grant this letter :

APPENDIX. 507
" Headquarters MiliTjVrt Division ov the Mississippi,
In the Field, April 28, 1805.
" Lievt.-General U. S. Grant, Oeneral-in- Chief, Washington, D. C:
" General — Since you left me yesterday, I have seen the New York
Times of the 24th inst., containing a budget of military news, authenti
cated by the signature of the secretary of war, which is grouped in
such a way as to give very erroneous impressions. It embraces a copy
of the basis of agreement between myself and General Johnston, of
April 18th, with commentaries, which it will be time enough to discuss
two or three years hence, after the Government has experimented a
little more in tho machinery by which power reaches the scattered
people of the vast country known as the South. But, in the moan
time, I do think that my rank (if not past services) entitle me, at least,
to the respect of keeping secret what Avas known to none but the
cabinet, until further inquiry comes to be made, instead of giving
publicity to documents I never saw, and drawing inferences wide of tho
truth. " I never saw, or had furnished mc, a copy of Mr. Stanton's dispatch
to you of the 3d of March, nor did Mr. Stanton, or any human being,
ever convey to me its substance, or any thing like it ; but, on the con
trary, I had seen General Weitzel's in relation to the Virginia Legis
lature, made in Mr. Lincoln's very person, and had failed to discover
any other ofiicial hints of the plan of reconstruction, or any idea calcu
lated to allay the fears of tho people of the South, after the destruction
of their armies and civil authorities would leave them without any
government at all.
" We should not drive a people to anarchy, and it is simply impos
sible for one military power to Avaste all the masses of this unhappy
country. "I confess I did not Avant to drive General Johnston's army into bands
of armed men, going about without purpose, and capuble only of
indefinite mischief.
" But you saw, on your arrival at Raleigh, that I had my armies so
disposed, that his escape was only possible in a disorganized shape ; and,
as you did not choose to direct military operations in this quarter, ]
infer that you were satisfied with tho military situation.
"At all events, the moment I learned, what was proper enough, the
disapproval of the President, I wished in such manner to compel tho
surrender of Johnston's Avholo army on the same terms as you had
proscribed to General Leo's army, when you had it surrounded, and in
your abfoluto power.

508 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
" Mr. Stanton, in stating that my order to General Stoneman was
likely to result in the escape of ' Mr. Davis to Mexico or Europe,' is in
deep error.
" General Stoneman was not at Salisbury then, but had gone back to
Statesville. Davis was supposed to be between us, and Stoneman was
beyond him.
"By turning towards me he was approaching Davis; and, had he
joined me as ordered, I then would have had a mounted force needed
for that and other purposes. But even now I don't know that Mr.
Stanton wants Davis caught. And as my official papers, deemed sacred,
are hastily published to the world, it will be imprudent for me to state
what has been done in this respect.
" As the editor of the Times has (it may be) logically and fairly
drawn the inference from this singular document, that I am insubordinate,
I can only deny the intention. I have never in my life questioned or
disobeyed an order, though many and many a time I have risked my
life, my health, and reputation in obeying orders, or even hints, tc
execute plans and purposes not to my liking. It is not fair to withhold
from me plans and policy (if any there be), and expect me to guess at
them ; for facts and events appear quite difi'erent from different stand
points. For four years I have been in camp, dealing with soldiers, and
I can assure you that the conclusion at which the cabinet arrived with
such singular unanimity differs from mine. I have conferred freely with
the best officers in this army as to the points involved in this controversy,
and, strange to say, they were singularly unanimous in the other con
clusion, and they will learn with pain and sorrow that I am deemed
insubordinate and wanting in common sense ; that I, who have labored
day and night, winter and summer, for four years, and have brought
an army of seventy thousand men in magnificent condition across a
country deemed impassable, and placed it just where it was wanted
almost on the day appointed, have brought discredit on tho Govern
ment. " I do not wish to boast of this, but I do say that it entitled me to
the courtesy of being consulted before publishing to the world a pro
position rightfully submitted to higher authority for adjudication, and
then accompanied by statements which invited the press to be let loose
on me.
" It is true that non-combatants — men who sleep in comfort and
security, while we watch on the distant lines — are better able to judge
than we poor soldiers, Avho rarely see a newspaper, hardly can hear
fr>m our families, or stop long enough to get our pay. I envy not

APPENDIX.

509

the task of reconstruction, and am delighted that tne .secretary has re
lieved me of it.
"As you did not undertake to assume the management of the affairs
of this army, I infer that, on personal inspection, your mind arrived at
'a different conclusion from that of Mr. Secretary Stanton. I will there
fore go and execute your orders to tho conclusion, and when done, will,
with intense satisfaction, leave to the civil authorities the execution of
the task of which they seem to me so jealous ; but, as an honest man
and soldier, I invite them to follow my path, for they may see some
things and hear some things that may disturb their philosophy,
" With sincere respect,
"W. T. Sherman,
" Major-General commanding.
" P. S. — As Mr. Stanton's singular paper has been published, I de
mand that this also be made public, though I am in no way responsible
to the press, but to the law and my proper superiors.
"W. T. Sherman,
" Major-General commanding."
Since my arrival at Washington, I have learned from Gen
eral Grant that this letter was received, but he preferred to
withhold it untU my arrival, as he knew I was making towards
Washington with my army. Upon my arrival, I did not
insist on its pubhcation tUl it was drawn out by this inquky.
I also append here the copy of a letter from Colonel T. S.
Bowers, assistant adjutant-general, asking me to modHy my
report as to the point of violating my truce, vrith my answer.
"Headquarters Armies of the United States
Washmgton, May 25, 1865.
"Major-General W. T. Sherman, Commanding Military Division of
the Mississippi :
"General Grant directed me to call your attention to the part of your
report in which the necessity of maintaining your truce at the expense
of many lives is spoken of. The general thinks that in making a truce
the commander of an army can control only his own army, and that
the hostile general must make his own arrangements with other armies
acting against him.

510 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
"While independent generals acting against a common foe would
naturally act in concert, the general claims th.it each must be the judgo
of his own duty, and responsible for its execution.
" If you should wish, the report will be returned for any change you
may deem best " Very respectfully, " Your obedient servant,
" T. S. Bowers,
" Assistant Adjutant-General."

"Headquarters Military DmsioN op the Mississippi,
Washington, D. C, May 26, 18G5.
" Col. T. S. Bowers, Assistant Adjutant-General, Washington, D. C:
" Colonel — I had the honor to receive your letter of May 25, last
evening, and I hasten to answer. I wish to precede it by renewing the
assurance of my entire confidence and respect for the President and
Lieuten.ant-General Grant, and that in all matters I will be most willing
to shape my official and private conduct to suit their wishes. The past
is beyond my control, and the matters embraced in the official report
to which you refer are finished. It is but just the reasons that actuated
me, right or wrong, should stand on record; but in all future cases,
should any arise, I will respect the decisions of General Grant, though I
think them wrong.
" Suppose a guard has prisoners in charge, and officers of another
command should aim to rescue or kill them, is it not clear the guard
must defend the prisoners as a safeguard ? So jealous is the military
law to protect and maintain good faith when pledged, that the law ad
judges death, and no alternative punishment, to one who violates a
safeguard in foreign ports. (See Articles of War, No. 55.) For mui'-
der, arson, treason, and the highest military crimes, the punishment
prescribed by law is death, or some minor punishment ; but for the
violation of a " safegu.ird," death, and death alone, is the prescribed
penalty. I instance this to illustrate how, in military stipulations to an
enemy, our Government commands and enforces " good faith." In dis
cussing the matter I would like to refer to many writers on military
law, but am willing to take Halleck as the text. (See his chapter,
No. 27.)
" In the very first article ho states that f/ood faith should always be
observed between enemies in war, because Avhen our faith has been
pledged to him, so far as the promise extends, he ceases to be an

APPENDIX. 511
enemy. He then defines tho meaning of compacts and conventions,
and says they are made sometimes for a general or a partial suspension
of hostilities for the " surrender of an army," etc. They may be special,
limited to particular places or to particular forces, but of course can
only bind the armies subject to the general who makes the truce, and
co-extensive only with the extent of his command. This is all I ever
claimed, and it clearly covers tho whole case ; all of North Carolina
was in my immediate command, with General Schofield, its department
commander, and his army present with me. I never asked the truce to
have effect beyond my own territorial command. General Halleck
himself, in his Order, No. 1, defines his OAvn limits clearly enough, viz.,
' Such part of North Carolina as was not occupied by the command of
Major-General Sherman.' He could not pursue and cut off Johnston's
retreat towards Salisbury and Charlotte without invading my command ;
and so patent was his purpose to defy and violate my truce, that Mr.
Stanton's publication of the fact, not even yet recalled, modified, or ex
plained, Avas headed, 'Sherman's truce disregarded,' that the whole
world drew but one inference. It admits of no other. I never claimed
that that truce bound Generals Halleck or Canby within the sphere of
their respective commands as defined by themselves.
"It Avas a partial truce of very short duration, cleariy within my
limits and right, justified by events; and as in the case of prisoners in
my custody, or the violation of a safeguard given by me in my own
territorial limits, I am bound to maintain good faith. I prefer not to
change my report, but again repeat that in all future cases I am Avilling
to be governed by the interpretation of General Grant, although I again
invite his attention to the limits of my command, and those of General
Halleck at the time, and the pointed phraseology of General Halleck's
dispatch to Mr. Stanton, wherein he reports that he had ordered his
generals to pay no heed to my orders within the clearly defined area of
my command. " I am, yours,
" W. T. Sherman,
" Major-General U. S. A., commanding."
I now add two letters Avritten to Mr. Stanton'* at Savannah,
and the dispatch from Atlanta mentioned in the body of my
testimony, with Mr. Lincoln's answer :

Seepages 325 and 327.

512 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
" HEADqUARTERS MELITART DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
In the Field, Atlanta, Ga., September 15, 1864.
" Major-General Halleck, Washington, D. G. :
" My report is done, and will be forwarded as soon as I get a few
more of the subordinate reports. I am now awaiting a courier from
General Grant. All well, and troops in fine healthy camps, and supplies
coming forward finely. Governor Brown has disbanded his militia, to i
gather the corn and sorghum of the State. I have reason to believe
that he and Stephens want to visit me, and I have sent them a hearty
invitation. I will exchange two thousand prisoners with Hood, but no
more. " W. T. Sherman,
"Major-General commanding."
" Washinqton, D. C, Septemher 17, 1864—10 a. m.
" Major-Gbneral Sherman :
"I feel great interest in the subjects of your dispatch mentioning
corn and sorghum, and contemplate *i visit to you. "A. Lincoln."
I have not possession here of aU my official records, most
of which are out West, and I have selected the above from
my more recent letter-books, and I offer them to show how
prompt and fuU have been my official reports, and how un
necessary was aU the clamor made touching my action and
opinions at the time the basis of agreement of AjprU 18 was
submitted to the President.

3 9002 00994 0876

.{--a-,-

-m

m*^

}'4-t
•i-J t<»
iititi;
f