Yale University Library



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YALE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

Presented by the Author

THE
TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS FROM
BRITISH TO AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT

BY

ROBERT LIVINGSTON SCHU.YLER, Ph.D.
Ifistructor in History in Yale University

Mr

NEW YORK
THE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
1909
AJl rights resii-iiiei

TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS FROM BRITISH
TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

THE
TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS FROM
BRITISH TO AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT

BY
ROBERT LIVINGSTON SCHUYLER, Ph.D.
Instructor in History in Yale University

NEW YORK
THE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
1909
All rights reserved

Copyright, igog
By The Columbia University Press
Printed from type April, 1909

THE TUTTLE, MOREHOUSE j: TAYLOR COMPANY.

To MY Father and Mother.

PREFACE.
The purpose of the following study is to describe the
transition from British to American government, which
occurred during the period of the Revolution, in that
part of the West known as "the Illinois." It will be
understood that the word Illinois does not here exactly
correspond in territorial extent to the present state of that
name. The view presented is that the result of British
administration in the West was a decisive factor in the
abandonment of that territory, which, of course, included
Illinois, by the English ministry in 1782. Therefore a
discussion of British policy respecting the West in general
forms a suitable introduction to the subject in hand. An
attempt has been made to describe conditions in Illinois
during the period of British administration, to trace the
progress of events which resulted in the overthrow of
British rule and the substitution for it of government by
one of the American commonwealths, to show the operation
of that government, and to explain conditions in the country
at the close of the Revolution. The study concludes with
a consideration of the peace negotiations of 1782, so far
as they relate to the West, as completing the transition of
which it treats.
The materials upon which it is based are indicated in the
footnotes and bibliography. I desire to express my obliga
tions to Dr. C. E. Carter of Illinois College, who courteously
allowed me to examine a part of his manuscript of a work
on British administration in Illinois. That monograph has
been awarded the Justin Winsor Prize of the American
Historical Association for 1908, and will be published in due
time. I gladly take this opportunity to record my indebted
ness to Professor William R. Shepherd of Columbia Uni
versity, under whose instruction I began the study of history

viii preface.
some ten years ago. His detailed knowledge of early west
ern history and Spanish colonial policy has rendered his
criticisms especially valuable. Professor Herbert L. Osgood
of Columbia, also, has read my manuscript and furnished
suggestions. The work of Professor Clarence W. Alvord
of the University of Illinois on the records of the Illinois
villages has, in large measure, made the present study pos
sible. To my father and mother I am under a debt of
gratitude of which they and I alone know the extent.
Yale University, April 2, 1909.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.
BRITISH POLICY IN THE WEST.
Colonial charters and the West — Early Exploration — ^Western
settlements and the French — ^Western settlements and
the Fur Trade — Importance of the Fur Trade — ^Trad
ers — British Policy towards western settlements after
1763 — Proclamation of 1763 — Its objects and effects —
Treaty of Lochabor — Possibility of new colonies in
the West — ^Vandalia — Proposed colony in western lands
claimed by Connecticut — The Quebec Act and its
effects — Illegal settlements in West — ^Their results —
Trade conditions in the West — Suggested remedies —
Failure of British Administration. . . . . 1-16
CHAPTER II.
ILLINOIS UNDER GREAT BRITAIN.
Boundaries of Illinois — Population — ^Villages — Indians and
Slaves — Occupations of the people — Social classes —
Attitude towards British government — Inauguration
and nature of British government in Illinois — Com
munication with the eastern colonies — Easterners in Illi
nois — Their activities — Their attitude toward the
government — Trade conditions in Illinois — Illinois
joined to Canada, but left to its own resources —
Troops withdrawn — Rocheblave as British Agent — His
problems, and relations with the eastern element in
Illinois — Sjrmpathy for the revolted colonists among the
French of Illinois — Expectation of an American attack
on Illinois early in the Revolution. . . . 17-33
CHAPTER III.
THE WESTWARD EXPANSION OF VIRGINIA AND GENESIS OF
THE EXPEDITION OF I778.
Western claims of Virginia — Creation of western counties
before the Revolution — Western Indians — Western
emigration — Dunmore's War — Transylvania — George

X contents.
Rogers Clark — Clark in Kentucky— Delegate to the
Virginia Assembly^Cherokee War of 1776 — Kentucky
organized as a Virginia county — The Revolution in the
West — Henry Hamilton — Possibility of an American
attack on British posts in the Northwest — Clark's plan —
Interview with Henry — An expedition authorized. . . 34-50
CHAPTER IV.
THE OVERTHROW OF BRITISH POWER IN ILLINOIS.
Recruiting — Corn Island — French-American Treaty — Clark's
route to Kaskaskia. The Taking of Kaskaskia — Clark's
Policy — Submission of the other Villages — Reasons for
Clark's success — Difficulties of his position — Clark and
the Indians — Relations with the Spaniards. . . . 51-61
CHAPTER V.
HAMILTON AND CLARK.
Hamilton plans to recover Illinois — He leads an expedition
from Detroit for that purpose — His route — Clark misled
concerning Hamilton's movements — Hamilton captures
Vincennes — His further plans — Clark learns that Ham
ilton is at Vincennes — He decides to attack Hamilton —
He captures Vincennes — Effect of the capture of Ham
ilton on the Indians — Clark plans to attack Detroit, but
is unable to do so— He takes up his headquarters at the
Falls of the Ohio  62-76
CHAPTER VI.
ILLINOIS UNDER VIRGINIA, 1 778-1 783.
Illinois under Clark — Clark's popularity with the inhabitants —
County government for Illinois established by Virginia —
Todd appointed County-Lieutenant — Henry's instruc
tions to him, to Clark, and to Montgomery — Inauguration
of civil government by Todd — Establishment of courts —
Paper money — Land speculation — Support of the
troops — Difficulties of Todd's position — He leaves Illi
nois — Characteristics of American frontiersmen — Griev
ances of the people of Illinois — Emigration of the better
class from Illinois — De la Balme episode — Expedition
against St. Joseph — Fear of British and Indian attacks
on Illinois — Plan to establish a fort at the mouth of
the Ohio — Attack on Cahokia and St. Louis — Fort

CONTENTS. XI
Jefferson — Rogers, Bentley and Dodge — Inhabitants of
Illinois left to their own resources — Decline of Virgin
ia's interest in Illinois — Further activities of Bentley —
Their results — Clark instructed to lead an expedition
against Detroit — Failure of the plan — Possibility of
restoring British authority in Illinois — ^Views of
Gerardin — ^Virginia retains nominal possession of Illi
nois till 1784. ... .... 77-111
CHAPTER VII.
THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE WEST.
The Transition in Illinois completed by the Treaty of Paris —
Rockingham Ministry — Appointment by Congress of
Peace Commissioners — Franklin and Oswald begin
informal negotiations — Views of Congress respecting
the West — Letter of Livingston — Instructions to Jay —
Franklin and Canada — Fox and the Negotiations —
Shelburne's Ministry — The Policy of Spain — The
Problem before the American Commissioners — Prom
inence of Jay in the Negotiations— Franklin's Conditions
of Peace— Aranda—Rayneval— Policy of Vergennes—
Jay's independent move — Shelburne's response — Sepa
rate negotiation between England and the United
States — Arrival of Adams in France— His attitude — A
theory of French policy — Provisional Treaty — Explana
tion of the abandonment of the West by Great
Britain  ¦ • 112-140

CHAPTER I— INTRODUCTION.
BRITISH POLICY IN THE WEST.
The expression "the West" is here used specifically to
designate the territory between the Alleghanies and the
Mississippi, the Great Lakes and the Floridas. This terri
tory did not become important in English colonial history
until the eighteenth century. It was included, however, at
least nominally, in one or another of the colonial charters
which emanated from the English crown in the seventeenth
century. By the Virginia charter of 1609 the territory of
that province was declared to extend "from sea to sea."
The grant made to the New England Council in 1620, the
Connecticut charter of 1662, the charter to the Lords
Proprietors of Carolina in 1663, and the Georgia charter
of later date, contained similar provisions. The Massa
chusetts charter of 1691 declared that the territory of that
province should extend "towards the South Sea, or west
ward as far as Our colonies of Rhode Island, Connecticut,
and the Narragansett country." With the exception of the"
Georgia grant these charters were issued at a time when the
vaguest and most inaccurate ideas prevailed regarding the
configuration of the North American continent. The South
Sea was supposed to be not very remote from the Atlantic,
and the crown was quite ignorant of the real extent of
territory embraced in the grants. In many cases they over
lapped, and conflicting claims resulted.
During the last quarter of the seventeenth century, the
French discoveries and explorations upon which Louis XIV
based his claim to sovereignty over the Mississippi valley
advanced geographical knowledge and disclosed something
of the true extent of the continent. Claimed by France,
the West assumed a real importance in the minds of British
statesmen. The small beginnings of English colonial exploration
west of the Alleghanies date from the seventeenth century.

2 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
The journal of a party of Virginians sent in 1671 to dis
cover "the ebbing and flowing of the water on the other
side of the Mountains, in order to the discovery of the
South Sea," has been preserved.^ They probably reached
the Kanawha river. In the seventeenth century, also, the
possibilities of the fur trade were beginning to be realized,
especially in New York. In 1686 traders under license
from Governor Dongan went to the Great Lakes .^
Governor Spotswood of Virginia took an intelligent
interest in the West and understood the danger from the
French power in Canada, on the Lakes, and on the Mis
sissippi. He saw that it virtually surrounded the English
settlements,' and believed that, if unchecked, it could not
only monopolize the whole fur trade, but actually conquer
the English colonies.* In view of this menace he deemed
it of the greatest importance that settlements should be
made on the Great Lakes, and possession acquired of those
passes over the mountains necessary to safeguard com
munication with them.^ From what he learned while on
an expedition over the Blue Ridge in 1716, he believed that
the plan was practicable. Basing himself on the charter of
1609, he asserted that "most of the Lakes and great part
of the head branches of Mississippi" were included
within the limits of Virginia, while the French settlements
on the lower Mississippi fell within the boundaries of South
Carolina.^ So long as the French power existed in the West the
British government was disposed to favor western settle
ments, to urge that their charters carried the colonies
indefinitely westward, and to assert that the French were
trespassing on English territory.'' In 1748, in connection
' Fernow, The Ohio Valley in Colonial Days, 220 et seq.
' Ibid., 66-67.
' Collections of the Virginia Historical Society, new series, II,
329-330. * Ibid., 296.
'Ibid., 296-297.
'Ibid., 295.
' Force, American Archives, 4th series, I, 182.

BRITISH POLICY IN THE WEST. 3
with a proposed grant in the West to the Ohio Company,
the Lords of Trade reported that "the settlement of the
country lying to the westward of the Great Mountains in the
colony of Virginia, which is the center of all His Majesty's
provinces, will be for His Majesty's interest and advan
tage .... inasmuch as his Majesty's subjects will be thereby
enabled to cultivate a friendship and carry on a more exten
sive commerce with the nations of Indians inhabiting those
parts, and such settlements may likewise be a proper step
towards disappointing the views and checking the encroach
ments of the French."* The claim that charters extended
the colonies to the South Sea, and the assertion that the
French claim to the Mississippi was not just, were made by
the president of the Virginia Council in 1749.® Governor
Dinwiddle in 1756 advanced the most extensive territorial
claims for his province. Virginia, he said, was supposed
to include all lands west of the Alleghanies between the
northern boundary of Carolina and the southern boundary
of Canada.^" He was willing, however, to consider settle
ments which had been made near the Ohio as "the present
boundary to the westward."^^ He was convinced of the
necessity of erecting forts as a barrier against the French.^^
Governor Pownall desired the establishment of western
colonies for the same purpose.^' This, also, was, no doubt,
the purpose of the recommendation made by the colonial
commissioners assembled at Albany in 1754 that measures
should be taken for the establishment of Protestant settle
ments in the West.^* It was in Franklin's mind when in
the Albany Plan of Union he proposed the founding of
western colonies.
' Fernow, op. cit., 245-246.
° Ibid., 259-260.
'"Colls. Va. Hist. Soc, new series, IV, 339.
"/Wrf., Ill, 381.
"/6id.,IV,339."Pownall, Administration of the Colonies, 2d ed., London, 1765;
appendix, 47-48.
" O'Callaghan, Documentary History of New York, II, 356.

4 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
Western settlements were favored not only as a barrier
against the French, but also because it was believed that
they would aid in the development of the fur trade. This
feature of western colonization was referred to by Spots-
wood early in the century. It was dwelt upon by Governor
Gooch of Virginia in 1747, in connection with the grant to
the Ohio Company, already referred to.^^ Dinwiddie was
fully aware of the possible profits of the fur trade, and
believed that it would be stimulated by western settlements.^*
But he thought that if the French remained in possession of
the Ohio, the English would be entirely deprived of the
trade." The problem which confronted the British government
at the conclusion of the Seven Years' War was not easy.
By the Treaty of Paris in 1763 Great Britain came into
possession of the great peltry-bearing regions, Canada and
the West. The belief, indeed, seems later to have been
common among her revolted colonists that the desire to
control the fur trade had been a leading object of her
policy in prosecuting the French war.^* An immense waste
of uninhabited country was a profitable acquisition only by
reason of its trade.'^* From this standpoint it was felt by
the nation to be an asset of distinct value.^" The ministry,
moreover, had preferred the possession of Canada and the
West to that of the French West India islands. For politi
cal reasons their choice had to be justified.^^ The new
possessions must be made profitable. This could be done
only by the monopolization and development of their sole
immediate source of wealth, the fur trade. Furs could be
secured in large quantities only by traffic with the Indians.
They belonged to the class of "enumerated" articles, which
could legally be exported from British colonies only to a
" Fernow, op. cit., 241.
" Colls. Va. Hist. Soc, new series, III, 94-95.
"/fctrf., 217.
" Collections of the New York Historical Society for 1886, 272.
" Annual Register for 1763, 6th ed., 18.
'^Ibid., 18-19.
" Ibid., 19.

BRITISH POLICY IN THE WEST. 5
British port. If, therefore, the tribes refused to do business
with English traders, or if the latter illegally exported their
goods to foreign ports, the objects of mercantilist policy
would be frustrated. No benefit would be secured by the
British treasury, British manufacturers, British shipping
interests, or by the consuming public. The possession of
the peltry-bearing regions would be of no value.
A tactful and conciliatory attitude towards the Indians
became, therefore, a necessary policy for Great Britain.
The success of the French traders had been mainly due to
their consideration for the savages. Unfortunately, from
the British point of view, English traders had long since
acquired a bad name with the Indians. This seems to have
been chiefly due to the bad character of the average trader.^^
As early as the administration of Governor Spotswood
there is evidence that the Indians were being maltreated by
English traders.^* In 1756 Dinwiddie attributed friction
with the Indians mainly "to the traders among them, who
are the most abandoned wretches in the world, and, in
respect to society, as uncivilized as the Indians themselves,
and less to be trusted in regard to truth and probity.^* The
Albany commissioners in 1754 dwelt upon the evils of
unregulated traffic with the Indians,^^ and Franklin's Plan
sought to place Indian affairs under collective control.^'
In the opinion of the commissioners the trade should be
made subservient to public rather than to private interests.''''
The abuses practised by traders on the Indians were
referred to by Lieutenant-Governor Colden in 1764 as of
long standing.^* The necessity for a comprehensive Indian
policy which would remove the evils of unregulated traffic,
"Collections of the New York Historical Society, Publication
Fund Series, IX, 383. For a statement of the reasons for the
hostility of the Indians towards the English see Beer, British
Colonial Policy, 1754-1765, 253, 255.
^ Colls. Va. Hist. Soc, new series, II, 145.
"7Wrf., IV, 340.
== O'Callaghan, op. cit., II, 355-
"Ibid., 356.
" Colls. N. Y. Hist. Soc, Pub. Fund Series, IX, 383.

6 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
and extend British influence over the tribes, was felt several
years before the end of the Seven Years' War.^*
By 1763 British policy regarding western settlements had
undergone a decided change. One cause of the previous
desire for their establishment no longer existed. The
French power having been overthrown, such settlements
ceased to be needed as a barrier for protection. The prin
cipal motive in causing the government to alter its policy
related, however, to the fur trade.'" Everything that would
antagonize the Indians must be avoided.
As early as 1756 Sir William Johnson informed the Board
of Trade that the advance of white settlements was an
eyesore to the Indians, and "infected them with jealousy
and disgust towards the English."'^ The Board showed
itself awake to this danger.'^ The probability that advanc
ing settlements would cause trouble with the Indians, and
prove injurious to the fur trade, was a commonplace among
British officials. "It does appear to us," wrote Hills
borough, president of the Board of Trade, in a well-known
report in 1772, "that the extension of the fur trade depends
entirely upon the Indians being undisturbed in the posses
sion of their hunting-grounds ; and that all colonization
does in its nature and must in its consequences operate to
the prejudice of that branch of commerce."'' Towards the
close of the war the Board of Trade proposed that the
king should issue a proclamation establishing an Indian
reservation "within certain fixed bounds," such lands to
be reserved for the Indians and for purposes of trade.'*
From the British imperial point of view, then, unrestricted
western settlements and unregulated trade with the Indians
were evils which must be guarded against.
" O'Callaghan, op. cit., II, 401, 409, 454.
™ Cf. Farrand, "The Indian Boundary Line,'' American Historical
Review, X, 782 et seq.
" O'Callaghan, op. cit., II, 419.
''Ibid.,AS2. "^ For the report see The Works of Franklin, Sparks' ed., IV, 303
et seq.
" Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New
York, Yll, 535-536.

BRITISH POLICY IN THE WEST. 7
Soon after the Seven Years' War the British government
addressed itself to the administration of its new territorial
acquisitions. On October 7, 1763, a royal proclamation was
issued creating civil governments for the four new British
provinces of Quebec, East Florida, West Florida, and
Grenada. Under this proclamation civil government was
inaugurated in Quebec, the most important of the new
provinces, in 1764, and this document served as its con
stitution till the Quebec Act went into operation in 1775."
But the West was not then included within the limits of any
province or provided with any form of civil government. It
was reserved temporarily for the use of the Indians. In it
settlements and individual purchases from the Indians were
forbidden, and the governors of the eastern colonies were
ordered not to grant warrants of survey, or pass patents
for lands beyond the sources of the rivers which empty
into the Atlantic. Governors of the new provinces were
not to suffer any extension of settlements beyond their
respective limits. The serious consequences of Indian
hostility were forcibly impressed upon British officials by
the uprising associated with the name of Pontiac. It was
constantly asserted in the English newspapers that this
uprising had been caused by maltreatment of the Indians."
Had an attempt been made in 1763 to extend civil govern
ment over the West, the result might have been disastrous.
If the English were to enjoy profits from the fur trade, if
the possession of the West was to be made lucrative,
measures of conciliation were imperative. This considera
tion, it is believed, explains to a large extent those parts
of the proclamation which relate to the West and to the
Indians. The proclamation attempted, moreover, to prevent
the evil consequences of unregulated traffic with the savages.
Trade was declared to be open upon license to all British
subjects. But traders were required to give security that
they would observe such regulations as the crown or its
'"Coffin, "The Province of Quebec and the Early American
Revolution," Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin, Economics,
Political Science and History Series, I, 275-277.
=° Colls. N. Y. Hist. Soc, Pub. Fund Series, IX, 270.

8 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
commissioners might make. The proclamation was thus an
outgrowth of British experience and policy.
It had, however, other objects than those which per
tained to the Indians and to the fur trade. In the report
referred to, Hillsborough mentions as purposes of the proc
lamation, "the confining the western extent of settlements
to such a distance from the seashore as that those settle
ments should be within reach of the trade and commerce of
this kingdom .... and also of the exercise of that authority
and jurisdiction which was conceived to be necessary for
the preservation of the colonies in a due subordination to
and dependence upon the Mother Country." According
to Dartmouth, it was the invariable policy of the govern
ment to prevent settlements where they would provoke the
Indians, and where the settlers would be beyond the reach
of British control and protection." Grenville's view, as
given by Franklin," that the king's purpose would be accom
plished as soon as the western lands were properly pur
chased from the Indians, seems improbable. A possible
purpose of the proclamation in restricting settlements was
to discredit the charter claims of the colonies to the West.
It was coming to be felt that imperial interests demanded
an abridgement of these indefinite and often conflicting
claims, but no certainty was yet felt as to where the western
boundary of the colonies should be established.'*
Hillsborough thought that the proclamation line, that is,
the Alleghany watershed, should be permanently main
tained as the western limit of colonial settlements,*" but
the government did not follow this policy. The proclama
tion line, confessedly temporary, involved a restriction of
settlements, but did not establish an ultimate boundary.*^
" Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, 4th series,
X, 72s.
"^ Works of Franklin, Sparks' ed., IV, 339-340.
""Annual Register for 1763, 20-21.
" O'Callaghan, op. cit., II, 577.
" Attempts were later made to show that the proclamation made
the Alleghanies the western boundary of the Atlantic colonies. Cf.
Sparks, Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution,
VIII, 156-160; Correspondience and Public Papers of John Jay,

BRITISH POLICY IN THE WEST. 9
Washington's view that it was a temporary expedient to
quiet the Indians, which did not extinguish the claims of the
colonies to the West, probably represents the better type of
colonial opinion on the subject. He thought that the
restriction of settlements would be removed when the
Indians consented to the occupation of their lands.*^ There
is abundant evidence that the colonies were considered by
good authority to extend west of the Alleghanies after
1763.*' The Board of Trade, it is true, advocated in 1768
a permanent boundary line between the colonies and the
western Indians,** but it does not seem to have been the
policy of the government permanently to reserve the whole
territory between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi for
the use of the Indians, as Burke in a rhetorical flourish
implied. After the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1768, by which the
Six Nations ceded to the crown their claim to lands south
of the Ohio as far as the Tennessee river, then called the
Cherokee,*^ the government was willing to allow settle
ments under authority of Virginia west of the Alleghanies.
By the Treaty of Lochabor in 1770, it was stipulated that
settlements under Virginia should be bounded on the west
by a line from the mouth of the Kanawha to some point
on the northern boundary line of North Carolina.*' This
new line was, of course, much further west than the line
of 1763. Dunmore favored settlements even beyond the
new line, but was instructed not to allow them.*''
It is probable that but for the outbreak of the Revolution
new colonies would have been established in the West under
Johnston's ed., II, 390; Works of Franklin, Sparks' ed., IV, 324,
367 ; Writings of Thomas Paine, Conway's ed., II, 52.
" Writings of Washington, Ford's ed., II, 396, and Maryland
Historical Society, Fund Publications, No. 11, 73.
" Archives of Maryland, XIV, 381, 479 ; O'Callaghan, op. cit., II,
577. "Docs. Rel. Col. Hist. St. of N. Y., VIII, 22.
" For the treaty see ibid., in et seq.
" O'Callaghan, op. cit., II, 543. Colls. Mass. Hist. Soc, 4th series,
X, 725-726.
"Ibid., 726-727.

10 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
royal charters. Both in the eastern colonies and in England
a growing interest was felt in the country beyond the
mountains. George Croghan, Sir William Johnson's
deputy, who was in London in 1764, reported that, at that
time, there was talk of the establishment of a colony near
the mouth of the Ohio.*^ Proposals were later made look
ing towards the founding of colonies in Illinois, at
Detroit, and at the mouth of the Ohio, but the Board of
Trade opposed these schemes, and they were dropped.*'
One reason for the Board's opposition was that such
colonies would be injurious to the fur trade.°" That the
Board was willing, however, to open up portions of the
West for settlement is shown by the proceedings relating
to the proposed colony of Vandalia.^^ This project
encountered much opposition. Hillsborough's attitude is
well known. He felt that it was opposed to all sound
policy.'^ Dunmore had written to him that a colony at such
a distance could benefit neither the eastern colonies nor
England. No commercial communication with it would be
possible. Emigration thither, said Dunmore, would reduce
the value of lands in the eastern colonies. The establish
ment of the colony, moreover, would probably involve an
Indian war.^' Nevertheless the Board approved the petition
for the Vandalia grant,^* and the charter had all but passed
the seals, when political agitation in the colonies made it
expedient to pause. Care, however, had been taken to
establish such boundaries for the proposed colony as would
not offend the Indians.^^ It is altogether unlikely that the
government would have allowed western settlements to
* Fernow, op. cit., 177-178.
"Ibid., 181, and Alden, "New Governments West of the Alle
ghanies before 1780," Bui. Univ. of Wis., Ec, Pol. Sci. and Hist.
Series, II, 17-19.
'"Docs. Rel. Col. Hist. St. of N. Y., VIII, 27 et seq.
" For the Vandalia proceedings see Alden, op. cit.
'' Works of Franklin, Sparks' ed., IV, 303 et seq.
'* Fernow, op. cit., 276-277.
" O'Callaghan, op. cit., II, 578 et seq.
"Colls. Mass. Hist. Soc, 4th series, X, 726.

BRITISH POLICY IN THE WEST. II
interfere with the fur trade. The sentiment expressed in
Hillsborough's report continued by many of the British to
be regarded as the proper solution of the problem: "Let
the savages enjoy their deserts in quiet. Were they driven
from their forests, the peltry trade would decrease." A
distinction has been suggested between the territory north
and that south of the Ohio. It may have been the govern
ment's policy permanently to reserve the former for the
Indians.^® On the eve of the Revolution an attempt was made to
establish a new settlement in the nature of a commonwealth
in that part of the Northwest claimed by Connecticut. On
April 2, 1774, Pelatiah Webster of Philadelphia, who under
stood the potential value of the West and prophesied that
its population would in the future control the continent,
wrote to Silas Deane of Connecticut, pointing out the impor
tance of the territory near the Great Lakes which was
claimed by Connecticut.^'' At about the same time Deane,
who had already become interested in the West, wrote to
Ebenezer Hazard of New York and Samuel H. Parsons
of Philadelphia, who were likewise interested.^* In the
letter to Parsons, he suggested a settlement on the south
west corner of Lake Erie or on the Mississippi. It would
be secure, he thought, whatever the result of the dispute
between England and the colonies. If arbitrary measures
were pursued, many would flee to this new asylum. In the
same year Hazard, Parsons, and Deane formed an associa
tion, the rules of which were drawn up by Hazard. To
this others were to be admitted on payment of a small sum.
The money raised was to be used to purchase from the
Connecticut Assembly a quitclaim or release of all the rights
of that colony to lands between the western boundary of
Pennsylvania and the Mississippi. Every member was to
be entitled to one two-thousandth of the lands granted by
" Coffin, op. cit., 428-429.
"Hinman, A Historical Collection from Official Records, Files,
etc., of the Part Sustained by Connecticut during the War of the
Revolution, 536.
"' Collections of the Connecticut Historical Society, II, 131-133.

12 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
Connecticut to the association. Each was to pay his share
for defending the claim under authority of that colony if
it should be disputed, and to contribute his proportion of
money necessary to purchase the Indian title and to make
a settlement. Hazard, who was prepared to invest heavily,
went to Hartford in 1774 to procure the quitclaim, but his
petition was rejected^" and the plan collapsed. The interest
of these men in the West, however, continued, and Deane
was one of the first of the revolutionists to advocate Con
gressional control over it.*"
The year which witnessed this unsuccessful attempt at
western colonization marked the passage by Parliament of
the Quebec Act, which involved the most serious attack
ever made by the British government on charter claims to
the West. The act included all the Northwest, between
the Ohio, the Great Lakes, and the Mississippi in the
government of Quebec. The main purpose of this extension
of the limits of that province will be discussed later.
It had the effect, of course, of nullifying all charter claims
of the eastern colonies to this territory. As was foretold
by the Opposition in the House of Commons, the bill
angered the colonists. Though it was not necessarily con
nected with the coercive acts affecting Massachusetts passed
at the same session of Parliament, the most unfavorable
interpretation was placed upon it in the colonies. The Con
tinental Congress declared it to be a violation of colonial
rights and demanded its repeal.*^ An unsuccessful attempt
was made in the Lords the following year to secure this.
The act was said to have unduly extended the limits of
Quebec and prevented the expansion of the eastern
colonies.'^ Since, however, it constituted one of the griev
ances of the revolutionist party, its nullification of colonial
claims to the Northwest was by them considered invalid.*'
"" Colls. Conn. Hist. Soc, II, 133-134.
»» Colls. N. Y. Hist. Soc for 1886, 383-385.
" Force, Am. Archives, 4th series, I, 912.
"Ibid., 1823-1824, 1826.
"' Sparks, Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution,
III, 268 et seq.

BRITISH POLICY IN THE WEST. 1 3
During the Revolution, therefore, the states continued to
assert claims to this territory on the basis of their old
colonial charters.
By many of the colonists, and especially by the frontiers
men, the proclamation of 1763 had been regarded as an
unjust attempt to deprive them of lands for which they had
fought. Its restrictive policy furnished one of the counts
which were later made against the home government by
the revolutionists."* The character of the American
frontiersmen was such that they could not be restrained
from hunting and building cabins in the forbidden terri
tory."' Even the recollection of the horrors of Pontiac's
War did not deter them."" Among the squatters were men
of low character who persisted in selling rum to the sav
ages."^ The imperial machinery for enforcing the proc
lamation was wanting. British sovereignty in the West,
it is true, was represented by garrisons stationed at a few
posts on the Great Lakes and on the Mississippi, and the sug
gestion was made that these forces should be employed to
punish squatters and destroy their cabins."* But the number
of troops in the West was quite inadequate to perform this
work. Some of the governors, indeed, seem to have con
scientiously tried to prevent illegal settlements."" But many
officials took a lax view of their duties.'"
Friction with the western tribes caused by these violations
of the proclamation was justly regarded as a matter of
imperial concern, since it was likely to involve a general
Indian war. Sir William Johnson warned General Gage
of the danger of the continued illegal settlements and
" Colls. N. Y. Hist. Soc. for 1886, 270.
" For evidence of the violation of the proclamation see Archives
of Md., XIV, 468, and Writings of Washington, Ford's ed., II, 221,
note. ''Archives of Md., XIV, 211.
" O'Callaghan, op. cit., II, 503.
'^Archives of Md., XIV, 362.
"Ibid., 199, 362.
™ Wharton, Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the
United States, V, 88; American State Papers, "Public Lands,'' II,
208.

14 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
trade.'^ In 1766 the latter, then commander-in-chief of the
British forces in North America, was instructed to
codperate with the civil power in enforcing the proc
lamation; and colonial officials were urged to take every
measure to remove squatters and to conciliate the Indians.'^
In the administration of the West the policy of Great
Britain continued to be determined by the fur trade. To
develop this at the least expense, as advocated by Gage,^'
represented the attitude of the government. To prevent
unlicensed trading and smuggling in this vast territory, the
police power which the few troops in the West could
exercise was so inadequate as to be virtually negligible.
The results of these conditions, so far as they relate to
Illinois, will be considered in the next chapter.
Pontiac's War did not make the Indians more inclined
to trade with the English. Their preference to do business
with the French who remained in the Northwest after 1763
was known to British officials.''* It was hoped, however,
that the establishment of British garrisons at the western
posts would do something to destroy French influence.'"
In the Northwest, competition between French and English
traders was sharp, and the former, many of whom carried
on unlicensed trade, enjoyed an advantage in the goodwill
of the Indians, and were able to go freely among the
tribes where Englishmen were not suffered. In short, the
area of English trade, as compared with the French, was
restricted, and mainly confined to the established posts.'"
But more important from the British standpoint was the
attitude of the English traders themselves. The natural
emporium for the commerce of the Mississippi valley was
New Orleans. La Salle had first developed a plan to ship
furs to Europe from the upper Mississippi down the river,
'"- O'Callaghan, op. cit., II, 498, 503.
" Archives of Md., XIV, 328-329, and Colls. Mass. Hist. Soc, 4th
series, X, 655.
" Gage to Hillsborough, 10 Nov., 1770, Carter, MSS. Thesis.
"O'Callaghan, op. cit., II, 476; Colls. N. Y. Hist. Soc, Pub. Fund
Series, IX, 443. .
'" O'Callaghan, op. cit., U, 476.
'° Ibid., 551, and Carter, op. cit.

BRITISH POLICY IN THE WEST. 1 5
instead of by way of the St. Lawrence.^' This port, how
ever, was in the possession of a foreign power, and hence
all shipments of fur to it were illegal. General Gage
thought that, while some British manufactures might be
disposed of in the West, so long as furs commanded a high
price in the New Orleans market, no peltry exchanged for
those manufactures would ever reach a British port.'* His
observations induced him to believe that the Indian trade
would "always go with the stream." It would all go either
down the Mississippi or down the St. Lawrence.'" Sir
William Johnson shared Gage's views.*" Unless the natural
course of western trade could be diverted from New Orleans
up the Ohio, or down the St. Lawrence, British possession
of the West would be a flat failure.
In order to check smuggling and enforce payment of the
duties various measures were suggested. Colden outlined a
plan to the Board of Trade in 1764. In his opinion the
export duties on peltry ought to be paid in kind at a fixed
rate at the posts where the furs were procured. A certifi
cate of the duty paid should be carried with every pack' of
peltries and finally lodged in the customhouse of the port
from which they were exported. The goods thus paid in
kind as duty should be sent once a year to the customhouse
and sold at public vendue. This method, Colden thought,
would effectually prevent evasions of the duty.*^
Sir William Johnson thought that illicit traffic with New
Orleans might be prevented, if the northern trade were
strictly confined to the posts in communication with the
Great Lakes. In that way, he thought, the furs would go
down the St. Lawrence. As for the trade of the Mississippi,
it might be possible to divert that from New Orleans to
the British province of West Florida, where French traders
were known to be well supplied with goods for barter.*^
" Winsor, The Mississippi Basin, 21.
" O'Callaghan, op. cit., II, 485, 486.
"/Wrf., 486.
""/Wd, 488.
'^ Colls. N. Y. Hist. Soc, Pub. Fund Series, IX, 384.
'' O'Callaghan, op. cit., II, 488.

1 6 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
Gage believed that the traders ought to be restrained by
law. The only way to enforce regulations, in his opinion,
was to invest the officers commanding at the several posts
with judicial power to see that they were put in operation.
Something could be done, he thought, by erecting posts at
the mouths of the Ohio and Illinois and preventing all boats
from descending those rivers. The establishment of an
adequate number of posts and forts, however, would be
difficult and expensive.*' Hillsborough expressed the same
opinion.** A possible means of preventing smuggling lay in the
capture of New Orleans from the Spaniards. If this
became an English port, the problem of western trade
would be solved. At the time of the dispute between Spain
and England over the Falkland Islands, when war seemed
likely, Hillsborough instructed Gage to mobilize an army
and prepare to attack New Orleans by way of the Ohio and
Mississippi.*' But the controversy was settled without war,
and New Orleans was not molested.
By 1767 officials most conversant with conditions in the
West had concluded that British possession of that territory
would be unprofitable unless the illicit New Orleans trade
could be prevented.*" "If our traders do not return with
the produce of their trade to the northward provinces by
way of the Ohio or the Lakes," wrote Gage, "it will not
answer to England to be at much expense about the
Mississippi."*' By 1770, Hillsborough had entirely aban
doned hopes of immediate commercial , benefit from the
West.** It is significant that the possession of the West
has never been profitable to any European nation.*'
"^ O'Callaghan, op. cit., II, 486, 488.
" Hillsborough to Gage, 31 July, 1770 , Carter, op. cit.
" Public Record Office, Am. and West Indies, vol. 127, Carter,
op. cit.
^ O'Callaghan, op. cit., II, 486, 499.
''Ibid., 485.
"Hillsborough to Gage, 31 July, 1770, Carter, op. cit.
" Shepherd, "The Cession of Louisiana to Spain," Political
Science Quarterly, XIX, 439, 452.

CHAPTER II.
ILLINOIS UNDER GREAT BRITAIN.
As a geographical expression in common usage "the
Illinois" referred to a part of the territory which had been
ceded by France to England at the close of the Seven Years'
War. Under French rule it had formed a district of the
province of Louisiana, and then included territory on both
sides of the Mississippi between the lines of the Illinois and
Ohio rivers.^ After the Seven Years' War the part west
of the Mississippi was known as Spanish Illinois, since it
was included in the territory ceded during the war by
France to Spain.
British Illinois itself was regarded as bounded by the
Illinois river on the north, the Wabash on the east, the
Ohio on the south, and the Mississippi on the west." It
included the central and southern part of the present state
of Illinois, and some of northwestern Indiana. In the fol
lowing narrative frequent mention will have to be made
of the Wabash posts, particularly Vincennes, and though
not usually considered as part of Illinois, they will here be
treated as such.
There was a considerable decrease of the white population
in eastern or British Illinois following the cession of the
country to England in 1763, and many French Creoles, pre
ferring Spanish to British government, crossed the Mis
sissippi into Spanish territory. St. Louis, founded by
Laclede in 1764, as a post for the Missouri river trade,
though in Spanish territory, remained under the control of
Laclede and a French successor till 1770, when the first
Spanish commandant arrived. This post and its neighbor-
^ Alvord, "Illinois in the Eighteenth Century," Bulletin of the
Illinois State Historical Society, I, No. i, 8.
' Pittman, Present State of the European Settlements on the
Mississippi, reprint of the original edition, London, 1770; Hodder's
ed., gg.

1 8 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
ing settlements gained much in population from the emigra
tion of the French from British Illinois. Laclede desired
to make St. Louis a refuge for them, and later the Spanish
authorities offered inducements to attract immigrants.'
Another reason for this emigration from British Illinois
may have been the attitude of the Indians, who appear to
have become lawless after the removal of French control.*
The exodus alarmed British officials, who feared that the
Spanish villages would monopolize the Mississippi trade."
The decrease in the population was partly offset, however,
by the entrance into the country of eastern traders and land
speculators. Throughout the British period the French inhabitants,
scattered among several villages, remained the largest ele
ment in the population. The seat of government under the
French, and under the British till 1772, was Fort Chartres
on the Mississippi, reputed "the most commodious and best
built fort in North America."" In 1772 it was so badly dam
aged by the waters of the Mississippi that it was abandoned,
and thenceforth Kaskaskia, situated on the river of that
name, about six miles above its confluence with the Mis
sissippi, became the military and governmental capital of
British Illinois.^ It was the most important village. At
the beginning of the period of British occupation it con
tained, however, only about fifty families,* besides slaves
and a few transient merchants. Prairie du Rocher, about
seventeen miles north of Kaskaskia, at this time boasted of
only twelve dwelling houses, while farther north St.
Philippe was practically deserted. Still farther north
' Chittenden, Fur Trade in the Far West, I, 100, 102 ; Houck,
History of Missouri, I, 302, 304.
* Transactions of the Illinois State Historical Society for 1907,
204. ' "Fernow, op. cit., 179.
• Pittman, op. cit., 89.
' Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library, I, 291. For
the history of Fort Chartres see Mason, Chapters from Illinois
History, 212-249.
° Trans. III. St. Hist. Soc, 1907, 217.

ILLINOIS UNDER GREAT BRITAIN. 1 9
was Cahokia, situated on the Mississippi about eighteen
miles south of the mouth of the Missouri. Though
smaller than Kaskaskia, it was important for its Indian
trade.' On the lower Wabash was the village of Vincennes,
with a population probably somewhat larger than that of
Kaskaskia.^" It, too, was an important post, since it was on
the chief commercial route between Canada and Illinois.^^
Farther north on the Wabash was the small trading station
of Ouiatanon. There were one or two small posts, also,
on the Illinois river.
A recent writer on Illinois history places the number of
whites in the villages near the Mississippi at the close of the
British period at something less than one thousand.^"
Dwelling in the neighborhood of Kaskaskia and Cahokia
were some four or five hundred Indians, regarded as more
or less debauched and degenerate.^' Along the Wabash
dwelt the brave and warlike tribes of the Kickapoos,
Piankeshaws, and Menomenies.^* There were also some
negro slaves in Illinois, especially in Kaskaskia.^" The
large extent of territory, and the small number of settle
ments, are thus facts of cardinal importance in a study of
this country.
The chief occupations of the people were trade, hunting,
and agriculture. The only place where agriculture was
pursued to any extent was Kaskaskia. The land along
the Mississippi, from the mouth of the Kaskaskia to that
of the Missouri, was and is exceedingly fertile, since it
receives the alluvial deposits washed down by the Missouri.
The soil yielded all kinds of European grains and fruits,
'For a description of these villages see Pittman, op. cit., 84-94.
For their populations in 1765, see Trans. III. St. Hist. Soc, 1907, 217.
'"Fernow, op. cit., 180.
"Benton, "The Wabash Trade Refute in the Development of the
Old Northwest." The Johns Hopkins University Studies in
Historical and Political Science, XXI, 7.
"Alvord, Colls. III. St. Hist. Lib., II, xv.
^'Ibid., xvi; Pittman, op. cit., 97.
^* Michigan Pioneer and Historical Society Collections, III, 16.
''Colls. III. St. Hist. Lib., II, xlviii.

20 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
and some produce had been shipped from Kaskaskia to New
Orleans during the French period.^" The Creoles, however,
judged by English colonial standards, were not enterprising
agriculturists.^^ The excitement of the fur trade and of
the chase exercised greater fascination over their minds than
the routine pursuits of the farm. Most of them belonged
to the "habitant" or "coureur de bois" classes, resembling
in all essentials their Canadian brethren familiar to us in
the pages of Parkman. They had come mainly from
Canada, few from New Orleans and the lower Mississippi.^*
The social classes and distinctions of the old world were
not, of course, reproduced in Illinois, but neither was there
the complete social equality that existed among the Amer
ican backwoodsmen. There were some prosperous and edu
cated men, traders and landowners, who constituted the
natural aristocracy of the country. The lower classes, no
doubt, were illiterate and superstitious,^' but less brutal than
the American frontiersmen.
Accustomed as they had been to despotic rule, the people
of Illinois were wholly unversed in the practices of self-
government and unfitted for the acceptance of democratic
institutions. While France held the country, they had been
happy under the absolutism of their commandant, and the
spiritual domination of the Jesuit priest, the most venerated
man among them. At the close of the Seven Years' War
they saw themselves abandoned by their king, but they did
not cease to love him. They never, indeed, felt any attach
ment for the new government, which they always regarded
" Thwaites, France in America, 85. Collins, "History of Ken
tucky," R. H. Collins' ed., I, 15.
"Mich. P. Colls., X, 266. For an account of the agricul
tural possibilities of Illinois, as well as of the unenterprising
character of the people, see a pamphlet written by a Kaskaskian,
published in Philadelphia, in 1772. It is reprinted in Alvord and
Carter, Invitation Serieuse aux Habitants des Illinois, by [sic] Un
Habitant des Kaskaskias.
"Colls. III. St. Hist. Lib., II, xvii, note 2.
" Alvord and Carter, op. cit., 15.

ILLINOIS UNDER GREAT BRITAIN. 21
as a "foreign yoke."''" They hoped that they would some
day be restored to France, but their habits of obedience
were such that they never organized a revolt.
The uprising of Pontiac, following the war with France,
postponed the occupation of the country by British forces
till 1765. It was believed by some that the Indian parties
which ravaged the colonial frontiers during Pontiac's War
were supplied with ammunition by the French at Fort
Chartres."^ The French in Illinois were supposed to be
reaping great profit from their trade with the Indians,"" and
it was expected that they would not give up the country
without a struggle."' It was regarded as very important
that the influence exerted by them over the Indians should
be brought to an end,"* and it was hoped that the British
occupation of the country would accomplish this result.""
Sir William Johnson considered Fort Chartres an important
settlement for purposes of trade,"" and Colden thought it
necessary that a British post should be maintained there."'
In 1765 the last French commandant at Fort Chartres
formally surrendered the post to his British successor."*
Thereafter, until the whole Northwest had been joined by
the Quebec Act to the province of Quebec, the troops at
Fort Chartres, and later at Kaskaskia, represented the
British government in Illinois. The local commandant,
subject to the commander-in-chief of the British forces in
North America, ruled the country as despotically as his
French predecessor had done."'
""'An Address to Congress from the French Inhabitants of Post
Vincennes, Kaskaskia," etc., 1788; Papers of the Continental
Congress, Library of Congress.
^ Colls. N. Y. Hist. Soc, Pub. Fund Series, IX, 336.
""Ibid.''Ibid."Ibid., 443.
" O'Callaghan, op. cit., II, 476.
"Ibid., 478.
''Colls. N. Y. Hist. Soc, Pub. Fund Series, IX, 380.
''Trans. III. St. Hist. Soc, for 1907, 211; Mason, Chapters from
III. Hist., 235.
=* Pittman, op. cit., 88.

22 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
As soon as Illinois passed under British control, eastern
colonists were attracted thither by the alluring prospects of
fur trade and land speculation. A new element was added
to the population. Communication was established between
the eastern colonies and Illinois." The easiest and most
customary route was from Fort Pitt down the Ohio,'^ and
boats were kept on that river to maintain communication.'"
Another possible route was by Lake Erie, up the Maumee,
and down the Wabash to the Ohio." The all-water route
by New Orleans was too long and expensive to be followed.
Eastern firms, anxious to participate in the profits of the
fur trade, established branches in the French villages and
sent out agents. Speculation in Illinois land proved equally
congenial to their commercial instincts. Land companies
were formed and several tracts were bought from the north
western tribes. In 1773, apparently with the consent of
Captain Lord, then British commandant at Kaskaskia, the
Illinois Land Company purchased a large tract from the
Indians. Another extensive purchase was made in 1775
by the Wabash Land Company, in which Lord Dunmore,
then governor of Virginia, was interested.'* These pur
chases, in violation of the proclamation of 1763, were, of
course, illegal. Consequently some of them were annulled
by General Gage.'^ The military authorities, indeed, made
a genuine effort to force the traders to deal fairly with the
Indians;'" and their attitude discouraged similar enter
prises. The incorporation of the Northwest into the
province of Quebec tended to lessen communication
between Illinois and the eastern colonies. But, although the
number of eastern traders declined after the Quebec Act
went into operation in 1775, some remained. They played
" Alvord and Carter, op. cit., 7-8.
¦" Colls. N. Y. Hist. Soc, Pub. Fund Series, IX, 381.
" Colls. Mass. Hist. Soc, 4th series, X, 724.
" Colls. N. Y. Hist. Soc, Pub. Fund Series, IX, 381.
'* American State Papers, "Public Lands," I, 27.
"'' Colls. III. St. Hist. Lib., II, xxx ; Report on Canadian Archives,
1885, 201.
"Ibid., 213; ibid., 1886, 512.

ILLINOIS UNDER GREAT BRITAIN. 23
a part in Illinois history before the Revolution similar to
that played in Canada by the "old subjects," as the English
inhabitants of the province were called, in distinction to
the French, the "new subjects." In Illinois, as in Canada,
this class was in the main in sympathy with the spirit which,
in the eastern colonies, was soon to break out in open revolt.
Their opposition to the military government can be
explained partly by the fact that it stood for the principles
of the proclamation of 1763, which conflicted with their
trading and speculating enterprises. In Canada, the "old
subjects" clamored for an assembly.'^ In Illinois, the
easterners protested against the evils of military and urged
the establishment of civil government.'* A memorial was
submitted in 1770 by Daniel Blouin, a French Creole, setting
forth the disadvantages of the military regime, and request
ing the establishment of a civil government like that enjoyed
by Connecticut. It was probably inspired, however, by
English colonial merchants and traders in the country.
Gage regarded Blouin not as a representative of the people
of Illinois, but as a mouthpiece of the "republican" faction
there." The majority of the French inhabitants of Canada
certainly did not desire the establishment of an assembly,
and it could hardly be supposed that the Illinois French
would demand one. The attempt to secure civil government
at this time failed.*" The easterners, however, exercised an
importance out of proportion to their numbers, for they
were more intelligent, shrewd and enterprising than most
of their creole neighbors. Their presence in Illinois dur
ing the decade 1765-1775 made possible correspondence
between that country and the Atlantic colonies, and prepared
some, at least, of the inhabitants for the reception of
American ideas, and, if they should come, of American
troops.*^ " Coffin, op. cit., 319.
"'Alvord and Carter, op. cit, xviii.
" Rept. on Can. Archives, 1884, 61.
'"Alvord and Carter, op. cit., xxiii.
" Colls. III. St. Hist. Lib., II, xxxi.

24 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
Most of the opposition to the government of Illinois dur
ing the decade of military rule emanated from the English-
speaking element. In 1765 Captain Stirling, the first British
commandant, brought a proclamation from General Gage
which served as a sort of constitution for ten years.*" By
the terms of this the liberty of the Catholic religion wa§
granted to the inhabitants of Illinois, as it had been granted
to those of Canada; all who chose were allowed to leave
the country, and those who remained and became British
subjects were to enjoy all the rights and liberties of the
king's "old subjects." They were required to take an oath
of fidelity and obedience, and to assist the British troops
to take peaceable possession of the country.
The task of the military commandant during the British
period was evidently difficult. He was called upon to pre
side over the old French and the new English inhabitants
of Illinois, two classes as inharmonious as could be
imagined. The French had knowledge only of their own
law, the "coutume de Paris." The easterners desired the
establishment of English judicial institutions. In Novem
ber, 1768, a court on the English model was set up at Fort
Chartres, consisting of seven judges, with civil jurisdiction.
Juries were not employed.*' At first, the majority of the
judges were eastern colonists who had recently come into
the country. Soon, however, the majority were French,
but the court continued to be presided over by one of the
most influential of the eastern traders, and it became the
mouthpiece of the faction which was opposed to the military
regime. In 1770, it ventured to protest against the arbitrary
actions of the commandant. Colonel Wilkins, who responded
by dissolving it.** The origin of an anti-governmental
party in Illinois during the period of British rule, therefore,
''Am. St. Papers, "Public Lands," II, 209; or Brown, History of
Illinois, 212-213.
" Alvord, Illinois in the Eighteenth Century, 21. The colonial
French seem always to have been opposed to juries; see Force, Am.
Archives, 4th series, I, 189.
" Alvord and Carter, op. cit., xix.

ILLINOIS UNDER GREAT BRITAIN. 25
is traceable to the presence of this eastern element. Most
of the influential French inhabitants, though not all, were
passively on the side of the government. Gabriel Cerre,
for example, who was decidedly the leading merchant of
Illinois, supported it.*° According to the testimony of
Captain Lord, the people in general were opposed to the
establishment of civil government.*"
Throughout the period, conditions on the Wabash were
little short of anarchical. It was felt necessary that some
government should be established there,*'' but no official
came to exercise authority till 1777.**
The failure of British administration in the West has
already been discussed, and its causes shown. The govern
ment hoped that the former commercial intercourse between
Illinois and New Orleans would be terminated, and that
the Illinois trade would be turned up the Ohio, by which
channel it would reach the eastern colonial ports. But the
English traders in Illinois followed lines of least resistance
and greatest profit. They sent their furs to New Orleans,
because it was far easier than to ship them to New York
or Philadelphia, and because prices were higher than in
EngHsh colonial markets. Gage was aware of this contra
band trade as early as 1766.*' It was his opinion that
practically no peltries from Illinois reached eastern ports,
that none ever would which passed through New Orleans,
and that nothing but force or greater profits could change
the natural course of trade.^" It was estimated by a con
temporary that between 500 and 1,000 packs of peltries were
shipped annually from Illinois to New Orleans.'^ The Mis
souri river trade, moreover, which, during the French
period, had centered at Cahokia, was now diverted to the
Spanish posts across the Mississippi.
" Trans. III. St. Hist. Soc, 1903, 275 et seq.
"Rept. on Can. Archives, 1886, 519.
" Fernow, op, cit., 181.
* Colls. III. St. Hist. Lib., I, 313-
" Carter, op. cit.
"Ibid.
"Ibid.

26 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
In 1768 Captain Forbes, then commandant at Fort
Chartres, made an effort to prohibit the New Orleans trade
by forcing traders to give a bond of £200 to ship their
furs to a British port," but he was unable to stop the
illicit traffic. Sir William Johnson, in 1767, complained of
the expense involved in the administration of Illinois, which,
he said, was vastly more than he had expected."
The British government came to feel that the Northwest
must be annexed to some province."* Some provision had
to be made for the French villages."" To leave them with
out any government, or to establish separate colonies for
them, was felt to be unwise."" Political considerations made
it inadvisable to join that area to any of the eastern colonies,
for this was the era of the Boston Tea Party and the
Committees of Correspondence. It seethed most expedient,
therefore, to annex it to the province of Quebec. This,
according to Lord North, was the motive of the Lords in
passing the Quebec Bill."^
The province of Quebec, including the whole Northwest,
as established by the act of 1774, was a crown colony, with
a governor and legislative council appointed by the king."*
On account of the small number of English inhabitants
no provision was made for an assembly."' General Guy
Carleton, who had been serving as governor of Quebec,
was retained in office. The chief post in the "upper
country," as the Northwest was called by the authorities
at Quebec, was Detroit. ' Subordinate to Carleton, Lieu
tenant-Governor Henry Hamilton was sent to take com
mand of that post, where he arrived in November, 1775.""
The Quebec Act, however, made little change in the govern-
^^ Carter, op. cit.
" O'Callaghan, op. cit., II, 499.
" Rept. on Can. Archives, 1884, 59, 61 ; ibid., 1885, 232.
"Annual Register, for 1774, 76.
"" Force, Am. Archives, 4th series, I, 181.
"Ibid. " Coffin, op. cit., 278.
" Parliamentary History of England, XVII, 1358
"Mich. P. Colls., X, 265.

ILLINOIS UNDER GREAT BRITAIN. 2^
ment of Illinois, and the troops were retained there until
1776. The American invasion of Canada in 1775, and the sub
sequent course of the Revolution, made it impossible for the
Quebec authorities adequately to provide for the govern
ment and defense of the whole province. Though Carleton
always sought to keep himself informed of general, and
particularly of military conditions in the Northwest, the
posts in that territory were left largely to their own
resources and self-defense."^
When the Quebec Act went into operation. Captain Lord
was acting as commandant of the British troops at
Kaskaskia. The next year they were withdrawn to Detroit,
as a result of the American invasion of Canada, and also
to save expense."" This event may be regarded as the
termination of military government in Illinois. Upon leav
ing the country Captain Lord suggested Rocheblave as a
suitable person to represent British interests. Rocheblave
was a Frenchman who had come to Canada about 1748,
taken up his abode in Illinois between 1770 and 1776, and
become a British subject."' He tells us that Lord appointed
him "judge and commander," with orders to keep the
Indians faithful to Great Britain."* Carleton, however,
stated that he employed Rocheblave "to have an eye on the
proceedings of the Spaniards and the management of the
Indians . . . .""" As military government had ceased, and
as Rocheblave had no troops to command, we are to regard
him not as Lord's successor, but merely as a British agent.
The establishment under the Quebec Act of formal civil
government for Illinois was prevented by the outbreak of
the Revolution."" Rocheblave was allowed to draw a small
''Ibid., IX, 343-344.
" Mason, Early Chicago and Illinois, 407 ; Mich. P. Colls., IX, 350.
•"For a sketch of Rocheblave see Mason, Early Chic, and III,
360-381. "Ibid., 396.
"Ibid., 395.
.™ Captain Mathew Johnson was appointed lieutenant-governor of
Illinois, and nominally held that position from 1775 to 1781. A

28 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
sum on the treasurer at Quebec for necessary expenses,"^
but he was inadequately provided for. Left in charge of
a country without troops or money, it is small wonder that
he did not succeed.
The brief period of Rocheblave's residence as British
agent in Illinois (1776-1778) was that in which the way
was prepared for the overthrow of British rule in the
country. He had a high opinion of the possibilities and
strategic importance of Illinois, and thought that, if better
known, it could be made a rich and prosperous colony. But
he feared that it would become the center of communication,
by way of the Ohio and Mississippi, between the eastern
rebels and the Spaniards on the Gulf of Mexico and in
Upper Louisiana."* Though affecting a position of neutral
ity in the early Revolution, Spain was secretly helping the
colonists,"' and Spanish officials in Louisiana were lending
aid to them.^" Rocheblave kept setting forth the danger
of this communication, and it was understood by the
authorities at Quebec.''^ But they could not furnish the aid
which he asked for. His requests for troops were unheeded,
and many of his drafts were protested.^"
The disposition of the Indians, upon which the fate of
Illinois to a large extent depended, was a matter of great
concern to the British agent. He was expected to keep
them friendly, and to prevent them from being seduced
by rebel and Spanish agents. The only means of accom
plishing this, as he well knew, was a liberal and continuous
bestowal of presents. Without adequate supplies, and with
no troops, he found great difficulty in dealing with them.^'
warrant for his salary for these six years was issued by the
authorities at Quebec, but he never exercised the functions of the
office. Rept. on Can. Archives, 1885, 337-338.
"' Mason, Early Chic, and III., 382.
" Ibid., 407.
" Floridablanca to Marquis D'Ossun, 17 Oct., 1777; Stevens,
Facsimiles of Manuscripts in European Archives Relating to
America, 1773-1783, XIX.
™ Houck, op. cit., I, 303.
" Mich. P. Colls., IX, 344.
" Mason, Early Chic and III., 371, 407.
"Ibid., 417.

ILLINOIS UNDER GREAT BRITAIN. 29
In attempting to check the evils produced by the sale of
Hquor to the Indians, Rocheblave seems to have aroused
ill-feeling among the English-speaking party. The danger
caused by the presence in the villages of disorderly and
intoxicated savages is obvious. The only power, however,
which he could invoke was public opinion. He accordingly
called an assembly of the people in April, 1776, to discuss
Indian relations. It was decided to place them under col
lective control, and the inhabitants agreed not to sell intoxi
cants to the savages. The agreement was signed by most
of the. influential among the French, but by only one of
the English-speaking party.''*
Further friction developed between the agent and this
element of the population. They accused him of having
taken oaths of allegiance successively to France, Spain and
Great Britain,'" and doubtless hated him as a renegade
Frenchman, who was representing a government from
which their friends and relatives in the east were revolting.
They were eager to thwart him whenever possible. They
constantly complained of his tyranny. They accused him
of siding with the French against them in disputes, and of
even acting as their counsel. They said that he paid no
attention to protests and appeals, and was not an English
man's friend. They even addressed a petition to the
governor of the province concerning his iniquities.''"
According to the terms of the Quebec Act the French
inhabitants of the province were to have their old law in civil
cases, but in criminal cases the English law was to prevail.''^
Political and judicial conditions during Rocheblave's
agency, however, were almost chaotic. He acted as judge,
and tells us that demands were constantly made that the
English law should be followed, if it happened to favor
the litigant, who might the very next day demand the
'* Colls. III. St. Hist. Lib., II, xxxii.
"Mich. P. Colls., XIX, 324-
" Mason, Early Chic and III., 385-388.
" Coffin, op. cit., 278.

30 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
French law, if advantageous to him.'* He complained bit
terly of the "reckless spirits," who thought that the govern
ment owed them everything while they owed the govern
ment nothing."
In the legitimate performance of his duties the agent
came into further conflict with the disaffected party over
the question of aid given to the eastern rebels by the
Spaniards at New Orleans and St. Louis. Boats laden with
supplies came up the Mississippi and Ohio to Fort Pitt, then
held by Virginia, and Governor Galvez at New Orleans was
on very friendly terms with Oliver Pollock, an agent of
Virginia and the United States in that city. The anti-
British party in Illinois knew of this communication and
beheld it with joy;*" and they themselves traded and cor
responded with the rebels.*^
Even among the French of Illinois sympathy for the
Americans existed.*" A condition somewhat similar is to
be found in lower Canada, during the period of the early
Revolution. In spite of the anti-Catholic sentiments of the
revolutionary party in the colonies, there was a decided
feeling of sympathy among the Canadians, especially the
lower class, for the "rebels," and some of the Jesuits, even,
sympathized. Of the inhabitants of Illinois who were
inclined to favor the Americans, the most important, on
account of his great influence, was Father Pierre Gibault,
the priest of Kaskaskia, who had instructed himself some
what in the questions at issue in the Revolution."
Evidently the British hold on Illinois at the beginning of
the Revolution was not strong.
From about 1776 the pro- American party was expecting,
and Rocheblave was fearing, an American expedition into
"Mason, Early Chic, and III., 391.
"761^,416. *> Colls. III. St. Hist. Lib., II, xxxiii.
"¦Ibid., I, 299; Mich. P. Colls., XIX, 324; Rept. on Can. Archives,
1890 (State papers), 92.
"Mich. P. Colls., XIX, 417.
" For information concerning Gibault see English, Conquest of the
Country Northwest of the River Ohio and Life of Gen. George
Rogers Clark, I, 184 et seq.

ILLINOIS UNDER GREAT BRITAIN. 31
the country,** from the direction of Fort Pitt. This strate
gic point, at the confluence of the Alleghany and Monon-
gahela rivers, "the gateway of the West," had been
evacuated by order of General Gage in October, 1772, but
had been re-garrisoned two years later by Major John
Connolly under instructions from Dunmore.*" Connolly was
in command at Fort Pitt when the Revolution broke out.
He speculated on the possibility of a body of rebels going
down the Ohio and up the Mississippi to attack Kaskaskia,
and wrote a letter to Captain Lord, then in command at
that post, warning him of this danger. The letter, however,
fell into the hands of the Americans, and probably called
attention to the possibility of such an attack,*" though this
could scarcely fail to suggest itself, since intercourse
between Fort Pitt and New Orleans had become frequent.
In July, 1775, the garrison at Fort Pitt was disbanded, and
Virginia militia took possession in September of the same
year.*' Their position, and the American hold on the Fort
Pitt region, were greatly strengthened by a treaty of friend
ship made in 1775 with the Indians of the upper Ohio by
commissioners of Congress and Virginia.**
In April, 1776, Congress appointed George Morgan agent
for Indian affairs in the Middle Department, which
included the West, with headquarters at Fort Pitt.*' He
was to cultivate the friendship of the Indians, and to do
everything in his power to attach them to Congress.
Morgan had been one of the first of the eastern traders and
"* Colls. III. St. Hist. Lib., II, xxxv; see also An Address
to Congress from the French Inhabitants of Post Vincennes,
Kaskaskia, etc., 1788.
" Thwaites and Kellogg, Documentary History of Dunmore's War,
53, note; Thwaites and Kellogg, The Revolution on the Upper
Ohio, 17.
™ Butterfield, History of George Rogers Clark's Conquest of the
Illinois and the Wabash Towns; 1778 and 1779, 8.
°' Thwaites and Kellogg, Rev. on the U. Ohio, 20.
" Ibid., 25 et seq.
"Journals of the Continental Congress, Ford's ed., IV, 268;
Morgan's commission is in MSS. of the Library of Congress, Letters
to Morgan.

32 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
speculators to go to Illinois, where he had lived for several
years." He, of course, had friends and associates in Kas
kaskia, with whom he maintained correspondence after his
appointment as Indian agent.'^ He was in communication,
also, with the American party in Detroit, and with Governor
Galvez of New Orleans.'" He probably knew more about
the West than any other man in the service of the United
States. The American party in Illinois expected that
Morgan would lead an expedition into the country." It
was this that Rocheblave feared. In a letter written in
July, 1776, to one of his friends in Kaskaskia, Morgan
desired "to know the exact situation of affairs at the Illinois,
and what quantity of flour and beef you could furnish a
company or two of men with at Kaskaskia the twenty-fifth
of next December."'* Rocheblave was thinking of such
an attack when he wrote in July, 1777, to Stuart, British
agent among the southern Indians, that he had learned that
a number of boats were being prepared at Fort Pitt for the
purpose of embarking a force, which could be intended only
for Detroit, or for the banks of the Mississippi.'" As early
as the spring of 1776, indeed. Congress did contemplate an
expedition against Detroit.'" In view of the disaffection
in Illinois, the well-known attitude of the Spanish power
on the Mississippi, and the uncertainty felt about the
Indians, it is not strange that Rocheblave concluded that
his position was undesirable and his task doomed to failure.
In May, 1777, David Abbott, a British commandant,
arrived at Vincennes." He tried to bring order out of
chaos, formed militia companies, and erected a stockade,
°° Colls. III. St. Hist. Lib., II, xxviii ; for his activity in the fur
trade in Illinois see Rept. on Can. Archives, 1886, 509.
" Colls. III. St. Hist. Lib., II, xxviii, note 2.
" Houck, op. cit., II, 109.
"Calendar of Virginia State Papers, II, 675; Colls. III. St. Hist.
Lib., II, xxxv.
"' Butterfield, op. cit., 518-519.
°° Rocheblave to Stuart, 4 July, 1777 ; Bancroft MSS., N. Y. Pub.
Lib. " Journals Cont. Cong., Ford's ed., IV, 373.
" Butterfield, op. cit., 49 and his authorities.

ILLINOIS UNDER GREAT BRITAIN. 33
known as Fort Sackville. Rocheblave regarded Abbott as
his superior and wanted him to come to Kaskaskia and
assume command as Captain Lord's successor." Abbott
seems to have been Velcomed by the French inhabitants of
Vincennes. But the neighboring tribes had been tampered
with by rebel emissaries, and his efforts to secure their
friendship were not very successful." He was unable to
make the necessary presents, and, to save expense, returned
to Detroit in February, 1778.^°" On his departure he left
Legras, a French creole, in command of the Vincennes
militia."^ While Rocheblave was fearing a rebel attack on Illinois,
British Indian agents in the south were expecting similar
attacks on Pensacola and along the southern Mississippi.^""
When he learned of the expedition of Captain James Will
ing, who had been sent in the spring of 1778 to attack the
British posts in that quarter, he feared a comprehensive
plan of the enemy to sweep the British power from the Mis
sissippi valley. A rumor reached him in March that a party
of rebels was building a fort on the lower Ohio. "This
being true," he wrote, "we are on the eve of great events
in this country."^"
" Mason, Early Chic, and III., 391.
¦" Butterfield, op. cit., 50.
'"Mich. P. Colls., IX, ^.
'" Butterfield, op. cit., 50.
"'Ross to Stuart, New Orieans, 5 Mar., 1778, Bancroft MSS.
'" Mason, Early Chic and III., 409.

CHAPTER III.
THE WESTWARD EXPANSION OF VIRGINIA AND GENESIS OF
THE EXPEDITION OF I778.
The western claims of Virginia, based on her old charter
of 1609, have been referred to. This charter, it is true, was
revoked in 1624 when Virginia became a royal province,
and all ungranted and unsettled lands in royal provinces
were subject to any disposition which the crown might see
fit to make.'^ Extensive areas, carved out of the territory
included within the boundaries of the grant of 1609, had
been regranted, and removed from the jurisdiction of
Virginia. This was the case with the provinces of Mary
land, Carolina and Pennsylvania. But the Old Dominion,
though proud of its connection with the crown, cherished
with tenacity the claims which were supposed to be derived
from the charter, and regarded all territory included in the
old grant, except those parts which had been specifically
regranted, as rightfully within its jurisdiction. It was on
this hypothesis that Virginia maintained her claims to the
West before and during the Revolution."
In 1720, the General Assembly took the first step, in the
sphere of legislative action, in what may be called the move
ment of westward expansion. As already explained, the
presence of the French on the Great Lakes and on the Mis
sissippi aroused interest in the country beyond the moun
tains. In that year, partly as a measure of defense against
the French, Spotsylvania and Brunswick counties were
established, including passes over the mountains within
their boundaries.' In 1734, a division of Spotsylvania was
made by the assembly to take effect the next year. The
' Osgood, The American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century, III,
91-92. 'Secret Journals of the Acts and P'roceedings of Congress, III,
169 ; Hening, Statutes at Large, X, 527.
' Hening, op. cit., IV, 77.

WESTWARD EXPANSION OF VIRGINIA. 35
western part was formed into Orange County, which was
bounded on the west by "the utmost limits of Virginia."*
As early as 1738 settlers from Virginia had crossed the
Blue Ridge. This expansion of settlements was viewed with
favor by the Virginia authorities as tending to safeguard
the frontier. In that year all of Orange extending north,
west and south, beyond the Blue Ridge "to the utmost
limits of Virginia," was separated from the rest and erected
into two counties. The northern was named Frederick,
the southern Augusta. Each was to remain part of Orange
till it contained a sufficient number of inhabitants to warrant
the appointment of justices of the peace and the creation
of county courts." As has been shown, the proclamation
of 1763 temporarily forbade settlements beyond the Alle
ghanies. But in 1770, by the Treaty of Lochabor, the line
of permitted settlements was extended to the Kanawha.
Beyond this river, however, the British government refused
to permit the frontiers to be advanced." Nevertheless in
1769 the Virginia Assembly divided Augusta into two
counties, the northern to retain the name of Augusta, while
the southern was called Botetourt County,' and settlements
"on the waters of the Mississippi" were mentioned as
lying in Botetourt. These, the assembly declared, would
probably soon be formed into a separate county.* Dunmore
himself favored the extension of settlements beyond the
Lochabor line, but his conduct in the matter called forth
a reprimand from the home government.' In 1772, Fred
erick was divided into three counties, known as Frederick,
Berkeley and Dunmore,^" while Botetourt was curtailed by
the formation of its western part into the county of
Fincastle.^^ * Ibid., 450.
' Ibid., y, 78-79.
° Colls. Mass. Hist. Soc, 4th series, X, 727.
' Hening, op. cit., VIII, 395-396.
'Ibid., 398.
' Colls. Mass. Hist. Soc, 4th series, X, 726-727.
" Hening, op. cit., VUJ, 597-598.
"/&jU, 600. 4

36 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
In the policy of restricting western settlement, Great
Britain was aided by the presence in the country beyond
the mountains of formidable Indian tribes. To the colonists
these furnished a more potent argument against westward
expansion than nullified edicts and unenforcible boundary
lines. Between the Tennessee river and the Gulf of Mexico
were the so-called Appalachian confederacies. Of these,
the two most powerful and most exposed to the white
advance were the Cherokees, dwelling in what is now east
ern Tennessee, northeastern Alabama and northwestern
Georgia, and the Creeks, their southern neighbors. North
west of the Ohio dwelt the Algonquin tribes, less civilized
but more warlike than the Cherokees. They were generally
hostile to the southern Indians, and the uninhabited land
between the Ohio and the Tennessee was in dispute between
the two. Before the colonists could cross the mountains
and settle in numbers, the Indian claims had to be
extinguished. The Treaty of Fort Stanwix was an important event
in the westward expansion of Virginia. Into the country
to which the Six Nations ceded their claims, Virginia
pioneers found their way. The first cabin on the Watauga
is said to have been built in 1769. The first attempt to
colonize Kentucky was made by Daniel Boone in 1773,^^"
and the following year a settlement was made at Harrods-
burg. The Kentucky country was at this time included in
Fincastle County. Before its settlement could progress,
however, the inevitable conflict between the frontiersmen
and the Indian tribes had to be fought out. In 1772, Hills
borough expressed the opinion that the extension of settle
ments beyond the line of 1763 would probably cause a
general Indian war, since the right of the Six Nations to
cede territory south of the Ohio was denied by other
tribes.^' As early as 1768 persons from the different colonies,
many apparently of dubious character, had made settlements
" Ranck, "Boonesborough," Filson Club Publications, No. 16, 146.
" O'Callaghan, op. cit, II, 577.

WESTWARD EXPANSION OF VIRGINIA. 37
on Redstone creek, an affluent of the Monongahela, which
were, of course, in violation of the proclamation of 1763.^*
From Fort Pitt as a center backwoodsmen began restlessly
pushing down the Ohio. Acquiring no attachment to
localities, they imagined that distant lands were better than
those which they had reached. "The established authority
of any government in America, and the policy of Govern
ment at home," wrote Dunmore, "are both insufficient to
restrain the Americans."^" Removed from the restrictions
of civilization, the frontiersmen could not be brought to
entertain a belief in the sanctity of treaties made with the
savages, whom they considered "as but little removed from
the brute creation."^" The enmity of the Indians, which had
not completely subsided since Pontiac's War, was revived.^'
The Shawnees were especially dissatisfied with the Treaty
of Fort Stanwix, and asserted claims to lands above the
Kanawha south of the Ohio.^* Conditions along the west
ern border were critical; it behooved the Virginia author
ities to assume a tactful attitude.
Fort Pitt, as already explained, had been evacuated in
1772, but was reestablished in 1774. Connolly, Dunmore's
agent in the West, was denounced by the home government
for his supposed unauthorized activities there.^' It was
learned with alarm that Virginians were injuring the
Indians and arousing their resentment."" Affairs at Fort
Pitt, indeed, were in dire confusion. Pennsylvania, claim
ing that it lay within her limits,"^ attempted to extend her
authority over it by the creation of Westmoreland County.
The authority of Virginia, also, was extended over it in-
1774."" Both claims were, of course, based on charters.
"Archives of Md., XIV, 468.
^"Thwaites and Kellogg, Doc. Hist, of Dunmore's War, 371.
"Ibid.
"Ibid., 373.
" O'Callaghan, op. cit, II, 577.
"Force, Am. Archives, 4th series, I, 774.
"Ibid."Ibid., 260.
"Ibid., 271.

38 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
Connolly was arrested by the Pennsylvania authorities,"'
but the latter were unpopular with the settlers, and in May,
1774, between five and six hundred of them petitioned
Virginia to take them under its protection."* Though the
country was finally awarded to Pennsylvania, the home
government was at this time inclined to favor Virginia's
claim"" and it was some years before the dispute was
settled. In the spring of 1774, rumors of a general Indian war
were rife all along the frontiers. The panic became general
when Connolly issued a circular asserting that a state of
war existed and calling the borderers to arms."" On the
last day of April occurred the murder of the family of
the famous Mingo chief, Logan ; and on June 10, Governor
Dunmore issued a circular letter, calling on the county-
lieutenants in the western counties to mobilize the militia."'
In the same month he started for Fort Pitt to make an
armed demonstration among the hostile tribes, for by this
time the Shawnees of the Scioto valley had taken up the
hatchet."* He wrote to Colonel Andrew Lewis, com
mander-in-chief of the southwestern militia, to meet him
at the mouth of the Great Kanawha, or at Wheeling, with
as many men as possible."' Early in October, Lewis arrived
at Point Pleasant, near the mouth of the Great Kanawha,
where, on October 10, the decisive battle of the war was
fought. On both sides the losses were heavy, but the
Shawnees, who had crossed the Ohio to attack Lewis, were
forced to retire.'" This battle was won by the western
militia, not by British troops, and it was later believed, or
at least stated, by members of the revolutionary party in
Virginia, that Dunmore had not been pleased at the fron-
" Force, Am. Archives, 4th series, I, 275.
"Ibid., 275-276.
" Ibid., 252 et seq.
'"Thwaites and Kellogg, Doc. Hist, of Dunmore's War, xiii.
" Ibid., 33-35.
"Ibid., 383-385.
" Ibid., 97-98.
" For descriptions of the battle by participants see ibid., 253 et seq.

WESTWARD EXPANSION OF VIRGINIA. 39
tiersmen's victory.'^ The Shawnees gave hostages, and
agreed to regard the Ohio as their southern boundary. A
greater idea of colonial prowess was impressed upon their
minds, and the victory had the important effect of keeping
the northwestern tribes quiet during the early years of the
Revolution and making possible the settlement of Kentucky.
That it "extinguished the rancor" felt by the frontiersmen
towards the Indians, as Dunmore hoped,'" there is little
reason to believe.
The Six Nations and the Shawnees having thus aban
doned all claims to territory south of the Ohio, the way
was paved for the enterprise associated with the name of
Richard Henderson of North Carolina. In March, 1775,
the Transylvania Company, of which he was the leading
member, negotiated a treaty with the Cherokees, by which
the latter ceded their claims to an extensive tract between
the Tennessee and the Ohio, comprising a large part of the
present state of Kentucky." The name Transylvania was
given to this purchase, and Henderson's desire was to erect a
proprietary colony, with a legislature representing the inhabi
tants.'* The Transylvania "House of Delegates" actually
met in May, 1775, at the new settlement of Boonesborough,
and its journal has been preserved.'" Land was sold by
the company.'" Transylvania, however, did not enjoy a
long existence. Before Henderson's treaty with the Chero
kees, the proposed purchase had been denounced as illegal
by the governors of Virginia and North Carolina." The
company petitioned the Continental Congress to add the
colony of Transylvania to the thirteen original colonies, and
a delegate was actually sent to Philadelphia," but Congress
"Bland Papers, I, 42.
°^ Thwaites and Kellogg, Doc. Hist, of Dunmore's War, 386.
'"The deed made by the Cherokees is in Ranck, op. cit., 151-156.
For the Transylvania enterprise, see Alden, op. cit., 49 et seq.
" Cat. Va. St Papers, I, 307.
'"Ranck, op. cit., 196-212.
" Cal. Va. St Papers, I, 282.
"Ranck, op. cit, 147-150, 181-182.
" Colls. Conn. Hist Soc, II, 318, note.

40 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
could not grant such a request without exceeding its
powers and angering Virginia, which claimed most of the
territory in question. The petition was accordingly refused.
The Virginia Assembly later declared Henderson's purchase
null and void," though it was held to be valid as against
Indian claims. The company, however, had performed some
real service in employing Boone to open up a route, the
famous Wilderness Road, to the banks of the Kentucky.
This long remained one of the most important hues of
communication between the country east and west of the
mountains. And in helping to extinguish Indian claims to
Kentucky, they facilitated the western movement. Most
of the Transylvania purchase was soon organized in the
new county of Kentucky.
Among the Virginia pioneers in the Ohio valley was a
youth about to play an important role in the annals of
the West. George Rogers Clark was born on November
19, 1752, near Monticello, in Albemarle County, Virginia.*"
He had a taste for mathematics, and his fondness for sur
veying exercised an important influence over his career;
for it opened to him a calling in great demand at a time
when settlement was rapidly expanding, and one calculated
to bring him closely in touch with the westward march of
civilization. He did not attend William and Mary, and
from the standpoint of the tide-water planter he was a man
of little cultivation. Indeed, the comparative culture of the
older settlements had little attraction for him. He was by
nature a pioneer and a pathfinder. His first journey west
occurred in 1772, when he remained for several weeks as
a member of an exploring party in the upper Ohio valley.*^
Much of his time during the next few years was spent in
this region, where he devoted himself to surveying, hunting,
fishing, and locating for himself a tract of land near the
modern city of Wheeling. By 1773 pioneers were settling
as far down the Ohio as the mouth of the Scioto.*" Clark
" Ranck, op. cit, 253.
" For Clark's early life see English, op. cit, I, ch. 2.
"Ibid., 60 et seq.
"Ibid., 63.

WESTWARD EXPANSION OF VIRGINIA. 41
became an expert with ax and rifle, and his craft as a woods
man was nearly equal to that of the Indian. Though he
frequently visited the East, his real home was the wilder
ness, and his career became yoked with that of the new
country. He was involved in some of the disturbances
which led to Dunmore's War; and he joined the force led
by the governor in person, in which he held a position of
some importance.
In 1775, after the war, Clark went to Kentucky, in the
forefront of the tide of western migration. He was much
impressed with the beauty of the blue-grass country, then
virtually an unbroken wilderness, and with the fertility of
the soil in the valley of the Kentucky river, and predicted
a rapid growth of settlement. Becoming thoroughly
acquainted with the whole region, he determined to make it
his home, and returned east in the autumn of 1775 to settle
up his affairs there. In Virginia he found the Transylvania
enterprise viewed askance, and also heard doubts expressed
whether Virginia could properly claim Kentucky. He was
opposed to the company, and believed that their purchase
from the Cherokees was worthless since, in his opinion, the
latter had possessed no valid claim to the country. The
company had opened a land office at Boonesborough, and
were beginning to raise the price of land, which caused
dissatisfaction among the settlers.*'
Clark returned to Kentucky in the spring of 1776. That
he played as important a part in frontier politics as his
memoir, written by him years later,, would lead one to
infer,** may reasonably be doubted ; for Clark, in this docu
ment, was anxious to emphasize his own share in the events
described. The majority of the Kentucky settlers, in the
conflict which had begun between England and the colonies,
were strongly on the patriot side.*" If the settlements were
to survive, immediate measures for their defense were
" Clark's Memoir, English, op. cit., I, 457.
"See Butterfield, op. cit, 546-557, for the reliability of Clark's
Memoir. "See Petition of the Committee of West Fincastle, Butterfield,
op. cit., 29.

42 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
imperative. A meeting of the Kentucky pioneers was held
at the settlement of Harrodsburg in June, 1776. Delegates
were chosen to petition the Virginia Assembly to take the
Kentucky settlements under their protection. Clark, though
he says that he "appointed" it, did not take an active part
in the meeting. He tells us that he desired the appointment
of "deputies" to treat with Virginia, and, if favorable
terms were not secured, the establishment of "an indepen
dent government."*" If this was really his desire, he made
no serious effort to have his plan adopted.*' He and John
Gabriel Jones were selected as delegates to the Virginia
Assembly, and soon started east for Williamsburg, where
that body was in session.
They arrived in the East only to learn that the
assembly had adjourned. Clark remained to interview the
governor, Patrick Henry. Jones returned west to the
Watauga and Holston settlements, to take part in an Indian
war which was just beginning.
The growth of these settlements angered and alarmed
the Cherokees, who replied by ravaging the American fron
tier, even invading Georgia and South Carolina. They
were driven back, however, and their attacks on the
Watauga and Holston were defeated by forces under James
Robertson and John Sevier. The Cherokees ceded most
of their claims between the Cumberland and the Tennessee ;
and Kentucky was thus secured from Indian attacks from
the south. This war of 1776, like that of 1774, stimulated
the western movement.
Governor Henry lay sick at Hanover, and thither Clark
repaired with his credentials.** He asked for a supply of
gunpowder, the article most immediately needed in Ken
tucky. The governor, realizing the importance of defending
the Kentucky settlements, wrote to the executive council
on the subject. The council hesitated to grant Clark's
request, which would have been exceeding their powers.
*¦ English, op. cit, I, 458.
"Ibid.*' Clark's Memoir, ibid., 461-462.

WESTWARD EXPANSION OF VIRGINIA. 43
Clark informed them that the situation in Kentucky was
critical in view of probable Indian attacks, and that the
settlements might be destroyed for want of the powder.
Further hesitation on their part led to his blunt state
ment that a country which was worth claiming was
worth protecting. The council finally yielded, and ordered
five hundredweight of powder to be sent to Fort Pitt,
delivered to the officer commanding there, and by him
delivered to Clark or his order for the defense of
Kentucky.*' The revolutionary government of Virginia had now
acknowledged its responsibility for the defense of Ken
tucky. In spite of opposition from various sources, that
territory, with its present boundaries, was erected into a
county of Virginia in October, 1776."° Henceforth it was
entitled to representation in the Virginia Assembly, the laws
of Virginia were extended to it, and it was included in the
military and judicial systems of the state. A county court
was commissioned by the governor of Virginia to take
charge of internal administration. For the work of defense.
Colonel John Bowman was commissioned county-lieuten
ant."^ Qark was commissioned major of the Kentucky
militia and had it enrolled by March 5, 1777."" He was
thus closely identified with the founding of Kentucky.
So far as the Revolution on the western frontier was con
cerned, the conflict was between the American pioneers and
the Indian tribes in alliance with the British government.
Stuart, British agent among the Indians of the Southern
District, with headquarters at Pensacola, was actively and
*For the order of the council see Henry, Patrick Henry, Life,
Correspondence and Speeches, I, 472. For Clark's relations with the
council see his Memoir, English, op. cit, I, 462.
""At the same time the rest of Fincastle was formed into the
counties of Washington and Montgomery, and the name Fincastle, as
applied to a county, became extinct. Hening, op. cit., VIII, 600, note.
°'For the county organization of Kentucky, see Roosevelt,
Winning of the West, I, 322.
" Clark's Diary, English, op. cit., I, 579.

44 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
successfully negotiating with the southern tribes,"' with
whom American agents also had endeavored to treat."*
But the leader in the work of arousing and instigating the
western Indians against the rebel frontiers was Lieutenant-
Governor Hamilton at Detroit. The task imposed upon him
was to keep the northwestern tribes firm in their attachment
to England. But his zeal carried him further than this,
and he suggested the employment of the tribes to harass
the American frontiers. The British government author
ized such use of the Indians against the frontiers of Vir
ginia and Pennsylvania in March, 1777;"" and Stuart was
instructed to instigate the Creeks to attack the frontiers of
Georgia and the Carolinas."" The British government thus
hoped to destroy all the American settlements west of the
mountains. The belief that this policy of employing
savages was favored by only a few of the most truculent
of the British officers and officials is an error. Even so
humane an officer as General Howe favored it."'
Early in September, 1777, Hamilton had more than eleven
hundred warriors dispersed over the frontiers, seven hun
dred of whom received ammunition from Detroit."* About
this time the management of the war upon the northwestern
frontier was taken out of the hands of Carleton, then gov
ernor of Quebec, and intrusted directly to Hamilton, in
whom the British government reposed great confidence."'
"'Germain to Stuart, 7 Feb., 1777, Bancroft MSS.
" Stuart to Knox, 10 March, 1777, ibid.
"Mich. P. Colls., IX, 346-348.
"'' Germain to Stuart, 2 Apr., 1777, Bancroft MSS.
°' Howe to Stuart, 13 Jan., 1777, Bancroft MSS. He says, ". . .
the general revolt of the colonies justifies every measure that can
be used to annoy and humble them, and, though I point out circum
stances under which I more particularly think the Indians should
be brought to act, you must not infer from thence that I would have
them restrained on any occasion when the propriety of such measures
shall appear to His Majesty's Governor and yourself." Governor
Tryon also favored this policy. See Tryon to Germain, 9 Apr., 1777,
Bancroft MSS.
" Butterfield, op. cit, 46.
"Mich. P. Colls., IX, 351.

WESTWARD EXPANSION OF VIRGINIA. 45
In June, 1777, he read a proclamation to the savages assem
bled at Detroit, setting them against the rebel frontiers.
The first fruit of his activity was an Indian attack in
September, 1777, upon Fort Henry at Wheeling, which
greatly alarmed the whole frontier and threatened the
annihilation of American settlements in the West.""
The nature of the revolting business upon which Ham
ilton was engaged is revealed by unimpeachable evidence,
two letters of his, one to Carleton, and the other to Carle-
ton's successor, General Haldimand. In the first of these
Hamilton reported that the Indians had "brought in 73
prisoners alive, 20 of which they presented to me, and 129
scalps." In the second he stated that from May to Sep
tember, 1778, "the Indians in the district have taken 34
prisoners, 17 of which they delivered up, and 81 scalps.""^
Among all the British officers in the Revolution none was
so universally execrated by the frontiersmen as Hamilton,
nicknamed the "Hair-Buyer," because he was supposed
to reward his Indian myrmidons according to the number
of scalps they brought in.""
Early in the course of the Revolution, Congress, as
already stated, was impressed with the desirability of send
ing an expedition against Detroit,"' and realized that only
by destroying British influence over the northwestern tribes
could the frontiers enjoy peace."* In November, 1777,
Congress seriously considered such an enterprise."" The
Indians of the upper Ohio, who had remained quiet since
the Treaty of Fort Pitt in 1775, were becoming restless.
The Americans could not furnish the articles necessary for
" Butterfield, Washington-Irvine Correspondence, 13.
"Mich. P. Colls., IX, 476 et seq. The installment of Haldimand
Papers printed in this volume give a clear idea of how Hamilton
managed the Indians.
"For the general and correct belief in Hamilton's responsibility
for Indian outrages along the frontiers, see Journals Cont. Cong.,
Ford's ed., IX, 942-944; Cal. Va. St Papers, I, 321-324.
"Journals Cont Cong., Ford's ed., IV, 373.
"Ibid., IX, 942-944.
"Ibid.

46 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
trade, and consequently the majority of the tribes would not
fight the British, but waited to see which party would gain
the upper hand."" General Hand, the Continental officer
placed in command at Fort Pitt in 1777, was instructed to
mobilize a militia force and attack those tribes that were
hostile to the United States ; but a conflict of Congressional
and state action arose and nothing was effected."' The
possibility and desirability of an American expedition into
the Northwest were thus generally understood early in the
Revolution. The year 1777 was critical in the history of the infant
Kentucky settlements. The fury of the Indian attacks was
such that the less resolute abandoned the country and
crossed the mountains to the east. The few that remained
held out bravely in the blockhouse forts at Harrodsburg,
Boonesborough, and a few smaller stations. Their work,
incessant and intense, consisted in defense, procuring provi
sions, caring for the wounded and burying the dead. Clark,
who remained in Kentucky through the terrible autumn of
1777, considered the possibility of saving the country by a
counter attack on the British posts in the Northwest. While
in eastern Virginia in 1776, he may have learned of the
intercepted letter written by Connolly to Lord,"* and this
may have first suggested to him an expedition into the
Northwest. It is just possible, too, that on his journey
west in 1776 he had talked with Morgan, since he is known
to have gone by way of Fort Pitt."' It is not likely, how
ever, for if he had, he would almost certainly have known
later much more about conditions in Illinois. But he did
know as well as Congress that the motive power directing
and impelling the Indian raids on Kentucky was British
influence, and that it was from Detroit, Michilimackinac,
"Hand to Yeates, Fort Pitt, 12 July, 1777. Emmet MSS., N. Y.
Public Library.
" Henry, op. cit, I, 569 et seq.
" See Butterfield, History of George Rogers Clark's Conquest, 58.
" Clark's Memoir, English, op. cit., I, 463. For the view that he
had talked with Morgan, see Butterfield, op. cit, 58.

WESTWARD EXPANSION OF VIRGINIA. 47
Niagara and Kaskaskia that England's forest allies were
directed. And he knew that the salvation of Kentucky
depended upon checking the Indian raids.
He had apparently begun to think seriously of an attack
on the British posts in the spring of 1777, for in the early
summer of that year he sent two members of the Kentucky
militia as spies to the Illinois villages, without disclosing
his motives. These men went to Kaskaskia and returned
with valuable information.'" They told Clark that the
militia, consisting mainly of French Creoles, officered by
Englishmen, were trained and in good order; that pains
were taken to inflame the inhabitants against the "rebels,"
but that traces of goodwill towards the latter were to be
discerned, and that there was no expectation of an American
invasion.'^ Clark, encouraged by their report, continued
speculating on the possibility of attacking the Illinois
villages. It has been asserted that he had got no further, while in
Kentucky in 1777, than to think an expedition against
Illinois would be possible; that when he went east, as he
did in the autumn of that year, he had no developed plans
in that direction, and that it was not till he had been east
some time that he decided to encourage such an expedi
tion.'" There is extant, however, a letter of his, written
probably to Governor Henry not later than the autumn
of 1777, which seems to place the conception of the
definite plan to conquer Illinois in the period before
he went east in October." In this letter he wrote,
"According to promise I haste to give you a descrip
tion of the town of Kuskuskies [Kaskaskia], and my
plan for taking it  The town of Kuskuskies con-
" Butterfield, op. cit., 60 and his authorities.
"The spies were misinformed in regard to this last fact (see above,
ch. II, 30 et seq.), and they probably failed to get into communication
with the pro-American party in Illinois.
" Butterfield, op. cit, 69, 71, 73.
"October is the date given in Clark's Memoir, and seems more
probable than that given in his Letter to Mason. See Butterfield,
op. cit, 69.

48 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
tains about one hundred families of French and English.
.... On the commencement of the present war the troops
were called off to reenforce Detroit  In June last I
sent two young men there. The principal inhaffitants are
entirely against the American cause  If it [Kaskas
kia] was in our possession it would distress the garrison
at Detroit for provisions, it would fling the command of
the two great rivers into our hands, which would enable
us to get suppHes of goods from the Spaniards 
I have always thought the town of Kuskuskies to be a place
worthy of our attention, and have been at some pains to
make myself acquainted with its force, situation and
strength  Was I to undertake an expedition of this
sort and had authority from Government to raise my own
men .... I should make no doubt of being in [posses
sion] by April next  I am sensible that the case
stands thus — ^that [we must] either take the town of Kus
kuskies, or in less than a twelve-month send an army against
the Indians on Wabash, which will cost ten times as much,
and not be of half the service."'*
Clark had several reasons for going east in the autumn
of 1777. There were some accounts of the Kentucky
militia to settle, some private business to attend to, and the
expedition to the Northwest to discuss.'" He reached Wil
liamsburg early in November. After settling the militia
accounts and visiting his father's home, he developed his
plans to a few leading men in the capital. These gentle
men approached the governor, but it was not till December
'•* Am. Hist. Rev., VIII, 491-494.
" For an extended discussion of Clark's motives for going east see
Butterfield, op. cit, S46-557. I cannot accept Butterfield's opinion
that Clark, when he went east, had no serious thoughts of leading an
expedition to Illinois, and that his desire to do so was partially
caused by the alarming nature of the situation he found in the East.
Butterfield bases his opinion upon Clark's Letter to Mason (English,
op. cit, I, 411-412). This account, however, should be modified by
the conflicting one which Clark gives in his Memvir (ibid., 468). In
reality, the state of affairs in the East, in the autumn of 1777, was
better, not worse, than Clark had supposed, for Burgoyne's surrender
had just taken place.

WESTWARD EXPANSION OF VIRGINIA. 49
10 that Clark had his first interview with Henry. The
governor was impressed with the possibilities of the plan.'"
He appreciated, however, the danger of dispatching a force
to so great a distance and he understood the necessity of
absolute secrecy. It would be unsafe to have the project
discussed in the assembly, for in that case it would soon
be talked of on the frontiers, and prisoners taken by the
Indians would be sure to divulge it to the British." An
act passed in the autumn of 1777 gave the governor power,
with the advice of the council, to order out the militia in
an expedition against the western enemies.'* Henry asked
the advice of a few prominent men who were members
of the assembly but not in the council, George Mason,
George Wythe and Thomas Jefferson. This informal com
mittee deliberated over Clark's proposals and studied his
plans of operation. Particular stress was laid upon the pos
sibility of a retreat from Illinois in case of disaster to the
Spanish settlements across the Mississippi" where, it was
believed, Americans would be well received.*" The informal
committee decided in favor of the expedition, and on Jan
uary 2, 1778, the plan was communicated to the council.
They advised Henry to authorize the expedition as quickly
and secretly as possible, to issue his warrant on the state
treasurer for i 1,200 payable to Clark, and to prepare
instructions for him.*^
These instructions were delivered to Clark on the same
day. There were two sets, one public, and the other
private.*" By the former he was authorized to enlist with-
" English, op. cit, I, 468.
''Ibid. "Henry, op. cit, I, 583-584. For text of this act, see Hening,
op. cit., IX, 374-375-
" Clark's Memoir, English, op. cit, I, 468.
°°The correspondence between Henry and Governor Galvez of
New Orleans shows that the two were on friendly terms. Tran
scripts of these letters are in the Bancroft MSS.
''Henry, op. cit, I, 585.
*" Both are printed in the appendix to Clark's Sketch of His Cam
paign in the Illinois, Cincinnati, 1869.

50 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
out loss of time seven companies, to be recruited from any
of the counties of Virginia. They were to proceed to
Kentucky and obey his orders for the period of three
months. If they remained on duty longer, they were to
receive compensation. These instructions conveyed the
impression that the recruits were for the defense of Ken
tucky only. The private instructions were longer. In
these Clark was authorized to apply to the commanding
officer at Fort Pitt for transportation down the Ohio, and
to attack Kaskaskia, but he was to keep his real destina
tion secret. ' "Its success depends upon this." Kaskaskia
was claimed as within the lawful boundaries of Virginia.*'
Clark was to show humanity to British subjects, and, if
possible, to conciliate them. His troops were to receive the
pay of Virginia militia. The establishment of a post near
the mouth of the Ohio was stated as in contemplation. In
a letter writter by the governor to Clark a few days later,
the latter was authorized to extend his operations from
Kaskaskia to the enemy's settlements "above or across, as
you may find it proper." The reference was probably to
Detroit and Vincennes. He was also advised to consult
with Colonel David Rogers, who was on his way to New
Orleans with a letter from Henry to Galvez, and who had
an extensive knowledge of conditions in the West.** The
government of Virginia was thus committed to the support
of Qark's plan.
On January 3, a letter was written to him by the
informal committee, and signed by Wythe, Mason and
Jefferson. In this the conquest of territory was clearly in
view. English and Indian aggressions were to be punished
"by carrying the war into their own country." Clark was
congratulated upon his appointment, and rewards were
virtually promised, in case of success, to officers and men.*"
" The reference is to Virginia's charter claims.
'*Am. Hist Rev., VIII, 494. A transcript of the letter from Henry
to Galvez is in the Bancroft MSS.
" A facsimile of this letter is given in English, op. cit., I, 102-103.

CHAPTER IV.
THE OVERTHROW OF BRITISH POWER IN ILLINOIS.
Clark, with the rank of lieutenant-colonel, immediately
left Williamsburg and hastened to the frontier.^ Clothed
with large discretionary power, in possession of £1,200 in
depreciated Virginia paper currency, a request for powder
and lead addressed to General Hand, and an authorization
to draw for extra funds on Oliver Pollock at New Orleans,
he set about the work of recruiting." Before the end of
January he had recruiting parties along the frontier from
Fort Pitt to North Carolina.' He advanced £150 to Major
William B. Smith to recruit on the Holston in the expecta
tion that Smith would join him in Kentucky.* Captain
Leonard Helm of Fauquier County, and Captain Joseph
Bowman of Frederick County, were each to raise a company
and meet Clark at Redstone on the Monongahela, where he
arrived early in February."
Clark and his recruiting officers experienced many diffi
culties. As already explained, the country about Fort Pitt
was in excitement over the rival claims to jurisdiction of
Virginia and Pennsylvania, and there was much opposition
in that vicinity to the recruiting of troops who were to be
used, judging from Clark's public instructions, for the
defense of a Virginia county. Helm reported that in his
county there was opposition, "as no such service was known
'Probably on Jan. 4, 1778, as he says in his Memoir, English,
op. cit, I, 469, not Jan. 18, as he says in the Letter to Mason. See
Butterfield, op. cit, 86.
''Butterfield, op. cit, 85-86. The statement in the Memoir
(English, op. cit., I, 468), that he had an "order" on Hand is incor
rect, for Governor Henry could not issue orders to a Continental
officer. 'Letter to Mason, English, op. cit, I, 413.
'Clark's Memoir, ibid., 469.
'Ibid.

52 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
by the Assembly."" While at Redstone, Clark had word
from Smith that he would join him at the Falls of the Ohio
with 200 men. By the middle of April he thought that
six companies had been recruited, in addition to those of
Helm and Bowman, which had joined him at Redstone, and
that he would have his "full quota."' On May 12, he left
Redstone with about 150 men, divided into three companies,
and "set sail" for the Falls of the Ohio, General Hand
having furnished him with all necessities.* At Fort Ran
dolph, at the mouth of the Great Kanawha, he was joined
by a few Virginians under Captain James O'Hara.' He
next touched at the mouth of the Kentucky, where dis
appointing news awaited him. Smith had experienced
great difficulties from desertion, and from a Continental
draft which interfered with his recruiting, and only a very
few of the men he had promised had arrived in Kentucky.^"
Clark feared this would prove fatal to his plans. He
immediately wrote to County-Lieutenant John Bowman
at Harrodsburg, asking him to join the expedition at the
Falls with all the men he could spare.^^ Towards the close
of May, Clark encamped his little force on Corn Island in
the Ohio, opposite the modern city of Louisville, where the
channel of the river was interrupted by falls. His object
in choosing this island for a camp was better to control his
troops and check desertion.^" Here he was joined by a few
men whom Bowman could spare from Kentucky, under
Captain Montgomery,^' and by a few of Smith's men from
Holston under Captain Dillard." He now made known
his real destination. In spite of precautions, one lieutenant
' Memoir, English, op. cit, I, 469, Letter to Mason, ibid., 413.
' Clark to Hand, Redstone, 17 Apr., 1778. Emmet MSS.
' Letter to Mason, English, op. cit, I, 413.
' Butterfield, op. cit, 96.
"Am. Hist, Rev., VIH, 496; Letter to Mason, English, op. cit,
I, 414, and Memoir, ibid., 471.
" Butterfield, op. cit, 98.
" Letter to Mason, English, op. cit, I, 414.
" Cal. Va. St. Papers, III, 441.
" Letter to Mason, English, op. cit, I, 414.

OVERTHROW OF BRITISH POWER IN ILLINOIS. S3
and a few men of Dillard's company made good their
escape;^" but the sentiment of the majority was revealed
by burning the lieutenant in effigy.^" A number of families,
who had followed Clark for the sake of protection, were
found useful in guarding a blockhouse which he erected
on the island.^'
While here Clark acquired a piece of information most
¦ valuable to h.im in the coming campaign. He received a
letter from Fort Pitt announcing the treaties which had
recently been concluded between France and the United
States.^* The advantages which the French treaty would
give him in dealing with the French of Illinois are
obvious.^' On June 24, Clark's little army left Corn Island, shooting
the Falls at a moment when the sun was in nearly total
eclipse, an incident "which caused various conjectures
among the superstitious.""" His whole force was about 180,
including officers."^ The men were divided into four com
panies, commanded by Captains John Montgomery, Joseph
Bowman, Leonard Helm and William Harrod."" This
number fell far short of the "seven companies" which
Governor Henry had authorized him to raise.
Speed and secrecy alone, Clark believed, could make up
for his numerical weakness. Accordingly, he rowed down
the Ohio as quickly as possible till he reached an island in
the mouth of the Tennessee. Here he landed on June 28
"Ibid." Memoir, ibid., 473.
" The presence of these families can scarcely be said to have given
Clark's expedition a migratory character, as stated by Roosevelt,
Winning of the West, II, 39.
"Memoir, English, op. cit, I, 474; Am. Hist. Rev., VIII, 497.
"Professor Alvord (,Colls. III. St Hist Lib., II, xlv) calls the
French treaty Clark's "trump card."
""English, op. cit, I, 159-160, 473.
" Bowman to Brinker, July 30, 1778, says, "about 175" ; English,
op. cit, I, 558. Governor Henry says, "one hundred and seventy
or eighty," ibid., 245. See also, Butterfield, op. cit, 582.
" Clark's Memoir, English, op. cit, I, 473.

54 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
to prepare for an overland march to Kaskaskia."' The
water route down the Ohio to its mouth and up the Mis
sissippi would have been easier. But it could not have
been followed with secrecy, for the Mississippi was
patrolled. Clark understood the importance of delivering
his attack from an unexpected quarter, and decided to fol
low the Ohio only as far as the site of old Fort Massac,
near the mouth of the Tennessee, thence to march overland .
in a northwesterly direction and enter Kaskaskia by the
back door. While in the mouth of the Tennessee, his men
seized a boatload of strangers. They turned out to be
hunters, who had recently been at Kaskaskia, and they
seemed to favor the American cause. Their intelligence
was not specially favorable to Clark, but they took
an oath of allegiance to the United States and joined
the expedition."* In the evening of the twenty-eighth
Clark ran his boats into a creek near Fort Massac, and the
next morning started on the trail for Kaskaskia, one hun
dred and twenty miles distant."" He had no w.agons, pack-
horses, or artillery. John Fiske's account of the early part
of this campaign is singularly inaccurate. "Clark," he says,
"had a hard winter's work in enlisting men, but at length
in May, 1778, having collected a flotilla of boats and a few
pieces of Ught artillery, he started from Pittsburg with
180 picked riflemen, and rowed swiftly down the Ohio
river a thousand miles to its junction with the Missis
sippi.""" He had no artillery, did not start from Pittsburg
with 180 men, and did not row down to the mouth of the
Ohio. For about fifty miles the march was difficult and fatigu
ing. Clark's men then reached the open, level prairies,
where his greatest fear was the likelihood of detection,
'" Butterfield, op. cit, 105.
"Letter to Mason, English, op. cit., I, 415.
" For Clark's route to Kaskaskia see Hulbert, "Military Roads of
the Mississippi Basin," Historic Highways of America, VIII, 18, 25
et seq. Also Butterfield, op. cit., 591-594.
" Fiske, American Revolution, II, 105.

OVERTHROW OF BRITISH POWER IN ILLINOIS. 55
which would have spoiled his plans."' The march, however,
was uneventful, save that once the guide lost his way.
Towards the end, food gave out, but the spirit of the men
remained excellent."* On the evening of July 4, after a
six days' march, they reached the eastern bank of the Kas
kaskia river, opposite the village. Taking possession of
a farmhouse, they found plenty of boats, and in two hours
were all transported across the river."' Clark learned that
there had been some suspicion in Kaskaskia of an Ameri
can attack, but that the people, having made no discoveries,
had "got off their guard.'""
The story of how he surprised the gay Creoles at a dance
is mythical. Clark himself thus baldly describes the taking
of Kaskaskia: "I immediately divided my little army into
two divisions. Ordered one to surround the town. With
the other I broke into the fort .... secured the governor,
Mr. Rocheblave; in fifteen minutes had every street
secured ; sent runners through the town ordering the people,
on pain of death, to keep close to their houses, which they
observed, and before daylight had the whole town dis
armed."'^ One of his captains describes the capture
as follows: "About midnight we marched into the town
without ever being discovered. We pitched for the fort
and took possession. The commanding officer we caught
in bed, and immediately confined him."'" The fort men
tioned was Fort Gage, the residence of Rocheblave. It was
now renamed Fort Clark." With Rocheblave were captured
the instructions and papers which he had received from
Detroit and Quebec.'*
'^ Letter to Mason, English, op. cit, I, 415.
" Bowman to Brinker, ibid., 559.
""Letter to Mason, ibid., 416. Professor Alvord suggests {Colls.
III. St Hist. Lib., II, xlii, note) that these boats may have been placed
here by members of the pro-American party in Kaskaskia, in expec
tation of an American attack.
"Letter to Mason, English, op. cit, I, 416.
"Ibid." Bowman to Brinker, ibid., 559.
" Butterfield, op. cit., 138.
''English, op. cit., I, 559, 564; Alvord, The Old Kaskaskia
Records, 43.

56 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
Clark describes in vivid but probably exaggerated lan
guage the abject terror of the Kaskaskians.'" As a matter
of fact, an American attack was not, as we have seen,
unexpected. Persons friendly to the Americans supplied
Clark's hungry troops with food, and urged the French to
submit.'" He himself was not long in learning of a pro-
American sentiment in the town."
The policy adopted by Clark in treating with the towns
men shows that he was gifted with true diplomatic insight.
He summoned the leading citizens to a conference, told
them he was sorry they had entertained so bad an opinion
of Americans, and explained, after a fashion, the nature
of the dispute between England and the United States.
It was the American principle, he said, to make men free,
not slaves, and if they would espouse the American cause,
they should at once enjoy all the privileges of American
government; but this favor was made to appear as a
privilege extended to a people who, by the fate of war,
were at his mercy.'* Equally tactful was his treatment of
the most influential inhabitants. Cerre, the leading mer
chant of Kaskaskia, who had been strongly opposed to the
American cause, happened to be in Spanish Illinois on busi
ness. In spite of accusations made by his enemies, Clark
gave him a hearing. Cerre took an oath of allegiance and,
says Clark, "became a most valuable man to us." " Father
Gibault became a zealous "Clark man" when informed that
the church would be protected, and that under the laws of
Virginia all religions enjoyed equal privileges.*" The atti
tude taken by Clark, and the information he gave of the
French treaty, brought the town completely to his feet.*^
"Letter to Mason, English, op. cit, I, 416-417; Colls. III. St. Hist.
Lib., II, xliv.
"See, e. g., Cal. Va. St Papers, II, 675, and Clark's Memoir,
English, op. cit, I, 478.
"Ibid., 477.
" Letter to Mason, ibid., 417.
"Clark's Memoir, ibid., 484-487; Am. Hist. Rev., VIII, 498-500.
For a sketch of Cerre, see Trans. III. St Hist Soc, 1903, 275 et seq.
" Letter to Mason, English, op. cit, I, 418.
" Colls. III. St. Hist. Lib., II, 536, and Letter to Mason, English,
op. cit, I, 417.

OVERTHROW OF BRITISH POWER IN ILLINOIS. 57
It may well be that hopes of a speedy restoration to France,
the only government for which the Illinois Creoles felt any
real attachment, partially explain the tameness of the sur
render of Kaskaskia.*" With a few exceptions, Clark
allowed any who chose to leave the country.
On July 5, Bowman, with a detachment of thirty mounted
men, and accompanied by a number of Kaskaskians, was
sent to take possession of the northern towns of Prairie du
Rocher and St. Philippe.*' They surrendered immediately,
and without resistance.** Within ten days about three hun
dred of the inhabitants of these northern towns took an
oath of fidelity, and appeared to be attached to the
American cause.*"
Clark now turned his attention to the reduction of Vin
cennes. In the case of this town, a repetition of the attack
on Kaskaskia was not possible, for the inhabitants were
aware of his proximity and could not be surprised.*"
Gibault's friendship was now found to be of the utmost
service. His spiritual jurisdiction extended over Vincennes,
and he offered to win the town for Clark by peaceful means.
Though he had nothing to do with temporal business, he
said, he would give the people such hints in the spiritual
way as would be "very conducive to the business."*' The
priest, in company with Dr. Laffont, the principal of the
Jesuit school at Kaskaskia, and a few others, soon started for
Vincennes, taking with him a proclamation from Clark to the
people.** His "hints" were effective. No resistance was
made to the transfer of allegiance from England to the
*= Colls. III. St Hist Lib., II, 536.
" This party was mounted on Illinois horses ; Clark had brought
none with him.
" Bowman to Brinker, English, op. cit., I, 559 ; Bowman to Hite,
ibid., 564-565 ; Colls. III. St Hist. Lib., II, 536.
"Bowman to Brinker, English, op. cit, I, 560; Bowman to Hite,
ibid., 565.
"Letter to Mason, ibid., 419.
"Ibid. For Gibault's services to Clark see Am. St Papers, "Public
Lands," I, 21.
" Letter to Mason, English, op. cit, I, 419, and Trans. III. St. Hist
Soc, 1907, 271 et seq. See also Am. Hist Rev., XIV, 544 et seq.

58 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
United States, and in a few days an oath of fidelity was taken
by the people.*' They had even less reason than the Kaskas
kians to feel attachment to Great Britain,"" and their
acquiescence in a change of masters is neither difficult to
understand nor discreditable. Legras, who had been left
by Abbott in command of the Vincennes militia, seems to
have done nothing to stem the tide of pro-American senti
ment, and was later accused of treason by Hamilton."^ The
post of Ouiatanon soon followed the example of Vincennes,
and came under American control."" Clark placed Captain
Helm in charge at Vincennes as commandant and super
intendent of Indian affairs."'
In attempting to explain Clark's success in this expedition
against Illinois, account must be taken of the secrecy and
speed of his movements, his spirit of dauntless perseverance
in the face of disappointment, the absence of British troops
in the country and the attitude of the inhabitants. The
element of secrecy is especially emphasized by Clark him
self,"* and by Captain Montgomery."" A few companies of
British regulars could probably have held the country
against any force which the Americans could have sent.
This, at least, was the opinion of General Haldimand, Carle-
ton's successor as governor of Quebec."" But the attitude
of the inhabitants, it seems to me, was the decisive factor
in the collapse of British rule in Illinois. Rocheblave
attributed the failure of the people to defend themselves to
Spanish intrigues, and to the treachery of the EngUsh-
speaking merchants."' What Qark could have done, had
military resistance been encountered, cannot be known, for
there was none ; and consequently there was no occasion for
¦"¦ Trans. III. St. Hist. Soc, 1907, 270 et seq.
" Supra, ch. II.
" Butterfield, op. cit., 175.
" Ibid., 194.
" Letter to Mason, English, op. cit, I, 420.
"Ibid., 41s.
"Cal. Va. St Papers, III, 441.
"' Mason, Early Chic, and III, 369.
" Ibid., 418.

OVERTHROW OF BRITISH POWER IN ILLINOIS. 59
the display of great military ability. In other words, the
explanation of his success in 1778 is to be sought for in con
ditions in the country before his arrival. The British
regime fell mainly from internal causes.
Within a few weeks Clark was in possession of the
territory along the Mississippi from Kaskaskia to Cahokia,
and on the Wabash from Vincennes to Ouiatanon. But
he had not men enough to hold it securely. The time of
his three months' recruits had expired and most of them
were anxious to return. It was only with great difficulty,
and by usurping authority, that he induced about one hun
dred to reenlist for eight months."* To preserve appear
ances and create an impression of greater strength, he gave
out that he could at any moment secure reenforcements
from the Falls of the Ohio. The several companies were
soon filled by the enlistment of creole volunteers, who were
anxious to serve under him."' The men who insisted on
returning were sent east under Captain Montgomery, who
conveyed Rocheblave as a prisoner, and letters from Clark
to the governor of Virginia informing him of the situation
in 'Illinois and the necessity of more troops."" Garrisons
were placed in Fort Clark at Kaskaskia, in Fort Bowman
at Cahokia, and in Fort Sackville at Vincennes."^
The establishment of friendly relations with the neigh
boring tribes was a task which immediately confronted
Clark. We have seen that it was primarily Indian attacks on
Kentucky that had occasioned his expedition."" The counter
action of British influence among the northwestern tribes
was, then, an essential part of his programme. His unex
pected appearance, and the position taken by the people of
Illinois, greatly perplexed and alarmed the savages, most
of whom had been hostile to the Americans. The French
traders, who possessed great influence over the Indians,
" Letter to Mason, English, op. cit., 1, 419.
"Ibid., 420.
"Ibid.; Clark's Memoir, ibid., 489; Cal Va. St Papers, III, 441.
" Clark's Memoir, English, op. cit, I, 489 ; Butterfield, op. cit, 138.
" Governor Henry to Virginia's Delegates in Congress, 14 Nov.,
177S, English, op. cit, I, 245.

6o TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
advised them to make their peace with Clark. By the middle
of August they were flocking to Cahokia, some, Qark says,
from a distance of five hundred miles, to smoke the pipe
of peace with the "Big Knives," as they called the Virginia
frontiersmen."' Clark did not believe in the methods com
monly employed by English colonists in dealing with Indians.
Abundant use of presents and over-conciliatory speeches
savored, in his opinion, of weakness. He seems, indeed,
always to have held these views."* He determined, accord
ingly, to employ "harsh language"; in other words, bluff
and braggadocio. During a five-weeks' residence at
Cahokia he concluded treaties with ten or twelve tribes.""
At the same time Captain Helm at Vincennes was making
treaties with several of the Wabash tribes.
Hamilton realized the importance of maintaining British
influence over the Wabash Indians, and thought they should
be utilized as a barrier against rebel inroads towards
Detroit."" As soon, therefore, as he learned of Clark's
success in Illinois, he sent an agent named De Celoron, to
hold these tribes firm in their alliance with Great Britain."'
De Celoron arrived at Ouiatanon about the time Helm
reached Vincennes. The latter, with a detachment of Clark's
men from Kaskaskia, started up the Wabash to capture the
British agent, who fled at his approach, leaving Helm to
negotiate a treaty with the Indians about Ouiatanon, which,
however, did not long keep them on the American side."*
Hamilton later criticised De Celoron sharply, and accused
him of treason."' Though Clark undoubtedly exaggerated
the extent of American influence over the northwestern
" Letter to Mason, ibid., 420, 422.
" Cal Va. St. Papers, III, 488.
" Letter to Mason, English, op. cit, I, 420-421, 426.
"Mich. P. Colls., IX, 459.
¦" Ibid.
" Letter to Mason, English, op. cit, I, 427-428 ; Butterfield, op. cit.,
193-194, 197, 243-
" Colls. Ill St Hist Lib., I, 359, and Colls, of the State Hist Soc
of Wisconsin, XI, 181.

OVERTHROW OF BRITISH POWER IN ILLINOIS. 6 1
tribes, his achievements in this direction were considerable
enough to worry the British officials at the lake posts.
He devoted some attention to cultivating friendly rela
tions with Francisco de Leyba, the Spanish commandant
of Upper Louisiana. That Leyba was as glad to see Clark
in possession along the Mississippi as the latter implies,"
seems doubtful, however, in view of later events.
'° Letter to Mason, English, op. cit., I, 426.

CHAPTER V.

HAMILTON AND CLARK.

Meanwhile Hamilton was not inactive. He was in many
respects an able and energetic soldier, and it was almost
certain that he would attempt to drive the Americans
out of Illinois. He learned of Clark's invasion in August,
1778, and immediately informed Carleton.^ Early in the
same month the disconsolate Rocheblave wrote a dolorous
letter to Quebec, stating the fact of his capture by
"the self-styled colonel."" In September, General Haldi
mand, who had in June succeeded Carleton as governor of
Quebec,' wrote to Germain, informing the British govern
ment that Illinois had been "overrun" by parties of
rebels.* Haldimand thought that the Indians, if properly
directed by Hamilton, might be able to clear Illinois of the
Americans," but he did not authorize Hamilton to under
take a regular expedition for this purpose." The latter
was, however, authorized by the British government to
employ the Wabash Indians to dislodge the Americans, but
this instruction could not have reached him, since it was
not written till after he had started from Detroit against
Clark.' But Hamilton was eager to lead such an expedition.
In the spring of 1778 he had been meditating an attack on
Fort Pitt, which had, however, been disapproved by Haldi
mand.* He now began to plan the recovery of Illinois.
But it was not a mere Indian raid which he had in mind.
' Mich. P. Colls., IX, 459.
' Mason, Early Chic, and III, 418-419.
' Haldimand to Sir Henry Clinton, received i Aug., 1778, Bancroft
MSS. 'Haldimand to Germain, 11 Sept., 1778, ibid.
' Butterfield, op. cit, 163.
' Ibid., 163-164.
'For proof that he was ordered to try to recover Illinois see
Germain to Stuart, 2 Dec., 1778, Bancroft MSS.
'Mich. P. Colls., IX, 398.

HAMILTON AND CLARK. 63
He would lead the expedition in person.' He hoped
first to recover Vincennes, and then to retake all the other
villages. He wrote Major De Peyster, commandant at Michili
mackinac, informing him of his plans, and asking for the
cooperation of the Indians in that vicinity.'^" De Peyster
had already sent a "belt" to the Illinois tribes to stir them
up against the rebels,^^ and he tried to convince the tribes
over whom he had influence that commercial considerations
bound them to Great Britain.^" He lent Hamilton his
hearty cooperation, but the Indians about Michilimackinac
were at that season so greatly dispersed that he was unable
to dispatch a formidable party,^' and his efforts to reenforce
the lieutenant-governor were not successful.'^*
Hamilton's work of preparation was effected with speed
and efficiency,^" and on October 7, he started from Detroit
for Vincennes at the head of about 230 men, regulars,
irregulars, militia and Indians.^" He was acting on his own
responsibility, without orders from Haldimand.^' The route
followed by Hamilton was down the Detroit river to Lake
Erie, on Lake Erie to the mouth of the Maumee, up the
Maumee to its source, over a portage to a source of the
Wabash, the "Petit Rivierre," and down the Wabash to
Vincennes. The details of the journey need not be
described.^* It was about 600 miles in length, and consumed
seventy-one days. During its progress Hamilton was joined
by coiisiderable numbers of Indians.^' The journey down
" Butterfield, op. cit, 164.
"Mich. P. Colls., IX, 476.
"Ibid.,37^. '^ Colls. St Hist. Soc Wis., XI, 117.
"Ibid., 119.
"Ibid., 121-122, 124-125.
" Butterfield, op. cit, 170 et seq.
" For the numbers see ibid., 180, 648-652.
"Mich. P. Colls., XIX, 474; Haldimand to Clinton, 26 May, 1779.
Bancroft MSS.
" The longest primary source for this expedition is a letter written
by Hamilton in 1781. See Mich. P. Colls., IX, 489-516.
"Colls. Ill St. Hist. Lib., I, 220, and Butterfield, op. cit, 206.

64 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
the Wabash was very difficult and slow, for the river was
low and full of floating ice.
On December 15 a party of scouts captured a small
detachment sent out from Vincennes by Helm to recon-
noifer."" From these men Hamilton learned that Helm
depended for defense almost entirely on the militia of Vin
cennes, who, the former wrongly imagined, were in the pay
of Congress."^ Helm was isolated. Clark, it is true, had
supposed that Hamilton would attempt the recovery of
Illinois,"" and he knew as early as September that the latter
was trying to rouse the northern tribes."' But when his
spies reported that the British commander was marching
south by the Maumee,"* he completely mistook his object.
In May, 1778, Congress, ignorant of Clark's expedition,
voted to raise three thousand men for western service.
General Hand was succeeded at Fort Pitt by General
Mcintosh, who arrived there in August. Mcintosh was
instructed to lead an expedition against Detroit."" After
spending some time in attempting to conciliate the Indians
whose hunting-grounds he would have to traverse, he
advanced thirty miles down the Ohio, where, at much loss
of time, he erected Fort Mcintosh. The furthest point
reached in this "campaign" was the headwaters of the
Muskingum, where another fort was built. Leaving 150
men there, Mcintosh returned in December to Fort Pitt,
disbanded his militia and went into winter quarters.""
When certain information reached Clark that Hamilton was
on the march, he supposed that he was moving against
Mcintosh, "little thinking," he says, "that Mr. Hamilton
had the same design on me that I supposed he had at Gen.
-° Butterfield, op. cit, 216.
" Hamilton to Stuart, 25 Dec, 1778, Bancroft MSS.
" Letter to Mason, English, op. cit, I, 428.
" Henry, op. cit, III, 194.
"Letter to Mason, English, op. cit, I, 429.
"'For the resolution of Congress leading to this expedition see
Journals Cont Cong., Ford's ed., XI, 588.
''"Justin Winsor, Western Movement, 125.

HAMILTON AND CLARK. 65
Mcintosh.""' , Clark cannot justly be blamed for not fore
seeing Mcintosh's utter failure. The latter's inability to
menace Detroit gave Hamilton a free hand, and he had
actually captured Vincennes before Clark received accurate
information of his whereabouts.
After arriving in the neighborhood of Vincennes, Hamil
ton sent out parties to watch the lines of communication
from that village to Kaskaskia and to the Falls of the Ohio,
and sent word in advance to the inhabitants that no mercy
would be shown them unless they abandoned the American
cause. Helm's militia proved useless, and resolved to make
as good terms as possible with Hamilton. Helm, indeed,
said he had not four men upon whom he could depend;
"not one of the militia will take arms, though before
sight of the enemy no braver men.""* He was hopelessly
outnumbered, and could make no resistance to a party as
large as that which was approaching. By this time it had
been increased by the addition of Indians to about five
hundred men."' On December 17, Helm surrendered Fort
Sackville. In the town Hamilton encountered no resistance.
The inhabitants laid down their arms to the number of
220." On December 19, the people were summoned to the
church, where Hamilton, after reproaching them for their
past treachery, read an oath of allegiance, which was signed
by more than 150 in a few days.'^ Those who had accepted
American commissions gave them up, and all who took the
oath received back their arms. Hamilton hoped that lenity
shown to the people of Vincennes would have a good effect
on those of Kaskaskia and the other villages. For his
success thus far he alone deserved the credit. He had acted,
"Letter to Mason, English, op. cit., I, 429.
"Am. Hist Rev., I, 90-91; English, op. cit, I, 233.
" Butterfield, op. cit, 225. Clark {Letter to Mason) exaggerates
the number in placing Hamilton's force at 800. He comes nearer
the actual figure in a letter to the governor of Virginia {Cal Va. St.
Papers, I, 315-316), placing it at 600.
'" Hamilton to Stuart, 25 Dec, 1778, Bancroft MSS.
" Butterfield, op. cit, 228-229.

66 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
as has been said, on his own responsibility, without orders
from his superior at Quebec.'"
Me at once put the fort, which he found " a miserable
stockade," in better condition, and erected blockhouses and
barracks." Parties were sent out in every direction to bar
intercourse between the Falls of the Ohio and the lUinois
settlements,'* and means were taken to intercept boats on
the Ohio. He deliberated on the project of an immediate
advance on Kaskaskia. But it was the dead of winter, the
route to be traversed (over 200 miles) was through a
country subject to inundation, and it was necessary to
maintain a garrison in Fort Sackville. These considerations
induced the British commander to winter at Vincennes and
postpone the attack on Kaskaskia till spring.
He knew of the aid extended to the Americans by
the Spaniards, and resolved, if possible, to put a stop
to it. As early as January, 1779, he suspected that war
had already broken out between Spain and England
and regretted that he had no information which would
justify him in taking the offensive against the Spaniards in
the West, "as there would be so little difficulty in pushing
them entirely out of the Mississippi."'" In the same month
he wrote to Galvez, briefly describing his capture of Vin
cennes. "Your Excellency," he said, "cannot be unac
quainted with what was commonly practised in the time of
your predecessor in the government of New Orleans, I
mean the sending supplies of gunpowder and other stores to
the rebels then in arms against their sovereign. Though
this may have been transacted in a manner unknown to the
Governor by the merchants, I must suppose that under your
Excellency's orders, such commerce will be positively pro
hibited  I think it incumbent on me to represent to
your Excellency that the rebels at Kaskaskia being in daily
apprehension of the arrival of a body of men from the
" Butterfield, op. cit, 226.
"Colls. Ill St Hist Lib., I, 390.
" Hamilton to Stuart, 25 Dec, 1778, Bancroft MSS.
" Hamilton to Haldimand, 24-30 Jan., 1779, Bancroft MSS.

HAMILTON AND CLARK. 67
upper posts accompanied by the savages from that quarter
have declared that they will take refuge on the Spanish
territory as soon as they are apprised of their coming. As
it is my intention early in the spring to go towards the
Illinois, I shall represent to the officers commanding several
small forts and posts on the Mississippi for His Catholic
Majesty the impropriety of affording an asylum to rebels
in arms against their lawful sovereign. If after such a
representation the rebels should find shelter in any fort or
post on the Mississippi, it will become my duty to dislodge
them, in which case their protectors must blame their
own conduct, if they should suffer any inconvenience in
consequence."'" But Hamilton was meditating something more momen
tous than the expulsion of the rebels from Illinois. He
anticipated for the coming season the greatest gathering of
Indians that had ever been collected on the American
frontier." Stuart was to incite the southern tribes ; Ham
ilton, who expected reenforcements from the commander-
in-chief, would, with the northern Indians, as circumstances
should decide, either first sweep the Americans from
Illinois, or immediately attack Kentucky." He hoped to
capture the post at the Falls of the Ohio, and also to build
a fort at the mouth of that river." Concerted Indian action
was to annihilate the American settlements west of the
Alleghanies. The danger to the American cause in the West
was never greater than at the opening of 1779.*" The
center of hostile operations, moreover, had come nearer.
It was now at Vincennes.
By February 22, 1779, the fort at Vincennes, Hamilton
says, was "in a tolerable state of defense." Scouting parties
were kept on the alert. Most of his Indians, however, were
" Colls. Ill St Hist Lib., I, 377 et seq.
" Hamilton to the commandant at Natchez, 13 Jan., 1779, Bancroft
MSS.
" Ibid., and Hamilton to Stuart, 25 Dec, 1778, Bancroft MSS.
" Colls. St Hist Soc Wis., XI, 180, and Mich. P. Colls., IX, 477.
*" Ibid., 497, and Butterfield, op. cit, 259-260.
6

68 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
allowed to return to their homes, as were some volunteers
from Detroit. The people of Vincennes never became
attached to him, and were ready at a favorable moment to
desert, if such desertion would not endanger their own
safety. Haldimand later expressed astonishment that a
competent officer would remain at Vincennes "when he
knew the impracticability of my supplying him with pro
visions or assistance, and after he must have received notice
of the rebels approaching toward Detroit."*^ Had Hamil
ton's antagonist, however, been a man of ordinary caliber,
his own occupation of Vincennes would have been tolerably
secure. As late as Christmas, 1778, Clark was completely in the
dark concerning Hamilton's whereabouts, and supposed
that Mcintosh had taken Detroit.*" Shortly after this,
however, an inhabitant of Cahokia was detected in a
treasonable correspondence with the British commander, in
which the failure of Mcintosh and Hamilton's aggressive
intentions were revealed, "but not so fully expressed ....
as to reduce it to a certainty."*' Clark was still misled by
the supposition that the enemy's first attack would be
directed against Kaskaskia rather than Vincennes. In this
event he determined to recall the garrison from Cahokia
and concentrate his forces at Kaskaskia. In January he
started for the northern town to confer with the people and
determine lines of policy. While he was on the way, a
party sent out from Vincennes nearly succeeded in captur
ing him. Failing to do this, they spread the false report
that Hamilton with 800 men was marching on Kaskaskia.
Clark, believing the story, was forced to return post haste
to that village, where his calmness prevented a panic. The
Kaskaskians were thoroughly frightened, but the arrival of
Bowman's troops and a company of volunteers from
Cahokia reassured them. "I believe," says Clark, "had
Mr. Hamilton appeared we should have defeated him with
•^ Colls. Ill St. Hist Lib., I, 446.
" Letter to Mason, English, op. cit, I, 429.
''Ibid.

HAMILTON AND CLARK. 69
a good deal of ease, not so numerous, but the men being
much better.** He soon learned from scouts that the
"army" which gave the alarm consisted of only about forty
whites and Indians "making their retreat as fast as pos
sible to St. Vincent [Vincennes], sent for no other purpose,
as we found after, than to take me."*" The enemy he now
knew to be at Vincennes.
Late in January, 1779, Francisco Vigo,*" a merchant of
St. Louis, whose business operations brought him into close
contact with the Illinois and Wabash settlements, arrived
in Kaskaskia from Vincennes with full information con
cerning that place, its capture by Hamilton, etc. From him
Clark learned that no attack would be made on Kaskaskia
till spring ; that Hamilton had sent most of his Indians out,
and had only eighty men in garrison ; that belts and presents
had been sent to all the tribes south of the Ohio, who were
asked to meet at a general council at the mouth of the
Tennessee and lay plans for the reduction of Illinois and
Kentucky, and that Hamilton "made no doubt of clearing
the western waters by the fall."*' "It was at this moment,"
says Clark, "I would have bound myself seven years a slave
to have had 500 troops."**
The situation was desperate. The only escape from dis
aster or immediate retreat from Illinois was to attack Ham
ilton before Hamilton attacked him. This would involve
a march of over 200 miles in the dead of winter, over snow-
clad prairies and drowned lands, concluded by the storming
"For this episode see Letter to Mason, ibid., 430-435.
" Ibid., 43S.
"Vigo was an important figure in the annals of the Northwest. A
Sardinian by birth, he had served in the Spanish army and was
stationed in Louisiana. Leaving the army he became a merchant.
A friendship sprang up between him and Clark, and he transferred
his allegiance to the United States. He was a financial power
throughout the country and rendered Clark much pecuniary service.
See English, op. cit, I, 267 et seq.
"For the information brought by Vigo see Cal. Va. St Papers,
I) 315-316 ; English, op. cit, I, 395-402, 436, 568.
"Ibid., 436.

70 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
of a fort — a task which Hamilton had decided was too diffi
cult for himself to attempt. "I was sensible," wrote Clark,
"the resolution was as desperate as my situation, but I saw
no other probability of securing the country."*' It was
nearly a year since he had heard from the Virginia authori
ties. He was thrown entirely on his own resources and
responsibility."" He called a council of his officers and
found that their sentiments coincided with his own."^ An
immediate march against Vincennes was agreed upon. All
was to be risked in a single encounter."" The issue was
thus expressed by Clark : "We must either quit the country
or attack Mr. Hamilton.""'
A large boat was rigged, equipped with two four-pound
ers and four swivels, and manned by forty-six men under
command of Lieutenant John Rogers. Loaded with stores
and ammunition, the "Willing," as she was called, left
Kaskaskia on February 4. Rogers was instructed to take
his boat down the Mississippi and up the Ohio and Wabash
to within a few leagues of the town, and there to await
further orders. If discovered, he was to do the enemy all
the harm possible without losing his vessel, and if Clark
was defeated, he was to join Colonel David Rogers on the
Mississippi."* Very gratifying to Clark was the enthusiastic manner in
which the French inhabitants responded at this crisis, and
the evidence which they gave of attachment to himself.""
Up to this time he had been doubtful of them, but they now
proved their fidelity to the new regime."" Without their
cooperation it is more than doubtful if he could have car-
'" English, op. cit, I, 396.
" Cal Va. St Papers, I, 315-316.
"¦Letter to Mason, English, op. cit., I, 436; Bowman's Journal,
ibid., 568.
" Cal Va. St. Papers, I, 315-316.
"Ibid."Ibid.; Letter to Mason, English, op. cit, I, 436-437; Clark's
Memoir, ibid., 520, Bowman's Journal, ibid., 568.
" Colls. Ill St. Hist. Lib.. II, 526.
"Ibid., Iviii.

HAMILTON AND CLARK. 71
ried out his plans. They contributed fiber ally, both in men
and in money."' On February 4, a volunteer company from
Cahokia under Captain Richard McCarty arrived at Kas
kaskia, and on the next day another one was raised under
Captain Francis Cliarleville."*
With these two companies, and two companies of his
troops, many of whom, it will be remembered, were Creoles,
under Captains Bowman and Worthington, Clark left
Kaskaskia for Vincennes on February 5. He had with him
about 170 meii."' "We were conducted out of the town,"
says Clark, "by the inhabitants and Mr. Gibault, the priest,
who after a very suitable discourse to the purpose gave us
all absolution, and we set out on a forlorn hope indeed,
for our whole party, with the boat's crew, consisted of
only a little upwards of two hundred.""" There were a
few pack-horses, but no tents or provision for shelter.
Over muddy trails and drowned lands, Clark's greatest
care was to keep up the spirits of his men. After much
hardship caused by the weather, the condition of the country
and the failure of provisions, he arrived in the immediate
neighborhood of Vincennes on February 23."^
His approach seems to have been entirely unexpected by
Hamilton."" The British commander could probably have
defended himself in the fort for some time; and, in the
event of a regular siege, reenforcements might arrive from
Detroit and oblige Clark to retire. The latter, therefore,
resolved to resort to diplomacy. His men had captured a
prisoner, who turned out to be friendly to the Americans
" See English, op. cit., II, 1054, for sums collected by Clark from
the French inhabitants. See also Colls. III. St Hist. Lib., II, li, note
3, xlvi.
" Bowman's Journal, English, op. cit, I, 568.
"Ibid."Letter to Mason, English, op. cit, I, 437.
"This famous march, which John Randolph compared with
Hannibal's passage of the Trasimene Marsh, can be followed in the
laconic journal of Captain Bowman (English, op. cit, I, 568 et seq.).
For the route taken, see Hulbert, op. cit, 34 et seq.
" Bowman's Journal, English, op. cit, I, 571-572.

72 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
and gave valuable information. The people of Vin
cennes, Clark knew, were not attached to Hamilton or
to the government which he represented ; there was, more
over, a chance that some of the Indians might abandon him.
Clark accordingly sent on in advance by a prisoner a proc
lamation addressed "To the inhabitants of Post St. Vin
cent," requesting all friendly to the American cause to
remain in their houses, and telling those who were opposed
to it to repair to the fort and fight like men. Everyone
found under arms would be treated as an enemy."' Before
dark he appeared in sight of the town, which speedily sur
rendered."* A number of Indians joined him, and the
inhabitants furnished his starving and half-naked men with
food, clothing and powder."" A detachment of troops was
sent to attack the fort, though Clark did not expect to be
able to effect its reduction till the arrival of the artillery
on the "Willing.""" There was almost incessant firing
for eighteen hours."' The hostile commanders held several
conferences on December 24, and in the evening articles
of surrender were signed."* The fort was delivered over
to Clark, and the garrison became prisoners of war. The
reasons given at this time by Hamilton for the surrender
were remoteness from succor, the low state of pro
visions, the unanimity of officers and men in its expediency,
and confidence in a generous enemy."' Clark's total casual
ties were — one man wounded. Though the attitude of the
" Bowman's Journal, English, op. cit, I, 571-572.
"Ibid., 397.
"Mich. P Colls., IX, 503.
" English, op. cit, I, 397.
" Ibid.
"Bowman's Journal, English, op. cit., I, 573-575; Mich. P. Colls.,
IX, 504; Letter to Mason, English, op. cit, I, 441-444; Clarks
Journal, Am. Hist. Rev., I, 91-94.
" In view of the last reason, the story told by Hamilton of Clark's
savage behavior {Mich. P. Colls., IX, 502) seems strange. Its
truth becomes doubtful when we compare with it a letter written
by Hamilton a few days after the surrender, in which he testifies to
the honorable behavior of Clark's officers and men. See Hamilton to
Lenioult, 28 Feb., 1779, Bancroft MSS.

HAMILTON AND CLARK. 73
people of Vincennes must be taken into account as a factor
of great importance in Clark's victory, he had undoubtedly
throughout this campaign displayed military ability of a
high order. He needs, perhaps, no greater praise than that
accorded by Hamilton : "The difficulties and danger of Col.
Clark's march from the Illinois were such as required great
courage to encounter and great perseverance to overcome."
On the morning of February 25, Fort Sackville was again
occupied by Americans, and its name was changed to
Fort Patrick Henry. Clark dispatched some troops to
ascend the Wabash and capture a party which had been
sent back by Hamilton to bring down stores from the port
age at the head of the river. Forty men and seven boats
loaded with provisions, together with dispatches from
Detroit, were captured."
On February 27, the "Willing" arrived. During her
voyage from Kaskaskia she had picked up a messenger with
letters from the Virginia government to Clark.'^ He was
notified of his promotion to the rank of full colonel, and
reenforcements were promised.
In a few days Hamilton, his officers and a few men, were
sent under guard to Williamsburg, where they arrived in
June. Hamilton was kept in confinement till October, 1780.
General Haldimand protested against this,'" but Governor
Jefferson justified it on the grounds of "national retalia
tion," and "personal punishment" for his instigation of
Indian atrocities. The terms of the capitulation, Jefferson
asserted, did not guarantee Hamilton against confinement."
After being exchanged, Hamilton finally reached England
in 1781. In the account of these campaigns which he wrote,
he attributes his failure "chiefly if not entirely to the treach
ery of persons whom I had reason to expect lenity and
moderation would have gained."
'° Letter to Mason, English, op. cit., I, 444.
"Bowman's Journal, ibid., 575, and Clark to the governor of
Virginia, 29 Apr., 1779, ibid., 398.
" Haldimand to Washington, 29 Aug., 1779, Bancroft MSS.
" Writings of Jefferson, Ford's ed., II, 248 et seq.

74 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
Upon the disposition of the Indians the effect of Ham
ilton's capture was great. It was to him they looked for
guidance and instructions, and the disaster which befell
him cooled their ardor for the British cause.'* Haldimand
called Hamilton's defeat a second "tour de Burgoyne."'"
In the spring and early summer information reached Quebec
from the lake posts that the spirit of the Indians was shaken.
The friendship of the Illinois French for Clark contributed
to the same result.'" The attitude of the French in the
lake posts and in Quebec, upon whom the French treaty
of 1778 had its natural effect, alarmed the British authori
ties. Haldimand knew the Americans had not abandoned
their designs on Canada." Small parties were constantly
entering the province and escaping unhurt.'* The home
government was aware of the importance and gravity of the
situation in Canada." Clark, indeed, had accomplished a
more important work than he knew. Had Hamilton been
able to maintain himself at Vincennes, and bring about the
wholesale onslaught upon the American settlements which
he had been contemplating, the American cause in the West
would have suffered a disaster.
Clark remained at Vincennes till March 20, when he
returned to Kaskaskia. While at Vincennes, he concluded
a number of treaties with the Wabash Indians, who flocked
to the village to take the child of fortune by the hand.*"
The dispatches brought to him by the "Willing," as
has been explained, were encouraging, and he was led to
hope for the reduction of Detroit.*^ They informed him
that reenforcements would be sent from Virginia. He knew
" For the effect on the Indians of Hamilton's defeat, see Mich. P.
Colls., IX, 382, 429; XIX, 383, 393. See also Rept on Can. Archives,
1885, 326.
"Rept. on Can. Archives, 1886, 471.
"Mich. P. Colls., IX, 382.
" Haldimand to Clinton, 10 Nov., 1778, Bancroft MSS.
" Colls. Ill St Hist Lib., I, 447-448.
" Germain to Clinton, 4 Nov., 1778, Bancroft MSS.
" Letter to Mason, English, op. cit., I, 445-448.
"English, op. c^t, I, 399.

HAMILTON AND CLARK. 75
that the Illinois militia would turn out for an expedition
against Detroit, and he believed that he could secure two
or three hundred men from Kentucky.*" The French
inhabitants, moreover, manifested commendable zeal in the
proposed enterprise.*' Clark felt with true military instinct
that the time to attack Detroit was before the enemy
recovered from the shock of Hamilton's defeat. Three
hundred men, he thought, would suffice to capture the place,
weakened as it was both by the loss of Hamilton's force,
and by the existence of a pro- American sentiment among
the French inhabitants.** The commanding officer at
Detroit, in expectation of an American attack, prepared
himself as well as he could.*"
When Clark returned from Vincennes to Kaskaskia he
found his force strengthened by the arrival of a company
from New Orleans under Captain Robert George.*" But
disappointments were in store. Captain Montgomery
arrived from Virginia at the close of May, with, however,
only half the men Clark had expected.*' In July, instead
of the two or three hundred promised him from Ken
tucky only about thirty arrived.** It was with genuine
sorrow that he was forced temporarily to abandon the
plan near to his heart. His settled conviction was that
the frontiers could enjoy no lasting tranquility with Detroit
in British hands.*' The reason why it was never captured
by the Americans was always the same, want of men. The
narrative of Clark's further efforts to capture it is not
germane to the present study. They will, therefore, be
" Ibid., 444.
"Bowman to Clark, 28 May, 1779, Colls. Ill St Hist Lib., II, 611.
"English, op. cit, I, 399, 449. For proof of the weakness of
Detroit see Hamilton to Haldimand, 27 Sept., 1778, Mich. P. Colls.,
IX, 481.
" Ibid., 407.
'" English, op. cit, I, 399.
" Cal Va. St. Papers, III, 442 ; Letter to Mason, English, op. cit.,
1,449- " Ibid., 450.
" Ibid., 400, 448.

76 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
referred to only so far as necessary to understand the course
of events in Illinois.
In the summer Clark divided his small forces between
Kaskaskia, Cahokia, Vincennes and the Falls of the Ohio,"
taking up his headquarters at the last-mentioned place "as
the most convenient spot to have an eye over the whole."'^
The post which he had established the previous year at
Corn Island to secure communication between Kentucky
and Illinois'" had been garrisoned by the families who had
followed him. In his absence they had crossed to the south
side of the Ohio, where they were laying the foundations
of Louisville. This post, strengthened and fortified by
Clark, contributed to the further settlement of Kentucky."
Montgomery was placed in general charge of the troops in
Illinois, with headquarters at Kaskaskia.'* McCarty was
put in command of the detachment at Cahokia,'" while Helm
was left in charge at Vincennes.'"
" Cal Va. St Papers, III, 433-
" Clark's Memoir, English, op. cit, I, 553.
"' Cal Va. St. Papers, III, 441.
" The town of Louisville was established by act of the General
Assembly of Virginia in May, 1780 ; Hening, op. cit, X, 293.
"'Cal Va. St. Papers, III, 442, and Clark's Memoir, English,
op. cit, I, 553.
¦" Colls. Ill St Hist Lib., II, 548.
" Clark's Memoir, English, op. cit., I, 550.

CHAPTER VI.
ILLINOIS UNDER VIRGINIA, I778-I783.
The campaign which resulted in the capture of the
British posts in Ilhnois was an enterprise planned and
executed by Clark under authority of the State of Vir
ginia. Though many of the people of Illinois imagined that
he was acting under authority of Congress, that view was,
as has been shown, entirely erroneous. Clark, his captains,
and most of his men were Virginians. His recruits were
Virginia militia, and not on the Continental establishment.^
From July, 1778, to May of the following year the only
government in Illinois was that exercised by him. The
posts were held by his officers and Virginia's authority was
sustained by his militia. In the secret instructions given to
him by Governor Henry in January, 1778, he was directed
to treat the inhabitants of Illinois as fellow-citizens, and see
that their persons and property were secure, if they would
"give undoubted evidence of their attachment to this state
.... by taking the test prescribed by law." Clark was
obliged to devote a large part of his time to civil administra
tion, pending the formal organization of a government by
Virginia. It was his policy to attach the people to the new
regime by making government mild." Business was done
without the imposition of fees.' He established "courts
of civil judication" at Cahokia, Vincennes, and probably
at Kaskaskia, with right of appeal to himself in certain
cases.* The members of the courts were elected by the
people. The Cahokia court began its sessions at least as early
'For the campaign as an example of state sovereignty see Van
Tyne, "Sovereignty in the American Revolution," Am. Hist. Rev.,
XII, 541.
' Letter to Mason, English, op. cit., I, 428.
' Clark's Memoir, ibid., 498.
'Ibid., 484. Alvord {Colls. Ill St. Hist Lib., II, xlviii) thinks
Clark may be mistaken about the establishment of a court at
Kaskaskia.

78 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
as October, 1778." It was composed almost entirely of
Creoles. Clark was successful in winning the favor of the
inhabitants, which he never wholly lost. The enthusiasm
with which they rallied to his support in the Vincennes cam
paign proves at least that, at that time, they preferred him to
the reestablishment of British control." Clark appears to
have taken a serious view of his duties, and to have tried to
provide for the safety and welfare of the people. He was
obliged to employ stringent measures to suppress disorders
in Kaskaskia which were attributed to the slaves. Several
murders had been committed. On December 24, 1778, he
issued an order forbidding slaves to walk the streets after
sunset without their masters' permission, and prohibited the
sale of liquor to them.'
In the first flush of enthusiasm following his appear
ance and the news of the French-American alliance, listen
ing to the new talk of liberty, and many of them believing,
they knew not how, that they would speedily be restored to
France, the people of Illinois gave freely to Qark, receiving
in return Continental paper money or drafts on the treasurer
of Virginia or on Oliver Pollock.* The paper money was
worth only a small fraction of its face value, but the unsus
pecting French for a while accepted it at par.' Pollock
exerted himself to maintain the credit of Virginia,^" but it
was sinking rapidly. Had it not been for the assistance of
the French, and the English-speaking merchants, Clark
could not have maintained himself.^^ The financial basis
of his government was unsound, and as soon as the enthu
siasm which had greeted his appearance subsided trouble
was bound to arise.
' Colls. Ill St Hist Lib., II, 2.
" For evidence of attachment to Clark at this time see ibid., 526.
'For this episode see ibid., xlviii-xlix, 13 et seq.
' A number of these drafts in payment for supplies for the troops
furnished by the Creoles, are in Illinois Papers (MSS.) in the
Virginia State Library. They were signed by Clark, and were drawn
on Pollock, or the treasurer of Virginia, usually at thirty days.
" Colls. Ill St Hist Lib., II, 1, and notes.
"Evidence of this is in the Illinois Papers (MSS.).
" Colls. Ill St Hist Lib., II, li, and notes.

ILLINOIS UNDER VIRGINIA. 79
It is probable that when Montgomery escorted Rocheblave
to Williamsburg, the letters which he carried from Clark to
Governor Henry suggested the establishment of civil gov
ernment for Illinois. To Clark, who desired to concentrate
his attention on military matters, civil affairs were distaste
ful.^" The arrival of Montgomery's party in eastern Vir
ginia in the autumn of 1778 naturally aroused excitement
and interest. A regular government had to be created for
the French villages, for Illinois was something other than
conquered territory which could be held under prolonged
military rule.
On November 14, Governor Henry wrote a letter inform
ing Virginia's delegates in Congress of the successful issue
of Clark's expedition, and suggesting the possibility of his
cooperation with measures which Congress might have in
view respecting the West.^' On November 19, Clark's
communications were referred to a committee of the
assembly, which prepared a bill for the establishment of
county government for Illinois.^* This was reported to the
house of delegates on the thirtieth, and passed December
9. A few days later it was passed by the senate.^"
The preamble of the act declared that several British
posts within the territory of Virginia had been captured by
the militia of the commonwealth ; that the inhabitants had
taken an oath of fidelity and acknowledged themselves
citizens of Virginia ; that they ought to be protected ; and
that, since it might be impracticable to govern them imme
diately by the laws of the commonwealth, a temporary
government should be established. All citizens of Virginia
settled, or about to settle, west of the Ohio, including the
Illinois French who had become citizens, were formed into
a "distinct county," to be called "Illinois County." No
'^Letter to Mason, English, op. cit, I, 449.
"English, op. cit, I, 245-247. November 16, the date given in
English, is wrong. The original of this letter is in the Papers of the
Continental Congress, Library of Congress, volume lettered "Vir
ginia State Papers," vol. I.
" Rowland, Life of George Mason, I, 307.
" Colls. Ill St Hist Lib., II, 9, note.

So TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
definite boundaries were established. The governor, with
the consent of the council, was empowered to appoint a
county-lieutenant, to hold office during pleasure, who
might appoint and commission deputy-commandants, militia
officers and commissaries, during pleasure. The inhabitants
were to enjoy their religion,, civil rights and property. All
civil officers to whom the people had been accustomed were
to be chosen by a majority of the citizens, convoked by the
county-lieutenant in the respective districts which might
be established. They were to be commissioned by the
county-lieutenant, paid in the customary manner, and were
to conduct themselves according to the laws to which the
people had been used. For the payment of officials to whom
the people had not been accustomed, the governor, with
the advice of the council, was empowered to draw warrants
on the treasury of Virginia up to £500. The county-Heu-
tenant might pardon any crime except murder or treason.
In these he might respite execution, till the sense of the
Virginia government was obtained. The governor was
authorized to raise 500 men, to march immediately to
Illinois. The act was put in force for twelve months, and
thence "to the end of the next session of Assembly, and
no longer." It was thus temporary in its nature and
intended operation." It was afterwards extended to 1781,"
when it legally expired; after that, till the enactment by
Congress of the Northwest Ordinance in 1787, there was no
legal government in the country northwest of the Ohio."
The act reveals a wise and conservative spirit, and a desire
on the part of Virginia's legislators to make the transition
to American government in Illinois as easy as possible.
Governor Henry quickly took measures to set in motion
the machinery for the establishment of civil government.
He appointed John Todd, a Pennsylvanian by birth but a
citizen of Virginia, as county-lieutenant. Todd had been
" For the text of the act see Hening, op. cit, IX, 552 et seq.
"Ibid., X, 303-304.
" For the civil organization of Illinois see Boyd, "The County of
Illinois," Am. Hist. Rev., IV, 623 et seq.; English, op. cit., I, ch. IX.

ILLINOIS UNDER VIRGINIA. 8 1
one of the first settlers of Kentucky, and had represented
it as a county in the Virginia Assembly. The governor's
choice was wise, for Todd, though he did not know
French,^' was acquainted with western life and conditions,
and probably possessed more education and knowledge of
the law than any other American frontiersman."" Henry's
letter of instructions to him, dated December 12, 1778, is
complete and judicious, and shows a realization by its
author of the truth proclaimed by Burke, that "the temper
of the people amongst whom he presides ought to be the
first study of a statesman.""^ Todd was urged to improve
upon the favorable condition existing in Illinois, and to
cultivate the friendship of the inhabitants and the Indians.
As he was "unacquainted in some degree with their genius,
usages and manners, as well as the geography of the
country," he was to consult and advise with the most
intelligent of the inhabitants. He was to cooperate when
ever possible with Clark and to aid the military. "The
inhabitants of the Illinois," wrote Henry, "must not expect
settled peace and safety while their and our enemies have
footing at Detroit, and can intercept or stop the trade of
the Mississippi." Hope was expressed that the French of
Detroit might be brought to cooperate with an expedition
against that place, but if this was found impracticable, the
new authorities in Illinois were to content themselves with
measures of defense only. One advantage hoped for from
the possession of Illinois was the cessation of Indian raids
south of the Ohio. A close attention to the disposition and
movements of the hostile tribes was therefore regarded as
necessary. "I know of no better general direction to give
than this," ran the instructions, "that you consider yourself at
the head of the civil department and as such having command
of the militia, who are not to be under the command of
" Mason, Early Chic, and III, 287.
•" Colls. Ill St. Hist Lib., II, liv.
^For these instructions see English, op. cit, I, 249, et seq., or
Boyd, op. cit. Am. Hist. Rev., IV, 625 et seq., or Mason, Early Chic.
and III, 289 et seq.

82 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
the military until ordered out by the civil authority and
to act in conjunction with them." The county-lieutenant was
instructed to impress upon the people the value of their
newly-acquired liberty. Hope was held out that in a short
time they might expect "a free and equal representation ....
together with all the improvements in jurisprudence and
police which the other parts of the state enjoy." .... "Let
it be your constant attention," urged Henry, "to see that
the inhabitants have justice administered to them for any
injury received from the troops, the omission of this may
be fatal."" .... You will embrace every opportunity to
manifest the high regard and friendly sentiments of this
commonwealth towards all the subjects of His Catholic
Majesty .... you will make a tender of the friendship
and services of your people to the Spanish commandant
near Kaskaskia and cultivate the strictest connection with
him and his people  A general direction to act
according to the best of your judgment in cases where these
instructions are silent, and the laws have not otherwise
directed, is given to you from the necessity of the case,
for your great distance from government will not permit
you to wait for orders in many cases of great importance.
.... The matters given you in charge are singular in their
nature and weighty in their consequences to ^ the people
immediately concerned and to the whole state. They require
the fullest exertion of your abilities and unwearied
vigilance." On the same day, the governor wrote an equally states
manlike letter to Clark, directing him to retain command
of the troops already in Illinois, and to assume command
of the five new companies to be raised under the recent
act of the legislature. To prevent a continuation of
Indian depredations south of the Ohio, Clark was instructed
to establish such new posts as he saw fit. "I consider your
further success," wrote Henry, "as depending upon the
goodwill and friendship of the Frenchmen and Indians who
"In view of subsequent events this injunction seems almost
prophetic.

ILLINOIS UNDER VIRGINIA. 83
inhabit your part of the commonwealth. With their con
currence great things may be accomplished. But their
animosity will spoil the fair prospects which your past
successes have opened. You will therefore spare no pains
to conciliate the affections of the French and Indians. Let
them see and feel the advantages of being fellow citizens and
freemen. Guard most carefully against every infringement
of their property, particularly with respect to land, as our
enemies have alarmed them as to that. Strict and even
severe discipline with your soldiers may be essential to
preserve from injury those whom they were sent to protect
and conciliate." Clark was instructed to cooperate with the
civil department when necessary. "Much will depend upon
the mutual assistances you may occasionally afford each
other in your respective departments, and I trust that a
sincere cordiality will subsist between you." The possi
bility of attacking Detroit was dwelt upon. Clark was "to
push at any favorable occurrences which fortune may pre
sent  For our peace and safety are not secure while
the enemy are so near as Detroit." He was also to cultivate
the friendship of the Spaniards. Extensive discretionary
powers were given to him."'
The governor, also on the same day, wrote a letter of
instructions to Montgomery, who had been promoted to the
rank of lieutenant-colonel. He was to superintend and
hasten the recruiting of the five new companies. "Our
party at Illinois," wrote Henry, "may be lost, together
with the present favorable disposition of the French and
Indians there, unless every moment is improved for their
preservation.""* As already explained, only a part of this
additional force ever reached Clark."" We shall see that it
was the very dangers which Henry feared that wrecked
Virginia's government in Illinois.
Todd arrived at Kaskaskia to take up the duties of
county-lieutenant and head of the civil department in the
" For the instructions to Clark see English, op. cit, I, 253, et seq.
"For the instructions to Montgomery see Henry, op. cit, III,
216 et seq.
"Cf. supra, ch. V.
7

84 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
first half of May, 1779."" His appearance was welcomed
by the people and by Clark; the two men were already
acquainted, and Clark was glad to be rid of civil affairs."'
Todd's first duty was to organize the militia under authority
of Virginia. Clark had confirmed the creole militia officers
who had been serving during the period of British govern
ment. They were now for the most part retained. Richard
Winston of Kaskaskia, a leading member of the eastern
merchant class, was indeed appointed commandant of militia
in that village. But Legras was retained in command of
the Vincennes militia,"* and all others commissioned by
Todd bore French names."'
For civil administration, the county was divided into
three districts: Kaskaskia, including Prairie du Rocher,
St. Philippe, and the little village around Fort Chartres;
Cahokia, including Prairie du Pont and Peoria; and Vin
cennes, including the lower Wabash valley."
In Todd's instructions stress had been laid upon the
administration of justice, and the act creating the county
of Illinois had decreed that all civil officials to whom the
people had been accustomed should be chosen by a majority
of the citizens in their respective districts.'^ Under French
government there had been no clear distinction between
executive and judicial functions.'" During most of the
period of British administration, the military commandant,
appointed, of course, from without, had acted as judge,
with the assistance of justices in the villages." Under
neither regime had the inhabitants acquired any experience
in self-government. But Clark had established courts
elected by the people, which were in existence when Todd
" Mason, Early Chic, and III, 287.
" Letter to Mason, English, op. cit, I, 449.
"Am. St. Papers, "Public Lands," I, 10.
'" Mason, Early Chic and III, 294 ; Colls. III. St. Hist. Lib., II, Ivi.
"Ibid., Ivii.
" Cf. supra.
'^Alvord, Illinois in the Eighteenth Century, 16.
" Colls. Ill St Hist Lib., II, Ivii.

ILLINOIS UNDER VIRGINIA. 85
arrived. This model the county-lieutenant determined to
follow. Civil government under authority of Virginia was
formally inaugurated on May 12, 1779. On that day the
people of Kaskaskia were called together in an assembly in
front of the church, always the meeting place and most
important edifice in the French colonial village. Clark pre
sided. His address in French was written and read by an
interpreter. He praised the people for their efforts in the
Vincennes expedition, presented Todd as their governor,
and urged them to elect the best persons as judges of their
court.'* A French speech by Todd, also read by an inter
preter, followed.'" He expressed thanks for his reception,
and declared that the State of Virginia was actuated only
by pure motives. Distance, he said, made it imprac
ticable for the new county to send representatives to the
Virginia Assembly, but representation, if desired, would
be granted in the future.'"
The assembly then proceeded to the election of the judges.
Six men, all of them French, were chosen, headed by the
most distinguished inhabitant, Gabriel Cerre. All of those
elected had cordially accepted Clark's regime. A few
days later, representatives in the court were elected from
Prairie du Rocher and St. Philippe, bringing the number of
justices for the Kaskaskia district up to nine." On May 21,
Todd commissioned these men, "justices of the peace for
the District of Kaskaskia and judges of the court of the
said district in cases both civil and criminal." Any four
or more of them were authorized to constitute a court,
before which should be cognizable all actions and cases of
which the courts of the other counties of Virginia had
cognizance. Their judgments were required to have the
concurrence of at least a majority, and to be entered with
"/&Jd., Ivii-lix.
"His later proclamations were regularly issued in French. See
Todd's Record-Book, passim; Mason, Early Chic, and III, 289-316.
"Colls. Ill St Hist Lib., II, lix-lx.
'"Ibid., ha.

86 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
the proceedings previous and subsequent, and recorded in
books provided for the purpose.'* The court chose a clerk,
and Winston was appointed sheriff." A prosecuting officer,
or state's attorney, was appointed by Todd.
The court for the district of Cahokia was soon established
and was in session early in June.*" Most of the justices
who had served under Clark's authority were reelected.*^
The Cahokia court appears to have numbered seven, four
of whom were necessary for a quorum.*"
In June, a similar court was established for the Vin
cennes district.*' It consisted of nine justices, six of whom
were elected from the village of Vincennes and the rest
from the neighboring posts.** It resembled the other
courts in essential features.
In these courts, monthly sessions were the rule, though
occasional special sessions were held.*" The records were
naturally kept in French.*" Individual justices had juris
diction in civil cases up to twenty-five shillings, as elsewhere
in Virginia. The law was French, the "coutume de Paris,"
somewhat modified by the laws of Virginia. Attempts were
made to imitate English forms; but on the whole, as was
to be expected in courts composed of French Creoles, French
practice was followed. Juries, though employed in criminal
cases*', were not popular. In civil cases litigants usually
preferred to have the court decide. To the French it seemed
" Colls. Ill St. Hist Lib., II, Ixi.
"Ibid.'"Ibid., 13.
'"/fetd., Ixii.
" Ibid., Ivii.
"Atn. St Papers, "Public Lands," I, 10.
" Colls. Ill St. Hist Lib., II, Ivii, Ixii.
" Ibid., Ixii.
"Cf. "Cahokia Court Records," Colls. Ill St Hist. Lib., II,
22-447, passim. Records in the courts established by Clark seem to
have been kept in English, ibid., 4 ct seq.
"Ibid., 12-21. For a jury trial in the Cahokia court see ibid., 70.
The statement that juries were not introduced till after the Ordi
nance of 1787 (Boyd, op. cit. Am. Hist. Rev., IV, 632) is wrong.

ILLINOIS UNDER VIRGINIA. 87
juster than submission of facts to a jury.** Prosecutions
were brought by the state's attorney.*' The opinion that
these courts did very little work"" is disposed of by the care
ful records of the Cahokia court."^ The scarcity of com
petent persons in Illinois accounts, no doubt, for the fact
that the names of men holding militia commissions are
encountered as judges.
The problem confronting Todd was exceedingly difficult.
He was called upon to preside over French Creoles and
American merchants, traders and pioneers, a truly hetero
geneous population. The knowledge of the French-Ameri
can alliance and the enthusiasm felt for Clark and the
United States had almost brought the French and the
Americans together. But it was a temporary union. They
differed not more in race, language and religion, than in
temperament, taste and tradition. But other and more fatal
difficulties were not slow in making their appearance.
The paper money in which the Creoles had been paid for
supplies furnished to Clark's men was a cause of endless
trouble. As stated above, it was greatly depreciated, but
was for a time accepted at par. The possibility of making
profits out of it proved attractive to "Yankee" speculators,
who arrived in Illinois in the spring of 1779, while Clark
was on the Vincennes expedition. They outbid one another,
offering fabulous prices, and the people woke up to the fact
that they had been swindled and refused to accept the
money. Clark would have been in a pitiable position,
indeed, had not some of the merchants suppHed him with
necessaries."" The natural result was an enormous rise of
prices, which was enhanced by the fact that the American
occupation of Vincennes, blocking the most important com
mercial route between Illinois and Canada, caused a
" Colls. Ill St Hist Lib., II, Ixiii.
"Ibid., Ixi, 18 et seq.
" Boyd, op. cit. Am. Hist. Rev., IV, 632. When this was written,
however, the Kaskaskia and Cahokia records had not yet been
brought to light.
" See Colls. Ill St. Hist Lib., II, 22 et seq.
" English, op. cit, I, 400-401.

88 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
scarcity of commodities."' The people of Illinois felt and
continued to feel that they had been deceived and cheated
by the Virginians.
Before his arrival in Illinois, Todd learned that Congress
had ordered the issues of Continental money dated May 20,
1777, and April 11, 1778, to be paid into the Continental
loan offices by June i, 1779. Otherwise they would be
worthless."* The hardship and injustice which this measure
would work in Illinois can readily be imagined. Todd
thought that a time extension should be given to the people,
who had not only accepted the money, but had taken it at
face value. He accordingly ordered all the paper of the
called-in emissions to be removed from circulation and
sealed up.""
For this he was blamed by some, on the ground that
it was injurious, and even fatal to Virginia's credit.""
The people of Kaskaskia received certificates from Todd in
exchange for the paper money. At Vincennes, Legras was
instructed to see that all the money of the called-in emis
sions was sealed up, and to give the holders certificates.
These Todd hoped Congress would some day redeem."'
About $15,000 of greatly depreciated paper was thus
removed from circulation in and about Kaskaskia, but a
great many notes of these issues remained in possession of
the inhabitants and became worthless."* By the summer
of 1779 it became almost impossible to purchase supplies
for the troops."' Hence animosity was engendered between
the military and civil authorities. The former seem
to have thought Todd was responsible for the growing
difficulty of procuring provisions and accused him of
" Cal Va. St Papers, III, 501.
" Colls. Ill St. Hist. Lib., II, Ixxi. For this resolution of Congress
(2 Jan., 1779) see Pennsylvania Archives, VII, 156.
'' Mason, Early Chic, and III, 317.
™ Colls. Ill St. Hist Lib., II, Ixxiii.
"Mason, Early Chic, and Til, 320-321.
"' Colls. Ill St Hist Lib., II, Ixxi.
"Ibid., 614-615.

ILLINOIS UNDER VIRGINIA. 89
championing the French."" This was not true, for Todd,
in trying to bolster up Virginia's credit, ordered the people
to receive Continental money at a par with Spanish
piasters."^ In Vincennes several persons were imprisoned
for refusing."" Todd's policy was, of course, equivalent to
a system of forced loans. The legislature of Virginia
finally committed itself to this policy by passing an act in
March, 1781, ordering that all bills of credit emitted by
Congress and the state of Virginia, as well as all bills of
credit issued by the governor, should "to all intents and
purposes" be considered as legal tender."' The unfortunate
Creoles were also subjected to the evils of counterfeit
money."* Some of the acquisitive Easterners who reached Illinois
in the summer of 1779 engaged in land speculation."" On
June 14, Todd issued a proclamation relating to this
subject. To protect just claims, every inhabitant was
required to lay before persons chosen in each district for
the purpose a memorandum of his land, with vouchers,
depositions, or certificates to support his claim. The mem
orandum was to prove the title. New settlements on the
"flat lands" of the Mississippi, Ohio, Illinois and Wabash
rivers, or "within one league of said lands," unless in the
French form of settlement, were forbidden until further
orders."" It was the policy of Virginia to confirm and protect
the titles and property rights of her new citizens and to pre
vent private purchase of land from the Indians."' In May,
1779, the Virginia Assembly passed an act declaring that the
commonwealth had the exclusive right of purchasing lands
, " For evidence of the breach between Todd and the military see
ibid., 615-616.
" See a memorial of the people of Vincennes to the governor of
Virginia, 30 June, 1781, English, op. cit, II, 738.
°* Mason, Early Chic and III, 328-329.
"Hening, op. cit, X, 398.
"Mason, Early Chic, and III, 328-329.
"Ibid., 318-319.
" Proclamation relating to land, by Todd, 14 June, 1779, ibid., 301.
"' Hening, op. cit, X, 161-162.

90 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
from the Indians within its chartered limits. Private pur
chases both past and future, were declared void."* The
assembly also forbade new settlements northwest of the
Ohio."' Sometimes, if nobody could successfully claim it,
land was adjudged to the state." Todd believed that
purchases by individuals from the Indians should be pre
vented under fine, and also that new settlements should be
made only under certain regulations.'^ After his departure
from Illinois, however, no attention was paid either to his
proclamation or to the Virginia law.'" The Vincennes
court, with the concurrence of Legras, assumed authority
to grant land, and kept on doing so for several years. They
later sought to justify their course by saying that former
commandants at Vincennes had exercised this power, and
that they had done it with Legras' permission."
But the support of the troops was probably Todd's most
difficult problem. They required food and clothing. The
people would no longer sell supplies for paper money, and
many drafts on Virginia and on Oliver Pollock were pro
tested.'* Unauthorized drafts seem to have been made on
other sources.'" On June 15, 1779, while the expedition
against Detroit'" was under discussion, Todd, anticipating
an absence from Kaskaskia, instructed Winston to consult
the members of the court regarding supplies which Clark
might want. If the people, having it in their power, refused
to dispose of their goods, Winston was authorized to impress
provisions "valuing the property by two men upon oath."
On no account was he to give the troops a pretext for
"forcing" property." On August 11, Todd, by proclama-
" Hening, op. cit, X, 97-98.
"" Ibid., 557, and Rowland, op. cit, I, 364-365.
'° Mason, Early Chic, and III, 308.
"Ibid., 318.
" Colls. Ill St Hist Lib., II, Ixx.
"Am. St Papers, "Public Lands," I, 10, 16, 71.
" Colls. Ill, St Hist Lib., II, Ixxv.
" Mason, Early Chic, and III, 322.
™ See supra, ch. V.
" Mason, Early Chic, and III, 302.

ILLINOIS UNDER VIRGINIA. 9 1
tion, invited the people of Kaskaskia to contract with com
missaries appointed to procure provisions for the troops.
"I hope," he said, "they'll use properly the indulgence of
a mild government. If I shall be obliged to give the military
permission to press, it will be a disadvantage, and what
ought more to influence freemen, it will be a dishonor to
the people."'* On August 20, Colonel Montgomery pro
posed that one of the citizens of Kaskaskia be appointed
to assess the inhabitants for the support of the troops."
Evidently the former enthusiasm and self-denial of the
people were now things of the past.
On August 22, the county-lieutenant issued another
proclamation enjoining the inhabitants of the county from
exporting provisions for a period of sixty days, "unless I
shall have assurances before that time that a sufficient stock
is laid up for the troops, or sufficient security is given to
the contractors for its delivery whenever required." Vio
lations of this order were to be punished by imprisonment
for one month.*" Measures were taken to put this proc
lamation in execution in the other villages as well as in
Kaskaskia.*^ The Kaskaskia court levied assessments on
the inhabitants and a considerable amount of supplies was
thus secured for the time, with the natural result of widen
ing the breach between the people and the government.
This breach was made irreparable by Todd's policy of
supporting the troops on Virginia's credit, when her
treasury was empty and her credit gone. Pollock at New
Orleans found it increasingly difficult to borrow on the
state's credit for the purpose of negotiating bills drawn
against himself.*" Perhaps it would have been impossible
for any man in Todd's position to have succeeded. In his
instructions he had been told to aid the military and defend
the rights and liberties of the people. These two injunc-
"Ibid., 305.
" Colls. Ill St Hist Lib., II, Ixxvi-lxxvii.
"Mason, Early Chic, and III, 306.
"Ibid., 321.
"Ibid., 323.

92 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
tions, with the development of circumstances, were incom
patible. The support of the troops, with conditions as they
were, meant injustice to the people. Todd tried to do his
duty, but his position was an impossible one. He soon
became convinced of the hopelessness of it. As early as
August i8, 1779, in a letter to the governor of Virginia, he
asked permission to attend the legislature the following
spring, and "get a discharge from an office which an
unwholesome air, a distance from my connections, a lan
guage not familiar to me, and an impossibility of procuring
many of the conveniences of life suitable, all tend to render
uncomfortable."*' In November of that year, he left Kas
kaskia for Kentucky, and arrived at the Falls of the Ohio
in December.** He did not, however, resign his position
as county-lieutenant, and returned for a short time in
1780.*" Correspondence was continued between him and
the people and officials in Illinois, and as long as he lived*"
he took a lively interest in the affairs of the county."
Before leaving, he appears to have abandoned his earlier
opposition to "forcing" supplies,** for he gave a general
consent to impressment by the troops of the property of the
people.*' After his departure Winston served as his
deputy." Very early in the life of the court established by Todd
at Kaskaskia we find the creole judges championing the
interests of the inhabitants against the troops. Probably
the very qualities which had fitted Clark's men for the work
they had accomplished unfitted them for dwelling peace
ably among the people. The typical American frontiers
man — and that was the class from which Clark's men had
"Mason, Early Chic, and III, 287.
"See dates of letters in Cal Va. St Papers, I, 358; see also Colls.
Ill St. Hist. Lib., II, 617.
" Ibid., Ixxix-lxxx.
" He was killed in the Battle of the Blue Licks in 1782.
" Mason, Early Chic, and III, 335
"Ibid., 302.
" Colls. III. St. Hist. Lib., II, Ixxviii.
"Mason, Early Chic, and III, 302, and Colls. Ill St Hist Lib.,
II, Ixxix.

ILLINOIS UNDER VIRGINIA. 93
been recruited — possessed many virtues. He was hardy,
self-reliant and brave. But he was not distinctively peace-
loving, or law-abiding. His passionate belief in himself
and in his race filled him with contempt for other peoples.
He was usually self-assertive and boastful. His fierce
individualism and aggressive democracy caused him to pay
little respect to constituted authority. He considered him
self the equal of any American, and immeasurably superior
to men of other races. To him, no doubt, the gentler and
more refined qualities of the French Creoles suggested
effeminacy and cowardice. These people spoke, moreover,
a language he could not understand, and in religion there
was no common ground upon which the followers of Calvin
could meet the adherents of Loyola. Clark, popular with
both, had, no doubt, done much to ward off a clash between
them. But even he could not permanently have prevented
it, and when he took up his headquarters at the Falls of the
Ohio, his immediate influence was at an end.
As early as May 24, 1779, the court of the Kaskaskia
district addressed a memorial to Todd setting forth the
grievances of the people. The soldiers had been seizing
and killing their anim.als. Even beasts of burden had not
been spared. "We have always been ready," said the
memorialists, "to furnish animals for the garrison in so
far as it was in our power, and are still ready as far as
we have resources. If it is permitted that our beasts of
burden be killed, how can we cultivate our fields, and
furnish the needs of the garrison and those of our fam
ilies?" The evil of trade in intoxicants with the Indians
was also complained of. Todd was requested to prohibit
this, and also to forbid traffic with slaves without their
masters' permission.'^ The first of these evils, the killing
of cattle, was the greatest, and of it we have constant com
plaint from this time on.'"
" Colls. Ill St Hist Lib., II, Ixvii-lxviii.
" Mason, Early Chic and III, 337-338; Colls. Ill St Hist Lib., II,
Ixxx, 548; English, op. cit., II, 738; Cal Va. St Papers, II, 192-193,
Address to Congress from the French Inhabitants of Post Vincennes,
Kaskaskia, etc., 1788.

94 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
Conditions were bad enough while Todd remained in
Illinois. They became worse when he left. The methods
which had made Wallenstein's army the scourge of Ger
many were regularly employed by the troops. The
worst features of militarism appeared. Tyranny and
brigandage was the rule of the day." It was hot only
from seizures of their property that the people suffered.
Troops were quartered in their homes, for whose board only
worthless notes were given.'* In December, 1779, in
response to a petition from the inhabitants, the Kaskaskia
court demanded of Montgomery that the troops should be
prevented from seizing property without their order, and
threatened to appeal to the governor and assembly of Vir
ginia. To this Montgomery paid no heed. He even
threatened to treat persons who refused supplies as
traitors "to the cause of America."'"
The troops were recalled from Cahokia in the autumn
of 1779,'" much to the joy of the inhabitants. Richard
McCarty, commander of the detachment stationed there, had
made himself odious to the people by playing the role of
military tyrant." He wrote to Todd in October 1780,
". . . . we are become the hated beasts of a whole peo
ple ... . the people are now entirely alienated against us."'*
In January, 1780, Montgomery asked the people of Cahokia
for supplies." The court agreed that a census should be
taken and the people forced to contribute according to their
capacity."" It is pathetic to find the Cahokians asking
Clark for aid, but expressing fears lest he should send more
men than they could support."^
¦^ Colls. Ill St. Hist Lib., II, Ixxx.
"Ibid., 546.
" Ibid., Ixxxi-lxxxii.
"Ibid., 546.
" Mason, Early Chic and III, 335.
" Ibid., 337-338.
" Colls. Ill St Hist Lib., II, 34.
'°° Ibid., 34, 36.
"" Ibid., 531.

ILLINOIS UNDER VIRGINIA. 95
It is evident that the civil authorities were unable to
remedy the evils of military oppression. Winston, Todd's
deputy, had never been popular with the French,^"" and was
suspected by them, as well as by the troops. He quarreled
with Montgomery, and accused him of attempting to bring
the county under military rule and to throw off the civil
authority altogether.^" He was for a time actually impris
oned by military order.^"* But he seems to have done
nothing to forward the interests of the people.^"" Many
of them suspected him of double dealing, and he was later
accused of instigating the troops against the people, while
at the same time urging the latter to resist.^"" He got into
a dispute with the Kaskaskia court on the subject of
arbitrary appointments.^"' A worse man to represent the
civil government could scarcely have been selected.
Corruption, moreover, seems to have found its way into
the Kaskaskia court. In the midst of general distress and
poverty, the justices took the opportunity to demand
higher pay.^"* The state's attorney accused them of laxity
in allowing new settlers, of whom nothing was known, to
take up land without subscribing to an oath of allegiance to
the United States."'
The lawless example of the troops was followed by some
of the new settlers from the East, who helped themselves
to their neighbors' property. The Kaskaskia court tried
and punished several of them.^^" Tramps and other unde
sirables, moreover, appeared in Illinois; Clark urged the
Kaskaskia court to proceed against them to the fullest
extent^^^ '"Ibid., evil.
"' Mason/ Early Chic, and III, 339.
"'English, op. cit, II, 736.
'"'Colls. Ill St Hist Lib., II, Ixxxvi.
'"Ibid., cxx-cxxi.
'" Ibid., cvi-cvii. For a view of the evil results of the activities of
Winston and McCarty, see John Rogers to Jefferson, 29 Apr., 1781,
Cal Va. St Papers, II, 77.
'" Colls. Ill St Hist Lib., II, Ixxxiv.
'" Ibid., Ixxxiv-lxxxv.
"' Ibid., cvi.
"'Ibid.,dx.

96 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
An emigration across the Mississippi had begun by
the close of 1779. The best class was leaving the country.
Cerre went before the end of the year. Gratiot, one
of Cahokia's leading citizens, unable to tolerate con
ditions in Illinois, moved to St. Louis,"" where he became
prominent.^^' Both of these men had rendered the Amer
ican cause valuable assistance, and both continued to
entertain friendship for Clark personally. The people of
Illinois in general did not attribute the evils that had come
upon them to him. Indeed, they came to look back on his
administration as a period of comparative happiness."*
This view seems to have been shared by the Americans as
well.^^" But many of the inhabitants were so disgusted with
the way Virginia government was working out, that they
would have welcomed even a restoration of British rule.^^"
An episode which occurred in 1780 further illustrates the
growing hostility between the people of Illinois and the
Virginia authorities. In July of that year a Frenchman,
Augustin Mottin de la Balme by name, appeared in Vin
cennes and shortly after in Kaskaskia. The purpose of his
presence in Illinois is not perfectly clear. He had held a
commission in the Continental army, but had resigned and
gone into business in Philadelphia.^^' He claimed to be in
the American service,^^* and was promoting an expedition
against Detroit, which, he hoped, if successful, would result
in a general rising of the Canadians against the English.
But the time when a joint enterprise of Americans and
French, like the expedition of February 1779 against Vin
cennes, could have been possible, had passed. De la Balme
consequently devoted himself to arousing the French, and
ignored the Virginia authorities. He had nothing to say
"' Colls. Ill St Hist Lib., II, 556. See also Houck, op. cit, II,
47-48. "' Houck, op. cit, II, 383.
'^'Cal Va. St. Papers, II, 192-193.
'" Colls. Ill St Hist. Lib., II, 621.
'"Ibid., S62.
'" Ibid., xc, and authorities in note 2.
"'English, op. cit, II, 695.

ILLINOIS UNDER VIRGINIA.

97

to Montgomery."' He tried to show the people that Con
gress was ignorant of the way they had been oppressed by
the Virginia troops, and urged them to ask the French
minister at Philadelphia to force Virginia to redeem the
paper money and withdraw the troops.^"" He also urged
them to undertake an expedition against Detroit, "which
will win the confidence of the honorable Congress."^"^
De la Balme's hostility toward the Virginia government
in Illinois may be explained reasonably enough by that
government's complete failure. It has been suggested, in
the attempt to substantiate the theory that France was try
ing to reconstruct her colonial empire,^"" that he was an
emissary sent by the French government to arouse the
Creoles for that end;^"' and it is true that in a manifesto
which he intended to publish after he got to Canada, no
mention was made of Congress or of the United States.^"*
The British at Detroit, moreover, believed that his activities
were independent of the United States.^"" Another theory
to explain his presence in Illinois is that it was in further
ance of a plan of Washington and Luzerne, the French
minister to the United States, to incite the Canadians to
throw off British rule.^"° His hostility towards Americans,
indeed, seems to have been confined to the Virginians. He
never spoke disrespectfully of Congress. Neither theory
has been proved.
The character of his reception by the French Creoles,
however, is not doubtful. They looked upon him as a Moses
"» Colls. Ill St Hist Lib., II, 620.
'^ "An Address of De la Balme to the Inhabitants," ibid., xci.
'^'Ibid., xcii.
^See infra, ch. VII.
"^Turner, "The Policy of France toward the Mississippi Valley
in the Period of Washington and Jefferson," Am. Hist. Rev., X, 255,
note 2.
'"Colls. Ill St. Hist. Lib., II, Ixxxix, note 3-
'^Mich. P. Colls., XIX, 581.
™This explanation is offered by Mr. Alvord, Colls. Ill St Hist
Lib., II, Ixxxix.

98 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
who would lead them out of a hateful bondage; they
received him as the Hebrews would have received the
Messiah.^"' It may well be that De la Balme thought an
expression of hostility towards Virginia would strengthen
him with the inhabitants. At any rate, he allowed them
to hope that the French king would again rule over Illi
nois,^"* and he seems to have created the impression among
the Virginia officers that his mission was hostile to the
American cause.^"' It was even said that he had announced
that French troops would be in Illinois in the spring.^'"
Having collected between fifty and one hundred volun
teers, De la Balme started for Detroit under French
colors, ^'^ possibly because the Creoles would march under
no others. He attacked and captured the little British post
at the head of the Wabash (Miamitown), plundered, and
destroyed cattle. Indians, however, attacked his party and
killed about thirty.^'" His papers, including memorials
from the Illinois villages to Luzerne, were captured.^"
This unsuccessful and abortive expedition still further
increased the hostility of the Creoles towards the govern
ment. Their hopes of a restoration to France were, for the
time at least, destroyed.
Another episode which has attracted some attention
followed De la Balme's activities in Illinois. Before start
ing for Detroit he had instigated a party of Cahokians to
undertake an expedition against the small British post of
St. Joseph, in what is now the state of Michigan. They
succeeded in capturing a number of traders and carrying
off some property, but after leaving were overtaken by a
party of Indians who captured or killed nearly all of
'"Cal Va. St Papers, I, 380.
"""Memorial of the Inhabitants of Cahokia to De la Balme,"
Colls. Ill St Hist Lib., II, 551.
"" McCarty's Journal, ibid., 618.
'" Mason, Early Chic, and III, 337-338.
"' Colls. Ill St Hist Lib., II, xcii and note.
'"Mich. P. Colls., XIX, 581.
"'Those from Cahokia and Vincennes are in the Canadian
Archives.

ILLINOIS UNDER VIRGINIA.

99

them."* The Cahokians, eager for revenge, then raised a
party of about twenty men. Francisco Cruzat, who had
succeeded Leyba as commandant of St. Louis, was at the
same time organizing an expedition to attack British posts
east of the Mississippi.^'" The two enterprises appear to
have been united, and a mixed party of Spaniards, French
Creoles and Indians, under a Spaniard, Eugenio Pouree,
marched to St. Joseph in January, 1781.^'" They sacked
the fort and made good their escape. Nor could a sufficient
force of Indians be raised to pursue them.^"
This insignificant raid was magnified by the Spanish
officials into an important victory. A highly embeUished
account of it was printed in the Madrid Gazette of March
12, 1782, in which it was stated that Pouree had taken
possession of the post of St. Joseph, with its "dependen
cies," and of the Illinois river.^'* During .the peace
negotiations in 1782, the Spanish ambassador to France
referred to this episode as a conquest which justified Spain
in claiming the Northwest.^"
In the spring of 1780, the situation in Illinois was as
gloomy as can well be imagined. Besides the grave
internal disorders already described, there was external
danger from anticipated British and Indian attacks.^*"
British officials at the lake posts, indeed, were meditating the
capture of all Spanish and American settlements on the Mis
sissippi.^*^ Clark knew something of their designs, which,
he feared, might result in the loss of Illinois and Ken
tucky. He could not maintain garrisons sufficient to defend
all the Illinois villages from such an attack as the British
and Indians were likely to deliver. The only way, in his
opinion, to hold the country was to evacuate his present
"'Mich. P. Colls., XIX, 591-592; Cal Va. St Papers, I, 465.
'" Houck, op. cit., II, 42.
"' Cal Va. St. Papers, I, 465 ; Houck, op. cit, 11, 42-43.
"'Mich. P. Colls., XIX, 600.
'" Houck, op. cit, II, 44, note 106.
""See infra, ch. VII.
"° Colls. Ill St Hist Lib., II, 531 ; see also ibid., 547.
'" Houck, op. cit, II, 35-
8

lOO TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
posts and concentrate his forces near the mouth of the
Ohio ; he thought that a fort there could be reenforced by
Kentucky militia, and supported by families who might be
encouraged to emigrate thither by grants of land.^*"
The plan of establishing a fort at the mouth of the Ohio
was not new; Governor Henry had referred to it in his
instructions to Clark in January, 1778, and in a letter of
the same month to Governor Galvez of New Orleans.
Shortly after his arrival at Louisville, as the settlement in
Kentucky at the Falls of the Ohio was beginning to be
called, Clark indicated his intention of estabhshing such a
post and encouraging settlers to go there.^*' A fort and
settlement at the mouth of the Ohio would, it was hoped,
strengthen Virginia's claim to the Mississippi as her
western boundary, control an extensive trade, secure com
munication with New Orleans, and serve as a barrier
against possible Spanish encroachments north of the
Ohio."* Todd, who retained his office though he had left Illinois,
favored Clark's plan. He did not believe in maintaining
the principal post at Louisville.^*" But a garrison at the
mouth of the Ohio could not be maintained without a
settlement to support it. He, therefore, granted four
hundred acres apiece to a number of families at a price
to be fixed by the assembly. Preparations were made to
withdraw the troops from the Illinois villages. Those at
Cahokia had already been recalled, and those at Vincennes
were withdrawn early in 1780, their place in garrison being
taken by militia."" On June 14, 1780, Governor Jefferson
wrote to the speaker of the house of delegates concerning
the establishment of a post near the mouth of the Ohio,
referring to the assembly the measures of Clark and Todd.
'" Cal Va. St Papers, I, 338.
'^Jbid.,331.'" Ibid., 338, 358 ; Henry to the governor of New Orieans, 14 Jan.,
1778, Bancroft MSS.; Butterfield, op. cit, 80.
"' Mason, Early Chic and III, 345.
"" Cal Va. St Papers, I, 358.

ILLINOIS UNDER VIRGINIA. lOI
Jefferson implied that the expense attending the support
of the troops in Illinois, and the trouble about paper money,
were the principal causes for withdrawing them south of
the Ohio."'
The total evacuation of Illinois was prevented by the
receipt of information that a strong British and Indian
attack was imminent.^** The British commandant at
Michilimackinac was organizing a large Indian force to
capture the Spanish and American posts on the Mississippi.
It was hoped that the capture of St. Louis would secure
for the English the fur trade of the Missouri river region,
which centered at that village.^*' The success of this expedi
tion would have meant the total destruction of American
power in Illinois.^"" Clark, with a force of about one
hundred and twenty officers and men, was busy establishing
Fort Jefferson, a few miles south of the mouth of the Ohio,
when news came that Cahokia was menaced.^"^ The
attack was made on St. Louis and Cahokia on May 26,
1780.^"" But it was not unexpected.^"' Preparations
for defense had been made at St. Louis,^"* and both
Montgomery and Clark were able to bring aid to Cahokia
before it was attacked."" At St. Louis the Indians
were repulsed though several of its defenders were killed
or captured.'^"" Clark planned a joint attack with the
Spaniards on the villages of the Indians who had composed
the expedition, but Montgomery, who was put in charge
"' Fergus Historical Series, No. 33.
"* Colls. Ill St Hist Lib., II, Ixxxvii.
'" Houck, op. cit, II, 35-36.
'"Ibid., 37.
'" Colls. Ill St Hist Lib., II, 53i-
'" Houck, op. cit, II, 38.
'" Colls. St Hist Soc Wis., XI, 154.
'" Houck, op. cit, II, 37-38.
"" Cal Va. St Papers, III, 442-443-
""Houck, op. cit, II, 38-40. Houck has used the report of
Navarro, the Spanish intendant. A few documents from the
Canadian Archives relating to this attack on St. Louis are printed
in the Missouri Historical Society Collections, II, No. 6.

I02 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
of the enterprise, effected nothing.^"' The southern part of
the British programme was defeated by the energy of
Governor Galvez, who succeeded in capturing West Florida.
Fort Jefferson did not enjoy a long or tranquil existence.
In July, 1780, it was attacked by a party of Indians, who
were, however, repulsed. But Indian depredations con
tinued to be of frequent occurrence. The number of troops,
too weak to defend the fort adequately, was diminished
through frequent desertions. The people who had come to
settle in expectation of assistance from the Virginia govern
ment found their hopes delusive, and many crossed the Mis
sissippi into Spanish territory. Sickness and famine played
havoc with those who remained. In the general decline of
American credit, even necessary supplies could not be
procured.^"* Clark was absent from the post during a large
part of 1780, and the following year his attention and efforts
were concentrated on a proposed expedition against Detroit.
At the new fort affairs went from bad to worse.^"' Mont
gomery stopped there in May, 1781, on his way back from
New Orleans to Illinois. "Want of provisions" he gave
as the main reason for the evacuation of the post, which
finally took place in June, 1782.^^""
When Montgomery left Illinois for a visit to New Orleans
in October, 1780, the few troops remaining in the country
were placed under the command of Captain Rogers. ^"^ The
further narrative of events in Illinois is a mournful com
mentary on the utter failure of the Virginia regime. Rogers
fell under the influence of two cunning and unscrupulous
adventurers who appeared in Illinois in 1780. Thomas
Bentley, a former resident of Kaskaskia, had been arrested
during Rocheblave's administration, upon the latter's true
"' Colls. Ill St Hist Lib., II, 541.
'"'Mason, Early Chic and III, 330-334; Cal Va. St Papers, I,
382, 424-425.
'"Ibid., 383.
'"Ibid., II, 313; 111,443-444.
'" Colls. Ill St Hist Lib., II, xcv.

ILLINOIS UNDER VIRGINIA.

103

accusation that he was in correspondence with the rebels.
He had been sent to Quebec, where he was confined till
1780, when he escaped.^"" Returning to Kaskaskia, he
resolved to recoup himself for his sufferings and loss of
property, and punish the inhabitants who, he believed, had
been in league with Rocheblave against him.^"' He wrote
to Clark, expressing himself as friendly to the American
cause, and about the same time also to Haldimand, saying
that the Illinois villages could easily be captured, since the
people were discontented and would not resist British regu
lars, though they would always fight Indians, if they were
sent, since they were in such fear of their cruelty.^"* Bentley's
correspondence proves the duplicity of his character. He
must have played his double game with skill, for the
Americans in Illinois had no suspicion of his correspondence
with the British, and Clark commended him as having "a
universal good character."^""
The other evil genius of Illinois was John Dodge, a native
of Connecticut. Early in the Revolution Dodge had been
engaged in trading in the Northwest. He had been
captured by the British, and taken first to Detroit and then
to Quebec, but escaped in 1778.^"" Dodge impressed Wash
ington as a man of intelligence, well acquainted with the
West and the Indians, who could be employed usefully
in any western enterprise that Congress might have in
view.^"' The monetary situation in Illinois at once appealed to
the mercenary instincts of this pair of Yankee minds, and
a sort of partnership was formed by them to buy up the
paper certificates held by the people."* It is probable that
'"Mich. P. Colls., XIX, 324 et seq.
'" Colls. Ill St Hist Lib., II, xcvi.
'"Ibid., note 3, and Mich. P- Colls., XIX, 561-562.
'" Cal Va. St. Papers, II, 153-
'"Colls. Ill St. Hist Lib., II, xcv, and note 4; Official Letters to
the Honorable American Congress by Washington, II, 345-346-
'"Ibid., 346.
'" Colls. Ill St Hist Lib., II, 621.

104 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
they resorted to dishonesty in their operations.^"' Their
activities, at any rate, increased the hatred felt by the
Illinois (Sreoles towards the Virginia authorities, and were
probably a partial cause of the zeal with which the people
welcomed De la Balme. Some of the Americans also were
antagonized. McCarty, who had been a vigorous supporter
of the military regime and an opponent of Todd, changed
his attitude. He had been arrested by order of Mont
gomery, before the latter left Illinois in 1780, and this fact
may partially explain his new point of view. But in a
letter written to Todd, McCarty implies that his change of
feeling was caused by the scandalous traffic of Bentley and
Dodge.^'" From this time on he sided with the inhabitants
and advised them to refuse supplies for the troops,^'^ as
did Winston, who accused Dodge of promoting faction
and discord, of bribery, and of trying to overthrow the
laws of the state.^'"
Rogers, on his side, entertained a lively hatred for the
representatives of the civil government, and expressed the
opinion that the people had been too leniently treated. He
professed to regard Winston and McCarty as instruments
of turbulence and sedition, inciting the people to "an
absolute state of rebellion."^" Todd, who continued to
receive complaints from Illinois, believed that the "avarice
and prodigality" of the Virginia officers were chiefly
responsible for the sad condition of the country. "They
all," he wrote, "vent complaints against each other 
I believe our French friends have the justest grounds of
dissatisfaction."^'* The withdrawal of most of the troops from the Illinois
villages threw the work of defense more upon the inhabi
tants. In July, 1780, the Kaskaskians defended themselves
'" Cal Va. St Papers, I, 381 ; Colls. Ill St. Hist. Lib., II, xcvii, 481.
'" Cal Va. St Papers, I, 379-380.
'" Colls. Ill St. Hist Lib., II, xcviii.
'" Cal Va. St Papers, I, 381.
"'Ibid., 11,77.
"' Ibid., II, 45.

ILLINOIS UNDER VIRGINIA.

I°5

successfully against an Indian attack."" In August the
Cahokia court, in expectation of a similar attack, convoked
the militia officers and principal inhabitants to deliberate on
the best means to avoid a surprise.^'" They decided to move
against the enemy, rather than stand an attack, and directed
that provisions for a fortnight should be kept on hand. A
reconnoitering party was sent up to the Illinois river to
locate the enemy."' By the autumn of 1780, indeed, the
idea was prevalent among the people that Virginia had
practically abandoned Illinois.
While the inhabitants, in constant apprehension of Indian
attacks, were being robbed of their all by the officers and
speculators, the troops themselves were suffering. The
commissaries were inefficient and probably dishonest. In
1779, the Virginia Assembly, appreciating the importance
of holding Illinois, had passed resolutions that the civil and
military establishments there ought to be supported and
augmented, that the governor should be authorized to pro
cure credit for that purpose in New Orleans, and that the
assembly would provide funds to fulfill any engagement
which he, with the consent of the council, might enter
into.^'* But Virginia's treasury was empty, and the only
way to increase expenditures was to increase indebtedness.
The fact is that the state could not support its troops in
Illinois. The possession of the country, moreover, was felt
to be extremely precarious.^" The soldiers had to live off
the land and the people 'as best they could. "The less you
depend for supplies from this quarter," wrote Jefferson to
Clark in 1780, "the less will you be disappointed.""" How
badly the troops fared can be imagined. From Louisville,
Vincennes and Fort Jefferson came the same story of
neglect and privation.^*^
'"Ibid., I, 368; Colls. Ill St Hist. Lib., II, Ixxxviii.
"'Ibid., 59.
"'Ibid., 61, 63.
"' Rowland, op. cit, I, 345.
"" Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford's ed., II, 345-
'"Colls. Ill St Hist Lib., II, Ixvii.
'" Cal Va. St Papers, II, 306-307, 313, 338.

I06 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
Then, too, Virginia's interest in her western county was
declining. As early as 1777, the proposition that Congress
should exercise sovereign powers over the West had been
made by Maryland's delegates in Congress.^*" The western
claims of Virginia and some of the other states seemed at
that time likely to prove fatal to the formation of a con
federation, since the smaller states, whose cause Maryland
was representing, considered themselves entitled to a right,
in common with all the others, to the West.^*' In order to
facilitate the unanimous ratification of the Articles of Con
federation, the Virginia Assembly, on January 2, 1781,
resolved that the commonwealth would yield to Congress
all its claims to territory northwest of the Ohio, upon cer
tain conditions.^** The prospect of this cession to Congress
was in view by the Virginia authorities at least as early as
the autumn of 1780.^*" Though it was not finally com
pleted until 1784, Virginia's interest in the Northwest
naturally declined, and the county organization of Illinois,
as has been said, was allowed to expire in 1781.
In the autumn of 1780, a conflict arose between the
Bentley-Dodge-Rogers clique and the Kaskaskia court.
Bentley brought a suit in November, but the court refused
to recognize his standing till he took an oath of fidelity to
the United States and to Virginia. This he refused to do,
but instead produced a certificate signed by Rogers which
declared that he had taken the oath. The court refused to
accept the certificate. The civil and military authorities thus
collided, and Rogers addressed a bullying note to the court,
threatening to set it aside. But that body, which was sup
ported by Winston, was not intimidated. Bentley left for
the East in the spring of 1781 to carry his case before the
governor and council, and also to get what he could for the
certificates which he and Dodge had bought up. He was
"''Adams, "Maryland's Influence in Founding a National Com
monwealth," Md. Hist Soc Fund Pub., No. 11, 27-28.
'" Hening, op. cit, X, 549.
'"Ibid., 564.
'" Writ, of Jef., Ford's ed., II, 347.

ILLINOIS UNDER VIRGINIA. 107
accompanied by the latter and Rogers. In order to counter
act "aspersions" against himself while in command in
Illinois, Rogers wrote to Governor Jefferson, blaming Win
ston and McCarty for the existing disorders and commend
ing the disinterested zeal and public spirit of Bentley.^*"
It is pleasant to learn that the latter failed to win the support
of the Virginia government. The council refused to regard
his claims, and implied that he was an imposter.^*' This
called forth a letter from Bentley in which he appealed to
Clark's expressed opinion of his character, and to testimony
of Dodge and Montgomery regarding his services in behalf
of the troops, and complained of his treatment by the
court.^** But the greater part of his claims were still unpaid
when he died, probably in 1783.^*' Rogers was back in Kas
kaskia in November, 1781, but we hear no more talk of his
setting aside the court.^"
The determination of Bentley to appeal from the court
to the governor caused the people of Kaskaskia and Cahokia
to send representatives to the Virginia government, to
counteract the mischief that might be done and to present
their claims and grievances. Early in April, 1781, the
Cahokians chose Pierre Prevost to represent their interests,
and the Kaskaskians chose Prevost and McCarty.^"^ A
memorial addressed to the governor was prepared and
signed by a number of the Kaskaskians, and other papers
were drawn up by the court.^'" A similar memorial was
signed by inhabitants of Vincennes in June.^" But
McCarty was killed by Indians and his papers were taken
to Detroit. They revealed to the British authorities the fact
that the people of Illinois were suffering great misery
and were heartily tired of the tyranny of the Virginia
'" Cal Va. St Papers, II, 76-77.
'"Ibid., 238.
'"Ibid. "° Colls. Ill St Hist Lib., II, cix.
'"Ibid.'" Ibid., cii-ciii, 479, 481.
"'/6irf., ciii.
"" Cal Va. St Papers, II, 192-193.

Io8 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
authorities.^'* Bentley, as we have seen, had made a similar
statement to Haldimand the previous summer.
After 1779, British authorities in the Northwest had
never been wholly free from anticipations of an American
attack on Detroit.^'" Of all Americans, Qark was the man
best qualified to lead an expedition against that post. His
preeminent fitness for the task was generally recognized,^'"
and the unbounded confidence reposed in him by the western
frontiersmen was a matter of common knowledge.^" As
we have seen, he had desired to attack Detroit immediately
after the successful issue of the Vincennes campaign in
1779. But the favorable opportunity was lost for want of
men. Even after Mcintosh's failure in 1778, Washington
had the reduction of Detroit constantly in mind,^'* for only
by this, in his opinion, could the frontiers secure peace.^"
Jefferson took a similar view.""" Military men most fami
liar with conditions in the West were keenly alive to the
importance of effecting this object.""^ It was chiefly to
discuss an expedition against Detroit that Clark went east
in the autumn of 1780.
Jefferson endorsed the plan and detailed instructions were
prepared for Clark, who was to lead the expedition."""
Washington heartily ccooperated with the proposed enter
prise and directed Colonel Brodhead, the Continental com
mandant at Fort Pitt, to furnish Clark with supplies and
as many men as he could spare.""' But the British invasion
of Virginia in 1781 prevented the governor from furnishing
the intended number of men,""* and Brodhead declined to
'"Mich. P. Colls., XIX, 646.
"' Butterfield, op. cit, 481 ; Mich. P Colls., XX, 3.
'" Rowland, op. cit, I, 366.
"^ Butterfield, Washington-Irvine Corresp., 53 ; Writ, of Jef.,
Ford's ed., II, 347.
'" Butterfield, Washington-Irvine Corresp., 53.
™ Ibid., 83.
™ Writ, of Jef., Ford's ed., II, 346.
'" Butterfield, Washington-Irvine Corresp., 79.
"' Cal Va. St Papers, I, 441.
^°° English, op. cit., II, 704-707.
'"' Cal. Va. St. Papers, II, 108-109.

ILLINOIS UNDER VIRGINIA.

109

spare any.""" The war had lasted so long that some of the
earlier enthusiasm had worn off and a disinclination to
enlist was apparent. This and the decline of Virginia's
credit made it impossible to raise the number necessary to
insure success."""
By August Clark himself, who had started down the Ohio
from Fort Pitt with what men he could collect, had almost
despaired of success.""' Intending to join him, a party of
about one hundred militia, recruited from the western
counties of Pennsylvania, followed down the Ohio. Their
commander was Captain Archibald Laughery, county-lieu
tenant of Westmoreland County. They arrived at Wheeling
on August 8. The chief Joseph Brant, with a party of
Indians, was watching for Clark near the mouth of the
Miami,""* but Clark passed them in the night undetected.
Laughery's party, however, was annihilated by Brant and
his followers."" This disaster gave the coup de grace to
the expedition against Detroit. Again Clark was baffled,
and again for the same reason, lack of men.
This proposed expedition, while not immediately con
nected with the internal history of Illinois, explains to some
extent the fact that the British commandants at the lake
posts were forced to act on the defensive, and dared not
weaken their garrisons by sending troops to conquer
Illinois."^" For offensive operations they relied upon the
Indians, who were held to their alliance only by presents,
which, it was said, made them inactive and lazy,"^^ and Indian
attacks, on account of the cruelty that always accompanied
them, the people of Illinois were sure to resist to the extent
of their power."^" Information similar to that revealed by
'"'Ibid., 116.
'"'Ibid., 116, 131, 294-295, English, op. cit, II, 710-712.
'" Cal Va. St. Papers, II, 294-295.
'"Mich. P. Colls., XIX, 655.
'"For this massacre see Indiana Historical Society Publications,
II, 106-107, 109-110; also Butterfield, Washington-Irvine Corresp.,
77; Mich. P. Colls., XIX, 658.
'"Mich. P. Colls., XIX, 623, 629.
'"/&irf., 622-623.
'" Colls. Ill St Hist Lib., II, 561.

no TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
the capture of McCarty's papers had, for some time, been
coming to the ears of the British commandants in the North
west. It naturally aroused the hope that British authority
might be reestablished over the Illinois villages by peaceful
means. Early in the summer of 1781, Patrick Sinclair, who had
been in command at Michilimackinac since October, 1779,""
dispatched a small party under a man named Clairmont,
with a letter to the inhabitants of Cahokia and Kaskaskia."^*
The object of this mission was to promote friendship
between the inhabitants and the British."^" But Clairmont
made the mistake of stopping at St. Louis. Since Spain
was now openly at war with Great Britain, the Spanish
commandant, Cruzat, caused Clairmont and his party to be
arrested, and sent a copy of their letter to Major Williams,
then in command of the few troops remaining at Kaskaskia.
It is unlikely, however, that Cruzat was as well disposed
towards the Americans as this action makes it appear. He
certainly allowed two of the emissaries to proceed to
Cahokia, where they were obliged by the court to find bonds
men answerable for them while they remained."^"
That this mission might have succeeded in reestabUshing
British control in Illinois is possible. Considerable dissatis
faction, at any rate, was expressed in Cahokia and Kaskas
kia at the action of the Spanish commandant in arresting
the emissaries."^' Antoine Gerardin, one of the most
influential men in Cahokia and a former member of the
court, who undoubtedly knew the state of public opinion,
wrote to Sinclair in November, 1781, that he thought the
people, partly for commercial reasons, were ready to receive
"' Colls. St Hist Soc Wis., XI, 141, note.
"' Colls. Ill St Hist Lib., II, 553, 557. Also Houck, op. cit, II, 49.
'"The three sources for this episode in Colls. Ill St. Hist Lib.,
II, 552-563, differ as to the exact purpose of the mission. One says
it was to put the people on their guard against the Spaniards;
another, to raise militia to be paid by the British, and the third, to
negotiate a commercial treaty.
'" Colls. Ill St Hist Lib., II, 95.
"'Ibid., 555.

ILLINOIS UNDER VIRGINIA. Ill
the English and renew their allegiance to England. He
offered his services, and agreed to prepare them to receive
the English, provided they brought no savages with them."^*
Had a British party of respectable strength, unaccompanied
by Indians, been promptly sent, it is difficult to believe that
it would not have succeeded, since Illinois by this time had
been almost completely evacuated by the Virginia troops."^'
But the military operations in Virginia in the autumn
of 1781 decided the war and no such party was sent. Vir
ginia's nominal possession of Illinois survived the Revolu
tion, though legally the county organization of that
territory, as explained above, expired in 1781. The Kas
kaskia court was abolished in 1782.""" The Cahokia court
continued to sit till 1790, and conditions in that town were
less anarchical than at Kaskaskia, possibly because there
were fewer Americans in it. The Vincennes court con
tinued in existence till 1787.""*
The financial condition of Virginia made prudent what
the termination of the war made possible, and the Illinois
troops were disbanded.""" In July, 1783, Clark was relieved
of his command.""' From the close of the Revolution till
the establishment of government under the Northwest
Ordinance the people of Illinois were cut off from associa
tion with the outside world, though they continued to regard
themselves as subjects of Virginia.""* But though relieved
of the burden of the troops, confusion continued, and there
was no tranquility or happiness for them. Hoping for
better things, they learned in 1784 of their transference to
the jurisdiction of Congress."""
'"Ibid., 559-563-
'" Cal Va. St Papers, III, 68, 198.
'" Colls. Ill St Hist Lib., II, cxvii.
"'Am. St Papers, "Public Lands," I, 10.
'" Colls. Ill St Hist. Lib., II, ex.
'"English, op. cit, II, 783.
"'Address to Congress from the French Inhabitants of Post
Vincennes, Kaskaskia, etc., 1788.
"'Colls. Ill St Hist Lib., II, 567.

CHAPTER VII.
THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE WEST.
The actual establishment of American rule in Illinois was
the work of the revolutionary government of Virginia. A
legal title to the territory was secured by the treaty of peace.
The scene shifts to the French capital, and the final step in
the transition was made in the negotiations which concluded
the Revolution.
The surrender of Cornwallis in October, 1781, settled the
question of American independence. In British official
circles the feeling was strong that peace must be secured."-
Before Lord North's ministry fell, speculation was rife as
to the extent of the surrenders which the government would
have to make. Independence, it was hoped, would satisfy
the United States." France expected territorial and com
mercial gains. The policy of Spain will be discussed later.
On March 20, 1782, Lord North, virtually forced out of
office, handed in his resignation, and the king was reluc
tantly obliged to resort to the Rockingham Whigs. Under
the Marquis of Rockingham, a ministry was formed whose
avowed policy was to end the war. In his cabinet, the home
and colonial departments were intrusted to Lord Shel-
burne, while Mr. Charles James Fox took the foreign
portfolio. As early as September, 1779, Congress had appointed
John Adams sole commissioner to discuss terms of peace
with the British government. He was instructed to claim
the Mississippi as the western boundary of the United
States, and the cession of Canada was stated as desirable.
He was to be governed by the terms of the French alliance.'
'Grafton to Shelburne, 14 Nov., 1781, Bancroft MSS. Trans
cripts from the State Paper Office and Lansdowne House MSS.,
concerning Negotiations for Peace, 1781-1783, 6 vols. These
documents will be referred to as Bancroft MSS., Peace Negotiations.
'Ibid.' Sparks, op. cit, IV, 339 et seq.

THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE WEST. II 3
But his relations with the French foreign minister, Ver
gennes, then regarded as the European sponsor of the
United States, were not cordial,* and in June, 1781, Con
gress, influenced by Luzerne, annulled Adams' commission
and issued another to him and four others. The additional
commissioners named were Franklin, Jay, Laurens and
Jefferson." Just as the Rockingham ministry was coming into power,
Franklin, the only one of the American commissioners then
in France, wrote to Shelburne, with whom years before he
had had pleasant relations, expressing an earnest hope for a
general pacification." In response the colonial secretary
sent Mr. Oswald, a Scotch merchant in whom he reposed
great confidence and who had extensive interests in
America, to interview Franklin in an informal manner.'
Shelburne attached great importance to this preliminary
negotiation and said that, if it failed, the war would be
vigorously carried on, since the nation at large was not
reconciled to American independence.* It was his policy
to reserve the concession of this as a valuable consideration
to be offered to the colonies, and to foment difficulties and
disagreements between America, France and Spain wher
ever their interests conflicted.' He was determined at all
events that the United States, if independent, should be
so of all the world, and should not become the protege and
permanent ally of France.^" He hoped, indeed, to detach
the United States from the other enemies of England.
'Durand, New Materials for the History of the American
Revolution, 232-233.
' Sparks, op. cit. III, 220.
'Ibid., 381.
' Oswald had previously been consulted by Lord North on
American affairs. For events leading to the decision of the Rocking
ham cabinet to open informal negotiations with Franklin see Fitz-
maurice, Life of William, Earl of Shelburne, III, 175.
'Paper marked "Private, to be burnt," Shelburne to Oswald, no
date, probably April, 1782. Bancroft MSS., Peace Negotiations.
° Fitzmaurice, op. cit. III, 169.
'° Memorandum to Mr. Oswald in conversation, 28 Apr., 1782.
Bancroft MSS., Peace Negotiations. Cf. also Sparks, op. cit, X, 12.

114 ' TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
Franklin, however, feeling that a separate treaty between
his country and Great Britain would be dishonorable, as
well as contrary to the terms of the French-American alli
ance and Congress' instructions of 1781, at once informed
Oswald that the United States would treat only in concert
with France,^^ and that no definite action could be taken
until his fellow-commissioners arrived.^"
In order to secure the West as far as the Mississippi,
Congress considered it necessary to show either that the
states as individual sovereignties had succeeded to all
rights which they had possessed when colonies, or that, -
when the king of Great Britain ceased to be king of the
thirteen colonies, all vacant lands of which he was seised
in that capacity passed to the United States collectively.^'
In other words. Congress desired to secure the West on
one principle or the other, and was apparently unwilling to
commit itself to either. According to the second principle,
the United States could claim the West, even if the procla
mation of 1763 were held to confine the individual colonies
to lands east of the Alleghanies.^* American statesmen,
however, understood that abstract claims would be greatly
strengthened by actual conquest and occupation. Jefferson
had expressed the view that Clark's expedition would have
an important bearing on the final establishment of the north
western boundary of the United States."^" George Mason,
who had also been concerned in Clark's enterprise, was of
the same opinion.^" They evidently considered it of great
importance that, when the treaty of peace was finally made,
the American commissioners should be able to argue the
principle of "uti possidetis" with respect to the West.
" Sparks, op. cit.. Ill, 381.
" Moore, Digest of International Law, V, 634.
" Sec. Journ. of Cong., Ill, 170, 198.
" For this national theory respecting the West, see Thomas Paine,
"Public Good," Writ of Paine, Conway's ed., II. Cf. also Pelatiah
Webster's essay on Western Lands, in Political Essays on the
Nature and Operation of Money, Public Finances, and other Sub
jects: Philadelphia, 1791.
" Bancroft, History of the United States: Boston, 1878, VI, 192.
" Rowland, op. cit, I, 365.

THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE WEST. 1 15
In January, 1782, an important letter dealing with the
question of the West in the coming peace negotiations was
written to Franklin by the American foreign secretary,
Robert R. Livingston.^' "  Our western and northwest
ern extent," wrote Livingston, "will probably be contested
with some warmth, and the reasoning on that subject be
deduced from general principles, and from proclamations
and treaties with the Indians  I believe it will appear
that our extension to the Mississippi is founded in justice,
and that our claims are at least such as the events of the
war give us a right to insist upon." The proclamation of
1763, he argued, was a temporary measure which did not
nullify the claims of any colony to western land. He even
argued from the wording of the document itself that such
was the case; otherwise it would not have been necessary
to forbid colonial governors to make grants in the West,
since they would have had no power to do so. The treaty of
Fort Stanwix, in his opinion, constituted no obstacle to
colonial claims. Arguments against American extension, he
admitted, might be derived from the Quebec Bill, but as
that was one of the laws that had occasioned the war,
"to build anything upon it would be to urge one wrong
in support of another." He referred to a map which had
been made by the king's geographer, shortly after the
Seven Years' War, on which Virginia and the Carolinas
were represented as extending to the Mississippi. "The
rights of the King of Great Britain .... to America,"
he said, "were incident to his right of sovereignty over
those of his subjects that settled America and explored the
lands he claims  If we admit .... that the right
of sovereignty over the people of America is forfeited, it
must follow that all rights founded on that sovereignty are
forfeited with it  Upon this principle Great Britain
is left without a foot of land in America beyond the limits
of those governments which acknowledge her jurisdiction."
To strengthen theoretical argtunents, Livingston adduced
the fact that actual settlements had been made in the West
" Sparks, op. cit, III, 268, et seq.
9

II 6 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
by people who acknowledged the jurisdiction of the United
States. In his opinion it would be impolitic as well as unjust
to abandon them. In expectation, however, that there would
be much dispute over the boundary, he unofficially suggested
that, if the Mississippi could not be obtained, the territory
between that river and the western limits assigned to the
states should be left to the Indians under a joint guaranty
of France, Spain, Great Britain and the United States.
An analysis of this document shows that the American
government was disposed to urge charter claims as ground
for claiming the West and the Mississippi boundary, that
the argument of actual settlement, and "the events of the
war," were to be advanced to strengthen these claims, but
that Congress would probably not insist upon the Mis
sissippi. In the instructions given in 1780 by Congress to John
• Jay, when he was sent as American agent to Spain,
the fact of actual settlement as ground for claiming the
West was more emphatically stated. ". . . . The people
inhabiting these states," ran the instructions, "while con
nected with Great Britain, and also since the Revolution,
have settled themselves at divers places to the westward
near the Mississippi; are friendly to the Revolution, and
being citizens of the United States, and subject to the laws
of those to which they respectively belong, Congress can
not assign them over as subjects to any other power."^*
During Oswald's first visit to Paris in April, 1782, Frank
lin had shown a disposition to talk matters over, and with
the utmost sang-froid had suggested the cession of Canada
to the United States as a measure likely to promote a true
reconciliation." If Canada were retained by Great Britain,
he thought it would involve perpetual friction between that
power and the United States. If ceded, the waste lands
there could be sold to indemnify the royalists for confisca
tions, and to pay for some of the damage to American
private property caused by the British and the Indians.""
"Sparks, op. cit, VII, 301-302; Sec. Journ. of Cong., Ill, 155.
"Fitzmaurice, op. cit. III, 180-182.
" Moore, op. cit, V, 634-635.

THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE WEST. II7
Oswald went back to England, and after a brief sojourn
returned with a paper refusing the cession of Canada."^
He expressed his personal opinion, however, that a satis
factory settlement on that point might be reached."" Indeed,
somewhat later, he went so far as to tell Franklin that he
personally agreed with him concerning Canada."' Franklin,
therefore, continued to hope for the acquisition of that
province. On April 23, an important meeting of the Rockingham
cabinet was held, a minute of which reads : ". . . . the
principal points in contemplation are the allowance of
independence to America upon Great Britain's being
restored to the situation she was placed in by the treaty of
1763.""* This meant that Canada was to be retained, and
also, presumably, the country between the Alleghanies and
the Mississippi, which had been relinquished by France in
the treaty referred to. Independence, moreover, was not
to be assumed as existing till granted by the proposed treaty.
Fox, in whose department negotiations with foreign
powers lay, sent Thomas Grenville, a son of the former
premier, to Paris early in May. As is well known, he
advanced the theory previously maintained by American
statesmen"" that the United States was already independ
ent."" Therefore, he argued, the conduct of negotiations
with the American commissioners belonged to his depart
ment, since the United States was a foreign power."' Act
ing on this theory, he instructed Grenville to "sound"
Franklin, and to inform him and Vergennes that independ-
^ Fitzmaurice, op. cit. III, 188-189.
"Ibid., igi.
"Ibid., 206.
"Ibid., 183-184.
" Sparks, op. cit, HI, 42-43 ; VI, 129.
" This theory may be considered finally to have prevailed, for the
treaty of peace was a recognition, not a grant of independence; see
Moore, op. cit, V, 695.
"In this contention Fox was technically wrong; till the independ
ence of the United States was recognized, negotiations with the
American commissioners belonged to Shelburne's department, ibid.,
624.

II 8 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
ence was to be the basis for negotiations. Grenville was
to find out whether, if a general pacification proved impos
sible, there was any prospect of a separate peace between
England and the United States."* Fox thought it would be
easy to show the Americans that it was unreasonable that
they should be incumbered and obstructed by "powers who
have never assisted them during the war.""' The foreign
secretary could not believe, he said, that Congress was
bound to support every claim set up by the court of Ver
sailles and its allies.'" Grenville reported that Franklin
earnestly desired peace, though he was determined to
adhere to the treaty obligations into which the United
States had entered; and that Vergennes would neither
make overtures nor answer propositions till after com
munication with the allies of France. It was evident,
however, that France would demand for her exertions
in the war more than the independence of the United
States. The acknowledgement of that would not be
regarded by the French government as a favor con
ceded by Great Britain to France, for, Vergennes signifi
cantly observed, France had found and not made America
independent.'^ He desired a treaty more just and durable
than that of 1763, which he never could read without shud
dering ("sans fremir"). "Justice" and "dignity," he said,
were the two chief points upon which his government would
insist in the proposed treaty.'" Grenville, accordingly,
became convinced that the demands of France, and of Spain
also, would be so extensive that it would be difficult, if not
impossible, for Great Britain to accede to them. "It is from
" Fox to Grenville, 30 Apr., 1782, Bancroft MSS., Peace Negotia
tions. " Fox to Grenville, 21 May, 1782 ; ibid.
"Fox to Grenville, 26 May, 1782, ibid. Fox, as a European states
man, wanted to end the American war quickly and isolate the
Bourbon powers; see Wakeman, Charles James Fox, 70-71.
" Grenville to Fox, 10 May, 1782, Bancroft MSS., Peace Negotia
tions; Fitzmaurice, op. cit. III, 192.
" Grenville to Fox, 10 May, 1782, Bancroft MSS., Peace Negotia
tions.

THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE WEST. 1 19
the expectation the courts of Madrid and Versailles entertain
of being supported by America in these claims," he wrote,
"that they will derive the greatest confidence in making
them." The obvious remedy for Great Britain to apply was,
if possible, to detach the United States from France."
The British foreign secretary, anxious for a speedy
escape from the American war, authorized Grenville to offer
independence "in the first instance, instead of making it
a conditional article of a general treaty."'* On June lo,
he sent full powers to Grenville to treat with any of the
enemies of Great Britain,'" and on the thirtieth he moved
in cabinet "that the independence of America should be
granted even without a treaty for a peace."'" He thus hoped,
no doubt, to get the negotiations with the Americans com
pletely out of the colonial secretary's hands. The cabinet,
however, decided against him and he resigned.
On July I Rockingham died, and the next day the king
offered the treasury to Shelburne, who accepted and formed
a new -ministry." The home and colonial departments were
given to Thomas Townshend; Lord Grantham took the
foreign office. Shelburne informed Grenville that neither
the resignation of Fox nor the death of Rockingham would
make any difference in the government's policy,'* but Gren
ville determined to retire with his chief, and "decline any
further prosecution of this business."" Benjamin Vaughan
was then sent to Paris to inform Franklin that the change
of administration would make no change in the progress of
the negotiations, and Alleyn Fitzherbert, British minister
at Brussels, was appointed to succeed Grenville in represent
ing the British foreign secretary. Oswald remained the
ministry's representative as far as America was concerned.*"
" Grenville to Fox, 14 May, 1782 ; ibid.
"Fox to Grenville, 26 May, 1782; ibid.
"Fox to Grenville, 10 June, 1782; ibid.
" Fitzmaurice, op. cit. III, 219.
" Ibid., 222-223.'
"Shelburne to Grenville, 5 July, 1782, Bancroft MSS., Peace
Negotiations. " Grenville to Shelburne, 9 July, 1782 ; ibid.
*¦ Moore, op. cit, V, 637.

120 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
Meanwhile Franklin had been joined by John Jay, who
reached Paris on June 23. Jay had been for several months
in Madrid as diplomatic agent of the United States, trying
to induce the Spanish government to recognize American
independence.*^ His residence there, however, was informal,
and did not bind Spain to recognize the United States as
an independent power.*"
The policy of Spain is a subject of importance in the
peace negotiations so far as they relate to the West. As
we have seen, that power had been secretly aiding the
Americans from the beginning of the Revolution. The
motives of the Spanish, like those of the French govern
ment, were, of course, wholly unconnected with sentiments
of genuine friendship for the United States. Both powers
were actuated by a spirit of revenge toward England. The
Count of Floridablanca, the Spanish Minister of state, in
particular, was suspicious of the Americans and entertained
no belief in the integrity of Congress or its commis
sioners.*' He feared, indeed, the success and independence
of the United States.** Before the alliance of 1778 Ver
gennes had pointed out that the Americans, if independent,
might turn conquerors and endanger Spanish America.*"
Lafayette, to whose efforts the final recognition by Spain
of the independence of the United States was partly due,
wrote from Madrid in March, 1783, that in his opinion
Spain feared the moral effect of that independence upon
her own colonies.*"
In April, 1779, Spain concluded a secret convention with
France, by which the Bourbon Family Compact was
renewed, and she bound herself to declare war on Eng-
" Corresp. and Pub. Papers of John Jay, Johnston's ed., II, 21.
" Moore, op. cit., I, 206-207.
"Floridablanca to Marquis D'Ossun, 17 Oct., 1777, Stevens,
op. cit, XIX.
"Bancroft, History of U. S., VI, 176.
" Considerations, 12 March, 1776, by Vergennes, Stevens, op. cit,
Xin, No. 1316.
" Sparks, op. cit, X, 34.

THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE WEST. 121
land.*' She did not, however, recognize the independence
of the United States. Among the avowed objects which
she expected to attain through her participation in the war
were the recovery of Gibraltar, Minorca and East Florida,
and the acquisition of Mobile. She desired to make the
Gulf of Mexico a Spanish lake, and to control the naviga
tion of the Mississippi by possession of both banks at its
mouth. Floridablanca, indeed, expressly declared that
unless Spain could exclude all other nations from the Gulf,
she might as well admit all. In his opinion, the exclusive
navigation of the Mississippi was an essential feature of
Spanish policy, more important even than the restoration
of Gibraltar.** Spanish hopes of controUing the Mis
sissippi were naturally raised by the work of Galvez in
Florida, for, before the end of the war, Spain actually held
both banks of the river at its mouth.
That at the time of this secret treaty the Spanish govern
ment desired to secure the possession of any territory in
North America beside the provinces of East and West Flor
ida cannot be categorically asserted. While Spain was still
nominally at peace with England, an agent, Juan de Miralles
by name, was sent to the United States to have an eye to
Spanish interests. In the instructions which were given to
him nothing was said about the conquest of territory. In
July, 1778, however, Gerard, the first French minister to the
United States, wrote to Vergennes about Miralles and his
mission. Gerard had not, indeed, seen his instructions, but
the Spaniard's conduct and language seemed to him to indi
cate their nature. Among other objects of his mission he
was trying to show, Gerard thought, that France should con
quer Canada, and that Spain should acquire all territory
"Text of the convention in Doniol, Histoire de la Participation
de la France a I'etablissement des Etats-Unis d'Amerique, III, 803
et seq.; or Wharton, op. cit., I, 356 et seq. For a brief discussion of
Spain's part in the war see Rousseau, "La Participation de I'Espagne
a la guerre d'Amerique," in Revue des Questions Historiques for
1902, 444 et seq.
" Rives, "Spain and the United States in 1795," Am. Hist Rev.,
IV, 64-65.

122 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
received by England in 1763 in Florida and on the Missis
sippi.*' Though he was mistaken concerning Miralles'
instructions, his suppositions were not unnatural in view of
the intimations made by the Spaniard on his own responsi
bility. At all events, after the conquest of the Illinois vil
lages by Clark, there is no doubt that Miralles actually
proposed the cession of Illinois to Spain, and, again without
authorization, urged the abandonment of American claims to
the Northwest."" As a result of the capture by Galvez of the
English settlements on the lower Mississippi, the Spanish
government itself began to view the situation in a different
light. In 1780 Gerard's successor, Luzerne, informed Con
gress that the king of France, desiring an alliance between
his two allies, Spain and the United States, had directed
him to communicate to Congress conditions which the
king of Spain regarded as important. Among these
were, besides the possession of East and West Florida,
a precise and invariable western boundary of the United
States, the exclusive navigation of the Mississippi, and the
possession of the lands on the east bank of that river above
West Florida. In the opinion of the Spanish government,
wrote Luzerne, the United States should extend no farther
west than the proclamation line of 1763, and were entitled
to no lands on the Mississippi. The territory on the east
bank of that river was a possession of England, and a proper
object of Spanish conquest."^ From Luzerne's communica
tion to Congress we cannot avoid the conclusion that, what
ever her previous policy may have been, Spain now desired
to acquire the whole east bank of the Mississippi. As
late as February, 1783, after the provisional treaty between
England and the United States had given the east bank of
that river to the latter, Lafayette wrote from Madrid
to Livingston that the Spaniards would "insist upon a pre-
* Gerard to Vergennes, 25 July, 1778, Doniol, op. cit. III, 293.
™For my information regarding Miralles' instructions and cor
respondence, I am indebted to Professor William R. Shepherd of
Columbia University.
" Sparks, op. cit, X, 402-403.

THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE WEST. 1 23
tended right to an extent of country all along the left shore
of the Mississippi. Not that they mean to occupy it, but
because they are afraid of neighbors that have a spirit of
liberty.""" But suspicions of Spanish designs on the West
were not confined to officials connected with the French
court. Clark, in estabhshing Fort Jefferson, thought that
post would be useful in frustrating any plans which Spain
might have formed for seizing the country north of the
Ohio. Indeed, he believed that the Spaniards would have
been glad to see the American posts in Illinois conquered
by England, so that they might have the opportunity of
reconquering them. Todd had not been in Illinois long
before he, too, concluded that Spain had aggressive designs
on the country."' The opinions of Clark and Todd were, of
course, formed from their observations of the conduct of
the Spaniards around St. Louis.
Jay's mission to Spain was a failure. Floridablanca
could not be induced to recognize the independence of the
¦ United States. In his attempts to come to an understanding
with the Spanish minister, Jay was subjected to delay and
mortification. He even complained that his mails were
tampered with and sometimes destroyed."* Upon his arrival
at Madrid, Floridablanca, according to Jay, implied that the
Mississippi was to be regarded as the western boundary
of the United States."" If the Spanish minister meant to
convey this impression, he was misleading Jay, for he cer
tainly was unwilling that the United States should possess
the left bank of the Mississippi. The slights which Jay
received while in Spain convinced him that the colonial
policy of that country was directly opposed to the interests
of the United States.
Franklin, also, was suspicious of Spanish policy in the
West. Before Jay's arrival in France, he wrote to the
"Ibid., 26.
" Cal Va. St Papers, I, 338, 358.
"Corresp. and Pub. Papers of John Jay, Johnston's ed., II, 20,
165, 186, 242.
" Sparks, op. cit, VIII, 203.

124 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
American foreign secretary, expressing fear that Spain was
trying to acquire the trans-Alleghany country at the expense
of the United States, and that she was using every pretext
to accomplish that end."" "I see by the newspapers," he
wrote, "that the Spaniards having taken a little post called
St. Joseph"' pretend to have made a conquest of the Illinois
country. In what light does this proceeding appear to
Congress ? While they decline our proffered friendship, are
they to be suffered to encroach on our bounds and shut us
up within the Appalachian Mountains? I begin to fear
they have some such project." Jay, also, read a version of
the St. Joseph affair, published in a Spanish newspaper."*
He came to Paris full of suspicions of Spanish policy, and
resolved that his country should not be at the mercy of the
European powers.
The situation confronting the two commissioners was
indeed serious. The treaty of 1778 bound the United States
to make no peace independent of France, and Congress had
supinely instructed its commissioners not to conclude any
arrangements with the English without the approval of the
French government."' "You are," ran the instructions, "to
make the most candid and confidential communications
upon all subjects to the ministers of our generous ally, the
King of France, to undertake nothing in the negotiations
for peace or truce without their knowledge and concur
rence." These instructions were, no doubt, highly proper
and honorable so long as France was acting in the interests
of the United States. Congress, indeed, expected that the
French government would assist the United States in secur
ing the Mississippi boundary."" But the French-Spanish
treaty of 1779, made without the knowledge of the United
States, introduced another factor into the war. By this
" Sparks, op. cit. III, 339.
" For the episode see supra, ch. VI.
°' Morton, "Robert R. Livingston,— Beginnings of American
Diplomacy," John P. Branch Historical Papers of Randolph-Macon
College, No. IV, 321.
"' For the instructions see Sec. Journ. of Cong., II, 446.
" Sparks, op. cit, X, 87-88.

THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE WEST. 125
treaty France bound herself not to make peace till Spain
had accomplished her objects. The United States were
surely not bound in honor to further the plans of a govern
ment which persistently refused to recognize their inde
pendence, especially when those plans, as the American
commissioners were convinced, were opposed to their own
interests. To argue that Spain for her own purposes could
compel the United States to continue hostilities indefinitely
would be a manifest absurdity. By experience and inclina
tion, no man was better qualified than Jay for the task of
defeating Spanish designs.
The first question on which his influence was decisive
was whether Great Britain should treat with the United
States as colonies, and acknowledge their independence in
the treaty, or whether she should conduct negotiations with
the United States as independent and sovereign. Shelburne,
as already stated, was anxious to end the American war
quickly. Parliament rose on July ii, and he desired to be
able to announce peace with America when next it met."^
Late in July a commission was sent to Oswald to treat with
commissioners of "the colonies," authorizing him to con
cede independence."" Jay promptly expressed his dissatis
faction. Independence, he thought, should be no part of
the treaty, but should have been expressly granted by Par
liament, and all troops withdrawn prior to any proposal for
peace. Since this had not been done, he thought the crown
should do it by proclamation."' Franklin, however, did not
see much difference between independence granted before
the treaty, or by it."* He held that Oswald's acceptance of
the American commission, which described the commission-
" Moore, op: cit, V, 686.
"Fitzmaurice, op. cit. III, 249-251. For the commission see
Sparks, op. cit, X, 76-79.
"Minutes of conversation with the American commissioners, 7
Aug., 1782, Bancroft MSS., Peace Negotiations, and Fitzmaurice,
op. cit. III, 251.
"Minutes of conversation, by Oswald, 11-13 Aug., 1782, Bancroft
MSS., Peace Negotiations ; Corresp. and Pub. Papers of John Jay,
Johnston's ed., II, 372.

126 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
ers as ministers of the United States, was equivalent to an
acknowledgment of independence."" Jay's position here
corresponded to that of John Adams, who had said a year
before, "There are no American colonies at war with Great
Britain. The power at war is the United States of Amer
ica.""" Vergennes, however, advised the American com
missioners to treat with Oswald under the commission
which he had received, but Jay positively refused."' His
firmness caused Oswald to write to Shelburne ". . . .
Your Lordship will see that the American commissioners
will not move a step until the independence is acknowl
edged.""* A decided difference of opinion was becoming manifest
between the two American commissioners. Jay was a
young man, a lawyer, and disposed to be somewhat assertive
and dogmatic. The purity of his patriotism could never
be questioned. Franklin, equally patriotic and equally dis
posed to peace, was an old man, versed in diplomacy and
the ways of the world, benevolent and wise. He was on
excellent terms with both Shelburne and Vergennes, and
inclined to suspect neither.
On July 6, Franklin had handed Oswald a paper contain
ing conditions of peace, some of which he regarded as
necessary, others advisable. Among the former were the
acknowledgment of entire independence, the extension of
the United States to the Mississippi, and a curtailment
of Canada to the extent it had possessed before the Quebec
Act; i. e., so as not to include the Northwest. Among
the latter he mentioned the cession of Canada." Oswald
" Hale, Franklin in France, II, 125.
" Sparks, op. cit, VI, 129.
"/6irf., Vin, 128, 135.
"Oswald to Shelburne, 18 Aug., 1782, Bancroft MSS., Peace
Negotiations. Dr. Wharton thought that Jay's attitude towards
Oswald's first commission, while patriotic, tended to undermine the
goodwill between England and the United States which Shelburne
and Franklin were seeking to promote, and that, had Franklin been
left to conduct matters in his own way, the United States would
probably have acquired Canada; Moore, op. cit, V, 638, 649.
"Ibid., 637.

THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE WEST. 1 27
at once communicated these conditions to Shelburne.'" In
August, numerous conferences were held between Oswald,
Jay and Franklin. The Americans sent to London for a set
of maps in order to discuss the boundary question more
intelligently.'^ Oswald concluded that to secure a lasting
peace, the abandonment by Great Britain of the Northwest,
which had been added to Canada in 1774, would be neces
sary. A refusal on this point, he thought, "would occasion
a particular grudge," as the American commissioners would
maintain that the ungranted and unappropriated lands in
the West belonged to the states. He supposed this demand
, would be granted "upon certain conditions."'" On Septem
ber I, Townshend authorized Oswald to concede Franklin's
"necessary" articles, implying the abandonment by Great
Britain of the West, and the curtailment of Canada to its
extent before 1774."
Viewing the peace negotiations as the last step in the
transition of which this study treats, the great problem con
fronting the American commissioners was to defeat what
they regarded as the hostile designs of Spain, supported
as they were by France. Shortly after his arrival
in Paris, Jay had a long interview with the Spanish ambas
sador to France, the Count of Aranda. The Spaniard, in
discussing the status of the West, gave it as his opinion
that this territory had belonged to France till 1763, when
it became a distinct part of Great Britain's dominions, out
side of any existing colony, "until by the conquest of West
Florida, and certain posts on the Mississippi and Illinois,
it became vested in Spain." He went on to argue that even
if Spain's right of conquest did not extend over all the West,
"Oswald to Shelburne, 10 July, 1782, Bancroft MSS., Peace
Negotiations. _!^ Minutes regarding the treaty, 29 Aug., 1782, Bancroft MSS.,
Peace Negotiations.
"Minutes of conversation 11-13 Aug., 1782, by Oswald, Bancroft
MSS., Peace Negotiations, and Minutes regarding the treaty,
29 Aug., 1782, ibid.
"Townshend to Oswald, i Sept., 1782, Bancroft MSS., Peace
Negotiations.

128 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
its real possessors would be the Indian tribes who dwelt
there.'* Aranda sent Jay a map on which he had indicated
what he considered an appropriate western boundary for
the United States. His line extended from the western con
fines of Georgia to the mouth of the Kanawha, thence
around the western shores of Lake Erie, Huron and Michi
gan to Lake Superior. Jay and Franklin both considered
this inadmissible.'" Oswald believed that Spain wanted the
country from West Florida "of a certain width quite up
to Canada, so as to have both banks of the Mississippi clear,
and would wish to have such a cession from England before
a cession to the colonies takes place."'"
Jay was now fully convinced that Spain and the United
States could never agree on the boundary question, for
Spain, he believed, would not consent to the possession of
the east bank of the Mississippi by the United States. He
came, moreover, to the further conclusion that France was
in league with Spain to deprive his country of the Mis
sissippi. The views of the French government were
expressed in a memoir written by M. de Rayneval, Ver
gennes' principal secretary, and handed by him to Jay.
Rayneval denied that the country between the Alleghanies
and the Mississippi formed part of the United States,
and said that the proclamation of 1763 proved that it
was a distinct part of Great Britain's possessions, beyond
the limits of the colonies. He suggested a partition of the
West between Spain, England, the Indians and the United
States. By this arrangement the United States would not,
at least south of the Ohio, extend to the Mississippi,
and would be deprived of the navigation of that river in
its lower course. The east bank, as far north as the mouth
of the Ohio, was to be given to Spain. The southwestern
Indians, whose lands were to intervene between the posses
sions of Spain and those of the United States, were to be
"Sparks, op. cit, VIII, 150; Corresp. and Pub. Papers of John
Jay, Johnston's ed., II, 390. •
"Ibid." Fitzmaurice, op. cit. III, 258.

THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE WEST. 1 29
divided into two zones or belts, the western under the pro
tection of Spain, the eastern under that of the United States.
North of the Ohio, possession was to be determined as
Great Britain and the United States decided." Jay was
justified in taking this paper as an authoritative expression
of the policy of the French government.
Though insisting on the independence of the United
States, Vergennes was for keeping them under European
tutelage. He opposed American claims to the West and
denied their validity. At the beginning of the French alli
ance in 1778 he had said that France insisted on independ
ence only for the thirteen United States exclusive of any
of the British possessions which had not revolted.'* In
a letter to Luzerne in September, 1779, he spoke of the
pretended right of the United States to lands on the Mis
sissippi." In October, 1782, in the midst of the peace
negotiations, he wrote to that minister that according to
Congress the English charters extended the territory of the
United States from the Atlantic Ocean to the "South Sea,"
and that Jay was urging this theory as the basis of negotia
tions. "Such folly," he said, "does not deserve to be
seriously refuted  But I know, sir, all the extrava
gance of the American pretensions and theories."*" Jay
"Corresp. and Pub. Papers of John Jay, Johnston's ed., II, 395
et seq.; Sparks, op. cit, VIII, 156-160.
"Circourt, Histoire de Faction commune de la France et de
I'Amerique pour I'independance des Etats-Unis, par George Bancroft,
III, 310. "Nous ne demandons I'independance que pour les treize
etats de I'Amerique qui seront unis entre eux, sans y comprendre
aucune des autres possessions anglaises qui n'ont point participe a
leur insurrection."
" Doniol, op. cit, IV, 357.
'" Circourt, op. cit. III, 290. "Suivant le Congres, les chartes
emanees de la couronne britanique etendent le domaine de I'Amer
ique depuis I'ocean jusqu' a la mer du Sud. Tel est le systeme
propose par M. Jay pour base de sa negociation avec I'Espagne. Un
pareil delire ne merite pas d'etre refute serieusement  Au
surplus, je ne vols pas a quel titre les Americains formeraient des
pretensions sur les terrains qui bordent le lac Ontario. Ou ces
terrains appartiennent au sauvages, ou ils sont une dependance du

130 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
evidently had reason for suspicion of the hostility of
France toward the westward extension of the United States.
"This court," he wrote in September, 1782, "as well as
Spain will dispute our extension to the Mississippi 
Dr. Franklin does not see the conduct of this court in the
light I do."*^ Franklin, indeed, could not bring himself to
share Jay's well-grounded suspicions of the French govern
ment.*" Livingston, likewise, though aware of Spanish
designs on the West, did not believe that the French min
ister was opposed to the expansion of the United States."
Jay was convinced that France would oppose this extension
and the free navigation of the Mississippi by the United
States, and believed, moreover, that she would support
British claims to the Northwest.**
On September 9, shortly after receiving Rayneval's
memoir, Jay learned of the departure of its author for
England. He suspected that the purpose of the French
man's mission was to impress Shelburne with the deter
mination of Spain to possess the exclusive navigation
of the Mississippi, and to suggest a partition of the
West which would satisfy both Spain and England,
leaving the territory north of the Ohio to the latter power.*"
On September 10, the American commissioners learned
of an intercepted dispatch, written by Marbois, secretary of
the French legation at Philadelphia, advising that the
Canada. Dans I'un ou I'autre cas, les Etats-Unis n'y ont aucun droit.
Mais je connais, monsieur, toute 1' extravagance des pretensions et
des vues americaines."
'^ Sparks, op. cit, Ylll, 126.
" Moore, op. cit, V, 687. Sparks thought Jay was mistaken in his
suspicions' of the French government. Dip. Corresp. of Am. Rev.,
VIII, 208-212; but the evidence in the third volume of Circourt's
work shows that he was not.
" Morton, op. cit, John P. Branch Hist Papers, I, No. IV, 321. ,
" Sparks, op. cit, VIII, 160.
" For Rayneval's mission to England, see Circourt, op. cit. III, 38
et seq. His purpose was to "sound" the British government on the
conditions on which peace would be made with Spain, and particu
larly to urge the surrender of Gibraltar. Not much was really said
about the American boundaries, ibid., 46.

THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE WEST. 131
United States be excluded from a share in the fisheries.*'
This further aroused Jay, and he took a very important
step.*' Without Franklin's knowledge, he induced Ben
jamin Vaughan to return to England, in order to counter
act influences which he believed were being brought to bear
on Shelburne, to suggest a separate negotiation between
England and the United States, and to show the premier
that it was England's interest to break the French-Amer
ican alliance.** Jay told Vaughan that the right of the
United States to the West was proved by charters and
"other acts of government." He declared himself ready
to treat without prior acknowledgment of American inde
pendence, provided Oswald should receive a commission
in which his country was referred to as the thirteen United
States of America. This meant, of course, an abandonment
of the instructions of Congress. Jay stood alone, for even
now Franklin refused to believe that the destinies of the
United States were not safe in Vergennes' hands."
The information brought by Vaughan showed Shelburne
that what he hoped for had come to pass : differences had
arisen between France and the United States. The altera
tions in Oswald's commission necessary to meet Jay's
requirements were quickly made, and a new one, authorizing
him to treat with commissioners of the United States of
America, was sent on September 24'" and received early
in October.'^
Formal negotiations without the knowledge of the French
minister were immediately begun between Oswald and the
"Ibid., II, 226-227.
"Winsor, Narrative and Critical History of America, VII, 121-122.
"For the Vaughan mission, see Sparks, op. cit, VIII, 165 et seq.;
Fitzmaurice, op. cit. III, 267. John Fiske, Critical Period, ch. I,
considers this the crucial point in the negotiations. Fitzmaurice
thinks that from this point on Jay predominated over Franklin, Life
of Shelburne, III, 258.
" Moore, op. cit, V, 687.
"Townshend to Oswald, 24 Sept., 1782, Bancroft MSS., Peace
Negotiations. "^ Oswald to Townshend, 2 Oct., 1782, Bancroft MSS., Peace
Negotiations. For this commission to Oswald see Sparks, op. cit.,
X, 80-83. 10

132 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
American commissioners,'" for Franklin agreed to disre
gard his instructions so far as to conduct separate negotia
tions with the British government, though he continued to
believe in the candor of Vergennes. On October 8 a series
of articles was agreed upon by Oswald and the Americans,"
less than a week after Congress had solemnly resolved that
it would listen to no propositions for peace, unless they were
discussed "in confidence and in concert" with the French
government.'* Franklin feared that these articles would not
be satisfactory to the British government and this proved
to be the case. The boundaries and the West were not so
troublesome as the fisheries, treatment of the loyalists, and
debts in America due British creditors. Oswald, though
a man of intelligence and considerable information, was no
match as a diplomat for the American commissioners. His
handling of the Canada question had been anything but
diplomatic. Instead of making the most of Rodney's great
victory in May, as a means of securing better terms for
England, he had made the astonishing statement that she
must have peace, that her enemies might do as they pleased,
but it was hoped that they would show magnanimity.'"
Much opposition to him was expressed in Shelburne's cabi
net, where Richmond and Keppel, leaders of the party
which was less inclined to peace, were especially bitter
against him.'" Nevertheless, he was retained by the min
istry. Henry Strachey, however, was sent to join him as
an additional envoy.
The repulse of the Spanish and French forces at Gibral
tar in September naturally caused the English to expect
more favorable terms. Strachey, therefore, was to induce
" Wharton, op. cit, V, 748.
" Ibid., 805 et seq.
" Sparks, op. cit, X, 87-88.
"^ Wakeman, op. cit., 75. Viscount Stormont, in criticizing the
negotiations, declared that Oswald was outmatched by any one of the
American commissioners, and described him as "a very extraordi
nary geographer and politician," Parliamentary History of England,
XXIII, 397.
" Moore, op. cit, V, 640 ; Rousseau, op. cit, 486.

THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE WEST. 1 33
the Americans to modify their demands, and to urge Eng
land's claims to the trans-Alleghany country." Shelburne
may have felt that he had been too precipitate in conceding
Franklin's "necessary" articles, he may have believed it
politic to seem to abandon the West only as a great con
cession to the United States or he may have come to feel
that the relinquishment of the whole West was too great
an apparent surrender. There is preserved among his
papers a letter written to him by an American Tory, which
was received in September, pointing out the importance of
the West, and saying that the cession of the Northwest to
the United States would deprive England of the peltry
trade, and render the part of Canada which was retained
of small value." At any rate, after the articles of October
8 had been rejected and Strachey dispatched to Paris, Shel
burne took strong ground against the American claims to
the West. "Independently of all the nonsense of charters,"
he wrote to Oswald, "I mean when they talk of extending
as far as the sun sets, the soil is and has always been
acknowledged to be the King's." He suggested that the
back lands might be used as a fund to compensate the loyal
ists for their losses. The commissioners later wrote to
Livingston that the question of the West was discussed at
length, and that the British commissioners advanced argu
ments for the retention of the whole province of Quebec
as established by the act of 1774.^"°
About the time Strachey reached Paris, another of the
American peace commissioners, John Adams, arrived to
participate in making the treaty. Adams came fresh from
a diplomatic triumph at the Hague, where he had succeeded
in negotiating a treaty between the United States and Hol
land. Jay told him what he firmly believed, that France
was not playing fair, and that it was her policy to give her
Bourbon ally the West, the Mississippi, and the whole Gulf
" Fitzmaurice, op. cit. III, 281.
"Lieutenant-Colonel Connolly to Shelburne, endorsed September,
1782, Bancroft MSS., Peace Negotiations.
" Shelburne to Oswald, 21 Oct., 1782 ; ibid.
""Sparks, op. cit, X, 117.

134 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
of Mexico. He at once sided with Jay and refused to con
sider that the instructions of Congress bound himself and
his colleagues in all respects to the will of the French min
isters.^"^ In his opinion the instructions should be inter
preted by "such restrictions and limitations as reason,
necessity, and the nature of things demand."^"" There is
not much doubt that a strict adherence to the letter of the
instructions would have meant the loss of the West for the
United States. Any designs which Spain might have
formed for the acquisition of territory in America would be
strengthened rather than weakened by the repulse which had
recently been inflicted upon her forces before Gibraltar. It
was now, indeed, out of her power to secure the recovery
of that fortress, and she might reasonably be expected to
look elsewhere for compensation. If the American com
missioners were to secure the West and the Mississippi, "the
nature of things" demanded a separate treaty with Great
Britain. They must not be hampered by constant communi
cation with a government which was supporting the policy
of Spain and was hostile to the object they had in
view. "Had I not violated the instructions of Congress,"
Jay wrote, "their dignity would have been in the dust."^"'
That Vergennes was opposed to the extension of the
United States to the Mississippi has been shown. The
ultimate policy of the French government respecting Amer
ica is difficult to determine. Vergennes' position was not
easy. France was at the head of a heterogeneous alliance,
and was feeling severely the burdens imposed by the war.
She needed peace. There was a feeling in Parisian circles
that she had been duped by her allies^"* and that they would
win the rewards which her exertions had made possible.
She had agreed to further the territorial policy of Spain,
'"' Sparks, op. cit., VI, 437.
"' For Adams' "Journal of the Peace Negotiations," see Wharton,
op. cit, V, 845 et seq.
™ Wharton, op. cit.;V, 810.
"'Fitzherbert to Grantham, 3 Oct., 1782, Bancroft MSS., Peace
Negotiations.

THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE WEST. 1 35
and Spain was opposed to the possession of the West by
the United States and was clamoring for exclusive control
of the Mississippi. Vergennes' attitude can be explained
without assuming that he had any designs on the West for
his own country. But he was not the statesman in whose
hands Congress should have placed the destinies of the
United States.""
Another and radical view of French policy has been
advanced in a striking article by Mr. F. J. Turner.^"" He
calls attention to a document written in 1777, the authen
ticity of which, however, is doubtful. It is entitled
"Memoire Historique et Politique sur la Louisiane," and
was written "par M. de Vergennes." If really written by
the French minister, it would prove that he had in mind
the reestablishment of the colonial empire of France. In
the "Memoire" it is stated that the United States cannot
rightfully claim the trans-Alleghany country on the basis of
colonial charters, and it is proposed that Great Britain be
obliged to restore to France at the close of the Revolution
all the conquests she had made in the Seven Years' War,
This revived colonial empire would involve the retrocession
by Spain to France of Louisiana west of the Mississippi,
a result which Vergennes actually tried to bring about.^"'
It will be noticed, too, that the contention of the "Memoire"
respecting the invalidity of American claims to the West
is in harmony with Rayneval's memoir, and Vergennes'
views referred to above. Mr. Turner considers the subse
quent conduct of Vergennes, after the date of the
"Memoire," as "entirely consistent" with the view that he
was its author, and thinks that his anxiety to forward the
interests of Spain between the Mississippi and the Alle
ghanies becomes more intelligible if we suppose that he
expected France to supplant that power in the interior of
'"For a temperate view of Vergennes' part in the peace negotia
tions, see McLaughlin, The Confederation and the Constitution, chs.
I and IL
™"The Policy of France towards the Mississippi Valley in the
Period of Washington and Jefferson," Am. Hist. Rev., X, 249 et seq.
""Ibid., 254.

136 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
North America. From this point of view, De la Balme's
abortive attempt on Detroit^"* becomes part of a compre
hensive scheme of French policy. Mr. Turner thinks that
Napoleon's efforts to reconstruct a French colonial empire
in America were along the lines planned by Vergennes.
His supposition regarding the latter's ultimate policy
is, however, conjectural. By the treaty of 1778, it
should be remembered, the king of France renounced for
ever, the possession of any territory in North America then
or previously belonging to Great Britain. Whatever the
ultimate policy of Vergennes may have been, his immediate
intention certainly was to prevent the acquisition of the
West by the United States.
Although in October, 1782, Shelburne showed a disposi
tion to retain the West, he was not inclined to let the
boundary question wreck the negotiations and lose the
advantages which would come from a separate peace with
the United States. After much deliberation and discussion
a provisional treaty was signed at Paris on November 30,'^°°
by which the West, from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi,
and from the Great Lakes to the 31st degree, north latitude,
was secured by the United States. The American commis
sioners who participated in making the treaty were Jay,
Franklin and Adams. Laurens arrived just in time to sign
it. Jefferson did not go to France at all. This territory
was not ceded to the United States, but was recognized as
included within their boundaries. To save the conscience
of the American commissioners, and to give them a technical
defense against France, these provisional articles were "to
be inserted in and to constitute the Treaty of Paris," but
the treaty was not to be concluded till England and France
made peace."" On December 5, the king's speech
announced to Parliament that a provisional treaty had been
made with the American commissioners .^^^
'"Supra, ch. VI.
"" Wharton, op. cit, VI, 96 et seq.
"° Fitzmaurice, op. cit. III, 302.
'" Par. Hist of Eng., XXIII, 206.

THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE WEST. 1 37
On November 29, Franklin wrote Vergennes that pre
liminary articles had been agreed upon with the British com
missioners."" The French minister was naturally surprised.
He felt that the American commissioners in violating their
instructions had acted towards France in a manner both
boorish and dishonorable.^^' He does not appear, however,
to have been displeased that the terms were so favorable
to the United States. ^^* Franklin admitted that he and his
colleagues had neglected a point of "bienseance," but
asserted that they had concluded nothing that was preju
dicial to France.*^" The truth is that the American com
missioners and the Enghsh government had stolen a march
on the Bourbon courts.
Historians have been puzzled to account for the very
favorable terms secured by the Americans. So far as
the acquisition of the West was concerned, the Ameri
can claims, based upon colonial charters or the right
of succession of the United States collectively to the
sovereignty over the West previously vested in the British
crown, probably counted for as little as theoretical claims
usually do. Laughed at by European statesmen, they can
not explain why Shelburne's government abandoned the
domain which England had wrested from France a few
years before.
Another explanation has appealed strongly to a large
number of writers. Clark's conquest and the establishment
of Virginia government in the Northwest have frequently
been pointed to as the decisive factor in the winning of
that territory. Clark has been metamorphosed into a con
scious empire-builder, and the state of Virginia represented
as possessing in 1782 the entire territory from Lake
Superior to the southern boundary of Kentucky.^^" Indeed,
in the opinion of some of his contemporaries, Clark's work
"" Complete Works of Benjamin Franklin, Bigelow's ed., VIII, 213.
"' Moore, op. cit, V, 654.
"' Sparks, op. cit, X, 120.
"' Com. Works of Franklin, Bigelow's ed., VIII, 228, 234.
"'Fiske, Crit Period, 18; Lodge, The Story of the Revolu
tion: New York, 1903, 337.

138 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
was an argument of great importance in favor of Amer
ican claims to the Northwest.^^' But if this were really the
case, we should surely encounter frequent mention of that
work and the establishment of Virginia government in Ilh
nois in the documents relating to the peace negotiations.
This we do not find. It may be that the American com
missioners intentionally refrained from referring to what
had been done in the Northwest, for, as we have seen in
the preceding chapter, the fair hopes aroused by Clark's con
quest in 1778 had been dissipated, and Virginia's govern
ment in Illinois had utterly collapsed. The Americans in
1782 could scarcely with good grace argue the principle of
"uti possidetis" as ground for claiming that territory.^^*
When we turn to the diplomatic situation confronting
Shelburne, we find a more satisfactory explanation of his
compliance with the American demands concerning the
West. In Europe, France, Spain and Holland were at war
with England. It was, of course, very much to his interest
to make a speedy peace with the United States, which
would place his government in a better position respecting
its European enemies, and at the same time break the
French-American alliance. We have seen how eager he
was to open discussion with Franklin, how readily he
accepted the latter's "necessary" articles, and how com
pliantly he met Jay's advances for a separate negotiation.
He was willing to concede much for the sake of peace, and
the American commissioners stood firm on the Mississippi
"' Rowland, op. cit, I, 365.
"'Mr. Van Tyne naively argues thus, American Revolution,
284: "These posts [Vincennes, Cahokia, and Kaskaskia] were
sufficient to insure the American hold upon the Northwest, until, in
the peace negotiations of 1782, the military prowess of Clark was
followed up by the diplomatic triumph of Jay. Although no mention
of Clark's work is found among the papers of the diplomats, yet the
fact of possession must have had weight." The italics are mine. Mr.
Van Tyne's statement is, of course, a mere conjecture. It would
be indeed strange if the decisive factor in causing Great Britain to
abandon the Northwest were not referred to in any of the documents.
As a matter of fact, by 1782, the "American hold upon the North
west" amounted to nothing.

THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE WEST. 1 39
boundary. To them, even more than to him, a separate
treaty was of vital importance. In a general treaty it is
difficult to see how they could have secured the West, to
say nothing of other advantages; and from the point of
view of later development, the acquisition of the West was,
next to independence, the most important provision of the
treaty. To Jay belongs the chief credit for putting in
motion the train of events which ended in the attainment
of this object. He deserves to be called, as John Adams
called him, the hero of the negotiations.^^' Of Spanish
designs on the Mississippi, Oswald, and, no doubt, Shel
burne, believed that they had evidence, and the premier
probably felt that a separate treaty which would give up
the West to the United States was preferable to a general
treaty which would abandon it to Spain.
There remains another consideration to explain the relin
quishment of Illinois and the rest of the West by Great
Britain. To me it seems the decisive factor in the case.
The enjoyment and monopolization of the peltry trade was
the leading object which Great Britain sought through her
possession of that territory. In this purpose she had failed.
Her chief motive for holding the country no longer
existed. In a debate in the House of Lords in February,
1783, critics of the peace asserted that by the boundaries
conceded to the United States Great Britain had lost the
fur trade.^"' Shelburne, defending the treaty which his
ministry had made, pointed out that the fur trade was not
abandoned, but only divided. He placed the annual imports
from Canada to England at only £50,000, and declared that
the preservation of this import of £50,000 had cost England
£800,000.^"^ Secretary Townshend declared in the Com
mons that the possession of the Northwest had not been
profitable."" "Suppose," said Shelburne, "the entire fur
trade sunk into the sea, where is the detriment to this

"' Sparks, op. cit, VI, Soi.
'^Par. Hist of Eng., XXIII, 377, 381.

"¦ Ibid., 409.
-''/6i<f.,46s.

140 TRANSITION IN ILLINOIS.
country? Is £50,000 a year imported in that article
any object for Great Britain to continue a war of which
the people of England by their representatives have declared
their abhorrence?" Great Britain abandoned only that
which it was unprofitable for her to retain.

APPENDIX.

A LIST OF THE SOURCES AND SECONDARY WORKS
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142 APPENDIX.
Butterfield, C. W. — History of George Rogers Clark's Conquest
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APPENDIX. 143
Fiske, J. — The American Revolution, 2 vols. Boston and New
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144 APPENDIX.
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