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THREE SERMONS

HUMAN NATURE,

A DISSERTATION

NATURE OF VIRTUE.

JOSEPH BUTLER, D.C.L.
i ' t
LATE LORD BISHOP OF DURHAM.

CAMBRIDGE:
J. & J. J. DEIGHTON AND T. STEVENSON.
1834.

ERRATUM.
I&fee 15, fine 8,' for ta&ve rettd haVing.

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PRINTED BY W. METCkMfe', ST. MART'S STREET,

EXTRACT

PREFACE TO BISHOP BUTLER'S SERMONS.

There are two ways in which the subject of morals may
be treated. One begins from inquiring into the abstract
relations of things ; the other, from a matter of fact,
namely, what the particular nature of man is, its several
parts, their economy or constitution ; from whence it pro
ceeds to determine what course of life it is, whieh is cor
respondent to this whole nature. In the former method
the conclusion is expressed thus, that vice is contrary to
the nature and reason of things ; in the latter, that it is a
violation or breaking in upon our own nature. Thus they
both lead us to the same thing, our obligations to the
.practice of virtue; and thus they exceedingly strengthen
and enforce each other. The first seems the most direct
formal proof, and in some respects the least liable to cavil
and dispute : the latter is in a peculiar manner adapted to
satisfy a fair mind, and is more easily applicable to the
several particular relations and circumstances in life.
The following discourses proceed chiefly in this latter
method. The three first wholly. They were intended to
a2

iv PREFACE.
explain what is meant by the nature of man, when it is said
that virtue consists in following, and vice in deviating from
it ; and, by explaining, to show that the assertion is true.
That the ancient moralists had some inward feeling or
other, which they chose to express in this manner, that
man is born to virtue, that it consists in following nature,
and that vice is more contrary to this nature than tortures
or death, their works in our hands are instances. Now,
a person who found no mystery in this way of speaking
of the ancients; who, without being very explicit with
himself, kept to his natural feeling, went along with them,
and found within himself a full conviction that what they
laid down was just and true; such an one would probably
wonder to see a point, in which he never perceived any
difficulty, so laboured as this is, in the second and third
sermons: insomuch, perhaps, as to be at a loss for the
occasion, scope, and drift of them. But it need not be
thought strange, that this manner of expression, though
familiar with them, and, if not usually carried so far, yet
not uncommon amongst ourselves, should want explaining ;
since there are several perceptions daily felt and spoken of^
which yet it may not be very easy, at first view, to explicate^
to distinguish from all others, and ascertain exactly what
the idea or perception is. The many treatises upon the
passions are a proof of this; since so many would never
have undertaken to unfold their several complications, and
trace and resolve them into their principles, if they had
thought what they were endeavouring to show was obvious
to every one who felt and talked of those passions. Th
though there seems no ground to doubt, but that the '
rality of mankind have the inward perception expressed
commonly in that manner by the ancient moralists, mo
than to doubt whether they have those passions/yet -t
appeared of use to unfold that inward conviction, and 1 •

PREFACE. V
open in a more explicit manner than I had seen done;
especially when there were not wanting persons, who mani
festly mistook the whole thing, and so had great reason to
express themselves dissatisfied with it. A late author, of
great and deserved reputation, says, that to place virtue in
following nature, is, at best, a loose way of talk. And he
has reason to say this, if what I think he intends to express,
though with great decency, be true, that scarce any other
sense can be put upon those words, but acting as any of the
several parts, without distinction, of a man's nature, hap
pened most to incline him.1
Whoever thinks it worth while to consider this matter
thoroughly, should begin with .stating to himself exactly the
idea of a system, economy, or constitution of any particular
nature, or particular any thing : and he will, I suppose,
find, that it is an one or a whole, made up of several parts ;
but yet that the several parts, even considered as a whole,
do not complete the idea, unless, in the notion of a whole,
you include the relations and respects which those parts
have to each other. Every work both of nature and of art
is a system: and as every particular thing, both natural
and artificial, is for some use or purpose out of and beyond
itself, one may add, to what has been already brought into
the idea of a system, its conduciveness to this one or more
ends. Let us instance in a watch : — suppose the several
parts of it taken to pieces, and placed apart from each
other: let a man have ever so exact a notion of these
several parts, unless he considers the respects and relations
which they have to each other, he will not have any thing
like the idea of a watch. Suppose these several parts
brought together and any how united : neither will he yet,
be the union ever so close, have an idea which will bear
(1) Religion of Nature Delineated. Ed. 1724, p. 22, 23.

yi PREFACE.
any resemblance to that of a watch. But let him view
those several parts put together, or consider them as to be
put together, in the manner of a watch ; let him form a
notion of the relations which those several parts have to
each other — all conducive, in their respective ways, to this
purpose, showing the hour of the day ; and then he has the
idea of a watch. Thus it is with regard to the inward
frame of man. Appetites, passions, affections, and the
principle of reflection, considered merely as the several
parts of our inward nature, do not at all give us an idea
of the system or constitution of this nature: because the
constitution is formed by somewhat not yet taken into con
sideration, namely, by the relations which these several
parts have to each other; the chief of which is the autho
rity of reflection or conscience. It is from considering
the relations which the several appetites and passions in
the inward frame have to each other, and, above all, the
supremacy of reflection or conscience, that we get the idea
of the system or constitution of human nature. And from
the idea itself it will as fully appear, that this our nature,
i. e. constitution, is adapted to virtue, as from the idea of a
watch it appears that its nature, i. e. constitution or system,
is adapted to measure time. What in fact or event com
monly happens, is nothing to this question. Every work of
art is apt to be out of order: but this is so far from being
according to its system, that let the disorder increase, and
it will totally destroy it. This is merely by way of explana
tion what an economy, system, or constitution is. And thus
far the cases are perfectly parallel. If We go further, there
is indeed a diiference, nothing to the present purpose, but
too important a one ever to be omitted. A machine is
inanimate and passive : but we are agents. Our constitu
tion is put in our own power. We are charged with it : and
therefore are accountable for any disorder or violation of it

PREFACE. Vll
Thus nothing can possibly be more contrary t,o nature
than vice ; meaning by nature, not only the several parts
of our internal frame, but also the constitution of it.
Poverty and disgrace, tortures and death, are not so con
trary to it. Misery and injustice are indeed equally con
trary to some different parts of our nature taken singly : but
injustice is moreover contrary to the whole constitution of
the natura
If it be asked, whether this constitution be really what
those philosophers meant, and whether they would have
explained themselves in this manner : the answer is the
same as if it should be asked, whether a person, who had
often used the word resentment, and felt the thing, would
have explained this passion exactly in the same manner in
which it is done jn one of these discourses. As I have no
doubt but that this is a true account of that passion, which
he referred to and intended to express by the word resent
ment, so I have no doubt but that this is the true account
of the ground of that conviction which they referred to,
when they said vice was contrary to nature. And though
it should be thought that they meant no more than that vice
was contrary to the higher and better part of our nature,
even this implies such a constitution as I have endeavoured
to explain. For the very terms, higher and better, imply
a relation or respect of parts to each other; and these
relative parts being in one and the same nature, form a
constitution, and are the very idea of it. They had a
perception that injustice was contrary to their nature, and
that pain was so also. They observed these two percep
tions totally different, not in degree, but in kind : and the
reflecting upon each of them, as they thus stood in their
nature, wrought a full intuitive conviction, that more was
due, and of right belonging to one of these inward percep
tions, than to the other ; that it demanded, in all cases, to

viii PREFACE.
govern such a creature as man. So that, upon the whole,
this is a fair and true account of what was the ground of
their conviction ; of what they intended to refer to, when
they said, virtue consisted in following nature: a manner
of speaking not loose and undeterminate, but clear and
distinct, strictly just and true.
Though I am persuaded the force of this conviction is
felt by almost every one, yet since, considered as an argu
ment and put in words, it appears somewhat abstruse, and
since the connexion of it is broken in the three first sermons,
it may not be amiss to give the reader the whole argument
here in one view.
Mankind has various instincts and principles of action, as
brute creatures have ; some leading most directly and im
mediately to the good of the community, and some most
directly to private good.
Man has several which brutes have not; particularly
reflection or conscience, an approbation of some principles
or actions, and disapprobation of others.
Brutes obey their instincts or principles of action, accord
ing to certain rules ; suppose the constitution of their body,
and the objects around them.
The generality of mankind also obey their instincts and
principles, all of them ; those propensions we call good, as
well as the bad, according to the same rules ; namely, the
constitution of their body, and the external circumstances
which they are in. [Therefore it is not a true representa
tion of mankind, to affirm that they are wholly governed by
self-love, the love of power and sensual appetites: since,
as on the one hand, they are often actuated by these, with
out any regard to right or wrong; so, on the other, it is
manifest fact, that the same persons, the generality are
frequently influenced by friendship, compassion, grati
tude; and even a general abhorrence of what is base, and

PREFACE. IX
liking of what is fair and* jusjfc takes its turn amongst the
other motives of action. This is the partial, inadequate
notion of human nature treated of in the first discourse :
and it is by. this nature, if one may speak so, that the world
is in fact influenced, and kept in that tolerable order in
which it is.]
Brutes, in acting according to the rules before mentioned,
their bodily constitution and circumstances act suitably to
their whole nature. [It is, however, to be distinctly noted,
that the reason why we affirm this, is not merely that brutes
in fact act so ; for this alone, however universal, does not
at all determine whether such course of action be corre
spondent to their whole, nature: but the reason of the
assertion is, that as, in acting thus, they plainly act con
formably to somewhat in their nature, so, from all observa
tions we are able to make upon them, there does not
appear the least ground to imagine them to have any thing
else in their nature, which requires a different rule or course
of action.]Mankind also, in acting thus, would act suitably to their
whole nature, if no more were to be said of man's nature
than what has been now said ; if that, as it is a true, were
also a complete, adequate account of our nature.
But that is not a complete account of man's nature.
Somewhat further must be brought in to give us an ade
quate notion of it ; namely, that one of those principles of
action, conscience or reflection, compared with the rest, as
they all stand together in the nature of man, plainly bears
upon it marks of authority over all the rest, and claims the
absolute direction of them all, to allow or forbid their
gratification : a disapprobation of reflection being in itself a
principle manifestly superior to a mere propension. And
the conclusion is, that to allow no more to this superior
principle or part of our nature, than to other parts ; to let

X PREFACE.
it govern and guide only occasionally in common with the
rest, as its turn happens to come from the temper and
circumstances one happens to be in ; this is not to act con
formably to the constitution of man : neither can any human
creature be said to act conformably to his constitution of
nature, unless he allows to that superior principle the abso
lute authority which is due to it. And this conclusion is
abundantly confirmed from hence, that one may determine
what course of action the economy of man's nature requires,
without so much as knowing in what degrees of strength
the several principles prevail, or which of them have actu
ally the greatest influence.
The practical reason of insisting so much upon this natu
ral authority of the principle of reflection or conscience is,
that it seems in great measure overlooked by many, who
are by no means the worst sort of men. It is thought suffi
cient to abstain from gross wickedness, and to be humane
and kind to such as happen to come in their way. Where
as, in reality, the very constitution of our nature requires
that we bring our whole conduct before this superior facul
ty ; wait its determination ; enforce upon ourselves its
authority, and make it the business of our lives, as it is
absolutely the whole business of a moral agent, to conform
ourselves to it. This is the true meaning of that ancient
precept, Reverence thyself.
The not taking into consideration this authority, which
is implied in the idea of reflex approbation or disapproba
tion, seems a material deficiency or omission in Lord
Shaftesbury's Inquiry concerning Virtue. He has shown,
beyond all contradiction, that virtue is naturally the interest
or happiness, and vice the misery of such a creature as
man, placed in the circumstances which we are in this world.
But suppose there are particular exceptions ; a case which
this author was unwilling to put, and yet surely it is to be

PREFACE. XI
put : or suppose a case which he has put and determined,
that of a sceptic not convinced of this happy tendency of
virtue, or being of a contrary opinion : his determination
is, that it would be without remedy? One may say more
explicitly, that leaving out the authority of reflex approba
tion or disapprobation, such an one would be under an
obligation to act viciously ; since interest, one's own happi
ness, is a manifest obligation, and there is not supposed to
be any other obligation in the case. " But does it much
" mend the matter, to take in that natural authority of reflec-
" tion? There, indeed, would be an obligation to virtue ; but
" would not the obligation from supposed interest on the side
" of vice, remain ?" If it should, yet to be under two con
trary obligations, i. e. under none at all, would not be
exactly the same as to be under a formal obligation to be
vicious, or to be in circumstances in which the constitution
of man's nature plainly required, that vice should be pre
ferred. But the obligation on the side of interest really
does not remain. For the natural authority of the principle
of reflection, is an obligation the most near and intimate,
the most certain and known : whereas the contrary obliga
tion can at the utmost appear no more than probable ; since
no man can be certain, in any circumstances, that vice is
his interest in the present world, much less can he be
certain against another: and thus the certain obligation
would entirely supersede and destroy the uncertain one;
which yet would have been of real force without the former.
In truth, the taking in this consideration totally changes
the whole state of the case ; and shows, what this author
does not seem to have been aware of, that the greatest
degree of scepticism which he thought possible, will still
leave men under the strictest moral obligations, whatever
their opinion be concerning the happiness of virtue. For,
(2) Characteristics, vol. ii. p. 69.

Xii PREFACE.
that mankind, upon reflection, felt an approbation of what
was good, and disapprobation ofthe contrary, he thought a
plain matter of fact, as it undoubtedly is, which none couid
deny, but from mere affectation. Take in, then, that autho
rity and obligation, which is a constituent part of this
reflex approbation, and it will undeniably follow, though a
man should doubt of every thing else, yet, that he would
still remain under the nearest and most certain obligation to
the practice of virtue ; an obligation implied in the very
idea of virtue, in the very idea of reflex approbation.
And how little influence soever this obligation alone can
be expected to have, in fact, upon mankind, yet one may
appeal even to interest and self-love, and ask, since from
man's nature, condition, and the shortness of life, so little,
so very little, indeed, can possibly in any case be gained by
vice, whether it be so prodigious a thing to sacrifice that
little, to the most intimate of all obligations ; and whieh a
man cannot transgress without being self-condemned, and,
unless he has corrupted his nature, without real self-dislike?
This question, I say, may be asked, even upon supposition
that the prospect of a future life were ever so uncertain.
The observation that man is thus, by his very nature, a
law to himself, pursued to its just consequences, is ofthe
utmost importance; because from it will follow, that though
men should, through stupidity, or speculative scepticism, be
ignorant of, or disbelieve any authority in the universe to
punish the violation of this law ; yet, if there should be such
authority, they would be as really liable to punishment,
as though they had been before-hand convinced that such
punishment would follow. For in whatever sense we under
stand justice, even supposing, what I think would be very
presumptuous to assert, that the end of divine punishment
is no other than that of civil punishment, namely, to prevent
future mischief; upon this bold supposition, ignorance or

PREFACE. Xlll
t i
disbelief of the sanction would by no means exempt even
from this justice ; because it is npt foreknowledge of the
punishment which renders us obnoxious to it, but merely
violating a known obligation.
And here it comes in one's way to take notice of a mani
fest error, or mistake, in the author now cited, unless,
perhaps, he has incautiously expressed himself so as to be
misunderstood ; namely, that "it is malice only, and not
" goodness, which can make ns afraid." 3 Whereas, in real
ity, goodness is the natural and just object ofthe greatest
fear to an ill man. Malice may be appeased, or satiated ;
humour may change; but goodness is a fixed, steady,
immoveable principle of action. If either of the former
holds the sword of justice, there is plainly ground for the
greatest of crimes to hope for impunity : but if it be good
ness, there can be no possible hope, whilst the reasons of
things, or the ends of government, call for punishment.
Thus, every one sees how much greater chance of impu
nity an ill man has, in a partial administration, than in a
just and upright one. It is said, that " the interest, or
" good of the whole, must be the interest of the universal
" Being, and that He can have no other." Be it so. This
author has proved, that vice is naturally the misery of
mankind in this world. Consequently, it was for the good
ofthe whole that it should be so. What shadow of reason,
then, is there to assert, that this may not be the case
hereafter ? Danger of future punishment (and if there be
danger, there is ground of fear) no more supposes malice
than the present feeling of punishment does.
(3) Characterittice, vol. i. p. 39.

CONTENTS.

SERMON I.
UPON THE SOCIAL NATURE OF MAN.
Rom. xii. 4, 5. Page
For as we have many members in one body, and all mem
bers have not the same office : so we being many are one
body in Christ, and every one members one of another . 1
SERMON II. IH.
UPON THE NATURAL SUPREMACY OP CONSCIENCE.
Rom. a. 14.
For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature
the things contained in the law, these, having not the law,
are a law unto themselves  21, 37
DISSERTATION ON THE NATURE OF VIRTUE . • . . 48

SERMON I.

UPON HUMAN NATURE.

Rom. xii. 4, 5.
For as we have many members in one body, and all
members have not the same office: so ive being many
are one body in Christ, and every one members one
of another.
The epistles in the New Testament have all of
them a particular reference to the condition and
usages of the Christian world at the time they
were written. Therefore, as they cannot be tho
roughly understood unless that condition and
those usages are -known and attended to ; so,
further, though they be known, yet, if they be
discontinued or changed, exhortations, precepts,
and illustrations of things, which refer to such
circumstances now ceased or altered, cannot at
this time be urged in that manner, and with that
force, which they were to the primitive Christ
ians. Thus the text now before us, in its first
intent and design, relates to the decent manage
ment of those extraordinary gifts which were
b

2 Vpon Human Nature.
then in the church,1 but which are now totally
ceased. And even as to the allusion, that "we
are one body in Christ," though what the apostle
here intends is equally true of Christians in all
circumstances ; and the consideration of it is
plainly still an additional motive, over and above
moral considerations, to the discharge of the
several duties and offices of a Christian ; yet it
is manifest this allusion must have appeared with
much greater force to those, who, by the many
difficulties they went through for the sake of
their religion, were led to keep always in view
the relation they stood in to their Saviour, who
had undergone the same ; to those who, from the
idolatries of all around them, and their ill treat
ment, were taught to consider themselves as not
of the world in which they lived, but as a
distinct society of themselves ; with laws, and
ends, and principles of life and action, quite con
trary to those which the world professed them
selves at that time influenced by. Hence the
relation of a Christian was by them considered
as nearer than that of affinity and blood ; and
they almost literally esteemed themselves as
members one of another.
It cannot indeed possibly be denied, that our
being God's creatures, and virtue being, the
natural law we are born under, and the whole
constitution of man being plainly adapted to it,
(1) 1 Cor. xii.

Vpon Human Nature. 3
are prior obligations to piety and virtue, than
the consideration that God sent his Son into the
world to save it, and the motives which arise
from the peculiar relation of Christians, as mem
bers one of another, under Christ our head.
However, though all this be allowed, as it ex
pressly is by the inspired writers, yet it is
manifest that Christians, at the time of the
revelation, and immediately after, could not but
insist mostly upon considerations of this latter
kind. These observations show the original parti
cular reference of the text ; and the peculiar
force with which the thing intended by the allu
sion in it, must have been felt by the primitive
Christian world. They likewise afford a reason
for treating it at this time in a more general
way. The relation which the several parts or mem
bers of the natural body have to each other, and
to the whole body, is here compared to the
relation which each particular person in society
has to other particular persons, and to the whole
society ; and the latter is intended to be illus
trated by the former. And if there be a like
ness between these two relations, the conse
quence is obvious : that the latter shows us we
were intended to do good to others, as the
former shows us that the several members of
the natural body were intended to be instru-
b 2

4 Vpon Human Nature.
ments of good to each other, and to the whole
body. But as there is scarce any ground for
a comparison between society and the mere
material body, this, without the mind, being a
dead, inactive thing ; much less can the compa
rison be carried to any length. And since the
apostle speaks of the several members as having
distinct offices, which implies the mind, it cannot
be thought an unallowable liberty, instead of
the body and its members, to substitute the
whole nature of man, and all the variety of
internal principles which belong to it. And then
the comparison will be between the nature of
man as respecting self, and tending to private
good, his own preservation and happiness ; and
the nature of man as having respect to society,
and tending to promote public good, the happi
ness of that society. These ends do indeed
perfectly coincide; and to aim at public and
private good are so far from being inconsistent,
that they mutually promote each other : yet, in
the following discourse they must be considered
as entirely distinct; otherwise, the nature of
man, as tending to one, or as tending to the
other, cannot be compared. There can no com
parison be made without considering the things
compared as distinct and different.
From this review and comparison of the
nature of man as respecting self, and as respect
ing society, it will plainly appear, thai there are

Vpon Human Nature. 5
as real and the same kind of indications in human
nature, that ice were made for society and to do
good to our fellow-creatures, as that ive were
intended to take care of our own life, and health,
and private good; and that the same objections
lie against one of these assertions as against the
other. For,
First, There is a natural principle of benevo
lence2 in man, which is in some degree to
(2) Suppose a man of learning to be writing a grave book upon
human nature, and to show in several parts of it that he had an
insight into the subject he was considering : amongst other things,
the following one would require to be accounted for ; the appear
ance of benevolence or good-will in men towards each other in
the instances of natural relation, and in others.* Cautious of
being deceived with outward show, he retires within himself, to
see exactly what that is in the mind of man from whence this
appearance proceeds ; and, upon deep reflection, asserts the prin
ciple in the mind to be only the love of power, and delight in the
exercise of it. Would not every body think here was a mistake
of one word for another ? That the philosopher was contemplat
ing and accounting for some other human actions, some other
behaviour of man to man ? And could any one be thoroughly
satisfied, that what is commonly called benevolence or good-will
was really the affection meant, but only by being made to under
stand that this learned person had a general hypothesis, to which
the appearance of good- will could no otherwise be reconciled?
That what has this appearance is often nothing but ambition ; that
delight in superiority often (suppose always) mixes itself with
benevolence, only makes it more specious to call it ambition than
hunger, of the two: but ki reality that passion does no more
account for the whole appearances of good-will, than this appetite
does. / Is there not often the appearance of one man's wishing
that good to another, which he knows himself unable to procure
* Hobbes of Human Nature, c. 9, § IT.

6 Vpon Human Nature.
society what self-love is to the individual. And
if there be in mankind any disposition to friend-
him ; and rejoicing in it, though bestowed by a third person ?
And can love of power any way possibly come in to account for
this desire or delight! Jls there not often the appearance of men's
distinguishing between two or more persons, preferring one
before another, to do good to, in cases where love of power cannot
in the least account for the distinction and preference ? For this
principle can no otherwise distinguish between objects, than as it
is a greater instance and exertion of power to do good to one
rather than to another. [Again: suppose good- will in the mind
of man to be nothing but delight in the exercise of power : men
might indeed be restrained by distant and accidental considera
tions ; but these restraints being removed, they would have a dis
position to, and delight in mischief, as an exercise and proof of
power : and this disposition and delight would arise from, or be
the same principle in the mind, as a disposition to, and delight in
charity. Thus cruelty, as distinct from envy and resentment,
would be exactly the same in the mind of man as good- will:
that one tends to the happiness, the other to the misery of our
fellow-creatures, is, it seems, merely an accidental circumstance,
which the mind has not the least regard to. These are the ab
surdities which even men of capacity run into, when they have
occasion to belie their nature, and will perversely disclaim that
image of God which was originally stamped upon it ; the traces
of which, however faint, are plainly discernible upon the mind of
man. If any person can in earnest doubt, whether there be such a
thing as good- will in one man towards another ; (for the question
is not concerning either the degree or extensiveness of it, but con
cerning the affection itself;) let it be observed, that whether man
le thus, or otherwise constituted, what is the inward frame in this
particular, is a mere question of fact or natural history, not prove-
able immediately by reason. It is therefore to be judged of and
determined in the same way other facts or matters of natural his
tory are : by appealing to the external senses, or inward percep
tions, respectively, as the matter under consideration is cogniz
able by one or the other : by arguing from acknowledged facts
and actions ; for a great number of actions of the same kind, in

Vpon Human Nature. 7
ship ; if there be any such thing as compassion,
for compassion is momentary love ; if there be
any such thing as the paternal or filial affec
tions; if there be any affection in human na
ture, the object and end of which is the good
of another; this is itself benevolence, or the
love of another. Be it ever so short, be it in
ever so low a degree, or ever so unhappily con
fined ; it proves the assertion, and points out
what we were designed for, as really as though
it were in a higher degree and more extensive.
I must however remind you, that though bene
volence and self-love are different ; though the
former tends most directly to public good, and
the latter to private ; yet they are so perfectly
coincident, that the greatest satisfactions to our
selves depend upon our having benevolence in a
due degree ; and that self-love is one chief security
different circumstances, and respecting different objects, will
prove, to a certainty, what principles they do not, and, to the
greatest probability, what principles they do proceed from: and,
lastly, by the testimony of mankind. Now, that there is some
degree of benevolence amongst men, may be as strongly and
plainly proved in all these ways, as it could possibly be proved,
supposing there was this affection in our nature. And should
any one think fit to assert, that resentment in the mind of man
was absolutely nothing but reasonable concern for our own safety,
the falsity of this, and what is the real nature of that passion,
could be shown in no other ways than those in which it may be
shown, that there is such a thing in some degree as real good-will
in man towards man. It is sufficient that the seeds of it be im
planted in our nature by God. There is, it is owned, much left
for us to do upon our own heart and temper ; to cultivate, to
improve, to call it forth, to exercise it in a steady, uniform
manner. This is our work : this is virtue and religion.

8 Vpon Human Nature.
of our right behaviour towards society. It may
be added, that their mutual coinciding, so that
we can scarce promote one without the other, is
equally a proof that we were made for both.
Secondly, This will further appear from observ
ing, that the several passions and affections, which
are distinct 3 both from benevolence and self-love,
(3) Every body makes a distinction between self-love, and the
several particular passions, appetites, and affections; and yet
they are often confounded again. That they are totally different,
will be seen by any one who will distinguish between the passions
and appetites themselves, and endeavouring after the means of their
gratification. Consider the appetite of hunger, and the desire of
esteem : these being the occasion both of pleasure and pain,
the coolest self-love, as well as the appetites and passions them
selves, may put us upon making use of the proper methods of
obtaining that pleasure, and avoiding that pain ; but the feelings
themselves, the pain of hunger and shame, and the delight from
esteem, are no more self-love than they are any thing in the world.
Though a man hated himself, he would as much feel the pain of
hunger as he would that of the gout : and it is plainly supposa-
ble, there may be creatures with self-love in them to the highest
degree, who may be quite insensible and indifferent (as men in
some cases are) to the contempt and esteem of those, upon whom
their happiness does not in some further respects depend. And
as self-love and the several particular passions and appetites are
in themselves totally different; so that some actions proceed
from one, and some from the other, will be manifest to any
who will observe the two following very supposable cases: —
One man rushes upon certain ruin for the gratification of a
present desire : nobody will call the principle of this action self-
love. Suppose another man to go through some laborious work,
upon promise of a great reward, without any distinct knowledge
what the reward will be : this course of action cannot be as
cribed to any particular passion. The former of these actions
is plainly to be imputed to some particular passion or affection,
the latter as plainly to the general affection or principle of self-
love. That there are some particular pursuits or actions

Vpon Human Nature. 9
do in general contribute and lead us to public
good as really as to private. It might be thought
too minute and particular, and would carry us
too great a length, to distinguish between and
compare together the several passions or appe
tites distinct from benevolence, whose primary
use and intention is the security and good of
society ; and the passions distinct from self-
love, whose primary intention and design is the
security and good of the individual.4 It is
enough to the present argument, that desire of
esteem from others, contempt and esteem of
them, love of society as distinct from affection to
the good of it, indignation against successful
vice, that these are public affections or passions ;
have an immediate respect to others, naturally
concerning which we cannot determine how far they are owing to
one, and how far to the other, proceeds from this, that the two
principles are frequently mixed together, and run into each
other. (4) If any desire to see this distinction and comparison made in
a particular instance, the appetite and passion now mentioned
may serve for one. Hunger is to be considered as a private appe
tite ; because the end for which it was given us is the preser
vation of the individual. Desire of esteem is a public passion ;
because the end for which it was given us is to regulate our beha
viour towards society. The respect which this has to private
good is as remote as the respect that has to public good ; and
the appetite is no more self-love, than the passion is benevolence.
The object and end of the former is merely food ; the object and
end of the latter is merely esteem : but the latter can no more be
gratified, without contributing to the good of society, than the
former can be gratified, without contributing to the preservation
of the individual.

10 Vpon Human Nature.
lead us to regulate our behaviour in such a
manner as will be of service to our fellow-crea
tures. If any or all of these may be considered
likewise as private affections, as tending to
private good ; this does not hinder them from
being public affections too, or destroy the good
influence of them upon society, and their ten
dency to public good. It may be added, that as
persons without any conviction from reason of
the desirableness of life, would yet of course
preserve it merely from the appetite of hunger ;
so, by acting merely from regard (suppose) to
reputation, without any consideration of the
good of others, men often contribute to public
good. In both these instances they are plainly
instruments in the hands of another, in the
hands of Providence, to carry on ends, the pre
servation of the individual and good of society,
which they themselves have not in their view
or intention. The sum is, men have various
appetites, passions, and particular affections,
quite distinct both from self-love and from be
nevolence ; all of these have a tendency to pro
mote both public and private good, and may
be considered as respecting others and ourselves
equally and in common : but some of them seem
most immediately to respect others, or tend to
public good; others of them most immediately
to respect self, or tend to private good : as the
former are not benevolence, so the latter are not

Vpon Human Nature. 11
self-love ; neither sort are instances of our love
either to ourselves or others, but only instances
of our Maker's care and love both of the indivi
dual and the species, and proofs that he intended
we should be instruments of good to each other,
as well as that we should be so to ourselves.
Thirdly, There is a principle of reflection in
men, by which they distinguish between, approve
and disapprove their own actions. We are plainly
constituted such sort of creatures as to reflect
upon our own! nature. The mind can take a
view of what passes within itself, its propen-
sions, aversions, passions, affections, as respecting
such objects, and in such degrees, and of the
several actions consequent thereupon. In this
survey it approves of one, disapproves of an
other, and towards a third is affected in neither
of these ways, but is quite indifferent. This
principle in man, by which he approves or dis
approves his heart, temper, and actions, is con
science ; for this is the strict sense of the word,
though sometimes it is used so as to take in
more. And that this faculty tends to restrain
men from doing mischief to each other, and leads
them to do good, is too manifest to need being
insisted upon. Thus, a parent has the affection
of love to his children : this leads him to take
care of, to educate, to make due provision for
them ; the natural affection leads to this : but
the reflection that it is his proper business, what

12 Vpon Human Nature.
belongs to him, that it is right and commendable
so to do ; this, added to the affection, becomes a
much more settled principle, and carries him on
through more labour and difficulties for the sake
of his children, than he would undergo from
that affection alone; if he thought it, and the
course of action it led to, either indifferent or
criminal. This indeed is impossible, to do that
which is good, and not to approve of it; for
which reason they are frequently not consi
dered as distinct, though they really are : for men
often approve of the actions of others, which
they will not imitate, and likewise do that
which they approve not. It cannot possibly
be denied, that there is this principle of reflec
tion or conscience in human nature. Suppose a
man to relieve an innocent person in great dis
tress ; suppose the same man afterwards, in the
fury of anger, to do the greatest mischief to a
person who had given no just cause of offence ;
to aggravate the injury, add the circumstances of
former friendship, and obligation from the in
jured person ; let the man who is supposed to
have done these two different actions, coolly
reflect upon them afterwards, without regard to
their consequences to himself; to assert that
any common man would be affected in the same
way towards these different actions^ that he
would make no distinction between them, but
approve or disapprove them equally, is too glar-

Vpon Human Nature. 13
ing a falsity to need being confuted. There is
therefore this principle of reflection or consci
ence in mankind. It is needless to compare the
respect it has to private good, with the respect it
has to public ; since it plainly tends as much to
the latter as to the former, and is commonly
thought to tend chiefly to the latter. This
faculty is now mentioned merely as another part
in the inward frame of man, pointing out to us
in some degree what we are intended for, and as
what will naturally and of course have some
influence. The particular place assigned to it
by nature, what authority it has, and how great
influence it ought to have, shall be hereafter con
sidered. From this comparison of benevolence and self-
love, of our public and private affections, of the
courses of life they lead to, and of the principle
of reflection or conscience as respecting each of
them, it is as manifest, that we were made for
society, and to promote the happiness of it; as
that we were intended to take care of our own life,
and health, and private good.
And from this whole review must be given
a different draught of human nature from what
we are often presented with. Mankind are by
nature so closely united, there is such a cor
respondence between the inward sensations of
one man and those of another, that disgrace
is as much avoided as bodily pain, and to be

14 Vpon Human Nature.
the object of esteem and love as much desired
as any external goods : and, in many particular
cases, persons are carried on to do good to
others, as the end their affection tends to, and
rests in ; and manifest that they find real satis
faction and enjoyment in this course of beha
viour. There is such a natural principle of
attraction in man towards man, that having trod
the same tract of land, having breathed in the
same climate, barely having been born in the
same artificial district or division, becomes the
occasion of contracting acquaintances and fami
liarities many years after : for any thing may
serve the purpose. Thus relations, merely no
minal, are sought and invented, not by govern
ors, but by the lowest of the people ; which are
found sufficient to hold mankind together in
little fraternities and copartnerships : weak ties,
indeed, and what may afford fund enough for
ridicule, if they are absurdly considered as the
real principles of that union ; but they are, in
truth, merely the occasions, as any thing may be
of any thing, upon which our nature carries us
on according to its own previous bent and bias ;
which occasions, therefore, would be nothing at
all, were there not this prior disposition and bias
of nature. Men are so much one body, that in a
peculiar manner they feel for each other, shame,
sudden danger, resentment, honour, prosperity,
distress ; one or another, or all of these, from the

Vpon Human Nature. 15
social nature in general, from benevolence, upon
the occasion of natural relation, acquaintance,
protection, dependence ; each of these being dis
tinct cements of society. And, therefore, to have
no restraint from, no regard to others in our
behaviour, is the speculative absurdity of con
sidering ourselves as single and independent, as
have nothing in our nature which has respect to
our fellow-creatures, reduced to action and prac
tice. And this is the same absurdity, as to sup
pose a hand, or any part, to have no natural
respect to any other, or to the whole body.
But allowing all this, it may be asked, " Has
not man dispositions and principles within, which
lead him to do evil to others, as well as to do
good ? whence come the many miseries else,
which men are the authors and instruments of
to each other ?" These questions, so far as they
relate to the foregoing discourse, may be answer
ed by asking, "Has not man also dispositions
and principles within, which lead him to do evil
to himself as well as good ? whence come the
many miseries else, sickness, pain, and death,
which men are the instruments and authors of
to themselves ? "
It may be thought more easy to answer one of
these questions than the other, but the answer to
both is really the same : that mankind have un-
governed passions which they will gratify at any
rate, as well to the injury of others, as in contra-

16 Vpon Human Nature.
diction to known private interest : but that as
there is no such thing as self-hatred, so neither
is there any such thing as ill-will in one man
towards another, emulation and resentment being
away ; whereas there is plainly benevolence or "
good-will: there is no such thing as love of
injustice, oppression, treachery, ingratitude ; but
only eager desires after such and such external
goods; which, according to a very ancient ob
servation, the most abandoned would choose to
obtain by innocent means, if they were as easy
and as effectual to their end: that even emula
tion and resentment, by any one who will con
sider what these passions really are in nature,5
will be found nothing to the purpose of this
objection ; and that the principles and passions
in the mind of man, which are distinct both from
self-love and benevolence, primarily and most
directly lead to right behaviour with regard to
others as well as himself, and only secondarily
(5) Emulation is merely the desire and hope of equality with,
or superiority over others, with whom we compare ourselves. There
does not appear to be any o//ier grief in the natural passion, but
only that want which is implied in desire. However, this may be
so strong as to be the occasion of great grief. To desire the at
tainment of this equality, or superiority, by the particular means
of others being brought down to our own level, or below it, is, I
think, the distinct notion of envy. From whence it is easy to see
that the real end, which the natural passion, emulation, and which
the unlawful one, envy, aims at, is exactly the same ; namely, that
equality or superiority : and, consequently, that to do mischief is
not the end of envy, but merely the means it makes use of to
attain its end.

Upon Human Nature. 17
and accidentally to what is evil. Thus, though
men, to avoid the^ame of one villainy, are some
times guilty of a greater, yet it is easy to see,
that the original tendency of shame is to prevent
the doing of shameful actions ; and its leading
men to conceal such actions when done, is only
in consequence of their being done ; i. e. of the
passion's not having answered its first end.
If it be said, that there are persons in the
world, who are, in great measure, without the
natural affections towards their fellow-creatures ;
there are likewise instances of persons without
the common natural affections to themselves :
but the nature of man is not to be judged of by
either of these, but by what appears in the
common world, in the bulk of mankind.
I am afraid it would be thought very strange,
if, to confirm the truth of this account of human
nature, and make out the justness of the fore
going comparison, it should be added, that from
what appears, men, in fact, as much and as often
contradict that part of their nature which re
spects self, and which leads them to their own
private good and happiness, as they contradict
that part of it, which respects society, and tends
to public good: that there are as few persons,
who attain the greatest satisfaction and enjoy
ment which they might attain in the present
world, as who do the greatest good to others
which they might do; nay, that there are as
e

18 Vpon Human Nature.
few who can be said really and in earnest to aim
at one, as at the other. Take a survey of man
kind: the world in general, the good and bad,
almost without exception, equally are agreed,
that were religion out of the case, the happiness
of the present life would consist in a manner
wholly in riches, honours, sensual gratifications ;
insomuch that one scarce hears a reflection made
upon prudence, life, conduct, but upon this sup
position. Yet, on the contrary, that persons in
the greatest affluence of fortune are no happier
than such as have only a competency ; that the
cares and disappointments of ambition for the
most part far exceed the satisfactions of it ; as
also the miserable intervals of intemperance and
excess, and the many untimely deaths occasioned
by a dissolute course of life : these things are
all seen, acknowledged, by every one acknow
ledged ; but are thought no objections against,
though they expressly contradict this universal
principle, that the happiness of the present life
consists in one or other of them. Whence is all
this absurdity and contradiction? Is not the
middle way obvious? Can any thing be more
manifest, than that the happiness of life consists
in these, possessed and enjoyed only to a certain
degree ; that to pursue them beyond this degree,
is always attended with more inconvenience than
advantage, to a man's self, and often with ex
treme misery and unhappiness ? Whence then,

Vpon Human Nature. 19
I say, is all this absurdity and contradiction?
Is it really the result of consideration in man
kind, how they may become most easy to them
selves, most free from care, and enjoy the chief
happiness attainable in this world ? or is it not
manifestly owing either to this, that they have
not cool and reasonable concern enough for
themselves to consider wherein their chief hap
piness in the present life consists ; or else, if they
do consider it, that they will not act conform
ably to what is the result of that consideration ?
i. e. reasonable concern for themselves, or cool
self-love, is prevailed over by passion and appe
tite. So that from what appears, there is no
ground to assert, that those principles in the
nature of man, which most directly lead to pro
mote the good of our fellow-creatures, are more
generally or in a greater degree violated, than
those which most directly lead us to promote our
own private good and happiness.
The sum of the whole is plainly this. The
nature of man, considered in his single capacity,
and with respect only to the present world, is
adapted and leads him to attain the greatest hap
piness he can for himself in the present world. The
nature of man, considered in his public or social
capacity, leads him to a right behaviour in socie
ty, to that course of life which we call virtue.
Men follow or obey their nature in both these ca
pacities and respects to a certain degree, but not
c 2

20 Upon Human Nature.
entirely : their actions do not come up to the
whole of what their nature leads them to in
either of these capacities or respects : and they
often violate their nature iu both : i. <•. as they
neglect the duties they owe to their fellow-crea
tures, to which their nature leads them ; and are
injurious, to which their nature is abhorrent : so
there is a manifest negligence in men of their
real happiness or interest in the present world,
when that interest is inconsistent with a present
gratification; for the sake of which they negli
gently, nay, even knowingly, are the authors
and instruments of their own misery aud ruin.
Thus they are as often unjust to themselves as to
others, and for the most part are equally so to
both by the same actions.

SERMON II. III.

UPON HUMAN NATURE.

Rom. ii. 14.
For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do, by
nature the things contained in the law, these, having not
the law, are a law unto themselves.
As speculative truth admits of different kinds
of proof, so likewise moral obligations may be
shown by different methods. If the real nature
of any creature leads him and is adapted to such
and such purposes only, or more than to any
other ; this is a reason to believe the Author
of that nature intended it for those purposes.
Thus there is no doubt the eye was intended for
us to see with. And the more complex any
constitution is, and the greater variety of parts
there are which thus tend to some one end,
the stronger is the proof that such end was
designed. However, when the inward frame of
man is considered as any guide in morals, the
utmost "caution must be used that none make
peculiarities in their own temper, or any thing
which is the effect of particular customs, though

22 Vpon Human Nature.
observable in several, the standard of what is
common to the species ; and, above all, that the
highest principle be not forgot or excluded, that
to which belongs the adjustment and correction
of all other inward movements and affections :
which principle will of course have some influ
ence, but which, being in nature supreme, as
shall now be shown, ought to preside over and
govern all the rest. The difficulty of rightly
observing the two former cautions ; the appear
ance there is of some small diversity amongst
mankind with respect to this faculty, with re
spect to their natural sense of moral good and
evil ; and the attention necessary to survey with
any exactness what passes within, have occa
sioned that it is not so much agreed what is
the standard of the internal nature of man, as
of his external form. Neither is this last exactly
settled. Yet we understand one another when
we speak of the shape of a human body; so
likewise we do when we speak of the heart and
inward principles, how far soever the standard
is from being exact or precisely fixed. There
is, therefore, ground for an attempt of showing
men to themselves, of showing them what course
of life and behaviour their real nature points out
and would lead them to. Now, obligations of
virtue shown, and motives to the practice of it
enforced, from a review of the nature of man,
are to be considered as an appeal to each parti-

Upon Human Nature. 23
cular person's heart and natural conscience : as
the external senses are appealed to for the proof
of things cognizable by them. Since, then, our
inward feelings, and the perceptions we receive
from our external senses, are equally real; to
argue from the former to hfe and conduct, is
as httle liable to exception, as to argue from
the latter to absolute speculative truth. A man
can as Httle doubt whether his eyes were given
him to see with, as he can doubt of the truth
of the science of optics, deduced from ocular
experiments. And allowing the inward feeling,
shame; a man can as little doubt whether it
was given him to prevent his doing shameful
actions, as he can doubt whether his eyes were
given him to guide his steps. And as to these
inward feelings themselves; that they are real,
that man has in his nature passions and affec
tions, can no more be questioned, than that
he has external senses. Neither can the former
be wholly mistaken, though to a certain degree
liable to greater mistakes than the latter.
There can be no doubt but that several pro-
pensions or instincts, several principles in the
heart of man, carry him to society, and to con
tribute to the happiness of it, in a sense and
a manner in which no inward principle leads
him to evil. These principles, propensions, or
instincts, which lead him to do good, are approv
ed of by a certain faculty within, quite distinct

24 Vpon Human Nature.
from these propensions themselves. All this hath
been fully made out in the foregoing discourse.
But it may be said*, " What is all this, though
true, to the purpose of virtue and religion ? these
require, not only that we do good to others when
we are led this way, by benevolence or reflection
happening to be stronger than other principles,
Jpassions, or appetites; but likewise, that the
whole character be formed upon thought and
reflection; that every action be directed by
some determinate rule, some other rule than the
strength and prevalency of any principle or
passion. What sign is there in our nature (for
the inquiry is only about what is to be collected
from thence) that this was intended by its Au
thor? or how does so various and fickle a temper
as that of man appear adapted thereto ? It may
indeed be absurd and unnatural for men to act
without any reflection ; nay, without regard to
that particular kind of reflection which you call
conscience; because this does belong to our
nature. For, as there never was a man but who
approved one place, prospect, building, before
another; so it does not appear that there ever
was a man who would not have approved an
action of humanity rather than of cruelty ; inter
est and passion being quite out of the case. But
interest and passion do come in, and are often
too strong for, and1 prevail over, reflection and
conscience. Now, as brutes have various in-

Vpon Human Nature.

j,;>

stincts, by which they are carried on to the end
the Author of their nature intended them for;
is not man in the same condition, with this
difference only, that to his instincts (i.e. appe
tites and passions) is added the principle of
reflection or conscience? And as brutes act
agreeably to their nature, iu following that prin
ciple or particular instinct which for the present
is strongest in them ; does not man likewise act
agreeably to his nature, or obey the law of his
creation, by following that principle, be it pas
sion or conscience, which for the present happens
to be strongest in him ? Thus, different men
are by their particular nature hurried on to
pursue honour, or riches, or pleasure : there are
also persons whose temper leads them in an un
common degree to kindness, compassion, doing
good to their fellow-creatures ; as there are
others who are given to suspend their judgment,
to weigh and consider things, and to act upon
thought, and rejection. Let every one then
quietly follow his nature; as passion, reflection,
appetite, the several parts of it, happen to be
strongest : but let not the man of virtue take
upon him to blame the ambitious, the covetous,
the dissolute ; since these, equally with him,
obey and follow their nature. Thus, as in some
cases, we follow our nature in doing the works
contained i» the law. so in other cases we follow
nature in doing contrary."

26 Vpon Human Nature.
Now, all this licentious talk entirely goes upon
a supposition, that men follow their nature in
the same sense, in violating the known rules of
justice and honesty for the sake of a present
gratification, as they do in following those rules
when they have no temptation to the contrary.
And if this were true, that could not be so which
St. Paul asserts, that men are " by nature a law
to themselves." If by following nature were
meant only acting as we please, it would indeed
be ridiculous to speak of nature as any guide in
morals: nay, the very mention of deviating
from nature would be absurd ; and the mention
of following it, when spoken by way of distinc
tion, would absolutely have no meaning. For,
did ever any one act otherwise than as he pleas
ed? And yet the ancients speak of deviating
from nature, as vice ; and of following nature so
much as a distinction, that, according to them,
the perfection of virtue consists therein. So that
language itself should teach people another sense
to the words following nature, than barely acting
as we please. Let it however be observed, that
though the words human nature are to be ex
plained, yet the real question of this discourse is
not concerning the meaning of words, any other
wise than as the explanation of them may be
needful to make out and explain the assertion,
that every man is naturally a law to himself, that
every one may find within himself the rule of

Vpon Human Nature. 27
right, and obligations to follow it. This St. Paul
affirms in the words of the text, and this the
foregoing objection really denies, by seeming to
allow it. And the objection will be fully answer
ed, and the text before us explained, by observ
ing, that nature is considered in different views,
and the word used in different senses ; and by
showing in what view it is considered, and in
what sense the word is used, when intended to
express and signify that which is the guide of
life, that by which men are a law to themselves.
I say, the explanation of the term will be suffici
ent, because from thence it will appear, that in
some senses of the word, nature cannot be, but
that in another sense it manifestly is, a law to us.
I. By nature is often meant no more than some
principle in man, without regard either to the
kind or degree of it. Thus, the passion of
anger, and the affection of parents to their chil
dren, would be called equally natural. And as
the same person hath often contrary principles,
which at the same time draw contrary ways, he
may by the same action both follow and contra
dict his nature in this sense of the word ; he may
follow one passion, and contradict another.
II. Nature is frequently spoken of as consist
ing in those passions which are strongest, and
most influence the actions ; which being vicious
ones, mankind is in this sense naturally vicious,
or vicious by nature. Thus St. Paul says of

28 Vpon Human Nature.
the Gentiles, who were dead in trespasses and
sins, and walked according to the spirit of dis
obedience, that they were by nature the children
of wraths They could be no otherwise children
of wrath by nature, than they were vicious by
nature. Here, then, are two different senses of the
word nature, in neither of which men can at
all be said to be a law to themselves. They are
mentioned only to be excluded ; to prevent their
being confounded, as the latter is in the objec
tion, with another sense of it, which is now to be
inquired after and explained.
III. The apostle asserts, that the Gentiles do
by nature the things contained in the law. Nature
is indeed here put by way of distinction from
revelation, but yet it is not a mere negative.
He intends to express more than that by which
they did not, that by which they did the works
of the law ; namely, by nature. It is plain the
meaning of the word is not the same in this
passage as in the former, where it is spoken of
as evil ; for in this latter it is spoken of as good ;
as that by which they acted, or might have
acted virtuously. What that is in man by which
he is naturally a law to himself, is explained in
the following words -.—which show the work of
the law written in their hearts, their consciences
also bearing witness, and their thoughts the mean
(1) Eph. ii. 3.

Vpon Human Nature. 29
while accusing or else excusing one another. If
there be a distinction to be made between the
works written in their hearts, and the witness of
conscience ; by the former must be meant, the
natural disposition to kindness and compassion,
to do what is of good report, to which this
apostle often refers : that part of the nature
of man, treated of in the foregoing discourse,
which, with very little reflection and of course,
leads him to society, and by means of which he
naturally acts a just and good part in it, unless
other passions or interest lead him astray. Yet
since other passions, and regards to private
interest, which lead us (though indirectly, yet
they lead us) astray, are themselves in a degree
equally natural, and often most prevalent ; and
since we have no method of seeing the particular
degrees in which one or the other is placed in us
by nature, it is plain the former, considered
merely as natural, good and right as they are,
can no more be a law to us than the latter. But
there is a superior principle of reflection or
conscience in every man, which distinguishes
between the internal principles of his heart, as
well as his external actions ; which passes judg
ment upon himself and them ; pronounces deter-
minately some actions to be in themselves just,
right, good; others to be in themselves evil,
wrong, unjust ; which, without being consulted,
without being advised with, magisterially exerts

30 Upon Human Nature.
itself, and approves or condemns him, the doer
of them, accordingly : and which, if not forcibly
stopped, naturally and always of course goes on
to anticipate a higher and more effectual sen
tence, which shall hereafter second and affirm its
own. But this part of the office of conscience is
beyond my present design explicitly to consider.
It is by this faculty, natural to man, that he is a
moral agent, that he is a law to himself: by this
faculty, I say, not to be considered merely as a
principle in his heart, which is to have some
influence as well as others ; but considered as a
faculty, in kind and in nature, supreme over all
others, and which bears its own authority of
being so.
This prerogative, this natural supremacy, of
the faculty which surveys, approves or disap
proves the several affections of our mind, and
actions of our lives, being that by which men
are a law to themselves, their conformity or dis
obedience to which law of our nature renders
their actions, in the highest and most proper
sense, natural or unnatural ; it is fit it be further
explained to you : and I hope it will be so, if
you will attend to the following reflections.
Man may act according to that principle or
inclination which for the present happens to be
strongest, and yet act in a way disproportionate
to, and violate his real proper nature. Suppose a
brute creature by any bait to be allured into a

Upon Human Nature. 31
snare, by which he is destroyed. He plainly fol
lowed the bent of his nature, leading him to
gratify his appetite : there is an entire correspon
dence between his whole nature and such an
action: such action therefore is natural. But
suppose a man, foreseeing the same danger of
certain ruin, should rush into it for the sake
of a present gratification ; he, in this instance,
would follow his strongest desire, as did the
brute creature : but there would be as manifest
a disproportion, between the nature of a man
and such an action, as between the meanest
work of art and the skill of the greatest master
in that art ; which disproportion arises, not from
considering the action singly in itself, or in its
consequences, but from comparison of it with the
nature of the agent. And since such an action is
utterly disproportionate to the nature of man, it
is in the strictest and most proper sense unna
tural ; this word expressing that disproportion.
Therefore, instead of the words disproportionate
to his nature, the word unnatural may now be
put ; this being more familiar to us : but let it
be observed, that it stands for the same thing
precisely. Now, what is it which renders such a rash
action unnatural ? Is it that he went against the
principle of reasonable and cool self-love, con
sidered merely as a part of his nature ? No : for
if he had acted the contrary way, he would

32 Upon Human Nature.
equally have gone against a principle, or part
of his nature, namely, passion or appetite. But,
to deny a present appetite, from foresight that
the gratification of it would end in immediate
ruin or extreme misery, is by no means an
unnatural action: whereas, to contradict or go
against cool self-love, for the sake of such gra
tification, is so in the instance before us. Such
an action then being unnatural, and its being
so not arising from a man's going against a prin
ciple or desire barely, nor in going against that
principle or desire which happens for the present
to be strongest ; it necessarily follows, that there
must be some other difference, or distinction,
to be made between these two principles, passion
and cool self-love, than what I have yet taken
notice of. And this difference, not being a dif
ference in strength or degree, I call a difference
in nature and in kind. And since, in the instance
still before us, if passion prevails over self-love,
the consequent action is unnatural ; but if self-
love prevails over passion, the action is natural ;
it is manifest, that self-love is in human nature a
superior principle to passion. This may be con
tradicted without violating that nature, but the
former cannot. So that, if we will act conform
ably to the economy of man's nature, reasonable
self-love must govern. Thus, without particular
consideration of conscience, we may have a clear
conception of the superior nature of one inward

Upon Human Nature. 33
principle to another ; and see that there really
is this natural superiority, quite distinct from
degrees of strength and prevalency.
Let us now take a view of the nature of man,
as consisting partly of various appetites, passions,
affections, and partly of the principle of reflec
tion or conscience, leaving quite out all consi
deration of the different degrees of strength, in
which either of them prevail ; and it will further
appear that there is this natural superiority of
one inward principle to another, or that it is
even part of the idea of reflection or conscience.
Passion or appetite implies a direct simple
tendency towards such and such objects, with
out distinction of the means by which they are
to be obtained. Consequently, it will often
happen there will be a desire of particular
objects, in cases where they cannot be obtained
without manifest injury to others. Reflection
or conscience comes in, and disapproves the
pursuit of them in these circumstances ; but
the desire remains. Which is to be obeyed,
appetite or reflection ? Cannot this question
b«t«nswered, from the economy and constitution
of human nature merely, without saying which
is strongest? or need this at all come into con
sideration ? Would not the question be intel
ligibly and fully answered by saying, that the
principle of reflection or conscience being com
pared with the various appetites, passions, and
d

34 Upon Human Nature.
affections in men, the former is manifestly supe
rior and chief, without regard to strength ? And
how often soever the latter happens to prevail,
it is mere usurpation. The former remains in
nature and in kind its superior; and every in
stance of such prevalence of the latter, is an
instance of breaking in upon and violation of
the constitution of man.
All this is no more than the distinction, which
every body is acquainted with, between mere power
and authority : only, instead of being intended to
express the difference between what is possible,
and what is lawful in civil government ; here it
has been shown applicable to the several princi
ples in the mind of man. Thus, that principle
by which we survey, and either approve or dis
approve our own heart, temper and actions, is
not only to be considered as what is in its turn
to have some influence; which may be said of
every passion, of the lowest appetites : but like
wise as being superior ; as from its very nature
manifestly claiming superiority over all others:
insomuch that you cannot form a notion of this
faculty, conscience, without taking in judgment,
direction, superintendency. This is a constituent
part ofthe idea, that is, ofthe faculty itself: and
to preside and govern, from the very economy
and constitution of man, belongs to it. Had it
strength, as it has right ; had it power, as it has
manifest authority, it would absolutely govern
the world.

Upon Human Nature. 35
This gives us a further view of the nature of
man ; shows us what course of life we were made
for ; not only that our real nature leads us to be
influenced in some degree by reflection and con
science, but likewise in what degree we are to
be influenced by it, if we will fall in with, and act
agreeably to the constitution of our nature : that
this faculty was placed within to be our proper
governor ; to direct and regulate all under prin
ciples, passions, and motives of action. This is
its right and office : thus sacred is its authority.
And how often soever men violate and rebel-
liously refuse to submit to it, for supposed inte
rest which they cannot otherwise obtain, or for
the sake of passion which they cannot otherwise
gratify ; this makes no alteration as to the natu
ral right and office of conscience.
Let us now turn this whole matter another
way, and suppose there was no such thing at all
as this natural supremacy of conscience ; that
there was no distinction to be made between
one inward principle and another, but only that
of strength ; and see what would be the conse
quence. Consider, then, what is the latitude and com
pass of the actions of man with regard to himself,
his fellow-creatures, and the Supreme Being?
What are their bounds, besides that of our natu
ral power ? With respect to the two first, they
are plainly no other than these : no man seeks
d2

36 Ujwn Human Nature.
misery as such for himself; aud no one unpro
voked does mischief to another for its own sake.
For in every degree within these bounds, man
kind knowingly, from passion or wantonness,
bring ruin and misery upon themselves and
others. And impiety and profaneness, I mean,
what every one would call so who believes the
being of God, have absolutely no bounds at all.
Men blaspheme the Author of nature, formally
and in words renounce their allegiance to their
Creator. Put an instance, then, with respect to
any one of these three. Though we should
suppose profane swearing, and in general that
kind of impiety now mentioned, to mean nothing,
yet it implies wanton disregard and irreverence
towards an infinite Being, our Creator ; and is
this as suitable to the nature of man, as reverence
and dutiful submission of heart towards that Al
mighty Being ? Or suppose a man guilty of parri
cide, with all the circumstances of cruelty which
such an action can admit of: this action is done
in consequence of its principle being for the
present strongest : and if there be no differ
ence between inward principles, but only that of
strength ; the strength being given, you have the
whole nature of the man given, so far as it relates
to this matter. The action plainly corresponds
to the principle, the principle being in that de
gree of strength it was : it therefore corresponds
to the whole nature of the man. Upon compar-

Upon Human Nature. 37
ing the action and the whole nature, there arises
no disproportion, there appears no unsuitable-
ness between them. Thus the murder of a father
and the nature of man correspond to each other,
as the same nature and an act of filial duty. If
there be no difference between inward principles,
but only that of strength, we can make no dis
tinction between these two actions, considered
as the actions of such a creature; but in our
coolest hours must approve or disapprove them
equally : than which nothing can be reduced to
a greater absurdity.

SERMON III.

The natural supremacy of reflection or consci
ence being thus established ; we may from it
form a distinct notion of what is meant by human
nature, when virtue is said to consist in follow
ing it, and vice in deviating from it.
As the idea of a civil constitution implies in it
united strength, various subordinations, under
one direction, that of the supreme authority ; the
different strength of each particular member of
the society not coming into the idea ; whereas,

38 Upon Human Nature.
if you leave out the subordination, the union,
and the one direction, you destroy and lose it :
so reason, several appetites, passions, and affec
tions, prevailing in different degrees of strength,
is not that idea or notion of human nature ; but
that nature consists in these several principles
considered as having a natural respect to each
other, in the several passions, being naturally
subordinate to the one superior principle of re
flection or conscience. Every bias, instinct,
propension within, is a real part of our nature,
but not the whole : add to these the superior
faculty, whose office it is to adjust, manage, and
preside over them, and take in this its natural
superiority, and you complete the idea of human
nature. And as in civil government the constitu
tion is broken in upon, and violated by power
and strength prevailing over authority ; so the
constitution of man is broken in upon and vio
lated by the lower faculties or principles within
prevailing over that which is in its nature su
preme over them all. Thus, when it is said by
ancient writers, that tortures and death are not
so contrary to human nature as injustice; by
this, to be sure, is not meant, that the aversion
to the former in mankind is less strong and
prevalent than their aversion to the latter : but
that the former is only contrary to our nature
considered in a partial view, and which takes
in only the lowest part of it, that which we have

Vpon Human Xatnrr. 35)
in common with tho brutes ; whereas tho latter
is contrary to our nature . oonsidored in a higher
sense, as a system and constitution contrary to
tho whole economy of man.'
^l) K\mv man, in his physical nature, is one individual single
agent. Ho has likewise properties and principles, each of which
may bo considered separately, and without regard to the respects
which they ha\e to each other. Neither \\( these are the nature
wo are taking a view o(. But u is tho inward frame ot man,
considered as a si/slrm or tsmstitulion : whose several parts are
united, not by a physical principle of indniduation, but by the
respects they have to each other ; the chief of whieh is the
subjection which the appetites, passions, and particular atlootions
ha\e to the one supreme principle of reflection or conscience.
The system or constitution is formed bv and consists in these
respects and this subjection. Thus, the body is a system or ooit-
>iitHlitm : so is a tree, so is e\ery machine. Consider all the
several pans of a tree without tho natural respects they have to
each other, ami vou haw not at all the idea of n tree: but add
these respects, aud this gi\os \ou the idea. The body may be
unpaired by sickness, a tree may decay, a machine be out of order.
and yet the system and constitution of thom not totally dissolved.
Chore is plainly somewhat which answers to all this in the moral
constitution of man. N\ h>>o\ or w ill consider his own nature, will
see that tho sewral appetites, passions, and particular aflivtions,
have different resects amongst themselves. They are restraints
upon, and are iu a proportion to, each other. This proportion is
just and perfect, when all those under principles are perfectly co
incident with conscience, so far as their nature permits, and, in all
cases, under its absolute and entire direction. Tho least excess
or defect, tit* least alteration of the due proportions amongst
themselves, or of their coincidence with conscience, though not
proceeding into action, is some degree of disorder in the moral
constitution. But perfection, though plainly intelligible and sup-
posahle. was never attained by any man. If the higher principle
of reflection maintains us place, aud, as much as it can, corrects
that disorder, and binders it from breaking out into action, this is
all that can bo expected u\ such a creature as man. And though

40 Upon Human Nature.
And from all these things put together, nothing
can be more evident, than that, exclusive of reve
lation, man cannot be considered as a creature left
by his Maker to act at random, and live at large
up to the extent of his natural power, as passion,
humour, wilfulness, happen to carry him ; which
is the condition brute creatures are in : but that,
from his make, constitution, or nature, he is, in the
strictest and most proper sense, a law to himself.
He hath the rule of right within : what is want
ing is only that he honestly attend to it.
The inquiries which have been made by men of
leisure after some general rule, the conformity to,
or disagreement from which, should denominate
our actions good or evil, are in many respects of
great service. Yet let any plain, honest man,
before he engages in any course of action, ask
himself, Is this I am going about right, or is it
wrong ? Is it good, or is it evil ? I do not in the
least doubt, but that this question would be an
swered agreeably to truth and virtue, by almost
any fair man in almost any circumstance. Nei
ther do there appear any cases which look like
exceptions to this; but those of superstition
and of partiality to ourselves. Superstition may,
the appetites and passions have not their exact due proportion to
each other ; though they often strive for mastery with judgment
or reflection ; yet, since the superiority of this principle to all
others is the chief respect which forms the constitution, so far as
this superiority is maintained, the character, the man, is good,
worthy, virtuous.

Upon Human' Nature. 41
perhaps, be somewhat of an exception : but
partiality to ourselves is not ; this being itself
dishonesty. For a man to judge that to be the
equitable, the moderate, the right part for him
to act, which he would see to be hard, unjust,
oppressive in another ; this is plain vice, and can
proceed only from great unfairness of mind.
But, allowing that mankind hath the rule of
right within himself, yet it may be asked, " What
obligations are wre under to attend to and follow
it ?" I answer : It has been proved, that man by
his nature is a law to himself, without the parti
cular distinct consideration ofthe positive sanc
tions of that law ; the rewards and punishments
which we feel, and those which from the light of
reason we have ground to believe are annexed
to it. The question then carries its own answer
along with it. Your obligation to obey this law,
is its being the law of your nature. That your
conscience approves of and attests to such a
course of action, is itself alone an obligation.
Conscience does not only offer itself to show us
the way we should walk in, but it likewise carries
its own authority with it, that it is our natural
guide, the guide assigned us by the Author of
our nature : it therefore belongs to our condition
of being, it is our duty to walk in that path, and
follow this guide, without looking about to see
whether we may not possibly forsake them with
impunity.

42 Upon Human Nature.
However, let us hear what is to be said against
obeying this law of our nature. And the sum is
no more than this: "Why should we be con
cerned about any thing out of and beyond our
selves ? If we do find within ourselves regards
to others, and restraints of we know not how
many different kinds ; yet these being embarrass
ments, and hindering us from going the nearest
way to our own good, why should we not endea
vour to suppress and get over them ?"
Thus, people go on with words, which, when
applied to human nature, and the condition in
which it is placed in this world, have really no
meaning. For does not all this kind of talk go
upon supposition, that our happiness in this
world consists in somewhat quite distinct from
regards to others, and that it is the privilege of
vice to be without restraint or confinement?
Whereas, on the contrary, the enjoyments, in a
manner all the common enjoyments of life, even
the pleasures of vice, depend upon these regards
of one kind or another to our fellow-creatures.
Throw off all regards to others, and we should be
quite indifferent to infamy and to honour : there
could be no such thing at all as ambition, and
scarce any such thing as covetousness ; for we
should likewise be equally indifferent to the dis
grace of poverty, the several neglects and kinds
of contempt which accompany this state ; and to
the reputation of riches, the regard and respect

Upon Human Nature. 43
they usually procure. Neither is restraint by
any means peculiar to one course of life ; but
our very nature, exclusive of conscience and our
condition, lays us under an absolute necessity of
it. We cannot gain any end whatever without
being confined to the proper means, which is
often the most painful and uneasy confinement.
And, in numberless instances, a present appetite
cannot be gratified without such apparent and
immediate ruin and misery, that the most dis
solute man in the world chooses to forego the
pleasure, rather than endure the pain.
Is the meaning, then, to indulge those regards
to our fellow-creatures, and submit to those re
straints, which, upon the whole, are attended
with more satisfaction than uneasiness, and get
over only those which bring more uneasiness and
inconvenience than satisfaction ? " Doubtless this
was our meaning." You have changed sides,
then. Keep to this : be consistent with your
selves ; and you and the men of virtue are, in
general, perfectly agreed. But let us take care,
and avoid mistakes. Let it not be taken for
granted, that the temper of envy, rage, resent
ment, yields greater delight than meekness, for
giveness, compassion, and good-will: especially
when it is acknowledged, that rage, envy, resent
ment, are in themselves mere misery; and the
satisfaction arising from the indulgence of them is
little more than relief from that misery : whereas

44 Upon Human Nature.
the temper of compassion and benevolence is
itself delightful ; and the indulgence of it, by
doing good, affords new positive delight and
enjoyment. Let it not be taken for granted,
that the satisfaction arising from the reputation
of riches and power, however obtained, and from
the respect paid to them, is greater than the
satisfaction arising from the reputation of justice,
honesty, charity, and the esteem which is uni
versally acknowledged to be their due. And if
it be doubtful which of these satisfactions is the
greatest, as there are persons who think neither
of them very considerable, yet there can be no
doubt concerning ambition and covetousness,
virtue and a good mind, considered in them
selves, and as leading to different courses of life ;
there can, I say, be no doubt, which temper and
which course is attended with most peace and
tranquillity of mind, which with most perplexi
ty, vexation, and inconvenience. And both the
virtues and vices which have been now men
tioned, do in a manner equally imply in them
regards of one kind or another to our fellow-
creatures. And with respect to restraint and
confinement : whoever will consider the restraints
from fear and shame, the dissimulation, mean arts
of concealment, servile compliances, one or other
of which belong to almost every course of vice,
will soon be convinced, that the man of virtue is
by no means upon a disadvantage in this respect.

Upon Human Nature. 45
How many instances are there, in which men
feel, and own, and cry aloud under the chains of
vice with which they are enthralled, and which
yet they will not shake off! How many instances,
in which persons manifestly go through more
pains and self-denial to gratify a vicious passion,
than would have .been necessary to the conquest
of it ! To this is to be added, that when virtue
is become habitual, when the temper of it is
acquired, what was before confinement ceases to
be so, by becoming choice and delight. What
ever restraint and guard upon ourselves may be
needful to unlearn any unnatural distortion or
odd gesture ; yet, in all propriety of speech,
natural behaviour must be the most easy and
unrestrained. It is manifest that, in the common
course of life, there is seldom any inconsistency
between our duty and what is called interest : it
is much seldomer that there is an inconsistency
between duty and what is really our present
interest ; meaning by interest, happiness and
satisfaction. Self-love, then, though confined to
the interest of the present world, does in general
perfectly coincide with virtue ; and leads us to
one and the same course of life. But, whatever
exceptions there are to this, which are much
fewer than they are commonly thought, all shall
be set right at the final distribution of things.
It is a manifest absurdity, to suppose evil pre
vailing finally over good, under the conduct and
administration of a perfect mind.

46 Upon Human Nature.
The whole argument which I have been now
insisting upon, may be thus summed up and
given you in one view. The nature of man is
adapted to some course of action or other.
Upon comparing some actions with this nature,
they appear suitable and correspondent to it :
from comparison of other actions with the same
nature, there arises to our view some unsuitable-
ness or disproportion. The correspondence of
actions to the nature of the agent renders them
natural : their disproportion to it, unnatural.
That an action is correspondent to the nature of
the agent, does not arise from its being agreeable
to the principle which happens to be the strong
est : for it may be so, and yet be quite dispro
portionate to the nature of the agent. The
correspondence, therefore, or disproportion, arises
from somewhat else. This can be nothing but a
difference in nature and kind, (altogether distinct
from strength) between the inward principles.
Some, then, are in nature and kind superior to
others. And the correspondence arises from the
action being conformable to the higher principle ;
and the unsuitableness from its being contrary to
it. Reasonable self-love and conscience are the
chief or superior principles in the nature of
man : because an action may be suitable to this
nature, though all other principles be violated;
but becomes unsuitable, if either of those are.
Conscience and self-love, if we understand our

Upon Human Nature. Al
true happiness, always lead us the same way. —
Duty and interest are perfectly coincident ; for
the most part in this world, but entirely and in
every instance, if we take in the future and the
whole ; this being implied in the notion of a
good and perfect administration of things. Thus,
they who have been so wise in their generation,
as to regard only their own supposed interest,
at the expense and to the injury of others, shall
at last find, that he who has given up all the
advantages of the present world, rather than
violate his conscience and the relations of life,
has infinitely better provided for himself, and
secured his own interest and happiness.

48

DISSERTATION ON VIRTUE.

That which renders beings capable of moral
government, is their having a moral nature, and
moral faculties of perception and of action.
Brute creatures are impressed and actuated by
various instincts and propensions : so also are
we. But additional to this, we have a capacity
of reflecting upon actions and characters, and
making them an object to our thought : and on
our doing this, we naturally and unavoidably
approve some actions, under the peculiar view of
their being virtuous and of good desert ; and
disapprove others, as vicious and of ill desert.
That we have this moral approving and disap
proving l faculty, is certain from our experienc-
(1) This way of speaking is taken from Epiclelus,* and is
made use of as seeming the most full, and least liable to cavil.
And the moral faculty may be understood to have these two epi
thets, Soici/ia<rriK7j and dTroc'oicifiao-Tucrj, upon a double account ;
because, upon a survey of actions, whether before or after they
are done, it determines them to be good or evil ; and also because
* Arr. Epict. lib. i. cap. 1 .

Of the Nature of Virtue. 49
ing it in ourselves, and recognizing it in each
other. It appears from our exercising it un
avoidably, in the approbation and disapprobation
even of feigned characters : from the words,
right and wrong, odious and amiable, base and
worthy, with many others of like signification in
all languages, applied to actions and characters ;
from the many written systems of morals which
suppose it ; since it cannot be imagined, that all
these authors, throughout all these treatises, had
absolutely no meaning at all to their words, or a
meaning merely chimerical : from our natural
sense of gratitude, which implies a distinction
between merely being the instrument of good,
and intending it : from the like distinction every
one makes between injury and mere harm, which,
Hobbes says, is peculiar to mankind ; and be
tween injury and just punishment, a distinction
plainly natural, prior to the consideration of
human laws. It is manifest, great part of com
mon language, and of common behaviour over
the world, is formed upon supposition of such
a moral faculty : whether called conscience, mo
ral reason, moral sense, or divine reason;
it determines itself to be the guide of action and of life, in contra
distinction from all other faculties, or natural principles of action :
in the very same manner as speculative reason directly and natu
rally judges of speculative truth and falsehood ; and at the same
time is attended with a consciousness upon reflection, that the na
tural right to judge of them belongs to it. e

50 Of the Nature of Virtue.
whether considered as a sentiment of the un
derstanding, or as a perception of the heart,
or, which seems the truth, as including both.
Nor is it at all doubtful in the general, what
course of action this faculty, or practical dis
cerning power within us, approves, and what
it disapproves. For, as much as it has been
disputed wherein virtue consists, or whatever
ground for doubfc there may be about particu
lars ; yet, in general, there is in reality an uni
versally acknowledged standard of it. It is that
which all ages and all countries have made
profession of in public : it is that which every
man you meet, puts on the show of: it is that
which the primary and fundamental laws of all
civil constitutions over the face of the earth,
make it their business and endeavour to enforce
the practice of upon mankind : namely, justice,
veracity, and regard to common good. It being
manifest, then, in general, that we have such a
faculty or discernment as this ; it may be of use
to remark some things, more distinctly, con
cerning it.
First, It ought to be observed, that the object
of this faculty is actions, 2 comprehending under
that name active or practical principles : those
(2) ovSe 1/ apBrrj Kal Kada — ev rrdatt dXKd ivcpyeia, M. Anton.
lib. ix. 16. Virtutis laus omnis in actione consistit. Cic. Off.
lib. i. c. 6.

Of the Nature of Virtue. 51
principles from which men would act, if occa
sions and circumstances gave them power ; and
which, when fixed and habitual in any person,
we call, his character. It does not appear that
tRrutes have the least reflex sense of actions, as dis
tinguished from events : or that will and design,
which constitute the very nature of actions as
such, are at all an object to their perception.
But tb ours they are : and they are the object,
and the only one, of the approving and disap
proving faculty. Acting conduct, behaviour,
abstracted from all regard to what is, in fact
and event, the consequence of it, is itself the
natural object of the moral discernment ; as
speculative truth and falsehood is of speculative
reason. Intention of such and such conse
quences, indeed, is always included ; for it is
part of the action itself : but though the intend
ed good or bad consequences do not follow, we
have exactly the same sense of the action as
if they did. In like manner we think well or
ill of characters, abstracted from all considera
tion of the good or the evil, which persons of
such characters have it actually in their power
to do. We never, in the moral way, applaud or
blame either ourselves or others, for what we
enjoy or what we suffer, or for having impres
sions made upon us which we consider as alto
gether out of our power : but only for what we
do, or would have done, had it been in our
e2

52 Of the Nature of Virtue.
power ; or for what we leave undone which we
might have done, or would have left undone
though we could have done it.
Secondly, Our sense or discernment of actions
as morally good or evil, implies in it a sense or
discernment of them as of good or ill desert.
It may be difficult to explain this perception, so
as to answer all the questions which may be
asked concerning it : but every one speaks of
such and such actions as deservingt(punishment ;
and it is not, I suppose, pretended that they
have absolutely no meaning at all to the expres
sion. Now the meaning plainly is not, that we
conceive it for the good of society, that the doer
of such actions should be made to suffer. For if
unhappily it were resolved, that a man who, by
some innocent action was infected with the
plague, should be left to perish, lest, by other
people's coming near him, the infection should
spread ; no one would say, he deserved this
treatment. Innocence and ill desert are incon
sistent ideas. Ill desert always supposes guilt :
and if one be not part of the other, yet they are
evidently and naturally connected in our mind.
The sight of a man in misery raises our com
passion towards him; and, if this misery be
inflicted on him by another, our indignation
against the author of it. But when we are
informed that the sufferer is a villain, and is
punished only for his treachery or cruelty ; our

Of the Nature of Virtue. 53
compassion exceedingly lessens, and, in many
instances, our indignation wholly subsides. Now
what produces this effect, is the conception of
that in the sufferer, which we call ill desert.
Upon considering then, or viewing together,
our notion of vice and that of misery, there
results a thjrd, that of ill desert. And thus
there is in human creatures an association of
the two ideas, natural and moral evil, wicked
ness and punishment. If this association were
merely artificial or accidental, it were nothing :
but being most unquestionably natural, it greatly
concerns us to attend to it, instead of endea
vouring to explain it away.
It may be observed farther, concerning our
perception of good and of ill desert, that the
former is very weak with respect to common
instances of virtue. One reason of which may
be, that it does not appear to a spectator, how
far such instances of virtue proceed from a vir
tuous principle, or in what degree this principle
is prevalent : since a very weak regard to virtue
may be sufficient to make men act well in many
common instances. And on the other hand, our
perception of ill desert in vicious actions lessens
in proportion to the temptations men are thought
to have had to such vices. For, vice in human
creatures consisting chiefly in the absence or
want of the virtuous principle ; though a man
be overcome, suppose, by tortures, it does not

54 Of the Nature of Virtue.
from thence appear, to what degree the virtuous
principle Was wanting. All that appears is, that
he had it not in such a degree, as to prevail over
the temptation : but possibly he had it in a
degree, which would have rendered him proof
against common temptations.
Thirdly, Our perception of vice and ill desert
arises from, and is the result of, a comparison of
actions with the nature and capacities of the
agent. For, the mere neglect of doing what we
ought to do, would, in many cases, be deter
mined by all men to be in the highest degree
vicious. And this determination must arise from
such comparison and be the result of it ; because
such neglect would not be vicious in creatures
of other natures and capacities, as brutes. And
it is the same also with respect to positive vices,
or such as consist in doing what we ought not.
For, every one has a different sense of harm done
by an idiot, madman or child, and by one of
mature and common understanding ; though the
action of both, including the intention which is
part of the action, be the same : as it may be,
since idiots and madmen, as well as children, are
capable not only of doing mischief, but also of
intending it. Now this difference must arise
from somewhat discerned in the nature or capa
cities of one, which renders the action vicious ;
and the want of which in the other, renders
the same action innocent or less vicious : and

Of the Nature of Virtue. 55
this plainly supposes a comparison, whether
reflected upon or not, between the action and
capacities of the agent, previous to our de
termining an action to be vicious. And hence
arises a proper application of the epithets, in
congruous, unsuitable, disproportionate, unfit,
to actions which our moral faculty determines to
be vicious.
Fourthly, It deserves to be considered, whether
men are more at liberty, in point of morals, to
make themselves miserable without reason, than
to make other people so : or dissolutely to neg
lect their own greater good, for the sake of a
present lesser gratification, than they are to neg
lect the good of others, whom nature has com
mitted to their care. It should seem, that a due
concern about our own interest or happiness, and
a reasonable endeavour to secure and promote it,
which is, I think, very much the meaning of the
word, prudence, in our language ; it should seem,
that this is virtue, and the contrary behaviour
faulty and blameable ; since, in the calmest way
of reflection, we approve of the first, and con
demn the other conduct, both in ourselves and
others. This approbation and disapprobation
are altogether different from mere desire of our
own, or of their happiness, and from sorrow upon
missing it. For the object or occasion of this
last kind of perception, is satisfaction or uneasi
ness : whereas the object of the first is active

56 Of the Nature of Virtue.
behaviour. In one case, what our thoughts fix
upon, is our condition : in the other, our con
duct. It is true, indeed, that nature has not
given us so sensible a disapprobation of impru
dence and folly, either in ourselves or others, as
of falsehood, injustice, and cruelty : I suppose,
because that constant habitual sense of private
interest and good, which we always carry about
with us, renders such sensible disapprobation
less necessary, less wanting, to keep us from
imprudently neglecting our own happiness, and
foolishly injuring ourselves, than it is necessary
and wanting to keep us from injuring others, to
whose good we cannot have so strong and con
stant a regard : and also because imprudence
and folly, appearing to bring its own punishment
more immediately and constantly than injurious
behaviour, it less needs the additional punish
ment, which would be inflicted upon it by others,
had they the same sensible indignation against
it, as against injustice and fraud and cruelty.
Besides, unhappiness being in itself the natural
object of compassion ; the unhappiness which
people bring upon themselves, though it be wil
fully, excites in us some pity for them : and this
of course lessens our displeasure against them.
But still it is matter of experience, that we are
formed so, as to reflect very severely upon the
greater instances of imprudent neglects and
foolish rashness, both in ourselves and others.

Of the Nature of Virtue. 57
In instances of this kind, men often say of them
selves with remorse, and of others with some
indignation, that they deserved to suffer such
calamities, because they brought them upon them
selves, and would not take warning. Particu
larly when persons come to poverty and distress
by a long course of extravagance, and after
frequent admonitions, though without falsehood
or injustice; we plainly do not regard such
people as alike objects of compassion with those,
who are brought into the same condition by
unavoidable accidents. From these things it
appears, that prudence is a species of virtue, and
folly of vice: meaning by folly, somewhat quite
different from mere incapacity ; a thoughtless
want of that regard and attention to our own
happiness, which we had capacity for. And this
the word properly includes ; and, as it seems, in
its usual acceptation : for we scarcely apply it to
brute creatures.
However, if any person be disposed to dispute
the matter, I shall very willingly give him up the
words virtue and vice, as not applicable to
prudence and folly : but must beg leave to insist,
that the faculty within us, which is the judge
of actions, approves of prudent actions, and dis
approves imprudent ones ; I say prudent and
imprudent actions as such, and considered dis
tinctly from the happiness or misery which they
occasion. And by the way, this observation may

58 Of the Nature of Virtue.
help to determine what justness there is in that
objection against religion, that it teaches us to
be interested and selfish.
Fifthly, Without inquiring how far, and in
what sense, virtue is resolvable into benevolence,
and vice into the want of it ; it may be proper
to observe, that benevolence and the want of it,
singly considered, are in no sort the whole of
virtue and vice. For if this were the case, in
the review of one's own character or that of
others, our moral understanding and moral sense
would be indifferent to every thing, but the de
grees in which benevolence prevailed, and the
degrees in which it was wanting. That is, we
should neither approve of benevolence to some
persons rather than to others, nor disapprove
injustice and falsehood upon any other account,
than merely as an overbalance of happiness was
foreseen likely to be produced by the first, and
of misery by the second. But now, on the con
trary, suppose two men competitors for any thing
whatever, which would be of equal advantage to
each of them ; though nothing indeed would be
more impertinent, than for a stranger to busy
himself to get one of them preferred to the
other; yet such endeavour would be virtue, in
behalf of a friend or benefactor, abstracted from
all consideration of distant consequences : as
that examples of gratitude, and the cultivation of
friendship, would be of general good to the world.

Of the Nature of Virtue. 59
Again, suppose one man should, by fraud or
violence, take from another the fruit of his
labour, with intent to give it to a third, who,
he thought, would have as much pleasure from
it, as would balance the pleasure which the first
possessor would have had in the enjoyment, and
his vexation in the loss of it ; suppose also that
no bad consequences would follow : yet such an
action would surely be vicious. Nay, farther,
were treachery, violence, and injustice, no other
wise vicious, than as foreseen likely to produce
an overbalance of misery to society ; then, if in
any case a man could procure to himself as great
advantage by an act of injustice, as the whole
foreseen inconvenience, likely to be brought
upon others by it, would amount to; such a
piece of injustice would not be faulty or vicious
at all : because it would be no more than, in any
other case, for a man to prefer his own satisfac
tion to another's in equal degrees. The fact
then appears to be, that we are constituted so,
as to condemn falsehood, unprovoked violence,
injustice, and to approve of benevolence to some
preferably to others, abstracted from all consi
deration, which conduct is likeliest to produce an
overbalance of happiness or misery. And there
fore, were the Author of nature to propose no
thing to himself as an end but the production
of happiness, were his moral character merely
that of benevolence ; yet ours is not so. Upon

60 Of the Nature of Virtue.
that supposition indeed, the only reason of his
giving us the above-mentioned approbation of
benevolence to some persons rather than others,
and disapprobation of falsehood, unprovoked vio
lence, and injustice, must be, that he foresaw
this constitution of our nature would produce
more happiness, than forming us with a temper
of more general benevolence. But still, since
this is our constitution ; falsehood, violence, in
justice, must be vice in us, and benevolence to
some preferably to others, virtue ; abstracted
from all consideration of the overbalance of
evil or good, which they may appear likely to
produce. Now if human creatures are endued with such
a moral nature as we have been explaining, or
with a moral faculty, the natural object of which
is actions : moral government must consist in
rendering them happy and unhappy, in reward
ing and punishing them, as they follow, neg
lect, or depart from, the moral rule of action
interwoven in their nature, or suggested and
enforced by this moral faculty; in rewarding
and punishing them upon account of their so
doing. I am not sensible that I have, in this fifth
observation, contradicted what any author de
signed to assert. But some of great and distin
guished merit have, I think, expressed them
selves in a manner, which may occasion some

Of the Nature of Virtue. 6 1
danger to careless readers, of imagining the
whole of virtue to consist in singly aiming, ac
cording to the best oftheir judgment, at promot
ing the- happiness of mankind in the present
state ; and the whole of vice, in doing what they
foresee, or might foresee, is likely to produce an
overbalance of unhappiness in it : than which
mistakes, none can be conceived more terrible.
For it is certain, that some of the most shocking
instances of injustice, adultery, murder, perjury,
and even of persecution, may, in many supposable
cases, not have the appearance of being likely
to produce an overbalance of misery in the
present state ; perhaps sometimes may have the
contrary appearance. For this reflection might
easily be carried on, but I forbear  The happi
ness of the world is the concern of him who is
the lord and the proprietor of it : nor do we
know what we are about, when we endeavour to
promote the good of mankind in any ways but
those which he has directed ; that is indeed in
all ways not contrary to veracity and justice.
I speak thus upon supposition of persons really
endeavouring, in some sort, to do good without
regard to these. But the truth seems to be, that
such supposed endeavours proceed, almost always,
from ambition, the spirit of party, or some indi
rect principle, concealed perhaps in great measure
from persons themselves. And though it is our
business and our duty to endeavour, within the

62 Of the Nature of Virtue.
bounds of veracity and justice, to contribute to
the ease, convenience, and even cheerfulness
and diversion of our fellow-creatures : yet, from
our short views, it is greatly uncertain whether
this endeavour will, in particular instances, pro
duce an overbalance of happiness upon the
whole ; since so many and distant things must
come into the account. And that which makes
it our duty, is, that there is some appearance
that it will, and no positive appearance suffi
cient to balance this, on the contrary side ;
and also, that such benevolent endeavour is
a cultivation of that most excellent of all vir
tuous principles, the active principle of bene
volence. However, though veracity, as well as justice,
is to be our rule of life ; it must be added,
otherwise a snare will be laid in the way of some
plain men, that the use of common forms of
speech generally understood, cannot be false
hood ; and, in general, that there can be no
designed falsehood without designing to deceive.
It must likewise be observed, that in numberless
cases, a man may be under the strictest obliga
tions to what he foresees will deceive, without
his intending it. For it is impossible not to
foresee that the words and actions of men in
different ranks and employments, and of differ
ent educations, will perpetually be mistaken
by each other : and it cannot but be so, whilst

Of the Nature of Virtue. 63
they will judge with the utmost carelessness, as
they daily do, of what they are not, perhaps,
enough informed to be competent judges of,
even though they considered it with great atten
tion.

THE END.

W. METCALFE, ST. MARY'S STREET, CAMBRIDGE*

YALE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

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