YALE university library A39002013116463B THE SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY CONSIDERED IN ITS RELATION TO CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY, IN A COURSE OF LECTURES DELIVERED BEFORE THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD, IN THE YEAR MDCCCXXXII. AT THE LECTURE FOUNDED BY JOHN BAMPTON, M.A. CANON OF SALISBURY. BY RENN DICKSON HAMPDEN, M.A. LATE FELLOW OF ORIEL COLLEGE. OXFORD, PRINTED BY SAMUEL COLLINGWOOD, PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY, FOR THE AUTHOR. SOLD BY J. H. PARKER, OXFORD : AND BY J. G. AND F. RIVINGTON, LONDON. MDCCCXXXIII. EXTRACT FROM THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF THE REV. JOHN BAMPTON, CANON OF SALISBURY. " I give and bequeath my Lands and Estates to " the Chancellor, Masters, and Scholars of the University " of Oxford for ever, to have and to hold all and sin- " gular the said Lands or Estates upon trust, and to the " intents and purposes hereinafter mentioned ; that is to " say, I will and appoint that the Vice-Chancellor of the " University of Oxford for the time being shall take and " receive all the rents, issues, and profits thereof, and " (after all taxes, reparations, and necessary deductions " made) that he pay all the remainder to the endowment " of eight Divinity Lecture Sermons, to be established for " ever in the said University, and to be performed in the " manner following : " I direct and appoint, that, upon the first Tuesday in " Easter Term, a Lecturer be yearly chosen by the Heads " of Colleges only, and by no others, in the room adjoin- " ing to the Printing-House, between the hours of ten in " the morning and two in the afternoon, to preach eight " Divinity Lecture Sermons, the year following, at St. " Mary's in Oxford, between the commencement of the " last month in Lent Term, and the end of the third week " in Act Term. a2 iv EXTRACT FROM CANON BAMPTON'S WILL. " Also I direct and appoint, that the eight Divinity " Lecture Sermons shall be preached upon either of the " following Subjects — to confirm and establish the Chris- " tian Faith, and to confute all heretics and schismatics " — upon the divine authority of the holy Scriptures — " upon the authority of the writings of the primitive Fa- " thers, as to the faith and practice of the primitive Church " — upon the Divinity of our Lord and Saviour Jesus " Christ — upon the Divinity of the Holy Ghost — upon the " Articles of the Christian Faith, as comprehended in the " Apostles'1 and Nicene Creeds. " Also I direct, that thirty copies of the eight Divinity " Lecture Sermons shall be always printed, within two " months after they are preached, and one copy shall be " given to the Chancellor of the University, and one copy " to the Head of every College, and one copy to the Mayor " of the city of Oxford, and one copy to be put into the " Bodleian Library; and the expense of printing them shall " be paid out of the revenue of the Land or Estates given " for establishing the Divinity Lecture Sermons; and the " Preacher shall not be paid, nor be entitled to the revenue, " before they are printed. " Also I direct and appoint, that no person shall be " qualified to preach the Divinity Lecture Sermons, un- " less he hath taken the degree of Master of Arts at least, " in one of the two Universities of Oxford or Cambridge; " and that the same person shall never preach the Divinity " Lecture Sermons twice.1' PRE FACE. IT is not an unusual effect of taking a particu lar view of a subject, to give the appearance of overlooking another view of it, no less important than that immediately presented. This is par ticularly the case in a question of religion, in which the mind naturally fixes its eye on the divine part of the argument : and we are apt ac cordingly to regard that as altogether slighted, because it is not ostensibly brought under our survey. I wish therefore to obviate any such miscon ception of my design, in regard to the observa tions contained in the present course of Lec tures. I am exclusively engaged in considering what I may call a human section of the complex history of Christianity. But I would not, at the same time, be thought insensible to the divine part of the history ; or to forget, even for a mo ment, the holy Agent himself by whom the a 3 vi PREFACE. great work, in all its sacred outlines and living energy, has been wonderfully wrought. I request accordingly, that it may be remem bered throughout, what is the immediate and re stricted business of my inquiry : that it presup poses a Divine origin to the Christian revela tion, and a superintending Providence over its whole course. This is my point of departure. Assuming that the Holy Spirit has not been un faithful to his charge over the church of Christ, I have endeavoured to take some account of that resistance, which the human agent has op posed to the diffusion of the truth as it was purely inspired. A work of Christian evidences would have for its leading idea the operation of the Divine Author and Guardian of the Faith. Take, for instance, the Gospels, or the Acts of the Apostles : and it is the facts bearing on the character of the Divine Being and the Divine dispensations, which are solely or prominently brought to view. Human sentiments and con duct are the mirror in which the work of God is reflected. Or take any merely human treatise on the evidences of Christianity: and the object will be found to be, to detect, amidst the various PREFACE. vii circumstances which have accompanied the rise and propagation of the Gospel, the indications of a power, wisdom, and goodness, more than human. As the present, however, is not a work of evidences, but a particular view of the con nexion of human philosophy with the given truths of the Scriptures, the agency of man here forms the leading idea : and this therefore I have singled out for particular observation. There seems indeed to be an unreasonable jealousy in regard to any attempt to describe the importance of the human means concerned in the establishment and maintenance of the Gospel truth. There is a proneness in professed defenders of Christianity, as also in the Christian in general, to overstate the argument in its fa vour. Whatever detracts accordingly from their own undue estimate, they are apt to regard as taking so much from the real evidence of Chris tianity. But let us not estimate the cares of the Author of our salvation for the security of his work, by the standard of our fears. Let the human agents whom He has employed in the furtherance of it, have contributed their utmost either to support or to thwart what He has a 4 viii PREFACE. begun, the work still remains his. As in the natural world ; corruption and disease may mark for their own the fairest works of the Divine hand, but cannot unmake them : so neither are we to suppose that the superintendence of Christ over his Church no longer exists, because the fields of his vineyard have been overrun with thorns and weeds. CONTENTS. LECTURE I. p. 3. ORIGIN OF SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY. NJ ATURE of the Inquiry proposed, the force of Theory on Theo logical language — the Scholastic Philosophy an important branch of this General Inquiry — its connexion with the philosophy of Aristotle — Neglect of consideration of its influence in compari son with that of Platonism — the greater extent of its influence — its more immediate interest. The Scholastic Philosophy the result of a struggle between Reason and Authority — its history to be traced to the ascendancy of the Latin Clergy — contrast between the Greek and Latin Fathers — Practical character of the Latins exemplified in their leading men — strict correspondence sustained among them — Contrast of state of Society in the East and the West — Civil disturbance and misery of the West favourable to the power of the Latin Church — Rhetorical character of the Latin theological writers — Fruitless attempt of Jerome to improve the Latin lite rature of his time — Monastic Institutions of the West less en thusiastic than those of the East — Origin of the Scholastic System more developed in the progress of the Church after the middle of the Vth century. — The principle of liberty of reason which had led to the power of the Church, operating within the Church, leads at once to heresy and ecclesiastical coercion — Extent of jurisdiction over opinion claimed by the Latin Clergy evidenced in the predestinarian Controversy of the IXth cen tury — Subsequent history a continuance of the struggle between Reason and Authority in the West. — Subjugation of the intel lect leads to its insurrection — Character of its efforts at this pe riod. The argumentative theology at length sanctioned by the Church itself in its authoritative capacity — The Book of the x CONTENTS. Sentences — Albert the Great, and -Thomas Aquinas, perfect the method established — Success of Scholasticism owing to its combination of unlimited discussion with deference to authority. LECTURE II. p. 51. FORMATION OF THE SCHOLASTIC THEOLOGY. General statement of the evil of a Logical Theology — The Church sanctions the use of Logic only as an art of defence — Platonism the established Philosophy of the Church — An art of Logic indispensable to the speculating Christian in the West — Division of the Sciences in the middle age — Tendency of the age to blend all into a metaphysical Logic, or Dialect — Logic perverted into a Science of Investigation — Obstructions to the real improvement of Logic — Ignorance of Aristotle's writings in themselves — Importance of the writings of Boethius — Effect of the Crusades in opening fresh sources of knowledge — Progress of Scholasticism illustrated in the division of parties into Nomi nalists and Realists — Triumph of Realism. Realism, the scientific basis of Scholasticism — Nominalism, the resource of the more liberal speculators — Opposition be tween Duns Scotus and Ockam — Ascendancy of a Logical Phi losophy evidenced in the subsequent state of knowledge. Theology erected into an exact demonstrative Science — its Principles drawn from the incomprehensible nature of the Di vine Being — Regard to Authority maintained, by assigning Faith as the preliminary to the whole Speculation — Aristotle's Phi losophy applied as a method of eliciting the Divine truths in volved in the Scripture — This resulted in a combination of the Ideal Theory of Platonism with the Sensualism of Aristotle's Philosophy — Logic the instrument in effecting this result — Union of Mysticism and Argumentation in the Scholastic writ ings — Abuse by the Schoolmen of the disputatious form of Aristotle's writings. Fundamental errors of Scholastic Theology, i. its neglect of the Historical Nature of the Christian Scriptures — consequent loss of the real instruction contained in them — 2. their Rhe torical nature also overlooked in an exclusive attention to the mere words of revelation. — 3. their Ethical lessons also dispa raged in the pursuit of theoretic truth. CONTENTS. xi LECTURE III. p. 97. THE TRINITARIAN CONTROVERSIES. Questions on the Trinity naturally the first to engage the attention of disputants — Their ecclesiastical and political im portance in the early ages — Maintenance of the orthodox doc trine chiefly owing to the Latin Church — Controversies on the subject assume a scientific form in the Scholastic writings — Promiscuous character of Ancient Philosophy exemplified in the discussion — Scholastic System applies the philosophy of mind to the investigation of God from his Effects in the world — Doc trine of the Trinity, in its principle, the ideas or reasons of all existing things, traced to the Intellect of God — Description of the Scholastic mode of rationalizing the doctrine — Orthodox theory of the Divine Procession the exact view of the principle of Causation — Extremes of Sabellianism and Arianism traced to their misconception of this principle — Mischievous effect of the notion, that doctrines must be defended from their speculative consequences — Influence of Materialism — Rise of a technical phraseology — Logical principles employed in settling the precise notions of the different terms introduced — Popular illustrations of the Trinity examples of this mode of philosophizing — Contro versies turn principally on the views taken of sameness, unity, diversity, &c. — Differences between the orthodox and the Sabel- lians and Arians in regard to the Divine Unity — Difficulties pro duced by the word Persona, obviated by logical distinctions. Illustration of the doctrine of the Incarnation from the prin ciples of the established logical philosophy — It accounts for the differences between the orthodox, the Nestorians, and Euty- chians. Application of this philosophy in the Controversies on the Procession of the Holy Spirit — The words Filioque added to the Nicene Creed — This addition ultimately maintained on logical grounds. General practical reflections — Difficulties on the subject of the Trinity metaphysical in their origin — Popular misappre hension of the Divine Unity an instance of this — The various theories all Trinitarian in principle — Simplicity of belief in Scripture facts, the only escape from perplexity. xii CONTENTS. LECTURE IV. p. 153. THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSIES.— PREDESTINATION AND GRACE. Scholastic nature of controversies relative to Divine and Hu man Agency — State of the West disposes the Latin Christians to the discussion of such questions — Importance of the ques tions in order to Church-government — The disputes here at first, less philosophical in comparison with the Trinitarian — Consequent laxity in the terms of the Pelagian theories, occa sions more continual disputes — The Schoolmen, the first to systematize these doctrines — Connexion of them with the pre vious theory of the Trinity — Scholastic view of Predestination an application of the Principle of Activity in the Divine Being to human actions — Importance of excluding reference to the Divine Intelligence, in our estimate of Predestination — Mode in which the notions of Contingency and Necessity, Time and Eternity, were employed in Scholastic reasonings. — The only proper difficulty on the subject is, the prevalence of Evil — No tions of Optimism influential on such speculations — The term Good in ancient philosophy coincident with an object of will — Reprobation consequently, as implying evil willed, unknown to Scholastic system — Illustration to be derived to our article on the subject from the theories opposed by the Schoolmen — Dread of Manicheism in the Latin Church. Scholastic notion of Grace as the effect of Predestination, both physical and logical — The term Grace designates properly a general fact of the Divine conduct — Application of Aristo tle's physical doctrines in the scholastic account of the process of Grace — The theory of Transmutation — Instinctive Principle of motion attributed to the System of Nature — Approximation to Pantheism in this system. Practical reflections — Truths of Grace and Predestination concern the heart principally — Theoretic statements of them must always be peculiarly open to difficulty — The difficulties, evidently, chiefly metaphysical — The doctrines, practically taken, full of real comfort and peace. CONTENTS. xiii LECTURE V. p. 207. THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSIES.— JUSTIFICATION. Truths of Divine and Human Agency necessarily qualify each other — Human Agency, as viewed in the Scholastic system, the continued action of the First Cause — Justification, the law of Divine Operation in the Salvation of Man — Sketch of the Chris tian scheme involved in this principle — Theory of Human Agency concerned first in accounting for Resistance to the Di vine Will — Difficulty, as felt in ancient philosophy, was to re concile the fact with the certainty of Science — Schoolmen adopt Aristotle's practical views of human nature — Application of the term Corruption founded on his physical philosophy — Theory of the Propagation of Sin maintains the universality of the prin ciple of Corruption — Objections of Pelagius and Celestius to this theory — Error, both of the Orthodox and of the Pelagians, in speculating on the nature of Original Sin — Concupiscence — the application of this term to Original Sin, derived from ancient divisions of the soul — Materialism involved in the Specula tion. — Doctrine of Original Sin, the counterpart to the doctrine of the Incarnation — Disputes between the Orthodox and the Pelagians turn on the force of the terms Nature and Person — Connexion between the heresies of Nestorius and Pelagius — Distinction between the effect of Adam's sin, and the sin of subsequent parents on their posterity — View of the Christian life, as a change, coincides with this theory of Original Sin — Faith, the infused element of the new life — Doctrinal statements of Justification by Faith, to be interpreted by the light of Scholastic notions involved in it — Scholastic Notion of Free will, not opposed to Necessity, but to the Force of sin, in en slaving the will — Introduction of the theory of Justice into the Christian Scheme — Notion of Merit to be understood in con nexion with this theory ; as also of Merit of Condignity, Merit of Congruity — Peculiar views of Repentance, as a compensa tion for offence — of Punishment and Satisfaction, as applied to the Sacrifice of Christ — of Self-Mortification and Supereroga tion — drawn from this theory of Penal Justice. Inefficacy of Repentance to remove guilt, and need oi Atone ment, illustrated by these speculations — Debasing effect of Scho lastic theory of Expiation — True view of Human Agency to be xiv CONTENTS. found in simple practical belief of the Atonement — Union of Strength and Weakness, implied in this doctrine, coincident with facts of human nature — Mischievous effect of speculative discussion of the subject — Moderation and forbearance of lan guage on the subject most accordant with the spirit of Pro testantism. LECTURE VI. p. 261. MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE SCHOOLS. No proper Moral Philosophy in the Scholastic System — Con fusion of moral and religious truth injurious to both — Instance in Paley's Moral Philosophy — Moral Truth at first taught on the ground of Authority — Platonism influential in blending it with Theology — Influence of Christian literature, the Sermons, and legends of the Saints, Ambrose's Treatise " On the Offices of " Ministers," Gregory's " Morals," Boethius' " Consolation of " Philosophy'' — Ethical science corrupted by being studied with a view to the power of the Clergy. Schoolmen systematize ethical precepts drawn from practice of the Church — The Treatise " Of the Imitation of Christ" — Plato's theological account of the Chief Good combined with practical detail of Aristotle's Ethical Theory — Scholastic moral system a development of the Divine Energy in man's internal nature — Aristotle's notion of Happiness accordant with this view — Scholastic gradations of moral excellence to be traced to this fundamental idea — Hence, also, the importance attributed to the life of contemplative devotion — The doctrine of Perfection — Distinction of Counsels and Precepts — Outline of this double morality seen in the Aristotelic notion of an Heroic Virtue- Coincidence of Aristotle's theory of Good-Fortune with the superhuman virtue of the Scholastic System — Connexion of ethical doctrine of the Schools with notion of Original Sin — Mortal and Venial Sins — Proper ground of this distinction — Division of Virtue into Theological and Moral, and into infused and Acquired — Doctrine of Gifts. Origin of questions in Modern Moral Philosophy to be traced to scholastic discussions — Instance in the idea of Moral Obli gation — Extreme opinions as to the relative importance both of Theology and Ethics — Proper province of Ethics, inquiry into the principles of Human Nature — Revelation only gives new CONTENTS. objects to those principles — Importance of regarding the Science of Ethics as in itself independent of Religion. LECTURE VII. p. 307. THE SACRAMENTS. Doctrine of the Sacraments a continuation of the Scholastic scheme of Divine Agency — Separate nature of the soul and body assumed throughout the speculation — The Sacraments viewed as the means of supporting and renovating the life of the Soul — General notion of them founded on the belief in secret influences — Belief in Magic auxiliary to this notion — Connexion of Sacramental Influence with the doctrine of the Incarnation — Agitation of the subject in the IXth century in connexion with Alexandrian Philosophy — Difference of opinion as to whether the Sacraments were signs or instruments — Pre cision of language respecting the Eucharist in particular — Pre eminence assigned to this Sacrament attributable to the esta blished theory of Sacramental Influence — Doctrine of Intention — Question of the effect of the Vice of the Minister on the efficacy of the Sacrament — Notion of impressed Character at tributed to some of the Sacraments — Evident superiority of Baptism and the Eucharist in comparison with the rest — Rough form of the early Controversies on the Sacramental Presence of Christ — The terms Substance and Species not taken at first in a strict metaphysical sense — Aristotelic Philosophy of Mat ter and Form, Substance and Accident, introduced to perfect the theory of the Sacraments — This exemplified particularly in Transubstantiation — Connexion of this doctrine with the power of the Church enforces the assertion of the mystical virtue of the consecrated elements — Physical theory of Transmutation applied to the establishment of the Presence of Christ — Con nexion with this, of the notion of the mysterious efficacy of certain words — Realism involved in the further use of the no tions of Substance and Accident in the account of Transub stantiation — The theory of the doctrine at variance with popular representations of it. General reflections on the abuse of the doctrine of the Sacra ments in the Scholastic System — its repugnance to the spirit of Christianity — Necessity of vigilance against the temptations to refinement on this subject. xvi CONTENTS. LECTURE VIII. p. 347. NATURE AND USE OF DOGMATIC THEOLOGY. Examination of the nature and use of Dogmatic Theology sug gested by previous inquiry — Confusion of thought on the subject, evidenced in popular statements of the relation between Faith and Reason — also in attempts to settle the necessary points of belief— Discussion of the Scholastic principles : 1. that whatever is first in point of doctrine is therefore true ; and, 2. that the logical consequence of any doctrine is necessarily true — The former principle, a remnant of Scholastic view of Theology as a demonstrative science. — Universality and ubiquity of belief no tests of divine truth — The principle only true when strictly con fined to Scripture facts — Contrast of the earlier and later Chris tian writers in the tradition of doctrine — The preference for earliest authorities inconsistent with the principle which es tablishes doctrines by logical consequences — Symbolical nature of language in its application to Theology — Unscriptural doc trines must result from the method of logical deductions — Ne cessity imposed in such a case of answering all objections — Impossibility of maintaining thus the principle of Authority — Progressive accumulation of doctrines by such a mode of pro ceeding — Truth of Fact confounded with Truth of Opinion in the Scholastic method — No dogmas to be found in Scripture itself — Dogmas therefore to be restricted to a negative sense, as exclusions of unscriptural truth — Articles and Creeds not necessarily to be dispensed with, because imperfect — Their de fence however not to be identified with that of Christianity — Use and importance of Dogmatic Theology to be drawn from its relation to Social Religion. Sum of the whole inquiry — Present interest of it — Scholas ticism the ground of controversial defence to the Church of Rome — Remnants of it in Protestant Churches in the state of Con troversy, and in the importance attributed to peculiar views of religious truth- — Result of the examination sufficient to prove the force of Theory on our Theological language — The impress sion from this fact not to be transferred to the revealed truths which are real parts of sacred history — Real beneficial effect of honest search into the truths of Divine Revelation. LECTURE I. LECTURE I. ORIGIN OF THE SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY. SUMMARY. Nature of the Inquiry proposed, the force of Theory on Theo logical language — the Scholastic Philosophy an important branch of this General Inquiry — its connexion with the philosophy of Aristotle — Neglect of consideration of its influence in compari son with that of Platonism — the greater extent of its influence — its more immediate interest. The Scholastic Philosophy the result of a struggle between Reason and Authority — its history to be traced to the ascendancy of the Latin Clergy — Contrast between the Greek and Latin Fathers — Practical character of the Latins exemplified in their leading men — strict correspondence sustained among them — Contrast of state of Society in the East and the West — Civil disturbance and misery of the West favourable to the power of the Latin Church — Rhetorical character of the Latin theological writers — Fruitless attempt of Jerome to improve the Latin lite rature of his time — Monastic Institutions of the West less en thusiastic than those of the East — Origin of the Scholastic Sys tem more developed in the progress of the Church after the middle of the Vth century. — The principle of liberty of reason which had led to the power of the Church, operating within the Church, leads at once to heresy and ecclesiastical coercion — Extent of jurisdiction over opinion claimed by the Latin Clergy evidenced in the Predestinarian Controversy of the IXth cen tury — Subsequent history a continuance of the struggle between Reason and Authority in the West. — Subjugation of the in tellect leads to its insurrection — Character of its efforts at this period. The argumentative theology at length sanctioned by the Church itself in its authoritative capacity. — The Book of the Sentences. — Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas, perfect the method established. — Success of Scholasticism owing to its combination of unlimited discussion with deference to authority. B2I i Peter IV. ii. If any man speak, let him speak as the oracles of God. E£ tis \a\et, '. From this period we may notice a continued struggle in the Latin Church, between the advo cates of Reason and the advocates of Authority. x Hincmar, driven from his see by an incursion of the Nor mans, died December 21, 882, three years after the death of the persecuted Gotteschalc, and in the 37th year of his Epi scopate. >' Two Councils condemned the work of Scotus, as containing haereses plurimas, ineptas qusestiunculas, et aniles paene fabel- las, pluribus syllogismis conclusas, Scotorumque pultes puri- tati fidei nauseam inferentes, &c. Vind. Pradestin. et Gratia Hist, et Chron. Synops. p. 12. in the work entitled, Veterum Auctorum, qui IX saculo de Pradestin. et Gratia scripserunt, Opera et Fragmenta, by Mauguin. 2 vols. 4to. Paris, 1650. LECTURE I. 37 The contest between Ratramn and Paschase on the doctrine of the Eucharist ; of Lanfranc with Beren- ger on the same subject ; of Anselm with Roscelin on the nature of Universals ; the complaints of Bernard against the dialectical theology of Abe- lard z ; are all illustrations of the collision between Reason and Authority a. All these disputes, in fact, were in principle the same. They were only varied forms of rationalism13 — the pure exertions of the mind within itself, conscious of its own powers, and struggling to push itself forth against the con stringent force of the Spiritual government. The mind sought no diversion into the paths of general literature ; — there was no study of history or natural science ; — none of these could afford it that relief which it demanded, if even opportunities had ex isted for the prosecution of such studies. An effort was required, that immediately bore against the pressure by which it was distressed. The re action must be, where the force had been directed. ** Radbert Paschase, Abbot of Corbey in France A. D. 844, died April 26, 85 1 . — Ratramn, or Bertram, a Monk of Corbey, contemporary with Paschase. — Lanfranc, Archbishop of Canter bury, consecrated 1070; died May 24, 1089. — Berenger, died 1088 ; his controversy with Lanfranc began in 1047. — Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, born 1034, died 1 109. — Roscelin, died : 0g0. — Bernard, Abbot of Clairvaux, the great Saint of the Xllth century, born 1091. — Abelard, born 1079, died 1 142. — Note N. a Note O. b This term, having been lately appropriated to a particular class of theological opinions, may require the explanation, that it is here used in the general sense corresponding with its etymology. D 3 38 LECTURE I. The Spiritual power forbad the mind to think for itself, to use its own faculties, to examine, to dis cuss, to object. Obedience was become another word for Religion c. It was no wonder, then, that some more liberal spirits essayed those natural ex ertions of their faculties on which the painful pro hibition lay. It was like one who had been bound hand and foot, feeling the luxury of the limbs once more free, and enjoying the perception that he yet has strength and energy. It is enough for such an one, to feel the play of his muscles, to exult that he has broken the bands in sunder, and cast away the cords from him. We can sympathize with the wildness of his gesticulations, however distorting and fantastic. So we may appreciate the efforts of the Rationalists of the middle ages. Their mind ex ulted in the simple perception that it still was free. It is impossible for us, at this day, to conceive the force of the pressure of authority on the mind in those ages. The Schools of Philosophy were intirely in the hands of the Ecclesiastical Power. The discipline of moral restraint was extremely weak ; for we read of acts of the greatest outrage committed by the students. The same spirit of irregularity and violence, of which Augustine com plains as disgracing the Schools of his day, at Car- c Aquinas, it is said, being asked why he had suffered him self to be annoyed by some troublesome brother of his Order, who had worn him out with walking, answered, " By nothing " else is Religion perfected but by Obedience." Vita S. Thome Aquin. Oper. Vol. I. ed. Antuerpiae, 1612. LECTURE I. 39 thage, Milan, and Rome, seems to have descended to those of the subsequent ages d- But, amidst the ' moral disorder which prevailed, there was the greatest severity of mental coercion e. The case was similar in the monasteries : the greatest moral irregularities17 were suffered to exist in them, amidst all the strictness of the creed professed, and the solemnities of rituals, and rules £. A passive, un thinking obedience to spiritual direction, was the great object aimed at in all these institutions. It was the intellect, therefore, that was the point of attack, — the governing principle within the indi vidual. If he were instructed, in a school of Philosophy, he was taught to think as his supe riors thought. If he were brought under the rule of a Religious Order, he was taught to sacrifice his own personality in the will of the superior. It was no desire accordingly of what we now under stand by liberty, which actuated the struggles of human reason : the licence of the times afforded a sort of compensation for the miseries of social tyranny: but it was a resistance to the internal spell which bound the faculties ; a resumption of the long- d Augustin. Confess. 1. V. c. 8. c. 12. — Note P. •* Cod. Theod. 1. 14. tit. 9. A.D. 370, gives the severe re strictions imposed on Students at Rome. Du Boullay cites a canon of the IVth council of Toledo to the same purport. Hist. Acad. Paris, t. I. p. 76. f Abelard was never noticed with censures on account of his moral irregularities, whilst he was severely attacked for his spe culations. * Note Q. D 4 40 LECTURE I. lost perception of personal individuality. There was no sympathy between the efforts of the Italian Republics to obtain social liberty, and those within the Church to recover personal freedom of thought ; though both efforts were proceeding at the same period h. It is a curious fact that the Spiritual Powers persisted in strenuously opposing the successive efforts of the Rationalists, and at the same time gradually adopted the very system to which they were so averse, into their own authoritative Theo logy. They opposed, that is, both the principle of the Rationalists, — the principle that human reason was to be exercised in matters of religion, — and the conclusions to which the unrestrained use of it had led. But afterwards, when the books of contro versialists had passed into records of opinions, they readily adopted, as guides in their decisions of any new opinions, the conclusions of that rationalizing method which as such had been so passionately denounced. Throughout the whole period, when the Scholastic Philosophy may be said to have been growing, we meet with constant disclaimers, on the part of Church-leaders, of the system itself — a con stant appeal to the authority of the Scriptures and holy Fathers against the rationalist spirit of the times. Luther himself has not more vehemently h This has been remarked by M. Guizot, in his admirable Lectures on the History of Civilization in Europe. Cours d'Histoire Moderne, Lecon VI. p. 37. Paris, 1828. LECTURE I. 41 denounced the Scholastic Philosophy, than Bernard and other Doctors anterior to the Reformation, have declaimed against the importunateness of the spe culations of their times K Thus even the celebrated work of Peter Lombard k, Bishop of Paris in the Xllth century, did not escape the censures of theo logians, at the time when it appeared1. After wards it was regarded with the highest veneration as the precious depository of the Sentences of the great Fathers and Luminaries of the Church ; and became itself an Authority of the Church. Amidst, too, all the prohibitions of Papal Legates in suc cessive reformations of the University of Paris ; amidst express instructions to the Clergy, that they should seek rather to become theodidactim, than versed in the arts of human disputation ; appeared the works of Albert, surnamed the Great, and of his illustrious disciple Thomas Aquinas n — the most elaborate specimens of that exercise of Reason which the Church denounced. When the authors themselves were dead, and the reputed sanctity of their lives diffused a savour of religion over their speculations, then the value of such subtile defences of the doctrine of the Church against the like as saults of a self-interpreting Reason was acknow ledged : and these works, especially those of the ' Note R. k Peter Lombard, Bishop of Paris 1159, died 1164. 1 Note S. m Note T. r Albert, born about 1193, died 1280. — Thomas Aquinas, born 1224, died 1274; canonized by the Pope John XXII. 1323. — Note U. 42 LECTURE I. latter, — the Augustine, as we may call him, of the middle age, — were consecrated with the appro bation of the Spiritual Power, as part of the stock of Ecclesiastical Authority. The same effect, it may be observed, had taken place in the Und and IHrd centuries. The phi losophizing Divines were continually objected to, by those who held forth the Scripture as the only Au thority on sacred things. Still the philosophical Theology proceeded. Clement of Alexandria0, in the Und century, undertook its special defence in his work entitled Stromata, inculcating its sub servience to Christian knowledge. This work af terwards passed into the Church as an authoritative document. In the Latin Church the case was different in this respect : that the peculiar authority which that Church claimed, was derived immediately from the practical influence of its great Divines, Jerome and Augustine, the two, who may be regarded as, in an especial sense, the Fathers of the Latin Church. With their exertions, they established also their writings, as a documentary appeal next in authority to the Scriptures themselves. And though these writings were extremely argumentative, they were more the authoritative declarations of the spiritual rulers, commanding the silence of other reasoners in the presence of their judgment. We trace ac cordingly in the Scholastic Philosophy a constant ° Died A. D. 220. LECTURE I. 43 preference for the authorities of these two, and of Augustine more particularly, in whom the whole power of the Latin Church ultimately resided. In the Und and IHrd centuries, then, the opposition was rather to the philosophies of Plato and Ari stotle, as corruptions of the simplicity of the faith. Subsequently, the opposition of the Latin Bishops and Saints was dictated by a jealousy for the es tablished opinions and conclusions of the venerated Fathers of the Church p. The work of Peter Lombard, which afterwards constituted the great Text-book of the Scholastic Theologians, and which established to that writer the title of " The Master," or " The Master of the Sentences," was exactly such an exposition of Chris tian doctrine, as we might have expected from that conflict between Reason and Authority, which ex isted in the Latin Church. It is an elaborate com pilation of passages from the writings of the emi nent Latin Doctors ; a tissue stiff with antique embroideries, and displaying the ingenuity of the artist who has so curiously wrought the patchwork into a whole. He introduces little reasoning of his own, only enough to give a consistency to his citations, and he avoids all reference to the opinions of heathen philosophers. He seems throughout on his guard against the suspicion of exercising the privilege of thinking for himself too far, endeavour ing to shew, that he follows received opinions, rather p Note V. 44 LECTURE I. than his own speculations i. The work was pro bably written in imitation of a treatise of a Greek Father of the VIHth century, — the treatise "On the Orthodox Faith," by John, a Monk of Damascus, celebrated in the Iconoclast disputes of his times, or Damascenus, as he is usually termed ; — a writer, who sets out with the profession, that he states nothing of his own, but only what the holy and wise had taught1. This work had been translated into Latin ¦*, and was regarded with great deference by the Latin Divines, for the very reason probably, that it was a mere record of opinions already sanc tioned by the approbation of the Church. In Lom bard, however, there is little of the logical precision by which Damascenus is characterized. He is in tent on displaying his authorities for the positions 1 Aristotle is incidentally referred to by Lombard, Sentent. lib. II. dist. i. B, but not in the way of authority. 1 'Epw Toiyapovv e(/.ov oiiSeV ra. Se &Tropa,o'v}v deloti; re kcu o-od)oi<; ccvtoda \e"A€y pha o-uXX^SSiji' eKSvjtro^ai. Joan. Damasc. Dialectica. Oper. vol. I. p. 9. He chiefly follows Gregory Nazianzen. Peter Lombard, speaking of him, says : Joannes Damascenus, inter doctores Grae- corum maximus, in libro quem de Trinitate scripsit, quem et Papa Eugenius transferri fecit, &c. Sent. I. dist. 19. p. 59. ed. Louan. s Eugenio tertio, summo Pontifice, liber de Fide Orthodoxa Latine redditus est a Burgundione cive Pisano. Hac porro translatione usi sunt Magister Sententiarum, Sanctus Thomas, aliique subinde Theologi. . . . Id enim proposuerat sibi, ut sua nequaquam, aut nova, cude- ret, sed veterum potius placita, variis in voluminibus sparsa, in unum opus theologicum congereret. . . . Quamobrem, nedum in Oriente, verum etiam in Occidente, et apud Latinos, magna semper fuit apud Theologos ipsius auctoritas. Le Quien, Pro- legom. in lib. de Fid. Orth. Damasc. Oper. torn. I. p. 119. LECTURE I. 45 advanced. At the same time the form of Qviestions, in which the several points of Theology are dis cussed, shews the inquisitive spirit of the age in which such a work appeared; that, though Abelard had been silenced by Councils, the spirit which crowded his Lectures with hearers ¦*, was still vigor ous in the Church itself. The Book of the Sen tences, so far as it was disputatious, expressed the demands of this spirit ; so far as it was a com pilation of authorities, maintained the spiritual su premacy of the Church u. The previous remarks have tended to shew, that the Latin Theology was not averse to disputation, from its earliest period of development : only it affected not a merely li terary disputation, but such as had reference to some practical effect. The connexion then of dis putation in this fundamental work of the Scholastic Theology, with the enforcement of deference to the spiritual authority, gave it that popularity which it obtained in the Church x. ' Coactus est ille scripta sua coram igni dare. Nee idcirco juventus studia aemulans ab eo defecit. Paul. JEmil. Veronens. Hist. Franc. V. — Prcef. Apolog. Abaelardi Oper. 11 In the time of Charles V. this work was held in so import ant a light, that of two Professorships instituted at Louvain by that Emperor, one was appointed for the interpretation of the Old and New Testaments, the other for the interpretation of the " Book of the Sentences." Prof, ad Pet. Lomb. Sent. Louan. 1553. ** Lombard profited at once by the previous labours of Abe lard, and by the example of the persecution which had attended them. He was not only a hearer of Abelard, but is said to have made Abelard's Treatise of Theology a frequent subject of his 46 LECTURE I. But no sooner was the principle of such a work recognized, than other works, answering the same requisitions of human reason, appeared. The Xlth and XHth centuries had evinced extraordinary ac tivity in the exercise of the human intellect. But the efforts then put forth were desultory and irre gular. They were the results of individual enter- prize and courage : like the voyages of mariners pushing out to sea, not knowing where the tide and winds might drive them. Now a principle was established, according to which human reason might freely expatiate. The liberty of commenting and discussing without limit might be indulged, pro vided the intellect confined itself within the range of established authorities. The world of conse quences and deductions was open to the Rationalist, whilst that of First Principles was surrounded with Stygian waters. What the speculator had to guard against was, the appearance of proposing any thing new ; any thing that did not admit of being traced up to some received opinion. The suspicion of ori ginality was fatal to the reputation of the Scholastic Divine. " If any man speak, let him speak as the " oracles of God ;" that is, according to the sense of the Scholastic age, let him speak only the words of those, whom God has successively sent as the min isters and dispensers of sacred truth y. If it was a study. Not. ad Hist. Calam. P. Abcelardi. — Oper. p. 1160. Whilst he probably therefore derived much of his own Theology from that work, he was careful to throw it into a less ob jectionable form. y N0t;e W. LECTURE I. 47 point on which the Church had pronounced, that was no longer a matter of opinion. It was to be received as a sentence. To discuss it simply as an opinion was heretical. Hence the expedient of Dis tinctions ; the artifice, by which an acute Reason could maintain its own hypothesis, consistently with the devotion due to the prescriptions of authority. It is under this point of view, that we shall dis cern the origin of that speculative dialectical cha racter which the Scholastic Philosophy assumed. It was the crisis, when the reasonings of individual in quirers ceased to be simply expressions of personal contemplations, but were pursued on a systematic plan, that combined in it, the restless impatience of the human mind, and the arbitrary determinations of the spiritual authority ; that made Heresy itself the handmaid of orthodoxy ; like the fable, which would represent pleasure and pain linked together by the heads, as the means of neutralizing their opposition %. Why this Philosophy assumed the particular form which it actually exhibits ; — by what means Ari stotle became the great oracle of the system, super seding the more theological Philosophy of Plato ; — and the general character imparted to the Theology of the Western Church from that circumstance; will be the subjects of consideration in my next Lecture. ** Platon. Phaed. c. 9. LECTURE IL FORMATION OF THE SCHOLASTIC THEOLOGY. E SUMMARY. General statement of the evil of a Logical Theology — The Church sanctions the use of Logic only as an art of defence — Platonism the established Philosophy of the Church — An art of Logic indispensable to the speculating Christian in the West — Division of the Sciences in the middle age — Tendency of the age to blend all into a metaphysical Logic, or Dialectic — Logic perverted into a Science of Investigation — Obstructions to the real improvement of Logic — Ignorance of Aristotle's writings in themselves — Importance of the writings of Boethius — Effect of the Crusades in opening fresh sources of knowledge — Progress of Scholasticism illustrated in the division of parties into No minalists and Realists — Triumph of Realism — Realism, the scientific basis of Scholasticism — Nominalism, the resource of the more liberal speculators — Opposition be tween Duns Scotus, and Ockam — Ascendancy of a Logical Phi losophy evidenced in the subsequent state of knowledge. Theology erected into an exact demonstrative Science — its Principles drawn from the incomprehensible nature of the Di vine Being — Regard to Authority maintained, by assigning Faith as the preliminary to the whole Speculation — Aristotle's Phi losophy applied as a method of eliciting the Divine truths in volved in the Scripture — This resulted in a combination of the Ideal Theory of Platonism with the Sensualism of Aristotle's Philosophy — Logic the instrument in effecting this result — Union of Mysticism and Argumentation in the Scholastic writ ings — Abuse by the Schoolmen of the disputatious form of Aristotle's writings. Fundamental errors of Scholastic Theology, i . its neglect of the Historical Nature of the Christian Scriptures — consequent loss of the real instruction contained in them — 2. their Rhe torical nature also overlooked in an exclusive attention to the mere words of revelation. — 3. their Ethical lessons also dis paraged in the pursuit of theoretic truth. E 2 Acts XIX. 8— n. And he went into the synagogue, and spake boldly for the space of three months, disputing and persuading the things concerning the kingdom of God. But when divers were hardened, and believed not, but spake evil of that way before the multitude, he departed from them, and separated the disciples, disputing daily in the school of one Tyrannus. And this continued by the space of two years ; so that all they which dwelt in Asia heard the word of the Lord Jesus, both Jews and Greeks. Elcre\da>v be els rr\v avvayayriv, k'napp-qo-L&^eTO, km p,rjvas Tpeis biaKeyofxevos, kcll ireCOoov tcl irepl ttjs /3acrtXet'as tov ®eov. '£ls oe rives eo-KXrjpvvovro koX ryneLQovv, naicoXoyovvTes ttjv obbv kvanrtov tov irKrjOovs, airocrTas am avru>v, acpcopiae tovs p.a6r)Tas, kas. Introgressus autem synagogam, cum fiducia loquebatur per tres menses, disputans et suadens de regno Dei. Cum autem quidam indurarentur, et non crederent, maledicen- tes viam Domini coram multitudine, discedens ab eis, segregavit discipulos, quotidie disputans in schola tyranni cujusdam. Hoc autem factum est per biennium, ita ut omnes, qui habitabant in Asia, audirent verbum Domini, Judaei atque Gentiles. Lat. Vulg. LECTURE II. IN my first Lecture, I have endeavoured to shew the origin of the Scholastic Philosophy, in the pecu liar circumstances of the Latin Church ; that it was such a system, as naturally grew out of the struggle continually subsisting in the West between Reason and Authority. I now purpose to explain the na ture of that Philosophy itself, when it became the acknowledged system of the Church ; to give some account of its formation ; and of the general cha racter of the Theology resulting from it. The subject immediately before us, is one of the most serious interest to all, who have a just concern for the maintenance of sound practical Christianity. We are now tracing to its origin that speculative logical Christianity, which sur vives among us at this day ; and which has been in all ages, the principal obstacle, as I conceive, to the union and peace of the Church of Christ. To some indeed the assertion may even seem strange, that the cause of Christianity has suffered to such extent, from the logical character of the speculations adopted into its system. They may readily admit in general terms, that the intermixture of any spe culation whatever with the body of religious truth, must be detrimental to that truth. But they may not be aware, at the same time, of the mischief E 3 54 LECTURE II. arising from the purely logical character of the spe culation. It will be the object of the whole of the present course of Lectures, to point out this mis chief. But in order that I may carry my hearers along with me throughout in my design, I would place in front of the observations now to be sub mitted, the nature of that evil which Scholasticism embodies in it, — the evil of a Logical Theology. If it be inquired then, why a Logical Theology should be injurious to the cause of Christian truth, we must seek an account of the case, not in the association of any particular truths of human reason with those of revelation, but in the simple fact of the irrelevance of all deduction of consequences to the establishment of religious doctrine. The Scrip ture intimates to us certain facts concerning the Divine Being : but conveying them to us by the medium of language, it only brings them before us darkly, under the signs appropriate to the thoughts of the human mind. And though this kind of knowledge is abundantly instructive to us in point of sentiment and action ; teaches us, that is, both how to feel, and how to act, towards God; — for it is the language that we understand, the language formed by our own experience and practice ; — it is altogether inadequate in point of Science. The most perfect reasonings founded on the terms of theological propositions, amount only to evidences of the various connexions of the signs employed. We may obtain by such reasonings, greater precision in the use of those signs. But the most accurate LECTURE II. 55 conclusion still wants a key to interpret it. There must be in fact a repeated revelation, to authorize us to assert, that this or that conclusion represents to us some truth concerning God. If then it should appear, that the Scholastic Phi losophy was in its fundamental character, a Logical Theology, the nature of that evil which it has im ported into Religion, will be sufficiently apparent. And antecedently to our entering into the examin ation of particular points, the reason will be seen in general, of that vast apparatus of technical terms* which Christian Theology now exhibits. It will appear, that, whilst theologians of the schools have thought they were establishing religious truth by elaborate argumentation, they have been only mul tiplying and arranging a theological language. Nor let it be thought that the evil has rested here ; — that the mere futility of the process has worked its own antidote. Experience tells us that it has not rested here. The signs have been con verted into things. The combination and analysis of words which the Logical Theology has produced, have given occasion to the passions of men, to arm themselves in defence of the phantoms thus called into being. Not only have professed theologians, but private Christians, been imposed on, by the specious religion of terms of Theology ; and have betrayed often a fond zeal in the service of their idol-abstractions, not unlike that of the people of old, who are said to have beaten the air with spears, to expel the foreign gods by whom their E 4s 56 LECTURE II. country was supposed to be occupied3- For my part, I believe it to be one of the chief causes of the infidelity which prevails among speculative men. Notions are proposed to them, which they feel them selves competent to examine with freedom ; because they have an instinctive perception of the source from which they are derived. Every one who re flects at all, has some knowledge of metaphysical truth ; for it is the truth that is most intimate with him. And when a reflecting person, accordingly, has notions proposed to him, which he finds to be part of the internal stock of principles belonging to his nature, he is led to compare them with each other, to discern contrarieties, and to reject what perplexes and confounds him. Premising these observations, with the view of keeping steadily before the attention, the object, not only of this Lecture in particular, but of the whole course ; and as a general index to the re marks which I shall be continually directing to the same point ; I proceed now, to give a sketch of the progress of Christian Theology to that state, from which the evil consequences adverted to, have flowed. These evil consequences have long been fully ac knowledged in the parallel case of Physical Science. It has been admitted there, that conclusions from abstract terms, are no valid indications of facts in nature. May we hope, that the time will come, when the like will be as fully, and as practically, admitted in Theology ! a Herodotus, in his account of the Caunians. LECTURE II. 57 " Time was," says a Greek Father b, " when " things with us were flourishing and well-ordered; " when this exquisiteness, and precision, and tech- " nicality, of Theology, had not so much as access " to the divine courts ; when the saying or hearing " any thing of subtilty, was accounted the same as " playing tricks with pebbles that deceive the sight " by sleight-of-hand, or as imposing on spectators in " dancing with various and effeminate inflexions ; " when simplicity and ingenuousness of expression " had the estimation of piety. But from the time " of the Sexti and the Pyrrhos, the tongue of " antithesis c, like some grievous and malignant " plague, has insinuated its corruption into our " Churches, and frivolity has been considered eru- " dition ; and, as the Book of the Acts says, we " spend our time in nothing else but in telling or " hearing something new d." In this passage, Gregory Nazianzen, writing dur ing the keen agitation of the Arian disputes, is ex pressing his strong dislike of that disputatious logic, which had proved an active weapon of disturbance t> Gregor. Nazianz. Orat. XXI. p. 380. ed. Prun. Paris, 1609; also Orat. XXIII. p. 422.— Note A. Lecture II. c Antithesis was the favourite expedient of the heretic Mar cion. By stating antitheses, or contrarieties, in the Old and New Testaments, Marcion wished to prove, that the God of the Jews was distinct from the God of the Christians. See TertuUian adv. Marcion. lib. I. c. 11. lib. II. c. 29. — The ex pression appears to be drawn from the ancient Physical Phi losophy, in which the doctrine of Contrarieties was a funda mental principle. d Note B. 58 LECTURE II. to the Church. Early in the Latin Church, in the writings of TertuUian, we find the like remon strances against the dialectical warfare with which heresy assailed the doctrine of the Trinity d. From other ecclesiastical writers also, many passages might be collected to a similar purport. And yet the great Father of Latin orthodoxy, Augustine, expressly di rects the Christian student to acquaint himself with the discipline of disputation, the Logic or Dialectic of those times ; characterizing it, as available for " the penetration and solution of all kinds of ques- " tions in sacred literature ;" and only cautioning against " a passion for wrangling, and a childish " sort of ostentation of deceiving an adversary13." To logical science, in fact, simply considered as an art of defence, as a discipline of disputation ap plicable to the service of orthodoxy, there was never any indisposition on the part of the Church author ities. The most violent declaimers against the re finements of logic are often, on the contrary, exam ples of the most strenuous and undaunted argumen tation in their own writings. As defenders of the sacred truth, they would justify themselves by an appeal to the manner and the precept of the Scrip tures. The Epistles, it would be observed, were for the most part works of controversy. St. Paul is ll Tertull. de Praescript. Haer. c. vii. p. 205. fol. e Sed disputationis disciplina ad omnia genera quaestionum quae in literis Sanctis sunt, penetranda et dissolvenda, et pluri- mum valet : tamen ibi cavenda est libido rixandi, et puerilis quaedam ostentatio decipiendi adversarium. August, de Doctr. Christ, lib. II. c. 31. LECTURE II. 59 particularly represented in the passage of the Acts, which I have already read, and in other places, as " disputing and persuading the things concerning " the kingdom of God '." The word " disputing" — in the original, SiaAe-yo^ews* — would be recognised as the technical term, by which the Greeks denoted their familiar exercise of philosophical discussion ; and which gave the name of Dialectic to their ori ginal logical science. Again, in the conversations of our Saviour himself, traces would be found of the argumentative method of the ancient Schools : such as the dilemma respecting the baptism of John?: and the mode in which he sometimes evades a par ticular question, by putting a question in return. To the same purport would be interpreted, the de scription of him in the midst of the Jewish Doctors, hearing them, and asking them questions h. Such passages as these are expressly referred to, indeed, by theological writers, in order to prove, that the science of argumentation is a just accomplishment of the Christian, who would " give a reason of the " hope that is in him." Still more, the word Logos ' Note C. s This instance is still more striking when we refer to the Greek, Matt. xxi. 24. ''Epa-r^ru w*a; Kq.yu Xoym ha — expressions which remind us of the Socratic method of disputation — the erotetic method by which the Greek sage used to extort the truth from his reluctant opponent in argument. See also Matt. xxii. 41—46. 11 'EitepwuvTa. Luke ii. 46. Duodecim annos Salvator imple- verat, et in templo senes de quEestionibus legis interrogans, magis docet, dum prudenter interrogat. Hieronym. Epist. ad Paulin. p. 6. Opera, Vol. I. 60 LECTURE II. has been singled out for especial remark ; and1 its application to Christ, as the Reason or Wisdom, and Word, of God, has been cited, as an account of the connexion of Logic, the science of words and rea sons, with Christian Theology1. It would appear, therefore, that the authorities of the Church objected only to the employment of logic in discussing questions of religion, when it was found a vexatious instrument in the hands of the heretic. Where the disputant professed an agreement with the prescriptive views of the Church, there was no objection in this case to the use of subtilties, which otherwise incurred the severity of reprobation and invective. Even sophisms, it was conceded, might be rightly employed, where the design was, to esta blish the orthodox truth, and subvert the false and delusive conclusions of heresy '**. Thus was a kind of Lacedaemonian policy pursued in regard to the cultivation and exercise of logical science in the Church. The member of the spiritual common wealth was trained to acts of hostility against the stranger and the enemy, but was most inconsistently expected to live in quietness and inaction at home. The whole institution was for war abroad ; whilst he was strictly prohibited from displaying the skill which he had acquired, in any occasion of domestic grievance. The natural consequence was, that, as the Spartan was restless within his own territory, so the Christian logician was ever impatient to exert 1 Note D. k Note E. LECTURE II. 61 ¥ his disciplined acuteness within the pale of the ChUrch itself. Aristotle had been the great authority of some of the early heretics. The speculations on the Trinity, introduced by Artemon and Theodotus in the Und century, were imputed to their study of Aristotle, amongst other philosophers and authors of exact science l. A prejudice against Aristotle appears to have been created from that circumstance among the professors of Christianity ; so far, that " Aristo telic subtilty" was the familiar expression for a minute and captious logic ; and the name of the philosopher himself became almost a by- word for the master and guide of each adventurous reasoner in Theo logy m. Unjust and unreasonable as this imputation was, it undoubtedly had its weight. It is enough to give a name to any matter of objection, for the many to join in the clamour against what they have not examined, or have no disposition to examine. Thus a traditional dislike to the logic, or rather the philosophy in general, of Aristotle; — for he was chiefly known as a logical Philosopher; — descended from the early ages of the Church ; and his philo sophy, accordingly, had to fight its way to the throne, which it afterwards occupied with an undisputed, unlimited, dominion. So far, indeed, as Philosophy was owned by the Church, the Platonism of Alexandria was the ascend ant system. The piety of Platonism, its abstracted- 1 Note F. m Note G. 62 LECTURE II. ness from the visible world, its elevation of the moral sentiments, recommended it forcibly to the imagination and the feelings of the contemplative theologian. It appeared eminently, in contrast with other systems, a knowledge of divine things ; a knowledge, which led the mind to " acquaint itself " with God, and be at peace." The Aristotelic Phi losopher was regarded as a profane intruder, bring ing the noisy jargon of the world into a sanctuary, where every thought and feeling should be hushed in holy contemplation. The busy spirit of the Latin Churchman was a strong counteraction to this mys ticism. Still the expressed partiality of Augustine for the philosophy of Plato, combined with the in vectives against Aristotle, thrown out from time to time, had established that philosophy, in name at least, as the orthodox system of the Western Church ". But whatever were the objections to Aristotle, and to the art with which his name was associated, it was impossible that logical science could remain dormant in such a state of things, as that which the Christian Church presented in the middle age. The principles which I pointed out in my former Lec ture, as conspiring to the rise of the Scholastic Philosophy, the liberty of individual mind, and the restraint of spiritual authority, would necessarily force the mind into an artificial method of philoso phizing. The intellect was in a situation, analogous to that of a heart cut off from all that used to give " Note H. LECTURE II. 63 play to its feelings, and turning inwardly to feed on itself. An art of Logic answered these internal cravings of the mind. It enabled the mind, to wan ton within the limits of prescribed hypotheses, and to indulge in excursions which gave at least the semblance of freedom to its efforts. Here was the fundamental grievance, which led the intellectual Christian of the middle age to cultivate a subtile logic ; and raised the name of Aristotle to that dreary eminence, from which he looks down on the subject realms of Scholasticism. The arts indeed were divided into different de partments of study. The mystical number of Seven completed the enumeration of them : but even in this narrow range there was sufficient to exercise and discipline the intellect, had they been independ ently pursued. The three first, technically called the Trivium, were Grammar °, Logic, Rhetoric ; forming together the elementary instruction of the Schools. The remaining four, under the corre sponding name of the Quadrivium, or the Ma- thesis, being Arithmetic, Geometry, Music p, Astro logy % were the studies of the proficient. In fact, however, no one of these sciences was independently ° John of Salisbury gives an interesting account of what was taught under the name of Grammar, in what he says of Bernard of Chartres, in his Tract entitled Metalogicus, lib. I. cap. 24. p. 780. — Note I. p On the connexion of Music with Theology see Abelard, In- trod. ad Theol. lib. I. Oper. p. 1017. — Note J. *" Astrology was the name for what we now call Astronomy, as well as for the mystical art of divination by the stars. 64 LECTURE II. pursued. All were studied in subservience to Theo logy ; as subordinate sciences, handmaids, and mi nisters, to Theology, the queen-science, to which all owed obeisance and service. The result was, of course, that no one science was studied perfectly, or on its own principles ; and soon, all were absorbed in one vast speculative system, in which Logic took the lead ; but of which the constituent principles were, an abstruse system of Metaphysics drawn from the philosophy of Language. The neglect into which the different arts fell in process of time, is important to be observed ; for it marks the direction, in which the efforts of specula tion were then tending. The mind seized on every subject, in order to convert it into theological specu lation. Logic, consequently, became more than a mere instrument of disputation. It was converted into a method of philosophy, an instrument for in vestigating truth. As one of the Seven Arts, it was neglected, no less perhaps than the rest. There was no searching into its principles, with the view of ascertaining a just theory of argumentation. Its exaltation to the rank of the science of Investiga tion, left the fields of its own proper region unculti vated, amidst the vain ambition of conquests over the empire of science. As an organ of philosophy, it was explored only in its connexion with meta physical truth ; as it serves, that is, to unravel those associations of thought, of which it is the key, so far as it is the result of them, — an effect produced by the mind's operation within itself. LECTURE II. 65 It is obvious, that the study of a Science solely with a view to a particular object, and that too an object not strictly connected with it, must narrow and corrupt it. A very cursory survey of the Dialectic of Damascenus will shew, to what a di minutive outline the noble Science of Aristotle had dwindled, in the Greek Church of the VHIth cen tury. We find there, no longer an enlarged phi losophy of language, but mere Terminology ; a col lection of technical terms, explained, in immediate application to their theological use, and by way of Introduction to Theology. Such, in a still greater degree, was the Logic of the Latin schools. It was only indeed at the time of Cicero, that Aristotle's writings were brought to light, from the long ob scurity in which they were buried. And it is not asserting too much to say, that, even had the Ro mans been disposed to encourage a speculative phi losophy, there was then no one competent, either justly to value, or fully to explain, his logical doc trines. An art of logic had long been current in use, the Dialectic of the Stoics, which, so far from opening the mind to the reception of a truly phi losophical method, had diverted men from the right pursuit, had prejudiced them with wrong notions of the science. If Aristotle therefore were studied, it would naturally be such portions of his Logic, as coincided, or seemed to coincide, most with the existing imperfect views. Hence the almost ex clusive study among the Latins of his treatise en titled, The Categories, or Predicaments. Though F 66 LECTURE IL other treatises of his Logic were translated into Latin, these soon fell into disuse. A compendium of Dialectic, founded on the Categories of Aristotle, and passed under the name of Augustine, became the ordinary text-book, from which the whole sci ence was professed to be taught in the Latin schools, down to the end of the XHth century. Other ab stracts of logic, drawn from Boethius, Cassiodorus, and Capella, appear also to have been used ; and each distinguished master, probably, composed his own treatise of the art. But all were confined to the same meagre technicalities, which alone accorded with the corrupt theological taste of the times. Whilst indeed the Church-authorities so jealously watched the progress of logical speculation, the writings themselves of Aristotle lay under a ban of exclusion. Some of his treatises were actually coupled in the same sentence which branded the heretical disputer : — such was the prevailing ignorance, even at the University of Paris, the principal school of the Latin world, respecting the contents of those volumes, which alone developed the principles of the philosopher, of whom all professed themselves the disciples r. This ignorance, and the fear resulting from it, were the result of that state of things, in which we find the Latin Church after the division of the Em pire. Reduced to an infrequent intercourse with Greece, the Latin lost not only the knowledge, but the language itself, of philosophy. He could no '* Note K. LECTURE II. 67 longer avail himself of the treasures of Greek wis dom in their own authentic depositories, but was obliged to have recourse to the secondary channel of translations and commentaries in the Latin lan guage. The very professors of science fell into a decrepitude of learning, which needed every auxiliary to its feebleness. It was the noble conception of the admirable Boethius to have repaired this loss to the Latin world, and to have transfused into their own tongue the principal documents of Greek philosophy ; not only by translations, but by his own writings. He applied himself to this vast undertaking, with a spirit worthy of the best days of Rome, and a talent for philosophy, cultivated by hearing the last suc cessors of Plato and Aristotle, on the classic ground itself where those philosophers had taught. Un happily however, cut off by the cruel jealousy of the Emperor Theodoric, in the midst of his patri otic and gentle labours, he lived only to bequeath to the Christians of the West an inconsiderable portion of these comprehensive designs. But what Boethius accomplished served, in fact, to maintain the tradition of Philosophy, through the dark period consequent on the opening of the Vlth century, to the days of its incipient regeneration in the VHIth. He was, to the Latin Science, what Augustine was, to the Latin Theology s. His writ- s Augustine knew nothing of the Greek Philosophy but through translations. He had disliked and neglected the study of Greek in his youth ; and his mature age called him to prac- F 2! 68 LECTURE II. ings were the foundation on which the Scholastic Philosophy afterwards reared its complex system; so far as they presented an example to the Latin Church, of that eclectic philosophy of the New-Pla tonists, which combined the logic and metaphysics of Aristotle with the fundamental theories of Plato. The Latin Christians then, confined by the policy of their Church, as well as by the circumstances of the times, within the narrow boundaries of the Latin Philosophy, became necessarily mere sciolists in the very art which they ostentatiously professed. In the XHIth century however a marked im provement is discernible. The Western Church feels the influence of that general excitement and renovation of society, which the transportation of Europe into Asia by the first Crusades had pro duced. An ardour is revived for the recovery of the monuments of Greek Philosophy ; and several of Aristotle's treatises, which had been unknown or forgotten in the schools of the West, are now brought home to the inquisitive Latin. An im portant accession is made to the stock of Latin literature, by translations from the works of Ara bian philosophers, who had laboured in the exposi tion of Aristotle's doctrines. The genius of the Arab, wild and waste as his own plains, imparts the touch of its metaphysical enthusiasm to the reanimated spirit of the Latin schools t. And thus at length Scholasticism, rich with the Aristotelic cal labours of another kind. See his Confessions, lib. I. c. 14. VII. c. 9. VIII. c. 2. t Note L. LECTURE II. 69 spoils gathered by other hands, attains its fulness of stature, as a logical philosophy, the interpreter at once of Revelation and of Nature. In the meantime however irregular efforts were continually made towards an enlargement of the basis of the Dialectical Science professed in the Schools, and to introduce the Logic of Aristotle himself11. Whilst some obstinately adhered to the existing narrow system, content with the little sphere in which they could exert a feeble talent with address and applause ; or apprehensive of danger from any experiment of improvement ; there were others of vigour and penetration of mind, be yond the horizon which limited their excursions, or bold enough to risk the imputation of heresy in their adventurous pursuit of the truth. The question debated between the Nominalists and Realists is a striking instance of this fact ; and is of great importance consequently in tracing the progress of philosophy among the Latins to its ultimate development in the Scholastic system. Unfortunately, there are no extant writings of Roscelin, the ostensible head of the Nominalists of the Xlth century ; so that it is scarcely possible to ascertain what his precise opinion was. The evi dent cause however of that violence with which his logical theory was attacked, was, its supposed con sequences in theology. He was accused of having taught, that in expressing the doctrine of the Tri nity, we might say three Gods, with as much pro- 11 Note M. F 3 70 LECTURE II. priety as we say there are three Persons; if the former were only sanctioned by the usage of speech. Anselm of Canterbury, himself an acute reasoner, to whom the opinion of Roscelin was reported as a matter of heresy, had the candour to suspect the Justness of the imputation x. But as the oracle of orthodoxy of his time, Anselm still felt himself called upon to check the progress of the heretical logic. By his active vigilance, both as a writer and a governor of the Church, the offending Nominalist was silenced. But not so the cause itself of Nomi nalism. This had too deep a seat in the requisi tions of the human mind in that age ; it shrank from the gaze of orthodoxy; but it still grew in the shades of the Schools. The triumph of Realism is particularly to be noticed here, as an instance of the very same prin ciple which had given its general mould to the Scholastic System. It was Philosophy held in sub ordination to Church-Authority. It was that view of the origin of human knowledge which carried men from efforts of self-information, from examin ation of nature to repose on principles infused into the mind by dictation from others. This theory, by assigning, what metaphysicians call an objective reality, to the general notions of the mind, made the whole of our knowledge deducible from abstract ideas. A dictatorial and a speculative Theology readily combined with such a theory. Men were x Note N. LECTURE II. 71 thus taught, to distrust the senses ; to distrust con clusions from mere experience ; and to rely only on the clear consequences of unquestioned speculative principles. It was the maxim, Invisibilia non de- cipiunt, made the ground of alliance between Re ligion and Philosophy. Nominalism, on the contrary, by denying any objective reality to general notions, led the way directly to the testimony of the senses and the conclusions of experience. Though in the Scholastic age itself, the whole consequences of that theory of human knowledge might not be per ceived, it would lead men certainly, even in that dark period, to think more for themselves — to ex amine their own convictions — to look to the exter nal evidence by which any given assertion might be supported. For if it were admitted, that the notions of the mind, expressed by general terms, were not the actual representatives of objects exist ing out of itself, men would no longer depend on abstractions, as their sure and only means of know ledge. They would doubt the physical truth of con clusions resting solely on such evidence ; and would be disposed at least to seek some ground of belief elsewhere. The validity of an appeal to experience would, of course, be but tremblingly entertained at such a period, amidst the complete general subjugation of the intellect to the force of Religious Authority. And we shall not be surprised therefore, that the Nominalists of that day, or of the following century, did not push their theory to its full consequences >r. y Note O. F 4 72 LECTURE II. The triumph of Realism is coincident with the ascendancy of the Scholastic Philosophy. It is just at this point, that the maturity of the struggle be tween Reason and Authority was consummated. Albert and Aquinas, by adopting the Realist doc trine, gave its proper philosophical basis to Scho lasticism. Before the middle of the XIHth century, when these great authors of the system flourished, it could not be considered as having obtained any definite scientific character. The ground-plan of such a mode of speculation had been previously sketched, with more or less distinctness, and parti cularly, by Anselm, Abelard, and Lombard. But these established the Principle, on which the specu lation should henceforth proceed ; gave it a body and a system, working out the original faint out line from the more extensive materials supplied to their hands. The conflicts of argument at an earlier period, shew the unsettled state of opinion as to the prin ciple of the system, which those several efforts were tending to erect. The questionings of the IXth century on the nature of Christ's Presence in the Eucharist, evince a doubt as to the point where the evidence of the senses ends, or how far such evi dence might be admitted against internal convictions of the mind. Here the original Platonism of the Church ruled the case. A Real Presence was as serted, which implied the deceptiveness of the senses z- Whilst however this decision prevailed, it z In the Catechismus ad Parochos, the direction is given to LECTURE II. 73 did not pass, we may observe, without a counter- appeal on the part of the disputant of that age, to the validity of the testimony so imperiously set aside. As we glance through the Xlth and Xllth cen turies, we perceive the philosophical character of Scholasticism coming more into view. In its pro gress through that period, it exhibits not so much the literary form as the professorial. We find in dividuals eminent for their talents as lecturers, like the Sophist of old, leading after them, by the charm of their voice a, troops of sequacious hearers, as they went from place to place. This was a state of ef fervescence. What was wanting evidently for the literary perfection of the system, was a more ex tensive acquaintance with the stores of ancient phi losophy. Individuals were vaguely seeking rather to originate systems of their own, than working on any established method. But the Scholasticism of Albert and Aquinas being once recognised as the philosophy of the Church, we find the same spirit in action, which had originally given truth to Scholasticism itself. No minalism seemed to be silenced ; but it was only to recruit its vigour, and to struggle more effectually the ministers of Religion, to withdraw their flocks, as much as possible, from attending to the judgment of the senses. — Curan- dum igitur est, ut fidelium mentes, quam maxime fieri potest, a sensuum judicio abstrahantur ; atque ad immensam Dei vir- tutem et potentiam contemplandam excitentur. Catech. ad Paroch. p. 195. ed. 4to. Romae. a Plato, in the Protagoras. — Note P. 74 LECTURE II. against the ascendant doctrine of the Realists. John Duns Scotus, and William Ockam, the two most distinguished names of the following period, are the personal representatives of the rival theories as then subsisting in the philosophy of the Schools b. Ockam, indeed, has obtained a merited celebrity by the title of the second founder of the school of No minalism ; and from having, on that account, in curred the condemnation of the ruling party in the Church ; of the University at least of Paris, the great centre of philosophical orthodoxy in those times c. It is evident that, now that a proper Church-Philosophy had been established, Nominal ism was to the present system, what the previous efforts of speculation had been, when the objection was to all speculation whatever. It was regarded as hostile to reasonings, on which a systematic per fection had been given to the Christian truths. It is remarkable however, as illustrative of the ma turity of the School-Theology ; of its perfect trans formation, that is, into a Logical Philosophy ; that Nominalism was maintained by Ockam, rather as a question of Philosophy than of Theology d. Prac tically he was a Realist, no less than his Master Duns Scotus, whom he strenuously opposes in theory : since we find both equally pursuing the track of their predecessors, not only in the dry syl logistic form of their arguments, but in the import- b John Duns Scotus taught at Cologne in 1308. — William Ockam died in 1343. c Note Q. a Note R. LECTURE II. 75 tance attributed by them to abstract notions in their respective speculations. The XlVth century in fact, though it witnessed the revival and spread of Nominalism, the germ of a future revolution in science, exhibits precisely that state of learning and literature, which might be expected from the established ascendancy of a Logical Philosophy. The dominion of a sterile principle is shewn, in the blank waste which the fields of knowledge present ; in the no-harvest pro duced from even that happier soil on which the hand of Roger Bacon e had laboured. The senten tious philosophy extracted from the writings of Aristotle was wonderfully attractive to the sciolists of the day; as it furnished them with an ample nomenclature of science, and enabled them to pro nounce with little effort on every point of specula tion. It was attractive also to the gifted spirits of the age ; for they would see, that there was enough deeply to interest and exercise the highest intellect, in the questions excited by that master of exact thoughts and comprehensive views. Whilst the former class could thus readily fill the schools with a wordy war, the latter spent their strength in mi nute speculations subservient to the dominant spirit of Scholastic Logic. Thus was the state of things immovable for a period. A great effort appeared to have been accomplished; and men rested for a while, in devout admiration and self-complacency at what they had gained ; more oppressed by the vast e Roger Bacon, born 12 16, died 1294. 76 LECTURE II. stores which had crowded on them, than able to apply these treasures to any solid account. This state of quiescence sufficed however for the perpetuity of the Aristotelic Philosophy in the West, even after the revolutions of science which characterized the following centuries. It is not with a logical philosophy, as with any other system. A particular theory in metaphysics, or physics, may have its day and pass away. But a science, which is an universal method — which is carried into every subject — particularly one like this, entering into the vitals of Religion, and entwining itself with a para sitical fondness round the majestic body of sacred truth — cannot be dispelled altogether by any re formation. It becomes part, not only of the scien tific language of a people, but the idiom in which they express their ordinary ideas. This has been eminently the case with the philosophy of Ari stotle, in its transition through the schools of the middle age. It is in the very air of our social life. Its legend, though worn, is not effaced from the current coin of our philosophy and our theology. On the present occasion, we are concerned with its influence on our Theology : or to state it more explicitly, with the traces of itself, which it has left on the terms familiarly employed in our creeds and articles and expositions of religion. With a view to this result, I shall now give some account of the general character of Theology, as moulded by the disputations of the Schools. LECTURE II. 77 The tendency of the whole system which we have been reviewing, was, to erect Theology into a perfect Science. It set out with the design of en abling the Christian, when assailed on points of heresy, or perplexed with questionings as to truths simply proposed to his belief, to give a reason of the doctrines of his Faith. Assuming that matters of Faith might become matters of understanding to those who believed; it attempted to establish, by processes of reasoning from given principles of Theology, each doctrine of Religion, independently of the sacred authority on which it rests in the Scripture. Arguments, proposed originally as an swers to an opponent, and availing properly only, as solutions of particular objections, or refutations of particular statements, were applied as grounds of evidence, for the establishment of the truth uni versally. And thus a vast collection of principles was obtained, from which conclusions in Theology might be drawn. At length Theology rose into a regular demonstrative science, built up on axioms of metaphysics, and cohering in all its parts by the cement of logical connexion f. Rightly to conceive the nature of this scientific or logical Theology, we must divest our minds of that popular notion of Science, which modern im provements in Philosophy have introduced. It is not the reduction and classification of facts, which was understood as Science by the Scholastic Phi losopher. His notion of Science was deduced from f Note S. 78 LECTURE II. the ancient philosophy, which considered no know ledge worthy of the name, but such as rested on fixed indisputable principles; — not, as those collected from experience and observation, open to exception and contradiction from varied and conflicting ex periences ; — but possessing an intrinsic necessary evidence ; of the nature, that is, of mathematical truth. When Theology then was exalted by the Schoolmen to the rank of the queen-science, and viewed as containing in it the primary truths of all knowledges; it was conceived to be the science of necessary principles, on which the mind reposed with the fullest confidence, as impossible to be otherwise than they are, and therefore affording a sure ground for the conclusions of reason. But to the Christian speculator, under such a method, these principles would, of course, be sought nowhere else, but in the Divine Being himself. He who alone " changes not," would naturally be the point of departure in such a philosophy. His nature and attributes, so far as they were explained by the light of reason, or revealed by the illumination of Scripture, would alone present to the inquirer that immobility and eternity and absolute priority of truth, of which he was in quest. b Secundum hoc quaerit sermocinales et logicas scientias, ut ancillentur ad sciendi adminiculum et modum, sive addiscendi. .... Impossibile est, quod haec scientia finem in aliis scientiis habet; sed ipsa finis aliarum scientiarum est, ad quam omnes alias referuntur ut ancillae. Albert. Mag. in Lib. Sent. Tract. II. qu. vn. fol. 7. — Also Aquin. S. Theol. Ima P. qu. 1. art. 5. LECTURE II. 79 It was a circumstance favourable to this scientific Theology, that what the ancients called their First Philosophy, or their abstract philosophy of Being, they dignified by the name of Theology h ; placing under this head, the speculation concerning spiritual natures, as well as the science of the principles of the human mind. The application again, of the term Truth to the person of Christ, as also of Wisdom to the knowledge of the most sublime and divine things, (both in the Scripture and in the works of philosophers,) further promoted the erec tion of Christian Theology into that exact theoretic form, which it obtained in the Scholastic system. Originating however in a combination of the judgments of speculative Reason with the prescrip tions of Authority, the system, at its maturity, ex hibits in its internal structure, the result of that conflict of elements, out of which it had grown. Its principles, as I have said, were to be drawn from the nature of the Divine Being ; as the only sure ground on which a Divine and Universal Philosophy could fix its first steps. But where was the evi dence or criterion of the truth of those principles ? Given the nature of the Divine Being ; given the principles themselves immediately as they existed in Him ; there could be no doubt of the truth of the conclusions deduced from them. But it was ad- 11 Est apud eundem Aristotelem, in Imo Metaphysicorum, praeclara disputatio de summa ilia divinaque sapientia, mirifice in Theologiam nostram congruens. Petavii Dogm. Theol. Pro- legom. c. 8. — Also Aquinas, S. Theol. Ima P. qu. i. art. 6. 80 LECTURE II. mitted that the nature of God, as He is in Himself, is incomprehensible by the human faculties ; that we cannot attain in the present life to the knowledge of his essence'. This difficulty might appear in superable. But it was not so to the Schoolman versed in an eclectic philosophy, in which the mysti cism of Plato was blended with the analytical method of Aristotle. The principle of Faith here answered the purpose of solving this speculative difficulty, as well as of securing the prescriptive right of Autho rity. Theology then, as a natural knowledge, could not itself discover and establish the principles on which it reasoned. It might however receive those principles, through Faith, from an higher science, the science or knowledge of God ; as one human science receives its principles from another ; as Music, according to the illustration of Aquinas, as sumes its principles from Arithmetic, or Perspec tive from Geometry k. If we believe the Scripture ' The Scholastics inherited this admission not only from the Platonic philosophy, but from their own early authorities. Hilary has well expressed the truth. — Perfecta scientia est, sic Deum scire, ut, licet non ignorabilem, tamen inenarrabilem scias. Credendus est ; intelligendus est ; adorandus est; et his officiis eloquendus. S. Hilar, de Trin. lib. II. c. 7. torn. II. p. 31. k Quaedam vero sunt, quae procedunt ex principiis notis lu- mine superioris sciential, sicut Perspectiva procedit ex principiis notificatis per Geometriam ; et Musica ex principiis per Arith- meticam notis. Et hoc modo sacra doctrina est scientia, quia procedit ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientiae, quae sci licet est scientia Dei et beatorum. Unde sicut Musicus credit principia tradita sibi ab Arithmetico, ita doctrina sacra credit principia revelata sibi a Deo. Aquinat. Summa Theolog. Prima Pars. qu. 1. art. 2. LECTURE II. 81 accordingly, we may proceed to the exercise of un derstanding: — the authority of Revelation being conceded, Reason has its ground, on which it may build its airy edifice of speculation l. The object accordingly of the Scholastic Theology was, to detect and draw forth from the Scripture, by aid of the subtile analysis of the philosophy of Aristotle, the mystical truths of God, on which the Scripture-Revelation was conceived to be founded. The Scripture itself, addressing us in the language of our natural knowledge, conveys to us the prin ciples of the Divine Science by analogies, which at once intimate the truth, and veil it from human apprehension. Philosophy applied to the Scripture, dispels these shadows with which the truth as now seen is overcast ; removes the veil which now inter cepts our view ; withdraws our attention from the mere symbols and signs ; and brings ultimately be fore the eye of the mind, the mysterious, yet more real, verities of the Divine knowledge. Thus was the Idealism of the Platonic School combined with the Sensualism of the Aristotelic. The principles on which the Scholastic Theology 1 Et ut alia taceam, quibus sacra pagina nos ad investigan- dam rationem invitat ; ubi dicit, " nisi credideritis, non intel- " ligetis," aperte monet, intentionem ad intellectum extendere, cum docet, qualiter ad ilium debeamus proficere. Denique, quoniam inter fidem et speciem, intellectum, quem in hac vita capimus, esse medium intelligo, quanto aliquis ad ilium pro- ficit, tanto eum propinquare speciei (ad quam omnes anhela- mus) existimo. Anselm. De Incarnat. Verbi, praef. p. 33. G 82 LECTURE II. here professed to be based, were no other than the Ideas of the Divine Mind, as assigned by the Pla- tonists of the Alexandrian School. Translated into the language of Aristotle, these Ideas of Platonism became, in the Scholastic system, the Forms of things; — the expression being adopted, by which Aristotle denoted the differences, or characteristics, that distinguish one object from another™. By this substitution of technical phraseology, was the phi losophy of Aristotle brought to the support of a Theory, which in his own writings he has strenu ously condemned as a vain mystification of science. The employment of Logic, as an organ of inves tigation, naturally led to this result. The business in which such a method of philosophizing was really engaged — the utmost that it actually ac complished, amidst all its curiosity and activity — was to frame a science of exact definitions. Logical distinctions and conclusions amount only to an analysis of the notions involved in general terms; and when employed therefore to ascertain the na ture of a thing, terminate in giving a more exact notion of the term by which it is signified. Such in fact was the science of Forms in Aristotle's Phi losophy. They were strictly the logical definitions of the species of things ; limits fixed in the region m Respondeo dicendum, quod necesse est ponere in mente dtvina ideas. Idea enim Graece, Latine forma dicitur. Unde per ideas intelliguntur formae aliquarum rerum, praeter ipsas res existentes, &c. Aquinat. Summ. Theolog. Ima Par. qu. xv. art. i. — Also qu. xliv. art. 3. — Note T. LECTURE II. 83 of the mind alone ; and so far coincident with the Ideas of the Platonists. This then was a neutral ground between the two philosophies, on which the Scholastic Theology took its stand. Here, as in a point of contact, met the theories peculiar to each, to diffuse themselves after wards in a vast system of Realism, that embraced within it the whole world of science. For whilst it was admitted with Aristotle, that our natural know ledge originates in occasions furnished by the ob servations of Sense, this sound experimental phi losophy was absorbed and lost, in the more sublime and mystical science, to which it was held to be the mere introduction, or symbolical language. We may see, at the same time, how the mystical, and the practical character, originally belonging to the Latin Theology, still continued to characterize it, when it assumed the definite form of Scholasti cism. The regard paid by the Schoolmen to the mystical treatises of The Celestial Hierarchy, and The Divine Names, — works, composed probably in the Vth century, but, in the fashion of the age n, " We must not suppose that there was always fraud designed, in such ascriptions of works to venerated names. There pro bably was in this particular case, as it appears to have been a bold effort on the part of the New-Platonism, to establish itself in the Church. But in many cases, the practice appears to have been adopted on rhetorical grounds, to give greater in fluence to the arguments of a work. Alcuin used this method, with a view of exciting emulation of the great writers of anti quity. Gibbon mentions a supplicatory letter of Pope Stephen III, A. D. 754, written in the name and person of St. Peter. Rom. Emp. c. 49- It was in the same taste, that, at one time, G 2 84 LECTURE II. ascribed to Dionysius the Areopagite, the convert of St. Paul at Athens, shews that their system did not recoil even from the most extravagant mysticism of contemplation °. Indeed no further proof of the fact is required, than the commentaries lavished on the Book of the Canticles p, at the different periods of Scholasticism. Still, as we might expect, the practical character is the more apparent. The fore ground is filled with discussion and debate. We find ourselves in the midst of arguers and masters of Theology, to whose reasonings we must listen with a docile attention ; whilst we bow in awe be fore the mystic forms of a piety and a spirituality, which cast their solemn shadows over the scene of disputation. The whole philosophy of Aristotle readily accom modated itself to such a Theology. His physical science is throughout logical, being indeed a body of conclusions from his metaphysical doctrines. writers of the middle age used to assume after their own names, that of some classic author. ° The singular work of Erigena on The Division of Natures, whilst as an original work of Philosophy it exhibited too bold a form of metaphysical speculation for the taste of the Latin Theologian, is an evidence of the strong current with which Platonism flowed in the Western Church in the IXth century. P It is curious to find Jerome, in prescribing a course of edu cation for the infant grand-daughter of Paula, recommending the study of the Canticles, as the ultimate point of her theolo gical progress. Hieronym. Epistol. ad Laetam. Opera, torn. I. p. 57. Bernard has eighty-six Sermons on the Canticles, and these form only an unfinished work. — Note U. LECTURE II. 85 His ethical science, though in its principles founded on fact and observation, is thrown, in its didactic form, into the same logical mould. So that, upon the whole, his Philosophy, in its written form at least, may justly be regarded, as a deduction of given principles to the particulars implied in them ; as a method of establishing truth, by processes of reasoning, by discussion of questions on points of speculation, rather than by interrogation of nature. The method of a Logical Philosophy must con sist chiefly of discussion of opinions. Argument, and not evidence, will be the object of its pursuit. It will be concerned in finding out, what may be unanswerably affirmed, rather than what is the fact and the truth of things. The interminable ques tions of the Schoolmen were but an exaggeration of the method of Aristotle himself; — a depraved ap plication of his maxim, that, " to propose doubts " well i," is of service for the discovery of truth. This mode of proceeding was strictly their philo sophical Analysis : in untying the perplexed knots in which the ingenuity of speculation or fancy might entangle a subject, they were opening, ac cording to their views, the real nature of the sub ject so involved. It was more indeed the example of the Greek Sophists that they followed, than of Aristotle himself in this respect. For though Ari stotle may ascribe too great importance to the dis cussion of logical questions and difficulties, he has q To iMopfrat W.S«. Metaphys. 1. III. c. i.— Also Topic. 1. I.— Ethic. 1. VII. G 3 86 LECTURE II. not so entirely rested the truth of science upon them ; nor has he descended to such frivolities of inquiry. The Schoolmen, however, rest the whole strength of their cause in the determination of questions. Their whole Theology is a congeries of doubts ; the effect of which is to leave the mind in a state of Academic Scepticism, very different from that reasonable satisfaction which is apparently the object of pursuit1-. They readily seized the man ner of the Philosopher, so far as it appeared on the surface of his writings. They pronounced senten- tiously ; but they omitted to philosophize largely. The vast materials through which his research must have extended, were to them a subterranean world, over which they trod with unsuspecting step. What added to their delusion was, that the writings of Aristotle are, for the most part, sug gestive treatises, composed with reference to the oral instruction, with which they were accompanied in their delivery. Appearing consequently in the form of text-books, they were easily converted into authorities, applicable in detached sentences to the decision of each controverted point. In Scholasticism accordingly the Dialectical Art I was all in all. Theology becoming a science founded on Definitions, and being conceived to contain the first principles of all other sciences, was forced to have recourse to the analytical power of Lan- l* See John of Salisbury, Policratic. lib. VIII, c. 6. p. 425. Metalogic. lib. III. pp. 839, 845. — Note V. LECTURE II. 87 guage, the only means of combining into one mass the various incongruous materials usurped into its system. Each term of language being significant of an indefinite number of particulars ; and these par ticulars again, when denoted by words, being each significant of other particulars ; language presents a medium of classification to an indefinite extent. But the very medium of classification thus pre sented, enabling the mind to combine things, in dependently of actual observation of facts with a view to such combination, imposes on us by the subtilty and facility of its application. We believe that we have combined real facts in nature, when we have only explored and marked connexions which our own minds have woven together. Such then was the Theology of the Schools. It is, in effect, what we designate in a word by Real ism — the conversion of mere Logical and Metaphy sical truth into physical — a description, as it were, of the lands and seas of the visible world by an untravelled eye, from a study of the map of the human mind. For whilst some Scholastics pro fessed to disclaim the Realist doctrine, yet, as I have already observed of the great leader of the Nominalists of the XlVth century, all were prac tically Realists in this respect, that they applied the analytical power of language to the interpretation of nature. It may further illustrate the character of a Theology so constructed, to observe the ana logy which it bears to the personifications of heathen mythology. The genius of Paganism seized the G 4 88 LECTURE II. fancy with some image of loveliness or mirth or awe, expressing the tendency of the mind to realize its own abstractions, in the fabled beings of a many- peopled heaven. Scholasticism in like manner has its apotheosis of human ideas ; only that here an exact Logic has worked the transmutation, which Poetry effected in the other. When a Theology of this a priori character was established, it nullified the use of the Scripture as a record of the divine dealings with the successive generations of mankind. The voice of God was no longer heard as it spoke " in sundry times and in " divers manners" to holy men of old ; but simply as uttering the hallowed symbols of an oracular wisdom. The whole of Revelation was treated as one contemporaneous production ; of which the se veral parts might be expounded, without reference to the circumstances in which each was delivered. For what was termed in the Schools, the Analogy of Faith, was not, as might be supposed, an inter pretation of passages relatively to particular periods and particular occasions, but merely the shewing that " the truth of one Scripture was not repugnant " to the truth of another8." The Bible thus lost its most important characteristic in the comparison with other assumed Revelations. The Koran is professedly the effusion of a single writer ; — slowly s Analogia vero est, cum Veritas unius Scripturse ostenditur veritati alterius non repugnare. Aquinas, Summ. Theolog. Ima Par. qu. i. art. io. — Note W. LECTURE II. 89 dealt out indeed at intervals as the calls of imposr ture suggested ; and therefore spread over some period in its actual delivery. But if we compare it with our sacred books in this respect ; in the one, we find a continuous rhapsody unconnected with the solid materials of progressive history ; in the other, we have details of successive events — docu ments of history, of prophecy, and of precept — published at distinct and wide intervals, relating to the history of mankind at large, as well as to that particular people among whom they were pub lished. If now we regard the Scriptures in the way of the Schoolmen, as having God for their proper sub ject, instead of reading them as a divine history of man, we naturally neglect the analogies of times and circumstances. The immutability of the Divine Being, in the contemplation of whom we are then exclusively engaged, is the prevailing object of our inquiry. Distinctions of time lose all their import ance in this point of view. Our business is, to col lect into one theory every scattered intimation of the Divine being and attributes. If on the contrary we take the nature and con dition of man under Divine Providence, as the great subject of our sacred Books, we are as naturally led to study the facts recorded in the Scripture in their real historical place. We then seek to learn, what man has been at the infancy, and at the maturity, of his condition in the world ; how he has been treated by his Creator at different periods, and how he has 90 LECTURE II. responded to that treatment. Hence results an his torical theology, a register as it were of the reli gious conduct of man under the government of God ; and consequently principles of the Divine Character and Government applicable to the future direction of our lives. Such however was not the method of the Schoolmen. They inverted the pro cess, and commenced with those notions in which they should have ended their inquiry. The theology of the Schools involved further a total disregard of the Rhetorical nature of the Scrip tures. In the ascendancy of the spirit of dog matism, every sentiment of holy exhortation, the terrors of rebuke, the winnings of persuasion, the piety of fatherly love, the commands of authority, all disappear, except in the inert tangible material of the words themselves, on which an unfeeling reason may act. I need only advert here to the effect produced on the doctrines of Grace by this intrusive Logic. The truth of the Divine Predes tination has suffered, perhaps more than any other, from being treated in this way. We recoil from the train of consequences which have been de duced from it, and from the subtile speculations by which the notion of it has been attempted to be defined. But read it in the Scripture ; — take it as a word of encouragement, as an unanswerable ap peal to the heart ; — feel it, that is, and be per suaded by it, as an argument of the Holy Spirit pleading with you ; — and then you find, that it has LECTURE II. 91 not been written in vain in the history of God's providences. The subject of the Rhetorical nature of the Scrip tures is of large compass; and one that, from its real importance, deserves a more distinct consider ation than it has yet obtained. I feel convinced that, were due weight given to it in our theological studies, it would tend more than any thing else, to dissipate the wild theories of speculative religion ists, and bring men to the true way of finding out God in the Scriptures. At present however I only allude to it, as the neglect of it was involved in that kind of Theology, which the Schools established. The Schoolmen had a high veneration for the text of Scripture — not inferior, I should say, to that of the most zealous Protestant. But it was an im properly-directed veneration — a reception of the Scripture, not simply as the living word of God, but as containing the sacred propositions of inspired wisdom. We know to what scrupulous nicety the Jews carried their glosses of the older Scriptures. Theirs was a respect simply for the words of God ; not incompatible, as experience proved, with an ac tual nullification of the Divine Word itself. Their Scribes were expert in interpretation and comment, whilst the people wandered as sheep not having a shepherd. Thus did the theologians of the Schools, with dutiful officiousness, gather up the fragments of revealed truth ; but, in the mean time, they lost the opportunity of feeding on the bread of God which came down from heaven. Their piety be- 92 LECTURE II. came a superstition, transubstantiating the truth of God into the verbal elements by which it was sig nified. The preternatural enlargement of the logical powers of the understanding, from being an effect of the discipline of the Scholastic Philosophy, became in its turn a cause of the morbid taste for verbal exposition. The subject and predicate of Scriptural propositions were examined in their respective force of signification, with the view of ascertaining the nature of the things described. This was done in subserviency to the statement of theological defini tion ; to fix exact limits within which the Catholic faith might be included. As heresies multiplied, more and more were such definitions required ; and the verbal analysis of Scriptural propositions was carried on to meet the increasing demand. And thus, out of simple declarations of Scripture, a mass of theories was constructed. In justifying their practice by an appeal to the argumentative charac ter of the Scripture, they forgot to observe, that the Scripture-arguments are arguments of inducement, addressed to the whole nature of man — not merely to intellectual man, but to thinking and feeling man living among his fellow men ; — and to be appre ciated therefore in their effect on our whole nature ¦*. * The remark applies as well to the evidences of Christianity. No one, as far as I am aware, has so stated the force of the Christian argument, except Bishop Butler. In the Chapter on the subject in his Analogy, he points out that the true estimate of the Evidences is in their effect. Each may be answered LECTURE II. 93 They were like critics, examining some work of art in the portions of its composition, and exploring the adjustment of each to a certain standard of ideal perfection, instead of looking at the whole as a pro duction of taste, directed to interest a spectator. From the observations already made, it would appear, that the ethical nature of the Christian Scrip tures had been insufficiently attended to by the Divines of the Schools. Eager to erect their Theo logy into a Philosophy of the Divine Being, they were comparatively indifferent to the humbler truths which lay in the walk of man's every-day life. But they did not at the same time omit the consider ation of human duties ; as I shall have an oppor tunity of shewing on a future occasion. What I would point out now is, the disparagement of Re velation, as a code of moral discipline ; and the exaltation of Theology, in the sense of a Theoretic Science, as the appropriate subject of the Inspired Volumes. This would follow indeed from the in fluence of that dialectical spirit, with which they pursued the whole inquiry into Divine Truth. Con clusions, and not Precepts, or Rules of Conduct, were the object of attention as they read ; and instead separately ; but there is no denying the real effect produced by them as a whole on our complex nature. Whoever has ex amined them must feel that they impress him strongly ; or if he refuses to admit the effect in his own case, he cannot but allow that they are such as to produce an effect on men in general. The last point is enough. 94 LECTURE II. therefore of tracing the coincidence of revealed obli gations with the internal laws of our moral nature, they were intent only on applying the rules ob tained, whether from Scripture or from the works of philosophers, to particular cases, and forming a code of Casuistry rather than a Theory of Moral Sentiments and Duties. Happily for the ethical system of the Schools, the chief human authority followed was that of Aristotle. The sound sense of this philosopher was a corrective to the extrava gancies, into which their religious enthusiasm, or their speculative refinement, separately might have carried them. Fenced within the inclosure of Scrip ture precepts, and under the guidance of Aristotle, they reared a more comprehensive and sober sys tem of morality, than such as would have resulted from their theological opinions alone ; or from the maxims of the Christian moralists who preceded them; or from the condition of social life in the middle ages. LECTURE III. THE TRINITARIAN CONTROVERSIES. SUMMARY. Questions on the Trinity naturally the first to engage the attention of disputants — Their ecclesiastical and political im portance in the early ages — Maintenance of the orthodox doc trine chiefly owing to the Latin Church — Controversies on the subject assume a scientific form in the Scholastic writings — Promiscuous character of Ancient Philosophy exemplified in the discussion — Scholastic system applies the philosophy of mind to the investigation of God from his Effects in the world — Doc trine of the Trinity, in its principle, the ideas or reasons of all existing things, traced to the Intellect of God — Description of the Scholastic mode of rationalizing the doctrine — Orthodox theory of the Divine Procession the exact view of the principle of Causation — Extremes of Sabellianism and Arianism traced to their misconception of this principle — Mischievous effect of the notion, that doctrines must be defended from their specu lative consequences — Influence of Materialism — Rise of a tech nical phraseology — Logical principles employed in settling the precise notions of the different terms introduced — Popular illus trations of the Trinity examples of this mode of philosophizing — Controversies turn principally on the views taken of same ness, unity, diversity, &c. — Differences between the orthodox and the Sabellians and Arians in regard to the Divine Unity — Difficulties produced by the word Persona, obviated by logical distinctions. Illustration of the doctrine of the Incarnation from the prin ciples of the established logical philosophy — It accounts for the differences between the orthodox, the Nestorians, and Euty- chians. Application of this philosophy in the Controversies on the Procession of the Holy Spirit — The words Filioque added to the Nicene Creed — This addition ultimately maintained on logical grounds. General practical reflections — Difficulties on the subject of the Trinity metaphysical in their origin — Popular misappre hension of the Divine Unity an instance of this — The various theories all Trinitarian in principle — Simplicity of belief in Scripture facts, the only escape from perplexity. H Rom. I. 30. The invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead. Ta yap aopara ovtov cnro ktCctkos Koaptov, rots irorfiJ.ao~i voovfj-eva KaOoparat, rjre cdbws ovtov bvvajMs Kai OeioTrjs. Invisibilia enim ipsius, a creatura mundi, per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciimtur ; sempiterna quoque ejus virtus et divinitas. Lat. Vulg. LECTURE III I HE consideration of the Trinitarian controversies naturally takes the lead in the present inquiry. We have seen, that the Scholastic Philosophy had for its basis a theoretic knowledge of the Divine Being ; a knowledge of God as the Highest Cause of all things, the Primary Being in the order of the Uni verse. We have also seen, that it was a system of Realism, employing terms denoting abstractions of the human mind, as the philosophical accounts of processes in nature ; and establishing revealed truths by logical deduction. It was consistent therefore, that theologians, the disciples of such a philosophy, should commence their Books of Sentences, their Sums of Theology, and their Commentaries, with expositions of those First Truths which immediately respect the Divine Being a. The controversies, however, involved in the doc trine of the Trinity, are the least peculiar to the Scholastic Theology, in point of fact. They were a Thus too, not only in the decrees of the Council of Trent, but in our own Articles, the doctrines on this head occupy the first place; the Church of Rome evidently following that method of Theology, which her great Doctors had sanctioned by the authority of their practice ; whilst the Fathers of the Church of England, even in shaking off the spiritual bonds of Rome, were tacitly influenced by the discipline in which their minds had been trained. H 2 100 LECTURE III. congenial indeed to the spirit of that Theology, and presented it with materials, on which it has amply exercised its keen and inexhaustible research. But the outlines were supplied to its hand, by the labours of earlier disputation. It remained only for the Schoolmen, to dilate, to give distinctness, to me thodize objections and replies, and to reduce each member of the disputation to its proper place, in a minutely-articulated system of Theology. This in general is what they have accomplished : and they have accomplished it, we must allow, with extra ordinary penetration, with amazing compass of thought, and, on the whole, with an admirable skill. I speak more particularly of Aquinas, in whom, we see the system, in its utmost perfection of workman ship. The more indeed we study his writings, the less we shall wonder, that the admiration of a spe culative age should have crowned such labours, with the titles of Angelic, Seraphic, Profound, and other similar designations of honour, which distinguish the several leading Doctors of the Schools b These controversies could not fail to attract the curiosity of the Greeks, at an early period of the Gospel. For their Philosophy, in itself a mass of subtile speculation into the nature of Being, was confronted by a system of Theology, declaring facts illustrative of the great First Being, the object of their pursuit, and professing to have surpassed b Aquinas is styled the Angelic Doctor ; Bonaventura, the Seraphic ; Alexander de Hales, the Irrefragable ; Duns Scotus, the Subtile ; &c. LECTURE III. 101 the utmost reach of all former discoveries of the truth. Looking from a distance at the ardour and bit terness, with which minute points of difference were debated, in the several attempts to perfect the theory of the Trinity, we are apt to feel surprise at the extraordinary excitement ; and either to pity, or to smile at, such apparent waste of intellect and energy. But such feelings are awakened only by very super ficial views of the case. Adequately to conceive the interest of theological questions, at the period, when they were most keenly agitated, we must view them under a political aspect. We must imagine, how persons may have felt, whose social existence and importance were regarded as at stake, in any shock to the unity of the Faith. The theory of the Divine Being was eminently that point, in which an unity of opinion was indispensable to the religious society. The smallest discrepancies in this primary article, — the very base on which the society stood combined, — compromised the principle of perfect unity, as really, as the greatest differences. The abstract curiosity of the question itself, and the habit of disputation, contributed, undoubtedly, to give an eagerness, and a relish, to controversies on the Trinity. But these are not sufficient to account for the origin, and the extent, of the interest excited. For the interest evidently was not confined to the Church-leaders : they were fully supported by the spirit existing in the Christian public at large. The profane fami- H 3 102 LECTURE III. liarity, with which articles of the Trinitarian question are said to have entered into the every day conversation of the times, characterizes the general feeling on the subject, at a period, when the Spiritual Polity formed the great common wealth of the Roman world ; and whilst Philo sophy, regarded as identical with Theology, was essentially dialectical or colloquial. There was, in fact, no other topic of such common concern. The national bond of union had been lost in the vague citizenship of the Roman Empire; and that Em pire, now falling into disjointed masses, ceased to possess the charm of a common welfare, or a com mon glory, for the individual members of it. But whilst the fabric of civil society was daily decaying, the principle of religious union, as I pointed out on a former occasion, was diffusing and strengthening itself by sure advances. In such a state of things as this, the bold assertion of its characteristic doc trines, in their points of contrast with the antagonist systems of Judaism and Paganism, would naturally appear. Assertions of its external evidences would diminish ; and its internal system, the theory of the religion, would be brought more prominently into notice. The battle being won, the victors had only to proclaim the name of the Lord in songs of tri umph — to tell it out among the heathen, that He was God alone. It was then, in this day of triumph, that the peculiar notions of God, involved in the in ternal system of Christianity, were freely discussed in writing and in conversation. When friend met LECTURE III. 103 friend, or stranger met stranger, it was the natural inquiry, what was doing in the great religious com monwealth. It was of less consequence, even poli tically, to the mass of the people, what victories, Constantine, or Constantius, might have gained over the arms of Imperial opponents, than to which party of the theological disputants the reigning Emperor inclined. The passionate obstinacy, with which the people of Alexandria, and of Milan, supported the cause of their Prelates, shews, how deeply implicated the fortunes of individuals were, in the decisions of questions on the doctrine of the Trinity. What rendered these disputes more complex, was, that they were agitated, whilst as yet an active intercourse subsisted between the Greek and Latin Churches, as members of one spiritual body. The Latins were unable, on account of " the narrowness " of their language and their poverty of terms c," to reach the precision and compass of the Greek phraseology. But the Greeks, regarding their own tongue as the sacred idiom of philosophy and the ology, strove to impose their own modes of thought, and their very words, on the reluctant sense of the Latins. Even among the Greeks themselves, disputes were multiplied, as each employed the prin cipal terms of the controversy in a strictly philoso phical, or in a popular, acceptation ; as the habits of c Gregory Nazianzen speaks of disputes having been caused, 8ia arevorryra rfjs rrapa tois 'iTaAoir ykarrns, nal bvopArav rreviav. Orat. XXI. p. 46. H 4 104 LECTURE III. thought in individuals, were coloured with Oriental, or Greek, associations. So great indeed were the impediments arising from the varied use of Terms, where the whole discussion was fundamentally dia lectical, that the measure of accommodation be tween those who really agreed with each other, would probably have failed in any other hands but those of Athanasius. The years which that intrepid advocate of orthodoxy spent at Rome during his second exile, when, with the sagacity of Themis- tocles, he studied the language of the party, on whose protection and influence he had thrown him self, gave him a facility for overcoming the existing obstacles from the discordances of language. He seized the points of agreement between the contend ing parties, and, by his wise and conciliatory policy, secured, at least, a standard of orthodoxy for future ages of disputation, both to the East and the Westd- But though Athanasius was the great author of that theoretic agreement, which established the or thodox doctrine of the Trinity ; the maintenance, and diffusion of it, were owing principally to the active zeal of the Latin Clergy. Nothing can de clare this more strongly, than the fact, that the original of the Athanasian Creed is a Latin com position. It is sufficiently remarkable, that eccle- " The works of the Latin Fathers were sometimes translated into Greek. We find Damascenus quoting passages from Am- brosius in Greek. Contra Jacobit. p. 443. Oper. Damasc. In general however the Greeks were ignorant of the Latin literature. —Note A. Lecture III. LECTURE III. 105 siastical history has not been able positively to assign the authorship, or date, of the Creed as a composition e. It appears to me, that the silence re specting the individual author was designed, or at least his name was forgotten, in the wish to give a higher authority to the document; and that its reception by us in its present form, as the " sym- " bol" or " faith" of Athanasius, is an evidence of the triumph of a party in the Church, thus de claring their authoritative judgment, under the sanc tion of a name, which expressed in itself every thing hostile to Arianism f. The Greek placed " the sword of Aristotle" in the hand of the Latin ; but the spiritual legionary of Rome girded it on, and cleft with it the way for the orthodox truth, through the opposing ranks of heresy and infidelity. The jealousy, with which the Latin Church watched " Vigilius of Tapsus, to whom it has been ascribed, is excluded, from the expressions not being those employed by him, in touch ing on the same points. He uses the word, Unio, where the Creed has Unitas. See Le Quien, in Dissert. Damascen. prefixed to his edition of the works of Damascenus. Hilary of Aries, a contemporary and correspondent of Augustine, has also been supposed to be the author of the Creed ; and so has Vincent of Lerins, of the same period. But the Creed throughout savours more of the African Theology than of the Gallic. Many of the expressions closely correspond with the language of Augustine himself. f It is by no means necessary, as I have before observed, to have recourse to the supposition of fraud, to account for the attaching the name of a particular author to any writing. The Schoolmen, however, cite the Creed as written by Athanasius himself ; which was natural in an age ignorant of criticism, and when Greek authors were read only in Latin translations. 106 LECTURE III. the whole doctrine of the Trinity, corresponds with this view. The Greeks sustained the debate more on particular points, disputing about the parts; whilst the Latin seems to have looked on the whole, as a deposit entrusted to his care. The Latin at once looked to the effect of each proposition on the whole question ; and raised his arm against the authors of the heretical language, as against the impious blasphemer, the denier of the truth con cerning God s. The living disputants however, who gave the mould to the controversies on the Trinity, had long passed away, when, with the rise of intellectual activity in Europe, the quarrels of other days were resuscitated in the Schools of a theological litera ture. In the Volumes of the Scholastic divines, we contemplate the phantoms of the departed, acting over, in solemn representation, the pastimes of their real life ; and the transactions of ages of tumult and noise glide before our eyes, as in one panoramic scene. It is here then, that the Trinitarian con- s So vigilant were they, that Hincmar of Rheims commanded the ancient Hymn, Te Trina Deitas, to be altered to, 71? Summa Deltas, and wrote a book himself against it; the former ex pression admitting of a tritheistic construction. The alteration however excited the jealousy of the other great party of the Gallic Church, that of the South of Gaul ; and Ratramn of Corbey was employed to defend the obnoxious expression ; which he did in writing. The keenness of the Occidentals on the Trinity, was probably the effect of persecution ; — the Arian persecution in Africa, under the Vandals, and in France and Spain, and even Italy, under the Visigoths. — Note B. LECTURE III. 107 troversies fully reveal themselves as a Science. They are no longer living energies, acted on by events, and modified by personal intellect and cha racter ; but a combination of logical theories, all tending, as to a common point, to establish a per fect theory of the Divine Being. The various opinions of the early disputants, were, for the most part, founded on, or maintained by, the same method of philosophizing, of which the Scholastic system was the mature development. The disputations of the Schoolmen, accordingly, are, at once, an historical sketch of the Trinitarian question, and an establish ment of the theory of the Trinity by a course of logical investigation. The Doctor of the Schools, as the judge of the sacred cause argued before him, hears the pleadings of the heretic, and the replies of the orthodox ; and extracting the truth from the conflict of opinions, pronounces it with the weight of reason and authority, at once, as the conclusion of the philosopher, and the sentence of the master of theology. Generally then, in the first place, I would observe respecting the controversies on the Trinity, that the only means of arriving at just notions of them, is, to be aware of that promiscuous combination of sciences, which formed the ancient Logical Philoso phy; and which was adopted into the Christian Church, both as coincident with Theology, and as an organ for the investigation of Truth. The several disputations will be found to have for their 108 LECTURE III. object; either to explain the Being and Attributes of God on assumed physical principles ; or to reconcile the various hypotheses advanced with each other, and illustrate them, in their connexions and con sequences, by processes of argumentation, and exact distinctions. But the two proceedings are con tinually running into each other ; as must be the case, where metaphysical truth is only a refined materialism, and physical truth is sought in the abstractions of metaphysics : — which was eminently the case in the Ancient Philosophy, and the Scho lastic system founded on it. The pantheism of the New-Platonists was an ex treme case of the application of the logical method of philosophizing. When nature is explored in the mirror of the human mind, material objects are easily represented to our thoughts, as pos sessing only a shadowy metaphysical existence. The mind becomes every thing in fact and reality, as it is every thing in its power of conception and generalization h. And when the philosopher is also a theologian, and carries up his speculation from the human mind to the divine, the theory of ma terial nature resolves itself into the pure existence of the Divine Being, in whose intellect are the h Aristot. De Anim. 1. III. C. 9. 17 faxr/ ra ovra rras eVri iravra. Ibid. C. 3. Kai ev Si) ol Xeyovres ttjv \^u^jjv rival ronov rihuaV nkrjv on ovre o\t], aXX' rj varyriKr), oifre hrikif^ria, dWa bvvapei ra ("8r) orav 8e ovras eKacrra yevrjrat, as 6 liria~Tr\p.vsv \eyerat o Kar evepynav. Aquin. Summa Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xiv. art. i. — Note C. LECTURE III. 109 primordial causes, the immutable first principles, of all existing things. The Schoolmen, as I pointed out in my last Lec ture, did not explicitly adopt the Platonic doctrine of Ideas, the basis of the pantheistic philosophy. They did not proceed to the extreme of resolving all material things into mere phenomena, the simple manifestations of the Divine Being : the more ex perimental philosophy of Aristotle guarding them from the express admission of this extreme theory : but they virtually admitted it, in their a priori method of tracing up all real existences to the Being of God. Thus, according to their view, all power, or wisdom, or goodness, observed in the uni verse, were actual derivations of qualities, intrinsi cally residing in God himself, and going forth as it were out of Him into the works of his creation; not simply the evidences of the existence of such qualities in Him as their Author and Giver ; but the real presence of the Divine qualities themselves analogically denoted by those terms. So again, the relations of human life, as that of Father and Son, were, according to their view, not original as ex isting in human nature, but founded on their arche types in God. Appeal was made to that text of St. Paul ; — " I bow my knees to the Father of our " Lord Jesus Christ, from whom the whole family " in heaven and earth is named," — ex quo omnis paternitas in terris et in ccelo nominata est; — to prove, that the filial relation among men, was only an expression, or copy, of a prior relation, existing 110 LECTURE III. between the Father and the Son in the Holy Trinity i. A philosophy of this kind led them to seek their definitions of the Being and Attributes of God, in the phenomena of the material world. The analo gies of the physical universe were to such phi losophers, more than presumptive proofs of the ex istence and character of God : they were positive resemblances, or participations, of the Divine Na ture ; so that, in the survey of these, the mind con templates express manifestations of God himself. This is the sense, in which the School-Divines speak of our knowing God, only by the Effects of his agency on the world. At the first view, they may appear in this admission, the advocates of a cautious in ductive Theology, that modestly gathers up the notices of God's agency scattered throughout nature. But a closer attention to their method, will shew, that this very notion of our Divine Knowledge, was highly speculative ; that, as I have stated, it was a discernment of God himself, as manifested in his works, — a theory of the principles of the Divine Nature, indirectly obtained through the veil of the material world, but immediate and direct at the same time, so far as those principles were discernible by the spiritualized intellect k- Such was their construction of the Apostle's 1 This instance may suffice to shew the Scholastic miscon ception of the real nature of Scripture-truth, when speculators could so readily seize on a word to raise a system of Theology. — The argument is lost in our translation. — Note D. k Manifestum est autem, quod ea quae naturaliter fiunt, de- LECTURE III. Ill words to the Romans ; " The invisible things of " God are clearly seen, being understood by the " things that are made :" words, perhaps, in them selves, borrowed from the Platonic philosophy, but clearly intended by the Apostle, in the practical argument pursued in this Epistle, only to declare the sure attestation of Nature to the Divine Being, by whom its constitution and course have been framed. As their Theology, accordingly, was the Science of God, — an attempt to explore the mysterious principles of the Divine Intelligence, on which the truths of Revelation were conceived to depend, — the Schoolmen set themselves in the first instance, to rationalize the doctrine of the Trinity. The in tellectual grounds of this doctrine demanded to be ascertained, and premised ; because these would con stitute the great First Reasons, or Principles, from which, the whole train of reasonings to the ra tional principles of other doctrines, would neces sarily be deduced. Or, to express it more ac cording to their technical method, the Being of terminatas formas consequuntur. Haec autem formarum deter- minatio oportet quod reducatur, sicut in primum principium, in divinam sapientiam, quee ordinem universi excogitavit, qui in rerum distinctione consistit. Et ideo oportet dicere, quod in divina sapientia sunt rationes omnium rerum, quas supra diximus ideas, id est, formas exemplares in mente divina ex- istentes. Quae quidem licet multiplicentur secundum respectum ad res, tamen non sunt realiter aliud a divina essentia, prout ejus similitudo a diversis participari potest diversimode. Sic igitur ipse Deus est primum exemplar omnium. Aquinas, S. Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xliv. art. 3. — Note E. 112 LECTURE III. God, considered abstractedly from the works of his creation, presented to the Philosopher that ultimate abstraction of which he was in quest ; — the Ideas, or Forms, of all existing things of the Universe, reduced to their perfect simplicity and immate riality. Every particular subordinate theory of doc trine drawn from the analogies of nature, would thus be rationalized in the most intense degree; being contemplated, as it was the reason, the very intelligence, of God himself. For in order to understand the Scholastic mode of proceeding, in their reasonings on this as well as every other truth of Christianity, we must bear in mind throughout, the nature of the inquiry under taken. It was to assimilate and identify, as far as possible, two apparently different systems — the re vealed, and the intellectual, world. The facts of both were assumed ; — those of the revealed world, as given in the words of Scripture and in the authoritative decisions of the Church : those of the intellectual world, as ascertained by the principles of the esta blished philosophy. Their object then was, to ex tort from that philosophy, a confession of the mys terious wisdom, revealed in Scripture and ex pounded in the dogmas of Theology. The primary truth therefore, which, in one sense, may be called a Theory of all revealed truth ; as being, in the just view of it, the combined result of all the Scripture- facts; — the doctrine of the Trinity; — was to be con verted into a speculative a priori principle, — a logical basis, from which all other facts of Scripture, ra- LECTURE III. US tionalized in like manner, might be demonstratively concluded. The controversies on the Trinity, accordingly, if we view them in their result, were a determination in precise terms of that account of the Divine Being, which the Scripture-Revelation involved : those terms being drawn from the analogies of na ture, in which the mysterious truth was conceived to be veiled. But in their progress and formation, — in the views taken of those analogies on which the reasonings are founded, — use is made of all existing theories, in the different branches of science, whether physical, metaphysical, or moral, as then understood and received. The human mind, as I have observed, being taken as the medium of philosophical observation in the Scholastic system, the facts of Scripture and nature were resolved into the fundamental principles of our mental constitution. These presented in such a method of inquiry, those ultimate truths which the philosopher desired to reach. For after all the va rious associations of thought have been analysed, — after the utmost effort of minute subdivision of no tions, — there still remains an higher ground of ab stract contemplation ; that, in which all these various ideas are resolved into the principle of Consciousness itself, — into the nature of the thinking mind, in which all this wonderful mechanism of thought is carried on. It was observed then, that in the human mind i 114 LECTURE III. there were two distinct classes of facts ; those in which the mind is exercised immediately on itself — the intellectual principles; and those in which it applies itself, as it were, to external objects — the moral principles. Plato, and Aristotle, had both recognised this division of the mind. The School men inherited and availed themselves of this divi sion, in their survey of the various manifestations of God, for the erection of their philosophical system of the Trinity. The effects discernible in nature being summed up in these primary laws of the human mind, and there regarded as in their Causes ; the next step of the speculation was, to trace the order of connexion between these principles now viewed in the mind. An object of our moral nature, as Aristotle had pointed out, must first be apprehended by the intel lect ; it must first be known in order to be pursuedm. The intellectual principle therefore was prior in order to the moral — or the intellect prior to the will. Thus far the speculation was merely human. The various effects of nature were referred to their great m Necesse est autem quod amor a verbo procedat ; non enim aliquid amamus, nisi quod conceptione mentis apprehendimus. Unde et secundum hoc manifestum est, quod Spiritus Sanctus procedit a Filio. Aquin. S. Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xxxvi. art. 2. Sed Deum velle, habet aliud verum naturaliter prius eo, scilicet Deum cognoscere, quoniam Deus naturaliter prius cog- noscit quodlibet volutum, quam velit illud. Omnis enim volutio est necessario praecogniti, sicut tam Philosophis quam Theo- logis satis constat. Bradwardin. De Causa Dei, lib. I. c. 12. p. 200. LECTURE III. 115 moving causes in the mind ; and a theory was given, of the mode in which these causes moved, or pro ceeded into effect. But the human mind being formed in the image of God — being in itself an ef fect of the agency of the Supreme Mind, — the transi tion was easy, from the human principles of causa tion, to the divine, as from the inferior and derivative agency, to the superior and the original. The mind therefore, its intelligence, and its will, were contem plated, as they had their being, in the mind, the in telligence, and the will of God. These principles, accordingly, were the true analogies, corresponding to the Scripture designation of the great Divine Cause of all things, under the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. It only remained, in reason ing upon these analogies, to take into view the circumstances of imperfection and darkness, under which they were discerned, — the proper incom prehensibility of the Divine subject by the human faculties in the present state. It was necessary further, to proceed by negations ; to abstract from the divine truth, whatever was peculiar to the ordi nary human notion of Causation ; and so to ap proximate to the notion of the Divine Being, as He exists in himself, — to the theory of the Causa Al- tissima, as it is purely the principle of causation. Aquinas philosophizes concerning the Trinity ex actly in the way that I have described. Assuming the process of the intellect and the will in man, as the counterpart of the Scriptural truth which he has undertaken to explain, he demonstrates the I 2 116 LECTURE III. theory of Divine Procession according to it. The Son, the Logos, the Reason and Word of God, is the principle of intelligence in the Divine Being, — the internal word of God, expressing and comprehend ing all the principles of created things. The Holy Spirit is the Love of God towards his creation, re garded as it subsists in his own nature ; as it centres in the Divine Word or Reason, or principle of intelli gence ; being the nexus, or bond of union, between the Father and the Word. But why, it may be asked, is the one process called Generation ; the other simply Procession? — why is the Word called the Son, and the Love of God called the Spirit ? It is the resemblance of the thought to the mind from which it proceeds, that gives the appropriateness of the term Generation in its highest sense, — that of like producing like, — to the Procession of the Word or Reason of God ; and therefore, the relation of the Word is represented, as that between a Father and a Son ; and the Word is called the Son. But in the process of the will, there is no resemblance between the object on which it is exerted, and the will itself. Hence, there is no appropriate name for the pro ceeding of the Divine Love, but the general one of Procession ; and this relation in the Divine Being can only be expressed by the name of Spirit, founded on the analogy of spiration, or breathing, by which his derivation from the Father and the Son is de scribed in Scripture n. n Aquin. S. Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xxxvu. art. i. The ex pression, ex substantia Patris, was appropriated to the Son ; so LECTURE III. 117 In this speculation there is certainly a great deal of the language of Platonism. In the Timceus, we find, the term povoyevrjf, the unigenitus of the Latin Fathers, more than once applied to the Universe, the secondary Divine Being of the Platonic system ; and the description of a third Being, as a bond be tween God and the Universe — ha^ov ev fj.eaw ap.Pr\a'lv ^X0V(Tl ^'Xa ^(rrjs (TwaKoMprjs Kai a~up.(pvpcrea>s' ov8e e^to-rap.ev(ov, rj Kar ovaiav repxopivav Kara tt\v 'Apeiov Siaipecnv. Damasc. De Fid. Orthod. I. p. 140. y Note J. » Note K. LECTURE III. 127 account, and notion, of their Being. Such was the unity, at' once physical and logical, maintained by the orthodox. The Sabellian approached nearly to the orthodox in his account of the Divine Unity; since he not only maintained the Divine distinctions, but was willing also to use the term homoousion in the de scription of the Trinity. The Latins indeed, during the agitation of the Arian disputes, were taunted by the Greeks, as symbolizing with the Sabellian : his zeal for the consubstantiality, being construed into an indiscriminateness in his notions of the Father a, Son, and Holy Spirit. The stress of the controversy, accordingly, between the Sabellian and the orthodox, lay in the proof, that, in his application of the word homoousion, the Sabellian maintained an actual soli tude of the Divine Being, — merely the physical notion of usia or substance, and not the logical also ; a sameness, that destroyed the distinction of number a Hilary of Poitiers, on making his appearance at the Coun cil of Seleucia, was anxiously inquired of concerning the faith of the Gallic Church, which the Orientals suspected of Sabel- lianism. Sulpicius Severus says : Is ubi Seleuciam venit, magno cum favore exceptus, omnium in se animos et studia conver- terat, ac primum quaesitum ab eo, quae esset Gallorum fides : quia turn, Arrianis prava de nobis vulgantibus, suspecti ab Orientalibus habebamur, trionymam solitarii Dei unionem se cundum Sabellium credidisse; sed exposita fide sua, juxta ea quae Nicaeae erant a patribus conscripta, Occidentalibus per- hibuit testimonium. Hist. Sacr. II. c. 42. p. 271. Illud apud omnes constitit, unius Hilarii beneficio, Gallias nostras piaculo haeresis liberatas. Ibid. c. 45. p. 279. See Letter of Jerome, Note A. Lect. I. 128 LECTURE III. in the members of the Trinity, and left only a dis tinction of Names b. The Arian Unity was a logical, and not a physi cal unity ; because the difference which the Arian assigned between the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, would not admit the assertion of a sameness, or even of a similarity, of substance, and left only a general consonance in which the Holy Three agreed. The term God, indeed, might be applied to each, accord ing to the Arian notion; but evidently only in a generic sense, as equivalent to divine nature. Thus it was, that the Arian asserted an unity in thought, and will, and action ; interpreting, in this way, the saying, / and the Father are one. He urged again the text, the Father is greater than I, as evidence against the unity of substance ; taking substance in the sense of individual Being — the ¦v-parry olo-la. of the Categories. The orthodox, consequently, had to shew against the Arian, that such an unity as this, was a severing of the Godhead ; that it consisted with so great a distinction between the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, as either to establish three Gods, or otherwise, one Supreme God and two subordinate Divine Beings. The various illustrations of the Trinity from na tural objects, employed in the writings of the Fathers and the Schoolmen, are instances of the same dia lectical spirit, which laboured to establish the Divine Unity amidst the Trinitarian distinctions. The con- b Note L. LECTURE III. 129 nexion between the sun, the ray, and the heafe; the fountain, the stream, and the lake ; the seed, the stalk, and the fruit ; the metal, the seal, and the impression; the memory, the intelligence, and the will ; the premises and conclusion of a syl logism ; and other like instances ; — have been ad duced on this point, when the design has been, not so much to establish the truth, as to illustrate itc. It is probable, that such illustrations were drawn from the explanation of Sameness, given by Aristotle. The instance, indeed, of the application of the word same to the water taken from the same fountain, is that expressly given by the philosopher, in his Topics, to shew, that things are called the same, so far as they are very strongly alike d. The Christian speculators, when pressed in argument to explain, in what the identity of the Godhead con sisted, resorted to illustrations in which, a close resemblance, or intimate connexion, was regarded as equivalent to sameness. And we thus see the reason, why the Anomaeans objected to the admission of the expression, homoiousion, or similar substance, into the Creed e. It was felt by these reasoners, that similarity and sameness were convertible terms, when applied to the essence of a thing. Accord ingly, both Hilary and Basil were disposed to sanction the term, on the same ground on which the Ultra-Arians rejected it ; as equivalent, that is, c Note M. d Note N. e Sulpic. Sever. Hist. Sacr. lib. II. c. 40. K 130 LECTURE III. when rightly understood, to the homoousion of Nice f- The disputation, in its progress, turned upon the point, how far difference might be asserted, con sistently with that sameness, which constituted the Divine Unity of Being, or Substance. It was in quired, whether the distinction could be rightly ex pressed by hypostasis, or persona; whether the ideas involved in one, or the other, of these terms, did not import too express and real, or too shadowy a distinction. The difficulty here was; to avoid dis tinguishing the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, in such a way, as to represent them differing, as three angels, or three men, differ from each other ; and yet to preserve the real distinctions. Dialectical Science furnished the expedients in this difficulty ; and established that peculiar phraseology, which we now use, in speaking of the Sacred Trinity, as three Persons and one God. The manner in which reasonings had been drawn from the visible effects of Divine Power, Wisdom, and Goodness, to the existence of a Trinity in the Divine Being, seemed to confound the Trinitarian f Testor me utrumque sensisse; says Hilary, De Synod, hb. I. — "If the term airapaXkaKrSis be added to the term (homoiousion) " I also admit it ;" Basil. Epist. ad Apollinar. Note to Damasc. Dialectic, p. 38. — Hilary, De Trin. lib. IV. c. 4. p. 73. gives several Arian explanations of the term homoousion. Arians en deavoured to shew, that they objected to it, on grounds distinct from those on which it was held by the orthodox. — Note O. LECTURE III. 131 Distinctions with the Divine Attributes. It was pri marily important therefore to the Theologian, to mark the difference between the two. He points out accordingly ; that, whilst the Attributes of God exist substantially — are of the substance or essence of God, — or in logical language, belong to the Cate gory of Substance ; — the Trinitarian distinctions ex ist relatively, — or belong to the Category of Relation ; the terms, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, denoting intrinsic relations in the Divine Being, agreeably to what I have before observed. Whence it followed, that it would be improper to speak of the divine power, or justice, or wisdom in the plural ; for this would be to assert three Beings, or Substances, in God. But there was no impropriety in asserting three Relations ; since these differed in properties only, and their distinctness did not multiply, or separate, the Divine Substance s. But this idea of the Trinitarian Distinctions could not alone satisfy the requisitions of a logical philosophy. Distinct Relations must be in distinct subjects. They could only be conceived, as they were based on their peculiar supposita, or grounds. This was the occasion of the adoption of the word g Ea vero quae significant essentiam adjective, praedicantur pluraliter de tribus, propter pluralitatem suppositorum : Dicimus enim tres existentes, vei tres sapientes, aut tres aeternos et im- mensos, si adjective sumantur. Si vero substantive sumantur, dicimus unum increatum, immensum, et aeternum, ut Athana sius dicit. Albert. Mag. in lib. Sentent. Tract. IX. qu. xliv. fol. 94. Aquinas, S. Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xxxix. art. 3. —Note P. K 2 132 LECTURE III. Hypostasis, by the Greeks, and of Person, or Sub- . sisting Person, by the Latins. Hypostasis indeed was a word already consecrated to the use of Re ligion, from its being employed by St. Paul in several passages of his Epistles. It is obviously a tech nical term, denoting that ultimate point of meta physical analysis, in which we conceive the bare existence of any thing, apart from its properties : the expression itself being a metaphorical one, drawn from a supposition, that the connexion be tween the being and the properties of a thing, re sembles that between a material prop, or base, and what it supports. It will be found, I think, to be used in this fundamental sense by the Apostle. The Greek therefore answered strictly on the principles of his dialectical science, when, being interrogated as to the point where he rested the Trinitarian distinctions, he replied, that they were three Hy postases. But to the Latin, the want of a philosophical vocabulary rendered the answer not so easy. When the Latin was pressed with the question, — quid tres, or quid tria f — what are the three ? — he found, that his unscientific language denied him the means of answering satisfactorily. He had no other word, that sufficed at all to represent, what the Greek in tended by Hypostasis, but Persona: since Substan tia was already appropriated to denote the Divine Being. What rendered Persona more applicable to the high subject, was, that, in its transition to denote an individual man, it was first applied to LECTURE III. 133 individuals of dignityh- The Schoolmen are express in pointing out, after Augustine, that the term was adopted, not to express any definite notion, but to make some answer, where silence would have been better ; to denote, by some term, what has no suit able word to express it'. But the term exposed him to a double inconvenience. If it was under stood, in its original sense, of a mask, or character assumed, he was charged with Sabellianism ; if it was taken in its acquired sense, it gave the sound h Thus Aquinas says, Cum Persona importat dignitatem, &c. S. Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xxix. art. 3. qu. xxxn. art. 3. He ar gues, that the humanity in Christ is not a Person, because it was assumed a digniori. Cicero uses Persona in this elevated sense : as in, personae et dignitatis esse negent — DeFin. I. c. 1. Black- stone states, in accordance with this, that the appellation of " Parson" is " the most legal, most beneficial, and most honour- " able title that a parish priest can enjoy; because such a " one, (as Sir Edward Coke observes,) and he only, is said " vicem seu personam ecclesice gerere." Commentar. B. I. c. 11. P- 3§4- The use of the term was probably facilitated by its adoption in the systems of Grammarians. The Scholastic writers draw illustrations from the grammatical use of the ist, 2nd, and 3rd Persons, to the Persons of the Trinity. It is probable, as a friend has observed to me, that the as sociation, which made Persona signify dignity, is the notion of the public character, which every one in office must act. A pri vate person is not called upon to personate, or act, for instance, the Magistrate, the Bishop, &c. But when such partes have been given him in the drama of the world, he must use his authority under the proper mask, ov persona. ' Tres nescio quid, is the expression of Anselm, in his Monolo- gium. — P. Lombard. Lib. Sentent. I. Dist. 25. — Aquin. S. Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xxxi. art. 2. qu. xxxn. art. 3. — Note Q. K 3 134 LECTURE III. of Tritheism. On the one hand, the Arian, dis satisfied with the term, still exacted of him, the confession of the three hypostases of the Greeks; and " branded him," on his refusal, as Jerome in dignantly complains, " with the cautery of the " Union k." On the other hand, the difference as serted was too great, to be consistent with an unity of Substance, if by three Persons were conceived three individual Beings. In order to obviate this last inference, it was necessary to have recourse to the original subtile speculation, on which the Procession of the Divine Being was founded. It was pointed out, that the objection arose, from an inattention to the peculiar circumstances, to which the reasoning applied. There was in God no distinction of matter and form, as in all created things. In man we see the two principles of matter and form, — the idea of the Divine Intellect, and the material on which it is impressed. The idea or form, when viewed out of the Divine Being, must have a suppositum of mat- k In the Epistle to Damasus, before referred to ; and given in Note A of Lecture I. — The anxiety to avoid Sabellianism sometimes led the orthodox into tritheistic modes of expression. Gregory Nazianzen, in Orat. I. speaks of " some over-orthodox " persons," rives tS>v nap' rjplv ayav 6p6o8o££>v, having introduced " polytheism." Aquinas, in like manner, observes, that, " for the " purpose of stating the truth of Essence and Person, holy Doc- " tors have sometimes spoken more expressly, than the pro- " priety of speaking admitted." S. Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xxxix. art. 5. Such appears to have been the case with Dr. W. Sher lock, in his Defence of the Trinitarian Doctrine ; in which he insisted on the notion of three distinct Minds. — Note R. LECTURE III. 135 ter, on which it may act. It thus is individualized in matter. The humanity imparted in each in stance, constitutes an individual Being, separate from other instances in which the same operation takes place. But in God there is no material in dividuation. In Him the form and the suppositum are identical. So that, whilst the Divine Nature is communicated, and distinct relations therefore are constituted, there is no separation of Beings. The persons accordingly are Three, whilst the Divinity remains One1. Sometimes indeed the objection was answered in another way. It was argued, that the Deity would not be multiplied, though we might assert Three Persons ; since it was only the usage of speech which made us say Three Men — employing, that is, the word man in the plural — of Three Individuals. There was strictly only one humanity, the common essence of all human individuals. This explanation, 1 Hasc igitur est ratio, quare Socratem, et Platonem, et Ciceronem, dicimus tres homines : Patrem autem, et Filium, et Spiritum Sanctum, non dicimus tres Deos, sed unum Deum ; quia in tribus suppositis humanae naturae sunt tres humanitates ; in tribus autem personis est una divina essentia. Aquinas, S. Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xxxix. art. 3. Nam nee Deum, nee personas ejus cogitat ; sed tale aliquid, quales sunt plures humanae personae. Et quia videt unum hominem plures homines esse non posse, negat hoc ipsum de Deo. Non enim idcirco dicuntur tres personae, quia sint tres res separata?, sicut tres homines : sed quia simihtudinem habent quandam cum tribus separatis personis. Anselm, De Incar. Verb. c. vi. p. 40. K 4 136 LECTURE III. however, merged the physical notion of the Divine Being in the logical m. These several difficulties, in the explanation of the Trinitarian doctrine, are well summed up and stated by Aquinas, in a manner which throws light on the logical character of the whole theory. " It behoves us," he says, " in what we say of " the Trinity, to beware of two opposite errors, tem- " perately proceeding between both ; the error of " Arius, who laid down, with the Trinity of Per- " sons, a Trinity of Substances ; and the error of " Sabellius, who laid down, with the unity of Es- " sence, an unity of Person. To escape, then, the " error of Arius, we must avoid, in divine things, " the terms Diversity and Difference, lest the unity " of Essence be destroyed. We may however use " the term Distinction, on account of the Relative " Opposition. Whence, if any where, in any au- " thentic Scripture, diversity or difference of Per- " sons is found, diversity or difference is taken for " Distinction. Again, that the Simplicity of the " Divine Essence may not be destroyed, the terms " Separation and Division must be avoided, which " are of a whole into parts. Again, that equality " may not be destroyed, the term Disparity must " be avoided. Further, that similitude may not be " destroyed, the terms Alien and Discrepant must " be avoided. . . . Further, to avoid the error of Sa- " bellius, we should avoid Singularity, that the " communicability of the Divine Essence may not m See Curcellaei Oper. p. 852. — Note S. LECTURE HI. 137 " be destroyed. . . . We ought also to avoid the term " One Only, TJnicum, that the Number of Persons " may not be destroyed. . . . The term Solitary also " must be avoided, lest the association, of Three " Persons be destroyed"." If we compare, with these general disputations respecting the Trinity, the particular controversies connected with the Incarnation and the Procession of the Holy Spirit, we shall find them following the same method. The discussions on the Incarnation were, in like manner, partly physical, partly logical. It was at tempted to be explained, in what way the Son might be said to be generated of the Father ; whether out of the substance of God, or out of a common Di vinity, of which each participates ; or by division of the Paternal substance, as a portion severed from the Father : whether further, He is the Son of God by nature, or necessity, or will, or predestination, or adoption. The confusion of principles of differ ent sciences in these promiscuous inquiries, is suf ficiently apparent. But it was by such a philosophy that the orthodox language was settled, declaring the Son " begotten, before all worlds ; of one sub- " stance with the Father." The account of the Incarnation itself was more peculiarly logical; still there was a mixture of phy sical speculation respecting the principle of life in man. The notion entertained, both by Fathers n Aquin. Summa Theolog. Prima Pars, qu. xxxi. art. 2. — Note T. 138 LECTURE III. and by Schoolmen, was, that the animating prin ciple was infused into the body ; and thus, the inert matter of the flesh became the living substantial form of man. That all souls were consubstan- tial with the Deity, was an ancient Pythago rean notion, that survived in the Church. Thus TertuUian speaks of man as animated out of the substance of God. The observation of this fact accounts for the opinion attributed to Apollinarius, that the Divinity was the animating principle of Christ. He was fearful of introducing a Quaternity into the Notion of the Divine Being, if it were con ceived, that our Lord possessed the Substance of human nature, a sentient and intelligent human principle, as well as the Substance of the Divinity ; and was thus led to the denial of the perfect huma nity of Christ °. The peculiarly logical part of the inquiry appears, in the points of controversy between the orthodox and the Nestorians and Eutychians. These were, in respect to the Incarnation, analogous to the disputes between the orthodox and the Sabellians and Arians, on the general question of the Trinity. The points of sameness and diversity were here also to be exactly determined. The orthodox main tained, that the notion of sameness here consisted, in the Personal individuality of Christ, regarded as o Damascen. De Haeres. p. 77. note. — Lombard. Sent. II. Dist. 17. B. Putaverunt enim quidam haeretici, Deum de sua sub stantia animam creasse, &c, p. 178. — See Ibid. Dist. 18. H. on the Creation and Infusion of the Anima, p. 182. — Note U. LECTURE III. 139 a Member of the Trinity ; whereas the diversity was in the two Natures, the divine and the human, united in His Person. But the Nestorian offended against the theories of the logical philosophy, in stating two different hypostases, as the support of those common properties which belonged to Christ, and destroyed also the personal individuality. The Eutychian maintained the personal individuality, but destroyed the substantial differences. Theories of the composition and mixture of bodies, entered largely into these discussions : but they were still metaphysical in principle, resulting only in settling the connexion and relation of ideas concerning the Incarnation. They terminated in the decision of the place which the terms — Substance, Nature, Person, — should hold in the definition of the whole nature of Christ. And the excellence of the orthodox theory, we may observe, consisted, in its excluding from that definition, all ideas imported from the physical speculations, and reducing it to perfect consistency with the original theory of the Divine Procession. It brought the inquirer back to the point from which he set out, to acknowledge the simple Di vine Personality of the Saviour, — that He was the Word made flesh. The disputes, at the same time, were in many points merely verbal ; the contro versialists reasoning about words which they took in different senses p. We should observe, for in- P Apollinarius and Cyril took the word Nature in different senses : Apollinarius, after the manner of the Oriental Chris tians, for Essence, or Substance ; Cyril, in a popular sense, for 140 LECTURE III. stance, how the more general language, according to which, our Lord was described as having two whole and perfect Natures, was preferred to the assertion of two Substances. The term Nature here expressed the proper Divinity and the proper Humanity; — the proper Divinity, as indicating that real persona lity, which belonged to Christ, as very God of the Substance of the Father; the proper humanity, as in dicating that abstract humanity, which He assumed to the Divinity, by being made flesh of the Substance of his Mother. It was adopted, evidently, to avoid the assertion, that our Lord assumed to the Divinity any particular individual man ; which would have implied a twofold personality % We may observe too, how the perpetual union of the Godhead and the manhood in Christ, was secured, by the logical basis, on which the distinct properties of the two natures were rested. Being united in one hypos- an individual thing in itself, whether essence, or hypostasis, or person. Many Catholics thought, that, to oppose Nestorius, one Nature in Christ was to be professed, taking Nature in its common meaning. Dissert. Damasc. II. p. 42. — Contra Ja cobit. c. 52. p. 408. t. I. Oper. Damasc. Monophysites objected to the illustration, drawn from the union of soul and body, to the two natures of Christ, arguing that soul and body constituted only a single nature. Damasc. Dialect. 41. p. 44. — Note V. 1 Non enim est alius Deus, alius homo in Christo, quamvis aliud sit Deus, aliud homo ; sed idem ipse est Deus, et qui homo. Verbum enim caro factum, assumpsit naturam aliam, non aliam personam. Nam cum profertur homo, natura tantum quas com munis est omnibus hominibus significatur, &c. Anselm, De Incarn. Verb. c. 5. p. 39. — Note W. LECTURE III. 141 tasis, — or, as it is expressed, the union being hy- postatical, — the two natures remain "indivisible " throughout r." Thus we find the language of our article affirming in Christ, " two whole and perfect " natures," " never to be divided." The controversies relating immediately to the Holy Spirit, became more dialectical in their pro gress. At first, the Latins were content to speak of the Holy Spirit, as the mutual Love of the Father and the Son ; using the language of Platonism s. Afterwards, as they came into collision with the Greeks on the point of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, the disputation with their philosophical antagonists obliged them to a more precise, and strictly logical, mode of stating the doctrine. This transition may be noticed, in the treatise of Anselm on the Procession of the Spirit ; a work composed in his more advanced age, after a conference with the Greeks, in which he had taken an active part. In this treatise there is no mention of the original theory of the Latins, but the proof «* Thus Damascenus, " When, once for all, the natures re- " ceive the hypostatical union, naff ima-rdo-iv ivua-iv, they remain " indivisible for ever," adialperoi el$ to na.vte'hei;. Dialectica, cap. 67. Oper. p. 78. " for though the soul," he adds, " is parted " from the body in death, still the hypostasis of both is the " same." — Note X. s Rationes praecipuae, quibus probatur Spiritum Sanctum a Patre et Filio procedere, sumuntur ex verbis Dionysii, lib. de Divinis Nomin. c. \; ubi dicit, quod etiam in Deo extasim fa- cit divinus amor: non sinens ipsum sine germine esse, &c. Albert. Mag. in Sent. Tract. VII. qu. xxxi. fol. 73. 142 LECTURE III. of the point is rested entirely on logical grounds f such as, the necessity of identifying the Father with the Spirit, or of asserting the procession of the Son from the Spirit, if the procession of the Spirit from the Son were denied. The point appears to have been left undetermined during the heat of the Arian disputes. The heresy of Macedonius, in stating the Holy Spirit to be a creature, was only a form of Arianism ; and did not touch this question immediately l. The orthodox seem to have avoided any express assertion of the Procession from the Son ; both, as it was not re quired in that state of the controversy, and as the Procession from the Father was more directly op posed, both to the Sabellian and Arian notions of successive, or continuous, derivations u- But the spe culations of the Nestorians concerning the Incarna tion, were found to bring perplexity into the subject. Aquinas expressly attributes to the Nestorians, as a novel article, the doctrine, that the Holy Spirit does t Theodoret objected to Cyril of Alexandria, for asserting the procession of the Spirit from the Son, ex Filio, as savouring of the heresy of Apollinarius, and of Macedonius. Dissert. Da- mascen. I. c. 2. De Fid. Orthodox. I. Damascen. Oper. torn. I. p. 141. "" This appears to have been the foundation of the objections of the Greeks to the insertion of the proceeding " from the Son." Cavebant enim, Le Quien says, ne, Ariano more, Spiritus Sancti productio in Filium praesertim refunderetur. Note at p. 141. Damasc. Oper. torn. I. on the text of Damascenus, re tov Yiov be to nvev/m oi Xeyofiev. The opposition once begun, other reasons were of course readily devised, both for, and against, the filioque. LECTURE III. 143 $ot proceed from the Son; referring to the Council of Ephesus, in which a creed of the Nestorians was con demned on that ground-*. To those who, as the Nestorians, admitted two hypostases in Christ, there was a logical difficulty, in admitting the procession of the Spirit from the Son ; since it introduced a Quaternity in God instead of a Trinity. At length, having been gradually introduced, it seems, in the course of divine service, in some Churches of the West, the words filioque were sanctioned by the IHrd Synod of Toledo, towards the close of the Vlth century, when the Goths of Spain abjured their Arianism. At the beginning of the IXth cen tury, the Gallo-Frank Church adopted the same ex pression. Afterwards, but at what precise period is a matter of uncertainty, at the instance of the Western Churches, it received the sanction of the Apostolic See ?. The gradual admission and preva- " Ad tertium dicendum, quod Spiritum Sanctum non proce- dere a Filio, primo fuit a Nestorianis introductum, ut patet in quodam symbolo Nestorianorum damnato in Ephesina Synodo. Et hunc errorem secutus fuit Theodoritus Nestorianus, et plures post ipsum. Inter quos fuit etiam Damascenus. Unde in hoc, ejus sententiae non est standum. Quamvis a quibusdam dicatur, quod Damascenus, sicut non confitetur Spiritum Sanctum esse a Filio, ita etiam non negat ex vi illorum verborum. Aquinas, S. Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xxxvi. art. 2. We see also in this passage, how anxious the Schoolman was, not to lose any authority that had once been sanctioned by the Church. Even the opposing Greek must be brought over to his side, if possible. y Leo III. refused his authority for inserting the words filioque, into the Nicene Creed, simply on the ground of not altering the 144 LECTURE III. lence of the article among the Latins, marks the triumphs of the orthodox theology under the strong hand of the Spiritual Power ; whilst, in the East, the state of controversy, controlled by Imperial dis putants, would admit no alteration of the original formularies z. It shews, how tenacious the Latin was, of what had once been passed as a doctrine, by the authority, or even the practice only, of his Church ; and with what pliant facility his logic could min ister reasons for its abstract truth, and incorporate it with the system of his faith. The words were confessedly an addition to the Nicene Creed. The Latins only claimed to themselves the right, of more explicitly stating the doctrine on that point a- But the Greek urged the anathema of the Council against all who should alter the words of the Creed, and fiercely resisted all accommodation with the Latins on the point. According to the Schoolmen, the ground, in which the procession of the Spirit from the Son was maintained, was altogether logical : since, as they argue, unless it be allowed, there will be no means of distinguishing the Holy Spirit from original formulary ; professing at the same time his full assent to the doctrine involved in the addition. z Ratramn of Corbey is said to have written a work, about A. D. 868, against the Greeks. The title of it evidences the dif ferent characters of the Greek and Latin disputants. Contra opposita Grxcorum Imperatorum Ramanam Ecclesiam infaman- tium, libri quatuor Rathramni Monachi. Mauguin, torn. II. Dis sert, c. 17. in his Collection of Tracts of the IXth century on Grace and Predestination. a Anselm de Process. Sp. Scti. Oper. torn. III. p. 134. — Note Y. LECTURE III. 145 the Son. Relations, they observe, are only distinct when they are opposed. Thus the Father has two Relations, one to the Son, and the other to the Spirit; but these two relations, not being opposed, do not constitute two Persons. The like then would be the case, if the relations of the Son and the Holy Spirit to the Father were not opposed : whence it would follow, that the Son and the Holy Spirit were but one Person a. I have now taken a review of the principal parts of the Trinitarian controversies, so far as I have thought it necessary to illustrate the origin of our theological vocabulary on this sacred subject. I have some general remarks yet to offer, on the effect pro duced on the whole doctrine, by the consideration of those scholastic discussions to which I have called your attention. The examination then, I would observe, has forci bly impressed on my mind the conviction, that the principal, if not the only, difficulties on the doctrine of the Trinity, arise from metaphysical considera tions — from abstractions of our own mind, quite distinct from the proper, intrinsic, mystery of the holy truth in itself. Perplexities from the nature of Number, of Time, of Being; in short, all those various conceptions of the mind which are its ulti mate facts, and beyond which no power of analysis a Aquin. S. Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xxxvi. a. 2. Respondeo dicendum, quod necesse est dicere Spiritum Sanctum a Patre esse. Si enim non esset ab eo ; nullo modo posset ab eo per- sonaliter distingui, &c. — Note Z. 146 LECTURE III. can reach ; these, I think, the course of the present in quiry has tended to shew, are our real stumbling- block, causing the wisdom of God to be received as the foolishness of man. These have forced them selves on the form of the Divine Mystery, and given it that theoretic air, that atmosphere of repulsion, in which it is invested. The truth itself of the Trinitarian doctrine emerges from these mists of human speculation, like the bold, naked land, on which an atmosphere of fog has for a while rested, and then been dispersed. No one can be more convinced than I am, that there is a real mystery of God revealed in the Christian dis pensation ; and that no scheme of Unitarianism can solve the whole of the phenomena which Scripture records. But I am also as fully sensible, that there is a mystery attached to the subject, which is not a mystery of God. Take, for instance, the notion of the Divine Unity. We are apt to conceive that the Unity must be un derstood numerically1-; that we may reason from I ^ In Gregory Nazianzen, Orat. 45. p. 717. the question is proposed, " If the nature of God is simple, how will it admit the " number three ?" &c. Again, Integer, perfectus numerus Trinitatis est. Concil. Sir- miens. A. D. 357. Hilar. De Synodis, Opera, p. 466. — np6t he Kai rfwcriKij dvdyKt] povdSa eivas ISvd&os apx^v. Damasc. De Fid. Orthod. Les- The Valentinian System was a play of numbers. The Pytha gorean part of Platonism, the philosophy of Numbers, it cannot be doubted, must have exercised great influence over the minds of the early philosophic Christians. So also would the Jewish mystical application of Numbers, on the converts from Judaism. ECTURE III. 147 the notion of Unity, to the properties of the Divine Being. But is this a just notion of the Unity of God ? Is it not rather a bare fact, a limit of specu lation, instead of a point of outset ? For how was it revealed in that system, in which it was the great leading article of divine instruction? When Moses called upon the people ; — " Hear, O Israel, the Lord " our God is one Lord ;" — was it not a declaration, that Jehovah is not that host of heaven, — that multi plicity of the objects of divine worship, which heathen idolatry has enshrined, but the God in heaven, and in the earth, and in the sea, — not the Teraphim of domestic worship, but the Universal Governor, over shadowing all things with the ubiquarian tutelage of his Providence ? Surely the revelation of the Divine Unity was not meant to convey to Israel any speculative notion of the oneness of the Deity ; but, practically, to influence their minds in regard to the superstitions from which they had been brought out. It was no other than the command ; " Thou " shalt have no other Gods but me." Now, were this view of the Revelation of the Divine Unity strictly maintained, would it not greatly abate the repugnance often felt at the ad mission of a Trinity in Unity ? We should profess, that we only knew God, as the exclusive object of divine worship ; and should acknowledge, that it was quite irrelevant to our scheme of Religion, either to demonstrate, or to refute, any conclusion from the nature of Unity, concerning any further revelation of the Divine Being. To deny a Trinity, L 2 148 LECTURE III. would then be felt the same, as to assert, that, be cause Polytheism is false, therefore no new mani festation of God, not resulting from the negation of Polytheism, can be true. There is another observation, which the present inquiry has suggested, and which I think of great importance, in order to a just view of the Trinitarian Controversies. Let it then be remarked, that all the theories proposed on the subject are Trinitarian in principle. If the opinions of Praxeas, and Artemon, and Theodotus, of Paul of Samosata, Noetus, Sabel- lius, and others, amounted to Unitarianism ; it was in the way of consequence, or inference. They set out with a Trinitarian hypothesis, and either explained it away themselves by their speculations, or had the consequences of their theories forced on them by their adversaries, as the principles of their belief. We can plainly perceive, though unfortunately but very slight memorials remain to us of their dis quisitions, that their anxiety was, to account for certain acknowledged facts of the Scripture narra tive. They refer to admitted manifestations of God, as the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit : and the desire of accommodation to Jewish or Hea then prejudices, the refutation of the theories of others, the fancies of private speculation, — these, and other influences concealed from our research, — sug gest to the several inquirers peculiar combinations, or analyses, of the given facts, in their respective doc trines of the Trinity. Take the reverse of the case, LECTURE III. 149 and you will judge, what a difference would have been in the language of these theorists. We should have had no attempts to explain the Divine Unity consistently with Trinitarian distinctions. They would not have been employed in explaining away distinctions, which they did not admit in some sense at least. They would have simply explained, and enforced, the Unity which they did admit. Or, had they referred to Trinitarian distinctions as main tained by opponents in argument, they would have endeavoured to disprove them, instead of labouring, as they have done, to retain these very views, how ever imperfectly, erroneously, or vainly, in their own systems. One fact is clear through all this labyrinth of variations which theological creeds have exhibited; — that there is some extraordinary communication concerning the Divine Being, in those Scriptural notices of God which have called forth the curiosity of thinking men in all ages. To me it matters little, what opinion on the subject has been prior, has been advocated by the shrewdest wit or deepest learning, has been most popular, most extensive in its reception. All differences of this kind belong to the history of the human mind, as much as to the ology, and affect not the broad basement of fact on which the manifold forms of speculation have taken their rise. The only ancient, only catholic, truth is the Scriptural fact. Let us hold that fast in its depth and breadth — in nothing extenuating, in no thing abridging it — in simplicity and sincerity; and L 3 150 LECTURE III we can neither be Sabellians, or Tritheists, or Soci- nians. Attempt to explain, to satisfy scruples, to reconcile difficulties ; and the chance is, that, how ever we may disclaim the heterodoxy which lurks on every step of our path, we incur, at least, the scandal at the hands of others, whose piety, or pre judices, or acuteness, may be offended by our words. I should hope the discussions in which we have now been engaged, will leave this impression on the mind. Historically regarded, they evidence the re ality of those sacred facts of Divine Providence, which we comprehensively denote by the doctrine of a Trinity in Unity. But let us not identify this reality with the theories couched under a logical phraseology. I firmly and devoutly believe that word, which has declared the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. But who can pretend to that exactness of thought on the sub ject, on which our technical language is based? Looking to the simple truth of Scripture, I would say, in the language of Augustine, Hcec scio. Distin- guere autem inter Mam Generationem et hanc Pro- cessionem, nescio, non valeo, non sufficiod. — Verius enim cogitatur Deus, quam dicitur ; et verius est, quam cogitatur e. 11 Contra Maximin. III. p. 237. 4to ed. «De Trin. VII, c. 4. LECTURE IV. THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSIES. PREDESTINATION AND GRACE. SUMMARY. Scholastic nature of controversies relative to Divine and Hu man Agency — State of the West disposes the Latin Christians to the discussion of such questions — Importance of the ques tions in order to Church-government — The disputes here at first, less philosophical in comparison with the Trinitarian — Consequent laxity in the terms of the Pelagian theories, occa sions more continual disputes — The Schoolmen, the first to systematize these doctrines — Connexion of them with the pre vious theory of the Trinity — Scholastic view of Predestination an application of the Principle of Activity in the Divine Being to human actions — Importance of excluding reference to the Divine Intelligence, in our estimate of Predestination — Mode in which the notions of Contingency and Necessity, Time and Eternity, were employed in scholastic reasonings. — The only proper difficulty on the subject is, the prevalence of Evil — Notions of Optimism influential on such speculations — The term Good in ancient philosophy coincident with an object of will — Reprobation consequently, as implying evil willed, unknown to Scholastic system — Illustration to be derived to our article on the subject from the theories opposed by the Schoolmen — Dread of Manicheism in the Latin Church. Scholastic notion of Grace as the effect of Predestination, both physical and logical — The term Grace, designates pro perly a general fact of the Divine conduct — Application of Aris totle's physical doctrines in the scholastic account of the pro cess of Grace — The theory of Transmutation — Instinctive Principle of motion attributed to the System of Nature — Ap proximation to Pantheism in this system. Practical reflections — Truths of Grace and Predestination concern the heart principally — Theoretic statements of them must always be peculiarly open to difficulty — The difficulties, evidently, chiefly metaphysical — The doctrines, practically taken, full of real comfort and peace. James I. 17. Every good gift, and every perfect gift, is from above, and cometh down from the Father of lights, with whom is no variableness, nor shadow of turning. Tlaara boms ayaOri, Kai tt&v bd>pr)p,a Ti\ewv, ava>6ev kern Karapalvov dw6 roi) Trarpbs t&v (pcaTtav, irap' <3 ovk evt irapaX- Xayrj rj Tpovrjs amoo-K(.acrp.a. Omne datum optimum, et omne donum perfectum, de- sursum est, descendens a Patre luminum ; apud quem non est transmutatio, nee vicissitudinis obumbratio. Lat. Vulg. LECTURE IV. IN opening my inquiry into the influence of the Scholastic Philosophy, as also in entering on the illustration of it in the Trinitarian Controversies, I had occasion to point out the fact of the real as cendancy obtained by the Latin portion of the Christian Church. It appeared that this ascendancy was not at once decided and complete ; but that still it was effectually achieved by those stirring spirits, the great Latin Fathers of the IVth century. A review of another class of controversies, which, next to those on the Trinity, engaged and absorbed the attention of Christian disputants, — the controver sies relating to Divine and Human Agency, — will still more illustrate this origin of the Scholastic Philosophy, and its incorporation with Theology, as a subtile instrument of spiritual power. We now, indeed, enter on ground which is more peculiarly that of Scholasticism; where the Greek Theology is comparatively silent, and the whole moulding and ultimate complexion of the doctrines professed, are the work of the Latins, or rather of the influential portion of the Latins, the African Churches, under the management of Augustine, at the commencement of the Vth century. The Greeks, looking more with the eye of philosophers than of Church-leaders, at the questions of Divine and 156 LECTURE IV. Human Agency, did not take a strictly theolo gical interest in their decision. They regarded these questions, rather as the proper matter of phi losophical disquisition ; as they really are, when justly considered ; since they suggest themselves to the inquisitive mind, independently of any peculiar views of God and man resulting from Revelation. This field of disputation therefore, as a part of Christian Theology, was left open to the busy intel lect of the Latin Divines. In the East indeed, there was not that call for the decision of these questions, which existed in the West. The attention of the Greeks was sustained on parts of the Trinitarian controversies, at the period when Pelagianism was producing a ferment in the Latin Church. The uniformity of the general state of things in the Eastern Empire, is strikingly contrasted by the restlessness, and fever of change, with which the West was troubled during the IVth and Vth centuries. Though the East was the theatre of wars during that period, there was no such uni versal shock to the repose of the human mind, as in the West, where revolution and confusion had taken the place of regularity and order. The world witnessed the sack and misery of the Im perial City herself; whose fall might well seem the prelude of the universal dissolution of society. All was either ruin, or expectation of ruin. This anar chy of social life in the West might naturally re present itself to the religionist, as well as to the pro fane and irreligious, as the disenthroning of Provi- LECTURE IV. 157 dence ; whilst the one would be confirmed in his infidelity, the other would be staggered in the con fidence of his Faith. To a Christian trained in a speculative Theology, the difficulty would be aggra vated. The immutability and perpetuity of order, which he had been taught to ascribe to the Divine Principles, would receive, to his apprehension, a contradiction, in what he observed passing around him. How prevalent such feelings were, we may learn from the testimony of Salvian, a Gallic writer of the Vth century, in his work " on the Government " of God ;" whose expressions, though allowance must be made for a declamatory style, give a vivid repre sentation of the disorder of the times, and of the infidel distrust of Providence resulting from it. The evil seems to have reached its height, when this writer drew his picture of it. It was at such a crisis, when Pelagianism began to make advances in the world; when opinions were disseminated, which were regarded, or at least apprehended in their consequences, as infringements on the great truths of Providence and Grace, and as in this sense harmonizing with the profane tendency of the agea. Africa, however, continued for some time exempt from the general ruin, and Augustine had leisure to contemplate the rolling wave in its progress, before » See also Augustine's complaint of the drunkenness which prevailed in the African cities in his times ; and with which even the celebration of the memory of the martyrs was pro faned : and the ineffectual attempts of the Bishops to check it. —Note A. Lect. IV. 158 LECTURE IV. at length the cities of Carthage and Hippo were swept under itb- Jerome also, sequestered from every thing but the storms of a passionate enthusiasm, at his loved retreat in Palestine, could watch the state of religious feeling at this crisis, and, himself un moved, mingle with the agitating events of the West. But the sceptre of spiritual power was then passing from his veteran hands to the more vigorous Bishop of Hippo c ; and, whilst his counsels and ex ample are sought in the difficulties of the strug gle against the Pelagianism of the times, it is the African Divines, with Augustine at their head, who take the lead in the controversies ; to whose ex ertions the orthodox decision is owing d. Read the repeated expostulations of the African clergy, con veyed, in the form of respectful epistles, to the heads of the Roman Church, on the case of Pelagius and Celestius ; and, under their half-expressed fears of the orthodoxy of Rome, and their obsequious language of duty, you will easily see, who are the real arbiters of the dispute ; whose is the influential opinion, be- b Jerome born A. D. 331, died in 420. Augustine born A. D. 354, died in 430. Pelagian Controversies began to be agitated in 405 . c Jerome, amidst his compliments of Augustine, still reminds him who it is that makes these acknowledgments : Quem post me, he says, in writing to Augustine, orientem in scriptura- rum eruditione laetatus sum. Epist. XIV. in Augustin. Oper. torn. II. p. 1 9. — Note B. d Prosper, in speaking of the Council of Carthage, says, .... cui dux Aurelius, ingeniumque, Augustinus erat. Carm. de Ingratis. — Note C. LECTURE IV. 159 fore which even the pride of the Apostolic See must bow e. The nature and the decision of the controversies on Divine and Human Agency, bespeak entirely the practical theology of the Western Divine. These controversies were of leading importance in relation to the government of the Church. Opinions, adverse to a belief in the supremacy of Divine Providence, were also adverse to the dependence of the spiritual community, on the personal oracles of the Divine Will, and visible ministers of the Divine Power. If the real invisible Theocracy were not acknowledged in the fullest sense, the principle of a deputed theo cratic power would sink in estimation at the same time ; and the hearts of the people would be se duced from that loyalty, with which the sacerdotal ministrations had been hitherto attended. So that, even though the logic of Pelagius, and the known purity of his character, might have acquitted him from the charge of teaching a doctrine of ingrati tude and rebellion against God ; yet it was probable, that discussions, touching the nature and necessity of Divine Grace, if they amounted only to a modera tion of language on the subject, would raise ques tionings and unsettle the faith of many f. Practical men would readily see this, and, regarding the mat ter, not as a point of disputation, but as a question of government, would take their measures against consequences probable in fact, rather than against the abstract speculation itself. e Note D. f Note E. 160 LECTURE IV. It was also to hearts, which had so lashed them selves to the helm of the Christian vessel, a ques tion of piety or impiety, whether an exclusive, or a qualified, ascription to God, of the glory of human salvation, should be adopted in the dogmatic lan guage of the Church. In opposing Pelagianism, they conceived themselves pleading " the Lord's con troversy" against His " ungrateful" creatures s, and felt their zeal, as Churchmen, stimulated by the righteousness of the cause which they advocated. To impute any efficacy to Human Agency, in thd great work of Salvation, might appear a denial of God's mercy and power, — a disclaimer of that Pro vidence, whose blessing had hitherto crowned their measures with success. They exulted in an oppor tunity of vindicating the cause of God, through evil report and good report; rejoicing in the very hatred incurred at the hand of the heretic h. S Prosper's Poem against the Pelagians, is inscribed, De In- gratis. Bradwavdine, Archbishop of Canterbury in the XlVth century, entitles his elaborate metaphysical work against Pela gianism, De Causa Dei. Bradwardine died in 1349. h They perverted our Lord's declaration, " Rejoice when " men hate you and persecute you," &c. Macte virtute, says Jerome, writing to Augustine, in orbe celebraris ; catholici te conditorem antiquae rursum fidei vene- rantur, atque suspiciunt : et, quod signum majoris glorias est, omnes haeretici detestantur, et me pari prosequuntur odio; ut, quos gladiis nequeunt, voto interficiant. Epist. 25. — Augustini Oper. torn. II. p. 29. 4to ed. Gregory Nazianzen speaks with exultation of the shocking manner of Arius's death. Arius is uniformly regarded by the orthodox Fathers as another Judas. LECTURE IV. 161 The Pelagian controversies, accordingly, evidenced a different character, at their outset, from that by which the questions on the Trinity were distin guished. The assertion may seem paradoxical ; but it may be said, that they were more properly re ligious than the Trinitarian ; that is, they were viewed more immediately in their reference to the general sentiments and conduct of Christians, and decided, in the first instance, on practical grounds. The disputes on the Trinity, indeed, more properly belonged, in principle, to Christianity; as, on the other hand, the Pelagian controversies, in principle, be longed to Philosophy. But, in the discussions of the former, Christianity was almost forgotten in the philosophical spirit with which they were pursued. And so, in the discussions of the latter, the proper philosophical arguments, by which the truths re specting Divine and Human Agency might have been fairly appreciated, were neglected ; and points of abstract inquiry were decided by their probable effect on human practice. The consequences of certain opinions were estimated in each case, both in the Trinitarian and the Pelagian disputes. A Theology, essentially logical, shewed itself in the one as in the other. Only, in the Trinitarian disputes, the argumentation was exclusively and strictly lo gical ; in the Pelagian, the logical and practical con sequences were confused together. Because such an effect would probably follow such an opinion in the conduct of the Christian, therefore, it was argued, the opinion must be untrue. M 162 LECTURE IV. Thus the objection, which Jerome adduces against the theory of the power of man imputed to Pela gius, is, that it tended to an " apathy" and " a sin- " lessness k," such as was inculcated by Stoic or Pythagorean, and consequently would lead to a state of inaction and presumptuous security. The imputation, surely, is groundless and unphilosophical as an argument against the truth of the theory; though, as a practical objection, and rhetorically employed, it may avail. In like manner Augustine argues, that, if the doctrine of Pelagius were ad mitted, the importance of Baptism would cease ; men would no longer think it necessary to resort to the laver of regeneration, to be washed from pol lutions which they did not acknowledge. Again, that the duty of Prayer would be neglected : in vain would our Lord have commanded men to pray, that they be not led into temptation, when the self-forti fied soul felt, within itself, the fond presumption that it was safe. We may perceive, then, in the origin of these con troversies, a confusion of rhetorical and logical ar gumentation; such as might naturally have been expected from the rhetorical school, in which the Latin Fathers were trained, and from that prac tical design which was ever uppermost in their minds in all their theological discussions. Had these controversies, in their connexion with Chris- fc 'AvaBtla et avoifAapvrio-ia. It is curious to find the very same consequences imputed to Calvinism in more modern times. — Note F. LECTURE IV. 163 tianity, been as fully treated by the Greeks as the Trinitarian were, we should have found a more exact technical vocabulary on the several points of discussion, as well as a more logical deduc tion of consequences, at the outset of the dispu tation. As it was, they were left by the Latin Fathers in the unscientific, floating form of prac tical conclusions. The Latins had not the acumen, and the expertness, of the Greek theologian ; as neither had they a proper instrument of philosophy in their language ; to enable them to draw those lines of discrimination, on which an exact theoretic phraseology could be constructed. Indeed, they had no design of so stating the truths of Divine and Human Agency. They were bent on resisting a practical mischief. And hence has resulted that very remarkable difference in the comparison with the Trinitarian controversies. A copious phraseology, an exactness and rigour of statement, are charac teristic of the Trinitarian theories, from the first full discussion of them. On the Pelagian question, we seek in vain, in the writings of Augustine, any positive, dogmatic language, by which an exact theory of Divine and Human Agency, in their re lation to each other, may be enunciated. This is evidenced in the fact, that the orthodox, the Jan- senists, the Thomists, and the Jesuits, or Molinists, all equally refer themselves to the authority of that Father. Something must be allowed in such re ferences for the obligation felt by the several dis putants, to maintain their agreement with so catholic M 2 164 LECTURE IV. an authority. Something too must be allowed for the unphilosophical nature of the Latin language. Still, had Augustine spoken with more dogmatical precision on the subject, there would not have been that plausibility of evidence in his writings to views so opposed. The observation is illustrated in the disputes sub sisting on the Question, after the death of Augus tine, and in the difficulty manifested, in the course of these discussions, of ascertaining the precise views of Augustine himself. In the monasteries of the South of Gaul, not long after the death of Augus tine, objections were raised against some of his as sertions, as destructive of the freewill of man1. The authority of the Father was maintained at the ex pense of the orthodoxy of his objectors ; who, as not advancing to the full length of the Great Mas ter's language, were accused as favourers of Pela gius, or as Semi-Pelagians. But we do not find any thing of this kind taking place, in regard to the great authorities on the question of the Trinity. There is no ambiguity, for instance, on the Trinity, as to the precise doctrine of Athanasius, or Gregory Nazianzen. The precision of the Greek Philosophy guards the doctrines of these writers throughout. 1 Mera pev roi ye Bdvarov tov ev dyiois Avyovarivov rjp^avro rives ra>v ev r<3 kXij/)£0 to pev Svo-o-efies Kparvveiv hoypa, naKcos 8e Xtyctv 'Av- yovarivov Kai diaavpeiv, a>s dvaipeo~iv tou dvre^ovcriov elo-rjynadpevov . "AXXa Kai KeXeoTicos 6 'Paprjs, vnep re Beiov dvSpos, Kai Kara to>v dva- kivovvtov ttjv atpetriv, to'is ey\a>piois ypd(pav emaKoTtois, ttjv kivov- pevrjV rrkdvrpi ea-rqa-ev. Photii Biblioth. c. 53. Voss. Hist. Pelag. lib. 1. c. 30. p. 81. LECTURE IV. 165 The same is observable in Augustine himself, in his treatises on the Trinity. But, where he had not the previous clearing of the question, in its theological bearings, by the labours of Greek theologians, he is more the practical reasoner than the accurate theo rist ; stating rather what may check a growing evil, than what is calculated to set at rest a speculative question. I do not indeed say this, as supposing that any speculative statement, or scheme, of Di vine and Human Agency, could set the question at rest. Experience proves the contrary. It opens too many attractive views to the curiosity of the human mind, for speculation to acquiesce in any given definition of the subject. But I merely wish to point out the state, in which the Pelagian con troversies descended to the Church : particularly, as it affords some solution of the general state of those controversies in all ages of the Church. It is a striking fact, that Trinitarians, with little ex ception, are all now agreed among themselves : whilst, in regard to the Pelagian controversies* there subsists the greatest variety of opinion in whole Churches and among individuals. Each spe culator has his theory, his peculiar view; — each separate communion, some antagonist statement on the several points involved in them. Now, it is not enough to say, that one class of truths is more prac tical than the other, and therefore more awakens the attention and interest of thinking persons. Those who rightly discern and value the Trinitarian truths, will hardly allow, that there are any truths of the M 3 166 LECTURE IV. Gospel more strictly practical than these. But, even on that supposition, there will still remain to be ac counted for, a remarkable difference, in the opening for controversial discussion, presented in the terms, by which the truths relative to Divine and Human Agency are expressed. There is a great deal of de finition and of apparent precision of language on the subject. But, with all its formality, the disputation bears the mark of its rhetorical origin, leaving an escape for the theorist to raise up his own system even on the terms of its theories. In the revival of the Pelagian Question in the IXth century, in the discussions on Predestination to which I alluded in my first Lecture, an attempt was made by Erigena to introduce the language of philosophy into the subject. He laboured to prove, against the unfortunate Gotteschalc, who had de duced from the writings of Augustine " a twofold " Predestination," as it was termed, — a Predestina tion to Life, and a Predestination to Death, or Re probation, — that it was impossible for the doctrine of Reprobation to be true ; on the grounds, that Death and Sin, and Evil in general, were non entities, mere negations, that had no proper being, and therefore could not pre-exist in the mind of God, or be predestined. This conclusion, however, of Erigena, being founded on an abstruse, mys tical philosophy, not very intelligible to an age of literature, only then emerging from the barbarism of preceding times, obtained no favourable reception LECTURE IV. 167 with the Church. In fact it only roused a spirit of resistance. The Southern Church of Gaul felt alarmed for the authority of Augustine. Not only were individuals engaged in replying to the argu ments of Erigena ; but even the Church of Lyons, softer in temper than her sister of Rheims m, pub lished her strictures on the arguments of the phi losopher, and her remonstrances against the perse cution of Gotteschalc ; characterizing, as " inhuman " cruelty," the violence with which the poor sufferer had been treated11. This resistance against a more theoretic view of the doctrines involved in these Controversies, was a further means of keeping the discussion in that practical form, in which it had been bequeathed to the Church by Augustine. The writers against Erigena, Ratramn of Corbey, Prudentius, Bishop of Troyes, and Florus, a Deacon of Lyons, are all strongly opposed to a scientific discussion of the sub ject. They rule the question by the simple autho rity of Scripture and the Fathers ; objecting to Eri gena, on the very ground, that he had corrupted the simplicity of the truth by refinements of reason ing0. Such then was the form, in which the Theories m The Southern part of Gaul had a larger infusion of Roman Civilization, and this is seen in the different character of the Church there, as compared with the Northern. n Note M of Lecture I. o These several writings are in the Collection, by Mauguin, of Authors of the IXth century on Grace and Predestination. M 4 168 LECTURE IV. belonging to the Pelagian Question descended to the proper age of Scholasticism — the period, when the disputations of the Schools were reduced to a sys tematic form, in consequence of the fuller introduc tion of the Aristotelic Philosophy. Therefore it is, that I characterize this class of controversies, as more peculiarly Scholastic than the Trinitarian. The conclusions to be established were handed down to the Schoolmen, in the volumes of their own great Master. But these conclusions wanted contexture and theoretic stability. It yet remained, for the doctrines on these points to be moulded into a ra tionalized system of Theology ; to be deduced in connexion with the Principles of the Divine Being, already laid down as the scientific basis of all truth. It has been seen, in the account which I gave of the theories proposed on the Trinity, that the ground of the speculation was, the notion of God, as the Principle of Causation or Efficiency; that this no tion itself was drawn from analogies in the human mind, viewed as the means of tracing up the facts of the visible world to their fixed principles in God. The speculations on the Pelagian Question, as developed in the Scholastic system, were an appli cation of this fundamental principle of the Theology to a particular class of facts ; those produced by moral and intellectual Beings. The theory of God, as a Trinity in Unity, had respect, according to the scholastic views, to the whole universe : it was the mysterious solution of the whole order of things ; LECTURE III. 169 containing in it the immutable reasons, or principles, of all existences whatever. The account, however, of the peculiar phenomena attending the thoughts and actions of rational agents, such as angels and men — and of men more particularly, as the subjects of Divine Grace revealed in the dispensations of re ligion — suggested occasion for a more explicit and distinct inquiry. A theory of Providence, therefore, was to be drawn out ; of the connexion rather of Providence with the natural and revealed condition of human nature. The Schoolmen, accordingly, proceeded to philo sophize on the mode, in which the Will of God ful filled itself, consistently with the free-will of man. The spirit of their Theology made it incumbent on them to demonstrate the operation of the Divine Will, as the sole Master-Will, comprehending in itself the derived and subordinate wills of all other agents. And here the important point to be observed, in developing the force of theory on the doctrines now under review, is, the reason, why they referred the speculation to the Will, rather than to the Intelli gence of God. It was in pursuance of a maxim of their adopted philosophy, that " mere intelligence " moves nothing," — is no cause of production or change p. The inquiry was essentially concerned about a theory of change, — an account of a class of ever-flowing, variable, phenomena. To understand this, we should be aware of the extent of meaning P AristOt. Ethic. VI. diavoid 8' avrrj ov6ev Kivei. 170 LECTURE IV. attached to the word Motion, in the ancient Physics. It included under it much more than we apprehend by the term ; applying to any change whatever that might occur, either in the internal structure, or ex ternal form of bodies, no less than to their change of place. As the nature of the soul was classed among the objects of physical inquiry, any modification of the soul, by its exertion in action, came under this definition of Motion. We may judge then of the con nexion of the maxim, to which I have referred, with the theory of Divine Agency. In exploring the principle of actions, we exclude from the induction whatever belongs to the simply intellectual view of their nature. We look only to the motive principle. We are sufficiently accustomed, indeed, to ascribe the moral nature of actions to the motives exemplified in them. But we little think of the abstruse philo sophy on which the expression is founded ; that it is a rejection of every thing else but the Will, — the principle of Activity, — from the abstract theory of human conduct. The doctrine of Predestination, accordingly, is a reference of actions to their primary Motive, the great principle of all Activity, the Will of God. The reasons or ideas of actions, as of all other effects throughout the Universe, might have existed eter nally in the Divine mind ; like the principles of an art in the mind of the artist: but nothing would have been created, no action would have taken place, unless the Divine Will had stretched out the hand of God to the work. It was the Will of God LECTURE IV. 171 that occasioned the Divine Intelligence, the wisdom or word of God, to go forth, and diffuse the Divine power, wisdom, and goodness over the works of a visible world. From the perfect simplicity, indeed, of the Divine nature, the Will of God is identical, as the School men assert, with his Intelligence ; as both are also identical with his Being i. But, in speculating con cerning the principle of voluntary actions, it is im portant that the attention should be confined strictly to that ultimate abstraction which properly repre sents their nature in the Being of God — the simple principle of the Divine Will. Had the views of the Schoolmen, and of others who have philosophized after them, been confined strictly to this point, much perplexity of thought on the questions arising out of the subject would have been avoided. A simple solution in that case would have been given of the effects of subordinate agents, by deducing them from the great law of the Divine Will. This class of variable phenomena would, at least, have been simplified, by being contemplated as His agency, in whom is no variableness, nor shadow of turning. They would have been deprived of their anomalous character, by the steadiness of purpose with which such a theory would invest them. 1 Et sic oportet in Deo esse voluntatem, cum sit in eo in- tellectus. Et sicut suum intelligere est suum esse, ita et suum esse est suum velle. — Aquinas, Sum. Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xix. art. i. Quia essentia Dei est ejus intelligere et velle. Ibid. art. 4. 172 LECTURE IV. But the intellectual principle, as being physically inseparable from the moral, has been also brought into the speculation : and the stability, attributed to this principle, has been taken into the view of the origin of those changes which the moral world ex hibits. Conclusions have been drawn from that other maxim of ancient philosophy, that what is known — whatever is the object of Science — must be fixed and immutable. It has been forgotten in the course of inquiry, that the speculation is concerning the principle of change, — that it is an endeavour to ascertain some limit to those variable results which the human will produces, by viewing them in their original cause of variation, itself immutable, the Will of God. Thus, when any event or effect is simply regarded in its reference to the Will of God, the assertion which it becomes us to make respecting it, is that its accomplishment could not eventually be resisted ; could not be frustrated. The design of that act of volition must surely be effected : the wills of all sub ordinate agents must work together with that sove reign Will, which pursues its own purposes through their agency. In the acts of Human will there is no assurance of the result being the object intended ; there is no certainty of correspondence between the motive and the effect, because of the various obstacles arising from the conflicting wills of different indivi duals. But, even of the Human will, we may pre dict a certain result, in proportion as the agent ap pears to have calculated justly the resistance, or the LECTURE IV. 173 cooperation, to be expected from the wills of others. Now the Divine Will is only an extreme case of this analogy, — a case in which are included the wills of all creatures, — where the purpose, accord ingly, will surely be accomplished, not only amidst the utmost variety and complexity, and apparent contradiction of human wills, but by means of that very entangling and contrariety of motions which puzzle the eye of the human spectator. Take however the Divine Intellect into the account ; re gard any given effect as the simple object of Divine knowledge ; and we must then say that the effect could not be otherwise; the result, in any other form, becomes inconceivable and self-contradictory : as known to God, it must be infallibly and specula tively true : a conclusion which brings us immedi ately to a doctrine of Necessity, or Fatalism. The Schoolmen attempted, in this speculation, to solve the difficulty which had perplexed the ancient philosophers. Whilst some of these resorted to the notion of a sovereign fate, or a principle of malig nity, or necessity — and the more pious to that of a providence — to explain the devious course of human events ; all may be regarded, as having admitted the impossibility of reducing this class of facts to any strictly scientific principles. They were placed, indeed, among those truths which were held to be essentially variable or Contingent, in contradistinc tion to those which were called Necessary, as capable of being referred to fixed laws. So that, whilst the 174 LECTURE IV. philosopher assigned these several abstract causes for the variable phenomena of actions, it was not a solution of the facts that he proposed, but a con fession of his ignorance of any proper philosophical account of them. The Platonic doctrine of an abstract Idea of Good, was the nearest approach to such an account. This was, however, an attempt to reduce the calculations of moral judgment, to the certainty which belongs to the purely intellectual perceptions, rather than a theory that applied itself to the actual anomalies of human life. But the Schoolmen, adopting Aristotle's practical view of the subject, admitted, with that philosopher, the uncertainty of human conduct in its dependence on the free-will of man. At the same time, as theologians and logicians, they felt themselves bound to reconcile this admission with the fixedness of those Ideal Principles, from which all this devious course of human actions primarily originated. The manner in which they effected the reconcilia tion, is extremely worthy of our notice, as an in stance of the dependence of their Theology on meta physical theories. The explanation rests entirely on assumed definitions of Time and Eternity. These are contrasted with each other ; Time, as the " mea- " sure of motion," — Eternity, as the " measure of " permanent being." Whilst events therefore, viewed in connexion with the capacities of finite beings, develope themselves successively, and are uncertain, or contingent, as arising out of their proximate causes; LECTURE IV. 175 they are fixed and immutable in their " presentiality" before God, whose eternity admits no change, no suc cession r. It is sufficiently clear, I think, from these diffi culties, and their proposed solution, that the meta physics of a logical philosophy have tied the knot, in which this subject has been involved. Realism converted distinctions, which are the mere cre ations of the mind, into differences in the nature of things. For the terms, Necessary and Contingent, express nothing more than laws of thought, the varied character of evidence belonging to dif ferent perceptions of the mind : the necessity im puted to the objects of Divine knowledge being a consequence from the notion of immutability; the contingency imputed to the facts of human life, being the simple evidence of experience, which may vary, and even be directly contrary, without any in trinsic absurdity. Whence, the attempt to reconcile them is only to confound two distinct classes of mental facts. The Schoolmen, indeed, were not ig norant of the nature of this distinction ¦* ; but the logical basis of their Theology obliged them to in terpret it in the way in which they have done. The necessity, and fixedness, and eternity of the Divine Being, were the given principles, which their method called upon them to apply to the facts of human ex perience. They commenced with the rigour of logic, "* Note L.s, Sum. Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xix. art. 3. — Note H. 176 LECTURE IV. and were forced to throw its chains over the stream of human affairs. The only proper difficulty in the subject of Divine Agency, — that which has more strictly the force of objection against it, — is, the fact observ able in the world, of apparent resistance to the will of God, by the deep and wide prevalence of evil. This fact impugns the very ground on which the truth of the Divine Agency is founded ; since the good designed in the constitution of the world, is the evidence to us of that great law of natural re ligion, — that God wills the happiness of his creatures. In short, it is principally, if not solely, from a con viction of the Divine good-will, that we assign to God the operation of will at all. But even this difficulty, real as it is, (for the ex istence of sin and misery in the world is as clear a fact as any in its history,) is greatly aggravated by that speculative optimism, which seems a funda mental prejudice or instinct of our minds. The maxim that nature works all things for the best — that there is nothing imperfect or vain in her sys tem — was the form which this idea assumed in the ancient philosophy. It would be well, if we held it simply as a general truth, highly important for our practical needs ; as a resource in the perplexities of life ; but rejected it altogether as a ground of spe culation. For as soon as we begin to reason from it, that, " of two ends, the better must be the design " of Providence;" as the ancients did reason, and as LECTURE IV. . 177 *¦ ff\ we are ourselves apt to do; we incur difficulties arising from our own conceptions of what is best. We have then to satisfy the importunate requisi tions of imaginary hypotheses. When we come indeed to examine the subject more closely, as it is illustrated by that Logical Philosophy on which our attention is now engaged, the theory itself of Predestination will be found to involve reasonings on this fundamental principle. It is, in fact, a speculation founded on our moral nature ; which cannot rest satisfied, until it has mo delled the system of Grace, as of Nature, after its own tendencies towards an excellence and perfection beyond its positive experience. The Father of Mo dern Philosophy has observed, that the human in tellect supposes a greater regularity and equality in things than it actually finds. This is particularly the case in the world of religion. Captivated with the contemplation of the eternal destinies of man, it loves to trace the links, which bind together the remote parts of the mysterious life of the soul, in continuous and uniform series. It will not acquiesce, therefore, in the naked declarations of Scripture on the subject of Human Salvation. It eagerly seizes on the truths contained in these, to recast them in the mould which its own imaginations have framed. Hence that charm, which doctrines of Absolute Predestina tion, Indefectible Grace, Assurance of Salvation, and the like, possess both for the philosopher and the vulgar. The mind is placed by them in a com manding elevation, from which it beholds the whole N 178 LECTURE IV. course of the Christian life stretched before it. It feels itself transported into the very region which properly belongs to religion ; where the amazement of thought, naturally excited by the subject, seems to be answered by the majesty and sublimity of the scenery presented. Otherwise, it might be matter of surprise, how pious and amiable men have delighted in stern and appalling views of the Divine Predes tination ; not scrupling to declare the devout emo tion, with which they could contemplate the terrors of Divine wrath, sentencing the sinner to everlast ing dereliction and misery **. To understand, however, the theoretic nature of Predestination, we must enter more fully into the ethical speculation, of which it is the counterpart in the system of Religion : if, at least, we would rightly estimate the meaning of the dogmatic declarations on the subject. Whatever is the object of a natural passion, or active principle of the soul, was termed, in the lan guage of ancient philosophy, " a good," and an " end;" — an end, because the affection, or active prin ciple, when duly exerted, was conceived to rest in its object, then attained or completed ; — a good, because nature does nothing in vain, and suggests no object to the desires of man, without a beneficial design. The notion of Good became thus essentially at tached to an object of the will ; or was rather the t Note I. LECTURE IV. 179 result of such an association. Accordingly, whatever was desired, was represented to be a good, either real or apparent ; — a real good, if the affections were rightly constituted ; — an apparent good, pursued as real, where the affections were disordered and per verted. This general view of moral facts will be recognized as pervading the ethical philosophy of Aristotle. And hence the great business of that philosophy, as of the ancient Ethics in general, was, to find out the general law of Good, or great End of Actions ; the object universally aimed at, though often under mistaken views, in the va rious moral facts which human life exhibits ; or, as it was abstractedly termed the Chief Good, — the ultimate End, or in Scholastic language, Final Cause, of all actions. Now, if we conceive this Theory of Actions trans ferred to the Divine Being, we shall obtain a just view of what the Schools intended by the doctrine of Predestination. The End, or Final Cause, of all the actions of God, — of all exertions of his will, — could be no other than his Goodness. As, under the view of religion, the Chief Good of Man must be God himself, so, to the will of God, there could be no other object than the Divine goodness itself. So far then as all things done in the universe were the actions of God, they were referable to the great law of good, original in the nature of the Divine Being. Nothing evil, as such, could be referable to God, because what was evil could not be conceived to be the object of Will at all, much less of the perfect N 2 180 LECTURE IV. Divine will. It was wrong therefore, according to the Scholastic doctrine, to speak of the predestina tion of evil. The wicked might be said to be pre destined to punishment, but not to the evil com mitted by them. This was only the result of their improper exercise of their own will ; through which, as individuals, they missed the good designed for them by God; and, in thus missing it, sinned against the benevolent constitution of God. Good would surely follow, whatever might be the actions of the individual, however evil these might be in their immediate result, since nothing else but goodness could be the object of the Divine Will. God there fore could not be said to will the evil action of the sinner ; though He might " permit" it, in order to that ultimate good which He educes out of it. The use of the word Permission may be remarked here ; as it has passed into modern use, and is employed still to remove the objection arising from saying, that God appoints or decrees evil. Taken in its popular sense, it only removes the difficulty a step further ; as it still leaves the question, why God does not interfere to prevent the evil done and suffered in the world. But the scientific use of it, by Aquinas, seems to be, to avoid making evil an object of volition ; and yet not to exclude it from the cognizance and control of Divine Providence as an event u. Reprobation accordingly, in the Calvinistic sense, had no place in the Scholastic theology. Predesti nation, regarded as the sole primary cause of all our « Note J. LECTURE IV. 181 actions, as they are moral and Christian — as they have any worth in them, or any happiness — was as serted in that Theology in the most positive man ner ; though different Doctors varied in further ex positions of its nature x. But Reprobation, as it implies a theory of the moral evil of the world, I think I may confidently say, is no part of the Sys tem^. The term, indeed, is derived to us from the Schoolmen ; and so far they are chargeable with having perplexed theology with the disquisitions arising out of it. But, had they employed the term to denote an antecedent will, on the part of God, of the sin and misery of the wicked, they would have contradicted that philosophy, from which they drew their speculation on the subject. Whether it becomes us to theorize at all on the subject, is another question. But, if there must be theory, the Schoolmen were so far right, that they simply endeavoured to trace the Divine Goodness, as manifested by Nature and Revelation, to its pri mary cause in the Divine Being. Their theory in culcated the great truth, that the apparent anomalies of the world were in reality instances of the same general law ; that the evil actually found in nature, was not the design of God, or the effect of any Prin ciple of Evil. This is their Predestination. And they assert Election accordingly, in the same man ner, as part of Predestination. Election, according x Note K. y Aquinas, Sum. Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xxm. art. 3. — Note L. N 3 182 LECTURE IV. to them, is an analysis of Predestination, considered as a moral act : since, where there is good willed, there must be the love, and consequently the choice of the persons so predestined z. Looking indeed back to the origin of the question of Divine Agency in the Latin Church, to the cha racter and conduct of Augustine, who gave the first impulse to it ; and observing at the same time the mode in which it is explained by the Schoolmen; I cannot but think, that the dogmatic assertion of Predestination is primarily to be understood solely in opposition to Manicheism, and its kindred errors, with which Pelagianism was associated : that the ex clusive design of it was accordingly, to maintain a theory of Divine Goodness, — to exhibit the moral and religious world in harmony with the physical, that God might be seen as all in all. The Latin Church appears to have felt a constant dread of the influx of Manicheism. The cry of Manicheism was sure to rally defenders round the standard of orthodoxy. The poor sufferers, cruelly executed at Orleans in the Xlth century, were murdered under the plea of their profession of Manicheism. The alarm was spread against the rising sect of the Albigenses of Thou- louse, in the following century, on the same ground3. z Note M. a The Pelagians seem to have retorted the charge of Ma nicheism on the Orthodox : — Catholicos Manichaeorum nomine criminantur. — Contr. Duas Epist. Pelag. ad Bonifac. lib. ii. Augustin. Oper. torn. vii. p. 286. — Note N. LECTURE IV. 183 Augustine naturally felt a strong antipathy to that error, from which he had, with many painful strug gles, extricated himself. Whilst the disciple of that gross, material philosophy, he had been accus tomed to regard Evil as a substantial or corporeal element of the Universe, coordinate with Good. Having once overcome this noxious prejudice of his early creed, he shrank from any approach to it af terwards, as from an antichristian enemy. We see this in his manner of treating the questions raised by Pelagius. He is constantly viewing them in their connexion with the Manichean doctrines. As a practical man, bent on carrying a point of Church- government, he calls attention to the unpopular consequences of the Pelagian notions ; calculating doubtless that the alarm of Manicheism would come with full force from one, able to speak, from his own experience, of its delusions. The antipathies of Augustine descended, with his doctrines, to the Schoolmen. Following his foot steps, they sought only to set forth his views of the Divine Agency, as of every other question of theo logy, with theoretic precision. It would appear, accordingly, that the Scholastic doctrine of Providence, and of Predestination as a part of Providence, is opposed to philosophical no tions of Providence current in the early ages of the Church. In speaking indeed of the Divine Power, Aquinas expressly points this out. " There have been some," he says, " as the " Manichees, who said that spiritual and incorporeal N 4 184 LECTURE IV. " things are subject to divine power, but visible " and corporeal things subject to the power of a " contrary principle. Against these then we must " say, that God is in all things by his Power. " There have been others again, who, though they " believed all things subject to divine power, still " did not extend divine Providence down to these " lower parts : in whose person it is said, in Job " xxii. ' He walks about the hinges of heaven, and " ' considers not our concerns V And against these " it was necessary to say, that God is in all things " by his Presence. There have been again others, " who, though they said all things belonged to the " Providence of God, still laid it down, that all " things were not immediately created by God ; but " that He immediately created the first creatures, " and these created others. And against these it " was necessary to say, that He was in all things " by his Essence c." These are the theories, accordingly, which should be studied, in order to have a right conception of the definition of Predestination, as given in the Scholastic writers, and from them derived to modern Theology. But, if this be the case, the most important ele- b Job xxii. 13, 14. " And thou sayest, How doth God know? " can He judge through the dark cloud ? Thick clouds are a " covering to Him, that He seeth not ; and He walketh in the " circuit of heaven." c Aquinas, Sum. Theol. Prima Pars, qu. vm. art. 3. LECTURE IV. 185 ment for a right judgment of the doctrine, as pro fessed by our Church, has been generally overlooked. Divines have been anxious to shew, that our Re formers were not of the same opinion on this sub ject as Calvin. It is evident, however, that the statement in our Articles could not have been ex pressly opposed to Calvinistic views. For such an opposition would imply, that the theories opposed were prevalent at the time ; whereas they were maintained at their greatest height after the com position of our Article. Theory is met by counter- theory, when the language of erroneous speculation has begun to infect the orthodoxy of the Church. A speculation, indeed, may have been in exist ence — may have been growing, — as many of the Trinitarian theories were, before they obtained the names by which they are now known. So un doubtedly was, what is now called Calvinism. Still it would not be opposed by a dogmatic statement, until the profession of the theory was become no torious, and troublesome to the leading Clergy of the times. It has been often observed of our XVIIth Ar ticle, that, whilst it declares a predestination to Life and Glory, it is reserved on the subject of Reproba tion, speaking on this point in the language of prac tical admonition d. It is no little confirmation of d The allusion at the end of the Article to the " Will of God" should be particularly noticed, as illustrative of the train of thought throughout it, and also the correction of the expression by the terms joined with it : — " that Will of God is to be fol- 186 LECTURE IV. this view, that it coincides exactly with the theory of Divine Agency, developed in the reasonings' of the Scholastic Philosophy. From observing this coincidence, I should conclude, that our Reformers, feeling themselves called upon by the state of opinion, to make some authoritative statement on the sub ject, and led also to speculate on it, from their own education in the theories of Scholasticism; returned to the original mode in which the truth had been theoretically propounded. They saw, at least, the moderation of that language : the notions involved in it, were their philosophical creed : and they wisely preferred it to the extreme views of some of their contemporaries. Consistently with this notion of Predestination, Grace is set forth by the Scholastic writers as the " Effect of Predestination," or Predestination as the " Preparation of Grace." Both indeed are spoken of as Divine " ordinations" to the Life Eternal e, and are equally characteristic therefore of the Di vine Agency, as taught in the Scholastic Theology. But, the Pelagian controversies have given a more Christian emphasis to the term Grace, by its employ ment as the antagonist statement to the anathe matized doctrines of Pelagius ; and made it equiva- lowed, " which we have expressly declared unto us in the Word " of God." These last words call us from the theoretic sense of the "Will of God" to the practical one, of the precepts con tained in Scripture. e Aquinas, Sum. Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xxiv. art. 3. — Note O. LECTURE IV. 187 lent practically to the whole of Gospel-truth. So that, in fact, it more properly represents the part of God in the scheme of human salvation, than any other term of Theology. Amidst the copious matter of inquiry, which a term, so pregnant with theological interest, presents to our hands, I confine myself to what belongs more strictly to the notion of Divine Agency — the point particularly selected for illustration in the pre sent Lecture. First then I would call attention to the word Grace itself. The sense, which the discussions of Pelagianism have impressed on the term, is par ticularly to be noticed. The dogmatic manner in which we now speak of " the grace of God," — placing it in contrast with the powers of human nature, or with nature in general, — conveys the idea of something positive in God, something that admits of explanation as to what it is, — of definition, and distribution into its various kinds. We hear of grace operating and cooperating ; grace preventing and following; grace of congruity, grace of con- dignity. But how erroneous is the conception pro duced in the mind, by these several modes of speak ing ? When we try the notion of Grace by a sur vey of the Scripture-dispensations, what is it but a general fact, a summary designation of the various instances of benevolent, pitiful condescension on the part of God, to the wants and helplessness of man ? It is thus that " grace and truth" are said 188 LECTURE IV. to come by Jesus Christ. The mission of Christ to the world was the strongest instance of the be nevolent exertion of God for our good. Thus St. Paul speaks of the grace of God having appeared unto all men, in sending his Son into the world, characterizing by the word grace this act of heavenly interposition. Thus, too, we are said to be " saved " by grace;" the Apostle alluding, evidently, as be fore, to the act of Christ's coming into the world and dying for our sins. Again, we are desired to pray for " grace," — and grace is said to be " given" to us. These last instances convey a dogmatic impression ; but when we consider them more strictly, they resolve themselves into concise modes of speaking, adapted to the purpose of giving a distinct and striking view of the fact to which reference is made. We pray, that is, that God will graciously help us ; and, in acknowledging the gift of grace, we deny our own sufficiency, and declare that what we do good, is of God working in us both to will and to do. The word Truth is subject to the like erroneous conception ; but here we are not apt to fall into the realism of supposing something in God positively denoted by the term : since it has not been equally the occasion of religious dispute. It is then from Scholasticism that we have derived this positive sense. Those subdivisions which I have referred to, of " preventing" and " following" grace, grace " operating" and " cooperating," and others which our Church has not adopted ; are expressly taken from the Scholastic Theology. Grace is LECTURE IV. 189 treated of in this system, as something " infused f" into the soul, by virtue of which the sinner is jus tified, and the operation of which on the heart it is endeavoured to trace through the stages of its process p. The order of ideas pursued, may be stated gener ally as the following. Grace is first communicated to the soul of man in baptism, as an infused prin ciple superadded to his natural powers, — as the seed of a new birth regenerating the soul. Hence is obtained the primary impulse, the original motive or efficient cause, by which the sinner is set forward on the course of the Life eternal. This produces in him a motion towards God ; in which state it is called " a preventing" and an " operating" grace ; — prevent ing, as it precedes all motion on the part of man ; — operating, as it is the sole mover or motive prin ciple. The soul of man being thus set in action towards God, is brought to feel its own sinfulness. But, though it has received this divine seed, — this element of holiness and future happiness, — still the natural powers are unable to expand and mature the germ, that it may grow to the life everlasting. The progress of the soul must therefore be sustained by him, who gave it the principle of spiritual f Aquinas, Summa. Theol. Prima Ildae. s One of the questions discussed by Aquinas is, Utrum Gratia ponat aliquid in Anima. S. Theol. Prima Ildae. qu. ex. art. i. which he decides in the affirmative. — Note P. 190 LECTURE IV. life. The desire of holiness and the hatred of sin are implanted : but the temptations to which the weakness of the flesh exposes the regenerated soul, must be resisted by continued divine assistances, by grace following and cooperating. And the soul, contemplated in this state of progress, is said to be endued with the " grace of perseverance h." And when, at last, the course in which the soul has been proceeding through this continued divine aid, is completed ; still grace is needed, that it may obtain remission of sins — a pardon of that guiltiness which even repentance cannot obliterate from the soul. Finally, by grace, it is glorified in the presence of God. Such is an analysis of the progress of the soul enjoying the "habitual gift of grace," as taught by the School divines. It is justification, if the pro cess of grace be considered in its effect on the sinner. It is predestination, if it be contemplated in God himself, as the effect of his eternal Love. It is Salva tion, if the antecedent agency of the Son of God be the point from which the process is viewed. It is sanctification, if it be referred to the operation of the Holy Spirit, whose " gift" it is, and whose peculiar office it is, thus to move and quicken the soul '. h The Kaprepla of Aristotle — the power of holding out against temptations from pain — is what Augustine and the Schoolmen understood chiefly by Perseverance. The transition of the word into a symbol of mystical doctrine, is among the curious instances of the disguise of Aristotle's philosophy under terms of Theology. Aquin. S. Theol. Prima Ildae. qu. cix. art. io. • Note Q. LECTURE IV. 191 In examining this account of the nature of Grace; whilst we fully acknowledge the general truth im plied in it, that all our salvation is of the free gift and goodness of God ; we may clearly perceive, that the mode of thinking is founded on princi ples of ancient physical philosophy : in which, ac cordingly, we must seek the account of our tech nical language on the subject of Divine Agency. I. The doctrine of Transmutation was a vital principle in Aristotle's Philosophy. According to this doctrine, any object in nature might be trans muted into another — the actual form of any thing, not depending on its being constituted of any par ticular substance or matter, but on the presence of its constituent properties. When those properties were removed by the presence of other natures, with which they could not coexist, the thing itself was changed. It passed into that other form, to which these new qualities belonged. I shall have occasion to illustrate this point further, when I come to speak of the doctrine of Transubstantiation, into which it enters more particularly. I allude to it only now, for the sake of illustrating the notion, by which our Christian state under the influence of Grace is described. If it be allowed, that the state of holiness and perfection to which the Gospel seeks to bring us, is a state for which we are not fit in our present condition, evidently we must undergo some change, some special adaptation for that glory which we are destined to receive. The qualities then, to 192 LECTURE IV. speak in terms of the ancient philosophy, of that form which we are to assume, must be brought to our present nature. The holiness of the Gospel state must be superinduced on the intrinsic unholi- ness in which we now stand. In a word, we must be transformed. The old things must pass away, and all must become new l. We must cease to be what we were, and be new creatures. On this prin ciple, then, the presence of the grace of God is indis pensably necessary to render us meet for the in heritance of the saints. It comes and displaces that previous form of unrighteousness which once was our nature. Thus is it true both scripturally and philosophically ; " Except ye be converted, and " become as little children, ye cannot inherit the " kingdom of heaven." As we have borne " the " image of the earthy," we must also bear " the " image of the heavenly." We must be " trans- " formed" by the renewing of our mind — Christ must be "formed" in us. II. But the proper and full solution of the lan guage adopted by Augustine, and after him by the School Divines, in the Doctrines of Grace, is to be found in the refined Materialism of the ancient l Baptismus adhibetur hominibus in hac vita, in qua homo potest transmutari de culpa in gratiam : sed descensus Christi ad inferos, exhibitus fuit animabus post hanc vitam, ubi non sunt capaces transmutationis praedictae. Et ideo per baptismum pueri liberantur a peccato originali et ab inferno : non autem per descensum Christi ad inferos. Aquin. S. Theol. Illtia P. qu. lu. art. 7. LECTURE IV. 193 theological philosophy of Naure. According to Aristotle, Nature was in itself an instinctive prin ciple of motion and rest. It was a vast system of distinct powers, ever exerting themselves, and real izing by this activity the various forms of physical being. But what was it that sustained this activity? what was it that kept Nature in this state of effort — in this restless pursuit of that perfection of being, in which alone it could rest — throughout the various things of the universe ? It was the great Principle of Beauty and Goodness — the abstract perfection of the whole Universe — the Chief Good — which ani mated and moved each member in the system of Na ture. The great struggle of the whole, — the effort of each particular thing in Nature, — was ; to attain to this ultimate form of beauty and perfection. There could be no quiescence in any thing, so long as it had not accomplished its utmost effort, in order to the attainment of this End — this Final Cause, of all its motion. This pure abstraction of Excellence pervaded all things alike — the inanimate as well as the animate — the irrational no less than the rational. All in their measure felt its influence m — the transi tory things of the world aiming at its immortal excel lence by successive productions and reproductions of themselves ; and the durable, as the heavenly bodies, attaining more perfectly to a perception of the Di vine Principle, by their invariable and endless re volutions. In rational Beings, it was the great End «n The idea may be traced in the language of Hooker, at the end of the ist book of the Ecclesiastical Polity. O 194 LECTURE IV. to which all their desires tended, the Active Cause of all their activity, — that gratification which they pursued more or less rightly and fully, as their passions were governed, and their intellect was cul tivated ; — the real happiness aimed at under all the manifold and capricious disguises of pleasure. Here then was the Divinity of the philosophic system of the Universe. Hence its designation, in the language of Aristotle, as the First Mover, itself unmoved; — that which being itself invariable, impassible, eter nal, acted on, and moved all things, from the great est to the least. Hence, too, we find the Schoolmen speaking of the Deity, as pure Act — pure Energy — Power, whose development and operation were coinstantaneous with, and inseparable from, its ex istence. This was a system of Theism, which trembled on the verge of Pantheism — of a system, that is, which sinks individual existence in the vague notion of One instinctive Universal Divine Being. And it was soon, we find, so perverted by the Stoics, and by the Alexandrian School, in which the Pla tonic doctrine of Ideas assumed this modification. Its ready transition, also, into a system of Fatalism is sufficiently apparent. The connexion of all the motions in the universe with the First Mover, ex hibits the analogy of a chain of links depending from the Divine Being, in a series of perpetual con nexion. It becomes a doctrine of Necessity, or Fate, or Destiny, according as the peculiar views of the philosopher impart to it their shade. LECTURE IV. 195 Theories of this kind, we know, were extremely prevalent at the time when the Pelagian controver sies were agitated. In the Vth century, indeed, vigorous efforts were made to restore the modern Platonism to its empire in the Church, and in the Schools. The publication at that period of the mystic Treatises of the Pseudo-Dionysius, was an effort of this kind. During this age too, Proclus, the distinguished disciple of the Alexandrian school, presided in the school of Athens. In the Vlth century, Simplicius and others were employed in accommodating the theories of Platonism to those of Aristotle, and forming, out of the union, an Eclectic Philosophy, in which the dogmas of Alexandria were the dominant principles. At the same time, Boethius, at Rome, was engaged in the like labour. We see also, at the opening of the Vllth century, the prevalence of a doctrine of mystic connexion between the things of the world and their great pri mary Cause, in the conjoined Unitarianism and Fatalism of the Mahometan Creed. In the IXth century again, we find the pantheistic philosophy attracting the notice of the Western Church, by the fame of Erigena, the eminent advocate of the Theory in its boldest form. But the adoption of Aristotle's system of nature, in its more genuine principles, introduced a more express reference to the doctrine of Motion, in the language of the Schools, on the subject of Grace. The material analogies were then fully introduced, as a means of explaining those invisible motions o 2 196 LECTURE IV. which the Spirit of God works on the soul. In this system, neither was the Deity identified with the individual acted on, nor was the individual annihi lated in the Deity n. The distinctness of the divine agent and the human recipient was maintained ; in accordance with the Scripture revelation of God, as a sole Being, separate in his nature from the works of his Providence and his Grace. Still the notion of Him as an Energy — as a moving Power — entered into all their explanations of the Divine Influence on the soul. So far they were strictly Aristotelic. But, with this exception, the Platonic notion of a real participation of Deity in the soul of man per vaded their speculations. Aristotle's idea of hu man improvement and happiness was rather, that of a mechanical or material approach to the Divine Principle — an attainment of the Deity as an end of our Being. We see a great deal of this in the scho lastic designations of the progress of man in virtue and happiness. Plato's view, on the other hand, was that of assimilation, or association with the Divinity. This notion more easily fell into the expressions of Scripture, which speaks of man as created in the image of God ; of our future state as like that of the angels of God ; and which holds out to us an example of Divine Holiness for our imitation. n In saying this, I must make an exception with respect to the language of some Scholastic writers : as, for instance, that of Abelard ; whose expressions, in his " Introduction to Theo- " logy," are decidedly pantheistic ; identifying the Holy Spirit with the Anima Mundi of the Stoics. LECTURE IV. 197 The pantheistic notion then of a participation of Deity, or an actual Deification of our nature0, is the fundamental idea of the operation of Grace according to the Schoolmen. The Aristotelic idea of motion — of continual progress — of gradual attainment of the complete form of perfection — is the law, by which this operation of Grace is attempted to be explained. Expressions of Scripture also coincided with this view; so far as our state in this world is spoken of, as a going on towards perfection — as a grow ing in grace ; and we are exhorted to be unmove- able, always abounding in the work of the Lord p. In fact, this system, made up of Platonic and Aris totelic views, was regarded as sanctioned by the Apostle, in his application of that text of philosophy : " In him we live, and move, and have our being i." The soul, it was conceived, might be transformed by the operation of motives extrinsic to itself; by im pulses from evil spirits ; as also by the Spirit of God : it might assume the "form of godliness," without ° Aquin. Prima Ildae, qu. cxn. art. i. Donum autem gratia? excedit omnem facultatem naturae creatae, cum nihil aliud sit, quam qutsdam participatio divina natures, quae excedit omnem aliam naturam : et ideo impossibile est, quod aliqua creatura gratiam causet. Sic enim necesse est, quod solus Deus deificet, communicando consortium divinae naturae, per quandam simi- litudinis participationem ; sicut impossibile est, quod ahquid igniat, nisi solus ignis. P I Cor. XV. e8pawi ylveade, dperaKivryroi, — agreeably to Aris totle's description of the virtuous character, fiefiaias, dpeTaKivijras , e'xav, one, not to be changed by any disturbing force from its present course. 1 Acts xvii. 28. ev airy yap g£>pev, Kai KivovpeBa, Kai evpev. o 3 198 LECTURE IV. " the power r." But, when the work of Grace was complete in the soul, the form of godliness was the Energy of power coming down from the Father of lights and Author of all goodness. Accordingly, by the Schoolmen, the natural powers and capacities of men are regarded as the materials on which the Divine Grace operates. The freewill of man, as we shall see hereafter, is not impaired by this supernatural action s. Their idea rather is, that the will of man thus obtains its proper free dom, is enabled to act freely, unimpeded by those obstacles which the corruption of nature places in its way. Still, the notion throughout, on which they proceed, is that of material impulse, of gradual pro gress and alteration, from a state of alienation to one of holiness and perfect conformity with God. To turn, however, from these speculations, in themselves, to the view of the Divine Agency, which the study of them brings before us. First, I would observe, the importance of the con- r 2 Tim . iii. 5 • ex0VTes popa>o-iv eiaefielas, ttjv he hvvapiv avTrjs fjpvrj- pevoi. The notion of Energy may also be perceived in the language of St. Paul ; as in Eph. iii. 20. " the power that worketh in us" — Trjv hvvapiv ttjv evepyovpevnv ev fjplv — Also Eph. i. 1 1. " who work- " eth all things after the counsel of his own will" — toO ri rravra evepyovvros Kara ttjv [3ov\r)v tov 6e\rjpaTOs avTov. s Si bene considerentur quae dicta sunt : aperte cognoscitur, quia cum aliquid dicit Sacra Scriptura pro gratia, non amovet omnino liberum arbitrium, neque cum loquitur pro libero arbitrio excludit gratiam, &c. Anselm. De Concord. Grat. et Lib. Arb. Op. torn. iii. p. 278. LECTURE IV. 199 sideration, that the theory of the Divine Predestina tion, on which our doctrinal statement is founded, is a much more simple one than is commonly supposed. It is not at all concerned with explaining the origin of Evil. It is only a theory of God's mercy in Christ, deduced from its originating cause in the Being of God. I have already pointed out this. I repeat it now, as it is a view of the subject on which I am desirous of fixing your attention. A theory of Re probation is, on the other hand, a theory of the origin of Evil; and, so far therefore from being deducible from our doctrinal statements on Predesti nation and Grace, is the very doctrine to which these statements are opposed : unless we are to suppose that a philosophical theology, in which the framers of our Articles had been trained, had no influence on their minds. But the exact accordance of our Article on Predestination, with what appears the true Scholastic notion of the subject, is, to me, ample evidence, that this notion was the doctrine de signed. I am not prepared, at the same time, to vindi cate those statements in their theoretic points, as the proper way in which the Divine Predestination and Grace should be apprehended by the Christian. These are truths, it cannot be too often repeated, which concern more the heart than the intellect; and, in defining which accordingly, every attempt, however exactly and piously worded, must fail ; much more, any theory of them drawn from ante cedent speculations on the Nature and Will of God. o 4 200 LECTURE IV. To Scholasticism indeed, though the theories o# Predestination and Grace, which it taught, are of a less complex form than is commonly supposed, we may trace the origin of those idle questions, with which this department of Theology has been vexed ; such as, whether Predestination is certain ; whether there is Assurance of salvation ; whether the number of the Elect is fixed x ; whether all are pre destined. These, and similar questions incidental to the general inquiry, have been naturally laid hold of by theologians, following the example of the Doc tors of the middle age, from whom they received the speculation itself. And this effect shews the evil of any speculation at all on the subject. It only marks out the lines of future disputation. If these truths are to be defined, the only legitimate mode is, the laborious, historical, experimental one5 formed on a comprehensive and accurate study, un der the guidance of that selfsame Spirit, whose ways we are exploring, of every fact of Nature and Scrip ture, and the collection of these into a general law of the Divine Procedure. But this is the work of a Christian life ; it is a process of induction which can only be carried on, where there is a disposition x The different opinions on this point, were: i. that as many should be saved of men, as had fallen of angels ; 2. as many of men, as of angels who had stood in their obedience ; 3. as many of men, as of fallen angels ; and besides, as many, as the whole number of angels created. Aquinas refers to these different opinions, and wisely concludes, that the number of the elect, to be placed in supreme happiness, is known to God alone. Sum. Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xxiii. art. 7. LECTURE IV. 201 "and an activity, in doing the Divine Will, and obey ing the Divine Motions. Otherwise we are but tracking the arrow through the air, or the keel of the vessel through pathless waters. But the assertion of them in the theoretic form, as primary truths concerning the Divine Being, can never be free from objection. We have then, as it were, placed in our hands, the great Original Reasons of things — the first definitions, from which all other truths are, of course, conceived to be deducible ; and nothing inconsequent to them can, without the greatest difficulty, be admitted. Whatever we do then concede to the independent perceptions of our reason, it is with a kind of resignation to a mystery that overwhelms the faculties — a resignation, very different from that of the heart bowed down before God. The truths, theoretically stated, are so es sential to the very idea of God, that we adopt them immediately, as self-evident axioms ; and we expect, in the theology raised upon them, the demonstrative- ness of truths deduced from unquestionable pre mises. The dominion of a Logical Theology is here, accordingly, particularly to be dreaded. Its delusions are fostered, by the nature of the prin ciples themselves, on which it is here exercised. Experience has shewn, how ready the minds of men are, even at this day, to treat the question of Divine Agency, as a matter pregnant with consequences, or inferences, rather than as one of simple, moral acqui escence and obedience. Even the piety of men turns from its own proper task, to minister to the appe- 202 LECTURE IV. tite of speculation. The desire to establish the name of God, as first in the thoughts, involves them in paradox on every subordinate subject. Let it then be examined by such persons, whether, little as it may have been thought, they have not been pur suing the necessity and cogency of logic, in their theological opinions ; whether the notions of Divine Agency, on which they so insist, are not merely the connexions of conclusions and consequences with assumed hypotheses and definitions. With respect then to the doctrines expressive of Divine Agency, I would observe, as I did of those concerning the Trinity, the difficulties belonging to them arise from metaphysical speculations. Here, they are the result of the primary ideas, which the mind combines together in its complex idea of God. Or, it would be more correct, perhaps, to speak of them, as the result of these several ideas in them selves ;— as of priority, necessity, power, will ; all mere abstractions of the mind, and, as such, capable of being discerned in their consequences and contra dictions ; but very fallacious tests of what is con clusive, or inconclusive, in facts out of the region of the mind itself. The whole philosophy of the Schools on the subject of Divine Agency, let it be remembered, is founded on an application of pro cesses in the mind to processes in nature. And our technical language on the subject has been inherited from the Schools. I only wish it then to be con sidered, whether our difficulties may not be as- LECTURE IV. cribed to our false philosophy more than to our Religion. Could we read the language of the Apostle Paul, on which so much stress is commonly laid, as de cisive of this question, — without prejudice, — without thinking of the volumes of controversy which have been employed on it, or the arguments that we have heard, — I feel persuaded, that we should draw no speculative doctrines of Divine Predestination and Grace from his Epistles. We should only see the Apostle declaring the same fact, which all Nature and Revelation proclaim ; that our God is a " God " very nigh unto us ;" whose goodness is as un changeable as his Being ; and who will surely per fect those counsels of love, in which he gave his Son, from everlasting, for the salvation of man. St. Paul's references to the Divine Agency are all of this character. They suggest to us thoughts of God, on all occasions of our life, in all difficulties of our temporal and spiritual condition. Are we de jected and despairing of our spiritual life? " God," we are assured, "will not forsake his elect, whom He " hath foreknown." He has blessed us ; He has mercifully revealed his salvation to us : we have an earnest then, that He, who is unchangeable, has not lightly begun a good work in us, but will most surely accomplish it. " Why art thou so disquieted, " my soul ?" says the anxious inquirer. " Hope " thou in the Lord," is the answer ; " He is thy " helper and defender :" " a very present help in " time of trouble." Ascribe your salvation to God, 204 LECTURE IV. and you rest on a rock which the rains and the storms shall assail in vain. Are we again proceed ing on our way cheerfully in the hope of everlasting life ? " Work out your salvation with fear and " trembling, for it is God that worketh in you, both " to will and to do." Be encouraged to proceed ; for you are armed with a strength not your own, and a work that is of God, cannot come to nought ; and yet " with fear and trembling ;" for the respon sibility of a work to which God has set his hand, is an heavy one, — that should make the heart serious amidst its gladness. These are the words, with which one Christian would naturally comfort and encourage another. And such, accordingly, may well be conceived the stress of the Apostle's asser tions respecting Grace and Predestination. It is the Charity that " never faileth," which he is in culcating throughout, where many have errone ously thought that he was proclaiming the wonders of the Divine knowledge. Banish the scientific no tion of Predestination and Grace ; for nothing can come of it, but the confidence of mere reason, and a false enthusiasm, that fashions the idol before which it prostrates itself. Take up the truths as the Di vine Law of Love, and you will find in them some thing more than that fixedness and quiescence, which is sought in the abstractions of Theory ; you will find rest and peace to the soul in Jesus Christ. LECTURE V. THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSIES. JUSTIFICATION. SUMMARY. Truths of Divine and Human Agency necessarily qualify each other — Human Agency, as viewed in the Scholastic system, the continued action of the First Cause — Justification, the law of Divine Operation in the Salvation of Man- — Sketch of the Chris tian scheme involved in this principle — Theory of Human Agency concerned first in accounting for Resistance to the Di vine Will — Difficulty, as felt in ancient philosophy, was to re concile the fact with the certainty of Science — Schoolmen adopt Aristotle's practical views of human nature — Application of the term Con-uption founded on his physical philosophy — Theory of the Propagation of Sin maintains the universality of the prin ciple of Corruption — Objections of Pelagius and Celestius to this theory — Error, both of the Orthodox and of the Pelagians, in speculating on the nature of Original Sin — Concupiscence — the application of this term to Original Sin, derived from ancient divisions of the soul — Materialism involved in the Specula tion. — Doctrine of Original Sin, the counterpart to the doctrine of the Incarnation — Disputes between the orthodox and the Pelagians turn on the force of the terms Nature and Person — Connexion between the heresies of Nestorius and Pelagius — Distinction between the effect of Adam's sin, and the sin of subsequent parents on their posterity — View of the Christian life, as a change, coincides with this theory of Original Sin — Faith, the infused element of the new life — Doctrinal statements of Justification by Faith, to be interpreted by the light of Scholastic notions involved in it — Scholastic Notion of Free will, not opposed to Necessity, but to the Force of sin, in en slaving the will — Introduction of the theory of Justice into the Christian Scheme — Notion of Merit to be understood in con nexion with this theory; as also of Merit of Condignity, Merit of Congruity — Peculiar views of Repentance, as a compensa tion for offence — of Punishment and Satisfaction, as applied to the Sacrifice of Christ — of Self-Mortification and Supereroga tion — drawn from this theory of Penal Justice. Ineflficacy of Repentance to remove guilt, and need of Atone ment, illustrated by these speculations — Debasing effect of Scho lastic theory of Expiation — True view of Human Agency to be found in simple practical belief of the Atonement — Union of Strength and Weakness, implied in this doctrine, coincident with facts of human nature — Mischievous effect of speculative discussion of the subject — Moderation and forbearance of lan guage on the subject most accordant with the spirit of Pro testantism. John I. ia, 13. But as many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on his name : which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God. 0Kev avTois k£ovcr[av reKva &eov yevicrdat., toZs mvTevovo-iv els to Svop.a avrov' ot ovk ff aip,a- T(av, ovbe e*c 6e\tfp.aTos crapKOS, , and thus separating the personality of Christ as man, from his personality as God, gave ground for the supposition, that Christians were not born of God — made one with the Father and the Son — in that intimate sense which the orthodox doctrine implied. Nestorius, however, appears to have differed from the orthodox principally in this ; that he viewed dis tinctions, which the orthodox regarded as different Natures, under the notion of different Persons. Pelagius, on the other hand, making Original Sin a matter of personal distinction, abandoned that unity of nature, in which the invariableness of Human Corruption was conceived to consist. We may further see the importance of the dis tinction between Nature and Person, in regard to the doctrine of Original Sin, in the Scholastic explana tion of the reason, why the First Sin only trans mitted its effects to the posterity of Adam ; why subsequent sins, or even those of a man's immediate Parents, are not equally injurious in their conse quences. It was contended, in answer to such ques tions, that it was only the nature of the species, and not the individual peculiarities, that could be transmitted from generation to generation. The first sin of Adam deprived human nature of its ori ginal justice,— altered its natural constitution ; — but not so the subsequent sins either of Adam or of y To state it more correctly, he objected to the word Bcotokos, Deipara, as applied to Christ. LECTURE V. 235 others : these were merely personal ; did not alter the general nature once corrupted z. It was a consequence of this notion of Original Sin, that the elements of the Christian Life should be, in the strictest sense, a change, a transformation, a renewal. It was necessary that we should be " born " again." To counteract that living death within us, a new life from God must be imparted. Hence that view of Faith, in the scholastic system, as an " Infused principle." " As in Adam all die, so in " Christ shall all be made alive." All were corrupted in the flesh by Adam's transgression ; all must be quickened by the righteousness of Christ. If we regard this reasoning as a description of conjoined events in each case, it is undoubtedly scripturally just. The connexion of the universal ruin of man — whatever may be the nature of that ruin — with the sin of the first transgressor ; and the connexion of universal salvation — whatever may be the nature of that salvation — with the righteousness of Christ; are facts, which the word of truth has inseparably bound together. The logical deduction, however, of one from the other, is what I am now pointing out. The state of man, under Original Sin, being that of a Privation, he was without that perfect consti tution of his nature, in which all his principles were, in proportion to each other, and rightly ordered to the final end of them all — the Divine Goodness. This z Aquinas, S. Theol. Prima Ildae. qu. lxxxi. art. i and 2. —Note D. 236 LECTURE V. inherent evil must be remedied by the presence of some effectual antidote. Scripture fully revealed that antidote in the perfect righteousness of the Son of God. But, how to apply that righteousness to the individual sinner — how to exhibit its power of transforming and renewing the fallen nature of man — was the question. Here, too, Scripture provided an answer to the real difficulty. It has told us, that, " by grace ye are saved through faith, and that not " of yourselves ; it is the gift of God :" that those who " believe, and are baptized, shall be saved." Faith, then, as emanating from the grace of God, and having for its principal object the righteousness of Christ, is the new principle of life in man. Bap tism indeed is requisite as the " sacrament of faith," — as the mystical act of the new birth ; at once the visible and spiritual incorporation with Christ. But Faith must first come down from above to the soul, and turn it towards God. It is the principle by which the Life and Immortality of the second Adam are generated in the soul. It is the grace of Christ, by which, antecedently to any acts of the Chris tian life, a spiritual power is given to the soul, and the heir of corruption becomes the child of Godz. It is important to observe accurately this physical notion of Faith, as an infused principle, the origin of a new life ; because it serves to account for that z Gratia Christi traducitur in omnes qui ab eo spiritualiter generantur per fidem et baptismum. Aquin. S. Theol. Prima Ildae, qu. lxxxi. art. 3. LECTURE V. 237 priority, which is ascribed in such strong terms, in our Articles, to Faith, among the acts of the Chris tian life. On this view of the case, it appears as inconsequent and absurd to suppose, that any Chris tian works can be performed without Faith ; as to suppose that the natural actions of life can be per formed before the principle of life exists in us. " Whatever is not of faith" is then literally " of sin." It proceeds from that nature in which the seed of corruption exists with unchecked influence — from " the natural man," which has already displeased God in our first parent, and cannot please God under any modification, but in itself must deserve the wrath of God. Even works that might be called good, as they result from Nature, have then the nature of sin, peccati rationem habent, — belong to that unregenerate principle which is called Sin, — and come into the estimate of our natural disability to please God. Scripture, indeed, asserts the difficulty, the folly, the sinfulness of any endeavour to work out our own salvation on our own strength ; and therefore lays such stress on the principle which sends us to the altar of the Cross. But not em ploying definitions in its delivery of divine truth, it avoids that paradoxical air, which appears in all systematical developments of the nature of Faith. There is one passage, in which it seems to give a logical account of Faith, in the Epistle to the Hebrews ; where Faith is described, as " the sub- " stance (hypostasis) of things hoped, the evidence " (elenchus) of things not seen." But even here, 238 LECTURE V. when the Apostle is speaking in the terms of a logical philosophy, it is not speculative truth that he is engaged in treating, but practical. He is giving that idea of Faith, which may excite in his brethren a principle of conduct, exceeding the narrow range of present things, and expanding itself to those nobler views opened by a revealed hope to the Chris tian eye. Some judgment may be formed, from these con siderations, to what extent the difficulties attending the notion of Faith, and of Works done before Justi fication, may be attributed to the abstract theories preserved in the technical language of Theology. And I would draw attention to those theories, there fore, as solutions of the difficulties ; and as among the illustrations of the important fact, that there exist perplexities in Theology, which do not involve real scriptural difficulties : there arising necessarily a stiffness and positiveness of doctrine, from the very nature of systematic statements. What strivings, indeed, and heart-burnings would have been saved to the Christian world, had the proper negative notion of Faith been strictly guarded: had Faith been cherished in the heart, simply, as the heaven-sent keeper of God's own sanctuary there, to drive away the proud imaginations of the worldly spirit, and to still the anxieties of the contrite, self- despairing soul. In this sense, Justification by Faith only is the sum of Christianity. View the truth in this broad historical form ; and then, to add to the assertion of it, the necessity of conditions, is LECTURE V. 239 to counteract the proper efficacy of Jesus Christ. But, throw the great Christian Fact into the form of a dogma, and it is immediately acted on by the philosophy of language. It becomes matter of in quiry, what Justification is, what Faith is ; and dis tinctions are introduced, to obviate consequences from this or that statement. Hence too, the importunate comparison between Faith and Works, as to their relative importance a. Faith, being regarded as the infused principle of a new life, does not supersede the natural faculties of man, nor does it destroy the inborn principle of corruption. The infection of evil is in the flesh, and there, as the School Divines explicitly assert, it remains, even in the regenerate. The divine seed is in the higher spiritual part of our nature, and is a new power by which the subjugation of the cor rupt passions of the inferior part, the lusts of the flesh, is gradually accomplished. By faith in Christ, through baptism, being born of God, we need still to grow in that life, to proceed from our state as babes in Christ, to the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ. It is by this procedure, through the continued assistances of grace, that, as we become stronger in the Lord, the offending Adam within us becomes weaker ; our holiness and our security a From the scholastic distinction between Implicit and Ex plicit Faith, we may trace the assertion, that the "Fathers " looked not for transitory promises," &c. The invariableness and sameness of the object of Faith was thus maintained. 240 LECTURE V. increasing together. So far then from man's free will being impaired, by the divine life thus growing within us, under the blessing of Him who first gave it, our freewill is in reality established. Our con dition, antecedently to these influences, is one of slavery ; we are sold under sin — in bondage to the lusts of the flesh : we could not then do what we would, and we did what we would not. But having received the new creation in Christ, we commence the mastery of the rebellious passions ; and so long as the spiritual life is cherished within us, our power daily increases. This then is the scholastic notion of free-will. It means a liberty from compulsion, as distinct from a liberty from necessity b. When the Schoolmen assert, in the language of our Article, that we have no power without the grace of God preventing us, that we may have a will, and working with us when we have that will ; they mean that we cannot be said to be free to will or to do what we design, so long as we are in the mere state of sons of Adam ; that our real power is that command of the passions in obedience to the will of God, which the new life of Faith brings with it. Thus the responsibility of man, instead of being lessened by the consideration of the Divine Influence on his soul, is, in fact, in creased ; agreeably to the scripture-declaration that, " to whom much is given, of him much will be re- " quired." In the state of nature, we are powerless b Libertas a, coactione, and libertas a necessitate. — Note E. LECTURE V. 241 against the assaults of temptation — under grace the means of victory are placed in our hands. It appears, that our Article on Free-will is framed with the same view ; to declare, I mean, that our proper responsibility, as Christians, commences at the time of our receiving divine assistance. We are apt to suppose, that free-will consists in the circumstance of originating our own purposes ; in not being ac tuated by any thing extrinsic to ourselves. This, at least, is not the accurate theological sense of the term. It is here the actual power, viewed in itself, at the moment of exertion ; the power shewn in doing what we wish, or of doing otherwise, what ever may have been the inducements to this or that mode of action previously. And this power, evi dently, is increased, by whatever removes obstacles, by whatever strengthens the reason, and enforces the dictates of conscience. In carrying on our estimate of the effect of the Scholastic Philosophy on the scheme of human agency, involved in our theological language, we should bear in mind the view of human responsi bility, which is given under the analogies of Scrip ture. We are described, as subjects owing certain duties of allegiance to a king, — as soldiers enlisted under the Captain of Salvation, — as servants having certain services to perform for a master, — as la bourers having certain works to execute for an em ployer. By these several analogies does the Gospel strikingly depict to us the condition, under which, it 242 LECTURE V. we are placed in the world. The principle through out is, that our thoughts, our actions, our works, are dues that we owe to God ; — that we are not properly our own ; — that our time and industry are not at our own disposal ; — but that we are under an obligation of working for Him who has bought us, redeeming us from the captivity into which we had been sold, and now employing us in his own ser^ vice. Judaism had already taught mankind to re gard God as a Governor, dispensing rewards and punishments to men, as his subjects, according to the works performed in his service ; as they kept, or broke, his commandments, statutes, and ordi nances. To this description of human agency, in relation to God, Christianity succeeded. A principle of obligation was adopted in the Gospel scheme, ana logous to that of the Jewish. The service of the Israelite was due, because God had brought them out of the land of bondage, and settled them in his own land, Himself the founder of the colony. The service of the Christian was due, because Christ had interceded for them — had won them out of the hand of the enemy, and given them both liberty and life. Hence the language of that great Christian rule : " When ye shall have done all those things " which are commanded you, say, We are unprofit- " able servants, we have done that which was our " duty" — o iu\op.ev — which was owing from us, to do. Under such a scheme of human agency, the cha racter of Justice would be the natural and compre- LECTURE V. 243 hensive description of right conduct. Men would be led to inquire, what the Lord had required of them, — by what inducements he had called upon them to obey, — by what punishments he had threat ened disobedience; and in regard to themselves, how far they had fulfilled their task, how far they might aspire to his rewards, or had subjected themselves to his punishments. The estimate of these circum stances appeals to our sense of Justice; to that virtue which dispenses to each his due, both relatively to himself and to other members of the same commu nity ; and which presupposes an authority by which its awards may be distributed and enforced. Judaism accordingly inculcated this leading notion both of Divine and Human Agency. The Israelite was never suffered to forget, that Jehovah was a just God, the Judge of the earth. He was taught to examine himself ; whether he had done justly — what was the righteousness of his conduct — whether he had incurred Divine Displeasure by any defect of his duty, or might hope reward from his obe dience. The Lord reasons with him, whether the Lord's " ways are not equal, and the ways of his " people unequal:" whether " the Judge of all the " earth" would not " do right." Agreeably to this, Christ is "the Lord our Righteousness," or "the Lord " our Justice:" and the Apostle speaks of God having shewn his justice in the act of justifying sinners through Christ. We trace, indeed, the same idea in some of the principal terms of Christianity, evi dently drawn from legal or equitable proceedings r 2 244 LECTURE V. in the dispensing of Justice ; as in the terms, Me diator, Advocate, Intercessor, Justification, Remis sion, Pardon. It runs through the whole of St. Paul's exposition of the state of man under the Gospel. The introduction of the notions of Merit and Demerit into Theology, is to be explained on this principle. Original Sin, being a fault of nature, could not indeed, as such, be a personal fault ; and yet it subjected the individual man to the punishment of sin ; in itself deserving God's wrath and damnation. The guiltiness of the nature in volved in it the demerit of the person. Thus, even those who had not personally sinned after the simi litude of Adam's transgression, stood personally un holy in the sight of God, and obnoxious to punish ment b : the offending nature cried aloud for the Divine Wrath. Nor could the Christian, in the most advanced state of Justification, be regarded otherwise than as personally sinful and unholy ; because it is his being essentially and virtually in Christ — his being " accepted in the beloved" — that entirely constitutes his meritoriousness. Though the act of sin may have passed away, the guiltiness still remains ; and even his case therefore is one of de merit. For there is this difference in regard to the application of the merits of Christ to the Christian ; that a personal merit does not result to him indi- b Punishment, pcena, as distinct from guilt, culpa. We see this distinction referred to in our XXXIst Article, — '* in remis- " sionem poenae aut culpae." LECTURE V. 245 vidually, from his union with Christ ; as a personal demerit does to the son of Adam, from his being in Adam. The natural unholiness in which he stands before God, excludes the idea of any personal merit in him, whilst, by grace, he is admitted to the glorious privilege of the sons of God. Eternal life remains the gift of God ; for the regenerate Chris tian has still the guilt of that sin, whose wages are death. We attach, at present, an exclusive idea to the term Merit, different from that properly belonging to it as a technical term of Theology. We are apt to regard it as denoting, strictly, praiseworthiness, moral title to reward. We should revert rather to its original meaning, which is to be sought in its connexion with the ancient theories of Justice. It is hence that it has been introduced into the account of Justification. Now the notion of Justice, we know, according to the ancient philosophy, was fun damentally political. It was conceived to have place only among the members of the same community, personally equal among themselves, and acting under a common authority. It was the rule by which the respective claims of individuals so circumstanced might be adjusted. In order to that comparison which such an adjustment of claims requires, some common measure is required ; and this, as applied to each, is the "worth," or merit of the indi vidual, the value of his services. Now the first application of the term merit to Christian Theology, appears to have been exactly of this nature. The R 3 246 LECTURE V. great Christian society was viewed by the speculator, in its relation to God as its Governor and Judge. The principle, which Human Authority can apply only to external actions, was applied to the invisible, internal principles of our nature, cognizable by the Divine Authority. It began to be considered what man had done, or could do, in the way of claim on the Justice of God. Then the doctrine of Original Sin came into the consideration on the one hand — that of the Incarnation and Righteousness of Christ on the other; — and the estimate of Merit accordingly was to be drawn from a comparison of what man now is, at once a Fallen and a Saved creature, with what he once was, when perfect from the hands of his Maker. From this comparison would result the conclusion, that man could have no merit whatever in the eye of God. Then only could he earn the reward of happiness, when all the principles of his nature, as originally constituted, tended towards that Divine Goodness which was their real End. Now he entered on his career of service a debtor to the Justice of God, not a claimant on it. He had only merited Punishment by his intrinsic delin quency. But, in the righteousness of Christ, a title to reward was found. The submission of Christ to the Divine Will had been voluntary; He had earned a recompence for services given to God, with out a previous debt of service unpaid ; and an abun dant reward was bestowed on Him, overflowing with Divine goodness to the sons of his Love. The expressions, Merit of Condignity, Merit of LECTURE V. 247 Congruity, if examined on this ground, resolve them selves into less exceptionable modes of describing Human Agency in the work of Justification, than they appear at first sight. With the practical evil of so characterizing any actions of man, I am not now concerned. But their theoretic truth is to be seen, in their consistency with the philosophical no tion of Merit, as the measure of political justice, and the theological description of it, as the effect of co operating grace. For, whilst it is his own gifts, which God rewards in those whom He accepts in Christ, He cannot be otherwise than just in bestow ing these rewards. This requires that the rewarded should be brought under the notion of worthiness c ; and should thus have merit of condignity; relatively9 that is, to God, as a just Judge. Such was the doc trine understood in those words of St. Paul: " Hence- " forth there is laid up for me a crown of righteous- " ness, which the Lord, the righteous judge, shall " give to me in that day d." Merit of congruity, on the other hand, is the work of the Christian viewed relatively to the mercy of God. If God, that is, mercifully rewards, then there must be, as a cor respondent to this excellent mercy on his part, a c " Whoever has Grace," Aquinas says, " is on that very "¦ account worthy of eternal life." Quicunque enim gratiam ha- bet, ex hoc ipso dignus est vita aeterna. Summ. Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xxiv. art. 4. ^ 2 Tim. iv. 8. Trjs hiKaiotrivns o~Te(pavos, ov dwohaa'ei poi 6 Kvpios ev eKeivrj t§ Tjpepa, b hUaios KpiTr/s. Aquinas, S. Theol. Prima Ildae, qu. cxiv. art. 3. R 4 248 LECTURE V. congruity, or suitableness, in the person to whom it is vouchsafed. The two expressions are correlatives to the Grace of God viewed as the gift of a just and merciful Judge e. The doctrine of Repentance, as exhibited in the Theology of the Schools, also takes its expression from Aristotle's Theory of Justice. Aquinas places it under the head of Commutative Justice, or that exercise of Justice by which due compensation is awarded for an offence committed. It is the poena, the satisfaction, or requital, due for the offence, vo luntarily taken on himself by the offender, as dis tinct from the infliction of it by a judge. And the indispensable necessity of it is rested, by Aquinas, on this ground ; because an offence against God is in direct opposition to Grace : the goodwill of God, the only cause of goodness in man, is turned from the offender ; and God cannot remit the offence without a change of will, which in Him is impos sible. The offender therefore must himself be turned towards God, by a detestation of the past sin, and a resolution of amendment. In the consideration, however, of this doctrine, we may observe a striking difference in comparison with others relating to human agency. To the reduction of the subject under the head of Penal Justice, may be e The proper sense of Merit may be seen in that fine expres sion of Tacitus ; — iisque virtutibus iram Caii Caesaris meritus. Agricola, c. 4. — Note F. LECTURE V. 249 ascribed, in great measure, the unscriptural notions and unholy practices which grew up in the Church, in regard to the expiation of offences, and their re spective criminality. The word poena alone gave opportunity for introducing into religion, all the subtile casuistry and technical distinctions of Civil Law. Hence too the sacramental character with which Repentance has been invested under the name of Penance f, the application of a penal code of re ligion demanding the ministrations of the priests. Thus the subject of Repentance, instead of taking its place by the side of Faith, in the discussions of the Schoolmen, is passed over as a doctrine of the Gospel, with slight notice. But, as a Sacra ment, and a ritual of punishment, it obtains a full consideration. We may perceive the effect of this mode of treating the subject in our Articles : there being none expressly on the doctrine of Repentance ; whilst there is reference to the questions raised on the subject by the Scholastic philosophy, in the Articles which speak of Penance, Purgatory, and Masses. f The translation of the Latin Vulgate has here sanctioned a most important deviation from the simplicity of the Greek ori ginal, in the use of the terms pcenitentiam agite, for the simple peravoeire. e The expression of Aristotle, KoXdo-eis elo-iv larpeiai rives, was adapted to the explanation of the efficacy of suffering to expiate guilt. See Aquin. Summ. Theol. Prima Ildae, qu. lxxxvii. art. 7. — unde non habet simpliciter rationem pcenae, sed medicinae. Nam et medici austeras potiones propinant infirmis, ut conferant sanitatem, &c. 250 LECTURE V. The application of the term Punishment to the sacrifice of our Saviour, belongs to the same philo sophy. It was contended, that an offence being an act of the will, must also be removed by the will ; that, whatever indulgence the will had allowed itself, the same ground must be recovered by suffering; that thus the equality of justice might be main tained. Hence it would be construed, that the passion of our Lord, being accepted by God as the means of human salvation, must be a punishment (poena) sustained by Him, equivalent to the delin quency of sinful man. And this further accounts to us for the theological use of the word " Satisfac- " tion." It declares the sufferings of Christ to be the voluntary payment, on his part, of what was other wise not owing from Him, to the Divine Justice s. Hence too would arise the notion, that self-morti fication would recommend us to the favour of God : in fact, that, the more voluntarily such chastise ment of ourselves was undertaken, the more effec tual would be the compensation for offence. Hence, also, the fond impiety of Supererogation. The compensation might be supposed to exceed the weight of the offence, where the depth of the sor row for personal Sin might produce an excess of personal infliction. And it might be concluded, that this excess, beyond the requisitions of justice, would redound to the remission of the offences of others h. s Note G. h Aristotle's idea of taking from the " gain," of the offender, and adding this difference to the " loss" of the sufferer, and LECTURE V. 251 The Reformation opposed a practical check to these refinements of Christian truth. It was an energetic practical amendment that was here needed. And our Church, accordingly, has here declared against the abuses, which had perverted the doc trine of Repentance ; instead of addressing itself to the decision of the speculative nature of Repentance considered as a doctrine of the Gospel. It is to be remarked, however, how strongly the inefficacy of Repentance to wipe away guilt, and re store the sinner to his lost state, has impressed the minds of those, who have thought on human nature with any depth of philosophy. It is of little pur pose, to urge the natural placability of the Divine Being, his mercy, his willingness to receive the peni tent. God, no doubt, is abundantly placable, merci ful, and forgiving. Still the fact remains. The offender is guilty : his crime may be forgiven, but his criminality is upon him. The remorse which he feels — the wounds of his conscience — are no fal lacious things. He is sensible of them, even whilst the Gospel tells him, — " Thy sins be forgiven thee — " Go, and sin no more." The heart seeks for re paration and satisfaction : its longings are, that its sins may be no more remembered, that the cha racters in which it is written may be blotted out. Hence the congeniality to its feelings of the notion of Atonement. It is no speculative thought which then taking the mean, in order to obtain the equality of justice, pervades the speculation. — Note H. 252 LECTURE V. suggests the theory : speculation rather prompts to the rejection of it : speculation furnishes abstract reasons, from the Divine Attributes, for discarding it as a chimera of our fears. But the fact is, that we cannot be at peace without some consciousness of Atonement made. The word Atonement, in its true, practical sense, expresses this indisputable fact. Objections may hold against the explanations of the term ; they are irrelevant to the thing itself denoted by the term. Turn over the records of human crime ; and, whether under the forms of supersti tion, or the enactments of civil government, the fact itself constantly emerges to the view. All concur in shewing, that, whilst God is gracious and merci ful, repenting Him of evil, the human heart is in- , exorable against itself. It may hope — tremblingly hope — that God may forgive it, but it cannot forgive I itself. This material and invincible difficulty of the case, the Scripture Revelation has met with a parallel fact. It has said, we have no hope in ourselves ; that, looking to ourselves, we cannot expect hap piness ; and, at the same time, has fixed our atten tion on a Holy One who did no sin ; whose perfect righteousness it has connected with our unrighte ousness, and whose strength it has brought to the evil of our weakness. Thus Christ is emphatically said to be our Atonement ; not that we may attri bute to God any change of purpose towards man by what Christ has done ; but that we may know, that we have passed from the death of sin to the life of LECTURE V. 253 righteousness by Him; and that our own hearts may not condemn us. " If our heart condemn us " not," then may we " have peace with God ;" but, without the thought of Christ, the heart, that has any real sense of its condition, must sink under its own condemnation. The bane of this philosophy of expiation was, not that it exalted human agency too highly, but that in reality it depressed the power of man too low. It was no invigoration of the mind, no cheer ing of the heart, to masculine exertion, in working out the great work of salvation, by exaggerated, yet noble, views of what man could accomplish. But it checked the aspirings, both of the heart and of the intellect, by fixing them at a standard, that had only the mockery of Divine strength, and not the reality. It brought men to acquiesce in a confession of im potence, without carrying them at once to the throne of Grace. The ecclesiastical power stood between the heart and heaven. Atonement was converted into a theory of Commutation degrading to the ho liness of God, whilst it spoke the peace of God in terms of flattering delusion to the sinner. The value of confessions and rites of penance was acknow ledged ; and, accepting this vain substitute for that assurance of Atonement, which alone can satisfy the longing soul with goodness, men looked no further : their proper power was exchanged for a servile de pendence on the ministrations of the priest — the presumed all-sufficiency of a man like themselves. 254 LECTURE V. On the other hand, the true scriptural practical view of Human Agency is to be seen in the great truth of Atonement, simply believed and acted on, without the gloss of commentators, or the refine ments of theorists. These are but attempts to weigh the ocean in the hollow of the hand. Take the truth simply, and what does it mean but that God is infinitely just and merciful, visiting iniqui ties to the third and fourth generation, and yet shewing mercy to thousands — that we cannot please Him by our works, or our sacrifices, or our prayers, but yet we can do all things, by Christ strengthen ing us, working for us, offering Himself for us, pray ing for us. The doctrine declares to us at once how much is out of our power, and yet how much is in our power. And, by combining these two ap parently contrary facts in one scheme of human agency, it imparts to us the true secret of our Power against the temptations and dangers of the world. For, let it be considered, whether it is not pre cisely by such a combination of strength and weak ness, that ability and success in worldly conduct are attained. Every one, who attentively considers the state of the case, must perceive that Revelation has only extended to the spiritual world two classes of facts evidenced in the natural. In every exercise of our minds, in every action or event, are we not conscious that much is left in our own power? Do we not see the fact strikingly displayed in the con duct of men whom we call great ; whose greatness evidently consists in this, that, by dint of their LECTURE V. 255 intellect and moral energy, they bring the train of events into their own power, exercising an arbitrary influence over the voluntary actions of other men ? But again, on the other hand, do we not find, also, a stint and a bound put to this our intrinsic power ? It is equally apparent, that the issues of events are not in the hand of the thinker, or the counsellor, or the agent. There is something like a chain of causes, in the connexion of circumstances themselves — some thing of an involuntary process in the association and current of our own thoughts. So real is all this, — (and this is the point particularly to be ob served in illustration of Human Agency, in con nexion with the Divine,) — that our actual power, in each instance of exertion, depends in great measure on our assumption of this fact — the fact, that things are not in our power ; and our adaptation, consequently, of our conduct to it. For thus we see even the great men of the world have chiefly owed their failure to the circumstance; that they overlooked this clear fact : their former success emboldening them to an exclusive trust in their own power, and closing their eyes to the commanding influences out of their own sphere of action k. Thus are energy and repose, intrepidity and diffidence, magnanimity and humility, at once, inculcated on us in the course of nature. We cannot sleep nor stop, thinking that the con trolling Power by which events are disposed, will work without us : we cannot lean on our own ac- k Hence prosperity was represented in ancient mythology, as provoking the envy of the Gods. 256 LECTURE V. tivity, trusting that we can work without the power from above. Whoever duly estimates these things, will readily see that Scripture enforces on us no strange thing, when it tells us, that we are " saved " by grace," that " our sufficiency is of God ;" and again, he who " doeth the will of God, is accepted by " him," and that every man shall receive according " to his works." But whoever acknowledges both these principles as the complex Law of Actions under both the spiritual and natural government of God — will, at the same time, see that the truths of human sinful ness, of Repentance, of Atonement and Satisfaction made for sin, are only varied expressions of this great law; as being declarations of the weakness and the strength of man : — the union of strength and weakness, constituting his real power in the events of time — his justification in eternity. Disputation, however, as we have seen, has not suffered the plain method of Religion to take its course. Speculative statements have been made; and from these, certain consequences have been de duced : and the Scripture has been searched to verify these deductions. In the pursuit of these discussions, a technical phraseology has been intro duced : and, to systematize the whole, definitions and explanations have been drawn from the phy sical and moral sciences, and woven into Theology by the subtleties of Logic. The Reformation, by the blessing of God, has cleared away, from a large portion of Christendom, LECTURE V. 257 those practical mischiefs, of which the speculations on the nature of justification were, partly the cause, and partly the palliation. We still, however, feel the effects of them in the discussions which abound among Protestants, on the questions arising out of this subject. Unscriptural practices were to be as sailed, against men who possessed an admirable art of polemical defence ; and by men who had sat at the feet of the Doctors of the Schools. It is nothing strange therefore, that the truth, so maintained, should bear the scars of the conflict through which it had to struggle. It is nothing strange, that the dialectical spirit should have survived among Pro testants, even on the very points on which Pro testantism took its firmest stand. It is worthy of our remark, that those Protestants who have advanced to extremes in opposing the errors of Rome ; both, those who have opposed them on the ground of Superstition, — and those who have been unreasonably jealous in the cause of Reason, — have adopted more of the specula tive method connected with those errors, than the more moderate reformer. For what is all that ac curacy and positiveness, with which some persons state their views of Justification, but the point and precision of theory ? What is all that profession of Rational Religion, with which some maintain the natural efficacy of Repentance, but a dogmatism founded on theory ? We may learn, from these ex tremes, that, the more indistinct our language is on this sacred subject, — the less of theoretic principle it 258 LECTURE V. embodies in it, — the more closely do we imbibe the true spirit of Protestantism ; — the more faithfully do we walk in the path of that Holy Spirit, whose " ways are in the deep," and whose " footsteps are " not known." LECTURE VI. MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE SCHOOLS. SUMMARY. No proper Moral Philosophy in the Scholastic System — Con fusion of moral and religious truth injurious to both — Instance in Paley's Moral Philosophy — Moral Truth at first taught on the ground of Authority — Platonism influential in blending it with Theology — Influence of Christian literature, the Sermons, and legends of the Saints, Ambrose's Treatise *' On the Offices of " Ministers," Gregory's *' Morals," Boethius' '* Consolation of " Philosophy" — Ethical science corrupted by being studied with a view to the power of the Clergy. Schoolmen systematize ethical precepts drawn from practice of the Church — The Treatise " Of the Imitation of Christ" — Plato's theological account of the Chief Good combined with prac tical detail of Aristotle's Ethical Theory — Scholastic moral sys tem a development of the Divine Energy in man's internal nature — Aristotle's notion of Happiness accordant with this view — Scholastic gradations of moral excellence to be traced to this fundamental idea — Hence, also, the importance attributed to the life of contemplative devotion — The doctrine of Perfection — Distinction of Counsels and Precepts — Outline of this double morality seen in the Aristotelic notion of an Heroic Virtue — Coincidence of Aristotle's theory of Good-Fortune with the superhuman virtue of the Scholastic System — Connexion of ethical doctrine of the Schools with notion of Original Sin — Mortal and Venial Sins — Proper ground of this distinction — Division of Virtue into Theological and Moral, and into Infused and Acquired — Doctrine of Gifts. Origin of questions in Modern Moral Philosophy to be traced to scholastic discussions — Instance in the idea of Moral Obli gation — Extreme opinions as to the relative importance both of Theology and Ethics — Proper province of Ethics, inquiry into the principles of Human Nature — Revelation only gives new objects to those principles — Importance of regarding the Science of Ethics as in itself independent of Religion. S 3 Matt. XIX. 16, 17. And, behold, one came and said unto him, Good Master, what good thing shall I do, that I may have eternal life ? And he said unto him, Why callest thou me good ? there is none good but one, that is, God : but if thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments. Kai Ibov, ets irpoireXOav, elirev avn3* AtSaVxaXe ayaOe, tL ayadov 7101770*0), tva r>(o> £0)771' aldvwv ; O be elnev a*ura" Tt p.e Xiyeis ayadov ; ovbels ayados, el /X77 eh, 6 &eos. Et be 0e\et,s elo-ekdeiv els rqv £m\v, T-qprjo-ov rhs evroXds. Et ecce, unus accedens, ait illi ; Magister bone, quid boni faciam, ut habeam vitam aeternam ? Qui dixit ei : Quid me interrogas de bono ? Unus est bonus, Deus. Si autem vis ad vitam ingredi, serva mandata. Lat. Vulg. LECTURE VI. 1 COME now to take a more intimate view of the Scholastic Philosophy — its mode of treating the Law written in our hearts, and the influence which it has exercised on the frame, and the language, of Morals, in modern times. This is a department of the in quiry, not only possessing the highest interest in itself, and demanding for its own sake a much greater attention than it has yet received, but strictly belonging to the history of our theological language. The intellectual and moral instincts of man were regarded, by the School-Divines, as the materials on which the sacred elements of divine truth were to act; and, by this action, to assimilate them to the Divine Nature. It was not an operation merely in the way of instruction, of elevation of sentiment, of purification of feeling, that was here understood ; but an identification, if I may so say, of the divine things, with the purer and nobler principles of our nature. The truths of Revelation were to be steeped into the heart. And the inquiry, therefore, into the Philosophy of Human Life, was pursued by them, as containing the elements and the development of their theological system. It is, in fact, Moral Theo logy, rather than an account of man's moral nature ; so that, whilst real truths of morality are alleged, the truths, as such, are overlooked : the illustration of the given Divine Theory is all that is sought in 264 LECTURE VI. them. It is the Life of God in the soul of man, that is presented to our notice. The close connexion of Theological and Moral Truth, has been of serious injury to both depart ments of human knowledge. The assertion may seem strange ; but, when it is fully considered, it will, I think, appear; that Theology and Ethics are entirely distinct in their nature, — in the principles, I mean, on which they are based ; and that, therefore, to mix up principles of the one with principles of the other, must tend only to confusion of thought and speculative error on each subject. That they are closely connected in their results and applica tions, must be fully admitted. But this connexion is only like that of Mathematics with Physics, or Anatomy with Medicine : both, that is, must be taken into account, in the practical application of one or the other. In speculation however, and in their theories, they are perfectly distinct. I. In Theology, human nature is regarded under a single point of view, that of its relation to the Author of its existence. The office of Theology is to solve such questions as these ; which cannot but occur to every thoughtful man, as he contemplates himself amidst the vast scenes of the universe : Whence am I ? What is my nature and condition here ? What my connexion with the past and with the future ? Why am I sensible of so much pain or of so much pleasure? What is the great' LECTURE VI. 265 end of all these various connexions and relations of events, so entangled and perplexed with each other, and yet, amidst all this apparent disorder, so instinctive with design, and order, and uniformity ? Theology, accordingly, takes man under its survey as a whole. It is not as an intellectual being, or as a moral being, simply, that it regards him, but as a compound of natures ; the compound being that he really is, in his animal life, as well as in his life of thought and action : and so proceeds to inform and guide him in those high truths, of which this com plex system demands the resolution. It acquaints him, that he is the creature of a benevolent and wise God, — that he is living under divine govern ment, — that he is in a state of discipline, — that his natural weakness has been provided for by divine intercession, — that all things are working together for good ; giving him supernaturally so much of the history of God's special providences, as may be ne cessary to pierce through the gloom of the present world, and lift up his eyes to the sanctuary, from which alone help can come down to him. II. Moral Philosophy, on the other hand, surveys human nature in its moral and intellectual consti tuents, as they are related and combined principles of action. Every action that we see outwardly, — every judgment that we exercise within ourselves, — every feeling, as we indulge or control it, — presents a moral phenomenon demanding explanation. The questions that arise here, are : Is there any common 266 LECTURE VI. principle, which may give us the Law of these vari ous facts ? What is that principle ? Is it instinc tive, or factitious ? or is it, in the result, an intel lectual perception, or a sentiment of the heart, or both united ? These, and other such questions, are what properly engage the moral philosopher. But here, it must be seen, we are concerned only with a particular class of facts, and that a very different one from the theological. The inquiry is bounded by a far narrower horizon. The relation of parts, in the internal structure of our moral nature, is what now occupies the attention. It is the little world within us that we are examining: and we are endeavouring to ascertain the springs which set it in motion, and the end to which all combine. The extent of Moral Philosophy, indeed, embraces the views of man's social and religious nature ; and, in these respects, it seems a science of greater compre hension, than according to the limits which I have stated. But these views belong to the same funda mental principle, the science of man in his internal nature : since the social and religious instincts are as much parts of that nature, as those which more immediately respect the individual. It is clear, that, if principles of one kind of know ledge be applied to the facts of another, only con fusion and error must result. The application is purely hypothetical, though the principles themselves may be perfectly true. This is readily acknowledged in the case of mere sciences. Every one now sees, LECTURE VI. 267 that mathematical theories can be of no avail, to in terpret the nature of physical facts. But it was not so obvious to the ancient philosopher, who constructed his system of the universe on mathematical or logical data, nor to the physiologists who united medicine with geometry. Nor does it now appear inconsistent to many, to blend together principles of Theology and Morals. The close connexion of these, in their application, is the fallacy that misleads such persons. But a combination of results is, evidently, a very different thing from coincidence in principles. An example may illustrate this. Paley has endeavoured to combine the separate principles of Ethics and Theology, in his Moral Philosophy. He was not satisfied with that kind of certainty, which moral truths appeared to possess. Probably, as a mathe matician, he exacted, for his own satisfaction, some firm principle, from which the rules of morality might be deduced with logical precision. Sound philosopher as he was practically, he still aimed at a theoretic demonstrativeness in ethical science, of which all sciences conversant about facts must, by their very nature, be incapable. What, then, has been the consequence of this attempt to establish morality on an immovable basis? Instead of es tablishing morality, it has, in reality, weakened the theory of moral truth. The whole of morality, ac cording to his view, resolves itself ultimately into Religion. The theological principle, on which he bases his system, — the duty of conformity to the Will of God, — is perfectly just and true in itself. But, in 268 LECTURE VI. making that principle a ground of morality, he has destroyed the independent character, and, with this, the philosophical truth, of Ethics, as a science of human nature. The broadness of the principle tramples upon the little world of principles, which lie within man himself. It has been often argued ; that, if the theory of Paley were acted on simply, evil might be done with a view to a good result : there is, in fact, no such thing as evil in itself, as there is nothing good in itself, where the tendency of actions is the criterion of their worth. The only error which can be committed then, is a speculative one, — that of not having generalized sufficiently, so as to see, that the conduct pursued, is not, in fact, the Will of God ; as not being conformable with the general law of the Divine procedure. It must be a return to the consideration, whether evil is not something resting on its own grounds, independently of the mere tendency of actions, that can check the agent, in following up the theological principle by immoral, practical consequences. Paley himself has ingeniously argued against this construction ; and successfully; so far as to shew, that the immoral con sequences do not logically follow from his theory. It must be admitted, that no action, conformable to the Will of God, can, as such, in any case be pro ductive of Evil. If we assume conformity to the Will of God, as a definition of right, nothing evil can be inferred from it. But the logical consist ency is not the point in question. The test of the theory is, its adaptation to human nature. And its LECTURE VI. 269 erroneousness is sufficiently shewn, by its tendency to mislead even the wish to do good. It is the mis take of acting upon an anticipated result, out of our own power ; when the very attainment of that result is, a consequence of having acted previously accord ing to the laws of our nature. Religion, in truth, begins where morality ends. Let each action be done as it is morally right. We are encouraged then to proceed, for we are sure that it has the sanction of God. Whatever may be the immediate effect of it, we know that God will ultimately re ward it. Whatever may be its intrinsic imper fection, we rely on his mercy in Christ, and the grace of his Spirit, to give it a worth not its own, and consecrate it to the doing of his Will. The source of that confusion of Theology and Morals, which I have noticed, is to be traced back to the origin itself of Moral Truth : first of all, in its being handed down in the forms of maxims and proverbs, the traditional wisdom of other days. Moral truths thus rested, in the first instance, on Authority; being propagated from age to age, as venerable precepts of immemorial usage, or as the sacred sayings of some reputed sage. This mode of their reception imparted to them more of a re ligious, than of a philosophical, character. They would carry with them something of that awe, which the mystery of their origin, and the names of ancient sages, could not but awaken in the mind. Particularly, when moral truths were conveyed, 270 LECTURE VI. amidst the political regulations, and the rewards and punishments, of civil enactments, — as they are found in the Pentateuch, and in the extant Polities of early legislators or philosophers, — men would be induced to regard morality as a matter of ordinance ; as what exacted their obedience ; rather than as the internal discipline of their affections. In the next place it should be observed, that, so far as morality was reduced to any system in the ancient philosophy, it was not exempt from that in discriminate endeavour at scientific exactness, which corrupted the other branches of philosophy. Until the time of Aristotle, indeed, it appears to have been strictly included among the number of demonstrative sciences. For even Socrates, with all his practical excellence as a moralist, still considered Ethics as on a footing with arts and sciences — as what re quired only to be known, in order to be fully pos sessed — and as what might be acquired by mere instruction. Aristotle, with a much more sagacious sense, exposed the fallacy of this prevalent idea, and set the example of a truly practical system of Ethics. But his system did not become the popular philosophy of Greece. His writings being long lost to the world soon after his death, the more es tablished system of Plato maintained its ground on this, as on other points of philosophy. This system, which was chiefly an expansion and adjustment of the Pythagorean speculations, perpetuated that mys tical form in which the great Master had delighted LECTURE VI. 271 to invest his theories. According to the Platonic doctrine, morality was based on immutable specula tive principles, the abstract species, the real con stituents, according to his view, of every thing de nominated good. This was to take morality out of the sphere of man's moral nature, and place it in a kind of philosophical pietism. He rejected, accord ingly, the notion, that man was the " measure" of moral excellence, and admitted no standard of human perfection below that of the Deity Himself. His religion and his morality, following the Pythagorean train of thought with little variation, coincided in the maxim, that the business of man was the Imi tation of God. Thus was the confusion of ethical and theological truth begun in that method of phi losophy, which first obtained the sanction of the Christian Church. The principle of the Imitation of God, so elevating in its conception, and so ac cordant with the language of Scripture, being found in the volumes of philosophy, — a precedent was es tablished, for conjoining the two classes of truth in one promiscuous speculation. It is thus that Augustine speaks of Plato's sys tem of morals, as the only one compatible with Christianity. Having alluded to the different opin ions concerning good, which made man himself, more or less, the seat of good : " let all these," he says, " yield to those Philosophers, who have said not " that man was happy, in enjoying the body, or in " enjoying the mind, but in enjoying God a" who J August. De Civ. Dei, lib. VIII. c. 8. 272 LECTURE VI. have " determined, that the end of good is, to live " according to virtue ; and that this result could be " to him only, who had the knowledge and imitation "of God b." The same tone of thought runs through the Greek Fathers. The noble and seductive language of Plato, respecting the Chief Good, was too strong a tempta tion to be resisted by the ingenuity of the philoso phical Christian, accustomed to the theoretic spirit of the ancient masters, and anxious for some fixed, eternal ground, on which moral truth might be rested. The metaphysical abstraction of Plato was thus, with the universal assent of the Schools, em bodied in the Christian truth of the living God ; at once the object of devout contemplation, and the immutable principle of Ethical Inquiry. The state of literature in the Western Church, after the period of Augustine, to the close of the VIHth century, was such as to confirm the con nexion already established between Theology and Ethics. The compositions of this time were all of a theological cast. Sermons, and legends of Saints, constituted the mental employment of those, who were the oracles of knowledge to the Christian world. And the Sermons of this period, it should be remarked, were not of a controversial character, directed to the establishment of points of doctrine, but chiefly moral reasonings and exhortations. If b August. De Civ. Dei, lib. VIII. c. 9. LECTURE VI. 273 we look, for instance, into those of Cesarius c, the most eminent of the Bishops of Southern Gaul during the first half of the VI th century, — and which are a highly favourable specimen of the literature of that day, — we find them consisting of argu mentative expostulation on the conduct of Chris tians. The legends of the Saints, the romance of religion, as we may term them, are also practical appeals to the Christian world, — endeavours to in terest either the imagination, or the feelings, in the energetic pursuit of religious action. Throughout all this period, accordingly, the intermixture of theology and ethics was proceeding. From the adoption, by the Clergy, of the language of ethical exhortation, in the service of religion, the truth, which cultivates the sentiments and rectifies the con duct, was confounded with that which regenerates and quickens the soul. The same cause, which, in the first dawnings of ethical science, had acted in obscuring its philosophical character — its reception in an authoritative form — also acted powerfully within the Church. Moral truth was received from the lips of the venerated ministers of the divine word, and imbibed rather, as the precious dews of heaven falling on the passive soil, than as the heart of one man pouring itself out on the heart of another. The Latins, indeed, were not altogether without some elementary ethical treatises in their own lan- <• Cesarius, Bishop of Aries from A. D. 501 to 542; born in 470. His Sermons are printed in an appendix to the Sermons of Augustine, in torn. V. Oper. ed. fol. 1683. T 274 LECTURE VI. guage. The " Offices" of Cicero appear to have been familiarly known to them. But they were not satisfied to derive precepts of morality from a heathen source. They seem to have been fearful of detract ing from the intrinsic authority of Scripture morals, if they conceded any originality of thought to heathen precepts of duty. Where they acknowledged the correctness of such precepts, they insinuate, at the same time, that it was a wisdom borrowed from the Christian Revelation. Ambrose, accordingly, com posed a treatise, in three books, after the plan of Cicero's Offices, on the " Offices of Ministers ;" sub stituting the hopes and sanctions of the Gospel for the worldly principles of the Roman philosopher, and the examples of Jewish and Christian devotion for those of Greek or Roman virtue. The work, as is indicated by its title, was designed exclusively for the Clergy d. But the treatise which obtained the greatest popularity, if we may judge from its fre quent quotation in the Scholastic writings, was " The Morals" of Gregory the Great. Gregory was a fierce opponent of secular learning ; and, like Am brose, was only desirous of supplying the studious Clergy with a manual of ethical instruction, which should supersede the reading of a work of heathen literature. This was no proper attempt, therefore, to d Augustine characterizes this work thus, in writing to Je rome: — nisi forte nomen te movet, quia non tarn usitatum est in ecclesiasticis libris vocabulum Officii, quod Ambrosius noster non timuit, qui suos quosdam libros utilium preeceptionum ple- nos, de Officiis voluit appellare. Epist. XIX. Oper. Tom. II. p. 24. ed. 4to. LECTURE VI. 275 establish a Science of Morals. It was only a trans fusion of theological doctrine into the technical phraseology of the Ancient Ethics : in itself utterly barren of all sound instruction as to the foundation and nature of human duties. Consequently, it only promoted the confusion, already begun, and sanc tioned by the practice of the Church, between moral and religious truth ; as embodying that confusion in a text-book, and consecrating it by the authority of a high ecclesiastical name. Nor ought the mention to be omitted in this place of the well-known treatise of Boethius, on the " Consolation of Philosophy." It may be de scribed as a manual of philosophic devotion ; the effusion of the piety of an elegant mind, grateful for those literary delights, which had soothed its anxie ties, and strengthened its resignation. It is import ant in the history of the ethics of the Schools ; as it is a work, which attracted the study of the scholastic theologians, serving as the basis of elaborate com mentaries: and it tended, accordingly, to promote and establish that contemplative religious character, with which the moral philosophy of the Schools was tinc tured at its outset. But what contributed, perhaps, more than any thing to this confusion of Theology and Ethics, was, the spiritual power, which the Latin Church had been acquiring, more and more, throughout this period, over the consciences of men. The Church became the dupe of its own ambitious pretension. The laity were brought into captivity to the impe- T 2 276 LECTURE VI. rious sense of their spiritual leaders; from whom, not only the theories of the faith were to be sought ; but also the practical doubts, the heresies of conscience, were to obtain their answer. The exigencies of such a complex and subtile government demanded its own peculiar code of spiritual legislation. A system of moral rules was required, which should be in strict accordance with the theocratic principle, in which the power of the Clergy consisted. They must be such, whose lines should continually terminate in some religious object, and mingle the passiveness of the votary with the active obedience of the subject. They must be enforced by rewards and punishments, to sustain the idea of subjection to the spiritual guide ; and these rewards and punishments must be such, as the spiritual arm alone could administer. But the rules and sanctions of conscience, when thus applied, would evidently lose their nature, as simple laws of morality. Whatever validity they pos sessed, would result from the principle of spiritual subjection ; from the notion, that they were pre scribed by a Power which held the soul in its grasp. And the assumption of this power, by the Clergy, made them, as I have said, the dupes of their own pretension. As they mistook subtilty of speculative distinctions for theology, so they also mistook casu istry for moral philosophy, and the indulgences and penances of spiritual discipline for Religion. The monastic institutions, in themselves an effect of the confusion of theology and morality, tended, in their turn, to foster that confusion. The mix- LECTURE VI. 277 ture of ritual and moral precept in these institu tions, and the blending of the whole under the name of Religion ; — so that those who lived under these systems, obtained the exclusive appellation of the Religious; — must have forcibly cemented the two ideas of virtue and holiness, as representations of one and the same principle. The devoutness, the submissiveness, the self-annihilation of the holy re cluse, commanded the attention of the world; and naturally became, in the popular estimate, equiva lents for the self-examining conscience and internal convictions of right. The fact, indeed, is, that the right of private judgment, in morality, was as effectually excluded by the spiritual power of the Church, as it was in articles of faith. Both the rule of conduct, and the rule of belief, were to be received implicitly. The questioning of the heart, and of the intellect, were equally superseded. The whole came to this, that Christian perfection was reduced to the surrender of the will; so that nothing enjoined by the command of a religious superior, was either wrong or impossible6. The labours of the Schoolmen, in Morals, gave a speculative harmony and perfection to the system which had grown out of the practice of the Church. In constituting an exact science of Theology, it was their part to collect the fragments of ethical juris diction, which lay scattered in the sermons, and le- e Note A. Lect. VI. T 3 278 LECTURE VI. gends, and institutions, and discipline of the Church; and to mould them, in accordance with the language of Scripture, and the theories of their theology. Professed works of ethics were composed by some of them : and commenting on the Ethics of Aristotle became part of the labours of the Schools. But, though this exercise of powerful minds on moral truth, could not but elicit some scattered lights on the subject, ethical science may still be regarded as having slumbered through the darkness of the middle age. The proper character of it, indeed, is seen in the devotional work which appeared in the XVth century, the celebrated treatise by Thomas a Kem- pis, of the " Imitation of Christ." This work was a vigorous effort of that moral study which had been cultivated in the Church, to extricate itself from the fetters of a systematic theology ; a disen gagement, as it were, of the spirit of the theological morality, from the forms in which it had been em bodied. Its great popularity marks, both the bent which previous ethical systems had given to the general taste, and the intrinsic defects of them. It was the ethics of religion that men wanted : and, at the same time, they wanted the pure substance with out the technical alloy, with which it had been con founded. To proceed, however, in giving an account of the peculiar character imparted to ethics by the method of the Schools, — I would observe, in the first place, that here also, as in the purely speculative part of their LECTURE VI. 279 system, they united the precision and detail of Ari stotle's ethical system, with the fundamental doctrines of Plato. They have taken, that is, as their great principle, Plato's theological account of the Chief Good. It is established as their point of outset, that, as the inquiry is into the end of all human actions, the mind must first lay hold of that principle itself, — that great end, or Chief Good. On the participation of this, must depend the goodness of all particular actions. And a collection of moral rules, accordingly, directed to the good or happiness of man, would be deducible as consequences from this their general idea or constituent nature. But, to the Christian moralist, this Chief Good could be no other than God Himself, as revealed in the Scriptures. Indeed, the Scriptures themselves suggested, in some passages, a view of God in accord ance with this notion ; as where the Psalmist says : " whom have I in heaven but thee ? and there is " none upon earth that I desire beside thee ;" and in the passage which I have already read : " there " is none good but one, that is, God." Whilst, then, the notion of God, as the Chief Good, had been originally received into the Church, inde pendently of Aristotle's Philosophy, the peculiar modification of that notion by the Schoolmen was obtained from the physical theory of Aristotle, which I had occasion to describe in a former Lecture. I pointed out, that, according to Aristotle, it was the pure principle of Excellence and Beauty that gave T 4 280 LECTURE VI. its perfection to each existing thing : at once the motive principle, and final cause, of all the activity of Nature ; and therefore characterized by him, as Energy, intrinsic Activity, or, in the Scholastic translation of the expression, " Pure Act." The theories of Divine and Human Agency, as I have endeavoured to shew, were applications of this Principle of Energy to the Divine dealings mani fested in the salvation of man. It remained yet to develop its workings in the internal mechanism of man's moral nature ; to illustrate here also, that God was all in all ; realizing, by His vital operation, the harmony and perfection of the various powers of the soul. How readily the Ethical System of Aristotle fell into this theoretic mould, will appear, if due con sideration be given to the language, in which Ari stotle himself has expressed his notion of Human Happiness. His description of it, as Energy, is evidently not an accidental one, but in strict unison with his physical doctrine. He has in view the idea of the soul's exerting itself by natural efforts, in order to the full development of its powers, and attainment of the End of its Being ; when it should have infinitely approximated to, and identified itself, as it were, with, that divinity with which it is instinct. Such, indeed, is his account of Pleasure ; which he considers as the indistinct, unconscious pursuit of a divine principle, with which all things are, more or less, instinctively animated. His theory of Happi- LECTURE VI. 281 ness sought only how to conspire with, and aid, these natural tendencies existing in the human soul ; so that in each instance of action, in every perception and thought, this pleasure might be attained ; and nature thus wrought to its utmost perfection. Transfer this doctrine of the Philosopher to the Christian Schools, and you have the notion incul cated in the Ethics of the middle age, of the funda mental principle of morality. God is conceived to be the moving cause of all that effort, which the soul puts forth in reaching after happiness. It is the operation of Divine Goodness, which sets in motion, and carries forward, and invigorates the soul, in order to its perfection of being. The coincidence of the ideas of Virtue and Powerf, in their Ethical System, is an illustration of this notion. For, according to such a philosophy of Human Actions, Virtue would be that state of the soul in which all its faculties were fully exerted : in which there was, not only a tendency towards the Chief Good, but a vigorous and invariable cooper ation with the Divine Energy — a command, or power, established by the higher principles of our nature, over the inferior animal propensities. From this complex notion of the Chief Good, both as the Deity Himself, and as essentially Energy, or Operation, we may trace those gradations of moral f The word divapis is frequently translated by Virtus. The Divine Attribute of " Power," is expressed both by Virtus and Potentia. Our familiar use of the word " virtually," is an illus tration of the same point. 282 LECTURE VI. excellence which the ethical discipline of the Latin Church has established. First, we may remark, Happiness was placed out of the confines of this present world. It could only be sought by abstraction, by self-denial, and a pro cess of devotedness to the One Supreme Good. The body was an incumbrance to the soul, impeding its motions towards the Principle of Life and Joy, and obscuring its perceptions of its real happiness. Self-denial would, on such a view of the case, con sist in the mortification of the body; not in the command of the passions, amidst the various occu pations of life, but in renouncing those occupations altogether — not in disclaiming our own righteous ness — not in living to men as to God — but in living, as out of the world, and to God alone. This is clearly the effect of holding forth the Deity as the real object of attainment ; to be reached by efforts of ardent exertion, and by expansion of the powers of the soul beyond their present limits. The soul becomes virtually its own divinity, when the Deity, towards whom its desires are thus strained, is regarded, in this physical sense, as the great end of its pursuit. Hence the distorted and discoloured view, which human life exhibits by the light of such a theory. The blessings which God has scattered around us, to cheer us on our way, and the active occupations, with which He would have us con tribute to the mutual benefit of each other, lie in deep shadow, as regions which the sun of heaven never visits. Under such a theory, we need not wonder at the LECTURE VI. rise of mysticism, or any of the extravagancies of fantastic piety. So long as the attainment of God is proposed as a process of spiritualization, it is perfectly natural, that, in minds of an enthusiastic or melancholy temperament, a violent effort should be made to realize at once, or approach as nearly as possible, the ultimate end of the aspirant soul. The Love of God becomes the sole exclusive prin ciple of action, not as it is the bond of peace and of all virtues, but as it is in itself the most intense expression of the soul's effort — the condensation of all the affections and desires into one divine ardour. The frenzied self-devotion of those saints of the East, who passed their lives on pillars or in caverns, and the Quietism s of Fenelon, were only various instances of the same principle carried to its full extent, under different modifications of personal cha racter and circumstances. Again, we may observe the influence of Aristotle's notion of "Energy" in the speculations by which the Latin Clergy established the superiority of that mode of Life to which they were themselves de voted, and in the estimation of which, among the members of the Church, their spiritual influence s The rjpepla of the intellect, according to Plato and Aristotle. — So Duns Scotus, Sent. III. dist. xxviii. fol. 56. Licet ergo so lum infinitum bonum quietet voluntatem ; et hoc in quantum infinitum bonum : non tamen oportet quodlibet bonum finitum, secundum gradum suum in bonitate, magis et minus quietare : quia isti gradus sunt accidentales per comparationem ad ex- trinsecum quietandum. 284 LECTURE VI. depended. If Happiness was Energy, — the more in tensely, and the more purely, the soul might be ex erted, — the fuller, and the purer, would be the hap piness attained ; the more nearly would the soul be brought to the fruition of God. But no other state of life presented such opportunities ; in no other employment was the action so uninterrupted, as in that of the speculative theologian. We find, in fact, the very same arguments employed by them, in asserting the godlike preeminence of the thought ful solitary above the rest of mankind, which are alleged by Aristotle in favour of the Theoretic Life over the Practical1-. The Philosopher, having proved that happiness was, by its nature, " Energy," was obliged to explain this idea, consistently with the acknowledged superiority of the intellectual nature of man. He insists, accordingly, that the occupa tions of the mind were no less really practical, than the business of active life ; that the philosopher was as completely energetic in his pursuits, as the man who took a more personal part in the concerns of social life. So that, perfect happiness, according to Aristotle, consisted at once in leisure and in ac tivity — in that state of life, consequently, which com prized both ; where no worldly avocations should interfere, no pressing calls of personal, or social, de mands on the time and thoughts, should disturb the busy tranquillity of the intellect1. This was pre- h Aquin. S. Theol. Prima Ildae, qu. clxxix. clxxx. clxxxi. — Note B. ' Aristot. Ethic. X. Polit. VII. 3. Mag. Mor. I. 35. LECTURE VI. 285 cisely such a defence, as would serve the cause of the scholastic theologian. He must command the admiration and respect of mankind, as leading a life to which few could attain ; as having approxi mated, during his earthly career, to the sublime purity, of which the full attainment was necessarily reserved for a higher state of being; when the body should no longer cloy and weigh down the soul. He required to be regarded by mankind in that point of view, in which his participation of a com mon corrupt nature should least appear, — in which the divine principle of pure and ceaseless energy should be evidently predominant k. Hence was established the doctrine of Perfection. The Christian, who, by cooperating with the in fused principle of grace, should cultivate the divine principle within him, would regularly advance to ward that End or Chief Good — the Deity — which was the consummation of his being. The religious devotee, intent only on the immovable End of all human exertions, and not disquieting or interrupt ing his own progress by vain pursuit of the mutable goods of life, would reach the ultimate object, his perfection, by the most compendious process. The more he lived in theory, the more would the theory of human perfection be realized in him. For here also Aristotle's philosophy of nature served the purpose of their speculation. In assigning the different classes of Being throughout the universe, k See Hooker, Eccl. Pol. B. I. s. ii. p. 256 — 261. 8vo. 286 LECTURE VI. their degrees of approximation towards the uni versal End which actuated their motions, he ar gues, that those are the highest and most ex cellent natures, which attain the ultimate End by the least effort ; tending immediately, without any disturbance or variety of movement, towards the Divine Principle. What the heathen Philosopher applied to the visible luminaries of the heavens, was transferred by the Christian speculatist to the invisible hierarchy of the angelic host, and from them, in succession of order, to the saints of God on earth. Angels and holy men accomplished, by direct and immediate methods of operation, the at tainment of the Sovereign Good ; which others reached only by circuitous and interrupted ways, and by a multitude of repeated endeavours. To support this theory of Perfection, many of our Lord's expressions were adduced : such as ; " if " thou wilt be perfect, go, and sell all that thou " hast, and give to the poor ; — be ye perfect, as your " Father in heaven is perfect; — I have many things " to tell you, but ye cannot bear them now" — that is, as it was interpreted, " not in your present im- " perfect state." His declaration also concerning some, who had " made themselves eunuchs for the " kingdom of God's sake," was cited to the same purport. As evidences again of the same point, those texts were adduced which speak of the per fection of Charity, or the Love of God. Charity, according to this theory, is that which at once unites the soul to God ; bringing the individual, in whom it dwells, into direct contact with the End of his LECTURE VI. 287 pursuit. St. Paul, therefore, might be conceived to have justly pronounced, that charity was greater than faith and hope : and St. John to have expressed the same truth, when he says ; " that perfect love " casteth out fear ;" — and whosoever abideth in love, " abideth in God, and God in him." Two different tracks of Life were thus pointed out to the pursuit of men by the Moral Theology of the Schools ; — the direct and immediate, but strait path of spiritual abstractedness ; and the indirect and vulgar road through the impediments of worldly occupations : — the one adapted for those higher na tures, for whom the restraints of law were not de vised, — in whom the divine principle predominated, — in whose hearts the thrones of spiritual power were erected : the other, the walk of inferior souls, blest indeed with divine influence, but still engaged in the commerce of the world, and needing the further aid of admonition and direction from their spiritual superiors. Each mode of life, consequently, had its correspondent Rule. The perfect life was that which conformed to the loftier principle of the Divine Counsels; whilst the imperfect, that of the mere proficient — of him who was content to tread the humbler path of duties of indispensable neces sity — was ordered by the Divine Precepts K The former would be a system of conduct, derived from 1 Aquinas Summa Theolog. Prima Ildae, qu. c. art. 2. Et ideo manifestum est, quod lex divina convenienter proponit praj- cepta de actibus omnium . virtutum : ita tamen quod quae- dam, sine quibus ordo virtutis (qui est ordo rationis) observari LECTURE VI. that state of intimate communion with God, in which the divine life of the soul consisted ; — rules drawn from the relation of Friendship ; — the fulfilment of duties not obligatory in themselves : whereas the latter — the life of Precepts — would be a system of conduct accordant with that state of remoteness from the Divine End, in which the less holy stood ; and a law derived, accordingly, from the strict re quisitions of Justice. Do we not recognize here the double morality of heathen philosophy, — the strict right, — the wise man of the Stoics, — in the perfect Christian ; the proprieties, or offices, as they were called, in the imperfect services of the ordinary Christian, who, whilst mixing in the concerns of the world, yet pur sues right to a certain extent, according to his capa city of attainment m The outline, however, of this artificial and enthu siastic distinction may be traced in the ethical sys tem of Aristotle himself. Aristotle has clearly placed the perfection of man's nature out of the non potest, cadunt sub obligatione praecepti : quaedam vero, quae pertinent ad bene esse virtutis perfectae, cadunt sub ad- monitione consilii. m Thus Ambrose, in his Treatise of Offices, expressly says : Hoc etenim Karopdapa, quod perfectum et absolutum officium est, a vero virtutis fonte proficiscitur. Cui secundum est com mune officium, quod ipso sermone significatur non esse arduae virtutis ac singularis, quod potest pluribus esse commune .... Alia igitur prima, alia media officia. Prima cum paucis, media cum pluribus .... Duplex enim forma perfectionis : alia me- dios, alia plenos numeros habens : alia hie, alia ibi : alia se cundum hominis possibilitatem, aha secundum perfectionem futuri. De Offic. Ministr. lib. III. c. ii. p. no. LECTURE VI. 289 sphere of the strictly moral duties. He has spoken. of a Virtue beyond the natural capacity of man ; and which he designates an heroic or divine Virtue, as contrasted with the Vice, that degrades man be low the standard of Human Vice ". In asserting also the preeminence of the purely intellectual life, in the scale of moral excellence and happiness, he reduces the moral virtues to a degree of worth, which may very naturally have promoted the scho lastic theory of a twofold Virtue. The virtues, simply ethical, he describes, as necessary to the in tellectually happy man, that he may do his part as man ° — may live as a man amongst men. Reflected in the Christian mirror, this picture, from the hand of the philosopher, represents the ascetic pietist, de scending from the lofty region of devotional con templation, to the ordinary duties of the weaker and less spiritual brother. There is a curious passage, indeed, in one of his ethical works, in which Aristotle expresses himself still more strongly on that kind of excellence, which is attained, not by dint of human exertion, or by the regular use of the faculties, but is the result of an immediate Divine impulse p. In his system, this Divine impulse is, simply the instinctive force >» This is illustrated by the fact, that the first step, in a pro cess of Canonization, is a sentence from the Pope, declaring that the candidate for saintship had practised Christian virtue in gradu heroico. « AerjO-erai ovv rav toioutwv npos ro dvBpwreveadai. Ethic. X. C. 8. p Note B. U 290 LECTURE VI. of Nature, operating in such cases not by the or dinary course : and he refers to it, as an account of what is called good-fortune, or success dispro- portioned to the apparent means employed. This description became, in the scholastic system, the triumphant career of the holy man under the in fluence of Divine Grace, realizing a perfection of conduct, that transcends the power of human prin ciples. Connecting, again, this notion of superhuman virtue with that of the principle of Corruption, the Original Sin of man's nature, we see the peculiar complexion of the Virtue, to which the Schoolmen gave the highest place in the rewards of heaven. It was the Virtue of Conquest, — that by which the fuel (fomes) of Concupiscence — the lust of the flesh — was sub dued and quenched. For this was the earthly prin ciple, — that which turned away the soul from God ; the direct contrary, therefore, to the principle of Grace, by which the soul is turned to God. If one was the greatest virtue, the other would there fore be the greatest vice. Hence, the rigid rule of a life of celibacy was established, as the perfection of morality. And hence, chiefly, that inveterate pre judice, by which we are disposed even now, to iden tify moral purity with the converse of sensuality; overlooking other principles of our nature, no less difficult and no less necessary to be controlled, in order to right conduct and happiness. The distinction of Sins into Venial and Mortal, LECTURE VI. 291 is deduced from the same notion of the Chief Good. Since the whole excellence of the Christian life con sisted in its direction towards God, as the ultimate object of all its aims ; whatever tended to withdraw the soul from this direction, tended towards the death of the soul; or, in the language of the Schools, was a mortal sin. Whatever, therefore, touched the fundamentals of belief, or any express disobedience to the commands of God, was, as they described it, an " inordinateness" of the affections; it rendered the desires " inordinate" — put them out of that course, in which they were rightly ordered towards God. Sins of unbelief, of heresy, contumacy in error, im penitence, rejection of the spiritual authority of the Church, were therefore mortal sins. Venial Sins, on the contrary, were such as were committed in the inferior path of Christian discipline ; such as occurred by the force of temptations, acting on the concupiscible part of our nature. The heart might be right towards God, and therefore guiltless of offences destructive to the soul in themselves. Yet, so far as these offences turned the soul towards the changeable goods of the world, they were sins in jurious to the Christian progress and aim. They came into the class of Venial, on the ground, that here the religious principle was not deficient ; and the circumstances, accordingly, under which they were committed, might be taken into consideration as excuses. These were the sins of frailty and in firmity, occasioned by the conflict between the evil desires remaining from Original Sin, and the Divine v 2 292 LECTURE VI. principle infused into the soul by Grace. In the development of this part of their ethical system, the observations of Aristotle on the force of the desires in counteracting the reason, and on the voluntary nature of actions, were their chief guide and autho rity. The degrees of extenuation, or indulgence, to different offences in the Venial class, are ascer tained by the principles of his philosophy. The whole consideration of this subject may be regarded indeed, as the popular ethics of the Schools ; as a system of condescension to the weak nesses of the subject-disciple; by which, at the same time, the power over his conscience was artfully maintained. The rule, in itself, is a just and sound one, when confined to its proper exercise. Its sphere is, in the intercourse of thought between man and man ; to regulate the judgments which each passes on the conduct of another. Indulgence becomes, on this ground, the strict law of right. A sense of our own infirmity, a consideration of the condition of man in the world, of our imperfect knowledge of the heart, a genuine fellow-feeling, are the great principles which here must guide our moral de cisions. And the several decisions of the heart, framed on these principles, constitute a tacit code of Venial offences, known by the name of Candour, or Equity, or Kindness, or Good-will. The Scho lastic philosophy converted this law, with great ad dress, to the service of the ecclesiastical power. To the same principle may be traced the divisions LECTURE VI. of Virtue, into Theological and Moral, and into In fused and Acquired. The theological virtues are Faith, Hope, and Charity ; each of which has God Himself for its object ; Faith, it is stated, having respect to the Divine Truth, Charity to the Divine Goodness, Hope to the greatness of the Divine Om nipotence and Kindness. The Moral Virtues are those, by which the nature of man is regulated with respect to human things. These are comprehensively denoted by the Schoolmen, under the name of The Four Cardinal Virtues ; agreeably to the arrange ment in the Morals of Gregory, and which seems indeed the most ancient division of Virtue ; — Pru dence, Justice, Fortitude, Temperance i. These, to gether with the theological virtues, making up the mystical number of seven, (which their method de lighted in tracing out in different objects,) com prized all the various duties belonging to man, as he respects " God, his neighbour, or himself." We readily see the connexion of the Theological virtues, with the perfection of the Speculative Life. Such a system left scarcely any place for the simply Moral virtues ; so far as these were employed in the lower sphere of merely human duties. These virtues, how ever, were consecrated to the divine service, by the distinction between Infused and Acquired Virtue. Acquired Virtue was the simple result of our na tural instincts, cultivated by exercise and matured <1 Schoolmen refer to Wisdom viii. 7. If a man love right eousness, her labours are virtues : for she teacheth temperance and prudence, justice and fortitude. U 3 294 LECTURE VI. into habits. But Infused Virtue was, the same moral qualities perfected in us by Divine influence : the theological virtues, in themselves, the gifts of God, being the principles of the Infused virtues, in like manner as the natural instincts are the princi ples of the Acquired virtues. As the Acquired vir tues, then, fitted men for human affairs ; so the In fused virtues, it was represented, qualified men to be " citizens of saints and domestics of God." Their system, we find, provided for the growth and ex pansion of the seed of divine grace — the element of the heavenly life in the human soul — in a manner analogous to the improvement of our natural moral instincts ; by accessions, that is, of the same kind to the original principles. The soul proceeded in the divine fife, as in the moral ; increasing in favour with God, as, according to the theory of Aristotle, it advances in its natural conquest over the passions. A still further distinction of moral excellence was derived, from the Scripture-declaration of the mani fold offices of the Holy Spirit, in the sanctification of the human heart. These were the qualities of wis dom, science, understanding, counsel ; — the effects of the Holy Spirit on the rational principle of the soul : fortitude, piety, fear — the effects of the Holy Spirit on the affections. They were denominated the Seven Gifts of the Spirit ; the enumeration being drawn from that passage of Isaiah, which declares the Spirit of the Lord, as " resting," and " as the Spirit of " wisdom and understanding, the Spirit of counsel LECTURE VI. 295 " and might, the Spirit of knowledge and of the " fear of the Lord." As Gifts they differed from the Infused Virtues, in being higher means of perfection, immediate divine instincts, — dispositions prompting to follow the divine motions, and carrying man at once to acts beyond those of human virtue. In the further development of their Ethical System, the Schoolmen closely follow the method of Aristotle's Ethics throughout. Aquinas, in par ticular, has illustrated the application of Aristotle's principles to Christian morality, with an admirable comprehension of the subject, and sometimes, with a knowledge of human nature, which, though briefly and darkly intimated, has scarcely been surpassed by the modern philosopher. On the moral por tion of his great argument, he seems to feel his strength more than elsewhere ; and, though still encumbered with the armour of his technical sys tem, exerts a more independent power. For, though he explains the formal divisions of Virtue received in the Church, he still pursues the in quiry into all the different heads of Aristotle's more copious enumeration, and shews their consistency with the tenour of Christianity. This portion, indeed, of the labours of Aquinas, is particularly interesting to the inquirer into the history of Moral Philosophy, and of its connexion with Theology. It shews to what extent, our phraseology on moral sub jects, has been derived from the Latin versions of Aristotle's expressions of moral ideas; and how u 4 296 LECTURE VI. deeply we are indebted to the Scholastic Philosophy, for its transfusion of the valuable theories of that philosopher, into this department of science. By looking, indeed, to this source, we find the origin of the whole of the questions which have engaged the attention of the modern ethical philo sopher, as well as of our ordinary language on moral subjects. The question of the nature of Moral Obligation, and the very use of the term Ob ligation, are derived from this source. It is strictly connected with that view of Justification, which I endeavoured to explain in my last Lecture. In con sequence of Original Sin, man comes into the world a debtor to Divine Justice. He is under an obliga tion to punishment, on account of his deficiency from that form of Original Justice, in which he rendered to God all that service of love, which the great good ness of God demanded. Hence our terms, due, and duty, as employed to express right conduct. But the use of these words has created, at the same time, a speculative difficulty, which does not properly be long to the subject. Philosophers, we find, have been anxious to solve the question, — why man is obliged to the performance of right; and have sought, accordingly, for some enforcement of virtue, beyond the simple fact, that virtue is a perfect law in itself. Religionists, accordingly, have drawn down an unnecessary force from the law of God, considered as the rewarder and punisher in a future state ; whilst the irreligious have had unholy recourse to the arm of social power. The truth is, that the term Obliga- LECTURE VI. 297 tion is a religious one ; introduced into Morality by that peculiar connexion, which the speculative Theo logy of the Schools established, between Religion and Morality. The Divine Law, the principle of the Divine Being Himself, was to be traced downwards in its operation on fallen man ; and its powerful ef ficacy was to be asserted, as well as its transcendant goodness, in the blessing, and in the vengeance, with which it was accompanied. The subject on which I have been discoursing, is much too large even to be touched adequately, in the compass of a single Lecture. My object, how ever, is chiefly to point out the origin of that pre judice, by which the distinct provinces of Theology and Morality have been popularly confounded : and I therefore confine myself to such a view of the Scho lastic Ethics, as exhibits its connexion with Theology. It is in this respect, that the ethical system of the Schools has been injurious to Moral Philosophy; whilst it has conferred important benefit, as I have observed, by its introduction into modern language of the practical science of Aristotle ; — an effect, that each individual has unconsciously experienced, in the tone which education and society have given to his mind. What is more familiar to us, I may ask, before we have begun to reflect on the words which we employ, than to speak of the motives and the ends of actions ? But, in using these terms, we are speaking in the theories of what we are apt to re- 298 LECTURE VI. gard, as an absurd and exploded philosophy, of no interest to ourselves. It is to the technical language, indeed, of the School-Ethics, that we may ascribe the extrava gance of those Modern Philosophers, who have re duced all actions to the necessity attributed to mo tion consequent on impact, or to the results produced by the powers annexed to material nature. The origin, indeed, of this modern " necessity," is pre cisely the realism of the Schools. Actions have been analysed mentally into motives and ends, and this mental distinction has been converted into forces and effects. Consequently, the very distinction be tween rational and material agents has been con founded, by such a mode of philosophizing. For it is the characteristic of the former, that they are agents in themselves, — endued with a principle of motion intrinsically, in their own nature, — and there fore spontaneous and variable in their course of action : — whilst the latter, having no such principle in themselves, depend for their actions on their re lations to other objects. The influence of the scholastic blending of Theo logy and Ethics is evidenced in the very general confusion of thought still observable on this point. There are two extreme opinions on the subject : that on the one hand, which regards ethical principles, as unholy and forbidden ground to the Scriptural re ligionist; as enervating and debasing the sacred LECTURE VI. 299 truth ; that on the other hand, which considers no system of religious truths obligatory on the be lief and the conduct, unless it can be reduced to some principle of our moral nature. Evidently, the limits, and proper department, of these two great portions of our moral instruction, are not attended to, in these extreme views. Too much is ascribed to Theology in the one, too much to Mo rality in the other. According to the former, we can do nothing to the glory of God, unless his glory is the object immediately present to our thoughts in each action. According to the latter, the truth of human nature is disparaged, by the endeavour to kindle the natural sentiments of the heart with the celestial fire of the altar. The distinct provinces of intellectual and revealed knowledge have often been remarked, with a view to silence the objections of such speculators. But I think this account of the matter by no means meets the difficulty of the case, which arises as much from an improper estimate of the moral, as of the intellectual powers ; and that a further answer to it should be sought, in a just view of the relation of Moral Philosophy to Theology. Morality then, it should be observed, is the sci ence of our own internal nature. It ascertains all those principles by which we are actuated in our sentiments and conduct, and establishes the general law in which they all agree. Its office is throughout one of discovery. The existence of these principles is assumed ; and the facts, both of our observation and our consciousness, are examined, with a view to 300 LECTURE VI. their discovery. But all these inquiries are only satisfied to lead to another, which is quite beyond the province of the moralist to answer, as to the ultimate reference of all this complex machinery which we have been studying ; whether it is a whole in itself, or there is something beyond it, in which it originated, and to which it tends. The Christian Revelation has answered this, by shewing the refer ence of these principles to the invisible, eternal world ; giving us an account of their origin in the dispensations of Providence, and the ultimate effect, in a future life, of their present observed tendencies. We should observe, then, that it is only results of which Revelation informs us, the ultimate relations and effects of what we have already ascertained, or are able, by inquiry of ourselves, to ascertain. It is highly important to observe this ; because our popular language on the subject confounds the dis tinction, between the principles of our conduct and the results to which they tend. We are apt to speak of Religion, as supplying fresh motives of con duct. But, in fact, the principles of our moral na ture are the motives, the only motives to actions, as, to use an imperfect analogy, the springs and wheels of a machine are the motives to its action : and the truths of Christianity are presented to those principles, as objects towards which they should tend. There is thus infinite room for addition to our actual moral improvement, by the presentation of new and more glorious objects to our moral prin ciples ; whilst, at the same time, there is no addition LECTURE VI. 301 of even a single new moral fact to the history of our internal nature. Results may be unfolded to us, utterly beyond the reach of all conclusions from observation and consciousness ; and these results may open objects to our faith, and, through faith, to all the principles of our nature ; whilst the prin ciples themselves are unchanged, and unchangeable, so long as man, and the world around him, are what they are. But this confusion of results with the motives of conduct takes place, when the religious principle is substituted as the spring of action : as, when it is argued, that no action can have any moral value, except it be done immediately, and exclusively, on a motive of glory to God. The glory of God supplies, indeed, the great religious centre of our actions : they are incomplete and irreligious, if they terminate in worldly objects. But our actions must still be performed according to the laws of our nature. They must originate within us ; they must be morally right in themselves, in order to their sanctification in the great object, which Religion holds out to our view. Christianity, in fact, leaves Ethical Science, as such, precisely where it found it : all the duties which Ethical Science prescribes, remain on their own foot ing ; not altered or weakened, but affirmed and strengthened by the association of Religion. And, so independent is the Science of Ethics, of the support, and the ennobling, which it receives from Religion, that it would be nothing strange, or objectionable, in 302 LECTURE VI. a Revelation, were we to find embodied in its lan guage, much of the false Ethical Philosophy, which systems may have established i. This, I conceive, would appear to those, who bear in mind the real distinctness of Religion and Moral Science, nothing more objectionable, than the admission into the sa cred volume of descriptions involving false theories of Natural Philosophy. There is greater affinity to revealed truth in the nature of Moral Philosophy ; because it has, in common with Religion, the hap piness of man for its object : but a coincidence of object is different from an actual agreement in the means employed. Holiness, separation from the world, devotion, stillness of the thoughts and the af fections, are the means of Religion : — Ethics are all activity, all business. Neither will answer the pur pose of the other : both are indispensable to the per fection and happiness of human nature. Let those, then, who would endeavour to substitute one for the other, either Theological Truth for Moral, or Moral for Theological, reflect whether they are not bringing into competition two classes of truth which have no rivalry with each other. Let them think, whether religion may not be true and obli gatory, though it may touch on points beyond the sphere of their moral anticipations: and whether the yap eyviav Mvap.LV k£e\dovcrav arts kpov. 'Ibovaa be fj yvv-q on ovk e\a6e, rpep.ovaa rjXde, ko.1 irpocnreoWcra avr&, bi f/v alriav rjyjraro av rov arrriyyeiXev avr& kvdmov rravrbs tov Xaov, ko.1 a>s lAO-n •napa)(p?\p.a. 'O be eiirev avrfj- ®dpo-ei, dvyarep' rj it Carts Invisibilis gratiae visibile signum, is the usual definition of a Sacrament in the school-writers. The words are drawn from Augustine. — Note B. c Ad primum ergo dicendnm, quod per omnia Sacramenta fit homo particeps sacerdotii Christi, &c. Aquin. Sum. Theol. III. Pars, qu. lxiii. art. 6. 314 LECTURE VII. strengthened and vivified : by Penance, recruited from the effects of sin : Extreme Unction removes the last relics of the sinful nature, preparing the soul for its departure. These, then, are the influences of Christ's passion on Christians, in their personal ca pacity. But the Christian Society needs to be sup ported, both in its natural and in its spiritual exist ence. The grace annexed to Matrimony supports the natural life, in order to the spiritual ; since the Christian must first be born into the world, that he may afterwards be regenerated in Christ. The sa crament of Orders, analogous to Matrimony in the spiritual community, is the grace of Christ's pas sion, continuing the vital succession of Ministers, the living instruments, through whom all grace is imparted to the Church d. Rightly, then, to understand the doctrine of the Sacraments in general, we must look to the theory of secret influences on which it is based, the mys terious power, conceived to belong to certain things, or actions, or persons, of effecting changes not cog nizable by the senses, and changes, as real as those apparent to observation. It is true indeed, that, in the Christian application of this theory, the power was not conceived to belong intrinsically to the things themselves. They were only subordi nate, instrumental causes, by which the Divine Agency accomplished its ends. Christ was held to be the sole primary cause of Grace, however d Note C. LECTURE VII. 315 given. In this respect, the mystical philosophy of secret agents in nature was christianized. But, though it might thus be denied, that any proper efficacy was attributed to the symbol employed in the administration of a Sacrament, still its power of communicating grace instrumentally, was asserted in the strongest manner. Illustration was drawn from the manner in which any instrument of art per formed its work. The artist, or workman, was properly the executor of it, as the designer of the result : the instrument executed it, according to its adaptation, as an instrument, to produce the result e. The general belief in Magic, in the early ages of the Church, may sufficiently account for the ready reception of such a theory of Sacramental influence. The maxim of Augustine, Accedit verbum ad ele- mentum, et fit Sacramentum, appears to be, in fact, an adaptation of the popular belief respecting the power of incantations and charms, to the subject of Religion. The miracles themselves, indeed, of our Saviour were supposed to act in this manner, even by those who did not impute them to the agency of evil. His word, or His touch, was sought for by persons acknowledging in faith the reality of his mission. " Say in a word only," said the Cen turion, " and my servant shall be healed." The woman, who forced her way through the crowd, fully trusted that she should be made whole, if she could touch but the hem of the garment of Jesus. And our Saviour, whose condescension was shewn e Note D. 316 LECTURE VII. even to the prejudices of his faithful followers, often accompanied the working of his miracles with sig nificant actions. In the instance of the woman, in deed, thus suddenly cured, He is described as having perceived that some one had touched Him, by the fact, that virtue had gone out of Him ; — a mode of speaking, characteristic of the prevalent idea con cerning the operation of Divine Influence, as of something passing from one body to another. The physical philosophy received in the Schools, was in itself favourable to this doctrine of sacra mental efficiency. Nature being regarded as a sys tem of powers inherent in matter, it would be easily conceived, that these powers might be secretly di rected by that Sovereign Will which gave them being. As they operated visibly in various ways through the Divine Word, so they might also act invisibly for the production of spiritual effects. The Word which spoke things into being, could surely influence the mode of their operation. This doctrine, however, of the Sacraments ap pears to have subsisted in the Church without ques tioning, and consequently without much precision of opinion on the subject, until the agitation of the controversies respecting the nature of Christ e. These <* Ratramn was engaged in a controversy on the manner of Christ's Birth. Paschase also wrote on the same point in opposition to Ratramn. The coincidence of this controversy with that on the Eucharist, further illustrates the connexion of the points disputed in each. — Note E. LECTURE VII. 317 would evidently affect the notion of a communicated virtue derived to the powers of nature from his Person. If, according to Nestorius, God and man were not united in one Person in Jesus Christ, it might naturally be inquired, whether the " Virtue " of his Passion," obtained sacramentally, flowed from the Divinity or from the Humanity ; since his Passion was thus considered as distinct from his Divine Nature. Accordingly, at the Council of Ephesus, two opinions on this article were con demned : one asserting " the flesh of the Son of " man," to mean some one among men, into whose flesh and blood the earthly substance of bread should be changed ; the other asserting, that the individual, whose flesh and blood should have this salutary efficacy, should be some eminently holy person — the temple of God — in whom God should dwell in the truest sense f. Whether, indeed, such opinions were actually held in the form here stated, may be doubted. But it seems evident, from the notice itself of dif ferent opinions on the Eucharist in the time of Nes torius, that the popular notion of sacramental in fluence, was affected by his theory of the Incarna tion. The communication of secret virtue by the sacramental symbol, seemed to be broken in its first link, if the Divinity were separated from the Hu manity of Christ: and speculation exerted itself to f I have taken this account from Lanfranc, De Corp. et Sang. Domini, c. xvii. p. 242. Oper. — Note F. 318 LECTURE VII. find a stay, on which the sacred chain might be fastened. Afterwards, the Alexandrian Philosophy, as re vived by Erigena, seems once more to have awakened the opinions of speculative men on the question of Sacramental influence. The Eucharist again, as the most complex subject of disquisition, was the point of the general question, to which at tention was particularly directed. There is no ex tant work of Erigena on the subject, though we find allusions, in subsequent writers, to his doctrine, set forth, as it seems, in some express treatise. There remain, however, other treatises of the same period, those of Paschase and Ratramn, of which I have had occasion to speak before : and these, though entirely confined to a discussion of the Eucharist, indicate a general agitation of the question concern ing the manner, in which grace was communicated by the Sacraments. That inquiry should have been directed to the presence of Christ in the consecrated bread and wine, seems to have been only accidental, from the circumstance, that the celebration of the Eucharist was more identified with Divine worship than the other Sacraments. It appears that the Alexandrian Philosophy re vived the question, by removing all actual power from nature, and reducing all natural effects to the sole agency of the Deity. There would be, accord ing to this philosophy, no real instrumentality in the Sacraments. All would be the immediate action LECTURE VII. 319 of the Deity. The virtue attributed to the sacred symbols would therefore vanish. They would not contain Christ's passion by real participation in themselves. They could only act as the representa tives, or signs, of his presence, not as the causes, or instruments, of his operation on the soul. The popular and orthodox doctrine, however, was, that the Sacramental influence was a power of cau sation. Accordingly at this period, when disputation began again to be the pastime of theologians, the notion was strenuously opposed, that the Sacrament of the Eucharist was a sign only, and not the actual presence of the crucified body of Christ. The or thodox, indeed, maintained that it was a sign, so far as it consisted of visible symbols ; but they further contended, that a real efficacy must be im puted to the operation so signified. The collision, however, of adverse statement, forced them into a precision of language, which, probably, but for the force of controversy, would have had no place in this department of theology. It is no inconsider able evidence of this observation, that the precision of language has occurred on that particular Sacra ment, which was the immediate matter of discus sion, — the Eucharist. The nature of Christ's pre sence in Baptism might have been attempted, no less, to be defined : but here the point is left com paratively open to opinion ; whilst, respecting the Eucharist, the path of orthodoxy is rigidly marked out to the disciple of the scholastic theology. The opposition of controversy, whilst it led the 320 LECTURE VII. orthodox to assert an actual presence of the incar nate Christ, under the sacramental symbols of bread and wine, made them charge their adversaries with holding the Sacraments to be only signs, — memo rials of Christ's passion, and not the actual oblation. And this may account for the pointed expression in our Article, that " the Supper of the Lord is not " only a sign of the love which Christians ought to " have among themselves, but rather is a Sacrament " of our Redemption." In denying an actual com munication of Christ to the sacred emblems, it be came necessary to guard against the construction of asserting a merely commemorative rite, and thus evacuating the Sacrament of its holy burthen of Grace. For neither Ratramn, in opposing the doc trine of Paschase, nor afterwards Berenger, in ad vocating the views of Erigena against Lanfranc s, appear to have held, that the Eucharist was nothing more than a sign. Ratramn, indeed, distinctly as serts a real presence, though he does not admit a presence of the crucified body of Christ in the con secrated bread and wine. It is a real and true pre sence that he asserts ; — the virtue of Christ acting in the way of efficacious assistance to the receiver of the Sacrament. The Church of England doc trine of the Sacraments, it is well-known, is founded on the views given by this author. Cranmer and Ridley are said to have studied his work together and to have derived their first ray of light on the subject from that study b. e Note G. h Note H. LECTURE VII. 321 The relative importance of the Eucharist, in com parison with the other Sacraments, and, indeed, with the whole doctrine and ritual of Christianity, in the system of the Church of Rome, may be drawn from this primary notion of sacramental efficiency. It may well be asked, why this sacred rite should stand so preeminent in the scheme of Christianity. I do not say, that it ought not to hold a principal station among the observances of a holy life. But it is the doctrinal supremacy given to it, to which I refer. View it, as it exists in the Roman Church, and it is there found absorbing into it the whole, it may be said, of Christian worship. There, the ministers of religion seem to be set apart chiefly for this sacred celebration : it is the spiritual power of their office — the essence of their priesthood. If we ask then, why this particular Sacrament should have attained this superiority over all other rites of Chris tianity, we may find an answer in the Scholastic theory. Whilst the other Sacraments, recognized by that theory, participate of the virtue of Christ's passion, this is the passion itself of Christ, — the whole virtue of his priesthood mystically repre sented and conveyed. The priesthood of Christ comprehending in it the whole of Christianity, the rite by which that priesthood was especially signi fied, would become the great act of human ministra tion, when the notion was once established of an instrumental causality attached to the use of the sign. The importance which this Sacrament ob tained, appears, accordingly, to have increased, in 322 LECTURE VII. proportion as controversy more explicitly shaped the doctrine, giving a greater point and boldness to the assertion of a real oblation of Christ. It was freely admitted, that Christ was offered once for all on the Cross ; that henceforth He is seated at the right hand of the Divine Majesty, to die no more. But the sacrifice performed by the priest was still a real offering of Christ ; as being the appointed chan nel, through which the expiatory virtue of the Great Sacrifice descends in vital efflux from the person of the Saviour '. The necessity of a general " Intention" on the part of the priest administering a Sacrament, to " do " what the Church does, and intends," by that Sa crament, is founded on the same mystical construc tion of the rite, as an actual communication with Christ Himself. Inanimate things, so far as they act instrumentally in communicating the virtue of Christ's passion, act simply according to the laws of their nature, moved by the impulse given to them externally. But the human agent, the animated in strument15 of the sacramental Virtue, being in him self a principle of motion, operates by the moral, and therefore variable, power of freewill, in pro ducing the mystical result. This doctrine led, of course, to many questions on the point ; such as, whether the forgetfulness of the Priest, the omission of any expression, the variation of words in the form of consecration, would affect the validity of the 1 Note E. k Aristotle's ep^rvxov opyavov. LECTURE VII. 323 Sacrament. These difficulties, however, were skil fully evaded, by resolving the personal individuality of the Priest into the general abstract personality of the Church. As officiating in the Sacrament, he appeared in the person of the Church. The ques tion then only was, whether the general intention of the Church was fulfilled in the act of consecra tion. Whatever arose from the mere person of the priest as an individual man, could not vitiate the rite1. Hence, though the nature of man, as a volun tary agent, was included in the theory of the Sa craments, the personal vice of the officiating mi nister could not impede the due consecration of the rite. The Church itself could not err. He there fore, in whom the person of the Church was vested, if only it was his design to act in that ca pacity, and to do the work of the Church, could not fail in the performance of the rite. The mys tical virtue was brought down to the sacred ele ment, though the lips were unholy that pronounced the transforming benediction. Thus it was argued, the baptism of Judas was valid, because it was per formed with the authority of Christ ; whilst the baptism of John was not valid, as not being the act of the Church m. We are ready, indeed, ourselves to admit, that the vice of the Minister does not impede the effect of the Sacrament. For it is evident, that, where the Faith of the receiver is the true consecrating i Note F. m Note G. Y 2 324 LECTURE VII. principle, — that which really brings down Christ to the heart of each individual, — the personal delin quency of him who administers it, cannot deteriorate the Sacrament itself. There seems, indeed, scarcely sufficient reason for the introduction of an express article on the subject, when it is once fully understood on Protestant grounds. We see, however, the occa sion of it, in the Scholastic theory of the Sacraments. The immediate occasion, indeed, in the case of our Articles, was, the canon of the Council of Trent upon the subject. But the importance attributed to the point by so distinct a notice of it, belongs to the re condite philosophy of sacramental influence. An authority and sanctity were to be maintained for the Church, as the sole and certain instrument of sa cramental grace, against all objection to the indi vidual agents, to whose hands her rites should be intrusted. It was an admirable expedient, indeed, of ecclesiastical policy, thus to rest the power of the Church on the purity and indefectibility of an ab straction. Religious imagination was sustained on the picture of the Church, as the great Mother of the Faithful, cherishing her beloved children in her pure bosom ; whilst her many-handed agents in the world were securing their hold on the consciences of men, by- that prerogative of veneration which they enjoyed in her person". Realism here be- n We should observe the confusion of ideas prevalent in the early Church on the subject of Baptism. The Church was con sidered as " the body of Christ." The Church also was " the "* mother of the faithful." Hence, being baptized, and being LECTURE VII. 325 came an effectual means of power. The Clergy being regarded in their collective character, as re presentatives of the person of the Church, exhibited an uniform, undying, principle of operation. The stability and eternity of a Theory were substituted for the variable and conflicting views in religious belief and action, which the actual facts of the Church presented. The same principle was applied to the body of the Faithful at large; as, for instance, in the ad ministration of Baptism to Infants, the scholastic ground on which the validity of such baptism is asserted, is, that the Faith of the Church is ac cepted, instead of that of the individual0. The will of the Infant is incapable of putting any bar to the reception of the rite ; and the intention of the Church therefore, it is alleged, fully avails in its behalf. Such, then, is the characteristic idea which per vades all the Sacraments, according to the enume ration of them given by the School-authors, and adopted by the Church of Rome. But it should be remarked, that of the seven, whilst all were held to made a " member of the body of Christ," and being " incor- " porated" into the Church, became equivalent expressions. Hence too the Church was said to " generate" sons by baptism. Augustin. contr. Donatist. I. c. 10. et alib. ° By Canon XIII. of Sess. VII. of the Council of Trent, the Faith of the Church is stated to be the ground on which infants are baptized. This accords with the language of Augustine. — Note H. Y 3 326 LECTURE VII. be means of Grace, and divinely instituted, the two, which we hold exclusively as Sacraments, were considered as of more imperative obligation on the Christian world at large. Baptism, Confirmation, and Orders, indeed, were distinguished from the rest in this respect ; that they were conceived to im press a Character on the Soul — an indelible mark, by which the Soul is consecrated to the service of God. Hence it was maintained that these rites could never be repeated. Though Baptism might have been administered by the hands of a heretic, yet, if the rite had been performed, it was enough. The Christian " character" had been impressed, and the baptized was already a member of the Church. Cyprian, in his zeal against heresy, had main tained the contrary ; requiring, that those who had been baptized by heretics should be rebaptized by the orthodox i'. But the opposite doctrine pre vailed in the Church, and was established by the authority of Augustine. It gave, in fact, to the Church a power over all who had once been bap tized, whether within or without her pale ; so that the spiritual terrors might be applied to such per sons, to compel them to the faith in which they had been baptized i. We may perceive a trace of the P Note I. 1 See this in the Council of Trent, Sess. Sept. de Bapt. — Si quis dixerit hujusmodi parvulos baptizatos, cum adoleverint in- terrogandos esse, an ratum habere velint, quod Patrini eorum nomine, dum baptizarentur, polliciti sunt, et si se nolle respon- derint, suo esse arbitrio relinquendos, nee interim poena ad Christianam vitam cogendos, nisi ut ab Eucharistise, aliorumque LECTURE VII. 327 scholastic doctrine of " impressed character," in the scrupulous care shewn by our Church in the Bap tismal Service, to ascertain whether Baptism has been already performed rightly ; and in the provi sion (itself a scholastic one) of conditional Baptism, in cases where doubt may exist of its previous due administration r. The doctrine of Baptism, indeed, was what na turally attracted the attention of the Church in the early ages. Its connexion with the doctrine of Ori ginal Sin brought it into prominent notice, during the Pelagian Controversies. And, before the rise of these controversies, we see the extravagant opin ion entertained of its sacramental power, in the prac tice of delaying the reception of it until the approach of death s. So that the indispensable necessity of Baptism had been established, before the period of Scholasticism. Both Pelagius and Celestius main- Sacramentorum perceptione arceantur, donee resipiscant, ana thema sit. Canon xiv. r It is suggested by the Cardinal Caietan, in his commentary on the Summa of Aquinas, Hda Ildse, qu. i. art. 3. ed. Antuerp. s Augustine's account of the delay of his own baptism illustrates this. Feeling himself dangerously ill in his youth, he eagerly demanded baptism. He recovered ; and it was postponed, for the reason that, if he should live, he would contract fresh im purity. — Et conturbata mater carnis meas, quoniam et sem- piternam salutem meam carius parturiebat corde casto in fide tua, jam curaret festinabunda, ut sacramentis salutaribus ini- tiarer et abluerer, te Domine Jesu confitens in remissionem pec- catorum, nisi statim recreatus essem. Dilata est itaque mun- datio mea, quasi necesse esset, ut adhuc sordidarer, si viverem; quia videlicet post lavacrum illud, major et periculosior in sor- dibus delictorum reatus foret. Confess, lib. I. c. 11. Y 4 LECTURE VII. tained the necessity of Baptism. The orthodox dif fered from them, in asserting that, without baptism, none could be saved. It was allowed, indeed, by the Schoolmen, that the wish (votum) to receive bap tism might avail, in a case of impediment to the actual reception of it : as also in regard to the Eu charist. The blood of martyrdom too was supposed to flow with regenerating efficacy. For thus had the holy Innocents been baptized in blood : the sword of the murderer consecrating them to the Saviour, for whom they unconsciously suffered. But, as no wish, or vow, of receiving the rite could be conceived by the Infant, it was impossible that, dying unbaptized, — humanity may shrink at the recital of such a tenet, — it could escape the punish ment due to Original Sin. The Eucharist also, though not regarded of the same absolute necessity as Baptism, was a rite, which could be omitted, with safety, by none who were capable of desiring it. In fact, these two or dinances, amidst all the scholastic subtleties with which they are surrounded, bear evident marks of being considered, as of an higher origin, and a more divine import'- They are clearly the Sacra ments of the primitive Church, whilst the rest have ( Unde manifestum est, quod sacramenta ecclesiae specialiter habent virtutem ex passione Christi, cujus virtus quodammodo nobis copulatur per susceptionem sacramentorum. In cujus signum, de latere Christi pendentis in cruce, fluxerunt aqua et sanguis, quorum unum pertinet ad baptismum, ahud ad eucha- ristiam, quae sunt potissima sacramenta. Aquin. Summa Theol. Illtia Pars, qu. lxii. art. 5. LECTURE VII. obtained that rank through the ingenuity of theo logians, seeking to give a numerical perfection to their system in all its parts, and to trace out a minuteness of correspondence in the Sacraments to the Seven Virtues, and Seven Gifts of the Spirit. Peter Lombard, I believe, was the first who assigned that number to the Sacraments u. The controversies of the IXth and Xlth centuries exhibit the theory of the Sacraments, in what may be called an unfinished state. They are only the commencement and outline, of what was afterwards worked out by the introduction of the philosophy of Aristotle into the subject. The disputes had been, whether there was a real Divine efficacy in the consecrated symbols themselves, so that they were no longer the same as before consecration ; or whether they remained the same in themselves, and yet possessed a mystical efficacy, in the act of being received. The point in controversy is, in what sense, the words " really" and " truly" are to be under stood, when affirmed of the presence of Christ. Both parties affirm that Christ is really and truly present in the Eucharist ; both affirm that a change is worked on the Bread and Wine by consecration, so that they then are verily and indeed the Body and Blood of Christ. But on one side it is denied, that this re ality and truth are to be sought in the Bread and u The question of the Number of the Sacraments was one of considerable perplexity at the Council of Trent. Courayer, translat. of Sarpi, torn. I. p. 376. 330 LECTURE VII. Wine ; or that the change is a physical one, though real as to efficacy or virtue. On the other side, it is contended, that this reality and truth of the Di vine presence, must be in the consecrated elements themselves ; or otherwise they are mere signs with out any latent virtue. But in this case, the Sacra ments of the New Law, (as the Christian sacraments were termed, in contrast with the types and ordi nances of Judaism,) would be inferior to those of the Old Law. For the latter, it was admitted, were the shadows of Christ — they contained Christ in the way of anticipation : — whereas the latter would be thus reduced to empty Signs. The word Substance, we may observe, was em ployed in these controversies ; but it was not used in that exact metaphysical sense, in which we find it employed in the Trinitarian controversies, or which it acquired in the course of the Scholastic discussions. The Latins of the IXth century were infants in philosophy, compared with their pre decessors of the IVth century. They understood, accordingly, at this period, by Substance, chiefly the gross idea, which we commonly attach to the term, when we speak of the Substance of any thing, mean ing the principal or most important part of it. The idea of Substance, as the support or basis of acci dents, was not familiarly recognized, it seems, by the Latin of the middle age, until the revived study of Aristotle had once more restored it to that sense. The like observation is to be made with regard to the word Species, as it was employed in the sacra- LECTURE VII. 331 mentarian controversies of the IXth and Xlth cen turies. It was not then restricted to a metaphy sical sense, but rather simply expressed the physical objects themselves, to which it was applied. The species of bread and wine, that is, were not the abstract natures of bread and wine, but the com pound things themselves, as really existing. The term, as introduced into this subject, was derived to the Latin Church, not from philosophy, but from the ordinary forms of Roman exaction of tribute ; according to which, certain articles were to be fur nished to the government in the species — the arti cles themselves — as distinct from their equivalent in money x. It remained then for later discussion, for the rest less, penetrating spirit of Scholasticism, to analyze, by the philosophical power of language, the oper ation of Grace in the Sacraments. The subtile spe culations about matter and form, substance and accident, were accordingly introduced, to establish and perfect the theory of instrumental efficiency ascribed to the rites themselves. And it is upon these speculations that the doctrine of the Sacra ments, and in particular of Transubstantiation, is maintained in the Church of Rome even now ; amidst all the accessions of light from improved science, which the world has obtained since the days of Scholasticism. A review of any of the defences of Transubstantiation, which have been put forth in x Note I. LECTURE VII. the course of the last few years, will convince any one how completely bound up with the theories of substance and accident, and matter and form, that tenet is ; and that, consequently, the tenet and the theories must be false or true together. But if, as is the fact, those theories are mere assumptions in physics, not resting on observation, but distinctions, existing only in the mind, and applied to the ana lysis of external objects ; it must appear, that the process of Transubstantiation is entirely an as sumed one, and that it ought to be discarded as an idol, at once, of religion and of philosophy. We hear it sometimes stated, as if Transub stantiation were a dogma suddenly introduced into the Church; — as if Innocent III. and the IVth Lateran Council, had, by the declaration of the ar ticle, accomplished a triumph over human reason and sound religion. But this appears to me a very mistaken view of the doctrine. It has a much deeper origin ; growing, in fact, out of the natural Realism of the human mind. It was a gradual extension of the same principle which corrupted the doctrines of the Trinity and of Divine Grace, to the doc trine of the Sacraments. The principle floated down the stream of the philosophical Theology of the Schools ; and, from time to time, fastened itself round each projecting point that met its course. That the doctrine of the Eucharist in particular, should have been the principal occasion of the speculation concerning the Sacraments in general, may be ac counted for, in the importance which that Sacra- LECTURE VII. 333 ment had assumed in the practice of the Church. The sacrificial character of the Church-minister was especially involved in it. And the leading Clergy, accordingly, were peculiarly sensitive to any opin ion, which seemed to examine too closely, the mi raculous virtue claimed for the rite. From the time of Erigena, there had been constant endea vours, to attain more exact ideas of the nature of the sacrifice performed in the Eucharist, on the one part ; whilst, on the other, a fear lest the authority of the Church should be shaken, called forth de fenders of the miraculous import of the consecra tion. The treatise of Paschase was a bold attempt to settle the doubts and speculations of the time, by a strong and confident assertion of the power as sumed for the ministration of the priest. It did not, however, settle the question even in the Church itself. Not only did Ratramn freely discuss the mode of Christ's presence ; but differences of opinion must have existed generally, when we find Leothe- ric, Archbishop of Sens, charged with heterodoxy on the subject, in the very commencement of the Xlth century ; and afterwards, in the course of the same century, Berenger appearing the forward advocate of the moderate doctrine >'. The obstinacy, indeed, with which Berenger resumed his profession of the obnoxious opinion, argues the general interest taken in the question, as also the support and countenance which he must have obtained from others, agreeing in his views, though not equally ready to encounter y Note J. 334 LECTURE VII. the persecution, attendant on a more open dissent from the orthodox rule. When the Schools took up the formal discussion of the doctrine of the Sacraments, the general the ory was to be adjusted to those views of the Eu charist, which the progressive realism of orthodoxy had created. It was to be shewn, how the actual conversion of the Bread and Wine into the Body and Blood of Christ took place, according to recog nized physical principles, the supposed agents in producing the result. I have already had occasion to point out the extent, to which the theory of Transmutation was carried in the physical system of Aristotle. It was conceived to be a sufficient account of all the variety of appearances which Nature exhibits. The forms of things were continually coming and receding in the ceaseless flux of sublunary nature ; contraries expelling contraries ; whilst a common matter sub sisted, the same in all things, and becoming all things, as the various forms of things successively acted on it. I have pointed out all this nearly in the same manner before. But the notions of Form and Matter require to be more particularly noticed, in reference to our present subject, in their con nexion with the mystical philosophy of the Divine Word. A Christian Philosopher could not adopt such a theory of Nature, (for in itself it was strictly atheistic ; it described Nature as an omnipotent en ergy in itself, working out its own instinctive ten- LECTURE VII. 335 dencies,) without modifying it by the principles of his Theology. He did not therefore conceive these forms, in nature, to be independent of the Di vine Reason or Word. Interpreting those passages of Scripture which speak of things made by the Word of God, as denoting expressly the creative efficacy of the Second Person of the Trinity, he connected the communication of forms to matter with the Word of God throughout ; that is, he conceived the Divine words uttered, to carry that mystical creative force, which belonged to the Divine Word as existing in the Trinity z. Hence it was, that certain words, accompanying the celebration of a Sacrament, were said to be the Form of the Sa crament. In a manner analogous to the original formation of all things by the Divine Word acting on matter, it was conceived, that the sacred words pronounced by the Priest came with power to the element or matter, and imposed on it a mystical or sacramental forma. Thus a Sacrament has been described as consisting of matter and form : — the matter being the water, or the bread and wine ; or, in Confirmation, the chrism ; in Penance, the contrition of the penitent: the form, the particu lar words of consecration uttered by the priest. Hence, too, the use of the word Element itself, to denote the consecrated bread and wine ; these being viewed, like the four imagined elements of the ma- z Aquinas, Sum. Theol. Illtia Pars, qu. lxxviii. art. 4. — Note K. a The priest is therefore said, conficere Sacramentum. 336 LECTURE VII. terial world, as the bases of the sacred natures into which they were transformed. A certain matter and certain form are thus considered as indispens able to a Sacrament b. This part of the theory of Transubstantiation applies to all the Sacraments in common. But it did not fully explain that point in which the Eu charist differed from all other Sacraments, as being the whole virtue of Christ's priesthood, whereas the others were only participations of that virtue. It was to be further shewn, therefore, with regard to this, how the esse, or substance, of Christ, was brought down to the consecrated elements. This was, in fact, the establishment of the term Transub stantiation as the orthodox language of the Latin Church. Christ had been asserted to be substan tially present in the Eucharist during the contro versies of the IXth and Xlth centuries. But, as I observed, the term Substance was not yet commonly interpreted in its proper metaphysical sense. The increasing acquaintance with Aristotle's Philosophy subsequently to that period, both demanded and suggested a further and more minute explanation. The term Substance now came to be viewed in its logical and metaphysical sense, as the support of accidents, — as that nature of a thing which may be b Hence the inquiries in our Baptismal Service. " With " what matter was this child baptized?" " With what words " was this child baptized ?" " Because some things," it is said, " essential to this Sacrament may happen to be omitted through " haste." LECTURE VII. 337 conceived to remain, when every other nature is re moved or abstracted from it — the ultimate point in analysing the complex idea of any object. The term Accident, on the other hand, denotes all those ideas which the analysis excludes, as not belonging to the mere Being or Nature of the object. But by the fallaciousness of Realism, both Sub stance and Accident being understood to denote parts in the physical composition of bodies, the applica tion of this doctrine to the presence of Christ in the Eucharist, was naturally suggested. If Substance and Accident were parts of things, they might be conceived in a state of separation. The substance of any thing might be present, whilst the accidents were absent : and the substance of one thing might be changed for the substance of another, whilst£the accidents remained. It being admitted, then, that there was a trans forming power in the words of Consecration ; whilst, at the same time, it was evident, that no visible or sensible change was wrought on the bread and wine ; it was urged, that the change had taken place in the substance of the sacred elements. The Substan tial Forms of bread and wine were no longer in ex istence, at the instant that the words of Consecration were completed ; but they were displaced by the Sub stance of Christ. The accidents of bread and wine, — the taste and colour, and other such qualities, — were not supposed, indeed, to be in Christ " as in their " subject;" though they evidently remained after the change of the substance, to which they had be- z 338 LECTURE VII. longed. In general, however, the accidents are re presented, in the mystical phraseology of Platonism, as outward veils, under which the real spiritual sub stance of Christ is latent z. This explanation raised a number of minute ques tions, as to the mode of coexistence of accidents with a substance not belonging to them, and of their ex istence out of a subject ; as to whether the accidents of the bread and wine possessed the power of nourish ing; and the like. The discussion of such points ex actly suited the genius of the Scholastic Philosophy, and at length matured the theory of the Eucharist, as professed in the Latin Church, under the name of Transubstantiation. In no point is the prodigious influence, which the Scholastic Philosophy has had on the world, more apparent, than in this particular article. Antece dently to experience, we might have regarded it as impossible, that a doctrine so abstruse, — so remote from religion when viewed in its source, — not ap pealing to any sentiment of the heart, — not capti vating the judgment by the sublimity of its con ception, — should have become a corner-stone of faith to a large proportion of the Christian world. I do not speak of its absurdity ; for it is clearly not z The ingenuity with which the scholastic system is brought into unity, should not pass unobserved here. As Christ has not, in the scholastic view of the Eucharist, the forms of flesh and blood, it might seem that Transubstantiation did not pre serve the man. Still this could not be the case ; since it was determined that forma substantialis hominis is anima rationales. LECTURE VII. 339 absurd, if, by that expression, we mean its incon- ! sistency with reason. It is, on the contrary, per fectly consistent with reason, if we grant the hypo theses in philosophy on which it is founded. And, even in those hypotheses themselves, there is nothing intrinsically absurd. We can only say, with our present light in physical science, that they are un philosophical and untrue. The abstruseness of the speculation is what I remark, considered together with its popularity. It proves, how entirely sub jugated the human understanding has been, to the imperious reason of the Church-leaders of the middle age. The doctrine was shaped to meet the cavils and disputations of the spiritual body among them selves, that no dissentient leader of a party might produce schism in the Church ; but that, whilst the living oracles of faith all spoke one language, a de lusive consistency might pass for the singleness of truth with the multitude of the faithful. If the disputatious leader of opinion were silenced, it was enough to secure the assent of the sequacious herd of believers. Sometimes, indeed, expedients were adopted to interest the imagination in favour of the dogma, by descriptions of miraculous appearances of flesh and blood, or of an infant, in the celebration of the Eucharist a. But the resort to these methods of proof, shews, that the doctrine of Transubstan tiation, in its speculative form, was not adapted to conciliate the attention of the vulgar, but rather the logical armour of the Church, in its contests with **• Note K. z 2 340 LECTURE VII. logical opponents. For these alleged miraculous appearances were at variance with the proper spe culative notion of the Real Presence. These led the people to believe, that it was the passible body of Christ locally present in the elements : whereas the philosophical doctrine was, that the substance of Christ only was present — that nature by which He is the Christ ; and which might be represented in an infinity of instances, whenever the sacrifice of the Eucharist should be offered ; without being mul tiplied in itself, or without being broken and divided in itself, however the consecrated elements should be physically separated into parts. The proper doc trine of the Real Presence was a logical unity — an ens unum in multis; — an idea, quite beyond the reach of the unscientific intellect. The violence again with which the Cartesian philosophy was at tacked, still further shews how closely implicated was the doctrine of sacramental influence with the ancient metaphysics. That philosophy was no di rect attack on Transubstantiation : but as rejecting the Aristotelic theory of Matter and Form, and therefore evidently militating with the established notion of Transubstantiation, it had to bear the brunt of opposition from the Schools. The polemi cal discussions which it occasioned, are monuments of the keen anxiety, with which the shadowy out works of the doctrine were guarded, against the assaults of a novel method of philosophy. Had the doctrine been simply rested on the Divine Word, it would have had nothing to fear; but, cased as it LECTURE VII. 341 was in metaphysical armour, it sensitively shrank from collision with the weapons of an Ideal Philo sophy b- Briefly, however, to review in conclusion that doctrine of the Sacraments, which we have been considering. It appears, that the simplicity of Scripture truth has been altogether abandoned, in the endeavour to raise up, on the solemn ordinances appointed by our Lord, for the edification, and charity, and comfort of his Church, an elaborate artificial system of mystical theurgy. In the views of the Scholastic system which have previously occupied our attention, the Divine Being and Agency were the leading ideas. God Himself was displayed as the great subject ; — his power, wisdom, and goodness, as developed in his own Being, and as diffused in the works of his Providence and Grace. The speculation was human; but the burthen of it was divine. But, though it is the same thought prolonged here also, it must be ob served, that the divine argument here is subordinate to the human agency involved in it. The history of the Sacraments, in the Scholastic system, is, God working by the instrumentality of man. The theory is of the divine causation ; but the practical power displayed, is, the sacerdotal : the necessary instru ment for the conveyance of Divine Grace, becoming in effect the principal cause. Surely it requires no research into ecclesiastical b Note L. z 3 342 LECTURE VII. m history or philosophy, to see that so operose a sys tem is utterly repugnant to the spirit of Christianity. Contemplate our Saviour at the Last Supper, break ing bread, and giving thanks, and distributing to his disciples ; and how great is the transition from the institution itself to the splendid ceremonial of the Latin Church ? Hear Him, or his Apostles, exhorting to Repentance ; and can we suppose the casuistical system to which the name of Penance has been given, to be the true sacrifice of the broken and contrite spirit ? Or, if we think for a moment of Jesus Christ, taking the little children in his arms, and blessing them, and declaring that " of " such is the kingdom of God ;" and then revert to the minute inquiries, as to the state of infants dying unbaptized ; — do we not seem, to have exchanged the love of a Brother, for the cold charities of strangers to our blood, not knowing the heart of man, and dealing out a stinted measure of tender ness, by the standard of abstract theory, and the law of logical deduction ? Thanks to the Christian resolution of our Re formers, they broke that charm which the mysti cal number of the Sacraments carried with it, and dispelled the theurgic system which it supported. We are not, perhaps, sufficiently sensible of the ad vantages, which we enjoy through their exertions in this respect — exertions which cost them so many painful struggles, even to the bitterness of death. They have taken our souls out of the hand of man, to let them repose in the bosom of our Saviour and LECTURE VII. 343 our God. We have been enabled thus to fulfil the instruction of Scripture, to " come boldly to the " throne of Grace," and ask of Him who gives liber ally, and denies to none. The perplexities and dis tress of heart, of which we have been relieved, none perhaps can now adequately conceive. We must ask of those, who have experienced the false comfort of that officious intercession of the sacramental sys tem of the Latin Church. They will tell us, that, under that system, they knew not the liberty of the Gospel. They were unhappy without resource. Their wounds were opened, but there was none to heal c. But, though we are free from the yoke which the Sacramental ritual imposes on members of the Roman Communion, we still require watchfulness against the temptation to refine on the subject, and lest we enslave ourselves to a kind of priestcraft in our own minds. The tendency to raise questions about Baptism, in modern times, is an evidence of this spirit of refinement. Men are not content with the simple declarations; — "Repent, and be bap- " tized :" — " Except a man be born of water and the " Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God :" " Go, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the " name of the Father, Spn, and Holy Ghost :" — nor will they acquiesce in the duty of conforming their practice to these Scriptural injunctions. But it is thought by some, that the question must further be decided, whether Baptism is in all cases equivalent to Regeneration. They propose a ques- c Note M. z4 344 LECTURE VII. tion, that is, as to the intrinsic efficacy of the rite; — a difficulty, which practical Christianity by no means calls upon us to decide, and the decision of which, after all, can be only speculation. In regard, indeed, to both the Sacraments, singleness of heart is the only human means that we pos sess, of apprehending their true import. " He " which hath said," observes Hooker, " of the one " Sacrament ; ' Wash, and be clean ;' hath said con- " cerning the other likewise ; ' Eat, and live.' If " therefore," he continues, (I quote his words for their general application to the whole subject of the Sacraments,) if " without any such particular " and solemn warrant as this is, that poor distressed " woman, coming unto Christ for health, could so " constantly resolve herself; ' May I but touch the " ' skirt of his garment, I shall be whole ;' what " moveth us to argue of the manner how life should " come by bread ; our duty being here but to take " what is offered, and most assuredly to rest per- " suaded of this, that, can we but eat, we are safe ? "... What these elements are in themselves, it " skilleth not ; it is enough, that to me which take " them, they are the body and blood of Christ : his " promise in witness hereof sufficeth : his word he " knoweth which way to accomplish : why should " any cogitation possess the mind of a faithful com- " municant, but this ; O my God, thou art true ! 0 " my soul, thou art happy d ?" d Eccl. Pol. V. 67. LECTURE VIII. NATURE AND USE OF DOGMATIC THEOLOGY. SUMMARY. Examination of the nature and use of Dogmatic Theology sug gested by previous inquiry — Confusion of thought on the subject, evidenced in popular statements of the relation between Faith and Reason — also in attempts to settle the necessary points of belief — Discussion of the Scholastic principles : i . that whatever is first in point of doctrine is therefore true ; and 2. that the logical consequence of any doctrine is necessarily true — The former principle, a remnant of Scholastic view of Theology as a demonstrative science — Universality and ubiquity of belief no tests of divine truth — The principle only true when strictly con fined to Scripture facts — Contrast of the earlier and later Chris tian writers in the tradition of doctrine — The preference for earliest authorities inconsistent with the principle which es tablishes doctrines by logical consequences — Symbolical nature of language in its application to Theology — Unscriptural doc trines must result from the method of logical deductions — Ne cessity imposed in such a case of answering all objections — Impossibility of maintaining thus the principle of Authority — Progressive accumulation of doctrines by such a mode of pro ceeding — Truth of Fact confounded with Truth of Opinion in the Scholastic method — No dogmas to be found in Scripture itself — Dogmas therefore to be restricted to a negative sense, as exclusions of unscriptural truth — Articles and Creeds not necessarily to be dispensed with, because imperfect — Their de fence however not to be identified with that of Christianity — Use and importance of Dogmatic Theology to be drawn from its relation to Social Religion. Sum of the whole inquiry — Present interest of it — Scholas ticism the ground of controversial defence to the Church of Rome — Remnants of it in Protestant Churches in the state of Con troversy, and in the importance attributed to peculiar views of religious truth — Result of the examination sufficient to prove the force of Theory on our Theological language — The impres sion from this fact not to be transferred to the revealed truths which are real parts of sacred history — Real beneficial effect of honest search into the truths of Divine Revelation. Jeremiah XXIII. 28. He that hath my word, let him speak my word faith fully. What is the chaff to the wheat ? saith the Lord. nsrrnN pi^-no jtom •nai -sat" toa i-cn "ibJmi t— lv v — - aw: * t; ¦¦ — : - • ¦ t : ¦••—:— Qui habet sermonem meum, loquatur sermonem meum vere. Quid paleis ad triticum ? dicit Dominus. Lat. Vuxg. LECTURE VIII. THE examination in which I have been engaged, involves the consideration of two principles of Theo logy : 1. That whatever has been originally esta blished in Religion is true ; whatever is subsequent, or may be shewn to have arisen at any particular period during the progress of the Gospel, is cor rupt ; 2. That whatever may be deduced by ne cessary inference from any established proposition, must also be true. These principles were employed by the School-divines in two ways : either to prove the affirmative of any point ; or to demonstrate the erroneousness of any assumed truth. I purpose now calling your attention to a discussion of these fun damental principles ; and, from this discussion, to deduce the nature and use of Dogmatic Theology. The consideration of our Religion, under this last point of view, is naturally brought before the mind, by the inquiries which I have been pursuing into the effect of Scholasticism on our theological lan guage. For the question arises : If a technical statement of the Sacred Truth necessarily involves so much of human theory — if, as has been shewn, the Christian doctrines, in their mode of expression, carry so much of the speculation of an antiquated philosophy ; — how far are all human formularies of faith to be admitted ; and what is the ground, on 350 LECTURE VIII. which they rest their pretension to be received by the Scriptural Christian ? The discussion on which I am now entering, is an arbitration of the point, where Divine Truth ends, and Human Truth commences ; or, where the certainty of Divine Fact ceases, and the pro bability of Opinion takes its rise, in matters of Re ligious belief and conduct. For it is the confusion of the limits of these two things, that brings per plexity into the subject ; occasioning fallacious in ductions from one ground of assent to the other. The dialectical theologian calls upon us to receive his sentences, as the voice of God which none can gainsay ; building the necessity of pious submission on the theoretic necessity of demonstrative argu mentation : or, on the other hand, he appeals to our reason, and insists on our accepting, as irrefragable conclusions, what no conclusion of reason can es tablish, and what ought to rest solely on the autho ritative Word of God. Hence it is that writers, in different ages of the Church, have been so often employed in debating the respective provinces of Faith and Reason. A confusion of thought has been constantly prevalent on the subject. The very circumstance of treating Faith and Reason as distinct principles, is an evi dence of this confusion : as if the assent to Divine Truth could be an act of Faith, in any way distinct from an act of Reason. The mischief of such a statement of the case is, indeed, too apparent from LECTURE VIII. 351 experience. The indolent, or the sensitive, mind, readily seizes on a distinction, which, to the one, saves the trouble of thought* and diligent examin ation, — to the other, supplies a pious sentiment for the acceptance of any wild, or even repulsive doc trines of religion. To say; this is of Faith, — that is of Reason, — peremptorily silences all suspicions and misgivings of the judgment and the heart. Persons are thus led to overlook the analogy of God's deal ings with his creatures ; and to imagine, that the truths of the world of Grace are to be received and judged, by a different set of principles from those which are applied to the ordinary providences of God. On this hypothesis, there is nothing so extravagant that may not be admitted as part of Divine Truth. Indeed, the more extravagant any proposed doctrine is, the more attractive should it be, on such a principle, to the religious inquirer: since it is then, a more striking exemplification of the contrast supposed between truths of Faith and Reason. Many a devout and excellent mind, I fear, has been seduced from sober religion, by this specu lative distinction between Faith and Reason : or, at least, where fanatical doctrine has been adopted, it has furnished a defence, against which, all attempts to convince of error have been necessarily unavailing. What, however, has been at bottom the real object of all these inquiries, is, to ascertain the distinction between dogmas and facts of Religion. Men have found both rested on the same footing. They have 352 LECTURE VIII. felt perplexed at the evident discrepance between the two things so associated ; and their prejudices, not suffering them to make the requisite separation, they have applied themselves to laying down limits, be yond which human reason could not proceed. Thus it is sometimes stated, that Reason is concerned about the evidence of Religion, Faith about the things revealed; — a distinction, which leaves the real matter of dispute altogether untouched ; since it is about the various things themselves proposed to our belief, that we want a criterion. It appears to me, that such a mode of stating the case is further highly objectionable ; on the ground that we may be thus led to ascribe to Tradition the authority of Scripture, and to receive the Truth of Man, with the deference due only to the Truth of God. The want of a proper satisfaction on this ques tion, is evidenced also in the floating state of opinion, as to what doctrines are to be regarded necessary to be believed and professed, and what may be vari ously held without danger to salvation a- The dis putes on these points are remnants of the scholastic spirit, which reduced all religion into theoretic dog mas. The comparative importance of theories may be reasonably examined ; for, as such, they may be viewed in their relations and consequences. The re lation of any particular theory to the Divine Being a See Bramhall's " Schism Guarded," Works, fol. 1677. pp. 400 — 402. — Stillingfleet's " Rational Account," &c. Works, fol. 1709. vol. iv. pp. 51 — 54. — Note A. Lecture VIII. LECTURE VIII. 358 immediately, or its consequence as affecting our pri- mary notions of the Divine Being, will, of course, render that theory one of principal importance; that is, in religious conduct, of indispensable necessity in order to salvation. But, when we have once sepa rated matters of religion into simple facts divinely revealed, and theories of divine truth founded on those facts ; there can be no question of relative importance in what we receive as purely divine. The theology resulting from such an estimate, is either altogether entirely worthy of our acceptance, or is open to the strict examination of our reason as to its probability. Between facts, all of which are admitted to be real signatures of God in his dealings with man, there is no comparison, no choice. All must be equally received and followed as true. It is not for us to decide, what instances in the display of God's providences, are more or less important. To overlook any one in the con struction of a religious system, would be as unphi losophical as it would be impious. But, so far as doctrines are deductive statements — conclusions drawn from the facts, or words, of Divine Reve lation, — they may be examined by that reason which deduces them. It being granted that they follow from the data of Scripture, it is to be seen, whether they are such as ought to have been de duced ; whether they have the support of evidence, from their general accordance with Scripture, — from the concurrent opinion of the wise and the unpre judiced, — and from other considerations of this kind. a a 354 LECTURE VIII. And the degree of evidence, resulting from such considerations, must decide the theological truth and relative importance of such conclusions. Let us inquire then, in the first instance, into that principle of the Scholastic Theology : — that whatever is originally established as a point of doc trine, is therefore true ; whatever has subsequently arisen, is corrupt b : — and let us see, whether it has not had a considerable influence in producing that confusion of thought, which we find existing on the subject of Dogmatic Theology. Justly to examine this principle however, let us take it as it is stated by the great authority on this point, Vincent of Lirins : according to whom the test of orthodoxy is ; that a doctrine should have been be lieved in all places, and in all times, and by all menc; and any doctrine accordingly, which does not bear these marks of catholicity, must be heretical. Now it appears to me, that the principle itself, current as it is in the language of Protestants, is a relic of that Philosophy, which sought, with such anxious search, for a speculative certainty to b TertuUian states it thus, using it as a decisive argument against the heretic : Hanc regulam ab initio Evangelii decucur- risse, etiam ante priores quosque hasreticos, nedum ante Praxeam hesternum, probabit tam ipsa posteritas omnium hsereticorum, quam ipsa novellitas Praxeas hesterni. Quo perasque adversus universas heereses, jam hinc praejudicatum sit ; Id esse verum, quodcumque prius, id esse adulterum quodcumque posterius. Adv Prax. II. p. 501 . c Commonitorium, p. 317. ed. Baluz. Quod ubique, quod sem per, quod ab omnibus, creditum est. LECTURE VIII. 355 moral facts ; finding no rest until it had reduced the variable truth connected with human life, to the same exactness which belongs to truth purely me taphysical. The eternity and immutability attri buted to the theorems of science, would, in such a state of philosophy as that of the primitive and middle ages of the Church, seem to be still more appropriately the characteristics of that Wisdom which descended from above. For the wisdom given by Revelation was, as I have throughout been en deavouring to shew, conceived, in the theory of the Schools, to be a demonstrative science, established by necessary links of dependence on primary truths concerning God. Theology, accordingly, was a sci ence on a footing with other sciences, or rather with what we now call the exact sciences, as contrasted with sciences resting on observation and experience. But an assumption of the nature of Theology so erroneous, naturally led to the assumption also of a test of its truth, founded on the fundamental miscon ception. The universality, and the ubiquity of be lief, were thus applied to the case of theological doctrine, as equivalents, in this instance, to the eternity and immutability of the principles of scien tific demonstration. These views of divine truth were, at least, approximations to the certainty be longing to pure science. And hence the truth which, in its proper nature, and in order to its due recep tion, appeals to the candour, the fairness, the piety of the individual Christian, was brought under the iron sway of speculative argumentation. In short, a a 2 356 LECTURE VIII. the belief of man, the rebellious, uncontrollable prin ciple of his nature, was subdued to that passive obedience which the imperative force of reason in itself exacts. But it is only an assumption, as I further would proceed to shew, that universality and ubiquity are thus made the tests of religious doctrine. No uni versality or ubiquity can make that divine, which never was such. It is a mere prejudice of veneration for antiquity, and the imposing aspect of an unani mous acquiescence, (if unanimous it really be,) which make us regard that as truth, which comes so recom mended to us. Truth is rather the attribute of the few than of the many. The real Church of God may be the small remnant, scarcely visible amidst the mass of surrounding professors. Who then shall pronounce any thing to be divine truth, simply be cause it has the marks of having been generally or universally received among men ? If we go back to the primitive age of Apostles and Evangelists, the acknowledged inspired teachers of our Religion, who received their instructions by the hearing of the ear and the seeing of the eye, and the handling of the Word of Life, and to whom God spoke in the thoughts of their hearts; there can be no doubt that the principle holds to the fullest extent. To doubt it then, is to raise a ques tion, whether there has been a case of inspiration, or to what extent inspiration may be regarded as a ground of authority. Assuming, however, that there is a clear case of inspiration established in re- LECTURE VIII. 357 gard to our sacred Books, — that they are a com plete volume of inspiration, — and that this inspiration extends to all matters pertaining to the kingdom of God, which we are concerned to know, — it follows, that whatever is recorded in those books is indis putably true; and that nothing independent of these books, or not taken from them, can possess the same authority, — not to say in degree only, — but even in kind. For this is divine truth ; whatever is dis tinct from it, is human. So that, in the history of doctrines, when we look to their Scriptural source, we may affirm, that whatever is first is true, what ever is of a subsequent period is corrupt. But, the moment that we step out of this sacred inclosure, the maxim proves to us a most fallacious guide. In fact, the reverse of it is much nearer to the truth. For, if we consider what the state of things was, when the first inspired teachers disap peared from the world, we shall find it extremely adverse to the maintenance and propagation of the truth as it was purely inspired. Take first into view the novelty of the case. The new leaven of divine truth was just infused into the mass of complex human opinions ; those opinions, the results of associations and habits, not only di versified in themselves, but fundamentally heathen or Jewish, discordant with the spirit of the Gospel. What chance could a pure religion have had in such a state of things, of being generally simply received, as a collection of divine truths? Would not those obstacles, that we know to have existed a a 3 358 LECTURE VIII. in the minds of the Apostles, antecedently to their divine illumination, exist at least equally in the minds of first converts, not enjoying the like illu mination from above ? The ear of the world was not attuned to the songs of Sion ; and, though in some honest and good hearts, finely sensible to the touch of the Holy Spirit, they may have awakened concordant emotions, yet, in very many instances, the immortal sounds would be lost in the dissonant murmurs of irreligious thoughts and feelings. To suppose it otherwise, is to go against the analogy of all similar cases. It is to suppose, that knowledge could be obtained without previous training; that the air of divine truth could be commonly breathed, amidst an atmosphere charged with heathen pro- faneness, and the carnal prejudices of Judaism. But, not to dwell on these presumptions of the state of the case ; what is the fact, when it is dis passionately considered, as to the immediate suc cessors of the Apostles ? Take even the very period when the Apostles themselves were teaching ; when the Holy Spirit Himself went about with those chosen vessels of divine truth, putting into their hearts and mouths what they should say. At this very period, the most wild theories were incorpo rated with Christianity: the hearer of an Apostle sought to obtain from him with money the power of the Spirit, the strength itself of the Apostle's labours in the Gospel. But to come to the period of the Apostolic Fathers. Whatever praise we may assign to them for their ardour and firmness as be- LECTURE VIII. 359 lievers, can we justly ascribe to them the merit of accurate expositors of Christian Truth ? Imparti ality, I think, requires us to say otherwise. Were we to endeavour, indeed, to form a system of divi nity out of these writers, it would be found neces sary to explain away many of their positions and expressions, in order to bring them into accordance with the admitted truths of Scripture. As evidences of the essence and spirit of the Gospel, as it was handed down from its outset, they are invaluable ; as testimonies of the earnestness of individuals, — of their Christian character and Christian hopes, — the writings are also highly interesting and important : but as authorities decisive of what is true or what is false in theological statement, they are in reality less valuable than the writings of a subsequent age. The remark may be extended to the Fathers of the IHrd and IVth and Vth centuries, in compa rison with each other. Compare TertuUian at the end of the Und century, with Augustine at the end of the IVth, and this difference is readily perceiv able. In TertuUian, we see nothing of the deliber ation, the accuracy, the thoughtful sedulity of Au gustine ; but he at once rudely throws out his thoughts, as if dealing blows on his adversary, and caring nothing but for the force with which he strikes. Augustine is strenuous in his dogmatism ; but he is prudent at the same time, subduing the vehemence of the personal combatant, into keeping with the art of the theological diplomatist. Whilst, •then, from TertuUian, we should gather many ex- a a 4 360 LECTURE VIII. pressions of Scriptural truth inconsistent with the truth itself; in Augustine, the systematic caution with which he writes, acts in some measure as a security against such a perversion. And the later writer, accordingly, is the more authentic oracle of what is true, or what is false, in theology, than the earlier. The Montanism, indeed, of TertuUian has served as a practical caution against the abuse of his authority. Otherwise, perhaps, we should have seen his doctrines quoted with that reverence, which prejudice ascribes to his place in the roll of ecclesi astical tradition. Justin Martyr and Origen, at the distance of about an hundred years from each other, are instances to the same point. Origen had a far more capacious mind than the Syrian martyr — a far greater penetration of thought ; — combining a philosophical power of discerning analogies with an acuteness of logical deduction. Origen, no doubt, must be read with a very severe scrutiny : we must be ever on our guard against the enthusiasm of spe culations, raised on the stores of a vast erudition, and tinged with the many-coloured hues' of Oriental and Greek philosophy. But, at the same time, he is, I conceive, a much more important author than Justin, the nearer to the Apostolic times, in order to the decision of a disputed point of theology. The comparison, indeed, of Justin and Origen illustrates the case forcibly ; since, in respect of piety and Christian feeling, both have powerful claims on our love and veneration. Both were sincere Christians in their writings and in their actions. And yet, LECTURE VIII. 361 viewing them as equal in this respect, we cannot rest on the authority of Justin, with the confidence due to the inquisitive spirit of Origen. And yet I do not mean that either Augustine or Jerome, or any other ecclesiastical writers, are, be cause they are later, more truly excellent as Church authorities. I speak only relatively, as examining the position, whether the most ancient are, as such, the most valid authorities in doctrine. The later writers have, indeed, their peculiar danger — the danger arising from their greater art and tact in the management of controversy. It was only, indeed, about the commencement of the IVth century, that Christians began to appear at the Schools established by the Emperors. And it is from that period that Christian Literature pro perly commences. Previously it was heathen phi losophy, accommodated to the delivery of Christian Truth : so that from those who undertook the de fence or explanation of Christian doctrines, the Truth received a large portion of alloy in its transmission. Consequently the earlier Fathers are, in reality, much less instructive than the later. There is one excellence that they possess in the contrast with the later, — a far more valuable excel lence indeed than that of mere exactness of theo logical statement, — the greater piety, and Christian spirit, of some of the primitive Christian Fathers, as compared with some of the later, whose authority is chiefly employed in the Church. Had the reverence to antiquity been rested on this ground, no com- 362 LECTURE VIII. plaint could have been made. It is, as if we were drinking of the pure fountain, near its rise, before it was rendered turbid in its passage into the world. For the same reason, the errors of the primitive Fathers are much less dangerous in their effect than those of their successors. Their errors are left loose and indefinite on the surface of their Christian system. The Fathers of the IVth century incor porated their errors with the Gospel itself. But practical Christianity, and dogmatic Christianity, are two very different things. And conclusions belong ing to the one, have been improperly transferred to the other. Not only again was the early Christian literature generally defective; but the language itself, in which Christian doctrines should be expressed, was yet to be formed. The terms in which the truth was to be appropriately signified, required to be acted on by the force of usage, like all other significant ex pressions. It was yet to be ascertained, what proper meaning the tacit convention of theological writers should affix to them. The latitude with which some of the most important terms of Theology, as sub stance, nature, person, were used in the earlier writers, is a sufficient evidence of this. None, in deed, of the strictly technical terms may be said to have been settled in their use, until controversy had given them their mould and temper. To seek, ac cordingly, among the earlier Fathers of the Church, for authorities by which conflicting doctrines may be decided, is often only to embarrass ourselves with LECTURE VIII. 363 an unsettled phraseology; or to extort from words a sense which they could not have at the time when they were written. The method, like the torture of the ancient judicial investigations, forces the indi vidual expressions thus examined, to confess what they do not mean, — to disburden themselves of a burden, with which they have not been charged d- From these considerations it may be concluded, that the principle is at least a very doubtful one, which would lead us to ascribe any peculiar au thority in the decision of religious truth, to the declarations of the primitive Christian writers ; Christian writers, I say, as distinct from the In spired Authors, to whom alone that deference is due. But, have the advocates themselves of this prin ciple adhered to it in fact ? Have they not rather completely departed from it, in their adoption of that other principle of their theology ; that whatever is logically deducible in the way of consequence from any given divine truth, must also be true ? Let us then proceed to examine this point, both in itself, and in its connexion with the other assump tion of Scholasticism. That the principle in itself is most fallacious, must appear from what I have, on a former occa sion, stated, respecting the nature of a Logical Theo logy. It was shewn, that the terms of all theological propositions are mere assumptions in their applica tion to Theology, — a symbolical language, derived " Note B. 364 LECTURE VIII. from the operation of the mind about the objects of the natural world. Hence it is evident, that con clusions drawn from these terms, are nothing more than further connexions of that symbolical language : and that there the 'proper use and application of them is terminated. The interpretation of them to denote new facts in the Divine scheme of things, is perfectly arbitrary ; as hypothetical, indeed, as if we had at once assumed the facts themselves to which we apply them. It is like starting from an inaccurate algebraic statement, and working out results by the established rules of calculation. It is like making every circumstance in an emblem or metaphor, the ground of scientific deduction. Only the delusion of applying an ingenious instru ment to the solution of the case, makes the ap parent solution seem satisfactory. The cogency and perspicuity of logic are mistaken for the certain and clear discovery of religious truth. This ob servation cannot be too much insisted on; as the practice is, by no means, restricted to the days of scholasticism ; but is to be met with every day, both in writings and in conversation. We cannot be too often reminded, that the terms employed in theolo gical discussion are no classifications of theological ideas and terms. They are simply the superscrip tions, or labels, by which we denote several classes of facts, respectively placed under them, as it were. This is the nature of language as applied to nature. Still more so is it, when language is applied to Theology. LECTURE VIII. 365 In the scholastic ages, indeed, theologians looked more to the consequence than to the position itself. The method of theology then pursued, being essen tially argumentative ; the deep-thoughted eye learned to dive to the lowest point of any given principle, and, with unwearied vision, to seize the most remote deductions, as if they were present on the surface. The heretical disputant in vain fluttered and shifted his position. The serpent-gaze of the subtile logi cian was still watching the tendency of all his efforts, and bound him by an irresistible fascination to the spot from which he was anxious to escape. It is this circumstance, it may be remarked by the way, which renders it so very difficult to ascer tain the precise shades of opinion, by which differ ent heresies are distinguished. Consequences have been imputed as principles of belief; and the dis putants on each side not questioning the fairness of the imputation, an ambiguity has resulted in regard to the original tenets opposed. But the great mischief of adopting this rule in Theology, appears in the fact, that no purely Scrip tural truth can be maintained consistently with its admission. The theologian who is influenced by it, will be ever solicitous against exposing his doctrine to the censure of the captious objector. What a temptation then is here, to the minute adjustment of doctrines to the cavils of the theorist? The pain ful pursuit of the dogmatist will be to attain that precise form of expression, which shall obviate, as far as possible, every objection that may be raised 366 LECTURE VIII. from the existing state of knowledge in the different departments of science. He must be prepared to shew, that this, or that notion, is implied, or ex cluded, in his doctrine, as the case may require. Nor is this all. He must be further able to de monstrate, that his collection of doctrines coheres as a system ; that no assertion is made on one head, that may not be strictly reconciled with an other, and with every other. Here again, then, his mind must be kept intent on a process, very dif ferent from that of the mere follower of Revela tion. He must be engaged in giving a theoretic perfection to his enunciations of the sacred truth ; in regulating the terms of one proposition, so as to accord with the terms of another; and that the whole system may appear compacted of harmonious parts. Such a theology is inevitably driven to abstrac tions — to the subtile inventions of the mind itself — in its statements of Scripture-truth. The simple facts of Revelation must, by their nature, be open to objections, and, it may be said, to unanswerable objections ; because these facts belong to an order of things, of which we do not directly know the general laws. The more indeed we approximate to a knowledge of these general laws, the more will such objections disappear. But as we never can ar rive, in this state of our being, at a proper know ledge of them ; numerous anomalies, the evidences in truth of our real ignorance of the subject, must always exist. For, what is the explanation of an objection but a demonstration, that an apparent LECTURE VIII. 367 anomaly resolves itself into some general fact better known f It is only where the mind has exactly framed to itself the ideas comprized in any given doctrine, or expression of doctrine, that it can de monstrate the inconsequence of all objections what ever. Objections may be equally futile against the bare revealed facts : but they cannot be decisively proved to be so ; since the facts are not founded on any precise estimate of ideas involved in them : and in regard to these, therefore, objections may be suffered to stand, without any detraction from our theology. The case, on the other hand, of a meta physical theology imperatively demands their solu tion. Is it then for a moment to be supposed, that the simplicity of the Faith can be held, where such a principle of Theology is recognized ? Is it not evident rather, that the Faith, as it is in Christ, must be corrupted ? The conclusions of human reason will naturally be intruded on the sacred truth. The fact will be accommodated to the theory : and exactness of theological definition will usurp the place of the plain dictates of the Holy Spirit. The instances adduced, in the course of the present Lectures, of the Scholastic mode of establishing doc trines, abundantly illustrate these observations. The principle of Consequences was, indeed, the life and soul of the Scholastic system, as such. Scholasticism only adopted the principle of Authority, so far as it artfully insinuated itself into the established Church 368 LECTURE VIII. system ; maintaining the unity and infallibility of the Church, amidst its own unauthorized, adven turous theology d. For we may observe how impossible it was, to adhere to the simple principle of authority in fact, whilst theological truth was pursued by pro cesses of argumentation. A system of truth so formed would necessarily be progressive. Fresh objections against particular parts of the system would arise from time to time, as the state of know ledge varied, and as curiosity was attracted to points of controversy. But it was not competent to the Scho lastic theologian, to avoid the determination of such questions. He was assailed within his own terri tory. His own arms were hurled against him. His logical theology could no longer stand, if the hostile consequences were not fenced off. The necessity of the case would call upon him constantly to proceed in the decision of questions ; and thus to add to his number of doctrines ; until at length he would be found, far to have exceeded the narrow base of the prescriptive Theology with which he commenced. Hear the testimony of Augustine to this effect : " Many things," he says, " were latent in the Scrip- " tures ; and, when heretics were cut off, they agi- " tated the Church of God with questions. The d The principle of authority (to adopt an illustration sug gested by a friend) acted as the barrier in the lists of ancient tournaments. The combatants might use every art and device within the lists : but when either of them was pressed against the immovable fence, he was not allowed any attempt to break through or overleap it : he must surrender, or perish. LECTURE VIII. 369 " latent things were opened, and the Will of God " was understood. . . . Many therefore, who were " excellently qualified for discerning and handling " the Scriptures, were latent in the people of God, " and did not assert the solution of difficult ques- " tions, when no calumniator threatened. For, was " the subject of the Trinity perfectly treated, before " the barkings of the Arians ? Was the subject of " Repentance perfectly treated, before the opposition "of the Novatians? So, neither was the subject of " Baptism perfectly treated, before the contradiction " of the rebaptizers, who were put out. Nor con- " cerning the very unity of Christ were the state- " ments exactly drawn out, until after that the se- " paration began to annoy the weak brethren. So " that those who had the skill to treat and resolve " these points, to prevent the perishing of the weak " thus solicited by the questions of the impious, " drew forth, and made public, by discourses and " disputations, the hidden things of the Law e." It is expressly acknowledged, we find, that doc trines grew under the hands of disputants : that even the most sacred articles of the Trinity, and of the Incarnation, only gradually reached their perfect dogmatic expression. I might multiply quotations to the same purport, from various writers of the Scholastic age. I may, indeed, sum them up by stating it as their uniform confession, that the speculations of " heresy," — in other language, the conclusions of human reason, — forced the Church e August, in Psalm. LIV. torn. vm. p. 177. quarto ed. — Note C. Bb 370 LECTURE VIII. into successive adoptions of additional doctrinal statements ; that is, unless a particular enunciation of sacred truth had been sanctioned by the Church on each occasion, " the calumny of heretics could " not have been quieted f." That articles, indeed, might become doctrines at one time, which had not been so at another, is ad mitted, in the distinction drawn by Aquinas between what is heresy, and what is not. The same opinion, if held antecedently to the determination of the Church, would not be heretical : it was so, when once the Church had pronounced s. It appears, then, that the Church-leaders, in the endeavour to maintain at once an authoritative and an argumentative Theology, incurred the error of confounding truth of Fact with truth of Opinion. It is the nature of the truth of Fact, to admit no additional certainty from the progress of discussion. If a fact, indeed, is questionable, then may discus sion, and subsequent inquiry, establish it with an evidence, which it did not appear originally to pos sess. Such a fact partakes of the nature of the Truth of Opinion. But the facts of the Scripture- records are assumed not to belong to this class, by all who acknowledge the divine character of our *f Note D. S Non enim, ut quisque primum in fide peccarit, hsereticus dicendus est; sed qui, Ecclesise auctoritate neglecta, impias opiniones pertinaci animo tuetur. Catechism, ad Partithos, p. 80. Roma;, 1761. — Note E. LECTURE VIII. 371 sacred books. Any fact, therefore, that is found expressly written in the Bible, must be regarded, by virtue of its sole and primary existence there, to be ascertained with an evidence to which no further proof can add reality. We may indeed, and we often do, bring confirmation to Scripture-facts, by historical or philosophical evidence. But this is always done on the assumption for the purpose of argument, that the fact so established is antece dently questionable ; and with the view of proving the divine authority of the whole Revelation. Take the fact as a portion of an authentic history of God's providences; and it appears to the eye graven with an iron pen on the rock, in characters as bold and strong as the rock itself. But the Truth of Opinion is of a nature to be modified, and improved, and established, by the course of time, — by the pro gress of civilization, and arts, and knowledge, — by accessions of experience, — by the conflict of judg ments. Here also there is occasion for personal in fluence and authority, in guiding the minds of indi viduals. It would be quite unreasonable in mat ters of opinion, for those duly conscious of their own disadvantage for the formation of just views, whether from natural incapacity, or the want of experience, or defect of skill in any particular sub ject, to reject the conclusions of the wise and the experienced. As the great philosopher himself ob serves; "one ought to attend to the undemonstrated " assertions of the wise, more than to the demon- " strations of others." It is essential indeed to the n b 2 372 LECTURE VIII. truth of Opinion, that it be held as variable ; that one should be always open to new light, — to new con viction. Whereas a fact of the Gospel is such, that, were an Angel from heaven to preach to us any thing different from it, our ears must be stopped to the sound ; we must reject it as untrue. Now the Scholastic Philosophy, in its construction of a theological system of Christianity, necessarily overlooked this very important distinction. It boldly stepped beyond the bare facts of Scripture, in the assumption of theoretic conclusions from them, as the principles of its theology ; and then retired upon the authority of that Scripture, from which it had presumptuously departed ; demanding the certainty of fact, for the dictates of progressive, varying, opinion. Had it called upon the Faithful to respect the learning, the zeal, the piety, the candour of the Master in Theology ; had it insisted on a patient, docile hearing of opinions, hoary with age, and con secrated by venerable names in Church-History ; it would have recognized a sound theory of Tradi tion h- But we should not then have had dogmas intruded into the place of Religion, and arbitrations of doubts forced on the conscience of believers, as the voice of the Holy Spirit speaking by the minis ters and stewards of the divine mysteries. It might have been supposed, that the very discus- h Reasonings from authority, when thus regulated, are coin cident with probabilities. See the opening of Aristotle's Topics. The word evho^ov expresses such coincidence. LECTURE VIII. 373 sion of religion in the form of doubts, would have palpably shewn the impropriety of proposing truths so obtained, as matters of Revelation ; since the truths of religion were thus exhibited as appeals to the reason of man. A doubt is, by its nature, rela tive to human reason ; and the settlement of it by argument, is a simple decision of human reason. If the conclusion be received on the authority of the reasoner in his sacerdotal character ; the previous doubt and the argumentation are perfectly irrelevant. So anomalous, indeed, is the mode of proceeding in the Scholastic development of Christian Theo logy, that it is only capable of solution, as appears to me, from the fact noticed at the commencement of these Lectures ; that the Scholastic system was a prolonged struggle between Reason and Authority. The effort throughout is, to maintain both princi ples. But the method of Theology being originally founded in speculation and resistance to mere au thority, we find traces of this beginning, in the com promise of principles which the maturity of the system displays. It is ratiocination that triumphs ; and Logic domineers over Theology. The previous discussion has, I trust, prepared the way for the conclusions, which I wish now to submit to your consideration, as to the nature and use of Dogmatic Theology. It is evident, I think, from the inquiry which I have been pursuing, on the whole, as well as more immediately from the preceding observations, that B b 3 374 LECTURE VIII. the doctrinal statements of religious truth, have their origin in the principles of the human intellect. Strictly to speak, in the Scripture itself there are no doctrines. What we read there is matter of fact : either fact nakedly set forth as it occurred ; or fact explained and elucidated by the light of inspiration cast upon it. It will be thought, perhaps, that the Apostolic Epistles are an exception to this observ ation. If any part of Scripture contains doctrinal statements, it will, at any rate, be supposed to be the Epistolary. But even this part, if accurately considered, will not be found an exception. No one perhaps will maintain, that there is any new truth of Christianity set forth in the Epistles ; any truth, I mean, which does not presuppose the whole truth of Human Salvation by Jesus Christ, as already determined and complete. The Epistles clearly im ply that the work of Salvation is done. They repeat and insist on its most striking parts ; urging chiefly on man, what remains for him to do, now that Christ has done all that God purposed in behalf of man, before the foundation of the world. Let the experiment be fairly tried : let the inve terate idea, that the Epistles are the doctrinal por tion of Scripture, be for a while banished from the mind : and let them be read simply as the works of our Fathers in the Faith — of men who are com mending us rather to the love of Christ, than open ing our understanding to the mysteries of Divine Knowledge : and, after such an experiment, let each decide for himself, whether the practical, or the theo- LECTURE VIII. 375 retic, view of the Epistles, is the correct one. For my part, I cannot doubt but that the decision will be in favour of the practical character of them. The speculating theologian will perhaps answer, by adducing text after text from an Epistle, in which he will contend that some dogmatic truth, some theory, or system, or peculiar view of divine truth, is asserted. But " what is the chaff to the wheat ?" I appeal, from the logical criticism of the Apostle's words, to their Apostolical spirit — from Paul philo sophizing, to Paul preaching, and entreating, and persuading. And I ask, whether it is likely that an Apostle would have adopted the form of an epi stolary communication, for imparting mysterious pro positions to disciples, with whom he enjoyed the opportunity of personal intercourse ; and to whom he had already " declared the whole counsel of " God ;" whether, in preaching Christ, he would have used a method of communicating truth, which implies some scientific application of language, — an analysis, at least, of propositions into their terms, — in order to its being rightly understood ? And I further request it may be considered, whether it was not, by such a mode of inference from the Scripture-language, as would convert the Epistles into textual authorities on points of controversy, that the very system of the Scholastic Theology was erected. Dogmas of Theology then, as such, are human authorities. But do I mean to say by this, that B b 4 376 LECTURE VIII. they are unimportant in Religion, or that they are essentially wrong, foreign to true Religion, and in consistent with it ? I wish rather to establish their importance and proper truth, as distinct from the honour and verity of the simple Divine Word. We have seen how Doctrines gradually assume their form, by the successive impressions of con troversy. The facts of Scripture remain the same through all ages, under all variations of opinions among men. Not so the theories raised upon them. They have floated on the stream of speculation. One heresiarch after another has proposed his modifica tion. The doctrine, so stated, has obtained more or less currency, according to its coincidence with re ceived notions on other subjects, — according to the influence possessed by its patrons, or their obstinacy against persecution. Nearly the whole of Chris tendom was, at one time, Arian in profession'. At one time, Pelagianism seemed to be the ascendant creed of the Church k. In such a state of things, it was impossible for the Scriptural theologian, even if not himself susceptible of the seductive force of a Logical Philosophy, to refrain from mingling in the conflict of argument. Orthodoxy was forced to speak the divine truth in the terms of heretical speculation ; if it were only to guard against the novelties which the heretic had introduced. It was the necessity of the case that compelled the orthodox, as themselves freely admit, to employ a phraseology, * Note D. k Note E. LECTURE VIII. 377 by which, as experience proves, the naked truth of God has been overborne and obscured. Such being the origin of a Dogmatic Theology, it follows, that its proper truth consists in its being a collection of negations ; of negations, I mean, of all ideas imported into Religion, beyond the ex press sanction of Revelation. Supposing that there had been no theories proposed on the truths of Christianity ; were the Bible, or rather the divine facts which it reveals, at once ushered into our notice, without our knowing that various wild no tions, both concerning God and human nature, had been raised upon the sacred truths ; no one, I con ceive, would wish to see those facts reduced to the precision and number of articles, any more than he now thinks of reducing any other history to such a form. We should rather resist any such attempt as futile, if not as profane: or, however judiciously such a selection might be made, we should undoubt edly prefer the living records of the Divine Agency, to the dry and uninteresting abstracts of human com pilers and expositors. But, when theoretic views are known to have been held and propagated ; when the world has been familiarized to the language of these speculations, and the truth of God is liable to corruption from them ; then it is, that forms of ex clusion become necessary, and theory must be re torted by theory. This very occasion, however, of the introduction of Theory into Religion, suggests the limitation of it. It must be strictly confined to the exclusion and rejection of all extraneous notions 378 LECTURE VIII. from the subjects of the sacred volumes. Theory, thus regulated, constitutes a true and valuable phi losophy, — not of Christianity, properly so called, — but of human Christianity, — of Christianity in the world, as it has been acted on by the force of the human intellect. This is the view which I take, not only of our Articles at large, but in particular, of the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds, as they stand in our Ritual, or are adopted into our Articles. If it be admitted that the notions on which their several expressions are founded, are both unphilosophical and unscrip tural ; it must be remembered, that they do not impress those notions on the Faith of the Christian, as matters of affirmative belief. They only use the terms of ancient theories of philosophy, — theories current in the Schools at the time when they were written, — to exclude others more obviously injuri ous to the simplicity of the Faith. The speculative language of these Creeds, it should be observed, was admitted into the Church of England as established by the Reformers, before the period, when the genius of Bacon exposed the emptiness of the system, which the Schools had palmed upon the world as the only instrument for the discovery of all Truth. At such a time, accordingly, the theories opposed in the ori ginal formularies of the orthodox, would be power fully felt as real obstacles to a sound belief in Chris tian Truths ; and the terms, declaring the orthodox doctrine, would be readily interpreted by the exist ing physical and logical notions. The minds of LECTURE VIII. 379 men would be fully preoccupied with the notions of matter, and form, and substance, and accident ; and, when such notions had produced misconception of the sacred Truth, it would be a necessary expedient, to correct that misconception by a less exceptionable employment of them \ If this account of the origin and nature of Dog matic Theology be correct, surely those entirely per vert its nature, who reason on the Terms of doc trines, as if they were the proper ideas belonging to Religion ; or who insist on interpretations of ex pressions, whether as employed by our Reformers, or the primitive believers, in a positive sense ; with out taking into their view, the existing state of theology and philosophy at the different periods of Christianity. Creeds and Articles, without such pre vious study, are as if they were written in a strange language. The words, indeed, are signs of ideas to us, but not of those ideas which were presented to the minds of men, when the formularies were writ ten, or when they were adopted by the Church. But here the question may be asked, how far on these grounds Creeds and Articles may be retained, when the original occasion for them has ceased? The answer of Hooker will readily occur to many ; that, the occasion having ceased, it by no means follows, that the statements themselves should no longer be of use m ; a fact that may be illustrated l Note F. m Eccies. Polity, b. V. 42. p. 167, &c. vol. II. 8vo. ed. 1807. 380 LECTURE VIII. by several analogies. But the case of Articles is a peculiar one in this respect ; that the result itself is conceived to be an evil, or, at least, an alternative to avoid an evil : it being admitted to be better, except by way of antidote against heretical doc trine, that there should be no other Articles but the Word of God itself. It appears to me, then, that the occasion for Articles will probably never cease. Were the Realism of the human mind a transient phenomenon, peculiar to one age, or one species of philosophy, and not, as is the fact, an instinctive propensity of our intellectual nature ; then it might be supposed, that the unsoundness of a metaphysical and logical Theology being once fully admitted, the cumbrous machinery might be removed, and the sacred truth allowed to stand forth to view, in its own attractive simplicity. But such a result seems rather to be wished, and prayed for, by a sanguine piety, than reckoned upon in the humbling calculations of human experience. In the mean time, it were well to retain, amidst all its confessed imperfections, a system of tech nical theology, by which we are guarded, in some measure, from the exorbitance of theoretic enthtt- siasm. It would be a rashness of pious feeling, that should at once so confide in itself, as to throw down the walls and embankments, which the more vigilant fears of our predecessors have reared up around the City of God. In the present state of things, such a zeal for the Faith would look more like the ostentatiousness of Spartan courage, than LECTURE VIII. 381 the modest discipline of the soldiers of Christ, trust ing in his arm for success, and yet availing them selves of all natural means of strength, which their reason points out. The force, indeed, of History must always act on a literary age ; and an influence is exercised, by former speculators, on the opinions and conduct of their successors. We cannot therefore conclude ; that, because the original occasion of Creeds and Articles has ceased, there are actually no existing prejudices of a like kind, kept alive by the tradition of former opinions, to be obviated by the like theo retic statements. At the same time, we must not suppose, that the same immutability belongs to Articles of Religion, which we ascribe properly to Scripture-facts alone. As records of Opinions they are essentially variable. It is no impeachment of their truth, to regard them as capable of improvement, — of more perfect adapta tion to the existing circumstances of the Church at different periods. As to the difficulty and hazard of any actual alteration, I have nothing to say. I do not presume to say, that alteration is actually required. I am merely addressing myself to the general question, as to the capacity of improvement in Church-Creeds and Articles, with the view of suggesting a right theory of the subject. To deny the essential variableness of such documents, is, to admit an human authority to a parity with the au thority of Inspiration. It is to incur the imputation, 382 LECTURE VIII. which members of the Roman Communion have sometimes brought against the Church of England ; that, professing to make the Scriptures the sole Rule of Faith, we have inconsistently adopted another Rule of Faith in the deference paid to our Articles. It is a temptation, indeed, to which the members of any particular communion of Christians are pecu liarly exposed — to identify the defence of the formu laries of the Communion with the defence of Chris tianity. It is like securing the fortifications of the city, instead of looking to the strength and discipline of its garrison as the main resource. As belonging to a Communion, we must be able to shew that we have good reason for our preference. And it is enough for this purpose, to prove that our Church is truly Scriptural in its basis, walking in the foot steps of the Holy Spirit, and drinking of the pure fountain of inspiration. This is the sole proper notion of the infallibility of a Church. For it is an infallibility not its own, but of God present with it. We are not called upon, to defend every parti cular expression which has been adopted into its formularies. This would be, to make it infallible in itself It would be to suppose, that a fortress, strong in its internal resources, must fall, because some of its outworks are not impregnable. And we may find indeed at last, that, by such a proceeding, we are tenaciously cleaving to means of defence, which the present state of religion and knowledge entirely supersedes : as we might suppose the inhabitant of LECTURE VIII. 383 a castle fortified in feudal times, imagining himself safe amidst his walls, against assaults from modern inventions in the art of war. The use and importance then of Dogmatic Theo logy are to be estimated, from its relation to the Social Profession of Christianity. It is, in regard to Christianity, what political institutions are in regard to the social principles of our nature. As these principles are the real conservative causes of human society; and political institutions are the supports and auxiliaries ; so are the dogmas of Theology en forcements by external barriers, of the saving, quick ening truths of the Gospel. The imperfection of man is equally the occasion of both. Were all men just, the social instincts would develop themselves, without the artificial methods of civil government. So, were all the humble disciples of Christ, Christian sentiment would speak in its own accents, and not be constrained to learn the foreign tongue of tech nical theology. The case appears to be this. The agreement of a community in certain views of Scripture-facts is presupposed. The problem be fore the Dogmatic Theologian is, to preserve that agreement entire ; to guard it from a latitudinarian- ism which would virtually annul it ; and to prevent its dissolution by innovators, either within or with out the religious society. The anathemas of Creeds and Councils can only be justified on this ground. They are the penalties of social Religion. The authority of the Church, which has prescribed any particular collection of Articles to its members, by 384 LECTURE VIII. the use of these invisible sanctions, calls upon them, not to profess its doctrines lightly and unadvisedly ; but to bear in mind the awful responsibility at tached to matters of divine Revelation ; and that it is about these they are engaged, when they set their hand to Articles or any professions of doctrine. I have now completed the inquiry which I pro posed, into the influence of the Scholastic Philosophy on our Theological Language ; at least to the ex tent which the present occasion permitted ; and suf ficiently, I trust, to the establishment of the fact; that this Philosophy is the basis of all our most im portant technical terms, and modes of thinking, both in Religion and in Ethics. I have also, in this last Lecture, discussed the principles of Authority and of Reason, which the Scholastic system embodied in itself ; and have endeavoured to draw the line of dis tinction, between a legitimate combination of them in a system of Dogmatic Theology, and that arrogant method of universal speculation, which, commencing with the confusion of all human truth, ends in the confusion of Divine Truth with human. Nor let it be supposed, that the speculative Theo logy into which I have been examining, is a thing of another day — a mere matter of curiosity to the literary or ecclesiastical historian. I should have failed indeed in the present attempt to bring the subject before you ; if this should be the impression LECTURE VIII. 385 from it. Scholasticism indeed has passed away, as to its actual rude form, in which it appeared in the middle age. But its dominion has endured. In the Church of Rome, indeed, it still holds visible sway ; clothed in the purple of spiritual supremacy, and giving the law of Faith to the subject-con sciences of men. Those who are at all acquainted with the public documents of that Church, as esta blished by the Council of Trent, or with its con troversial writers, will attest the general observation; that it is the metaphysics of the Schools, which form the texture of the Roman Theology, and by which that system is maintained. In the destitution of Scripture-facts for the support of the theological structure, the method of subtile distinctions and reasonings has been found of admirable efficacy. It eludes the opponent, who, not being trained to this dialectical warfare, is not aware, that all such ar gumentation is a tacit assumption of the point in controversy ; or is perplexed and confounded by the elaborate subtilties of the apologist. No argument indeed from fact can suffice against the artifice of distinctions. The expert metaphysician is ready with some new abstraction, as soon as he is assailed with an adverse position or consequence ; and the objector feels himself entangled in meshes, against which his strength, however superior, is wasted in unavailing efforts. The resistance, which the Roman Church has shewn against improvements in Natural Philosophy, is no inconsiderable evidence of the con nexion of the ecclesiastical system with the ancient C c 386 LECTURE VIII. <**• Logical Philosophy of the Schools. There has been a constant fear, lest, if that philosophy should be exploded, some important doctrines could not be maintained n. But, though the sorceries of the Scholastic Theo logy have been dispelled where the light of Re formation has been received ; yet the transformations of religious truth, which they effected, could not at once be reversed by the same effort of improvement. The minds of men had been trained to think and speak of divine things, in the idiom of Scholasti cism. So that, not only the reformer in Philosophy, but the reformer in Religion also, was compelled to use the phraseology of. the system which he assailed. Thus, through its technical language, has Scholasti cism survived even in Protestant Churches. Clearly, we may trace its operation in the controversies agi tated among Protestants about Original Sin, Grace, Regeneration, Predestination ; — all which, when strictly considered, are found to resolve themselves into disputes concerning the just limits of certain notions, — into questions of the exactness of pro posed definitions. So again, it is not uncommon to find, even among our own * theologians, one doctrine insisted on, as necessary to be admitted in order to the reception of another. Original Sin, for instance, is not unfrequently inculcated, as es sential to be believed to the fullest extent, in order te an acceptance of the truth of the Atonement : as if the truth of either doctrine were a matter of logical n Note G. LECTURE VIII. 387 deduction, or dependent on the truth of the other : whereas, in the correct view, each is an ultimate fact in the revealed dispensations of God, resting on its own proper evidence. Once acknowledging, indeed, the reality of the Christian Revelation, we are bound to refer the whole of Human Happiness to the me diation of Christ; though the Scriptures had been entirely silent respecting the fact of the intrinsic sinfulness of man. And conversely ; we should have been under an obligation of acting, as feeling our selves under sin, and naturally incapable of hap piness ; had the Scriptures simply stated our incapa city and misery, without revealing the mercies of the Atonement. The real state of the case then is, that the spirit of Scholasticism still lives amongst us : that, though we do not acknowledge submission to its empire, we yet feel its influence °. At the time, indeed, when Luther raised his voice against the corruptions sanctioned by the Roman Church, the complaint was, that the spiritual lessons of Scripture were become a dead letter. There were however, even at that time, men of deep and fami liar acquaintance with Scripture, the votaries of an ardent and sincere piety. Their religion, however, was inaccessible to the poor, and the illiterate, and the busy. It was the privilege of the theologian, — of the holy and speculative recluse. The mass of ° The practice itself of preaching from Texts of Scripture is a remnant of Scholasticism. At the time of the Reformation it was carried to the most absurd excess. — Note H. c c 2 388 LECTURE VIII. the people indolently, or superstitiously, reposed on the sanctity of their Fathers in religion; and sought their rule of faith and conduct, in devout attendance on the vicarious ministrations of the man of God. In a word, Religion was become a professional thing. None could be truly and properly religious, but those who were versed in the logic and casu istry of a scientific theology. Therefore it was, that Luther so vehemently proclaimed the great doc trine of Justification by Faith alone ; setting himself against that divorce of Theology and popular Reli gion, by which the Gospel had in effect been unevan- gelized and desecrated. And are there not still traces amongst us, of a separation between the religion of the few and the religion of the many? The delusion indeed has passed away in its theoretic form ; that true religion can consist in any thing but in holiness of active life, — in an habitual conduct conformed to the example of our Lord Jesus Christ. But the principle of that separation, against which the Re formation was directed, is still seen in that enthu siasm, which, even in these days, loves to diffuse itself in sentimental religion ; — which spends the strength of devotion in holy thoughts, — the lux ury, like the Scholastic Piety, only of the pure, the cultivated, the sensitive, and the ardent mind. It is now an enthusiasm of the heart, rather than of the intellect. But the principle is still the same. Re ligion is converted into Theological Contemplation. The examination which I have been pursuing, LECTURE VIII. 389 has led me over much entangled ground ; from which I can hardly hope to have extricated myself, in a way to satisfy the views, or scruples, of all whom I address. But the peculiar difficulty of forming just estimates of controversial statements, — and of seizing the shifting lights of philosophical theories, as they have passed over the truths of Revelation, and given to them their various hue, — will obtain for me, I trust, a patient and candid construction of opinions expressed. It would ill be come me, indeed, to dogmatize on a subject, in which I am directly engaged in illustrating the injurious effects of Dogmatism in Theology ; and especially before an audience, from some of whom I should rather expect the judgment of a point, than endeavour to impose my own opinion. It must be admitted, I think, on the whole, that the Force of Theory has been very considerable in the modifica tion of our Theological language. Aud I would submit to your reflection, whether that force has been sufficiently allowed for, either in our general profession of Christianity, or in our controversies on particular articles of Doctrine ? But, however successfully I may have established the desired conclusion ; there may, I fear, remain in some minds, — where there has existed an indiscrimi nate veneration of the names and terms attached to Christianity, as of parts of the holy religion itself, — a painful impression of mistrust, — a suspicious reason ing with themselves ; that, either the argument must c c 3 390 LECTURE VIII. be erroneous, or they have followed cunningly-devised fables — the imaginations of the sophistical wisdom of this world — as the Gospel of Truth ? For the sake of such persons, I would once more call attention to the divine part of Christianity, as entirely distinct from its episodic additions. Whatever may have been the motives and conduct of successive agents em ployed in its propagation from age to age ; whatever may have been the speculations of false Philosophy on the facts of Christianity ; those facts themselves are not touched ; — they remain indisputable, so far as any objections on such grounds can avail. These facts form part of the great History of mankind : they account for the present condition of things in the world : and we cannot deny them without in volving ourselves in universal scepticism. There can be no rational doubt ; that man is in a degraded, disadvantageous condition, — that Jesus Christ came into the world, in the mercy of God, to produce a restoration of man, — that He brought Life and Immortality to light by his coming, — that He died on the Cross for our sins, and rose again for our justification, — that the Holy Ghost came by his promise to abide with his Church, miraculously as sisting the Apostles in the first institution of it, and, ever since that period, interceding with the hearts of believers. These, and other truths con nected with them, are not collected merely from texts or sentences of Scripture : they are parts of its re cords. Infinite theories may be raised upon them ; but these theories, whether true or false, leave the LECTURE VIII. 391 1 facts where they were. There is enough in them to warm and comfort the heart ; though we had assurance of nothing more. It is an excellent effect indeed of unprejudiced theological study, — a reward, it may be called, of our honesty in the pursuit, — that our sensitiveness to particular objections diminishes, as we advance in the investigation. If there are any therefore, whose anxiety for the sacred cause has been awakened by any observations in the course of the present Lec tures ; I exhort them to proceed, fearless of any ultimate shock to the real truth of Christianity by the most searching investigation. The knowledge of the speculations, which have mingled with the statement of the truth, cannot but be, in the result, of the greatest service. It will enable the theolo gical student to see, that objections against the theo retic parts of doctrines (and objections are prin cipally of this kind) are no objections against the fundamental doctrines themselves — the revealedfacts — which are really and in themselves, independent of those theories. And, — what is of even still greater, far greater, importance to him as a Christian, — it will inculcate on him candour, forbearance, charitable construction of the views of others, an humble and teachable disposition towards God. c c 4 APPENDIX. NOTES. APPENDIX. LECTURE I. NOTE A. p. 17- I HAVE translated the following epistle of Jerome, wish ing to give the general reader a more obvious view of the style of intermingled address and authority which appears in it ; and which affords a fair specimen of the general cha racter of the writer : though it is impossible by translation, to present a full idea of the art of the composition ; as the very collocation of the words is studied, both to please the ear and give point to the expressions. Jerome*- to Damasush. Since the East, jarred by inveterate fury of the people among themselves, tears piecemeal the Lord's tunic " with- " out seam and woven from the top;" and foxes exter minate the vine of Christ0; so that, amidst " the broken " cisterns that hold no water d," it may with difficulty be discovered, where is the " sealed fountain, and the in- " closed garden :" I have, therefore, thought it right to consult the chair of Peter, and the faith approved by apo stolic lips ; demanding my soul's food from the same source now, whence formerly I took on me the vestments of Christ e. Nor, in truth, could the vast expanse of liquid element, " Hieronymi Opera, ed. Erasmi, 1565. torn. II. p. 131. b Damasus, a Spaniard by birth ; Bishop of Rome from A. D. 367 to A. D. 384. Jerome had been his ecclesiastical secretary. c Cantic. ii. 15. d Jerem. ii. 13. e Alluding to his ordination at Rome, or more probably to his baptism there. 396 APPENDIX. and the interjacent length of lands, restrain me from searching for the precious pearl. Wherever the carcase is, there are the eagles gathered together. The patrimony being squandered by an evil offspring, with you alone is preserved uncorrupted the inheritance of the fathers. There the earth with fruitful glebe returns an hundredfold the pure seed of the Lord : here, overwhelmed in the furrows, the wheat degenerates into darnel and wild oats. Now in the West the sun of justice rises ; but in the East, that Lucifer who had fallen, has placed his throne above the stars. You are the light of the world ; you the salt of the earth ; you the vessels of gold and silver : here the vessels of clay, or wood, await the rod of iron and eternal con flagration. Although therefore your greatness deters me, still your kindness invites me. From a priest I ask the victim of salvation ; from a shepherd the protection of the sheep. Let invidiousness droop : let the ambition of the Roman summit recede. It is with the successor of the fisherman, and the disciple of the cross, that I am speak ing. For my part, except as following Christ, I associate no first f in communion with your Blessedness ; that is, with the Chair of Peter : on that rock, I know, the Church was built. Whoever without that house has eaten of the lamb, is profane. If any one is not in the ark of Noah, he will perish when the flood prevails. And because for my of fences s, I have migrated to that solitude which parts Syria from the adjacent Barbarian confines; and I am unable always to ask the holy thingh of the Lord from your Sanc tity, at such intervening spaces ; I therefore, follow your colleagues here, the Egyptian Confessors ; and lurk, my self a little bark, under ships of burden '. I know not Vitalis; Meletius I reject; I am ignorant of Paulinusk. f To shew that He did not give precedence to the Patriarch of Antioch. g As doing penance by self-mortification. h Erasmus explains this of the body of Christ, or the Eucharist. ' As contrasting his own affected littleness with the full-freighted sanctity of the Egyptian monks. k All, bishops of the Arian party at Autioch. NOTES TO LECTURE I. 397 Whoever gathers not with you, scatters : that is, who is not of Christ, is of Antichrist. Now therefore, alas! after the Nicene faith, after the Alexandrian decree made in concurrence with the West, the novel expression of three hypostases is exacted of me, a Roman man, by the Arian Prelate and the people of the Campe '. Who are the Apostles, I pray, that have handed down such things ? Who is the new master of the nations, — the Paul, — that has taught them ? Let us ask them ; what they conceive can be understood by three hypostases. Three persons subsisting, they say. We answer, that we so believe. The sense is not enough ; they are importu nate for the term itself: because some unknown poison lurks under the syllables. We exclaim, if anyone con fesses not three hypostases, or three enhypostata, — that is, three subsisting persons, — let him be anathema. And because we do not get words by heart, we are judged here tical. If any one however, understanding by hypostasis, usia, does not say, one hypostasis in three persons, he is alien from Christ. Yet under this confession, we are, equally with you, branded with the cautery of the Union m. Determine if it is your pleasure, I beseech you ; I shall not fear to say three hypostases : if you order it, let a new faith he framed after the Nicene ; and let us who are the orthodox confess in like words with the Arians. The whole school of secular literature knows nothing else by hypostasis, but usia. And who, I ask, with sacri legious mouth will proclaim three substances. One and sole is the nature of God, which truly is. For, what sub- ' The curve of the coast of Cilicia, so called. ni The familiar name for Sabellianism. Union however scarcely gives the same idea as the Latin Unio. The term Cautery is borrowed from the practice of branding a mark on the young soldier. — So again he says iu au epistle to the Presbyter Mark : Haereticus vocor, homusion prsedicans trini- tatem. Sabellianse impietatis arguor ; tres subsistentes, veras, integras, per- fectasque personas, indefessa voce pronuntians. . . . Quotidie exposcor fidem ; quasi sine fide renatus sim. Confiteor ut volunt ; non placet. Subscribo ; uon creduut. Opera, torn. II. p. 315. 398 APPENDIX. sists, has not from any other ; but is its own. Other things which are created, though they seem to be, are not; because at one time they were not ; and that which has not existed, may again not exist. God alone, who is eternal, — that is, who has no beginning, — holds truly the name of Essence. Therefore also to Moses from the bush, he says, " I am " that I am ;" and again, " He that is sent me." There existed truly then, angels, heaven, earth, seas. Yet how does God vindicate to Himself properly the common name of Essence? But, because that nature alone is perfect, and one Deity subsists in three persons ; which truly ex ists, and is one nature; whoever says, that three are, — that is, that three hypostases are, — that is, usia; — under the name of piety, attempts to assert three natures. And if this be so, why are we by walls separated from Arius ; when in perfidy we are coupled with him ? Let Ursicinus n be joined with your Blessedness ; let Auxen- tius" be associated with Ambrose. Far be this from the Roman Faith. Let not the religious hearts of the people imbibe so great a sacrilege. Let it suffice us to say; one substance, three persons subsisting, perfect, equal, co- eternal. Let there be no mention of three hypostases, with your leave; and let one be held. It is of no good sus picion ; since, in the same sense, the words are dissentient. Let the traditional mode of belief suffice us. Or, if you think it right, that we should say three hypostases with their interpretations, we refuse not. But believe me, poison lurks under the honey : an angel of Satan has transfigured himself into an angel of light. They interpret hypostasis well ; and when I say, that I hold what they themselves expound, I am judged heretical. Why so anxiously do they hold one word? Why do they lurk under an am biguous expression ? If I so believe, as themselves affect to think ; let them permit me also to speak their own sense in my own words. " An Arian competitor with Damasus for the papal see. ° Arian Bishop of Milan, predecessor of Ambrose. NOTES TO LECTURE I. 399 I therefore beseech your Blessedness, by the Crucified One, the Salvation of the world, — by the homoousion Tri nity, — to give me authority by your letters, either to for bear saying, or to say, the hypostases. And lest perhaps the obscurity of the place in which I am living, may es cape your search, be so gracious as to transmit your writ ings by your letter-carriers, to Evagrius, the presbyter, who is well known to you ; at the same time, to signify with whom I should communicate at Antioch : since the people of the Campe, coupled with the heretics of Tarsus, are only ambitious that, supported by the authority of your communion, they may proclaim three hypostases in the ancient sense. NOTE B. p. 17- After the death of Auxentius, the city of Milan was thrown into commotion by the contending factions of the Arians and the Orthodox ; each seeking to elect as suc cessor to the see, a man of their own party. Ambrose ap pears in the Church, in his capacity of Prefect of Italy, to quell the disturbance : when suddenly, according to his biographer Paulinus, the voice of an infant in the crowd called out the name of Ambrose. The name was received as an happy omen by the assembled multitude, and spread from mouth to mouth, until the uproar of acclamation pro claimed the choice of the people to have fallen on the Pre fect himself. He leaves the Church, ascends the tribunal of justice, and tries the constancy of his electors, as Pau linus proceeds to relate, by a severity unusual in him, the question by torture. Still the people continue their ac clamations, " Thy sin be upon us ;" " Thy sin be upon " us ;" — thus silencing any scruples of his conscience. He attempts further to decline their importunity by flying from the city at midnight ; and his escape being prevented, afterwards conceals himself in a private house. But all being unavailing, the reluctant Prefect at length con sents to take on him the burden of the sacred office, 400 APPENDIX. and ascends the step to the honours of his future saint- ship. We may not unreasonably suspect in this instance, a dissimulation like that of some civil rulers, who have de clined in appearance, a proffered crown, the real object of their ambition. This is the more likely, when we find, according to the same authority, Probus, the Praetorian Prefect, by whom Ambrose was sent to quell the com motion at Milan, instructing him to " go and act, not as " judge, but as bishop :" and hailing afterwards, in the election of Ambrose, the fulfilment of his word P. Ambrose himself thus speaks of his own election. Quam resistebam ne ordinarer, postremo cum cogerer, saltem ordinatio protelaretur ! Sed non valuit praescriptio, prsevaluit impressio. Tamen ordinationem meam occiden- tales episcopi judicio, orientales etiam exemplo, probarunt. Et tamen neophytus prohibetur ordinari, ne extollatur su- perbia. Si dilatio oKdinationi defuit, vis cogentis est: si non deest humilitas competens sacerdotio, ubi causa non hseret, vitium non imputatur. Ambros. Epistol. LXI1I. Oper. torn. n. p. 1037- Dicetur enim : Ecce ille non in ecclesiae nutritus sinu, non edomitus a puero, sed raptus a tribunalibus, ahductus de vanitatibus saeculi hujus, a praeconis voce ad psalmistne adsuefactus canticum, in sacerdotio manet, non virtute sua, sed Christi gratia, et inter convivas mensae caelestis re- cumbit. Serva, Domine, munus tuum ; custodi donum quod contulisti etiam refugienti. Ego enim sciebam quod non eram dignus vocari episcopus ; quoniam dederam me saeculo huic, &c. Ambros. De Pcenit. lib. II. Oper. torn. u. p. 432. Unus enim verus magister est, qui solus non didicit quod omnes doceret : homines autem discunt prius quod doce- ant, et ab illo accipiunt quod aliis tradant. Quod ne ipsum quidem mihi accidit. Ego enim raptus de tribunalibus, v Amhrosii Vii. per Paulinum. — The work is addressed to Augustine. Pau- linus, the author, was a deacon, and notary, or secretary, to Ambrose. NOTES TO LECTURE I. 401 atque administrationis infulis, ad sacerdotium, docere vos ccepi, quod ipse non didici. Itaque factum est ut prius docere inciperem, quam discere. Discendum igitur mihi simul, et docendum est ; quoniam non vacavit ante discere. Ambros. De OJjficiis Ministror. I. c. 1. The instance given by Gregory Nazianzen, of a similar election, is the following one. 12s 8' els nXeCovs roi; br\pov biaipedevros, /cat dXXtav aXXov rrpofiaXXopeviav , onep kv rots roiovrois ai, rreidol /3tai> avapCgavres' ov XCav pev evraKTCos, XCav be niar&s /cat biarrvpas. Kqvravda ovk eanv elirelv, ov nva evboKipdrepov kKeCvov, Kai deoaefieaTepov, bi- ebei£ev 6 /catpos. rt yap yCverai ; ko.1 ttoi irporjXdev r\ ardais ; e/3tao*6*?jo*az*, rjyviaav, aveKr/pv^av, rai rbv dpovov edeaav, xet/>' pfiXXov, tj yvdpy, Kai biadeaei, irvevparos. k. t. X. Orat. XIX. Mentioning a recurrence of these contentions, he adds : Kai f; ardais rjv, oaio depporepa, roaovrto ko.1 aXoyairepa. Ov yap rryvoelro ro virepaipov, &arrep 0118' ev aarpaaiv ijXios, aAAa ko.1 XCav kirCbr)Xov r\v, rots re dXXois a-naai, Kai tov Aaoi? pdXiara rcS kyKpCrio re ko! KaOapwrdria, oaov re rtepl ro firjpa, Kai Saov kv rois Ka& rjpas Nafapatots* ecp ols I8et ras roiav- ras 7J*po/3oAas Keladai povois, rj on p&Xiara' Kai ovbev av rjv rats kKKXrjaCais /ca/coV aXXa prj rots evTropardrois re ko.1 bv- varcordrois, rj opq br\pov ko.1 aXoyCq, Kai rovriav avr&v pd Xiara rots evcavordrois. vvv be Kivbvveva ras brjpoaCas apyas evraKTiorepas irtoXapfidveiv r&v rjperepaiv, ats rj deia xCXov xeLP> yuvaiKa kmbebcoKe. npoayo- pevv, os ye rraibodev alrCav ea)(ov birXopaveiv re /cat irrnopaveiv nepa tov beovros, avidaopai pev rt yap Kai rrddca, ras (piXrdras idvas adr/povs 6pS>v, /cat ra Toga dpurr]biaraTa' KapTr)pr\aa> be, &v kmrdrrr] deos' /cat puaocppovns &v, obvvtfaopai pev, avigopai be, biKibCav, /cat rrpaypdrav, XeirovpyCav nva ravrrjv, el Kai /3apelav, kKTTiprrXas rep 0«o* boy para be ovk k-nrjXvydaopai, ovbe araaidaei p.01 it pos rrjv yX&rrav 17 yvu>p,-q. Willing however as he is to make some sacrifices, he resolutely refuses, we find, any compromise of his opinions. On this point lie explicitly says : XaXeirov kanv, el p.7] Kai XCav dbvvarov, els yjrvxnv 7a 0L' kmaTrjprjs els dsnobeigiv kXdovra boypara aa- Xevdfjvai. olada b' on rroXXd cpiXoaoaa> rrore ai&paros varepoyevrj vopC^eiv rbv Koapov ov (prjaai ko.1 raXXa pepy) avvbiatpdeCpeadar ttjv Kada>p.iXr\pev7)V dvdaraaiv lepov n Kai drsoppryrov rjyr\pai, ko.1 rroXXov beat rats tov rrXrj- dovs vnoXrplreaw opoXoyrjaai. vovs pev ovv (piX6aoavvrjs avyyapovaiv kpol vopoi, bvvaCpqv hv lepa- a6ai, ra p.ev oXkoi v, ra be efco (piXopvd&v el pr) bi- bdaKatv, dAA' ovbe pev roi perabibdaKiav, peveiv be k&v krrl ttjs ¦n-poXrpfreias, el be (paaiv ovra> Seti* koI Kiveladai, /cat brjXov NOTES TO LECTURE I. 409 etvai rbv lepea rats 80'fats, ovk av ddvoipi (pavepbv kpavrbv airaai Kadiards' brjpio yap Sr) /cat kppC{ovTes kav- rovs, /cat rr)v epr\pov darra£6p.evoi, £5>ai de<£ iravreov p.aXXov t&v aTpeTriap,evov rrjs deoXoyCas ml evre%- vov, ovbe mdpobov efyev els ras deCas avXds' dXXa ravrbv Jp>, •Repots re rraCgeiv T-qv o-yfnv KXertrovaais r<5 rdxet rijs peradk- aews, rj Karopyeiadai t&v Oear&v, navToCois Kai avbpoyvvois XvyCapaai, Kai rrepl deov Xiyeiv n /cat aKOveiv Kaivdrepov Kai rtepiepyov to be cnrXovv re Kai evyeves tov Xdyov evaejieia kvo- p,C{ero. dtp' ov be 2efrot, Kai Uvppuves, koi f/ dvnderos yX&aaa &airep rt voarjpa beivov /cat /ca/co?j6*es rats e/c/cXjjcrtats rip&v el- aeipddpri, ko.1 r\ cpXvapCa rraibevais - paTmv. lv bCbaaKe ovoparC pov, bmaei vpiv. Also in v. 26. 'Ev kKeivrj rfj fipepq kv r& ovdpari pov alrr\aeade' koX ov Xeya> vpiv, Sn kyib kptorqaa rbv rtaripa wept vp&v. The one expression seems properly to denote asking for information or- argument ; the other, that a favour may be obtained. Other citations occur to the same purport ; with the appositeness of which we shall not so readily concur : as Jerome's appeal to the opening of the book of Proverbs, which speaks of the understanding of " discourses and artifices of words, pa- " rabies, and obscure discourse, sayings and enigmas ;" as descriptive of the office of dialecticians and philoso phers '. Nor shall we be disposed to sanction an inter pretation, attributed to Augustine, of our Lord's direction: " ask, and it shall be given you ; seek, and ye shall find ; " knock, and it shall be opened unto you," in the follow ing manner : " ask by praying ; seek by disputing ; knock "by asking, that is, by interrogating: — petite orando ; i Hieronym. Op. torn. I. p. 326. Ep. adv. Mag. Orat. Rom yf 434 APPENDIX. " quaerite disputando ; pulsate rogando, id est, interro- "gandoV NOTE D. p. 60. Clemens Alexandrin., Stromat. lib. I. referred to in Pe- tavii Dogm. Theol. Prolegomena, c. 4. p. 13. Ipsum quippe Dei filium, quem nos Verbum dicimus, Graeci Xoyov appellant, hoc est, divinae mentis concep tual, seu Dei sapientiam vei rationem. Unde et Augus- tinus in libro quaestionum octoginta trium, capite quadra- gesimo quarto : " In principio," inquit, " erat Verbum, " quod Graece Ao'yos dicitur." Idem in libro contra quin- que haereses : " In principio erat Verbum. Melius Graeci " Ao'yos dicunt : Aoyos quippe Verbum significat et ratio- " nem." Et Hieronymus ad Paulinum de divinis scrip- turis. " In principio erat Verbum : Ao'yos Graece multa " significat. Nam et verbum est, et ratio, et supputa- " tio, et causa uniuscujusque rei, per quam sunt singula, " quae subsistunt. Quae universa recte intelligimus in " Christo." Cum ergo Verbum Patris Dominus Jesus Christus Ao'yos Graece dicatur, sicut et aopev roivvv tovs bovXovs rrjs dXqdeCas Xo- yovs, Kai rqv /ca/cc3s avr&v rvpavvqaaaav daej3eiav drrpa&peda' Kai prj r<3 /caAxS /ca/cfis xpqaapeda' p-q rspbs k^andrqv r&v arrXovarepaiv ttjv riyvqv r&v Xdymv perayeipia&peda' dXXa el Kai prj belrai ttoikCXwv aov f) dX-qdeia, rrpos ye ttjv t&v KaKopd\cav, Kai rrjs \{revba>vvpov yvc&aevs dvarpoTtrjV rovrois arroxprjadpeda. Damasc. Dialectic, c. 1. To the same purport may be adduced what the Scho lastics say of the mendacium officiosum. See Thomas Aqui nas, Surnma Theol. Secunda Secundce, qu. ex. art. 2 et 4. Ff 2 436 APPENDIX. The question respecting the mendacium qfficiosum was touched in a correspondence between Jerome and Augus tine. NOTE F. p. 61. Xpio-r&i* be fiyvo-qKaaiv ov n al deiai Xeyovai ypacpat (q- rovvres, &XX otto'iov ayrjpa avXXoyiapov els rrjv rrjs ddeorqros evpedfi avaraaiv, cptAoTroVcos daKOvvres' Khv avrols irporeCvrj ris p-qrov ypacpjjs de'iKrjs, k£erd(ovai norepov avvqppevov q bie£evy- pevov bvvarai rroifjaai ayjjpa avXXoyiapov. KaTaKinovres be ras ayCas rot) deov ypacpas, yecoperpCav kmTrjbevovaiV cos hv e/c rrjs yrjs ovres Kai kK rrjs yrjs XaXovvres, Kai tov avadev kpxdpevov dyvoovvres. 'EvKXeCbqs yovv rrapd naiv avr&v (piXorrovas yea- /ierpetrat* ' ApiaroTeXqs be /cat ©eo'cppacrros davpd^ovrai' Ta- Xr/vos yap tcrcos irto nvav /cat 'npoamive'iTai. oi be rats t&v wnCarav reyvais els r-qv rrjs alpeaeais avr&v yviopqv diroxpd- p.evoi, koi ry r&v adecov -navovpyCq rqv dirXriv t&v deCav ypa- v t&v kmaT-qp&v karC rts, etTrep mtdpyei rts ovaCa roiavrq' Aeyw 8e xcapiarri /cat aK'ivqros. 07rep neipaaopeda bem- vvvar Kai elirep karC rts roiavrri (pijais kv rots ovaiv, ivravd' &v e'Cq irov /cat to delov Kai avrq hv elq rrpdrq Kai icvpicardrq dpx?J. 8?jAof roCvvv ort rpta yevq r&v deapqriK&v kmarTjp&v eari, (pvaiK-q, padrjpariK-q, deoXoyiKq' j3eXnarov pev ovv rb r&v deo>- p-qriK&v kiriarqp&v yevos' tovtiav b' avr&v f) reXevraCa Xeydelaa' wept ro ripuarepov yap fan r&v ovnav fieXrCav be koi xetpui/ e/cdcrrrj Ae'yerat Kara ro o'tKelov kmar-qrov. Metaphys. lib. XIII. cap. 7- p- 988. Duval. Accordingly its scientific nature is thus set forth by Aquinas : Licet in scientiis philosophicis alia sit speculativa, et alia practica, sacra tamen doctrina comprehendit sub se utramque ; sicut et Deus eadem scientia se cognoscit, et ea quae facit. Magis tamen est speculativa quam prac tica : quia principalis agit de rebus divinis, quam de acti- bus humanis, de quibus agit, secundum quod per eos ordi- natur homo ad perfectam Dei cognitionem, in qua aeterna beatitudo consistit. Summa Theol. Prima Pars, qu. i. art. 4. Haec scientia accipere potest aliquid a philosophicis dis- ciplinis, non quod ex necessitate eis indigeat, sed ad ma- jorem manifestationem eorum, quae in hac scientia tradun- tur. Non enim accipit sua principia ab aliis scientiis sed immediate a Deo per revelationem. Et ideo non accipit ab aliis scientiis tanquam a superioribus, sed utitur eis tanquam inferioribus et ancillis : sicut architectonicae utun- tur subministrantibus, ut civilis militari. Et hoc ipsum quod sic utitur eis, non est propter defectum, vei insuf- ficientiam ejus, sed propter defectum intellectus nostri: qui ex his, quae per naturalem rationem (ex qua procedunt aliae scientiae) cognoscuntur, facilius manu ducitur in ea, NOTES TO LECTURE II. 453 quae sunt supra rationem, quae in hac scientia traduntur. Ibid. art. 5. Sacra autem doctrina propriissime determinat de Deo, secundum quod est altissima causa : quia non solum quan tum ad illud quod est per creaturas cognoscibile (quod philosophi cognoverunt, ut dicitur Rom. i. " quod notum " est Dei, manifestum est illis ;") sed etiam quantum ad id, quod notum est sibi soli de seipso, et aliis per revela- tionem communicatum. Unde sacra doctrina maxime di citur sapientia. Ibid. art. 6. Omnia autem pertractantur in sacra doctrina, sub ra tione ; Dei vei quia sunt ipse Deus : vei quia habent ordi- nem ad Deum, ut ad priucipium et finem : unde sequitur, quod Deus vere sit subjectum hujus scientiae. Ibid. art. 7- Utitur tamen sacra doctrina etiam ratione humana, non quidem ad probandum fidem ; (quia per hoc tolleretur me- ritum fidei ;) sed ad manifestandum aliqua alia, quae tra duntur in hac doctrina. . . . Et inde est, quod etiam auc- toritatibus philosophorum sacra doctrina utitur, ubi per rationem naturalem veritatem cognoscere potuerunt : sicut Paulus Actuuni 17, inducit verbum Arati, dicens ; " sicut " et quidam poetarum vestrorum dixerunt, ' genus Dei su- " ' mus.' " Sed tamen sacra doctrina hujusmodi auctorita- tibus utitur, quasi extraneis argumentis et probabilibus : auctoritatibus autem canonicae scripturae utitur proprie et ex necessitate arguendo : auctoritatibus autem aliorum doctorum Ecclesiae, quasi argumentando ex propriis, sed probabiliter. Innititur enim fides nostra revelationi Apo- stolis et Prophetis factae, qui canonicos libros scripserunt, non autem revelationi si qua fuit aliis doctoribus facta. Ibid. art. 8. NOTE T. p. 82. It is worth while to compare the reception of the Pla tonic theory of Ideas by two different philosophers of the Schools — the one a Platonist, the other an Aristotelian. Ideae quoque, id est, species vei formae, in quibus rerum Gg3 454 APPENDIX. omnium faciendarum, priusquam essent, immutabiles ra tiones conditae sunt, solent vocari ; de quibus latius in processu operis dicemus, testimoniisque sanctorum Pa trum roborabimus : et nee immerito sic appellantur ; quo- niam Pater, hoc est, principium omnium, in Verbo suo, uni- genito videlicet Filio, omnium rerum rationes, quas faciendas esse voluit, prius quam in genera, et species, numerosque, atque differentias, caeteraque, quae in condita creatura, aut considerari possunt, et considerantur, aut considerari non possunt, prae sui altitudinem, et non considerantur, et ta men sunt, praeformavit. Erigen. De Divis. Natur. II. p. 48. Ad id quod objicitur de positione Platonis : dicendum ; quod non talis fuit positio Platonis quam improbat Aristo- teles. Sed Plato posuit formas quae sunt ante rem : et principia rei in seipsis existere : et in ipsis sigillari res sicut ad sigillum : nee posuit eas in mente divina, sed in seipsis. Et hoc modo improbat Aristoteles earn. Et forte Plato dixit verum. Necesse est enim principia esse prius natura : et prius esse principia quam principiata. Unde si formas sunt rerum principia, et esse formati ; et sunt, et principia sunt, ante formata. Et si quaeritur ubi sint : quaestio Porphyrii est : qui ita quaerit de universalibus et primis principiis. Pro certo in suis principiis sunt : quae sunt lumina et influentiae primae causae in intelligentias et intelligentiarum orbes ; et orbium in elementa, et elemen- torum in virtutes formativas seminum et generatorum. Sic enim ex mente divina formae sive ideae prodeunt in ideata sive formata. Et ideo dixit Plato quod procedunt sicut ex quodam sigillo. Et hoc non negat Aristoteles : sed negat quod formae sunt ante rem per seipsas, et secundum seip- sas separatim existentes. Albert. Mag. in Sent. Tr. XIII. qu. lv. fol. 124. NOTE U. p. 84. Discat primo psalterium ; his se canticis avocet ; et in proverbiis Solomonis erudiatur ad vitam. In Ecclesiaste consuescat, quae mundi sunt, calcare. In Job virtutis et NOTES TO LECTURE II. 455 patientiae exempla sectetur. Ad Evangelia transeat, nun- quam ea depositura de manibus. Apostolorum Acta et Epistolas tota cordis imbibat voluntate. Cumque pecto ris sui cellarium his opibus locupletaverit, mandet memo riae Prophetas; Pentateuchum, et Regum, et Paralipome- non libros, Esdrae quoque et Hester volumina. Ad ulti- mum sine periculo discat Canticum Canticorum ; ne si in exordio legerit, sub carnalibus verbis spiritualium nup- tiarum epithalamium non intelligens vulneretur. Hiero nym. Ep. ad Lcetam, Opera, torn. I. p. 57- The whole epistle, though hreathing an intense fanatical spirit, is an interesting document for the history of the times. It has its excellences too as a composition. Se veral of the passages are beautifully executed, exemplify ing in their style that melodious rhythm in which Jerome delights, and which is quite peculiar to him. Take, for instance, the conclusion : Ipse si Paulam miseris, et ma- gistrum, et nutricium, spondeo. Gestabo humeris ; bal- butientia senex verba formabo ; multo gloriosior mundi philosopho, qui non regem Macedonum Babylonio peri- turum veneno, sed ancillam et sponsam Christi erudiam, regnis ccelestibus offerendam. Aquinas was employed in expounding the Canticles almost with his dying breath, at the request of the monks of the Convent where he lay ill. NOTE V. p. 86. Fiunt itaque in puerilibus Academici senes; omnem dic- torum, aut scriptorum excutiunt syllabam, imo et literam ; dubitantes ad omnia, quaerentes semper, sed nunquam ad scientiam pervenientes : et tandem convertuntur ad vani- loquium, ac nescientes quid loquantur, aut de quibus as- serant, errores condunt novos, et antiquorum aut nesciunt aut dedignantur sententias imitari. Compilant omnium opiniones, et ea quae etiam a vilissiniis dicta vei scripta sunt, ab inopia judicii, scribunt et referunt : proponunt enim omnia, quia nesciunt praeferre meliora. Tanta est Gg4 456 APPENDIX. opinionum, oppositionumque congeries, ut vix suo nota esse possit authori. Accidit hoc Didymo, quo nemo plura scripsit, ut, cum historiae cuidam tanquam vanae repugna- ret, ipsius proferretur liber, qui earn continebat. Sed nunc multos invenies Didymos, quorum pleni, imo referti sunt commentarii, hujusmodi Logicorum impedimentis. Recte autem dicuntur oppositiones, quia melioribus studiis oppo- nuntur : obstant enim profectui. Metalogicus, lib. II. c. 7- Such is the sarcastic complaint of John of Salisbury in the Xllth century. The subsequent state of Scholasti cism was only a continued aggravation of this erroneous method. Indocta putant omnia, says Erasmus of the later writers, nisi centies inculcaris philosophum. Actum pu tant de Christiana religione, si quis Aristotelis decreta rejeceritb. NOTE W. p. 88. The different applications of the Scriptures have been thus deduced by the Scholastic writers. Auctor sacrae scripturae est Deus, in cujus potestate est, ut non solum voces ad significandum accommodet (quod etiam homo facere potest) sed etiam res ipsas. Et ideo, cum in omnibus scientiis voces significent, hoc habet pro- prium ista scientia, quod ipsae res significatae per voces, etiam significant aliquid. IUa ergo prima significatio qua voces significant res, pertinent ad primum sensum, qui est sensus historicus, vei literalis. IUa vero significatio, qua res significatae per voces, iterum res alias significant, dici tur sensus spiritualis, propter quod sensus spiritualis super literalem fundatur, et eum supponit. Hic autem sensus trifariam dividitur. Sicut enim dicit Apostolus ad He- braeos vii. " lex vetus figura est novae legis:" et ipsa nova lex, ut dicit Dionysius in Ecclesiastica Hierarchia, est figura futurae glorias. In nova etiam lege ea quae in capite sunt gesta, sunt signa eorum quae nos agere debemus. Secundum ergo quod ea sunt veteris legis, significant ea b Hieronym. Ep. ad Ctesiph. Erasmi Scholia, p. 258. NOTES TO LECTURE III. 457 quae sunt novae legis, sensus est allegoricus. Secundum vero quod ea quae in Christo sunt facta, vei in his quae Christum significant, sunt signa eorum quae nos agere de- bemus, est sensus moralis ; prout vero significant ea quae sunt in asterna gloria, est sensus anagogicus. Aquinas, Summa Theol. Prima Pars, qu. i. art. 10. LECTURE III. NOTE A. p. 104. X HE residence of Athanasius at Rome for so consider able a portion of time, is a very important point in ecclesi astical history. Who can say, how much the orthodoxy of the Western Church may be attributable to that circum stance? So restless a spirit, we may be sure, was not unoccupied in the sacred cause during the interval. And yet respecting any actions performed by him at that time, there is a profound silence. Qui tantum otii nactus, (says the biography,) quid gesserit, edideritve, altum ubique silentium. But this silence is an extremely expressive one. According indeed to his own account it was not an indolent one. " Applying myself wholly to the Church," he says, " for of this only had I any thought, I enjoyed " leisure for the councils : Kai rfj kKKXqaCq ra. Kar kpavrbv " rrapadkpevos, tovtov yap povov poi (ppovrls rjv, kay6Xa(ov " rats avvd£eai c." To a person, whose heart and eye were alive to all that was passing in the Church at that time, this leisure devoted to the councils must have been a period full of reflection and instruction. To watch the different leanings of controversy, the conflicts of private and party feeling, the intrigues of ecclesiastical diplo macy, the shifts of subtile argumentation, which were dis played on the theatre of the public councils, was an effort c Athanas. Ope?: torn. I. p. 297. 458 APPENDIX. of attention not unworthy of the powers of Athanasius ; nor could it be unproductive of results as to the future decision of theological questions. I do not observe it expressly said any where, that he employed himself in learning the Latin language, though Gibbon has so stated it. But I conceive the fact of his learning the theological language of the Latin Church, is borne out, by what Gregory Nazianzen has said of his tact in reconciling the dissensions produced by a difference of terms between the Greeks and Latins. Having touched on the verbal variations which occasioned so much discord in the doctrines of theologians, Gregory adds, concerning Athanasius : Taw' ovv bp&v ko.1 aKovaiv 6 paKdpios e/cetz*os, /cat a>s aXqd&s dvdpcoiTos tov deov, ko.1 peyas t&v \jn>x&v oIko- vdpos, ovk (a-qdj} beiv ¦napibe'i.v ttjv aroirov ovtoo /cat dXoyov tov Xoyov Kararop-qv, to be nap' eavrov (pdppaKOV, krrdyei r& d&- pcaarrjpan. 7n3s ovv tovto rroiei; npoaKaXeadpevos djxcpOTepa ra p-epq, ovnoal rrpqeos Kai iXavdpcoTTb)s, Kai tov vovv t&v Xeyop.evb>v d/cpt/3<3s kgerdaas, krreibr] avpuppovovvras eSpe, Kai ovbev biear&ras Kara rbv Xoyov, ra dvopara avyxafrqaas, avv- bei rots rrpdypaai. Orat. XXI. p. 396. Some light is reflected on the character of Athanasius, from the description of the Egyptian monks, Ammonius and Isidorus, who accompanied him to Rome. The au stere taste of Ammonius would not suffer him to look at the memorials of the greatness of the city in her classic times ; but the only attractions for him at Rome were the shrines of Peter and Paul. So resolute too was he against all worldly honour, even connected with spiritual duties, that when on some occasion the episcopal dignity would have been forced on him, he not only fled away, but in order to disable himself for the office, (no maimed person being admissible to the priesthood,) cut off one of his ears. The other, Isidorus, it is added, was no less conspicuous for piety and abdication of the changeable things of the world d. d Vita S. Athanasii, p. 36. Opera, Paris, 1698. NOTES TO LECTURE III. 459 NOTE B. p. 106. Dehinc post aliquot annos, cum Hincmarus in Ecclesia Remensi vetustissimum et receptissimum hymni ecclesi- astici hunc versiculum ; " Te Trina Deitas Unaque pos- " cimus :" cantari vetuisset ; ipse Ratramnus volumine non modicae quantitatis ad Hildegarium Meldensem Epi- scopum edito, ex libris S. S. Hilarii et Augustini de Tri- nitate veterem Ecclesiae traditionem confirmavit. Mau- guin. Dissert. Hist. c. 17, cited in an edition of Ratramn's treatise on the Body and Blood of the Lord, p. 18e. Religiosi S. Benedicti diu multumque reluctati sunt huic immutationi. Ibid. p. 29. NOTE C. p. 108. I give the following passage as an illustration of this mode of philosophizing carried to its natural extreme. Tanta enim, divinae virtutis excellentia, in futura vita omnibus qui contemplatione ipsius digni futuri sunt, ma- nifestabit, ut nihil aliud praeter earn, sive in corporibus, sive in intellectibus, eis eluceat. Erit enim Deus " omnia " in omnibus :" ac si aperte Scriptura diceret ; solus Deus apparebit in omnibus. Hinc ait sanctus Job : " et in " carne mea videbo Deum." Ac si dixisset ; in hac carne mea quae multis tentationibus affiigitur, tanta gloria futura erit, ut quemadmodum nunc nihil in ea apparet, nisi mors et corruptio : ita in futura vita nihil mihi apparebit, nisi solus Deus, qui vere vita est, et immortalitas, et incor- ruptio. Ac si de sui corporis felicitate talem gloriam pro- misit, quid de sui spiritus dignitate existimandum est ? praesertim cum, ut ait Magnus Gregorius, Theologus, cor pora Sanctorum in rationem, ratio in intellectum, intel- lectus in Deum ; ac per hoc tota illorum natura in ipsum Deum mutabitur. Joan. Scot. Erigen. de Divis. Natur. lib. I. c. 11. p. 5. « Bertram, or Ratram, concerning the Body and Blood of the Lord, in Latin, with a new English translation, 8vo. London, 1688. 460 APPENDIX. NOTE D. p. 1 10. Sicut dicit enim Anselinus ; processio personarum est ante processionem creaturarum, sicut causa ante effectum, et sicut aeternum ante temporale, et sicut exemplar, ante exemplatum. Albert. Mag. in lib. Sent. Tract. VII. fol. 68. Hoc expresse vult Dionysius in Ubro de divinis nomi- nibus, cap. 4. tractans illud Apostoli Eph. iii. " Hujus " rei gratia, flecto genua mea ad Deum Patrem : ex quo " omnis paternitas in coelo et in terra nominatur." Dicit enim : quod ex hoc accipiatur, quod omnis paternitas et omnis filiatio, ex qua, et deorum parentes, et deorum filii sunt, sive in coelo, sive in terra, est ex patriarchia et fili- archia omnibus proposita. Hoc expresse probatur per illud Esaiae lxvi. " si ego aliis generationem tribuo, ipse sterilis " ero : dicit Dominus." Ibid. qu. xxx. fol. 69. NOTE E. p. 111. 'Erreibri roiwv ov yvpvfj rrj ^nrxfi {&p.ev, dAA' warrep vito napaneraapxiTi t& aapKia KaXvnropevrj fjp.&v ¦yjrvxv, vow p.ev bp&vra Kai yvcoanKov. . . . avXeos npoaeXdapev rfj dXrjdeCq. Damasceni Dialectica, c. 1 . Among the doubts proposed by Albert on the question ; Utrum Deus cognoscibilis sit, secundum quod est unus Deus in tribus personis, is this : Et videtur quod sic. Rom. primo capite; " Invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta intel- " lectu conspiciimtur." Ibi glosa : invisibilia dicit, propter Patrem : sempiterna virtus, propter Filium, divinitas, prop ter Spiritum Sanctum : ergo ductu rationis philosophi cog noverunt Deum unum in tribus personis. Summa, Tract. III. qu. xiii. fol. 12. NOTE F. p. 117- Aquinas, discussing the question ; Utrum processio sit in divinis ; and first, according to his usual plan, adducing objections, and in opposition to these the text of John viii. NOTES TO LECTURE III. 461 " Ego ex Deo processi," adds, in his Conclusion on the point. Respondeo dicendum; quod divina scriptura in rebus divinis, nominibus ad processionem pertinentibus utitur. Hanc autem processionem diversi diversimode acceperunt. Quidam enim acceperunt hanc processionem, secundum quod effectus procedit a causa. Et sic accepit Arius, di- cens, Filium procedere a Patre, sicut primam ejus creatu- ram ; et Spiritum Sanctum procedere a Patre et Filio, sicut creaturam utriusque. Et secundum hoc, neque Filius, ne que Spiritus Sanctus, esset verus Deus; quod est contra id quod dicitur de Filio, 1 Joan. ult. " ut simus in vero Filio " ejus. Hic est verus Deus." Et de Spiritu Sancto di citur, 1 Cor. vi. " nescitis quia membra vestra templum " sunt Spiritus Sancti." Templum autem habere, solius Dei est. Alii vero hanc processionem acceperunt, secun dum quod causa dicitur procedere in effectum, in quantum vei movet ipsum, vei similitudinem suam ipsi imprimit. Et sic accepit Sabellius, dicens ipsum Deum Patrem Filium dici, secundum quod carnem assumpsit ex Virgine : et eumdem dicit Spiritum Sanctum, secundum quod creatu ram rationalem sanctificat, et ad vitam movet. Huic au tem acceptioni repugnant verba Domini de se dicentis, Joan. v. " non potest Filius a se facere quicquam;" et multa alia, per quae ostenditur quod non est ipse Pater qui FUius. Si quis autem diligenter consideret, uterque acce pit processionem, secundum quod est ad aliquid extra ; unde neuter posuit processionem in ipso Deo. Sed cum omnis processio sit secundum aliquam actio nem : sicut, secundum actionem quae tendit in exteriorem materiam, est aliqua processio ad extra: ita, secundum actionem quae manet in ipso agente, attenditur processio quaedam ad intra. Et hoc maxime patet in intellectu, cujus actio, scilicet intelligere, manet in intelligente. Qui- cunque autem intelligit, ex hoc ipso quod intelligit, proce dit aliquid intra ipsum ; quod est conceptio rei intellectae ex vi intellectiva proveniens, et ex ejus notitia procedens. 462 APPENDIX. Quam quidem conceptionem vox significat ; et dicitur verbum cordis significatum verbo vocis. Cum autem Deus sit super omnia, ea quae in Deo dicuntur, non sunt intelligenda secundum modum infimarum creaturarum, quae sunt corpora; sed secundum similitudinem supremarum creaturarum, quae sunt intellectuales substantias ; a quibus etiam similitudo accepta deficit a repraesentatione divino rum. Non ergo accipienda est processio, secundum quod est in corporalibus, vei per motum localem, vei per actio nem alicujus causae in exteriorem effectum, ut calor a cale- faciente in calefactum : sed secundum emanationem intel- ligibUem, utpote verbi intelligibilis a dicente, quod manet in ipso. Et sic fides catholica processionem ponit in divi nis. Summa Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xxvn. art. 1. On the application of the terms Generation, Son, Spirit, the following passages are explicit. Sic igitur processio Verbi in divinis habet rationem ge- nerationis : procedit enim per modum intelligibilis actionis, quae est operatio vitae; et a principio conjuncto, ut supra jam dictum est : et secundum rationem siinihtudinis ; quia conceptio intellectus est similitudo rei intellectae ; et in eadem natura; quia in Deo idem est intelligere et esse, ut supra ostensum est. Unde processio Verbi in divinis di citur generatio, et ipsum Verbum procedens dicitur Filius. Ibid. art. 2. Secundum autem operationem voluntatis invenitur in nobis quaedam alia processio, scilicet processio amoris, se cundum quam amatum est in amante, sicut per concep tionem verbi, res intellecta est in intelligente. Unde et praeter processionem Verbi ponitur alia processio in divi nis, quae est processio amoris. Ibid. art. 3. Processio igitur quae attenditur secundum rationem in tellectus, est secundum rationem similitudinis ; et in tan- tum potest habere rationem generationis, quia omne gene- rans generat sibi simile. Processio autem quae attenditur secundum rationem voluntatis, non consideratur secundum rationem similitudinis ; sed magis secundum rationem im- NOTES TO LECTURE III. 463 pellentis et moventis in aliquid. Et ideo quod procedit in divinis per modum amoris, non procedit ut genitum, vei ut filius ; sed magis procedit ut spiritus. . . . Et quia in creaturis communicatio naturae non est nisi per genera- tionem ; processio in divinis non habet proprium vei spe- ciale nomen nisi generationis. Unde processio, quae non est generatio, remansit sine speciali nomine : sed potest nominari spiratio, quia est processio Spiritus. Ibid. art. 4. Abundant passages might be adduced to the same pur port from other Scholastic writers. In some, the analogy on which the reasoning proceeds, is carried to the most offensive excess. We find indeed the same language adopted by the Church of Rome after the Council of Trent, in the authoritative document entitled, Catechismus ad Parochos ; which clearly recognizes this philosophy of the subject as a sound theological view of it. Oret tamen assidue, ac precetur Deum, et Patrem, qui universa ex nihilo condidit, disponitque omnia suaviter, qui dedit nobis potestatem filios Dei fieri, qui Trinitatis mysterium humanae menti patefecit : oret, inquam, sine intermissione, qui divino beneficio haec credit, ut, ali- quando in aeterna tabernacula receptus, dignus sit qui vi- deat, quae tanta sit Dei Patris fecunditas, ut se ipsum intuens, atque intelligens, parem et aequalem sibi Filium gignat; quove modo duorum idem plane et par charitatis amor, qui Spiritus Sanctus est, a Patre et Filio procedens, genitorem, et genitum, aeterno, atque indissolubili vinculo inter se connectat; atque ita divinae Trinitatis una sit es sentia, et trium personarum perfecta distinctio. Catechis mus ex Decret. Concil. Trident, ad Paroch. Romae, 1761. p. 18. quarto ed. Yet with all this ratiocination on the subject, Aquinas, it must be observed, expressly denies, as also Albert and other scholastics do, that human reasonings can attain to so high a mystery. In Question xxxn. art. 1, of the First Part of his Summa, he discusses the point, whether a knowledge of the Trinity could be ascertained by the 464 APPENDIX. light of reason. He there states the value of reasonings on the subject to be relative to those who already believe; and that the speculation proceeds on the assumption that the doctrine is authoritatively established. We see here the scholastic principle, the combination, that is, of reason and authority, (as I have pointed out in the preceding Lec tures,) consistently supported. Reason is to be exercised boldly in theological truth ; only with this reserve, that it is subordinate to authority. Though by its adventurous excursions it may supersede the simple statements of re vealed truth, in pretension it is only the minister of the divine word. We see also in this admission an evidence of the origin of the logical theology, in the disputes agi tated between the heretic and the orthodox, — between parties, both acknowledging the inspiration of the Scrip tures, but each anxious either to impose his own creed on the other, or to resist the imposition on himself of the creed of another. It was Reason maintaining its prero gative, both under authority and against authority. Thus Reason was in effect made supreme over the re vealed truth. Hence too the distinction of a philosophical and a popular belief, became a recognized principle among theologians. I find this principle expressly sanctioned by an eloquent modern philosopher, in reference too to the very point which is the subject of the present note. Mystere est un mot qui appartient non a la langue de la philosophie, mais a celle de la religion. Le mysticisme est la forme necessaire de toute religion, en tant que re ligion ; mais sous cette forme sont des idees qui peuvent etre aborde'es et comprises en elles-memes. Et, Mes sieurs, je ne fais que repe"ter ce qu'ont dit bien avant moi les plus grands docteurs de l'eglise, saint Thomas, saint Anselme de Canterbury, et Bossuet lui-meme au dix- septieme siecle, a la fin de YHistoire universelle. Les grands hommes ont tente une explication des mysteres, entre autres du mystere de la tres sainte Trinite ; done ce mystere, tout saint et sacre qu'il etait a leurs propres NOTES TO LECTURE III. 465 yeux, contenait des ide'es qu'il etait possible de degager de leur forme. La forme symbolique et mystique est in- herente a la religion ; elle est, dans le eas qui nous occupe, empruntee aux relations humaines les plus intimes et les plus touchantes. Mais, encore une fois, si la forme est sainte, les ide'es qui sont dessous le sont aussi, et ce sont ces id^es que la philosophie degage, et qu'elle considere en elles-memes. Cousin, Introduction a VHisloire de Phi losophie, 5e. Lecon, p. 19. Paris, 1828. NOTE G. p. 117. Amplius autem plurimi antiquorum Philosophorum po- suerunt amorem Dei originale principium quorumcunque ; Amor autem a voluntate minime separatur. Recitat si- quidem Philosophus, 1. Metaph., Hesiodum et Parmeni- dem, dicentes, amorem Deorum providentem omnibus esse principium generationis universi: qui amor omnia condidit : quem necesse est esse in entibus, et esse causam quae res ipsas moveat et congreget. Bradwardin. De Caus. Dei, lib. I. c. 9. p. 192. It may be perceived, from the following passage of Albert, that the notions of the Timaeus were accommo dated by the scholastics to their theological system ; though the necessity of maintaining the supremacy of Revelation, required from them a disclaimer of the authority of Plato, as original on the sacred subject to which they applied it. Adhuc Plato in ultima parte Tymaei de thugatero, hoc est, paterno intellectu, loquitur, et Filio logon, et matri- cula : Patrem ergo et Filium cognovit. Et quia Pater et Filius non nectuntur sine amore in Patre et Filio : nexum cognovit utriusque : qui est Spiritus Sanctus : ergo et alii cognoverunt. Ad aliud dicendum : quod Plato Patrem intellectum cre- antem nominat : Filium autem mundum. Quem mundum vocavit : eo quod a mundissimo exemplari exivit, arte sc. Creatoris. Quem archetypum mundum dixit : matri- culam autem vocavit materiam. Unde constat quod de Hh 466 APPENDIX. appropriatis, et non de propriis, loquitur: et ad produc- tionem rerum hoc refert, et non ad processionem persona- rum. Albert. Mag. Summa, qu.- xiii. Tract. III. fol. 13. NOTE H. p. 122. Materialism may be regarded as generally the doctrine of the primitive Church. It accorded more with the po pular view of future punishments which was originally held : and it reserved to God himself more exclusively the prerogative of spirituality. It was the creed of an unphi losophical piety, vaguely and loosely conceived ; not an ingenious theory, such as that which a false modern phi losophy has devised. Were the material nature of the soul denied, the infidel might argue against the possibi lity of its undergoing those sufferings for sin which Chris tianity denounces. Or man might be tempted to lift up himself with pride, as little less than the Divine Being. Thus TertuUian says : Nihil enim si non corpus. De Anim. c. 7- n- 96. Omne quod est, corpus est sui generis; nihil est incorporale, nisi quod non est. De Carne Christi. Ut concedam interim esse aliquid incorporale, de sub- stantiis duntaxat; quum ipsa substantia corpus sit rei cu- jusque. Adv. Hermogen. c. 35. He even does not scru ple to apply the word corpus to the nature of God. Quis enim negabit Deum corpus esse, etsi Deus spiritus est ? Spiritus enim corpus sui generis in sua effigie. Adv. Prax. c. 7- — Jerome, alluding to the different opinions concerning the nature of the soul, speaks of its propaga tion in a manner analogous to the body, as the prevailing tenet in the West. — Utrum lapsa de ccelo sit, ut Pytha goras philosophus, omnesque Platonici, et Origenes, pu- tant, anima; an a propria Dei substantia, ut Stoici, Ma- nichaeus, et Hispaniae Prisciliani haereses, suspicantur; an in thesauro habeantur Dei olim conditae, ut quidam eccle- siastici stulta persuasione confidunt ; an quotidie a Deo fiant, et mittantur in corpora, secundum illud quod in evangelio scriptum est, " Pater meus usque modo operatur, NOTES TO LECTURE III. 467 " et ego operor;" an certe ex traduce, ut Tertullianus, Apollinaris, et maxima pars Occidentalium autumant, ut, quomodo corpus ex corpore, sic anima nascatur ex anima, et simili cum brutis animantibus conditione subsistant. Hieronym. Marcellino et Anapsychice d. Citations might be made from other writers to the same purport. At length, about the commencement of the Vth century, the Pelagian discussions, and in particular the po sitive statement of the materiality of the soul by Faustus, bishop of Riez, attracted the attention of philosophical Christians to the point. The arguments of Faustus were answered in a treatise by Mamertus Claudianus, a priest of Vienne, and the most eminent philosopher of that day in Gaul. About the same time the Greek philosopher Ne- mesius, Bishop of Emesa, argued the incorruptible vitality of the soul, in a work " On the Nature of Man." Then also we find Augustine discussing the subject. His Ma- nichean prejudices having leaned entirely on the side of Materialism, when he became a catholic Christian, he was naturally led to assert an opposite theory. In his dialogue, De Quantitate Animce, he derives the origin of the soul from God, and affirms its simplicity and immateriality. So again in an epistle to Jerome, he says : Incorpoream quoque esse animam, etsi difficile tardioribus persuaderi potest, mihi tamen fateor esse persuasume. Platonism was now the received philosophy of the Church : and the necessity of arguing against the preexistence of the soul was not so imperatively felt. Nemesius indeed expressly teaches its preexistence. There seems therefore to have been no objection to admitting the principles, from which Plato drew his conclusions of the natural immortality of the soul. Still speculation did not rest on the subject : as we may perceive from the remarks of John of Salisbury. — At physici, dum naturae nimium autoritatis tribuunt, in autorem naturae, adversando fidei, plerumque impingunt. d Ep. XXVII. torn. IT. August. Opera. • Augustini Opera, torn. II. fol. 30. H h 2 468 APPENDIX. Non enim omnes erroris arguo; licet plurimos audierim, de anima, de virtutibus et operibus ejus, de augmento cor poris et diminutione, de resurrectione ejusdem, de cre- atione rerum, aliter quam fides habeat, disputantes. Po- licraticus, lib. II. p. 147. NOTE I. p. 123. Sed dicent forsitan : flatus utique ille non erat de sub stantia humana, et tamen quasi suam ilium emittebat. Quapropter docetur per hujusmodi Spiritus Sancti datio- nem : quia cum dat Filius Spiritum Sanctum, dat et mittit suum spiritum ; sed non de suae divinitatis essentia. Di- cant igitur, si qui haec opinantur : quia, sicut flatus non est humana natura cum emittitur ab homine, ita Spiritus Sanctus non est divina substantia, cum datur vei mittitur a Deo Filio ; quod nullus confitetur Christianus. Dicant etiam cum audiunt : " Verbo Domini cceli firmati sunt, et " spiritu oris ejus omnis virtus eorum :" si ibi non ne- gant intelligendum per spiritum oris Domini, Spiritum Sanctum, non ilium esse de essentia Domini, cujus oris spiritus dicitur : quia spiritus qui ex ore solet hominum procedere, non est de subtantia illius de cujus ore proce dit, &c. Anselm. De Process. Spir. S. p. 130. Oper. torn. III. ed. 1612. NOTE J. p. 126. Gregory Nazianzen, having spoken of the Nature of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, corrects himself with the observation ; that " one should rightly say usia, essence, " rather than Nature." Orat. XLV. p. '7 17. Aquinas gives, as a reason for saying unius essentice rather than unius natures, that things agreeing in any act, for instance, all heating things, may be said to be of one Nature, but things cannot be said to be of one Essence, unless they have unum esse, one Being. S. Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xxxix. art. 2. On the same principle substantia was a still more apt NOTES TO LECTURE III. 469 expression than essentia; particularly as substantia was the logical term of the Latins for the ovaia of the Cate gories. NOTE K. p. 126. This may be seen in the following, instances : — Idque quo facilius intelligas ex teipso ante recognosce, ut ex imagine et similitudine Dei, quam habeas et tu in temet- ipso rationem, qui es animal rationale, a rationali scilicet artifice non tantum factus, sed etiam ex substantia ipsius animatus. TertuUian. adv. Prax. p. 503. Paris. 1675. Quasi non sic quoque unus sit omnia, dum ex uno om nia, per substantiae scilicet unitatem. Ibid. c. 2. p. 501. Suscepturus etiam ipsas substantias hominis carnem et animam. Ibid. c. 16. p. 509. Quaecunque ergo substantia sermonis fuit, illam dico personam, et illi nomen filii vindico. Ibid. c. 7- P- 504. Quapropter tres substantiae sunt. Hilar. De Trin. IV. c. 13, and August. De Trin. VII. Hoc vero utcunque simile est, quia et veteres qui La- , tine locuti sunt, antequam haberent ista nomina, qua non diu est quod in usum venerunt, id est, essentiam vei sub stantiam, pro his naturam dicebant. August. De Trin. lib. VII. fol. 114. col. 1. Also lib. V. fol. 106. col. 3. Nomen substantiae (cui respondet in Graeco nomen hy postasis) communiter accipituf apud nos pro essentia. Aquin. Summa Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xxix. art. 3. Confirma, Domine, famulos tuos quos ex aqua et Spi- ritu Sancto propitius redemisti, ut veterem hominem cum suis actionibus deponentes, in ipsius conversatione viva- mus, ad cujus substantiam per haec Paschalia mysteria transtulisti. Extract from an ancient Gallic Missal {. So in the Athanasian Creed, in the sentence, " God of " the substance of the Father, begotten before the worlds : f Cited in an edition of Ratramn, on the Body and Blood of the Lord, 8vo. London, 1688. p. 479. It was the prayer, it is there observed, made in the name of the new- baptized persons on the Friday in Easter week. h b.3 470 APPENDIX. " and man of the substance of his mother, born in the " world," substance is clearly used in two different senses; first to denote the essence of God, next to denote the fleshly nature of the mother of Jesus Christ. NOTE L. p. 128. Synodi (Nicaenae) sensum Marcellus Ancyranus non per- - cepisse fertur; sed, errore Sabelliano, consubstantiale sic defendisse, ut personarum Trinitatem tolleret. Verum auctor dissertationis ad Sabellii gregales, quae extat inter opera Athanasii, admonet earn esse vim nominis, 6p.oovaiov, consubstantialis, ut multorum secundum substantiam con sortium efferat; et idcirco Sabellianos ei subrogasse, to piovooijaiov, quod unius substantice significat. Particula 6p,ov, una, simul, inquit Epiphanius, Hcer. LXIX. c. 70, ovx eva, aXXa bvo a-qpaCvei reAeta. Damasc. Dialectica, c. 41. p. 44, note, Le Quien. NOTE M. p. 129. Olov kv fjXCois rpialv kxop.evois dXXqXeia, is a com parison of Gregory Nazianzen, in Orat. XXXVII, intro duced by Damascenus, De Fid. Orthod. I. p. 140. Videamus tamen, an in rebus creatis, quae et loci et temporis, et compositionis partium, legi subjacent, inve- niri possit aliquatenus, hoc quod negat in Deo. Ponamus fontem, de quo nascatur et fluat rivus, qui postea colliga- tur in lacum, &c. Anselm. De Incarn. Verb. c. 7- p- 40, also De Process. Spirit, p. 132. Exivit autem ex Patre, ut radius ex sole, ut rivus ex fonte, ut frutex ex semine. Tertull. adv. Prax. lib. XXI. also Hilar. Ex Oper. Histor. Frag. II. p. 646. TertuUian uses the expressions; Trinitas per consertos et connexos gradus a Patre decurrens — nee frutex a ra- dice, nee fluvius a fonte, nee radius a sole, discernitur — fons et fluvius duae species sunt, sed indivisae. Adv. Prax. NOTES TO LECTURE III. 471 NOTE N. p. 129. Quaerunt autem quomodo in Deo, una penitus perma- nente substantia vei essentia aliqua, ibi proprietatum sit diversitas, secundum quas Trinitas personarum constat : vei quomodo potest esse, ut cum unaquaeque ibi persona sit Deus, nee tamen una persona sit alia, non etiam plures Dii, sicut et plures personae sint dicendi. Aut quae sit denique generatio Filii de Patre vei processio Spiritus ab utroque. Quod quidem ut diligentius fiat, praemittendum est, quot modis, Idem, et quot modis Diversum, accipiatur. Tribus autem modis utrumque et fortasse pluribus dici solet. Idem namque similitudine, idem essentialiter sine numero, idem proprietate dicimus, &c. . . . Tribus etiam modis solet diversum sumi; essentialiter scilicet, numero, proprietate, seu diffinitione. Diversa namque essentialiter dicimus, si eadem essentia quae est hoc, non sit illud ; et si homo est, nullius essentia tanquam pars includatur, ut manus et homo. Tunc vero etiam numero sunt diversa, cum ita tota quantitate suae essentiae sunt discreta, ut in computatione sibi queant admisceri, cum videlicet dicitur unus, duo, tres, &c Proprietate vero seu diffinitione diversa sunt, quae licet habeant de se praedicari, cum es sentialiter idem sunt, secundum proprios tamen status, aliud est hujus proprium, et aliud illius, et singula propriis diffinitionibus et in sensu diversis sunt terminanda. Abce- lardi Introd. ad Theol. lib. II. p. 1076. NOTE O. p. 130. The theological vocabulary of the Latins appears not to have been settled before the writings of Augustine. In TertuUian great laxity of expression is observable. Even in Hilary, the immediate precursor of Ambrose and Au gustine in the Arian controversy, the terms are not used with that precision which the captiousness of heresy after wards enforced. Thus Hilary does not scruple to speak of tres substantice, or to use person in the sense of nature; Hh 4 472 APPENDIX. and in general to conform himself more to the phraseology of the Greek theologians, than the Latins after him could venture to do. It was the object of Hilary, to mediate between the Christian of the East and the West, and he adopted accordingly a phraseology that might conciliate both parties. The work, De Synodis, of Hilary, is a curious illus tration of the unsettled state of religious opinion in the times when it was composed. It is throughout a con ciliatory document — a rhetorical address to his episcopal brethren of the West, to induce them to acquiesce in the decisions of the several councils, by shewing how little in reality the differences were. The attempt indeed is car ried so far as to amount to a compromise of opinions. NOTE P.p. 131. The distinction rested principally on the coincidence of the notions of " having" and " being," in their application to the Deity. Thus Anselm observes. Videndum igitur quomodo intelligendum sit, quando ilia natura, quae est ipsa justitia, dicitur justa. Quoniam enim homo non potest esse justitia, justitiam autem habere pot est. Non enim intelligitur Justus homo, existens justitia, sed habens justitiam. Quoniam igitur summa natura non proprie dicitur justa, quia habet justitiam, sed existit jus titia : cum dicitur justa, proprie intelligitur existens jus titia, non autem habens justitiam; quare si cum dicitur existens justitia, non dicitur qualis est, sed quid est ; con- sequitur, ut cum dicitur justa, non dicatur qualis sit, sed quid sit, &c. Monologium XV. p. 6. Oper. Distinctio autem in divinis non fit nisi per relationes originis. Relatio autem in divinis non est sicut accidens inhaerens subjecto, sed est ipsa divina essentia : unde est subsistens, sicut essentia divina subsistit. Sicut ergo dei- tas est Deus: ita paternitas divina est Deus Pater, qui est persona divina. Persona igitur divina significat rela- tionem ut subsistentem ; et hoc est significare relationem NOTES TO LECTURE III. 473 per modum substantiae, quae est hypostasis subsistens in natura divina; licet, subsistens in natura divina, non sit aliud quam natura divina. Aquin. Summa Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xxix. art. 4. NOTE Q. p. 133. Sed quia nostra loquendi consuetudo jam obtinuit, ut hoc intelligatur, cum dicimus substantiam; non audemus dicere, unam essentiam, tres substantias, sed unam es- sentiam vei substantiam, tres autem personas : quemad- modum multi Latini ista tractantes, et digni authoritate dixerunt ; cum alium modum aptiorem non invenirent, quo enuntiarent verbis quod sine verbis intelligebant. . . . . Tamen cum quferitur quid tres, magna prorsus ino- pia humanum laborat eloquium. Dictum est tamen tres personae, non ut illud diceretur, sed ne taceretur. . . . Aut quoniam propter ineffabilem conjunctionem, haec tria simul unus Deus, cur non etiam una persona, ut ita non possimus dicere tres personas. ... An quia Scriptura non dicit tres Deos ? Sed nee tres personas alicubi Scrip- turam commemorare invenimus. An quia nee tres nee unam personam Scriptura dicit haec tria, legimus enim personam Domini, non personam Dominum, propterea licuit loquendi et disputandi necessitate tres personas dicere, non quia Scriptura dicit, sed quia Scriptura non contradicit. . . . Quid igitur restat, nisi ut fateamur lo quendi necessitate partita haec vocabula, cum opus esset copiosa disputatione adversum insidias vei errores haereti- corum. Cum enim conaretur humana inopia loquendo pro- ferre ad hominum sensus, quod in secretario mentis pro captu tenet, de Domino Deo creatore suo, sive per piam fidem, sive per qualemcunque inteUigentiam, timuit dicere tres essentias, ne inteUigeretur in ilia summa aequalitate ulla diversitas. Rursus non esse tria quajdam non poterat dicere ; quod Sabellius quia dixit, in haeresim lapsus est. . . . Aut si jam placet propter disputandi necessitatem, etiam exceptis nominibus relativis, pluralem numerum ad- 474 APPENDIX. mittere, ut uno nomine respondeatur, cum quaeritur, quid tria, et dicere tres substantias, sive tres personas, nullae moles aut intervalla cogitentur, nulla distantia quantulae- cunque dissimilitudinis, ut ibi intelligatur aliud alio, vei paulo minus, quocunque modo minus esse aliud alio potest, ut neque personarum sit confusio, nee talis distinctio qua sit impar aliquid. . . . Ideoque dici tres personas vei tres sub stantias, non ut aliqua intelligatur diversitas essentiae, sed ut vei uno aliquo vocabulo responderi possit, cum dicitur, quid tres, vei quid tria. Augustin. De Trin. lib. V. fol. 106. VII. fol. 113, 114, VIII. fol. 114. Ecce patet omni homini expedire, ut credat in quandam ineffabilem trinam Unitatem et unam Trinitatem. Unam quidem et Unitatem, propter unam essentiam ; trinam vero et Trinitatem, propter tres, nescio quid : licet enim possim dicere Trinitatem, propter Patrem, et Filium, et utriusque Spiritum, qui sunt tres ; non tamen possum pro- ferre uno nomine, propter quid tres, velut si dicerem prop ter tres personas ; sicut si dicerem unitatem propter unam substantiam. Non enim putandae sunt tres personae: quia omnes plures personae sic subsistunt separatim ab invicem, ut tot necesse sit esse substantias, quot sunt personae : quod in pluribus hominibus, qui, quot personae, tot indi- viduae sunt substantiae, cognoscitur. Quare in summa es sentia, sicut non sunt plures substantiae, ita nee plures personae. Si quis itaque inde velit alicui loqui, quid tres ; dicet esse Patrem, et Filium, et utriusque Spiritum ; nisi forte, indigentia nominis proprie convenientis coactus, ele gerit aliquid de illis nominibus, quae pluraliter in summa essentia dici non possint, ad designandum id quod congruo nomine dici non potest ; ut si dicat, illam admirabilem Trinitatem esse unam essentiam vei naturam, et tres per sonas sive substantias. Anselm. Monologium, c. 76. Oper. p. 22. Unum enim sunt illi tres, id est, essentia divina. Unde Veritas ait : " Ego et Pater unum sumus." Veruntamen cum quaeritur, quid tres, vei quid tria; non de essentia NOTES TO LECTURE UI. 475 quaeritur, nee ibi quid ad essentiam refertur. Sed cum fides Catholica tres esse profiteretur, sicut Joannes in epi stola canonica ait : " Tres sunt qui testimonium perhibent " de coelo :" quaerebatur quid illi tres essent, i. e., an es sent tres res, et quae tres res, et quo nomine illae tres res significarentur. Et ideo loquendi necessitate inventum est hoc nomen persona ad respondendum, et dictum est tres personae. Lombard, lib. I. dist. 25. p. 73. Unde quibusdam visum est quod hoc nomen, persona, simpliciter ex virtute vocabuli, essentiam significet in di vinis, sicut hoc nomen, Deus, et hoc nomen, sapiens ; sed propter instantiam haereticorum est accommodatum ex or- dinatione Concuii, ut possit poni pro relativis. . . . Sed haec non videtur sufficiens ratio : quia si hoc nomen, per sona, ex vi suae significationis, non habet quod significet, nisi essentiam in divinis, ex hoc quod dictum est tres per sonas, non fuisset haereticorum quietata calumnia, sed ma- joris calumniae data esset eis occasio. . . . Et secundum hoc etiam dici potest, quod haec significatio hujus nominis (per sona) non erat percepta ante haereticorum calumniam : unde non erat in usu hoc nomen, persona, nisi sicut unum ahorum absolutorum : sed postmodum accommodatum est hoc nomen, persona, ad standum pro relativo, ex congru- entia suae significationis : ut scilicet hoc quod stat pro re lativo, non solum habeat ex usu, (ut prima opinio docebat,) sed etiam ex significatione sua. Aquinas, Summa Theo- log. Prima Pars, qu. xxix. art. 4. NOTE R. p. 134. Ad primum ergo dicendum ; quod ad exprimendam ve- ritatem essentiae et personae, sancti doctores aliquando ex presses locuti sunt, quam proprietas locutionis patiatur ; Unde hujusmodi locutiones non sunt extendendae, sed ex- ponendae ; &c. Aquinas Summa Theol.. Prima Pars, qu. xxxix. art. 5. 476 APPENDIX. NOTE S. p. 136. Complures antiquorum, ut jam supra demonstravi, gene- ratim loquentes, naturam docuerunt communem sic esse, ut est quaelibet species individuis communicata pluribus ; immo ovaCav nihil aliud esse, quam speciem ultimam. Hinc autem consectarium hoc esse sane irapdbogov ostendi- mus, uti plures homines numero, unam et eandem habeant essentiam, ideoque ne homines quidem plurativo numero dici debeant, sed unus homo. Quod etsi perabsurdum videtur, et abhorrens a consuetudine communi; multi hoc tamen asseverare non dubitant. Petav. Dogmata Theol. de Trin. VI. c. 9. Curcellaei Oper. Amst. 1775. p. 883. NOTE T. p. 137- Oportet autem in his quae de Trinitate loquimur, duos errores oppositos cavere, temperate inter utrumque proce- dentes : sc. errorem Arii, qui posuit cum trinitate persona- rum trinitatem substantiarum, et errorem Sabellii, qui po suit cum unitate essentia? unitatem personae. Ad evitan- dem igitur errorem Arii, vitare debemus in divinis nomen diversitatis et differentiae, ne toUatur unitas essentiae. Possumus autem uti nomine distinctionis, propter opposi- tionem relativam. Unde sicubi in aliqua Scriptura authen- tica diversitas, vei differentia personarum invenitur, sumi- tur diversitas vei differentia, pro distinctione. Ne autem toUatur simplicitas divinae essentiae, vitandum est nomen separationis et divisionis, qua? est totius in partes. Ne au tem toUatur aequalitas, vitandum est nomen disparitatis. Ne vero toUatur similitudo, vitandum est nomen alieni et discre- pantis. . . Ad vitandum vero errorem Sabellii, vitare debemus singularitatem, ne toUatur communicabilitas essentiae divi nae. . . Debemus etiam vitare nomen unici, ne toUatur nu- merus personarum. . . Vitandum est etiam nomen solitarii, ne toUatur consortium trium personarum. Aquinas, Sum ma Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xxxi. art. 2. NOTES TO LECTURE III. 477 NOTE U. p. 138. Vincent of Lerins gives the following account of the opinion of Apollinarius, or Apollinaris. Apollinaris vero in unitate quidem Trinitatis quasi con- sentire se jactitat : et hoc ipsum non plena fidei sanitate ; sed in Domini incarnatione aperta professione blasphemat. Dicit enim in ipsa Salvatoris nostri carne, aut animam hu- manam penitus non fuisse, aut certe talem fuisse, cui mens et ratio non esset. Sed et ipsam Domini carnem non de sanctae virginis Mariae carne susceptam, sed de ccelo in virginem descendisse dicebat ; eamque, nutabundus sem per et dubius, modo coaeternam Deo Verbo, modo de Verbi divinitate factam praedicabat. Nolebat enim in Christo esse duas substantias, unam divinam, alteram humanam, unam ex patre, alteram ex matre : sed ipsam Verbi natu- ram putabat esse discissam ; quasi aliud ejus permaneret in Deo, aliud vero versum fuisset in carnem : at cum Veri tas dicat ex duabus substantiis unum esse Christum, ille, contrarius veritati, ex una Christi divinitate duas adserat factas esse substantias. Commonitorium, ed. Baluz. p. 333. The fear of assigning a quaternity instead of a trinity, seems to have actuated other Christians also in their rea sonings on the subject ; and to have made the orthodox careful of protecting their doctrines on that point. A pas sage of Ambrose will shew this. Nee timeo ne tetrada videar inducere : nos enim vere solam, qui hoc adserimus, colimus Trinitatem. Non enim Christum divido, cum carnis ejus divinitatisque distinguo substantiam : sed unum Christum cum Patre et Spiritu Dei praedico, et illos magis, qui carnem Christi unius cum divinitate ejus dicunt esse substantiae, tetrada inducere demonstrabo. Non enim quod ejusdem substantiae est, unus, sed unum est ; nam utique Filium ejusdem cum Pa tre substantiae confitentes in tractatu concilii Nicaeni, non unam personam, sed unam divinitatem, in Patre et Filio crediderunt. 478 APPENDIX. Ergo cum dicunt ejusdem carnem, cujus et Filius Dei erat, fuisse substantiae ; ipsi, quod nobis objiciunt, ineptiis vanae adsertionis incurrunt, ut dividant Christum. Itaque quartum increatum, quod adoremus, inducunt, cum sola in- creata sit divinitas Trinitatis. Ambros. de Incarn. c. VII. Oper. torn. II. p. 721. NOTE V. p. 140. The illustration from the union of body and soul, to the union of God and man in Christ, appears in Augustine's writings ; and probably was adopted from him into the Athanasian Creed. To take it in its proper force, it must be viewed by the light of the theory already alluded to ; which assumed the distinct formation of the soul and its infusion into the body. For in this point of view, it cor responds with the doctrine of the separate Divine nature, associated with the separate humanity, in the person of Christ. Those who acknowledged the former assumed fact, might consistently admit the latter. To those, on the other hand, who have no such theory on the nature of the soul, the illustration applies only in the most loose and general acceptation; as representing a case of our believing in a mysterious combination of powers, to induce us to be lieve another like inexplicable union. Strictly to speak, however, the analogy, as it is stated, is entirely hypotheti cal, and is calculated to pervert our notion of Christ. NOTE W. p. 140. The following passage of Anselm, bearing on the same point, is a most striking instance of the manner, in which the Christian doctrines have been made completely to de pend on a certain school-system. According to Anselm, it appears, that unless the abstract man was a reality, the Incarnation could not be true. Cumque omnes, ut cautissime ad sacrae paginae quaestio- nes accedant, sunt coinmonendi, illi utique nostri temporis dialectic! (imnio dialecticae haeretici, qui quidem non nisi fla- NOTES TO LECTURE III. 479 turn vocis putant esse universales substantias, et qui colo- rem non aliud queunt intelligere nisi corpus, nee sapientiam hominis aliud quam animam,) prorsus a spiritualium quae- stionum disputatione sunt exsufflandi. In eorum quippe animabus ratio, quae princeps et judex omnium debet esse, quae sunt in homine, sic est imaginationibus corporalibus obvoluta, ut ex eis se non possit evolvere : nee ab ipsis ea, quae sola et pura ipsa contemplari debet, valeat discer- nere. Qui enim nondum intelligit, quomodo plures homines in specie sint unus homo ; qualiter in ilia secretissima et altissima natura comprehendet, quomodo plures personae, quarum singula quaeque est perfectus Deus, sint unus Deus. Et cujus mens obscurata est ad discernendum inter equum suum et colorem ejus, qualiter discernet inter unum Deum et plures relationes ejus. Denique qui non potest intelli gere aliquid esse hominem nisi individuum ; nullatenus in telliget hominem, nisi humanam personam. Omnis enim individuus homo persona est. Quomodo ergo iste intelliget hominem assumptum esse a Verbo, non personam, id est, aliam naturam, non aliam personam, esse assumptam. An selm. De Incarn. c. II. p. 35. NOTE X. p. 141. The logical difficulty in regard to the theory of the In carnation was the reverse of that in regard to the Trinita rian. In the general theory of the Trinity, the common nature or idea was the given point : and the problem was, how to deduce from that, the distinctions of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. In the theory of the Incarnation, certain distinctions in Christ were the data ; and the problem was, to find a common idea in which they should agree. As concerning the Trinity, some erred in arriving at conclu sions at variance with their data, by making too great a difference between the persons of the Trinity; or destroyed the distinctions by a too rigid deduction of the exclusive notion of Divinity to the particular facts: — so in solving the question of the Incarnation, some left the difficulty un- 480 APPENDIX. explained, by making that common notion in which the dif ferent characteristics of Christ should agree, a compounded and imperfectly-united nature ; whilst others overthrew the original assumption of certain distinctions, by con founding them in one indistinct idea. The doctrine of the " hypostatical union" was the expedient which met the difficulty most satisfactorily ; giving at least that solution of the case, which a logical theology demanded. NOTE Y. p. 144. Ad hoc autem quod nos reprehendunt, in symbolo illo, quod pariter nos et illi suscipimus et tenemus, addidisse Spiritum Sanctum a Filio procedere : et quaerunt, cur hoc factum sit; et quare hoc prius eorum Ecclesiae monstratum non est : ut communiter consideraretur, et communi con sensu adderetur, quod addendum erat. Ad hoc, inquam, responsum sufficiens habemus. Nam si quaeritur cur fac tum sit ; dicimus, quia necesse erat propter quosdam mi nus intelligentes, qui non animadvertebant in illis, quae universa credit Ecclesia, contineri, et ex his sequi, Spiri tum Sanctum de Filio procedere : ne forte hoc credere du- bitarent. Quod quam necessarium fuerit, per illos qui hoc negant, quia in illo Symbolo positum non est, cognosci- mus. Quoniam igitur et necessitas cogebat, et nulla ratio prohibebat ; et vera fides hoc admittebat ; fiducialiter as- seruit Latinitas, quod credendum et confitendum esse cog- noscebat. Scimus enim quod non omnia quae credere et confiteri debemus, ibi dicta sunt ; nee illi ; qui symbolum illud dictavere, voluerunt, fidem Christianam esse conten- tam ea tantummodo credere et confiteri, quae ibi posue- runt : ut alia taceam ; non ibi dicitur Dominus ad infernum descendisse, quod tamen pariter et nos et Graeci credimus. Si autem dicunt nullo modo debuisse corrumpi symbolum tanta auctoritate firmatum : nos non judicamus esse cor- ruptionem, ubi nihil addidimus, quod his quae ibi dicta sunt adversetur. Et quamvis defendere possemus hanc adjec- tionem non esse corruptionem, si quis tamen hoc conten- NOTES TO LECTURE III. 481 tiose voluerit asserere : respondemus, nos illud non corru- pisse, sed aliud novum edidisse : illud secundum proprieta- tem Graeci dictaminis translatum, cum illis integrum ser- vamus et veneramur. Illud autem, quo frequentius in populi audientia utimur, Latino more dictatum, cum addi- tamento supradicto edidimus. Quod autem quaeritur, quare hoc Graecorum ecclesiae consensu factum non est : respon demus; quia et nimis erat difficile Latinis, eorum episcopos ad consulendum de hac re colligere ; nee erat necesse. Unde non dubitabant in hoc quaestionem adducere. Quae est enim ecclesia, quae vei per amplitudinem unius regni dilatatur, cui non liceat aliquid secundum rectam fidem constituere, quod in conventu populi utiliter legatur aut cantetur. Quanto ergo magis licuit Latinis hoc constanter proferre, in quo omnes gentes, et omnia regna, quae Lati nis utuntur Uteris, pariter concordant. Anselm. de Pro cess. Spir. S. Oper. t. III. p. 134. NOTE Z. p. 144, Relationes autem personas distinguere non possunt, nisi secundum quod sunt oppositae : quod ex hoc patet ; quia Pater habet duas relationes, quarum una refertur ad Fi lium, et alia ad Spiritum Sanctum : quae tamen, quia non sunt oppositae, non constituunt duas personas, sed ad unam tantum personam Patris pertinent. Si autem in Filio, et Spiritu Sancto, non esset invenire nisi duas relationes, qui bus uterque refertur ad Patrem ; illae relationes non essent ad invicem oppositae ; sicut neque duae relationes, quibus Pater refertur ad illos. Unde, sicut persona Patris est una; ita sequeretur, quod persona Filii et Spiritus Sancti esset una, habens duas relationes oppositas duabus relationibus Patris. Hoc autem est haereticum ; cum tollat fidem Tri nitatis. Oportet ergo, quod Filius et Spiritus Sanctus ad invicem referantur oppositis relationibus, &c. ... Si ergo ab una persona Patris procedunt duae personae, scilicet Fi lius et Spiritus Sanctus ; oportet esse aliquem ordinem eo rum ad invicem : nee potest aliquis ordo alius assignari, 482- APPENDIX. nisi ordo naturae, quo alius est ex alio. Non est igitur possibile dicere, quod Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sic proce- dant a Patre, quod neuter eorum procedat ab alio; nisi quis poneret in eis materialem distinctionem ; quod est impossibile. Aquinas, Summa Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xxxvi. art. 2. LECTURE IV. NOTE A. p. 157- OCIAS itaque domine beatissime, et plenissima charitate venerabilis, non desperare nos, immo sperare vehementer, quod Dominus et Deus noster per authoritatem personae quam geris, quam, non carni, sed spiritui tuo impositam esse confidimus, multas carnales felicitates et aegritudines, quas Aphricana Ecclesia in multis patitur, in paucis gemit, consiliorum gravitate et tua possit sanare Com- messationes enim et ebrietates, ita concessae et licitae pu- tantur, ut in honorem etiam beatissimorum martyrum, non solum per dies solennes, quod ipsum quis non lugendum videat, qui haec non carnis oculis inspicit, sed etiam quoti- die celebrentur Sed feramus haec in luxu et labe domestica, et eorum conviviorum quae privatis parietibus continentur, accipiamusque cum eis corpus Christi, cum quibus panem edere prohibemur, saltem de sanctorum cor- porum sepulchris, saltem de locis sacrorum, de domibus orationum, tantum dedecus arceatur Sed tanta pestUentia est hujus mali, ut sanari prorsus, quantum mihi videtur, nisi concilii authoritate non possit. . . . De con- tentione autem et dolo quid me attinet dicere, quoniam ista vitia non in plebe, sed in nostro numero graviora sunt ? Augustinus Aurelio, Ep. 64. Aug. Oper. torn. II. fol. 94. NOTES TO LECTURE IV. 483 NOTE B. p. 158. Augustine appears constantly to have treated Jerome with the deference due to an elder brother in the Church. He shewed his judiciousness in the management of Je rome's haughty and enthusiastic temper, so as to apply the learning and polemical talent and established authority of the holy recluse of Bethlehem, to the effectual mainte nance of his own ascendancy in the ecclesiastical world. Jerome was a man calculated to establish a principle, to give a tone to opinion and feeling; but not to perpetuate a personal influence. Augustine, on the contrary, was formed for guiding the conduct of other men after his own ex ample ; but he wanted the power to give an intense in terest to an abstract question, by throwing over it a warm colouring, or merging it in solemn shadow. All his writ ings shew the man of business ; the energy which they display is that of one earnest in proving and carrying his point, and not such as to interest the mere reader, like those of Jerome, by the intrinsic force of the composition. The personal influence accordingly of Jerome sank with him at his death; whilst that of Augustine survived his own existence, and permanently controlled the fortunes of the Church. Augustine at the same time reaped the fruits of Jerome's ardent exertions; which served, by conciliating devotion to the doctrines themselves which he taught, to support his personal authority. These observations on the contrast of these two great men of the Church are illustrated in the case of the Pela gian controversies. Augustine takes no decisive measures in the emergency, until he has consulted Jerome on the philosophy of the question. He sends him an epistle by Orosius, inquiring what opinion should be held on the na ture of the soul. Quaestio de anima, he says, in writing to him, multos movet, in quibus et me esse confiteorS. He then proceeds to state his own views and difficulties on s Epist. XXVIII. Augustin. Opera, torn. II. fol. 30. I i 2 484 APPENDIX. the subject, and he requests Jerome to instruct him what he is to hold and teach respecting it. Misisti ad me dis cipulos, ut ea doceam, quae nondum ipse didici. Doce ergo quod doceam. Nam ut doceam multi a me flagitant, eis- que me, sicut alia multa, et hoc ignorare confiteor Quid si ideo adhuc ista nescimus, et ea neque oraudo, ne que legendo, neque cogitando et ratiocinando, invenire po- tuimus, ut probemur, non solum indoctos quanta charitate doceamus, verum a doctis etiam quanta humilitate disca- mus? Doce ergo, quaeso, quod doceam; doce quod teneam, &c.h — In the same epistle Augustine complains of the dis tance which separated him from Jerome, and which neces sarily made the intervals long between their several com munications. Nihil equidem molestius fero in omnibus angustiis meis quas patior in difficillimis quaestionibus, quam in tarn longinqua tuae charitatis absentia, ut vix pos- sim meas dare, vei recipere literas tuas, per intervalla, non dierum, non mensium, sed aliquot annorum : cum, si fieri posset, quotidie praesentem te habere vellem, cum quo lo- querer quicquid vellem. What an idea is given us of the steadiness and uni formity of purpose with which the operations of the Latin Church leaders were carried on, when we read the letters that passed between these two, and notice the keen and patient interest sustained on questions of speculative theo logy over such spaces of time ! NOTE C. p. 158. Mihi enim omnis occasio gratissima est, per quam scribo vestrae reverentiae, testem invocans Deum, quod si posset fieri, assumptis alis* columbae, vestris amplexibus impli- carer : semper quidem pro merito virtutum vestrorum, sed nunc maxime quia cooperatoribus et authoribus vobis hae resis Celestina jugulata est : quae ita infecit corda mul- torum, ut cum superatos damuatosque esse se sentiunt, tamen venena mentium non omittant, et quod solum pos- h Epist. XXVIII. Augustin. Opera, torn. II. fol. 30. NOTES TO LECTURE IV. 485 sint, nos oderint, per quos putant se libertatem docendae haereseos perdidisse. Hieronymus Augustino et Alipio '. Sanctse memoriae Bonifacius, cum esset doctissimus, ad- versus libros tamen Pelagianorum, beati Augustini responsa poscebat. Prosper, adv. Collat. c. 41.k NOTE D. p. 159. The character of invariableness claimed for the Church of Rome, is not a little affected by the account of the pro ceedings in the case of Pelagianism. Not only was Pela gius not condemned by John, Bishop of Jerusalem, and afterwards declared orthodox at the Synod of Diospolis (the ancient Lydda) in Palestine, in the year 415, but pro tected in some measure by the Roman Pontiff also, Inno cent I : as is evident from the allusion contained in the following passage of an epistle from the Fathers of a Coun cil held at Carthage, A. D. 416. Si ergo Pelagius episco- palibus gestis quae in oriente confecta dicuntur, et tuae venerationi juste fuerit absolutus, error tamen ipse, et im- pietas, quae tam multos assertores habet, per diversa dis- persos, etiam authoritate apostolicae sedis anathematizanda est '. . . . Quaecunque autem alia ab eis objiciuntur, non dubitamus venerationem tuam, cum gesta episcopalia per- spexerit, quae in Oriente in eadem causa confectae dicuntur, id judicaturam, unde omnes in Dei misericordia gaudea- mus. . . . Audivimus enim esse in urbe Roma, ubi ille diu vixit, nonnullos, qui diversis causis ei faveant, quidam sci licet qui vos talia persuasisse perhibent : plures vero qui eum talia sentire non credunt ; praesertim, quia in Oriente ubi degit, gesta ecclesiastica facta esse jactantur, quibus putatur esse purgatus. . . . Aut ergo a tua veneratione ac- ciendus est Romam, et diligenter interrogandus, quam di- ' Ep. XXIV. Augustin. Oper. torn. II. fol. 28. k Vossii Hist. Pelag. lib. I. c. 29. 1 Ep. XC. Opera Augustin. torn. II. fol. 125. 1 i3 486 APPENDIX. cat gratiam. . . . Aut hoc ipsum cum eo per literas agen dum m, &c. They affect not to believe that Pelagius had been ac tually acquitted at Rome; and point out, without much reserve, the course which they require the Pontiff to pur sue in the matter. This address was supported by a similar one from an other African Council held in the same year at Millevi; and by a letter of several African bishops, among whom was Augustine. Innocent replies to these communications, but in a style which leaves it very ambiguous what his real design is. The style indeed of his three letters re sembles that of Cromwell in some of his state papers — full of wordy clauses which appear to say a great deal, but in reality say nothing at all. And yet Augustine, having occasion to make use of the authority of Innocent, speaks of these letters in terms of approbation. — Ad omnia nobis rescripsit eodem modo, quo fas erat, atque oportebat Apo- stolicae sedis antistitem n. Innocent lived but two months after these replies, leaving the prosecution of the cause between the African Prelates and the Pelagians to his successor Zosimus in the year 417- But the same vacillation of purpose appears also in Zosimus. He was at first disposed to favour Celestius, and on examination received him into the communion of the Church. But the Africans were on the alert to secure on their side the popular sanction of the Apostolic See. In 418 another Council was held at Carthage, and appli cation was made to the Emperor Honorius to obtain sup port to their cause by the force of civil edicts. Zosimus could not resist these importunities ; and finding that there were no means of protecting Celestius, or hopes of restor ing him to the Church, at length yielded the point, and m Ep. XCV. Augustin. Opera, torn. II. fol. 129. " Augustinus et Alipius Bonifacio, Ep. CVI. Opera, torn. II. fol. 144. It has been denied that these letters were written by Innocent. Vossii Hist. Pelag. lib. I. c. 27. NOTES TO LECTURE IV. 487 wrote to the African bishops, declaring his condemnation of the Pelagians. The Pelagians, though vanquished by these proceedings, took advantage of this hesitation on the part of the Ro man See to pronounce against them, to proclaim the opinions of the Roman Clergy as favourable to their doc trines, as appears from the following passage. Quinetiam Romanos Clericos arguunt, scribentes eos jussionis timore perculsos, non erubuisse praevaricationis crimen admittere, ut, contra priorem sententiam qua gestis catholico dogmati affuerant, postea pronunciarent malam hominum esse naturam : imo Pelagiani spe falsa putave- runt, novum et execrabile dogma Pelagianum vei Celes- tianum persuaderi quorundam Romanorum catholicis men- tibus posse, quoniam ilia ingenia quamvis nefando errore perversa, non tamen contemptibilia, cum studiose corri genda potius quam facile damnanda viderentur, alioquin lenius, quam severior postulabat ecclesiae disciplina, trac- tata sunt. Tot enim et tantis inter apostolicam sedem et Aphros episcopos currentibus et recurrentibus scriptis ec- clesiasticis, et gestis, de hac causa, apud illam sedem, Ce- lestio praesente et respondente confectis, quaenam tandem epistola venerandse memoriae papae Zosimi, quae interlo- cutio reperitur, ubi praeceperit credi oportere, sine ullo vitio peccati originalis hominem nasci : nusquam prorsus hoc dixit, nusquam omnino conscripsit. Contra duas Ep. Pelag. ad BonifacP The orthodox, we find, had to la bour to palliate the conduct of Rome. The sequel of this passage further illustrates the part taken by the African Clergy in stimulating Innocent to act against Pelagius and Celestius, and the anxiety of Augustine to remove the appearance of reluctance and hesitation on the part of the Pope. In noticing the exertions of the African Clergy in these controversies, we must not forget that Jerome was also a principal instrument in carrying the orthodox decision. " Augustin. Opera, torn. VII. p. 287. 1 i4 488 APPENDIX. He not only wrote strenuously and vehemently on the sub ject ; but by his presence in Palestine, at the critical mo ment when all seemed favourable to Pelagius, he excited a reaction against the heresy, even amidst its apparent triumph. NOTE E. p. 159. The prevalence of the infection of Pelagianism is evi dent from the fact that eighteen bishops of Italy refused to subscribe the condemnation of Pelagius, and in con sequence of their refusal were deprived of their sees, and exiled to the East P. Even in Africa, the seat itself of opposition to Pelagianism, the heretical cause was not without its advocates. This may be seen from the re script of Honorius to Aurelius, Bishop of Carthage ; where it is said : Praecipue tamen ad quorundam episcoponim pertinaciam corrigendam, qui pravas eorum disputationes, vei tacito consensu astruunt, vei publica oppugnatione non destruunt 1, &c. NOTE F. p. 162. Quae enim potest alia major esse temeritas, quam Dei sibi, non.dico similitudinem, sed aequalitatem vendicare: et brevi sententia, omnium haereticorum venena complecti, quae de philosophorum, et maxime Pythagorae, et Zenonis principis Stoicorum, fonte manarunt? Illi enim quae Graeci appellant nddrj, nos perturbationes possumus dicere, aegri- tudinem videlicet et gaudium, spem et metum, quorum duo praesentia, duo futura sunt, asserunt extirpari posse de mentibus, et nullam fibram radicemque vitiorum, in homine omnino residere, meditatione et assidua exercita- tione virtutum. . . . Pudeat ergo eos principum et sociorum P See M. Guizot, Histoire de la Civiliz. Francaise, $". Lecon, p. 208. Paris. 1829. This Lecture of M. Guizot gives, in the shortest compass, the most perspicuous philosophical view of the Pelagian Question that has ever appeared. 1 Salviani Opera, Appendix, p. 448. NOTES TO LECTURE IV. 489 suorum, qui aiunt, posse hominem sine peccato esse si velit, quod Graeci dicunt dvapdprrjTov . Et quia hoc eccle- siarum per Orientem aures ferre non possunt ; simulant se sine peccato quidam dicere, sed dvapdprqrov dicere non audere: quasi aliud sit, sine peccato, aliud, dvapdprqrov, et non Graecum sermonem, qui apud iUos compositus est, duobus verbis sermo Latinus expresserit. Si absque peccato dicis, et dvapdprqrov dicere te diffiteris, damna eos ergo qui dvapdprqrov praedicant. Sed non facis. Hieronymus ad Ctesiph. Opera, torn. II. p. 251. NOTE G. p. 175. Respondeo dicendum; quod, cum supra ostensum sit, quod Deus sciat omnia, non solum quae acta sunt, sed etiam quae sunt in potentia sua, vei creaturae; horum au tem quaedam sint contingentia nobis futura; sequitur quod Deus contingentia futura cognoscat. Ad cujus evidentiam considerandum est, quod contingens aliquod dupliciter potest considerari. Uno modo in seipso, secundum quod jam in actu est ; et sic consideratur, non ut futurum, sed ut praesens ; neque ad utrumlibet contingens, sed ut determi- natum ad unum ; et propter hoc, sic infallibiliter subdi potest certae cognitioni, utpote sensus visui : sicut cum video Socratem sedere. Alio modo potest considerari con tingens, ut est sua in causa. Et sic consideratur ut futu rum, et ut contingens nondum determinatum ad unum ; quia causa contingens se habet ad opposita : et sic con tingens non subditur per certitudinem alicui cognitioni. Unde quicunque cognoscit effectum contingentem in causa sua tantum, non habet de eo nisi conjecturalem scientiam. Deus autem cognoscit omnia contingentia, non solum prout sunt in suis causis, sed etiam prout unumquodque eorum est actu in seipso. Et licet contingentia fiant in actu successive, non tamen Deus successive cognoscit con tingentia, prout sunt in suo esse, sicut nos, sed simul; quia sua cognitio mensuratur aeternitate, sicut etiam suum esse. jEternitas autem tota simul existens ambit totum 490 APPENDIX. tempus, ut supra dictum est. Unde omnia, quae sunt in tempore, sunt Deo ab aeterno praesentia, non solum ea ra tione, qua habet rationes rerum apud se praesentes, ut quidam dicunt; sed quia ejus intuitus fertur ab aeterno supra omnia, prout sunt in sua praesentialitate. Unde .manifestum est, quod contingentia et infallibiliter a Deo cognoscuntur, in quantum subduntur divino conspectui, secundum suam praesentialitatem : et tamen sunt futura contingentia, suis causis proximis comparata. Aquinas, Summa Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xiv. art. 12. NOTE H. p. 175. Respondeo dicendum, quod necessarium dicitur aliquid dupliciter, scilicet absolute, et ex suppositione. Necessa rium absolute judicatur aliquid ex habitudine terminorum; utpote quia praedicatum est in diffinitione subjecti, sicut necessarium est hominem esse animal : vei quia subjectum est de ratione praedicati ; sicut est necessarium numerum esse parem vei imparem : sic autem non est necessarium Socratem sedere ; unde non est necessarium absolute ; sed potest dici necessarium ex suppositione : supposito enim quod sedeat, necesse est eum sedere, dum sedet. Aqui nas, Summa Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xix. art. 3. This distinction is laid down with precision by Ari stotle, so that his followers in the Schools could not well misapprehend the theory of the subject, whilst they prac tically offended against it. The distinction is still more clearly stated by a writer in the Xlth century, the monk Gaunilo, in his observations, to which I before referred r, on the argument of Anselm's Monologium. It may be interesting to see how he develops his view, so far at least as the obscurity of his Latin will permit his sense to ap pear. Anselm's argument, in his Monologium, is an an ticipation of the Cogito, ergo sum, of Descartes. It rests the proof of the existence of the Deity on the existence of the ideas of supreme goodness and greatness in the mind r Page 449. NOTES TO LECTURE IV. 491 of man. He argues, that unless these ideas existed in re as well as in intellectu, there would be a contradiction ; for in such a case they would not be the ideas of supreme goodness and greatness ; since it is greater aud better to exist in re and in intellectu, than in the intellect alone. The treatise in itself, as a whole, is an admirable specimen of. scholastic reasoning. As an ingenious deduction of the speculative reasons (rationes) conceived to be involved in the doctrine of the Trinity, it stands unrivalled : though the style is extremely rough and obscure. The objection of Gaunilo is as follows : Prius enim certum mihi necesse est, fiat revera, esse alicubi majus ipsum, et tamen deinde ex eo quod majus est omnibus, in seipso quoque subsistere non erit ambi guum. Exempli gratia : Aiunt quidam alicubi Oceani esse insulam, quam ex difficultate, vei potius ex impossibilitate inveniendi, quod non est, cognominant aliqui perditam : quamque fabulantur, multo amplius quam de fortunatis in- sulis fertur, divitiarum deliciarumque omnium inaestimabili ubertate pollere, nulloque possessore aut habitatore : uni- versis aliis, quas incolunt homines, terris, possidendorum redundantia, usquequaque praestare. Hoc ita esse dicat mihi quispiam : et ego facile dictum, in quo nihil est diffi- cultatis, intelligam. Ac si tunc velit, consequenter adjun- gat, ac dicat : non potes ultra dubitare insulam illam, om nibus terris praestantiorem, vere esse alicubi in re, quam in intellectu tuo non ambigis esse ; et quia praestantius est non in intellectu solo, sed etiam esse in re. Ideo sic earn necesse est, quia nisi fuerit, quaecunque alia, in re, est terra praestantior, ilia erit ac si ipsa jam a te praestantior et intellecta praestantior non erit. Si, inquam, per hoc ille mihi velit astruere, de insula ilia, quod vere sit, ambigen- dum ultra non esse ; aut jocari ipsum credam ; aut nescio quem stultiorem debeam reputare ; utrum me, si ei conce- dam; an ilium, si se putet aliqua certitudine insula*; illius essentiam astruxisse; nisi prius ipsam praestantiam ejus solummodo, sicut rem vere atque indubie existentem, nee 492 APPENDIX. ullatenus, sicut falsum aut incertum aliquid in intellectu, in eo esse, docuerit. Liber pro Insipiente. Anselmi Opera, torn. III. p. 30. NOTE I. p. 178. It may be sufficient to refer to the following passage of Calvin, to see how he differs from Aquinas on the same point. De modo quo Deus hominem in vitium tradit, minime necessarium hoc loco texere longam quasstionem. Certum quidem est, non sinendo tantum et connivendo, ilium per- mittere homines prolabi : sed justo judicio sic ordinare, ut turn a propria concupiscentia, turn a Diabolo in ejusmodi rabiem agantur et ferantur. Ideo Tradendi voce utitur, ex perpetuo Scripturae more : quam vocem nimis violenter torquent, qui sola Dei permissione in peccatum agi nos putant. Nam ut minister irae Dei est Satan, et quasi car- nifex : ita non dissimulatione, sed mandato judicis in nos armatur. Neque tamen ideo aut crudelis Deus, aut nos innoxii ; quando aperte ostendit Paulus, nos non aliter ad- dici in ejus potestatem, quam si tali poena digni simus. Tantum id excipiamus, peccati causam a Deo non prove- nire : cujus radices in peccatore ipso perpetuo resident. Illud enim verum esse oportet; Perditio tua Israel: in me tantummodo auxilium tuum. Calvin, in Ep. Pauli ad Rom. c. 1. v. 24. Genevae, 1600. NOTE J. p. 180. Respondeo dicendum, quod Deus aliquos reprobat. Dic tum enim est supra, quod praedestinatio est pars provi dentiae. Ad providentiam -autem pertinet permittere ali- quem defectum in rebus quae providentiae subduntur, ut supra dictum est. Unde cum per divinam providentiam homines in vitam aeternam ordinantur, pertinet etiam ad divinam providentiam, ut permittat aliquos ab isto fine de- ficere. Et hoc dicitur reprobare. Sic igitur, sicut praedes tinatio est pars providentiae, respectu eorum qui divinitus ordinantur in aeternam salutem, ita reprobatio est pars pro- NOTES TO LECTURE IV. 493 videntiae, respectu illorum qui ab hoc fine decidunt. Unde reprobatio non nominat praescientiam tantum, sed aliquid addit secundum rationem, sicut et providentia, ut etiam supra dictum est. Sicut enim praedestinatio includit vo- luntatem conferendi gratiam et gloriam, ita reprobatio in cludit voluntatem permittendi aliquem cadere in culpam, et inferendi damnationis pcenam pro culpa. Aquinas, Summa Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xxiii. art. 3. Aquinas also shews a like objection to that observable in our 1 7th Article, against sanctioning the notion that any one should suppose himself reprobated by God. Thus he observes : Etiam si aliquibus ex speciali privilegio sua praedestinatio revelatur, non tamen convenit ut reveletur omnibus : quia sic illi, qui non sunt praedestinati, despera- rent, et securitas in praedestinatis negligentiam parerets. He appeals indeed to the same tests of the presence of Divine Grace in the heart, which our Article employs in speaking of predestination. Hoc modo aliquis cognoscere potest se habere gratiam, in quantum scilicet percipit se delectari in Deo, et contemnere res mundanas ; et in quantum homo non est conscius sibi alicujus peccati mor- talis .... ille qui accipit gratiam, per quandam experi- entiam dulcedinis novit, quam non experitur ille qui non accipit '. NOTE K. p. 181. Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus nominally divided the Schools into two parties ; the former as the strictest interpreter, the latter as the more moderate expositor of Augustine's doctrines on the subject of Divine Agency. The factious spirit which reigned in the political world, extended itself to the monastic orders and the Schools ; and it is no wonder that in such times, we find classes of theological partisans designated as Thomists, and Scotists, and Ockamists. Then the Dominicans and Franciscans, s Summa Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xxiii. art. i. ' Ibid. Prima Secunda?, qu. cxn. art. 5. 494 APPENDIX. as rival professions, supporting the peculiar opinions of their own member, perpetuated the distinction between Thomist and Scotist. Fresh employment, of that kind which particularly suited the scholastic genius, was thus supplied to the Schools of a succeeding age ; that of re conciling the respective tenets of the leading doctors, and shewing their fundamental concord. This was only to act over the part which Boethius, and others who preluded to the scholastic philosophy, had originally acted, in forming an eclectic system out of the theories of Plato and Aristo tle. Among the merits accordingly of the once celebrated Picus Mirandula, it is mentioned, that he was employed in establishing an agreement between Aquinas and Duns Scotus, when his premature death deprived the schools of this and other labours on which he was engaged" NOTE L. p. 181. Praeterea, si Deus aliquem hominem reprobat, oportet quod sic se habeat reprobatio ad reprobates, sicut praedes tinatio ad praedestinatos. Sed praedestinatio est causa sa- lutis praedestinatorum. Ergo reprobatio erit causa perdi- tionis reproborum. Hoc autem est falsum. Dicitur enim Oseae 13. Perditio tua ex te Israel, tantummodo ex me auxilium tuum. Non ergo Deus aliquem reprobat. .... Ad secundum dicendum quod aliter se habet re probatio in causando quam praedestinatio. Nam praedes tinatio est causa, et ejus quod expectatur in futura vita a praedestinatis, scilicet gloriae; et ejus quod percipitur in praesenti, scilicet gratiae. Reprobatio vero non est causa ejus quod est in praesenti, scilicet culpae, sed est causa de- relictionis a Deo. Est tamen causa ejus quod redditur in " Inter Thomam et Scotum, qui jam diu conflictaverant, si non pacem in universum, in multis tamen impetrasset inducias, quando in eorum pluribus controversiis, si quispiam dissidentia verba rimetur attentius, et exactius li- bret, scrupulosiusque vestigaus, cutem deserens, introrsum ad imas latebras, profundaque penetralia mente pervadat, unionem sensuum indisseparatis pugnantibusque verbis citra ambiguitatem comperiet. Pic. Mirandul. Vita, Oper. ed. 1496. NOTES TO LECTURE IV. 495 futuro, scilicet pcenae aeternae. Sed culpa provenit ex libera arbitrio ejus qui reprobatur et a gratia deseritur. Et se cundum hoc verificatur dictum prophetae, scilicet, Perditio tua, Israel, ex te. Aquinas, Summa Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xxiii. art. 3. Of course as speaking on a subject extending over so large a range of volumes as those of the Schoolmen, I must be understood to speak with some reserve. Still I cannot but think that the . assertion made in the Lecture will be verified by more extensive research. The predes tination of punishment wUl be found to be the prevailing character assigned to the term Reprobation. But punish ment was viewed in the Scholastic system, according to the Platonic and Aristotelic notion of it, as a good to those to whom it was dispensed, as a purifying and healing of the distempers of the soul. The scholastic distinction between poena and culpa should be particularly noticed in reference to the question of Reprobation. The Schoolmen would not admit a predestination of guilt, for this would have argued the presence of evU in the Divine Mind. For it should be observed, that the will of God was considered identical with his being and his intelligence ; and that predestina tion accordingly was fundamentally coincident with the doctrine of Ideas. Tt was the application of this doctrine to moral subjects. I have alluded in the Lecture to the ar gument of Erigena, according to which the predestination of evil was impossible, since there were no such Ideas as those of evil in the Divine Mind. It may be seen from the following passage, how the rationalized doctrine of pre destination was connected with the Idealism of Plato. Causae itaque primordiales sunt (quod et in praecedenti- bus dixeram, quas Graeci ideas vocant, hoc est species vei formas) aeternae et incommutabiles rationes, sed in quas et in quibus visibilis et invisibilis mundus formatur et re- gitur; ideoque a Graecorum sapientibus rrpa>TOTvna appellari meruerunt, hoc est principalia exempla, quae Pater in Filio fecit, et per Spiritum Sanctum in effectus suos dividit atque 496 APPENDIX. multiplicat ; rtpoopCapAXTa quoque vocant, id est, praedesti- nationes, in ipsis enim quaecunque divina prudentia et fiunt et facta sunt et futura, sunt simul et semel incommutabi- liter praedestinata. Nihil enim naturaliter in creatura visi- bili et invisibili oritur, praeter quod in eis ante omnia tem- pora et loca praedefinitum et praeordinatum est ; item a philosophis dela deXqpara, id est, divinae voluntates nomi- nari solent; quoniam omnia quaecunque voluit dominus facere, in ipsis primordialiter et causaliter fecit, &c.x Joan. Scot. Erigen. de Div. Natur. lib. II. p. 94. Though the later schoolmen might not go to the full length of this language, the same views in a great measure seem constantly before them in their disquisition on the subject. They would not admit that evil had any positive existence : they speak of it as a defect from good, as an absence of what constitutes the perfection of any nature. The real meaning again of the term Divine Will, as ap plied to the subject of predestination, is not commonly apprehended. In speculating on the course of the Divine dispensations, and finding themselves at a loss to give a satisfactory solution of the differences observed in the con duct and fortunes of different individuals, scholastic rea soners were forced to retire on the ground from which they set out, and to confess that they could discover no cause of these differences but the simple WiU of God. The expression therefore is not to be taken as any positive account of the case, but as an admission of ignorance of any proper reason, and a denial of any of the reasons that were alleged ; as the foreknowledge, for instance, of the merits of individuals. Voluit igitur Deus, says Aquinas, in hominibus, quantum ad aliquos quos praedestinat, suam repraesentare bonitatem, per modum misericordiae par- cendo ; et quantum ad aliquos, quos reprobat, per modum justitiae, puniendo. Et haec est ratio quare Deus quosdam eligit, et quosdam reprobat Sed quare nos elegit in x He ascribes the rise of the predestinarian controversy of his time to the neglect of literature, and particularly to ignorance of the Greek language. NOTES TO LECTURE IV. 497 gloriam, et illos reprobavit, non habet rationem, nisi divi nam voluntatem y. NOTE M. p. 182. Respondeo dicendum ; quod praedestinatio secundum ra tionem praesupponit electionem, et electio dilectionem. Cujus ratio est : quia praedestinatio, (ut dictum est,) est pars providentiae. Providentia autem, sicut et prudentia, est ratio in intellectu existens, praeceptiva ordinationis ali- quorum in finem, ut supra dictum est. Non autem praeci- pitur aliquid ordinandum in finem, nisi praeexistente volun tate finis. Unde praedestinatio aliquorum in salutem aeter nam, praesupponit secundum rationem, quod Deus illorum velit salutem : ad quod pertinet electio et dilectio : dilectio quidem, in quantum vult eis hoc bonum salutis aeternae : nam diligere est velle alicui bonum, ut supra dictum est : electio autem, in quantum hoc bonum aliquibus prae aliis vult, cum quosdam reprobet, ut supra dictum est. Electio tamen et dilectio aliter ordinantur in nobis et in Deo : eo quod in nobis voluntas diligendo non causat bonum, sed ex bono praeexistente incitamur ad diligendum. Et ideo eli- gimus aliquem, quem diligamus. Et sic electio dilectionem praecedit in nobis. In Deo autem est e converso. Nam voluntas ejus, qua vult bonum alicui diligendo, est causa quod ilium bonum ab eo prae aliis habeatur. Et sic patet, quod dilectio praesupponitur electioni secundum rationem, et electio praedestinationi. Unde omnes praedestinati sunt electi et dilecti. Aquinas, Summa Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xxiii. art. 4. NOTE N. p. 182. Tu autem nos Manichaeos vocas, cur legi Evangelium praeferent.es, in ilia umbram, in hoc veritatem esse dica- mus. Hieronym. adv. Pelag. lib. I. Oper. torn. II. p. 274, His morbis inter se contrariis, Manichaei Pelagianique confligunt, dissimili voluntate, simili vanitate,separati opin- y Summa Theol Prima Pars, qu. xxm. art. 5. xk 498 APPENDIX. ione diversa, sed propinqui mente perversa. Jam vero gratiam Christi simul oppugnant, baptismum ejus simul evacuant, carnem ejus simul exhonorant ; sed etiam haec modis causisque diversis. Nam Manichaei meritis naturae bonae, Pelagiani autem meritis voluntatis bonae, perhibent divinitus subveniri. Illi dicunt ; debet hoc Deus laboribus membrorum suorum: Isti dicunt; debet hoc virtutibus ser- vorum suorum. Utrisque ergo merces non imputatur se cundum gratiam, sed secundum debitum, &c. Contr. duas Epist. Pelag. ad Bonif. Augustin. Oper. torn. VII. fol. 286. Les premiers de cette Soci^te, qui parurent en France, sont ces quatorze personnes de la noblesse, et du clerge' d'Orleans, contre lesquels le roi Robert assembla une espece de Concile, en l'anne'e 1022, et qu'il fit bruler vifs sous pretexte de Manich&sme. Beausobre, Hist, de Ma- nich. torn. I. pref. p. 4. NOTE O. p. 186. Grace, no less than Predestination, is spoken of in the language of the Schools as that by which a man is " or- " dained" or " set in order" to eternal life. For, in dis cussing the question, " whether any one may be blotted " out of the book of life," Aquinas decides, that the ordi nation of predestination " never fans ;" whereas, that of grace, though in itself a title to eternal life, may fail, through mortal sin. And the reason assigned is, that the predestined have eternal life in itself; the ordination of grace alone is to eternal life, not in itself, but in its cause. Est enim liber vitae conscriptio ordinatorum in vitam aeternam. Ad quam ordinatur aliquis ex duobus ; scUicet, ex praedestinatione divina; et haec ordinatio nunquam de ficit : et ex gratia. Quicunque enim gratiam habet, ex hoc ipso dignus est vita asterna. Et haec ordinatio deficit interdum : quia aliqui ordinati sunt ex gratia habita, ad habendam vitam aeternam, a qua tamen deficiunt per pec- catum mortale. Illi igitur qui sunt ordinati ad habendum NOTES TO LECTURE IV. 499 vitam aeternam ex praedestinatione divina, sunt simpliciter scripti in libro vitae ; quia sunt ibi scripti ut habituri vitam aeternam in seipsa ; et isti nunquam delentur de libro vitae. Sed illi qui sunt ordinati ad habendum vitam seter- nam, non ex praedestinatione divina, sed solum ex gratia, dicuntur esse scripti in libro vitae, non simpliciter, sed secundum quid : quia sunt ibi scripti, ut habituri vitam aeternam, non in seipsa, sed in sua causa. Et tales pos sunt deleri de libro vitae, ut dilectio non referatur ad noti- tiam Dei, quasi Deus aliquid praesciat, postea nesciat, sed ad rem scitam : quia scilicet Deus scit aliquem prius ordinari in vitam aeternam, et postea non ordinari, cum deficit a gratia. Aquinas, Prima Pars, qu. xxiv. art. 3. The general designation of the Divine Agency under the notion of Grace, was a modification of abstract doctrine, sanctioned by Scholasticism not without good reason. It was a softening of the hard outlines of the theory of Pre destination. By fixing the thoughts on the Divine good ness, amidst the survey of the inflexible appointments of Providence, it presented a view of God, touching to the heart, and awakening pleasurable emotions. It preserved the supremacy and constancy of the Divine Will, whilst it exhibited that supremacy and constancy as the working of a law of gentleness and love. NOTE P. p. 189. Sed contra; Lux ponit aliquid in illuminate. Sed gra tia est quaedam lux animae : unde Augustinus dicit in libro de Natura et Gratia : praevaricatorem legis divinae lux de- serit veritatis, qua desertus utique fit caecus : ergo gratia ponit aliquid in anima. Sed quantum ad primum est differentia attendenda circa gratiam Dei et gratiam hominis : quia enim bonum crea tura? provenit ex voluntate divina, ideo ex dilectione Dei qua vult creaturae bonum, profluit aliquod bonum in crea tura. Ad secundum dicendum, quod Deus est vita animae per Kk2 500 APPENDIX. modum causae efficientis : sed anima est vita corporis per modum causae formalis. Inter formam autem et materiam non cadit aliquod medium, quia forma per seipsam in- format materiam vei subjectum. Sed agens informat sub- jectum, non per suam substantiam, sed per forniam quam causat in materia. Aquinas, Summa Theol. Prima Se- cundcB, qu. ex. art. 1. Manifestum est autem quod gratia gratum faciens hoc modo comparatur ad beatitudinem, sicut ratio seminalis in natura ad effectum naturalem. Ibid. qu. lxii. art. 2. NOTE Q. p. 190. Respondeo dicendum ; quod sicut gratia dividitur in operantem et cooperantem, secundum diversos effectus : ita etiam in praevenientem et subsequentem, et qualiter- cunque gratia accipiatur. Sunt autem quinque effectus gratiae in nobis, quorum primus est ut anima sanetur: secundus, ut bonum velit : tertius est, ut bonum quod vult, efficaciter operetur: quartus est, ut in bono perse- veret : quintus est, ut ad gloriam perveniat. Et ideo gra tia secundum quod causat in nobis primum effectum, voca- tur praeveniens respectu secundi effectus : et prout causat in nobis secundum, vocatur subsequens respectu primi ef fectus. Et sicut unus effectus est posterior uno effectu, et prior alio ; ita gratia potest dici praeveniens et subse quens secundum eundem. effectum, respectu diversorum. Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicet in libro de Natura et Gratia : " Praevenit ut sanemur ; subsequitur ut sanati " vegetemur; praevenit ut vocemur; subsequitur ut glo- " rificemur." Aquinas, Summa Theol. Prima Secundce, qu. cxi. art. 3. NOTES TO LECTURE V. 501 LECTURE V. NOTE A. p. 229. A.QUINAS, shewing that sin was not a total privation of our nature, whence would follow the Stoical paradox that " all sins were equal," observes : Hujusmodi autem pri- vationes recipiunt magis et minus ex parte ejus quod re- manet de habitu contrario ; multum enim refert ad aegri- tudinem vei turpitudinem, utrum plus vei minus a debita commensuratione humorum vei membrorum recedatur. Et similiter dicendum est de vitiis et peccatis; sic enim in eis privatur debita commensuratio rationis, ut non totaliter ordo rationis toUatur ; alioquin malum si sit integrum, de- struit seipsum, ut dicitur in quatuor Ethic. : non enim pos set remanere substantia actus vei affectio agentis, nisi ali quid remaneret de ordine rationis. Et ideo multum inter est ad gravitatem peccati, utrum plus vei minus recedatur a rectitudine rationis. Summa Theol. Prima Secundce, qu. lxxiii. art. 2. Quia tamen natura humana per pec- catum non est totaliter corrupta, ut scUicet toto bono na turae privetur, &c. Ibid. qu. cix. art. 2. The reference made in this passage is to the observ ation of Aristotle, that " vice destroys itself; and if it be " total, becomes intolerable : rb yap /ca/coz- /cat avrb airdX- " Xvai, k&v oXoKX-qpov fj, d(pdpqrov yCverai z." The expressions again, " total corruption," or " wholly " corrupt," as applied to human nature, evidently derive their character from the logical notion which the Scholas tics intended by them. The whole of human nature is, the whole extent of signification of the term human nature. It means that every thing included under that term is also included under the term corrupt. It is misconceived, when it is understood to denote the several physical and moral constituents, which, taken together, make up the com plex idea of human nature. The mistake here is that of z Aristot. Ethic. IV. t. 5- Kk3 502 APPENDIX. supposing, that what is true of all the kinds or varieties found in a certain class of objects, is, on the other hand, true, only in regard to all the parts of which any in dividual of the class is composed. Anselm sufficiently shews this, when, in a chapter of his treatise on Original Sin, inquiring in what manner human nature is corrupt, he observes : Quoniam autem personaliter peccaverunt, cum originaliter fortes et incorrupti haberent potestatem semper servandi sine difficultate justitiam, totum quod erant infirrnatum et corruptum est. Corpus quidem, quia tale post peccatum fuit, qualia sunt brutorum animalium corruptione et carnalibus appetitibus subjacentia : anima vero, quia, ex corruptione corporis et ejusdem appetitibus, atque ex indigentia bonorum quae perdidit, carnalibus af- fectibus infecta, et quia tota natura humana in illis erat, et extra illos nihil erat, tota infirmata et corrupta est. . . . Nee impotentia excusat earn in ipsis infantibus : quia in illis non solvit quod debet : quoniam ipsa sibi fecit earn, deserendo justitiam in primis hominibus in quibus tota erat : et semper debitrix est habere potestatem, quam ad servandam semper justitiam accepit : hoc esse videri potest in infantibus originale peccatum a. Clearly Anselm is speaking of the abstract being Human Nature, the logical universal ; which, he contends, is cor rupt in all born of Adam, because the whole being was corrupted in the first sinner, and is the same in all who participate of it. But since the Scholastic phUosophy has been out of fashion, this is a notion by no means familiar to the minds of men ; and the expression, " totally cor- " rupt," has been very naturally taken in its most obvious sense, as denoting all that is in any one individual man. It is time indeed that we should study that philosophy, to our contempt and ignorance of which, we may ascribe so much aberration of theological opinion. We have indeed more than enough of the Scholastic spirit among us, but we want the Scholastic depth of thought. We treat the con- **¦ De Concep. Virg. et Pec. Orig. c. 2. Opera, torn. III. p. 96. NOTES TO LECTURE V. 503 elusions of the Schoolmen, as superficially, as they treated the Greek philosophy, which they implicitly adopted. We take their terms and reason from them, without acquaint ing ourselves with the principles on which they are founded. For instance, I have seen it somewhere argued, that man is naturally in a state of utter reprobation ; because the Scripture says, that " the carnal mind is enmity against "¦ God." For, it was urged, had the expression been " enemy," and not " enmity," then the possibility of re conciliation might be conceivable ; but " enmity" could never be reconciled. Could the Platonist or the Scholas tic, I would ask, insist more on the importance of abstract ideas, than is insisted on by such an argument ? We find here an endeavour to establish the impossibility of a fact concerning human nature, from a consideration of the nature of a contradiction : or in other words, logical truth is transformed into physical. NOTE B. p. 233. Est peccatum a natura, ut dixi ; et est peccatum a per sona. Itaque quod est a persona, potest dici personale : quod autem a natura, naturale, quod dicitur originale : et sicut personale transit ad naturam ; ita naturale ad perso nam : hoc modo. Quod Adam comedebat, hoc natura exigebat, quia ut haec exigeret sic creata erat. Quod vero de ligno vetito comedit, non haec voluntas naturalis, sed personalis Adae propria fecit: quod tamen egit persona, non fecit sine natura. Persona enim erat quod dicebatur Adam : natura quod homo. Fecit igitur persona pecca- tricem naturam : quia ubi Adam peccavit, homo peccavit. Siquidem non quia homo erat, ut vetitum praesumeret im- pulsus est : sed propria voluntate, quam non exegit natura, sed persona concepit, attractus est. Similiter fit in infan tibus e converso. Nempe quod in illis non est justitia, quam debent habere, non hoc fecit illorum voluntas per sonalis, sicut in Adam ; sed egestas naturalis, quam ipsa natura accepit ab Adam. In Adam namque, extra quem xk4 504 APPENDIX. de ilia nihil erat, est nudata justitia quam habebat : et ea semper nisi adjuta careret : hac ratione : quia natura sub- sistit in personis, et personae non sunt sine natura, fecit natura personas infantium peccatrices. Sic spoliavit per sona naturam bono justitiae in Adam ; et natura egens facta, omnes personas quas ipsa de se procreat, eadem egestate peccatrices et injustas facit. Hoc modo transit peccatum Adae personale in omnes, qui de illo naturaliter propagantur, et est in illis originale sive naturale. An selm. De Concep. Virg. et Pec. Orig. c. 22. p. 103. The same idea is further illustrated by the following passage of Aquinas. Unde etiam posito, quod anima rationalis traduceretur, ex hoc 'ipso quod infectio animae prolis non esset in ejus voluntate, amitteret rationem culpae obligantis ad poenam : quia ut Philosophus dicit in tertia Ethicorum, nullus im- properabit caeco nato, sed magis miserebitur. Et ideo alia via procedendum est, dicendo, quod omnes homines qui nascuntur ex Adam, possunt considerari ut unus homo, in quantum conveniunt in natura quam a primo parente acci- piunt; secundum quod in civilibus omnes homines qui sunt unius communitatis, reputantur quasi unum corpus, et tota communitas quasi unus homo : sicut etiam Porphyrius dicit, quod participatione speciei plures homines sunt unus homo. Sic igitur multi homines ex Adam derivati sunt, tanquam multa membra unius corporis, actus autem unius membri corporalis, puta manus, non est voluntarius volun tate ipsius manus, sed voluntate animae quae primo movet membrum. Unde homicidium quod manus committit, non imputaretur manui ad peccatum, si consideraretur manus secundum se, ut divisa a corpore ; sed imputatur ei in quantum est aliquid hominis, quod movetur a primo prin cipio motivo hominis. Sic igitur inordinatio, quae est in isto homine ex Adam generate, non est voluntaria volun tate ipsius, sed voluntate primi parentis, qui movet mo- tione generationis omnes qui ex ejus origine derivantur, sicut voluntas animae movet omnia membra ad actum. NOTES TO LECTURE V. 505 Unde peccatum quod sic a primo parente in posteros deri vator dicitur originale : sicut peccatum quod ab anima de rivator ad membra corporis, dicitur actuale. Et sicut pec catum actuale quod per membrum aliquod committitur, non est peccatum illius membri, nisi in quantum illud mem- bruiu est aliquid ipsius hominis, propter quod vocatur pec catum humanum ; ita peccatum originale non est pecca tum hujus personae, nisi in quantum haec persona recipit naturam a primo parente, unde et vocatur peccatum na turae: secundum illud Ephes. 2. Eramus autem filii irae. Aquinas, Summa Theol. Prima Secundce, qu. lxxxi. art. 1. NOTE C. p. 233. Octavum in haec causa Concilium cecumenicum erat, quod anno ccccxxxi habitum est. Quamquam enim propter Pelagianos convocatum non fuit ; tamen Pelagianis Nes- torium damnare refugientibus, atque adeo ilium etiam ju- vantibus, Patres occasione ea uti voluerunt, ad. Pelagii asseclas una cum Nestorio damnandos. Haec ita esse, ip sius Concilii actis comprobatur. . . . Quod vero ex actis synodicis hactenus ostendimus, idem variorum etiam scrip- torum auctoritate demonstrator. Prosper in Chronicis : " Congregata apud Ephesum plus ducentorum synodo sa- " cerdotum, Nestorius cum haeresi nominis sui, et cum " multis Pelagianis, qui cognatum sibi juvabant dogma, " damnatur." Et adversus Collatorem : " Per hunc virum " (Caelestinum) etiam Orientales ecclesiae geniina peste " purgatae sunt ; quando Cyrillo, Alexandrinae urbis an- " tistiti, gloriosissimo fidei Catholicae defensori, ad exe- " crandam Nestorii impietatem, apostolico auxiliatus est " gladio : quo etiam Pelagiani, dum cognatis confederan- " tur erroribus, iterum prosternerentur." Haec causa est, cur idem Prosper unum utriusque haereseos scripserit epi- taphium, quod praemittitur carmini, Trept axa-pCanov. Etiam Gregorius M., lib. V. epist. 14, Pelagium ea synodo dam- natum testatur. Item Photius, pvpiofi'ifiXov, cap. 53. 'Ara- depanadrj avrq f) r&v YleXayiaviar&v a'Cpeais Kai kv rfj 'Ecpe- aCav dyt'a avvobu. Foss. Hist. Pelag. lib. I. c. 47. 506 APPENDIX. NOTE D. p. 235. Si aliquis diligenter attendat, impossibile est, quod ali qua peccata proximorum parentum, vei etiam primi paren tis, praeter primum, per originem traducantur. Cujus ratio est, quia homo generat sibi idem in specie, non autem se cundum individuum. Et ideo ea quae directe pertinent ad individuum (sicut personales actus, et quae ad eos perti nent) non traducunt a parentibus in filios : non enim gram- maticus traducit in filium scientiam grammaticae, quam proprio studio acquisivit. Sed ea quae pertinent ad natu ram speciei, traducuntur a parentibus in filios : non enim grammaticus traducit in filium scientiam grammaticae, quam proprio studio acquisivit. Sed ea quae pertinent ad naturam speciei traducuntur a parentibus in filios, nisi sit defectus naturae ; sicut oculatus generat oculatum nisi na tura deficiat: et si natura sit fortis, etiam aliqua accidentia individualia propagantur in filios, pertinentia ad dispositio- nem naturae ; sicut velocitas corporis, bonitas ingenii, et alia hujusmodi : nullo autem modo ea quae sunt pure per sonalia, ut dictum est. Sicut autem ad personam pertinet aliquid secundum seipsam, et aliquid ex dono gratiae : ita etiam ad naturam potest aliquid pertinere secundum seip sam ; scilicet quod causatur ex principiis ejus ; et aliquid ex dono gratiae : et hoc modo justitia originalis, (sicut in Primo dictum est,) erat quoddam donum. gratiae toti hu manae naturae divinitus collatum in primo parente ; quod quidem primus homo amisit per primum peccatum. Unde sicut ilia originalis justitia traducta fuisset in posteros simul cum natura, ita etiam inordinatio opposita. Sed alia pec cata actualia, vei primi parentis, vei aliorum, non corrum- punt naturam, quantum ad id quod naturae est, sed solum quantum ad id quod personae est; id est, secundum proni- tatem ad actum : unde alia peccata non traducuntur. Aquinas, Summa Theol. Prima Secundaz, qu. lxxxi. art. 2. NOTE E. p. 240. Respondeo, dicendum ; quod necessitas dicitur multi- NOTES TO LECTURE V. 507 pliciter. . . . Ex agente autem hoc alicui convenit, sicut cum aliquis cogitur ab aliquo agente, ita quod non possit contrarium agere : et haec vocatur necessitas coactionis. Haec igitur coactionis necessitas omnino repugnat volun- tati. Nam hoc dicimus esse violentum, quod est contra inclinationem rei. Ipse autem motus voluntatis est incli- natio quaedam in aliquid. Et ideo sicut dicitur aliquid na turale, quia est secundum inclinationem naturae : ita dici tur aliquid voluntarium, quia est secundum inclinationem voluntatis. Sicut ergo impossibile est, quod aliquid simul sit violentum et naturale ; ita impossibile est, quod aliquid simpliciter sit coactum, sive violentum, et necessarium. Necessitas autem finis non repugnat voluntati, quando ad finem non potest perveniri nisi uno modo : sicut ex volun tate transeundi mare, fit necessitas in voluntate ut velit navem. Similiter etiam nee necessitas naturalis repugnat voluntati : quinimo necesse est quod, sicut intellectus ex necessitate inhaeret primis principiis, ita voluntas ex ne cessitate inhaereat ultimo fini, qui est beatitudo. Finis enim se habet in operativis, sicut principium in speculati- vis; ut dicitur in 2. Physic. Oportet enim quod illud quod naturaliter alicui convenit et immobiliter, sit funda- mentum et principium omnium aliorum : quia natura rei est primum in unoquoque, et omnis motus procedit ab ali quo immobili. Aquinas, Summa Theol. Prima Pars, qu. lxxxii. art. 1. See also Voss. Hist. Pelag. lib. VII. par. I. p. 701. NOTE F. p. 248. The difficulty on the subject of Merit is, in applying the term to any relation between God and man : because we closely connect the two ideas of serving God and moral excellence. Still it is possible in theory to detach these ideas from each other, and to view man in his service to God, under the simple analogy of man earning a recom pense from his fellow-man. And this is what the Schools have done, in their various speculations on the subject of Merit. Even however under this point of view, Aquinas 508 APPENDIX. points out that no one can serve God, or have any merit with God, unless by the gift of God. Dissimiliter, he says, se habet in Deo et in homine : nam homo omnem virtutem benefaciendi habet a Deo, non autem ab homine : et ideo a Deo non potest homo aliquid mereri, nisi per donum ejus ; quod Apostolus signanter exprimit, dicens : " Quis " prior dedit ei, et retribuetur iUi ?" Sed ab homine potest quis mereri antequam ab eo acceperit, per id quod accepit a Deo. Summa Theol. Prima Secundce, qu. cxiv. art. 2. On the use of the terms Condignity and Congruity, the following passages of Aquinas illustrate the observations made in the Lecture. Respondeo, dicendum, quod opus meritorium hominis dupliciter considerari potest. Uno modo secundum quod procedit ex libero arbitrio. Alio modo secundum quod procedit ex gratia Spiritus Sancti. Si consideretur secun dum substantiam operis, et secundum quod procedit ex libero arbitrio : sic non potest ibi esse condignitas, propter maximam inaequalitatem : sed est ibi congruitas, propter quandam aequalitatem proportionis. Videtur enim con- gruum, ut homini operand secundum suam virtutem, Deus recompenset, secundum excellentiam suae virtutis. Si au tem loquamur de opere meritorio, secundum quod procedit ex gratia Spiritus Sancti : sic est meritorium vitae aeternae, ex condigno. Sic enim valor meriti attenditur secundum virtutem Spiritus Sancti moventis nos in vitam aeternam; secundum illud Joan. iv. "Fiet in eo fons aquae salientis in " vitam aeternam." Attenditur etiam pretium operis secun dum dignitatem gratiae ; per quam homo, consors factus divinae naturae, adoptatur in filium Dei, cui debetur haere- ditas ex ipso jure adoptionis; secundum illud Rom. viii. Si filii, et haeredes. Summa Theol. Prima Secundce, qu. cxiv. art. 3. Opus nostrum habet rationem meriti ex duobus. Primo quidem ex vi motionis divinae ; et sic meretur afiquis ex condigno. Alio modo habet rationem meriti, secundum quod procedit ex libero arbitrio ; in quantum voluntarie NOTES TO LECTURE V. 509 aliquid facimus ; et ex hac parte est meritum congrui : quia congruum est, ut dum homo bene utitur sua virtute, Deus secundum superexcellentem virtutem excellentius operetur. Ex quo patet, quod merito condigni nullus potest mereri alteri primam gratiam, nisi solus Christus. . . . Sed merito congrui potest aliquis alteri mereri primam gratiam. Quia enim homo in gratia constitutus implet Dei volunta- tem, congruum est secundum amicitiae proportionem, ut Deus impleat hominis voluntatem in salvatione alterius Impetratio orationis innititur misericordiae, meritum autem condigni innititur justitiae : et in eo multa orando impetrat homo ex divina misericordia, quae tamen non meretur se cundum justitiam. Ibid. art. 6. NOTE G. p. 250. Hunc honorem debitum, qui Deo non reddit, aufert Deo quod suum est ; et Deum exhonorat : et hoe est peccare. Quamdiu autem non solvit quod rapuit manet in culpa ; nee sufficit solummodo reddere quod ablatum est ; sed pro contumelia illata plus habet reddere quam abstulit. Sicut enim qui laedit salutem alterius, non sufficit, si salutem re- stituit, nisi pro illata doloris injuria recompenset aliquid : ita qui honorem alicujus violat, non sufficit honorem red dere, si non secundum exhonorationis factam molestiam, aliquid quod placet illi quem exhonoravit restauret. Hoc quoque attendendum, quod cum aliquis quod injuste ab stulit, solvit, hoc debet dare, quod ab illo non posset exigi, si alienum non rapuisset. Sic ergo debet omnis, qui peccat, honorem quem rapit, Deo solvere ; et hoc est satisfactio, quam omnis peccator debet Deo facere, &c. Anselm. Cur Deus Homo, lib. I. c. 2. p. 46. Satisfactio est redditio voluntaria equivalentis alias inde- biti. Primum scilicet redditio patet; quia non est absoluta datio. Nam hoc quod est satis, dicit commensurationem ad aliquid praecedens correspondentem. Quod dicitur vo luntaria patet ; quia si esset involuntaria, non esset satis factio, sed satispassio : et hoc modo ille, a quo exigitur in 510 APPENDIX. inferno poena debita culpae commissae, satis patitur et non satisfacit, &c. Joan. Duns Scot, in lib. sentent. IV. qu.xv. fol. 80. Conjungitur autem Deo homo per voluntatem : unde ma cula peccati ab homine tolli non potest, nisi voluntas ho minis ordinem divinae justitiae acceptet : ut scilicet vei ipse sibi pcenam spontaneus assumat in recompensationem cul pae praeteritae, vei etiam a Deo illatam patienter sustineat. Utroque enim modo poena rationem satisfactionis habet. Poena autem satisfactoria diminuit aliquid de ratione pcenae: est enim de ratione poenae, quod sit contra voluntatem ; poena autem satisfactoria, etsi secundum absolutam consi- derationem sit contra voluntatem, &c. Aquinas, Summa Theol. Tertia Pars, qu. lxxxvi. art. 4. NOTE H. p. 251. Actus enim peccati facit hominem reum pcenae, in quan tum transgreditur ordinem divinae justitiae : ad quem non redit nisi per quandam recompensationem pcenae quae ad aequalitatem justitiae reducit : ut scilicet qui plus voluntati suae indulsit quam debuit, contra mandatum Dei agens, secundum ordinem divinae justitiae aliquid contra illud quod vellet, spontaneus vei invitus patiatur, quod etiam in inju- riis hominibus factis observatur, ut per recompensationem pcenae, reintegretur aequalitas justitiae. Aquinas, Summa Theol. Prima Secundce, qu. lxxxvii. art. 6. Consequitur peccatum mortale reatus alicujus pcenae, quia inordinatio culpae non reducitur ad ordinem justitiae nisi per pcenam. Justum est enim, ut qui voluntati suae plus indulsit quam debuit, contra voluntatem suam aliquid patiatur : sic enim erit aequalitas. Unde Apocal. xviii. di citur : " Quantum glorificavit se, et in deliciis fuit, tantum " date illi tormentum et luctum." Aquinas, Summa Theol. Tertia Pars, qu. lxxxvi. art. 4. NOTES TO LECTURE VI. 511 LECTURE VI. NOTE A. p. 277. X HUS Thomas a Kempis, expressing the natural con summation of the theological morality. Valde bonum est in obedientia stare, sub praelato vivere, et sui juris non esse. Multo tutius est in subjectione vi vere, quam in praelatura. . . . Curre hue vei illuc : nusquam invenies quietem, nisi in humUi subjectione sub praelati regimine. . . . Quis est ita sapiens qui omnia plene scire possit ? Ergo noli minis in sensu too confidere ; sed velis etiam aliorum sensum audire. Si bonum est tuum sentire, et hoc ipsum propter Deum dimittis, et alius sentire se- queris, magis exinde proficies. De Imit. Christi, lib. I. c. 9.We may regard the monastic institutions, when brought to their perfection of organization, as an attempt to realize the principle of a theocracy, in the human government of a particular society. The wonderful effect under the Divine Government is, that the Will of God is the law of the world of free agents ; each of whom has his own distinct will acting by its proper laws, whilst yet the sovereign Will is accomplished throughout, and all are as instruments in the Divine hand to work the Divine pur poses. In order to effect the same object by mere human government, it was necessary to neutralize the refractory power of the will in the subject, and antecedently to re duce the human agent to the condition of the mere instru ment. Thence the principle of Obedience so incessantly and strongly inculcated in the rules of the monastic orders : —an obedience carried to the minutest points ; so far that an immediate attention to the word of the superior was required, however the individual addressed might be en gaged at the moment. If he should happen to be writing, he must leave the very stroke unfinished, and instantly 512 APPENDIX. proceed on the errand to which he was summoned. An inspection of the rules of the different orders will furnish ample evidence of the truth of these statements? The system was carried to its perfection by the Jesuits. A member of that society might be at Rome at one mo ment, quite unconscious of any scheme in which he was to take a part, and the next moment be proceeding on his way to China or Paraguay. I have already mentioned an instance of the kind among the Franciscans, in the case of John Duns Scotus a. The amazing power obtained to the governors of societies so constituted may easily be supposed. The wonder indeed which so greatly perplexes us in the Divine government — the circumstance of a regular direction of results, by means intrinsically variable, and apparently uncontrollable, — vanishes in the survey of the artificial human system. We see the mechanism by which the result is effected. The subject of the human institu tion has been trained by unnatural discipline, not to feel his own proper responsibility as a moral agent. And a person brought to such a state, is of course prepared to execute any purpose, however mischievous in itself, be cause it is commanded by an external authority. Under such a system, . crimes may be perpetrated without re morse, and crimes too of an atrocity that would make the heart shrink from them, were it not steeled against its own intercession. The only wonder is, that men have been brought to this state of submission ; that an artificial sys tem has so completely mastered their moral principles. The consummate art of the framers of the institutions has been shewn, in their success in thus modifying the charac ters of men, and bringing them under the perfect command of a sovereign intellect. Let the principle, however, be once established, that the wiU of another is the supreme law of conduct, and then the like effects will be produced, to what we find under the stern dominion of fatalism among Ma- " Page 4Z5- NOTES TO LECTURE VI. 513 hometans. The subject- votary concentrates his whole energy and interest on the one false principle on which his character has been formed ; and he proceeds to the work enjoined on him, with a fanatical self-devotion, that resem bles motion produced by impact rather than the operation of a moral being. Moral force, in fact, is converted into physical; and morality is extinguished; all check being given to the exercise of moral judgment and discretion. The same consequences in kind follow from taking the will of God as the sole practical guide of conduct; or, which is the same thing, making religion the substitute for morality. For the error is the same ; that of acting on one abstract principle, instead of attending to the several internal laws of our nature, the whole law of God written on the heart, by which He instructs us how to do his will. The principle here takes a noble and sublime form : for who can argue abstractedly against the propriety of fol lowing the Divine will ? But, from its abstract excellence, it is the more likely to lead to romantic aberrations in con duct. In the true practical view of the will of God, the term is only a general expression for the various particular instances, in which God informs and admonishes us, what is our duty and interest in conduct, whether by the laws of our nature, or those of his revealed word. To argue re specting the will of God, as if we had any positive notion of what it is in God, can lead to no practical truth : for it is to argue from a mere hypothesis. Such a proceeding indeed is found necessarily to involve us in paradox. For thus Ockam affirms, that if God should so will, what is now held to be vice might become virtue. This statement was probably made by him and other scholastics, merely with a design of maintaining the principle itself as specu latively true; whatever consequence might be deduced from it : and without any view of establishing the conse quence as absolutely true. There is a passage of Anselm which inculcates this interpretation of the doctrine ; and which is important to be attended to, in forming an esti- l1 514 APPENDIX. mate of its real import, that we may not judge the main- tamers of it too hardly. Quod autem dicitur, quia quod vult justum est, et quod non vult, justum non est, non ita intelligendum est, ut si Deus velit quodlibet inconveniens, justum sit, quia ipse vult. Non enim sequitur, si Deus vult mentiri, justum esse mentiri ; sed potius Deum ilium non esse. Nam ne- quaquam potest velle mentiri voluntas, nisi in qua cor- rupta est Veritas, immo quae deserendo veritatem corrupta est. Cum ergo dicitur, si Deus vult mentiri, non est aliud, quam si Deus est taUs naturae, quae velit mentiri : et id circo non sequitur justum esse mendacium : nisi ita intel- Ugatur, sicut cum de duobus impossibUibus dicimus : si hoc est, illud est : quia nee hoc, nee illud est : ut si quis dicat : si aqua est sicca, et ignis est humidus : neutrum enim verum est. Itaque de illis tantum est verum dicere; si Deus hoc vult, justum est ; quae Deum velle non est in conveniens. Si enim vult Deus ut pluat, justum est ut pluat : et si vult ut aliquis homo occidatur, justum est ut occidatur. Cur Deus Homo, lib. I. c. 12. p. 47. The real objection however to the introduction of such a speculation into ethics is, that it is unphilosophical ; over looking clear facts of our moral nature, and suggesting, instead of rules founded on these facts, an abstract notion, which has no existence independently of them. NOTE B. p. 284. Principaliter quidem ad vitam contemplativam pertinet contemplatio divinae veritatis : quia hujusmodi contempla- tio est finis totius humanae vitae. Unde Augustinus dicit in 1 . de Trinitate, quod contemplatio Dei promittitor nobis, ut actionum omnium finis atque aeterna perfectio gaudio- rum. Quae quidem in futura vita erit perfecta, quando vi- debimus eum facie ad faciem ; unde et perfecte beatos fa ciet. Nunc autem contemplatio divinae veritatis competit nobis imperfecte, videlicet per speculum et in aenigmate. Unde per earn fit nobis quaedam inchoatio beatitudinis, NOTES TO LECTURE VI. 515 quae hic incipit ut in futuro continuetur. Unde et Philo- sophus in 10. Ethic, in contemplatione optimi inteUigibilis ponit ultimam felicitatem hominis. Aquinas, Summa Theol. Secunda Secundai, qu. clxxx. art. 4. Secundum se quidem manifestum est quod vita contem- plativa diuturna est dupliciter. Uno modo, eo quod ver- satur circa incorruptibilia et immobilia. Alio modo, quia non habet contrarietatem. Delectationi enim quae est in considerando, nihil est contrarium, ut dicitur in 1 . Topic. Sed quoad nos etiam vita contemplativa diuturna est : turn quia cotnpetit nobis secundum actionem incorruptibilis partis animae, scilicet secundum intellectum ; unde potest post hanc vitam durare : alio modo, quia in operibus con- templativae corporaliter non laboramus. Unde magis in hujusmodi operibus continue persistere possumus : sicut Philosophus dicit in 10. Ethicorum. Ibid. art. 8. Dicendum est ergo quod vita contemplativa simpliciter melior est quam activa : quod Philosophus in 1 0. Ethic. probat octo rationibus ; &c. Ibid. qu. clxxxii. art. 1 . NOTE C. p. 289. The passage which is commonly referred to by the Schoolmen, occurs in the Eudemian Ethics. The philo sopher is endeavouring to account for the phenomenon, that fortune often appears in the world triumphant over virtue and reason : and he closes his discussion in the following manner. " The object of inquiry is," he says, " what is the principle of motion in the soul. It is " plain then that as God is in the universe, so every thing "is in Him; for the divinity within us in a manner " moves all things. But the principle of reason is not " reason, but something superior. What then can one " say is superior even to science, but God? for virtue is an " instrument of the intellect. On this account also the " ancients said: they are called fortunate, who have an im- " pulse to succeed, being themselves without reason ; and " willing is not expedient for them ; for they have a prin- 1.12 516 APPENDIX. " ciple of a nature superior to intellect and wUl. But there " are some that have reason, and not this : and there are " enthusiasms ; but these have not the power of this : for " as being unreasonable, they fail It is evident then that " there are two kinds of good-fortune: one, divine; whence " also the fortunate seems to succeed through God : this " is the character that is apt to do right through impulse: " the other one who does right against impulse b." We see plainly in this passage of the philosopher a warrant for the notion of divinely-inspired Virtue, as of a principle with which the reason itself of man had no proper con cern ; but animating the agent by an instinctive efficacy, and promoting his success in a way beyond his own con sciousness or intentions. These divine instincts, regarded in their effects on the human subject, assumed in Scholastic phraseology the forms of good Dispositions, Preparations, Conversion of heart. They were termed Dispositions, so far as the agent was thereby fitly disposed for the operation of grace; since the matter on which any power has to act, must be of a suitable nature in order to that action. Preparation expressed the previous operation of the Spirit, rendering the agent susceptible of divine impressions, both at the commencement of his Christian life, and for his habitual progress in that life c . Conversion denoted the efficacy of the Spirit in producing the change of the soul towards God, the proper end of its being, by a series of effects ad justed successively to that end. These terms are all dif ferent views of the process of that energy which is working in the soul and bringing it to God — parts of the history of that alteration which it undergoes in putting off the form of the sinful Adam, and putting on the glorious form of the sons of God. >> Aristot. Eth. Eudem. lib. VII. c. 14. torn. II. p. 289. Du Val. c Aquin. Summa Theol. Pi-ima Secundte, qu. cix. art. 6. qu. xlii. art. 2. NOTES TO LECTURE VII. 517 LECTURE VII. NOTE A. p. 311. 1 HAVE before spoken of the refined materialism, which, particularly in regard to the nature of the soul, was the early and general tenet of theologians. In the IXth cen tury controversy revived on the nature of the soul as on other subjects. Ratramn of Corbey was employed in writ ing a book De Anima, at the instance of Odo, Bishop of Beauvais, in reply to the fanciful theory, drawn probably from the New-Platonists, of a monk of the same convent, who maintained that all men had but one and the same soul. Another evidence of the sort of physical speculation which was afloat at this period is, that the same writer is said to have been engaged in an inquiry concerning the fabled race of the Cynocephali, " whether they be truly " men of Adam's seed, or brute creatures d." Are we not disposed even in these days to rest too much on the natural or metaphysical arguments for a future state, and to imagine that the Christian Faith is compro mised by a denial of the immateriality of the soul ? I by no means intend to deny its immateriality. The soul is undoubtedly immaterial in this sense; that it is only to confound distinct phenomena, to identify the facts of con sciousness with those of external observation, as Priestley has done, in his attempt to establish the material nature of the soul. The two classes of facts are clearly distinct and different, and they ought therefore, in philosophical accu racy, to be distinguished by different names. But we go beyond the basis of the facts, when we assume, in our ab stract arguments for the natural immortality of the soul, its separate existence apart from the body. There is no observation which shews that the living powers, (to use * Ratramn's Treatise on the Body and Blood of the Lord, in Latin and English, 8vo, 1688. 1.13 518 APPENDIX. the phrase of Butler,) the powers of thought, and will, and action, exist otherwise than in connexion with a bodily system. However little the bodily system may be called into action during the exertion of these living powers, however it may in some instances be an obstruction to their energy, and however actively they may energize in the very moment of the decay of this system, stiU it is always in connexion with the bodily system that the living powers are displayed : and we are not authorized therefore speculatively to conclude their future existence, independ ently of their union with such a system. But what mat ters this to the Christian, who is fully assured, that, because Christ lives, he shaU live also ; that, " as by man came " death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead." I would say, in the words of Nemesius, 'Hplv be dp/cet -npbs drtdbei£iv rrjs ddavaaCas avrqs, rj r&v deCtav XoyCmv bibaaKaXCa, to nriarbv d Page 485—488. 544 APPENDIX. tionis virtute cooperta Veritas, et a sacris patribus ad pos- teritatis utilitatem Uteris commendata. Sed forte tibi aliter videtur. M. NuUo modo. Ideoque prius ratione utendum est in his quae nunc instant, ac deinde auctoritate. Joan. Scot. Erigen. De Div. Nat. I. c. 70, 71. p. 39. NOTE D. p. 376. Non peregrina loquor, neque ignorata scribo. Audivi ac vidi vitia praesentium, non laicorum, sed episcoporum. Nam absque episcopo Eleusio, et paucis cum eo, ex majori parte, Asianae decern provinciae, intra quas consisto, vere Deum nesciunt. Atque utinam penitus nescirent; cum procliviori enim venia ignorarent quam obtrectarent. Hi lar. De Synod, p. 498. Item, quando Arrianorum venenum, non jam portiun- culam quandam, sed paene orbem totum contaminaverat, adeo ut prope cunctis Latini sermonis episcopis, partim vi, partim fraude, deceptis, caligo quaedam mentibus offun- deretur, quidnam potissimum in tanta rerum confusione sequendum foret, &c. Vincent. Lirinens. Commonit. p. 319. ed. Baluz. NOTE E. p. 376. The extent of the popularity of Pelagianism at its rise, appears from what has been already observed in regard to this point". In the XI Vth century Bradwardine, surnamed the Profound Doctor, felt himself roused to vindicate " the " cause of God" by the Pelagianism of the times, com plaining that the whole world was gone after Pelagius. NOTE F. p. 379. The Apostles' Creed states nothing but facts. The transition is immense from this to the scholastic specula tions involved in the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds. Both these last indeed are logical definitions of the high subject of which they treat, differing from each other only in point of comprehensiveness and exactness. A definition in spe- ° P. 485—488. NOTES TO LECTURE VIII. 545 culative theology would necessarily be imperfect, so long as disputation was actively proceeding on the matter de fined. New ideas would be continually introduced into the discussion, and a term or a description that seemed before sufficiently exclusive of notions foreign to the subject, would require to be further fenced round with new limitations. Thus the term Con substantial, which at one time was heterodox, when the tendency was to " con- " found the persons" of the Trinity, would become neces sary, and consequently orthodox, when the tendency was the other way, " to divide the substance." It was a re quisite limitation in the Nicene Creed, of the assertion previously made concerning Christ's derivation from the Father ; since that assertion taken in itself might include also the Gnostic and Arian notions. The addition of the term in this place, applied the restriction just where it was wanted, and brought the terms of the proposed definition more immediately on the point to be defined. Thus Hilary, in explaining the term, recommends the cau tious mode of applying it ; by not setting out, that is, with declaring one substance, but adding it, after having first stated the relations of the Father and the Son °. The more we examine into the Trinitarian Contro versies, the more will this form of definition evidence itself to our view in these two Creeds. We shaU find the idea of the Divine Being gradually expanded in each; whilst at the same time a more restricted and exclusive set of cha racteristics are successively brought before us ; each of which has been ground won from the heretic by hard- fought debate. The copious particularity of the Athana- sian Creed still more illustrates the logical nature of the formularies. There we have the terms of a definition strongly put in contrast with each other, so that each in succession may limit that which precedes. Does a pre ceding term taken in itself include in its meaning any of the theories which the Church has rejected : — immediately a " De Synodis, Oper. p. 501. n n 546 APPENDIX. term is subjoined, which corrects the statement by nar rowing the extent of the former : as is evident in the in stance " neither made, nor created, nor begotten, but pro- " ceeding?" Where the terms involve numerical state ments, an air of contradiction is given to this series of limitations of which the Creed wiU be found to be made ¦*% up. But this arises, as I have before stated, from the positive notions which we attach to the numbers, instead of regarding them as negative; and generally indeed from not taking them in their acquired controversial sense. The paradoxical mode, in which the several terms are strung together, was probably further designed by the composer of the Creed, to combine with the logical expo sition a rhetorical effect, — to render the formulary more energetic and more easy to be remembered, or perhaps more adapted to the alternations of choral chaunting, and imitative of the repetitions of Hebrew poetry. The reason indeed of those clauses, in which the contradiction appears most explicit, is the same as that of the others. Definition is what the author is engaged in. Thus, having affirmed the essential attributes of omnipotence, immensity, and eternity of each of the Persons, he is careful afterwards to exclude the notion of distinctness, from that of distri bution, which his first declaration had asserted. NOTE G. p. 386. It is enough to refer to the reception which the Carte sian philosophy experienced at Rome, where a decree was passed immediately on its appearance, that no one of any degree or condition should presume either to print, or read, or keep in his possession, any of the works of Descartes; — or to the clamour raised against the Copernican theory of the universe, and the various shifts to which mathema ticians were consequently driven, to evade the threats of the Vatican ; — or lastly, to the well-known persecutions of Galileo. See Brucker, Hist. Crit. Phil. torn. V. p. 284. 628. 637. NOTES TO LEC^RE VIII. 547 NOTE H. p. 387. The manner in which the words of texts of Scripture were used in sermons, is illustrated in the following ac count given by Foxe, in his life of Latimer. " Amongst these, there was an Augustine Friar, who " took occasion, upon certain sermons that Master Lati- " mer made about Christmas 1529, as well in the Church " of St. Edward, as also in St. Augustine's, within the " University in Cambridge, to inveigh against him ; for " that Master Latimer in the said sermons (alluding to " the common usage of the season) gave the people cer- " tain cards out of the fifth, sixth, and seventh chapters of " St. Matthew, whereupon they might not only then, but " always else occupy their time. . . . This was upon the " Sunday before the Christmas-day; on which day, coming " to the church, and causing the bell to be tolled to a " sermon, he entered into the pulpit, taking for his text " the words of the Gospel aforesaid read in the church " that day, Tu quis es ? in delivering the which cards (as " is aforesaid) he made the heart to be triumph ; exhort- " ing and inviting all men thereby to serve the Lord with " inward heart and true affection, and not with outward " ceremonies : adding moreover to the praise of that tri- " umph, that though it were never so small, yet it would " make by the best court card in the bunch, yea though " it were the king of clubs, &c, meaning thereby, how the " Lord would be worshipped and served in simplicity of " the heart and verity, &c. It would ask a long discourse " to declare, what a stir there was in Cambridge upon this " preaching of Master Latimer. . . . First came out the " prior of the Black Friars, called Bucknham, otherwise " surnamed Domine Labia ; who, thinking to make a " great hand against Master Latimer, about the same " time of Christmas, when Master Latimer brought forth " his cards, to deface belike the doings of the other, 548 APPENDIX. " brought out his Christmas dice, casting them t*o his " audience cinque and quater : meaning by the cinque five " places in the New Testament, and the four Doctors by " the quater : by which his cinque quater he would prove " that it was not expedient the Scriptures to be in English," &c. Foxe's Eccl. Hist. vol. II. p. 1903. THE END. YALE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 3 9002 01311 6463